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Abdul Hameed Kamali

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ALFĀRĀBI AND IBN RUSHD ON PHILOSOPHY

Martin A. Bertman

For the history of ideas the encounter between two rich intellectual forces and the consequent attempt to either reconcile one with the other or repudiate one by the other is most significant. The great philosophical tradition in Islam results from, or at least cannot be understood without, the encounter of the Qoranic attitudes and the classical heritage of ancient philosophy. Shari'ah (and Sunnah) defines the community of Islam, the Ummah; whereas the claim made by philosophers is that the wisdom and the happiness provided by religion is not in opposition to philosophy.¹

The social and intellectual context of Islamic philosophy must be understood from the appreciation of the central role of divine law, Shari'ah. Unlike the Christian community with its juridical separation into canon law and civil law the Muslim community, as well as the Jewish community, held no such separation. The Christian could more easily find philosophy a secular activity parallel to and serving the purposes (*ancilla*) of religion somewhat in the same way as civil law serves canon law. However, neither Islam nor Judaism had such a tradition for separation; in fact, both strongly tend to find it difficult to view anything outside the

¹ See Martin A. Bertman, "Alfārābi and the Medieval Islamic Conception of Happiness," *The Islamic Quarterly*, Winter, 1970.

religious even hypothetically or for practical purposes. This made for the great need to understand the value of philosophy for the believer.

It is not also significant to note that neither in Islam nor in Judaism, for that matter, was there an ecclesiastical institution which had the authority to determine the correct interpretations of the prescriptions made by Law. Consequently, all questions of individual or community behavior had to be justified directly in terms of Law, where the lack of a decisive authority made variant interpretations possible. This in itself produced a climate of argumentation which may have both stimulated philosophical activity and also allowed for the attempt to harmonize philosophy and religion without some of the strictures of the more authoritarian Christian. With this in mind we will discuss Alfarabi and Ibn Rushd on Philosophy.

Abū Nasr Muhammad al-Fārābī, (ca. 870-950 AD) was born in Transoxia and studied in Khorāsān and Baghdad. He is one of the earliest and most respected Islamic philosophers. Ammonites, for instance, in the twelfth century, considered him the greatest of all Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sinā.

Alfarabi finds truth and happiness to be intrinsically wedded; here he fully agrees with Plato and Aristotle. Also, this point is in concert with the religious tradition. Alfarabi stresses the harmony of philosophy and religion in terms of goal but makes a distinction between them in their methods:

In everything of which philosophy gives an account based on intellectual perception or conception, religion gives an account based on imagination. In everything demonstrated by philosophy, religion employs persuasion.²

It is interesting to note that though God can be known in many ways, Alfārābi understands that the contemplative mode of knowing is to be held in the highest regard since it is best to understand God. Alfārābi tells us that the investigation of the heretical principles of beings leads necessarily "to the ultimate cause of beings. This is the divine inquiry into them. For the first principle is the divinity, and the principles that come after it are the divide principles."³

Of course this emphasis on the contemplative mode elevates the philosopher to a preeminent position. Indeed, the "true philosopher" is the person capable of the greatest happiness. Since occupations may be ranked in terms of the objects that they seek, philosophy merits supreme position since it not only seeks knowledge of God but seeks that knowledge in a way that is qualitatively superior to other methods. The philosopher is consequently ranked superior.

² Alfārābi, *The Attainment of Happiness*, in Lerner and Mandi, eds., *Medieval Political Philosophy* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 77.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

Man's specific perfection is called supreme happiness; and to each man, according to his rank in the order of humanity, belongs the specific happiness pertaining to this kind of man.⁴

Yet it would be false to give the impression that Alfarabi means by the philosopher someone isolated from political activity. Against the classical tradition which tended to isolate the philosopher from action, making him to be a mere contemplator, Alfarabi stresses the fulfillment of the philosophical role through action. Actually, this emphasis allows him to bring the philosopher closer to the religious tradition which elevates the prophet to political leadership. Compare;

When the theoretical sciences are isolated and their possessor does not have the faculty for exploiting them for the benefit of others, they are defective philosophy. To be a truly perfect philosopher one has to possess both the theoretical sciences, and the faculty for exploiting them for the benefits of others according to their capacity. Were one to consider the case of the true philosopher, he would find no difference between him and the supreme ruler.⁵

Consequently, the "true philosopher" needs the ability to persuade found in or through religion as well as the ability to demonstrate; he must concern himself with the imagination as well as the cognitive powers. Yet this seems to elevate philosophy above religion in the sense that to persuade is more vulgar than to

⁴ Alfarabi, *The Political Regime*, in *ibid.*, p. 55.

⁵ Alfarabi, *The Attainment of Happiness*, in *ibid.*, p. 76.

convince through reason. Notwithstanding this implication, Alfārābi seems to reject such a favoritism for philosophy. Religion is the ultimate educator and guide for men, all men, within whose boundaries there is a genuine place for those capable of philosophy. This is the only conclusion that is to be had from his enumeration of the "vain philosopher," and the "counterfeit philosopher" as species of thinkers who are without the guidance, marked by a concern for the community, which religion provides. It is from this point of view that we can understand his pious comment:

Not everyone who wishes to legislate is a true legislator, but only one whom God creates and equips for this purpose.⁶

Ibn Rushd or Averroes, as he was known to the Latin West (Abū al-Walid Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Rushd, ca. 1126.1198), was born in Cordova to an eminent family of jurists. He himself was at judge in Seville and Cordova and a favourite of the Almohad princes. His reputation as an Aristotelean is unprecedented in the Medieval period; as Thomas Aquinas called Aristotle "the philosopher" and called Ibn Rushd "the Commentator."

Ibn Rushd is among the most aggressive of Muslim philosophers in presenting the superiority of philosophy. He finds the Qoranic texts, with their injunction for the believer to know God, a basis of legitimating Philosophy within religion. He says:

⁶ Aifarabi, Plato's Laws, in *Ibid.*, p. 8

Since it has now been established that the Law renders obligatory the study of beings by the intellect, and reflection on them, and since reflection is nothing more than inference drawing out of the unknown from the known, and since this is reasoning or at any rate done by reasoning, therefore we are under an obligation to carry on our study of beings by the intellectual reasoning. It is further evident that this manner of study, to which the Law summons and urges, is the most perfect kind of reasoning, and this is the kind called demonstration. The Law, then, has urged us to have demonstrative knowledge of God, the Exalted, and all the beings of His creation.⁷

In dealing with the 'relationship between religion and philosophy Ibn Rushd proceeds on the principle that the truth of the one does not oppose the truth of the other; "truth does not oppose truth and accords with it and bears witness to it." Upon this principle he undertakes the obligation of showing how the seemingly figurative, popular and contradictory elements of the religious texts relate in their truth to the truth of demonstrative or philosophical knowledge.

His method of harmonization is not too different from Alfarabi's approach. He also finds that since religion attends to the needs of all men that it must speak to each on his own terms. Ibn Rushd finds that there are essentially three types of men which are convinced by the three types of approaches in the religious texts; these three types of men may be called the imaginative, the legalistic, and

⁷ Ibn Rushd, *The Decisive Treatise*, in *ibid.*, p. 165.

philosophical. They are brought to assent, to Islam, through three corresponding types of arguments: the rhetorical, the dialectical, and the demonstrative; the apparent confusions in the religious texts reconciled once it is realized that it carries the burden of the three approaches; the Qoran is ■ written for all men. Ibn Rushd says:

Since we, in the Muslim community, hold that this divine Law of ours is true, and that it is this Law that incites and summons us to the happiness that consists in the knowledge of God, Mighty and Majestic, and of his creation, that end is appoint for every Muslim by the method of the assent that his temperament and nature require. For the nature of men are on different levels with the respect to their paths to assent. One of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another (comes to assent through rhetorical arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative arguments.⁸

Therefore, Ibn Rushd sees that religion is practically indispensable to the fundamental moral objective, assent for all men. Yet philosopher is superior in the quality of his knowledge. In fact, suggests that the philosopher alone might be capable of an appropriate relationship to God without religion. This is a muted suggestion but one of which his opponents often accused him.

⁸ Ibid., p. 169.

In both *Alfārābi* and *Ibn Rushd* we find an attempt to harmonize religion with philosophy and in both, to a different degree, a defence of the superiority of philosophy. Further, we find that both felt the strong obligation to use philosophy for the well-being of others and as such, subsume it under the moral and religious imperative of assent for the *Dar al-Islam*.

IQBAL AND BERGSON: CONCEPT OF TIME

Riffat Jahan Dawar Burki

Time is a central concept in Iqbal's philosophy, From various accounts we know that the tradition *la tasubbu ad-dahr* i.e. Do not vilify Time (for Time is God), accompanied Iqbal all his life. He even surprised Henri Bergson with it when he visited the French philosopher in Paris."He took this prophetic word for a designation of that overwhelming reality of which time and space are only aspects." In 1933, he wrote,"If dahr is continuous and extended and if it is Allah himself - what then, is space? Just as if time is a kind of reflection of dahr." Iqbal emphasizes time more than space. Time is more fundamental than space; it is related to space as soul is to the body. It is the mind of space. Pure duration is the matrix of the whole universe.

In his view of time, Iqbal comes nearest to Bergson of whom he says;"among the representatives of contemporary thought Bergson is the only thinker who has made a keen study of the phenomenon of duration in time". Bergson uses 'time' in two senses. In its narrow or superficial sense it means specialized or clock time. In its wider or real sense it is conceived as 'duree' which is not mere blank lastingness, enduring through a hypostatized, specialized Time—it is ceaseless, continuous flow in which all things live and move and have their being. Like Heraclitus, Bergson insists that the notion of ceaseless change is

fundamental, but unlike him he does not stultify the notion by permitting cyclic repetition. For him, *duree* evolves ever new and newer forms, that is, it is genuinely creative.

Like Bergson, Iqbal distinguishes between the serial and non-serial aspects of time. The former is associated with what Iqbal calls the efficient self and the latter with the appreciative self. The efficient or practical self is related to the spatial world. While retaining its unity as a totality, the efficient self reveals itself as a series of discrete (quantum) states. The time of this efficient self is just a dimension of the space-time continuum. It is of the serial character postulated by the Ash'arites. The time in which the efficient self lives is the time of which we predicate 'long' and 'short'. It is hardly distinguishable from space. Time, thus regarded, is not true time, according to Bergson.⁹ The appreciative ego lives in pure duration, i.e. change without succession. According to Iqbal, the unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is wholly qualitative. There is change and movement but they are not divisible. Their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. The time of the appreciative self is a single 'now' which the efficient self spatializes into a series of 'nows'.

⁹ Reconstruction, p. 46.

Bergson also points out the difference between time as infected by the idea of space and pure time: "when we speak of time we generally think of a homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity. Would not time, thus understood, be to the multiplicity of our psychic states what intensity is to certain of them—a sign, a symbol, absolutely distinct from true duration? Let us ask consciousness to isolate itself from the external world, and, by a vigorous effort of abstraction, to become itself again. We shall then put this question to it: does the multiplicity of our conscious states bear the slightest resemblance to the multiplicity of the units of a number? Has true duration anything to do with space?...If time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space . . . it follows that pure duration must be something different".¹⁰ It has been pointed out that Bergson does not deny succession to pure duration. For him the flow of pure duration is a succession of interpenetrating states. Iqbal takes away succession altogether. For him pure duration is eternity in the sense of change without succession.

¹⁰ (Bergson, H., *Time and Free Will*, translated by Pogson, F. L., London, 1910, pp. 90-91)

Iqbal agrees with Bergson that pure duration is known intuitively rather than intellectually. Bergson points out the barrenness and artificiality of intellectual abstraction which cannot perceive the organic unity of life."Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality."¹¹ Iqbal's distinction between intellect and intuition, like Bergson's, is in alignment with his distinction between specialized time and *duree*. In *Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadid* (p. 216) Iqbal says:

Unable to perceive infinity,
The intellect just multiplies pure unity
Lame, it likes to stand still;
And blind, give up the kernel for the shell
The stars and planets that we see
Are fragments of reality –
Creations of the intellect
Which must dissect.
We never saw Time with our inner sight

¹¹ (Bergson, H., *Time and Free Will*, translated by Pogson, F. L., London, 1911, p 332.

And have invented year and month and day and night.¹²

And again he comments upon the inadequacy of the intellectual approach to the question of time (Gulshan, p. 229):

The Intellect counts every breath With a clock's hand,

As if breath were Time's unit. So it can never comprehend

And take the measure of Infinity. It only fashions night and day, Imaginary parts of Time.

Afraid to seize the flame,

It gathers sparks alone.¹³

He compares the intuitive and the intellectual mode of perceiving reality (Gulshan, p. 229):

Life's essence is eternal, though seen with the body's eye it is a part of Time.¹⁴

Thus for Iqbal, it is "only in the moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience."¹⁵ However it is to be remembered here that Iqbal does not agree with Bergson in thinking that thought only "that spatializes living

¹² Translation by Husain, H., p.7.

¹³ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁴ Ibid.,

¹⁵ Reconstruction pp 47-48H

processes. For him, in its deeper movement, that is "in its true nature", thought "is identical with life".

Iqbal shares with enthusiasm an idea found both in the Qur'an and in Bergson's philosophy, namely, that time is creative. Bergson vehemently opposed the old idea expressed in Ecclesiastes that "there is nothing new under the sun."

On the contrary, he urges if we picture duration as a ceaseless as a ceaseless flow, we are bound to hold some kind of an evolutionary view in conjunction with it. Time is not static, it is a process continually working towards ever new forms which cannot be predicted. He takes the example of a painter. "The painter is before his canvas, the colours are on the palette, the model is sitting—all this we see, and also we know the painter's style: do we foresee what will appear on the canvas? We possess the elements of the problem; we know in an abstract way, now it will be solved, for the portrait will surely resemble the model and will surely resemble also the artist but the concrete solution brings with it that unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art."¹⁶

According to Bergson, "science can work only on what is supposed to repeat itself—that is to say, on what is withdrawn, by hypothesis, from the action of real time" and thus "concentrated on that which repeats, solely preoccupied in welding the same to the same, intellect turns away from the vision of time." Iqbal also

¹⁶ Creative Evolution, p. 360.

points out that creation and not repetition is the characteristic of real time."If time is real, and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which make conscious experience a delusion, then every moment in the reality is original, giving birth to what is absolutely novel and unforeseeable

...To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation...creation is opposed to repetition which is characteristic of mechanical action. That is why it is impossible to explain the creative activity of life in terms of mechanism¹⁷

Despite the many similarities between the thought of Bergson and Iqbal, there are certain significant differences. Bergson denies the teleological Character unreal of Reality on the ground that it makes time According to him,"the portals of the future must remain wide open to Reality"; otherwise it will not be free and creative. Thus if teleology is admitted, the primordial freshness of *duree* will be nullified. Iqbal points out that this objection only holds good so long as teleology means the acting out of a plan in view of a pre-determined purpose. As Professor Bausani observes,"such a religious predestinationalism would destroy the freedom of both God and man," Teleology is to be understood not as a vitalistic-creative process—a line not already drawn, but a line in the drawing—an actualization of open possibilities. The world-process" is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in

¹⁷ Reconsruction, p. 50.

character and brings itself to some sort of present fulfillment by actively preserving and supplementing the past.” For Iqbal, then, ultimate Reality "is pure duration in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity”.¹⁸ In his opinion Bergson’s mistake was that he overlooked the forward looking aspect of consciousness which makes it teleological.

According to Iqbal, Bergson was wrong in that he considered pure time as preceding the Person, of whom alone both pure duration and *elan vital* can be predicated. Pure time cannot keep the multiplicity of objects together. The multiplicity of nature, broken up into innumerable instants, can only be grasped by the appreciative act of a lasting self which can build it up together in a lasting synthesis. For Iqbal, time, although an essential element in reality, is not reality itself. In Greek and Hindu thought time was bound to things visible and escape from it was possible only through self-annihilation, but Iqbal boldly introduces Time into the very heart of God. God is not the unmoved mover; the God portrayed by the Qur’an is an active changing, and living God. For Iqbal, God lives both in eternity and in serial time. The former means change without succession while the latter is organically related to eternity in so far as it is a measure of eternity. In Javid Nama (pp. 178-180), Iqbal attempts to portray life in the non-serial time of the world beyond creation:

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 55.

I passed beyond the bounds of this universe
And set foot in the undimensioned world,
A world . . . without both right and left,
A world devoid of night and day.
In that universe was another world
Whose origin was from Divine fiat,
Undecaying, and every moment transformed,
Unimaginable, yet there clearly visible;
Every moment clothed in a new perfection,
Every moment clad in a new beauty.
Its time had no need of moon and sun;
In its expanse the nine spheres are contained.¹⁹

Serial time comes into existence only by the very act of creation:"The Time of the Ultimate Ego is revealed as change without succession, i.e., an organic whole which appears atomic because of the creative movement of the ego. This is what Mir Damad Mulla Baqir means when he says that time is born with the act of creation by which the Ultimate Ego realizes and measures, so to speak, the infinite wealth of His own

¹⁹ Translation by Arberry, pp. 113-114.

undetermined possibilities.” Hence it is possible for Iqbal to interpret logically the two contrasting statements on creation in the Quran: "All things have We created bound by a fixed decree: and Our command is no more than a single word, like the twinkling of an eye" (54: 50) "and do thou trust in Him who liveth and dieth not; and celebrate His praise who hath created the heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, in six days; and ascended His Throne; the Merciful" (25:60). Viewed intellectually, one Divine Day, in the terminology of the Quran and the Old Testament, becomes equal to a thousand years. But from another viewpoint, the process of creation is a single act as swift as the twinkling of an eye. Iqbal illustrates this point further. The sensation of red is caused by a wave-motion of the frequency of 400 billion per second and is practically incalculable, yet it is received by the eye in a single momentary act of perception.

ADDRESS TO JAVID

(Talk to the New Generation)

B. A. Dar

(Translator)

INTRODUCTION

There are two translations of Iqbal's Javid Nama into English, one by Professor Mahmud Ahmad under the title Pilgrimage of Eternity, published by the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore (1961) and the other by the late Professor Arberry, published under the UNESCO Collection of Representative works (1966). But they did not translate the last section of the book entitled "Address to Javid" with the sub-title: Talk to the New Generation. Professor Arberry says, "Appended to the Persian text is an 'Address to Javid': the poet's son after whom the poem was named: this appendix does not form part of the whole work and the present translator has followed the example of his predecessors and has omitted it."

It is true that this section does not form part of the pattern of the Heavenly Journey which constitutes the Javid Nama but it has its own importance. I think it is perhaps the only poem of Iqbal that is exclusively addressed to the younger generation and as such deserves our serious consideration, especially in the present socio-economic situation of the Muslim World. It is for this

reason that I have tried to render it into English prose to make such an important piece of literature available to a larger audience.

Summary

Iqbal mourns that the real dynamic spirit that moved the Muslim of the old seems to have left us altogether. The Qur'an is there with us as the great Fount of Wisdom but unfortunately it no longer inspires us to deeds that may transform the destiny of the Muslims of today.

We in the East have become blind imitators of the West in almost all aspects of our life. Our arts and sciences, our conceptions of politics and religion are all derived from them. The result is that we have lost our identity and whatever we do in the field of art, science and industry is hardly of any worth in the eyes of the world. If we wish to maintain and develop our individuality, and contribute something fruitful for the betterment of the people of the world, we must turn to our own heritage on the basis of which alone we can, lay the foundation of a healthier culture. In the words of Rūmī, "we, must come back to our mother who alone can help us in recovering from our ailments which have been aggravated through treatment from alien hands".

In order to help the new generation in laying the foundation of a new culture that maintains its contact with the ancient cultural heritage, Iqbal tried to provide in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, an intellectual basis for it. It is

expressed in the framework of modern thought which, as he himself says, can be improved upon in the light of new knowledge. [“As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other views, and probably sounder views than those set forth in these lectures, are possible.”] But what we need today is not only an intellectual equipment of highest order but also, and rather more, if we truly interpret Iqbal, intuitional approach that gives warmth, richness, beauty and charm to one’s life. Iqbal calls this aspect by different names such as love, madness (junun), faqr, dhikr. Thus the best and the only way is to lead a life that is a synthesis of dhikr and fikr. The present educational system patterned as it is after the alien ideals needs to be replaced by one that is more in consonance with the spirit of our culture. We need an educational system that caters to the demands of body as well as of the soul, that besides enlightening the minds of the young people, must try to maintain and develop the moral and spiritual values characteristic of our culture which distinguish us from other peoples and cultures. It must attempt to provide to our young people an opportunity to attain highest intellectual capabilities and then to exercise them to the best advantage but it must also see to it that these achievements are in the context of those spiritual values that flow from our faith and are inspired by our ideology.

Iqbal feels that in the present circumstances when materialistic approach to the problems of life has almost dulled the moral conscience of the people, the main guiding principle should be to stress on following the Law (the Shari'ah) in spirit as

well as in letter. He specifically mentions that the young people should scrupulously avoid all those means of earning livelihood that are unlawful, prohibited and thus tend to create mischief in the land, and dissatisfaction and frustration among the people. Complete and total submission to the Laws of Islam is most essential.

This submission to the Law must lead one to the cultivation of (a) a spirit of loving kindness towards all, irrespective of distinctions of race, creed and colour, and (b) of simple austere life, as characterized by him under the term *faqr* and *qalandari* which stand for an attitude of absolute detachment amidst affluence, although, as he states, a life of affluence steels the heart against compassion and sympathy for others.

The present day Muslims are unfortunately in a miserable predicament. Among their leaders there are three kinds of people

i. Religious preceptors who more often by-pass the Qur'ān and ignore its explicit injunctions;

ii. Sufis with their long hair are no more than predatory wolves. There is much activity and charm in the life of monasteries but their sufism is a shell empty of the wine of true and real ecstasy;

iii. Europeanized Muslims who are trying to seek the Water of Life from the mirage.

All these people are unfortunately ignorant of the implications of true faith; they are vultures accustomed to prey on the dead and are rooted to the earth and what is earthly and disdainful of the soul and whatever is of the soul. What we are badly in need of is a man of the heart who burns you in his fire and then imparts his ecstasy to you and bestows on you kingdom both of the earth and the heaven. Without him, we are only base metal, insignificant, unproductive and worthy to be thrown away. But the greatest tragedy is that amidst the present environment where value is only material value and body is preferred to spirit, it becomes almost impossible to lay one's hand firmly on a man of this calibre, even though he may be physically before our very eyes. There are men all around us but the Man that we most need today is not there. Iqbal suggests that we should not give up our search for him, whatever difficulties we may have to face in this undertaking. Till we find him, we should, Iqbal recommends, turn our minds and hearts to Rūmi who "walks in the street of the Beloved with a sure foot and knows right from wrong and good from bad" His celebrated Mathnawi is the storehouse of true wisdom and true ecstasy born of "soul's dance" that produces "wisdom and knowledge" characteristic of prophets (the Qur'an, xii. 22; xxi. 74).

This charming array of words is useless,

What is in the recesses of the heart hardly comes to the lips. Although I have expressed several points without any difficulty, I have something here which cannot be expressed in words.

5 If I say it, it becomes all the more knotty,
Words and sounds make it more mysterious;
Catch its warmth from my look,
Or from my morning lamentation.
You got your first instruction from your mother;

10 It was her breeze which helped open your bud.
It was her breath that made you what you are;
O dear one, your worth is all due to her.
You gained immortal riches (of the spirit) through her,
And learnt lā ilāh through her lips.

15 O Son, have from me the joy of vision,
And burning in (the fire of) lā ilāh.
If you say lā ilāh, speak it from the depth of your heart,
So that your body may smell of soul.
The sun and the moon revolve through the burning of lā
ilāh;

20 I have seen this "burning" in mountains and grass.
These two words, lā ilāh, are not mere words;

La ilāh is but a sword from which there is no escape.

To have this burning is to attain power;

Lā ilāh is a stroke very telling and effective.

25 A believer and to pay obeisance to others!

A believer and to be disloyal, beggarly and hypocrite!

He sold away his religion and community for a trifle,

And burnt away the household goods as well as the house.

His prayers were once inspired by lā ilāh though not now;

30 His submission (to God) had once a grace of its own.

His prayer and fasting have lost all (spiritual) light;

No longer is there any (divine) manifestation in his universe.

He whose source of strength was only God,

Has fallen prey to love of money and fear of death.

35 He has lost ecstasy, ardour and zest that once characterised him;

His religion is in the Book and he is in the grave.

The modern age has adversely affected him ;

He learnt his religion from two prophets;

The one was from Iran, the other from India;

40 The former disapproved of Hajj(pilgrimage), the latter, of Jihad.

When Hajj and Jihad (holy war) are no larger religious duties,

Prayers and fasting lose their inner essence.

When prayers and fasting are deprived of their soul,

Individual loses his balance and society becomes disorganised.

45 When the hearts lack warmth of the Qur'an,

There can be no hope of good from such people.

The Muslim lost his Khudi ;

O Khidr! Help us, for the situation has gone beyond our control. Prostration which causes tremours to the earth,

50 And to whose bidding the sun and the moon revold,

If it casts its imprint on the stone

It would melt into thin air like smoke;

That prostration these days is nothing but bending down of the head,

And is but symbol of old age's weakness.

55 It no longer has the grandeur of: God is High;
Is it (due to) our fault or any defect in it?
Everybody is moving fast on his path,
Like a bridleless dromedary and without any goal.
The upholder of the Qur'an, with no zest for search,
60 How strange it is!
If God grants you insight,
Look at the times in which you live.
Reasons are impudent and hearts impervious to
compassion,
Eyes lacking in modesty and immersed only in appearances.
65 Art and science, religion and politics, reason and heart—
Each dealing only with water and clay.
Asia, that land of the Rising Sun,
Looks towards others, and is hidden from herself.
Her heart has ceased to have new experiences,
70 Her (intellectual) products are not worth anything;
Her life in this ancient world

Is stationary, frozen and without any urge for movement.

She has fallen prey to Mullas and Kings ;

Her thought, being lame and cripple, can't soar high.

75 Her reason, faith, wisdom and honour

Are all tied to the apron-strings of the lords of the West.

I made an assault on her world of thought

And tore the veils from over her secrets.

My heart has bled within my breast,

80 Thus have I been able to revolutionize her world.

I have said a few words for the people of the age;

Two oceans have been condensed in two cups.

I have expressed my ideas in a technical language,

That I may win applause from the people;

85 It is in the difficult language, using the terminology of the
West:

Ecstatic songs from the strings of a harp.

The origin of one is contemplation, the origin of other is
thought,

May you be the inheritor of both these!

I am a rivulet, my water comes from both these sources;

90 My separation is both separation and union.

As the demands of the present age are different

I laid the foundation of a different phenomenon.

The young of today are thirsty and yet have an empty cup,

Charming to look at, with a clever mind but with dark soul;

95 Lacking in insight and conviction and hopeless of future,

Their eye didn't see anything in the world.

Poor in spirit, lacking faith in themselves, dependent on others,

The architect of the temple uses bricks made of his earth.

The school is unaware of its objective,

100 Hence it does not appeal to their innermost heart.

It robbed their souls of the light of nature;

Not a single graceful rose grew on its branch.

Our architect lays the foundation stone awry:

He cultivates the habits of a duck in the young of a falcon.

105 Unless knowledge gets warmth of burning from Life,

Heart remains empty of new experiences.

Knowledge is nothing but exposition of your stations,
And commentary of your manifestations.

One must burn oneself in the fire of sense-impressions,

110 That one can distinguish between one's silver and copper.

Knowledge of truth starts with sense impressions and ends
in

vision. Its end can't be comprehended by reason.

A hundred books have you learnt through efficient
teachers,

Far better is the lesson that you receive through sight.

115 From that wine that d in his own way; Everybody gets

The morning breeze puts out the lamp

But it fills the tulip's cup with wine.

Eat little, sleep little, talk little:

120 Move round yourself like a compass.

He who denies God is an unbeliever in the eyes of a
theologian.

To me, he who denies himself is a greater unbeliever.

The one was called "hasty" because of denial of Being;

The other was "hasty" as well as "unjust" and "ignorant."

125 Be steadfast in the way of sincerity

And free yourself from fear of kings and landlords.

Don't swerve from the path of justice whether in anger or
in peace,

Stick to the golden mean in affluence or in poverty.

The Law may be difficult; don't seek escape from it;

130 Let none but your own heart be your guide.

Soul's welfare: limitless remembrance (of God) and rational
thinking. Body's welfare: self control in youth.

Position of authority in the world below and above

Cannot be attained except through body's and soul's
welfare.

135 The object of journey is to enjoy moving about,

If your object is to return to the nest, then don't start
flying.

The moon revolves that it may attain its station,

For man's journey, staying at any place is disallowed.

Life is nothing but enjoyment of flight;

140 Nest is incompatible with its nature.

The food of vultures and crows is in the earth of the grave,

The food of hawks is in the neighbourhood of moon and
sun.

The essence of religion is: truthful speech and lawful food;

To look at Beauty in solitude and in company.

145 Live as hard as diamond in the path of religion,

Be in constant touch with God and live without anxiety.

I tell you of the essence of religion

And relate to you an episode from the life of Sultan
Muzaffar.

He was unique in his acts of sincerity,

150 A king enjoying the spiritual states of Bayazid.

He had a horse whom he loved as a dear son;

Like his master, the horse was hard hitting in war;

A black steed of Arab breed,

Faithful, faultless and of pure stock;

155 O man of intelligence! for a believer, there is nothing more
dear

Than the Qur'ān, a sword and a horse.

What can I say about that horse of noble stock !

He was like a mountain and moved over rivers like a wind.

On the day of battle, he was swifter than eye-sight;

160 A stormy wind encircling mountains and rocks.

Several tumults of Resurrection lie in his swift running;

Stones break into pieces under his hoofs.

One day, the horse, as noble as man,

Suffered from acute pain in his stomach.

165 A veterinary doctor treated him with wine

And thus the horse was relieved of pain;

The righteous king no longer used that horse;

The ways of *taqwa* are different from our way.

May God grant you sincere heart!

170 See the submission of a true Muslim!

Religion is burning from head to foot in search,

Its end is love and its beginning, correct behaviour.

The beauty of the rose lies in its colour and smell;

One who is disrespectful is without honour.

175 When I see a young man, lacking in correct behaviour,

My days become dark as night.

It increases pain in my heart

And I remember the testament of Mustafa.

I feel ashamed of my own deeds

180 And hide myself in days gone by.

A woman's protection is her husband or the grave,

A man's protection is security from bad company.

It is wrong to speak ill of others;

Believer and unbeliever—all are God's creatures.

185 Manliness is to respect man;

Be aware of the true position of man.

Man prospers by maintaining proper relationship with others,

Set your foot on the path of friendship.

Man of love tries to follow in the Ways of God,

190 Is kind to all, believer and unbeliever alike.

Let belief and unbelief find room in the expanse of your heart;

If your heart feels ill at ease, then God protect you!

Although heart is confined within water and clay,

This whole world is the world of heart.

195 Even if you are a lord of the land.

Don't give up the attitude of faqr.

The ardour (of this faqr) lies hidden in your soul:

This old wine is an inheritance from your ancestors.

In this world seek nothing but pangs of the heart,

200 Ask blessings from God and not from kings.

It so often happens that a man of insight and God-oriented

Becomes blind through affluence.

Abundance of wealth dries the springs of compassion,

Produces pride and destroys submissiveness.

205 I have moved round the world for years,

I have never seen tears in the eyes of the rich.

I love him who lives like a dervish;

Woe to the man who lives forgetful of God

Don't expect to find in Muslims that rapture and ecstasy,

210 That faith, conviction and power (which were once their characteristics).

Scholars are forgetful of the knowledge of the Qur'an,

Sufis with their long hair are predatory wolves.

Although there is much activity in the monasteries,

There is hardly a person there who has wine in his cup.

215 On the other hand, the West-oriented Muslims

Are seeking sweet water from mirage.

All are ignorant of the essence of religion,

They are men of deceit and malice.

Good and virtue are hardly to be found in the elite;

220 Sincerity and truth are found only among the masses.

Distinguish people of religion from the people of malice;

See the man of God and sit in his company.

The vultures have their own law and custom;

The grandeur of the flight of the hawk is a different thing

225 Man of truth comes down from the heaven like lightening;

His fuel is cities and towns of east and west.

We are still (wrapped) in the darkness of the universe;

He partakes in its management.

He is like Kalim, Messiah, Khalil;

230 He is Muhammad, the Book and the Gabriel.

For the people of the heart he is like the sun

And his rays impart life to them.

First he burns you in his own fire Then teaches you
kingship.

235 We are all people of the heart through his ardour,

Without him, we would be unreal images of water and clay.

I fear, the time in which you were born

Is immersed in body and is hardly aware of the soul.

When through the dearth of soul, body becomes
everything,

240 The man of truth hides himself within himself.

Search does not bring such a man to your view

Although you see him face to face. Still you don't give up
your search,

Although you have to face a hundred difficulties.

245 If, however, you don't find company of such a wise man,

Get from me what I have inherited from my forefathers.

Make Rūmi your guide on the path.

That God may grant you ardour and compassion.

For Rūmi knows kernel from the shell,

250 He is steadfast in the way of the Beloved.

People have written commentaries on his works but none
him,

His real intent like a deer missed our grasp.

People learnt from him bodily dance;

They closed their eyes from the dance of the soul.

255 Bodily dance leads to the movement of the earth,

Soul's dance upsets the skies.

From soul's dance comes knowledge and judgement,

Earth as well as heaven are caught in the net.

The individual through it achieves Moses' ecstasy,
society becomes inheritor of a great kingdom.

260 To learn soul's dance is a difficult task;

To burn other-than-God is not a child's play.

so long as the heart does not burn in the fire of avarice and
grief

O Son, the soul does not dance till then.

265 Grief is the sign of weak faith and affliction,

O young man! grief is half old age.

Do you know that avarice is modern faqr,

I am slave of him who controls himself.

You will be a source of comfort to my impatient soul,

270 If you chance to learn soul's dance.

I tell you the essence of Mustafa's religion,

And shall pray for you in the grave too!

Introduction

1. “Jāvid Nāmā is a description of a spiritual journey made by the poet from earth through the 'spheres' of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupi, ter and Saturn, to beyond the 'spheres' and to the Presence of God. TN antecedents of this heavenly adventure go back, within Islamic tradition, to the celebrated mi'rāj of the Prophet Muhammad, that famous legend o his Ascension the germs of which are to be traced in the Koran.’ Arberry, A. J., Javid-Nama (London, 1966), p. 12.
2. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Javid-Nama, translated from the Persian with Intro. duction and Notes by A. J. Arberry (London, 1966), p. 16.
3. Rumi, Mathnawi (Nicholson’s ed.), ii, 326. See Iqbal: Bāl-i Jibril (Lahore), p. 181 where he quotes this verse of Rumi,
4. Dhikr literally means remembrance, especially remembering God and fikr is rational thinking. See notes 87-88 later on for an elucidation of these terms.

Text

1. Sukhan ārāstan, lit. to utter charming words, to sing beautiful songs Here it stands for composing beautiful verses.

3. Nukta, a point, a subtle point, some point of metaphysical significance

4. Lit. cannot be put in (the form of) a hook, i.e. inexpressible.

5-6. It is the expression of the inherent incommunicability of the mystic and religious experiences. See Reconstruction, pp. 20-21. Cf. Zabur-i ‘Ajam (p. 94):

زباں اگرچہ دلیر است و مدعا شیریں

سخن ز عشق چہ گویم جز این کہ نتوان گفت

Though the tongue is bold enough,

The argument right fair,

What can I declare of love

Save that none can declare?

7. look. In Iqbal's thought, "look" has an important place. Nigāh, look, stands for spiritual attainments, the consequence of direct contact with the Ultimate Reality. In Bāl-i Jibril (p. 72), he says:

فقط نگاہ سے ہوتا ہے فیصلہ دل کا

Only "Look" decides the issue of the heart. In Bāng-i Darā, p. 309, he says:

نگاہ مرد مومن سے بدل جاتی ہیں تقدیریں

On Look of a Momin changes the destiny (of the people).

8. "Morning lamentation" in Iqbal stands for love, ecstasy, intuitive approach to life. In Zabor-i 'Ajam (p. 229). he says:

شب و روزے کہ داری برابر زن

فغان صبحگاہی بر خرد زن

خرد را از حواس آید متاعے

فغان از عشق می گیرد شعاعی

Change your days and nights for eternity,

Change from intellect to the morning lamentation. Intellect has its source in senses,

Lamentation gets light from love.

Ibid. (p. 142):

کہ از اندیشہ برترمی پرد آہ سحر گاہے

The morning lamentation flies higher than thought. Ibid. (P. 152):

ز اشک صبحگاہی زندگی را برگ و ساز آور

Adorn your life through morning tears.

11. Rang-u bu, lit. colour and smell. Iqbal uses this phrase, in association with the word jahān (world), to denote beauty and charm, as, for instance, in Armaghān (p. 222):

ہے مرے دست تصرف میں جہان رنگ و بو

This charming world is in the hollow of my hand.

But here this phrase stands for aptitude, capacity, characteristic. Cf. Armaghān (p. 69):

نگیرد لاله و گل رنگ و بویم

Tulip and rose do not acquire my characteristic. Ibid. (p. 50):

حرم از دیر گیرد رنگ و بوئے

The Mosque acquires character of the church.

15.16. Iqbal here offers his son two things: nigāh, vision, penetrative insight and sukhtan, suz, burning, ardour. Nigāh, look, has immense spiritual power which often helps in bringing about moral transformation of the individual. In Armaghān (p. 64), he speaks of this power of nigāh, look:

مرا درس حکیمان درد سر داد

کہ من پروردہ فیض نگاہم

Teaching of philosophers brings headache,

For I was brought up in the effluence of "Look."

In Bāl-i Jibril (p. 72), he says:

فقط نگاہ سے ہوتا ہے فیصلہ دل کا

نہ ہو نگاہ میں شوخی تو دلبری کیا ہے؟

Only "look" decides the matter of the heart;

If the "look" lacks charm, then what is the use of dilbari?

See also *ibid.* (p. 76):

فقط نگاہ سے رنگیں ہے بزم جانانہ

The charm of beloved's society is only through "look". In *ibid.* (p. 81), he emphasises the importance of nigāh thus:

تیری نگاہ سے دل سینوں میں کانپتے تھے

کھویا گیا ہے تیرا جذب قلندرانہ

Your look brought terror to the heart of the people;

Alas! you have lost that Qalandar's madness.

It is the kind of look which is the touch-stone of the worth of intellect, as Iqbal says in *Pas Che Bayad Kard* (p. 4, verse 8)

It is this look again which leads to broadening of one's vision. *Bali* (D. 86):

دلوں میں ولولے آفاق گیری کے نہیں اٹھتے

نگاہوں میں اگر پیدا نہ ہو انداز آفاقی

Unless the look acquires the broader vision,

The heart does not have the ambition of controlling the universe.

In *Darb-i Kalim* (p. 83), he compares the worth of knowledge and "look, thus:

حریف نکتہ توحید ہوسکا نہ حکیم

نگاہ چاہیئے اسرار لالہ کیلئے

The Philosopher could not comprehend the implications of Tauhid; Look is needed to understand the mysteries of *lā ilāh*.

In *Bāl-i Jibril* (p. 28), he describes *Faqr* as the sword-display of "look", just as political authority is the sword-display of an army of soldiers.

There is another aspect of this "look" which Iqbal calls "firāsāt" (discernment, penetrative insight) of the believer (p. 231 of *Armaghān*) or "light of firāsāt".

(p. 257 of *ibid.*)

The other gift which Iqbal wishes to transmit to the new generation is what we call *sūkhtan* (burning) in *Iā ilāh* or what in most places he calls simply *sill* which like "look" is something distinct from reason. In *Payām-i-Mashriq* (p. 37), he says:

خرد آتش فرزند، دل بسوزد

Reason lights fire while heart burns. In *Bāl-i Jibril* (p. 44), it is said:

علاج آتش رومی کے سوز میں ہے ترا
تری خرد پہ ہے غالب فرنگیوں کا فسوں

Your cure lies in burning in the fire of Rūmi;

The spell of the Franks has overwhelmed your reason. In *ibid.* (p. 81), he speaks about himself:

مقام گفتگو کیا ہے اگر میں کیمیا گر ہوں
یہی سوز نفس ہے اور میری کیمیا کیا ہے!

There is nothing to doubt, if I am an alchemist;

My alchemy consists in nothing but this burning breath. In *Armaghān* (p. 68), he says:

دل از سوز در و نم در گداز است

My heart is melting through inner burning. In *ibid.* (p. 83), he says:

ازاں آتش کہ جان من بر افروخت

نصیبی ده مسلمان زا دگان را

From the fire that lit my soul

Give a portion of it to those born Muslims.

In several verses, he mentions both these together. In *Bāl-i Jibril* (p. 74), he enumerates the characteristics of an ideal leader:

نگہ بلد، سخن دلنواز، جان پرسوز

یہی ہے رخت سفر میر کارواں کیلئے

A high "look", charming talk and a burning soul:

These are the requisites for a leader of the caravan.

17-18. *bū-i-Jān*, smell of soul. According to the mystic tradition, soul is more important than body; rather, soul is the man in its true sense. Rūmi says:

جان همه نور است و تن رنگ است و بو

رنگ و بو بگزار و دیگر آن مگو

رنگ دیگر شد و لیکن جان پاک

فارغ از رنگ است و از ارکان خاک

Soul is all light while body is colour and smell;

Leave colour and smell and say nothing more.

Colours change but the pure soul

Is above colour and elements of earth.

In another place, he brings out clearly that body is bound up with the limitations of three dimensions and is a hindrance in the flight of the soul on its destined journey towards God:

گر تو خود را پیش و پس داری گمان

بسته جسمی و محرومی ز جان

زیر و بالا پیش و پس وصف تن است

بے جهت ها ذات جان روشن است

If you consider yourself bound in 'before' and 'after',

It is because you are limited by body and devoid of soul.

Down and up, before and after are characteristics of the body;
The bright soul is devoid of dimensions.

In Jāvid Nāma (pp. 20 and 68), Iqbal similarly emphasises the importance of soul as compared with body.

19. Cf. Rūmi (i, 1811):

چرخ در گردش گدائے هوش ما

The revolution of the sky is indebted to us.

24. Cf. the following verses from Pas Che Bayad Kard (p. 20):

لا مقام ضرب هائے پی به پی

این غو رعداست نے آواز نے

ضرب او هر بود را سازد زبور

تا بروں آئی زگرداب وجود

"No" is a station of blows, one after the other;

It is like the noise of the thunder, not like the (sweet) tune of the flute. Its blow changes every being into non-being,

So that thou comest out of the whirlpool of Existence.

25. Nitaq, a girdle. To tie girdle round one's waist is to display obedience submission.

27. Pischeza, a small thin piece of money.

30. nāz, glory, grace. Niyāz, supplication, prayers, submissiveness.

33. Sāz-u barg, apparatus, armour, source of nourishment, support and development. Cf. Zubur-i'Ājam (p. 152):

زاشک صبحگاهی زندگی را برگ و ساز آور

Bring blossom to your life through morning tears.

Pas Che Bayad Kard (p. 22):

لا و الا ساز و برگ امتان

Negation and affirmation are source of strength to peoples. Musafir (p. 10):

برگ و ساز کائنات از وحدت است

Unity is the source of strength for the universe.

34. It is related that the holy Prophet once said that the cause of Muslims' decline would be due to wahn which he defined as fear of death. Iqbal has added to it love of money. Cf. Pas Che

Bayad Kard (p. 17) where he is describing a follower of the Pharoahs:

هر زمان اندر تلاش ساز و برگ

کار او فکر معاش و ترش مرگ

He is busy day and night in seeking worldly paraphernalia,

His two objects in life: anxiety for livelihood and fear of death.

36. It is a variation of the common Persian line:

مسلمانی در کتاب و مسلمانان در گور

Islam is in the Book and (true) Muslims, in the grave.

37. dar giriftan, to make an impression, to affect, to take effect. About modern age, Iqbal has much to say. In Armaghān (pp. 134 and 135), he says:

چه عصر است این که دین فریادی اوست

هزاران بند در آزادی اوست

ز روی آدمیت رنگ و نم برد

غلط نقشه که از بهزادی اوست

What an age that religion protests against; Thousands of chains on its freedom.

It took away all lustre from the face of man, A false picture, drawn by it.

نگاهش نقشبند کافری ها

کمال صنعت او آذری ها

Its look establishes ways of kufr,

The perfection of its art is idol worshipping.

جوانان را بد آموز است این عصر

شب ابلیس را روز است این عصر

This age misguides the young,

Its days are like the nights of Satan

و لیکن الامان از عصر حاضر

که سلطانی به شیطانی بهم کرد

But God save us from the modern age, It combined kingship with Satanism.

Zarb-i Kslim (p. 82):

عصر حاضر ملک الوموت ہے تیرا جس نے

قبض کی روح تری دے کر تجھے فکر معاش

The present age is the Angel of Death for you,

It has taken away your soul by giving you anxiety for livelihood.

38-40. We find several references to the Indian prophet, Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad of Qāadian, in his poetical works. In Pas Che Bāyad Kard, for instance, he says (P. 41):

عصر من پیغمبرے ہم آفرید

آنکہ در قرآن بجز از خود ندید

My age produced a prophet too,

Who could see in the Quran nothing but himself.

In Darb-i-Kalim (p. 20), he refers to him:

پنجاب کے ارباب نبوت کی شریعت

کہتی ہے کہ یہ مومن پارینہ ہے کافر

The Shari'a of the prophet of the Panjab Says that this old Muslim is a kafir.

On p. 22, *ibid.*, the poem "Jihad" refers to the same prophet. Similarly on p. 53, the last lines are a criticism of this very prophet:

وہ نبوت ہے مسلمان کے لئے برگِ حشیش

جس نبوت میں نہیں قوت و شوکت کا پیام

That prophethood is an opiate for the Muslims,

Which does not promise them a life of power and grandeur.

49-50. Cf. *Bāl-i-Jibril* (p. 56

وہ سجدہ روح زمین جس سے کانپ جاتی تھی

اسی کو آج ترستے ہمیں منبر و محراب

The pulpit and the niche long for

That prostration which brought tremors to the soul of the earth.

55. The phrase *rabbi-al a'la*, God is very high (*a'la* signifying not physical but spiritual height), occurs in prayers. When one prostrates before God, one recites this phrase to emphasise one's lowliness as compared with God's loftiness. (This phrase does not occur in the Quran though its variation *rabbukum a! a'la* your Lord, most high) is found in *lxxix: 24*.

58. harza, vain, futile, frivolous, absurd. du, from davidan, to run. Harza du' one who runs aimlessly of Iqbal believes that it is possible for man not only to control this universe various dimensions but to pass beyond it, disregarding all limitations of space, time and direction. This is possible through love or what in Javid Nāma (p, 15 he calls "(spiritual) birth" or "ascension" which is achieved through "a revolution in sense" (ibid. p. 20) caused by developing one's appreciative self. The spirit of time and space (Zurvān) says to man (p. 22):

لی مع اللہ پر کرا در دل نشست

آن جو انمردے طلسم من شکست

He who has in his heart: I have a time with God,

That doughty hero has broken my talisman.

Iqbal uses the phrase rabbi al-a'la to denote this spiritual attempt by man to attain power to go beyond the limitations of space and time- Cf. Pas Che Bayad Kard (p. 14):

مرد حق! افسون این دهر کهن

از دو حرف ربی الاعلیٰ شکن

O man of God ! break the spell of this old world. By the two words: God is the highest of all,

In Darb-i Kalim (p. 16), he says:

مقام فکر ہے پیمائش زمان و مکان

مقام ذکر ہے سبحان ربی الاعلیٰ

The job of fikr (thought, reason) is to measure time and space, The job of dhikr is: praise be to the Lord most High.

64. Majāz, metaphor, allegory, appearance in contrast to reality; hence also signifies superficiality, insincerity, profanity.

66. āb-u gil, water and clay, signifying world of matter.

67. marz-u bum, place of residence. See about this subject, Pas Che Boyad Kard, p. 60.

73. For the role of mullas and kings, see Shamioo, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, pp. 132-133.

83. harf-i pecha pech, words rolled in a circle, words difficult to understand. In the footnote Iqbal explains that they refer to his English book, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam written in the technical language of philosophy.

84. Lit. that I may catch the mind and heart of the people in my net.

85. harf-i teh dār, crooked, involved, difficult words.

ba andāz-i farang, in the way of the West, in the technical language of Western philosophy.

87-88. dhikr (contemplation) and fikr (thought, reason), correspond to intuition and intellect, dhikr, lit. reciting the name of God or words in His praise or uttering some sacred formulae. The word dhikr occurs in the Quran in several places. In ii. 152, it is said: Remember Me, I will remember you. In Iqbal, dhikr does not mean mere ritual reciting of some formulae in the mystic tradition. In Armaghan-i Hijāz (p. 228), for instance, Satan advises his followers to keep the Muslim away from the field of active life and keep him engaged in the mystic dhikr:

مست رکھو ذکر و فکر صبحگاہی میں اسے

پختہ تر کردو مزاج خانقاہی میں اسے

Keep him engrossed in the morning dhikr and fikr; Ripen him in the ways of monastic life.

True dhikr, for Iqbal, is what he calls specially in the Reconstruction (pp. 109 ff.) the vital way of appropriating the universe which comes off when the individual self establishes fruitful connection with God.

Fikr (thought, reason) and dhikr (remembrance, meditation prayer) are taken from the following verses of the Quran (iii. 189-190):" . men of under-standing; those who remember (dhikr) Allah standing and sitting and (lying) on their sides, and reflect (fikr) on the creation of the heavens and the earth: Our Lord, thou hast not created this in vain 1 Glory be to Thee"

In Darb-i Kalim (p. 16), Iqbal contrasts the two, dhikr and fikr, contemplation and reflection:

مقام ذکر کمالات رومی و عطار

مقام فکر مقالات بو علی سینا

مقام فکر ہے پیمائش زمان و مکان

مقام ذکر ہے سبحان ربی الاعلیٰ

The achievements of Rūmi and ‘Attār are stations of dhikr,
The compilations of Bu ‘Alī Sina pertain to the station of fikr; To
measure time and space is the station of fikr,

To recite: Exalted be my Lord, most High, is the station of
dhikr.

In Javid Nama (p. 89), Iqbal, says:

فقر قرآن اختلاط ذکر و فکر

فکر را کامل ندیدم جز بذكر

The faqr of the Quran is the mingling of dhikr and fikr; I have
never seen reason perfect without dhikr.

In Pas Che Bāyad Kard (p. 52), he says:

عقل و دل را مستی از یک جام مئے

Reason and heart are intoxicated through one cup of wine, By
a mixture of dhikr and fikr of Rūm and Ray.

93-98. Cf. t- a following verses from Pas Che Bayad Kard (pp
16, 18, 28 ff.):

وائے قومے کشتہ تدبیر غیر

کار او تخریب خود تعمیر غیر

دین او عہد وفا بستن بغیر

یعنی از خشت حرم تعمیر دیر

پست فکر و دین نہاد و کور ذوق

مکتب و ملائعے او محروم شوق

Woe to the people emaciated (in spirit) by the stratagem of
others

Who destroy themselves and nourish others;

Their motto is to offer loyalty to others:

To build the temple with the bricks of the mosque.

Lowly in thought, mean of nature, vulgar in taste;

His teachers and religious preceptors are devoid of fervour.

105-112. According to Iqbal, knowledge is of two kinds: knowledge based on and derived from sense experience. It must however be supplemented by knowledge based on intuitional experience. It is often described by Iqbal as 'ilm and 'lshq, knowledge and love. Rumi says (1,3447):

علم را برتن زنی مارے بود

علم را بر دل زنی یارے بود

When knowledge is struck on the body, it becomes a snake, If it is struck on the heart, it becomes a helper. In Gulshan-i Rāz Jadid (p. 218), he says:

به آن عقلے کہ داند بییش و کم را

شناسد اندرون کان ویم را

جهان چند و چوں زیر نگین کن

بگردوں ماه و پرویس را کمیں کن

و لیکن حکمت دیگر بیاموز

رهاں خود را ازیں مکر شب و روز

With the aid of the intellect that deals with quantities

Probe the depths of mines and oceans; Master the world of how and why;

Catch the moon and the Pleiads from the sky. But then learn wisdom of another sort,

Free yourself from the snare of night and day.

114. nazar, literally, sight. In Iqbal it stands for spiritual vision in contrast to khabar, information, scientific knowledge. In Bāl-i Jibril (p. 110), he says:

فقر مقام نظر، علم مقام خبر

Faqr is the station of vision while knowledge is station of khabar. In Armagh-ān (p. 232), he says:

خبر، عقل و حرد کی ناتوانی

نظر دل کی حیات جاودانی

khabar shows the weakness of reason, Nazar, eternal life of the heart.

نظر درد و غم و سوز و تب و تاب

Nazur is pain, sorrow, burning, rapture, ecstasy.

In Zabūr-iʿAjam (p. 180), comparing the two, Iqbal recommends passing from khabar to nazar:

گزر آزانکه ندید است و جز خبر ندهد

سخن دراز کند لذت نظر ندهد

Pass by one who has not seen and gives nothing but information; He talks much but does not give pleasure of vision.

In Bāl-i Jibril (p. 184), Iqbal asks Rūmi: What is the goal of man, khabar or nazar? Rūmi says:

آدمی دیداست و باقی پوست است

دید آن باشد که دید دوست است

Man is but vision, all else is mere skin ;

True vision is the vision of the Beloved.

In Gulshan-i Rāz Jadid (p. 232), he speaks of the man of vision as the really perfect man whom we should try to seek and follow. Similarly in Jāvid Nāma (pp. 16-19), Iqbal tries to explain "the new birth" which means spiritual renewal and recommends our passing from reason to love, from materiality to spirituality, from the context of time and space to the sphere of eternity. The Spirit of Rūmi says:

تیز تر کن این دو چشم و این دو گوش

هر چه می بینی بنوش از راه هوش

آن نگاه پرده سوز از من بگیر

کو بچشم اندر نمی گردد اسیر

آدمی دیداست باقی پوست است

دید آن باشد که دید دوست است

جمله تن را در گداز اندر بصر

در نظر رو در نظر رو در نظر،

Sharpen your two eyes and your two ears, Whatever you see, digest with full consciousness. Take from me the sight that burns the veil, That becomes not the eye's prisoner.

“Man is but vision, all else is mere skin. u; True vision is the vision of the Beloved. Dissolve thy whole body into vision,

Go for vision, go for vision, go for vision.”

123-124. For ‘ajūl (hasty), see the Quran xvii. 11: and man is ever.. . hasty; also xxi. 37: Man is created of haste. For Zulūm and Juhūl see the Quran xxxiii. 72: Surely, he is ever unjust and ignorant. With regard to ‘ajūl, hasty, see the following sentences from the Reconstruction, "Satan, .however persuaded him (i. e. Adam) to eat the forbidden fruit of occult knowledge and Adam yield, not because he was elementally wicked, but because being "hasty" ‘ajūl by nature he sought a short cut to knowledge....:" (p. 86).

125. Ikhlas, purity, sincerity. Here it seems to stand for loyalty to the spiritual basis and source of life.

126. Sultān-u amir stand for people enjoying political power and authority which in modern democracies is associated with economic exploitation. Cf. Bāl-i fibril (p. 167):

زمین میر و سلطان سے بیزار ہے

The people are sick of kings and landlords.

In Zabur-i ‘Ajam (p. 135), It is said:

میر و سلطان نردباز و کعبتین شاں دغل

جان محکوماں زتن بردند و محکوماں بہ خواب

Prince and sultan gambling go, Loaded are the dice they throw,
Subjects’ soul from body strip While their subjects are asleep.

In Armaghān (p. 259), Iqbal says:

سینہٴ افلاک سے اٹھتی ہے آہ سوز ناک

مرد حق ہوتا ہے جب مرعوب سلطان و امیر

A deep bewailing arises from the breast of the heavens,

When a man of truth begins to fear kings and lords;

127. Ridā, voluntary submission (to God), here stands for mood peace and acquiescence. cf

‘adl, justice. See the Quran (xiv. 135):"O believers, be maintainers of ‘ justice—bearers of witness for Allah’s sake— though it may be against your own selves or your parents or near relatives, if he be rich or poor. . . ,

128. Qasd, keeping the (right) middle path, being in a middle state neither one nor the other of the two opposite qualities.

129. ta’wil, an interpretation.

130. There is a very famous tradition of the Holy Prophet.

Once a person asked him how to determine whether a particular act is good or otherwise. He replied: consult your heart; if it feels pleased, the act is good; if the heart feels perturbed, then, surely, the act is not good.

There is another tradition. The Holy prophet once said: if heart is man’s breast is well, all else is well.

131. dhikr and fikr, see note 87.

132. self-control, see *Asrār-i Khudi*, pp. 46-8.

142. hor, the sun, the moon, name of a star which is seen once in a thou. sand years.

143. Cf. *Darb-i Kālim* (p. 87):

اک صدق مقال ہے کہ جس سے

میں چشم جہاں میں ہوں گرامی

It is only truthful speech due to which

I command respect from the people of the world.

For the other aspect of lawful bread, see Pas Che Bāyad Kārd (p. 37):

تاندانی نکتۀ اکل حلال

بر جماعت زیستن گردد و بال

So long as you don't realise the significance of lawful bread,
Living becomes a heavy burden for society.

144. Cf. Jivid Nama (p. 224):

چیست بودن دانی اے مرد نجیب؟

از جمال ذات حق بردن نصیب

Noble sir, do you know what it is to be ? To take one's share
of the beauty of God.

145-146. Cf. Asrār (p. 64):

فارغ از خوف و غم و وسواس باش

پخته مثل سنگ شو الماس باش

می شود از وے دو عالم مستنیر

هرکه باشد سخت کوش و سخت گیر

Be void of fear, grief and anxiety, Be hard as a stone, be a diamond !

Whatsoever strives hard and grips tight, The two worlds are illumined by him.

148. Sultān Muzaffar, king of Gujrāt. Kathiāwār. His name was Zafar Khān and acted as governor of Sultan Feroz Shah Toughly. But after the invasion of Taimur, he became independent under the litle of Muzaffar Khān. He was a great general and succeeded in subduing several important fortresses of Rajputana. See E. I. (1st. Ed.), article 'Gujrat'.

150. Bāyazid of Bistām, well known sufi, died in 875 C.B.

156. In Javid Nama (p. 182), while describing Sharafunnisa (grand daughter of 'Abdul Samad Khān, governor of Punjab in the early years of the 18th century), Iqbal says of the Qurān and the sword:

این دو قوت حافظ یک دیگر اند

کائنات زندگی را محور اند

These two forces preserve each other.

And are axis of all lifes creation.

168. Taqwa is usually translated as fear of God. It really stands for an attitude of righteousness which tries to win the pleasure of God (ii. 207 iv. 114).

169. Qalb-o jigar. lit. heart and liver. In Iqbal this phrase usually stands for heart. Cf. Bāl-i Jibril (p. 129):

معجزهٔ فن کی ہے خون جگر سے نمود

Only the heart's warm blood feeds such marvels of craft.

خون جگر سے صدا سوز و سرور و سرود

Melody, mirth and joy gush out of warm heart's blood. See Bāng-i Dārā (p. 302):

تا خلافت کی بناء دنیا میں پھر ہو استوار

لا کہیں سے ڈھونڈ کر اسلاف کا قلب و جگر

In order that the foundation of Khilāfat be again laid,

Try to get back the the heart of your fathers.

170. tā'at (or atā'at), obedience, submission to the law of God. According to Iqbal, this is the first stage in the development of self

(Asrār, p. 45):

در اطاعت کوش اے غفلت شعار

می شود از جبر پیدا اختیار

ناکس از فرماں پزیری کس شود

آتش ار باشد ز طغیان خس شود

Endeavour to obey, O heedless one !

Liberty is the fruit of compulsion.

By obedience the man of no worth is made worthy ;

By disobedience his fire is turned to ashes.

171. Here Iqbal defines din, religion, as constant search—for what ?

I think it is search for knowledge of the self. According to Iqbal it is necessary that man should try to go down into the deeper recesses of the heart to transcend the upper layer of intellectual life and reach the inner core of self through intuitional approach, the core that he calls appreciative self, It is what Iqbal, following Rūmi, calls seeing, didan,

In Musāfir (p.7), Iqbal says:

چشمت دین؟ دریافتن اسرار خویش

زندگی مرگ است بے دیدار خویش

What is religion ? It is to find one's secrets ; Life is death without seeing one's self.

In Pas Ghe Bāyad Kard (p. 40), we read:

فاش می خواهی اگر اسرار دین

جزبه اعماق ضمیر خود مبین

گر نه بنتی، دین تو مجبوری است

ایں چنین دین از خدا مهجوری است

If you wish to see the essence of religion clearly, Look but into the depth of your heart.

If you don't see, your din is only compulsion; Such a religion is a veil between you and God.

In Jāvid Nāma (p. 5), we read:

برے تجلی زندگی رنجوری است

عقل مهجوری و دین مجبوری است

Without revelation, life is a mortal sickness,

Reason is banishment, religion constraint.

See *ibid.*, p. 67:

چیست دین؟ برخاستن از روئے خاک

تا ز خود آگاه گردد جان پاک

What is religion ? To rise up from the face of the dust, So that the pure soul may become aware of itself.

See *ibid.* (pp. 129-130):

زندگی را شرع و آئین است عشق

اصل تهذیب است دین دین است عشق

دین نگرده پخته بے آداب عشق

دین بگری از صحبت ارباب عشق

Love is the law and ritual of life,

Root of culture is religion, religion is love.

Religion does not mature without love's schooling ;

Learn religion from the company of the lords of Love.

175-180. Most probably reference is to the event in the life of Iqbal, which he has described in *Rumuz* (pp 150-152). One day a beggar came to the door and persistently raised his voice in supplication. Iqbal, as a young boy, could not restrain himself and began to maltreat the beggar. His father was unable to control himself and in tears appealed to the young man to be aware of the holy Prophet's admonition (see the *Qaran*, xciii. 10: An I him who asks, chide not) and treat others with loving-kin in

185. Cf. *Jāvid Nāma* (p. 75):

برتر از گردون مقام آدم است

اصل تهذیب احترام آدم است

Loftier than heaven is the station of Man, And the basis of culture is respect for man. 193-194. Cf. Armaghān (p. 168):

دل ما گرچه اندر سینه ماست

و لیکن از جهان ما برون است

It is true, our heart is within our breast ; Yet it is beyond our world.

Ibid., p.170:

جهان دل جهان رنگ و بونست

در و پست و بلند و کاخ کو نیست

The world of heart is not the world of colour and smell; There are no ups and downs, no high and low in it.

196. Faqr in Iqbal is through and through positive. We find it defined in different books but specially in Pas Che Bāyad Kard, pp. 23-31.

A faqir (or a qalandar) is not only indifferent to the vicissitudes of material life ; he is a man of strong will, who has a moral stake in the social and political life of the people around him, motivated by the love for the ideal of moral and spiritual regeneration of mankind. In the attainment of this ideal, he is ready to sacrifice everything.

210. rang-u bū, colour and smell, stands for majesty, power, capacity. See Pas Che Bāyad Kārd, pp. 41 if. for the same discussion.

218. ahl-i kin, people of hatred, malice. Cf. Pas Che Bāyād Kard (p. 16):

حکمت ارباب کین مکر است و فن

The way of the people of malice is fraud and deceit.

235-236. Cf. Payām-i Mashriq (p.30):

دل از ذوق تپش دل بود لیکن

چو یک دم از تپش افتاد گل شد

The heart is heart through joy of burning,

When once it ceases burning, it is no longer heart.

237. Iqbal complains of modern age because of its materialistic outlook.

In Aamaghān (p. 134), he says:

چه عصر است این که دین فریادئی اوست

What an age is this that religion is all protest against it !

Ibid., p. 135:

کہ بے نور است و بے سوز است این عصر

This age is without light and without warmth. Zabūr-i 'Ajam (p. 136):

من درون شیشہ ہائے عصر حاضر دیدہ ام

آں چناں زھرے کہ ازوے مارھا در پیچ و تاب

I have seen in the cups of the modern age

Such venom that serpents twist and writhe in pain.

240. Cf. Zābur-i 'Ajam (p. 179):

چراغ خویش بر افرو ختم کہ دست کلیم

دریں زمانہ نہاں زیر آستین کردند

I have lit my lamp since Moses' (White) Hand Has been hid, in the present age, under the sleeve.

253. raqs-i tan, dance of the body. It refers to the Sufis of the Maulvi Order, after the name of Maulana Jalaluddin Rūmi. They were known as Dancing Derwishes. For dance of the body and dance of the soul, see Darb-i Kalim (p.135):

چھوڑ یورپ کے لیے رقص بدن کے خم و پیچ

روح کے رقص میں ہے ضرب کلیم اللہی

صلہ اس رقص کا ہے تشنگی کام و دهن

صلہ اس رقص کا درویشی و شاہنشاہی

Leave for Europe movements of body's dance, In spirit's dance lies the Prophet's might. The former produces thirst of the mouth, The latter gives you faqr and kingship.

257. 'Ilm-u hukm, knowledge and judgement, the two qualities that, according to the Qur'an, are the characteristics of the prophets. In xii.22, it is said of Joseph:"And when he attained his maturity we gave him wisdom and knowledge." The same is said of Moses in xxv iii.14.

259. Jadhb-i Kalim, love characteristic of Moses, that does not take into consideration dangers of the path in view of the ideal which one has in view. It is best expressed in the following verse:

بے خطر کود پڑا آتش نمرود میں عشق

عقل ہے محو تماشائے لب بام ابھی

Love jumped down into the fire without Sear,

Reason is still waiting an the rooftop calculating the consequences.

Iqbal has used this phrase for love in contrast to reason. See Bāl-i fibril (p. 98):

یا حیرت فارابی یا تاب و تب رومی

یا فکر حکیمانہ یا جذب کلیمانہ

Either Fārābi's wonder or Rūmi's ecstasy ; Either philosopher's reason or Love of Kālim.

In another place in the same book (p. 81), Iqbal used the equivalent phrase, *jazb-i qalandari*:

تیری نگاہ سے دل سینوں میں کانپتے تھے

کھویا گیا ہے تیرا جذب قلندرانہ

Your look put terror in the people, You have lost your qalander-like love.

260. Mulk-i 'azim, a great kingdom. It may mean spiritual kingdom as well as temporal. The words are used in the Qur'ān iv. 34: But indeed we have given to Abraham's children the Book and the Wisdom, and we have given them a grand kingdom.

AHMAD AMIN AND MUHAMMAD IQBAL

Datlev Khalid

I. The "Missing Link"

To Ahmad Amin (1872—1954) perhaps the most prominent aspect of the present-day world situation is the dependence of the Easterners upon the Westerners who are masters of all trades. The thought of this Egyptian historian rotates constantly round this theme and the various phenomena connected therewith. He does not, how-ever, lament over this modern constellation. Rather he deplores the attitude of hesitation and tardiness of the Muslims in seeking Western assistance. He is pained to see schools built on ultra-modern designs whereas public instruction follows medieval methods with the help of antiquated books. Similarly he is grieved by the dichotomy between the emancipated Muslim females dressed according to the latest fashion and other members of their own sex who still go fully veiled. The Muslim world accepts certain externals of the West without, however, owning the principles and inner meanings which form the kernel of those achievements. Ahmad Amin sums up by saying:

“In adopting the sciences and experiences of Europe we ought to have been as determined and quick as the Japanese.”²⁰

The opinion that the Muslim world could and should emulate the example of Japan in technical development is held even by a

²⁰ Fayd al-Khātīr, a collection of essays (Cairo, 1953), vol. VIII, p. 77.

revisionist author like Abū l- ‘Ala Mawdūdī.²¹ Therefore, when Ahmad Amin advocates adoption of European methods of agriculture, industrialization and education and plans to infuse into them the best of Islamic tradition, i.e., rahuniya (spirituality), he merely follows a conception current among contemporary writers of various trends, an often-repeated cliché.²² In this context he fails to indicate what he exactly means by adoption of the "principles and the intrinsic nature" of Europe.²³ Thus he does not appear to be really different from other Egyptian intellectuals of the liberal generation whose stance has been described by an acute observer as "a formula full of wisdom, but merely a formula", because the decisive factor in solving the crisis of orientation is to define precisely the 'best' which is to be adopted from the Orient and the Occident.²⁴ Nevertheless, the dictum of Pierre Cachia in his dissertation on Taha Husayn and

²¹ This view was expressed during an interview granted to the present writer in Lahore in March, 1959.

²² Cf. M. Husayn Haykal, *Fi Manzi/ al-Wahy* (Cairo, 1937), p. 665.

²³ *Fayd al-Khātir VIII*, 77; Iqbal expresses himself in a similar vein:

“Our only fear is that the dazzling exterior of European culture may arrest our movement and we may fail to reach the true inwardness of that culture. During all the centuries of our intellectual stupor Europe has been seriously thinking on the great problems in which the philosophers and scientists of Islam were so keenly interested.” (*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, reprint Lahore, 1965, p. 7)

In contrast to Amin, Iqbal pursues this finding with a detailed discussion of the nature of this "true inwardness" of European culture.

²⁴ Raoul Makarius, *La Jeunesse Intellectuelle d’Egypte—Au Lendemain de la Deuxime Guerre Mondiale* (Paris, 1960), p. 79.

his place in the development of modern Muslim thought holds equally true of Ahmad Amin, to wit: "To have realised that there is more than technology in the achievements of the West, to have recognized that the forces of the spirit need not solely be contemplative; these are so many steps nearer to the formulation of a positive principle for the Egyptian Renaissance."²⁵

The force with which Ahmad Amin demands the adoption of Western sciences is certainly remarkable. He envisages it as a radical process. This is one of the main topics of the Stream of Thought (a ten volume collection of his essays).²⁶ Besides, in his series on Muslim history he has made a vigorous and fairly successful attempt to give a tangible expression to this ideal.²⁷ In his writings he has dealt at length with the complexity of problems connected with this adoption. Therefore, it is all the more surprising when he reduces the whole issue to the simplified formula of "lopping and grafting" (al-taqlim wa l-tat'im). By lopping he means doing away with those portions of the

²⁵ Tāhā Husayn—His Place in the Egyptian Literary Renaissance (London, 1956), pp. 93.

²⁶ Fayd al-Khātir, published successively between 1938 and 1955, cf. vol. 1, pp. 133, 138 ; II, 52; VIII, 26, 199, 251; IX, 18; also Zu'ama al-Isiah fi l-'Asr al-Hadith (Cairo, 1948), p. 347.

²⁷ Tāhā Husayn, historian and doyen of the liberal udaba, in his article Ahmad Amin the Scholar pays his tribute to the colleague by saying:

"For the first time in Muslim history, he gave an exposition of the development of Arabic thought during the first three centuries of Islam, in a correct and precise way suitable to the modern mind." (In Ahmad Amin bi-Qalamih wa Qalam Asdiqāih, Cairo, 1955).

traditional knowledge which no longer fit into modern times. On the purged heritage are to be grafted all those elements of modernity which are considered to be useful. This procedure is basic to the thought process of the former Azharite who became Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Cairo University.²⁸ It is borne out by the emphatic words used by him in the following quotation, "The operation of lopping and grafting' is the law of life."²⁹

With this central motive in mind one easily gets the proper perspective for understanding fully one of the earliest essays in the Stream of Thought. It is entitled A Missing Link and provides a clue to the manner in which he plans to carry out the 'operation'. It also brings into focus the models that serve him as guides.

"In Egypt," he writes, "a link is lacking which we miss especially in the academic circles, although it constitutes one of the strongest pillars on which we have to base our reconstruction. Its absence is one of the causes of our paltriness in the creation of values and suitable nourishment of the spirit.

"That missing link is a group of scientists who combine a thorough grounding in Arabic and Islamics with an education of the European scientific type Without such a group it will not be easy for us to rise."³⁰

²⁸ For a detailed account of Ahmad Amin's life and work see, Detlev Khalid, Ahmad Amin and his Contribution to Modern Muslim Thought in *Din-w-Dānīsh Quarterly* (Journal of the 'Ulama' Academy, Awqāf Department, Lahore, October, 1970).

²⁹ Fayd al-Khātīr, III, 124.

³⁰ Fayd al-Khātīr I, 30.

This professor of Arabic literature then proceeds to describe the two factions that dominated the intellectual life of Egypt in his days. On the one hand, there are the graduates of Al-Azhar, of the Dār al- and the Madrasat al-Qadā'. He reproaches them for incompetence to understand the language and methodology of modernity. In their writings, he observes, they stick to petrified parables which cause weariness of mind and ennui. About Kant and Bergson they know nothing, and they have miserably failed to represent the traditional lore and values in a new and attractive form. They have retired into a world of their own, and the people are glad they did so. On the other hand, there are the degree holders from European universities and the graduates of the modern Egyptian institutions. They possess a very comprehensive knowledge of the latest theories in the natural sciences, the philosophy and literature of Europe, but their knowledge of the Arabic language is deficient and they are unable to pass on their learning to others. Many of their attempts in this direction met with utter failure. On account of thi they are as much cut off from the masses as the first mentioned group of theologians. Their appalling ignorance of Muslim culture is illustrated by Ahmad Amin as follows: "Yesterday I had a conversation with a number of modern educated persons. We talked about al-Birūni and his discoveries in mathematics and astrology. I told them that the German orientalist Sachau is firmly of the opinion that al-Birūni is the greatest mind of all times. For this reason he intends to found a society dedicated to the revivification of his work, called the 'Al-Biruni Society'. Thereupon most of them told me that they had

never come across any of his writings nor had they even heard of his name. They are, however, very well acquainted with Descartes, Bacon, Hume, and John Stuart Mill. Improvement in this situation is not possible without endeavouring to provide the ‘missing link’. This endeavour means to take full account of both the branches of education—the oriental and the occidental—, the recognition of both the fountainheads of knowledge. Therein the Arabic language and the spirit of Islam would be forceful and firmly entrenched. One would find in it whatever the Europeans have produced of fascinating means of presentation and elegant methods of composition as well as a stimulating comparison between the works of the ancient and those of the modern scholars.”³¹

As an excellent example for the realisation of the link he mentions Rifā’a al-Tahtāwi (1801 — 1873) and his bureau of publication. This Azhari Shaykh who accompanied the first batch

³¹ Ibid. pp. 32-33; the division of the educated class in Egypt has been rendered very clear by the German scholar Babes Johansen in his thesis on Muhammad Husain Haikal—Europa und der Orient im Weltbild eines Agyptischen Liberalen (Bayrut, 1967), pp. 102-7.

As a whole Ahmad Amin’s plea seems to lend credit to the statement by Montgomery Watt that:

“ At the present time the two groups of intellectuals continue to exist side by side in most countries, and many of the more thoughtful Muslims have two sets of ideas in separate compartments in their minds. This state of affair may go on for a long time but not indefinitely. Unless somehow there is fusion or synthesis between the two outlooks, the Islamic world as we have known it will cease to exist.” (Islam and the Integration of Society, London, 1966, p. 251).

of Egyptian students to France was probably too advanced for his time. Tahtāwi's successors, Ahmad Amin holds, did not come up to his standard.³² The well-read scholar of Cairo continues his reflections about the "missing link" with the revealing confession that: "In providing this missing link and utilizing it our Indian brethren are ahead of us. They have produced Muslim history in a new garment. They have presented it after the model of the western writers but in an Islamic spirit. They have written about Islamic religion and law in the language of the modern times. Outstanding examples of this trend are Amir Ali and Muhammad Iqbāl. Both these great scholars were well-grounded in European education. Their hearts were permeated by the love of Islam. They wrote books which the educated youth read and love. They appreciate the topics of these writings and long to read more about them. While reading them the young people specialised in biology and chemistry discover that these books keep pace with the science in which they are trained, that they conform to the method to which they are used. With Muhammad Iqbāl one finds a presentation of Kant's philosophy which gives evidence that he has studied this subject profoundly. He writes about Ghazālī on whom he has also done thorough research. He compares Islam with Christianity and proves to be a scholar who knows what he is writing about. He discusses German poets like Goethe and analyses them most admirably. When he talks about the Mu'tazila and Sufism, it is evident that he has penetrated into the full depth of their thought. He brings to light the innermost essence and

³² Cf. the article on Rifā'a al-Tahtawi in Fayd al-Khātīr, V, 69.

explains their doctrines so brilliantly and in an enjoyable way as the Europeans do with there philosophy.”³³

However, being Pakistanis both these Muslim brethren write in English. The Arabs are, therefore, still waiting for the day when the missing link will be inserted into the Arab world, when the barriers between the two compasses of knowledge—the oriental and the occidental—are going to be demolished.³⁴

Notwithstanding his otherwise so fruitful labour in the field of writing and editing our prolific Egyptian author does little to provide a more concrete theoretical outline of the link he desires to establish.

But it certainly goes to his credit that he succeeds fairly well in giving individually—a practical shape to his aspiration. This has earned him the deep felt admiration of many colleagues and especially of his friend Taha Husayn with whom he shares the orthodox background of the ‘Abduh-reformed Azharite institutions as well as the emancipation towards the Western inspired liberalism that characterizes the epoch of Egyptian intellectual life in which he lived. A striking proof for the successful self-identification with Iqbāl is the fact that Tāhā Husayn’s appreciation of Ahmad Amin’s first major achievement,

³³ Fayd al-Khātir, I, 33-34.

³⁴ Fayd al-Khatir, I, 34.

the history entitled Dawn of Islam, is almost identical with the latter's description of Iqbāl's work as quoted above.³⁵

To point out conceivable failings in the scheme of Ahmad Amin would be of little consequence in the context of the present discussion. Our concern here is to elaborate his ideas and to pinpoint the models which serve as his poles of orientation. After he has expressed so clearly how precisely Iqbāl's procedure corresponds to his own ideal pattern, it is rather surprising that later on he never refers to Iqbāl again. It is only in Dawn of Islam (1929), his first volume on the history of Muslim culture, that he cites as one of his sources 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia with which Iqbāl had obtained his doctorate from Munich in 1907.³⁶ After that even the name of Iqbāl has not been mentioned in any of his publications. This is most striking in his

³⁵ Cf. the preface by Taha Husayn to Amin's *Fajr al-Islām* (Cairo, 1929, 10th edition, 1965), p. v:

أنه وصل بين الثقافة الأدبية و الثقافة الدينية و الفلسفية و صلا متينا لن يتعرض منذ للان لضعف او وهن، فقد كان الناس يعلّمون ان للدين و الفلسفة أثرًا في الشعر و النثر، و لكنهم لم يكونوا يزيّدون على هذه القضية العامة: اما الان فقد استطاع ((احمد امين)) ان يضع ايدينا على هذه القضية العامة: الخادة التي يتركها الدين و الفلسفة و الادب، و اصبح كتابه وسيلة قيمة الى ان تتصل الحياة الدينية الاسلامية في وضوح و جلاء و قوة الى نفوس الشبان الذين يد رسون الادب العربي في الجامعة او غيرها من معاهد العلم و العالي و من ذا الذي كان يقدر ان سيصل شبابنا الى تعمق الفقه و التفسير و الحديث و التوحيد و اثرها كلسها في الادب العربي؟

ان كان الشبان ليسمون هذه الالفاظ فيا خذهم شئ من الوجوم و الازدراء، اما الان فسيقراؤن و سيشوقهم ما يقراؤن، و سيحرصون الحرص كله على التزيد من البحث و الامعان في القراءة و الدرس-

³⁶ *Fajr al-Islām* (Cairo, 1929, 10th edition 1965), p. 124.

book *Leaders of Reform in the Modern Age* where he dedicates two of the ten treatises to Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Sayyid Amir ‘Ali two great Muslims outside the Arab world. The book was published in 1948,³⁷ i.e., at a time when Iqbal, who died in 1938, had become as much a subject of historical research as, say, Sayyid Amir ‘Ali.

The Syrian author Mustafā al-Sibā’i has been very critical of Ahmad Amin. In his book *The Sunna and its Position in Muslim Jurisdiction* he reports that during one of his sessions he learned from Doctor ‘Ali Hasan that Doctor Ahmad Amin once gave an advice to Doctor Hasan ‘Abd al-Qādir, who had got involved into a vehement dispute with the furious Azharites. Ahmad Amin is alleged to have said:

“The Azhar does not accept independent scientific views. The best method to disseminate whatever you find valuable with the orientalist is not to ascribe it openly to them but to present it to the readers as your own research and to clothe it into a fine garb the touch of which they do not feel as unpleasant. That is what I have done in my books *Dawn of Islam* and *Forenoon of Islam*.”³⁸

This polemical report is certainly not of a deserving type. The substance cannot, however, be disavowed. During the course of the present study it will be shown that in fact he acted in accordance with the principle laid down above and presented

³⁷ *Zu’amā’ al-Isiāh fī l-’Asr al-Hadīth*, some of the chapters were published previously as independent articles and as such they form also part of *Fayd al-Khātīr*.

³⁸ *Al-Snnna wa Makānatuhā fī l-Tashri ‘al-Islāmi* (Damascus, 1966), p. 176 f.

many an idea as his own although it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that they originated with Iqbāl. It is tempting to surmise that by doing so he might have intended to obviate objections against the ‘Anglophone’ Pakistanis³⁹, objections to which they are subjected by many Arabs almost automatically because of their immersion in British culture.⁴⁰ There are few Muslim scholars from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the rest of the non-Arab world who have succeeded, like the Nadawi-men, in gaining full recognition from the Arabs.⁴¹ To the majority of the Arabs and especially to the Azharites a perfect mastery of the Arabic language is still the indispensable pre-requisite for recognition as an authority on Islam. “Knowledge of the Arabic language is a religious obligation,” writes M. Rashid Ridā in his treatise on the Caliphate.⁴² This is one of the arguments on which he bases his verdict that the Caliph has necessarily to be an Arab from the tribe of Quraysh.⁴³

³⁹ ‘Anglophone’ is used here in the sense the term francophone is used for those people of former French colonies who do not only express themselves in French but, a more or less natural corollary, think like Frenchmen.

⁴⁰ Again it is not just because of the Pakistanis’ persistent attachment to the cultural orbit of England. The cause is a much more basic one as Wilfred Cantwell Smith has so well understood; for, he writes: “Muslim Arabs have never quite acknowledged, have never fully incorporated into their thinking and especially their feeling, either that a non-Muslim is really a complete Arab or that a non-Arab is really a complete Muslim.” (Islam in Modern History, Princeton, 1957, p. 94).

⁴¹ A comparatively recent example of such recognised Arabic writing from the subcontinent is M. Al-Rābi’ Al-Nadawi: Al-Adab al-‘Arabi bayna ‘Ard wa Naqd (Bayrut, 1965).

⁴² Al-Khilāfa aw al-Imāma al-‘Uzmā (Cairo, 1923), p. 87.

⁴³ In fact, Rashid Ridā goes so far in his insensibility as to appeal to the Muslims of the subcontinent to make financial sacrifices for the sake of reestablishing the purity

Ahmad Amin's book on leading reformers contains inter alia a chapter on the Arab nationalist, 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibi, who betrayed a poignant anti-Turkish bias. While reviewing his writings Ahmad Amin pays hardly any heed to the entwinement of Islam and Arabism which appears so indissoluble in the thought of the Syrian author. As a matter of fact, Zaki al-Mahāsini, whose Lectures on Ahmad Amin are otherwise mere eulogy, has criticised his hero on one single point, viz., his detached attitude towards modern Arabism. He ascribes this shortcoming to Ahmad Amin's undue adherence to Ibn Khaldun who in his turn was no good because of his naz'a barbariyya (Berber tendency, or inclination toward Berberism). Al-Mahāsini generously concedes that during Ahmad Amin's lifetime the concept of the Arab nation had not yet so forcefully emerged. He is firmly convinced that otherwise Ahmad Amin would surely have called his books Dawn of Arabs and Forenoon of the Arabs instead of Dawn of Islam and Forenoon of Islam.⁴⁴ The fact that he did not do so is certainly remarkable because even a Muslim revisionist like Hasan al-Bannā, was ensnared in the Arabist tangle spun by Rashid Rida and al-Kawākibi. This is evident from a statement of Bannā at the Fifth Congress of the Society of the Muslim Brethren of which he was the founder, to wit:

of Islam while at the same time he avows that only the Arabs can warrant the purity of Islamic law. Furthermore, he asserts that the Umayyads and the 'Abbasides had brought about the ruin of Islam by handing over important offices to Iranians and Turks (op. cit., p. 131).

⁴⁴ Muhādarāt 'an Ahmad Amin (Cairo, 1963), p. 73.

“Islam arose among the Arabs and it was passed on to other nations by the Arabs. Its Holy Book is in Arabic. The tradition say’s ‘When the Arabs are degraded, Islam is degraded.’ The correctness of this view was proved when the Arabs lost political power and the reins of government were taken over by non-Arabs. The Arabs are the main pillar of Islam, they are its guard.”⁴⁵

Since the reference to this attitude is here made in the context of Iqbāl and his echo in the Arab world it may not be out of place to quote a passage from his writings which illustrates how his stress on the supranational tendency in Islam caused him to clash with Arab tutelage. While discussing Ibn Khaldun’s view on the Caliphate and the attitude of the modern Turk, Iqbāl says:

“To my mind these arguments, if rightly appreciated, indicate the birth of an international ideal which, though forming the very essence of Islam, has been hitherto overshadowed or rather displaced by Arabian imperialism of the earlier centuries of Islam.”⁴⁶

The trend of thought that characterized the Shu'ubiya-epoch of nationality conflicts within the Muslim community has obviously never been overcome. Whatever lip service may be paid to the ideal of complete equality, in reality the Muslim brother who is not of Arab descent is seldom recognised as an equal partner in the discussions on Islamic sciences. This attitude has

⁴⁵ Risālat al Mu'tamar al-Khāmis (Cairo, n.d.), p. 47.

⁴⁶ Reconstruction, p. 158.

found a grotesque illustration in the case of the Ahmadiya sect. The Ahmadi hermeneutics probably Surpass whatever arbitrary interpretation the history of Islam has known,⁴⁷ this notwithstanding Arab theologians hardly ever bother to enter into a detailed discussion of this exegetic dexterity. Rather they reject the totality of Ahmadi doctrines ab initio with the argument that these people do not know Arabic properly and, therefore, they have no right to claim theological competence and to enter into details. The Ahmadis or Mirzā'is, on the other hand, devote most of their propaganda effort not so much to the actual dissemination of their heterodox ideas. Their main concern is rather to make the Arabs come round to recognise the Ahmadi scholars on the basis of their grounding and proficiency in Arabic. Their founder, Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad, even offered a price of Rs. 500, which was quite an attractive amount at the turn of the last century, to anyone who was able to write such excellent Arabic as he took his own to be. Indeed, he believed that, with the exception of the Glorious Qur'an, no other Arabic style could compare with the beauty of his own writings in that language.⁴⁸ Ever since Mirzā'is are in the vainglorious habit of pointing out that so far no Arab has had the courage to take up this challenge.

⁴⁷ From among the profuse literature published by the Mirzā'i headquarters at Rabwah it may suffice here to mention two books by their founder, Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad: *Haqiqat al-Wahy* and *Nuzul al-Masih*. The most academic study of the movement is still *Ahmadiya Tahrik* by M. Ja'far Khan (Lahore, 1958).

⁴⁸ Cf. his books *Arba 'in, 'Ijāz al-Masih*, and *Al-Khutbat al-Ilhāmiya*. Ahmad Amin's account of the Ahmadi sect is brief and without the usual polemics *Yawm al-'Islām*, p. 196:

Thus the intellectual assertions of Muslim revisionists betray a frame of mind that more-often-than-not puts the instrument and the form of expression above the value of its content. Evidently, Ahmad Amin is completely free from such an attitude. His contacts with European literature and with outstanding orientalist like Nallino, Nyberg, Schaade, and Bergstrasser may have been partly responsible for this. Besides, there is his intellectual impetuosity which drove him to learn English laboriously for many years.⁴⁹ It proves that his attitude is closer to that of his liberal friends at the National University than to that of the Azharites. No doubt, it is surprising that he does not contribute to a sounder Arab understanding of the historic role of the Turks in Muslim culture. It is, however, remarkable that he puts the Iranian contribution to Islam on an equal footing with that of the Arabs.⁵⁰ He even holds the refreshing opinion that Muslim resurgence need not necessarily proceed from the Arabs, for he writes:

“God accustomed us to the fact that if the sun of Islam disappeared in one direction, it would rise in another. Al-Andalus fell into the hands of the Spaniards, but the sun of Turkey rose at

⁴⁹ Cf. his autobiography *Hayati* (Cairo, 1950, 3rd ed., 1958).

⁵⁰ Cf. *Duha l-Islam*, vol. I, chapter II and the entire first volume of *Zuhr al-Islam* (Cairo, 1945). *Tāhā* Husayn has very well summarised the approach of Ahmad Amin by saying:

"I do not know any scholar of the history of Arab literature who was as successful as Ahmad Amin in establishing the relationship between Arabs and Indians or between Arabs and Iranians." (The preface to the first vol. of *Atha l-Islam*, p. h).

the same time, strong in its first appearance. Baghdad declined under the impact of the Tatar onslaught, but Islam spread to India. Palestine was lost, but the Arab people rose in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and [sic] Indonesia to seek their independence. Therefore, we look for another strong sun to appear in the Muslim world to give it strength, something similar to what has happened to India with the appearance of Pakistan as a strong modern power.”⁵¹

For an unbiased mind like Ahmad Amin who was emancipated enough to regard the intellectual and spiritual achievements of the Iranians as equal, nay, even superior to those of the Arabs and who, moreover, admitted that many a European orientalist had a more thorough knowledge of Islamic issues than most Muslim scholars, for such a mind it could not be difficult to acknowledge the Islamological competence of a Pakistani brother like Iqbāl. As an Egyptian, how-ever, he must have been conscious of the fact that Iqbāl, who did not write in Arabic, could never be recognised as an authority by the Azharite and the circles affiliated to them.⁵² Looked at from this point of view it is understandable that later on he does not mention the name of

⁵¹ *Yawm al-Islam* (Cairo, 1952), p. 224.

⁵² With due respect to the undisputable greatness of Iqbal as a thinker and poet one should not feel restrained to admit that his knowledge of Arabic, though surprisingly profound for a modern educated barrister, was not that comprehensive as to range him among the classical scholars. His friend, the acclaimed scholar of the traditional sciences, Sulaymān Nadawī, was in fact ideally suited to complement Iqbal. The early demise of Iqbal, how-ever, did not allow their exemplary cooperation to come to fruition. Some translations of Qur'ānic verses in the *Reconstruction* are rather too remote from the original, even if the right of the liberal thinker to interpret freely is fully conceded.

Iqbāl any more and reproduces ideas of the Pakistani thinker as if they were his own. Again, this does not satisfactorily explain why in his book on Leaders of Reform he does not devote a chapter to Iqbāl after his chapter on Amir 'Ali. It is true that the passages which Ahmad Amin has literally taken over from Iqbāl are also present in Amir 'Ali's *The Spirit of Islam*, which was corrected by Iqbāl, then a student at Cambridge (he also prepared the index, see preface, VIII).⁵³ The similarity with Amir 'Ali is restricted to contents only. It is not a literal one as is the case with a number of phrases from Iqbāl. Besides, *The Spirit of Islam* embodies some and not all of the typical Iqbalian thoughts that appear in the writings of Ahmad Amin.

It cannot be ruled out completely that while leaning increasingly on Iqbāl, Ahmad Amin did not want to make his dependence on the poet-philosopher's thought too apparent. In other words, he did not want to draw the attention of the Arab reader unnecessarily to the little known Iqbāl. In this way it was certainly easier to assert the merit of his independent creation. The scarcity of intellectual communion between modern Pakistan and the Muslim thinkers of Egypt is a phenomenon not yet sufficiently explained. It has baffled quite a number of observers, like the orientalist Kenneth Cragg who calls Iqbāl an example of Muslim thought from outside the Arab world that is too uncomfortable to deal with. He holds that it is for this very inconvenience which Iqbāl's challenging approach poses that he

⁵³ Syed Ameer Ali: *The Spirit of Islam* (London, 1899).

has not found any disciples among the Arabs. Cragg concedes that Iqbāl's poetry is difficult to translate and his thoughts, in their symbolical presentation, can be apprehended only through assiduous efforts at interpretation which renders critique rather irksome. All this notwithstanding, his eminent position in the intellectual life of Pakistan ought to have secured him some Arab following. However, such a discipleship, even if it exists, has not yet come into prominence.⁵⁴

Since Cragg expressed this opinion Iqbal has, no doubt, received somewhat more attention from the Arabs. The blind poet of Egypt, Sāwiy Sha'lān, has come out with some more translations of Iqbal's verses⁵⁵ and the number of articles devoted

⁵⁴"The Modernist Movement in Egypt" in *Islam and the West—Proceedings of the Harvard Summer School Conference on the Middle East, July 25-27, 1955* (Den Haag, 1957), p. 152.

Walther Braune, Professor of Comparative Religions at the Free University Berline, puts emphasis on the conviction of Muhammad 'Abduh that the ultimate interest of religion are not the legal prescriptions. In this connection Braune refers to Iqbal and says:

Wenn noch einmal über den Bereich der Araber hinausgehend ein Mann zu nennen ist, der unbeachtet zwar von ihnen, aber beachtenswert für das Fragen des Islam nach neuen Formen, eben diese Auffassung auch theoretisch erörtert hat, so ist es der indische Denker und Dichter Sir Muhammad Iqbal." (*Der Islamische Orient zwischen Vergangenheit and Zukunft*, Bern, 1960, p. 150; italics are mine),

⁵⁵ *Mukhtārāt min Shi'r Iqbal* published in the Arabic magazine of the Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad, *A/-Dirāsāt al-Islamiya* (March 1969). This is the first installment of a new translation of *Payām-i Mashriq* and other poems by Iqbal rendered into Arabic by Al-Sāwiy Sha'lan with the collaboration of the present writer.

to Iqbāl in Arabic cultural magazines has increased.⁵⁶ In Morocco, the Bergson disciple M. 'Aziz Lahbabi with his concept of Muslim personalism (*shakhsanyia*) betrays great affinity with the Pakistani philosopher, although he quotes him in French from the rather defective translation of Eva Meyerovitch.⁵⁷ The Lebanese writer, Hasan Saab, ranks Iqbāl among the three great Muslim thinkers of our time, along with the existentialist 'Adb al-Rahman Badawi in Egypt and the Moroccan 'Aziz Lahbabi mentioned above.⁵⁸ A leading Egyptian Islamicist like Father Anawati goes a step further by admitting that the Arabs have no one who can compare with Iqbal as a Muslim philosopher⁵⁹; but, on the whole, Cragg's observation still holds true that there exist few serious works about Iqbāl in Arabic and hardly any attempt at interpreting his famous Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.⁶⁰

The above quoted excerpts from the essay on the "Missing Link" clearly show that Ahmad Amin refers to the lectures delivered by Iqbāl at the universities of Madras, Aligarh, and Hyderabad in 1928. They were published in 1934 under the title of *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* with a seventh chapter in addition to the original six lectures. Whereas

⁵⁶ Cf. especially *Al-Mimbar* published from Cairo and the Moroccan monthly *Da'wat al-Haq* (1970).

⁵⁷ *Le Personnalisme Musulman* (Paris). Hassan Saab, "The Spirit of Reform in Islam" in *Islamic Studies* (Islamabad, March, 1963).

⁵⁸ In reply to a question by the present writer during a talk at the Christian Study Centre, Rawalpindi, in January, 1971.

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⁶⁰ Cragg, *op. cit.*, 152.

Iqbāl's verses were written in Persian and Urdu, this prose work is in English. Bergson, Kant, Goethe, Ghazālī, the movement of the rationalist Mu'tazila, Sufism, and the relation of Islam to Christianity, in short, all the salient features enumerated by Ahmad Amin, are treated in this book of Iqbāl most explicitly. Over the years the influence of this outstanding work on the writings of Ahmad Amin becomes noticeable to an ever increasing degree until, in the *Day of Islam* (1952), we come across more or less literal borrowings — as shown in the appendix to the present paper. It is, no doubt, possible that this influence received a new impetus through the Arabic and English translations of Iqbāl's poetry like *The Secrets of the Self* by Nicholson in 1920, or *The Tulip of Sinai* (1947) and the Persian *Psalms* (1948) by Arberry.⁶¹

One of Ahmad Amin's best friends was 'Abd al-Wahhāb 'Azzām. They came to know each other at the *Madrasat al-Qada* ' where 'Azzām was a student of Amin. Later on they were colleagues for more than twenty years at the University and in the Committee for Writing, Translation, and Publication. As delegates of the University they travelled together and attended conferences in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Belgium, Italy, France, and Switzerland.⁶² In 1937 they went together on pilgrimage to Mecca. In 1955 a booklet in honour of Ahmad Amin was published with the title *Ahmad Amin as Seen by Himself and by His Friends*. Whereas

⁶¹ Amin might as well have come across *The Complaint and the Answer* translated by Altaf Husain (1943) and *The Mystery of Selflessness* by Arberry (1953).

⁶² Hayati, 278-281.

most of the contributors write as former students, co-workers, and admirers, 'Azzām writes his Souvenirs of Ahmad Amin from the viewpoint of a close associate and friend.⁶³ One of the few photos contained in the brochure depicts the two scholars together on Hajj. In the History of World Literature published by Ahmad Amin the chapter on Persian literature is by 'Abd al-Wahhāb 'Azzām.⁶⁴ Later he became Ambassador for Egypt in Pakistan and translated Iqbāl's Message of the East (Payam-i Mashriq) into Arabic. In the preface to this translation 'Azzām mentions that he has received this book long before his departure for Pakistan from the Turkish poet Mehmet Akif.⁶⁵ It would be of no avail to surmise that the interest of Ahmad Amin in Iqbal was solely kindled by .Abd al-Wahhāb 'Azzām, but it may be conceded that this interest was nurtured by the intense prepossession of his companion with the Pakistani poet. 'Azzām was not only the first translator of Iqbāl into Arabic but also the author of a little monograph on the Muslim philosopher.⁶⁶ For Iqbālists it must certainly be disappointing that in his study on 'Abd al-Wahhāb 'Azzām the Syrian professor Zaki al-Mahāsini gets stuck up in the futile attempt to press him into the obligatory mould of Arabism with racial undertones.⁶⁷ In this way he missed the opportunity of unfolding 'Azzām's role as an intellectual bridge, however fragile

⁶³ " Dhikrayat 'an Ahmad Amin" in Ahmad Amin bi-Qalamih wa Qalam Asdiga'ih (Cairo, 1955), pp. 77-84.

⁶⁴ Ahmad Amin and Zaki Najib Mahmud, Off at al-Adab if I'Alam, 4 volumes (Cairo, 1943-48).

⁶⁵ Risālat al-Mashriq (Karachi, 1951), Muqaddimat al Mutarjim.

⁶⁶ Muhammad Iqbāl —Siratuhu wa Falsafatuhu wa Shi'ruh (1954).

⁶⁷ 'Abd al-Wahhāb 'Azzām-Fi Hayātihi wa Athārihi I-Ada biya (Cairo, 1968).

it might be between Pakistan and Egypt. In this monograph, there is no mention about the dissemination of Iqbāl's ideas which started with the trans. lator of the Message of the East.⁶⁸ Both 'Azzām and Amin wrote essays on the Sūbarmān. Following Iqbāl, they contrast the Islamic notion of the Perfect Man (al-insan al-kāmil) with the Superman of Nietzsche.⁶⁹ This was done at a time when the Pakistani thinker was even less known to the Arab world than he is today.

Iqbāl, the poet, and Amin, the historian, are very different types of spokesmen. They differ from each other particularly in their different modes of expression. Notwithstanding this, there is an affinity in nature as well as in experience between the two personalities. It may have been this affinity which impelled Ahmad Amin to an unconscious—if not conscious- self-identification with the intellectual endeavour of Muhammad Iqbāl. Common to both is the strong concern for education— which is but natural for modernists who follow in the direct reform tradition of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad 'Abduh.⁷⁰ Iqbāl cherished the hope of undertaking a journey to Turkey, Egypt, and Iran to study the educational systems of these countries. Such a task was dearer to his heart than the political activity in which he

⁶⁸ 'Abd al-Wahhab 'Azzam, Muhammad Iqbāl, p. 61

⁶⁹ Fayd al-Khatir, VII, 296.

⁷⁰ Cf. Detlev Khalid, "Ahmad Amin and the Legacy of Muhammad 'Abduh" in Islamic Studies (Islamabad, March, 1970), translated into Arabic (Al-Dirasat al-Islamiya, September, 1969), Urdu (Fikr-o Nazar, March, 1971), and Bengali (Sandhan, April, 1971).

found himself involved.⁷¹ Amin testifies in his autobiography that among all his manifold duties he was most dedicated to those having to do with teaching and the reform of education.⁷² Whereas Iqbāl worked out a course for Urdu teaching at institutions of higher learning,⁷³ Amin participated in writing several text-books of Arabic which are still in use.⁷⁴ Iqbāl was invited by King Nādir Shāh to discuss problems connected with the foundation of a university in Kābul.⁷⁵ Similarly, when Amin was invited to Baghdād, his advice was sought by King Faysal with regard to the educational system in Iraq.⁷⁶ Both, Iqbāl and Amin, took part in Round-Table Conferences with the highest representatives of the colonial power in London — Iqbāl discussed in 1931 and 1932, the future of India and Pakistan,⁷⁷ Amin in 1946 that of Egypt and Palestine.⁷⁸ They welcome the Turkish revolution and reforms in the same spirit, although later on Amin is less sharp in his criticism of the heedless imitation of Europe by Atatürk than Iqbal with his biting condemnations.⁷⁹ Another interesting feature, common to both, is their brand of

⁷¹ Shaikh Muhammad Ata: *Iqbālnama*-A Collection of Iqbal's letters in Urdu, 2 vols. (Lahore, n. d.) II, 88, 90.

⁷² Hayati, 311.

⁷³ Khurshid Ahmad, "A rare Compilation of Iqbāl" in *Iqbal Review* (Karachi, July, 1961).

⁷⁴ *Al-Akhlaq li I-Madaris al-Thanawiya*,

⁷⁵ *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, compiled by "Shamloo" (Lahore, 1945). XXIV, XXV.

⁷⁶ Hayati, 261.

⁷⁷ *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 212.

⁷⁸ Hayati, pp. 315-317.

⁷⁹ *Sir Muhammad Iqbāl, Javid Nama*, translated from the Persian by A. J. Arberry (London, 1966), p. 58; cf. Amin, *Yawm al-Islam*, pp. 150-3.

utopianism. Being faced with seemingly impassable hurdles in their own countries, they transpose their ideals of a reformed Muslim society to another land which they claim as model, thereby giving it almost the veneer of a dreamland. Thus in Iqbāl's *Payam-i Mashriq* as well as in his *Musāfir Afghanistan* is transfigured into the ideal of a progressive yet Muslim state; this may be paralleled with Amin's praise for Turkey in his autobiography.⁸⁰ Such a flight away from dismaying realities at home is certainly a phenomenon common to many thinkers of all ages. What makes this transposition of ideals relevant in the case of Iqbāl and Amin is the similarity of situation and motives, of purview and aspiration. This is best expressed by Iqbāl in his preface to a book by British authors on Modern Afghanistan where he writes:

“The Afghan conservatism is a miracle: it is adamantive yet fully sensitive to and assimilative of new cultural forces. And this is the secret of the eternal organic health of the Afghan type.”⁸¹

Most prominent among the Iqbalian ideas adopted by Ahmad Amin is that of the dominion of Greek philosophy on early

⁸⁰ Hayati, pp. 230-250; cf. Sir Muhammad Iqbal: *Javid Nama*, translation by A. J. Arberry, p. 128:

"Asia is a form cast of water and clay; in that form the Afghan is the heart; if it is corrupt, all Asia is corrupt, if it is dilated, all Asia is dilated."

⁸¹ Syed Abdul Wahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal* (Lahore, 1964), p. 232, Here we have the link to the "conservative modernism" of the 'Abduh type which characterises the approach of Ahmad Amin; cf. Detlev Khalid: *Ahmad Amin and the Legacy of Muhammad 'Abduh* referred to above.

Muslim thought. This foreign element impaired the believers' vision of the Qur'ān until they rose in intellectual revolt against Greek thought. Here again it is true that this view of Greek philosophy is not confined to Iqbal and Amin alone. As Wilfred Cantwell Smith has rightly observed, some Muslim writers consider the influence of Greek thought a greater threat to the religion of Islam than the crusaders or the Mongols, and therefore they are suspicious even of theology.⁸² However, the distinguishing feature of the Iqbal-Amin approach is the line of argument that leads to the concept of an intellectual revolt against Greek philosophy in all departments of thought, a revolt "that brings out the real spirit of the culture of Islam, and lays the foundation of modern culture in some of its most important aspects."⁸³ Iqbāl's confrontation of induction as an Islamic (Arabic) method and deduction as a Hellenistic (European) method can be met within Amin's *Noon of Islam*⁸⁴ but still more so in the *Day of Islam* where he writes: "The Islamic method relies on induction insofar as it investigates all data separately as much as possible and then draws the general conclusion from the totality of those results. This is how Muslim scholars proceeded, e. g., in grammar (*al-fā'il marfū'*). The Greek, i. e., the Aristotelian philosophy, however, relies on deduction The inductive

⁸² Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁸³ *Reconstruction*, p. 128.

⁸⁴ *Zuhr al-Islam*, vol. II (Cairo, 1946).

method led the Muslim scholars to the principle of doubt and experiment.”⁸⁵

This clearly echos Iqbal who says in the Reconstruction:

“It was, I think, Nazzām who first formulated the principle of ‘doubt’ as the beginning of all knowledge and Ibn Taymiya, in his Refutation of Logic, shows that induction is the only form of reliable argument. Thus arose the method of observation and experiment.”⁸⁶

For the sake of comparison we reproduce another passage from Ahmad Amin’s Day of Islam:

“In the Animal Life of Jahiz we notice in various places that he starts his observation by putting something in doubt and then putting it to the test. He is bold enough to point out the mistakes of Aristotle and to prefer the information provided by an Arab Beduin. Nazzām did so even with the traditions of the Prophet. First he doubted their authenticity then he subjected them to the test of reason to find out whether they are genuine or not. Ghazali and Jāhiz forestalled Descartes in the principle of doubt and Miskawayh anticipated Darwin’s theory of evolution The Europeans claim that Roger Bacon was the first who, during the Renaissance, advocated the method of induction. They do not take into consideration that he was a graduate of the Arab universities of Spain...The same applies to Ibn Khaldūn. He

⁸⁵ Yawm al-Islam, p. 89.

⁸⁶ Reconstruction, p. 129.

preceded Descartes in founding sociology. The difference between the two is that Ibn Khaldūn bases his work on the inductive method which the Arabs preferred to the deductive method followed by the Europeans.’⁸⁷

These lines are but a gist of Iqbal’s lecture on The Spirit of Muslim Culture and in particular of the quotation from Briffault’s Making of Humanity given therein, a quotation that has obviously an everlasting fascination for Muslim writers of the apologetic trend.⁸⁸

Here we are not concerned with the validity of this conception which regards Greek philosophy as utterly opposed to the spirit of the Qur’an. Since the time when Amin began to follow in the footsteps of Iqbal some Muslim writers have disputed this contention and some of them have even risen in counter-revolt.⁸⁹ As a matter of fact, one may well hold that Ahmad Amin who wrote so forcefully against taqlid⁹⁰ has in this instance himself fallen a prey to it. In the following, especially while discussing Amin’s interpretation of Muslim universalism, his

⁸⁷ Yawm al-Islām, pp. 89-90.

⁸⁸ Reconstruction, p. 130; one of the most recent examples of copying The Spirit of Muslim Culture and especially the brief quotation we find in a publication of The Motamar Al-Alam Al-Islami entitled Islam and Evolution of Science (Karachi, n.d.) by a certain Muhammad Saud.

⁸⁹ Cf. the preface by Khalifa 'Abd al-Hakim to the Urdu translation of Iqbal's *Asrār-i Khudi* by S. A. Rahman (Lahore).

⁹⁰ Cf. Ahmad Amin and the Legacy of Muhammad 'Abduh referred to above.

heavy leaning on Iqbal will become more and more apparent.⁹¹ Here it may suffice to say that the subtler ideas of Iqbal are hardly found in the writings of Ahmad Amin, at the most they occur in fragments and are rather vague in their reformulation. Such central concepts as time and Satan, which are so essential to the Pakistani's philosophy of "self", have not been touched by the Egyptian.⁹² Kenneth Cragg thinks the noteworthy fact that Egyptian thought has not seriously tackled the issues broached by Iqbal could possibly be attributed to the pragmatic nature of the Arabs whose spirit is not speculative and to whom Iqbal's world of ideas is unfamiliar. Iqbal's reconstruction of Islam, he argues, is in fact a construction of religious thought.⁹³ While fully admitting that Ahmad Amin's study of European philosophy was negligible as compared to that of his Pakistani model we are rather inclined to hold the linguistic barrier as partly responsible for the lack of a deeper understanding of Iqbal's message. Although Ahmad Amin had learnt English well and even translated the *Primers of Philosophy* by A. S. Rappoport⁹⁴ some of the Lectures must necessarily have remained inaccessible to him as a scholar who had received no basic English education. S. A. Vahid has called Iqbal's style as simultaneously elegant, idiomatic, impressive, and

⁹¹ Detlev Khalid, "Ahmed Amin—Modern Interpretation of Muslim Universalism" in *Islamic Studies* (March, 1969); Bengali translation in Sandhan (March, 1971), Urdu translation in *Fikr-Nazar*.

⁹² Cf Alessandro Rausani, "The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal" and "Satana nell' opera filosofico-poetica di Muhammad Iqbal", *Riv. degli Studi Orientali*, XXX, 1957.

⁹³ *Op. cit.*, 152.

⁹⁴ London, 1904, translated as *Mabadi' al-Falসাfa* (Cairo, 1918).

eloquent⁹⁵ but again, the verdict of Cragg is that "they are too English in their address and assumptions ever to be a potent force popularly within the Islamic setting."⁹⁶

We may not entirely agree with Cragg but we cannot ignore the View of the German orientalist Annemarie Schimmel, who is certainly much more at home in English than Ahmad Amin was. She has stated that the "rather complicated" English prose of the lectures requires several perusals if they are to be understood properly.⁹⁷ It is, therefore, but understandable that the more or less literal adaptations in Ahmad Amin's Day of Islam are all from the fifth and especially from the sixth lecture—The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam. These two lectures are of a less philosophical nature and more easily understandable than the rest.

In 1937 Ahmad Amin performs the pilgrimage to Mecca. He is deeply impressed by the demonstration of piety which bears a 'democratic' stamp. But at the same time he is so much disgusted by the lack of organization, the undignified bustle and unhygienic conditions in the hallowed places that he sends a report about it to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. The same complaints he raises in his talks over the radio. Thereupon he is called to the Ministry and finally Tal'at Pasha Harb, the then Minister, succeeds in

⁹⁵ Iqbal: His, Art and Thought (Lahore, 1944, second impr. 1948), p. 294.

⁹⁶ Counsels in Contemporary Islam, in the series "Islamic Surveys", 111 (Edinburgh, 1965), 62.

⁹⁷ Gabriel's Wing - A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal (Leiden, 1963), p. 50.

persuading him to desist from further inciting the public through the press and broadcasting. In return the Egyptian Government promises to forward his report to the competent authorities in Hijaz.⁹⁸

Thus it is not surprising that later on he takes great interest in very liberal ideas of pilgrimage. In the second volume of his history called *Noon of Islam* he recapitulates:

“Finally we saw that al-Hallāj (the famous 9th century mystic Husayn Ibn Mansur of Baghdad) was accused of having propagated the abolition of the hajj. He held it to be sufficient that man undertakes the pilgrimage to a room in his house. Abū Hayyān al-Tawhīdī wrote a treatise entitled ‘The Intellectual Pilgrimage’ which, however, we could not lay hand on, in spite of all our efforts to find it out.”⁹⁹

The reader is reminded of Iqbal who expressed his admiration for Ibn Sa‘ūd and his ‘purification’ of the hallowed places. For thus sympathising with the Wahhābis he incurred the wrath of several of the self-appointed custodians of religion. Throughout his life Iqbāl hoped to perform the pilgrimage and often he deplored his inability to realise this intention. Had he been able to do so his reaction could hardly have been different from that of the Egyptian historian. In compensation for the physical pilgrimage he was unable to perform, Iqbāl raised the ‘spiritual’ or ‘symbolical’ pilgrimage to the rank of the ideal just as Ahmad

⁹⁸ Hayati, pp. 269-271.

⁹⁹ *Zuhr al-Islam*, T1, 64.

Amin made it his ideal in compensation for the disappointment he experienced at the cradle of Islam. Deprived of the hope that he might kiss one day the threshold of the Prophet and the Black Stone of the Ka'ba, Iqbāl finds consolation in the internal meaning of the rites, and in the circumambulation not of the sacred building but of the Divine Beloved.⁸¹ Similarly for Amin, the pilgrimage becomes a symbol of the direct presence of God wheresoever it may be experienced.¹⁰⁰

The Egyptian author, who was also editor of the leading cultural magazine *Al-Thaqafa*, confronts an Islam benumbed by rituals with the true inwardness of faith. In fact, he treads in the best tradition of Sufism the initial motive force of which was genuine moral enlightenment, following the lead given by al-Ghazālī who taught that an excessive stress on the external disciplines of the revisionist faith merely creates religious fossils. Ahmad Amin's departure from revisionist interpretations of Islam is clearly evident when he says:

“True religion raises its followers above all lust of power and above all politics. Artificial religion, however, makes its followers distort the faith so that it may be exploited for the sake of power and serve political ends.”¹⁰¹

The following lines by the great Spanish mystic Ibn 'Arabi are a favourite quotation in the essays of the Egyptian scholar:

¹⁰⁰ Annemarie Schimmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-199.

¹⁰¹ Fayd al-Khatir, II, 14.

“My heart began to absorb every picture;

It became a pasture for gazelles and a monastery for monks.

A temple for idolators and a Ka’ba for the believer;

It turned into Torah-scrolls and into a copy of the Qur’an;

I profess the religion of love —regardless of whatever object
it may turn. Love is my law and my faith.”¹⁰²

It is therefore but natural that his interpretation of Islam (Ices not bow before the restrictiveness of pan-Arabism. Under the heading Precedence of Religion and Culture over Nationalism, he writes:

“This culture of Islam dominated all Muslim peoples and gradually assimilated their distinct mentalities. Finally they gave preference to their culture and religion over their national feelings. Therefore, the Egyptians are Muslim first, and Egyptians afterwards; the same applies to the Syrians, North-Africans, and Andalusians. They all have one uniform culture, and uniform principles of government. National identity, regionalism, and attachment to language and native place assume secondary place for them.”¹⁰³

The close resemblance to Iqbāl becomes apparent if the lines quoted above are compared to the poet’s speech delivered at the

¹⁰² Fayd al-Khatir, IX, 252.

¹⁰³ Fayd al-Khatir, VIII, 69.

annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore in 1932:

“Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man. Yet that which really matters is a man’s faith, his culture, his historical tradition. These are the things which in my eyes are worth living for and dying for, and not the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated.”¹⁰⁴

The founder of the Egyptian popular university describes how Muslims assimilated different regional cultures and thereby brought about an intellectual unity. Like Iqbāl he never ceases emphasizing the assimilative spirit of Islam.¹⁰⁵ His concept of ‘mental unification through cultural assimilation’¹⁰⁶ amplifies the positive motive of pan-Islamism because thus it is envisaged as a constructive stage on the way toward “a world without war, without crime, without nationalism, where humanism and cosmopolitanism would occupy the seat of nationalism, where there would be no colonialist and all peoples would be like brothers.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ S. A. Vahid, op. cit., p. 288.

¹⁰⁵ Fayd al-Khatir, II, 208; VI, 10; VII, 296.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., VIII, 69; cf. Iqbal:

"In order to become a living member of the Muslim community, the individual, besides an unconditional belief in the religious principle, must thoroughly assimilate the culture of Islam. The object of the assimilation is to create a uniform mental outlook..." (S. A. Vahid, op. cit., p. 379).

¹⁰⁷ Fayd al-Khatir IX, 252. Reconstruction p. 167.

Here again Iqbāl seems to have provided the orientation; for in the Reconstruction he says:

“Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the final combination of humanity by drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing a self-consciousness of their own.”¹⁰⁸

Iqbāl employs the allegory of Greek and Afghan, for the Western and the Eastern men, who are not yet free enough from the clay and water of differentiation to say "First I am a man." Amin, the Egyptian, adopts the symbol of two pyramids:

“As a matter of fact,, these two pyramids are not at loggerheads with each other because of their intrinsic nature, but rather because of a misunderstanding between their inhabitants. It is certainly possible to create strong bonds of friendship between them, each one assisting the other with his respective virtues.”¹⁰⁹

In the Day of Islam there occurs a passage which may evoke the impression that Ahmad Amin gives vent to anti-European sentiments. He was frustrated with the progress of Muslim integration toward the goal of world-community; nevertheless, he appears to be glad about the internecine wars among the Christian nations rendering them weak.¹¹⁰ Such resentment certainly renders

¹⁰⁸ . Payma-i Mashriq (Lahore 1923), p. 161.

¹⁰⁹ Fayd al-Khatir, VIII, p. 74,

¹¹⁰ Yawm al-Islam, p. 148.

correct assesment of his real aspirations more difficult. It seems to contradict our findiug that throughout his writings one of his main concerns is to bridge the gulf between the Orient and the Occident. He constantly visualized the establishment of a world culture based on genuine tolerance encompassing all peoples in peace and harmony. No doubt, the Day of Islam echoes an outcry against the Western domination of the East as does, in the field of poetry, Iqbāl's Mysteries of the Self.

But the ideal of a global humanism is reiterated even in the Day of Islam.¹¹¹ The book is, therefore, to be understood as the lament of a jilted lover rather than an implacable foe. This becomes all the more apparent in his later book East and West, the subject-matter of which is stated as follows:

“The ideal we aim at is a humanist civilization without nationalism, a civilization where the entire world is regarded as one family, where the sick person is cared for until he is healed, where the little one is taken by the hand until he is grown up, and where highways are made for those left behind so that they could catch up with those who have gone in advance.”¹¹²

Concomitantly he does not ascribe the responsibility for the backwardness of the Orient to the Occident alone, but holds both sides equally responsible for that. In his treatise East and West he gives expression to the desirability of replacing the abuses of orientiel spirituality by healthy measure of materialism and equally

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 188.

¹¹² Al-Sharq wa I-Gharb (published posthumously, Cairo, 1955), p. 27.

to add a measure of uncorrupted spirituality to occidental materialism.¹¹³ This is exactly what Iqbāl wanted to convey by saying that reason Without love is a diabolical enterprise which the West is pursuing. On the other hand ‘ishq without ‘aql is a self-deception into which the East is fondly indulging. In his criticism the professor of Cairo exposes the abuses of Oriental spirituality almost more forcefully and convincingly than those of occidental materialism.¹¹⁴ Thus another strong parallel between Iqbal and Amin is their abysmal hostility toward the mullahs. The unmitigated acrimony with which the Egyptian author depicts the irksome manners of the teachers of religion is not confined to his autobiography. It is a prominent feature of his Stream of Thought, for he frequently takes the field against the "syndicate of the descendants of the Prophet, the trade. guilds of the mystical orders and all that goes along with it such as anniversaries of saints and motive offerings."¹¹⁵ He desires to "preserve religion in its most perfect form and sublime significance"¹¹⁶ and his rejection of the "noisy theatre performances and acrobatics of artificial religion"¹¹⁷ commensurate with the ringing condemnations used by the Pakistani poet while exposing the galling hypocrisy of the priestly class:

¹¹³ Al-Sharq wa l-Gharb, 164; cf. Yawm al-Islam, p. 210.

¹¹⁴ Al-Sharq wa l-Gharb, 141 if.

¹¹⁵ Fayd al-Khatir, V, 278.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. II, 13.

“The religion of God is more shameful than unbelief, Because the mullah is a believer trading in unfaith!”¹¹⁸

Ahmad Amin has once been accused of plagiarism, although in a different context. In *Al-Adab al 'Arabi fi Athar al-Darisin* the Lebanese M. Yūsuf Najm writes that the *Literary Criticism*¹¹⁹ by Amin is nothing but a concise version of English works on this subject.¹²⁰ The well-known Egyptian author Bint al-Shati' ('A'isha 'Abd al-Rahmān), however, found no difficulty in proving that this fact had been duly acknowledged by Ahmad Amin in the preface to the book.¹²¹ With regard to the borrowings from Iqbal in the *Day of Islam* such an acknowledgement is obviously not possible. There is no bibliography but a few footnotes which indicate the sources of some of the quotations. Iqbal, however, is nowhere mentioned.

Besides, the author has not remained faithful to the systematic exposition of Iqbal. The relevant passages are interwoven into his own writings in a rather incoherent manner. This book is anyhow the least systematic one of his works. The styles, however, is quite swaying and reminds in many ways of a sermon, one of those lengthy khutbas in the course of which the preacher returns every now and then to his cardinal points.

¹¹⁸ Iqbal-Nama, translated by Arberry (London, 1966).

¹¹⁹ *Al-Naqd al-Adabi* (Cairo, 1952).

¹²⁰ *Al-Adab al-'Arabi fi Athar al-Darisin* (Bayrut, 1961), p. 354.

¹²¹ Daily *Al-Ahram* dated 3rd of March, 1963, p. 13.

In 1955, shortly after the death of Ahmad Amin, the Committee for Writing, Translation, and Publication¹²² published the Arabic translation by Mahmud 'Abbas of The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.¹²³ Amin was chairman of this committee from its inception in 1914 till his death in 1954. In fact, during the last years of his life most of his activity was dedicated to this *lajna*.¹²⁴ Therefore, it is certain that Iqbal's lectures were rendered into Arabic under his supervision. The language barrier was thus removed, but for a deeper penetration into the philosophical purport it was obviously too late. The Egyptian author, who was by then almost entirely blind, dictated his *Day of Islam* somewhat earlier. In the preface he states that this volume is based on what has been stored up in his mind from the books he happened to study during the course of many years.¹²⁵ Whether the literal adaptation of the excerpts from the

¹²² *Lajnat al-Ta'lif wa l-Tarjama wa l-Nashr*.

¹²³ *Tajdid al-Tafkir al-Dini fz l-Islam*, (Cairo, 1955).

¹²⁴ . Hayati, p. 302 ; he was working in the office of the Committee only 36 hours before his death, cf. Ahmad Zaki, "Ahmad Amin al-Sadiq" in Ahmad Amin bi-Qalamih wa Qalam Asdiqa'ih referred to above.

¹²⁵ *Yawm al-Islam*, preface,

Al-Muntakhab fi I-Adab al-'Arabi,

Al-Mufassal fi I-Adab al-'Arabi,

Al-Mutala'at al-Tawjihiya,

Ta'rikh al-Adab al-'Arabi, (Cairo, 1941).

lectures of Iqbal are due to an intense absorption dating back much earlier or whether they are to be attributed to a simultaneous occupation of their Arabic version is a moot question. Even his associates have not been able to answer it univocally,

In the appendix to the present paper a few examples have been adduced showing the almost literal conformity of passages in the Day of Islam with the Lectures on The Reconstruction of Religious Thought. These examples are chosen at random. They serve no other purpose but to demonstrate the extent to which one has to be conversant with the Iqbalian model while studying Ahmad Amin's contribution to modern Muslim thought, despite the fact that in all his writings he has mentioned the name of Iqbal only once.

APPENDIX

Iqbāl explains the meaning of the word *ijtihād* (Reconstruction, P. 148) and observes that (p. 149) "the idea of complete *ijtihād* is hedged round by conditions which are well-nigh impossible of realization in a single individual."

Amin explains the meaning of the word *ijtihād* (Yawm al-Islam, P. 189) and observes:

لم يبق في الناس من تتوفر فيه شروط المجتهد.

Analysing the development that led to the closure of the 'door of *ijtihād*', Iqbal writes (Reconstruction, p. 149):

"The real causes are, in my opinion, as follows:

1. We are all familiar with the Rationalist movement which appeared in the church of Islam during the early days of the Abbasides and the bitter controversies which it raised.

(p. 150)....conservative thinkers regarded this movement as a force of disintegration, and considered it a danger to the stability of Islam as a social polity."

Amin expresses himself in a similar vein in *Yawm al-Islam* (p. 190):

و انما اصاب المسلمون بقولهم بسد باب الاجتهاد لاسباب ثلاثة:

اولها كارثة المسلمين بضياع المعتزلة وهم الفرقة العقلية في الاسلام وانتصار اهل الحديث عليهم.

Iqbal continues his enumeration (Reconstruction, p. 150):

"2. The rise and growth of ascetic Sufism....On its purely religious side Sufism fostered a kind of revolt against the verbal quibbles of our early doctors. The case of *Sufyān al-Thawri* is an instance in point. He was one of the acutest legal minds of his time...; but

being also intensely spiritual, the dry-as-dust subtleties of contemporary legists drove him to ascetic Sufism."

Similarly Amin says (Yawm al-Islam, p. 190):

و الثاني مهاجمة اهل التصوف للفقهاء بانهم شكليون و يعنون باشكل اكثر مما يعنون بالروح، فاتفقوا مع المعتزلة في مناهضة الفقهاء و كان على راسهم سفيان الثوري الذي توغل في الروحانية مع اطلاعه الواسع في الفقهيات.

(With tawaghghala fi l-rūhāniya Amin has in fact rendered Iqbāl's "being also intensely spiritual" better than Mahmud Abbas in his published translation of the Reconstruction where he writes wa lakinna farta ruhaniyatihi,) Reconstruction, p. 151:

"On the top of all this came the destruction of Baghdad - the centre of Muslim intellectual life... all the contemporary historians of the invasion of Tartars describe the havoc of Baghdad with a half-suppressed pessimism about the future of Islam. For fear of further disintegration, ... the conservative thinkers of Islam focused all their efforts on the one point of preserving a uniform social life for the people by a jealous exclusion of all innovations and there is no doubt that they were partly right." Yawm al-Islām, p. 190

الثالث سقوط بغداد على يد التترو قد كانت بغداد اذ ذاك مركز الحضارة و الثقافة. الاسلاميتين فاصيب العلماء بالفزع من جراء هذا السقوط و غلبهم

التشاؤم وودوا ان استطاعوا فقط حتى المحافظة القديم من غير تجديد و هم في ذلك معذورون بعض العذر-

Speaking about the sources of Muslim law Iqbal begins with the hadith (Reconstruction, p. 171) saying:

"Among their modern critics Professor Goldziher has subjected them to a searching examination in the light of modern canons of historical criticism, and arrives at the conclusion that they are, on the whole, untrustworthy there arises a very important question as to how far they embody the pre-Islamic usages of Arabia which were in some cases left intact, and in others modified by the Prophet."

"The Shari'a values (ahkām) resulting from this application are in a sense specific to that people; and since their observance is not an end in itself they cannot be strictly enforced in the case of future generations." (p. 172)

In Amin's adoption this reads as follows (Yawm al-Islam p. 196):

ورغم ان الاستاذ جولديزير نقدها نقدا علميا حديثا و ابان ان كثيرا منها مزيف
ماخوذ من شرائع اخرى دست في الاسلام فانها اصل من اصول التشريع
الاسلامى- نعم ان كثيرا من الاحكام الشرعية اسست على تقاليد كانت جاهلية و

اقرها الاسلام لانها لا تزال وفق بيئته فاذا تغيرت البيئـة لم يعد للعمل بهذه
الاحاديث محلـ.

Reconstruction, p. 172

"It was perhaps in view of this that Abu Hanifa made practically no use of these traditions. The fact that he introduced the Principle of istihsan ... throws further light on the motives which determined his attitude towards this source."

Yawm al-'Islām, p. 196:

و ربما كان هو الداعى ايضا الى تخرج الامام ابى حنيفة من الاحاديث و العمل بها
و اقتصاره على نحو سبعة عشر حديثا، و انما اعتمد اكثر ما اعتمد على
الاستحسان.

Reconstruction, p. 1973:

"The third source of Mohmmedan Law is *ijma'* which is, in my opinion, perhaps the most important legal notion in Islam. The growth of republican spirit, and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great step in advance."

Yawn al-Islām, p. 197:

توسع ابو حنيفة فيه و لكن مع الاسف طبقه تطبيقا ارسططا ليسيا

Speaking about the fourth basis of Muslim Law, *giyās*, and the school of Abū Hanifa, Iqbāl writes (Reconstruction, p. 176):

"The application of Aristotelian logic, ... was likely to prove exceedingly harmful in the preliminary stages of legal development."

Compare *Yawm al-Islām*, p. 197:

Quoting from Sarkashi, Iqbāl holds that (Reconstruction, p. 178):

..."*ijtihād* for later doctors is easier than for the earlier doctors. Indeed the commentaries on the *Qur'ān* and *Sunna* have been compiled and multiplied to such an extent that the *mujahid* of today has more material for interpretation than he needs."

Accordingly, Amin says (*Yawm al-Islām*, p. 191):

و الا جتهاد في عصرنا اسهل من الا جتهاد في عصرهم، فامطابع نشرت
عشرات التفسيرات للقرآن الكريم، و عشرات الكتب في جمع الحديث، و
اصبحت المطالعة في الكتاب تغني عن الرحلات المختلفة الى ممر و الانداس و
الحجاز، فقد كفانا المحدثون مئونة ذلك.

THE CONCEPT OF THE MAGIAN SOUL IN OSWALD SPENGLER'S

Decline of the West: **An Evaluation**

Kamal Muhammad Habib

Spengler holds that one of the important attributes of the Magian Soul is that for it "the civil and the ecclesiastical are identical". He further holds that as a civil and religious authority, consensus is a cultural characteristic of the Magian Soul. Identification of the religious and secular and the institution of consensus (idjma) in Islam were consequently treated by him as sufficient indications of the Magian nature of Islam. We shall discuss his contention by taking up the problem of consensus in the West as well as in Islam.

Consensus, in one form or the other, has been operative not only in the history of Europe but of the world. It was consensus that expelled James II from England; consensus too it was that resulted in the Religious Peace of Augusburg (1555 A.D.) based on *cujus regis ejus regis* ("he who rules a region prescribes its religion"). Might one not say that this is the European equivalent of what Spengler says of the Magian culture? The punishment of Catholics in Lutheran areas and of the latter in Catholic areas through banishment, usually in the community of like-minded believers, further strengthens this suspicion. In the event,

consensus operated in Europe till the Age of Reformation and immediately afterwards, and from the time of the Battle of Lutzen there have been no religious wars in Europe.

Since during the Sassanid period the original Zoroastrian base was decorated with and almost hidden by the filigree work of alien philosophies, the Sassanids too had to entail compromises. Both Mani and Mazdak, in turn, were victims to the turning wheel of fortune. If Spengler contends that in the Magian culture, "civil and ecclesiastical are identical", it was a feature of Europe down to the Reformation period too. About St. Augustine, one of the founder fathers of Western Christianity, Spengler remarks: "With him there was not and could not be any question of an infallible Papal ego or of any sort of authority, to settle dogmatic truths; that would completely destroy the Magian concept of consensus."¹²⁶ This means that St. Augustine Was a Magian.

In Islam consensus is prescribed for juristic purposes, to be used on the basis of the Qur'ān and hadith. It is, finally, because of the legal thoroughness of the fiqh, that an infallible religious authority like the Pope in Roman Catholicism is not theoretically necessary in Islam. Spengler relates consensus to the negation of individual ego in the Magian culture. According to him, it believes in one *Pneuma* which entails that the individual ego is buried under the avalanche of the collective ego. In Judaism, there is in the ultimate sense little or no individual ego. The halaka which

¹²⁶ D.W., 11, p. 243.

determines the Jews' existence is mainly collectivistic and the history of Israel during the period of the Judges amply exemplifies this collective spirit. With Christianity the situation is rather peculiar. St. Paul postulates two kinds of men: the pneumatic (spiritual) man and the sarkical or psychical man. According to the Pauline view, a non-Christian man, however high his moral and intellectual attainments, would all the same remain within the boundary of the human; but by receiving the unction of the Spirit of God or *Pneuma* on embracing Christianity, he becomes fully conscious of the inspiration vouchsafed to him: in effect, he is born again. Applied to the Christian concept of the ego, Spengler has said something very correct; but in Islam which lays constant stress on *ijtihād* (the progression of the individual ego), individual and the collective egos supplement and qualify each other: each would be impossible without the other.

Another aspect of one single *Pneuma* is that both Islam and Christianity embrace diverse people so that in both the *Pneuma* should be one and multiple. In Judaism, on the other hand, the people and the ethnic identity of these people are identical to a degree rare in the history of any people, so that their *Pneuma* should converge on to the point of self-preservation as a race. The Pauline concept, on the other hand, transposed the original one *Pneuma* concept from a community of the like-minded people of a race to a community of like-minded believers of different races. Islam carries the idea further by emphasizing and enjoining the spirit of *ijtihād* on the believers, so that their individual ego may keep them away from becoming a drag on the society.

Reverting now to the question of idjma in the sense postulated by Spengler, the pas in this case should be given to Judaism in which since the days of Judges (ca., B.C. 1425), with the ex-communication of the tribe of Benjamin from the fold of the believers, the emphasis on ethnic purity has become a virtual desideratum;... for the children of Israel have sworn, saying, 'Cursed be he that giveth a wife to Benjamin'" (Judges, 21: 18).

Thus in Judaism race and religion, as in the Sassanid Zoroastrian exiles from Iran after the fall of the Sassanids, became one. What applies to the Sassanid Zoroastrian exiles from Iran, applies more or less, to the Jews in diaspora. Islam and Christianity, on the other hand, as world religions, cannot wed religion and race, and therefore Spengler's contention en regard *Pneuma* as a Magian characteristic could perhaps justifiably apply to the earliest stage of Christianity prior to the appearance of St. Paul on the scene with his formulation of the sarkical-*Pneumatic*-man concept. Such a concept obviously has to do away with the identification of race with religion which the other Apostles had inherited from Judaism.

It is now worth examining whether civilization which Spengler adumbrates as an entirely new culture arising during the Augustan period was really a new culture or whether it was a continuation of an older civilization having undergone modifications in the wake of epoch-shaking changes. Dawson's observation is:"...certainly the new elements in later Hellenistic civilization may be explained as due to Oriental influences, but

these influences came, not from the budding energies of a new People, but from older people whose cultural development was even older than that of the Hellenes.”¹²⁷

Toynbee extends his support to Dawson's view that "the Gospels and primitive Christianity belong rather to the last stage of the Judaeo-Aramaen culture — a culture which expressed its ' heroic ' phase a thousand years earlier in the sage of Samson, of Deborah of Gideon, and the like.”¹²⁸ He therefore concludes that " Islam, Christianity, and the several civilizations that these two regions have mothered, are all products, either direct or indirect, of an identical compost consisting of both Syriac and Hellenic elements.”¹²⁹

Muhammad, the Prophet of God (blessings on him), represents an uninterrupted line of prophets, of which the Qur'ān as revealed to him represents culmination. From the Muslim point of view, of course, the link with the Israelite prophets is unquestionable.

There are, in addition, other civilizations in the classification of which Spengler departs from his own thesis. One such instance is that of Carthage, which normally he should have, on his analogy, classified as Magian. It is true that Carthage, though Semitic through and through in origin, ultimately emerged as

¹²⁷ Christopher Dawson, *The Dynamics of World History*, p. 382.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

¹²⁹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, XII, 458.

Hellenic during the time of Hannibal; but, then, might not one be justified in ascribing to it a pseudomorphic transfiguration?

The reasons which Spengler advances for assigning Carthage the Apollonian orientation are: "...Their ship-building was in Roman times more classical than Phoenician, their state was organized as a polis, and their educated people, like Hannibal, were familiar with Greek."¹³⁰ In assigning to the Carthaginian culture the Classical orientation, Spengler is contradicting his own otherwise remarkable hypothesis of pseudomorphosis on the basis of which he explains the revolt of the Syriac against the alien classical culture shortly after the emergence of Islam. Carthage was close to Egypt which was fast becoming Hellenic, not merely by the momentum generated by pseudomorphosis but also by the immigration of Greeks into it, and in the north loomed large a state that was becoming very powerful, Rome. If Carthage really was Hellenized as Spengler claims, it became so, not so much by choice as through necessity. According to Spengler, one of the principal features of the Classical man was his contact with the immediate and the absence of memory in the sense that we understand it, but the Carthaginians maintained close contacts with Tyre, whence they had migrated between 1200 and 1000 B. C. If the Carthaginian ship-building was Classical, its warfare was not. Elephants were something new for the Romans, and contributed in no small measure to their early reverses. Similarly, the Carthaginian pantheon was also Semitic, with Baal-Amon, the

¹³⁰ D.W., H. n., p. 323.

god, and Tan'ith, the goddess. It also continued with the Syriac practice of human immolation. In sum Carthage (or Kart-hadasht or "New Town") was the transplanted child of a Semite parent culture. It was a polis, too, not in the sense that Athens and Rome were, even though it was an oligarchic republic; it was a city-state with wilderness as its hinterland. Nor do its works of art reflect the proportion and chiseling of the Classical works of art: they are essentially vulgar, the handicraft of a trading community. The Hellenic influence on Carthage thus can only be explained on the basis of pseudomorphosis. And why, to stretch the point further, should Hannibal who knew Greek be regarded as classical, but Plotinus who wrote good Greek and wrote *Enneads* be regarded as Magian? On Eunapius' authority Plotinus hailed *Enneads* from Lyco (i.e., probably Lycopolis in Upper Egypt, the modern Assiut), but Spengler in spite of the slenderest of evidences on Plotinus' birth, but not his ethnic origin, regards him as a Magian, despite his Roman name.

Hughes contends that "Spengler's concept of pseudomorphosis is, if anything, too imaginative."¹³¹ Be that as it may, there is little doubt that the hypothesis can unlock many a Gordian knot of history. It could, for example, explain the encrustation of Islam and Christianity by Magianism and animism, the configuration of the Sassanid Iran, and the orientation of the Syriac culture during Classical domination. One would however hardly agree with Spengler's view of Russia since

¹³¹ H. Stuart Hughes, *Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate*, p. 74.

the time of Peter the Great, since which time in his opinion Russia has been under Faustian influence through pseudomorphosis.¹³² Here his Central European mind fails utterly to grasp the broad humanism of the giants of Russian literature, Turgenev Dostoievski, Tolstoi, and Berdayev,

A comparative study of the religions in the periods both immediately preceding and following the Christian era would, however, show that, although the concept of a universal order governing the whole course of nature finds its fullest expression in the Greek philosophy, other cultures also shared a similar approach. Confucius, for instance, taught "that the law of social life must be a reflection and a participation in the universal divine order which rules the universe, and which is manifested primarily in the stars."¹³³ Hsuntze's Book (IX, 11, translated by H. Dubbs) also says:

"The Superior Man brings Heaven and Earth into order; the Superior Man forms a triad with Heaven and Earth; he is the controller of all things, the father and mother of the people."

With certain reservations, however, one might justifiably state that such an approach approximates to the early anthropomorphic Hebrew approach towards the understanding of a Supreme Godhead. The religious literature of China also abounds in views verging on the latter-day Vedantic and Platonic portrayals of the

¹³² D.W., II, 192-4.

¹³³ Christopher Dawson, *Progress and Religion*, p. 105.

existence of One and illusive nature of the external world. Says Kien-Wenn, the Chinese emperor of the 6th century A.D.:

Do I sleep? Do I wake?

Does that which I love exist?...

Am I not myself part of the great Seer,

Of the great Dreamer, who in the long night,

Dreams the great dream?¹³⁴

This is not very different from Sankara's concept of maya. Unlike the Semitic and Iranian cultures, China's was a more insular culture, and the correspondences which such ideas share with the Classical and Hindu religious views can presumably be ascribed to independent thinking and not to subsumption. Whether such thinking characterized the whole of the Chinese civilization as the "absolute metaphysical view of life" characterized Hinduism too after the decline of Buddhism is a different story; but it is, nevertheless, there. Such a correspondence of thinking should tell on Spengler's hypothesis that each culture has, because of its individual characteristics, its own individual soul. How, for instance, would Spengler explain the Chinese civilization on the terms of reference which he has adopted for the Magian, Classical, and Faustian civilizations? Even his theory of pseudomorphosis would serve to explain such parallelisms only to a very limited degree; the only answer is to be found, in spite of the individual

¹³⁴ Tr. Welger, *La Chire a traverers les ages*, p. 166.

differences inherent in each culture, in the effort of each culture to cope with the expanding and changing world-vision which it has to face.

Hughes has criticized Spengler on the score of the two charts which the latter has appended at the end of Volume I of the Decline. It is not the intention of this author to question whether Spengler's contention that the ethical socialism of the West today constitutes the "spread of a final world-sentiment" and that "the extinction of spiritual active force" is correct: such questionings lie beyond the purview of this essay. But his view that since 1000 A.D. after the age of Al-Khwarizimi, Ibn-i Qurra, and Al-Biruni, the creative force in the Muslim world, has been on the wane is entirely correct and cogent, however pejorative and however pessimistic such a view might appear to us. And the history of the Muslim world since that period has been substantiating Spengler's contention that any civilization that yields to the benumbing invasion of the softer emotional data of life (which in turn enmesh man into the net of escapism from the realities of life; and life is paved with gold only for those that have earned it with the sweat of their brow, and which remains one of the hadith of Muhammad, the Prophet of God, on the Arab poet, Antara) by living

in the world of the "lyrical" instead of the "technical," in the realm of the "paint-brush" than the "sea," in the world of witticisms and fancies than induction and ratiocination, in the world of the brown study and phantasy than that of ijthad,

unconsciously earmarks itself to be waylaid into the bye-ways of history. The Muslims, overcome by a succession of upsets surrendered scientific rationalism and took to empiricism, forswearing experimentation. And the goals of empiric-ism, it is quite clear, are limited. Forgotten is the corpus of the work bequeathed to us by giants like Al-Razi, Abu Ali Sina, and Ibn-i Haitham, and other Muslim masters. Surprising though it might seem to us in this age, our forefathers had even gone so far as to have formulated the concept of "lock and key" in body metabolism, a concept which was seized upon by the German chemotherapist, Paul Ehrlich, towards the end of the last century, and who converted it into the full-fledged science of chemotherapy.

There is little doubt, however, that Spengler's *Decline* is aimed at the eulogization of the greatness of the Fautian culture. We have also in part refuted his formulation of the Magian civilization, and will refute it further in this essay; but an examination of Spengler's view that the Muslim culture has been virtually stagnant, in spite of a few empires flowering for a while here and there, is essentially correct.

Another Magian characteristic which Spengler adduces in favour of his formulation of the Magian civilization's existence is that of paradosis (elevation) in the writing of religious literature. As an extreme example of this style he cites St. Paul's Galatians (4: 24-6):

24. Which things are an allegory: for these are the two covenants: the one from the mount Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, which is Agar.

25 For this Agar is mount Sinai in Arabia and answereth to Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage with her children.

26. But Jerusalem which is above is free, which is mother of us all.

But the technique employed by St. Paul is only in part based on paradises; it is substantially Greco-Latin too. The Greco-Latin rhetorical technique depends upon the three techniques of ethos (establishment of the speaker's on the writer's character as being sufficiently trustworthy to impart authority to his works), pathos (arousal of feelings in the audience or the readers), and logos (by depending upon the apparent proof of his position through the power of words). The rhetorical arrangement or sequence generally comprises: exordium (preface), partitio (statement of the problem and establishment thereof through elaboration via the medium of description), partitio (division of narration into stages), confirmatio (the burden of discussion), suasio (persuasion), and peroratio (peroration). Other very powerful tools in the hands of men like Cicero and St. Paul are those which make the readers or audience benevolent (favorably disposed), attentus (attentive), and docile (willing to listen or to read).

St. Paul's technique, as exemplified by Galatians, has almost all of these characteristics, particularly those of the ethos and

pathos."Which things are an allegory" is the equivalent of the exordium, while "for these are the two covenants" represents narratio and partitio."But Jerusalem which is above" is peroratory and enthymematic—that is to say, one of the propositions is implied but not stated. Thus, the whole style (with of course the acicular Aramaean mind of St. Paul everywhere in evidence) is cast in the Greco-Latin mould. The literary style of the Qur'an, on the other hand, is unique; the impact of the images and statements is direct and telling. No peroration is needed when the words are from God. When directness is the overpowering force, no rhetorical techniques are needed; nor are any disputations to be settled. The method of the Qur'ān is something entirely different from the technique of paradosis employed by St. Paul who had to carry Christian message beyond Tarsus to the Greeks and the slaves of Rome. One of the principal attributes of prophethood is tadhkia (purification of the audience through contact with the prophet). This is everywhere in evidence in the New Testament, but in the Qur'an with the finality of prophethood, the process of tadhkia has reached its ultima Thule in sublimation and mental purgation. Iqbal's view, therefore, that Spengler was just not aware of the significance of the finality of prophethood in Islam and therefore of the meaning of Islam is entirely correct and just. Moreover, St. Paul, in spite of his Hebrew heritage, was in many ways more of a Roman. He realized that the approach of St. Peter as Judaism manque would only succeed in making it into another sect of the Jews. The Pauline Epistles, Corinthians, and Ephesians, all abound in controversia, the rhetorical means

whereby the writer or the speaker can plead for public support. This style, Greco-Latin in the main, has been transmitted to Cardinal Newman's *Apologia pro vita sua* and John Milton's *Defensio pro se*.

To elaborate further on Spengler's contention that *paradosis* as a style could lead us further on the spoor of the detection of a Magian unit, discernible even in spite of the several components comprising it, one cannot, perhaps, dispute the fact that there is bound to be some resemblance between the Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic languages. In the Qur'ān however, whatever these resemblances be in the works besides the Qur'ān, the departure is sharply obvious from any previous works in these languages, with rhetorics replaced by statement, exordium by awe, and the human' ethos by the assertion of the sovereignty of the Godhead.

We have seen for ourselves that Spengler's approach is rather far-fetched insofar as his concept of a unitary Magian civilization is concerned. It has already been shown that according to Spengler, when the Magian culture flashed forth in world history during the Augustan period, it contained in it elements older than those of the Hellenic civilization. Neither on ethnic, linguistic, and intellectual grounds is it reasonable to class the Sassanid-Iranian civilization with the Semitic, nor the Carthaginian with the Classical, when both these civilizations could have been approached through Spengler's own brilliant hypothesis of pseudomorphosis. Even otherwise also one would not be justified in grouping the Sassanid-Iranian civilization with the Semitic-

Israelite and Semitic-Arab civilizations, whose intuitive-visionary works constitute the most unique record in the religious experiences of man.

Let us, for a single moment, admit ourselves into Spengler's analogy that a culture has a feel of its own into which several and manifold factors have coalesced, and that the mere existence of a people as a biological community without contributing anything substantial or creative does not confer upon them the entitlement of a culture, as correct. Now, Spengler has tried to show that the spirit of Euiope has been anti-classical in the main, down from 1000 A.D. The period that precedes the Faustian civilization he calls the "culture period", as an example of which he cites the Merovingian pre-Carolingian Era (500-900 A.D.).¹³⁵ But with all his justifications in this direction, the weakest link in the Spenglerian argument remains, and this weak link might equally be applied to the birth of the Magian civilization and the period preceding it. Spengler has not been able to cogently account for the evolution of the Faustian culture-soul in which infinite space and time predominate, in which the will remains no longer subject to a blind Ananke but spirals upwards, in which introspection becomes more pronounced than in any other culture, in which music becomes contrapuntal and symphonic, and, finally, which, amongst other things, pictures life in alternating light and shade, from the Classical civilization. In other words, the author of the *Decline* has not been able to show to us whether the many of the

¹³⁵ D.W., I, Table II, "Contemporary" Cultural Epoch.

characteristics which we associate with Faustian culture were resident in the latter-day Classical-Roman world, albeit in their embryonic form. It is this chrysalid which has metamorphozed itself into the Faustian adult, and on the same analogy one might establish that the Magian civilization also represents uninterrupted growth since its birth several thousand years ago in the areas known to us as the Fertile Crescent and Arabia.

It would be a futile exercise on our present purposes to discuss whether Rome should be grouped with Greece to constitute one Classical culture-unit. In spite of the many differences which Rome displays--its pragmatic approach, emphasis on the imposition of a juristic pattern on the people, and so on—Toynbee is one with Spengler on this score at least.¹³⁶ What is, however, more important for our immediate purposes is to note that the world-vision of Rome was undergoing rapid expansion. Syrian (particularly during the reigns of Septimius Severus, Caracalla, and Elagabalus), Hellenic, Zoroastrian (as attested by the Migration of the god, Mithra, from Iran to Rome as Mithras), and Aramaean influences made themselves increasingly felt by Rome, and made the Empire of Rome something very different from the early Roman Republic, which, at least in spirit, was at best a city-state. Many of the Empire's notable figures were ethnically non-Roman. Among the most prominent are Vespasian (Etruscan); Trajan, Hadrian, and Seneca (Spaniards); and Constantine and Diocletian (Illyrian). The

¹³⁶ Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, XII, 377.

Empire of Rome after Augustus thus became a very complex affair, and more so with ethnic dilution from its provinces and the influx of denizens from far-flung areas.

But even otherwise also, aside from outside influences, the glimmer of complexity is already visible in Virgil's *Aeneid*. It would rather alone suffice to show that the art of myth making—with the disappearance of circumstances that lent themselves to this art—came with considerable difficulty to the poet, and in the result the emphasis has now shifted from plot to thought. Gone is the Homeric delight and spontaneity in telling a good story; the gulf between thought and myth had become for less easily bridgeable. The natural in Homer would thus naturally become artificial in Virgil, and the latter therefore at times almost strikes as being the blind poet's epigone. Fate is, no doubt, still there; but it is no longer the blind Ananke of the Attic tragedy; the Schicksal or Destiny has now been transformed into the destiny of Rome, outbidding, consciously or unconsciously, the hand of fate. Virgil has finally taken away its sting. His hero displays a will-power that is Faustian in proportions, and is bent on just one purpose, the founding of Rome. And the gods, too, have almost embarked on their departure towards the haven of allegory, being at best pale, shadowy figures.

Dido is even more than a tragic figure; she almost symbolizes obstruction through her pathetic widowhood, sincerity and love for Aeneas, and determined enmity through her curse. In symbolizing all these, she, primitively at least, anticipates the

roundness of characters in the modern European fiction and drama.

Lucretius, in his *De Rerum Natura* (On the Nature of Things), accelerates the speed with which Rome is moving towards the modern European world. Abolishing the gods, he ushers in a mechanistic vision which one can discern beneath the overlay of his Stoicism:

For him, as truly as for any Christian believer, faith is the evidence of things not seen. He must always be telling that the dark principle of this world is invisible. Its elements, secret and viewless, lurk beneath, behind. They are far beyond the range of the senses,...'Truth for him is a hidden thing not palpable except to searching reasons'¹³⁷.

Death, for Lucretius, should hold no terrors for man in its train, because beyond his earthly span of life nothing awaits him. This is not something equivalent to the Classical man's concept of concern with the present, with the bodily only, which Spengler emphasizes time and again in the *Decline*, but a revolt. There may be something unseen but it is not the will of the gods."World fear"has been transfigured into resignation, something not very different from, say, Matthew Arnold's resignation:

This terror, then, this darkness of the mind,
Nor sunrise with its flaring spokes of light,

¹³⁷ Mark Von Dorbe, *Great Poems of Western Literature*, p. 133.

Nor glittering arrows of morning can disperse,
But only Nature's aspect and her law.

IMAN AND ISLAM IN THE QUR'AN

Dr. Sheila McDonough

This study is based on a compilation of the usages of various forms of iman and islām as listed in Flugel's Concordance. It is perhaps significant that the majority of these pages are those with the verbal form of the word. In the case of iman, the most common form is *āmanū*, of which there are two hundred and forty-four instances.

This seems to suggest that the Qur'ān in addressing those who believe was exhorting them to act in a certain manner, or to orient themselves and their actions in a particular direction, rather than to possess 'a certain abstract substance (to have faith).

The pattern which recurred most frequently was *yā ayyuha alladhina amanū* which is translated 'O ye who believe'. There are fifty-five instances. These contexts suggest that belief is an on-going active process, and that those who believe cannot just rest content in their certain salvation, but are in constant need of reformation and improvement. In all of these instances, the invocation 'O ye who believe' is followed by a command to some particular action.

Believers are exhorted not to follow Satan (24:21), to fast (2: 179), to take precautions in battle (4: 73), to remember God's favour towards them (33: 9), not to indulge in usury (2: 278), to fear God and crave the means to approach Him (5: 39), to stand

steadfast (5: 11), not to be treacherous (8: 27), and not to take idolaters as patrons (4: 143).

Several instances suggest that belief is an active response to God, helping him (47: 8). One such instance reads:

“O ye who believe! answer God and His Apostle when He calls you to that which quickens you.” (8: 24).

This would seem to indicate that response to Revelation is being ‘Quickened’, coming alive, and that it is a process which continues after the believer has entered the community of the faithful.

The second most frequently recurring pattern was *amanū wa ‘amilū Sālihāt* which was translated ‘believe and do right’. There were thirty-six instances of this.

The promise that those who believe and do right will enter Paradise was frequent. It was stated that the unjust are the opposite of those who believe and do right (3: 50). Several times it was stated that those who believe and do right are the best of creatures (98: 6), They need have no fear (6: 48), they may expect God to support them (26: 227), and to answer their prayers (42: 25). It would seem significant that the phrase ‘believe and do right’ recurs so regularly the implication would seem to be that ‘to believe’ and ‘to do right’ are parts of one process, which are not to be separated—the process of entering into an active relationship with God. The contexts mentioned above all seem to indicate that

God also acts in response to the human action of believing and doing right, and that His response is to help and to reward.

There were three instances where to believe was related to fighting in God's cause.

Belief in the sense of acceptance of the unseen is indicated twice:

“Say to those who believe not, ‘Act according to your power; verily, We are acting. And wait yet; verily, We are waiting too!’” “God's are the unseen things of the heavens and of the earth; and unto Him the affairs doth all return.” (11: 122)

Belief in the unseen is thus equated with waiting in expectancy for the hidden to be made known; belief is certainty that the unseen will be known, and hence ordering one's life in expectation of a certain judgment. This seems very closely parallel to the Pauline affirmation:

“For we are saved by hope: but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for?” (Romans, 8: 24)

If one asks what is the object of belief according to the Qur'ān' one receives the impression that the first and most emphatic exhortation of the Qur'ān is the commandment to believe in the Judgment Day. There are instances of this commandment.

“when the Day comes, then it will be too late to believe. (6: 159)

“And when it has fallen—will ye believe in it now?” (10:52)”
Those who believe not would hurry it on; and those who believe shrink with terror at it and know that it is true.” (42: 17)

If it is right to consider that *imān* is certainty that the Day will come, then perhaps one can say that this truth which is to be believed is both objective and subjective. It is objective in the sense that the eventual arrival of the Day is posited as an objective fact like the arrival of any other day. It is subjective in the sense that the response in the believer’s heart—what the waiting for the Day means to him, and how it affects his life—is necessarily subjective. On the Day, she will be alone.

Other phrases which are regularly used to denote the objects of belief are:

“Belief in God and His Apostles, and the Book which He hath revealed to His Apostle, and the Books which He sent down before; for whoso disbelieves in God, and His angels, and His Apostle and the Last Day, has erred a wide error.” (4: 135)

These additional objects of belief would seem complementary rather than opposed or even extraneous to the central warning to believe in the Day. Belief in God Who will judge men on the Day; to believe in God without believing in the Day would seem false in the perspective of the Qur’ānic imperatives.

The significance of works can also perhaps be best understood by viewing works as the response of the individual to the expectancy of the coming of the Day. The individual is often

warned to believe and do right because he must fear the Day. It would be wrong, however, to deduce from this that imān means simply fear. On the contrary, as Ringgren has pointed out, the sense of the word imān as used both in pre-Islamic poetry and in the Qurʾān is the opposite of fear. Ringgren has maintained that the words related to imān carry connotations of security, trust and confidence, and that such words imply the opposite condition to fear. In the Qurʾān there are several instances where such words are used in the sense of trust and certainty. For example, it is narrated of Joseph that the king thought him worthy to be placed in a position of permanent ‘trust’ (12: 54). In this instance, the translation ‘trust’ indicates that the meaning is completely reliable and secure. One of the early Meccan sūrahs contains the promise:

“So let them serve the Lord of this hour Who feeds them against hunger and makes them safe against fear.” (106: 3)

In at least one instance al-amānah has the meaning of a responsibility laid upon men, in the sense of something which is entrusted to them, a trust.

Verily, we offered the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to bear it, and shrank from it; but man bore it.” (33: 72)

It is, however, certainly true that believers are often warned to fear God and the Day, and disbelievers are condemned because they jeer and mock and do not fear.

“They only believe in our signs who ... call upon their Lord with fear and hope.” (32:15)

This is yet another example of paradox resulting from the mode of expression of Semitic prophecy. Believers should fear, and should also be free from fear because God is both righteous and trustworthy. Those who are proud and hypocritical are warned to fear because He knows them and will judge them, and those who are humble and sincere, and who give alms and obey are assured of their reward and their freedom from fear.

Works should lead to no fear if the works are sincerely offered in gratitude to God; but works in themselves are no guarantee of salvation, because God knows the heart, the intention, that lies behind the works, and will pass judgment on the Day.

There are three contexts where increase of faith is mentioned.

“That those who have been given the Book may be certain, and that those who believe may be increased in faith.” (74: 31).

These contexts seem to imply that the Qurʾān as it continued to come to the believers effected a continuous process of growth in understanding and faith in the hearts of the persons who responded. The believers grew closer to God’s purpose for them, and the unbelievers, as they continued to mock and scorn the Revelation, grew increasingly separated.

Many of the contexts of imān describe the qualities of those who do not believe. Disbelief is often equated with failure to recognize the signs from God. Many of these signs are the destructions wrought by God among the peoples who rejected the warnings delivered by the former prophets.

Several contexts emphasize hypocrisy as one of the major aspects of disbelief.

“And God bears witness that the hypocrites are liars.... That is because they believed and then disbelieved, wherefore is a stamp set on their hearts so that they do not understand.” (63: 2)

There are a number of contexts which indicate that God hardens the hearts of those who disbelieve. A characteristic instance is as follows:

“Verily, those who disbelieve, it is the same to them if ye warn them or if ye warn them not; they will not believe... God has set a seal upon their hearts and on their hearing... They would deceive God and those who do believe: but they deceive only themselves and they do not perceive.” (2: 7 and 8).

In each of these instances, it appears that to disbelieve is equated with refusal to perceive, refusal to recognize the significance of the signs. It seems that disbelief is willful rejection of the warnings, and that God responds by abandoning the disbelievers to their fate. In no instances does the hardening of hearts appear as an arbitrary act of God against innocent men; it is

always related to the activities and attitudes of those who scorn the warnings and the prophets.

The contexts of the term ‘they do not believe’ indicate that ‘to disbelieve’ is an active attitude towards life as a whole. In the early Meccan surahs, those who disbelieve are those who heed not the warnings of the Judgment Day. They laugh at those who believe (83: 29). They quarrel, especially over theology (16: 43); they value the things of this world (12: 107), and worship idols. Thus the opposite of Imān is an active attribute of character; it is the attitude of heedlessness and scorn and pride.

It is certainly clear that *lorān* is often used in the Qur’ān with reference to those who follow the warnings from the former prophets.

There are a number of instances where the term is used in connection with Abraham. Abraham warned against idolatry, and those who believed his warning were promised security and guidance (6: 77). There are also eleven instances where the term is used in connection with Moses. In addition there are twenty-two instances where the term is used with reference to the warnings brought by other prophets after Abraham and Moses. A typical instance of such a verse is as follows:

“And when our order came We saved Hud, and those who believe with him, by mercy from Us; and We saved them from harsh torment. That (tribe of) ‘Ad denied the signs of the Lord, and rebelled against His apostles, and followed the bidding of

every headstrong tyrant, They were followed in this world by a curse, and on the resurrection day—'Did not 'Ad disbelieve their Lord! away with 'Ad the people of Hud'." (12: 62)

It appears that *Imān* was an attribute of the persons who responded to the messages brought by Abraham, Moses and the former prophets, who feared God, and lived in expectancy of the Judgment Day. This suggests that *Imān* was not restricted to those who responded to the *Qur'ān* but applied to all who responded to the warnings of the former prophets.

The *Qur'ān* refers several times to the matter of belief and disbelief among the Jews and the Christians in the lifetime of Muhammad. The people of the Book are severely criticised for their quarrelling and their disobedience. It seems clear, however, that some among these people have the attribute of *Imān*.

“They are not all alike. Of the people of the Book there is a nation upright.... They believe in God, and in the last Day, and bid what is responsible, and forbid what is wrong, and vie in charity; these are among the righteous.

What ye do of good surely God will not deny, for God knows those who fear.” (3: 106)

In another instance, the *Qur'ān* states:” And We sent Noah and Abraham; and placed in their seed prophecy and Book; and some of them are guided, though many of them are workers of abomination!

Then we followed up their footsteps with our apostles; and we followed them up with Jesus, the son of Mary; and we gave him the gospel; and We placed in the hearts of those who followed him kindness and compassion. But mockery, they invented it;... But we gave to those who believe amongst them their hire; though many amongst them were workers of abomination....

That the people of the Book may know that they cannot control aught of God's grace; and that grace is in God's hands. He gives it to whom He will." (57: 24 ff.)

Another verse says:

“ And God has struck out a parable: two men, one of them dumb, able to do nothing, a burden to his lord; wherever he directs him he comes not with success ; is he to be held equal with him who bids what is just and who is on the right way?

Do they not see the birds subjected in the vault of the sky—none holds them in but God: verily, in that is a sign unto a people who believe.” (16: 81).

The implication here would seem to be that for man to be properly subjected to God, as the birds in the vault of the sky, would be for him to be active and creative, on the right way. It appears that the ‘bad’ person is the man useless to God, able to do nothing, negative, sterile.

Further contexts of 'Islām' suggest that there is a close relation-ship between Islam and good works, and also that God is an active agent in leading men to submission.

Conclusion

It appears that Imān and Islām in the Qur'ān are both attributes of persons in action, terms which distinguish certain persons in opposition to other persons. Persons who have these attributes will be recognizable by their fruit—justice, charity, humility. Persons who do not have these attributes will be recognizable by their fruit—injustice, idolatry, mutual quarrelling, claims to exclusive control of God's grace, and the rejection of prophets.

The mode of expression in the Qur'ān is the mode characteristic of Semitic prophecy, that is, the mode of exhortation in particular situations. Hence paradox in Semitic prophecy results not from inherent contradiction, but from the fact that the prophecies are a revelation of God's judgment on particular situations, and the judgment varies with the situation. Thus the exhortation to fear God is a warning directed against those who are proud, heedless of the coming judgment, and unjust. The assurance that those who believe need not fear is an affirmation that sincere response to guidance from God will assuredly receive a just reward.

It is true that the Qurʾān warns of harsh judgment on hypocrites and liars, but it is difficult to understand how anyone could imagine that the New Testament promises a more easy fate for such persons.

“Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites ! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men’s bones and all uncleanness.” (Matt. 23: 27)

REVIEWS

Ideology of the Future by Dr. M. Rafiuddin (3rd ed. Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1961), pp. 480. Price Rs. 18.00.

The third edition (1970) of the book has appeared after the death of the writer, who placed before thinking men the world over the remarkable concept that the urge for ideals is the real, the ultimate and the sole dynamic power of all human activity. This is the central idea of the book, and the writer affirms that the urge for ideals can form the basis of a solution of all social and political problems and of a real and permanent unity of the human race.

The book deserves to be read by men of culture, intellect and understanding in all countries - men who undoubtedly have an

urge for ideals, who are keen to know the meaning of the present crisis in human affairs and the future of man.

The writer has endeavoured to provide an answer to the following questions:

What is the purpose and function of the urge for ideals in the nature of man?

What is the relation of this urge to the economic conditions of a society?

How can the human urge for ideals be properly satisfied?

Are all ideals equally satisfactory? If not, what are the qualities of the ideal that is most satisfactory to the nature of man?

What is the relation of the human urge for ideals to the animal instincts of man which have a biological compulsion like sex, food, pugnacity, etc.?

What is the relation of this urge to various departments of human activity such as religion, science, philosophy, and politics?

What is its relation to the ultimate reality of the universe and to the purpose of creation and evolution?

Imperfect ideals, says the writer, mark transitory phases in the history of man and are only mistaken substitutes for the most perfect ideal of the future. Since the forces of our nature are driving us towards this ideal every moment of our life, the total

result of all progress of science and philosophy will be to lend greater support to it.

By explaining the urge of the unconscious mind as an urge for Beauty and Perfection, the theory of this book gives a rational and intellectual support to all the great religions of the world.

Dr. Rafiuddin deplors that while the great philosophers and psychologists agree that man has an urge for ideals, they disagree as regards the source, the meaning and the purpose of this urge in the nature of man and, therefore, as regards its relation to his activities. He says that they arrived at faulty conclusions. The another gives the following analysis of their views on the subject:

According to Freud, the urge for ideals has its source in the sex instinct, and its object is to provide man with a substitute activity (in the form of religion, politics, morality, art and science) for the thwarted and obstructed activity of the sexual instinct.

Adler is of the opinion that the urge results from the instinct of self-assertion. When an individual is unable to satisfy a particular desire for power, he creates the desire for a suitable ideal and strives after it to compensate for his sense of inferiority.

McDougall thinks that the ideal impulse is the outcome of a combination of all the instincts (known as the sentiment of self-regard) and subserves the particular instinct of self-assertion.

Karl Marx has advanced the view that ideals are rooted in the economic urge of man and are no more than distorted reflections of his economic conditions.

Dr. Rafiuddin explains that the urge for ideals is neither derived from nor subserves any of the human impulses known as the instincts the object of which is the maintenance of life, but is man's natural and independent urge for Beauty and Perfection. It is the real, the ultimate and the sole dynamic power of all human activity, whether economic or otherwise.

He says that instead of the class-war theory of Marx, there has proceeded in the human world a war of ideal-groups, which will go on as long as humanity has not discovered and accepted the ideal which is most satisfactory to man's nature.

The book should be of particular interest to those who are worried by the political power of Communism. Dr. Rafiuddin says that the strenuous efforts to check the advance of Communism have not succeeded so far because it has not yet been completely realized that the real issue is an intellectual one and can be settled only on the intellectual plane. He explains: "No amount of economic aids or political alliances, armaments or atom bombs, prisons or bullets, can stand against the force of ideas which conquer the hearts of men, and the idea of Communism will persist in the world even after it has been defeated in the battle-field. Communism is a philosophy and can be met only by a philosophy".

The writer says that if there is a general agreement on the belief that the urge for ideals is the sole dynamic power of human activity, it will create "a world-wide intellectual atmosphere in which Communism will wither away of itself without anybody having to fire a shot, and the peoples of different beliefs and ideals will come closer together for the creation of a new, free, peaceful and prosperous world".

For this general agreement he points to the need for development of man's knowledge of human nature, particularly of the principles of human motivation, and joins McDougall in emphasizing that the existing chaos in world affairs, fraught with the possibility of a total collapse of civilization, is traceable to the absence of our knowledge of human nature.

Ideology of the Future is in itself a study of the laws of human nature and human activity and the manner in which they determine the course of history or the process of ideological evolution.

Qayyum Malik