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THE TIDE OF ISLAM

T.B. Irving

Islam occupies much more of the world's area than most people realize. Between 800 and 900 million Muslims make up about 20% of the world's population, from Morocco to Indonesia. Islam also has contributed fourteen glorious centuries to the world's history. This is mentioning the bald statistics only.

Yet currently the West finds itself in a serious confrontation with Islam that must be resolved if both parties are not to court disaster. The Portuguese finally left West and East Africa in panic because of this confrontation; they evacuated Angola and Mozambique in humiliation, leaving those former colonies to the mercy of the Cubans.

None the less the Portuguese, almost without knowing it, took Islam to Brazil three or four centuries ago when they kidnapped Africans and sold them as slaves in South America. Many of these slaves were nobles who were literate, and whose language of prestige was Arabic, just like the Malay nobles who were exiled to the Cape of Good Hope in the same sixteenth century. These are pages of world history that either have been ignored or are underestimated.

Similarly, the Spaniards finally lost their last toeholds in Morocco and Equatorial Africa only recently, while they still hang on to the cities of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, where they 'refuse to permit any mosques to be built, just as they ban them in Spain itself. The only mosques permitted in Ceuta, for instance, on the continent of Africa, is in the basement of the city market next to the toilets, where farmers are allowed to pray. 'Abd al-

Rahmān al-Dākhil's great mosque of Cordoba can only be used for the noon and afternoon prayers, and at these times only grudgingly.

This Spanish attitude towards Islam and Black Africa was set in the mid-sixteenth century when Bartolome de las Casas from Seville preached Black slavery as a way of saving the American Indians from extinction, which was threatened by their serfdom under the Spaniards in the West Indies and Mexico. The expulsion of the Spanish Muslims from Granada and Valencia spawned the North African corsairs, whose name shows that their model was really set in the island of Corsica. The American Marines took this European battle "to the shores of Tripoli" in Libya in 1804, as their anthem boasts, and President Reagan's present policy continued this in 1981.

Yet no one tells us nowadays that the Maltese Muslims near by were also sold as slaves, because interest in their fate has vanished from our current history books. Their language is still Arabic laid on a Punic base but with a thick Italian Christian overlay. The Yugoslav Muslims living north of the Sawa River were likewise sold as galley slaves to the French navy by the Venetians during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The French then intervened in Syria and Algeria, carving a new empire in the Islamic world after losing Canada and India to the British. Louis Massignon expressed his interest in and sympathy for Islam, but most of their experts have been "Orientalists," which is a harsh word in Islamic circles because these officials tried to find out how to humiliate the Muslim and to make him "submit," in their terminology, to Paris and London rather than to God Alone. French interference in Syria has left us Lebanon as an extravagant legacy that embroils the Middle East in further military and religious suppression.

The British had similar schemes in India and Egypt, where they continued this policy of subjection and bland patronage of decadent aristocrats. The legacy has continued in Pakistan and Bangladesh, both cut loose without adequate planning, and with-out the defensible and recognized

borders that other people occupying Middle Eastern land loudly demand. Perhaps the brightest hope received from the British empire has been Nigeria that now leads West Africa as a new Islamic colossus. There 50 to 60 mil-lion Muslims live, out of a total population of over 80 million. It also has a score of universities which are engaged in freeing their departments of Islamic studies from the prejudice of their British-trained professors.

Nigeria might become the leading Islamic power in West Africa once the Yoruba and Ibo military are convinced that the assassination of Muslim prime ministers and presidents is a crime against humanity and not a national sport. My own book called Islam Resurgent on which this paper is based, was published in Lagos, although it could not be published by the usual publishing houses in the United States.

Islam has been accused of being "medieval," but that is a false charge, though it is still current. When it might have lived in a middle age, Islam produced four great empires to give this judgment the lie.

The first such empire was the Moghul one in India, with its magnificent architecture and culture that was contemporary to the European renaissance. It ended in 1857 with the exile of its last emperor to Burma, but the 80 million Muslims in the Indian republic are still the most skilful and articulate minority in all the Islamic world despite the lynching that harass them.

Next door and contemporaneously, the Safavids of Persia under the great emperor Shāh 'Abbās showed similar glory in architecture and empire. Half the world is Isfahān, they say. Persia fought off the Portuguese pirate and priest, then both the British coming from India and the Muscovite from the north. Afghanistan fought in the same struggle against the British and the Tsars, and trounced the English, sent them packing. Now it is engaged in a similar struggle against Russia, which calls for our assistance. It may lead to consequences within the Soviet sphere itself, as Poland seems to indicate further West.

The Ottomans likewise ruled the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean area in Anatolia and the Balkans for many centuries, long enough to be respectable by any historical or sociological standards. If Cyprus is Orthodox Christian and Hungary the only country in Eastern Europe with any Protestants, this is because of Turkish religious tolerance, not Venetian or Hapsburg occupation.

The Ottomans' heir, the new secular republic, has been over publicized by the Western media and superficial scholars, since republican Turkey cannot maintain the prosperity of its now limited Lebensraum. The adoption of the Latin alphabet has not made Turkish a subject of real study anywhere. The Turks might better have kept the Arabic script, as Iran has, since it is more beautiful and stores the records of Ottoman past glory.

Moreover, more ethnic Turks live today under Soviet rule than in diminished Turkey itself. This fact might be a source of strength for the West, provided its centres of Middle Eastern and Soviet studies could learn to understand Islam sympathetically and cease to take the other side in matters like the Cyprus confrontation. Hitler and Napoleon lost out on the road to Moscow by marching east. Washington's contact with the Islamic world should be friendly in the future if the West is to survive, just as episodes like Biafra and Bangladesh have proved to be counter-productive diversions.

. The fourth Islamic empīre is Morocco. That country has been free since Rome, except for forty shameful years under French occupation when its king learned to drink wine and brandy. Morocco once produced two of the great African empires, the Murābits (or Almoravides in a typical European barbarism) of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the Muwahhids (or Almohades) of the twelfth and thirteenth. The pure Arabic forms give these dynasties dignity once their meanings are clear, as they should be, in the historian's mind.

The Muwahhids' preoccupation with Tawhīd (God's Oneness), shown in their very name, produced philosophers as towering as Ibn Tufail who ranks with Rene Descartes in his artistic analysis of epistemology, and his protégé Ibn Rushd (barbarised as "Averroes"), who provided the texts for the revival of Aristotle in the rising universities of Western Europe of his day. Morocco has imperial cities, as they say, where fine handicraft is commonplace in the marketplace and whose architects worked on stone, not plaster as the Granadines did in the last days of the Alhambra.

The past two hundred years have witnessed the ravages of colonialism on the Islamic body politic. Actually this decline began with the perfidy of Cardinal Ximenez de Cisneros, that great genocide, when he repudiated the 1492 Treaty of Granada, and baptised the Granadine Muslims by aspersion, using a fire-horse one might say, before the conflagrations of the Inquisition, that "Holy Office" as it is called officially in Christian Spain.

Finally only Turkey, Iran and Arabia remained free from foreign occupation, although they all lived under some degree of outside pressure. Since the Second World War the remaining countries have slowly but gradually become free, though their intellectual institutions and politicians still need to achieve full independence. What is freedom when minds and economies are still enslaved?

The British generals Clive and Wellesley fought for the glory of the East India Company in the seventeenth century against Sirāj al-Dawlah and Tippū Sāhib. Then in the following century Indian Islam was transported bodily to Mauritius, Fiji, Trinidad, Guyana and Natal with indentured labourers after Black slavery was abolished. Another mockery of freedom has left some fruitful scars. The Dutch likewise took Islam from Indonesia to Surinam in South America through the same form of serfdom. Except for Kashmir and the great cities of India like Delhi, Hyderabad, and Lucknow, the area is free now, though under military and political pressure, and the communal riots that too often end in lynching.

Napoleon, whom Arthur Wellesley (or the Duke of Welling-ton) later defeated at Waterloo, next tried to occupy, Egypt, taking a printing press there from the Vatican. Then the French occupied Algeria in the Flyswatter War of 1830, the same year as France lost her Pastry War against Mexico. Their frivolous names show the unscrupulous nature of these campaigns. Lebanon continues as an international nuisance because of similar French interference, because that unhappy patch of land is simply not big enough to form a viable state.

Unfortunately the Lebanese Maronites supply the West, especially the United States, with too many of its Near Eastern "experts" who pretend to understand Islam and interpret it for the State Department and the media even though the Maronites never understood it for fourteen long centuries in their own mountains. None the less it was again Islamic tolerance that left the Christians of Lebanon free in their mountain stronghold, just as by contrast the Muslims of Granada and Valencia were expelled from Spain, as they also were from Croatia and Serbia.

Explorers and missionaries soon went searching the Islamic world for souls to save and more land to occupy or conquer, men like Mungo Park and Foucauld in West Africa and Livingston and, the clown Burton in Central Africa. Cardinal Lavigerie had grandiose visions of occupying Algeria and Tunisia for the Vatican. In East Africa, the great port cities like Sofala, Kilwa, Lamu and Malindi, some of which were visited by lbn Battūtah in the fourteenth century, were devastated by the Portuguese and Jesuits two centuries later.

The 'Urnānīs then came to Zanzibar, to free the sawādail or East, African "coastlands" and restore peace, trade and culture in the seventeenth century with British assistance, though the ancient ports were not rebuilt. Ki-Swahili remains as a daughter language to Arabic, which was married to Bantu through its syntax. Their trade before steam navigation and airlines

had been based on the semi-annual winds of the monsoon trade, centuries even before Islam.

North Africa is Semitic today because the Phoenicians arrived there three millennia ago and founded Punic-speaking ports like Carthage and Algiers. Punic as a language survived in eastern Algeria at least until the time of St Augustine, who was bishop in Annāba or Hippo. The underlay you can find in the French and Italian museums of North Africa prove this fact, though the colonial museums and textbooks tried to make Vercingetorix into an Algerian hero and to forget Hannibal and his elephants, or Arius the Unitarian from Libya.

Thus Arabic became the language of trade in the cities in Tunisia almost as quickly as in Syria, and the Hilālī invasion later on affirmed this fact. The camel plus the Berber pack saddle tied the Maghrib to the Arab world, and also to West Africa across the Sahara. Salt and gold were the articles of commerce in a two way international trade that flourished between Sijilmāsa in southern Morocco and the Futa Jallon mountains of Guinea.

Thus West Africa was linked to North Africa through trans-Saharan trade, and merchant families of mixed blood, Berber and Black, sprang up on the great savannas of the Sudan, the fabled land of "the Blacks" which stretches from the Atlantic across Africa to the modern republic of that name. When Europe pierced the southern jungles from the sea and established ports for the cruel slave trade, West Africa spread with the banana and marimba music to Brazil, the West Indies and the southern United States.

An ancestral memory tells both the North and South American Blacks that their forefathers were Muslims if they were educated, as many of them were. The valiant Palmares republic in seventeenth-century Brazil reflected the inland empires of Ghana and Songhai along the upper Niger, while the Male cult of Brazil is a disguised Islam from Mali, like the Mandingos of

Trinidad. Revolts during the past century reveal this Islamic process that fresh sociologists need to explore.

The stories of Brer Rabbit are a reflection of the jackals Kalila and Dimna who migrated from India through the Arab and Persian world to West Africa, and from there in the kidnapped Black slaves' scanty baggage to the pages of Uncle Remus in Georgia. Other folklore of this sort needs to be sifted all over the American continent.

The less said about the shameful Italian role in its colonies of Somaliland, Eritrea and Libya, the better. The contemporary leaders of Libya still suffer from this trauma.

Indonesia and Malaysia need to be considered here,' especially for their struggle against the evils of secularism and communism, twin remedies the West has applied to Turkey as well. Three hundred years ago, Malay nobles who were exiled to South Africa brought Islam to the country of South Africa almost as early as Christianity came, if the monsoon trade in the Indian Ocean had not brought it to harbours like Durban even earlier, as it had been to the ports destroyed by the Portuguese. No real research has been made on these facets of South and East African history so as to integrate them in a dignified way into its culture.

Since the Second World War there has been an affirmation of Islamic identity that began with the triumphant establishment of Pakistan and the hard fought Algerian War of Independence. Kashmir, Hyderabad and Bangladesh, however, were left as still festering sores on the subcontinent, just as Bakhara and Tashkent are in Central Asia.

West Africa followed suit with Ghana first of all, and then Nigeria, whose initial statesmen under independence were miser-ably assassinated by Christian army officers. This affront to democracy and religion must be erased through earnest atonement, possibly through its present president, Shehu Shagari, who must serve out his term of office in dignity. The

northern Muslims of Nigeria must be assured of their security and institutions.

Sir David Jawara was bared from his native village in Gambia till he became a Muslim again. Let us hope his conversion is sincere. Nigerian schools and those in the Sudan, where Black imāms are trained, hold hope for the spread of Islam in other Black areas of Africa and America.

Recently there has come the Great Migration of Muslims to the cities of Western Europe and North America. Their hijrah opens up vistas for the spread of Islam in other countries we had never dreamed of before. The migrants are all of different nationalities, with North Africans in France and the Low Countries, Turks in Germany, and Pakistani and Indian Muslims in England.

In Canada the new Muslims arrive educated and speaking English, so their immediate participation in society as professionals is assured. In the United States they are unfortunately disorganized, and the Blacks especially need more contact with the centres of Islamic teaching we have mentioned in West Africa. Washington simply does not know how to consult them to their mutual benefit.

Who is watching this great movement carefully, and with intelligence and sympathy ? Each phase of it, in each separate country, is different, and they all require study, support and direction. There has been little research of this sort in the departments of religious studies in either North America, Europe, or South Africa. They are concerned with other forms of academic freedom, and bring non-academics to lecture them on it.

In fact, if there is any research, it is generally done by sociologists, as the French have done in North Africa and Brazil, sociologists who can find no message and little ideology in Islam. Not even the Western historians have contributed much, so the field lies wide open for our own students in the Islamic countries with research institutions.

French policy was fatal in the Near East and Africa, but now France is coming around, as that government realises its own true interest ever since the oil crunch. Yet the five universities that the French destroyed in Algeria are being restored by the Algerians, just as the demolished cities of Benghazi and Sfax were not rebuilt by the Germans and British who smashed them.

Iran and Lebanon, the two former French bases in the Middle East, have been lost to Paris through their own ineptitude, so now the French are courting Riyadh and send their senators to Peshawar to help the Afghans against the Soviets. Perhaps they may relieve some of the suffering of the Afghan refugees, and thus repay in some measure the agony of the Algerians who huddled in similar camps along the borders of Tunisia and Morocco twenty years ago. This tragedy underlines the irony of French policy over the years which they have only been able to reverse by losing everything and then starting over.

Meanwhile the Russians likewise have a problem in their own Muslim areas in the Caucasus, Central Asia and along the Volga where the occupation of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan started under Ivan the Terrible. Mass-produced Soviet arms and propaganda seem to be easier to assemble than are meat, potatoes and cabbage, or housing and clothing, so that the Soviets have occupied Afghanistan and threaten Iran and Pakistan. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs have partners in the menace of their neighbors.

Tsars and commissars express the same destructive policy, yet each Islamic area the Russians occupy raises the overall percentage of Muslims they must now deal with in their total population figures, so that occupation itself becomes a demographic nightmare for them and a strain upon their military. Babakhanoy is a pathetic figure, as he bears goodwill to the Muslim world and to visiting Muslims.

The British, fumbling and hypocritical as ever, are both corrupt and corrupting. Their Christian, Jewish and kāfir professors still try to love Islam,

as the French loved their Franco-Musulmans. The Americans use these worn-out experts and some from, other countries in even their best universities, like Hamilton Gibb, Roger Le Tourneau, Bernard Lewis, and Gustav von Grunebaum. Thus their policy is paralyzed and aborted.

In Islamabad their diplomats may want to counter the burning of their embassy by acting friendly to visiting American Muslims who can speak for them, while in Cape Town they treat the same 'Muslims with contempt. Mobil Oil sponsors seminars on .Islam at universities where no Muslims are invited to speak, and policemen are posted at the door to give the impression that Muslims are violent. These propagandists need guidelines so that these lectures on the Middle East are not window dressing. Americans cannot hold the Middle East because they are not trusted there, if they are not despised for their duplicity and pro-vocative alliances.

For instance, in South Africa, what is the government policy towards Islam, and in fact towards Islam in all of Africa? Our religion is as old as Christianity in that country, because it arrived with the Malay nobles, princes and commoners who were trans-ported there as slaves. At the University of Cape Town only five students out of a class of-over a hundred had visited any of the sixty mosques in the Western Cape, and apparently because these students happened to be Muslims. Witwatersrand is more concerned with "academic freedom" as preached by non-academics like Jane Fonda than with any lectures on Islam. Perhaps because actors have achieved success in high spheres elsewhere, the students prefer actors to academics in their political and social activities.

This attitude resembles the study of the Black Muslims in North America which is carried on, if at all, by the departments of sociology, not by those of religious studies, and never by historians. No wonder serious investigators do not take these studies too seriously. Thus the United States finds itself paralysed in dealing with Muslims elsewhere in the world. Its

methods of re-search on the Islamic world, including in its own territory, must improve, even at its best institutions.

For this reason let us now return to the ongoing mood of confrontation with Islam that prevails in the West, especially with the government and the media in Washington and New York.

This attitude had its beginnings with Algeria in recent years, where, until the Algerians won their freedom twenty odd years ago, they were termed "terrorists". It has continued with Iran and Lebanon, and with Pakistan's dilemma along her Afghan border, which has been badly handled by its sympathisers abroad, as well as in her relations with her generally hostile neighbour to the East. Pakistan's position is extremely delicate, so the country should not be pushed or rushed into any hostile posture, but helped to face its problems calmly.

These problems none the less are not being handled with expertise but with fumbling. This carelessness may lead the United States into a war on two fronts as happened precisely with Hitler,' and led to his final defeat in a Berlin bunker.

The fault lies with the Orientalists in Harvard, Princeton, Columbia and Chicago who advise Washington pathetically, just as almost the same persons advised Britain and France so ineptly that they had to abandon North Africa and the Middle .East. Those experts' intellectual monopoly with the government and media vitiates any sound planning on the part of the United States. Now better experts must be trained to advise them:

The firm resistance of statesmen like Jinnah and Bourguiba till they achieved freedom for their countries has now yielded to the shriller revolutionary calls of Colonel Qadhdhāfī and His Eminence the Ayatollah Khomeini. What sort of reaction will the next phase bring?

We watch as the tide of Islam sweeps back over Asia and Africa, and brings forth an affirmation of basic human values into the cities of Western Europe and North America which can no longer be ignored. The world's attitude must change with this tide; the Islamic fifth of mankind is at long last recognised as enjoying elemental human rights: this the same basically the right to organise and worship God Alone as they see fit wherever they may be, in Africa, in Western Europe, in Central Asia, in Sindbad's many islands of the sea, or wherever they have made their home,

QADI VERSUS SHAIKH: THEIR ETYMOLOGIES

S. Mahdihassan

What can be called "Traditional Etymology" looks upon a word in isolation? The word is all in all without any background or past which has given rise to it. Nevertheless to know the word Qādī requires our appreciating above all the circumstances when it became necessary to acquire the word since none other could express the sense at the time. The pre-Islamic Arabs were mainly nomads. There were various tribes each headed by a Shaikh. The word signifies Master, such as that of a slave, being the law-administrator as also the law-giver. His will and pleasure was all and his judgment was carried out with the speed of marshal law.

Later came a time when Arabs traded with China, bringing silk for the Alexandrian market. This maritime activity can be safely dated as beginning about 200 B.C. while later on Arabs became more and more daring sailors. We can easily grant that while in China disputes arose among the Arabs and they had to be settled. There was no Shaikh nor his plenipotentiary with the same autocratic powers. Thus arose the need for an arbitrator to dispense justice and redress the grievances. We have to realise such a situation, which created the circumstances for the word Qādī to enter into Arabic. Above all, Qādī becomes a pre-Islamic introduction. On the contrary, Bazmee Ansari[1] imagines that ".it is also probable that the Chinese borrowed the word Qādī from the Arabs". In support of his suggestion the only source he offers is the Urdu work by Badr al-Din Chīnī, entitled Chin-o 'Arab Ke Ta'alluqāt, Karachi, 1949. This work is a popular history of later Arabs visiting and settling in China. It throws no light whatsoever on the circumstances in which either the Arabs borrowed a Chinese term or the Chinese took over an Arabic word.

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[1] Bazmee Ansari, Humdard Islamicus, Karachi, Vol. II, No. 4 (1979), p. 88.

Let us now consider the word Qādī. It is not found in the Holy Qur'an and for obvious reasons. When it does appear for the first time in Arabic can be safely predicted. The great miracle of Islam was to integrate the numerous tribes into a community of the faithful when the Shaikh was superseded by the Holy Prophet. He now became the sole administrator but with the Holy Qur'an as the code of law. Further, after the demise of the Prophet his successor, the Khalīfah or Amīr al-Muminīn, be-came the proper administrator of justice. Only late when Khilāfat was virtually abolished and kingdoms arose to be ruled by Amīrs that these, being otherwise engaged in warfare or luxury, had to leave administration of justice to special officers, Qādīs. The word has a long history ; it was coined in China and came into prominence in Arabīa when Muslims were ruled by Amīrs rather than by the Khalifs of the Prophet. We have now to etymologise the word Qādī.

Giles[2] gives the word Shih, character 9992, which he translates first as "officer" and next as "learned," so that Shih = learned officer. This reminds us of the way we speak of a judge invariably as a "learned judge". Shih then becomes a learned judge or simply "judge". Now judgments were inscribed on wooden tablets. Such material is more tangible than paper or parchment, either of which was very expensive at the time. The word for "wooden tablets" as also for "law" is Ku, character 6221, in Giles. Karlgren[3] also translates the word Ku as "a block of writing, law". This implies that a judgment or a verdict of law and the material on which judgment is inscribed, as the container and content, get identified with each other. Ku then would be a verdict or judgment inscribed on a wooden tablet. Then two words Ku-Shih would signify a judge who regularly dispenses justice. Now the pronunciation of the present Chine language differed in pre-Thang period or before A.D. 600. Ku was pronounced Kuo, as given by Karlgren.[4] And Shih was Dzi again according to Karlgren. Then Ku-Shih was pronouneed Kuo-

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[2] H.A. Giles, Chinese-English Dictionary (1892).
[3] B. Karigren, Analytical Dictionary of Chinese (Paris, 1923).
[4] Idem, Phonologic Chinese (Paris, 1923), Chapter 18.

Dzi earlier than A.D. 600. It is easy to accept that Kuo-Dzi was Arabicised as Qa-Dzi, hence Oādī or Kazi, the designation for a law-dispensing or active judg,. The word Qādi thus was imported before Islam.

The history of the word Qādī appears quite consistent with its significance as judge. But it lacks historicity. However, Hegel[5] "held that the real is rational and rational is the real." This means that what appears as most probable and thereby rational would have greater chances of having been real. Moreover, Professor S.H. Nasr[6] observes that "One of the most important questions of Islamic philosophy [has been] the conditions under which something needs a cause". Just as an -invention is preceded by some necessity, reality is preceded by some cause. Hence, according to al-Bīrunī, "what becomes manifested at a particular period of history is no more than the unfolding of possibilities already present in that being (at that time)." I ventured to explain how a colony of Arabs in, China would require a judge to settle their internal disputes. Such information I discovered is a recent book by R. Israeli where we read as follows:

"At Canton there is a Muslim appointed over those of his religion by the authority of the Emperor of China and he is the judge of all Muslims who resort to that area. The judgments he gives are conformable to the Quran and in accordance with Muslim jurisprudence."[7]

This statement appears in an anonymous work in Arabic dated A.D. 851 entitled "Accounts of China and India". Firstly, we must realise that the judge was no Shaikh or Imām and that he functioned specifically as a law-giver, whose services were required by the Arabs in a foreign land. It is natural to grant that his office was created as soon as the Arabs had formed a colony at Canton. This certainly occurred in pre-Islamic times. It coincides

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[5] J. Fergusson, Encyclopedia of Mysticism (1976), quotes Hegel on p. 75.
[6] S.H. Nasr, "Alberuni as Philosopher," Proceedings of Alberuni Intern. Congress, Karachi, 1973, p. 402.
[7] R. Israeli, Muslims in China (Copenhagen, 1980), p. 81.

with the period of early trade between China and Arabia. In turn it means the time when the word Tseen for China entered Arabic.

The Emperor of the first Chhin dynasty died in 210 B.C. and it was about this time that Chhin = China = Tseen. Words like Qādī, Kimiyā and Sūfī are loanwords from Chinese, all to be dated soon after 200 B.C. At first the Qādī was a Pagan but later a Muslim, but in each case an Arab whose appointment was made official by the local government.

Summary

In Chinese Ku means wooden tablet, as also law, suggesting Ku=judgment. Shih signifies learned, officer. Before A.D. 600 Ku-Shih was pronounced Kuo-Dzi. It signifies a judge regularly dispensing justice. Kuo-Dzi was Arabicised as Qa-Dzi clearly before Islam.

IBN KHALDUN AND KARL MARX: ON SOCID- HISTORIC CHANGE

Fuad Baali & J. Brian Price

The relationship between history and sociology has long been subject to controversy. In this paper history is conceived of as a series of changing events and, in this sense, is social change. This theme has important implications for social theory. As C. Wright Mills argued, "the general problem of a theory of history cannot be separated from the general problem of a theory of social structure.[8]" However, history is still construed by some to be an idiographic discipline which differs from sociology, a homothetic discipline.[9] This tends to justify, with a few notable exceptions,[10] mutually exclusive scholarship within two separate disciplines.

An adequate solution to the dilemma of how to preserve sociology as a generalizing science, taking into account historical variations in society, is suggested in the work of Ibn Khaldūn (733-809/1332-1406) and Karl Marx.[11]

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[8] C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 47.

[9] See, for example, Neil J. Smelser, "Sociology and the Other Social Sciences," in P.F. Lazarsfeld, et al., Eds., The Uses of Sociology (New York : Basic Books, 1967) ; Franz Adler, "The Basic Difficulty of Historical Sociology," Sociological Quarterly, 2 (January 1961) ; and Werner J. Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff, Eds., Sociology and History : Theory and Research (New York : The Free Press, 1964).

[10] See, for example, Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Engle-wood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1952) ; and Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Diet atorshīp and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston : Beacon Press, 1966).

[11] Neil J. Smelser has come closest to utilizing historical material within a functionalist framework in his study of the Lancashire cotton industry. However, as the subtitle of his book indicates, it is an application of theory to the study of this industry. See his book Social Change in the Industrial Revolution : An Application of Theory to the Lancashire Cotton Industry, 1770-1840 (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).

In their writings we can find a dialectical synthesis between history and, what we now know as, sociology which incorporates the aspect of change. By dialectical we mean that their approach to the study of human social activity "grasps things and their images, ideas, essentially in their interconnection."[12]- As Marx and Ibn Khaldūn proceed inductively in making socio-historic generalizations they avoid some of the limitations experienced by functionalism.[13] This unique conception of social science can be understood

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[12] This is the definition used by Frederick Engels in Anti-Duehring (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 29. Throughout the paper we employ the usual convention of treating Marx and Engels as the same person, especially as the latter deferred to Marx throughout his intellectual career.

[13] The attempt to equate functionalism with Marxism (Robert Merton, On Theoretical Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1967); Alfred G. Meyer, Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice : A Critical Essay (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1954); Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," American Sociological Revīew, 24 (December 1959), pp. 757-72 ; Arthur Stinchombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York : Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), as well as the attempt to posit a "conflict functionalism" (Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict [New York : The Free Press,. 1956] ; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society [Stanford : Stanford University press, 1959]) are seen here as misleading. In one sense functionalism can be defined so broadly that it can actually cover almost any kind of scientific endeavour, as Kingsley Davis did. However, this appears to be a way of avoiding or negating the differences involved between functional and dialectical sociology by appealing to a higher, more embracing system. This is resonant to another great system-builder, Hegel, and his idea of the Absolute in which all contraditions will be resolved and stands in direct opposition to the Marxian approach. Meyer himself equates the dialectic with concreteness. Functionalism may be considered as a reified approach to the study of social phenomena. (See Joachim Israel, Alienation from Marx to Modern Sociology [Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971], p. 328; Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg,"Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness, " History and Theory, 4, 1965, p. 196). That is, it views society as the independent variable or objective reality, with emphasis on institutions and social-structure as components

better if we sketch their work as to (I) the dialectical interpretation of the role of economic and non-economic factors in history; and (2) the nature of historical change. From their study of these phenomena Marx and Ibn Khaldūn provide us (1) with the rudiments of an empirical-dialectical methodology; (2) with the beginnings of a theory of society and the manner in which it changes ; and thus (3) with a unique conception of historical sociology.

Economic Interpretation of History. The best known and yet most often misunderstood aspect of Marx's work is his economic interpretation of history. He is often labelled as an economic determinist, and, as such, having a closed system of thought. To clarify this we must engage in some textual criticism. Consider the following three commonly quoted passages from Marx. Each passage is divided into two parts ; the first (A) reflecting an emphasis on economic determinism, the latter (B) an emphasis on free-will activity of men as they make their history.

I (A) "The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature."

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of society. Marx and Ibn Khaldūn, however, proceed from a dialectical synthesis of sociological and psychological assumptions and avoid this fallacy. Thus, functional and dialectical sociology are not mutually exclusive methodological approaches, but differ as to the level of critique on which they operate. For more orthodox critiques of the logic of functionalism, see J.N. Demerath III, and R.A. Peterson, Systems, Change, and Conflict : A Reader on Contem Ovary Sociological Theory and the Debate on Functionalism (New York ; The Free Press, 1967) ; Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Causation and Functionalism in Sociology (New York : Shocken Books, 1968).

(B) "…The writings of history must always set out from' these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of man."[14]

II (A) "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness."

(B) "The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life-process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness."[15]

III (A) "The production of ideas, of conceptions, or consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior."

(B) "…Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.--real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its

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[14] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 7.

[15] Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. In Marx and Engel's, Selected Notes (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), p. 362.-

furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process."[16]

In statement II (A), Marx especially appears as a strict economic determinist. Yet in II (B) he uses the word "conditions" and then in the next sentence "determines". Each alters the causal direction implied. Even when Marx says that social being determines consciousness, social being is not made synonymous with economic existence. In the statements below we can see the sociological element in Marx's thought:

"By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and their mode of co-operation is itself a 'productive force'."[17]

We have to juxtapose these opposing ideas of determinism and free will and see them in their dialectical relationship to one another. Joachim Israel sums up this crucial Marxian thesis as follows:

"Man is certainly a product of social, especially economic, conditions, but it is man himself who creates and changes these conditions. There exists a dialectic interplay, seen in a historical perspective, between man as active, self-creating subject, and man as an object of the conditions he creates."[18]

Marx was not careful enough in his choice of words; at times his polemic carried him away from the dynamics of history he was trying to convey into what seemed to be a single-factor determinism. In a letter to Joseph Bloch, in 1890, Engels writes that:

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[16] Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 13-14.
[17] Ibid., p. 18.
[18] Israel, op. cit., p. 68.

"…According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase."[19]

The use of political, juridical, religious, and other variables as explanatory ones is evident in historical monographs written by Marx such as the Eighteenth Brumaire and The Class Struggles in France. Merton has pointed out that if we convert Marx's statement that religion is the "opiate of the people" into a statement of neutral fact, then we can see that "system of religion do affect behavior, that they are not merely epiphenomena but partially independent determinants of behavior."[20] Similarly, when Marx says that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas,"[21] he is clearly recognising that ideas can rule. However, these ideas do arise from the economic interests of the ruling elite. There is no apparent contradiction in

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[19] "Letters on Historical Materialism," in Lewis S. Fener, Ed,, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 397. Engels' explicit modification of historical materialism in four letters in 1890 is not without its critics. Bober concludes his discussion of the letters by saying: "The general impression which these letters make, in common with all the other evidence bearing on the problem, comes to the familiar formula that while institutions and ideas have a part in history, their influence is of such a sub-ordinate character that social events and changes are explicable mainly in terms of economics." See M.M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 310. Similarly, Mayo says : "So we have an apparent retreat from the earlier strict determinism, a denial that the economic is the sole determining factor-whatever that may mean—and are told that only 'ultimately,' 'basically,' 'on the whole,' or 'in the last instance' does the economic foundation determine the super- structure and the course of history There is a frequent use of such vague terms in Marxist literature" (Henry B. Mayo, Introduction to Marxist Theory [New York : Oxford University Press, 1960], p. 77).

[20] Merton, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

[21] Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 39.

saying that ideational variables influence the course of history, even though they did arise from concrete material conditions. This issue goes back to the metaphysical roots of science with Aristotle's exposition of material cause as an object of scientific inquiry, as distinguished from the Platonic theory of ideas. This is all Marx is doing when he observes:

"Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas 'the idea' 'die Idee,' etc., as the dominant force in history, and thus to understand all these separate ideas and concepts as 'forms of self-determination' on the part of the concept developing in history."[22]

In looking at statement III above this awareness on the part of Marx of the tendency for ideas to eventually develop an autonomy of their own in the face of change is communicated in his use of such terms as "at first" and "at this stage" when speaking of how conceptions appear to be directly related to the material activity of men. We agree then with the Needleman and Needleman's statement, with regard to Marx's work, that, although "there is ultimate economic determinism, the theory is a multi-casual one."[23]

Ibn Khaldūn also gave a predominant, though not exclusive, position to the economic factor in history. Heinrich Simon points out that "the intellectual activity of man, the arts and sciences, his moral attitudes and behaviour, the style of living and taste, standard of living and customs are,

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[22] Ibid., p.42.

[23] Martin Needleman and Carolyn Needleman, "Marx and the Problem of Causation," Science and Socīety, 33 (Summer 1969), pp. 322-39. By multi-causal here is not meant "a causal pluralism in which everything could be traced to a virtually infinite multiplicity of effective causes." Meyer, op. cit., p. 28. Rather it refers to a dialectical interplay of causes and effects, which can be explicitly defined. The reader is referred back to footnote 6.

determined by the kind and degree of development of production.[24] We find evidence for this in Ibn Khaldūn's Muqaddimah:

"It should be known that the differences of condition among people are the result of the different ways in which they make their living. Social organization enables them to co-operate toward that end and to start with the simple necessities of life, before they get to the conveniences and luxuries.

"... Those who live by agriculture or animal husbandry cannot avoid the call of the desert, because it alone offers the wide fields, acres, pastures for animals, and other things that the settled areas do not offer. It is therefore necessary for them to restrict themselves to the desert. Their social organization and co-operation for the needs of life and civilization, such as food, shelter, and warmth, do not take them beyond the bare subsistence level, because of their inability (to provide) for anything beyond those (things). Subsequent improvement of their conditions and acquisition of more wealth and comfort than they need, cause them to rest and take it easy. Then, they co-operate for things beyond the (bare) necessities. They use more food and clothes, and take pride in them. They build large houses, and lay out towns and cities for protection. This is followed by an increase in comfort and ease, which leads to formation of the most developed luxury customs.... Here, now, (we have) the sedentary people. 'Sedentary people' means the inhabitants of cities and countries, some of whom adopt the crafts as their way of making a living, while others adopt commerce. They earn more and live more comfort-ably than Bedouins, because they live on a level

[24] Heinrich Simon, Ibn Khaldun Wissenschaft von der Menschlichen Kultur (Leipzig: Veb Otto Harrassowitz, 1959). p. 78 : Fuad Baali, Tr. (Simon), Ibn Khaldun's Science of Human Culture (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1978), p. 109.

beyond the level of (bare) necessity, and their way of making a living corresponds to their wealth."[25]

The badū, or bedouins, are the most primitive and tough people, while the hadar are the sedentary, or civilized people. The transition from desert to city life is one from badawa to hadara.

Although these economic exigencies are given such a prominent place in the Muqaddimah, non-economic factors are not excluded from exerting an influence on society. Ibn Khaldūn attached great importance to 'asabīyah[26] as an historical force. In inter-dependence with other phenomena such as religion, royal authority (mulk), morals, science, and economic organisation itself, 'asabīyah is a major independent variable in the development of human societies. In contrast to Simon, Ayad, and Issawi[27] who see economic materialism as the most important explanatory element in Ibn Khaldūn's work, White views 'asabīyah (group solidarity) as "at once the motive power of the historical process and the principle which, when discovered, explains

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[25] Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah : An Introduction to History, trans. from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1967), I, 249-50.
[26] 'Asabīyah is one of the most important basic concepts in Ibn Khaldūn's work. It has been translated as " esprit de corps," "famille," "parti," "tribal consciousness," "blood relationship," "feeling of unity," "group mind," "collective consciousness," ".group feeling," "group loyalty," "group adhesive," and "group solidarity". The latter, group solidarity, the closest to the original term. 'Asabīyah is a social bond that can be used to measure the strength and stability of social groupings. It is not confined to badawa, or desert life, as some writers believe (e.g. Mohamed Abd Monem Nour, "Ibn Khaldun as an Arab Social Thinker," A'amal Mahrajan Ibn Khaldun,_Cairo, pp. 84-119), although it is stronger among desert people than among ruralites and urbanites. 'Asabīyah, furthermore, is not confined to Arab people : "Ibn Khaldun identifies the 'asabīyah of many [ancient] peoples, even the non-Islamic, Persians, Jews, Greeks. Romans, Turks." Edouard Will, "Comptes Rendus Critiques," Revue Historique (October-December 1970), pp. 441-448.
[27] Simon, op. cit., M. Kamil Ayad, Die Geschichts und Ghesellschaflslehre Ibn Halduns (Stuttgart u, Berlin, 1930), p. 105 ; Charles Issawi, An Arab Philosophy of History (London : John Murry, 1950), p. 17.

the process."[28] However, these two positions can be juxtaposed as we did with Marx in order to see the essentially dialectical relationship between social solidarity and changes in social structure. The effects of 'asabīyah are numerous. For one, it is the basis of mulk, or royal authority, which is necessary for its restraining influence on man.[29] It is through group solidarity that the bedouin tribes are able to survive the harsh desert life.[30] When 'asabīyah has declined in a dynasty, its downfall is all but inevitable: "The dynasty can be founded and established only with the help of group feeling. There must be a major group feeling uniting all the groups subordinate to it."[31] Religion is another important element in society; a dynasty based on religious law is more likely to have wide power and extensive royal authority as religion "does away with mutual jealousy and envy among people and causes concentration upon the truth. But religion cannot fully materialize without 'asabiyah as every mass undertaking by necessity requires group feeling.[32]

'Asabīyah is not unrelated to the economic structure of society. Rabie[33] considers it to be one of several phenomena whose characteristics and development are effects of the prevailing mode of living in a culture and of the transition from the more primitive bedouin culture[34] to the more civilised

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[28] Hayden V. White; "Ibn Khaldun in World Philosophy of History, Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, 118.19. See also Muhammad Abdullah Enan, Ibn Khaldun : His Life and Worh (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 114.
[29] Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, I, 60, 84, 91, 313, 380-81 ; II, 137.
[30] Ibid., I, 261.
[31] Ibid., I, 119. However, this disintegration can be postponed as"the ruling dynasty may for a while dispense with group feeling, and retain control over the populace with its money and soldiers; but eventually "senility" does overtake the dynasty and it falls (II, 111-24).
[32] Ibid., I, 320, 322.
[33] Muhammad Mahmoud Rabic, The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun (Leiden : E J. Brill, 1967), p. 51.
[34] Including backwoods' Villages. See Gaston Bouthoul, Ibn Khaldoun: Sa Philosophie Sociale (Paris : Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1930), pp. 63-64;

life of the sedentary peoples. But at the same time ‘asabiyah is the “vehicle or instrument of transition” of this change because of its unifying power over the desert tribes, giving them greater cohesion and strength over the decadent city-dwellers.[35] Even though religion and, more generally, group solidarity are essential elements of Ibn Khaldūn’s description of social organization, according to Rabie, socio-economic reasoning and materialistic interpretation of cultural events are two basic methodological assumptions of Ibn Khaldūn.[36] There is a dialectical interplay between economic and cultural elements of social solidarity:

“No abstract polarization of cause and effect can be found in his study of 'asabīyah in the two environments. While primitive and vigorous 'asabīyah, with all its pecularities, is an effect of the way of living under badawa, it acts in due time as the principal cause of changing this very way of living to a completely different one under hadara.”[37]

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and P.A. Sorokin, et al., A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 1930), Vol. I.

[35] Ibn Khaldūn, op. cit., I, 52. In this sense ‘asabīyah is directly analogous to Marx’s concept of class consciousness, in which wage workers become aware of their historical revolutionary mission and make the transition from a Klasse au sich (class-in-itself) to a Klasse fuer sich (class-for it self), or the proletariat (see Coser, op. cit., p. 48 : Marx and Angels, The German Ideology, pp. 58-59 ; Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 25). Only one student of Ibn Khaldūn, Lewin (in Simon, op. cit., p. 50), has interpreted ‘asabīyah as a superstracture phenomenon, and was taken to task by Ayad (op. cit.) who viewed 'asabīpyoh more as an interdependent variable. In the context of this paper, neither of these interpolations would be correct as they both miss the essential point of the dialectic interplay between these phenomena.

[36] Rabie, op. cit., p. 33.

[37] Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., I, p. 54. Also pp. 42, 160. See also Rabie, op. cit., p. 230 ; Joseph J. Spengler, “Economic Thought of Islam : Ibn Khaldun,” Comparative Studies in Sociology and History, VI (1663-64), 290-92, 294-95 ; 304-05 ; Issawi, op. cit., p. 17 ; George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science (Baltimore : Williams and Wilkins Co , 1948), III, 1171 ; Muhsin Mandi, Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 268 ; Hilmi Zia Ulken, “Ibn Khaldoun : Initiateur de la Sociologie, “A’amal Mahrajan Ibn Khaldun

Ideational elements definitely have an autonomy in history as conceptualized by Ibn Khaldūn. Compare the following statement of his to Marx's position on the place of "ruling ideas" in history: "The widely accepted reason for changes in institutions and customs is the fact that the customs of each race depend on the customs of its rulers. As the proverb says: 'The common people follow the religion of the ruler.' "[38] Although seeing the dialectical interplay between ideas and material substratum, both Ibn Khaldūn and Marx tended to emphasise the latter more. Some of the specific ways in which they dealt with economic variables, especially with the role of labour in social relations, are worth pursuing here. For example, Ibn Khaldūn regards labour as the foundation of human society and of all values and discusses profit as value realised from human labour. He also shows how a person earns and acquires capital in terms strikingly similar to the economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[39] To Ibn Khaldūn "men persist only with the help of property". To take property away is an injustice which ruins civilisation; people have no incentive to co-operate with one another and thus live in apathy.[40] Marx's views on labour are expressed poignantly in the following passage:

"Indeed, labour, life-activity, productive life itself, appears in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species—its species character—is contained in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is

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(Cairo), p. 29 ; and H.K. Sherwani, Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration (Lahore : Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963), pp. 187-88, 196.

[38] Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., I, 58.

[39] Ibid., II, 311-17. For an excellent study of Ibn Khaldūn's views on the organisation of economic activity see M.A. Nash'at, "Ibn Khaldun ; Pioneer Economist," L'Egypte Contemporaine, XXXV (Cairo), 377-490. See also Simon, op. cit., pp. 78-98 ; and Issawi's translation of segments of the Muqaddimah pertaining to economics (op. cit., pp. 71-86).

[40] Ibn Khaldūn, op. oit., II, 103-09.

man's species character.. Life itself appears only as a means to life. . . . The object of labour, is, therefore, the objectification of man's species life: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he con-templates himself in a world that he created."[41]

Despite this more philosophical emphasis placed on labour by Marx, there is no contradiction here with the views of Ibn Khaldūn on the same subject. They also both express disdain for forced labour[42] and monopolies.[43] The reasons for this are quite different though. Marx believes that man is estranged from labour in a system where private property dominates because the only true relationship to one's work is in the form of communal labour.

To Ibn Khaldūn man can be estranged only if his incentive for gain is destroyed, because all men are self-seeking: "Every man tries to get things; in this all men are alike."[44] There is no explicit concept of alienation, no depiction of the enslaving power of the market--he is describing the fourteenth-century beginnings of capitalism. But Marx also described man as beset by the "furies of private interest".[45] Without the futuristic point of reference when communism brings "the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) being"[46] ; Marx's conceptual elements bear a remarkable similarity to Ibn Khaidūn's.

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41 Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York : International Publishers, 1964), pp. 113-14.
42 Ibid,, p. 111 ; and Ibn Khaldūn, op. cit., I, 84-85.
43 For Ibn Khaldūn's view see Nash'at, op. cit., pp. 393-94; for Marx, "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation," in Basic Writings on-Politics and Philosophy, Karl Marx rnd Frederick Engels, pp. 164-67.
44 Ibn Khaldūn, op. cit., II, 311.
45 Marx, Basio Writings on Politics and Philosophy, p. 137.
46 Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 135.

The emphasis placed on economic variables,[47] notwithstanding' the modifications necessitated with consideration of non-economic ones, tends to make Ibn Khaldūn and Marx seem more like determinists than as if they had placed equal emphasis on free-will elements. The role of the individual in history is a theme worth following up as it involves the question of the extent to which the individual is chained to or free from economic circumstances and historical inevitability. We have seen how, in the words of Schaff, "in the Marxist view, man is the maker of history not as a monad of utterly unconditioned free will, which belongs in the realm of philosophical phantasy, but as a product of history and so as a real, socially conditioned psychophysical individual who makes certain choices."[48] Ibn Khaldūn, on the contrary, has been criticized for his "inability to come to grips with the individual human personality in history."[49] He "regards individual efforts completely useless in this respect."[50] Indeed, the Muqaddimah laboriously traces the rise and fall of a myriad dynasties and groups in history. By stressing the importance of 'asabīyah or group solidarity in the change of one dynasty to another it appears as if Ibn Khaldūn does relegate the individual to a secondary place in historical development. Interpreting this in terms of

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[47] According to Michels, Ibn Khaldūn "may have been the earliest scientific exponent of the economic concept of history." Roberto Michels, First Lectures in Political Sociology (New York : Harper Torchbook, 1965), p. 10. Ulken (op. cit., p. 30) believes that Ibn Khaldūn is an early fore-runner of Karl Marx beeause it was he who stressed the importance of economic factors." And Rabic (op. cit., p. 47) emphasises that Ibn Khaldūn "had not been preceded by any thinker of any political creed or religion who had ever treated, in such a scientific way, the interaction of economic factors and societal phenomena".

[48] Adam Sehaff, Marxism and the Human Individual (New York : MeGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 150. Gouldner has even equated the "voluntarism" of early Marx to that of the early work of Talcott Parsons. Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York : Basic Sociology, 1970), pp. 185-95.

[49] White, op. cit., p. 115.

[50] Ali H. Wardi, "A Soeiological Analysis of lbn Khaldun's Theory : A Study in the Sociology of Knowledge" (Austin : University of Taxas—Dissertation, 1950), p. 109. See also p. 279.

the realism-nominalism distinction, Ibn Khaldūn would seem to be classified as a realist, in contradistinction to the apparent nominalism of Marx. This would place Ibn Khaldūn in Durkheim's mode of sociology. However, both Ibn Khaldūn and Karl Marx achieved a synthesis of realism and nominalism which reflects the dynamic, dialectical character of their sociology. For Ibn Khaldūn, the impetus for change in society, although depending on 'asabīyah (group solidarity) and the transition from badawa (desert life) to hadara (urban life), rests also on a psychological-basis as the nomads yearn for what the civilized societies possess.[51] Similarly, in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx says: "Above all, we must avoid postulating 'Society' again as an abstraction vis a vis the individual. The individual is the social being."[52] On closer examination Marx's conception of the relationship between the individual and society appears to be a synthesis similar to that of Simmel:[53]

"Social activity and social mind exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal mind, although communal activity and communal mind–i.e., activity and mind which are manifested and directly revealed in real association with other men—will occur wherever such a' direct expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity's content and is adequate to its nature."[54]

Marx seems to acknowledge the existence of a social mind, but is unsure of its place in capitalist society in which man is alienated from the community by this social consciousness as an abstraction, and not as a living community.[55]

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[51] See R. Chambliss, Social Thought (New York : Dryden Press, 1954), p. 308.
[52] Pp. 137-38.
[53] George Simmel, The Sociology of George Simmel, trans. and edited by Kurt H. Wolff (New York : The Free Press, 1950), pp. 26-29.
[54] Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 137.
[55] In Marx's own words : "My general consciousness is only the theoretieal shape of that whieh the living shape is the real community, the social fabrie, although at the

A deeper understanding of these fluid relationships between social phenomena is possible when we grasp the dialectical nature of Ibn Khaldūn's and Karl Marx's approach to historical change in the following section.

Nature of Historical Change. In the preceding section we have seen, in the words of Roberto Michels, that Ibn Khaldūa "insisted on the essential thesis that differences in customs and institutions depend on the various ways in which man procures for himself the means of subsistence".[56] Changes in history are in part the changes that take place in the transition from the badawa to the hadara mode of living. Similarly, Marx believed that "any change arising in the productive forces of men necessarily effects a change in their relations of production".[57] The root of these changes in the productive base is conflict which is endemic to all societies. For Ibn Khaldūn this conflict often rests on a psycho-logical basis as the nomads dislike the urbanites for what they possess. Marx was not unware of this clash between agrarian and non-agrarian groups: "The greatest division of material and mental labor is the separation of town and country. The antagonism between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilization, from tribe to state, from locality to nation, and runs through the whole history of civilization to the present day."[58] He goes on to say that "the great uprisings of the Middle Ages all radiated from the country".[59]

For Ibn Khaldūn and Karl Marx, however, there is a macro-level of socio-historic change which is fundamentally a dialectical movement from one stage to another. They only differ in that Marx sees the movement

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present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and confronts it with hostility" [emphasis removed] (ibid., p. 137).

[56] Miehels, op. cit., p. 10.

[57] Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (London, 1910), p. 133.

[58] Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 43.

[59] Ibid., p. 46.

progressing toward communist society,[60] whereas Ibn Khaldūn sees a cyclical rise and fall of dynasties. To Ibn Khaldūn there are five stages of dynasties:

"The first stage is that of success, the overthrow of all opposition, and appropriation of royal authority from the preceding dynasty. In this stage, the ruler serves as model to his people by the manner in which he acquires glory, collects taxes, defends property, and provides military protection…

"The second stage is the one in which the ruler gains complete control over his people, claims royal authority all for himself, excluding them, and prevents them from trying to have a share in it…

"The third stage is one of leisure and tranquility in which the fruits of royal authority are enjoyed… acquisition of property, creation of lasting monuments, and fame… This stage is the last during which the ruler is in complete authority…

"The fourth stage is one of contentment and peacefulness... "The fifth stage is one of waste and squandering… [the ruler] ruins the foundation his ancestors had laid and tears down what they had built up. In this stage, the dynasty is seized by senility and the chronic disease from which it can hardly ever rid itself, for which it can find no cure, and, eventually, it is destroyed."[61] In another section of the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldūn compares the life spans of dynasties to that of individuals. These stages describe how the desert attitudes of toughness and savagery change in the second generation to humble subservience and luxury-mindedness under royal authority. In the third generation the period of desert life is forgotten, and as luxury reaches its peak, group feeling disappears. In the fourth generation ancestral prestige

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[60] However, Venable dissents from this view : "Always they speak of classless socialism as the next stage, not the final stage, of history, and every-where they imply, and frequently explicitly assert, the impossibility of any social or historical finality." Vernon Venable, Human Nature : The Marxian View (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 174.

[61] Ibn Khaldūn, op. cit.. I, 353-55.

is destroyed, and the cycle begins again as other desert tribes over throw the corrupt society. [62]

"In this way the history of human society involves in an eternal cycle: Human society is in an eternal up and down movement, it develops and completes itself not into something higher and better, but into something different which comprises the old and the new at the same time. The dialectics that view the nature of the world as movement, but not as a purposeful development—opposite forces do not neutralize each other, the total movement is static—are characteristics of the time in which Ibn Khaldun composed his work."[63] On the contrary, Marx conceives of society as passing through successive evolutionary stages: "In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as so many epochs in the progress of economic formation of society."[64] The first stage is that of primitive communism and is discussed at length by Engels in his Origin of the Family. The second deals with slavery in ancient Greece and Rome, the third with medieval feudalism—lbn Khaldūn's era. This is the period of the great clash between town and country. We are fortunate in having this description by Engels of the mass movements of the Middle Ages, in a footnote to his essay "On the History of Early Christianity".

Islam is a religion adapted to Orientals, especially Arabs, i.e., on one hand to townsmen engaged in trade and industry, on the other to nomadic Bedouins. Therein lies, however, the embryo of a periodically recurring collision. The townsmen, grow rich, luxurious, and lax in the observation of the 'law'. The Bedouins, poor and hence of strict morals, contemplate with envy and covetousness these riches and pleasures. Then they unite under a

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[62] Ibid., I, 353-46. A medieval Islamic group, Ikwān al-Safā', had .a somewhat similar view on the growth and the "gradual" decline of the State. See Fuad Baali, Social and Ethical Philosophy of Ikhwan al-Safa (Baghdad : Ma'arif Press, 1958), p. 61.
[63] Simon, op. cit., p. 64.
[64] Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 363.

prophet, a Mandi, to chastise the apostates and restore the observation of the ritual and the true faith, and to appropriate in recompense the treasures of the renegades. In a hundred years they are naturally in the same position as the renegades were: a new purge of faith is required, a new Mandi arises, and the game starts again from the beginning… All these movements are clothed In religion, but they have their source in economic causes, and yet even when they are victorious they allow the old economic conditions to persist untouched. So the old situation remains unchanged and the collision recurs periodically."[65]

Simon has observed that Engels' statements are fully congruent with the theory which Ibn Khaldūn has set up, but "we do not know whether he knew the work of Ibn Khaldun". The translation of Ibn Khaldūn's work which was published by the Institute of France in the 1860's "could very well have been known to Marx and Engel's, who were doubtless interested in new scientific publications, especially those that dealt with social problems".[66]

Ibn Khaldūn was standing on the threshold of capitalist society, and this has been expressed in his economic theory. Marx had the advantage of living at the apex of civilization when he could look in retrospect at the period in which Ibn Khaldūn lived. But on the one hand, the notion of evolution is not entirely absent from the Muqaddimah, as a general shift toward sedentary civilisation could be detected.

The limitation placed on Ibn Khaldūn's study of history is, in the words of Toynbee, "the axiom that all historical thought is inevitably relative to the particular circumstances of the thinker's own time and place".[67] The same can be said of Marx when we observe the failure of many of his predictions to come true. But Marx's work is evolutionary in another sense: history is the

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[65] Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, pp. 169-70.
[66] Simon, op. cit., p. 65 : Fuad Baati, Tr.. op. cit., p. 3, footnote.
[67] Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (London : Oxford University Press, 1935), III, 516.

progressive transformation of human nature, with full human freedom its end.[68] Freedom "consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development",[69]

Aside from their outlook on historical evolution, Marx and Ibn Khaldūn both set forth a conception of historical change characterized by conflict and one which is dialectical in nature: each successive stage arises from the conflicting contradictions of the previous one. Although Ibn Khaldūn's conception of change is the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties in contrast to the more evolutionary postulates of Marx, to both these men these changes in stages are essentially dialectical. Their statements are fully congruent with one another. Because of his appearance in the nineteenth century, Marx was confident to say that "the history of all hitherto existing society has been the history of the class struggle".[70] lbn Khaldūn was more circumscribed in limiting his notion of conflict to one between the desert people and those in urban areas. Their dialectic does not rest on a reified metaphysical principle, but is rooted in actual historic relations. Historical materialism is a better term to use than dialectical materialism, but, as we have seen this term can also be misleading in the light of the dialectical relationship of productive and non-productive factors in history.[71] Confusion exists over this because when we abstract from particular historical events and posit the dialectic as a scientific methodology, it often seems as if it has been made into a hypostasized reality. We have to remember Marx's admonition that "in direct

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[68] Joseph O'Malley, "History and Man's 'Nature' in Marx," Review of Politics, XXVIII (October 1966), 516.
[69] Engels, Anti-Duehring, p. 125.
[70] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York : International Publishers, 1964), p. 57.
[71] Israel (op. cit.. p. 91) points out that dialectical materialism is concerned with problems of epistemology ; historical materialism with sociological-economic problems seen in an historical perspective.

contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven",[72]

Conclusion

The dialectic which Ibn Khaldūn and Karl Marx saw operating in history is nothing more than an historical generalisation based on empirical observations. In his observation, especially of the Arab world, Ibn Khaldūn described the conflict between nomadic peoples and the more civilised sedentary peoples in the context of a continual change of power; in a cyclical rise and fall of dynasties. Four centuries later Marx observed the inner dynamic of different social classes 'as they created systems which in turn became the source of their downfall. Marx looked at men "in their actual empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions".[73] In addition to this both men rejected a narrow cause-and-effect determinism in the relation-ship between the material and ideational elements in history in favour of a dialectical sociology. For these reasons they provided the foundations long ago for an empirical-dialectical methodology which has not been developed into its fullest possibilities in sociology.

In addition to methodology Ibn Khaldūn and Karl Marx have provided us with the beginnings of it theory of society and the manner in which it changes. In the Grundrises der Kritic derpoli tischen Okonotnie[74] Marx indicates a central theme of his work. He proposes to study the "abstract characteristics of society, taking into account their historical aspects". At the highest level of generality of scientific theory, that of general ideas about the structure of theory and the nature of causality, this historical sociology has many advantages. The fact that many of his predictions failed to come true bolster rather than detract from this definition. That is, had Marx lived on

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[72] Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 14.
[73] Ibid., p. 15.
[74] In T.B. Bottomore, Ed., Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 17.

into the twentieth century he would have had to take note of historical changes taking place which would modify his theory of society, recognising that theoretical propositions are open to later refinement or alternation. A refutation at the level of prediction does not mean a refutation of Marx's theory up to the highest level of generality. Stinchcombe[75] notes that there are different levels of critique corresponding to the different levels of generality and each must be considered separately. Marx's work has not been emphasized enough by American sociologists partly because some of his predictions failed to come true, giving rise to the belief that his work was unscientific or ideological. But as Bottomore points out, "the general inclination of Marx's work, when it is traced from his earlier to his later writings, is clearly away from the philosophy of history and towards a scientific theory of society, in the precise sense of a body of general laws and detailed empirical statements".[76]

After defining history as "information about human social organisation," Ibn Khaldūn goes on to say that "discussion of the general conditions of regions, races, and periods constitutes the historian's foundation".[77] This clearly refers to the generalizing aspect of science. As Nour concludes:

"All together, it is a credit to Ibn Khaldun that he tried to study society in all its phases, perceiving the universal processes behind the particular events and seeking generalizations fitting societies of different times and places. If we conceive sociology as the effort to generalize from observed facts on the behavior of men in society, with a view to more accurate and more complete comprehension of the associative life of man, both in its

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[75] Stinchcombe, op. cit., p. 53.

[76] T.B. Bottomore, "Karl Marx : Sociologist or Marxist ?" Science and Society, Vol. XXX (Winter 1966), p. 15.

[77] Ibn Khaldūn, op. cit., I, 63. Ibn Khaldūn criticised the tradition-bound historians who "disregarded the changes in conditions and in the customs of nations and races that the passing of time had brought about" (I, 9).

static and dynamic aspects, then we are justified in speaking of lbn Khaldun as a sociologist".[78]

Another student of his work, Schmidt, points out that "when Ibn Khaldūn speaks of science ('ilm), he does not mean knowledge in .the rough, but that certain and systematized knowledge which to us is science—not Wissen, but Wissenschaft".[79]

Thus, in the work of Karl Marx and lbn Khaldūn there is no real bifurcation or in congruency of theory and method which is the basis of difficulties and the object of concern to many today.

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[78] Mohamed Abdel Monem Nour, An Analytical Study of the Sociological Thought of Ibn Khaldun (Lexington : University of Kentaky—Dissertation, 1953), p. 248. Similar views were expressed by Simon, op. cit., p. 145 ; Issawi, op. cit., p. 8 ; Nathaniel Schmidt, Ibn Khaldun : Historian, Sociologist, and Philosopher (New York : Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 27-28 ; Robert Flint, History of the Philosophy of History (New York : 'Charles Scrbiaer and Sons, 1894), p. 161 ; Howard Becker and H.F. Barnes, Social Thought from Lore to Science (New York : Dover Publications, 1961), I, 266, 269 ; Sati al-Husari, Studies on Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah (Cairo : Dār al-Ma'arif, 1953), p. 235 ; Ali A.W. Wafi, Abdul Rahman Ibu Khaldun (Cairo : Mektabat Misr, 1962), p. 205 ; Sorokin, at al., op. cit., p. 54 ; Ulken, op. cit., p. 29 ; Bouthoul, op. cit., p. 21 ; and T. Hussein, Etude Analytique et Critique de la Philosophie Sociale D'Ibn Khaldoun (Faculte des lettres de L'Universite de- Paris—Dissertation, 1917), pp. 48-59.

[79] Schmidt, op. cit., p 21.

PANDIT ANAND NARAIN MULLA AS A TRANSLATOR OF IQBAL

Jagan Nath Azad

Pandit Anand Narain Mulla needs no introduction as a leading poet of Urdu today. He is equally known as one of the top-most litterateurs of Urdu both in India and Pakistan. But many of us are perhaps not aware that he is also a poet of English. During his college days Anand Narain Mulla was as active as a,poet of English as he is today as a poet of Urdu. In those days he translated into English verse Iqbal's quatrains entitled "Lālah-i Tūr," included in Iqbal's third collection of Persian compositions, Payām-i Mashriq, the first two being Asrār-i Khudī and Rnmūz-i Bekhudī.,

These quatrains have also been rendered in English verse by Professor Arthur J. Arberry and the translated version appeared under the title Tulip of Sinai from London in 1947.

Later in 1971, Mr Hadi Hussain brought out his book A Message From the East with a sub-title "A Selective Verse Rendering of Iqbal's Payām-i-Mashriq". In the words of the translator, "the rendering was selective in a quantitative rather than a qualitative sense: it was confined to those of the poems 'in the Payām-i-Mashriq which had in the first instance appealed to me most as a translator, much as I admired the whole of that work". A revised and enlarged edition of this book with a sub-title "A Translation of Iqbal's Payām-i Mashriq into English Verse" appeared again from Lahore in 1977 on the occasion of Iqbal's birth centenary celebrations.

Anand Narain Mulla's English version of "Lālah-i Tūr," although appearing in a book form after the two versions of those quatrains have already appeared, actually saw the light of the day long before A.J. Arberry's translation appeared in 1947.

Iqbal, as a poet of Urdu and Persian, shot into prominence like a meteor star in the first decade of the present century when his Urdu poems entitled "Himālah," "Mirzā Ghālib," "Bachche Ki Du'ā," "Khuftgān-i Khāk Se Istifsār," "Aftāb," "Eke Ārzu," "Sayyid Ki Lauh-i Turbat," "Rukhsat Ai Bazm-i Jahān," "Tasvīr-i Dard," "Subh Kā Sitārah,""Tarānah-i Hindī,""Kanār-i-Rāvī and many others appeared in prominent journals of the country, followed by the publication of Asrār-i Khudī and Rumūz-i Bekhudi, the two Persian mathnavīs, in 1914and 1918, respectvely. But actually it was two years later that he was, in a befitting manner, introduced to his Western readers by Professor R.A. Nicholson whose translation of the Asrār-i Khudī under the title Secrets of the Self brought Iqbal much closer to the Western poets, 'writers and intellectuals. The Secrets of the Self, in spite of some flaws in it here and there, is a laudable attempt on the part of Professor Nicholson to introduce Iqbal's poetry and philosophy to the West. Nicholson's translation kindled a genuine desire in the minds of the Western students of literature to know more and more of what Iqbal had written, and today Iqbal's galaxy of translators for the Western readers consists of, in addition to Nicholson, luminaries like Arthur Arberry and Victor Kiernan (U.K.), Eva Vitre-Meyerovitch and Luce-Claude Maitre (France), Annemarie Schimmel and B.M. Weischer (West Germany), Prigarina Natasha, Cheleshev, Dr Abdullah Jan Ghaforov and Dr Sukhochev (U.S.S.R.), Henri Broms and Jussi Taneli biro (Finland), Allessandro Bausani and Arthur Jeffery (Italy), Wojceich Skalmowski and Dr Hiltrud Reusten (Belgium), Sheila McDonough (Canada), Jan Marek (Czechoslovakia), J.C. Burgel (Switzerland), Barbara Metcalf (U.S.A.), Shaikh Akbar Ali, Hafeez Malik, Abdullah Anwar Beg, Bashir Ahmad Dar, Sayyid Abdul Vahid, Khwajah Abdul Waheed, Dr Muiz-ud-Din and Dr Mohammad Maruf (Pakistan) and Atiya Begam Faizi, Nawwab Iftikhar Ali Khan and Dr Sichdanand Sinah (India). The latest to join this illustrious fellowship is Pandit Anand Narain Mulla,, translator of Lālah-i Tūr.

Translation is a difficult art, and all those scholars of various languages who have undertaken this task have referred to the difficulties involved in the art-of translation. Iqbal himself, while referring to his translation of "Gayatri Mantra" into Urdu verse entitled "Aftāb," says that "the difficulties of translation from one language into another are well known to the scholars". Professor A.J. Arberry, who has translated Lālah-i Tūr and some other works by Iqbal, namely, Jāvīd Nāmah, Zabūr-i 'A jam, Shikwah and Jāwab-i Shikwah, is fully conscious of the difficulties of translation from the poetry of one language into the poetry or the prose of another language. Dilating on this issue, Professor Arberry says in the Introduction to the Tulip of Sinai: "I have sought to be as faithful to the letter of original as possible and have imitated the stanzas used by Iqbal. ... Iqbal is not an easy writer to understand, as Professor Nicholson him-self confessed, and the form of quatrains he uses in the 'Tulip of Sinai' further augments the difficulty of grasping his full meaning. But I think 1 have made out his intention and have endeavored to compress it into the version." In the words of the late Justice S.A. Rahman, an Iqbal scholar of Pakistan, "a competent translator has to be fully conversant with the two languages he seeks to work in". Professor Arberry's command over the two languages, English and Persian, is an established fact, but in addition to having a thorough grasp of English and Persian, Anand Narain Mulla is a poet himself, and that makes all the difference in so far as translation of Persian poetry into English verse is concerned.

Discussing the issue of translation from one language' into another, Professor Arberry says in the Introduction to his translation of the Jāvīd Nāmah: "It has been said that the ideal at which the translator should aim is to produce a version as near as possible to what his original would have written, had he been composing in the translator's language and not his own." In this discussion Arberry quotes instances of translation by two translators of a few couplets of the Jāvīd Nāmah. One is, of course, Iqbal himself and the other Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad. The original couplets are:

زندۂ یا مردہ یا جاں بلب
از سہ شاہد کن شہادت را طلب
شاہد اول شغور خویشتن
خویش را دیدن بہ نور خویشتن
شاہد ثانی شغور دیگرے
شاہد ثالث شغور ذات حق
خویش را دیدن بہ نور ذات حق
پیش ایں نور در بمانی استوار
حی و قاہم چوں خدا را شمار!
بر مقام خود رسیدن زندگی است
ذات را بے پردہ دیدن زندگی است
مرد مومن در نسازد باصفات
مصطفیٰ راضی نشد الا بہ ذات
چیست مغراج آرزوے شاہدے
امتحانے رو بروے شاہدے

در حضورش کس نماند استوار
وربماند ہست او کامل عیار
ذرہ از کف مدہ تابے کہ ہست
پختہ گیر اندر گرہ تابے کہ ہست
تاب خود را بر فزو دن خوشتر است
پیش خورشید آزمودن خوشتر است
پیکر فرسودہ را دیگر تراش
امتحان خویش کن "موجود" باش

ایں چیں "موجود" "محمود" است و بس
ورنہ نار زندگی دود است و بس

Iqbal himself translates these lines as:

"Art thou in the stage of 'life', 'death', or 'death-in-life'?

Invoke the aid of three witnesses to verify thy 'Station'.

The first witness is thine own consciousness

See thyself, then, with thine own light.

The second witness is the consciousness of another ego—

See thyself, then, with the light of an ego other than thee.

The third witness is God's consciousness

See thyself, then, with God's light.

If thou standest unshaken in front of this light,

Consider thyself as living and eternal as He!

That man alone is real who dares

Dares to see God face to face!

What is 'Ascension'? Only a search for a witness

Who may finally confirm thy reality?

A witness whose confirmation alone makes thee eternal

No one can stand unshaken in His Presence;

And he who can, verily, he is pure gold.

Art thou a mere particle of dust?

Tighten the knot of thy ego;

And hold fast to thy tiny being!

How glorious to burnish one's ego

And to test its luster in the presence of the Sun!

Re-chisel, then, thine ancient frame;

And build up a new being.

Such being is real being;

Or else thy ego is a mere ring of smoke!"[80]

And Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad:

"Art thou alive or dead or dying fast?

Three witnesses should testify thy state.

The first as witness is the consciousness

Of self, to see thyself by thine own light

The second is another's consciousness

That thou may'st kindle thus to see-thyself.

And thy third witness is God's consciousness,

A light in which thou may'st see thyself.

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[80] Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 198-99.

Before the Lord's effulgence if thou stand'st

Thou art alive like him. For life is but

To reach thy destined end, that is to see

The Lord unveiled. One who believes

Shall never lose himself in Attributes

For Mustafa insisted on the Sight.

The flight to heaven means a longing for

A witness who may testify thyself

Unless it be confirmed by Him, our life

Is nothing but a play of tint and smell

No one can stand against His beauty bright,

Except the one who has perfection reached.

O grain of sand! thy lustre do not lose,

Thy ego's knot but tighten up. Thy gleam

Increase, then test thyself against the sun,

If thou canst thus reshape thyself and pass

The test, thou art alive and praised or else

The fire of life is smoke and naught beside."[81]

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[81] Shaikh Rlahnnul Ahmad, Tr. (Iqbal Javid Nāmah), Pilgrimage of Eternity, pp. 11-12, 11. 230-256.

In order to have a fuller comparative study, I would like-to reproduce here one more translation of the same lines and that is by Arthur J. Arberry. He writes:

"Whether you be alive, or dead, or dying—for this seek witness from three witnesses.

The first witness is self-consciousness,

to behold oneself in one's own light;

the second witness is the consciousness of another,

to behold oneself in another's light ;

the third witness is the consciousness of God's essence,

to behold oneself in the light of God's essence.

If you remain fast before this light,

count yourself living and abiding as God!

Life is to attain one's own station,

Life is to see the Essence without a veil;

the true believer will not make do with Attributes—.

the Prophet was not content save with the Essence.

What is Ascension? The desire for a witness,

an examination face-to-face of a witness

a competent witness without whose confirmation

life to us is like colour and scent to a rose.

In that Presence no man remains firm,

or if he remains, he is of perfect assay.

Give not away one particle of the glow you have,

knot tightly together the glow within you:

fairer it is to increase one's glow,

fairer it is to test oneself before the sun;

then chisel anew the crumbled form ;

make proof of yourself; be a true being!

Only such an existent is praiseworthy,

otherwise the fire of life is mere smoke."[82]

Judged by any standard Iqbal's translation is the best. It is faithful, as near as possible to the original and full of poetic fervour. The reason is not far to seek. Let Iqbal's superb translation not misconstrue us to conclude that his translation is the best because it is his own piece of poetry which he has rendered into English. No. This is not the reason. The reason of Iqbal's amazing success in this field is that he is a poet and it is his poetic genius that has lent superiority to his translation over the two other specimens. This very difference is visible in a comparative study of the English rendering of Arthur Arberry and that of Anand Narain Mulla. Another reason is that Anand Narain Mulla being one of the major poets of Urdu in India is closer to Iqbal's Persian idiom than Arthur Arberry. Professor Arberry is correct in saying that "Iqbal is not an easy writer to understand." Actually, Iqbal is a more difficult writer to understand for his translators outside the Urdu- and Persian-speaking regions of the world, namely, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,

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[82] A.J. Arberry, Tr., Jāvīd nāmah.

Iran, and Tajikistan, than those in these regions for the obvious reason that in poetry, whether it is Urdu or Persian, Iqbal uses old and conventional idiom and symbolic expressions only to impart new meanings to them. Sayyid Abdul Vahid, dealing with this point, says: "The remarkable point about Iqbal's poetry is the sense of newness and the main reason for this is that, although Iqbal was not actually anti traditionalist, he uses certain words and combination of words to express his visions which are entirely original. Some of these words are coined by him; others represent old words used in an entirely new sense. . . . He is also a superb phrase-maker and has wonderful felicity of phrasing by which language acquires meanings beyond those formally assigned by the lexicographer. These words and phrases act as the keystone for the entire arch of the poetic inspiration. As the removal of the keystone is sure to cause the downfall of the entire arch, so if we try to substitute some-thing else for the master word or phrase, the whole artistic expression is marred… The use of those words and phrases gives to Iqbal's poetry not only a sense of newness found in very few Urdu and Persian poets, but also the quality of surprise which 'characterizes all great poetry."[83] One notices a further elucidation of this point in Reyazul Hasan's review of Arberry's Tulip of Sinai wherein he gives a few quatrains of Iqbal in original along with Professor Arberry's translation and tries to show "how a literal translation has deviated from the meaning of the verse' and may cause confusion in the mind of English readers. He further says: "Such readers may even find Iqbal an extravagant poet." In this context the first quatrain that Reyazul Hasan quotes along with Arberry's translation is:

درین گلشن پریشان مثل بویم
نمی دانم چه می خواهم چه جویم
برآید آرزو یا بر نیاید
شہید سوز و ساز آرزویم[84]

[83] Iqbal: His Art and Thought.
[84] Payām-I Mashriq (Kulliyāt), p. 27/197.

A spent scent in the garden I surprise,

I know not what I seek, that I require,

But be my passion satisfied, or no,

Yet here I burn, a martyr to Desire.

Commenting on this translation Reyazul Hasan says: "The word parishān-has been translated as spent and the idea behind the word, spent, is 'consumed or exhausted,' while the proper idea of parīshān here is scatteredness like the spread of the fragrance in the garden." It is difficult to disagree with Reyazul Hasan on the point he has made. I would, therefore, like to quote here Anand Narain', Mulla's rendering of the same quatrain to highlight the importance of the point made by Reyazul Hasan. He says:

Breeze like I wander aimless in this bow's

The, scheme of things is hid from me entire,

I live in constant Hope and Fear, a harp

Played on by changing moods of my desire.

Another quatrain with Professor Arberry's translation and Reyazul Hasan's comments:

تنے پیدا کن از مشت عبارے
تنے محکم تر از سنگیں حصارے
درون او دل درد اآشنارے

چو جوے درکنار کوہسارے[85]

A hand of dust a body fortified

Firmer than rocky rampart shall abide,

Yet beats there in a sorrow-conscious Heart,

A river flowing by a mountain side.

"The phrase dil-i-dard ashnā'i" has been translated as sorrow-conscious Heart which does not convey the complete idea of the phrase. Properly it is a tendency to share another person's emotion or mental participation in another's trouble, i.e. a sort of sympathy with another person's misfortune. This is what Heine has called 'Heiligheint der Schmerzen' (holiness or sanctity of pain)."

Anand Narain Mulla's translation is:

From thy frail dust a massive body forms,

As hard as rock to face the fiercest storms;

Within, a heart that knows the pangs of pain,

A rivulet singing in a mountain arms.

The difference of expression does not require any clarification. Such instances are quite a few in number. This variation in the rendering can be easily attributed to the two causes: firstly, the Mulla's affinity with the classical Persian as used by Iqbal and, secondly, in so far as the translation of poetry is concerned he himself has the gift of poetic expression which a non-poet does not have.

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[85] Ibid., p. 29/199.

Those conversant with Iqbal's Payām-i Mashriq and particularly its first chapter entitled "Lālah-i Tūr" would realize that the task before the Mulla wasan arduous one—translation of Iqbal's Persian poetry into English poetry—but Pandit Anand Narain Mulla being an acknowledged litterateur with a grasp of both Persian and English has acquitted himself admirably well in this challenging task. His version is distinguished both for its literary qualities and faithfulness to the original. This translation, which is neither literal to the extent of being prosaic, nor free to the limit of drifting away from the original, is a commendable attempt to present Iqbal to his Western readers. I am sure those studying Iqbal through English will find this translation not only an, interesting and a pleasant reading but also enjoy through it Iqbal's flights of imagination, his depths of philosophical thoughts, the beauty of his imagery and language and his astonishing freshness of ideas.

NOTHINGNESS IN THE EXISTENTIALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Niaz Erfan

What is the nature of Nothingness or Non-being? Does it -exist? Is it real? Is it the same thing as empty space? Such questions and answers to them have all along been confusing.

This confusion on the problem of Nothingness in the history of Philosophy has mostly arisen due to the equivocation of such statements as "Nothing is there," which may mean either the negation of Being or affirmation of Non-being. These two statements do not have the same meaning. Even if we say: "Nothing is nothing besides being tautological it has two meanings: (1) That Nothing as identical with Non-being exists, (2) that Non-being is not there. Similarly, the traditional logical formula Ex-nihilo nihil fit, i.e. "out of nothing nothing comes out," has two meanings.

The confusion and equivocation, which led to antagonistic and opposing views, was, at once, the cause and the consequence of the fact that this problem and others alike were being discussed on conceptual level. In order to discuss the existentialistic view we must first glance over the views of the old philosophers.

Parmenides was the first philosopher to say something about this problem. He denied the existence and reality of Nothingness on the ground that it cannot be thought about. It we think, the thought is contentless; it means it is not. Non-being is not. Being "is". Plato, on the other hand, denied the reality of Non-being, yet admitted its factual existence. The particular objects which partake into reality (i.e. ideas) do have an element of Non-being in so far as they have spatiality. Space and, therefore, matter

(which is extended in space) "is," yet it is unreal. Spinoza's great saying "Determination is negation" implies that the world in space, the world of particular determinate beings, is nothing.

Thus he did not fare better than Plato. In modern times we find Hegel discussing the problem again on purely conceptual level. Pure Being (as much as it is undeterminate and attributeless) and pure non-Being are the same thing. Determinate Being is particular Being, not pure Being. Devoid of all attributes and qualities it will become pure Being but then it will lose all the qualities and modes of expression, i.e. it will become contentless. But it can-not be thought in this contentless form as already Parmenides had, declared. Therefore, it is equal to non-Being, which "is".

Thus we see that the great philosophers who have expressed themselves on Nothingness have used this concept to bring in change to the immutable reality. It is a device to make the objective world possible.

Religion has also something to say about Nothingness, for religion has to admit the existence of Non-Being so that God may create out of Nothing and thus the eternity, uniqueness and omnipotence of God may be safeguarded. Mysticism received its inspiration from religion. It teaches the negation of the soul by means of its merger into God. In ecstasy this aim is achieved momentarily.

Before finding out the characteristic approach of the existentialists to this problem we must briefly know what Existentialism is and what it stands for.

Existentialism is the recall of Philosophy to the concrete individual and his real situation in the world. The sophists had declared: "Man is the measure of all things," but they had superficially understood the truth. They sought to make the passing whims and caprices of an individual the standard of judgments and reality. But existentialists who, by the analysis of very important common human feelings, that reality and its multifarious

phenomena, are given in them. We experience reality, we live it, but not in the sense in which subjective Idealists or Spiritualists or even Bergson take it.

The problem of Nothingness has a very important position in the existentialistic philosophy. We find reference to the feeling of Nothingness through dread in Kierkegaard, the founder of the school. Dread and fear are not synonyms: fear is aroused by some specific object but dread is aroused by nothing, i.e. Nothingness. But the reference to the relationship of dread and Nothingness, made by Kierkegaard is occasional and does not play a major part in his exposition of the nature of dread. But this hint seems to have inspired the whole views of all existentialists, specially Helmut Kuhn and Heidegger with regard to the problem of Nothingness.

The historical expression that nothing nihilates, which fundamentally embodies the existentialistic approach, comes from Helmut Kuhn. It is found in his book An Encounter with Nothingness.

Heidegger has developed his view first in his book entitled Being and Time and later on he has explained and expanded it in a lecture captioned "What is Metaphysics?"

Heidegger defines Nothing as the complete negation of the totality of' what is or the complete negation of Being. But at once-he poses a question: "Does Nothing exist only because the Not (i.e. the negation) exists?" Or "Does negation exist only because Nothing exists?" In answer he asserts: "Nothing is more primary, than the Not and negation." But if Nothingness is primary, it means it must be given to us in some form so that we may be able to derive the Not from it. It has already been stressed that Logic can hardly capture nothing We may get a formal concept of Nothing by first imagining the whole Being and then negating it. We may also posit a void, a Nothingness or a non-Being over and above Being and thus unwittingly posit existence and being for Nothingness. In this sense Nothingness is Being because' it "is". Thus Nothingness eludes all our efforts to capture it into the moulds of logical concepts. All our feverish endeavors fail and each time we

hit at Being and never at Nothingness. Nothingness is not—is Nothing. What then should we do in order to, get at Nothing?

Heidegger has the following solution. The individual does. only comprehend by means of intellect the totality of what is as explained above, but the individual also finds himself in the midst of what-is-in-totality. Sometimes it so happens that the feeling of the wholeness surrounding him entirely absorbs him, comes over him. He is not enchanted by or interested in any particular object. He is overcome by the totality. This happens in a feeling of real boredom which is not due to any particular object. We are simply bored. The real boredom reveals what-is-in-totality. Joy also, to some extent, does so. Such states are just like thick fog of solid Being which hide Nothingness behind them because the distance between the objective Being and the knowing Being is eaten up by Being and it also swallows up, rather "oppresses," the knowing Being. So in such states there is only Being nothing is not. It is hidden. We can get at Nothingness only if somehow this totality slips away and leaves a void behind. Existentially there must be some mood to reveal Nothingness which lies behind Being. Heidegger borrows ready-made solution from Kierkegaard. The mood is dread which is distinct from fear or anxiety. Fear and anxiety pertain to particular objects and, therefore, are limit-ed. Heidegger, moreover, defines dread as a feeling of uncanniness., Dread holds us in suspense because it makes what-is-in totality slip away from us. "Hence we too," he says, "as existents in the midst of what is slip away from ourselves along with it." Moreover, it is not you or I as you and I, i.e. the particular individual, that has the feeling but only as "One". This impersonal "One" he calls Pure Dasein. So when Pure Dasein is struck dumb by this feeling of slipping away of Being and his own self and there is nothing to hold to, he has the real experience of Nothing.

From the description of the revelation of Nothingness one gets the impression that Heidegger raises the conception to the level of Being as if Nothingness "is," as if it has a quasi-objective being. So he hastens to add that Nothing is revealed in dread, but not as something that is objective.

Neither is it to be taken as an object, nor is dread to be taken as the perception of Nothingness.

Nothingness functions as if it were at one with what-is-in totality, i.e. it is withdrawal or retreat from Being. This has its source in Nothingness which does not attract but repels. This "repelling from" is essentially "expelling into"; it is a conscious gradual relegation to the vanishing what-is-in-totality and it is also the essence of Nothingness; the same may be called nihilation. Nihilation is neither annihilation of what is, nor does it spring from negation. Nothing hilates of itself. Negation is the after effect of this shock, this experience. When one comes over the shock, one finds Being as the other as contrasted with Nothing. Heidegger's theory is that such an experience is essential for a clear and overt revelation of Being to the Dasein (the human individual).

It is in the being of what-is that the hilation of Nothing occurs. Human Dasein is projected into Nothingness. Had it not been so projected or transcedent, it could never relate to what is. Human existence is possible only by a perpetual feeling of dread. Accordingly, dread is there, but- sleeping. "All Dasein quivers with its breathing." It is awakened only rarely by unusual occurrences. Lastly, Heidegger observes that our enquiry into Nothingness is truly a metaphysical enquiry as the enquiry of Being falls in the scope of science., Now what Heidegger has said about Nothingness is in many points confused and unacceptable.

In the first place Heidegger—all existentialists for the matter of that—has not justified the use of moods and feelings for the revelation of Being and Nothingness--all philosophical problems. Care, guilt, joy, boredom, dread and curiosity are some of the states that are said to reveal whatever is and is not. Boredom, for example, is said to be the experience of what-is-in-totality as a whole. We do not quite understand as to why this mood has been selected. Yet let us grant that the dumb state of boredom does reveal the totality of Being. But he also says that joy too reveals it. Psychologically

speaking, the statement does not appeal. The two experiences are poles apart and, if moods at all reveal any-thing, the two moods, boredom and joy, cannot reveal the same thing.

There is yet another objection too. In spite of the fact that Heidegger has cautioned us against supposing that Nothingness. exists, yet he has discussed it as if it has an objective Being. Does it not appear that dread is like a perceptual experience of Nothingness. Still he states that dread is not an apprehending of Nothingness. It is not clear what sort of experience it is. The description that the Eastern mystics in general and the Muslim, sufis in particular give of the ecstasy, appears to be a better source of such an experience. Perhaps it was such a state that was intended when he said that joy is a second mood revealing Nothingness.

These are, according to him, two steps in the whole experience which may be called the functioning of Nothingness. Boredom is broken away by dread wherein the totality slides away and the Dasein's control over the things is loosened. Here the individual is in the domain of Nothingness. The second step is the withdrawal. The Nothing repels. The individual is thrown back, and the Being now faces him with greater clearness and brightness. The experience of Nothingness, according to him, is essential before one can probe into the being of Being. Doesn't it appear as a philosophy of madness?

Lastly, though Heidegger makes Nothingness only an antithesis—not a conceptual antithesis—of what-is-in-totality, yet because he never makes clear what what-is-in-totality is, the concept of Nothingness remains empty. Therefore, our experience of it gives, us nothing about Nothing. So we have to depend on our discursive thought to make a picture of it. As such Existentialism has failed to help us in getting at Nothingness.

Coming in the footsteps of Heidegger, Jean Paul-Sartre has made Nothingness the most important concept of his philosophy. He agrees with his master in two main points (1) He considers that negation is dependent upon Nothingness. (2) He says more clearly than his predecessor that

Nothingness has only a borrowed existence. It is there, because Being is there. Being is empty of all other determination except identity with itself, but Nothingness is empty of Being. In other words, Being "is," Nothingness "is not," so Being is original, real and it also exists.

Heidegger's position is an advancement over that of Hegel. But Sartre has one objection against him. "If negation is the original structure of transcendence, what must be the original structure of the human reality, in order for it to be able to transcend the world?" In both cases it is a negating activity and there is no concern to ground one such activity upon the other. Heidegger, in addition, makes of Nothingness a sort of intentional correlate of transcendence, without seeing that he has-already inserted it into transcendence. If Nothingness provides the ground for negation while transcendence of Being (by the Daseins) has been conceived as going into Nothingness, that is if I emerge into Nothingness beyond the world (Being), how can this extra mundane Nothingness furnish a foundation for those little pools of non-Being in the depth of Being which appear when we make such negative statements as "I have no more money," "My class is absent."

As against this, Sartre's contention is that Nothingness is neither before nor after Being, nor in-a general way outside Being. Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of Being like a worm. If so, then, it cannot derive from itself the necessary force to nihilate itself because, to nihilate itself, it must "be". But Nothingness is "not". If we can speak of it, it is only because it possesses an appearance of being—a borrowed being. Nothingness does not hilate itself as Kuhn had said. Nothingness is nihilated. It follows, therefore, that there must exist a being of which the property is to nihilate Nothingness, to support it in its being, a being by which Nothingness comes to things. Sartre says: "Man is the being through whom Nothingness comes to the world." Man, whom he terms as Being-for-itself, "is" what it "is not" and "is not" what it "is". Human consciousness is not what it is conscious of, but its hilation. Further, the human individual is at any moment projected into the future and the past by memories and hopes. A man's being and personality is

made up by his adjustments in the world which, in turn, is the result of his past history and future plans ; take away that and you turn, the man into a different type of personality. But future and past are not. In this sense human consciousness is what it is not and is not what it is. Freedom is another name for consciousness or human being. There is no restriction or compulsion upon the self to be this or that. It chooses itself freely. But at the same time it exists as the negation of Being.

Sartre is very much indebted to Heidegger when he says that Nothingness is given to the human individual, not through concepts or relations, but through a specific experience or mood. But while Heidegger says it is dread, Sartre says it is anguish. Anguish is precisely my consciousness of being my own future in the mode of non-Being: it is the realisation that a Nothingness slips in between myself and my past and future. Nothing is responsible and accounts for my decisions. In other words, the Being-for-itself at any moment exists in the form of anguish, because the realization of non-Being and free choice to be this or that is the same thing.

But in spite of all this description we cannot help posing a fundamental question: How did Nothingness come to the world where Only Being exists? The rise of human consciousness is the break in the unbroken and undifferentiated being. It is just like a negation in the heart of Being; may we not conceive it in the form of a bubble where non-Being or empty space appears in the heart of Being ? So the consciousness exists only as the negation of Being. But after the question "How" has been answered, the question "Why" at once appears. Why did the break occur? What caused it? What was the necessity of such a break and differentiation in the immutable identity of Being? This problem he has discussed in the last chapter of his book Being and Nothingness. In fact, Sartre did realise that he owed such an explanation'. He held out a promise to us by saying that the question would be replied if we answered the more fundamental question.

Why is Being there? But this promise is never fulfilled.

Sartre has failed to reconcile two types of statements. (1) He always says that consciousness and freedom mean the same thing. In other words, consciousness is undetermined. (2) But again in the concluding chapter he suggests that Nothingness is made-to be by the in-itself or Being. In other words, consciousness is determined. As such it cannot be free.

There is another difficulty with the philosophy of Sartre. Consciousness, being the for-itself is Nothingness and is in desire of Being or in-itself. This means that if the for-itself desires objects, it desires Being directly in the sense that it wants to assimilate or be assimilated with Being and thus become one with it, and become, through synthesis, in-itself-for-itself. But it is a self-contradictory ideal. It means also that the fulfillment of desires and the attainment of the ideals is carrying the world back to the original position when if was a block immutable universe, with no break or differentiation (inasmuch as differentiation and. break occurred due to the nihilation of Being in consciousness).

Is not Sartre advocating a static universe where movement and differentiation are but transitory and unreal? Is he not advocating devolution? There is a tinge of nihilism in this, for only death synthesises for-itself and in-itself. There is also a tinge of Eastern mysticism, for the synthesis can be regained in the merger of the individual in the Absolute. Anyhow it is not a -healthy philosophy.

Sartre's synthesis of for-itself and -in-itself into an in-itself- for-itself is God according to him, but God does not exist. God is the future of man, an open possibility. Man is a passion to be Good. His whole life is a pursuit to become God. But it is a vain passion and a futile pursuit—a race towards an Eldorado, in so far as God, the ideal, does not exist. We are not here concerned with the religious significance of his conception of God. There is another point in this connection. Sartre talks as if the synthesis of for-itself and in-itself is the goal and as such it must be taking place or must take place.

Then all will become in-itself-for-itself. Now is it not against the tone of the existentialistic philosophy that the synthesis of for-itself which is Nothing and in-itself which is Being should take place? Doesn't it render all the criticism of Sartre against Hegel superfluous? Isn't the constant desire of for-itself to merge back into in-itself an irrational desire for death? Therefore, isn't it escapism and nihilism?

All these and a number of other objections can be levelled against the existentialistic conception of Nothingness. One thing must be admitted, however, that the credit goes to the existentialists for rightly breaking with the tradition of conceiving Nothingness as somehow or the other existing. They have gained a point in adopting a right sort of attitude about Nothing by saying that Nothingness or non-Being nihilates. It is a better way of expressing the fact than the traditional way of saying that "Nothing is nothing." But the fault lies in their working out of the concept in detail: in short, the fault lies with the curious philosophizing about Nothingness.

MYSTICISM AND MODERN MAN

Syed Fayyaz Habib

The modern man is in a strange predicament. He is in conflict with his inner and outer self. He feels a void in his life and is also alienated from society. He is cut from the roots of his being. Now there is a growing tendency in the modern man to be associated with his self. I call this the mystic attitude of the modern man.

Mysticism in common speech is a word of very uncertain con-notation. It has in recent times been used as an equivalent for two characteristically different German words mystizizmus, which stands for the cult of the supernatural, for theosophical pursuits for a spiritualistic exploitation of physical research, and mystik, which stands for immediate experience of a Divine-human inter-course and relationship. The word "mysticism" has, furthermore, been commonly used to cover both (1) the firsthand experience of direct intercourse with God and (2) theologico-metaphysical doctrine of the soul's possible union with the Absolute Reality, i.e. with God. It would be conducive to clarity to restrict the word "mysticism" to the latter significance, namely, as an equivalent for the German word mystik and as designating the historic doctrine of the relationship and potential union of the human soul with the Ultimate Reality and to use the term "mystical experience" for direct intercourse with God. On account of its common uses, the name "mysticism" is more misleading than" any other of our type names. As a form of philosophy, mysticism is not to be associated with occultism or superstition, nor with physical research, nor with an application of the fourth dimension to psychology, nor with a cult of vagueness, nor with a special love of mysterious for its own sake.

Mysticism does indeed assert that after our best intellectual efforts there remains an element of mystery in reality ; in this respect, mysticism is more allied to scepticism or agnosticism than to credulity. But the mystic, in the history of philosophy, is the initiate, one who has attained a direct vision of Reality, a vision which he is unable to describe. Like the initiate in the old Greek mysteries, after the sacred drama has been shown to him as a pictorial symbol of metaphysical truth, the mystic is silent, not because he does not know, but because he cannot explain.

Mysticism has had a long history; it is older than realism, older than idealism without notable representative of this type. The influence of Plotinus was enormous. It spread, via the later neo-Platonists—as his school is called—from Alexandria through the whole. world of fading classical antiquity. It was transmitted to Arabic philosophy and came to life again in a series of Muslim Persian mystics. One of these was al-Ghazali, who, falling into scepticism while teaching philosophy in Baghdad, abandoned his chair and his family, betook himself to asceticism, and ultimate-by reached a mystical philosophy. It influenced the Pseudo-Dionysius who in turn became the progenitor of a long line of Christian mystics.

Spinoza and Schelling have much in common with mysticism in their doctrine that the One, the Absolute Substance, cannot be described, since all description is limitation. The Absolute Being is beyond the distinction of mind and matter, of good and evil, of finite and infinite, even of numerical one and many. The mystic has recovered the power to be realistic to face the facts. There are several ways in which this takes place.

First of all, the power of plain scientific observation. What we call the scientific attitude toward the world is clearly the result of a moral development, a new reverence for Nature developing into a new care in according fact and discerning natural law. It has come to appear to us not merely a scientific but a moral duty to submit our minds to the evidence found in experience, the honesty required for scientific work. The mystic is

entirely right in his doctrine that the chief conditions for truth-getting are moral, not alone the metaphysical truth of the One, but the truth of physical detail as well.

The discovery of new hypotheses calls for something more than faithful observation ; it requires imagination. But not every imagination will do. What distinguishes the successful from the unsuccessful explorer of Nature is, in the first place, simplicity and open-mindedness,—freedom from pretence and personal vanity, showing itself in cravings to be different or ingenious or in the haste to gain startling results and, in the second place, a kind of sixth sense about the way Nature works, which can come only from a love of the thing. Both of these are moral qualities and such qualities as the mystic's discipline is particularly fitted to develop.

Further, the mystic recovers the-power to appreciate facts of the qualities of things, achieving a new innocence of the senses so that flowers, sounds, colours are felt as if for the first time. The mystic acquires or recovers the power to face the facts of social intercourse and thus to extend his capacity for friendship. Friendship, among other objects of appreciation, has its own way of running down; largely because, as it develops, there come occasions for saying truths we judge to be unwelcome and we cannot command the art to say them without offence. We are not able wholly to eliminate the self-interest from our criticism. One needs something like the mystic detachment from' self in order to find that common ground with one's neighbour which will enable one to denounce him, say to him: "Thou art the man," in such wise as to leave the friendship strengthened rather than destroyed.

If we are right, then it requires the mystic to be a completely successful realist and the realist to be a successful mystic. The practical conduct of life falls into a normal alternation between work and worship, each phase sharpening the need for the other. Only by some such alternation can mankind keep at par, and remain fit for the increasing burdens of an intricate

civilisation with its growing load of material power. For with this material load, the race must grow pari passu in its capacity for transparent observation, for artistic sensitivity, and for friendly personal and national relationship.

Mysticism is a highly specialised form of that search for Reality, for heightened and completed life. It is a constant characteristic of human consciousness. It is largely prosecuted by that "spiritual spark," that transcendental faculty which, though the life of our life, remains below the threshold in ordinary man. Emerging from its hiddenness in the mystic, it gradually becomes the dominant factor in his life, subduing to its service and enhancing by its having contact with Reality, these vital powers of love and will which we attribute to the heart, rather than those of mere reason and perception, which we attribute to the head. Under the sphere of this love and will, the whole personality rises in the acts of contemplation and ecstasy to a level of consciousness at which it becomes aware of a new field of perception: By this awareness, by this "loving sight," it is stimulated to a new life in accordance with Reality which it has beheld. So strange and exalted is this life, that it never fails to provoke either the anger or the admiration of other men.

A discussion of mysticism, regarded as a form of human life, will include two branches. First, the life-process of the mystic: the remaking of his personality, the method by which his peculiar consciousness of the Absolute is attained and faculties which have been evolved to meet the requirements of the phenomenal,, are enabled to do work on the requirements of the transcendental plane. This is the "Mystic Way" in which the self passes through the states or stages of development which were codified by the neo-Platonists and, after them, by the medieval mystics, as purgation, illumination, and ecstasy. Secondly, the content of the mystical field of perception, the revelation under which the contemplative becomes aware of the Absolute. This will include a consideration of the so-called doctrine of mysticism; the attempts of the articulate mystic to sketch for the world into

which he looked, in language which is only adequate to the world in which the rest of us dwell. Here the difficult question of symbolism, and of symbolic theology, comes in, a point upon which many promising expositions of the mystics have been wrecked. It will be our business to strip off as far as may be the symbolic wrap-ping and attempt a synthesis of these doctrines to resolve the apparent contradictions of objective and subjective revelations of the ways of negation and affirmatian, emanation and immanence, surrender and deification, the Divine Dark and the Inward Light and, finally, to exhibit, if we can, the essential unity of that experience in which the human soul enters consciously into the Presence of God.

Now I will deal with Existentialism. I will give a brief introduction of it. The contemporary philosophy holds that there is no essential human nature common to all men. Instead, each individual creates his own essence or character throughout his lifetime by his choice of interests and actions.Existentialism is a philosophy of irrationalism, because of the prominence it gives to man's passionate and aesthetic nature and to his feelings of anguish, love, guilt, and sense of inner freedom. It conceives of truth as a free commitment on the part of the individual. Existentialism, despite its exaggerated emphasis on the freedom of the individual, is not committed to a theory of free will. It is a form of individualism which recognises the crucial importance of the decisions of the individual man but does not ignore the individual's relation to others, the individual, through his self-transcendence, communes with other individuals and ultimately with an all-embracing Being. Although German Existentialism owes many of its insights to traditional idealism, both Heidegger and Jaspers would reject the idealistic level ; they refuse to identify being with consciousness, mind, spirit or any other idealistic principle.thought, usual philosophical classifications for it claims toiha e trap cended the oppositions between naturalism and spiritualism, realism and idealism, pluralism and monism.

The significance of Existentialism lies not in its contribution to technical philosophy. Existentialism is pre-eminently the philosophy of crises; it has

interpreted the whole of human and like wise of cosmic existence, as a succession of critical situation, each fraught with danger and demanding for its resolution all the inner resources of the individual; each crisis gives rise to a new crisis requiring similar resolution and the entire series leads to ultimate "shipwreck". Existentialism is a philosophy of disillusion and despair. It is not, however, properly speaking, philosophical pessimism, since it does not impart evil to the ultimate being; the ultimate being transcends both good and evil. Historically considered, existentialist philosophy is a basic response to the present cultural crises.

Existentialists have opened or re-opened a new world within, subjective existence which has scarcely been treated by philosophers since Socrates ; moreover, they have brought to focus once again the needed emphasis upon individual responsibility and freedom, which was becoming rapidly forgotten in a world which was relegating moral responsibility to the realm of pseudo-factuality. Furthermore, their stress on the role which "possibility" plays in the life of man is more than challenging; it is an encouraging thought which should inevitably lead to optimism, despite the pessimistic outlook and conclusion of the existentialist. How can any person be other than optimistic with the thought that his life is laden with numerous possibilities to which he has direct access and control by individual choice! To ask for more would be to place heaven beneath earthly existence.

A few lines on Pragmatism will suffice at this moment. The term' "Pragmatism" is derived from the Greek word pragmats, which means acts, affairs, business. It was first introduced into philosophy by Charles Peirce. Peirce's original formulation of they pragmatist principle: "Consider what effects, that conceivably might have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."

There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic- method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley and Hume

made momentous contributions to truth by its means. Sadworth Hodgson keeps insisting that realities are only what they are "known as". But these forerunners of Pragmatism used it in fragments; they were preluders only. Not until in our time has it generalisation itself, become conscious of a universal mission, and pretended to a conquering destiny.

The last aspect is Humanism, a very important movement in philosophy. Humanism is the philosophical movement which originated in Italy in the second half of the fourteenth century and diffused into other countries of Europe, coming to constitute one of the modern cultures. Humanism is the attitude of mind which attaches primary importance to man and to his faculties, affairs, temporal aspirations and well-being. Humanism is the philosophy which recognises the value or dignity of man and makes him the measure of all things or, somehow, takes human nature, its limits or its interests as its theme.

In the first sense Humanism is the basic aspect of the Renaissance and precisely that aspect through which Renaissance thinker sought to reintegrate man into the world of Nature and history and to interpret him in this perspective. Medieval Christianity suggested that man's life on earth was significant only in -so far as it affected his soul's expectation of God's mercy after death and it was against this belittling of his natural condition that the humanists of the Renaissance asserted the instinct value of man's life before death and the greatness of his potentialities. As ecclesiastical influence waned, the protest of Humanism was turned against secular orthodoxies that subordinated man to the abstract concept of political or biological theory. In the twentieth century some new senses were given to the word "Humanism". F.C.S. Schiller took it as the special name of his own version of Pragmatism, maintaining that all philosophic thinking or under-standing from human activity and reaffirming "protageras" that man is the measure against what he called the intellectualist philosophers; whether represented by Plato, by Hume or by the idealists of his own time.

The religious humanists believe in God—meaning a summation of all the social aspirations of the race and the ideational forces operating in history. They believe in immortality. The' most significant thing is that they believe in man, particularly man's idealistic aims and achievements. They also believe that whatever contributes to human welfare is Divine and all the activities which advance mankind's highest development are religious activities. Such is the gospel according to the contemporary religious Humanism.

According to naturalistic Humanism, there is only one order' of existence and that is the natural world and that man is a wholly natural creature whose welfare and happiness come solely from his own unaided efforts. Nature provides us with raw material and it is our duty to build a satisfying existence far ourselves and perhaps for our descendants. But Nature guarantees us nothing; we are on our own in an environment which has no plans, no moral preferences and makes no promises. The naturalistic humanists reject the illusion of immortality. They believe that this life is all and is enough. They do not deny that the yearning for survival is widespread and hence must be considered natural. But this has no relation with survival. However, their real emphasis is not upon the negative implications of this central doctrine, but rather upon showing that life here and now can be satisfying enough to make the prospect of death acceptable psychologically.

Humanism asserts that man's own reason and efforts are his best and indeed only hope and his refusal to recognise this point is of the chief causes of his failures throughout history. The humanist philosophy persistently strives to remind men that their only home is the mundane world. There is no use of searching elsewhere for happiness and fulfillment, for there is no other place to go. We must find our destiny and our promised land here and now. If one accepts this humanistic ideal of good life and good society, then the following implications would have to be acknowledged.

First, it would seem to mean that religion in virtually all its present forms would die out. A humanist society, assuming its members were intellectually consistent, would have no use for religion.

Secondly, a society living by naturalistic Humanism would necessarily have to shift its ethics from the foundation, they have had for centuries, namely, "the will of God" or Divine commands.

The third implication of the humanist philosophy is more intellectual than ethical. If life in this world is all we have, then knowledge of this world is most important. And the more reliable source is the scientific research. It follows that science provides us with knowledge which is the most humanly significant. The sciences of man are particularly important to Humanism and its exponents insist that these fields should be developed as rapidly as possible.

Psychologists have felt a necessity for inner life. The older psychologists were accustomed to say that the messages from the outer world awaken in that self three main forms of activity: (1) They arouse movements of attraction or repulsion, of cravings of a hungry infant to the passions of the lover, artist or fanatic. (2) They stimulate a sort of digestive process in which she combines and cogitates upon the material presented to her, finally observing a certain number of the resulting concepts and making them part of herself or of her world. (3) The movements of desire or the action of reason or both, in varying combinations, awaken in her a determination by which percept and concept issue in action bodily, mental or spiritual. Hence the main aspects of the self were classified as emotion, intellect and will, and the individual temperament was regarded as emotional, intellectual or volitional, according to whether feeling, thought or will assumed the reins. The unsatisfied psyche in her emotional aspect wants to love more, her curious intellect wants to know more. The awakened human creature suspects that both appetites are being kept on a low diet ; that there reality is more to love and more to know, somewhere in the mysterious world without

and, further, that its powers of affection and understanding are worthy of some greater and more durable objective than that provided by the illusion of sense. Urged, therefore, by the cravings of feeling or of thought, consciousness is always trying to run out to the encounter of the Absolute and always being forced to-return.

The vindication of the importance of feeling in our life and in particular its primacy over reason in all that has to do, with man's contact with the transcendental world has been one of the great achievements of modern psychology. In the sphere of religion it is now acknowledged that "God known of the heart" gives a better account of the character of our spiritual experience than "God is more trustworthy than the dialectic proof. One by one the common places of mysticism are thus discovered by official science and given their proper place in the psychology of the spiritual life.

Further, the heart has its reasons which the mind knows not. It is the matter of experience that, in our moments of deep emotion, transitory though they be, we plunge deeper into the reality of things than we can hope to do in hours of the most brilliant argument. At the touch of passions, doors fly open which logic has battered on in vain, for passion rouses to activity not merely the mind, but the whole vitality of man. It is the lover, the poet, the mourner, the convert, who shares for a moment the mystic's privilege of lifting that Veil of Isis which science handles so helplessly, leaving only her dirty fingermarks behind. The heart, eager and restless, goes out into the unknown and brings home, literally and actually, "fresh food for thought". Hence those who "feel to think" are likely to possess a richer, more real, if less orderly, experience than those who "think to feel". This psychological law, easily proved in regard to earthly matters, holds good also upon the super sensual plane. It was expressed once for all by the author of The Cloud of Unknowing when he said of God: "By love He may be gotten and holaen, but by the thought of understanding, never." That exalted feeling that "secret blind love pressing," not the neat deduction of logic, the apologist's "proofs" of the existence of the Absolute, unseals the eyes to

things unseen before: "therefore," says the same mystic, "what time that thou purposes" thee to this work and feelest by grace that thou art called of God, lift then up thine heart unto God with a meak stirring of love, and means God that made thee and bought thee and that graciously hath called thee to thy degree, and receive none other thought of God. And yet not all these but if thou list, for it sufficeth thee enough, a naked intent direct unto God without any other cause than Himself." Here we see emotion at its proper work. The movement of desire passing over at once into the act of concentration, the gathering up of all the powers of the self into a state of deter-mined attention which is the business of the Will. "This driving and drawing," says Ruysbroack, "we feel in the heart and in the unity of all our bodily powers. This act of perfect concentration, the passionate focusing of the self upon one point, when it is applied, 'with a naked intent,' to real and transcendental things, constitutes in the technical language of mysticism the state of recollection, a condition which is peculiarly characteristic of the mystic consciousness and is the necessary prelude of pure contemplation that state in which the mystic enters into communion with Reality."

Our next concern would seem to be with this condition of contemplation; what it does and whither it leads? What are (a) its psychological explanation and (b) its empirical value? Now in dealing with this and other rare mental conditions, we are, of course, trying to describe from without ; which is as much as to say that only mystics can really write about mysticism. Many mystics have so written and we, from their experiences and from, the explorations of psychology from' another plane, are able to make certain elementary deductions. It appears generally from these that the act of contemplation is for the mystic a psychic gateway, a method of going from one level of consciousness to another. In technical language it is the condition under which he shifts his "field of perception" and obtains his characteristic outlook on the universe. That there is such a characteristic out-look, peculiar to no creed or race, is- proved by the history of mysticism, which demonstrates plainly enough that in some men another

sort of consciousness, another "sense," may be liberated beyond the normal powers. This sense has attachments at each point to emotion, to intellect and to will. Yet it differs from and transcends the emotional, the intellectual and the volitional life-of ordinary men. It was recognized by Plato as that consciousness which could apprehend the real world of Ideas. Its development is the final object of that education which his Republic describes. It is called by Plotinus "Another intellect, different from that which reasons and is dominated rational." Its business, he says, is the perception of super sensual-or, in neo-Platonic language, the intelligible world. Al-Ghazālī says: "Like an immediate perception, as fore touched its object with one's hand." In the words of Bernard: "It may be defined as the soul's true unerring intuition, the unhesitating apprehension of truth," which simple vision of truth, says St Thomas Aquinas, "ends in a movement of desire".

Normal man is utterly unable to set up relation with spiritual Reality by means of his feeling, thought and will; it is clearly in this depth of being—in these unplumbed levels of personality—.that we must search, if we would find the organ, the power by which he is to achieve the mystic quest. That alternation of consciousness which takes place in contemplation can only mean the emergence from this, "fund or bottom of the soul," of some faculty which diurnal life keeps hidden "in the deeps".

There is within us an immense capacity for perception, for the receiving of messages from outside, and a very little consciousness which deals with them. It is as if one telegraph operator were placed in charge of a multitude of lines ; all may be in action, but we can only attend to one at a time. In popular language, there is not enough consciousness to go round. Even upon the sensual plane, no one can be aware of more than a few things at once. These fill the centre of our field of consciousness as the object on which we happen to have focussed our vision dominates our field of sights. The other matters within that field retreat to the margin. We know dimly that they are there, but we pay them no attention and should hardly miss them if they ceased to exist.

The "passivity" of contemplation is a necessary preliminary of spiritual energy, an essential clearing of the ground. It with-draws the tide of consciousness from the shares of sense, stops the "wheel of imagination". "The soul," says Eckhart, "is created in a place between Time and Eternity; with its highest powers it touches Eternity with its lower Time." These, the worlds of Being and Becoming, are the two 'stages of Reality" which meet in the spirit of man by cutting us off from the temporal plane, the lower kind of reality, contemplation gives the eternal plane, and the powers which can communicate with that plane, their chance. In the born mystic these powers are great and lie very near the normal threshold of consciousness. He has a genius for transcendental—or, as he would say, Divine—discovery in much the same way as his cousins, the born musician and poet, have a genius of musical or poetic discovery. In all three cases the emergence of these higher powers is mysterious and not least so to those who experience it. Psychology, on the one hand, and theology, on the other hand, may offer us diagrams and theories of this preceding of the strange oscillations of the developing consciousness, the visitations of an ellucidity and creative power over which the self has little or no control, the raptures and griefs of a vision by turns granted and withdrawn.

Thus we have seen some of the modern views on the .progress of life. Modern man is a wide term. It includes the younger generation, the scientists, the psychologists and other intellectuals. They are feeling a need of religion which can prove a boon for the modern man. The psychiatrists are laying stress on social and moral values which are essential for the preservation of the individual and the society. They feel that, without this spiritual orientation, the life force is apt to become stagnant. The modern scientists have become a slight hesitant in rejecting all unknown entities. Many of them hold a strong possibility for the existence of a spiritual phenomenon.

PROBLEM OF DEATH

Mohammad Noor Nabi

Every man, whether great or small, wealthy or poor, high or low, good or bad, must inevitably move towards that hour when life will cease and the body return to dust from which it came. To the eye, this is the end, the finale, the conclusion. And this is called "death". Thus man is born, grows, struggles, dreams, plans and builds only to surrender at last to death. But why? This "why" has always remained a central problem of theology, but in philosophy it could not occupy that prominent place which was its due. Credit must go to the existentialist thinkers who, in recent times, have taken up this problem, of death, and tried their best to throw some light, but their approach is not the meta-physical approach; on the contrary, they have approached the problem of death purely as a phenomenon of human existence. In the present paper I propose to discuss the viewpoints put' forward by Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre.

I

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), a German individualist, .accepts the fundamental notion of Schopenhauer that will is the principle of existence, but this will, he conceives, not merely as the will to live, but as the will for power. Life is essentially a striving for a surplus of power, and exuberant instinct is good.[86] This is the basic principle of the philosophy of Neitzsche and on: this principle he presents the conception of "Overman".

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[86] Frank Thilly, A History of Philosophy (Allahabad : Central Book Depot, 1949), p. 520.

The Overman, in the opinion of Nietzsche, is one who seeks to become, to achieve, what he is to be—the new, the unique, the incomparable, making laws for ourselves and creating our-selves.[87]

Thus the Overman of Neitzsche has become God-like by murdering God ; that is, he is the person who, not only chooses between good and evil, but who himself establishes new values and affirms the significance of life in so doing.

Nietzsche assigns this duty of "Overman" to the philosophers who have to fill this need for a re-emphasis of self-creation and self-legislation regarding values. These "Overmen," even in extreme difficulty and critical situation, say "yes" to life. Death, for them, is not the termination of life; on the contrary, it is a consurnmation to life, as "a spur and promise to the survivors, the living".[88]

Thus death, for Nietzsche, is not a mere happening that be-falls an individual, but a free act, not different in kind from other acts one might choose to do, "the holy No when the time for Yes passed."[89]

Can we affirm on this principle that suicide is a meaningful alternative for Nietzsche?

Nietzsche will answer it in the affirmative provided it is to die fighting.[90]

Death must be illuminated by a meaning issuing from within the life which is ending.

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87 Fernando Molina, Existentialism As Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs,. N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 29.
88 Ibid.
89 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (New York : The Inking Press, 1960), p. 185.
90 Ibid., p. 184.

"That your dying be no blasphemy against man and earth, my friends, that I ask of the honey of your soul.... Thus I want to die myself that you, my friends, may love the earth more for my sake."[91]

Thus the basic point which we find in the system of Nietzsche about death is the glorification of death by the deeds of the dying person. A man has to perform such creative and courageous deeds that after his death those deeds may serve as stimulus for living persons and thus the dying man may be immortal through the deeds of the living persons.

After Nietzsche we come to Kierkegaard.

II

Man, in the opinion of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short he is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two factors.[92] It is not the disrelationship but merely the possibility, or, in the synthesis, is latent the possibility of the disrelationship. And "Despair" is the disrelationship in a relation which relates itself to itself. lf the synthesis were the disrelationship, there would be no such thing as despair, for despair would then be something inherent in human nature as such, that is, it would not be despair; it would be something that befell a man, something he suffered passively, like an illness into which a man falls, or like death which is the lot of all. No, this thing of despairing is inherent in man himself; but if he were not a synthesis, he coutd not despair, if the synthesis were not originally from God's hand in the right relationship.[93]

This is the basic theme of Kierkegaardian philosophy and,. due to the emphasis on despair, a charge of morbidity has been leveled against him.

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[91] Ibid., pp. 185-86

[92] Robert N. Beck, Perspectives in Philosophy (New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961), p. 350.

[93] Ibid., p. 351.

Thus we find that death, a thing of despairing, is inherent in man. Kierkegaard, not only emphasizes the in herent nature of death, but also the uncertainty of death. Death, according to him, might be "so treacherous as to come tomorrow". This treacherous nature of death is occasion for realizing that the individual's resolve for the whole of his life must be made commensurate with that uncertainty that attends the coming of death.[94]

"My death, when it comes, will not be something general; it will not be mere instance of dying. It is the ever-present possibility that demands my utmost concern;—and in the same degree that I become subjective, the uncertainty of death comes more and more to interpenetrate my subjectivity diabetically. It, thus, becomes more and more important for me to think it in connection with every factor and phase of life; for since the uncertainty is there in every moment, it can be overcome only by overcoming it in every moment."[95]

Thus we find that it is not the thought of the uncertainty of death, but the uncertainty itself of death becomes involved in the subjectivity of the individual in such a way as to become an essential aspect of his existence. In other words, it can be said that Kierkegaard treats death as constitutive of existence itself, in-stead of simply as the ceasing to be of existence.

Here an important question arises as to how the conception of death will transform an individual's existence in view of that individual's need to overcome the uncertainty of death at every moment.

Kierkegaard answers this question by putting forward the conception of subjectivity. He says that to the extent that the individual gives himself over to reflection on the possibility of death, he is developing himself in his subjectivity. The thought of death is, accordingly, a thought that is a deed.

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[94] Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated in English by Swenson (Princeton : University Press, 1944), pp. 148-49.
[95] Ibid., p. 149

Because it is the active interpretation of the individual about himself by reflection concerning his own existence that brings forth his development, so that he really thinks what he thinks through making a reality of it.[96]

But this does not mean that death can be achieved by taking a dose of sulphuric acid. That would be an objective consideration regarding death, not a subjective one; and Kierkegaard's concerns are emphatically confined to the subjective one.

Thus we find a glaring difference between the position of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Nietzsche is a great optimist, while Kierkegaard is a pessimist.

in the system of Nietzsche, death brings immortality to a dying man by his actions copied by living men ; while in that of Kierkegaard, death is a thing of despairing which brings an end to his existence.

After Kierkegaard we survey the existential approach to death by Heidegger (b. 1889), a well-known German philosopher.

III

Heidegger's analysis of death, in his book Sein and Zeit, Being and Time in English, reveals in thought the truth that has been presented by Dostoevski in his novel Memoirs from the House of the Dead which he wrote after his return from imprisonment in Siberia and by Tolstoy in a story "The Death of Ivan Ilyich". Both Dostoevski and Tolstoy have tried to show the existential view of death from the facts of their own experience.

Here is the experience of Dostoevski in the words of Myshkin "This man had once been led out with the others to the scaffold and a sentence of death was read over him. Twenty minutes later a replience was read to them, and they were condemned to another punishment instead. Yet the interval between these two sentences, twenty minutes, he passed in the fullest

[96] Ibid., p. 151.

conviction that he would die in a few minutes… The priest went to each in turns with a cross. He had only five minutes more to live. He told me that those five minutes seemed to him an in-finite time, a vast wealth. . . . But he said that nothing was so dreadful at that time as the continual thought, what if I were not to die ; what if I could go back to life… What eternity I would turn every minute as an age ; I would not waste .one…"[97]

In a like manner Tolstoy, in his story "The Death of Ivan Ilyich," narrates:

"Ivan Ilyich is a thoroughly ordinary and average bourgeois. He falls from a ladder, but the accident seems slight and he thinks nothing of the pain in his side. The pain stays, however, and grows; he begins to go from doctor to doctor, but no diagnosis seems to serve. Then the horrifying thought dawns upon him hat he may be going to die. The reality of death is not in the physical structure, the organs that medical science examines it is a reality within Ivan Ilyich's own existence…

"The reality of death is precisely that it sunders Ivan Ilyich from all other human beings, returns him to the absolute solitude of his own individual self, and destroys the fabric of society and family in which he had lost himself. But awful and inexorable as the presence of death is, it gives to the dying man the one revelation of truth in his life, even though the content of this revelation is chiefly the pointlessness of the way he has lived".[98]

Both the above quotations explain the authentic meaning of death and this authentic meaning of death forms the basis of Heidegger's existential approach to death.

The authentic meaning of death, "I am to die," is not, in the opinion of Heidegger, "as an external and public fact within the world, but as an internal

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[97] William Barrett, Irraeional Man (London : Butler and Tanner, Ltd., 1961), p. 124.
[98] Ibid., p. 127.

possibility of my own Being. Nor is it a possibility like a point at the end of a road, which I will in time reach. The point is that I may die at any moment, and therefore death is my possibility now. It is also the most extreme and absolute of my possibilities. Extreme, because it is the possibility of not being and hence cuts off all other possibilities ; absolute, be-cause man can surmount all other heart-breaks, even the deaths of those he loves, but his own death puts an end to him. Hence death is the most personal and intimate of possibilities since it is what I must suffer for myself; nobody else can die for me."[99]

Touched by this interior angel of death, I cease to be the impersonal and social one among many, as Ivan llyich was, and I am free to become myself. Thus death becomes a liberating force. It frees us from servitude to the petty cares that threaten to engulf our daily life and thereby opens us to the essential projects by which we can make our lives—personally and significantly our own. Heidegger calls this the condition of "freedom to-ward death" or "resoluteness".

This resoluteness discloses the radical finitude of our existence. We are finite because our being is penetrated by non-Being. Though logically it seems paradoxical, we ourselves, as existing beings, comprehend it all too well when we are plunged into the mood of anxiety, when the void of non-Being opens up within our own Being.

Anxiety is not fear, being afraid of this or that definite object, but the uncanny feeling of being afraid of nothing at all. It is precisely Nothingness that makes itself present and felt as the object of our dread. Because Nothingness is a presence within our own Being, always there, in the inner quaking that goes on beneath the calm surface of our preoccupation with things. Anxiety before Nothingness has many modalities and guises but always it is as inseparable from ourselves as our own breathing because

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[99] H.J. Blackhain, Six Existentialist Thinkers (reprinted by arrange-anent with The Macmillan Company, New York, 1959), p. 96 ; William. Barrett, op. cit., p. 201.

anxiety is our existence itself in its radical insecurity. In anxiety we both are and are not, at one and the same time, and this is our dread. Thus our finitude is such that the positive and negative interpenetrate our whole existence. We are finite because we live and move within a finite understanding of Being.[100]

Thus we find that death shares one of the fundamental characters of existence—Femeinigkeit. "No one can die for an-other. He may give his life for another, but that does not in the slightest deliver the other from his own death."[101]

Heidegger presents the analogy of the ripeness of a fruit to understand death. As the ripeness of the fruit is not something added to the fruit in its immaturity but it means "the fruit itself in a specific way of being. In like manner though death is the end of man as being-in-the world, the end is not something added on, so to speak; it belongs itself to the being of man".[102]

But this analogy breaks down at that point, for, whereas ripeness is the fulfillment of the fruit, the end may come for man when he is still immature or it may delay until he is broken down and exhausted with his fulfillment long past. But here again one positive result emerges. Death belongs to my possible ways of being—though in a unique kind of way, since it is the possibility of ceasing to be.

Heidegger clarifies the understanding of death as an existential phenomenon by referring it to his interpretation of the being of man as care. Care has a threefold structure: (i) possibility, (ii) facility, and (iii) fallenness. Death belongs to man's possibility—it is, indeed, his most intimate and isolated possibility, always his own.

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[100] William Barrett, op. cit., p. 202.
[101] Heidegger, Sein a and Zeit (Being and Time), (New York : Harper & Row, 1962), p. 240.
[102] Ibid., p. 243.

This possibility of death is not accidental or occasional. It belongs to man's facticity. He is always already thrown into the possibility of death, as existing. His being, whether he is always conscious of it or not, is a "being-into-death" (Seinzum-Tode).

Certainty and indefiniteness are the two characteristics of this possibility. It is certain because we are sure of it that it will be actualized and it is indefinite because as possibility it is already present. I am already thrown into it, and we never know when it will be realized. "Man is always old enough to die."

Fallenness is related to the flight from death. Man, in his. everyday, inauthentic existence, avoids the thought of death and conceals from himself its real significance.'[103] Thus we find that for Kierkegaard the fact that an individual will die provides an-other occasion for living in his thoughts the possibility of his death—for his becoming subjective. But for Heidegger, death appears as a liberating goal, a super-possibility of the person, as it were.

Secondly, death is treacherous in nature for Kierkegaard, but for Heidegger it is sure as an indefinite.

Thirdly, death is a despairing thing for Kierkeggard, but for Heidegger it provides the authentic existence to the individual.

Now from Heidegger we pass on to Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980).

IV

Jean-Paul Sartre, a French novelist and thinker, admires the Heideggerian conception of the meaning and role of death. But he basically

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[103] John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (New York : Harper & Row. 1965), p. 119.

disagrees with the standpoint of Heidegger where he says that death is the sovereign possibility of man. "Death," says Sartre, "is not my possibility at all, it is a can be, which is out-side my possibilities." Death is accidental in its occurrence and, therefore, absurd. It does not give any meaning to life as both Tolstoy and Heidegger, each in his own way, maintained, but, on the contrary, it may leave that meaning in doubt and suspense. "My project towards a death is comprehensible (as suicide, martyr, hero), but not the project towards my death as the indeterminate possibility of no longer realizing presence in the world, for this project would be the destruction of all projects. Thus death cannot be my peculiar possibility; it cannot even be one of my possibilities. On the positive side, my death is the triumph of the point of view of others over the point of view which I am. My whole life then simply is, and is no longer its own suspense, can no longer be changed by the mere consciousness which it has of itself,"[104]

Like Nietzsche, Sartre makes a bold assertion that death is no annihilation. The fate of the dead is always in the hands of the living. Death is the lapse of the subjectivity of man out of the world. "I leave behind meanings and traces," says Sartre, "which are my meanings and traces and which are modified at the hands of others: I exist solely in my dimension of exteriority. Therefore, to mediate on my life considering it from the standpoint of death would to be mediate on my subjectivity taking the point of view of another upon it, and that is impossible.[105] Indirectly, however, there is a future to my death, a future that is not for me but for others. On the occasion of my death, my entire life is past. But the past is not a non-being; it is, on the contrary, in the mode of the in-itself. In and by itself the in-itself is without meaning, but the in-itself that is my past may have

[104] H.J. Blackham, op. cit., p. 135.
[105] Ibid., p. 136.

meaning bestowed upon it by other human beings who are, therefore, cast in the role of the guardians of my life."[106]

Death, Sartre asserts, belongs in its origin to my facticity. Death is a pure fact, like birth. I am not free in order to die (Heidegger), but a free being who dies.

Sartre, like Heidegger, neither takes death as the source of human freedom. Finitude, for Sartre, is not a function of mortality but of freedom. In my freedom I project certain possibilities to the exclusion of others; I am myself finite by this excluding aspect of the choice by which I determine my being.

Neither does death serve to limit my freedom, although it is an external limit of my subjectivity. Death would be such a limit were it, as conceived by Heidegger, an unavoidable possibility, a possibility which I could not refuse to choose.

And Sartre concludes that death is a situation which a human being must eventually confront.

Thus the importance of death is lost in the cobweb of Sartrian thought.

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[106] Jean-Paul Sartre, L'Etre etle neant (Being and Nothingness), (New York; The Philosophical Library, 1957), p. 541.