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FROM BAL-I-JIBRIL: THIRTEEN GHAZALS

Translation A. A. Shah

میری نوائے شوق سے شور حریمِ ذات میں
اگر کج رَو ہیں انجم، آسماں تیرا ہے یا میرا
گیسوئے تاب دار کو اور بھی تاب دار کر
اثر کرے نہ کرے، سُن تو لے مِری فریاد
کیا عشق ایک زندگیِ مستعار کا
پریشاں ہوکے میری خاک آخر دل نہ بن جائے
خودی وہ بحر ہے جس کا کوئی کنارہ نہیں
یہ پیام دے گئی مجھے باد صبحگاہی
ضمیر لالہ مئے لعل سے ہوا لبریز
اک دانش نورانی اک دانش برہانی
وہی میری کم نصیبی وہی تیری بے نیازی
اپنی جولان گاہ زیر آسمان سمجھا تھا میں
یا رب یہ جہاں خوب ہے لیکن

میری نوائے شوق سے شور حریمِ ذات میں

1. A blaze is raging near His Throne
   By my strains that burn like flames:
   The cries of 'Mercy'! rise aloft
   From the Temple of His Names.

2. Houris and Angels all alike
   My soaring thought can keep in hold:
   The moulds in which Thou dost reveal
   Get ruffled by my glances bold.

3. In my search and quest for Thee
   Clois ers and Kirks I did design,
   But my groans and woeful wails
   Can shake the founds of fane and shrine.

4. There were times when my vision sharp

Pierc'd the heart and core of life:

Time again it fell short of mark

By mine inner doubts and strife.

5. I was the only secret veil'd,

In Nature's womb in latent form,

When I was brought to light for show,

What a wonder Thou didst perform !

II

اگر کج رَو ہیں انجم، آسماں تیرا ہے یا میرا

1. If the stars from their courses turn.
Is the sky mine or Thine?

Why need I bother for this world?

Is this world Thine or mine?

2. Where lies the blame,

O Mighty Lord! If Void's shore is free

From Life's tumultuous roar:

Is the Void Thine or mine?

3. Why that Fiend held his homage back,

On Creation's Early Morn?

How can I let Thee know: is he

In my Counsels or in Thine?

4. Mohammad, Gabriel and Kuran,

No doubt, to Thee belong;

But its numbers sweet and fine whose

Thoughts expound: mine or Thine?

5. It is the blaze of this clay-born star

That makes the world so bright.

If this earthly star suffer'd blight,

Whose loss is it: mine or Thine?

گیسوئے تاب دار کو اور بھی تاب دار کر

Make your ringlets still more coiled and curled:

Let darts carrying death and ruin on all be hurled.

It suits not that Love and Beauty both be veiled:

Either You reveal yourself or let me be unveiled.

You are an ocean deep and I a river small:

Make me the ocean strong and let my waters in

You fall. I am a common shell; on

You depends my worth:

Change this piece of clay into a gem of noble birth.

Though fated not to share the joys of spring,

Let this birdie mute and dumb, the advent of April sing.

What for you drove me from Eden's gate?

The cares of life are unending, long now You must wait.

On the day of Reckoning, when my sin-charged scroll is brought,

Have pity on this sinner and let him with shame be fraught.

IV

اثر کرے نہ کرے، سُن تو لے مِری فریاد

1. O Lord, hearken to my woeful wail,

Though it may move or it may fail.

This bold and unfettered wight Begs

Thee not to do the right.

2. Thou hast put this speck of dust

Midst deep abyss and raging gust.

Is thine fondness for creation

An act of mercy or oppression?

3. The red rose, with its lovely dome,

Found its bed no lasting home. Is this the spring in its prime?

Is this the livening wind and clime?

4. In me there runs a streak of sin,

I am a stranger to this inn;

But hosts of heaven with all their might

Could not set this Chaos right.

5. This world of Thine on its shaking founds,

Lay bare, with unbroken grounds.

It is indebted to my love for toil

That has adorned and peopled its soil.

6. The orchard that has no danger,

Where lies no ambushed hunter,

Ill sorts with the dauntless mind

Which is to risks and hazards blind.

7. The lofty state of passions strong

Is out of the grasp of angels' throng:

Only they retain it in their hold,

Who much can dare and eke are bold.

V

کیا عشق ایک زندگیِ مستعار کا

1. What can the love of man avail,
   Whose life like glass is short and frail:
   How can a mortal's love accord
   With God, the Everlasting Lord?

2. The love whose heat and flame are lost
   With Death's single icy blast,
   To suspense and fret has no claim,
   Like the love that is all aflame.

3. My strength and reach are no more
   Than a moment's breath and roar:
   How can a faint and tiny spark
   With 'Blazing Flame' on war embark?

4. First of all, on me bestow
A deathless life with constant glow,
And Thou wilt see the zeal and zest
Of restless heart within my breast.

5. A thorn within my breast infix
To make me feel its prods and pricks:
I pray Thee, Lord, to me impart
A ceaseless pain, an endless smart

VI

پریشاں ہوکے میری خاک آخر دل نہ بن جائے

1. My scattered dust charged with love
The shape of heart may take at last:
O God, the grief that bowed me then,
May press me low as in the past!

2. The maids of Eden by their charm.
May arouse my urge for song:
The flame of love that burns in me,
May fire the zeal of Celestial Throng!

3. The pilgrim's mind can dwell at times,
On spots and stages left behind:
My heed for spots and places crossed,
From the quest may turn my mind!

4. By the mighty force of love,
I am turned to Boundless deep:
I fear that my self-regard,
Me, for aye, on shore may keep

5. My hectic search for aim and end,
In life that smell and hue doth lack,
May get renown like lover's tale,

Who riding went on litter's track!

6. The rise of clay-born man hath struck
The Hosts of Heaven with utter fright:
They dread that this fallen star,
To moon may wax with fuller light!

VII

خودی وہ بحر ہے جس کا کوئی کنارہ نہیں

1. The Self of man is ocean vast,
And knows no depth or bound:
If you take it for a stream,
How can your mind be sound?

2. The magic of this whirling dome
We can set at naught:
Not of stones but of glass

Its building has been wrought.

3. In holy trance in Self we drown,
And up we rise again;
But how a worthless man can show
So much might and main?

4. Your rank and state cannot be told
By one who reads the stars:
You are living dust, in sooth,
No: rul'd by Moon or Mars.

5. The maids of Ed'n and Gabriel eke
In this world can be found,
But alas! you lack as yet
Glances bold and zeal profound.

6. My craze has judg'd aright the bent
Of times wherein I am born:

Love be thank'd for granting me

The gown entire and untorn.

7. Spite of Nature's bounty great,

Its grudging practice, mark!

It grants the ruby reddish hue,

But denies the heat of spark.

VIII

یہ پیام دے گئی مجھے باد صبحگاھی

1. A message in my ears was poured

Early by the wind of morn

That one who knows the worth of Self

Is as free as a noble-born.

2. It is the source and fount of life

And keeps up Honour's flame:

If blest with it, you are a king:

If b'reft, a prey to shame.

3. O sage, your teachings do not yield

A clue to aim or goal;

But you are not Devout or Saint,

So you are not to blame.

4. The dauntless free, who well can play

The regal mode and part,

Is still unripe and raw in my

Realm of poetic art.

5. These problems fine and intricate

Can lead to brawls and strife:

Do what you will and like, but I

Vote not for cloistered life.

6. This world is not your destined end,

Your goal and aim is high:

Your sojourn here is for your good

And will lift you to the sky.

7. Your recital that there is no

God but He, Whatever your race and land,

If not attested by your heart,

Is like a print on sand.

IX

ضمیر لاله مئے لعل سے هوا لبریز

By dint of spring the poppy cup

With vintage red hath overflown:

With her advent the hermit too

Temperance to the winds hath thrown.

When great and mighty force of Love,

At some place its flag doth raise,

Beggars dressed in rags and sack

Become heirs true to King Parvez.

Antique the stars and old the dome

In which they roam and move about:

I long for fresh and virgin world, Where my mettle I can prove.

The stir and roar of Judgement Day Hath no dread for me at all:

Thine roving glance doth work on me Like the Last Day's Trumpet call.

Snatch not from me the blessing great of sighs heaved at early morn:

With a casual loving look

Weaken not thine fierce scorn.

My sad and broken heart disdains

The spring and dower that she brings:

Too Joyous the song of nightingale

I feel more gloomy when it sings.

Unwise are those who tell and preach,

"Accord with times and the age:"

"If the world befits thee not,

A war against it thou must wage.

X

اک دانش نورانی اک دانش برهانی

One lore can set the heart aglow,

Another rests on reasoning skill:

Learning gained by means of head

Leaves a man bewildered still.

This earthly frame one object holds

And it too belongs to thee:

To keep it back from lusts of flesh

Is a charge too hard for me.

If my plaints have reached the stars,

Why lay the blame entire to me:

It was my yearning great for Thee

That stirr'd my fiery minstrelsy.

Why repeat the image twice

If it bore a flaw at first?

Dost Thou like that Man must be

Cheap and worthless like the dust ?

The West in me has instilled

The germs of doubt and unbelief:

Why are the Mullahs of this age

For Faith a cause of shame and grief.

Might enough has man as yet

To pit against what Fate ordains:

Fools, in sooth, are they who think

That Man is held by Chance in chains.

Thou dost hold thy idols dear And

I no less my gods adore:

Both of us have earthly pets

That live for short and are no more.

XI

وهی میری کم نصیبی وهی تیری بے نیازی

Mine ill luck the same and same,

O God, the coldness on Your part:

No useful aim has been served

By my skill in poetic art!

Where am I and where are you,

Is the world a fact or naught?

Does this world to me belong,

Or is a wonder by you wrought?

The precious moments of my life

One by one have been snatched,

But still the conflict racks my brain,

"If heart and head are ever matched."

A hawk forgetful of its breed,

Upbrought and fed in midst of kites,

Knows not the wont and way of hawks:

And cannot soar to mighty heights.

For song no tongue is set apart,

No claim to tongues is laid by me:

What matters is a dainty song,

No matter what its language be.

Faqr and Kingship are akin,

Though at odds may these appear:

One wins the heart with single glance,

The other rules with sword and spear.

Some have left the caravan train,

And some on Kaaba turn their back,

For Leaders of this Faithful Band,

Winsome mode and manners lack.

XII

اپنی جولان گاہ زیر آسمان سمجھا تھا میں

I thought my field of play to be

On earth below the whirling dome:

The toy from mud and water wrought

Methought to be my world and home.

The display of Thy charms hath broke

The spell that erstwhile bound my view:

Ah, my folly deep and great!

For sky I took a mantle blue.

The worn and weary Caravan

Was lost in twirls and twists of space:

The Sun, the Moon and Mars I thought

Were my comrades in the race.

The stretch that seemed to have no end

By Love was traversed in a bound:

Sans end or marge to me did seem

The sky above and earth beneath.

My ardour, though I watched it close,

The secret of my love reveal'd:

It proved to be a mode of plaint,

Though I kept my grief conceal'd.

The cry of anguish raised by one

Left behind by Travellers' Band

Struck me as the call of guides,

"Depart, depart to distant land!"

XIII

یا رب یہ جہاں خوب ھے لیکن

Oh God, this changing world of

Thine Is, no doubt, superb and fine;

But why the people do despise

The true, the honest and the wise?

Though the rich and bankers' band

In His Godhead have a hand,

Yet the men with full accord

Hold the Man of West as Lord.

Thou dost not grant a blade of grass

To men with talents high, alas!

The Man of West with generous hand

Bestows on fools squares of land.

With meat and wine like ruby red

The Faithful Fold at Church is fed:

There is nothing in the Mosque,

But sermons dry and painful task.

The Laws of God are true and plain,

But when our scholars do explain,

They give the Text such twist and bend

Which makes the laws abstruse as Pzand.

The Heaven for the pure and clean

None alive as yet has seen,

But every hamlet in the West

Is more like Eden at its best.

For years on end my thoughts have dwelt

On problems which by man are felt; I beg

Thee, God, to shut them soon

Beyond this world in caves of Moon.

God to me such traits did grant

Which in angels he did plant:

Though born of dust and clay I be,

Yet of links with earth am free.

The Dervesh with God's love replete

No kinship claims with West or East:

To Spahan, Delhi or Somercand

I do not trace my native land.

I utter what is true and right

Without the thought of fear or fright:

The fool of Mosque I am not,

Am nor the child of Western thought

Friends and foes are all alike

In contempt for me and dislike:

For I could never honey call

What is bitter like the gall.

A man with wisdom and insight

Who loves the truth and loves the right,

By mistake will not take at all

A mound of filth for Damawand tall.

The flames of fire by Nimroud lit.

Make me not complain a bit;

For a Muslim firm and true

Crackles not like the seed of rue.

Broad mind and clement heart I own,

Wish well to all, on none I frown:

Though in chains, my heart is free,

Devoid of wealth, yet full of glee.

My heart is free and on the spree,

No matter what my state may be:

No one can by force or guile

Divest the bud of pleasant smile.

Iqbal, no doubt, was blunt and bold,

His peace before God he could not hold:

Would, some had bid this ill-bred slave

To hold his tongue and not to rave!

IQBAL AT A COLLEGE RECEPTION IN LAHORE

Qazi Muhammad Aslam

I studied for M. A. Philosophy at Government College, Lahore, during the years 1921-23. Professor G. C. Chatterji our brilliant teacher (St. Stephens, Delhi and Trinity, Cambridge) had then just returned from abroad and taken charge of the M. A., class at G. C., which had been suspended or abolished since L. P. Saunders (1911-14) had left G. C., seven years earlier. Saunders himself had relieved Iqbal of his professorship at G. C. I had come to Lahore with a B. A., from Aligarh and from Aligarh I had brought with me a copy of Secrets of the Self, Nicholson's English translation of Iqbal's Asrar-i-Khudi.

Students including Muslim students of our generation; knew Iqbal largely through hearsay, to a lesser extent through direct reading. During a visit to Lahore I had listened to one of his public recitations at the Himayat-i-Islam and had read some of his longer poems then available in print. Whether we understood much or little of Iqbal, there was no doubt we were all proud of Iqbal, great Indian and great Muslim, leader, scholar, poet, and philosopher.

I returned to college from the 1921 winter recess at Amritsar on New Year's day. The newspapers carried the New Year's Honour list. I had barely looked at it in the Civil and Military Gazette when I found that Iqbal had been knighted. It delighted

and even thrilled me. Thinking was in Hindu-Muslim terms. Muslims had to hear criticism issued from Hindu quarters that Muslims were backward in everything, in brains, in business, in the professions, in the services and so on. But here and there evidence cropped up and it was very welcome that Muslims were not so backward after all, that they had brains and professional and managerial gifts, and intellectual gifts sometimes of a very high order. The most outstanding example was Iqbal, Muslim barrister who wrote poetry and pursued philosophy as his hobbies, and who had been chosen now by a Western scholar for projection upon the Western intellectual scene. Iqbal proved that Muslims were not backward. Given the chance to express or assert they could give an excellent account of themselves. Iqbal's verse proved that if Muslims lacked riches or education or social and political importance, they more than made up by their rich past and their promise of a rich future.

It was good Iqbal had been chosen for the honour of a knight-hood. The British conferred this honour on their own distinguished men. Iqbal was not in politics, nor in any other field the British might wish to reward for imperialist ends. Iqbal's knighthood was a recognition of his intellectual gifts. Occasionally such recognition was present in Honours lists produced by the British. Iqbal had been knighted for his eminence as a poet and thinker and for his significance for Muslim Indian, Muslim Asian and Muslim world culture. When the college reopened our small class of 4 or 5 or 6 Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Sikh students talked about it and without" any effort the decision came that

students of philosophy at G. C., l grouped in the Brett Philosophical Society should hold a reception in,' honour of Dr. (now Sir) Muhammad Iqbal, old G. C. student and professor, distinguished Lahore citizen, and Muslim poet and thinker, whom a Western professor and a Western publisher had chosen for the notice of the West. In crude Indian-Hindu-Muslim terms he could be placed next to Rabindra Nath Tagore, higher than Tagore according to some. If Tagore had been chosen for knighthood and for the Nobel prize Iqbal could also be. Office holders of college societies look for such occasions. The principal working officer of the Brett, in those days was the Secretary, generally chosen from out of the B. A., students. The M. A. students were a minority not available or not important for the purpose. Brett Secretary, Kalimur Rahman, belonged to a family well-known in the cultural circles of Lahore. He was joined by Assistant Secretary Manohar Nath Seth, also a B. A., student, liberal and cosmopolitan by temperament. The mechanics of the reception was in the hands of these two: they raised the money, they chose the caterer, they made up the list of the guests to be invited from outside the hosting philosophical circle. They drew up the programme. The date carefully recorded on the group photograph taken on the occasion was late in January 1922. The honour o carrying the invitation of the Brett Society, which meant an invitation by G. C., staff and students functioning through one of their most celebrated societies, went to the M. A., students. We went in a group consisting of myself, Ranjit Singh who, let me record in sorrow, died a young lecturer in Guru Nanak College,

Gujranwala, and Dina Nath, later of Punjab Police. There could be others, Secretary Kalimur-Rahman, for instance, but I do not remember. The poet had shifted from his Anarkali residence to a bungalow on McLeod Road. We called sometime in an the easy afternoon chair, may be with him a newspaper, e verandah sitting his hookah crosslegged conveniently near and dressed in the easiest and simplest of ways, a shirt and shalwar and something woollen. There was no excitement on our arrival. Only, a visit by a group of students-Hindu, Muslim, Sikh—all from his own old G. C., and all students of philosophy meant something. We carried a letter from Professor Chatterji, addressed to Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal Having handed over the letter we did not have to do much. Naturally and easily came the answer. Of course, after necessary inquiries, the answer was yes. The date and time were settled. It was also settled that some of us will come to his house to accompany him to the college. But we were not dismissed soon after. Courtesy and curiosity seemed to intervene. The poet asked us questions. We could not have said much in reply. But he seemed to take us seriously and talked to us as to his equals. One could see there was a big subject on his mind. He revealed some of it at this very meeting, some of it at the reception.

The reception was held in one of the smaller lawns to the west of the college tower. To this we repaired soon after the group photo-graph had been taken by Bali under the well known Indian laburnum which—with its clusters of yellow flowers-has supplied the back-ground of 90% of all G. C., group photographs.

In the photograph can be seen Principal A. S. Hemmy, model of British punctiliousness, who seemed to take a keen interest in our function the equally keen or even keener Professor G. C. Chatterji, head of our department, Professor Ahmad Husain, our only other teacher those days (recently retired at 78 as Principal, Islamia College, Gujranwala), all the M.A., and B.A., students of philosophy and some others. One may see, as indeed in any such photograph may be seen, how some of those who later became important in different walks of life in India and Pakistan looked in their early youth. Also in the photograph may be seen Major Shaikh Fazl Haq whose carefully kept copy of this historic Photograph has been reproduced in this issue of Iqbal Review; also Anwar Sihander Khan who became important in public school administration in West Pakistan.

The reception itself was simple and rational. Tea was served by Lorangs, leading Lahore caterer of the time. Then came the speeches. Only two. One from the college side, the other in reply by Iqbal. There were also recitations from Iqbal. Somehow I had taken charge of the college speech and the recitations. The speech was done by me, for the recitations I asked a friend Kazim Husain, for many years one of the only two or three Muslim members of the faculty of the then Maclagan Engineering College. The recitation (or recitations) came at the end and every one—including Iqbal—enjoyed. Iqbal listened with great dignity, quietly, and somewhat seriously.

As for the college speech. I had written it out and got it up perfectly. A copy of it later went to the Muslim Outlook and was printed verbatim. (Who can now lay hand on this once great Muslim daily published by Maulana Abdul Haq from Bungalow Ayub Shah and edited by a brilliant Muslim Englishman or Anglo-Indian Daud Upson?)

In my speech I had—undersigned--worked on the theme that philosophers differed very much amongst themselves, that philosophy was mostly concerned with defining differences, that students of philosophy had to choose soon enough the philosopher or philosophers they would rather belong to, that their choice depended very much on' the impressions they received from their first readings or their first teachers, that philosophy in short, tended to be personality-dominated. One sentence in my speech ran like this:

Elsewhere there may be Kantians or Hegelians or what not, but we at GC are just Chatterjians!

A key description of my theme and also of how persuasive and popular was our own teacher Chatterji. The speech seemed to have worked well. It raised some laughter. Hemmy and Chatterji were the loudest to laugh. Among the students Ugra Sen later well-known Professor of English Literature sat as chief correspondent of the G,C.,' magazine Ravi. He wrote about it in the Ravi. I cannot say what Iqbal thought of it. Not much, I suppose. Except that it was a welcome speech by a student. But it made me glad to think I had come to his notice.

When Iqbal rose to speak every one adjusted himself, so as not to jmiss a single word out of what he was going to say. Anything that came from the poet's lips was important and had to be listened to with attention. Iqbal did not speak much though. Maybe he was in search of a theme. Before an audience of Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian students and teachers, among them an English Principal, a physicist of some learning, what theme was it best to raise? A completely Muslim theme would not go well with a mixed audience. An Indian theme was hard to invent. A philosophical theme could be tame or tenuous. If there was a search, it was settled by Einstein. Einstein was the rage those days. And Iqbal's interest in Einstein was unusual. In retrospect today, one can say that Iqbal at the time was thinking of what to make of Einstein in philosophy, in higher poetry and in religious experience. Einstein had set new dimensions for philosophical thought and scientific descriptions. No wonder, Iqbal had taken little notice of the speech he had just listened to. He went on to speak about something which, it became quite clear, was very much on his mind. It also became clear that what he was going to say was linked with the conversation he had raised with us when we went to invite him to this GC reception. And in the light of what Iqbal has said and written since (especially in his Reconstruction), we can say that in the 1920's Iqbal was thinking furiously of the philosophy and science of his day and of relating everything important in it to an Islamic world-view reconstructed after his own mind and heart. It is impossible to recall, now aftera bout 50 years, what Iqbal actually said on the occasion. But from

the images which happen to survive I think I could construct his speech in the following way:

My interest in philosophy—the last many years—has centred round the problem of space and time. Our earth and all around it occupies space. It is itself space and moves in space but has its being in time. So at least many of us would say. But how space and time appear to us in our daily experience may not be as they appear to a philosopher or a scientist. Space and time of daily experience may be dismissed as mere appearance. Philosophers have said this since Hegel. But what they are in reality, we have no means of knowing. Nobody knows, therefore there is also the problem of how space and time appear to God. These are problems also for theistic philosophers. And they have thought and speculated about them. In the Muslim scripture—the Holy Quran—there are clear indications that time is important, very important, that there is human time and there is divine time. Divine time is reckoned in a way different from human time. There is also the infinite, unlimited knowledge of God, knowledge without dimensions; without a before and after except perhaps in a sense to be defined carefully; without, that is to say, a sharp distinction between past, present and future.

Muslim mystical poets and thinkers have been attracted to this theme and some of them have expressed themselves in startlingly modern ways. Their modern parallel is the German Professor Albert Einstein who has proved mathematically that our time and space are phenomenal. They may be important phenomenally, but

they are nothing ultimate, nothing in their own right. They are symptoms of a more ultimate reality, to be described in ways very different from the conventional.

Einstein's thought is yet unkown except to mathematicians. Therefore, I have been discussing the subject with professors of mathematics. But they are unable to communicate the meaning Einstein's ideas have for ordinary men and philosophers. In mathematical language, mathematicians tell us, Einstein makes perfect good sense. I believe they are right. But Einstein should make perfect good sense even to the ordinary man and the philosopher. Perhaps not yet I have been studying expositions of Einstein's mathematical work. Everybody says it is startling. And it does seem startling. Exactly what is startling in it, it is not easy to say. My own study of the subject—it is called Relativity—extends over the last many years. I have felt interested in it more and more. For, it seems to bring Islam, the Holy Quran, and the mystics of Islam, on the one hand, and the new physical and mathematical science, on the other, closer together. I have a mind to trace out the two strands and put them together so as to show how significant and how similar they are. The commonsense view of a world of solid matter moving in the stream of time, or of time flowing upon a world of space and solid objects, is not true. It has to change. It is truer to say that space and time are signs of events. The world is made of events. No even can be described in terms of space and time, that is, partly space, partly time, but rather in terms of space and time all at once. We are still able to speak of space and time though. Space has to lose its rigidity and

its status as something ultimate. In any case it is difficult to say which is more important ultimately, space or time? Perhaps time.

I hope I will have another opportunity of meeting you. I should also have time to consider the subject more carefully, also more time talking over and discussing. I may then explain more clearly how mystical religion—at least some mystical thinkers—and modern science are coming closer, trying to say the same thing. The outcome is interesting for every one, for students of religion as well as for students of science.

The speech—Iqbal's speech to the Brett Philosophical Society, Government College, Lahore-was over. Every one looked at every one else and all at Iqbal. A profound effect had been produced. Something very important—something that was yet unfolding—was on the poet's mind. Some of it had found expression; very much more of it was to find expression in its own good time. Iqbal's short speech had been heard by all agog. It was the promise of a longer speech to come. The promise was fulfilled at Madras in Iqbal's famous Lectures on the reconstruction of religious Thought in Islam,

After the speech came the recitations. Kazim Husain had taken charge of these. One piece sung beautifully by Kazim was especially well chosen. Kazim did not live long, He did not live to see all that Iqbal was to become in years to come. And certainly did not live to see Pakistan—Iqbal's conceptual and political child—take birth. So, let this reminiscence serve as a tribute to a

forgotten friend who contributed much to the beauty of this occasion.

This piece I reproduce below from the Bang-i-Dara. It has a Powerful universalist message and it fitted so well into the occasion.

Incidentally, few people realise that Iqbal remained a universalist in his outlook and his thinking even when in politics he changed from an Indian nationalist to a Muslim communalist. For, as a leader of Indian Muslims he continued to argue for his positions not from partisan premises or for partisan ends, but from general premises, for general ends. How much he liked to talk of Asia and Africa and in the same breath! And not of Muslim Asia and Muslim Africa only, but of Asia and Africa as such. By Asia and Africa he meant the back-ward, the down - trodden, the exploited part of the world. The future of this part had to be assured before the future of the world could be assured.

The point is not understood by some of Iqbal's critics especially in India. Indian Muslim communalism was brought to birth by Indian Hindu communalism. But even after it had come to birth, its justification was sought in universalist, humanist terms, in the beauty of variety, in sub-grouping inherent in the political nature of man. This variety, this sub-grouping allowed to grow along healthy lines was bound to organise itself into a rich, meaningful, voluntary unity.

The piece I reproduce below describes the lovers of Iqbal's conception. Iqbal's lovers are devotees of big causes. Wherever found, Iqbal is ready to praise them, to stand up to them and salute them. The piece well-chosen, was as well-received at the Brett reception.

انوکھی وضع ھے سارے زمانے سے نرالے ھیں
یہ عاشق کون سی بستی کے یارب رھنے والے ہیں
علاج درد میں بھی درد کی لذت پہ مرتا ہوں
جو تھے چھالوں میں کانٹے نوک سوزن سے نکالے ہیں
بھلا بھولا رھے یا رب چمن میری امیدوں کا
جگر کا خون دے دے کر یہ بوٹے میں نے پالے ہیں
رلاتی ہے مھے راتوں کو خاموشی ستاروں کی
نرالا عشق ہے میرا نرالے میرے نالے ھیں
نہ پوچھو مجھ سے لذت خانماں برباد رھنے کی
نشین سینکڑوں میں نے بنا کر پھونک ڈالے ھیں
نہیں بیگانگی اچھی رفیق راہ منزل سے
ٹھہر جا اے شرر ھم بھی تو آخر مٹنے والے ھیں
امید حور نے سب کچھ سکھا رکھا ھے داعظ کو
یہ حضرت دیکھنے میں سیدھے سادے بھولے بھالے ہیں
مرے اشعار اے اقبال کیوں پیارے نہ ھوں مجھ کو

مرے ٹوٹے ہوے دل کے یہ درد انگیز نالے ہیں

1, Strange in their ways and different from all the rest! Wherefrom do they come? these lovers, my Lord?

2. Pain I must love, it maybe pain of the wound or pain o the lancet,

The thorns in my wounds I have pulled out with a needle-point.

3. May it ever remain rich and green, this garden of my hopes,

Its tender plants I have watered with the blood of m liver.

4. These still stars, night after night, oh they make me cry! Strange is my love and strange are my love-laments.

5. Ask me not how happy it feels to be without hearth and home, How many nests have I built only to burn away!

6. Eschew not me your fellow-traveller, and Tarry 0 fatas flame, we are doomed alike to destruction.

7. The saint lives on the hope of houries in heaven, His innocence and simplicity are all assumed, all appearance.

8. My couplets, Iqbal, why shouldn't they be dear to me? Mournful laments they, they flow out of a mournful heart.

It only remains to add that Iqbal walked both ways, from his McLeod Road, house to GC and back. We walked with him. An

experience never to be forgotten. Throughout we witnessed an exceptional love of students in a great man. From the moment we went to invite him to the moment we parted with him at his door, he made us feel his equals.

On the subject of Iqbal's interest in students and his simple unassumed kindness towards them it may be mentioned that during a year or so in the late 1930's, a group of students (majority Sikh, 1 think), let by—now the Indian Sikh scholar and leader-Kapur Singh, visited Iqbal, now and then and returned invariably with interesting accounts of these visits. Between them—for a time—they also managed to bring out a Punjabi magazine (in Urdu script) called Sarang. An earlier issue of Sarang carried a full-length interview with Iqbal. The writeup was Kapur Singh's. One of the questions perhaps the main question—discussed was why Iqbal did not write Punjabi. Iqbal's answer was he was not wedded to any language in the creation of his verse. The choice of language depended on the theme to be handled. Iqbal's themes required now Persian, now Urdu, as a vehicle. His famous Lectures he wrote in English. There was no objection to writing Punjabi, therefore. If a theme turned up which required the use of Punjabi, he would write Punjabi.

I know about this because Kapur Singh was then studying for M. A., philosophy and was in almost daily contact with me. He was a brilliant student and passed M.A., a Nanak Bakhsh Medalist of the Punjab University. He entered the ICS but resigned soon after 1947 over some differences. He is very much in politics now.

EXPLANATORY NOTES on the text of the "Kitāb al Tawasin"

On the style of the Tawasin:

As the present text shows us. the style of the Sūfi authors, in the second half of the third century after the Hijra, takes on a character which the works of al Muhasibi and Sahl did not have as yet. I deliberately and constantly uses its whole technical terminology. Bt instead of having the formal and chilling posture of an Ibn I 'Arab setting outworn formulas with a jeweller's artistic talent, it betrays "hyperdialectic" tension, passionate and impetuous, marked wit frequent assonances and a division of the sentences that makes for reciting aloud. These characteristics of the Hallājian style appear for the first time in al Junayd's "authentic opuscules"; this is quit surprising, for al Junayd (+297/910), before this discovery, was regarded a very prudent and discreet mystical author. I give here the first lines of his كتاب دوآء الارواح"[1]

الحمد لله الذى ابان بواضح البرهان، لاهل المعرفة و البيان، ماخصهم به فى قديم القدم، قبل كون القبل حين لا حين و لا حيث و لا كيف و لا ابن، و لا لا حين و لا لا حيث و لا لا كيف ولا لا اين، ان جعلهم اهلا لتوحيد و افراد تجريد، و الدابين

[1] Ms. Shahid 'Ali Pasha 1374, 4th Opuscule of al Junayd.

عن ادعا ادراک تحدیده، مصطنعین لنفسه مصنوعین علی عینه، القی علیهم محة منه له، "و اصطنعتک لنفسی، لتصنع علی عینی، و القیت علیک محبة منی"[2] فاجد اوصاف من صنعه لنفسه و المصنوع علی عینه و الملقی علیه محبة منه له منه له ان لا تستقر له قدم علم علی مکان، و لا موافقة عقل علی استقرار فهم، و لا مناظرة عزم علی تنفیدهم، الذین جرت بهم المعرفة حیث جری بهم العلم[3] الی لا نهایة غایة غایة... هیهات ذاک له ما له به عنده، فابن تذهبون، اماسمعت علم طیبه لما ابداه و کشفه لما ولاه، و اختصاصه لسر الوحی لمن اصطفاه، اوحی الی عبده ما اوحی" ما کذب...[4] بالافق الاءلی، شهد له انه عبده وحده... و لا سبق حق بلفظة، و لا سبق حق بلفظة، و لا سبق اهل الحق بنطقة، و لاروية حظ بلمحة، اوحی الیه حینئذ ما اوحی، هیاه لفهم ما اولاه بما به تولاه و اجتباه لامر، فحمل ما حمل فحمل اوحی الیه حینیذ ما اولاه بما به تولاه و اجتباه لامر، فحمل ما حمل فحمل اوحی الیه حینیذ ما اوحی[5] ...."

Siraj: to the 39th question of al Tirmidhi's Khatam al Awliya "wa mā al 'Aql al Akbar,- alladhi qusimat al 'uqul minhu lijami' khalqihi?" - Ibn I 'Arabi answers: it is al sirāj (Ms. 'Umumi, majmu'ah No. 1).

I-7°.

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[2] . Qur. XX, 43; then 40; then 39.
[3] . Ms. for ~1a71'
[4] Qur. LIII, 11.
[5] Qur. Llll, 10.

This theory of Muhammad's pre-existence[6] seems to have developed very early. Authors of the 4th century after the Hijra give an explicit testimony to this, and it must be admitted that it figured already in the "tafsir" fragments which the Sūfis have preserved under the name of Jā'far Sādiq.[7]

كما قال الصادق "اول ما خلق الله نور محمد صلعم قبل كل شئ، ما وجد الله عزوجل من خلقه ذرة محمد صلعم، و اول من[8] حوى به القلم، لا اله الا الله محمد رسول الله"[9]

The dogmatic development of this proposition is likely to have been the cause of accusations against al Fayyad ibn 'Ali, the author of al Qustas; for having affirmed the "divinity" of Muhammad, some 30 Year before al Hallāj's death.[10] It is possibly also al Fayyad and his group[11] whom al Baghdadi[12] has in mind when he speaks in the following terms of 'a group generically called "Mufawwidah:

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[6] Later summarized in the famous hadith SJ y; awl ja.t,, J JI ", (cf.al Shaharstani II, 125).

[7] These fragments, published by the traditionalist Ibn' Ata (+309/922) in his "Tafsir", were incorporated together with the latter in al Sulami's (+412/1021) "Tafsir" which in its turn was re-edited in al Baqli's "Tafsir".

[8] Sic. .'327.

[9] In al Baqli's "Tafsir" on Qur. XLVIII, 81: Ms. Berlin, f° 335a.

[10] Cf. Mas'udi's and Ibn Hazm's texts, in Friedlander, The Heterodoxies of the Shi'ites, 167.

[11] And perhaps also the author of the Tawāsin.

[12] Farq, ed. in Cairo, 238.

"زعموا ان الله تعالى خلق محمدا ثم فوض اليه تدبير العالم ..."

but the fact that further on 'Ali is being added to God and Muhammad as the "third mudabbir" seems rather to point to a special Shi'ite deformation of the general trend of ideas here under examination. On their side, the Sālimiyah shared al Hallāj's ideas on this point, since al Kilani accuses them of having said that "Muhammad knew the text the Qurān by heart In already before the date on other fragments related which received to the call".[13] In al Hallaj's other fragments related to the Mission of Muhammad[14] the pre-existence theory appears less strongly than in the Tawasin: fragment 155 is however characteristic enough, and quite parallel to the "Tasin al Siraj". Al Sulami, tafsir on Qur. XLVIII, 29:

"سئل الحسين (بن منصور) متى كان محمد صلعم نبيا[15] وكيف جاء برسالته؟"

فقال نحن بعد[16] الرسول والرسالة و النبى والنبوة، اين انت عن ذكر من لا ذاكر له

فى الحقيقة الا هو، و عن هوية من لا هوية له الا بهويته، و اين كان النبى صلعم

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[13] 9th condemned proposition, in Ghunya...I,83-84. Cf. Nusayries. I. c. f° 54a-b and Wasiti and Sayyāri (in Baqli, I. c. on Qur. XXXIII, 56).

[14] Preserved in al Salami's Tafsir (on Qur. III, 138; IV. 103; IX, 43; IX, 129; XLVIII, 29) and in al Baqli's Tafsir (on Qur. XLVIII, 10, fragment 40).

[15] Traditional question. It presupposes the distinction between "nabi" and "rasul", admitted by the Imāmites. denied by the Zahirites (Ibn Hazm) and the Ash'arites. Al Ash'ari's answer was that Muhammad was really "rasul" only at the moment when he received his call (tabsirah, 435).

[16] . Al Baqli adds:

عن[17] نبوتء حيث جرى القلم بقوله تعالى "محمد رسول الله" (Qur. XLVIII, 29) و المكان علة و الزمان علة و الزمان علة، فاين انت عن الحق و الحقيقة و لكن اذا ظهر اسم "محمد" صلعم بالرسالة[18] عطم محله بذكره له بالرسالة فهو الرسول المكين و السفير الامبن، جرى ذكره فى الازل بالتمكين، بين[19] الملائكة و الانبياء عم على اعظم محل و اشرف جمال"

In al Hallāj's thought, Muhammad, being entrusted with the untreated Word (cf. here below I,9, seems to have the twofold generation which the Catholic dogma affirms of Mary, the Mother of the Verbe: pre-eternal conception (Siraj=nabi) and temporal birth (risalah).

From the point of view of the "divine union", al Hallāj did not see it typified in Muhammad, but rather in Moses[20] and most of all in Jesus.[21] Hence, when one day he was urged to comment on Muhammad, he said this[22]

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17 . Ms. Azh. Kopr. 91: as

18 Sic: Kopr. 91; Azh.:

19 Azh., Kopr. 91:.., 338 Cf. here below, p. 163.

20 Of whom he makes the model of perfect life (cf. the very precise analysis of his doctrine in al Istakhri. 1. c p. 135). In this he follows Muhammad Ibn Al' at Hakim al Tirmidhi (+285/898) who had established the superiority of Jesus

21 Khatim al wileiyah" on Muhammad "Khatim al nubuwah" (in khatam al awliyā, quest. 13 and 29; cf. Ibn 'Arabi, Futuhat.., I. 206 etc.) Cf. al 'Ijli's and Ibn Hayit's ideas on Jesus (Shahrastāni, ed. 1317, I, 76 and II, 15). It is a development of the Quranic "Jesus"; the Sufis expected the second coming of Jesus as the triumph of the true Islam (Cf. Abu 'Uthmān al Maghribi, in Sulami's Tafsir on Qur. XIX, 32). A text of al Hallaj (Riwayat ..., trans! by at Baqli, in Shathiyat, Ms. Qadi 'askar, f°144a)

و قال رحم "لولم يبحث محمد عم لم تكمل المحجة على جميع الخلق و كان يرجوا الكفار النجاة من النار و اشد لنفسه، (بسيط)

لم يبق بينى و بين الحق بنيان و لا دليل و لا آيات بهران

هذا تجلى طلوع الحق نائرة قد ازهرت فى تلاليها بسلطان..."

i.e.: if Muhammad had not been sent, the proof would not have been complete ... (But now), "between God and me there is no more in between. It is not any guide,[23] it is not any signs[24] that are a proof of God to me! Behold, the divine flames are rising, radiant, their blazing shine brings me the proof, glistening, majestic!!..."

II-5°[25]

"The meaning of all this is not accessible to him who is idle,-who ruins himself, as a sinner who nurses his desires,-as I do, as I

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depicts the second coming of Jesus commissioned to establish on earth "the Supreme Prayer, the supreme Alms, the Supreme Fast and the Supreme Pilgrimage." For these Sufis "there, will be no other. Mandi than Jesus," according to the hadith reported by al Shafi'i following Bunan (in Malini, who died about 430/1038, "araba'in", Ms. Zahiriyah, XIII, 121).

[22] In Ibn Khamis al Ka'bi, Manaqib.." (320-a-15°); the verses of which I quote here only the first two, figure already in al Kalabadhi's "Ta'arruf", (cf. 143-a-15°).

[23] . A prophet.

[24] . "Ayat" means at the same time "verses" and "miracles".

[25] 11-2°: farash. Cf. hadith, in Sayiyd Murtadha (Ithaf IX, 590-following Asin).

do! And yet, "He" is as I, He is an "I" - do not then go away from me (o my God!) if Thou art "I" . . . ! Al Hallāj here plays upon the double meaning of انا grammatically it means: "it is I", and in philosophy it became the equivalent of Greek "……." (cf. the so-called Theology of Aristotle, ed. Dieterici, 1882, p. 118; its feminine form" "انية", is more common: id. p. 189). Compare with al Hallāj's verse which aroused Nasir al Din al Tusi's admiration:

بینی و بینک "انی" ینازعنی[26]، فادفع بلطفک[27] "انی" من البین

In translation: "Between Thee and me there is an "it is I!", and it tortures me with the pains of hell,-ah! for mercy's sake, remove the "it is I" from in-between us!" so that in my heart there be no "in-between" anymore!"[28],

II-7°.

The word "ghamada al 'ayn 'an al 'ayn" is strictly parallel with Abū 'Amr al Dimishqi's words:[29] "التصوف غض الطرف عن الكون"

II - 8°

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[26] Var.: ';„.>! .;

[27] Var.:

[28] Criticising this verse, Ibn Taimiya (in Tafsiral kawakib, i.e.) notes that it concludes on the demand for fans (annihilation'. But fan& as "fang fi wandat al wujud", or as fang fi tawhid al rububiya 'an wujud al siwa" is impious, and is "fang 'an 'ibadat al siwa" is reserved to the prophets.

[29] In Hujwiri, Kashf al Mahjub, translated by Nicholson, 38.

A parallel passage, taken from another, unnamed work of al Hallāj, is given by al Sulami[30] as a commentary on *al Qur.IX 129*:

"لقد جاء كم رسول من انفسكم" ... قال الحسين (بن منصور) من اجلكم نفسا، و اعلاكم همة، جاء بالكونين عوضا عن الحق، ماينظر الى الملكوت و لا الى السدرة و "مازاغ، بصره عن مشاهدة الحق، و "ما طغى" قلبه عى موفقته،

III - 4°.

We find here only a brief allusion to al Hallāj's theory of the vision Moses had of God on Mount Sinai, according to the Quranic account (VII, 139-140), which afforded the Sūfi vocabulary the term tajalli, i.e. "local transfiguration of the divine omnipresence under the form of a radiance that is visible to the saint."

Al Hallāj developed this theory in certain important passages preserved by al Sulami's Tafsir, fragment 69 (on al Qur. XX, 26; to be compared with the other recension preserve in al Baqli's. Tafsir fragment 22, on al Qur. VII, 139), by his Tabaqat[31], and by Ibn Khamis al K'abi's Manaqib[32] The Sūfis' attention was struck mainly by two points of the Quranic account: l). by the fact that Moses had asked to see God (VII, 139). and 2) by the fact that God had granted his demand, although the Quranic theology says

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30 In Tafsir, Ms. Azhar, Kopr. 91. Copied in Baqli, Tafsir, Ms. Berlin, f° 127a

31 Cf. Bibliogr. (170-a-13°). Compare with Makki, Qut al Qulub II. 66.

32 Cf. Sha'rawi, tabagat...ed. 1305, I, 107; except the piece of verse which is not reproduced.

he is inaccessible. Al Hallāj explained the two points with his theory of the infirad[33]: Moses, while thinking of the unique God, had unified, simplified and separated himself from the created beings to such an extent that God could show Himself to him only in the perfect isolation of his bare unity:

"انفرد [موسى] للحق و انفرد الحق به"

This theory, which is found sketched already in J'afar Sādiq's[34] "Tafsir", took on, in al Hallāj's century, at least two interesting variants: that of al Qāsim al Sayyari's (+342/953) "Tafsir" where Moses, first dazzled, then helped by Jibrāyl and Mikāyl, speaks with God who in the end[35] says to him: "انا اقرب اليک منک" I am closer to you than you yourself" and that of the Sālimiyah which incurred al Kilāni's censure.[36] Abū 'Uthmān al Maghribi (+373/983) who exposed it, explains Moses' being dazzled at the moment of the divine "tajalli" with the fact that at that moment he saw "seventy thousand Sinais" appear before him, - "and on top of each of them seventy thousand Moses, all dressed like him,

[33] Cf. here p. 168. Compare theses on Moses of Hasan Basri, Faris and Abu 'Uthman Maghribi (in Baqli, tafsir, Ms. Berlin, f° 100b, 119a, 222a).
[34] On Qur. XXVIII, 29: extract, through al Sulami, in al Baqli's Tafsir, Ms. Berlin, f° 284b-285a.
[35] In al Baqli, Tafsir, on Qur. XXVIII, 29, Ms. Berlin, 285a.

[36] In Ghunya ..., ed. 1288, t. I, p. 83-84: where there is the number "hundred".

with a staff in their hands like him and speaking the same words."[37]

III - 7°.

Already earlier the Khattābiyah sect seems to have applied to J'afar Sādiq the comparison of the person who is inspired, with the Burning Bush from which rings the voice of God in the same way. Later it is also found with the Druze[38], with reference to the Imām. And again with the Sālimiyah who use it[39] in connection with their theory of the "tilāwah" (recitation of the Qurān) _which seems to go well back to J'afar Sādiq[40], although al Kilāni condemns it as not orthodox.[41]

III - 11°

"(Moses) said: God has made me become reality"....He has testified to my "sirr", but without my "damir". For this is the ".sirr", and that the "reality"!

When saying: God has "testified" to my "sirr", al Hallāj wants to say that God has "realized" it fully, has "personalized" it

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[37] In al Baqli Tafsir, on Qur. VII, 139, Ms. Berlin, f° 100b.
[38] Kitab al Nuqat .... p. 92.
[39] Makki, Qut al Qulub I, 47.
[40] Makki, ibd, ibd.
[41] 10th proposition of his list, in Ghunya ... T, 83-84. Cf. to the contrary Fakhr al Din Razi's theory (khalq fi mahall) on the Burning Bush of Moses "Kallama Musa bi kalam andathahu fi al shajarah" (c.f. Goldziher, in Der Islam, 1912, p.p. 245-247).

definitively. A Hallājian fragment preserved by al Kalābādhi[42] underlines this meaning of the verb "shahada":

"التوحيد افرادک متوحدا، و هو ان يشهدک الحق اياک"

The "tawhid" is that you isolate yourself when pronouncing it, and God may thus give testimony of you to yourself!

As to the difference between "sirr" and "damir": "damir" means that "external" consciousness, that shell of the personal being which is expressed by the pronoun "I"; "sirr", on the other hand, is inside "damir", it is the subconscious, the unpronounceable substratum of the "I"

IV-1.

Here appear for the first time those curious mathematical symbols which al Hallāj uses throughout the "Tawasin" (cf e-l1°,

[42] In " Ta'arruf " (143-a-51°). One sees that for al Hallaj the divine union is not a destruction, but a transfiguration of the personality. The Saint has found his true identity. The word quoted by al Kalabādhi is most noteworthy, it is the key to the word of the dying Hallaj, an ambiguous word:" (sic)

"The aim of the ecstatic lies in the perfect isolation of the personal being in the unity where God is for Himself Cf. My comprehensive study as regards the later variants of this word and the curious interpretations to which they have given way (cf. here p. 182).

g-1°, h-4°s 5°, J-1°, 16°) in order to Summarize his mystical definitions.[43]

This method has, after him, been resumed and developed in ways dhfferent from his own: by the authors of the Druze, like the one of the Kitab al Nuqat wa al Danāyr",[44] then by Ibn I 'Arabi[45] and (1786) in his whole modern school on to Abu al Khayr al Suwaydi (+ 1200/1786 in his commentary on the "Salawat al Mashishiyah", where it served for the diagram of the "qab qawsayn".[46]

IV - 5°.

This obscure verse of the Quran (II,262), so painstakingly elite dated by al Baqli, is also the subject of an allegory in book V, § I Jalal al Din al Rūmi's "Mathnawi ma'nawi" (-F-673/1273)[47]

V - 11 °.

This famous quatrain (in "Bash"), in translation, reads thus: saw my Lord with the eye of my heart,-and said to Him: "who a Thou?"="Yourself!" - It is true, in Thee the "where" goes astray,-

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[43] In the West I know only Rayon Lull (Raymundus Lullius, 1315) for having had this same idea, in his "Liber de Quadratura ..." (extract in Pasqual, Vindicice Lullianae, Avignon, 1778, I, 329: cf. Littre et Heureau, Hist. litt, fr,. XXIX, 305.)

[44] Ed. by Seybold, pp. 17, 64. One sees that like al Hallaj they use the words "nuqta" and "dayra" symbolically.

[45] In Futuhat,etc.

[46] Pp. 113-114 at the end of his Kashaf al Hujub ..., printed in Cario, with-out date, 125 pages (859-a-1°, b-2°). His diagram has been somewhat summarily reproduced by Blochet, in Le Messianisme . . ., 1903, pp. 179-182.

[47] T. V, pp. 2-3 of the Bulaq ed., 1269

the "where" does not exsist with regard to Thee! - For the imagination there is no image of Thy duration which would show "where" Thou art. - Thou art the One who encompasses every "where", onto the "non-where"; "where" then couldst Thou be?"

This quatrain, which in al Hallāj's thought intends to demonstrate that the understanding is incapable of forming any image of the divine presence as it is experienced by the soul, alludes to a hadith beginning with "Raaytu Rabbi bi 'ayni wa bi qalbi" which Muslim Ibn al Hajjaj quotes in his "Sahih".[48] The four verses, attenuated and watered down, are found in a piece of eight verses which the "Account of It Khafif"[49] ascribes to al Hallāj. They are partially quoted by 'Abd al Ghani al Nābulusi (+1143/1731)[50] according to Daud al Oa: sari's extract (+751/1350).[51]

Resuming the theme in a section of his "Tafsir a! Quran"[52] (Ibn I 'Arab by the changes he made, pointed out strongly the distant that divides his monism from the Hallājian doctrine:

رايت ربي بعين ربي فقال "من انت؟" قلت "انت!"

"I saw my Lord with the eye (=essence) of my Lord. He said t me: "who are you?" And I answered Him: "Thyself!".

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48 Following al Baqli, Tafsir, Ms. Berlin, f° 355a (on Our. LIII, 11).
49 Compilation of the 5th/11th century by al Kirmani (Ms. London 888, f° 326a, variant f°342b).
50 In "Hatk al aster . . .", Ms. Cario, f°36.
51 In "Sharh Kitab al Hujub", Ms. Cario, f°205b.
52 Printed in Cario: 1, 379: in reality it is from at Kashi (+730/1330).

V - 13°.

The same Quranic passage ("dana… fatadalla…") is also use by al Makki.[53]

V - 25°.

Dawn al lawh: Having reached there, man is in consequence absolutely free. Cf. Abū Bakr al Qahtabi's words: "God has free us from the slavery of the things since pre-eternity";[54] and "the spirit" (al rah) has not to endure the shame of (the Creator's) "Be"! (It is therefore uncreated).[55] Al Hallāj, speaking of man's creation, says: "God has given him a surah freed from the shame of the "Be"!.[56]

V - 27°.

On the mim and awha cf. al Hahelāj (in Sulami Tafsir, Qur. X11 I), the Nusayris (l.c.f° 47 a, l0b) and al Junayd (I.c. above, p. 158).

V - 30°.

"Min zanid al 'awrah": I do not know what this phrase ma; mean. Is it: "He who strikes from his tinder-box (?) the spark o dawn (?)." Al Baqli has passed over this part of the sentence in his commentary, perhaps on purpose.

VI-7°-8°.

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[53] In Qut al Qulub II, 78.
[54] In al Qushayri, Risalah, ed. 1318, p. 39, 1.8.
[55] In Kalabadhi, Ta'arruf (after fragment 143-a-18'i.
[56] In Sulami, Tafsir, on Qur. LXIV, 3; comp. Wasiti, in Baqli, I. c., f°210a.

This is why al Hallāj wrote[57]

"اول قدم فی التوحید فناء التفرید!"

"In order to penetrate the "tawhid"[58], the first step to do is to renounce entirely the "tafrid"!"

And as regards the "tajrid", al Hallāj writes it must equally be renounced when knowledge of the essence of the "tawhid" is aimed at[59] "Tafrid" may be defined as that negative simplification of the "I" by way of eliminating all foreign elements from it in a complete isolation from every thing, as that "internal" asceticism which is only a preparatory stage leading to the endosmosis of the full divine Unity into the "shell" that has been emptied of the human "I".

"Tafrid" is not be confused with "ifrad";[60] the Hallājian vocabulary applies "ifrad" or "isolation" not to the creature, but to the Creator: "ifrad al Wahid ... ", "the isolation of the One", i.e. of the divine essence[61]: "ifrad al qidam . . .", "the isolation of the Absolute" from the contingencies.[62]

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57 Quoted in at Hujwiri, Kashaf al Mahjub, ed. by Nicholson, p. 281.
58 One sees how much the Hallàjian concept of "tawhid" differs from the inaccessible "unity of God" in the Quran.
59 In al Sulami, Tabaqat ... (Cf. Sh'arawi, Tabaqat ...I, 107). Likewise Faris, in at Kalabadhi (143-a-51°).
60 Cf. here p. 165 and 182.
61 Cf. here p 165.
62 Cf here p. 103.

"Tajrid means life "in seclusion", with the same sense of preparatory asceticism as "tafrid".

VI - 13°.

…whereas I have been summoned a thousand times to prostrate myself; I did not prostrate myself…" There is here a formal divergency between the "Tawāsin" and the teaching of the Sāheimiyah, according to whom Ibheis refused only once, and "prostrated himself when he was invited the second time".[63] This same discreet hope for God's mercy was expressed by Sahl al Tustari, the master of the founder of the Sālimiyah, in his curious "conversation with Iblis" where Iblis forces him to admit that God remains always free to rescind the verdict He has pronounced Himself, and to withdraw an enternal damnation.[64]

VI - 15°.

These words allude to a theory of al Hallāj: the superiority of meditative prayer (fikr) over recited prayer (dhikr). This theory has been disapproved by the majority of the Safis[65] inspite of Fāris who has preserved the following two beautiful verses of al Hallāj:

(بسيط)

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[63] 4th proposition of the list of condemned propositions by at Kilani, (in Ghunyah.. t. I, p. 83 of the 1288 ed.).

[64] In Futuhat .., of Ibn 'Arabi, first ed., II, 737. Cf. another dialogue between Moses and Iblis, in al Ghazali (Ihya III, 34).

[65] Cf. fragments of al Hallaj in al Kalabadhi (cf. Bibliogr. 143-a-32'-34°).

انت الموله لا الذكر و لهنى　　حاشى لقلبى ان يعلق به ذكرى

الذكر واسط يحجبک عن نظرى　　اذ توشحه من خاطرى فكرى

VI - 19°.

This comparison alludes to the silk and the rough serge.

VI - 20°.

It appears that the comparison between al Hallāj's "Ana a! Haqq" and the "*Ana khayr minhu*" of Iblis made in his life-time, for Ibrahim ibn Shaybān (+303/915), when asked about al Hallāj's preaching, answered comparing his "da'wa" with that of Iblis.[66]

It is noteworthy enough that the argument brought up here, namely the "futawah",[67] had already been mentioned and refuted by al Tirmidhi (+285/898) in these terms[68] regarding Fir'awn:

"ليس من الفتوة ذكر الضايع و ترداده على من اصطنعت الله، الا ترى الى فرعون لما لم يكن له فتوة كيف ذكر ضيعه و اتريه على موسى"

VI - 22° (Iblis).

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[66] Isnād in Ibn Bakuyeh, bidayah ..., in al Khatib and in at Dhahabi. The comparison was made by at Kilani, 'Attar; at Samani (in Kashifi, Mawahib. on Qur. LXXIX, 25 and Qari, Sharh al Shifa) compares him to the "Ana" of Fir'awn.

[67] On the precise meaning of this technical term of the Sufis cf. al Qushayri, ed. by Ansari, III, 167.

[68] In at Baqli, Tafsir, on Qur. XXVI, 17: Ms. Berlin, f°274a.

Satan's "fall", - this curious Jewish-Christian tradition which found its way into the Quran, has since early days preoccupied the theologicahe thinking of Isheam. It was felt shocking to think that God had damned him just for having made himself the irreducible champion of God's inalienable unity, which is the fundamental dogma of Islam. And the strange fact that God ordered the angels to worship "another than God",[69] led to the conclusion that God's will is arbitrary and unforeseeable, that on His part "makr" is always possible,[70] and that man must obey Him without trying to under-stand. For, according to the verse of Sūfi Abū Sa'id al Kharrāz (+286/899):

(بسيط)

لو كان يرضيه شئ من بريته، لكان ابليس فى غاية ادلال[71]

(God does not care for His creatures, - their deeds leave Him unmoved.)

For "if anything could find His pleasures in the! deeds of his creatures,-the act of Iblis would certainly have moved Him to leniency!".[72] Yet this argument appeared to many an avowal of bare weakness, and so, stimulated also by the Christian

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[69] Adam. Strangeness which the Christian account explains with the fact that Adam is " the prefiguration of the Verb Incarnate": cf. St. Paul, "Hebr." I.

[70] Even for the saints, prophets and angels (Qut I, 227, 229.230; Qushayri, ed, by Ansari, I, 74, II, 200; IV, 158).

[71] In al Sulami, Tafsir, on Qur. XXN, 28: Ms. Kopr. 91.

[72] Since his intention was to adore God alone.

contribution to the problem,[73] of Satan's "fall", it brought forward other explanations. There had to be "something divine" in Adam wherefore God had proposed him to the angels for adoration and had fixed a legitimate sanction against the rebel who would refuse it. It is Bayān ibn Sam'ān's[74] theory of the "juz ilahi", a rough draft of al Hallāj's conception of the "Huwa huwa", which seems to have been very close to the theories of the other contemporary Sufis, to that of the Hulmāniyah for example which we know only through a fairly poor attempt at refutation by al Baghdādi.[75] Adam had to be worshiped because he was created as the particular, real, living and speaking image of the divine splendour. And it is only because pride had dimmed his sight that Iblis denied what was evident. The con-temporary Sufis Abū Bakr al Wāsiti (+ 320/932), Ibn 'A tā (+309/922), Abū 'Uthmān al Maghribi (+373/983) and 'Abd at Rahim al Qannād[76] were unanimous about it.

Before Sufi thought had taken up this problem, the "fall of Ibis" had already preoccupied the theologians of the Khārijiya and of the Mu'ttzilah. They worried as much repelling the attacks of the Zanādiqah like Bashshār ibn Burd[77] as giving the matter a full theoretical treatment. Yunus al Samarri, a Khārijite,[78] sustaining against the Murjites that faith was not simple knowledge of the

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[73] i.e. that of the "Murjites", of AbU Hanifah of al Ash'ari.
[74] Cf. at Shahrastani, ed. 1317, t. 1, p. 204.
[75] In Farq, ed. in Cairo, 245.
[76] In al Baqli, Tafsir: Ms. Berlin, f°89a, 18 lb, f°312b.
[77] Verse in al Baghdadi, Farq, p. 39.
[78] In Shahrastani, Cairo ed., 1317, I, 187.

"tawhid" and that without adherence of the heart and without worksit remained insufficient, declared somewhat paradoxically that Iblis was at one and the same time a "muwahhid" and a "kafir" (i.e. the contrary of a "mumin").

Likewise, according to the Mu'tazilites, Iblis (and Fir'awn), inspite of being "muwahhidin", were damned as 'fasiqin", which sounds little better than "kāfirin".[79] The Sālimiyah, on their side, accused[80] the Murjites of being unable to explain[81] the damnation of Iblis. In the Murjite view indeed, the knowledge of the one God means essentially to be a believer; which is sufficient for salvation. Nothing certainly shows better than Iblis' damnation how weak the "Murjism" of the majority of the doctors of Islam is from the logical point of view and how - intentionally- poor their concept is of the pre-eminence of faith which they mainly consider an adherence of the understanding alone, to the one God.

f - 22° (continued: Fir 'awn).

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[79] Cf Ibn al Murtada, ed. by Arnold, 1902, p. 49, for the answer of the Mutazilite AbU al Husayn at Khayyat to this subject.

[80] In Qut al Qulub II, 134.

[81] Cf. in at Kilani, Ghunyah . . . I, 80, a short analysis of the theory of the Murjite Ibn Shabib on this object. It is clear that, for them, Iblis is the exceptional case of a "mumin" changed into a "mushrik" losing in an instant all his knowledge of the "tawhid"; this the Murjites would not admit even for the greatest sinners among the Muslims.

The "iymān Fir'awn", i.e. the question whether the "Pharao's" conversion in extremis, as reported in the book of the Exodus, was sincere is one of the most controvertial issues in Isheam. The respective texts of the Qurān allow a good deal of freedom in the interpretations.[82] Besides it would be hard to explain why the Quranic discussions made such an unexpected stir, if the question did not mark one of those areas where the monistic philosophy of the Sufi "zanādiqah" had at heart to demonstrate the legitimacy of its claims to orthodoxy.

It is God who spoke through Fir'awn's mouth, Ibn al'Arabi declares in his Futuhāt,[83] and it is quite clear - inspite of Sha-'rāwi's statement[84] - that in his Fusus[85] he was even more outspoken on the "sanctity" of Fir 'awn.

Fir 'awn was just as pious as Moses, Jalāl al Din al Rūmi stated.[86]

And at Daūwāni (+907/1501), a mystic and theologian, wrote a whole treatise which was widely spread in the libraries of Turkey: Risalah f i iymān Fir'awn.

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[82] Qur. VII, X, 90 etc. Cf the hadith quoted here in al Baqli's commentary, p. 94. The second founder of Ash'arism, al Baqilani was inclined to believe that Fir'awn was not damned, but saved. Al Khālidi was of the same view (al Sh'arawi, Ki brit at ahmar, ed. 1306, on the margin of his Yawāqit, p. 2).
[83] First ed., I, 307; IV, 615.

[84] In Kibrit' al Ahmar . . ., on the margin of the Yewaqit ..., p. 12-13.
[85] Ed. in 1892, p. 392-97.
[86] In Mathnawi, trans]. by Tholuck, Ssufismus, Suppl, p. 31.

A passage[87] of Abū Bakr al Wāsiti (+320/932), the auhor of Hā Mim al Qidam, sketches a theory similar to that of at Hallāj in "Ta-Sin-al Azal":

"...ادعى فرعون الربوبية على الكشف..."

"Fir 'awn at least laid claim to Divinity so that it might be seen openly ..." (contrary to the Mu'tazilites: qadar).

VI - 23°.

"Ana al Haqq": I am the truth.[88]

It is here not the place to expand upon the question whether the word was really pronounced by al Hallāj and on what occasion: whether it was before at Junayd, as it is reported by al Baghdādi ("Farq", 247), and al Harawi ("Tabaqat" . . . cf. 1059-a-21°), or before Shibli, as suggested by a parallehe account of the grammarian Abū 'Ali al Fasawi (+377/987) (in "Risālah" of Ibn at Qārih al Halabi). What matters is that al Hallāj 's ecstatic doctrine was summarized in this word in the eyes of the later generations.

What meaning does the word "al Haqq" take on here ?

There is no point thinking here of the 11th of the 99 names of God as given in Ibn Mājah's[89] traditional list, i.e. of one of the real

[87] In at Qushayri, Risalah, ed. by Ansari' 1,54-55; cf. tabsirah, 406.
[88] Cf. in Der Islam, year 1912, III-3, pp. 248-257.
[89] Sources in Doutte, Magie et Religion clans 1' Afrique du Nard, 1909, pp. 199-203.

attributes of God, considered from the angle of "truth".[90] The meaning is that of the pure creative essence, of God's absolute simplicity.[91] Answering a question, al Hallāj made it clear:

سئل الحسين[92]

"من هذا الحق الذى تشيرون اليه؟ قال معل الانام و الا يعتل"

It is noteworthy that this term "al Haqq" spread among the Sūfis of the third century after the Hijra in the sense of "al Bāri", the Creator,[93] i.e. at a time when the Mu'tazilite's drive for adaptation of the Greek forms of thought was at a climax. The Plotinian works, being translated at that time, popularized the idea that the name "al Haqq" must be applied to the Creator[94] for reasons which in the following century[95] were summed up by Abū Nasr ah Fārābi in terms which mean that the Neo-platonic thought was become tinged with those shades which were probably due to Hallājian influence.

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[90] As will be held later on by Ibn I 'Arabi (cf. Futuhat ... IV, 90, 171) and 'Abd al Karim at Jili (al Insan al Kamil, ed. 1324, I, p. 40).

[91] The influence of the Mu'tazilite "ta'til" is visible.

[92] In alSulami, Tafsir on Qur. X, 35.

[93] AI Haqq" is constantly opposed to "al Khalq".

[94] Cf. the pseudo Kitab Uthulujiya Aristatilis wa huwa al qawl 'ala al rubuyah, transl. by al Himsi and al Kindi, ed. Dieterici, 1882, pp. 12. 13, 75, 90, Where this name, unusual at the time, is still a sample epithet: "true"

[95] In Fusus . . . hikmah, ed. Dieterici, 1892, p. 82,§ 55 fl.; cf p. 70, § 16.

"Ana al Haqq"[96]: i.e. "I am the creative Truth",[97] - this is the supreme expression of sanctity, according to al Hallāj's doctrine.[98] It is the shout of him whose consciousness makes him discover that he is "deified" by the Spirit of the Verb (Rūh Nātiqah), that he has become the "Hūwa hflwa" - the "shāhid al and" - the Witness whom God has appointed as His representative in front of all the creation, - as the privileged creature that actually symbolizes God "from the inside to the outside" by its radiance, and of which the other creatures, following al Hallāj's own words, are but images and mirrors:

الصوفي...هو المشير عن الله تعالى، فان الخلق اشاروا الى الله[99]

"The Sufi points to God from the inside,[100] - whereas (the remaining) creation points to God at the outside."

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[96] Kindness of Prof. Duncan Macdonald who wrote to me in connection With this word: "For myself, I incline to translate haqq, in this phrase, as "reality". As if "al haqq" was here the equivalent of haqiqah". "Haqq" alone, without the article, may have this impersonal and monistic meaning, but not "al Haqq", which is determined: cf. below, p. 184, and note 1.

[97] On this word of the famous answer of Orsola Benincasa (+1618), when in ecstacy at Rome, to Cardinal San Severina who was exercizing her: "Tu quis e. -Ego sum qui sum" (Santacroce, Madina, V. Gilbert, S. Pepe: in Diego Garzia Trasmiera, Vita della V. M. Orsola Benincasa, Monreale D. Grillo, 1648, II-5 fl138-139).

[98] Earlier, "al haqq" was generally considered as created, following the teaching of al Tirmidhi (Khatam ... quest. 88, 93), cf. al Junayd, Kitab i al uluhiyah, in Opscules. Ms. cit., VII.

[99] In Qushayri, ed. by Ansari, IV, 8: where "Abu (=Ibn) Mansur" must t corrected in accordance with Ibn Khamis al Ka'bi's rectification ("Manāqib ...' Cf. in at Sulami, tafsir on Qur. XXV, 60; LVIII, 22 and in al Baqli, tafsir c Qur. X 36).

A series of Hallājian texts[101] describe the stages of this gradual transformation where asceticism joins with grace by which the human personality is established as a "divinized personal being." The "unification" of the "I" by way of asceticism introduces the human being to a sort of real "endosmosis" of the divine essence.[102] It is difficult not to see in this the "hulul", that "incarnation" of the Creator in the creature, that "intrusion" of the Absolute into the contingent which the Islamic orthodoxy has ever since rejected, by arguments of pure logic as well as by tradition.

Apart from Fāris ibn 'Isa al Dinawari and the Sālimiyah, none of the Sūfis dared to teach the unmingled pure doctrine of the master for which he had incurred the death sentence. Explanations in great number later proved, or rather profusely attempted to prove, that al Hallāj could not have been a "hululi".

The union of the divine and the human nature (lahut and nāsut), being a proscribed proposition, it was held that at the moment the Sufi pronounces similar words, his personality is annihilated, evaporated, as it were, and God alone speaks through his mouth. This is thethesis sustained by the tayfuri, Khurqāni[103] (+426/1034), a faithful disciple of Abū Yazid al Bistāmi

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100 For he possesses "al 'ilm a! laduni" (explained by al Hallaj in al Baqli tafsir on Qur. XVIII, 64).

101 Cf. My extensive study. In particular, consult the fragments of al Hallaj in al Sulami, Tafsir on Our. III, 34; XXX, 45 and LXXXVIII, 13, and in al Baqli, Tafsir. on Our. XXXVII, 7.

102 Cf. al Hallaj in al Sulami, tafsir on Qur. LXVIII, 4.

103 In 'Attār, Tadhkirat al Awliya, ed. by Nicholson, II, 21I.

(+261/875). This indeed is quite the Idea al Bistāmi allegedly wanted to express with his famous „Subhāni! Praise be to Me!" But, inspite of the fact that the whole later Sūfi tradition gave up the "hululi" explanation and assimilated the "Ana al Haqq" of al Hallaj to al Bistāmi's "Subhāni", this assimilation is undoubtedly arbitrary. Al Hallāj himself condemned al Bistāmi 's Subhāni! Praise be to Me!" in these terms:[104]

"مسکین ابو یزید! در بدایت نطق بوذ ناطق بوذ از جهت حق بوذ محجوب با یزید دران میان بندارد [که] عارف از حق شنوذ، بایزید نه بیند و از ان انکار نکند و آنرا بسیار نه بیند"

"Poor Abu Yazid! He only was beginning to learn how to speak! (He was but a beginner) since (he was speaking) from God's point of view. The ignorant one! He was believing in Abu Yazid's[105] existence in this, whereas the Sage understands this word as related to God; he loses sight of Abu Yazid without having in mind to deny him nor to exalt him!" i.e. with al Bistāmi the union with God was not yet established, it had not yet that transforming power which makes of my "Ana" (I), the "Hūwa" (He) of God, at every instant and in each one of my words !

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104 Persian translation preserved in al Baqli, Shathiyat, f° 159a, with commentary where al Baqli claims to bring the proof that it is an excuse of ; Hallāj for his 'Ana al Haqq!" Ibn al Dā'i (Tabsirah...402), while condemning this proposition, sums it up like this:c ddb j

105 His own "I" which was not yet deified.

Al Khurqāni's explanation, developed by al Harawi (-♦-481/1088)[106] prevailed nonetheless within the Sūfi circles, whereas the uninitiated were going to be familiarised with al Ghazāli's theory of the illusion of love which intoxicates the mystic and makes him believe, wrongly, that he has been fused with his Beloved One. It is impossible to summarize here the various theories on the "Ana al Haqq" with all their shades such as they were set forth by: al Qazwini (+488/1095),[107] al Shahrazūri (VI/XIIIth century),[108] al Baqli.[109] 'Umar al Suhrawardi (;-632/1234),[110] 'Attār (+620/1223),[111] Majid al Din al Baghdādi (+616/1219)[112] 'In al Din al Maqdisi (+660/1262),[113] Jalāl al Din al Rūmi (+672/1273),[114] 'Afif al Din al Tilimsāni (+690/1291),[115] Nur al Din al Kasirqi (+690/1291),[116] Ibn Taymiyah (+72/he328),[117] 'Alā al Dawlah al Samnāni (+736/13361,[118] Nasir

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106 In Makatib: extract of his correspondence in ShUshtari, Majālis Muminin, chap. Vt. allegory of the destruction through fire.

107 In Akhbar a! Hallaj, extract in Bustāni, Dayrat al Ma'arif, t. VII p. 1! f1. Cf. Der Islam, III-3, 1912, pp. 249-250.

108 In Al rumuz. ., al lahutiyah . . ., Ms. 'Umumi, f°15b: explanation by ti "Ishrāq" theory (cf. Ihyā . ., III, 287, IV, 174, 230).

109 In Shathiyat f° 54a, 58a, 59b, 68a, 70a, etc... and in Tafsir on Qur. I' 165 XLI,53, XXVIII, 10.

110 In 'Awarif . . . ed. 1312, I, 177.

111 In Hilaj Nameh, Tadhkirat al Awliya, and Bulbul Nameh.

112 In Risalat fi al Safar, Ms. Koprulu, 1589.

113 Pieces of verse and dissertations, in Hall a1 rumuz ... and Sharh hal Awliya.

114 In Mathnawi Ma'nawi II, §8, verse 64; §45, 70; III, §16, verse 99, §81, and in Diwan Shams al Haqayq (Tabriz, 1280) p. 199, verse 17-20

115 In Sharh al Mawaqif.

116 In Tafsir on the Surahs I-LI (Ms. Cairo): t. IV, on Qur. XXV III, 48.

117 In Kitab ila a! Manbiji, in Jalal at 'Aynyn . . . of al Alusi, pp. 54-61; his fatwas "fi al radd 'alā at Hallāj" (Ms.cit. Zahiriyah, Damascus).

al Din al Tūsi (+672/1273),[119] Ahmad al Rūmi (+717/1317),[120] Mahmūd al Shābistāri (+720/1320).[121] al Bukhari (+740/1340),[122] al Jildaki (-F-743/ 13421,[123] Ibn Khaldūn (4 808/1406),[124] Hāfiz (4-791/1388),[125] al Nasimi (+820/1417),[126] Jāmi (+898/1492),[127] al Qāri (+1014/1605),[128] al Sayyid al Murtada (+1205/1790),[129] Hamzah Fānsūri of Sumatra.[130] We are going to give here a summary of only three theological theories on the "Ana al Haqq", but of those whose importance is exceptional: those of al Ghāzāli (+5051 1111), of 'Abd al Qādir al Kilani (+561/1166), and of Ibn'I 'Arabi (+638/1240).

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118 In Tafsir on Qur. CXII, 4.

119 In Awsaf al Ashrāf, bāb V, fasl 6.

120 In Sharh al Aiba 'in' Ms. Paris, Suppl. Pers. 115, f' 57b fl.In Gulshani Raz, §§XXVII-XXVIII-XXLX,

121 In Nāsihat a! Muwahhidin, opuscule in Ms. Umumi, 11.

122 In Ghayat al Surur. .. alchemist theory of the "tajawhur al nafs" ("trans-substantiation of the soul").

123 In Muqaddamah . . ., ed. in Cairo, 1322, p. 258.

124 In Ghazal, 4th piece in bā (Diwan, ed. in Bombay, 1277,p.12).

125 The first poet in Turkish language, skinned alive for having been preaching the doctrine of the "Ana al Haqq!" (cf. Sha 'raw], Yawāqit ... p. 14; and Gibb, A History of the Ottoman Poetry, 1900, I, 344-367).

126 According to him, it is by repeating continuously "Ana al Haqq" that al Hallāj succeeded in maintaining himself in the "ittihād", permanent union with God (trans]. in Probst-Biraben, in "Initiation", April 1901, p. 39).

127 In "Sharh" of 'Iyād's Shifa, Cario 1285, t. II, p. 745.

128 In Ithaf al Sadah . . ., commentary on al Ghazāli's Ihya, Cairo, I, 250 VIII, 484; IX, 569.

129 Malayan author of the 10th/16th century, Ms. of the collection Snouck Hurgronje ("Mys tiek", f°109, f°115, kindness of Dr. Rinkes).

130 In Ihya al 'ulum al din, ed. 1312: I, 27; 1I, 199; III, 287; IV, 219.

Al Ghazali's Theory:

It bears the stamp of the two contradictory influences which had impressed upon Ghazali's intellectual formation: at first his studies of the Ash'arite scholasticism under al Juwayni, then the research in experimental mysticism under al Gurgāni's disciple al Fārmadhi, which he undertook after a thorough study of the mystical theology of the Sālimiyah. As a staunch supporter of orthodox "Sifatia" theollogy, al Ghazāli speaks at first[131] of the reflexion which the splendour of this or that name, of this or that "veil of light" of the divinity produces in the heart of the mystic. It is so bright that the mystic is dazzled and in his illusion cries out: "Ana al Haqq". And al Ghazāli declares[132] that it can only be an illusion, - dangerous if it is pro pagated, - an exaggeration of the drunkenness with love, for there can be no real "transfer", no real "transfusion" of the divine essence, or even only of one of its attributes, to the human nature of the mystic But then, at the end of his life, - in his "Mishkat al Anwar", - he does not mention anymore the divine attributes as really distinct, and he discovers that the essential Being is the "true Light" and that the name of "Truth" (Haqq) designates only the pure divine essence, exclusively, fully.[133] And he realizes that the exclusive vision of

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131 Id' and in "al Maqsad al Asna ... ", ed. 1324, pp. 61, 73, 75; cf also Ma'arij al Salikin, Ms. Paris, 1331, f° 160a

132 Mishkāt al Anwār...ed. 1322, pp. 17-20, 24; his avowal is surrounded with quite telling reserves borrowed from earlier works to which he refers (p. 18-19).

133 Criticized in "Bahr al Ma'ani" of Muhammad al Makki al Tshishti (Ms. Paris, Suppl pers. 966, f°132a fl.)

this divine essence exclusively, fully. 451 And he realizes that the exclusive vision of this divine essence into which the mystic plunges with the shout "Ana al Haqq" is the supreme stage, the absolute "fardāniyah"[134]

'AM al Qadir al Kilani's Theory

The Saintly founder of the Qadiriyah order, great Hanbalite preacher and patron Wali of Baghdād, reconciled respect for the judges' verdict with admiration for al Hallāj[135] in this way:

"طار طاہر عقل بعض العارفين من ذكر شجرة صورته، و على الى السماء خارقا صفوف الملائكة، كان بازيا من بزاة الملک بخيط العينين بخيط و خلق الانسان ضعيفا" () فلم يجد فى السماء مايحاول من الصيد، فلما لاحت له فريسه "رايت ربى" ازداد تحيرة فى قول مطلوبه "فاينما تولوافتم وجه الله" ()، عاد هابطا الى حفيرة خطة الارض لمكسب ما هو اعزمن وجود النار فى قعور البحار، تلفت بعين عقله فما شاہد سوى الاثار فكر فلم يجد فى الداربن مطلوبا سوى محبوبه، فطوب فقال بلسان سكر قلبه "انا الحق" ترنم بلحن غير معهود من البشر، صفر وى روضة الوجود صفيرا لايليق لبنى آدم، لحن بصوته لحنا عرضه لحتفه، و نودى فى سره "يا

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134 In al Shattanawfi " Bahjat al Asrār ... " Ms. Paris, 2038, f°72a: isnad through al Basāyhj! cf. abridged recension, id. f°98b.

135 Allusion to the "Burning Bush" of Moses (Our. XX, 14); cf. above, PP. XX, 81.

حلاج اعتقدت ان قوتک و حولک بک؟ قل الان نبابة عن جمع العارفين "حسب الواجد افراد الواحد!" قل "يا محمد! انت سلطان الحقيقة! انت انسان عين الوجود! على عتبة باب معرفتک تخضع اعناق العارفين، فی حمی جلالتک نوضع جباه الخلائق اجمعين!"

Once upon a time "the reason of one of the Sages flew away, out of the nest on the tree[136] of the body, and rose up to heaven, - where it joined the Angels. But it was only a falcon from among the falcons of the world. His eyes were hooded with the hood "Man has been created weak." Now this bird did not find anything in heaven which he could hunt for, but suddenly he saw the prey "I have seen my Lord"[137] shine before him, and his dazzle grew when he heard his Purpose say to him: "Wherever you turn your faces, you will have God in front of you. Gliding down, the falcon then came back to put in safety on earth what he had taken, - a treasure more precious than fire in the depths of the oceans; - but he turned and turned in vain the eye of his reason, - he, only saw the traces (of the divine dazzlement). So he returned, but could not find, throughout the two worlds, any other purpose than his Beloyed One! Joy roused him and he cried out "Ana al Haqq", I am the Truth ! expressing thus the drunkenness of his

136 Hadith, cf here p. 167.

137 This word which al Hallāj indeed pronounced before dying, has perhaps also another, less orthodox meaning (cf. here, p. 165 ; however, 'Isa al Qassār assures us that the witnesses who heard him, took it in good part (in al Sarrāj, Luma', Ms. London 7710 f°164b: "hasb al tawhid, ifrad a! wajid!)

heart. He intoned his forbidden to the creatures, he chirped from joy in the song in a way Garden of Existence, but such chirping was unsuitable to the sons of Adam. His voice struck up a melody that made him liable to die. And in the secret of his conscience he heard ring these words: "Oh Hallaj, did you believe that your power and your will depended only on you? Declare now on behalf of all Sages: the purpose of the ecstatic is to isolate (ifrad) the unique one perfectly! Say:[138] Oh Muhammad you are the proof of the reality! You arc the very man of the essence of existence![139] On the threshold of your Wisdom the Sages bow their necks! Under the protect ion of your Majesty the creatures all together bend their heads!"

On another occasion when al Kilani was asked why the same word "Ana" (I) had earned such difference in treatment to Iblis who was damned, and to al Hallāj who became a saint, he declared: It is because at Hallaj, when he uttered it, intended only the annihilation fanā) of his "I" . . . whereas Iblis, when he pronounced it, intended only survival (baqa) of his "I'.[140]

Ibn'l 'Arabi's Theory

It springs from the monistic interpretation which is already so plain in the famous Qasidah put by the poet Abu al Hasan 'Ali al

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[138] Embryo of the "Insan Kamil" theory (cf. here, p. 140); i. e.:

[139] You alone are the "Huwa huwa!"

[140] Isnād through 'Ali al Hid, in al Bandaniji (--after 1092/1681), "Jami' al Anwar ... ": in al Kilāni's biography (cf. Bibliogr. 1335-a-1°).

Musaffar (+after 600/1203)[141] into the mouth of al Hallāj[142] after he had been executed:

(بسيط)

(verse 1) قل لاخوان رآونی میتا * فبکونی اذ رآونی حزنا

(verse 2) اتظنون بانی میتکم * لست ذاک المیت و الله انا!. . .

(verse 6)[143] فاهدموا البیت فرضو قفصی * و ذروا لکل دفینا بیننا . . . .

(verse 7) و قمیصی مزقوه رمما * و ذروا الطلسم بعدی و ثنا . . .

Ibn'l Arabi formulates his theory in his Fusus al Hikani.[144] It is an application of his theory of imagination; the images which man

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141 Author of the Kitab al Madnun al Saghir wrongly ascribed to al Ghazāli Ibn 'Arabi, Musamarat..., ed Cairo, I, 158-159).

142 Cf. the anonymous legend of al Hallaj with Title "al Qawl al Sadid fi arjamant al Arifal Shahid" (Bibliogr., 970 a-14 °).

143 Ibn 'Arabi makes an allusion to this verse in his Taja!iiyāt al Ilāhiyah.

144 6 of the Istanbul edition, 1891; cf also Ms. Wien other opuscule with title al Bā, Ms. Paris, 1339, f'19a

creates in his dreams, have a real existence, exterior to his thought, when this man is a Sage ('arif). since his will remains in a continuous adherence - in God - to that creative force which is the divine imagination. Yet, whereas the divine thought cannot forget any detail of its Creation, the thought of the Sage, whose memories are divided into five distinct planes[145], forgets necessarily some of them, so that the affirmation of the Sage "Ana al Haqq" is only partly correct, since he has not the whole creation present to his mind at one and the same time.

One may wonder why it is here supposed that God can be aware of His divinity and affirm it to Himself only by thinking the totality of His creation. It is because according to Ibn l'Arabi "creator" and "creation" are two terms united in a necessary relationship. Ibn Taymiyah, his adversary, observed it well: "Ibn l'Arabi claims ... that the existence of the contingent creatures is the essence of the Creator's existence:

"ان وجود المحدثات المخلوقات هو عين وجود الخالق"[146]

This is how Ibn l'Arabi refutes al Hallāj's "Ana al Haqq", "I al the Truth (=God)!" as follows:

"No, I am the mystery[147] of al Haqq, - I am not al Haqq i Rather: I am Haqq[148]; - there is a difference between the two of

145 Theory of the five hadrāt.
146 Extract from Alusi, Jalal al aynayn.,., p. 57; comp. Fusus..., 103.
147 "Sirr" is the subconscious, the subliminal.
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us. I am God's essence in the things! What then is there visible' in the creation if not the essence of both of us?"

انا سر الحق ماالحق انا * بل انا حق ففرق بيننا

اناعين الله فى الاشياء فهل * ظاهر فى الكون الا عيننا

'Azazil: This name is of Hebrew origin and designates in the Old Testament[149] the "scapegoat" loaded with Israel's sins. In the "Book of Henoch"[150] it becomes synonymous with Satan and Thus. In Muslim tradition it serves as the general name of the Angels who are "nearest" to God.

VI - 31° - 32°.

We had attempted a translation of this complicated passage in Revue de 1 'Histoire des Religions[151] before the discovery of al Baqli's recension. As was seen, the latter, even though thoroughly different from our first text, made it possible for us to improve both reading and metrical scanning. The two recensions are too divergent to allow any common translation. Besides, the above translated[152] commentary of al Baqli carries the "gamut of tints" of the words of the second recension, if not their literal meaning.

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149 Levit. chap. XVI, Numb. XXIX, 34.

150 Ed. by Gfrorer, Prophetae vet eres pseudoepigraphi, 1840, chap. VIII IX, 5 X, 6; XIII, 1. ' 1;

151 T. LXIII, No. 2, p. 204.

152 Cf. Above, p. 96-97.

With regard to the first one, we would today suggest the following translation:

31. - "Iblis' attempted move to withdraw (from the presence of God) was in reality thwarted by God's rigid immobility which kept . him-bound. Iblis remains exposed to the twofold glow of his bivouac fire-place and of the clarity of divine knowledge.

32. - Drought sucks the sterile soil of the stagnant waters, his eye is swollen with tears that dry up immediately in a circle, the "sharham" of his gaze keeps it fixed and immobile, his alleged wild beasts are but the scarecrows with which he has tried to ward off the wild beasts, and if he does not see any longer, it is because he has blinded himself by his own fault and has entangled himself in his own deceits !".[153]

VI - 33°.

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[153] This paragraph is entirely different in al Baqli's recension: "The place where Iblis is dying from thirst, is precisely the place which flows from abundance,- his jagged (notched?) knife has the stealthy smile of a lightening,- the "sharham" of his gaze keeps it steady and immobile,- his moves to go away are shams,- he is blinded by his own deceits!"- It is to be noted that "barhama" is founded in Lisan al 'Arab, ed. 1303, XIV, 314; whereas "sharhama" and "fathama" are unique, As regards the feelings here expressed,- compare the word of al Hallaj who, while walking through a lane of Baghdad, was surprised by the exquisite sound of a flute; "It is Iblis who weeps over the world" to put us to a test... (al Tanukhi, nishwar 56b;- cf. al Sarrāj Masari al ' Ushshaq, ed. 1301, 98-99).

This exclamation: "Oh brother!" is also found in the contemporary esoteric initiation literature, as that of the Druze[154] and that of the "lkhwān al Safa".[155]

VI - 36°.

Following, like the Mu'tazila, (compare Hujwiri, Kashf . . ., 239), the Christian theory, al Hallāj admits the superiority of the angelic nature over that of man. In the orthodoxy the idea prevailed that the angels do not have the "knowledge of the names" which Adam was given (cf. already in Ibn 'Ali, in al Sulami Tafsir on Qur. VII, 11).

VII - 1°.

The term "mashiyah" is here the equivalent of "irādah"[156] and of "qadā"[157]: it signifies "divine will", in the meaning of„decree" of the divine prescience, of predetermination of the good or aptart from the Sufi circles, seems to be Christian origin.[158]

The series of the four created "dawāyr" that encircle the divine essence, i.e. "mashiyah, hikmah, qudrah and malumah

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154 In Kitab al Nuqat., ed by Seybold p 76.

155 Passim, cf. also in opuscules of al Junayd (1. c II; letter to Yusuf ibn al Husayn al Rāzi).

156 Cf above, p. 145. Al Mashiyah, i, e. "a! ma'lum". says al Hallaj (in al Sulami, Tafsir; on XLVII, 21 and LXII, 4).

157 Cf. al Haliāj fragment in al Sulami, Tafsir on Qur. XXI, 43.

158 Cf. the old Arabic version of the "Gospels" used by 'Abd al Masih ibn Ishaq al Kindi in his "Risdlah ila al Hashimi" (written towards 210/825? ed. in London, 1880, p. 156), where .,:t,:':..i,5 zJ stands for the Greek of Matth. VI, 9. Compare also in this text the dualism of " Malkut .., Mashlyah" with that of " amr ...iradah ' .

(azaliyah)" are close to two similar enumerations which are found in two fragments of other works of al Hallāj.[159]

VIII - 3°.

"Fi hi" and "'an hu": opposite terms familiar to al Hallāj, the former meaning "al jam", the latter "al ihtijab" (cf, al Sulami's Tafsir on LI, 21 (at the end).

IX - 2°.

This passage is of capital importance for the Hallājian doctrine[160]: "The pronoun of the "tawhid" (is it the word "hūwā" in

,a>'I Ll Ji Qur. CXII, 1?) represents any variable subject, i.e. not _pa God, but the saint who bears witness to Him. The tawhid then does

not consist in the subject of this pronoun, but it is on the contrary the very sign of the pronominal expression, its "h": ah ! If you cry "alas", the echo answers "al !" It is thus that God rouses (through "hulul") the "huwa" in us". This is a deduction strictly proper to the Hallājian theory of the "huwa huwa" (cf. p. 130), and 'Umar al Suhrawardi, who knew it, condemns it in connection with the significance he gives to the "Ana al Haqq"[161]:

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159 In al Sulami, Tafsir, on Qur. VII, 1; XXIV, 35 (170-d-41°, 108°).

160 Recension B appears purposely attenuated.

161 "' Awarif al Ma'arif", ch. IX; on the margin of "Ihya", Cairo ed. 1312, t. I, p. 177,

"...انه يقول ذلک... على معنى الحكاية عن الله تعالى... و لو علمنا انه ذكر القول مضمر الشئ من الحلول و رددناه".

This passage can be compared with c-11 here above: it shows the same procedure of grammatical analysis applied to mysticism.

X - 6° - 15°.

The reasoning displayed in this very subtle dialectical passage is closely related to the argumentation found further on in k-3° - 13°, 8° The matter is here to drive the "tanzih" to its extreme limits by showing that none of the known definitions of the "tawhid" (dogma of the divine unity) is acceptable. A sentence of Abū 'Ali al Husayn ibn Ahmad al katib al Misri (+after 340/951), a friend of the Hallājian Qādi Abū Bakr al Misri, clearly shows in how far the "tanzih" of the Sūfis differs from that of the Mu'tazilites:

المعتزله نزهو الله من حيث العقل فاخطؤوا، و الصوفية نزهو الله من حيث العلم فاصابوا.[162]

"The Mu'tazilites have driven the "tanzih" to the extreme of "withdrawing "from God"[163] the intellect[164], - in which they have committed a sin; - the Sufiyah have driven it to the extreme of

[162] In Sulami, reproduced in Sha'rawi, Tabqāt .., Cairo ed., 1305, t. I, p.111.
[163] Seclude from the definition of the pure divine essence.
[164] The faculty of discerning between good and evil; for God, they say knows only the good: the Intellect is created, not uncreated.

withdrawing from God the knowledge[165], - in which they have been true Here is a tentative translation of these paragraphs:

7. - "If, in order to define the one God. I say: "It is He, He"[166] will be told: This is not "Tawhid".[167]

8. - And if I say: "But the "tawhid" of God is positively sure!" I will be told:[168] "Positively!".

9. - If I say: The "tawhid" means affirming God outside time[169]., I will be told: Does "tawhid" therefore mean "tashbih"[170],) So, if no "comparison" is admissible to say what God is, - then the "tawhid" (according to you) is nothing further but a word without any relationship to the God whom it has for its aim. Nor with any relationship either to the created things (since you put Him "outside time"!)…

10. - If I say: "The "tawhid" is the word of God" (kalam), I will be told: "So, is the "kalam" an attribute of the essence"?[171]

11. - If I say: "The "tawhid" states that God wants to be one" it will be objected: "all right! If the divine will (iradah) is an

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165 The piecemeal gradual knowledge of the good and evil deeds, for the "Mashiyah" is created, not uncreated (cf. here p. 148 and 152).
166 On the "Huwa huwa" cf. here p 130
167 For the third person singular does not designate exclusively God.
168 Ironically.
169 I. e.: in the absolute,
170 "Comparison", because "time", which is created, is brought into the definition.
171 "Sifat adh Dhat"; and not an "attribute of the act" (sifat al fi'l), a hotly controverted question in those days (cf. p. 128).

"attribute of the essence", how is it that its volitions (inuradāt) are created?"[172],

12. - If I say: "God is the "tawhid"! but only for the divine essence", - (I will be told): is then the divine essence the "tawhid"?

13. - If I answer: "No, the "tawhid" is not the divine essence!" - then do I (not) pretend that the "tawhid" is created?

14. - If I say: "Name and what is named are one and the same", - then what can the word "tawhid" still mean?[173]

15. - And if I declare[174]: "(The tawhid" means that) "God is God", - do I (not) say that God is "the essence of the essence" and that "it is He, He"?[175]

Elsewhere[176], al Hallaj explains why one cannot say of God's pure essence: "it is He, He!":

I.-

"قيل للحسين (بن منصور) ا هوهو؟ قال بل! هو ورآء كل هو و هو عبارة عن ملک مالا يثبت له شی دونه"

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[172] The particular will of God Mashiyan=ira.dah in al Haliāj) is therefore created and is not acceptable as a definition of the " "tawhid",

[173] It has no:'raison d'etre" any more.To "call off the dogs".

[174] Proposition which was refuted at the beginning.

[175] In al Sulami, Tafsir, on Qur. CXII, I.

[176] Every definition is exclusive, restrictive.

Al Husayn (ibn Mansur) was asked (in connection with the "tawhid": "is it He, He? - No! God is beyond every "He"! For "he" is an expression indicating simply[177] a (limited) thing of which it is thus asserted that it possesses nothing but itself.[178]

II. - In his 'aqidah' which al Qushayri put at the beginning of the first chapter of his "Risaldh"[179], at Hallaj once again points out the logical insufficiency of the name "هو" as applied to God: و ان قلت هو فالهاء و الواقعه "If you say (of God):"He!" (Huwa), the two letters (ha and waw) of which this word is composed, are but of his creation…[180]" This same argument figures also in the 'aqidah which is found at the beginning of his Kitab Nafi al Tashbih.[181]

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177 Whereas God possesses everything.

178 Ed. by Ansari, Cairo, 1290. I, pp. 45-48.

179 For al Hallaj as for Ibn 'Atā the letters are created,- the Arab alphabet is created, contrary to the Hanbalite view. With a laconic irony quite characteristic, al Hallaj one day motivated his thesis thus:

" i)2' '.0 J J,;.(,., G,..V9 J)1 r,..L$y a.,"

(in Kalābadhi, Ta'arruf, 143-a-8°); i. e.: whoever is obliged to use letters for speaking, has a cause (for doing so), and whoever breaks up his speech in series (of clauses), does it by compulsion' ; the first proposition plays upon the root "alla" and the ' ta'lil", disease, i.e. the grammatical weakening of a consonant ; the second puts up the thesis - which was resumed by the Ash'arites,- that the divine Word is an indivisible totality which cannot be dissolved in a sequence of model clauses in order to express itself full:

180 Published by al Kalabadhi: cf above, p. I.

181 Is it perhaps a cipher of the corresponding letters of the alphabet, in numerical values represented like this: dl j d a d b jl It does not appear to make any sense,

On the "tanzih at tawhid" al Sulami has preserved in his "Tafsir" (on Qur. LVII, 3,5) fragments of al Hallaj which carry the same doctrine as this "Ta Sin".

X - 21°.

This strange figure is composed; of two numerical formulas with twice the letter "ha" (explained in the next paragraph), and thrice thesyllable "la" ("No!") written below. I have not been able to elucidate these two formulas: I think they are numerical, for the signs they carry, manifestly come from the Arabic notation, especially in the second formula which can easily be transcribed like this: 9/5 59,182. But what is the. kind of arithmetical operation which the mathematicians of those days used to represent in this way ? I do not know, and I also do not see how it could symbolize[182] the "fikr al khāss" in opposition to the first formula which is the symbol of the 'fikr al 'amm".

The two formulas are nonetheless very interesting, for they seem to have given origin, very rationally, to certain groups of signs which the later Süfls continued copying without understanding them, and which in the end they used as a cabalistic talisman, while in fact they were the remains of a secret alphabet[183] which I have been unable to decipher. A group of tea similar formulas are

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[182] Cf. the alchemists ; compare the alphabet of the sirnāyā, in Ms. Paris, 2675 f°29a, 36a, 37b, 42b; cf. the "letters a lunettes", of Jewish origin (A. Danon, Amulettes sabbatiennes, J. A. P. 1910, p. 6, No 2, p. 14).

[183] F°5a, title quoted under No 416, in Tahir Beg's list.

among others found at the end[184] of a manuscript[185] of Ibn l'Arabi's "Kitab al Qutb wa al Imāmayn wa al Mudalajayn" where they play the role of talismans. They should not be confused with other symbols, far more common, which the later Süfls[186] borrowed from the astrological symbols of the seven planets.[187]

XI - 1°.

The fundamental proposition of this "Ta Sin", namely the idea that Wisdom, the only adequate knowledge of the divine essence, can only be by "infusion" from God Himself, with a wholly divine operation which "deifies" man in some manner[188], is categorically_ summarized in three Hallājian fragments preserved by al Kalabadhi:[189]

"لا يعرفه الا من تعرف اليه، و لا يوحده الا من توحد له، و لا يومن به الا من لطف له، و لا يصفه الا من تجلى سره"

"Nobody knows Him, if He has not given him wisdom; - nobody professes Him as the real One, if He has not unified him; nobody believes in Him, if He does not grant him the grace; - nobody

184 In "Majmu'ah", No 2, 'Umumi Library, Istanbul.
185 Cf. Ms. London, 888' f°342a.
186 Cf. Doutte, Magie et Religion dans l'Afrique du Nord, 1909, p. 155-156.
187 This proposition is closely related to what the Western scholasticism used to call the "information".
188 In "Ta'urruf" (143-a-13°. 16°, 42°).
189 Bringing the "subconscious" forward to the domain of reflection.

describes Him, if His radiance has not shone upon the most secret aspect of his conscience."

"ان الله عرفنتا نفسه بنفسه، و دلنا على معرفه نفسه بنفسه، فقام شاهد ـ المعرفة بالمعرفة، بعد تعريفه المعرف بها"ـ

"It is God Himself who makes Himself known to us by Himself,- it is through Himself that we are led to the knowledge of Himself,- and it is He who within the Wisdom remains the Witness of the Wisdom, after He has made it known to the one whom He has made a Sage."

"المعرفة احضار السر بصنوف الفكر، فى مراعاة مواجيد الاذكار، على حسب توالى اعلام الكشوف"

"Wiedom' ! It means the gradual introduction of the most intimate conscience into the categories of thought[190] with the help of the inner illuminations that result from the ritual prayers,- .following the unint errupted progress in teaching the successive revelations".

XI-3°fl,

3° He who says: "I know God because I stand in need of Him (= because I desire Him)!"- How can he, who says he is in need, know Him who IS in fulness? - 4 He who says: "I know Him

[190] Cf. above, p. 153.

because exist! " An absolute cannot co-exist with another absolute! - 5° He who says: "I know Him, since He is unknown to me !"- Agnosticisfi is all a veil, - Wisdom dwells behind these idle veils,- 6° He who says: "I know Him by His Name!" The name cannot be separated from what is named, when this is uncreated ... 7° He who says: "I know Him by Himself!" - This means splitting into two the object one pretends to know... - 8° He who says: "I know Him by His work!" This means to be satisfied with the work without caring for its creator - 9° He who says: "I know Him by the very imperfection of my apperception of Him !" If it is imperfect, it is intermittent, and how can an intermittent knowledge comprehend its whole object? - 10° He who says: "As He has taught me, so I know Him! This is (discursive knowledge),- it means coming back to prescience; but prescience is distinct from essence[191]; if therefore it differs from it, how can there be comprehension? - II° He who says "I know Him as He has described Himself! This means being satisfied with the Tradition, without any direct contact .-12° He who says: "I know Him by twofold definitions"! But the object one seeks: to know, is unique (simple),- it does not admit of any localisation nor division into parts.- 13° He who says: "The known Object knows Itself! "This means to confess that the Sage remains conditioned by the fact of his very difference (with his object), whereas the object (at the same time subject and object) keeps knowing Itself in Itself!- 18° He who says: "I know Him in His reality!" In saying so, he puts his own "being" higher than the Being he claims to know,-

[191] Cf. above, p. 153.

for he who knows a thing in its reality, exceeds it in potentiality. as he knows it."

This hard pressing dialectic thus destroys a certain number of propositions famous in those days. The sixth article has, as its target, the Hanbalite thesis of God's identity with his names as revealed in the Quran.[192] It clears the ground for the belief in the "ineffable name" (ism a'zam). The seventh article destroys the hypothesis that "Huwa" can be a name of God, and prepares for the doctrine of the "Huwa Huwa". The eighth is an applicatian of the "tanzih" (cf. above, p. 103). The nineth is directed against a proposition traditionally ascribed to the caliph Abu Bakr[193] and prepares the condemnation of relativism (follow-

ing article). The tenth is analyzed further on. The eleventh pleads for mystical experimentation against the traditional formalism of the schools (cf. al Hallaj's discussion with al Nahrjuri in Mecca[194] The twelveth denounces the insufficiency and the purely negative character of Abu Said al Kharrāz's[195] contemporary theory that "God could be defined as being the only object of knowledge that unites simultaneously two contradictory aspects (diddayn): "first, last, hidden, manifest ..". The thirteenth concludes on the necessity for the "subject to be

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192 Cf. al Kilani, Ghunyah..., I, 54, where Ibn Hanbal's propositions are found.
193 Cf. Qushayri, ed. by Ansāri, IV, 148; Ibn 1'Arabi, Futuhat .,,, III, 149 ; stani, ed. 1317, II, 111-112.
194 In Akhbar al Halldj,, Ms. London, 888, 1'° 340b-341a.
195 Cf. in Ibn 'Arabi, Fusus ..., ed. 1891, pp. 94-95 • adopted in the aq;dah" of al Haliaj as expressing the preliminary "tanzih".

consummated in its object" so that there may be perfect knowledge, without solving the objection of "hulul" and "imtizāj".

k - 10°.

"Prescience leaves the essence aside". Convinced of the relativism of the sciences, al Hallaj clearly takes the position of superiority of the Wisdom (ma'rifa=gnosis) over discursive knowledge ('ilm). Other Sufis of his tend "pmafr fa'. For, because use of the "scriptural" and antinomy "textual" ilm" the word "'ilm" embraces at the same time character of Islam[196], the totality of objective rational knowledge and the prescriptions of the Law, the written form of the Quran which according to the pure Sunni doctrine is the essence of religion. This is why the more Spurude among the Sufis, unlike al 298/910) the superiority of Halilrn" over P maerifah"[197]:

with al Junayd (

قال الجنيد "العلم ارفع من المعرفة و اتم و اشمل و اكمل، تسمى الله بالعلم و لم تسمى بالمعرفة، و قال "و الذين اؤتو العلم درجات ثم لما خاطب النبى صلعم خاطبه باتم الاوصاف و اكملها و شمالها للخيرات فقال "فاعلم انه لا اله الا الله " و

196 Cf. the famous hadith on the "ink of the scholars weighing more Gha2al1 (by the . tears of the saints and the blood of the martyrs!" which al Ghazali (Ihya…, 1,6) surprisiongly ascribed to Hassan Basri.

197 Al Baqli, I.c. on Qur.XLVII< 21; comp. with al Junayd's Kitab al Mithaq (Opucs., Ms. Cit. VI).

لم يقال "فاعرف" لان الانسان قد يعرف الشئ ولا تحيط به علما، و اذا علمه و احاط به علما فقد عرفه"

Al Hallaj's solution was a consequence of his attitude in the controversy on "'aql", reason. Al Kalābadhi, disciple of the Hallājian Faris ibn 'Isa, speaking of the common opinion of his masters on reason, says it can be summed up with the word of Ibn 'Ata, the friend of al Hallāj[198]:

قال ابن عطا "العقل آلة للعبودية * لا للاشراق على الربوبية"

"Reason is the tool of our serving condition as creatures,- it does not illuminate what is divine." As a result, what happens when our reason attempts to penetrate the divine essence, a thing for which it is not meant? Sahl al Tustari (+283/896), al Hallaj's first master, had already explained it in vigorous terms[199]:

سئل (سهل) عن العقل قال

198 Notes on Tawasin 57 Ibn Taghribirdi, Nujum ... II, 340-341; al Qushayri IV, 12, 184! Jami, Nafahat .„ ed Less, 210). He was indeed Great Qadi of Egypt in 322-324, 324-325 and 333-334 (cf. al Kindi, Histoire des qadhis d'Egypte, ed. Gottheil, 156, 157, 159, 164).

199 In Abu al Qasim at Saqali (+about 390/999), Kitab al Sharh ... min kalam Shal, Ms. Kopr., 727, chap. V, end. - Following at Nahāwandi, the book was written in Qayrawan and was chosen from Sahl's book of the "thousand sentences" which Abu al Hasan Ibn Salim, the founder of the Sālimiyah, had collected directly.

"هو العافية سعرة، ان العقل اذا لم يصرف فى ذات الله صار اعدا عدوا الله عزوجل"

"Reason means good health (of the spirit), but it is also able to make it ill! (How?) Yes, because once reason realizes that it cannot change itself into the divine essence, it becomes hateful and starts hating God…" The same is said by al Hallaj in the two often cited verses[200]:

(بسيط)

من رامه بالعقل مستتر شدا * اسرحه فى حيرة يلهو

شاب بتلبيس اسراره * يقول من حيرته "هل هو؟"

"He who, in his search for God, takes Reason as his guide,- will find himself "left grazing"[201] in a perplexity wherein he has to take delight. In the depth of his conscience ambiguity troubles him,- and dazzled, he finally wonders: "is it He?"-

Only two centuries later the monistic Sufis, on account of their eclecticism, would combine the Greek conception of the primacy of Reason ('aql) with the data the Sufis had

[200] In al Kalabadhi, Taarruf (143-a-12°). In another prose fragment (id, 143-a-17°) al Hallaj resumes this idea and gives it greater precision.
[201] Like grazing cattle.

experimentally established about the Spirit (rah). Elsewhere[202], al Hallāj curiously proceeds by Way of elimination in order to clear the idea of "ma'rifa" of any idea of knowledge ('ilm): all branches of knowledge amount to the knowedge of the Qur'an which, in its turn, amounts to the knowledge o the separate letters[203],- which again amounts to the knowledge of "Lam-alif" (the absolute negation "No!")-which amounts to the know, ledge of the Primordial Point (al nuqta al asliya),- which amounts to the Wisdom (Ma'rifa), knowledge of the "mashiya",- which resides 14 the abyss of the divine "He".

This theory of the nuqta asliya is remarkable,- for it coincides with the "nekuda rishuna", "primordial point"of the Jewish Cabbalas[204] and the "kha" of the Sanscrit philosophers whom at Biruni' studled.[205]

XI-14°.

"Bayda...sawda.-Cf. the Gospel text, Matthew V, 36. XI-15°.

Qalb: the heart.- In mystical language this word combines two data: one material, the visceral "lump of flesh", as al Hallaj says here (mudgha jawfaniya),- and the other supernatural, the "point

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202 . In al Sulami, Tafsir, on Qur. VII, 1, etc. - al Hallaj's text in Ms. London, 188, f° 336a, which carries the sentence aiy..,, JI ajl i; Jh 1„ Jl y ~gJlr'« yi 4ii;JI cf. Ms. Sulaymāniya; 1028, XXV, f° II.

203 Written at the beginning of certain surahs.

204 . References in Etheridge, Hebrew Literature, London 1856, p. 319.

205 Tarikhal Hind, text p. 169, trans!. I, 333. Of the " sr" it says this ccvl aS~ aaJ! ~ .° ' L A,J 111,.,J V1 -alai I (HI.... ea ••ala'e,1»

of impact of the divine gaze" (mawd'i nazar al Haqq)[206]. Following the Sufis, the heart of flesh, the regulating organ which records the variations of our general organic condition (and equilibrates, as we know, the rhythm of the blood circulation which keeps life temperature constant),-this hollow insensitive muscle is also the organ of our contemplation; and at the time of ecstasy, the divine impact takes a direct hold of the life pulsation (slackening of the heart throb). It is most note-worthy that in the Arab literature which places emotional repercussions generally in the liver or the bile,-the mystical authors alone have been speaking of the heart. Their "experimental knowledge of the hearts", "ilm al qulub[207], has thus been built on dialectical premises which had been laid down by various Mu'tazilites: Abul Hudhayl (farq, 110), Ibn Hāyit (farq, 256), Ashwāri and Futi; and by Ibn at Rawandi (cf. shāmil, Ms. Quoted, f°14a).

XI-22°.

This passage which describes the final state of the Sage in terms intended to remain obscure, must be brought together with e-35°-39. But this time we are missing the help of the commentary. The word ".Aii recalls al Shibli's ".asli939 (aa J

206 Al Hallaj and Faris, to Sulami, Tafsir on Qur. XXXIII, 72 etc; comp. with Ghazali, Ihya ... III, 11.

207 Cf. the Malikite Turtushi's (+520/1126) criticism of al Ghazali; " ... he strayed from the path of the 'Ulema, ... he devoted himself to those who are masters in the knowledge of the hearts" ... " (in Salami, Radd... II, 355).

1,~ „„>I; L:j..,"[208] "He who finds his joy in the 'tawhid', is a loser". XI-23°.

"Wisdom has its likeness only in Itself,-God has His likeness only in Himself,- and yet there is likeness between Wisdom and God, between God and Wisdom Wisdom is not God, God is not Wisdom,-and yet there is of God but Wisdom, and of Wisdom but God,- there is of Wisdom but God! There is of God but God! This passage where al Hallaj affirms the identity, in the ultimate approach, between Wisdom and God,-seems to be composed for "dhikr" recitation (litany)[209] "Lā Huwa Hya!"

XI-25°.

'The Creator remains the Creator,- and creation is creation"•such is the ultimate difference which the transforming union and the most perfect "deification" cannot efface, since it is the sign of love;[210] al Hallaj points it out clearly also in another passage[211]:

"لا فرق بينى و بين ربى الا بصفين، وجودنا منه و قومنا به"

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[208] In Qushayri, Risalah, ed. Ansari, IV, 49-50.

[209] It might he that the observation which was made of the "dhikr" of the Hallajiy consisting of the repetition of " Lah He, Lah Ha Lah Hi" '- derives from there (in Le Chatelier, Confreries Musulmanes du Hedjaz, 1887, p. 33, No. 1; source unknown)-.

[210] Made manifest by the creation of God's "nāsut", the "huwa huwa", which unveils the secret of God's love, according to at Hallaj (cf. above p. 130)

[211] In Ibn Dihdār Fani (+1016/1607) " Sharh Khutbat al Bayan " Ms. Ind. Off. Pers. 1922, f° 207a.

"(At the summit of sanctity) only two differences exist any further between God and us: they are that our existence comes from Him, and our substance subsists in him."

In a few other most remarkable fragments[212] al Hallaj notes expressly that there can be no question of admitting any mixture, any illogical and impossible inclusion of the divine Absolute in our contingency,- of the Divinity (ilahiyah) in our flesh (bashariyah); the very word hulul, "infusion", which we have used so far by way of approximation, betrays his real thought[213]; in the strict sense of his words, God literally annihilates the creaturely attributes of the creatures which He sanctifies, and resuscitates them providing them with His own divine attributes[214] this is the "essentialisation", tajawhur[215] of the saint who ultimately is personalized by a miracle of grace, "Such as he is in himself, eternity finally charges him"[216]

Conclusion

The text which explains best the doctrine of the Hallājian sanctification is the prayer al Hallaj recited in prison" the day before his execution on Monday 25th March 922 (23rd Dhu al qada

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212 Ms. Sulaymāniyah, 1028, XXV, f°s 10-11.
213 AI Hallaj discards it in a fragment preserved by at Sulami, Tafsir, on Qur. LVII, 3 (end). Ja'far Sādiq admitted it (Baqli, tafsir, f° 265b).
214 In at Sulami, tafsir on Qur. XXX, 45.
215 The word comes from at Jildaki.
216 . S. Mallarme, Le Tombeau d'Edgar Poe.

309). There are few texts more certainly contemporary, and whose importance is better ascertained than this by the variety of recensions available:

(follows the diagram of 5 recensions, pp. 202-205)

Note: This text figures in an account of al Hallaj's last moments. It comes from his "khadim" Ibrahim ibn Fatik[217] who had been imprisoned together with him. Ibn Fatik is a well known Sufi[218]. If certain accounts put under his name and related to al Hallaj, can be questioned[219], the one before us is undoubtedly contemporary, since it was published by the great Qadi ibn al Haddad al Misri who died in 345/956,[220] highly esteemed by the Shafi'ite judiciary and the Sufi circles as well. In translation the text reads thus:

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217 Hamd, son of at Hallaj, notes expressly in the introduction of the account published by Ibn Bakuyeh (in bidāya).

218 Abu al Fatik Ibrahim Baghdadi ibn Fatik ibn Sa'id: son of a Syrian Shaykh of Bayt al Maqdis (Jerusalem) (following Harawi, 'Tabaqāt ..'. cf. 1059-a-27°). "Rawi" accepted by al Qushayri (Risala, ed. Ansari, IV. 4, 97). Not to be mistaken, as it has happened, with his brother Abu al 'Abbas Ahmad, surnamed al Razzaz (Jami, Nafahat .., 170.

219 In Akhbar al Hallāj Whereas the isnad of the recension borrowed by al Khatib from al Sulami carries one single intermediary between al Sulami and al Misri: Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn at Qaffāl al Shāshi, a recognized Shafi'ite jurist who died in 365/975)Haji Khalifah, ed. by Fluegel, II, 639; III, 413.

220 Abu Bakr Muhammàd ibn Ahmad al Kināni àl Misri, surnamed "ibn al Haddad" and "Abu al Hadid"; born in 264/877, died in 345/956; jurist, disciple of al Tabari, then Shāfi'ite, author of the Kitab al Furst': this book was Wide spread among the Sufis (cf. Ibn Khallikān, ed. Bulaq 1859, I, 163; Fihrist 1, 235;

"Here we are: in Thy Witness[221] we must seek refuge, and clarity in the splendour of Thy glory, so that Thou mayest make manifest of Thy power and Thy decree that which Thou hast willed. For Thou art the God in heaven, and the God on earths![222] O Thou who irradiatest (through the universe) according to Thy will as on the day when Thou tookst on the Most Beautiful Form" (the human form)[223] in order to irradiate, according to Thy decree: the Form which then carried[224] the Spirit, only Witness to Thee by knowledge, eloquence and freedom!

Since then, it is (me), Thy present Witness, that Thou hast invested with the "essential personality".[225] And just as of old Thou closest my essence to represent Thee (among men),-when,- grace, after grace,- Thou causest the recognition (and proclamation) of my essence as the supreme Essence[226],- and as I showed the realities of my knowledge and of my miracles,- and in my "Ascensions" rose up to the thrones of my pre-eternities, from where I spoke the word that became creative of my creations[227]

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221 Theory of the "Shahid, cf. p. 140

222 Recension B here adds: "O Thou hast unrolled the course of the ages and hast given shape to the space, - before Thee the substances humiliate and the accidents prostrate themselves, - from Thee the bodies receive coherence and the laws exemplarity!"

223 In Adam. Cf. Qur. XCV, 4.

224 B: who was …cf. al Kharraz, I.c. above, p. 132.

225 The "Hawa huma", the power to say "he" in the name of God.

226 Allusion to the "Ana al Haqq!" (note 2 of Baqli, p. 205).

227 From the point of view of his supernatural existence (as man) as being his own "creation", "barriyah" (note 4 of al Baqli, p. 205.

So, now, I am here (again at Thy disposal),- to be exposed in public,

executed, put to the gallows and burnt,- my ashes being scattered to the winds and the waters,

For, to speak the truth, a single grain of this aloe (—my ashes)[228] which is going to burn for Thee, lays for the future temple of my apothe oses[229] a foundation larger than the largest mountains!"

The rhythmical antitheses of this prayer which, in front of the pre-eternal splendours of the "Rūh" - Join the graces of the election so intimately with the hardships of the impending execution, - resound like an echo of words that were spoken in supremae nocte coenae (=in the night of the Last Supper), within sight of the Cross, according to the Gospel of Saint John: "Now, Father, it is time for you to glorify me with that glory I had with Thee before ever the world was.[230]"

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[228] Under the root "نج: ينجوج و الافجوج العود الذى يتبخربه" Lisan al 'Arab, ed. 1300, II. 198). The wrok is used in a hadith on Adam's fall from the Parasise (fc. Ibn al Athir, Gharib al Hadith, s.v.)

[229] My body risen, transfigured and glorious.

[230] John VXII, 5. compare with S. Paul, Ephes., I, 4: (= Before the world was made, he chose us in Him, to be holy and spotless, and to live through loe in his presence.).

INTUITION IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY

BY: Dr. Riffat Jehan Dawar Burki

In Iqbal's philosophy great emphasis has been laid on 'intuition' as a mode of knowledge. The word 'intuition' is derived from a verb which means 'looking at', and its extended use seems to have originated as a metaphor from sight.[231] "It would stand, presumably, for a mental inspection in which a direct revelation is made to the mind, comparable to the direct revelation which accompanies the exposure of physical object to the eye.[232] The word is used in the works of Descartes and Locke to mean the apprehension of indubitable, self-evident truths. Descartes explains how intuition is "not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgement that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the pure intellectual cognizing of which an unclouded and attentive mind is capable, a cognizing so ready and so distinct that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we thus intellectually apprehend."[233] Locke describes intuitive knowledge as "the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to

[231] Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition" Reason and Intuition and other Essays, London 1954 P. 3.
[232] Ibid.
[233] Descartes quoted in Aaron, R. I. "Intuitive knowledge" Mind London October 1942 Volume LI No. 204 pp. 297-298.

the perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is perfectly filled with the clear light of it."[234] Hence the traditional philosophical meaning of 'intuition' is knowing with absolute certainty, or knowing in such a way that there is no room for doubt.

Possibility of intuitive knowledge

Kant in showing the limitations of pure reason had also demonstrated the impossibility of 'intuitive' experience without which metaphysics and religion are not possible. But paradoxically enough in proving the relativity of the finite objects of experience to the intelligence, he also showed "though without himself being fully conscious of it, and almost, we might say, against his will, that we cannot admit the validity of the empirical consciousness without admitting the validity of the consciousness of that which, in the narrower sense of the word, is beyond experience."[235] It can be seen clearly from his Lectures that Iqbal is very anxious to show the possibility and validity of the intuitive consciousness. If intuitive experience is possible then it follows that both metaphysics and religion are possible.

Kant had rejected the possibility of metaphysics because it dealt with that which could not be systematized by the categories

[234] St- John. J. A, (Editor). The Philosophic works of John Locke, London 1843. p. 386.
[235] Caird, E. "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time" Essays on Literature, Glasgow. 1909. p. 195

of space and time and therefore, in his opinion, could not constitute knowledge, But supposing, says Iqbal, that there is more than one kind of space and one kind of time, then it is quite possible "that there are other levels of human experience capable of being systematised by other orders of space and time—levels in which concept and analysis do not play the same role as they do in the case of our normal experience."[236] Iqbal agrees with Kant in regarding space and time as subjective but he does not look upon them as unvarying modes into which all our knowledge is moulded. Rather, they admit of new meaning in relation to various grades of experience and their import varies as psychic powers increase or decrease. [237]

Iqbāl has devoted a considerable portion of his Lectures to discussing the question of the nature of Space and Time. It was necessary for him to do so in order to demonstrate the possibility of levels of experience which were free from the "normal" spatiotemporal determinations. The importance he attached to this question can be gathered from his words, "In the history of Muslim Culture, we find that both in the realm of pure intellect and religious psychology, by which term I mean higher Sufism, the ideal revealed is the possession and enjoyment of the Infinite. In a culture with such an attitude the problem of Space and Times becomes a question of life and death,".[238] In the course of his discussions Iqbal has reviewed the various conceptions of Space

[236] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam p. 183.
[237] Enver, I. H. Metaphysics of Iqbal, pp. 12-18
[238] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 132

and Time held by thinkers from the ancient to the present times. Iqbāl's conception of Space and Time forms a very interesting part of his thought. He distinguishes between kinds of Space and Time, and points out there are levels of experience which refer not to these forms of experience in their ordinary connotation, but to "the interpenetration of the super-spatial 'here' and super-enternal 'now' in the ultimate Reality."[239] Such an interpenetration suggests "the modern notion of space-time which Professor Alexander, in his lectures on Space, Time and Diety regards as the matrix of all things."[240]

Iqbāl believes, then, in potential types of consciousness which lie close to our normal consciousness and yield life and knowledge.[241] Such knowledge is gained through intuition. Iqbāl describes the main features of intuitive experience when he enumerates the characteristics of mysticism which deals with the ultimate by way of intuitive apprehension."[242]

Characteristics of Intuitive (Mystic) Experience

(a) The characteristic of intuition which has traditionally been most emphasised is its indubitability. "Intuitionism is the theory which asserts, in the face of all asceptical criticism, that absolutely certain knowledge occurs in human experience."[243] Iqbāl states

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[239] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 137.
[240] ibid.
[241] Ibid. p. 185
[242] Undehrill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism ? Relativity, Logic and Mysticism. p. 151.
[243] Aaron, J. J. "Intuitive Knowledge" Mind October, 1942 Vol. LI No. 294 p. 317

that according to the Qor'an, the heart of 'qalb' (the seat of intuition) is "something which 'sees' and its reports, if properly interpretd, are never false."[244]

(b) It is immediate experience of Reality. A notable writer on mysticism writes, "we can claim for those whom we call mystics—and, in a lesser degree, for innumerable artists and contemplative souls—that experience at its fullest and deepest does include the immediate apprehension of an unchanging Reality, and that this apprehension, in one form or another, is the sheet-anchor of the religious consciousness."[245]

Intuitive experience is direct like perception but sensation is not involved in it. As Plato said, intuitions come "in a flash."[246] Iqbal says:

عشق کی اک جست نے طے
کر دیا قصہ تمام
اس زمین و آسمان کو بیکراں
سمجھا تھا میں

[247](BM-e-Jibril, p. 29)

[244] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 16
[245] Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism disperse with Mysticism," pp 149-150.
[246] Aaron, R. I, "Intuitive Knowledge" p. 317.
[247] In one leap love traversed the whole length, I had thought that the earth and sky were boundless.

or, as he says in the Introduction to Zabur-e-A jam

وادئی عشق بسے دور و دراز
است ولے
طے شود جادۂ صد سالہ باھے
گاھے

[248](Zabur-e-A jam, p. 2)

For Iqbal the immediacy of mystic experience lies in that in it God is known as other objects are known. "God is not a mathematical entity or a system of concept mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience."[249] As Ibn Arabi pointed out, God is a percept not a concept.[250]

(c) Intuitive experience possesses an unanalysable wholeness. In it Reality is given as one indivisible unity. Iqbal compares intuitive consciousness with discursive consciousness. "When I experience the table before me, innumerable data of experience merge into the single experience of the table. Out of this wealth of data I select those that fall into a certain order of space and time and round them off in reference to the table. In the mystic state, however vivid, such analysis is not possible."[251] A writer

[248] Very far and wide is the valley of love, But there are times when the journey of a hundred years is completed in the duration of a sigh, (Translation by Singh, I. The Ardent Pilgrim p. 168.
[249] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 18
[250] Ibid. p. 183.
[251] Ibid. p. 18.

observes that, here, Iqbāl is denying, by inference, that immediacy to normal experiences which he associated with them earlier.[252] But a closer analysis shows that Iqbāl is not denying the immediacy of sense-perception but rather trying to show the relative importance of analysis in the two types of consciousness. The rational consciousnes specialisess in analysis and synthesis but in the mystic consciousness all the diverse stimuli run into one another forming a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinctness of subject and object does not exist.[253] The distinction between the discursive and intuitive consciousness as regards the apprehension of part and whole has also been brought out by H.H. Price. "In discursive consciousness, there is a passage of the mind from one item to another related item, for instance, from a subject to a concept under which we classify it, or from premises to conclusion...And when we have discursive consciousness of a whole or complex of any sort (as in counting) although the whole may be vaguely present to the mind from the first, yet definite consciousness of the whole comes after consciousness of the parts. In intuitive consciousness, on the other hand, consciousness of the whole comes before definite consciousness of the parts. And there is no passage of the mind; whatever we intuit is present all at once. We might say that intuitive consciousness is "totalistic", not "progressive" or "additive".[254]

[252] Rahman, F. "Iqbal and Mysticism" Iqbal as a Thinker
[253] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 18-191.
[254] Price, H. H. Perception, London, 1932, pp. 151-152.

(d) Intuitive experience is objective. Iqbal thinks it is erroneous to think that the mystic state is "a mere retirement into the mists of pure subjectivity."[255] The mystic, for instance, experiences God or the ultimate Reality as both imminent and transcendent. He is in direct communion with the 'Other' and momentarily loses consciousness of himself as a distinct and private personality.[256] But he emerges from his experience possessing "a Supreme Richness — unspeakable Concreteness — overwhelming Aliveness, having been a witness to that Being which gives Becoming all its worth".[257]

Iqbal compares the objectivity of intuitive experience with the objectivity of social experience. We know other minds only by inference and yet "the knowledge that the individual before us is a conscious being floods our mind as an immediate experience.[258] One test of the objectivity of our social experience is that other persons respond to us. Iqbal bases the objectivity of religious experience on the testimony of the Qo'ran that God responds to our call: "And your Lord saith, call Me and I respond to your call" (40:62) "And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh unto them and answer the cry of him that crieth unto Me." (2:182).[259]

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[255] Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in Iqbal's Philosophic System p. 12.
[256] Ibid.
[257] F. von. Hugel quoted by Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism? p. 152.
[258] Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the System of Iqbal, p. 13.
[259] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 19-20

Iqbal advances another argument to substantiate the claim that religious experience—which is based on intuition—is objective. "The very fact that religious life is divided into periods indicates that like the student of the scientific method, the practical student of religious psychology learns to sift experience critically in order to eliminate all subjective elements, psychological or physiological, in the content of his experience with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective."[260]

To meet the charge that intuitive experience is purely subjective, Iqbal points out a number of times that intuition is not a faculty of knowledge qualitatively distinct from reason or perception, but rather as a quality which is implicit in cognition at every level.[261] Thus while intuition is feeling, this does not mean that it is purely subjective since feeling itself has cognitive content as Bradley and Whitehead have shown.[262] In Iqbal's opinion, this may be seen if we reflect on the character of our knowledge of our Self. Man rises from the intuition of the finite self to the awareness of life as a centralising ego and the ultimate experience of God as a universal, unifying, toile power.

(e) Intuitive experience is incommunicable. One of the most oft-repeated objections to intuitive experience is that being incommunicable, its reality cannot really be established. To this Evelyn Underhill would reply: "If impressibility be indeed the criterion of the real, as some philosophers have dared to

[260] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 197
[261] Whittemore, R. "Iqbal's Panentheism" Iqbal Review April. 1966. p. 70
[262] Ibid.

suggest—and this leads us to the strange spectacle of a Real World laboriously keeping pace with the expanding vocabulary of man—not only our mystical but our highest aesthetic and passional experiences[263], must be discredited; for it is notorious that in all these supreme ways of human knowing and feeling, only a part of that which is apprehended can be expressed; and that the more completed and soul-satisfying the experience the more its realization approximates to the mystic's silence where all lovers lose themselves."[264]

According to Iqbal, the incommunicability or inexpressibility of mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect.[265] But intuitive experience has a cognitive content which can be translated into idea. Feeling is outward—pushing as idea is outward reporting.[266] The mystic reports not directed but through symbols and "the wonder surely is not that these reports tell so little; but—when we consider our human situation and resources—that they tell so much. The reports are always oblique, but so are the reports of all artists; of whom it is probably true to say that the greater the aesthetic values which they seek to communicate, the more oblique is the method involved."[267]

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[263] Ibid.
[264] Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism." p. 153.
[265] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 21.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Underhill. E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism" pp. 153-154.

(f) According to Iqbal, intuitive experience reveals Reality as an eternal 'now' and reveals the unreality of the serial character of time and space.[268] "All intense religious experience—more than this, all experience in which transcendental feeling is involved—appears to be accompanied by a marked slowing-down of consciousness, a retreat to some deeper levels of apprehension where reality is experienced not merely as succession but as existence: a genuine escape from the tyranny of "clock-time", though not a transcendence of duration."[269]

But according to Iqbal this state, does not abide, although it gives a sense of overwhelming authority to those who have experienced it.

Both the mystic and the prophet return to levels of ordinary experience, but for Iqbal the return of the prophet is of greater meaning than that of the mystic.[270]

(j) Mystic experience springs from the 'heart' but it is not qualitatively different from 'normal' experience. According to Iqbal, the seat of intuition is the 'heart' which in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception."[271] Professor Nicholson tells that in mystic thought, "the qalb, though connected in some mysterious way with the

[268] Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 13.
[269] Underhill, E. "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism"?. p. 157
[270] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 22-23
[271] Ibid.

physical heart, is not a thing of flesh and blood." Unlike the English 'heart' its nature is rather intellectual than emotional, but whereas the intellect cannot gain real knowledge of God, the qalb is capable of knowing the essences of all things, and when illuminated by faith and knowledge reflects the whole content of the divine mind, hence the Prophet said, "My Earth and My Heaven contain Me not, but the heart of My faithful servant contains Me."[272]

Iqbal does not regard intuitive experience as 'mysterious'. It is "a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word does not play any part. Yet the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience."[273] Iqbal differs from William James who regards religious experience as being completely unconnected with normal experience. According to William James, religious experience cannot be deduced by analogy from other sorts of experience. It refers to a wider spiritual environment which the ordinary, prudential self cannot enter.[274] Iqbal, on the other hand, extends the sphere of normal experience to cover mystic experience, since whatever be the mode of knowledge, it is the same Reality which operates on us.[275]

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[272] Nicholson, R. A. The Mystics of Islam. London 1914 p. 68
[273] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 16.
[274] Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 21
[275] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 18

(h) Intuitive experience reveals life as a centralising ego. It makes us aware of "the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organizing principle of unity, a synthetic activity which holds together and focalizes the dispersing dispositions of the living organism for a constructive purpose."[276] The intellect tries to reduce the rich variety of experience to a concept, but intuition does not proceed by universalization and as a consequence is able to reveal the true character of concrete things, namely, that every living entity converges upon an egohood.[277] Like the existentialists Iqbal holds that the intuitive consciousness grasps Reality not in an abstract theoretical way but in a decisively personal manner.[278] This 'intuitive insight into individual essence' has been aptly described by Mr. Roth writing on the philosophy of Spinoza: "Abstract recognition passes into concrete appreciation. Man is then conscious of nature as a unity, but not as before from the outside. He feels it in himself; he understands its wholeness in and from his own being. He thus not only contemplates externally the ways of the universe in which, like everything else, he is caught up. He not only sees himself as one item in the detail controlled by an all-embracing cosmic order. Nature for him is more than an abstract whole of general laws. It is a concrete system of self-directing individualities. He knows himself in it as an individual, and realizes his place in it among

[276] Ibid. op. 61-61.
[277] Malik, G. R. "The Nature of Ego" p. 45
[278] 'Erfan, N. "What is Common between the Existentialists and lqbal" p. 26

other individuals. He grasps both himself and things, not in their universal aspect only, but in their unique singularity."[279]

[279] Mr. Roth quoted in Stocks, J. L. "Reason and Intuition". p. 12.

THE CONCEPT OF THE MAGIAN SOUL IN OSWALD SPENGLER'S "Decline Of The West": An Evaluation

Kamal Muhammad Habib

I

ORIGINALITY per se could be a rather risky affair. A work like Der Untergang des Abenlandes is possibly a work entailing that risk: it is an attempt at the interpretation of various cultures, but such an effort is more often than not likely to overemphasize certain points and to minimize or underscore others. What is however unique about the work is the vast—indeed, staggering—array of facts which the author has marshalled in support of his hypotheses, and by any measure even its adverse disclaimer will have to admit the grand design and the dedication of the author to his viewpoint, Spengler's avowed purpose in it is to show that the "Second Cosmos" or World History has a different content and a different trajectory or movement when contrasted with the "First Cosmos" (Nature) insofar as it obeys Shiksat (Destiny) against the law of causality operative in Nature. He also intends telling his fellow-Europeans that, as with all cultural souls, the epiphany of the Western intellect and material prosperity which has lasted for some half a millinium is about to draw to its close.

It is but natural that in such a work certain discrepancies and manifestations of unevenness are bound to be displayed. Spengler is obviously not at home with certain cultural souls, such as the

Chinese, Aztec, and South-East Asiatic. Certain other facts to which he refers for the establishment of certain premises are awkwardly inaccurate, e.g., when he refers to the Civil War between Othman and Ali (A.D. 656-61) as an "expression of a true Fronde."[280] Similarly, Spengler has overemphasized the various similarities between the different Semitic culture-souls and the Persian civilization, but his attempt at the creation of a unitary pattern—that of the "Magian" culture—has resulted in the advancement of the theory of historical pseudomorphosis (in which an entirely different or older civilization is submerged under the high flood-tide of a more recent and dominating civilization, e.g., the Russian under the Faustian since the time of Peter the Great,[281] Syriac under the Roman and the Aztec under the modern European). It has been held by Toynbee to be "one of the most illuminating of his intuitions."[282] That too is perhaps an understatement; it is perhaps, oneof the brightest spots in historiography.

Thus, while one might reject Spengler's hypothesis of a unitary Magian soul (the term, Magian, in itself is entirely non-Arab) pseudomorphosis should prove to be a very useful medium in the determination of the impact of one civilization over another, sometimes in a staid, at others in a bravura fashion. The unfolding of a complex picture—and that too on the canvas of

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[280] D.W., II, p. 424.

[281] Ibid., p. 192.

[282] Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, XII, p. 670.

world history—could never be a simple task, but Spengler has not shirked from it, whereas most of the others have.

No writer can free himself from the debt he owes to his predecessors in his field of work. Spengler is no exception to this generality. The foundation for such a work—this is not to say that Spengler does not bring to bear the flashes of his intuition into his 935-page Decline—was laid by Vico in 1725 with the publication of his Principles of a New Science Treating the Common Nature of Nations (Principii d' una scienza nova) and represents a revolt against the Newtonian concept of history. Nietzsche, with his dictum, "God is dead", emphasized the sterility of the modern age, with its image-making powers having become extinct. Nietzsche's influence on Spengler, as also on his contemporaries, is visible in the Decline. Both betray positivistic overtones.

The German romantics, and Herder in particular, had postulated a return to the mediaeval past of Germany, and this might help to explain (as suggested by Dawson) in part at least Spengler's anti-intellectual and relativistic attitude. For Spengler, each culture possesses its own ethos and "feel" which results in certain characteristics enchorial to each culture in spite of its undergoing interaction with other cultures. Even, if such an interaction results in pseudomorphosis, the original characteristics of the culture, nevertheless, assert themselves in the long run. Each culture therefore possesses its own soul, can feel its pulse alone, and has its own characteristic expressions which manifest

themselves in architecture, literature, music, and belle lettres. It also pictures world history in its own way.

The appearance of the Magian culture, according to Spengler, dates from the time of Augustus "in the countries between Nile and Tigris, Black Sea and south Arabia"[283] whose picture of world history is cavern-like, with everything pre-ordained and for which "the When...issues from Where"[284] Such a civilization would, on Spengler's analogy, look to hte planets. (dominated as it is by the clear cerulean sky) to determine auguries and portents pertaining to individual and collective destinies as typified (according to Spengler) by the Chaldeans. Here there is neither the Apollonian body-sensuousness nor concern with the mere present nor the symphonization of the individual will. The individual, on the other hand, looks on life as a series of constant expectations. The flux of life is thus viewed apocalyptically. The Magian concept of time also is cavern-like, since both the creation and the end of the world have been pre-ordained by the Creator.[285]

Another characteristic feature of the Magian culture adumbrated by Spengler is that the Magian man worships one God (whether He is called Yahweh, Elohim, Ahura-Mazdah or Marduk-bal) who is the the principle of good, all the other deities being evil or impotent.[286] One might stretch Spengler's hypothesis further, and on his analogy also say that Neus (Plotinus'

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[283] Ibid, p 183.
[284] D.W., p. 238.
[285] Ibid, pp. 174, 209, 215.
[286] D.W., p. 206.

transcendent First Principle), Annum of the Akkadians, and Enlil of the theolgians of Nippur (Mesopotamia) could also be so categorized. In this connection the Muslim philosopher, Iqbal, says: "If this view of the prophetic teaching is meant to apply to Islam, it is obviously a misrepresentation. The point to note is that the magian admitted the existence of false gods, only he did not turn to worship them. Islam denies the very existence of false gods...Spengler fails to appreciate the cultural value of the idea of the finality of prophethood in Islam. No doubt, one important feature of magian culture is a perpetual attitude of expectation, a constant looking forward to the coming of Zoroaster's unborn sons, the Messiah, or the paraclete of the fourth gospel. I have already indicated the direction in which the student of Islam should seek the cultural meaning of the doctrine of finality of prophethood in Islam...It may further be regarded as a psychological cure for the magian attitude of constant expectation which tends to give false value of history. Ibn-i-Khaldun, seeing the spirit of his own view of history, has fully criticized and... finally demolished the alleged revelational basis in Islam of an idea similar, at least in its psychological effects, to the original magian idea which had reappeared in Islam under the pressure of magian thought."[287]

Iqbal does, however, concede the growth of a Magian crust over Islam as practised by certain sects but he strongly criticizes Spengler for the latter's postulation of the cavern-concept and on

[287] M. Iqbal, Lectures, pp. 144-45.

his ignorance of the existence of "I" as a "free centre of experience" as an expression in the religious experience of Islam.[288] I shall, however, revert to a detailed discussion of this and allied aspects later on. In the meantime, however, it would be well worth pointing out that it is actually the grouping by Spengler of the Semitic Sumero, Akkadian, Assyrian, Chaldean, Syeriac, south Arabian, Judean, primitive Christian and Muslim cultures with the non-Semitic Iranian civilization that is most open to question.

Turning to the cavern concept—the visualization of closed space and time—this view, even if it were applicable to the so-called Magian man, is not any different from that held by the physicists and astronomers of today, whether they are the exponents of the steady-state or explosion theory, on the probable evolution of the cosmic system. At a distant time (thousands of million years ago) the element of Destiny or Chance led to the formation of hydrogen and thence to the higher elements, after which the coalesence of particles commenced, leading, finally, to life. Likewise, the end of the solar system (of which our world happens to be a part) is equally pre-ordained (the radioactive process undergoing in the sun and the energy loss under-gone by it in the energy process has been worked out in detail by Hans Bethe), so that, in the ultimate analysis, it is doubtful if the concept of time attributed by Spengler to the Semitic world-picture is applicable to it in the sense in which it is meant by him.

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[288] Ibid., pp. 143-44

Nor is it in any way different from the modern scientific (or shall we say the Faustian?) concept of time, whether considered on the cosmic, physical, biological, and rhythmic time levels.

An intriguing point about Spengler's characterization of the Magian soul is its expression as displayed through its architecture. According to Spengler, in the Magin architectural design it is "a definite roof that is emphasized (whereas in the other domain the protest against the classical feeling led merely to the development of an interior)".[289] This is an acute, if a rather generalized, observation. The Byzantinian dome built over the centre of the basilica created the impression of dividing off the interior, and the art of balancing the dome over a square is a Byzantinian contribution.[290] The effect produced by chiaroscuro—that in which the shades alternate and present a non-sensuous pattern—should be absent in the Byzantinian mosiacs on Spengler's supposition. The Byzantinian art however is a compromise between the Hellenic and Aramaean spirits. The Greek sense of pro-portion and the "newly released Armaean energy concentrated on thin, small, and easily portable miniatures."[291] The arabesque design, which Spengler attributes to Magians, was more probably due to the Armenian-Iranian non-Semitic influence, as exemplified by Naqsh-i-Rustam, and was carried to the farthest limits of perfection by the Arabs in Spain. However, if Spengler holds cupola to be the basic expression of the Magian

[289] D. W., I, p, 210
[290] Sir Steven Runciman, Byzantinian Civilization, p. 258
[291] Ibid., p. 267

culture in terms of the roof-concept, then the Aramaean architecture represents a radical departure from the Iranian architectural expression. The latter is based on square-shaped columns and flat roof, e.g., the Xerxes Hall of Hundred Columns which had a wooden vault once. The art of making stained glass has been brought to Europe by the Byzantinians. The Achaeminid and Sassanid architecture of Iran bears close resemblance with the Indian Hindu and the Far Eastern Hindu (e.g., the Angkor temple in Tahiland) architecture. In the Zoroastrian fire temple it is the interior—more so than it is in the Hindu temple—that is shut off from the exterior.

In the Muslim architecture, however, open spaces predominate, more so than in the Western churches and synagogues. Generally, the mosque is transepted into a hall which is closed from three sides and from which the imam leads the prayer. The hall is contiguous with a courtyard which is generally larger than the hall and bears a roof. It might be possible that Spengler's idea of Muslim architecture was largely derived from the architectural pattern of the Church of St. Sophia in Istanbul converted into mosque by the Turks after the fall of Constantinople in A.D. 1453.

The earlier Iranian sculpture also takes more after the Hindu than the classical mode; it is sensuous and non-proportionate. The contours of the body, ornaments, and the overall general pattern (as in the pre-served statue of Anahita, the gooddess of waters and fertility) is sharply reminiscent of the Ghandara statues and

nudity which is singularly absent in the Arab-Byzantinian art or in the latter-day Iranian art itself, is not abhorred. In the field of poetry also Persian and Arabic poetry are far apart. In the corpus of Arabic poetry we find similes outnumbering metaphors and a very extensive vocabulary, with strong emphasis on the narrative, which is amply displayed in parables. Persian poetry, on the other hand, by and large, is metaphorical, with images transfigured into metaphors. In the result, Persian poetry is mainly abstract and metaphorical and singularly lacking in contours. The description of Raman Sahira in the Shahnamah is an instance of contourless delineation; her appearance is conveyed to the reader through generally employed similes. Arabic poetry, on the other hand, describes the contours fully and sensuously. A narrative poet like Imr-al Qais would perhaps be closer to Homer than to Firdausi in spite of the latter's substantial Arabic background. Persian poetry primarily believes in images which recall features vaguely than in bold concrete descriptions. Its attitude is therefore classical, if "classical" implies the deliberate rejection of realism and the adoption of a formal style.

It is also hard to believe that Islam as a world religion should not have felt the impact of cultures which it has absorbed or displaced. Islam in Al-Magrib, the Sudan, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, Central Asia, southern Russia, the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and West Africa would naturally absorb the "soul-expressions" of the cultures in these areas and, in many cases, even retain the animistic substrates of the original cultures which it has either overwhelmed or displaced. The same process has

been experienced by Christianity in Latin America, Haiti, the Caribbean islands, and in many parts of Africa. Possibly visitations to shrines and graves of saints are the reliquae of the animistic residue which has become part of the collective unconscious of the Muslim community of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

Having made a few general observations on Spengler's concept of the Magian soul and what it stands for in the Decline, it would perhaps be germane to our purpose to examine the racial cultural components of the soul, viz., those that extend from Iran to Asia Minor in the north and from the latter to south Arabia in the south. It is to be seen whether Iran and the Semitic areas grouped by Spengler with it on the basis of its argument that both obey the principal Magian characteristics and constitute a unitary pattern which could be fitted into the Magian culture-soul. Linguistic and anthropological evidence, how-ever, points to the Aryan or Indo-European origin of the Armenians and Iranians, and, if the pre-Islamic Sassanid Iran cannot be regarded as a sibling of the Semitic culture during the period envisioned by Spengler, then Spengler's hypothesis obviously suffers from certain serious drawbacks. In effect, it is to be seen whether Spengler is justified in grouping Iran during the Sassanid period with the Semitic cultures as constituting a Magian whole. Although the considerations might at first sight strike as being empirical, there are broader aspects that transcend the bounds of empiricism and are fundamental.

II

Whatever the origins of the religions of great civilizations, with their history shrouded in the horizons of the distant past, it might be legitimate to infer that no civilization is insular enough not to borrow from other civilizations either coeval with or preceding it. During the second millennium B.C. considerable trafficking by various races occurred in the Mesopotamian and Anatolian regions, mainly by the Hittites, Mitannians, and the Kassites, who belonged to the Indo-Aryan linguistic group. The continguity of the frontiers between the Iraqi and the Iranian regions accelerated the process of racial admixture, with the original Iranian cast being reinforced by the Semitic, and the original Sumero-Akkadian racial pattern being rendered more complex through interaction with the Aryan racial invasion. One such direct exchange of ideas might have occurred in the case of Zoroastrians vis-a-vis Judism, and later on in Christianity.

Spengler gives rise to what might constitute the hub of a controversy by asserting rather boldly that the Sassanid empire was the nation of the "Persian" people, and that in the Sassanid period the belivers were of Semitic origin. For Spengler, there are no "proto-Persian people branched from the Aryan."[292] He further elaborates the above point by averring:

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[292] D.W., II, p. 168

"The Persians of the Sassanid period no longer conceived them-selves, as their predecessors of the Achaeminid times had done, as a unit by virtue of origin and speech, but as a unit of the Mazdaist believers, vis-a-vis unbelievers, irrespective of the fact that the latter might be of Persian origin (as the bulk of the Nestorians were), so also with the Jews, and later the Mandaeans and Manichaens, later again the Monophysite and Christian—each body felt itself a legal community, a juristic person in the new sense."[293]

In other words, what Spengler implies is that, whatever the con-figuration of the Iranian culture during the early period—that is, that of the Medeans and the Achaeminids—the "soul-expression" of the Zoroastrian-based Iranian culture had become Magian both in thought in spirit, with the Ohrmazd-Ahriman dualism (with evil victorious in the middle and good triumphant in the end) leading to the worship of one god, and Ahriman symbolizing the evil god. One classic parallel which might be cited here is offered is that of Egypt since the advent of Islam. Till the advent of Islam, Egypt went through a period that was akin in many ways to the Seleucid period in Iran, but the Hellenization of Egypt had proceeded further because of its geographical proximity to Greece and Rome. Its population, preponderantly Hamitic, had first had Hellenic, later on Aramic, and finally Arab infusions. But a transformation of such kind can be better explained on the basis of pseudomorphosis than by asserting that

[293] D.W., II, p. 69

there is no pro to-Hamitic component in the Egyptian-Arab culture. It is possibly the momentum of such a pseudomorphotic transfiguration that counts. One might see the same process at work in Al-Magrib, with the original Berber, Nilotic, and Nordic casts being flooded by the Arabic: in the result, North. Africa has become the avant grade of Arab renaissance.

Unfortunately, no tangible evidence which could lead on to the spoor of the religious beliefs of the pre-Zoroastrian Iran is available. But what could be inferred is that, consequent upon the extinction of Assyria and later of Chaldes and the ascendancy of the Medeans, the extent of ex-change between the Semites east of Syria and Iranians increased: the transfer of the Jewish population from Jerusalem to the land of Medes accentuated and furthered this exchange. It is perhaps equally justifiable to assume that modification in the pantheon of a culture is not always the result of borrowing, and may be arrived at independently. At the same time the myths of the same culture may be contradictory. Such is the case, for example, with the Sumerian and Mesopotamian eschatology. One Sumerian version of the after-life suggests a "land of no return", a vast space somewhere underground where Ereshkigan, the Sumerian Demeter, and Nugal, the god of war and pestilence (and her husband) reign, and yet another version states that the sun lights the underworld, and Utu, the sun-god, pronounces judgment on the dead.[294] It would therefore be a rather bold hypothesis to advance that one culture has borrowed

[294] George Roux, Ancient Iraq, p. 91.

the components of its pantheon directly from another and has not arrived at them on its own. In the Mesopotamian eschatology also the dead spirits had to cross a river by ferry, as in the Greek. Roux suggests:

"...The famous Babylonian 'pessimism' was much more than a temporary outburst of despair. It was metaphysical in essence...The Tigris-Euphrates valley is a country of violent and unexpected changes...Each spring, therefore, a great and poignant ceremony took place in many cities and especially in Babylon: the akitu or New Year festival which combined the Sacred Marriage of the gods. the great drama of Creation, and the annual reinstatement of the king, and culminated in the gathering of all the gods who solemnly 'decreed the Destinies'. Only then could the king go back to his throne, the shepherd to his field. The Mesopotamian was assured that the world would exist for another year."[295]

Such an attitude does not substantially differ from the ancient Hellenic propitiation of the gods through immolation. It has been claimed that the concept of after-life came to Judaism through Zoroastrianism, but it would seem that the very germ of the concept of after-life was present in the Mesopotamian theology and, if Judaism did borrow the concept of after-life, Babylonia might well have been as good a source as Zoroastrianism. The fact is that we do not know. Much has also been made of Zoroaster's postulation of monotheism. The concept however of

[295] Ibid., p. 93

the external world as the projection of the mind of the mind of God is not the preserve of one people alone; it is the nature of the concept and not the mere elementary postulation that is more important. Speaking of Akhnaton (Ikhnaton), White remarks:

"This view of cosmos and reality is world-wide. In Egypt we. find it expressed in the conception of the god Ptah. In his early days Ptah was the patron of architects and craftsmen. But eventually he became the supreme mind from which all things were derived. The world and all that is in it existed as thought in his mind—and his thoughts, like his plans for building and works of art, needed but to be expressed in spoken words to take form as material realities."[296]

Thus in Egypt, in the 14th century B.C. monotheism was established by Ikhnaton. As for Breasted's contention that "consciously and deliberately by intellectual process he (Ikhnaton) gained his position" or that he was the "first individual in history"[297] is an altogether another matter. Be that as it may, what can be said with certainty is that, given proper environment, multiple cultures can postulate analogous thought-attitudes to theology.

One might therefore wonder whether, in considering Zoroastrianism, it would not be profitable to invoke Spengler's hypothesis of pseudomorphosis and to regard the original Aryan-

[296] Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture, p. 234.
[297] J.H. Breasted, Encyclopedia Britannia, 14th Ed.

Iranian substrate as the foundation on which the edifice of the Zoroastrian theological system has been constructed. The Zoroastrian theological system incorporates several basic characteristics which were inherent in the Aryan-Vedic culture and its pantheon. The chief point of difference lies between the geographical situations of Iran and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The Vedic theological system because of the, as it were, closed geography of the subcontinent, remained impervious to impact from foreign cultures to the extent of Iran. Buddhism therefore possibly represents an internal revolt and an overflow resulting in a different configuration, as the Vedic culture soul could not suffice for the complex and enlarged world picture that was unfolding itself with riotous rapidity before its view. The case with Iran was altogether different; it was open to osmotic pressure from all sides. The Kassite, Barthian, Sumero-Akkadian, Armenian, Judean, and Hellenic influences—both on intellectual and racial planes—interacted with, and finally modified, the original Iranian pantheon. Mesopotamia underwent the same process of interaction. Kassites, an Indo-Aryan people, who invaded Mesopotamia from Luristan, immediately to the south of Hamadan, governed the country from 1594 to 1171 B. C. As result of the Kassite influence, the Mesopotamian pantheon of the period incorporated such Indo-Aryan deities as Shuriash (Ind. Sury), Maruthash (Ind. Marut), and Buriash (possibly identical with the Hellenic god of north wind, Boreas). These deities occur

side by side with the Sumero-Akkadian gods, Kashahu, Shipak, Harbe, Shumalia, Shuqama, etc.[298] The same process, it is more than probable, occurred in Iran during the formative period of its cultural expression.

If the *Gathas* are taken to be the guide, a rather clearer picture emerges. Zaehner has dwelt on this point in some detail. The Iranian *devas,* for instance, correspond to the Indo-Vedic *Devas.* The Indo-Aryan Sarve or Rudra who later turns up as Siva runs parallel to the Iranian Saurva and Nanhaitya to the two Naslyas or Asvins of the Vedic texts. The *devas* themselves were regarded by Zoroaster as malilicent powers who refused to fulfil the commands of Ahura-Mazdah or the Wise Lord.[299] The Rigveda recognizes two types of deities: the *asuras* and *devas.* The former are removed from man, and possess cosmic significance--that is, they are more concerned with the right ordering of the cosmic system. The *devas* are regarded as being closer to man, and, what is more, are associated with the advancing Aryans into the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.[300] But the collective unconscious of the Iranians during the thousands of years covering this migratory process and the appearance of Zoroaster had produced a considerable body of changes both in the Iranian pantheon and in the theological system.

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[298] George Roux, *Ancient Iraq,* p. *202.*

[299] R .C. Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroasterianiam, p. 40

[300] Ibid., p. 39

Now Spengler's view is that, by virtue of the intense Zoroastrian vizualization of the struggle between good and evil, Zoroastrianism is Magian through and through. If the latter-day Zoroastrianism is adopted as the standard, this might well be the case. Zoroaster's antithesis was that of *Asha* (Truth) and *Druj* (Lie). Such an antithesis is derived from the Rigveda. It is the Iranian prophet who brought this duality to the forefront. In the later-day Zoroastrianism, less so during the Achaeminid, Seleucid, and Arsacid periods, but with the display of a remarkable intensity during the Sassanid period, the original Aryan concept of the dualism between Truth and Lie was made to crystallize as one between Ahura-Mazdah and Ahriman. This dualism, as pointed out by James, is also reflected in the Judeo-Christian eschatology and angelogy, and occurs time and again "in relation to dualism and the concept of evil".[301] Whereas in the Gathas, Ahura-Mazdah, who later personifies the principle of good life, is regarded as the twin author of Spenta Mainyu (the good) and Angra Mainyu (the evil), the latter-day expanding world-picture which faced the "Magians" of the Sassanid era (A.D. 224-650) probably rendered the solution insufficient, and hence arose the Ohrmazd the latter-day version of Ahura-Mazdah)-Ahriman duality. A simple theological system was thus made more and more complex.

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[301] 22. E.O. James, The Ancient Gods, p. 281

Zaehner claims that this transfiguration of the Vedic gods, such as the devas, derives from Zoroaster's world-vision which is rooted in the pastoral conditions of his time. He observes:

"He (Zoroaster) does not, however, start from any abstract principle, he starts from the concrete situation as it faced him in eastern Iran. On the one side, he found a settled pastoral and agricultural community devoted to the soil and the raising of cattle, on the other hand he found a predatory, marauding society which destroyed both cattle and which was a menace to any settled way of life. The gods were like unto them: never were they good rulers, delivering over, as they did, the ox to fury (aeshma) instead of providing it with good pasture."[302]

It has not been found possible to ascertain and pinpoint the birth-place of Zoroaster. Nyberg assigns the place of his birth to some-where between Oxus and Jaxartes, inhabited by savage tribes, before the conquest the region by the Persians. He also ascribes to the prophet the role of a shaman.[303] Such a hypothesis Nyberg bases on the principal desiderata of shamanism which are the two requirements of equal importance, the ordeal and the Maga. It is on this basis, according to Nyberg, that the whole edifice of Zoroastrianism has been constructed, and from which have been derived the concepts of after-life, ordeal by molten metal, and judgment. Herzfeld, the noted archaeologist, attributes to Zoroaster in his Zoroaster and His World the role of a crafty

[302] R.C. Zaehner, The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, p. 40
[303] H.S. Nyberg, Die Religionen des Alten Man, p. 45

politician. A study of the Gathas would however show him to be a man of sensivity and deep insight, cast in the mould of Ikhnaton.

It would therefore be fair to conclude that Zoroastrianism first grew on a pattern similar to that obtaining with regard to the Indo-Aryan pantheon, but that ultimately, through its interaction with the other extraneous—mainly Semitic theological systems—diverged from its original course. For instance, in the Sumerian mythology the first man is Adapa whose loss of immortality results from his blind disobedience and who is condemned by Anu to pass his days on earth as a mortal. Similarly the fall of Man described in Genesis might have influenced the latter-day Iranians, as is amply shown by the legend of Mashye and Mashyane in Bundashisn, a Pehlavi text describing the origin of the world. The legend finds no mention in the Gathas and is clearly of a later provenance. Likewise, Ahriman represents an extension and embellishment of the original concept of Deaf (Lie) as postulated by Zoroaster, to which the latter-day theologians added their own panoply of symbols and exegeses, so much so that Mani, although he retained the names of the original Zoroastrian deities, rejected the dualism of good and evil as abstract principles. In this context Cornford observes.

"...no student of Orphic and Pythagorean thought will fail to see between it and the Persian religion such close resemblance that we can regard both systems as expressions of one and the

same concept of life, and use either of them to interpret the other."[304]

James holds that Aristotle extends recognition to the affinity existing between the dualism of the Magi and the Platonic distinction between Form and Matter. He further affirms:

"The Pythagoreans made a similar distinction between the principles of good and evil, corresponding to the contrast of soul and body. For Empedocles, these primary elements of 'roots of things' were held together by two contrary forces, love and hate, producing a state of tension with order and harmony emerging from strife and discord and the reign of chaos. All constructive forces of reality arose from love but only as a temporary measure destined to give place to the dominance of discord as the ever recurrent sinister element in the world".[305]

This basic correspondence has, however, emerged as a very dominant characteristic of Iranian cosmogeny and religion, with a colouring of its own (Spengler has not discussed the Apollonian dualism of virtue and wickedness in unequivocal terms which accorded recognition to such a dualism). This would naturally lead us to question Spengler's assertion about the classical man that "only concretes ..condensed into being for him".[306]

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[304] F.M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p. 174

[305] E.O. James, The Ancient Gods, p. 283.

[306] D.W., p.402.

Mani's dualism was that of light (spirit) and darkness (matter). In Mani's philosophy Zurvan was the father of light and Zurvanisnn was used as an instrument for the creation of a welded Iran by uniting its heterogenous components during the Sassanid period. The concept of God had also become vastly different. Zoroaster had originally vizualized the world and flesh as "the projection of the mind of God": the latter-day Iranians, were, however, led into other ways of thinking. In this context it might again be worth our while to quote Zaehner:

"Zoroaster's God creates ex nihilo—he thinks the world into existence. Both the Greeks and the Indians, howeyer, accepted it as axiomatic that nothing can arise out of nothing, Either, then, God emanates both the intelligible and sensible orders from himself, or he gives form to an eternally existing final matter. It was the latter view that prevailed in the Sassanian orthodoxy, and we find it explicitly stated (in Denkart, ed. Madan, 250. 3-4 and Sikand Gumanik Vichar, 6) that no form can be brought into being from not being, nor can it be made to return thither. Creation is no longer a philosophically respectable idea; the prophet's insight had been forgotten and the Sassanian theologians became the yictims of two alien (i.e., Indian and Greek) philosophies which had no roots in Iran."[307]

Something very similar had happened in Egypt. Ikhnaton having died in about 1369 B.C., his successor, Tutenkhaten, abandoned lkhnaton's monotheism in order to placate the priestly

[307] R.C. Zaehner,--The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism, p. 199

class. The resemblances, however, between the early Zorastrianism and the Semitic religions (particularly the earlier ones, especially Judaism and Christianity) are so pronounced as to trigger off attempts to determine whether it was chronologically at all possible for Zoroaster to have been influenced by some source which came not from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent but from the Semitic lands. Toynbee is essentially correct in suggesting that Zoroaster "turned his back on the Irano-Indian pantheon", and that "he saw the godhead as singular, not plural, and as being righteous, not as being the morally indifferent source of Evil as well as Good."[308] Toynbee's tentative suggestion is that Zoroaster might have been influenced by the Israeli exiles who, according to 2 Kings XVII. 6 and XVI11. 7 were settled by the Assyrians in the "cities of Medes" consequent upon the capture of Samaria and the decimation of Israel in 722 B.C.[309] But he also keeps the alternative view (and this seems to be much more probable) in sight that the similarity between Zoroaster's vision and Deutero-Isaiah can also be explained not as a result of "stimulus diffusion in either direction, but as a result of independent similar reactions to similar experiences."

It therefore seems probable that the configuration of the Iranian culture-soul is complex in the extreme. The original overlay of the Indo-Aryan pantheon and life-view were submerged under Zoroaster's monotheism. This monotheism

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[308] Arnold J. Toynbee, A Stndy of History, XlI, p. 435.

[309] Ibid., p. 435

later on sinks under the complex flood-tide of ideas pouring in from all directions. Nevertheles, if the configuration of the Iranian culture during the Sassanid period is to be examined from the Spenglerian theory of the Magian soul, the non-Magian characteristics of the Iranian culture during this period would be: the Magil (rather ironic, but then the Magi constituted a phalanx of inherited priesthood, and like, the Brahmins, were originally philosophers and teachers to the Achaemenid kings; Judaism, since the days of the Judges, did have an inherited priestly class, e.g., the Cohens, but Christianity and Islam have none); the ritual, particularly with respect to the Hama plant, which correspnds to the Indo-Aryan Soma plant; and the conflict between Asha and Druj which was stretched by some of the magi to the Zurvan-Ohrmazd-Ahriman triumverate, with Zurvan-Time existing co-eternally with them. Indeed, Ahriman is so intensely Iranian that one would hesitate to arrogate to it any Magian colouring in the Spenglerian sense. The Magian characteristics of the Sassanid Iran, on Spengler's analogy, would be the concepts of Apocalypse, Resurrection, Reward and Punishment, and the non-mortality of soul. If, however, the examples of Marcion and Ibn Daysan, the Syrian philosopher, are taken as parallels, then one might also show that Ibn Daysan was of Persian origin and Marcion's. philosophy rested on the rejection of the Old Testament.

There is another very important point about the pre-Islamic Iranian culture soul, and this might well be considered from Spengler's concept of the form of culture soul Iran's is a very old civilization and one therefore wonders why it should not be

allowed to stand on its own in the Sassanid times. The Sassanid influence has persisted even to this day in one form or the other. Firdausi, a Muslim, displays at times the residue of fatalism that characterizes much of the pre-Islamic Iranian soul-expression. Sal, the father of Rustam, when summoned by the king to appear before the Magian priests who put to him several riddles, says about time that it is like a wood-cutter, and we, men, are like grass to him.[310] This is how Omar Khayyam also visualizes life. He is at times an epicurian, stoic, and at other times displays expiatory moods, but all through his Rubayat runs the strand of unmistakable fatalism.

This strand of fatalism runs through Persian poetry in one form or the other and the genre of ghazal (lyrical poetry) which later gained ascendency over the other genres amply attests to this. Persian poetry is the poetry of desire but of non-fulfilment, of idealization accompanied by timorousness lest the ideal be shattered. Almost utterly non-sensuous, it is unlike the Western poetry or, for that matter, any other poetry. It shows a clear departure from the Sanskritic poetry, since the principal characteristic of the latter is equilibrium, of which Kalidasa's Shakuntala is a patent example. It approximates somewhat to the European Mediaeval Courtly Love, but is more sublime and noble. The Iranian mysticism has a colouring of its own; fulfilment both in the realms of temporal and religious love becomes a marathon—indeed, almost a Sisyphean—task. No

[310] Firdausi. The Shahnamah,, ed. Vullers, 208-11.

poem could illustrate this high—almost-out-of-reach—degree of idealization than the Mantiqat-i-Tayr (The Paraliament of Birds) of Farid-ud-din Attar which is a splended allegory, with the various birds symbolizing the spiritual evolution of man. Attar postulates the journey of life through seven valleys of search. This is not to say that the Iranian mysticism and poetry in general have not been influenced by Arabic: indeed, the influence of the latter has trans-formed the vocabulary, symbolism, and the thought-structure of Persian. But, even keeping the Arabic influence in sight, a good deal of difference is visible on the surface, notwithstanding the symbols and allusions bequesthed by Arabic to it.

Whereas Arabic is a vigoruous language, having a vast storehouse of words as wide and panaromic as as the expanse of the Arab desert, Persian is, by and large, metaphorical, volatile, and hauntingly fatalistic. It is abstract and eschews contour-drawing; but primarily it reflects the conflict between escapism and fatalism.

For instance, Hafiz says:

از قال و قیل مدرسه حالے ولم
گرفت
یک چند نیز خدمت معشوق و
مے کنم
کی بوددر زمانه وفا جام ومے بیار

تامن حکایت جم و طاؤس کے کنم

"This heart of mine is oppressed with the catechism of how and why. Let me for some time at least serve the beloved and the liquid ruby.

When was there any fidelity in our world? Come; let us regale ourselves with wine and with the stories of Jamshed, Kaus, and Kai."

Even behind this apparent jocularity lurks the unmistakable Iranian fatalism. It is not a conflict between catechism and delight, but between the individual intellect and reality which the poet finds so oppressive and which has very little to offer him.

The poetry of the post-Islamic Iran has an individuality of its own, and, if it resorts to Arabic symbols, it is also irresistibly drawn towards the myths and symbols of an age that lies beyond Rudagi, beyond the Sassanid, even beyond the Achaeminid, and the Medean eras, to the primoridial past of Iran when its racial consciousness had its birth. This is the age which Firdausi so longingly visualizes.

One is therefore led to believe that since the Safavid period the Iranian culture-soul has been trying to discover and thereby retrieve or revive its past heritage through the employment of new symbols from its glorious and chequered past, witness the poetry of Pur-i-Dawud. Whereas the Arab language has unified heterogenous people, such as the Berbers, the Sudanese and the Hamites, and has conferred upon them the Arab mode of

thought, the Iranian, though Muslim, is essentially non-Arab in his soul expression.

Pur-i-Dawud, rather well known for his penchant towards the purgation of non-Persian words, concretizes the longing of Firdausi

when he says:

گراز ستم کیتی آتشکده شد ویران

درکاخ دل افروزم کالون اوستارا

"If through the cruelty of Destiny, the Fire temple is quiet, still shall I enkindle anew, in the receptacle of my heart, the altar of the Avastha."

The maqtah (last verse) of another celebrated poem by Pur-i-Dawud echoes the same idea in rather more drastic terms:

اگر پرسی ز

کیش پور داود

جوان پارسی

ایران پرستد

"If one asks the creed of Pur-i-Dawud, he would say: Let the young Parsi (Persian) worship Iran only."

The modern Iranian, for Pur-i-Dawud, should be a throw-back on the original Zoroastrian.

The alternatiye suggestion that might therefore be advanced in this context is that during the Sassanid period Iran underwent a process of pseudomorphosis (in part, at least), retaining some of the original Iranian characteristics. No Semitic religion before the latter-day Zoroastrianism had raised Satan (or Eblis) to the pedestal of Ahriman, for and against whom even the planets join into the fray.

III

The nexus in the Spenglerian thesis regarding the unitary nature of the Magian culture is the worship of one God, who is the principle of good, whereas the other deities are either impotent or evil (e.g., Ahriman), that is, they have either been relegated to a secondary position ritually or otherwise or have been interred deep within the collective unoconscious of a community to erupt all of a sudden and then subside and so on. Instances of such a kind are provided by the Old Testament, to which reference would be made later.

The corpus of the Faustian or Western literature would, however, go to show that this peculiarity, if it at all obtains in the Magian culture, is not endemic to it alone, and that the acknowledgment of an impotent deity can be made on a symbolic level also. Milton's Paradise Lost written during the "summer" of the Faustian period displays a rather potent Satan, and the Romantic evaluation of the role of Satan as the real hero of the

epic has demanded considerable effort at rebuttal. The same thing more or less could be said of the Dark Angel and Mephistopheles. Evil as a concept had been trans-figured into a symbol both in the Renaissance drama and poetry. But even otherwise evil was a crucial point for discussion and polemics during the Reformation period. In Paradise Lost the character of Satan has undergone a change in keeping with the more complex world-vision, and, instead of being an extraneous, depersonalized force, he emerges as force lying latent within the intellect, emerging at times with shattering effect. Withal he persists. Lionel Johnson's poem, The Dark Angel, is rather illustrative of this transfiguration. For Johnson, a Catholic poet of fin de siecle, the immanence of the Dark Angel derives from his harbourage within, who can at best be sup-pressed but not destroyed. In other words, this is the symbolic transfiguration of the anthropomorphic Ahriman. The modern Christian attempt to evolve a kenotic concept of God (that is, in which God has emptied His characteristics in Jesus) is also an attempt to resolve the question of evil.[311] Later on, in this essay, I shall have the occasion to discuss how Islam has dealt with the problem of evil.

[311] In the letters and fragments written by Nietzsche Dionysos and the Crucified merge into one symbol. Holderlein celebrates in his last hymn the union of Jesus and Dionysos. The gnostic theogeny of the early 17th-century mystic Bohme also provides just another garb to gnosticism in his Everlasting Yes and Everlasting No. (Jacob Taubes, On the Nature of the Theological Method: Some Reflections on the Methodological Principles in Tillich's Theology, The Journal of Religion (Jamiary 1954)

It is generally thought that, with the conclusion of the covenant between God and Moses, Judaism became a purely monotheistic religion. This conference is, however, rather debatable. Mere belief in one God is something different from the practice of monotheism. In Isaiah (6:1-2) we read:

"In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphims: each one had six wings; with twain, he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly."

God is thus visualized in clear and unequivocal human terms. This naturally means that the prophet's mind, as presented through the medium of the Old Testament, has not been able to present the attributes of God in non-reified terms. Man's conceptualizing faculty, based on a sequential and sensuous world, obviously fails to express the non-external world which is the preserve of the religious and mystical experience alone. Christianity has evolved further and demonetized the Hebrew concept of God; but in its totality the abstract concept of God, beyond the ordinary mundane understanding of man, has been conveyed to man in the Quran, and the Quran, alone.

Even though idolatry had been abolished in Deuteronomy 12, with the period probably around 1451 B.C., notwithstanding this edict, till as late as 705 B.C. and 621 B.C. Hezekiah and Josiah had to purge Solomon's temple of the brazen serpent, Nehustan; the

god, Baal; the goddess, Asherah; and the heavenly bodies. In 2 Kings 23,4 we are told:

"And the king commanded Hilkiah the high priest, and the priests of the second order, and the keepers of the door to bring forth out of the temple of the LORD all the vessels that were made for Baal, and for the grove, and for all the host of heaven; and he burned them without Jerusalem in the fields of Kidron, and carried the ashes of them unto Bethel."

The above passage substantiates Toynbee's view that the Hebrewes, who had by this time built up agricultural settlements were subject to certain traditions which were being practised in Syria at the time, e g., rural prostitution which was an agricultural fertility rite common to the Syrian and the Sumero-Akkadian civilizations, and that "at this stage of religious development it was natural that the peoples of Syria, including those that were Yahweh-worshippers, should each tolerate and even welcome of its neighbour's god with its own national god."[312] It was from the time; of Elijah and Elisha that monotheism, based on a new vision, was reinforced by the Ecclesiastes, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, amongst others.

The Jewish eschatology also underwent a change. Thus, Ecclesiastes (9: 10) says:

[312] Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History, XII, p. 425

"Whatever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom in the grave whither thou goest."

Prior to Isaiah the Jewish belief in after-life was confined to sheol—a shadowy, depersonalized existence that would be the fare of all men, whatever their deeds on earth—which has something in common with the Sumerian eschatological legends and the Sumero-Akkadian pessimism. It has been categorically affirmed by eminent authorities on comparative religion, particularly by E.O. James and R.C. Zaehner, that contact with Zoroastrianism makes Daniel conscious of after-life. The concept of Reward and Punishment also occurs in Isaiah (26:19) and Job (19:25-26), besides Daniel (12:2) but one wonders whether the matter is all that simple: there is also the possibility that the Israelite exiles in Babylon during the Chaldean days might have drawn on Sumerian eschatology which postulated in some of its versions judgment by the sun-god, Utu, on the dead.

While we do not know as to who borrowed from whom and how far during the period leading to the decline of Assyria and Chaldea, the relevance of all this to Judaism—and for that matter to all religions—is that each religion, with the passage of time, has to face up to a changed environment and expanding world picture. The Aivlik Eskimo, for instance, believes death to be a temporary sleep; soon the body will reawaken, and life therefore is above time. Ideas such as these possesses the germs of the immortality of the soul. But the Eskimo had almost no contact

with foreign cultures till the recent times, and his theological system had sufficed for him for the time being. No teleological or ontological apercus were required for the simple reason that his life was simple and confined to chores that just led him to survive. Not so with the Classical and Semitic worlds: history did not pass them by as it did the Eskimo; they made history. It would therefore be a bold task to ascribe or pinpoint either the extent or the period when any such borrowing was effected with any degree of certainty.

Regarding the ancient syncretism, Spengler claims: "The Roman people admit that the circle of its own gods is momentarily bounded... According to its sacral law, the annexation of foreign territory involves the addition to Urbs Roma of all the religious obligations pertaining to this territory and its gods—which of course logically follows from the additive godfeeling of the Classical."[313]

Mention has already been made earlier of the array side by side with the Sumero-Akkadian deities of the Indo-Aryan Kassite gods during the first millenium B.C. in Mesopotamia. The additive god-feeling of the Classical world was nothing new and on Spengler's analogy, considering the latter-day theological structure of Iran, the immigration of the Iranian god, Mithra, as Mithras to Rome during the latter-day pre-Christian Roman Empire, and the Kassite syncretism, might not one ascribe the additive god-feeling

[313] D.W., I, p. 405.either in the panoply of symbols or has invisibly penetrated deep into the fundamental precepts of Islam.

to have been a characteristic of the Indo-European group? Also, Mithras who had to compete with one God of Christianity was not just confined to the sensuous world; he becomes the saviour who frees the human soul from the trammels of the purely mundane existence controlled by the hostile Zodiac and the planets, themselves the agents of a blind fate, Ananke. On Spengler's analogy, which adopts sensuousness as the prime measure by which the Classical world is to be judged, even though Mithras would still be enveloped by sensuousness, the Classical man was at least making an effort to move out of the confines of the senses to some-where beyond. I would however, discuss this point towards the concluding part of this essay from another angle. In the original Zoroastrian pantheon, Mithra (Ind. Mitra) ranks second to Ahura-Mazdah only and is the just judge who, assisted by Rashnu and Sarosha (whence the modern Persian word, sarosh) judges the soul of men in accordance with how they have lived on earth.

If Spengler's statement about the preponderance of one god and the impotence or wickedness of the secondary gods, if any such gods are either symbolically or ritually acknowledged in Islam, bears any relevance it is this: we must determine whether there is any such deity or any deity that is masked by any overlay of monotheism, whose worship has been suppressed in Islam, but who nevertheless exists.

We are naturally led forth to Satan. Iqbal has discussed the position of Satan in Islam rather acutely and brilliantly in his

Lectures.[314] He interprets the Fall of Man not as the result of Original Sin but as an exercise of the expression of free will which had its birth in the consciousness of Adam and Eve. Satan in Islam never emerges as the equivalent of the Satan of Paradise Lost or the Dark Angel of Lional Johnson, but"represents--clearly and unequivocallya!-nafs-al-ammara, which in turn, denotes the uncontrolled, appetitive soul; extension of the concept would lead us to Satan symbolizing division in the ethical substance of man and the distortion of free will. What is perhaps more relevent for our examination is the fact that the Quran altogether dispenses with the story of the Serpent and thereby eliminates the importance allotted to Satan in Genesis (3). In Genesis (3:7) after the commission of the Original Sin by man we are made to read: "And they heard the voice of LORD GOD walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of LORD GOD amongst the trees of the Garden."

Such a description—the discevery of the Original Sin after the lapse of a certain period—obviously tends to represent God in purely human and sensuous connotations. In Genesis (3:5) the Serpent says to Eve:" "God Both know that in the day ye eat thereof (i.e., the forbidden fruit)... your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." In the Quranic version, on the other hand, all description militating against the concept of God as the omnipotent and omniscient being has been

[314] Iqbal, Lecture pp. 82-3, 86-7.

utterly eliminated. In the Book of Genesis Adam and Eve try to hide themselves from the presence of God (the implication is obvious). In the Quran they try to hide their nakedness with the leaves of Paradise. In the Genesis version Adam and Eve still think that they can deceive their Creator; in the Quranic version they discover the enormity of the sin, and feel con-trite. In the corresponding version of the Quran God addresses both of them immediately after the commission of the Sin. In the Biblical version Eve emerges as the more culpable of the two, having induced Adam to partake of the fruit; in the Quranic version the apportionment of blame is equally distributed.

Iqbal's interpretation of the Fall of Man is worth quoting: "The 'Jannat', mentioned in the legend, cannot mean the eternal abode of the righteous...In the second episode of the legend the garden is described as a 'place where there is neither hunger, nor thirst, neither heat, nor nakedness'. I am therefore inclined to think that the 'Jannat' in the Quranic narration is the conception of a primitive state in which man is practically unrelated to his environment and consequently does not feel the sting of human want, the birth of which alone marks the beginning of human culture."[315]

It will be also seen that the God of the Book of Genesis (1) if He creates the world ex nihilo ("And God said, Let there be light; and there was light"), He still retains certain anthropomorphic

[315] Iqbal, Lecture pp. 82-3, 86-7.

traits ("And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from darkness"). Such traits present God in purely conceived terms, for the Divine lies beyend the conceptual sensuous limitations of man. Such a representation of God, however, has been absolutely eliminated from the Quran. Further, since the Being of God in the Islamic theology is entirely different—in the sense that man is limited by his senses, time-sequence, and dimensions—no interaction between a dimensionless Being and Satan, who cannot be so, is possible. Islam thus eliminates the Ohrmuzd-Ahriman duality completely without any kind of equivocation being possible.

Since the Quranic version states that Adam and Eve hope to achieve immortality by eating the forbidden fruit, they are mortal and this might well point to the assertion of free will for the first time by man. Since man by his very nature is governed by senses and time sequence, the absence of any time sequence in the sense that we under-stand it is an impossibility, and therefore the banishment of Adam from Paradise symbolizes his re-adjustment—that is, he asserts his free will and brings himself into a closer and more harmonious relationship with the world which he inhabits.

Islam represents the acme of monotheism for several reasons. In the first place no other religion has no many symbolic connotations (isma ul uzma) with regard to the transcendent attributes of God as Islam—connotations through words that can be used for God alone. Rehmat, Fazal, Qehr and a host of other

attributes and their derivatives-(ninety-nine such attributes have been mentioned in the Quran) have raised God to a symbolic plane having no parallel in other religions. But even otherwise many other facts stand out. Genesis, for instance commences with the fact of the creation of the world by God. The Quran, on the other hand, commences with man's relationship with God. And not only that, He has been called rabul-Alarneen, that is, the Lord of the cosmos, not of the world or the solar system which we inhabit, alone, but of the total expanding universe. Surely, in suchconcept, the most transcendental, the farthest that has been bequeathed to man, no anthropomorphic or near-anthropomorphic attributes could be possible.

It is rather surprising that Stace, in his rather thoughtful essay, Space, Time and Eternity, should have averred: "The Islamic conception of God is deeply anthropomorphic, and the notion of His personality and consciousness belongs rather to the positive than the negative conception, and direct affirmations of the nothingness are not as a rule to be found in Sufi literature."[316]

Surprisingly enough, Stace does not refer to the Quran but only to Jili and ibn al Arabi, the Muslim mystics. It has been emphasized at many a place in the Quran that the time of man and the time of God are entirely different, and, since Stace's contention is that intuitive understanding of God must evolve symbolic connotations, of the array of expressions by which an

[316] H.A.R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, ed. S. Shaw and W. R. Polk, pp, 183-4.

attempt is made to convey the idea of God to man, Islam has by far the largest such array. The concepts of God, the Eternal Non-Being (or "Esse est Deus" or Meister Echart and "The Everlasting Yes-the Everlasting Nay" of Jacob Bohme), lies more in the domain of theology—that is, in the elaboration of the basic concept—than religion. The basic first essential is the concept of God as the First Principle. Neither in the New Testament nor in the Quran has the negative concept of God been emphasized; in the New Testament He is the God of Love, in the Quran the God of Compassion (rehmat). Secondly, Stace departs from his own analogy in attributing anthropomorphism to Islam, since in his view Islam presents the positive aspect of God. Man's dimensional and conception-based mind, attuned to a universe of flux, to anabolosm and catabolism interlocked in repetitive cycles, cannot seize the understanding of a Being that is dismensionless, immutable, ineffable omnipresent, and omnipotent, since the dimensions are entirely different: and, if the vaguest of understandings are seized by man through intuition, it cannot be translated into an expression that would be understandable by him. The clossest such understanding has been provided by the Quran alone.

It is true that the Gospel of St. John (Chapter 1,1-3) carries the concept of God far beyond that of Isaiah insofar as it describes the world as the creation of the mind of God through the word (Logos) that was with Him. Nevertheless, the ineffable majesty of God, the supplication of man (without any reservations whatever) before Him and His Will, and His transcendental

attributes scale their apogee in the Quran only. Here for the first and the only time has the concept of God been blended within the framework of the narrative, Gibb distinguishes between two kinds of animistic symbols: those that have patent and unconcealed animistic associations and those that have assumed a sublimer, higher significance. As an instance of the latter, he cites Hijr-i-Asvad or the Block Stone and the Christian Eucharist, which has transposed 'the temple sacrifices and pagan sacrificial meals."[317] In the Muslim theology Hijr-e-Asvad carries a very deep significance because of its association with the sunnat of Prophet Abraham, of which Islam is the culmination. In all of the three Semitic religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all animistic associations have been discarded, so that the Spenglerian thesis from this angle regarding the existence of important deities could also be definitely refuted.

In Islam the doctrine of Ressurection is fundamental to the religion; it derives from the Quran. Judaism presents no clear cut picture as has been mentioned above. In Christianity, on the other hand, the place of this doctrine is peculiar. It owes its origin to St. Paul (Acts 17: 32), Jacques Choron's remarks in this context are rather apposite:

"But is it not more realistic to assume that the doctrine of resurrection was propounded by St. Paul because he believed it to be true, and because it is a more satisfying one?...It was a time when in Rome the commerce in pills of immortality was thriving,

[317] Jacques Choron, Death in Western Thought, pp. 84-5.

and mystery rites to cleanse the body and prepare it for transfiguration and elevation were a daily occurrence. It is into this troubled and horror-filled world that the news burst that resurrection was actually witnessed. Death, this great terror, was after all not what it appeared to be—the invincible power, the inescapable faith. It had been conquered—the dead will rise again."[318]

It is rather plausible to assume that St. Paul, being one of the most clear-sighted of men, had clearly visualized resurrection independently and as a logical corollary to the teachings of Christ. As a matter of fact, the concept of after life in Christianity and Zoroastrianism held entirely different significance.

Another concept which Spengler claims to be specifically Magian is that of Ijma (consensus):

"...in Magian there is no individual ego but a single Pneuma present simultaneously in each and all of the elect, which is likewise Truth...In the Magian world, consequently, the separation of politics and religion is impossible, whereas in the Faustian culture the battle of the Church and State is inherent in the very conceptions, logical, necessary, unending. In the Magian civil and ecclesiastical, laws are simply identical. Side by side with the Emperor of Constantinople stood the Patriarch, by the Shah was the Zarathrustatema, by the Exilarch the Geon, by the Caliph the Sheikh-ul-Islam, at once superiors. and subjects. In the

[318] D.W., II, 242-5.

constitution of Diocletian this Magian embedding of the state in the community of the faithful was for the first time actualized, and by Constantine was carried into full effect."[319]

In its ultimate analysis, the statement would seem to imply that there was general areement in the M Magian cultural units on the theocratic structure of the State, whatever their other differences, and that this was facilitated by a single Pneuma or soul uniting the religious community. Daring the early Muslim polity there was no Sheikh-al-Islam by the side of the early Caliph;, and especially during the days of the Pious Caliphs, who, as the Companions of the Holy Propet (peace be on him) were absolutely independent to give their own judgments and dispensations. Nonetheless Islam definitely postulates a theocratic state, and Ijma constitutes, besides the Quran, hadith (sayings of the Prophet), and qiyas (analogy), the basic juristic principles of conduct for the Muslim. It is also equally true that consensus operated in Israel, the Byzantinian Empire, and the Sassanid Iran. The first Oecumenical Council at Nicea is certainly an example of consensus in the context implied by Spengler insofar as it brought to an end the antagonism between Church and State, and made Constentine Isapostalos, the Thirteenth Apostle.

The fact, however, is that secularism, the separation of Church from State, is a phenomenon that owes its sharply defined origin from the Renaissance period in Europe. (In its vaguely defined and nebulous state, it has been latent in the history of

mankind from the very beginnings in the art of governance.) It was then that Henry VIII became the Defender of the Faith in England, and Germany sank in prosperity and culture during the century dating from the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War to the end of the Thirty Years' War.

But, in one form or the other—whatever its external trappings might have been—the conflict between secularism and theocracy has been a recurrent feature of the Muslim history also. Islamic theocracy ceased to be an instrument of government and enforcement of sunna after the decline of the Umayyids.

Spengler's contention, however, is that secularism is endemic to Europe. The history of the post-Renaissance Europe would however show that it is a sort of compromise between two sections—the one insisting on the enforcement of dogma in the administration of the State, the other insisting on aligning itself with the exigencies of the situation. Germany (i.e., the area constituting Germany till the beginning of World War I) which is slightly more than half Protestant now, could not afford to be non-secular, because of the compromise that secularism generated between the infallibility of the Pope and the Papal decree on the one hand and opposition to the suzerainty of a supranational authority, on the other. Such conflicts however arose in lands in the very heart of Catholicism also. An example of such a conflict is the issue of a Bull of Excommunication by Pope Sixtus against Lorenzo dei Medici, not on heretical grounds but simply because the latter was acting counter to the interests of his nephews. Only

it so happened that this break asserted itself more expressly during the Reniassance period. It is rather for bringing about an adequate adjustment—according to the exponents of secularism—that secularism has now become an accepted principle in Europe and America. The same thing is more or less true of the clericism of France and the appointment of the soverign of Britain as the Head of the Church of England.