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Table of Contents

Volume: 15	Iqbal Review: October 1974	Number: 3
1. 'UMAR B. 'ABD AL-AZIZ'		4
2. IQBAL AND THE MODERN MAN		14
3. DIOTIMA, TAHIRA AND IQBAL		23
4. ETHICS OF AL-GHAZALI.....		31
5. IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF POWER.....		44
6. REVIEWS		56

‘UMAR B. ‘ABD AL-AZIZ’

(His Place in Muslim History)

M. Hadi Hussain

‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz occupies a unique position in Islamic history: he is the only ruler, apart from the Prophet’s first four successors, who is acknowledged as a *khalifa* in the true sense of the word. The acknowledgment, made by all schools of orthodox opinion, is formally betokened by the use before his name of the reverential title *Hadrat*, which is vouchsafed to no other rulers, with the exception of the Prophet’s first four successors, whose company he joined, across a span of six decades, to become the fifth and last of the Rightly Guided Caliphs.

The intervening six decades, beginning with the accession of Mu‘awiya, witnessed an increasing recession from the primary goal of Islam, namely, the establishment of a society living in accordance with the *Shari‘a*, the divine law revealed in the Qur’an and elucidated by the Prophet’s acts and sayings. A fundamental postulate of such a society was a ruler who conformed, and enforced conformity by others, to the *Shari‘a*; and this implied, among other things, his appointment by election and his conduct of affairs by consultation, as prescribed by the *Shari‘a* in both cases. The monarchical system introduced by Mu‘awiya flew in the face of this postulate inasmuch as it entailed appointment of the ruler by nomination on the part of his predecessor and an autocratic form of government in which there was no room for consultation.

The society that flourished under the Umayyads was a society of an order different from the one envisaged by the Qur’an, founded by the Prophet and maintained by the first four caliphs. The territorial expansion and material progress that the Umayyads achieved, great as they were without doubt, were achieved at the expense of Islam’s *raison d’être* itself. The Umayyad empire was not an Islamic state in the true sense of that expression. It was, indeed, a replica of the Byzantine and Sassanian empires with this difference that the institutions and conventions of those empires were reconstructed on the foundation of customs and practices surviving from the

Arabs' pre-Islamic tribal past. It was thus at best an Arabian version of non-Islamic systems of government having little to do with the system of government prescribed by Islam. Islam was no doubt the state religion, the religion of the rulers, the administrators and the fighting men, the religion in whose name holy wars were waged, spoils acquired, territories annexed and taxes levied, the religion whose laws were administered by the courts of justice. Beyond these formal and nominal features, however, there was nothing Islamic about the Umayyad state: the methods of government, the relations between the rulers and the ruled, the public and private lives of the rulers and nobles, the atmosphere of the court, the ethos of the community at large were all different from what Islam had intended them to be. The rulers and their officers were too intent upon serving their personal, dynastic and tribal interests, too busy with self-enrichment and pleasure-seeking – which, in the case of some of them, included drunkenness and debauchery—, too deeply involved in palace intrigues and personal rivalries to devote themselves to building the good society enjoined by Islam. Far from doing so, some of them were lax even in performing, and inculcating the performance of, the purely religious duties prescribed for Muslims, such as the five-time daily prayers. Promoting the Islamic way of life was none of their preoccupations. What reconciled the people at large to their rule was partly a political passivity ingrained in them by the preachings and rulings of the *'ulamā'* in elaboration of the Qur'anic commandment to obey God, the Prophet and the ruler, and partly the material and spiritual rewards accruing or expected to accrue from holy wars, territorial annexations and large-scale public works. Where these failed strong measures were resorted to; in fact, they were the order of the day, their object being to keep the people permanently in a submissive frame of mind, so that they could be made to fulfil their part of the divinely ordained contract between the ruler and the ruled, no matter whether the former fulfilled his or not.

It was in this milieu that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Aziz was born and brought up as a member of the Umayyad royal family. Spending his early years at Medina, where the traditions of piety and learning set by the Prophet and his Companions were still alive, he received instruction in the religious sciences from an eminent scholar, Salih b. Kaisan, and also heard *abadith* (traditions) from a number of Sahabis (Companions) and Tabi 'in (the Companions' followers). This instilled into him not only a high degree of religious learning, but also a profound understanding of Islam, which proved a dominant

influence on him in later life. Meanwhile, however, he was a typical Umayyad prince fond of gaiety, luxury and ostentation, with this difference that his extravagances were of the more innocent type. A handsome youth with a light complexion, finely chiselled features and a well-proportioned figure, though slightly inclined towards fulness, he was conscious of his personal attractiveness and omitted no means of self-embellishment calculated to enhance it. He wore expensive and sumptuous clothes, which he would often discard after wearing them only once because he thought that once he had been seen in them they became old. So lavish was his use of perfumes, especially ambergris, that he would leave gusts of fragrance behind him whichever way he passed; the sealing wax on which he affixed his signet ring would for long smell of ambergris; and people used to bribe his washerman to have their clothes washed in the same water in which his had been washed so as to get some of the scent from his clothes into theirs. He had a mincing walk, which the young maidens of Medina used to admire and imitate. Attended by an entourage of servants and slaves, he would swagger along the streets, every inch an Umayyad prince, a living embodiment of pride and self importance. If a corner of his trailing lower garment got stuck in one of his shoes, he would tear it off rather than stoop to pull it out; if one of his shoe-laces came undone, he would throw the shoes off his feet rather than stop to tie up the lace or have it tied up for him; and if one of his slaves picked up the shoes and brought them back to him, he would take the slave to task for thinking him to be so mean as to take back a thing he had cast aside. When a highly respected religious scholar pointed out to him the impropriety of wearing garment trailing on the ground because of its being against the Prophet's *sunna*, he snubbed and indirectly threatened him, saying: "Don't be like a lamp that provides light to others, but itself burns."

His love of ostentation was not confined to his personal appearance: it came into play even more conspicuously in his style of living, an idea of which can be gathered from the single fact that when he proceeded to Medina to take charge of its governorship thirty camels carried his household effects. But he was not merely a dandy and *bon vivant*; he was also a man with a refined intellectual and aesthetic taste, who enjoyed the company of poets, men of letters, wits and musicians. He wrote verses, is credited with the invention of a number of musical tunes and was an impressive speaker, debater and conversationist with a gusto for the finer points of Arabic grammar and rhetoric, a lively epigrammatic wit and a wealth of aphorisms at

his command. Not impervious to feminine charms, he is reported to have had at least one affair of the heart, the object of his affections being a slave-girl, in whom wit and beauty were combined. He had his share of worldly ambition too, which is the only explanation that seems to fit his demolishing, as governor of Medina, the apartments of the Prophet's wives in order to utilize the the land for the extension of the Prophet's mosque, as desired by' the then Caliph, Walid, and, later, his carrying out to the letter Walid's orders to administer a hundred strokes of the whip to Khubaib b. 'Abd-Allah b. Zubair, a highly respected citizen, who had led the public opposition of the apartments, the punishment resulting in Khubaib's death.

The man who ruled the Muslim empire from 99 to 101 A. H. as the eighth Umayyad caliph had little in common with the haughty, pleasure-loving and self-centred Umayyad prince described above except the name of 'Umar b, 'Abdal-'Aziz. To cite the most comprehensive and yet the most concise description of him, that given by Dhahabi, "he was like his maternal great grandfather 'Umar in justice, like Hasan Basri in piety and like Zuhri in learning" — a combination unmatched in the whole history of Islam, the three men whom he is described as resembling being the highest exemplars of the qualities respectively attributed to them. He signalized his break with his own past and that of his family by his very first act on being informed that the seventh Umayyad caliph, Sulaiman b. 'Abd al-Malik, had nominated him as his successor: he told the people assembled in the mosque for swearing allegiance to the new caliph that, as he had been nominated without his knowledge and consent and without consultation with the people, they were under no obligation to render *ba'ia* (homage) to him and were free to elect whomever they liked as their *khalifa*. That it was he whom the people would elect was not a foregone conclusion: for Sulaimān's brother, Hishām, had already questioned his nomination as soon as his name had been announced. However, the assembly hailed 'Umar as *khalifa*. Thus his appointment conformed to the pattern of 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb's appointment and was a clear departure from the Umayyad practice of nomination by the outgoing *khalifa* ratified by homage extracted by force or threat of force. In keeping with the democratic method of his appointment he proceeded to the caliphal palace riding his own mule in preference to one of the steeds brought for him from the royal stables and ordered away the usual armed escort. His first public act as *khalifa*, initiated on his very first day in office, was to restore to their original owners estates wrongfully acquired by

members of the royal family. Beginning with himself, he surrendered to the *baital-māl* (public treasury) all the estates he had inherited except for a small area of irrigated land, so that his annual income dropped from 50,000 dinars to 200 dinars, hardly enough for bare subsistence. He disposed of all his paraphernalia of luxury and display — his horses, his slaves, his wardrobe, his carpets, his perfumes. Even his favourite slave-girl did not escape this clearance and was returned to the heirs of her original owner. "What about your love for me?" she tauntingly asked him as she was going. "It is still there," he replied; "in fact, it is greater now than it ever was."

Dealing next with his wife, he made her surrender to the treasury all her jewellery, including a priceless diamond which was a gift from her father, the caliph 'Abd al-Malik. Not only did he draw no salary and spend no public money either on himself or on his household, but he would not use for his private purposes any state goods or services, such as paper, candles, fuel, post horses; nor would he accept even the smallest present from anyone without paying for it. Consequently, he and his family lived in such poverty that at times his children cried in vain for milk or fruit, and on one occasion one of his daughters whom he had sent for could not obey his summons, because she had no suitable clothes to change into. He ate his meals at the free state mess for the poor, paying for them. The few clothes he had he wore till they became rags that could not be patched up any more.

He cast anger and pride completely out of his system. Thus, when a petitioner threw a bundle of papers at him, making his cheek bleed, he not only went completely unpunished, but was also granted his prayer. To a governor who had sought instructions as to whether he should sentence to death a man arrested for abusing him ('Umar) he replied that abusing anybody but the Prophet was not a capital offence and that, therefore, he should set the man free straightaway or, if he could not forgive him completely, abuse him in retaliation and then let him go. In public assemblies 'Umar made himself so inconspicuous that strangers had to have him pointed out to them. Aware of a tendency to relapse unconsciously into his former swaggering walk, he charged his slave Muzāhim with the duty of checking him as soon as he saw any signs of the relapse. So modest did his walk ultimately become that people used to say that it resembled that of a monk. He would suddenly stop dead, in the middle of a speech or a dictation if he became conscious of a feeling of pride in what he was saying or dictating, or if he even suspected that he was being prompted by pride in his

power of expression.

He spent his days and nights in accordance with a strict and strenuous regimen of work and prayer, his only diversion being conversation with learned and pious men, whose advice he sought and acted upon in managing affairs of state. His nocturnal devotions were more like the spiritual exercises of saints than the prayers of ordinary human beings, whose spiritual capacity and physical endurance they far transcended. In work as well as in prayer, in public as well as in private life his ruling motive was to avoid displeasing God. Indeed, fear of Judgment Day and concern about the Hereafter dominated his entire outlook and activity without, however, deteriorating into an egotistic preoccupation with his own salvation or a morbid religiosity that might have made of him a quietist or a fanatic or a bigot. He was saved from that deterioration by a healthy belief in what he used to describe as the Greater Fiqh in contradistinction to the medley of hairsplitting, chicanery, sophistry and traditions of all degrees of authenticity which passed for *fiqh* at the time and at which he was more than a match for any of his contemporaries. The principal virtues which, according to his Greater Fiqh, were dear to God were contentment and kindness---the two virtues least practised by the higher society of the day and most practised by him. While the former virtue exhibited itself in his life of ascetic self-denial, the latter did so in a boundless munificence to his subjects. He threw open the *bait al-māl* to the people, fixing stipends for everybody — not merely for the needy, such as the aged, the blind, the disabled, indigents, widows and orphans, but for anybody who came forward to claim his share in the common property of the community. Even prisoners were among the recipients; and, what was more, the stipends were fixed on an equal basis for all Muslims, abolishing the distinction that had existed between members of the Umayyad family and others, on the one hand, and between Arabs and *mawālī* (clients of the Arabs), on the other. A ration of grain was fixed for everybody on a similar basis of equality. For the poor, however, ‘Umar provided certain special facilities, as, for example, a free public mess, repayment of their debts by the *bait al-māl*, issue of good coins for bad ones surrendered by them and, if they were blind or otherwise disabled, attendants at state expense to look after them.

As if to set off these generous measures, ‘Umar abolished and remitted a number of unjust and oppressive taxes levied by his predecessors, such as *jizya* (poll-tax) on newly converted Muslims, *kharaj* (revenue) instead of *asbr*

(tithes) on lands acquired by Muslims in certain regions, taxes on minting money, on melting silver, on petition-writing, on shops and houses, on marriages and on many other possessions and activities of the people. He also stopped receiving presents on the Persian festivals of Nauroz and Mihrijān. In regard to the taxes that remained in force he issued strict orders against the use of unfair or coercive methods of realization. The immediate result was a great drain upon the public treasury without any corresponding replenishment. To the governors' alarming reports on the state of the provincial finances 'Umar's reply was: "Go on giving money from the *bait al-māl* to everybody who asks for it. When there is no money left in the *bait al-māl*, fill it with rubbish." Things, however, never came to such a pass. Thanks to a restored public confidence in the government and a reawakened sense of religious, political and social responsibility in the people's minds — both due to the charisma of 'Umar's personality and the elevating effect of his just and generous policies — the influx of money into the treasury soon outdistanced its disbursement. The revenue receipts in 'Umar's time broke all Umayyad records. As regards expenditure, 'Umar's charities involved much less of it than had his predecessors' imposing edifices, extravagant court ceremonials, military adventures styled holy wars, and lavish grants to their relatives and hangers-on; and even 'Umar's charities soon reached saturation point because of a general increase in prosperity resulting from the fillip given to economic activity by an equitable distribution of wealth and by a fair taxation policy. The prosperity that prevailed in 'Umar's time was of a different order from that which had seemed to prevail in the hey-day of the Umayyad empire, that is during the reign of Walid b. 'Abd al-Malik, who had spent huge sums of public money on constructing magnificent buildings — monuments, all of them, to the grandeur of his reign, built with funds obtained largely through oppressive levies. It was presumably because he regarded such monuments as symbols, not only of human vanity, but also of royal tyranny that 'Umar set his face against building any of them. So great was his aversion that he resolved never to lay one brick over another during his reign. He was unable to adhere to this resolution literally; but the few buildings he did put up were simple and inexpensive structures, all of them but one of a religious character.

Just as he shunned the construction of grand buildings as a means of impressing the people, 'Umar avoided another spectacular activity of his predecessors, namely, *jihād* interpreted, in the narrowest sense, as war on

unbelievers. Far from launching any new military campaigns, he effected the orderly withdrawal from Constantinople of an expeditionary force that faced the prospect of being starved to death for lack of reinforcements. Peaceful persuasion and forthright incentives rather than the use or threat of armed force were his methods of dealing with adversaries, whether those of Islam or his own. Even against those inveterate enemies of the established religious-political order, the Khārijites, he relaxed the campaign he had inherited, permitting them to go freely wherever they liked so long as they harmed no Muslim or *dhimmī*. The happily paradoxical result was that the Khārijites suspended their disruptive and seditious activities on the ground that, as the reigning caliph was a good Muslim, they had no quarrel either with him or with his government. If it was the *khalīfa's* duty, in accordance with the *Shari'a*, to promote Islam in the sense of adding to the number of its adherents, 'Umar performed this duty better than most khalīfas, and he did so without recourse to arms. His stopping of the realization of, *jizya* from newly converted Muslims opened the flood-gates of conversion. At the same time his highly tolerant policy towards the *dhimmīs* (i. e. Jews and Christians enjoying the protection of the state on payment of a poll-tax) encouraged them to remain loyal and peaceful. There was thus no religious strife during 'Umar's reign. Religion became a unifying rather than a divisive factor: the followers of every religion and sect carried on their own religious practices and professed their own beliefs undisturbed by others. If the caliph was a devout Muslim and if he administered the affairs of the state in accordance with the *Shari'a's* commands and prohibitions, the adherents of other religions followed their own way of life in harmony with the Muslims as their equals in all civic and legal matters.

No better proof could be demanded of 'Umar's respect for the *dhimmīs'* places of worship and of his upholding their rights vis-a-vis the *umar n.* -Ana ai — Aziz Muslims than was provided by his ordering the restoration to the Christians of an area of land which Walid had forcibly acquired for the extension of the Grand Mosque at Damascus. As 'Umar must have expected, the order caused a stir among the Muslims; but that did not make him rescind the order: he stuck to it because he was sure that it was right and just. That the order was also wise and statesmanlike was proved by the fact that it led to a happy compromise whereby the Christians accepted another piece of land offered to them by the Muslims in lieu of the one in dispute. This liberality was the more remarkable for being practised by one who was an

ardent champion and promoter of Islam and so particular about the formal correctness of his prayers that he appointed thirteen muezzins in the royal mosque to say the *adhān* one after another in order to make sure that he would have time to walk to the mosque and be ready to start leading the prayers before the last of the muezzins had completed his *adhān*.

The Christians reciprocated ‘Umar’s just and gracious treatment of them with a profound veneration for him. What better compliment could a Christian have ever paid to a Muslim or for that matter to anybody than was paid to ‘Umar by the Byzantine emperor when, on hearing of ‘Umar’ death, he said to a Muslim visitor, Muhammad b. Said: "If there was any man after Jesus Christ who could bring the dead back to life, that man was ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz." Nor were the Christians alone in revering him: the Muslims, all sects of them, did so too. The Sunnis regarded him as a *mujaddid* (a renovator of Islam) because of his great piety and learning, his following the Prophet’s *sunna* in everything he did, and his reviving the traditions of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. The Shias were grateful to him for excluding from the Friday sermon the imprecations on ‘Ali introduced by Mu’awiya, for the respect and consideration he showed to ‘Ali’s descendants and for his restoring their stipends. Even the Kharijites, as we have already mentioned, did him the honour of acknowledging him to be a good Muslim and a righteous *khalifa* -- a rare thing for them to do. The only people who disliked him were the members of the Umayyad family whom he had divested of their unlawful acquisitions and undue privileges. It was they who won the day by removing him from the scene with the aid of poison administered by a slave (whom, incidentally, ‘Umar granted pardon and freedom with the advice to go to some place where nobody could find him). Their triumph, however, was short-lived: history was on the side of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. When the ‘Abbasids overthrew the Umayyads three decades later, 1 they celebrated their victory not only by putting to death every Umayyad they could lay hands on, but also by demolishing the graves of the Umayyads’ dead, exhuming their remains and publicly dishonouring them — with one exception, namely, ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. Neither the manic vengeance of the ‘Abbāsids nor the pent-up rage of the people against their fallen oppressors touched ‘Umar’s grave. It remained intact in a church graveyard, where ‘Umar had bought the land for it during his last illness in order to make sure of being buried in legitimately acquired land, gently declining the pastor’s offer of a free gift and authorizing him to level his grave to the

ground after a year, for which he had bought the land — which authority the pastor, of course, did not exercise. An index to what the ‘Abbāsids thought of him is provided by an admission attributed to the ‘Abbasid caliph al-Mandi that one of the things in which the Umayyads had surpassed his dynasty was that they had produced ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.

It is a strange commentary on the latter-day Muslims’ reading of Islamic history that the long list of their popular heroes, which ranges from conquerors, empire-builders, rulers and statesmen to saints, scholars, thinkers, jurists, scientists, writers and poets, does not contain the name of ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. They content themselves with honouring him by using Ḥaḍrat before his name and with pronouncing the conventional words invoking God’s mercy on him. The occasions on which they do even that must be few; for ‘Umar’s name is not a household word like that of, say, his illustrious namesake and model, Umar b. al-Khaitab, or, for that matter, like those of many lesser men with a more powerful appeal to the popular imagination than that of a righteous, pious, self-denying, compassionate and peace-loving *kehalifa*, even if by living, both as ruler and as man, in accordance with the spirit of the Islamic *Shari’a* he presented to the world an embodiment of the Islamic ideal of leadership. For the popular mind ideals of this kind are abstract entities belonging to some metaphysical realm: it cannot recognize them when it sees them embodied in creatures of flesh and blood. What is, however, incomprehensible, except on the hypothesis that Islamic scholarship, especially in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, has allowed itself to be influenced by popular preferences, is that very little that was worth writing or is worth reading has been written on ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. One cannot help feeling a shock of surprise when one observes that even Iqbal overlooked him; for one would have thought that in this royal saint, no less than in any of the personalities that figure in his works and, indeed, more than in some of them, Iqbal would have found a perfect paradigm of the human virtues he extolled and to whose synthesis in flesh and blood he gave the name of the Perfect Man or its variants. However, ‘Umar has only paid the price of being what he was. His awe-inspiring moral loftiness, to mention only one of his many qualities, inspires a distant reverence more naturally than it engenders that warm admiration for superior, but imitable, virtues which transfigures men into heroes for humanity in generals — heroes in whom the common people can, with conviction, see themselves idealized.

IQBAL AND THE MODERN MAN

Khalid Ishaque

When Pakistan - the great vision of Iqbal — came into existence, the Islamic community thought it had arrived at its destination. It put down its guards and put aside its arms. It did so when, in fact, the great struggle was just beginning. In a simple-minded fashion, political liberty was confused with spiritual and intellectual freedom. The first, doubtless, has been achieved, but achieving the second, demanded a more arduous devotion and constant effort.

2. Observing the community's performance over the last 27 years, a critic could justifiably charge that the post-partition history of Pakistan can be characterized as the beginning of a new type of Western imperialism, particularly through economic aid and trade on the one hand, and through cheap books, magazines, films and radio on the other. The power was so subtly exercised that the new slaves did not recognise the chains any more. They called them borrowed bracelets!

3. To Iqbal, the spiritually empty but externally glittering West, against which he warned the community so insistently, was a threat, looming large. Perhaps, he did not anticipate how overwhelmingly would it enchant the beleaguered community. When Iqbal rung his warning bell, against Western materialism, there were many, even in the West, who saw the symptoms but stoutly protested against the charge and claimed that basically the heart was in the right place and Western Man was spiritually as healthy as ever. Since then a great deal happened to more than justify Iqbal's pre-monition.

4. The Second World War, the discovery of the wide-spread spiritual emptiness of the Nazi and Fascist regimes and the colossal inhumanity of Stalin's regime shattered all illusions about the existence of spiritual strength in the Western Man. The display of unspeakable inhumanity in Pearl Harbour and Hiroshima, in Moscow and in Hungary, in Dachau and many other places shattered all the carefully nurtured illusions about the existence of an enviable value pattern in the Western Man. This was one facet.

5. Side by side, the total power available to mankind to produce goods for immediate satisfaction of physical needs and pleasures has increased manifold. There has come about a worldwide democratisation of good things

of life. The spiritual emptiness of the modern materialist is sought to be filled by the sound of jazz and din of automobiles. People recklessly plunge into a race for acquisition of things to distract the mind, to engage the eye, to satiate the body, and fill all the time. In the 20th century, there has been no shortage of worldly philosophers justifying the new materialism. But the newly discovered power has another aspect also. Means are now available to release the natural forces imprisoned in matter at a dimension that humanity can easily obliterate itself out of existence. The possibility of total destruction is one pervasive fact of modern world. The resultant outlook is singularly confused.

6. Notwithstanding the astounding glitter, the growing spiritual emptiness continues. The facade of normalcy shows signs of strain and decay. Each day, its mortar crumbles a little more. The much touted and so-called axiomatic principles of economics and politics seem ever so uncertain sources of strength. Democracy or its identifiable techniques do not seem any more to prevent totalitarianism, or oppression; fundamental rights bind no dictator's hand; tight monetary controls no more prevent inflation; state-controlled cooperatives or socialised farming does not increase the produce; nor the state-controlled industries assure a better lot to the individual worker.

7. The decisions are increasingly getting out of hand. A worker in a factory hardly has a meaningful say in regard to what he does or produces. At a slightly higher scale, the manager of the factory finds himself a helpless creature in the hands of yet higher and stronger combinations. The legislator in the highest national legislature feels equally helpless. The options and choices in the making of national legislative: policy originate and are dealt with at a yet different level, and often enough the legislatures are called upon to merely authenticate what has already been decided beforehand. This is true of Soviet Supreme as of British Parliament, perhaps with only a slight difference of degrees. A frustrating sense of helplessness seems to permeate society at all its levels.

8. Simultaneously, a mad struggle is on to control the communication media, the means to manipulate the human mind. The colossal battle for the control of human mind is on in full fury. Radio, television, films, newspapers, magazines and paperbacks are now locked in struggle to control human mind. All entertainment and information is objective oriented—whether to promote free enterprise in the so-called free societies, or the fearsome leviathan known as the modern socialist welfare state. Overt and covert

indoctrination goes on constantly. In the evenings or at night, after the day's chores are done, hardly any conversation or exchange takes place between parents and children or husband-wife. They are all being talked to, by the Radio or the television, who represent either the 'big industry' or the "big brother". The hard-earned free hours have become the covert schools for deprivation of all freedom. Freedom implies a genuine possibility of choice — an exercise of critical faculty. But where all media reaching the most private sanctuary of a man's home give no information but constantly serve creation of a desired opinion, then the critical faculty is put to a deep slumber; it has no chance of survival. However, when the performance of a self-proclaimed welfare state fails to match its promise, large doses of propaganda whet the appetite but fail to carry conviction; the daily widening gap between expectations and achievements produces two typical reactions: scepticism and apathy in some and commitment to violent and revolutionary politics in others. Scepticism and apathy produce lack of commitment and nothing is more tragic than a soul without faith and without commitment. On the other hand, the revolutionary politics of gun reduces humans to irrational animal level and destroys the under-pinning of law on which the edifice of civilization is built. Informalism and return of mysticism represent reaction of yet another type where it is not merely imitative, it is essentially a search for authentic experience. For the third world, the problem is compounded because a spirit of thought-less imitativeness permeates the avant-garde of the developing countries. Everywhere elites count, but they do a great deal more in developing countries. Our elites thoughtlessly, without an authentic experience of the spiritual and intellectual crises that faces the Western youth, imitatively adopt the external styles of the current categories. Far too many are phoney hippies madly engaged in their hedonistic frenzies; vocal socialists furiously building up bourgeoisie industrial or agricultural empires for them-selves. Such widescale absence of authenticity at every level double confounds an already confused situation. In such a situation, old songs of wisdom and of moderation find few listeners.

9. Constant and speedy change has become a special feature of modern times. The revolution in technology and the cosequent changes in the very structure of human society has made yesterday's solutions otiose for today's problems. Whether it is the field of crop-raising or making of raiment or manipulating of public mind, father's wisdom and experience has become irrelevant for the son. This has had understandable effect in other fields also.

If father's technology could be improved upon, why not his morality, is a growing question in many a young mind, particularly when he is being constantly exposed to aggressive secularism.

10. Things are no better in regard to the past also. There was a time when it provided an image of what people had to aspire for it provided the wisdom which could be trusted as dependable means to solve all problems. Alas! the past has no such promise for the modern man. Over the centuries, a great change has come about in the West. The orthodox Church insisted that everything pronounced by it was as valid and binding as 'the religion', as if the Church was immune from error; no part could be rejected without involving rejection of the eschatology of the whole. Protestantism was a rebellion from within the Christian community, but the rise of scienticism was rebellion without. The very argument that rejection of the part amounts to rejection of the whole was utilized by the modern scientists with deadly effectiveness. They asserted that if a part of what the Church claimed to be revealed could be demonstrated as false or erroneous, no guarantee remained for the truthfulness of the rest. The rise of scienticism provided a great impetus to the modern secularism which seems to have eroded the foundation of religion in the West. When the Church's world view was shaken, its ethical teachings also lost their authority. This was not all. The proponents of all the earth-oriented and secular philosophies borrowed left and right to give new blows to hereafter oriented religions. The theory of relativity was plainly abused to justify the thesis that there was nothing permanent about ethical values and they were also relative in content and application; that there was no higher moral law above the Man, and Man was the maker of all laws including the moral laws. Freud and Marx provided theoretical foundations for mounting fresh attacks.

11. One discernible result of some of above trends is that many, feeling powerless to control their future and finding no meaningful guidance from the past, imagine that the present alone holds the possibility for their meaningful participation, for they can still possess the moment. By choosing to live only in the present, the modern man cuts himself from those values which had propped man's vision of himself as hero in history. The sense of unfolding of a divine design has no meaning for him; long-terms goals have lost their relevance. Institutions like marriage and filial ties have become forms without their former content. Marriage was for protection of virtue; it becomes outmoded where extracting the last drop of pleasure from the

fleeting time is the top priority. Without an identifiable and permanent frame of reference, everyone feels free to seek perpetuation of what he thinks best. The opponent is, by necessary logic of the situation, either wrong or misguided. The issue in conflict is, therefore, not resolved on principle but gets sorted out on the basis of power. The unresolved conflicts continue to increase. The future appears full of foreboding symptoms.

12. Iqbal was keenly aware of the dangers that were implicit in the West for people in the East who were then actively seeking political independence. He warned against the gathering threatening clouds. He persistently pleaded for a clear-sighted commitment to Islam. He boldly sought a separate Muslim State to provide a refuge for the Muslim community wherein it could separately build up the spiritual and physical resources to meet the new challenge.

13. A great surge of enthusiasm got the Muslims a separate homeland. However, quite erroneously, many thought that they had arrived at the destination. Everyone imagined that they could now within the safe sanctuary of the new-found State carry on as before. Few realized that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Little was it realized that modern media of communication recognised no frontiers. The shrinking of the world creates problems common to all humanity. The 'learned in religion' were not yet willing to take a lesson from the experience of Catholic Church in the West. Many persisted as before in refusing to make a distinction between the faith and the historical, space-time oriented experience of the community; between the guiding spirit and the historical shell. Many are quite deaf and blind to what Iqbal was attempting while writing the closely reasoned six lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Not many realized that by re-stating the metaphysics of Islamic thought Iqbal was not rejecting the glorious historical past of the Muslims, but was merely re-applying the first principles afresh, in the light of new knowledge. When many persons are travelling to a distant town, the visions of its outlines would be different at different distances. The view of one looking from a distance of ten miles would certainly give a description different in many particulars from one who observed from a distance of twenty miles. His views will not involve attributing a wilful falsification of his predecessor. He would stand obliged to his predecessor for making his journey possible, by providing the initial guidelines. It is for this reason that for all its modern capabilities, say, in the field of optics, humanity will always remain obliged to Ibn-Haithem, in the

field of radio to Marconi, in philosophy to Aristotle.

14. Iqbal also spoke for urgent fresh and fundamental reconstruction of Islamic Law. A glorious history of a thousand years had amongst other reasons provided a great respectability to the time-tested legal institutions of Muslim people. The immoral attempts of the Rulers during the period of decay and decline to find legal cover for their misdeeds compelled the popularization of the principle of 'Taqlid' by the Ulema. But the new dawn for the Muslim community required a fresh look at the historical heritage. Iqbal was keen that even during his very lifetime he should see a new attempt at rationalization of legal institutions to enable the community to carry the burden of new responsibilities that freedom will bring. He could visualize the new importance that law would acquire in the new world that was shaping. Some work was done, but a very great deal remains. There are innumerable fields wherein the bewildered humanity could grate-fully learn from Islam. In the field of constitutional law, family law, of contract or crimes, Islam has something of great significance to contribute. The pity is that as if in a great big dark hall, the true light-bearers do not as yet know how to switch on their lights. The re-statement of Islamic law for the twentieth century is a project yet awaiting completion. An 'Ijtihad', guided wholly by the spirit of Quran and Sunnah and operating within the limits of Allah, has yet to find universal recognition, acceptance and articulation.

15. To carry the message of Islam to a sick world, is the immediate task which faces all the serious-minded Muslims and particularly those who would like to tread the path that Iqbal lighted. Change — constant change — is, like sheer speed, a new element of the 20th Century world. To discover and stick to an abiding frame of reference is the most challenging problem of the modern Man. We shall have to discover a way to restore Man his dignity. For, the Beat generation is a generation of orphans, cut off from the past and severed from their future. They have heard too many lies and seen too many satans donning angelic masks. Their education has been one great effort in debunking. For them old history dressed up in new garbs would just not do. It is for this reason that the orthodox modernist carries little conviction with the youth. Their loudly-touted old legal institutions are showing signs of great strain and stress. The solutions shall have to be more radical. We will have to study the Prophetic example anew in fresh light. We have been commanded to follow the guidance of the Prophets. No Prophet was bound by sheer history; nor did they ever feel so; they were makers of history and

not its slaves; they were absolutely committed to principles, which they were willing to apply vigorously and consistently and to all new situations. Whether it was in regard to governance of society or fighting of wars or even choice of the apparel to be worn, the Prophet was willing to select a new institution, a new weapon and even a new dress if it served the principle better. Noah was a great ship-builder, and David made coats, of mail. The Prophet (ﷺ) adopted an Iranian style of defence by digging a defensive canal; he ordered his companions to make and use the long Iranian bow in preference to the short Arab bows. He adopted testud and catapult. He chose the Iranian 'shalwar' as a wearing apparel in preference to loin cloth worn by the Arabs, and when asked for the reason for this preference he is reported to have said to the effect that it was more suited to protection of modesty and that he was commanded to guard his modesty. To strike upon a new solution is as much a Sunnah of the Prophet (ﷺ) as treading the trodden path. Examples of many new institutions adopted by Umar constitute a classical example.

16. What then must be done now. The first step is to re-state for the benefit of the humanity in general and the Muslim community in particular what Islam has to say to a modern man. The cob-webs of confusion must be removed. The challenge of secret doubts must be squarely met. In the process, we will have to make a sharp distinction between Islam — which, as a 'deen', was completed during the life-time of the Prophet (ﷺ) — and historical experience of the community. Our attempt to pass it off also as 'deen' has created a perpetual feeling of guilt for the committed, and silent apathy for the uncommitted.

17. According to Quran, the main field of effort for spiritual development consists in unflinching commitment to moral effort within the social group. We will have to accept and propagate by word and deed a profile of Islam wherein people gear up to performance of their social obligations.

18. The second step in this behalf would be to work incessantly for restoration of human dignity to Man--to make the Quranic declaration: "Verily — We have honoured the children of Adam", a living reality. Ibn Maaja reports that once circumambulating the Kaaba, the Prophet (ﷺ)

said; 'How agreeable are you and how fragrant is your atmosphere. How sanctified are you and how hallowed is your station (but) I swear by Him who has Mohammad's life in His hand, the sacredness of a Momin with Allah is greater "than " yours.'

19. This sharing of holiness would create in Man a self-view, befitting his station in the creation. Quran has characterized the Muslims as people who have faith, in God, in hereafter, in believers and in themselves. The transformation of Arabs after acceptance of Islam is a perfect example justifying the above assertion. It would not come except by re-affirming the great covenant between God and Man by giving back to Man his responsibility in the universal order of things. It will come if we all actively proceed to give effect to that great commitment made by Prophet on *Hajj-at-ul-Wida* when amongst other things he said:

"Allah says 'O mankind We have created you from a male and a female; and We have made you into families and tribes that you may recognise one another. Verily, the most honourable in the sight of Allah is he who is most righteous amongst you. A coloured man has no preference over a white man, nor a white man over a coloured man, nor an Arab over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab, except for righteousness.

"O People, your lives, your honour and your properties are to be respected by one another till the Day of Reckoning comes. They are to be respected as you respect this day (Youm-al-Arfa) and this month (Al-Ha jja) in this city."

To see that each person is assured the opportunity to acquire knowledge and to develop capacity to fulfil his destiny is the extreme limit of society's domain over an individual. To over-see that justice is done and that every one is assured his rights is the obligation of every man and woman in Islam, for the Prophet (ﷺ) when asked as to when justice would be established on earth, is reported to have said: "Justice will be established only when the onlooker feels as outraged as the sufferer of an injustice." Imitating the West, we keep crying for our rights without performing our obligations, when, according to Quran, the whole life of a believer consists in discharging his obligations under his covenant with Allah.

20. Lethargy and lack of commitment are the main diseases arising out of spiritual confusion. People are activated and inspired not by discourse alone but also by deed. Working out an enviable social order wherein an individual could proceed from stage to stage in his evolutionary path is the immediate obligation of all believers. The field of economics and of law need immediate attention. But, even, before the great intellectual framework of a great Islamic society is worked out, there is room even now and here for putting into practice the qualities that according to Quran characterise a Muslim. The Prophet (ﷺ) and his Companions were good Muslims even in Mecca before the migration and before the establishment of a truly Islamic State in Medina. In fact, the major cause of contemporary disillusionment with religion is dichotomy demonstrably found between preaching and performance. To a generation fed on propaganda and on an intellectual tradition of debunking of all idealism — whether it be by Comte and Voltaire of old or by the logical positivists, the Freudians and the Marxists of recent times—faith comes with difficulty.

21. Some who live in the West are disillusioned. But there are others—and they are many — who claim disillusionment in sheer limitation. Be that as it may, the problem now has a universal dimension, and the solution shall have to be of the same dimension. In fact, it has to be so because the Prophet (ﷺ) was sent as mercy for the whole mankind. There is room for Muslim intellectuals to enter the current debate in the Western world with confidence and with fervour. It will require a lot of re-thinking because notwithstanding Islam's universal-ism, the Muslims as a community have been too obsessed with their history.

DIOTIMA, TAHIRA AND IQBAL

Shaheer Niazji

Iqbal was not only an outstanding poet of the East but an eminent thinker and scholar of great erudition. Like his predecessors, Sadi, Rumi and Ibn Arabi, Iqbal had adopted deliberately the language of the verse for the expression of his thought and the hard facts of life which seldom gives vent to a harsh criticism and many controversial subjects are easily dealt with in a poetic manner. Every student of Islamic mysticism knows it very well that whatever Rumi and Ibn Arabi uttered in the language of the verse, would not have been possible in prose at all. One of the major characteristics of Iqbal's poetry is ' that he frequently refers to such personalities of the past which are not known to his readers generally and the main reason is that Iqbal as a scholar had surveyed some remote corners of the world of learning extending beyond the range of average scholars. His book, 'Jawid Namah' (The Everlasting Epistle), is full of such allusions to, for instance Qurratul-Ain Tahira¹ (Zarrin Taj), Sharafun-Nisa², Jahan -Dost³, Said Halim Pasha⁴, Syed Ali Hamadani⁵ and Bhartari Hari⁶, a great Sanskrit poet, who is referred to by him first time in Urdu poetry. There is no doubt that the names of these people are known to almost all the educated persons but they are not fully acquainted with the background on which basis an importance is attached to them by Iqbal. For instance Iqbal fully understands what he is writing but the readers are generally at a loss to understand what '*tawasin*' (طواسين) means to him and how '*Tawasin-i-Halla*' and '*Tawasin*' (one of the abbreviations of the Holy Quran) are inter-related.

In this short note I cannot naturally accommodate all the personalities mentioned above; therefore I will simply deal with his verses about Qurratul-Ain Tahira of Iran and Diotima of Greece, whose name is not mentioned.

¹ "Jawaid Namah" (Lahore edition 1947), pp. 126-127

² Ibid. pp. 181

³ Ibid. pp. 32

⁴ Ibid. pp. 63

⁵ Ibid. pp. 184

⁶ Bal-i-Jibril's Title Page (Any edition)

This fact should be borne in mind that Iqbal has name used the name of Sharafun-Nisa as a symbol of piety; the name of Diotima as a symbol of wisdom and the name of Tahira as a symbol of evil, abnegation and rebellion due to her antinomianism.

DIOTIMA

Iqbal has not mentioned the name of Diotima but simply referred to her calibre in relation to the euridition of Plato. Diotima, an out-standing teacher of the art of love, was a citizen of Mantinea in Greece. Many people have been of the opinion that Diotima⁷ is not a historical person but a legendary figure while others insist that had it been the case, the place of her dwelling would not have been mentioned because all the deities and imaginary heroes are always Olympians or Cosmopolitan and belong to no place particularly. Iqbal has referred to Diotima in the following verse:

مکالمات فلاطون نہ لکھ سکی لیکن اسی کے شعلے سے ٹوٹا شرار افلاطون!⁸

‘That though a woman could not write dialogues like Plato but still it was her flame that extinguished the sparks of Plato's wisdom’.

What Iqbal implies in this verse is that though a woman has never been occupying a place equal to Plato but it does not mean necessarily that no woman can be wise or witty enough to rule out the conclusion arrived at by an eminent thinker, philosopher or a scholar. In my opinion it is imperative to give a brief account of Diotima's life and thought. Due to the fact that there is very scanty information about Diotima at hand; therefore we shall have to depend upon Plato alone for the dialogue between her and the great Socrates. At this point we should bear in mind that Plato has ascribed everything to his great teacher Socrates whether it was befitting or not. For instance Socrates was a perfect monotheist and he had nothing to do with the Greek deities and the stories woven about them. His crime in fact was that he had diverted the attention of the young generation towards the

⁷ 'The Dialogues of Plato' tr. by Jowett, chap. Symposium (Library Pocket ed. 1955), pp. 205

⁸ "Darb-i-Kalim", (Lahore ed, 1947), pp, 92

realities and the meaning of 'Divine' in its true sense. His disregard for the traditional deities was enough to arouse the feelings of the infidels against him and to take his life which they did at last.

Plato in one of his marvellous dialogues⁹, entitled 'Symposium' has referred to a conversation¹⁰ between Diotima and Socrates, though according to Plato himself, it seems that Diotima was neither a con-temporary of Plato nor of Socrates and the dialogue is actually based on the teachings of Diotima in general and her ideas about the art of love in particular. Iqbal seems to be very careful about it and he simply refers to her without mentioning her name. However, a brief summary of the great dialogue on which his verse was based, is as following:

'Diotima of Mantinea was a very wise woman and a great expert not in the art of love alone but in other subjects also' says Plato. 'She was the woman who in the days of old, when the Athenians were suffering from fear of an epidemic, had delayed the disease for ten years by her spiritual powers!' Then Plato says ;

Plato = In my opinion and in the opinion of others, the deity of love is fair and good.

Diotima =It is absolutely wrong. He is neither fair nor good.

Plato = Is love then evil or foul?

Diotima =Hush! Must that be foul which is not fair? Is there nothing between the two extremes?

Plato Yes, there is, but I still insist that 'Love' is a great god.

Diotima=But how he can be acknowledged as a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?

Plato = Who are they?

Diotima = You and I, are two of them. Plato = How?

⁹ 'The Dialogues of Plato' (ed. 1955), pp. 205

¹⁰ Ibid, pp. 205-218

Diotima = Since it is clear that 'love' is always for something that we do not possess, as the 'love' for 'beauty' indicates that the god of love is not beautiful and when he is not beautiful, he is not good also, because 'Beauty' is 'Good' and thus a deity who is not fair and good cannot be a god at all.

Plato = You are perfectly right Diotima, but you please tell me what is 'love' then?

Diotima 'Love' is not a deity but an instrument of relation between man and god. Those who are saintly, want to embrace the divine beauty, so that they may become immortal but others who are involved in the charm of flesh lose their seed of procreation for a temporal pleasure.

Plato = Do you mean Diotima that we should not love beautiful bodies of our opposite sex?

Diotima = No! I do not mean so. What I mean to say is that we should procreate in good for the sake of good and not for the sake of physical pleasure alone. You know that the physical beauty is the image of the real beauty; therefore you should shift from this 'unreal love' to the 'real love' which is the destination of our soul.

Plato = I do not understand fully what you mean by procreation.

Diotima = I will make my meaning clear. I mean to say that all men are desirous for procreation in their bodies and souls. At a certain age all the human beings need procreation, which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman and it is of course divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature. Since beauty represents 'good' and deformity

represents 'evil', one should try to pro-create in the good and not evil. We are anxious to pro create because we want to be immortal through gene-ration after generation. Don't you see how all the animals, birds, as well as beasts in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; where to is added the care of offspring, on whose behalf the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost and to die for them, and let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their young. Man is more conscious about it because he is always prepared to sacrifice everything for his children and for his fame or prestige, which to his belief are the real sources of immortality. But those who are pregnant in the body, only betake themselves to women and beget children. This is the character of their love, their offspring, and they hope that they will preserve their memory in future, while the souls which are pregnant in themselves, create the same outwardly and more and more they proceed from unreal to the real. To them the concept of beauty is not physical or relative but absolute. These stages serve them as the stepping-stones from earth to heaven. This world of absolute Wisdom and beauty is above all other beauties in this universe. Consequently the love of the 'Real' is the real immortality.

So this is the summary of the discussion between Socrates and Diotima, according to Plato. Before we scrutinize this statement and separate the facts from fallacies, it is essential to note down some more remarks passed by Plato about Diotima. On one occasion he says that Diotima was a stranger to Athens from Mantinea. She talked like a great Sophist and she taught him time to time but at the same time he regards her a venerated lady of the old days. What we gather from the statement already noted above, is as following:

1. That Diotima was not an Athenian like Socrates and Plato but she had come there from Mantinea, to stay there for a while. It is not certain 'when she came to Athens and how long she stayed there'.
2. That she was a saintly woman of mature age certainly, who had protected Athens for ten years against an epidemic plague, *in the old days*.
3. That she taught Plato time to time and not in one sitting. What he learnt from her apart from the art of love is not known. From the word 'time to time' it seems that Plato had been studying her teachings time to time, because she was not his contemporary.
4. That she talked with certainty but like a Sophist. When she returned to Mantinea or when she died is not known.¹¹

The aggregate that leads us to some conclusion is that though the biographical data about Diotima is not complete but it is evident that she was not a legendary figure but a real person. Moreover she was not a polytheist like Socrates who believed in one God. Most probably she was not a contemporary of even Socrates because no writer of that age including Aristotle and Xenophon has referred to her presence. Iqbal rightly ascribes the dialogue to Plato because Socrates was never defeated by any human being and had never been a disciple of any academic person. He was a God-gifted person like the prophets.

TAHIRA

Qurratul-'Ain Tahira whose real name was Zarrin Taj was the beautiful and learned 1 daughter of Haji Mullah Muhammed Sualeh of Qazwin (Iran). In her youth when she was married, she came into contact of Haji Syed Kazim, by chance, who was a leader of Sheikhi Sect, founded by Sheikh Ahmad. The followers of this sect were antinomians in the opinion of Shi'ah

¹¹ Les religions et les philosophies dans L 'Asie Centrale' by Count — Gobineau, pp. 168

Sect to which Tahira belonged by birth. In the meantime Mullah Hussain, a disciple of Syed Kazim, showed her a letter from Bab¹², the founder of the newly formed Babi group, who seemed to be interested in Tahira. Soon she became his follower and he very kindly called her 'Janab-i-Tahira' (Her Excellency the pure) and, Qurratul-,Ain' (Lustre of the eye) was the title that she received from Bahauallah, the successor of Bab. Bahauallah not only claimed to be a prophet but the Incarnation of God also. He abrogated the Holy Quran and Islamic Shari'ah after introducing his own book '*al-Aqdas*' (The Holy Scripture) wherein he has sanctioned sex liberty to a great extent. For a long time this book was not available but now its English translation is published from London. The copy is very authentic because it is signed by the son of Bahauallah. Tahira was an excellent Arabic scholar and a poetess. She was very pretty, possessed of high intellectual gifts, eloquent, devoted and fearless. She was so dauntless that she made an attempt¹³ to take the life of the King of Iran who was opposed to the Babi and then Bahai movement¹⁴. Consequently she was imprisoned and then killed. Iqbal seems to be one of the admirers of her poetry and talent when he re-produces her poem under the caption of '*Nawa-i-Tahira*' in his '*Jawid Namah*' (pp. 137) but at the same time he refers to her in a most derogatory manner when she appears as prophetess on the Sphere of Mars, in the same book. What he says about her is following:

'We passed by thousands of streets and mansions. On the edge of the city was a broad square and in that square a swarm of men and women was hearing a woman of the radiant face but without the light of the soul. Whose words had no meanings. She lacked the fire of desire and tears. Her breast was void of the ardour of youth. She knew nothing of love and the doctrine of love. Rumi discloses further 'This damsel is not of the Martians but Farzmarz (Satan) has kidnapped her from Europe and has made her perfect in the craft of prophethood and then smuggled to this planet and now what she proclaims is--'I have come down from heaven. My message is final.' She speaks of the secrets of the

¹² 'The Epistle of Bab' pp. 285-291

¹³ *Tarikh-i-Jadid*, pp. 284

¹⁴ 'Bahauallah and Modern Times', Urdu tr, by A.A. Butt (Karachi ed. 1955), pp.277

male and female bodies more frankly. She induces women to become free and not to live as darling of men-folk because in her opinion 'to be a darling' is to be a victim, to be dominated and to be deprived of freedom of action and thought. To be the consort of a man is a torment of life for a woman. His union is like poison and separation from him is sweet. Man is a twisting serpent; therefore flee from his coils. Do not pour his poison into your blood by becoming the mother of his child¹⁵.

She proclaims further 'The divine revelation comes to me continuously. It is revealed on me that the time has come now when it is possible to see the foetus within the woman and now you can have male and female child of your choice. After this age another age will come when all the secrets of nature will be revealed. The foetus will be nourished outside the womb of a woman also but such creatures will not survive. The secrets of life will emerge themselves. The melody without string will be possible. Woman's unitarianism is to escape from the union of two bodies (i.e. the male and female). Be on your guard and tangle not with men¹⁶

In the light of the passages noted above it becomes clear that Iqbal by no means insults Tahira but rather he takes shelter in her name to prophesy about the time to come after him. Now we find that all the movements of women's emancipation throughout the world have similar slogans to shout against menfolk. They demand equality of sex also. The most remarkable thing is that Iqbal has predicted almost all the trends of sexology in modern times, the permissive society and even the test-tube babies which is a recent experiment and which was not practicable in Iqbal's lifetime. This power of prediction is also one of the main characteristics of Iqbal's poetry.

References:

¹⁵ 'Jawid Namah' (Lahore ed. 1947), pp. 126

¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 127

ETHICS OF AL-GHAZALI

Mrs. Arifa Shamim.

INTRODUCTION

Ghazali's ethical views are inspired by his mysticism. His ethical teachings are expounded in his three celebrated books:

1. *Kimīya-e-Sa'adat*; (The Alchemy of Happiness).
2. *Ihya-al-'Ulum-al-Din* (Revivification of Religious Sciences).
3. *Mizān-al-'Aural* (Scale of Actions).

There is a difference in the treatment of moral problems in the *Ihya* and the *Kimīya*. The, third book of *Ihya* contains discussion on popular moral philosophy. While the intellectuals and the philosophers may be benefited by these discussions, Ghazali's intention in this book is to make his moral views accessible to the common people.

Kimīya contains mystical side of Ghazali's ethical teachings. But since mysticism is a part and parcel of Ghazali's ethics, study of *Kimīya* is a necessary prelude to the study of *Ihya*. Discussions on the moral problems in the *Mizān-al-'Amal* are not very different from those in the *Ihya*. *Ihya*, however, is more comprehensive than *Mizān*.

The Alchemy of Happiness

In the preface of the *Kimīya Ghazali* defines man's purpose in the world in terms of Ma'rifat (Gnosis) or communion with God. Man is capable of acquiring Ma'rifat and ultimately the Beatific vision through perfection of his self. By nature he is imperfect. But through constant efforts he can attain perfection of his self. The Science which may enable him to attain perfection is called by Ghazali *Kimīya-e-Sa'adat*.

Ghazali writes: "Just as Alchemy, that changes copper and brass into gold by cleaning them is difficult and is not known to every body, in the same way, this Alchemy (of happiness) which cleans man of his bestiality,

and leads him to the purity of angels, through which he ultimately attains eternal felicity (Sa'ada) is also difficult and is not known to everyone".¹⁷

This Alchemy (of Happiness is Ma'rifat which is both the way (*Tariqa*) and purpose (*Ghaya*) of man's life. Man attains Ma'rifat)through four stages:

1. By knowing himself,
2. Knowing God,
3. Knowing the world, and
4. Knowing the life Hereafter.

The first step towards Ma'rifat is knowing oneself. It is in this context that Ghazali makes his ethical discussions.

It is evident from his treatment of the subject that Ghazali draws all his moral concepts from a psychological study of man. He no-where attempts a purely philosophical analysis of the ethical concepts such as 'good', 'right', 'virtue', 'ought', 'duty', etc. His analysis is through and through psychological.

However, a true appreciation of Ghazali is possible only if he is seen in the background of medieval Muslim thought. Ghazali was an heir of Ash'arite theology on the one hand, and Hellenic wisdom on the other. But the Ash'arite's glorification of the absolute power of God could not justify moral responsibility. Ghazali attempted a reconciliation of God's absolute power with man's moral responsibility by seeking the source of good and evil in man himself. This he did with the help of Greek Philosophy which also sought to explain all moral concepts through a psychological study of man.

The Human Soul as a Divine Principle

In conformity with his mysticism Ghazali lays down both in the *Kimiya* and the *Ihya* that the reality of man is his Heart. Heart is the source of all good and evil in man. Immorality is a disease of the *heart or souls*¹⁸ which deprives the soul of its immortality in the same way as diseases of the body ultimately lead to its death. And just as it is necessary for those among us who are endowed with superior intellect to learn the science of medicine in order to be capable of keeping the body healthy and to avoid death as long as possible, in the same way, it is necessary for every person to learn the science

¹⁷ Al-Ghazali, A .H ,— *Kimiya-e-S'adat*.

¹⁸ The expressions 'soul"Heart' and 'self' are used as synonyms in the *Ihya*

of morality in order to be able to deal successfully with the diseases of the heart, so that the soul remains healthy and tranquil and enjoys abiding and eternal life.

According to Ghazali there may be three conditions prevailing upon the soul to which allusion has been made in the Quran.

1. When the soul is overpowered by passions and desires and is not able to resist them it is called the instigating soul (*Nafs-al-ammarah*)¹⁹ or the indulgent soul.
2. When the soul checks itself from indulgence and tries to resist the desires and passions but cannot successfully do it, and remains unsatisfied with itself, it is called the upbraiding soul (*al-Nafs-al-Lanwamah*)²⁰.
3. When the soul is capable of resisting successfully the desires and passions and is contented and satisfied with itself, it is called the tranquil soul (*Al-Nafs-al-Mutma'innah*)²¹.

Out of these three conditions the soul is diseased in the first state; it is under treatment in the second and acquires perfect health in the third.

The soul enjoys abiding life only when it is able to attain the third stage (the stage of tranquillity). It should, therefore, be the aim of every person in this world to keep the soul healthy and tranquil as far as possible, in order that it enjoys abiding life and eternal felicity (Sa'ada).

Khalq and Khulq

This is possible only through practising morality (*Khulq*). The term *Khulq* has varied shades of meaning. It means conduct, character or morality. In order to avoid confusion Ghazali distinguishes it from another term, *Khalq*. He uses the terms *Khulq* and *Khalq* more or less in the sense of conduct and character, respectively. He writes:--

¹⁹ Quran, XVI : 63.

²⁰ Ibid, IXXV : 2

²¹ Ibid, XXIX : 27,

"We may speak about the same person that he has both good *Khulq* and good *Khalq*. By *Khulq* is meant explicit nature whereas *Khalq* is implicit nature".

Ghazali proceeds to explain these terms further. "*Khulq*" is that permanent feature of the soul from which actions issue freely without reflection²². He insists that *Khalq* ought to be the permanent mode of behaviour.

If a person occasionally spends for a good cause he will not be described as generous. Actions must issue from *Khalq* without reflection. For if money is spent after long reflection and hesitance, it is not a mark of generosity.

In short *Khalq* according to Ghazali, has the following implications:

1. The actual acts,
2. The agent has command over his will and can do good or bad without hesitance,
3. He discriminates between good and bad,
4. He is disposed towards good or bad.

Khalq is not therefore to be identified with the act alone or with the power to act or with the knowledge about good and bad, or with the disposition. It is complete with reference to all these together. In judging a person's, therefore, one has to take account of all these factors.

Ghazali's interpretation of *Khalq* is not very different from what we generally understand by Character. Character is generally defined as a completely fashioned will or a permanent mode of behaviour. Its implications are almost the same as described by Ghazali. As for *Khulq*, Ghazali does not specifically define it anywhere. How-ever, by *Khulq* he throughout understands explicit behaviour or what we call conduct.

Donaldson has = confused the meaning of these terms when he interprets Ghazali. He thinks that *Khalq* in Ghazali is created nature whereas *Khulq* is disposition. This is to misunderstand Ghazali. By *Khalq* Ghazali

²² Al-Ghazali, A.H.— *Ihya al-'Ulum-al-Din*,

Donaldson, D.M —. *Studies in Muslim ethics*; London S — P.C.K. 1953, p. 138.

does not understand created nature. For created nature he has another term *Tab'a* or what we call temperament. *Khalq* for Ghazali is definitely acquired nature which has its foundation in *Ta'ba*, but which is capable of changing. It is what a man becomes by virtue of his disposition or nature and a rationally conceived moral goal. Nor is *Khulq* simple disposition. In fact disposition is implicit in *Khalq*. Ghazali uses the term *Khulq* more or less in the sense of conduct. It is the actual act, as determined by the rationally conceived moral ideal. Both *Khalq* and *Khulq*, he believes, are capable of changing.

Of Human Bondage

Here Ghazali is beset with two questions. Is it possible to change our nature and disposition? 2. Is man free to effect such a change? With regard to the first question Ghazali lays down that the objection that it is not possible for a person to change his character since it is deeply rooted in his passions, desires and, his nature is not tenable. We observe that even animals are capable of changing their disposition, then why not man?

Though Ghazali insists that it is not possible for us to bring about an absolute change in our nature 'for we are bound by our nature, but a relative change is definitely possible. Thus it is not possible for a person to absolutely change his bodily organs or his passions or desires. But through training and exercise he can definitely bring about relative change in them. Our character is formed by our habits. Habits are formed by constant repetition of an act. Habits are liable to become our second nature. But if we have an honest desire to change our habit and adopt a new one we can successfully do it by constant repetition of the desired act. Here Ghazali distinguishes between four types of bad characters that we meet in society and discusses the possibility of preaching them morality. He writes:

"In this particular we may group mankind in four stages. The first are those who are heedless, who do not distinguish truth *al-haqq* from folly (*al-batil*), or the beautiful (*al-jamil*) from the base (*al-qabih*). They lack conviction (*itiqad*), and in the pursuit of pleasures they are unable to control their desires. They are the easiest, however, of the several kinds of men, to cure for they need only the instruction of a teacher (*murshid*) and a sufficient motive to direct them. Thus the disposition of anyone of this kind of men may become good in but a short time.

"The men who are in the second stage are those who know well enough the baseness of what is base, but they do not become habituated to good conduct because they consider that their evil conduct is something enjoyable. As a consequence they engage in it submissively, in accord with their desires, but contrary to their own better judgment. As a result the situation of those in this stage is much more difficult than that of those in the first stage, for they are more at fault. They can, however, resort to one of two expedients. Either they may root out their established habit that makes for corruption, or they may direct their desire towards something else that is not corrupt, relying on the" expulsive power of a new affliction. On the whole they may be said to be capable of exercising this discipline, but it will require strenuous effort.

"Those in the third stage actually approve of base dispositions, maintaining that they are necessary, right, and beautiful. So they pursue them whole-heartedly. It is almost impossible for men in this third stage to be cured. In fact there is no hope for them, except, in the rarest instance, for their opportunities for error (*asbab al-dalal*) are being constantly increased.

"The fourth kind are those who, along with what accompanies corrupt belief and practice, see also a 'sort of virtue in their very excess of evil and in the destruction of lives. In this they vie with one another, and they think they gain fame by the amount of evil they accomplish. It will be seen that they are most difficult of the four stages, and it is of them that it has been said: It is a real torture for anyone to have to train a wolf to be well-bred, or to wash black hair cloth to make it white.

"In summarizing the men of these four stages, we observe that the first are those who may be called ignorant (*jabil*); the second are those who are also in error (*Zalum*); the third are ignorant, in error, and are dissolute (*fasiq*), and the fourth are ignorant, in error, dissolute and wicked (*Sharin*)²³".

Freedom of Will

Ghazali was a follower of Ash'arite theology. His solution to the problem of freedom of will is therefore in conformity with Ash'arite views on the issue. God's power and His will is absolute. There is no efficient cause save God. Man acquires his powers from God by virtue of which he has a consciousness of limited freedom. Man has on the one hand a consciousness

²³ *Ihya, Op. Cit.* p. 58-59.

of being determined by his nature which includes desires, passions, inclinations etc. On the other hand, he has a consciousness of being capable of exercising choice also. It is this consciousness of a free will that justifies his belief in moral responsibility. "While the occurrence of a strong desire or inclination may come without man's responsibility, yet his reason is free to make a decision, and his will is free to accept the decision of reason as good and to implement the corresponding action. In such a case man would be free to do what he desires, but complete control of his desires would be beyond his power.²⁴

Ghazali's reconciliation of determinism and free will is not free from difficulties. He justified moral responsibility on the basis of freedom. But the question is, is not this consciousness of freedom a false consciousness? For according to Ghazali each time a man acts, the power to act is produced in him by God. It is actually God who acts through man. In such a case, what is the significance of the consciousness of freedom and how can moral responsibility be justified? Are we going to justify moral life on the basis of a false belief, Pla to would call a doxa?

Besides, Ghazali on this issue cannot escape the attacks of M'utazilites who would say that such a view calls the justice of God in question.

The Human Soul as a Psychological Phenomenon

Both *Khulq* and *Rbalq*, he believes, are capable of changing. Man can develop good character (*Khalq*) and his conduct (*Khulq*) can be good only if he acquires command over different faculties of his soul. Following the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition and following his Muslim predecessor, Ibn-Muskavaih, Ghazali distinguishes between faculties of soul.

1. The Power of Passion (*Al-Qummat-al-Shahwiya*),
2. The Power of Anger (*Al-Qummat-al-Ghadhabia*),
3. The Power of Reason (*Al-Qummat-al-Natiqa*).

These three powers of the soul should not be confused with the three conditions of the soul described earlier; the former may be called states of conscience, whereas the latter are powers of the soul by virtue of which these

²⁴ *Studies in Muslim Ethics, Op. Cit.*

states prevail upon the soul.

To these three faculties or powers Ghazali adds a fourth, which he calls power of justice (*Al-Qummat-Al-'Adl*).

This last power, namely power of justice, is what keeps a balance between the first three powers and is itself the result of this balance.

Following the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition Ghazali maintained that the first three faculties of the soul are the source of all virtues and vices. As a result of moderate exercise of these faculties virtues generate. When these faculties are immoderately exercised they result in vices. Virtue is a mean between two extremes, that is, excess (*Ifrat*) and defect (*Tafreet*). The extremes lead to vices (*Razail*).

These three faculties, along with the power of justice, give rise to the four cardinal virtues: Temperance, Courage, Wisdom and Justice. Opposite to each of the three cardinal virtues are two cardinal vices, having their source in the extremes:

1. When the passionate faculty is moderately exercised it leads to the cardinal virtue temperance (*iffa*). As a result of its excessive and defective use we have the cardinal vices: intemperance and inertia respectively.
- 2- Moderate exercise of the faculty of anger results in the cardinal virtue courage. Its excess and defect lead to rashness and cowardice respectively.
3. When the rational faculty is moderate, it generates the cardinal virtue wisdom (*Hikma*). When towards excess or defect it results in deceit (*Makr*), and Ignorance (*Jahl*) respectively.

Alongwith these cardinal virtues and vices, Ghazali draws a long list of subsidiary virtues and vices. Thus e.g.. under the cardinal virtue Temperance (*iffa*) come virtues such as contentment, modesty, etc. The subsidiary vices are greed, discontentment. and shamelessness. Subordinate to Courage are valour, tolerance, forgiveness, etc. Their opposite subsidiary vices are foolishness, stupidily etc. Opposite to the cardinal virtue Justice is injustice. A number of subsidiary virtues and vices generate from them.

The Power of Justice and the Role of Reason

What is significant here is that Ghazali considers justice as the result of a special faculty which he calls power of justice. He clearly deviates from the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition according to which justice is the result of a balance between the first three powers (passion, anger, and reason).

As for the nature of the power of justice, there is a lot of confusion in Ghazali. In the beginning he defines it as "The power which maintains a balance between the first three powers (Passion, Anger and Reason)". Next he says:

"By power of justice we understand the power which brings passion and anger under the control of Law (*Sharia*) and Reason. Reason should be taken as Adviser, and Power of Justice as the power which obeys the command of Reason".

What we gather from the first definition is that the power of Justice for Ghazali is an independent power which controls the first three powers, namely, Passion, Anger and Reason. The power of justice here appears very much like will. But it is will oriented by Reason. or we may call it a rationally determined will. This is clear from the last part of the second definition where Ghazali calls reason the adviser and power of justice a power that obeys the command as reason. As such the power of justice is a power that is partly created and partly acquired. Created in so far as it is identical with will, acquired in so far as it is determined by reason.

Ghazali sometimes seem to identify the power of justice with Reason itself, as it appears from the second definition. But here it is Reason in its regulative aspect. When Reason performs regulative function it becomes will.

One is reminded here of the controversy between Ash'arites and Mu'tazilites, on the question of priority of Reason or will in God. Mu'tazilites stood for Reason and said that God's will is determined by his wisdom. The Ash'arites glorified the will of God and said that God's will is His wisdom.

Ghazali, who is taken by the Ash'arites as one of their strong exponents, seems on this issue to be leaning toward M'utazilites. He believes that God does whatever He wills but His will is always directed by His wisdom. This view is reflected in his ethical discussions where he seems to subordinate will to Reason.

However, the confusion still permits, for Ghazali's account of the operation of the faculty of reason involves ambiguity. On the one hand he

seems to follow Aristotle in that Reason is a power of the soul which generates its own specific virtues and vices. When moderately exercised it generates the cardinal virtue, wisdom. But when its operation is immoderate i.e. either toward excess or defect, from it follow cardinal vices. deceit and ignorance. On the other hand he implies that the four cardinal virtues issue from the soul only when Passion, Anger and Will are under the control of reason. Ghazali regards Reason as an absolute authority over Passion, Anger and Will. The four cardinal virtues follow as a result of healthy relation between the earlier three powers and Reason.

But, again, Ghazali insists that the operation of Reason would itself be checked by the power of justice otherwise its excess or defect would lead to deceit and ignorance. Now, if by power of justice we understand will, it would imply that Ghazali recognises will as an authority over reason. This would contradict and falsify his earlier position, i.e., the authority of reason over the other faculties. If power of justice is identified with reason in its regulative function it would imply that reason ought to be its own judge. This is absurd. It would further imply that reason in its conative function can act contrary to reason in its cognitive and regulative function. In other words a contradiction in practical reason. As such practical reason should be as untrust worthy as theoretical reason. But this Ghazali does not seem to realize.

There is another difficulty, Ghazali believes alongwith Aristotle that just as the excess and defect of passion and anger lead to the vices, in the same way excess and defect of reason result in vices such as deceit and ignorance respectively. This is very strange. As for the earlier two faculties, namely, passion and anger, we can very well understand that their excess or defect could lead to vices. But to say about Reason, which is the guiding and controlling authority over passion and anger, that its excess can ever lead to deceit and cunningness appears very doubtful. Reason is an ideal faculty in man. When Aristotle defined man as a rational animal what is implied in his definition is not that man is actually rational, but that he has the potentiality to become rational. Rationality is man's differentia; it is his nature, his ideal, his perfection. But when Aristotle calls deceit and ignorance vices of reason, and wisdom a mean between these two, he is involved in a contradiction. It would imply that man's desire to, be rational can lead him to immorality also. This is absurd. When reason is man's ideal, his perfection, how can excess of reason generate vices such as deceit and cunningness?

Ghazali, being a follower of Aristotle in this respect, cannot escape this criticism for he also considers reason as the perfection of man. He writes in the *Kimiya* "Man has also been endowed with perfection. His perfection is reason with the help of which he knows God and His attributes, and frees himself from passion and anger".

In the first book of *Ihya* there is a chapter on the superiority of reason. There he defines reason as the purpose (*Ghaya*) of man and distinguishes between superior and inferior men in accordance, as they have more or less of reason.

The difficulty with Ghazali is that he is not capable of defining properly the role of reason in human life. Being a mystic and follower of Ash'arite theology, he would not like reason to have a free play. But, in the capacity of a philosopher and a logician, he cannot possibly ignore the authority of reason with the result, that he vacillates sometimes between Rationism and Mysticism and sometimes between rationalism and voluntarism. Ultimately he seeks refuge in mysticism. In the opening page of the third book of *Ihya* he says "The reality of man is his heart. This is a divine principle in man whose reality is a mystery".²⁵

Metaphysical foundation of the moral concepts

So far, through his psychological study of man, Ghazali establishes that moral notions such as virtue and vice have their source in human nature.

But, as human beings differ widely in their nature, these moral notions become subjective. The criterion of 'mean' provides objectivity to these notions, but cannot provide absolute objectivity. Besides, the criterion of 'mean' is not recognised by Ghazali himself as final. As an author of popular moral philosophy Ghazali defines virtue as a mean between two extremes. But, as a mystic Ghazali recognises a completely different criterion of good actions. To the followers of mystic order he recommends complete suppression of passion and anger by Reason, and ultimate surrender of individual's will to the Divine will. This is possible only through renunciation of earthly pleasures and dedication to God through mystic way (*Tariqa*).

Ghazali's recognition of a parallel moral code (*Tariqa*) for the followers of the mystic order alongwith the popular moral code (*Shari'a*) for the masses implies that the notions of virtue and vice are relative and subjective.

²⁵ *Ihya* p.1.

In order to provide objectivity and absoluteness to these moral notions, Ghazali seeks to establish their metaphysical foundation.

In *Al-Maqṣad-al-asna fī Sharḥ Asma-al-Husna* (The Highest aim in explanation of the Excellent Names of Allah) Ghazali refers to the names of Allah as the absolute criterion of virtue. He writes "The perfection of the worshippers, as well as his happiness lies in imitating (*Takhalluq*) the qualities of Allah, the most High, and in according himself with the meaning of His attributes and of His names — in that measure of course that may be within his right".

Attributes of God thus become values for man — approximation to, or imitation of these attributes his virtues. From a psychological analysis of virtue Ghazali arrives, in the manner of Plato at an absolute notion of perfection:— the attributes of God, like the Ideas of Plato, are the eternal verities. Man participates in these verities by approximating to or imitating them.

However, Ghazali unlike Plato would not allow man to have a free participation in the perfections of God. He imposes a limit by adding, "in that measure of course that may be within his right".

In further explanation of his relationship between God and man, he suggests the limits of legitimate imitation. The worshipper is not required to imitate all the divine attributes. He has no share in the divine names such as the Creator (*Al-Khalīq*), the Artificer (*Al-Bārī*), the Fashioner (*Al-Musammir*), etc. The reason is that man has no way of approach to those Names. But how do we know that man has a way of approach towards certain Names (Attributes) and not towards other Names, Ghazali does not tell.

Here it is interesting to compare Ghazali with Iqbal on the one hand, and with some contemporary writers on Muslim Philosophy, such as Dar, on the other. Iqbal in his "Reconstruction" argues that man shares with God His nature. Individuality and creativity are what constitute God's (Infinite Ego) Essential nature. The same constitute Man's (finite ego) nature. The more a man is progressive in individuality and creativity, the closer he is to God and to his own nature. Man's moral purpose is defined in terms of attainment of these perfections (Creativity and Individuality)²⁶

Dar in his "Ethical Teaching of Islam"²⁷ maintains that the most

²⁶ Iqbal, M — *Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam* (Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf) 1962,

²⁷ Sharif M M.ed., — *History of Muslim Philosophy*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1963.

important attributes of God such as Unity and power are the values of first order for man. Man is therefore obliged to imitate them.

Ghazali's position is notably different from all such views. Being a mystic and a follower of an ascetic code of life, he recommends to man development of his passive nature, and imitation of only such attributes of God as would help him in his surrender to the will of God. These in his view are mercy, kindness, forgiveness, piety, temperance, etc. He forgets that surrender of a free, creative, powerful ego to the Infinite ego is a more complete surrender.

IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF POWER

Reyazur Rahman

For Russell 'the intoxication of power...is the greatest danger of our time]²⁸. Lust of power being the most potent danger of the present day, it appears to be worthwhile, to analyse Iqbal's treatment of power, who is claimed to be a political thinker of some position.

Power has been eulogized by Iqbal without any reservations. Since 1907, he seems to have realized the importance of power as it is evident from the poem 'March 1907', wherein the aspiration and the ambition is to overcome the more powerful tide, the small ants will become stronger and the 'tiger' will awaken to senses.²⁹

It is evident from his letter written in 1915 that it was since 1906 that he was deeply concerned to determine the relation of power with religion. It is also asserted that religion without the support of power is mere Philosophy. And his assertion in this letter that he wrote his *Asrar-e-Khudi* with the purpose to make the Muslims realize the importance of power for religion³⁰ is borne out in clearest possible terms by some of his poems in this very work.

Here Iqbal is critical of Plato for his escapism, which he believes, to have largely influenced the thinking of the Muslims.

"He dominates our thinking,

His cup sends us to sleep and takes the sensible world away from us.

The soul of the Sufi bows to his authority.

And called the world of phenomena 'a myth'?"

"Our recluse had no remedy but flight:

²⁸ Russel, B., *History of Western Philosophy*, George Allen And Unwin, 1957, p. 855.

²⁹ *Bang-e-Dara*. p. 150, 51.

³⁰ Ataulah Shaikh, Ashraf Publications, *Iqbal Namah*, vol. II, p. 45.

He could not edure the noise of this worlds".³¹

To counter the impact of such sufism which teaches other-worldliness and makes the Muslims morbid and inactive, Iqbal wishes to make them conscious of their ownelves and of their ideals and mission in the world.

"The moral and religious ideal of man is not

self-negation but self-affirmation...".

"My criticism of Plato is directed against those philosophical systems which hold up death rather than life as their ideal..."³²

Iqbal's criticism of Plato's thought and his argument about a life of action and expression of power has been interpreted differently. In this regard Iqbal himself has taken a stand, which in the first glance, looks too brutish and radical. Thus, in the *Asrar* he talks about truth and strength as going hand in hand. They appear to be two sides of the same coin.

Strength is the twin of truth.

'Falsehood derives from power the authority of truth. And by falsifying truth deems itself true'.³³

Here it has been emphasized that physical power also is of great importance, because without power nothing could be achieved. It is true that power is declared to be, the sustainer of truth, but not the creator of truth. But admiration for power is so unreserved that his commentators ascribe it to the influence of Nietzsche.

- (a) Aziz Ahmad in his *Nai Tashkil* emphasises that Iqbal in spite of his difference in detail with Nietzsche had accepted his influence in the concept of power.³⁴
- (b) Very recently, a political scientist in a Doctoral dissertation asserts "that Iqbal was subject to a certain amount of

³¹ Nicholson, Reymond. A. Tr. *Secrets of the Self*, pp 57 and 59

³² *Ibid.*, — pp. xviii and xxii,

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 9

³⁴ Ahmad, Aziz, *Nai Tashkil*, p, 282

Nietzschean influence. It was Nietzsche's great emphasis on power which was a matter of constant attraction".³⁵

- (c) By ascribing Nietzsche's influence on Iqbal's concept of power, it is quite logical to involve the latter also in Fascism and as it actually happened. The assertions are made about Iqbal that his national ideal for Islam must make the fascist, leap for joy"³⁶ he was looking for "a dictator saviour"⁶ and ultimately to his satisfaction he declared:

"In Germany Hitler has found a new era"³⁷

Iqbal was acquainted with Nietzsche. But to assert that he was influenced by the latter in his concept of power with all of its implications does not, appear to be tenable. It is contended so on the ground that the two not only differ in the vital aspects of the problem, but they face each other from hostile camps, although there might appear some resemblance here and there superficially.

The following will show that there is neither any validity (1) in ascribing Nietzsche's influence on Iqbal's concept of power, nor (2) in the assertion that Iqbal was pro-fascism.

Power is declared to be the deciding factor between right and wrong. The emphasis on the decisive role of power in matters of right and wrong or even victory and defeat is the result of Iqbal's study of History. The gist of a poem given below will show that it is his study of History which has enabled him to recognize the importance of power and which in no way is Nietzsche inspired. The very caption of the poem apart from its contents is significant: *Qummat our Din* (Power and religion).

In this poem it is pointed out that humanity so many times has had to suffer at the hands of the conquerors like Alexander and Changez. And that it is the verdict of History that lust for power has catastrophic implications. Power without religion is most poisonous, whereas power for the sake of

³⁵ Hassan, Dr, Parveen Feroze, *The Political Philosophy of Iqbal*. United Limited, Lahore, 1970.

³⁶ Smith, W.C. Victor Gollancz, London, 1946, *Modern Islam in India* p. 120-21.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

religion is the panacea of all ills.³⁸

Here it may be pointed out that had Iqbal been inspired by Nietzsche, instead of warning against dangers of lust for power he would have sung in praise of the Conquerors.

Before proceeding further to examine the relation between Iqbal and Nietzsche in the context of power, it will not be out of place to say a few words about power as understood by Iqbal.

Power may be taken as the capacity to achieve the desired object. Thus two elements compose it (1) Capacity (2) Desire. Both the capacity and the desire' may have two aspects each:

'Capacity' may be created either through love, affection, sympathy, unity, or through falsehood, deceit, terror; unity through terror, support through fear by exploiting and sacrificing the weak as suggested by Machiavelli and Nietzsche.

So also 'desire' may be of two types: Material, personal and selfish gain, conquest and personal glory, or moral, impersonal and selfless.

The two stand poles apart both in the capacity or means and Desire or end of Power. Nietzsche aims to achieve power by sacrificing the society (believed in 'individual power' and exercises his power for personal glory and self aggrandizement.

To Iqbal the source of power is radically different from that of Nietzsche. In the case of Iqbal power comes through unity based on religion. Iqbal's emphasis on unity is of vital importance in the context of power which has been generally neglected by his commentators. Power, unity and religion are inter-related. It is unity which creates power and it is religion or *Tauhid* which creates the unique sense of unity. Unity based on *Tauhid* brings power.³⁹ Iqbal emphasises the importance of religion in forging a unique sense of unity. Religion based on sincerity and truth forges unity of thought among them. The loss and gain for one becomes so for all. It creates common outlook among them. Thus they are bound together firmly for the purpose of achieving common goal.⁴⁰

In the case of Nietzsche, neither unity, nor religion has got anything to

³⁸ Iqbal, *Zarb-e-Kalim*, p 29.

³⁹ *Javed Namah*, pp, 227.

⁴⁰ *Ramuz-e-Bekbudi*, pp. 106,107.

do with power, as it is with Iqbal. Nietzsche was no believer either in unity or in religion or God. He rejects both.

A "good and healthy aristocracy" in the words of Nietzsche must "accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who for its own sake, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments. Its fundamental belief must be precisely that society is not allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding, by means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate themselves to their high duties" ⁴¹

Thus for Nietzsche power is to be achieved by sacrificing the society—whereas for Iqbal unity (or millat or society) is not to be sacrificed for the sake of the individual. Society or Millat is the source of Power.

"In his striving for power, Nietzsche *ubermensch* cynically tramples all the generally accepted moral and ethical values, and the people for him are a mere crowd, a herd above which he must proudly rise and reign. Iqbal on the contrary wants the entire people to be made up of strong, wilful personalities united by common ideals of friendship, fraternity, and mutual service. In his works Iqbal repeatedly disassociated himself outright from Nietzsche's cynical aristocratism" ⁴²

Nietzsche declares God to be dead. The question of God's being the source of strength and inspiration in case of Nietzsche does not arise.

"When Zarathustra was alone, however, he said to his heart: "could it be possible! This old saint in the forest hath not yet heard of it, that God is dead" ⁴³

"Once blasphemy against God was the greatest blasphemy! but God died, and therewith also those blasphemous" ⁴⁴

The two face each other

⁴¹ Nietzsche, *Philosophy of Nietzsche*; p.576, translated by Thomas Common, Helen Zimmer etc, The Modern Library, New York, 1927.

⁴² Anikeyev N P., *Iqbal Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan*, p. 273 Ed. Malik Hafeez, Columbia University Press, 1971.

⁴³Nietzsche, *Op. Cit.* p.6

⁴⁴ Ibid. p.7.

It is not only in the source of power that they oppose each other, the opposition between the two in assigning the role to power is still more pronounced. Without going into the details it may be said that it is not a question of difference between the two rather the two face each other from hostile camps. Iqbal desires power to protect the weak from exploitation and oppression.⁴⁵ Besides in the poem '*Qunwat Aur Deen*' as noted earlier, Iqbal tells it in unequivocal terms that power for religion is panacea, whereas power without religion is poi-son. Nietzsche, on the other hand has a different attitude towards owper. Power is to be used for exploitation.

"Exploitation" does not belong to a deprived,
or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs
to the nature of the living being as a primary
organic function; it is a consequence of the
intrinsic will to power, which is precisely
the will to life"⁴⁶

FASCISM

Now an attempt should be made to analyse briefly how far it is tenable to hold that Iqbal has fascist leanings. A dispassionate and also extensive study of Iqbal's political ideas will not encourage one to link him with this creed of destruction and barbarism. In this regard an analysis of the key fascist concepts will throw the whole discussion in proper perspective.

(a) Individual and the State

The individual in the Fascist state does not have his own will. He is to act according to the will of the state. According to Mussolini he is "deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom, but retains what is essential; the deciding power in this question cannot be the individual, but the state

⁴⁵ *Pas Che Bayad Kard* p. 59.

⁴⁶ Nietzsche, *Op.cit.* p. 578.

alone".⁴⁷

"The Fascist state" he (Mussolini) writes "is itself conscious, and has itself a will and a personality—thus it may be called the 'ethic' state".⁴⁸

(b) The State

State according to Mussolini has a personality and a will of its own which is superior to the wills of individuals. It must be obeyed by all. Obedience is to be tacit so much so that it becomes an object of worship. The state is all pervading:

"Nothing outside of the state, nothing against the state, nothing, above the state".⁴⁹

(c) The Leader and the State

As a matter of fact State itself is something abstract. It is the Leader who 'emerges' in the fascist society and identifies his own will with the will of the State.

"The function of the course of justice was openly asserted to be to serve the interest of the state: and the state could be bound by no law, laws was the will of the state formulated by the Fuehrer."⁵⁰

(d) Law and the will of the leader

The position of a fascist leader is quite different from that in a democracy. His will is supreme. He is both the creator of Law and its interpreter. He is himself above the law. He is infallible and is always just. This is what Hitler's Lieutenants used to preach; "Justice and Hitler's will are one and the same thing" (Goering) "since Hitler has been presented to us by God— those who do not place themselves at his side are evil willed".⁵¹

⁴⁷ Joad, G.E. \4. Gollancz Ltd., London, 1948, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics*, p .622 .

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.588.

⁴⁹ Mussolini — quoted by Ebenstein William; *Modern Politics, Thought* Rinehart and Company Ltd., New York, 1955, p. 324.

⁵⁰ Weldon. T.D , *States and Morals* John Murray London, 1962, p. 179,

⁵¹ Joad, *Op. Cit.* p. 608.

Under fascism as noted earlier the state is worshipped and on behalf of the state the leader is worshipped.

This brief analysis of fascist thought shows that Iqbal can hardly be said to echo it. Inspired by Islam Iqbal is a firm believer in the rule of Law. It is for this reason that he eulogizes Khilafat. He refers to it again and again that Khilafat is based on the supremacy of Law. The ruler and the ruled both are equally bound by the same Law.

The Law of God is absolutely supreme...Islam has a horror for personal authority".⁵²

"The Caliph...is fallible like other men and is subjected like very Muslim, to the impersonal authority of the same law"⁵³.

"From a legal standpoint, the Caliph does not occupy any privileged position. In theory, he is like other members of the common-wealth. He can be directly sued in an ordinary law court".⁵⁴

In this context Iqbal mentions the role of Judiciary for maintaining its independence without fear and favour of the Chief Executive. It did not hesitate in summoning the Head of the State to the Court of Law and impose punishment on him if found responsible for the violation of the laws.⁵⁵

So far as the state is concerned, in Iqbal's scheme it is necessary no doubt. But its necessity does not lie in itself, because to him it is a means and not an end itself. And the means for the implementation of the law. In his letter to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1973 he writes that enforcement and development of Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states".⁵⁶

Apart from state worshipping under fascism, war is no less adored. All problems are solved with the help of brute force. Mussolini believed in the importance of state but attached greater importance to war, rejecting peace in human society. William Ebenstein points out "More important than Mussolini's plea for a strong state is his frank rejection of the ideal of peace

⁵² Wahid, Syed Abdul Sh. Muhammod Ashraf, Lahore, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, p. 52

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.61

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.64

⁵⁵ *Ramuz-e-Bekbudi*, p. 123—25

⁵⁶ Malik Hafeez, *Op. Cit.* p. 386.

among nations". War is eulogized because 'war alone' in the words of Mussolini 'puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it.'⁵⁷

"Though words are very beautiful things", Mussolini declared "rifles, machineguns, ships, aeroplanes and cannons are more beautiful things still".⁵⁸

"For Fascism" Mussolini writes, "the growth of empire, that is to say, the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifestation of vitality and its opposite a sign of decadence"⁵⁹

Iqbal emphatically denounces the war of conquest in the name of religion.

"That the Muslim peoples have fought and conquered like other peoples, and that some of their leaders have screened their personal ambition behind the veil of religion. I do not deny; but I am absolutely sure that territorial conquest was no part of the original programme of Islam. As a matter of fact, I consider it a great loss that the progress of Islam as a conquering faith stultified the growth of those germs of an economic and democratic organization of society which I find scattered up and down the pages of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet"⁶⁰

There is no place for war of aggression in Iqbal's scheme of things. He considers the aggressors as robbers. The dialogue between Alexander and the Sea Pirate, shows the hatred that Iqbal had for war of aggressions, when he identifies, the great conqueror, Alexander with a Sea Pirate. The profession of both is the same, to plunder, one does it on land and the other on seas⁶¹ .

⁵⁷ Ebenstien, *Op. Cit.* p. 324.

⁵⁸ Joad, *Op. Cit.* P. 639.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 646.

⁶⁰ Ed. Vahid, S.A. *Op. Cit.* p. 100.

⁶¹ *Zarb-e-Kalim*, P. 157.

This shows that Iqbal would admire only those generals who fight for the right and would brand those as plunderers and tyrants who fight not for the right, rather to establish the supremacy of their might.

In a letter in 1936 he asserts that for territorial gain war in Islam is forbidden so also for preaching religion.⁶²

IQBAL'S CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE

As a believer in peace, Iqbal rejects the idea of war both on economic as well as on religious grounds. Also some of his ideas may be conducive to international peace. One of the basic needs for inter-national order is the existence of international community which unfortunately does not exist and so also the international peace.

Laski emphasizes the point that the nations of the world with their own sovereignties defied the League of Nations and violated the international Law, because they do not possess the sense of being an 'Organic community guided by some superior law. "There is no organic community of its own to which their own law is subordinate"⁶³: In the absence of international community with a sense of unity there cannot be peace in human 'society. There is international society but no such community.

"International Society lacks the Solidarity without which an effective political order is unthinkable"⁶⁴. Referring to the League of Nations, in the *Zarb-e-Kalim* Iqbal points out that although the nations, have formed an association, but even they have failed to conceive the idea of unity of mankind, or international community hence the League of Nations is not human association, rather an association of the different nations of the world.⁶⁵ Believing and believing firmly in the unity of mankind, Iqbal asserts:

In the interests of a universal unification of mankind the Quran ignores their minor differences and says, "Come let us unite on what is common to us all"⁶⁶

Khudi and War

⁶² Ataulah Sheikh, Ed. Ashraf Publications, *Iqbal Nama* vol. I.p. 204.

⁶³ Laski, Herold, J. George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London, 1955, *Grammar of Politics*, p. xviii.

⁶⁴ Peters, R.s, and Benn, S.1., *Social Principles and the Democratic States* Allen Unwin, 1966. p. 369.

⁶⁵ *Zarb-e-Kalim* p. 54

⁶⁶ *Op. Cit.* p.99.

Through *Khudi* and *Khilafat* Iqbal aims at improving the tragic human situation. He emphasizes upon the Muslim the need to establish *Khilafat* to serve the interest of humanity. *Khudi* is recommended to create "Unique" individuals. After passing through the two stages of the development of *Khudi*, the individual becomes 'Unique' and attains Divine vicegerency and in that capacity, Iqbal exhorts him to see that peace and harmony prevails in human society.

"Silence the noise of the nations, Imparadise our ears with the music,
Arise and tune the harp of brotherhood, Give us back the cup of the
wine of love"⁶⁷.

Besides, in a letter⁶⁸ Iqbal himself points out that peace in human society is not possible unless the nations of the world develop their *Khudi*, i. e. completely subordinate themselves to the Divine Command, and power will be exercised only for the law and not for self aggrandisement.

It must always be kept in mind that Iqbal is well aware of the rule of moral law in the affairs of man. This, in fact, is the differentia which distinguishes Iqbal's thought from those of Nietzsche. Iqbal has insisted on the moral and spiritual elements and has identified them with self-restraint. In this regard he mentions Hazrat Ali.

Immediately after the section describing the stages for the development of *Khudi* leading to establishment of Divine Vicegerency or *Khilafat* (about *Khilafat* he wrote in so many places before mentioning it here in the *Asrar*), follows the section wherein he comes to eulogize Ali — the symbol of Power both Moral and Physical.

He is the symbol of moral power because he could control the physical desires. Body is considered by Iqbal as 'dark clay'. It is held responsible for debasing the ideas and thoughts of man and also for making him the slave of his lust.⁶⁹ But this physical power could be converted into moral power by means of subduing the 'body's clay'. By achieving this, Ali, the Lion of God could change the darkness of the earth into brilliance.⁷⁰

It is painted out, that man with the help of his physical power can win

⁶⁷ Nicholson, Reynold A. *Op. Cit.* p. 83.

⁶⁸ *Iqbal Namah* vol. I, p.202.

⁶⁹ *Asrar-e-Khudi*, p. 53

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

territorial war. However, his greatest or brightest possession is not territory but victory over himself.

"Man wins territory by prowess in battle, But his brightest jewel is mastery of himself".⁷¹

Thus, Iqbal not only talks about power in terms of brute force but links power with moral checks, and self-restraint.

Taken into the context of societies or nations the concept of restraint would imply that to satisfy one's own hunger at the cost of others is the sign of the barbarians. In this sense most of the nations today are barbarians. They are barbarians in the sense that they do not hesitate in doing harm to other nations, for their own national interest. And those nations which have the capacity of committing aggression against the smaller nations, do not hesitate in doing so. So far as the society envisaged by Iqbal is concerned, there is no question of aggression of the powerful against the weak either at national or at international level. The use of coercive power largely remains idle, because the individuals possess self control. If at all occasions arise for its use the man in authority will not misuse his it. He will not exercise it for self interest. Through 'self control' he becomes master of his desires.

A person with self control will obey the law out of his own inner conviction and not under coercion. This is the mark of civilized person, which distinguishes him from a barbarian who believes in force coercion. If the members of society obey the law not because it appeals to their moral sense, not because of their conviction, rather they obey only to avoid coercion, force and punishment, they are not civilized. Once the fear of coercion and punishment is removed they will turn barbarians as depicted by Hobbes — they will be thrown back to the state of nature where there is "continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short"⁷² And through his theory of *Khudi* Iqbal aims at producing such individuals in the society who obey the law out of their own inner urge and where the chances of going back to the state of nature do not arise.

⁷¹ Nicholson, R.A. op. cit., p. 87.

⁷² Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, p, 97, quoted by Weldon T.D. *States and Morals*, p. 105. John Murray, 1962.

REVIEWS

A.M.A. R. Fatmi

Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim's "The Prophet and His Message." Published by Institute of Islamic Culture, Club Road, Lahore. (First Edition, March, 1972. Pages 455. Price Rs. 1.5/-)

Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim died in January, 1959. This book is therefore a posthumous publication. Had he lived to have a final look at the manuscript, it might have improved immensely. Nonetheless, the book, as it is, without having the advantage of final revision by the author, is a complete and well-ordered exposition of the subject-matter which he intended to discuss, elaborate and present. And the manner and style he has adopted, and the references employed indicate the author's command over the subject and his mastery over the logical presentation of his point of view.

The text is preceded by a 'Foreword' by Justice S. A. Rahman who says that the Prophet's advent as "Mercy to the World" appears to him "to be the keynote of the author's clear and cogent exposition of the Prophet's teachings". Mr. Justice S. A. Rahman further says that in the Second Part dealing with the Prophet's message, "rationale of all the major Islamic tenets is brought out in a lucid discussion, at a high philosophic level, in consonance with the dynamic and progressive spirit of Islam". There is no doubt that Islam is "dynamic and progressive" but we must say herein lies occasion for deep thought and realistic imagination to determine whether the progress sought for is within the orbit of Islam or it has been allowed to cross the boundary in the anxiety to prove that every surmise of the Western thinkers can be found out in Islam. It is a well-known fact that while a handful of the so-called Muslim integral recommend that the vast and valuable collections of the Hadithes should be discarded as trash, relying solely on the Holy Quran as the only source of law and guidance, the consensus of the Muslim theologians uphold that the two together form an integral whole and "dynamism and progress" must be determined within this circle.

"The Prophet and His Message" is broadly divided into two parts. The First Part consists of eight chapters spread over 165 pages. The Second Part

consists of twelve chapters spread over 290 pages.

The first chapter is captioned "General Introduction" and it is in this chapter that the author rises to the greatest stature of the scholarly exposition of a comparative study of religions quoting all relevant references supposed to be authentic. "Philosophical ethics in the West begins with Socrates and Plato" writes the author, "but they do not make the cords of human heart vibrate". Plato's Republic is an exponent of an "idealistic scheme of ethics and politics" but it draws a "pattern of caste system". Coming to Budha he writes "life, according to him, could not be mended; the only remedy, therefore, is that it must be ended". Krishna desires that a person must be dedicated to his duty. "This Karma Yoga as presented by Krishna in the Bhagvat Gita, comes very close to the positive ethics of Islam". According to him "the simple mono-theistic creed of Jesus" was wrapped into the concept of incarnation which is "a most unforgiveable blasphemy". Writing about Zoroastrianism the author very aptly remarks that it "made existence an eternal battle-ground of light and darkness, God and the Devil" Thus quoting exhaustively and bringing up the distinctive traits of all the extant religious dogmas with reference to some of the great thinkers such as Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, Goethe, Nietzsche etc. quite convincingly and logically proves that "comprehending life in all its variety, diversity and a constant attempt to harmonise multiplicity into a constant unity, is the distinguishing feature of Islam", and this distinguishing feature was not an impracticable ideal or theory but it was so practical that the Prophet of Islam showed its practicability in his own life and his earliest associates worked wonders in the world with this same teachings. Thus "the comprehensiveness of Islam and its attempted harmonisation of the various spheres of life under an all-embracing ideal was embodied in the life of the Prophet".

In the book the author has drawn his material from the Quran, the Hadithes and the Biographies of the Prophet and has indeed succeeded in presenting the Prophet of Islam "as a super-human being, distinguishable from other human beings only by the revelation of eternal truths especially granted to him." The Prophet laid the foundation of a state and society where fundamental human rights were secured by all irrespective of anything. Equality before law and perfect freedom granted to the people are yet to be desired by mankind. According to Islam "life here, as seen and experienced and lived, is not the whole reality. Our purpose should be better and higher life both here and here-after."

In the second chapter under the caption "Before the Call" the author describes the life of the Prophet with great eloquence and marvellous success. He has dealt with the childhood and the youth of the Prophet, pointing out his personal integrity. He has very successfully refuted the unfounded accusation of the Western critics, such as the "Imposter Theory", and the statement of Professor Margoliouth of Oxford alleging that he and his wife Khadija were wont to worship the idol Uzza before retiring in the night. Commenting on the views that he borrowed his religious ideas from the Christian monks he holds it absurd but at the same time he considers "the Orthodox Muslim belief" that the Prophet knew nothing of the Biblical lore as untenable".

Commenting on the blasphemous allegation of sexuality the author retorts "the unjust critic tolerates the Biblical polygamy of these Prophets and Patriarchs (of Israel) as divinely approved but when it comes to Mohammed he imputes sensuality as a motive". Continuing he reminds the Western critics that "monogamy was first made a matter of legislation in the West by the Emperor Justinian, a Roman (and Pagan) jurist". And removing the curtain from the perverted sex attitude of the Western societies he writes..."adultery is preferred to bigamy or polygamy. In the legally monogamous Christian West fornication is not a crime, and the law takes no notice of men and women living in sexual intimacy without contracting a civil or religious marriage. And these nations stigmatise the Muslims as Polygamous. Disclosing the facts about the sexually criminal societies of the West he very rightly observes "Muhammed set an example of ideal monogamous marriage to be practised in the normal conditions of life but as Islam was legislating for all grades of culture and all kinds of circumstances it allowed restricted and regulated polygamy".

The third chapter deals with "The Call". Under this heading he has successfully refuted the baseless theories of Freud, Jung, and Adler and exposed the hollowness of William James and Max Nordon regarding their view of "neurotics". Referring to the local opposition he concludes that the motive was "economic, racial, tribal or national".

The fourth chapter deals with Migration and the circumstances have been explained full.

The fifth chapter is captioned "Arrival at Medina" followed by other two chapters dealing with the Political struggle and Fightings. In these three chapters the author has successfully portrayed the enthusiastic welcome the

Prophet received at Medina and the circumstances compelling him to fight for the survival of Islam and the Muslims and lastly the conquest of Mecca and the treatment meted out to the now vanquished but once blood-thirsty enemies. Commenting on the universal forgiveness he poses the question to the modern world "is there any case in the long human history which can equal in magnanimity this act of unconditional forgiveness for the types of enemy whom Muhammad forgave?" But the civilised West which held Nuremberg trial and killed all the enemies can hardly appreciate this magnanimous forgiveness in so early a period as seventh century A.D. A Christian member of the Australian Parliament, discussing the treatment to be meted out to Vanquished Japan said, "Let us forget all the cruelties and iniquities prescribed by this enemy and treat the Japanese as Muhammad had treated his enemies". But did this appeal stir the stone hearted West?

Mentioning that "when an Ansar died his Emigrant brother inherited from him in preference to his blood-relations" he says that "longer this...natural heirs and blood-relations were given priorities and their shares were fixed". He concludes "the shares thus fixed are generally believed by a large majority of Muslims to be the final law of Islam" ..."but in liberal reconstruction of Muslim jurisprudence it would be legitimate to adopt a new pattern by adaptation to fundamentally different circumstances". (Page 96-97). This view is contrary to the verdict given by all the learned theologians of the last fourteen hundred years. He has however dealt with at length on this point and quoted several instances in support of his view. But all these instances are related to the interpretation of the laws within the recognised standard and norms of the law.

The eighth chapter on "Morals and Manners" is the last chapter of Part I of the book. He has sub-divided the chapter under the headings of Precept and Example and Religion and Morality. Under these two heads he has made a comparative study of Buddhism, Brahmanism, Judaism, Christianity and proved successfully the superiority of the laws of Islam. Buddhism, Christianity and Brahmanism, according to him "developed two common characteristics: incarnation and asceticism". Budha has nothing to offer to us in the realm of civilisation or culture as his ethics is full of negative morality. Christianity "based salvation, not on moral living, but on belief in irrational dogma". "Hinduism and Buddhism taught that human beings are born burdened with the consequences of their actions in previous lives and Christianity said that every human child is born with ineradicable perversion

of its nature. Islam contradicted these and held that human beings are born with human nature with potentialities both for good and evil". He concludes beautifully that "Mosaic law was loveless" and the Christian's "love was lawless". Islam combined the two in a healthy synthesis.

In the Second Part consisting of chapters 9 to 20, dealing with the Prophet's message, "the rationale of all the major Islamic tenets is brought out in a lucid discussion, at a high philosophic level, in consonance with the dynamic and progressive spirit of Islam". The Islamic tenets in these chapters are discussed under the captions of (9) the Religion of Love (10) Rights and Duties (11) The Ethical Teachings of Islam (12) Islam's Ideal Man (13) How Islam Revolutionised Arabian Society (14) Is Universal Religion Possible (15) What is Islam (16) Evolution (17) Religion and Symbolism (19) Islam and Democracy and (20) Law and Islam.

These captions are enough to give a vivid picture of the contents that have been dealt with. The marvel of these discussions lies in the facts that all these points have been discussed in detail with special reference to the views held on these topics .by all other religions and the well-known philosophers and thinkers. Thus the readers are acquainted not only with the Islamic tenets but the tenets of all the extant religions and learned views and they can very well draw their own conclusions and admit the superiority of Islam if read and thought of with impartial and unbiased mind.

The learned Muslim theologians may however differ from the author in certain interpretations which may appear to be contrary to the well established views held by the Orthodox theologians but they must give credit for the learned exposition of his own point of view.

1. On page 180 he writes that the Quran "repeats twice its liberal theistic faith that all believers in God and after-life who lead virtuous lives are saved". This interpretation regarding salvation is not in consonance with the established view of the Muslim theologians.

2. On page 213 the author has bestowed praise on the liberalism practised by the Muslim rulers, in respect of other religions, from Cordova to Baghdad He says "If Islam had practised religious intolerance and coercion and used pressures that were common in the ancient and medieval world, all Spain, all Eastern Europe, all India would have been solidly Muslim today". This may lead a critic to think that the spread of Islam elsewhere was probably the result of pressure or coercion. As a matter of fact in Spain, Eastern Europe and India the Muslim rulers failed in their duty to propagate

Islam through the recognised methods of peaceful preaching and had therefore to pay heavy penalty in the form of persecution, massacre and slavery

3. The Quranic reference of the "Trust" offered by God and accepted by man has been interpreted as "Free Will" (Page 220). This is contrary to the established view. This is a matter of interpretation.

4. On page 298 the author has supported the theory of Evolution. This concept is in contradiction to the established view of the Muslim thinkers. But the author appears to be overawed by the glittering of the Western thought and pleads that "no religion can now command universal approval which runs counter to the conception of Evolution... Through immeasurable ages the unicellular pulsation of life has reached its highest manifestation in the human organism". He further asserts that "no form of life came into existence *ex-nihilo* at a stroke."

The logic that a religion counter to the conception of Evolution cannot command universal approval is fallacious inasmuch as a theory cannot necessarily be accepted for the sake of its acceptance by a section of the Western thinkers. Further the claim that "no form of life came into existence *ex-nihilo* at a stroke" appears to be contrary to the Quranic verse "*kun fa-yakun*".

Pleading the acceptance of the theory, the author on Page 299 holds that 'the unity and solidarity of humanity, irrespective of race, creed or colour, is another indispensable belief for any religion that aspires to be universal'. In this connection it is quite pertinent to note that the Islamic theory of the creation of mankind from one and the same parent is a more unifying force than the theory of Evolution in which it is difficult to prove that only one pair of man could have evolved in this world. The Whites, under this theory, can have reasons to claim that they belonged to different ancestors. Similar may be the explanations of other races. The theory of Evolution has further been explained more elaborately in a separate chapter (Chapter Sixteenth). Dealing with this theory of Evolution he admits that "no orthodox Muslim theologian has ever conceived life and existence in terms of Evolution" but Ibn Miskawaih and Rumi "presented pretty elaborate convictions about it" and Iqbal was convinced that the Quran supported the dynamic and evolutionary view of life". Unfortunately he has not given the references of these authors. Since the theory is disputed, it was all the more necessary for the guidance of other researchers involved in this kind of research. The three

Muslim names quoted by him are held in great esteem by the Muslims and a reference to them might have strengthened the stand of the author. More surprisingly, however, he contradicts himself by admitting that "no theology reconcilable with the concept of created evolution has yet been constructed which would seek its support and justification from the Quran itself." (Page 315). If that be, the case how can it be claimed that "Iqbal was convinced" of its truth? The author, however, belongs to that group which aspires to prove every bit of his own belief from the holy Quran. He claims that "we believe that it is possible to do so". But as the Destiny did not allow him further lease of life, the proof from the Quran is yet to be accomplished by some one of his followers.

Under the chapter "Law and Islam" the author holds that only those rituals and laws which are enjoined in the Quran are rigid and cannot be changed or modified. But those which were prescribed by the Prophet are subject to changes. "It is legitimate to believe that what is not prescribed in the Quran is a variable element". (Page 428). According to him "even if a ruling is believed to have originated in the Prophet he was giving it not as an eternally valid revelation but something that met a particular situation". (Page 430). This position is totally untenable by the Muslims all over the world who very rightly apprehended that its acceptance would lead to anarchy and confusion in every realm of society and no more universal uniformity even in regard to the prayers and rituals would be conceivable. The Muslim Jurists first refer to the Quran and then to the Hadithes believed to be authentic and in case they find anything in the authentic Hadithes, they cannot dare add or subtract anything from it. They exercise their free judgement only with respect to that which is not explicit in the Quran or the Hadith and in that case also they remain confined to the spirit of Islam.

His summing up of the chapter is quite comprehensive. "In Islamic society law cannot be secular in the sense that it should renounce any connection with religion. For a Muslim, religion is an all-comprehensive reality. Personal morality, social relationship, private law, public law, inter-faith or international relations must be justified and referred back to the fundamentals of Islam". (page 446). But for him the "fundamentals" are only the Quran whereas for the Muslim jurists it includes the authentic Hadithes.

In conclusion it must be admitted that the book is full of learned discourses and is a very useful and informative treatise on the comparative study of religions. He has very successfully explored the cause of Islam

proving logically that Islam alone is the true religion and what-ever runs counter to it is false. He has also replied to the malign criticism made by some of the Western scholars on Islam and the Prophet. The study of this book will help a lot the non-Muslims and those ignorant of Islam, in understanding the truth about religions. We wish he would have avoided the controversial matters relating to the fundamentals of Islamic belief.

M. Hadi Hussain: Imam Abu Hanifah-Life and Work.

Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, Rs. 17/- Pages 256.

'Allamah Shibli Numani's "Sirat al-Numan" is a well-known biography of Imam Azam Abu Hanifa al-Numan in Urdu and is still unparalleled, as it gives not only the biography of the great Imam but also an analysis of the salient characteristics of the Hanafi School of Law. It also reveals to the adherents of other schools of Islamic Law as to how much their leaders are indebted to the great Imam, his pupils, and their works. In view of the importance of the book, it has been rendered into English by Mr. M. Hadi Hussain who is so well-known as a writer for his several books in English and Urdu.

The work under review bears an eloquent testimony to the fact that Mr. Hadi Hussain has an admirable mastery over both the languages — English and Urdu. His simple, easy style has facilitated greatly his task of translating the ornate scholarly diction of one of the greatest Urdu prose-writers — 'Allamah Shibli Numani.

Perhaps, it will not be far from truth to say that the present English translation seems, for the modern westernised young readers, to a great extent, to be more easily intelligible than the original. While the translation seems to be marvellously perfect, skilful and accurate, the beautiful language induces the readers to proceed with the work till its end.

The students would have been greatly benefited if the translator would have thrown some light on the method of his own translation in an introduction added by himself, and have enlightened his readers on the system of his own writing and rendering from one language to another. Nevertheless, even the learned scholars excel one another in the art of expressing their own theme and manifesting their own ideas. What is appreciable with the present translator is that he possesses a unique knack and skill with which he displays his own mastery in rendering the learned

passages of ‘Allamah Shibli in his own simple and attractive English.

Just like the writer the publishers also deserve our congratulations and appreciation for making such an important study accessible to us in the present beautiful volume at a moderately reasonable price.

The Arabic readers would not, however, mind some minor mistakes that have crept in the transliteration of a number of titles and names so easily detectable by them.⁷³ The work has distinguished itself for its criticus apparatus and good transliteration.

⁷³ p. iv : al-Durr read al- Dural:

p. V : al-Sumairi: read al-Saimary,

p. vi. (B) al-Intiha: read gal-Intiqa',

p. (25) 'Abr : read 'Ibar'.

p. 13. Qadariyyah : read 'Qadariyyah' : Marjiyya : read 'Murji'ah, p. 19. 21. 'Ainiyyah : read Uyanyah; p• 20, read turuq : 'turuq', p. 21. 2, Shafi raed Sha'bi'.