
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
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CONTENTS.

		PAGE
PREFACE		vii
PROLOGUE: THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION		1
DUOLOGUE		
I.	THE CONSTITUTION OF MATTER	4
II.	OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF EXISTENCE	15
III.	TRUTH	28
IV.	EXPERIENCE	39
V.	THE METAPHYSICAL MIND	43
VI.	PARTS	55
VII.	RESURRECTION	61
VIII.	MONISM	72
IX.	THE GHOST	76
X.	THE THING	80
XI.	THE MATTER-SOUL	87
XII.	CAUSE	90
XIII.	IMAGINATION	93
XIV.	THE DREAM	100
XV.	ELECTRICITY	104
XVI.	LIGHT	109
XVII.	DARKNESS	117
XVIII.	HEAT AND COLD	125
XIX.	SOUND	127

DUOLOGUE		PAGE
XX.	Movement	135
XXI.	Space	155
XXII.	Time	159
XXIII.	Parallax	166
XXIV.	Sensory Feeling and Sensing	169
XXV.	Shape	181
XXVI.	Gravitation	195
XXVII.	Size	209
XXVIII.	Transformations; Radium	212
XXIX.	Evolution	217
XXX.	Consensus of Suggestion	226
XXXI.	Thought	238
XXXII.	Number	254
XXXIII.	Will, Consciousness, Soul	263
XXXIV.	Environment	276
XXXV.	Heredity	287
XXXVI.	The Fetish	306
XXXVII.	Immortality	311
XXXVIII.	Re-incarnation	323
XXXIX.	The Outlook	330
XL.	Genesis	343
XLI.	The Metaphysical Indictment	360
XLII.	Jesus Christ	365

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PREFACE.

THE first duologue in this book was originally intended to appear in a large work entitled *Sic Transit Scientia*, which may soon be issued, though urgency is obviated by the publication of the present work. *Sic Transit Scientia* consummates and much amplifies original investigations in the writer's earlier works, *Heresies* (five volumes) and *Meta-Christianity*. The like may be said of the present work.

The importance of the duologues, and necessity of issuing them apart from and prior to the main treatise, grew on the writer as one followed another in a course of sequential thinking started through a controversy with Mr. David Christie Murray in the *Referee*, involving the issue, by the writer, of a number of pamphlets.

The duologues cover the main points of the writer's investigations, in such a concise, lucid, and, it is hoped, attractive form, as to render them easily assimilable to anybody of average education and intelligence. For practical purposes, they are a complete exposition of the writer's most advanced conclusions and their grounds.

The duologues are in two sections: (*a*) those dealing with the causal aspects of the fundamental presuppositions of empirical science, and interpreting phenomena by the canons of the science of causation; (*b*) those dealing with the religious and moral aspects of the science of causation.

This volume contains the first section. The succeeding volume, containing the second section, will be entitled *The Religious and Moral Aspects of the Science of Causation.*

The science of causation ensures the intellectual collapse of empirical science. Empirical science is the pabulum by which atheism, in all its forms, lives. By ensuring the intellectual collapse of empirical science, we devitalise the atheistic propaganda. There is no other means of re-establishing religion than by squeezing the intellectual life-blood, to the last drop, out of empirical science. Conventional, theological, dialectical, methods of meeting the atheistic propaganda are but beating of the air. Religion, for this age, must be intellectually impregnable, or it must succumb. So long as empirical science retains its present pretensions to intellectual integrity, atheism must flourish. The science of causation, set forth in this book, demolishes the intellectual pretensions of empirical science, and elucidates what empirical science constitutes a gigantic system of illusion.

Fully to apprehend the significance of the religious and moral section of the duologues, it will

be necessary to read the present section, in which, what is taken for granted, in the other section, is intellectually demonstrated. Incidentally to this demonstration, various fundamental religious problems are glanced at. Indeed, as intellectually vindicating religion against current atheism, it is hoped that this section is adequate in itself. In the later section, the main concern is to render intellectually compulsive a system of morality conforming to the demands of religion.

The author desires to record his appreciation of the courtesy of the Venerable Basil Wilberforce, Archdeacon of Westminster, who was the first to apply for this book when it was submitted for subscription, prior to publication; also, of like courtesy on the part of the Right Honourable A. J. Balfour, M.P., who is the latest subscriber, to date.

The following letter (or others to like effect) was sent, by the author, to the following representatives of empirical science:—Lord Kelvin, Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir James Dewar, Lord Rayleigh, Professor Horace Lamb, Sir William Crookes, Professor W. Osler, Professor A. Schuster—all Fellows of the Royal Society. Replies have been sent by all excepting Professors Dewar, Schuster, and Osler. The last-named gentleman, being in America, has probably not received the author's letter, which was addressed to Oxford University.

Copy of Letter.

"I send a pamphlet (seven sent earlier, inclusive of this one, but perhaps not received by you, as I have had no acknowledgment of any of them), containing particulars of my forthcoming book, *The New Science of Causation,* which assails the fundamental premises of empirical science. I venture to submit the following points:—Will you read advance-sheets, and, if you consider my positions vulnerable in important respects, expose the defects; your exposure to be embodied, or not, at your option, in the book? My subjects of belief are quite impersonal concerns to me. So soon as I am enabled to reject them, I shall be as zealous in suppressing and denying, as I now am in propagating and affirming. If I could apprehend your exposure as vitally affecting my positions, I should have no hesitation in stopping publication of the book. My action would be entirely governed by my belief. The issues I raise are supremely important. I profess to demonstrate that empirical science is nothing but a system of practically useful illusion, the ultimate postulations of which are figments."

Those gentlemen who noticed the reference to non-acknowledgment of pamphlets, accounted for the omission on the ground of custom among scientific men, and pressure of work. All declined to criticise.

The following is copy of a second letter sent by the author. This, like the foregoing one, is typical.

Copy.

"I am obliged for your letter of ——, and note for what reason I have not been favoured with acknowledgment of any of the six pamphlets sent earlier.

Pardon my observing that, if scientific people follow the rule not to acknowledge such work as I have sent you, it seems to me that their rule is susceptible of improvement.

"Of course, I can readily appreciate your ground for declining my proposal, earlier made, regarding criticism of my forthcoming book. On the other hand, I submit that, as the masses of this country, under the auspices of agitators who accept empirical science as a system of invulnerable truth, are rapidly becoming an atheistic horde, it cannot reasonably be a matter of indifference to scientific people—at any rate to such as have concern about religion—if, as I profess to demonstrate, empirical science is nothing but a system of practically useful illusion, the ultimate postulations of which are figments.

"Again, I submit that, if my pretensions to invalidate empirical science are intellectually without warrant, it will be advantageous to the public, and satisfactory to scientific men (among whom I claim to be included), if such work as mine is repudiated and withdrawn by its author. As earlier written, I have no partisan interest in what I propound. So soon as it is intellectually invalidated, to my apprehension, which is tolerably lively, nobody will be more eager to suppress it, than yours, etc."

The subjoined correspondence between the author and Sir Oliver Lodge is inserted, here, by permission of Sir Oliver, as regards his letter, which was in reply to one from the author, to the effect of the second of the letters printed above:—

"The University, Birmingham,
5th May 1905.

"Dear Sir,—It must be apparent to you that each man is likely to be fully occupied with his own work,

and there is no reason why he should make himself responsible for the work of another. If you have had sufficient scientific training to be able to criticise science, by all means do so. If your criticisms are valid and substantial, they will do good; if they are superficial and paradoxical, they will attract no attention among educated people and will do no harm.

"If there were a *prima facie* case for examination I might feel impelled to go into the matter, but such writings of yours as I have already seen have not impressed me, so that the *prima facie* case is not made out.

"Believe me, yours faithfully,

"OLIVER LODGE."

"DIDSBURY, MANCHESTER,

6th May 1905.

"DEAR SIR,—Accept my thanks for your letter of yesterday, which is very welcome to me, because it shows that there is a probability that what I promulgate may ultimately gain access to your attention. Of course, it is obvious to me that people will be inclined to concentrate their attention on what they conceive to be the most important work—usually, their own—and I fully sympathise with the standpoint from which you seem to contemplate my work, which I judge from the standpoint from which you contemplate your work. On the other hand, I venture to urge: I have devoted much attention to your work, and have spent many hard years in pursuing my work. So, whatever defects may attach to it, you will perhaps grant that it has the virtue of inspiring one individual, at any rate, with disinterested zeal on behalf of what he judges to be a supremely important object.

"I note that you have already read some of my writings, which have not impressed you. Assuming

these writings to be recent, it might be a matter of public utility, and would certainly be a favour appreciated by me, were you to indicate a single crucial point advanced by me, which you considered susceptible of intellectual demolition.

"In my forthcoming book, you will find, if you read it, that I have formulated a case—to my mind, absolutely impregnable—against the intellectual foundations of the empirical investigation of which you are a foremost representative. If my criticisms are—to adopt your own words—'superficial and paradoxical,' I shall hope to be enlightened, at your leisure, by intellectual exposure of the defects you mention. If the criticisms are what I at present hold them to be, I shall hope to have your powerful support in bringing them to the notice of the public.

"Sincerely yours,

"H. C. HILLER."

The author will be obliged if those readers who may desire to subscribe for the moral and religious sequel to this work (which, as was the present work, will be offered on reduced terms for subscription, prior to publication) will notify him to that effect. The published price of the next book will not exceed ten shillings, and subscribers will be supplied at two-thirds of the published price.

DIDSBURY, MANCHESTER,
May 1905.

THE NEW SCIENCE OF CAUSATION.

PROLOGUE.

THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION.

"It used to be a favourite subject for metaphysical argument amongst the schoolmen whether matter is infinitely divisible, or whether *space* is infinitely divisible, which some maintained; whilst others maintained that *matter* only is not infinitely divisible, and demonstrated that there is nothing inconceivable in the infinite sub-division of space. Why, even time was divided into moments (time-atoms!), and the idea of continuity of time was involved in a halo of argument, and metaphysical—I will not say absurdity—but metaphysical word-fencing, which was no doubt very amusing for want of a more instructive subject of study." (Lord Kelvin, *Popular Lectures and Addresses*, vol. i. pp. 156-157.)

"Electricity exists in small particles called 'electrons.' Atoms are small—three hundred million of them can lie in a row side by side in an inch, and there are a trillion of them in each granule of lycopodium dust. But electrons are very much smaller—one hundred thousand of them can lie in the diameter of an atom, for they are a thousand million million times smaller in bulk than atoms are; they are to

atoms as a grain of dust shot is to the size of the Town Hall." (Sir Oliver Lodge, at Birmingham, January 5th, 1904.)

"We have a right to insist . . . that atoms are not merely helps to puzzled mathematicians, but physical realities." (Professor Rücker, Presidential Address, British Association, 1901.)

"Lord Kelvin said that 'ether was absolutely structureless and homogeneous.' He speaks of it as if it were a definite concrete thing like the atmosphere. . . . The fact is that the ether is a mere mathematical figment, convenient because it satisfies various formulæ. As it is only an intellectual conception, we may invest it with any properties we please. The late Professor Clifford once told me that it was harder than steel. I believe it is now thought to be gelatinous. Anyhow, it is nothing more than a working hypothesis, which some day, like phlogiston, will only have historic interest." (Letter to the *Times*, May 7th, 1903, by Professor Thiselton-Dyer.)

"In my opinion, the existence of ether is as certain as that of ponderable matter—as certain as my own existence, as I reflect and write on it." (Professor Haeckel, *Riddle of the Universe*, English translation, p. 80.)

"In spite of the great progress made in science, it is curious to notice the occasional recrudescence of metaphysical dogma. For instance, there is a school which does not hesitate to revive ancient mystifications in order to show that matter and energy can be shattered by philosophical arguments and have no objective reality." (Professor Dewar, British Association Meeting, 1902.)

"As compared with the older view the function of

physical science was now seen to be much more modest than was at one time supposed. . . . We had been led to recognise that the formal and mathematical element was of our own introduction, that it was merely the apparatus by which we mapped out our knowledge, and had no more objective reality than the circles of latitude and longitude on the sun." (Professor Lamb, British Association Meeting, 1904.)

"Chemists . . . were lost in astonishment at the wonderful feats of imagination which the physicist was performing at the present time." (Professor Armstrong, British Association Meeting, 1903.)

DUOLOGUE I.

THE CONSTITUTION OF MATTER.

Speakers:—ILLUSTRIOUS SCIENTIST.
OBSCURE METAPHYSICIAN.

I. S. If I am to enlighten you about the question of the divisibility of matter, I stipulate for no metaphysical word-fencing. I deal with objective realities, not imaginative figments, and you want me to enlighten you—is that understood?

O. M. It is, sir.

I. S. Well; you know what is a brick wall.

O. M. Do you mean, what it is apparently?

I. S. I mean, what a brick wall is really. You've seen the thing, have you not?

O. M. Yes, I've seen a thing called a brick wall.

I. S. Well, what you have seen is the brick wall.

O. M. Do you mean that it is the wall when I only remember it?

I. S. Be bothered! That thing out there is a brick wall, isn't it?

O. M. Undoubtedly; that is the definition I apply to it.

I. S. If you were to cut a clean line dividing that wall, there would be two parts of the wall, wouldn't there?

O. M. Certainly, there would be two empirical parts.

I. S. Never mind if they would be empirical or any other sort; they would be parts, wouldn't they?

O. M. Though you raise a profoundly important metaphysical issue in your assumption, I will not detain your promised demonstration by discussing the issue, but will grant your assumption about parts.

I. S. Assumption about parts! pooh, pooh, sir, that is trifling. I'm not going to chop logic about that contingency.

O. M. Granted. Parts.

I. S. Well; you might take a brick out of that wall, and pulverise the brick, mightn't you?

O. M. That is an empirically possible contingency.

I. S. Never mind about "empirically." You might pulverise that brick, I say.

O. M. I might.

I. S. And you might take one of the particles of that powder in your hand and look at it, might you not?

O. M. Yes.

I. S. And you might crush that particle of clay into still smaller particles.

O. M. Granted.

I. S. And those smaller particles would be clay, wouldn't they?

O. M. Would not you be satisfied if I assented to the proposition that they would be particles, and ignored the issue as to their being clay?

I. S. As you like about that. Whether clay, or anything else, they would be particles of dust that was clay. That was all I meant to imply.

O. M. Granted.

I. S. Now, assume that you cannot see anything more minute than one of those smaller particles; you will grant the possibility, physically or chemically, of disintegrating that particle into something smaller than itself.

O. M. That, I cannot grant.

I. S. But, I tell you the thing has been actually done.

O. M. In what form is the proof?

I. S. As mathematical reasoning and optics.

O. M. Do they render the ostensibly invisible thing, visible?

I. S. Phew! Through mathematics, we know the wave lengths of light. Through knowing these, we can measure the size of a molecule, which is one ten-millionth of a centimetre in diameter.

O. M. I will take your word for that. But, you said that that object in the garden was a wall.

I. S. Well?

O. M. It was a wall, because it was a particular visual experience, was it not?

I. S. Go on! you are getting fatuously amusing.

O. M. It would not have been a wall, had there been nothing visible, would it?

I. S. What puerility!

O. M. Sorry you think so; but, from my standpoint, the question is very pertinent to the issue you raise. Will you kindly answer? Would there have been a wall if there had been nothing visible?

I. S. No.

O. M. And, I suppose you will grant that the particle of clay-dust was a particle for like reason as the wall was a wall?

I. S. Granted. Get along.

O. M. So, if nothing was visible, there could be no particle.

I. S. No particle, if you like; but, a molecule.

O. M. Do you wish me to grant congruity of this molecule, with the particle?

I. S. It is not a matter of wishing you to grant. You are bound to grant, unless you reject demonstration.

O. M. As you granted that, if nothing was visible, there could be no particle, in what sense is your molecule congruous with the particle?

I. S. In the sense that both are matter.

O. M. Is this matter something that can be seen, touched, tasted, smelled?

I. S. It is the substratum of such things.

O. M. What is a substratum?

I. S. What we identify, through mathematical investigation, as underlying what is sensed.

O. M. As a product of mathematical investigation, I suppose that this underlying thing must be thought.

I. S. Call it what you like, it underlies what is sensed.

O. M. Do people know about matter, before they know about what is sensed?

I. S. Suppose they do not, what then?

O. M. If they do not, I fail to apprehend rational significance in your assertion that matter underlies what is sensed. You say that mathematics proves the fact. But, unless you can enable me to understand what you mean by your ostensible fact, there is no fact, for me. Unless you can enable me to apprehend what you mean by the assertion that matter, which, according to your own showing, must

be thought, underlies what is sensed, your assertion is meaningless, to me.

I. S. Mathematics proves the fact.

O. M. What is the fact?

I. S. That matter underlies what is sensed—is its substratum.

O. M. Those words have no substratum of thought, to me.

I. S. But they have for me.

O. M. I have average intelligence: cannot you convey your thought to me?

I. S. There could be nothing sensed unless there were matter. That's my thought.

O. M. Does the infant know about matter, before sensing?

I. S. No; and it doesn't know about word-fencing until it gets twisted into a metaphysician.

O. M. Thanks. Still, if there could be nothing sensed, unless there were matter, as the infant does sense, it would seem that it ought to know something about matter. I am sorry you cannot enlighten me regarding the substratum. Now, I should like to discuss another aspect of what I must term your dogmatism.

I. S. Proceed!

O. M. Your implication, in postulating the size of atoms, is that they are congruous with the sensed particles, as being things that can be seen or touched.

I. S. Why?

O. M. Because the word, size, has no meaning, unless implicating sensed experience.

I. S. Tut, tut! If mathematics proves the size of atoms, they are that size.

O.M. Then, as atoms, *ex hypothesi*, can only be thought, thought must have size. What sort of size is the size of thought?

I.S. It is size stated in definite terms of measurement, through mathematical demonstration.

O.M. To my apprehension, that is not size of anything whatever, but is merely dogmatism that an empty numerical formula is equivalent to what we apprehend as bulk of a sensed object.

I.S. You may call it what you like in your metaphysical jargon, I say it is the size of atoms.

O.M. You might as well tell me it was the size of invisible and intangible mastodons.

I.S. You are rendered purblind by metaphysical fog.

O.M. There seems to be a scientific, as well as metaphysical, impediment to clear vision. You imply that because you have logically attenuated a numerical formula symbolising bulk as quality of a sensed object, into a formula with which you cannot, by any exercise of imagination, associate a sensed bulk, you have thereby resolved sensed substance into something lacking the only quality by which you identify sensed substance; in other words, that you have transformed sensed substance into a mere definition of abstract numerical relationship. Again, while you profess to found all your knowledge on what you call objective experience, implying experience through the senses, you stultify the pretension by affirming that your objective experience is merely an outcome of your subjective experience.

I.S. You take my breath away; but those atoms are there all the same.

O.M. I sympathise with your assurance, as you no doubt sympathise with the allegiance of the devout person to the old theory of verbal inspiration of the Bible.

I.S. Do not compare me with such a benighted victim of credulity!

O.M. By no means. Comparisons are occasionally odious. I merely credited you with my sympathetic tolerance of assurance. You have proved nothing, to my apprehension, about the possibility of transforming that seen particle of dust into what is invisible. You have merely propounded a dogma implicitly confounding two intrinsically different types of experience: sensory and psychical. Your mathematics is quite inadequate to support your dogma. To prove the possibility of insensible size, you must, as a preliminary, demolish modern metaphysic.

I.S. Modern metaphysic! Ugh! The old sort is enough for me. Life is short; objective investigation is long. I give you up as incorrigible. Word-fencing is in your bones.

O.M. You now raise the issue I referred to when I took your breath away. I should like us to thresh it out together. By objective investigation, you mean?

I.S. As you put it: investigation of what comes through the senses.

O.M. Do atoms and matter come through the senses?

I.S. The scientific imagination identifies them as the necessary outcome of investigation of what comes through the senses.

O.M. That proposition seems to contradict your

other proposition that matter is the substratum underlying what is sensed.

I. S. Where's the contradiction?

O. M. If matter is the imagined outcome of investigation of what comes through the senses, what comes through the senses would seem to be the substratum underlying matter.

I. S. Special pleading!

O. M. Not at all. You cannot have an imagined outcome of investigation, unless there is a subject of the investigation. So, this subject underlies the outcome of investigating it.

I. S. Word-fencing!

O. M. Still, the words are good as symbolising thoughts. In that respect they seem to have an advantage over words you have spoken. Your proposition that matter is the substratum of what comes through the senses, as well as the outcome of investigation of what comes through the senses, is self-stultifying. You cannot have matter both as the one and the other. What, then, becomes of your objective principle of investigation?

I. S. The only principle I recognise!

O. M. Where do you recognise it when you give it away by postulating about sensed substance as outcome of a substratum that only exists as thought? Your principle seems, to me, one of obfuscation.

I. S. I must go, sir. I am a practical man; I wanted to enlighten you about practical concerns.

O. M. It seems a tolerably practical concern if your principle of flitting from objective to subjective, and confounding sensory and psychical, according to speculative convenience, involves popular assurance that religion is done for.

I. S. What has scientific theory to do with religion?

O. M. Nothing, really; though scientific people are in the habit of leading the public to suppose the contrary.

I. S. Science is science. If religion won't fit in with science, it must go to the wall.

O. M. Suppose metaphysic fits in with religion, while science does not?

I. S. So much the worse for metaphysic and religion.

O. M. Don't you think that, on such conditions, it is of importance to have metaphysic discredited, or accepted as a public concern of the highest moment?

I. S. That depends. There are any number of idiots ready with crazy notions they call metaphysic. Life's too short to pick out the sane sort, if there are any.

O. M. Well, you've had a little spray treatment with my metaphysic.

I. S. And I don't want drenching with it. It's not practical. Nowadays, we want things proved by concrete results. You'll not get to know the time of an eclipse by metaphysic.

O. M. Or the best manure for potatoes. I grant the cogency of your claim for science.

I. S. It provides marketable crops. There's no demand for metaphysical sky-scrapers. We want fobs filling. Science fills them.

O. M. I grant that superiority to science. Speaking as an authority who has applied experimental tests, I assure you that metaphysic is good for emptying fobs.

I. S. Catch Carnegie or the universities keeping a

metaphysician out of the workhouse! The proof of the pudding's in the eating. A scientific man gets ornamental tags, a fairish living wage, a title if he drops on a new gas, a fortune if he hits on an idea that can be floated. What does the metaphysician get?

O.M. The satisfaction of providing light for folk who want to be in the dark.

I.S. What did Balfour get for trying your stuff on the British Association?

O.M. Somewhat the reception we might attribute to an audience of Whitstable Natives, open on their shells; and much erudite satire from press pundits.

I.S. Level-headed representatives of practical common-sense. The age has outgrown mystical cackle. It wants telephones, microbe-killers, Maxim guns, motor cars, music-hall religion—things that get home to the senses.

O.M. I suggest that you include atoms and the substratum among those things that get home to the senses.

I.S. Certainly. They consummate modern achievement in identifying objective reality.

O.M. I notice that an illustrious representative of your branch of romance has been informing the public, at a certain Town Hall, that there are a trillion atoms in each granule of lycopodium dust.

I.S. Well?

O.M. And that there are other atoms comparing with those, in size, as does a grain of dust-shot to that town hall, being a thousand million million times smaller than major atoms.

I.S. Well?

O.M. It occurs to me that dust which I may term

liecompositum is occasionally shot in town halls, and that those atoms, major and minor, must be of that species.

I. S. You ape the mountebank, sir. I must go. Hope I may not meet you again.

O. M. Those electrons — the thousand million million sort, sir—— Alas, he has gone!

DUOLOGUE II.

OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF EXISTENCE.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST *of practical order, to whom "seeing is believing," but who is not so assured as to be pathologically impervious to intellectual infection.*

METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. (*handling a knife*). That's a knife, isn't it?

Met. It is experience, as touchings and seeings.

Em. These seeings and touchings you call a knife, don't you?

Met. I do.

Em. And you grant that that knife is something that exists independently of yourself, don't you?

Met. I deny that.

Em. Why?

Met. Because I know nothing about that knife but as experience, and to know the knife as experience, I must make it for myself.

Em. Do you mean to tell me that, if you go out of this room, that knife will not exist?

Met. I mean to tell you that if I go out of this room, that knife will not exist, for me, as seeings and touchings.

Em. But, surely you don't deny that it will continue to exist as seeings and touchings, merely because you cannot see and touch it?

Met. I do not deny that; but I affirm such continued existence of the knife merely because I hold,

by faith, that there are other agents, like me, seeing and touching that knife.

Em. Suppose that knife were buried in the earth, so that nobody could see or touch it, would you deny its existence as seeing and touching?

Met. I would deny that.

Em. Why?

Met. Because I should not see or touch, as experience I called the knife, and should not hold, by faith, that any other experiencing agent was seeing and touching as the experience I called the knife.

Em. But, surely you will grant that, if you unearth that knife, it is the same knife that was buried?

Met. I will grant that the experience once constituted, as seeing and touching, for myself, is the same experience that I again constitute.

Em. Then, as you call this experience the knife, it is the same knife, buried as unburied.

Met. No! It is the same knife only as unburied.

Em. Why isn't it the same knife when buried?

Met. For the simple reason that it is not the same experience, as seeing and touching.

Em. What is it when it is buried?

Met. So far as it can be predicated about, as identity, it is thought, as what is called a memory.

Em. Well, isn't the knife the same thing as memory as when seen and touched?

Met. No; it is radically different.

Em. Why?

Met. Because it is radically different as experience. As memory, the knife is thought; as seen and touched, it is sensing.

Em. But are you not quite assured that the

memory of that buried knife is practically demonstrative that the knife, as sensing, continues to exist, whether buried or unburied?

Met. As a matter of faith, I grant this as a practical contingency. This does not affect my assurance that the knife ceases to exist as sensing, when buried, or that the knife, as buried, may never again become sensing: in ordinary terms, that the knife may be practically annihilated, or put out of existence as sensed experience, by burying it.

Em. Do you hold that, if I cover this knife with this book, I may possibly not find the knife when, a moment later, I raise the book?

Met. I hold that.

Em. Is not that irrational scepticism?

Met. Practically, it may seem so; metaphysically, the scepticism is quite rational.

Em. Why is it metaphysically rational?

Met. Because I am assured that the knife only exists as sensing, because you and others, as causal agents, constitute it sensing; and because I am assured that there is no necessity that, when you have once covered that knife with the book, you or anybody else shall ever again constitute that knife a sensing.

Em. You deny that the knife has any existence at all, unless as experience determined by yourself and others?

Met. I deny that it has any existence that can be predicated about as knife, unless as experience determined by me and others whom I metaphysically identify as causal agents like myself.

Em. But ordinary experience assures us that the knife exists quite independently of ourselves.

Met. Ordinary experience only affords us this assurance because it affords us the illusion that experiences exist independently of our own causal activity, as knowers. Obviously, ordinary experience, as reflection, also affords us assurance that we can only predicate about experiences as knowing them, and that, to know them, we must determine them. Accordingly, as we only know the knife as particular seeings and touchings, the knife cannot exist independently of ourselves.

Em. Then, you hold that it is possible to annihilate that knife, merely by covering it with this book?

Met. I hold it to be possible so to annihilate the knife, as sensing.

Em. What becomes of the knife when it is annihilated as sensing?

Met. It becomes thought, as memory: what we commonly call a remembered thing or object.

Em. How can it "become"? Does the experiencing agent turn it into something else?

Met. No; the experiencing agent merely substitutes the thought, as memory, for the sensing, associating the former with the latter.

Em. Then, the sensing is not really annihilated?

Met. It is annihilated, in the practical, not the metaphysical sense of the term.

Em. What is the difference between practical and metaphysical annihilation?

Met. Practical annihilation merely involves extinction, as actual experience; metaphysical annihilation involves extinction as existence.

Em. But, you said that we could predicate nothing about existence, but as experience.

Met. It is metaphysical experience that existence can only be annihilated by the Power that gives it being. So, in predicating about metaphysical annihilation, the metaphysician does predicate about experience: experience that existence cannot be annihilated.

Em. Then, after all, the knife does continue to exist, whatever we may do with it.

Met. No; it only continues to exist, either as sensing or thought (remembered).

Em. Why, if sensing and thought cannot be annihilated?

Met. Because we only know it as sensing and thought.

Em. But you say that sensing and thought cannot be annihilated.

Met. As existence, they cannot be annihilated; as experience, they can. We can only predicate about their identity, as experience.

Em. How can you predicate about their continuity, without predicating about their identity?

Met. By metaphysically identifying cause of the creative order. About the identity of experiences, as metaphysically permanent, the metaphysician does not pronounce. About their permanence, as existence, he is assured. He refuses to pronounce about the knife, as identity, except as thought and sensing. About the existence of thought and sensing, apart from his own thinking and sensing, or from the sensing and thinking which, on the ground of faith, he attributes to others, the metaphysician will not pronounce, beyond affirming that thought and sensing cannot be annihilated.

Em. Suppose the knife is ground into dust, does the knife continue to exist?

Met. Yes; in what is metaphysically identified as the mnemonic storey of mind, and in top storey, as thought, or remembered.

Em. Then, the knife is not annihilated by grinding it into dust?

Met. As thought, no; as sensing, it is practically, though not metaphysically, annihilated. As it persists metaphysically as sensing, it may be caused again to exist practically as sensing.

Em. Do you mean that it is possible, in a moment, after grinding the knife into dust, to have the knife again in experience?

Met. Metaphysically, this is quite possible, and there are many familiar facts, of the so-called occult order, practically illustrating analogous possibility. That such substitution is not commonly in evidence is merely incident to a common habit, involving what is metaphysically termed consensus of suggestion, determining particular modes of constituting experience.

Em. What is to prevent the Creator from annihilating, in the metaphysical sense, thoughts and sensings?

Met. Nothing.

Em. Then, why do you affirm that thought and sensing cannot be annihilated?

Met. The affirmation only applies to relatively causal agents: ourselves. About limit of possibility, in regard to the Creator, the metaphysician affirms nothing; except that the Creator cannot create what shall be able to cause independently of the Creator's determinism.

Em. Why do you limit the Creator's power in this way?

Met. Because, that what was created should be able to cause independently of its creator, would necessitate that this creator was supplanted by another creator implanting fresh causal powers in what was created, and annihilating other causal powers implanted in what was created by the other creator. Such an implication would stultify the term, creator, as involving rational thought.

Em. What does the term, creator, imply as rational thought?

Met. The term implies an Agent causing all that can exist, to exist.

Em. Why does not this agent itself need accounting for as being caused?

Met. Because the Agent, on such conditions, would not cause all to exist, and corollarily would not be creator.

Em. Why may not cause itself, as thought, be illusion, and things exist merely as sequences and co-existences?

Met. For the simple reason that, if things did merely exist as sequences and co-existences, we should know nothing about cause, as thought, just as we should know nothing about sequence, as thought, if things merely existed as co-existent.

Em. Then, you affirm that nothing can be predicated about sensings and thoughts, as practically existing, unless they are in actual experience or remembered?

Met. And, unless, on the ground of faith, they are attributed to causal agents, as experiencing them.

Em. So, from your standpoint, sensings and thoughts may be termed puppets coming on and

going off the stage, as experience, through the determinism of the causal agents?

Met. Exactly.

Em. And, from your standpoint, there is no such thing as we commonly consider to be mind, as a thinking agent distinct from body?

Met. There is not. Body, as sensing, is equally mind as is thought. The metaphysical mind is all possible experience, as thought, feeling, sensing. The mind of the created causal agent is what part of this metaphysical mind the agent constitutes experience. The mode of this constitution is elucidated by metaphysical investigation of causality. I hope we may deal with it in future conversations.

Em. So, my seeing and touching this knife is as much my manifestation of mind as is my thinking about the knife?

Met. Certainly. You, as causal agent, are as much behind, as determining the existence of, the knife as the thought.

Em. Why do I always determine as do other people about the knife, but often determine differently about thoughts?

Met. That occurs through consensus of suggestion involving preponderance, in one or another direction, of causal agents in constituting mind, experience.

Em. Is not sensing, as what you call metaphysical existence, the same thing as what the physicist calls matter, as substratum?

Met. No; the two are radically different. The physicist's matter involves confusion of sensing and thinking: the defining of thought as though it were sensing. This leads to wrong conclusions regarding causation, which, again, lead to wrong conclusions

vitally affecting the highest human concerns: religion and morality.

Em. Do you deny the existence of the physicist's matter?

Met. Yes; unless as a fiction useful in practical application.

Em. There is no such thing as matter?

Met. No more than there is a sack of thought, or a pound of toothache.

Em. You maintain that a knife buried in the earth ceases to exist, practically, as sensing?

Met. I do.

Em. Do you hold that your brain and lungs do not exist, practically, as sensing?

Met. I do—until somebody cuts me open and sees or touches my brain and lungs.

Em. I assume that, from your standpoint, your brain and lungs, unless constituted seeings and touchings by some person as causal agent, can only exist as memories, or thought.

Met. And as metaphysically persisting sensings, about which we can predicate nothing as identities —that is, as being brain and lungs.

Em. Still, judging from what you said about the knife, as being merely out of your personal experience as seeing and touching, I suppose you will grant that your brain and lungs do exist as possible seeings and touchings?

Met. The case in regard to the knife, when I merely leave the room in which the knife is exposed, is not parallel with the case of my brain and lungs. In the case of the knife, I have faith that some causal agent is constituting it experience, as sensing. In the case of my lungs and brain, I am assured that

nobody is constituting, or can constitute them sensing until I am cut open. As I am not cut open, I do not grant that my brain and lungs exist practically as sensings.

Em. How do they exist?

Met. As memories, or thought, imposed by consensus of suggestion, incident to the cutting open of people and so involving brains and lungs as sensings.

Em. Still, I suppose that you are assured that, if you were cut open, your brain and lungs would exist as seeings and touchings?

Met. I hold that assurance on the ground of faith incident to my belief that, when people are cut open, brain and lungs do become seeings and touchings. This does not affect my assurance that, so long as a person is not cut open, neither brain nor lungs, as his, exist as seeings and touchings; and I know nothing about brain and lungs but as seeings and touchings.

Em. But you are assured that a person must breathe air to live, and that he breathes through the operation of brain, nervous system, and lungs.

Met. All here hangs on what you mean by your term, operation. I know that physiologists constitute for themselves seeings and touchings as experiences which they call brain, nervous system, lungs, air, and that these people attribute causal efficiency to these things, as determining what they call life; but I deny any causal efficiency whatever, except as empirical illusion, in these things. I know no causal agent (exclusive of God) but the soul manifesting its activity as will.

Em. Do you mean that you could live without breathing?

Met. That is a metaphysically possible contingency, and there are even recorded facts testified for by reputable witnesses, medical men among the number, evidencing the possibility as practical.

Em. Will you particularise such a fact?

Met. Yes. Dr. McGregor, in his *History of the Sikhs* (p. 227), relates in medical detail the case of a person who was laid in a sealed coffin, and, after six weeks' interment, was taken out of the coffin and revived from apparent death. There are other carefully investigated cases of the sort.

Em. Do you hold that if that man had remained entombed for a century, he might have continued living?

Met. That is as metaphysically possible as it is practically possible that I may continue living if I abstain from breathing for a few moments.

Em. Then why do people generally die, failing their breathing?

Met. Because they cease to sense, think, feel, when they cease to constitute the experiences which we call breathing. So they empirically, though not metaphysically, die.

Em. But the mere facts of ceasing to sense, think, feel, do not necessarily involve death. People in trance cease to sense, think, feel.

Met. No. They merely cease to sense, think, feel, as what we call consciousness. Really, they carry on some or all of those operations in what are metaphysically identified as storeys of mind involving such consciousness as is, practically, unconsciousness.

Em. If the brain does nothing, how comes it that

physiologists can abolish particular actions by excising particular parts of the brain?

Met. That merely indicates that when physiologists have cut away the parts, the animals, assuming them to be causal agents, and the physiologists do not will certain sensings as what are called actions.

Em. Is not that tantamount to acknowledging that the brain does something, and so is a causal agent?

Met. No more than our affirming certain sensings as incident to the application of the physiologist's scalpel is tantamount to acknowledging that the scalpel is a causal agent. Mere sequences of experiences indicate nothing as to causal agency.

Em. Is the case of the scalpel on all fours with the case of the brain?

Met. Certainly: the brain and scalpel are equally mere sensings—seeings and touchings.

Em. But the brain, in the connection, controls the activity of what you call the causal agent, which cannot constitute experiences for itself, as actions, when the brain is mutilated.

Met. This applies to the scalpel which the physiologist uses to pick out the cerebral matter. Unless the physiologist constitutes the scalpel his experience, he does not pick out the matter. The scalpel causally affects his experience as much or little as the brain affects the ostensible experience of the animal. Really, the causal agency is no less behind the brain than the scalpel.

Em. But, apart from mere experiences as actions, life itself will be abolished by cutting away the brain.

Met. That depends on what you mean by life.

Em. Well, I mean that spontaneity and alertness which we all recognise as distinguishing a living agent from dead matter.

Met. So far as you know anything about this spontaneity and alertness, it is merely certain sensings, as movements, which you constitute for yourself and attribute to another agent causally like yourself. The cessation of this sort of life merely involves that the agent to which you attribute it has ceased to constitute for itself certain experiences. About the persistence of the agent itself, this empirically final cessation proves no more than does the empirically intermittent cessation which we call sleep or trance.

DUOLOGUE III.

TRUTH.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. Our earlier conversation impels me to put a famous poser: What is truth? People say this or that is true; but what is truth itself? The whole experience of humanity shows that what is true at one time is false at another. So, it would seem that truth itself, if there were such a thing, must be distinct from propositions said to be true.

Met. You have hit on a proposition that is very relevant to the problem of the nature of truth. If we are to investigate to any effect the nature of truth, the first thing we have to recognise is the distinction you indicate: between propositions called true and the object of our quest: truth itself.

Em. It is obvious to me that truth itself, if the term is anything better than a mere vocal explosion with no thought-backing, must be distinguishable from propositions.

Met. Yes; and the marshalling of propositions, as what are called synthetic imagination and logic, is quite irrelevant to the identification of truth.

Em. Irrelevant, in the sense that we may know conclusions as true, without knowing anything about truth.

Met. Just as we may know a fire as being hot,

without knowing anything about the scientific identification of heat; or things as being in temporal and spatial relationship, without knowing anything about time and space.

Em. What, then, do you make of truth?

Met. Truth is any thought, or series of thoughts, involving what is called a conclusion, with which we may will one or both of two feelings called belief and faith.

Em. A proposition is true whenever we experience belief with it?

Met. Always true when this occurs.

Em. But, suppose two people experience belief with contrary propositions?

Met. Then, the respective propositions are true and untrue, according to the believer.

Em. So, the logical law of non-contradiction goes to the wall?

Met. Yes; it is merely dogmatic assumption as premise for a theory.

Em. A thing may be and not be?

Met. Yes; if there are two people, one affirming, the other denying, on the ground of belief or faith.

Em. Then, there is no absolute criterion of what is true?

Met. There is such criterion for everybody who holds by belief or faith.

Em. That seems to imply that what he holds is foreign to truth.

Met. Except as being endorsed by belief or faith.

Em. Belief or faith gives what is held the character of being true?

Met. Yes; apart from belief or faith, the thoughts have no character as being true.

Em. You seem to imply that there is no such contingency as what we call error or fallacy.

Met. Only in regard to those who reject particular conclusions on the ground of belief or faith.

Em. That seems to imply that what is false is also true, and *vice versâ?*

Met. Yes; assuming that there are people willing belief or faith denying and affirming the proposition. What we call denying a proposition is willing an affirmative proposition as the so-called denial.

Em. So, a negative is really an affirmative?

Met. Yes; affirmation of a negation.

Em. When I deny that two is three, I affirm that two is not three.

Met. That is the position.

Em. So, what is true is always affirmation.

Met. Yes; of assent or dissent; the quality of being true or false being determined by the belief or faith, not by the negative or affirmative thoughts involved.

Em. So, belief and faith always, really, affirm; never deny?

Met. They always affirm, whether a negative or affirmative.

Em. So, there is no fallacy; only truth?

Met. Only truth; as thoughts experienced with belief or faith, and involving affirmation of assent or dissent.

Em. If one person believes, and another disbelieves, that twice two is five, both people affirm what is true.

Met. Yes; the one as affirming assent; the other, dissent.

Em. And, if some people believe, or hold by faith, that the earth does not move round the sun, while others hold that the earth does so move, the earth does and does not move round the sun?

Met. Yes; to the respective people. The earth only does what these people make it do, as believing or holding by faith.

Em. But, surely, we must trust science about that issue!

Met. If we do trust science, we shall will faith or belief affirming assent. If we do not trust science, we shall will belief affirming dissent. In the one case, there will be movement; in the other case, there may be none.

Em. Well; do you trust science regarding that issue?

Met. Not at all. I maintain that the earth does not move round the sun.

Em. On what grounds?

Met. Metaphysical grounds, with which I hope we may deal later. The scientific proofs of the earth's movement are, to me, no proofs at all, but are merely instances of scientific confusion of two radically different experiences: sensing and thinking. Such confusion renders what we commonly call science merely a logic of illusion.

Em. But, I suppose you will grant that some thoughts endorsed by belief and faith have more validity, as being true, than others?

Met. Practically, but not intrinsically. I cannot grant, in that connection, that the belief or faith of a million people has, intrinsically, more weight than the belief or faith of a single person.

Em. You will grant that, if there is a person who

believes that there are twenty-one shillings in a pound, his belief has not equal credentials to that of a million people who deny that there are twenty-one shillings in a pound?

Met. To me, to talk of the credentials of belief or faith is to talk meaninglessly, just as would be to talk of the credentials of neuralgia. There are no credentials for feelings. Belief and faith are special feelings. I am ready to grant, as a practical contingency, more or less valid credentials for thoughts, as subjects of belief; but, this difference of validity is merely a matter of numbers of believers and of my own belief.

Em. Well, you will grant that the thought that there are not twenty-one shillings in a pound has better credentials than the thought that there are?

Met. Yes; because I credally affirm dissent and have faith that I am in a majority.

Em. And if you knew that somebody believed that there were twenty-one shillings in a pound?

Met. I might try to enable him to change his subject of belief by offering to exchange a few pounds for shillings.

Em. Say an unlimited number of pounds. You would not tire, if he were hard to convince. The test you applied would seem to show that you were happy with your own view as truth.

Met. That would not affect our present issue. My subject of belief would be no more truth than his. I could only affect truth by enabling him to accept my subject of belief.

Em. You will grant that what millions believe is better, as practical truth, than what an individual here and there believes?

1603 | 3655

Met. I will grant superiority as weight; quality is another question.

Em. But is not the quality of practical truth, as subjects of belief, to be measured by its weight, as conditioning multitudes?

Met. That may be granted as a working hypothesis. On the other hand, what we call mental evolution depends on isolated individuals whose practical truth is not that of the multitudes, and who eventually compel the multitudes to reject their old truths and take those of the isolated folk.

Em. You hold that mental evolution occurs through units, not through multitudes?

Met. I hold that no new thought ever became human experience but through the initiating causal agency of some particular person determined, by God, to bring that particular thought into what is metaphysically identified as top storey of the metaphysical mind, or possible universe, involving what we call experience. The vast majority of people merely experience thoughts so originated and rendered prevalent through responding to, as being hypnotically dominated by, consensuses of suggestion, emanating from the person we call an original thinker, discoverer, genius.

Em. From your standpoint, there seems to be no such contingency as what we commonly call knowing things, implying, by the term, knowing, that we get some certainty beyond that of believing.

Met. There is no certainty other than as believing or holding by faith.

Em. So, what we call scientific truth is not absolutely more certain than what we call ignorant superstition?

Met. No; the certainty of any practical truth lies exclusively in the belief endorsing the truth as subjects of belief.

Em. So, to people who believe that God made the universe in six days, or that a person caused the waters of a sea to part, allowing people to walk on dry land between the waters, the particular event did occur. And, to people who do not believe, the event did not occur.

Met. That is the criterion of the certainty of the event. There is no other criterion for humanity.

Em. So, a person who credally accepts the Bible, *verbatim et literatim*, as the word of God, knows as much about the Bible as does a person who judges it as a modern critic?

Met. Neither knows more nor less than the other.

Em. And, that the Bible is or is not, word for word, direct from God, depends on numerical preponderance of believers one way or the other?

Met. Exactly. That applies to all contingencies involving what is commonly called truth. Majorities practically decide.

Em. A person must be ignorant if he is able to take the Bible, word for word, as from God.

Met. Rather, he will be ignorant if he overlooks on what conditions the Bible may be literally from God.

Em. You mean: ignorant of the metaphysical identification of truth?

Met. Yes; if not ignorant on that point, a person will not be too ready to dogmatise about the biblical contingency.

Em. When one reflects, it does seem that there is nothing to decide certainty but belief, and that the

conventional assumption about knowing, as transcending belief, is wrong.

Met. To me, the point is so obvious as hardly to need emphasising.

Em. In our atmosphere of scientific assurance, it is hard for a person to get away from the notion that he has got hold of something in the way of final certainty.

Met. Just as, in another atmosphere, it is hard for the so-called superstitious to get away from the notion. Most of us are prone to be hypnotics to credal fetishes. There is scientific, as well as religious superstition. To recognise the fact, you have only to suggest a little metaphysic to a well-assured physicist.

Em. Yes; judging from the utterances of certain eminent folk in that line, I think we could stage a new Inquisition if they had their way.

Met. The treatment of the Brunos and Galileos points a lesson which our scientific dogmatists are apt to overlook. I incline to the opinion that if I and certain of these knowers had been alive a few centuries ago, and they had controlled the thumbscrews, I should have felt them.

Em. Looked at in proper perspective, I think they'd have made a Bruno of you.

Met. Even though they lacked the concern about my soul that inspired the old oppressors.

Em. Yes; I think they'd have screwed you from impersonal, altruistic solicitude about the good of humanity, identified with the good of their specialisms.

Met. Their solicitude would probably have manifested itself in some such way.

Em. There does not seem much good in scepticism, unless it is your sort, about the finality of knowing.

Met. I am no sceptic about that. Scepticism is intellectual palsy, as absence of belief. I am a strong believer about the quality of knowing.

Em. People distinguish between scepticism and mere doubt.

Met. Distinction without real difference. So long as we hesitate to affirm, we doubt.

Em. As do folk calling themselves agnostic about God.

Met. There is no profit in the assurance that you do not know.

Em. And you do know when you credally affirm that knowing is only believing.

Met. Just as I know when I affirm that a horse is a quadruped. Belief is excluded in scepticism.

Em. One cannot believe he knows nothing.

Met. No more than he can feel a non-existent pain, or see an invisible object.

Em. When a person asserts he knows nothing about God, he implies that he believes nothing.

Met. And the implication is wrong. He believes something about God, in affirming that he knows nothing, just as a person believes something about mathematics, in affirming his ignorance of it. Anybody making a credal statement, knows about the subject of his statement.

Em. When the agnostic says he knows nothing about God, what does he imply?

Met. That he knows a God void of specific qualities; just as a person who says he knows nothing of a dog that is scarlet, implies that he

knows a dog that is not scarlet. When we profess to know nothing about a thing, we stultify the profession by predicating about the thing.

Em. Then, a genuine agnostic does not exist?

Met. No. We are all gnostics, denying or affirming about subjects of belief. The current agnostic about God is a gnostic affirming denial of subjects of belief about God held by other people.

Em. The cheese-counter sort of agnostic finishes you off with the dogma that nobody has proved God to exist.

Met. And he proves God to exist, by advancing the dogma.

Em. By his criterion of proof, Newton did not prove gravitation to exist.

Met. By proof, that order of knower means sixteen ounces to the pound—cheese or bacon on one side; lumps of iron on the other.

Em. He implies that he, only, knows something about the only real sort of God, did a God exist at all.

Met. Yes; it would be a god that one could prove by getting a good hold of, like the parcel of cheese.

Em. Something filling and satisfying, like the cheese when one gets outside it.

Met. Yes; his agnostic grip of God is firmer than he seems to recognise.

Em. There seems no possibility of bringing the truth of the metaphysician into line with that of the empiricist.

Met. No; they are high and low level truths. There is no need to trouble about bringing them into line. There is only need to recognise the difference in levels.

Em. And to get folk on the high level.

Met. A desperately disheartening business. If you do not think at their level, people call you dreamer, mystic, crank, lunatic, or some other nice name that indicates their satisfaction with their own limitations and disinclination to look beyond them.

Em. I daresay your level ensures you appreciation of that sort.

Met. The appreciation I get is of the sort that sparkles in the eyes of a cod-fish head on a fishmonger's slab. This applies particularly to folk popularly measured as philosophers and prophets of the practical order. They love mystics, dreamers, cranks, as a certain curate loved London.

Em. Naturally; or they would not be popular philosophers. You cannot expect the mob to take in your cut at a gulp.

Met. No; one must be near the top crust of things if he is to capture the mob.

Em. You are the first, to my knowledge, who has advanced the identification of truth we have discussed.

Met. I do not know that anybody else has advanced it, and shall be glad to hear from anybody who can intellectually invalidate it.

Em. It seems to bear intimately on the current attacks on religion.

Met. Yes; it knocks the ground from under superficialists who imagine that religion is a mere matter of specific subjects of belief, and that discrediting the subjects of belief is equivalent to demolishing religion.

DUOLOGUE IV.

EXPERIENCE.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. You say that all I can possibly know is sensing, thought, feeling?

Met. That is all you can possibly know.

Em. And that I must equally determine sensing, as I determine thought and feeling?

Met. Yes.

Em. I have an intuition that that table is outside myself, and exists independently of myself.

Met. What you call your intuition is a feeling. So, you determine that, if you determine experience.

Em. Certainly I cannot suppose that intuition to be outside myself in the sense that the table seems to be outside.

Met. Well; let us suppose, for the moment, that the table is outside yourself—what is yourself?

Em. I can conceive no self in regard to which I can postulate spatial relationship of the table, but my body.

Met. Well; what is your body?

Em. So far as I know anything about, it is certain seeings and touchings.

Met. Can you suppose that seeings and touchings can know themselves?

Em. No.

Met. Then, as you say that you know your body as seeings and touchings, your body cannot be what knows it.

Em. It cannot. Suppose my mind knows it?

Met. What is your mind?

Em. My capacity to think and feel.

Met. Must it not be equally your capacity to see and touch?

Em. Yes; but that the capacity can operate, there must be something to see and touch.

Met. What do you mean by *something* to see and touch?

Em. Something outside my mind.

Met. If a thing is outside your mind, how are you to know anything about the external thing?

Em. That is beyond me; I can only speculate, on the ground of the intuition, that there is the thing.

Met. Well; assuming there is the thing, is it that table?

Em. No; that table must be inside my mind, if there is any question of inside or outside, at all.

Met. So, you can predicate nothing about that table as being outside your mind?

Em. No; whatever is outside, if there is anything, is certainly not that table.

Met. I am glad you see that point. It is an important one.

Em. What I see and touch can only exist as inside my mind. There is nothing but the seeing and touching that I can get the faintest grip of.

Met. You can only know what is inside your mind?

Em. Yes; I must grant that.

Met. Your speculation about something outside your mind, is to what you cannot know to exist?

Em. Certainly, I can know nothing about it. My speculation is of the wild-cat order.

Met. That is another important point which I am glad that you recognise.

Em. To talk about something outside my mind is to gas. I know absolutely nothing about that table but as seeings and touchings, and they can be outside nothing but other seeings and touchings.

Met. Your body, for instance?

Em. Yes, my body. I know nothing more about it than about the table. If anybody knows more about his body than as seeings and touchings, he knows more than I do.

Met. That is another important point settled. Now, let us turn to that capacity to think and feel, which you say is your mind. What do you mean by a capacity?

Em. A power.

Met. The term, power, symbolises a thought, does it not?

Em. It does.

Met. Then, do you imply that your mind is a thought that thinks and feels?

Em. If I implied anything, I implied that; and it is nonsense.

Met. You see that to imply that your mind is a capacity, is to imply that it is a thought; and, to imply that a thought thinks and feels is to imply nonsense.

Em. I see it all.

Met. Can you imagine anything as your mind but experiences: sensings, thoughts, feelings?

Em. No; if thoughts cannot think or feel, they can be no more my mind than are any other experiences.

Met. You know nothing outside your mind, and you know nothing, as your mind, but thoughts, feelings, sensings?

Em. Nothing whatever.

Met. Let us now turn to another point. Have you not an intuition that you, whatever you may be, are not this mind?

Em. Yes. I am behind that mind. It can do nothing that I do not make it do.

Met. It does nothing of itself?

Em. Nothing; I'm the doer.

Met. That table and your body only exist because you make them exist, as experiences: seeings and touchings?

Em. Yes; I pull the strings. Mind is of no account, unless I'm behind it.

Met. You see that you must determine the table, as seeings and touchings; your body, as seeings and touchings; your thoughts and feelings—all equally?

Em. I see that nothing can exist, for me, but what I determine, as experience.

Met. Nothing coming into your mind from outside?

Em. No mind for anything to come into from outside—no outside at all, in connection with mind; all inside.

DUOLOGUE V.

THE METAPHYSICAL MIND.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. What is the process involving the soul's willing of thoughts, feelings, sensings in different storeys of mind?

Met. All grades of intensity of experiences are incident to what we call consciousness, which is a particular feeling comparable to a light. We know that we are willing thoughts, feelings, sensings, through willing with them this particular feeling, which I term the consciousness-sensation. Like all other feelings, the consciousness-sensation is willed in varying intensities. When it is willed in maximal (involving different degrees) intensity with other experiences, these become what we call fully conscious. Then, they are in top storey of mind, more or less vivid, according to the degree of maximal intensity of the consciousness-sensation. In mnemonic storey, experiences are willed with such minimal intensity of the consciousness-sensation as to be what we term unconscious. Then, they are what I term metaphysically existent.

Em. I understood you to imply that being in that storey involved that they were remembered.

Met. In mnemonic storey, experiences are metaphysically, not practically remembered. To be practically remembered, they must be willed back, from mnemonic, to top storey, with the duration-sensation. Any experience once willed in top storey goes into mnemonic storey, and may be willed back into top storey as empirically, or practically remembered.

Em. I see. What is merely metaphysically remembered, as being in mnemonic storey, is empirically forgotten.

Met. Yes. The record of human experiences willed into top storey is in mnemonic storey. Every experience that humanity has brought into top storey is, as we may say, pigeon-holed in mnemonic storey of mind, ready again to be brought into top storey by the soul or souls determined, by God, to that end.

Em. Why do you call the metaphysical mind the possible universe?

Met. Because it is all that can possibly exist as sensing, thinking, feeling.

Em. A sort of mine out of which the individual digs his mind.

Met. Or out of which particular people called discoverers, prophets, seers, thinkers, avatars, dig mind for the rest of folk.

Em. Our last conversation played havoc with the mind dealt with by psychologists implying an active agent, or thinker.

Met. That sort of mind is merely a product of empirical illusionism. The metaphysical mind, so far as it is human experience, may be pictured as a landscape at fragments of which multitudes of souls

are glancing, so rendering particular thoughts, feelings, sensings prevalent at particular epochs, among particular races, communities, sections, isolated individuals.

Em. This mind seems to be inert.

Met. Absolutely. It is apparently active through the causal agency of souls constituting it experience.

Em. Is there any empirical evidence for such a mind as you indicate?

Met. Yes; the whole of what is called occultism—telepathy, clairvoyance, hypnotism, multiple personality, physical phenomena of so-called spiritualism—is such evidence. These classes of phenomena are entirely beyond the scope of ordinary psychological interpretation. In fact, this applies to all mental phenomena. Ignoring the fundamental problem of causation, psychology, whether empirical or theoretical, offers no real interpretation of mental activities.

Em. From your standpoint, there would seem to be no such contingency as the activity attributed to thoughts, involving what is called association of ideas?

Met. None whatever. Thoughts no more associate, or do anything else, than do iron nails. The experience of association, whether between thoughts or sensings, is purely dependent on the activity of the soul as willing a particular feeling, which I call the multiplicity-sensation, coincidently to the willing of thoughts or sensings experienced as associating.

Em. In what sense do sensings associate?

Met. As being willed in relationship.

Em. The relationship or association depending on the willing with them of the feeling you call the multiplicity-sensation?

Met. Yes. The association itself is constituted by this particular feeling. Thus, the floor and this table associate because I will with them the multiplicity-sensation. There is no metaphysical necessity that the table and floor shall thus associate. The table might associate with the ceiling instead of the floor. There are multitudes of spiritistic facts evidencing such abnormal association.

Em. That seems to dispose of the necessity imposed by what is called gravity.

Met. Yes; there is not much necessity left for gravity when it has gone into the metaphysical crucible.

Em. And astronomy?

Met. Of course follows gravity into the dreamland of empirical illusionism.

Em. You do not credally accept astronomy?

Met. No more than as convenient fiction.

Em. I see that your proposition regarding association of sensings follows from the metaphysical view of sensings as being causally determined by the soul, just as are thoughts.

Met. Yes; the empirical view of sensings, as being outside the causal determinism of the soul, ignores the whole problem of causation, and is entirely chimerical.

Em. So you reject all the fundamental subjects of belief of what is commonly called science?

Met. Completely; except as convenient fictions applicable solely to sensual needs.

Em. Your practical truth affirms dissent, instead of assent, in regard to science?

Met. Yes; when science is applied outside its

sensual limitations, as to religious and moral problems. Then I uncompromisingly pronounce: no assets, not a halfpenny in the pound!

Em. So, you brush aside current speculation about mental evolution, implying that thoughts and feelings automatically become other thoughts and feelings?

Met. Yes; metaphysic has no room for empirical becomings and changings of any sort. Nothing can change except as being willed from one to another storey of mind.

Em. The soul, as it were, lifting and lowering experience.

Met. Yes, metaphysical change may be so pictured.

Em. That applies to physical as well as mental evolution?

Met. Equally in both cases.

Em. Suppose you cut an apple into halves, have you not changed the whole into the parts?

Met. Only as willing the whole into mnemonic storey of mind.

Em. Do you mean that the whole apple continues to exist as well as the parts?

Met. Yes, as in mnemonic storey; otherwise the parts could not be known as parts.

Em. That is hard to grasp.

Met. It is harder to grasp how we could know the parts as related to the whole, unless we remembered the whole. As remembered, the whole must exist as thought, just as it exists as sensing. As thought or remembered, the apple exists in top storey. As sensing, it is practically, but not metaphysically, annihilated. In an earlier conversation,

we dealt with the difference between practical and metaphysical annihilation.

Em. Yes; I recollect the distinction, involving the substitution of thought for sensing, as experience. I quite see the impossibility of knowing the parts, as parts, failing remembrance of the whole, and that the whole must exist as thought, to be remembered; but do not see why the whole, as sensing, must also continue to exist.

Met. If it did not continue to exist, you would need to annihilate it by transforming it into parts.

Em. Well, why cannot I do that?

Met. First, because the capacity to annihilate implies the capacity to create, and you have neither capacity. Apart from that consideration, you cannot annihilate the whole, because then you would know nothing about the parts as parts; you would only know them as wholes.

Em. Why could I not remember the whole?

Met. What do you imply by the term, remember?

Em. That I think of the whole.

Met. How are you to think of the whole if you have annihilated it?

Em. I could not do so, unless I turned it into the thought.

Met. That would involve that you annihilated a sensing and created in its place a thought.

Em. I see that must be the case, if I really change the whole into the thought.

Met. If you could do that, you would be a creator.

Em. I'm certainly not creator. What do I do when I remember the whole?

Met. You will a thought in conjunction with the whole, by bringing the whole back out of mnemonic

storey, into top storey as what we will later discuss as an apparition.

Em. What is the thought, in itself, apart from the whole, as apparition?

Met. It is hard to find a generic definition for any of the three types of possible experiences. We can define particular feelings and sensings in terms of thought, and we can define thoughts in terms of other thoughts; but we cannot definitively isolate a thought from a sensing or feeling in relation to which the thought exists as memory. In the case of the remembered whole, pending later detailed discussion of thought, we will take it as a bare assurance of identity willed coincidently with the apparition, the duration-sensation, the multiplicity-sensation, and the parts, as sensings.

Em. What we commonly call the universe seems to be your metaphysical mind.

Met. Yes; with the additional consideration that no constituent of the universe can be affected to the least degree by the soul.

Em. Our bodies, growing, decaying, empirically becoming chemical elements, are thus permanent?

Met. Yes; down to the body of a gnat; an ink-spot; a dust-particle;—all persist until God annihilates the metaphysical mind.

Em. Is there any empirical evidence for such inconceivable permanence?

Met. Plenty. You may have heard of people at the point of apparent death, who assert that their whole lives, to the most trivial incidents, had passed before them as in a flash?

Em. Yes, I have heard of such cases.

Met. They are to the point. Again, it is tolerably

familiar to people acquainted with clairvoyant phenomena, that so-called mediums recount long-forgotten incidents in the lives of dead and living people. These incidents are indelibly recorded in the mnemonic storey of mind tapped by the medium, but out of reach of the people to whom the experiences occurred.

Em. It would seem that the chemist could change water into oxygen and hydrogen.

Met. He can, empirically, as illusion; not metaphysically, as putting the water out of existence, and substituting the gases, as existence.

Em. I see. The water and the gases exist independently of one another. The illusion of substitution of the one for the other, as existence, is incident to the bringing of the one or the other into top storey of mind.

Met. Yes; just as in the case of halving the apple.

Em. You imply, against the chemist, that substance is creatable?

Met. Creatable, in the sense of being indefinitely transferable from lower to top storey of mind. The chemist assumes substance to be something existing independently of himself, as causal agent knowing it, and, consequently, determining it. So he gets the illusion that when he empirically changes one into another substance, the old substance is annihilated, in the sense of being transformed into the new substance. The metaphysician holds that the old and new substances exist permanently and unchangeably as the metaphysical mind, and that all he can do is to will the one or the other into top storey.

Em. So, he might possibly will more of a new

substance into top storey as product of his empirical change, than he had of the old substance; which would be counter to his law of the conservation of substance.

Met. Just so. The recently-discovered substance called radium illustrates such a contingency. According to the avowal of chemists and physicists themselves, a given bulk of this substance must give out, as so-called emanations, other bulks, without affecting itself as bulk.

Em. That seems to imply that, according to the showing of physicists themselves, substance, as bulk, creates substance as bulk.

Met. Yes. In regard to radium, physicists give away their fundamental laws of the conservation of matter and energy.

Em. Apart from this case of radium, is there any empirical evidence for the creation of substance, in your sense of bringing it into top storey of mind, as I may say, out of nothing?

Met. There is a vast body of such evidence in the records of spiritistic phenomena. You will find plenty of such evidence in a book entitled *Researches in Spiritualism*, written by one of the most illustrious of scientists, Sir William Crookes. This sort of creation of substance is one of the commonest of spiritistic facts.

Em. The mind must be as you propound, as a matter of causal necessity?

Met. Certainly; no other sort of mind is possible.

Em. Why?

Met. Because thoughts, feelings, sensings constitute all possible experience, and all are equally possible only as experience.

Em. That is clear to me. Whatever else they may be, than experience, we can know nothing about them, but as experience. That is tantamount to their being possible only as experience.

Met. Experience necessarily presupposes an experiencing agent.

Em. Obviously.

Met. That agent must either create the experience, or the experience must be created for the agent.

Em. That is undeniable.

Met. So, the agent must either be creator, or creature. As it has experience created for it, the agent is not creator.

Em. I see that.

Met. Then, experience must metaphysically exist, that it may practically exist.

Em. As being possibly available for the agent. Unless the experience, in some guise, were there, there would be nothing for the agent to appropriate.

Met. Certainly. About the guise of this experience, as prepared for the agent, we can say nothing beyond predicating what I term metaphysical existence. As such existence, it constitutes the possible universe, or all the experience potentially possible to humanity.

Em. It exists that way, before any of it has been brought into top storey, as actual experience?

Met. Necessarily. Now, let us consider this experience when and after it has been brought into top storey. An agent that cannot create cannot annihilate.

Em. Certainly not.

Met. To change what is created involves annihilation; taking change to imply transformation *in esse.*

Em. Yes; whatever is substituted, as fresh, must involve annihilation of that for which it is substituted.

Met. So, the created agent can neither add to, nor take from the metaphysical mind.

Em. Which involves experiences coming into, and going out of, top storey into metaphysical existence, as you propound.

Met. You see that that is necessarily the case?

Em. I see that there is no possible alternative, unless the experiencing agent is creator.

Met. It cannot be creator, because it is limited by relationship. We will discuss that point in later conversations.

Em. You predicate nothing about mind that is not in top storey?

Met. Nothing beyond the fact that it continues, as metaphysical existence, when out of top storey.

Em. To be possibly brought again into top storey.

Met. Such willing out of top storey involving mind in mnemonic storey.

Em. You seem to imply a difference between the metaphysical mind in what may be termed its primitive condition as fresh from the Creator, and in its later condition as having been brought into top storey and passed into mnemonic storey.

Met. We can only deal with difference as an empirical contingency, involving that we can only deal with it in respect to top storey mind. About the contingency of top storey mind differing, or not differing, from mnemonic mind, and from what you call primitive mind, we can predicate nothing, inas-

much as we know nothing of mind out of top storey, but as metaphysically existing.

Em. What mind is, as metaphysically existing, we can say nothing about.

Met. So, we cannot compare it with mind, as experience.

DUOLOGUE VI.

PARTS.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.

METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. Though I think I see the metaphysical drift about parts, it is so dead against intuition that I cannot properly take it in.

Met. The illusion of parts is difficult to expose in what I may term its naked deformity.

Em. When I cut that apple, the whole process is so clear and open that to deny that those halves are identical with what was the whole seems almost childish.

Met. I grant that the contingency seems to leave no opening for dispute.

Em. There is no break of experience of any sort.

Met. Let us discuss that point in a little detail! You see that whole apple, and you know nothing about it, but as seeing it.

Em. That, I grant.

Met. You divide "it"; but, where, what is "it"? How can you predicate anything about it, or about doing to it, when it vanishes immediately you start doing anything to it in the way of mutilation?

Em. How does it vanish?

Met. Because it is no longer there as the seeing, as which, alone, you granted that you knew it.

Em. Do you mean that it is not the same seeing if I cut a slit in it?

Met. Necessarily; or you could not distinguish between it with, and without, the slit. If it only exists with the slit, it does not exist without the slit.

Em. I cannot dispute that.

Met. But your predication of sameness implies that when you only see it with the slit, you see it without the slit. You must have, at least, two experiential contingencies that you may predicate sameness, involving difference, as distinguished from identity, involving no difference.

Em. It seems to work out that way. Suppose it only exists with the slit, as seeing, and without the slit, as thought?

Met. Then, you have two radically different things: a sensing and a thought, stultifying your predication of sameness.

Em. Obviously I have no seeing to predicate about as being the same as the seeing with the slit, if I have only a thought as without the slit.

Met. You are beginning to assimilate. The uncut apple must continue to exist, in some guise, as distinct from thought, if you are to differentiate to the extent of predicating that it is the same as a cut apple, distinct from thought.

Em. You are getting the radium into me. That intuition isn't worth much for proving parts.

Met. Your postulation of sameness necessitates that the apple, cut and uncut, shall independently exist as the same type of experience, which involves, metaphysically, that the uncut apple is in mnemonic

storey, as metaphysically existing sensing; in top storey, as thought, or practically remembered, and that the cut apple is in top storey, as sensing.

Em. I see it all clearly. Parts are as much wholes as that is a whole from which they empirically emanate. That seems to dispose of a lot of mathematics.

Met. Yes; metaphysic plays havoc with mathematics, and, corollarily, with some stupendous achievements in the way of cosmical speculation.

Em. It also does away with a lot of identities.

Met. Yes; there is no such contingency as that any sensing, in top storey, can be identical with anything in any other storey, as metaphysically existing. When we earlier discussed the problem of the knife, buried and unburied, you will remember that I denied sameness. Our present discussion will perhaps cast further light on that case.

Em. Yes; I am clearer about the difference between things metaphysically existing in mnemonic storey, and things in top storey. I see why you denied your brain until somebody saw it.

Met. I know nothing about a brain but as seeing and touching, and I only know seeing and touching as top storey experience, though I know that they must persist, in some guise, as metaphysically existing, and that I can predicate nothing about them, metaphysically existing, as seeing and touching.

Em. It would seem that sensings must be in a perpetual flux between top and mnemonic storeys: that there is no such contingency as an absolutely stable sensing.

Met. The flux involves the transformations dealt with by chemistry, physics, biology, and attributed,

by the sciences, to the causal agency of sensings themselves.

Em. Of course, the physicist's atom gets coffined in the general ruin of parts.

Met. Yes; if there is no part of a halved apple, there is no hope for a trillionth part of a granule of lycopodium dust.

Em. Is that the physicist's best in the way of identifying parts?

Met. By no means. Sir Oliver Lodge knows parts, each of which is a thousand million million times smaller than that trillionth sort.

Em. There's excuse for a fellow who thinks he knows half an apple. If one wants to be good at believing, starting as physicist seems a promising method.

Met. If you ever acquire renown as such a personage, I fear that you will credit me with a large stock of credulity, and relegate metaphysic to the category of futile mysticism. As physicist, you will be a very practical person.

Em. A person who can feel serious about those thousand million millionths of the trillionth sort of parts does not seem to need much coaching in the art of credulity.

Met. His efficiency, as believer, is passable.

Em. He has no need to hide himself when superstitious, religious folk give a show. It is clear to me that pronouncements by chemists and physicists about changes, transformations, becomings, imply logical impossibility.

Met. Not merely logical, but metaphysically demonstrable, impossibility.

Em. When the scientist talks of transformations of energy and substance, of those astonishing

emanations and what not, in the case of radium, he romances.

Met. Yes; he tells fairy tales to grown-up children, and, in the case of radium, stultifies his own axioms about what he calls conservation, and unconsciously endorses metaphysic, in regard to the non-existence of parts. By his own showing, in the case of radium, parts may be greater than the whole. Radium, according to his own testimony, gives out more energy and substance than it possesses; because, it gives out energy and substance without losing any. The behaviour of radium involves such a contingency as cutting up an apple, and yet having the apple, intact, before you.

Em. He should go in for a course of metaphysic.

Met. Yes; his discovery of radium ought to convince him that his theoretical blankets are too short. But, the scientist is a crusted conservative.

Em. He needs a lot of jogging, if he turns up his nose at metaphysic.

Met. He elevates that protuberance at a high angle. His disdain tends to render the sensitive metaphysician painfully conscious of his own insignificance. When Mr. Balfour introduced as a novelty, at the last British Association meeting, that subject of the scientist's confusion of sensing with thinking, at which I have been hammering for years, the reception of his remarks, by his scientific auditors, showed what a *vis inertiæ* there was in scientific conservatism.

Em. I see that there is no such contingency as what we commonly imply in the word, sameness, attributing identity with separate individuality, as whole and parts.

Met. There is not, because the implication, in such a case, is that we can compare when there is only a single experience in evidence.

Em. Involving that we really only predicate about an experience as being the same as itself.

Met. Obviously. But, when we commonly predicate about parts, as ordinary folk and scientists, we imply that there are two experiences in regard to which we identify certain differences that are not inconsistent with sameness; while, at the same time, we deny, by implication, that there is more than a single experience. Thus, in the case of the apple, we predicate that the so-called halves are the same as the so-called whole, thereby implying that the whole persists, to permit comparison. On the other hand, we implicitly deny persistence of the whole, by implication that we have abolished it by transforming it into the parts.

Em. I see that there can be no such contingency as changing one experience into another.

Met. None. All empirical changes, transformations, becomings, are illusion.

Em. Nothing is possible, but willing experiences in one or another storey.

Met. Nothing.

DUOLOGUE VII.

RESURRECTION.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. How can our body retain integrity when it changes, physiologically, from hour to hour, and obviously is quite different as between infancy and maturity?

Met. The metaphysical body is all that empirically changes as shapes and bulks, between birth and death.

Em. Suppose we cut off a leg, does that body persist with the leg intact?

Met. Certainly; just as the apple persists intact, as whole, when we empirically halve it.

Em. The body with the leg goes into mnemonic storey, when we cut off the leg?

Met. Certainly, or we could not know it ever had a leg.

Em. Suppose we cut off the head—chop up the body?

Met. Still, the body, intact, persists in mnemonic storey.

Em. Do you affirm that, if we chop up a human body, it is possible again to have that body in its integrity, as experience?

Met. I affirm that.

Em. Is there any sort of actual evidence for such an apparently impossible occurrence?

Met. Yes; there is such evidence as what are called telepathic apparitions, and apparitions of the dead. A notable case of the latter sort is the apparition of Katie King, a full account of which you will find in Sir W. Crookes's book, *Researches in Spiritualism.*

Em. Do you, personally, credit such reputed occurrences?

Met. As I tell you, they are quite possible, judged from the metaphysical standpoint, and I am quite prepared to accept the emphatic testimony of such an observer as Sir W. Crookes, that he has witnessed such an occurrence. If you reflect that the body is only a sensing, and that it is determined as such by the soul, as willing mind into top storey, you may recognise that the apparent impossibility is merely incidental to the conventional, empirical standpoint, ignoring that the causation of sensings is the same as that of thoughts.

Em. There seems no difficulty about resurrection on such conditions.

Met. None whatever.

Em. But, if all the changes, from birth to death, constitute the body, why shall any particular phase of these changes be, as it were, resuscitated?

Met. There is no necessity of the sort. A body may appear, as apparition, in any phase, just as it appears in one or another phase during what we call life.

Em. So, what we know, at any particular time, as our own body, is merely what may be termed a fragment of our body.

Met. A fragment of our metaphysical body.

Em. Do you believe we shall have some phase of this metaphysical body in a future life?

Met. No; because I believe that the future life involves our willing another than the mundane mind, involving sensings.

Em. Do you believe in what is called re-incarnation, involving a fresh willing of the mundane mind, after what we call death — say, as some sort of animal?

Met. No; I do not believe in any renewal of willing the mundane mind, as sensings.

Em. So, you hold that if we preserve our identity in a future state, the identity will be independent of our body?

Met. I do.

Em. Do you suppose we have existed before this life?

Met. Time, being a feeling, and so a constituent of the mundane mind, cannot be predicated about as affecting the existence of souls. There is no question of before or after, in the connection you indicate; because souls themselves, as causal agents, determine the temporal contingency, by willing the duration-sensation.

Em. Time is merely a feeling?

Met. Yes; we will discuss it in detail later. It is the feeling of duration.

Em. I grasp the point that, in considering metaphysical time and space, we must drop the notion of them as the all-embracing, omnipresent factors we commonly imagine.

Met. Say, rather, imagine we imagine. Whatever we know, we must determine as known. The

time and space we know, must be time and space we determine. As such, they are the feelings which I call the duration-sensation and distance-sensation.

Em. I suppose that the body, as the empirical changes constituting what we call growth and decay, in mnemonic storey, exists only metaphysically; not as any shape and bulk about which we can predicate as being a practical body?

Met. Yes, it becomes metaphysically persistent, as in the case we earlier discussed of the halved apple.

Em. And when, as we commonly say, we remember a person, as a body, we bring some of this metaphysical body, as thought, into top storey.

Met. You correctly state the contingency. The like, of course, applies to all bodies that we empirically recognise as changing through what we call growth and decay.

Em. Such as plants and animals generally.

Met. Yes; what we commonly call life is merely this empirical growth and decay of a body. We determine this sort of life by willing the particular sensing into top storey and into mnemonic storey.

Em. A sort of panoramic flux of sensings.

Met. Any of which we may possibly will back from mnemonic into top storey, as what we call an apparition or ghost, as well as mere thought, as what we call a memory.

Em. I see. There may be either thought-resuscitation, as memory; or sensing-resuscitation, as apparition or ghost.

Met. Yes; according to our determinism, as causal agents.

Em. So, the case of Christ's appearing again, "in

the flesh," after death, is, metaphysically, nowise incredible.

Met. Perfectly credible; on all fours with the apparition described by Sir William Crookes.

Em. Christ, as apparition, was talked with and touched by other people.

Met. This applies to Katie King, as apparition. There is plenty of testimony for tangible apparitions communicating by signs other than spoken words, and a fair amount of testimony for talking apparitions.

Em. How do you account for a talking apparition of a dead person, from your standpoint that death involves cessation of willing the mundane mind?

Met. The speech of a person, like his body, is sensing (of the auditory order). This goes into mnemonic storey, like the body, and may be willed back into top storey, as in the case of the body.

Em. The tones of a person's voice, after he has died?

Met. Just as the shape of his features. Whether a sensing is a sound or a shape does not affect the condition of possible resuscitation.

Em. Any living person may effect such resuscitation?

Met. Yes; though, practically, the resuscitation is generally effected by intimates—at any rate in the first instance. Afterwards, as in the case of the ordinary ghost, an indefinite number of people, entire strangers to the deceased person, may render the persistence continuous.

Em. You make me recognise how ridiculous are so-called scientific pretensions to account for these

abnormal occurrences, and to judge of their credibility.

Met. Yes; to appeal to empirical science on the subject, is about as profitable as appealing to a cookery-book or railway-guide.

Em. Or, to Tertullian, about the nebular hypothesis. The assurance of these modern pedagogues in applying their little dogmas of certainty equals anything of the sort indulged in by old theologians.

Met. Yes; from the standpoint of modern metaphysic, there is little to choose between the certainties of modern fathers of science and ancient fathers of the Church.

Em. The fog provided by modern scientific pundits equals that provided by the old ecclesiastics.

Met. As obscuring what is inherently outside the particular purview. So long as science recognises her limitations, she is justified by practical results. The mischief arises through the blindness of her votaries to the fact of her limitations.

Em. The sort of resurrection we have been discussing is not the sort implied by theologians.

Met. No; theological resurrection implies the willing again, in a post-mundane state, of mundane bodies by the souls that willed them with the self-sensation: that is, as their own bodies, in the mundane state.

Em. As empirical death is cessation of willing mind, I assume that you deny this theological sort of resurrection.

Met. Yes; I no more grant that souls of the empirically dead can again will their earthly bodies, than that they can will any other sensing. A body of the dead may be willed, as apparition, by souls of

the living; but not by the soul that was hereditarily determined to will the body as its own.

Em. I see that, in the case of a body, as apparition, or ghost, the willing is exclusively by souls of the living—quite a different contingency from that assumed by theology.

Met. Yes; in the case of the metaphysically demonstrable resurrection, souls of the living merely bring the body out of mnemonic, into top, storey. They do not will the body with the self-sensation as does a soul hereditarily determined to will a body as its own.

Em. So, I take it that you reject theological resurrection.

Met. I reject any version of resurrection attributing to souls of the empirically dead the capacity to will their mundane bodies into top storey.

Em. Can you accept any sort of resurrection, as applied to souls of the dead?

Met. Only in the sense that the post-mundane mind may involve some sort of continuity with the mundane mind permitting experience as analogue to corporeal identity in the mundane state.

Em. On such condition as you suggest, as the mundane body, from your standpoint, is all the empirical changes occurring between birth and death, did a soul, in the post-mundane state, will an analogue to its earthly body, it would seem that either the willing would have to involve analogues to all the changes occurring in the case of the earthly body, or, we should have to assume that only some particular phase was repeated, as analogy.

Met. Yes. Personally, I reject any assumption attributing to the post-mundane soul the willing of a

body, implying by that term, any experience that we can identify with a mundane organism. Metaphysic can say nothing about the post-mundane mind, except that, as the soul, or causal agent, is not annihilated on ceasing to will the mundane mind, the soul must be assumed to have some object, corresponding to the mundane mind, on which to operate causally in the post-mundane state. What the correspondence will involve, as experience, cannot be expressed in terms of mundane experience, which is tantamount to denying possibility of defining it.

Em. So, the upshot is that you decline to pronounce about theological resurrection, beyond denying the possibility of post-mundane willing of the mundane body?

Met. Yes; I deny the possibility of such willing by a soul that has passed beyond mundane life.

Em. Looking at the matter from the naïve, practical standpoint, the term, resurrection, implying the actual earthly body in the post-mundane state, seems meaningless, unless we assume a repetition of earthly phases between birth and death. Any other assumption at once mystifies us with the question: what sort of a body will be willed—that of an infant, or adult; a body wasted by disease, or plump and vigorous?

Met. Yes; I fear that it is hopeless to wrestle with the problem of resurrection, from the standpoint you now indicate.

Em. I should like a theologian, professing to hold resurrection in the sense of a repetition of the earthly body, to tell me whether it was to be the body at birth, or death; diseased, or healthy—and why.

Met. I fear you would get little satisfaction from the theologian.

Em. You deny that a soul that, as what we call death, has ceased willing the mundane mind, can ever again live, in the sense of willing the mundane mind?

Met. I do.

Em. So, you deny theological resurrection?

Met. Yes; the only resurrection I affirm is as the willing, from mnemonic into top storey, of bodies of the empirically dead, as apparitions, or ghosts, by souls of the empirically living.

Em. Such willing involving that some phase of the empirical changes through which a body passes, between birth and death, is brought into top storey, as the so-called ghost.

Met. Yes; I affirm no other resurrection than that.

Em. So, you do not believe that Christ rose from the grave, as a soul of the empirically dead, willing again its mundane body?

Met. I do not.

Em. What do you believe about Christ's reputed reappearance after empirical death?

Met. That, if Christ did so reappear, he reappeared as an apparition willed into top storey by those who reputedly saw and conversed with him.

Em. When, in our second conversation, we were discussing life, you said that the cessation of empirical spontaneity was irrelevant to the question of vital persistence.

Met. I did.

Em. Then, it would seem that we had no empirical test to guide us about the cessation of mundane

life. The corruption of the body, proving nothing in the connection, why may we not assume that death is merely a sort of trance, and that, as theologians imply, by resurrection, all souls are destined as it were to awake together from the trance, willing again their mundane bodies, and taking judgment by the Almighty?

Met. We will discuss the question of judgment when we come to deal with the moral and religious aspects of causation. As regards the awaking from your supposititious trance, and willing again of the mundane body, your question again applies: what body—that of the infant, or the adult; a diseased or a decrepit and wasted body? This sort of speculation requires that we know what sort of body we imply.

Em. I grant that the difficulty of identity confronts us in the case of my assumed trance as fully as in the case of post-mundane willing of the earthly body.

Met. Another difficulty is that, in the case of mere trance, we should need to postulate not merely the willing again of the body, but of the mundane mind of sensings, thoughts, feelings, as now existing for us. The mere willing of the body, isolated from our present world of experience, would involve experiential inconsequence. A mundane body, without mundane sensings, thoughts, feelings, is meaningless.

Em. A sort of fly in the amber.

Met. Again; the temporal contingency, in regard to ordinary trance, only exists as the willing of the duration-sensation by living agents. The implication, in the case of your suggested trance, is that the temporal contingency exists when no agents are willing the duration-sensation.

Em. Yes; I see that the awaking together of all souls implies that souls of the dead are applying our chronology, and time their awaking accordingly.

Met. Or, that God, who determines time as our experience, is limited by our chronology. Even supposing that the metaphysical and practically conceptual difficulties in regard to the mere willing again of the mundane body were obviated—which they cannot be—and that the willing were granted, it would have no significance but as a fanciful concession to our ordinary, unphilosophical hankering for the concrete as test of reality.

Em. Even granting my trance, and the old body, there would be nothing in it philosophically significant?

Met. Nothing whatever. God does not need our bodies, whereby to identify us. What bodies we need, that we may identify one another in the post-mundane state, are, metaphysically, intelligible, in default of earthly bodies. If death merely involves empirical trance, it merely involves again bringing into top storey the mundane mind of sensings, thoughts, feelings.

DUOLOGUE VIII.

MONISM.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. The body, from your standpoint, being a mere sensing determined by the soul, as causal agent, why need you postulate other souls than yours?

Met. I suppose you mean, putting the case in a familiar way: why may not I be you, and you I?

Em. That is what I imply. How can we know that there is more than one soul determining everything—suns, planets, human and animal bodies, plants, thoughts, feelings—as its own created experience out of nothing?

Met. Your question implies metaphysical monism, if you consider the single soul you suggest to be God, the Creator.

Em. I do not see that such a soul could be other than Creator. But, the point I now want to get at is: why do you postulate humanity as multitudes of souls? Is there any sort of proof that a man, as causal agent, is not simply humanity *en bloc?*

Met. You raise a profound metaphysical issue, a purely intellectual solution of which is unattainable.

Em. You mean that we must take whatever solution is available on trust?

Met. Yes; we must decide largely by faith in the guidance of a particular feeling which I call the self-sensation, affording us the experience of personal identity and of identity other than our own.

Em. That feeling, like all others, being determined by the soul.

Met. Necessarily. It involves what we call self-consciousness and experiences of ownership, whether of thoughts and feelings, or of what we call property.

Em. I fully recognise such a feeling in myself.

Met. Do you recognise any capacity to project this feeling beyond yourself?

Em. I hardly think I do.

Met. Let me illustrate the point! Suppose you are an ardent teetotaller and you see a person enjoying a glass of whisky. You, we will assume, loathe the intoxicant. So you will the feeling of abhorrence with the self-sensation, constituting the repulsion your own feeling.

Em. I see that point clearly.

Met. You also know that the other person enjoys the whisky. To know this, you must also constitute the feeling of enjoyment your own by willing the self-sensation with it.

Em. I think I also see that point.

Met. But, while you so appropriate the feeling of enjoyment, you also reject it. The rejection involves the projection of the self-sensation beyond yourself, to the other person. You are thereby empirically assured that the other person, not you, enjoys the liquor.

Em. I seem to grip that point, too.

Met. You know that there is another person through this sort of projection of the self-sensation.

Em. I see that this will apply to every case of different likings.

Met. Every such case involves this projection of the self-sensation.

Em. And that is our sole ground for postulating multitudes of causal agents?

Met. Not our sole ground, but our main ground. Hypnotism, telepathy, clairvoyance afford us complementary proofs.

Em. Do these proofs suffice to assure you, personally, of the fact of such causal differentiation of agents?

Met. Yes; I am practically assured.

Em. Of course, the fact of differentiated causal agents does not affect the all-embracing unity of the Creator?

Met. Not at all. The Creative Agent, giving existence to all, involves metaphysical monism.

Em. The Creator is not one with what He creates?

Met. No; that would be inconsistent with His creating, just as it would be inconsistent with your causing the experience you call a tree, that you and the tree were identical.

Em. Your monism seems to be a sort of dualism.

Met. Dualism, as involving differentiation between cause and caused; monism, as involving causal oneness.

Em. You reject pantheistic monism, identifying God with the universe?

Met. Obviously. That sort of monism ignores the problem of causation by implicitly attributing causal activity to mere sensings. Beyond that, it implies that a causal agent is determined by relationships which can only exist through its own determin-

ism: a metaphysical impossibility, and a logical absurdity.

Em. Why a logical absurdity?

Met. Because what causes, determines, and what determines is necessarily undetermined by what it determines.

Em. Does that apply in case of ourselves? Are not we, in some guise, determined by the experiences we cause?

Met. Not at all. We are only determined by other souls, to which we are relatively causal as they are to us. Our merely relative causation is not the causation implied by pantheistic monism, attributing self-existence to a so-called cosmos. Such a cosmos is in the position of a First Cause, necessarily out of relationship, but implied by that sort of monism, to be a congeries of relationships. Nothing is causally accounted for by such a monistic assumption. It is merely bogus philosophising on the basis of empirical illusionism.

Em. I see that a First Cause cannot be determined by any relationship to what it determines.

Met. And until we have identified a First Cause, we have identified no real cause. Every cause we empirically identify reveals its own inadequacy by impelling us to seek a cause beyond itself.

Em. And all our knowledge hangs on our apprehension of causal agency.

Met. Certainly. Failing that apprehension, the pantheist would be utterly powerless to excogitate his monism, by which he stultifies the apprehension.

DUOLOGUE IX.

THE GHOST.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. From what you state regarding tangible, visible, and talking apparitions of the dead, it seems that our living bodies do not essentially differ from apparitions of the dead, or what are commonly called ghosts.

Met. So far as regards their quality as sensings, there is no difference between living bodies and ghosts.

Em. In the case of a living body, we notice various movements indicating the performance of what we call physiological functions, such as pulse and respiration movements. Does this apply in the case of the ghost?

Met. Quite possibly. Sir W. Crookes testifies that he timed the pulse and heard the heart-beats of the Katie King apparition.

Em. That is amazing.

Met. No more so than that a ghost walks and lets you feel its body.

Em. But, physiological functions—a heart beating! Surely, that is life itself!

Met. I see you have not yet quite freed yourself

of the empirical illusion of causality. You still have a mental hankering for that physiological figment of vital functions carried on by sensings that can do nothing whatever, but are merely the puppets determined by the intellectually identified causal agent. If you hear a heart beat, or feel a pulse throb, or see legs, hands, eyes move, the experiences are all equally dependent on your own causal agency.

Em. I recognise the force of what you say, and see that it all inevitably follows from the metaphysical demonstration of causality; but the uncanniness of a beating heart in a dead body is a sort of staggerer.

Met. Yes; physiology is hard to put aside, unless we are properly impregnated with the metaphysical virus inoculating us against empirical illusion.

Em. Well, I'm not going to be slave to my prepossessions, when metaphysic intellectually proves, and Sir W. Crookes vouches for fact. I see clearly that I can know nothing about a heart beating, unless I make it beat.

Met. And whether the heart is in your body, or in some other body, makes no causal difference.

Em. I see that. If the ghost-body has legs that move, it may have a heart that moves.

Met. There is no causal difference.

Em. Ghosts are only transient experiences, as compared with the permanence of living bodies. I suppose you will grant that this constitutes an important difference.

Met. Yes; it involves the only radical difference between a ghost and a living body. A living body is willed by a soul, with the self-sensation not projected to another soul or sensing. So, that body is

the particular soul's own, and persists so long as that soul wills the self-sensation with it. Thus, it is practically permanent. A ghost is willed by souls that do not will the self-sensation with the ghostly body, as their own, but project the self-sensation as in the case we earlier discussed, of the teetotaller.

Em. In that case, the projection was to another soul. In the case of the ghost, it is to a body.

Met. Yes; the self-sensation may be projected to a soul or to sensings. When the projection is in connection with thoughts, feelings, emotions, the projection is, normally, to another soul. Abnormally, as in cases of what is called alienation or multiple personality, the projection is by a soul to itself as, illusively, another soul. The facts on record of alienation are metaphysically interesting as illustrating different willings of the self-sensation. I have examined several of such cases, in detail, in the fifth volume of *Heresies*.

Em. I have read accounts of such cases, and the totally futile attempts of physiologists and psychologists to account for them.

Met. I am personally intimate with such a case. The interpretation, by metaphysic, is clear and complete. The cases are merely aggravated examples of normal differentiations of personality.

Em. The soul of a dead person has no office in willing the ghost?

Met. No; because such a soul no longer wills the mundane mind.

Em. How comes it that other souls will the ghost into top storey?

Met. The souls that first do this are people who knew the dead person. The conditions involving

such willing are those at the root of the possibility of knowing the halves, as parts, when we divide an apple. The whole apple, as we earlier saw, persists as metaphysically existing, in mnemonic storey, and is willed into top storey, as thought. So, the halves are known as related to the whole.

Em. But the whole apple is not again willed into top storey, as sensing; while the body is.

Met. The apple might be willed again in its integrity, just as is the body.

Em. I see. That works out to what you state: that there is no essential difference between what we call a real thing and an apparition.

Met. None. Of course, an apparition, as ghost, may lack one or another character, as sensing. Thus, it may be visible, but intangible. But, so far as it is any particular sensing, it is real as real can be.

Em. Undoubtedly, I know nothing about your body, but as seeings and touchings. If you were dead and buried, and I saw and touched what I now recognise as your body, my experience would be just as real as it is now.

Met. And your experience is all you can predicate about.

Em. Exactly. To talk of ghosts as being unreal is to talk nonsense.

Met. To the extent that we are sensings, we are all apparitions, living or dead.

DUOLOGUE X.

THE THING.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. A point occurs to me which we have not earlier discussed. Whenever I sense what I call an object or thing, there is something in the experience quite distinct from the sensing or sensings, giving me the impression of coherent identity. The particular feeling cannot be described in any terms of sensing, ordinary feeling, or thought.

Met. That particular experience of coherent identity is incidental to interaction between the soul and matter-soul. Every sensing involving what we call a thing or object is primarily determined through this interaction.

Em. Do you mean that this interaction as it were labels certain seeings and touchings as a particular object?

Met. No; not as a *particular* object, but as some coherent identity. Once this coherency is established by the interaction, its quality as a particular object is incidental to the sensings. The interaction merely determines a "thing," or "thing itself." What this thing is to be, as square, round, long,

short, bright, dark, hard, soft, etc., etc., is incidental to the sensing.

Em. A sort of welding of sensings.

Met. Yes. Let me illustrate the point, premising that the interaction involves what I term hypnotism of the matter-soul, by the soul. My soul hypnotises the matter-soul. This involves that I will certain sensings into top storey, and that these sensings are a "thing." But, what sort of a thing are they? They are, say, a thing that is smooth, bright, whitish, hollow, hard, transparent, and I call that thing a glass.

Em. Do you mean that your interaction with, or hypnotism of, the matter-soul involves your willing all those sensings into top storey?

Met. No; but it involves my willing the sensings as a coherent identity, or thing. If I willed the sensings, without hypnotising the matter-soul, they would have no character as a thing.

Em. Seeing without touching; or touching without seeing might enable us to recognise a thing.

Met. Certainly; there is no necessity that any particular sort of sensings shall be incident to our interaction with the matter-soul. There is only the necessity that, whenever we do interact, one or another sort of sensing will involve our recognising a thing.

Em. The interaction with the matter-soul seems to be a distinct activity from sensing.

Met. It is distinct as involving exclusively the particular experience of sensory coherence, which I term, preter-empirical notion, because, like the intuition of cause, it is a sort of afflatus transcending ordinary feeling.

Em. Do you mean that the experience we call cause and the experience we call thing are typically alike?

Met. They are alike to the extent that they are indefinable in terms of ordinary feeling and thought.

Em. The interaction between the soul and matter-soul seems to underlie sensing.

Met. It pre-conditions sensing, and sensing pre-conditions thinking and feeling. Accordingly, the interaction pre-conditions all experience.

Em. Must we interact with the matter-soul, that we may sense?

Met. Yes. The interaction involves the metaphysical objective:

Em. Corresponding, metaphysically, to what we commonly call objective experience?

Met. Yes; the empirical objective, as sensed things is determined by the metaphysical objective, as the preter-empirical notion, thing, incident to the interaction.

Em. Is there any sort of empirical proof of what you call the preter-empirical notion, thing?

Met. Yes; hypnotic suggestion of what are called sensory illusions is such proof. A hypnotised person may see and touch, say, a coat as a dog. In such a case, a false preter-empirical notion involving what would be, normally, sensings as a dog, is substituted, through the hypnotist's suggestion, for the normal preter-empirical notion and sensings as a coat.

Em. Does the hypnotic really see a dog?

Met. He sees the dog only as willing it out of mnemonic storey, as thought.

Em. Does he not also will the normal preter-empirical notion and sensing, as the coat?

Met. Yes; but the thought sensing and suggested preter-empirical notion practically nullify the normal sensing and preter-empirical notion.

Em. So, he practically sees a dog?

Met. Yes; through willing a false preter-empirical notion compelling him to construe a real sensing incident to a normal preter-empirical notion, into a thought normally incident to another sensing, not, on the occasion, in top storey.

Em. There would seem to be a special preter-empirical notion incident to every sensing, as thing.

Met. Yes; as welding the sensing into coherency.

Em. But, in the case of the suggested preter-empirical notion, I understand you to imply, there is no incident sensing; only thought.

Met. That is so, practically, because the sensing only exists metaphysically, as in mnemonic storey, thereby illustrating the distinction between sensing and the preter-empirical notion, and empirically evidencing the preter-empirical notion.

Em. Why need we assume the preter-empirical notion, in the case of the hypnotic experiment, rather than assume that the hypnotic takes the dog for the coat merely because the thought is suggested?

Met. Because, mere thought, when he saw and touched the coat, could not nullify the sensings. No thought, alone, could involve a person's confusing a coat with a dog, as sensing.

Em. Does the hypnotic confuse as sensing?

Met. Yes, as sensing incident to the suggested preter-empirical notion, willed from mnemonic storey as metaphysical existence, into mnemonic storey as

thought, and from mnemonic storey into top storey as practically remembered.

Em. Does the hypnotic really interact with the matter-soul according to the suggestion?

Met. Yes; both according to the suggestion, and against it, as normally, though he only wills the product of the normal interaction into top storey as sensing, willing the product of the suggested interaction into top storey only as thought.

Em. He has both the suggested thought and the normal sensing in top storey?

Met. Yes; but he wills faith with the suggested thought, not with the normal sensing. So, he affirms experience as the dog instead of the coat.

Em. Why does he not will faith with the thought independently of any suggested preter-empirical notion?

Met. Because, if he merely willed the thought, he would recognise the inconsistency of the thought with the real sensing, and though he might obey the hypnotist's suggestion to the extent of affirming the dog instead of the coat, the obedience would be merely mechanical, as a matter of words, while, really, he would be perfectly assured that the coat was a coat, and that there was no dog at all.

Em. How are we to know that that is not really the case in such a contingency?

Met. We may judge by various analogous phenomena of suggested illusion. Thus, water has been often suggested as a powerful drug, and conversely, powerful drugs have been suggested as inert, with results corresponding to the suggestion. Simulation is excluded in such cases. If water may be suggested

as ipecacuanha, producing the physiological effects of the drug, we may reasonably assume that a person really has faith that he sees and touches as a dog, what he really senses as a coat.

Em. In empirically dividing what we call wholes into parts, I suppose we will fresh preter-empirical notions, as the parts, remembering the whole, as preter-empirical notion, as in the case of sensings we discussed earlier?

Met. Yes; but in all contingencies involving sensory parts, imagination, as well as memory, operates. We will discuss imagination, later.

Em. So, if we pulverise a brick, every particle is a preter-empirical notion.

Met. Yes.

Em. But, I suppose, the physicist's atom cannot be a preter-empirical notion.

Met. No; because there is no sensing.

Em. The atom is entirely foreign to sensing, so that it cannot possibly emanate from or change into a sensing, even as an empirical contingency, apart from the metaphysical denial of transformations of experiences?

Met. No more than a sneeze can emanate from or change into a hammer.

Em. One preter-empirical notion seems to embrace or subsume another, as in the case of a body embracing arms, legs, head, etc.

Met. Yes. The like applies to sensings, as parts and wholes. Our identification of sensings, as empirical parts and wholes, depends on our willing preter-empirical notions as embracing other preter-empirical notions. We recognise the parts as constituents of the whole apple, through willing the

latter as preter-empirical notion, embracing the former as preter-empirical notions.

Em. I see. That follows from the metaphysical view of the preter-empirical notion as welding sensings into things. We recognise wholes as things embracing other things, as parts.

Met. The special character of the things depending on the sensings.

DUOLOGUE XI.

THE MATTER-SOUL.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. I see that mere sensing can afford us no knowledge of coherent identities, as things, and that such an intuition or feeling as you call preter-empirical notion is real experience affording such knowledge. Can you tell me, in a few words, why it is necessary to postulate the matter-soul, as active agent beyond the soul, and why the willing of the preter-empirical notion, thing, unlike the willing of other experiences, is dependent on interaction between the soul and matter-soul?

Met. To answer your questions without taking a serious plunge into metaphysic is not easy. The necessity for postulating the matter-soul hangs on the fact of the inertness of mind, with which the soul does not interact, but on which it operates as a causally determining agent. Do you get a clear idea out of that statement?

Em. I take it to imply that there is no reciprocal doing between the soul and mind, but that the soul deals with mind after the manner of our eyes, glancing at one, then another, object, while the object does nothing as influencing the eye to glance at it.

Met. That will serve as a mental picture of the contingency. We have now to consider another point. Though the soul causally determines in regard to mind, it is not a finally causal agent, or creator; but is merely relatively causal. As being relatively causal, it must interact with another relatively causal agent in order to initiate causal operation on the inert object, as mind.

Em. Why could not interaction between a number of souls initiate sensing?

Met. Because, in regard to initiation of experience, any number of souls would merely be as a single soul, which, in the connection, would preclude interaction.

Em. Am I to understand that, once experience is started, as sensing, interaction between souls suffices to consummate experience, as the willing of thoughts and feelings?

Met. Yes; and to start experience, as sensing, the interaction is between the soul and the matter-soul.

Em. Why is that interaction necessary? Why may not the creative cause directly compel the soul to initiate causal operation?

Met. Because the soul is not relatively causal to the creative cause, but is absolutely determined by that cause, analogously as experience is determined by the soul.

Em. As between creative cause and the soul, the contingency is analogous to that between the soul and mind?

Met. So far as regards absence of causal reciprocity, it is.

Em. So, souls, without the matter-soul, would not account for the initiating interaction.

Met. No; in respect to initiation of causal opera-

tion on mind, souls, as multitude, are merely in the position of a single soul. The interaction of souls is conditional with their interaction with what may be termed a typically different causal agent.

Em. You mean that, once experience is initiated, but not until that contingency, souls causally interact?

Met. That is my meaning.

Em. A sort of flint-and-steel arrangement, with initiated experience as sparks?

Met. You may put it that way; or, as the hand moving the trigger that fires the gun.

Em. The soul being the hand; the matter-soul, the trigger?

Met. Yes; the soul's hypnotism of the matter-soul may be compared to the pulling of the trigger. The resulting preter-empirical notion and sensing may be compared to the flash; thoughts and feelings to the gases liberated in the combustion.

Em. I now see why you call the interaction the metaphysical objective. The matter-soul is the active agent on which the soul operates so as to involve the empirical objectivity of sensed things.

Met. Yes; the matter-soul is causally objective to the soul.

Em. Then, there are two sorts of relatively causal agents, and the inert mind?

Met. Yes. That may be termed the metaphysical trinity.

Em. With God, as Creative Cause, determining all.

Met. Yes.

DUOLOGUE XII.

CAUSE.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. I take it that, from your standpoint, the experience to which we apply the term, cause, reveals to us our own essential identity and the identity of the Creator.

Met. It does.

Em. Obviously, all our rational experience may be said to be founded on the experience of cause.

Met. That is so. Science, art, intercourse, rational action are only possible subject to the experience of cause.

Em. We know things as caused; but cause itself always eludes us. No sooner do we seem to identify it than it becomes effect.

Met. That occurs because we commonly never get near to identifying cause, but merely identify relationships determined by it, confusing the relationships with what determines them, analogously as we confuse subjects of belief with truth.

Em. Cause, itself, transcends caused things, as truth transcends what we call the true.

Met. And, as the preter-empirical notion, thing, transcends sensings.

Em. From your standpoint, I suppose that the experience of cause is independent of the experience of sequence of events.

Met. Quite independent of experience of relationship of any sort, in one of its two aspects. In another aspect, it reveals necessary relationships of a special order. It is a unique complex, as experience.

Em. How, a complex?

Met. In one aspect, it is will itself manifested as a pure feeling or intuition of power, impulsive force, momentum, entirely apart from any other experience. In another aspect, it is thought interpreting the feeling of power as active agency, *in puris naturalibus.* Again, manifesting itself as the feeling of power, and as constituting the self-sensation top storey experience, it reveals our essential personality as itself: causal agency. Again, as thought, it attaches itself to sensings, thoughts, feelings involving the empirical attribution of causal agency to such experiences. Forsaking one such experience and attaching itself to another, it involves empirical experience of its own elusiveness, constituting what were empirical causes merely effects. Finally, as thought, it involves intellectual identification of itself, in its ultimate character, as creative, or first, cause.

Em. As I understand you, I take it that we recognise empirical causes by projecting cause, as thought, to other experiences, analogously as in the case of projecting the self-sensation involving identification of another person.

Met. Yes; only in the case of empirical cause, the projection involves illusion; while, in the case of projecting the self-sensation, there is no illusion, but identification of really distinct personalities, as souls.

Em. Cause, as thought and the feeling of power, tells us we are cause?

Met. Yes; when we will the self-sensation.

Em. As thought, it attaches itself to other experiences, involving that we attribute causal activity to the experiences?

Met. Yes; and contradicts the attribution by forsaking the experiences and so constituting them what we call effects.

Em. As thought, it finally attaches itself to creative cause, revealing itself in its ultimate aspect.

Met. And, as thought, it then, as I may say, abdicates, telling us that we are only effects of the creative cause.

Em. There is a lot more in cause than those evolutionising *cognoscenti* dream about.

Met. Yes; their intellectual navvying hardly gets down deep enough to reach causal foundations.

Em. You call cause, like thing, a preter-empirical notion.

Met. Yes; they are the only preter-empirical notions—the only experiences that transcend ordinary thoughts, feelings, sensings.

Em. Obviously, the experience of cause drives us to identification of God.

Met. Certainly. There is no stopping until we reach self-existent Cause: the Creator.

DUOLOGUE XIII.

IMAGINATION.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. From your standpoint, there are no experiences but sensings, thoughts, feelings—am I not right?

Met. You are.

Em. Sensings, thoughts, feelings constitute the metaphysical mind in what you call top storey?

Met. Right.

Em. In mnemonic storey, they continue to exist, as you term it, metaphysically: as what we commonly call forgotten?

Met. That is the case.

Em. When they are what you call empirically or practically remembered, thoughts and feelings are brought again into top storey?

Met. Right.

Em. Sensings are only remembered as thoughts; but they may be brought back, as sensings, into top storey, as apparitions.

Met. Which also implies, as we have earlier seen, that what we commonly distinguish from apparitions, as real objects, are as much apparitions as are what we commonly call ghosts.

Em. So, you imply that thought, as remembered

sensing, involves no such conversion or transformation of sensing as is implied in the empirical notion of remembering a sensing.

Met. No; there is no possibility of abolishing any experience so that it becomes, *in esse*, another experience. Sensings, thoughts, feelings may be taken as analogous to three parallel lines. Experiences never fuse, mix, or alter their integrity. Empirical changes occur through special willings of the consciousness-sensation, involving different storeys of mind, and through willings of the multiplicity-sensation, involving experiences of association. Experiences are constituents of the metaphysical mind, persisting so long as that mind persists.

Em. When we empirically substitute a thought as what we call memory of an object, the thought affords us a picture of the object. Thus, I can think of a knife so that I can have a picture of the very thing itself.

Met. In such a case, what operates as affording the picture is what we call imagination. The effect of memory, in the case, is merely to tell us that this picture is represented by a thought symbolised by the term, knife.

Em. I see. Reproducing a sensing, as memory, is distinct from reproducing it by imagination.

Met. Yes; though, practically, both memory and imagination are involved in the contingency. When you imaginatively reproduce the knife, as a picture, you really will some particular sensing and preter-empirical notion, as knife, as a visual apparition. When you memorise this picture by thinking it as associated with the sensing, you do so by willing the multiplicity-sensation with the thought and sensing.

Practically, in the case of sensings and feelings, memory always involves imagination, as apparition, as well as thought.

Em. So, I really sense the knife in imagining it?

Met. You sense some knife as a visual apparition.

Em. But, the image is manifestly different from a really seen knife.

Met. It merely differs according to its vividness, which depends on the intensity of the consciousness-sensation that may be willed with it, consistently with its being top storey experience.

Em. Do you mean that the knife, as imaginatively pictured, is a real sensing?

Met. As real as when you actually, as you say, have a knife before you. There is no knife but what you make as willing seeings and touchings and the preter-empirical notion, thing. If you will the preter-empirical notion and the seeing, as the imagined knife, you have all that is necessary to constitute a knife, so far as regards seeing it. Empirical reality or unreality is merely a matter of willing the consciousness-sensation in one or another intensity.

Em. Suppose I imaginatively picture a man's head and face, with an elephant's four legs, and a horse's body and tail, do I really sense such an object?

Met. You really sense various objects, according to the sensings and preter-empirical notions which you abnormally associate as the nondescript. If you imagined normally, you would not associate a man's head and face with elephant's legs and horse's body.

Em. So, whatever I imaginatively picture as a sensing and preter-empirical notion is the particular object?

Met. As visual sensing.

Em. Can I imaginatively picture other experiences than sensings?

Met. Only sensory and psychical feelings.

Em. Sensory and psychical feelings? I thought feelings were exclusively psychical.

Met. They are, psychologically, but not metaphysically.

Em. What are sensory feelings?

Met. They are experiences involving æsthetic discrimination in the sensory arena.

Em. Does not sensing, alone, involve the discrimination?

Met. No.

Em. Will you instance some sensory feelings?

Met. Beauty, ugliness, brightness, dulness, smoothness, roughness, remoteness, nearness, in the visual arena; heaviness, lightness, roughness, smoothness, sharpness, bluntness, closeness, wideness, narrowness, in the tactual arena; loudness, faintness, shrillness, deepness, in the auditory arena; bitterness, sweetness, sourness, in the gustatory arena; pungency, faintness, in the olfactory arena; and so on. We may, later, consider sensory feelings and sensings, in detail.

Em. When I imagine these sort of feelings, do I picture them as in the case of sensing and preter-empirical notion?

Met. Yes; as so pictured, they may be termed apparitions of feelings, the degrees of vividness, as in regard to sensings, depending on the intensity of the consciousness-sensation that may be willed with them.

Em. Thoughts cannot be imagined?

Met. No; they can only be empirically associated through willing the multiplicity-sensation with them. When we apply the term, imagination, to thoughts, it merely implies this association; not their pictorial re-presentment.

Em. What we call the flow of thought is this sort of association?

Met. Yes. Thoughts, in themselves, are isolated identities. We get the illusion of their associating, through the multiplicity-sensation, as in the like case of sensings.

Em. Apart from associatively imagining thoughts, we may remember them.

Met. As remembered, thoughts are merely willed, in their integrity, into top storey, with the duration-sensation and multiplicity-sensation; the latter experiences involving that the thoughts are empirically associated with themselves, constituting them remembered.

Em. We know that they are willed again, through willing with them the multiplicity-sensation and duration-sensation?

Met. Yes; we only so know that they are renewed.

Em. The physicist tells us about atoms, which cannot be sensings. Yet he implies them to be equivalent to sensings. How does he imagine the equivalence?

Met. Nobody can imagine equivalence of one sort of experience to another, unless in the sense of confounding the one with the other. The physicist confounds thought, as mathematical quantity, with sensing, applying to the abstract quantity the term, atom.

Em. I suppose that the confusion involves some sort of imagination?

Met. Yes; metaphysically invalid imagination, leading to a vast amount of bogus theorising about infinitely littles and bigs—atoms, millions of millions times smaller than anything that can be seen; stars, millions of millions miles away, and millions of times bigger than the earth; light, moving through millions of millions of miles of void, at the velocity of thousands of miles in a second of time, and so on, in speculative abundance.

Em. Mathematical physics and astronomy is an edifice of the Munchausen sort?

Met. Yes; those sciences have many imposing *chateaux en Espagne*, erected on the foundation of invalid imagination.

Em. Should you consider the case we earlier discussed, of the suggested illusion of the dog, an example of imagination?

Met. No; hypnotic suggestion of the sort merely involves the willing of faith with memory of sensing, as thought.

Em. There was no dog, in the case, as apparition?

Met. No; only as thought, incident to the suggestion of a false preter-empirical notion.

Em. The hypnotic did not see the dog, as apparition?

Met. No; he knew the coat as a coat, but denied his knowledge through faith imposed by the hypnotist in suggesting the dog-preter-empirical notion. Imagination, of the valid order, always involves the reproducing of sensings or feelings, as apparitions; or, when the term is applied to thoughts, the association of thoughts, so that they become empirically

projected from one another, involving what is called synthesis. Ordinary hypnotic phenomena involve memory and faith, but not imagination.

Em. You earlier said that our recognition of parts depended on imagination, as well as memory. I suppose wholes are willed as apparitions: that I will the whole apple, as apparition, when the parts appear?

Met. Yes; all wholes, as well as being memories, are more or less vivid apparitions, associated with the parts through willing of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. The vividness depending on the intensity of the consciousness-sensation?

Met. Yes.

Em. So, when I see a person, in a fog, he is an apparition willed with inferior intensity of the consciousness-sensation?

Met. Yes.

Em. The fog does not causally affect the issue?

Met. No; it is merely an incidental sensing to the willing of the intensity of the consciousness-sensation. No experience is causally efficient.

Em. Of course. We settled that long ago. My question betrayed mnemonic fogginess.

DUOLOGUE XIV.

THE DREAM.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. It would seem that what we called dreams were merely exercises of imagination.

Met. They are such, under special conditions of willing the consciousness-sensation.

Em. What are the special conditions?

Met. In the waken state, the consciousness-sensation is so willed as to involve memories of a continuous body of experiences constituting normal sequences bound together through willings of the multiplicity-sensation, so involving a coherent whole which we call customary. In the dream-state, the incidents constituting such waken memories are willed with such intensities of the consciousness-sensation as to involve their merely being in mnemonic storey, and so, practically forgotten, while the consciousness-sensation as involving top storey experience is focussed on a few special willings constituting the dream-experience.

Em. You seem to imply that, in the waken state, there is practically a world of experience about us constituting a sort of criterion of any particular experience on which the attention, for the moment, may be centred; while, in the dream-state, we are,

as it were, forced to take with our eyes shut whatever may turn up in the way of experience.

Met. That states the case in a familiar way.

Em. So far as regards the dream-experiences, I suppose they are in top storey, just as in the case of waken experiences?

Met. Yes; the intensity of the consciousness-sensation willed with the dream-experience is often greater than that willed with ordinary waken experiences, so involving greater vividness of presentation. This accounts for the fact that people, in dreams, may accomplish intellectual and other feats beyond their powers when awake.

Em. Suppose a dream involves a practically probable incident, how is it that we recognise the experience as in a dream?

Met. This recognition does not invariably occur, though it generally happens, within a short time of awaking. Later, the distinction is often obliterated in the case of a probable event. The recognition of the distinction is incident to the rupture in willing memories.

Em. How do we know there is a rupture?

Met. When we awake, we normally will a number of memories with the duration-sensation and multiplicity-sensation, involving that we recognise the waken states as bound together in time and coherence. While we also will the dream-experience with the duration-sensation, involving that the experience is temporally past, we fail to will the multiplicity-sensation with it. So, we fail to make it cohere with the waken state.

Em. What is the difference between trance and dream?

Met. As regards experiences in the states, there is no vital difference. The peculiarity of the trance-state, when not too profound, is the excessive degree of suggestibility incident to it. On this suggestibility depend phenomena of so-called spiritualism and ordinary hypnotism. Another peculiarity of some trance-states is the willing of memories of symbols, as writing and speech, with the multiplicity-sensation, involving association of the trance-experiences with the symbols, and consequent capacity to respond to suggestion for expression, in writing or speech, of the trance-experiences.

Em. A sleeping person is not suggestible?

Met. He is suggestible; but, far less so than a person in trance.

Em. In cases of very deep trance, people may be totally irresponsive and, so far as we know, devoid of experience, for long periods.

Met. Yes. Metaphysically, the temporal duration of practical insensibility is not of much moment, as affecting causation. Whether insensibility lasts for a few hours, as in ordinary sleep; or, for months, as in rare cases of trance, merely involves a question of willing the duration-sensation by waken people. The causally significant issue, in regard to sleep and trance, is the rupture of memories.

Em. In the case of trance, it is said that people do not remember what has occurred in it.

Met. That is generally the case. On that account, we can only predicate about trance-experience, by observing the actions of people in the state. Such observation teaches that, in cases of trance corresponding to the dream-state in ordinary sleep, the

causation of experience is on the same conditions in both states.

Em. If rupture of memories is the only vital distinction between the trance, dream, and waken states, why may we not consider our waken state, a dream-state?

Met. As you suggest, the terms, asleep and awake, involve somewhat arbitrary distinction. There is as much rupture of memory in awaking from a dream as in becoming oblivious to surroundings, in a dream, with the reservation that we generally recognise the fact of rupture, on awaking from the dream, but fail to do so on, I will say, awaking from the ordinary state.

Em. Shakespeare got near the mark: "We are such stuff as dreams are made on."

Met. So far, he was not much astray; but, the context: "and our little life is rounded with a sleep," begs much that metaphysic will not grant, unless with the proviso that the sleep means more dreaming.

DUOLOGUE XV.

ELECTRICITY.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. The up-to-date physicist, as I read in the papers, resolves everything into what he calls electrons—sort of knots of electricity, keeping cosmical things going.

Met. Thought-attenuations, *in nubibus.*

Em. Not of much account, from your standpoint.

Met. Except as illustrating the alertness of the scientific imagination.

Em. What do you make of electricity?

Met. That there is none.

Em. What?—and motor cars, telephones, wireless telegraphy, currents, volts, ohms, electrolysis!

Met. A formidable array of facts. Still, there is no electricity.

Em. Why?

Met. Because it is thought, implied to act on sensings, and there is no thought that can act on anything.

Em. Electricity is merely thought?

Met. Certainly. It is not sensing or feeling; so, if it is experience, it must be thought.

Em. Suppose you take hold of the electrodes of

a lively induction coil, isn't there something more stimulating than thought playing with you?

Met. As incident to holding the poles, I grant that I will certain feelings; but the fact proves nothing about the existence of electricity.

Em. It proves the existence of something making you feel, does it not?

Met. Certainly; but what makes me feel is will, bringing the feeling into top storey.

Em. Then, why is not electricity, will?

Met. Because, as the term is applied, it is not metaphysically identified cause, but is merely thought.

Em. Why is it merely thought?

Met. Because it is assumed to be a so-called force, acting independently of the metaphysically identified causal agent. As such, it is merely an effect of the causal agent, as thought.

Em. Well, as such an effect, why is it not electricity?

Met. Because it is implied to be a causal agent.

Em. You compel me to grant that it must be a causal agent, or thought, and that it cannot be both; but that, taken as a force, it can only be thought assumed to be a causal agent.

Met. Then, as it is so taken, there can be no electricity.

Em. It would seem that, on like ground, we might deny the existence a knife, which is also an effect which we commonly take as cause.

Met. No; your analogy will not hold. The knife is an empirical cause because we have the illusion that it is outside ourselves. In the case of thought, we have the empirical illusion that it is inside our-

selves, and that we cause it because it is inside ourselves. For electricity to exist, in the sense that the knife exists, as empirically causal agent outside ourselves, we must have the illusion that thought is outside ourselves. As we take electricity to be a causal agent, while we have no illusion that thought is outside ourselves, electricity does not exist—in other words, the term, electricity, symbolises no experience.

Em. You corner me. Of course, what you say about electricity applies to the whole collection of causal agents in the scientific emporium, called energies and forces.

Met. Yes; in every case in which causal agency is attributed when we have no illusion that the ostensible agent is outside ourselves, thought is implied to be outside ourselves, while we have the illusion that it is inside ourselves.

Em. Energies and forces are bogus assumptions.

Met. Formal statements useful in practical application, but symbolising no experiences.

Em. But, even if they are bogus, they mean something, don't they? and as meaning something, they must exist, as thought.

Met. They exist as thought nullifying itself: as formal statements implying existence that cannot exist.

Em. Well; we have pretty effectually despatched a batch of invisibles and imponderables to *Ewigkeit* —what do you make of heat, light, darkness?

Met. They are sensory feelings.

Em. No demand for ether-vibrations?

Met. No; ether has gone to *Ewigkeit,* with energies and forces.

Em. As electricity is nothing, what makes a Marconi receiver record a message sent a thousand miles away?

Met. Will, as suggestion.

Em. Why cannot will act without the instruments?

Met. There is no impediment on the ground of possibility. There is nothing, metaphysically, to prevent a message being sent across the Atlantic, without instruments of any sort. I have lately read, in the press, that it has been done.

Em. What sends the electric tram-car along?

Met. Will, as involving movement in top storey.

Em. No need for instruments in that case?

Met. No metaphysical necessity. There is plenty of evidence for movement of sensings, as material objects, by will, independently of any empirical essentials, as appliances.

Em. Well; you've currented or shocked electricity out of me, unless it is will. The scientist is pretty well up in applying what he knows nothing about. That seems to be the balance of the ledger about electricity, so far as he is concerned.

Met. Yes; and it is the balance in respect to every other causal illusion of the sort which science harnesses to drag the car of what is called material progress. The credit due to science for useful achievement through taking for granted assumptions proved, by metaphysic, to be illusory, is obvious. What is not obvious, is that there are inherent limitations of scope for the application of the illusory assumptions constituting the foundations of science, and that, through ignoring the limitations, scientific people are misleading themselves and the general

public about the only really vital concerns of humanity: religion and morality.

Em. Yes; force, in place of God, is not a good omen if we are to put any value on religion and morality. I do not think that science will get behind electricity in nailing down the root of things.

Met. No; I surmise that electricity is the ultimate illusion measurable in terms of mathematics as being a causal agent, that will ever be available to science.

Em. It will never get what some of its boss professors are dallying with, as psychic force, into the equation cage?

Met. Never. So long as it retains the force-notion, science will be useful quackery confounding effect with cause. Emancipated from the force-notion, science is metaphysic.

Em. The business of science is to crawl; of metaphysic, to soar. You can't do much on the ground unless by footing it; or, in the empyrean, unless by winging it.

Met. In their special arenas, science and metaphysic are supreme.

Em. But the arenas won't mix.

DUOLOGUE XVI.

LIGHT.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. You say that light, like electricity, does not exist.

Met. Yes; light, invalidly imagined, as ether vibrations proceeding from a so-called source, through space, does not exist, except as stultification of thought.

Em. Such light, from your standpoint, is merely thought assumed to be a causal agent operating independently of ourselves.

Met. Yes; the so-called light is active agency attributed to a mathematical statement of quantity in terms of movement. A mathematical statement of quantity cannot move. What moves is what is willed, as sensing, with continuously varying distance-sensation. A mathematical statement of quantity is not sensing, and cannot be willed with continuously varying distance-sensation. Therefore, the physicist's light does not exist, except as a stultification of thought, involving invalid imagination.

Em. The ether, through which the so-called light is assumed to pass, as movement, is said to be a homogeneous medium. That sort of thing, if it exists,

must be either sensing, thought, or feeling; must it not?

Met. Necessarily; as those constitute all possible experience.

Em. Which of them is it?

Met. Thought, as invalid imagination, involving confusion of thought with sensing. What empirically occupies space can only be sensing. The ether, being thought, cannot occupy space. Therefore nothing can be empirically propagated through the ether.

Em. Practically, the physicist's theory about light enables us to deal with it, whatever it may be, efficiently.

Met. Certainly; as in all other like cases of invalid imagination. That does not affect the fact that no such light as the physicist assumes can possibly exist.

Em. What is light, from your standpoint?

Met. A sensory feeling.

Em. Analogous to pain, as a psychical feeling?

Met. Quite.

Em. Then, what is called an incandescent object is quite distinct from light?

Met. As distinct as is a knife from the pain of a cut.

Em. An incandescent object does not cause light?

Met. No experience causes anything.

Em. What is an incandescent object, such as the sun is said to be?

Met. A sensing.

Em. We never have light, unless we have such a sensing.

Met. There is empirical evidence for light without

such a sensing. I have willed light, on such conditions, and you may find instances of such willing, in the records of spiritistic phenomena.

Em. When we turn off the gas, at night, the room is in darkness.

Met. Generally, that is the case.

Em. Does not the fact show that light comes from the gas flame?

Met. Not in the sense that the flame causes the light. Causally, the fact merely indicates a convention of willing in top storey, a sensing, as the flame; the duration-sensation, involving temporal succession, and the sensory feeling, light. If we can resist the consensus imposing this convention, we may will the flame, without light; light, without the flame.

Em. You seriously hold that it is possible to will the flame without light?

Met. I have willed a flame without light, and I daresay you have when you have shut off the gas, suddenly, at night-time.

Em. That is an image, not the flame itself.

Met. You may call it what you like. Metaphysically, it is an apparition, and, as such, is really a flame, as sensing. I have seen such an image as bright as what you call a real flame, with no light about it. And I have seen such a flame, not as the image we are discussing, which is called an after-image, but independently of any empirical source as a flame as so-called stimulus. You may have an apparitional landscape as such an after-image, and see more of the landscape than you do when actually gazing at it.

Em. In such a case, there would seem to be more reality in the apparition than in the impression itself.

The psychological explanation, I suppose, is based on the physical theory of light.

Met. Yes; the retina, brain, and light-waves are taken to be causal agents. The light, as so-called external stimulus, falling on the retina, is assumed to be preserved there for a short time after the external supply is stopped.

Em. From your standpoint, there is no causal relationship between what we call a source, as an incandescent body, and light?

Met. None whatever.

Em. No causal relationship between light and colour?

Met. None.

Em. Even assuming the physicist's light, we get no further towards what we experience as light, through physiology, than through physics?

Met. Not a bit. The road is blocked for all theorising attributing causal activity to experiences.

Em. Through a prism, we can cut up light into bands of different colours. That shows that light, as we commonly experience it, is compounded of the colours; does it not?

Met. No; it only shows that we can will sensings, which we call the prism and colours, into top storey.

Em. If we make a small hole in a window-shutter of an otherwise dark room, we shall have light through the hole; shall we not?

Met. Yes; we generally will light, on such conditions; though there is no causal connection between the hole and our willing of light.

Em. If we put a prism near the hole, we shall have a band of colours on a screen opposite. Does

not that show that the prism has done something with the light?

Met. Assuming that light is a causal agent forcing itself through the hole and against the prism; and that the prism is a causal agent as it were swallowing and digesting the light, and so transforming it into sensings called colours, the case is as you put it. But, the light and prism are not causal agents. So, the light cannot force itself against the prism, and the prism cannot swallow and digest the light.

Em. The colours are not products of decomposition of the light?

Met. They are products only in the sense of being willings of sensings which we bind to the sensory feeling through the multiplicity-sensation, involving our experience of empirically necessary connection.

Em. There has been no real changing of the light into the colours?

Met. No more than there has been changing of the light into the prism. There has merely been willing of light into mnemonic storey, and colours into top storey.

Em. The colours are quite different things from light?

Met. As different as is the prism. Colours are sensings; light is a feeling.

Em. You might have colours without what is called white light?

Met. Very easily, if you take a dose of one or another of such drugs as salicylate of soda, digitalin, hashish.

Em. Such colours are called subjective, are they not?

Met. Yes; by people who have no scientific

knowledge of causation, and are, consequently, in a fog about subjectivity and objectivity.

Em. The apparitional colours are as real as those seen under normal conditions?

Met. Certainly.

Em. Suppose you saw a shilling in your hand, as apparition, should you consider it a real shilling?

Met. If I willed, with the sensing, a maximal grade of the consciousness-sensation, the shilling would be a real one, as visual sensing. If I also willed it as tactual sensing, it would be a real shilling in all respects involving empirical reality.

Em. Whatever distinction there is between apparition and reality is incident to the willing of the consciousness-sensation?

Met. Yes; as regards the class of experience. Usually, in the case of sensings, we require to have them as visual and tactual, in order that they may be empirically real.

Em. So, there is no light moving at the rate of 186,300 miles in a second, and taking 3,500 years to reach us from a star of the twelfth magnitude?

Met. No more than there is toothache accomplishing the same feat.

Em. We may have pain as moving?

Met. Yes; but in that sense of the term, moving, we do not imply that the pain has moved, as a causal entity outside ourselves. The moving implied in respect to light, attributes to light such causal efficiency. Movement, as of a pain, is the willing of continuously varying distance-sensation and sensings, as our body, in conjunction with the pain. It implies no causal activity outside ourselves. In that sense, we cannot have light as moving.

Em. Suppose we hold a mirror to the sun, moving the mirror so that a luminous image moves, is not that movement of light?

Met. Not at all. The luminous image is a sensing, like the sun, or the mirror.

Em. Will you grant that the sun causes the image?

Met. No more than I will grant that the image causes the sun.

Em. Do you hold that it is possible to have that image without the sun and mirror?

Met. Quite possible; and there are many actual instances on record of analogous willing of luminous images.

Em. It is hard to think of that image as causally unrelated to the sun and mirror.

Met. If we granted the causal relationship, we should repudiate the science of causation. It is always hard to assimilate conditions involving resistance to consensuses of suggestion imposing conventions of willing experiences. However difficult it may be to think out of empirical cause and effect, we must face the difficulty, until we have intellectually upset the metaphysical axiom that experiences are causally inert.

Em. From your standpoint, what are called rays of light do not exist?

Met. They no more exist than do rays of toothache. Whatever we see as luminous is a sensing, not light. We do not see light, but feel it.

Em. Sensory æsthetics, distinct from sensing?

Met. Yes; as distinct from sensing as is a pain; though, in certain cases, we are bound, practically, to identify the feeling with sensings.

Em. You deny movement of light as an ostensible activity of thought confused with sensing and called ether, assumed to condition itself independently of an experiencing agent?

Met. That is what I deny. I deny causal activity to any experience.

Em. You hold that light is not even an empirical cause, because it is not empirically outside ourselves?

Met. Yes; we have no more empirical experience of light, than of pain, as outside ourselves.

Em. If we shut our eyes, we shut out light.

Met. Not necessarily. I have often experienced light with my eyes shut, and have often shut out pain by rubbing it away.

Em. You mean, willing the pain away—the rubbing being what you call fetish facilitating the willing?

Met. Yes; the eye is another such fetish which we generally utilise in willing light.

Em. Physiological optics is as far astray as is physical?

Met. Of course; as equally attributing causal activity to experiences.

DUOLOGUE XVII.

DARKNESS.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. What is darkness?

Met. A sensory feeling.

Em. Not merely the absence of light?

Met. No more than headache is merely the absence of stomach-ache; or hunger, merely the absence of thirst.

Em. Darkness and light are two specific feelings, like hunger and thirst?

Met. They are alike, as being feelings, though one class, embracing light and darkness, is sensory; the other, embracing hunger and thirst, psychical.

Em. Darkness involves our not seeing things?

Met. Yes; usually, though visual sensings may be in top storey with darkness; as in various trance states, somnambulism, dreams.

Em. In themselves, light and darkness have nothing to do with seeing or not seeing?

Met. No; no experience being causally operative on another experience, the empirical necessity of light, for seeing, darkness, for not seeing, is merely a matter of submission to consensuses imposing conjunctions of experiences.

Em. If we have not light, must we not have darkness?

Met. Both may be in mnemonic storey, involving that they are out of experience, as in sound sleep.

Em. We cannot have them together in experience?

Met. That is a very common contingency. What we call twilight is light and darkness willed together in top storey.

Em. Would you call a shadow darkness?

Met. No; a shadow is a sensing.

Em. Why is the sensing not darkness?

Met. Because darkness is a feeling. What you seem to imply by the term, shadow, is not what I imply. By the term, shadow, you seem to imply the empirical illusion of causal agency of a so-called opaque body in obstructing light, as another causal agent. I imply any visual, to the exclusion of tactual, sensing.

Em. Certainly, what I now imply, by the term shadow, is the darkness empirically caused by an opaque body between me and an empirical source of light.

Met. You will see that your implication attributes causal activity to what you call a source of light; to light, and to the opaque body.

Em. I see that such is the case.

Met. Metaphysically, you might as well attribute causal activity to the shadow, as to the source. Metaphysically, there is no such thing as a source, in the empirical sense of the term. No experience can generate another experience. If it could, it would be a causal agent.

Em. You will grant that shutting up the windows stops light.

Met. I will only grant your proposition in this sense: that when I will the shutters closed, I do not will light. But, I will not grant your proposition in the sense that the shutters cause me to will darkness. I could give you a number of facts showing that I may possibly will light with the shutters closed.

Em. Will you grant that the darkness normally occurring when an opaque body obstructs light occurs conformably with the physicist's theory about light?

Met. Certainly I will grant that. On the other hand, I know of cases of shadows when light is obstructed by an opaque body, which do not conform with the physicist's theory about light.

Em. Why does the shadow normally occur conformably with the physicist's theory about light?

Met. For like reason as pain and structural lesion on handling red-hot coal normally occur conformably with the physiologist's theory about nervous response to heat. Home, the medium, resisted a consensus of suggestion involving conformity with the physiologist's theory about nervous response and activity, and the physicist's theory about the causal efficiency of heat. According to both those theories, nobody could handle red-hot coal without having his flesh burned and suffering pain. Home did handle red-hot coal without such consequences.

Em. The physicist's theory about light is merely thinking rendered conformable with limited conditions of sensing, which are constantly transcended?

Met. That applies to all empirical theories. They are merely logics, based on spurious causation, conforming with conventions of willing sensings. When the consensuses imposing the conventions are resisted, the theories are nullified.

Em. The physicist's knowledge generally comes out right in practice. He gets lenses to work right, and foretells eclipses by applying his logic about light and darkness.

Met. Yes; his logic is good for adjusting lenses and predicting eclipses. If we only accepted its credentials so far, there would be less need for metaphysic than there is.

Em. It is an imposing fact that an eclipse happens as he predicts by his logic.

Met. Yes; he has conformed his thought logic to conventions of sensed logic, in regard to the eclipse. The like applies in the case of the optician who makes the lens.

Em. The optician designs the lens. The astronomer does not design the eclipse. That looks as though the astronomer had got hold of something causally significant in regard to the eclipse.

Met. Design, or purpose, which you imply to involve a difference, in the connection, between the cases of predicting the eclipse and fashioning the lens, is causally insignificant. Design is merely a feeling. A feeling does not causally affect the happening of anything, whether a lens or an eclipse.

Em. You mean that the lens is as inevitable as the eclipse?

Met. Just so.

Em. The intermediate operations in fashioning the lens do not affect that?

Met. Not causally. The operations incident to making the lens are merely what I term bridges leading to the lens as end-issue, analogously as my opening the room door is a bridge leading to my seeing a book on the table. A clairvoyant might see the

book without opening the door. My logic or design in opening the door has no causal bearing on my seeing the book. The physicist's logic about light has no causal bearing on the eclipse.

Em. The astronomer foretells the eclipse. You merely remember that the book is there, or see it accidentally. If you were a stranger to the house, you could not know that the book was there, by any process of inference.

Met. If I were clairvoyant, I might know the book was there, by responding, as what you call intuition, to a consensus involving that the book is there.

Em. Yes; but suppose you inferred all the conditions on which the book would be there, and predicted its exact position at a particular moment, would not that involve that your inferential processes had causal significance?

Met. Not at all. Each inferential process would merely be, causally, as was the clairvoyant's intuition, enabling him, without inference, to know that the book was there. There would be no more necessary connection between my inferential processes, than between his intuition, and the book's being there. For instance, it might be there quite independently of my inferring correctly that there was a table and that somebody had taken the book off a shelf and placed the book on the table.

Em. But, if you found that whenever you inferred about the book, the event was as you inferred?

Met. Whether the correspondence occurred once or a thousand times, would have no causal significance. My inference about the book is merely the willing of thoughts and the duration-sensation. It no more tells me why the book is there, than the

book's being there tells me why I will the thoughts and duration-sensation. If I infer that somebody has placed the book there, my inference is only thought. Thought cannot cause the book to be anywhere. When the astronomer infers that an opaque body will obstruct a mathematical formula, and so cause an eclipse, he does not prove that a mathematical formula is light, or that an opaque body can do anything to a mathematical formula.

Em. Though I see my shadow on a wall, conformably with the physicist's theory about light, the correspondence has no significance as proving that a mathematical formula is light, or that my shadow is causally affected by my body or by light?

Met. That is the metaphysical truth.

Em. A person might see my shadow if I were miles away?

Met. If you were in your coffin.

Em. I seem to see what you mean by the existence of thought-logic, as corresponding to sensed logic. We may call and think light what we like—ether vibrations, radiant energy or anything else—so long as our thinking conforms practically with our willing of light?

Met. Yes. The conforming postulate may involve what is impossible as light, darkness, movement, space, time, substance, without affecting its practical utility. That we deceive ourselves, causally, with ether vibrations coming millions of miles through space, does not involve that we deceive ourselves practically, so long as we take care not to apply our illusion outside its legitimate scope, by attributing causal significance to it.

Em. If we do apply our illusion illegitimately?

Met. We deceive ourselves about the most momentous concerns of humanity: religion and morality.

Em. Empirical thought-logic proves nothing about necessary relationship of experiences, and nothing about the actual happening of sensed contingencies?

Met. Nothing. It merely proves how contingencies will occur, if they do occur. If they cannot occur—as in the case of celestial sizes, distances, movements, shapes; the case of invisible and intangible substance; the case of ether vibrations transformed into light, and so on—the logical proof of occurrence is merely proof that the impossible happens—a logical absurdity. Such absurdity may be practically useful in application to sensed contingencies that do occur; as in the case of the eclipse, or the fashioning of a lens.

Em. If we saw the shadow of a celestial body moving, would not that prove that the celestial body moved?

Met. No. Nothing can prove movement of what cannot possibly move. If you cannot possibly see a celestial body as moving, the body cannot possibly move.

Em. You imply that a shadow may move independently of the concrete source?

Met. Certainly I do imply that; or, that the shadow may stand still, while the concrete source moves. If I did not imply that, I should imply that the concrete source, or the shadow, was a causal agent determining movement.

Em. Is there any empirical proof of such independence?

Met. I cannot, at the moment, call to mind any instance of the particular independence; but, as I can recall instances of the occurrence and movement of shadows entirely apart from concrete sources, that will suffice.

Em. Of course, my question implies attribution of causal activity to the concrete source.

Met. Metaphysically, you might as well attribute causal activity to the shadow, as to the source. What you call the source may as well be the shadow as the concrete object. Your application of the term source, implies that the concrete object causally determines the existence of the shadow.

Em. The term source, as commonly applied, implies radical fallacy.

Met. It implies that the impossible is the actual.

DUOLOGUE XVIII.

HEAT AND COLD.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. I suppose that our conversations about light and darkness apply to heat and cold?

Met. Yes; there is little more consideration needed for heat and cold than that we have given to light and darkness.

Em. Cold is not merely the absence of heat.

Met. No more than heat is merely the absence of cold. Heat and cold are sensory feelings, like light and darkness.

Em. More or less intensity of heat is, indifferently, more or less cold or heat, as more or less intensity of light is, indifferently, more or less darkness or light.

Met. Yes; whether we take light, darkness; heat, cold, as our standard, is arbitrary, unless the intensity of one or another of the feelings is such as to render it obtrusive, as experience.

Em. Have you an instance in mind of the obtrusive willing of heat, say, as from a fire, in the absence of any empirical source?

Met. No; but I have such an instance in mind of the willing of cold. Indeed, I have many such instances in mind, as the phenomenon is a common

incident in spiritistic manifestations. Sir William Crookes, referring to such manifestations, generally, says that the temperature of the air is so much lowered as to alter the thermometer-record several degrees. On some occasions, he says that the cold has been so intense that he could only compare it to the cold felt when the hand was within a few inches of frozen mercury.

Em. The physicist's theory of heat will not account for that sort of abstraction.

Met. The like applies to the emission of heat and light by radium, which is quite inconsistent with physical theory.

Em. The empirical analogies between heat, light, sound, are striking.

Met. Yes; in regard to light, heat, sound, we get similar practical conformities by taking for granted the happening of the impossible.

DUOLOGUE XIX.

SOUND.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.

METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. Is sound, like light, a feeling?

Met. No; sound is a sensing. Its æsthetic quality is a sensory feeling.

Em. Do you mean, for instance, that loudness or faintness of sound constitutes sensory feeling; while sound, in itself, is a sensing?

Met. Yes.

Em. Does not the like apply in the case of light? Is not its intensity, apart from itself, a sensory feeling?

Met. No; its intensity depends on the conjunct willing of the complementary sensory feeling, darkness.

Em. When light is faint, we are willing darkness with it?

Met. Yes.

Em. So we may call it faint light, or faint darkness?

Met. Yes. You may take, as analogy, the case of one pain empirically rendering another less acute.

Em. Does not one sound similarly modify another?

Met. No; no sound ever rendered another feebler.

Em. I have read somewhere that one sound may abolish another sound, so that between them, they make no sound.

Met. In the case to which you refer, there is no sound to predicate about, so there is no abolition to predicate about as the work of sound. You have read of sounds mutually destroying one another; but those ostensible sounds are like ether vibrations in respect to light. They are not sounds at all. The ostensible destruction of sound by sound, light by light, involving what is called interference, implies that sound is air-movement, and light, ether-movement. But sound and light are not movement of anything.

Em. Sound is not air-movement?

Met. It is not movement of anything. Movement is a visual or tactual experience. Sound is an auditory experience. By no possibility can a visual or tactual experience become an auditory experience.

Em. Assuming sound to be air-waves, like water-waves, one sound would counteract another, as do water-waves under the condition that the crest of one wave coincides with the depression of another.

Met. Yes; but the physicist's assumption of that mutual destruction by waves, implies that they are causal agents, and consequently ignores the causal problem. Waves, sound, light, pain do nothing to one another or to anything else.

Em. Did you not imply, in your analogy, that one pain lessened another?

Met. Yes; empirically, as illustration. But I did not imply that the pains were affecting one another, as other things than pains, as is implied in the case of sound or light.

Em. The destruction, in the case of waves, is merely what you term a convention of sensing?

Met. Nothing more. Waves are visual sensings. They only do what the causal agent makes them do. The causal agent cannot turn them into sound.

Em. I have read that if you work two organ-pipes of the same pitch near one another on the same wind-chest, there will be no sound. That looks as though there were some connection between air-waves and sound, doesn't it?

Met. No; if anything, it shows that there is no connection.

Em. How?

Met. As showing that air may go through organ-pipes without sound ensuing.

Em. But, if the air going through the pipes causes the sound, by going through in a particular way?

Met. There is much virtue in that "if." When the physicist has disposed of that "if," I shall be disposed to take him seriously.

Em. You cannot get sound in a vacuum. That looks as though air were necessary that sound might exist.

Met. Yes; it seems conclusive if we ignore the causal problem. If we do not ignore that problem, we shall recognise the conjunction to which you refer, as merely an instance of convention of willing mind into top storey.

Em. The physicist's theory of air-waves has no more relevancy to sound, than his theory of ether-vibrations has to light?

Met. Just as little.

Em. And the practical efficiency of his theory about sound has no more causal significance than has the efficiency of his theory about light?

Met. No more. Consensuses of suggestion involve thought-logic, as scientific theory, and sensing-logic. The empirical correspondences between these logics involve the practical efficiency of scientific theory, while proving nothing regarding causal connections involving such transformations of experiences as are implied in scientific theories about sound, light, heat, electricity, and chemical compositions and decompositions.

Em. Is not the phonograph proof that sound is air-waves?

Met. No more than a locomotive is proof that movement is steam.

Em. You get indentations and movements conforming to the theory of sound, as air-waves, and you get a human voice, the owner of which may be dead. If there is proof of anything, that seems proof that air-movement involves sound.

Met. The sequence seems necessary, if you are content to ignore the causal problem, and deceive yourself with the illusion that experiences are causal agents. The gramophone or phonograph proves no more than that, by applying thought-logic about sound, we can construct an appliance empirically facilitating our willing of a human voice, as apparition. There are multitudes of cases on record of the willing of such an apparition without any appliance, as fetish.

Em. I have heard the voices of singers and talkers through a gramophone, and I am absolutely assured that I could not distinguish between the

sounds as uttered by the people, and those coming from the gramophone.

Met. The fact is quite irrelevant to the question of causal connection between the gramophone and the sound. Metaphysically, you might as well assume the gramophone to be caused by the sound, as the sound, by the gramophone. The only causal connection is between you, the sound and gramophone. You determine, as empirical experience for yourself, certain sequences of experiences as being causally related. You assume that, because one set of these experiences constantly precedes another, the one set causes the other. As the constancy of sequence is merely what you determine as experience, you are, obviously, the only causal agent in the contingency.

Em. Yes; that is the old point you have so often impressed. There is no getting round, under, over, or behind it. It is bed-rock certainty.

Met. Suppose we grant that there may be experiences without an experiencing agent, what can such ostensible experiences be to us?

Em. Idiotically useless to suppose experiences we can know nothing about.

Met. The whole of empirical science is built on that implication. By postulating sensings as acting independently of ourselves, science implies cause that is not our experience, which is tantamount to implying experience without an experiencing agent.

Em. Because the cause is experience.

Met. Necessarily it is experience, as being conception of relationship.

Em. Suppose the relationship itself, apart from the conception, is outside us?

Met. What is relationship, apart from conception?

Em. A fatuous suggestion of mine. Pray excuse it.

Met. It is excusable. A number of very eminent people make it the basis of their wisdom. Empirical science would not exist without it.

Em. Certainly, empirical causality implies relationship that is not conception.

Met. Which is equivalent to implying that it knows what cannot possibly be known.

Em. Invalid imagination.

Met. Obviously. The like applies to the things empirically postulated as causally interacting, implying that they exist independently of our constituting them experience. As so existing, they must be what we cannot possibly know to exist.

Em. That's as clear as plate-glass. A self-acting cosmos won't get past that.

Met. Not, unless we are that cosmos.

Em. The case is different when we postulate cause, as creator, and ourselves as relative causes?

Met. Quite different. In postulating about ourselves, as causes, we do not postulate about relationships determined by ostensible experiences outside ourselves, but about relationships and experiences that we determine, as knowing ourselves as causal agents in relationship one with another. The validity of this knowledge we have discussed in earlier conversations. As knowing ourselves as related causes, we determine experience of Cause that is not related, but determining what is related.

Em. Our postulation of relationship to that Cause is experience determined by ourselves?

Met. Yes; and as we do not determine experience

as relationship of that Cause to us, we deny such relationship.

Em. The position you indicate is quite different from the empirical one implying relationships and agents that cannot be our experience. Your agents and relationships are all our experience.

Met. Reverting to our subject of discussion, sound, the empirical implication is that there are agents, as air-waves, gramophone, ears, brain affecting one another as causal agents. But, who or what knows these things and their relationships? Do they know one another; tell one another to do this or that? If they do not, who or what does?

Em. Ask the professors of physics.

Met. Are we air-waves, gramophones, ears, brain?

Em. Perhaps some of those professors will tell you if they are air-waves. They are good at launching bubbles.

Met. These things cannot do, or be, as our experience, what they are empirically implied to do and be. So, in predicating, empirically, about them, we predicate about what is impossible.

Em. You have upset the empirical apple-cart and the donkey as well. But you'll grant that the illusion is terribly hard to get away from in the case of sound and that gramophone.

Met. All illusion of empirical causality is hard to get away from, and we can achieve little in the way of rendering consistent thought-logic and sensed logic, involving practical applications, by getting away from it. That does not affect the fact of the illusion or the urgent necessity of recognising it and discarding it outside the limits of its right application.

Em. I agree about the urgency. The farther we

progress in practical applications of science, the more irresistible is the illusion about causality; and the more irresistible it is, the less inclined we become to concern ourselves about anything but sensual matters. It looks as if science was specially designed to knock the soul out of us and turn us into a lot of gramophones.

Met. It is like fire: a good servant, but a bad master.

Em. Metaphysic is wanted to keep it in order.

DUOLOGUE XX.

MOVEMENT.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. What is movement?

Met. A sensory feeling, always willed with sensings and with different intensities of the distance-sensation, involving continuous difference of what we commonly call spatial relationship.

Em. You mean that there can be no movement unless a sensed thing is seen or felt as continuously changing its position with regard to another sensed thing?

Met. That is what I mean.

Em. Suppose I take this pencil from the mantelpiece, and place it on the table—the pencil has moved.

Met. Put the case: there is movement of yourself and the pencil.

Em. Suppose that you and I go out of the room, after seeing that pencil on the mantelpiece, and that when we return, the pencil is on the table—there has been movement, has there not?

Met. You are now raising essentially the same issue as in the case of the knife, buried and unburied, which we earlier discussed.

Em. Do you deny identity between the movement

which you attribute to the pencil during our absence from the room, and the movement when we were in the room, as you denied identity between the knife buried and unburied?

Met. I do. The ostensible movement when we are out of the room, is a thought, as memory. The movement when we are in the room is a sensory feeling willed with a preter-empirical notion and sensing and continuously varying intensities of the distance-sensation.

Em. So, the movement when we are in the room is like the knife unburied; when we are out of the room, like the knife, buried?

Met. Yes; and we associate the two sorts of movements and the two sorts of knives through willing with them, respectively, the multiplicity-sensation and faith.

Em. Faith involving that you take the movement and knife as being the same things seen or not seen?

Met. Yes; as a practically necessary assumption; but not as metaphysical fact.

Em. The buried knife and unseen movement are thought, as memories?

Met. Yes; and, perhaps, also imagination, as apparitions.

Em. If the buried knife and unseen movement are apparitions as well as mere memories, they are as real as what we call the actual experiences?

Met. Yes. The difference lies in the inferior intensity of the consciousness-sensation that is willed with them.

Em. When we earlier discussed the buried knife, you said that you could only predicate about it as metaphysically existing.

Met. That is the case. I cannot predicate about the identity of an apparition, constituted by imagination, with any particular actual sensing, unless as a matter of faith. In the case of the buried knife, I should predicate identity on the ground of faith, not belief. Of course, there are exceptionally vivid, so-called apparitions, as ghosts, which are really actual sensings. About identity, in such cases, we predicate on the ground of belief as well as faith. Such so-called apparitions as little involve imagination as do normal sensings, which are no less apparitions than are such ghosts.

Em. The movement assumed to take place when we are out of the room can only be identified with specific movement, on the ground of faith.

Met. Yes; that movement, as imagined, is an apparition of a sensory feeling, which, on the ground of faith, is accepted as identical with some ostensibly actual movement. As merely remembered, the movement and knife are thought. Then, as feeling and sensing, they are only metaphysically existing.

Em. I suppose you do not hold, as matters of faith or belief, the movements predicated about by physicists and astronomers?

Met. I do not. Such ostensible movements are non-existent, for like reasons that forces and energies are non-existent. The astronomer's and physicist's movements involve invalid imagination of space, and no movement as sensory feeling, apparition, or memory that can be predicated about. In relation to movement, actual or apparitional, the astronomer's and physicist's movements labour under the same defects as do atoms, forces, energies, ether, elec-

tricity, light, heat, in relation to actual sensings and feelings. The ostensible movements are merely abstract mathematical statements inherently disjunct from movement, whether as memory or imagination.

Em. By taking the astronomer's movement as real, we accurately predict an eclipse.

Met. That proves nothing about the fact of movement. It merely proves that if specified movement occurs, the heavenly bodies will be in the respective positions. If that occurs, we will thought and sensing into empirical correspondence.

Em. Does not the fact that the bodies are in the predicted positions prove that they have moved?

Met. There is no proof of movement, but as willing it as actual experience, apparition, or memory. Nobody has ever willed such experiences in respect to celestial bodies.

Em. Must not things necessarily move, if they change their relative positions?

Met. No. Change of relative position is necessarily incident to movement; but movement is not necessarily incident to change of relative position. Let us consider this point. There is no necessary connection between one relative position of objects and another relative position; but there is necessary connection, when difference of relative position involves movement. This necessary connection, in the latter case, depends on the willing of continuously changing distance-sensation and sensing.

Em. In the case of change of relative position, without movement, each relative position is, inherently, an isolated experience; while, in the case of change of relative position, with movement, there

is no isolation of one relative position from another. That is clear to me.

Met. That continuity, or absence of isolation, in the case of change of relative position with movement, constitutes the sensory feeling of movement. There is no movement, but as this feeling of continuity.

Em. In the case of change of relative position without movement, may we not constitute movement by imagining it, as apparition, as occurring between the changes?

Met. No; because, we cannot identify it, as apparition, with any specific contingency of willing mere change of relative position—unless, of course, on the ground of faith.

Em. As in the case of the buried knife, as apparition. Well, have you not faith that an apparition you may imagine, in the case of change of relative position of celestial bodies involves movement?

Met. None whatever.

Em. Why?

Met. Because, to will an apparition of the sensory feeling, movement, or of any other experience, the actual experience must be willed. In the case of celestial bodies, the actual experience, as movement, is not willed. Nobody has ever seen a celestial body move; but, everybody sees terrestrial bodies move. So, while movement, as apparition, is possible in regard to terrestrial bodies, it is impossible in regard to celestial bodies.

Em. So, we can predicate nothing about movement of celestial bodies, on the ground that they change relative positions?

Met. Nothing.

Em. You imply that change of relative position is possible without movement?

Met. Not merely possible; but that it always occurs without movement unless as constituting movement.

Em. And, when it constitutes movement, it is virtually another experience than mere change of position?

Met. Quite different, as involving continuity.

Em. Somehow, I cannot properly assimilate the possibility of change of relative position, without movement.

Met. The difficulty probably occurs through your habit of contemplating space, movement and change of relative position, as independent of your causal determinism.

Em. I cannot make objects change their relative positions, without moving them.

Met. Oh yes, you can. You do that every time you see objects in different relative positions, without seeing them moved.

Em. But, somebody else has moved them.

Met. Yes; as a matter of faith, for you. But you have not moved them. So far as you are concerned, they have changed their relative positions without moving.

Em. I have never seen objects in the act of changing their relative positions, without moving.

Met. For the good reason that you are then seeing them moving. Their being in the act of changing their relative position is your willing them as moving.

Em. I begin to see that the necessity that seemed obvious to me in regard to movement and change of

relative position, is merely a matter of my assuming that a customary sequence of experiences is a necessary one.

Met. Yes; you imply that experiences are causal agents, determining their own relationships. There is no necessity that one experience shall be incident to another, though, in some cases, we do practically always will certain experiences with others. Experiences are, inherently, disjunct, as thoughts, feelings, sensings. They are willed into empirical relationship incidentally to the willing of the multiplicity-sensation; thought, as memory, and apparition, as imagination.

Em. Terms such as motion, velocity, momentum, conceived in the abstract sense of physicists, I suppose are irrelevant to movement.

Met. Yes; they are merely symbols incident to a logic of quantity, in itself proving nothing about the existence of quantity, as sensing or feeling.

Em. So, the laws of motion prove nothing about the movement of celestial bodies.

Met. No more than they prove that you have a nose.

Em. That movement occurs, mathematically, proves nothing about its occurring actually?

Met. No more than "twice two is four" proves that there are four pennies in my pocket.

Em. The crucial point seems to be continuity. Intermittently changing distance-sensation, involving mere change of relative position, lacks the quality of continuity.

Met. Analogously as one sensory object lacks continuity with another. There is more radical difference, as experience, between movement and mere change of position, than between a living body

and a stone effigy. There is no better ground, except as a matter of convention of willing experience, and of faith, for postulating movement from change of relative position, than for postulating a cat in the next room, from a dog in this. To postulate movement from change of relative position, in regard to objects that we will as moving, calls for no critical scrutiny. In regard to objects which we cannot possibly will as moving, we must apply causal scrutiny to the postulation. Such scrutiny tells us that we cannot predicate about the fact of movement, in regard to such objects, merely on the ground of change of relative position.

Em. If things may change their relative positions without moving, it would seem that a thing might be in two places at once.

Met. That is quite possible, and there is empirical evidence for the fact.

Em. Empirical evidence?

Met. Certainly. You will find such a case dealt with in the fifth volume of *Heresies*. There is no metaphysical limit to the possibly simultaneous locations of an object. Practical limitations are incident to consensuses of suggestion.

Em. Why will you not accept, on the ground of faith, the astronomer's determinations about celestial movements?

Met. For the, to me, very good reason that I have no faith that anybody has willed, or ever will will, the sensory feeling and other experiences incident to movement, with celestial bodies.

Em. In that respect, you hold that the astronomer's movements are radically different from any movement predicated about terrestrial objects.

Met. I deny that the astronomer's movement exists, just as I deny that the physicist's electricity exists.

Em. You hold the movement to be merely abstract thought confounded with the sensory feeling.

Met. Nothing but that confusion.

Em. What about Foucault's experiment with the pendulum? Does not that show the earth's movement?

Met. No; it merely shows change of relative position between the plane of oscillation of the pendulum and the sides of the building. Even were movement proved to my satisfaction, it would not involve proof, for me, that the earth moved in any such sense as the astronomer's.

Em. Astronomers see celestial bodies moving across the fields of their telescopes.

Met. Pardon me; they do not.

Em. What do they see?

Met. Terrestrial sensings and preter-empirical notions which they confound with celestial ones.

Em. Well, suppose the terrestrial sensings move, does not that necessitate, in the case, that either the earth or the celestial body moves?

Met. By no means. It merely evidences that the image moves. There is no necessity that the movement of the image shall involve the movement of anything else.

Em. If I look into a mirror, either I or the mirror must move, if the image moves. So, if the image of the celestial body moves, either the body or the earth must move.

Met. You may easily prove, by moving the mirror

to and fro, that the image may move without your face moving.

Em. Yes; I see that an image may move while what it presents is stationary; but I do not see that the image, alone, may move, failing movement of what reflects it, or of what the image presents.

Met. That applies to cases in which you can verify movement as the sensory feeling, or apparition of it, as imagination. In the case of the celestial body and earth, there is no such possibility.

Em. Are we not bound to infer movement, though there is no possibility of verifying it as the sensory feeling or apparition?

Met. You cannot infer, as movement, what you know to be impossible, as movement. If movement is to exist, you have to make it, as willing it. If you cannot possibly make it, there is nothing to treat inferentially.

Em. I see that my suggestion about inference implies the empirical fallacy that sensings are causal agents, acting independently of ourselves.

Met. Certainly. You imply that the celestial body or the earth can do what you cannot possibly make it do. In the case of the image, there is nothing, as movement, to be predicated about, but the movement of the image, or the telescope, as the case may be. You apply the analogy of ordinary empirical experience of movement to prove that what is manifestly impossible, as movement, is movement.

Em. I understand that you will grant that there is change of relative position, as between heavenly bodies; but, that you deny this change to involve movement.

Met. Yes; I deny movement on the ground that

there is no possibility of movement, unless I can possibly make it, as willing the sensory feeling, continuously varying distance-sensation.

Em. And, you hold, it is impossible to make it in respect to the heavenly bodies?

Met. Obviously impossible. So, if we infer the ostensible movement, we infer the impossible.

Em. I quite see that to talk of inferring what cannot exist, is to talk nonsense. I also see that the astronomer's movement cannot exist, because it is impossible for us to will such changing distance-sensation as is necessary to constitute the ostensible movement.

Met. Which ostensible movement, on the conditions, you will see, is merely a formal mathematical statement, as in the case of other pseudo-concepts: energy, force, electricity, light, heat. In such cases, the postulated thing is non-existent, because it is implied to be congruous with what it is incongruous.

Em. The astronomer's inferences are sound, provided what the inferences lead to can exist. As it cannot exist, the inferential result is futile.

Met. Yes. The event would happen as the astronomer infers, were the event possible. But, the event is impossible.

Em. The astronomer will perhaps urge that a superhuman being can render the event actual: willing the celestial movement as man wills ordinary movement.

Met. Of course, the astronomer may urge that, just as I may urge that no superhuman being willing the movement exists or can exist. But, even did such a being exist, the movement known by that being

would not be movement known to humanity and, corollarily, would be no experience about which humanity could predicate, as being movement.

Em. I see. There is no ground for the inference I suggested, because there is nothing to be predicated about. Of course, the inference would be sound in regard to ordinary movement.

Met. Yes; practically, though it is metaphysically quite possible for the telescopic image to move in default of any other movement, just as in the case of the balance movement vouched for by Sir W. Crookes. There is any quantity of empirical evidence, in spiritistic records, for such movement.

Em. I suppose that there is no metaphysically necessary relationship between an image and what it empirically presents.

Met. None whatever. The relationship is determined by the willing of the multiplicity-sensation, as in other cases.

Em. I see that, having finished off light rays, we can predicate about nothing as coming from the celestial body to the telescope.

Met. Nothing. When we have the image, we have metaphysically done with the celestial body, except as willing the two into relationship.

Em. Suppose I look at my face in a mirror; how does that work out?

Met. The mirror, as is any other appliance, may be termed a fetish facilitating your willing of your face as an apparition.

Em. What about a magnified microbe in a microscope?

Met. The instrument facilitates the willing of an apparition which we call a microbe.

Em. What about the micrometer? I have been shown one on which lines were said to be defined a millionth of an inch apart.

Met. There were no such lines.

Em. But, you could see them through a lens.

Met. Only under the lens; not apart from it.

Em. Were not they a millionth of an inch apart?

Met. No; they were only so far apart as they appeared through the lens.

Em. The distance did not exist, when not under the lens?

Met. No.

Em. Why?

Met. Because distance only exists as the distance-sensation, which is a feeling. As the feeling was not willed when the ostensible lines were away from the lens, there were then no lines.

Em. I see. We get back to the old point. The lines only exist when we will them into top storey, involving that we will the distance-sensation in top storey. If there is no distance-sensation, there are no lines. The lens is merely what you call a fetish, incident to, but not causally operative in, the contingency.

Met. Certainly.

Em. So, merely removing the lens destroys the lines.

Met. Involves that the causal agent sends them into metaphysical existence.

Em. Accordingly, lines a millionth of an inch apart do not exist.

Met. Certainly not: whether as actual, apparition, or memory. They are an empirical figment.

Em. The lines do not exist when the intersecting

space enabling us to know them as lines no longer exists.

Met. Of course not; just as movement does not exist, when all we have in experience is relative position. For lines to exist, special visual or tactual sensings, as shapes, with distance-sensation, as what we call space, must be willed in top storey. When these experiences are not willed, there are no lines.

Em. When we feel, but do not see, lines, or any other shapes, the incident space is tactual?

Met. Yes; the distance-sensation may be willed as incident to visual or tactual sensing. We feel shapes, as well as see them. As in relative position, felt shapes involve tactual distance-sensation.

Em. You stated that a microbe was an apparition. I suppose that involves that its apparently spontaneous movements, under the microscope, are merely continuously varying distance-sensations willed by ourselves?

Met. Yes; the like applies to all movement that we attribute to ostensibly causal agents, not ourselves.

Em. To a horse, or dog?

Met. Certainly. The mere fact of movement proves nothing about causal agency in the horse or dog, just as it proves nothing causally in regard to the microbe.

Em. You hold that there is no absolutely conclusive proof of causal agency, but in regard to ourselves?

Met. There is none.

Em. But, I suppose you grant that a horse or dog is a causal agent?

Met. Yes; on the ground of faith, incident to the

projection of the self-sensation in regard to feelings and thoughts, analogously as in the case of the teetotaller and whisky-drinker we earlier discussed.

Em. You do not consider that proof equally conclusive in the case of the horse or dog, as establishing independent causal activity, as in the case of man?

Met. Practically, I consider the proof equally conclusive in the two cases. Metaphysically, there is no real proof of causal agency, but in regard to ourselves.

Em. Of course, you deny that microbes cause disease?

Met. There is no cause of disease but as response to suggestion by human souls, and other souls, if such exist. Empirical causes of disease, such as microbes, are effective, as fetishes, facilitating the suggestion of disease, analogously as mechanical and other appliances are effective, as fetishes, facilitating our willing of movement.

Em. I take it that the microscope is such a fetish facilitating our willing of microbes, as apparitions.

Met. It is.

Em. Apart from our application of the microscope, microbes only metaphysically exist?

Met. They may also exist as thought.

Em. Then, before people used microscopes, there were no microbes?

Met. None.

Em. And microbes, then, did not empirically cause disease?

Met. They did not.

Em. Practically, it does seem as though we ought all to have been snuffed out thousands of

years ago, if microbes performed the feats attributed to them by modern medicos and bacteriologists.

Met. Yes; on their assumptions regarding causality, it is hard to account for present majorities and minorities.

Em. Humanity ought, long ago, to have become a minus quantity. I am now going to put a final point, for the present, about movement. The orbits of celestial bodies conform with Kepler's laws of motion. Newton's law of gravitation shows why they must conform. If the bodies do not move, why should the conformity exist?

Met. Because Kepler's motion and Newton's gravitation are abstract thought, and we will celestial positions conformably with this thought. The movement which we involve with this willing of positions is abstract thought, like the laws with which it conforms. We have no possible experience as real, terrestrial movement such as is implied in Newton's law of gravitation, presupposing a body endowed with so-called motion and pursuing a course free of all interference. So, the law starts by assuming the impossible. No bodies can possibly exist conditioned as the law assumes.

Em. But, the law applies universally to movement which you consider real.

Met. On the contrary, there are multitudes of cases of infringement or, rather, utter nullification of the law.

Em. You refer to spiritistic phenomena?

Met. Yes; commonly so called, though they are no more essentially spiritistic than are any other phenomena. They show that we have as good reason to assert that moving bodies disobey, as that they

obey, Newton's law. As the law does not even account for movement that is common experience, how can it establish the fact of movement that is impossible as experience?

Em. Then, as regards celestial bodies, Kepler's and Newton's laws signify no more than the conformity of abstract thought with changes in relative positions; being irrelevant to the question of movement?

Met. That is their only significance, as regards celestial bodies.

Em. And, change of relative position does not necessarily involve movement?

Met. Not unless it constitutes movement.

Em. Otherwise, the movement, as inferred from change of position, is merely thought?

Met. Yes—the thought being practically valid in regard to contingencies of possible movement; but invalid in regard to implications of impossible movement.

Em. Can you give me any sort of picture facilitating assimilation of the possibility of change of relative position without movement?

Met. Perhaps I can, if you can rid yourself, for a few moments, of your common habit of looking at things.

Em. If I am not able to do that much, the fault will not be yours.

Met. Suppose those two chairs to be moved while you are out of the room. When you come back, they are in different relative positions. They are in different relative positions because you will them, as memory and imagination (apparitionally), in certain positions, and will them, in top storey, as in other

positions. Your apprehension of difference of positions is constituted by your willing a feeling which I call the difference-sensation. Your apprehension of relationship between the respective positions is constituted by your willing the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. That is all clear to me, as thought; but I want to get a grip of the possibility that, say, I am looking attentively, for a few hours, at the sky, and see stars rising, descending, and disappearing below the horizon, and yet neither the stars nor anything else, in the connection, moves.

Met. You do not see stars rising and descending. If you did, you would see them moving. What you do see are stars in different positions relative to sensings which you call the east and west horizons. When you detect a difference in relative position, you will one or the other horizon from mnemonic storey, in which it is out of spatial relationship, into top storey, in which it is in spatial relationship, to the stars. You also will it and the stars into top storey, as memories and apparitions, in the relative positions which you first noticed.

Em. So, I have got apparitions and memories on one side, and top storey sensings on the other, bringing them into relationship through willing the multiplicity-sensation, and recognising difference as willing the difference-sensation.

Met. Yes; you are doing all that, and the stars and horizons are doing nothing.

Em. And the difference, if the stars or horizons were moving?

Met. Would be that you would will them as continuously in spatial relationship.

Em. No intermittence, as in the other case?

Met. None. Each position would merge into another position.

Em. No willing into mnemonic storey, and back into top storey, of positions?

Met. No; a continuity of distance-sensation and sensings, involving the sensory feeling.

Em. Must you not remember distance-sensations and sensings that you may recognise them as continuous?

Met. No more than you need remember an object before your eyes, to recognise it as continuous.

Em. The difficulty in gripping change of position, without movement, is in getting away from our habit of taking experiences as causal agents.

Met. Yes; while our own activity is the determining factor, we fall to the illusion that we are dummies and that the real dummies are determining agents. That sort of abasement gives us Kepler's and Newton's laws, and most of the other triumphs of scientific legislation.

Em. Mathematical quantity is like the balance in the books of a levanting bankrupt, or the pebbles representing sovereigns for impecunious youngsters playing beggar-my-neighbour.

Met. Yes; mathematical quantity is merely symbolism proving nothing about the existence of what is symbolised.

Em. Atoms, ether vibrations, forces, astronomical shapes, distances, movements, are paper balances, which the bankruptcy examination, before metaphysic, has to expose in their naked deformity.

Met. That is the contingency.

Em. Twice two is four, and the three interior angles of a triangle together equal two right angles,

are good solid mathematical facts, but they prove nothing about the existence of anything that we can see or touch.

Met. Nothing whatever.

Em. A triangle made of space proves nothing about the existence of a triangle made of seeings.

Met. No more than thinking about a dinner proves that you are eating it.

Em. Mathematical logic is a fine institution for showing how things will occur, if they do occur.

Met. And for showing us that things occur which cannot possibly occur.

DUOLOGUE XXI.

SPACE.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. You have stated that space is a feeling which you call the distance-sensation. As such, I understand that space is not empirically outside ourselves, and that, accordingly, we have really no empirical illusion of space as indefinitely extended expanse, as we commonly assume we have.

Met. We have no real experience of space, but as what I may term a tie between visual sensings, or what we call seen objects. Apart from this differentiation of relative positions of objects, we have no real experience of space. The real experience is the sensory feeling which I call the distance-sensation.

Em. So, if there were no objects, there would be no space?

Met. None.

Em. How is it that we come to think of space as embracing objects?

Met. Such all-embracing space is thought, as the sensory feeling, distance-sensation, invalidly imagined, analogously as atoms are thought, as sensed substance invalidly imagined. In both cases, thought is con-

founded with typically different experiences. In the case of space, this confusion leads to impossible magnifications and minimisations; in the case of atoms, it leads to impossible minimisations.

Em. I see why atoms involve what you call invalid imagination; but why does the all-embracing space involve it?

Met. Because, the ostensible space cannot be verified as the sensory feeling, distance-sensation, or as that feeling validly imagined, as apparition.

Em. So, the all-embracing space, in respect to real space, is like a mathematical abstraction, as atom, in respect to sensed substance?

Met. Exactly. In both cases, there is inference to the impossible, involving what I term invalid imagination. The like applies, as we earlier saw, to electricity, light, forces, energies. They all imply that the impossible happens.

Em. But, as regards space, it seems as though we had actual, real experience that it embraced things.

Met. No; we have not such experience. It is impossible to experience space unless as tie or cleavage—whichever term we prefer—between visual sensings. Tactual space is merely visual space, as memory, or thought, with or without valid imagination of visual space, as apparition.

Em. You seem to imply that, unless there are objects to be spatially differentiated, there is no space.

Met. Just as, unless there are objects to move, there is no movement.

Em. When there are no such objects, space and movement are only metaphysically existent?

Met. Yes; and about their identity, as only metaphysically existent, we can predicate nothing.

Em. What applies to sensings, thoughts, feelings generally, as metaphysically existing, applies to space.

Met. Which is merely a special feeling.

Em. When I gaze up, down, forward, I experience no space but as between one and another object—clouds, sun, stars, earth, trees, houses, walls, and so on.

Met. Exactly. Space no more embraces those things, than they embrace space. Indeed, if we contemplate inclusion as a contingency, the objects embrace space, instead of space embracing them.

Em. That does seem to be the case. That we go on thinking about space as beyond objects, merely shows that we can think the impossible.

Met. Really, we cannot think space as beyond objects, any more than we can think a pain that is beyond feeling. The ostensible thinking of infinite space is merely a vague assumption of quantity transcending empirical accumulations of the distance-sensation constituting what we commonly call distances and extensions.

Em. We have the experience of inclusive extension of space, as well as the experience of linear projection, as distance.

Met. The experience of inclusion is merely the empirical blending, as memories and apparitions, of distance-sensations as linear distances. This inclusion can only exist within sensings. If there are inclusive factors, they are sensings, not the distance-sensation.

Em. You are right. There can be no experience

of inclusion, failing sensings. And I see how the empirical blending of distance-sensations will involve inclusive extension. Empirical inclusion, by space, is merely inclusion of one set of sensings by other sets. The sensings are the inclusive factors.

Met. Obviously; because they empirically determine the existence of space.

Em. I think I have a fair outline-grip of the bearings.

DUOLOGUE XXII.

TIME.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. I should like us to have a short conversation specially about time, as we had about space. You say that time is a feeling which you call the duration-sensation?

Met. Yes; it corresponds, in the psychical, to space, in the sensory, arena.

Em. What applies to space, as not being all-embracing, infinite and so on, I suppose applies, analogously, to time?

Met. Yes; time and space are strictly limited, as contingencies of willing mind into top storey.

Em. When we imagine time as going on for ever and ever, we perform a like feat of thought-obfuscation as in the case of space?

Met. Yes; the time we then invalidly imagine involves inference to the impossible, as in other contingencies which we have discussed. It cannot be verified as the psychical feeling, duration-sensation, or as that feeling validly imagined, as apparition.

Em. The invalid imagination in the case of time, is plausible, as in the case of space?

Met. Yes; in both cases, it misleads by seeming to present experience. Time is contained in or limited by sensings and feelings, as space is by sensings. For time and space to be validly imagined, or to be valid as thought, there must be what I may term a clear pedigree from the postulated time and space to the respective psychical and sensory feelings, involving that the postulated time and space are possible.

Em. I suppose you imply that mathematics dealing with space and time, proves nothing about the existence of space and time, as real experience, analogously as mathematical identification of atoms proves nothing about the existence of any sensed experience?

Met. Yes; applied mathematics merely proves impossibility in regard to sensing, time, and space. The transcendental space and time with which it deals are figments.

Em. When the astronomer talks of a star forty billions of miles away, the space is of the same fantastical order as that of the bulk of that sort of atom which, the physicist says, is a thousand million million times smaller than an ordinary atom?

Met. Yes; there is no possible quantitative space such as the astronomer assumes, and no possible quantitative bulk such as the physicist assumes.

Em. The astronomer's distance is as incongruous with the sensory feeling, as the physicist's atomic bulk is with sensing?

Met. Yes.

Em. Parallax proves nothing about the fact of distance?

Met. Nothing whatever. It merely proves that if distance exists, it will exist as some quantity. If the distance is impossible, the quantitative determination is insignificant, apart from its practical utility.

Em. The like, I suppose, applies to time?

Met. Yes. Time is quantitatively determined by movement. The transcendental time of the astronomer, geologist, paleontologist is impossible, because it implies that time exists independently of causal agents willing the duration-sensation.

Em. We might as well assume that neuralgia existed independently of agents willing pain.

Met. Time really exists only for the agent willing the duration-sensation, as neuralgia only exists for the agent willing pain. The willing of the duration-sensation is incidental to the willing of sensings and feelings into and out of top storey. The duration-sensation itself is willed in and out of top storey. A sequence of willings of the duration-sensation constitutes an empirical lapse of time, which we determine quantitatively, say, as a minute or hour.

Em. A practical duration, or lapse, is a number of duration-sensations?

Met. It is.

Em. Then, what is a single duration-sensation?

Met. A single duration-sensation may be termed a single present—a mere willing of a sensing or feeling into and out of top storey.

Em. That would seem to constitute, practically, a momentary interval.

Met. Yes; you may consider a duration-sensation a momentary interval. Willing such intervals into and out of top storey, involves a continuous flow of

duration-sensations, constituting some specific lapse, as empirical time.

Em. The like would seem to apply in the case of the distance-sensation as involving movement.

Met. Yes; time, as lapse, may be termed psychical movement.

Em. Time is continuously varying duration-sensation, as movement is continuously varying distance-sensation.

Met. Yes.

Em. Does the analogy hold as between a single duration-sensation and a single distance-sensation?

Met. No; there is no experience as distance-sensation corresponding to a single duration-sensation. Distance-sensation is any sensory feeling involving spatial tie between sensings.

Em. Do we practically remember each duration-sensation?

Met. No; in experiencing time, as practical duration, we cut off, or isolate some particular flow of duration-sensations, and imagine it as apparition.

Em. I suppose that the apparition may be more or less accurate as quantitative estimate?

Met. Yes. Generally, its accuracy, in terms of quantity, is limited to lapses ranging from a second or so, to a few hours.

Em. It seems that we have to take on trust a great deal of time that we do not will ourselves: historical time, for instance.

Met. Yes; our credentials for traditional time are our faith that causal agents have willed it.

Em. It does not seem to matter much when an event happened, historically.

Met. No; dates are not of as much consequence as is commonly assumed.

Em. Unless they are dates when accounts fall due.

Met. That contingency adds a factitious importance to what we call the future; which, really, does not exist.

Em. There is no future?

Met. Only in the sense that we expect the present to become past.

Em. And past?

Met. Only exists as our imagining flows of duration-sensations, as apparitions, and trusting that people will duration-sensations, as apparitions, that we do not will—the willing of these people constituting traditional or historical time.

Em. It seems to pan out that there is nothing but present.

Met. It comes to that in the end.

Em. It seems that we might do away with time, without upsetting things much.

Met. We often do that in dreams.

Em. Birthdays are not of so much account in measuring age.

Met. No; some people are old before others have done being children, measured by birthdays.

Em. I've seen doddering antiquities at twenty-five, and frisky youngsters at sixty.

Met. Our common quantitative measurements of time are entirely arbitrary. They imply that everybody is willing time at the same rate.

Em. And that is not the case?

Met. Anything but the case. One person may be willing time at double the quantitative rate of another.

Em. In what way?

Met. If I am sleeping soundly, and you are hard at work, you will be willing time, while I shall be willing none.

Em. Certainly. I ought to have got that far without telling. A person is no more willing time, sound asleep, than he is willing ordinary seeings and touchings. There are not twenty-four hours of time in the day.

Met. Not unless we credit other folk with willing what we fail to will of the twenty-four hours.

Em. And if we give plenty of credit, there may be a tremendously greater quantity of time than twenty-four hours in the day.

Met. Yes; if we sum up, on the credit system, all the time that is being willed in London, in the day, there will be a big surplus over the twenty-four hours.

Em. It seems about as reasonable to apply the fixed quantitative measure to time, as to toothache.

Met. Metaphysically, the application to time is no more apposite than would be a like application to toothache.

Em. If there are twenty-four hours in the day, and I sleep twelve hours, I have only got half a day.

Met. The quantitative measurement is merely a formal proposition based on the fallacious implication that the temporal experience is possible in default of an experiencing agent. It is practically necessary, though it involves a vast amount of chimerical speculation.

Em. As, when the geologist tells us what was happening on the earth before man took possession.

Met. Yes; the quantitative measurement of time has much to blush for, as well as take credit for.

Em. It would be a good thing to send those free-thinkers a few metaphysical tracts. They're asleep. A metaphysical dig in the ribs will suit their complaint.

Met. They are like the theologians and scientists. I have tried to rouse them from their slumbers; but they persist in snoring.

Em. Well, if they can snooze when metaphysic's about, they're proof against dynamite bombs.

DUOLOGUE XXIII.

PARALLAX.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. You said that parallax was no proof of celestial distances.

Met. I did.

Em. By triangulation, surveyors determine ordinary terrestrial distances. These are valid, I suppose?

Met. Yes; practically, as matters of faith that accumulations of actual distance-sensations equal the surveyor's results.

Em. So, the faith is justified.

Met. That may be granted.

Em. So, we get to know the distance between one place and another, on earth.

Met. Yes; the practical distance being valid as quantitative accumulations of possible distance-sensations.

Em. Why does not this method, applied to celestial bodies, enable us to know their distances?

Met. Because there are no possible distance-sensations to be quantitatively accumulated.

Em. Is not the angular distance of a celestial body the same matter as the angular distance of a terrestrial body?

Met. No more than the micrometrical distance of lines a millionth of an inch apart is the same matter as any distance-sensation.

Em. You mean that there are no possible distance-sensations to be accumulated between the earth and the celestial body, as there is no possible distance-sensation between the micrometrical lines?

Met. Just so. Parallax proves nothing about the fact of the specified quantitative distance, just as the micrometer proves nothing about the fact of the lines.

Em. The inference is sound, in the astronomical case?

Met. Perfectly, if you accept the premises. But, it merely issues in predicating the impossible, as in other cases we have discussed. No quantitative distance is possible that we cannot make as empirical accumulation of distance-sensations—whether it be distance of a millionth of an inch, or of millions of miles.

Em. I see that, in both cases, the common implication is that distance exists independently of the experiencing agent.

Met. With the corollary that thought distance, as invalidly imagined, is the same contingency as thought distance as validly imagined.

Em. I see. The imagined lines, in the terrestrial and celestial surveying are confounded with real lines, as sensings; and because the confusion is applicable to the determination of validly imagined quantitative distances in regard to terrestrial contingencies, it is taken to be equally valid in regard to celestial contingencies.

Met. That is the case. The surveying proves dis-

tances, if they are possible. About the possibility, it proves nothing.

Em. We can no more prove the fact of distance, by inference, than the fact of neuralgia?

Met. We cannot. The fact, in either case, is a matter of feeling which, to be possible, must be possible as its own experience determined by the causal agent. In the case of validly imagined terrestrial distances, we may accept, as a matter of faith, the results of geometrical inference. In the case of celestial distances, there can be no valid imagination, because there is no possibility of empirical accumulation of distance-sensations.

Em. I see. The issue must be, as you say, predication of the impossible.

DUOLOGUE XXIV.

SENSORY FEELING AND SENSING.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. What is shape?

Met. A sensory feeling always willed with a visual sensing.

Em. We only see; not touch, as shape?

Met. Yes; tactual shape is merely visual shape, as thought.

Em. Can we have a visual sensing without shape?

Met. Yes; we have one when we see a flat surface, without contour or edge. Practically, we may consider visual sensing identical with shape, though the sensory feeling is distinct from mere sensing. In using the term sensing, in our conversations, I imply sensing inclusive of sensory feeling, unless in some connection necessitating distinction. The like applies in regard to sensing and preter-empirical notion.

Em. We cannot have shape without sensing?

Met. No; without sensing, shape is only metaphysically existing.

Em. When the hypnotic, in the case we discussed earlier, of suggested sense-illusion, took the coat for

a dog, would he not will the sensory feeling of dog-shape as apparition?

Met. No; that would involve that he imagined the dog-shape. The hypnotic, in the case, does not imagine; he merely wills a false preter-empirical notion with a corresponding thought, on the ground of faith imposed by the hypnotist.

Em. Thought, alone, without sensing, on such conditions, involves practically, all the effect of sensing?

Met. It may do that, though, generally, in regard to suggested sensory illusion, there is some deficiency, as experience, as between actual sensing and suggested illusion.

Em. You instanced cases of people consuming innocent substances suggested as powerful drugs, and responding, physiologically, as to the drugs. Such cases seem to involve all the effects of actual sensings.

Met. Yes; showing that physiological effects and drugs are not what physiologists consider them to be. Such cases are empirical evidence for the metaphysical truth that the so-called effects of drugs are incident to suggestion, as consensuses; not to any activity of the drugs, as sensings. The hypnotist, by imposing faith, and the non-existing drug, merely as thought, on the hypnotic, ensures the effect of the drug.

Em. Do you call taste a sensory feeling?

Met. Yes; gustatory sensing, alone, is flavourless, as in the case of water.

Em. That involves the same sort of distinction b etween sensory feeling and sensing, as in the case the flat surface.

Met. It does. Gustatory and visual sensings are alike in being severable from the practically identical sensory feelings.

Em. Is there sensory feeling, as sound, analogous to the feelings of shape and taste?

Met. No; there is no sensory feeling practically identical with sound as sensing. There is only sensory feeling as qualifying sound, say, as shrill, rumbling, hoarse.

Em. Touch and smell?

Met. Are in like case with sound—no practically identical sensory feeling; merely sensory feelings as qualifying.

Em. Must we always will a sensing with a preter-empirical notion?

Met. No. The only sensing necessarily willed with a preter-empirical notion is visual. When we associate other sensings with a preter-empirical notion, we do so through willing the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. When we hear a sound, and attribute it to a piano, we will the multiplicity-sensation with the sound and a visual apparition, as the piano? But, when we see the piano, we do not will the multiplicity-sensation with the visual sensing and preter-empirical notion?

Met. That is the distinction. The seen thing involves inherent connection, incident to interaction between the soul and matter-soul, involving the preter-empirical notion and visual sensing. The auditory sensing has, as it were, to be artificially grafted on to the visual sensing and preter-empirical notion through the willing of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. Is visual the only sensing necessarily incident to willing the preter-empirical notion?

Met. It is. All other sensings are grafted, through the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. So, we may will touching, hearing, tasting, smelling, without willing a preter-empirical notion?

Met. Such willing often occurs.

Em. Is the contingency of suggesting a sensing apart from a preter-empirical notion different from that of suggesting with a preter-empirical notion?

Met. Yes. Suggestion apart from a preter-empirical notion may involve the willing of the suggested sensing in its complete integrity.

Em. If a hypnotist suggests, say, round or bitter, apart from a preter-empirical notion involving a thing, or object, the hypnotic may will the visual and gustatory sensings, themselves, into top storey?

Met. Yes. Such a case involves suggested sensory hallucination, as distinct from illusion.

Em. Wherein is the distinction between hallucination and illusion?

Met. Hallucination involves sensing when none normally exists. Illusion involves the substitution of the suggested sensing for the one that normally exists.

Em. When a dog is suggested, for a coat normally seen, the case is illusion, and the dog is only willed as thought? When, say, round is suggested, with no object normally to see, as on a blank sheet of paper; or, when bitter is suggested, with nothing normally to be tasted, the case is hallucination, and the sensings are really willed in top storey?

Met. Yes.

Em. Suppose a hypnotist places some sugar in a

hypnotic's mouth, telling him it is rhubarb; will the hypnotic really will the bitter taste?

Met. Not if he has seen the sugar.

Em. Then he will only will the bitterness as thought and preter-empirical notion?

Met. Only that way.

Em. Suppose the hypnotic does not see what is put in his mouth?

Met. Then, he may will the sensory feeling, bitter.

Em. The difference is involved in the preter-empirical notion which is willed when the sugar is seen?

Met. Yes. Whenever a preter-empirical notion is normally willed, the suggestion is only adopted as thought and a false preter-empirical notion; or, in cases of what are called negative hallucinations, as thought that the normal preter-empirical notion is non-existent.

Em. Is ordinary hypnotic suggestion, such as we have been discussing, different from such suggestion as you said involved Home's nullifying gravitation?

Met. Yes; the ordinary hypnotic phenomena are incident to the imposition of faith, by the hypnotist, who does not resist a consensus in imposing the suggestion. Spiritistic phenomena, involving levitation, and cognate manifestations, involve resistance to consensuses, by so-called mediums, who impose the resistance, as suggestion, on those who witness the phenomena.

Em. An ordinary hypnotist does not impose resistance to a consensus?

Met. He may do that; but, he does not himself resist a consensus.

Em. His is a sort of make-believe performance?

Met. Yes; he lacks faith in what he suggests.

Em. Suppose that an ordinary hypnotist suggests water as wine; the hypnotic only tastes wine as thought and preter-empirical notion, not as sensory feeling and sensing?

Met. Only as thought and preter-empirical notion, as in the visual case of the coat suggested as a dog.

Em. Could a medium suggest the coat as a dog, or the water as wine, so that a person would really take the one for the other as sensing and sensory feeling?

Met. That would occur on such conditions of the medium's resistance to consensuses, that he suggested the willing of coat and water, as sensings and sensory feelings, from top, to mnemonic, storey; and also suggested the bringing of dog and wine, as sensings and sensory feelings, into top storey.

Em. Such resistance would involve that the medium empirically annihilated the coat and water, and empirically created the dog and wine?

Met. Yes; there would be such empirical annihilation and creation.

Em. Do you know of any instance of such empirical annihilation and creation?

Met. The empirical creation of sensings and sensory feelings is a common spiritistic phenomenon; but I know of no instance of the empirical annihilation.

Em. It is easier to create, than to annihilate, empirically?

Met. Yes; empirically to annihilate sensings and sensory feelings as what we call objects, demands

such a power of resistance to consensuses as I do not know to have been manifested by any medium.

Em. It seems that seeing and tasting may be termed compound sensings; hearing, smelling, touching, simple ones?

Met. Yes; they may be so distinguished.

Em. A dog, as shape, is a sensory feeling practically identical with a sensing; and the like applies to water, as taste?

Met. Yes.

Em. But sound, smell, touch, are only sensings?

Met. Only sensings.

Em. Seeing, touching, hearing, tasting, smelling, involve the willing of sensings in top storey, and, in the cases of seeing and tasting, the willing of sensory feelings, shape and taste, practically identical with the respective sensings?

Met. Yes.

Em. What we commonly call an object or thing is any, or all, of these sensings willed into top storey with a preter-empirical notion?

Met. Yes.

Em. You say that light is a sensory feeling, and that an empirical source of light, as the sun or a flame, is a sensing. Is the sensory feeling, light, in like relation to such a source as sensing, as is shape, as sensory feeling, to a sensing and preter-empirical notion such, for instance, as the sun or moon, or a flame?

Met. No. Light, as sensory feeling, is not practically identical with a visual sensing and preter-empirical notion, as empirical source, as is shape, with a visual sensing and preter-empirical notion. The relationship between light and the source is

constituted by willing the multiplicity-sensation, involving grafting such as we discussed in regard to sensings other than visual, empirically connected with a visual sensing and preter-empirical notion, or what we call object.

Em. So, light, in relation to its empirical source, as, say, the sun, is like such a sensing as sound in relation to its empirical source as, say, a piano?

Met. Yes; light, as sensory feeling, and sound, as sensing, involve the grafting.

Em. Light is not practically identical with its source, as is shape with the object, as visual sensing?

Met. It is not. As differing, in that respect, from shape, light and sound are akin.

Em. While we might have light or sound without a sensing, as source, we could not so have shape?

Met. That is the difference in the connection.

Em. What we call an object is, necessarily, a visual sensing, sensory feeling as shape, and preter-empirical notion; but is not, necessarily, any other sensing or sensory feeling?

Met. That is the case. Any other sensing or sensory feeling than visual, as shape, is grafted, as constituent of the object.

Em. Is not size, as sensory feeling, like shape, as being practically identical with sensing?

Met. No; size has to be grafted, like sound or light.

Em. It is not directly incident to interaction between the soul and matter-soul, as in the case of shape?

Met. No. The inherent connection between sensory feeling and sensing in the case of shape, does not exist in the case of size.

Em. A specific object is not, necessarily, a specific size; but it is, necessarily, a specific shape?

Met. Yes; we cannot will a sensing and preter-empirical notion, without willing shape; but we may, without willing size.

Em. You said that a flat surface, without contour, involved visual sensing without shape.

Met. I did.

Em. And you said, in an earlier conversation, that interaction between the soul and matter-soul involved a preter-empirical notion.

Met. Yes.

Em. Then, if a flat surface is not shape, and we cannot will a sensing and preter-empirical notion without willing shape, a flat surface does not involve interaction between the soul and matter-soul?

Met. To know a surface as flat, without shape, we must know shape. So, indirectly, the flat surface involves interaction between the soul and matter-soul.

Em. The interaction is basical to all sensing, though, in particular cases, the product of the interaction, as preter-empirical notion, involving shape, may not be willed in top storey?

Met. Yes. When such a product is in top storey, there is shape. When the product is not in top storey, there may be a flat, shapeless surface, or any other sensing or sensory feeling without a preter-empirical notion.

Em. Putting the case in ordinary terms, you seem to mean that whatever may be the sensing, some visual object, or what you call, thing, is always implicit in the experiential contingency.

Met. Yes; we cannot practically will any sensing without implicitly attributing it to a thing, or object, necessarily incident to interaction between the soul and matter-soul.

Em. So, interaction between the soul and matter-soul is at the root of all sensing?

Met. And, as being at the root of all sensing, also at the root of all thinking and feeling.

Em. A visual object being always implicit in a sensory contingency, how do you account for sensing in the case of a congenitally blind person?

Met. In such a case, tactual sensing practically takes the place of visual.

Em. Yes; but how can tactual sensing, in such a case, involve interaction between the soul and matter-soul, if the interaction always implicitly or explicitly involves visual sensing, as shape?

Met. That a congenitally blind person does not see, and so does not bring visual sensing into top storey, does not involve that he does not will visual sensing in mnemonic storey. His tactual shape is implicitly visual, as in the case of a seeing person.

Em. You mean that he interacts with the matter-soul as does a seeing person, though the interaction does not come into top storey?

Met. Yes. Even after such a person—as through operation for congenital cataract—is enabled to see, he does not at once fully will visual shape into top storey. For some time, he is apt to assure himself about objects by touch, rather than by the newly acquired vision.

Em. At first, he fails to respond fully to consensuses imposing visual shapes?

Met. Yes; until normal response is established,

he tends to submit to tactual, rather than visual, consensuses.

Em. Is there any empirical proof of the willing of visual sensing in mnemonic storey?

Met. What is called clairvoyance is such proof. The clairvoyant sees minutely what he has never normally seen as submitting to consensuses involving top storey shapes.

Em. Still, he submits to them, abnormally, by bringing the objects into top storey?

Met. Yes; he wills the sensings in mnemonic storey, bringing them into top storey without submitting, as would normally occur, to other consensuses involving intermediate sensings in top storey.

Em. So, a congenitally blind person wills visual shape in mnemonic storey, as does a seeing person?

Met. Everybody wills every experience once brought into top storey, in mnemonic storey, whether or not he wills it in top storey.

Em. Meaning that he helps to constitute consensuses?

Met. Yes; whether he responds or fails to respond, as bringing or failing to bring experience into top storey.

Em. This discussion helps me to realise the difference between the empirical causality of sense-organs and the really causal activity that underlies it. I see that the visual organs are merely, as you term them, fetishes, not causally operative in the contingency of willing visual sensings.

Met. The causal activity involving sensing underlies sense-organs, which are merely as are other empirically causal agents, such as we call machines

and appliances. The really causal agent, soul, has to determine such things, no less than it has to determine what they empirically cause to exist.

Em. I see that it is possible to will sensings, as objects, without normally willing sense-organs as empirically rendering the objects experience.

Met. Not merely possible; but, actually, a not unfamiliar occurrence. Any treatise on hypnotism will supply instances of the sort.

Em. I also see that the connection between light and what we call a source is, as you put it, an artificial connection involving the grafting, distinct from the necessary connection, involving practical identity between sensory feeling and sensing, as in the case of shape.

Met. To those familiar with spiritistic phenomena, light sometimes occurs independently of an empirical source, as incandescent or so-called luminous body. A more common spiritistic occurrence is for such a source, with light, to be seen in entire independence of any normally seen source.

Em. The non-necessity of heat, as incident to an empirical source, is illustrated by such a case as that of Home's handling the red-hot coal.

Met. Certainly. Cases of the sort illustrate the truth of the metaphysical distinction between sensory feeling and sensing in regard to light, heat, sound.

DUOLOGUE XXV.

SHAPE.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. What do you hold the shape of the earth to be?

Met. Metaphysically, I know no shape of anything, but what I see or feel, as shape. So far as I know anything about the shape of the earth, it is flat, depressed, elevated, according to the conditions under which I see it.

Em. You do not hold that it is, in any sense, globular?

Met. Not in any causal, or metaphysical, sense.

Em. You do not accept its spheroidity as a matter of faith?

Met. Neither of faith nor belief.

Em. In what respect, if any, do you consent to spheroidity?

Met. As a practically useful assumption. As I deny all inferential proof that the impossible happens, and as I am assured that it is as impossible to sense a spheroidal earth as to sense an atom, or the distance of the sun, I deny all inferential proof that the earth is globular.

Em. You will grant that it is practically impos-

sible for me to travel straight from a point, and back to it, unless I travel over and under a surface?

Met. No; I will not grant that, even as practical impossibility. I might travel round a single plane surface, coming back to the point.

Em. Then, you would not be going straight forward.

Met. I might, as truly as if I travelled round a sphere. I travel straight when I have a sensed standard of straightness, and only then. There is nothing, causally, to prevent my willing a sensed standard of straightness that would involve my travelling round a plane surface.

Em. That would take you, ultimately, to the edge of the surface—would it not?

Met. Not unless I willed an edge, as sensing. There is no edge if I do not will one. Your question implies that the edge might exist independently of myself, as constituting it experience.

Em. Does not the compass show when I travel straight?

Met. I know nothing about direction, as the pointing of the compass, but as my willing of the pointing. I might will direction, as the pointing of the compass, together with thought direction on a plane surface, so as to involve that I was empirically steering by the compass. Your question implies that the compass does something that I do not make it do as determining its pointing as visual sensing.

Em. I do not grip that point. If I follow the compass, I do not see how I can go round a plane surface.

Met. You know nothing about the pointing of the compass and the surface but as your response to

consensuses involving the compass and surface as sensings. You see that, I hope.

Em. Yes; but it does not enable me to see how I can follow the compass in going round a plane.

Met. By following the compass, you mean willing your body or some other object, with movement, so that your body or the object preserves one relative position to the pointing of the compass.

Em. Yes; I mean that.

Met. Well; your willing the relative position is, causally, a distinct contingency from your willing the movement.

Em. You mean that I might preserve the relative position no matter what movement I willed?

Met. Just so.

Em. Suppose the compass to point to that wall of this room, and I walk with my face to that wall. I follow the compass. Suppose I walk back from that wall to the other one. I do not follow the compass. Do you mean that I might possibly walk from the wall to which the compass now points, to the other one, and yet preserve my relative position to the compass?

Met. Yes; you might possibly do that.

Em. How, on earth, would that be possible?

Met. Simply on the condition that you resisted a consensus of suggestion involving that you empirically associate, causally, relative positions with movement.

Em. I cannot assimilate that.

Met. Because you cannot resist the consensus.

Em. I see that there can be no causal connection between my willing movement and my willing the pointing of the compass. But, I cannot see how I

am to follow the compass round this room, unless I make the compass move with me.

Met. Cannot you assimilate that your position relatively to the compass may persist, unchanged, whatever be your position relatively to other objects —in other words, that there may be no necessary connection between your position relatively to the compass, and your position relatively to other objects with which you will continuously varying distance-sensation, constituting movement?

Em. I see, theoretically, that I may will any sort of movement, without affecting my willing of relative position to the compass; but I cannot conceive the case you put, as possible.

Met. Let me try to help you with that pendulum experiment of Foucault's. You see that pendulum oscillating between two points on opposite walls of a building. However carefully you may watch that oscillation, you will detect no movement of its plane. But, soon, you will find that the relative position of the plane, to the walls, is changed. Now, imagine the pointing compass to behave as does the swinging pendulum. You have the compass on a table, and walk towards a wall, in the direction of the pointing. Then, walking parallel to the wall you have approached, you do, speaking roughly, what the physicist infers the walls of the pendulum-building to do. You look at the compass and find it still pointing in your direction. You then walk parallel to the second wall, involving that you are moving in a direction contrary to that you first took. Still, the compass points as you move. So, you have moved round the compass analogously as the physicist infers the building to move round the plane of oscillation.

Em. Yes; but you deny the movement of the building.

Met. That does not affect the analogy, so long as there is change of relative position in both cases.

Em. I see. My movement, or the non-movement of the building does not affect the fact that the compass and pendulum-swing change their relative positions without my willing them to move. But, suppose, while I am moving, that I keep my eye on the compass, instead of looking at it intermittently, shall I not see it moving?

Met. Not on my assumption that it behaves as does the plane of oscillation of the pendulum. If, while persistently looking at the compass, you see it follow your movements, of course you will it to move.

Em. I cannot imagine it, on such conditions, as not moving.

Met. But, you have ocular demonstration that neither the plane of oscillation nor the building moves, however persistently you fix your gaze on the one or the other, and yet, if you take a position away from the plane, you will find that, later, the plane coincides with your position. In that case, you empirically constitute movement of the building through imagination. Cannot you also constitute no movement of the compass through imagination?

Em. Not if the compass is to follow me.

Met. Of course not. Then, it would not be behaving as does the oscillating pendulum-plane; but would be moving.

Em. I see what you want me to do: to banish the idea of movement, and limit myself to the idea of change of relative position.

Met. Then you would imagine the compass to behave as does the pendulum.

Em. As I moved round the room, I should not see the pointing of the compass move; but, wherever I stood, I should see the compass pointing my way?

Met. Yes. You would will movement, as regarded the compass, into mnemonic storey, and would only will relative position into top storey.

Em. But, that I could do that, should I not have to will the compass alternately into mnemonic and top storeys?

Met. No more, necessarily, than you have so to will the pendulum or walls of the building.

Em. The compass might be continuously in top storey?

Met. Just as is the pendulum.

Em. And I should see it changing its relative position without moving?

Met. Just as you see the pendulum.

Em. I might infer that the compass point moved, though I did not see it move.

Met. Certainly you might; but the inference would not be worth much if, with the compass before you, you did not see it move.

Em. Applying, of course, to the building.

Met. Obviously. You have no ground for inferring movements of objects actually under your observation, which you do not sense as moving.

Em. The only thing I can appeal to, as inferentially moving, in the case of the pendulum experiment, is the earth?

Met. Yes; and that inference would be to the impossible.

Em. Because the earth does nothing that I do not make it do, and I cannot possibly make it move. Foucault's experiment being taken as about the most conclusive proof of the earth's rotation, and its shape following as consequence of its rotation, as, from your standpoint, the experiment proves nothing about the fact of movement, it proves nothing about the fact of shape.

Met. Except about the facts—if facts they may be called—of impossible movement and shape. The movement and shape proved by the pendulum experiment are merely mathematical statements proving impossibility.

Em. Of course, we are practically bound to ignore the impossibilities.

Met. Certainly. We can accomplish nothing in practical applications, but by deferring to illusions of causal relationship imposed on us by consensuses of suggestion.

Em. But, it is another matter when people brush away God and religion, on the strength of the illusions. I suppose that what applies to the compass in regard to change of relative position without movement, applies to a star, taken as standard of direction? Thus, when a star is in a different relative position to the Pole Star, there has been no movement.

Met. None. All cases of ostensible celestial movements involve such willing as we have discussed, of change of relative position without movement.

Em. I might will the Pole Star before me, however I faced, without its moving with me?

Met. Just as you might have the pointing of the

compass. You might have that table before you, however you faced, without its moving.

Em. Consensuses of suggestion render the contingencies practically impossible?

Met. Yes. When you will movement, involving your turning your face from the star, other people, constituting the consensus which you are unable to resist, are willing the star in such a position relatively to you, that you do not face the star when you will the movement. The like applies to the compass, which you do not follow when you move round the room.

Em. That willing, by the consensus, involves the efficiency of the compass as a standard of direction. We could not make any practical progress by applying metaphysical truth about causation. For instance, we could not produce a serviceable nautical almanac, by applying the causal truth about movement and change of position.

Met. No; metaphysical truth about causation is only of practical moment as obviating the effect of materialistic science on the highest concerns of humanity: religion and morality; and affording us belief, as supplementing and consummating the faith which, in pre-scientific epochs, sufficed to impose religious truth on humanity. Were it possible for us to act on metaphysical truth in dealing practically with experiences, we should will appliances, if we used them, without willing thought, as empirical theories, through which we now, laboriously, as what is called construction, experiment, invention, will the appliances into top storey.

Em. Involving what we should now call miracle?

Met. Yes. All sensings being apparitions, we

should then will appliances analogously as a Katie King apparition is willed.

Em. No need, then, for empirical theories about light, electricity, celestial movements, distances, bulks, shapes.

Met. No; we should not need to reconcile thought logic with sensed logic; but should, as it were intuitively, will the most perfect appliance for our purpose.

Em. No need to toil for bread, beef, beer.

Met. No; we should have them, if wanted, without willing the feeling of exertion.

Em. When we attain that sort of intuitive perfection, we shall probably not need to worry about such things as almanacs, compasses, bread, beef.

Met. But other objects may be substituted, for which we shall have to exert ourselves.

Em. How can the sun rise and set, if the earth is a plane surface?

Met. Your question, analogously as did your earlier suggestion about the stars and horizon, implies that the sun is a causal agent, acting independently of the agent that constitutes its rising and setting experience.

Em. Physics explains on the assumption that the earth is a globe.

Met. Yes; but the explanation begs the question whether the earth *is* a globe. A globe is a shape. A shape is a sensory feeling involving sensing. You cannot prove the existence of a sensing, by the existence of a thought. If a sensing is impossible, the thought of sensing is merely thought that the impossible happens.

Em. We keep coming back to that point. It

invalidates all speculative plausibility of the astronomical order. But, where does the sun go to when it sets, and come from when it rises?

Met. Into and out of mnemonic storey of mind, as does every object that appears and disappears.

Em. Its rising and setting are foreign to the question of shape of any other object.

Met. Metaphysically, entirely foreign.

Em. If you stood on an isolated, suspended body, and you saw another body come into view at one side, and go out of view at the other, you would infer that the appearing and disappearing body moved over and under the body on which you stood; or that that body itself moved?

Met. Yes—if I were dealing with bodies that I could possibly sense as shapes, and movement that I could possibly will as sensory feeling.

Em. If you could not possibly will the movement or shapes, you would decline to trust inference based on analogy?

Met. I should decline to accept the inference otherwise than as a convenient assumption quite irrelevant to the fact of shape or movement. I will not accept, on the ground of analogy, any inference that the impossible happens.

Em. The most irrefragable logic will not satisfy you that a sensing or movement exists that is impossible as your sensing or movement?

Met. That is not merely impossible as my sensing or movement; but is impossible to any causal agent constituted as I believe humanity to be constituted.

Em. Your proposition of impossibility involves no mere dogma, inference from analogy, assumption?

Met. The proposition involves as invulnerable a

postulate as is available to humanity. Shape, whether as thought or sensing, can only exist as experience determined for itself by an experiencing agent. Shape, as thought, is only possible as presenting shape which is possible as sensing. The like applies to all spatial contingencies.

Em. That is self-evident—no need to prove it.

Met. If the agent cannot possibly constitute shape experience as sensing, no shape is possible.

Em. People of the atheistic persuasion are fond of assuring us that miracles don't happen. They seem to absorb a tolerable mouthful of miracle in assuming that they know the shape of the earth. But I'm going to make another assault on that issue. Does not the fact that high objects, such as a ship's masts, the tops of mountains, are first seen from a distance prove curvature of the earth?

Met. You are again attributing causal agency to mere experiences. The facts you indicate merely evidence convention of sensing. A clairvoyant, resisting the convention, might disqualify the facts. There is no proof of curvature, but as seeing or feeling it. It is impossible to see or feel the earth as curved, unless as some surface sensing. Taking the earth as a whole, what we do sense involves flatness instead of curvature or spheroidity.

Em. My inferential assumption of curvature implies that the curvature can exist independently of my making it as sensing?

Met. Just as in other analogous cases we have discussed. To infer curvature that we cannot possibly make, as sensing, is to infer the impossible; as in the cases of inferring movement, distance, size, that we cannot possibly determine, as sensing. The

shape of the earth inferred by astronomers is merely a mathematical formula. Shape that we know is sensing.

Em. Astronomical shape involves analogous confusion of experiences and spurious causality as are involved in the physicist's ether and air movements, as light and sound?

Met. The cases are quite analogous. All empirical transcendentalism involves those results.

Em. The round shadow thrown by the earth, in eclipse, is no proof?

Met. None whatever, judged from the metaphysical standpoint. We have earlier discussed that point in dealing with shadows and images.

Em. That circumnavigation business is a stubborn fact.

Met. Yes; as showing how a globe may be travelled round, if the globe exists; not as showing that the globe does exist.

Em. You hold that no inferential proof whatever can establish the fact of the earth's spheroidity?

Met. I do; because I hold that no inferential proof can establish the fact that the impossible happens. If I am told of a shape that is impossible as sensing, I am told of a figment. I want another term than shape, for that sort of experience.

Em. If you could sense, or had faith that it was possible to sense the earth as a globe, I suppose that you would grant the cogency of the astronomer's inferences?

Met. No more than I do at present. I now accept the inferences as an example of rendering consistent sensed logic and thought logic. This consistency proves nothing about the fact of the

earth's shape. If I sensed the earth as a shape, I should want no thought logic to prove that it was a shape. If I cannot possibly sense the earth as a shape, no thought logic can render it a shape.

Em. It seems that you reject all inferential proof.

Met. When it leads to the happening of the impossible. The only shape I know is sensing. I know no sensing that can be transformed. The astronomical shape is thought. That shape and my shape are as eternally asunder as are a sigh and a hippopotamus.

Em. You grant that the sun is round?

Met. Yes; I have no doubt about that.

Em. And the moon?

Met. That is round, when I see it round.

Em. You do not grant that it is a sphere?

Met. No; I know it only as a disc.

Em. It must have another side than the one you see?

Met. As inference to the impossible.

Em. You do not grant that the moon has another side than the one you can possibly see?

Met. Not at all. I know nothing about a side of the moon, but what I see as a side.

Em. You grant that a penny has two sides?

Met. Yes; because I am assured that I can make two sides to it. The penny has sides, only because I make them.

Em. The whole empirical phantasmagoria is a case of mixing up experiences and assuming impossible causes.

Met. You put the case concisely. Empirical science is a fabric of useful illusion, confusion, and assumption.

Em. It looks as though the Creator had cunningly devised empirical science to lure us to delusion.

Met. There is no delusion if we restrict ourselves to applying empirical science to its legitimate purpose of conducing to the satisfaction of our sensual needs. The delusion only arises when we apply science outside its proper scope, to deciding ultimate, causal problems germane to morality and religion. The modern science of causation has come to rectify our misapplication of empirical science.

Em. If the modern science of causation does not knock the cocksureness out of a lot of other modern science, write me down a false prophet!

DUOLOGUE XXVI.

GRAVITATION.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. On the assumption of a force, called gravity, the physicist pronounces about the shapes, distances, bulks, movements of the solar system. You hold that there are no such shapes, distances, bulks, movements, and that there is no such thing as a force?

Met. Yes; every ostensible contingency to which you refer involves the postulation of the impossible; the confusion of thought with sensing, and the ignoring of causal necessity.

Em. A tolerably strong indictment of Newton's great principle. And there is plenty of common fact to support the indictment?

Met. Practically as much fact for the indictment as against it. The facts of spiritistic so-called levitation, for which thousands can testify at the present moment, are as good practical evidence for the non-existence of gravity, as ordinary facts are for its existence as an empirical contingency.

Em. If the assumption of gravity does not account for common contingencies of sensing, what is the real contingency that causally corresponds to

the fanciful contingency called gravitation, and does cover the contingencies to which you refer?

Met. The causal contingency is the operation of consensuses of suggestion involving common habit of willing a sensory feeling which we call weight, with sensings and movement.

Em. When those consensuses are resisted, gravitation is nullified?

Met. Yes; assuming gravitation to be other than the impossible postulated as actual; which it is not.

Em. You say that there is plenty of evidence for actual occurrences involving the resistance?

Met. Virtually as conclusive evidence of the sort for resistance, as for non-resistance, to the consensuses in question.

Em. Will you state a single actual instance of the resistance, which you hold to be practically conclusive evidence against the physicist's assumption of gravitation?

Met. Sir William Crookes testifies that he has seen Home, the medium, cause the index of a spring balance to move without physical contact.

Em. You mean, to record a weight when none was attached?

Met. Yes.

Em. Taking Sir William Crookes's testimony for the fact, you hold it to be conclusive?

Met. As conclusive as it is possible for a fact to be. I will give you another fact vouched for by Sir William. He writes that he has seen Home rise bodily from the ground and float in the air.

Em. No mechanical dodgery?

Met. Well, Sir William has devoted his life to the most rigid application of exact methods of in-

vestigation. He assures us that there was not the faintest possibility of trickery in the case. If you want details on that point, you should read his book on *Spiritualism*. He writes that there are at least a hundred recorded instances of such rising by Home as the cases for which he personally testifies, witnessed by as many different people, and that, to reject the recorded evidence is to reject all human testimony; for no fact, he writes, in sacred or profane history is supported by a stronger array of proofs. I could give you many other instances of the sort. I merely invoke Sir William Crookes on account of his position in the world of scientific empiricism.

Em. The case is a staggerer for the gravitationist. How does he get over it?

Met. Either by denying the facts, or assuming some other force overcoming gravitation.

Em. His forces seem like the poet's fleas, that have other fleas to bite 'em.

Met. Yes; even Sir William Crookes, himself, wants another force to account for Home's rising and the movement of the balance.

Em. What sort of force does Sir William want?

Met. He calls it psychic force.

Em. Has he got mathematics on to it?

Met. Not yet.

Em. It's as hard to get those scientific folk away from their holes, as to make a horse drink when he isn't thirsty.

Met. About the commonest of spiritistic phenomena is the nullification of gravitation.

Em. Then, weight, from your standpoint, has nothing to do with gravitation?

Met. Nothing. Weight is a sensory feeling.

When we resist a consensus imposing the willing of the feeling, the particular sensing has no weight.

Em. Home resisted the consensus; so he raised himself without applying mechanical means.

Met. Yes; enabling those who saw him rise, also to resist the consensus, through suggestion. The converse occurs as resistance to a consensus normally not imposing weight with a sensing.

Em. That applies to the case of the balance recording a non-existent weight?

Met. Hardly to that case, which is merely one of resistance to a consensus normally involving no movement. The contingency of weight is one of a feeling distinct from the feeling of movement.

Em. What should you consider a case of resistance to a consensus normally not imposing weight?

Met. When a person is unable to raise and otherwise manipulate sensings which are normally susceptible of such treatment. Good examples of the contingency are certain hypnotic phenomena, involving that a person is disabled, by the hypnotist's suggestion, from raising or moving such an object as a walking-stick or pencil.

Em. I may take it that the practical possibility of raising a body is incident to resisting a consensus, or to the absence of a consensus, imposing the feeling of resistance which we call weight, and which the physicist attributes to the causal activity of a force?

Met. That is the case.

Em. We could not deal practically with weight, according to the causal conditions you indicate?

Met. No; practical application necessitates that we ignore causal conditions and adopt illusory standards. To deal quantitatively with weight,

we must have empirical standards in terms of sensings.

Em. But, as in the cases of movement, distance, shape, mathematical dealing with weight proves nothing about the fact of existence of any predicated weight?

Met. Nothing.

Em. No proving, by mathematics, that the earth or sun is a particular weight?

Met. Except as proving the weight as a particular impossibility.

Em. I suppose you will grant that a cart-load of coal may be, say, a ton of coal?

Met. Of course, I will grant that practically. But, before we discuss that particular contingency, further, I should like to say a word or two about our common notion of things as having weight. You will see that, as weight is a feeling, the contingency of weight in a body, as commonly assumed, does not exist.

Em. You mean that bodies, in themselves, are neither light nor heavy?

Met. Yes; the weight that they empirically possess is the sensory feeling, in a particular intensity, that we will with them.

Em. We can will no sensory feeling constituting a ton weight, with a body.

Met. That is the point we will now discuss in connection with your question about the coal. The only weight that is quantitatively possible, as being empirically in a body, is as the sensory feeling actually willed with the body, together with the feeling of exertion and sensing, constituting what we call lifting the body; or, as alternative, some body

accepted as a standard representative of some actual willing of intensity of the sensory feeling constituting weight. Practically, we judge weight by such a standard.

Em. So, the weight of the ton of coal is not the sensory feeling?

Met. Not at all. It is thought, as mathematical quantity, symbolising accumulations of the sensory feeling which are not imposed by a consensus of suggestion.

Em. Meaning, in common language, that the ton represents what cannot normally be lifted.

Met. Yes. It does not represent normal response to a consensus imposing weight as the sensory feeling. The like applies to what we commonly call distance and lapse of time. A distance of miles; a temporal lapse of weeks or months, or even of hours, is symbolisation, as thought, of accumulations of the distance-sensation and duration-sensation.

Em. So, when we talk of a weight that cannot normally be experienced as an intensity of the sensory feeling, we refer to a standard in thought, taken to be equivalent to some practically impossible sensory feeling?

Met. Yes. On such conditions, we judge weight by visual sensing and movement, willed as some appliance for measuring empirical weight; or, we judge by mathematical logic assuming an impossibility called the force of gravity.

Em. Why do you hold the force of gravity, or any other force or energy, to be impossible?

Met. Because it is implied to be a causal agent independent of the only causal agents I know: myself and other creatures, as souls. Such a

force or energy renders me, as causal agent, a nonentity, and I know that, causally, I am not a nonentity.

Em. Suppose we call the force or energy, will, will you accept it?

Met. Yes; if it is not confounded with thought, as quantity.

Em. On such conditions, it certainly would not be the physicist's gravity, heat, light, electricity.

Met. Which accounts for my holding the force or energy impossible.

Em. You hold that a pound weight in your hand is a sensing willed with a specific intensity of the sensory feeling, weight, and you grant that if a certain number of pound weights were placed in a balance, with the coal, the balance would be in equilibrium. Nevertheless, you hold that the pound weights, taken collectively, are merely symbols, as thought, of weight, as the sensory feeling, quite distinct from the sensory feeling itself?

Met. Yes.

Em. You will grant that, taken separately, each of the pound weights does involve the willing of a specific intensity of the sensory feeling?

Met. Yes.

Em. Why will you not grant the same for them taken collectively?

Met. Because I cannot lift or move them. Unless I can do that, I cannot will the sensory feeling constituting weight.

Em. I have heard of people supporting a ton weight.

Met. Such people may will a ton weight, as sensory feeling.

Em. If the ton weight were on your toe, would you not will the weight as sensory feeling?

Met. No; I should probably will it as pain and pressure.

Em. Is not pressure tantamount to weight?

Met. Only if it is pressure willed with the feeling of overcoming it.

Em. You must will pressure, to will the feeling of overcoming it?

Met. Yes; but I need not will the feeling of overcoming it, to will pressure.

Em. The same sort of distinction as between movement and change of relative position?

Met. Yes; the sensory feeling of movement involves the willing of change of relative position, and the sensory feeling of weight involves the willing of pressure; but change of relative position does not involve movement, and pressure does not involve weight.

Em. Practically, you will grant that what you will with the feeling of pressure always involves the willing of weight?

Met. I will grant that, if the weight be taken to be either thought or the sensory feeling. If, by weight, you only imply the sensory feeling, I cannot accept your proposition.

Em. Well, you will grant that the coal is, practically, a ton weight?

Met. Yes; as valid imagination, involving quantity, as thought, symbolising accumulations of the sensory feeling.

Em. Will you grant that a certain hill may weigh a million tons?

Met. Yes; in the sense that the coal weighs a ton.

Em. Will you grant that the earth may weigh billions of tons?

Met. No.

Em. Why?

Met. Because, to predicate about weight, it must be possible to will the sensing in three dimensions.

Em. Why must that be possible?

Met. To render possible comparison with standards involving weight as quantitative accumulations of the sensory feeling.

Em. You mean that the sensing must be something that we can distinguish as shape and bulk?

Met. Yes. There is no such possible sensing, as the earth; so I decline to predicate about its weight.

Em. You granted that the hill might weigh a million tons. If I take an area inclusive of the hill, the total weight must be greater than that of the hill?

Met. Yes; if the total weight is possible. If you can turn that area with the hill into a sensing, as shape and bulk, I will grant that what you call the total weight is possible.

Em. I should have to shovel up from the other side of the earth, to do that.

Met. Assuming the earth has another side, which, as we have earlier seen, is open to discussion.

Em. You refuse to credit an estimate of the weight of the earth, based on the assumptions of a force and of a particular shape and bulk of the earth deduced from the force?

Met. Most resolutely I refuse that credit, or what I should rather term, credulity.

Em. You hold that the earth has no possible weight?

Met. No weight that I can possibly symbolise by thought, as accumulations of the sensory feeling.

Em. Which, from your standpoint, is equivalent to denying that the earth has weight.

Met. Yes; weight about which it is impossible to predicate is equivalent to no weight, just as shape about which it is impossible to predicate is equivalent to no shape. Our discussion about the weight of the earth brings us back to our earlier discussion of parts.

Em. I see. The hill is not a part of the earth.

Met. No. The hill is a sensing. The earth you imply is a mathematical statement, as thought. A sensing cannot even be an empirical part of a thought, apart from the metaphysical issue of the possibility of parts.

Em. I see that any weight I may attribute to the earth must be inference from impossibility, as thought, called gravity, acting independently of myself, though I know nothing about it but as experience I necessarily fabricate.

Met. That is the case in a nutshell. Either you must abdicate, as causal agent, and merge yourself in the august personality of gravity; or you must treat gravity with the becoming disrespect of a Russian Grand Duke for a moujik.

Em. I elect to be Grand Duke, so far as gravity is concerned, and so far as the whole menagerie of forces and energies is concerned.

Met. The menagerie is an admirable collection if you keep it in the right perspective.

Em. We have hitherto discussed weight as the sensory feeling and its symbolisation as accumulations in thought. What about its diminution? Balances are made recording such a weight as the

ten-thousandth of a grain. Is that weight like the micrometrical lines, a millionth of inch apart?

Met. No; the micrometrical lines are only lines under the lens. The infinitesimal weights exist apart from the balance, as thought.

Em. As we can have thought symbolising accumulations, we can have thought symbolising diminutions of the sensory feeling?

Met. Yes. So long as we have a sensing, we may have weight as valid imagination, whether involving *plus* or *minus*, as thought.

Em. The infinitesimal weight is only thought?

Met. Nothing more.

Em. But it makes the balance turn.

Met. We make it turn, as willing movement. The fact is causally foreign to our willing the sensory feeling, as weight.

Em. If we placed a sufficient number of objects weighing a ten-thousandth of a grain into an ordinary balance, it would record a weight as sensory feeling.

Met. Yes; but until that is done, there is no sensory feeling. If you take a lump of coal from the cart-load, you will have weight as sensory feeling. Conversely, if you take a handful of objects each weighing, as thought, a ten-thousandth of a grain, you will have weight as sensory feeling.

Em. I see. I was thinking of the sensings as having weight in themselves.

Met. There is no weight, as sensory feeling, until you will it, whatever be the sensing, or the movement you may will.

Em. The mere fact of the turning of the balance does not necessarily indicate weight?

Met. By no means. As we have seen, Sir William Crookes's balance turned when there was no sensing to represent a weight. It is quite possible to will any movement of the balance independently of a sensing constituting empirical cause of the turning.

Em. Practically, if we see a balance turn when an object is placed on the balance, we must believe that the weight of the object causes the movement of the balance.

Met. Of course. But, the weight may be thought; not the sensory feeling. In the case of the infinitesimal weight, it is thought.

Em. Whether the object be minute or large, it has no causal effect on the movement of the balance, such as we imply in our common notion of weight as causing such movement?

Met. None whatever. If we assume such effect, we give away the causal problem. Even empirically, in the case of Sir William Crookes's balance, we see that there is no such causal relationship.

Em. You make it quite clear to me that what we call the cosmos has not much existence unless we manufacture it.

Met. No; it is a much less stable and independent entity than physicists would have us credit.

Em. It couldn't well have started as nebulæ, cosmic dust, or what not.

Met. Not unless we were there to manufacture such things.

Em. The Bible is not so far out of it about man and the cosmos.

Met. It gets nearer the bull's-eye than does empirical science.

Em. Metaphysic does as much damage in the scientific china-shop as a hearty bull can accomplish in an ordinary crockery establishment.

Met. Yes; but, as well as damaging crockery in the scientific china-shop, metaphysic supplies new ware of a less fragile order.

Em. In an earlier conversation dealing with imagination, you said that such experiences as brightness and heaviness, constituting what we commonly call qualities, were sensory feelings. If light and weight are also sensory feelings, there seem to be two sorts of sensory feelings; the one sort constituting qualities of the other—thus, brightness, as a quality of light; heaviness, of weight.

Met. In such cases, the qualifying term symbolises either more or less intensity of the consciousness-sensation willed with the sensory feeling empirically qualified; or, in case there are two complementary sensory feelings empirically modifying one another, as in the case of light and darkness, the qualifying term symbolises the predominance of one of the modifying sensory feelings. Thus, a bright light is the sensory feeling, light, willed with little or no darkness.

Em. And where there is no complementary sensory feeling, as in the case of weight?

Met. Then, the qualifying term symbolises the willing of more or less intensity of the consciousness-sensation with the particular sensory feeling. Thus, a heavy weight is the sensory feeling, weight, willed with a high intensity of the consciousness-sensation.

Em. So, brightness and heaviness do not symbolise sensory feelings?

Met. Not unless the terms are applied as qualifying objects.

Em. An object may be bright or heavy, as sensory feeling; but light or weight cannot be, respectively, bright or heavy, as sensory feeling?

Met. That is the distinction.

Em. Can you have weight without an object?

Met. Yes. Empirical evidence of the fact occurs as what is called nightmare.

Em. We empirically transform sensory feelings into thought. Thus, we talk of a bright or heavy speech.

Met. Applying to sensings as well as sensory feelings. We may always trace what may be termed the pedigree of thoughts to sensings and sensory feelings.

Em. Causally, I suppose, the empirical connections are constituted by willing the multiplicity-sensation?

Met. Yes; all cases of empirical association of experiences depend on willing the multiplicity-sensation.

DUOLOGUE XXVII.

SIZE.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. What is size, from your standpoint?

Met. A sensory feeling, always willed with sensings, and with the difference-sensation and multiplicity-sensation, involving what we call comparison.

Em. There is no size of things that cannot be seen or touched?

Met. No more than there is intensity of a pain that cannot be felt.

Em. Ostensible size of things that cannot be seen or touched is another example of invalid imagination, postulating the impossible?

Met. It is.

Em. So, the size attributed, on the ground of mathematics, to an atom, is impossible?

Met. Certainly.

Em. And, to the sun, moon, stars?

Met. Also impossible; as in the cases of weight, shape, distance, attributed to them.

Em. I suppose that the practical size of a thing is the intensity of the sensory feeling that we will with it?

Met. Yes; taken in comparison with validly

imagined intensity of the feeling involving size of objects other than the sensing immediately under observation, as being willed in top storey.

Em. Then, objects are not, as we may say, inherently of any size?

Met. No; they are only of size when we will the sensory feeling with them.

Em. Can we see an object without willing the sensory feeling with it?

Met. That is a common occurrence when we gaze abstractedly at an object, apart from other objects.

Em. But, we cannot experience the sensory feeling unless we see or touch an object?

Met. No; size can only be experienced in conjunction with sensings, either actual or apparitional.

Em. We talk of the volume of a sound. Is that the size of the sound?

Met. In that connection, volume is another sensory feeling, in like relation to auditory sensing as size is to visual and tactual sensing.

Em. The volume of a sound is the same sort of contingency as the size of a seen object?

Met. Yes; both involve the willing of a sensory feeling involving the experience of magnitude. Such sensory feelings as acuteness, softness, brightness, willed in conjunction with visual or auditory sensings, involve analogous relationship as in the case of size and volume.

Em. What is the size of a person or other object seen through a telescope?

Met. The size of an apparition willed in conjunction with a sensing, as fetish.

Em. The telescope is a fetish?

Met. Yes.

Em. What is the real size of the person or object?

Met. Such intensity of the sensory feeling as we may will with the particular sensing, as normal seeing.

Em. The size of an object seen through a microscope is also the size of an apparition willed in conjunction with a sensing, as fetish?

Met. Certainly.

Em. There is no real size of an object, corresponding to real size of an apparition seen through a microscope, as there is in the case of the apparition seen through a telescope?

Met. Not if the microscopic apparition is normally invisible. Then, there is no sensing about which to predicate.

Em. Of course, as being invisible, there is nothing with which we can will the sensory feeling.

Met. Failing which possibility, there is no possible size.

Em. Difference in size is merely a matter of intensity of the sensory feeling?

Met. Nothing more, considering size as a sensory feeling. Of course, we may deal with size, as valid imagination, analogously as we may deal with weight. We discussed that issue in our preceding conversation.

Em. What you said about weight, applies to size?

Met. Yes.

Em. Size and weight are different sorts of sensory feelings from shape, difference in which is not merely a matter of intensity?

Met. Yes; there is the difference you indicate; each shape being a special sensory feeling.

DUOLOGUE XXVIII.

TRANSFORMATIONS; RADIUM.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. Nothing that we empirically change into another thing is affected by the empirical change?

Met. Except as being willed as thought, as remembered; or, as metaphysically existing.

Em. That does away with the chemist's and physicist's compositions.

Met. Certainly. They cannot possibly exist in the sense of the physicist and chemist, implying the annihilation and substitution.

Em. The annihilation merely involves sending things out of top storey; the substitution, bringing things into top storey?

Met. Yes—the willing of the multiplicity-sensation involving that the things are associated as the one being constituent of the other.

Em. The so-called emanations of radium do not affect the radium as annihilating it?

Met. Not at all. In the case of radium, unlike other cases of empirical transformation, there is no real empirical demonstration, quite apart from metaphysic, of annihilation. So far as physicists and chemists really know, the radium is quite unaffected

by the emanations. This applies to the energy, as light, heat, etc., said to be given off by the radium. No physicist or chemist can afford the slightest proof, apart from wild mathematical speculation, that the radium is, in the slightest degree, affected by the energy and emanations said to proceed from it.

Em. Is mathematical inference, in the case of radium, different from such inference in the case of ordinary decompositions?

Met. Yes; in the case of radium, it leads to wild dogmatism, in terms of time—ranging from ten thousand, to a thousand million years—for any appreciable effect on the integrity of the radium. There is not a scintilla of genuinely empirical evidence for any such effect. Even mathematicians say as much. To take a case, Mr. Boys, president of the mathematics and physics section, at the 1903 meeting of the British Association, stated: "An atom of radium can constantly produce an emanation, that is something like a gas, which escapes and carries with it wonderful properties; but the atom, the thing which cannot be divided, remains and retains its weight. . . . The discovery by Professor and Madame Curie of what seems to be the everlasting production of heat in easily measurable quantity by a minute amount of radium compound is so amazing that, even now that many of us have had the opportunity of seeing with our own eyes the heated thermometer, we hardly are able to believe what we see."

Em. In the case of radium, at any rate, it looks as if mathematics, even as an empirical oracle, was of no account against metaphysic.

Met. Radium drives us past mathematics, into metaphysic. The empiricist has discovered, in radium, something that he cannot tuck within confusion of sensing with thinking and the ignoring of the problem of causation.

Em. Radium empirically evidences the metaphysical fact that there is no such contingency as what physicists call emanation of one from another thing?

Met. Certainly; radium and the so-called emanations and giving out of heat and light are, causally, entirely distinct contingencies, each equally an effect of the activity of the only causal agent: the soul, as willing radium, emanations, heat, light into top storey.

Em. That does away with the empirical dogmas about the uncreatability of substance and energy.

Met. Yes; according to the physicist's own showing, in the case of radium, substance and energy are empirically created; because there is more substance and energy empirically produced by the radium than it possesses.

Em. Conforming with the metaphysical determination that the causation of the radium, and of the emanations, are two distinct contingencies, independent of one another.

Met. Yes; there is no metaphysical necessity that the emanations shall not be greater in bulk than is the radium that empirically produces them. So far as physicists really know, this metaphysical truth is actually illustrated by the empirical behaviour of radium, which produces a greater bulk of substance than itself.

Em. That plays the deuce with physical specula-

tions about the permanence of our system, based on mathematical estimates of the sun's capacity to produce heat and light.

Met. Radium and the physicists themselves, apart from metaphysic, accomplish so much. I surmise that Lord Kelvin is less confident than he was, a few years ago, regarding the accuracy, to a few million years, of his cosmical estimates.

Em. If there's a fair supply of radium in the sun, we need not worry about the troubles of posterity in a universal collapse.

Met. There will be no such collapse so long as there is a posterity as souls willing the mundane mind.

Em. When the collapse does come, there will be nobody there to know anything about it.

Met. And, if it does come, it will come merely because there is nobody to know anything about it.

Em. It seems that the difference, in empirical behaviour, between radium and ordinary substances showing changes of bulk and form in giving off empirical parts, lies in the fact that, in the case of radium, it is kept, intact, in top storey, while the emanations are also willed into top storey; whereas, in the case of an ordinary substance, there is a continuous willing of it into mnemonic storey, together with the willing of the emanations, products, or what not, into top storey.

Met. You put the case appositely. We preserve in top storey, in the case of radium, what, in the case of an ordinary substance suffering so-called decomposition, we will into mnemonic storey. So, we get the empirical changes in the latter case, which we fail to observe, in the former case.

Em. All depending on our willing; nothing depending on any causal activity of the substances.

Met. Exactly. The substances no more change themselves, than water hauls itself up out of a well.

DUOLOGUE XXIX.

EVOLUTION.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. Transformations only occurring as the willing of certain experiences into mnemonic storey, and the bringing of other experiences into top storey, I suppose that there is no such contingency as what the scientist calls evolution?

Met. No; the scientific conception of evolution is founded on the illusion of events as occurring independently of our causal determinism.

Em. So, there could be no such happenings as physicists, geologists, paleontologists pronounce to have occurred before humanity existed.

Met. Obviously, none; because that events can happen at all, humanity must determine them by willing mind into top storey.

Em. Nothing can be predicated about events as happening before humanity existed. We have already settled that.

Met. Nothing. The temporal contingency itself is merely one of the experiences dependent on the causal determinism of man.

Em. There is no time unless man makes it, as experience.

Met. No more than there is a seeing or touching.

Em. You deny that the earth passed through stages of cooling from incandescence, millions of years antecedent to man?

Met. I deny that the earth existed a moment before man was on it, just as I deny that a thought existed before man thought it.

Em. You mean that if the earth existed without man, it would exist metaphysically?

Met. Yes; and as so existing, cannot be predicated about as earth.

Em. But, I suppose that God existed before man?

Met. As time only exists as a feeling, the duration-sensation, determined by man, we can predicate nothing temporally in regard to God's existence.

Em. Do you credit the existence of such a thing as a living megatherium or eohippus?

Met. I daresay some men willed such preter-empirical notions and sensings as the ostensibly living creatures to which paleontologists apply the names in question.

Em. They did not exist unless man kept them company?

Met. Not to my belief or faith.

Em. They must have lived, as we have their bones?

Met. Nothing lives, metaphysically, unless as a causal agent, or soul. The existence of a body does not necessarily involve the existence of a soul.

Em. So, there might never have been a living megatherium?

Met. Quite possibly.

Em. You place little account on the ape, as ancestor of man?

Met. I know no apes that have not arisen from man, as preter-empirical notions and sensings.

Em. Your canon of credibility, in regard to ancient happenings, is that man was on the premises to bring the happenings into existence?

Met. Yes; if you can satisfy me that man was available, as causal agent, I am disposed to accept an incandescent earth, geological formations, megatherium, ape, and anything else in the way of ancient events that scientific folk may discover.

Em. But, you reject the sort of evidence satisfactory to uniformitarians, paleontologists, mathematicians, *et hoc*, for ancient happenings?

Met. Yes; I reject it *en bloc*, because it is evidence for the happening of the impossible.

Em. What do you hold about the origin of man?

Met. That God created the matter-soul, mind, and souls, and determined that two souls should hypnotise the matter-soul, to the result of willing preter-empirical notions and sensings, thoughts, feelings.

Em. The souls were man and woman?

Met. Yes.

Em. That gets pretty near Genesis.

Met. Yes; I plump for Genesis rather than for Darwinism.

Em. Assuming brutes to be souls, in what relation do you hold them to human souls?

Met. As different types of mundane souls.

Em. As the human body, from your standpoint, is merely a manifestation of the activity of the soul as willing mind, and, as the human body, in course of development and as matured may be termed an epitome of bodies of what are called lower organisms,

you do not hold, on that ground, descent of the human soul from the brute soul, or, *vice versâ*, descent of brute, from human, soul?

Met. I do not. The structural resemblances or identities to which you refer, and on which are based empirical speculations about the descent of man from other organic beings, have no relevancy to the question of descent of causal agents, as souls; but merely indicate that man wills sensings as his own body, in conjunctions, as resemblances, with other sensings, as animal bodies.

Em. So, the Darwinian theory of descent is irrelevant to the contingency it is taken to establish?

Met. As irrelevant as would be the inference that I was descended from a portrait of my grandmother on the wall of my room. Assuming a dog or ape to know its own body, as I know it, as a sensing, the fact will merely indicate that the dog or ape and I will mind in top storey, as sensing, to like effect. The dog's or ape's body will be my, and the dog's or ape's mind. The contingency has no bearing on the issue of my descent from the dog or ape, but merely evidences that I will mind, as sensing, embracing mind, as sensing, willed by the dog or ape.

Em. The Darwinian theory of descent is a mere logic of illusion confounding products of the activity of causal agents with the agents themselves?

Met. Nothing more. Darwinian sequences are merely sequences of willing experiences, as sensings called bodies, about which man can predicate nothing but that they are his own experiences. Assuming that an ape wills such a body as its experience, as man wills as the ape body, as his experience, the fact is utterly foreign to the question

of necessary sequence in regard to the man and ape as causal agents.

Em. The like, I suppose, applies to thoughts and feelings, assuming the ape to will them as does the man?

Met. Certainly. Nothing is proved about derivative connection between causal agents through identification of empirical relationships between experiences.

Em. Nothing could change an ape soul into a man soul?

Met. Nothing but annihilation and a fresh creation by God.

Em. Darwinian change, called evolution, only exists because man determines it as his common, empirical illusion?

Met. Obviously. It is nothing but a formal figment, convenient for classification, like other empirical postulations of necessary sequence.

Em. No species can originate, as change, from another species of animal?

Met. What is called species is merely experience determined by man for himself, as sensings. The problem of the origin of species, is the causal problem of man's determining his experiences.

Em. Measuring up man by Darwinism seems about as profitable a business as trying to bite the back of one's head.

Met. Like other empirical edifices, it is a crumbling ruin at the touch of metaphysic.

Em. What applies to Darwinism, in the sensory arena, applies in the psychical arena?

Met. Certainly. When Darwin argues, on the ground that there is more difference in mental power

between a lamprey and one of the higher apes, than between the ape and man, to the conclusion that man's mental and moral powers emanate from powers in lower types, Darwin implies that thoughts and feelings, instead of agents that think and feel, manifest causal activity. There are no mental powers in apes, but as thoughts and feelings determined as his own experience, by man. Darwin argues from the implicit premise that thoughts and feelings are causal agents, as it were sprouting from one another.

Em. Darwin puts the cart before the horse. If there is any contingency of descent, it is merely one of lower types emanating from the human type, as trains of thinking, feeling, sensing, constituting the mind of the human type.

Met. Yes; Darwinism is a system of logical plausibility, implying, as does transcendental physics, that the impossible happens: that man can know what he does not determine as his own experience.

Em. If the assumed causal agents do what Darwin implies they do, they merely will among themselves, sensings, thoughts, feelings the totality of which are willed by man.

Met. Obviously.

Em. Instead of man's development from the lower types, the real contingency is the development of the lower types from man?

Met. Yes; man is the *fons et origo;* the *vis a tergo.*

Em. If there is evolution, it is from man to the lamprey; not from the lamprey to man?

Met. Man constitutes what is called evolution, by constituting and responding to consensuses of suggestion. Whether there are or are not causal agents

willing, as their own minds, constituents of man's mind, is utterly irrelevant to the question of sequential necessity as between the agents.

Em. If there be any contingency of descent of causal agents, it can only occur as sequences of creative determinism, by God?

Met. To talk of descent at all, in the sense of Darwinism, is to talk nonsense, from the standpoint of scientific causation, because the implication is that man has identified limitations in the Creator's power to create souls. The Darwinian implication is that God must create souls in specific sequences, and that man has identified the sequences.

Em. The Darwinian thinks he can get along without a Creator.

Met. Of course he would reject the implication I suggest; nevertheless, Darwinism leads to it, metaphysically scrutinised. The only causal agents, scientifically demonstrable, are human souls. About the existence of other causal agents, we can postulate nothing but varying degrees of probability.

Em. We know nothing about a lamprey or its experiences, but as our experiences.

Met. Accordingly, we can grant no existence to the lamprey, but as our own mind. If there is any other lamprey than as our sensing, we can know nothing about it.

Em. The atheistic revival under the auspices of Darwinism is a pretty sort of mess.

Met. A necessary preliminary to the reinvigoration of religion.

Em. Do you believe in progress, in the Darwinian sense?

Met. It has no significance to me.

Em. You hold that there is no progress—that things are as they were, essentially?

Met. Yes; progress is only an empirical illusion for people who judge the past by the criterion of the present, and are, accordingly, merely swayed by the same sort of satisfaction with their own conditions as induced satisfaction of earlier people with their conditions.

Em. You hold that the locomotive and train is an advance on the old stage-coach; the modern steel, on the old flint, cutting implement?

Met. Yes; but my satisfaction with my implements is no greater than was the satisfaction of the paleolithic savage with his. I am no better qualified to decide an absolute standard of perfection than was the old savage.

Em. You act on the assumption that you are qualified to decide?

Met. Certainly; and so does the savage. That merely involves that I and the savage select according to our God-determined limits of apprehension. The fact is irrelevant to my having a better criterion of progress than has the savage.

Em. The savage will probably own the superiority of civilised implements over his.

Met. Then, he will submit to the civilised consensus imposing criterion of superiority. Still, the problem of progress will be *in statu quo*.

Em. Do you not hold that your moral conditions would be better than those prevailing?

Met. Certainly. To me, the prevalent conditions called moral, are essentially those of the primitive savage.

Em. You would eradicate present conditions by any means you could command?

Met. Undoubtedly.

Em. Why should you trouble, if there is no criterion of progress?

Met. Because I hold that my duty is to act according to the belief God has put in me.

Em. And if other people, acting on their belief opposing yours, act as you do?

Met. I shall oppose their action, and shall try to enable them to believe as I do. I hold that no person of average intelligence who faces my credentials can reject them on the ground of belief, and that if such a person rejects them against his belief, he is lower in the moral scale than was the paleolithic savage. Without troubling about the problem of progress or regress, I know that one principle is right, another wrong, and that my business, as a moral agent, is to ensure the prevalence of the principle I know to be right.

Em. What is called material progress seems a very trivial affair from your standpoint.

Met. It is. The only sort of progress that seems to me of vital moment is moral: the establishment of what I believe to be principle consistent with performance of duty to God.

DUOLOGUE XXX.

CONSENSUS OF SUGGESTION.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. Metaphysically, the identification of sensings as things coming through the sense-organs from some outside source, is illusion?

Met. Of course. Sensings are sensings because they are particular types of experiences. There is plenty of empirical proof, quite apart from metaphysic, of the fact of the independence of sensory experience of the application of sense-organs—nothing, themselves, but sensings.

Em. All our empirical subjectivity and objectivity is chimerical?

Met. Dreams, somnambulism, clairvoyance are empirically conclusive that there is no necessity to use sense-organs, to sense.

Em. Still, a person born blind cannot see.

Met. Or, a person born without legs, walk; or, a person without a brain, think. Such facts prove nothing, causally.

Em. From your standpoint, a brain or sense-organ is, causally, merely equivalent to a knife.

Met. Exactly. A knife is a fetish facilitating our willing of cutting; a brain is a fetish facilitating our willing of thoughts.

Em. It is metaphysically possible to think without a brain?

Met. Metaphysically, quite possible. Empirically, there is no proof of such possibility in regard to the brain; in regard to sense-organs, there is plenty. A clairvoyant may have as vivid a visual impression of the interior of a room he has never normally seen, as has a person in the room.

Em. The clairvoyant sees it as an apparition?

Met. He may see it as an apparition only in the sense that normal seeing is apparitional.

Em. He really sees the room?

Met. He may do; as really as you see this room.

Em. How is that possible?

Met. The clairvoyant is hyper-suggestible to consensuses of suggestion, and to individual, or telepathic, suggestion. As responding to the latter sort of suggestion, he may see the room through suggestion of a person, or persons, familiar with it, and with whom he is more or less intimate. Or, he may see it merely as responding to a consensus of suggestion, through which that room exists as what may be termed an established sensing.

Em. The room is that particular room through what you call a consensus of suggestion?

Met. Yes; all experiences become, as I may say, common property, through consensuses of suggestion. A house, a tree, a mountain, an ornament are empirically fixed in this or that so-called place, or moved about, through consensuses of suggestion.

Em. Will you explain this in a little more detail?

Met. The metaphysical mind, as we have seen, is the totality of possible experience. It is willed, in lowest storey, in its entirety, by every soul. To

become practical mind, any fragment of the metaphysical mind has to be willed into top storey, by some soul. Once that fragment has been willed in top storey, it goes into mnemonic storey. Then, all souls are willing that fragment in mnemonic storey, except such souls as are willing it in top storey. The willing of the latter souls involves the operation of consensus of suggestion.

Em. Souls are, as it were, mutually dominating one another?

Met. Yes; as suggesting the particular experience.

Em. That is what constitutes the fixity of things?

Met. Yes; and their evanescence. What is called evolution involves the prevalence of one or another consensus of suggestion.

Em. I see things as they are in this room, because everybody is willing the things in mnemonic storey?

Met. Yes; and you are taking suggestion to will them in top storey.

Em. And when I go out of the room?

Met. You are responding to some other consensus of suggestion, and are helping others to suggest the room in top storey, to anybody who may, as you say, enter it.

Em. So, the clairvoyant sees the room through responding to consensuses of suggestion, just as does the person who is in the room?

Met. Virtually so.

Em. Then, why cannot anybody see the room without going near it?

Met. Because ordinary people are not so suggestible to consensuses of suggestion imposing that room in top storey. Their suggestibility limits

them to willing that room in top storey, only on the condition of walking into it and applying eyes.

Em. The clairvoyant, as it were, takes a leap to the sensings incident to a particular consensus?

Met. Yes; thereby omitting responses to a number of consensuses to which ordinary people perforce respond when they walk into the room.

Em. The clairvoyant's response is, as it were, concentrated; ordinary folk's diffused?

Met. Yes; you may figure the case that way. The clairvoyant omits response to consensuses imposing experiences, as what I term bridges, leading to the room.

Em. Do I understand your meaning to be that, when I enter the room from outside, the garden walk, front door, hall, stairs, etc., are what you term bridges?

Met. Yes; any experience empirically leading to another, I term a bridge, which is incidental to the willing of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. I suppose that thoughts and feelings, as well as sensings, are imposed by consensuses?

Met. Yes; all conventions of experience are so imposed.

Em. Etiquette, propriety, sentiment, opinion, and so on, depend on the prevalence of one or another consensus of suggestion?

Met. Yes; it is hardly possible to act, think, or feel except as slave to some consensus of suggestion.

Em. Is it possible at all?

Met. To some extent, for believers, and for people we call discoverers, inventors, seers, thinkers, lunatics.

Em. How do consensuses originate?

Met. Through God's determinism, involving that particular souls shall initiate dominant suggestions, by bringing fragments of the metaphysical mind into top storey.

Em. It would seem that we were all pretty well knuckled down by consensuses.

Met. Yes; they do not allow much scope for spontaneity. The person who is not slave of consensuses is a sort of pariah.

Em. Everybody has a half-brick on full cock for him. "Britons never will be slaves" sounds funny, when one thinks of consensuses.

Met. Yes; it would seem advisable to eliminate the letter "n" from the second word of the proclamation.

Em. You said that Home, the medium, raised himself, independently of mechanical support. I suppose that would involve his resisting a consensus of suggestion?

Met. Yes; spiritistic phenomena, generally, involve such resistance.

Em. It is merely a consensus of suggestion that keeps this table on the floor?

Met. Just as it is one or another consensus that puts the sun in one part of the heavens in the morning; another, in the afternoon.

Em. If a person had suitable power of resistance, he might make the sun stand still in the sky, by nullifying the customary consensus?

Met. Certainly; just as Home nullified customary consensuses by making the balance record a non-existent weight.

Em. Metaphysic is good for softening the starch of certain cocksure authorities about miracles.

Met. Miracles are merely examples of resistance to consensuses of suggestion.

Em. The theologians ought not to be happy until they got metaphysic.

Met. From the standpoint of metaphysic, the criterions applied by current criticism, to so-called miracle, are contemptible. It is, as you suggest, time that theologians supplemented—I would say, superseded—their conventional methods of meeting what is called rationalist criticism of religion, by applying the metaphysical germicide to critical pretensions which do not even apprehend the rudiments of the crucial problems they pretend to decide. When, as I hope we may, we discuss the religious and ethical bearings of the science of causation, I daresay we shall bring to light some pregnant results adapted to startle the equanimity both of theologians and their atheistic adversaries.

Em. The theologians, at any rate, want nudging out of their slumbers. They don't seem good for much but advertising the tub-thumping sort of critics of religion.

Met. The issues, at present considered vital, by matter-of-fact critics of religion, are only extrinsic incidents to religion. I hope that I shall be able to render this point clear to you, in later discussions specially devoted to religion and morality. For the present, I propose that we limit our discussions to what I may term the phenomenal department of metaphysic, our special concern being the bearing of the science of causation on the concepts of empirical science.

Em. There does not seem much more business of that sort before us. Those concepts are *in articulo*

mortis. We only want the undertaker to measure for the coffin.

Met. The sooner the concepts are out of the way, as perturbing judgment of the problem of religion, the better it will be for humanity.

Em. It seems that we might apply the common notion of mind, as a thinking agent, to affording us an anthropomorphic grip of the mind of the Creator, taking consensuses of suggestion, as the mind of the Creator, to be equivalent to thoughts, feelings, sensings, as our individual minds.

Met. Yes; your picture may facilitate gratification of our hankering for an anthropomorphic Deity.

Em. As I experience in terms of thoughts, feelings, sensings, God experiences in terms of consensuses of suggestion. God manifests Himself to Himself, through consensuses of suggestion imposed on humanity, as I manifest myself to myself through thoughts, feelings, sensings as my response to particular consensuses. So, God's mind, as analogy to the empirical mind of the individual, is thinkable as all the consensuses that condition humanity: the substitution of one for another consensus, constituting what we call mental evolution, being taken as equivalent, in regard to God's thinking, to successions of ordinary experiences, in regard to the creature.

Met. Your analogy, taken merely as illusion affording us some sort of conceptual anchorage, may be useful. On the other hand, when we think of God as an experiencing agent, we are apt to fall away from conception of God as a causal agent. Any humouring of our empirical notions of ourselves as thinking, as distinguished from willing, agents,

tends to obscure the causal fact that our thinking is merely the appropriating of what is already, as I may say, thought for us.

Em. It seems impossible to think of God as not an experiencing agent.

Met. We can mentally dissociate experiences from ourselves, contemplating them, as objects with which we deal, as more or less transient extrinsics to our essential selves as causal agents.

Em. Even then, we are within the limitations of experience.

Met. Certainly; but it is experience that drives us beyond itself, telling us that thoughts, feelings, sensings, and our essential selves are not necessarily bound together.

Em. Of course, we know nothing about experience, but as thought, feeling, sensing.

Met. As *our* thought, feeling, sensing. So, if we attribute experience to God, there is only our experience available for attribution. As I hope to show, in our next series of conversations, such attribution leads to much misconception in regard to moral and religious issues. Much of the apparent force of modern atheistic attacks on religion emanates from conception of God as an experiencing agent—practically implying an agent limited by our experiences.

Em. I quite see that point. The atheist urges: look at your God, how good He is! how He loves, pities, recognises justice! Then come such bombs as "I will dash them one against another, even the fathers and sons together, saith the Lord: I will not pity, nor spare, nor have mercy, but destroy them." "Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, Put every man

his sword by his side, and go in and out from gate to gate throughout the camp, and slay every man his brother, and every man his companion, and every man his neighbour."

Met. The atheist's bomb carries destruction, at this day, unless we free ourselves of the illusion of a God limited by experience, which can only be, to our apprehension, our own experience.

Em. I am not quite clear about the meaning in regard to what you have earlier said about consensuses of suggestion. You stated that the operation of a consensus involved any bringing of mind from mnemonic into top storey?

Met. Yes.

Em. So, once anybody, as discoverer, has brought any experience into top storey, the experience goes into mnemonic storey, and everybody is then willing it, as metaphysically existing, in that storey?

Met. That is the case.

Em. Was that experience, as metaphysically existing, willed before the discoverer brought it into top storey?

Met. Necessarily, it was so willed; otherwise there would have been nothing for the discoverer to bring into top storey. Until the experience is brought into top storey, by the discoverer, it exists as constituent of what you called, in an earlier conversation, the primitive mind, fresh from the Creator, which you distinguished from mind as metaphysically existing in mnemonic storey.

Em. I remember. We were then discussing the metaphysical mind. Then, am I to understand that the discoverer who first brings an experience

out of the primitive mind does not submit to a consensus of suggestion?

Met. The primitive mind, itself, involves a consensus of suggestion, which I term, preter-empirical.

Em. A sort of collective omniscience in the womb.

Met. Such it may be termed. It is the condition of the existence of ordinary consensus of suggestion through which experience is determined in top storey, and rendered persistent, as metaphysically existing, in mnemonic storey.

Em. I see that nothing can exist, as experience, until a discoverer has brought mind into top storey, from the primitive mind.

Met. In relation to the primitive mind, or preter-empirical consensus, the discoverer may be considered as is an ordinary person, to the consensus imposing mind in mnemonic storey.

Em. He responds to the preter-empirical consensus analogously as a person responds to an ordinary consensus when he brings mind from mnemonic into top storey?

Met. Yes.

Em. What we call evolution seems to depend on the response of discoverers to the preter-empirical consensus.

Met. Such is the case. All initiation of experience depends on such response.

Em. A different sort of evolution from that of the biologists and other ologists. Columbus was not a discoverer, in our present sense of the term?

Met. Not, as discovering America. That discovery merely involved his response to consensuses in full, empirical operation. The real discoverers,

bringing what is absolutely fresh out of the primitive mind, by responding to the preter-empirical consensus, are extremely rare souls, and are generally esteemed in inverse ratio to their rarity, by their contemporaries.

Em. Yes; even the ordinary innovator generally gets measured at the price of the pickpocket.

Met. The result is inevitable. To appreciate discovery, one must be very near the discoverer, in capacity to respond to the preter-empirical consensus.

Em. The preter-empirical consensus seems to be a collective willing of metaphysical existence, as what you term the possible universe or metaphysical mind.

Met. It is.

Em. A collective response of all souls, to the Creator, continuing from the first human beings to us.

Met. Yes.

Em. So everybody is as efficient as anybody else at the business of responding to the preter-empirical consensus.

Met. No; that is not the case. I can hardly be considered as efficient in responding to an ordinary consensus involving the willing into top storey of a place in the centre of China, as is a person living there.

Em. No; I see I was wrong. The discoverer is more efficient than the ordinary person, because he brings the primitive mind into top storey. Still, we must all equally be constituting the preter-empirical consensus?

Met. Certainly; but responding to it, and con-

stituting it, are two different contingencies. I am constituting the consensus involving the place in China, in mnemonic storey; but, I am not responding to it, as bringing the place into top storey.

Em. The distinction is now obvious to me, and I see the difference between a discoverer and a person who merely brings mind out of mnemonic, into top storey.

DUOLOGUE XXXI.

THOUGHT.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. I should like us to discuss, in more detail than we have done, the nature of a thought itself.

Met. That will be a very elusive subject of discussion, because we have to discuss in terms of the subject of discussion itself. To define a sensing or feeling in terms of thought is comparatively easy. To define the nature of thought, limited as we are to thought as machinery of definition, is difficult.

Em. What is the best you can do in the way of definition?

Met. Considered generically, a thought is will-pulse with experiential colour. The experiential colour, constituting the will-pulse an empirical thought, is incident to the linking of the will-pulse to a sensing or feeling, as apparition.

Em. The will-pulse, apart from the linking, has no experiential colour?

Met. None.

Em. So, one pure thought, as will-pulse, cannot be differentiated from another?

Met. It cannot. It can only be experientially identified as will-pulse.

Em. Can you experientially identify the will-pulse?

Met. I can; and I daresay you can, if you try. You will probably notice that when you think a sensing or feeling, the empirical thought does not seem to reveal itself of its own initiative, as does a sensing or feeling, but seems to be thrust forward by what I may term a compulsive afflatus which vanishes so soon as the thought is there in its integrity.

Em. I think I do notice something of the sort when I think a particular sensing or feeling and set myself to analyse what occurs.

Met. Do you not notice a difference, in that respect, between any case of sensing or feeling, and the case of thinking?

Em. Yes; I can identify no such compulsive introduction of sensing or feeling. Feelings and sensings seem to come quite unbidden and spontaneously.

Met. The introductory, colourless compulsion is thought as will-pulse.

Em. You say that this will-pulse ties itself to an apparition of a sensing or feeling?

Met. Yes.

Em. So, when we think a sensing or feeling, we also imagine it, as apparition?

Met. Yes. The empirical thought involves that the unsophisticated thought, as will-pulse, is tied to the apparition.

Em. So, the thought itself is quite distinct from its empirical correlative: the apparition, through which it becomes empirical thought?

Met. Quite.

Em. It is what may be termed bodiless, as being about nothing in particular?

Met. Quite bodiless. When it has individuality, it is empirical thought, sophisticated through the conjunct willing of the apparition.

Em. The thought of a feeling or sensing seems very different from the feeling or sensing itself.

Met. The degree of difference will be according to the vividness of the particular apparition, which will depend on the intensity of the consciousness-sensation that may be willed with it. With a certain intensity of the consciousness-sensation, the experience is no longer apparitional, but is what we call real. Then the thought goes into mnemonic storey, and we have an actual sensing or feeling as the case may be.

Em. It is only a case of thought so long as the will-pulse as it were preponderates over the apparition?

Met. Only on that condition.

Em. How does that apply in the case of what is called abstract thought? Take the thought, conclusion—that can never be anything but thought, can it?

Met. Certainly it can. So far as "conclusion" is thought, it is apparition of a psychical feeling to which the will-pulse is preponderant, just as in the case of a thought sensing.

Em. If the thought, conclusion, is not abstract, what should you call an abstract thought?

Met. I do not know any thought that does not involve an apparition of a sensing or feeling.

Em. That seems tantamount to denying abstract thought.

Met. The only thought to which I would apply the term "abstract," would be the will-pulse. I hold that all thoughts commonly considered abstract are constitutively identical with any other thoughts.

Em. Can we not think a triangle that is not any particular triangle?

Met. Only as a will-pulse and empirically mixed apparitions of specific triangles.

Em. Is not a number, as quantitative thought, abstract?

Met. No more than is the triangle. A number, as quantitative thought, is merely the empirical accumulation of conjunctions of willing sensings or feelings; the accumulation involving apparitions of the multiplicity-sensation, as memories.

Em. Take the thought, give—how should you account for it as involving apparition?

Met. When we think, give, we will apparitions of psychical feelings, as gratification, renunciation; or, of sensory feeling, as movement, with sensings, as an object said to be given; or, of psychical feelings, as sympathy, pity, said to be rendered, bestowed, given.

Em. The thought, difficult?

Met. That involves apparitions of the psychical feelings, lack of power, desire, dissatisfaction, unrest, perplexity, effort.

Em. An empirical thought seems to be very complex in regard to apparitions involved.

Met. It is always complex in that respect, though the complexity is practically concealed through the predominance of the will-pulse constituting the pure thought. We may take, as analogy to this blending and practical suppression of individuality of apparitions, the case of the phonograph as reproducing

the sounds of an orchestra. According to empirical acoustics, the phonograph does not record the tones of each instrument, but records the whole body of sound issuing from a number of instruments.

Em. Thoughts, like feelings and sensings, are fixed in the metaphysical mind?

Met. They are fixed as constituting the metaphysical mind.

Em. A person discovering a new thought has to bring it out of the primitive mind?

Met. Yes; by willing particular apparitions with the will-pulse as pure thought.

Em. You say that no class of experience can be transformed into another class; while you also say that a thought involves apparitions of other experiences. Does not that involve that the other experiences, as the apparitions, are transformed into thought?

Met. No; the will-pulse with apparitions, as empirical thought, is inherently distinct from apparitions without the will-pulse.

Em. The will-pulse determines the apparitional element as thought; but, as thought, no apparition is transformed?

Met. That is the contingency. The apparition is intact, dominated by the will-pulse. The domination of the will-pulse is the thought itself. The apparitional element merely involves that the will-pulse is in an empirical category.

Em. The will-pulse, as it were, seizes the apparition?

Met. Yes. The will-pulse is active; the apparition, inert.

Em. Like the steam and the locomotive?

Met. Somewhat analogous, though we must not push the analogy far.

Em. As the steam sets the locomotive going, the will-pulse sets the thought going?

Met. That will do as a concrete picture.

Em. You hold that every empirical thought may be ultimately traced to some apparition of a sensing or feeling to which the will-pulse is predominant?

Met. I do.

Em. In what we call a flow of thought, as distinguished from an isolated thought, the will-pulse is empirically non-existent?

Met. The will-pulse is only distinguishable in the case of deliberate thought, incident to willing the feeling called effort, and in the case of thoughts within what we call a train or stream, the contents of which are mainly nothing but will-pulses, as experience.

Em. The apparitional elements being practically lost?

Met. Except in regard to some thought or thoughts which empirically stand as peaks in the train, and are willed as memories incidentally to what we call the conclusion. The other thoughts of the train constitute a flow of will-pulses practically void of the apparitional element.

Em. The fact of the apparitionless will-pulses, in the case of a train of thought, is plain to me. We are practically unconscious of the majority of the thoughts. Still, we can detect the onrush of the will-pulses, as a sort of gust.

Met. Anybody who analyses his experiences will readily verify the fact of the will-pulses.

Em. It seems that your proposition regarding the

seizing of apparitions, by will-pulses, is tantamount to granting association of thoughts.

Met. Not of empirical thoughts, which is the psychological implication. Will-pulses, as pure thoughts, may be said to associate through determinism by the Creator. This is quite another contingency from that of attributing causal activity to empirical thoughts as determining their own relationships.

Em. A flow of thought seems comparable to ordinary movement; the conclusion, to an obstacle stopping the movement.

Met. Yes; the psychical is analogous to sensory movement.

Em. When we measure up, we stop the movement.

Met. Just as when we analyse relative position, we stop sensory movement. So soon as we involve what we call meaning and intelligibility, we will special feelings into top storey, and the stream into mnemonic storey, bringing one or another member of the stream, as some particular thought or thoughts, into top storey, as memory.

Em. Meaning and intelligibility are distinct from thoughts?

Met. Yes; they are special feelings willed in conjunction with thoughts.

Em. And what we call the conclusion, incident to a run of thinking?

Met. Is another special feeling, quite distinct from thought.

Em. How do we come to take thoughts as symbols of sensings and feelings, and words as symbols of thoughts?

Met. Through establishing and submitting to consensuses of suggestion involving that we will the multiplicity-sensation constituting the conjunctions.

Em. When a person resists the consensuses, he may be crazy, imbecile, and so on?

Met. Yes; or merely what we term, ignorant, obtuse, stupid, eccentric.

Em. There is nothing inherent, in empirical thoughts, involving that they tie themselves to one another?

Met. Nothing whatever. What is psychologically dealt with as association of ideas is incident to willing the multiplicity-sensation, involving the experience of conjunction. The psychological assumption of association implies that the mere apparitional elements in thoughts are causal agents.

Em. The thoughts, "The dog is a quadruped," imply no forcing of one by another thought?

Met. No more than the anvil and hammer compel the blacksmith to appear. The thoughts empirically compel one another as incident to our submission to consensus of suggestion involving particular willing of the multiplicity-sensation with the thoughts.

Em. How is it that when I will the thought "dog," I think of a dog-show, at the advertisement of which I glanced a week or so ago, but do not think of my own dog in the next room?

Met. Because you will the multiplicity-sensation with the thoughts "dog-show" and "dog" as submitting to a consensus establishing the conjunction.

Em. Why do I will the thought "dog" in the first instance, rather than some other thought?

Met. Because you submit to some consensus imposing the willing of the multiplicity-sensation with some other experience and the thought "dog."

Em. Every time I jump or glide from one stream of thoughts, or from one thought to another thought or stream of thoughts, I respond to one or another consensus of suggestion imposing particular willings of the multiplicity-sensation?

Met. Yes; that is what you do in the associative contingency.

Em. It is hard to conceive a consensus of suggestion for every possible line of thought.

Met. Either you must start the consensus, or it must be there for you to respond to. If you start a consensus imposing a particular willing of the multiplicity-sensation with other experiences, you will be the first to will one set of experiences as associating with another, as a particular conjunction. That conjunction, when you have done with it, as top storey experience, will go into mnemonic storey, available for others to submit to, as associative willing.

Em. All possible conjunctions exist as consensuses?

Met. All possible existing ones do.

Em. Whether as single thoughts, or streams of thought?

Met. Yes; and whether as conjunctions of sensings or of feelings. You cannot think, feel, sense, without submitting to, resisting, or originating some consensus of suggestion. Whatever is once thought, felt, sensed goes in mnemonic storey, and thereby involves a consensus of suggestion available, for submission, to any soul.

Em. So, whenever I think, I, as it were, select some consensus to which to respond?

Met. Yes; and you do the same whenever you sense or feel.

Em. There is nothing in the way of spontaneity in my thinking and feeling and sensing?

Met. Nothing, beyond your submitting to one or another consensus; unless, of course, you initiate a consensus.

Em. Why do I submit to one rather than to another consensus?

Met. Because you are determined, by God.

Em. No freedom of selection?

Met. Yes; because you do not know how you are determined to select.

Em. In associative willing of thoughts, there is not the slightest inherent power in thoughts, to cohere?

Met. Not the slightest in regard to thoughts in their empirical aspect. Coherence is purely a matter of willing the multiplicity-sensation, the willing of which involves submission to one or another consensus.

Em. Do you mean that through willing the multiplicity-sensation with the thoughts, say, "Going home, to-day," I render them coherent?

Met. I mean that, in regard to empirical, or psychological, association.

Em. And that, through failing to will the multiplicity-sensation with the thoughts, say, "nuisance, egg, hard," they are not coherent?

Met. Yes. If you willed the multiplicity-sensation with the thoughts, "nuisance, egg, hard," they would become coherent.

Em. How?

Met. As implying that you did not like a hard-boiled egg.

Em. The willing of the multiplicity-sensation would make that difference?

Met. Yes; you would then respond to a consensus imposing the multiplicity-sensation with the feeling of aversion and a hard-boiled egg. You might express the aversion, by the word "nuisance."

Em. A thought, or train of thought occasionally comes into my head, and I cannot, by the most rigid scrutiny, connect it with a preceding train, or thought.

Met. Then, you do not respond to a consensus, as involving conjunction. That is a common manifestation by people we call demented, and it is not uncommon with perfectly sane people.

Em. Why should a person fly off at a tangent in that way?

Met. He would not do so, were there any inherent association in thoughts. He flies off at the tangent because he responds to consensuses that do not impose conjunction as between themselves.

Em. What we call sanity would seem to be response to consensuses imposing conjunction as between themselves.

Met. Yes; that is the test of psychical sanity.

Em. There is nothing inherently sane or insane in thoughts?

Met. Nothing. The sanity or insanity is incident to submission or resistance to consensuses imposing conjunctions.

Em. What is wrong with the lunatic is not his thinking, but his response to consensuses?

Met. That is the mischief with him. He responds to consensuses not imposing conjunction between themselves, and, corollarily, resists consensuses imposing such conjunction.

Em. What applies to thoughts, I suppose applies to words, as symbolising them. The association of words with thoughts is incident to submission to consensuses imposing the conjunctions?

Met. Yes; failure to respond, in regard to words and thoughts, involves analogous aberration as in the case of thoughts themselves. The various so-called aphasias are comparatively familiar examples of such resistance.

Em. You seem to imply that it is possible to think independently of words, as symbols.

Met. I often do that. My real thinking is virtually done before I put it into words. I look on verbal expression as a sort of easy drudgery.

Em. You don't worry about word-polishing?

Met. No; I have not leisure for that, and if I had, I doubt whether I should consider the result worth the expenditure of the leisure.

Em. You are evidently not appreciative of what is called pure literature.

Met. If I discover what is worth the artistic exercise, as thought, emotion, humour, I derive pleasure from polished expression. In my own case, words come as they may, and I do not worry about them, once they are on paper.

Em. What do I do when I remember thoughts?

Met. You will them with the self-sensation, if you remember them as your own; and with the duration-sensation as empirically past time.

Em. What do I do when I try to remember?

Met. You will the feeling of effort, and you respond, more or less readily, to the consensus imposing the willing of what you try to remember.

Em. But how do I know, as determination or intention, to what to apply effort, when what I try to remember is out of my mind?

Met. It makes no difference, causally, whether you know or do not know.

Em. If I determine to put on my hat, but not my gloves, I put on my hat.

Met. Not because you determine; but because you respond to a particular consensus imposing the putting on of the hat. If you were hypnotised, and the hypnotist told you you could not put on your hat, however you might determine, you could not put it on, because you would submit to the consensus imposed by the hypnotist.

Em. As not hypnotised, if a person tells me I cannot put on my hat, I put it on.

Met. The contrary results of the same assertion are good empirical illustration of the fallacy of the psychological attribution of causal efficiency to thoughts, as so-called association.

Em. That's clear. If association of thoughts involves my putting on the hat when one person tells me I cannot; failing to put it on when another person tells me the same, association is out of court as causally affecting the event.

Met. So it is in regard to remembering. You do not remember through associating thoughts; but through responding to one or another consensus of suggestion. No experience has any inherent, necessary connection with another experience.

Behind, determining all empirical connections, is the will, manifested as response to one or another consensus.

Em. The operation of the will-pulse as seizing particular apparitions to constitute empirical thought, seems analogous to what we discussed as interaction between the soul and matter-soul, constituting the thing or object, involving a sort of appropriation of sensings similar to the appropriation of apparitions by the will-pulse.

Met. Yes; the analogy holds. Hypnotism of the matter-soul involves a bodiless, indefinable product, as thing, analogous to pure thought, as will-pulse.

Em. And the thing gets body or colour from the sensing, analogously as the empirical thought is bodied through the apparition?

Met. Yes; the causal conditions of objects of sense and empirical thoughts illustrate what I may term the starting-point and destination of soul-activity.

Em. The starting-point being hypnotism of the matter-soul and sensing; the destination, the will-pulse determining apparition as empirical thought?

Met. Yes.

Em. The hypnotism of the matter-soul affording the material, as sensing, to be seized, as sensory apparition, by the will-pulse?

Met. Exactly—the precondition of thinking being sensing.

Em. Meaning that the matter-soul was hypnotised and sensings willed out of the primitive mind, into top and mnemonic storeys, and back into top

storey as sensory apparitions, in order that empirical thoughts might be willed?

Met. Yes; thought may be termed the pinnacle of an edifice erected on the foundation of hypnotism of the matter-soul and sensing; intermediate to thought and the foundation being sensory and psychical feeling.

Em. In earlier discussion, you said that imagination involved the willing of apparitions. Thought would seem to be a sort of imagination.

Met. It involves imagination, as involving apparition, though imagination, as merely involving apparition, need not involve thought.

Em. Memory involves imagination and thought?

Met. Yes; with the duration-sensation.

Em. The distinctive feature about thought seems to be the dominating will-pulse?

Met. Yes; it is the essential factor.

Em. Analogously as the preter-empirical notion, thing, is the essential factor in regard to the object of sense?

Met. Yes.

Em. The will-pulse involving thought seems distinct from will as causal activity determining general experiences.

Met. It is only distinct as involving a special manifestation of itself as empirical experience.

Em. In regard to sensings and feelings, we have no direct, empirical experience of will?

Met. None. The experience only occurs in the cases of thought and the bare intuition of power. In the case of thought, it occurs as the afflatus, or what you call gust, heralding the apparition involving the empirical thought, and also manifests itself in the

thoughts empirically devoid of apparitional element, in a flow of thinking.

Em. In the case of actions, will manifests itself as the bare intuition of power, without dominating the experience as in the case of thought?

Met. Yes; it has no empirically typifying effect in the case of action.

DUOLOGUE XXXII.

NUMBER.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. What is number?

Met. Will-pulse, as pure thought, dominating apparitions, as willing of the multiplicity-sensation involving conjunctions of experiences.

Em. The will-pulse colours the apparitions of the multiplicity-sensation, as it colours other apparitions in ordinary thought?

Met. Yes; the complexity of a quantitative thought, constituting what is called abstract number, involves imagination, as apparitions, and memories of distinct willings of the multiplicity-sensation involving conjunctions.

Em. The will-pulse seizes the apparitions, as in the case of ordinary thought?

Met. Yes.

Em. The symbolism of quantitative thought, by figures, occurs on the same conditions as the symbolism of ordinary thoughts by words?

Met. Yes.

Em. Suppose I think, "two," does that involve two willings of the multiplicity-sensation?

Met. No; one. Two is the primary quantitative

thought. One is not a thought at all, but is merely an arbitrary sign. In thinking two, you memorise one conjunction of experiences incident to willing the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. When I think three, I memorise two conjunctions of experiences incident to two willings of the multiplicity-sensation, and so on?

Met. Yes, the numbers you think always symbolise conjunctions of experiences, and corollarily, willings of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. I do not think of the experiences themselves that are joined by the multiplicity-sensation?

Met. You may do that; but the essentially constitutive element, apart from the will-pulse itself, of quantitative thought, is apparition of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. So, when I think quantity, in the abstract, as number, I, as it were imagine a mass of multiplicity-sensations lumped together?

Met. That is the contingency.

Em. And when I think quantity, in the concrete, as applying, say, to sensings?

Met. You will still, as you put it, lump together multiplicity-sensations, and may also similarly lump together sensings, as apparitions, or as actual, top-storey experiences. The quantitative thought will symbolise the lumpings together.

Em. When I think twenty, in the abstract, I memorise a certain mass of multiplicity-sensations as conjunctions?

Met. Yes; you may put it that way.

Em. And suppose I think a fractional part of one?

Met. You cannot.

Em. I cannot think half of one?

Met. You cannot.

Em. Why?

Met. For one reason: because you have no apparition of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. Do you hold that I cannot think half of an apple?

Met. You can do that, as invalid imagination, involving parts; but that is not thinking half of one. That is merely remembering a sensing, which you call an apple; seeing two other sensings, and invalidly imagining that what you remember is annihilated, as being changed into the two sensings.

Em. Half of one is different from half an apple?

Met. Obviously. One is not an apple.

Em. What is one?

Met. A black stroke on paper.

Em. Is not it a thought?

Met. No, it is merely an arbitrary sensing taken to symbolise a thought, feeling, or sensing.

Em. I begin to see that. Unless I think "one" with some thought, feeling, or sensing, there is no experience in it of any sort. There is thought in two?

Met. Yes; because there is apparition of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. Well; cannot I think half of two?

Met. You cannot think half of any quantitative thought.

Em. Do you mean to say that I cannot think half at all?

Met. You cannot think half of a quantitative thought.

Em. I can think two and two as making four?

Met. No; you cannot think that. You can merely remember some arbitrary symbols of quantitative thoughts. You cannot think the thoughts as constituting other thoughts.

Em. I can think four as a greater quantitative thought than two?

Met. Yes; as greater mass of apparition of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. Well; if I can think it as greater, I can think it as containing two?

Met. No; you cannot think one quantitative thought as containing another.

Em. When I think, twice two is four, I do that, do I not?

Met. No; you merely remember a conventional sequence of quantitative thoughts—quite a different contingency from thinking one thought as containing another.

Em. I can think a pudding as containing four plums?

Met. Undoubtedly; but that is not equivalent to thinking one quantitative thought as containing four others.

Em. The upshot, from your standpoint, seems to be that arithmetical processes are merely a matter of symbolic formalism.

Met. Nothing more. They are merely conventions of willing sensory symbols, called numbers, of quantitative thoughts.

Em. Matters of memory, rather than thinking?

Met. Just so.

Em. A fraction is not quantitative thought?

Met. Not at all. It is merely an arbitrary symbol of an empirical part of a sensing.

Em. I grant that I cannot think half, quarter, and so on, apart from remembering empirical parts, and I see that I do not think the fractions at all, in ordinary arithmetical operations, but merely remember them as arbitrary symbols.

Met. Whenever you think, in fractions, you think empirical parts of sensings.

Em. Does not the like apply to quantitative thought, as whole numbers?

Met. No; they are real thought, involving apparitions of the multiplicity-sensation.

Em. So, the possibility of fractions is bound up with the possibility of empirical parts?

Met. Certainly; no empirical parts, no fractions.

Em. I would like to argue this matter from my own standpoint. Six is half of twelve. You'll grant that?

Met. Yes; if your twelve can be transformed into sixes, which it cannot.

Em. If there are twelve men, and I separate them into two parties, there are six in each.

Met. Certainly.

Em. Well, the sixes are halves of the twelve, are not they?

Met. But where are the twelve?

Em. There, in the two parties.

Met. No; the two parties are not twelve, but sixes. Immediately you will these sixes into top storey, you have no twelve.

Em. But the men are there.

Met. Certainly; but you are dealing with quantitative thought, as a fraction of twelve; not with the men. Your twelve is a whole which you imagine as cut up into parts. But your twelve is not there.

So, when you predicate about cutting up the twelve, you predicate cutting up nothing.

Em. Suppose I have transformed the twelve into two sixes?

Met. Then, you would need to annihilate the twelve, which is impossible. Moreover, by predicating about the twelve, you imply that you have not annihilated it.

Em. Suppose I remember the twelve?

Met. Then, you have the twelve, intact, in top storey, as memory. So, if you have also the two sixes, you must merely have substituted them for the twelve, in top storey as actual experience, without affecting the integrity of the twelve.

Em. Where have I got the two sixes from?

Met. From where you got the twelve; from mnemonic storey. But you imply that you have got the sixes from the twelve.

Em. I have merely shuffled sixes and the twelve between top and mnemonic storeys?

Met. You have done nothing more. Your fractions of the twelve are merely formal statement of an illusion, involving dogma, that you have turned twelve into two sixes. Really, you have done nothing of the sort.

Em. It is a case of the apple over again.

Met. Yes; what applies to the apple, in the sensory arena, applies to quantitative thought, in the psychical arena. Whether they be sensory or psychical parts, they are equally impossible.

Em. The six men, added to the other six, will be twelve men?

Met. Certainly.

Em. Have not those sixes become twelve?

Met. Yes; as formal statement of an illusion of transformation of two quantitative thoughts into another, single quantitative thought.

Em. Is not that a practically necessary illusion?

Met. Yes; so long as we do not apply it as proving the fact that any men are there.

Em. I see that the illusory fact, as dogma, that twice six is twelve, is irrelevant to the fact of there being twelve men.

Met. And you will also see that the illusory fact that there are a trillion atoms in a grain of lycopodium dust is irrelevant to the fact of there being a part of a grain of dust; and that the illusory fact that it takes a ray of light a thousand years to reach the earth from a star, is irrelevant to the fact of there being a sensory feeling coming to the earth from the star.

Em. Yes; I see that the whole mathematical arsenal has not a proof in it of the fact of the existence of a single thing that man has ever seen, touched, tasted, heard, smelled.

Met. And that it has not a proof of the nature of such things?

Em. No more than it has proof of the fact of the existence of any one of them. Now, I'm going to heckle you in another direction. Do you hold that there are several million people, say, in London?

Met. I hold that a number of figures symbolising quantitative thought representing sensings, as human bodies, may be superposed so as to involve a formal statement of quantity impossible as thought.

Em. You grant the facts arrived at through a census of population?

Met. As a practically necessary hypothesis on

which to act; but the facts represent no quantitative thought for me.

Em. You hold that every human body involves a soul?

Met. Though not absolutely assured on that point, on grounds which I cannot at present properly formulate, but which, I may state, are incident to moral, rather than to purely metaphysical considerations, I do hold that every human body involves a soul.

Em. Then, do you hold, as a practically necessary hypothesis, trillions, quadrillions, quintillions, or what not, of souls, as having willed bodies since the Creation?

Met. No; I cannot apply quantitative thought to souls that are not willing the mundane mind.

Em. Why?

Met. Because they are then only metaphysically existing. About metaphysical existence, we can predicate nothing quantitatively.

Em. You grant that you and I are two souls?

Met. Yes; because I know us both as empirical souls constituted of the intuition of power and the thought, cause. So knowing us, I can will the multiplicity-sensation involving conjunction, as two. In the case of souls of the empirically dead, I cannot will conjunctions involving number.

Em. That's a sort of mystery, like the theological trinity.

Met. I can no more predicate quantitatively about metaphysically existing souls, than about metaphysically existing sensings. Number is an empirical contingency, only applicable to empirical contingencies.

Em. An apparently living human body, not in-

volving a soul, would be merely a speaking, moving visual and tactual apparition?

Met. An apparition rendered normally permanent through consensus of suggestion.

Em. Well; I do know human bodies that seem to answer that description so far as seeming to have nothing worth calling a soul in them or owning them.

Met. The contingency has only very recently forced itself on my attention. So far, I am only a little less assured than I was as to the necessary coincidence of souls to sensings normally permanent, as human bodies.

DUOLOGUE XXXIII.

WILL, CONSCIOUSNESS, SOUL.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Met. You will perhaps see that the points we discussed in our preceding conversation, imply that all we can do, as causal agents, is to deal with what is creatively provided for us, as the possible universe. We cannot add to, or take from, it.

Em. Not a jot or tittle. I see that clearly. There can be no changing of one into another thing. We can do nothing but hoist and lower. No chemist ever made water anything else than water. No mathematics ever turned radium into emanations, light, heat; or turned ether vibrations into light, or air waves into sound. Metaphysic is as good for getting us out of the world of romance, as science is for getting us into it.

Met. The earlier discussion will also perhaps help us to form a conception of the nature of will. Responding to the Creator, as constituting the preter-empirical consensus, involves that will, as it were, embraces or takes to itself the primitive mind, or possible universe.

Em. I see that point. Will, as it were, represents the Creator, as determining metaphysical existence.

Met. That is what I may term the preter-empirical aspect of will. In another aspect, which we may term empirical, will severs itself from, or, as I may say, objectifies, the metaphysical mind, as fragments. This involves the bringing of mind into top storey.

Em. Why, if will does that, should it not bring the whole possible universe into top storey?

Met. Because the Creator has limited its capacity for determining the feeling, the consciousness-sensation, on which the contingency of objectification, or willing into top storey, depends.

Em. You have said, in earlier conversations, that the consciousness-sensation may be compared to a light.

Met. Yes; it is that light which involves the difference between metaphysical existence and top storey experience. The Creator determines that the light shall not be sufficient to illumine more than fragments of the possible universe. Those fragments are what the will can constitute top storey experience.

Em. All the fragments that have once been willed with the light, may be again willed with it, involving the bringing back from mnemonic, into top, storey?

Met. And any fragment that may be willed, as discovery, involves that the Creator determines more of the light, and a special soul to apply the light to the fragment.

Em. To a certain extent, the consciousness-sensation would seem to be equivalent to will itself.

Met. No; it is merely a feeling, though certainly unique as such. Causally, it is as inert as any other experience.

Em. As it involves that all other experiences are in top storey, it would seem that the consciousness-sensation, itself, must be always in top storey.

Met. That it is not, constitutes its uniqueness. While all other constituents of the metaphysical mind are rigidly fixed, as are stones in a mosaic, the consciousness-sensation is intrinsically unstable. On this instability depend what we call the vividness and intensity of other experiences.

Em. I suppose that, as in the case of any other experience, we can predicate nothing about the consciousness-sensation, as metaphysically existing?

Met. No; we can know nothing more than that it metaphysically exists in some intensity, essentially as it exists as experience.

Em. The vividness of a sensing; intensity of a pain; clearness of a thought depend on the intensity of the consciousness-sensation the will, as it were, focusses on the experiences?

Met. Yes; that is broadly the case, though the intensity of the consciousness-sensation is generally of less moment than is its concentration, as abstention from willing it with other experiences than a particular one. We find good examples of such exclusion in hypnotic, trance, and dream states.

Em. As experiences only exist in top storey through the consciousness-sensation, if that feeling does nothing but light up the experiences, why shall not we predicate that, as metaphysically existing, experiences are as in top storey?

Met. Because we can only predicate about experience, and what is metaphysically existing is not experience; except the experience of persistence, as against annihilation.

Em. Might not the experience preserve its identity?

Met. Hardly. How could a body, as infant, youth, adult, so preserve identity?

Em. No; you are right. We must give it up as regards metaphysical existence, beyond affirming the fact.

Met. As a fact, it is inferentially demonstrable; as definition, it cannot be predicated about.

Em. In an earlier conversation, dealing with cause, you said that it existed as a sort of complex of intuition of power and thought—the thought constituting what might be termed a revelation of identity of causal agency, and of experiences as empirically and illusively causal.

Met. Yes; I did define to that effect.

Em. Then, am I to consider what we are now dealing with, as will, to be cause, as the intuition of power, as well as the thought?

Met. No. Will is the essentially active principle, as constituent of the causal complex. As involving cause, as thought, will has to bring the thought into top storey, as in any other contingency of top storey experience.

Em. Then, the thought, cause, is, as it were, an extrinsic to the essentially causal agency?

Met. It is extrinsic, as being mind, determined by the causal agency. On the other hand, as revelation of the preter-empirical agency, it is intrinsic to it, as rendering the causal agency aware of its own identity.

Em. Then, I suppose I may take it that will is the intuition of power revealed in its essential significance, as active agent, by thought, as cause?

Met. That is the contingency. The causal complex is incident to the revelation, by the thought, cause, of the active significance of the intuition of power. Alone, without the thought, as interpretation, the mere intuition of power would afford us no experience as actively determinate agency.

Em. The intrinsic union of the thought, cause, and the intuition of power, seems analogous to the intrinsic union of continuously changing relative position and distance-sensation, constituting movement.

Met. Yes; the analogy holds.

Em. I suppose that what you call the soul is the causal complex: will and the thought, cause?

Met. Yes. As empirically existing, we know soul as the intuition of power, or will, and the thought, cause. As metaphysically existing, we cannot predicate about it definitively.

Em. Implying that, as *ens*, or essential personality which you call, soul, we can only know ourselves as causal complex?

Met. We can only so know ourselves.

Em. As practically distinct individualities, I suppose that we also know ourselves through what you call the self-sensation, involving what is commonly called self-consciousness?

Met. Yes; the self-sensation affords us practically conclusive knowledge of our own identity, as distinct from other identities.

Em. I remember we discussed its significance when we were earlier considering monism.

Met. The knowledge incident to the self-sensation is not knowledge of ourselves as causal agents; but merely as individualities distinct from other individu-

alities. Knowledge of ourselves as causal agents depends, exclusively, on the will, as intuition of power, and the thought, cause.

Em. Behind all, as it were, pulling the strings, is the metaphysically existing soul, as the active personality itself?

Met. Manifesting itself, primarily, as will, and incidentally to the operation of will, as the bringing of mind into top storey.

Em. If there is intrinsic union, as the soul, of the thought, cause, and the intuition of power, may there not also be such union in the case of thoughts, feelings, sensings generally, and that intuition, involving that mind is constituent of the soul?

Met. The intrinsic union of the intuition of power and the thought cause, is only an empirical contingency.

Em. As it were supplying us with a label by which we may identify soul, analogously as the apparition labels thought?

Met. Yes; we can predicate nothing about such a union as constituting the metaphysically existing soul.

Em. Analogously as we can predicate nothing about colour, shape, size as a metaphysically existing object of sense?

Met. Yes; we can predicate nothing about metaphysical existence, but the fact. As definition, we cannot deal with it. Definition is an empirical contingency; metaphysical existence transcends that contingency.

Em. Empirical existence is like a coral islet in a vast expanse of ocean.

Met. Yes; or like a flash of light momentarily dispersing black obscurity. Before and after empirical existence is the undefinable, from which it emerges, and into which it sinks.

Em. Have you formulated any speculation regarding the origin of souls?

Met. Yes; in my work *Heresies.* I assume that Creative determinism involved the existence of two souls: the matter-soul and the organic-soul. These souls I call ante-cosmic.

Em. As ante-cosmic, would the organic soul be differentiated as individual souls?

Met. No; in the first case, as involving the creation of humanity, the differentiation would occur as what may be termed the disintegration of the ante-cosmic organic soul through the immediate determinism of God. Later differentiations, involving what we call births, would occur as specific response of the ante-cosmic soul, involving its further disintegration, to individualised, or mundane souls. This response of the ante-cosmic soul to mundane souls, involves what we may later deal with as pre-natal suggestion, involving what biologists deal with as heredity.

Em. What about the matter-soul—would it be similarly differentiated so as to involve differentiated response, as preter-empirical notions and sensings, to the mundane soul?

Met. No; the differentiation involving diverse response of the matter-soul would be incident to the initiating activity of the mundane soul.

Em. The mundane soul would condition the response of the matter-soul, so that particular constituents of mind, as preter-empirical notions and

sensings—what we call objects of sense—came into empirical existence?

Met. Yes; that influence of the mundane soul involves what I term hypnotism of the matter-soul.

Em. Implying that the mundane soul dominantly affects the matter-soul?

Met. Yes. Putting the case in ordinary language: objects exist through the determinism of mundane souls, as what we call percipient.

Em. There was no cosmos before there were mundane souls to will sensings?

Met. None. There had to be percipients that there might be objects.

Em. That falls in with your earlier contentions against the assumptions of geologists, astronomers, and that ilk, postulating a cosmos independent of and preceding percipients.

Met. Such a cosmos is impossible.

Em. Your speculation seems to involve a sort of breaking-up of the ante-cosmic organic soul into fragments, as individual, mundane souls.

Met. It does.

Em. So, if there were such a contingency as the exhaustion of the ante-cosmic soul as source of organic souls, such souls would cease to exist?

Met. Yes; and, corollarily, the empirical cosmos would revert to metaphysical existence.

Em. Meaning that it would be practically annihilated?

Met. Yes; through the absence of percipients.

Em. What about individual souls that had passed the mundane stage, through what we call death? Would they again lose individuality, as being merged in what might be termed a post-cosmic organic soul?

Met. There is no metaphysical ground for denying or affirming such resolution.

Em. Is there any other ground for believing one way or the other?

Met. For me, there is such ground. Were the re-merging to occur, Creative determinism of individual souls would have no rational meaning for me; and I hold Creative purpose to be rational.

Em. Certainly we could identify no rational purpose in determinism so stultifying itself.

Met. Of course, you will distinguish between speculation such as we are now entertaining, and the metaphysical demonstration of the individual soul and of the causal conditions of experience.

Em. I do discriminate between the merely speculative and the demonstrated.

Met. We will now ignore this speculation and revert to the metaphysically demonstrable.

Em. You say that, as in mnemonic storey, experiences are only metaphysically existent, involving that we cannot predicate about them, discriminatively?

Met. That is so.

Em. And you say that, in constituting top-storey experience, the soul wills the consciousness-sensation, as light, with what so become experiences?

Met. Yes.

Em. How does the soul select or differentiate, among what, you say, cannot be identified, as being merely metaphysically existent?

Met. Your question implies that you are conceiving the activity of the soul as being analogous to the empirical discrimination which you exercise as

result of this operation of the soul on the metaphysically existent.

Em. Yes; I see that I am considering the contingency from the common standpoint you indicate. I am assuming that the soul must have things provided, as it were, for it to see, hear, touch, analogously as I have such things empirically outside myself.

Met. You are thereby attributing your empirical mind to the causal agent through the activity of which your empirical mind exists.

Em. I am confounding my seeing, touching, feeling, thinking, with the causal activity, as will, through which my empirical activities exist?

Met. Yes. If you are to know how the soul discriminates, in the sense that you know how you discriminate, you must be able to differentiate experience, as will, as you are able to differentiate experiences, as products of the activity of will. That would necessitate that you were able empirically to put yourself outside will, as you are able so to put yourself outside thoughts, feelings, sensings.

Em. I see that my question involves a problem inherently beyond solution, as presupposing my ability to get behind the conditions on which the possibility of discrimination, for me, exists. Still, I suppose we must assume some sort of selective discrimination by the soul, as bringing particular constituents of mind out of metaphysical existence into top storey?

Met. We may assume selective willing, subject to God's determinism; but we must not imagine the selective activity as in any way congruous with what occurs as our empirical consciousness.

Em. The blind, inevitable sort of discrimination of trance mediums and clairvoyants seems to illustrate the volitional selection.

Met. Yes; but the illustration affords us no knowledge of what I may term the selective material. The clairvoyant can no more tell how he selects than can you or I.

Em. The operation of will, as the causal manifestation of the soul, is, I suppose, entirely foreign to what we commonly call will, as involving effort, intention, and so forth?

Met. Of course. That sort of will is merely particular feelings taken as causal agency. The will, as causal agency, determines such empirical will.

Em. Effort, intention, determination have no causal significance?

Met. None; though they may operate as fetishes, facilitating one or another exercise of will.

Em. Suggestion, involving consensuses, is quite independent of effort, intention, involving the empirical will?

Met. The suggestive activity itself is entirely independent of any conscious manifestation, though the feelings of effort, intention, determination may be incidentally operative as fetishes facilitating imposition of certain classes of suggestion called hypnotic and telepathic.

Em. You say that all that has once been brought into top storey and has gone into mnemonic storey is preserved, in that storey, as consensuses of suggestion which all mundane souls are constituting, and which any soul, as responding agent, may again bring into top storey, as ordinary thinking, feeling, sensing; as

memory, or as the visions of clairvoyants and trance-mediums?

Met. Yes. On the fact, unscientifically guessed at, are based religious and other speculations about so-called pre-existence and the subliminal consciousness.

Em. A person might possibly, to-day, respond to a consensus established a thousand years ago, and so bring experiences incident to that epoch again into top storey?

Met. There is no more metaphysical impediment to such willing, than to re-willing of the experiences of an hour ago, or to the ordinary revelations of the trance medium at a spiritistic seance. We occasionally hear stories of such revivals, as visions of a remote past by people who have no normal acquaintance, as by study of records, with the epoch revived by their visions.

Em. So, a person might revive a "missing link," a prehistoric lizard, the interior of an ancient temple?

Met. Certainly. The condition would be that he responded to some consensus involving the ancient things in mnemonic storey. The practical method of bringing such things into top storey, as by excavation, is merely a variant of the abnormal revival by so-called seers, sensitives, clairvoyants.

Em. The practical method involves the willing of what you call bridges, which the seer omits?

Met. That is the difference.

Em. Your speculation about the ante-cosmic organic soul and matter-soul involves, as you earlier remarked, what may be termed a metaphysical trinity?

Met. Yes.

Em. In the beginning, God creates two active agents: the ante-cosmic organic soul and matter-soul, and an inert spiritual thing: the metaphysical mind. Then, through a determining act of the Deity, the ante-cosmic organic soul disintegrates itself as the first mundane souls: man and woman, who start hypnotising the matter-soul, so involving mind in top storey, as sensings.

Met. And further, bring mind into top storey, as primitive feelings and thoughts and auditory and visual sensings, as symbolic sounds and gestures. So would arise the first ordinary consensuses of suggestion. Later, these primitive souls, imposing prenatal suggestion, would excite further disintegration of the ante-cosmic organic soul, involving what we call birth and the inception of what biologists call heredity.

DUOLOGUE XXXIV.

ENVIRONMENT.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. I suppose that those consensuses of suggestion involve what is called environment?

Met. Yes.

Em. Is a person born and brought up, say, in England, rather than in Russia or Japan, because he responds to particular consensuses of suggestion?

Met. Yes; that response determines where he is born and brought up.

Em. Whether he lives in a hovel or a palace?

Met. Yes.

Em. Whether he is Tory or Radical; Christian, Buddhist, Jew?

Met. Yes.

Em. Whether it is day or night; hot or cold; pleasant or unpleasant for him?

Met. Yes; whatever a person's circumstances may be, they are determined by his response to one or another consensus of suggestion.

Em. So, they have winter in Australia, when we have summer, here, because we and they respond to different consensuses?

Met. Certainly.

Em. And if there were no consensuses but ours, there would be no Australia?

Met. No Australia, on such conditions.

Em. If there were only two people existing, and they had never known more than the area of a parish, that would constitute the world?

Met. Certainly, as being the limit of their response to consensuses of suggestion.

Em. And, when Columbus discovered America?

Met. He responded to consensuses established by the natives.

Em. And, when Adam and Eve, assuming the parties existed, started in the garden of Eden?

Met. They initiated consensuses of suggestion.

Em. You are a metaphysician; I, a practical sort of fellow not quite stuck fast in his hole, because we respond to particular consensuses?

Met. Yes; though I may be the instrument determined to initiate fresh consensuses, there is not much to choose between us as creatures of environment.

Em. If a person is starving, he is responding to bad consensuses?

Met. Yes; an environment that assures starvation can hardly be called good.

Em. And he cannot get away from it?

Met. Not so long as he is suggestible to it.

Em. What is he to do?

Met. Respond to the environment, or abolish it.

Em. How is he to abolish it?

Met. By establishing an environment inconsistent with the other one.

Em. How's the poor beggar to do that?

Met. By co-operating with other poor beggars in responding to consensuses of suggestion supplied by

people determined to the end of initiating them. We shall see how these propositions work out practically when we come to deal with religion and morality.

Em. Your environment is a different sort of thing from that of the empirical schools?

Met. Yes; their environment is merely the effect of mine. My environment is post-natal suggestion. Theirs is merely sensings, thoughts, and feelings. Theirs does nothing. Mine is a doer: consensuses of willing mind into top storey, by causal agents.

Em. I suppose that people get diseases through responding to consensuses?

Met. No other way.

Em. And people who discover new diseases supply consensuses enabling people to get the diseases?

Met. Exactly. The medical faculty provides a good harvest in that way.

Em. It provides the diseases as well as cures them?

Met. Yes; it is tolerably efficient in both capacities.

Em. Does it cure them with drugs?

Met. No; by the same means it adopts to provide them: suggestion. The drugs are fetishes facilitating the suggestion.

Em. If a person takes prussic acid, on the strength of your assurance that the poison does nothing, it seems he'll take an off chance of having much time in which to reflect on the consequences?

Met. Yes; we have generally to act on the illusions of causal agency determined for us by the Creator. Still, I have quoted, in the fifth volume of *Heresies*, the following *menu*, certified by Berlin doctors, as having been consumed by a gentleman

exceptionally qualified for resisting consensuses determining the normal, empirical effects of poisons. The dainties in question were verdigris, ultramarine, sulphur, borax, solution of strychnine, a bottle of patent rat-killer, made of pulverised glass, arsenic, and atropine.

Em. Had you not rendered me metaphysically credulous, I would as soon swallow that repast as the account of it.

Met. I read, a month or two ago, in the *Morning Leader*, that the gastronomical achievement had been repeated in London, before medical men who certified for its genuineness. One of these gentlemen, in an interview, suggested a "freak" stomach, whatever that may be, as accounting for the immunity of the consumer.

Em. A freak idea of that medico.

Met. Nullification, through suggestion, of the normal effects of powerful drugs, and production of the effects through suggesting them, on consumption of normally innocent substances, are quite familiar occurrences.

Em. I see that the effects we attribute to the causal agency of drugs and poisons can only occur through consensuses of suggestion, as environment.

Met. Anybody resisting the environment, nullifies the empirical effects.

Em. For the vast majority of people, environment is irresistible?

Met. The contingency of resistance depends largely on pre-natal suggestion, commonly called heredity, which we will make the subject of our next conversation.

Em. It seems, from what you say about poisons

and drugs, as being fetishes facilitating our willing of occurrences which we call effects of the substances, that anything to which we empirically attribute causal efficiency is really such a fetish.

Met. That is the case. Appliances, machines, charms, omens—even to divine saviours—are examples of fetishes more or less effective as facilitating our willing of particular experiences which we attribute to the causal efficiency of the fetishes. Once a consensus is established, endowing any such fetish with causal efficiency, response to the consensus involves the particular so-called effect of the fetish.

Em. So, the particular consensus being established, poisons and drugs generally affect people in the same ways?

Met. Yes; people will the so-called effects with the substances, as they will effects with appliances; as, for instance, the moving of a train through a locomotive; the sending of a message through a telephone; the playing of an orchestra, or singing of a voice through a gramophone or phonograph; any production of sound by a performer on a musical instrument.

Em. So, the influence of heavenly bodies on human affairs, as affirmed by astrologers, may be practically real?

Met. Undoubtedly, it has been a very practical reality during many ages in which the particular consensus prevailed.

Em. Then, astrology is not all nonsense?

Met. No more than astronomy is nonsense. Whether a consensus makes the earth move round the sun; or makes the relative positions of planets determine human affairs, the essential contingency is

the same: the empirical correspondence of thought-logic with sensed logic.

Em. Then, astrology is as much a science as is astronomy?

Met. Certainly. The difference is merely that astrology has passed the zenith as predominant consensuses, while astronomy is at the zenith. Causally, there is nothing to choose between the two sciences.

Em. How could the positions of planets rule human affairs?

Met. In this guise. The affairs and the positions of the planets are equally determined by the causal agents that will them as experiences. The affairs are no less inevitable than are the planetary positions. If a science establishes a thought-logic, as consensus, rendering empirically consistent sensed logic, as planetary positions, and sensed logic, as human affairs, the planetary positions will, practically, determine human affairs, just as the poison will kill a person.

Em. I see that, if a person predicts that my swallowing prussic acid will involve my death, there will be correspondence of thought-logic with sensed logic. There is force in that sort of prediction. But I do not see why, if a person predicts that I shall swallow the acid, on the strength of my being born when certain planets are in particular relative positions, there should be any force in that prediction.

Met. The causal conditions are the same in both cases. What difference there is between the contingencies is incident to response to the consensus. In regard to the consensus determining that the poison will kill if taken, the response is, practically,

assured. In regard to a consensus, as astrological divination, that you or I will take the poison, the response is, practically, not assured. Even had we been living when astrological consensuses were far more potent than they are now, we might have resisted the prediction of an astrologer that we should take poison, just as that person who has been puzzling the Berlin and London doctors resists a prediction that swallowing prussic acid will involve death.

Em. I begin to see that as neither the poison nor the planets are causally operative, it is beside the question to measure the validity of the prophetic procedure by implicitly attributing causal efficiency to the poison or planets.

Met. Certainly. The measure of the validity of the prophetic procedure is the consensus of suggestion incident to it, not the fetish that may be applied in the particular prophetic contingency. Suggestion by the consensus is the determining factor, equally in the case of a person's taking poison, as in being killed by taking it.

Em. When people generally believed in astrology, they would tend to take suggestion ensuring fulfilment of the prediction.

Met. Just as, when everybody believes in physiology, people take suggestion ensuring fulfilment of a prediction that they will die if they swallow prussic acid.

Em. There seems to be a lot in that old magic that is too deep for our modern *cognoscenti* to fathom.

Met. Though modern empiricism has largely obviated the effect of divination and allied occultism,

as consensuses of suggestion, it has not touched credentials. I surmise that we are about to see what our empiricists will term a recrudescence of effete superstition.

Em. Those ancients were not such fools as our professors of physics would have us believe.

Met. They had causal intuitions which are likely to reassert their significance.

Em. We are drifting back to old anchorages. What do you hold about religious prophets such as those of the Bible? Do you think they predicted astrologically?

Met. Likely enough. But, whether they applied astrological science or any other fetishistic means, their efficiency would depend on their capacity to render thought-logic consistent with sensed logic. If they failed in that respect, their prophecy would be falsified, just as, if a mathematician errs in calculating, his prediction of an eclipse will be falsified.

Em. What we call science seems to be one or another consensus of thought-logic corresponding to sensed logic?

Met. Yes; any such consensus is a science.

Em. It may predict events, as well as merely account for them?

Met. Yes.

Em. It seems that consensuses may be divided into two categories: those involving thought-logic, and those involving sensed logic?

Met. Yes; that applies as regards empirical contingencies, implying illusory causal distinction between sensing and thought. When, as dealing with causal problems, we transcend empiricism, we transcend the empirical distinctions to which you refer,

dealing with the causal agency itself determining the two categories of consensuses.

Em. You mean that, as dealing purely with causation, there is no concern about reconciling the two classes of consensuses?

Met. None. It is no concern of the pure science of causation to reconcile sensing with thought. The only concern of the science of causation is to identify causal agency and interpret moral and religious problems according to the identification. It deals with the consistency of thought with sensing merely as empirical credentials for its own conclusions about causation.

Em. You mean that metaphysic is only concerned about empirical science as an application evidencing the truth of metaphysical causation?

Met. Yes—not as criterion; but merely as evidence. Metaphysic is the criterion of science; not science, of metaphysic.

Em. I suppose that what you have been saying about astrology applies to all sorts of magic?

Met. To all—exorcism, augury, oneiromancy, scapulimancy, rhabdomancy, chiromancy, necromancy, sorcery, or any other method of constituting empirically causal relationships consensuses of suggestion. Our modern science is nothing but a type of magic.

Em. How?

Met. Its causal efficients are as spurious as those of the Chinese doctor who prescribes heads of plants to cure head affections; middles, to cure bodies; roots, to cure legs.

Em. Do you hold that that Chinese medico's dealing with heads, middles, and roots is as effective

for curing disease as is the prescription of a Harley Street specialist?

Met. Probably more so, where the Chinese doctor practises, than would be the specialist's prescription. All would depend on the efficiency of the consensus as ensuring response by the patient. The Chinese doctor's consensus would probably be more efficient in China.

Em. If a consensus assured a person that he was suffering from a devil inside him, and that a witch-doctor knew how to deal with that devil, the man would stand as good a chance of recovering under exorcism, as under current treatment?

Met. Better, if the current treatment was inefficient as consensus.

Em. Drugs; telling devils to get out; planetary positions and so on, are merely fetishes?

Met. Nothing else.

Em. You hold that the Chinese doctor is as good at curing as is the Harley Street man?

Met. I surmise that they are equally able magicians.

Em. I have read of practitioners, called medicine-men and sorcerers, who provide diseases, and cure them—for a consideration.

Met. They are well represented in this country.

Em. You hold, as you have already hinted, that our doctors are in the morbid provision business?

Met. In a wholesale way.

Em. Not disreputably, like those artists who go straight for a man's vitals with a kangaroo bone, or by cribbing a lock of his hair and roasting it with fat till the poor beggar shuffles off or shells out for the cure?

Met. No; our practitioners are in the morbid provision business inadvertently, and with the most admirable intentions.

Em. Not much satisfaction to those who have to take what they deal in. We shouldn't need to pine for the cures, if we could get away from the other sort of stock in the emporium.

DUOLOGUE XXXV.

HEREDITY.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. You call heredity, pre-natal suggestion. That implies assumption that souls exist before what we commonly call birth.

Met. We can predicate nothing, temporally, regarding agents not willing the metaphysical, or mundane mind.

Em. Meaning the mind embracing sensings, thoughts, feelings?

Met. Yes; we can predicate nothing about time outside that mind, which exists, as sensings, thoughts, feelings, exclusively for souls constituting the essential personalities of causal entities which, as being what we term, born, suggest to, and take suggestion from, other souls willing the duration-sensation, or time. What we term procreation, or begetting of offspring, is suggestive co-operation by two such souls. In the case of birth, the suggestive product of this parental co-operation is responded to by a soul determined to will the mundane mind, or, be born.

Em. Do the parental souls suggest actual thoughts, feelings, sensings to the unborn soul?

Met. That would be impossible. No soul can take suggestion for willing the mundane mind until

it has interacted with the matter-soul, involving its willing of sensings, as what we call the body.

Em. The unborn soul cannot interact with the matter-soul?

Met. No; a soul that does that wills a body.

Em. Well, what sort of suggestion does the unborn soul take from parental souls?

Met. It takes suggestion as predispositions to special willings of sensings, thoughts, feelings. These predispositions are commonly called hereditary. I call them pre-natally imposed suggestibility.

Em. Propensities to will in special ways, when the object on which they are destined to operate is available to their causal activity?

Met. Yes; that is a fairly good statement of the case, in familiar terms. The object, as matter-soul, and corollarily, mind, becomes available to the soul, as what we call birth. How the soul will deal with this object depends on pre-natally imposed suggestibility to the influence of other souls, as consensuses of suggestion, or environment.

Em. The parental souls will suggest such suggestibilities as they have derived, in the same way, as pre-natal suggestion, from other souls, as their parents?

Met. Certainly.

Em. So, the first pre-natal suggestibilities were imposed by the two souls first determined, by God, to will the mundane mind?

Met. Yes.

Em. They got their suggestibilities, as it were, direct from God?

Met. Yes.

Em. As there would be no consensus of sugges-

tion, as environment, how could they manifest suggestibility?

Met. By hypnotising the matter-soul, and so willing preter-empirical notions and sensings.

Em. Then, I suppose, there would be earth, sky, sun, vegetation, animals, and so on?

Met. Yes; and the first consensuses of suggestion would be ready for the first generation.

Em. The first man and woman would be the greatest discoverers.

Met. They would be great as initiators, though their scope, in the arenas of thought and feeling, would probably be very limited.

Em. The first generation would continue the exploration business, increasing the stock of consensuses of suggestion?

Met. Yes; and the imposition of pre-natal suggestion on the first generation would involve discovery of the sexual feeling.

Em. The first humans were bound to be man and woman—not one or the other alone?

Met. The discovery of the sexual feeling would necessitate man and woman.

Em. When the first generation appeared, there would be an environment for them constituted by the willings of mind of the first man and woman?

Met. Yes; for the first generation, environment and heredity would be virtually identical.

Em. There would be no opposition between environment and heredity?

Met. Practically none. Probably many generations would come and go before heredity and environment were differentiated, so as to constitute

environment a controlling influence on the manifestation of heredity.

Em. Still, I suppose, as the first man and woman would each contribute to the pre-natal suggestion of the first generation, so constituting that generation hereditarily different from the parents, there might be some clashing between heredity and environment, even at the earliest stage of humanity.

Met. The clashing might occur, but it could hardly be of such a nature as to involve control by environment. What control existed, at primitive generations, would probably occur through opposing pre-natal suggestibilities, rather than through environment. The main effect of consensuses, as controlling the manifestation of heredity, at that early stage, would be to ensure willings of sensings, as food, covering, housing, conducing to satisfaction of sensual cravings. Such environment would probably be established at the first generation, and would long remain in its primitive state.

Em. That sort of environment would involve the initiation of work.

Met. The consensus imposing which would, no doubt, be a powerful controlling influence on heredity, at later stages; though, at first, it would probably be merely satisfaction of the demands of heredity.

Em. I conclude that environment cannot affect heredity?

Met. Not beyond modifying its manifestation.

Em. How, then, has it come about that people are, hereditarily, so infinitely diversified?

Met. We must attribute the diversity to the modifying influences of the parental suggestions, and the

prepotency of one or another parent, as suggester. Such influences would begin to operate at the earliest epoch, and would soon involve great hereditary complexity.

Em. Why does an unborn soul take suggestibility for willing one rather than another sex?

Met. Because the parental suggestion for that sex is prepotent.

Em. Men and women have much in common, sexually, and sometimes the sexual characters are, as it were, in a jumble, so that it is hard to decide whether the person is man or woman. How does that occur?

Met. We may assume that, in the first man and woman, the sexual characters were completely differentiated. Later, special prepotencies would involve what may be termed admixtures of suggestibilities constituting characters of both sexes for a single soul.

Em. Perhaps, those abnormal folk called hermaphrodites, sexual inverts, and other fancy names presage a humanity in which sexuality will not involve procreation?

Met. Likely enough. It is conceivable that there is a limit to the creation of souls. When such limit had been reached, there would be no souls born, as willing the mundane mind.

Em. That would mean the depopulation of the earth.

Met. And, with the depopulation, the extinction of the earth.

Em. An end of terrestrial things generally.

Met. Such an end is to be contemplated. As rational beings, knowing purpose in ourselves, we

must suppose that the Creator has an object in creating, and that, once that object is attained, creation will cease, as regards mundane souls.

Em. I cannot conceive a Creator devoid of purpose, however inconceivable may be what constitutes the object, or why the object, whatever it may be, is pursued in what seems to me to be a bungling, roundabout way.

Met. Assume a Creative object partially attained by the extinction of causal agents willing the mundane mind, certain sexual manifestations, abnormal to us, might take the place of our normal manifestations.

Em. Looking at the matter practically, it seems that, within a not very long period, some sort of great check to procreation must become operative, or the world will not be able to feed its population.

Met. The premature extinction incident to such a contingency would be a check. But, I surmise that the check will come in some other guise, as modification of sexual suggestibility.

Em. There seems to be indication of something of the sort in the falling off in the birth-rate in most civilised countries.

Met. No doubt, it will come, in due course.

Em. In the case of the first man and woman, you said that the sexual characters would be completely differentiated—no merging of one into another?

Met. I should take that to be the case. Later admixtures would be incident to the comparative prepotency of one rather than the other parent in imposing pre-natal suggestibility.

Em. That accounts for the fact that the characters

are now hardly ever completely differentiated in a single individual?

Met. Yes; the multitude of suggestive acts of which every existing person is the product have probably tended to minimise primal differentiation.

Em. From your standpoint, heredity means that everybody comes into the world endowed with certain propensities to will feelings, thoughts, sensings, which he cannot get rid of?

Met. Though there is no possibility of eradicating pre-natally imposed suggestibility, its practical effect, as the willing of thoughts and feelings, may be largely obviated by environment, as well as by what I may term the clashing of hereditary suggestibilities themselves. To illustrate the latter point—a person may have hereditary suggestibility to over-indulgence in drink, together with hereditary suggestibility to submit to consensuses imposing certain standards of behaviour inconsistent with drunkenness. If the one suggestibility happens to be the stronger, it will practically nullify the other. This applies throughout the field of hereditary suggestibility.

Em. I quite see that point, and that the consensuses of suggestion to which a person is subjected will themselves tend to nullify hereditary predispositions urging against the consensuses.

Met. I hold that the practical effect of environment, on the individual, in the majority of cases, is more compulsive than that of hereditary predisposition.

Em. You imply that environment itself is virtually nothing but hereditary predisposition, manifesting itself prepotently?

Met. Certainly; but, in regard to the individual,

it constitutes what may be termed a controller of hereditary predisposition.

Em. The control being good or bad, according to the environment?

Met. Yes. Environment may render bad, as readily as good, hereditary predisposition practically prepotent.

Em. It seems to be rendering a lot of bad predisposition conquering hero.

Met. There is plenty of scope for initiators of new consensuses of a superior order to those now prevalent. When we come to discuss religion and morality, I daresay we shall be able to forecast some of those consensuses.

Em. Some folk with what they call advanced ideas are advocating the breeding of human beings, on the principles of the breeder of prize pigs.

Met. I hold that restrictions on the indiscriminate bringing of children into the world are, at present, needed. I hold this view because I consider it a flagrant wrong to the community and children, to beget offspring with the practical certainty of their being subjected almost entirely to consensuses of suggestion favouring the manifestation of the worst hereditary predispositions.

Em. Do you not hold that, apart from any question of environment, certain hereditary predispositions, such as those for epilepsy, dipsomania, are so sure to manifest themselves prepotently, in certain cases of procreation, that control by the community is advisable?

Met. I hold that there are cases of the sort, but that they are comparatively rare, and that there would be much danger that restrictions, on the

ground you indicate, unless very carefully applied, would involve more harm to the community than would be obviated. Rigidly applied to certain cases of heredity, I hold that the restriction is one of the most urgent public and private needs. In applying the principles of stirpiculture to brutes, our object is to attain certain shapes and bulks, and such qualities as fleetness and endurance. In the case of human beings, the problem is infinitely more complex, and the objects at which we aim in the case of brutes, are only subsidiary to other requirements. We want men and women for thought, feeling, action, motive. We want a pig merely for ham and bacon; a horse, for strength, endurance, fleetness; a cow, for sirloins and milk.

Em. And we cannot breed for the higher requirements?

Met. No. We have no means of judging on what conditions the higher requirements are likely to be propagated. There is much evidence tending to the conclusion that people greatest in achievement spring from hereditarily defective family stock.

Em. Even from the practical standpoint, it seems ridiculous, in the case of humanity, to assume that mere animal vitality, length of life, freedom from ailments, are of supreme importance.

Met. Such an assumption can hardly be held, unless by people who consider that the cessation of mundane life is equivalent to annihilation.

Em. Personally, I think that lethal chambers are a greater desideratum than is our humanitarian and professional solicitude to add a few years of broken-down existence.

Met. Our present views as to the desirability of

preserving mundane life are likely to be radically revised in the near future.

Em. If people had a tithe of the solicitude about what they did in their lives, they have about preserving them, this would be a better sort of world to live in.

Met. Your remark is suggestively fertile. I hope that we may deal with the suggestive crop in future conversations.

Em. I take it that what you call post-natal suggestion, involving response to what you call consensuses of suggestion, or what is commonly called environment, cannot affect what you call pre-natally imposed suggestibility, commonly called heredity. In other words, I suppose that environment cannot involve the transmission of any fresh hereditary quality, or the extinction of any old hereditary quality?

Met. No. The effect of post-natal suggestion is merely on the manifestation of existing hereditary suggestibility. Diversity in hereditary suggestibility itself is exclusively incident to the prepotencies of different parental suggestions imposed at pre-natal suggestion, or what we commonly term, procreation.

Em. From your standpoint, it would seem that all possible hereditary suggestibility was directly imposed by God, on the first man and woman?

Met. Yes; God imposed all possible suggestibility, involving male character, on man, and female character, on woman. But, as consensuses of suggestion are necessary, that pre-natal suggestibility may manifest itself, and as but few consensuses could be initiated by the first man and woman, what I may term the incentive for manifestation of hereditary

suggestibility would be limited, for primitive, as compared with later, generations.

Em. I see that point clearly. It involves that, practically, the comprehensive suggestibility imposed by God, on the first man and woman and their early descendants, was a very limited suggestibility, because the environmental opportunities for its manifestation were very limited. So, the early suggestibility might be termed latent, awaiting future opportunities to become patent?

Met. Yes; and while those environmental opportunities were increasing, there would be more and more of what I may term adulteration of the purely differentiated sexual suggestibilities imposed on the first humans, as succeeding generations came into mundane existence.

Em. I see that point, too. Perhaps, at one act of pre-natal suggestion, the female was prepotent as suggester; at another act, the male. So, every succeeding person would tend to become what I may term more and more a sexual mongrel; in whom the purely sexual differentiations were mixed up.

Met. Yes. You will see that such admixture would soon lead to hereditary results very different from those existing at primitive stages of pre-natal suggestion.

Em. Yes; and I also see the force of your distrust of methods of improving humanity by indiscriminate application of the teaching of the stock-yard.

Met. In the case of humanity, at any rate, the problem is too complex to be dealt with in that way.

Em. So, in creating the first man and woman, God imposed all possible hereditary suggestibility for humanity?

Met. Yes; as, in creating mind, God imposed all possible thought, feeling, sensing for humanity.

Em. Implying a creative act imposing causal determinism, and the object through which that determinism was to be manifested?

Met. Yes.

Em. That disposes of empirical evolution. No ape becoming a man.

Met. No. That sort of becoming implies that sensings, as bodies, transform themselves into typically different sensings.

Em. A mere raw confusion of sensings with causal agents.

Met. It begs the whole problem of causation, as does all empirical theorising.

Em. And those tub-thumping atheists take it as their gospel.

Met. As confidently as those they castigate accept other gospels.

Em. They ought to be stopped braying.

Met. I do not suppose they will stop of their own accord, so long as there is anybody to listen to their music.

Em. They cannot hear you, for their own noise.

Met. No; they have a resonant orchestra, and blowing the brass is a somewhat flourishing business.

Em. I'd make them face causation, or, I'd stop the row.

Met. If you can make them face causation, you can do what I cannot. I have been tempting them with causation for a goodly number of years. As to stopping the row, I fear that nothing but an Act of Parliament will do that, and you know how precious we hold the free expression of opinion.

Em. Free expression of opinion! Where's that, when we allow a lot of pretentious quacks to keep their dupes ignorant of all but the inanities that befool them?

Met. Our worship of the free expression of opinion is as unscientific as is generally the opinion that is expressed. So long as opinions are exploited mainly as vested interests, those who make a business of ventilating them will have more solicitude to keep them in cotton-wool, than to expose them to the blasts of criticism.

Em. The prime need of the day is an association for the propagation of the science of causation. We want that more than the whole menagerie of associations.

Met. I will not say nay to that.

Em. It would seem that certain hereditary suggestibilities in one generation might be entirely absent in the next.

Met. This is possible, though it probably very rarely occurs. What does commonly happen, and is practically equivalent to the extirpation of a suggestibility is that it is so weakened as to involve no apparent manifestation. We can only judge on this point by observing comparatively gross manifestations, as in regard to build, features, aptitudes, temperament, and certain diseases, such as dipsomania, epilepsy, tuberculosis.

Em. How, do you suggest, does such weakening occur?

Met. Either through the comparative impotency of the parent to impose the particular suggestibility, or through the clashing of some other, opposing suggestibility, especially when such an opposing

suggestibility is favoured by environment. Given equally strong opposing suggestibilities, and environment strongly favouring the one, I hold that the other may be practically extirpated.

Em. You mean extirpated as manifesting itself?

Met. Yes; I have a good example of the sort in my mind, in the case of a family with which I am intimately acquainted. In this case, there is a strong hereditary taint of scrofula on the paternal, and tuberculosis on the maternal, sides. The mother died of phthisis, as did the eldest son. The three younger sons, with the eldest, were attacked, about the same time, with inflammation of the lungs, which in the case of the eldest resulted in the tuberculosis. The three other sons were pronounced tuberculous, though they recovered from the acute ailment. They were sent to South Africa, where one of them now is, married, and to Australia. This would be about twenty years ago. Apparently, they are now thoroughly vigorous and robust.

Em. And the lesson of it?

Met. That, in the places they were sent to, consensuses of suggestion, as environment, prevailed, opposing consumption, and that these so favoured hereditary suggestibility opposing the scrofulous and tuberculous suggestibility that the latter was practically extirpated.

Em. You say that one son is in South Africa. Where are the others?

Met. In England; where they have been for many years.

Em. I understand you to imply that, in England, we have consensuses favouring consumption?

Met. Yes.

Em. How is it that the strong hereditary tendency has not again manifested itself against the opposing suggestibility which you say was favoured by African and Australian consensuses?

Met. I hold that the manifestation or exercise of a suggestibility, as willing conforming experiences, involves increased efficiency of manifestation. This is well illustrated in the case of ordinary hypnosis, in which, at first, the hypnotic may be comparatively irresponsive. The oftener he is hypnotised, the more completely his suggestibility is manifested as obedience to the hypnotist.

Em. A case of practice makes perfect.

Met. Applying this to the case we are considering, I hold that the exercise of the opposing suggestibility, away from England, rendered it practically predominant even in the English environment favouring phthisis.

Em. What about the next generation? Do you hold that the practical nullification of the phthisical suggestibility, as manifestation by these men, will affect their suggesting it pre-natally?

Met. No; I hold that the practical manifestation cannot affect its pre-natal suggestion. If it is nullified as pre-natal suggestion, that must occur through the prepotency of the other suggesting parent.

Em. I suppose that early generations of mankind would not have brought diseases into top storey, and that, accordingly, there would then be no morbid environment for morbid suggestibilities to respond to?

Met. That was the case at early generations.

Em. Such people would not die, as most of us do, of diseases?

Met. No; they died much more easily and pleasantly.

Em. As a painless cessation of willing mind?

Met. Yes. Through our discovery of diseases, we supply environments facilitating the manifestation of morbid suggestibilities which, otherwise, would have no opportunity of manifesting themselves.

Em. The more diseases we discover, the more suffering from them we ensure?

Met. Undoubtedly.

Em. What we call the art or science of medicine has provided more suffering than it has obviated?

Met. I should say, immeasurably more.

Em. We have an exhaustless mine out of which to unearth consensuses, but, once we have got them, we must take the bitters with the sweets?

Met. Obviously, it is no object of the Creator to afford us bliss through our mining operations; or rather, in the connection, I would say, through our sampling the fruit in a certain garden.

Em. That fruit maintains the reputation attributed to it in Genesis. Ignorance is bliss?

Met. At any rate, equally as is knowledge.

Em. Well; we've bitten ravenously. We must go ahead at the business?

Met. Yes; there's no stopping for us.

Em. Environment can only touch manifestation; not the suggestibility itself?

Met. That is the case.

Em. Practically, that is all we need if we set about improving humanity. If we get the right manifestation, we can afford to ignore the suggestibility?

Met. Yes; the great reforming agency is environ-

ment. When we get a morally right environment, we shall be on the way to getting a morally right humanity.

Em. I am itching to know how the science of causation pans out on that issue?

Met. I hope to gratify your curiosity in our next series of conversations.

Em. If we extirpated morally bad consensuses of suggestion, we should practically render humanity morally perfect?

Met. Yes; though in very rare cases, hereditary suggestibility is so strong as to be proof against any environment. Such cases involve people we call monsters, maniacs, geniuses.

Em. It seems, from what is called reversion or throwing back, that hereditary suggestibilities may lie dormant for long periods—a person resembling a remote ancestor more than either parent?

Met. Yes. The phenomena of reversion are of a complex character, but I think they may all be resolved into results of the weakening of opposing suggestibilities to the ancestral ones, by special prepotencies at the act of pre-natal suggestion involving the ancestral reversion.

Em. The restraining influence of the opposing suggestibility being obviated, the ancestral one asserts itself?

Met. Yes; say, for instance, that the ancestral bent suggested during several generations is also practically nullified by an opposing bent incident to acts of pre-natal suggestion during that period. At another act, the opposing bent itself is nullified, and the ancestral one manifests itself.

Em. It would seem that the restraining influence

of one on another hereditary suggestibility involved practical heredity, as manifestation.

Met. I take that to be the case.

Em. A sort of balance is struck of active manifestation, according to the predominance of contending suggestibilities.

Met. The case being further complicated by the modifying influence of consensuses of suggestion, as environment.

Em. It is hopeless to try to doctor heredity?

Met. Unless by environment.

Em. Weismann's theory of germ-plasm seems to approximate formally to what you have been saying.

Met. Yes; it may be termed a bastard metaphysic based on the illusion of empirical causality. The biophoric constituents of the germ-nucleus are the equivalents, in his system, to my pre-natal suggestibilities.

Em. You are familiar with his system?

Met. Fourteen or fifteen years ago, I published a book dealing with it, entitled *Against Dogma and Free-will and For Weismannism.*

Em. At that time, you were not a metaphysician?

Met. Not a hatched one, though I was struggling to get out of the shell.

Em. Pre-natal suggestibility before the soul is born, is hard to think.

Met. Not if you think that it is God who imposes it and the consensus to which it is destined to be responsive. To God, the consensus and the suggestibility are equally present.

Em. My difficulty is about the suggestibility, before the consensus is there.

Met. Let me try an illustration. Imagine a

magnet as consensus of suggestion, and the armature as suggestibility. Apart, the armature is suggestibility of the unborn soul. When you bring the armature and magnet together, the suggestibility is manifesting itself as response to environment, and the soul is born.

Em. That clears the atmosphere for me. It would seem that consensuses, like hereditary suggestibilities, were clashing and overpowering one another?

Met. They are. That clashing involves what empiricists deal with as evolution.

Em. A wholesale bringing of mind into top storey, and sending it into mnemonic storey?

Met. Yes; Ptolemy giving place to Copernicus; catastrophism, to evolutionism.

Em. And evolutionism about to give place to causationism.

Met. A consummation to be prayed for, and striven for.

DUOLOGUE XXXVI.

THE FETISH.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. You have often used the term, fetish, and have incidentally enabled me roughly to grasp what you mean by the term; but, I should like us to discuss it in a little detail.

Met. A fetish is any experience or set of experiences that empirically facilitates submission or resistance to a consensus of suggestion imposing other experiences.

Em. Will you illustrate the point?

Met. A poison is a sensing empirically facilitating submission to consensuses imposing pain, what we call organic lesion, and cessation of willing the mundane mind, as what we call death.

Em. What do you mean by empirically facilitating submission to a consensus?

Met. That, when we will the fetish, we will more or less faith that a particular event does or will occur.

Em. The fetish does not causally affect the happening of the event?

Met. Only as being incident to our willing of faith, which, itself, may be termed the prince of fetishes.

Em. The dictum that faith can move mountains means more than appears on the surface?

Met. Yes; faith is a great fetish.

Em. How does the fetish originate?

Met. As imposed by a consensus of suggestion.

Em. So, consensuses of suggestion impose both fetishes and the events in respect to which the fetishes are empirically operative?

Met. Yes; a fetish may be termed the product of a consensus of suggestion, symbolising it.

Em. You say that appliances, involving what we call construction and destruction, are fetishes—steam-engines and guns, for instance?

Met. Yes; all empirically causal agents are fetishes.

Em. The savage's magic stone; the ancient Egyptian's words of power; the Christian's rites and ceremonies?

Met. All are fetishes.

Em. The avatar, or saviour?

Met. A fetish. Not only does the fetish exist as sensing; it also exists as thought.

Em. What is a thought-fetish?

Met. Any theory or set of rules may be a fetish; mathematics, for instance, as enabling us to predict eclipses; astrology, as involving analogous prediction affecting individuals and communities; medical theory, involving faith that we take diseases under particular conditions, and faith in the efficiency of other fetishes, as drugs, therapeutic treatment.

Em. It seems that whatever is incident to the willing of faith in its causal efficiency, is a fetish?

Met. That is broadly the case. The essential

feature of a fetish is that it shall be willed with faith in its causal efficiency.

Em. Would you call the soul, as causal agent, a fetish?

Met. So far as we have faith in its power, as will —yes; but not as incident to belief in its causal efficiency.

Em. Belief is a contingency apart from fetishism?

Met. Yes; only faith is incident to the fetish.

Em. Then, theory, merely as intellectual product involving belief, need not be a fetish?

Met. Theory is only a fetish, as involving faith. We often find theories operating as fetishes long after they have ceased to exist as matters of belief.

Em. Much that passes as religion offers vivid illustration of such survival?

Met. Yes; but if we look for them, we may find such survivals in multitudes of directions besides that of religion. Our ordinary intercourse and activities are largely constituted of such survivals.

Em. I do not quite see how mathematics is a fetish, as enabling us to predict an eclipse. We do not attribute causal efficiency to the mathematics; do we?

Met. Yes, we do, implicitly; when we have faith that the eclipse will happen conformably with mathematical determination. Thereby, the mathematics becomes empirically causal to our predicting, analogously as a knife, as fetish, is empirically causal to our cutting.

Em. The intellectual contingency of our believing the mathematics, is distinct from the contingency of applying the mathematics to predict?

Met. Yes; only the contingency of application involves that the mathematics is fetish.

Em. The faith, at the root of fetishism, does seem to have real causal connection with events.

Met. As prince of fetishes, faith may be termed a symbol of the causal activity that really determines events. Though it is only a feeling, and, as such, causally inert, it may be said to point the way of causal determinism.

Em. A sort of prophet, as feeling.

Met. And a prophet that often prophesies truly.

Em. As future events involve our response to consensuses, determined by God, I seem to grasp how prophecy of all sorts, through fetishes, may be practically reliable, according to the faith of the prophet and the faith of others in him. On such conditions, faith becomes, as you term it, a symbol or sign-post pointing the way of destiny.

Met. The prophet, essentially, is a hypnotist more or less able to impose what, in regard to ordinary hypnotic phenomena, is called post-hypnotic suggestion. Those who have faith in the prophet are analogously circumstanced as is the ordinary hypnotic to the hypnotist.

Em. The prophet, as it were, bends consensuses of suggestion to his will?

Met. Applying his own faith analogously as the ordinary hypnotist applies his faith, with passes, magnets, etc., as fetishes.

Em. The person who has faith, imposes it on others, as suggestion?

Met. Certainly. Such people are the moulders of events. When they fail, it is usually because they lack faith of sufficient intensity to be imposable as what I may term suggestive contagion.

Em. I can see how, on such conditions, a fetishistic system, such as astrology, Mahommedanism, Buddhism, Christism, may lose its vitality though losing prophets richly endowed with the power to will faith.

DUOLOGUE XXXVII.

IMMORTALITY.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. From your standpoint, that is not life, about which, biologists and empirical philosophers concern themselves?

Met. I am somewhat in a fog as to what these people do concern themselves about, as life, and, so far as I can judge by their disquisitions, they seem hardly more enlightened, in the connection, than I am.

Em. You have a clear idea as to what you mean by life?

Met. A perfectly clear one. Life is the activity of the soul, as willing thoughts, feelings, sensings. This is mundane life, and does not affect the persistence of the causal agent.

Em. On what ground do you maintain persistence of the soul?

Met. On the ground that I can only credit that the Creator has created causal agents to the end that they shall persist independently of one or another incident to their causal activity.

Em. Why can you only credit that?

Met. Because, to assume that the Creator had

created causal agents merely as incidents to incidents of their own causal activity would, from my standpoint, be to attribute imbecility to the Creator.

Em. Why, imbecility?

Met. Because it would imply that the Creator deemed products of the activity of an agent He had created, to be of more account than the agent. If this were the Creator's estimate, to create the agent, would appear, to me, an imbecile act, because entirely superfluous.

Em. Why, superfluous?

Met. Because, if the Creator had wanted the experiences to exist, merely for Himself, He could have caused them for Himself, without creating the agent.

Em. Suppose the Creator wanted them to exist for the agent?

Met. I fail to apprehend rational ground for His wanting experiences to exist for an agent that He annihilates, merely because he determines that the agent shall not cause the experiences. To create such an agent would stultify the act of annihilating it.

Em. I grant that analogous action in the case of a human being would be fatuously inconsequent. Still, what you urge is merely inferential, as proof.

Met. I only know two sorts of proof: that sort involving belief and that involving faith. You may define my proof as you like; so long as it involves faith or belief, for me, it is the best, the only possible, proof. A number of folk, sceptical about immortality, bow deferentially to inferential proof of the existence of atoms a thousand million million times smaller than ordinary atoms.

Em. The person who can assimilate those atoms, on the ground of inferential proof, ought to be happy with inferential proof about anything. You may put Q.E.D. to that. But, why shall not the Creator be imbecile, according to our lights, and snuff us out? According to our lights, there's a lot happening in the world that looks like imbecility, and the Creator determines the happenings.

Met. As the Creator also determines your apprehension of the happenings, as indicating imbecility, you can hardly apply the imbecility of happenings, as indicating possible imbecility of the Creator.

Em. No; on reflection, I see it works out that way. That causal agents, determined by the Creator, apprehend what they cause as indicating imbecility, has no bearing on argument based on assumption of the Creator's sanity.

Met. Or, rather, tends to support assumption of the Creator's sanity.

Em. Yes; if creatures are sane enough to detect imbecility in their achievements, the Creator must be at least as sane as they are.

Met. Then, assuming the Creator to be sane, from our standpoint, we must assume that He has not created us on conditions that we can apprehend as betraying insanity?

Em. Yes; I agree that sane judgment will not permit us to doubt that we are created on sane conditions.

Met. Then, as the conditions would be insane, that determined us for annihilation, we are determined for persistence.

Em. I cannot get behind that. I cannot believe otherwise than that we are determined to persist, at

any rate beyond the willing of sensings, thoughts, feelings constituting our present life.

Met. There is no need to believe more than that, to affirm immortality.

Em. As the Creator has deputed to us the business of making worlds, suns, mountains, light, electricity, we are a cut higher than those things, as regards importance to the Creator.

Met. Yes; our capacity to make such things is not consistent with our cessation of making them being the criterion of persistence of ourselves.

Em. Of course, failing actual experience in a life which we can associate, through memory, with this life, there can be none but inferential proof. I hear that the late Mr. Myers left a sealed packet containing a message to be submitted, after his death, to the test of discovery by a medium, to whom, on the spiritualistic hypothesis, it might be revealed by the deceased gentleman. The experiment failed entirely. Had it succeeded, I should take it as strong practical evidence of the fact of post-mundane existence.

Met. From the metaphysical standpoint, such an experiment could only succeed on the condition that the late Mr. Myers, when alive, had telepathically suggested it, or inadvertently revealed it, to somebody who telepathically suggested it to the medium; or, that somebody had read the message, sealed up the paper, and told or telepathically suggested the words to the medium. As I have shown, in detail, in dealing with the Piper case, in *Meta-Christianity*, all ostensible communications from the dead to the living are easily interpretable as phenomena of suggestion between souls in the mundane state. As death is cessation of willing the mundane

mind, communication of actual thoughts, feelings, sensings by the dead to the living, or by the living to the dead, is metaphysically impossible. Had the medium rightly stated the message, the fact would have proved no more to me than that Mr. Myers had telepathically, or inadvertently, revealed the message to some living person, who suggested it to the medium.

Em. Do you deny any sort of communication between the dead and living?

Met. No; I hold that there is communication, as what is called rapport, involving mutual domination, apart from the suggestion of actual experiences. In the case of the so-called spirit-communication, this rapport awakens memories in the sitter, of the deceased, and these memories are, as it were, tapped by the hyper-suggestible person called a medium.

Em. Rapport, to which you refer, I suppose is the same influence that exists between the hypnotist and hypnotic, in experimental suggestion?

Met. Yes; in the case of the ordinary hypnotic, there is extreme susceptibility to the dominant influence of another soul: the hypnotist. In cases of close, but ordinary, intimacies, there is less intense, mutual susceptibility of the sort.

Em. Which, you hold, persists in the future state?

Met. Yes.

Em. Do you hold that it will involve discriminative recognitions, as between children, parents, wives, husbands, friends?

Met. In some guise, as between friends; not as the other relationships.

Em. Why not as the others?

Met. Because the other identifications would involve the willing again of the mundane mind, which, from the metaphysical standpoint, the soul ceases to will, as what we call death.

Em. Would not recognition, as friends, involve such renewed willing?

Met. Not necessarily. Our earthly attachments and repulsions, involving rapport, are often clearly distinguishable from what we consider grounds for them, as ordinary sensings, thoughts, feelings.

Em. "I do not like you, Doctor Fell; the reason why, I cannot tell." That's rapport, is it?

Met. Yes; rapport, involving repulsion.

Em. The tie is indifferent, as liking or disliking?

Met. Yes; it is soul-domination, pure and simple—in cases of mundane intimacies, willed with feelings of repulsion or attachment, as the case may be.

Em. Is it peculiar to intimates?

Met. Yes; as soul-domination, or soul-rapport. There is another form, which I call fetish-rapport, involving what may be termed self-hypnotism by sensings, thoughts, feelings. This form involves our recognising people merely as sensings—shapes, sizes, etc. Then, the people are strangers.

Em. You hold that this soul-rapport will ensure recognitions in the future state, though there be no such clues, as bodily presence, voice, features?

Met. Yes; there is analogy to this sort of recognition in the case of experimental hypnotism, in which the hypnotist influences the hypnotic when both are far out of range of ordinary seeing and hearing. Telepathic control at a distance illustrates soul-rapport, apart from sensings.

Em. You hold that this rapport prevails as between the dead and living?

Met. Yes. The ostensible communications from so-called spirits are incident to that prevalence, involving memories, for the sitters, which they telepathically suggest to the medium, who externalises them, as writing or speech, through his capacity for so-called automatic expression in the trance state. So, what the medium writes or speaks, seems to emanate from the so-called spirit.

Em. There is no communication between the medium and the so-called spirit?

Met. No; only between the medium and sitter who is influenced by rapport, and so stimulated to will memories relevant to the intimacy when the spirit was a living person.

Em. How comes it that the medium is able to report these circumstances? Does the sitter start thinking of a dead intimate; remember a lot of incidents, and suggest them to the medium?

Met. That may occur; but it is not necessary that the sitter shall practically remember all the incidents recounted by the medium.

Em. Do you mean that the medium may recount what the sitter has forgotten?

Met. That often occurs. Through his abnormal suggestibility, the medium can, as it were, tap what is only in mnemonic storey of, and so forgotten by, the sitter. This may occur, not merely in regard to the sitter, but in regard to his living intimates, whom the medium may tap, through the sitter. So it may occur that the medium reports circumstances quite unknown to the sitter, but telepathically suggested to him by distant intimates, and by him, to the

medium. I have gone into this point, in detail, in *Meta-Christianity*, in discussing the theories of Professor Hyslop and Dr. Hodgson about the Piper manifestations.

Em. Wireless telegraphy may be superseded by telepathy?

Met. In the fifth volume of *Heresies*, I suggested an experiment of the sort, which I surmised might be successful. In the *Morning Leader* of November 9th, 1904, I read that Professor Hyslop had reported a case of telepathic communication across the Atlantic.

Em. The human personality being, from your standpoint, the soul, manifesting its activity as the willing into top storey of sensings, thoughts, feelings, in what sense do you attribute personal identity to such an agent?

Met. Its personality consists in its tendency to will special experiences, rather than others. Thus, one person wills his body as tall and lean; another wills his body as short and stout. One wills what we call a choleric temperament; another, an equable one, and so on throughout the field of human individuality.

Em. This inherent tendency being imposed by pre-natal suggestion by parental souls?

Met. Yes.

Em. The metaphysical mind being a sort of medium through which this pre-natal tendency manifests itself during what we commonly call life?

Met. Just so. Through constituting fragments of this metaphysical mind experience, as its own mind, the particular soul manifests its personal identity as a resultant of pre-natal suggestion.

Em. The manifestation of this hereditary individuality being affected by environment?

Met. Yes; and this environment itself being what may be figured as preponderant accumulations of hereditary individualities involving what I term consensuses of suggestion operating as post-natal suggestion.

Em. I see that this sort of inherent tendency to will special experiences and to respond to established willings by other souls, as what you call consensuses of suggestion, will constitute what we commonly call an individuality; but, how are we to conceive of such individuality as persisting after what we call death, involving, from your standpoint, cessation of willing the metaphysical mind?

Met. You will see that the problem you now suggest is distinct from the problem of present personality and the problem whether that personality is independent of the mundane incidents to its manifestation, as ordinary thoughts, feelings, sensings, and, accordingly, persistent, though these manifestations cease.

Em. I quite see the distinction, and that, to show immortality, it suffices to prove the independence, though we fail to conceive any hypothesis accounting for continuity of the future and present personality.

Met. The continuity is conceivable if we assume that certain constituents of the metaphysical mind continue as constituents of the post-mundane mind. The particular constituents are the duration-sensation, involving what we call time; a feeling involving what we call self-consciousness, which I term the self-sensation, and the consciousness-sensation itself, involving what we call consciousness. If these ex-

periences continued to be willed, we should know ourselves as continuous with an anterior state, as we know such continuity on awaking from ordinary sleep.

Em. Would that account for our recognising earthly intimates in the post-mundane state?

Met. Yes, that recognition would occur on the same ground that we recognised ourselves as persisting. We should suggest to the post-mundane intimates our continuing personality, and they would suggest theirs to us, involving what we have earlier discussed as rapport.

Em. So soon as you identify a really causal agent, you identify the immortal personality?

Met. Naturally. To assume that such an agent ceased to exist merely because it ceased to determine particular experiences would be to take an absurdly speculative jump.

Em. And, if you identify a Creative Cause, to assume that this cause determined the existence of the inferior cause, merely to snuff it out after a few years of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, smelling, thinking, would be to attribute imbecility to the Creative Cause.

Met. Obviously, on such conditions, there would be no rational meaning in the existence of such an inferior cause.

Em. What about a gnat, a dog, vegetation—are those causes analogous to ourselves?

Met. The grounds for supposing what we call organisms, apart from ourselves, to be causal agents, are in varying degrees of cogency. Personally, I deny causal agency to vegetable organisms and to most animals.

Em. What do you hold organisms to be to which you deny causal agency?

Met. I hold them to be merely sensings determined by ourselves.

Em. Have we not good reason for attributing feelings and thoughts to all animals?

Met. We know nothing about their ostensible feelings and thoughts but as our own, which we attribute to the creatures. There is no purely intellectual proof of causal agency but in ourselves and the Creator.

Em. I have been reading, in the *Saturday Review* of December 31st, 1904, what purports to be the view of a very distinguished scientist, regarding the attitude of science to the question of personal immortality. The attitude is said to be "sceptical in the main, and not infrequently frankly antagonistic, and this in spite of the latter-day revulsion of many men towards the older paths."

Met. If I were limited by the empirical standpoint, I should be in the frankly antagonistic camp. Anybody who accepts, as a measure of the contingency of immortality, the illusion of empirical causality, must, on rational grounds, deny immortality.

Em. He must get free of the empirical gnosis, or hold that he is done for when he stops breathing.

Met. Obviously, so long as he accepts such things as nerve-cells and fibres as causal agents, when these cease manifesting ostensible activities constituting what is called life, there is nothing to predicate about as persisting.

Em. To talk to him about personality that is independent of brain, heart, lungs, blood, is, from his standpoint, to talk in the clouds.

Met. Say, in the omnipresent ether!

Em. About the vital integrity of which he seems to have the fullest assurance.

Met. He can gulp a high degree of tenuity, as an immortal agent, provided it has no personal identity.

Em. And he places small account on himself as being a necessary factor in enabling the gulping to be accomplished.

Met. Yes; he ignores that, in predicating about his ethers, energies, atoms, he implies that there is something that determines the things as experience in order that he may know anything about them.

Em. The things cannot do anything that he does not make them do?

Met. Nothing that he can possibly know, and what he cannot possibly know cannot be predicated about as being done.

Em. He takes for granted that the things are outside himself, acting on their own account?

Met. Yes; notwithstanding that he can know nothing about the ostensible action but as determining it as his own experience.

Em. And yet, he castigates religious folk for being superstitious.

Met. His unconsciousness of his own credulity, and his authoritative judgment of the credulity of others involve a somewhat farcical situation.

DUOLOGUE XXXVIII.

RE-INCARNATION.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.

METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. I assume that you reject what is termed the transmigration of souls?

Met. Yes; whether as willing other human bodies, or any other sorts of bodies. That follows from the metaphysical standpoint regarding mundane death, involving cessation of willing the mundane mind.

Em. On an earlier occasion, I think you stated that it was metaphysically possible to think and feel without a brain?

Met. Likely enough I said that, because it is what I believe.

Em. If that is possible, why, when people empirically die, may not the souls start again willing the mundane mind and constitute fresh human bodies, or even brute bodies?

Met. It will suffice, in the connection, if we deal merely with the supposititious willing of fresh human bodies. Though it is not metaphysically impossible that a soul shall continue willing the mundane mind, after ceasing to will a specific body, the fact of hereditary determinism, precludes our contemplating realisation of the possibility. Every soul wills a specific body because it is pre-natally determined to

will the particular sensing with the self-sensation. That it willed another body would necessitate fresh pre-natal suggestion. But, in being born, it has passed the stage of receiving pre-natal suggestion. That stamps its identity, as a mundane soul.

Em. It does look as though pre-natal suggestion, once imposed, must fix the soul, once and for all, as a stage in its career.

Met. Transmigration would involve such a contingency as that, after creating the first souls and determining their willing of mind, as their own bodies, God annulled that determinism, and substituted another, involving their willing fresh bodies.

Em. That would seem to indicate a sort of imbecility in the Creator.

Met. When we consider the complex procreative conditions of which each existing person is the outcome, there is no ground for assuming a contingency which would amount to a stultification of the determinisms involving that complexity. Of how many millions of procreative acts you or I am the outcome, as willing body, who can estimate? Is it conceivable that the Creator should arbitrarily nullify such determinism?

Em. No; that sort of determinism is irrevocable, to my belief. Souls cannot jump out of and into bodies in the frolicsome way implied in the assumption of transmigration. People who invented that hypothesis overlooked heredity. There is no trying back by the Creator.

Met. Not in regard to causal agents. Though, in regard to experiences, we detect much that seems to indicate hesitation and retracing of steps, as what we call reversion, throwing back, destruction, recon-

struction, the contingencies in question are irrelevant to the question of creative inconsequence and hesitation in regard to causal agents themselves. That different pre-natal suggestions were determined for the same soul, would indicate creative inconsequence and hesitation in regard to causal agents.

Em. I see the distinction between reversions in regard to mere experiences, and in regard to agents constituting the experiences.

Met. That a soul wills a particular body is the direct, unsophisticated result of hereditary determinism, in regard to that causal agent, itself. That it were to will a fresh body, would involve revocation of the first creative determinism; not merely of responses to particular consensuses of suggestion, involving particular experiences.

Em. The case would seem to work out this way:—God permits any amount of apparent imbecility in regard to the willing of experiences, by souls; but, He perpetrates no imbecility in determining souls, themselves.

Met. And we must not overlook, in identifying these apparent imbecilities in the willing of experiences, that the ostensible irrationality only exists for those determined, by God, to detect it, as imbecile.

Em. That is an all-important point which nonchalant critics of Deity generally ignore.

Met. They overlook that that is only imbecile which they constitute imbecile, as their experience, and that, as God determines their causal fabrication of the experience, God determines what they consider their own sagacity, as His critics.

Em. Yes; we had the point over in our last conversation.

Met. By willing what may be termed, in the connection, imbecile experiences, we may identify imbecility in the Creator. Metaphysic enables us to amend our experiences.

Em. Theosophists, and some of the Church Fathers, maintain re-incarnation?

Met. Yes; as regards the Fathers, for the purpose of accounting for what we conceive to be moral qualities, as attributes of the Creator. Recognising the apparent inequities in this world, it is an easy expedient for reconciling them with a Creator manifesting our justice, if we assume that, in ante-mundane stages, souls act in such ways as to merit consequences, in this world, seemingly inconsistent with Creative justice.

Em. Apart from that issue of our eagerness for a Creator cut to our measure of goodness, there is no reason that those old theologians should have troubled themselves about re-incarnation?

Met. None that I can see. Moreover, even if we granted re-incarnation, it would be useless for the theological purpose unless we granted the metaphysical impossibility of power, in the creature, to thwart its Creator, involving what is called free-will.

Em. We discussed that point in one of our early conversations. You hold that such power is impossible?

Met. Impossible. To thwart a Creator implies the creating, as motive and action, of what the Creator has not created.

Em. Suppose the Creator creates the motive and action involving the thwarting, giving the soul the choice of one or another motive and action?

Met. Such choice will involve power to create motive not created by the creator you assume.

Em. Why?

Met. Because the exercise of choice is merely the manifestation of motive. If the exercise of choice involves action not determined by the creator, it involves motive not created by the creator.

Em. Suppose the creator creates motive involving and not involving the action?

Met. That involves that the creator creates exercise of choice involving and not involving the action. So, no action can result.

Em. No action result?

Met. Obviously, none. The two exercises of choice nullify one another, stultifying the postulation of choice.

Em. You are right. If choice means anything, it means the exercise of motive. To assume capacity to choose implies unfettered liberty to determine motive. Unfettered liberty to do that implies power to create motive. So, if the agent can thwart the creator, the agent must be another creator?

Met. You will see that such a contingency involves related agents. Related agents cannot be creators. So, we require a third causal agent, as real Creator, to determine your two ostensible creators.

Em. Obviously. The two creators in opposition must be no more than empirical causes. Choice, as between creature and creator, is impossible. To affirm it, is to stultify thought.

Met. Choice is merely an empirical illusion, practically necessary as among ourselves, but meaningless, as between us and the Creator. Anybody who

maintains the possibility of choice, as against the Creator, thereby shows that the term, creator, is void of thought-backing—a mere vocal jingle—so far as he is concerned.

Em. How does that affect human responsibility?

Met. Renders it more than ever rigidly compulsive and definable, through incident intellectual revelation of a single principle of action, the ignoring of which principle involves that action that has no intellectually moral, but has merely expediential, significance. The full discussion of this point will be within the province of our future conversations dealing with morality and religion.

Em. Obviously, our common experience of option is entirely foreign to the problem of liberty as between creature and Creator?

Met. It merely involves illusion determined for us, by the Creator, as critical in our relationships one with another, but utterly irrelevant to any contingency of causal relationship of ourselves to the Creator.

Em. Obviously, the theosophical ground for assuming re-incarnation, as incident to actions in an earlier stage, is knocked away, if there is no freedom as between creature and Creator?

Met. Obviously.

Em. And there is no other ground?

Met. While there is no metaphysical ground for denying re-incarnation, as possible, there is no ground for holding, but much ground for denying, that it does occur. As to ante-mundane existence of souls, there is no empirical ground for speculating about it, and, as the assumption implies the temporal contingency, which is merely a matter of willing a

feeling, the contingency has no metaphysical significance.

Em. You mean that, as regards the existence of souls, all is present?

Met. Yes; the temporal contingency is merely involved in their causal activity as willing experiences.

Em. You talk about the first man and woman. That seems to involve the temporal contingency with souls.

Met. Yes; souls as willing temporal experience, not souls, as existing.

Em. As existing, souls are out of time?

Met. Just as they are out of neuralgia.

Em. Beginning and end are meaningless terms, in regard to the existence of souls?

Met. Just as they are in regard to the existence of the Creator. The terms are only relevant to experiences; not to causal agents willing the experiences.

Em. If there is no agent willing time, there is no time?

Met. Just as, if there is no agent willing neuralgia, there is no neuralgia.

DUOLOGUE XXXIX.

THE OUTLOOK.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. The discussions we have had, so far, have been of absorbing interest to me. Your metaphysic vanishes in mystery.

Met. It does; all real science vanishes in mystery. What professes to dispense with mystery is not science. The object of science is to afford belief. If I have enabled you to believe, my mission, as affording you knowledge, is accomplished.

Em. You have certainly fulfilled your mission, so far as I am concerned; but, what about the bawling, gesticulating, posturing, scheming, log-rolling, word-spinning dogmatists who bewilder and bemuddle the public with their raw contentions about ephemeral trivialities, and who are accepted as intellectual beacons—will those people try the effect of the science of causation on their multitudinous assurances and expediencies? Will they honestly test the searching of your crucible?

Met. That will be decided by Providence. If I provide the light, my work, as God's machine, is done.

Em. What you call metaphysical existence is mystery pure and simple. I cannot imagine sensings,

thoughts, feelings as other than themselves; so, I cannot imagine in what guise they can metaphysically persist.

Met. Nor can I. But I know that they do metaphysically persist, otherwise, they could not practically exist or persist.

Em. The scientist's matter, as what he calls substratum, is mystery.

Met. No; it is not mystery, but is merely definition of what is impossible. Whatever involves definition, does not involve mystery. Mystery starts where definition ends.

Em. Then as science ends in definition, it ends as nescience?

Met. It does; passing through science to nescience, not to mystery. In its intermediate theories and applications, science is science. In its ultimate speculations, it is quackery.

Em. It affords belief; so, from your standpoint, it is true.

Met. True, until metaphysic is applied to it.

Em. You are right. No scientist who honestly faces metaphysic can continue to believe, as he did, in that substratum. Depend upon it, he will keep out of the way of metaphysic as long as possible.

Met. Probably he will.

Em. So far as my experience of scientific people goes, they are among the most bigoted of folk.

Met. They are generally hypnotic slaves to the authority of their specialisms.

Em. Like clayed-up frogs. I should say that intellectuality was as conspicuous by its absence, in the case of the average scientist, as in that of the average religious bigot.

Met. Yes; the so-called free thinking of the devotees of empirical science seems to be mainly a matter of freedom to think as slaves. About the most hopeless of enterprises is to get people, in any walk, to think at all; let alone, getting them to think freely.

Em. Unless about their pockets and bellies.

Met. Even in respect to those important considerations, their thinking is of a very rudimentary character; abject slave of their emotions, passions, inclinations.

Em. Most of us are clayed-up frogs.

Met. Helots to particular consensuses of suggestion.

Em. Look at those politicians pummelling one another, and the public making a ring as the pets go at it. What is it all about? Does the victory of one spell salvation; of the other, perdition? Does it matter a brass button which gets floored?

Met. No; I don't think there is much that can be intellectually identified as important in the spectacle, and I surmise that what issues are raised might be settled as effectively by tossing a coin as by the present method.

Em. Look at a coat-tail-flying, twisting, smirking, pirouetting contortionist vamping ecstasies out of music-hall jingles, and a fatuous blusterer telling folk they are on the way to Hell if they do not take his raving at the price he tickets it. Do people who think about religion want that sort of thing?

Met. No; I hardly think it meets the religious requirements of this age and country. It seems to be part of the mystery of things. Before God determines the complete extinction of an old order,

He seems to determine a thorough rotting for it. The manifestations to which you refer, indicate, for me, the last stage of rotting of what now passes as religion.

Em. Emotional religion seems always to have been subject to such outbursts.

Met. Yes; as real ecstatic manifestations; but I cannot class what is now occurring in London, with such phenomena.

Em. It is common showman business; quite different from what is occurring in Wales.

Met. Yes; that seems to be a really spontaneous outburst of religious fervour which may mark a transitional stage towards the coming religious developments which I hope we may discuss in a future series of conversations.

Em. Do you see indications, in the Welsh movement, of a consummation on your lines?

Met. No. At present, it merely impresses me as the latest example of an outburst of religious ecstasy of a sort often recorded.

Em. Epidemics of emotionalism?

Met. Emanating from one or another powerful hypnotist motived by intense religious fervour.

Em. You consider the influence of such a missionary as Evan Roberts, hypnotic?

Met. Purely that. He is an example, in the religious arena, of the type of trance-medium of the spiritistic *séance*. All propagandism not appealing to intellect, is hypnotic. Until very recently, religious movements have been exclusively hypnotic phenomena. Christ, himself, was supreme as hypnotist. His power, in that respect, is to-day manifested in the Welsh revival. The like applies, in their respective spheres, to Buddha and Mahomet.

Em. You hold that Christianity must now be intellectualised?

Met. Yes; if it is to persist as a living influence on Western civilisation. Hypnotic influence, at this day, must be supported by intellectual assent, if religion is to dominate the mass of people.

Em. The Welsh revival seems to have worked wonderful changes in character and action.

Met. Undoubtedly. But such sporadic, personal revulsions will not religiously leaven this age. Beyond hypnotic submission to Christ, as fetish, this age requires intellectual appreciation of the validity of Christ's teaching. Christ is now an intellectual compulsion, over and above his claims as fetish.

Em. I quite agree that "coming to Jesus," at this day, for the mass of people, will need to involve clear apprehension of intellectual compulsion in Christ's teaching.

Met. And, if the compulsion is intellectually impregnable, the exaction, by society, of its requirements.

Em. Certainly. If people are intellectually assured that Christ's teaching is right, it follows that unless they are to brand themselves as frauds and hypocrites, they must not tolerate a society affronting Christ's principles.

Met. We will go into these matters fully in our next series of discussions, and see if we cannot identify Christ's principles as they have never before been identified.

Em. We shall get no Christian society until we get Christian governors.

Met. And we shall not get the governors until the governed demand them.

Em. Certainly; the people get as good governors as they deserve and want.

Met. Government ought to be merely the machinery for administering intellectually identified principles.

Em. The making of laws ought not to be decided by votes.

Met. Not by such votes as now determine their making. Our present method of applying votes to the making of laws is as insufficient as would be deciding by the toss of a coin.

Em. Those who made laws ought to be thinkers, not nobs.

Met. Laws ought to be merely the embodiment of intellectually identified right. So soon as the right was identified, the law ought to follow, as I may say, automatically.

Em. Rich and poor being equally bent on "make," there seems little hope of intellect having a look in.

Met. We must reorganise motive, as preliminary to a better state of things than now exists. We shall only reorganise motive through rendering religion intellectually compulsive.

Em. The poor distrust intellect, through obtuseness and ignorance; the rich and cultured fear it as a peril to their pretensions. Between rich and poor intellect gets a ticket for Flanders.

Met. So long as people have no belief in God and a future life, they will appreciate principles of right merely as facilities or obstructions to their personal ends.

Em. Christ must not touch pockets and privileges, if the rich are to patronise him. Christ must empty

full pockets into starved ones, if the poor are to run after him. The rich support what they call religion, because they take it to be a cult of non-resistance to their pretensions, and so adapted to bolster them by what the masses are led to suppose is God's sanction.

Met. You seem to imply a condition conducing, at present, and probably at all epochs, to the popularity of Christianity with the powerful and prosperous: the condition being that the cult has been construed merely as a means of regeneration of the individual, with no concern to regenerate the body politic.

Em. If Christ's teaching is necessary for the individual, it is obviously necessary for society.

Met. Until very recently, that necessity has been consistently ignored, with the result that individual responsibility for anti-Christian and anti-moral institutions, and the necessity of the individual's action no less to the end of eradicating collective, than his own, personal, moral criminality, have been deemed outside the concern of religion. Now, people are beginning to apply Christ to social institutions, and we accordingly find that pedagogic exponents of religion, such as Professor Harnack, alarmed at the peril to the social *status quo* incident to applying religion to collective action, are making laboured, and, as I hope to prove to you, fatuous and disingenuous attempts to dissociate Christ's teaching from what they call "the affairs of the world."

Em. If a man deliberately abstains from working to upset collective iniquity about which he is assured, and under which he personally prospers, he is as great a moral rascal as in deliberately perpetrating the crime. That is A B C to me. On

the other hand, I see that when a religion comes along that proves God's sanction for uprooting social iniquity, its missionary funds will not bulge on the scale of those of conventional Christianity.

Met. In our next series of discussions I hope to show you that such a religion is now revealed.

Em. Take my word; that affluent, cultured, and highly intelligent constituency which now rules the roast will be desperately impervious to the credentials of that religion. They'll hum and ha; rub their pates; blink like owls in the sunlight, and seem to be afflicted with spasms of imbecility. You'll want a sledge-hammer to drive in that religion.

Met. I have already had evidence of the state of impotency to which you refer; but I persevere with the tonic applications. The religion is already on record in my book, *Meta-Christianity* and other writings. I hope to submit its credentials, in their most advanced aspects, to your scrutiny on future occasions. The discussions we have had relate to the intellectual foundations of my religion.

Em. They have pretty well dusted away the foundations of the cult of atheism.

Met. Yes; they have been tolerably destructive in that respect.

Em. Those free-thinkers will be at you like terriers after rats.

Met. Hitherto, their tails have been the only parts of them I could discern.

Em. They have been too busy mangling the ministers, theological professors, and religious press, to notice you. When they sniff you, the fangs will be into you. They are as keen after the taint of belief in God as Inquisitors were, after infidelity.

Met. I have done all in my power to tempt Professor Haeckel, and the leaders of the atheistic movement in this country, to give me a run.

Em. Haeckel swears by ether, I understand?

Met. I do not know whether he swears; but he says that he is as certain about the existence of ether, as about his own existence.

Em. Fancy a man saying that, and pitching into others for saying they believe in the existence of God and soul!

Met. The conjunction of contingencies has a humorous aspect. The trusting credulity of atheists of the critical order is enough to excite the envy of the professedly faithful.

Em. Had they as much faith about Christ, as Haeckel has about ether, there would be less ether about religion.

Met. Decidedly less tenuity.

Em. Haeckel ought to have a mild imprecation on the counter for you. Your conduct constitutes monstrous provocation for any self-respecting atheist.

Met. In regard to myself, the atheists seem long-suffering, patient, tolerant, myopic, astigmatic.

Em. Virtues modified by afflictions. They don't use the blind eye for Nelson's purpose?

Met. No; they turn it to the foe.

Em. They are keener after the sheep of the fold, than after seasoned bisons.

Met. Their preferences seem to lie that way.

Em. If a man can only survive, in his society, by being a rogue, what's he to do—let his fellows squeeze and suck him dry, or squeeze and suck back? Say, a person professes to believe in Christ, as a divine authority; or, that he has intellectual

conviction that honesty to the God in whom he professes to believe is only possible as a principle of collective and individual action which is entirely ignored in the constitution of his society, and thus practically impossible for him as a line of action, through the constitution of his society—how is that man to act, without being a rogue to the Deity he professes to serve?

Met. You raise issues with which I hope we may deal exhaustively in our next series of discussions. In your earlier expression of views regarding the moral calibre of a man who deliberately abstains from working to upset collective iniquity under which he, personally, prospers, you show that you appreciate one fundamental requirement. Whatever else a man does or fails to do, he cannot escape the moral criminality of such tacit connivance as you indicate.

Em. A man who is a failure at the sucking and squeezing business will easily fall in with that subversive requirement. The successful operator will not take kindly to it.

Met. Undoubtedly that applies to the very low condition of motive which you contemplate. But I am hopeful that, when a fundamental principle of duty to the Deity is rendered intellectually undeniable to the mass of people of this country, there will be the motive to act up to the conviction, apart from considerations of personal satisfaction or dissatisfaction with present material circumstances.

Em. I daresay that will apply to real believers in God. To me, it is inconceivable that any rational person, fully assured of the existence of God, and of specific requirements, the repudiation of which involves fraud to God, will lack motive to work for the

establishment of social conditions consistent with practical realisation of the requirements. But, how many people are fully assured about the existence of God, and about the requirements?

Met. At present, there are large constituencies denying God, and with vague tendencies to accept the existence of God. Taking the whole population, I should say that there was practically nothing in the shape of belief, as an intellectual contingency, in the existence of God. So far as the existence of God is maintained, it is maintained on the ground of faith, not belief.

Em. Well, how are you going to deal with the two large constituencies of atheists and hedgers?

Met. Apply the metaphysic we have been discussing. I hold that they cannot assimilate that metaphysic without getting believing in God.

Em. And the faithful, who call themselves Christians?

Met. Again, apply that metaphysic, and ask them to follow Christ.

Em. I am with you. Any man who faces that metaphysic will have a brazen countenance if he can face it out as atheist or sceptic.

Met. And I hope to show, in our next discussions, that any Christian who does not co-operate for the establishment of what that metaphysic reveals as duty to God, repudiates the fundamental requirements of Jesus Christ.

Em. Well; let us hope that hope tells no flattering tale. I daresay I'm nearly as sanguine as you, about the effect of that metaphysical prescription. It ought to be well advertised as touching the spot.

Met. Though I have experienced to the full the sickness of hope deferred, faith prods me along gaily. A man does not worry much about impediments, when he knows that God has fixed the destination and time of arrival. We shall arrive to time, my friend.

Em. Yes; even looking at the matter from the fashionable, business-like standpoint, I think a big moral and religious shunt is within what our oracles call the region of practical politics. The ordinary man of this age and country, once he gets the alternative of being rogue or honest to God, hitting him square in the face, will think twice before he elects for the vocation of rogue.

Met. He feels that he can choose. The measure of his virtue or criminality is his action in comparison with his knowledge. As he knows, so is his responsibility.

Em. He must have an easy conscience, to say nothing of his prudence as an entity that has not done with things merely by stopping the mundane *rôle*, if, knowing what's straight to God, he elects to go crooked. Even as a matter of profit and loss, the rogue's business, carried on with God, ought not to be popular with long-headed folk. Perhaps, they'll fight shy of the knowledge; do the ostrich.

Met. The deliberate adoption of such procedure will merely aggravate their criminality.

Em. Obviously; and I don't think, if they try it, that they will stave off the inevitable. Intellectual demonstration of a fundamental principle of integrity to God is too big to be lifted on to the top shelf. There are too many folk who don't get trumps under

present conditions, to render the ostrich business feasible. Even the successful diddler will hardly think good enough: *hic jacet* a fellow who flourished at the business of playing cut diamond with his Maker, and is now scooping in the proceeds.

DUOLOGUE XL.

GENESIS.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. You hold the Biblical account of creation, against modern materialistic evolutionism?

Met. Emphatically, I do.

Em. But, you say that there was no earth until man determined it as experience, while Genesis says, in the earlier account, that God created the earth, first, without form and void; then, with light divided from darkness; then, with a firmament dividing waters above and below it; then, with the lower waters gathered together, and dry land existing; then, with grass, herb, tree, seed; then, with the two great lights, to rule the day and night, and the stars; then, all aquatic animals, and birds; then, all animals moving on the earth; and, lastly, man. How does that conform with your proposition?

Met. Those creative acts of God involved only the various products as metaphysically existing. Earth, firmament, sun, moon, stars, animals, existed only to God, as the primitive metaphysical mind, not yet constituted experience by creatures, as causal agents. But, when God created man "in His own image," God created a causal agent competent to constitute this metaphysical mind experience.

Em. Until man was created, the other products only existed for God?

Met. Yes. Giving man "dominion" over the products metaphysically existing, God determined that man, as causal agent, should bring these things into top storey of mind, as human experience.

Em. God's creating man in His own "image" implied that man was causal agent?

Met. Yes; the likeness to God was involved in man's causal agency. God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."

Em. The reference to nostrils, implies that man, as body, existed?

Met. Yes; to God, as the universal body of humanity.

Em. Of course, we must assume that the narrative would be coloured by the notions of primitive narrators, and would pass through multitudes of re-statements before reaching us.

Met. Necessarily, all religious revelation, as condition of its prevalence, is coloured by the willing of thought and feeling in top storey, peculiar to the epoch at which the revelation first comes to humanity. There has been much discussion about the two accounts, distinguished as Elohist (the earlier) and Jehovist or Jahvist (the later), which differ widely, judged from the empirical standpoint, with which I am not concerned.

Em. According to the first account, man was created last; according to the second account, before the other products.

Met. Yes; I am only concerned about the metaphysical aspects. From my standpoint, the temporal

contingency is negligible, because the products of creation only existed for God, until man was determined to will them as top storey experience.

Em. It would seem that God's breathing into man's nostrils the breath of life, implied the creation of what you earlier discussed as the ante-cosmic organic soul.

Met. Yes; the condition is indicated vaguely in the fourth and fifth verses of the second chapter: ". . . In the day that the Lord God made . . . every plant of the field before it was in the earth, and every herb of the field before it grew." In like sense, God created man before he became, as the disintegrated ante-cosmic organic soul, a causal agent willing fragments of the metaphysical mind, as top storey experience.

Em. What indicates that event, in the narrative?

Met. The twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh verses of the first chapter: "And God said, let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea. . . . So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them."

Em. That marks the appearance of man as willing mind in top storey?

Met. Yes. Giving man the "dominion" implies giving man the power, as causal agent, to will animal bodies, from the metaphysical mind, into top storey.

Em. What passage marks the actual willing of animal bodies in top storey?

Met. No passage indicates such willing by an individual human creature, but the nineteenth verse of the second chapter bears on the point: "And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of

the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof." This implies that, to God, humanity, as Adam, did (suiting the tense to our empirical illusion of time) will the living creatures, as bodies, into top storey.

Em. You mean that, to God, all top storey experience, as well as metaphysical existence, from the creative event to the present moment and to all futurity, is present?

Met. That is what I mean. The actual sensing of the living creatures by human beings is not the contingency implied in the passage. That would only occur when God determined the disintegration of the ante-cosmic organic soul as the sexually differentiated souls involving the first man and woman.

Em. God did not bring the animals to Adam, as an individual man, in our common sense of parading them?

Met. Of course not, from our present standpoint. The words, "brought them unto Adam" are purely figurative, stating the contingency in terms of our common empirical illusionism. Adam's giving them "names" is the totality of sensing of animal bodies possible to humanity, and present, to God; but possible to no individual human creature. The first man and woman, though willing all bodies as the metaphysical mind, could no more sense them than can you or I.

Em. Your statement that the totality of sensings is present, to God, seems to imply impossibility, as implying that our bodies, for instance, in all stages, from the womb onwards, exist together, intact.

Met. Why should that be more impossible, for God, than that the sensings succeed one another as our actual experience?

Em. You mean that, at the creation, God knew my body, as all its empirical stages together, as I and others knew or know it, from my birth to this moment?

Met. Certainly I mean that. If God creates the causal agents so knowing your body, why shall not God know it?

Em. I cannot conceive the possibility. On the other hand, I cannot deny it to the Creator of causal agents which, *en masse*, render the experiences their own. The implication of what you now propound regarding Creative omniscience seems to be that, to the Creator, the metaphysical mind and our top storey experiences, are conjunct, as Divine knowledge.

Met. Certainly. The Cause of all causes embraces the causal activity of all causes. As embracing that activity, the Creative cause embraces the products of the activity.

Em. Yes; there is no getting away from what you advance. Once we face the causal problem we must scout impossibility as applying to the Agent in relation to which all other causal agency is merely effect.

Met. Always with the one proviso: that the Agent cannot create what shall cause independently of, or in opposition to, the Agent.

Em. That would involve related creators?

Met. And so stultify identification of Real Cause.

Em. The creation of Adam is the creation of humanity as what you call the ante-cosmic organic soul?

Met. Yes; and its disintegration as souls willing the male and female characters, physical and psychical.

Em. In that respect, creation would seem to be now in operation as fully as when the first man appeared.

Met. Yes; the appearance of the first man merely involved causal determinism operating at this moment. To God, it is all present. We only, are conditioned by time, in respect to products of causal activity.

Em. God knows our temporal limitations, as imposing them?

Met. While also transcending them.

Em. With the sexual disintegration of the antecosmic organic soul would start the "naming," as sensing?

Met. Yes.

Em. Land, water, sky, sun, moon, stars, animals, plants would then be in evidence?

Met. Yes. Then, man, individually, would have "dominion" over them.

Em. If the animals were souls, that would involve creation of causal agents, as in the case of man?

Met. Yes.

Em. Might not the animals will their bodies and other experiences, independently of man's existence?

Met. We have often discussed the point you raise. We know nothing about animal bodies or experiences, but as our own experiences. So, there is nothing to discuss as animal bodies independent of man.

Em. Of course. My question is superfluous. Talking about animal bodies and experiences, with-

out man, is to talk of human experiences without any human being to experience. We cannot get along without man to ring up the cosmic curtain. Darwinism, geology, astronomy try to build pyramids from the top downwards. What do you make of the serpent tempting Eve?

Met. The serpent is one of a number of epithets or fanciful personifications applied to an agent of evil common to most religious traditions, which I identify, on grounds we will discuss in our next series of conversations, with the matter-soul.

Em. What about Eve tempting Adam?

Met. From my standpoint, her temptation was suggestion, involving the willing in top storey of the sexual feeling.

Em. A case of sexual attraction incident to the sexual differentiation of the ante-cosmic organic soul?

Met. Yes; I take the account in the third chapter to have a phallic implication. "The tree which is in the midst of the garden," of which Adam was not to eat, I take to imply the reproductive parts, and eating the fruit, to imply sexual gratification.

Em. In eating the "fruit," they became sexually attracted, and "knew that they were naked"?

Met. That is my interpretation. Before the sexual inception, they were "not ashamed" of their nakedness.

Em. In the first chapter, the man and woman are told to "be fruitful and multiply." That seems far abroad from wrong attendant on sexual gratification.

Met. Yes; the two accounts seem to me very different in origin and character. I regard them as a composite of myth and allegory clothing profound truths only discernible by the light of metaphysic.

The earlier account is mainly cosmogony; the later one, mainly ethical.

Em. You do not take the "garden" to be a place planted with trees?

Met. Not at all. I take that part of the account to be allegorical. I read the garden as symbolising the human body. Adam and Eve in the garden, implies, to me, two souls empirically within bodies.

Em. The account refers to a river as watering the garden, and parting into four rivers, two of which are the Euphrates and Tigris, and the other two are supposed to be the Indus and Oxus.

Met. Naturally, the narrator, viewing the contingency from the materialistic standpoint, gives local colour to the events.

Em. You take the account to have esoteric significance?

Met. Yes; unless interpreted metaphysically, practically the whole account is rationally intolerable to me.

Em. I agree that nobody can pretend to assimilate, in the literal sense, such a statement as that God was "walking in the garden in the cool of the day."

Met. We must read in the light of metaphysic, if we are to attain intellectual appreciation of the significance of the Bible.

Em. As the first account tells the man and woman to be fruitful, where is the ethics of the second account in holding them guilty because of sexual gratification?

Met. From the standpoint of the writer of the narrative, the wrong was in the sexual act. In the light of metaphysic, the wrong was only incident to the act, not in the act itself.

Em. How incident to the act, but not in the act itself?

Met. Because the act involved the assertion of human rights by the man, who "shall rule over" the woman.

Em. Then, God determined the sin, in determining the assertion of rights by the man?

Met. Yes; nothing can occur that is not determined by God.

Em. Neither the man nor the woman opposed the will of God?

Met. Not in the light of metaphysic.

Em. But, the Bible reads as though they did.

Met. No; I cannot grant that. Though the account is written by a primitive Hebrew, who describes God as "walking in the garden," there is nothing in it inconsistent with the fact of God's determining the events. The offence is recorded; but, about the power of the creatures to oppose the will of God, nothing is stated.

Em. Why the cursing, by God, if the sin were not opposition to His will?

Met. To impress a lesson regarding the consequences of moral delinquency.

Em. But, if the delinquency were determined by God?

Met. And, if the will of God be that man shall view it as his own delinquency—then, God determines the man as a moral agent.

Em. You say that the assertion of human rights is a moral crime?

Met. The moral crime embracing and consummating all other moral crime.

Em. Have you any authority, beyond yourself, for asserting that?

Met. Yes; Jesus Christ.

Em. I feel curious to know how you will establish that fact.

Met. Your curiosity shall be gratified in our next series of conversations, in which I hope to show that practically the whole teaching, not merely of the New, but also of the Old, Testament, from the story of Cain and Abel onwards, is to the effect of denial of human rights.

Em. Will you now satisfy my curiosity to the extent of telling me how you would interpret the teaching to that effect, in the case of Cain and Abel?

Met. Cain, assuming that his rights, as the elder, have been overridden in favour of Abel, takes the law into his own hands. Then, assuming the rights of men to punish him, he appeals to God to save him from like assertion of rights, by men, as the assertion involving his killing Abel. God reserves to Himself, against men, the right to deal with Cain.

Em. As the elder, Cain might feel aggrieved that his offering was rejected, and Abel's accepted.

Met. So, implying his assumption of rights.

Em. You hold that this is the principal teaching of the Bible?

Met. That it is practically the whole moral teaching. Real moral criminality is not in specific acts, *qua* acts, but is in the assertion of human rights they may involve. Acts only have moral significance as incident to principle.

Em. So, the surface implication that Adam and Eve sinned through specific acts is not the real implication?

Met. No; the sin was incident to God's constituting man a moral agent, by determining that he should "rule over" the woman and so manifest a principle, strife against which constitutes moral activity.

Em. How is a man to act at all, unless on the assumption of human rights?

Met. Your question involves complex issues, the discussion of which we must defer to our next series of conversations. Here, it will suffice to remark that such action is quite feasible, given a right social system. With a wrong social system, the action is, practically, impossible. Accordingly, all that is at present practicable to the individual, as moral agent, is to do his utmost to conform his personal conduct to the principle. The first requirement, in this respect, is that he shall spare no effort in working for a social system compatible with the moral principle.

Em. God determines the bad social system?

Met. Certainly—as moral sin to be extirpated by moral agents.

Em. Suppose this social system to be extirpated, and a morally right one substituted—what then?

Met. Then, man's individual responsibility for wrong action would be a contingency with which society was morally competent to deal as penal agent.

Em. Society would have moral *locus standi* as judge, and the man, as I may say, would go on his merits?

Met. Yes. Until society is moral, man's responsibility for his action is, virtually, society's. On such conditions, society has no moral competency

as judge, and man, individually, practically ignores personal responsibility, beyond its bearing on his animal expediencies.

Em. A moral state such as you imply would seem to involve conditions such as Christ called the kingdom of God.

Met. Yes; a society recognising no rights but God's might be called a kingdom of God, as distinguished from a kingdom, or society based on the recognition of human rights not incident to exaction of God's rights. We will work this out exhaustively in our later discussions.

Em. At present, Do to others as you would have them do to you, seems to read: Do others as you would have them do you—if they are spry enough.

Met. That approximates to the current version, in practice. The Confucian and Christian version is practically impossible, unless under a moral social system.

Em. Even then it would be a bit craggy to act out and out.

Met. As a general line of conduct, I think that it would then offer no practical difficulty. Given a society based on the principle that rights only appertained to God, I think that most sane people would desire to be dealt with, and would readily deal with others, according to the principle.

Em. I daresay there would be a big majority constituted that way, with such a rule of the ring governing society. A man would certainly have a cut higher motive than prevails at present, for observing the proprieties. He'd be a real patriot, then.

Met. And with good reason.

Em. In an earlier conversation, you mentioned Professor Harnack, as typical of a school contending that Christ's teaching is foreign to social problems.

Met. Yes. I have read much valiant special pleading by German professors with theses, but I do not remember anything of the sort that has so impressed me by its desperate valour as has the professor's method of dealing with that issue.

Em. Christ's bearing on social problems needs dexterous treatment by a professor under the eye of Kaiser Wilhelm.

Met. In reading the product of the professor's dexterity, I had the vision of an old lady caught by the tide, tucking up her clothes, and making a bold dash.

Em. He gets a bit splashed?

Met. And comes a cropper in the middle. We'll haul him out in our next series of discussions.

Em. What sort of tackle are you going to use to fish him out?

Met. Metaphysical tackle. We shall see that there are two sides to the Christian shield, both displaying the same essential verity, but each showing it under very different conditions.

Em. How, different conditions?

Met. Under the condition of appeal to faith and emotion, and the condition of appeal to belief and intellect. The one condition involves quiescence, as humility, submission, love; the other condition involves aggressive activity, as the practical assertion of intellectually demonstrable moral right. This side of the Christian shield constitutes what I call Meta-Christianity, as passing beyond the conventional interpretation of Christ's teaching.

Em. Do you mean that you reconcile Christ's teaching with the application of force?

Met. Very much so—the application of force to exact the only moral right that, intellectually, exists.

Em. What right is that?

Met. The right demanding recognition of human rights only as incident to the exaction of God's rights.

Em. When you have established that right, you'll have Christ at social problems, with a vengeance, provided you demonstrate that Christ's teaching embraces the assertion of the right?

Met. That demonstration I undertake to afford to your intellectual satisfaction.

Em. It will hoist the professor out of the puddle?

Met. Yes, and wring him out, dry. But we are now getting far away from Adam and Eve and Genesis. Let us return to our original topic.

Em. Obviously, had God provided no sin, man could not have become a moral agent.

Met. Certainly not. A moral agent is only compatible with the existence of moral crime. Had God determined man to remain what we imagine as perfect, man would have remained non-moral.

Em. Obviously, he could have no claim to moral *status*, if he did not know how to sin.

Met. Accordingly, God provides the sin.

Em. If a moral is higher than a non-moral creature, the so-called Fall was really a rise.

Met. Certainly.

Em. Adam, in his reputed state of pristine perfection, was really a poorer specimen of humanity than after his sin?

Met. To my apprehension, that is the real contingency. I cannot conceive human perfection void of the potentiality for moral criminality. To me, the moral is infinitely the highest human attribute. If a man cannot commit moral crime, the moral attribute cannot be his.

Em. So, when God determined sin, He really exalted man?

Met. To my apprehension, that is beyond dispute. The whole of the Bible is, virtually, a didactic narrative, showing how, through various instruments determined by God—prophet, evangelist, saviour—man copes with the God-determined sin constituting him a moral agent.

Em. That seems a stiff proposition in view of the greater part of the Old Testament.

Met. Read literally, and out of what I may term perspective, there is no doubt much in the record utterly repulsive and nonsensical. But, I think I shall be able to show you that, read by the light of metaphysic, the main drift is to inculcate the moral teaching I mention.

Em. What can you make of Abraham, but an avaricious, bloodthirsty rascal? Think of him handing over his so-called wife, as his sister forsooth, to Pharaoh, to save his own ugly old skin!

Met. The picture is not attractive from our standpoint; neither, I surmise, would be a faithful portraiture of a highly reputable New Guinea savage. But, the great lesson is enforced by Abraham as it is enforced by Christ. Both live, for this age, as illustrating victory over the moral wrong reputedly originating in the Garden of Eden. We will now quit the subject until we go into it thoroughly.

Em. Just another question. How do you reconcile the punishment of death pronounced in the third chapter, with your belief in immortality, and with the statement in the second chapter, that God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul"?

Met. The statement in the third chapter, "dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return," merely implies empirical death, corollary to empirical birth, incident to sexual exercise. So, it is quite consistent with metaphysic, and with the passage in the second chapter.

Em. It merely implies death, in the sense of cessation of willing the mundane mind, as the body?

Met. Yes; by the soul that wills the body as its own. We discussed that sort of death, in various earlier conversations.

Em. "Dust thou art" merely applies to the physical body, as sensing?

Met. Certainly. The transitory existence of that body, as constituting the empirical indication of a human personality, does not affect the permanence of what, in the earlier chapter, is termed the "living soul."

Em. I grant that those early chapters of Genesis are entirely consistent with your metaphysic, so far as regards the cosmological issue, and I await with much interest your promised demonstration of conformity in the moral arena.

Met. That demonstration will be afforded when we come to examine Christ's teaching, in the light of metaphysic.

Em. If anybody had told me, before our dis-

cussions, that it was possible for Genesis to stand against modern science, I should have told him to go on show in a museum, ticketed Pliocene fossil. Now, my suggestion to sundry Fellows of the Royal Society is that they go to school.

DUOLOGUE XLI.

THE METAPHYSICAL INDICTMENT.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. Your science of causation is also the science of experience. It intellectually verifies and investigates experience.

Met. It is the only science which can be credited with that achievement.

Em. Empirical science is the science of illusion, incident to non-intellectual scrutiny of experience.

Met. Yes; empirical science is the science of confounding experiences and ignoring the problem of the conditions on which experiences are possible.

Em. So, it is the science of dogmatising about cause, by warrant of ignorance of the problem of causation.

Met. Obviously, that is the case.

Em. The empirical scientist starts by implicitly confounding himself with what he only knows to exist as his own experience.

Met. Yes; he starts from that gigantic *petitio principii*.

Em. He postulates about things outside, independent of, preceding, succeeding, acting on, himself,

by warrant of infantile insensibility to the fact that there is any problem involved in identifying himself.

Met. Yes; he has the audacity often accompanying limited apprehension and reflection.

Em. He professes to practise nothing but a method of investigation which he calls objective, and stultifies the profession by predicating about thoughts as being identical with sensings?

Met. Yes; he accomplishes that masterpiece of stultification, with the most admirable nonchalance, and hurls thunderbolts at the poor metaphysician for his lack of objective discernment.

Em. By virtue of his infallibility, we have an army of folk making livings by convincing the masses that there is no God, and nothing before the sensible man but to strike the best possible bargain with present circumstances, and then to fizzle out like a spent squib.

Met. That is the edifying solution of life logically emanating from reflection on the teaching of scientific objectivity.

Em. When the cheese is rotten, there'll be the maggots.

Met. The social cheese is "high," and scientific objectivity is the ripening agent. The "maggots" are helpless and blameless. I should be one, failing metaphysic.

Em. I agree. Philosophers may beguile their best with expediency furbished up as morality; still, there's no gospel at the bottom of atheism, but the gospel of "make," "get," "serve yourself," "follow your inclinations."

Met. No philosopher has yet convinced me that man is under any moral obligation to his fellow-

men, failing belief in the obligation as incident to obligation to God. I have no hesitation in avowing that failing my own belief in God and incident duties to God, I should repudiate any obligation to my fellow-men, but that imposed by expediency and, of course, emotional inclinations.

Em. I am with you, there. My maxims, as atheist, would be: help those you like, especially yourself; let those you do not care for go hang; see that you never get on the wrong side at a bargain; if a shivering wretch offends your susceptibilities after a good dinner, hand out a "tanner" or "brown," or, if you have a full fob and want to combine *kudos* with gratification of your amiable propensities, come out strong in the subscription lists; if you see a poor beggar drowning, and feel the impulse on you, jump in; if prudential impulse prevails, walk away; if you do not like whisky, and want people to have enough to eat, without sending wages up, go strong with Sir Wilfrid; if you want plenty of kids in the gutter as future food for the factory and prison, hound the prostitutes out of life—except those necessary for the "classes"—(N.B., no need to veto any little extravagances in get-up of your women-folk, likely to lead to misconception of vocation); conform to the current proprieties—when folk are looking your way; —don't prig—unless the odds are a thousand to one against your being found out; in a word, be lamb, wolf, goat, fox, as occasion and your inclinations prompt.

Met. Your programme, as atheist, does not sound nice; but, substantially, I surmise that it would be mine were I under the banner of scientific objectivity and its sceptical corollaries.

Em. What rational object can a man have, rejecting God and immortality, beyond pleasing himself as long as he is alive?

Met. I cannot see any other rational object.

Em. If he is inclined to what passes as goodness or badness, what difference does it make, in regard to himself, whether his hereditary propensity leads him to conventional virtue or vice?

Met. Philosophers tell us that vice leads to self-destruction; virtue, to self-preservation.

Em. If the man's bound to be out of it in a few years, any way, what has he got to do with philosophers and their Gothamism? Why shall not he destroy himself, with gratification, rather than preserve himself, without gratification? What's the good of living, to him, unless he gets fun out of it?

Met. Some philosophers would tell the man that his duty to humanity was to preserve himself, as virtuous.

Em. They might tell me that, but there would be desperately little chance that I should take them as authority. My authority, in that connection, as atheist, would be yours truly. It would take a heap of philosophy to convince me that duty to humanity had any bulge against Number One, for a fellow who was bound for annihilation in a few years.

Met. I am entirely with you. I see no rational ground, failing belief in God and immortality, for entertaining the assumption of duty to humanity.

Em. If humanity can serve itself at the expense of me, as atheist, I say: let humanity do its best or worst. I'll do the same for myself. If it suits me to act up to the humbug about duty to humanity, I'll act up to it. If it doesn't, I'll act the other way and

take my chance of being crucified by that precious humanity that only cares for me for what it can get out of me.

Met. The standpoint you indicate would be mine, as atheist. As a matter of expediency, I should co-operate, as far as practicable, with my fellows; but, I should entirely repudiate duty as a factor in the contingency.

Em. Fancy; talking to a starved, ragged, toil-worn atheist, about duty to a humanity that uses him only as a tool to be exploited by 'cute wits and full pockets!

Met. Unless we stop the tidal wave of empirical objectivity, there will be no argument practically available against pure selfism, beyond expediential sophistry of the philosophy washed up by that wave.

Em. The metaphysical indictment of empirical science seems to me the most important issue presented to civilisation since the advent of Christianity.

Met. I hardly need assure you of my complete agreement with your view.

Em. In these days there is a vast amount of talk and writing about religion, but the essential problem of religion is evaded and ignored.

Met. Ultimately, the whole strife, *pro* and *con*, will have to go into the metaphysical melting-pot to have the dross purged away. For these days, religion is an intellectual problem; not merely a matter of hypnotic dominance. People must believe, as an intellectual contingency, or religion must suffer, at any rate transient, eclipse.

Em. Appeal, persuasion, exhortation, example will not prevail against belief and faith in the infallibility of empirical science.

Met. No; the only enemy worth the notice of upholders of religion is empirical science.

Em. We may retain cultured hypocrites, habit-enslaved bigots, cynical indifferentists, prudent expedientialists as ostensible supporters of religion; but the vital sap will ooze out of it unless the real enemy is coffined.

DUOLOGUE XLII.

JESUS CHRIST.

Speakers:—EMPIRICIST.
METAPHYSICIAN.

Em. As conclusion to our present series of discussions, I would like you to answer a few questions about Christ. First, I suppose you accept the fact of the existence of the personality recorded in the synoptic Gospels?

Met. I do.

Em. Do you affirm, on the ground of belief or faith, that Christ was, in any sense, God?

Met. No more than I affirm that I am God.

Em. You hold that Christ was simply a man?

Met. Simply a man; though a unique man.

Em. In what sense, unique?

Met. As being a man from whom pre-natal suggestibility involving susceptibility to consensuses imposing emotional inclinations of the anti-moral order was eliminated by a special fiat of the Creator.

Em. You hold that Christ was born, in the ordinary way, through pre-natal suggestion by a man and woman?

Met. Yes; so far as regards the imposition of certain suggestibilities involving the willing of a body, and certain feelings and thoughts as response

to prevailing consensuses; but not so far as regards taking normal pre-natal suggestion involving capacity to will thoughts and emotions of the morally vicious order.

Em. You mean that pre-natal suggestion involving vicious capacity, normally imposed, in greater or lesser degree, at each birth, was, in the case of Christ, nullified by special act of God?

Met. That is what I mean. Christ was born, or, after birth, determined by God, without the capacity for what we call sin.

Em. You stated or implied, in our discussion about Genesis, that, for a moral agent to exist, there must be the capacity for moral crime.

Met. I did.

Em. Then, as Christ, from your standpoint, had not the capacity for moral crime, he was not a moral agent?

Met. He was not a moral, but a super-moral, agent.

Em. As such an agent, is he a teacher of morality?

Met. No; of super-morality. His example and precepts, as super-moral, were to the end of rendering men insusceptible of what we call temptation, as he was. By hypnotically dominating men, he worked so to rule their emotions that only the virtuous ones should manifest themselves. To the extent that this hypnotic dominance influences men, they become like Christ, incapable of experiencing temptation to what we call viciousness.

Em. So, Christ was, from your standpoint, as you have earlier stated, a fetish?

Met. Certainly. The measure of his success, in

that capacity, is the intensity of faith he imposes, as hypnotist. Emotional capacity for viciousness, in regard to himself, was destroyed directly by God. In ordinary men, it is more or less completely nullified through Christ, as fetish operating hypnotically.

Em. So, real Christians, from your standpoint, are not moral agents?

Met. They are not. So far as they are merely moral agents, they are not Christians; because moral agency necessitates the capacity for moral criminality. Practically, of course, there are no real Christians. The people we know as Christians, are merely those cultivating benevolent inclinations; professing to hold certain convictions regarding Christ's credentials; working for ends which they consider beneficial to their fellows, and maintaining certain liturgies.

Em. Obviously, if a man's emotions are so conditioned that only the virtuous ones can manifest themselves, he will escape any sort of struggle in going right; the struggle, for him, would be to go wrong.

Met. Such a person is a super-moral, not a moral, agent. The real hypnotic to Christ is such a person.

Em. His super-morality will embrace morality?

Met. Yes; in the sense that exclusively virtuous emotion involves exclusively virtuous motive and action, so embracing moral right. But, to the moral agent, it is a critical problem what constitutes virtuous emotion, motive and action. If the moral agent is hypnotic to some authority, the problem is decided for him by the authority. If the moral agent is intellectualist, the problem, for him, must be solved by his own intellect, either as approving demonstra-

tion provided by some other intellect, or by attaining demonstration through its own initiative.

Em. Practically, the influence of Christ would seem to be as authority for morality, rather than as hypnotic source of super-morality?

Met. Certainly. Normal men, being moral agents, are not fully hypnotic to Christ, but are merely subject to the extent of accepting Christ as moral authority. As we shall see, in our next discussions, the conventional interpretation of Christ, as moral authority, altogether misses the cardinal issue involved in Christ's moral teaching. This issue is a profoundly intellectual one, the application of the solution of which involves the only really moral foundation for individual and collective motive and action.

Em. Then, Christ was a great moral teacher as well as the source of super-morality?

Met. Christ's main explicit injunction implies the sole intellectually demonstrable principle of moral right, and his whole body of precept and example is only intellectually intelligible in the light of that principle.

Em. You seem to imply that, as conventionally interpreted, Christ's teaching has no intellectual significance as moral right.

Met. None whatever. As so interpreted, it is not moral teaching at all, from the intellectual standpoint. Its effect on the individual is entirely dependent on his hypnotic subjection to Christ as fetish. For this age properly to appreciate Christ, apprehension of the intellectual gravity of his teaching is a prime requirement. That, alone, enables this age to appreciate the supreme greatness of Christ as an instrument of the Deity.

Em. As, by Adam, man became a moral agent; by Christ, man becomes a super-moral agent?

Met. Yes. The moral capacity, to sin, determined for Adam, was eliminated in the case of Christ.

Em. In that sense, Christ washes away the sins of mankind?

Met. Yes; both events being equally determined by God.

Em. You said that you considered the so-called Fall, through Adam, to be really a rise?

Met. Yes; I hold that a moral is higher than a non-moral agent.

Em. How do you apply your estimate in the case of Christ, who, you say, was not a moral agent?

Met. But a super-moral agent.

Em. What is the difference between a non-moral and a super-moral agent?

Met. A non-moral agent does not know moral wrong; a super-moral agent knows moral wrong.

Em. Do you estimate Christ higher than a moral agent?

Met. As being super-moral, he is, from my standpoint, super-human; so he is out of my category of comparison. I hold the moral to be the highest man. I will not presume to measure the super-human in man.

Em. Should you consider a super-moral, higher than a moral, society?

Met. No.

Em. Why?

Met. Because I should consider such a society ill-adapted to the needs of moral agents.

Em. If the agents were super-moral?

Met. Then, the society would be out of my category of comparison, as is Christ.

Em. As you consider a super-moral society unsuited to moral agents, what do you hold to be Divine purpose in determining a super-moral agent as influence on moral agents?

Met. As affording a human ideal tending to exalt emotional incentive for moral agents, and so to incline them to submission to moral demands. But, I hold that Christ's importance to humanity, at this day, is less as conditioning emotional incentive than as affording moral direction through the intellectual implications of his teaching. I hold that the emotional incentives nourished by Christ, in his super-moral aspect, are now sufficiently developed to thrive without what I may term the hypnotic stimulus of the Christ personality, while this stimulus is urgently needed to foster the practical application of the intellectual implications of his teaching and example.

Em. You mean that Christ is more needed as moral authority than as super-moral inducement?

Met. That is what I mean.

Em. Certainly, there seems nothing, at this day, emotionally distinguishing professed Christians from non-Christians. The emotional virtues once peculiarly characteristic of Christians are now practically universal as regards civilised communities.

Met. Yes; we now need Christ more in the intellectual, than in the emotional, arena; or, rather, we want him in the emotional arena mainly as facilitating our getting him in the intellectual arena.

Em. Do you hold that Christ, as hypnotic influence tending towards super-morality is becoming stronger or weaker?

Met. Decidedly weaker. I hold that his efficiency as fetish facilitating super-morality is now a practically negligible contingency; but that his efficiency as fetish, influencing towards practical manifestation of the moral implications of his teaching is now a momentous contingency.

Em. You have no hope of Christian so-called conversion such as would render feasible an approach to a super-moral society?

Met. Not the faintest hope. If such a society were ever a practically possible contingency, the epoch is long past in which the society could have arisen. Intellectualism, now—and, I believe, for all future time in the mundane sphere—the basic condition of civilised motive and action, is inherently irreconcilable with super-morality. I hold that morality is the highest achievement determined for humanity on the mundane plane, and that the present office of Christ is as authority for morality.

Em. "Coming to Jesus" we must now approach as honest folk concerned to know and act what Christ laid down as morally right?

Met. Yes. Throwing ourselves into the arms of Jesus, for this epoch, involves sternly intellectual integrity, vivid intellectual insight, and unflinching resolution to resist animal selfishness and the assertion of intellectually demonstrable immoral claims.

Em. Different requirements from those conventionally associated with surrender to Christ!

Met. As different as are the mental conditions

now prevailing, from those prevailing at the advent of Christ.

Em. That Christ is intellectually acceptable as authority for our time seems to put him in a unique category as religious avatar.

Met. Yes; no religious initiator is universal in the sense that Christ is. He is for all time and place. As intellectually interpreted, Christ's message is destined to be the religion of the world.

Em. His super-moral, supplementing and strengthening his moral, authority?

Met. Yes.

Em. I suppose that the wonder-working attributed to Christ, is, from your standpoint, completely consistent with, and interpretable on, the metaphysical principles we have discussed?

Met. Yes; all the so-called miracles attributed to Christ are as much within the interpreting scope of the science of causation as are ordinary phenomena in respect to empirical science, and are paralleled by well-attested occurrences such as we have glanced at in our earlier conversations. Christ, himself, by various emphatic utterances, makes clear that he attributed little importance to his wonder-working, as credentials for his divine mission.

Em. We earlier discussed the question of resurrection. You seem to reject the reputedly miraculous element in regard to Christ's birth.

Met. From my standpoint, it is a very insignificant matter. There is nothing metaphysically impossible in the occurrence of pre-natal suggestion exclusively through the female agent. In normal procreation it probably always happens that one or the other sexual agent is prepotently active as imposing suggestibility

on the unborn soul. It is quite possible that a sexual act may involve pre-natal suggestion through one, to the entire exclusion of the other, sexual agent.

Em. Might a woman conceive and bear a child independently of ordinary sexual commerce?

Met. Though I believe no such event has ever occurred, and that there is no need, outside the thaumaturgical cravings of theologians, for invoking the event in regard to Christ, I will not say that the event is metaphysically impossible. Were I assured that it occurred in the case of Christ, the assurance would make no difference in my estimate of Christ.

Em. Christ made vast pretensions to supremacy, while also exemplifying the extreme of submissiveness.

Met. His assertion of kingship applied to the realm of the super-moral, or super-human. His subjects were to be super-moral hypnotics. Like their monarch, these hypnotics were to be the lowliest of the lowly in conduct to the outside world of moral agents.

Em. A census of those subjects, to-day, would not make an imposing show.

Met. The really loyal subjects of that kingdom were never a numerous body. The majority of their representatives, to-day, divide their allegiance.

Em. And the other kingdom gets the bigger share of it.

Met. So far as super-moral impulses operate effectively, at this epoch, they must operate as exacting the intellectually moral implications of the Master's teaching.

Em. Practically nothing, except a sort of genea-

logical history, is recorded, in the Gospels, about Christ, until he is thirty years old.

Met. My view is that there was nothing to record, because Christ was merely an ordinary Jew until, by a fiat of God, his incapacity for sin and his Messianic mission were imposed on him. Only then, did he become the super-moral hypnotist, divine exemplar, moral authority.

Em. If that were the case, it would seem curious that he did not refer to his past life, indicating some sort of break between it and the later stage.

Met. There are instances of change of personality in ordinary people, involving practically complete rupture of reminiscences of an earlier state.

Em. Yes; I have read of such cases. We might account for Christ's apparent insensibility to a past life, on such grounds.

Met. Had there been anything extraordinary in his earlier life, it seems to me that we should have had some record of it.

Em. So it does to me. I cannot credit a thirty years' hiatus, if there were anything about the earlier, approximating to the later, Christ.

Met. His peculiar behaviour and references to his kindred, as recorded in the Gospels, seem to me strongly indicative of such a rupture of personality as I suggest.

Em. What about the wise men who worshipped him, as an infant?

Met. That event, if it occurred, would seem to render all the more unaccountable the hiatus.

Em. Yes; one would not expect such an infant to grow to manhood practically unnoticed. On the conditions, I incline to reject that tale of the wise men.

Met. Legends of the sort are common in the records of religious avatars.

Em. Christ calls God, the Father, and himself, the Son, and asserts that men can only know the Father through him, the Son—what do you make of such statements?

Met. That Christ was hypnotic to God; not as are ordinary men, through responding to consensuses of suggestion; but as in direct rapport, as between ordinary hypnotic and hypnotist. In this sense, Christ knew God. For ordinary men to know God, Christ held that they must be hypnotic to him, as he was, to God. As he was Son of God, through hypnotic rapport, so, ordinary men become children of God through hypnotic rapport with Christ. In his super-moral capacity, Christ dominates men purely as hypnotics. All their actions, thoughts, feelings must so emanate as to involve the merging of their personalities in the personality of Christ, analogously as the personality of the ordinary hypnotic is merged in that of the hypnotist.

Em. The Christian must utterly surrender what we call his individuality?

Met. So he will become a super-moral agent after the likeness of his Master.

Em. And lose moral status?

Met. Just as an ordinary hypnotic loses it. The real Christian is virtually a machine set in motion by Christ. Practically, the real Christian is impossible. The conventionally real Christian is merely partially hypnotic to Christ. Mainly, he is hypnotic to ordinary consensuses of suggestion. Through such division of hypnotic submission, we get the various rationalising attempts, by theologians and

others, to reconcile Christ on the super-moral plane, with that practical, individual liberty constituting ordinary men, moral, but not super-moral, agents; and with the intellectual outcome, as empirical science, apparently inconsistent with Christ's mission, pretensions and miraculous deeds. When there is practically no hypnotic submission to Christ, we get the avowed anti-Christian, concerned only to maintain conclusions incident to the materialistic consensuses to which he is hypnotic. Between these two extremes of normal hypnotic submission, there are various grades preponderating more or less decisively for or against Christ or materialistic negation.

Em. Trying to reason a man into being Christian seems about as profitable an enterprise as trying to reason him into having stomach-ache.

Met. Certainly. A man who needs intellectual compulsion as condition of being Christian, lacks the rudimentary element of being one. The prime requirement of the Christian is that his intellect shall abdicate as arbiter. Real conversion to Christianity is an impulse of absolute self-surrender. The like applies in respect to ordinary hypnotism, the success of which is usually dependent on the emotional consent of the subject.

Em. I cannot say that such a real Christian as you identify appeals, as a man, to my admiration.

Met. Very likely not. Your moral, probably preponderates largely over your super-moral, capacity. The man you appreciate highly is a moral agent, empirically deciding his own actions, and needing intellectual compulsion in discriminating between right and wrong. As such a person, I call you Meta-

Christian, not Christian. For you, Christ may be authority on the intellectual plane. Though you may appreciate his greatness as a divine agency determined to condition mankind, you are precluded, by your super-moral incapacity, from complete hypnotic surrender to him.

Em. As you say, the epoch of such surrender is past. No man of average culture can, in these days, evade the critical compulsion of his intellect. To do that, he must really be born again.

Met. We see sporadic examples of such new birth among the emotional and uncultured, as in the cases of the Welsh revival and the Salvation Army propaganda; but such cases are of little significance as indicating the time-spirit.

Em. Christ evidently believed in a personal Devil. You stated, earlier, that you identified the agent of evil, going under various names, with the matter-soul.

Met. Yes; the matter-soul may be termed the animal aspect of divine determinism. All human moral depravity may be ultimately traced, in some guise, to sensing. All our evil passions are empirically incident to sensory incitement of one or another sort. Sensing is the direct resultant of interaction between the soul and matter-soul.

Em. So, when a man gives way to such passions, he may be said to have a devil inside him, and ridding him of the devil is so dominating his will that he fails to bring the passions into top-storey?

Met. That is the contingency. The man is hypnotically disabled from responding to consensuses imposing the passions. In his super-moral aspect,

Christ disables the man from such response, in what I may term a wholesale way.

Em. Apparently, to Christ, any sort of disease was having a devil inside one, and the cure was as getting rid of the devil.

Met. All diseases, mental or physical, are ultimately traceable to sensings, as empirical causes.

Em. Fever, cancer, toothache, insanity, are, empirically, matters of tissue disarrangement. Envy, hatred, malice, are matters of seeing and hearing, as empirically causal provocatives. Extirpating the diseases and evil passions means disabling the sensings as empirical causes?

Met. Exactly. So, the extirpated devils resolve themselves into the matter-soul.

Em. When Christ tells a person suffering from disease, that his sins are forgiven, Christ implies that the person's capacity so to respond to the matter-soul that the sensing is empirically the cause of the disease, is abolished?

Met. Yes: Christ so disables the sensing, as fetish.

Em. The person's "sin" is his special response to the matter-soul?

Met. Yes; that involves the person's submission to the "devil."

Em. It seems that the more completely we are under the empirical dominion of sensings, constituting them fetishes, the less efficient we are likely to be as moral agents.

Met. That is the case. Animalism, in all its forms, is incident to sensory fetishism. The only practically efficient counteracting agency to sensory fetishism is intellectualism. To the extent that a

man is intellectual, to that extent we may reasonably pronounce him a practically moral agent.

Em. Of course, he needs the emotional impulse practically to effectuate his moral capacity.

Met. Certainly; and Christ's hypnotic influence is mainly efficient, at this epoch, as ensuring that emotional impulse. The practically genuine Christian, for our time, is he whom Christ influences to submit to intellectual demonstration of moral right.

Em. Not he whose Christianity spells merely making the best of both worlds—getting his fill of gratification of benevolent impulse, so long as there is no treading on the corns of Number One?

Met. Such a Christian is the Pharisee of this epoch—the type against which Christ levelled the bitterest rancour of which he was capable.

Em. He could turn on the hot blast when he wanted. There was a lot in him, besides lamb.

Met. Yes; but his passion was not against men; but against offence to the ideal in humanity. What he could not tolerate was lack of sincerity and thoroughness in motive and action.

Em. Making clean only the outside of the platter.

Met. For ignorance and honest wickedness, his charity was boundless; for the cunning of sham godliness he was as the furnace-blast.

Em. He certainly meant Christians to be more than labels, and wanted them for more serious business than singing psalms; shelling out at their convenience for a *per contra* of unction; squabbling about phrases and millinery, and preaching frugality, sobriety, chastity, industry, contentment, to the lower orders.

Met. Yes; in our next series of conversations, I

daresay that we shall get essential requirements, as determined by Christ, on such a basis of scientific definition as to reveal Christian business of a more serious order than that to which you refer.

Em. Draw a clean line—this side: Christian; the other, Pagan, or, rather, a lot worse?

Met. Yes; we shall have the line.

Em. In his super-moral capacity, Christ would seem to render virtue as easy, to the Christian, as vice is, to the ordinary man.

Met. Yes; the real hypnotic to Christ is outside moral legalism, because he is outside incentive to moral crime.

Em. He becomes automatically virtuous?

Met. Yes.

Em. So, Christ undoes, as one may say, the work at creation, when Adam was made a moral agent through the Eden incident.

Met. Yes; Christ supersedes the law, by taking away sin, so constituting the Christian super-moral.

Em. That involves virtue without merit. Such an automatically virtuous agent does not excite my enthusiastic admiration.

Met. You can only have the illusion of merit in respect to moral activity. You must have the illusion of causal spontaneity, involving empirical freedom, in order that you may have the experience of deserving—another illusion. Christ's reward to his followers was not promised on any ground of their merit; but was a free gift, entirely independent of their deservings. Christ was under no illusion of merit as appertaining to creatures. He was no upholder of the free-will figment. Even in regard to

himself, he entirely disavowed what is a commonplace of assumption, even at this day: that the creature has power to thwart its Maker.

Em. Do you mean that Christ disowned absolute freedom?

Met. Disowned any sort of freedom, as between himself and God.

Em. He did not profess to be God?

Met. He emphasised that he was not God; that he was absolutely powerless apart from God's determinism. Nothing can be plainer or more unequivocal than his statements on this issue.

Em. Then, theological creeds affirm what Christ denied?

Met. To me, that is too obvious to need discussion. If Christ affirmed what is in the Gospels, he affirmed that he was not God, and was utterly powerless in default of God's determinism. Some of his plainest, most unmistakable utterances are to that effect.

Em. Then, those creeds are dead against Christ, himself?

Met. Certainly; unless we reject Christ's recorded utterances. Apart from these utterances, it will be obvious to anybody familiar with the science of causation, that the whole Christian system is based on hypnotic control—inconsistent with the very idea of freedom. The fundamental condition is that the Christian is to be hypnotic to Christ, as Christ is to God.

Em. The Christian does not earn his reward?

Met. Certainly not. He gets it as a free gift from God, on condition of hypnotically losing himself in Christ.

Em. That he does lose himself in Christ, involves no freedom?

Met. None, beyond the freedom—such as it is—of desire to lose himself.

Em. There is not much freedom involved in desiring.

Met. That is all the freedom the Christian can claim.

Em. He has no illusion of choice?

Met. Not as real hypnotic to Christ. When he has that illusion, he is on the moral, not super-moral, plane.

Em. On the moral plane, a person has the illusion of freedom?

Met. Yes; so, he has the illusions of merit and responsibility.

Em. The real Christian has no illusion of responsibility?

Met. No more than has a hypnotic who murders by command of the hypnotist.

Em. Christ is the real actor, in regard to the Christian; as the hypnotist is in regard to the subject?

Met. Exactly.

Em. Christ's system seems more consistent with ultimate fact revealed by causal science, than is a moral system implying freedom and responsibility.

Met. So it is. On the other hand, creatures cannot act on ultimate fact. They are determined, by God, to accept and act on the illusions of freedom and responsibility, just as on the illusions of ordinary empirical causality. As an ordinary man has to act on the illusions that prussic acid can kill him, and that a red-hot poker can cause him to will pain and

structural lesion, so, also, he has to act on the illusion that he is a free agent.

Em. Whether he is, or is not, a free agent, is no concern of his, so long as God gives him the illusion that he is free.

Met. No concern, in one aspect; but a vast concern, in another aspect.

Em. How?

Met. If he is determined, by God, he has no merit. If he has no merit, he has no rights.

Em. I see. That gives us your principle of moral right. All rights are God's, and human claims are only valid as incident to the exaction of God's rights. There is no question about the vastness of our concern in that aspect of the contingency. A Philadelphia lawyer cannot get behind that principle. If the science of causation tells us nothing about eclipses, or how to make locomotives, it gives us a wrinkle worth having.

Met. The science of causation, though, like Christianity, not "practical," is radical to all that is practical. What Christianity is in the emotional arena, the science of causation is, in the intellectual arena.

Em. The science of causation not practical! You mean a bit more than that.

Met. I refer to the practical exclusively recognised by authorities who assure us about atoms and ethers. That particular principle, for revealing which the science of causation may claim a little credit, will probably be found practically important when permanently domiciled in our understanding.

Em. Take your davy, it will be too practical for a lot of folk long before it gets near their understand-

ing. They'll try to keep it off their understanding with the dogged resolution that keeps them out of smallpox wards.

Met. Familiarity will render it grateful and comforting as a beverage to be obtained on unlicensed premises.

Em. I have wheedled you into that arena you said was to be tabooed until our next series of conversations.

Met. Yes; you have lured me to much encroachment on that domain.

Em. I have an inkling as to where Christ comes in, in connection with that principle.

Met. I can credit your penetration with that achievement.

Em. His great moral maxim is: Resist not evil.

Met. It is.

Em. And, the evil not to be resisted is the assertion of human rights.

Met. Good. Your insight is efficient.

Em. So, Christ anticipated the moral right revealed, intellectually, by the science of causation?

Met. He did.

Em. What a muddle those wranglers have made of that direction of Christ's!

Met. They have floundered in quagmires inevitable to the ignoring of causal science.

Em. They are as far away from what Christ implied by the term evil, as we are, according to the Astronomer-Royal, from the fixed stars.

Met. Their remoteness from Christ is more real than that identified by the Astronomer-Royal.

Em. Does all Christ's emotional teaching fit in with that moral maxim?

Met. Accurately. His emotional teaching is intellectually intelligible only in the light of that maxim.

Em. "Turn the other cheek," as emotional direction, is intellectually valid, as corollary to the non-existence of human rights?

Met. Yes; implying that Christians are to be non-resistant to the assertion of human rights.

Em. And it is practically possible to carry out Christ's direction?

Met. Quite so, to Meta-Christians; but not, to Christians, until Meta-Christians have exacted the right social dispensation.

Em. Meta-Christians are the necessary complement to Christians?

Met. They are Christians on the intellectual plane.

Em. They do not resist the assertion of human rights?

Met. Only as resisting the ignoring of God's rights.

Em. Meta-Christians are active; Christians, quiescent, as exemplifying Christ's direction?

Met. That is the difference.

Em. Is the re-organisation practicable without complete disorganisation of current activities?

Met. The re-organisation might be effected next week, without affecting a single industry or pursuit conducive to the collective welfare.

Em. Manufacturing, trading, art, science, might all go on as at present?

Met. Just as at present. We will now adjourn until our next series of conversations.

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