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CIVILIZATION AND PROGRESS

Rene Guenon

The civilization of the modern West appears in history as a veritable anomaly: among all those which are known to us more or less completely, this civilization is the only one which has developed along purely material lines, and this monstrous development, whose beginning coincides with the so-called Renaissance, has been accompanied, as indeed it was fated to be, by a corresponding intellectual regress; we say corresponding and not equivalent, because here are two orders of things between which there can be no common measure. This regress has reached such a point that the Westerners of to-day no longer know what pure intellect is ; in fact they do not even .suspect that anything of the kind can exist; hence their disdain, not only for eastern. civilization, but also for the Middle Ages of Europe; whose spirit escapes them scarcely less completely. How is the interest of a purely speculative knowledge to be brought home to people for whom intelligence is nothing but a means of acting on matter and turning it to practical ends, and for whom science, in their limited understanding of it, is above all important in so far as it may be applied to industrial purposes? We exaggerate nothing; it only needs a glance at one's surroundings to realize that this is indedd the mentality of the vast majority of our contemporaries; and another glance, this time at philosophy from Francis Bacon and Descartes onwards, could only confirm this impression still further. We will mention, by way of reminder, that Descartes limited intelligence to reason, that he granted to what he thought might be called "metaphysics" the mere function of serving as a basis for physics, and that this physics itself was by its very nature destined, in his eyes, to pave the way for the applied sciences, mechanical, medicinal and moral, the final limit of human knowledge as he conceived it. Are not the tendencies which he so affirmed just those which at the first glance may be seen to characterize the whole development of the modern

world? To deny or to ignore all pure and super-rational knowledge was to open up the path which logically could only lead on the one hand to positivism and agnosticism, which resign them-selves to the narrowest limitations of intelligence and of its objects, and on the other hand to all those sentimental and "voluntarist" theories which feverishly seek in the infra-rational for what reason cannot give them. Indeed, those of our contemporaries who wish to react against rationalism accept none the less the complete identification of intelligence with mere reason, and they believe that it is nothing more than a purely practical faculty, incapable of going beyond the realm of matter. Bergson has written as follows: "Intelligence, considered in what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects, in particular tools to make tools (sic), and of indefinitely varying the manufacture."[1]And again: "Intelligence, even when it no longer operates upon its own object (i.e., brute matter), follows habits it has contracted in that operation: it applies forms that are indeed those of inorganized matter. It is made for this kind of work. With this kind of work alone is it fully satisfied. And that is what intelligence expresses by saying that thus only it arrives at distinctness and clearness."[2] From these last features it becomes obvious that there is no question here of intelligence itself, but quite simply of the Cartesian conception of intelligence, which is very different: and the "new philosophy," as its adherents call it, substitutes for the superstition of reason another which is in some respects still grosser, namely, the superstition of life. Rationalism, though powerless to attain to absolute truth, at least allowed relative truth to subsist; the intuitionism of to-day lowers that truth to be nothing more than a representation of sensible reality, in all its inconsistency and ceaseless change; finally, pragmatism succeeds in blotting out altogether the very notion of truth by identifying it with that of utility, which amounts to suppressing it purely and simply. We may have tabulated things a little here, but we have not falsified them in the least, and whatever may have been the intermediate stages, the fundamental

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1 Creative Evolution, p. 146, in the English translation of Arthur Mitchell

2 Ibid., p. 169.

tendencies are indeed those which we have just stated; the pragmatists, in going to the limit, show themselves to be the most authentic representatives of modern western thought: what does the truth matter in a world whose aspirations, being solely material and sentimental and not intellectual, find complete satisfaction in industry and morality, two spheres where indeed one can very well do without conceiving the truth? To be sure, this extremity was not reached at a single stride, and many Europeans will protest that they have not reached it yet; but we are thinking particularly of the Americans, who are at a more "advanced" stage of the same civilization. Mentally as well as geographically, modern America is indeed the "Far West"; and Europe will follow, without any doubt, if nothing comes to stop the development of the consequences implied in the present state of things.

But most extraordinary of all is perhaps the claim to set up this abnormal civilization as the very type of all civilization, to regard it as Civilization with a capital letter, and even as the only one which deserves the name. Extraordinary too, and also complementary to this illusion, is the belief in "progress," considered no less absolutely, and naturally identified, at heart, with this material development which absorbs the entire activity of the modern West. It is curious to note how promptly and successfully certain ideas come to spread and impose themselves, provided, of course, that they correspond to the general tendencies of the particular environment and epoch; it is so with these ideas of "civilization" and "progress," which so many people willingly believe universal and necessary, whereas in reality they have been quite recently invented and, even to-day, at least three-quarters of mankind persist either in being ignorant of them or in considering them quite negligible. Mr. Jacques Bainville has remarked that "if the verb civilize is already found to have been used by the good authors of the XVIIIth century in the sense which we give it, the noun civilization is only to be met with in the economists of the years which immediately preceded the French Revolution. Littre' quotes an example taken from Turgot Littre', who had ransacked all French literature, could not trace it any further back. Thus the

word civilization has no more than a century and a half of existence. It was only in 1835, less than a hundred years ago, that it finally found its way into the dictionary of the Academy… The ancients, from whom we still consciously trace our descent, were equally without a term for what we mean by civilization. If this word were given to be translated in a Latin prose, the school-boy would indeed find himself in difficulties… The life of words is not independent of the life of ideas. The word civilization, which our ancestors did very well without, perhaps because they had the thing itself, spread during the XIXth century under the influence of new ideas. The scientific discoveries, the development of industry, of commerce, of prosperity and of material welfare, had created a kind of enthusiasm and even a kind of prophetics. The conception of indefinite progress, dating from the second half of the XVIIIth century, helped to convince mankind that it had entered upon a new era, that of absolute civilization. It is the now quite forgotten Fourier, an utter Utopian, who was responsible for first calling the present age the age of civilization, and for identifying civilization with modern times----so civilization was the degree of development and perfection which the nations of Europe had reached in the XIXth century. This term, understood by everyone, although no one had defined it, included material and moral progress side by side, the one bringing with it the other, the one united to the other, both inseparable. In a word, civilization was Europe itself, it was a patent which the European world granted itself."[3] This is exactly what we think yourself; and we were bent on making this quotation, although it is rather long, to show that we are not alone in thinking so.

These two ideas, then, of "civilization" and "progress," which are very closely connected, both date only from the second half of the XVIII[th] century, that is to say from the epoch which saw, amongst other things, the birth of materialism;[4] and they were propagated and popularized especially by

[3] L'Avenir de la Civilisation: Revue Universelle, iermars 1922, pp. 586-587.

[4] The word "materialism" was invented by Berkeley, who only used it to design belief in the

the socialist dreamers of the beginning of the XIXth century. It cannot be denied that the history of ideas leads sometimes to rather surprising observations, and helps to reduce certain fantastic ideas to their proper value; it would do so more than ever if it were not, as is moreover the case with ordinary history, falsified by biased interpretations, or limited to efforts of mere scholarship and to pointless research into questions of detail. True history might endanger certain political interests; and it may be wondered if this is not the reason, where education is concerned, why certain methods are officially imposed to the exclusion of all others: consciously or not, they begin by removing everything that might make it possible to see certain things clearly, and that is how "public opinion" is formed. But to go back to two ideas that we have just been speaking of, let us make it quite clear that in giving them so close an origin we have in mind simply this absolute, and, as we think, illusory, interpretation, which is the one most usually given them to-day. As for the relative meaning in which the same words may be used, that is quite another question, and as this meaning is very legitimate, there can be no question here of ideas which originated at some definite moment; it matters little that they may have been expressed-in one way or another and, if a term, is convenient, it is not because of its recent creation that we see disadvantages in using it. Thus we do not hesitate to say that there have been and still are many different "civilizations"; it would be rather hard to define exactly this complex assemblage of elements of different orders which make up what is called a civilization, but none the less everyone knows fairly well what is to be understood by it. We do not even think that it is necessary to try to enclose in a rigid formula the general characteristics of civilization as a whole, or the special characteristics of some particular civilization; that is a somewhat artificial process, and we greatly distrust these narrow "pigeon-holes" that the systematic turn of mind delights in. Just as there are "civilizations," there are also, during the development of each of them, or for

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reality of matter; materialism in its modern sense, that is to say the theory that nothing exists but matter, originates only with La Mettrie and Holbach; it should not be confused with mechanism, several examples of which are to be found even among the ancients.

certain more or less limited periods of this development, "progresses" which far from influencing everything indiscriminately, affect only this or that particular domain; in fact this is only another way of saying that a civilization develops along certain lines and in a certain direction ;but just as there are progresses, there are also regresses, and sometimes the two are brought about at one and the same time in different domains. We insist then that all this is eminently relative; if the same words are accepted in an absolute sense they no longer correspond to any reality, and it is then that they come to represent these new ideas which have existed for barely a century and a half and then only in the West. Certainly "Progress" and "Civilization," with capital letters, may be very effective in certain sentences, as hollow as they are rhetorical, most suitable for imposing on a mob, for which words are rather a substitute for thought than a means of expressing it ; thus it is that these two words play one of the most important parts in the battery of formulae which those "in control" to-day use to accomplish their strange task of collective suggestion without which the mentality that is characteristic of modern times would indeed be short-lived. In this respect we doubt whether enough notice has ever been given to the analogy, which is none the less striking, between, for example, the actions of the orator and the hypnotist (and that of the tamer belongs equally to the same class) ; here is another subject for the psychologist to study, and we call their attention to it in passing. No doubt the power of words has been more or less made use of in other times than ours; but what has no parallel is this gigantic collective hallucination by which a whole section of humanity has come to take the vainest fantasies for incontestable realities; and, among these idols of modern worship, the two which we are at the moment denouncing are perhaps the most pernicious of all.

We must revert once more to the birth of the idea of progress, or rather of indefinite progress, to exclude these particular and limited progresses whose existence we have not the least desire to dispute. It is probably in the writings of Pascal that the first trace of this idea is to be found, applied

moreover to a single point of view: the passage[5] is the well-known one where he compares humanity to "one and the same man who always exists and who learns continually during the course of the centuries," and where he shows evidence of that anti-traditional spirit which is one of the peculiarities of the modern West, declaring that "those whom we call ancient were actually new in everything," and that consequently their opinions have very little weight; and in this respect Pascal had at least, one precedessor, since Bacon had already said with the same implication: Antiquitas saucily, juventus mundi. It is easy to see the unconscious sophism that such a conception is based on: it consists in supposing that humanity as a whole develops continuously along the same lines: the false simplicity in this outlook is quite blatant, since it is in contradiction with all the known facts. Indeed history shows us, at every epoch, civilizations independent of one another, often divergent, some of which are born and develop while others grow decadent and die, or are annihilated at one blow in some cataclysm ; and the new civilization by no means always gather in the inheritance of the old ones. Who would venture to maintain seriously, for example, that the West of to-day has benefited, however indirectly, by the knowledge which the Chaldeans or the Egyptians had accumulated, let alone some civilizations which have not even come down to us in name ? But there is no need to go back so far into the past, as there are sciences which were studied in Europe during the Middle Ages, and of which there remains no longer the least notion. If Pascal's idea of "collective man" (whom he very improperly calls "universal man") is to be kept, it must then be said that if there are periods in which he learns, there are others in which he forgets, or rather, that while he learns certain things he forgets others; but the reality is even more complex, since there are simultaneously, as there have always been, civilizations which do not penetrate one another, but remain unknown to each other: that is indeed, today more than ever, the situation of the western civilization with regard to the eastern ones. All told, the origin of the illusion expressed by Pascal is simply this: the people of the West, starting from the Renaissance, took to

[5] Fragment of a Trait due Vide.

considering themselves exclusively as the heirs and carriers-on of Greco-Roman antiquity, and to misunderstanding or ignoring all the rest ; that is what we call the "classical prejudice." The humanity that Pascal speaks of begins with the Greeks, continues with the Romans, then there is a discontinuity in its existence corresponding to the Middle Ages, in which he can only see, like all the people of the XVIIth century, a period of sleep; then at last comes the Renaissance, that is, the awakening of this humanity, which, from then on, is to be composed of all the European peoples together. It is a grotesque error, and one which indicates a strangely limited mental horizon, consisting, as it does, in taking the part for the whole. Its influence might be found in more than one sphere: the psychologists, for example, usually confine their observations to a single type of humanity, the modern Westerner, and they stretch inadmissibly the results so obtained even to the pretension of drawing from them, without exception, the characteristics of man in general.

It is essential to remember that Pascal only visualized an intellectual progress, within the limits of his and his time's conception of intellectuality; it was towards the very end of the XVIIIth century that there appeared, with Turgot and Condorcet, the idea of progress extended to all branches of activity; and this idea was then so far from being generally accepted that Voltaire eagerly set about ridiculing it. We cannot think of giving here the complete history of the different modifications which this same idea underwent during the XIXth century, and of the pseudo-scientific complications in which it was involved when, under the name of "evolution", people sought to apply it, not only to humanity, but to the whole animal world. Evolutionism, despite many more or less important divergencies, has become a real official dogma: it is taught like a law which it is forbidden to discuss, when actually it is nothing more than the most idle and ill-founded of all hypotheses ; this applies a fortiori to the conception of human progress, which is now taken for granted as being no more than a particular case of "evolution." But before reaching this position there were many ups and

downs, and, even among the champions of progress, there were some who could not help making one or two rather serious reservations: Auguste Comte, who had started by being a disciple of Saint-Simon, admitted a progress that was indefinite in duration but not in extent; for him the march of humanity might be represented by a curve with an asymptote which it approaches indefinitely without ever reaching it, so that the extent of progress possible, that is to say the distance from the present state to the ideal state, represented by the distance from the curve to the asymptote, grows perpetually less. Nothing easier than to show the confusions that underlie the fantastic Cheory which Comte named the "law of the three states," and of which the chief consists in supposing that the sole object of all possible knowledge is the explanation of natural phenomena. Like Bacon and Pascal he compared the ancient to children, and others, more recently, have thought to improve on this by likening them to the savages, whom they call primitives, but whom we on the contrary consider as degenerates.[6] Apart from these there are some who, unable to help noticing the ups and downs in what they know of the history of mankind, have come to talk of a "rhythm of progress"; it would be perhaps simpler and more logical in these circumstances to stop talking about progress altogether, but, since the modern dogma must be safe-guarded at all costs, progress is supposed to exist none the less as the final result of all the partial progresses and all the regresses. These reservations and disagreements ought to serve as food for reflection, but very few seem to have realized this. The different schools can come to no mutual agreement, but it remains understood that progress and evolution must be admitted ; without these it seems that one would lose all right to the title of "civilized man" There is still another point which is worth

[6] Despite the influence of the "sociological school," there are, even in "official circles," some authorities who agree with us on this point, notably M. Georges Foucart, who, in the introduction of his work entitled Histoire des religions, et Methode comparative, upholds the theory of "degeneration" and mentions several of its supporters. In connection with this, M. Foucart criticizes admirably the "sociological school" and its methods, and he very properly declares that "totemism or sociology should not be confused with serious ethnology."

noticing: if one examines which branches of the pretended progress most often come up for consideration to-day, which ones are imagined by our contemporaries to be the starting point of all the rest, it will be seen that they only amount to two, "material progress" and "moral progress." These are the only ones mentioned by M. Jacques Bainville as included in the current idea of "civilization," and we think he was right. To be sure, there are some who still talk about "intellectual progress," but for them this phrase is essentially a synonym of "scientific progress," and it applies above all to the development of the experimental sciences and of their applications.' Here again there comes to light this degradation of intelligence which ends in identifying it with the most limited and inferior of all its uses, experimenting upon matter for solely practical purposes ; the so-called "intellectual progress" is thus no more, to be accurate, than "material progress" itself, and if intelligence was only that, Bergson's definition of it would have to be accepted. Actually it never enters the heads of most Westerners of to-day that intelligence is anything else ; for them it no longer amounts even to reason in its Cartesian sense, but to the lowest part of this reason, to its most elementary functions, to what always remains closely, connected with this world of the senses which they have made the one exclusive field of their activity. For those who know that there is something else and who persist in giving words their true meaning there can be no question in our time of "intellectual progress,' but on the contrary of decadence, or to be still more accurate, of intellectual ruin ; and, because there are some lines of development which are incompatible, it is precisely this which is the forfeit paid for "material progress," the only progress whose existence during the last centuries is a real fact: it may be called scientific progress if one insists, but only in an extremely limited acceptance of the word, and a progress which is very much more industrial than scientific. Material development and pure intellectuality go in opposite directions he who sinks himself in the one becomes necessarily further removed from the other. It should be carefully noted that we say here intellectuality and not rationality, for the domain of reason is only intermediate, as it were, between that of the senses and that of the higher

intellect: though reason receives a reflection of intellect, even while denying it and believing itself to be the human being's highest faculty, it is always from the evidence of the senses that the notions which it works on are drawn. In other words, what is general, the proper object of reason and consequently of science which is reason's work, though it is not of the sensible order of things, proceeds none the less from what is individual, which is perceived by the senses; it may be said to be beyond the sensible, but not above it; it is only the universal, the object of pure intellect, that is transcendent, and in the light of the universal even the general itself becomes one with the individual. That is the fundamental distinction between meta-physical knowledge and scientific knowledge, such as we have shown it to be more fully elsewhere[7] ; and, if we call it to notice again here, it is because the total absence of the former and the disordered development of the latter are the most striking characteristics of the western civilization in its present state.

As for the conception of "moral progress," it represents the other predominant factor in the modern mentality, that is, sentimentality. The presence of this element does not serve in the least to make us modify the judgment which we formulated in saying that the western civilization is altogether material. We are well aware that some people seek to oppose the domain of sentiment to that of matter, to make the development of the one a sort of counterbalance against the spread of the other, and to take for their ideal an equilibrium as settled as possible between these two complementary elements. Such is perhaps, when all is said and done, the thought of the intuitionists who, associating intelligence inseparably with matter, hope to deliver themselves from it with the help of a rather vaguely defined instinct. Such is still more certainly the thought of the pragmatists, who make utility a substitute for truth and consider it at one and the same time under its material and moral aspects ; and we see here too how fully pragmatism expresses the particular tendencies of the modern world, and above all of the Anglo-Saxon world, which is one of its most typical portions. Indeed,

[7] Introduction generale al'etude des doctrines hindoues, pp.96 - 104.

materialism and sentimentality, far from being in opposition, can scarcely exist one without the other, and they both attain side by side to their maximum development ; the proof of this lies in America, where, as we have had occasion to remark in our books on theosophism and spiritualism, the worst pseudo-mystical extravagances come to birth and spread with incredible ease, at the very time when industrialism and the passion for "business" are being carried to a pitch that borders on madness ; when things have reached this state it is no longer an equilibrium which is set up between the two tendencies, but two disequilibrium. side by side which aggravate each other, instead of counterbalancing. It is easy to see the cause of this phenomenon: where intellectuality is reduced to a minimum, it is quite natural that sentiment should assume the mastery; and sentiment, in itself, is very close to the material order of things: there is nothing, in all that concerns psychology, more narrowly dependant on organism, and, in spite of Bergson, it is obviously sentiment and not intellect which is bound up with matter. The intuitionists may reply, as we are well aware, that intelligence, such as they conceive it, is bound up with inorganic matter (it is always Cartesian mechanics and its derivations that they have in mind) and sentiment with living matter, which seems to them to rank higher in the scale of existences. But whether inorganic or living, it is always matter, and in its domain there can never be any but sensible things; it is indeed impossible for the modern mentality, and for the philosophers who represent it, to escape from this limitation. Strictly speaking, if it be insisted that there are two different tendencies, then one must be assigned to matter and one to life, and this distinction may serve as a fairly satisfactory way of classing the great superstitions of our epoch; but we repeat, they both belong to the same order of things and cannot really be dissociated from each other; they are on one same plane, and not superposed in hierarchy. It follows then that the "moralism" of our contemporaries is really nothing but the necessary complement of their practical materialism,[8] and it would be an utter illusion

[8] We say practical materialism to denote a tendency and to distinguish it from philosophic materialism, which is a theory, and on which this tendency is not necessarily dependent.

to seek to exalt one to the detriment of the other because, going necessarily together, they both develop simultaneously along the same lines, which are those of what is termed, by common accord, "civilization."

We have just seen why the conceptions of "material progress" and "moral progress" are inseparable, and why our contemporaries are almost as indefatigably engrossed with the latter as with the former. We have in no way contested the existence of "material progress," but only its importance: we maintain that it is not worth the intellectual loss which it causes, and it is impossible to think differently without being altogether ignorant of true intellectuality. Now, what is to be thought of the reality of "moral progress" ? That is a question which it is scarcely possible to discuss seriously, because, in this realm of sentiment, everything depends on individual appreciation and preferences; everyone gives the name "progress" to what is in conformity with his own inclinations, and, in a word, it is impossible to say that one is right any more than another. They whose tendencies are in harmony with those of their time cannot be other than satisfied with the present state of things, and this is what they express after their fashion when they say that this epoch marks a progress over those which preceded it; but often this satisfaction of their sentimental aspirations is only relative, because the sequence of events is not always what they would have wished, and that is why they suppose that the progress will be continued during future epochs. The facts come sometimes to belie those who are convinced of the present reality of "moral progress," according to the most usual-conception of it; but all they do is to modify their ideas a little in this respect, or to refer the realization of their ideal to a more or less remote future, and they, too, might crawl out of their difficulties by talking about a "rhythm of progress." Besides this, by a much simpler solution, they usually strive to forget the lesson of experience: such are the incorrigible dreamers who, at each new war, do not fail to prophesy that it will be the last. The belief in indefinite progress is, all told, nothing more than the most ingenuous and the grossest of all kinds of "optimism"; whatever forms this belief may take, it is always

sentimental in essence, even when it is concerned with "material progress." If it be objected that we yourself have recognized the existence of this progress, we reply that we have only done so as far as the facts warrant, which does not in the least imply an admission that it should, or even that it can, continue its course indefinitely; furthermore, as we are far from thinking it the best thing in the world, instead of calling it progress we would rather call it quite simply development ; it is not in itself that the word progress offends us, but because of the idea of "value" which has come almost invariably to be attached to it. This brings us to another point: there is indeed also a reality which cloaks itself under the so-called "moral progress," or which, in other words, keeps up the illusion of it ; this reality is the development of sentimentalism, which, whether one likes it or not, does actually exist in the modern world, just as incontestably as does the development of industry and commerce (and we have said why one does not go without the other). This development, in our eyes excessive and abnormal, cannot fail to seem a progress to those who put feelings above everything ; and it may perhaps be said that in speaking of mere preferences, as we did not long ago, we have robbed yourself in advance of the right to confute them. But we have done nothing of the kind: what we said then applies to sentiment, and to sentiment taken alone, in its variations from one individual to another: it sentiment, considered in general, is to be put into its proper place in relation to intelligence, the case is quite different, because then there is a hierarchy to be observed. The modern world has precisely reserved the natural relations between the different orders of things: once again, it is depreciation of the intellectual order (and even absence of pure intellectuality), and exaggeration of the material and the sentimental orders, which all go together to make the western civilization of to-day an anomaly, not to say a monstrosity.

That is how things look when considered without any prejudice; and that is how they are seen by the most qualified representatives of the eastern civilizations who view them quite without bias, for bias is always something sentimental, not intellectual, and their point of view is purely intellectual. If

the people of the West have some difficulty in understanding this attitude, it is because they are incorrigibly prone to judge others according to themselves, and to attribute to them their own concerns, as well as their ways of thinking, and their mental horizon is so narrow that they do not even take into account the possibility of other ones existing; hence their utter failure to understand all the eastern conceptions. This failure is not reciprocated: the Orientals, when they are faced with eastern science, and when they are willing to give themselves the trouble, have scarcely any difficulty in penetrating and understanding its special branches, because they are used to far wider and deeper speculations, and he that can do the greater can do the less ; but in general they feel scarcely any temptation to devote themselves to this work, which, for the sake of things that in their eyes are insignificant, might make them lose sight of, or at least neglect, what is for them the essential. Western science means analysis and dispersion; eastern knowledge means synthesis and concentration; but we shall have occasion to come back to this point. In any case, what the westerners call civilization, the others would call barbarity, because it is precisely lacking in the essential, that is to say a principle of a higher order. By what right do Westerners claim to impose on everyone their own likes and dislikes? Besides, they should not forget that among earthly mankind taken as a whole they form only a minority; of course, this consideration of number proves nothing in our eyes, but it ought to make some impression on people who have invented "universal suffrage," and who believe in its efficacy. If they merely took pleasure in affirming their imagined superiority, the illusion would only do harm to themselves ; but their most terrible offence is their proselytizing fury: in them the spirit of conquest goes under the disguise of "moralist" pretexts, and it is in the name of "liberty" that they would force the whole world to imitate them ! Most astonishing of all, they genuinely imagine in their infatuation that they enjoy prestige amongst all other people; because they are dreaded as a brutal force is dreaded, they believe themselves to be admired; when a man is in danger of being crushed by an avalanche, does it follow that he is smitten with respect and admiration for it ? The only

impression that, for example, mechanical inventions make on most Orientals is one of deep repulsion ; certainly it all seems to them far more harmful than beneficial, and if they find themselves obliged to accept certain things which the present epoch has made necessary, they do so in the hope of future riddance ; these things do not interest them, and they will never really interest them What Westerns call nrnaracc is for Orientals nothing but change and instability ; and the need for change, so characteristic of modern times, is in their eyes a mark of manifest inferiority: he that has reached a state of equilibrium no longer feels this need, just as he that has found no longer seeks. In these circumstances it is indeed difficult to understand one another, since the same facts give place, on this side and on that, to interpretations which are diametrically opposed. What if the Orientals also sought, after the manner of the West, and by its methods, to impose their own outlook? But one may rest assured: nothing is more contrary to their nature than propaganda, and such considerations are quite foreign to them ; without preaching "liberty," they let others think what they will, and are even indifferent as to what is thought of them. All they ask, in fact, is to be left in peace ; but that is just what the people of the West refuse to allow them, and it must be remembered that they went to seek them out in their own home, and have behaved there in a way which might well-exasperate the most peaceful of men. We are thus faced with a state of affairs which cannot last indefinitely ; there is only one way for the West to make itself bearable: this is, to use the customary language of colonial politics, that it should give up "assimilation" and practice instead "association" in every domain ; but that alone would already mean some modification of their mentality, and the understanding of at least one or two of the ideas which form part of our present exposition.

A MUSLIM'S REFLECTIONS ON HANS KUNG

Seyyed Hossein Nasr

The present article is a commentary on art essay by Hans Küng published in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies (Vol. 17, No.1, Winter 1980). In his essay the eniment Catholic theologian formulated his fundamental stance vis a vis contemporary thought and suggested guide lines for a restatement of theology. Dr. Nasr's brilliant and penetrating analysis of the thesis, written from a purely traditional point of view, not only discerns the truth from error but also provides extremely useful insight into the current situation of Catholic theology. Hans Kung visited Pakistan too. His lectures and discourses, here, had a slant on our religio philosophic syndrome but the response to his readings in our situation, mainly coming from modern apologetic thinkers, wis very naive and usually tended towards a pandering for his ideas and this is all the more reason that we include S.H. Nasr's article with the courtesy of Studies in Comparative Religion, London, where it appeared first. (M.S.UMAR)

The observations and commentaries on Hans Kung's essay made here below come not from the point of view of a particular school of Islamic theology, but from that of the Islamic tradition itself, and in fact of tradition as such. To have lived and experienced any religion fully is in a sense to have experienced all religions. To have meditated on the basic intellectual problems concerning a particular religious community is to have confronted these problems as they face people of religion everywhere. The unity of the human race and the universality of the intellect as it functions in human beings are such as to permit the followers of one religion to think about about and comment on the theological perspectives of another religion,

especially in a world such as ours where traditional barriers between various civilizations have been lifted.

Yet, precisely because it is religion which actualizes the potentialities of those who follow it and provides an objective cadre for the functioning of that inner revelation within humanity, which is the intellect — in its original rather than debased meaning — particular problems of each religion remain its own. In commenting upon Küng's theses, I am therefore fully with the specific religious and dogmatic that I have no right to deal might be accused of dogmatic problems of Catholicism and might be accused of being simply and intruding outsider were I to deal with s being simply an intruding outsider issues of the Catholic faith and racterin a Catholic context, were I to Still, it is amazing how religious issues in one religion are also confronted by other religions and how the weakening or floundering of a particular religious universe can affect others. It is with full awareness of these factors and in humility as an outsider to the scene of present-day Catholic theology that the following comments are offered.

At the beginning of his essay Küngwrites "However, the Second Vatican Council demonstated that this [neo-scholastic] theology was unable to deal effectively with the contemporary problerrs of humanity, the church and society". The question to ask is whether the neo-scholastic theology, which is a revival of Thomism, is unable to deal with contemporary problems because of innate flaws in Thomism, is unable to deal with contemporary problems because of innate flaws in Thomism, or because its p rinciples have not been applied to contemporary problems of humanity, the church and society." The question to ask is whether the neo-scholastic theology, which is a revival of Thomism, is unable to deal with contemporary problems because of innateflaws in Thomism, or because its principles have not been applied to contemporary problems or because these problems are for the most part pseudeo-problems brought into being as a result of ill-posed questions. Is Thomism true? If it is true, that is, if it is an expression of metaphysical truth in its Christian form, then it cannot cease to be metaphysical truth in its

Christian form, then it cannot cease to be true. Its language might need modification but its message and content must continue to possess validity. And if there are other forms of theology different ways of explaining the eternal message of Christianity in a particular historical context with full consideration of the contingent factors involved, or are they no more than theologizing about passing and ephemeral experiences or so-called scientific "truths" which often cease to be of any great relevance from a theological point of view by the time the theologians have finished theologizing about them?

Truth must always come before expediency and even timeliness, especially as far as theology is concerned. Theology is after all literally:the science of God" It should explain the temporal with reference to the Eternal and not the Eternal in the light of temporality which is made to sound very real, central, and important by being baptized as the human condition, the modern world, or urgent human problems. There is no more urgent a human problem than the task to distinguish between the real and the Eternal on the on hand and the illusory and ephemeral of theologies is valuable only if it means different paths opening unto the same Truth, as it was in fact, the case in early Christianity, and not of relativizing the Absolute and positing pseudo-philosophies based upon the confusion between the Eternal and temporal orders alongside authentic forms of theology which remain conscious of the basic mission of theology as the study God and of creation in the light of God and God's Wisdom and Power.

Kung is not even satisfied with post-Conciliar theology because, in his words, "since modern exegesis was generally neglected in otherwise productive movements of theological renewal, such as the patristic-oriented 'ressourcement' (H. De Lubac, J. Danielou, H.U. von Balthasar) as well as the speculative-transcendental meditation of Karl Rahner, their insufficiency became more and more apparent." Would a theology inspired by St. Augustine and Origen be insufficient because it does not take into account modern exegesis, by which is usually meant the so-called "higher criticism"?

This issue is quite senstive from the Islamic point of view since Islam is based wholly on a sacred book. For it, "higher criticism" can only mean the unveiling of the inner meaning of the sacred book (ta'wil or the kashf al-mahjub of the islamic. esotericists). Moreover, this process can only be achieved through the use of the higher faculties of humanity associated with the Intellect which resides at the heart or centre of -humanity's being. It implies an inwardness and drawing within the "book" of one's own being in order to reach the inner meaning of the Sacred Book. It certainly has nothing to do with archaeology or rationalistic analysis of texts and documents. The so-called "higher criticism," which in fact reduces the really "higher," which can be nothing but revelation, to the level of human reason, is based on the twin error which in fact characterizes so much of modern historicism and also science.

These two errors are, first of all, the presupposition that that' for which there is no historical document did not exist, and secondly, that there is a kind of "uniformitarianism" in the laws and conditions of human society and the cosmos similar to what is posited as the key for the interpretation of the past by geologists and paleontologists. According to this thesis the systems, laws, and relations between cause and effect must have existed in days of old, let us say at the time of Christ, in the same way and mode that they can be observed today. To walk on water must be "understood" and explained away because no one can walk on water today. There is no better way to kill the inner meaning of a sacred text and the very elements which allow the human mind to ascend to higher levels of being than the so-called "higher criticism" whose result is the death of the meaning of sacred scripture as revealed meaning and the gate to the spiritual world.

Neither "higher criticism" nor the exegesis of sacred scripture, based on the common experience of a humanity which has been cut off from spiritual nourishment and lives in a world of ugliness, which stultifies the heart and the mind, can cause a theology based on the eternal truths of any religion to fail. If such a theology does exist and it appears to hare "failed," the failure

must be laid to those who have not succeeded in understanding it rather than to the theology itself, provided the theology in question is a veritable "science of God." It would be better to have a true theology under-stood by just,one person than a diluted or distorted theology based on compromising the truth by the multitude. Surely in the question of religious truth it cannot be numbers that reign, otherwise what could one say concerning the lives and actions of that very small; minority known as tie early Christian martyrs?

The auther believes that the only theology that could survive the future would be one which blends the two elements of "a 'return to the sources' and a 'venturing forth on to uncharted waters' or...a theology of Christian origins and center enunciated within the horizon of the contemporary world." We could not agree more with the author concerning the doctrine that God is at once the origin and the center, the beginning and the "now". Therefore, theology must obviously be concerned wth origins and the "now" which is the only reflection of eternity in time which binds human-kind to the Eternal. But religion is also tradition. It is a tree with its roots sunk in heaven but also with a trunk and branches and a law of growth of its own. Also, like a living tree, a living religion is always amenable to a revivification and rejuvenation. Every "back to the roots" movement which negates the existing trunk and branches, the long tradition which binds the particular person or community wanting to return to the roots to the origin, only weakens the tree as a whole. There are many examples of this phenomenon in-nearly all the major religions of the world, and their result is almost always a much impoverished version of that religion which resembles the origin outwardly but is never actually able to return to it. An awareness of Christian origins and center is exemplified most positively in the history of Christianity by a St. Francis of Assisi who was called "the second Christ." If by returning to the origin and center such an even or reality is implied, then certainly what it would produce would not only live through the future but in fact shape and make the future. What it needs, however, which is most difficult to come by is another St. Francis.

As for the "uncharted waters," as a result of the rampant secularism of the Western world, the water is first charted by non-religious forces and then religion is asked to take the map of a secularized cosmos and navigate through it. From the traditional point of view, however, it is religion itself which must lead the way and chart the course. Theology as the intellectual expression of religion must be able to make the future and not simply follow the secularized disciplines with the hope of guaranteeing some kind of survival for itself by placating the "enemy" or even ceasing to call a spade a spade. Today there are many physicists who wish theologians would take theology a bit more seriously and modern science somewhat less as far as it theological implications are concerned.

It is in the light of this statement that Kung's agreement with Schillebeeckx on the "two sources" necessary for the creation of a "scientific theology" must be examined. These sources are "the traditional experience of the great Judeo-Christian movement on the one hand, and on the other the contemporary human experiences of Christians and non-Christians." First of all in the term "non-Christians" two very disparate elements are covered in an indiscriminate fashion. A non-Christian can be a Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist or he or she can be an agnostic or atheist, who in fact is, to say the least, as far removed from the followers of other religions as she or he is from Christianity and Judaism. There are then three groups or "sources" to consider rather than two: the Judeo-Christian tradition, the other religions, and modern secularism. There is no doubt that the time has come for serious theology in the West to take cognizance of the religious and metaphysical significance of other religions, whose presence in a less mutilated and secularized form than much of contemporary Christianity is in a profound sense a compensation sent by heaven to offset the withering effect of secularism and pseudo-religious ideologies. A veritable dialogue in the spirit of an ecumenism which would respect the totality of each tradition and not reduce things to a least common denominator would certainly be a great aid to future theological formulations among Christians. The writings of such

figures as Frithjof Schuon have already made accessible the remark-able richness of this perspective.

But as far as the experience of the secular, or even modern science itself, is concerned, we do not believe that this can be a "source" for theology. Rather, it must be an element which contemporary theology must seek to explain in the light of its own principles. It is not theology which must surrender itself to modern science and its findings. Rather it is modern science which must be critically appraised from the metaphysical and theological of view and its findings 'explained in this light. As the basic role of religion is to save the human soul from the world and not simply to carry out a dialogue with the "world," the role of theology is to cast the light of the Eternal upon the experiences of humankind's terrestrial journey. If modern humanity has experienced the void and nihilism, °theology can explain the reason for such an experience and the meaning that such an experience can have in bringing humanity back to God, for as Meister Eckhardt has said, "The more they blaspheme the more they praise God." But this experience of the void or despair or injustice cannot be a "source" of theology without doing grave injustice to theology which alone can render meaning to human life.

There are a few other particular points in Küng's statements of agreement with Schillebeeckx which need to be commented upon in a few words. Kung states, "divine revelation is only accessible through human experience." "Human experience" yes, but no ordinary human experience. There is more to consciousness than what we usually experience. There is a hierarchy of consciousness as there is a hierarchy of experience leading to the concrete experience of the spiritual world. Genuine revelation is certainly an experience but not on the same level as everyday experience. It has been said of the messenger of divine revelation in Islam, namely Muhammad, that he was a man among men but not an ordinary man. Rather, he was like a jewel among stones. For Christianity, which is based on the doctrine of the incarnation and the God-man, surely divine revelation cannot be reduced to

the level of ordinary human experience, especially in a world where the higher modes of experience available to a human as a theomorphic being have become so rare.

As for revelation coming, in Kung's terms, "in a lengthy process of events, experiences and interpretations and not as a supernatural "intrusion," what is meant by revelation here is the disciples' faith in Christ and not Christ himself who is the revelation in Christianity. But even on the level of the apostles, this secondary mode of "revelation" was not necessarily always a lengthy process. It could certainly have been an immediate "intrusion" and illumination if the substance of the disciple in question were already prepared. For people living today it is hardly conceivable to imagine what it would mean actually to encounter a great saint, not to speak of the Abrahamic prophets or Christ himself.

Closely allied to this assertion is the second point of agreement between Kung and Schillebeeckx, namely that revelation is always reached through the human experience which is never "pure." This would negate the "supernaturally natural" function of the Intellect in humanity which is able to know objectively and to discern between the absolute and the relative. It would also negate the possibility of "annihilation" or what the Sufis call al-fana, through which the soul becomes "nothing" and removes itself as the veil, allowing the Supreme Self within to say "I". If humanity could not know the truth in itself, truth would have no meaning as either the source of objective revelation or that inner revelation which is the illumination of humanity's inward being. To say that there is no such thing as "pure experience" of the truth is in a sense a negation of his very thesis. We must first accept that there is such a thing as pure experience unveiling the truth in its pristine purity in order to decide that our experience is not pure experience in comparison with this pure experience—of which we must have had some kind of knowledge if we were going to compare something with it.

The third point of agreement between Küng and Schillebeeckx involves the significance of the "living Jesus of history" as "the source, standard and criterion of Christian faith." While not at all questioning this distinctly Christian position, we would only like to add that one cannot at the same time forget or neglect the central significance of that trans-historical Jesus who said, "I am before Abraham was". Islamic Christology, which emphasizes the trans-historical Jesus, is more akin to certain early forms of Christology rejected by the later councils. It is strange that, now that there is so much attention paid to the "origins" and patristic-oriented theology, contemporary theologians do not emphasize more the Christ as the eternal logos to which in fact many young Christians in quest of the rediscovery of integral Christianity are strongly attracted.

Finally, a comment must be made on each of the ten "guiding principles for contemporary theology" which Küng had formulated in his Existiert Gott? and which he repeats in the essay under review.

1. "Theology should not be an esoteric science only for believers but should be intelligible to non-believers as well".
   Comment: First of all every living tradition does need an esoteric science which, however, is not usually called theology. As for theology, it should of course be written in such an intelligent manner that even the intelligent non-believer would be attracted to it. But it would be better for theology not to lead believers to unbelief in its attempt to be intelligible to unbelievers.

2. "Theology should not exalt simple faith nor defend an 'ecclesiastical' system but strive for the truth without compromise in intense scholarly fashion"
   Comment: Certainly the goal of theology must be the truth, but if current scholarly methods are sufficient to attain the truth, then what is the difference between theology and humanistic and rationalistic scholarship? The role of theology cannot but be the defense of the truth as revealed in God's religion. Then there is

the basic question of what guarantee there is in each religion for the protection of the truth. Each religion has a different response. In Christianity it has always been the magisterium. How can one prevent the truth from becoming reduced to mere individualistic whim and fancy if the authority of the magisterium is denied?

3. "Ideological opponents should not be ignored or hereticized, nor theologically co-opted. Rather their views should be set out in a fair and factual discussion and interpreted in optimam partem as tolerantly as possible".
   Comment: Views of opponents should certainly be studied factually and objectively without passion. But truth is one thing and charity another. We must love other people, but that does not mean that we must be indifferent to the truth. Where truth is no longer of any consequence, the question of agreement or opposition is of little importance. It is easy to be tolerant when there are no immutable principles for which one stands. The situation becomes much more difficult when we have faith in a particular form of the truth which we call our religion and then either see those who possess other forms of truth which also come from God (a tree is judged by the fruit it bears), or simply live in error from the point of view of the truth we accept as truth. It is this much more delicate problem that all "living theologies" of today and tomorrow face and will face not only in Christianity but in all other religions.

4. "We should not only promote but actually practice an inter-disciplinary approach. Along with a concentration upon our own field, we must maintain a constant dialogue with related fields".
   Comment: This is indeed sound advice provided it is- not carried out from a position of weakness and with an inferiority complex and that theology remains faithful to its own nature, mission, and genius. Physicists should also follow the same advice, but

that does not mean that tomorrow they will go into the laboratory and study subatomic particles through theological methods, even if they draw theological conclusions from their physical studies.

5. "We need neither hostile confrontation nor easy co-existence, but rather a critical dialogue especially between theology and philosophy, theology and natural science: religion and rationality belong together!"
   Comment: This is certainly true but it can come about only if theology stops its retreat before the onslaught of both philosophy and natural science. Dialogue is possible only among equals or those nearly equal. Theology has as much a right to study nature and the mind as do science and philosophy. Eash discipline has a different approach and hence reaches different aspects of the truth which in its wholeness can only be seen by the science of the whole or of the totality, which is metaphysics in its original sense.

6. "Problems of the past should not have priority over the wide-ranging, multi-faceted dilemmas of contemporary humanity and society""
   Comment: It is mostly as a result of neglecting the past as a source both of tradition and of experience for humankind that so many problems face present-day humanity. Of course, theology must deal with contemporary dilemmas, but always in the light of the truth, which is and does not become, and the profound aspects of human nature, which despite appearances remains remarkably the same. It is in the light of this permanence that apparent change should be explained.

7. "The criterion determining all other criteria of Christian theology can never again be some ecclesiastical or theological tradition or institution, but only the Gospel, the original Christian message

itself. Thus, theology must everywhere be oriented. toward the biblical findings analyzed by historical-critical analysis".
Comment: Without in any way denying the central role of the Gospels we cannot but be astonished at how this Holy Book could serve as the source for the truth of the Christian faith without the church, the oral teachings, the traditions and all that in fact connect a human being who calls her or himself Christian to the origin of this religion. If the Gospels sufficed, how could there be so many different schools all basing themselves on the same book? Although the phenomenon of the proliferation of schools and "sects" is the same in all religions, nowhere has it been as great as in Christianity when the Gospels became considered by certain schools as the main source for Christianity. But even in most of these schools, until now, certain other aspects of Christianity as a historical reality have also been accepted. If the Gospels were to be taken as the sole source of theology, again the question would come up as to what guarantees the truth of the religion and what is the origin of the faith in the light of which the Christian reads the Gospels.

8. "The Gospel should not be proclaimed in biblical archaisms nor in Hellenistic scholastic dogmatisms nor in fashionable philosophic;-theological jargon. Rather, it should be expressed in the commonly understood language of contemporary humanity and we should not stay away from any effort in this direction".
Comment: We disagree completely with this thesis. The so-called commonly understood language of contemporary humanity is itself no more than a debased jargon, influenced by the mass media and often deprived of the beauty of the language in question. Sacred books are too sublime to be cast in the molds of a language form by the lower psyche of a humanity which is being dragged downwards by the very "civilization" it has created. Religious texts have always been elements of beauty

which have adorned human life, and today humanity is in need of this saving beauty more than ever before. Why should the words of God sound like the outpourings of a football announcer? In other religions such as Islam where the Sacred Book is couched in the immutable beauty of a sacred language, the unchanging nature of the language has certainly not made people any less religious over the ages, even people whose mother tongue has not been Arabic. The experience of Islam should be of some value for those who believe that catering to contemporary jargon will somehow draw people more to religion and the study of the Gospels. Let us not forget that even on the American frontiers the Bible survived in the language of Elizabethan England and was probably more widely read than many of its Americanized descend-ants are read by the "more-educated" descendants of those cowboys.

9. "Credible theory and livable practice, dogmatics and ethics, personal piety and reform of institutions must not be separated but seen in their inseparable connection".
   Comment: We could not but agree with this thesis, for in all religions method and doctrine must go hand in hand. But as far as reform is concerned, it is most of all the reform of ourselves that is at stake. Modern humanity wishes to reform everything but itself. That is why so many of its reformations become deformations.

10. "We must avoid a confessionalistic ghetto mentality. Instead we should express an ecumenical vision that takes into consideration the world religions as well as contemporary ideologies: as much tolerance as possible toward those things outside the Church, toward the religions in general, and the human in general, and the development of that which is specifically Christian belong together".

> Comment: Expressing an ecumenical vision in the sense already mentioned, by all means, but joining world religions and contemporary ideologies, which are the products of a secularized West, is really an insult to those religions. The much more logical position would be to place all the religions, including Christianity, in one world or camp before which stand the forces of agnosticism and secularism. In fact Christianity, already scarred by several centuries of battle against humanism, secularism, and rationalism, has the choice of either returning to the universe of religion as such, to the sacred cosmos in which Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc. still breathe, or attempt to bring about some kind of a wedding with secularism, which itself was born from a void created by the loss of the all-embracing Christian vision in the West. For the sake of humanity, let us hope that the first alternative will be followed and that the West will rejoin the rest of humankind, for from the marriage with secularism there cannot come into being anything but those beasts which shall lay the earth in ruin and to which the Book of the Apocalypse has referred so majestically.

I feel somewhat embarrassed criticizing a well-known Catholic theologian, but perhaps this exercise can be seen as a counterpart to the voluminous works written by Orientalists on the present and future of Islam and even Islamic theology. In contrast to some of these works, however, my intentions have derived not from hatred but love for Christianity and the followers of Sayyidna 'Isa, as the Quran has called Christ. Moreover, an aspect of the experience of contemporary humanity necessitates a universal perspective on religion and an awareness of the interrelated nature of the spiritual destiny of all of humankind which makes an interest in other religions imperative for a Muslim concerned with the future of his own religion as well as religion as such.

THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF DOUBT IN AL-GHAllĀLĪ'S PHILOSOPHY

Osman Bakar

Authentic works attributed to Abu Hāmid Muhammad al-Ghazzālī (450/1058-505/1111) are numerous and they deal with a vast range of subjects. But the specific work of his which has given rise to many commentaries by scholars upon the problem of doubt in his philosophical system, is the al-Munqidh min al-Dalall[9] (Deliverence From Error). This autobiographical work, written some five years before al-Ghazzālī's death and most probably after his return to teaching at the Maimūnah Nizāmīyah College at Naishapur in Dhū al-Qa'dah 499 July 1106 following a long period of retirement to a life of self-discipline and ascetic practices, has been compared by different present-day scholars with the Confessions of St. Augustine, with Newman's Grammar of Assent in its intellectual subtlety and as an apologia pro vita sua, and also with Bunyan's Grace Abounding in its puritanical sense[10]. More important, from the point of view of our present discussion, is the fact that this work has often been cited to support the contention that the method of doubt is something central to al-Ghazzali's epistemology and system of thought, and that in this question al-Ghazzālī,

[9] The title of the book occurs in two readings. One is Al—Munqidh min al—Oalāl wa'l—mufsih 'an al—Ahwāl (What saves from error and manifests the states of the soul). The other is Al—Munqidh min al—Dalāi wa'l —muwassil (or: al—mūsil) ilā Dhi' l—'lzza wa'l—Jalāl (What saves from error and unites with the Possessor of Power and Glory).

For an annotated English translation of this work based upon the earliest available manuscript, as well as translations of a number of al—Ghazzālīs other works that are specifically mentioned in the munqidh, see R.)oseph McCarthy, Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al—Ghazzalī's al—munqidh min .al—Oalāl and other relevant works of at-Ghazzālī Boston (1980). For references to translations of the munqidh into various languages, see this book of McCarthy, p.xxv

[10] See M. 'Umaruddin, The Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazzālī, Lahore (1977), p.286, note 2 to chap, IV; also, Wensinck, La Pensee de Ghazzalī,p.111.

therefore, anticipates Descartes (1596-1650)[11]. In fact, a number of comparative studies have been made of the place and function of doubt in the philosophies of the two thinkers.

Our aim in this paper is to discuss the meaning and significance of doubt in the life and thought of al-Ghazzālī, not as an anticipation of the method of doubt or the sceptical attitude of modern western philosophy, but as an integral element of the epistemology of Islamic intellectual tradition to which al-Ghazzālī properly belongs. We will seek to analyze the nature, function and spirit of the Ghazzāliandoubt. In discussing the above question, we re mindful of two important factors.' One is the specific intellectual, religious and spiritual climate prevailing in the Islamic world during the time of al-Ghazzali, which no doubt constitutes the main external contributory factor to the generation of doubt in the early phase of al-Ghazzālī's intellectual life. The other concerns the whole set of opportunities which Islam ever places at the disposal of man in his quest for certainty, and what we know of al-Ghazzālī s life shows us that he was very much exposed to these opportunities. Further, the spirit of the! Ghazzīlian doubt can best be understood when viewed in the context of the true purpose for which the *al-Munqidh* has been written and when also viewed in the light of his later works.

In the al-Munqidh *min al-Dalāl,* al-Ghazālī informs us of how in the prime of his life he was inflicted with a mysterious malady of the soul, which lasted for nearly two months during which time he "was a sceptic in fact, but not in utterance and doctrine"[12]. He was a student in his early twenties at the Nizāmīyah Academy of Naishapur when he suffered from this disease of scepticism. Now what is the nature of this Ghazzālian doubt? al-Ghazzālī tells us that his doubt has been generated in the course

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[11] See M.Saeed Sheikh, "AI—Ghazzali: Metaphysics" in M.M. Sharif, A History of muslim Philosophy, Wiesbaden (1963), vol.l,pp.587—588; Sami M. Najm, "The Place and Function of Doubt in the Philosophies of Descartes and al—Ghazzāli"; and also, W.Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of al—Ghazali Chicago (1982), p.12.

[12] McCarthy, R. J., op. cit.,,p.66.

of his quest for certainty, that is for the reality of things "as they really are" *(haqīiq al-umūr)*[13] This knowledge of the reality of things "as they really are" is what al-Ghazzīli calls aI-'ilm *al-yaqīn,* a sure and certain knowledge which he defines as "that in which the thing known is made so manifest that no doubt clings to it, nor is it accompanied by the possibility of error and deception, nor can the mind even suppose such a possibility"[14]. Here, we need to say something of this inner quest of al-Ghazzālī itself because it is very much relevant to-the whole of our present discussion. In fact, the meaning of this quest should never be lost sight of if we are to understand truly the nature and significance of the Ghazzālian doubt.

In Islam, the quest for haqāiq al-umūr originates with the famous prayer of the Prophet in which he asked God to show him things as they really are. This prayer of the Prophet is essentially the prayer of the gnostic in as much as it refers to a supra-rational or inner reality of things. And for this reason, it has been the Sufis ho have most faithfully echoed that prayer of the Prophet. The famous Sufi, Jāmi (d.1492), has this prayer beautifully expanded, capturing in an eloquent manner the spirit of the very quest of gnostic:

O God, delivers us from preoccupation with worldly vanities, and show us the nature of things "as they really are". Remove from our eyes the veil of ignorance, and show us things as they really are. Show us not non-existence as existent, nor cast the veil of non-existence over the beauty of existence. Make this phenomenal world the mirror to reflect the manifestation of Thy beauty, not a veil to separate and repel us from Thee. Cause these unreal phenomena of the Universe to be for us the sources of knowledge and insight, not the causes of ignorance and blindness. Our alienation and severance from Thy beauty all proceed from ourselves. Deliver us from ourselves, and accord to us intimate knowledge of Thee[15].

AI-Ghazzālī's quest for certainty as he has defined it is none other than this quest of the gnostic. Initially, however, it was a purely intellectual quest. There were both internal and external forces at work in fueling that quest to the point of generating a period of intense doubt in the youthful life of al-

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[13] al-Ghazzālī, munqidh min al-Dalāl,p.11.The text cited here is the one published together with its French translation by Farid Jabre,Erreur et Deliverance Beirut (1969).

[14] McCarthy, R.) op. cit.,,p.63.

[15] Jami, Lawā' ih, A Treatise On Sufism, Trans, by E.H.Whinfield and M.M.Kazvini, Royal Asiatic Society, London (1914).p.2.

Ghazzali. Internally, by his own admission, his natural intellectual disposition has always been to grasp the real meaning of things. As for the external forces, we have already referred to the most important of these, namely the various intellectual, religious and spiritual currents of al-Ghazzali's times, all of which could not but have engaged his highly reflective and contemplative mind. That these various currents were of central concern to him is very clear from the *Munqidh*. He, in fact, traces the genesis of his famous doubt to those currents. He was struck by the diversity of religions and creeds and by the fact that the followers of each religion cling stubbornly to their inherited beliefs. One consequence of his critical reflection upon this question is the loss of the hold of *taqlidāt* (uncritical inherited beliefs) on him. But living as he was in an age when the idea of Transcendence is very much a living reality in the souls of men, the prblem of diversity of religions wās not to lead al-Ghazzali to the kind of relativism that is rampant in modern times as a response to the same problem[16]. On the contrary, it was to lead him to the search for the inner reality of human nature, man's primordial nature (fitrah), which on the earthly plane becomes the receptacle for the multiplicity of religous forms and expressions.

It is wrong, however, to infer from the above that al-Ghazzālī is against taqlid as such. He never advocated at any time its abandonment altogether. In fact, he considered it to be necessary for the simple believers whose simple minds are free from the kind of intellectual curiosity that has been manifested by God in others, and are therefore content to accept things based on the authority of others. Al-Ghazzālī's criticism of taqlīd must be seen in the context of his quest for the highest level of certainty, a quest which in practical terms is the concern, not of the majority; but of the few Like him. From the point of view of this quest, taqlīd is certainly a great impediment to its realization and consequently he lets himself loose from the bonds of taqlīd (rābitat al-taqlīd). Here, one needs to make a clear distinction between taqlīd, which is a particular manner of acquiring ideas, and taqlīdāt, which are the ideas themselves. This distinction is somehow seldom noted by many students of Ghazzālian thought. AI-Ghazzālī's rejection of the former

[16] For a profound critique of the Modern interpretation of the meaning of diversity of religions,see F.Schuon, Gnosis: Divine wisdom, Perennial Book, Middlesex (1978), chap.!.

for himself is his methodological criticism of its inherent limitations, while his acceptance of it for the simple-minded is simply an affirmation of an aspect of the reality of the human order. The unreliability of taqlid stems from the fact that it is susceptible to lending itself to both true and false taqlīdāt. The solution to the problem of false taqlīdāt is, however, not sought through the complete eradication of taqlīd, which is practically impossible, but through addressing oneself to the question of the truth or falsity of the taqlīdāt, themselves. Thus, in the Munqidh, al-Ghazzāli tells us how, after reflection upon the problem of taqlīd, he seeks to sift out these taqlīdāt, to discern those that are true from those that are false[17]. A lot of his intellectual efforts were indeed devoted to this task.

For al-Ghazzālī, the positive function of taqlīd, namely the acceptance of truths based on authority, is to be protected by those who have been entrusted with true knowledge, who constitute the legitimate authority to interpret and clarify knowledge about religious and spiritual matters. As it pertains to knowledge, the reality of the human order affirmed by al-Ghazzālī is that there are degrees or levels of knowledge and consequently, of knowers. This view has its basis in the Qur'anic verse which al-Ghazzālī quoted:"God raises in degrees those of you who believe and those to whom knowledge is given"[18]. In Islam, there is a hierarchy of authorities culminating in the Holy Prophet, and ultimately God Himself. Faith (īmān), which is a level of knowledge, says al-Ghazzālī, is the favourable acceptance (husn al-zann)[19] of knowledge based on hearsay and experience of others, of which the highest is that of the Prophet.

There has been objection from certain modernist circles that the idea of admissibility of taqlīd for one group of people and its un-acceptability for another is a dangerous one for it will lead to the crystallization of a caste system which is against the very spirit of Islam. What has been said above is

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[17] Al-Ghazzālī, munqidh p.11.
[18] Qur'ān (58:11).See McCarthy,op.cit.,p.96.
[19] Al-Ghazzālī, munqidh,p.40.

actually already sufficient to render this objection invalid. Nevertheless, we like to quote here the rebuttal of a scholar who has bemoaned the banishment of the Islamic idea of hierarchy of knowledge and of authorities at the hands of the modernists: "In respect of the human order in society, we do not in the least mean by 'hierarchy' that semblance of it wherein oppression and exploitation and domination are legitimized as if they were an established principle ordained by God. The fact that hierarchical disorders have prevailed in human society does not mean that hierarchy in the human order is not valid, for there is, in point of fact, legitimate hierarchy in the order of creation, and this is the Divine Order pervading all Creation and manifesting the occurrence of justice"[20]. It is this idea of the hierarchy of knowledge and of being which is central to al-Ghazzali's epistemology and system of thought, and he himself would be the last person to say that such an idea implies the legitimization of a social caste system in Islam.

To sum up our discussion of al-Ghazzālī's methodological criticism of taglīd, we can say that he was dissatisfied with it because it could not quench his intense intellectual thirst. It is obvious to him at that young age that taqlīd, is an avenue to both truth and error, but as to what is true and what is false there is an open sea of debate around him, which disturbs him profoundly. It leads him to contemplate upon the most central question in philosophy, namely the question of what true knowledge is, and this marks the beginning of an intensification of his intellectual doubt. Besides the problem of the diversity of religions and creeds of which the central issue is taqlīd, there is another and more important religious and spiritual current which contributed to the genesis of his doubt and which deeply affected his mind. This he mentions as the existence of the multiplicity of schools of thought (madhāhib) and groups (firaq) within the Community of Islam itself, each with its own methods of understanding and affirming the truth and each claiming that it alone is saved. AI-Ghazzālī maint., ins in the Munqidh that in this state of affairs of the Community, which he likens to "a deep sea

[20] Al-Attas, S.M.N., lslam and Secularism, Kuala Lampur (1978), p.101.

in which most men founder and from which few only are saved", one finds the fulfillment of the famous promise of the Prophet: "My Community will split into seventy-odd sects, of which one will be saved". The above religious climate was not peculiar to the times of al-Ghazzālī alone. A few centuries earlier, al-Hārith b. Asad al-Muhāsibī (165/781-243/837)[21], another famous Sufi, whose writings exercised a great influence on al-Ghazzālī, lamented the similar pitiful state of affairs into which the Islamic community has fallen. In fact, the autobiographical character of the Munqidh may have been modeled on the introduction to al-Muhāsibī's work, Kitāb al-wasāyā (or al-Nasā'lh) which is also autobiographical in character[22]

The following extract from the wasāyā reveals striking similarities with certain passages in the Munqidh and speaks much of the kind of religious climate prevailing during the time of al-Muhāsibī:

It has come to pass in our days, that this community is divided into seventy and more sects: of these, one only is in the way of salvation, and for the rest, God knows best concerning them. Now I have not ceased, not so much as one moment of my life, to consider well the differences into which the community has fallen, and to search after the clear way and the true path, whereunto I have searched both theory and practice, and looked, for guidance on the road to the world to come, to the directing of the theologians. Moreover, I have studied much of the doctrine of Almighty God, with the interpretation of the lawyers, and reflected upon the various conditions of the community, and considered its diverse doctrines and sayings. Of all this I understood as much as was appointed for me to understand and saw that their divergence was as it were a deep sea, wherein many had been drowned, and but a small band escaped therefrom; and l saw

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[21] On the life and teaching of this early Sufi figure, see Smith, Margaret, An Early Mystic of Baghdad: A Study of the Life and Teaching of Hārith ibn Asad al—muhasibi, London (1935).

[22] See Arberry,A.J., Sufism: An Account of the mystics of lslam,) Unwin Paperback, London (1979),p.47.

every party of them asserting that salvation was to be found in following them, and that he would perish who opposed them [23].

It is interesting that, although al-Ghazzālī's autobiographical work is more dramatic and eloquent than that of al-Muhāsibī, both men were led to an almost similar kind of personal crisis by similar external circumstances. Both sought the light of certainty and that knowledge which guarantees salvation, and they found that light in Sufism. In their very quest, they accomplished a philosophical as well as a sociological analysis of knowledge, the details of which remain to be studied. But having said this much, there is no doubt that al-Ghazzālī's philosophical discussion of doubt (shakk) and certainty (Yaqīn) is his original contribution.

We have already discussed the main factors which contributed to the generation of the Ghazzālian doubt, and the formulation of the fundamental question: what is the true meaning of knowledge? We have also mentioned that this doubt becomes more intensified after he begins to reflect with great earnestness upon the above question. We now discuss the philosophical meaning of this Ghazzālian doubt. We have seen earlier how al-Ghazzālī defines the kind of certain and infallible knowledge (al-ilm al-yaqīn) which he seeks. It is that knowledge which is completely free from any error or doubt and with which the heart finds complete satisfaction. Is such kind of certainty or certitude possible? It is significant that al-Ghazzali never posed that question but, armed with the above criteria of certainty, proceeded immediately to scrutinize the whole state of his knowledge. He found himself "devoid of any knowledge answering the previous description except in the case of sense-data (hissiyyāt) and the self-evident truths (darūiyyāt)[24] He then sets out to induce doubt (tashkīk) against his sense-data to determine whether they could withstand his test of infallibility and indubitability. The outcome of this effort, in which reason (aql) appears as judge over the claims

[23] Arberry, 'bid,pp.47-48, italics mine, Compare the italics portion with McCarthy op.ci ….,pp.62-63.
[24] McCarthy, ibid'p.64.

of the senses to certitude, is that his reliance on sense-data no longer becomes tenable. The charge of falsity leveled by reason against sense-perceptions cannot be rebutted by the senses.

With his reliance on sense-data shattered, al-Ghazzālī seeks refuge in the certainty of rational data which "belong to the category of primary truths, such as our asserting that 'Ten is more than three', and 'One and the same thing cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied', and 'One and the same thing cannot be incipient and eternal, existent and non-existent, necessary and impossible' "[25]. However, this refuge in the rational data (aqliyyāt) too is not safe from elements of doubt. This time, doubt creeps in through an objection made on behalf of sense-data against the claims of reason to certitude. These claims of reason are not refuted in the way that reason itself has previously refuted the claims of the senses. They are merely subjected to doubt by means of analogical argumentations, but it is nevertheless a doubt which reason could not dispel in an incontrovertible manner. Reason is reminded of the possibility of another judge superior to itself, which if it were to reveal itself would "give the lie to the judgments of reason, just as the reason-judge revealed itself and gave the lie to the judgments of sense"[26]. The mere fact of the non-appearance of this other judge does not prove the impossibility of its existence.

This inner debate within the soul of al-Ghazzālī turns for the worse when suggestion of the possibility of another kind of perception beyond reason is reinforced by various kinds of evidences and argumentations. First of all, an appeal is made to reason to exercise the principle of analogy to the phenomena of dreaming: that the relation of this suggested supra-rational state to the waking state, when the senses and reason are fully functional, is like the relation of the latter to our dreaming state. If our waking state judges our imaginings and beliefs in the dreaming state to be groundless, the supra-

[25] McCarthy, ibid,p.65.
[26] McCarthy, ibid,p.65.

rational state judges likewise our rational beliefs. This argumentation is as if al-Ghazzālī, himself one of the most respected jurists, is addressing himself to the jurists and others who are proponents of reason and who are well-versed with the principle of analogy. We are not suggesting here that this idea enters into the mind of al-Ghazzālī at the time of his actual experience of this inner debate. It could well have surfaced at the time of his decision to write the Munqidh in as much as the Munqidh was written, we believe, with a view of impressing upon the rationalists that Islamic epistemology affirms the existence of supra-rational perceptions as the real key to knowledge. Thus, al-Ghazzālī reproaches the rationalists in the Munqidh: "Therefore, whoever thinks that the unveiling of truth depends on precisely formulated proofs has indeed straitened the broad mercy of God"[27].

Next to confront reason in support of the possibility of a supra-rational state is the presence of a group of people, the Sufis, who claim that they have actually experienced that state. They allege that in the states they experience they see phenomena which are not in accord with the normal data of reason. Finally, the last piece of evidence brought to the attention of reason is the prophetic saying, "Men are asleep: then after they die they awake", and the Qur'anic verse "Thou west heedless of this; now have We removed thy veil, and sharp is thy sight this day"[28]. Both the hadīth and the Qur'ānic verse refer to man's state after death, and reason is told that, may be, this is the state in question.

All these objections to the claim of reason to have the final say to truth could not be refuted satisfactorily by reason. The mysterious malady of the soul of al-Ghazzālī, which lasted for nearly two months, is none other than this inner tussle or tension between his rational faculty and another faculty which mounts an appeal to the former, through the senses, to accept its existence and the possibility of those experiences that have been associated

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[27] McCarthy,ibid,p.66.
[28] Qur'ān (50-22).

with its various powers, such as those claimed by the Sufis. This other faculty, which is supra-rational and supra-logical, is the intuitive faculty which, at this particular stage of al-Ghazzālī's intellectual development, has actualized itself only to the extent of acknowledging the possibility of those experiences. Later, during the period of his intense spiritual life, he claims to have been invested with higher powers of the faculty which disclose to him innumerable mysteries of the spiritual world[29]. These powers al-Ghazzālī terms kashf (direct vision) and dhawq (translated as fruitionl experience by McCarthy, and immediate experience by Watt) [30].

The gradational movement from sense-data to rational data presents no serious difficulty, but the first direct encounter between rational experience and the intuitive one proves to be a painful one for al-Ghazzālī. His two-month period of being "a skeptic' in fact, but not in utterance and doctrine" is the period of having to endure intense, doubts about the reliability of his rational faculty in the fact of certain assertive manifestations of the intuitive faculty. His problem is one of finding the rightful place for each of the human faculties of knowing within the total scheme of knowledge, and in particular of establishing the right relationship between reason and intuition, as this latter term is understood traditionally. Thus, when he was cured of this sickness, not through rational arguments or logical proofs but as the effect of a light,(nūr) which God cast into his breast, his intellectual equilibrium was restored and he once again accepted the reliability of rational data of the category of darūriyyāt. However, in this new intellectual equilibrium, reason no longer occupies the dominant position it used to have,

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[29] McCarthy, op.clt.,p.94.

[30] McCarthy, ibid,p.95;Wattop.cit.,p.62. On the various terms used in Islamic thought for intuition, and on the question of the relationship between intellect and intuition in the Islamic perspective, see Nasr, S.H., "Intellect and Intuition: Their Relationship from the Islamic Perspective" in S.Azzam (ed.), lslam and Contemporary Society, Islamic Council of Europe (1982), pp.36-46.

for al-Ghazzālī says it is that light which God cast into his breast, which is the key to most knowledge[31].

We do not agree with the view of certain scholars that the method of doubt is something central to al-Ghazzālī's epistemology and system of thought. The whole spirit of the Munqidh does not support the view that al-Ghazzālī is advocating in it systematic doubt as an instrument for the investigation of truth[32]. And there is nothing to be found in the Munqidh which is comparable to Descartes' assertion that "it is necessary once in one's life to doubt of all things, so far as this is possible"[33] This brings us to the question of the true nature of the first personal crisis of al-Ghazzālī. McCarthy describes this crisis of skepticism as an epistemological crisis, which is of the intellect alone, in contrast to his description

of al-Ghazzālī's second personal crisis as a crisis of conscience, which is of the spirit[34]. Father Poggi, whose Un Classico della Spiritualita Musulmana is considered by McCarthy to be one of the finest studies on al-Ghazzālī and the Munqidh, does not consider the youthful scepticism of al-Ghazzālī as real but purely a methodical one[35]. Another celebrated Italian Orientalist, Guiseppe Furlani, also agrees that the doubt of al-Ghazzālī is not that of the skeptic but that of the critic of knowledge[36]. We agree with the view of these scholars that at the time of his crisis al-Ghazzālī was neither a philosophical nor a religious skeptic, and that the crisis is an epistemological or methodical one. The Munqidh alone provides ample evidence to support this view. Al-Ghazzālī was not a philosophical sceptic because he never contested the

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31 Al-Ghazzālī, munqid p.13.

32 This view is discussed in Sami M.Najm,op.cit.,

33 Descartes,. Principles, pt.l,l in The Philosophical works of' Descartes, two vols., trans. by E.S.Haldane and G.R.T.Ross, New York (1955).

34 McCarthyop. cit.,p.xxix.

35 Poggi, Vincenzo NM., Un Classico della Spiritualita musulmana, Libreria dell' University Gregoriana, Rome (1967), p.171.

36 Furlani, Giuseppe, "Dr.J.Obermann, Der philos. and regligiose Subjektivis-ia (1922). McCarthy in his above cited work provides an Egnlish translation of some excerpts from Furlani's above review, see pp.388-390.

value of metaphysical certitude. He was always certain of the de jurecertitude of truth. Thus, as we have mentioned earlier, he never questions whether the knowledge of haqa'iq al-umur is possible or not. His natural intellectual disposition to always seek that knowledge is, in a way, an affirmation of his certainty of the de jure certitude of truth.

According to Schuon, it is the agnostics and other relativists who sought to demonstrate the illusory character of the de jure certitude of truth by opposing to it the de facto certitude of error, as if the psychological phenomenon of false certitudes could pre-vent true certitudes from being what they are and from having all their effectiveness and as if the very existence of false certitudes did not prove in its own way the existence of true once[37]. As for al-Ghazzālī, he never falls into the above philosophical temptation of the agnostics and relativists. His doubt is not of truth itself, but of the mode of knowing and of accepting this truth. But since by truth here, he means the inner reality of things, his quest for that reality also implies a quest for its corresponding mode of knowledge. His criticisms of all the modes of knowing that were then within his practical realization were motivated by a real theoretical awareness of the possibility of another mode of knowing, which the Sufis claim is theirs. In the case of al-Ghazzālī, this possibility must have agitated his mind right from the time it was first impressed upon him through his direct personal encounter with the way of the Sufis. We may recall here the early educational background of al-Ghazzālī. It was an education which was permeated by a strong influence of Sufism. His father, says al-Subki, was a pious dervish who spent as much time as he could in the company of the Sufis.[38]

The first teacher to whom his early education was entrusted was a pious Sufi friend of his. Studying together with him then was the younger brother, Ahmad al-Ghazzālī (d. 1126) who, though less famous later made his mark as

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[37] Schuon,F.Logic and Transcendence,Harper and Row, New York (1975),pp. 43-44.
[38] Al-Subki, T., Tabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah alKubrā, vol.IV, Cairo (1324/1906), p.102, quoted in M.Saeed Sheikh, op.cit., pp.582583.

a great Sufi whose disciples include ‘Abd al-Qāhir Abū Najīb as-Suhrawardī (d.1168), the founder of the Suhrawardiyyah Order, and most probably, as believed by a number of scholars, al-Ghazzālī himself. During his stay of study at Naishapur, besides studying Sufism as one of the subjects, he also became a disciple to the Sufi Abū ‘Ali ‘al---Fad! ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Fārmadhi al-Tūsī who was a pupil of al-Qushairi (d. 465/1074). Al-Ghazzālī learnt from al-Fārmadhi (d. 477/1084) about the theory and practice of Sufism and, under the latter’s guidance, even indulged in certain ascetic and spiritual practices.

He was increasingly attracted to the idea of a direct personal experience of God as insisted by the Sufis. He, however, felt a bit dis-heartened that he could not attain to that stage where the mystics begin to receive pure inspiration from “high above”[39]. With all these in mind we strongly believe that Sufism plays a central role in leading al-Ghazzālī to his epistemological crisis. AI-Ghazzālī’s doubt of the trust-worthiness of reason was not generated from “below” or by the reflection of reason upon its own self, but was suggested from “above” as a result of his acquaintance with the Sufi’s mode of knowledge which claims to be supra-rational and which offers its own critiques of reason. Likewise, the doubt was removed not by the activity of reason, but from “above” as a result of the light of divine grace which restores to each faculty of know-ledge its rightful position a End its validity and trustworthiness as its own level. Al-Ghazzali was also never at any time a religious skeptic. He tells us in the Mungidh that, throughout his quest for certainty, he always has an unshakable belief in the three fundamentals of the Islamic faith: “From the sciences which I had practiced and the methods which I had followed in my inquiry into the two kinds of knowledge, revealed and rational, I had already acquired a sure and certain faith in God Most High, in the prophetic mediation of revelation, and in the Last Day. These three fundamentals of our Faith had become deeply rooted in my-soul,

[39] Ibn Khallikan, wafayāt al-A’yān, English translation by de Slane, Paris (1842—1871), vol.l I, p.122, quoted by M.Saeed Sheikh, op.cit.,,p.583.

not because of any specific, precisely formulated proofs, but because of reasons and circumstances and experiences too many to list in detail."[40]

The above quotation is yet another evidence provided by the Munqidh that al-Ghazzālī's so-called skepticism is not to be equated with the ones we encounter in modern western philosophy. The doubting mind of al-Ghazzālī was, therefore, never cut off from revelation and faith. On the contrary, it was based upon a "sure and certain" faith in the fundamentals of religion. As for the doubting mind of the modern skeptic, it is cut off from both the intellect and revelation and in the pursuit of its directionless activity it has turned against faith itself. Now, what is the distinction between the "sure and certain" faith which al-Ghazzalī always has and the certainty which he seeks? We will deal briefly with this question because in its very answer lies the significance of the Ghazzālian doubt and also because charges have been levelled against al-Ghazzālī by scholars like J. Obermann[41] that his haunting doubts of objective reality led him to find sanctuary in religious subjectivism.

The answer to the above question is to be found in the idea of certainty (yaqīn) in Islamic gnosis. There are degrees of certainty: in the terminology of the Qur'ān, these are 'ilm al-yaqīn (science of certainty), 'ayn al-yaqin (vision of certainty) and haqq alyagīn (truth of certainty). These have been respectively compared to hearing about the description of fire, seeing fire and being consumed by fire[42]. As applied to al-Ghazzālī's quest for certainty, the "sure and certain" faith which he says he has acquired from his inquiry into the various sciences refers to 'ilm al-Yagīn since the acceptance of the truth is inferential in nature, based as it is upon the data furnished by revelation and the authority of the Prophet. In other words, at the level of faith, the truth which is the object of that faith is not known directly or with immediacy.

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[40] McCarthy, munqidh pp.90-91.

[41] Oberman n, J., Der philosophische und religiose Subjektivismus Ghazzalīs' Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Religion, Wien and Leipzig (1921),p.20.

[42] see Nasr, S.H., Knowledge and the Sacred, Crossroad, New York (1981),p.325; also, Abu Bakr Sirj al-Dīn, The Book of Certainty, New York (1974).

Nevertheless, to the extent that in one's act of faith one participates in the truth through both his reason and heart, faith already implies a particular level of knowledge and of certainty. Thus, from the beginning of al-Ghazzalī s quest for the true knowledge of the Real, a certain element of certitude was always present.

In the Kitab al-ilm (Book of knowledge) of his magnum opus, lhya 'Ulūm al-Dīn (The Revivification of the Religious Sciences), al-Ghazzali discusses the usage of the term yaqīn by the major intellectual schools of Islam up to his time. He identifies two distinct meanings to which the term is being applied. In one group are the philosophers (nuzzīr) and the theologians (mutakallimūn) who employ the term to signify lack or negation of doubt, in the sense that the knowledge or the truth in question is established from evidence which leaves no place for doubt or any possibility of doubt[43]. The second application of the term yaqīn is that of the jurists and the Sufis as well as most of the learned men. Yaqīn, in this case, refers to the intensity of religious faith or fervor which involves both the acceptance, by the soul, of that which prevails over the heart and takes hold of it" and the submission of the soul to that thing in question. For al-Ghazzālī, both types of yaqīn need to be strengthened but it is the second yaqīn which is the nobler of the two since it is the life and value of the first, and it fosters religious and spiritual obedience and praiseworthy habits. In other words, philosophical certainty is of no value if not accompanied by submission to the truth and the transformation of one's being in conformity with that truth. Although the jurists and the Sufis are both identified with the second yaqīn, they are centrally concerned with different levels of yaqīn. The Sufis are basically concerned with a direct or immediate experience of the Truth, and with submission not merely at the level of external meaning of the Sharī'ah (Divine Law) but with submission of all the powers of the soul to the Pure Spirit. For this reason, the degrees of certainty we have earlier spoken of belong to ma'rifah (Islamic gnosis) and not to fiqh (jurisprudence). Or, in al-

[43] Al-Ghazzālī, Kitāb al-'ilm, English trans. by Nabih Amin Faris, Lahore (1974),pp.193-194.

Ghazzālī's popular terminology in the lhyā, they belong to'ilm al-mukāshafah (science of revelation) and not to'ilm al-mu'āmalah (science of practical religion).

Reverting back to al-Ghazzālī's "sure and certain faith", there are, with respect to his ultimate goal, deficiencies in both his modes of knowing and the submission of his whole being. Deficiency in the former lies at the heart of his first personal crisis which, as we have seen, is epistemological while deficiency in the latter is at the heart of his second personal crisis which is spiritual, although the two crisis are not unrelated. We have identified this earlier faith of al-Ghazzālī with the level of 'ilm al-yaqīn which is a particular manner of participation in the Truth. Objectively, if doubts could be generated about the trustworthiness of 'īlm al-yaqīn as being the highest level of certainty, it is because a higher level of certitude is possible for as Schuon profoundly says, if man is able to doubt, this is because certitude exists[44]. AI-Ghazzālī's acquaintance with the methodology of the Sufis made him aware of the de jurecertitude of truth of a higher level. At the time of his epistemological crisis, he was certain of this certitude only in the sense of 'īlm al-yaqīn. After the crisis, as a result of the light of intellectual intuition which he receives from Heaven, that certainty was elevated to the level of 'ayn al-yaqīn. This new-found certainty is not the end of al-Ghazzali's intellectual and spiritual quest. He is too aware of the Sufis' claim of mystical experience but which he himself has not been able to realize yet, and this must have been a lingering source of inner disturbance for him. We remember how he did attempt to indulge in certain spiritual practices of the Sufis but without success. He is to realize later where his central fault lies: he was too engrossed in wordly desires and ambitions such as fame and fortune[45], while the efficacy of spiritual practices presupposes certain conditions like the sincerity of one's intention.

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[44] Schuon,F.;op.cit.,, p.13.
[45] McCarthy,op.cit., p.91.

Al-Ghazzālī mentions in the Munqidh that immediately after his first crisis is over, he proceeds to study with greater thoroughness the views and methods of the various seekers of the Truth, whom he limits to four. These are "the mutakallimūn (theologians) who allege that they are men of independent judgment and reasoning; the ha-finites who claim to be the unique possessors of al-ta'līm (authoritative instruction) and the privileged recīpients of knowledge acquired from the Infallible Imam; the philosophers who maintain that they are the men of logic and apodeictic demonstration; and finally the Sufis who claim to be the familiars of the Divine Presence and the men of mystic vision and illumination"[46]. There is no doubt that al-Ghazal has undertaken this comparative study of all the categories of seekers of the Truth with the view of exhausting all the possibilities and opportunities which lie open to him in his path of seeking the highest level of certainty seekable, although one may already detect in him then that his real inclination and sympathy lies in Sufism. At the end of this thorough study, he came to the conclusion that "the Sufis were masters of states (arbāb al-ahwāl) and not purveyors of words (ashāb alaqwal)"[47]. He also came to realize how great a difference there is between theoretical knowledge and realized knowledge. For example, there is a great difference between our knowing the definitions and causes and conditions of health and satiety and our being healthy and sated, between our knowing the definition of drunkenness and our being drunk, and between our knowing the true nature .and conditions of asceticism and our actually practicing. asceticism. Certitude derived from realized knowledge is what haqq al-yaqīn is. This knowledge is free from error and doubt because it is not based on conjecture or mental concepts but it resides in the heart and thus involves the whole of man's being [48].

Realized knowledge, however, demands the transformation of the knower's being. The distinctive characteristic of the Sufi mode of knowledge,

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[46] McCarthy, ibid, p.67.
[47] Al-Ghazzālī, munqidh p.35.
[48] Nasr op.cit.,, p.325.

says al-Ghazzālī, is that it seeks the removal of deformations of the soul such as pride, passional attachment to the world and a host of other reprehensible habits and vicious qualities, all of which stand as obstacles to the realization of that knowledge, in order to attain a heart empty of all save. God and adorned with the constant remembrance of God[49]. This led al-Ghazzālī to reflect upon his own state of being. He realized the pitiful state of his soul and became certain that he was "on the brink of a crumb-ling bank and already on the. verge of falling into the Fire"[50] unless he set about mending his ways. Before him now lies the most important decision he has to make in his life. For about six months he incessantly vacillated between the contending pull of worldly desires and the appeals of the afterlife. This is al-Ghazzālī's second personal crisis which is spiritual and far more serious than the first because it involves a decision of having to abandon one kind of life for another which is essentially opposed to the former. He tells us how, at last, when he has completely lost his capacity to make a choice God delivers him from, the crisis by making it easy for his heart to turn away from the attractions of the world. In the spiritual path of the Sufis, al-Ghazzālī found the light of certainty that he has tirelessly sought from the beginning of his intellectual awareness of what that certainty is.

It is therefore, in the light of the whole of Islamic epistemology and the idea of degrees of certainty (yaqīn) in Islamic gnosis that the famous Ghazzālian doubt should be studied and understood. When al-Ghazzālī turns to his own inner being to find the light of certainty, it is not an exercise in religious subjectivism or an act of disillusionment with objective reality as maintained by scholars like Obermann and Furlani. Al-Ghazzālī, on the contrary, is in the quest for the highest objective reality which is, but the intellectual and spiritual tradition in which he lives and thinks makes him fully aware of the fact that what veils man from that reality is 'the darkness of his own heart. Moreover, the living spiritual tradition of Islam also provides a

[49] McCarthy, op.cit.,p.90.
[50] McCarthy, ibid, p.91.

whole operative process, which leads by divine grace to the removal of that veil, for all the real seekers of the Truth, of which al-Ghazzali is an outstanding example. wa'llahu a'lam.

FROM THE DIVINE TO THE HUMAN *

AN APPRAISAL

Martin Lings

The author states in the preface that he is writing from the standpoint of metaphysics. Now it goes without saying that what is metaphysical, "beyond nature" in the sense of transcendence, is thereby metaphysics, or soul-transcending, which leads us by contrast to recall once again[51] Jung's remark that the soul is the object of psychology and unfortunately also its subject. In other words, for want of being metaphysical, the standpoint of modern psychology-which is all that Jung is referring to is unfortunately psychic and not metapsychic. On the contrary, insofar as the soul is the object of Schuon's considerations, his writings entirely escape the misfortune referred to by Jung. Moreover, as regards this particular book, the title is there to assure us that the human individual will not be approached from the side, that is, from its own level, but from above.

In a more general respect also the title proclaims in advance the great importance of the book - one can even say its necessity. We live in a world which for the last hundred years and more has been largely dominated by an idea which might be expressed "from the subhuman to the human". To that error this masterpiece comes as a devastating refutation.

The unusual power of the author's attack can be partly accounted for by a remark he has made elsewhere. "The individualistic and sentimental argumentation with which traditional piety operates has lost almost all its

* A recent book on Metaphysics and epistemology by Frithjof Schuon, Trans. Gustavo Polit and Deborah Lambert. (World Wisdom Books, 1982).

[51] See our review of Schuon's Islam and the Perennial Philosophy in the Autumn 1976 number of Studies in Comparative Religion.

power to pierce consciences, and the reason for this is not merely that modern man is irreligious but also that the usual religious arguments, through not probing sufficiently to the depth of things, and not having had any need to do so, are psychologically somewhat outworn and fail to satisfy certain needs of causality. If human societies degenerate on the one hand with the passage of time, they accumulate on the other hand experience in virtue of old age, however intermingled with errors their experience may be; this paradox is something that any pastoral teaching bent on efficacy should take into account, not by drawing new directives from the general error but on the contrary by using arguments of a higher order, intellectual rather than sentimental"[52].

The author's own practice of what he preaches is a marked characteristic of his writing as a whole and of this new book in particular; and some outstanding examples of his "arguments of a higher order" are to be found in the first chapter, "Consequences Flowing from the Mystery of Subjectivity":

Nothing is more absurd than to have intelligence derive from matter, hence the greater from the lesser: the evolutionary leap from matter to intelligence is from every point of view the most inconceivable thing that could be . . . Starting from the recognition of the immediately tangible mystery of subjectivity or intelligence, we can easily understand that the origin of the Universe is not inert and unconscious matter but a spiritual Substance which, from coagulation to coagulation and from segmentation to segmentation - and other projections both manifesting and limiting - finally produces matter by causing it to emerge from a substance which, though more subtle than it, is already remote from the principal Substance". Readers, may remember in this connection a remarkable passage where the author elsewhere refers to the inverse process, that is, the reabsorbtion of matter

[52] Islam and the Perennial Philosophy, pp. 53-4.

into Spirit, with reference to the "cloud" which hid Christ from sight[53] when his Ascension had reached a certain level.

Another powerful argument lies in the fact that "the ideas of the 'Great Spirit' and the primacy of the Invisible are natural to man, a fact which does not need to be demonstrated" and that "what is natural to human consciousness proves ipso facto its essential truth inasmuch as the intelligence exists for no other reason that to be adquate to reality." Analogously we could say that the existence of the ear proves the existence of sound; or as the author himself remarks: "We have heard it said that the wings of birds prove the existence of air, and that in the-same way the religious phenomenon, common a priori to all peoples, proves the existence of its content, namely God and the after-life: which is to the point if one takes the trouble to examine the argument in depth". The symbolism here is in itself illuminating for religion gives man "wings" and the air in question is the domain of the Transcendent for which those wings are made and the reality of which- they "prove". It is true that such proofs are, as the author says "inaccessible to certain minds": but he gives also arguments of common sense such as might convince some of those who are not - or not yet - open to demonstrations on a higher plane.

"Those who uphold the evolutionist argument of an intellectual progress like to explain religious and metaphysical ideas by inferior psychological factors, such as fear of the unknown, childish hope of a perpetual happiness, attachment to an imagery that has become dear, escape into dreams, the desire to oppress others at small expense, et cetera; how can one fail to see that such suspicions, presented shamelessly as demonstrated facts, comprise psychological inconsequences and impossibilities, which cannot escape any impartial observers? If humanity was stupid for thousands of years, one cannot explain how it could have ceased being so, especially since this is supposed to have happened in a relatively very short space of time; and one

[53] ibid., p. 53.

can explain it still less when one observes with what intelligence and heroism it was stupid for so long and with what philosophic myopia and moral decadence it has finally become 'lucid' and 'adult".

The book is divided into three parts, Subjectivity and Know-ledge, Divine and Universal Order, and Human World. In part one the first chapter on the general significance of subjectivity is followed by a more analytical chapter entitled "Aspects of the Theophanic Phenomenon of Consciousness" which throws light on certain facts that are imperfectly understood, largely through unconcious prejudice. Having mentioned what man has in common with animals, the author adds: "What belongs to man alone is the Intellect opened onto the Absolute, and thereby also reason which prolongs the Intellect in the direction of relativity; and in consequence, the capacity for integral knowledge, for sacralisation and ascension ". But it would be a mistake to suppose that what we share with animals is not different in them from what it is in us. Taking sexuality as an example and having remarked that it is "animal in animals and human in men", he adds: "To say that it is human means in practice that it demands spiritualization, hence interiorization and sacramenalisation; human sexuality is specifically and pejoratively animal when man wishes it so, but not in the framework of what is truly human, which is spiritual".

The final chapter of part one is "Transcendence is Not Contrary to Sense". In it some wide-spread faults of thinking are traced back to their causes. At the outset the author puts his fingers on the main difficulty which faces the theologian, namely "the mystery of relativity, not only the relativity of the world but also - and a priori - that of the personal aspect of the Divinity". Whatever the scope of his own particular intelligence may be, the theologian has a heavy exoteric responsibility. He must in fact "avoid at all costs, on the one hand placing one or several gods beside God, and on the other hand introducing into God a scission, which would amount more or less to the same thing; the Divine Nature has to remain simple, just as the Divine Reality has to remain One, notwithstanding the undeniable

complexity of the Divine Mystery". In a word, it is not possible to put before the religious majority the notion that the Personal God or God the Creator is transcendable. But whip recognizing the needs of that majority, this chapter is above all concerned with safeguarding the rights of man's theomorphic intelligence, made to perceive the Divine Truth in all its complex hierarchy by being itself a complex hierarchy. In fallen man this subjective complexity is simplified and stunted; fallen intelligences, no longer adequate to their supreme object, tend to be unaware of the hierarchy of the Divine Aspects. Form this there is only one step to denying the rights of the primordial intelligence to perceive what it, the fallen intelligence, is unable to see. Schuon very amply vindicates these rights; but having done so he expresses, with regard to Beyond-Being, that is, the Transpersonal Divine Essence, an all-important truth, which might in fact be capable of appeasing and reconciling those of the dogmatists who have the humility to admit their own intellectual limitations and the aspiration to overcome them:

"Concerning the transcendence of Beyond-Being, it is necessary to emphasize that in reality this transcendence is absolute plenitude, so that it could not possibly have a privative meaning: to say that the Trinity is surpassed therein means, not that the Trinity is abolished in its essentials, but that it is comprised - and prefigured in respect of its ontological or hypostatic projection - in Beyond Being in a way which, while being undifferentiated, is eminently positive; in the same way as the Vedantic Sat-Chit-Ananda which, although it corresponds to an already relative vision, is nonetheless ineffably and supereminently comprised in the pure absoluteness of Atma".

This truth of truths is taken up again and developed in part two, in the opening chapter on "The Interplay of the Hypostases". But here the positive and totally undeprived plenitude of the Essence is considered more in its aspect of Beginning than of End, for the theme is not that of ultimate reintegration but of the reverse process of the manifestation of the relative from the Absolute".

"Infinitude and Perfection are intrinsic dimensions of the Absolute; but they also affirm themselves 'descendingly' and in view of comogonic manifestation, in which case it could be said that Perfection of the Good is the 'image' of the Absolute produced by Radiation, thus in virtue of the Infinite. It is here that the Divine Maya intervenes, Relativity in divinis: whereas on the one hand the Absolute by definition possesses Infinitude and Perfection, on the other hand - in virtue of the Relativity necessarily implied by the Infinite - the Absolute gives rise to an operative Infinitude and to a manifested Good; thus to a hypostatic hierarchy, 'descending' and ultimately 'creative".

In what follows, the Hypostases are considered in their mutual relationships, with reference first of all to the Vedantine Ternary and then to the Christian Trinity. Many readers will no doubt agree with the reviewer that this is the most illuminating exposition of the Trinity that they have ever read, and that the author has indeed pronounced, as it were, the last word on the Orthodox-Catholic controversy about the procession of the Holy Ghost, as to whether it proceeds from the Father alone or from the Son also.

The chapter ends with a reference to Islam; "For Christians, to say that God is one means nothing unless it be added that God is three for Muslims, to say that He is three amounts to denying that He is one". But let us quote also from the concluding paragraph: "Both conceptions - the unitary and the trinitary - meet and are resolved in their archetype, which is none other than the immutable and radiating Absolute; being what It is, the Absolute cannot not be immutable, and It cannot not radiate. Immutability, or fidelity to Itself; and Radiation, or gift of Itself; there lies the essence of all that is".

There follows a remarkable chapter on "The Problem of Possibility" which makes clear the different meanings of the possible and the necessary at various levels, starting from the absolute Necessity and infinite Possibility of the Essence which is Beyond- Being

The third and last chapter of part two is entitled "Structure and Universality of the Conditions of Existence". The five conditions in question are matter, form, number, space and time. "Matter extends - starting from its basis, ether - from extreme subtlety to extreme solidity; one could also say: from substantiality to accidentally. Form evolves - starting from the sphere - between perfect simplicity and indefinite complexity; and number goes from unity to totality. Space goes from the ungraspable point to limitless extension; and time, from the instant to perpetuity. Each of these bases of departure, with its indefinite unfolding, offers an image of the supreme Principle realizing its potentialities in the mysterious direction of, relativity or contingency; but at the same time, this unfolding itself testifies in its own way to the intrinsic Infinitude and to the hypostatic modes of God".

The author goes on to point out that each of these conditions has an objective and a subjective aspect. Having mentioned the three dimensions of objective space, he adds: "In subjective space, by contrast, there is a centre and a periphery - the subject itself and the limits of its experience - and one distinguishes between what is above and below, in front and behind, to the right and to the left". Of particular interest is the symbolism of the subjective aspects of the conditions, and by way of example let us quote what is said about the three subjective dimensions of time,[54] namely the past, the present and the future:

"Positively, the past refers to the origin, to primordial and normative perfection, to the 'lost Paradise', it evokes in consequence the virtue of fidelity; negatively, it evokes immaturity transcended, imperfection conquered, the 'world' abandoned for God. Positively, the future signifies the goal, the ideal to be realized, the Paradise to be gained, it thus evokes the virtue of hope; negatively, it is the forgetting of the origin, infidelity to the primordial norm, the loss of innocent and happy childhood. It is the positive

[54] As to objective time, it "involves four phases, the most striking examples of which are the four seasons of the year", but he gives other examples such as "childhood, youth, maturity, old age".

sense which prevails here in fact, just as it is the negative sense that prevails for the past: for 'No man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God' and 'let the dead bury their dead'.

"As for the present, it is, negatively, forgetting the Origin as well as the Goal, hence attachment to the moment - forever fleeting - of present pleasure; but positively, the present signifies the virtue of faith, which determines both the virtue of hope and that of fidelity, the one not going without the other, just as there is no past without future, and conversely".

This quotation, which concerns one condition only, may serve to give a general idea of the fascination of this particular part of the chapter. But when we read on, we realize that we are proceeding from a mere antechamber to a yet vaster treasury of correspondences. The author now reminds us of the Divine roots of the different conditions, and from there, true as always to the title of the book, he takes us to the human microcosm. Finally, having included in this context the arts as prolongations of man, he shows us the conditions in their highest aspects, that is, as projections or reflections of the Essence itself, which determines them in three different ways inasmuch as It is Absolute Infinite Perfection.

Part three, Human World, opens with an "Outline of a Spiritual Anthropology this chapter-heading - and with it, implicitly, the imperative need for the book as a whole - is explained as follows:

"All 'anthropology' depends on a 'theology' in the sense that every science of man must prolong a science of God, for: 'Let us make man in our image, after our likenesses. To speak of a 'spiritual anthropology' is already a pleonasm - to say man is to say spirit - but it is justified in a world which, having forgotten the divine, can no longer know what is human".

To give briefly, at the risk of simplification, the essence of this chapter, we could say that since God is - absolutely, infinitely and perfectly - Knowledge, Love and Power, man necessarily personifies these qualities in

relative and finite perfection, and they can be identified respectively with intelligence, sentiment and will.

"In our heart, the elements knowledge, love and, power - or intelligence, sentiment and will - are combined as so many dimensions of one and the same deiform subjectivity. But we can consider the heart as the region of the will alone as soon as we attribute intelligence to the mind and sentiment to the soul, in which case our perspective is more outward;; and we can do so all the more rightly because, in a certain respect, the will is identified with the subject, with the individual who 'wills'; who wills because he loves. . . From the heart-intellect come knowledge and love, but it is not with the heart that we are able to think and feel; by contrast, it is with the heart - with pure subjectivity - that we are able to concentrate our spirit, and that is why we say that the will in general and concentration in particular pertain to the heart, even though in its depths it is not limited to this function and possesses equally and a priori knowledge and love".

Of the intelligence considered in itself he says: "Normally and primordially, human intelligence realizes a perfect equilibrium between the intelligence of the brain and that of the heart; the first is the rational capacity with the diverse abilities attached there-to; the second is intellectual or spiritual intuition, or in other words it is that eschatological realism which permits one to choose the saving truth even apart from any mental speculation. Cardiac intelligence, even when reduced to its minimum is always right; it is from this that faith is derived whenever it is profound and unshakeable, and such is the intelligence of a great number of saints. Nevertheless, the absolute norm or the ideal is the plenitude - not the sufficient minimum - of cardiac intelligence and the perfect expansion of dialectical intelligence".

Let us quote also what he says of the origin, within the subject, of the complementarity's spirit-soul:

"The Absolute 'radiates' by virtue of its intrinsic 'dimension' of Infinitude, which brings about the springing forth' of Maya, which itself both contains and produces reflections, world, beings: it is thus that one must distinguish a fundamental separation within the human subject, namely the complementarity spirit and soul; the first element belonging to the universal order, and the second constituting the individuality, hence the Maya of the microcosm".

Having referred the spiritual and psychic aspects of man to their divine archetypes, the author now gives us a chapter on "The Message of the Human Body", outset in which he says, almost at the outset:

"The human form marks not only the summit of earthly creatures, but also-and for that very reason--the exit from their condition, or from the Samsara as the Buddhists would say. To see man is to see not only the image of God but also a door open towards Bodhi, liberating Illumination; or let us say towards a blessed establishment in the divine Nearness...The animal, which can manifest perfections but not the Absolute, is like a closed door, as it were enclosed in its own perfection; whereas man is like an open door that allows him to escape his limits, which are those of the world rather than his own". Later, but in the same context, he says: "As to those animals which are intrinsically noble and which thus lend themselves directly to a positive symbolism, one may wonder whether they are not themselves also Theophanous; they are so necessarily, and the same holds true for certain plants, minerals, cosmic or terrestrial phenomena, but in these cases the theomorphic is partial and not integral as in man. The splendour of the stage excludes that of the lion, the eagle cannot be the swan, nor the water lily the rose...only man is the image-synthesis of the Creator, by his possession of the intellect — thus also of reason and language—and by his manifestation of it through his very form".

It is impossible to give here more than a faint impression of the wealth and originality of this remarkable chapter; but having conveyed something of

its more general contents, let us quote two passages where the author dwells on particular aspects of the body and in so doing gives us a hint of his powers of perception. The greatness of Schuon as an artist, and especially as a painter of the human form, is clearly, related to these powers, and in some measure explained by them;

"One of the most salient characteristics of the human body is the breast, which is a solar symbol, with a difference of accentuation according to sex; noble and glorious radiation in both cases, but manifesting power in the first case and generosity in the second; the power and generosity of pure being. The heart is the centre of man, and the breast is so to speak the face of the heart: and since the heart-intellect comprises both Knowledge and Love, it is plausible that in the human body this polarization should manifest itself by the complementarily of the masculine and feminine breasts".

"The gait of the human being is as evocative as his vertical posture; whereas the animal is horizontal and only advances towards itself-that is, it is enclosed within its own form-man, in advancing, transcends himself; even his forward movement seems vertical, it denotes a pilgrimage towards his Archetype, towards the celestial Kingdom, towards God. The beauty of the front of the human body indicates on the one hand the nobleness of man's vocational end, and on the other hand the nobleness of his way of approaching it; it indicates that man directs himself towards God, and that he does so in a manner that is humanly divine', if one may say so. But the back of the body also has its meaning: it indicates, on the one hand, the noble innocence of the origin, and on the other hand the noble way of leaving behind oneself what has been transcended; it expresses, positively, whence we have come and, negatively, how we turn our backs on what is no longer ourselves. Man comes from God and he goes towards God; but at the same time he draws away from an imperfection which is no longer his own and draws nearer to a perfection which is not yet his. His 'becoming' bears the imprint of a being'; he is that which he becomes, and he comes that which he is".

It goes without saying that the projection "from the Divine to the human" necessarily implies a movement in the opposite direction—or rather movements, inasmuch as the human being is a multiple entity. One of these reactive vibrations is intellectual discernment. Another, complementary to it, is partially akin to homesickness. An exile, as such, is acutely sensitive to anything that is typically representative of his homeland. The smallest such object may move him in an instant to tears. Now man on earth is an exile, and that which typifies his homeland is, precisely, the sacred. To this sensitivity the author now devotes a whole chapter, which is entitled "The Sense of the Sacred".

"As with intellectual discernment, the sense of the sacred is an adequation to the Real, with the difference however that the knowing subject is then the entire soul and not merely the discriminative intelligence. What the intelligence perceives quasi-mathematically, the soul senses in an as it were musical manner that is both moral and aesthetic; it is immobilized and at the same time vivified by the message of blessed Eternity that the sacred transmits.

The sacred is the projection of the celestial Centre into the cosmic periphery, or of the 'Motionless Mover' into the flow of things. To feel this concretely is to posses the sense of the sacred, and thereby the instinct of adoration, devotion and submission The sense of the sacred is thus the innate consciousness of the presence of God: it is to feel this presence sacramentally in symbols and ontologically in all things....The sacred is the projection of the Immutable into the mutable; as a result, the sense of the sacred consists not only in perceiving this projection, but also in discovering in things the trace of the Immutable, to the point of not letting oneself be deceived and enslaved by the mutable....The sense of the sacred, by the very fact that it coincides with devotion, essentially implies dignity: firstly moral dignity, the virtues, and then dignity of bearing of gesture; external comportment, which belongs to the moving periphery, must bear witness in this periphery to the 'Motionless Centre' ".

Let us quote also the following passage, which takes as back to the question of discernment and explains why the higher reaches of the intelligence can not be fully operative without a basic sense of the sacred:

"There is nothing paradoxical in the idea that man cannot be a metaphysician in the full sense without possessing the sense of the sacred; Plotlines is certainly not the only one to have pointed this out. The reason is not that the intelligence cannot a priori perceive the true without the concurrence of moral qualities, but that by itself it is not capable of excluding all possibility of error, inasmuch as errors often have their source in the imperfection of the soul, for man is a whole; it is no less true that, beyond a certain level of perception, the intelligence has need of particular graces which largely depend upon moral qualification in the broadest sense of the term...Altogether generally, we would say that one cannot enter the sanctuary of truth except in a holy way, and this condition includes above all beauty of character, which is inseparable from the sense of the sacred".

The above quotations are concentrated on the essential aspect of the chapter, but they neglect what the author has to say about the secondary and practical aspect of his theme. The reader will find some remarkable passages on rites and ceremonies, on liturgical art, and on miracles, all of which, in their different ways, are manifestations of the sacred. We will mention briefly here a point which he makes about the "inward miracle". Having spoken of "the necessity for the irruption of the supernatural into the natural order" - and it is clear that by "supernatural" he means above all "divine"-he adds: "If 'God exists'—really and fully, and not as some unconscious and passive 'power' as the naturalists and deists would have it-then miracles cannot not be". He then goes on to say: "What is true for the macrocosm is equally true for the microcosm: if the miraculous exists outwardly, then it also exists inwardly. The microcosmic or inward miracle is that which manifests the Divine Presence in the soul: gnosis, ecstasy, the sacrament, sanctity, all of which are proofs of the possibility, as well as of the necessity, of an unimaginable irruption of the divine element".

To deny "from the Divine to the human", that is, to deny the Divine origin of man and of the world, is to reject religion altogether. To affirm the Divine origin is to accept religion in itself, but not necessarily to accept a particular Revelation. In his final chapter, "To Refuse or To Accept Revelation", the author begins by examining the atheists' and agnostics' arguments which seek to defend and to justify those who in the past, like themselves in the present, refused to accept this or that Revelation. Characteristically he simplifies nothing and admits the complexity of some but not all of the situations. He makes it clear that the initial refusal of the pagan Arabs to accept Islam had no justification whatsoever. On the other hand, as regards the often made claim that the Pharisees "had no reason for accepting the message of Christ, that on the contrary they had reasons for not accepting it" he says: "This is partly true and partly false, taking into account on the one hand the intrinsic orthodoxy of Mosaism and on the other hand the prophetic quality of the Christ".

But he goes on to analyze the state of Judaism at the time of Christ, and this analysis brings to light the full gravity of the schism between the formalistic and outward yet none the less orthodox Pharisees and the Sadducees who, despite their heterodoxy, were in control of the Temple.

"Pure and simple logic is one thing, scriptural and semantic, or possibly moralistic, logic is another; the first operates on the basis of realities and concepts, and the second on the basis of words, then, sentiments, even of self-interest. The contemporaries of Christ appear to have known or practiced rather the second type of logic, which alone can explain the unfathomable inconsequence, on the part of the Sadducees, of following a religious Law without believing in the hereafter, and the no less extraordinary illogicality of the Pharisees in tolerating the Sadducees in the Temple. Before accusing jesus of the sin of heresy, the 'doctors of the Law' would have done well to come to an agreement on their own orthodoxy; and since they were not in agreement, it appears that even from their own point of view, they had much to learn from Christ, and in this sense be remains, in principle, a

Master within the very framework of Judaism. Within this framework, moreover, there was a third group, the Essenes, who were without doubt the ancestors of the Kabbalists and who were remarkably close to the spirit of Jesus; but despite this they did not become Christians, which evokes, theoretically at least, the saying in the Gospel: They that are whole need not a physician'.

An argument of a different kind is now brought to bear: "Subjectively one can turn away from a religious message for two reasons, one positive and one negative: one can turn away from it out of love for the truth - the truth in a given form - but again, one can refuse it out of hatred of true spirituality, of inwardness, and of asceticism, hence out of a kind of worldliness; this was the case with a great number of contemporaries of Jesus, who believed that they had established between God and themselves a modus vivendi well protected by formal rectitude, whereas in reality God likes to shatter and renew forms or the husks of things; for He wants our hearts and is not content with out actions alone, It is upon this aspect that Christ strongly insisted; too strongly in the opinion of the 'orthodox', but not too strongly from the point of view of the real needs of men.

In any case, even if Europe had had no need of Christ, Israel would have needed Jesus. The Buddha reject the Veda, yet the Brahmanists accepted him as an Avatara; Christ did not reject the Torah, and Mosaists could all the more easily - or with less difficulty-have accepted him as Prophet. In fact, Christianity seems to have done Judaism a service indirectly, just as Buddhism did for Brahmanism; not in the sense of a doctrinal influence of course, but in the sense that the new Revelation 'catalyzed' the old ones and allowed them to become once again fully themselves, no doubt with some additional emphases".

The author goes on to consider the "absurdities" which are allegedly contained in Scripture and which make the Revelation in question incredible according to the unanimous opinion of all unbelievers. He takes pertinent

examples from both the Bible and the Quran, and shows that in all cases the explanation is there - and must necessarily be there - for those who wish to see it. In the same context of "absurdity" he then considers, at some length, the apparent contradictions between one religion and another: "Certainly, God cannot contradict Himself in essence, but He can appear to contradict Himself within forms and levels; the phenomenon of multiple subjectivity is contradictory, but subjectivity in itself cannot be so, and the same holds good for certain scriptural passages or for the religions themselves".

It is indeed true that no man will say to another: "I am I and you are you", and still less will that other retort: "No, it is I who am I; in fact, I am the only I in the world". Nor will a third person conclude that both are wrong, and that subjectivity is therefore an illusion. Yet with regard to something that is parallel, namely the apparent contradictions between religions, whole nations have gone to war; and seeing this, the third party, that is the modern skeptic, concludes that if God existed He would not allow such contradictions and would make it absolutely clear which was right and which was wrong - whence the conclusion that God does not exist and that there is no such thing as revelation.

Schuon's answer is as follows:

"The plurality of religions is no more contradictory than the plurality of individuals: in Revelation, God makes Himself as it were an individual in order to address the individual; homogeneity in relation to other Revelations is inward and not outward. If humanity were not diverse, a single Divine individualization would suffice; but man is diverse not only from the point of view of ethnic temperaments but also from that of spiritual possibilities; the diverse combinations of these two things make possible and necessary the diversity of Revelations".

The chapter builds up in a remarkable way as more and more weight is thrown into the scale of acceptance. The author began by refuting and condemning the refusal to accept a particular Revelation, namely that which

is addressed to a man's own ethnic or, geographic group and therefore to himself. But the exposition proceeds with a flow that is in a sense in step with the flow of time. As the cycle draws to its close - and we live beyond doubt on the threshold of that finality - it becomes more and more necessary for faith, if it is to survive at all, to establish itself on a wider and firmer basis. There are certain things that old men can see in virtue of experience and that relatively few young men can see, almost apart from the question of greater or lesser intelligence, and simply by way of contrast between experienced age and inexperienced youth. Now man to-day is old; and that old cannot help seeing the disproportion between the immense claims that religion makes for itself and the ineffectual impotence of religion as, in the hands of its official exponents, it appears in fact to be. In many and perhaps most cases scepticism is the result of this evaluation; but some men today, who in other ages would never have probed beneath the exoteric surface, are compelled almost despite themselves to sound religion to its esoteric foundation which alone is adequate to support the claims in question.

"The question may arise of knowing to what extent a believer has the right or the duty to recognize the spiritual worth or even the full validity of the other religions. In principle and a priori no such obligation could exist, for each religion possesses within itself everything man needs; but in fact and in the context of inescapable experiences, this question ultimately cannot not arise How can a man, who observes that his religion of birth or adoption is visibly incapable of saving the whole of humanity, still believe that it is the only saving religion? And how can a man, who moreover observes the existence of other religions, powerfully established and having the same claim, persist in believing that God, sincerely desirous of saving the world, should have found no other means of doing so than by instituting one sole, strongly coloured by particular ethnin and historical features - as it must necessarily be - and doomed in advance to failure as regards the goal in question? Doubtless these questions do not arise a priori, but in the end they do arise after centuries of experience. And the fact that they arise and that

they greatly compromise religion which, it is clear, has no adequate means of answering them - this fact, we say, shows that they arise legitimately and providentially, and that in the religions there is, to the very extent of their exclusiveness, an aspect of insufficiency, normal no doubt but nonetheless, in the final reckoning, detrimental.

"The divine origin and the majesty of the religions implies that they must contain all truth and all answers; and there, precisely, lies the mystery and the role of esoterism. When the religious phenomenon hard - pressed as it were by a badly interpreted experience, appears to be at the very end of its resources, esoterism springs forth from the very depths of this phenomenon to show that Heaven cannot contradict itself; that a given religion in reality sums up all religions, and that all religion is to be found in a given religion, be-cause Truth is one".

It is fitting that this chapter should be the last, since Revelation is the final movement "from the Divine to the human", its purpose being to draw the human back to the Divine. The book ends with an exposition of what Revelation is in itself, and for what intrinsic reasons it is unrefusable. The author expresses his astonishment at the insensitivity of unbelivers and even of some believers, that they do not perceive from the very first that the Psalms, the Gospel, the Upanishads, the Bhagavad-gita could only come from Heaven, and that - from the point of view of credibility - the spiritual perfume of these Books dispenses with all theological analysis as well as with all historical research".

Parallel to this is the unbelievers insensitivity to the appearance of the celestial Messengers themselves; and having quoted the formulations "he who has seen the Prophet has seen God" and "God became man that man might become God", he adds: "One has to have a very hardened heart not to be able to see this upon contact with such beings; and it is above all this hardness of heart that is culpable, far more than ideological scruples".

There are also certain compensations for those who are not privileged to meet the Messengers, and those compensations are likewise fraught with danger for the hard-hearted: "The combination of sanctity and beauty which characterizes the Messengers of Heaven is transmitted so to speak from the human theophanies to the sacred' art which perpetuates it: the essentially intelligent and profound beauty of this art testifies to the truth which inspires it; it could not in any case be reduced to a human invention as regards the essential of its message. Sacred art is Heaven descended to earth, rather than earth reaching towards Heaven".

Ultimately it has to be said that for those who are adequate to it the most cogent reason for accepting the- Revelation is given by the Revelation itself in its own quintessential message, esoterism, or more precisely in esoterism's very basis, the truth of what is often termed the Supreme Identity.

"The worth of man lies in his consciousness of the Absolute, and therefore in the wholeness and depth of this consciousness; having lost sight of it by plunging himself into the world of phenomena viewed as such - this is prefigured by the fall of the first couple-man needs to be reminded of it by the celestial Message. Fundamentally, this Message comes from 'himself', not of course from his empirical 'I' but from his immanent Selfhood, which is that of God and without which there would be no 'I', neither human nor angelic nor any other; the credibility of the Message results from the fact that it is what we are, both within ourselves and beyond ourselves… To believe in God is to become again what we are; to become it to the very extent that we believe and that believing becomes being".

This sentence, which closes the book, would make a fitting close to our review. While letting it have the last word, let us simply add by wav of comment. a reference to what the author says, also on his last page, in explanation of "the mystery of Revelation, Intercession, Redemption", namely that these are inevitable because, in its aspect of Mercy, "the Principle

'loves' manifestation and 'remembers' that it is Its own, that manifestation is not 'other than It' ". Now what is said here of manifestation necessarily applies first and foremost to the quintessence of manifestation, that is, to man himself; and this very concentrated book whose every chapter unfolds an aspect of the title, may be considered above all as a claim addressed "from the Divine to the human" that the human is "Its own" and "not other than It" - a claim which, for those who "have ears to hear" will be no less than an imperative vocation.

THE MEANING AND ROLE OF INTUITION IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY

Riffat Hassan

According to Kant, the perceptual manifold must fulfil certain formal conditions in order to constitute knowledge. For him the noumenon or the 'thing-in-itseir is only a limiting or regulative idea. If there is some actuality corresponding to the idea, it transcends 'actual' experience and consequently its existence cannot be rationally demonstrated. The subject matter of metaphysics falls outside the boundaries of experience and cannot be systematised by space and time, and therefore, according to Kant, metaphysics is impossible. In Kantian terms, religion is equally impossible, but according to Iqbal, it is possible to attain knowledge of Ultimate Reality and therefore both metaphysics and religion are possible. In Iqbal's words, "Kant's verdict can be accepted only if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible."[55]

Iqbal believes that it is the lot of human beings to share in the deeper aspirations of the universe around them and to shape their own destiny as well as that of the universe."[56] However, in order to achieve the fullest possible development of their potentialities it is essential for human beings to possess knowledge." Man's life and the onward march of his spirit depend on the establishment of connections with the reality that confronts him. It is knowledge that establishes these connections."[57]

Iqbal defines knowledge as "sense-perception elaborated by understanding"[58] ('understanding' here does not stand exclusively for 'reason' but for all non-perceptual modes of knowledge) maintains that there are two

[55] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, 1962, p.182.
[56] Ibid, p.12.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.

sources of knowledge-the inner consciousness of humankind ("anfus") and the outer world or nature ("afāq").[59] The direct way of establishing connections with the Reality that confronts us is by means of observation and sense-perception; the other way is through direct association with that Reality as it reveals itself within. The latter is the intuitive method and in Iqbal's philosophy great emphasis has been laid on intuition' as a mode of knowledge.[60]

The word 'intuition' is derived from a verb means 'looking at', and its extended use seems to have originated as a metaphor from sight.[61] "It would stand, presumably, for a mental inspection in which a direct revelation is made to the mind, comparable to the direct revelation which accompanies the exposure of a physical object to the eye."[62] The word is used in the works of Descartes and Locke to mean the apprehension of indubitable, self-evident truths. Descartes explains how intuition is "not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgement that proceeds from the blundering constructions of imagination, but the pure intellectual cognizing so ready and so distinct that we are wholly freed from, doubt about that which we thus intellectually apprehend."[63] Locke describes intuitive knowledge as "the clearest and most" certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is perfectly filled with the clear light of it."[64] Hence the traditional

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[59] Dar, B.A., "Intellect and Intuition in Bergson and Sufis", Iqbal, January 1956, Vol, IV, No.3, p.82.
[60] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought In Islam, p.15.
[61] Stocks, J.L.,"Reason and Intuition", in Reason and Intuition and Other Essays, London, 1939, p.3.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Descartes quoted in Aaron, R.I., "Intuitive Knowledge",

Mind, London, October 1942, Vol. LI, No.204, pp. 297-298.
[64] St. John, J.A., (Editor), The Philosophic Works of John

philosophical meaning of 'intuition' is knowing with absolute certainty, or knowing in such a way that there is no room for doubt.

Possibility of intuitive knowledge Kant in showing the limitations of pure reason had also demonstrated the impossibility of 'intuitive' experience without which metaphysics and religion are not possible. But, paradoxically enough, in proving the relativity of the finite objects of experience to the intelligence, he also showed" though without himself being fully conscious of it, and almost, we might say, against his will, that we cannot admit the validity of the empirical consciousness without admitting the validity of the consciousness of that which, in the narrower sense of the word, is beyond experience."[65] It can be seen clearly from his Lectures that Iqbal is very anxious to show the possibility and validity of the intuitive consciousness. If intuitive experience is possible then it follows that both metaphysics and religion are possible.

Kant had rejected the possibility of metaphysics because it dealt with that which could not be systematized by the categories of space and time and therefore, in his opinion, could not constitute knowledge. But supposing, says Iqbal, that there is more than one kind of space and one kind of time, then it is quite possible "that there are other levels of human experience capable of being systematized by other orders of space and time-levels in which concept and analysis do not play the same role as they do in the case of our normal experience."[66] Iqbal agrees with Kant in regarding space and time as subjective but he does not look upon them as unvarying modes into which all" our knowledge is moulded. Rather, they admit of new meaning in relation to various grades of experience and their import varies as psychic powers increase or decrease.[67]

Locke, London, 1843, p. 386

[65] Caird, E., "The Problem of Philosophy at the Present 1 ime", Essays on Literature, Glasgow, 1909, p. 195.

[66] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 183.

[67] Enver, I.H., Metaphysics of Iqbal, Lahore, 1963, pp. 12-18.

Iqbal has devoted a considerable portion of his Lectures to discussing the question of the nature of Space and Time. It was necessary for him to do so in order to demonstrate the possibility of levels of experience which were free from the "normal" spatiotemporal determinations. Iqbal distinguishes between kinds of Space and Time, and points out that there are levels of experience which refer not to these forms of experience in their ordinary connotation, but to "the interpenetration of the super-spatial 'here' and the super-eternal 'now' in the Ultimate Reality."[68] Such an interpenetration suggests "the modern notion of space-time which Professor Alexander, in his lectures on Space, Time and Deity regards as the matrix of all things."[69]

Iqbal believes, then, in potential types of consciousness which lie close to our normal consciousness and yield life and knowledge.[70] Such knowledge is gained through intuition. Iqbal describes the main features of intuitive experience when he enumerates the characteristics of mysticism which deals with the Ultimate by way of intuitive apprehension.[71]

Characteristics of intuitive (Mystic) Experience

(a) The characteristic of intuition which has traditionally, been most emphasized is its indivisibility. "Intuitionism is the theory which asserts, in the face of all skeptical criticisms, that absolutely certain knowledge occurs in human experience."[72] Iqbal states that according to the Qar'an, the heart or "is "something which 'sees' and its reports, if (the interpreted, are never false."[73]

(b) It is immediate experience of Reality. A notable writer on mysticism writes, "we can claim for those whom we call mystics-and, in a lesser degree,

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[68] The Reconstruction of Religous Thought in Islam, p. 137.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid, p. 185.
[71] Underhill, E., "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?", Relativity, Logic and Mysticism, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume III, London, 1923, p. 151.
[72] Aaron, J.J., "Intuitive Knowledge", p. 317.
[73]The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 16.

for innumerable artists and contemplative souls-that experience at its fullest and deepest 'does include the immediate apprehension of an unchanging Reality, and that this apprehension, in one form or another, is the sheet anchor of the religious consciousness."[74]

Intuitive experience is direct like perception but sensation is not involved in it. As Plato said, intuitions come "in a flash"[75] Iqbal, the Poet, says

عشق کی اک جست نے طے
کر دیا قصّہ تمام
اس زمین وآسماں کو بیکراں
سمجھا تھا میں

[76] (Bal-e-jibril, p. 29)

or, as he says in the introduction to Zabur-a-'Ajam

وادئ عشق بسے دورودراز
است دے
طے شود جادئہ صد سالہ

[74] Underhill, E., "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism? ", pp. 149-150..
[75] Aaron, R.I., "Intuitive Knowledge," p. 317.
[76] In one leap Love traversed the whole length, I had thought the earth and sky were boundless.

بآہے گاہے

[77] (Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 2)

For Iqbal the immediacy of mystic experience lies in that in it God is known as other objects are known. "God is not a mathematical entity or a system of concepts mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience."[78] As Ibn 'Arabi pointed out, God is a percept not a concept.[79]

(c) Intuitive experience possesses an analyzable wholeness. In it Reality is given as one indivisible unity. Iqbal compares intuitive consciousness with discursive consciousness. "When I experience the table before me, innumerable data of experience merge into the single experience of the table. Out of this wealth of data I select those that fall into a certain order of space and time and round them off in reference to the table. In the mystic state, however vivid, such analysis is not possible."[80] A writer observes that, here, Iqbal is denying, by inference, that immediacy to normal experiences which he associated with them earlier.[81] But a closer analysis shows that Iqbal is not denying the immediacy of sense-perception but rather trying to show the relative importance of analysis in the two types of consciousness. The rational consciousness specializes in analysis and synthesis but in the mystic consciousness all the diverse stimuli run into one another forming a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist.[82] The distinction between the discursive and intuitive

[77] Very far and wide is the valley of Love, But there are times when the journey of a hundred years is completed in the duration of a sigh. (Translation by Singn, I. The Arden Pilgrim, London, 1951, p.168.).
[78] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 18.
[79] Ibid, p. 183.
[80] Ibid, p. 18.
[81] Rahman, F., "Iqbal and Mysticis", Iqbal as a Thinker, Lahore, 1966,p. 220.
[82] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Pp. 18-191.

consciousness as regards the apprehension of part and whole has also been brought out by H. H. Price.

"In discursive consciousness, there is a passage of the mind from one item to another related item, for instance, from a subject to a concept under which we classify it, or from premises to conclusion...And when we have discursive consciousness of a whole or complex of any sort (as in counting) although the whole may be vaguely present to the mind from the first, yet definite consciousness of the whole comes after consciousness of the parts. In intuitive consciousness, on the other hand, consciousness of the whole comes before definite consciousness of the parts. And there is no passage of the mind; whatever we intuit is present all at once. We might say that intuitive consciousness is 'totalistic', not 'progressive' or 'additive"[83]

(d) Intuitive experience is objective. Iqbal thinks it is erroneous to think that the mystic state is "a mere retirement into the mists of pure subjectivity."[84] The mystic, for instance, experiences God or the Ultimate Reality as both immanent and transcendent. He or she is in direct communion with the 'Other' and momentarily loses consciousness of himself or herself as a distinct and private personality.[85] But he or she emerges from his or her experience possessing "a Supreme Richness-unspeakable Concreteness-overwhelming Aliveness, having been a witness to the Being which gives Becoming all its worth."[86]

Iqbal compares the objectivity of intuitive experience with the objectivity of social experience. We know other minds only by inference and yet "the knowledge that the individual before us is a conscious being floods

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[83] Price,H.H., Perception, London, 1932, pp. 151-152.
[84] Khatoon, J., The Place of God, Man and Universe in Iqbal's Philosophic System, Karachi, 1963, p. 12.
[85] Ibid.
[86] F. Von Hugel quoted by Underhill, E., "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?", p. 152.

our mind as an immediate experience."[87] One test of the objectivity of our social experience is that other persons respond to us. Iqbal bases the objectivity of religious experience on the testimony of the Qar'an that God responds to our call.

"And your Lord saith, call me and I respond to your call" (40:62); "And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh into them and answer the cry of him that crieth unto Me." (21:182)[88]

Iqbal advances another argument to substantiate the claim that religious experience which is based on intuition is objective. The very fact the religious life is divided into periods indicates that like the student of the scientific methods, the practical student of religious psychology learns to sift experience critically in order to eliminate all subjective elements, psychological, in the content of his or her experience with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective.[89]

To meet the charge that intuitive experience is purely subjective, Iqbal points out a number of times that intuition is not a faculty of knowledge qualitatively distinct from reason of perception, but rather is a quality which is implicit in cognition at every level.[90]Thus while intuition is feeling, this does not mean that it is purely subjective since feeling itself has cognitive, content as Bradley and Whitehead have shown.[91] .Iqbal points out that reflection on the character of our knowledge of our self, shows that human beings rise from the intuition of the finite self of the awareness of life as a centralizing ego and the ultimate experience of God as a universal, unifying, telic power.[92]

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[87] Khatoon, J. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the System of Iqbal, p. 13.
[88] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 19-20.
[89] Ibid, p. 197.
[90] Whittemore, R., "Iqbal's Panentheism", Iqbal Review, April, 1966, p. 70.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.

(e) Intuitive experience is incommunicable. One of the most oft-repeated objections to intuitive experience is that being incommunicable, its reality cannot really be established. To this objection Evelyn Underhill is likely to reply:

"If expressibility be indeed the criterion of the real, as some philosophers have dared to suggest-and this leads us to the strange spectable of a Real World laboriously keeping pace with the expanding vocabulary of man-not only our mystical but out highest aesthetic and passional experiences, must be discredited; for it is notorious that in all these supreme ways of human knowing and feeling, only a part of that which is apprehended can be expressed; and that the more completed and soul-satisfying the experience the more its realization approximates to the mystic's silence where all lovers lose themselves."[93]

In Iqbal's viewpoint the incommunicability or inexpressibility of mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect.[94] But intuitive experience has a cognitive content which can be translated into idea. Feeling is outward-pushing as idea is outward reporting.[95] The mystic reports not directly but through symbols and "the wonder surely is not that there reports tell so little; but-when we consider our human situation and resources-that they tell so much. The reports are always oblique, but so are the reports of all artists; of whom it is probably true to say that the greater the aesthetic values which they seek to communicate, the more oblique is the method involved."[96]

(f) In Iqbal's opinion, intuitive experience reveals Reality as an eternal 'now' and reveals the unreality of the serial character of time and space.[97] "All

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[93] Underhill, E., "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?", p. 153.
[94] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam", p.21.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Underhill, E., "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?", p.153-154.
[97] Khatoon, J., The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 13.

intense religious experience-more than this, all experience in which transcendental feeling is involved-appears to be accompanied by a marked slowing-down of consciousness, a retreat to some deeper levels of apprehension where reality is experienced not merely as succession but as existence; a genuine escape from the tyranny of 'clock-time', though not a transcendence of duration."[98] According to Iqbal this state does not abide although it gives a sense of overwhelming authority to those who have experienced it. Both the mystic and the prophet return to levels of ordinary experience, but for Iqbal the return of the prophet is of greater meaning than that of the mystic.[99]

(j) Mystic experience springs from the 'heart' but it is not qualitatively different from 'normal' experience. Iqbal believes that the seat of intuition is the 'heart' "which in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception."[100] Professor Nicholson tells that in mystic thought, "the qalb, though connected in some mysterious way with the physical heart, is not a thing of flesh and blood. Unlike the English 'heart' its nature is rather intellectual than emotional, but whereas the intellect cannot gain real knowledge of God, the qalb is capable of knowing the essences of all things, and when illuminated by faith and knowledge reflects the whole content of the divine mind, hence the Prophet said, 'My Earth and My Heaven contain Me not, but the heart of My faithful servant contains Me!" [101]

Iqbal does not regard intuitive experience as 'mysterious'. It is "a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word does not play any part. Yet the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience."[102] Iqbal differs from William

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[98] Underhill, E., "Can the new Idealism dispense wit;. Mysticism?", p. 157.
[99] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp.22-23.
[100] Ibid, pp. 15-16.
[101] Nicholson, R.A., The Mystics of Islam, London, 1914, p.68.
[102] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 16.

James whom he interprets as saying that religious experience is completely unconnected with normal experience and non-deducible by analogy from other sorts of experience since it refers to a wider spiritual environment which the ordinary, prudential self cannot enter.[103] Iqbal extends the sphere of normal experience to cover mystic experience since what-ever be the mode of knowledge, it is the same Reality which operates on us.[104]

(h) Intuitive experience reveals life as centralizing ego. It makes us aware of "the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organizing principle of unity, a synthetic activity which holds together and focalizes the dispersing dispositions of the living organism for a constructive purpose."[105] The intellect tries to reduce the rich variety of experience to a concept, but intuition does not proceed by universalization and as a consequence is able to reveal the true character of concrete things, namely, that every living entity coverages upon an egohood.[106] Like the existentialists Iqbal holds that the intuitive consciousness grasps Reality not in an abstract theoretical way but in a decisively personal manner.[107] This "intuitive insight into individual essence" has been aptly described by Mr. Roth writing on the philosophy of Spinoza, "Abstract recognition passes into concrete appreciation. Man is then conscious of nature as a unity, but does not as before from the outside. He feels it in himself; he under stands its wholeness in and from his own being. He thus not only contemplates externally the ways of the universe in which, like everything else, he is caught up. He not only sees himself as one item in the detail controlled by an all-embracing cosmic order. Nature for him is more than an abstract whole of general laws. It is a concrete system of self-directing individualities. He knows himself in it as an individual, and realizes his place in it among other individuals. He

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[103] Khatoon, J., The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 21.
[104] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 18.
[105] Ibid, pp. 60_61.
[106]Malik, G.R., "The Nature of Ego", Iqbal Review, 1964, Volume V, No.3 p. 45.
[107]Erfan, N. "What is Common between the Existentialists and lqbal", The Pakistan Philosophical Journal, January 1963, Volume VI, No.3 p. 26.

grasps both himself and things, not in their universal aspect only, but in their unique singularity."[108]

REASON AND INTUITION

The dependence of Reason upon Intuition: Intuition is opposed to demonstration in that it needs no proof and is a single act while reasoning is a complicated process. But reason cannot function with-out intuition. All demonstration starts with propositions which are themselves incapable of proof. Plato had believed that it was possible to have innate knowledge of universal ideas. "Knowledge of truth, he would have said, is acquired by metaphysical intuition, and the function of logic or scientific methods is then deductive."[109] Not only does all reasoning begin with intuitions, intuition is operative continuously throughout every process of reasoning, since every step in the reasoning, taken by itself, is an intuition, self-evident and needing no external justification.[110] It has been said that the necessity of intuitive experience lies in the principle that we discover new truths neither by logic nor by scientific investigation, but by reaching out beyond the given, grasping the new thoughts, as it were, in the dark, and only afterwards consolidating them by means of reasoned proof. [111] Iqbal writes of the intellect's indebtedness to intuition.

عقلے کہ جہاں سوزو، یک جلوۂ بیباکش
از عشق بیآموزد، آئینِ جہانتابی

[108] Mr. Roth quoted in Stocks, J.L. "Reason and Intuition", p. 12.
[109] Read, H., "The Limits of Logic", The Tenth Muse, London, 1957, p. 108.
[110]Stocks, J.L., "Reason and Intuition", p. 8.
[111] Collingwood, R.G., "Can the new Idealism dispense with

Mysticism?", Relativity, Logic and Mysticism, p. 174.

[112](Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 156)

Pointing out the different ways in which thought and intuition operate and also their interrelatedness, Iqbal said, "the one grasps Reality piecemeal. The other grasps it in its wholeness. The one is present enjoyment of the whole Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation.[113] Now, an act of reason is a process which occupies a considerable stretch of time. The question arises; how does the thinker hold together the successive moments of his thought? At the end of a process of reasoning there is a conclusion but it depends for its truth and meaning on what was revealed in the course of the process. It is intuition. "in its characteristic, function of making possible the keeping of a whole in mind,"[114] which enables the thinker to hold together in his mind all the steps of the process. J.L. Stocks observes.

"We cannot suppose that the thinker, as he proceeds to each new proposition, remembers all the propositions which he has previously asserted, and it is equally impossible that he has forgotten them: he has them, evidently, in some real sense in mind. As propositions, as assertions, they are dead and gone; but their work remains. Each proposition, as it is asserted, has its felt source and confirmation in an intuition of the relevant whole, and contributes something to the development of the intuition, so that, when the development is fruitful, other assertions are possible there-after which were not possible before."[115]

It is implicit in Iqbal's thought that reasoning is not an autonomous, self-directing power, but dependent on intuition (or what he calls 'Love' as in

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[112] One bold spark of Intellect sets all the world aglow,but it learns from Love the art of lighting up the world.
[113] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp.2-3.
[114] Stocks, J.L., "Reason and Intuition", p. 9.
[115]Ibid,p. 9.

his poetry) if it is to possess real value and validity. A philosophy which is not based on 'intuition' is lifeless.

یامردہ ہے یا نزع کی حالت میں گرفتار
جو فلسفہ لکھا نہ گیا خون
[116] (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 37)

He rejects reason which does not recognize intuitions

ہزاربار نکوتر متاعِ بے بصری
زدا نشے کہ دل اور انمی کند تصدیق
[117](Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 161)

Spinoza had described intuitive knowledge as the goal of thought and "the function of reasoning may in fact be described without inaccuracy as precisely the development of intuition."[118] Iqbal approves whole-heartedly of 'reason' which has 'intuition' as its goal

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[116] Thai philosophy is either dead or in a state of mortal weakness, which is not written with the heart's blood.

[117] Better a man were blind,

Better a thousand wise,

Than knowledge to have in mind

That the seeing heart denies.

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Persian Psalms, Lahore, 1961, p. 103.)

[118] Stocks, J.L.," Reason and Intuition", p. 10.

علم را مقصود اگر باشد نظر
می شودہم جادہ وہم راہبر
علم تفسیر جہانِ رنگ وبُو
دیدہ و دل پرورش گیرد ازد
[119](Javid Nama, p. 222)

The dependence of intuition upon Reason

Iqbal states that intuition and thought-rejuvenate each other.[120] The Ego grasps Reality both by means of intuition and intellect.

درونِ شیشہ اور روزگار
است
ولے برما بتدریج آشکار
است
[121] (Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 2)

[119]If vision is the goal of the Intellect,

It becomes both the path and the guide!

Intellect elucidates this world of smell and colour,

It nurtures the eye and the emotions.

(Translation by Saiyidain, K.G., Iqbal's Educational Philosopy, Lahore, 1960, p. 150.)
[120] The Reconstruction of -Religious Thought in Islam, p. 3.

In his Lectures, Iqbal supports Ghazzali's view that intellectual discipline ought to precede intuitive insight.[122]

Although the final intuition remains unproven and unprovable, intuition is not a certainty arising from mere inspection to which reason makes and can make no contribution. Although intuition goes beyond reason, it does not exclude intellectual spade-work.

زمانہ عقل کو سمجھا ہوا
ہے مشعل راہ
کسے خبر کہ جنوں بھی
ہے صاحبِ ادراک
[123] (Bal-e-Jibril, p. 97)

Bergson also states "We do not obtain an intuition from reality that is in intellectual sympathy with the most inmost intimate part of it - unless we have won confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations."[124]

Iqbal would not have subscribed to a rationalism which stood for the view that the world can be known and life lived by something like a set of

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[121] There is a whole world in the crystal bowl he had, But he reveals it slowly phase by phase.

(Translation by Hussain, H., The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, consulted in manuscript form, p. 4.

[122] Dar, B.A., Iqbal's Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid and Bandagi Namah, Lahore, 1964, p. 15.

[123] As the wayside lamp the world regards the Intellect,

but who knows that Reason is possessed by Passion too.

[124] Bergson, H., An Introduction to Metaphysics (Translation by Hulme, T.E.), London, 1913, p. 77.

geometrical theorems, but if rationalism stood "for the faith that truth, independent of place and position, is attainable to man"[125] then Iqbal would have supported it wholeheartedly. He realized, as Locke and Mill had done, that "an intuition which claims sacrosanctity and declines the test of reason is… a moral and social offence, a mere misnomer for blind prejudice and crass superstitution."[126]

Iqbal is very anxious to find in reason an ally for intuitive experience. He says, "Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a rational metaphysics; indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself."[127] Iqbal states clearly that as regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense--data for our knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God.[128] In one sense, then, reason is the interpreter of intuitive experience, and "philosophy has jurisdiction to judge religion."[129] But, as Iqbal points out, religion has no need to be afraid of reason which call give only a sectional view of Reality.[130] It can find room within its "universe that thinks and knows" for all values, whether scientific, asethetic, ethical or mystical, finding in the transcendent the worth and meaning of the immanent, and in the immanent a graded revelation of the transcendent.[131]

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[125] Stocks, J.L., "Reason and Intuition", p.18.
[126] Ibid., p.17..
[127] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p.2.
[128] Ibid., p. 18.
[129] Ibid., p.2..
[130] Ibid., p. 42.
[131] Underhill, E., "Can the new Idealism dispense with Mysticism?", pp.155-156.

The relationship and relative importance of Reason and Intuition

At the very outset of his Lectures, Iqbal states that there is no reason "to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other."[132] More has been written on the apparent conflict between reason and intuition (or between "aql" or "ilm" and "ishq" in Iqbal's works than on any other aspect of his thought. Yet, there is no doubt that "as a philosopher… Iqbal has given intellect its full right besides the intuitional experience."[133] He went solar as to say that "thought and intuition are organically related."[134] If Reason and Intuition are organically related, it follows that neither can function alone but both must operate together.[135] In its deeper movement thought becomes almost identical with intuition (which, following Bergson, Iqbal describes as a higher kind of intellect.[136] In its narrower sense, reason may be contrasted with intuition, but only in the way in which analysis-synthesis may be opposed as complementary processes within a developing whole of thought.[137] The basic relationship between reason and intuition remains unaltered, since intuition, "is always found in intimate relation to the reasoning process, never in sheer opposition to it."[138]

I throughout his writings Iqbal am anxious to show that there is no bifurcation between the temporal and spiritual aspects of life. If intuition and reason are completely unrelated and if intuition alone can reach Ultimate Reality, then reason has to be left behind. In some places Iqbal says precisely that this should be so

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[132] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, P.2.
[133] Schimmel, A.m., Gabriel's Wing, Leiden, 1963, p_137.
[134] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp 5-6.
[135] Rahman, F., "Modern Muslim Thought", p. 21.
[136] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p.3..
[137] Stocks, J.L., "Reason and Intuition", p. 18.
[138] Ibid., p. 16.

گذر جا عقل سے آگے کہ یہ نور
چراغِ راہ ہے، منزل نہیں ہے
[139](Bal-e-Jibril, p. 119)

But in fact, one of the chief aims of Iqbal's philosophy is to show "that neither the world nor thought should be left behind."[140] His ideal is to unite Reason and Intuition, Power and Love, State and Religion

شکوہِ خسروی این است این است
ہمیں ملک است کو توام بدین است
[141](Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 210)

Both reason and intuition are necessary for the fulfilment of human destiny. Both must be employed to grasp the fulness of life. "To see the self only in the state of concentrating its power, of making itself a pearl or diamond, is as wrong as to see it exclusively in its exterior activity."[142] In "Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadid" Iqbal tells us that it is sinful to see the world "with one eye"

بچشمے خلوتِ خود را
بہ بیند

[139] Pass beyond the Intellect for this is a light which lights the Way but is itself not the final goal.
[140] Raju, P.T., "The Idealism of Sir Mohammad Iqbal", The Visvabharati Quarterly, August-October 1940.
[141] This is indeed a truly regal state,In which Religion is Dominion's comate.

(Translation by Hussain, H., The New Rose-Garden of Mystery, p. 5)
[142] Schimmel, A.M., Gabriel's Wing, pp. 105-106.

بچشمے جلوتِ خود را
به بیند
اگر یک چشم بربند
دگنا سے است
اگر باہر دوبیند شرطِ
راهے است

[143] (Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 208)

Iqbal tries to show that there is something in common between reason and intuition (or Love)

عقل هم عشق است واز ذوقِ نگه بیگانه نیست
[144](Zabur-e-'Ajam p. 36)

or between intuition and reason

[143] With one eye it sees the 'khalvat' (reclusion) of his self, With one eye it sees the 'jalvat' (manifestation) of his self. If is closes one eye, it is a sin,

If it sees with both eyes, it is the condition of the Path. (Translation by Schimmel, A.M., Gabriel's Wing, p. 105)

[144] Intellect is passion too,

And it knows the joy to view.

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Persian Psalms, p. 19.).

زمانہ ہیچ نداند حقیقتِ اُورا
جنوں قباست کو موزوں بقامتِ خرداست
[145] (Pas Che Bayad Kard Ai Aqwam-e-Sharq? p. 4)

Perfect knowledge - that which unites reason and intuition-destroys the idols which stand in the way of the attainment of Ultimate Reality

وہ علم اپنے بتوں کا ہے
آپ ابراہیم
کیا ہے جس کو خدا نے
دل و نظر کا ندیم
وہ علم کم بصری جس
میں، ہمکنار نہیں
تجلّیات کلیم و مشاہداتِ
حکیم
[146] (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 19)

And so Iqbal says

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[145] People do not recognize this reality

Passion is an attire that befits the Intellect.
[146] To its idols that Knowledge is like an Abraham

which God has willed to be the friend of both the heart and eye, that knowledge which is not myopic and joins the dazzling light of Moses' vision with the learned doctor's observations

خرد را بادلِ خود
ہمسفرکن
[147] (Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 217)

"Bergson's Message" is in 'fact his own too

تابر تو آشکار شود رازِ
زندگی
خود راجداز شعله مثال شرر
مکن
بہر نظارہ جزنگہِ آشنا میار
در مرزوبوج خود چوغریباں
گذر مکن
نقشے کہ بستہ ہمہ ادھام
باطل است
عقلے بہم رساں کہ ادب
خوردئہ دل است
[148] (Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 247)

[147] Make Intellect a companion of your heart.

Iqbal has criticized Ghazzali for abandoning Reason and regarding mystic intuition as the only true source of the knowledge of Ultimate Reality. When everything has been said about Iqbal's defence of reason (as against Bergson for instance) and the importance he gave to it, his fundamental position is, at least in one sense, not very different from Ghazzali's. As Professor Whittemore remarks,

"At the heart of Iqbal's philosophy lies the existentialist conviction that Reality is inexpressible purely in terms of reason and science. This is not to deny the import of these latter. Whatever view of Man, Universe and God we ultimately arrive at, it must, Iqbal thinks, be one in which the data of science are accounted for, one in which the demands of reason for coherence are met. Yet below and above the level of science there is that which man knows simply because he feels it and intuits it."[149]

Bergson too had felt that there is something in the universe analogous to the creative spirit of the poet, a living, pushing force, an elan vital which eludes the mathematical intelligence and can be appreciated only by a kind of divining sympathy or a feeling which approaches nearer to the essence of things than reason.[150]

Iqbal holds, then (with Bergson, Bradley, Whitehead, Ibn 'Arabi, Ghazzali, Rumi and others) that it is through intuition that the Ultimate is known. The experience which leads to this gnosis is not a "conceptually manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on inner categories."[151] Whitehead calls this vital way "transmutation" and Bradley

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[148] If thou wouldst read life as an open book, Be not a spark divided from the brand. Bring the familiar eye, the friendly look, Nor visit stranger--like thy native land. O thou by vain imaginings befooled, Get thee a Reason which the Heart hath schooled!

(Translation by Nicholson, R.A., "Iqbal's 'Message of the East", p.122)

[149] Whittemore, R., "Iqbal's Panentheism", p. 64.

[150] Thilly, F., A History of Philosophy, New York, 1931, p. 5,7 and 8.

[151] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 284.

refers to it as the transformation involved in the passage from the relational to the super-relational level of experience.[152] Iqbal, following the Qor'an calls it "Iman" which is not merely a passive belief in one or more pro-positions of a certain kind, it is a living assurance begotten of a rare experience."[153] It is "Iman" which makes the reader of the Book into the Book itself

یہ راز کسی کو نہیں معلوم کہ مومن
قاری نظر آتا ہے حقیقت میں ہے قرآن

[154] (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 57)

Contrast between Reason and intuition (Love) in Iqbal's Poetry Perhaps the most common contrast in Iqbal's poetry is between "ishq" and "aqI". Scientific knowledge is equated with aql' and mystic knowledge with "ishq'. The former is usually associated with the West and the latter with the East.

In Iqbal's verse the use of both Reason' and 'Love' is very wide. His poetry illustrates Evelyn Underhill's observation that Love "as applied to the mystics is to be understood in its deepest fullest sense; as the ultimate expression of the self's most vital tendencies, not as the superficial affection or emotion often dignified by this name. It is a condition of humble access, a life-movement of the self: more direct in its methods, more valid in its results - even in the hands of the least lettered of its adepts than the most piercing intellectual vision of the greatest philosophical mind."[155]

Underlying Iqbal's poetry is the idea that the world yields its secret only to one who sees with the eyes of Love:

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[152] Whittemore, R., "Iqbal's Panentheism", p.71.
[153] The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 109.
[154] This secret no one knows that although the person of God

appears to read the Book, he is, in fact, the Book itself
[155] Underhill, E., Mysticism, 1960, p. 85.

بچشم عشق نگر تا
سراغِ او گیری
جہاں بچشم خرد سیمیا
و نیزنگ است
[156](Payam-e-Mashirq, p.178)

The Poet explains the difference between scientific and mystic experience in Javid Nama.

کارِ حکمت دیدن و
فرسودن است
کارِ عرفاں دیدن و
افزودن است
آں بدست آور و آب و
خاک را
ایں بدست آورد جانِ
پاک را
آں نگدرا بر تجلّی می
زند

[156] Look at the world with the eyes of love its secret to attain

for to the Intellect's eye it is merely a magic-show

ایں تجلّی را بخود گم
می کند
[157] (Javid Nama, pp. 133-134)

Iqbal often refers to intellect as "the wayside lamp" which shows the way to the destination but cannot give knowledge of the Ultimate

خرد سے راہر و روشن بصر ہے
خرد کیا ہے ؟ چراغ راہ گذر ہے
درونِ خانہ ہنگامے ہیں کیا کیا
چراغِ رہگذر کو کیا خبر ہے!
[158] (Bal-e- J fibril, p. 120)

The Poet is inspired by Love and so he has a more direct and intimate access to Reality than the metaphysician[159]

بو علی اندر غبارِ ناقر

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[157] The task of science is to see and consume, the work of gnosis is to see and augment; science weighs in the balance of technology, gnosis weighs in the balance of intuition; science holds in its hand water and earth, gnosis holds in its hand the pure spirit, science casts its gaze upon phenomena, gnosis absorbs phenomena it o itself.

(Translateed by Arberry, A.J., Javid Nama, p. 90)

[158] . With Reason are lit up the Traveller's eyes;

what is Reason? It is the wayside lamp.

What tumults there are in the inner house

what can the wayside lamp know of such things!

[159] In the dust raised by the camel, Avicenna's lost, but the palanquin's curtain is held fast by Rumi's hand

گم

دستِ رومی پرد

[160](Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 122)

Knowledge which is not incandescent with love and remains a star to its travails, is of no avail[161]

عطار ہو رومی ہو رازی

ہو غزالی ہو

کچھ ہاتھ نہیں آتا بے آہِ

سحر گاہی

[162] (Bal-e- Jibril, p. 83}

Reason can yield only "Khabar" (knowledge) and cannot lead to "Nazar" (vision)

اس کی تقدیر میں حضور نہیں

عقل گو آسماں سے دور نہیں

دلِ بینا بھی کر خدا سے طلب

آنکھ کا نور دل کا نُور نہیں

[160] Naravane, V.S., Modern Indian Thought, London, 1964,p.299.

[161] Vahiduddin, S., "The Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal",

The Aryan Path, Bombat, December 1957, Volume XVIII, p. 550.

[162] Attar or Rumi, Razi or Ghazzali it may be without the passionate prayer at dawn, nothing is attained.

[163](Bal-e-Jibril, p.65)

The seeker, needs something more than mere information

خرد کے پاس خبر کے
سوا کچھ اور نہیں
ترا علاج کے سوا کچھ
اور نہیں
[164](Bal-e-Jibril, p..70)

And so he protests

ایں جہانِ کوہ
ودشت و بحروبر
ما "نظر" خواہیم
داو گوید "خبر"
[165] (Javid Nama, p. 5)

---

[163] Though from the House, it is not far off

yet vision it is not destined to have;

asd God also for a discerning hear,

for eye's sight is not light of the heart.

[164] Save information, Reason has nothing else,

your cure is vision alone and nothing else

[165] This world of mountain and plain, ocean and land-We yearn for visiion, and it speaks of report.

Iqbal calls the intellect "a question" and Love "the answer"

عشق کی گرمی ہے معرکہ
کائنات

علم مقامِ صفات' تماشائے ذات
عشق سکون و ثبات ' عشق
حیات و ممات
علم ہے پیدا سوال ' عشق ہے
پنہاں جواب!
[166] (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 13)

The 'heart' ("dil") says to the 'mind' ("aql").

رازِ ہستی کو تو سمجھتی ہے
اور آنکھوں سے دیکھتا ہوں میں
علم تجھ سے تو معرفت مجھ سے
تو خدا جو' خدا نما ہوں میں

(Translation by Arberry, A. J., Javid Nama, p.33)
[166] Creation's miracle is due to the warmth of Love,

Knowledge stops at Attributes while Love the Being beholds! Love is peace and stillness, Love is Life and Love is Death, Knowledge is born a question, its implicit answer is Love

[167] (Bang-e-Dara, p. 26)

The mind insists that vision of God is impossible, and yet Love prays hopefully

خرد گفت ' او بچشم اندر نگنجد
نگاهِ شوق در امید و بیم است
نمیگر دو کہن افسانه طُور
که در دل تمنّا سے کلیم است

[168] (Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 30)

Compared with the treasures hidden in the ocean of Love, the intellect has very little to offer

---

[167] You understand the secret of existence

and I perceive it with my naked eyes;

you give knowledge and I the direct vision

you *are a seeker of God and I reveal God

[168] "The Eye cannot attain Him," said the Mind:

Yet Yearning's glance trembles in hope and fear.

It grows not old, the tale of Sinai,

And every heart yet whispers Moses' prayer.

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., The Tulip of Sinai, p. 8)

بگذر از عقل و درآویز بموجِ یمِ عشق
که درآں جوئے تنک مایه گہر پیدا نیست
[169] (Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 203)

Reason gives power but it cannot answer some fundamental auestions.

علم میں دولت بھی ہے قدرت بھی ہے لذّت بھی ہے
ایک مشکل ہے کہ ہاتھ آتا نہیں اپنا سراغ
[170] (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 78)

and so the exhortation comes

اپنے من میں ڈوب کر پا جا سراغِ زندگی

[171] (Bal-e-Jibril, p.48)

An idea found often in Iqbal's poetry is that it is Love and not Reason which lead to life-giving and life-renewing action.

حکیماں مردہ را صورت نگار اند!
یدِ مُوسٰے ' دمِ عیسٰے ندارند!

---

[169] Pass beyond Reason and grapple with Love's ocean's waves

for in this shallow stream there are no real gems to find
[170] Wealth, Power and Pleasure Knowledge brings, but the

problem is it does not disclose to us the clue to one's own self,
[171] In yourself submerge yourself and find the secret of life.

[172] (Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 218)

And so the Poet urges

دل بیدار پیدا کر کہ دل
خوابیدہ ہے جب تک
نہ تیری ضرب ہے کاری نہ
میری ضرب ہے کاری

[173] (Bal-e-Jibril,, p. 57)

Rational Knowledge is a sheath without a sword.

عشق کی تیغِ جگر دار اڑالی کس نے
علم کے ہاتھ میں خالی ہے نیام اے ساقی !

[174] (Bal-e-Jibril, p. 17)

For a seeker of knowledge, Iqbal prays that he may learn to understand what lies beyond the superficial meaning of words

---

[172] Doctors give form to matter but they cannot give it life

for they have not Moses' hand nor the spirit of Jesus

[173] Let your heart be wakeful, for until it awakes ineffective

is your stroke, ineffective is my stroke

[174] Who has taken away the mighty-hearted sword of Love, in its hand, Knowledge has just the empty sheath, O Saqi

خدا تجھے کسی طوفان سے آشناکر دے
کہ تیرے بحر کی موجوں میں اضطراب نہیں
تجھے کتاب سے ممکن نہیں فراغ کہ تُو
کتاب خواں ہے مگر صاحبِ کتاب نہیں

[175] (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 81)

Love "flies into me Divine Presence"[176] unlike reason which noves through the crooked paths of secondary causes.

از حقائق تا حقائق رفته عقل

[177] ('avid Nama, p. 179)

Love, on the other hand, is not circumscribed by anything, and works like lightning.

می نداند عشق سال و ماه را
دیرو زود ونزد و دورِ راه را
عقل در که ہے شگافے می کند
یا دبگردِ او طوافے می کند

[175] . May God acquaint you with some thing momentous for in your ocean's waves there is no motion. You cannot do without your books because you only read the books, you do not know them.
[176] Schimmel, A.M., Gabriel's Wing, p. 359.
[177] Reason makes its way from fact to fact.

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Javid Nama, p. 113)

کوہ پیش عشق چوں کا ہے بود
دل سریع ایسر چوں ما ہے بود

[178] (javid Nama, p. 17)

Reason is cautious and fearful and proceeds slowly. Love is audacious and proceeds unhesitatingly- bold in manner and unswerving in resolve

علم بربیم و رجا دارداساس
عاشقاں رانے امیدے نے هراس
علم ترساں از جلالِ کائنات
عشق غرق اندر جمالِ کائنات
علم رابر رفته و حاضر نظر
عشق گودی آنچه می آید نگر
علم پیماں بسته با آئین جبر
چارئه او چیست غیراز جبروصبر

[178] Love knows nothing of months and years,

Late and soon, near and far upon the road,

Reason drives a fissure through a mountain,

or else makes a circuit round it;

before love the mountain is like a straw,

the heart darts as swiftly as a fish.

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Javid Nama, p.32)

عشق آزاد و غیور و نا صبُور
در تماشائے و جو آمد جسُور

[179] (Javid Nama, p. 139)

One significant difference between Reason and Love is that the former is calculating and cowardly but the latter risks all without fear

پختہ ہوتی ہے اگر مصلحت
اندیش ہو عقل
عشق ہو مصلحت اندیش تو
ہے خام ابھی
بے خطر کود پڑا آتشِ نمرود

[179] Science is founded upon fear and hope,

Lovers are troubled by neither hope nor fear,

Science is fearful of the grandeur of creation,

Love is immersed in the beauty of creation,

science gazes upon the past and the present,

love cries, 'Look upon what is coming!'

Science has made compact with the cannon of constraint and has no other resource but constraint and resignation, Love is free and proud and intolerant

And boldly investigates the whole of Being.

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Javid Nama, p. 93)

میں عشق
عقل ہے محوِ تماشائے لبِ بام
ابھی

[180] (Bang-e-Dara, p. 312)

To the West (which Iqbal identified with the cold, loveless Intellect) Iqbal sent this message

از من اے بادِ صبا گوئے بدانائے فرنگ
عقل تا بال کشوداست گرفتار تراست
برق را ایں بجگرمی زندآں رام کند
عشق ازعقل فسوں پیشہ جگر دار تراست

[181] (Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 225)

And because Love is "more brave than Intellect" the Poet writes

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[180] If Reason is mature, it calculates the pros and cons, but if Love is expedient it is imperfect still.

Fearlessly Love leapt into the fire of Nimrud

Whilst Reason still watches the scene intently by the brim

[181] O breeze take this message from me to the wise men of the West, That Intellect since it opened its wings has become more of a prisoner. For Love strikes the heart like lightning while Intellect only domesticates it. Love is more brave than Intellect the practiser of deceits. (Translation by Singh, I., The Ardent Pilgrim, pp.116-117).

صبحِ ازل یہ مجھ سے کہا
جبرئیل نے
جو عقل کا غلام ہو وہ
دل نہ کر قبُول

[182] (Zarb-e-Kalim, p. 71)

Iqbal "struggles mercilessly against that Intellect which is separated from Love."[183] Wisdom comes only through suffering or "soz (a synonym for Love) and the Poet prefers such wisdom to analytic knowledge.

یک ذرّہ دردِ دل از علمِ
فلاطون به

[184](Zabur-e-Ajam, p. 32)

The Intellect is waylaid by a thousand doubts but Love pursues its objective with single-minded dedication

نشانِ راہ زعقلِ ہزار حیلہ
مپرس

[182] On the morning of Creation, this Gabriel said to me-do not accept a heart that is a captive of the mind.
[183] Schimmel, A.M., Gabriel's Wing, p. 135.
[184] Better one distress of heart

Than all Plato's learned art

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Persian Psalms, p. 17)

بیا که عشق کمالے زیک
دارد

[185] (Payam-e-Mashriq, p. 194)

Iqbal regards loveless Intellect as being allied to Satan and forces of evil, of magic and idolatry. In Payam-e-Mashriq he quotes Rumi's famous line "From Satan Logic and from Adam Love."[186] In Javid Nama he writes

دل اگر بندو به حق، پیغمبری است
درز حق بیگانه گردو کافری است
علم را بے سوزِ دل خوانی شراست
نورِ اُوتاریکئی بحر و براست
قوتش ابلیس را دارے شود
علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیاں
علمِ با عشق است از لاہوتیاں

[187] Javid Nama, pp: 82-83)

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[185] Do not seek guidance from the Intellect

Which has a thousand wiles!

Come to Love which excels

By the singleness of its purpose.

(Translation by Saiyidain, K.G., Iqbal's Educational Philosophy, pp. 135-136)

[186] Rumi's Masnawi, Book IV, Line 1042, quoted in Payam-e-Mashriq., p. 246.

Iqbal often refers to the Mind as a creator of Idols, and to Love as the destroyer of these idols

زمان زمان شکند آنچه می تراشد عقل
بیا که عشق مسلمان و عقل زنّاری است

[188] (Zabur-e-'Ajam, p. 108)

This motif pervades Iqbal's whole work. Often Abraham is shown breaking the idols of his father. Love is a real 'Muslim' because it only worships the One, whereas Reason still wears the 'Zannar'-the Magian's Girdle-"which means not only that it creates new idols before which ignorant

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[187] If it (science) attaches its heart to God, it is prophecy, but if it is a stranger to God, it is unbelief.

Science without the heart's glow is pure evil,

for then its light is darkness over sea and land

Its power becomes the faithful ally of Satan;

Lights become fire by association with fire.

Science without love is a demonic thing,

science together with love is a thing divine.

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Javid Nama, p. 64.)

[188] Now and now Mind breaketh through

What idols it designed;

Come, for Love believeth true,

And infidel is Mind

(Translation by Arberry, A.J., Persian Psalms, p. 67.)

people prostrate themselves but also that it is still limited by the spell of serial time which hinders man from grasping the fulness of Divine time."[189] The thought is repeated in lines such as these.

عقل و دل و نگاہ کا مرشدِ اوّلین ہے عشق
عشق نہ ہو تو شرع و دیں بتکدہ تصوّرات

[190] (Bal-e- J ibril', p. 4)

Love, in effect, becomes the criterion for faith

اگر ہو عشق، تو ہے کُفر بھی مسلمانی
نہ ہو تو مردِ مسلماں بھی کافر وزندیق
[191] (Bal-e- Jibril, p. 54)

Iqbal is unhappy over the fact that modern education does not teach the value of Love but insists on the supremacy of reason

دانش حاضر حجابِ اکبر است
بت پرست و بت فروش و بت گراست

[189] Schimmel, A.M., Gabriel's Wing, p. 135.).
[190] The First Teacher of the Mind, the Heart, the Eye, is Love-lacking Love, law and religion are fancies' idol-house.
[191] If Love be there, even unbelief is Islam,

but lacking Love, pagan a Muslim is

پا بزندانِ مظاہر بستئہ
از حدودِ حس بروں نا جستئہ

[192] (Asrar-e-Khudi, p. 77)

Only Love can lead to vision, to the true realization of a person's deepest self

علم تا از عشق بر خور دار نیست
جز تماشا خانئہ افکار نیست
ایں تماشا خانئہ سحر سامری است
علم بے روح القدس افسونگری است
بے تجلّی مردِ دانا رہ نبُرو
از لکد کوبِ خیالِ خویش مرد
بے تجلّی زندگی رنجوری است
عقل مہجوری و دیں مجبوری است

[193](Javid Nama, pp. 4-5)

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[192] Modern knowledge is the greatest blind

Idol-making, idol-selling, idol-worshipping!

Shackled in the prison-house of phenomena,

It has not overleaped the limits of the sensible.

(Translation by Saiyidain, K.G., Iqbal's Educational Philosophy, p. 136.)

Reason can conquer only the visible world, but Love is more ambitious

عقلِ آدم بر جہاں شبخوں زند
عشق اُو بر لامکاں شبخوں زند

[194] (David Nama, p. 9)

And if human beings are constant in love, they can capture even' God Himself

عاشقی؟ محکم شو از تقلید یار
تاکمندِ تو شود یزداں شکار
[195] (Asrar-e-Khudi, p. 23)

Love lives on, though Reason dies

ہے ابد کے نسخئہ دیرینہ

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[193] . So long as knowledge has no portion of love

it is a mere picture-gallery of thoughts.

This peep-show is the Samiri's knowledge without the

Holy Ghost is more spell-binding. Wihtout revelation no wise men ever found the way, he died buffetted by his own imaginings; without revelation life is a mortal sickness, reason is banishment, religion constraint.(Translation by Arberry, A.J Javid Nama, p. 26)

[194] Man's reason is making assault on the world, but his love makes assault on the Infinite (Translation by Arberry,A.J., Javid Nama, p. 26).

[195] Be a lover constant in devotion to thy beloved,

That thou mayst cast a noose and capture God,

(Translation Nicholson, R.A., The Secrets of the Self, p.36)

کی تمہید عشق
عقلِ انسانی ہے فانی، زندہ
جاوید عشق

[196] (Bang-e-Dara, p. 163)

The embodiments of Love are not subject to decay. The Mosque at Cordoba, for instance, is a work of art created with love and faith, and so it lasts while generations of human beings pass away. The whole poem- one of the most beautiful in all Iqbal's work- is a poem on the potency and efficacy of Love

اے حرمِ قرطبہ ! عشق
سے تیرا وجُود
عشق سراپا دوام جس
نہیں رفت وبُود
[197] (Bal-e-Jibril, p. 129)

Perhaps one of the best known contrasts between Reason and Love occurs in 'Rumuz-e-Bekhudi where Iqbal sums up what he considers to be the chief differences between the two modes of apprehending Reality

مومن از عشق است و عشق از مومن است
عشق را ناممکنِ ما ممکن است

[196] Love is the introduction to Eternity's ancient book,-mortal is human Intellect but immortal is Love.
[197] Shrine of Cordoba! from Love all your existence is sprung, Love that can know no end, stranger to then-and-now. (Translation by Kiernan, V.G., Poems from Iqbal, p.38.).

عقل سفّاک است و اُو سفّاک تر
پاک تر ، چالاک تر، بے باک تر
عقل در پیچاکِ اسباب و علل
عشق چوگاں بازِ میدانِ عمل
عشق صید از زورِ بازو افگند
عقل مکّار است د دامے می زند
عقل را سرمایه از بیم و شک است
عشق را عزم و یقیں لاینفک است
آں کند تعمیر تا ویراں کند
ایں کند ویراں که آباداں کند
عقل چوں فاد است ارزاں درجہاں
عشق کمیاب و بہائے او گراں
عقل محکم از اساس چوں و چند
عشق عریاں از لباسِ چوں و چند
عقل میگوید که خود را پیش کن
عشق گوید امتحانِ خویش کن
عقل با غیر آشنا از اکتساب
عشق ازفضل است و باخود در حساب
عقل گوید شاد شو آباد شو

عشق گوید بنده شو آزاد شو

[198] (Rumuz-e-Bekhudi, pp. 125-126)

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[198] Unto Love belongs

The true believer, and Love unto him

Love maketh all things possible to us.

Reason is ruthless, Love is even more,

Purer, and nimbler, and more unafraid.

Lost in the maze of cause and of effect

Is Reason; Love strikes boldly in the field Of Action. Crafty Reason sets a snare;

Love overthrows the prey with strong right arm. Reason is rich in fear and doubt; but Love Has firm resolve, faith indissoluble. Reason constructs, to make a wilderness; Love lays wise waste, to build all up anew. Reason is cheap, and plentiful as air; Love is more scarce to find, and of great price. Reason stands firm upon phenomena, But Love is naked of material robes. Reason says, "Thrust thyself into the fire;"

Love answers, "Try thy heart, and prove thyself." Reason by acquisition is informed

Of other; Love is born of inward grace

And makes account with Self. Reason declares, "Be happy, and be prosperous;" Love replies, "Become a servant, that thou mayest be free."

(Translation by Arberry, The Mysteries of Selflessness, p.26.)

request has been made in the letter accompanying the article. These will be printed and the cost will be adjusted against their remuneration.

Editor, Iqbal Review

IQBAL'S IDEA OF DEMOCRACY

Muhammad Munawwar

I make bold to deal with a topic which has assumed a form of bitter controversy charged with emotions. The topic is democracy. Arguments are being advanced for and against democracy, and references are lavishly being made to what Iqbal thought of it. Interpretations of Iqbal's idea of democracy are being offered, duly twisted to suit the stance of the arguers. Excitement on both sides, i.e. for and against, is generally, out of all proportions to the subject. No respect is shown to the opinions of those who differ. Usually in our society, and especially, over the last two decades, the level of mutual toleration of those who entertain contrary ideas, has touched the lowest ebb. Those who differ are often called insincere, dishonest and even treacherous folk.

We have tried in the following pages to lay down our findings regarding Iqbal's opinion about democracy. Democracy, no doubt, has many facets. Iqbal liked some of them while disliking others. Iqbal was an idependent thinker. He observed things dispassionately. He did not accept things because of their popularity and vice versa. His mind was never static. His thoughts and ideas, constantly kept evolving till the last moments of his life. For him to live was to progress. Hence he loved change, not change for the sake of change but change for the better. The following verse does appreciably epitomise this aspect of his outlook.

ہر لحظہ نیا طُور
برقِ تجلّی!!
اللہ کرے مرحلہ
شوق نہ ہو طے!

(We, every moment seek a new Sinai Mountain and a new Illumination.

By the grace of Allah, our love-journey may never come to an end.)[199]

Similarly his ideas regarding democracy kept evolving. He had not picked them up ready-made, as we would see. But to have

an idea of what democracy means and what it stands for we down here a substancial quote.

"A word originating in the classical Greek city states, and meaning the rule of the demos, the citizen body:the right of all to decide what are matters of general concern. The size of modern nation states has meant that (apart from those which include provision for a referendum in theīr constitutions) democracy is no longer direct but indirect, i.e. through the election of representatives; hence the term representative democracy. The criteria of democracy are therefore; (a) whether such elections are free: i.e. whether they are held frequently and periodically, whether every citizen has the right to vote, whether candidates and parties are free to campaign in opposition to the government of the day, and whether the voter is protected against intimidation by the secrecy of the ballot; (b) whether such elections provide an effective choice: i.e. whether the choice of the electors is not limited to a single party, and whether a majority vote against the government in power leads to, a change of government; (c) whether the elected body of representatives variously known as parliament, congress, national assembly has the right of legislation, the right to vote taxes and control the budget(deciding such, ii matters by majority vote), and the right publicly to question, discuss, criticize, and oppose government measures without being subject to threats of interference or arrest.

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[199] Darb-i-Kalīm, Kull iyat-i-Iqbal. p. 127/589

Democracy is based on a belief in the value of the individual human being, and a further criterion is therefore the extent to which certain basic rights are guaranteed (in practice, not ju_, on paper) to every citizen. These are: security against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment; freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly (i.e. the right to hold public meetings), freedom of petition and of association (i.e. the right to form parties, trade unions, and other societies), freedom of movement; freedom of Religion and of teaching. As a corollary, democracy is held to require the establishment of an independent judiciary and courts of an independent judiciary and courts to which everyone can have access.

Critics of democracy fall into two groups. The first is opposed to democracy root and branch, on the grounds that it is the least efficient form of government and one in which the stability of the State is threatened by faction, complex issues are distorted by popular discussion, difficult dicisions evaded or put off, and matters of judgement reduced to the lowest common denominator acceptable to a majority of the voters. The second, in favour of the principles of democracy, agrues that these are inadequately realized unless carried further, e.g. by extending equal rights for all citizens from the political and legal to the economic sphere, without which democracy remains at best incomplete, at worst a sham (formal democracy) disguising the reality of class rule.

A variant of this type of cirticism argues that, with the growth of Bureaucracy and the power of governments, decisions are no longer effectively influenced by the view of the government or the elected representatives; hence the demand for greater Participation at all levels of decision-making and the problem of how to reconcile this demand with the need for prompt and effective decision on complex and controversial issues.[200]

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[200] The Fontana Dictionary of Modern thought, Edited by, Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, Fontana/Collins. 1977. Pp. 161-62.

We peruse the quoted above and we find that many good and positive points can be added to it. But the glaring drawback that transpires is the non-visibility of any moral fibre in this system. Rights are mentioned whereas the question of right and wrong is ignored. What sort of people as human beings are to be elected? Certainly they must be suitable individuals but are they suitable morally as well? What sort of people as human beings are those who elect their representatives? Are they upholders of human values and hence they elect those who have respect for what is good for humanity? Are they elected because they can spend lavishly on election campaign, can brow-beat others into voting for them on account of their muscles or just due to their positive capabilities? Does, in the Western democracy, even legal equality prevail? Are there no racial and territorial prejudices at work? Does Western domecracy stand for teaching man's respect for man and thus try to make human beings genuinely human? Does it create feelings of sympathy and sacrifice for others? It is quite obvious that Western democracy is not essentially for forming a government of good people, elected by good people, for promoting good and making people good.

Allama Iqbal in an article "Political Thought in Islam" published in 1910, referring to al-Māwardy, states that he (al—Māwardy) divides the Ummah into two classes; (1) the electors and(2) the candidates for election. The qualifications absolutely necessary-for a candidate were (1) Spotless character (2) Freedom from physical and moral infirmities (3) Necessary legal and theological knowledge (4) Insight necessary for a ruler (5) Courage to defend the empire (6) Belonging to the family of Quresh (Modern sunny lawyers do not regard this as indispensable) -(7) Full of age (al—Ghazālī) (8) Male sex (al—Baidāwī)"[201]

Just as the candidate for Caliphate must have some qualifications so according to al—Māwardi the elector must also be qualified. (1) He must

[201] Thought and Reflections pp. 62-63.

possess good reputation as an honest man (2) Necessary knowledge of state affairs (3) Necessary insight and judgement.[202]

From a legal standpoint the Caliph does not occupy and privileged position. In theory he is like other members of the commonwealth. He can be directly sued in an ordinary court of law.[203]

2. The Caliph may indicate his successor who may be his son but the nomination is invalid until confirmed by the people. The caliph cannot secure the election of his successor during his lifetime.[204]

3. If the caliph does not rule according to law of Islam, or suffers from physical or mental infirmities, the caliphate is forfeited.[205]

Democracy of Iqbal's liking requires the candidate whose first and foremost qualification is "spotless character; freedom from physical and moral infirmities, whereas the elector is required to possess above all other qualifications the attribute of "good reputation as an honest man". Western democracy does not lay down such conditions.

For Iqbal, Islamic government has to be God's kingdom on earth. Such government can be established only in the light of what Islam stands for. Obedience to God and loyalty to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) is to be the pivotal point in the overall behaviour and conduct of the governmental machinery. And, as is obvious, he who is devotedly obedient to God and loyal to the Holy Prophet (Peace be upon him) cannot be other than an essentially moral man. Such an individual has to be free from mundane and base considerations. His behaviour is not to be determined by lust and covetousness, treachery and deceit. He has to act as to how he can deserve God's Grace. If persons of such attitude and way of life establish

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[202] Ibid p. 66.
[203] Ibid p. 64.
[204] Ibid P. 64.
[205] Ibid p. 65.

their rule it can't be but a benevolent rule where spiritual brotherhood and justice must be the order of the day. On the contrary, in secular democracies the elected as well as the electors conform to the policy of behaving honestly if and when honesty looks to be the best policy. Iqbal, writing to Prof. Nicholson had made the meanings of Islamic government manifest thus:

"The kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over, by the most unique individual possible on this earth."[206]

Iqbal, by "The Kingdom of God on earth", means the government of shariat-i-Islāmia which is according to him the best government. It is God and then His Prophet (Peace be upon him) who know what is most suitable for human beings. Human reason howsoever developed and human farsightedness howsoever acute, stands absolutely nowhere as compared to the Creator's wisdom. Hence the way of life revealed through the Last Book. i.e., Quran and elucidated by the practical example of the Prophet (Peace be upon him) is the best and the most congenial way of life for mankind. This "way of life" is called Shariah by the Muslims (and non-Muslims too). Prof. Hasan Askari elaborates this point in the following lines:

"The shariat regime is superior to rational regimes in 3 all respects. The ideas and the beliefs it enjoins, the institutions it prescribes, the type of coercion it practices, the centre of loyalty it identifies, the common norm it engenders, are all superior to the principles and instruments of the rational orders. Shariah regime is the only stable and wholesome form of cultural and political existence. Rational regimes are given to fluctuations, rise, fall and death. Man can escape these cycles by putting his trust in the shariah and adopting a political form that is based on revealed law."[207]

Mian Muhammad Shafi states:

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[206] Arberry End. Translation of Javēd Namā p. 11.
[207] Society and State in Islam, Progressive Books, Urdu Bazar, Lahore. (1979) pp. 101-102.

"He(Iqbal) desired to dictate an intorudction to the study of Islam in which Islamic philosophy of jurisprudence were to be brought into bold relief. His eye-sight was declining day by day hence he intended to dictate that book to me. Had that book been written out, it would have proved to be the most authentic and the best book on Islamic form of government, social system and the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence."[208]

Similarly, Khawaja Abdul Waheed relates what Iqbal once said to him;

"I have expressed my ideas thoroughly in verse. But something much greater than that is still in my mind which I want to produce in the form of an interpretation of the Quran."[209]

Whether the desired book was to be called "An Introduction to the study of Islam" or "An Interpretation of the Quran", the fact remains that Iqbal ardently desired to deal with some very important topics concerning Islam, for the benefit of the Ummah Islamia. He knew the significance of such a work which in his opinion was to be far more valuable than what he had expressed in his poetry. One topic to be dealt with was Islamic form of government as indicated by Mian Muhammad Shafi. But the sad reasons of health did not allow Iqbal to realize that eager aspiration.

What Islamic form of government could be like? Could it be called a monarchy, aristocracy, theocracy, oligarchy, dictatorship, democracy, or still what? Dr. Taha Hussain, in his book "al-Fitnat-ul-Kubrā" [الفتنة الكبرىٰ] vol—I, has compared all known forms of government, pertaining both to past and present era, one by one, with—Islam. His conclusion is that Islamic method of governing human societies could not be likened to any

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[208] Iqbal Aur Mas ala-i-Ta'leem by Muhammad Ahmad, pub. by Iqbal Academy p. 392.
[209] Malfuzāt-i-1qbāl, pub. Iqbal Academy, Lahore p. 174

form of rule established by different nations of the world in different ages including those in vogue in the contemporary world of man.

Whether Iqbal liked democracy is a controversial topic. Was democracy, according to Iqbal, a form of governance nearest to Islam? But the question arises what sort of democracy? Democracy $ itself is not a plain and simple phenomenon. There can be direct democracy, indirect democracy, constitutional democracy, monarchical democracy, social democracy, totalitarian democracy, democracy of the aristocracy, democracy of the proletariate. Democracy as an abstract phrase gives no clearly understandable meanings. Democracy needs some qualifying clause. Yet democracy, as against monarchy and dictatorship attracts sympathy. Iqbal also had a soft corner for democracy. In an article "Islam as an Ethical and Political Ideal" written thirty years before his death i.e.in the year 1908, he took up the question of Islamic Democracy. We should keep in mind that Iqbal had returned to India after completing his education in Europe that very year and was thirty-one years of age. This is how he deals with Islam, Muslim Community and Democracy:

"Having thus established that Islam is a Religion of peace, I now proceed to consider the purely political aspect of the Islamic ideal----the ideal of Islam as entertained by a Corporate Individuality.

Three Main Problems

1) Given a settled society what does Islam expect of its followers regarded as a community?

2) What principles ought to guide them in the i management of communal affairs?

3) What must be their ultimate object; and how is

it to be achieved?

You know that Islam. is something more than a creed, it is also a community, a nation. The membership of Islam is not determined by birth, locality or naturalisation, it consists in the identity of belief.

Islam is Above all Considerations of Time and Space . The expression "Indian Muhammadans", however convenient it may be, is a contradiction in terms since Islam in its essence is above all conditions of Time and Space.

Nationality with us is a pure idea: it has no geographical basis. But in as much as the average man demands a material centre of nationality the Muslim looks for it in the holy town of Makkah so that the basis of Muslim nationality combines the real and the ideal, concrete and abstract.

When therefore, it is said that the interests of Islam are superior to those of Muslims it is meant that the. interests of the individual as a unit are subordinate to the interests of the community as an external symbol of the Islamic principle. This is the only principle which limits the liberty of the individual who is otherwise absolutely free.

Democracy of Islam

The best form of government for such a community would be democracy, the ideal of which is to let a man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable.

The Caliph of Islam is not an infallible being: like other Muslims he is subject to the same law, he is elected by the people and is deposed by them if he goes contrary to law. An ancestor of the present Sultan of Turkey was sued in an ordinary court of law by a mason who succeeded in getting him fined by the town Qazi----Muslims Failure to Improve the Political Ideals of Asia

Democracy, then, is the most important aspect of Islam as a political ideal. It must, however, be confessed that the Muslims, with their idea of individual freedom could do nothing for the political improvement of Asia.

Their democracy lasted only thirty years, and disappeared with their political expansion——————————————————

——Democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times, and

English Statesmen have boldly carried this principle to countries which have been for centuries groaning under the most atrocious form of despotism."[210]

I may kindly be excused for this elongated quote. But in my opinion it was necessary. This article which he wrote when he Was only 31 years of age shows clearly his idea of Muslim nationalism. In express terms he has laid down that the Muslim community is a spiritual brotherhood and its members are bound to one another on account of common beliefs and ideals. Muslim Community according to Iqbal was thus supra-territorial, supra-racial and supra-lingual. It was a brotherhood which could accommodate any individual and society from whatever ethnic stock it came and from whatever territory, provided it shared their essential Islamic beliefs. Such an individual or society which.may be free from all material and earthly shackles could be nurtured only by Islam. In Islam there were no racial, territorial, lingual, material distinctions on account of which a particular class or caste of people entitled them to rule others and condemn others to remain subjugated and in a state of servitude. Here the standards were different from other societies. Here it was not as a rule the best who belonged to the most powerful clan or the most wealthy family. In a Muslim society the best were those who feared God most; who were purest in respect of character. And the most prominent feature of an Islamic Society was the law based on Quranic injunctions and prohibitions as enforced by the Holy Prophet and amplified by his immediate successors. That law epitomised the egalitarian principles of a spiritual fraternity. These laws had the capacity to beat down all kinds of discrimination and injustice. Let justice be administered, was the most vital

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[210] Islam As An Ethical and a Political Ideal, ed. by Dr. S.Y. Hashmy, Islamic Book Service, Urdu Bazar, Lahore (1977) pp. 99-105.

fibre of Islamic structure. Iqbal has stressed this point in the excerpts quoted above. But the example laid down of Islamic justice pertains to Sultan Salim, who was not the elected head of a Muslim state, who rather was the most powerful Emperor of the Sixteenth century. Islamic law is essentially democratic hence cannot spare any one even the highest authority in hierarchy of administration. In Islamic law none is above law. Here a question inevitably arises. What would Iqbal prefer, a king who administers justice or an elected head of the state who is unjust? ——I hope the reply is obvious.

We have seen in the above quotation from Iqbal's article that he had named the Islamic form of government as Islamic Democracy. This shows his sympathy with the word democracy, although what he presumably meant was Islamic spirit of equality before law, Islamic spirit of equality in respect of opportunities and Islamic spirit of equality irrespective of class or ethnic differences.

And we have observed that for Iqbal, in 1908, it was democracy at work in Britian that he felt was comparatively better than other forms of rule then prevalent in the world. But perhaps the article written in 1908 was the last thing written by him in support of British type of democracy.

Anyway, it was the British type of democracy which had its impact on Indian political and administrative life. It was naturally the British type of democracy then that became the focal point of Iqbal's critical observation. The way, the British Imperialism bestowed political rights and brought about legislative Reforms, was castigated by Iqbal in un—equivocal terms. From 1909 on, some progress on the road to Self Rule was apparently taking place. After World War I and Act of 1919, the British Government looked more benign, constitutionally, in spite of Jalianwala Bagh tragedy, Khilafat and Non-cooperation Movements launched by Indians, Muslims and Hindus forging a sort of unity although a shortk lived one. What was the spirit of

those Reforms, is depicted by Iqbal in the following verses, composed in 1922, forming part of his famous poem "Khizr—i—Rah" [خضر راہ]

ہے وہی سازِ کہن مغرب کا جمہوری نظام
جس کے پردے میں نہیں غیراز نوائے قیصری
دیو استبداد جمہوری قبا میں پائے کوب
تو سمجھتا ہے یہ آزادی کی ہے نیلم پری
مجلس آئین و اصلاح ورعایات و حقوق
طبِّ مغرب میں مزے میٹھے، اثر خواب آوری
گرمئی گفتارِ اعضائے مجالس الامان
یہ بھی اک سرمایہ داروں کی ہے جنگِ زر گری
اس سرابِ رنگ و بو کو گلستاں سمجھا ہے تُو
اہ اے ناداں قفس کو آشیاں سمجھا ہے تُو

1) Western democratic system is the same old• musical instrument which contains no tunes other than Imperial ones.

2) It is the demon of autocracy dancing in the garb of democracy. And you think it is a fairy of freedom come from Paradise.

3) Legislative Councils, Reforms, Concessions and Grants, Rights etc are the Western medicine which tastes sweet but in effect is opiate.

4) This eloquence of the members of the Legislative Council is irresistible. It is (in reality) nothing but a warfare of Capitalists to make more money.

5) You take this mirage of colour and smell for a garden. I am sorry for you. You on account of your foolishness, see cage as your nest.[211]

These verses so clearly declare about and warn against Western sham democracy, by which he meant the British form of it, because it was the British Government that were granting Reforms and Rights to Iqbal's country-men. Iqbal characterised all that democratic process and apparatus as deceptive. Outwardly it was granting of freedom, inwardly it was tightening of the rope around the neck of the slaves. Appearance was democracy, reality was Imperialism and the most cruel type of autocracy. Moreover these playthings of democracy were meant only for the aristocratic and capitalist classes, who, through this democratic exercise aimed at nothing but earning more wealth. Thus earning more, the capitalists served the purpose of their masters in a more handsome and more artful manner.

Around this very period i.e. 1922, Iqbal was compiling his Persian poetry in the form of Pyam-i-Mashriq which was published in 1923: In it under the caption "Jumhuriat" he wrote:[212]

متاع معنی بیگانه ازدوں فطرتاں جوئی
زموراں شوخی طبع سلیمانے نمی آید

[211] Bang-i-Dara, Kulliyat-i-Iqbal (Urdu) pp. 262-62.
[212] Kulliyāt-i-Iqbāl (Persian) p. 135/305.

گریزاز طرزِ جمہوری غلام
پختہ کارے شو
کہ از مغز دو صد خر فکر
انسانے نمی آید

"You seek the treasures of an alien philosophy

From common, low grade people, themselves poor of mind. Ants crawling on the ground cannot attain The heights of wisdom of a Solomon.

Avoid the method of democracy;

Become the bondman of some one of ripe intelligence For a few hundred donkeys cannot have combined The brains of one man, of one homosapiens."[213]

These and other verses containing the same derogatory strain regarding democracy were written, as is obvious before he himself entered the arena of practical politics in 1926, when he fought elections to the Punjab Legislative Council and won a seat for himself. This he probably did to see the democracy work from still closer quarters. To suppose that he was misguided and was provoked into fighting an election by ill-guided people because it was below his dignity to become a member of an Assembly, dogs not carry much weight. He gained personal experience and due to it could afterwards talk of the divisive and deceptive nature of that democracy more vehemently. He wrote the following verses around the time he was a member of the Punjab Legislative Council:

فرنگ آئینِ جمہوری نہاد است

[213] A Message from the East by M. Hadi Hussain, Iqbal Academy (1977) p. 98.

رسن از گردنِ دیوے کشاد است
چورھزن کاردانے درتگ وتار
شکم ھا بھر نانے در تگ و تاز
گردھے راگردھے در کمین است
خدایش یار اگر کارش چنین است
زمن وہ اہل مغرب را پیامے
کہ جمہور است تیغ بے نیامے

1) Europe has enforced Democracy and has thus unleashed a demon

2) A caravan, is actively in search of some other caravan, like a robber. It is stomachs out to snatch a loaf.

3) A group of people is sitting in ambush to fall upon some other group. God help it if this be its performance.

4) Impart this message from me to the Westerners that government of the people is like a sword out of its scabbard, killing ruthlessly.[214]

And during this very period Iqbal was preparing his Lectures which he later on delivered at Madras and Aligarh. He referring to Turkish Ijtihad in respect of Khilafat had stated:

"Turkey's Ijtihad is that according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons or an elected Assembly. --- Personally I believe that the Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. The republican form of government is not only

[214] Zabūr-i-Ajam, Kulliyat-i-Iqbal (Persian) pp. 167, 168/559-60.

thoroughly with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam."[215]

As is obvious, Iqbal was a supporter of democracy but was against the amoral way of its exercise.

How could he reconcile with what the Western democracy stood for and what it brought about. Where fifty-one meant one hundred and where it were the number of votes and not the worth of voters that were to be the deciding factor, then how good and truth

could find support. Iqbal had expressed such forebodings in as early as 1908. He had said:

"The democracy has a tendency to foster the spirit of legality ----This is not in itself bad; but unfortunately it tends to displace the purely moral standpoint and to make the illegal and wrong identical in meaning."[216]

Where there are persons to count and not personalities, anything can be voted for and then given authority. The other day we read in a newspaper that a certain gentleman had sought permission of the British Parliament to marry his mother-in-law and the permission was granted ----as a special case though. Thus any moral requirement can be done away with, under democratic permit. Where voters have the final authority, no sin can remain sin, no crime can remain crime, even Divine Writ can be voted down and defied. We know that about a year ago a marriage between two adults belonging to the masculine gendre was ceremonised at a Church in England and Priest bestowed his benedictions on the couple and prayed for the success of the marriage. Tomorrow all kinds of incest can be voted through and thus brought in vogue. Any aggression and high handedness, on the international level can be validated. The world forum, United Nations, too, is apparently working democratically but it is the vote that sells away the souls

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[215] Reconstruction p. 157.
[216] Stray Reflections" Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, Lahore p. 12.

inhabitants and homelands of Palistinians, Eritarians, South-Africans, Namibians and so on and so forth to others with a permission to perpetrate all kinds of imaginable and unimaginable atrocities on the biped herds handed over to the cruel masters. Members of Parliaments and World Forums, with no morals and no notion of values are masters, more ferocious than carnivorous animals. But they are "heads" occupying parlimentary seats, nobody bothers about what the heads contain. Iqbal not without reason chastised this inhuman way of constituting legalities. He says:

اس راز کو اک مردِ فرنگی نے کیا فاش
ہر چند کہ دانا اسے کھولا نہیں کرتے
جمہوریت اک طرزِ حکومت ہے کہ جس میں
ہندوں کو گنا کرتے ہیں تو لا نہیں کرتے

1) A European gentleman has disclosed this secret although men of wisdom as a rule, do not give away what they have in their minds.

2) Democracy is a form of government in which persons are counted and not weighed.[217]

As has already been stressed one reason why Iqbal was against European democracy, in whatever country it worked and under whatever cover, was that it were the number of votes that characterized a thing right or wrong. And those who voted were not worthy of doing that job.

In his very famous poem, "Devil's Advisory Council" written hardly one year before his death, contained in his "Armughan-i-Hijaz", published after his death, he expressed his utter disgust with the so-called "Democracy". He

[217] Darb-i-Kālīm, Kulliyāt-i-Iqbāl (Urdu) p. 148/610.

makes an advisor of the Arch Devil refer to the European democratic method of rule in these words:

تو نے کیا دیکھا نہیں مغرب
کا جمہوری نظام
چہرہ روشن اندروں چنگیز سے
تاریک تر

"Have you not observed the Western democratic system? The face of this democracy is bright but the soul is darker than that of Chengis Khan."[218]

And now we come to his statement which was broadcast from All India Radio Lahore as the New Year Message on January 1st, 1938 i.e. only three months and twenty days before his death. A part of that Message is being given below:

"The modern age prides itself on its progress in knowledge and its matchless scientific developments. No doubt, the pride is justified. Today space and time are being annihilated and man is achieving amazing successes in unveiling the secrets of nature and harnessing its forces to his own service. But in spite of all these developments, tyranny of imperialism struts abroad, covering its face in the masks of Democracy, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism and heaven knows what else besides. Under these masks, in every corner of the earth the spirit of freedom and the dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way of which not even the darkest period of human history presents a parallel. The so-called statesmen to whom government had entrusted leadership have proved demons of bloodshed, tyranny and oppression.

[218] Armughān-i-Hijāz Kulliyāt-i-Iqbāl (Urdu) 8/ 65 p 9.

As I look back on the year that has passed and as I look at the world in the midst of the New Year's rejoicings, if may be Abysinia or Palestine, Spain or China, the same misery prevails in every corner of man's earthly home and hundreds of thousands of men are being butchered mercilessly. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life, and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialize![219]

Mention has been made in the foregoing pages that the Caliph who did not rule according to the shariah, forfieted his right to rule. This shows that between Islamic government and the Muslim society, there exists a tacit understanding, or to be more manifest, a contract. Iqbal understands the nature of relation between the elected and the electors according to al-Mawardy's view who defines this relationship as "Aqd" --binding together, a contract in consequence of which the caliph has to do certain duties If he fulfils his duties Muslims obey him and assist him.[220] Otherwise the Aqd or the contract stands broken. This is certainly a spirit of government akin to that of democracy, in other words a form of government tacitly democratic. It is neither purely, this form, nor that. It is an amalgam of forms of rule. If has always to abide by the broad based principles of shariah. No democracy has the liberty to temper with them. Similarly no kingship or dictatorial regime can set aside what has been laid down by shariah, hence Islamic form

[219] Thoughts and Reflections, S.A. Valid, pp. 373,374-75.
[220] Ibid pp. 67-68.

of rule cannot be any specific mode of polity known to the West. To make this point clearer I quote Ilyas Ahmad:

"The Islamic state is Theocratic Democracy. Thus to summarise: Islam was not merely a Revolution; it was a revelation also. It was not mere solution; it was full and complete Salvation. Hence if the Islamic state was the work of man in one sense it was also the work of God in another. If it was a democracy in one sense, it was also a theocracy in another. In fine, as it was both theocracy and democracy, it was a theocratic democracy as well as a democratic theocracy and as has been already said, it not only represented a democratic conception of divine government but also the divinely ordained method of democratic government. Religion and politics could never be separated in Islam and to this day Religion remains the basic foundation of Islamic social and political structure."[221]

We can conclude that according to Iqbal the spirit of Islamic government was akin to democracy but with a rider that only men of sound moral character and acute understanding of the affairs of the society could be declared candidates for the election as the Head of the State. Similarly it were individuals who commanded good repute could be the electors. This shows that adult franchise had no place in Islamic polity. Moreover party-system is not visible or at least cannot be visualized in Iqbal's writings.

Keeping these points in view we can safely say that the Parliament in Iqbal's view turns into a Shura of the Shariah whereas the structure of the government takes the shape of Khilafat ——————— It no longer remains Democracy as such.

[221] The Social Contract and the Islamic State, Shahzad Publishers Lahore (1979) p. 118.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE - HARBINGER OF A NEW ERA

Naeem Ahmad

There is a variety of mental activities that involves 'intelligence.' Doing arithmatic, operating a machine or understanding language,_ all require various degrees of intelligence. In the recent past many a computing machine has been invented that can perform all these tasks. A question naturally arises "If a machine can do arithmatic, calculate accurately and do other jobs that requir skill and dexterity, can we ascribe 'intelligence' to it?" Michael Scriven explains the nature of the problem:

"An example of this arises, in connection with the word 'intelligence'. One can well imagine a man whose work lies largely with one of the great electronic computers coming to apply this word to it. He often makes mistakes: it is faultless. His memory for figures is limited: it. has an enormous storage capacity. He is intelligent, yet the machine is better at the job. At first a slang, then,seriously, these machines will be called intelligence. A means for comparing the intelligence of different machines will perhaps be devised: connected with their speed and accuracy of working, rather than mere capacity; perhaps also with their versatility come to be used less for performing particular calculations than solving complete problems, the notion of consulting a computer, rather than using one, will grow. In various other ways usage will reflect the increasing tendency to regard a computer as a specialist par excellence. Then one day a man may ask "can machines ever be really intelligent?"

No doubt in the beginning, computers were a little better than such mechanical devices as windup toys, puppets and music boxes. But over the past few decades computer technology has made such remarkable progress

that the claim is proving true that the digital computer will someday match — rather surpass the intellectual abilities of the human mind. Many people liken the computer data to human knowledge, process of feeding the computer to the process of human learning, computer's operation of the programme to the stream of human consciousness.

Latest computer systems can diagnose diseases, plan the synthesis of complex chemicals, solve differential equations in symbolic form, analyse electronic circuits, understand limited amount of human speech and natural language text, or write small computer programmes to meet formal specifications. We might say that such systems possess 'intelligence' the question naturally arises "does machine think"? or "Does it merely simulate human thinking?" This question is not a new one. The Seventeenth century philosopher Rene Descartes was also confronted with this problem. He believed in the duality of Mind and Matter or of Thought and Extension. In the realm of Extension, laws were fixed once for all, every thing was predetermined and 'tied up' in the Universal chain of cause-and-effect. On the contrary, in the realm of thought, there was freedom and creativity, not mechanism and determinism. For Descartes the two substances were diametrically opposed to each other, yet he believed that they interact in the most mysterious and subtle manner. On any human action, both incorporeal mind and corporeal body interact with and influence each other. The question arose "Where do both meet together"? Descartes referred to "pineal gland" as the point of contact between mind and body, yet he was not satisfied with this solution and, in a letter to the Queen Christina, he confessed his inability to solve this problem.

The same Cartesian problem is revived by the advent of Artificial Intelligence, of course, with greater intensity. This can be restated against the background of computer technology as follows: "Does machine has consciousness" or "Is it capable of consiousness" when we use the term consciousness we imply all those attributes which are associated with life such as thinking, willing, learning, remembering, loving etc.

Our immediate answer to this question is that a robot despite he maximum degree of perfection, cannot be conscious, nor can it be capable of it.

A little reflection will reveal that the problem is not as simple as it appears to be. 'Conscious' is a term which is applied to man and other highly evolved species but one feels hesitant to apply it to some lower forms of life such as plants, amoeba or earthworm. Even in the case of a human being, the term cannot be used in the absolute sense. The child becomes conscious at some particular stage during his development from the unconscious germ-plasm. Again, I have only one way to establish that other people have minds, and that is on the analogy of my ownself. I observe the outer behaviour of a man and compare it with that of my own and conclude that he has also a mind like mine. The robot that emulates the behaviour of humans, despite all similarities of observable behaviour, cannot be regarded as having mind or life. Further, this is quite evident that observable outer behaviour does not necessarily imply the presence of mind. A person can be absolutely paralysed so far as his outward behaviour is concerned, but may not have lost consciousness. On the other hand, a person could be turned into a robot by thoroughly anesthetizing him and fixing tiny radio-active devices to the ends of his afferent nerves. The outward behaviour of this man will be similar to that of any other human being, but will not imply his consciousness. This will become the mechanical radio active behaviour being controlled from a distance. If the outward behaviour of a living human being can be mechanically controlled not by his consciousness but by some external agency, can't we regard the mechanical behaviour of a robot as 'intelligent'? Where does the mechanical, the material end and where does the creative the free and the living begin? It is quite clear that no hard and fast line of cleavage can be drawn. Cartesian problem becomes ever more perplexing.

Even if we ascribe intelligence, in some sense, to machines, we will not treat them at par with living beings. The machine can emulate human behaviour par excellence, yet it will differ, at least in one important respect,

from the humans. The machines cannot procreate or duplicate themselves. This is quite interesting to note that according to some thinkers even this difference does not matter at all:

"When man looks at the electronic computer and sees one supposedly unique human quality after another taken asay from him by the machine, he may fall back upon a major distinction between animal and machine and want to say

"Well, at least I can reproduce my own kind. I can father a human child" But now machines can, in a sense, reproduce their own kind. That is, they can create new "organisms" like themselves out of parts that can be obtained by them from their environment and utilized by other machines operating under instructions supplied by the "parent" device. But the animal uses food and a highly complex series of chemical transformations, while the machine uses mechanical parts, such as wires, batteries, photoelectric cells, and so on. Yet it is possible for a machine so programmed and with access to necessary material to construct another. Moreover, simple machines can be used to design more complex ones — the Remington-Rand Corporation of New York used Univac I and II in the design of Univac III, for example."!

Some philosophers subscribe to the view that it is possible to manufacture a computer that is conscious or capable of consciousness. Douglas R. Hofstadler of Indiana University believes that a time will come when computer hardware and human software will combine and make it possible for the machine to think, create and feel. Thus the computer may become capable of reflecting upon its own operations i.e. it may become self-conscious. A.M.Turing in his article "Computing Machinery and Intelligence"[222] has examined and rejected a number of objections that could be put forward to prove the contrary view that machines cannot think. Turing says "I believe that at the end of the century the use of the words and

[222] " The Mechanical Concept of Mind", Michael Seriven, Mind, Vol. LXII, 246 (1953)

general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicated."[223]

Does the machine have consciousness or not? Is its thinking creative or does it merely mimick human behaviour? These questions could be discussed endlessly. But one thing is incontrovertable — that the computer has brought about a revolution which has changed the whole intellectual scene. It presents modern man with far reaching economic, philosophic and social problems. According to a recent report by the National Research Council (America;, A.I. would effect the circumstances of human life profoundly. It would surely create a new economics, a new sociology and a new history".[224]

Thus a study of artificial intelligence has become necessary not only for other disciplines but also for philosophy.Aaron Slcman says:

"Within a few years if there remain any philosophers who are not familiar with some of the main developments in artificial intelligence, it will be fair to accuse them of professional incompetence, and that to teach courses in philosophy of mind, epistemology, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, ethics, metaphysics, and other main areas of philosophy, without discussing the relevant aspects of artificial intelligence will be as irresponsible as giving' degree course in physics which includes no quantum theory,,[225]

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[223] Corinne Jacker 'Man, Memory and Machines. Dell Book, New York 1966. pp. 69—70
[224] See "Minds and Machines" edited by Allan Ross Adersn, Englewood Cliffs N.J. 1964
[225] Ibid, p. 14.
5-'Machines that think' by Stanlay N. Wellborn, Economic

Impact (No.48) A Quarterly Review of World Economic, USA.
6-"The Computer Revolution in Philosophy". the Harvestor

Press Sussex 1978, P. 5.
7-'Artificial Intelligence'. by David L. Waltz, appeared in Scientific American Oct. 1982

At the end it seems appropriate to point out a few limitations of the computer:

1. The most difficult task for the thinking machine is to simulate commonsense.

"probably the most telling criticism of current work in artificial intelligence is that it has yet not been successful in modelling what is called commonsense."

One difficulty in simulating commonsense is that a programme must link perception, reasoning and action simultaneously, because ultimately the intelligent use of a concept depends on all three domains."1

2. Reitman (1965) has pointed out that human mind while solving a problem is not as rigid as the computer is. The human problem solver is quite distractable, both by external stimuli and by ideas unrelated to the problem he is working on. In other words, the computer programme works on one thing at a time while the human works simultaneously on several things, either productively or unproductively,within a given period.

3. The computer has typically perfect access to previous information, while humans lose information over time. Enormous capacity of storing memories is useful for the computer, but is a source of great torture for human life. Certain irrelevant events we ought to forget, else life would become intolerable. The computer cannot unlearn and forget that way. We can say that it does not have an Unconscious in the Freudian sense.

4. Computer technology, instead of alleviating human sufferings, may add to man's misery and alienation. It is quite possible that thinking machines assume independent role and make decisions which bring humanity to the brink of total destruction. Machines that can learn and decide are not obligated to be subserviant to humanity, they may turn out to be hostile to it.

BOOK REVIEWS

Author: Jagan Nath Azad; Publisher: National House, Urdu Bazar, Lahore (Pakistan) pp..232; Rs.125/—.

Prof. Jagan Nath Azad, who has earned for himself an authoritative niche in Iqbaliat, encompasses in this book the quartet of poetry, politics, philosophy and religion that forms the matrix of Iqbal's creative genius. In the first chapter, by collecting and collating facts and sifting them logically, he settles the controversy over Iqbal's date of birth and firmly determines it to be November 9, 1877.

In Indian Background of Iqbal's Poetry', Prof. Azad rebutts the lopsided criticism about Iqbal being merely a Pan Islamist. He contends that carping commentators and adoring critics of Iqbal who dichotomise his well-integrated genius hinder an unbiased assessment of his poetry and philosophy. If viewed in proper perspective, a pattern of Indian cultural heritage is discernible in the hinterland of many of Iqbal's poems, including his magnum opus, 'Javed Nama'.

In the next two chapters, Prof. Azad discusses some salient aspects of Iqbal as a poet, politician and philosopher and contends that in him- all the three are finely blended. There is nothing schismatic between his concept of nationalism and internationalism based on Islamic brotherhood. What Iqbal deprecated was the perverted, insular nationalism that encouraged atheistic materialism dividing humanity into warring sections. Prof.Azad holds that what turned Iqbal into a Pan Islamist was an urge to save the Islamic world from the throes of the de' ouring European nationalism in the beginning of this century.

One of the greatest among recent Islamic thinkers, Iqbal felt that Europe had learnt much from Islam in the past but had advanced so much that it was now imperative to see how European thought could help in the

reconstruction of Islamic religious thought. With his ingrained faith in the permanence of change, he believed that by keeping itself abreast of the physical and metaphysical evolution brought about by human thought and still preserving its own pristine glory could Islam remain a dynamic force. For him religion was not communalism, nor even a conglomeration of fetid dogmas and formalism, preaching renunciation or helpless submission to Cod. He has, therefore, struck a balance between the two attitudes of 'know in order to believe and beleive in order to know.

Pointing out Iqbal's affiliations with and deviations from the European thinkers in the context of Islamic thought, Prof. Azad says that, unlike Bergson, Iqbal believed that the 'vital impulse in its creative urge' leads to the amelioration of human life. Unlike Schopenhauer, Iqbal does not regard life as a mere effort to exist. While Nietzsche's Superman is devoid of all moral obligations, Iqbal's Mard-i-Momin has scrupulous ethical principles. Regarding fatalism as un-Islamic, Iqbal believed in bold action. This accounts for his recognition of the infinite potentialities of the Self which is in consonance with the Quranic conception of man as "a creative activity" and forms the basis of his preference of action to abstraction.

The appendices include stray notes on Iqbal, Prof. Azad's letters to newspapers and journals about controversial facets of Iqbal's evaluation, his reviews of books about Iqbal and his preface to Anand Narain Mulla's translation of Iqbal's "Lala-i-Tur". Prefaced by Dr. Mohammad Maruf's balanced and perceptive analysis of Prof. Azad's views and copiously studded with illustrative extracts from Iqbal's works and their meticulous translations, this valuable compendium on Iqbaliat provides smooth, racy reading in spite of frequent visitations from Printer's Devil.

Prof Azad Galati

GHALIB KE KHUTOOT

"Ghalib Ke Khutoot" by Dr. Khaliq Anjum (Vol.!) Pages 481 price Rs.75/— publishers: Ghalib Institute, Aiwan-i-Ghalib Marg, New Delhi.

Dr. Khaliq Anjum has carved out for himself a place, duly recognised by the litterateurs of Indo-Pak Sub-continent, in the domain of Urdu literature in general and in Ghalibian literature in particular. His first book about Ghalib entitled "Ghalib Ki Nadir Tehreeren" published in 1961 fully indicated that the critical and research work started on Ghalib by the scholars of older generation, namely Qazi Abdul Wudood, Ghulam Rasul Mehr, Abdus Sattar Siddiqi, Mahesh Prashad, Imtiaz Ali Arshi and Malik Ram had not only come down to the younger generation as a sacred heritage but was also in equally safe hands. "Ghalib Ki Nadir Tehreeren" was Khaliq Anjum's first contribution to Ghalibian literature, followed by his equally important book on Ghalib entitled"Ghalib Aur Shahan—i—Taimuria".

"Mriza Rafi Sauda", a research treatise on one of major poets of Urdu established Khaliq Anjum's position as a literary critic and) an authentic research scholar. "Matni Tanqeed" was yet another feather in Dr.Khaliq Anjum's cap as it was the first book in Urdu on Textual Criticism a comparatively new subject for Urdu writers and scholars.

Now Dr.Khaliq Anjum has presented to the Urdu world a voluminous book of nearly 500 pages entitled "Ghalib Ke Khutoot" (Vol.!). "Ghalib", in the words of Malik Ram, "is a very lucky poet, as, although over a century and a quarter has passed after his death, unpublished writings by him are still being discovered".

Ghalib's two collections of letters, namely "Ud-i-Hindi" and "Urdu-i-Mualla" were edited during his life-time and appeared immediately after his death. But critical and scholarly edited work on Ghalib's letters started only in the fourth decade of the present century, when the late Maulvi Mahesh Prashad, the then Professor and Head, Department of Urdu and Persian, Banaras Hindu University, Banaras, edited the first Volume of "Khutoot-i-Ghalib". This was published in 1941 by the Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdu

(Hind), Aligarh, with a preface by Dr.Abdus Sattar Siddiqi. The second revised and enlarged edition of this book was edited by Malik Ram and,- this edition was also published by the Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdu (Hind) with a preface by Professor Al-i-Ahmad Surror in 1962. "Makateeb-i-Ghalib" edited by Imtiaz Ali Arshi and "Khutoot-i-Ghalib" edited by Ghulam Rasool Mehr are two valuable compilations of Ghalib's letters which deserve a particular mention in this context. However, this list cannot be called complete without referring to Professor Masud Hasan Rizvi, Dr. Mukhtar ud Din Ahmad, and Dr.Gopi Chand Narang, through whose efforts a large number of Ghalib's unpublished letters have been unearthed and published in the literary periodicals of India and Pakistan.

But Dr.Khaliq Anjum's work is a,wBork with a difference, and the first of its kind in the sub-continent." The learned scholar has compiled all the available letters of Ghalibi in four volumes and determined as far as possible the date of each of those letters on which Ghalib had not put any date. H. has made full efforts to see that the correct version of these letters is inoluded in the book "Ghalib Ke Khutoot". The text of the letters contained in all earlier compilations has thoroughly been checked up with Ghalib's available letters in original. In addition to indicating the source of the text, Khaliq Anjum has also added his marginal notes to a number of letters thus enhancing the literary value of the letters. An index of all Urdu and Persian couplets used in the letters as also a complete index of all the individuals, places, Books and journals, mentioned in the letters form a valuable part of the book. Another important feature of the book under review is that it contains photographs of nearly two hundred letters of Ghalib, written in the great poet's own hand. Brief life-sketches of the addressees and in some cases their photographs also form part of this research work. To say the least "Ghalib Ke Khutoot" edited by Khaliq Anjum is an encyclopaedia of Ghalib's letters. The book has been published by the Ghalib Institute, New Delhi which is one of India's national institutions, founded by the late Shri

Fakhrud Din All Ahmad, President of India from 1971 to 1974. The Ghalib Institute deserves to be congratulated on this publication.

Prof.Jagan Nath Azad

TAZKERAH-I-MUASIREEN

Malik Ram an internationally-known authority on Ghalib is a versatile man of letters. A legend in his own life-time, he has a remarkable capability to deal with many subjects. He is, at the same time, an essayist, a biographer, a memoir-writer, a literary critic, a research scholar as also an authority on Islamic literature and culture and, it is in this capacity that he has won applause on his work from eminent Muslim scholars in India and abroad including the late Maul ina Abaul Majid Daryabadi (India) and the late Professor Yusuf Saleem Chishti (Pakistan);

Malik Rim, author of a large number of standard literary works like Zikr-i-Ghalib, Talamizah-i-Ghalib, Ayar-i-Ghalib, Qadeem Delhi College, Aurat Aur Islam and many others is at present busy with a work of classical nature with a tremendous magnitude. This is "'Tazkirah-i-Muasireen', four volumes of which are out by now. The first volume deals with the life and works of those Urdu poets, writers and scholars who passed away during the period 1967 to 1971; the second with those who left this earthly abode in 1972—1973; the third with those passing away in 1971975 and the fourth volume with the life and works of those who departed from us for good during 1975 and 1977.

While all these volumes and even those to follow form a part of one single whole, each one of these volumes has a separate entity and is complete in itself without being described as a part of the other one.

The fourth Volume of "Tazkirah-i-Muasireen", under review at present, is a Sahitya Akademi award-winning volume and deals with the lives and works of 52 prominent Urdu writers. More prominent of them are of course Syyed Mohammad Jafri (Pakistan), Josh Malsiani (India), Rasheed Ahmad

Siddiqi (India), Tehseen Sarwari (Pakistan), Krishan Chandra (India), Shyam Mohan Lal Jigar Bareilvi (India), Kirpal Singh Bedar (India), Ibrahim Jalees (Pakistan), Jan Nisar Akhtar (India), Kashfi Multani (Pakistan), Abd-ur-Razzaq Qureshi (India), Mohammad Usman Farqaleet (India), Mulla Wahidi (Pakistan), Syyed Waqar Azeem (Pakistan), Mubariz-i-ud-Din Rifaat (India), Makeen Ahsan Kaleem (Pakistan), Malik Nasrullah Khan Aziz (Pakistan) Rasa Jalandhri (Pakistan) and Jai Krishan Chaudhri Habeeb (India).

Memoir-writing in Urdu has an age-old tradition. But memoirs written in the early period were not memoirs in the true sense of the word. Most of these memoirs have dealt only with poets and after writing a sentence ot two about the name, parentage, date of birth and place of birth, even that too without full 'erification, the memoir writers have given a selection of their couplets. These memoirs are, therefore, more or less compilations of poems by the departed poets. Although further research has brought to light a number of new aspects of the lives and works of these poets, n)t a word has been added to these memoirs. And these are still Being used, with the incomplete information contained therein, is the source material by the students of Urdu. Also for a very long time no new book of memoirs of Urdu writers has appeared in India or Pakistan with the result that the gap already existing has widened in the sphere of Urdu literature.

Malik Ram deserves compliments from the Urdu world for embarking on a project which will fill this void to a great extent and guide the students of Urdu language and literature, desirous of working on any one of the writers dealt with in this book or the period to which these writers, scholars and poets belonged.

"Tazkirah-i-Muasireen" is a work of encyclopaedic nature and the writer has taken pains to collect material about these literatures from various sources including their relatives, pupils, friends, files of old magazines and newspapers and also notes prepared by Malik Ram himself during their life-time. In many cases he has also referred to the writings left by the deceased

himself. The work has also involved long travels on the part of the author in search of the source material and eventually to lend authenticity to what he wrote. The author while writing this volume has also depended on his memory as some of the men of letters about whom he has written, were personally. known to him. The book has become all the more valuable and authentic as the author has indicated in it the source of his information.

The volume under review like Malik Ram's other works, is a specimen of beautiful Urdu prose. A diligent reader of this book would note that the author does not join independent clauses by a comma, does not un-necessarily break a sentence into two, prefers the active voice to the passive one, omits needless words and avoids a succession of loose sentences. Not only this. He puts his heart and soul in his prose and comes very close to his reader leaving no scope for communication-gap.

Malik Ram's prose is vigorous and concise. Not only that his sentences contain no un-necessary words, his paragraphs contain no un-necessary sentences. To quote Professor William Strunk Jr. "a drawing should have no un-necessary lines and a machine no un-necessary parts". However, this should not lead a reader to mis-construe that Malik Ram avoids all details and treats his subject only in out-line. No in the case of his prose every word tells. His prose is a specimen of cleanliness, accuracy and brevity in the use of language.

"Tazkirah-i-Muasireen" published by Maktaba-i-Jamia, Ltd. New Delhi, is a valuable addition to the Urdu literature on memoirs produced so far. We the students of Urdu language and literature eagerly wait for the volumes to follow in this series."

Prof. Jagan Nath Azad

MAKATEEB-I-NIGAM

(Edited with notes by Mohammad Ayyub Waqif, Bombay, Published by Munshi Daya Narain Nigam Memorial Trust, Chakbast Road, Lucknow—Price Rs. 20.00)

"Makateeb—i—Nigam", edited by Mohammad Ayyub Waqif is a collection of 89 letters, written by the late Munshi Daya Narain Nigam to a number of Urdu writers and poets in India, including Ahsan Marehrvi, Basheshwar Prashad Munawwar, Josh Malihabadi, Shiam Mohan Lal J igar and Abdur Razzaq Qureshi.

Daya Narain Nigam (1882—1942) was an Urdu litterateur having a multi-dimensional personality. As founder-editor of the monthly "Zamana", Kanpur, he introduced a large number of young Urdu prose-writers and poets to the Urdu world. "Zamana" alongwith "Makhzan" (Lahore) and "Makhzan"(Delhi) had the distinction of publishing in the first three decades of the present century a large number of poems and prose articles by prominent Urdu poets and writers like Durga Sahai Surror, Iqbal, Brij Narain Chakbast, Akbar Allahabadi, Tilok Chand Mahru-n, Josh Malihabadi, Firaq Gorakhpuri, Ghulam Bheek Nairang, Maharaj Bahadur Barq, Abu Nasr Aah (Maulana Abut Kalam Azad's elder brother), Sadiq Az Kashmir (A Kashmiri poet of Urdu, whom we in Jammu and Kashmir have now almost completely forgotten), Lala Lajpat Rai and many others. The readers of the present write-up would be interested to know that Iqbal's poem "Sare Jahan Se achha Hindostan Hamara" originally appeared in the ""Zamana" under the title "Hamara Des". It was after the poet had revised the poem and made substantial changes in it that he included it in his first Urdu collection of poems "Bang-i-Dara" under the title "Tarana—i—Hindi".

The dozen of Urdu Litterateurs,Munshi Pram Chand, who originally started his literary career under the name of Nawwab Rai, followed by another pen-name, Dhanpat Rai, first of all appeared in the "Zamana". His first collection of short stories entitlted "Soz-i-Watan", which was prescribed

by the then Government of India, was also printed and published by Daya Narain Nigam.

It would be without any exaggeratior to say that Daya Narain Nigam wrote in his life time hundreds of letters to Urdu writers of standing in India, particularly in his capacity as Editor "Zamana" (1903—1942). Most of these letters have by now perhaps gone out of existence. The present writer vividly remembers to have seen in 1935 a large number of Daya Narain Nigam's letters addressed to Tilok Chand Mahrum in his ancestral house in Isakhel (now in Pakistan), carelessly dumped in a cane-basket alongwith many other letters from various Urdu writers of that period. Mohammad Ayyub Waqif has really done a highly creditable job by collecting Daya Narain Nigam's 89 letters from various sources and putting then together, alongwith his scholarly marginal notes, in the form of the book under review. Mr.Waqif has also added to the book a valuable preface wherein he has thrown good deal of light on the life of Daya Narain Nigam vis-a-vis Urdu literature in Northern India in the first half of the twentieth century.

Mohammad Ayyub Waqif, a young scholar from Bombay, has &commendable literary back-ground, having had long association with the Shibli National College, Azamgarh, Darul Musannifin, Azamgarh and Anjamun-i-Islam Research Institute, Bombay and, this background has successfully been manifested in all the books he has written,namely "Sudarshan Ki Afsana Nigari", "Jagan Nath Azad—Ek—Mutalia" and "Ali Sardar Jafri: Shakhsiyat Aur Shairi". The book under review "Makateeb-i-Daya Narain Nigam", which has recently seen the light of the day is his fourth publication and is a valuable addition to the literature produced on life and letters of Urdu writers and scholars. It is hoped the book will be received with the same warmth by lovers of Urdu in India and Pakistan, with which his earlier books have been received.

Prof. Jagan Nath Azad