IQBAL REVIEW

Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan

October 1975

Editor

Muhammad Moizuddin

IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

Title	:	Iqbal Review (October 1975)
Editor	:	Muhammad Moizuddin
Publisher	:	Iqbal Academy Pakistan
City	:	Karachi
Year	:	1975
Classification (DDC)	:	105
Classification (IAP)	:	8U1.66V12
Pages	:	85
Size	:	14.5 x 24.5 cm
ISSN	:	0021-0773
Subjects	:	Iqbal Studies
	:	Philosophy
	:	Research

Table of Contents

Volume: 16 **Iqbal Review: October 1975** **Number: 3**

EUROPE'S CRISIS OF BELIEF*

M. Hadi Hussain

One of the main objectives that inspired Sayyid Ahmad Khan's religious writings was to save the Muslims of India from a crisis of belief similar to the one experienced by the Christians of Europe in modern times It was, therefore, only natural for him to acquire some knowledge of the European crisis, at least enough for him to draw useful lessons from it. Although he never claimed or acknowledged it explicitly, there can be little doubt that he did do so. There are clear indications in his writings, such as references to modern European works on different aspects of Christianity. Apart from that, it is only reasonable to assume that a man, as avid for knowledge as he was, he must have utilised his association with Europeans, especially missionaries and scholars among them, to learn from them all he could on a subject of such vital interest to him. It will, therefore, help towards a better understanding of Sayyid Ahmad's religious ideas if we preface our discussion of them with a broad survey of the development of Christian religious thought in modern times, highlighting important landmarks in the struggle of Christianity against new scientific discoveries and philosophical ideas.

The doctrinal system of Christianity, whose foundations were laid by the scholars of the first five centuries, was built up into an imposing edifice by the Scholastics of the thirteenth. So strong and solid was this edifice that it stood foursquare to all winds of change until the seventeenth century. From the standpoint of the art and science, the learning, thought and belief of the times, it was the acme of perfection — so comprehensive that it seemed to leave out nothing but unimportant details of man's individual and social life, so logical that once its premises were accepted, there was no escape from its conclusions. It had been through many ordeals, such as the controversies of the early centuries over the nature of Christ and the Trinity, the ignorance, superstition and monasticism of the Middle Ages and, above all, the

---

* Being a chapter of the writer's forthcoming book: *Say yid Ahmad Khan: Missionary of Muslim Progress*.

onslaught of Islam. From each of them it had gained something, not least from Islam; for if Islam had wrested some territory and followers from Christendom, it had in return restored to it its lost heritage of Greek learning. The Renaissance of the fifteenth century, for all its adventures in secularism and humanism and its enlargement of the Europeans' intellectual horizons, left the broad structure of Christian doctrine intact. So did the Reformation of the sixteenth century, despite its revolutionising the organisation of the Christian Church.

The basic tenet of the Christian doctrinal system that held the field until the seventeenth century was that the Old and the New Testaments were the Word of God and, therefore, inerrant, final and unquestionable. Although the two Testaments had been heavily expurgated, their surviving text had all along been officially interpreted in a strictly literal manner, all attempts at reducing it to a rational narrative and philosophy with the aid of allegory having been severely condemned. Thus interpreted, it had been elaborated into a dogmatic scheme which, with the addition of Aristotelian science and Augustinian theology, constituted the Christian scheme of things in its entirety — its cosmology, its eschatology, its ethics, its *Weltanschauung*.

Under this scheme of things the Christians believed in a personal God conceived in anthropomorphic terms, who dwelt in a place called Heaven somewhere above the visible sky, from where He ruled the universe with a hierarchy of angels to give effect to His commands. They also believed in a personal Devil named Satan, a rebellious angel,' who had been expelled from Heaven and who had then avenged him-self by tempting Adam, the first man, God's chosen creature, to commit sin by eating of a forbidden fruit. For this, man's original sin, Adam had been exiled from Paradise to earth, where his progeny, mankind, was spending a life of toil and misery, torn between the forces of good commanded by God and His angels and the forces of evil commanded by Satan and his host of infernal creatures. In order to extricate man from this unhappy predicament, redeem him from the sin that is in him, save him from the fire of Hell and enable him to gain entry to Paradise, God had sent to earth His own son, Jesus Christ, who was in a sense God Himself in human guise. By suffering death on the cross for establishing the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, Jesus had completed his mission, and he had entrusted his Church with the work of saving souls until his Second Coming, which would be on Judgment Day, when God would award rewards and punishments to men for their deeds according as they had

or had not obeyed His commandments as interpreted by the Church. That would be the final act of the drama begun with the creation of the world by God in a week of six working days roughly four thousand years before the Christian era. The central theme of that drama, the epitome of all history, was the birth, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. There was no room in this system for the world of nature and temporal history except as a setting for the life of the Church, a life governed by miracles and supernatural events, to which the concepts of reason, probability and law were entirely alien. Nor was there any room in it for an organised body of verified knowledge, which, in fact, did not exist in those days in Europe any more than it did anywhere else.

Until the middle of the sixteenth century the only body of know-ledge in Europe outside the Scriptures and ecclesiastical writings was that derived from the Greek and Latin classics. Together they formed a curious hodge-podge of fact and fable, reason and superstition, truth and hocus-pocus, best illustrated by the so-called science of alchemy. In the earlier centuries only a few isolated attempts had been made to break out of these traditional bounds and explore the realms of nature and mind in a spirit of free inquiry. These had been made by devout Christians, often clergymen or monks or friars, such as Francis (1182-1226) and Roger Bacon (1214-1294), who had been largely influenced by the science and philosophy of the Arabs and who had undertaken the study of God's manifestations in the physical world and in the mind of man as a religious duty, a kind of intellectual crusade. The real beginning was made in the latter part of the fifteenth century. The pioneers were men like the Italian explorer and discoverer of America Columbus (1446?-1506), the Italian painter, sculptor, architect, scientist, natural philosopher and musician Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), the Dutch theologian and humanist Erasmus (1466?-1506), the Polish astronomer Copernicus (1473-1541), the German-Swiss physician and alchemist Paracelsus (1493?-1541), the German botanist Fuchs (150'-1566), the Flemish anatomist Vesalius (1514-1564), and soon after these a whole host of naturalists, biologists, botanists and anatomists.

The discovery of the New World by Columbus in 1492 exposed the incompleteness of biblical and classical geography. Leonardo, a universal genius, who in his eagerness to understand, grasp and re-create everything experimented in many fields, represented the thirst of his age for a more intimate knowledge of the world of sense-perception than was afforded by

the traditional learning of the Church. His experiments marked the transition from superstitious belief and magic to verified knowledge. Erasmus, the patron saint of Christian humanism, combined with his loyalty to the Church as an ordained priest a gusto for pagan literature and thought. His writings on religious questions were characterised by a rational rather than a doctrinal or sacramental approach, and he preached tolerance and free thought. Copernicus advanced a heliocentric theory of the universe, which demoted the earth from the position of cosmic centre to that of a minor planet revolving around the sun. As a corollary of this theory, man, lord of the earth, no longer remained the hero of the whole cosmic drama — a role which the mythology of the Church, based as it was on the geocentric theory of the Greeks, had assigned him. Paracelsus, trying to unravel the secrets of nature in his search after God, practised the ancient art of alchemy in the frame of mind of a modern scientist, although with the fervour of a mystic. According to him, God manifested Himself in nature as a mighty force of destiny and could be experienced through a process of adjustment to nature's laws as they operated in the animal world, in inanimate matter and in the human mind. The naturalists, botanists, biologists and anatomists revealed facts about plant and animal life and about the human body which were different from those made popular by Church authority and booklore.

Of a more fundamental importance to the advancement of knowledge than the discoveries made by these men was the inductive method of drawing inferences devised by the English philosopher, essayist and statesman Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Believing that correct generalisations could be reached only after a large number stressed the necessity of collecting of experiments, he personal observation and verification. about natural phenomena by systematisation of scientific procedure.

He was thus a pioneer in the these early inquirers, however, were not rebels against the Church, intent upon discrediting its age-old teachings. They were believing Christians, who addressed themselves to the investigation of the corporeal world with the object of furthering the work of the Church in interpreting the meaning of God's creation and adding to the Church's store of knowledge. For them, therefore, the accounts of Scripture, the speculations of the early Fathers, the Medieval scholars and the Greek philosophers and the results of their own investigations were all equally valid data for the formulation of new theories. Bacon, for example, reached a practical compromise by making a sharp distinction theology and philosophy.

The former, he held, must be derived between the Word of God and not from the light of nature or the dictates of reason; and the Word of God, he asserted, must be believed, even if it shocked reason.

The seventeenth century witnessed the definite beginning of modern scientific thought with the steady march of astronomy and physics from Copernicus to Newton. The intervening stages were the discoveries of three men, namely, the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), the German astronomer and mathematician Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), and the Italian astronomer and physicist Galileo (1564-1642), all of whom confirmed the truth of the Copernican theory. The greatest of them was Galileo, who, with the help of a telescope he had himself made, observed the stars and planets in the Milky Way and found that they obeyed Copernicus's laws. His most important contribution to the scientific outlook, however, was his analysis of the ideas of motion and inertia. He maintained that a terrestrial body, once moved, continued in a straight .ine unless interfered with. This ran counter to the theory of Aristotle that bodies were set and kept in motion by a mover which did not itself move, namely, God. Galileo held that even if God was the initial mover, once He had despatched a body on its way, it went on moving for ever independently of Him. These revolutionary ideas were stubbornly opposed by the Church. While Copernicus had escaped punishment by declaring that his finding was only a hypothesis, Galileo was condemned by the Inquisition, first privately in 1616, and then publicly in 1633; on the latter date, however, he recanted and promised never again to say that the earth rotates or revolves. Kepler was not so fortunate and was persecuted by the Theological Faculty of the University of Tubingen, in spite of his going into mystical ecstasies over the celestial bodies and calling the sun God the Father. Even less fortunate was the Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno (1548?-1600), who was burnt at the stake by the Inquisition for championing the Copernican theory and believing in a plurality of universes, although he declared that they had all been created by God.

Newton, with his synoptic genius, synthesised into a single system the theories of Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler and Galileo, thus completing the mechanics of the heavenly bodies whose foundations had been laid by these pioneers. He formulated a Universal Principle of Gravitation, namely, that every particle of matter attracts every other particle with a force varying directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance.. This grand generalisation embraced all the physical phenomena of the universe, which

now became a calculable machine in which the heavenly bodies obeyed the earthly law of gravity. This ended the centuries-old dichotomy between the heavens and the earth, and marked the triumph of naturalism over supernaturalism and of understandable laws over inscrutable mysteries in interpreting the workings of the cosmos.

In giving shape to this mechanistic world-picture philosophy worked hand in hand with science. The French philosopher, mathematician, astronomer and physicist Rend Descartes (1596-1650) evolved a method of reasoning which aimed at making deductions about the truth of things with the certainty of mathematical axioms. Dismissing all pre-conceptions, such as the assumptions of the Schoolmen, he adopted what he called the method of doubt, what involved the provisional denial of whatever was not clearly and distinctly apprehended as true. Whatever, he declared, was so apprehended was in fact true. The one indubitable proposition, according to him, was Cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am"). Having thus established the existence of the thinking self, he proceeded to deduce there from the existence of God. Ideas which were clearly and distinctly apprehended, he argued, could have emanated only from a perfect being, as they were perfect ideas; and since the thinking self was conscious of its own imperfection, that perfect being must be other than it: in other words, it must be God. A corollary of God's perfection was that He had established certain infallible laws in nature and impressed them upon men's minds. In this way Descartes established a new trinity, that of nature, reason and truth, parallel to the Christian Trinity. Although he personally escaped punishment for this mechanistic heresy, his works were officially condemned by the Roman Catholic Church and placed on its Index Expurgatorius (index of banned books), after his death.

The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) went a step further than Descartes in his opposition to supernaturalism: he extended the application of the mechanistic explanation of Descartes and Galileo from physical phenomena to the whole of reality. His thought thus assumed the extreme form of materialism, according to which matter and motion were the only ultimate realities, even human know-ledge being only a product of pressure exerted by matter on the sense-organs. Although he did not deny the existence of God, he asserted that man could have no idea of Him.

It was in the writings of the Dutch philosopher Spinoza (1632-1677) that the naturalism and rationalism characteristic of modern thought found

full expression for the first time. He challenged the Medieval notion of a capricious and despotic God, attributed the belief in miracles to ignorance, and insisted that the Scriptures must be submitted to the same kind of critical examination as any other historical documents He preached tolerance and propounded a universal religion in which Christianity was only one of numerous cults. God and man, be maintained, were alike controlled by nature's immutable laws, and man's duty to himself lay in realising his union with nature. Just as nature's laws were capable of being stated definitely, the principles of ethics could be demonstrated with the same precision as the propositions of Euclidean geometry. Although his philosophy is dominated by the idea of God, he was, curiously enough, regarded by his contemporaries as an atheist.

The philosophy of the German philosopher and mathematician Leibniz (1646-1716), who was a devout Christian and at the same time a daring thinker, aimed at unifying the religious and scientific outlooks of his time. According to him, material objects had no objective reality and were only appearances within the experience of what he called monads These monads were self-contained atoms of consciousness, the highest in intensity and range being God, the "monad of monads," Who had created the other monads and endowed them with a permanent harmony with one another. It was as if a supremely skilful clock-maker had made and set innumerable clocks to keep time together. This was a compromise between the teleological and mechanistic views of the universe, motivated by a desire to bridge the gap between the emergent materialism of the age and the supernaturalism of Christian belief.

The English philosopher John Locke (1632.1704), the founder of empiricism, held that all knowledge is derived from experience through impressions made on our sense organs by external objects, which the mind combines into ideas. Our sensations are copies of certain primary qualities of objects, but not of certain other qualities which the mind attributes to them subjectively. The result is that we can have no knowledge of real existence, that is, of substances, whether bodies or souls. The only ideas we have outside our sense-experience are those of our own existence, the existence of God and the truths of mathematics and logic. Because of these limitations of human knowledge, and the consequent indefiniteness of our beliefs and opinions, he opposed dogmatism in both religion and science. Locke's theory of knowledge was interpreted by his disciples as a mechanistic explanation of

the working of the mind, which he himself perhaps never intended it to be.

Although these scientists and philosophers, with the exception of Hobbes, hedged their theories with qualifications, which were concessions to orthodox theology, the scientific outlook, in its mechanistic form, gained ground as time passed. By the end of the seventeenth century it had fully established its dominion over the European mind while God, a mysterious First Cause, remained the supreme ruler of the universe, ruling it in accordance with certain laws made by Him, the laws became capable of being ascertained by observation and experiment, understood with the aid of reason, and stated in physical terms with the certitude and precision of mathematical equations. The universe became a huge clock and God a divine clock-maker.

There was also to be noticed an incipient trend towards atheistic thinking. An important representative of it was the French Huguenot Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), who was a severe critic of biblical literalism, belief in miracles, blind conformity and religious bigotry. He declared that atheism was not inconsistent with good morals.

The Irish Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753) spearheaded eighteenth-century philosophy's attack on the materialistic tendencies in thinking generated by the theories of Newton and Locke. He denied the existence of matter and held that material objects exist only through being perceived and that, when not perceived by man, they continue to exist in the mind of God, Who is all-perceiving.

To the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) nothing seemed to be real except a flux of unconnected impressions and ideas to which habitual association gives an illusory appearance of causal connection. His was a philosophy of scepticism which doubted the existence of everything, whether body or spirit, substance or idea. In a treatise entitled *Essay on Miracles* he expressed the opinion that there could never be adequate evidence for such supernatural occurrences.

The German philosopher Kant (1724-1804) attempted to bridge the gulf between the subjective and the objective. According to him, the mind possesses certain forms of intuition and certain *a priori* concepts ("categories"), which it adds to the materials it receives from the outer world through the senses, thus transforming the materials into experience. Such experience is all the knowledge the mind possesses of the outer world: it cannot know "°things-in-themselves". There are, however, certain innate

ideas, certain "ideas of reason," which are not acquired through such experience, e.g. the ideas of God, free will and immortality. But, although they are conceived by the mind with the aid of pure reason, the faculty through which it acquires all knowledge of the outer world, their reality cannot be proved by it. For such proof man has to rely upon another faculty, namely, practical reason, which postulates these ideas as "categorical imperatives" of morality. Kant thus justified religious faith as a prerequisite of good morals. The seed of materialism sown by Hobbes yielded a rich harvest in both Britain and France. The English philosopher Toland (1670-1721) maintained that matter is an active substance and mind nothing but one of its functions. The associationist psychology of the English philosopher Hartley (1704-1757) was virtually a branch of physiology.The English chemist and theologian Priestley (1733-1804) argued that the Christian dogma of God's omnipresence was untenable without assuming His materiality. Most of the French Philosophers were blatant materialists. La Mettrie (1709-1751) asserted that plants, animals and men are different stages of one evolutionary process and that man is a clock that winds up its own springs and, therefore, needs no divine clock-winder. Helvétius (1715-1771), concerning himself mainly with the social uses of philosophy, taught that self-love is the mainspring of all human activity and that everything that promotes the public welfare is legitimate and permissible. D'Holbach (1723-1789) described Christianity as a "sacred contagion" and preached that there are only atoms, gravity and the attraction and repulsion of things. Cabanis (1757-1808) regarded body and soul as identical, described man as nothing but a bundle of nerves, and held that the brain secrets thought just as the liver secretes bile.

Eighteenth-century science made rapid strides in many fields — observational and mathematical astronomy, physics (heat, sound, magnetism and electricity), chemistry, descriptive and systematic biology, natural history, botany, geology and medicine. The knowledge gained in these fields made further exposures of erroneous notions about the realm of nature and its laws that formed part of the Christian system of beliefs.

The theories of the new philosophers and scientists were popularised by the French *Philosophers*, just mentioned, who were a coterie of wits, literary men and journalists. Their chief work was an "Encyclopaedia," to which they gave the sub-title of "A Reasoned Dictionary of the Sciences". Its editors were Diderot (1713-1784) and d'Alembert (1717-1783). The central phrase in

their statement of objectives was "pour changer la facon commune de penser" (to change the common way of thinking). They succeeded conspicuously in achieving this objective, for the "Encyclopaedia" heralded a movement called the Enlightenment which gave its name to a whole epoch of European history. It was a declaration of the sovereignty of man's mind over the whole realm of nature and of his readiness to take command of his destiny instead of leaving it in the hands of an unknown and mysterious power. It was also a declaration of war by reason against religious prejudice, by free thought against Church authority and by innovation against tradition. A concrete outcome of the "Encyclopedia" was the French Revolution, which set up a new trinity, that of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, in supersession of the Holy Trinity of Christianity. The *Philosophers*, most of whom, as we have already indicated, were materialists, represented what has been called the low Enlightenment. They exaggerated the role of reason in the cosmic order and in human history to such an extent that they not only reduced the religious ideas of the seventeenth century to a secularised caricature, but had to invent a mechanistic eschatology to replace the Christian eschatology. The result was a new cult of liturgical occultism and puritanism whose high priest was the Jacobin leader Robespierre (1758-1794), who was ultimately executed by a people's tribunal which he had himself set up in order to purify the people's morals, or rather to offer human sacrifice at the altar of the Goddess of Reason, equated with the Supreme Being.

The leaders of the high Enlightenment were two men of a cast different from these men and from each other, namely, the philosopher, historian, wit, satirist, story-writer and dramatist Voltaire (1694-1778) and the philosopher and social theorist Rousseau (1712-1778). Voltaire preached a humanistic deism, consisting in a simple faith which would ensure the freedom and happiness of each individual. Such a faith, he explained, would have its source in reason, would need no organised Church, and would be reflected in the virtues of justice and compassion. Although he died protesting his belief in God, Voltaire was misunderstood to be an atheist on account of his anti-clericalism. Rousseau, while he shared both Voltaire's belief in God and his opposition to the ecclesiastic establishment, expounded a natural religion, which, according to him, had been embodied by God in the Book of Nature and was revealed by Him directly to each individual through his heart. The basic tenet of this religion was that man in his natural state was good — a

tenet which ran counter to the Christian doctrine of Original Sin. One could be virtuous only by following the model of the "noble savage," who was sincere to his feelings and was not misguided by reason, which is essentially selfish and the enemy of religion and morality. This, however, was a discordant note in the Enlightenment's fanfare in glorification of reason.

With the Enlightenment's belief in the omnipotence of reason — in its capacity to unveil all the secrets of nature to man and put him in command of its forces —went a belief in the perfectibility of man and in his capacity for unlimited progress. History was seen as a continuous ascent rather than a decline or a seesaw or a movement on a single plane. Man had regained his central position in the universe, from which he had been deposed by the astronomy of the seventeenth century. Indeed, he was now the potential master of an infinitely vaster universe than that in which the Scriptures had placed him, a universe whose God, if there was one, existed only to serve man's ends and was not, in any case, a capricious despot, but a rational being governing His dominion in accordance with certain fixed and intelligible laws. What man needed to make his mastery effective was more scientific knowledge and technique, better education than the outmoded learning patronised by the Church, and a society organised and run under rational laws.

The most influential exponent of this outlook was Helvetius, who wove around his theme of self-love as the main motivating force behind all human actions a scheme for the reorganisation of society through legislation and education aimed at achieving the maximum well-being and happiness of human beings. This euphoria of confidence in human powers continued into the nineteenth century and found expression anew in the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham (1748-1832) and his school.

As regards religion, while the masses, unaffected by the changed climate of opinion, and the higher classes, sharing with the Church an interest in preserving time-honoured privileges, remained practising Christians, the new intellectual and cultural elites, forerunners of the industrial middle classes, were for the most part hostile, or at any rate indifferent, to Christianity. When not frankly irreligious — atheists, sceptics or agnostics — they invented pseudo- or quasi-religions of their own. Some of them were coldly rationalistic, others mystical with a vague warmth of feeling: a common feature of all of them was anti' clericalism and emphasis upon a lay morality as a substitute for the Christian code of conduct. Three examples of these

surrogate religions have already been mentioned, namely, Voltaire's humanistic deism, Rousseau's cult of the noble savage, and Robespierre's liturgy of the Supreme Being. Two other examples are worth citing. One is the utopian socialism of the French nobleman Count Claude de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), according to which the Church was to be organised as a technocracy in order to put the Gospel into practice in industry for the benefit of the poor.

Another example is the Religion of Humanity propounded by the French positivist philosopher Comte (1798-1857) with its church of scientists consecrated to the service of the *Grand Etre*, humanity, the proper object of man's devotion and worship instead of an unknown and unknowable God, remote from the daily lives of men. The scientists would promote social and economic progress by acquiring, propagating and applying scientific knowledge.

By and large, the most fashionable cult among the intellectual and cultural elites — scientists, philosophers, writers, the new bourgeoisie produced by the French Revolution — was deism, which was a natural religion based upon reason. It accepted so much of the truth of Christianity as was not in open conflict with the new scientific know-ledge and thought and was not detrimental to human progress, moral as well as material. It, however, did not subscribe to revelation as the source of such truth and maintained that reason was by itself adequate to apprehend it. The clearest exposition of deism was perhaps made by Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648), who is generally regarded as its father. He described Christianity as the highest historical form of natural religion, which latter is prehistoric and non-ecclesiastical in character; and the Bible, according to him, was a republication of the principles of natural religion, which are known to man through his reason without the aid of revelation. These principles are: that God exists, that He exists to be worshipped, that He is best worshipped by virtuous living, man can reform himself, and that there is reward for good and punishment for evil deeds after death. By saying that these principles, which form an integral part of Christian doctrine, are self-evident to man in the light of nature, Herbert swept aside the basic Christian dogma that all knowledge of God, good and evil, and life hereafter was imparted to man through the Word of God revealed in the Bible. Deism, to which Descartes' concept of the thinking self and Locke's theory of the sense-bound understanding had been misinterpreted into lending support, reached its

height in Matthew Tindal (1653-1733). Carrying Herbert's natural theology a step further, Tindal asserted that, since Christianity was only a historical embodiment of universal natural religion, which was as old as mankind, everything in its doctrines which was an addition to the principles of natural religion and which did not stand the test of reason should be dismissed as superstitious stuff introduced by the priests.

Thus, in trying to provide rational justification for Christianity, deism reduced it to a corrupt copy of the book of nature. Indeed, it made questionable the very *raison d'etre* of Christianity as a self-contained system of beliefs. While it was possible to justify some of the metaphysical and ethical ideas forming part of Christian doctrine by an appeal to reason, no such justification could plausibly be attempted with regard to those parts of that doctrine which had been squarely contradicted by the new discoveries of science. The only thing to do about them was to explain them away, that is, to show that they did not really mean what they *prima facie* seemed to mean, or that the extant record of them was not authentic and reliable. This is how what is called Higher Criticism originated. A few outstanding examples will suffice to show how the authenticity of the Gospels and even the life-story and character of Jesus Christ according to them were challenged. They are all from Germany, which took the initiative. The theologian Reimarus(d. 1814) said that Christ was nothing but a moral teacher; as regards the miracles attributed to Christ, he dismissed them as self-delusion on his part and trickery on the part of Paul. The dramatist, critic and man of letters Lessing (1729-1781), who edited and published the writings of Reimarus, held that his time was a golden age in which humanity had outgrown irrational systems of belief like Christianity; he prophesied the coming of a Third Kingdom of Enlightenment, of which, he chiliastically hinted, he might himself be the Messiah. The philosopher and theologian Schleirmacher (1768-1834) maintained that Christian theology had to be made to suit the spirit of the times and, examining the Gospels in the light of this view, found them to be a mixture of texts of different periods, interpolations and corruptions. In the opinion of the philosopher Hegel (1770-1831) Christianity, although the highest of religions, was a presentation of the truths of philosophy in the form of myths. The theologian Strauss in his *Life of Jesus* (1835) eliminated the supernatural element from the life of his subject, describing him only as a remarkable man. The theologian Baur (1702-1860), rigorously applying the criteria of literary criticism to the New Testament, reached the conclusion

that it is not a con-temporary account of the events it relates and that, therefore, it is of little historical value. Historical criticism of the Bible thus tended to destroy even the rationalised supernaturalism which was the Enlightenment's substitute for religious faith.

In England a powerful attack was launched upon the cold rationalism of the Enlightenment (and simultaneously on the soulless formalism of the Church, which was its counterpart) by the Methodist movement of John Wesley (1703-1791). The movement, which was a revival of the old-time enthusiastic evangelicalism, preached a "vital Christianity," combining a high degree of piety — Bible-reading, church-going, observance of the Sabbath Day, abstention from frivolities and vices like gambling — with a profound religious feeling and a passion for saving souls. Originally intended for the poor and the unsophisticated, the movement brought about a revival of religious living among them; but, becoming fashionable among the richer classes, it lost its vital impulse after some time. It also suffered a setback owing to a schism in its leadership. At the turn of the century, however, it re-gained its vigour under the leadership of the Clapham sect. It then addressed itself once again in right earnest to its mission of spreading the Gospel. Side by side with that and, in fact, more conspicuously, it threw itself into the humanitarian work of social and political reform. Thus, by a strange turn of events, it became an active ally of a purely rationalistic and materialistic school of thought, to wit, utilitarianism, whose aim it was to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number through rational laws and sound education. Doctrinally it was from first to last a reactinary movement, which rejected all scientific theories and intellectual ideas which were not in accord with the Scriptures literally interpreted. But by swimming against the tide it could not reverse it. Liberalism was relentlessly on the march, carrying everything before it in every field--social, political, economic, intellectual and, not least, religious.

The spirit of free inquiry that was abroad in the wake of the Enlightenment could not but influence religious thinking even in ecclesiastical circles. Before the advanced thought of Germany reached England to provide a foundation for scholarly studies of the Bible as a historical document, anti-traditional and anti-dogmatic ideas began to make their appearance in theological writings, including those of churchmen. The Oxford movement launched about the middle of the nineteenth century by some of the most powerful intellects of the time, such as Newman (1801-

1890) and Keble (1792-1866), with the object of restoring Church authority and the unquestioning acceptance of tradition and dogma met with no more success than had evangelicalism in checking the growth of liberal ideas in theology. Dramatic developments in geology, archaeology, biology and historical research made it increasingly difficult for men to retain religious faith based upon literal acceptance of everything contained in the Scriptures and in ecclesiastical traditions. Charles Lyeil (1797-1875) in his three-volume Principles of Geology (1830-33) put forward a mass of facts about the earth's surface which did not fit in with the Biblical story of the earth's sudden creation four thousand odd years before the birth of Christ. His study of the stratification of rocks pointed, instead, to a long and slow upheaval followed by denudation. Moreover, the fossils he found in the rocks ruled out the Biblical view that global catastrophes, such as Noah's flood, had repeatedly interrupted the succession of living creatures on the earth. They also contradicted their order of creation as described in Genesis. Archaeology soon followed by bringing to light in 1857 stone implements and other objects that left no room for doubt that men had lived in Great Britain when animals extinct for many thousands of years had flourished in that land and long before the time of Adam according to Mosaic chronology.

The *coup de grace* was dealt to the Biblical story of man's origin — his sudden and special creation as he is today — by Charles Darwin (1809-1882) with his *Origin of Species* (1859). In that epoch-making book he showed, on the basis of twenty years' sedulous collection and study of thousands of specimens, that man is the final product of an evolution of animal species from lower to higher forms by natural selection over millions of years. Although this theory in a way discredited the mechanistic view of the universe and by suggesting an immanent goal behind the creation of living things supported the teleological view held by Christian theology, its attack upon the literal veracity of the Bible evoked a violent opposition on the part of the Church. The opposition was led by the Bishop of Oxford, Wilberforce, the son of one of the important leaders of the evangelical revival. While the controversy over the *Origin of Species* was still in its incipient stages, seven talented churchmen brought out a volume of essays under the title of *Essays and Reviews* (1860) designed to rid Christianity of what they described as "incrustations" and calling for a restatement of Christian doctrine in consonance with the new intellectual insights. The essayists were sharply rebuked by orthodox clergymen, and two of them were officially

condemned by the Church of England's Court of Arches. At the same time they were severely criticised by positivists and secularists for not going far enough.

Popularised by advanced thinkers like the biologist Huxley (1825-1895) and the positivist philosopher Spencer (1820:-1903), Darwin's theory of evolution, along with its corollaries, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, became a part of the general thinking of the British. It was extended to many other fields of intellectual activity, such as anthropology, sociology, ethics, law, ancient history, the history of civilisation. The leaps forward made in these and other fields became tributaries to the stream of progressive thought that was increasingly eroding religious faith. At the time of Sayyid Ahmad's visit to England (1869-70) Christian thought there was in a state of turmoil. To begin with, there was a fast dwindling number of men who, unquestioningly retaining their faith in the Bible as an infallible book and in the Church as a divinely appointed authority, either remained totally indifferent to the challenge of science or resolutely defended Christianity against it, by merely denying that it had any force in it. Then, there were those who, though they experienced intense moments of honest doubt, clung to a belief in the eternal truth of Christianity and sought to rediscover that truth with the help of the new insights of science and philosophy. For them the conflict between the two was only apparent and only needed to be resolved. Then, again, there were those who felt that Christianity had outlived its day and should give way to the religion of humanity, which they conceived of as a genuine religion demanding acts of worship, but completely free from superstition and irrational beliefs. Finally, there were those who believed in a religion of duty rather than of faith, that is, in no religion in the accepted sense of the word, but in morality; some of these found a satisfactory code of morality within Christianity, while others looked for it elsewhere, the criteria in either case being those dictated by the cult of progress.

Optimistic believers in the march of mind prophesied the final triumph, in the near future, of science over religion, of reason over faith, and of free thought over dictated beliefs. But they overlooked two important factors: man's inherent need for belief in a transcendent power and the essential religious-mindedness of the common people in Britain no less than in any other country. The latter fact, indeed, was of special importance in the case of the Victorians who, with their sanguine temperaments, felt a deep-seated

need for something to believe in and were, therefore, constantly in search of something worthy of their belief When the initial glamour of material progress faded, thoughtful men began to wonder if science was by itself any more adequate than they had found religion to be and if it told the whole truth about things any more than religion did. Gradually they settled down to the acceptance of science and religion as two equally necessary and important spheres of man's life which, even if they were mutually competitive, were not mutually exclusive or contradictory. This *rapprochement* was facilitated, if not dictated, by the establishment of a working partnership between science and religion in the tasks of empire. Christianity, credited with the ability, and charged with the mission, to spread the benefits of modern civilisation, the civilisation of the West in the scientific age, was considered to be as helpful in the fulfilment of the imperial assignment as science undoubtedly was by virtue of the technological power it endowed. The dialectic of history thus enlisted Christianity in the service of its adversary, namely, secular progress through the instrumentality of reason. From being a backward-looking, tradition-bound, authority-ridden and other-worldly system of ideas and beliefs Christianity became an agency for the modernisation of outmoded societies all over the world. What was even more interesting than this metamorphosis in the character and role of Christianity was the fact that modern Western civilisation began to be described as Christian civilisation, as if it were a peculiar product of Christianity. The propagation of Christianity and the dissemination of Western institutions and ideas thus became two integral parts of the imperial assignment; they also became the dual moral justification of empire. Whether or not the builders and rulers of the colonial empires and the Christian missionaries consciously collaborated with each other — some of them, it is known, did — they never lost sight of the fact that they were partners in one great undertaking. A third partner in the undertaking was a band of Orientalists whose writings were designed to make the people of the East, especially Muslims, feel dissatisfied with their own religious and cultural systems and admire those of the West.

FACETS OF IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM*

M. Moizuddin

Islamic polity, according to Iqbal, is based on Unity of God (Tauḥīd). Hence it demands a complete loyalty to the Almighty and not to the earthly thrones. In *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Iqbal says: "It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature."[1] Iqbal thus rejects the territorial basis of nationalism. The divisions between human beings on the racial, geographical, social and economic grounds is thus merged into one whole based on the idea of unity of God, because allegiance to God is the ultimate aim of a society. Iqbal's cardinal philosophy is the philosophy of the self. But as he explains in the introduction to his poem *Asrār-i Khudī*, he uses the word, not in the ordinary or in the traditional sense, but to denote "self-awareness" or "self-determination". Thus he has given a new meaning to or dimension of the word not connotated in a general sense. This individualistic concept of Iqbal reveals the fact that earthly fear is meaningless to an upholder of the "secret of self" which gives him a noble and sublime character for the betterment of the society he lives in.

Khudī is the source and strength for life both for the individual and the society. Self-revelation with immense potentiality is a boon for the society. It preserves our history and cultural heritage.

The universe, according to McTaggart, is the association of individuals, and individuals have their meaning only if they are united together. Thus Iqbal gives the individualistic idea only to see a powerful *millat*.

---

* Read in the Seventeenth Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress, held at Lahore on 20.22 October 1975 ("Philosophy of Iqbal" section).

[1] Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore, 1967), p. 147.

فــرد قــائم ربــطِ ملّــت ســے ہے تنہــا کچــھ نہــیں
مــوج ہے دریــا مــی ں اور بیــرونِ دریــا کچــھ نہــیں

[Individuals have their strength only in Unity,

Waves have their existence only in a river; outside the river, they are reduced to nothingness.]

Thus self-affirmation leads to the highest ideals of man in society. It is strengthened by love. Love to its highest forms gives a sense of value and respect for the Creator and His creation. Through it there flows a law of mutual respect. Thus Iqbal's individualism is in complete accord with society or community. Here he is bound to the earth and does not soar to heaven.

Writing about Iqbal, Arberry says: "But he was not interested merely in the individual and his self-realization; he was equally concerned with the evolution of an ideal society, or community as he preferred to call it. It is only as a member of this community that the individual, by the twin principles of conflict and concord, is able to express himself fully and ideally; it is only as an association of self-affirming individuals that the community can come into being and perfect itself. Iqbal thus escapes from libertarianism by limiting the individual's freedom, making him a member of a homogeneous community, and from totalitarianism by limiting the community's authority, making it a challenge and not an insurmountable obstacle to the individual's self-realization."[2]

Thus the individual and the community, according to Iqbal, are complementary to each other. The individual gains strength from society while society gains respectability from individuals that are well organised.

The community, however, would be guided by the principles of justice, equity and sense of brotherhood and the strong and benevolent leadership like that the Prophet of Islam. Only in such community a verile and strong leadership will emerge which in turn will work for the common good of the common people and will further bring a healthy and congenial environment.

---

[2] A.J. Arberry, Tr., *The Mysteries of Selflessness* (Iqbal's *Rumūz-i Bekhudi*), (John Murray, London, 1953), Preface, p. xi.

In such a community, democratic forces will work and provide a greater scope for the people to participate in the affairs of the State.

Thus it is imperative that such society should evolve in which the latent power of the individual is developed; this consequently necessitates the evolution of a society having an ideal social, economic, political, moral and spiritual conditions in which individuals have the maximum scope of utilising their talents and potentialities. It is the State's responsibility to help grow such a homogeneous society. Such a society cannot grow in a vacuum. It has a territorial base. But the geographical boundary is not the end of the political aspiration of a nation; it has to convert itself into an ideal nation.

Society, for Iqbal, is not merely an association of self-affirming individuals. It is, in fact, an association of persons with a necessary bipolar dialectic. In Iqbal's society, self-denial goes along with self-affirmation. Both these opposing tendencies in individuals give rise to a higher stage of existence and it is that of social cooperation. This social cooperation issues itself in the cultural spirit of the society, in its value-structures, ethical system and common beliefs. Iqbal's *Rumūz-i Bekhudī* shows this inner structure of human society and it must be kept in mind to understand Iqbal's conception of nationalism. A word of caution must be put with regard to Iqbal's concept of self-denial. It should not be taken to mean self-annihilation or self-immolation, as is the case with some non-Islamic and Hindu philosophies, It means denying to the self. This falls short of human dignity and sublimity. Self-denial, in the true sense of the word, is *faqr*.

Contemporary nationalism, in fact, is not different from love for place and family of the ancient tribal societies. This, however, leads to parochial and racial discrimination and is opposed to the idea of the usual kinship or relationship of humanity at large. Iqbal's main source of this inspiration is the Qur'an which very explicitly exhorts people to be above race, colour, language and tribal affiliation. Therefore, Iqbal keeps the high ideals and teaching of Islam in mind and preaches for the unity of mankind. In Islam, he finds an answer to this universal brotherhood.[3]

Islam teaches that all Muslims are brothers irrespective of territorial connections, but they must identify themselves with one society. This conception of society advocated by Iqbal is erroneously called Pan-Islamism.

---

[3] Iqbal., op.cit., pp. 155-56.

It is, in fact, the true Islamic concept of universal brotherhood.

قلب ما از ہند و روم و شام نیست مرز و بوم ما بجز اسلام نیست

[Our heart is not of India, Turkey and Syria,

Our common birthplace is nothing but Islam.]

Territorial nationalism is the root of social and political evil. It has put nations against each other and has led to much suffering for humanity at large. Even Western thinkers have realised its sinister aim, whereas "Islam was from the very beginning a civil society, having received from the Qur'ān a set of simple legal principles which, like the twelve tables of the Romans, carried, as experience subsequently proved, great potentialities of expression and development by interpretation. The nationalistic theory of State, therefore, is misleading inasmuch as it suggests a dualism which does not exist in Islam."[4] The Qur'an is the guiding principle and the law which binds the members of Islamic Society into one organised whole:

گر تو می خواہی مسلمان زیستن نیست ممکن جز به قرآن زیستن

[If you want to be a true Muslim,

You cannot live without following the Qur'an (exemplified through the Holy Prophet).]

One would naturally ask: How could Iqbal pass from his universal brotherhood to the idea of Pakistan, as a distinct nation? How can a person reconcile Iqbal's internationalism with his nationalism as ex-pressed in his demand for Pakistan? We must remember that Iqbal has two bases for the demand of Pakistan. Firstly, Islam is not, like other religions, a private affair; secondly, the concept of Pakistan is based on Islamic principles of life, not on territorial nationalism which tears society into pieces. These principles of life are distinctly different from those of other societies and accordingly generate a different value-structure. Iqbal has this in mind. The Muslims

[4] Shamloo, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal (Lahore, 1944), p. 204.

need a home-land, the way we have a body. However, our bodily limitations are no bar to our aspirations; boundaries of Pakistan are no obstacle for realising our ideals.

Similarly, regional aspirations are the outcome of ideal Islamic aspirations which are to be realised through regional efforts. It is like realising Divine injunctions through individual efforts. Individual ideals do not make Divine ideals redundant; rather the former get their content by the latter and not *vice versa*.

The talk about regional culture must be in the light of these thoughts. As a matter of fact, local and regional cultures are the component parts of the super-culture which is the Islamic culture from which they derive their worth. In other words, the sub-cultures are like the essential organs of a body without which the concept of a person with a proportionate figure cannot be conceived. It is like bricks and mortar; with their uniform mixture alone a magnificent building can be raised. The Muslims in other countries have different social customs, rituals and linguistic and cultural heritage, yet, without any racial and parochial prejudices, they are one on one ideology — the followers of one Holy Prophet and reciters of one *Kalimah* with-out any antagonistic feeling toward each other.

For Iqbal the individual's life should be adorned by God and His Messenger Prophet is the arch-builder of the society. In respect of Islam, he is the final Prophet. This means that the principles of social reconstruction are complete and final.[5]

What we have said so far about Iqbal's views on nationalism is:

(a) Here a distinction ought to be made between territorial and geographical nationalism and supra-territorial nationalism.

(b) That societies owe their existence to cooperation, but this cooperation must encompass the entire human race, keeping in view the principle of social and community life having supra-territorial elements (Islamic principles).

---

[5] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

(c) From this follows that the talk about regional loyalties and regional cultures is merely to deny social cohesion and is manifestly a betrayal of Islamic universalism.

(d) The demand for the creation of Pakistan was based on universal principles of life and not on particular or regional considerations.

I know turn to the historical reason which led to the development of the territorial nationalism in the West. In this regard I refer to Iqbal's address in the Muslim League Session in Allahabad in 1930. Here Iqbal says that the rejection of Christianity as a unifying moral force led to the division of Europe into different nationalities and this finally developed into political philosophies of national loyalties and parochial consideration. Once Europe got divided into a dozen nations, their industrial and colonial interests clashed with each other and resulted in numerous wars between them. Iqbal believed, and rightly too, that economic changes have profound effects on social attitudes. Once the destiny of societies was identified in Europe with geographical loyalties and social interests were identified with economic, industrial and colonial interests, the centre of reference was shifted from faith to political authority. Religious ties were replaced by territorial patriotism and regional loyalties and nationalism was identified with secularism.

However, political ascendency of Europe over the East influenced the Eastern political thinking. Hence we too have this jaundiced view of socio-political life. Iqbal fights against such a view since for him separation of religion from political or social life finally ends into "Changeiziate" — the symbol of brutality and barbarousness.

جدا ہو دیں سیاست سے تورہ جاتی ہے چنگیزی

[If religion is separated from politics, there remains nothing but barbarity.]

Iqbal was the first person amongst the modern Muslim thinkers to realise the gravity and magnitude of this problem. His verses as well as prose writings are pregnant with this burning topic which is even to-day a menacing problem to all of us In Pakistan, it shows itself in the form of the

slogan of four nationalities. As said earlier, Islam teaches complete loyalty to the Creator. In the early days of Islam this brought about a complete change in the existing Arab social order which was based on class and tribe. The Arabs submitted to the code of life which was divinely ordained and practised, through *Sunnah*. After his migration to Medina the Prophet gave a constitution for the State. This revolutionised the whole socio-political system. Tribal loyalty was shifted from class to God and in political and social terms to *Ummah* (community) based on Faith instead of kinship or any other relation.

For centuries the Muslims believed in "universal Islamic brother-hood" and considered Caliphate as the best political organisation. This gave rise to the idea of *Dar al-Islām*, the place of believers, having complete freedom to move freely in any part of the Muslim States.

However, when complacence set in and Islamic perspective got shifted, the Western nationalistic outlook crept in imperceptibly in some of the Muslim States like Turkey and Indonesia, for instance. A section of the Muslim world adhered to the principles of universal Muslim brotherhood, whereas a section fell under a secular type of nationalism.

Credit goes to Iqbal in that he gave a lead to the Muslim world in expressed terms and, except for a few years prior to his departure for Europe, when he advocated for narrow nationalism, he always held that territorial loyalty is the divisive curse in the body politic of the Muslim nation.

During his stay in Europe (1905-08), a great change came in his political thought. This was, in fact, a reaction against the materialistic view of life in Europe, and a deep study of the European intellectual environment led him to think differently. He was completely disillusioned and disenchanted with the Europe of that age.

He realised that, if this kind of nationalism is followed by the Muslims, it will create disunity and discord among them. This is further indicated during the First World War when a section of Muslims in the Arab world collaborated with the British against the Turks. Iqbal, in reply to a statement of Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, said: "I have been repudiating the concept of nationalism since the time when it was not known in India and the Muslim world. At the very start it had become clear to me from the writings of European authors that the materialistic designs of Europe were in great need of this effective weapon — the propagation of the European

conception of nationalism in Muslim countries — to shatter the religious unity of Islam to pieces."[6]

I now come to what Iqbal has to say about *Patriotism* and *Nationalism*. Iqbal had a clear notion of patriotism and nationalism. For him "Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of a man," and "Nationalism in the sense of one's love of one's country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of Muslims' faith."[7]

However, Iqbal explicitly distinguishes modern nationalism in a political sense with patriotism as a virtue.

Alluding to the Prophet's saying: "Love of one's homeland is a part of faith," he says in one of his verses:

ارشادِ نبوت میں وطن اور ہی کچھ ہے نیست ممکن جز به قرآن زیستن

[Love for a land in the political sense is different from the Prophet's saying.]

Iqbal's condemnation of nationalism is not a condemnation of love for the fatherland. "It is a condemnation of the modern concept of a nation, since the idea of nation is not merely geographical: it is rather a principle of human society and as such it is a political concept."[8]

Iqbal's opposition to modern nationalism is Islamic and human — which are two sides of the same coin. If he was not tilted so much to the religious side, as some of his critics say, he would have reasons to oppose it on the ground of his broad human outlook which has strong feeling for mankind, since modern nationalism tends to narrow down brotherly feeling and broad human outlook.

Iqbal's nationalism not only contains both universalism and patriotism, as we have seen, but also Islamic humanitarianism. The third element is unity in diversity.

It should not be thought that Iqbal, through his concept of nationalism,

---

[6] Ibid., p. 106.

[7] Ibid., p. 203.

[8] Ibid., p. 225

reduces all diversity to a neutral colour. Iqbal is alive to the demands of individual caprices. In his writings, he keeps in view the present-day conditions. He allows for diversity which enriches cultural homogeneity.

We have already observed that Iqbal's thought involves a necessary dialectic of self-assertion and self-denial. This bipolar dialectic adds colour to national aspiration and gives it a life of never-ending dynamism.

In conclusion I would say that Iqbal's nationalism not only goes beyond the traditional Western concepts, but it also gives it a more contemporary significance. Pakistan is not only the spiritual brain child of Iqbal, but, in one respect, it can get now energy from Iqbal's concept of nationalism. Our national integrity lies, as does its origin, in an awareness of our spiritual moorings. I believe that most of us would agree that Iqbal's concept of nationalism is not only a blue-print for our national integration, but also a message for Islamic brotherhood. It has been nicely illustrated by his poem "Mecca and Geneva":

اس دور میں اقوام کی صحبت بھی ہوئی عام پوشیدہ نگاہوں سے رہی وحدتِ آدم!

تفریق ملل حکمتِ افرنگ کا مقصود اسلام کا مقصود فقط ملتِ آدم!

مکے نے دیا خاکِ جنیوا کو یہ پیغام جمعیتِ اقوام کہ جمعیتِ آدم

[The association of nations is very common these days, but the unity of mankind is hidden from our sight.

The disruption of human communities is the mission of Frankish statesman-ship ; the object of Islam is the unity of mankind.

Mecca gives this message to the soil of Geneva: A league of nations or a

league of human beings?]

I end this paper with Iqbal's words which, in fact, summarise his message. Only three months before his death, in a New-Year's message, he said: "Only one unity is dependable, and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed national-ism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that

they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialise."[9]

[9] Ibid,, p.203.

A UNIQUE ASPECT OF IQBAL'S EVOLUTION THEORY

Dr L. S. May

"Praise be to God

Who created the heavens

And the earth,

And made the Darkness

And the Light ... .

He it is Who created

You....

And He is God

In the heavens

And on earth.

And He knoweth

The (recompense) which

Ye earn (by your deeds)" (Qur., vi. 1-3).

The term "evolution" in a restricted scientific sense signifies the physical development of the diverse species, including plants, animals and humans, inhabiting our universe. It also is used to convey more broadly structural patterns' earlier and progressive forms as well as cultural advancement respectively in the animal, such as primate and ape, and in the human societies.

Iqbal's evolution doctrine comprises diverse aspects also. They include

(a) physical; (b) mental; (c) cultural; and (d) other develop-mental forms. They respectively fall under the categories of (a) anthropology; (b) psychology; (c) philosophy, literature, art, etc.; and (d) socio-economics, law, etc. He linked them all together under one major heading: Religion. This discussion shall centre on his anthropological views. It was fostered by most recent research, including observations in the wild,[10] and the subsequent theories which, however, remain incomplete and subject to revision. After recently reading some of the most modern works,[11] and then re-reading Iqbal's lectures on *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*,[12] my eye fell on a few lines incorporated in Chapter Ill, entitled "The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer". He explained in this chapter why "Adam yielded to Satan". His explanation was that Adam gave in to the Devil "not because he was elementally wicked, but because being 'hasty' (*ajul*) by nature he sought a short cut to knowledge,"[13] It recalls, of course, the Paradise story according to which human disobedience led to the first human pair's[14] expulsion from the Garden of Eden [15] Iqbal's interpretation is truly anthropological.[16] It implies a wholly novel approach only now presented by those scientists particularly studying primates, amongst them chimpanzees,

---

[10] Jane van Lavick-Goodall; Vernon Reynolds; Dr A. Kortlandt; Drs S. Azuma, T. Nishida; N. Tinbergen, to name a few outstanding scholarly observers,

[11] J. van Lavick-Goodall, *In The Shadow of Man*, Boston, Houghton Miflin Co., 1971; N. Tinbergen, *Social Behaviour in Animals*, Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1953, and Science Paperbacks, 1969 reprint ; Elaine Morgan, *The Descent of Woman*, New York, Stein and Day, 1972; V. Reynolds, *Budongo*: *An African Forest and Its Chimpanzees*, Garden City, N Y., Natural History Press, 1965.

[12] Published in innumerable reprints and based on a series of Lectures. (Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Jan. 1962 reprint used.)

[13] Ibid., p. 86.

[14] See, for instance, Qur'an, ii. 35-36.

[15] Edin or "plain," presumably the fertile Tigris-Euphrates valley.

[16] There are other interpretations, viz, naturalistic: a change in climate effected altered living circumstances ; and religious, based on man's disobedience to God, although in Judaism and Christianity Eve, not Adam, is held responsible for

giving in to the Devil.

and hence called primatologists. This idea of Iqbal, indeed, involves a non-religious and, hence, a non-traditional interpretation. It raises the question of humanity's adaptation to the physical environment. It negates Darwin's[17] "Biological Materialism" stressing "external causation" which Iqbal regarded too mechanistic, unrelated to any Divine Creation theory — to which he subscribed — and too deterministic which he severely opposed. To understand more clearly his brilliant perception, the present pertinent data on human evolution and the primates' adaptability stated in capsule form now follow.

(a) *Human Evolution*. In view of the discoveries made in Africa, it now is believed that the human species began to evolve over four and possibly five million years ago. This would have occurred about the end of the arid Pliocene[18] and the beginning of the Pleistocene, whose exact beginnings still are in doubt. It is held by some anthropologists that during the approximately twelve million Pliocene years, when the forests dried up, a number of species,[19] including those as yet non-specialised that later evolving into humans, eventually[20] took to the water. The latter at that time were four-footed (*quadrupeds*). They consequently became bipeds or two-footed, for they were forced to stand up. They did not lose their legs which, in some instances, became fins, because they also would sit on the water edges, particularly when the female had to feed her offspring. They furthermore developed certain facial features and expressions such as, respectively,

---

[17] Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882), author of On *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* (1859) and *The Descent of Man* (1871). He created a furore by maintaining that the human race descended from an anthropoid animal. He is interred in Westminster Abbey. The argumentation is not altogether dead and there apparently is increasing evidence that there may have been two main parallel branches one giving rise to the human, the other to the apes.

[18] Following upon the Miocene occurring twenty million years ago. It was characterised by mild weather, heavy rainfall and flourishing forests. During this period in Kenya many "apes of generalised body structure" and of diverse types, such as the small gibbon and the large guerilla emerged.

[19] Including it appears the whale's, and the elephant's ancestors.

[20] It probably took a few million years.

eyelids, noses, brow contractions,[21] which are considered uniquely human.[22] When the Pleistocene dawned, they also had become accustomed to all kinds of food (*omnivorous*), meaning that they ate fish, eels (usually hidden under rocks), and other marine specimens apart from roots, fruits. etc. (*herbivorous*) and meat (*carnivorous*). When the climate once again warmed up and forests reappeared,[23] the "aquatic anthropoids" had turned into hominids or creatures of a more specialised human type. They were two-legged, stood and walked erect (Homo-Erectus[24]), no longer slept in trees (unlike the chimpanzees, amongst the apes ; and the baboons, amongst the monkeys, for example), and could cover much larger distances than any other primate. The new human species, in fact, had become well prepared to adapt themselves to life on earth. This is a mini-description of some physical evolution aspects.

The humans furthermore were forced to use their ingenuity in making dramatic *mental* forward Ieaps.[25] This was essential for their further development. To cross waterways, they had to build rafts which they perhaps did even before the Pliocene melted into the Pleistocene. Boats were to follow seemingly during the Bronze Age (*circa* 3200-1200 B.C.). During the (projected) "Bone" Age[26] (about one million years ago), hunting may have become a way of life. The invention of fire by Peking Man (*Homo-Sinanthropus*) circa 360,000 years ago allowed for the serving of roasted meat,

---

[21] Necessitated by sharp sunlight which in the forests is broken by the innumerable trees.

[22] Amongst them, crying ; tears are salty (sodium chloride).

[23] During the Pleistocene, the northern world suffered Ice Ages interrupted by warmer interglacial eras.

[24] *Homo-Erectus* (emerged circa 700,000 years ago, extinct by about 150,000 years ago) had a broad flat nose. Cf. the Proboscis monkey, which is the only one to have the nose covered with a lid — it takes to water.

[25] The hedonic mode characterised by "display," viz. the use of tricks or showing unusual objects so as to gain attention and leadership, are used by chimpanzees and guerillas (ape groups). The baboons (monkeys), however, employ an agonic mode based on threats, biting, and fighting. Their behaviour pattern, unlike that of the apes and man, is stereotyped and does not permit mental exercise and initiative. While the *agonic* mode is not fully absent from human conduct involving attacks on one's own group and species, it has profited from the *hedonic* pattern.

[26] The Old Stone Age's start sometimes is projected at one million years ago.

and, in the Copper Age (about 4200-3200 B.c.) for breadbaking in clay ovens. Fishing with angles and probably nets already was practised in the Old Stone Age (between 100,000 and 15,000 B.c.). "Natural" agriculture meaning the use of serrated sickles cutting wild-growing grain stalks became customary in the Middle Stone Age (15,000-7500 B.c.[27]). It was followed by "artificial" agriculture involving the building of irrigation-canal networks towards the end of the New Stone Age and the beginning of the Copper Age. Irrigational agriculture became most developed in Bronze Age times. Stockbreeding or the domestication of animals traditionally, said to have started during the Neolithic[28] period, may have begun in the previous Mesolithic era. It usually is associated with agricultural life. While earlier Stone Age men and women lived in caves,[29] those generations passing through the New Stone Age built mud huts, villages and towns (Jarmo, for instance). Their dwellings included brick and stone houses and palaces indicating class differentiation and affluence amongst a certain, usually small, group. This more luxurious style, complemented by innumerable magnificent artifacts (inlaid cosmetic chests, glass, bronze, and other ware for diverse purposes, etc.), typifies the Bronze Age. It furthermore is marked by distinctions according to occupation (baker, butcher, smith, jeweller, dressmaker, architect, weaver, dyer, *et al.*); religio-legal and socio-economic, as well as a tremendous scientific and literary developments.[30] The reason why humans reached far beyond even

---

[27] All dates are approximate, although archaeological findings and their scientific analysis help in a more precise dating than ever before.

[28] The Latin words for Old, Middle and Late or New Stone Age are: Palaeolithic (lithos = "stone"), Mesolithic and Neolithic. They imply that stone (apart from wood) was the main material used at the time. When copper and then bronze came into vogue, the subsequent eras were named after these metals. Bronze Age man reached a civilisational zenith (in Babylonia and Egypt particularly). While Iran's and Turkey's beginnings are datable to about 2000 B.c or shortly thereafter, the latter reached its heights during the Hittite Era'(second millennium rec.), while Iran's heyday lay in the subsequent Achaemenid period covering the Iron Age (which began in 1200 B.C., but the Achaemenids arose in the seventh century B.c. and becamegreat under Cyrus and his successors).

[29] It is alleged that living in a cave, viz. a more or less permanent domicile,implied or gave rise to the nuclear family.

[30] Writing began in the (Sumerian) Jemdet Nasr or Proto-Literate period (*circa* 3100-2900 B.c.).

the primates in their broad intellectual/cultural progress may well be explained by their acclimatisation to a new life-pattern for which possibly they were prepared during their millions of watery existence years in that dry Pliocene Era forming an interval between the Eocene and the Pleistocene when a new age dawned in human history!

What has the foregoing discussion to do with Iqbal's evolution doctrine? One aspect of it already has been cited, namely, his assertion that the first human (Adam) gave in to the Devil because he longed for knowledge. This statement immediately precedes the following dominant sentence:

> "The only way to correct this tendency was to place him in an environment which, however painful, was better suited to the unfolding of his intellectual faculties."[31]

That the physical and ecologicala daptation process was "painful" is undeniable. That it forced *Homo-Sapiens*[32] ("Knowing" or "Wise Man/Woman") to use their intellect and ingenuity neither can be ignored. That it signifies a non-stereotyped mental and behavioural pattern with its trial and error aspects, seems obvious. That it finally re-presents a forward thrust (*teleology*) is attested by the rich evidence left by the past generations. It is basic to Iqbal's entire philosophy aimed at the Muslims' revivification. This explains his total rejection of any doctrine in the least reflecting statism.

He remained Qur'ānic by acknowledging Allah's beingness and creativity, and that humanity earns its rewards by its "deeds". He stressed its "deeds" in terms of fervent activism which he saw as an-other expression — apart from prayer, for example — of true spirituality.

One critical question applicable to this discussion is whether there is not an inherent contradiction between such a view's implied deterministic and non-deterministic aspects. This problem raised by the medieval philosophers in a theistic form, namely, whether it is possible for humans to have full freedom of action thereby determining their future if God foreknows, was answered by al-Ash'arī (873-935). He held that all humans are created free from belief and unbelief, so that unbelief and faults are their own acts, but

---

[31] Iqbal, op. cit., p. 86.

[32] Emerged circa 35,000-30,000 years ago.

nevertheless are caused by Allah's will and knowledge. The Mu'tazilite rationalists, whose pupil he was originally, denied that acts are created by God's will and knowledge. Iqbal, therefore, seems to be a Mu'tazilite in the *philosophical* aspect of the doctrine under discussion.

What intrigued me, however, was the *anthropological* side of his evolution doctrine which clearly is anti-Darwinian in so far as the latter's "materialist" and "non-spiritual" theories are concerned. It was, indeed, unique in his time. It, once again, shows Iqbal's many-faceted thought and attests to his genius!

"Behold ! thy Lord said to the angels: 'I will create

A vicegerent on earth' . . .

And He taught Adam the nature

Of all things ..." (Our., ii. 30-31).

PROPOSITIONAL ELEMENT IN RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Professor Abdul Qayum

Empiricism has challenged the validity of religion in modern times by showing that the religious statements are meaningless. However, there are some empiricists who have tried to save the meaningfulness of religious assertions by putting on them certain interpretations. Thus R.B. Braithwaite, under the influence of the later works of Wittgenstein who therein urges us "to look at the sentence as an instrument and its sense as its employment,"[33] in his Eddington Memorial Lecture: "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief," has attempted to adjust religion to empiricism by a shifting ground technique. Braithwaite accepts the view that the meaning of language is found in its use, and, in order to show how a certain statement is used, he re-commends an empirical enquiry; "a statement need not itself be empirically verifiable, but that it is used in a particular way is always a straightforwardly empirical proposition"[34]. Thus the task of an empiricist, Braithwaite holds, is "to explain in empirical terms, how a religious statement is used by a man who asserts it in order to express his religious conviction".[35] This task Braithwaite undertakes in his Lecture. An attempt will be made in this article to examine his views in order to see how far he succeeds in saving the meaningfulness of religious beliefs.

Employing the "use" principle, Braithwaite enquires into the meaning of religious statements and argues that religious statements are used as moral assertions. But the ethical theory that he accepts is "a conative rather than an emotive theory; it makes the primary use of a moral assertion that of expressing the intention of the asserter to act in a particular sort of way

---

[33] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.H. Anscombe (Oxford, 1953), p. 126.

[34] R B. Braithwaite's Lecture: *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief* (Cambridge, 1955), p. 11. Hereafter referred to as Lecture.

[35] Ibid.

specified in the assertion".[36] The conative theory of ethics is accepted by him because it is in accordance with the spirit of empiricism. It can be empirically examined whether or not a person intends following a certain moral policy by the observation of what he says and does. Religious statements also, Braithwaite asserts, are "primarily declarations of adherence to a policy of action, declaration of commitment to a way of life".[37] "The intention of a Christian," he adds, "to follow a Christian way of life is not only the criterion for the sincerity of his belief in the assertion of Christianity; it is the meaningfulness of his assertions."[38] Though Braithwaite assimilates religious assertions to moral assertions, he points out some differences between religious assertions and moral assertions. One of them is that, while a moral assertion specifies the policy with which it is concerned, a religious assertion does not make it clear which policy is to be carried out. So it is not any one religious assertion to be considered, as is the case in morality, but a system of religious assertions as a whole which would indicate a moral function. In order to know what a system of religious assertions would mean, we have to specify the kind of behaviour "which is in accordance with what one takes to be the fundamental moral principles of the religion in question".[39] Braithwaite gives the example of Christianity the fundamental principle of which, according to him, is the principle of love or *agape*. Thus the system of assertions which constitutes Christianity would receive the meaning which is given to the assertion "God is love," namely, the declaration of an intention to follow an agapeistic way of life. It is thus "the intention to behave which constitutes what is known as religious conviction,"[40] and "the primary use of religious assertions is to announce allegiance to a set of moral principles".[41] This is borne out, Braithwaite holds, by the phenomenon of conversion "which is not only a change in the propositions believed — indeed there may

---

[36] Ibid., p. 12.

[37] Ibid., p. 15.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., p. 18.

[40] Ibid., p. 16.

[41] Ibid., p. 19.

be no specifically intellectual change at all; it is a change in the state of will".[42] A more fundamental difference between religious assertions and moral assertions is that in case of the former the intentions to carry out behaviour policies are associated with entertaining different stories. A story, according to Braithwaite, is a "set of propositions which are straight-forwardly empirical propositions capable of empirical test and which are thought of by the religious man in connection with his resolution to follow the way of life advocated by his religion".[43] It is the difference between one set of stories (the Buddhist stories) and another set of stories (the Christian stories) which would make the assertions of the former different from those of the latter. Thus, to assert the whole set of assertions of the Christian religion is both to tell the Christian doctrinal story and to confess allegiance to the Christian way of life.[44] But Braithwaite maintains that the stories need not be taken to be true in any sense; they are to be "entertained only". Their importance is "psychological and causal". "In religious conviction," Braithwaite says,' the resolution to follow a way of life is primary; it is not derived from believing, still less thinking, of any empirical story. The story may psychologically support the resolution, but it does not logically justify it."[45] Braithwaite concludes that his account of religious belief according to which "it is not a species of ordinary belief, of belief in a proposition [and] is an intention to behave in a certain way (a moral belief) together with the entertainment of certain stories associated with the intention in the mind of the believer . . . seems ... to do justice to both, the empiricists' demand that meaning must be tied to empirical use and to the religious man's claim for his religious beliefs to be taken seriously".[46]

Braithwaite's attempt to reconcile religion with empiricism is perhaps the boldest of all the efforts on the part of empiricists, and indeed his account of the nature of religious belief has stimulated a lot of discussion among the

---

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., p. 23.

[44] Ibid., p. 24.

[45] Ibid., p. 31.

[46] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

philosophers of religion. By trying to show that, though religious beliefs appear to be assertions, they are really declarations of intentions of pursuing certain moral policies, he has made himself a notable representative of what may be called ethical reductionism. Since religious beliefs which purport to assert certain facts are neither empirical statements, nor scientific hypotheses, nor even the necessary propositions like those of logic and mathematics, and since these three kinds of propositions are, according to Braithwaite, the only kind that a philosopher can admit, religious beliefs cannot be assertions or propositions. They, if they have meaning, are like moral beliefs which, though not belonging to any of the three categories of propositions mentioned above, are still meaningful, for, though they do not assert anything like a fact, they are used as expressing the intention to carry out certain behaviour policies. It is obvious that this view of the nature of the religious belief, which underscores the conative element in it, completely eliminates any cognitive element in religious belief and reduces it to the status of a moral belief. Now, no religious man would deny the practical aspect of religion, and some will regard it as the basic aspect, but no religious man at the same time would be prepared to accept the complete elimination of any cognitive element in his religious statements, as Braithwaite's interpretation does. What we have to see is this: how far Braithwaite is justified in completely eliminating the cognitive element in religious statements and, if he is not justified, how can cognitive element be retained without doing violence to the spirit of empiricism?

Braithwaite holds that, without allegiance to a set of moral principles, there cannot be any true religion, and it is a fact that some people lead an agapeistic way of life and find religion quite alien to it. For example, a humanist follows a certain moral policy with full devotion, and he may not get inspiration from the life of Christ as much as he can get from some other source. But can he be a true Christian? The followers of traditional Christianity would say that such a person cannot be a true Christian. Thus Braithwaite's view has been criticised for its incompatibility with traditional Christianity, according to which a Christian not only adheres to the moral policy as advocated by Christianity, but also believes in the historicity of Jesus Christ and in the existence of God. He is also committed to certain beliefs about the nature of the universe and man's relationship to it. Mascall objects to Braithwaite's supposition that Christianity would be content with his conative view of religious statements. Mascail points out that "it is surely

undeniable that Christianity demands personal commitment not to a personal way of lite (whatever that extremely vague phrase may mean), but to the concrete historical person, Jesus of Nazareth".[47] Braithwaite may reply to Mascall's objection that, though commitment to Jesus Christ entails that such a person existed, yet this commitment is basically bound up with adherence to an agapeistic way of life which Jesus Christ preached and exemplified in his deeds. Braithwaite will draw Mascall's attention to one of the stories of Christianity in which Jesus Christ said: "Ye are my disciples if ye do the things I command." Mascall's criticism is based on a particular interpretation of Christianity adopted by him and some people like Braithwaite may not accept it. This question of interpretation is, however, a controversial issue, as Frederick Ferre has suggested: "I he interpretation of the significance of Christian theism awaits an adequate analysis of theological discourse."[48]

Though the main thesis of Braithwaite's Lecture is that a religious assertion is primarily a declaration of commitment to a way of life, he does not deny that there is. a propositional element in a religious assertion. He admits that "a religious assertion will . . . have a pro-positional element which is lacking in a purely moral assertion,"[49] and that "the propositional element in a religious assertion consists of stories interpreted as straightforwardly empirical propositions which are not, generally speaking, believed to be true".[50] Braithwaite thinks that "there are four types of stories in the Christian set"[51]:

(1) Historical statements, e.g. "Jesus was crucified, dead and buried, for which empirical evidence is relevant".

(2) Historical statements, e.g. "Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary, where non-empirical considerations would be relevant".

---

[47] E.L. Mascall, *Words and Images* (London, 1957), p. 60.

[48] Frederick Ferre, *Language Logic and God* (London

[49] *Lecture*, p. 24.

[50] Ibid., p. 29.

[51] Ian T. Ramsay Ed., *Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy* (London, 1966), p. 91.

(3) Statements which are at once historical and metaphysical in import, e g. "Jesus was conceived by the Holy Ghost".

(4) Purely non-empirical statements, e.g. "God is the maker of heaven and earth".

When Braithwaite says that the story is not to be taken as "a matter of empirical fact" or true, he does not mean the stories of types (1) and (2) above, for which there is evidence, but the types (3) and (4) above which, according to him, "must be taken as telling stories which were empirical propositions but whose efficacy for a Christian did not depend upon their being believed to be true, i.e. to correspond to empirical fact."[52] It is with regard to these types of stories which cannot be regarded by an empiricist as true that Braithwaite's critics will disagree with him and say on the contrary that Christians do believe these stories to be true. D.M. Mackinnon finds it impossible to accept Braithwaite's view that "it would not matter whether or not there was such a person as Jesus of Nazareth provided that entertainment of the story about him restrained its causal efficacy . . . for, as a matter of fact," Mackinnon points out, "the efficacy of cementing the alliance between will and imagination that men have found upon the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth has been bound up with their belief that some at least of the events about which they are thinking actually happened."[53] Braithwaite would reply that Mackinnon is right here because the story about the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth is a matter of fact and it can be established as certain that events of his birth and death actually happened. But in the case of those stories [types (3) and (4) above] which cannot be established as a matter of fact and so cannot be regarded as true, Braithwaite would maintain that such stories should be "entertained in thought, i.e. the statement of story should be understood as having a meaning, without being taken as true".[54] Here Braithwaite seems to be suggesting that in the case of the stories which are known to correspond to empirical facts, like the story of the life and

---

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid., p. 80

[54] *Lecture*, p. 26.

death of Jesus of Nazareth, the question of their being believed to be true does noy arise ; they are *known* to be true. But it is different in the case of those stories [types (3) and (4) above] which are not *known* to correspond to empirical facts; and so they, Braithwaite holds, should not be *believed* to be true. Braithwaite does not use the phrase *known to be true*, but uses the phrase *believed to be true*, e g. when, with regard to the stories of type (3) and (4 above, he says that their efficacy does not "depend upon their being *believed to be true, i.e. to correspond to empirical fact*".[55] In fact, he should have used the words "known to be true" in place of "believed to be true," because when any story corresponds to empirical fact, it is not *believed to be true*, but *known to be true*. Braithwaite does not distinguish between a statement *known to be true* and a statement *believed to be true* and consequently confuses "knowledge" with "belief," which he should have not done, if, as a true empiricist, he had followed Hume who did make a distinction between "knowledge" and "belief." Braithwaite is right when he says that if the religious man, while associating his intentions with stories of the types (3) and (4) above, means them *known to be true*, the religious man is mistaken. But, on the other hand, Braithwaite is mistaken in suggesting that since such stories do not correspond to empirical facts, or, in other words, *are not known to be true*, they should not be *believed to be true*, and so should be simply entertained in thought. Braithwaite seems to hold that if a statement does not correspond to empirical facts, the only cognitive attitude that can be legitimately adopted towards it is that of entertaining it in thought. But, on the other hand, it may be suggested that if a statement does not correspond to empirical facts, or, in other words, it is not known to be true, we cannot adopt the attitude of "belief " towards it; we can legitimately say that it is *believed* to be true as Kant said with regard to the existence of God. Kant indeed held that we do not know that God exists, nor do we know that He does not exist. In the situation we can legitimately say that we believe that God exists. If Braithwaite accepts this distinction between "knowledge" and "belief" we can retain the propositional element in a religious belief, even if we regard it, as Braithwaite does, as primarily a declaration of adherence to a certain behaviour policy.

---

[55] Ian T. Ramsay, Ed., op. cit., p. 91.

According to Braithwaite, knowledge is "a species of belief "[56] and this is why he uses the word "believe" instead of "knowledge" when he says that "it is not necessary . . . for the asserter of a religious assertion to *believe* in the truth of story involved in the assertions".[57] He further remarks that "educated Christians of the present day who attach importance to the doctrine of the Atonement certainly do not believe in the empirically testable story in Mathew Arnold's or any other form"[58] and here also by the words "do not believe" he means "do not know". It is this inappropriate use of the word "belief" (not distinguishing it from "knowledge") that has perhaps been responsible for the position that Braithwaite has taken with regard to the propositional element in religious statements. We may agree with Braithwaite that the religious man does not know certain stories in the sense that they do not correspond to empirical facts, but the latter would still believe in those stories. In other words, the stories are not known to be true in the sense empirical statements are known to be true, but they are believed to be true, Braithwaite seems to have misunderstood the sense in which the religious man rightly uses the word "belief". When he uses it rightly, he does not use it in the sense the word "know" is used. Thus we may say that it is not essential for the religious man to *know* the truth of the story associated with his intention to practise moral principles, but it is necessary that he should *believe* in the truth of the story. Indeed, it is because of this belief in the truth of the story that his intention becomes the intention of a religious man.

Braithwaite maintains that "to assert the whole set of assertions of the Christian religion is both to tell the Christian doctrinal story and to confess allegiance to the Christian way of life". This would suggest that he regards the doctrinal story as an integral part of religion, but since some of the propositions contained in the story are not based on "reasonable grounds to be true" [story of types(3) and (4) above], it should not be taken as true; it should be entertained in thought only. We, on the other hand, would suggest that for the religious man the "doctrinal story" along with the declaration of allegiance to a way of life is an integral part of religious assertions, and it can

---

[56] Phillips Griffiths, Ed., *Knowledge and Belief* (Oxford, 1967), p. 29.

[57] Lecture, pp. 25-26.

[58] Ibid., p. 26.

substantially remain so if the story is believed to be true, and not merely entertained in thought. What does Braithwaite mean by "entertainment in thought"? By "I entertain a proposition," Braithwaite says: "I mean to say the least possible thing about my cognitive attitude, something involving neither my believing it nor my not believing it, neither my meditating upon it nor its just having come into my mind, neither my using it in a hypothetical proposition nor my making no use of it at all. To entertain a proposition in this sense is the same thing as to understand the sentence or other symbols used to stand for it."[59] One would wonder if any serious-minded religious man would regard a doctrinal story entertained in the way Braithwaite suggests, as an essential element of religious assertions. Braithwaite concedes that the propositional element in religious beliefs can be retained only by entertaining doctrinal stories in thought, and not by taking them as true, since there is no evidence for their corresponding to empirical facts. But the religious man may say that this is no concession. Retaining the propositional element in religious belief in the form suggested by Braithwaite is tantamount to not retaining it at all if it is not taken as true. Of course, the doctrinal stories should be taken as true, not in the sense that they are known to be true, but in the sense that they are believed to be true.

Braithwaite points out that "doctrinal stories" have a psychological and causal function. "Thus," he says, "it is an empirical psychological fact, that many people find it easier to resolve upon and to carry through a course of action which is contrary to their natural inclinations if this policy is associated in their minds with certain stories."[60] Hence Braithwaite is referring to an empirical fact which may not be true in all cases. Indeed, it may not be true in the case of mature people. William Lillie suggests that "this is the use rather blatantly made of such stories in children's sermons," but, he adds, "one wonders whether Nowell Smith would not regard this as a rather infantile element in Christian morality".[61] Besides, it may be asked whether a doctrinal story "merely entertained in thought" or the same story believed to be true would make it easier for a person to follow a course of action. Here

---

[59] A Phillips Griffiths, Ed., op. cit., p. 29.

[60] *Lecture*, p. 27.

[61] William Lillie, "Book Reviews," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, XX/1 (March 1967), p. 96.

Braithwaite has completely ignored the early period of Christianity and Islam when the believers pursued the religious way of life with such a profound spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice that it would be absurd to regard their actions as the effects of entertaining doctrinal stories in thought only. They, indeed, believed in the truth of the doctrinal stories they entertained, and the doctrinal stories not only served as the justification of their actions but also stimulated them to act.

Braithwaite holds that "a doctrinal story should be entertained in thought, it is telling of the story . . . the way in which one can tell ... the story of a novel with which one is acquainted".[62] In other words, he regards the doctrinal stories as fictitious. On the other hand, we have suggested that, though in certain cases a doctrinal story is not taken by the religious man as true in the sense that it is not known to be true, it can be and, in fact, is taken as true in the sense that it is believed to be true. Braithwaite here may reply that a doctrinal story believed to be true will be as fictitious as the one entertained in thought only. But Braithwaite is mistaken in having this view of "belief". A belief-attitude to a proposition is a cognitive relation to act which simply shows that what has been asserted in the proposition is not known to be so. When a husband says that he believes that his wife is faithful to him, his doctrinal story about his wife's character is not fictitious. Indeed, it refers to a situation about which he cannot adopt the attitude of "knowledge," i.e. he cannot say that he knows that his wife is faithful to him, but about which he can adopt belief-attitude and say that he *believes* that his wife is faithful to him. When Hume said that he believed in the external objects, though he did not know that they as such existed, his belief in the existence of external objects was not fictitious.

While discussing the psychological value of stories of the religious men to carry out their behaviour policies, Braithwaite mentions "the story that in so doing they are doing the will of God".[63] It is correct to say that, indeed, the religious man regards his religious conduct as doing the will of God, but what is surprising is that Braithwaite suggests that "the intention to do what a person commands or desires, irrespective of what this command may be, is

---

[62] *Lecture*, p. 24.

[63] Ibid., p. 31

no part of a higher religion".[64] What he means by "higher religion" is not clear, but since he refers to Christianity throughout his Lecture, he can be taken to mean by "higher religion" some institutional or prophetic religion like Christianity or Islam. And in these religions the moral conduct of the believer consists in carrying out the commands of God, as advocated by His prophet to whom he is by faith committed. His commitment is not conditional; it is absolute obedience to his prophet and to God. A true believer does not examine whether or not the commands to be carried out by him as a believer are in accordance with his own moral judgment. He carries them out even when he finds them against his own moral judgment. To say that "it is when the religious man finds that what . . . (God) commands or desires accords with his own moral judgment that he decides to obey or to accede to it"[65] is to ignore the fundamental characteristic of a religious behaviour policy, that it is pursued, not because it is determined by the believer's own moral judgment, but solely because it is commanded by God. Braithwaite may be right that "in religious conviction the resolution to follow a way of life is primary," but he is wrong in saying that "it is not derived from believing still less from thinking of, any empirical story". Indeed, in religious conviction the religious man resolves to follow a way of life because he believes in the truth of the doctrinal story associated with his resolution. It is in this religious belief that he finds justification for his conduct. To the question "why do you do this?" how common is this religious man's reply: "I do this because it is God's command!" The Christians certainly believe that because God loves them so they ought to love one another. They find the reason for following an agapeistic way of life in the conviction that "God loves them," by which they are trying to say that they themselves are the objects of God's love, and this gives them justification for their conduct of love to others. By ignoring the propositional element in religious assertions which, as suggested, can be retained in the form of "belief" and concentrating only on the conative element as the essence of religious assertions, Braithwaite has not characterised the religious assertions correctly. Indeed, the religious man does not use religious assertions in the way

---

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

Braithwaite suggests; for the religious man the propositional element is no less important than the conative element in his assertions.

There is one important aspect of the religious life which Braith-waite would not be prepared to ignore, and which in a way is very relevant to the moral life with which he identifies the religious life. This is the concept of prayer. If Braithwaite's interpretation of religious assertions is correct, the concept of prayer becomes meaningless. What does prayer involve? Prayer is generally regarded as talking to God. Now, talking to someone clearly involves (a) knowledge of, or belief in, the existence of the person talked to, and (b) directing one's talk to the person. It is senseless to say "I am talking to Tom — but Tom does not exist or is not believed by me to exist." If belief in the existence of God and directedness of one's talk which are presupposed by prayer are interpreted along Braithwaite's lines, then prayer as normally understood becomes an activity in which religious people never engage. They do not merely entertain the existence of God in thought while praying as Braithwaite's view would imply, they also believe in the existence of God. They would address Him neither as an object of knowledge, nor as an object of pure imagination, but as on object of belief, which in Kant's words would mean that they would address God as if He existed. In other words, they would expect some response from God in the way they expect response from human beings who are addressed or talked to in the same way. On Braithwaite's view, prayer loses this talking to or addressing form and becomes merely a kind of activity whereby one, reinforces one's intentions to pursue a certain moral policy. Braithwaite would agree with Paul F. Schmidt when the latter says: "When we pray to be forgiven, we are trying to instil in ourselves a disposition not to behave in a certain manner, and we wish our behaviour to manifest our sorrow, our concern over what happens and our repentance; when we pray for something we do not expect, I hope, it is like a telephone call to a large department store where the item is promptly mailed out. Rather we seek to develop in ourselves modes of behaviour that will tend to bring what is asked for."[66] This "evocative" function of prayer may be one of the meanings of the religious language used in prayer, but when the religious man is engaged in prayer, he, apart from showing certain feelings about his past conduct reinforcing his good

[66] Paul S. Schmidt, *Religious Knowledge*, p. 87.

intentions to follow the moral policy in right earnest, talks to or addresses God in Whose existence he believes.

Braithwaite admits that the positive account of religious belief that he has given is not "the whole truth about religious belief"[67] and insists throughout his Lecture that the primary use of religious assertions is to announce allegiance to a set of moral principles. This view of religious belief is an answer to the question as to "which view of religious belief is compatible with acceptance of a thoroughgoing logical empiricism," but it may be asked whether the aspect of religious belief that Braithwaite is describing and which he regards as the primary aspect is really the primary aspect. Here Braithwaite's critics will differ from him. They do not think that the conative aspect of religious belief is really a *primary aspect*, though they will concede that it is an important aspect. Thus H.D. Lewis says: "In presenting this view Professor Braithwaite makes much of the very close relation there has usually been thought to be between religion and ethics. In this, I, for one, go entirely with him. Few things seem to be more regrettable than neglect of this close relation of religion and ethics, and I have ventured on more than one occasion to voice some very vigorous protests against the tendency of some theologians to obscure or distort the ethical factor in religion. . . . Morality in some form lies at the heart of most religions " But, Lewis points out: "It is one thing to say this, and to be concerned about it, it is quite another to claim to give an account of all that matters in religion in ethical terms."[68] Braithwaite may reply that he has been misunderstood. He is just regarding the conative element as one and not the whole aspect. Though he says so and admits that there is a propositional element in a religious belief, the whole trend of his Lecture tends to ignore this element. It has already been argued that retaining the propositional element in religious belief by allowing the entertainment of doctrinal stories in thought only without believing them true and assigning to them psychological and causal function is tantamount to eliminating the propositional element altogether. Besides, he does not even mention that he is giving a secondary place to the propositional element which is implied by his contention that the conative

---

[67] Ian T. Ramsay, Ed., op. cit., p. 88,

[68] 36. RD. Lewis, *Philosophy of Religion* (London, 1965), pp. 92-93.

aspect is the "primary" use of religious beliefs. The way he accommodates doctrinal stories in his analysis of religious belief does not give them even a secondary position. If Braithwaite sincerely wishes to retain the propositional element, he cannot do so by giving it the position of "stories entertained in thought only"; it can be retained by taking stories as true, not in the sense of their being *known* to be true, but in the sense of their being *believed* to be true. "Belief " and "action" are the two basic components of religious life. Belief without action is a meaningless collection of words, and action without belief may be action all right, but it will not be the action of the religious man, however moral it may be in its character. It is the propositional element in the form of "belief" in religious assertions which gives them the name of religious beliefs and any system of religious statements in a particular religion the name of "belief system". If Braithwaite does not accept our interpretation, he is driven to the position which he seems to be avoiding that religious assertions are only declarations of commitment to a way of life and nothing else.

So we may conclude that Braithwaite's interpretation of religious utterances in terms of declarations of allegiance to a certain set of moral principles, as he has explained it, is not the correct interpretation of religious utterances. He is right in holding that religious utterances have no meaning in the sense that since they are not verifiable they cannot be factually meaningful, but the way he has tried to give them meaning by referring to the "use" principle and thus asserting that their use lies in their being declarations of allegiance to certain moral principles does not carry him far enough to give them any substantial meaning. Braithwaite's view of religious belief may be compatible with the spirit of empiricism, but it is hardly compatible with any religion (whatever view one may take of religion) especially with any higher religion. What is required is an interpretation of religious beliefs which may satisfy both empiricism and religion, and this is what Braithwaite has failed to achieve.

HAS IQBAL'S THOUGHT BEEN DISTORTED?

K.A. Rashid

In a letter published in The Pakistan Times sometime ago, I had stated: "An impression is being created that Iqbal was an advocate of the type of Sufism which is prevalent amongst the ignorant Muslim masses. Iqbal was a rationalist and an evolutionist, and never uttered anything against the Qur'ān." In a letter written to Maharaja Kishan Parshad on the 14th of April 1916, he says: "I have not written the *Mathnawī* on my own, but I was instructed to write it, and I am surprised why I was selected to express my views on this subject... . I knew I would be opposed, because we are the product of decadence. ... ' [translation mine]. This seed which Iqbal has sown in the dead land will grow, and in spite of opposition it will bear fruit. I have been promised that it will live.[69]

Then, in the Preface to the second edition to the *mathnawī Asrār-i Khudī*, he says: "In this edition those verses have been dropped which dealt with Khwājah Ḥāfiẓ, although they merely meant to criticise a certain literary attitude of the people and not the personality of Khwājah Hafiz."

In view of the above quotations, I would like to say that all that Iqbal's had said in his poetry, and what was expunged later, reappeared in his English writings, and still persists there to this day! This goes to show that Iqbal did not change his ideas about Sufism, and it was only under pressure that his rationalistic ideas about Sufism were forced to be dropped. This habit is still continuing, and many of his verses have been dropped. Even today efforts are being made to expunge his verses about Mawlānā Husain Aḥmad Madanī, not to mention about other problems, like the Return of Christ. I wonder if Iqbal's thought has been distorted. Why should Iqbal have expunged his verses about Ḥāfiẓ, if he was confident that he had been inspired? Iqbal believes in the Qur'ānic *Taṣawwuf* and not in the present-day ritualistic Sufism.

---

[69] *Adabī Dunyā*, "1qbal Number," V1/30, 12.

As no reply was received to this querry, I have resolved to dilate upon this question a little more and elaborate on the trend of thought that perpetrates to interpret the real teachings of Iqbal. I feel, we have fallen apart from what Iqbal meant to convey and have engaged ourselves in poetical and philosophical intricacies in which Iqbal never intended to enshroud himself. Of course, his medium of expression and communication is mostly poetry, and his line of thought philosophical, but he never meant to impress us by these two factors. Iqbal is the Poet of Islam, and we must not lose sight of this important fact. Iqbal is the interpreter of the Holy Qur'ān, and in his writings he has done nothing but to awaken in us a consciousness of religious duty regarding the wholesale recognition of the Almighty Creator. His preaching is the Unity of Being, the unity of thought and the unity of existence. Iqbal has in various ways interpreted the verses of the Qur'ān and he hoped the nation will ponder over his newer interpretations. He was fully conscious of the fact that all translations and interpretations of the Holy Qur'ān had become out of date, and newer meanings according to the dictionaries had to be given to make it more understandable according to the advancement made by modern research. With this in view he took a panoramic view of the Scriptures and brought out the salient features which had resulted in our decadence. The references of Iqbal in his poetry and prose are not meant to over-awe us with previous philosophies and thinking: but he brings them along to point out the gaps and loopholes they have created in our thinking which has led us far away from the Holy Qur'ān. In his *Lectures* (*Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*) he refers to almost two hundred persons of all branches of Science, Philosophy and Religion, but nowhere does he once recommend to us to follow any one of them. After giving their views he gives his own opinion and then refers to the Qur'ān as to what it says. In each problem, there-fore, he takes us back to the Qur'ān, meaning to prove to us that this is the only right path we should follow: a path we had forsaken since the last three hundred years. No matter what subject he is discussing, whether it be the existence of God, the meaning of Prayer, or .Ijtihād, or the philosophy of Movement and Time, for each subject he reverts to the Qur'ān and gives a modern interpretation of the verses as he understands them. This is discernible throughout his poetry and prose. In his selection of the translation of the verses of the Qur'ān, we find that he uses words which are most appropriate in our day, and which have been overlooked in the past. He was fully conscious of the fact that the

original rendering of the Qur'ān into Persian by Shāh Walī Allāh was according to the Arabic dictionary and suited to the times, but since then the world had advanced a very great deal putting new meanings into those words still remaining within the Arabic dictionary meanings. This needed readjustment to avoid con-fusion to the modern reader. The Uidu translations had failed to do so. They Had merely translated the Persian text without pondering what meanings fitted into the verses.

Iqbal's attitude towards Science is very compromising. It is because he knows that all knowledge, according to the Qur'ān, is external to man, in contradistinction to the Sufistic attitude which is mostly diverted inwards. lqbal's whole teaching is directed towards arousing the Muslims towards a self-consciousness based on Revelation. With this in view he develops his idea of personality, in the form of *Khudī* which is the essence of a human being. To give it perfection he links it with the Unity of Being and comes to the conclusion that there is nothing outside *Tawhīd* and elaborates traits which are expressions of this unique belief. Iqbal's whole thought revolves round *Tawḥīd*, be it politics or religion.

In interpreting Iqbal today, this vital point is lost sight of, and we start mixing up Iqbal with Existentialistic thinkers making a wide curve from his true teachings. We bring in all kinds of philosophies to aid us in this errand. lqbal keeps philosophy at an arm's length, like Ghazālī, and merely refers to them where they have gone astray. Iqbal's philosophy is the philosophy of action. Obviously, it cannot be pure philosophy: for, philosophy, instead of activating, is pacifying and par alysing ! The Holy Qur'ān does not discuss philosophy. This is a strange paradox. The Qur'ān mentions Biology, Genetics, Astronomy, Botany, Zoology, Minerology, Cosmology, Cosmogony, even Anatomy and Physiology, Embryology and Biochemistry, but never even a word about Philosophy ! Of course, it asks man to ponder, think and rationalise the creation outside and inside him, but nowhere asks man to philosophise! Once when a question was asked about the Soul, back came the reply: "It is Our business, and you have been given meagre knowledge of it." This was a shut-up reply, and man was prevented from putting any further questions on the subject. But strange as it would seem, man leapt out in search of the Soul and has written hundreds of thousands of pages without reaching any conclusion. And, then, he mixed up the *Nafs* with the soul (Hebrew, *Nafesh*) which meanings were against the Qur'ānic teachings. This led to the evolution of a whole system of Mysticism which

paralysed the community. It was against this misinterpretation that Iqbal had raised his voice. *Nafs* does not mean something sublime and immaterial inside the body of man. It means the conscious material self. This word appears almost two hundred times in different forms in the Qur'ān, and in only five places it means Heart; in the rest it means the Conscious Self. This shows that the entire thinking of the early and medieval Muslims was un-Qur'ānic. They had obviously been influenced by extraneous thought into which I have no intention of entering at this stage. It was this diversion towards which the nation had been driven when Iqbal proposed his theory of the Self, and expressed it in the *Secrets of the Self*. This Self is the Conscious Self or *Nafs* or Iqbal's *Khudī* which he desires to polish, illuminate and elevate. Unfortunately, so much pressure was brought upon him that he had to withdraw certain verses in the second edition of *Asrār-i Khudī*. But, strange as it may seem, Iqbal never forsook his ideas, and he was fully convinced that his ideas would bear fruit (see *supra*). But, unfortunately, the pressure of the clergy was so great that lqbal had to bow down to their demand. However, Iqbal had repeated these ideas in his *Lectures*, and his article "Islam and Ahmadism". But, most unfortunately again, our intellectuals who deal with modern philosophy and study and write about Iqbal seem to have missed this idea of the Unity of Being in Iqbal's thought, as they have completely overlooked it. They are writing on all kinds of things pertaining to Iqbal, but forget that Iqbal is reinterpreting and unfolding the Qur'ān to give the nation a sounder footing for further progress. Iqbal repeatedly says that this Book, the Qur'ān, is from a different Heaven: it is not a book, it is something entirely different — and if you wish to exist as a Muslim, you cannot live without the Qur'ān. Yet the interpreters of Iqbal are presenting him as a philosopher. To think is not to philosophise. To think is to rationalise! Iqbal's thought is primarily concentrated on the Qur'ān, and every time he tries to resolve the current problems in the light of Qur'ān's rationalistic thought and bring about a unity in creative thinking and unfold the unadulterated Unity of Being. It is for this reason that Pantheistic philosophy does not appeal to him. He has regard for Ibn ʻArabī as a philosopher, but not as a thinker; for, he often goes astray from the true teachings of the Qur'an. Iqbal is a rationalist and an evolutionist in his thought. He tries to bring about a sequence in the process of creation and synchronises the happenings in the universe. Iqbal has dealt with almost all the significant problems of philosophy, but he reinterpreted them in the light of the Qur'ān.

Iqbal is, therefore, a modern interpreter of the Qur'ān, and has brought the Qur'ānic knowledge up to date. There are some people who are trying to find contradictions in his statements. Some are even labouring to show that the Qur'ānic translations adopted by him are incorrect. This is all incorrect. There is a definite evolution in the thought of Iqbal, and all his thinking is beautifully linked. Those who find fault in his translations are themselves ignorant and unaware of the potentialities of the Qur'ānic words. Iqbal's translations of the verses of the Qur'an are factual and based on experience and modern research. They are not fanciful. Iqbal has drunk deep into modern philosophy and physics. But he is not content with their achievements, for he finds the various problems described differently in the Qur'ān. In the days when Ghazālī wrote his *Tahā fut a1-Falāsifah* he also criticised the philosophers, and with their own weapons. He did not bring in the Qur'ānic verses to contradict them. Their newer meanings had also not been unfolded upon him. But his main aim was to defeat the arguments of the philosophers with their own logic. In the time of Iqbal, knowledge had advanced to a much greater extent and the *Mutashābihāt* verses of the Qur'ān were becoming unfolded and con-firmed (*Muḥkamāt*) by a continuous process of research. Iqbal had full appreciation of this confirmation. Such verses as had become fully established for Iqbal still remained unestablished (*Mutashābthāt*) for the clergy, who had studied in the ancient lore and were unaware of modern knowledge. To them Iqbal seems unintelligible and un-comprehended. The so-called modern intellectuals in the Islamic world have indeed somewhat studied the modern sciences, but they are unaware of the Qur'ānic teachings! Iqbal was conversant with them both, and that is where he differs from them all. Iqbal, therefore, is unique in his thought and interpretation of the Holy Qur'ān.

Iqbal had a natural gift for poetry, and during the time he started to express his ideas, he naturally took to poetry ; for it was also the period of poetry with the Indian Muslims. Abu'l-Kalām Azad and Mawlānā Shiblī had just started to write prose, and also Muhammad Husain Azād. Ghālib, Dhauq and Ḥālī were hovering over the heads of the Muslims of India. Iqbal also tried his hand in writing prose. His excellent article in English on al-Jill's *Insān al-Kāmil* proved too high-flown for the Muslims to comprehend. He, therefore, resorted to writing poetry in Urdu, to express his ideas. But rather too soon he realised that Urdu was not the language for the expression of his ideas. It was too immature and incomplete. He, therefore, took to writing in

Persian, for it would also communicate his ideas to Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. He found Persian more fertile and the lands where Persian was spoken also more fertile. His thought would bear fruit sooner. By the time he had spread his message in poetry, he had gone through almost all the relevant literature and advances in scientific thinking in the Western world. He now wanted to convey the result of his researches to his people, but very soon realised that both the Persian and the Urdu languages were insufficient for the expression of his modern ideas, and he probably had the clergy also in mind who would perhaps again make an effort to rise up against him. He, there-fore, decided to write his masterpiece, The *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, in the English language. Iqbal has a great mastery over the English language too. Very few people indeed amongst his admirers have realised this fact. I say this, because the subject "Iqbal as a Prose-writer" has been completely neglected. One of Iqbal's English passages I cannot forget, and I have often quoted this as a masterpiece of English literature. I cannot refrain from quoting it here, He writes:

> "The life history of nations shows that when the tide of life in a people begins to ebb, decadence itself becomes a source of inspiration, inspiring their poets, philosophers, Saints, Statesmen, and turning them into a class of apostles whose sole ministry is to glorify, by the force of a seductive art of logic, all that is ignoble and ugly in the life of their people. These apostles unconsciously clothe despair in the glittering garments of hope, undermine the traditional values of con-duct and thus destroy the spiritual virility of those who happen to be their victims."[70]

Does this not remind one of Sa'dī's prose in his *Majlis-i Panchgānah* or the Urdu prose of Abu'l-Kalām Āzād in his *Tadhkirah*? It is certainly an excellent example of writing poeiry in prose ! Iqbal's thought flows unobstructed even in prose where he has been able to express his ideas even more fully. He has thus repeated many of his thoughts in his English prose which were dropped out of his Persian and Urdu poetry! ! ! Iqbal's thoughts could not have been suppressed by the pressure of clergy The clergy did not understand his

[70] Reproduced from *Islam*- the organ of Anjuman-I Khuddamuddin, Lahore 1.16, Tuesday, 22 january 1936.

method of revitalising and rejuvinating the Muslim nation. They were concerned only with their own ritualistic and traditional thought that remained uninterfered with, so that they could go on influencing the ignorant Muslim masses, so that they did not loose their importance.

I do not deny that there may be some flaws and contradictions in Iqbal's writings. But we must not forget that Iqbal's writings are a human composition and not a Divine Revelation. However, most of the contradictions pointed out are not contradictions in my opinion. They are a step in the process of evolution in his thought which is progressive and has a forward movement. I feel that Iqbal has tried to bring about a compromise between the various schools of thought amongst the Muslim thinkers. In this small article it is not possible to go into the details of this subject, but I will cite one example for which Iqbal is often quoted and sometimes maligned. It is the problem of Reason and Emotion which appears in his poetry as '*Aql* and '*Ishq*.

This problem is as old as Adam and Eve! And there has always been conflict between the two! But the two have never lived apart with-out a compromise. At the time of the creation of Man, God endowed man and woman with four attributes, viz.: (I) '*Ilm*, or Knowledge, (2) '*Aql*, or Reason, (3) Speech and (4) Emotion, or '*Ishq*. To man He gave more of Reason and Knowledge and to woman He gave more of speech and emotion ! This was a necessary and natural distribution. Woman had to bring up a progeny, and if she kept mum she would produce a progeny of dumb children! This is, therefore, an essential quality that she should speak more and speak by repetition. Man had to think more and hence he of necessity would speak less. And as the faculty of speech required an emotional background, woman was made more emotional. This was also necessary, as man after the day's toil needed more of attention: woman was endowed with more of this faculty. Marital relations also required that woman should be more emotional than man. This was thus the natural distribution of functions between the two sexes.

If we go through lqbal's prose and poetry we will find that he is trying to bring about a compromise between prevalent Sufistic thought, which had inclined towards emotionalism due to the influence of Greek thought and later the Vedantic thought, and the rationalistic Qur'ānic thought. In his Urdu poetry we find him coming to grips with this problem for the first time and he appears to be pacifying the emotionalists. But in his Persian poetry he

is more rationalistic and has almost brought about a compromise between the two. In his *Lectures* he completely avoids the problem and makes it appear that he has resolved it. Only in one place he mentions the word Passion, if that can be construed to mean '*Ishq* (emotion): and here too he does not use it in a very healthy sense. Briefly speaking, Iqbal's attitude towards this problem is factually compromising, and similar is the attitude of his spiritual teacher Mawlānā Rūmī.[71] Unfortunately, those who write on the subject select such verses of Iqbal which give an air of emotionalism, as if Iqbal was a non-rationalist! Iqbal cannot be an emotionalist as he is following in the footsteps of the Holy Qur'ān. The Qur'ān is a book of Reason — '*Aql*. This is clearly indicated by the abundance of its verses on the subject. It grants a very high place to Reason. In one place it says:"And He casts uncleanliness on those who will not use their Reason" (x. 100).

Iqbal is primarily a commentator of the Qur'ān, which very few people have realised. He offers a modern commentary in accordance with the advances of knowledge, thus making the renderings more up to date. Indeed, very few people have realised that the Qur'ān is not giving us a ready digested material. We have to swallow and digest it! It contains everything that has been verified and discovered and that has yet to be discovered. Its *Mutashābihāt* verses are becoming established by a gradual process of research, and by the end of this universe the whole of the Qur'ān will have become established or confirmed (*Muḥkam*) and then the people will see that all that the Qur'an was saying WAS CORRECT! Only we had failed to understand it. Even Kenneth Cragg (*Mind of the Qur'an*) has failed to understand the significance of close these verses.

Iqbal had fully realised that the medieval commentators had brought in superfluous ideas drawn from extraneous sources and had tried to impinge them upon the Qur'ān, which, instead of taking the reader forward, takes him back into wild untraced valleys of philosophy and logic. The Qur'ān has a logic of its own which cannot be disowned or denied even though it may not

---

71

پس نکو گفت آن رسول خوش جواز ذرۂ عقلت به از صوم و نماز

fit into the devices of syllogism. The Qur'ān also does not dabble in philosophy, for it knows that philosophy makes things vague. The teachings of the Qur'ān are firm, concrete and definite. The Qur'ān discourages philosophy, as already pointed out above. We see that philosophy in all its aspects has tried to confuse Reality and take people away from the true religion. The Revealed Religion teaches about the Unity of Being-*Tawḥīd*. But philosophy tries to split it up in its own peculiar way, either as a Trinity or as a Pantheon. It even does not hesitate a denial of the Ultimate Being, the Creator. *Waḥdat al-Wujūd* and *Waḥdat al-Shuhūd* (Pantheism and Panantheism) are tricks from up its sleeves ! This, in short, is the achievement of philosophy. Iqbal had very early realised this and tried to contradict this attitude in his prose and poetry. Alas ! we have failed to understand him and have taken the controversy further instead of calling a halt to it. The reason for this lack of appreciation is that the bulk of Muslim thinkers had inclined towards Sufistic thought. Sufistic leanings had also destroyed the pristine purity of *Tawḥīd*. This they affected by bringing in mediators ! The Muslims had come so much under the influence of Sufis that it became an ordeal to avoid them. Islam is a practical religion. It is the religion of action. It is not the religion of monasticism or escapism. It is the religion of "Do" and "Remember," as the Qur'ān directs. Iqbal wanted to dissolve this mystery, but so much pressure was brought upon him that he reluctantly had to withdraw some very significant Persian verses which were the matrix of his thought.

Iqbal had a great desire to rewrite the Islamic *Fiqh* and he had expressed this desire to several friends verbally and in writing. One wonders why he wanted to do this. The science of *Fiqh* was greatly valued by the '*Ulamā*', and they could not afford to let anyone mould it. But Iqbal was very much conscious of the modern needs of man. He knew fully well that all *Fiqh* had been written in the cosy atmosphere of metropolises, while the actual *Ijtihād* was being done by Islam's fighting forces in lands far beyond the original frontiers of Islam, and in the outlying areas of Central Asia, fighting under varying circumstances and under strenuous conditions. The '*Ulamā*' could not realise the difficulties of the struggling man; for, they themselves did not have to struggle and were living on easy money of the courts of the rulers. The '*Ulamā* ' soon turned into a class of *Mullās*, whom Iqbal has condemned because subsequently they did not possess that knowledge with which the '*Ulamā*' were endowed and which the Qur'ān was demanding. They thus

created difficulties in the life of the struggling people. These *Mullās* put the brakes so tightly that the nation could hardly move. The *Fiqh* which we follow today has led the nation into blind alleys of ignorance and apathy. It was for this reason that Iqbal had a great desire to rewrite the *Fiqh*. Says Iqbal: "Since the destruction of Baghdad they 'became extremely conscious and would not allow any freedom of Ijtehad."[72] Iqbal further says: "Thus the first objection of the nineteenth-century Muslim reformers was a fresh orientation of the faith and a freedom to reinterpret the law in the light of advancing experiences."[73] By reformers, of course, he means Mawlānā Jamāl-ud-dīn Afghānī, Sayyid Aḥmad Khan, ʻAbduh, and in the twentieth century Prince Said Ḥalīm Pāshā, Muṣṭafā Kamāl Pāshā (Kamal Ataturk), Ibn Sa'ūd and Ridā' Shah Pehlevi. Another reason Iqbal considers for the reorientation' of Islamic thought is the growing influence of mysticism amongst the ignorant Muslim masses. He says: "The nineteenth-century reformers rose in revolt against mysticism and called Muslims to the broad daylight of the modern world. Not that they were materialist. Their mission was to open the eyes of the Muslims to the spirit of Islam which aimed at the conquest of matter and not flight from it."[74]

It will thus have become quite clear that Iqbal had become fully alive to the problem of giving the Muslims a newer interpretation of the Islamic Law which would give them a simpler path to tread on in this modern world.

Iqbal was fully conscious of the contribution of the non-Arab Muslims towards Islamic studies, but he was rather pessimistic, and lamentably so, whether they had really understood the real spirit of Islam in which a lot of extraneous matter had poured in to dilute the dynamic spirit of this universal religion; Iqbal had indeed taken inspiration from Rūmī and Ghazālī, Shah Walī Allāh and Jamāl-ud-dīn Afghānī. But he had selected the matrix of their teachings which, according to Iqbal, represented a truer appreciation of the Qur'an. The extraneous matter they had also rejected. Iqbal does not in any way ridicule or deprecate the non-Arab nations, as something inferior; no, he admires their culture and character. But Iqbal had realised very early that all

---

[72] Islam, I/10, 22 January 1936, p. 31.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

that was un-Qur'ānic had been coming through their sources, as, for instance, Manichaean and Zoroastrian ideas had trickled in, and, similarly, Vedantic Buddhistic spiritualism had greatly influenced Islamic thought and also the Greek thinkers had influenced the Islamic teachings. All these Iqbal considered as non-Arab influences. The pristine purity of Islam had been adulterated by these sources which included the new converts. Iqbal clearly says in one of his Urdu quatrains[75] that all are prostrating before the idols of the non-Arab ('Ajam) world who have created a culture, a mysticism, a *Shari'ah* and *Kalām* in their own fashion, in which the *Ummah* is lost by forsaking the teachings of the Qur'an. Iqbal does not mean to belittle the personality of the great men of the non-Arab world, but he certainly detests the thought and ideas brought in by them.

[75] Sāqī Nāmah" *Bāl-i Jibril*:

تمدن تصورف شریعت کلام بتانِ عجم کی پچاری تمام

حقیقت خرافات میں کھو گئی یہ اُمت روایا ت میں کھو گئی!

IQBAL, THE GREAT SERVANT OF HUMANITY*

H.E. Ahmad All Bahrami

Today's commemoration is particularly rejoicing and significant in that it is being held on the noble soil of the People's Republic of China which herself, and for centuries, has been fashioned by humanitarian mystique and traditional hospitality. This is why I would like to pay a fervent homage to this great assembly consisting of so many eminent personalities who seek to penetrate the secret of the genius and the depth of thought, the revolutionary impulse of Iqbal, while at the same time cherishing his memory in offering him the respect and veneration that we all owe to this great servant of humanity.

The great servant of humanity was also an eminent man of letters, both a poet and a writer, and able to express himself marvellously well in three languages — Urdu, Persian and English.

Iqbal wrote his poetry as well in Persian as he did in Urdu and held the pen with authority and competence in the English language.

His two well-known works edited in the English language, The *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* and *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, are sufficiently well known and are a proof of the perfect mastery with which he expressed all the nuances of his thought in the language used by Shakespeare.

In Iqbal we admire not only a poet with an exquisite talent but also a philosopher who used poetry as a means of expression enabling him to give better expression to his inner meditations. Iqbal opened eyes to the world at a time when the entire Indian subcontinent was plunged into distress and destitution. India could only oppose the injustice of which it was the object for endless centuries with a more or less passive resistance. It was probably

---

* Being the English translation of a speech delivered during Iqbal Day Programme in Peking. Courtesy of the Embassy of Pakistan.

the display before his eyes of the scenes of misery and distress of his fellow human beings which made Iqbal revolt and aspire for liberty and to throw himself bodily into the political melee. Pakistanis accord him recognition for having proclaimed the necessity for the formation of an Islamic State on the Indian subcontinent. Alas! it was only (nine years) after his death that the independence of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic was proclaimed. It certainly would have been a consolation for him to see emerging from this ocean of races, cults and dialects that India is, a nation motivated not only by common ethics but also expressing itself in one language.

All those who know Iqbal accord him the recognition for having worked with courage and abnegation for the independence and spiritual development of his country.

It is of interest to follow Iqbal in the long and difficult march which led him to the summit of talent and towards a recognition which we will always accord him.

In 1905, Iqbal left his home for England where he studied philosophy at Cambridge University. His thesis for the doctor's degree entitled *Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, written in English, crowned the end of his studies in England. He left for Munich in 1908, where also he obtained a Doctorate in Philosophy.

During his stay in Europe, Iqbal was struck by the technological development in the West without, at the same time, allowing himself to be paralysed by the purely materialistic aspects of the European civilisation.

As a young man Iqbal fervently devoted himself to regenerating and shaping the nationalist sentiments of the peoples of the sub-continent.

Imbued with brotherly love, his nature overflowed with compassion; his pure and sensitive soul was painfully disturbed by the tyranny inflicted in different regions on the masses, with whom he identified himself.

His words and deeds laid the foundation of a social, spiritual and moral institution, that of a regenerated humanity.

His prime objective was the salvation of the Muslim population of the subcontinent and, next, the liberation of the oppressed people throughout the world.

His mission, the mainspring of which was fraternal love and unity of all humanity, was to be realised in stages, beginning with the unity of Muslims throughout the world, as inspired by the great leader of Islam.

His passion for independence and unity, deeply rooted in all his being,

compelled Iqbal towards lyrical creations that uphold heroism and bravery and condemn weakness and indifference.

Iqbal's first piece of work, *Asrār-i Khudī*, is purely a means of self-realisation, and thereby one of achieving predominance of mind over matter. Through poetry, the philosopher tries to make the people in the East conscious of the richness of their cultures and the grandeur of their civilisations. "To know your country, know yourselves!" — this is substantially Iqbal's message to all those who respect and admire him. One who denies humanism is a non-believer. But one who doubts himself is worse still, says Iqbal in one of his poems. In conclusion, he adds: To penetrate the secret of creation is nothing else than striving to know oneself.

Iqbal's philosophy develops also in another book, *Payām-i Mashriq*, which is in a way a reply to Goethe's *West Ostlicher Divan* which claimed that nothing can save the peoples of the East.

Though his writings such as *Jāvid Nāmah* and *Pas Chih Bāyad Kard Ay Aqwām-i Sharq*, Iqbal attacks the negative elements of Oriental philosophy such as "determinism," according to which life on earth is transitory and non-consequential. Iqbal considers this indifference to life irrational and attacks it with the full force of his talent:

Don't waver on the shore

Listening to the fury of the waves,

Plunge yourself into the sea,

For eternal life resides in hard struggle.

Says Iqbal in one of the collections of his poems:

A man sleeping on the seaside said:

"I have been living since a long time,

But I do not know exactly what I am."

A wave came to crash against the coast,

Shouting, "I move, otherwise I would have no chance to exist."

And finally, in his *Payām-i Mashriq* (Message to the East), is the optimistic note full of hope, like a mystic rose that blossoms in his palm:

Oh people of the East, what should be done?

Will the East once again be illuminated?

Yes!

Because deep within its nature the revolution sparkles,

The dark night will go away

And give place to light and eternal brightness.

Motivated by the mysteries and purity of humanism, his soul ceaselessly searched in the crucible of life's challenge for new modes of self-expression, and did not waver an instant on the threshold of the conventional and traditional manifestations of life.

His life succeeded in overcoming all physical and material obstacles that separate men and peoples, so that the audacious promise, the supreme harmony which springs from reconciliation and through which rises a new world based on unity and humanism, could flower and be born.

Having explored all the intricacies of the labyrinth of the human soul, devoured and consumed by the ardent desire to create a more just and a more equitable world, Iqbal was finally attached to this school of meditation and vision which calls itself mysticism and whose essential aim consists in promoting human virtues and eternal union through love for universal understanding.

Under the passionate impulse of this school of thought, as well as under the impulse of living as true human beings, pushed by love for his fellow men, Iqbal sought to discover the laws and the links of causality that rule the relationships between individuals and peoples as well as with their social environment.

It was during this period of meditation and contemplation that his soul found an outlet in the otherwise unfathomable depths of truth, an outlet towards the very source and nature of things, hoping thereby to find in the

micro-world of particles and molecules which he had not been able to find in a world where inequality ruled over the human conditions. What he looked for were the secrets of this harmony and the magnetic effects of this universal law which can only establish and exercise itself for the benefit of all.

In the end and after a long period of mystic contemplation and research, that always found expression in vibrant lyricism, he discovered this universal and human law.

This law was none other than the virtue of the soul to profess fraternity and love for the neighbours and to learn to live in co-existence, friendship and peace both in individual and social relations as well as on the political and international scene.

One can, therefore, say that long before the principles of peace and cooperation were born in the international community, the Poet and Thinker of Lahore had composed the sweet songs of humanism and fraternity through his poems full of beauty and dreams.

These were the songs that he offered to humanity as a token of happiness and universal salvation.

Iqbal was a thinker and at the same time a poet strangely initiated into the secrets of music and the consonance of Persian poetry, particularly in that genre and that poetic form which is full of enthusiasm and is called lyricism.

It is for this reason that on reading his poems we rejoice in the discovery of the profound affinities with the two great Persian poets, Sa'dī and Ḥāfiẓ — with Sa'dī, because he was eternally sanctifying the wisdom and human solidarity, who, like Iqbal, has said:

Human beings are limbs of the same body,

Because through their creation, they participate in the same essence.

If misfortune strikes one limb,

The others will also feel its pain.

You, if you are indifferent to the misfortunes of others,

You are not worthy of the name of Man —

with Ḥāfiẓ, because he was the very essence of the poetic and mystic imagination, which urged him, as in Iqbal, not to stop at the surface of things, to reveal the unfathomable reality of things, because one who struggles to gain the light of truth has to defy the evils of darkness.

In their search for perfection and refinement in mystic devotion, Iqbal and both thought that human beings must apply themselves to a constant and creative meditation on the Ḥāfiẓ world of eternal change until they have forgotten themselves or at least succeed in dominating their ego, in order to serve humanity and their fellow beings.

Iqbal portrays the essence of this idea when he says:

Whether I am living or not

I am not conscious of it,

Because if I feel I exist or if I speak of it,

I will be an egotist;

But with a plaintive and harmonious tone

Someone murmurs within me that I exist.

The same idea is lyrically expressed by Hāfiẓ:

What is this voice which rises in my exhausted soul

And in my being at the end of its force?

I do not know at all its plaintive airs nor the vibrant music!

That it should not cease to pour out tumultuously

While silence reigns on my lips.

His soul constantly regenerated by the perfume of love, Iqbal's affinity with another great thinker and Persian poet grows more and more. This is Mawlānā Jalāl-ud-dīn, generally known as Rūmī.

Having similar sources of inspiration as Rūmī, Iqbal also chose this simple form of rythmic poetry called *Mathnawī* in order to pour into it

successive waves of his aesthetic emotion and of his mystic and revolutionary ecstasy.

In a sauve voice and seductive images he says:

Come and see how I have transformed the world

Drinking from the pitcher of Rūmī the sage.

This sparkling wine which wipes away even memory of your lost hope.

This mystic wine that constitutes henceforth

The noble ethic of an erring humanity.

Iqbal was quite right, because the international community has begun to be conscious of this ethic and this belief, which can be nothing other than the aspiration for social justice and for happiness of human beings without any discrimination whatsoever.

As his centenary draws nearer, his revolutionary zeal, his enthusiasm and his humanism urge us to meditate, and his voice, which knows no frontiers but echoes freely across the world, invites us to reflect, when he murmurs:

When I am no longer there

People will read my poems and say

A lucid man has shaken the world.

In that there is, I think, a vibration of love of one of the greatest initiates who belongs to the entire humanity.

Let us cherish his memory because he gives us strength and comfort, while hoping that the interdependent destinies of peoples and nations, travel together harmoniously towards horizons more luxuriant with love and with happiness, with justice and with peace,

THE GUIDE OF THE AGE*

S. M. Owais, Tr.

(1)

خضرِ وقت از خلوتِ دشتِ حجاز آید بروں
کارواں زیں وادئ دور و دراز آید بروں

Oh, Hark ! the Guide of Age is up and risen

From cloistered waste of Desert Araby!

And now from that far-off lonely wild Vale,

The Caravan starts and hastens, marches on !

(2)

من بسیمائے غلاماں فرِّ سلطاں دیدہ ام
شعلۂ محمود از خاکِ ایاز آید بروں

So radiant in the brows of his bondsmen

The Sultan's regal refulgence I've seen,

As leaps from dust of lowly humble Ayaz,

The many-splendoured flame of great Maḥmūd!

---

* *Zabūr-i `Ajam*, p. 103.

(3)

عمرہا در کعبه و بت خانه می نالد حیات
تا زبزمِ عشق یک دانائے راز آید بروں!

For ages long in Ka'bah and idol-house

Life sighs and yearns to grow and find own self,

Till comes the Sage — from hallowed Hall of Love

Of God's secrets and His Purpose fully wise!

(4)

طرحِ نو می افگند اندر ضمیرِ کائنات
ناله ہا کز سینۂ اہلِ نیاز آید بروں!

For inmost chord of God's own high Heavens

A melody fresh, a strain all new is vouched.

By soulful sighs when they in harmony rise

From hearts in tune with God, in submission couched.

(5)

چنگ را گیرید ازدستم که کار از دست رفت
نغمه ام خوں گشت و از رگہائے ساز آید بروں

Ah, take this lyre, my friend, from palsied hand!

No music-maker now ! Nor music in refrain !

To flowing stream of blood is turned my strain,

And now bursting gushes forth from lyre's stringed veins.

IQBAL'S QUATRAINS IN ARMUGHAN-I HIJAZ*

Q. A. Kabir, Tr.

چہاں از خود بروں آوردۂ کیست؟
جمالش جلوۂ بے پردۂ کیست؟
مرا گوئی کہ از شیطاں حذر کن؟
مگو با من کہ اُو پروردۂ کیست؟

Who brought the wide world on the cosmos scene?

Who flashed the sheen of the "Beauty Unseen"?

You bid me look out for the Satan's teen;

Who reared him to teem on the Gardens green ?

دل بے قید من در پیچ و تابیست
نصیبے من عتابے یا خطابیست
دلِ ابلیس ہم نتوانم آزرد
گناہ گاہے گاہے من صوابیست

My heart not prisoned is writhing with pain,

Is he destined for a prize or a sheer disdain?

---

* *Armughān-i Ḥijāz*, pp, 4-13.

I wished not to hurt the Satan's heart too,

So often my sins—God bless--were true.

صَبَنْتِ الکلّسِ عنّا اُمّ عَمرٍو
و کانَ الکاسّ مجراهَا الیمینا
اگر ایں است رسمِ دوستداری
بدیوارِ حرم زن جام و مینا

O AMRINE, thou hast reversed the cup of Wine

While the Cup had to move from right-hand line;

If this is fashion of thy fellowship lore

By the sacred "WALL" bang the flask and bowl.

بخود پیچیدگاں در دل اسیرند
ہمہ در د اند و درماں ناپذیرند
سجود از ما چہ میخواہی کہ شاہاں
خراجے از دہِ ویراں نہ گیرند

The self-diving hearts are captives of Lures,

All victims of pains and wriggling for Cures;

Thou seekest my kowtows but see that Kings

Are never prone to tax the desolated Wings.

دلِ من در کشادِ چند و چوں است

نگاہش از مہ و پرویں بلند است
بدہ ویرانۂ در دوزخ اُو را
کہ ایں کافر بسے خلوت پسند است

My mind often rakes in man's "how" and "why,"

The glance getting higher than Stars and Sky;

So hurl this heart in a ruined hellish heat,

This heathen is mad for a lone retreat.

چہ شور است ایں کہ در آب و گل اُفتاد
ز یک دل عشق را صد مشکل اُفتاد
قرارِ یک نفس بر من حرام است
بمن رحمے کہ کارم با دل اُفتاد

Why the Mud and Clay make a roaring glee

A hundred Love trials one heart would see;

A moment's rest is destined not to me,

Me forbear my deeds are linked with Heart and me.

روم راہے کہ اُو را منزلے نیست
ازاں تخمے کہ ریزم حاصلے نیست
من از غم ہا نمی ترسم و لیکن
بدہ آں غم کہ شایانِ دلے نیست

From whence I hail and whither will I go,

I gather no gains from the seeds I sow;

I fear not the griefs on a point please see,

I wish not the griefs not worthy of me.

مئے من از تنک جاماں نگه دار
شرابِ پخته از خامان نگه دار
شرر آز نیستانے دور تر به
بخاصاں بخش و از عاماں نگه دار

Keep off my wine from the shallow-hearted meeks,

Hold the ripe rum from the raws and the weaks,

As we keep the spark away from the reeds and hay,

So hold for the known and keep the crowd away.

ترا ایں کشمکش اندر طلب نیست
تر ایں درد و داغ و تاب و تب نیست
ازاں از لامکاں بگریختم من
که آں جا ناله ہائے نیم شب نیست

Thou hast no quest in thy efforts and zeals,

No wounds and scars and stirring writhing reels,

To the empyrean Stay I preferred a flight,

It was void of wails of the mid of night.

ز من ہنگامۂ دہ ایں جہاں را
دگرگوں کن زمین و آسماں را
ز خاکِ ما دگر آدم بر انگیز
بِکش ایں بندۂِ سود و زیاں را

Bid me shake the world with a cry and hue,

Get change on the globe with a complex new,

From the dust of mine make an Adam again,

Kill the bonds and slaves of the Loss and Gain.

جہانے تیرہ تر با آفتابے
صوابِ اُو سراپا ناصوابے
ندائم تا کجا ویرانۂ را
دہی از خونِ آدم رنگ و آبے

The gloom still lurking in the broad daylight,

His right is ne'er right but the might is right;

I know not how far he stoops to his doom,

From the Adam's blood get a glow and bloom.

غلامم جز رضائے تو نجویم
جز آں راہے کہ فرمودی نہ پویم

و لیکن گر به ایں ناداں بگوئی
خرے را اسپ تازی گو نه گویم

Thy slave I am and seek thy pleasure alone,

I tread not a path not guided and shown;

If thou ever bids this silly slave to say,

An ass a Berber horse I would not say.

نخواہم ایں جہاں و آں جہاں را
بجز ایں بس که دانم رمزِ جاں را
سجودے ده که از سوز و سرورے
بوجد آرم، زمین و آسماں را

I wish not this World nor the Cosmos whole,

Save that I know the essence of the Soul,[76]

So kindle my kowtows with melting delight,[77]

Bid me move the world with an ecstatic light.

مسلمانے که در بندِ فرنگ است
دلش در دستِ اُو آساں نیاید

[76] Or the inner pith of Soul.

[77] Kindle being a verb, emphasis can also be in the end of 'die. If "So kindle" is read as ONE METRE, then add "a" before "melting".

ز سیمائے کہ سودم بر درِ غیر
سجودے بوذر و سلماں نیاید

A Moslem tied down to a European fold,

is heart cannot be with ease in his hold;

From the head I knocked at an alien's door,

This bow can't be in Bu Zar-o Salmān's lore.[78]

بہ آں قوم از تو مے خواہم کشادے
فقیہش بے یقینے، کم سوادے
بسے نادیدنی را، دیدہ ام من
مرا اے کاش کہ مادر نہ زادے

I seek for this nation a rising field jurists,

With jurists confused and too hard to yield;

The woes I have seen I wish not to spot,

Alas my mother had mothered me not!

[78] Viz. Abu Zar-o Salmān, two disciples of the Prophet.

Book Review

CULTURE OF ISLAM, by (Dr) Afzal Iqbal, Pakistan Foreign Service; first published, 1967; second revised edition, 1974; published by the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore: no. 266: pice R s 30.

This is a delightful book and one that is sheer pleasure to review. The author has to his credit the first ever English work fully devoted to the poetry of Jalal al-Dīn Rūmī and is the author of the first biography of Mawlānā Muhammad ‘Ali Jauhar. It is rare indeed for a diplomat to undertake creative writing and to produce such an interesting book; in sum, to evoke the shades of the late Harold Nicholson.

The aim of the book is to study the cultural factors that shaped the pre-Islamic Arabia, the trans-formation wrought by Islam, interaction of the early Muslim culture with the Greek and Persian factors, and the evolution of Muslim jurisprudence and study of the *Ḥadīth*. The work breaks new ground in the sense that it does not study the problem as a study of the history of Islam but takes a broader perspective. It is well written and couched in a very interesting and catching style.

The book naturally starts with the societal structure and ethos of the pre-Islamic Arabia, known as the jāhilīyyah period. A.K. Julius Germanus says of the pre-Islamic Arabic language: "The Arabic language lent itself easily to the expression of thoughts and feelings of the uncouth sons of the desert. This richest of the tongues can pride itself on the greatest number of poets, *surpassing not only the bards of antiquity but of the world's poets*, dead or living. If this assertion seems an exaggeration, it speedily may be verified by undeniable facts. While ancient classic literature boasts of only ten poets of fame, the dawn of Arabic poetry con-fronts them with a hundred" ("Hilāl Nājī, the Poet, in the Light of his Critics," *Islamic Culture*, XLII/3 (1968), 151).

The author has rightly concluded that the tribal rivalry, exploits based upon *sa'ālīk* (brigandage), and the internecine strife that characterised the life of northern Arabia reasserted itself during the Umayyad Caliphate. But this was not the whole fabric of Arabic poetry. It also became mystic and abstract as in the poetry of Ibn Fārid and Ma'arrī. His statement, therefore, about the Arab ethos that: "The Arab mind is incapable of reviewing an object as a whole. He looks only at a certain aspect. He is incapable of a thorough analysis and synthesis of his perception and thought. If he stands before a tree, for example. he does not study it as a whole, but he is impressed by one particular feature of the tree, say, the straightness of its trunk or the beauty of its leaves. ... Not a single subject discussed thoroughly and evaluated fully can be discovered in famous books like *al-Aghānī* (*Iṣbahāni*), *al-'Iqd al-Farīd* (Ibn'Abd Rabbihī), *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān* and *Kitāb al-Bayān wa'l-Tabiyyīn* of *al-Jāḥiẓ*. It is diflicult to find in these books any continuity of thought" (pp. 44--i6).

This is a statement that requires further study. Do we then conclude that Ibn Taymīyyah, al-Birunī, Ibn Sīnā', Fārābī, al-Rāzī, and so on display continuity of thought because the first was of Kurdish extraction, the next three Central Asians, and the last a Persian? Al-Kindī, Shaykh Muḥiy al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Bājjah, and others were full-blooded Arabs, and they have left a system of thought all the same. *Al-Aghānī* is a

compilatory effort and the Umayyad Abu al-Faraj Iṣbahānī could not have compiled it all alone. Nor can Arabic be charged with neglecting drama. Persian also left that genre alone. It is so prone to universalism within what is apparent, one doubts if the Arabic poetry from the early Abbasid period down to the thirteenth century can be surpassed. For instance, the half-Syrian, half-Persian Abū Nuwās says:

اذا امـــتحن الـــدّنيا لبيـــب تكشـــفت

لـــه مـــن عـــدد فی ثيـــاب صـــديق

[The wise man, when he tests the world, finds that it is an enemy that is dressed in the garb of a seeming friend.]

The Yamanite Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbi, in a superb couplet, goes even further:

كفـــیٰ بـــک داءً ان تـــری المـــوت شـــافياً

و حـــب المنايـــا ان يكـــن امانيـــا

[Thou, overcome by the extremity of affliction, feelest death would be the cure. Enough is it for the success of death that it should become wish.]

Nor could Arabic poetry be-come confined to the mere delineation of contours and sensuous encounters in the light of the Qur'ānic message. The Qur'ān, especially in the Meccan *sūrahs*, has emphasised, time and again, the limits of human comprehension (sūrah xcvii. [Power] might be quoted as an example) and ushered for the first time in the history of mankind the first ever non-anthropomorphic concept of

God. How different is the context of the *Sūrat al-'Alaq* (The Clot) from the Book of Nahum in the Old Testament:

"The burden of Ninevah. The book of the vision of Nahum the Elkoshite God is jealous, and the LORD revengeth; the Lord revengeth, and is furious; the LORD will take vengeance on his adversaries, and he reserveth *wrath* for his enemies" (1: 1-2).

The burden of the Qur'an is that everything depends upon: "Do good deeds, and you will be requited":

آمنو و عملوالصٰلحت

Dr Afzal Iqbal discusses under "Did the Pre-Islamic Arab Completely Shed His Old Character?" the reliquae that clung to the Arab. He observes: "The literature produced during the Umayyad period, particularly poetry, bears a clear imprint of the preIslamic period. The popularity of the satire, the sentiments of self-pride and scorn for other tribes — these were clearly reminiscent of the days of ingornance and had no coherent link with the rising tradition of Islam. . . . Both tendencies worked side by side in different spheres of life" (p. 67).The tribal orientation of Abū al-Faraj Iṣbahāni, who, despite the eponymous name of Iṣbahāni, was an Umayyad through and through, might explain the discursive nature of his work. Other-wise people like Ibn al-Haytham, the physicist, and al-Kindī, both full Arabs, wrote perfectly coherent works. The state of affairs at the Abbasid court

might ex-plain the hedonism of Abū Nuwās.

The author's treatment of the cultural meeting between the Arab and the Iranian is masterly. I do not know whether in a work of this sort *al-Aghānī* has been quoted so liberally to etch out the impact of Persian ethos upon Arabic, but Dr Afzal iqbal has done so very well — and very convincingly. The Arab gave to the Iranian the prosodiacal system in poetry; the Persian gave to the Abbasids their turban (symbolising the synthesis of the Arab and ʻAjamī elements). Observes the author: "So freely, in fact, did the Arab writer accept the Persian traditions that we soon find the traditions of the Persian court being transplanted into Arab life. Literary meetings, an institution borrowed from Persia, began to be held in a spirit of complete relaxation. At such meetings a poet would recite his latest poem, a musician would entertain with a song, a storyteller would come out with a story, and there would be plenty of witty jokes, repartees, and lively conversation. This manner of meetings was wholly inspired by the Persians. It was, in fact, the court of the Persian

kings grafted on the Arab soil" (p. 100).

Add to this the *Arabian Nights,* and the picture becomes clearer.

The author's discussion of the movement led by ʻAbd Allāh b. Sabā', one of the ringleaders be-hind the martyrdom of the Third Pious Caliph, is rather incisive. Sabā' was a Yamanite Jew who had become a convert to Islam. The author observes: "When ʻAlī was assassinated, Ibn Ḥazm quotes Ibn Sabā', the Jew, as protesting: ʻBy God, by God, we shall never believe that ʻAll died. He shall never die until he fills the world with justice as it is now filled with injustice.' It is obvious that Ibn Sabā' derived his theory of Return from Judaism. The Jews believed that Ilyās had ascended the heaven and would return one day to bring back religion and law. The same idea occurs in Christianity in its early stages. This idea has been developed by the Shīʻīs who believe in the ʻdisappearance' of the Imāms" (p. 199). The early founders of the Imāmite creed, he rightly observes, were Arabs, notably the Southern Arabs. Abū Mukhtār al-Thaqafī belonged to Ṭā'if, whereas Ṣā'ib Kalbī was a Yamanite. The Jews of Yemen were different from those of Khaybar in that they were not Israelites proper. This point has been discussed by Philby in his description of Najrān and Yemen.

A very important part of the book is the last chapter ("Con-temporary Centres of Culture"), in which is discussed the evolution of the cities of Kūfah and Baṣrah, of the Ḥijāz, Syria, and Egypt and ought to be studied by every student of Islamic history. The late Arnold J. Toynbee was right in praising it.

It is hoped Dr Afzal Iqbal would publish a third, enlarged edition of the work doing away with the constraints of space. The trouble is that the subject is one that offers too many potentialities.

There are certain misprints like bi-lanes for by-lanes which need to be corrected ;

but otherwise the quality of printing is consistently good.

—Kamal M. Hab