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IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH

S. M. Rahman

An important dimension which has eluded the interest of writers on Iqbal, both in the East as well as in the West, is his profound psycho-dynamic and therapeutic insight into human personality, its growth potentialities, as well as the factors that lead to its decay and disintegration. This short paper is a modest venture to interpret Iqbal's basic concepts and ideas in the light of some of the contemporary researches and findings in the field of clinical psychology and psychiatry. It is not attempted here to systematise or interpret Iqbal's theory of personality, which deserves a concerted and serious attention in its own right, but merely to focus that Iqbal, through his bold imaginative genius, could foresee and comprehend what practitioners of modern psychotherapy have discovered through tedious and intensive probing and diagnostic testing of those afflicted with worries and anxieties and live in a state of perpetual disharmony with themselves. It is interesting to discover that among the contemporary personality theorists there is a fairly significant number who fall into the broad humanistic cadre and have corrected the image of man from that of a "noble savage" to that of a self-actualiser, from one constantly responding to stimuli to one of actively seeking, organising and enriching life. Koch[1] rightly laments the unhappy image of man in modern psychology:

"For if psychology does not influence man's image of himself what branch of scholarly community does? That modern psycho-logy has projected an image of man which is as demeaning as it is simplistic, few intelligent and sensitive non-psychologists would deny. To such men— whether they be scientists, humanists or citizens— psychology has

[1] S. Koch, "Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge as Unitary," in T.W. Wann, Ed., Behaviourism and Phenomenology, Chicago ; University of Chicago Press.

increasingly become an object of derision. They are safe even when most despairing. But for the rest, the mass dehumanization which characterizes our time—the simplification of sensibility, homogenization of experience, attenuation of the capacity for experience—continues apace. Of all fields in the community of scholarship, it should be psycho-logy which combats this trend. Instead we have played no small role in augmenting and supporting it. . . . Is it not true that we raise the courage to relent?"

The notable among those who took the courage are Carl Roger,[2] Abraham Maslow,[3] Gordon Allport,[4] Erich Fromm,[5] and some existentialistically-oriented psychologists, whose thoughts and ideas bear close resemblance to those of Iqbal. This group of psychologists, contrary to classical psychoanalytical thinking of Freud,[6] have laid considerable emphasis on the growth motivation of individuals. Freud[7] being infatuated with the physicalistic and materialistic view of man ignored his spiritual and undermined religion. He also ignored the limitless potentialities of the soul, particularly the imagination, which he characterised as the Great Deceiver and "illusion" and not a reality. Although he accepted that the concept of the Supreme Being is experienced in early childhood, he bitterly criticised the dogma of religion. But his worthy disciple Jung,[8] explicitly affirmed that religion was an integral factor in the emotional adjustment of an individual. He believed that religion which could satisfy intellect as well as emotion was a fundamental requirement of psychotherapy. Gordon Allport[9] went to the extent of saying that religion is superior to psychotherapy in dealing with the

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[2] C.R. Rogers, On Becoming A Person, Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1942.
[3] A.H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, New York : Harper & Row Publishers.
[4] G.W. Allport, The Individul and His Religion, New York : The Macmillan Company, 1957.
[5] E. Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, New Haven : Yale University Press, 1950.
[6] S. Freud, Collected Papers, Toronto: Clark, Irwin & Co., Ltd., 1949.
[7] Idem, The Future of An Illusion, London, Hogarth Press, Ltd.
[8] Carl G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of A Soul, New York : Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1953.
[9] Allport, op, cit.

individual's emotional problems. Mowrer[10] is of the view that the acceptance of the great moral teachings is essential for the treatment of mental illnesses.

A very perceptible trend in contemporary Western thinking is a growing collaboration of psychiatry, behavioural sciences and religion. In primitive times medicine and religion were administered by one and the same person who met both the physical as well as the spiritual needs of an individual. In modern times, psychiatry and its sister discipline clinical psychology are beginning to realise the importance of meeting the deeper and spiritual requirements of the self. A large number of Christian Minsters are incorporating the findings of modern psychiatry and have developed a new discipline called "Pastoral Care". Professor Burtt's [11] book, Man Seeks the Divine, is an attempt to integrate themes of religious experience with those of teachings of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. This has created a new brand of philosophy of religion. On the other hand, there are a large number of thinkers who are integrating psychiatry, biological and behavioural sciences with that of essential teachings of the great religions of the world. Julian Huxley's book entitled Religion Without Revelation[12] is a notable example of this trend. Montagu,[13] in a similar vein says: "To love thy neighbour as thyself is not only good text material for Sunday morning sermons but perfectly sound biology."

Contemporary philosophers and eminent literary writers have written abundantly on the predicament of modern man and characterised his malady as that of chronic atomisation, "dispersion into multiplicity" estrangement of the self and a haunting sense of meaninglessness in life. Iqbal made relentless struggle to give man his true identity, dignity, purpose and centrality in the universe. He categorically affirmed:

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[10] O. Hobart Mowrer, "Learning Theory and Neurotic Paradox," American Journal of Ortho-Psychology, Vol. XVIII,

[11] Edwin A. Burtt, Man Seeks the Divine, New York : Harper & Brothers. 1957.

[12] Julian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation, New York : Harper & Bros., 1957.

[13] A. Montagu, The Direction of Human Development, New York : Harper & Bros., 1957,

نہ تو زمیں کے لیے ہے نہ اٰسماں
کے لیے
جہاں ہے تیرے لیے تو نہیں جہاں
کے لیے[14]

[Thou art neither for the earth nor for the sky,

The world is ordained for thee and not thee for the world.]

In a' beautiful verse he depicts the sacredness and grandeur of man:

نعرہ زد عشق کہ خونیں جگرے
پیدا شد
حسن لرزید کہ صاحب نظرے
پیدا شد
فطرت اٰشفت کہ از خاک
جہان مجبور
خود گرے، خود شکنے، خود

[14] Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū (Bāl-i Jibrīl), p. 49.

نگرے پیدا شد[15]

[Love proclaimed that a bruised-hearted creation is born,

Beauty trembled that a visionary is born.

Nature was perturbed that from the dust of a predetermined world, A creature, self-evolving, self-destroying and self-evaluating is born.]

What better eulogising of man could be than this couplet:

اٰدمیت

احترام

اٰدمیت

باخبر شو از

مقام اٰدمی[16]

[Humanity consists of the respect for man,

So acquaint thyself with the dignity of man.]

The job of being a self-respecting human is the governing principle of life, as Iqbal views it. Jesus taught: "For what is a man profited, if he shall

[15] Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī (Payām i Mashriq), p. 655.
[16] Ibid. (Jāvīd Nāmah), p. 793.

gain the whole world and lose his own soul" (New Testament). A Chinese philosopher, Laotse,[17] from whose teachings Taoism has developed, says:

"Fame or one's own self, which does one love more ? One's own self or material goods, which has more worth ? Loss of self, or possession of goods, which is the greater evil ?"

Confucious was also reported to have said: "If one hears the Tao or the way of life in the morning one can die in the evening." Thus all great religious thinkers have emphasised the need for proper attention to the welfare of the self or soul. Iqbal views "self" or individuality as an achievement of man, through constant strife and struggle, and not something genetically deter-mined. "The life of the ego," he says, "is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego."[18]

دلا ناراءی پروانه تا کے
نگیری شیوهٔ مردانه تا کے
یکے خود را بسوز خویشتن
سوز
طواف اتش بیگانه تا کے[19]

[17] Lin Yutang, Ed,, The Boole of Tao, The Wisdom of China and India, New York, Random House, 1942.
[18] Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam

(Lahore Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 102.
[19] Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī (Payām-i Mashriq), p. 199.

[Flow long, 0 heart, this burning like the moth ?

How long this aversion to the ways of true manhood ? Burn thyself in thy flame,

How long this fluttering round the stranger's fire ?]

Erich Fromm[20] has characterised five basic orientations toward life, namely, receptive, exploitative, hoarding, marketing and productive. The typical traits of passive orientation are lack of character, submissiveness and cowardliness. In exploitative orientation, one manifests traits of aggression, egocentricism, conceit, arrogance and seductiveness. A person with hoarding orientation shows stinginess, unimaginativeness, suspiciousness and possessiveness. Similarly, in the marketing-oriented individual, there are traits of opportunism, inconsistency, aimlessness, lack of principle, stubbornness and possessiveness. The productive orientation, which undoubtedly is Fromm's own. ideal, reflects modesty, adaptability, trust, activeness, pride, confidence, practicability, patience, openmindedness and an experimenting spirit. If we add the supreme trait of spiritualism and love for God, he can be identified as Mard-i Mu'min of Iqbal. Rogers[21] also maintains that a "fully functioning individual" is one who shows complete openness to experience, i.e. opposite of defensiveness. He says: "One aspect of this process which I am naming 'the good life' appears to be a movement away from the pole of defensiveness toward the pole of openness to experience". Such an individual is basically creative. He further elaborates: "The process of good life is not, I am convinced, a life for the faint-hearted. It involves the stretching and growing of becoming more and more of one's potentialities."

The self-actualiser as conceived by Maslow[22] also manifests same traits as those of Fromm's productive type and Roger's fully functioning

[20] E. Fromm, Man for Himself, New York ; Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
[21] Rogers, op. cit.
[22] Maslow, op. cit.

individual. There is an acceptance of the self, the others and the material world ; spontaniety, task-orientation, sense of privacy, independence ; appreciativeness and spiritual-ism (not necessarily religious in the formal sense but the ability for peak experiences) ; sense of identity with mankind, creativeness and nonconformism. The "self-actualiser" also in essence approximates Iqbal's concept of ideal man or healthy personality. Apart from Iqbal's basic insistence on the privacy of individual's religious needs and something fundamental for his normalcy, these two thinkers from different fields are surprisingly very similar in their ideas and approach, particularly on aspects of meta-motivation. Iqbal, being intensely religious and inheriting from the rich sufi tradition of Islam, sees unity in the knowledge and Being, and cannot entertain any idea of separateness from God. "The norm of mental health," as Dr Ajmal[23] puts it, "is the psychological closeness to God." Any tendency to deceive God, to hide and conceal oneself is self-defeating as it leads to dissociative tendencies and disintegration of personality.

Both Iqbal and Maslow have given considerable importance to love ('ishq) as self-actualising principle. Maslow maintains that in self-actualising the quality of love relationship and sex satisfaction may both improve with the length of relationship. This urge for insatiable longing is uniquely expressed by great mystic poet Bedil:

ہمہ عمر با تو قدح زدم و نہ
رفت رنج خمار ما
چہ قیامتے کہ نمی رسی

[23] Muhammad Ajmal, "Muslim Traditions in Psychotherapy" (Public Lecture), Proceedings of Senior Psychologists Seminar, held in Peshawar University, October 1966.

[I drank the goblet for all my life with thee as partner but the intoxication does not wither.

What a tragedy that thou dost not reach from my side toward my side.]

From his rich clinical experience Erich Fromm[24] sums up as follows:

"There is no more than convincing proof that the injunction, 'love thy neighbour as thself,' is the most important norm of living and its violation is the basic cause of unhappiness and mental illness than the evidence gathered by the psychoanalysts. Whatever complaints the neurotic patient may present are rooted in his inability to love, if we mean by love the capacity for experience and responsibility and respect and understanding of another person and the intense desire for that other person's growth. Analytic therapy is essentially the attempt to help the patient to gain or regain his capacity for love. If this aim is not fulfilled, nothing but surface change can be accomplished."

Psychologists agree that the conflict of desires is at the centre of mental illnesses and personal happiness. This agreement is explicitly stated by Karen Horney[25]:

"The temptation (the devil) speaks to two powerful desires ; 'The longing for the infinite (glory) and the wish for an easy way out. . . . Speaking in symbolic terms, the easy way to infinite glory is inevitably also the way to an inner hell of self-contempt and self-torment. By taking this road, the individual is in fact losing his soul—his real self."

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[24] Fromm, Psychanalysis and Religion, op. cit.
[25] K. Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, New York : N.W. Norton & Co.

The ability to see oneself with detachment, and keep one's life always open to inspection, i.e, muhāsibah-i nafs, is a psycho-logical requirement. In the words of Iqbal:

مرد مومن زنده و با خود
بجنگ
بر خود افتد ہمچو بر اہو
پلنگ[26]

[The Mu' min is alive and at war with himself,

He sweeps down on himself as the wolf on the deer.]

A patient who constantly criticises other people for being egotistical, authoritarian or aggressive, often has these characteristics in himself ; only he does not see these characteristics in himself as clearly as he sees them in others. As a matter of fact, when a patient comes to see these characteristics in himself, he generally becomes more tolerant and less critical toward other people.

By briefly comparing some of the basic ideas of Iqbal with those of some contemporary psychiatrists and clinicians one can-not help being impressed how deep his understanding of human psyche was. His philosophy has immense therapeutic potentials for individuals as well as the community in which he was vitally interested.

[26] Kulliyāt-i lqbāl Farsī (Jāvīd Nāmah), p 627.

اے امینے از امانت بے خبر
غم مخور، اندر ضمیر خود نگر [27]

[Trustee, unaware of the Sacred Trust, Grieve not, look into thyself.

[27] Ibid., p, 602.

IQBAL, AN INTERPRETER OF ISLAM

H.K. Qureshi

Robert Frost once wrote: 'Poetry is words which can be-come action,' Iqbal wrote in similar veins on different occasions regarding the function of a poet in relation to his art and responsibility. In his collection of poems Asrār-i Khudī, he says:

اے میان کیسه است نقد
سخن
بر عیار زندگی او را بزن[28]

[O ! you, who have the coin of poetry in your pocket, Test it on the touchstone of life.]

In another line:

نغمه کجا و من ک جا ساز
سخن بہانه است

[28] Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī (Asrār-i Khudī), p. 38.

سوے قطار می کشم ناقۂ
بے زمام را ! [29]

[i have nothing to do with songs and melodies, they are only an excuse. 'The object of my singing is only to bring back to the line the camels that have wandered away.]

Going a step further he declares:

مری نواءے پریشاں کو
شاعری نہ سمجھ
کہ میں ہوں محرم راز درون
مے خانہ ! [30]

[Don't take my incoherent chanting to be poetry. I'm one who knows the hidden mysteries of things]

And thus taking these ideas to their final conclusions, Iqbal asserts:

شعر را مقصود

[29] Ibid. (Zabūr-ī 'Ajam), p.447.
[30] Kulliyāt-i Iqbdl Urdū (Bāl-i Jibrīl), p. 343.

اگر آدم
گری است
شاعری هم
وارث پیغمبری
است [31]

[If poetry aims at producing ideal men,

the poet may rightly be said to have inherited the qualities of a prophet.]

Iqbal having made himself clear on the subject, it would not be difficult for us to understand why his poetry has attained the distinction of being so unique yet so potent, warm, sincere and lofty. Iqbal as a man and as a poet was moulded in a different cast. Ile was born and raised at a time when the Muslims were at their lowest ebb, particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

In India, they had recently lost their political power and, with it, economic benefits. They were trying to cope with the shock of this loss and were confused and in disarray. To make matters worse, the onslaught of the British power which made itself felt on all the facets of life was taken as a threat to their culture and, above all, religion. Then, there was another front on which the Muslims felt a challenge which leaped right into their face. The rivalry displayed by their compatriots was even more hurting. The Muslims soon realised and watched in disbelief that other Indians were already better organised and with each passing day were gaining strength and consolidating their economic and political power. The imperial interests of the British

[31] Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī (Jāvīd Nāmah), p. 632.

Empire also encouraged and helped in creating polarisation between political groups of India.

But the Muslims were neither progressive nor well organised, with the result that they were lagging behind. They developed philosophies which would help them hide behind religion to escape the pain of the loss of their material well-being. More and more emphasis was laid on the ritualistic aspect of religion resulting in obscurantism and fanaticism. In short, the situation was pitiably hopeless. When Sayyid Ahmad Khān started the Aligarh Movement and with it when the Muslims got somewhat acquained with the Western aducation, studied sciences and analysed their condition vīs-a-vis their compatriots, the realisation of their hopelessness became even more acute. The intelligent calss of Muslim population gradually pulled itself together and started moving ahead with the spirit of the time.

On the other hand, a great majority of the poor, the uneducated, the religion-oriented escapist became more rigid and swung to-wards conservatism, rigidity and took refuge in what they perceived as spiritualism. They remained backward, confused and did not know for certain as what to believe, where to turn and how to find the destination through the abyss. However, those who quickly seized the opportunity of educating themselves began to march, although slowly, towards a new horizon seeking a new dawn.

It was under these circumstances that Iqbal came on the scene and immediately called the Muslims to wake up from their state of self-oblivion Through his poetry he infused a new life in the Muslims of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. He argued with a reason that was tinged with emotion. His reasoning was so powerful and logical and yet so sweet and enticing that it soon engulfed all the Muslims of India. Iqbal fought on many fronts. One of the most important was to create an under-standing of Islam which would bring into focus the religion of Islam as a living, dynamic force of life. This understanding was necessary to separate the truth from fiction, din from

superstitions and religion from local traditions of its varied adherents. For this, Iqbal crystallised the ideas which had their origin in the Qur'ān, Prophet's traditions, Islamic history and cultures as practised in Islamic societies through their evolutionary stages. It encompassed a comprehensive study of theology, philosophy, social and political history of various movements which criss-crossed during the history of Islam. What came out of this was later compiled into six lectures that were delivered al Madras and other places in India.

Iqbal explains that from the early periods it was realised that Islam holds a dynamic view of the universe. Accordingly, Muslim thinkers believe that it is but natural for life in this world to seek its own needs and to set its own direction. This is done almost intuitively. Therefore, in this divergent, expanding and often conflicting push-and-pull situation, the unifying and binding factor can be provided by Islam through its principle of Tawhīd. As Iqbal writes, 'Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind.'

ولایت ، پادشاہی ، علم اشیا کی
جہانگیری
یہ سب کیا ہیں؟ فقط اک نکتۂ
ایماں کی تفسیریں ! [32]

To this extent, there is a universal agreement but, then, as Professor H.A.R. Gibb has pointed out in his Modern Trends in Islam, that, 'despite

[32] Knlliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū (Bāng-i Durā'), p. 271.

many good features and hopeful signs, the besetting intellectual sin of Muslims in general is the readiness to indulge in a romantic glorification of the past and the existence of a paralyzing confusion of thought'. For Iqbal, too, this was the crux of the problem, particularly for the Indian Muslims, in view of their immediate history. While the majority of ulema of India recognised Islam as a natural religion whose major expression is its self-implementation in a social order in this world, they failed to adopt themselves to the exigencies of the ever-changing fluxes of the socio-economic realities of modern times. Not that the Muslim history of the bygone era did not leave any precedents. In fact, right from the days of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and within the next two hundred years, we see a chain of such adaptations as one can see in Quranic injunctions, traditions of the Prophet and events that led to the establishment of schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

These things had set pace and direction for making Islam a living, organic and dynamic faith, a philosophy and a social order which at the same time assimilated all the attainable ideas of surrounding peoples. Unfortunately, this process had come to a complete halt with resultant stagnation. The inertia thus created produced passive and escapist attitudes in the Islamic society. Iqbal abhorred this and to restore the dynamism he wrote with such fervour, eloquence and inspirational fieriness that the Indian Muslim society was transmuted from solidity to its ebullience. Iqbal then stressed the need for understanding Islam, not just its religious theology (din), but also the jurisprudence (u usūl) and Muslim law (furū') in relation to socio-political conditions of the present time. Muslims should think as to how, today, after fourteen centuries the law and rules enunciated by the Qur'ān and as laid down by the traditions of the Prophet and later followed by various schools of jurisprudence can be interpreted and applied in diverse countries in which Islam subsists. On this point he was a bit dejected when he wrote: 'Unfortunately, the conservative Muslim public of this country is not yet quite ready for a critical discussion of 'Fiqh,' which, if undertaken, is

likely to displease most people, and raise sectarian controversies.'[33] Yet, he explained the correct Islamic viewpoint by going into the background of the origin and development of the Islamic law. He drew the conclusion that further evolution of this law is imperative. Explaining briefly the sources of law, he explains that the Qur'ān is the primary source. How-ever, it should not be taken as a book of legal code as its main purpose is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his relation with God and universe. The Qur'ān does lay down a few general principles and rules of a legal nature, especially relating to family which is considered the ultimate basis of social life. And, it is an undeniable fact of history that the Muslim legislative authorities evolve a number of legal systems from the Qur'ān, yet they remained individual interpretations in accordance with their existing conditions. They could not, therefore, be final to be strictly followed for all times to come. Accordingly, it would be all right for the present-day jurists to reinterpret these foundational legal principles in the light of our own experience and altered conditions of modern life. However, Iqbal emphasised that no one, not even the Prophet, has the authority or right to change and discard the clear Quranic injunctions.

The second source of Islamic law is Hadīth. There have been several searching and animated discussions on this topic. Iqbal quoted Shāh Walīullāh that, generally speaking, the law revealed by a prophet takes special notice of the habits, ways and peculiarities of the people to whom he is specifically sent.

His method is to train one set of people and use them as a nucleus for the building up of a universal Sharī'ah. What follows from this is that the application of those ahkām is specific to the people of his time and are not to be strictly enforced in case of future generations (take, for example, the penalties for crimes). Imām Abū Hanīfah, perhaps in view of this, introduced the principle of Istihsān, juristic preference, which necessitates a careful study

[33] Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (Lahore : Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1944, p, 164.

of the actual conditions in legal thinking. But the most important and of immense utility is the intelligent study of the literature of traditions, if used as indicative of the spirit in which the Prophet himself interpreted his Revelations. This may be of great help in understanding the life-value of the legal principles enunciated in the Qur'ān. A complete grasp of their life and value alone can equip us in our endeavour to reinterpret the fundamental principles.

Shāh Walīullāh and Iqbal in their own understanding and interpretation of these two basic sources of Islamic law make a case for legislating Islamic law for our living conditions. We all know that the bulk of traditional ulema maintain a rigid stance, while Iqbal asks us to re-examine the Sharī'ah and kalām in all its aspects by applying modern philosophy, metaphysics, ethics and psychology to formulate and re-state the essential principles. Since the days of Imām Ghazālī, this approach has been abandoned. Although, if there was any time more appropriate for such application, it is now in the age of scientific reasoning and high technological attainments.

The third source of Islamic law is Ijmā', which lqbal considered to be the most important legal notion. Apart from being discussed academically in early days of Islam, it never assumed a form of permanent institution anywhere. Iqbal suggests that in these days of modern democracy, it could be used through our legislative assemblies. Here ulema too can play a vital role (say, by being nominated to the upper House of Legislature) by helping and guiding free discussions on questions relating to law.

The fourth source is Qīyās, i.e. the use of analogical reasoning in legislating. In the early times, divergent views were taken by Mujtāhīdīn. Imām Mālik and Shāfi'ī criticised Imām Abū Hanīfah on the latter's stand in formulating legal opinion through Qiyās. There were discussions as to what should be the guiding principle-event or the idea. Should the deductive methods be followed or the inductive? Temporal or eternal? Or precedents over imagined ? Iqbal believes all could be useful according to the

temperament and psychological make-up of individual countries. Anyway, it was recognised that the observance of actual movement and variety of life is necessary to apply the juristic principle. In Islamic countries, there is no reason why this cannot be tried out to make Islam a living force. There is indeed a great need that we reconcile the Islamic convictions with the realities of the times. In the early Abbasid and Umayyad periods, there were individual Mujtāhidīn who formulated legal codes. Those were the days of true Ijtihād when Muslim jurists rose to the challenges of the time and responded effectively to the ever-changing and very chaotic political, military, racial and intellectual demands.

All areas of human life from stark ugly tribalism to subtle other-worldly metaphysic were closely examined by our early doctors of law. The rationalistic movements of Ash'arīyyah, Mu'tazilah, and Zāhirīyyah bear witness to this. They exercised great intellectual powers to achieve an Islamic equilibrium. They sought and received in large measures the prophecy of the Holy Qur'ān: 'And to those who seek, we show Our path'. Iqbal's call is in line with those of our early doctors like Imām Abū Hanīfah down through Imām Ibn Taimiyyah and Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhāb.

Iqbal strongly feels that the dynamic spirit of Islam requires, rather makes it obligatory upon, every Muslim to exercise his freedom and responsibility in order to achieve the status of 'representative of Allah' on earth (Khālīfat Allāh fi'I-Ard). This Quranic injunction is pregnant with far-reaching philosophical and intellectual ideas. God has created man from earth and given him soul to achieve spirituality. Thus, the 'Unity' called 'Man' interfaces the external world. The spirit of his action is to realise the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting. The political

formulation of state (or human organisation), from Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform the ideal principles into space-time forces. Islam is theocracy only in this sense. To quote Iqbal:

'The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunity in the natural, the material, and the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being. The greatest service that modern thought has rendered to Islam, and as a matter of fact to all religion, consists in its criticism of what we call material or natural—a criticism which discloses that the merely material has no substance until we discover it rooted in the spiritual. . All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit. . . . As the Prophet so beautifully puts it: 'The whole of this earth is a mosque.' The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the spiritual in human organization.'[34]

This Quranic concept allows unlimited freedom to man. Thus, statecraft becomes subservient to the free-will of man, who through his belief in Tawhīd can function in his own time-space reference. Within this frame of reference by employing Ijtihād, man, the trustee of a free personality, shapes his destiny towards the ultimate Reality.

Unfortunately, the traditional ulema, because of their lack of understanding, equate the use of matter with materialism and consider it sinful. They put considerable constraints on human free-will, thus limiting man's action t) only rituals. They fail to realise that this age of technological development and new socio-economic order and secular matters have acquired new dimensions. In matters of civil law, company law, the law of insurance, the law of air, hire-purchase agreements, international financial transactions involving payments and receipts of interest, government and corporate loans, industrial and labour disputes, union and labour laws, law of trade and commerce, tariff and such innumerable instances, laws have to be made if one has to live in an international society which is now so closely knitted with each other by reasons of mobility and shared interest, and political and military strategies. On most of these matters, the traditional

[34] Ibid., p, 155.

ulema would react almost impulsively and would refuse to recognise them worthy of being legislated. Of course, one can bury one's head in sand, but the futility of this is quite apparent.

Iqbal in his writings on Islam was quite broadbased. All those aspects of Islam that have degenerated over a period of time invited his wrath. The case in point is mysticism (Ṭāsāwwuf). Iqbal has come down heavily on this, as the world of Islamic thought had to be purged of all that was impure and alien. Dnring the centuries that followed, the hard but crystal core of the word of Prophetic revelation had become overlaid with layer after layer of false and delusive metaphysics. During ninth-thirteenth centuries Greek ideas played havoc with Islamic out-look, especially so the Platonic influence which affected the health and vitality of Islam. In Asrār-i-Khudī Iqbal described Plato as the 'leader of the old herd of sheep'. Vedantism was also repudiated as it stresses on the ecstasy of meditation, pantheism and passivity. These were contrary to the philosophy of action embodied in the Qur'ān. Iqbal's logical mind consequently repudiated the heritage of sufi poets and mystics. Hāfiz also came in for criticism. What Iqbal really objected to was the emphasis sufism placed on the negation of the ego, on its annihilation and renunciation and for the absorption of the individual self in the universe. He wrote: 'This spirit of total other-worldliness in later Sufiism obscured men's vision of a very important aspect of Islam as a social polity.'[35] Iqbal later developed his own concept of 'self' or 'ego,' which places emphasis not on self-negation but on self affirmation. The Prophet said: 'Create in yourself the attributes of Allah'(تخلق با خلاق الله)

Further clucidation on this is unnecessary because all of us know what Iqbal's concept of 'self' (khudī) did to the Muslims of India.

It is laden with ideas of self-respect, positivism, dynamism and action. It does not even let the man merge into God and very ardently keeps him away

[35] Ibid., p. 150.

from the benumbing affects of wandat ālwujūd, 'pantheism'. It gives man a dignity to follow the real ideal of God's servitude. Iqbal's thoughts on religion include politics, economics and culture. He has examined some aspects of various political and economic systems in the light of Islamic thoughts. We do not find an indepth study, although he was able to analyse various systems with his characteristic candour. He applied the touchstone of science and art of Ijtihād and accepted many Western ideas with varying reservation. For example, he did not totally reject Communism. In fact, he welcomed it. Had it not been so red in tooth and claw and devoid of man's spirituality, it could have come close to the Islamic principle of equality and fraternity.

Iqbal continuously mourned the lack of spirituality in the West. A Western scientist recently wrote: 'My feeling is that the technical society is in a mess because it has reached the end of its road. How many times do we have to step on the moon be-fore saying, O.K. ; it's a rock ? What now ? Then maybe we can look inside ourselves again, where things are really interesting."

This cynicism is not without reason. The fellow who uttered this is a scientist. In the language of philosophy and religion all that he is looking for is spirituality. In the discovery of the matter, man has lost himself. Iqbal wants to keep this equilibrium. The dilemma of this world is that men of reason are after rocks and the old shepherds had turned themselves into cheap 'faith-healers'. And what Iqbal is looking for is Mārd-i Mu'min.

ہاتھ ہے اللہ کا ، بندۂ مومن کا.

ہاتھ

غالب و کار آفریں ، کارکشا

، کار ساز
خاکی و نوری نہاد ، بندۂ مولا
صفات
ہر دو جہاں سے غنی ، اس کا
دل بے نیاز
اس کی امیدیں قلیل، اس کے
مقاصد جلیل
اس کی ادا دل فریب ، اس کی
نگاہ دل نواز
نرم دم گفتگو ، گرم دم جستجو
رزم ہو یا بزم ہو ، پاک دل و
پاک باز[36]

[As is the hand of God, so is the Believer's hand,

Potent, guided by craft, strong to create and rule;

Fashioned of dust and of light, creature divine of soul,

Careless of both the worlds beats his not humble heart.

Frugal of earthly hope, splendid of purpose, he earns

[36] fiulliyiit-i Iqbal Urdū (Bāl-i Jibrīl), p. 3S9,

Friendship with courteous mien, wins every voice by his glance.

Mild in social hour, swift in the hour of pursuit,

Whether in feast or in fray pure in conscience and deed.]

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF HISTORY

M. Moizuddin

Iqbal's early interest in history is evident from the fact that, as early as in 1913, he compiled an elementary book of history as text-book under the title Tārīkh-i Hind for school students similar to text-books of Urdu and Persian. He firmly believed that the fall and rise of nations, if studied in historical perspective, may save nations from decline and disaster and help them to preserve their cultural heritage. He had deep insigh tof human history and Muslim society and penetrating eyes on their social and cultural evolution. He studied particularly the history of Islam. References and allusions to events in Islam are copiously given in his works of prose and poetry and events and anecdotes are found in abundance in his writings.

In the year 1910 he gave a lecture in the Strachey Hall, Muslim University, Aligarh. It was later translated into Urdu by Maulānā Zafar 'Alī Khan under the title "Millat-i Baidā' Par Ek 'Imrānī Nazar".

This was a very important lecture from the point of view of his analysis of the causes of the rise and fall of nations, particularly with reference to Muslims' decline in educational, social and cultural fields. Like Ibn Khaldūn, a great Muslim historian, he analyses the moral and cultural experiences of different nations and states that human experiences are governed by a definite set of historical laws. If examined from anthropological and sociological point of view, it appears that there are stages of development of human faculties of different nations. Bravery, kindness and self-control are the virtues exemplified in notable personalities. If we take examples from the history of Muslim India these qualities are reflected in Taimūr, Bābar and 'Alamgīr, respectively. He considered Aurangzeb 'Alamgīr as a pioneer of

Muslim nationhood in the history of Muslin's of the subcontinent—the same 'Alamgīr who is described by some historians as tyrant, fanatic and a symbol of machination against non-Muslims.

To grasp fully Iqbal's concept of history, it must be remembered that the absolute unity of God and the innate freedom of man's inner self are the basic principles through which, according to him, the socio-economic and moral values in a society are governed. As a matter of fact, moral and ethical degradation resulted in the economic and political backwardness of the Muslims in the subcontinent. Nations which do not change their lot by moral, economic and social improvement have no right to exist on earth. They are bound to crumble and collapse. History does not sympathise with any individual or nation. It is cruel to those who deviate from the set pattern prescribed by historical forces and is favourable only to those who follow the Divine laws. Survival of the fittest does not mean only the physical fitness, but moral and spiritual strength is also necessary to gain power and a place in the annals of history. He illustrates this point in the following line:

"You are fully aware of the reasons of the decline of the Muslims;

It is certainly not on account of want of money."

According to Iqbal, history changes its course. New events take place with the forces of evolution; nevertheless the basic facts of history remain the same. According to him, the love for power, lust for money, domination over the weak all are universal facts of life and have remained the same throughout different periods of history.

"Adam is old but the idols are young."

Thus his vision of human history is not merely the narration of facts ;it is rather realisation of the empirical truth. According to him, life is not only for the conquest of the universe ; its ultimate achievement is nearness to God. He considers history an unbreakable chain between man and God.

Living individuals, by their collective self, change the course of history. They create history. When this chain of historic man and God is weakened, it ends in tragedies. Thus the philosophical side of history, according to him, is that the events in this world never lead to mental peace. Man has to struggle to conquer happiness.

In his note-book. Stray Reflections, he notes:

"History is a sort of applied ethics. If ethics is to be an experimental science like other sciences, it must be based on the revelations of human experience. A public declaration of this view will surely shock the susceptibilities even of those who claim to be orthodox in morality but whose public conduct is determined by the teachings of history."[37]

In his opinion, the interpretation of history is a delicate and sensitive matter. The facts from fiction are to be sifted with care and caution. He says:

"History is only an interpretation of human motives ; and, since we are liable to misinterpret the motives of our contemporaries and even of our own intimate friends and associates in daily life, it must be far more difficult rightly to interpret the motives of those who lived centuries before us. The record of history, therefore, should be accepted with great caution."[38]

He is delighted to read the glorious history of the Muslim community, and praises them in the following words:

'The more you reflect on the history of the Muslim community, the more wonderful does it appear. From the day of its foundation up to the beginning of the sixteenth century—about a thousand years—this energetic race (I say race since Islam has functioned as a race-making race) was continually busy in the all-absorbing occupation of political expansion. Yet in this storm of continuous activity this wonderful people found sufficient time

[37] Javid Iqbal, Ed. (Iqbal), Stray Reflections (Lahore : Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1961), p. 21.
[38] Ibid., p. 86.

to unearth and preserve the treasures of ancient sciences, to make material additions to them to build a literature of a unique character, and above all to develop a complete system of law—the most valuable legacy that Muslim lawyers have left to us."[39]

His poetic mind thinks of a beautiful simile and compares history to a gramophone. He says that "History is a sort of a huge gramophone in which the voices of nations are preserved."[40]

Now coming to the philosophical side of history, as a source of human knowledge, Iqbal considers history as a great power of inner experience. According to him, the function of Sufism in Islam has been to systematise mystic experience. But according to him Ibn Khaldūn was the only Muslim historian who approached it in a thoroughly scientific spirit. In his book Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam Iqbal writes:

"But inner experience is only one source of human knowledge. According to the Quran there are two other sources of knowledge-Nature and History ; and it is in tapping these sources of knowledge, that the spirit of Islam is seen at its best."[41]

He further elaborates that

"It is one of the most essential teachings of the Quran that nations are collectively judged, and suffer for their misdeeds here and now. . . . The Quran constantly cites historical instances, and urges upon the reader to reflect on the past and present experience of mankind."[42]

Every nation has its fixed period (Holy Qur'ān, vii. 32). Iqbal in his lecture, "The Spirit of Muslim Culture," included in his monumental work

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[39] Ibid., pp 100-01.
[40] Ibid, p. 107.
[41] Reconstrction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore: Sb. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 121.
[42] Ibid., p. 138,

Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, has discussed at length the Quranic references in history. The Qur'ān extends farther than mere indication of historical generalisation. He says:

"Since accuracy in recording facts which constitute the material of history is an indispensable condition of history as a science, and an accurate knowledge of facts ultimately depends on those who report them, the very first principle of historical criticism is that the reporter's personal character is an important factor in judging his testimony. . . . The growth of historical sense in Islam is a fascinating subject."[43]

lbn Khaldūn, Ibn Ishāq, Tabarī, and Mas'ūdī are the pro-duct of the desire to furnish permanent sources of inspiration to posterity.

According to Iqbal, the possibility of a scientific treatment of history means a wider experience, a greater maturity of practical reason, and finally a fuller realisation of certain basic ideas regarding the nature of life and time. These are based on two Quranic teachings: (I) the unity of human origin ; (2) a keen perception of time and concept of life as a continuous movement in time.

Iqbal's concept of history is derived from Quranic teaching. Elaborating this aspect in the essay referred to above he says that "considering the direction in which the culture of Islam had unfolded itself, only a Muslim could have viewed history as a continuous, collective movement, a real inevitable development in time."[44]

A living nation with the help of its collective ego may change the current of history. It will be an epoch-making nation. But if the collective unity is broken and forces of disintegration start working, the tragic side of the

[43] Ibid., p. 140.
[44] Ibid., p. 141.

history of a nation is manifested. The creation of Pakistan is a unique feature of Muslim history. It is our sacred duty to preserve and safeguard it keeping in line with the golden period of Muslim history.

Let us remember the following admonishing verses of 'Allāmah Iqbal:

وہ کل کے غم و عیش پہ کچھ حق نہیں رکھتا
جو آج خود افروز و جگر سوز نہیں ہے !
وہ قوم نہیں لائق ہنگامہ فردا
جس قوم کی تقدیر میں امروز نہیں ہے ! [45]

[45] Kulliykt-i Iqbāl Urdū (Dārb-i Kalīm), (Lahore : Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1977), p. 142,

MUHAMMAD IQBAL: The Spiritual Father of Pakistan

Hermann Schafer

The house on Neuenheimer Lanstrasse 58 in Heidelberg is an ordinary residential house. The garden in front separates the building from the street. Noteworthy, however, is only a small board "Mohammad Iqbal 1877-1938, national philosopher, writer and spiritual father of Pakistan lived here in the year 1907". This inscription, a page from an unknown book of history, reminds one that the idea of the Pakistan State received its philosophical impulse on the Neckar.

Muhammad Iqbal, however, was no emigrant like Lenin who envisaged a future Soviet State during his exile in Zurich. His objectives were not the barricades or the class-war. Like his Prophet in Medina, Iqbal came to this world to ignite a fire in order to make people the messengers of God and to reconcile Islam and Christianity. As he worked on this creative style in Heidelberg and later in Munich, nobody knew him. He had, however, till then only got the respect of a small circle of poets and philosophers in the Universities of Cambridge, Lahore and Munich. After his law studies in England, the young Professor of Islamic Philosophy came to Munich in 1905. He required three months to learn the German language. Three years later, he completed his studies in the history of religions at Munich. Iqbal was conferred a Doctorate with special distinction by a German university. It played a special spiritual relationship with Germany for the "Father of Pakistan" which continued up to his death.

That in these times, an Indian had decided to come to Germany was extremely exceptional. For 150 years, the Indian subcontinent belonged to the British empire. The English deter-mined all mediums for higher education. In spite of this, the young Iqbal did not interest himself in Shakespeare but in Goethe, "the friend from the garden of Weimer". The first meeting between the two had already taken place in Lahore. Iqbal repeatedly read Faust. The tragedy was also published in Urdu. Iqbal had the ear to listen to the spiritual noises contained in Faust and to recognise the dramatic call for Islam.

Now in far away Lahore, Heidelberg was a magic word for the young Indian. On the Neckar, he found the vision to integrate the ideas of the Orient with the European history of the West. From Heidelberg come the origins of Faust, the student Johann Faustus. However, what interested Iqbal was Goethe's answer to the basic conflict. As Herder, Schlegel, Ruckert, Nietzsche and the romantics of the "Heidelberg Circle," Faust also sought refuge in the Orient. In the "West-East Divan," Iqbal has shown the way how Western civilisation and the appeal of Europe and Christianity can reconcile each other. Goethe's letter to Adele Schopenhauer demanded Iqbal's complete power of imagination to understand. "We all live in Islam but we must have the courage to choose our own form of worship."

In the following years, Iqbal wrote stories on Heidelberg, Nietzsche, Schopenhauer and Goethe. A hundred years after the "West-East Divan," a continuation of the spiritual dialogue of Iqbal was published in his book "Message from the East" (Payām-i Mashriq). Later in Jāvīd Nāmah, which he wrote in the frame of the Eternal Comedy of Dante, Iqbal called upon the Muslims of India to recognise their self-confidence. He got away from the mystics of the time and observed himself in his work as the son and representative of his Creator. In his social criticism, he rejected the works of Karl Marx for Islam, because they were without light and were contrary to transcendental withdrawal which was necessary for life in a free society.

The road from Heidelberg to Islamabad is one of the biggest adventures of history. As President of the All-India Muslim League, in December 1930, Iqbal called for a Muslim State in India. One year later, he repeated his position at the Round Table Conference in London. From the alphabets of the provinces of Punjab (P), Afghan frontier (A), Kashmir (K), Sind (IS) and Baluchistan (TAN) came the name "Pakistans". On 23 March 1940, the Pakistan ideology of Iqbal became the official programme of the Muslim League. Seven years later the Islamic Republic of Pakistan saw the light of the world after the bloody division of India.

Iqbal, powever, did not live to see the day which he had dreamed for Indian Muslims. He died in 1938 and left behind him fourteen philosophical and poetic works. The most important parts of his works have been well translated into the German language by Professor Annemarie Schimmel of the Harvard University. The evening of his death, Iqbal spent in conversation with Hans Hasso of Veltheim-Ostrau.

THE HEGELIAN KEY TO UNDERSTANDING IQBAL

Absar Ahmad

The Hegelian influence is clear both in Iqbal's criticism of the cosmological argument as well as in his combined criticism of the ontological and teleological arguments. Iqbal's comments on the ontological and teleological arguments contain a whole epistemology and an entire metaphysic, and his position is, I would suggest, only quasi-Hegelian. Consider, for example, the following two statements by Iqbal:

(1) Apropos of the cosmological argument: "The true infinite does not exclude the finite; it embraces the finite without effacing its finitude, and explains and justifies its being."[46]

(2) Apropos of the ontological and teleological argument; ". . . thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things ; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end."[47]

It is my contention that the Hegelian influence here is unmistakable even though his name is not explicitly mentioned. This suggestion of a Hegelian influence is, therefore, an interpretation, but in its absence Iqbal's statements are not intelligible. In the present climate of modern English-speaking philosophy, statements of the type "the true infinite does not exclude the finite" and "thought is the ultimate ground of the original nature of things and constitutes the very essence of their being" would at least raise, and left unqualified perhaps deserve, considerable suspicion and incredulity ;

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[46] Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore : Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 30.
[47] Ibid., p. 32.

indeed, the more positivistically inclined linguistic philosophers would hardly hesitate in branding them as patent nonsense. The complexion of this problem is radically altered when we attempt to understand Iqbal's statements within the context of the Hegelian system. My aim here is the very modest one of trying to make sense of Iqbal's arguments in the context of Hegel's philosophy. Clearly then we are committed to some minimum exposition of that philosophy. But I must emphasise that this "minimum exposition" is not intended to be a condensed account of the Hegelian system. It is simply an attempt to indicate certain salient features in their barest outline so that we may get a reasonable view of the nature and purpose of the Hegelian philosophy—and sufficient, hope-fully, to show that Iqbal's theses are intelligible only as integral components of such a system.

The Hegelian System

(I) Hegel's Circle. The Hegelian philosophy is, arguably, the most ambitious system developed within the Western tradition. It presents at its very core the apparent paradox of setting out to resolve that which, in ordinary thought and experience, is irresolvable, to unite that which cannot be united: God and Man, Spirit and Nature, Thought and Being, Subject and Object. It is a self-contained circle—an oft-recurring image throughout Hegel's writings—and one which is unprecedented alike in its comprehensivness as well as its immunity to external criticism. Hegel himself characterises his enterprise in the Introduction (following the famous Preface) to the Phenomenology of Mind, thus:

"... the pathway of the natural consciousness which is striving toward a true knowledge, or the path of the soul which is making its way through the sequence of its own transformations as through way stations prescribed to it by its very nature, that it may, by purifying itself, lift itself to the level of

Spirit and attain cognizance of what is in itself through the completed experience of its own self."[48]

For Hegel philosophical truth cannot be merely stated, asserted, or, even, in the traditional manner, argued or demonstrated. Truth is rather the culmination of a long, arduous and complex process of development—the whole elaborate movement being subsumed (though not simply cancelled) in the final result. Accordingly, such terms as "emerge," "final outcome," "con-summation" assume a special significance and occur frequently in his writings.[49] The following rigorously selected textual passages well indicate the nature and style of the Hegelian philosophy.

From the Preface to the Phenomenology of Mind: "This be-coming of science in general or of knowledge is what this phenomenology of the spirit represents. . . . To become true know-ledge, to generate the element of science which is a pure concept itself, it has to work its way through a long journey." Later on, in the same section, "The individual must also pass through the

contents of the educational stages of the general spirit. . . . The world spirit has had the patience to pass through these forms in the long expanse of time, taking upon itself the tremendous labour of world history..:." And further, "consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what lies within its experience; ... The Spirit, however, becomes an object, for the Spirit is this movement of becoming something other for itself, i.e. an object

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[48] (a) Sec Heidegger's opening note in his Hegel's Concept of Experience, p. 7.

(b) ".. , the wealth of human experience actually described in the Phenomenology of Spirit is a most eloquent demonstration that Hegel's method is far more 'empirical' than that of philosophers who call them-selves empiricists" (K.R,Dove, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXIII, No.

[49] [June 1970], p. 624). What logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this know ledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition . . . the notion of logic has its genesis in the course of the exposition...." (Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 43).

for itself, and then to sublimate this otherness. And experience is the name we give to just this movement.

Science may organise itself only through the life of the Concept ;[50] the determinedness which some would take externally from the scheme to affix it to existence is in science the self-moving soul of the abundant content." (A related statement occurs at the very beginning of the conclusion: "I find the distinctive mark of science in the self-movement of the concept....) Further variations on this theme—"what therefore matters in the study of science is taking upon oneself the exertion of the concept... . The content should be made to move itself by virtue of its own nature, i.e. through the self as its own self, and then to contemplate this movement. One should not intrude into the immanent rythm of the concept. . . . The concept is the object's own self which presents itself as its becoming. . . . It is the concept that moves itself and takes its determinations back into itself. In this movement the resting subject itself perishes.... The return of the concept into itself must be represented expressly. This movement which takes the place of that which proof was once sup-posed to accomplish is the dilectical movement of the proposition itself."

The following statements occur near the end of the Preface: "True thoughts and scientific insight are to be won only through the work of the concept. . . . We must have the conviction that it is of the nature of truth to prevail when its time has come, and that truth appears only when its time has come. . . ."

From the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind: "This dialectical movement, which consciousness exercises on itself—on its knowledge as well as its object—is, insofar as the new, true object emerges to consciousness as the result of it, precisely that which is called experience."

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[50] A key Hegelian term—"Begriff," translated as concept or notion.

From the Science of Logic: "This spiritual movement which, in its simple undifferentiatedness, gives itself its own determinedness its quality with itself, which therefore is the immanent development of the Notion, this movement is the absolute method of knowing and at the same time is the immanent soul of the con-tent itself. I maintain that it is this self-construing method alone which enables philosophy to be an objective, demonstrated science. . . . What logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition. . . The Notion of logic has its genesis in the course of exposition. Now if logic has not undergone any change since Aristotle . . then surely the conclusion which should be drawn is that it is all the more in need of a total reconstruction ; for Spirit, after its labours over two thousand years, must have attained to a higher consciousness about its thinking and about its own pure, essential nature.... The exposition of what alone can be the true method of philosophical science falls within the treatment of logic itself; for the method is the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic."

Some of the features exemplified above together with the image of the circle are vigorously, and not ineloquently, expressed by Hegel in the section headed "With what must the science begin ?" at the beginning of The Science of Logic:

" . . Absolute Spirit which reveals itself as a concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the end of the development is known as freely externalising itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate being—opening or unfolding itself (sick entoabliessend) into the creation of a world which contains all that fell into the development which preceded that result and which through this reversal of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed into something dependent on the result as principle. The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the

first. . Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determination."

(2) The Nature of the Content. According to Hegel, religion and philosophy have the same content.[51] The following statement is especially worthy of note (Introduction to The Science of Logic): " . . . Logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. This realm of truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind." And again, even more plainly, in the very opening section of the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel writes: "The objects of philosophy, it is true, are upon the whole the same as those of religion. In both the subject is truth, in that supreme sense in which God and God only is the truth."

Further, Hegel identifies logic with metaphysics. Thus in the Preface to the first edition of The Science of Logic he writes of "the Science of Logic which constitutes metaphysics proper of purely speculative philosophy". And again in the Encyclopaedia Logic (Section 24): "Logic therefore coincides with Meta-physics, the science of things set and held in thoughts."

(3) The Elements of the System. The concept of the Notion (Begriff) is perhaps the most centrally important idea in the entire Hegelian philosophy. The last chapter of the Encyclopaedia Logic (Chapter 9, third sub-division of logic: the doctrine of the notion) commences thus: "The Notion is the principle of freedom, the power of substance self-realised. It is a systematic whole" and, further on: "The Notion, in short, is what contains all the earlier categories of thought merged in it. It certainly is a form, but an infinite and

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[51] The matter has been put very well by Lauer : "The `Philosophy of Religion' of which Hegel speaks is not a philosophising about religion; it is the thinking philosophically what religion thinks religiously" (Q. Lauer, Hegel and the Philosophy of Religion, ed. by D.L. Christensen).

creative form, which includes, but at the same time releases from itself, the fullness of all content. ... The Notion is a true concrete ; for the reason that it involves Being and Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres with them, merged in the unity of thought. The movement of the Notion is development: by which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present."

If the spirit of the whole Hegelian philosophy could somehow be expressed briefly and schematically, the most succinct formula would be "the internal self-movement of the Notion". This process of self-movement is the famous dialectic--the process through which Spirit undergoes self-negation and self-reconciliation (by overreaching its self-negated form). Being, the Notion, dialectic, negation, and overreaching are, in fact, the key terms in the Hegelian system. The three major components of the system are Logic, Nature and Spirit. Emil Fackenheim's brilliant work The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought enunciates "the principle of the Hegelian middle". "And we shall seek to grasp it by interpreting Hegel's thought as a threefold mediation, of which each phase involves the other two. Elements of all three phases are found scattered throughout Hegel's works." Fackenheim elaborates on this and goes on to quote the Hegelian pass-age which "states the principle of the threefold mediation clearly, tersely, and completely." The passage opens thus: "Everything rational shows itself to be a threefold union or syllogism, in that each of the members takes the place both of one of the extremes and the mediating middle. This is especially the case with the three members of philosophical science, i.e. the logical Idea, Nature and Spirit."

(4) The Nature of the Problem of Knowledge. Hegel had the very deep insight that there could be no "external" examination of knowledge. Therefore, anything like the Kantian beginning is entirely mistaken. He writes in the Science of Logic (Preface to the second edition): "Since, therefore, subjective thought is our very own, innermost act, and the objective notion of things constitutes their essential import, we cannot go outside this our act,

we cannot stand above it, and just as little can we go beyond the nature of things." And again in the Encyclopaedia Logic: "But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to seek to know before we know is as absurd as the wise resolution of the Scholasticus, not to venture into the water until we had learned to swim." Accordingly the assessment of knowledge must necessarily remain a purely "internal" procedure. Thus he writes in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind: "The fundamental standard of measurement would be in us . . . since consciousness provides itself with its own standard, investigation will he a comparison of consciousness with its own self." Hegel then develops this argument, and resolves the problem of the correspondence between knowledge and that (object) which is known, in terms of his concept of the Nation. K.R. Dove[52] has characterised this phase of Hegel's thought as a revolutionary departure from the time honoured approach to the problem of knowledge (based on the abstract distinction between knowledge and truth).

This rapid excursus into Hegel's philosophy enables us to return to the two Hegelian themes in Iqbal (viz. the unity of thought and being, and the finite-infinite relationship) more profitably.

The Unity of Thought and Being

Ivan Soli has recently argued that the abolition of the separation of the knowing subject from its object is the major function of The Phenomenology of Mind. There can be no doubt that this is one of the most important motifs in the entire Hegelian system. Soli relates this to Hegel's case against Kant: "According to Hegel, the denial of knowledge of things-in-themselves rests on the separation of the knowing subject from its object." Thus we read in the Preface to The Phenomenology of Mind:

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[52] Vide The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, June 1970.

"It is the standpoint of the consciousness to know of objective things in opposition of itself, and to know of itself in opposition to them (Section 7, 'The Element of Knowledge'). The development of philosophical science, through the internal self-movement of the concept, overcomes this dichotomy—'Being is mediated absolutely ; it is substantial content which is just as immediately property of the ego, self-like, or Concept. With this the Phenomenology of the Spirit is concluded. What the spirit prepares for itself in this phenomenology is the element of knowledge. In this element the moments of the spirit spread themselves out in the form of simplicity which knows its object as itself. They no longer fall apart into the opposition of being and knowledge but abide in the simplicity of knowledge."

In The Science of Logic we find plainer and more forceful The Hegelian Key to understanding Iqbal39 statement of these theses:

"These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness ; but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason . . . then they are errors the refutation of which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is philosophy."

And, further, Logic is "defined as the science of pure thought, the principle of which is pure knowing, the unity which is not abstract but a living, concrete unity in virtue of the fact that in it the opposition in consciousness between a self-determined entity, a subject, and a second such entity, an object, is known to be overcome ; being is known to be the pure Notion in its own self, and the pure Notion to be the true being. These, then, are the two moments contained in logic."

The Finite and the Infinite

The peculiarly Hegelian identification of logic, metaphysics and philosophy of religion is well exemplified by the theme of the relationship between the finite and the infinite. At the very out-set of his Lectures on the

Proofs of the Existence of God, Hegel observes that he has "chosen a subject that is connected with the other set of lectures which I gave on logic . . . a kind of supplement to that set inasmuch as it is concerned only with the particular aspect of the fundamental conception of logic." The finite-infinite relationship is only the most abstract aspect of "this wealth of relationship which exists between the human spirit and God," and "the logical relation is at the same time also the basis of the movement of the fullness of content". Indeed, the tension between the finite and the infinite is at the very heart of Hegel's entire metaphysical enterprise. Fackenheim has expressed this admirably:

"Hegel has not forgotten that the time which he sees as ripe for 'science' is also (like all time)—one of conflict, chance and brute fact, and that he—a self rising to absolute thought—is also a contingent self in the midst of time. Many years after the composition of the Phenomenology Hegel wrote: 'I raise my-self in thought to the Absolute. Thus. being infinte consciousness ; yet at the same time I am finite consciousness. . . . Both aspects seek each other and flee each other. . . . I am the struggle between them.' This struggle—and 'the struggle to resolve the struggle'—is in the end the sole theme of the Phenomenology and, indeed, of the whole Hegelian philosophy."

The purely logical aspect of the finite-infinite relationship is described thus in the Science of Logic:

"The Notion of the infinite as it first presents itself is this, that being in its being-in-itself determiness itself as finite and transcends the limitation. It is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation and become infinite. Thus the infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to the finite, as if the finite had enduring being apart from or subordinate to the infinite."

The transition to the "principles of theology" in the Encyclopaedia Logic is noteworthy:

"And what men call the proofs of God's existence are, rightly understood, ways of describing and analysing the native course of the mind, the course of thought thinking the data of the senses. The rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the supersensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the chain of sense, all this transition is thought and nothing but thought."

The finite-infinite relation ship recurs again in the Lectures on the Proofs of God's Existence. Thus, apropos of the Cosmological Proof Hegel writes:

"Finite Being does not continue to be an Other: there is no gulf between the infinite and the finite. The finite is something that cansels itself, loses itself in something higher, so that its truth is the Infinite, what has Being in-and-for-itself."

And in relation to the Teleological Proof:

"The finitude of finite minds is not true Being ; it is, by its very nature, dialectic, which implies that it abrogates itself, negates itself, and the negation of this finitude is affirmation as infinitude, as something universal in-and-for-itself. This is the highest form of the transition ; for the transition is here Spirit itself."

The logical concept of the Notion, the finite-infinite relationship, the epistemological (and metaphysical) thesis of the unity of thought and being and the theological idea of the existence of God all cohere in a uniquely Hegelian manner in the following remarkable statement (which occurs near the end of the Lectures on the Proofs of God's Existence):

"In the case of the finite, existerce does not correspond to the Notion. On the other hand, in the case of the Infinite, which is determined within itself, the reality must correspond to the Notion ; this is the Ideal, the unity of subject and object."

ISLAM: A THIRD FORCE VIS-A-VIS CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM

Ejaz Faruqi

If we look at the globe, we find a continuous belt of Muslim population covering the belly of the globe from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. It is also a continuous stretch of Muslim countries except India where Muslims, though one million in population, are outnumbered by non-Muslims. Nevertheless, Indian Muslims have remained, throughout Muslim history, an integral part of Muslim consciousness. The Muslims ruled India for about seven hundred years and it was only the failure of the War of Independence in 1857 which culminated in the transfer of power to the British.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were the darkest period in the history of these Muslim countries. One by one, they were militarily defeated, politically subjugated and colonised by European Powers. With the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire in the Second World War, the circle was completed: the nadir of Muslim political power and the zenith of Christian political power in the world.

The world of Islam was now exposed to intellectual and cultural onslaught of the West which was basking in the glory of its military and political supremacy and of its achievements in the field of philosophy, psychology, science and technology. The practice of laissez faire had given to the individual an unfettered liberty, though at the cost of social equilibrium, previously unknown in human history, whereby a group of purely mercantile entrepreneurs had started raising armies and conquering foreign territories as was the case of East India Company. Life in the West was reshaping itself on a completely new set of values. It was an age of freedom of expression and thought and of scepticism in which religious doctrines and dogmas were under unmitigated attack. Secularism, liberalism and laissez faire had be-come the foundations of Western society and started influencing the minds of the

younger Muslim generation who were receiving education in Western institutions. This produced a section of Muslim intelligentsia who looked to the West for inspiration and adopted the Western way of thinking and life style. They understood Islam as represented by the Ulema, did not consider it meaningful in this-worldly life, and, therefore, relegated the role of Islam to the sphere of prayer and worship in order to have freedom to restructure their society on Western values. The tradition-bound intellectual foundations of Muslim society stood completely battered, and this led to a state of despondency about the meaningfulness of Islamic identity.

This weakened intellectual position of Islam suffered another blow at the hands of successful Communist Revolution in Russia which set in a new chain of thinking in a section of Muslim intelligentsia, who propagated an atheistic society structured on Communism. Communist Russia also subjugated Muslim states of Central Asia and annexed them to the Soviet Union. Previously Islam was confronted with Capitalism which relegated religion to the private life of an individual. Now, Islam was faced with an atheistic system which claimed that religion was an obstacle in the way of organising a truly moral and ethical society.

This was the intellectual scene in the world of Islam after the Second World War. But, for the Muslim masses, the foremost problem was poverty, deprivation and loss of political and social rights. The real issue was to throw off the yoke of European rule. This could be done only by acquiring skills which enabled the Europeans to conquer Muslim lands. This attracted Muslims to the Western system of education. The issue of non-Muslim character of Western culture and civilisation became secondary, rather of no meaningful significance for people in slavery. The first and foremost objective was to gain independence. This political consciousness led to widespread liberation movements in all Muslim lands. Ideological differences between left and right, between secular-minded educated elite and religious-minded Ulema, between Communists and Capitalists, lost their meaning in the heat of struggle for independence. All joined together for the common

cause. The Second World War loosened the grip of the Colonial Powers and the decade after the War witnessed the liberation of Muslim lands. It also witnessed the adoption of Communist system by the non-Muslim countries of Eastern Europe and East Asia.

After independence, the intellectual scenario, which had earlier been pushed to oblivion, re-emerged to the forefront. The issue came into focus due to the presence of two systems in the world--Capitalist and Communist. What was to be the chosen path? The ruling elite in the newly independent Muslim states were educated in the Western traditions of a rational and scientific attitude with a sceptical approach to religion. In fact, religion ceased to be meaningful in the Capitalist system. It was the cultivation of this rational and scientific attitude, devoid of spiritual element, which led to the acceptance of Communist ideology by a section of the educated elite. There ensued a struggle between the two groups, each striving to organise the state according to his own model. But, basically, it was the question of the Islamic aspirations of the Muslim masses. For common man, physical and spiritual aspects of life are integral and he seeks spiritual atonement in Islam. The Western culture, which has been presented to the people, has been seen as hollow and deprived of moral and ethical aspects of life. There are bizarre cults which are coming up in the West, like Yogi and Sikh cults, and people see that even the West is in search of spiritual and physical integration. Communism is an atheistic system which does not admit of the spiritual aspect of life. So, neither Capitalism nor Communism becomes a model for the Muslims.

The Western-educated ruling elite were opposed by the Ulema who strove to establish an Islamic Order based on the interpretation of Islamic Law given by Muslim jurists who lived in the second and third centuries of Hijrah. The problems, with which those Muslim jurists were faced at that time, were different from the problems which are being faced in the modern age. Basically, the Arab society, at the time of the advent of Islam, was tribal and pastoral, and when Islam reached other lands, which had agricultural

societies, the problems of those societies seemed more complicated and the jurists had to grapple with those problems and had to reinterpret Islamic Law to apply its principles to an agricultural society. We are now living in an industrial age, and, on the same analogy, there is a dire need to reinterpret Islam to cope with the complexities of the modern society. The Ulema have not exposed their minds to the complexities and problems of the modern age. The common man, though ignorant of intellectual sophistications, does have a feel of the modern age and, by his intuition and common wisdom, does not believe that the Ulema can lead him to a system, spiritual as well as meaningful in this-worldly life.

The Ulema have also been demanding the right to oversee and overrule the legislature which consists of elected representatives of the people whom they do not consider competent and qualified to interpret Islamic Law and to pass legislation. They have wanted a supreme religious council to be vested with the power of overseeing and overruling the elected legislature. This goes against the spirit of the twentieth century, an age of democracy and ever-rising consciousness of peoples' rights. This is an-other tension and conflict between the Ulema and the people. All this has given rise to a feeling amongst the people that the Islam which is being presented by the Ulema will not be meaningful for them.

Nevertheless, in the 'seventies, there has been a great spurt of intellectual activity in the Muslim world to work for the renaissance of Islam. A section of Muslim intelligentsia, though small in number, who were educated in the Western tradition of rational and scientific attitude, have turned to a deep, incisive and scientific study of Islam and are trying to reinterpret Islam in the modern way in order to meet the requirements of the modern age. They are rediscovering Islam as a system of life distinct from Capitalism and Communism.

There is a dire need to disengage Islam from the trappings of temporal traditions, as distinct from fundamental principles, which grew out of

corporate living in the past. This is necessary to be able to understand and comprehend new political, economic and social relationships emerging as a result of new forces working in the world. The past traditions were evolved as a result of historical experience of Muslim society at a given time. Changes in political, economic and social relationships require reinterpretation of Islam, and this is the process which is called dynamism of Islam. Muslim society has passed through such historical experiences in the past. The most important and significant was the onslaught of Greek philosophy and literature which led the intelligentsia at that time to reinterpretation of Islam. In the twentieth century, the major problem is reorganisation of the whole Muslim society in the face of new emerging relationships in the social, political, economic and cultural fields in the world at large. A reorientation of mind is required to deal with the existential situation.

In order to unburden the mind of tradition-bound attitude and to create a positive atmosphere of intellectual investigation, it is necessary that ethical, social and economic values of Islam should be redefined and should be cultivated as distinct Muslim character. This will have to be done with reference to psychic, social and economic needs of the contemporary man. It has to be realised that "man in history" is not a static being but is a "continuous movement in time and space". Cultural, political, economic and social institutions, catering to the needs of man in the bygone times, may not be relevant to the contemporary situation. Change is, therefore, the essence of human life and human institutions. The redefinition of ethical, political, economic and social values of Islam is necessary for wholesome development of Muslim society in an atmosphere of universal justice and rightness. The redefinition of Islamic cultural pattern and emphasis on intellectual investigation will rid Muslim society of

sordid and romantic moods and generate an immense intellectual activity. This will make the mode of science compatible with the ecstasy of religious experience. Once the religious experience is conceived in the

context of psychic needs of man, there will be no incompatibility between religious experience and intellectual investigation..

Until recently, there were only two intellectual forces, backed by political, technological and military power, in the world: Capitalism and Communism. Capitalism had a glorious past spread over two hundred years but in the process of aging. Communism was comparatively young, pulsating with vitality and energy. Lately, the world of Islam has emerged as an economic power to reckon with. It has yet to assert itself as an intellectual force.- Whereas, Capitalism has generated social tensions due to economic disequilibrium, Communism has created cultural tensions and intellectual disenchantment (or spiritual barrenness) due to regimentation. If Islam has to emerge as the Third Force, it has to combine its economic power with an intellectual thrust and vitality capable of resolving social and cultural tensions with which the contemporary man is faced. Political and military power will follow.

EXTRA-SENSORY PERCEPTION AND RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

Niaz Erfan

Extra-sensory Perception (E.S.P.) is the perception of objects and events without the use of sense-organs. Some people have preferred to use the term "parapsychology" for it. It is quite a wide term as it includes telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudience, psychokinesis (P.K.), precognition of future events, psychical phenomena, etc. The belief in the existence of E.S.P. and allied phenomena in certain individuals of extraordinary powers has always been present among the followers of almost all religions. However, scientists have generally tended to treat the subject disdainfully, probably because, it is supposed, it does not fulfil one of the criteria of science, i.e. the possibility of repeatable experiments. They have, therefore, by and large, equated it with superstition and obscurantism. Such deep-rooted and strong prejudice of the sciensists against parapsychology has been the cause of its neglect. Psychologists themselves have been rather reluctant in recognising parapsychology as a genuine field of study.

In modern times the interest in extra-sens ry perception or parapsychology may be traced back to the year 1882 when the well-known Society for Psychical Research was first formed in London. It was only in late thirties in the present century that psychologists relented and became somewhat open-minded on the subject. A laboratory for research in parapsychology was set up in the Duke University. By the year "1952, there were some indications of a slight trend towards acceptance of E.S.P. as a valid phenomenon".[53] The best known work in this field is being carried on in a state-financed parapsychical laboratory in Leningraad in the U.S.S.R.

[53] Floyed L. Rueb, Psychology and Life.

This change of mind occurred in the wake of persistent reports of certain undeniable data. It will be profitable to have a glance at the data available in history, particularly Islamic history.

First of all, let us take examples from the life of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), and some other illustrious persons from the history of Islam.

(O It is reported in the,Sahīh Muslim, "Kitāb al-Fitn," that on the occasion of the Battle of the Trench, the Prophet clearly predicted to his Companions: "You will fight in the Arabian peninsula and God will give you victory. Then you will fight against Persia and you will be victorious, and then you will fight against Roma and you will win." Earlier on the same occasion the Prophet had told his Companions how he had had the vision of the cities of Persia, the Roman Empire and Abyssinia. The prediction came true.

(ii) Once the Prophet visited the house of a poverty-stricken Companion, Hadrat Jābir, and asked if he had a carpet in his house. He replied in the negative and thought that the Prophet was just joking. But the Prophet said: "Yes, soon you will sit on carpets and costly floor coverings." This prediction also proved true.

(iii) It is well known that the Prophet predicted the victories of Khaibar, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Kirmān, Egypt, Jerusalem, Constantinople and Turkey. He predicted the death of Hadrat Zainab, one of his wives, Hadrat Fatimah, his daughter, and also his own death. He correctly foretold that the duration of the peroid of the Caliphate after him would be thirty years. He clearly foresaw the chaotic conditions that would ensue the death of Hadrat 'Umar and also the martyrdom of the last three Caliphs. He forewarned people of the civil war betweem Hadrat 'Alī and Hadrat 'A'ishah Siddīqah ; as also that between Hadrat 'Al and Hadrat Amīr Mu'āwiyah. The Prophet had the vision about the reconciliation of Hadrat Hasan and about the martyrdom of Hadrat Husain. The Prophet clearly prophesied that there would be pretenders of prophethood although the door of prophethood was closed

after him. The Holy Prophet had once said: " انی واللہ البصر من وزانی کما ابصر من بین یدی" [By God, I see the hidden objects just like those present before the eyes].

We have a well-known example of E.S.P. from the life of Hadrat 'Umar. He had sent to Syria, for jihad, an army under the command of Hadrat Sāriyah. One day Hadrat 'Umar was delivering Friday sermon. During the course of the sermon he abruptly uttered these words: یا ساریة الجبل [0 Sāriyah ! move to the mountain]. He repeated these words three times, although they were not relevant to the topic on which he was lecturing. When after a few days a messenger from the army came to the capital, he informed the caliph: "O Ruler of the Faithful ! one day when the army was just at the verge of defeat a voice was heard thrice urging Sāriyah to move to the mountain side. We obeyed and retreated to the mountain for protection. As a result, with God's grace, we inflicted a crushing defeat on the non-believers."

There is a story of a Punjabi majdhūb recorded in the book entitled Hikāyāt-i Auliyā' by Maulānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānvi. This majdhūb lived in a small village known as Lohari, where a renowned religious divine Hadrat Hājī 'Abd al-Rahīm Shahid also lived. The religious divine went for Hajj by ship. One day his water-pot fell into the sea. Soon a hand appeared from the sea with the water-pot and handed it back to Haji 'Abd al-Rahīm. Exactly at that moment, back in Lohari, the majdhūb was telling the personal attendant of Hājī 'Abd al-Rahīm: "The water-pot had fallen from the hand of your Hājī [i.e. Hājī 'Abd al-Rahīm] into the sea. I have handed back his water-pot to him." When 'Abed al-Rahīm returned from Hail he confirmed the account given by the majdhūb. This is clearly a case of telepathy and psychokinesis.

In the same book there is a story of another seer named Hāfiz 'Abd al-Qādir who lived in Delhi in 1857. One day the reporter of the testimony was following him when he abruptly stopped and started crying: "Beware ! beware! beware!" Then pointing to his chest he said: "I am hit by bullet here.

I am hit by bullet here !" Hardly about five weeks had passed when the sad events of 1857 started and the seer was hit by a bullet in the chest exactly in the same way as he had prophesied, and he died.

Instances from the life of Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thānī may also be quoted in this regard. One day during a journey Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thāni said to his companions: "When I turned my attention inwards I learnt that an unexpected calamity will befall us." He then told them to recite a certain prayer for protection against the calamity. Within hours of the prediction a fire broke out which could not be controlled. In the general chaos that ensued many lives were lost. But those who recited the prayer, taught by Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Th,ini, escaped unharmed.[54]

Once the younger brother of Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thānī went to Qandhār on a business journey. In his absence Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thānī told the people: "It is a strange matter that whenever I turned my attention to know about the well-being of my brother, I could not find him anywhere on the surface of the earth, though I tried my level best to search him. When I further meditated I only saw his grave." Just a few days after it the companions of his younger brother returned from Qandhār and informed him that his younger brother had died there.[55]

Quite a large number of instances of E.S.P. are quoted from the life of Sayyid 'Abd al-Qādir Jīlāni. I would suffice to repro-duce just one.

One day in Muharram 559, Sayyid 'Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī was sitting in his guest-room with about three hundred of his devotees. Abruptly he got up and hastily left the room beckoning the other people to follow him immediately. No sooner had they left the room when the roof fell with a

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[54] Muhammad Halīm, Mujaddid A'zam (Lahore; Shu'ā'•i Adab, 1958), 11.132.
[55] Ibid., pp. 133-34.

crash. He told the people that when he was sitting he was forewarned about the collapse of the roof.[56]

A large number of examples of E.S.P. are also to be found in the book entitled Ibriz written in the year 1129 A,H. in Arabic by 'Allāmah Ahmad b. Mubārak Saljmāsī of Algiers. Thebook is actually the biography of a saint Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azīz Dabbāgh. It contains his miracles and the miracles of his spiritual guide and relative Sayyid Fashtali al-'Arabi. The book has been translated into Urdu by Dr Muhammad Hasan of Rawalpindi and is entitled Khazīnat al-Ma'ārif. In this book there is a story related by one Ahmad b. 'Abd Allah and it is reproduced here in his own words: "I was in Sabis. Al-'Arabī told me that a great mishap had occurred. I asked him about the nature of the mishap, whereupon he said: 'Muhammad b. Nasīr has just expired.' I asked him as to how he had come to know about it. He replied: 'There is no doubt about his death.' When I expressed surprise he pointed to a man who was coming and said: 'Look at the man who is coming there. He is bringing the news of the death of Muhammad b. Nasīr.' The man was still at a distance and was not clearly visible. We ourselves walked up to receive the man. When at last we met him we asked if there was any news. He said: 'Muhammad b. Nasīr had died.' "[57]

Now we take an example of mediumship and contacting the souls of the dead. In Karachi there lived a lady who acted as a medium. One day a gentleman interested in palmistry approached her with the request to call the spirit of late Cheiro, the famous palmist, for consultation on a tricky issue. The lady asked him to place his palm on the table for reading. Then she went into a trance and said: "Good morning everybody. Cheiro speaking." Then through the medium Cheiro spoke about the lines of the hand of the gentleman for about seven minutes.[58]

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[56] Tālib Husain, Tadkkirah Sayyidnā Ghawth-i A'zam (Lahore : Shu'ā'-i Adab), p. 151.
[57] P. 6.
[58] Dr Ghulām Jīlānī Barq, Man Ii Dunyā, pp. 218-19.

During the last ninety years a large number of books have been written in Europe on all forms of E.S.P. and parapsychology. They all go to prove that the claims regarding the possession of such powers by mystics and saints of the past were not just tall claims.

Now we come to the question as to why and how E.S.P. is possible. The answer on which almost all believers in E.S.P. seem to agree is that E.S.P. and psychical phenomena are possible because in man, besides the physical body, there is an astral or psychical body which is not governed by the laws of the physical world or the so-called laws of Nature. In this regard Rt. Rev. C W. Leadbeater writes: "You are not your body. You inhibit your body. Bodies are mere shells which we cast aside like a suit of clothing."[59]

Scientists have been trying to invent devices to prove the existence of the astral body. A European spiritualist prepared a machine, with a glass chamber known as Wilson Chamber. A living frog was placed inside the chamber and air was pumped out of it. A meter was also fitted into the chamber. As soon as the frog died, the needle would at once point to "D" (i.e. death). Simultaneously photographs of the frog were taken with powerful cameras. A number of times two photographs of the frog appeared on the film, one that of the physical body of the frog and the other that of its astral body. This astral body was found at a distance of about five inches above the frog's body, and exactly resembling it. However, it was ethereal in form like mist. Dr R.A. Watters, a physicist, worked on the machine for a long time and published his findings under the caption "Intra Atomic Quantity".[60]

According to Mrs Gaskil, a spiritualist, there are two systems working simultaneously in the body. One is the physical and the other "etheric". The "etheric" body lives in the atoms of the physical body and separates on

[59] R t. Rev. COW. Leadbeater, Invisible Helpers.
[60] Cf. Dr Ghulām Jīlanī Bard, op. cit., p. 57.

death. The real body is the "etheric" body, while the physical body is just like a shell or an inn wherein the real body has only a temporary abode.[61]

Mr Trine, another famous spiritualist, writes: "Here, in this world, our bodies are dual, physical and etheric. These two bodies interpenetrate each other but the etheric body is permanent. The physical body is only a protective covering for the etheric body during its passage through the earth life."[62]

So we see that the explanation given by the spiritualists for E.S.P. and other related data is that there exists in us an etheric or astral body which transcends the barriers of space and, there-fore, has the so-called supernatural powers.

The belief that the only sources of knowledge are our sense-organs and also that each sense-organ is capable of receiving only a particular type of sense-data is no longer tenable. European ophthalmologists have discovered the presence of the retinal cells under the human skin all over the body. That is why some people are capable of seeing while they are tightly blindfolded. This is not a new belief. In ancient times, the art of reading without using eyes was acquired by certain people through practice.

It may, therefore, rightly be concluded that the presence in man of higher and more refined sources of knowledge, hitherto-fore untapped, cannot now be ruled out. After all our knowledge of the capabilities of human beings is still incomplete and is continuously expanding in the same way as our knowledge of the plant life is continuously being revolutionised by the discovery of new facts about them. For example, till recently plants used to be considered as just living but not sentient. However, it has now been proved that they are even more sentient than human beings. A plant can feel the intentions of an approaching person and can be affected by his

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[61] Mrs Gaskil, What is Life.
[62] R.W. Trine, In Tune With the Infinite.

undisclosed thinking. Instruments to record their feelings and reactions in various conditions have been developed and now we know that plants sing, laugh and weep just as we do. Sir Jagdis Chandra Bose, a Bengali botanist, has writ-ten a book entitled Plant Autographs and Their Revelations: In this book he tells us that plants sleep and wake up. They can be anaesthesised by administering chloroform into their roots. Maulānā Shabbīr Ahmad 'Uthmānī, the geat religious leader who was in the vanguard of the Pakistan Movement, rightly observes ; "Now we should take care while using the term 'Laws of Nature'. When we see something happening differently from the known pattern, we should not hastily pronounce it as against the 'Law of Nature'."[63]

The invention of Wireless, Radio and Television has proved the possibility of similar powers in human beings. There was a time when no sane person would even think of listening to distant sounds or exchanging messages or seeing things happening at great distances. It was considered against the "Laws of Nature". But the invention of instruments which have turned these impossibilities into possibilities have revolutionised our concept of a law of Nature. These instruments, i.e. Wireless, Radio and Television, which receive sounds and pictures at great distances arc made of metals and they are dead matter. Previously the metals were there but only their particular arrangement was wanting to make them capable of receiving distant sounds and pictures. When scientists discovered the right type of the arrangement of the metallic parts of the instruments, they acquired the power to receive distant sounds and pictures. Therefore, there is a clear possibility that human brain, which is definitely superior to metals, if properly trained and in some individuals even without any training, can become capable of receiving distant sounds and pictures. In other words, people who are capable of E.S.P. and of contact with the spirits of the dead, may be considered as human wireless, radio and television sets. Dr Ghulām Jīlānī Barq has told the story of a French couple who had be-come human wireless

[63] Maulānā Shabbīr Ahmad •Uthmānī, Islām our Mu'jizāt, p. 113.

sets. The husband worked in an office. Whenever a guest came to him he used to close his eyes and with powerful concentrated thought would telepathically tell his wife to prepare meals for the guest, which she did. Similarly, we may say that Hadrat 'Umar and his general, Hadrat Sāriyah, were both human wireless sets.

If what has been said above is true, and there is no reason to believe it to be otherwise, then there is no ground to reject the view held by a large section of humanity that the world of matter is subordinate to mind or consciousness. Even scientists seem to be gradually coming round to this view. For example, Sir James Jeans admits that he is inclined to sharing the Ideal its' view that consciousness is the fundamental reality and the physical world is derived from it.[64] Similarly, Max Planck also thinks that consciousness cannot be explained with the help of matter and its laws. According to him, consciousness is the basic reality and matter is derivable from it.[65]

This leads us to the belief that in man there lie hidden certain powers which, if fully tapped and exploited, can enable him to conquer the world of matter and rise above the so-called laws of Nature, thus to transcend the barriers placed on him by his physical body.

So far we have been concerned with the question of the meaning and nature of E.S.P., but now we must discuss its relation with religion. Religion and spirituality or the power of E.S.P. are generally considered synonymous. Though close relationship between the two is admitted in Islam, yet some differentiation is made between formal religion (Sharī'ah) and real religion (Tarīqah). The former consists in the adherence to the rituals pre-scribed by religion, while the latter consists in personal exp Hence of the Divine Being and the cultivation of the inner self. Shāh Wālī Allāh of Delhī, after explaining this distinction between the two, adds: "Then it has become

[64] Sir James Jeāns, The Mysterious World.
[65] Max Planck, Science and the Modern Mind.

evident that there are two aspects, outer and inner aspects, of religion. . . . After the Prophet's death there appeared two forms of adherence to religion: those persons who were endowed with the capability of sticking to the Sharī'ah became custodians of the outer form of religion. This is the class of jurists, bearers of tradition, Ghazīs and the Oārīs.... The second group of the champions of religion consists of the people whom God has endowed with the capability of preserving the inner aspect of religion—the inner aspect of religion is also known as Ihsān. The company and conversation of the people of this group has the power to charge those who come in contact with them with magnetism and an extraordinary power of influencing others. All types of supernatural deeds are performed by them. A person of this group comes to know the hidden intentions of other people through E.S.P. (کشف و اشراق) and with God's help brings about change "in the routine course of events".[66]

Therefore, according to this view, E.S.P. and spiritualism are considered as part or offshoot of religion. On the contrary, there are people who think that E.S.P. is not necessarily dependent on religion, as it may exist even without religion. For example, Ra'īs Amrohvī, a prolific writer on E S.P. and related phenomena, distinguishes between spiritualism (روحانیت) and psychicism (روحانیت). Thus he writes: "It is difficult to under-stand the problems and discussions of parapsychology without first understanding the difference between the spiritual and psychical points of view of life. Spiritualism is based on a particular (religious) creed, whereas psychicism is a scientific and empirical theory. Parapsychology deals only with psychical phenomena, e.g. E.S.P. (Normal) Psychology lays stress on the view that the only sources of human perception are the sensory and motor nerves. Parapsychology does concede the importance of the sense-organs in the acquisition of knowledge, but it also claims that in man there are certain

[66] Shāh Walī Allāh, Ham'āt, translated in Urdu by muhammad Sarwar (Lahore : Sind Sagar Academy), pp. 40 43.

supernormal powers by which, if he uses them, he can acquire the knowledge of some or most of the facts without the use of sense-organs."[67] Then he goes on to define psychicism in the following words: "Psychicism is the name of that particular psychological or mental state which sometimes raises mind above ordinary level of consciousness and brings it into contact with certain mysterious forces or some unknown laws. . . . Precognition of future events, predictions, spells, inspiration, intuition, E.S.P., are some of the psychical phenomena and fall within the scope of parapsychology."[68] He further adds: "Spiritualism recognises duality of spirit and body, each having its own sphere and its own objectives. From the psychical point of view, human existence has three planes, i.e. physical body, astral body and spirit. parapsychology or psychicism does not deal with the functions of the spirit since it is the business of spiritualism, and spirit has a religious tinge. Psychicism is open-mindedly neutral to religious and spiritual creed.[69] According to the writer, psychicism deals with the astral body, its functions, its relationship with physical body and so forth.

Here the wording of the description of psychicism and spiritualism which the writer has employed is a bit lopsided and confused since he has not been a regular student of psychology, but the point of view which he is trying to put forward is quite clear. In his opinion there is no necessary relationship between religion and E.S.P. People who do not subscribe to a particular religion, or do not subscribe to any religion at all, may acquire, and in history are known to have acquired, the power of E.S.P., because all human beings have astral body. But it may rightly be pointed out that all human beings have spirit too, and it is not possible to precisely distinguish between spirit and psyche or astral body. Even Muslim thinkers and mystics admit that even non-believers of religion can cultivate in themselves the supernatural powers, but they are considered inferior in nature, Muslim

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[67] Ra'īs Amrohvī, Psychology and Parapsychology. (Urdu), p. 61.
[68] Ibid., p, 62.
[69] Ibid., p. 69,

theologians have coined terms to distinguish different planes of the supernatural powers. In a prophet they lead to prophetic miracle (mu' jizah), in a follower of the prophet they lead to mystic miracle (karāmat) and in a non-believer they lead to acquired miracle (istidrāj).

Without philosophising on this issue it can be said that all those who acquire the power of E.S.P. do believe in reality beyond the world of matter and the supremacy of the spiritual being over the physical being. Therefore, such people may or may not be believers in any religion, but they do utilise and develop a power whose basis may be termed as religious. As such, E.S.P. and other related powers are linked with religion, although one may acquire these powers without consciously sub-scribing to any religion.

The most interesting part of the study of E.S.P. is the consideration of the question of the methods and techniques which can be used for the acquisition of the power of E.S.P. it is believed that some people are innately endowed with such powers. Mystics, spiritualists and writers on E.S,P. tell us that other people can cultivate such powers by certain exercises. Some of these exercises have been generally used by mystics, while others have been used by other people. The main aim of most of these exercises is gaining the concentration of attention. Various exercises for gaining the concentration of attention have been practised since times immemorial. Even primitive people were quite well versed in this art. Crystal-gazing was the most popular method. Sometimes any other shining object was also used for this purpose. Assyrians were specially well known for making use of a number of exercises for achieving the concentration of mind. From them this art was learnt by Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Chinese and Tibetans. The latter two nations made some innovations in this field. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries crystal-gazing was widely practised in Europe. In Egypt, ceediums were asked to gaze constantly at the flame of a lamp which was filled with a mixture of wine and oil. In our own country oil is poured in a shining metal tray and a burning lamp placed inside it. Then the medium is seated in a dark room and asked to gaze, without blinking eyes, at the reflection of the flame

in the oil. Sometimes the medium is required to gaze at the oiled nail of his thumb. This is a practice which has been inherited from our ancestors. In this way a state of hypnotic trance is induced in the medium and in that state acquires the power of E.S.P. and he makes correct predictions, tells the names of the thieves and sees pictures of the absent individuals.

Now we shall mention some of the exercises prescribed by Muslim sufis for acquiring the power of E.S.P. First of all is the meditation of the real name of God (مراقبہ اسم ذات اللہ)

This consists in constantly gazing at the word "Allah" (اللہ) written in white Arabic letters on a black background. Similarly, there is the meditation of the Holy Prophet which consists in constantly gazing at the word "Muhammad" (محمد) in shining white Arabic characters on a black background. Some sufis prescribe dhikr (ذکر) of the Kalimah, the dhikr of Allāh Hu (اللہ ھو), The dhikr may be loud (جلی) or silent (خفی). Shāh Wall Allāh of Delhi also suggests, apart from these dhikrs, the remembrance of death, reading of the stories of love and listening to music.[70] The aim is to induce a peculiar mood in the mind of the seeker.

Other sufis talk of other types of meditation. Maulānā Ashraf 'Alī Thānvī deseribes five stages of contemplation, viz.:

(i) Dhikr (remembrance), i.e. contemplation of the beloved who is absent.

(ii) Hadar (Presence), i.e. contemplation of the beloved who is visible but is at some distance.

(iii) Mukāshafah (Vision), i.e. the contemplation of the beloved who is present close by so that his looks are clearly visible.

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[70] Op. cit., p, 64.

(iv) Mushāhadah and Faith' (Observation and Absorption), i.e. the contemplation of the beloved who is too close and the observer is lost and absorbed in his contemplation.

(v) Mu'āinah, Fan al-Fanā (Unification and Absolute Absorption), i.e. the contemplation of the beloved so deeply that the contemplator becomes one with him.

Hindu mystics prefer holding of the breath and meditation of Pramatma, i.e. the "infinite self," for the same purpose.

In all these exercises the posture of the body plays an important role. One ought also to be physically clean and pure. As already pointed out, the real purpose of all these exercises is the gaining of complete concentration of mind on an external or ideational object. Such undistracted concentration for quite a long time, it is believed, leads to the acquisition of supernatural powers like E.S.P., mediumship and hypnotism.

The other exercises which are often used for acquiring super-natural powers are:

(i) Lacanomancy or candle gazing.

(ii) Captromancy or mirror gazing.

(iii) Hydromancy or water gazing.

(iv) Crystal-gazing (التصوير).

(v) Point-gazing (التسخير).

(vi) Sun-gazing.

(vii) Moon-gazing.

(viii) Nose-gazing (البصير).

(ix) Cross-gazing (التجلی), i.e. gazing at the roor of the nose, both eyeballs trying to look at each other.

(x) Shadow-gazing.

(xi) Meditation of any source of light.

(xii) Meditation of an imaginary point of light in any part of the body, specially in the heart.

When the attention is concentrated on any of the objects listed above to the point of absolute absorption, one starts experiencing E.S.P. Some researchers in the nature of E.S.P. have even shown the physiological basis of the supernatural powers.

By constantly gazing, without blinking eyes and by riveting full attention at a certain point or object, a state of self-hypnosis is caused. It results in the "disassociation of consciousness," and from within it emerges a timeless-spaceless consciousness or the astral body. The seat of this consciousness is supposed to be the pineal gland which is activated by the functioning of the pitituary gland in the brain. Constant gazing at a point or meditation of an object causes it to function.

These are only a few of the innumerable exercises which have been prevalent among mystics and spiritualists belonging to various religious groups. It is believed that anybody who undertakes these exercises in the manner prescribed for each can develop in himself the power of E.S.P., although the degree of success may differ from individual to individual according to his aptitude and effort.

So much convincing data on the subject of E.SP. is now available that it will be unscientific to brush it aside as mere superstition. In fact, there is need for a thorough systematic empirical study of this subject. It may be mentioned here that, some years back, the Government of India allowed and

even financed the creation of chairs for the subjects of astrology, palmistry and other predictive sciences, in various universities, where much useful research work is being done. In Pakistan and many other countries, E.S.P. and other related fields of study are considered nothing more than mere abracadabra.

It is, therefore, recommended that a State-financed Society for Psychical Research be formed in Pakistan to undertake research in parapsychology and other allied fields in the light of the teachings of Islam.

PLOTINUS' ETHICAL THEORY?

Miss Tahira Braid

A reader, interested in the mystical philosophy of Plotinus, is often nonplussed on discovering that it is devoid of ethics. What may be stated, by way of generalisation, is that his explanation about "Reality" may be subjected to an ethical interpretation. That is to say, when Plotinus draws a sketch of "Reality," he posits ethical values to it. For example, the first hypostasis of "Divine Being" is "The One" as well as "The Good". Yet one wonders where the moral proposition in Plotinus' advocacy for things of the physical world to strive back to "The Source" lies. And the justification that this is the only one possibility of the soul's redemption from the cyclic reincarnation does not explain its rational necessity. In this respect hardly any reference is made to the subject of ethics in the Enneads except in the course of discussion "On Beauty". But even in this section Plotinus refers to virtues as moral actions and as states belonging to the higher (secondary) realm of "Beauty". But beyond the use of descriptive terms concerning moral actions, Plotinus does not proceed further.

Yet, if one were to closely examine the general framework of his mystical philosophy, one may infer an ethical theory of a different category. This is to be found in his idea of spiritual guidance. In Plotinus' thought we are confronted with a strange combination of two antagonistic doctrines and which is a synthesis of Stoic and Aristotelian ethics. From the Stoics he borrowed the idea that virtues make oneself like God. From Aristotle he borrowed the idea that virtues make oneself like oneself and not like anybody else. Plotinus thinks that, according to Aristotle, "by Civic virtues, not in the Divine, one be-comes truly oneself ; by doing so one comes closer to the Divine, by exercising higher virtues emanating from the Divine one be-

comes Divine."[71] To this he combines his own idea of "self with-drawing" from the many factors of the physical world.

In this paper, I shall try to indicate that, although in the general sense an ethical theory is lacking, there is an ethical theory of a different type in relation to Plotinus' view of spiritual guidance. I shall also endeavour to prove that it is precisely in the above context that he has overlooked the problem of social morality. And this I shall discuss at length in the following two sections.

Section "A". In the second tractate of the first Ennead titled "Virtues" Plotinus states his concept of the two kinds of virtues, civic and political, the idea of which he inherited from Aristotelian ethics. By means of these virtues the soul is purified and attains the final stage of enlightenment.

Virtues, he contends, is the good of the soul in the way the good of matter is form or the good of the body is soul. Because all virtues lead to the "Spirit" and the "Spirit" of the "Good" is the "One," the "One becomes our "First Nature". In the, Plotinian theme this is the logical pattern. That is to say, every-thing in the physical world emanates from the "Source" and all emanated things must share their nature with the "Source," i.e. "The One".

The practice of all virtues would begin with the avoidance of evil. The first Plotinian generalised ethical maxim would be the avoidance of evil, i.e. matter, and striving towards good—form. Therefore, any kind of involvement with matter, which pervades the universe by way of a "Necessary law,"[72] ought to be avoided through the practice of virtues. "Since evil is here, 'haunting this world by necessary law,' and it is the soul's

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[71] Eimer O'Brien, The Essential Plotinus (New York, 1964), p. 109.

[72] Stephan IdacKenna, Tr., Plotinus : The Enneads (London, Faber and Faber), p 30. When Plotinus discourses on the necessity of evil, he is taking Plato's view into consideration. In Theaetetus, 176 a-b, Plato says : "Evils . . . can never pass ahtay for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the good in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature and this earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from this earth to heaven as quickly as we can."

design to escape from Evil, we must escape hence."[73] But what is this escape all about ? According to Plotinus, escape from evil lies "in attaining likeness to God".[74] And this is explained further "as becoming just and holy living by wisdom, the entire nature being grounded in Virtue."[75]

In the following two sections of the same tractate, Plotinus endeavours to show that, although souls ought to take the World Soul as their moral model, this does not imply that any state of virtue exists as such in Being. Yet he is convinced, "there is no reason why we should not, by virtues peculiar to our state, attain likeness to a model in which virtue has no place."[76] For any objection to the view that it is impossible for a soul to derive virtue from Being which in turn is above virtue, Plotinus explains by way of analogy: "The material house is not identical with the house conceived in the intellect, and yet stands in its likeness: the material house has distribution and order while the pure idea is not constituted by any such elements ; distribution, order, symmetry are not parts of an idea. . . . So with us ; it is from the Supreme that we derive order and distribution and harmony, which are virtues in this sphere ; the Existences."[77] So in Being, virtue does not exist. And if it exists, it exists as pure thought. Yet once this pure thought begins to exist in the soul, it takes the form of virtue which in turn may be likened to the pure thought of Being. It must nevertheless be emphasised that Virtue in Being (only in a manner of speaking) is neither identical nor equivalent to the Virtue in the Soul. Virtue in the Soul possesses a trace of perfection which enables a person to lead a better life. On analysing virtue, we come to the conclusion that it is neither wholly matter nor wholly form. But the more it partakes in common with the Divine (Being), the more it shares with formless Divinity. This means the souls that share in Virtue also share more

[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid,
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid., p. 31.

form, and are closer to Divinity. Or, again, the more form the souls take into themselves, the more Divine or Godlike do they become.

Plotinus agrees with Plato that Virtues are a purification of the soul. Purification is described as the unmingling of the soul with body or matter. Paul Henry, in his article "The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought," explains Plotinus' concept of purification in the following manner: "To purify is to remove what has attached itself from the outside to the inmost self."[78] He continues: "the categorical Imperative of Plotinian mysticism is, 'cut away everything' . . . which includes the sensible and corporeal realities which are exterior and inferior . . . the multiplicity of concepts . . . to the pure unity of the self-withself and self with God."[79]

Concerning the soul's purification, the following would be the presentation of the Plotinian argument: Before matter entered into the soul there was "Good". Therefore, the cleaning of the soul from matter would suffice. But in this case, it is the act of cleaning and not the cleaned thing which is good. It is unthinkable that the "Absolute Good" should have its abode in matter, for matter is evil. Therefore, the resulting "Emergent" in the process of purification is of the nature of good. The soul's nature, which is good, lies in its devotion to the "Intelligible Realm". There is no other option for the soul but to withdraw itself from the world-at-large and enter into communion with this "Intelligible Realm". "The soul's true good is devotion to the 'intellectual Principle,' its kin ; evil to the soul lies in frequenting strangers. There is no other way for it than to purify itself and so enter into relation with its own, the new phase being by a new orientation."[80]

Through disengagement with the physical world, and in its state of self-contemplation, the soul finds itself in a state that is above emotions, passions and affections. As it no longer knows suffering it suppresses all forms of

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[78] Ibid., Introduction, p. 1.
[79] Ibid., Introduction, p. 1, xv.
[80] Ibid., p. 33.

feelings without fear, desire or shame. One may infer that, at this stage, the soul begins to exist on a rational plane. And, again, it is at this stage that Plotinus would begin to consider the human individual as a moral being. And in a moral being, whenever desires are there, these desires can no longer be considered as evil or sinful. For instance, when there is a desire for food or drink, it would be for the sake of satisfying the basic needs of the body. In a moral being, no matter what the desire may be, it would not be there for the sake of sensuous pleasure. This is because reason would be in total control of, and in domination over, emotions.

Section "B". If Plotinus' views on ethics must be forcefully drawn from what has been stated so far, one may affirm that he places importance over the intention of the act that makes it good or evil. An act is good if it is motivated by reason. An act is evil if it is motivated by emotion. For Plotinus emotions al-ways lead to sensuousness, and sensuousness ought to be avoided, nay, shunned. Reason, on the other hand, by its own necessity, having the nature of good would avoid actions regarded evil.

Once reason begins to dominate emotions, the stage of self-discipline is reached. Through exercise of self-control over passions and affections, the soul will be like God. "In all this, there is only matter of discipline . . . but our concern is not merely to be sinless but to be God."[81]

Critical Appreciation. In the Plotinian scheme, there is no scope for evil as a hostile potential force as it is understood in the Christian, Jewish or Islamic sense. In the Plotinian theme, evil is the principle of negation. At a moral level (as there can never be absolute evil), human wickedness is never absolute. Any form of outward action is good or bad to the extent that it reflects the inner state of the soul. And he who becomes a sage is not the one who has primarily mastered an evil force but the one who has become a reasonable being and is in full control of his emotions.

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[81] Ibid., p. 34,

Like Kant, Plotinus pays importance to intention rather than the consequence of an act. An action is good only if it is motivated by reason. But sometimes a good action may be per-formed through a sentiment. And it is only in the aftermath of the experience that such an action is realised to be motivated either by reason or emotion. But Plotinus would perhaps over-rule such a possibility to be the moral good because such an act as initially swayed by a sentiment would be judged as an emotional or a moral act.

(1) Having a complete picture of Plotinus' scheme of morality what strikes us is that Plotinus completely ignores the problem of social morality. The problem of morality arises only with inter-personal relations. Instead, Plotinus is more interested in the salvation of the individual. In his view of spiritual guidance he draws out a mystical path by means of which "the flight of the alone to the alone" is rendered possible. And as his views favour an individual living in isolation, he is indirectly advocating against social life. Human beings, psychologically speaking, are of such a nature that they shun isolation. Because man is gregarious by nature, he likes to keep to his kind. And he does this by establishing a community life.

But suppose, even for the sake of argument, we were to accept the idea that all men should live alone. There would come a time when the whole race would become extinct. This is be-cause, in the first place, propagation would not be possible. Secondly, the outside forces of the natural world would prove hazardous to human life.

(2) Again, the mystic path or "the flight of the alone to the alone" is without a general or universal appeal to mankind. This is why all forms of mystical doctrines are not publicly accepted. Also the idea of an isolated individual living with the infinite Being is rather unpopular. Having no foreknowledge of God save that He is an "ineffable Being" brings to the human mind a fear of the unknown. This is the reason why monotheistic religions have a greater appeal to people than mysticism. For example, all revealed religions ensure the idea of a social life to man. According to the

Christian belief, before Christ dies on the cross, he promises one of the thieves (who dies with him) that soon they shall be together in Paradise. The Qur'an also refers to the concept of Paradise as a place in which man will live in communion with his fellow beings.

(3) Finally, Plotinus' philosophy suffers, from the unresolved contradiction of determinism and indeterminism. In his theory of emanation, Plotinus shows how things "flow" in and out from one another. The emanation of one level of reality from another is a kind of determinism. Yet he advocates for the souls striving towards good which is not possible without the precondition of a free will. That is to say, without the precondition of free will, any judgment pertaining to morality is not possible. If man does not have freedom to choose between courses of action, it does not make sense to question the rightness or the wrongness of the action. So although Plotinus does talk about man's struggle to-wards the acquisition of good, he does not explain the possibility of striving with reference to his metaphysics.

In conclusion one may state that an ethical theory as accept-(ed in the general sense does not exist in Plotinus' philosophy. The main criticism lies in the fact that, although Plotinus uses ethical terms, these terms bear no reference to social morality. Considering the fact that Plotinus does not claim to be a prophet of revealed religions, his use of ethical terms does not carry religious sanction. But whether the use of the words "Good" and "Evil" converts Plotinus' philosophy into an ethical theory is an open question.

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PLACE OF DOUBT IN ENQUIRY IN PEIRCE IN COMPARISON TO DESCARTES

Mrs Arifa Shameem

Philosophers have always looked suspiciously at the common-sense beliefs and notions accepted by common man. The philosopher's task consists in enquiring into the real nature of things instead of simply assuming their existence. The common man hardly questions things around him. This is the reason why he is ignorant. It is characteristic of a philosopher, on the other hand, to question everything. This is how, he thinks, he can ultimately embrace the truth.

One may ask here what the psychological motives behind man's quest for knowledge are. The motives can be varied. Curiosity, love of truth, guilt or shame felt on accepting uncriti-(cal beliefs, or a sense of responsibility to accept only what is true, are some of the possible motives. There may be many more. However, doubt about conventional beliefs and opinions seems to be the most fundamental and dominant motive for rejection of such beliefs. From Parmenides to Plato, down to the father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes, and the father of pragmatism, Sanders Peirce, philosophical quest has always been initiated by doubt.

Doubt may be a perversive tendency. It might end in scepticism. It is an irritating state of mind and makes one uncomfortable, but it has its positive side, too. It initiates enquiry. This was realised by Descartes as early as eighteenth century, and this is what Peirce reaffirms.

Doubt, according to Peirce, is "an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves".[82] Whereas belief is a habit of mind, doubt is a privation of habit. The struggle to free oneself from this uncomfortable state of mind called doubt, and to form a habit of mind called belief, is enquiry. Since enquiry is a struggle to free oneself from doubt, in the absence of doubt, no genuine enquiry, Peirce believes, is possible.

Peirce's recognition of doubt as the sole motive of enquiry opens so many questions: (1) What are the different kinds of doubt? (2) What is the place of doubt in human enquiry? (3) Can doubt be used as a method of enquiry?

We are all familiar with the feeling of doubt which Peirce characterises as irritating and uncomfortable, and from which we struggle to free ourselves. In an attempt to overcome this dissatisfying state we begin enquiring into the nature of ideas and objects and things, etc., which we doubt. This state of doubt is psychological. It serves a great purpose. It is the psycho-logical root of all scientific and philosophical enquiry. Were this feeling of doubt absent, no enquiry, Peirce believes, would have been possible. In the absence of such a feeling man would either have become God Who knows everything, or would have fallen to the level of animal who cares for no knowledge. Thanks to doubt, it restores man's dignity as a rational being who enquires into the nature of things and acquires knowledge as a result of it.

Whereas for Peirce a genuine feeling of doubt is the sole motive of enquiry, the sole object of enquiry is "settlement of belief or opinion".[83] Beyond that no enquiry is reasonable or recommended. Peirce offers two criteria for the assessment of a true belief. One is negative, the other is positive. The negative criterion is the absence of uneasy, irritating state of

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[82] Sanders Peirce, Fixation of Belief. Reprinted in justins Buehler, Ed., Philosophical Wrilings of Peirce, Peter Smith.
[83] Ibid.

mind. The positive criterion is the settlement of opinion based on scientific enquiry. Peirce blamed Descartes for not seeing the difference between ideas that are seemingly clear and those that are really so. However, he commits the same error. It never occurred to him that there can be a confusion between beliefs that seem true and those that are really true ; in other words, between true and false beliefs. He never cared to draw such a distinction between beliefs. It suffices Peirce to withhold enquiry whenever one feels satisfied with regard to any idea or concept. What the mind does not question need not be questioned. However, it is interesting that, whereas Peirce views doubt to be the sole motive of equiry, he does not consider subjective certitude of any significance in enquiry. Peirce ignores and mistrusts the feeling of certainty which is claimed to be accompanied by ideas clear and distinct. Subjective certainty is no criterion of truth in Peirce's opinion. Peirce's view seems to be confused on this issue. On the one hand, he asserts that in the absence of doubt no enquiry is justified ; on the other, he thinks certainty is no criterion of truth. He does not see that doubt and certainty are correlative. Absence of one implies the presence of the other. To Peirce, absence of doubt is a habit of action called belief. He does not realise that certitude is indispensable to belief. If by belief he means a determination of mind, certainty and indubitability are essential elements of such a habit.

Descartes views psychological doubt differently from Peirce and he would probably agree with Peirce that psychological doubt motivates the doubter to struggle against it and to rest with some belief. But his views are different about the function of the psychological doubt in philosophical and scientific enquiry. The best way to free oneself from such an irritating state called doubt, he would argue, is to accept some ready-made belief or opinion about the object in question and to cling to it tenaciously till one is disturbed again ; or remains satisfied if luckily not so disturbed. There the struggle should end. Descartes would not devaluate the place of such psychological feeling of doubt in enquiry. But he rejects it because it does not guarantee

true knowledge as a fruit of the struggle. The doubter has a tendency to seek refuge in any opinion or belief that may help him get rid of the uncomfortable state of mind. The goal of psychological doubt is not truth or knowledge. It can end at best in what Plato calls "true belief". Since such beliefs are accepted without proper assessment, they are easily shaken whenever any conflict arises. Descartes, therefore, rejects psychological doubt on account of its unscientific character. Psychological doubt might initiate enquiry. But all enquiry need not be initiated by a genuine feeling of doubt. Descartes is a thoroughgoing rationalist. To him, rational enquiry ought to be initiated by a rational motive. Though Descartes does not specify different possible motives of enquiry, his own reason for starting fresh enquiry was his discontentment with Scholastic theology. He felt a strong urge to disown his Scholastic philosophical heritage. He felt it his responsibility to overthrow all beliefs and convictions that have no rational foundation and to raise knowledge equal to the dignity of man. Mistrust or authority and absolute faith in reason are the primary motives for his fundamentally new search for truth.

However, Descartes looked at doubt as a very useful tool of enquiry. He used doubt for a double purpose: (1) as an instrument of clearing the mind of all past prejudices, and (2) as a method of arriving at indubitable truth. To this combined effort he gave the name methodological doubt. Here the first step can be appropriately described as provisional doubt, the second procedural doubt. Descartes sets aside psychological doubt as of no use in a systematic enquiry and feels the need of replacing it with methodological doubt. There need not be a genuine feeling of doubt in order to doubt methodologically. Doubt has to be used as a procedure, as a systematic way of pursuing knowledge. It is here that Peirce disagrees with Descartes. Without a genuine living doubt no enquiry is possible. You cannot doubt, he argues, by writing down on a piece of paper that you doubt. "Doubt is not as easy as lying."[84] We shall not enter into a discussion of the possibility and

[84] Ibid.

feasibility of methodological doubt before examining it carefully. Let us examine here, there-fore, the two steps: (1) provisional doubt, and (2) procedural doubt, of the method.

Provisional doubt is only a temporary suspension of judg. ment on things which have not been known in a systematic or methodic way. Such provisional doubt would refrain us from making hasty and premature judgments. Its purpose is to help us abstain from all positive assertions until reflective consciousness comes face to face with genuine truth.

In a way all great thinkers have been making use of pro-visional doubt before beginning their enquiry. Looking at the natural world with suspicion provisionally in order to recognise its true nature is what every great thinker thought as its most appropriate starting point. Their enquiry was not necessarily initiated by a genuine psychological feeling of doubt. Most of them participated in the natural world more effectively than common folk. Yet a provisional doubt, a temporary suspension of judgment until enquiry is complete, is characteristic of every great philosophical enterprise. They all cast doubt on natural standpoint. They all challenged it provisionally. But in the end of their enquiry, some of them reaffirmed it more fully ; others offered a modified interpretation of the world. Following the line of Descartes, the phenomenologists especially adopted pro-visional doubt as part of their phenomenological method. Sus-pension of judgment is the first step towards their understanding of the world. Their suspension of judgment or "bracketing existence" is very similar to Descartes' doubt of the commonsense world. Peirce only needs to see how useful provisional doubt has been to these thinkers, though he may not agree with the results of their enquiry. Provisional or pretended doubt is useful as providing a direction to enquiry. It helps focus attention on the real objects of enquiry. It refrains the understanding from its tendency to confuse real objects of enquiry with objects given in the natural standpoint. The effectiveness and usefulness of feigned or provisional doubt can hardly be questioned.

Doubt provides a new dimension to enquiry when it becomes procedural. The previous stage was the stage of suspension of judgment. Now it is a real procedure. Descartes indicates different steps that have to be systematically followed.

One has to begin doubting things about which one is least certain, step by step, to those that appear most certain. In other words, things that we less strongly believe have to be doubted first, e.g. first sensory objects, then other people's bodies and souls, and then ones own body and soul, and lastly mathematical objects to which one more strongly adheres. Methodological doubt does not end only in a negative procedure of t iminating everything that has been believed in so far. A possibls being, "a Deus Deceptor," is imagined to exist, who is suspected of deceiving us in making us believe things that are not true. This procedure, when followed to its utmost limits, Descartes thinks, will bring us to a point beyond which whatever we notice is indubitable. The cogito is the first such indubitable truth which surpasses all limits of doubt.

Methodological doubt serves the putpose of cleaning all the rubbish in the way of knowledge. Its purpose is to eliminate all thoughts and beliefs that have no rational foundation. It is a mental catharsis. It purges the mind of all past prejudices, Once the mind is purified through this procedure, every new entry would be accepted as truth. There will be no risk of confusing truth with mere beliefs. Methodological doubt ends in absolute indubitability. It is a stepping stone to all positive discoveries. Absolute indubitability is not merely a subjective feeling. It has its foundation in reason itself. It is a stage where reason announces that whatever is apprehended now is true. When doubt ends, the mind perceives "clear" and "distinct" ideas. Such "clear" and "distinct" ideas are much more than mere beliefs. They are truths objective and absolute.

So much for Descartes' claim. It is interesting that, whereas Descartes sees methodological doubt as an important tool of knowledge, Peirce rejects

it as stupid. The question, therefore. how doubt can be used as a method requires some further clarification. The significance of methodological doubt in enquiry can be determined by raising the question: what is the purpose of enquiry ? To Descartes the purpose of enquiry is to arrive at clear and distinct ideas. For Peirce the purpose of enquiry is settlement of opinion. This is the question of the very meaning of knowledge. How is knowledge to be defined ? Peirce would define

knowledge in terms of a set of beliefs established by scientific reason. Descartes defines knowledge in terms of "clear" and "distinct" ideas known by intuitive reason. Descartes aims at indubitability or certitude which is his criterion of truth. Peirce rejects certitude as a criterion of truth because it is subjective. He seeks truth in beliefs that are scientifically establised by common consent of competent persons. To Peirce truth is public, not personal. Beliefs are not true because I consider them to be so. They are true because scientific research has proved them to be so, and because competent authorities agree on them. These beliefs, such as beliefs in the real or external world, are very precious to Peirce. They should not be disturbed without genuine reason. It does not make sense to destroy all beliefs at one stroke without having any genuine doubt about them. This does not serve any purpose. Why should we give up long-established beliefs if they sound perfectly true to us ? One must not be misled here to think that Peirce is defending personal or uncoordinated beliefs—beliefs that have no rational foundation, or beliefs that are not firm. He himself condemns the way of tenacity and the way of authority in establishing beliefs. It is very unsafe to cling to one's irrational beliefs or beliefs that are propagated by state, church or any other authority. In a way Peirce might appear to appeal to authority when he talks about settlement of opinion amongst competent authorities. But this is a different kind of authority. Authority of the scientist and other competent persons in the relevant field has to be relied upon because what is transmitted by such authorities is a result of genuine scientific research. The scientists are persons who are dedicated to the search of truth and have

reached an agreement on the point in question. However, Peirce defends some commonsense beliefs also. Our commonsense belief has to be trusted because what is known by it cannot be genuinely questioned. By merely putting into interrogative form does not make a fact a question. One gains nothing by putting aside what has been commonly believed by the scientists or what common sense is disposed to believe.

Enquiry, Peirce believes, is a cooperative venture. It is progressive. Every new thinker or scientist is expected to participate in this joint cause. If there is any disagreement on any point, scientific reason is fully capable of handling it. Scientific reason is something we all commonly share. It is different from an apriori reason. The so-called a priori reason is nothing but an "inclination to believe '. Peirce looks at it contemptuously. FIe refuses to admit any such capacity of intuitive reason which in his view is perhaps another name for one's own fancy. The subjective certitude claimed by such reason is nothing more than one's "inclination to believe" which should occupy no place in scientific or philosophic enterprise. As against it scientific reason is objective. Its claims are based on observed facts. Most of these claims can be verified. It is reliable. In the presence of such an objective method there is no need to question beliefs based on it, unless they are really questionable. Peirce considers scientific method as almost foolproof. Besides, it is practical. It economises efforts and helps progressive enquiry. Pretended doubt, to Peirce, is uneconomical and impractical. It is waste of effort and time. It is, therefore, undesirable.

So much for Peirce to whom purpose of enquiry is to establish beliefs. This is in sharp contrast to Descartes to whom philosophical enterprise is aimed at certitude in the form of "clear" and "distinct" ideas. Descartes believes that it is important for all of us to question at least once in life all our beliefs and convictions. Most of these beliefs are prejudices which we inherit from our parents and society. In the presence of these beliefs our vision is likely to be obscured and confused. There is always a possibility of confusing true for false and vice versa. If we are not able to focus our attention on what

we intend to understand, we cannot genuinely know a thing. Knowing is knowing "clearly" and "distinctly". But this is impossible in the presence of con-fused perceptions that have already occupied our mind. We need, therefore, to clear our mind of all past prejudices in order to have clear perceptions. Methodological doubt is, therefore, required to do this cleaning. What follows are clear and distinct ideas.

Peirce strongly protests to this procedure. The whole bunch of old beliefs are rehabilitated after the application of methodological doubt. This sounds ridiculous to Peirce, What is the point in rejecting beliefs first and rehabilitating them later? This is impractical and uneconomical.

The difficulty with Peirce is that he judges the worth of philosophical enterprise in terms of its practicality and economicality. He does not recognise that some pursuits are worth doing in them-selves, and philosophical pursuit is one of them. The practical world is well taken care of by science. The yearning of man to know something beyond the scientific world could be justifiable in itself. Once this is admitted the feasibility of methodological doubt becomes apparent. Methodological doubt helps view the fundamental problems of philosophy always in a new light and in a new perspective.

Besides, Peirce's conception of philosophical progress is also mistaken. He views philosophical achievements in the manner of scientific achievements. Scientific progress consists in coordination and assimilation of old discoveries with now ones. Scientific project is a combined and cooperative effort. Many minds, rather than one mind, are involved in the establishment of scientific hypotheses and scientific theories. Every single bit of scientific information is incorporated somewhere with other information. Every new scientist is expected to take note of available relevant scientific information in his field. No scientist can afford to reject totally the work of his predecessors and take up the matter in question afresh. If this were to happen, scientific progress would be blocked. Now, this is not the nature of

philosophical enquiry. Philosophical investigation is essentially individualistic in character. Every philosopher expresses new ways of looking at things. Every new philosophical theory claims to supersede the old ones. Every time problems are seen in new light. New apparatuses are designed to cope with problems, new issues are raised, new meanings are assigned. Philosophical progress has a completely different meaning. It consists in critically examining the old views, and replacing them with new ones whenever they are unsatisfactory. Every philosophical enterprise comes up as a new challenge. It proclaims rejection of old beliefs, old customs and old habits. The philosopher's mind hates to walk on beaten path. He wants to open new avenues ro knowledge by closing the old ones. Philosophical progress means revolution of thought and knowledge. It constantly requries replacement of stale ideas with fresh ones. If philosophical progress is thus understood, the feasibility of doubt as a method becomes all the more obvious. For methodological doubt, after clearing the ground for new knowledge, provides new direction to enquiry and helps build knowledge on new and stronger foundation.

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