

IQBAL REVIEW

Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan

October 1960

Editor

Dr. Muhammad Rafi-ud-Din

IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

Title : Iqbal Review (October 1960)
Editor : Muhammad Rafi-ud-Din
Publisher : Iqbal Academy Pakistan
City : Karachi
Year : 1960
DDC : 105
DDC (Iqbal Academy) : 8U1.66V12
Pages : 90
Size : 14.5 x 24.5 cm
ISSN : 0021-0773
Subjects : Iqbal Studies
: Philosophy
: Research



IQBAL CYBER LIBRARY
(www.iqbalcyberlibrary.net)

Iqbal Academy Pakistan
(www.iap.gov.pk)

6th Floor Aiwan-e-Iqbal Complex, Egerton Road, Lahore.

Table of Contents

Volume:1

Iqbal Review: October 1960

Number: 3

1. IQBAL AS A REFORMER.....	4
2. IQBAL'S CONTRIBUTION TO 'LIBERALISM' IN MODERN ISLAM.....	18
3. POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY IN IQBAL.....	22
4. THE IDEA OF GOD AND UNIVERSE IN TAGORE AND IQBAL.....	27
5. IQBAL ON THE NATURE OF TIME.....	38
6. NATURE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF.....	47
7. THE LOGICAL DISCREPANCIES OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM.....	65
8. BOOK REVIEWS.....	83

IQBAL AS A REFORMER

DR. GHULAM JILANI

I want to discuss here that aspect of Iqbal which relates to the revival of the Muslims.

I have heard some people remark that Iqbal has outlived his utility: and his message has served the purpose in the creation of Pakistan and, therefore, it has ceased to be effective. As a statement of fact, it is partly right and partly wrong. It is wrong because it is to take a very superficial view of Iqbal to think that the aim of his message was only to achieve political independence and, since that has been done, it has ceased to be of value. The fact is that his message is an expression, and an exposition of the fundamental truths preached by Islam and, therefore, has a universal appeal. All great philosophies, which changed the fate of nations, originated from the needs of the specific conditions obtaining at the time. For that matter, their utility and their application did not become restricted to the time or the place with reference to which they took their origin. Iqbal, like all great thinkers, is a leader in the history of the development of human thought. Though his message may be polished, improved, modified and adjusted from time to time the question of its losing value does not arise.

It is partly right because the factors, which in the history of Islam have been making the message of the Qur'an ineffective from time to time, are likely to make Iqbal's message ineffective too. The truth of the statement is further borne out by the nervousness and anxiety I have already noticed among the admirers of Iqbal to keep his message 'alive'—as if the message which revived Islam among the Muslims itself now needs revival. It is also supported by the fact that there is a noticeable change in our attitude from one aspect of Iqbal's message to another: from the practical to the theoretical. In the history of mankind periods of intense practical activity for the achievement of certain ends were usually followed by relaxation, either in the form of indulgence in luxury or in the form of purely intellectual activity, except in cases where the energy so violently aroused was kept constantly flowing towards newly-created goals as means for the realization of well-planned long term ideals. I find that when from the books which changed the destinies of mankind, people passed on to the writing of further books on them, that itself became one of the causes of weakening the message, of

deviation from the fundamentals to the details, of change from action to theory. This is what happened with the message of Socrates, with the books of Ghazzali, of Mujadid Alf-i-thani and of many other great reformers in the history of Islam. This is what happened with the Qur'an itself. Though by itself such an activity is valuable and praiseworthy, there is always a danger of our over-doing it, of our getting lost in the details to the disregard of the fundamentals and the main spirit of the message itself. I am afraid, that is about to happen with the books on Iqbal too. We might get entangled in the intricacies of his metaphysics, in the purely intellectual criticism of the details in the light of the latest developments in philosophy and science; in some other controversies over certain problems mentioned in his books, in proving his greatness by drawing out comparison with other great thinkers of the world and in holding meetings and discussions on his message for purely intellectual delight. I am very cautious in making this remark, but I cannot help remarking that it was in the golden period of Islam, when the largest amount of literary and philosophical work was done on the Qur'an, that some of the seeds for future inactivity and degeneration of the Muslims were sown. The more we feel unconsciously, though it has been given conscious expression by some, that there is a gradual decline in the effectiveness of Iqbal's message, the more active we are likely to become in intensifying this theoretical aspect of our activity in order to keep his message alive, committing the same mistake as has been committed repeatedly in the history of Islam and outside. If lectures on Islam, on the Qur'an and *Hadith* have fallen on deaf ears at times in the history of Islam, lectures on the message of Iqbal are likely to produce no better results. Knowledge that does not lead to action is, for Iqbal, pale academic vanity or intellectual luxury. It will, therefore, be the negation of Iqbal if his message, 'as the source of action' is allowed to be reduced, even with the sincerest motive, to the 'metaphysics of action,' and intellectual luxury and hobby which, perhaps, we cannot afford yet.

The Wider Problem

The question is more general of which Iqbal's message is a specific illustration: Why do we not feel attracted towards the Qur'an, towards the Islamic way of life at times? The question is relevant here, because if the words of God and his Prophet ceased to produce any effect on us from time to time, the words of Iqbal and other reformers are bound to lose their hold

on us, however effective they might have been in the past. This is exactly what has been happening in the history of Islam and this is what is likely to happen now. In modern times, changes are much quicker than in the past. Why this ineffectiveness and how to face it, in order to keep Iqbal and therefore the message of Islam alive, is the problem before us today.

There is no ready-made answer to this general question, though looking for the answer in the external conditions, without due attention to human nature, is not likely to lead us far. History is likely to provide the answer if studied with the background of psychology: historical phenomena after all are both the expression and the reaction of human minds to certain situations and, therefore, must be studied from that angle.

When I look back to the history of Islam I find that sometimes it was over-indulgence in luxury, sometimes passivity and inactivity caused by false sufism, sometimes the frustrating and depressing social and political conditions, sometimes superficial dominance of shallow rationalism causing lack of confidence among Muslims in relation to their religion, sometimes the neurotic reaction in the form of fanaticism and rigorism born of the feeling of inferiority in relation to the materially superior culture of the West—all these singly or jointly became responsible for the degeneration of the Muslims, and like the chronic and periodic ailments, have been attacking them at different periods of their life. It is against these ailments that the reformers of Islam like 'Umar ibn al-'Aziz, Ghazzali, Ibn Taymiyya, Shah Waliullah and Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan to mention only a few, had to fight.

Conditions Before Iqbal

What, then, are the factors which are likely to make Iqbal ineffective and how can we save the situation? Let us very briefly look to the immediate past. Sometimes before partition, due to various reasons, Muslims became politically disorganized, economically dependent and educationally backward. All the symptoms of weak and degenerated personality set in and political slavery undermined the character and the spirit of Islam among the Muslims. Ignorance, poverty, lack of religious fervour and degeneration in all spheres of life went on increasing. Iqbal, like all great thinkers, felt the pulse of the nation, became directly concerned with the contemporary conditions obtaining at the time. He diagnosed the ailment, interpreted the symptoms, prescribed the remedy and its dosage and taught how to administer it. He set

the crooked thinking right, removed the clog in the free movement of Muslim thought, provided a goal to make the action possible, used his magical vehicle of expression as a shock therapy to stimulate the people to the achievement of the end. But it is wrong to think that once the immediate objective was attained, the purpose and the effectiveness of his message was finally served. All great thinkers and reformers seriously and effectively reflect on the *existing* conditions, with reference to the *past*, with a view to moulding the *future*. Iqbal was no exception. The greatness of Iqbal, as of all great thinkers, lies in concentrating on the present with a view to changing the future. They are all creatures of their times and creators of the future. Iqbal likewise had to fight against false sufism and inactivity, against shallow rationalism and western culture which had created a sense of inferiority among the Muslims. He had to fight against the economic domination of the Hindus and the political domination of the British. Since all these were the direct or indirect consequence of slavery, he put political freedom as the most important and immediate goal to combat all other evils. We find, that, though the message of Islam has been the same, these different physicians have been suggesting different prescriptions depending upon the different conditions and symptoms manifesting themselves at different times.

If we now go on repeating exactly the prescription in all its details as given by Iqbal, we will be committing the very mistake against which Iqbal himself has warned us in his introduction to the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. The most essential thing for us is to ponder and see what we are now, how do we feel and how can Iqbal's prescription be adjusted according to the changed conditions of the patient who was withering away in the times of Iqbal but is not so bad to-day. *Conditions To-day*

What are the conditions to-day and what should be the line of action to keep the message of Iqbal alive?

Thank God, the Muslims are alive and awake. We are free and the sense of freedom is there. Thirst for the acquisition of knowledge and material advancement is visible. And the impulse for activity is also there, though for want of clear consciousness of ends, and in some cases absence of ends, it has been, in the recent past, misdirected towards channels which were not socially useful. These factors are on the credit side.

On the debit side, the most important problem that faces us to-day is the onslaught of western culture with all its embellishments and attractions, backed by wealth and all the forces derived from the advancement of scientific knowledge and material progress. The danger is much greater to-day than it was in the days of Iqbal. Then we were imitators of the culture of the West as a subject nation, all the time consciously or unconsciously alive to the fact that after all we were slaves and blind followers of the rulers. The inner conflict of attraction and repulsion and the desire to cast it off one day, was always there. We were in search of an opportunity and it was provided by Iqbal, who, like a master-mind, unleashed the suppressed and frustrated energies of the Muslims, harnessed them in the constructive channels by providing the ideal of Pakistan to which the storm could be directed. Revolt against political slavery automatically succeeded in the revolt against western culture. Iqbal's message was successful because the clog in the thinking of the Muslims was removed, and the energy born of tension created by the attitude of the Hindus and the Britishers could be directed towards the newly presented end. Above all, the basic foundation, the sentiment of love for Islam and for the Prophet of Islam was there on which he could play with the magic of his poetic expression and shake them with the help of this effective instrument. Nothing could stop the Muslims from marching onward.

But now, the freedom is achieved, the tension is gone and we feel free. We entertain no hatred towards the people of the West. Therefore the inner revolt and resistance to western culture is gone. Previously it was, as it were, thrust upon us. Now we are accepting it voluntarily. And unfortunately, I found from an experimental study of the youth that the ground on which we stood firm is gradually slipping away from underneath our feet. I noticed that only about 55 per cent of the students felt attracted towards Islam and further analysis revealed an obvious and graduated decline in this attraction. They were quite frank in pointing out the reasons for this negative attitude. Islam's incompatibility with modern scientific outlook, the attraction of western culture, communism, backwardness of the Muslims in the international field are mentioned as some of the factors responsible for the absence of attraction towards their religion. Islam, as preached, they believe, does not represent modern outlook of life, and better ideals than Islam are available in modern times. They also admit that they do not know much of

religion except what they have learnt from their uneducated parents. Their faith in religion was further shaken by the lack of confidence which our leaders in the past betrayed in Islam. They also complain of Islam's rigorism which makes it unfit for practical life in modern times. Islam does not appeal to reason and its teachings are contradictory to science and reason, they add. The extremely frustrated few react violently in the remark: "One can do without religion and even without God."

When we had a pivot there was always a possibility of coming back. Now that we are gradually loosening our hold of it, we are likely to be carried away, we do not know where. With a base you are likely to absorb all that is good and modern in western culture. Without a base, you are likely to be completely absorbed in the superficialities of this culture. Admitting the benefits which are definitely there, the bad effects of this impact are obvious. Our society during the last twelve years has been undergoing a mental shake, a confusion of thought and there are all the forceful factors working towards weakening of personality before it could be fortified properly after the creation of Pakistan.

With this picture in view we can very well realise that some of the objective factors which made Iqbal's message effective are non-existent and some subjective factors—the religious sentiment or the ground on which he could raise the forces of constructive revolution, are about to be taken away from underneath our feet. If the sentiment of love for religion is gone, what appeal can Iqbal's message have, which itself is nothing but a device for awakening what was dormant.

With the immediate objective achieved and the tension gone, with a new sense of freedom acquired, and with the ground on which the whole superstructure was raised gradually slipping away from underneath our feet, Iqbal's message might become a force without direction, a mere form without matter, a source of emotional stimulation and intellectual relaxation.

How Are We Going To React?

How are we going to meet the danger? There are two ways in which the Muslims have been reacting from time to time in similar situations in the history of Islam. One, to revert to the background and hold fast to the orthodox way of life with a false sense of security and pride in the face of the superior culture of the West. Puritanism, fanaticism and rigidity of outlook

and hatred towards everything of the West, have been the different forms of expression of this reaction. The popular cry has been: "Back to the Qur'an". The other is to make an effort to meet the West on its own ground by adopting western outlook, western ways of life. In other words, to become westernised both in thought and action. The product has always been a peculiar phenomenon, a hybrid, which is neither here nor there, one who is neither firmly rooted in his own culture nor has the background, the qualifications or even the possibilities of being properly absorbed in the other. What is true of individuals is true of nations. Both these forms of reaction are the expressions of the inner sense of inferiority and both are non-creative. They are comparable to the reactions of a child who, sometimes, in the presence of a danger, runs back to take shelter behind the mother and at times, to cover his weakness, goes aggressively forward to face the danger with an outward display of confidence, but with a palpitating heart and trembling limbs. Though the first attitude has a value of its own which I cannot discuss here, none of these two ways has given anything constructive either to the Muslims or to the rest of humanity. One has, on many occasions, resulted in stagnation in Islam and the other, in producing the imitators who are held out to ridicule both by their own people and by those whom they try to imitate.

There is yet another danger in reaching in these ways. The widening gulf between the two types of the same group drifting to opposite directions leads to greater and greater hatred and conflict between themselves, ultimately weakening the very cause which they both thought, they would be able to champion by their respective reactions.

Meeting the West on its own ground in this way will not do. If we try this we will never be able to revert to anything which we may be able to call our own. The current is too strong and we might be carried away completely for want of a firm base. Reaction to the other extreme will not do either. The youth have already begun to feel and express disgust for the way religion has been presented to them by the orthodox. My answer, therefore, is that the only way to make the reaction creative is to meet the West *on our own ground*. Our slogan should not be "Back to the Qur'an", but "Forward with the Qur'an".

The greatest need of the time, therefore, is to create pride in Islam in the minds of Muslims. This is the time to do what Ghazzali did, though we

should not follow his method. He hit the philosophers right and left, betrayed the hollowness of their approach, thereby successfully breaking the backbone of rationalism, which had frightened the Muslims in his time and had created a feeling of inferiority in their minds. Ghazzali's attack did convince the Muslims that after all reason is not an infallible judge whose judgements on religion are binding. Nevertheless his attack on reason crippled rational thinking among the Muslims for a long time to come. Antagonism towards reason and its condemnation, though it served its purpose well at the hands of Ghazzali, is not the spirit of Islam. Therefore, Ghazzali's destructive approach will not do. Iqbal, in defence of Islam, followed a slightly different line *vis-a-vis* reason. He has tried to show how reason and science support everything that Islam says. His attitude was cooperative, but somewhat apologetic. That I personally feel, will not do either, if we, once for all, want to get over the 'basis' of feeling of inferiority which infects us from time to time at different stages of the advancement of science and philosophy. For, though I would strongly advocate an intelligent understanding and interpreting of the Qur'an at different stages of advancement of our knowledge, I cannot appreciate the anxiety to always look up to science and philosophy for support. I am not in favour of this apologetic attitude towards religion, nor do I believe that it is this aspect of Iqbal's *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* which has brought about this revolution among the Muslims of this sub-continent and created a stir among the Muslims of other parts of the world. I do not say that either Ghazzali or Iqbal- was wrong in his attitude towards rationalism. Probably both. did the right thing keeping in view the demands of their times. But I personally feel that for the future, neither the negative and destructive attitude of Ghazzali nor the indirectly apologetic attitude of Iqbal will work in the emancipation of religion and giving it a place of dignity and honour in the minds of men. We cannot, as Muslims, afford to be all the time on the defensive and on the edge of our nerves to prove that every time what Alexander, or McTaggart, Whitehead or Russell or Einstein says is there in the Qur'an. The Qur'an is not a book on metaphysics nor on physics, and it just does not matter whether, what the philosophers and the scientists say, supports or contradicts what is given in the Qur'an. This apologetic attitude will break us and will always give religion and Muslims an attitude of inferiority in relation to the western culture backed by scientific development and philosophy. The urgent need of the time is that this attitude must be got over once for all so that we

may be able to meet the West in their advancement of science and philosophy with relaxed nerves and peace of mind.

How Is That Possible?

There is no antagonism between religion on the one hand and philosophy and science on the other, nor is there any rivalry between the two. It is this wrong attitude and misplaced expectations from religion which have created misgivings and sense of inferiority among our youth in relation to the advancement of science and philosophy. Religion has its own independent basis to stand upon which has been pointed out by Ghazzali, and modified and effectively presented by Iqbal. Religion provides you with the framework of morality within which science and philosophy should have unlimited potentialities to advance. Evil was the day when Kepler and Copernicus and others (if that was the beginning) launched mankind upon those strange seas of speculation which by their emphasis created a bifurcation between thought and morality. The wound has been gapping ever since until to-day we are confronted with what Toynbee called "the atomic consequence of our evil deeds," so faithfully underlining implications inseparable from all our acts. We have philosophers who are philosophising like Russell in a world without warmth; we have our scientists, who are ignorantly happy and convincing, working in their own way, knowing not the goal to which they are moving; we have our men of religion who have compromised so long that they cannot lead or inspire. We as Muslims, once for all, will have to change our attitude towards religion in relation to science and philosophy. Islam does not believe in condemning rationalism as Ghazzali did, nor should Islam seek support from philosophers and scientists for the justification of its principles as Iqbal did. The attitude of Islam is very healthy in this respect. It is my religion to appreciate what the scientists and philosophers are doing. Islam strongly supports their activities. Let them fumble and tumble in the progress of their achievements. Let them propound theories which contradict one another at different times or at the same time. Let them support or contradict what the Qur'an says. Let them reach the moon and harness all the force of Nature and prove the superiority of man over Nature. Nothing should frighten Islam: nothing should create any nervousness among the Muslim. For, none of these things in reality affects our religion adversely. It is our wrong thinking and wrong attitude that recoils on us and creates nervousness and uncertainty regarding the

firmness of the ground on which we stand. Advancement of science and philosophy fitted in the framework of morality alone can make the life of man really meaningful and worth living. Let Islam look at the drama of scientific and philosophical development with appreciation and equanimity of mind. We have no enmity towards intellectual and material advancement, entertain no jealousy and certainly should feel no inferiority.

Programme for Future

(i) The approach will have to follow a short-term and a long-term policy. There are certain things which we will have to do immediately and some spread out over a long period. There are others which will have to be undone. In the times of Iqbal the nation was suffering from a chronic and serious type of depression and lethargy for which shock therapy was the only remedy. Iqbal's poetry served the purpose. Now when the whole nation is bubbling with activity, the urgent need of the time as a short-term policy, is the proper direction of this energy to newer goals and thus maintain the continuity in the dynamic life of the nation. Any violent exciting of emotions at this constructive stage will overhit the mark.

(ii) As a long-term policy and the only effective method which can provide a sound and permanent basis for religious reconstruction is to create an attitude of reverence and attraction for religion among the children. Here the more important thing is not to teach, but how to teach. With our knowledge of psychology we can avoid the mistakes of creating anti-religious attitude in the very process of teaching religion to children. This needs a very elaborate, systematic and sensible planning.

(iii) One way to get over the feeling of inferiority is to make a person conscious of what he is and of what he possesses; of what others need and what he is capable of giving. Let me quote Toynbee as representative of the West to show what the world needs and what our religion can give them:

"Two conspicuous sources of danger, one psychological and the other material. . . in our modern western society are race-consciousness and alcohol, and in the struggle with each of these evils the Islamic spirit has its service to render, which might prove, if it were accepted, to be of high moral and social value.

"The extinction of race-consciousness as between Muslims is one of the outstanding moral achievements of Islam and in the contemporary world there is, as it happens, a crying need for the propagation of this Islamic virtue; for, although the record of history should seem on the whole to show that race-consciousness has been the exception and not the rule in the constant inter-breeding of human species, it is a fatality of the present situation that this consciousness is felt and strongly by the very peoples which, in the competition of the last four centuries between several western powers have won—at least for the moment—the lion's share of the inheritance of the earth."

(iv) Attitudes are infectious, particularly in the relationship of the elders and the juniors. One of the strongest factors which has been responsible for shaking the confidence of the youth in Islam is the lack of confidence which our elders and the leaders, in the recent past, betrayed in religion, and in themselves as the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Their own attitude needs analysis. It was partly due to ignorance and wrong notion of relationship between Religion and Philosophical and Scientific advancement, and partly to our political and material backwardness in the world of to-day. But above all this lack of confidence was born of their consciousness of incompatibility between their professions, as leaders of the Muslims, and their actions, which, they realised, fell short of the ideal of Islam. This should not have been a cause of nervousness for them. Islam is an ideal which we try to approximate. Whether good or bad, we are Muslims. Given honesty of effort, one can pick up courage and say, "I may not be a good Muslim but I am a Muslim and Islam is my ideal." This can give confidence to oneself and create confidence in others.

(v) Though I do not want support, yet fortunately for the wavering minds it may be pointed out that almost all the natural and social sciences have themselves started challenging their own assumptions which indirectly lend support to the basis on which our religion stands. Whereas Psychology is proving more and more effectively the reality of subjective phenomena which do not stand the test of scientific method in the ordinary accepted sense of the term, the physical sciences themselves have begun to feel nervous about the so-called objectivity of their methodology. Whereas the material achievements of the West themselves are becoming diabolical in nature, anthropology is fast exploding the myth of racial and cultural

superiority. Probably the only criterion of superiority among human beings might ultimately turn out to be: "*Verily the best among you with God, is one who is the most pious and God-fearing.*" And lastly, the metaphysicians themselves, realizing the limitations of human reason, have given up the ground to which they stuck so fast. This realization should not be regarded as a support to our religion but should lend support to these *Mujahids* in the intellectual sphere that they seem to be moving on the right direction.

(vi) As pointed out above, no moral rules or code of morality, whether derived from psychology, philosophy or religion, can be effective unless they are provided with ends, both immediate and remote, in the service of which they can be applied. Iqbal's message of '*Khudi*' or ego-hood, so forcefully and beautifully expressed in his poetry, can become effective only in the realization of some ends which are supplied or at least made conscious, if they already exist. The fact is that there are so many ends on the social side awaiting our serious and systematic attention that one fails to understand from where to start. Individualism and inner conflict in our own society are the two great sources of danger with which we are faced to-day. Iqbal's message can be utilized as a strong instrument for the most important end of welding people together. We can also concentrate on this aspect of Iqbal's message for providing to the world something to which reference has already been made by Toynbee. Psychology is there to do the diagnosis for the cause of social tensions which are universal phenomena in the post-War world and Iqbal's expression can do the construction, provided we jealously guard the ground on which we are ultimately to build and start preparing it from the beginning for the future. Then in our society there is the danger of Communism to which Islam is fundamentally opposed. Islam is against any system which denies individuality and moral responsibility to citizens and puts them at the mercy of the state which wields all political and economic power. Iqbal's gospel of egohood, which is one of the fundamentals of Islamic view of man, can serve as an effective force to meet the challenge of communism in our society. *If a fraction of the money so far spent in fighting against Communism had been spent on the propagation of the true spirit of Islam in relation to the egohood of man, more than half the battle of Communism among the Muslims would have already been won.*

(vii) On the negative side we find there are certain environmental conditions which are working against the factors conducive to the

fortification of personality according to Iqbal. We have to fight against them. Sometimes a frontal attack from the action side is necessary to bring about a change of attitude as, at times, it is necessary to change the mode of thinking in order to bring about change in action.

I may end my discussion with a reference to the remark made by the Rehabilitation Minister of Germany when he visited Pakistan sometime ago. It is reported that he was asked by someone: "What is your list of priority in the rehabilitation programme?" "Moral and religious rehabilitation", was the answer. Explaining it further he remarked, "We are Christians and therefore we must be good Christians before anything else, just as you Pakistanis are Muslims and therefore must be good Muslims before anything else".

It is not necessary always to go too far and too deep in the diagnosis of certain ills. Sometimes the ridiculously too obvious is ignored just because it is so. The need of the time is to teach the Qur'an and teach it well; to take pride in Islam whether we are good Muslims or not; and to go forward with the Qur'an if we want to be creative. With the moral and religious background prepared and with the newer and newer goals put before the nation, there is enough in Iqbal which can always goad the Muslims on to the higher and higher stages of progress.

Summing Up

Let me summarise in a few words what I have said above. Iqbal was a great reformer who shook the Muslims from their deep slumber. The political domination of the British, the economic domination of the Hindus, the cultural domination of the West and the wrong philosophy of the pseudo-sufis, which in a way was the effect rather than the cause of these depressing social circumstances, had reduced the Muslims to the state of virtual death and created a sense of inferiority with regard to their religion and position in life. Iqbal looking at the totality of the situation, gave the immediate ideal of Pakistan as the pulling force, removed the fear of western culture by composing its shallowness and its superficialities and inherent weaknesses, provided strength to religion by getting support from western thought itself and by providing an independent basis for its existence. He removed the clog from the life of the Muslims by his philosophy of the Ego and shook them violently from their pathological depression and inactivity by

his vitalizing and forceful expression which served as a shock-therapy. He thus restored the dignity and prestige of the Muslims and therefore of Islam.

Though in certain aspects the appeal of Iqbal's message is universal, we will have to adapt it to the conditions obtaining to-day in order to retain its effectiveness. This is not the time for any more shocks but for calculated, systematic and constructive effort. Keeping in view the present conditions, the urgent need of the time is to start providing religious foundation to the growing generation which is fast slipping away from underneath the feet of the youth; to create pride in Islam, to present fresh immediate ends to the nation and make them conscious of them to move forward with the Qur'an with a view to shaking hands in confidence and appreciation with the materially-superior culture of the West. There is a lot that Iqbal can do in the fulfilment of these objectives and in the achievement of the ends which are too many to mention here but of which the nation has to be made fully conscious. This aspect of our national life, the social and religious rehabilitation, which has remained ignored for a long time after the creation of Pakistan, needs serious and systematic action.

IQBAL'S CONTRIBUTION TO 'LIBERALISM' IN MODERN ISLAM

DR. JAVID IQBAL

In the eighteenth century the moral, political and economic deterioration of Islam under the Ottoman, the Russian and the British rule had reached its climax. This general decadence was followed by the growth of 'puritanic' reform movements in Arabia, North Africa, South Russia and India.

Although these movements were not linked with one another and it was a mere coincidence that they existed in numerous parts of the Muslim world more or less at the same time, they were identical with regard to their object which was to purify Islam from the corruptions introduced by Sufism, conservatism and the arbitrary Ottoman Sultanate. The Muslims were influenced everywhere by these 'puritanic' reform movements, for the reformers preached a return to the original simplicity of Islam by laying emphasis on God's Unity, the sufficiency of the Qur'an and the Tradition as 'precedents for the Muslims, and the complete rejection of all innovations or heresies. Notwithstanding the fact that these movements encouraged communal tendencies among the Muslims, particularly of those countries where they constituted a minority, these movements remained, generally speaking, entirely internal in character, because Islam, at that stage, had not become fully conscious of the threat of European expansion.

By the close of the eighteenth century the economic considerations of the European Colonial Powers necessitated a penetration in the world of Islam. This penetration resulted, in some cases, in the occupation, and in other, the economic exploitation of the Muslim countries on the part of the European Powers. The contact with the West led to the infiltration of such new ideas as constitutionalism, secularism, nationalism and radicalism into the world of Islam. But by the time the Muslims abandoned their passive role the outer 'fringe' of the Islamic world had fallen into the hands of the Great Powers. The Muslims of the 'heart' or the 'core' of the world of Islam at any rate, looked forward to holding their own at least in those territories where they predominated. Accordingly Islamic 'puritanism' of the later half of the eighteenth century culminated in the condemnation of Western civilisation. The followers of Muhammad Ibn'Abd-al-Wahhab in Arabia, Muhammad al-

Sanusi in North Africa, and Sayyid Ahmad of Bareilly in India were violently anti-Western.

However, within a generation or two, the 'puritanic' beginning of the Muslim revival broadened into what has been termed 'liberalism', and the work of Islamizing the Western ideas was taken up by Midhat Pasha in Turkey, Mufti 'Alam Jan in South Russia, Sheikh Muhammad 'Abduh in Egypt and Sayyid Ahmad Khan in India. For a time it appeared that the two groups (the 'puritans' and the 'liberals') would develop in opposition to one another. But as both the groups were still apprehensive of external European threat, they contributed jointly towards the religious and territorial defence of Islam. In connection with the reconciliation of these two seemingly antagonistic trends of 'puritanism' and 'liberalism' within Modern Islam, the name of Jamal-al-Din Afghani has been frequently mentioned. He laid stress on the acquisition of the technique of European progress and exhorted the Muslims to grasp the secret of Western power. Actually it was due to the influence of Jamal-al-Din Afghani that 'liberalism' together with 'puritanism' developed into 'Pan-Islamism', and shortly after the 1914-1918 War, when the Ottoman Empire was being dismembered, 'Pan-Islamism' further developed into 'Muslim nationalism'. 'Liberalism', 'Pan-Islamism' and 'Muslim nationalism' therefore, were movements which were stimulated by external European pressure.

In the Indian sub-continent 'liberalism' seems to have developed hand in hand with 'political conservatism'. Perhaps with the exception of Shibli and his followers who had 'radical' tendencies and who found no objection to joining the Indian national movement, the 'liberalism' of all the other reformers of the Indian sub-continent was based on the Muslim separatist policy, and was confined to the uplift of the Muslims generally and particularly of the Indian sub-continent.

A glance at the works of Muhammad Iqbal, the last of the great 'liberal' reformers, from 1907 onwards, reveals that all his ethico-philosophical teachings, *e.g.*, his stress on the importance of the Individual and the Community, his vigorous optimism, his emphasis on creative activity, his constant striving for the absolutely new—were motivated by one permeating desire, the consolidation of Islam generally and particularly of the Indian sub-continent. In his 'liberalism' were blended the 'political conservatism' of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (like Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Iqbal was opposed to the

idea of the Muslims joining the Indian national movement, and consequently he was not in favour of surrendering separate electorates, the 'radicalism' of Muhammad Shibli (like Muhammad Shibli, Iqbal was aware of the need of economic uplift of the Muslim agriculturists), and the 'Pan-Islamism' of Jamal-al-Din Afghani. This synthesis made it possible for Iqbal to interpret 'Muslim nationalism' as the political emancipation of numerous races, speaking different languages, but professing Islam and inhabiting those territories which comprise the world of Islam, without that emancipation coming into conflict with the general principles of equality, fraternity and solidarity among the Muslims as established by their religious usage and cultural coherence.

Islam, he asserted, is hostile to nationalism when nationalism isolates itself from Islam and as a political creed, based exclusively on race, colour, language or territory, puts forth rival claims in opposition to those of Islam. However, patriotism or a readiness to lay down one's life for one's country, belief, historical traditions or culture, is, according to him, an integral part of *a* Muslim's faith.

Iqbal envisaged an international Islam when he preached that Islam was neither 'nationalism' nor 'imperialism' but a 'commonwealth of nations' which accepted the racial diversity and the ever-changing geographical demarcations only for the facility of reference and not for limiting the social horizon of its members.

Life viewed from the standpoint of Islam was his principal theme and a philosophical foundation was provided for that basic theme. Iqbal, unlike his predecessors, was neither polemical nor apologetic. He boldly attempted a socio-political reconstruction of the Muslims by insisting on the development of 'Self' through which the Muslims could achieve freedom and power once again. He preached that the Muslims should endeavour to cultivate Islamic character and thereby become perfect as individuals. Islamic community, in his opinion, was a unique community composed of unique individuals. Thus through Islam he provided an 'ego' of their own particularly to the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent.

In replacing nationalism by Islam as a nation-building force, Iqbal helped the growth of 'Muslim nationalism' which in its turn led to the secession of Islam from the Indian sub-continent. A nation was constituted

on the basis of Islam as a culture or a civilization and this nation eventually managed to secure self-determination as well as territorial specification.

As for an Islamic interpretation of 'constitutionalism', Iqbal regarded the Turk's decision to abolish the Caliphate as perfectly sound. He approved of the growth of a republican spirit in the Muslim countries, which was, in his opinion, a return to the original purity of Islam. He was likewise pleased at the establishment of legislative assemblies in the Muslim lands. These developments, he maintained, necessitated the revision of old Muslim institutions in the light of modern experience. Accordingly he laid emphasis on the need for a reform in Muslim Law as well as Muslim legal education, and recommended the revival of *Ijtihad* for a re-interpretation of Islamic Law in the light of modern experience, but in such a way that the original spirit of that Law was not lost.

Iqbal denounced 'secularism' which had resulted from the fundamental duality of spirit and matter in Christianity, and which led to the exclusion of religion from the life of the Western states.

Iqbal even provided the Muslims with an Islamic interpretation of 'socialism'. He was greatly impressed by the economic implications of the Muslim Law of Inheritance, and believed that Islam could create a new world where the social rank of man would be determined not by his caste or colour, or the amount of dividend he earned, but by the kind of life he lived. From the standpoint of Islam human society was founded on 'the equality of spirits' not on 'the equality of stomachs'; and, notwithstanding private ownership which was regarded as a trust, Islam did not allow capital to accumulate in such a way as to dominate the real producer of wealth.

Iqbal influenced the course of events in Muslim India through the force of his poetry and writings, but he died before Pakistan actually came into being. It is necessary that the 'liberal' spirit, to which Iqbal and his predecessors contributed, should be kept alive in Pakistan, and also that 'liberalism' should be safeguarded and protected from being abused at the hands of those who are not acquainted with the sources, history and limitations of this movement. Islam is good for all times. It tends to look forward with the help and under the guidance of its past experience, therefore we must be always ready and prepared to adapt our ways of life to changing conditions *without losing our integrity*.

POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY IN IQBAL

SAYYID ALI AHSAN

While discussing Ezra Pound's poetry, T. S. Eliot says that he knows that Pound has a scheme and a kind of philosophy behind it and it is quite enough for Eliot that Pound thinks he knows what he is doing. 'I am glad that the philosophy is there, but I am not interested in it.'

It is rather a difficult task for us to be less interested in what a poet is saying, and only be absorbed in the way he says it. Our assessment of Iqbal's greatness is generally on the basis of his abstract thoughts or his political credo, that is on the basis of what he says. Not to study the exploitation of the language for the expression of his ideas, but actually to study the apparent propositions in his poems seems to be our aim. Unfortunately this is an absurd position. It uproots language from experience and makes it a dead weary tool. Iqbal definitely never aimed at this. He always wanted his words to reveal his emotional staves and the accumulation of sense-perceptions. In his introduction to the *Muraqqa-i-Chughtai*, Iqbal says:

"The spiritual health of a people largely depends on the kind of inspiration which their poets and artists receive. But inspiration is not a matter of choice. It is a gift the character of which cannot be critically judged by the recipient before accepting it. It comes to the individual unsolicited and only to socialise itself. For this reason the personality that receives and the life-quality of that which is received are matters of the utmost importance for mankind. The inspiration of a single decadent, if his part can lure his fellows to his song or pictures, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Atilla or Changiz...To permit the visible to shape the invisible, to seek what is scientifically called adjustment with Nature is to recognise her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimuli and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance to what is with a view to create what ought to be, is health and life. All else is decay and death. Both God and Man live by perpetual creation."

The poet is therefore a creator and creation in poetry involves several things, words, metaphors, similes, images, and symbols and meaning interwoven with them. If we want only the meaning, which normally we

do in the case with Iqbal, we actually uproot words from his experience and kill poetry. It must be remembered that Iqbal as a poet always tried to balance certain harmonies, to achieve certain rhythms and to conquer certain difficulties of medium. He created specifically poetic emotions. We always say that he created religious emotions or philosophical emotions, but the very fact that we are moved by these emotions in poetry proves that these emotions are connected with words and their esthetic apprehension and therefore these are not detached emotions of religious or philosophical contemplation. Even *Tulu-i-Islam* and *Khizr-i-Rab* which are essentially Islamic in character and emphasis have an emotional ecstasy which gives these poems a depth of feeling and a grandeur of thought.

It must be remembered that when we accept a poet for his religious significance only, his words do not get any extension of meaning. If it is a question of belief in relation to a certain religion, we give scope to the believers of other religions to regard the belief of the poet as false.

This will invariably happen if we judge poetry in terms of its subject, considered in abstraction. If we allow such a judgement to stand we would have to do without Dante, Rumi and Milton. Therefore we need a criterion. In reading Iqbal, say, in *Payam-e-Mashriq*, we find the belief of the poet giving the poem metaphorical significances. Whether the reader is a Muslim or not—believes in Islam or not, these poems are a poetic success not because of any message but because of an experience of love. Love, here, is not just a word but a whole universe of experience, of feeling and apprehension, which, as a critic has rightly said, "cannot be encompassed in any language known to man." Though it cannot be encompassed in any way, it is also simple because it brings about an identity of emotion between the poet and the reader. It does not require any analysis or argument. Iqbal affirms and herein lies his greatness. It is not reason which makes Iqbal a poet, it is not analysis and argument but affirmation and ecstasy of realization and experience which make him a poet and a very great poet indeed. We should not be interested in hearing the religious beliefs of the poet stated, we must be interested in poetry. Whether or not the reader shares Iqbal's beliefs, he will always accept his affirmation and realization expressed through metaphors and symbols. In a poem in *the Payam-e-Mashriq*, Iqbal expresses his admiration of Einstein. A certain critic of Iqbal discovered Iqbal's

appreciation of the Theory of Relativity and these lines are quoted as an example:

"Impatient like Moses he wanted a manifestation of the Glorious,
To his bright intellect resolved the mysteries of light.

Whose flight from the heights of the sky to the observer's eye takes but
one instant.

'And is so swift that it cannot even be conceived'."

This is poetry and not the Theory of Relativity, poetry because of its emotional significance, determination and experience. This poem has an emotional unity. This emotional unity cannot be measured by the instruments of reason. If the reasonable expression of a religious idea is what is desired in a poem, it would be simpler to express it in prose. The poem is always "received directly without questioning, and loved or hated. It is impervious to reason, and if it has no discoverable meaning, it has immeasurable power." I am quoting from Herbert Read in support of my argument. "The poet has created in words an objective equivalence of his emotional experience: the words may not make sense, but they make the emotion—follow the contour of the thought—and reproduce, as nearly as possible, the mind's eternal echo of the imperfect sound."

What should be my comment on Iqbal's '*Asrar-e-Khudi*'? This great poem has been judged as the philosophical realization of self by an ascetic. I am not contesting this opinion, but the thing which inspires me in *Asrar* is the sublimation of an imaginative flight into the realm of ideas. This flight is presented with arguments, but arguments in terms of poetry. Certain parables and anecdotes in *Asrar* are of course highly didactic and have no emotional existence, but moments of purest inspiration in this poem are many. His comment on the secret of life, which according to him is desire and seeking, is refreshing and has definite emotive content. To me it is a poetic experience and not philosophical abstraction.

"The secret of life is in the seeking,

Its essence is hidden in desire.

Keep desire kindled in your heart,

Lest your dust becomes a tomb.
Desire is the soul of this world of colour and scent,
The nature of everything is faithful to desire.
Desire sets the heart dancing in the breast,
And by its glow the breast is bright as a mirror.
It gives to the earth the power of growing,
It is the *Khizr* to the Moses of perception."

Professor Nicholson describes the scope and purpose of Iqbal's *Asrar* in these words:

"Its author professes, indeed, to expound the inmost sense of the prophetic revelation; but any one looking through -the work at random can see that the doctrines, interwoven with apologues, anecdotes, fables, legends, and traditions range over the whole domain of medieval religious life and thought. Whereas in his odes he often wishes from the standpoint of the mystic who sees nothing but God, the *mathnawi* shows him as an eloquent and enthusiastic teacher explaining the way to God for the benefit of those who have entered upon it."

Iqbal found in himself a sense of identity of spiritual purpose with Rumi and like Rumi he saw as his main mission in life the exposition of "the inmost sense of the prophetic revelation." Through the process of negation and purification, by clearing the mind of all irrelevancies and by purging the world of Islamic thought of all that was impure and alien, Iqbal wanted to experience the truth of the revelation. And in his ecstasy to experience the truth of the revelation, Iqbal reached the heights of true poetry. *Asrar* is essentially the imaginative story of the journey of the poet to the desert sublimity of Arabia:

"You who have gathered roses from the garden of Persia
And seen the birth of spring in India,
Now taste something of the heat of the desert,
Drink the old wine of the date,
Lay your head for once on her hot breast,

Yield your body a while to her scorching wind".

In *Asrar*, we find the poet's creative process as an active enjoyment, not a passive suffering of his experiences. Like all great poetry we find here the ordering activity of the imagination which gives significance to emotion. Mere emotion in itself is not what is needed in great poetry, what is necessary for poetry is the imaginative command of this emotion. "The life of art is in this sense a strenuous effort after release from emotion in the very act of experiencing it: There must be a quietness in the midst of the speed of passion." Poetry is not concerned primarily to awake 'emotion' and attitude; its concern is to convey imaginative ideas of, among other things, emotions. Successful conveyance of such imaginative prehension will certainly be accompanied by excitement—but excitement of a unique kind, which is not itself part of the content of the poem, for it is that which accompanies contemplation of the object. Judged from this standard, *Asrar-e-Khudi* is great poetry. While reading this poem I never felt the need of studying Bergson, Nietzsche and Hegel but the inspiration of the poet carried me to the realm of imaginative radiance.

It is true that one cannot afford to ignore Iqbal's philosophical and theological beliefs; but it must be remembered that the reader should not be called upon to believe them himself. It will be wrong to think that *Asrar* or *Ramuz* is of interest only to Muslims, because in these poems we do not discover philosophical belief. What we do find is poetic assent. It is not necessary for me to know what Iqbal believed as a man, I am interested in what he believes as a poet. "The question of belief or disbelief", as a critic has beautifully said, "never arises when we are reading well. If unfortunately it does arise, either through the poet's fault or our own, we have for the moment ceased to be readers and have become astronomers, theologians, or moralists, persons engaged in a quite different type of activity."

THE IDEA OF GOD AND UNIVERSE IN TAGORE AND IQBAL

KAVI GHULAM MUSTAFA

Two great poets of the East that earned international reputation in modern times are undoubtedly Iqbal and Rabindranath Tagore. Both of them are brilliant luminaries on the literary firmament of Indo-Pak Sub-continent, having to their credit outstanding contributions in the field of poetry and thought. It is, however, not possible to give a complete picture of these two master-minds in all their colours Within the frame-work of a single article. Different approaches from different view-points will be necessary for such a comprehensive study. In the present article, I shall confine myself to looking into their conception of life *vis-a-vis* God and Universe that has been revealed in and through their poetry.

I shall begin with Rabindranath.

What was Rabindranath's view of life and the world? What message did he give to mankind about the origin and ultimate destiny of man? I am sorry to observe that Rabindranath failed to give us any new message. His poetry and thought have been inspired by the teachings of the *Vedanta* or the *Upanishad* of which he was a votary. A correct appraisal of Rabindranath's conception of life will necessitate a brief survey of the religious beliefs and philosophical obsessions that had been dominating the world from the earliest times right down to the end of the nineteenth century.

Historical Background of Philosophical Thought

Greece was the cradle of philosophy and of other branches of knowledge. It was Socrates, Plato and Aristotle who gave the world rudimentary ideas about human life and other problems connected with it. According to Plato, this phenomenal world is not real; it appears to be real, but it is not really real. To him, only the Forms or Ideas are real and permanent. This is what is called Idealism in philosophic parlance. According to this doctrine, all cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but mere illusion, and only in the idea of pure understanding and reason is the truth. Accordingly, this external world is nothing but a shadow, as it will ultimately disappear and be absorbed into that Absolute Idea from which it

emanated. The inevitable corollary to this proposition is that man also has no permanent value, as he, too, will lose his identity into that Ultimate Reality, like a drop into the ocean.. Thus, the Idealistic philosophy of Plato and his followers did not recognise the reality or immortality of the Soul. This gave rise to a sense of frustration, 'ascetic inaction and other-worldliness in the mind of man. He tried to escape—not from death—but from life, for his emancipation. Iqbal himself has criticised Plato as follows:

The thought of Plato regarded loss as profit

His philosophy declared that being is non-being.

In India, too, the same gloomy picture of life was presented to the people by the Indian sages. Buddha preached the doctrine of "*Nirvan*" which was essentially identical with the Idealism of Plato. Complete evaporation of life into nothingness was the goal of Buddha. As Buddhism did not recognise God and believed in the law of *karma* and transmigration of the soul, a true Buddhist was to live a life of asceticism, carefully avoiding all actions and battles of life, so that he might not have to come back to this world again and again in consequence of his actions. It was rather his look-out to see that his body might speedily be liquidated. Life was practically death to him.

The Hindu philosophy was no better off. Among the six systems of Indian philosophy, *viz.* *Sankhya*, *Patanjal*, *Nyaya*, *Kapila*, *Vaisesika* and *Upanishad*, the first five were based on atheism; it was only the *Vedanta* or *Upanishad* that recognised the existence of God. But the philosophy of the *Upanishad* was more or less a counterpart of Plato's Idealism. It also advocated the doctrine of Unity and the illusiveness of the world. In later times (in or around the 7th century A.D.), Sankaracharyya gave it a systematised shape and called it as *Adwaitabad* (Unity). But Sankar's Unity was a bit different from Plato's. Plato established the unity of Godhead by denying the external world; whereas Sankar established His unity by admitting that this external world has no separate entity at all; it is only for *Maya* that it looks like real, but actually it is part and -parcel of God, or '*Brahma*' as he calls Him. "*Ekanzebadvitiyan*" (non-dualism) is the underlying significance of *Adwaitabad*. According to this view, Man is part and parcel of God, like all other things in the world. In other words, there is no distinction between the Creator and the Creation; God is all pervading and immanent in the world. Thus we see that the Vedanta philosophy was pantheistic in its

outlook. "*Aham Brahmasmi*" (I am Brahma), "*Ayamatma Brahma*" (this soul is Brahma), "*Soham*" (That is I)—these are the tenets of the *Upanishad*.

Unfortunately, the Islamic world was also caught into the vortex of this Pantheistic Idealism. Hazrat Muhammad (Peace be upon him) no doubt brought a new message and a new philosophy of life, *viz*: that the soul is immortal, that it will not be absorbed unto God, but will continue to exist as a separate entity even after death, that this world is also real and worth living in, and that man should boldly face the music of life to achieve his ultimate end. But within three centuries after his death, Muslim mind was perverted by Greek, Iranian and Indian philosophies and a new creed was developed in the Islamic fold under the name of Sufiism. This Sufiism was nothing but Idealistic Pantheism as it also believed that God is immanent and that man will ultimately be absorbed unto God (*fang' fillah*). Great stress was also laid upon the unreality and transitoriness of the world. Like Sankaracharyya, Ibn al-'Arabi, a distinguished Muslim mystic of Spain (b. 1164 A.D.) propounded a theory of "*Wahadat-al-Wujud*" (Unitysm) and one of the renowned sufis, Mansoor Hallaj, openly proclaimed "*An-al-Haq*" (I am the Truth). This is identical with the saying "*Aham Brahmasmi*", meaning "I am Brahma".

Very little change or innovation was effected in the western thought *vis-a-vis* its concept of Man, God and Universe. Kant, Hegel, and many others were groping in the dark and had no clarity of vision in this respect.

In the 19th century, the great German philosopher Neitzsche and the French philosopher Bergson presented some radical thoughts in respect of the prevalent view of life. Neitzsche's theories of "Superman" and "Eternal Recurrence" were no doubt thought-provoking, but these theories were capricious and so they could not get any foothold in the intellectual world. "New Gods, or resucitated old Gods," he said, "can no longer be of any avail. Our only hope lies in new men". He advocated the masculinisation of the world, the rearing of a high type of man and the creation of a ruler caste. For this he demanded complete emancipation from Judaeo-Christian morality and total transvaluation of all values. "Will to power" was his motto and there was nothing wrong or immoral to him in the way of grabbing that power. He deprecated common people as "herd". To crown all, he was an atheist. For these reasons, his teachings fell through and he was branded as "a misanthropist, promoter of war, infidel and corruptor of morals". Iqbal himself describes Neitzsche as a "madman who has entered the glass-maker's

shop and smashed every article of vanity. In doing so, his iconoclastic rod also fell on some sacred vessels, he may be excused."

Bergson's "Creative Evolution" was, no doubt, a distinct land-mark in the evolution of philosophical thought, but that had no direct bearing on the point under investigation. It did not say anything about the individuality or immortality of the Soul.

Thus, it can be safely said that the same gloomy prospect of life was dominating the world up to the nineteenth century.

Rabindranath Tagore

We now come to Rabindranath. Did he break away from the age-old beliefs and traditions? No. His conception of life was perfectly in tune with the teachings of the *Upanishad*. His poetry and songs were saturated with pantheistic thoughts and ideas which he drew from the *Upanishad*, and the Persian mystic poets like Hafiz and others. He saw the vision of his 'Beloved' in the moon, the stars and flowers and other beauties of Nature and perceived her footfalls in the stormy night behind the clouds; he heard her singing in the birds and whispering in the breeze. He feels constant pangs of separation from her and is ever anxious to meet her. Complete identification with her is the cry of his soul. His imagination ends there and cannot go beyond that. The following extracts from Rabindranath will bear me out:

(i) আমার মাথা নত করে দাও হে তোমার
চরণ ধুলার তলে।
সকল অহঙ্কার হে আমার
ডুবাও চোখের জলে ॥...
আমারে না যেন করি প্রচার
আমার আপন কাজে
তোমারি ইচ্ছা কর হে পূর্ণ
আমার জীবন মাঝে। ..
—(গীতাঞ্জলি)

Bend down my head under the dust of your feet

Drown my egotism into my tears...

(vi) “রক্ষা কর হে।

আমার কর্ম হইতে আমায় রক্ষা কর হে ॥
আপন ছায়া আতঙ্কে মোরে করিছে কম্পিত হে
আপন চিত্ত গ্রাসি হে আমায় রক্ষা কর হে।
প্রতিদিন আমি আপনি রচিয়া জড়াই মিথ্যা জালে
ছলনা ভোর হইতে মোরে রক্ষা কর হে ॥”

—(ধর্ম সঙ্গীত)

Let me not express myself in my actions

Fulfil thy will in my life.

(ii) “তুমি আমার আপন, তুমি

আছ আমার কাছে

এই কথাটি বলতে দাও গো বলতে দাও।

এই নিখিল আকাশ ধরা

এষে তোমায় দিয়ে ভরা

আমার হৃদয় হতে এই কথাটি

বলতে দাও গো, বলতে দাও।”

—(গীতাঞ্জলি)

Thou art my own, thou art my dear and near

Let me say this, Oh, let me say this.

This universe, this sky, this earth

All are pervaded by thee.

Let me say this, Oh, let me say this.

(iii) “আজি যেন ভেদ নাহি রয়

আপনা পরে

আমায় যেন এক দেখি হে

বাহিরে ষরে।”

—(গীতাঞ্জলি)

Let there be no distinction between you and me

So that I may see myself at one with you, both in and out.

(iv) আমার মাঝে তোমার লীলা হবে

তাইত আমি এসেছি এই ভবে।

সব বাসনা যাবে আমার খেমে

মিলে গিয়ে তোমারি এক প্রেমে

দুঃখ-সুখের বিচিত্র-জীবনে

তুমি ছাড়া আর কিছু না রবে।

—(গীতাঞ্জলি)

I have come to this world only as a pawn of your sports

My own desires will die unto your pleasure and love

And in weal and woe, none shall survive except you.

(v) “মনকে আমার কায়াকে

আমি একেবারে মিলিয়ে দিতে

চাই এ কালো ছায়াকে।

তুমি আমার অনুভবে

কোথাও নাহি বাধা পাবে

পূর্ণ একা দেবে দেখা

সরিয়ে দিয়ে মায়াকে।”

—(গীতাঞ্জলি)

I like to liquidate my mind and my body for ever

So that you may reveal yourself as a Complete

Whole After removing this illusive body and mind of mine.

(vi) “রক্ষা কর হে।

আমার কর্ম হইতে আমায় রক্ষা কর হে ॥

আপন ছায়া আতঙ্কে মোরে করিছে কম্পিত হে

আপন চিত্ত গ্রাসি হে আমায় রক্ষা কর হে।

প্রতিদিন আমি আপনি রচিয়া জড়াই মিথ্যা জালে

ছলনা ভোর হইতে মোরে রক্ষা কর হে ॥”

—(ধর্ম সঙ্গীত)

Save me from my actions

My own shadow terrifies me

My own mind devours me

I entangle Myself everyday with my self-created snares

Protect me from these clutches of illusion.

(vii) যা হবার তাই হোক
যুচে যাক সর্বশোক
সর্ব মরীচিকা।
নিভে যাক চিরদিন
পরিশ্রান্ত পরিক্ষীণ
মর্ত্যজন্মশিখা।
সব তর্ক হোক শেষ
সব রাগ সব ঘেঁষ
সকল বালাই
বল শান্তি বল শান্তি
দেহ সাথে সব ক্লান্তি
পুড়ে হোক ছাই ॥”

—(চিত্রা)

Let the inevitable come

Let all sorrows and illusions disappear

Let the lamp of this earthly life be extinguished for ever

Let all controversies, passions and jealousies go

And let the mind have the peace of eternal rest.

(viii) “সীমার মাঝে অসীম তুমি
বাজাও আপন সুর
আমার মধ্যে তোমার প্রকাশ
তাই এত মধুর ॥”

—(গীতাঞ্জলি)

Thou art Infinite, Thou playest thy music in the Finite

This is why Thy revelation in me is so sweet.

(ix) “পারবি নাকি যোগ দিতে এই ছন্দে ।

খসে যাবার ভেসে যাবার

ভাঙ্‌চারই আন্দে রে ॥”

—(ধর্মসঙ্গীত)

Won't you be able to join this rhythm

And pleasure of death, decay and disappearance?

(x) “ওগো আমার এই জীবনের পরিপূর্ণতা ।

মরণ, আমার মরণ, তুমি কও আমারে কথা ॥

সারা জন্ম তোমার লাগি

প্রতিদিন যে আছি জাগি

তোমার তরে বয়ে বেড়াই সুখ-দুখের কথা

মরণ, আমার মরণ, তুমি কও কথা ।”

—(গীতাঞ্জলি)

Death, Oh my Death, speak unto me

Thou art the culmination of my life

I am waiting all the life for thee

Bearing the burden of sorrows and pleasures

Death, Oh my Death, speak unto me.

Innumerable instances can be cited like these wherein Rabindranath's conception of life in relation to God and the World has been revealed. Rabindranath is out and out a mystic poet of Pantheism, bordering, at places, on paganism. The burden of all his philosophic poems and songs is separation from, and hankering after complete communion with, his consort. Like the Vedantists and the Sufis, he also tries to flee from life and merge himself into the Ultimate Being. Death is the target of his life! The glorification of death and self-effacement thus constitutes his principal message to mankind. In a typical fashion he plays on soft sentiments of love and separation and does not bother about the duties and responsibilities of man towards God and the World.

Iqbal

Against this Idealistic-Pantheistic-Vedantic-Sufistic background of under-estimation of life, Iqbal boldly proclaimed the individuality and immortality of the Soul and its never-ending progress and development in our after-life. He says that this visible world is not a baseless fabric of fantasy; it is also real and meaningful. Man is also real and his Ego or Soul will not be absorbed as has been indicated by our fundamental article of faith: *La-ilaha-illallah Mubammadur Rasulallah*. (There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet). Here man has been bracketted with God and given the exalted position of His Viceroy. This proves that there is no intermediary in between God and Man and that man has limitless power and potentiality in him. Indeed man is destined to rule the universe as the representative of God. Ev'dently, as long as God is, man is. God is no doubt our Creator, but once He has created us, He will not absorb or annihilate us. It is His pleasure that we live eternally with Him. This philosophy, of course, is not his own; it is broad-based on the teachings of the Holy Qur'an which vouchsafes eternal life not only to the dwellers of Paradise, but also to those of Hell (*wa boom fiha khalidun*). Iqbal has given a philosophic shape to this eternal verity of Islam. Herein lies his contribution. I quote below a few lines from Iqbal to corroborate my views:

In every atom slumbers the might of the Self
Inasmuch as the life of the Universe
Comes from the power of the self,
Life is in proportion to this power.
When a drop of water gets the self's lesson by heart
It makes its worthless existence a pearl.
When the mountain loses its self, it turns into sands
And complains that the sea surges over it
Because the earth is firmly based on itself
The captive moon goes round it perpetually,
The being of the sun is stronger than that of the earth
Therefore is the earth fascinated by the sun's eye.

Life is preserved by purpose;
Because of its goal its caravan-bell tinkles. Life is latent in seeking.
Its origin is hidden in desire.
Desire keeps the Self in perpetual uproar ..
Negation of life is death to the living.

Abandon self and flee to God
Strengthened by God, return to thy self.

It is sweet to be God's Vicegerent in the world
And exercise sway over the elements.

In this beautiful way, Iqbal narrates his philosophy of life. He gives new values to life and urges upon strengthening of the Soul, as he believes that, in the scale of being, the status of every object is determined according to the degree of strength it attains. As God is the perennial source of all power and success, and as man's is not yet a complete personality, it is essential that he should come in close contact with God for borrowing strength from Him. The motivating idea behind this should be not to absorb himself into God, but rather to absorb God into himself. There is a *Hadith* in support of this view. The Holy Prophet has said: "*Takhallequ bi Akhlaqillah*" i.e. mould your character in accordance with the character and Attributes of Allah. Indeed, the nearer is a person to God, the greater is his personality. A man full of divine qualities is the perfect man. Iqbal calls him "*Insan-i-Kamil*" or the Perfect Man, as opposed to Nietzsche's Superman". Iqbal pays tribute to the perfect man in these two immortal lines:

خودی کو کر بلند اتنا کہ ہر تقدیر سے پہلے

خدا بندے سے خود پوچھے بتا تیری رضا کیا ہے

Develop thyself, so that before every decree

God Himself will ascertain from thee "what is thy will?"

In short, while the terminus station of Rabindranath's journey of life is God, that of Iqbal is Eternity. Iqbal is a through passenger, he does not stop at God, but goes further beyond. Rabindranath's span of life is, therefore, shorter than that of Iqbal, his outlook is also narrow and antiquated and mediaeval in character, having no dynamic appeal to this new age of space-flight and inter-planetary journey. Iqbal is the poet of today and also of tomorrow.

IQBAL ON THE NATURE OF TIME

PROFESSOR M. M. SHARIF

What is the nature of time? is one of those knotty questions which have troubled the philosophical mind throughout the ages. It was hotly discussed by the ancients and the medievals and the same is the case today.

Common sense takes time vaguely to be something like a stream moving towards the future from one moment to the next—something in which events float down to the past. This is very much like saying that the stream flows in one direction, and its flow carries the floating logs of wood in the opposite direction—a palpable contradiction. This is, however, one of the many contradictions which the common sense view involves and which the philosophers have tried to remove throughout history.

The flow of time involves change and more than three thousand years ago the Vedic writers vaguely felt the difficulties involved in the idea of change and declared that the world of experience is a mere appearance of Reality and Reality itself always remains unchanged. The first great thinker who philosophised on this problem came to the same conclusion, but on purely logical grounds. It was Parmenides of Elea,¹ who was in the prime of his life in about 500 B.C. According to him, a thing either *is* or *is not*. Whatever is not, *i.e.*, has no being, cannot be thought or spoken of, for that is logically impossible. As the past can be thought or spoken of, it has not passed away into non-being, but still *is*. As the future also can be thought or spoken of, it already *is* and cannot be said to be *going to be*. Since whatever is in the past, present and future *is*, there is no coming into being or ceasing to be, no becoming and no passing away. In other words, there is no change in time. There being no change in time, Reality is eternal and unchanging.

There may be other reasons for holding the view that Reality is without change, but the reason advanced by Parmenides is not sound. It is true that whatever can be thought and spoken of in some sense *is* or exists. The present object does exist, but whatever is past has ceased to exist. What still exists and is thought and spoken of is not 'it', but a recollection or description of 'it'. Likewise whatever is in the future does not already exist.

¹ Elea was a Greek Colony in the south of Italy.

What exists and is thought and spoken of is not 'it', but an anticipation of 'it'. Parmenides' mistake lies in taking the existence of the recollection or description of an object that has passed away as the existence of that object and the existence of the anticipation of a future-event as the existence of that event. Therefore his conclusion that whatever is past, present and future exists is unwarranted and the further conclusion that there is no passing away and no becoming unjustified.

Iqbal, like Bergson, takes just the opposite view. Both of them are inspired by Heractitus (500 B.C.) who denied permanence altogether and held that reality is ever-changing and always in motion. Nothing is constant. "It is not possible to step twice in the same river". The waters of the river have already changed when you plunge into it a second time. The fact that the stone on which drops of water fall for years wears off at the point of contact, shows that a change is effected in it with the fall of each drop. In fact it ever changes by friction of one sort or another and is never the same. It is impossible to touch the same substance twice, for it is no longer the same after the first touch, even though the change is imperceptable. There is no rest; everything is continually in motion and in the process of transformation. This perpetual change of things is effected through struggle against each other. The struggle of the forces inside the drop and the stone transforms both.

Bergson accepts Heractitus's theory of continual change. Iqbal in a way accepts also his theory of perpetual struggle. With this latter theory we are not at present concerned.

Following Bergson, Iqbal makes a distinction between pure time and serial time, pure time for him is not unreal as Zeno and Plato had thought. Nor is it cyclic, everything in it repeating itself as with Heractitus and the Stoics. It is a genuine creative movement, the path of which is not already determined.

Like Bergson he holds that pure duration is identical with life and is an unceasing flow or a continual change, as perpetual flux.

دما دم رواں ہے یم زندگی

ہر اک شے سے پیدا رم زندگی

In reality there is no rest and no permanence

To real time or pure duration, the distinctions of past, present and future do not apply. In this flow, the past rolls into the present:

فریب نظر ہے سکون و ثبات

تڑپتا ہے ہر ذرہ کائنات

ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود

کہ ہر لحظہ تازہ ہے شان وجود

and the future consists only of open possibilities. Neither the future nor the past has any independent existence. Nor are distinction of hours, days and nights true of real time.

اے خوش آن روزی کہ صبح و شام نیست

صبح اورا نیم روز و شام نیست

اس شب و روز کی اور حقیقت ہے کیا

ایک زمانے کی رو جس میں نہ دن ہے نہ رات

Bergson does not deny succession to pure duration. With him the flow of pure duration is a succession of interpenetrating states. Iqbal takes away succession altogether. For him pure duration is eternity in the sense of change without succession. It is different from serial time the moments of which are successive and space the points of which are always simultaneous. If we must picture it in spatial terms, it is a line in the drawing—an actualisation of open possibilities. It is selective and purposive in the sense

that it preserves the selected remnants of the past and supplements them by continual creative activity. In this sense it is identical with history.

You can know pure duration only by looking within your own self for both space and time are states of the mind.

چشم بکشا ہر زمان و ہر مکان

این دو احوال است از احوال جاں

To explain further pure duration in its aspect of activity, Iqbal

takes a dictum of Imam Shafi'i, الوقت سيف (Time is sword) and writing under the title a whole poem of sixty one couplets in *Asrar-e-Khudi*, attempts to inject its significance into his own Bergsonian conception of pure duration, though it does not seem to have been fully assimilated by it. Pure duration which is indistinguishable from life is a cutting sword. Its flashing edge is the self.

"Its owner is exalted above hope and fear

His hand is whiter than the hand of Moses

At one stroke thereof water gushes from the rock

And the sea becomes land from dearth of moisture.

Moses held this sword in his hand,

Therefore he wrought more than man may contrive.

He clove the Red Sea asunder

And made its waters like dry earth.

The arms of 'Ali, the conqueror of Khaiber

Drew its strength from this same sword."

The self by its act seizes pure duration, nay, the relation is closer. To exist in pure duration is *to be a self*. To know pure duration we must turn our eyes from serial time and look into our own selves.

تو از شمار نفس زنده نمی دانی

که زندگی به شکست طلسم یام است

As for Bergson, so for Iqbal, the self has two aspects. While Bergson called these aspects the fundamental self and the social self, Iqbal, more appropriately, calls them the appreciative self and the efficient self. The appreciative self lives in pure duration, in eternity which means change without succession. Its life consists in movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, from pure duration to serial time which can be measured by days and nights. Serial time is born of this movement.

شام و سحر ما از گردش ما خیزد

دانی که نمی سازد این شام و سحر مارا

By making the efficient self an important stage in the outward journey of the life of the appreciative self, Iqbal assigns to it though secondary yet an important place. But there are moments when carried away by poetic contrasts he speaks of it rather disparagingly, as for example, in these lines:

اے اسیر دوش و فردا در نگر

در دل خود عالم دیگر نگر

در گلی خود تخم ظلمت کاشتی

وقت را مثل خطی پنداشتی

باز با پیمانہ لیل و نہار

فکر تو پیمود طول روزگار

وقت را مثل مکان گسترده

امتیاز دوش و فردا کرده

اے چو بو رم کرده از بستان خویش

ساختی از دست خود زندان خویش

Iqbal criticises Bergson, for making time prior to the self, which I don't think he ever did, and says that the intellect of the enduring self is prior to the multiplicity of pure duration, it seizes this multiplicity, breaks it up into an infinity of instants and transforms it to an organic whole of synthesis. He rightly accuses Bergson taking this activity of the intellect as a mere analysis. It involves as much synthesis as analysis. This organic structure of events in the life of the self constitutes its behaviour. The complete removal of succession from Bergson's conception of pure duration, has enabled Iqbal to regard the human soul as eternal and has made it easy for him to pass from the human self to the ultimate self and from the Ultimate Self to the universe, and thus to vindicate what he regards as the true philosophy of Islam. By analogy from our own self, Iqbal regards the Ultimate Reality as the Absolute Self, and Nature as its behaviour. Pure time as revealed in our own selves leads to the notion of the Ultimate Reality as Pure Duration, as change without succession, as eternity in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form a unity. Again on the basis of an analogy from our efficient self, the Ultimate Self, God, is viewed in His creative activity as making Himself appear as Divine behaviour, as a *successive* creative movement, as Nature. The self as appreciative knows itself and its pure time—eternity—by direct intuition; as efficient self it tries to do so by the *intellectual* study of its *own* behaviour—personal events spread out in serial time. On the same analogy; as the appreciative self it knows God by direct intuition, and as efficient self it tries to do so through an intellectual study of *God's behaviour—of* Nature spread out in serial time. It would have been all well if Iqbal had grounded his view of the Ultimate Reality only on intuition, for an intuition it is; but by unnecessarily invoking the help of analogy he has dangerously exposed it to attacks from formal logic.

Iqbal's attitude towards the activities of the self in its relation to Nature is truly reflected in these lines:

زمانے با ارسطو آشنا باش
دمے با ساز بیکن ہمنوا باش
و لیکن از مقام شاں گزر کن
مشو گم اندریں منزل سفر کن
به آن عقلے کہ داند بیش و کم را
شناسد اندرون کان و یم را
جہاں چند و چوں زیر نگین کن
بگردوں ماہ و پرویں را کمیں کن

But in this very poem his enthusiastic preference for the intuitive approach to God makes him describe taking this journey as adorning the dead (مکر شب و (صورت نگاری مردہ) and being in the snares of nights and days (روز) and in the poem quoted before as moving inside the walls of a prison. These metaphors seem to ill accord with the idea of Nature as God's behaviour.

The difficulties in explaining time in relation to Reality forces both Bergson and Iqbal to make a profuse use of simile and metaphor, but whereas the use of simile and metaphor is an advantage inasmuch as it makes the imaginative picturing of an experience easy, it is also a disadvantage in so far as it makes acute analysis of these experiences difficult. But both of them, very consistently with their presuppositions believe that analysis, however, acute cannot be of much use in the true apprehension of Reality. But can imaginative picturing which, in their view, is also infected with space, be of any great help?

In *Payam-i-Mashriq* there is an exquisite poem entitled *Nawa-i-Waqt*, "The Song of Time." It gives expression to most of Iqbal's ideas about time in unforgettable language. I quote it in full:

خورشید به دامنم انجم به گریبانم
در من نگری پیچم در خود نگری جانم
در شهر و بیابانم در کاخ و شبستانم
من در دم و درمانم من عیش فراوانم
من تیغ جهان سوزم من چشمه حیوانم

چنگیزی و تیموری مشتے ز غبار من
ہنگامہ افرنگی یک جسته شرار من
انسان و جہان او از نقش و نگار من
خون جگر مردان سامان بہار من
من آتش سوازنم من روضہ رضوانم

آسودہ و سیارم این طرفہ تماشبین
در بادہ امروز کیفیت فردابین

پنہاں بہ ضمیر من صد عالم رعناہیں
صد کوکب غلطان ہیں صد گنبد خضرا ہیں
من کسوت انسانم پیراہن یزدانم

تقدیر فسون من تدبیر فسون تو
تو عاشق لیلائی من دشت جنون تو
چون روح رواں پاکم از چند و چگون تو
تو راز درون من، من راز درون تو
از جان تو پیداہیم در جان تو پنہاہیم

من رپروو تو منزل من مزرع تو حاصل
تو ساز صد آہنگے تو گرمی اہیں محفل
آوارہ آب و گل! دریاہ مقام دل
گنجیدہ بہ جامے ہیں اہیں قلمز بے ساحل
از موج بلند تو سربرزدہ طوفانم

NATURE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

A. H. KAMALI

Multiplicity of autonomous spheres of knowledge has almost become the academic fashion of our times. Averrossean scheme of the separate spheres of Moral-Religious Knowledge and Scientific-casual inquiry, on whose basis Kantianism provides a frame of reference to a deeper penetration of Reality, is revealed as a projection of the departmentalism that is inherent in the destiny of our present Commercial Civilization. Human life is wrecked in the multiplicity of act-organisations; spheres after spheres of knowledge are invented and treated as if they have nothing to do with each other. In this age, man is not an identity but a clustre; not a system but a constellation; not one massive being but a set of tiny particles. He does not harbour one comprehensive loyalty, but is torn to pieces by countless conflicting loyalties.

In this age Iqbal appears to be one who addresses himself to the restoration of identity in life. His relentless criticism of the Contemporary Civilization and of its fundamental ideologies is positive towards a new theory of life, necessitating a new approach to knowledge, preserving the richness of experience and the multi-dimensionality of its character, but at the same time deepened in the vastness of a unity that regains for life its pristine vigour and glory, meaningfulness and rationality.

Following is an attempt to develop the main outlines of a theory of experience which employs not only the 'raw-feels' but also rational judgements of the poet-philosopher in its constructions and which may serve as an objective manifestation of the spirit of Iqbal's philosophy of self.

Ideational Form of Knowledge

The world is an appearance. Viewed from a distance it is at the most an idea. Consciousness is out to capture the Realm of Existence, but has to be content with the seizure of its phantom; a 'show' intervenes between the sentient being and the process of reality. Our memories are filled with the virtual images of the past episodes; our reminiscences are depressed in dull ideations of the cherished moments of our life. We are carried away from the

happiest situations of our life in the forward rush of time and are now left with the empty corpse of their concretion and ghostly ideas of their animation. It is all ideation.

Ideation is a mode of consciousness which maintains contact with the world of facts through the medium of ideas. To the Greek mind it is the only possible form of knowledge. The highest Greek virtue is contemplation, an effort to disappear into a silent mirror. And, who is a better Grecian than al-Farabi or Ibn Rushd ? They want to surpass every one in becoming a mirror pure and simple.

Speculating is the essence of Ideation, the archeform of all experience. The Sage of the Allegory of Cave² prepares, nevertheless, a blue print of knowledge, wherein departure from the blazing and intense, variegated and rich, evanescent and fleeting ideas is besought so that in the end their vague patterns and figurhead profiles remain to captivate the emptied minds of those initiated in the pursuit of truth. Thus, undecorative, intangible, and colourless presentations of things and entities are enshrined in the temple of knowledge as the most celebrated idols to be worshipped in contemplation.

Aristotle, the pupil of the Sage, lays down within the framework of this methodology of knowledge the total scheme of gnosis. In its immediate surrounding, the Eye is but to witness the bubble-like ideas; they are particulars; here and now and no more. The gnostic has to abstract away similarities and uniformities from the experiential fluid of these objects; gradually there dawn before his mind the permanent features, stable facsimiles, and regular shapes impressed on the undelineated events mirrored in emerging particularities. The ground of their vision lies in Imagination. Imageries and fantasies are relatively permanent ideas immune from the lot and accidents that betake the immediately present storming ideas. The mind must not be content with this imaginative knowledge as it is still nearer to the perishing sphere; it must move further, and go far far away operating with abstraction in selecting and picking up the common characters shared by all of them (the images). This process is denoted by 'Conceptualization' which results in the apprehension of the immutable forms, eternal universals and permanent models of all beings in general. Their direct intuition formulates

² Plato

the supreme goal of all knowledge, the final emancipation from the hurdles of life and the unprecedented height of all awakening and illumination.

This is the Platonic-Aristotelean theory of knowledge, which has to govern the future course of the Greeko-Roman civilization. Being made to prostrate in the morbid standpoint of remote observation, and confounded in the mesh of imageries, mankind has to rotate in a close circle, passing through the clustre of perishing ideas and the constellation of universals, for ever removed from the internal glance of the reality. It is on the scaffolding of this philosophy that Muslim Culture has attempted to build itself up, but simply to crack down under its impact like a house of cards destined to be levelled to the ground. Platonic-Aristotolian theory is not only a theory of knowledge, it is also a theory of morality, not only of gnosis but also of life. The concept of Mirror is, at once, the methodology of knowledge, the way of life, and the philosophy of religion, thoroughly defining all the higher pursuits of existence projected in the development of the Muslim frame of mind, though not without powerful intermitent voices against its permeation.

Nietzsche saw beneath this ideology of life the deterioration of the Dionysian. Spirit in the ascension of Apollonianism with the impending transvaluation of values with the consequence that Homer has been loathed to become the poet of the infantile savagery, and Plato is crowned to become the High Priest of mature civilization. Nietzsche's penetrating insight discerned in the enthronement of Plato the root genesis of the decadence sapping from within the entire Western Civilization of our own time. Therefore, he is the first giant intellectual who disentangles himself, in the history of the West, from the mounting heritage of the Platonic traditions.

Nietzsche is a philosopher of life; he is always contemptuous towards the Rationalism of Plato which makes a mirror of life. But, Schopenhauer and Bergson criticise Rationalism from the epistemological point of view. They discovered in the phenomenon of ideation not knowledge but appropriation. Ideation, they claimed, is a function of the living organism in the movement of satisfaction. Its sole justification is appropriation of the environment and gratification of the organic impulses.

Iqbal singles out himself, in the newly anti-platonic movement, from Nietzsche by outstripping the limited perspective of life in the cosmic problem of Existence.

Iqbal strikes out a new note of the first magnitude by recognizing in the givenness of ideation a degree of knowledge which must be significant if assigned to its proper place in the total scheme of experience. The commentators of Iqbal have generally been unable to grasp the nature of his attack on Platonism. They confuse his line of opposition with that of Bergsonian mysticism, and unhesitatingly read in his expressions a camp-follower of the French School of Thought, which seduced to immediacies and besieged in *Abwal* (feeling-states), cannot raise itself up to hold the ideas of things. Iqbal dives into the immediate flow of experience, returns to entertain their ideas and remarks, "It is in the nature of feeling to seek expression in thought"³.

Iqbal assigns the ideational knowledge to the angels. In the hierarchical structure of reality, angels are stationed at a lower stratum of existence in relation to mankind and they have access only to the outermost vision of the reality.

Idea mediates between the knower and the known; it is not the reality, it is simply a snapshot, a sketchy portrait of flourishing concretion and blooming mobility of the real. Idea stands to the real as a photostat looks in relation to the moving and spirited person: dead and static, inert and cold. Ideation enacts a dense populace of fragmentary snaps, atomic ideas and isolated impressions. Mind overcomes them, by delivering itself from their rush, in another act of externalization, which posits an "idea of many ideas". Such posited ideas are also quite large in number; in a series of enactments mind constitutes the ultimate Idea (of the ideas . . . of the ideas) at the highest matrix of ideation which is, nonetheless, a reflection (of the reflection . . . of the reflection) of reality. Reflective thinking, as it is called, is a procession of intermediation; it does not fall upon object; it is self-reflexive; falls upon itself; demonstrates a total exile and perfect alienation from the warmth and zeal of the perennial occurrences.

³ Muhammad Iqbal: *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 1929, p. 27

Iqbal is out to dismantle this scheme of knowing activity which stretches veils upon veils on the broad countenance of reality. He calls it spatializing activity in which the reflective intellect is unsparingly engaged to bury itself in the debris of the pyramid of ideas made of impressions, images, concepts, categories and forms. The most sweeping denunciation of the Platonic Forms is indeed directed against the contemplative intellect which generates distances after distances between sentience and Reality. Plato, a sheep in the guise of man who is final authority to the Sufi, drives his intellect to the skies and declares the causal world a fiction. Plato's thought judges the harmful to be useful; and the existent, non-existent. His nature is sleepy and produces dreams; his eye of prudence generates illusions.⁴

گوسفندمے در لباس آدم است

حکم او بر جان صوفی محکم است

عقل خود را بر سر گردون رساند

حالتهم اسباب را افسانه خواند

فکر افلاطون زیان رو سود گفت

حکمت او بود را نابود گفت

قطرتش خوابید و خوابیے آفرید

چشم پوش او سراییے آفرید

Iqbal turns the direction of our attention; substitutes the concrete wholes for the abstract forms and asks to return from ideation to perception. Ideation is only a limited segment of thinking life; it is only a moment of the active rationality, which must be surpassed. This act of transcendence beyond the idea is anti-Greek and anti-classical.

II

⁴ Iqbal: *Asrar-e-Khudi* (The Secret of the self), p. 35

Perceptual Flow of Experience

An idea is a sign of reality, however empty it may be yet it is a signal. Mind must travel on under its guidance. From a distance a garden appears like a green spot, like something vague; the active subject must move towards it; and he would witness the disclosure of the green spot, the far off idea, before his eyes; it turns into the blooming of many trees; he comes nearer and hears the chirping birds; he makes a further approximation; and all the richness, beauty, fragrance and pleasant breeze refresh him. This process means the transformation of the idea into percept.

Iqbal realizes in this approach to knowledge the essential property of Muslim thought which revolts against the Greek philosophy of Ideation. "The appeal to the concrete combined with the slow realization that, according to the teachings of the Qur'an, the universe is dynamic in its origin, finite and capable of increase, eventually brought Muslim thinkers into conflict with Greek thought which, in the beginning of their intellectual career, they had studied with so much enthusiasm".⁵ "Knowledge must begin with the concrete. It is the intellectual capture of power over the concrete that makes it possible for the intellect of man to pass beyond the concrete."⁶

Like Iqbal, Bergson is also a philosopher of concrete experience. But, unlike Iqbal, Bergson shuns ideation. The characteristic originality of Iqbalian approach keeps up a traffic between idea and percept and discerns an unimpeded continuity running through them. "Thus, the character of man's knowledge is conceptual, and it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspect of reality."⁷

Perception is the closest external view of reality, in which every idea is immersed in every other; the chirps pour into the fragrance which again is carried over into the greenery; and all of them in mutual fusion make one concrete whole; the inertia of the particular impressions, their static isolations are clipped aside and all of them are mobilized into one gestalt flowering. The remote green spot is, now, one compact wholeness in which the tiny ideas, little impressions are held together in the unity of a flowering and flourishing garden. Iqbal explains that the table perceived is a mutual fusion

⁵ Iqbal: *Reconstruction*, p. 179

⁶ *Ibid*: p. 183

⁷ *Mid*: p. 17

of countless impressions, a concrete unity of their interpenetrating mobility. The abstract category of space is derivative⁸; it is the product of ideation and abstraction; it exists as a pointer towards reality; and the reality perceived is an immense dynamic whole of which the separate impressions are isolatory and abstracted moments. In its indivisibility and concrete wholeness, it is perception.

Perception is not made of sensation. The atomistic view is false; its reverse is true; sensations are the consequences of perceptions. "Life is only a series of acts of attention"; and every act of attention is disjunctive; it bifurcates the dynamic wholeness into a discontinuity of static sense-data, a conglomerate of atomic entities. Reflective thought is bifurcatory; it instantializes the flux of reality into a series of instants, each existing in its own right, self-imposed and self-contained. This reveals the spatializing property of the ideational thought. But the progress of human knowledge has done away with the particle-like atoms of Democritus with the realization of a category of Matter, which is an advanced conjecture towards the holistic nature of the external world. But, even that category is tampered with in the evolution of scientific thought. Modern physics, in its concept of the Relativity which integrates time as the fourth dimension, cannot go along with the concept of matter which involves "simple location in time".⁹ The temporal character of reality, which reveals changing dimensions of the dynamic events breaks through the static category of matter. The situation is that we have to admit primacy of the dynamic wholes and conceive staticism of things derivative. Movement cannot be derived from static substances and entities; rather it is the simple location and discrete boundaries that can be marked off on a speedy continuum.¹⁰ This logical understanding going side by side with the real experimental conclusions in contemporary physics throws enormous light on the genesis of sense-data and their relation to the concrete events, as well as on the problem of ideation as related to perception. The sensations are signs of the existing and moving wholes. From ideation one could and should move towards perception. Moreover, perception is capable of expressing itself in ideas.

⁸ *Ibid*: p. 47

⁹ *Ibid*: p. 42-46

¹⁰ *Ibid*: p. 47-55

Thus, Iqbal validates the conceptual knowledge; and approves the description of concrete events in the language of sense-data in the domain of reflective thought; provided that it should be considered as a statement of sign-systems of the reality. Iqbal restores the Platonic forms, the Spatio-temporal framework of Physics, the reflective knowledge of religion to their proper places.

His philosophy is successful exactly at the same point where Bergsonianism disintegrates into a mystic trance. Existentialism is the ultimate consequence of Bergsonianism, as has also been demonstrated by the history of recent French thought. The prospect for Iqbalian thought is a thoroughbred conceptual knowledge bordering on the solid core of perception.

Perception of the Whole

Perceptual structure of experience is a profusedly interlaced stream of events which maintains openness and develops into multi-directional becoming. It is a spatiality in temporal expansion sharply edging towards the future. Within the categories of conceptual knowledge it appears to be an inference; the external world seems to be a logical construct; it may be projected in the reintegration of the separate sensations into an interactional system. The rehabilitation of the dust like sense, in multilateral organization, works out an approximate adequation of the perceptual Gestalt of the Real. In its immediateness the object world is a perceptible structure of dynamic realities expanding into temporal spread. It is out of this continuous formation that differentiations are made, memories are disassociated, expectations are discriminated, distinctions are extenuated, and things are carved out.¹¹

Scattered events are functional counterparts of the abstractive disengagement, imaginative marks are drawn, separation lines are stretched. The result of this activity is seeming millions of ruptured ideas and fissured entities. The stresses are petrified intellection in which the possibilities of infinite consciousness shrink to small gravitational stabilities of observation, each cutting a section of the universe round its nexus. Sciences come to stay in the stresses of the attention field. And "there is no doubt that the theories

¹¹ *Ibid*: p. 69

of science constitute trustworthy knowledge".¹² But we must not forget that what is called science is not a single systematic view of reality. It is a mass of sectional views of reality—fragments of "total experience which do not seem to fit together".¹³ In fact the various natural sciences are like so many "small vultures falling on the dead body of Nature, and each running away with a slice of its flesh". "The moment you put the subject of science in the total of human experience it begins to disclose a different character".¹⁴

The movement of consciousness is fettered in the stresses of close rotations with the multiplication of disordered dissection of the universe. Therefore, release from their grip is necessary for the free movement of consciousness. It must achieve independence from their determinations in order to have a direct access to the reality. Perceptual knowledge is disrupted into various segments under their pull; they have to be overcome; their mediation must have to be broken asunder.

Perceptual knowledge does not remain a problem of theoretical reason; now it becomes a moral issue. Bracketting the stresses controlling the pulls and arresting their concentric arti-crafts is the logical condition of the cognitive consciousness operative to witness the flow of the objective world. In our time, the vocation of practical life is conceived independent of the knowledge a person possesses; the licentious life he passes, accordingly, does not modify the opinions he expresses. This idea has created the greatest non-sense of the contemporary world. The pressure of the stresses carries its logical character to the world a man envisions; consequently, the real world is coloured in the modes of his life, moulded in the bulwark of his wishes, and articulated in the patterns of his demands. Only a free life has the privilege to pass through the gate-way of the objective reality given in its own right. And, therefore, purification is the basic requirement of the intuitive grasp of the structural wholeness of the given world. Human mind, closely related to the bio-physical stresses grasps only those abstractive poses of the reality which correspond to them; the absorbing engagements in their pulls disclose only those fields of the universe in which they could move and fulfil themselves. Their prejudicial character, *a priori* disposition disallows the consciousness to

¹² *Ibid.*: p. 57

¹³ *Ibid.*: p. 57

¹⁴ *Ibid.*: p. 57-58

act according to its own dictates. Growing on the bio-physical bases is an ever increasing set of uncountable cravings civilization has imposed on life; and all of them 'run away' with a piece of the reality. The logical outcome is a disordered erosion and unsystematic access to events of various stresses, leaving out many of the events which were essential bricks of the structural dynamics of the reality.

The only way to come out of the simulation of the arrays of stresses, resulting in the inevitable fissure and abstract segmentation of the reality, is to be liberated from them. The one, whose being is not free from the earthly attraction, has no right to the pleasure of flight in the universe.¹⁵ The liberated consciousness is the most vital ground of the direct external apprehension of the Gestalt of Reality. Consequently, Islam has laid down fundamental emphasis on the purity of life as the prior condition of knowledge and of other responsible assignments. The testimony of the impious, the evidence of a *fasiq* (the slave of wishes) are unacceptable in Islamic law. The dubious character of experience of a slave of stresses, sham states of a licentious person, the abstractive occurrences (*waridat*) of a spirit mortified in the disassociative pulls and contractions cannot constitute the foundational protocols of the objective knowledge encompassing the entire stretches of Reality. It is due to this reason that in Muslim traditions a knower dictated by the agitating dispositions is a complete contradiction in terms. *Tazkiyyah al-Nafs* (purification and cleansing of the psyche) have been granted the status of the prime most methodology of knowledge. All ways of reality (*Rah-i-Suluk*) pass through the self-purification process in order to have the direct cognition of the concrete whole of reality. This is an initiation into the series of negations; stresses after stresses are surrounded, grasped and negated; every negation is self-forwarding with the positive restoration of the abstract moments and figments to the original spread of reality. At the apex of self-purification, the restoration of complete concretion is affected; the original unmediated ocean like vibrations of the single united configurate of reality is perceived. Its original flow and patterns, styles and operations shine forth before the pure mind; all its, henceforth neglected, moments present in their total setting are open to the liberated man.

¹⁵ Iqbal:p. 217

It is he who is the witness of reality. He is the unmixed percipient; he pollutes not the given by mingling his thoughts in it; he never projects his own spirit the aboriginal flow; anthropocentricism, ego-centric predicament are thoroughly transcended in his presence. He is one whose words are the translations of reality, whose gestures are rader-pointers to the given, whose turns and movements indicate the flow and direction of the whole.

Western thought, even, in its most spectacular leaps could not reach at the apprehension of the perceptual continuum. W. James' celebrated stream of consciousness makes but a very narrow threshold of the widespread flux; it gives simply series of ideas passing one by one through the consciousness. The ideational stand-point is confirmed in the Radical Empiricism whose axiomatic statements come out to construct the mental world and the physical world out of these initial ideas. Ernst Mach's 'Pan Impressionism' is an abstract ideation of the dust of impressions which in one organization are physical things; in another are mental events. Russell's and Neo-Realists' "neutral stuff " is a series of strangulated contents which in their different togethernesses are different things. Bergsonian "flux" is arresting luminary of the feelings carried in unindirectedness generating the phenomenon of serial continuity.

In fact, all of them are absorbed in the echoes of the aboriginal flux without reaching the flux; they are ideating the ideas of (the perception of) the flux.

The flux is the multidirectional patterning integrated in one single wholeness. The neutral stuff of Perry and Russell or the 'impressions' of Wittgenstein and Moor are trails of this universal developing constellation growing and organizing itself continuously. The percipient observes its Grand Form integrating in innumerable manners the relics, traces contours and lines of becoming. This Total Singleness is the ultimate matrix of all external knowledge. Emotions, ideas, impressions, memories, expectations, colours, sounds, pressures, touches, etc. etc., all are embroidered on this outer garb of the Reality, around which are beseated the sublimated knowers enjoying it all among themselves. It is incommunicable; only those who know it share it; for others, fettered in stresses, it is beyond comprehension. All the sectional views are submerged in its vision wherein one concrete expanding wholeness imposes itself on the faculty of knowledge, as the bold insignia, bright emblem and splendid sign of the still deeper reality.

"The Sign" is beheld and firmed; it is *Taslim wiz Rida*; the percipient is calmly, silently, a witness of the becoming.

III

Activistic Category of Knowledge

Positivism is an entailment at the station of perception in the journey of knowledge. From Platonic envisioning of the empty forms down to the beholding of the concrete patterns the attitude is outrightly set—the attitude of submission. Consequently, inactivity and calmness, patience and forfeiture are the governing principles of life. It is from this station that the Sage and the Sufi speak of utter resignation and the positivist like Russel in his "Free Man's Worship" advises wholesale bowing down before the facts.

Iqbal terms it as a negative attitude and points out to passing beyond it. His gesture to go beyond is a new movement of knowledge which discloses the depths of the real, penetrates through the inmost crusts of the Sign. The excavation is instituted in the deeper movement of consciousness which is active on the basis of cognitive illumination unfolded in the Logic of Participation.

Encountrance with the real and interaction with it is the activistic element integrated with cognitive thinking. It is in participation with the given that the new mode of knowledge opens to lay bare the hidden features of the real. Out of one group of interactions develops the science of physics; out of another chemistry; out of a third the biological studies. The methodology of knowledge necessarily entails the conative groups of operations which decipher the layers of the Being peculiar to their nature. This is the logic of science; physiology, psychology, economics, etc. emerge out one by one along with the typical action categories immanent in their axiomatics.

Pure perception floats at the surface; its high achievement is mathematics; the science of patterns and shapes, figures and forms, lines and sketches. Participation is *purva sive*: its high discoveries are causality and development, energy and waves, stimulus and response, force and resistance, gravitation and magnetism. To the Sight reality is endless juxtaposition; to the Grip it is internal boundedness; To the calm Spectator it is divisible band of accidents; to the active Agent it is unbreakable system of necessities. To

the one it is static; to the other it is moving. The former catches hold of the 'become' and the 'past'; the latter of the becoming, piercing into the future.

Vision is external; participation is internal. Situation in participation is the essential constitutive principle of life. Life is in perpetual active relationship of assimilation adaptation and transfiguration with the environmental forces and casual sequences. "Consciousness may be imagined as a deflection from life. Its function is to provide a luminous point in order to enlighten the forward rush of life."

The idea of life is unintelligible without the concept of consciousness. Casual interactions, pulls and pushes, shorn off consciousness, are devoid of life. It is only when the element of consciousness, however feeble and flimsy it may be, is immanent in the springing events, that the life-concept is applicable to them. Now, as soon as life throws out its luminous core to install an external sensitivity, the moment of liberation from the immediate involvement comes. It is only in man, on earth, that awareness has achieved a considerable degree of deliverance from the immediacy of life to view the entire situation from the outside. The Bergsonians and Instrumentalists are not right to reduce consciousness to Intelligence which is enchained to the immediate commitments. Iqbal sees in the givenness of consciousness a principle and reality which is capable of infinite liberation and unrestricted developments.

Internal involvement participation and equilibrium pour into the span of consciousness its data, supply it with the contents it must keep in view, offer it the material it must attend to. The perceptual structure of experience is incessantly consolidated in the dynamic states of life which throws at its disposal the stuff and outputs that substantialize its vision.

Thus, perceptual knowledge permanently feeds on the provisions won in participation and involvement. Activities component is the grounding formulae of Perception. The external system throngs over the nervous system, interacts with it and generates the experience of colour, sound, temperature and smell. "The cause of your sensation of red", says Iqbal, "is the rapidity of wave motion the frequency of which is 400 billions per second". The nervous system reacts to it and the redness (a visual content) is before the eye. The conclusion is: perception in its genesis, is a shining speck casting rays on the end-results without illumined of the acts in which they are

posited. The consequence is: subject and object of experience stand disjointed from each other; there seems an abrupt demarcation; two separate unconnected realms come into being.

The experience of external confrontation is but a case of limited consciousness, which may be conceived either as a dwarfed awareness or a fallen cognition. It reveals only some of the parts of the whole and as such is abstract partial and incomplete in its very nature. Therefore, it needs completion, development and perfection. The principle of participation provides the cue to go beyond the surface observation; restores the acts in which the external object is posited, uncovers the dynamic relationship in which the subject and object are part of a total structure, and restores to knowledge the order of internal connection between man and his environment.

This methodological technique of reproducing the acts of formulation and reconstructing the perennial interactions is essentially a movement from the Spatiality of phenomenon to the temporality of the neumenon. Yet, this movement is arrested by its own inherent shortcomings and cannot comprehend the reality in its staggering totality. It discovers only very small and meagre processes and features of the universe. In it the world appears as Nature, a whirlpool of unbridled energies and blind forces. It simply gives us the set of natural sciences which undoubtedly have their loci inside the reality. However, it still remains nearer to externality rather than to the deep internality which is the essence of Existence.

Consequently, the principle of participation or activistic cognition is nothing but Efficient Intellect as Iqbal calls it. Its content is mechanistic; it can capture the atomic valence, can go into the structures of physical collisions and beyond these spheres it is helpless and undone.

IV

Pathos: The Adequate Mode of Knowledge

Activistic consciousness provides the training ground for a higher intellect which contains in its Kernel Pathos '*Shanque*' as the law of its emergence. Revelation in its nature is the most adequate form of knowledge which unfolds the world as the Sign of a living universal personality, and

gives flashing eperque of its ultimate character. Pathos tears to pieces the hardest core of the universe and brings forth its concealed enclosed nature.

Sympathy, apathy, antipathy, etc., are distinct forms of pathos whose universality may be evaluated by the fact that it alone is the organizing law of all the acts of knowledge. The physical operations are co-ordinated in its range to produce the terrible havoc of devastating atomic bombardments to express the antipathy; the chemico-physiological processes are arranged in its design to cure the sympathised unfortunates; astonishing technological artifices are embodied in its move to develop the civilization. The one single principle of Pathos is the ultimate integral movement in the essence of the universe; and it alone has to be crowned as the most comprehensive mode of knowledge.

Pathos is referential in its character, and necessitates the existence of a living being in its enactment. It is the most excellent privilege of a living entity and entails an immanent self-affirmation in its being possible.

Pathos is an act of formation; it formulates a living otherness. In its early stages it merely postulates the living otherness, but does not remain closed in its own formulation and supposition. It is the law of its own verification; in its further realizations and acts, it verifies the correctness of its own reference. Living otherness responds to the pathos and thus puts a seal of correctness upon the referential act of the subject, who in his turn, again replies to the other. Thus there is no limit in mutual transactions of the living persons.

It is in Pathos that the world is finally known and verified as an open system of responding individuals.

It is in Pathos that one discovers one's own reality as a living Ego. But, this Self-acknowledgement is the most superficial truth in the system of the deeper truths, deploying the entire concrete reality as the sign system of one's own self-hood. This experience, although superficial in comparison with other ranges of experience, yet is enormously big so as to engulf the total spatiality to express it as one of its own modality. It simply comes to its knees at the shuddering heights of the Duration from where all the events come down like pearls and drops one after another, disallowing self-involvement to persist as the -ultimate truth in the system of the universe.

Time is self-transcending movement which can be grasped in the principle of pathos which is itself other-directedness in its total expression.

Pathos is an emanation from one subjectivity radiating towards another subjectivity. It does not mitigate but rather sharpens the distinction of their separate givenness. Resolution (of one subjectivity) into its alter as happens in the phenomenon of identification, degenerates the whole experience into ego-experience. Self-divestment accompanied any total mergence in the alter is a knowledge of single subjectivity; again cancellation of the identity of an alter in the enhancement of selfhood is also the same experience of single subjectivity. Therefore, the logical condition of pathos lies in the enhancement and intensification of mutual otherness. Consequently, Iqbal is vigorously insistent on self-affirmation as methodological procedure in the movement of *Shauque* whose various forms *viz.*, anger, hate, sympathy and help are only possible on the basis of Ego and Alter-Ego as pluralistic centres of reality.

However, all the forms of Pathos have different degrees of universality and contain diverging intensities of appropriation to reality. But, it is only Love that discloses the highest form of movement, adequate to comprehend the whole range and intensity of the Being. I and Thou define the ultimate category of reality and of knowledge. Denial of thou-ness is egoistic experience; and self-divestment in thou-ness is again an experience of I-ness. Therefore, in love the distinction become more refined and cultivated, the demarcating separations are heightened in its progression. The structure of love experience belies the category of concentric experience which is incident upon the reduction of either side of the reality. This is a point of the greatest significance in the whole body of Iqbalian thought that provides the key-note to his philosophy of *Khudi*. In Neitzche, the experience is self-centric; it is the same in Bergsonian vitalism; but in Iqbal's philosophy it is bi-centric, constituting the logical condition of the *ma'arifat* (real knowledge).

V

Revelation: The Height of all Knowledge

Iqbal picks up in the property of self-possession the logical essence of Ego-existence. Consequently, every ego in its individuality possesses a core of Privacy in its unmixed uninfiltated primacy. Consequently, there is always a cordon of concealment in the very inwardness of every person. Every

particularity in the universe, every stretch of the space is laid open for trespass; "the dead" and "the *become*" has no resistance; it has no inner circle of vacation that cannot be seen, touched or heard. Only the living personality has an untouchable vacation (*Takhlīya-i-Harim*) that cannot be traversed; no one can pass through it, or dare to peep into it. Consequently this sphere, of being is laid beyond the experience of love.

In Idealistic philosophy of knowledge and experience of love, the principle of privacy and uniqueness does not find place. Mutual infiltration logically guarantees the expansion of knowledge in the process of identification. Therefore, in this philosophy love or implantation into each other's heart constitutes *ma'arifāt*. But, it bows down before the threshold of the Inner Circle and cannot enter into it without the consent of the alter-ego. Ultimate knowledge is dependant on the voluntary disclosure of self to other self; even the unfathomable love cannot be a substitute for voluntary disclosure. The Beloved may keep secret whatever He likes, and may whisper to the lover whatever He likes. This knowledge is revelation.

The category of the bearer of secrets surpasses the category of lover. The highest reciprocation of love is love; and not knowledge.

The distribution of personal secrets to others is a prerogative of the personal life, which cannot be questioned.

The inter-subjective world of plurality is a network of intimacies limited by privacies. Speech provides the inter-personal system of communication.

Iqbal believes that the inmost essence of reality is non-transferable, it cannot be shown to others. "The dentist may sympathise with my toothache but cannot experience the feeling of my toothache. My pleasures, pain, and desires are exclusively mines a part and parcel of my private ego alone."¹⁶ Therefore, an ego may disclose his willingness, pleasures and pains and other articulations of his life, in the mode of language only. Revelation is linguistic in its highest form, denoting the deepest secrets of the reality.

Revelation in its lower form is intuition beyond the category of love; the Alter shines forth to the Ego and directly presents, himself to the vision. But

¹⁶ Iqbal: *Reconstruction*, p. 139

it develops into *Kalam* (discourse) as soon as the knowledge of the events of the Untouchable vacation is involved; it is given in the form of language.

Every word of a language system is a name, it names some idea; therefore, the linguistic revelation is an idea-system, an external vision of the inmost events.

The revelation can further be conceptualized in the most abstract and general ideas.

This shows that there is necessary continuity between thought and revelation, language and reality, concept and experience.

The final aim of all knowledge, therefore, is intuition and revelation, which for the purpose of communication can be conceptualized.

THE LOGICAL DISCREPANCIES OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

MANZOOR AHMAD

I

The movement of Logical Positivism as it has been developed in the hands of Wittgenstein and Carnap, and its many other adherents, who disagree with one another on minor points (though some times these points are very significant) is but a 20th century form of subjectivism, with the only difference that the classical subjectivism "explained" reality in terms of subject, while this new form of it actually "limits" reality, by "analysing language" and by arbitrarily proclaiming what 'can' and what cannot be 'said' by considering the logical syntax of the language in which we express them.

It is my intention to show in this article that the theory of Logical Positivism is full of inherent contradiction, and that a sound philosophical system can only be based upon a proper realization of the objective reality of the self. For this purpose I shall first elaborate the point of view of Logical Positivists.

II

Hitherto the main obstacle in the way of true philosophy is the belief that *apriori* reasoning for the discovery of new facts is possible. Kant's quest for the possibility of synthetic judgment *apriori* was a vain attempt after a mirage. Philosophy can't discover new facts. All the questions of human interest belong to special sciences and are capable of being decided by empirical evidence (at least in theory). Hence all the problems of philosophy are the problems of logic, which means every philosophical problem when subjected to analysis is found either not philosophical at all or logical. Such a treatment can be accomplished in the following way:—

(1) Positive knowledge gained empirically is transferred inductively into facts and generalizations. No *apriori* reasoning is of any help in epistemology.

(2) Propositions formed as a result of step (I) is subjected to logical analysis.

(3)The analysis produces a new clarity by analysing logical form of truth to the facts already known.

The idea of such a logical analysis is rooted in pure mathematics and mathematical logic. In mathematics the need for exact definitions of the terms used was very strongly felt. Russell suggested that the same method of exact definition of terms can as well be applied to philosophical investigations.

For instance in the sphere of differential calculus the idea of the differential functions was very obscure. A differential function gives the velocity of a moving body at a given instant of time, and this was thought to involve the very obscure conception of the infinitely small distance travelled in an infinitely small time. Obviously, the whole idea of infinitely small quantities was impossible and contradictory since all real quantities, howsoever small, are necessarily finite. This difficulty was removed by giving a more exact definition to differential functions. It was defined as the LIMIT towards which the relation of the distance travelled to the corresponding period of time approaches as the distances and time considered, get smaller

and smaller. $\left\{ \lim \frac{8s}{8t}, 8t \rightarrow 0 \right\}$

In the same way the difficulty of an explanation of irrational numbers was avoided by defining them (*i.e.* $\sqrt{2}$) in terms of rational numbers, and thus showing that all irrational and imaginary numbers have an ultimate mathematical reality.

Not only this but Russell has attempted in his '*Principia*' to analyse all numbers in terms of logical idea or classes, which he later on attempted to apply to philosophy.

The most important idea in this conception of logical analysis is that of logical form. Every proposition and inference has apart from its subject matter a particular form, a way in which the constituents of a proposition are put together. Different propositions may possess same form, but differ in content, some others may have same content expressed in different forms. The proper object of philosophy is this form of a proposition, in abstraction from the real world, which is reflected in these forms on the one hand, and the process of thought which create these forms on the other. A main series

of logical forms of propositions has to be worked out, and Russell in *Principia* and Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* have tried to work out the same.

This begins with elementary propositions, from which complicated and complex propositions are arrived at. Elementary propositions say that a certain thing has a property or certain thing stands in certain relations with other. Complex propositions are arrived at by assigning truth functions to these propositions. For example P is a proposition. Then P is either true or false (not P or P) that it is true when not P is false, is false when not P is true. Thus we get by assigning truth functions to elementary propositions a negative proposition which is the simplest truth function. If we take two propositions *i.e.* P and Q a lot more truth functions can be obtained *i.e.*

P implies Q	—	$P \supset Q$
either P or Q	—	$P \vee Q$
not both P and Q	—	$\neg (P \wedge Q)$

These compound propositions, can be exclusively defined as truth functions of elementary propositions. General propositions are also simply constructed and may be of any order or complexity.

Logical analysis as it is developed has taken two procedural forms in the hands of logical positivists. Wittgenstein follows the Socratic pattern in a casuistic way—individual confusions clarified, and cases treated. But the general theory of treatment is not elaborated systematically. On the other hand Carnap and others formulate a complete system. These two procedures differentiated the two groups of philosophers on the basis of their respective logical reconstructions. One headed by Wittgenstein, Schillick and Waismen remained experientialistic, while the other headed by Carnap, Neurath and Hempel became physicalistic. I will take Wittgenstein as the representative of the first and Carnap of the other to elaborate my point.

III

The fundamental characteristic of Wittgensteinian philosophy is the relation he wants to establish between language and world. Language is the totality of significant assertions which is related to the totality of objectives of those assertions. Those assertions which are not related to any such objectives are simply insignificant, and either nonsense, poetry, or metaphysics. The objectives which are related to such significant assertions

or propositions are facts, or more correctly they may be described as the combination of objects. This 'fact' is different from that of Aristotle, because here it is a conceivable structure whereas Aristotle limits the fact to "the inherence of something in some thing else." The fact is a fundamental entity and hence is indefinable. Object can be defined as (a) set of facts in which it occurs *i.e.* the set of facts which possess at least one feature of absolute similarity (blue colour of sky) or (b) as whatever is distinguishable constituting a fact. Fact is an independent entity, where as objects are dependent in as much as they occur in one fact or the other.

The world is a totality of independent atomic facts. Whether a fact is atomic or not cannot be known on *apriori* grounds, but only by direct inspection. These atomic facts are composed of objects in immediate combination. When objects are combined it is called structure of the facts.

The form of the object is therefore the possibility of the structure of the fact. Possibility is a logical concept and not an ontological one, hence object is a formal reality requiring completion in order to exist and is only conceivable as being complete in a given set of ways.

The atomic facts must exist as a demand of logical theory, and are capable of being completely logically demonstrated. This demonstration consists in showing the relationship between facts and propositions. The intricate symbolism of language is definitely more complex and seems surplus than atomic facts. Hence a theory must be worked out to establish the relation between this symbolism and that which is being represented by these symbols.

Wittgenstein's demonstration is simple. There are two ways of relation.

1. Relation between the proposition and the fact.
2. Relation between the proposition and propositions.

The relation of a proposition and a fact is that of agreement. When a proposition agrees with a fact it is true otherwise not.

In what this 'agreement' consists. The answer is, it is a pictorial relation. The proposition is a picture of fact. The pictorial character consists in the circumstances that it is itself a fact possessing certain features in common with the fact which it pictures. These common factors, are (1) the logical

form and (2) a one-one correlation between objects comprising the respective facts. This relation can't further be explained it must be presupposed.

Logical form is the common invariant feature of various modes used to express a proposition. Therefore several facts differing in many particulars may be used to express the same sense *i.e.* to picture the same objective fact if they enjoy a community of form. Thus the definition of a proposition is that it is a fact used to picture another fact or a class of facts used to picture another fact. In these case the structure of the propositional fact is identical with the structure of the other fact, in the second case the class of facts enjoys a common structure, and this structure is identical with the structure of fact.

As noted above the sense of a proposition depends upon its form of representation and it is the possibility of the fact which it represents. It is quite different from its truth, and from the proposition itself. The proposition neither can be said identical nor it contains its sense. Two propositions may express the same fact and any proposition can be understood without knowing it to be true; because truth is the agreement of the proposition with reality, while sense is the possibility of agreement.

All the propositions which are significant or in other words which have a sense have an ultimate reference to the empirical realm. The atomic facts are experiential facts and sense can only be found in experience.

But all the propositions are not pictures of facts. The general propositions, concerning logic and arithmetic seem to be understandable without any reference to experience (Wittgenstein then has to show that all general propositions are reduceable to elementary and all elementary propositions are simply and exclusively concerned with empirical reality).

The theory that elementary propositions are pictures of reality is not a novel attempt in the history of philosophy, Hume's theory of ideas as copies of impressions is virtually the same save the fact that the nature of psychological process does not enter, into consideration in the Wittgensteinian theory.

Elementary propositions are said to picture the reality which means both of them agree one another, as I have referred above. But proposition and a

fact does not resemble with one another save in few respects (as a map of a country resembles with the country).

Shilick, who later agreed with the picture theory of Wittgenstein once criticised him on the very question. Thus, he wrote, "In ordinary language agreement simply means likeness. Two tones, two colours two propositions, two opinions agree if they are alike. The word is obviously not to be taken in this sense here, for the judgment is something completely different from that which is judgedit is .not like that which is judged and this can be contested from the stand point of adventurous metaphysical systems which equate thought and being in general, and about which we should waste no words here."

If agreement does not mean likeness, perhaps it could mean similarity. In what sense our judgments are similar to facts? Similarity must mean at least partial likeness, hence it must be possible to find certain moments of judgment which are revealed in the facts themselves. In purely conceptual truths, where the object judged, as well as the judgment consists of purely ideal forms, likeness might be found in both sides under certain circumstances but that cannot be the essential requisite for truth, for propositions about real things also make claim to truth... here, indeed, the nature of truth first becomes a problem but in both, one will seek for such similar moments. For the concepts occurring in the judgement are certainly not of the same nature as the real objects which they designate, and the relations among concepts are not like the relation of things, for in the latter temporal moments always occur, and they are spatial, where as conceptual relations are non-spatial and non-temporal. In the judgement 'the chair stands at the right of the table,' the concept of 'chair' is not placed at the right of the concept 'table'.

Thus the concept of agreement melts away under the rays of analysis in so far as it is to mean sameness or similarity, and what remains of it is simply univocal arrangement. The judgement pictures the nature of the judged as little as the note pictures of tone or as the name of the man pictures his personality. 'Shilick's criticism mainly covers the type of criticism levelled against the pictorial theory of Logical Posotivism. For Wittgenstein the answer to such a criticism consists in showing that the minimum requirements for picturing are:

(1) That the fact pictured and the fact used to picture it possesses the same number of distinguishing parts and

(2) That the structure of the first is identical with the structure of the second.

But some facts may possess only the first condition, as in the example given by Shilick of notes of a melody. The relation among the notes in the score and the relation among the tones of the instrument or voice are not identical for the former relation is spatial and the latter temporal, the relation between different colours of a map is different from the relation of the altitudes which they represent.

But nevertheless for Wittgenstein all these pairs have in a sense some form in which their picture-ness consists. This can be very easily compared with geometrical projections. In geometrical projection a figure may be projected on a surface such that the result is visibly quite different from the original. The laws of geometrical projection determine that certain properties remain invariant for all possible projections of a given figure. A geometrical science could be developed, and in fact has been partially developed, such that the facts from different modalities could be used as projections of one another. On the same pattern the logical form of a fact may be identical with that of another fact even if the entities and relations of one differ from those of others.

The essential connection between discourse and empirical reality is thus established by demonstrating the pictorial character of propositions which have empirical reference. The sense of proposition is the method of verification, that is to say what it represents if it is true. The sense of empirical propositions is the possibility that the facts which they picture exist. But several problems present themselves. How do we know that all propositions are reducible to elementary propositions? Is it possible to show that all elementary propositions are exclusively concerned with picturing empirical reality?

The answer to these problems consists in showing that all propositions are truth functions of the elementary propositions, and that elementary propositions exist which are not truth functions of any other proposition. Wittgenstein describes the truth of a proposition in its agreement of its sense with reality, disagreement of sense with reality is falsehood.

Truth and falsity are neither properties nor relations of propositions or of facts. Thus, 'A' loves 'IV and 'it is true that A loves B' are exactly the same thing. The addition of 'It is true' is simply redundant. On the other hand to say that $P = X$ is true is nonsense, since 'it is true' is not the predicate of X. The addition of 'is true' "exists" etc. to the term X is non-sensical.

Hence the word 'true' false' "exist" "does not exist" do not stand for any entities whatsoever. A proposition is true when it agrees with reality, otherwise is false. This can only be established by comparison. Truth is not the comparison but its result.

When two propositions P.Q. are asserted the result of the double assertion does not represent two facts and a conjunctive relation between them. Moreover, 'and' is not the name of any proper entity. Similarly when a proposition is negated the negation sign is not any entity of the objective world. Truth and falsity are therefore, not objective entities. The logical content 'and' 'not' etc. are simply a part of linguistic apparatus necessary to represent the world.

It remains to be shown that why Wittgenstein believes that elementary propositions are exclusively about empirical reality. The importance of this problem is overwhelming for the Logical Positivist. For if all propositions are truth functions of elementary propositions and if the elementary propositions are concerned with empirical then all words, sentences, assertions, about the non-empirical would be simply nonsense.

The demonstration of the exclusive empirical content of proposition consists in showing the existence of logical simples. A logically simple object is an object which according to its nature makes any further analysis impossible. In history of philosophy we may find similar conceptions. For example the monad of Leibnezian metaphysics is an absolutely simple entity without qualification. It differs however, from the logical simples in being a non-empirical notion. Perhaps the 'simple impressions' of Hume would serve a better example. If one translated Hume's literary psychology, into the language of logic and at the same time removed the naturalistic tendency from the system whatever would correspond to the simple impressions would be very much like the logically simple object of Wittgenstein. The reasons for demonstrating the existence of simple objects as being the 'ultimate furniture of the world' are: In order to show the exclusive concern of

elementary propositions with empirical facts, it is necessary to show that there is one and only one complete analysis of any proposition and this analysis absolutely terminates in the elementary proposition, and finally the elementary propositions are not capable of analysis save into the names which compose them. If many distinct analysis were possible then even though a given analysis of propositions lead to elementary propositions which were not solely concerned with empirical reality, another possible analysis might very well lead to elementary propositions which were not solely concerned with empirical reality. Similarly if there is no ultimate limit to analysis then although a given analysis led solely to elementary proposition of the kind in question, when carried out to any previously assigned limit, further analysis might reveal some non-empirical content in the propositions. Both these possibilities are excluded first because of the fact that propositions are composed by truth-operations and the second can be excluded if the objectives of elementary propositions can be shown to be composed of logical simples.

The argument for logical simples is this "If the world had no substance (simple objects) then whether a proposition has sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world true or false."

Perhaps the above complicated argument can be summed up in one sentence: "If there are pictures of facts then some propositions have sense without being truth functions of other propositions, then the existence of propositions with independent sense implies the existence of simple objects."

IV

Carnap has attempted, avoiding the difficulties of the older doctrine, to maintain the empirical tradition and anti-metaphysical direction of logical positivism.

The first difficulty of the older doctrine was the empiristic absolutism which is hardly the spirit of a non-metaphysical and scientific philosophy. The doctrine of atomic facts, the rigid distinctions between discourse and empirical reality, depend upon the assumptions which cannot be demonstrated.

Carnap in his attempt has simply abandoned the Wittgensteinian atomism as being without proof, and the distinction between discourse and reality has been dispensed with in favour of a purely discursive theory of truth and meaning. It is no longer necessary to distinguish between discourse and fact because everything is expressible. Logical syntax of language may now be formulated in a significant way.

The most interesting part of Carnap's philosophy is his Radical Physicalism according to which all sentences may be translated into a "universal language which is similar in form to the contemporary physics. The methodological solipsism and the extreme empiricism which prevented Positivists from formulating a satisfactory account of scientific objectivity are thus simply avoided without reintroduction of metaphysical principles.

"The questions dealt within any theoretical field" wrote Carnap, "can be roughly divided into *object questions* and *logical questions*. By object questions are to be understood those which have to do with the objects of the domain under consideration such as inquiries regarding their properties and relations. The logical questions on the other hand do not refer directly to the objects but to sentences, terms, theories and so on, which themselves refer to objects."

Thus, science deals with objects. But philosophy that is the logical analysis of science, does not deal with objects at all, but with language.

Thus, it appears that Wittgenstein should not have spoken of objects and facts and of the comparison of propositions with reality. Scientific philosophy must confine the discourse to the relation of propositions with *propositions* and of thought with *thoughts*. This standpoint means that a new interpretation of logic is required. Carnap gave this new view by defining "logic as syntax," and he explains it, "By the logical syntax of a language, we mean the formal theory of the linguistic forms of that language—the systematic statement of the formal rules which govern it, together with the development of the consequences which follow from these rules."

"A theory, a rule, a definition, or like is to be called formal when no reference is made in it either to the meaning of the symbols (*e.g.* the words) or to the sense of the expression (*e.g.* the sentences) but simply and solely to the kinds and order of the symbols from which the expressions are constructed."

Formal logic or logical syntax is then concerned simply and solely with symbols or with language without regard to meaning. This means that it is concerned only with the rules of formation and transformation of a language. The rules of formation show that how symbols may be combined together to form sentences. The rules of transformation show how sentences may be derived from other sentences.

Thus if we know the rules of formation we can know which sentences are significant and which insignificant (allowed by one language or not allowed).

It may be objected, how do we know which are the right rules of formation and transformation without knowing the meaning of sentences.

Carnap's answer is that this question is the result of a prejudice that the principles of logic, must constitute a faithful rendering of the 'true logic' *i.e.* the eternally valid principles of logic, which any system of logic may contrive to mirror. This is merely a metaphysical illusion.

The rules of formation and transformation are chosen quite arbitrarily. This choice whatever it may be, determines what meaning is to be assigned to the fundamental logical symbols. On this very basis and owing to the difficulties of the world languages, the general syntax of an artificially constructed language may be formulated, which may be applied to any language later on what so ever.

By application, the correct sense of any language may become clear. A few examples will suffice to explain the intent of Carnap:-

Material Mode of Expression	Formal Mode.
-----------------------------	--------------

(natural language)

A thing is a complex of sense data.

Every sentence in which a thing designation occurs is equipollent to a class of sentences in which nothing designation but sense data

A thing is a complex of atoms

Every sentence in which a thing designation occurs is equipollent to a sentence in which spacetime coordinates and certain descriptive functors (of physics) occur

The world is a totality of facts not of things.

Science is a system of sentences, not of names.

A fact is a combination of objects (entities, things)¹⁷.

A sentence is a series of symbols.

From the above sentences it is clear that when they are in material mode they sound as if they were asserting some property of the objective world, while they are only syntactical assertions (about words not about objects).

According to Carnap there are three kinds of sentences:—

- (1) Object sentence.
- (2) Pseudo-object sentences.
- (3) Syntactical sentences.

The sentences of science are object sentences. To use the material mode they are about the properties of objects. Philosophical sentences of the analysis of science are pseudo-object sentences, when they are expressed in material modes, but if they are significant they are 'equipollent' to syntactical sentences.

Science according to Carnap is a system of statements based on direct experience and controlled by experimental verification... Verification is based on *protocol sentences*.

Protocol sentences refer to the given and describe directly given experiences or phenomena *i.e.* the simplest states of which knowledge can be had. The programme of the logical analysis of science is only to show that

¹⁷ Maurice Cornforth, *Science Vs. Idealism*, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd. London, 1955, pp. 166-67

how the whole system of scientific statements is derived from protocol statements according to certain formal rules.

Sentences are to be compared with sentences not with 'experiences' not with a 'world' not with anything else.

All these senseless duplications belong to a more or less refined metaphysics, and are therefore, to be rejected. Every new sentence is confronted with a totality of sentences which are present and which have been brought into agreement. Then a sentence is called correct if it can be brought into a system. (we can also alter the whole system for the inclusion of some new sentences which can't be rejected).

Carnap says that there can be one Universal Language of science into which all statements of different sciences can be translated. The unity of sciences is being established by showing that there is a universal language of science into which all scientific statements can be translated.

The language is called the physical language, and the theory of the Unity of Science is called 'Physicalism.'

In Carnap's own words this is a kind of materialism. Thus he wrote, "Our view that protocols constitute the basis of the entire scientific edifice might be termed Methodical Positivism. Similarly the thesis that physical language is the Universal Language might be denoted as methodical Materialism. Our approach has been termed as Positivist, it might equally be termed as materialist. Nevertheless for the sake of clarity we would prefer the name of Physicalism."

V

So far we concerned ourselves with a sympathetic exposition of the doctrine of Logical Positivists. As a matter of fact the school in the beginning was quite fanatic, making more claims than were absolutely necessary for a philosophy of clear meanings, by forming a kind of Metaphysical Liquidation Board. Later on their claims became more modest. Even Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* is less emphatic about certain extreme positions which he held before in *Tractatus*. Nevertheless the fundamentals remained the same. The kernel of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, and that of Moritz Schilick is their picture theory of reality. Though Schilick himself once raised doubts against the picture theory, but later on accepted it, and without being

able to clear those doubts became stubborn about them. He declared that "he can" compare the statements with facts, yet he can remain outside of the circle of metaphysicians.¹⁸

But apart from the difficulties, which Schilick himself enumerated, the picture theory suffers from the basic defect of involving the ego-centric predicament. The facts, if they can be compared at all, can only be compared with individual experiences of them. And such experiences are personal and subjective, unless we bring in some *apriori* categories, which is not warranted by their method. The Logical Positivists plea for declaring the subjective terms ('I', 'Mine' etc.) as meaningless does not solve the problem at all, it avoids it sullenly. The difficulties are still greater when a comparison is tried in between a proposition, and a fact belonging to the past, or referring to the experience of others. "Mr. Jamali has a pain in his right leg." The verification of this statement would perhaps consist in seeing Mr. Jamali making faces, holding his leg by his hands, limping while walking or grunting once a while. The meaning of such a proposition would never be clear to me, for how on earth can I 'compare' the pain in others experience with the statement of pain. If I also develop the same kind of pain in my right leg and can claim to Mr. Jamali's satisfaction, that now, I understand the meaning of the statement that 'he has got a pain in his right leg,' then too I can only verify 'my statement' with 'my experience,' but never will that of Mr. Jamali's. Even if this verification is granted, or is made possible by some sort of verbal trick it would ultimately lead to a solipsistic position, and as a matter of fact it does lead to it. The only difficulty is that it can not be said. "What solipsism means is quite true only it cannot be said."¹⁹

This Wittgensteinian adherence to facts, and all the attempts to picture them in propositions, seemed to be too much orthodox, and too weak, for the purpose of anti-metaphysicists. It also could not solve the problem, by making a rigid distinction between atomic facts, and propositions. Actually all the difficulties of Lockian correspondence theory presented themselves, only in a new form. Hence Carnap thought it fit to do away with all the references

¹⁸ Moritz Schilick, "Facts and Propositions", in Margaret Macdonald (ed), *Philosophy and Analysis*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1954

¹⁹ Maurice Cornforth, *Science Vs. Idealism, ab. cit.*, p. 148.

to facts, all together. It was a second and bold step to avoid the problem completely, by claiming all questions about reality as wrong questions.

Neurath, Hempel, and Carnap, at one time believed that propositions must not be confronted with facts. One can never compare reality with propositions and sentences. It is the same position which Schilick had once adopted against Wittgenstein. Hempel maintained that the system we call true "may only be characterized by the historical fact, that it is the system which is actually adopted by mankind, and especially by the Scientists of our cultural circle."

But this type of philosophy actually leads us no where. The whole argument about the acceptance of a system by the mankind of a particular culture is circular. Because in order to know that a particular system is adopted by the scientists of a particular culture, it is necessary to know that "All sentences in a given system are accepted by the scientists of a particular culture" is accepted by a particular culture. This in its turn depends whether this acceptance of the scientists is accepted by the scientists of a particular culture. This is manifestly circular, and can establish no significant conclusion.

The obvious defect of the Carnap's method is this, that they have lost sight of the difference between the basis of mathematical, and empirical truth, and ultimately turned philosophy into a grand but extreme subjectivism, where we are told to shut our eyes, from the objective world, and to believe that whatever we say has no non-linguistic causes, and non linguistic effects. Now we are not to understand the world, but only sentences, and the syntactical rules governing them. Kant was modest to claim that metaphysics is impossible, Hume was sane enough to deny the existence of substance, but here all the assertions of all the philosophers are declared nonsense, and all the questions wrong save those of logical positivists.

On the whole the philosophy of Logical Positivism is beset with three drawbacks. Firstly by its very way of treatment it looses in substance. Logical Positivists go on talking to find that they are talking on nothing. All the grandeur of meaning of terms, of syntactical rules, of physical language, and of inter subjective verification, when developed to its utmost, one finds with dismay that the actual thing vanishes. It is like a continuous sharpening of one's knife till nothing is left.

The second drawback is of problem blindness. All the living and real issues of philosophy are very conveniently declared "nonsense" "absurd" or "senseless." "Most propositions and questions," says Wittgenstein, "that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We cannot therefore answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language."²⁰

Thirdly there is a danger of pursuing pseudo-problems instead of the actual problems of philosophy, simply because the perinreal problems have been treated with prejudice and declared unlawful and illegitimate.

In fact any philosophy that shuts its eyes from the concrete facts of reality and tries to indulge in fruitless linguistic quibbles cannot keep for a long time the human yearning for the knowledge of the reality. This age is an age of crisis. The classical metaphysical systems seem to have exhausted their possibilities, and the maglomaina of technological progress has found its way into the field of philosophy as well. The question for a methodology of philosophy which the father of modern philosophy Descartes started three hundred years ago, because he was tired with the subtleties of scholastic philosophy, has turned itself into an elaborate and complicate system of technology, with the irony that Descartes did formulate the rules to find *the truth* which he believed worth searching, while the case here is totally different. Here the "Ideas are definitions of operations, plans of action, not the mere flow of phenomena in the subjective consciousness; and this development, known as the instrumental theory of knowledge, is in fact a theory of Technology as well. The quest for certainty with which the age began is thus brought to a new stage by the answer that secular values can only be realized by perfecting methods of inquiry and action... it is the answer that the knowledge of most worth is the knowledge of technique by which values can be reached or restored."²¹

Or as Vahinger says, "we may compare it (thinking) with calculations or with the performance of a machine, we cannot uphold the ordinary view that thought is an end in itself; thought serves something else, and all its particular

²⁰ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, Harcourt Brace & Co. Inc.

²¹ Richard D. Mosier, *The American Temperament*, University of California Press, 1952, p. 300.

functions are to be regarded from the point of view of mechanical means of thought.

This mechanical and technological conceptions of thought, of whose Logical Positivism is one of the expressions is so much alien to the very nature of man, that apart from being a self contradictory system, it leaves human self in a total void. That is why a return to self—to concrete experience and to reality would seem to be the first requirement. Any knowledge which is not related to self is contingent and inessential. The essential and real knowledge is provided by the ego only by a process of *participation* in the reality, where the possibility of perceiving a *gestalt* is open. The logical positivist is keenly searching for truth, but forgets that it is he who is doing so. He does not take into account himself, the searcher of truth at all. If truth is to be searched out by somebody, that somebody cannot be ignored in order to assure that the search is a success. The logical positivist should have, therefore, put such questions to himself before undertaking his quest for truth:

"Why should I set out in search of truth at all. Why do I desire the real? What for is it wanted by me ? Am I equipped with the necessary capacity to search for truth ? If so what is the nature of that capacity and how can I make the least use of it to achieve my object ? Are there any factors which may interfere with the proper functioning of this capacity ? If there are such factors what is their nature ? What should I do to assure that they do not interfere with my capacity to search for truth? If there are no such factors what is the cause of the vast differences of opinion among human beings about the nature of truth."

But he does not answer any of these questions and yet he embarks on his great adventure which has for its object the search for truth. He is like a man who sets out with an enthusiastic desire to buy some valuables but leaves his bag of money at home. He does not realise (and we are indebted to Iqbal for drawing our attention forcefully to this simple but significant fact) that man himself is the most important factor in his search for truth and he must not therefore ignore himself. The nature of self is the key to the knowledge of truth and the mystery of the universe:

هستی و نیستی از دیدن و نادیدن من

چه زمان و چه مکان شوخی افکار من است

Logical Positivism is not a philosophy because it does not go far enough in its search for wisdom. It finishes just where philosophy ought to begin because the common man does not happen to be intellectually competent to go ahead. The logical positivist is like one of the non-Euclidian Geometrician who makes a number of wrong assumptions and then builds a fine geometrical system upon them. But when the foundations of an intellectual construction are wrong it must go wrong up to the top, no matter how beautifully it is built after the foundations are laid:

خشت اول چون نهد معمار کج

تا ثریا می رود دیوار کج

BOOK REVIEWS

Islam in Modern History

Professor Wilfred C. Smith's book *Islam in Modern History*²² is a study of the new trends in the world of Islam and, as the author states, seeks to present "a view beneath the surface of events, providing insight into the tension between faith and history in the Islamic world."

It begins with the succinct observation that "The Muslim Community in our day, like the rest of mankind, is in a serious transition. What distinguishes it is that its members face the perplexities and opportunities of modernity as heirs of a unique tradition. Their society is characterized by a faith, Islam, and a great past." The book is an endeavour to study "what is happening to the community and to the faith" (The sequence "Community and the faith" is important, for throughout the discussion problems of community receive precedence over those of the faith).

The book is divided into eight chapters. In the first chapter the author presents his own understanding of the Islamic faith, as the Muslims profess it, and its relation to history. The second chapter gives a bird's eye view of the present day cultural movements in the world of Islam and a survey of the modern intellectual trends which, from beneath the surface, are moulding the destiny of the Muslims at present. In the next five chapters an attempt is made to study the problems and prospects of Islam in certain specific regions *viz.* Arabs, Turkey, Pakistan, India and other countries. In the last chapter the author gives his concluding observations about the present and the future of Islam.

Professor Smith realizes that "Islam for Muslims is not an abstract idea but an idea in operative practice". He sums up his estimation of Islam as "a faith expressed not primarily in a system of ideas, but in a system of life, a community and its ways". And it is, according to him, this characteristic of Islam which makes history decisive for Muslims.

"The fundamental *malaise* of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic history. The fundamental problem of modern

²² Wilfred Centwell Smith, ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey (1957), pp. 317, \$ 6.00

Muslims is how to rehabilitate that history: to set it going again in full vigour, so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely guided society should and must. The fundamental spiritual crises of Islam in the twentieth century stems from an awareness that something is awry between the religion which God has appointed and the historical development of the world which He controls".

The response to this challenge has come forth in different forms, in different Muslim regions. Muhammed bin Abdul Wahab of Arabia, Shah Waliullah of Delhi and Jamalluddin Afghani are the three great leaders of the Muslim world who came to grips with the new challenge of our times and became the mainspring of the movement for internal reform, external defence, political revival and pan-Islamism.

The later developments followed the lines envisaged by these three basic movements. There has been a more or less continuous upsurge in the world of Islam and the new movements derived their inspiration from these mainsprings.

After a survey of this background Professor Smith discusses in detail the four contemporary trends *viz*:

- (a) *Liberalism*, the hall-mark of which is rationalistic approach towards religion, West-orientation and a liberal interpretation of Islam;
- (b) *Nationalism*, which, in the Muslim world, is being used to revitalize Islam and "has become more and more religious the more the movement has penetrated the masses";
- (c) *Apologetics*, which consists in the endeavour to prove, to oneself and to others, "that Islam is sound"; and
- (d) *Dynamism*, which he regards as "the appreciation of activity for its own sake and at the level of feeling a stirring of intense, even violent emotionalism".

After a survey of the general trends of the contemporary situation the author has presented detailed studies of the Arab World, Turkey, Pakistan and India and has substantiated his views on the above subjects by facts revealed by the case-study of these countries. Briefly stated the author holds that liberals and secularists are on the decline throughout the Muslim world

except Turkey. Although there are still many liberals, he asserts, liberalism is disappearing. Apologetics are most active in the Arab World and are achieving popularity among the Arabs because they are "a proud and sensitive people". In his opinion, two basic responses to the challenge of modernity are those of 'reviving of an ancient reality that has lapsed', and "reformation" or the "modifying of an existing one that has gone wrong". Professor Smith holds that the "former idea applies more aptly to the modern mood of other Muslims, particularly the Arabs and Indo-Pakistanis, the latter to the Turks, because "the Arab dream is that of restoration, the modern Turks consciously talk of novelty".

The author's analysis of these trends can be summed up as follows:

- (i) The modernists and secularists are losing their strength day-by-day and liberalism is no longer a vital movement. This is so because the modernists have failed to realise the difficulties which beset them in the Muslim lands. Moreover modernists have failed to present any winsome ideology and have also failed to win the support and co-operation of the people.
- (ii) The old theologians too have not fully realised the nature of the problems of the modern world and as such they too have failed to come to grips with them.
- (iii) Two new movements in the Muslim world: the Ikhwanul Muslemoon in the Arab world and Jamat-e-Islami in Pakistan emerged to offer "magnificent leadership" into "the breach left by the evermore conspicuous failure of both the modernizers and classicists".
- (iv) There has been a lot of "dynamism" in the contemporary Islamic world, but the revival has been "more ebullent than thoughtful".
- (v) Turkey has tried to adopt another line: "it has abandoned the whole concept of a specific Islamic prescription of social pattern, and have accepted a separation of religious and politico-economic institutions". Now there are again some moves to revive the traditional Islam but the author is not hopeful about their success.
- (vi) As to Pakistan, the author holds, that its establishment signified

"the emergence of Islam from the period of oppression and eclipse and the embarking on a great and glorious enterprise, the society's reimplementation of Islam in our day". He holds that Islam is a matter of life and death for Pakistan and the implementation of the idea of Islamic state is of crucial importance.

In conclusion Professor Smith observes, that Islam as a religion is alive and dynamic. "Mundane problems cannot be solved by man where ideological and moral outlook is seriously inappropriate to their solution... the direction in which Islam moves is highly relevant to all other developments". On the whole Professor Smith seems to hold that modernists and classical theologians both have failed. But the future still lies in the hands of the *'Ulama*. In his own Words:

"Our study here would suggest that Gibb is right at least for the Arab world in stating that 'the future of Islam rests where it has rested in the past'—on the orthodox *'Ulama!* But as he goes on to say, they have yet to come to grips with the modern world."

Professor Smith's book is no doubt one of the most important and most interesting books written on Islam in the west in the recent past. However, some of his opinions are formed rather hastily and without proper reference to facts. Some others, we regret to observe, suffer from bias and lack of objectivity.

The author is not correct, for example, when he says that Islam is "a faith expressed not primarily in a system of ideas but in a system of life, a Community and its ways". Islam, undoubtedly attaches great importance to action, but it is fundamentally a system of ideas or an ideology which embodies an outlook on life and creates a set of norms and values. The first essential for an individual, who enters the fold of Islam, is to believe in this system of ideas. Action comes only next to belief. Islam, therefore, cannot be identified with what those who call themselves Muslims think or do. According to the Holy Qur'an if the existing community of Muslims were to give up their devotion to Islam, God will raise another community of Muslims who will be devoted to the *deep* and willing to serve it whole heartedly.

Again, the author has not understood the significance and the ultimate direction of changes actually going on in the Muslim world of today. It is true

that there is still a good deal of tension among the Muslims between what the writer denotes as "Modernism" and "traditionalism", but thanks to the creative vision of Iqbal and some other thinkers of Islam, this tension is already in the process of being completely resolved. The view is beginning to prevail that true Islam, as passed on to the Community by the prophet and his immediate followers, is perfectly in accord with all that is best and noblest—whether it is much or little—in the modern civilization. The Muslim Community, as a whole, is more definite in its attitude towards the west, more confident of its ideological stand point and more certain of its future today than it was in 1946 when professor Gibb wrote his *Modern Trends in Islam*.

Professor Smith dislikes Islam's insistence on a "system" and dubs it as "formalism". It is unfortunate that he does not realize that every ideology has its own form consisting of its institutions and an ideological Community lives up to the spirit of its ideology as long as it sticks to its form. The abandonment of the form of an ideology and the abandonment of its spirit and moral essence come so closely together that no one can say which of them came first. In fact the moment the form of an ideology is abandoned its spirit also disappears. It is not a mere chance that the weakening of the habit of Church-going in the West has synchronized with a proportionate weakening of morals.

The author's understanding of Iqbal seems to be very superficial. It is difficult for a western scholar accustomed to read systematized philosophies of western thinkers to grasp fully the philosophical hints of a poet-seer like Iqbal. The author asserts at one place that "Iqbal is so contradictory and unsystematic that it is difficult to assess him." And as an example of the "contradictory and unsystematic" views of Iqbal he refers to his being "a soofi who attacked soofism and perhaps the liberal who attacked liberalism." It is not clear why he thinks that a sufi has no right to attack what he thinks is not true sufism and why a liberal should not tell the world what are the real demands of true liberalism. If Iqbal is not a sufi or a liberal of a particular type—the one which the author has in mind—it can hardly be an indication that he is self-contradictory or unsystematic. The author no doubt requires a deeper and a more thorough-going study of Iqbal. Unfortunately the book is not, on the whole, a fully objective analysis of the Islamic panorama. Instead,

the missionary thinking of Dr. Smith seethes between the lines and tells adversely on the scientific value of the book.

K. A.

Literature on Iqbal

In the present age of specialization bibliographies serve a useful purpose in promoting research. Without bibliographies a research scholar is seriously handicapped for a good deal of his time is wasted in wandering about in search of relevant material.

We are at present far behind other nations of the world in the field of research. Lack of adequate library facilities, absence of good bibliographies, etc. are no doubt some of the factors responsible for our backwardness in this field. Even regarding Islamic and Pakistani subjects, we hardly possess any good bibliographies. The work under review compiled under the auspices of the Iqbal Academy is a remarkable exception.²³

This two-hundred page annotated bibliographical essay attempts to introduce all available works, articles, etc. of Iqbal and on Iqbal, in different eastern as well as western languages. The book opens with a chapter which throws light on Iqbal's prose writings and poetic compositions, as well as on his unfulfilled literary plans. The subsequent chapters throw light on Iqbal in his various capacities-as a poet, as a thinker and as an active participant in the politics of the sub-continent. The book concludes with a chapter which introduces works on Iqbal, written particularly in foreign languages, either by way of translation of Iqbal or by way of Iqbal's introduction, exposition and criticism. This chapter also mentions in brief the new bibliographical works so far published on the subject.

This bibliography is the work of learned assiduous scholar, the late Qazi Ahmad Mian Akhtar Junagarhi, who has left behind a number of books which testify to his sincere devotion to learning and his capacity for serious research. Through this annotated bibliography, which appears to be fairly comprehensive on the subject, Akhtar Junagarhi has rendered a valuable service to the cause of learning in this country. His labour is all the more praiseworthy because in our country this is almost a pioneering work in the

²³ Qazi Ahmad Mian Akhtar, Junagarhi, IQBALIYAT KA TANQIDI JA'ZAH Iqbal Academy, Karachi: 1955, pages 102-price Rs. 3/-.

field of bibliography—compilation. The formal and printing of the work, however, leaves room for improvement.

Z. I. A.

Letters of Iqbal

It is well said that letters are the true mirror of the personality of their writer. It is in letters that the real *man*, shorn of all artificial masks, speaks and unveils his personality. That is why letters of great men have always been read with profound interest. They provide a window on the life and character of the writer.

Several volumes of Iqbal's letters have been published during the last so many years. Most important of them is the compilation, *Iqbal Nama*, edited by Shaikh Ataullah. Now a valuable contribution to this literature has been made by Syed Nazir Niyazi²⁴ who has compiled *one hundred eightytwo* letters of Iqbal, all of which, except two, were written to him by the great sage of the East. Mr. Niyazi has also added profuse notes to throw light upon the background of the points discussed in the letters.

Many of the letters, in this compilation, relate to matters connected with Iqbal's illness and his treatment. Although such letters have little literary value, but they show the perseverance with which Iqbal lived and the way he braced the soul-rendering disease which afflicted him.

A unique characteristic of Iqbal's letters is that they always contain some very valuable comments on social, religious and philosophical topics. In his letters Iqbal used to discuss even very intricate problems in a very simple way. That is why his letters sparkle with gems of wisdom rolled over here, there and everywhere. The book under review also contains a large number of such random thought-pearls.

About *Tasannuf*, Iqbal makes the succinct observation that it is not meant for study or reportage: *it is something that should be lived.*

"By reading books and making historical researches nothing can be gained in this field. Neither the author of such books, nor the readers thereof can derive real benefit from such studies." (p. 10)

²⁴ "MAKTUBAT-I-IQBAL" edited by Syed Nazir A. Niyazi, Iqbal Academy, Karachi, 1957, pages 372, price Rs. 5/8-.

In a letter Iqbal discusses his approach to the study and interpretation of the Qur'an. He says that in his lectures he has confined himself to the explicit and the commonly understood meaning of the words of the Holy Book. He warns against the artificial interpretation of the Qur'an and asserts that the Holy Prophet himself used to take the Qur'anic words in their ordinary simple meaning and did not resort to far-fetched interpretations (*ta'weel*)". (p. 44)

Somewhere in 1934 an Anti-God society was formed in Aligarh. This event so perturbed Iqbal that he could not sleep throughout the night. (p. 202). This is an index of the philosopher's passionate desire to see a spiritual order prevail in the world.

Some important observations have been made by Iqbal in respect of the new liberal movement of Turkey. About Khalida Adeb Khanam's discourses on Modern Turkey and its approach to Islam he says that they betray a shallowness that is common among western writers on Islam. He has also complained of narrowness of her vision and her lack of understanding of the revolutionizing role of the Qur'an and of the Prophet of Islam in the cultural conflict of the East and the West. (p. 250)

These and other similar observations of Iqbal add to the value of his letters and help the reader in understanding the mind and thought of the great philosopher-poet of the east.

A.A..