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# **SPIRITUALITY AND SCIENCE: CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?**

Seyyed Hossein Nasr

In a world torn by contention and strife at every level, from the spiritual and intellectual to the physical, those in quest of the creation of peace and harmony have often turned to the task of seeking accord-between spirituality and science. The contemporary landscape is in fact filled by such efforts many of which, although based on the best of intentions, only contribute to further chaos in the present day world. Many such attempts substitute sentimental wishing for reality and ambiguous definitions and positions for the clarity and rigour which alone can disperse the fog of ignorance that blurs the vision of present day humanity travelling on a road that becomes even more perilous thanks to a large extent to the lack of critical discernment in the relation between a knowledge derived from the senses and its consequences and the wisdom which descends from revelation, intellection or illumination. The "harmony" between science and spirituality, characteristic of much of the so-called New Age mentality in the West and also numerous Westernized Orientals who speak without a clear definition of the concepts involved and modes of knowledge and consciousness at play within the boundaries of what is to be harmonized and unified, is itself one of the sources of discord and cacophony in a world in which intellectual, discernment, so long a hallmark of all metaphysical traditions especially those of India, is too easily sacrificed for ambiguous and disruptive accords which cannot but lead to discord as long as one mistakes the rope for a snake.

The subject of the relation between religion and science, and for those embarrassed by the use of the term religion then spirituality and science, remains for other reasons, of paramount importance in a world in which on the one hand a science of nature based upon power and dominance over nature rather than the contemplation of its ontological and symbolic reality reigns supreme as the only legitimate form of knowledge and is almost deified and certainly absolutized while its practitioner appear more and more to the masses at large as priests wielding ultimate authority over human life

and even determining its meaning. And on the other hand, the demands of the Spirit and the quest for the spiritual still continue unabated for they are woven into the very texture of human existence, and if anything the very threat to human life on earth brought about by the applications of modern science have only increased this yearning of late as seen in the revival of religion throughout the world and the even greater flowering of "home grown" and exotic forms of so-called spiritualities as well as aberrant mutations of Oriental teachings, in even the most secularized parts of Western society. In the light of this situation it is therefore necessary to ask before delving into the question of convergence or divergence exactly what we mean by science and spirituality in the context of the present discourse.

The definition of science might appear to be simple if one only uses the current understanding of the term in English and not in fact French or German where the terms science and Wissenschaft have more general connotation. In English the term science implies a particular way of knowing the natural world based upon empirical and rational methods and excluding by definition other modes of knowledge based upon other epistemological and ontological premises. Of course, even in English we do use such terms as Chinese, Indian, Islamic or Buddhist science because such a basic term as science derived from *scientia* cannot, become completely limited to its positivistic, operational, empirical or rationalistic meaning. In the latter case, that is, if we were to think of let us say Chinese or Islamic science, then the relation of such a science to spirituality would be very different from what exists today when one limits the term science to its main current English usage. This difference is due to the fact that the traditional sciences are based on very different cosmological and epistemological principles from modern science. For the purpose of this discussion, however, we shall define science as that body of systematic knowledge of nature, combined with mathematics, which grew out of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century on the basis of earlier Latin Islamic and Greek sciences. This limitation is quite unfortunate, especially in a discourse given here in India, and because so little attention has been paid by Oriental as well as Western scholars to the relation between spirituality and the traditional sciences of nature. And yet the crisis is not in that domain but is to be found in the confrontation between the modern Western scientific world view, now

spread over much of the globe, and the spirituality which has flowered over the millennia within the gardens a various religions of the world.

The definition of spirituality is, however, more problematic because of the very ambiguous manner in which it has been used during the past few decades. The origin of the usage of this term in European languages is fairly recent, that is, within the past century or two, where it was first used in Catholic circles. Only recently has it become widely used, often as substitute for religion and for some in opposition to it. Words used in Oriental languages to denote spirituality usually reflect the etymology of the word as coming from spiritus or the Spirit. For example, in Arabic the term ruhaniyyah is a prevalent translation, the term coming from al-ruh which means precisely spiritus, without the meaning of the Arabic term having become in any way ambiguous. In the modern world, however, which is characterized by either the denial of the Spirit as an objective, ontological reality, or its confusion with the psyche, what can spirituality even mean? Most often it implies a vague yearning for meaning and the experience of the noumenal while settling for the psychological instead in forgetfulness of the truth that the Spirit manifests itself according to certain principles and only within the great traditions of celestial origin. And if the Bible asserts that "the Spirit bloweth where it listeth", this only points to the exception which proves the rule.

Once traditional criteria of the reality of the Spirit and laws of its manifestation as contained, in various tradition such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam are denied, then anything can be called spiritual and the term spirituality loses both its intellectual dimension and sacred quality. The vast labyrinth of the psychic world becomes confused with the luminous Heaven of the Spirit and the type of so-called spirituality resulting from this confusion can be made to converge with almost anything including science. In this present discussion, therefore, we shall define spirituality as the inner, spiritual dimension of traditional religions dealing with the noumenal and the formless that can be experienced directly and is beyond mental categories but is not anti-intellectual. On the contrary if intellect is understood in its original sense as intellectus or the buddhi and not simply reason, spirituality and intellectuality are inseparable from each other.

The task of studying whether there is convergence or divergence between science and spirituality is in fact worthy of pursuit only if spirituality is understood in this traditional sense and not in an ambiguous manner which can embrace almost anything including the psychic and even the demonic. Be that as it may, the discussion which follows confines itself to the traditional understanding of spirituality, one which is nevertheless vast beyond our imagination for it includes a Sankara as well as an Eckhart, a Rumi as well as a Honen, a Milarepa as well as a Chuang-Tzu, no to speak of the great masters of spirituality of other traditions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Confucianism and Shamanism.

Defined in this manner, one can at first ask what are the points of divergence between spirituality and science. Obviously there is first of all the question of the understanding of what constitutes reality. In traditional spirituality, reality is at once transcendent and immanent, beyond and here and now but in all cases above every categorization and conceptualization of the mind. It is beyond the psycho-physical realm and yet encompasses this domain. One cannot comprehend it in the sense of its being encompassed because nothing can encompass that which is infinite. Yet it can be known by the Intellect which is a divine noetic faculty at the center of our being. Ultimate reality is Absolute and Infinite, the supreme Good and the source of all good. It is Beyond-Being as well as constituting Being which is the origin of the cosmic hierarchy and levels of universal existence.

In contrast, for modern science reality, to the extent one still speaks of such a category, is that which can be empirically verified. Everything that is beyond the empirically verifiable cannot be treated or known "scientifically"; nor strictly speaking can it even be of scientific significance. To all extents and purposes it is non-existent. To use the language of Hinduism, the Real is Atrnan while all modern science is a science of maya or more exactly of its lower reaches, or in Buddhist terms of samsaric existence even if extended to the galaxies. The Real is known through the twin sources of revelation and intellection with the aid of the buddhi, while both of these sources, and along with them metaphysical and cosmological truths, are denied by the world view of modern science, although not necessarily by individual scientists.

Authentic spirituality is always aware of the basic distinction between the Principle and Its manifestations, between Atrnamn and maya, nirvana and samsara, the Divine Essence (al-Dhat) and the veils (hijab) which hide and yet reveal the theophanies of the Divine Names and Qualities from us and to us. The foundation of all traditional metaphysics is in fact the distinction between the absolute and the relative and knowledge of the relative in the light of the Absolute. By denying the Absolute in the metaphysical sense, modern science cannot but absolutize the relative mistaking the cosmic "illusion" or maya for reality. Its grave sir is what Buddhism calls the error of false attribution. As a result .-the scientific world view denies not only the Absolute in Itself but also the hierarchie and levels of being beyond the psychophysical, the sensible and the measurable. Many of its exponents then set about to reveal the mysteries o existence through the microscope, or some computer model, and a world dazzled by the glitter of modern technology and having divinized modern science stands with full anticipation for the revelation of the next "mystery of the universe" which does not usually go beyond adding or subtracting some purely quantitative element to or from the universe seen in a purely quantitative manner.

There is of course a metaphysical significance to those discoveries of modern science which correspond to some aspect of physical reality and an not purely conjecture, for all that is real is real .to the extent that it symbol a reality beyond itself and everything in the universe is ultimately symbolic except the Absolute Reality Itself. But this truth concern! precisely what lies beyond the confines of modern science and cannot be understood save by a metaphysician whether he be himself a scientist or not.

Before turning away form the question of divergence between spirituality and modern science, it is necessary to emphasize again that authentic spirituality depends ultimately upon a revelation from the Spirit on the basis of immutable principles. Modern science is also based on a set of premises but the latter have not descended from Heaven. Rather, they are the creations of those philosophers who weaved together the elements that constitute the paradigm within which modern science has functioned' since the 17th century. Strangely enough it is only during the past few decades that the dependence of modern science upon a particular world view and paradigm of physical reality is becoming accepted at least in some circles

while the majority of modern educated people continue to believe that religion or spirituality is based on faith and certain assumptions about the nature of reality and science on the contrary is based upon reason and observation. Both in fact base themselves upon faith in a body of knowledge which for religion is considered to be the truth and for science premises and foundational assumptions. The great difference is that in one case the doctrines descend from the immutable Divine Order and the other from rational and empirical philosophies of a purely human order whose consequences cannot of necessity transcend the purely human and because of their denial of the supra-human, place man in the danger of falling into the sub-human. It is because of the radically different epistemologies, views of reality and premises involved that science cannot confirm the Divine Origin of the world or its eschatological omega point, the reality of the spiritual worlds above the physical or the immortal nature of the soul of man, to use the terminology of the Abrahamic religions. Nor can it point to what constitutes the goal of human life here below.

Science is based in fact upon the idea that there is only one mode of perception and one level of external reality which that single level of consciousness studies. The world according to it is what we see if only we extend the word "see" to include what is shown by the microscope and the telescope which do not represent a new mode or level of seeing but simply the extension, horizontally, of what the human eye perceives. In contrast authentic spirituality is based upon the basic thesis that not only are there levels of reality but also levels of consciousness which can know those levels of reality. What we perceive of the external world depends upon our mode of consciousness not in the sense that a geologist looking upon a mountain sees certain geological structures which the non-geologist does not perceive; rather in the sense that other non-physical levels of reality of what taken only physically becomes the mountain can be known if we possess higher levels of consciousness. And again this does not mean that this knowledge is based on some kind of subjectivism but means that when we possess a higher level of consciousness we have the preparation to "see" other dimensions and levels of the reality in question. In any case according to all traditional spiritual doctrines what we see depends upon our mode of consciousness and knowledge and our mode of consciousness in turn depends upon our mode of being. Hence the centrality of spiritual discipline

which transforms our mode of being as well as consciousness. Seeing is only believing if we extend the meaning of seeing beyond what the physical eyes perceive.

This great contrast becomes more evident when we consider the fact that to become educated as a modern scientist, it is not necessary to undergo any spiritual training but only to develop certain mental faculties and keenness of observation in total contrast to the case of spirituality when it is practiced seriously and not simply talked about, for authentic, spirituality demands the transformation of our whole being and a change in how we think, perceive, evaluate and act. The result of this basic difference is that there are some scientists who are interested in spirituality and some not at all. Even in the realm of ethics, modern science qua science demonstrates a relation very different from what we find in traditional spirituality. Ethical values are inseparable from the acts and deeds of spiritually realized men and women and spirituality has always been the fountainhead, the inner spring and the life force of ethics in various religions. In contrast modern science as a system of knowledge is ethically neutral and in fact ethical questions are irrelevant to it. On the practical level there are many scientists who are very ethical and then of course there are many who are not, as the history of this century has amply demonstrated. In fact the whole idea of scientists being responsible for the consequences of the applications of their science within the societies in which they function has only recently become acceptable to a notable body of scientists, at a time when these applications threaten both the natural environment and the quality and possibility, even continuity, of human life on earth.

One could go on at length but the points mentioned should suffice to demonstrate that the facile convergence of science and spirituality championed in so many circles is based more on fervent desire than on reality. Also it is often based on the one hand on confusing science with the views of some of its practitioners and on the other on the dilution and distortion of authentic spiritual teachings. Nowhere is this more evident than in the question of evolution understood in its modern biological sense. All traditional doctrines which do deal with cosmogony, some like Taoism and Confucianism remaining silent about the genesis of the cosmos, speak of the descent of the world from the Divine principle, the celestial

archetypes, the logos, etc. God said, "let there be light and there was light", the Bible asserts and the Quran states that Allah has said "Be!" and all things came into existence. There is the primordial sacrifice of Purusa in Hinduism and of Gayonarth in Zoroastrianism to which numerous examples could be added from other traditions. The beings of this world have descended from the Divine, from the world of the Spirit and the reality of all things in the cosmos resides in God, to speak in the language of Abrahamic faiths, or according to Hinduism is contained in the original cosmic egg which far from being material is a spiritual reality containing all the possibilities to be manifested in a particular cosmic cycle.

In evolutionary theory, on the contrary, everything has ascended from below, from the original "soup of molecules" which somehow mysteriously produces a consciousness that can stand outside the process and understand and study it. Nothing in the world is more opposed to the spiritual understanding of the origin of man and other beings than 19th century evolutionary theory which is a philosophy rather than science but which is presented as science because it is the main support for the whole structure of the modern scientific world view without which the whole secularist Weltanschauung would collapse. And nowhere is this sentimental attitude. so opposed to metaphysical discernment that has always characterized the intellectual life of the land of India, more evident than in the writings of an array of people, many from the Indian world, who would simply equate the traditional Hindu doctrines of descent and gradation of being with evolution and ascent of the higher from the lower through simple temporal processes of change and transformation.

To this century old attempt at bringing about the convergence of totally divergent perspectives must now be added a new recently written chapter by those who would reduce both science and religion or spirituality to a "story", claiming that each has a story about reality which can be made to converge. Of course this is done not only through the introduction of a certain degree of ambiguity and cloud to cover the terrain which cannot be easily traversed intellectually, but also by a kind of subjectivism and psychologism which characterize much of the contemporary scene and especially what is called New Age spirituality. Moreover, to bring about convergence, it is usually the religious truths which are sacrificed because they are accused of being

"dogmatic" and what is substituted for them is usually drawn from evolutionism itself with some modifying factors to placate those who are still searching for a reality which is not simply material and physical. That such a thinking has entered even into writings that are taken seriously in certain religions, such as the works of eilhard de Chardin in Catholic circles, only points out .how far away the current understanding of spirituality has moved from that of the worlds which produced the Honens, Ramanujas, St. Teresas and Rumis as well as the Sankaras, Nagarjunas, Eckharts and Ibn Arabis who, each in his or her own way and according to different modes and perspectives have dominated the spiritual -and intellectual lives of different human collectivities over the centuries.

Seeing how powerful science, or at least its image, is in modern society and also how persistent is man's need for spirituality, we must now ask what can be done to bring about a serious convergence and accord between science and spirituality, one which would not only be apparent and contribute further to the confusion and chaos that characterize so much of contemporary life. Needless to say there cannot be a convergence between the view which believes that we have descended from above and that which clamis what we have ascended from below. But if one puts paseudo-science, or rather philosophical hypotheses parading as science aside on the one hand and pseudo-spirituality, now so rampant in the West, on the other, then there are certainly significant steps that can be taken in bringing about if not a convergence, at least an understanding between the principles of spirituality and the dicta of science as they exist today and might exist tomorrow while being always mindful of the continuously changing nature of the latter at least in details,if not Weltanschauung.

Let us begin by recalling the fact that today even the world view or paradigm of modern science is beginning to change for the first time since the 16th and 17th centuries. There are scientists, especially physicists, who are turning to a world view in which the reality of what is of concern to spirituality is not reduced to subjectivism or a secondary, derivative set of phenomena. It is as yet too early to foretell what will happen in this domain. At the present stage there are those who, groping for a new philosophy of nature, remain satisfied with superficial comparisons between the dance of Siva and that of electrons or electro-magnetic polarity and the Yin-Yang

principles of Far Eastern cosmology. This may, however, be but the first halting step or series of steps in the direction of the discovery, or rather re-discovery of Reality in its vast amplitude and numerous dimensions beyond the truncated version of its which is the subject of modern physics and which is then taken to be reality as such by the scientific mind.

Since it is not possible to discover higher levels of reality simply by means of even further analysis of matter and energy in a quantitative sense, such a discovery, if it ever comes, must of necessity draw from the metaphysical teachings of various traditions and be the result of the navigation through higher levels of reality by those who have been able to make such a journey, thanks to authentic spiritual techniques. If the shift of paradigm, so often discussed in the current philosophy of science, is to be anything more than the substitution of one limited view of reality for another, then recourse must be had to spiritual traditions especially those of the East where a great deal of such teachings have been better preserved than in the modern West. If the substitution represents simply a "horizontal" shift, then accord between the new paradigm of science and spirituality will be as problematic as what one observes today. But there is some hope, that a positive transformation of paradigm will come about. There are in fact a number of scientists, particularly physicists, who speak in such terms and who express serious theological and spiritual concerns, more than many theologians, who in fear of the onslaught of modern science, continue to surrender theology to the discoveries of the microscope and the telescope to an even greater degree.

In this process of the formation of a new paradigm, spirituality itself carries a heavy burden. What is called spirituality in various religions must be clearly defined, its roots in revelation, divine descent or corresponding realities in other religions elucidated and its wedding to authentic metaphysics or Sophia based upon the twin sources of intellection and revelation/illumination made manifest. It is for those knowledgeable in such metaphysics and molded by authentic spirituality to formulate a contemporary metaphysics of nature and cosmology in the traditionally honored sense of this term which could provide the intellectual background for the new paradigm being sought by modern science. Spirituality abdicates from its function and role when it simply repeats the current findings of

modern science, which will not be current tomorrow, and then distorts its own millennial teachings to demonstrate that they are in accord with present day scientific theories or findings. Spirituality is based on the primacy of the Spirit, on the supreme reality of the One, the Tao, the Godhead, Atman, Allah and not on a reality discovered through the external senses alone. Spirituality envisages man as at once Spirit, soul and body, and not only the mind and body of Cartesian dualism, and the cosmos also as a reality possessing not only a "body" which we can observe and study but also other dimensions corresponding to the psyche and Spirit. The more the basic metaphysical and epistemological differences between authentic spirituality and the current understanding of science are brought out, the more is there the possibility of the forging of a paradigm for science which could live at peace with the spiritual and not endanger the very existence of man on earth through its even greater exertion of power over both the human psyche and the domain of nature. If representatives of authentic spirituality do not become aware of this grave responsibility, they will simply leave the field open- to pseudo-spirituality and caricatures of authentic teachings to which many a well-meaning scientist, himself not trained in such matters, will turn for inspiration or guidance. The consequences cannot but be more catastrophic than an out and out rejection of all the claims of spirituality by this or that materialistic or agnostic scientist.

One might say that the most immediate task at hand is the creation of a sacred science of the cosmos which would not necessarily negate what modern science has discovered but provide another type of knowledge of the cosmos rooted in its sacred reality. Such a science, which had existed in various traditional civilizations but is rarely spoken of by current representatives of spirituality, would be the meeting ground between spirituality and science. It would provide a sacred view of nature, now being so mercilessly desecrated and one might say even murdered in the-act which is now being called ecocide. It would also provide a knowledge of the cosmos which could discern between the aspects of modern science that correspond to some aspect of physical reality and those that are merely conjecture parading as science. It could also provide a domain of discourse between spirituality and science without destroying or mutilating the corresponding realities involved. Of course such an endeavor would require humility not only on behalf of certain individual men and women practicing

science, for there are to be sure many humble scientists, but on behalf of science as a discipline. There must come the admission on behalf of the guardians and propagators of science in general, that modern science is a possible science and not the only legitimate science of nature. As long as such a totalitarian and monopolistic view of science exists all talk of the harmony of spirituality and science remains mere talk unless spirituality is diluted or transformed into something which has as little to do with the Spirit as do the discoveries in a physics laboratory. Once such a limitation is admitted, however, there is certainly the possibility of an approachment and even of the opening of the door to the metaphysical and symbolic significance of major modern scientific discoveries, a significance which lies beyond the realm and boundaries defined by science for itself and therefore meaningless "scientifically" speaking in the same way the term sacred in "sacred science" is simply a meaningless word in the context of the way in which modern science defines and understands concepts and terms.

Let us hope that at this dangerous juncture of human history, when man's ever greater quantitative knowledge of nature, based on a definition of knowledge which excludes the numinous and the sacred, is threatening all human life and in fact the whole of the natural ambience, a deeper understanding will be attained of the infinitely profound and rich sources of authentic spirituality and the real nature and limitations of modern science. The dharma of those who know cannot but be to discern, to overcome the supreme sin of false attribution, to preserve a sense of proportion and to remain faithful to the hierarchy of existence and the true relation between the spiritual and the physical based upon these realities. Only, in the quest, preservation and propagation of authentic spirituality and an honest and critical understanding of the premises, assumptions findings and groping of modern science can one hope to avert the tidal wave that threatens what remains of traditional civilizations, authentic religions and spiritual teachings and that direct manifestation of Divine Wisdom and Power that is virgin nature. Also, this pursuit provides the opportunity to exercise to the highest degree the virtue of compassion. The task is daunting but the end cannot but be witness to the victory of the truth.\*

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\* We have discussed more extensively the issues brought forth in this essay in t our

# IQBAL' S METHOD OF RECONSTRUCTION

**Zainal Abidin M. Baqir**

It is interesting to note that two contemporary Muslim scholars have given attention to the term "Reconstruction" as used by Allama Iqbal in his *Reconstruction*,<sup>1</sup> and both express their disagreement about it. Here I am referring to Fazlur Rehman and S.M. Naquib al-Attas.<sup>2</sup> Iqbal himself never elaborated this term expressly. But he used it explicitly in few passages of the *Reconstruction*, and, as we will show, he seemed to have a clear, particular idea of what he wanted to convey with the term; in other words, he deliberately used the term.

By way of introduction, we may characterize the *Reconstruction* as Iqbal's response to "the problem of modernity". Historically and intellectually, Iqbal lived in a changing world of Islam. This world was changing due to some internal factors,, but also, not less importantly, to its direct contact -- and clash, at some points -- with the modern civilization, the most significant characteristics of which are science and technology. "The problem of modernity" above refers to the results of this contact. Iqbal was among the first Muslims exposed to the wide-scale "propagation of this new civilization in its imperialistic form. Before investigating the idea later, we may at this stage say that his proposed solution to the problem is by attempting a "reconstruction." As we will show later, that very term indicates

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Knowledge and the Sacred. Albany (N.Y.), State University of New York Press, 1991; *The Need for a Sacred Science*, Albany (N.Y.), State University of New York Press, 1993; and *Religion and the Order of Nature*, (New York) and Oxford, University Press, 1995.

<sup>1</sup> All references to Iqbal in this essay, unless otherwise stated, are to *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, edited and annotated by M. Saeed Sheikh, Iqbal Academy Pakistan and Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986. This work would be simply referred to as *Reconstruction*

<sup>2</sup> Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, (second edition), The University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 257; Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *A Commentary on the "Hujjat al-Siddiq" of Nur al-Din al-Raniri*, Ministry of Culture, Malaysia, 1986, p.465. Their views regarding this issue will be discussed in the last part of this essay.

the method, while the aim being the solution of what we have vaguely and generally characterized as (the solution of) the problem of modernity. An examination of how Iqbal uses the term "reconstruction" in the work, therefore, would surely be revealing. This would be the first part of this essay. The second part tries to put Iqbal's views in the Reconstruction in historical perspective; we will discuss also few criticisms of the idea of reconstruction in the last part of this essay.

In his Reconstruction Iqbal explicitly mentions his programme of reconstruction several times, in different contexts.<sup>3</sup>

(i) In the preface he states an urgent demand for "a scientific form of religious knowledge" (p. xxi), which he sees as natural in the absence of a method to experience religion as a living, inner experience, on which religious faith ultimately rests. According to him Sufism had done good work in the past in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience. Yet this method is no longer suitable for modern men, i.e. those who have "developed habits of concrete thought." It is for him, the modern man, in his own peculiar situation, the modern world, that scientific form of religious knowledge is felt as an urgent yet natural demand. To meet this demand, Iqbal promises in his preface, he would try.

to meet, even though partially, this urgent demand by attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy -- with due regard to the philosophical tradition of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge. (p. xxi - xxii).

He then immediately adds that the present moment is quite favourable for reconstruction in view of the latest developments in modern science.

(ii) In another place Iqbal emphasizes the last point: The frontline of scientific theories (as presented mostly by Einstein) has suggested new ways of looking at reality, which are common problems to both religion and philosophy.

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<sup>3</sup> In the quotations below all italics are mine.

No wonder then that the younger generation of Islam in Asia and Africa demand a fresh orientation of their faith. With the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it is necessary to examine in an independent spirit, what Europe had thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam. (p. 6)

Next he explains,

In these lectures I propose to undertake a philosophical discussion of some of the basic ideas of Islam, in the hope that this may, at least, be helpful towards a proper understanding of the meaning of Islam as a message to humanity".(pp. 6-7)

(iii) Speaking about the conception of God, Iqbal touches on the classical issue in kalam of how God's creative activity proceeds to the work of creation, and tries to evaluate the development of atomism in Islamic theology -- which he calls "the first important indication of an intellectual revolt against the Aristotelian idea of a fixed universe" -- in the light of modern physics. He calls this effort of his as "the work of reconstruction in the light of modern physics." (p 55) What he does here is showing how the Ash \ arite atomism is in full agreement with recent (that is, early 20th century) discoveries in physics, regarding the discontinuity of matter. However, he goes further by pointing out the common defect of both, i.e. the lack of psychological analysis.

The quotations above indicate what Iqbal means by "reconstruction". First, reconstruction of religious thought in Islam means 'formulating' religious knowledge in a "scientific form". Secondly, this kind of effort is felt as an urgent demand for modern man, i.e. those who have developed the habits of concrete thought through their acquaintance with (modern) science. On one hand, "habits of concrete thought" refers to scientific method which emphasizes empiricism. On the other hand, recent scientific findings have suggested new ways of looking at reality, which is a common central concern of both religion and philosophy, and they would be taken into account in the work of reconstruction.

The attempt at relating religion to modern science reminds us of many similar attempts that have been preoccupying Muslim thinkers since the last century. A question may arise at this point: what is the difference of reconstruction with any similar, but clearly apologetic, works such as the one by, for example, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan? Does reconstruction merely mean a presentation of basic ideas of, Islam clothed in modern philosophico-scientific terms? A fuller discussion of this question would be taken up in the last part of this essay; at this point we would only try to make those characteristics of reconstruction stated above clearer.

It seems that Iqbal takes modern science and philosophy much more seriously than only as a means of justifying his ideas. Reflecting on the modern development of science and technology, he even takes it as an indication that the intellect of man seems to have outgrown its own most fundamental categories. Yet of this very important development of human knowledge, Muslims seem to be not aware; the philosophical thinking in Islam has reached its finality, as it were, during the last five hundred years:

During all the centuries of our intellectual stupor Europe has been seriously thinking on the great problems in which the philosophers and scientists of Islam were so keenly interested. since the middle ages, when the schools of Muslim theology were completed, infinite advance has taken place in the domain of human thought and experience. The extension of man's power over Nature has given him a new faith and a fresh sense of superiority over the forces that constitute his environment. New points of view have been suggested, old problems have been restated in the light of fresh experience, and new problems have arisen. It seems as if the intellect of man is outgrowing its own most fundamental categories -- time, space, and causality. With the advance of scientific thought even our concept of intelligibility is undergoing a change. (p. 6)

Now, with this great change affecting, especially, modern Muslims, there must be a parallel change in the metaphysics of Islam:"..... the concepts of theological systems, draped in the terminology of a practically dead metaphysics, [cannot] be of any help to those who happen to possess a

different intellectual background. The task before the modern Muslims is, therefore, immense. He has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past." (p. 78 - italics mine) Here another point emerges: while modern science and philosophy might be of great help -- not to say indispensable – for Muslims, reconstruction also demands another thing: continuity with tradition.

It is significant to note that in one of his letters, talking about Reconstruction, Iqbal mentions the above two main points of reconstruction, namely, the intellectual tradition of Islam and modern philosophy:

These lectures are primarily addressed, to these Muslims who are influenced by philosophy and it is their desire that Islamic philosophy should be restated in the terms of modern philosophy, and if there are certain shortcomings in the old concepts, these should be removed. My whole work has largely been constructive. I have, during this work of (re) construction, tried to keep in view the best traditions of Islamic philosophy.<sup>4</sup>

Another important thing to note is Iqbal's remark at the beginning of his first lecture, about the need to give rational foundation to religion. The aim of religion is the transformation and guidance of man's inner and outer life.(p. 1) On its doctrinal side, quoting Whitehead, religion is defined as "a, system of general truths having the transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended." Now man only acts on the basis of principles he firmly believes. As such that system of general truths must not remain unsettled; hence the importance of giving rational foundation to religion. Besides that, discussing the mystic's religious experience, Iqbal points to the fact that, like all feeling, mystic feeling has a cognitive element also, which lends itself to the form of idea. Thus, "while religion starts with

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<sup>4</sup> Sh. Ata Ullah, ed., Iqbal Namah, vol. I, Shaikh Ashraf, Lahore, n.d. p. 210-211; also see Nazir Ni'azi, ed., Maktubat-i-Iqbal pp.24, 25 42-3, 45-6. This extract is translated from Urdu by Mr. Muhammad Suheyl Umar. This writer is obliged to thank him for his showing and translating this important and relevant extract. Other translations from Urdu works in this essay are also his.

feeling, it has never, in its history, taken itself as a matter of feeling alone and has constantly striven after metaphysics." (p. 17)

In the case of Islam, the search for rational foundations, according to Iqbal, have begun with the Prophet himself, when he prayed, "God! grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things!" The works of the falasifa, mutakallimun and sufis that began soon after the demise of the Prophet also moved in this direction. (pp. 2-3) So Iqbal sees the whole philosophical tradition -- in its broadest sense -- in Islam as consisting of a series of attempts at giving rational foundation to Islam. And his reconstruction of religious thought in Islam was a part of it. It had the same aim of giving rational foundations for Islam, yet it differed from them since it happened to occur in a period in which great changes had occurred -- that is to say, in the beginning of the period of direct contact with modern western civilization. As we mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the distinctive character of this civilization is its science and technology, and this modern science, in terms of both its method and findings, has affected the way modern Muslims look at reality. It is this that must be taken into account in any contemporary attempts at giving rational foundation for Islam; and it is this that differentiates Iqbal's programme of reconstruction from the previous philosophical undertakings in Islam. With this we can now define reconstruction as "an attempt at giving rational foundation to Islam that draws its sources from the intellectual tradition of Islam -- that is, that which is to be reconstructed -- and philosophical considerations suggested by the findings of modern sciences." And this is all done for modern Muslims living in a modern world, which has its particular characteristics.

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Before proceeding further, at this point we may question the possibility of reconstructions as defined above, since it is problematic: it brings religion - something divine, meant to be universal and everlasting, and more than mere knowledge -- into contact with science and philosophy. For Iqbal, the answer to this question is definitely in the affirmative. The starting point for this is that religion, philosophy and science all try to answer the same problem that is, concerning our understanding of reality. But in face of the apparent image of conflict between religion, on one hand, and philosophy and science, on the other hand, which is deeply rooted in history, the affirmation begs

explanation. And it seems that this problem of reconciliation between science and religion has become a problem not only in the milieu of western civilization, but also for Islam. This statement can be substantiated by some historical facts of Islamic intellectual developments. For example, the fact that there were apologetic tracts in defense of philosophy and certain sciences against fuqaha's and theologians' attack -- such as Ibn Rushd's *Kitab Fasl al Maqal*, in which he shows that philosophical studies are even obliged by the Shari's demand, or al-Biruni's long introduction to his book on geography (*Kitab Tahdid al-Amakin*), in which he tries to show that functionally science is needed by Muslims to perform their religious, including societal, obligations -- shows that even in its early period, reconciliation of science and philosophy and religion was a problem in Islam. While for later period, due to some conclusion, reached by modern science and philosophy, this has become more manifest. Moreover, Iqbal's claim is not only that religion may be reconciled with philosophy and science, but that the latter may serve as one of the sources for his reconstruction of religious thought in Islam. Besides, there is also the Kantian challenge that, coming to the matters of religion, man, due to his lack of "proper faculties", should be silent; knowledge about them is impossible, but since we need them, we should simply have faith in them.<sup>5</sup> Here we shall first examine some key-points involved in the definition of reconstruction, i.e. religion, philosophy and science, as Iqbal understands them, and then specify their meeting points.

First, about philosophy. Is the term "philosophy of religion" a contradiction in terms? Or is it meaningless, since 'religion' is much broader a term than 'philosophy'? How can something narrower in scope be a judge of another, broader thing? The answer for this is that Iqbal takes philosophy more as a methodology than a certain specific discipline which has its own subject matter. Doing philosophy does not make one committed to a certain ism.<sup>6</sup> "The spirit of philosophy is one of free inquiry. It suspects all

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<sup>5</sup> This is not exactly Kant's statement. What he denies is the possibility of a metaphysics discussing problems such as God, soul, and freedom. But, as Iqbal rightly says, for that matter his argument "applies with equal force to the realities in which religion is especially interested." (p. 144)

authority. Its function is to trace the uncritical assumptions of human thought to their hiding places, and in this pursuit it may finally end in denial or frank admission of the incapacity of pure reason to reach the Ultimate Reality." (p. 1) It is with the same spirit of philosophy that he is critical to the capability of philosophy itself. Philosophy may deal with religion, but, due to the nature of its object, it cannot give religion an inferior place among its data. (p. 2) It should not subject religion to its own terms by reducing religion to a mere system of logical concepts, and thus conceiving religion merely as a body of doctrines and ignoring it as a vital fact -- such as what the Mu'tazilah have done. (p. 4) Religion is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man.(p. 2) Therefore, though it may be object of philosophy, religion will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy, except on its own terms. Thus in the process of philosophizing on religion, philosophy, as a method, might be modified to meet the demand of its object, i.e. religion. This is what Iqbal tried to do in his Reconstruction.

To do so, undoubtedly, the first question that should be dealt with is that of epistemology. Here Iqbal uses an uncommon term ( and not always consistent in using it) for the faculty on which philosophy relies: thought; while that of religion is intuition. Now, for him, there is no reason to suppose that thought and intuition are opposed to each other. (p. 6) Instead, they are complementary and spring up from the same root. The difference between them is only in the way they deal with reality: the former grasps it piecemeal, the latter in its wholeness; the former fixes its gaze on the temporal aspect of reality, the latter on its eternal aspect. Following Bergson, intuition is regarded only as a higher kind of intellect, which is a generic term comprising thought and intuition. Thought and intuition are organically related; in other words, they are one in essence. Here Iqbal criticizes al-Ghazzali who, according to him, separates thought from intuition, and thus, like Kant, could not affirm the possibility of a knowledge of God; finally, moving to mystic experience, al-Ghazali found independent content for religion there. (p. 4) The separation of thought from intuition, therefore, leads to the impossibility of some kind of "philosophy of religion", since

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<sup>6</sup> Saeceda Iqbal, *Islamic Rationalism in the Indian Subcontinent*, Islamic Book Service, Lahore, Pakistan, 1984, p. 252.

thought -- the faculty on which philosophy relies — in this construal is finite and thus could not speak about God, the Infinite. But it would not be the case if thought is understood as able to capture the Infinite. Iqbal takes this stance by asserting that in its deeper movement thought is capable of reaching an immanent infinitude; it is dynamic and, like a seed which from the very beginning carries within itself the organic unity of the tree, it unfolds its internal infinitude in time. (p 5) Thought, in its deeper movement, then, is nothing else than intuition. The difference between thought and intuition is in degree, not kind. The conclusion is: intuition — that faculty on which religion relies --may also be a source of knowledge in doing philosophy. So, while rejecting shallow rationalism of the Greek-based falsafa, Iqbal argues for another kind of philosophy that is capable of dealing with religion justly. To put it in another way, Iqbal argues for another kind of rationality, in which religious beliefs might be construed as rational. We would discuss this point again and Iqbal's answer to the Kantian challenge in the next section, as an example of how reconstruction works.

Concerning science, Iqbal shows much more receptivity. First, it is true that religion and science have their points of departure in human experience. Conflict between them, if it arises, is not because the one is experience-based while the other is not, but it is due to the misapprehension that both interpret the same data of experience. The specific region of human experience that religion tries to interpret is religious experience, which is irreducible to the data of any science. (p. 20) Saying that religious experience constitutes a specific region of human experience is not tantamount to saying that it is a (kind of) species of the genus experience, and that science deals with an exclusively different species of experience. The object of religion or scientific experience is, to some extent, the same: it is Reality (which might as well be called Nature); but each employs different methods (or sees it from different angles), so that one may go deeper than the other into its inner nature. That is, Iqbal makes a distinction between experience as a natural fact, significant of the normally observable behaviour of Reality, and experience as significant of the inner nature of Reality. Both are experience of the one and same Reality, but in its different 'manifestations'. Science tries to understand the meaning of reality in reference to its external behaviour, while religion tries to discover the meaning of reality in reference to its inner nature. So, both are descriptions of the same world, and their final aim is the

same: reaching the most real. (p. 155) In trying to reach the most real, both have to find its way to pure objectivity -- experience of Reality untainted by the scientist's or the mystic's subjectivity -- through "purification of experience". Scientist purifies the experience by taking an exclusive standpoint, creating a distance from the object of his investigation,<sup>7</sup> while in the religious process, the ego integrates its competing tendencies and develops a \*single inclusive attitude resulting in a kind of synthetic transfiguration of his experiences. (p. 15)

The different standpoints, or methods, taken by science and religion result in different views of reality. 'Different' here does not necessarily mean 'conflicting'. Science is a mass of sectional views of Reality -- fragments of a total experience which do not seem to fit together. It cannot, if it is true to its own nature and function, set up its theory as a complete view of Reality. (p. 33) while religion demands the whole of reality. Different though the results of scientific and religious processes, they are complementary. Speaking about the meaning of prayer, which is a concrete living experience of God, he asserts that prayer must be regarded as a necessary complement to the intellectual activity of the scientist. "The scientific observation of Nature keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality, and thus sharpens our inner perception for a deeper vision of it". (p. 72) In this sense, scientist who observes Nature is like a mystic in the act of prayer. (p. 73) So highly is Iqbal's appreciation of science that he regards it, and, in general, all search for knowledge, as a form of prayer.

So, Iqbal not only reconciles religion with science, but construes them as complementary to each other. Science, therefore, may help religion in constricting its metaphysics. And, if necessary, he is ready to suggest a modification of basic principles and presuppositions of science. For example, asking whether natural science, especially biology, is finally committed to materialism, he finds some supporting evidences from his contemporary

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<sup>7</sup> An example Iqbal gives for this is Hume's criticism to "emancipate empirical science from the concept of force, which has no foundation in sense experience." (p. 155) This statement may mean that since 'force' comes not from the experience of reality, it must come from the other party involved in the business of science: the scientist. Accepting this means accepting subjectivity, thus spoiling the purity of scientific process.

biologists to use the concepts of 'end' and 'purpose' instead of 'cause' and 'effect' in investigating living organisms. In some aspects of living organisms, the object of biology, an explanation in mechanical terms ('cause-effect') is still possible, but when it comes to the question of life, the concept of mechanism becomes inadequate. (p. 33-38)

We may conclude, then, that reconstruction, for Iqbal, is possible given our readiness to accept certain limitations of philosophy and science and, if necessary, to modify some of their presuppositions. Later when we give examples we will see more precisely how Iqbal sees the role of modern science and philosophy in his reconstruction.

But before that, there is one more thing worth-mentioning here in relation to Iqbal's attitude toward (western) science and philosophy, as well as knowledge from other civilizations. He regards them not something alien to Islam. Often he simply calls them "human knowledge" which means that it is universal in the sense that, in terms of knowledge they belong to the whole human race; every people has their own share in it. In the pursuit of truth, every man has the same goal to achieve, and the same problems to overcome: In case of western civilization, Europe has learnt from Islam many things that helped her to become something called "modern civilization", so it is not a shame at all that now, we, Muslims after our long intellectual stupor, learn from Europe, who has thought of the same problems we were so keenly interested in. After all, we did the same thing in our history: learning from other civilizations, mainly the Greek, Persian, and Indian. That finally we departed from them shows that we still could maintain our critical attitude; the same thing should happen today. This seems to be Iqbal's stance.

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A striking point in Iqbal's reconstruction that would not escape our attention is the keen observance he gives to modern science. As we will briefly show soon, this is a characteristic present in many Muslim thinkers -- since about the second half of last century. There are at least two reasons for this: firstly, the colonialization of many Muslim lands by western countries, which are identified as advanced countries in terms of science and technology. Politically, economically, and culturally as well, this had left very deep impacts. Secondly, the remarkable development of modern science and

technology since, at least, the seventeenth century. Especially given the dramatic development of modern science in the last few centuries, and which reaches its peak in this century, no one would find this attention uncommon. The word "dramatic" here is hardly an exaggeration. When, scientific work was declining in Islam, the development of science in the West took a totally fresh direction. Beginning, at least, with Galileo, modern science has since made its successes one by one, and only in a period of three centuries it has, unexpectedly opened up many subtle regions of human experience that would be unimaginable had the scientific findings not been really "proven". Moreover, many of the "proofs" came it a very dramatic way, that is to say, they seemed to be even beyond the scientists' expectations -- as the theories of the great scientists such as Galileo, Newton and Einstein themselves testified. In addition to this, the more unimaginable development of modern technology which made use of those scientific findings, gave science more credibility. It is not surprising, therefore, that finally science became, almost, the most authoritative form of knowledge, if not the only valid one, especially in the west. Everything, then, seemed to be valid only if it had passed the test of science.

The beginning of the 20th century, especially, was the time of great optimism regarding the development of science. At that time Einstein's theory had already been proven dramatically by experiment. It is true that the victory of Einstein's theory of relativity also meant the demise of Newton's theory, which was unshaken for two centuries. But in another sense, it added to the scientific optimism, since this event also showed, as it were, that left to itself science could correct its own mistakes. This is also noted by Iqbal: "The present moment is quite favourable for [reconstruction of Muslim philosophy]. Classical physics has learned to criticize its own foundations. As a result of this criticism the kind of materialism, which it originally necessitated, is rapidly disappearing ..." (p. xxii) Regardless of the truth or falsity of this optimism, we can say that the spirit of the 19th and early 20th century is a scientific one.

It is important to note that this period happened to be the period of the "reawakening" of Islamic world. In fact, it seems that the two events were not merely a coincidence. The "reawakening" of Islamic world was mainly facilitated -- if not motivated -- by Europe's colonialism of the Islamic world.

At that time most of the Muslim world was colonialized by Europe. And the role played by the new advanced (military, especially) technology here cannot be exaggerated. The logic derived from this event was simple: Europe owes its victory to its science and technology, so if we, the Muslim world, want to defeat them we must also possess this science and technology. The West, then, became a symbol of power.

This kind of environment would naturally call Muslim intellectuals to give their response. we may also naturally expect to find two things in relation to their responses: the attitude toward their own tradition, and toward the values or culture of this modern, western civilization. Indeed, in the beginning; this attitude, to some extent, was hardly distinguishable from a mere feeling of frustration of a defeated people; and in Indian sub-continent it was perhaps best personified by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. This attitude was manifested in his naive rejection of the old (the Islamic tradition) and uncritical acceptance of the new, i.e. the modern science and technology, along with its "liberating forces". Among those "liberating forces" is explanation of events in terms of their immediate -- and most of the time, physical -- causes. In the west it helped liberating people from superstitions and the coercive grip of the Church. Now, with the same spirit, Sir Sayyid felt obliged to "emancipate" his fellow Muslim people by getting rid of the unnatural (read: supernatural) -- hence unscientific --elements from the Qur'an -- such that he had to find his own principle of exegesis.<sup>8</sup> we would better see how far Sir Sayyid's effort had gone if we compare him with another towering figure in the Sub-continent's history, namely, Shah wali Allah. Historically they were only separated by less than a century, which is nothing compared to the centuries-old intellectual tradition of Islam, but intellectually the gap was quite manifest. In Shah Wali Allah we could still easily recognize the intellectual traces, not t mention the style, of a tradition which had begun developing in Islam r, world since the time of the first Muslim scholar, and, though it had undergone many changes and modifications, this tradition still maintained its distinctive characters. There was still a continuation of the centuries-old tradition. But Sir Sayyid's ideas seemed to mark a break with the pas Especially, there seemed to be a clear

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<sup>8</sup> See. Maqalat-i-Sir Sayyid, published in 16 Volumes by the Board for Advancement of Literature, Lahore.

and bold line separating this figure and Shah wali Ullah. He strikingly divides the history of Islam into the old and new world, which contains, respectively, the traditional and his own views of the basic beliefs of Islam .<sup>9</sup>

Now, the next generation of Muslim thinkers right after Sir Sayyid is Iqbal. It is very significant to note that Iqbal was perhaps among the first Muslims, especially in Indian sub-continent, who had the opportunity to learn the fine thoughts of the thinkers of the modern west, yet we can say that he also had an access to the Islamic intellectual tradition. It is these two points, equipped with his critical attitude, which emerge from his Reconstruction. That his concern was similar to his immediate predecessor is natural: both faced the same problems. The difference lies in his understanding of the intellectual tradition of Islam as well as the West which was incomparable to that of Sir Sayyid. And this is exactly the point that distinguishes Iqbal's response from the apologetic attempts as that of Sir Sayyid, that is, attempts to justify religious beliefs by showing them to be in full agreement with the modern science and philosophy -- even at the expense of the beliefs. This kind of apologetic attempts stemmed from the common-sense view of science that regards science as a "proven" body of knowledge; showing that religious beliefs are justified by scientific findings means that the beliefs are "proven" as well.

Iqbal's understanding of the intellectual tradition of both Islam and the West was profound; he had a good appreciation of the Islamic intellectual tradition, as his letter also confirms,<sup>10</sup> even though he is also critical of it. He was also well-versed in the thought of his contemporary western philosophers and scientists. This surely contributed to his self confidence in dealing with them, that he could maintain his critical attitude in face of the "tempting frontiers of modern science and philosophy. At this point, his stance is even better than many today's Muslim thinkers who are still grappling with the same problems. Firstly, he shows that the harmony between religion, especially Islam, and science is not merely at the surface. We have mentioned that for him the activity of scientist is just another form

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> See f. n. 4 of this paper.

of prayer: science has, to some extent, the, same aim with religion of reaching the most real. Furthermore, the anti classical spirit of Islam, i.e. that which fixes its gaze on the concrete, as manifested in Muslims' intellectual revolution against Greek tradition, is similar with that gave birth to modern science. So it is not only that there is an essential compatibility between religion and science, but, much further than that, it seems that both go in the same direction, to reach the same aim. But there is a question here: how would these two different enterprises interact?

Instead of taking scientific findings at their face-value, in which case religious ideas must be made in conformity with -- if not modified or interpreted to suit -- the findings, it seems that Iqbal takes them as a set among many other sets of evidences, which include, for example, theories of Islamic philosophy, sufi metaphysics, and modern philosophy. Or we may as well say that the scientific theories are taken as a kind of a 'source of inspiration', to widen the horizon of possibilities of how to see things: that they suggest new ways of looking at reality, while the discussion on reality itself, as a whole, is beyond the task and capability of science itself. It is one of the tasks of philosophy to interpret the scientific theories?<sup>11</sup> This, in our opinion, is Iqbal's position. An example for this is his discussion on Einstein's theory of relativity. (p. 30-32) this theory, while asserting that space is real but relative to the observer, rejects the Newtonian concept of an absolute space. there is no self-subsistent materiality of classical physics. Iqbal further asserts his "personal belief that the ultimate character of Reality is spiritual: but in order to avoid a widespread misunderstanding it is necessary to point out that Einstein's theory, which, as a scientific theory, deals only with the structure of things, throws no light on the ultimate nature of things which possess that structure." (p. 31) And, after showing the philosophical value of the theory, he rejects one of its philosophical implications that construes time as unreal. For there time becomes a kind of fourth dimension of space. If it is so, then it is theoretically possible to make an effect precedes its cause, and thus the future is regarded as something already given, as

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, some modern philosophers themselves are of the opinion that it is the only task of philosophy. The statement above is not intended to mean this way, but that if we want to make use, philosophically, of scientific theories, what we do, then, is not science, but interpretation of scientific theories.

indictable fixed as the past. "Events do not happen; we simply meet them". (ibid.) This conclusion is definitely in conflict with the Qur'anic ideas: "Nature is not static, but it is a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow which thought cuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concept of space and time." (p. 28) That is why Whitehead's interpretation is likely to appeal to Muslim students more than that of Einstein himself (time as the fourth dimension of space). (p. 106) Here we see how a scientific theory is interpreted to help explaining philosophical ideas. This is in line with our previous discussion before<sup>12</sup> that since science is a mass of sectional views of reality, fragments of a total experience which do not seem to fit together, it cannot, if it is true to its own nature and function, set up its theory as a complete view of Reality. (p.33)

Another example is Iqbal's taking Heisenberg's uncertainty principle not at its face-value, but as an indication that Kant's categories -- especially that which concerns causality, the essence of which is serial time -- had been transcended since this theory is not compatible with the Newtonian strict principle of causality. This means that serial time is not the only possible construal of time. The fact that Kant's categories are transcended by scientific findings means that there might be another level of experience different from our normal level of experience; if this is so, thus the argument goes, it is an indication that reason may have an access to things-in-themselves, and thus there is a prospect for some kind of theology. (p. 144)

Still another example is the one cited before, about Iqbal's discussion on the manner of Divine creation; there he makes use of Ash'arite theology, modern science and philosophy, but also metaphysics of the Sufis; he also shows which parts of Ash'arite theology that could be further explained, evaluated and, perhaps, corrected by new scientific findings. (p.

Besides that, modern science may also explain or reach a conclusion which otherwise would be unattainable, that could be taken as a further interpretation of what the Sufis experience in their mystical experiences. The case for this is 'Iraqi of which Iqbal says "was unable to see the full implications of his thought partly because he was not a mathematician a

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<sup>12</sup> See p. 8 of this essay.

partly because of his natural prejudice in favour of the traditional Aristotelian ideas of a fixed universe." (p. 109)

By taking this stance -- that science is not taken at its face-value, but philosophically interpreted by taking into account many other considerations outside science -- Iqbal could make use of new scientific findings, while, at the same time, avoiding their liability to change. There still possibility, to be sure, that his views would be affected by any possible fundamental change of scientific theories, but, at least, it is less vulnerable than the other position. So if Iqbal's ideas that have bearings on scientific findings were very much up to date, it also means that now some of them might be outdated. This is the risk of the attempts such as Iqbal's. But Iqbal himself claims no finality of his thoughts; in general, he asserts that there is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking: "As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other view and probably sounder views than those set forth in these lectures, a possible. Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it." (p. xxii) This is another way of seeing Iqbal's reconstruction. One of the characteristics of philosophy is that, unlike mathematics, for example, which could be satisfied by one proof, the greater the number of proofs for a philosophical idea is the better.<sup>13</sup> Therefore proofs from modern scientific findings must straighten the arguments for an idea.

Finally, about the notion of "reconstruction" itself, there are also some interesting observations and criticisms by Fazalur Rahman and S. M Naquib al-Attas, as mentioned in the beginning of this essay. The criticisms come from their disagreements with Iqbal regarding his evaluation of the Islamic intellectual tradition and modern science and philosophy -- the two most important characteristics of reconstruction. Rahman sees that the tradition of Islamic philosophy as represented by figures such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, and the Ash'arite and Mu'tazilite theologians, "essentially a product of history and bears little direct relationship to the Qur'an and the Prophet themselves."<sup>14</sup> In another place he says that in its material or content aspect

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<sup>13</sup> Murtada Mutahhari, "An Outline of Muslim Contribution to Philosophy", *A1-Tawhid*, vol. X, No. 1, p. 86.

the philosophical system such as built by Ibn Sina is "Hellenistic throughout".<sup>15</sup> Although the system itself, as a whole, has an indubitably Islamic stamp, and tries to reckon with the religious metaphysics of Islam, "that it does only in so far as the rational Greek character of the material would allow."<sup>16</sup> Up to this point Iqbal might be in agreement with Rahman, since he criticizes this Greek-based Islamic philosophy and theology on the same basis:" while Greek philosophy very much broadened the outlook of Muslim thinkers, it on the whole, obscured their vision of the Qur'an they read the Qur'an in the light of Greek thought." (p. 3) But then, Iqbal also observes that later they realized their mistake, "and the result of this perception [that the spirit of the Qur'an was anti-classical]. was a kind of intellectual revolt ...." (Ibid.) While Rahman seems not to make this differentiation between the earlier and later philosophical thought in Islam. It is clear for him that there is a need for elaborating an Islamic metaphysics, but it has to be done on the basis of the Qur'an.<sup>17</sup> This is Rahman's key-point. His strong criticisms of Iqbal, as well as of the Muslims theologians and philosophers, is that their philosophical systems are not systematically based on the Qur'an.<sup>18</sup> In this context, he mentions "reconstruction", most probably with Iqbal's working in his mind, saying, "One should perhaps say that Islamic theology/philosophy has to be rebuilt afresh on the basis of the Qur'an, rather than reconstructed from this medieval heritage. How does one reconstruct, for example, the medieval theological doctrines of God and His Attributes?"<sup>19</sup>

Concerning Iqbal's Reconstruction itself Rahman observes that Iqbal's aim was the reawakening of the stagnant Muslim community of his time.

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<sup>14</sup> Islam, p. 257.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>17</sup> Cf. idem., Islam and Modernity, the University of Chicago Press, 1982 pp. 133, 151-154, 157-158.

<sup>18</sup> Ialam, pp. 256-257.

<sup>19</sup> Ialam, p. 257, italics mine; cf. Ialam and Modernity, pp. 151-152.

And to achieve that aim, on one hand, he "did not carry out any systematic inquiry into the teaching of the Qur'an but picked and chose on its verse -- as he did with other traditional material -- to prove certain theses at least some of which were the result of his general insight into the Qur'an but which, above all, seemed to him to suit the most contemporary needs of a stagnant Muslim society."<sup>20</sup> On the other hand, he criticizes Iqbal's attempts as very much dated, "since he took seriously his contemporary scientists who tried to prove a dynamic free will in man on the basis of the new subh-atomic scientific data, which they interpreted as meaning that the physical world was 'free' of the chain of cause and effect!"<sup>21</sup> Indeed, Rahman admits that in modern times the Reconstruction is the only systematic attempt at building an Islamic metaphysical system, "But despite the fact that Iqbal had a certain basis and rare insight into the nature of Islam as an attitude of life, this work cannot be said to be based on Qur'anic teaching: the structural elements of its thought are too contemporary to be an adequate basis for an ongoing Islamic metaphysical endeavour ..."<sup>22</sup> This insistence on making the Qur'an -- in a systematic way -- as the basis or foundation upon which any Islamic intellectual endeavour must be built is Rahman's special characteristic. He does not deny that any systematic interpretation of the Qur'an, which is the only way of making a theological or metaphysical system truly Islamic, will necessarily be influenced by contemporary modes of thought, such as what happened to Iqbal philosophical system. Furthermore, "this is also required in the sense that only in this way can the message of the Qur'an becomes relevant to the contemporary situation. But it is quite another thing to couch the Qur'anic message in terms of a particular theory..."<sup>23</sup> Here are Rahman's two related points of disagreement with Iqbal formulation of certain concepts, such as the concept of God, in terms contemporary scientific

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<sup>20</sup> *Ialam and Modernity*, pp. 153-154.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 132

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154

theories, and the method by which he attempts deduce the concepts from the Qur'an.<sup>24</sup>

From a very different point of view, S.M. Naquib al-Attas' criticisms Iqbal also end up in his rejection of the term "reconstruction". He sees that the reconstruction is basically an attempt at a reasoned simplification of the Sufi method of approaching a complex vision of the nature of reality, and that Iqbal could never have formulated his philosophy without sufficient knowledge of Sufi theology, psychology, and metaphysics -- although "himself did not clearly and positively acknowledge his profound debt the sufis of the school of wahdat al-wujud."<sup>25</sup> But what is objected by Attas is his fusing this with certain elements derived from modern science and philosophy, and thus amounts to an impossible combination, while misinterpreting the Sufi metaphysics.<sup>26</sup> An example of this fusion in the idea

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Al-Attas, op.cit., p. 459. But regarding his ideas as expressed in his *Asrar. Khudi and Rumuz-i-Bekhudi*, Iqbal writes

One word more. In my notes which now form part of your introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi*, I deliberately explained my position in reference to Western thinkers, as I thought this would facilitate the understanding of my views in England. I could have easily explained myself in the light of the Qur'an and Muslim Sufis and thinkers e.g., Ibn Arabi and Iraqi (Pantheism), Wahid Mahmud (Reality as a Plurality), Al-jili (the idea of the Perfect Man) and Mujaddid Sarhindi (the human person in relation to the Divine Person). As a matter of fact, I did so explain myself in my Hindustani introduction to the Islam edition of the *Asrar*.

I claim that the philosophy of the *Asrar* is a direct development out of the experience and speculation of old Muslim Sufis and the thinkers. Even Bergson's idea of time is not quite foreign to our Sufis. The Qur'an is certainly not a book of metaphysics, but it takes a definite view of the life and destiny of man, which must eventually rest on propositions, especially when it is done in the light of religious experience and philosophy invoked by that great book, is no putting new wine in old bottles. It is only a restatement of the old in the light of the new.

See Discourses of Iqbal, edited by Shahid Husseini Razaqi, Sh. Ghulam Ali, Lahore, 1979, p. 196.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 460 Regarding Iqbal's misunderstanding of Islamic intellectual tradition, there is another example, as shown by Muhammad Suheyl 'Um which concerns his view on Ibn 'Arabi and the theory of wahdat al-wujud. Suheyl Umar lists 19 causes identified by Iqbal of the decline of Islamic community the source of which he ascribes to Ibn 'Arabi or his

of evolution found in both . modern science and Muslim (especially sufi, and failasuf metaphysics: the former refers to a biological evolution nature, while the latter refers to the spiritual evolution of the soul of ma But here Iqbal reads modern scientific theories and philosophy into t Muslim metaphysics. This brings us to the other criticism, concerning t merits of modern philosophy and science.

In contrast with Iqbal, al-Attas sees that there is divergence between Islamic metaphysics and modern science and philosophy which is "root in their respective positions concerning the, sources and methods knowledge and the epistemological process..."<sup>27</sup> He sees that mode: philosophy has become the interpreter of science, and organizes the rest of the natural and social sciences into a wrold-view. "The interpretation turn determines the direction in which science is to take in its study nature. It is this interpretation of the statements and general conclusions science and the direction of- science along the lines suggested by the interpretation that must be subjected to critical evaluation, as they pose for us today the most profound problems that have confronted us generally the course of our religious and intellectual history."<sup>28</sup> while science its■ has narrowed its method, and, consequently, the range of reality it wants deal with: "The study of nature ought not to be reduced to the methods empiricism and rationalism that operate solely on the world of objects events in space and time and their relations."<sup>29</sup>

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followers, or tasawwuf in general, especially their view of wahdat al-wujud. But upon a closer examination of Ibn 'Arabi's works themselves, it seems that Iqbal misunderstands them. And this stemmed from his bad access to them; many times he has to rely only on secondary sources. See Muhammad Suheyl 'Umar, "Contour of Ambivalence: Iqbal and Ibn 'Arabi in Historical Perspective," *Studies in Traditions*, vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 67-81, and No, 2, pp. 75-88, Karachi, Pakistan, 1992.

<sup>27</sup> S. M. N. al-Attas, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 560-461. For a more elaborate discussion on his criticisms of modern science see his *Islam and the Philosophy of Science*, International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Kuala Lumpur, 1989, especially pp. 3-9.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 465.

Furthermore, al-Attas sees that in Islamic tradition itself, there already a unified system that overcomes the too narrow methods empiricism and rationalism in modern science. this system integrates reason and experience with their higher orders in the suprarational and transempirical levels of human consciousness, and it discloses the ultimate Reality in positive terms. And this Islamic metaphysics "is but another name for philosophical Sufism."<sup>30</sup> It is into this system that the reformulation of the statements and general conclusion derived from the methods of sciences, and the modification of the methods themselves must be integrated. The recognition of this system brings him to the following conclusion:

What we need, then, is not a reconstruction, but a restatement of the statements and general conclusions of Islamic metaphysics in accordance with intellectual perspective of our times and the developments in the domains of knowledge; and this entails a realignment, where relevant or necessary, of the direction of developments in the various sciences such that they become integrated with it.<sup>31</sup>

Even though Rahman and al-Attas reject the term "reconstruction", which is implied by their rejections of some of Iqbal's evaluations of Islamic intellectual tradition and modern science and philosophy, there is one

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid. Al-Attas' above criticisms of Iqbal are discussed in the Epilogue of the book we are referring to, A Commentary on the "Hujjat al-Siddiq" of Nur al-Din al-Raniri. This book is basically an elaboration of that metaphysical system identified above as philosophical Sufism, through an extensive commentary on the work of Nur al-Din al-Raniri, the most prominent Malay Muslim thinker of 17th century whose views are identified by al-Attas as belonging to this school. (See p. 44) He identifies the proponent of this school as follows: "Among the notable early representatives of this school of Sufis 'after al-Junayd were Abu Nasr al-Sarraj, 'Ali al-Hujwiri, Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri and 'Abd Allah al-Ansari. to this school also belonged al-Ghazali, But their chief exponent was Ibn 'Arabi, who first formulated what is originally given in the intuition of existence into an integrated metaphysics expressed in rational and intellectual terms. Among his erudite commentators were Sufis such as Sadr al-Din Qunyawī, 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Qashani, Dawud al-Qaysari, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jami; and his doctrine of the Perfect Man (al-insan al-Kamil) was developed by 'Abd al-Karim al-jili. the philosophical expression of the transcendent unity of existence [wahdat al-wujud] was formulated by Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, called Mulla Sadra." (pp. 44-45).

<sup>31</sup> Al-Attas, op. cit, p. 465.

important point on which all of them agree. Namely, that there is today a need for stating Islamic metaphysics in the "modern" language, that is to say, the language familiar to Muslims living in this modern world; a language which is very much coloured by modern scientific-philosophical theories. In other words, this is a problem of communication. In Iqbal's letter cited above he emphasizes this point as the aim of his reconstruction; and for Rahman, an Islamic theological or metaphysical system built through a systematic interpretation of the Qur'an will necessarily be influenced by contemporary modes of thought if we want to make it relevant, to the contemporary situation; while al-Attas' restatement exactly addresses this problem, and, moreover, he even mentions that the understanding of the unified metaphysical system mentioned above in rational and intellectual terms "had to wait till our present age, when scientific developments in our understanding of nature have advanced considerably, before its profound significance can be realized."<sup>32</sup> the difference between them lies in the extent to which an Islamic metaphysics may accommodate modern scientific and philosophical theories.

In his Reconstruction Iqbal has tried to meet this challenge of communicating Islamic metaphysics, as he understood it, to the young modern Muslims who had been "influenced by modern philosophy"<sup>33</sup> However, it seems that there are still some problems here, especially regarding the terminology he used. Both Rahman<sup>34</sup> and al-Attas disapprove Iqbal's couching of the Islamic metaphysical concepts in a particular scientific or philosophical theory – despite their views above regarding the necessity of modern expression of Islamic metaphysics. Surely there is a very fine line between these two things; and Iqbal, according to them, has fallen into the former. For; example, as observed by Al-Attas, Iqbal used terminology which is derived from modern, western evolutionist philosophy and science as represented by Bergson, Nietzsche and Whitehead, and thus obscuring the ideas itself: "The ultimate Reality is not to be conjectured

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. xv.

<sup>33</sup> See his letter cited in p. 4 above.

<sup>34</sup> Islam and Modernity, p. 154.

vaguely as Force, Energy, Elan Vital, Space- Time, Movement, Change, or Becoming, in line with the statements, conclusions and interpretations of modern science and philosophy.<sup>35</sup> These are the (modern) terms chosen by Iqbal in expressing his vision of Islamic metaphysics. But, to do justice to Iqbal, we should also remember that his Reconstruction was one of the first attempts at expressing Islamic metaphysics in a modern language; even today merely translating an Islamic metaphysical work into a modern European language remains problematic. The difficulties faced by Iqbal should, therefore, have been greater.

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In the beginning of this essay we characterized the Reconstruction as Iqbal's attempt at facing the problem of modernity; we also said that his problem arose as a result of the unavoidable direct contact with modern, western civilization. In the last few decades of the so-called post modernity, the contact intensifies greatly through many kinds of media. In any case there is no choice except to face it. Seen in this perspective, Iqbal's deliberation of bringing Islamic metaphysics into contact with modern science and philosophy, which he regards simply as "human knowledge" (p. xxii), was natural. Today we are in a better position to do efforts such as Iqbal's reconstruction, since, firstly, there have been increasingly many works addressing the problem Iqbal tried to solve, whether they are in the context of Islam or not, and-thus the subtlety of this problem has become more manifest. And, secondly, we also have a better access to our own intellectual tradition, thanks to the scholarly efforts of many Muslim scholars as well as 'orientalists.

Above all criticisms of him, Iqbal had, given a starting point from which the pursuit of the solution of this problem might proceed. As response to the problem, we may say that Reconstruction was among the first serious works devoted to answering this problem -- the one that is genuine and, in many ways, still fares much better than many of the works of today's Muslims scholars.

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<sup>35</sup> Commentary, pp. 464-5.

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3. In the quotations below all italics are mine.

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9. Ibid.

10. See f.n. 4 of this paper.

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12. See p. 8 of this essay.

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14. Islam, p. 257.

15. Ibid., p. 117.

16. Ibid.,

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18. Ialam, pp. 256-257.

19. Ialam, p. 257, italics mine; cf. Ialam and Modernity, pp. 151-152.

20. Ialam and Modernity, pp. 153-154.

21. Ibid., p. 153.
22. Ibid., p. 132.
23. Ibid.,p. 154.
24. Ibid.
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27. S. M. N. al-Attas, op. cit., p. 464.
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- 29- Ibid., p. 465.
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31. al-Attas, op. cit., p. 465.
32. Ibid., p. xv.
33. See his letter cited in p. 4 above.
34. Islam and Modernity, p. 154.
35. Commentary, pp. 464-5.

# IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF THE LIFE

**HEREAFTER**

Dr. Abdul Khaliq

In Islam it is recognized as one of the fundamental, indispensable articles of faith that man, after his physical death in this world, which is bound to occur sooner or later, will be reborn in a world that is yet to be --- a world 'much superior in respect of degrees and much superior in respect of excellence'.<sup>36</sup> No one can be truly faithful without subscribing to this article. This incident of resurrection, according to the Qur'anic scheme of things, must necessarily be in store for men so that they meet in the big, the final and the total way rewards or punishments for their various deeds, good or bad. The hereafter has been called 'the domain of recompense' (dar al jaza), the world here and now being 'the domain of action' (dar al-'amal)

So he who does an atom's weight of good will see it.

And he who does an atom's weight of evil will see it<sup>37</sup>

However, the Qur'an has not furnished any premisses which could provide conclusive evidence for the rebirth of man as it does not, in general, do for any one of the eschatological realities or metaphysical truths including the existence of God Himself. Firstly, no 'proofs' ---- in a strictly logical sense of this term ---- appear to be possible in this area of speculation; and secondly, if at all proofs had been given that would have robbed man of the capacity to make existential choices between alternatives. Man's freedom to choose and freedom to believe are so immensely valuable in the estimation of God that He would not like at all to bind him down to irresistible conclusions. So, the Qur'anic appeal in such cases is primarily to an intuited assurance in man of, and emotive faith in, the all-powerfulness of God, His justice etc. For this it resorts at the most to various stances of analogical reasoning. For the phenomenon of resurrection, the Qur'an says:

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<sup>36</sup> Qur'an, 17:21.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 99:7-8.

See they not that Allah, Who created the heavens and the earth, is able to create the like of them? And He has appointed for them a term, whereof there is no doubt. But the wrongdoers consent to naught but denying<sup>38</sup>

And says man: When I am deed, shall I truly be brought forth alive?

Does not man remember that We created him before, when he was nothing?

So by thy Lord! We shall certainly gather them together...<sup>39</sup>

From it We created you, and into it We shall return you, and from it raise you a second time .<sup>40</sup>

See they not that Allah, Who created the heavens and the earth and was not tired by their creation, is able to give life to the dead? Aye, He is surely Possessor of power over all things.<sup>41</sup>

Were We then fatigued with the first creation? Yet they are in doubt about a new creation<sup>42</sup>

And so on. That conviction in the hereafter is structured on emotion rather than logic is what Iqbal also subscribes to. In one of his letters he says.

The cast of my emotional life is such that I could not have lived a single moment without a strong faith in the immortality of human consciousness. The faith has come to

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 17:99.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 19:66-68.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 20:55.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 50:15,

me form the Holy Prophet of Islam. Every atom of me is brimming with gratitude to him .....<sup>43</sup>

On the same subject, he writes in another letter:

....In this regard there are many facts which are beyond the ken of human reason. An awareness about them grows from certain sources which have nothing to do with philosophical understanding.<sup>44</sup>

The question arises why is there an emphasis on the prospect of resurrection or rebirth in the hereafter, the next world *al-akhirah*, in the terminology of the Qur'an. The answer is that it helps man towards a moral and spiritual uplift here and now. Clear and transparent descriptions of the externally fascinating paraphernalia of heavens and the most dreadful upheaval that characterizes hell are meant for persuading individuals to lead a good life in this world and deterring them from the evil ways. In the hereafter, it has been promised, the principle of personal accountability and equitable justice will reign supreme. No proxy will be permitted and no sharing of burdens will be allowed. Every individual will be treated strictly in accordance with his own deeds alone and with the deeds of no one else. The Qur'an says:

I will not suffer-the work of any worker among you to be lost.<sup>45</sup>

Whoever goes aright, for his own soul does he go aright; and whoever goes astray, to its own detriment only does it go astray. And no bearer of a burden can bear the burden of another<sup>46</sup>

Leave Me alone with him whom I created.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Quoted in Zia Bar, Iqbal Number, p. 50.

<sup>44</sup> Sayyid Nazir Niazi, Makutbat e Iqbal, p. 74.

<sup>45</sup> Qur'an, 3:195.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 74:15.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 74:17.

But when the deafening cry comes, The day when a man flees from his brother, and his mother and his father, And his spouse and his sons. Every man of them, that day, will have enough concern to make him indifferent to others.<sup>48</sup>

Iqbal, during his discussion of the problem of immortality, specially in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, has described and examined the views of a number of Eastern and Western thinkers so as to be in a position to formulate his own standpoint in the richest possible perspective. The frame of reference and the subjacent current of his entire critical examination of these views necessarily happens to be his firm commitment to the insistent standpoint of the Qur'an, delineated in the verses just quoted, that man's immortality is uniquely individual in character. He so beautifully says:

اگر یک ذره کم گردد ز انگیز وجود من  
باین قیمت نمی گیرم حیات جاودانه را

This would immediately refute the doctrine of metempsychosis or, what has more commonly been known as, the 'transmigration of souls' as well as the view that the immortal life of an individual consists in his ultimately becoming a part and parcel of the totality of existence like a drop of water which eternalizes itself by getting submerged in the expanses of an ocean. The former for example, was the view of Buddhism in India and of the Hindus who accepted the Buddhist influence. The latter was, for one thing, accepted by a number of Muslim mystics who subscribed to a pantheistic metaphysics partly due to the inherent logic of mystic experience itself and partly due to certain alien influences.

The first thinker whom Iqbal critically examines in his *Reconstruction* and finds reasons to refute is Ibn Rushd who, according to him, had propounded the doctrine of collective immortality'. To being with, Ibn Rushd did not subscribe to the orthodox conviction in bodily resurrection which they had built upon the basis of a literalist understanding of the Qur'an: Al-Ghazali, in his *Tahafah al-Falasifah*, defended this conviction and

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 80:34-37.

declared it as one of the basic articles of faith in Islam. Ibn Rushd, in his powerful poser *Tahafat ul-Tahafah* refuted al-Ghazali on this point as he chose to allegorize ---- like Farabi and Ibn Sina before him ---- the relevant Qur'anic verses instead of understanding them in their plain, lexical meanings.

Ibn Rushd made a distinction between sense or mind, on the one hand, and intelligence, on the other ---- presumably corresponding to the two Qur'anic terms *nafs* and *ruh*. Mind, occurring to him, depends for its operation and in fact for its existence on the data received through the sense organs of the body. It is the principle of individuality in man. Being entirely dependent on the body, it dies with the physical death of man. *Ruh*, on the other hand, he believes, is independent of the body. It is the principle of universality and collectivity. Though residing in a particular body, it only temporarily resides there as a representative of the universal Soul or Universal Intellect or Active Intellect to which alone belongs immortal existence. Universal Intellect may be taken to symbolize the entire human race. So not man as a person but the human race, in general is bound to survive eternally.

Iqbal raises at least three objections to Ibn Rushd's point of view. Firstly, Ibn Rushd is wrong when he appears to hold that the Qur'anic words *nafs* and *ruh* are the sort of technical terms used for two distinct elements in the human organism which are opposed to each other in character. The former being privately and indissolubly attached to the body; the latter being universal and transcendent and so essentially independent of any physical substratum. Qur'anic concept of the human person, Iqbal, instead, rightly emphasizes is that of an indissoluble organic unity. Secondly, this point of view fails to prove immortality for the human person: it only proves continued existence for the human race even only for the human civilization and culture. Thirdly, it "looks like William James, suggestion of a transcendental mechanism of consciousness which operates on a physical medium for a while and then gives it up pure sport"<sup>49</sup> and thus it fails to give due importance to the primal, unique individuality of the human person as such.

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<sup>49</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 89

Kant has dealt with the problem of immortality in both of his Critiques. The general tenor of his argument is moral. The observation that can be quoted as the basic intuition of his entire reasoning is available towards the end of his Critique of Practical Reason.

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heaven above and the moral law within.... I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my experience.

In his Critique of Pure Reason he argues that in this world virtue and happiness are two mutually divergent notions. Our reason demands that, they should meet so that virtue is rewarded with happiness. Given the different natures of both, this meeting is not possible in the limited span of an individual's life in this world. It needs an additional other world to eventuate. Hence the inevitability of the life hereafter. In the Critique of Practical Reason he proceeds a little differently. Under the auspices of the Moral Law we are duty bound to be perfect. Now any duty, by virtue of its very content, has to be carried out. Perfection to be attained being to, and absolute. This would not be possible within the limited period of time available in this world. It necessarily needs an unlimited time and so immortal life.

To the line of argument adopted by Kant Iqbal has some objections specially insofar as it tends to belittle the importance of the present world for the realization of the moral ideal. Further, if it is granted that virtue and happiness are mutually incongruent notions, how can even an unlimited period of time make them meet together. Iqbal is of the opinion that Islam's view of this worldly life is different from that of Christianity which Kant might have in mind. According to Christianity man has been thrown into this world as a package of punishment for the original sin committed by Adam. Being a pit of damnation, this world cannot be the proper place where he can possibly attain the ideal of moral and spiritual excellences. This attainment is to be entirely postponed to the next world. For Islam, on the other hand, the present world plays a positive and constructive role in this connection. It is man's actions here and now that serve to secure higher and higher perfection for the ego and this progression continues on to the life hereafter also. Iqbal's attitude to this world is neither optimistic nor pessimistic but rather melioristic so that the ideals of moral perfection are neither completely

realizable nor absolutely unrealizable here: a meaningful progress can ofcourse be made towards their realization.

Besides these points of criticism we can raise objection against the argument on another count also. Kant seeks to draw a factual judgement as a conclusion from an evaluative judgement: "Virtue ought to be rewarded with happiness; therefore life hereafter exists for this reward". Or, "it is our duty to be perfect; therefore there will be an immortal life in the hereafter in which it will be positively to carry out this duty". But it is just a matter of simple understanding that 'is' by no trick of logic or even imagination, can be deduced from 'ought', as 'ought' too would be incapable of being deduced from 'is'.

William James tried to build up a case for immortality by refuting the point of view of the Darwinians" and the materialists that mind or consciousness is only a productive function of the brain and so, according to them, when body dies, mind goes into non-existence alongwith it. This was, in general, the standpoint of the school of Psychology known as Behaviorism. William James observes that mind is rather the transmissive or permissive function of the brain so that it essentially transcends the brain. It only employs the brain temporarily for its neuro- contact with the body; so by virtue of its nature it is capable of surviving the cessation of bodily existence. Iqbal, however, objects to this view by saying that it appears to be similar to that of Ibn Rushd insofar as it easily boils down to the point of view that consciousness is a cosmic, universal element which uses the individual brain as an instrument for a limited period of time and then, after the extinction of the brain, lives on as ever before.

Another thinker whom Iqbal mentions and mentions in some detail is Nietzsche with his doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Nietzsche believed that the world comprises centers of energy which are limited in number as the quantum of energy is fixed once for all. It is the combinations and recombinations of energy centers which make up the entire furniture of the universe. As time is infinite according to Nietzsche, all such combinations have been exhausted in the past: have in fact been repeated a number of times. There is no happening in the universe which can be declared as totally novel. Whatever happens has already happened repeatedly in the past and will continue to happen an infinite number of times in the future. This

incidentally provides a guarantee for the continuing, periodic emergence of the ideal human person whom he calls the superman'.

Iqbal rejects this doctrine as a sort of sheer mechanism based not on any established fact but on just a working hypothesis of science. Movement of time as circular---- instead of being linear ---- in which various events simply continue repeating themselves infinitely makes immortality intolerable. Nietzsche seems to have had some realization of this implication as he himself described his doctrine not as of immortality but rather as a view of life which would make immortality endurable. This endurability is, according to him, due to the expectation that the energy centers will one day enter into the ideal combination known as the 'Superman' as they have been doing so in the past. This expectation, says Iqbal, is only a passive expectation of the irresistible and does not involve any active progression towards a stage of existence really new. It is only the latter that would be the essential spirit of the concept of personal immortality. Nietzsche's view, he says, is a kind of fatalism worse than that implied in the word qismat which, according to the orthodox interpretation, means that the entire life schedule, to the minutest details, of every individual was pre. determined and in fact written down on the lawh-e-mahfiz, the ' guarded tablet' before he was actually born. "Such a doctrine, far from keeping up the human organism for the fight of life, tends to destroy its action tendencies and relaxes the tension of the ego".<sup>50</sup>

After criticizing various Eastern and Western doctrines of immortality from his own characteristic standpoint let us see now how does he put forth his own point of view. There are three basic facts which, he says, are emphasized by the Qur'an in this regard. These are as follows:

1. Human ego has a beginning in time and did not pre-exist its emergence in the present spatio-temporal order. Iqbal quotes in favour of this the following verses:

And certainly We create man of an extract of clay,

Then We make him a small life-germ in a firm resting place,

Then We make the life-germ a clot, then We make the clot a

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 92.

lump of flesh, then We make (in) the lump of flesh bones,  
then

We clothe the bones with flesh, then We cause it to grow into  
another creation. So blessed be Allah, the Best of creators.<sup>51</sup>

However, elsewhere, word of the Qur'an does describe the phenomenon of the pre-existence of human souls----maybe in their disembodied form. The Qur'an says:

And when thy Lord brought forth from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants, and made them bear witness about themselves: Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes; we bear witness. Lest you should say on the day of resurrection: We were unaware of this.<sup>52</sup>

In view of the lexical meaning of this verse, Iqbal's point of view may appear to be incorrect. However, it can be justified in either of the two ways: either Iqbal would accept only a symbolic interpretation of this verse and understand by it that faith in god is embedded in the primordial nature of man and now needs to be simply revived by observing His signs spread throughout the universe; or, he proposed to emphasize only that aspect of the Qur'anic idea according to which---- despite the pre-existence of souls that may be granted --- a personality that possesses the quality of being fortified or weakened by various sets of behavior patterns did not exist prior to its emergence in this world. The Qur'an, I hold, has a provision for both these ways of justification

2. There is no possibility of a return to this earth after one is deed and removed from the scene. The Qur'an has many verses emphasizing this point:

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<sup>51</sup> Qur'an, 23:12-14.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 7:172.

Until when death overtakes one of them he says: My Lord send me back,

That I may do good in that which I have left. By no means! It is but a word that he speaks. And before them is a barrier, until the day they are raised.<sup>53</sup>

And by the moon when it grows full. -

That you shall certainly ascend to one state after another.<sup>54</sup>

3. Finitude is the essential character of the destiny of man. Every person shall meet God in the hereafter strictly in his capacity as an individual person with a unique sense of accountability for his and his own deeds alone. Finitude is not a misfortune either. It is rather a matter of respect, dignity and honor for the human individual. The higher is the stage of his moral and spiritual evolution, the more well-knit and disciplined his personality becomes. It is only such an ego who will be able to stand the catastrophic upheaval that the Day of Judgement will be and only he will be able to face God with composure and confidence. The Holy Prophet (peace be on him) is the embodiment of this ideal of perfect manhood in Islam. On the occasion of Mt' raj (the Supreme Ascension), when he was face to face with god, 'his eye turned not aside, nor did it wander'.<sup>55</sup> This would be an impossibility in the case of pantheistic metaphysics according to which the individual egos get obliterated in the Supreme Ego just as the rivers flow into, and get indistinguishably mixed up with, the sea waters or just as the light of a candle gets immersed in the daylight when the sun rises. Mansur Hallaj's ejaculation "aria '1 Haq (I am the Truth) which is generally understood pantheistically was, according to Iqbal, the affirmation by Mansur of a strictly theistic state of affairs. He only meant to declare that his ego had acquired a veritable truth and a robust authenticity by the assimilation of

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 23:99-100.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 84:18-19.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 53:17.

Divine attributes or that in the words of the Qur'an --- it had been soaked in the Divine colours, better than which no colours are available.<sup>56</sup>

Connected with the last point alone is Iqbal's primary thesis that immortality is closely relevant to the moral endeavors of the individual self or ego, "there are no pleasure-giving and pain-giving acts; there are only ego-sustaining and ego-dissolving acts. It is the deed that prepare, the ego for dissolution or disciplines him for a future career ... personal immortality, then, is not ours as a right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it".<sup>57</sup> That is to say, he has to work and work seriously for its attainment. Referring to *barzakh*, a term available in the Islamic literature for the stage between death and resurrection, Iqbal says, it would not be a merely passive state of expectation but rather a state of consciousness characterized by a change in the ego's attitude to the new spatio-temporal order that he is going to encounter in the next world. "It must be a state of great psychic unhingement, specially in the case of full-grown egos who have naturally developed fixed modes of operation on a specific spatio-temporal order, and may mean dissolution to less fortunate ones. However, the ego must continue to struggle until he is able to gather himself up and win his resurrection. The resurrection therefore is not an external event. It is the consummation of a life-process within the ego"<sup>58</sup> This activity process in the career of the ego never stops, not even after k resurrection, according to Iqbal. Neither hell is a pit of eternal damnation nor heaven a perpetual holiday. Both are only stages ---- one earlier; the other latter ---- in the he eternal, unending continuation comprising the development of the ego.<sup>59</sup> The former is a creative, purifying mechanism; the latter too is characterized by a gradual, on-going journey towards the realization of higher and higher levels of excellence. The orthodox have always held that the life hereafter will be a life of almost passive inactivity, the one involving only different levels of recompense in terms of rewards and punishments. Those in hell will be subjected to the severest pangs and tortures as if these were ends in themselves whereas the residents of heaven will have all kinds of pleasures readily available to them without the involvement of any effort on there part.

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 2:38.

<sup>57</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal, op. cit., p. 95.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 96.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 98.

Iqbal, for whom Islam invariably emphasizes deed more than idea, regards life as a continuum, a perpetual moral struggle without a holiday either here or there. Hell, he says, is a transitional phase. Being 'the painful realization of one's failure as a man' it provides an occasion to 'make a hardened ego once more sensitive to the living breeze of Divine grace will be involved in a constant effort to "march always onward to receive ever fresh illuminations from an Infinite Reality which 'every moment appears in a new glory'.<sup>60</sup> Every act of a free ego creates a new situation and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding".<sup>61</sup> Iqbal concludes that heaven and hell are ever-evolving states and positions rather than geographical localities. The Qur'an says:

No soul knows what is hidden for it of that which will refresh  
the eyes: a reward for what they did.<sup>62</sup>

An explanation of this verse by the Holy Prophet (peace be on him) is recorded in Bukhari as: Allah says, "I have prepared for my righteous servants what no eye has seen and no ear has heard and what the mind of man has not conceived".<sup>63</sup> Similarly Ibn 'Abbas is reported to have said that "nothing that is in paradise resembles anything that is in the his world except in name".<sup>64</sup>

In view of the above Iqbal appears to be right when he says that the eschatological descriptions by the Qur'an involving references to the so-called physical objects and situations are all of them symbolic in nature. In this he was not alone. It were the Mu'tazilites we know who for the first time regularly resorted to this mode of interpretation. However, if such an interpretation seeks to completely transform the character of existence from physical to mental, that would be going too far. Comparatively less resistant hypothesis would be to say that it may possibly be 'physical' but in the sense that suits the requirements of its incumbents. Iqbal accepts this latter

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<sup>60</sup> Qur'an, 55:29.

<sup>61</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal, op. cit., p. 98.

<sup>62</sup> Qur'an, 55:29.

<sup>63</sup> Sahib Bukhari, 58:8.

<sup>64</sup> Quoted by Mawlana Muhammad Ali on the Holy Qur'an, (Translaton), Preface, p. xxviii.

hypothesis because "ego as an individual", he says, "is inconceivable without some kind of local reference or empirical background".<sup>65</sup>

Anyhow, irrespective of the Qur'anic standpoint and its various interpretations, it may be remarked just in the passing that modern researches in parapsychology have indicated the possibility of disembodied existence. In the phenomenon of thought-transference, for example, there is mind-to-mind traffic and consciousness is found to operate independently i.e. without any material reference. The incidents of visitations by the souls of the dead also tends to establish the existence of individual without physical garbs ---- the so-called astral bodies.

The view that the concept of hell specifically be demythologized as to mean a corrective process, as Iqbal holds, rather than a purely punitive measure, has not been maintained by very many thinkers: only a few have done this. These few thinkers, one tends to feel, do so primarily on the basis of considerations over and above those of the strictly Qur'anic text ---certain hopes and aspirations, an overall optimism about human destiny and even some sayings said to be reported from the Holy Prophet (peace be on him). According to the plain Qur'anic text itself immortality is not an honorific term -- as Iqbal would have it — because the inmates of both hell and heaven will equally have, according to it an immortal lease of existence.

For Iqbal the term immortality, as said alone, stands reserved for the ever-evolving life of the human ego in the heaven where, with the passage of time, he will have a closer and closer approximation to God, the Ultimate Real. Here, incidentally a question arises: if the human ego is immortal in heaven will it not contravene and violate the Muslims' firm faith in the singular eternity of God? The Qur'an is very clear on this point when it says that everything 1 everyone is bound to perish except God.<sup>66</sup> The truth of this verse, however, stands vindicated and vouchsafed in three ways. Firstly, in this world all living creatures and everything else will of course be annihilated till the human beings are raised once again on the Day of Judgement for purposes of recompense. Secondly, in the heaven it will be the divinity itself which will be involved in the process of self-realization. Temptation towards

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<sup>65</sup> Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>66</sup> Qur'an.

evil, the element of non-divinity (referred to in the Qur'anic phrase 'except God') will simply be non-existent there. It is in this sense that God has singular eternity which He does not share with anything or anyone else . Thirdly --- and that is very important ---God's eternity is simply incomparable with man's immortality: they are mutually different categories. Eternity means timelessness whereas immortality involves a linear, non-ending sequence of temporality.

# IQBAL'S EPISTEMIC VIEWS

Dr. Muhammad Maruf

The ultimate aim of human life is to know reality and to act in accordance with that knowledge. According to the Holy Qur'an, the ultimate aim of man's life is the conquest of Nature (Taskhir-i-Ka'inat)<sup>67</sup> Reality, however, which has to be known and conquered, has two aspects: (i) the inner core of Reality and (ii) the outward appearances or shuhud of the real. Iqbal calls them the 'Observable aspects of reality'<sup>68</sup> and says that '...the Ultimate Reality ... reveals its symbols both within and without'<sup>69</sup> If, therefore Reality is to be grasped fully, then it has to be understood both from within and from without. Thus, the task of man is two-fold. Iqbal stresses the need for approaching the Reality from both the angles in order to have a completer grasp there of.

As regards the external, observable aspects of Reality, which the Qur'an describes as the symbols (ayat) of Allah, Iqbal agrees with the famous German thinker Kant's epistemic model: 'Knowledge is sense-perception elaborated by understanding'.<sup>70</sup> He also agrees that 'character of man's knowledge is conceptual, and it is with this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of Reality'. The Nature which Iqbal calls the character of God is divisible into' three main levels-- the level of matter, the level of life and the level of mind and consciousness-- the subject-matter of physics, biology and psychology respectively'.<sup>71</sup> Thus, what is required is the study of these natural sciences: we have to study and conduct research into physical sciences and social sciences in order to understand the observable aspects of reality and to exercise control over them. This will

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<sup>67</sup> Iqbal, Dr. M., *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore) M. Ashraf, 1977, p. 13.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, p. 15.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, p. 12.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, p. 31.

amount to capturing one aspect of the Nature. Iqbal devotes his second lecture "The philosophical Test of the Revelation of Religious Experiences" to a study of the nature of matter, life and consciousness and comes to the conclusion that basically all the three levels have a spiritual basis and hence come much closer to each other. It is not only this, they also beckon into the direction of a spiritual reality where of they are the manifestations. In the words of Iqbal, "... space, time and matter are interpretations which thought puts on the free, creative energy of God. They are not independent realities existing per se, but only intellectual modes of apprehending the life of God".<sup>72</sup> In fact, the Nature and God are much more closer for Iqbal than we are in a position to think or conceive. Iqbal sums up this whole discussion when he says, "The knowledge of nature is the knowledge of God's behavior"<sup>73</sup> Hence, in the view of Iqbal nature and God are intimately closer to each other and there is no legitimate bifurcation between them. While talking of Islam Iqbal says, "With Islam the ideal and the real are not two opposing forces which cannot be reconciled."<sup>74</sup> Thus Iqbal does not agree with those dualists, or Deists, who make a clear bifurcation between God and the universe. Almost all the naturalists and positivists have been guilty of this error; even the spiritualists and mentalists are equally one-sided.

Kant reached upto this level and failed to go beyond because of his Western legacy. He talked of Sensible Intuition and Intellectual Intuition,<sup>75</sup> but denied that man possessed the latter the result being that man could not know the Noumenon (the Reality Itself). Iqbal, on the other hand, following his Muslim legacy of Rumi and Imam Ghazali, and other sufis came to believe that man can develop a certain type of sensitivity to comprehend the Reality Itself. This sensitivity is generally called "intuition." Regarding intuition Iqbal says, as against the common suffrage, "We must not, however, regard it as a mysterious special faculty; it is rather a mode of dealing with

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, p. 65.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, p. 57.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>75</sup> Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, (Eng. tr. Norman Kemp Smith), (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 268.

Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part'. He goes on to add, 'Yet the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience'.<sup>76</sup> This is very important as it throws light on the basic theory of knowledge as expounded by Iqbal. Iqbal holds, as said in the beginning, 'The total-Reality, which enters our awareness and appears on interpretation as an empirical fact, has other ways of invading our consciousness and offers further opportunities of interpretation'.<sup>77</sup> Again Iqbal acutely remarks, 'As regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense-data for our knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God'.<sup>78</sup> It appears from this that there is a religious "data" which, when interpreted properly, gives us the knowledge of God. While talking of 'heart' or intuition Iqbal says, 'It is, according to the Qur'an, something "sees", and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false'.<sup>79</sup> Thus, Iqbal has claimed a kind of finality for this knowledge. It implies that religious experience is also a kind of datum which is not sensory or physiological and which requires interpretation, like the ordinary experience, in order to become knowledge proper.

Another point which Iqbal emphasizes in connection with knowledge is the nature and role of thought or reason in this field. Following the legacy of Aristotle, Kant believed in two kinds of thought/reason only– viz., Pure Reason and Practical Reason. The function of the former is to analyze and unravel the skein of discursive thought, while that of the latter is to suggest ways and means to the already given end. Kant, accordingly, titled his famous treatises *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and *The Critique Practical Reason* (1788).<sup>80</sup> Iqbal, however, insisted the need for a third level of thought, beside these two, which he described as the deeper movement of

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<sup>76</sup> Iqbal, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 18.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 16.

<sup>80</sup> The two famous treatises of Imanuel Kant published in the 18th centuries.

thought. He says, 'In its deeper movement thought is capable reaching an immanent Infinite ...'.<sup>81</sup> He regrets that both Ghazali and Kant failed to see the real movement of thought in the field of knowledge.<sup>82</sup> In the system of Iqbal, thought plays an immensely important role in the field of religious knowledge. While critically examining the Pure Reason

(Thought) Iqbal writes in Baal-i Jibril (The Gabriel's Wing):

خرد کی گہتیاں سلجھا چکا  
 مرے مولیٰ مجھے صاحب جنوں کر!  
 میں

'Having unravelled the knotty skein of Intellect;

O Allah! bestow madness on me'.<sup>83</sup>

In this verse he pithily brings out limitations of the Intellect or Pure Reason. Next he proceeds to examine the nature of Practical Reason in the following verse,

گزر جا عقل سے آگے کہ یہ  
 چراغ راہ ہے منزل نہیں ہے !

'Pass beyond the Pale of reason as this light;

Can show the way, not the goal'<sup>84</sup>

<sup>81</sup> Iqbal, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>83</sup> Iqbal, Baal-i Jibril (Urdu), (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali, 1976), p. 87.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p. 84.

In the above verse Iqbal advises the man to go beyond the sphere of Practical Reason as it cannot suggest the goal; it can at best show the way to a given end. Both these kinds of thought or reason are superficial and 'discursive'. Besides these, Iqbal believes in the "deeper movement of thought",<sup>85</sup> which may be called "non-discursive" thought, in which capacity thought and intuition become complementarities to each other. He says, "They spring up from the same root and complement each other".<sup>86</sup> Not only this, he goes on to add, 'Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality...'<sup>87</sup> Here Iqbal comes closer to al-Farabi who, in his theory of Intellect, holds, "The acquired intellect rises to the level of communication, ecstasy, and inspiration".<sup>88</sup>

We have seen above that Iqbal agrees with Kant regarding the organizational role of thought in human knowledge. He agrees that thought organizes the sense-data received through the various senses and integrates them into knowledge proper of the external world. As said before, he agrees to the epistemic model of Kant so far as our knowledge of the external world is concerned. However, Iqbal extends the application of this epistemic model to the sphere of religious knowledge also. In his view, thought plays the same organizational role in religious knowledge as in the case of sensory knowledge - a fact which Kant failed to realize due to his Western legacy which presupposed that (i) sensory kind of experience is the only genuine human experience and (ii) that all human thought is discursive and cursory. According to Iqbal, on the other hand, religion' knowledge, like any other form of knowledge, consists of data organized by human thought or understanding. The religious data<sup>89</sup> which arise through intuition, is a non-

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<sup>85</sup> Reconstruction, p. 6.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>88</sup> Sharif M.M. (ed.), A History of Muslim Philosophy, (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1963), Vol.-I. "Al-Farabi", p. 462.

<sup>89</sup> Reconstruction, "There conflict is due to the misapprehension that both interpret the same data of experience. We forget that religion aims at reaching the real significance of a

sensory type of data which arises through intuition, is a non-sensory type of data which arises through a direct and immediate presentation of the religious object to the 'faculty of knowing and this data is then organized into knowledge proper, not of course by the ordinary discursive thought but by higher, or what Iqbal calls, 'the deeper movement of thought' which is non-discursive. Among the Western writers it was Nels Ferre, the French writer, who in this book *Reason in Religion*<sup>90</sup> realized that there could be various kinds of thought, but ever he could not assign it any constitutive role in religious or mystic knowledge. Iqbal believes, like al-Farabi that at its higher level thought or reason becomes one with ecstasy or intuition, as said before. Now according to Iqbal, the model of religious knowledge is that some specific kind of data is supplied by the intuition (intellectual intuition in the case of Kant which he denied of man) on which higher thought operates organizing them into knowledge of religious realities. Thus, Iqbal has divested religious or mystic knowledge of its weird or mysterious nature and has brought it at par with sensory or any other form of human knowledge. This, to my mind, is a great and original contribution of Iqbal.

What is very important in Iqbal is that he denies that there is any antagonism between reason and intuition, between philosophy and, religion. Rather they spring up from the same root and complement each other.<sup>91</sup> Not only this, 'Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life'<sup>92</sup> It is not that they do not oppose each other, they rather must go together and complement each other in order to have a complete and fuller vision of Reality: the two vistas of knowledge must combine to avoid the sin of one-sidedness. He say in *Javed Namah* (Pilgrimage of Eternity);

علم ہے عشق است از طاغوتیاں

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special variety of human experience', pp. 25-6.

<sup>90</sup> Nels Ferre, *Reason in religion*, (London: Thomas Nelson, 1963).

<sup>91</sup> op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 4.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3.

علم با عشق است از لاهوتیاں !

'...If it be divorced from love,  
then knowledge is but Satan's progeny;  
But if it blends with love, it joins the ranks  
Of high celestial spirits ....'<sup>93</sup>

Iqbal is more emphatic in his Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadeed (The New Rose Garden of Mystery) when he says:

اگر یک چشم بر بندد گناہے است  
اگر باہر دو بیند شرط راہے است

'If he should close one eye, it would be sin:  
It is by seeing with both eyes that he can gain  
The path....'<sup>94</sup>

Thus, for Iqbal one-sided approach is an unpardonable sin because it leads the man astray as is the situation obtaining in the West. The Westerners have gone too far into their materialism and technology. He accuses both the East and the West of one-sidedness when he says in Javed Namah:

غریباں را زیر کی ساز  
شرقیان را کائنات عشق راز

'For Westerns doth reason furnish all -

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<sup>93</sup> Mahmud Ahmad, Pilgrimage of Eternity (Eng. tr. of Javed Namah), (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture), Vs. 1400-1405, p. 66.

<sup>94</sup> Iqbal, Gulshn-i-Raz-i Jadeed, Eng. tr. by Hadi Hussain, (Lahore: Sh.Ashraf, 1969), p.8.

Accoutrement of life and for the East

Love is the key of mystery...<sup>95</sup>

Thus, both the East and West are erring by one-sidedness. He goes on to add:

حق	گردد	عشق شناس	از	زیر کی
محکم	زیر کی	از اساس	عشق	کار
ہمبر	زیر کی	با شود	چوں	عشق
دیگر		عالم شود		نقشبند

Love-led

Can reason claim the Lord and reason-lit Love strikes firm roots. When integrated,

These two draw the pattern of a different world'<sup>96</sup>

What Iqbal wishes to emphasis is that the approaches of the East and West he combined; that the wisdom of the East and the West be brought closer in order to re-solve the ills and problems of the modern world which, being one-sided and West-dominated, is heading towards a very big catastrophe. What he advocates is that we should combine the rational and technological advancements of the Western world with the moral and spiritual thinking of the East, only then a proper balance can be struck between them which can generate a world of peace and salvation which Iqbal has called "the pattern of a different world", the path of peace and salvation, as said before. Discussing the results of modern Western civilization, Iqbal

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, Mahmud Ahmad, Vs. 1133-35, p. 54.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, Vs. 1133-38, p. 54.

writes: "Thus, wholly overshadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, the modern man has ceased to live soulfully, i.e., from within. In the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless .egoism and his infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness<sup>97</sup> This situation can best be retrieved only by the moral and spiritual asp, contributed by Eastern thought. Only a proper balance between them in guide human progress on the right and straight lines which the .?Qur'an calls "al-Sirat al-Mustagim ".

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<sup>97</sup> Op. cit., Reconstruction, pp. 187-88.

# IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF THE ULTIMATE REALITY

Dr. Naeem Ahmad

Iqbal, like Bergson, follows the Cartesian tradition and makes his own conscious experience the starting point. He says that experience manifests itself at three levels, the level of inert matter, the level of life and the level of consciousness. These are the fields of Physics, Biology and Psychology respectively. Thus he thinks that the study, analysis and interpretation of the findings of these sciences can provide a clue to the nature of ultimate reality. This approach establishes three things: -

i) That Conscious experience is life in time,

ii) That pure time is duration or non-successional change and

iii) That life is a centralizing ego i.e. it is not a chaotic fluid but an organizing principle which has efficient and appreciation aspects.

The finite centre of experience is real but its reality is so profound that it cannot be grasped by the intellect. When we introspectively study our mental phenomenon, we come to realize the conscious existence is life in time i.e., that we do not pass from state to state but live in pure duration. Our intellect splits up duration into isolated states. Pure time "is an organic whole in which past is not left behind, but is moving along with and operating in, the present. And the future is not, given to it as lying before, yet to be traversed; it is given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility."<sup>98</sup> Conscious experience is thus life in time or better life in pure time or duration. Duration is not a mechanical repetition of homogeneous moments. No two moments in the life of an individual can be exactly alike. "To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation. Creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of

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<sup>98</sup> M. Iqbal Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Sh. Ashraf, Lahore, p 49.

mechanical action."<sup>99</sup> Life cannot be explained in terms of mechanism. Iqbal quotes Haldane in support of his thesis' "There can be no mechanism of reproduction. The idea of mechanism which is constantly maintaining or reproducing its own structure, is self-contradictory. A mechanism which reproduced itself would be a mechanism without parts and therefore not a mechanism."<sup>100</sup> Thus an analysis of conscious experience takes us to the conclusion that life is a free creative activity. What is true of conscious existence is also true of the universe at large. Iqbal moves from the highest form of existence to the lowest form and holds that what is true of the highest known form, is also true of the lowest form of existence. This procedure is not scientific but has, however, been followed in philosophical idealism and religion. "On the analogy of our conscious experience, then, the universe is a free creative movement."<sup>101</sup>

On this point Iqbal's vitalistic conception of the universe became different from that of Bergson. Bergson's conception of the ultimate reality is quite inadequate as it fails to assign any role to thought. Iqbal holds that "in conscious experience life and thought permeate each other."<sup>102</sup> Bergson ignores the teleological aspect of the unity of consciousness. Conscious experience is illuminated by idea therefore it becomes teleological. The presence of end does not imply that there are fixed goals to which life moving. In fact there are no distant goals. "... there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scale of values as the process of life grows and expands. We become by ceasing to be what we are."<sup>103</sup>

Again "The world process, or the movement of the universe in time, is certainly devoid of purpose, if by purpose, we mean a foreseen end— a far off fixed destination to which the whole creation moves. To endow the

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid. p. 50

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. p. 44

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. p. 51

<sup>102</sup> Ibid. p. 52

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. p. 54

world process with purpose in this sense is to rob it of its originality, and its creative character."<sup>104</sup>

Iqbal says on the basis of the analysis of conscious experience that the Ultimate Reality is pure duration in which thought life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity.

Such panpsychism is very prominent in Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, William James etc. It also characterizes the thought of many eastern poets and philosophers. Take for example following verses: -

خاک و باد و آب و آتش و بندہ اند  
 بامن و تو مردہ باحق زندہ  
 (رُرمی) اند

از مہر تابہ ذرہ دل و دل بے آنہ  
 طوطی کو شش جہت سے مقابل بے آنہ  
 (غالب) آنہ

در پس آنہ طوطی صفتم داشتہ اند  
 ہرچہ استاد ازل گفت ہماں می گویم  
 (حافظ) گویم

آہستہ چل کہسار  
 میان

ہر سنگ دکان شیشہ گر بے  
 (میر) میر

Such a view of the Ultimate Reality necessarily leads to pantheism. B Iqbal is not a pantheist. He may be regarded as a spiritual pluralist. F him, the entire universe, in the last analysis, is nothing but an infinite number of egos or monads of spiritual atoms. These egos are not like Lieb nizean monads in so far as these are not windowless. These are capable of interaction. Further these are different grades of ego-hood. "It is the degree of the intuition of I-

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. pp. 54-55

amness that determines the place of a thing in the scale of being\_\_\_\_\_our I-amness is dependent and arises out of the distinction between self and the not self." But to the ultimate self" the not-self does not present itself as a confronting other. What we call Nature or the not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of god. His .I-amness is independent, elemental, absolute."<sup>105</sup> Ghalib has beautifully expressed this idea:

وجود	سامان	تری	تجلی	ہے
نہیں	خورشید	تو	ہے	ذره

(your self-revelation is the reason behind the phenomenal existence. An atom has no being without the reflection (in it) of the sun.)

In Iqbal's words:

وجودے	حق	وجود	از	را	خودی
نمودے	حق	نمود	از	را	خودی

(ارمغان حجاز ص 173)

(Self exists by virtue of the existence of God. Self gets expression through the self-revelation of God.)

The self-expression of a finite self is his character. Similarly the Infinite Self or God expresses Himself in a uniform mode of behavior, "Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self."<sup>106</sup> Nature, therefore, can grow and expand. It is limit but boundless. Its boundless is potential not actual. There are no external barriers which may constitute a limit to it. Since Nature is organically related to the Ultimate self, it can grow and expand. "The knowledge of the world is, therefore, the knowledge of God's behavior."<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid. p. 56

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. p. 56

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. p. 57

Thus Iqbal infers from the analysis of conscious experience that Ultimate Reality is a rationally directed creative life. His argument proceeds on analogy. He brings forward the findings of modern physics regarding the nature of time and space to strengthen his vitalistic conception of Reality. The process of divine creation continues without ceasing because the Ultimate Reality is a rationally directed creative life. "To interpret this life as an ego is not to fashion God after the image of man. It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organizing principle of unity".<sup>108</sup>

موجے	چوں	تپیدم	خویش	بحر	بہ
بطوفانے		رسیدم	تا		تپیدم
	خوش	ازیں	رنگے		دگر
		ندیدم			
خویش			بخون		
(ارمغان حجاز ص 123)	کشیدم		تصویرش		

(In my ocean I agitated like a wave,  
I agitated 6111 encountered a storm,  
I did not perceive any other form

Better than the form of ego.with my own I blood I prepared His portrait"

بر صورت	صنم	شیدم	ترا
	خویش		
نقش	را	خدا	خود
		بسٹم	بشکل

محل	رفتن	بروں	خود	از	مرا
		است			
خود	بستم	کہ	رنگے		بہر
		پرستم			

(I carved idols after my own image

I painted God after my own form.,

I cannot transcend limitations of my own being.

Whatever form I assume, I am a worshiper of my own self.)

Iqbal's position is panentheistic rather than pantheistic. The Ultimate Reality or God is both transcendental and immanent in nature. Nature is not opposed to God. In this sense God is immanent. God transcends the world in so far as the world is not co-extensive with him. In other words we can say that although the world is in God yet God has certain aspect that are beyond the spatio-temporal order of the world. Nature or the world is merely a fleeting moment in the life of God.

Here a difficulty arises. A self is unthinkable without a not-self. How can we conceive of God as a self that encompasses the whole universe and also transcends it? "The world in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement, thought in the human ego, -is the self-revelation of the great 'I am', every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence is an ego"<sup>109</sup> Iqbal removes this difficulty by saying that logical negations are of no use in forming a positive concept which must be based on the character Reality as revealed in experience. Now if we regard the universe as a mere men self-revelation of God, what will be the status of evil as an ethical problem? We will have to include it in the Divine scheme of things. Moreover, it would become difficult to draw a hard and fast line between the self- revelation of God and the self-revelation of a finite ego. If we apply Iqbal's principle consistently, it will snatch away all creativity, initiative and originality from the human ego. If

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid. p. 71

we regard the created realm of finite egos as the self-revelation of the supreme Ego or God, we will have to believe that a rigid determinism prevails in the world. If I am going to be the author and master of my own actions, then my personality cannot be the self-revelation of God.

Iqbal does not believe in determinism which is a necessary corollary of pantheism. He thinks that once human ego comes into being, it becomes independent of and separate from his origin. A pearl has its origin in water. But once it comes into being, it severs itself from its origin. It does not shade off into water but maintains its individuality; rather it confronts water. Iqbal conceives of the emergence of human egos in this fashion and says that like pearls we come into being and continue to live in the Divine of Flow Energy.

Thus the summum bonum of the human ego is not self-negation i.e, slipping of the drop into the ocean but a bold affirmation of one's individuality, existence and presence. God has created the finite egos giving them complete freedom. No doubt in doing so, He has taken extreme risk.

If space is a subjective interpretation of the human ego which is ascribed to the activity of God, then it follows that God is not in space and spatial categories are not applicable to Him. Space and time are the subjective forms of human understanding. Iqbal, in a sense, is committed to kantian position. The world as it is in itself cannot be imagined. Even the discovery of the Ultimate Reality by the appreciative self cannot be described in our ordinary language.

For Iqbal, mind and spirit are- identical. Consciousness is a spiritual principle and body is termed as a colony of egos of a lower order.

تن	و	جان	را	دوتا	گفتن	کلام	است
تن	و	جان	را	دوتا	دیدن	حرام	است
بجان		پوشیده		رمز		کائنات	است
بدن		حاله	ز	احوال		حیات	است

(زبور عجم ص 217)

(To say that body and soul are two is a way of expression

To see them as two different entities is forbidden.

In soul is concealed the secret of the universe.

Body is a state among the states of life.)

Iqbal thinks that body, spirit and mind belong to one and the same continual; these are the off-shoots of the same stem. Body is the habit of the soul. The acts composing the body repeat themselves. Here we should note that this statement contradicts Iqbal's main thesis viz., there is no repetition in life.

In short, we can say that for Iqbal Ultimate reality is pure duration in which life, thought and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity. But by purpose we should not understand a distant goal towards which is moving, but it is an inner principle. Thus the movement of rationally directed will remains creative and undetermined.

# SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF IQBAL ' S THOUGHT

Prof. Sayyid Muhammad al-Naquib al-' Attas

(Address given at the International Congress, Lahore, Pakistan.)

The question of Iqbal's statement that "there is a need for a rational foundation for religion" should not necessarily be accepted as valid without further study and reflection. Professor al-Attas said, after elaborating on the Western concept of Knowledge pertaining to the correspondence theory of truth, and tracing its history of ideas in connection with the problem of intellectual perception of higher truths from Aristotle to Augustine and the Avicennan School of the University of Paris; to Aquinas and the Thomistic Synthesis; Ockham, Descartes, and finally Kant —that their problem of the existence of God arose out of the context of their theory of knowledge based on Parmenides' identity of intelligence and being. Because of this he said that for the West the existence of God cannot be rationally demonstrable. Iqbal's raising of the need for a rational foundation for religion, he said further, seemed an involvement in this Western scholastic and intellectual context, and a reaction to this Western problem, and is relevant, only within the non-Islamic intellectual context. Only when Muslims have become confused about Islam and the Islamic world view will such a need arise among them. The need for a rational foundation for religion is then relevant and valid only within the context of Western religion and of intellectually confused Muslims (which actually was the case of the audience Iqbal addressed at Hyderabad) because a 'rational' foundation is already built into the very foundation of Islam and the worldview it projects. Such a need does not occur except when Muslims have become intellectually westernized and confused. The alternative solution to the problem of conveying Islam in its true form to intellectually confused Muslims is to be effected through education and the learning of its true nature as understood and formulated by our great predecessors, and not through the formulation of a philosophical-rational system as this would lead to further confusion. Muslims would invariably

inherit Western philosophico-rational problems in this way, as we have learnt from the lesson taught by al-Ghazali in this respect.

2. Iqbal's contention - or that of those who interpret him- that al-Ghazali and perhaps others such as the ahl al-Tasawwuf thought within the framework of an existing dichotomy between reason on the one hand and intuition on the other is perhaps a misunderstanding of the Islamic conceptual structure within which all true Muslims think. They did not recognize nor apply such a dichotomy, which they knew to be non-existent in Islam - and this fact is further attested to by the Islamic vocabulary they employed. In Islam there is only one term - i.e. al'aql which is used to convey meanings denoting both reason and intuition in the sense Iqbal means. The 'aql is ratio as well as intellectus. The imagined, dichotomy arises out of reading Western philosophico-rational vocabulary such as reason and intuition, ratio and intellectus, into the thoughts of the great Muslim thinkers and theologians and Sufis of the past, imputing conceptual error which did not exist in their thoughts but did exist in the thoughts of Western philosophers, metaphysicians and scientists.

3. In connection with what is stated and implied in paragraphs 1 and 2, above, Professor al-Attas contends that al-Ghazali's conception of the soul has been misrepresented as "immutable" and "static (Iqbal's terms). He says that, on the contrary, the word nafs, which is an aspect of ruh, already conveys within its own semantic structure the connotation of dynamic duration, and that there is no reason to suppose that the great Muslim thinkers were unaware of this.

4. In regard to the concept of knowledge, he said that the Western conception and its methodological approach made rationally possible only the knowledge of the world of objects and their relations. The development of secular science in the West is geared to this conception, which emphasizes the role of ratio and naturalism, leading to a thorough-going scientific empiricism. He said that knowledge is not neutral, and that the conception of knowledge in Islam does' not lend itself into the Western framework in which to conceptualize their ideas will invariably become confused in their conception of the Islamic worldview. It is therefore necessary that the Islamic concept of knowledge be made the foundation of our educational system before any "rational" formulation of the Islamic worldview can be permitted

to propagate itself and be propagated among Muslims. Education, and learning based upon a system of education couched within the Islamic concept of knowledge; is therefore more fundamental than a formulation of a rational philosophical foundation for religion at this stage. When the stage after passing through such a system of education and learning has been reached then it will have been realised that there ought to have been no question of a necessity for a philosophical rational foundation of Islam to arise in the manner advocated.

5. Professor al-'Attas said that Iqbal's philosophical ideas are not to be construed as new as some of his interpreters seem to have made out. What Iqbal says regarding the Self has already been clearly understood and 'systematized' by the early Sufis. In fact Professor al-'Attas contends that Iqbal has in his Reconstruction attempted to present a simplified version of the metaphysics of the Ahl al-Tasawwuf couched in philosophical and rational vocabulary and method in the hope that its essential teaching might be conveyed to a wider audience. In further elaboration of the above argument, in which an exposition of the salient features of the classes of Sufis are given, Professor al Attas said that Iqbal's conception of the Ego and the Ultimate Ego is derived from that class of Sufis called by Sadruddin al-Qunawi as the Ahl-al-Tamkin - i.e. the People of Maturity in Spiritual Understanding - and by Sayyid Haydar Amuli as the Dhu'l 'Aynayn – as the Possessors of Two Eyes - who did not reject the world as illusory, but who affirmed its metaphysical reality in relation to the Ultimate Reality. He went on to give a brief account of the distinction between the spiritual experiences of fana and baqa which has given rise to serious misunderstandings about the Sufis and Tasawwuf. In doing so he quoted Ibn' Arabi, al-Qunawi, 'Iraqi, Jami, Amuli and others.

6. Professor al-' Attas believes that it might be detrimental to our understanding of Iqbal if at this stage we are bent upon 'developing' his philosophical ideas in a kind of secularized empiricism. Other concepts alien to our minds will invariably be introduced. Already Iqbal has been compared by some Western scholars with certain Western theologians and philosophers whose views of truth and reality are contrary to Islam. Unfortunately the haste among the Muslim scholars who have not quite grasped the essential features in Western intellectual history and their fundamental differences

with those within the tradition of Islamic intellectual history seem too uncritical in accepting foreign views about Iqbal's ideas and meanings so that eventually, in their quiescence to such view, we will have an Iqbal who means differently to Muslims than the real Iqbal himself. The Western mind is now bent upon 'universalizing' values and truth everywhere geared, of course, to its own form and desire and inclination. Now is the fashion in which religion itself is universalized, and the process of universalizing in the way that is now happening is none other than the dilution of selected values and concepts so that they might mix into each other and become acceptable to all. This way means the loss of individuality and distinctness that makes Muslims different from others and Islam different from other religions.

7. Finally he also remarked that we should not attribute to Iqbal what he did not intend and is not his claim, nor to 'develop' him into the kind of Universalist that some people mean in the way some Western scholars and Muslim intellectual have developed Muhammad 'Abduh into a modernist Reformer. This manner of 'developing' a man will not necessarily enhance his stature in greatness, on the contrary, it might tarnish true greatness in that any amount of making out a man to be what he is not will not escape the critical scrutiny of future generations.

# JAMES AND IQBAL

## (A NEW APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION)

Dr. Asif Iqbal Khan

William James (1842-1910) is one of the outstanding figures in the philosophical movement known as pragmatism. He is equally notable for his contributions in the field 'of psychology of religion'<sup>110</sup> His interest in religion was mainly centred on its personal aspect rather than on institutional religion.<sup>111</sup> What attracted him were 'the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine'. Thus, he undertook generally a descriptive analysis of religious phenomena.

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal ' (1877-1938), a contemporary of James, is basically a religious thinker who employed both verse and prose to express his ideas.<sup>112</sup> He is considered to be-the greatest Muslim scholar of his time, at least in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. His main contributions, however, can be narrowed down to his attempt to reconstruct the Muslim religious thought in the light of the more recent developments in the domain of knowledge. Both James and Iqbal have tried to interpret religious phenomena by employing psychological instruments of explanation and understanding.

The propensity towards a psychological study of religion is of a relatively recent origin and manifests itself prominently in American psychology. The Varieties of Religious Experience by William James appeared in 1902 and

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<sup>111</sup> His major works include The Varieties of Religious Experience; Pragmatism and Principles of Psychology.

<sup>112</sup> His main religio-philosophical works are: The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Prose-English), Secrets of the Self (Asrar.i. Khudi), Mysteries of Selflessness (Rumuz-i-Bekhudi) and The Book of Eternity (Javid Nameh) are in Persian verse. There are numerous essays as well (both English and Urdu) of religio-philosophical import.

made him 'the Father of the Psychology of Religion'. It was, till then, the most exhaustive single contribution to the psychology of religion and set the pattern for many subsequent studies on the topic. Even today, scholars make generous use both of the text and the ideas available in this epoch-making work. Iqbal--- a contemporary of James, was, of course, influenced by this trend.

In a short span of time, this discipline has made a phenomenal progress and attempts are in the offing to make it a truly scientific study. Psychology of religion is supposed to be a further development of general psychology 'reaching in the direction of religious behaviour to comprehend its meaning.'<sup>113</sup> In this perspective it looks within human experience to understand what religion means to persons. It is different from philosophy of religion, which aims to view all religions impartially and evaluate each from a universal point of view. It is, thus, more akin to history of religion and sociology of religion in so far as both, like a psychology of religion 'gather, classify and arrange facts in a systematic order.' From these facts general principles are inferred. Hence, there is a tendency to formulate a scientific definition of psychology of religion. 'This stress on the behavioural and the practical is amply evidenced in the urge to make it branch of general psychology, "which attempts to understand, control predict human behaviour -- both appropriate and peripheral --- which 'perceived as being religious by the individual, and which is susceptible to one or more of the methods of psychological science.'<sup>114</sup>

Although William James is recognized as one of the most important figures in the American psychology of religion, his influence in the

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<sup>113</sup> The matter, in our view, is more complex. The phenomenon referred to by the author may as well indicate a reaching out, on the part of modern psychology, for gaining a fresh vision of Reality which is denied to it within the confines of the Freudian and Jungian paradigms. Frontier thinking in psychology such as Hillman's Revisioning Psychology testifies to it which borrows its underpinnings and occasional insights from Ibn 'Arabi via Henry Corbin (Editor).

<sup>114</sup> William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, New York, 1929, p. 73.

contemporary era remains far from dominating. Thus, one finds little affinity between James' "ether mysticism" or "anaesthetic revelation" and Freud's religion as "projective process" or Marx's "alienation" or even with Jung's work. Interestingly, many among the practitioners in the field are interested in the forms and potentials of human consciousness and thus share James' concern with both the religious consciousness and psychic phenomena. Without, of course, making substantive use of James' thought they refer to him as a thinker who exemplifies many of their own concerns and intentions. But, for them, he remains only worth a referential use.

With Iqbal, however, the situation is quite different. For him, the Varieties of Religious Experience was an inspiration as well as a work which he used substantially in working out his own view of religion.<sup>115</sup> The core of the work is James' extended descriptions of various personal religious experiences. He takes up two major areas for detailed treatment:

1) The main features of mystical states of consciousness, viz. ineffability, noetic quality, transiency and passivity.

"2) The possibility of other avenues to truth or sources of knowledge than traditional philosophy and science; and a serious but critical treatment of mystic experience in this regard.

Now, Iqbal had vital interest in both these areas of mystical' consciousness. The discerning reader can' easily detect a clear reflection of the impact The Varieties had on Iqbal's view of religious experience.

In the first two Chapters of The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbal's identification of the main features of mystic experience as well as the terminology and tone and tenor of his discussion, in general, betray a clear influence of the American philosopher. Obviously, the similarities have deeper implications for the whole of Iqbal's religious thought. But, there are other reasons for Iqbal's attraction to James also.

## **TRANSPERSONAL PSYCHOLOGY**

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<sup>115</sup> See Chapters I & II of The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.

With Abraham Maslow as its main exponent, the contemporary transpersonal psychology attempts to offer an alternative account against the traditional Western view of human consciousness. Going beyond the behaviourists, the psycho-analysts and even the humanists in psychology, it shows interest in such extraordinary issues as "meta-needs, ultimate values, unitive consciousness, peak-experiences, ecstasy, mystical experience, B Values, essence, bliss, awe, wonder, self-actualization, ultimate meaning, transcendence of the self, spirit, sacralization of everyday life, oneness, cosmic awareness, cosmic play, individual and species-wide synergy, maximal interpersonal encounter, transcendental phenomena, maximal sensory awareness, responsiveness and expression, and related concepts, experiences and activities."<sup>116</sup> This kaleidoscopic vision of human consciousness implies inadequacy of the Western science paradigm, the precedence of the Eastern model of "spiritual psychologies" and the possibility of there being "higher" or "altered" states of consciousness. This is indicative of an awareness rather than a rejection of the narrow rationalistic and scientific-technological bias of the Western understanding of human consciousness. Therefore, the need to extend the scope of the model outside of its paradigmatic confines to include in its purview consciousness found at the fringe of our normal consciousness. The logical corollary is, thus, the bringing together of religion and psychology for fostering new insights in both these fields of human inquiry. The new psychology of religion so formulated, then, seeks to bring together the theoretical-analytical modern psychology and the traditional Eastern one with its practical techniques of meditation and inner experience. It is but natural for this holistic and monistic treatment of consciousness to criticise Western psychology for failing to take into account the "whole person". It, thus, hopes to lead to a more inclusive, integrated picture of the person and life as a whole.

James, however, advises care and caution in this transition from the domain of psychology to the more philosophical, normative concerns. Yet, his treatment of consciousness and religious experience is highly relevant to the contemporary transpersonal psychology: He, thus, indicates the scope and the range of the new psychology when he argues:

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<sup>116</sup> The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 1969, "Statement of Purpose", 16,i.

Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lies potential forms of consciousness entirely different<sup>117</sup>

By extending the sphere of psychology to include various levels of consciousness and by looking at life in its total perspective, James naturally places himself in the anti-behaviourist camp. However, he interprets consciousness chiefly as a function, and unlike transpersonal psychologists, assigns to beliefs and belief systems a crucial status for understanding human beings. It is, therefore, fitting for James to claim that "beliefs contribute to an awareness of the limitations of psychology as a natural science and of the importance of distinguishing between a study of belief and the act of believing itself."<sup>118</sup>

In a strain similar to James, Iqbal reacts against an entirely behavioural account of human phenomena. He also agrees with James that man does not live for ever at the same level of consciousness. Consciousness, as James points out, is "a stream of thought", a continuous flow of changes with a felt continuity. But Iqbal does not agree with the view that ascribes to consciousness a fleeting element in experience: For Iqbal, its function to enlighten the forward movement of life.

It is a case of tension, a state of self-concentration, by means of which life manages to shut out all memories and associations which have no bearing on a present action. It has no well defined fringes: it shrinks and expands as the occasion demands: To describe it as an epiphenomenon of the processes of matter is to deny it as an independent activity, and to deny it as an independent activity is to deny the validity of all knowledge which is only a systematized

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<sup>117</sup> Robert Orenstein, *The Psychology of Consciousness*, New York, 1972, p. 7.

<sup>118</sup> G.T. Alexander, "William James, the Sick Soul and the Negative Dimensions of Consciousness", *Journal of American Academy of Religion*, XLVIII/2, p. 202.

expression of consciousness. Thus, consciousness is a variety of the purely spiritual principle of life which is not a substance but an organizing principle, a specific mode of behaviour essentially different from the behaviour of an externally worked machine.<sup>119</sup>

It is in this context that Iqbal has criticised modern trends psychology. Since an exclusively objective method of psychology unable to explain adequately the religious experience as a form knowledge, it must fail "in the case of our newer psychologists as did fail in the case of Locke and Hume."<sup>120</sup> It does not imply the Iqbal was at all against psychological analysis in the domain religion. On the contrary, he approvingly mentions Prophet Muhammad'-s (peace be upon him) observation of the psychic Jew and eulogises Ibn Khaldun for having, for the first time, approach the content of religious consciousness in a critical spirit and f anticipating the modern hypothesis of subliminal selves. For Iqbal; psychology of religion means higher Sufism. and not merely scientific study of the religious phenomenon. He, therefore, hop that modern psychology will realize. the importance of a careful study of the contents of mystic consciousness, which, for him, is real and concrete as any. form of experience.

## **A NEW ROLE FOR PSYCHOLOGY**

The main concern in modern psychology of religion has all along been to limit religious experience within the so-called scientific boundaries of an objective study. But religious experience itself is not so simple as to legate itself to the status of norm scientific data. The peculiar characteristics of religious experience make it extremely difficult to confine it within the bounds of laboratory discipline. For Iqbal, strangely, it follows more or k the same course as is followed by our normal experience. There the same awareness of stimuli and a search for meaning. The on difference here is that both the stimuli and the meaning assigned 1 it are religious in nature. As in

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<sup>119</sup> Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Sh. M. Ashraf, Lahore, 1968, pp. 40-41.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26

normal experience, judgment value and recognition are made, and ideals are visualised to I attained in the foreseeable future. He, thus, claims that the nature religious experience nowhere contradicts or violates the natural order of normal consciousness. 'Religious consciousness is not a world separate from secular consciousness'.

Iqbal very strongly stresses the experiential character of religious experience in his 'psychology of religion'. In this regard, he gives secondary importance to science.. He says:

Religion is not Physics or Chemistry seeking an explanation of nature in terms of causation; it really aims at interpreting a totally different region of human experience---religious experience--the data of which cannot be reduced to the data of any other science. In fact, it must be said in justice to religion that it insisted on the necessity of concrete experience in religious life long before science learnt to do so. The conflict between the two is due not to the fact that the one is, and other is not, based on concrete experience. Both seek concrete experience as a point of departure. Their conflict is due to the misapprehension that both interpret the same data of experience. We forget that religion aims at reaching the real significance of a special variety of human experience.<sup>121</sup>

But, how the data of the two disciplines differ? Iqbal has divided religious life into three periods and has named them as 'Faith', 'Thought', and 'Discovery'. In the third period, he claims that metaphysics is displaced by psychology and religious 'life develops the ambition to come into direct contact with the ultimate reality. This is possible only in the case of what Iqbal designates as the higher Sufism, which is possible only in higher religion, and is the real subject of such a psychology of religion. While equating higher religion with a search for a higher life he asserts that it is essentially experience (thought of a higher order), and recognises the necessity of experience as its basis. Higher religion, for him, is a genuine endeavour to clarify human consciousness.

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid., pp. 25-26

Iqbal, significantly, is against effecting the ultimate divide between science and religion --- the Western and Eastern traditions of treating religious phenomena. Without making psychology the basis of religious belief he, nevertheless, wanted to widen the horizons of the psychological treatment of religion. This is precisely the foundation on which James criticises the transpersonal psychologist's either-or option between Western analytical paradigm and the Eastern spiritual psychology. Like Iqbal, ' he refuses to limit the framework of psychology to the Western science alone. While appreciating the importance of religious experience and belief as vital to a complete and comprehensive understanding of man, still he avoids using psychology as the ground of a substantive theology. For him, it arises from the lived experience of individuals and groups and manifests itself in the form of personal beliefs and belief-systems

What actually makes religious experience distinct from normal human experience is the fact that it manifests itself as unanalysable whole, that to its recipient it is a moment of intimate association with a unique other self, that it is incommunicable and finally, that it is an immediate experience of the Real 'transcending', encompassing, and momentarily surpassing the private personality of the subject of experience'. Now, since the quality of religious experience is to be directly intuited, it is obvious that it can be communicated only in its wholeness. Moreover people claiming to have religious experience seldom feel like describing it. Those who try to do so are often vague due to the use of a peculiar symbolism. Iqbal finds nothing amiss here, since the standpoint of the man who relies on religious experience for capturing reality must always remain individual and incommunicable. Moreover, there can be no bar on looking for other avenues of experience than the normal one if it fails to yield desired results. So, the moot point is, whether the normal level is the only level of knowledge-yielding experience. Iqbal looks for historical support in the recorded evidence of religious divines.

The evidence of religious experts in all ages and countries is that there are potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness. If these types of consciousness open up possibility of life-giving and knowledge-yielding experience, the question of the possibility of religion as a

form of higher experience is a perfectly legitimate one and demands our serious attention.<sup>122</sup>

The fact of there being more than one space-time orders induces Iqbal to question whether the causality-bound -aspect of nature is the only acceptable mode of experience. Is not the Ultimate Reality invading our consciousness from some other directions as well?

Iqbal considers religious experience as perfectly natural and normal. In this context he compares it with normal human feelings. He tries to establish the similarity by pointing out the common characteristics that the two possess as human activities. Like feeling, the meaning of its content is presumed to be transmitted to others in the form of propositions, but the content itself cannot be transmitted. The incommunicability of religious experience itself hinges on the claim that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect. The real difference lies the fact that religious experience (though essentially a state feeling) is not the ordinary feeling of pleasure and pain which organically based. It is rather a unique kind of feeling requiring special faculty to receive it.

For Iqbal, religious experience is not merely a subjective state the individual. In his Lecture on "Knowledge and Religion Experience" he discusses the point at length: Religious -experience, I have tried to maintain, is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be communicated to others, except in the form of a judgment. Now when a judgment which claims to be the Interpretation of a certain region of human experience, not accessible to me, is placed before -me for my assent, I am entitled to ask, what is the guarantee of its truth? Are we in possession of a test which would reveal its validity? If personal experience had been the only ground for the acceptance of a judgment of this kind, religion would have been the possession of few individuals only. Happily we are in possession of tests which do not differ from those applicable to other forms of knowledge. These I-call the intellectual test and the pragmatic test. By the intellectual test I mean critical interpretation, without any presuppositions of human experience, generally with a view to discover whether our

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid., p. 185

interpretation leads us ultimately to a reality of the same character as is revealed by religious experience. The Pragmatic test judges it by its fruits. The former is applied by the philosopher, the latter by the prophet.<sup>123</sup>

The fact that religious experience 'possesses a cognitive import carries much weight with Iqbal. What is, however, more important is Its capacity to centralize the forces of the ego thereby endowing him with a new and a richer personality. For Iqbal, religious life is a step higher in life's struggle for evolution. From a fragile unity of the ego with ever present danger of dissolution, the religious life takes him to the domain of greeter freedom in the realms of new and unknown situations. It fixes its gaze on experiences symbolic of those subtle movements of reality, which profoundly affects the destiny of the ego as a possible permanent element in the constitution of reality. It is in this sense that Iqbal expresses his dissatisfaction with the latter development of psychology and counsels it to look for an independent method and a new technique. Presently, for him, psychology has yet to touch even the outer fringe of religious life and is far from the richness and variety of religious experience.

What makes religious experience of vital importance to psychology is its claim to express and represent the whole man.,William James has emphasized the point in the following passage:

If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your faith, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely knows that the result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk. however clever, that may contradict it.<sup>124</sup>

It is true that in some sense religious experience integrates the disparate and competing propensities of the ego and develops single synthetic

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid., pp. 26-27

<sup>124</sup> The Varieties of Religious Experience, op. cit., p. 73

transfiguration of his experiences. In a semi religion is the expression of man's whole life. It is concerned, not with one aspect of life, but with whole of life or with life as whole. The point can be made clear if religion is likened to attitude. For an attitude involves the whole of the personality of person--conscious and unconscious:

Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities towards the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies... This definition defines religion as an 'attitude'... The word 'attitude' shall hereby used to cover that responsive side of consciousness which is found in such things as attention, interest, expectancy, feeling, tendencies to action etc. The advantages of defining religion as an attitude are sufficiently manifest. It shows that religion is not a matter of any one 'department' of psychic life but involves the whole man. It includes what there was of truth in the historical attempts to identify religion with feeling, belief or will. And it draws attention to the fact that religion is immediately subjective, thus differing from science (which emphasises 'content' rather than 'attitude'); and yet it points to the other fact also that religion involves and presupposes the acceptance of the objective. Religion is the attitude of a self towards and object in which the self genuinely believes."<sup>125</sup>

It is 'obvious from the above discussion that there are similarities between Iqbal and James in so far as they consider religion to be an expression of the whole personality of man. But, then there is also agreement between him and J.B. Pratt on this point, though Iqbal lays greater stress on the cognitive content of religious experience. Still, for him, religion is not a matter of any one 'department' of psychic life, but involves the whole man:

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<sup>125</sup> J. Bissett Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, Macmillan, New York, 1959, pp.2-3

Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man.<sup>126</sup>

Iqbal goes a step further and makes it incumbent upon the recipient, of religious experience to involve himself in a 'world. shaking' or a . 'world-making' act, diffusing itself in the time movement, and making itself effectively visible to the eye of history. Religious experience as the expression of a total ego, then, is expressed in a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and remade by perpetual action and struggle.

It is this social aspect of religious experience which provides Iqbal the basis for this view that Prophetic experience is different from that of the mystic.

The mystic does not wish to return from the repose of 'unitary experience'; and even when he does return, as he must, his return does not mean much for mankind at large. The Prophet's return is creative. He returns to insert himself into the sweep of time with a view to control the forces of history, and thereby to create a fresh world of ideals. For the mystic the repose of 'unitary experience' is something final: for the Prophet it is the awakening, within him, of world-shaking psychological forces, calculated to completely transform the human world. So, the desire to see his religious experience transformed into a living world-force is supreme in the Prophet. Thus his return amounts to a kind of pragmatic test of the value of his religious experience.<sup>127</sup>

It is true that both the Prophet and the mystic come back to the normal levels of experience. However, the difference lies in the fact that 'the return of the Prophet is fraught with infinite meaning for mankind.'

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<sup>126</sup> The Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 124

It has been claimed by some scholars of Iqbal that 'although the mystic experience differs from the experience of a prophet, it does not differ from it qualitatively. That is, the two forms of religious consciousness differ not in kind, but in degree only'. Indeed, Iqbal has defined a prophet as:

a type of mystic consciousness in which 'unitary experience' tends to overflow its boundaries and seek opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life. In his personality the finite centre of life sinks into his own infinite depths only to spring up again, with fresh vigour, to destroy the old, and to disclose the new directions of life."<sup>128</sup>

No doubt, the above definition clearly indicates the fact that a prophet is a type of mystic consciousness. But this consciousness is different both 'in degree and kind'. And Iqbal is not at all vague on this point:

The nature of Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Qur'an, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experiment and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order.<sup>129</sup>

He goes further and argues:

The point to be seized is that while it is psychologically possible for a saint to attain to a prophetic experience, his experience will have no socio-political significance making him the centre of a new organization and entitling him to declare this organization to be the criterion of the faith or disbelief of the followers of Muhammad.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid., p. 125

<sup>129</sup> Syed Abdul Wahid (ed.), *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 166-167. (Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on 1930.

What does this prove? (1) that quantitatively the mystic experience is limited; (2) that qualitatively, it does not have that in-built force which cannot but create a new socio-political order. so far as mystic experience. is a 'consciousness' similar to that o prophetic consciousness, Iqbal does not restrict it to man alone:

Indeed the way in which the world Wahy (inspiration) is used in the Qur'an shows that the Quran regards it as a universal property of life; though its nature and character are different at different stages of the evolution of life. The plant growing freely in space, the animal developing a new organ to suit a new environment, and a human being receiving light from the inner depths of life, are all cases of inspiration varying in character according to the needs of the recipient, or the needs of the species to which the recipient belongs.<sup>131</sup>

Despite these differences, a comprehensive study of mystic consciousness still remains the only possible way to an understanding of religious experience. More so, if in the realm of psychology, "all states, whether their content is religious or non religious, are organically determined."<sup>132</sup> It is true that we are not in possession of a really effective scientific method to analyse and evaluate the contents of non-rational and other-than-intellectual modes of consciousness. Still, there is no justification for an escape from the fact of there being types of experience other than purely sensory. It is no use dubbing religious experience as illusion.

The view that such experiences are neurotic or mystical will not finally settle the question of their meaning or value. If an outlook beyond physics is possible, we must

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid., pp. 268-269. (Reply to questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru).

<sup>131</sup> The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

courageously face the possibility, even though it may disturb or tend to modify our normal ways of life and thought.<sup>133</sup>

Iqbal attempts to find an organic unity between various levels of consciousness and while trying to draw an analogy between cognitive faith and sense-perception seems to implicate an extended use of science, and by implication physics. Like the transpersonal psychologists, he appears to have a fascination for the scientific paradigm. Obviously such a stand involves an implicit and a priori interpretative element. Thus, one may ask if he was trying to study the religious states of consciousness or the experience of such states of awareness. This is the moot point for planning to contrive a genuine relation between psychology and religious consciousness. It may be alright wishing to base religion on an objective, scientific study. But, the problem of meaning involved here does not arise within a scientific frame work and is essentially in issue for the normative analysis of philosophy. Religion as a lived experience remains crucially a personal affair. A scientific, psychological study may illuminate the phenomenon only partially. But, in James' words, "the science of religion may not be equivalent for living religion."<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid., pp. 189-190

<sup>134</sup> The Varieties of Religious Experience, op. cit., pp. 479-481

# IQBAL AND HADITH: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar

Iqbal had extreme reverence and respect for the personality and divine mission of the Prophet Mohammed (s.a.w.). It is this reverence which, to a greater extent, brought out of him a poet and philosopher of international repute. He is so much emotionally and spiritually associated with the great Prophet (s.a.w) that like the generality of Muslims he believes him alive. In a letter, he writes:

To have the vision of the Prophet (s.a.w) would be a great blessing during these days. It is my belief that the Prophet (s.a.w) is alive and the present day people can be benefitted by his company in the same manner as the Companions used to be. But giving vent to such beliefs in contemporary times does offend most and for this I keep silence.<sup>135</sup>

It has been seen that on hearing the name of the Prophet (s.a.w) Iqbal used to get emotional and often his eyes sunk into tears.<sup>136</sup> It was the beloved hobby of Iqbal to study the biography of the Prophet (s.a.w). Admitting this fact, he writes to Maulana Sulaiman Nadvi:

Theoretically I enjoy your company, because I study the Prophet's biography during the nights. Maulana Shibli has done a great service to Muslims, for which he will get the reward in the Prophet's Court.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Iqbal's letter to Khan Niaaz-ud-din Khan dated 14 January 1922; See Syed Akhtar-as-Salam, *Mutalaat Aur Makateeb Allama Iqbal*, 287 (Urdu)

<sup>136</sup> Abu Muhammad Muslah, *Quran-Aur-Iqbal*, 18(Urdu):

<sup>137</sup> Bahar Allahabadi (Ed.), *Tafsir-i-Iqbal*, 68 (Urdu).

Iqbal's attachment with the Prophet (s.a.w) was so immense that he desired death in Hijaz.<sup>138</sup> In his poetic verses, he pleads with Allah that at the time of his resurrection-day he should not be presented before the Prophet (s.a.w).<sup>139</sup> It was his insatiable wish to visit the Prophet's grave. In a letter to Pir Ghulam Miran Shah, he writes:

Would that happen that I also accompany you (on Hai) and benefit from the blessings of your company. But unfortunately some days of separation seem yet in store. I am not so worth that I can be remembered at the prophet's grave. However I feel encouraged by this statement of the Prophet (s.a.w) that "the sinner is with me". I hope you will not forget me on reaching the Prophet's Court.<sup>140</sup>

While writing to Maulana Sulaiman Nadvi, he says: "I will surely see your article on Sunnat and would benefit from it in my writings."<sup>141</sup>

Like all Muslims, Iqbal considers the belief in the Prophethood of Muhammad (s.a.w) a must for a Muslim. He is of the view that Islam as a religion came from Allah but Islam as a society or state is indebted to the personality of the Prophet (s.a.w)<sup>142</sup> In *Jawab-i-Shikwa* this fact is clearly depicted;

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<sup>138</sup> Khurshid Ahmad, "Iqbal Ka Tasavur-i-Shariat", *Iqbal Review*, Vol. I. No.2 pp. 59-80 at 72 (July, 1960).

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> *Supra* not 2 at 89.

<sup>141</sup> Tahir Tawnsawi, *Iqbal Aur Syed Sulaiman Nadvi*, 88-89 (Urdu).

<sup>142</sup> B.A, Dar, "Fikhr-i-Iqbal aur Mas'la-i-Ijtihad", *Iqbal*, Vol. II No. 2, pp. 29-48at 38 (Oct, 1953)

If you are loyal to Muhammad (s.a.w), then we are yours.  
What this world is! the guarded Tablet and the Pen recording  
it belong to you.<sup>143</sup>

Iqbal considers the following of the path shown by the Prophet (s.a.w) as 'Islam' and deviation from it as 'Kufr'.<sup>144</sup> The life of Muslim community depends upon the adherence to the path shown by the Prophet (s.a.w).<sup>145</sup> The limits prescribed by the Prophet(s.a.w) though apparently hard, are mandatory and we should, instead of complaining, strive hard for the conformation to these limits<sup>146</sup> The present decadence and degeneration of Muslims is the result of deviation by Muslims from the Prophet's conduct.<sup>147</sup> The Prophet's guidance can prove a strong instrument for the organisation of Muslim community in India<sup>148</sup> Iqbal considers the propagation of Islam and the diversification of information regarding its achievements as the greatest service to the great Prophet (s.a.w).<sup>149</sup> The love for the Prophet (s.a.w) is a sine qua non for the Muslims.<sup>150</sup> One can reach to great heights if there is a faith in the Prophet (s.a.w). In the Prophet's guidance, there is a message for life.<sup>151</sup> The Prophet's personality stands for truth and his sayings differentiate between truth and falsehood.<sup>152</sup> All progress and success is possible in this

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<sup>143</sup> Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, (Urdu), Educational Book House, Aligarh), 1988 p. 208.

<sup>144</sup> Supra not 4 at pp. 73-74.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. p. 74

<sup>147</sup> Ibid

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. p. 76

<sup>149</sup> Iqbal's letter to Pir Ghulam Miran Shah dated 29 March, 1938; see Supra note 2 at 89.

<sup>150</sup> Supra not 4 at pp. 70-71.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. p. 69

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. p. 68

world if we follow the guidelines set by the Prophet (s.a.w).<sup>153</sup> In an article, Iqbal says:

Its (Islam's) founder stands out clear before us; he is truly a personage . p of history and lends himself freely even to the most searching criticism. Ingenious legend has weaved no screens round his figure; he is born in the broad-day light of history; we can thoroughly understand the inner spring of his actions; we can subject his mind to a keen psychological analysis.<sup>154</sup>

Iqbal considers the Prophet (s.a.w) as living Quran and consequently advises Mu 'min to follow the good ideals of the Prophet (s.a.w).<sup>155</sup> He is of the view that the object of the prophethood is not only to creat relationship between Allah and his creatures but its purpose is also to prepare Constitution for individual and social life of mankind.<sup>156</sup>

## II

We have seen the extent upto which the Prophet's personality influenced the thoughts of Iqbal.. But the related question which sprouts from the preceding discussion is the extent upto which Iqbal recognises Hadith - the sum total of the sayings, doings and tacit approvals of the great Prophet (s.a.w) as a guide for all times. It is an open truth that Iqbal based much of his poetry on Hadith. He took immense advantage from Hadith pertaining to geographical unlimitations, time, finality of Prophethood, Prophet's accession and forgiveness.<sup>157</sup> Sometimes he even reinforced his

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid. p. 69

<sup>154</sup> M. Iqbal, "Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal" in Latif Ahmed Sherwani (compiled & Ed.), *Speeches, Writings and Statements of Iqbal*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, Lahore, 1977, p. 87.

<sup>155</sup> Ilyas Rana, "Quran Aur Iqbal" in *Supra* note 2 at 17.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid, p. 76

<sup>157</sup> For details, see *Supra* note 3 at 77-88

poetry with weak Hadith.<sup>158</sup> However, there is an incident wherefrom we can safely conclude that Iqbal recognises the Hadith as a material of relevance. In *Jawahir-i-Iqbal* it is mentioned that:

Once a person astonishingly made mention of a Hadith in which it is said that the Prophet (s.a.w) was with his three Companions on Mount Uhud. Meanwhile Mount Uhud started shaking and the Prophet (s.a.w.) directed the Mount Uhud to stop' saying you don't have anyone else on you except a Prophet (s.a.w), a Sidiq and two martyrs. The Mount stopped.

On hearing this Hadith, Iqbal said to that person:

What sort of astonishment is there? I do not interpret it metamorphically but consider it a material reality and for me there is no need of interpreting or explaining it. Had you known the reality then you could have learnt that big masses of matter did tremble practically and not metamorphically underneath the Prophet's feet.<sup>159</sup>

With such views about the greatness of the Prophet (s.a.w) and the Hadith, one could expect Iqbal as the firm believer in the authenticity of the Hadith literature and the Hadith being guide for Muslims in all ages and' at all times. However, on the basis of material before us, we are of the opinion that Iqbal does not, on the whole, accept the Hadith as a guide for all times and considers also its role as a limited one. He is highly apprehensive about the authenticity and transmission of the Hadith and this apprehension makes him somewhat indifferent towards the Hadith. Once in a discussion with one Ahl-i-Hadith, he said:

I (Iqbal) rely only on the Quran in matters of faith and regarding the Hadith I and you know, how it has reached us.

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<sup>158</sup> Wahid Akhtar, "Iqbal Aur Islami Fikr Ki Tashkeel-i-Nav", in Rahid Nazaki and Assad-Ullah Wani (compiled), *Mahfil-i-Iqbal*, 20 (Srinagar, 1978).

<sup>159</sup> Ghulam Ahmad Parvez, "Pakistan Main Qanoon Sazi Kay Asool ", *Iqbal*, Vol VIII No. 2, pp. 81-104 at 88 (April, 1960).

On hearing this conversation, one person got emotionally charged and pointed to Iqbal:

If we are careless about the Hadith in such a manner then Mussalmani will come to an end. None of our practice and worship is complete without the Hadith. The Quran does not even elaborate prayer and other daily routine matters and it is for this reason that the Ahl-i-Quran group have prescribed strange types of prayer for us which have no relation with the masses of Ahl-i-Islam. The timings, requirements and Rakats etc. of such prayers are different from the one operating in the whole Islamic world. Would you not treat such persons under these circumstances as unbelievers?

In reply, Iqbal politely said:-

Don't say "unbelievers". Give them any other name. This is extremism. You people fight for the Rakats and the requirements of the prayers but I don't at all see the existence of "prayers" i.e., Muslims do not offer prayers.<sup>160</sup>

Likewise, in a letter to Mawlana Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, he writes:

"About the authenticity of the Hadith, whatever apprehension I have in my heart, it does not mean that the Hadith are useless completely."<sup>161</sup>

It means Iqbal had earlier written such views about the Hadith that Nadvi had come to the conclusion that Iqbal absolutely rejects the Hadith. Even in the above letter it is clear that Iqbal does not recognise the Hadith in its entirety on account of susceptibility about its authenticity.

The above views about the authenticity of the Hadith seem to have' been a guiding factor for Iqbal for ignoring the Hadith. to a certain extent In

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<sup>160</sup> Muhammad Hussain Arshi Amritsari, "Hayat-i-Iqbal Ka Aek Goshai-Pinhan", Iqbal Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp 1-12 at 11-12 (July 1974).

<sup>161</sup> Iqbal Nama, Vol. 1, 152.

order to have his unconventional views on the Hadith accepted, Iqbal extensively quotes the views of the Orientalists. In *The Reconstruction*, he writes:

These [traditions of the Holy Prophet (s.a.w )] have been the subject of great discussion both in ancient and modern times. Among their modern critics Professor Goldzieher has subjected them to a searching examination in the light of modern canons of historical criticism, and arrives at the conclusion that they are, on the whole, untrustworthy.<sup>162</sup>

Besides, without referring to N.P. Aghnides by name, Iqbal elaborates his views about the Hadith in following words:

Another European writer, after examining the Muslim methods of determining the genuineness of a tradition and pointing out the theoretical possibilities of error, arrives at the following conclusion:

It' must be said in conclusion that the preceding considerations represented only theoretical possibilities and that the question how far these possibilities have been actualities is largely a matter of how far the actual circumstances offered inducements for making use of the possibilities. Doubtless the latter, relatively speaking, were few, and affected only a small proportion of the entire Sunnah. It may, therefore, be said that for the most part the collections of Sunnah considered by the Muslims as canonical are genuine records of the rise and early growth of Islam.<sup>163</sup>

Instead of refuting these views of orientalists and coming up with viewpoint whereby the traditional thinking regarding the Hadith would have been recognised and endorsed, Iqbal himself gives prominence to above sort

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<sup>162</sup> M. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam*, I.A.P., Lahore, 1989, p. 135.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

of views while dealing with the Hadith as a source of law. He contends in his poetry that 'weak', 'irregular' and 'uninterrupted' traditions do exist. In Ramuz, he taunts at a preacher:

The preacher is story-teller and tale-collector. His meaning is low, and his words are high. He talks of Khatib and Daylami and is interested in traditions "weak" and "irregular" and "uninterrupted".<sup>164</sup>

Besides, Iqbal does not seem impressed by the contention that after the Quran, the Hadith is a mandatory guide for Muslim Ummah for all times. He considers it valid only to the generation in which the Prophet (s.a.w) was born and does not favour its enforceability in the case of future generations. For these views he approvingly quotes the following observations of Shah Wali-Allah:<sup>165</sup>

The Prophet who aims at all embracing principles, however, can neither reveal different principles for different peoples, nor leaves them to work out their own rules of conduct. His method is to train one particular people, and to use them as a nucleus for the building of a universal Shariat. In doing so he accentuates the principles underlying the social life of all mankind, and applies them to concrete cases in the light of specific habits of the people immediately before him. The Shariat values (Ahkam) resulting from this application (e.g., rules relating to penalties for crimes) are in a sense specific to that people; and since their observance is not an end in itself, they cannot be strongly enforced in the case of future generations.<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Rumuz-i-bekhudī, Lahore. 1918, p. 142.

<sup>165</sup> Reconstruction, op. cit. pp. 136-137.

<sup>166</sup> Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan was also impressed by the above views of Shah Wali Allah. It is likely that Iqbal might have been impressed by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's stand in this regard. For details, see B.A. Dar "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as a Religio - philosophical

The fact is that views of Shah Wali-Allah about the Hadith are extraordinary.<sup>32A</sup> In his book *Hujjat Allah Balighah* in a chapter "Kinds of Prophet's Knowledge," Shah Wali-Allah quotes a Hadith in which the Prophet (s.a.w) is reported to have said:

I am a human being. When I say anything to you about religion, then adopt it and whatever I say on the basis of my opinion, then I happen to be human being.<sup>167</sup>

Commenting on this Hadith, Shah Wali-Allah writes:

These matters (i.e. based on opinion) were not related to the Prophetic propagation. There are the matters which were partially the result of expediency during the Prophet's life time and were not compulsory and binding for the whole Ummah. These Ahkams include those commands and decisions of the Prophet relating . to family plans, economic discipline and material politics. The jurists have not come out with the complete figure regarding these matters.<sup>168</sup>

Besides, Shah Wali-Allah has raised many questions about the receipt and authenticity of the Hadith and treats them as basis of fiqhi disagreements amongst jurists.<sup>169</sup>

Shah Wali-Allah's views as reproduced by Iqbal in *The Reconstruction* were, inter alia subjected to judicial comment in Muhammad Riaz.<sup>170</sup> The Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan in this case observed:

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Thinker" in M.M. Sharif (Ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy, 1598-1614 at 1609-10* (Gemany, 1963). (hereinafter referred as M.M. Shari").

<sup>32A</sup> This opinion is based upon an erroneous reading of Shah Wali Ullah's text provided by Shibli Numani. For details see M. S. Umar, *Iqbaliyat*, Jan. 1996,(Editor's Note).

<sup>167</sup> *Supra* note 24 at 98.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>169</sup> For details ° see, Zafar Ishaq Ansari, "Shah Wali-Allah and Fiqhi Disagreements", *Iqbal*, Vol. XV. No. 3, 44-52 (January, 1967).

Islam thus recognised that not all customs and usages of the Arabs were repugnant to Shariah; and maintained most of them as good as law. Our Statute laws whether inherited from the British Government or enacted after independence are based upon the principle of common good and justice, equity and good conscience which is the same as the principles of public good (Masaleh Mursala) of Imam Malik and principle of Istihsan of Imam Abu Hanifa. A fortiori, these laws must be more in harmony with the Shariah. In some respects the Statute law may not fulfil the standard of the law of the Quran and may also be repugnant to it but such instances are few.<sup>171</sup>

Iqbal strengthens his views about the Hadith by referring to contribution of Imam Abu Hanifa. In Reconstruction, he is of the view:

It was perhaps in view of this (i.e., the Hadith cannot be strictly enforced in case of future generations) that Abu Hanifa, who had a keen insight into the universal character of Islam, made practically no use of these traditions. The fact that he introduced the principle of 'Isthsan', juristic preference which necessitates a careful study of actual conditions in legal thinking, throws further light on the motives which determined his attitude towards this source of Mohammedan Law.<sup>172</sup>

In view of different social and agricultural conditions prevailing in the countries conquered by Islam, the school of Abu Hanifa seems to have found, on the whole, little or no

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<sup>170</sup> Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Govt. PLD 1980 F.S.C.1. (Federal Shariat Court).

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Reconstruction, op. cit. 137.

guidance from the precedents  
recorded in the literature of traditions.<sup>173</sup>

From these quotations it is evident that according to Iqbal, Imam Abu Hanifa avoided the use of the Hadith as a source of law on the basis that Hadith 'has no potential of meeting and studying actual conditions in the legal thinking and could not provide an answer to the challenge posed by different social and agricultural conditions of conquered countries.

Iqbal is not at all impressed by the contentions of some jurists that Imam Abu Hanifa did not make use of the Hadith in view of non-availability of its regular collections in his times. Treating Imam Abu Hanifa's stand regarding non-use of the Hadith somewhat deliberate and intentional, Iqbal writes:

It is said that Abu Hanifa made no use of traditions because there were no regular collections in his day. In the first place, it is not true to say that there were no collections in his day, as the collections of Abdul Malik and Zuhri were made not less than thirty years before the death of Abu Hanifa. But even if we suppose that these collections never reached him or that did not contain traditions of legal import, Abu Hanifa, like Malik and Ahmad Ibn-i-Hanbal after him, could have easily made his own collections if he had deemed such a thing necessary.<sup>174</sup>

Iqbal's views about Imam Abu Hanifa are not without basis. Khatib Baghadadi in his history<sup>40A</sup>, with reference to Yusuf Ibn Isbat, writes:

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid, p. 140. (Emphasis Laid)

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 137 (Ibn Hazm, however, informs us that all Abu Hanifa's pupils are agreed that Abu Hanifa's practice was that even a weak tradition was to be preferred to (one's opinion formed by) analogical reasoning (Qiyas) or private judgement (ray). See Abul Ala Maudoodi, "Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf", in M.M. Sharif (Ed.), op. cit., 674-703 at 681.

<sup>40A</sup> There seems to be confusion in these discussions of Abu Hanifa's views on the validity of Hadith as a source of law. It has arisen, primarily, by an indiscriminate use of the

Abu Hanifa used to say that if the Prophet (s.a.w)

would have found me and I could have found him (i.e. both would have lived at the same time!), then He [the Prophet (s.a.w)] would have adopted many of his (Abu Hanifa's) thoughts. Religion is not anything else except the good and fine opinion.<sup>175</sup>

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan also seems to share the same views about Imam Abu Hanifa's approach to the Hadith as Iqbal did. He is reported to have said:

He [i.e. Imam Abu Hanifa] was not willing to accept Tradition as a valid source of religious knowledge. The reason being that when the collections of the Hadith were compiled in the second/eighth century, politics and social conditions of the time helped in the fabrication of innumerable traditions ascribing them to the Holy Prophet ... he would, however, accept only those traditions which are compatible with the letter and spirit of the Quran. He approvingly quotes the statement of Ibn Taimiyyah that "The truly traditional is truly rational." In case by a critical analysis a tradition is proved to be true, Sayyid Ahmad would be willing to accept it as a valid basis for religion.<sup>176</sup> He freely questioned the credentials of the reputed commentators and

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word "Hadith" to cover the whole range of reports of the Proahet's, acts, deeds, statements as well as for his established wont which is known by an unintenepted practice of the whole muslim community from the times of the Prophet(i.e. sunnah mutawatirah). The usage of Abu Hanifah and Malik has a strictly technical sense. In their discourse and arguments the word is used to denote akhbar Ahad i.e. reports transmitted through a single narrator or with an interrepted chain of transmission. For an elucidation of the point see khurshid Ahmad, "Istidrak", in Charag-i-Rah, Vol. 12, No. 7, 1985, p. 87. (Editor's Note)

<sup>175</sup> Supra note 24 at 97.

<sup>176</sup> Supra note 31 at 1610.

on this basis he thought that the Hadith did not 'furnish an adequate basis for the understanding of Islam.'<sup>177</sup>

Iqbal's philosophy owes a lot to Imam-al-Ghazali. Ghazali himself is not unquestionably sympathetic to the Hadith. He contends: "The validity of some parts of the Hadith depends upon historical authenticity."<sup>178</sup>

Likewise, Ibn Hazm considers that Hadith true which is related in a sure way and by reliable men in a connected chain which reaches the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w).<sup>179</sup> He thinks that the Prophet (s.a.w) is certainly trustworthy and quotes in this connection from the Quran:

Nor does he speak out of desire, it is naught but revelation that is revealed.

Iqbal had also some queries about the Hadith. In a letter to -Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, he writes:

You write the Prophet (s.a.w) had two positions: Nabuvat and Imamat. In Nabuvat are included Quranic commandments and his deductions ... What is the definition of Wahi Ghair Matloo from psychological viewpoint. Do we come to know about the differentiation between Wahi Matloo and Wahi Ghair Matloo during the Prophet's life-time or these terms were coined after him. The Prophet (s.a.w) consulted companions regarding Azan. Does this consultation come under Nabuwat or Imamat?<sup>180</sup>

What reply Iqbal gets from Nadvi to these queries is not known to this author, but in Reconstruction, he philosophically deals with the question of the Prophetic revelation. He says: "The world-life intuitively sees its own

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<sup>177</sup> Abdul Hamid, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan as a Politician Historian and Reformist" in M.M.Sharif (Ed.) op. cit., 1580-1597 at 1591.

<sup>178</sup> Leonard Binder, "Al-Ghazali" in M.M.Sharif (Ed.), op. cit., 774-789 at 775.

<sup>179</sup> Iqbal's letter to Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, See Supra note 2 at 82.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

needs and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation."<sup>181</sup>

Commenting on this, Schimmel<sup>182</sup> writes: "That would be almost the same conclusion which Soderblom has reached in his simple and unsophisticated sentence: The Prophet is an effect of God's activity."<sup>183</sup>

The Holy Quran reads: "Whatever the, Prophet gives, accept it, and whatever he forbids you abstain from it."<sup>184</sup> and 'O Ye who believe, Obey God and obey the Prophet."<sup>185</sup>

The impact of these verses on Muslim Ummah has led by the Muslims to recongnize the Hadith in conjunction and not in isolation of the Quran Ibn Hazm is of the view that, "Only the Prophet Mohammed (s.a.w) must be taken as a model in all matters of belief and behaviour."<sup>186</sup> Shaikh Ahmad. Sirhindi is of the opinion that submission to the Prophet's traditions (Sunnah) is the real bliss while opposition to it is the cause of ad disasters. Hence he treats restoration of Sunnah as the best of worship and ensures the restorer reward in the heaven.<sup>187</sup> Likewise Muhammad bin Abd• al-Wahab took the Quran and the Sunnah as the sole guide for human action.<sup>188</sup> What is, however, important is that there are people who consider the Hadith like the Quran a revealed material.

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<sup>181</sup> Reconstruction, op. cit. p. 117.

<sup>182</sup> Annermarie Schimmel, Gabriel's Wing, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edn. Lahore, 1989, p. 251.

<sup>183</sup> Soderblom, The Living God, Giffered Lectures, London, 1933, p. 224.

<sup>184</sup> Al-Quran, 49:7

<sup>185</sup> Al-Quran, 4:59

<sup>186</sup> Supra note 44 at 284

<sup>187</sup> Muhammad Farman, "Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi" in M.M. Sharif (Ed.), op. cit., 873-883 at 882

<sup>188</sup> Ibid. p. 878

For example, the Jamait Islami<sup>189</sup> is of the view:

The Prophet (s.a.w) has been given the knowledge of the Hadith like the Quran ... Angel Gabriel revealed both the Quran and the Hadith. He used to teach the Hadith to the Prophet in the same manner as the Quran. For this reason, no differentiation in revelation is accepted. The Quran and the Sunnah are both simultaneous sources.

However, Justice Kayani in Ghulam Bhik<sup>190</sup> refused to accept the revelatory character of the Hadith. The Judge observed: "It is not necessary for me to say here that the argument for Sunnat being based on revelation is not well-founded."<sup>191</sup>

As against the view taken by Justice Kayani, we must derive satisfaction from the following views about the Hadith expressed by a non-Muslim writer, Kashi Prasad Saxena back as far as in 1934:

Traditions are implied revelations through Muhammad, in matters of law and religion. But as laws are needed for the benefit of the community, the Divine Legislator has delegated the power to get the laws framed by the Prophet. He consulted God whenever any necessity arose. The laws so laid down, are presumed to be what God intended and are thus covered by the definition of law as a communication from God. The precepts and every word and saying of the Prophet are believed to be in accordance with commandments of God. These traditions also were recorded as laws of God and the sacred source of law, having been placed next in importance to the Quran. The laws which the tradition so lays down, have most of the attributes of legislative enactments, though in theory they expound laws. The Prophet alone was invested with the supreme legislative power at the time

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<sup>189</sup> Supra note 24.

<sup>190</sup> Ghulam Bhik v. Hussain Begum, PLD 1957 Lah. 998.

<sup>191</sup> Justice Kayani's observation regarding the Hadith has been criticised by Maulana Maudoodi but defended to some extent by Malik Muhammad Jaffar. For details, see Malik Muhammad Jaffar, "Future of Islamic Law in Pakistan - Judicial Process", Iqbal, Vol. XVI, No. 3, pp. 3-26 at 17 (January, 1968).

when Islam was promulgated in Arabia. The Prophet sometimes gave his own rulings, in his own words, termed Hadith but his actions were quite in consonance with the wishes and desires of Divine Legislator; so, in this sense, he may be termed as the Legislature of the next legislative power of the Muslim State.<sup>192</sup>

### III

The extent upto which Iqbal treats the Hadith as a source of law can be envisioned from the following lines:

The second great source of Muhammedan Law is the traditions of the Holy Prophet ...<sup>193</sup> It is, however, impossible to deny the fact that the traditionist by insisting on the value of the concrete case, as against the tendency to abstract thinking in law, have done the greatest service to the law of Islam. And a further intelligent study of the literature of traditions, if used as indicative of the spirit in which the Prophet himself interpreted his Revelation, may still be of great help in understanding the life value of the legal principles enunciated in the Quran. A complete grasp of their life-value alone can equip us in our endeavour to reinterpret the foundational principles.<sup>194</sup>

These lines suggest that like other Muslims Iqbal considers the Hadith as the second main source of Islamic Law. ' However, he is not so enthusiastic in highlighting the salient peculiarities of the Hadith as a source of law as ordinarily a Muslim jurist is or is expected to be. Instead he has all praises for the traditionists rather than for traditions. He considers insistence by the traditionists on the value of concrete case against abstract thinking as the greatest service to the law of Islam. Iqbal does not seem satisfied with the

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<sup>192</sup> Kashi Prasad Saxena, *Muslim Law as Administered in India and Pakistan*, 3 (Delhi, 4th ed., 1963)

<sup>193</sup> *Reconstruction*, op. cit. p. 135.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.* at 137.

study of the Hadith so far made and so pleads for "further intelligent study of the literature of traditions." According to Iqbal this 'intelligent study' must be indicative of the spirit in which the Prophet (s.a.w) himself interpreted his Revelation and then and there a great help can be rendered in understanding the life-value of the legal principles enunciated in the Quran. And once we completely grasp the life-value of Quranic legal principles, then we can succeed in our endeavour of reinterpreting the foundational principles. What can be summed up from the above lines is:

- (1) that there has not been so far complete intelligent study of the literature of traditions;
- (2) that whatever study has taken place, it has not been fully indicative of the spirit in which the Prophet (s.a.w) himself interpreted his revelation;
- (3) that we can understand the life-value of the Quranic legal principles only when we-study literature of traditions in the spirit in which the Prophet (s.a.w) himself interpreted his Revelation; and
- (4) that only then we can equip ourselves with the required intellect needed for the re-interpretation of foundational principles.

It is obvious that Iqbal has been highly choosy in his words and whatever he says about the role of the Hadith in The Reconstruction does not pertain to its past or present contribution. Rather he is optimistic about its prospective positive role provided the present day Muslims work on the above suggested lines. However, many Muslim writers have tried to defend Iqbal's views regarding the Hadith by attributing such contentions to Iqbal which he personally never contended. For example, Professor Khurshid Ahmed writes:

Iqbal regarded the Sunnah of the Prophet as the real binding force of the Muslim society. He regarded the authentic traditions as an indisputable authority in law and believed that "the traditionist ...<sup>195</sup> to the law of Islam."<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>195</sup> Khurshid Ahmad, "Iqbal and the Reconstruction of Islamic Law", Iqbal Review,

The learned Professor fails to quote the authority where Iqbal regards the authentic traditions as an indisputable authority in law." The extract, 'the traditionist ... to the law of Islam' reproduced from 'The Reconstruction' fails to serve the purpose. As already discussed, in these lines Iqbal praises the traditionists rather than the traditions and nowhere binding force of the Hadith as a source of law and consideration of authentic traditions as an indisputable authority in law is visible in these lines.

Likewise, at another place, the learned author writes:

According to some people, Iqbal does not recognize the Hadith as a source of law and religious proof (Hujjat), he gives this place only to the Quran. But this notion is wrong and no basis is found for it in Iqbal's philosophy. Contrarily Iqbal has again and again emphasised on history and traditions of Islam and considered them essential for the upbringing and growth of Muslim community. For Iqbal, the Hadith has same place in religion as has till today remained with the great men of Millat.<sup>197</sup>

We, again, fail to understand as to how Iqbal recognises the Hadith as a source of law and how his views about the Hadith are in consonance with the great men of Islam. From the fact that Iqbal emphasised the role of Islamic history and traditions, we are unable to relate it with the relevance of the Hadith. By "Riwayat", it is meant the customary and cultural heritage of any community which even vary from place to place and country to country. Linking of Islamic "Riwayat" with the Hadith, we contend, is a fait accompli and in no case proves that Iqbal recognised the Hadith as source of law.

In order to show that Iqbal recognises the Hadith as a source of law, the learned professor refers to Mu'adh Hadith as quoted by Iqbal in 'The Reconstruction'<sup>198</sup> and concludes:

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Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 63-90 at 73.

<sup>196</sup> Reconstruction, op. cit. p. 137

<sup>197</sup> Supra note 3 at 60.

<sup>198</sup> Reconstruction, op. cit. 118

By referring to this Hadith, Allama not merely points out that he himself deduces from the Hadith and also presents it by way of explanation but clarifies this point that what is his stand regarding it (Hadith). He considers it as the permanent source of law and this is the status which Shariat has given to it (Hadith).<sup>199</sup>

Our view is that Iqbal referred to Mu'adh Hadith for strengthening his view regarding legislative liberalism in Islam through the doctrine of 'Ijtihad'. It is indeed a paradoxical situation but on this basis we cannot conclude that Iqbal recognises the Hadith as a source of law. Rather this Hadith is quoted to justify utmost freedom to Muslim legislatures in the enactment of laws.

Professor Khurshid Ahmad, besides, refers to about eleven Quranic verses, and four Hadith whereby he high-lights the role of the Prophet<sup>200</sup> with the object of showing that how much the Hadith is important as a source of law. Further the author tries to impress upon the readers regarding the Hadith by referring to the Mu'tazilites doubting the relevance of the Hadith; Muslim reaction against this view, the discarding of Mu'tazilah view by Muslims in its infancy and criticism of the Hadith by contemporary Orientalists.<sup>201</sup> All these points are religiously and historically most relevant and have impressed Muslim minds for centuries with regard to the relevance and importance of the Hadith as a source of law in Islam. But the question is how these details can be related with Iqbal, Iqbal, in our view, stands least impressed by these realities and instead he did choose to remain indifferent to the Hadith as a source of law. The contention of the learned Professor that "Iqbal gave least importance to the thinking of Orientalists regarding the Hadith",<sup>202</sup> it is submitted, is the most unfounded contention. A look in 'The Reconstruction' reveals that Iqbal rather starts his discussion with the views of Goldziehar and N.P. Aghnides, whereby it has been said that the Hadith

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<sup>199</sup> Supra note 3 at 75.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid. pp. 62-66

<sup>201</sup> Ibid. p. 61

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

are, on the whole, untrustworthy<sup>203</sup> but genuine records of the rise and early growth of Islam.<sup>204</sup>

The fact is that Iqbal does not favour usage of Hadith as a source of law; rather his indifference to it as a legal source is writ large. In order to give weightage to such a view about the Hadith he comes out with the theory of legal and non-legal traditions and attaches too many conditions to legal traditions.<sup>70A</sup> In *The Reconstruction*, he writes:

For our present purposes, however, we must distinguish

traditions of a purely legal import from those which are of a non-legal character. With regard to the former, there arises a very important question as to how far they embody the pre-Islamic usages of Arabia which were in some cases left intact, and in others modified by the Prophet. It is difficult to make this discovery, for our early writers do not always refer to pre-islamic usages. Nor is it possible to discover that the usages, left by the express or tacit approval of the Prophet, were intended to be universal in their application.<sup>205</sup>

These lines contain a volume of information about Iqbal's views about the Hadith as a source of law. Ordinarily, for a Muslim all traditions, whether of legal or non-legal import are equally binding and universal. Any sort of differentiation on account of content and basis is immaterial and irrelevant. But, consistent with his theory of indifference towards the Hadith, as a source of law Iqbal emphasises upon the distinction of the traditions of legal

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<sup>203</sup> *Reconstruction*, op. cit. p. 135

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.* p. 136

<sup>70A</sup> This theory is nothing new in Islamic legal history. Different schools of thought are, however, divided over the question of principles differentiating the two categories and the extent of their law-giving value. (Editor's Note)

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, B.A. Dar says that "Like Shah Wali-Allah, Iqbal divides the Hadith into two kinds i.e. explanatory and non-explanatory. Explanatory are those from which some legal rule can be deduced and non-explanatory Hadith are common Hadith." See *Supra* note 8 at 43.

and non-legal character. Then, regarding the traditions of legal character, Iqbal stresses that it is to be seen upto which extent these traditions embody pre-Islamic usages of Arabia left intact or modified by the Prophet (s.a.w). In a mood of self-defeat Iqbal then says that it is difficult to discover this pre-Islamic extent in traditions in view of non. reference by early writers to this fact. Likewise, contends Iqbal, it is not possible to discover the application universality of the traditions based on the express or tacit approval of pre-Islamic usages. Rather, Iqbal is doubtful about the application universality of the traditions of legal import. Once the universality of a past institution is doubted, it means that it was relevant only to the time in which it was born and cannot guide the future s generation. Such has been the view of Iqbal when he quotes approvingly the views of Shah Wali-Allah with regard to the role of the Prophet (s.a.w).<sup>206</sup> However, on Shah Wall-Allah, B.A. Dar writes:

From the opinion of Shah Wali-Allah, only this conclusion can be arrived at that in the formation of future Fiqh, the Hadith should be given secondary importance and for its replacement and alteration, the standard should be same as Imam Abu Hanifa kept before him.<sup>207</sup>

We fail to agree with Dar that in any manner from the views of Shah Wali-Allah and Imam Abu Hanifa (as quoted by Dr. Iqbal) we can conclude that the Hadith should be given secondary importance in framing the fiqh; rather both consider it an ignorable material.<sup>208</sup> Hence we treat the attribution by Dar as unfounded.

The categorisation of the Hadith into legal and non-legal and non-binding character of the former is further justified by Iqbal by referring to the attitude of Imam Abu Hanifa regarding the Hadith. Iqbal writes:

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<sup>206</sup> Supra note 32.

<sup>207</sup> Supra note 9 at 44.

<sup>208</sup> We are goaded again to add a note of dissent here. A direct reading of Shah Wali Ullah and Abu Hanifah yeilds no support to the view expressed by Mr. Ahangar which, in turn, is based on Iqbal. We have investigated the causes that made this misunderstanding creep in the discussion. See our article refered in note 32-A (Editor's Note).

The attitude [i.e., non use of the Hadith of Imam Abu Hanifa towards the traditions of a purely legal import is to my mind perfectly sound; and if modern liberalism considers it safer not to make any indiscriminate use of them as a source of law, it will be only following one of the greatest exponents of Muhammedan Law in Sunni Islam.<sup>209</sup>

Our view that Iqbal stands for an outright non-consideration of the Hadith in legal matters is strengthened by the fact that Iqbal is critical, otherwise appreciative, of the Wahabi movement for the reason that in matters of law it mainly relies on the traditions of the Prophet (s.a.w). About this movement he writes:

The essential thing to note is the spirit of freedom manifested in it: though inwardly this movement, too, is conservative in its own fashion. While it rises, in revolt against the finality of schools, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgment, its vision on the past is wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions of the Prophet.<sup>210</sup>

Besides the above views, Iqbal did not view favourably the Hadith as a source of law for the reasons of the presence of contradictory traditions and non-existence of written law of Islam apart from the Quran from the earliest times upto the rise of the Abbasides.<sup>211</sup>

#### IV

The question which is paramount at present is how far the contemporary Muslim world accepts Iqbal's views about the Hadith. We feel the judicial response to this question in Pakistan - a country which originated

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<sup>209</sup> Reconstruction, op. cit. p. 137( Emphasis Laid).

<sup>210</sup> Ibid. p. 121.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., p. 165. Mazheruddin Siddiqi, however, contends that the greatest single factor which stopped Ijtihad activity was the practice of the literal application of Hadith and the ascertainment of Sunnah by means of Hadith. It implies, it is submitted, that this factor may also have influenced Iqbal in not recognising the Hadith as a source of law. For details, see Mazheruddin Siddiqi, Concept of Muslim Culture in Iqbal, pp. 86-125 (Islamabad, 1983).

mostly due to Iqbal's poetic persuasions and philosophical ideas, can provide us some refreshing answer.

In Ghulam Bhik<sup>212</sup> Justice Kayani dealt with the general question of the place of the Hadith in comparison with the other sources of Muslim Law. His Lordship expressed the following opinion:

...The real difficulty comes to be faced with the Hadith, which reports the Sunnat or practice of the Prophet. Apart from the fact that the authenticity of a Hadith in respect of a particular matter is seldom free from dispute, even the established practice of the Prophet in certain matters was departed from by some of Khulfa-e-Rashidin, particularly Umar ... The correct attitude towards the interpretation of Muslim Law as illustrated by the Sunnat, if I may venture to give an opinion, would be to regard it as changeable in detail to suit the requirements of time and place. I am not giving an opinion but indicating actual practice.<sup>213</sup>

Ghulam Bhik was followed by Bilqis Fatima.<sup>214</sup> In this case Justice Kaikaus observed:

We are really dealing with the interpretation of the Holy Quran and on a question of interpretation. We are not bound by the opinion of Jurists .... Similar considerations apply to the interpretation of the traditions of the Prophet.

Malik Muhammad Jafer sees a ray of hope in Ghulam Bhik and Bilqis Fatima. Commenting on these judgements, he writes: "The judicial trends do provide some hope for the development of Muslim law on right lines."<sup>215</sup>

The other case in which the question of the Hadith as a source of law was dealt with is Rashida Begum.<sup>216</sup> This was a case under the Guardians and

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<sup>212</sup> Supra note 59.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid. [For critical assessment of this judgment, see supra note 56].

<sup>214</sup> Bilqis Fatima v. Najm-ul-Ikram, PLD 1959 Lah. 566.

<sup>215</sup> Supra note 56 at 21.

Wards Act. The dispute was with respect to the guardianship of the persons and property of two minor girls, whose mother had, after the death of the father of the minors, married a person not related to the girls. The trial judge had appointed a real paternal uncle of the girls as their guardian and the mother brought an appeal against this order. The matter really was simple one not involving any intricate questions of fact or law. But the learned judge, Justice Mohammad Shafi felt himself called upon to adjudicate upon, inter alia, the following questions, most of which would appear to have a very remote, if any, connection with the case: (1) The supreme sovereign authority vesting in Almighty God, (2) The capacity of all Muslims to interpret the Holy Quran and to follow its teachings (3) Rules-which should guide us in interpreting the Quran. (4) Credibility of the Hadith sources, (5) value of the Hadith in the legal system of Islam, and many other allied topics. The learned Judge makes an outright attack on the very institution of the Hadith. He discusses the supposed weakness of the historical material in relation to the traditions and in order to reinforce his argument, he cites a number of the Hadith to show that their contents are sufficient intrinsic evidence that these particular traditions could not be a correct record of the sayings of the conduct of the Holy Prophet (s.a.w), These traditions generally relate to what are called the private affairs of the Prophet (s.a.w) especially some aspects of his marital relations. About the views of learned judge about the Hadith as a source of law,<sup>217</sup> Malik Muhammad Jafer writes:

On Hadith the views of the learned judge are clear and unambiguous. He does not consider the Hadith material as a reliable record of the precepts or conduct of the Holy Prophet and he does not admit the Traditions as being a valid source of Muslim Law.<sup>218</sup>

In Khushid Jan, Yaqub Ali, J. seconded by other two judges observed:

In the beginning there was a controversy as (to) the authority of Sunnah, for, some believed that later in point of time it

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<sup>216</sup> Rashida Begum v. Shahab Din PLD 1960 Lahore 1142.

<sup>217</sup> Supra note 56 at 22-23.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

repealed the text of Quran. The accepted position, however, is that it is the most authentic source of Islamic law next to Quran . Jurists like Imam Abu Hanifa an-Numan Ibn Thabit formulated legal theories of speculative character comparable to legal fiction in the modern laws. While he relied on eighteen Ahadith only, Imam Malik (died A.H. 179) relied mainly on Ahadith and he gathered them not for their sake but to use "them in law. Even in the authentic': compilations of the Ahadith there are certain contradictions. How are the courts to reconcile them? The answer is two fold: either the so called contradiction lies in different rules of decision being laid down for different facts or that one or more .of them are not authentic. There are numerous rules for determining the authenticity of a tradition. They neither ensure certainty nor carry conviction of genuineness. Some of the Faqih's have not accepted them as having the authority of law.<sup>219</sup>

Thus, Khurshid jan recognises the Hadith as the most authentic source of Islamic Law next to the Quran, though in the process it highlights certain problems. The recent cases B.Z. Kaikaus<sup>220</sup> and Muhammad Riaz<sup>221</sup> also recognise the Hadith as a valid source of law after the Quran.

In brief, the strength of judicial pronouncements in Pakistan is, on the whole, in favour of the recognition of the Hadith as a second valid source ; of law and is in no mood of compromising on this stand.

## V

Now, if Dr. Iqbal's views and visions about the role of the Hadith as a source of law are taken to their logical end, then what can be safely said is that many legal institutions wholly or partially based on the Hadith are liable to be

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<sup>219</sup> Khurshid jan v. Fazal Dad, PLD. 1964(W.P). Lah. 558.

<sup>220</sup> B.Z. Kaikaus v. President of Pakistan, PLD 1980 S.C. 160.

<sup>221</sup> Muhammd Riaz v. Federal Government, PLD 1980 F.S.C. 1.

discarded. The legal doctrines pertaining to wills, wakf and pre-emption, to name a few, have mostly their origins embedded and superstructure founded on the Hadith. Likewise, the Hadith many a time made additions and supplementations to the legal provisions in the Quran;<sup>222</sup> made explicit what the Quranic injunction had implicit;<sup>223</sup> qualified absolute declarations of the Quran;<sup>224</sup> and made certain exceptions to certain general rules in the Quran.<sup>225</sup> All these institutions are to be overhauled, reformed and replaced if Dr. Iqbal's indifference to the Hadith as a source of law is cared for. However, the fact stands that the relevance of the Hadith as a source of law instead of diminution is already on the increase and future warrants its enhanced use in the legal system of the Muslim countries. The 1/3 rd provision of bequest which has been used as a device for benefitting orphaned grandchildren by most Muslim countries is wholly based on the Hadith. Likewise if one gauges through personal laws operating in Muslim countries<sup>226</sup> contemporarily, in legal matters there is either complete conformity with the recognised Hadith or a least departure from it. In nutshell, Dr. Iqbal's philosophy of according no or minimum role to the Hadith<sup>227</sup> as a source of law has so far failed to impress generality of the

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<sup>222</sup> Al-Quran forbids marriage with the two sisters simultaneously; al-Sunna disallows also marriage with aunt and niece simultaneously.

<sup>223</sup> Al-Quran permits Nikah while al-Sunna guides us about the essentials for entering into Nikah.

<sup>224</sup> Al-Quran mandates the cutting of hands of male and female thieves but al-Sunna ensures that culprit should not be of unsound mind or a child.

<sup>225</sup> Al-Quran allows bequest in favour of any person but al-Sunna provides that a legal heir cannot be a beneficiary under bequest; For details, see Supra note 1 at 96-99.

<sup>226</sup> Tahir Mahmood, Personal Law in Islamic Countries, (Delhi, 1987).

<sup>227</sup> In view of the material available in Iqbal's letters, statements and other works (poetic-prose), on the same topic it is hard to accept the finding that Iqbal had a "philosophy of according no or minimum role to the Hadith". The matter needs further elaboration and more detailed and comprehensive research. (Editor's Note).

Muslim mind and in immediate future no worthwhile departure from the present position is expected.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> The position which Iqbal accords to the Hadith as a source of law can be further understood by comprehending his views about the legal importance of the Quran. For details, see Muhammad Altaf Hussain Ahangar, "Iqbal and Qur'an: A Legal Perspective", *Iqbal Review*, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 1-22 (Oct. 1994).

# RECONSTRUCTION OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT: REVIEW ARTICLE

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In spite of the widely accepted importance of Allamah Iqbal's "Lectures" titled *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, in the field of Iqbal Studies, the works published on it are very limited. Only a few books have been written with reference to the "Lectures". This is due firstly to the fact that the "Lectures" are in English language and, secondly, they address profound literary and philosophical problems. The language of literary and philosophical problems is usually more difficult and delicate than the common language, which renders their comprehension difficult for the average reader. Consequently, the average researchers shy away from this serious responsibility. In addition, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is a book which is one of the greatest importance among those written after the period of our downfall. It leads us to comprehension of the spirit of our cultural and civilizational progress and the basic causes of our decadence as well as points out to us the ways of understanding the requirements of the new age and the reconstruction of our present and future and shows us the principles on which our renaissance is possible. After studying the Western civilization and Phenomenon of our downfall with deep insight Iqbal has raised questions in this book, on the answer to which depends the shaping of our present and future collective well being. It is obvious that these basic questions and their answers are such delicate subjects that attempting their solution is very difficult. The new book of Professor Muhammad Uthman, *"Fikr-i-Islami kee Tashkil-i-Nau"* (*The Re-organization of Islamic Thought*) is a bold and thought-provoking book on the "Lectures" of Allamah Iqbal whose review is the subject of this paper.

Several other books are also available in Urdu about "The Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam". Included among these are: *"Khutubat-i-Iqbal per Eik Nazar"* If (*A Glance at Iqbal's "Lectures"*) by Muhammad Sharif Baqa, a book of the same name by the distinguished theologian Maulana Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi and the "Muta' aliqat

Khutubat-i-Iqbal per Eik Nazar" (A Glance at the Matters Concerning Iqbal's lectures) by Dr. Saiyyid Muhammad Abd Allah. In addition to these Dr. Khalifah Abd al-Hakim, has given an abstract of these lectures at the end of his book "Fikr-i-Iqbal (Iqbal's Thought).

All This work, though admirable and conducive to a good comprehension of Iqbal, does not amount to much with reference to a book of the caliber of the "Lectures". The truth is that the work on Allamah Iqbal's "Lectures" does not at all equal in authenticity the work on his verse. Consequently, till now, despite its defects and shortcomings, the translation of the late Saiyyid Nazir Niazi "Tashkil-i Jadid Ilahiyat-i-Islamiyah" (The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam) is the only available source for study of the "Lectures" to some extent for the Urdu readership. Mir Hasan al-Din had translated one or two lectures but that also could not be completed which restricts its utility. The abstracts of the "Lectures" prepared by Dr. Khalifah Abu al-Kakim is not very useful. It does not create anything except misunderstanding and confusion in the comprehension of Iqbal. It can only create a superficial understanding about the "Lectures" in students. It does not even create an interest for study of the "Lectures".

The book of Muhammad Sharif Baqa, Khutubat-i-Iqbal per Eik Nazar (A Glance at the "Lectures" of Iqbal) is a good introduction to the titles and subjects of the "Lectures". However, it has neither reached the depth of the "Lectures" nor has done justice to its subjects initiated by the Allamah. At best it can be regarded as a student's effort. In reality it must be admitted that even the utility of the "Lectures" has not been understood. These "Lectures" are spread over the vast canvas of the religious, intellectual, theological, political and practical problems created for the Muslims in the evolution of the new life in the Indian sub-continent and the Muslim world, and by the continuous struggle between them and the West. In the whole Islamic world the basic challenges faced by religion itself and by the Muslim Ummah for its existence and continuity have been addressed in the background of Islam and its relationship with the West by Iqbal in an unprecedented manner. This was due to the fact that in the Indian sub-continent the Ulama understood Islam only with the perception of a special traditional system. Most of the eminent Ulama were only good teachers in religious seminaries, but totally lacked the perception of the current thought and the political, social and economic

problems confronting Muslims. In fact the conduct of some of them proved detrimental to the Muslim independence movements by knowingly or unknowingly continuing to play in the hands of the powers operating against the Muslim interests. These Ulama were ignorant of the advancements of the western philosophy, western theology, new psychology and new technology. In contrast to them the new educated mind was adopting the western ways completely. The changes continuously created by the slow and insidious hold of the Western civilization on the cultural, political and ethical life of Muslims under the guise of new technology, seriously affected the collective life of Muslims. The greater number of our Ulama could not comprehend this state of affairs, and failed to understand the special nature of the problems facing the Muslims in the present day world. Consequently, the demands of life have continued to pull Muslims towards Western culture and have been consistently creating uncertainty and doubt against religion itself and particularly Islam even in the face of the preaching and edicts of the Ulama. The modern-minded class of Egypt, Turkey and the Indian sub-continent itself was offering such explanations of Islamic teachings as reflected the lack of ambition and indicated submission to the Western culture as well as ignorance of both Islam and Western culture. In these circumstances Iqbal formulated some basic questions with the background of Western philosophy and Islamic theology. In this way, with reference to the spirit of their times, the Muslim Ummah, particularly those of the Indian sub-continent became aware of these basic questions, the answers to which were essential for the organization of the Muslims' new social, cultural, political and economic life. Iqbal was the first to raise these questions in the Muslim society. In the history of philosophy the answers often have not been considered as important as the questions. This is so because the formulation of a question gives birth to new intellectual discussions which lead the human mind to new fields of knowledge and opens new dimensions of vision. It is these questions which lead to the rise and evolution of knowledge. Iqbal understood the spirit of his time and raised new intellectual questions with the background of the basic customs of his time. Even if Iqbal had not offered answers to these questions he would have enjoyed unique eminence. But the greatness of Iqbal lies in his not leaving these questions hanging in the air and tried to provide their answers with serious thought and deep insight. These "Lectures" of Iqbal are a mirror of our

national perceptions. Again, as Iqbal himself has said in the "Preface" to the "Lectures" that:

"It must, however, be remembered that there is no such thing as finality in Philosophical thinkings. As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other view, and probably sounder views than those set forth in these lectures are possible".

We neither do nor should insist on the finality of the thoughts presented in the "Lectures". On the other hand, as said by Allamah Iqbal in the above reference:

"Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought, and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it".

This means that just as the Allamah viewed the Islamic and Western knowledge with due regard to the growth and development of human thought in his own age we should also keep a careful eye on the growth and development of human thought of our own times, and should organize the perceptions of today in the light of ' Allamah Iqbal's scientific intellectual conclusions. The conclusions of the nineteenth century physics brought about the destruction of religion and old theories by attacking them in such a manner as created an intellectual stampede in the realm of old theories and religion. As religion was attacked and criticized by Freud through psychology, by Marx through economics, by the Vienna Circle through linguistics, by Darwin through biology and by Kant, Hume, Lock and Berkeley through experimentalism and was equated with mythology and evolution of Voodooism by George Fraser the whole world witnessed the insult of religion. This led to the concept that religion was nothing more than some blind beliefs, and an unintellectual and illogical labyrinth of some rituals, which might have been somewhat useful for man in the medieval times, but was only an obstacle on the road to progress and an instrument of oppression in the hands of the strong against the weak. The critics of religion used this self-made testimony of physics against religion. However, in the twentieth century, as physics itself started contradicting its own basic theories and affirmation of some fundamental axioms of religion Iqbal, arguing from

the fallacies of the claims of classical physics and support of the claims of religion through modern physics for the confirmation of the beliefs of religion, established the rationality and acceptability of the truths of religion on the basis of the existence of concordance between religion, physics and other sciences. thus, he took the stand that "by carefully watching the progress of human thought" we can create new angles of vision for the truth of religion.

By far and large our scholars have studied the "Lectures" without taking the trouble of understanding the basic problems by pondering over this basic stand and way of thought of Iqbal, and without identifying the basics of Iqbal's thought, the various subjects and problems of the "Lectures" have been viewed only in a cursory way.

A well-known book of the late Mawlana Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi known as *Kbutubat-i-Iqbal per Eik Nazar* (A Glance at the "Lectures" of Iqbal) has been published by the Iqbal Institute, Srinagar, Kashmir. the erudition of the Mawlana is widely accepted but the conclusion is imperative that the method adopted by him in the explanation and appreciation of the "Lectures" of Allamah Iqbal stands on very weak ground. According to him Allamah Iqbal's "Lectures" amount to be the theology of the modern age and this theology is far superior, firmer and better promoter of faith and insight than the classical theology. Careful examination will show Allamah Iqbal's theology to be only an extension and continuation of the classical theology. Actually it must be said that it was the theology of Plotinus and his predecessor the Jewish philosopher Philo, whose theology provided the rational foundation for finding concordance between Islam and Greek philosophy to Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Rushd and other Muslim theologians. Earlier Muslim theologians continued to establish concordance between Islam and Greek philosophy. Sir Saiyyid found concordance between Islam and naturalism which was the prominent thought of his time. the same concordance appears to us as a way of thought in the "Lectures" also. the requirements of every age call for the rationalization of old theories and thought. Confucius used to call this 'presenting old wine in new bottles'. By establishing concordance between the physics, science, technology, modern psychology, biology and sociology of his age with Islamic beliefs Iqbal established the rationale for religion. Iqbal's theology is not different form

that of his predecessors in spirit. The Mawlana has presented three arguments for distinguishing Iqbal' theology from that of his predecessors however, he does not support his hypothesis, but attests that this hypothesis has been advanced in poetic high sounding language in a hurry without rationality. Iqbal himself neither claimed this nor this eminence needed such irrational claims. In addition, the discussions on the various subjects of the "Lectures" are so short, ambiguous and in-comprehensive that it could not do justice to Iqbal. These important and serious discussions could not be conducted in such a cursory manner. In fact, on reading this book mind becomes confused about Iqbal's "Lectures". The attitude of Mawlana Saeed Ahmad Akbarabadi is unnecessary praise of the Allamah at some places and is apologetic at others. Would that he had viewed the Allamah's discussions within the vast expanse of Islamic theology and had pointed out these discussions in the history of Islamic theology, which would have facilitated the understanding of Iqbal's discussions with reference to the traditions of Muslims theology. Like Dr. Muhammad Alba'hi of Egypt the Mawlana has also shown some differences with Iqbal. Though a detailed discussion of these is not possible here the objections of Muhammad Alba'hi betray lack of comprehension of Iqbal. The support which the Allamah provided to every movement created in the Islamic world was a demand of the times, because the start and growth of any movement anywhere in the down-trodden and suppressed Muslim world was in itself a great matter. Every action which could motivate Muslims was laudable to Iqbal. Its being appropriate or otherwise was of less importance at that time. Later, if this movement started drifting from its path Iqbal would point out that also the objection of Muhammad Alba'hi had resulted from a lack of understanding of the state of affairs created by colonialism. Instead of clarifying the correct position of Iqbal the Mawlana has thrown his weight also in favor of Muhammad Albahi. Thus, this book is the result of an incomplete effort.

With reference to the "Lectures" of Iqbal the book compiled by Dr. Saiyyid Abd Allah, titled *Muta'allaqat-i-Khutabat-i-Iqbal* (About Iqbal) is also a very well-known book. Included in this book are "Iqbal aur Dini tajrubah" (Iqbal and Religious Experience) by 'Abd al-Hafiz Karadar, "Allamah Iqbal ka Junubi Hind ka Safar" (The Trip of Allamah Iqbal to South India) by Dr. 'Abd Allah Chughtai, "A'alam-i-Khutabat-i-Iqbal" By Dr. Ghulam Husain Zulfiqar, "Allamah Iqbal ka Tasawwur-i-Taqdir" (Allamah Iqbal's Concept of

Destiny) by Professor Muhammad Munawwar, (Iqbal ka Tasawwur-i.-Baqa-i-Dwam" (Iqbal's Concept of Eternity) by Muzaffar Husain, "Khutubat. Main Ulamah-i-Islam kay Havalay" (References to the Philosophers of Islam in the "Lectures"), "Iqbal aur Fakhr al-Din Razi" (Iqbal and Fakhr al Razi) by Dr. Amin Allah Wasir, the "New Gulshan-i-Raz Jadid Khutubat kay Aienay Main" (The New Secret Rose-garden in the Mirror of the "Lectures"), and "Iqbal aur Shabistari" (Iqbal and Shabistari) by Dr. Saiyyid 'Abd Allah. The papers of Professor Muhammad Munawwar, Muzaffar Husain Chudhry and Abd al-Hafiz Kardar are important with reference to the subject matter of Iqbal's "Lectures", while those of Saiyyid Abd Allah, Abd Allah Qureshi, Amin Allah Wasir and Dr. Ghulam Husain Zulfikar cover the introductions to and histories of the personalities of the "Lectures". Some discussions in this book are admirable. Though the purpose of the "Lectures" that can be discerned in this book its effect is blurred and unclear on account of the book having been written and compiled without any solid theme. It does not provide satisfactory guidance for the comprehension of the "Lectures". In the background of all this work we want to review Professor Muhammad Uthman's book Fikr-i-Islami ke Tashkil-i-Naw (The Restatement of Islamic Thought) and study its special features.

Professor Muhammad Uthman is a well -known specialist of Iqbal Studies. The Hayat-i-Iqbal ka Jazbati Dawr (The Emotional Phase of Iqbal's Life) and Asrar-u-Ramuz per eik Nazar (A Glance at the Asrar-u-Ramuz) or Iqbal's philosophy of "Khudi" are admirable works. His point of view in the study of Iqbal is not abstract but practical and applied. He has always seen and shown Iqbal as a man down to earth, living, having feelings and a real life. He is shown as man of life and blood who becomes a victim of disappointments in adversity and is happy in prosperity. The Iqbal of Professor Muhammad Uthman is an Iqbal full of life and away form the limitations of creeds.

Two characteristics of Fikr-i-Islami,... are very prominent. Though it is not lacking in errors of proof-reading and existence of unfilled blank spaces left for the English equivalents at some places this book is an example of its good calligraphy and beautiful printing on high quality paper. The efforts of both the author and the publisher in this direction are admirable. The second quality of this book is its simple and easy language. Professor Muhammadn

Uthman by presenting elegant subjects and discussions in extremely easy and simple language has brought the lovers of Iqbal studies so close to these "Lecture" that even a person of average education can read and understand very easily the subjects and discussions of the "Lectures". Now these "Lectures" of Iqbal are no longer the 'prohibited tree' for the average person. This work is so basic that Professor Muhammad Uthman deserves all praise. The title of each lecture is on the lines of the titles established by Allamah Iqbal. He has offered elucidation of each lecture separately. In this way the Professor has adopted the style of interpretation instead of translation. It can be said with confidence that Professor Muhammad Uthman has first pondered over each lecture, has fixed its contents and has then briefly described the contents of each lecture. In such works the author usually interjects his own opinions freely, but Professor Muhammad Uthman has explained and interpreted' the lectures objectively rather than subjectively, in which he has been successful. Thus, this book deserves the best attention out of those written for understanding the "Lectures". At several places Professor Muhammad Uthman has also made an effort to describe the purport of Iqbal in detail and in conformity with the modern style and methods. Here also the style of the Professor is one of understanding and explaining Iqbal. Professor Muhammad Uthman has also written a comprehensive preface himself before writing the interpretation, which is very important in itself. It shows the depth of the Professor on these "Lectures."

Simultaneously with these qualities one cannot help noting shortcomings at some places and feeling that in each lecture there is need for some more discussion of some subjects. Though such feeling is possible for any book but it is felt this book for more than one reason and in more than one way. This is so because if, rendering of the "Lectures" in easy language was aimed at that aim has been achieved but if the understanding of the "Lectures" was the object it leaves scope for more explanation on many subjects which appear during the study of these "Lectures" and no work on them has appeared so far. It will also be appropriate to mention here parenthetically that in the beginning of the first Lecture the occult incident related by him about his early life does not find a solid reference. This is so because it neither resembles a prophet's spiritual experience nor - has any relationship

with a saint's inner events. The basic question raised by Iqbal in this first lecture itself needs attention and explanation. Merely saying that "Yet it cannot be denied that faith is more than mere feeling. It has something like a cognitive content" is an incomplete assertion till, by establishing the nature of intellect in religion, we bring into human understanding an entity which would make spiritual experience verifiable like other experiences. of science and social learning? How can an experience which cannot be verified and tested objectively be molded into the form of a science? In any case, the reason for this ambiguity appears to be that the true nature of spiritual experience could not be defined as to the sense in which it is objective. It was necessary to explain the concept of the component of intellect in religion. In the same way Allamah Iqbal has adjudged Islam as the expression of the inductive reason but nothing is known about the state of inductive reason in Islam. Also, the question arises as to why Islam is against deductive intellect when the source of knowledge is not entirely induction but is composed of both the ways, i.e. deductive and inductive knowledge.

Again, calling only deduction to be the cause of Islam's decline and basing all hopes on induction for the renaissance of Islam betrays undue criticism of deduction and unnecessary dependence on induction which is a dilemma which can give birth to many new confusions.

How deduction has weakened Islam and the reason for its being not in concordance with the disposition of Islam are important question. The majority of Muslim theologians were not independent in their intellectual conclusions from the Greek deduction. Is it not an intellectual fallacy to base the foundation of knowledge on induction? The Holy Qur'an stresses the need for the study of the universe on the basis of both induction and deduction. Many examples of this can be presented from the Holy Qur'an. To adjudge pure induction as the source of knowledge is itself only half truth. The other half truth is that ignoring deduction amounts to repetition of the same delusion as that of the supporters of deduction about induction. It is also not permissible to adjudge pure induction as the foundation: of modern knowledge and science. Both modern knowledge and science use deduction as well as induction in arriving at intellectual inferences. However, this subject will be discussed in detail at some other place as to the results of this logical delusion in the "Lectures". The same kind of logical delusion has

been created by the supposition that if the Islamic education had evolved and developed on the path of induction it would have taken the place of the new European civilization. The first point has been explained above that the Islamic civilization would not have reached its climax merely by induction. Secondly, it has also been supposed that the modern European civilization has reached some climax. If mere acquisition of technology is considered as civilization Muslims can reach the stage of the Western civilization with mere technology. But is not technology only a part of civilization? Also, is acquiring technology the climax of civilization even in spite of the havoc created by it? Technology has imprisoned man in conditions of fear, terror, starvation, disease and war to a much greater extent than the services it has rendered to him. This is due - to the fact that technology, which we are adopting, considering it the climax of European civilization, being deprived of balance is under the influence of blind mechanization, and man is standing on the pyramid of these destructive armaments. Would the Islamic civilization have reached' the same climax with induction? To adjudge the Western civilization as an evolved form of Islamic civilization is also a notional delusion and a very dangerous one, because it has given birth to the thinking in the Islamic world that adoption of the European civilization, together with faith in God and the Holy Prophet will attain the objectives of the Islamic civilization. This notional delusion has made the Muslim intellect a victim of Western civilization. The intellect based on induction will arrive at the same conclusion when passing through more stages of evolution. This one sidedness of thought will lead to similar inferences. Professor Muhammad Uthman has missed this and several similar problems and questions. He has not brought his intellect into play to express any opinion on several such subjects emanating from the back-ground and fore-ground of the "Lecture? These controversies have been presented as a sample, otherwise Iqbal's "Lectures" is an ocean concerning which such questions have arisen and can be raised with reference to the identification of our cultural and civilizational identity which can create a new insight.

Similarly, the standard of attaining results for prophets set by Iqbal may be somewhat comprehensible if considered with the interpretation that Iqbal has set ' this standard only for the prophets with a book. If the standard of results be applied as proof for every prophet's prophethood it will be impossible for every prophet to measure up to such a standard. This is so

because innumerable prophets were killed immediately on claiming prophethood without the results of their prophethood making appearance. Their prophethood has been attested by some prophet 'succeeding them. Here the question rises whether prophethood itself has been attested by some prophet succeeding them. Here the question rises whether prophethood itself has ever proposed this standard for its attestation. It is difficult to answer this question in the affirmative. In the same way in the matter of the "Termination of Prophethood" the question remains unanswered whether the human intellect has reached the stage at which it can fix its own path and whether this argument is sufficient for "Termination of Prophethood"? The other question is about the nature of the principle established by Iqbal about spiritual democracy and spiritual purification of the individual. What is the form of this spiritual democracy? In the same way the question of conferring the right of Ijtihad on the parliament following the example of Turkey deserves consideration. This is so because extinguishing the individual's rights of Ijtihad and conferring it on parliament raises the question about the parliament's capability. The question also rises whether parliament can bridle the selfish motives of the ruling classes. In view of all this what is the assurance for the correct use of the right of Ijtihad by the parliament it is appropriate not to extinguish the individual's right of Ijtihad this is so because often such eminent personalities can have the compelling power of keeping the ruling classes on the right track. Also making parliament the law-giver will create a form of theocracy whose eradication has always remained the distinctive feature of Islam. Similarly, Professor Muhammad Uthman could bring under of discussion such and several other questions in the interpretation of the Lectures. However, as the impossibility of discussing all subjects in one book is well known some very important questions have been left undiscussed in his book also. Professor Muhammad Uthman could be expected to bring under discussion numerous questions of this nature. It is quite possible that he will include these matters in some other forth-coming book of his. Still, notwithstanding the serious feeling of incompleteness the present book can be regarded a good effort and a helpful guide in the comprehension of Iqbal.