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### **IQBAL'S IDEA OF THE SELF**

#### Mohammad Rafiuddin

From the earliest times men have endeavoured to solve the riddle of the universe, having had an intuitive conviction that the world is a unified whole. To the idealist philosopher or to the man of religion this view is quite natural, since he believes that the universe is the creation of a single personality and is permeated by a single purpose. But even the materialist philosophers have been unable to get away from the urge of their nature, common to all philosophers and all thinking men, to look upon the world as a unity. Indeed if those who are engaged in search of knowledge were not to start with the idea, that there is a unity and uniformity of design and purpose in the universe, neither science nor philosophy would have been possible. Iqbal too looks upon the world as a unity.

No one, therefore, can do justice to Iqbal unless he explains all his ideas with reference to a single central idea with which they are shown to be rationally connected.

There is no doubt that, since the death of Iqbal, a large amount of very able criticism of his works has come into existence, but no ordered and systematic exposition of his philosophy is yet known to be available. No one has so far explained his ideas as parts of a comprehensive theory of the universe. He is our national poet-philosopher, and we claim with him rightly that his message is of supreme importance to anxious humanity now face to face with complete annihilation on account of the series of world wars in which it has got entangled and from which it knows no refuge. But unless we, arrange-his ideas in a logical order, work out their full implications and carry them to their conclusions, neither we nor the rest of the, world, can benefit from his valuable teachings.

One who undertakes this highly important task will have to satisfy at least two conditions. First, he should go back to the very source, the very fountain-head of his ideas, to that basic feeling or intuition of his mind from which all his ideas emanate. In other words, he should acquire Iqbal's own vision of reality, his own 'mystic or spiritual experience. How little is it realized, in spite of repeated, unequivocal pronouncements of Iqbal, that, although he is both a poet and a philosopher, he is fundamentally neither a poet nor a philosopher but a mystic. His gifts of poetic expression and philosophical knowledge are both subservient to his mysticism. All that he has done is to interpret his mystic experience in the familiar intellectual and intelligible language of philosophy and to express his philosophical ideas born in this way through the forceful medium of verse that influences deeply and strongly the minds of others. It is not his object to please his readers by songs or stroies of love like other poets. Accordingly, he repudiates the title of a poet which is sometimes attributed to him.

> نه پن*د*اری که من بے بادہ مستم مثال شاعران افسانه بستم نه بيني خيز ازاں مرد فرو دست که بر من تهمت شعر و سخن بست او حدیث دلبری خواید زمن رنگ و آب شاعری خواېد زمن کم نظر بر تابئ جانم ندید آشکارم دید و پنهانم ندید

نغمه کجا و من کجا، ساز سخن بهانه ایست

سوئے قطار می کشم ناقهٔ بےزمام را

Don't you think that I feel intoxicated without drinking wine and that I have fabricated a story like poets ?

You can never expect any good from that inferior man who caluminates me as a mere versifier.

He wants me to speak sweet words of love and expects the style and radiance of poetry from me.

The short-sighted fellow did not see the restlessness of my soul; he simply saw my outwardness and not my inwardness.

There is a vast difference between me and the melody; the instrument of poetry is only a pretext. I do lead the bride-less dromedary to the string of camels.

He hates, and dissociates himself from, all philosophy that is the outcome of a distorted and incomplete vision or intuition of Reality on the ground that it is divorced from the love of God.

> تڑپ رہا ہے فلاطوں می اں غیب و حضور ازل سے اہل خردکا مقام ہے اعراف

Plato is feeling restless between the concealed and the visible;

the place of the wise has been purgatory since the very beginning.

نہ فلسفی سے نہ ملاؓ سے بے غرض مجھکو یه دل کې موت، وه اندیشه و نظر کا فساد بلند بال تها ليكن نه تها جسور و غيور حکیم سر مہبتسر بر نصیب رہا پھرا فضاؤں میں شاہیں اگرچہ کر گس وار شکارزنده کی لذت سر بر نصیب رہا حکمتش معقول و با محسوس در خلوت نرفت گرچه فکر بکر او پيرايه يو شد چون عروس طائر عقل فلک يرواز او داني که جيست؟ ماکيان کز زور مستي خايه گيرد بر خروس

I have no concern whatsoever either with the philosopher or with the Mulla; the former is the death of the heart while the latter represents a conflict of thought and sight.

He knew how to fly high but he lacked courage and high mindedness. That is why the philosopher remained deprived of the secrets of love. Although the Shaheen (falcon) continued to fly in the sky like a vulture, yet he felt deprived of the ecstacy of the live prey.

What he says about Hegel applies equally to other philosophers.

His wisdom did not indulge in the privacy of the touchable, though the virginity of his thought appeared in the garb of a bride.

Do you know what the bird of his high flying wisdom is like? It is like the hen which in the moments of profound lust gets germinated without a cock.

On the other hand, he openly and repeatedly claims for himself the experience of a mystic. He often uses such words as: ذوق نگاه، سوز درون جان

.etc ہے تاب

عصر حاضر را خرد زنحير پاست

جان بے تابے کہ من دارم دارم کجاست؟

Wisdom is proving a shackle to the present-day world.

Where is the man who possesses a restless soul like myself?

اے پسر! ذوق نگاہ از من بگیر

سوختن در لا اله از من بگير

مرے کدو کو غنیمت سمجھ کہ بادۂ ناب

O my son! get the joy of inner sight from me. Learn from me how to burn in the fire of 'None is worthy of worship except God'.

Treat my pumpkin as a boon since the pure wine is available neither in schools nor in monastries.

What a lovely couplet was sung by a non-Arab! The soul is still burning from inside due to its forceful effect.

He loves to use for himself such words as فقير قلندر درويش etc., each of which signifies a mystic.

A derwesh who is intoxicated with the love of God, belongs neither to the East nor to the West. Delhi, Isfahan, Samarqand-neither of them is my abode.

The days of this Fakir have come to an end; it is to be seen whether or not another secret-knowing sage appears on the scene.

The devotee knows nothing except a couple of words of 'None is worthy of worship except God', while the theologian of the town is the master of all the religious vocabularies.

Secondly, in order to understand Iqbal's philosophic interpretation of his own spiritual experience, he should have a thorough knowledge of philosophy and of the latest discoveries of science. Evidently, when such a man begins to systematise Iqbal's philosophical rendering of his own mystic experience (which will be common between him and Iqbal), he will build upon that rendering and carry it a step further.

But these two conditions are such that, while each of them may be fulfilled by several men individually, their combination in a single man is rare. There is a great dearth of intellectual mystics in this age of irreligious intellectualism and intellectual barrenness of religiosity.

It is not possible for me to attempt a systematic exposition of Iqbal's idea of the self in. this small article. But I shall endeavour to give below its salient features and to explain each as much as I can within the space at my disposal.

(A) Khudi is the fundamental reality of the universe.

ييكر ہستى ز آثار خوديسست

## ېرچه می بینی ز اسرار خودیست زمین و آسمان و چار سو نیست دریں عالم بجز اللہ ہو نیست

The structure of man's existence is *a* relic of his own self;

whatever you see around, is one of the secrets of the self.

It is not the earth and the firmament that is spreading in all directions. In this universe there is nothing except the manifestation of God.

Khudi signifies mind or consciousness. Since, wherever there is mind or consciousness there is life, Iqbal has frequently used the words حيات and

or consciousness. We know that consciousness is to be خودی for found in both man and animal. But the standard of human consciousness is higher than that of animal consciousness. Because an animal is conscious, it knows, feels and thinks. But a humanbeing not only knows, feels and thinks, but when he does so, he also knows that he knows, feels and thinks. Thus in the human being consciousness knows itself and human consciousness is of the nature of self-consciousness. It is this self-consciousness which is described more briefly by the word "self". Iqbal gives the Urdu or Persian translation of this word as Khudi. It was hardly possible to find a more appropriate Urdu or Persian equivalent of this old and simple philosophical term. Yet, unfortunately, it has been widely misunderstood by the readers of Iqbal. The reason is that this word is already in use in Urdu and Persian in avery different sense, in the sense of pride and selfishness, and Iqbal, too, in view of our present lassitude, has stressed one out of the several characteristics of Khudi, the characteristic, namely, of self-assertion. This has led many persons to imagine that the philosophical term Khudi has

something in common with the meaning of this word in everyday language. This, of course, is not true.

Iqbal's view of the reality of consciousness is not a new idea in philosophy. It is a view that has been very popular with philosophers throughout. Most of the philosophers have been idealists, *i.e.*, have believed in the primacy of mind. Consciousness in man and the universe is the one great theme of not only mediaeval European philosophy, the object of which was the rationalization of Christianity, but also of the great philosophical systems of the modern age expounded by philosophers like Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Croce, Bergson, etc.

This view, however, received a serious setback on account of the 18th Century science which, on the basis of actual experiments in the laboratory, concluded that matter was indestructible and was, therefore, self-existent and the only reality behind the universe. Consequently, it was believed that mind or life is only a property of matter that appears when matter assumes a particular chemical composition. Berkeley challenged the conclusion of the scientists and stood up boldly against them, defending the view of the idealist philosophers. But his contention appeared to be a losing one. Twentieth. Century hypotheses in Physics and Biology like Relativity Theory, Quantum Theory, Second Law of Thermodynamics and the theories of Creative Evolution and Emergent Evolution have, however, entirely changed the situation. These hypotheses have compelled the scientists to revise their theory about the nature of matter and to favour, instead, the view, long advocated by religion and idealist philosophy, that consciousness is the basic force in the universe and that matter is its emanation. Thus materialism, the ideal of scie nce, has been shattered by science itself.

The result is that the materialistic philosophies, built on the 18th Century view of the nature of matter, are gradually losing their ground and the idealistic philosophy is acquiring *a* new force. The scientists, bewildered by their own discoveries, are busy giving a spiritual explanation of the universe. They have wandered out of the realm of matter into the world beyond, because it is now there that they hope to discover the Ultimate Reality. This is evident from the numerous books written by top scientists of the world like Einstein, Eddington, James Jeans and others on the subject.

"The present state of physical knowledge," writes load, "seems to prominent scientists to point to conclusions directly contrary to those of the old materialism and to favour a spiritual interpretation of the univserse as strongly as the science of fifty years ago was thought to favour a materialist interpretation."

(B) Evolution is a fact.

چو فطرت می تراشد پیکرے را تمامش می کند در روز گارے یه کائنات ابھی نا تمام ہے شاید که آرہی ہے دما دم صدائے کن فیکون

When nature carves out a figure, then it completes it in the course of time only.

This universe is perhaps still incomplete, for the voice of the command, 'Be and it came into being' is being constantly heard.

But the cause of evolution is the creative activity of the consciousness of the universe. Evolution is the method of creation which is always gradual. Consciousness, in creating anew the universe from moment to moment for the sake of its own self-expression, is continually breaking through its own resistance and outgrowing itself, and thereby gradually advancing towards its goal, its destination or ideal. Consciousness is going on and on in search of that goal like a swiftly running stream that meets with obstacles of hills and rocks and turns right and left to avoid them or washes them away to make a passage for itself. The onward creative march of consciousness resulted in the evolution of matter till matter became ripe for the production of animal life. During the animal stage, stretched over a period of millions of years, the evolutionary process resulted in the production of innumerable species of animals out of which those that did not suit the purpose of evolution continued to be destroyed side by side with the creation of others that suited the needs of evolution and bore promise for the future. The story of evolution is related by Iqbal in اسرار خودی and اسرال from which the following lines are quoted:

Flows the rocky rivulet jumping, entangling, bending, moving, springing, sliding, recovering and coiling.

# ہر اک شے سے پیدا رم زندگی اسی سے ہوئی ہے بدن کی نمود که شعله می ں پوشیدہ سے موج دود گراں گر چہ سے صحبت آب و گل خوش آئی اسے صحبت آب و گل یہ ثابت بھی سے اور سیار بھی عناصر کے پھندوں سے بیزار بھی يه عالم يه بت خانهٔ شش جهات اسی نے تراشا ہے یہ سومنات ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود که بر لحظه تازه می شان وجود زما نے کے دریا میں بہتی ہوئی ستم اسکی موجوں کر سہتی ہوئی

## تجس کے راہیں بدلتی ہوئی دما دم نگاہیں بدلتی ہوئی سازد ازخود پیکر اغیار را تا فزاید لذت پیکار ر

It cuts the slabs of stones when it pauses and penetrates into the hearts of mountains.

Just look here, O tulip-coloured sweetheart! The rivulet conveys the message of life.

The ocean of life is flowing ceaselessly; every thin records the flight of life.

It is responsible for the manifestation of the body, for in the flames lie hidden the waves of smoke.

Though the company of water and earth proves incongenial, yet the association of water and earth is pleasing to it.

It is stationary as well as moving and yet it is fed up with the shackles of the elements.

This universe, this idol-temple of six dimensions; this great idol-temple has been carved by it.

The caravan of life does not stop anywhere; the pomp and show of existence is every movement green and fresh.

Bearing the tyrannies of its waves, changing the ways of searching and constantly displaying the changing eyes, it floats on the river of time.

It builds out of itself the structure of opponents to avoid augmenting the ecstasy of conflict.

می شود از بہر اغراض عمل عامل و معمول و اسباب و علل وا نمودن خویش را خوئے خودی است خفته در ہر ذرہ نیروئے خودی است پیکر ہستی ز اسرار خودی است ہر چہ مے بینی ز اسرار خودی است

For the various stages of action it becomes itself the subject, the object, the cause and the stimulant.

Displaying of the self is customary with the ego. In every particle lies hidden the power of the ego.

The structure of existence is of the signs of the ego. Whatever you behold is of the secrets of the ego.

Passing through the earner forms of life, consciousness came to its own and gained its freedom and self-consciousness in the human being for the first time since the beginning of creation.

From the very beginning it is struggling hard to appear in the shape of man.

The abode of the ego is in your heart just as the firmament is seen in the pupil of the eye.

And now consciousness will make man the instrument of its own selfrealization. It will express itself in man more and more till in him it will behold itself in its full splendour. The perfect man of the future is the final objective of all this tedious and lengthy process of evolution.

Thou art the late-discovered meaning of the verse of the universe. Caravans of hue and scent are roaming about in thy search. The purpose underlying the revolution of time is that thy ego should reveal itself to thee.

When he comes, the strife of the nations will end and peace and prosperity will reign on the earth. Iqbal addresses the man of the future as follows:

> اے سوار اشہب دوراں بیا اے فروغ دیدۂ امکاں بیا رونق ہنگامۂ ایجاد شو در سواد دیدہ ہا آباد شو شورش اقوام را خاموش کن نغمۀ خود را بہشت گوش کن

O white rider of the horse of time, come forth. O splendour of the eyes of this world! Come forth.

Be the elegance of the commotion of inventions, take thy abode in the environs of the eyes.

Put down the discontent of the nations; fascinate them with the melody of your songs of peace.

The process of evolution involves a good deal of waste and experimentation which one is likely to mistake for cruelty or purposelessness in nature. For example, consciousness creates millions of solar systems in order to have one that suits its ends; it creates millions of species for the sake of one that is perfect; and it creates innumerable prophets before the Perfect Prophet makes his appearance. Really in all such cases the end justifies the means. Because the final results is extremely precious, it more than compensates for the loss that is involved in its creation.

> خود فريبي بائر اور عن حيات سمجه گل از خون و ضو عین حیات بہر یک گل خون صد گلشن کند از يئر يک نغمه صد شيون کند شعله بائر او صد ابراہیم سوخت تا چراغ یک محمد بر فروخت عذر این اسراف و این سنگین دلی خلقو تكميل حمال معنوى

His self-deceits are the essence of his life, like the rose which derives life from the redness and radiance.

He destroys a hundred flower-beds for the sake of a single rose, and indulges numerous lamentations for creating one melody.

In order to lit one lamp in the shape of Prophet Mohammad (may peace

be on him), its flames have burnt one hundred Abrahams.

Creation and completion of the inner beauty was the pretext for all this lavishness and hard-heartedness.

While Iqbal's view of the causes of evolution is entirely Quranic. it is the only one that is compatible with the most recent hypotheses of Physics. These hypotheses point to consciousness as the sole reality of the world. This view is further supported by the most up-to-date scientific investigations in the field of Biology. Serious students of Biology, according to Professor Haldane, no longer entertain the view that life is the result of a definite chemical composition of matter, The experiments of the German Biologist, Driesch, in particular, have led to the conclusion that there is an internal regulating principle active in the organism which moulds and forms it in the interest of the whole, changing and directing its purpose to suit this interest. This regulating principle must be interested not only in the growth of the individual organism, but also in the growth and evolution of life as a whole. Bergson supports this contention in his book *Creative Evolution* by a seris of highly cogent arguments.

Lamarck explained the evolution of life as a result of adaptation by living beings to the conditions of environment. Adaptation causes a sight alteration in the form of the animal — an alteration inherited by the offspring, which, being itself subjected to the necessity of adaptation, undergoes a further change. In this way, modifications go on accumulating gradually till we have a new species. But it is now well-established that variations may not only be due to an accumulated effect, but may also take place suddenly. This is impossible unless there is a conscious drive in the organism itself causing it to develop a sudden change or improvement. Briefly, the 19th Century view advocated by Lamarck and Darwin that evolution is the chance result of the play of mechanical forces, is now being abandoned in favour of the view that evolution is purposive and is the outcome of a conscious and creative activity in nature.

(C) Self-consciousness — whether as the Universal Self-consciousness or as expressed in the human being — has only one urge and that is Love or the urge or quest for Beauty. But what is self-consciousness to love? Where is that Beauty which it seeks ? The answer is that self-consciousness itself is Beauty. The human self-consciousness loves the Universal Selfconsciousness (which is really within it) and the Universal Self-consciousness loves the human self-consciousness. The latter, on account of its love for the former, is in a perpetual process of creation. As a result of this process, it will reach the height of its beauty and perfection in due course of time.

حسن را اذ خطد برطی جستن خطاست

آنچه می بایست پیش ما کجاست

It is a mistake to search for the beauty outside the self. Where is it that which ought to be before us ?

Loving or seeking that is going on at both ends of consciousness, is really the cause of history or the process of evolution, leading to the perfection of the universe or rather to the perfection of man who is the essence of the universe.

We have gone astray from God and He is in search of us. Like us he is also supplicating and slave to longings.

He sometimes writes His message on the leaves of tulips; and

sometimes he sings songs through the chirpings of the birds.

He has concealed Himself in the marcissus just to witness our beauty. He is so tricky that His very looks are in conversation.

The heart-rendering sigh that he heaves in our separation in the morning, echoes in all directions, outside and inside, above and beneath.

All this tumult has been made just to behold the portrait of one made of clay. Inspection is only a pretext to enjoy the sight of hue and colour of the same.

The pearl of life is lost in our earthen body. Are we this lost pearl or He?

The head-preacher has kept back this secret from us that the sacred enclosure of Mecca is itself the lover of the lamp of the Haram.

The divine lustre itself had a keen desire to witness those eyes, which have now become hopeless of seeing the light of the valley of Aiman.

Man expresses his love for the Divine Self by worshipping It, adoring Its qualities and acting in Its service, *i.e.*, by expressing Its qualities in his own action. Self-consciousness (human or Divine) is Love and Beauty at the same time. When it is seeking self-consciousness, it is Love; and when it is being sought by self-consciousness, it is Beauty. The Divine Self is actual Beauty, but the human self-consciousness is potential Beauty that has yet to be actualized or revealed as a result of the creative process. Beauty includes all its qualities like Power, Goodness, Truth, etc., which are all lovable and admirable and which are always expressed in the service of Love. They belong to Self-consciousness of the Universe, and, therefore, also to man to the extent to which he is able to increase his love and his knowledge of Beauty, and thereby to evolve and display his latent self-consciousness.

By adoration and action the self evolves its self-consciousness, identifies itself more and more with the qualities of Beauty and adds to its knowledge of Beauty as well as to its power to give a better and fuller expression to its urge for Beauty.

What is soul? It is absorption, exhilaration, burning and affliction; it is the incentive to conquer the spans of the revoling heavens.

Shun the association of all of them and seek the company of the person akin to your nature. Ask God to give you the ego and demand God from the ego.

چو سيمابر که بندد چوب عودش

The secret of the ego is; 'None is worthy of worship except God'; the ego is a sword and the whatstone is 'None is worthy worship except God.'

Our heart is fire and the body is a wave of its smoke. Frequent burning is in harmony with its existence.

The mid-night prayers are a source of its strength; like a mercurial artist who remains restless without his musical instrument.

Knowing the Self-consciousness of the Universe and knowing one's own self, are one and the same thing, because the growth of the self's knowledge in one direction results simultaneously in the growth of its knowledge in the other.

خودي را فاش تر ديدن بياموز

When you search for Him, you will find nothing but your self; when you search for your self, you will see nothing but Him.

His manifestation is your manifestation and your manifestation is His manifestation. You unravel God, and God will unravel your ego.

If you wish to witness God unveiled, then learn to see your ego in a clearer manner.

(D) Action is a tool which the self uses as a means for the satisfaction of its urge for Beauty. The self acquires knowledge (cognition) for the sake of action. All action is really directed to the removal of resistance in the path of the self's urge for Beauty. By effort and action it gains in power for further effort and action. When the self is obstructed in the achievement of its ends, it musters the whole of its power to smash resistance. The Divine Self and the human self are, therefore, both perpetually in action.

> دما دم رواں ہے یم زندگی ہر اک شے سے پیدا رم زندگی ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود سفر اس کا انجام و آغاز ہے یہی اس کی تقویم کا راز ہے یہ ہے خلاصۂ علم قلندری کی حیات

خدنگ جستہ سے لیکن کماں سے دور نہیں

The ocean of life is in constant flow. Everything reveals the flight of life.

The caravan of life does not pause anywhere since every moment displays the grace of life afresh.

Its journey is its beginning and its end. This is the secret of its almanac.

This is the gist of the knowledge of truth-seekers that life is a released arrow but not far from the bow.

(E) The fact that Love or the search for Beauty is the sole urge of human self-consciousness has implications which bring to light some highly important facts of human psychology. Iqbal alludes to this possibility when he addresses the psychologist in the following words:

> جرات ہے تو افکار کی دنیا سے گذر جا ہیں بحر خودی م یں ابھی پوشیدہ جزیرے کھلتے نہیں اس قلزم خاموش کے اسرار جب تک تو اسے ضرب کلیمی سے نہ چیرے

IIf you possess boldness, then pass on from this world of worries. There are still islands hidden in the ocean of the ego.

The secrets of this quiet see are not revealed until you smite it with the rod of Moses.

I make a brief survey of the implications of these couplets below:

(i) It is only the Divine Self and Its attributes that can really satisfy a man's urge for Beauty. Consequently, when a man is loving, and seeking by action and service, the consciousness of the universe and its qualities, he is expressing his urge for Beauty in the right way. But when, owing to his ignorance of the real desire of his self, he is not doing so, his urge for Beauty finds expression in some other idea to which he wrongly attributes all the qualities of Beauty. The reason is that we cannot hold any urge of our nature, least of all the most powerful urge of all, in abeyance for a single moment. This substitute-idea chosen by man becomes the ideal of his life, and dominates all his activities. The idea of his choice, no doubt, appears to possess some qualities of the Real Ideal and that is the reason why he is allured to it. But his love for the wrong ideal will not endure long. Sooner or later, his urge of the self, his inner criterion of Beauty. will begin to operate and the man will discover the elements or qualities of Beauty that the ideal is lacking. When this happens, he will be disillusioned and disappointed, and will come to know that the apparent qualities of Beauty in the idea that had lured him to it were no more than illusions. Therefore, he will turn immediately to another ideal for the satisfaction of his urge for Beauty. In the new ideal he will try to avoid those elements of ugliness or imperfection of which he had become conscious. But in the absence of his knowledge of the Right Ideal and the qualities of Beauty, he introduces some other unknown elements of imperfection into it, and these, sooner or later, make him dissatisfied with it and then he abandons it totally for another ideal. This process of trial and error continues as long as he does not hit upon the Right Ideal. What idea a person will choose as the ideal of his life at a particular time, will depend upon the state of his knowledge and experience at that time, and, therefore, as his knowledge and experience improve, he will approach nearer the qualities of true Beauty in the choice of his ideal. But the process is very long, for innumerable combinations of right and wrong, perfect and imperfect, are possible. It is also difficult as every new choice is the result of a painful adjustment.

Thus the urge for Beauty in man takes the form of the urge for ideals and is capable of being fully satisfied, by an ideal of the highest beauty and perfection, and that is the Divine Self. Ideals form stages in the development of the self. We are never absolutely wrong, but we advance trom a lower to a higher and **from a** less perfect to a more perfect ideal. This is what Iqbals means when he says:

زندگی شرح اشارات خودی است لا و الا از مقامات خودی است

Life is a commentary on the signs of the ego. 'None' and 'But' are some of the stages of the ego.

Istands for the self's stages of wrong ideals; and

Stands for the Right Ideal.

Because the urge for Beauty or the urge for ideals is the only urge (ii) of man's self-consciousness, it is prior to his instincts and rules them. Instincts are those psychophysical dispositions or compelling tendencies of action which man inherits from his animal ancestors and shares with them now. Evidently, their object is to compel the half-conscious animal to act for the preservation of its life and race. Without them, the current of life would have never reached the human being and self-consciousness would have never come to its own. When the instincts reach higher up in man, they naturally perform in him their original function of compelling action for the preservation of life. But man preserves his life for the sake of the urge of his self for Beauty. The instincts in him do not obstruct the urge of the self, which is free to have its way, but only help it to satisfy itself, if called upon to do so. The proof is that man can oppose any of his instincts, even the most compelling of them, and even lay down his life whenever he thinks his ideal needs this sacrifice. Animals below man in the scale of evolution cannot do so, because they are not self-conscious and do not possess the urge for ideals. This urge, in man, proves stronger than his instincts. It is his ideal of Beauty and not any one of his instincts, or all of them together, that dominates his life.

(iii) Since Politics is an aspect of the life of an individual which is

completely dominated by his ideal, the individuals who form a state have a common ideal — the ideal of their state — and that is the reason why they come together to form **a** state. Thus all the aspects of the life of a state are ruled and controlled by the ideal that it has come to adopt for the time being. The ideal of a state, *i.e.*, the common ideal of its members, determines very strictly all its political, ethical, legal, economic, constitutional, educational, diplomatic and military activities. These activities take a definite direction, and there can be no change in them, unless the ideal from which they result is itself changed.

(iv) Since an ideal has to exercise a complete control over a man's relation to the universe around him, it answers, to the entire satisfaction of the man who loves it, all possible questions about himself, about the society of which he is a member and about the rest of the universe, no matter how vague, incorrect and even fantastic these answers may be to others. An ideal, therefore, develops around itself a system of ideas becomes an ideology or a philosophy of life which may be vague or definite, developed or undeveloped, correct or incorrect, according to the intellectual stage of the society that believes in it.

(v) Variety of states is due to the variety of wrong ideals or ideologies and must persist or cause bloodshed as long as humanity does not agree upon a single ideology throughout the world. No wrong ideal can unite mankind permanently, for a wrong ideal is based on a part of our nature and satisfies only a part of our urge for Beauty. Therefore, even if it succeeds in uniting humanity for once, it must, in due course, break up and give rise to a number of different ideals, dividing humanity again into hostile fragments. The Right Ideology is the only stable and enduring foundation of our unity. Without it, unity or any other value will be difficult to achieve, and if achieved, will be impossible to maintain.

(vi) Since an ideal is the ideal of the highest beauty or perfection known to the self, the self's efforts to realize it are really its efforts to amass as much glory and power as possible. Every state, *i.e.*, every ideological group, has, therefore, an urge for unlimited expansion which brings it at once into a life and death struggle (sometimes open and sometimes concealed) with all the other states in the world. Thus a perpetual war of ideals is going on. In this struggle only the Right Ideology can emerge victorious. The reason is that every wrong ideal is not only being smashed from outside by the attacks of other ideals, but is also being disrupted from within by the elements of its own contradiction and imperfection. It may protect itself from outside, but cannot protect itself from its inner negations, which sap its vitality continuously and ultimately render it too weak to withstand external attacks. This must be the fate of every ideal except the Right Ideal which, atone, will survive the war of ideals.

As in the case of the individual, so in the case of society, ideals (vii) must advance by a painful and laborious process of trial and error towards the Right Ideal. If the ideal of a society is wrong, a time must come sooner or later when its latent elements of imperfection become known to it. This may come about when the internal strength of an ideal is put to test and found wanting at a critical point of its struggle with other ideals or by a slow realization of its weaknesses. In any case, when this happens, the society at once begins to feel the real or imaginary beauty of another ideal and makes a rush towards it. This phenomenon is known as a political or social revolution. Philosophy deals with ideals, and that is why original thought in philosophy giving fresh theories of man's relation to the universe, is always the fore-runner of political revolutions. We all know that there was no great revolution in history that was not preceded by a philosophy. Thus when a society abandons one ideal and adopts another, it rigorously avoids in the new ideal those elements of defect which marred the old ideal and caused its disruption. But in the absence of its knowledge of the Right Ideal (since it can have no means of making sure that its new choice is correct), it tends to adopt an ideal which contains certain other unsuspected elements of imperfection, and then these elements prove to be the seeds of another revolution which comes inevitably sooner or later. The potential revolution concealed in the nature of the ideal may take centuries to actualize, but it is there and must ultimately come to the forefront. No state, no political, economic or social set-up is stable or permanent, unless it is created and determined by the Right Ideal. Thus, man's idea of Beauty is evolving with the growth of his knowledge and experience and is being conserved in history. One day he will come to know that nothing but the Right Ideal can satisfy him perfectly and permanently.

خيال او که از سيل حوادث پرورش گيرد

His thought which is nursed by the current of accidents, will one day come out of the whirlpool of the bluish sky.

Then his devotion and service to the Right Ideal will enable him to unfold the deepest possibilities of his nature and reach the height of his perfection.

The glory of man, made of clay, will one day surpass that of the angels, the creatures of light. The very earth will, one day, become as exalted as the firmament on account of the brightness of his fate.

What do you want to ask me? Think over the significance of Adam. That which still pricks the nature from within will become agreeable one day.

This view contains the fundamentals of a new Social Psychology and of a new Philosophy of History, which, in contradistinction from the Historical Materialism of Marx, may appropriately be described as Historical Idealism.

*(viii)* Since all the activities of man are dominated by his love of the ideal, reason plays only a subordinate role in his life.

The life is enriched by ambitions and desires. Wisdom is one of its offsprings.

I am a free man, love is my only leader. Love is my only master while wisdom is my slave.

Reason is a discriminating faculty that only helps the self in the realization of its ideal. An ideal is a judgment of Beauty which has to be made directly with the help of intuition. Intuition is the urge of Beauty itself playing a cognitive role. Ideas of beauty are wholes or totalities of knowledge which have to be directly felt. Love makes its own judgments. Realization of Beauty does not come within the scope of reason which cannot see a totality of knowledge but can see only its parts. Reason cannot make judgments of Beauty, although it rules with new wholes of knowledge and thereby can spur the self to intuit Beauty. Thus it serves the self in two ways, by helping it how to act in the service of it existing ideal and by enabling it to vision a higher ideal. Reason cannot enter the domain of Love and cannot feel Beauty. That is the privilege of the urge of the self alone to feel. Because reason goes with us a part of the way we forget when we reach the end of our journey that it had left us long ago.

خرد سے راہ رو روشن بصر ہے



The wayfarer is enlightened by wisdom. What is wisdom? It is a lamp on the road side.

The outside lamp is totally ignorant of the tumults that prevail inside the house.

According to this view of reason — and this view is certainly more consistent with facts of human psychology, more defensible and more convincing than any other — Ethics, Politics, Education and Philosophy are determined by Love and not by Reason at all.

Ethics is the direct outcome of a person's ideal. Everybody knows that in order to achieve his ideal he has to do certain things and to avoid doing certain others. He is aware of a code of do's and dont's code of right and wrong which he follows strictly on account of an inner pressure created by his love of the ideal. Thus every ideal has its own moral system or moral law and there are as many moral laws as there are ideals. This is the reason why states with different ideologies cannot agree on what is justice, truth goodness, morality, civilization or culture in their international assemblies. Unless nations have one ideology they cannot have the same moral viewpoint. The Moral

Law which is dictated by the Right Ideal is the only moral law which is right and on which men can agree and must agree sooner or later. The very urge of their nature is gradually driving them towards it. When a person's ideal is right, all his activities will be right; when the ideal is wrong, to the same extent will all his activities be wrong. Politics, like Ethics, is not a separate science. It is the image of our ideals a reflection of our views on life generally. An ideological group or society cannot live without an internal organization or government. As every ideal has its own ethics, so every ideal has its own politics, its own ideas and theories of the constitution and management of human societies. Since all aspects of the life of an individual or a state are strictly controlled by the single force of the ideal, a state or a nation that is able to banish religion successfully from its politics will be compelled to banish it from the whole of its life. This is what Europe has been forced to do.

The foundation of every system of philosophy is the philosopher's intuition or vision of the nature of Reality. While the philosopher actually rationalizes his intuition, he imagines, and makes others imagine that he has been led to his conclusions by a process of hard and close reasoning. But if his intuition is wrong, his rationalization must be wrong and lead to wrong conclusions. His reasoning never crosses the limits of his intuition or vision of the universe. The correct vision of Reality is that of a prophet or that of a man who acquires a true spiritual experience on account of his being a true lover and follower of a prophet. All prophets have a true vision of Reality, but there can be only one prophet who is able to give a complete idea of his vision in its application to practical life. When such a prophet comes into the world, no more prophets are needed or created by nature, and so he becomes the last of them. It is on the intuition of such a prophet passed on by him to the best of his followers that we can construct an all-correct philosophy, perfectly relevant to all the known and unknown facts of existence, and therefore, capable of enduring till the end of the world. Such is the philosophy of Iqbal. This explains why Iqbal, in spite of being a philosopher himself, has attacked and condemned philosophy and philosophers. According to him, no philosophy, which is based on an incomplete or sectional vision of Reality, can be true.

Education, like Ethics, Politics and Philosophy, is not an independent system of knowledge. Every system, programme or plan of education is the creation of an ideal. The text-books, the mentality of the teacher and his general attitude towards life, the views of the managing and governing authorities, whether they are public or private bodies, the environment and the atmosphere of the school in so far as they uphold that system, and
programmes or plans of education, reflect the ideal. Therefore, the ideal is continually attracting pupils towards itself. Education is a servant of ideals, whether wrong or right, and can be adapted to serve every one of them equally. Moral behaviour, in accordance with absolute and universal principles of morality, is impossible without a strong love of the Right Ideal which it should be the object of education to create. The learners are inspired by the love of wrong ideals, imperceptibly, through the agency of the schools that embody the educational systems created by those ideals.

> گلا تو گھونٹ دیا اہل مدرسہ نے ترا کہاں سے آئے صدا لا الہ الا اللہ مکتب از مقصود خویش آگاہ نیست تا بجذب اندر و نش راہ نیست علم تا از عشق برخوردار نیست جز تماشا خانۂ افکار نیست

The school personnel have already throttled thee; where-from can now come the voice of 'None is worthy of worship except God'?

The school is unaware of its aims and objects, until it has an access to the urge within.

As long as knowledge does not taste the fruits of love; it is nothing but an exhibition of thoughts. يه بتان عصر حاضر که بنے ہيں مدرسے م يں

نه ادائے کافرانه نه تراش آذرانه

These ideals of the present era, the product of the school, are endowed neither with the manners of the infields nor with the masterly cut of Abraham's father.

(F) The principal form in which the urge for Beauty expresses itself is the love of an ideal, since the self attributes to the ideal that it loves all the beauty that it desires. But this urge finds an independent expression also in three other ways which are meant to serve the Right Ideal, the real embodiment of Beauty (since their source is the urge of the self), but which the society that indulges in them makes subservient to the ideal it charishes.

These three ways of living and seeking Beauty are:

- (1) the love of Goodness;
- (2) the love of Truth or the search for knowledge;

and (3) the love of Art.

(1) Man has not only an urge of love for the consciousness of the world, but also an urge of love for its qualities which are all beautiful and lovable. Each quality of consciousness is a quality of Beauty and implies all its other qualities. Hence an individual has a desire to express these qualities in action. But when he comes to love a wrong ideal, his wrong love does not allow him to judge correctly what a good action is. His urge for goodness comes into conflict with his love for the ideal, and in this conflict it is always the latter that wins. The result is that the man feels inwardly dissatisfied with his decision, and cannot get rid of the idea that there is something wrong with it. On the other hand, the moral judgment of a man who loves the Right Ideal will take the correct line.

(2) The man who loves a wrong ideal may try to engage himself in the search of knowledge dispassionately, but his love for such an ideal will twist

his line of search in the wrong direction in spite of himself. This is what is now happening to general Philosophy, social and individual Psychology. Politics, Economics, Ethics, Education and other social sciences. But in the case of Mathematics (and of the physical sciences, in so far as they use Mathematics), the margin for the interference of a misplaced love is small, since Mathematics is a form of tautology. But men who love wrong ideals use the results of their mathematical investigation in the wrong manner. The use of the atom bomb, resulting from the mathematical theories of Einstein, for the mass-destruction of peaceful citizens is an example.

It is, however, true that, on the whole, knowledge is evolving and correcting its own errors more and more in the course of its evolution. Since the urge of the universe is in the direction of the Right Ideal, all real advancement of knowledge in the domain of Science and Philosophy is meant to, and must, ultimately strengthen the Right Ideal in theory as well as in practice.

(3) Like the above two activities, the source of art is the urge of the self, and, therefore, it cannot be at its best and highest, unless it subserves the urge of the self. Every variety of art that is divorced from Goodness, Beauty and Truth, the principal qualities of consciousness, is not only a grave disservice to the cause of evolution but also low and inferior as art.

> سرد و شعر و سیاست، کتاب و دین و ہنر کمر ہیں ان کی کرہ میں تمام یکدانہ اگر خودی کی حفاظت کریں تو عین حیات نہ کر سکیں تو سراپا فسون و افسانہ اے اہل نظر! ذوق نظر خوب سے لیکن

## جو شے کی حقیقت کو نہ دیکھے وہ نظر کیا؟ شاعر کی نوا ہو کہ مغنی کا نفس ہو جس سے چمن افسردہ ہو وہ باد سحر کیا؟

Melody, poetry, politics, the book, belief and skill, are pearls in his possession, all incomparable gems.

If they take care of the ego it is real life; if they fail to do it then it is simply an enchantment and a fable.

O discerning one's the joy of perceiving is commendable, but useless is the sight that does not penetrate into the reality of things.

Be it a message of the poet or a melody of the musician; if the morning breeze withers the flower-beds it is of no use.

(G) Moral action is based on correct moral judgments and correct moral judgments are possible only at a high stage of self-consciousness.

نم*و*د جس کی فراز خودی سے ہو، وہ جمیل

جو ہو نشيب ميں پيدا، قبيح و نا محبوب

Beautiful is he whose manifestation emerges from the heights of the ego; things born in the low hollows are ugly and detestable.

But a high stage of self-consciousness presupposes continued moral action. Moral evolution would have been impossible if consciousness had not created the phenomenon of prophethood which provides a natural agency for teaching the Moral Law to human society, and thus raising it to that high stage of self-consciousness where it can have an intimate personal realization of the distinction between right and wrong — a distinction necessary for its continued advancement to ever higher and higher levels of self-consciousness.

How is the knot of what is excellent and what is not to be unfastened if the life itself does not interpret the very secrets of life.

Prophethood is the natural outcome of the urge of the Universe for Beauty, on account of which evolution takes the direction of the Right Ideal. Whenever the actions of a society violate flagrantly the urge of the universe, *i.e.*, whenever consciousness is confronted with serious obstacles in its search for Beauty through the process of creation, it takes — on account of its nature to crush resistance — a sudden push forward which results in the appearance of a prophet who teaches the Law of the Right Ideal to that society, revives its faith in truth and virtue, and thus brings it (and through it the rest of humanity as far as possible) back to the path of evolution.

The sudden appearance of a prophet in a deteriorating society Is like the sudden appearance of a storm in an area where the pressure of atmosphere has lowered or like the sudden reaction of an organism to disease which results in the restoration of its health.

The phenomenon of prophethood is really a continuation, in a different shape, appropriate to the human stage of evolution, of the phenomenon of sudden variation of species which nature manifested earlier in the animal stage of evolution. Whenever the movement of life became too slack in the animal stage of evolution, consciousness made an extraordinary push forward and took a sudden leap which resulted in the sudden appearance, as if by miracle, of a distinct species, registering a considerable improvement upon the previous one. In the human world, the extraordinary leaps of consciousness on such occasions of retarded evolution have resulted in the sudden appearance of men of genius whom we call prophets. One can assume that, just as in the animal world, the sudden variations of species came to an end with the appearance of man, so, in the human world, the phenomenon of prophethood will come to an end with the appearance of a prophet who sets before himself and others the Right Ideal in all its grandeur, i.e., whose life offers him full opportunities to set an example of how the human society of the future ought to live and grow, struggle and expand in the actual process of evolution. The career of such a prophet will represent the full expression of the latent possibilities of life. Such a prophet, therefore, must be the last link in the chain of prophethood; the last embodiment of the exceptional drives of consciousness in the human stage of evolution. He would be the most perfect as well as the last one among the prophets. The reason is that in him life would have achieved its completion, a completion to be maintained and preserved by life in the form of a community of his followers who would keep alive his teachings till the end of the world. This explains why the appearance of a last and perfect Prophet is indispensable for the evolution of the world — this or any other.

> بر کجا بهنگامهٔ عالم بود رحمة اللعالمینے مېم بود خلق و تقدیر و ېدایت ابتداست رحمة اللعالمینی انتها ست بر کجا بینی جهان رنگ و بو آرکه از خاکش بروید آرزو

یا ز نور مصطفی او را بهاست

یا ہنوز اندر تلاشی مصطفیٰ است

Wherever there are world-wide tumults and disturbances, the "Blessing for the world" (i.e. Prophet Mohammad) is also there.

Creation, fate and divine guidance are only the beginning; the quality of being a "Blessing for the world" is the end.

Wherever you behold the world of hue and smell, it is these objects which give birth to longings.

He is either blessed by the light of the Prophet Mohammad (may peace be on him) or he is still in search of the Prophet.

Thus, while Iqbal's view of human nature, as sketched above, is entirely Quranic, it is yet a challenge to the psychological theories of McDougall, Freud, Adler and Karl Marx.

According to McDougall, all the activities of man are due to the instincts which man inherits from his animal ancestors and shares with them now. Still labouring under the delusion created by the teachings of Aristotle about the place of reason in human nature, he thinks that reason is the only distinction enjoyed by man over the animals and, therefore, his higher activities, like religion, morality and the search for knowledge are due to the control of reason over the instincts. He fails to see that reason is not an urge for action and cannot intefere with the instincts, each of which has an unchangeable course of activity, which, once started, must run its course, and that, if man is actually able to interfere with the activity of his instincts, it must be due to some other purge of his nature which is more powerful than these instincts. His theory cannot give an adequate explanation of that powerful impulse in man, known as violation, on account of which man is able to act for an ideal for its own sake and even to sacrifice his life in opposition to his instincts. McDougall traces the volitional effort of men to the instinct of self-assertion, which, although intended to enable the animaLto overcome danger to its life, takes an entirely different course in man — a course involving even the necessity of endangering his life. According to McDougall, our instinct of self-assertion seeks its realisation in moral action, because human society admires our moral efforts and we like to win their admiration. The admiration of society for moral behaviour is, in his view, due to the tradition founded by rare personalities like saints and prophets by their admirable moral efforts. But he does not explain why the saints and prophets themselves act morally and why we admire their moral action as well as our own, if there is no independent urge in our nature for such action. Our admiration for all forms of activity that is above the plane of instincts is really due to the urge of the self for Beauty.

Freud thinks that the dominating urge in man which resides in his unconscious mind is sex. This urge operates from childhood onwards and the first sexual attachment of the child is to his parents. The child loves the parents and, therefore, fears their harshness and the loss of their love. When the child comes of age, the parents lose their charm for him gradually and their function is taken up by ideals which he calls the superego. According to Iqbal's theory, the love of ideals is not a substitute of an earlier complex of sex-love, but it is itself an essential and independent urge of human nature. That Freud himself is not convinced of his fantastic theory will be apparent from this observation of his. "I cannot tell you," he says, "as much as I could wish about the change from the parental function to the super-ego .... partly because we ourselves do not feel we have fully understood it."

Adler, a pupil and co-worker of Freud, came to differ from his master about the nature of the urge in the unconscious mind and advanced his own theory about it. According to him, the fundamental urge of the unconscious human mind is for power and not for sex. The child develops not a sex complex but an inferiority complex on account of the presence around him of persons who are superior to him in everything and, therefore, the whole of his life is one long painful story of his endeavours to compensate for his inferiority. Iqbal's answer will be that man does really strive for power but, firstly, power is a quality of Beauty itself. We feel inferior not only when we are unable to get power but also when we are unable to act morally. Thus, power partakes of Goodness, Beauty and Truth. — Secondly, man's desire for power is not an end in itself. If we examine closely a person's motives in his search for power, we find that he seeks it for the sake of realising his ideal (his idea of the highest Beauty) which may belong to a lower plane like pleasing one's friends and vexing one's enemies or to a higher one like seeking to glorify a race; a nation or a religion. The power that a man may have in a desolate desert is of no use to him.

Karl Marx's theory that the economic urge of food, shelter and clothing is the controlling urge of human life is equally unable to stand investigation. The economic urge is evidently subservient to self-maintenance. If the maintenance of life is the only source of human activity, how is it that one becomes ready to lay down one's life for an ideal ? Facts of human nature and human history lead very clearly to the conclusion that the ultimate desire of man is not the maintenance of life, but the maintenance of the ideal, and that the activity directed to the former end is really subservient to the latter. Men will give up their lives more easily than they will give up their ideals.

None of these theories can give an adequate explanation of man's higher activities. The scope of this article does not permit **me** to show in detail how Iqbal's view of human nature has laid bare the fallacies of these theories and how it is capable of meeting them on their own grounds and smashing them by employing their own technique. Suffice it to say, that some of the greatest men of learning in the West, including psychologists, admit that their knowledge of human nature is inadequate and this inadequacy of their knowledge has brought their civilization face to face with the danger of a final collapse. McDougall writes as follows: —

"Our ignorance of the nature of man has prevented and still prevents the development of all the social sciences. Such sciences are the crying need of our time; for lack of them our civilization is threatened gravely with decay and perhaps complete collapse."

"My thesis is that in order to restore the balance of our civilization...we need to have far more knowledge (systematically ordered or scientific knowledge) of human nature and of the life of society than we yet have." "Here, then, is the only remedy of the perilous and ever more dangerous state of our civilization. We must actively develop our social sciences into real sciences; and, in order to do that, we must first create a science of human nature and of its activities."

"What, then, in practical terms, is the remedy? I can give my answer, most concisely, by suggesting what I would do if I were a dictator ... I would, by every means, seek to divert all our most powerful intellects from the physical sciences into research in the human and social sciences."

The knowledge of human nature is a matter of inner experience, and Iqbal is, perhaps, the best exponent of that knowledge. Every social science, in order to be definite, has to develop around itself an ideal or a view of human nature. At present, all the social sciences are confused or vague, because none of them specifies what the ideal of man should be. No social science can be really a science unless it is based on the Right Ideal. No social science, moreover, can be independent of other social sciences. All the activities of man are determined by the single uniting force of the ideal. These activities, therefore, overlap and partake of each other. No activity of man can be purely political economic, ethical or educational. The purely economic man, whose existence is assumed by the economists in the formulation of their science, does not exist, because the economic man is also the social, ethical and political man simultaneously. We cannot, therefore, have separate social sciences but only one science of society based on the Right Ideal.

Iqbal's idea of the Self, thus properly developed and unfolded, is relevant to all the scientific facts now known. It is a complete philosophy of the universe and, as such, it is a philosophy of Economics, a philosophy of Ethics, a philosophy of Education, a philosophy of Art, a philosophy of Politics, a philosophy of Law, a philosophy of History, all in one, and a psychology of the individual and society. It gives the lead to all these departments of knowledge and places them on a correct footing. It is this scientific *Weltanschauung*, or religio-socio-political ideology which has always been the search of all religions, philosophies and sciences. Political equality known as Democracy and economic equality known as Communism are just the two aspects of the Right Ideal. Butwe cannot have a part of the Right Ideal and ignore the rest. If we do so, we shall not be able to realise the part that we wish to realize. These ideals can be achieved only in the whole of which they are the parts, i.e., as parts of the Right Ideology. Only a state founded on the Right Ideology can make them realities and put them into practice successfully. If we sacrifice a part of our nature to serve the rest of it, we shall fail miserably and shall not be able to serve any part of it whatsoever, Equality, political or economic, cannot be established by force. To be genuine it needs an inner moral realization which is made possible by an intense love of the Right Ideal. It can come only from within the hearts of men as a spontaneous expression of their nature at a very high stage of their self-consciousness. Education for the Right Ideal is the only means of achieving it and since the state is the greatest instrument of education, it can be achieved only by a state founded on the Right Ideal.

It is futile to compare Islam with Democracy or with Communism and to show the superiority of Islam over them. The question is not what Islam and Democracy or Islam and Communism have in common with each other and what they have not. The question is whether Democracy and Communism can realize without Islam the ends for which they claim to stand. The answer contained in the immutable laws of the nature of man is: They cannot, and the world will not take long to discover the correctness of this answer.

Dreams of world-peace and world-unity can never come out true unless all abandon their false ideologies and adopt the Right Ideology which has now fortunately taken a scientific shape in the philosophy of Iqbal. Peace will come to the world, not because we shall succeed in harmonising conflicting ideologies, but because one ideology will replace the rest and dominate the Whole world. The ideology that will dominate the world and bring everlasting peace can only be the Right Ideology as sketched by Iqbal. He knows, this fact and therefore writes:

سبزه نا روئيده زيب كلشنم

My garden is adorned with a verdure which is yet to sprout from the earth. My skirt is full of flowers which are yet to emerge from the branch.

The light of dawn has shone in the East. The flower of world is bedewed afresh.

I wait for the early-risers of the morning. How fortunate the worshippers of my fire !

I am a note which does not require the hand of a musician to tune I am the song of the poet of tomorrow.

My song belongs to a different world. My bell is calling a different caravan.

Signs of the emergence of Iqbal's philosophy as a political force in the world are already visible.

All of us love and admire Iqbal as a great man, but few of us know wherein lies his real greatness. Karl Marx is the intellectual king of the present Communist state of Russia. But Iqbal is the intellectual king of the future world-state which will endure for ever, bringing to man all the blessings of permanent peace and unity and enabling him to achieve that highest progress-material, mental, moral and spiritual of which the promise resides in the potentialities of their nature. It is for this reason that Iqbal deserves our admiration and gratitude.

### **IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF STATE**

#### PROF. ZIAUDDIN AHMAD

Iqbal ranks as one of the greatest political thinkers who have sponsored revolutions in the domains of thought and culture and under whose intellectual impact great kingdoms were carved out. Like Plato, Rousseau, Mazzini and Karl-Marx, who were the forerunners of Greek Republic, French Republic, Italian Empire and the Communist State, Iqbal is the spiritual founder of Pakistan. His contribution to political philosophy and science are valuable in as much as he revitalised the decaying civilization of the Muslims of India and raised them to a higher pedestal of vision and culture.

"Dare and Live" said Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, "is Iqbal's message. Optimism, industry, faith, self-confidence and courage are the principles on which Iqbal bases his philosophy and which he believes are the essential factors for the purification of human soul, and for the elevation of human character. The obstacles and setbacks in life, according to him make the life worth living. The sacrificees and losses made and incurred in the service of a right cause and for noble principles elevate a nation and make life more glorious and worth living.

"Iqbal never believed in failure. He believed in the superiority of mankind over all the rest that God created. In fact he was convinced that man is a collection of all that is best in God's universe. Only man does not know himself. Man has but to utilise his great potentialities and to use them in the right direction for the realization of that 'self' which finds itself so near to God; and Islam is the code which has prescribed easy ways and means for that realization.

"Iqbal was not only a philosopher but also a practical politican. He was one of the first to conceive of the feasibility of the divisior of India on national lines as the only solution of India's political problem. He was one of the most powerful thinkers, tacit precursors and heralds of modern political evolution of Muslim India."<sup>1</sup>

Iqbal's most significant contribution to the contemporary political thought was made in his presidential address to the All India Muslim League in 1930 at Allahabad. It is here that he propounds the Muslim philosophy of state and suggests in its light the solution to the communal problem of the sub-continent. It was this suggestion to divide India on Ideological grounds that flowered into Pakistan. In this address Iqbal said: "Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the East, and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India it will bring peace and mutual goodwill to this ancient land which has suffered so long. more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.

"As far as I have been able to read the Muslim minds, I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian homelands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India.

"I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslims State appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.

"The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Statement issued by Quaid-i-Azam on the death anniversary of Iqbal, The "onward", Allahabad, April 1942.

British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus, possessing full opportunity of development within the body politics of India, the North-West Indian Muslims will prove the bast defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion the one of ideas or of bayonets.

"I therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and Peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times."

Iqbal had filled the minds of the Muslims of this sub-continent by his powerful and penetrating politico-cum-spiritual poetry and speeches and reawakened the lifeless and slumbering soul of Muslim India. He was the Mazzini and Rousseau of his nation to inspire confidence to carve out their own Empire — the Pakistan. Our Quaid-e-Azam received inspiration for the revival of Islamic spirit and the creation of the state from the sage of Lahore; and played the role of Cavour and Garibaldi.

In the domain of political science and constitutionalism, Muslim jurists and thinkers like Abu Hanifa, Malik, Shafii, Ghazzali, Tusi, al-Mawardi Shah Waliullah Abdul Wahab have exercised a profound and far reaching influence on Iqbal, but there is originality and Ijtihad in his ideals of 'Islamic Polity'.

For a true estimate of Iqbal's polity let us have a glimpse at the evolution of Political Science.

Aristotle had distinguished ethics from politics but had not separated the two, whereas Machiavelli brought about a complete divorce between them. Moral virtues had their own values, but he refused to assign them any place in his scheme of things. Morality was not denied but was subordinated to politics. It is because of this Erastianism<sup>2</sup> that we think that modern study of politics begins with Machiavelli and the idea of a secular 'national' and 'isolated' state gained ascendency.

Luther's revolt against the universal tradition of the Roman Church created a definite distinction between spiritual and secular authority and gave an immense impetus to the growth of Nationalism, Rousseau, Bodin and Hobbes were also the advocates of Erastian theory and were responsible for the creation of modern national States. These movements led to Royal Absolutism and the formulation of doctrine of Divine Right of Kings. But after the Industrial Revolution Democracy and Parliamentary Government came into existence. The Divine Right of kings was replaced by 'Social Contract? principles and the foundations of the Government by the people and for the people were laid. But during all these periods the separatist tendency of the Church and the State had its firm roots in the Western Civilization.

Iqbal regarded Erastianism as a curse and an impediment to human progress and civilization and says: "It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity by which expression I mean a social structure, regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal-has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups, and finally transform them into a welldefined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people building force, has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere, the structure of Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal.

What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is, under the pressure

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Note:- *Erastianism*: connotes the teaching that the Church should be subordinate to the State. It derives from the name of Thomas Erastus (1524-'83)' a German-Swiss theologian and physician whose surname was Luber, Lieber or Liebler. It does not imply interference with rights of conscience, but merely a control and supremacy of the state in ecclesiastical matters.

of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries, without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity was understood to be a purely monastic order which gradually developed into a vast church-organisation. The protest of Luther was directed against this Church-organization, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And Luther was perfectly justified in rising in revolt against this organisation: though, I think, he did not realise that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into a mutually ill-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation such as the nation of country and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved on national lines i.e. on lines which recognise territory as the only principle of political solidarity.

"If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems and ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual, and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realizing itself in space and time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter probably from Mannichaean thought. Her best thinkers are realising this initialmistake today, but her statesmen are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestionable dogma. It is, then, this mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal which has largely influenced European religious and political thought, and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European States. The result is a set of mutually ill adjusted States dominated by interests, not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted states, after trampling over the moral and religious convictions of Christianity, are today feeling the need of a federated Europe, i.e. the need of a unity which the Christian Church-organisation originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing in the light of Christ's vision of human brotherhood, they considered it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam, however, is an impossible phenomena; for here there is no Church-organisation, similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, inviting a destroyer."

Expounding the unique feature of Islam, he further says: "In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed to have been revealed' but whose structure, owing to our legists, want of contact with the modern world, stands today in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments, I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of different spirit, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea, is hard to predict. Professor Wensinck of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day: 'It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christianity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Christianity, still less what it will be for Islam.' "At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may moan the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam."<sup>3</sup>

In Germany, the rise of the Idealist School marked a distinct reaction against the materialistic rationalism prevailing in the latter half of the 18th century with the influence of the teachings of Locke, Hume and others. This materialistic rationalism was attacked by Rousseau who valued man not

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Presidential address, All India Muslim League 1930.

according to his reason but according to his moral nature. Rousseau's ideas profoundly influenced the German Philosophers like Kant, who laid the foundations of the Idealist School in Germany.

By binding Politics to Ethics, Kant like Iqbal gave an entirely new orientation to the conception of Right, Property, Law, State etc. His system of idealism puts the absolute truth at the basis of morals, law and politics. Morality, law and politics are concerned with the co-existence and interaction of two or more rational free wills. It is morality that guides him to do that only, which is consistent with the same action of every other.

Commenting on Kant and Ghazzali Iqbal writes: "It cannot, however. he denied that Ghazzali's mission was almost apostolic like that of Kant in Germany of the eighteenth century. In Germany rationalism appeared as an ally of religion, but she soon realised that the dogmatic side of religion, was incapable of demonstration. The only course open to her was to eliminate dogma from the sacred record. With the elimination of dogma came the utilitarian view of morality and thus rationalism completed the reign of unbelief. Such was the state of theological thought in Germany when Kant appeared. His Critique of Pure Reason revealed the limitations of human reason and reduced the whole work of rationalists to a heap of ruins. And justly he has been described as God's greatest gift to his country. Ghazzali's philosophical scepticism which, however, went a little too far, virtually did the same kind of work in the world of Islam in breaking the back of that proud but shallow rationalism which moved in the same direction as a preKantian rationalism in Germany. There is, however, one important difference between Ghazzali and Kant. Kant, consistently with his principles, could not affirm the possibility of a knowledge of God. Ghazzali, finding no hope in analytic thought, moved to mystic experience, and there found an independent content for religion. In this way he succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist independently of science and metaphysics."4

But undoubtedly there should be a harmonious adjustment of Ethics and Politics in any system of Government. The State is no doubt a human

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. P. 5.

institution for the good of mankind. Morality and State are, therefore, concomitant to each other.

Iqbal loves his country but is greatly dissatisfied with the aggressive Nationalism which is a canker eating into the very vitals of humanity and is also totally antogonistic to the principles of Islam: He writes:

"If the purpose of human society is to ensure peace and security for the nations and to transform their present social organism into a single social order, then one cannot think of any other social order than that of Islam. This is so because according to my reading of the Quran, Islam does not aim at the moral reformation of the individual alone; it also aims at a gradual but fundamental revolution in the social life of mankind, which should altogether change its national and racial view. point and create in its place a purely human consciousness. The history of religions conclusively show that in ancient times religion was national as in the case of Egyptians, Greeks and Iranians. Later on, it became racial as that of the Jews. Christianity taught that religion is an individual and private affair. Religion having become synonymous with private beliefs, Europe began to think that the State alone was responsible for the social life of man. It was Islam and Islam alone, which, for the first time, gave the message to mankind that religion was neither national and racial, nor individual and private, but purely human and that its purpose was to unite and organise mankind despite all its natural distinctions. Such a system cannot be built on beliefs alone. And this is the only way in which harmony and concord can be introduced in the sentiments and thoughts of mankind. This harmony is essential for the formation and preservation of a community. In the present day political literature, however, the idea of nation is not merely geographical: it is rather a principle of human society and as such it is a political concept. Since Islam is also a law of human society the word 'country', when used as a political concept, comes into conflict with Islam."<sup>5</sup>

Like Utilitarian thinkers Iqbal believed in hard realities of human life. Man is social by nature and is always moved to action by desire to obtain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> speeches and statements of Iqbal, 225-226-.

happiness and avoid pain, which desire involves him into relationship with other individuals, necessitating state regulation of mutual relations of men by legislation. Utilitarianism has, thus, a close touch with practical ethics and politics. To the utilitarians the State is a human necessity, for it promotes general welfare or the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

But Iqbal believes that the law of the State is only respectable when based on Truth and Righteousness; and Allah is the fountain of all power. He is the real ruler of the Universe and bestows wordly powers and positions whomsoever he pleaseth. But all are based on a regulated law.

The Quran has laid down the following principles of Polity:

Verily the command is

Only Allah's (XII-40)

ان الحكم الالله So exalted be Allah, the

فتعلى الله الملك الحق (XVIII-116) فتعلى الله الملك

There is no rival in his

Kingdom.	لم يكن له شريك في الملك

To Him belongs all that is

in heavens and earth.

Thus we see that God is the real ruler of the world. His law is supreme, while man is His vicegerent, and of the human species. He appoints Kings, and magistrates whose most important duty is to do justice according to the law and never to be led away by personal desires — such are the teachings of the Quran; and this is the ideal of unselfish justice which was a definite break with the past and which, in turn, is regarded as the most sacred right of the citizen, all the world over.

The poet thinks: "Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle *(Thawhid,* i.e. Monotheism) a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is enternal and reveals itself in variety and change.<sup>6</sup>

"But", Iqbal thinks, "eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all possiblities of change which, according to the Quran is one of the greatest 'signs' of God, tend to immobilise what is essentially mobile in its nature. The failure of Europe in political and social science illustrates the former principle, the immobility of Islam during the last 500 years illustrates the latter."

#### Value of Ijtihad

Exhorting the Muslims to "Ijtihad" which in the terminology of Islamic law means to exert with a view to form an opinion on a legal question not specifically stated in the Quran and Sunah, most in keeping with the spirit of the shariah and the needs of the society. Iqbal believes that the idea had its origin in a well-known verse of the Quran — "and to those who exert we show Our path." We find it more definitely adumbrated in a tradition of the Holy Prophet. When Ma'ad was appointed ruler of Yemen, the Prophet is reported to have asked him as to how he would decide matters coming up before him. 'I will judge matters according to the Book of Allah', said Ma'ad. 'But if the Book of Allah contains nothing to guide you ? 'Then I will act on the precedents of the Prophet of Allah: 'But if the precedents fail ?' Then I will exert to form my own judgment'.

Upholder of the doctrine of Ijtihad he was one with the 'doctors of law both of Arabian and non-Arbian descent' and believes in three degrees of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam P 147- 148.

Ijtihad (1) Complete authority in legislation (2) Relative authority (3) Special authority which relates to the law determining the law applicable to a particular case left undetermined by the founders." Discussing the first degree of Ijtihad only i.e. complete authority in legislation, Iqbal says, "The theoretical possibility of this degree of Ijtihad is admitted by the Sunnis, but in practice it has been denied ever since the establishment of the schools, in as much as the idea of complete Ijtihad is hedged round by conditions which are well-nigh impossible of realisation in a single individual. Such an attitude seems exceedingly strange in system of law based mainly on the ground work provided by the Quran which embodies an essentially dynamic outlook on life.

In the 13th century there arose a great reformer and preacher of Islam Ibne Taimiyya who claimed the freedom of ljtihad for himself and revolted against the rigidity of the schools and exerted himself to rethink and make a fresh start. "Like Ibn-i-Hazm — the founder of Zahiri school of law — he rejected the Hanafite principle of reasoning by analogy and *Ijma* as understood by older legists and he was right in doing so... In the 16th century Allama Sayuti claimed the same priviliege of Ijtihad to which he added the idea of a renovator at the begining of each century but the spirit of lbn-i-Taimiyya's teaching found a fuller expression in a movement of immense potentialities which arose in the 18th century from the sands of Najd, described by Macdonald as the cleanest spot in the decadent world of Islam. It is really the first throb of life in modern Islam. To the inspiration of this movement are traceable, directly or indirectly, nearly all the great modern movements of Muslim Asia and Africa e.g. the Sennusi movement, the Pan Islamic Movement."<sup>7</sup>

This movement of Ijtihad only infused a spirit of freedom, though inwardly this too was conservative in its own fashion. "While it rises in revolt" as writes Iqbal, "against the finality of the school, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is wholly uncritical and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions of Prophet".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Lectures **P.** 155,

Reviewing the history of the trends of orientation in Islamic thought, Professor H.A.R. Gibb comments thus: "The counterpart of Ijma or Consensus, is Ijtihad, "exercise of judgment, which has been called by Iqbal the 'Principle of Movement in Islam'. But it is important for us to understand exactly what Ijtihad means and the role which, it has played in the history of Muslim religious thought. To begin with, it in no way implies, as some modernists would like us to believe 'freedom of judgment'. The word literally means 'exerting oneself' in the sense of striving to discover the true application of the teachings of the Quran and the traditions to a particular situation, and it may not go against the plain sense of these teachings. The orthodox theologians fearing that to recognise the legitimacy of Ijtihad might open the door to individual reinterpretation and schism, have always done their best to limit its scope. According to the classical doctrine the range of Ijtihad was progressively narrowed down, as successive generation of doctors, supported by 'Consensus', filled up the gaps in the doctrinal and legal systems. Finally no more gaps remained to be filled and only very insignificant ones and thereupon "the gate of Ijtihad was closed", never again to be reopened.

"By this means the scholastics applied an effective brake to the principle of movement. Nevertheless, many reformers dared the ban and claimed the right of Ijtihad. Here again we are faced with a paradox. Their claim is, of course, worthless unless it is supported by Ijma. But it is precisely against *Ijma* that they have raised their voices, against (that is to say) the doctrine that matters of belief and practice have been irrevocably determined by the consensus of the community in past generations. They assert that later generations cannot be bound by what they regard as errors of past generations. Those modernists who claim *the 'right of Ijtihad'*, the right to reject the theological constructions of the Middle ages and to reinterpret the sources in the light of modern thought, may have at least an arguable case. But their action remains purely individual, personal and therefore negligible unless they can secure the approval of *Ijma*. And it is a significant fact that only claimants to Ijtihad whose claims have been supported by some measures of consensus have been those who rejected certain of the beliefs or practices sanctioned by Ijma, not in order to modernise the doctrines of Islam, but in order to return to the practice of the primitive community.<sup>8</sup>

#### Views on Modern Trend of Legal. Thought

In Turkey the idea of Ijtihad in the light of modern philosophical ideas received fresh orientation in the political and religious thought of the nation. Halim Sabit's new theory of Muslim law is undoubtedly based on modern sociological concepts and the renaissance of Islam demands a revaluation of Muslim intellectual inheritance.

Iqbal disliked the idea of Turkish nationalist theory of State and called it misleading in as much as it suggests a dualism which does not exist in Islam. "In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines it character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life hehind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity. In Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at fi am one point of view and State from another. It is not true to say that Church and State are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies. The truth, however, is that matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call the external world; it is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting.

Iqbal asserted that the essence of *Tawhid* as a working idea is equality, solidarity and freedom. The state, from the Islamic stand point, is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, as an aspiration to realise them in a definite human organization. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen His despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. The critics of Islam have lost sight of this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Modern trends in Islam by H.A.R. Gibb P. 11-12.

important consideration. The ultimate reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is thereforce, sacred in the roots of its being. As the Prophet beautifully puts it: 'The whole earth is a Mosque'. The State, according to Islam, is only an effort to realise the spiritual in a human organisation.

Iqbal warns that it is the duty of the world of Islam today to understand the real meaning of what has happened in Europe, and then to move forward with self-control and a clearer insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social polity." <sup>9</sup>

A study of history will reveal that the local influences and pre-Islamic superstitions of Muslim nations have de-Islamised the moral and social ideals of Islam. Therefore Iqbal suggests that the only alternative open to us, then is to tear off from Islam the hard crust which has immobilized an essentially dynamic outlook on life, and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, equality and solidarity with a view to rebuild our moral, social and political ideals out of their original simplicity and universality.

#### International Ideal

Iqbal envisaged a world Muslim Brotherhood on the pattern of present United Nations. He says: "For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of Republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by a merely symbolical over-lordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity of free independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonised by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognises artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only. and not for restriction of the social horizon of its members."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. P. 154-155.

Quran has also laid emphasis on this aspect of life وجعلنكم شعوبا و i.e. we have made you in groups and tribes only for recognition, which clearly thrashes bare the idea that thenational and tribal division of humanity are for recognition and distinction and not based on Machiavellian and Lutheran theory of Nationalism which divides humanity into water-tight compartments.

In support of his argument Iqbal quoted from the Turkish nationalist poet Zia Gok Alp (1876-1924) "Whose songs, inspired by the philosophy of Auguste Comte, have done a great deal in shaping the present thought of Turkey". Iqbal has reproduced the substance of one of his poems from Professor Fisher's German translation.

In order to create a really effective political unity of Islam, all Muslim countries must first become independent and then in their totality they should range themselves under one Caliph or President. Is such a thing possible at the present moment? If not today, one must wait. In the meantime the Caliph must reduce his own house to order and lay the foundations of a workable modern Islamic state.

In the International world the weak find no sympathy; power alone deserves respect.

#### Spirit of Democracy

Let us sum up in brief the spirit of Islamic democracy as envisaged by Iqbal:

1. *Tawhid* (Monothism) is the first and the most essential principle on which Islamic democracy is based. It lays the foundation of world-unity and demands loyalty to God and not to the thrones. In his *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi* Iqbal has beautifully summed up the implications of this principle: —

# سرے از اسرار توحید است ہس یک شو و توحید را مشهو دکهن غائبش را از عمل موجودكن دين ازو حکمت ازو آئين ازو زور ازو قوت ازو تمكين ازو قدرت او بر گزیند بنده را نوع دیگر آفریند بنده را بيم و شک ميرد عمل گيرد حيات چشمه می بیند ضمیر کائنات لا اله سرماية اسرار ما رشته اش شير ازهٔ افکار ما

What is it that infuses one breath in a hundred hearts ?

This isone of the secrets of faith in Tawhid.

Be united and thus make Tawhid visible,

Realise its latent meaning in action;

Faith and Wisdom and Law all spring from it,

It is the source of strength and power and stability,

Its power exalts the nature of man

And makes him an entirely new being;

Fear and doubt die out; action becomes alive.

The eye beholds the heart of the Universe;

"There is no god but Allah" — this is the capital of our life;

Its bond unites our scattered thoughts.

2. The second principle is the obedience to the Law as given to mankind by the Prophet. The extraordinary and remarkable personality of Prophet Mohammad (peace be on him) provides agreat unifying force and a focus of loyalties for the growing polity of Islam:

از رسالت در جهان تکوین ما

از رسالت دین ما آئین سا

"Prophethood is the basis for our

Organisation, our religion and our law.

It creates unity in our diversity and makes us into a well-knit community, which is meant to bring a message of peace for mankind. If we let go our hold of this unifying life giving conception, it means our death as a nation; for, it is this centre which has given us a dynamic unity of outlook and purpose."

3. The third principle is freedom, social justice and human brotherhood. Islam sounded the death-knell of economic and political slavery, oppression and bondage and gave a new set of values and offered liberation to mankind:

> حیرت ز ادا ز ضمیر پاک او این مئے نوشیں چکیدن خاک او نا شکیب امتیازات آمدہ در نہاد او مساوات آمدہ عصر نو کایں صد چراغ آوردہ است چشم او در آغوش او آوردہ است

Liberty took its birth from its exalted teachings,

This sweet wine dripped from its grapes;

It was impatient of invidious distinctions,

Democracy was implicit in its being,

The modern age, which has kindled a hundred lamps,

Has opened its eyes in its lap,"

"Islam", says Iqbal, "is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the final combination of humanity by drawing its adherent from a variety of mutually repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing a self-consciousness of their own."

4. The fourth principle of Islamic democracy is Tolerance. Iqbal thinks that "the principle of the ego sustaining deed, is respect for the Ego in myself as well as in others". To him tolerance of a man of strong faith who, possessing fervently cherished convictions of his own, realises that respect is due to those of other. How beautifully he puts this idea of Tolerance born of love:

> کفر دل را گئر در پنہائے دل دل اگر بگریزد دل وائے دل! گرچہ دل زندانئ آب و گل است این ہمہ آفاق آفاق دل است!

Religion is a constant yeaning for perfection,

It begins in reverence and nends in Love;

It is a sin to utter harsh words

For the Believer and the unbeliever are alike childern of God.

What is humanity? Respect for man:

Learn to understand the dignity of man;

The man of Love learns the ways of God

And is benevolent alike to the Believer and the un-Believer,

Welcome faith and faith alike to the heart

If the heart flees from the hear, woe betide the heart;

If the heart, no doubt, is imprisoned in water and clay

But the whole Universe is the domain of the heart;

5. The fifth principle of far-reaching importance is interpreting the divine' laws into action and making provision for a principle of movement in the progressive ideology of Islamic democracy. This dynamic concept has been thoroughly discussed in the foregoing pages in the principles of Ijtehad where Iqbal had tried to strike and correct balance between categories of permanance and change which is indispensable for the sound growth of Democracy.

## **IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY** —

An Analysis & Comparison.

#### PROF: USMAN RAMZ

Definition: —

The distinction between an event and history is a priord. It is abundantly perceptible. We distinguish between the death of Prophet Muhammad (Sm) and the history of Arabia, between the invention of steam engine and the history of Industrial Revolution, between the date of the publication of 'Javed Nama' and the history of the evolution of Iqbal's thought. It is true that we 'stumble' on events in the context of history, we 'understand' events in terms of history, we 'isolate' events within a history, we 'abstract' events from history and we 'locate' events in a history, but it is, after all, true that events and history are different from though not stranger to, each other.

What then is history? Like all familiar terms, it is very difficult to define history too. We can not invite risk by saying that history is nothing but a bundle of events, which make it up. The risk is abvious because events evaporate, they stand annihilated by the passage of time. What at best we can assert is that 'events' and 'history' are correlated terms. To explain the relation between 'events' and 'a history', we can borrow a metaphor. The metaphor is known as PATTERN. The idea which the 'Pattern-hypothesis' intends to convey is very well illustrated in a familiar newspaper drawing, containing scattered numbers which the reader is invited to connect by means of lines. The reader-, at the out set, does not find any 'pattern' in the drawing, rather he is embarrassed to look at it. But as soon as he proceeds to fill in the lines from number to number, he begins to see the 'pattern'. The 'pattern' was there for all time. On the basis of this analogy we can amplify our point in question as below:

Scattered numbers = Events.

Drawing of lines =Tracing of connections in history.

Seeing the picture = Grasping the history.

This 'pattern-hypothesis' may be treated as rudimentary and not final. For some historians it is a plausible hypothesis, as it helps us in coining terminologies to suit our purpose of understanding history.

So "the claim that there is patternedness, we could call it historical rationalism. The claim that there is no patternedness, we could call historical nihilism. The claim that we do not know whether there is a pattern, we could call historical scepticism".

We are not concerned with the variaties of history as mentioned above. What I am labouring at to bring in lime-light is the evident distinction which exists between an 'event' and 'a history'. Iqbal was fully aware of this distinction. He raises the question in the following verse:

> چیست تاریخ اے ز خود بیگانهٔ داستا نر قصهٔ افسانهٔ

The reply of his question is a big 'No'. A story, a fiction and a narration is an event in its context. Iqbal is reluctant to give any one of them the status of 'a history'. The reason is obvious, we have to trace out the inner connections, which binds together one story with another story and one narration with another narration. Then we have to 'grasp' the 'relatedness' of different stories and narrations as a whole.

Iqbal defines history in the following positive terms:

ایں ترا ازخویشتن آگاہ کند

To Iqbal history a medium which helps one in understanding himself. It makes a man active and self-conscious of the duties to be performed by him. It is a rich glamour for one's soul. History, metaphoricallyspeaking, is the nervous-system for the body of a millat. Iqbal exhorts human being in general and muslim in particular to see their 'yesterday' in the
mirror of 'to-day' of their history. He contends that the 'lamp of history' is the guiding-star for a nation. A nation should take lessons from her history.

The true spirit of Iqbal's Philosophy of history teaches us that history is the expression of the "collective-mind" of a nation. It is a continued creative force with the help of which we evoluate and criticise life, laws and values. Such a "force", for Iqbal, is not monotonous. There are changes in it. These changes, sometimes create unity and uniformity in our system of life and sometime they create diversity and chaos. If we at all want to know anything about a nation, we should, then, study the history of that nation, because it is history which preserves and maintains record of the activities of the same.

### **METHOD:**

If history plays such a vital role, and it is decidedly so, then what is that 'method' which we can apply in understanding the same ? It has become a fashion of the day to apply the method of natural Sciences in the domain of history. The stubborn pride of Industrial Revolution, the shallow boast of the advancement in technology, the ever increasing last for colonialization and the evergrowing indignation for religion in Europe and other western countries have all contributed to help create an atmosphere in the laboratories of our Universities and Colleges, where man is compared with ants, bees and horses. The result of the application of the method of Physics, Biology and other natural sciences is that man has been reduced to a mechine. It is on the-basis of the result of Natural Sciences that man is said to be governed by his 'instincts'. He is said to have been under the strict control of his 'blind-impulses'. This sophistry of our age is pregnant with dangers.

Those who have an 'insight' equal to that of a "peasant and nomad, who have discovered the art of governing the vegetable and the Animal kingdom", may share with them in their sardonic smile "at the boastful industrialist who glories in his facile conquest of the material universe and has not paused to remind himself" that "the proper study of MANKIND is MAN". "The industrialist has concentrated all his effort and attention upon the relation of Man with the Physical Nature to the neglect of the relation between Man and Man; and he has thus hightened the effect — for good or for evil — of every human action by putting at its disposal a terrific deriving-power, without having take thought to improve the wisdom or the virtue... Virtue of the human beings whom he has been endowing so recklessly with these improved technical facilities".

The proposition of the application of the method of Natural Sciences in the field and sphere of history is totally untenable. "Why should we think that a scientific method of thought, a method which has been devised for thinking about in animate nature, should be applicable to historical thought, which is the study of living creatures and indeed of human beings".

Iqbal's poetical works, his lectures and other writings, which explicitly speak of his grasp of both the Western and the Eastern civilizations, both the Western and the Eastern Philosophies and religion, do not casts vote in favour the application of the method of Natural Sciences in history. He all along toiled hard to study 'Man-kind' with the help of 'Man'. He exhorts men to "learn the true status of Man". The relevant verses, surcharged with strong moral precepts, are worthy of consideration:

> آدمیت احترام آدم ی با خبر شو از مقام آدمی حرف بد را لب بر آوردن خطاست کافر و مومن ہمہ خلق خداست بندۂ حق از خدا گیرد طریق می شود بر کافر و مومن شفیق

Iqbal in the above-quoted verses raises the question: What is humanity? And his reply is simple: It is the respect for man. Iqbal thinks it to be a sin to utter a single harsh word to one's fellow-being, as all are equally created by God, who is equally gracious to the believer and the non-believer. He asks to betide the heart, if it runs away from the heart of one's fellow-being. Iqbal in his last verse unveils the deep-seated secret and truth. He says that the human heart undoubtedly, is shut within the prison house of clay, but one would do well to keep it in his memory that the entire Universe is the empire of his heart.

There have had been thinkers and philosphers whom we find too much proned and inclined to the study of 'macrocosm' and not 'microcosm'. This tendency to study 'microcosm' is a result of the overemphasis laid on the Method of Induction. The method is not bad in itself. Iqbal is not averse to the use of the method of Induction. Iqbal, having been inspired by the teaching of the Islam and Quran, admits the value and importance of the Method of Induction. But with what he dissents is the misuse of this method, through which 'Man' is reduced to the awful status of a machine a passive, lifeless and an invert machine. He, as a leading pioneer of the Science of Human Nature, is openly opposed to any such move of the present-day civilization.

His interpretation of the status and station of man in the universe is thrilling, thought-provoking and a self-radiating truth. He says:

از گل خود آدمی تعمیر کن آدمی را عالمے تعمیر کن خيز و خلاق جهارت ازه شو شعله در برکن خلیل آوازه شو با جهان نا مساعد ساختن ہست در می داں سیر انداختن مردخود دارے که باشد بخته کار با مزاج او بسازد روزگار گر نه سازد با مزاج او جهان می شود جنگ آزما با آسماں اے ز آداب امانت ہے خبر از دو عالم خویش را بهتر شمر

"Build thy clay into a Man" and "Build thy man into world" is the massage of Iqbal. He pursues Man to "arise and create a new world". He

commands, "wrap thyself in flame, be an Abraham". Iqbal speaks of those warriors with whom this world does not comply in their 'taste' nd 'ehumour'. Iqbal suggests them to wage war against heaven, as it is the raply of the cruelties of this world. Iqbal had total confidence in 'power' and 'potentialities' of 'Man'. He is optimist of the future of 'Man'.

To repeat once again: "the proper study of mankind is Man" — a 'Man' who is "superior to both the world". Then whyi the modern Western thinkers have shirked to study "Man" ? The reply is very clear. The Western mind has lost itself in the 'quest' of nature. It has not attempted to 'conquer' it. The Western mind holds that 'Man' is nothing but a part of 'Nature'. It holds Nature to be superior to Man and not Man Superior to Nature. In this regard the study of the Natural Sciences had led them to the confirmation of their belief and stand about Man. But they have not yet been able to see the hollowness of their belief; they have not yet realized that the whole process of the study of Natural Sciences is devoid of the higher Values of life. The Western mind has not been able to get a true epistemology; they have not been able to find out the point of equilibrium in 'rationalism' and 'empericism'. Though the services of the Western mind are immense in different walks of life, yet Iqbal is the last man to give them a blank-cheque in the appreciation of their services.

He says:

- علم را بر تن زنی مارے بود
- علم را بر دل زنی یارے بود

Knowledge does not come from 'Accumulation of Facts', 'Definition' 'Classification' and 'Explanation' as a host of Western Scientist and thinkers would suggest, it rather springs from 'Heart' too. Again two verses from Iqbal:

سپاه تازه بر انگیزم از ولایت عشق

که در حرم خطرے از بغات خرد است

It is the analytic attitude of a Western mind which has created hurdles in his way of getting 'unity' in his thought. But as the Western mind is the creation of its own civilization and as the civilization is "بے نور", the Western man is not getting any way out to withdraw himself from the vicious alley.

He voices his conviction as below:

تہی وحدت سے سے اندیشۂ غرب کہ تہذیب فرنگی بے حرم سے

Iqbal does not deny the sensory faculties of man or the knowledge gained through them. He does not minimise the faculties of reasoning in man. What he contends are the limitations of both. To remove such limitations and to compensate them, other than 'Revelation', Iqbal adds his own theory of 'love'. The 'love' in the teaching of Iqbal is the key to the understanding of that 'Man-within-man', who escaped the eyes of such Western-minds, whose laboratories are packed up with tools, instruments and animals of lower species.

The inner self of the Western-mind is dark, nay of the whole Western civilization is without light, as it has failed to give man the true status of Man.

Howsoever proud they may be of their advancement in the field of Industry and technology, they should not forget that they are creating 'events' and not 'history'. There is no such thing as the 'Age of Machine' "for all that we know, the older techniques, from fintchipping to iron-smelting inclusive, may each have been invented a number of times over by different societies in different times and places

An invention does not make 'a clear cut' between two epochs of world History. It rather sets in motion a wave of mimesis; and this psychic wave behaves like other waves in media. It travels outward in different direction from its points of origin; it takes time to travel and it takes a different length of time in different sectors according to the size and disposition of the local obstacles which it encounters, and the degree of local resistance which it has to overcome." The two verses, quoted below, are sufficient to prove his stand regarding the issue:

> وہ حکمت ناز تھا جس پر کردمندان مغرب کو ہوس کے پنجۂ خونیں میں تیغ کار زاری ہے نظر کو خیرہ کرتی ہے چمک تہذیب حاضر کی یہ صناعی مگر جھوٹے نگوں کی ریزہ کاری ہے

#### MOTIF

Granted the legitimacy and importance of the Method of History, let us now proceed to the consideration of the problem of 'Motif'. The search for 'Motif' is no doubt the starting point of our subject, but the very process of history speaks that it has had been the stumbling-block. Many a spiritualist and materialists stumbled and they stumbled repeatedly, even then they could not find out the real and true nature of 'Motif'. For one "heros" are the real 'Motif' of history, for other 'territorial nationalism', for yet others "Environment, Race and 'Colour' are the Motif of history. But we can be sure that they have mistaken, that they have mistaken. They have stumbled upon their cherished ideals, which carry little importance for a Universalhistorian like Confucious, Buddha, Prophet Muhammad (sm), Ibn-e-Khaldum and Iqbal. For Iqbal the 'Motif' of history lies in the struggle of two forces — the force of "Good" and the force of "Evil". This 'Motif' which governs human history is not only comprehensive but eternal too. It will be better to quote Iqbal in original:

ستیزہ کار رہا ہے ازل سے تا امروز

# چراغ مصطفوی سے شرار بو لہبی

The broader idea of the struggle between two antogonistic forces is neither new nor novel. If we turn over the pages of history that an encounter between two super human personalities is the central theme of some of the greatest stories and dramas of the world, which human mind could ever produce. An encounter between Yahweh and the Serpent in the book of Genesis, an encounter between the Lord and Satan in the Book of Job and an encounter between the Lord and Mephistophles in the Faust of Goethe are the crystal instances which support the proposition. We are revitted with wonder when we find almost similar encounter in the sphere of Science being expressed in new terminologies e.g., the two operative factors in Darwin — (I) Variation and (2) Natural Selection. Our wonder knows no limit when we find an astronomer explaining the problem of creation with the help of the principle of two encountering stars.

The apparent similarity between Iqbal and a poet, a philosopher and a scientist is no doubt interesting, but the differences are fundamental. Iqbal's conception of the 'Motif' of history is (1) ideological (2) impersonal and (3) non-mechanical. Whereas some other conceptions are either non-ideological, personal or mechanical. Iqbal undoubtedly, has used the names of two personalities-Mustafa (sm) and Abu Lahab, but the words جراغ should not be detached from their context. In this connection, a comparative

survey of Iqbal with Goethe will reveal the fact that the latter is a determinist in belief as Goethe says "the external factor is to supply the inner creative factor, a perpetual stimulus of the kind which suits best to evoke the potent creative variation", whereas Iqbal treats the individual 'ego' to be a free creative force. To him life is a ceaseless endeavour.

He says:

### The Views of Universal Historians

From the study of 'Motif' in history I now switch over to the description of the different philosophies of history, propounded by some great thinkers of the world. Not many persons hold a philosophy of history. The reason is obvious. Either they do not find any "patternedness" in history or they have such a vast treasure of history at the disposal — of their memory that they become scriptical about any single theme; yet their number who could safely see a 'pattern' in human history is many. I propose to deal with Augustine, Ibne-Khaldun, Kant, Hegel Marx, Spengler and Iqbal.

### Augustine:

This Bishop of Hippo lived in an age when man's soul was tried for no fault of its own, when the barbarian tribes were invading the Roman Empire and when the West Goths, under Alaric, in 410 A.D., had captured and sacked the city of Rome. A few years latter the Vandals, under Generic, had moved in the Roman territory in North Africa. These events and others compelled Augustine to think about the fate of Rome.

Augustine started his enquiry into the realm of history from the origin of Man. The Celestial King, the winged musicians and messengers, the creation of Adam and the first woman "from his rib" are all the subject matter of the pope. The Pope proceeds onward and asserts that a time came when "the herbs and roots lost their original potency", due to which the man turned his face "to the flesh of other animals". This resulted in the fact that "death gained upon life", and man sank deeper in wickedness. Hence arose two spirits, two parties or as Augustine would prefer to call "two Cities" — the city of 'Satan' and the city of 'God'. Our history is nothing but a conflict between two cities; between two moralities, one natural and the other supernatural; between two philosophies, one rational and the other revealed; between two institutions, one the world, the other the Church.

In the opinion of Augustine, "man is still in his childhood, for he can not respect his ideal which is not imposed on him against his will, nor can he find satisfaction in a good created by his own action. Man is always afraid of a universe that leaves him alone." Freedom appeals him". Man is a sinister by birth. One can not expect that he would be competent to safeguard all that is given to him by God. Lest the works of His hands wholly perish, God promised to redeem some of "Adam's children and restore them to a natural life. Augustine, then does not hesitate to disclose that the eternal city is not Rome," but congregation of all who will be saved through the death of Christ and shall pass their eternity in Paradise.

#### Ibn-e-Khaldun

Unlike Kant and Hegel, who were born in the brilliant centuries of human civilization, Ibn-e-Khaldun was born in a 'dark age'. Umayyad and Abbasid dynesties had broken down. In North-West African and the Iberian penensula "the last Vegtiges of the old order had been swept away by a conflux of barbarians from the three continents: Europian Austrian, Frank from Pyreness and African Nomads from Sahara". The destruction was brought home to Ibn-e-Khaldun by his family history as well as by his personal experience.

Ibn-e-Khaldun was ever occupied in thinking over the causes of the changing interregnum. He was too much involved in court life as such he could not find time before A.D. 1375 to write all about the subject which pressed his mind. It was somewhere in the year 1375 A. D. that Ibn-e-Khaldun got time to get himself settled at Qilad-bin-Salamah. It was at this place that he composed his immortal work, on Universal History in four years. He gives a first-hand account as quoted here: "I installed myself in a large and solid suite of room that had been build there (at Qilad-bin-Salamah) by Abu Bakar-bin'Arif'. "It was in this retreat that I composed the Muqaddemat, a work which was entirely original in its plan and which I made out of the cream of enormous research".

The vitality and life of Ibn-e-Khaldun's philosophy of History is found in his 'Motif' of Asabiyah (عصبى ت) — the esprit de corps. It expresses itself in effective social action. It is a rare phenomenon and is found in Nomad hordes. "In the metal picture which Ibn-eKhaldun constructs out of his historical evidence, the lack of Asabiyah or deficiency in social vitality is taken to be the normal ethos of sedentory population in all times and places". Some more observations of Ibn-e-Khaldun are noted below:

- 1. "Asabiyah is not the only kind of Social protoplasm; an alternative and superior-kind exist in the shape of religion".
- 2. (2) It is impossible to find a dominion or dynesty without possessing the support of a people animated by the esprit de corps".
- 3. Early Muslims succeded because they had both the dynamic force of religion and asabiyah".
- 4. The decline of Umayyad, Abbasid and Banu Hilal were due to the atrophy of the socially unconstructive ethos. "When an empire has acquired its natural form through the establishment of autocracy and the introduction of luxury, it tends to decay".
- 5. "In empires the habit of the nomadic life are gradually replaced by those of the sedamtry life." "The faculty of living in the deserts is confined to communities that are animated by a strong esprit de corps".

# Kant

Hume, Voltaire, Condorcet, Rousseau and many others had repudiated the views of Augustine. A clear shift from an "Age of faith" — to an "Age of Reason" was then visible. Kant, in such a period of transition, was faced with the question: What philosophy of history could a man propose that would command the belief and support of the peoples of Europe ?

Kant, who said, "I have . . . found it necessary to deny knowledge of God, freedom and immortality, in order to find out a place for faith", had also admitted the superiority of 'Practical will.' The man who had "indeed neither life nor history in the proper sense of the word" wrote the idea of a

Universal history in 1784. In his work on history Kant proceeds with the belief that man is predisposed by nature to develop tendencies. It involves the use of reason. Such development does not occur in any single individual rather it takes place in the species as a whole. Nature has created man in such a way that the human tendencies develop through antagonism, conflicts and give and take of life in society. The highest problem nature has set before man is the creation of society which will not stand destroyed by conflicts. It requires, for its final solution, the establishment of a world-state. Thus a world-state is the ultimate goal of man.

Having emphasized the development of tendencies in human species as a whole, Kant makes haste to observe that "man should transcend the mere constitution of his animal existence and that he should be susceptible to no other happiness or perfection than what he has created for himself through his own reason". In controlling his "animal existence" and attaining "perfection" Kant emphasises the role of reason and attaches little importance to "instinct" According to him the forethought of man needs no help of instinct. Even for his security and superstructure of delight man requires no aid of instincts. But how to bring instincts under the control of reason was the question with which Kant was faced. In this connection Kant adds that no doubt man has "gregarious instinct" in him; but he is equally bestowed with antigregarious instinct. It is the antigregarious instinct which forces every thing into compliance with the humour of man. "It derives him to master his propensity to indolence and in the shape of ambition or avarice, impels him to procure distinction for himself amongst his fellows". It was through this process of mastery over the gregarious instinct that man marched onward from the savage stage to the stage of culture. And such a stage of culture is the stage of the social worth of man.

The stage of culture was not achieved by man in a single attempt. Man had to struggle hard and he had to struggle against himself. It was all a problem of the right understanding and the realisation of the meaning of "freedom". "The history of the human species as a whole may be regarded as the unraveling of a hidden plan of nature for accomplishing a perfect state of civil constitution for society". The urge for freedom in man is innate. Nature herself has put this urge in him. To attain freedom man required an equilibrium both in the control of his instincts and the application of his reason.

A nation after hard test and turmoil may attain freedom. But it will not be itself exempted from danger, because other nations would always look at it with covetous eyes. Should we, then, give up our hopes regarding the future of man? Kant's reply is an emphatic 'No'. On the contrary he suggests the cure in these words: "a philosophical attempt to compose a universal history tending to unfold the purpose of nature in a perfect civil union of the human species is to be regarded as possible." It is possible through the establishment of a world-state. The duty of such an institution will be to put a curb on the freedom of a nation (as a nation will impose curb on the freedom of man) and to compel it into submission to a Universal will, which "may" secure the possibility of "Universal freedom".

### Hegel

The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Great Revolutions of the modern age, the rise of science, the 'growth of industrialism and the spread of teritorial nationalism have had been moulding and re-moulding history. Thanks to the effort of last four or five centuries that man has unmistakably learnt the worth and value of 'Freedom', though he could not attain even to that degree which was the proud possession of the early Arabs. No doubt the century of Hegel was a century of the demand for 'freedom' but this demand gradually degenerated in the demand of 'License.' This demand for 'licence' brought the 'iron-handed' regime of Napolean, whom Hegel termed as "the world-spirit on the horse-back". In such circumstances, saturated with conflict and contrast, Hegel was out with a three point-mission noted below:

- 1. To save the concept of 'freedom' by establishing distinction between law' and Licence.
- 2. To create a place for a greatman or 'Hero'.
- 3. To justify the attempt of the 'Reaction' to save Europe from Licence and tyranny in the name of "rational freedom" or 'freedom under law'.

Hegel delivered his lecture on "Philosophy of History" in the University of Berlin. The lectures were posthumously published in

1837. These lectures are very widely read, much more widely read than the work of Kant. As a true idealist Hegel starts with the observation that "the world history belongs to the realm of spirit, not to the realm of matter. The term world, indeed, includes both physical and psychical. But our concern is not with nature at large. On the stage of history, spirit displays itself in its most concrete reality". The development of spirit is our central theme. With the help of an analogy Hegel makes the point more clear. He says, "As the essence of matter is gravity, so the essence of spirit is freedom". The freedom, in turn, is the "capacity to act".

'Freedom' can be had in two ways. The means suggested by Hegel are: (1) the realization of freedom and (2) the study and analysis of human passion. In the words of Hegel himself, "one is the warp, the other the woof, of the vast arras web of world history". Hegel exhorts that the spirit, which is manifest and present in man, must come out to gain freedom, it must achieve capacity to act. In realizing the true connotation of freedom man shall have to decide the 'aim', the 'Principle' and the 'destiny', first, in the second phase of the attainment of 'freedom' a man shall have to control his own passions. The decision of the 'aim' of spirit is not an easy task as it is something 'latent', 'profoundly hidden' or something which resembles an 'unconscious instinct'. Its knowledge cannot be had in a day or two. "The whole process of history is directed to rendering this unconscious impulse a conscious one". This much about the 'warp'.

The 'woof' or the passion is "the concentrated energy". It *is a* sort of "private interest". Passion has been condemned by many a philosophers and psychologists. Hegel is opposed to such condemnations. He wants "to silence such pallid moralizing", because, "nothing great has ever been accomplished without passion ...... self-seeking to the exclusion of all things else".

One should not think that Hegel gave a rosy picture of human history. He says that the price of 'freedom' is not only 'eternal vigilence' it is eternal 'strife' and Violence too. The history, as such, "appears to be the slaughterbench at which the happiness of the people, the wisdom of states and virtue of individuals have been victimized". The explanation of strife and violence is dialectical. In the arena of history an encounter between a 'thesis' and an 'antithesis' is always going on. The antithesis, according to Hegel, is nothing but an off-spring of the thesis and the former inherits some qualities of the latter. The caravan is thus marching on.

According to the study of the ideal-Hegel — every period of human history is a unity, it is a total whole in itself. It is out of such 'uniformity' that 'diversity' springs. To be more explicit, Hegel contends that an antithesis appears at the declining stage of every period of human history. Such antithesis brings new ideals, values, trends and thoughts in its train, and thus a conflicts takes place between the new and old ideas, new and old values, so forth so on. The struggle ends in *a* compromise between the rival thesis and antithesis. It ends in a synthesis, which very large-heartedly embraces certain dominant factors of the out-going phase of civilization. Thus the human history is necessarily moving onward. It does not move in a circle. Its course is also not like that of a horizontal line. It is, to be some after Hegel, is like a straight line.

The onward march of history is controlled and governed by the 'Absolute Spirit', which makes use of the great personalities of the world to unveil and unfold its reality. General masses are no more better than puppets in the hands of the Absolute and the world of matter is no more better than a mile-stone, which reckons the journey. As a true idea list Hegel believes that the encounter is held in the world of ideas and not in the world of matter, because the latter is the semblance and shadow of the former. The world is nothing but the 'exhibition ground' of the Absolute.

Hegel, at this juncture of his enquiry, comes to rescue what he calls "rational freedom" or "freedom under law". 'Freedom' is neither 'primitive nor natural'. Every man, of extraordinary will power, has to seek it. He has to win it. But the victory of man over 'freedom' supposes "an incalculable discipline of intellectual and moral powers". All that is given by Nature is not welcomed by Hegel. According to him nature has given man injustice, violence, untemed impulse and inhuman feelings etc. "Limits are certainly imposed by social organizations; but they are limits imposed on emotions and instincts. In more advanced stages, they are limits imposed on self-will, caprice, passion. Limitation of this kind is, impart, the means where by rational freedom, contrasted with unbridled licence, can be obtained". To make this hard-won 'freedom' secure and lasting Hegel suggests in unambiguous terms that individuals and states should get themselves related with other states.

The ideal of the relation of one state with the other has till now proved to be a wild-goose chase. Different peoples have been at daggers drawn. History is repleat with the instances of bloody wars. Wars, for Hegel, has an ethical element. "It must not be regarded as an absolute ill" "Eternal peace is often demanded as an ideal toward which mankind should move. But nations issue forth invigorated from their wars." Thus the profounder of the 'Dialectic' remains true to his 'method' upto the last.

#### Marx

Marx was an intellectual disciple of Hegel but very different from the disciples of the 'East', who would not even think of criticizing their 'Gru' or Ustadh. The dialectic method of Hegel appealed the mind of Marx but the latter found it hard to accept the same without criticism. He made the reality stand on its feet and not on its head as it was the case in the dialectic of Hegel. One may very well choose to differ with Marx, but one can not dare deny the depth of his knowledge, the sharpness of his insight and the boldness of his stand. He is termed as "one of the makers of the modern mind". His "Manifesto" and "Capital" have shed enormous influence on modern trend of thoughts. Iqbal did not hesitate to call him "بيغمبر بر كتاب" or 'a prophet without scripture.'

The force with which Hegel had asserted the reality of the "world of ideas" could not subdue Marx. He did not like to fly on "the wings of ideas". He attempted to unearth the root of the social evil. Being born in an age in which the smoke of gigantic chimneys had affected the lungs of the working class and the sore of capitalism had run deep into the body of every proletariat, Marx could hardly think of a fairy-land of the 'Absolute of Hegel'. He was himself an earthly man, as such he kept his feet undaunted on the earth. He ventured to give an economic interpretation of history, in which the theory of 'Production' works like a magic key. Marx claims "The mode of production of material life determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of man which determines their being, but on the contrary their social being that determines their consciousness."

With this magic key — the theory of 'production' — Marx unlocks the doors of human history. And he found that history is a "slaughter bench" — "Free men and slaves, Patricians and Plebians, Lord and Serf, Guild-master and Journeymen, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fights, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes". In the fight of the oppressor and the oppressed the 'dialectic' played its destined role. What was once a synthesis became a thesis *e.g.* there was a struggle between the serfs and chartered burghers, As a result of that conflict the "first elements of the bourgeoisie" developed. It was then the synthesis. Now it has itself became a thesis and is encountered by its antithesis — the communism.

Communism is the only cure of capitalism. It will do for the capitalists what they did for their masters of the feudal order. "But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapens that bring death to itself, it has also called into existence the men who are to weild those weapons — the modern working class the proletarians". These proletarians will bring a revolution which will involve the whole society; though "it will gather momentum in national movements", it will gradually "spread into an international movement". This class distinction of the 'haves' and 'have-nots' will obliterate. It will cease in the long run. And "in place of the old bourgeoisie society, with its classes and class antagonism, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains".

# **Oswald Spengler**

The writer of the *Decline of the West* was opposed to the scheme of history termed as "ancient-medieval-modern". He proposes his "copernican"

view and it is the distinction between "Kultur" and "Civilisation". Each epoch, for Spengler, begins with a "Kultur" and ends with a "Civilisation". They are very intimately related; one is inseparable from the other. "Kultur" is the starting point and "Civilisation" is the destination. It will be better to reproduce Spengler in original: "Every culture has its own civilisation. In this book these two words are used in a periodic sense, to express an organic succession. The civilisation is the destiny of the culture. In this principle we obtain the view-point from which the problems of historical morphology becomes capable of solution. Civilisation are the most artificial and external states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. Civilization are a conclusion, death following upon life,rigidity following expansion. To the culture belong, gymnastics, the joust, the tournaments. To the civilisation belongs sports".

The growth of culture is analogous to the growth of an organic body. As a body passes through the stages of 'birth' infancy, childhood, youth and oldage so also a culture passes through the above-mentioned stages lying in between life time and death. "Each culture has its own new possibilities of selfexpression, which arise, ripen, decay and never return." And each culture "grows with the same superb aimlessness as the flowers of the field". Spengler was very bold in asserting the aimless growth of a culture. He had no mind, no sign of any treaty of peace on this point. He re-affirms his views in these words: "I see world history as a picture of endless formation and transformations".

If a culture "never returns" then does it mean that it dies for ever. For Spengler the culture of a particular epoch dies, but certain 'events' may reappear in another culture. The re-appearance of certain events or traits of a culture does not mean the re appearance of the culture as a whole. At this point Spengler passed to develop the thought that a history of many different epochs will inevitably develop analogies between one epoch and another. The use of the method of analogy in the past was a curse, "for they had enabled historians to follow their own tastes, "yet it might be a blessing to historical thought. The historian despite risk, should be prepared to make large use of analogies. "He will be interested in noting what things in epoch A are contemporary with things in epoch B." And the word 'contemporary' in Spengler's use means happening in one epoch at relatively the same point as in an other epoch. With these general ideas in mind Spengler focussed his attention to the main subject of his famous book — the Decline of the West. He contended that the peoples of the West "live at the end of an epoch", they are living in a civilization and not in a culture. His massive book is an inductive survey of the evidence for his claim.

#### Criticisms

There was an age when human history was highly saturated with religious legends. Education was then not democratized. It was the monopoly of a few. Popes and Bishops had final say in every matter. Augustine was blessed with the same status and position in his age. His theory of 'universal history' is a fine piece of legends. The most striking weakness of his theory lies in the antagonism of 'revelation' and 'reason' and the 'church' and 'world'. The second point of weakness is found in the fact that Augustine called man a 'sinister' by birth and he found him "in his childhood; for he can not respect an ideal which is not imposed on him against his will nor can he find satisfaction in a good created by his own action". One can very well see that the Bishop of Hippo had totally ignored the achievements of the civilizations of China, India and Egypt etc. He had ignored the achievements of the Greek civilization which was destined to play an important role in the formation and transformation of the civilization of Europe, before and after his own century. Augustine is an unsuccessful advocate of 'Determinism'. It sealed the fate of man. His theory drastically curbed the power and potentialities of man. Augustine may the Christianity as such, is guilty of this unhoby 'interpretation' of the status of man.

Islam, almost after two centuries, unveiled the truth. It gave man the status he deserves in the cosmos. Ibn-e-Khaldun picked up the thread of discussion from the literature of his muslim predecessor He had little charm for Christian legends. Ibn-e-Khaldun starte with the principle of Asabiyah. It is the elan vital of history. Bt how the two entirely different historic transactions of the Early Muslim Arabs and Banu Hilal are to be explained? He solved this conundrum by stating that Asabiyah is not the only kind of social protoplasm, a alternative exists in the shape of religion, this Asabiyah is a trait c Nomadic life. It has a smell of 'nationalism'. Ibn-e-Khaldun, de! pite his effort to moderate his esprit decorps by an over coating of religion, could

not make the Quinine tablet tasteful. It is too narrow a principle to bear the burden or to justify the range of his masterly journalization. The second point of criticism which surges in our mind when we come to the equation of Asabiyah with Nomadic hordex as why it should be so and not otherwise ? Had the Chinese, th Indians, the Egyptians, the Greeks and the North Europeans bees deprived of Asabiyah in their respective ages of glories? The corollary, the principle of la-Asabiyah with the sedentary life seems to much sweeping. In offering these criticism we should not fee proud of our intellectual superiority. These criticism have been possible due to the fact that we have a wider field of historial evidences to work upon which Ibn-e-Khaldun did not possess. He deserves credit for his study of the human nature, for his introduction of the method o Induction in history and for the 'universal history', which he left for progenities to come. The main contribution of Ibn-e-Khaldun lies in the fact that he cleared up the mess of legends and fictions, createc by the dogmatic Christian thinkers from the grand edifice of history.

Kant "never travelled more than forty miles from his birth place or took a voyage upon the water of the Baltic on whose shores he lived; and the daily round of his activities was so monotonously regular that the towns people learnt to set their watches by his punctual passage past their windows on his daily 'constitutional' walk". His life was a mystry. And his works both on metaphysics and history are more mysterious than his life.

Kant had, no doubt, taken pains to study human nature. But in it he could not see no more than a fair reflection of his own life. The antigregarian instinct was very strong in him. He gave it the strongest role in the formation of the nature of man. The reason was very strong in his thought and it enjoyed the same status in moulding the destiny of the human species as such. In short, Kant could not rise above his own introvert personality in his writing. Kants' interpretation of history in terms of 'Universal Freedom' is highly Utopian. His scheme of a world — state, without any solid support of a comprehensive code of life, appears to be a tall-talk. His contention that human history, as nature would have wished it, is necessarily marching onward is not above criticism. His statement that "Nature does nothing superfluously and in the use of means to her ends does not play the prodigal" gives human being a licence to go to Wars. Kants agnosticism in the sphere

of nuemena-soul & God etc. is the cause of his concentrated attention on nature. He could realize little that man is born to conquer nature and is not born to be enslaved by her.

Hegal's 'Philosophy of history' is no less romantic than that of Kant. The difference between the two Germanthinkers lies in the fact that the former is understandable to his readers, the latter is just the reverse. Though history is "the unreveling of the plan of nature" to Kant he failed to show as why man would be a slave of nature. Hegel shifts the burden to God. He says that history is "the march of God on earth". The how and why of this contention of Hegel has not been explained by him. As such the claim becomes a fiction, a chimera and an episode. According to Hegel history is a theatre Hall, where man plays the role of a puppet devoid of intention, power and knowledge. Man is a tool in the hands of the Absolute, which creates conflicting ideas in him. These ideas undergo a fight, then a stage comes when the Absolute itself dictates the terms of compromise between the conflicting ideas.

Hegel's Dialectic process has an iota of truth in it. He is correct in his reading when he says that a conflict (in history) is going on between rival ideas and that the 'synthesis', got at the ends of every conflict, formed a part of human culture. But he did not go deep into the process. He could not find out the real nature of thesis and antithesis. He could not explain as why a synthesis in course of time becomes a thesis. His speculative genius failed to earn an unconditional support from his readers.

An Inductive inquiry and an unbiased analysis of history will show that:

- A. History does not move in a straight line.
- B. History is not necessarily an onward march of events.
- C. There have had been rise and fall in human cultures and civilization. History is not a one-way traffic. There are ups and downs in it.

Marx as stated earlier is an intellectual disciple of Hegel. He converted the Dialectic of his master into 'Dialectic materialism'. The conclusions which can be drawn from the thought of Marx are now examined critically.

- The civilization of every period is a unit-whole. The arts, Science, philosophy, religion and values are all the manifestation of their age. With the change in the system of production and distribution there is change in all walks of life.
- 2. When a civilization is ripened an antithesis is born out of the womb of the outgoing civilization. The latter is comparatively better than the former.
- 3. The ideas and the ideals are all similar in similar system of production.

These deduction from the teaching of Marx do not stand the test of history. Marx, who applied the Heraclitian principle of change in his interpretation of history, is ever faced with a Zeno. Science, Philosophy, religion, values and art do not change with the change in the system of 'production'. It is a change in idealogy of a nation which leads to the changes in different departments of human life. The economic conditions of Rome and Perisa were almost the same, yet before the advent of Islam they possessed different religions, different values and different philosophies of life. With the spread of Islam we find a new change introduced in the social body of Persia etc. People, in general, changed their religion, their values and philosophies of life in favour of Islam. Then, does this change in the social body of Persia etc. mean that their economic conditions were similar to the economic conditions of Arabia — an abode of a revolutionary code of life ?

Marx is also incorrect in his statement that the emerging civilization is necessarily better than the preceding one. Is our modern Western civilization better than any of the idealogical civilization of the past? The development in Science and technology should not make our eyes shut to see the truth. We have to see whether man has got the true status of man in this civilization. The reply is a clear 'No'. Man might have learnt to fly like birds and to swim like fishes but he has to relearn that he is a man. In past kings and emperors exploited their subjects, in medeaval ages popes and Bishops looted the general masses, in modern history capitalists and the 'Capitalist of the capitalists' have been performing the same drama of inhuman cruelties, oppression, and tyrannies. So where lies the difference ? The difference lies in the technique of oppression and not in its nature. In old days 'have not' were killed by swords but to day they are killed by devastating bombs. Last of all, the contention of Marx that the distinction of the 'haves' and 'have not' will cease by the establishment of the 'dictatorship of the proletariats' is not simply a hoax but also a bad example of self-contradiction. Marx could not realize the dilemma: If class distinction ceases, the process of history also comes to a stop, as according to Marx class-struggle is the only 'Motif' which makes and unmakes history; if the class-distinction does not cease then there can not be a universal 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which further means that capitalists will continue to exist. He could not rebut this 'major premise' of the dilemma which flows from his teaching.

The distinction between 'Kultur' and 'Civilisation' in spengler is shallow and sweeping. Had he studied the civilization of Greece or India etc. coolly, circumspectively and thoroughly, he would have changed his views. The notion of 'Kultur' profounded by Spengler is a posteriori and emperical. By the term 'Kultur' he understood the manifestation of the forces of morality, economics, policies and international Law of a nation. This view of culture is superficial. Culture is not a bundle of sensory emblems of a nation. It has its deep roots in the mind of the people. It has a deep-seated connection with the thoughts, idealogies and values of a nation. And it is the 'root' which can be termed as 'civilization'. It can be characterized as that mode of thinking (of a nation) which results in the preparation of a unique, type of collective character. In other words we can say that it is a specific ethico-rational make up of a nation. This real difference between 'Kultur' and 'Civilisation' was not picked up by Spengler. He failed to perceive it. Spengler committed another mistake. He thought of 'Kultur' on the analogy of an individuals' organisms. He plainly believed that as an individual's organism passes through the stage of childhood, youth and old-age, the 'Kultur' also "arise, ripen, decay and never returns". History does not testify this view. We find that a culture and aposteriori manifestation of a nation — have been dying from age to age but the civilization and a priori ethicorational make-up of a nation never dies. A further analysis of the view of Spengler confronts us with a simple question. Can we determine the spans of childhood youth and old-age of a nation? The reply is a definite 'NO'.

Iqbal

Iqbal, like Kant, Hegel and others has written no separate treatise on philosophy of history. But it does not mean that he has no philosophy of history. His game of wisdom are scattered here and there (both in his prose and poetry) like the twinkling stars studed in the blue sky hanging over our heads. Other than the verses quoted earlier, Iqbal in his preface to the Rumuz-e-Bekhudi gives a thought-provoking description of history. He says: as an individual's will to act, aspirations for higher values and realization of an end lie in the gradual unfolding, extention and stability of his ego, similarly the secret of the life of a nation of a millat lies in the realization and preservation of her 'history'. In individuals the continued realization of 'ego' is based on his 'memory'. It is his 'memory' which gives him a continued existence and saves him from the anarchy of discrete ideas. Likewise, it is 'history' which helps a nation in maintaining and preserving her records. The 'continuity' 'relatedness' and 'pattern' in human life are due to history. The 'patternedness in 'nationalego' is based on history. As an individual, through his affection and conation, reaches to the depth of his ego, a millat determines her ultimate objective with the help of history. It is history which tears the darkness created b3 the abstraction of 'events'. Our social existence gets its meaning from history. It is history which interprets human actions. If any nation forgets her history, then history also forgets her.

> زنده فرد از اتباط جان و تن زنده قوم از حفظ ناموس کهن مرگ فرد از خشکئ رود حیات مرگ قوم از ترک مقصود حیات قوم روشن از سواد سر گذشت

# خود شناس آمد ز یاد سر گذشت

سر گذشت ا و گر از یادش رود

باز اندر نیستی گم می شود

We human being are proned to divide time into past, present and future. The division is a posteriori. "If we regard past, present and future as essential to time, then we picture time as a straight line, part of which we have travelled and left behind, and part lies yet untravelled before us. This is taking time not as a living creative movement but as a static absolute". A deeper insight into human conscious experience leads Iqbal to believe that beneath a posteriori duration there is a true apriori duration. History is related with the apriori duration, a duration which transcends all limits of human experience. Iqbal and Spenglar accidently coincided on this point. Like Iqbal, Spengler is also opposed to the understanding of history kn terms of 'ancient medieval

and modern'...But to both of them the causes of such arbitrary division of

time are different. For Spengler the division is due to the fact that each nation treats itself a "steady pole" and "great histories of millenial duration and mighty far away cultures" are made to revolve round it. For Iqbal the division is due to the misconceptions of the philosophy of TIME. Time regarded as the fourth dimension of the space-time continuum is relative, but time regarded as destiny is real. "It is not a mere repetition of homogenous movements which makes conscious experience a delusion". To Spengler the solutions of the division of history lies in his copernican theory of 'Kultur' and Civilisation', that is the solution lies in an organic study of history. To Iqbal the solution of this problem lies in the attainment of 'Khudi', which will master time and will not allow itself to be mastered by it. 'Khudi'is the "Warp" and 'Bai-Khudi' is the "Woof" of Iqbal's philosophy of history. The 'Khudi' is the "rationally directed creative will". It is spiritual. But there are degrees of spirits. The ultimate reality is the ultimate Ego, from which finite egos proceed. In his Lectures, Iqbal speaks "the creative energy of the ultimate Ego, in whom deed and thought are identical, function as ego-unities. Every atom of Divine energy, howsoever low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. Throughout the entire gamot of beings runs the gradually rising note of

egohood, until it reaches its perfection in man...".Iqbal did not believe in a

universal life. To him all life is highly in dividual in character. God himself is an Individual. Man is also an individual and the highest form of life in man is 'Khudi' or Ego. In his state of 'Khudi. man becauses a "self-contained exclusive centre".Human personality is a "state of tension. It is" ... a kind of

tension caused by the Ego invading the environment and the environment invading the Ego". This makes human life dynamic and restless. The key to the success of human life in his ceaseless pursuit of fresh scope for self-manifestation, self-expression and self-realisation<sup>10</sup> If man ceases to 'Act', he

خودی کیا ہے راز درون حیات خود کیا ہے بیداری کائنات is then no better than a piece of stone.<sup>11</sup> The creative activity in man which helps him to rise from one state to another.

This pursuit of 'becoming' — a pursuit to find out new scopes for selfexpression — is not aimless. The ultimate end of human 'ego' is 'freedom'.<sup>12</sup> The term freedom in the philosophy of Iqbal has a wider denotation. It includes:

- (a) Freedom from one's animal desires and passions.
- (b) Freedom from the so-called tradition and convention, which stem out from belief in mythologies and hearsay.
- (c) Freedom from the 'rules' of one's fellow-beings.
- (d) Freedom from the bondage of extraneous and blind forces of nature. Life is, thus, a perpetual endeavour to be free. And the 'Ego' "reaches fuller freedom by appropriating the individual who is most free — God". Such a freedom does not mean either 'anarchy' or 'Licence'. It has its own limits. These limits come from God who is most free. God has created this world not with a sportive spirit. He has a clear design behind his creation. To have this design realized, God has given man a complete code of life. The code of life is known as 'Islam'.

"Islam", says Iqbal, "is not a departmental affair, it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole

> <sup>۱۱</sup>وہی جہاں سے تراج س کو تو کرمے پیدا یہ سنگ و خشت نہیں جو تری نگاہ میں ہے <sup>۱2</sup>خودی کے نگمہاں کو ہے زہر ناب وہ ناں جس سے جاتی رہے اس کی تاب وہی ناں ہے اس کے لئے ارجمند رہے حس سے دنیا میں گردن بلند

man". Without Islam, 'Khudi' cannot be developed. If the development of 'Khudi' is checked, the attainment of freedom also becomes an impossibility. In the light of the teachings of 'Islam', Iqbal enumerates three stages of the development of 'Ego' — (l) obedience to law (2) self-control and (3) divine Vicegerency. It has already been said that the final end of 'Ego' is 'freedom' and 'freedom' to Iqbal does neither mean 'anarchy' nor licence. To check the degeneration of freedom into licence, obedience to law, self-control and divine vicegerency are all equally indispensable.

A recollection of the preceding discussions of Kant and Hegel would show that both of them advocated the cause of human 'freedom'. They had duly emphasized it too. But they failed to give a proper solution of the time old problem of the degeneration of 'freedom' into licence. They might have realized that 'freedom' is an inner urge. But they did not realize that an extraneous check on 'freedom', to save it from degeneration, have had failed. Human history has proved it beyond doubt that the man-made-laws, the states and the so-called League of Nations have all failed to put an effective check to the degeneration of 'freedom' into 'licence'. Iqbal gave the best of his thought to this problem; he suggested that the inner urge of freedom must be controlled and guided by the inner forces of man.<sup>13</sup> The forces which control the inner urge of freedom are to be found in Islam, which is a comprehensive code of life and as such does not simply fortify faith but also inspires its adherent to see the faith wedded with action. Consequently the verdict on freedom, as what it is and what it is not, must come from God,

<sup>13</sup>گر تو می خواہی مسلمان زیستن نيست ممكن جز بقرآں زيستن از یک آئینی مسلمان زنده است ييكر ملت ز قرآن زنده است ہست دینی مصطفی دین حیات شرع او تفسير آئين حيات

the most free Ego. Total submission to God means full freedom. The acid taste of a total submission to God is found in the establishment of a state based on the principle of the vicegerency of man and the sovereignty of god.

The establishment of such an idealogical state implies the problem of the relation of one finite ego with another finite ego. In other words the question can be put like this: What is the relation between society and individuals? This is indeed one of the stock questions. These are two stock answers to it. One answer is that the society is an aggregate of atomic and autonomous individuals. The other stock answer is just the opposite. According to it society is a perfect and intelligible whole, which the individual is simply a part of the whole. The classic view of a segregated atomic and autonomous individuals is very well described by Homer in painting the character of cyclops poly phemus. This view of Homer is quoted by Plato in his diologue-laws. The verses run as below:

Mootless are they and lawless. On the peaks

Of mountains high they dwell, in hollow caves

where each his own law deals to wife and child

In sovereign disregard of all his peers.

This view of individualism was a favourite theme of the protagonists in the past. It was a creed with Locke and Spencer in modern age. But this Cyclopic conception of man is a myth and a fiction. The second view that society is a sort of entity, existing independent of individuals and in a real sense of superior worth, was a tune on which many thinkers of the past played well. In modern period Fichte and Hegel did their best to prove the superiority of society over individual. To them the social order is a concrete embodiment of the 'Weltgeist'.

In its extreme shape, doubtless, neither of these statements of society is acceptable. "Society in the individual," the 'individual in the society" seems to

be a more plausible view.<sup>14</sup> It is a matter of importance and emphasis and not a question of fundamental difference between individual and society. Iqbal studied the problem from this angle of vision. His philosophy of 'bekhudi' is an antidote of the philosophy of 'Khudi'. 'Bekhudi' means the losing of self (or Khudi) in the community life to serve a common end. By 'Bekhudi' I do not understand self-negation as it is found in pantheism in general and in morbid Sufism or Yogism of the East, in particular. Bekhudi does not even mean self-extinction or self-annhilation. To borrow a phrase from Toynbee to express my idea, I understood by 'Khudi and Bekhudi' a constant and continued process of "withdrawal-and-return" of an individual in society. An individual will at times, 'withdraw' himself from the society but he will again 'return' back to it with his findings and finally he will develop his Khudi to such an extent that he will not hesitate to submit himself to the 'millat'. Neither the 'withdrawal' of an individual will cut him as under from the society nor the 'return' will make him merged in it. In the whole process of repeated "withdrawal-and-return" the Khudi will remain animated with an intense love for action and freedom. Only such individuals will prove to be a source of strength to the 'millat', consequently the millat will exalt the position of such individuals.

Man is a social being. He does not live in a vacuum, in the allegorical cave of Plato. He lives in a society of his fellow-beings. The individual and the millat reflect each other. The individual is exalted through 'millat' and the 'millat' is organised through individuals. A cyclopic-fashion man, according

> <sup>۱</sup>در جماعت فرد را بینیم ما از چمن اورا چوگل چنییم ما فطرتش وارفتهٔ یکتائی است حفظ او از انجمن آرائی است فرد و قوم آئینهٔ یک دیگراند سلک و گوہر کہکشان وا ختراند

to Iqbal, is supposed to be ignorant of his ideals and capabilities. It is the 'Millat' which inspires him with adequate knowledge of his function in life and forces him to attain freedom under the 'rule of law'. It is the craving for association that the individual forms the basic unit of the millat. It is an inner urge in man. It is not dictated by the extraneous forces of nature. As soon as an individual loses his 'self' in the millat, he finds his personality an embodiment of past traditions. Future also reflects in his personality. And thus the emperical barriers of time are transcended by him.

Iqbal's stock answer to the stock question, related with the individual and society, may appear to be an utopia. But one will feel obliged to correct himself, if one has at all any knowledge of Islam and the Prophet of Islam (Sm). In its revolutionary 'Kalma', Islam presents only two fundamental points of its teachings. One is لا اله الاالله عنه الع من الع الم bere is no 'Rah' but Allah, the other is محمد الرسول الله – Muhammad (Sm) is the messenger of Allah. Iqbal deals with both the cardinal Points of the 'Kalma'. His handling of the subject is not metaphysical. He does not hanker after an 'abstract', logical and a contentless reality. On the Contrary Iqbal's philosophy of 'Tawhid' spring up from his Philosophy of Khudi, as the Philosophy of 'Khudi' itself springs up from his philosophy of 'Tawhid'. Iqbal had realized that the world is highly mysterious. One can not 'discover' all that is embedded in it. There is every likelihood, that a man, unaware of his 'Khudi, may lose himself in the 'Talisman' of the universe. If man is to save himself from such a loss, he must know his 'Khudi'. This knowledge of 'Khudi' is the knowledge of 'Khuda',3 as both are inter-related. The statement of Caliph Ali (peace be on him) that "he who had recognised himself, has recognised God", conveys the same message.

Iqbal continues his contention and observes that: unless a man unveils the secrets of 'La ileha', he can not break the idols of different types of polytheism to pieces. In one or the other sphere of life man shall have to bow down his head to the perceptable or imperceptable gods, created by him or his society in which he lives. It is the denial of petty gods which lead to the consequential affirmation of God — the ultimate 'Ego' — which impowers man to control the universe. This belief alone is the key to the secrets of nature.

'Tawhid' is the highest virtue in the scheme of virtues. It is analogous to the position of heart in a human body. 'Tawhid' makes an individual 'Lahooti' and a millat 'Jabroti'l. It gives 'Jalal' to the individual and 'Jamal' to the millat. In other words all true theistic cultures and civilizations spring from it. The best yard-stick, to measure the progress of culture and civilization is 'Tawhid'.

> ملتے چوں می شود توحید مت قوت و جبروت می آید بدست فرد ازتوحید لاہوتی شود ملت ازتوحیدجبروتی شود ہر دو از توحید می گیرد کمال زندگی ایں را جلال آں را جمال

'Allah' has his own attributes. In surah-e-Nas, the Quran speaks of three such attribute: (1) Rabbin-Nas, (2) Malek-in-Nas and (3) Ilah-in-Nas. Allah is the sustainer, the, sovereign and the object of worship. No individual can even dream of sharing his attributes. Each attribute has its own impact on the character and conduct of an individual and a society at large, provided both of them have come to realize His existence from a practical point of view. Thus "Islam as a polity is only a practical means of making the principle (Tawhid) a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideals".

To make man free from the loyalties of thrones and to give an incentive to man's loyalty to his own ideals, Allah sent His prophets. The message of the Prophets was one and the same. It did not differ in fundamentals. Islam's view of human civilization is different from all those views which have been propounded on the basis of natural sciences. Modern Sciences believe that 'man' is an evolved species of lower animals. He had to traverse a long-way of prehistoric era. He got the light of civilization and culture at a pretty later stage of history. These were the forces of nature which unfolded his potentialities. Islam, against the 'findings' of anthropology says that the first man-Adam-had got the light of culture and civilization direct from God. He did not allow Adam to grope in darkness. Adam was the first man, as well as, the first messenger of God. According to Iqbal the life of Adam on Earth started when he realized his 'ego'.

In Payam-e-Mashriq, Iqbal depicts the birth of Adam as below:

Adam's life in heaven symbolises the stage when he had got no consciousness of his 'ego'. He had not learnt to adjust himself with nature. His knowledge and power were of little use to him. It was the preevolutionary stage of the life of Adam. God gave the consciousness of ego to Adam as a gift. The gift has been inherited by the posterity of Adam.

The mission of the prophets was to revive the awareness of human ego on the basis of the code of life revealed to them. Muhammad (sm) is the last of all prophets. Like all prophets he had to undergo the process of withdrawal and return. And this process of withdrawal and return of a prophet is different from that of a mystic and all other individuals of the world. "The mystic does not wish to return from the repose of 'unitary experience' even when he does not return, as he must, his return does not mean much for mankind at large. The prophets return is creative. He returns to insert himself into the sweep with a view to control the forces of history and thereby to Create fresh world of ideals. The mystics or other individual egos do not create fresh ideals. Prophets did create fresh ideals. Prophet Muhammad being the last Prophet gave the last ideal of the series. This Ideal-Islam-is perfected by God, but it was translated into action by the Prophet. As we have to surrender to God, we have to obey the Prophet. Obedience to the Prophet is obedience to Allah. He must be an 'Uswa-e-Hasna' for a believer, as his acts are the aots of God and his deeds are the deeds of God.

طرح عشق انداز اند ر جان خویش

تازه کن با مصطفی پیمان خویش

به مصطفى به رسان خويش راكه دين بمه اوست

Mankind, both as an individual and a society, gets all that is needed through and from the Prophet (sm).

Islam is the last code of life. Prophet Muhammad (Sm) is the last prophet. And the muslims are the best people to give a lead to the rest of human folk. The finality of prophet leads to the finality of 'Ummat-e-Muslimah'. The most crucial task of controlling the forces of history can not be performed by a single individual. This power is vested in the 'Ummat' by God. The Quran says: Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had organised a nucleus of his companions to further the forces of history. To keep the equilibrium of the hard-earned freedom intact, he emphasized the subjugation of one's animal existence along with its instincts passions and emotions — to the forces of love — a love for the Prophet and God. The Prophet himself had submitted totally to the Will of God.

اندر کے اندر سرائے دل نشیں ترک خود کن سوئے حق ہجرت گزیں محخم از حق شو سوئے خود گام زن لات و عزائے ہوس را سر شکن لشکرے پیداکن ازسلطان عشق جلوہ گر شو بر سر فاران عشق

Prophet Muhammad (sm) gave meaning and content to the body social of the Muslims. The Arabs were grossly engaged in tribal Asabiyah. Strifes, discords and struggles were the order of the day. The tribal Asabiyah of the pre-Islamic Arabia, has manifested itself in territorial nationalism, linguisticism and racialism of the world of today. The cure does not lie in the so-called scientific analysis of man. It lies in total submission of man to God. Man must behave as an 'Abd (عبد) all through his life. He must feel every moment that he is not the 'Lord, of the universe, rather a 'slave', a 'servant' and a 'Vicegerent' of God on this earth. But this will not mean that a man has attained the goal. The goal lies yet ahead. It lies in the attainment of the
status of 'Abduhu' (عبده). The 'Abd is he who is in search of God, the 'Abduhu' is he when God searches. The 'Abd is the' lover' and the 'Abduhu' is the 'beloved' of God.

عبد دیگر عبدہ، چیزے دگر

ما سراپا انتظار او منتظر

The Prophet was an *Abd'*, as in every walk of life he obeyed the dictates of God. In his obedience to Allah he did never attach any weight to a worldly loss, he expressed little apprehension to the tyrannies and oppression of the forces of opposition, he could not be bribed by 'wealth, woman and wine. History is a witness that Muhammad (Sm) proved to be a solid rock unmoved by the tidal-bores of the forces of 'Darkness' of Arabia. He emerged victorious from the troubled water. It was not the victory of an individual. It was the victory of an ideology, which roused the Khudi of the Arabs from their dogmatic slumber and made them a force in the world. This awakening of Arabia, in particular and of mankind in general, is not welcomed by Toyenbee. He observes, " in the first stage of his career he — Muhammad (Sm) withdraws as a merchant and returns as a prophet, in the second stage he withdraws as a prophet and returns, as a conqueror. In other words the second stage of Muhammad's career which is conspicuously successful stage, is apparently the exact in-verse of the career of Lyola; and if Lyola's career is a striking example of spirituals transfiguration Muhammad's by the same token is an equally striking example of spiritual bathos". Had Toyenbee studied the career of Muhammad (peace be upon him) in the light of the idealogy of Islam, he would have refrained from passing such silly and absurd remarks on it. Muhammad was no doubt a merchant, a prophet, a conqueror a commander in chief a judge and a reformer but in all phases of his life he was an Abd'. The ideology be preached, the plan he suggested the programmes he made, the reforms he introduced were all revealed to him by God. Muhammad's (peace be upon him) comparision with Loyla is fallacious. Loyla was a mystic. Muhammad (peace be upon him) was a prophet. Loyla, in the world of Iqbal could not return from "the world of unitary experience"

to create "fresh ideals". Muhammad (peace be upon him) did return from the same world and he created an immortal world of fresh ideals. He has created a new 'millat', which is destined to survive upto the day of Resurrection. He established a polity, which shall ever remain an 'objective' and an 'end' for the millat.

Thus we see that religion, which was entrusted with a secondary role in moulding the forces of history in Ibn-e-Khaldun, has re-appeared as a basal force in the philosophy of Iqbal. Iqbal's philosophy of history is constructed on the corner stores of (1) Ultimate Ego (2) Prophethood (3) Individual Ego (4) Ego of the nation and (5) Stability of the individual Ego. The idea of 'Ego' is a system in Iqbal. It is co-extensive with Islam. Islam helps creating 'Ego' and 'Ego' is stabilized by Islam. Without 'Ego' Islam can hardly be known; and without Islam 'Ego' can hardly be realized. Whole history is the history of the realization of 'Ego'. The ups and downs of history are related with the corresponding stability and instability of the 'Ego'.

In Asrar-e-Khudi. Iqbal presents his reading of the history of muslims. In his opinion the cause of the downfall of this millat — lies in the fact that it lost its 'Khudi' which was a proud possession of its ancestors. The 'millat' allowed itself to be deceived by the "flock of sheep" that is the 'Ajmi nations'. The 'Ajmi nations had realized in full that they could not then, rise to the standard\_ of the muslim millat, as such they conspired to pull down the millat to their own status in life. To achieve this end the 'Ajmis preached the 'gospel' of non-violence and the philosophy of the negation of self. Like the sheep of jungle, the Ajmis precepted the muslims - the lions - to surrender their 'Ego' to humility, modesty and lowliness of mind. The sheep further advised the lions to give up the habit of taking flesh, because one who cultivates such habit is loved by God. This sheepiness was adopted by the fatigued lions which ultimately resulted in atrophy of action. The muslim millat likewise was pursuaded by the 'Ajmis to sheepiness, and as a result of that philosophy of easy-going-life the muslims had to lose the spirit of Jehad. The loss of the spirit of Jehad consequently led to a loss of will-power, determination and action. The muslims got entangled in splitting hairs in the name of academic discussion and stood mesmerised by the creed of 'Ruhbaniyan'. All these factors combined together led to the downfall of the muslims.

The muslims earned name and fame in art, science, music, literature philosophy, logic and mysticism, but all at the cost of Jehad-fi-Sablilah.

آن تقاضاء عمل در دل نه ماند

The muslims to-day have not yet got themselves liberated from the mental slavery of the 'Ajmis'. In old days the 'Ajmis preached the gospel of Ruhbaniyah, in our age the 'Ajmis are advocating the gospel of materialism. The muslim all over the globe, after two great world-wars, have been successful in earning freedom from respective foreign yokes, but they have not been able to get themselves liberated from the hold of the western ideology. The class which is at the helm of affairs in different muslim countries is bent on aping westernism. Though they do not feel shy of exploiting the name of Islam, yet they have a scheme of their own to fit Islam in the frame of westernism and not westernism in the mould of Islam.

Iqbal is fully alive to the dangers of westernism. He knew it well that the edifice of western civilization is built on the foundation stones of secularism, nationalism and democracy. He has condemned each one of them. His criticism on the western civilization, as a whole, is noted below:

يورپ ميں بہت روشنئ علم و ٻنر ہے

حق یه سے که بے چشمه حیواں ہی یه ظلمات

He compares the two civilization of the East and the West. The latter possess the forces of life but does not possess any lofty ideal, its efforts and strivings are aimless; the former lacks in the forces of life, though it knows its destination and goal:

مردہ لا دینئ افکار سے افرنگ میں عسق

عشق ہے ربطئ افکار سے مشرق میں غلام

:The reconstruction of a healthy civilization and culture lies in the assimilation and synthesis of the codes of the East and West. The true equilibrium and balance, between spiritualsim, and materialism, between 'revelation' and 'reason' and between 'church' and 'state', is furnished by Islam. Islam alone guarantees the stability of human civilization and culture. This gigantic task starts with the realization of the individual 'ego'. The realization of 'ego' is nothing but a step toward moral rearmament of a nation.

It is a moral rearmament in the sense that the realization of 'ego' is the realization of the code of life  $(c_{e_1})$ 

The present day muslim generations are very much fond of sheepiness of the west. They wrongly believe that they can climb upto the peak of culture and civilization by adopting the 'hedonism' of the west. They further believe that a competition in dance and music will help them to attain the goal. Iqbal unambiguously corrects this notion of the present generation:

### آ تجھکو بتادوں میں تقدیر امم کیا ہے ،

شمشر و ثناںاول طاؤس و رباب آخر

The 'Khudi' can not be realized through musical instruments it requires the weapons of knowledge and sword. The philosophy of Tawoos-o-rabab has always appeared at the decaying stage of a civilization, opposed to it, the philosophy of shamsheer-o-sana appeared at the beginning of every civilization. The symbols of shamsheer and sana stand for the creativity of thought and 'Jehad'. Creativity of thought for Iqbal is a matter of faith. If one possesses 'creativity of thought' one is a 'momin', in case otherwise be is no better than a 'Kafir' or 'Zandiq':

ېر که او را قوت تخليق نيست نز د ما جز کافر و زنديق نيست

Similarly 'Jehad' is also an article of faith to Iqbal. It does not mean war for the sake of war. It is not a synonymous of colonization. 'Jehad, etimologically means to make effort. It is of different types. It includes (1) Jehad bin Nafs (2) Jehad bil Muashara and (3) Jehad-bil-Hukumat. If any of the three entities stand in the way of realizing 'Khudi' according to the ideals of Islam, one shall have to wage 'war' (Jehad) against it.

> زند کی در جستجو پوشیده است اصل او در آرزو پوشیده است آرزو را در دل خود زنده دار

## تا نه گردد مشت خاک تو غبار

It is a message of the dignity of labour, hard-work and ceaseless activity, without which life becomes meaningless.

The message of Iqbal has no doubt earned appreciation but has not yet been put to action. The muslim youths, starting from Indonesia upto Morrocco, still complain of the hardness of Islam.

> شکوه سنج سختئ آئي مشو از حدود مصدطفي بيروں مرو حکم د شوار است تاويلے مجو جز بقلب خويش قنديلر مجو

The complain is due to the fact that the Muslim youths are generally ignorant of the ideology of Islam. They are not to be blamed for their apathy and ignorance because in educational institutions, set up under the regimes of the foreign 'masters', all except Islam has had been taught to our youths. In the first instance Islam has been kept out of syllabi of such institutions. In the second instance Islam has been very skilfully distorted by the foreigners. With the movements of liberations from the foreign yokes a new conscience dawned upon the Muslim world. And as a result of it the conspiracy of our 'masters' has been detected. All that is now required is the forceful method of revitalization of our faith in Islam.

The first step in this direction, suggested by Iqbal, is to realize the 'Khudi'. It is due to the loss of Khudi that the Muslim youths are blindly aping the "culture" of the West. The revival and realization of Khudi presupposes the knowledge of self and the knowledge of the ideology which governs the self, the society, the Government and the State. It is the knowledge of the self which dispells the darkness of ignorance and the shadows of skepticism. The knowledge of Khudi is a prelude to 'Yaqeen-e-Muhkam' or the 'firmness of faith'. If the Muslims possess the firmness of faith in Islam they are destined to rise, to progress and to prosper. But if they lack in this fundamental virtue they are, by the same token, fore-ordained to see their downfall continued. The reason is very simple. If the Muslims profess Islam in words and pay lip service to it but they refrain to translate it into action in their individual and collective life, hypocracy will set in. And it is hypocracy which eats up the vitality of life. Yaqeen-e-Muhkam and hypocracy are contradictory to each other.

It is Yaqeen-e-Muhkam' which leads to actions. Action or the will to act is the berometer of Yaqeen e 'Muhkam'. They are inseparably related. One proceeds, the other follows. One is the antecedent, the other is the consequent. But what is the nature of action? Action is the effort of an individual ego to become something. Every action takes its start from 'becoming' and aims at 'being'. The goal of 'being' is unattained and remains unattainable, as such the action is ceaseless and perpetual. It has no terminous. Action begins with the beginning and ends with the ending.

It is not 'Amal alone but 'Amal-e-Paiham'. It is not action alone which is required for the reconstruction of culture and civilization, rather it is continued action with counts much.

Yaqeen-e-Muhkam and 'Amal-e-Paiham are followed by Love that is a conquering force. To Iqbal 'love' has a very wide denotation. It includes the love for knowledge, love for God and His Prophet, love for the ideology of Islam and Love for the humanity at large. This love transcends geographical barriers, racial discriminations, linguistic differences and the feeling of parochial nationalism. This message of love, as profounded by Iqbal is, totally opposed to the concept of the survival of the fittest and the idea of the conflict between thesis and antithesis, as they breed hatred. The concept of the survival of the fittest are the successful allies of nationalism. But the concept of love in Iqbal can only be an ally of Internationalism — an Internationalism which is not a "Law of Jungle".

The 3 point programme of Iqbal, to conquer the world is laid down in the verse quoted below:

یقیں محکم، عمل پیہم، محبت فاتح عالم جہاد زندگانی م یں یہ ہیں مردوں کی شمشیریں

Iqbal was fully convinced that the world trend is fastly moving toward a war of idealogies, in which the atomic weapons will stand obsolete. As such he devoted himself to the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam.

A writer on Political Science advocated that "eternal vigilence is the price of liberty". But where from this, eternal vigilence, is to come? Will it come from the atomic weapons? Can it be had from the coterie of rulers deeply engrossed in wealth, woman and wine? The reply is a manifest No. 'Eternal vigilence' is an act of mind and a trait of character of an individual and a society. It must come from all those values which educate the individual and the society. In other words it can be had from an idealogy. Iqbal recommends the values of Islam to cultivate 'eternal vigilence' to safeguard liberty. Yaqeene-Muhkam 'Amal-e-Paiham and Muhabbat-Fatah-e-Alam are the values stated by him. These values will solidify the Khudi of an individual and a society. The Khudi will invigilate liberty and will effectively check it from deterioration and degeneration.

Contrary to these values of Islam, the powerful nations were ever deluded by the lust and luxuries of their so-called cultures built on the corner stones of wealth, woman and wine. They thought that their hedonistic culture will safeguard their liberty. But they proved to be a failure. Instances can be multiplied both from the history of the East and the West. History bears witness to the fact that only those people rose to power who, comparatively speaking, have had (1) better characters (2) strong feeling of continued action and (3) an undiluded love for simple living. History also supports the fact that people with such traits were successful over people who were deeply plunged in wealth, woman and wine. There has been a coterie of rulers which thought of defending its liberty by the help of its soldiers and the deadly weapons, which their scientists invented for them at a heavy cost. But history has proved it beyond doubt that such coteries, were killed by their own weapons.

The problem of the vigilence and equilibrium of liberty is highly complex. It can not be over-simplified. From the study of different civilizations and cultures one can easily come to the conclusion that the seed of decay and downfall is inherent in every culture and the march of civilization is not a march on the straight line. It is full of incombatable ups and downs. The moral rearmament ever led a naylon to its zeneth and the moral degeneration of a nation pulled her down to the lowest ebb. The only understandable code is that the goddess of liberty does not yearn for the damsel of beauties, goblets of wine, pompous dresses etc. All it desires is the unadulterated worship of those principles which make an individual a man of character and a man of action. Thus we come to the conclusion that in reconstructing our culture, the first and the last arm is morality. Likewise in creating an atmosphere of 'eternal vigilence' to safeguard one's hard earned freedom all amount of so-called material prosperity, all sort of totalitarianism, all kind of deadly weapons are ordained to fail. The rule of wealth, woman and wine has had ever collapsed. The man-made rule of Law has had proved ineffective, sterile and barren. Great monarchs and dictators did great disservice by usurping powers. All that the lofty end demands is the rule of Ideology — the rule of Islam — which gives man what is due to him and which takes from man what is due on him.

It is the schism in soul which has posed a very threatening challenge to the Man of to-day. "The physical force generated by splitting an atom" can be used for the services of man. It is no threat in itself. Iqbal has exhorted the Muslims to get control over the forces of Nature because Man is to conquer it and he is not supposed to be conquered by it. The same view is upheld by Toynbee, a well-known historian of our age. He has very aptly remarked: "The devastating agency that Western Man has thus let loose to his own mortal peril was not the physical force generated by splitting an atom; it was the spiritual force generated by a schism in the soul......He must reorient his spiritual out-look by once more taking for his QIBLAH his father's ABRAHAM'S MECCA in place of his prospector bentham's New Jerusalem." Greater the number of challenges thrown to man by man, society, his Government and the forces of nature, the more active is the Man in giving response. This flow of ChallengeandResponse is a blessing in disguise. It has convinced Man that he must surrender to God alone, because the Oneness of God means the Oneness of man and the Oneness of state. Iqbal expressed his hopes in the future of Man. He says:

شب گریزاں ہو گی آخر جلوۂ خورشید سے

یہ چمن معمور ہو گا نغمۂ توحید سے

# PROLOGUE TO THE FORMALIZATION OF SOCIALTHEORY—ACCORDING TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

#### A. H. Kamali

Social knowledge in general is formulation of thought or language in accordance with the rules that spring from the nature of Social Experience. As Social Experience is communication of 'Social Fact' to an experiencing agent, it is bound to have its grounding, for the fulfilment of its own implicit intent, in the universal and necessary conditions inherent in the composition of that fact.

### I

'Social Fact' to summarize the conclusions of my last paper<sup>15</sup> is a spatial manifold, whose mode of givenness is posited in the connectives that join together mutually other individuals. This manifold becomes object of experience with a knower, within or without, to intuit it.

There is no doubt that the individuals in the composition of the Social order of reality are charged with consciousness, but the division of the Social Experience into subject and object by that account represents indeed, no ontological variations.

The division of experience into subject and object, when read as meaning ontological changeover involves intrinsic objectivity of the object, corresponding to the intrinsic subjectivity of the subject.

This metaphysical view, leading to intrinsic difference of the subject and object of experience, is at the heart of Absolutism and cannot assimilate facts

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> 'Metaphysics of Society', Iqbal Review April, 1963. undergo an ontological transformation of its nature. It remains a subjectivity.

of Social experience, as the latter essentializes a mode of experience in which an ego is in confrontations with another ego, for the uncontestable refutation of the Absolutistic premise of experience in whom the 'ego-in-opposition-tonot-ego' is posited as the Universal pattern of all experience.

In Social experience and not in social experience alone, but also in the knowledge of other minds the inseparable intrinsicality of subjectivity that belongs to the perceiving ego and the perceived ego is not effected. In becoming object of consciousness, the latter ego does not undergo an ontological transformation of its nature. It remains a subjectivity.

Indeed, Absolutism is a very limited and narrow philosophy that does not go beyond the ordinary physical experience in which a knowing mind is in apprehension of unknowing and inorganic objects. Generalization of this experience into a universal and necessary truth implies that all reality in its ultimate character is of the nature of an intrinsic Subjectivity bearing in its experience an Intrinsic Objectivity (...shorn off subjectivity in its own right.). Consequently, whenever Absolutism tries to describe the experience of other subjects, it has to divest them off their intrinsic subjectivity and thus reduce them to empty presentations like the physical presentations in opposition to the knowing mind. But, every spectator of a living person recognizes the intrinsicality of the Subjectivity, that inseparably belong to him. This very admission is a transcendence beyond the limits of Absolutism, and shakes to foundation its metaphysical categories of subject and object, according to whom to know is the logical property of the subject and to be known is that of the object. A subject when becomes known does not really change its nature, and is not divested off 'knowing.' That he is simply known is a 'position' without ontological significance. This truth is expressible as the ontological independence of the object from the Subject in the 'knowledgesituation' or 'experience'.

It is on the basis of this premis which overcomes the limits of Absolutism or Spiritual Monism that access to the domain of Spiritual Existence is possible. Absolutism narrows down to inert and inorganic nature only, but the idea of ontological independence of the object entails widened scope of experience and points out to the possibility of the knowledge of other minds. A sentient being is not only capable of knowing other entities devoid of sentience, but also other individuals who are sentient in their own right. Consequently, to be known is an epistemical position; and one and the same being may be constituent element of number of experiential systems in which he occupies different positions; in some of them he may be subject and in others, he may be object.

Therefore, to be subject of experience or to be object of experience has no import for the nature of a being qua sentient being. This statement may be called Epistemological Realism in distinction from the Epistemological Idealism of the Absolutists.

Since Society necessarily and universally pre-supposes the plurality of subjective agents in its constitution, the possibility of Social cognition has in its foundations the knowledge of the plurality of subjects and as such it involves in its essence the thesis of Epistemological Realism.

Social Knowledge is rooted in the knowledge of other subjects. Therefore, this notation of plurality of subjects in thought or language is the first necessary and universal rule of Construction at the bas's of social knowledge.

The second philosophical ground of Social Knowledge lies in the rule of Mutual Otherness. It is this rule of construction necessarily and universally involved in the social knowledge that differentiates this kind of knowledge from the knowledge of other person.

With epistemological Idealism, the experience of otherself is reduced to the experience of one self, but a case of reductionism is not impossible on the basis of Epistemological Realism also. This kind of reduction occurs when the social experience is interpreted as manifest of one (single) subjectivity and the categories of personality structure are brought forward to process the experience into thoughtful judgements.

When an experience containing plurality of subjects is ordered according to the rule of subjective existence successively, so that it is posited as a knowledge of one single subject in the earlier posited plurality of subjects, there is no more genuine social construct in language or in thought. Yet, constructs of this type and theories couched in its categories are abundant in social sciences. I have already examined that Social experience cannot be reduced to the experience of 'a subject in the plurality of subjects' and have seized upon the Law of Mutual Otherness as the universal and necessary condition of social factuality. Consequently, Mutual Otherness i s the Second Law of social knowledge; and constitutes necessary and universal rule for the constitution of social construct or thought.

It seems very much pertinent to point out that those who revolt against the tendencies of construing social experience as an experience of subjectivity in their flight from Collectivism take refuge in Individualism.

Individualism recognizes Mutual Otherness as the law of social phenomena, and very cautious individualists like Popper and Hyek adhere to this rule as a methodological principle, hence the distinction between Individualism and Methodological Individualism.<sup>16</sup>

However, since no rule is there which has no ground in the nature of experience; and no experience is valid which is not founded on the nature of 'the experienced', there is no distinction between Individualism and Methodological Individualism. The recognition of the law of Mutual Otherness, in Individualism appears as a sanction to employ the individualistic categories, i.e. those categories which are true of the experience of a Subject. Both Collectivism and Individualism commit the same kind of reduction. The category of the 'Acting Subject' is the Key concept in both types of Reductionism. The categoies of social theory are always borrowed from the nature of personalistic experience.

The constructive rule of Mutual otherness which effectively gives protection against collectivism does not safeguard against the Individualistic reduction with the revival of the same personalistic categories and the stratification of the first rule of the construction of subjective experience extends over to social experience.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Individualism is said to assert the ultimate reality of the Individuals, while the methodological Individualism is a principle of constructing knowledge.

The two camps, Collectivism and Individualism fail to project Social experience in thought and language. Consequently, the Law of Mutual Otherness which eliminates the collectivistic reduction must be supplemented by the Rule of Mutual Relatedness as the constructive principle in Social thought.

This rule is grounded in the universal necessity of social Relation as given in the structure of Social Experience.

Social relations in their establishment of connections between the separate egos constitute an order of its own kind. Thus Collectivism and Individualism are not the only alternatives: there is a third alternative also and that is spatiality which truly projects the nature of Social experience. It is constituted in the relationships between individuals and therefore the Rule of Relatedness is the constructive principle of Social Knowledge in whose implementation the distortions of personalistic categories are overcome and transcended. These three axiomatic rules of social knowledge (1) the rule of plurality of subjects, (2) the rule of mutual otherness, and (3) the rule of social relationship can be combinedly denoted as the Schema of Social Space.

Sufficient reason for this schema as philosophical foundation of Social Knowledge lies in the nature of social experience itself. As this Schema lies in the bases of social experience, it becomes the philosophical foundation of social knowledge. As articulated in accordance with it, the constructs and concepts about society become adequate to experience.

Logical limits of social knowledge lies within the limits of social experience. No social construct refers beyond the experience. Consequently, all social constructs which can be translated in terms of the social experience constitute social knowledge. The success of this translation is guaranteed in the schema of construction which apriorily formulates the construct in accordance with the constitution of social experience.

Consequently, the schema which is apriori to the constructs is a posteriori to the social experience. It is obtained in social experience as such.

The social experience is presentation and qua presentation imposes its own schema on the mind of the observer; and the observer by following it becomes conscious of the social experience.

#### Π

Since there is no object beyond social experience to which the social knowledge refers, the social experience is itself Social object. The idea that social object causes social experience leads to the difficulties not unlike those which beset the dualism of a material substance behind sensations.

There is no distinction between social experience and social object. The social fact when it becomes a constituent of some epistemical situation is social experience. The social experience is a known aspect of the Social fact. There are two possibilities: either the social fact completely enters or partially enters into an epistemical situation. In the former case social experience is completely identical with social fact. In the latter case a distinction arises between the experience and fact: the experience is only a constituent of the fact, so that not one, but many partial experiences constitute the totality of the social fact. Consequently, the distinction between experience and fact is epistemically valid; but it shall never be taken as the relation between consequence and ground, or that between effect and cause. The distinction is of the nature of part and whole. The social reality is the whole which is made of the component parts. In epistemical domain, this truth can be stated as the whole of experience which is given in the configuration of the partial experiences.

Since the whole of social fact has the constitution of the relational manifold in mutually other individuals, every partial experience has a movement to complete itself in accordance with its schema. Suppose that I intuit A who is in a social space; my experience of A contains an implicit reference to other components of the schema of social space. The partial experience will not become complete unless all the other aspects enter into the experience. Thus, Schematic completion lies in the nature of Social experience.

The unit of social experience, therefore, is a complete social fact. An experience which is a segment of the unit experience must inevitably move to integrate with other segments of the experience in order to fulfil the demands of its completion. It may be stated, therefore, that if a partial experience demands a logical completion in the fulfilment of the schema of sociality, it is a piece of social experience, otherwise it is not.

In conformation to this; if a proposition like "X is there" does demand completion by other propositions so that to convey a social fact, it is not a social proposition, unless combined with those propositions. All of them put together would convey a unit social fact. Consequently the unit of propositional set of social knowledge is to be defined as one which in its totality satisfies the schema of social fact.

Sociology is a systematic study of sociation and that of the dynamic varieties of its forms of actuality. Though with Comte and Spencer it had appeared as synthesis or apex of all sciences, yet these are the works of G. Simmel, F. Tonnies, L. F. Ward and L. W. Small, C. H. Cooley etc. that could acquire the full vision of the Category of Sociation, abstracted and objectified in the successive re-orientation of Sociology towards the goal of a wellordered science. Highly precious contributions of Max Weber, Durkheim, Von Wiese, W. Thomas, F. Znaniecke, Karl Mannheim etc. have consolidated the Category of Sociation in its own right with developing on its 'grund-begrif a web of conceptual tools that represent the social phenomena in an autonomous frame of reference independent of the constructs that were relevant to other sciences like biology, individual psychology, or say ethics, etc. Now, Sociology moves in a very well delineated context; it has ceased to oscilate between metaphysics and cosmology, or between biology and politics; it operates within the limits set by the category of sociation, and has to advance by feeding only on the immense possibilities latent in its constitution. Consequently, Sociological thought is dependent from its very inception on the structural apprehension of Sociation.

Most of the Sociologists, mentioned above including G. Simmel, Tonnies, and Mannheim import collectivistic categories in the body of Sociological system; there are others like Melinowski, R.K. Mukerjee, and Freud who conceive sociation as instrumental in origin. Consequently, such and possibly other varieties of models lead us to conceive that the definition of sociology as the science of sociation does not by itself guides us to objective and unanimous knowledge, unless the universal and necessary constitution of sociation is not grasped and internalised as the basic frame of reference of Sociology. The 1st section of this paper, therefore has been conclusively devoted to clarifying the category of sociation. That part of our thesis is metasociology, which investigate into the nature and character of sociation, the category presumed in the science of sociology.

Sociation, it has been shown in the preceding part of this thesis, has a place in the order of reality as an ontological category which when assimilated by thought becomes epistemological. As 'noesis' is not committed to any structural form, it has the capacity and the dynamism to adopt any form. Its attention to the being of sociation (a content of reality) makes it adopt the composition of the latter; its structural form becomes the structural form of sociation. In its creative moments then, it creates the 'ideal' entities which are but the determinations of its self-assumed formal nature. These ideal entities organised into a full fledged system is Sociology. Here I do point out to the constructed nature of sociology.

The concept of sociology as a construction in thought has a far-reaching consequences. The most important one is concerned with repudiation of the copy theory of systematic knowledge. Copy theory implies representation of all unbearable details of events in thought, a heap of unordered knowledge. Systematic knowledge, on the other hand, tries to leave out the details. Its mode of development lies in the apprehension of the germinal category of events, and is commitment to that category. By adopting the form of that category, thinking becomes independent of experience, and works out more determinate forms out of the general form assimilated in its nature. I think, at this moment we can do justice to Kant. Kant is perfectly right in so far as he conceives that thinking applies its own categories to the raw-material of experience, but is mistaken if he conceives the categories of mind as eternal. Hegel, Marx, Weber, Mannheim and Cassirer have opened the way to a more dynamic interpretation that the mental categories are gradual internalization of the objective reality. John Dewey's idea of the flexible human nature throws light on the problem in the same direction. However, the enormous possibility of adopting any form inherent in the nature of consciousness cuts short the whole discussion on the point by directly providing logical foundation of the relevancy and validity of objective thought.

The logical necessity of dynamic assimilation of the forms of external reality is universal basis of all systematic thought which after its being posited in accordance with the form of the attended context of reality becomes free from the particular contents. Hence thought, or systematic knowledge is not a reproduction of the particular events.

Sociological system, consequently, is a web of ideal concepts posited by the thinking mind of the sociologist in accordance with the forms of sociation. Systematic Sociology is a thought system; it's particular details are mental entities and not copies of the particular social events.

#### IV

This methodological construction of sociology is quite in line with mathematical systems. Sociological thinking follows the pattern of mathematical thinking. Mathematics is governed by a form whose compositional reduction has been attempted by Peano, Frege, Whitehead and Russel, Whyle, Hilbert, Godel and may others. The thinking mind assimilates the form, let us say, the five postulates of Peano, and constructs ideal entities, i.e. the number system. Mathematical procedure is thus strictly constructive as Kant has originally conceived it. Mind, to give another example, gives to itself Reimanian form (Postulates) and constructs a system of non-Euclidean geometry. The same constructionism as method is adopted in Sociological thought. Theoretical sociology is a system of ideal constructs out of the germinal form of sociation. Mathematics is formal discipline; theoretical sociology is also formal discipline and affirms in its architectonic independence from the particular contents of experience. Those who disfavour abstract thinking have pronounced formal sociology as a dead corpse of ideal forms. But this shows their aversion to the formal aspect of a science, and is likely to detract them from accepting the valuability of even Mathematics and formal logic.

Formal sociology may be an end in itself as an expression of the creative genius of mind in the same way as (formal) mathematics. Only a very small fraction of formal sociology may pass into practical uses, as very humble part of mathematics has found application in physical and other types of experience. This meagreness of practical aspect does not deter the growth and expansion of mathematics. So, it should not become an obstacle to the theoretical activity of the limitless rise of sociology. It may not have practical utility as a whole, still as an art activity, as an end in itself, can exist and must exist.

An intricately developed and sufficiently expanded sociological system with all its ramifications may be readily available like the advanced theory of equation in meeting with the newly developing perceptual situations. Theoretical knowledge is- backbone of perception; and theoretic constructs become applied concepts in relation to the context of fact. Non-Euclidean geometries and mathematical theory of probability have been mere theoretic constructs, but with the new advances in celestial mechanics and the development of uncertainly in specification of the movement of an atom along with its location, they have found respective empirical content to become applied systems. Similarly, many of the branches of formal sociology may become part of the applied sociology. The function of applied science is to describe and analyse the actually functioning concrete system.

Description and analysis of the concrete system presupposes on elaborate background of the theoretic system. Actually existing social systems are intricate cobwebs of relations and their composite configurations. Their perceptual grasp or observation demands that the perci pient should be adequately equipped with the theoretic architectonic which defines, discerns, and picks out the relevant object-matter from the mass of events.

The concrete social system, which is recorded by observation, requires analysis. Its complete particular form is broken in components. This act of analysis is not done in Vacuum, it also needs the theoretical system, which contains in its construct the possible ideal types of the concrete system. Analysis is done by isolating parts of the concrete system in accordance with the ideal configuration. The validity of analysis is judged by the synthetic activity in which an ideal blue print (the ideal form) is kept by the scientist, and the parts are fitted into it. If the resultant synthesis in accordance with the blue print completely corresponds to the actual system, then it is verified that the applied ideal type is relevant to the empirically observable social system. In this manner theoretic science guides the applied science. The formal procedure of applied science follows the steps of observation analysis synthesis and verification; and the entire procedure feeds upon the formal knowledge which is developed according to the principle of construction. Applied sociology following its own rules renders the empirical social systems intelligible by providing their analysis in terms of the elementary forms of sociation. These latter forms are the final terminus of analysis within sociology. It is not the task of sociology to go beyond.

It has been propounded in the preceding papers that social system is spatial system; and it has also been said that mathematics is the science of space.

A question may naturally arise that if mathematics is the universal science of space, what is the justification for sociology?

Our answer evokes the question why there is Geometry. All geometric constructs are exhaustively translatable in terms of the universal mathematics (i.e. Algebra); but still there is geometry. Its existence is justified on the basis of one fundamental fact that it selectively studies those forms which are immediately there in the visual field. Geometry directly studies that space which obtains in the compresence of the visual sense-data. This space can not be reduced to any other kind of space. Therefore geometry has a justification to exist as a science of a specific kind of space. Undoubtedly, it would continue to be a branch of the most general science of space, that is of Mathematics. Similarly Sociology has a right to exist by the side of Geometry to study space of its own kind — the social space. Studies in Sociology have a singular criterion; they follow the principle of social construction. Its description is of immediate significance and has immediate translation in terms of our direct social experience.

There is one more delicate point as it contains an ontological consideration: the mutual irreducibility of the different types of space points out ontological uniqueness given in their various figures; parallelogram, quadrilateral, polygon etc. are manifolds of triangles. Their description involves the presentation of the triangles of which they are constituted. The triangles, themselves, are made of straight lines. Consequently, straight lines and points are the ontological foundation of the existence of such figures. They cannot be deciphered further; they set the root-ground of the study of a triangle. A straight line is the smallest relation between two points; and is, member of the class of lines. Consequently the category of line is the ultimate foundation of plane Geometry. It is indivisible. Its abstraction and removal would change the geometric experience into something else. This experience not only presupposes the points, but the distinctive givenness of the lines also. Consequently the idea of line (or the immediate experience of line) provides the ontological basis of the geometric configurations. Similarly, the

category of sociation paves the ground for the unique order of social formations. It is ontologically irreducible, and presupposes not only the category of Individuals and their mutual otherness but also the unique category of social relatedness which binds the individuals in social systems.

Geometry studies the lines between points and their combinations into various possible configurations. Sociology studies sociation and those combinatory complexities that develop in its different designations. Consequently, Sociation as such is the basic frame of reference in Sociology.

#### VI

Universal and necessary conditions of societies, i.e.

- 1. The axiom of plurality of individuals
- 2. The axiom of mutual otherness
- 3. The axiom of their mutual connectedness:

as has been told, are the philosophical foundation of all social sciences. These are meta-sociological concepts, component of sociation which are projected in the determination of the entire body of sociology. Beyond them, there is no provision of philosophical generalities, metaphysical references and trans-social speculations within its constructions.

Since, not a few sociologist have violated the limits of the systematic discipline, as the ideal of sociology should be, it is really a part of duty to prove such inadvertant attempts meaningless within the bounds of this discipline. Since sociology is determined by its own apriori foundation, it is never competent to draw philosophic conclusions about society, human destiny arts and religion.

Sociology is a science and not philosophy. Consequently it has to incarnate the arche-form of science. I have tried to propound the schema of science and its differenting essence in the Third part of this work wherein I have placed sociology in the group of natural science. Here I content myself to pointing out roughly that the class-characteristic which differentiates natural science within the general class of all systematic knowledge (Wissenschaften) is the Category of Interaction. Unidirectional causal series yield historical knowledge. But natural science as such is grounded in the form of interaction. Mutual causation is the formulative schema of scientific knowledge.

Pure Mathematics is devoid of this schema. But Physics and Chemistry presuppose it, hence are natural sciences. Sociology, too, in order to become science has to presuppose it. It has to view its object-matter in the category of interaction which bestows on it the logical property of a natural science.<sup>17</sup>

Consequently, besides the schema of sociation which is also relevant to some aspects of philosophy, ontology, and axiology, sociology has its ultimate foundation in the schema of Interaction to become a science. This schema demands that if there are two individuals A and B, they must be determined apriori under the form of interaction. A causes B and B caused A. For sociological purpose, the content of this inter-causality is sociation. Therefore, A socially responds to B, and B socially responds to A. I think, the conjunction 'and' in the description of the scientifically schematized situation must be substituted by the word 'cause.' B socially responds to A, which causes "A to socially responds to B", ad infinitum. The abstract schema relevant for sociology would be: A's social Response in intercausation with B's social Response. A and B both are bracketted out; only interstimulating social acts remain in the field of observation. These acts are the data of sociology which are ordered in the schema, of interaction. In a situation composed of two individuals, the Unit of sociological observation is not the act of one individual; it is really half of the unit-fact, which must be completed by observation of the other half. A's affection to B must complete itself in B's attitude to A, and then alone the unit of observation is composed in the category of interaction.

As, it may appear, now, every unit-fact again develops and completes itself in the development of another unit fact. A's social Act causes B's social Act, which again causes A's social act. This interaction shows a development in time, or in more accurate language it has temporal dimensions. Actually

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> To define a science it is merely necessary to define its adequate object. This is done merely apriorily.

existing social facts are not only spatial events but also temporal. Their concrete perception therefore, demands the full category of space-time. The category of space is an abstraction out of the concrete and similar is the case with the category of time, but space-time is the concrete category of concrete factuality. Actual social systems are developing changing spatialities; their changing nature is represented by their temporality. Consequently, the business of sociology must be defined in relation to the concrete social systems, as prediction of the temporal sequences of the system. The theoretical concepts, developed within the body of sociology, must be such that they should make possible inferences as to the temporal dimension of the system. If such inferences are genuinely drawn from the concrete, it is said that the concepts have scientifically explained the concrete system.

The following attempt will gradually make all these points clarified and finally in the discussion of science, their full expositions will be attempted, according to the Philosophy of serf, we have propounded in the earlier papers.

## **BOOK REVIEW**

Interest Free Banking<sup>18</sup>

Since the inception of Pakistan as a Muslim State, one important matter bothering the heads of the intellectuals as well as thi common man is as to how the social, political and economic organisation of this country be adjusted to conform to the tenets of Islam. In the context of economic organisation, the problem of elimination of interest ranks high. In our existing economic organisation, interest plays the pivotal role. On the contrary, Islam has prohibited it. The crux of the problem, therefore, is that of eliminating interest from our economic organisation without impairing the latter's efficiency. In the booklet under review, the author has nicely dealt with this problem and has given some practical suggestions for the elimination of interest. Most of the books on this subject have denounced interest because it has been prohibited by Islam. Hardly any contains practical suggestions for it. The author of this booklet, with his practical experience of banking, has aptly done this job.

Usury has been denounced by all the Monotheistic Religions of the world. Islam has, however, prohibited interest also. In an Islamic State banking must, therefore, be conducted without the element of interest. The author suggests that an Islamic State must have a Central Bank, Commercial banks, Industrial and Agricultural banks, Insurance companies etc. like any other state. However, instead of making loans and advances on a fixed rate of interest, these banks should participate in industry, commerce and agriculture on a loss-profit basis. In other words, they should share the profits and losses in proportion to the amount of capital invested by them and in accordance with the time for which this capital is invested. In Islamic economic system, the principle of *Mudarabah i.e.* participation of labour and capital has an important place. Banks must also follow this principle.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> By S. A. Irshad. Published by: Orient Press of Pakistan. p.p. 100, Price Rs. 10/-.

The commercial banks accept the deposits of the public in two forms the demand deposits and the time deposits. Demand deposits are the deposits that can be withdrawn without any notice. On the other hand, the time deposits are for a fixed period of time. On demand deposits, the banks can take a service charge from their customers. Time deposits must be invested in business and industry on loss-profit basis. The profit or loss must be distributed among the deposit-holders proportionately. Similarly, the Central Bank must give loans to the commercial banks on loss-profit basis. Agricultural and industrial banks must also operate on the same basis. Insurance companies have been denounced by the writers on Islam. The author of the booklet suggests that if insurance companies invest their capital in business and industry on loss-profit basis instead of giving loans on fixed interest, there is no harm in their continuation.

Under the present system, the Government of a country takes loans from the public and commercial banks on a fixed rate of interest. In an Islamic state, the public and the banks that lend their money to the Government must share in her schemes and projects on a loss-profit basis.

The Islamic state will also have to maintain trade relations with other states. It will, therefore, be very difficult to avoid interest in this case. The foreign trade must be under the direct control of the Islamic Central Bank. The Central Bank must maintain a Pool to set off the effect of interest on its foreign trade transactions. For example, the importer of goods from a foreign country who receives goods under a letter of credit has to pay interest to a bank in the exporting country. On the contrary, the exporters' bank in the Islamic state would receive interest on the goods exported under letters of credit. The importers in an Islamic state must pay a part of the profits earned by them through the sale of these goods to the Islamic Central Bank to be credited to a Pool. Interest to foreign banks must be paid out of this pool. The Islamic Central Bank will also receive interest from the foreign importers. This money will also be credited to the pool and out of this a reasonable profit must be paid to the exporters' banks in the Islamic State. In this way the effect of interest will be levelled out.

The author has also emphasised the importance of Zakat in an Islamic State. He pleads for the creation of Community Zakat Funds. The Islamic banks should establish these funds and should contribute towards it as their own share of Zakat. The well-to-do people of the community must also voluntarily contribute towards this Fund. These Funds must look after the welfare of the poor and the distressed. They must also participate in the economic development programmes of the community.

These are, in brief, the main recommendations of the author. Apparently, these proposals seem to be very difficult to implement. However, I sincerely believe that if the society and the Government in Pakistan are willing to accept a major change, some of these proposals may well be implemented gradually.

It is, however, necessary to point out that the proposals made in this booklet and the analysis rendered by the author is of a very elementary nature. The problem in hand requires considerable research and this booklet may well be a starting point for it. The booklet under review contains some printing mistakes. At times the expression also becomes obscure. **However, on the whole it is a readable book.** 

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