


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
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The Problem of Immortality





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
THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

STUDIES IN PERSONALITY
AND VALUE

BY

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
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TO
CORRINNE STEPHENSON TSANOFF



(Research)

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PREFACE

Contemporary philosophy in its study of value is increasingly bent on analyzing the nature of the self and on determining the relations of value categories to categories of personality. Thus directed, the metaphysics of value is bound to concern itself with the problem of man's destiny; but its manner of dealing with this problem and its final conclusion may be simply corollaries of its first principles. Man is then allowed such final prospect as the theory of value in question seems to afford. But one's estimate of man and of man's destiny depends also on one's conception of human nature: man is allowed such final prospect as the particular analysis of human nature appears to warrant. The study of this second dependence has seemed to me likely to throw light on the first. Here, to be sure, human speculation on the subject is itself psychological material of the first importance. What man has thought of his own nature and destiny is nowise to be ignored in any intelligent effort to ascertain this nature and destiny. To study the fortunes of the idea of immortality in religious and philosophical thought is thus precisely to study man's most characteristic spiritual activity.

These considerations have led me to examine some of the more significant theories of human destiny in the history of thought, as related to the theories of human nature on which they are based. The better knowledge thus gained of man's thought about the hereafter, itself an end worth anyone's labor, has been to me also a means to the better understanding of the nature of value and personality.

The reader should not overlook the sub-title of this volume. These are *Studies*, in many ways incomplete, and

likely to disappoint as much by what they omit to consider as by the treatment of what is considered. One of the early interests in my reading on personality and destiny was to trace the influence of the Platonic tradition in philosophy and literature. The completion of smaller tasks has left this more ambitious one still unrealized, and meanwhile I am painfully aware that my recognition of the Platonic background in much later discussion does not atone for the lack of an adequate systematic account of the original doctrine; painfully aware also that the utter neglect on my part of Plotinus and of Spinoza, to mention only two, is scarcely pardonable.

My own judgments claim no finality, nor am I in any sense through with my problem. If I should need any apology for venturing to share with others now the partial results of my work, I could only plead my deep interest in my work, and the hope that someone may reward me for my book by helping me to see its errors. Several chapters of this volume have already appeared in print and have had the advantage of published and private criticism, both very valuable to me. I am grateful for permission to republish here material that first appeared in the pages of the *Philosophical Review*, the *Monist*, and the *Rice Institute Pamphlet*.

My obligations to the work of others are many and will be evident to the reader; nor is my indebtedness limited to those whose thought or words I have directly utilized. To the librarians and staffs of the Rice, the Cornell, the Bodleian, and the Berlin State and University Libraries I am indebted for much courtesy and assistance in the collection of material. I value deeply the generous confidence of my university, which relieved me of academic duties for a year and thus facilitated the completion of my book. But my gratitude for daily help and understanding and for daily stimulus to think honestly is due above all to her to whom this volume is inscribed.

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF.

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(57)

The Problem of Immortality

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I

"WHAT'S strange," we read in Dostoyevsky's *Brothers Karamazov*, "what would be marvellous, is not that God should really exist; the marvel is that such an idea, the idea of the necessity of God, could enter the head of such a savage, vicious beast as man. So holy it is, so touching, so wise and so great credit it does to man." The idea of God, even if present, is scarcely dominant in religions of a very primitive order; but the higher development of religion reveals man's growing realization of this idea; and the sort of spiritual demand which it satisfies in a given cult is more significant to the student of the religious consciousness than the abstract metaphysical validity of the idea itself. Untutored thought may become aware of profound truths that it does not possess the ability to formulate adequately. We must accordingly learn to apply the principle of the oak-to-be in the acorn, and not call primitive tribes utterly godless because they do not seem to be Trinitarians.

So with the idea of immortality: the meaning that we give to it ourselves is perhaps a comparatively late attainment of the religious consciousness; but in the comparison of our own ideas of human destiny with those of lower cultures the questions asked may turn out to be more significant than the answers formulated. When through richer or more tragic experience man's heart comes to feel new needs, his mind will come to ask new questions, and will seek to answer old ones in a new way. In the early faiths

of Greece, Rome, and Israel the belief in a hereafter is dim and incidental; and yet in their later development that was the outcome of new needs, new questions and new answers, these three religions contributed to the structure of Christianity, in which the doctrine of a future life is a capstone of theology. The new Christian vision of man's future was a reflection of a new conception of his present. In hoping for immortality, in demanding it, or in renouncing or even dreading it, men have ever perforce expressed an estimate of their own nature. Follow the trail of man in his groping after eternity: you catch him standing in judgment upon himself, and standing self-revealed.

Here, then, is the significant point to be emphasized at the outset: the guiding idea in our whole inquiry is not so much to ascertain whether a particular kind of human destiny is fact or fancy, but rather to understand the significance of a man's claim to a specific destiny. One may well pause in silence before "that great mystery of which fools profess their knowledge and wise men confess their ignorance."^o But in contemplating their destiny fool and wise man alike reveal character, and to understand their character as fully as we may is clearly an essential part of that knowledge of the universe required in the solution of the problem of human destiny. If the question of immortality cannot be settled definitely by dogmatic theology alone, neither can it be disposed of solely by physical science. Nothing in the whole discussion of the problem of immortality is more significant than the modern man's insistence on pressing certain demands regarding his destiny despite their apparent incompatibility with a body of scientific conclusions which he does not question. This insistence, so notable in modern thought since the day of Kant, is of the utmost import, for it has led to a critique of the adequacy of a purely mechanistic metaphysics, as radical as the critique of dogmatic theology and philosophy which had preceded it. The result has been a richer experience and a real advance in the understanding of human

personality. Whether or not man will ever know his destiny in advance, certain it is that he will never know it until he has acquired an adequate knowledge of himself, of his character and aspirations. In what other ways are his character and aspirations exhibited as significantly as in his claims, questions, and doubts regarding his destiny? Hence the double interest and possible profit of our inquiry.

What first gave rise to the idea of a life after death? Was it man's belief that during sleep his soul actually left his body and saw all that he dreamt of seeing; and did man then connect dream-experiences and hallucinations with cases of temporary unconsciousness, coma, epileptic fits; and did he thus come to regard death as a phenomenon of the same sort, in which the soul seemed to part definitely from the body? Was this the way he came to ask himself regarding its whereabouts during the sleep that knows no waking? About this matter a great deal has been written by way of theory, and modern investigation, since Tylor,^o has done much to make us acquainted with the notions of primitive men concerning the soul and its career after the death of the body.

In early popular thought the soul is a filmy shadow or breathlike image of the body, the bearer of life and self-consciousness. The terms 'shade' and 'spirit' express the characteristic connotation of 'soul' to the primitive mind. A man's shadow is essential to his being; and Peter Schlemihl's futile remorse after the sale of his shadow is paralleled by the fear of the Basuto savage, who will not walk too near the water's edge on a river bank lest a crocodile snap at his shadow and drag him in after it. This shadowy specter, image of man's being and the seat and essence of himself, is man's breath, spirit, *atman*, *prana*, *psyche*, *pneuma*, *anima*, *dukh*. The Maoris of New Zealand salute each other by rubbing noses, thus in friendly wise mingling the breath and thereby the soul. In all ages and tongues breathing has been held to be identical with living, and the last breath has registered the final de-

parture of the soul from the body. To forestall this departure, or to lure the departing soul back into the body, priest and lama, shaman and medicine man have tried their arts from Oregon to Burma. A Fijian savage at the point of death or when about to faint would bawl out lustily to his soul not to desert him; the Chinese would hold up a dying man's coat on a long bamboo pole, to entice the vagrant soul back home. The Renaissance medic and philosopher, Girolamo Cardano, has left a record of an occasion when his soul departed from his brain and proceeded down his spine.

The natural mortality of man, so obvious to the civilized mind, is to some savages an unfamiliar idea. By many primitive races all death is regarded as violent. Disease and death alike are held to be within the compass of sorcery. The first thing to learn, when a man dies, is whether a sorcerer or an evil spirit has caused his death; for if it be the latter, revenge is naturally out of the question; but if the death is due to a sorcerer's magic, then it is the bounden duty of the dead man's kinsmen to track the magician down and to kill him. Frazer has marshalled a melancholy array of evidence on this point: examples of the crude ritual which suggests or establishes the identity of the guilty sorcerer; the tribal practice which makes imperative the murder of a second man because another has died; the revolting ordeal of poison to which savage men had to submit in order to establish their innocence, and which in certain instances has led to the virtual extermination of entire clans.

During sleep the soul leaves the body on adventures of its own. The American Indian's soul may wander night after night in search of things that it does not attain in the daytime. As the red man thus anticipated Freud, the psychological researcher of today, with his double-check narratives of telepathy and spirit-communication, finds an early prototype in no less a person than St. Augustine. A man tells Augustine that one night before going to sleep

he saw in a vision a philosopher who explained some Platonic passages to him; the philosopher answers the man that he had dreamt interpreting these same passages. As King Gunthram lies asleep with his head in his loyal henchman's lap, the retainer sees a snake run out of the king's mouth and cross a brook over his sword on its way up a mountain. After awhile it returns into the mouth of the king, who then wakes to relate how he dreamed that he had crossed a stream over an iron bridge and climbed a mountain.

The story of King Gunthram brings out the hazards and the grave dangers run by the vagrant soul. For instance, had the henchman used his sword to kill the snake instead of providing it with a bridge, King Gunthram would never have waked to narrate his dream. That happened in the old German tale to the sleeping girl out of whose mouth a red mouse crept, which on its return could not find its way back, for the girl had been turned around by a companion. It wandered about and then vanished; but the girl never rose from her sleep; she was dead, *mausetot*.^o Again, in New Zealand "no well-bred Maori would waken a sleeper suddenly by shaking him or calling out to him in a loud voice. If he must rouse him, he will do it gradually, speaking to him at first in low tones and then raising his voice by degrees, in order to give the truant soul fair warning and allow it to return at leisure."^o The soul of man, his life and substance, is thus exposed to dire perils when man lies helpless in sleep. Accordingly it is high wisdom to deposit one's soul in some secret place unknown to other men. Is your soul concealed in a blue pebble swallowed by a fish in the bottom of the sea, or in a bird's feather under huge boulders on inaccessible crags? Then you may rest in peace. Or better still, hide your soul in a pomegranate, or in a heap of grain, or in thistledown or quicksilver: you are then safe until the last seed and grain, mote or droplet is caught and destroyed.

Doubly protected is the soul that can change its shape in the hour of danger. Many a fairy tale and popular tradition rests on this motive and this stock of ideas. Hartland, in his *Legend of Perseus*, has reviewed a number of them. The oldest story is the Egyptian tale of "Anpu and Bata," dating from the thirteenth century before Christ. Bata keeps his soul on the head of a flower of an acacia tree. His wife, who has deserted him to become the king's favorite, knows this secret and tells the king to have the acacia-flower cut down. When the flower falls Bata dies. But his brother Anpu finds his heart under the tree trunk, and puts it in a cup of cold water. Bata revives and assumes the form of a bull, which his brother rides and presents to the king. Bata then makes himself known to his wife in his new shape; she is terrified, and asks the king for the bull's liver. Two drops of its blood fall on the king's door-posts, from which two mighty persea trees promptly grow up. One of them speaks out to the king's favorite: "O thou deceitful one, I am Bata. I am alive." As she stands by to watch the trees cut down, a chip flying off into her mouth renders her pregnant. In due time she gives birth to a son, who is none other than Bata, her wronged husband, who succeeds to the throne upon the king's death and metes out appropriate punishment to his faithless mother-wife.°

This idea of rebirth and transformation is peculiarly characteristic of Celtic folklore. The Irish hero, Tuan MacCarill, after living his full hundred years as a man, spent over two centuries undergoing a series of metamorphoses: eighty years a stag, twenty years a boar, one hundred an eagle, twenty a salmon. Then he once more assumed human form. In the Welsh legend of Taliessin we are told how Gwian Bach, pursued by Caridwen, changed into a hare. She, however, became a greyhound. He turned into a fish, she swam after him as an otter; he flew up as a bird, she as a hawk hunted him until, in despair, he dropped as a grain upon a pile of winnowed

wheat. But she changed at once into a black hen, scratched him out, and swallowed him. Nine months later, when she was delivered of him, we are told, "she could not find it in her heart to kill him by reason of his beauty. So she exposed him on the sea; he was rescued by Elphin, and became Taliessin, prince of the bards."° Parallel tales are found in the folklore of Scotland, Transylvania, Russia, Anatolia, Bengal, and China.

To the primitive mind all creation either is animate, or may become animate. Anything may be born as a man if a woman but swallow or otherwise absorb it. Bata was born a crown-prince, when his wife swallowed the chip of the perseæ tree; Perseus, when Zeus visited Danae in a shower of gold. Early thought is unaware of the distinction, absent even in the early stages of Greek philosophy, between material and immaterial. The soul in its metamorphoses is occult: a filmy vapor, a breath, a shadowy image, it differs from other material existence only in its intangibility and elusiveness. It may be transformed into a claw, a pebble, an insect, a drop of liquid, a tree, a flower; a grain: it may assume any form, and afterward be again reborn into a human body. The notion of transformation, according to Hartland, develops naturally and imperceptibly into the idea of transmigration, itself regarded by Tylor as one of the two forms which the belief in a hereafter has assumed in human thought.°

The idea of transmigration provides primitive man with an explanation of birth and death. The two mysteries of existence are to him one. The soul's journey during the sleep of death is too long for the deserted body to endure; it perishes, and the soul, on returning, simply enters another body and continues its course. All over the world savages regard a newborn child as a dead ancestor returned to life. The Yorubas greet every babe with the words, "Thou art come!" From Dahomey to New Zealand the naming of children is really a ceremony intended to identify the ancestor who has been reborn; and the American

Indian might well revere his child as his own grandfather. African negro slaves have been known to commit nostalgic suicide, so that they might be reborn in their native jungles. The Australian savage was convinced that the white newcomers were really his ancestors returned to life. Sir George Grey was hugged and wept over by an old woman who recognized in him a son she had lost, and the lands that had belonged to his former self were promptly given to a convict-colonist. The native formula was simple: "Black fellow tumble down, jump up White fellow."

From rebirth in human shape to rebirth in animal form the step is brief, the briefer because to primitive thought the distinction between man and beast is not so sharply drawn as it is by ourselves. The widow of an Esquimaux who had been reborn as a walrus could not eat walrus meat because she was unable to identify him, and had to feed on birds. The dying Huron expects to become a turtle-dove, and the Zulu recognizes his forbears in wasps, lizards, and especially in some kinds of green and brown snakes. Pythagoras is said to have recognized in Hera's temple the shield which he had carried centuries earlier when, as Euphorbos, he had been slain by Menelaus in the siege of Troy. Lucian completes the story by relating that the soul of Pythagoras was later reincarnated in the body of a cock. Someone asks this gallinaceous ex-philosopher and Trojan warrior: "Tell me the story of Troy. . . . Was it all as Homer says?" And the sage rooster answers: "Why, where did Homer get his information? When the Trojan war was going on Homer was a camel in Bactria."

The Arunta savage of Australia believes that the total supply of souls is limited and fixed. When a man dies, his soul goes back to its totem, to await its turn to be reborn. And this retirement and rebirth will be repeated time without end.^o Now the question may be asked: What does the soul do while it is with its totem? What of its existence between the time it leaves its old body and the time it is reborn in the new? This question introduces us to the

other maze of beliefs in which the human mind has groped seeking the key to human destiny; the beliefs, namely, concerning the future life of the disembodied soul. Transmigration traces the soul's travels from one body to another; this other belief in the future life follows the career of the soul divested of any bodily frame. This is the ghost theory which in the course of time is to grow into a doctrine of immortality as the Western mind usually understands the term.

II

Certain ideas possess a strange pertinacity, by which they outlive their time and survive centuries of mental progress. "The doctrine that ghost-souls of the dead hover among the living is indeed rooted in the lowest levels of savage culture, extends through barbaric life almost without a break, and survives largely and deeply in the midst of civilization." ° People imagine that the soul naturally seeks its familiar haunts, and that the room or the house where a man has died is not easily rid of his soul's presence. Burial ceremonies are largely intended to insure the living against ghost-visitations. Carry the corpse out through the window, or through a hole in the wall; be sure no traitorous spying cat crosses in front of the body as it is taken out. To ward off the return of the vagrant soul, carry it to the burial ground in a roundabout way; light fires or start a smudge or pour water around the house, and burn incense within; or, if more radical measures are needed, desert the haunted house altogether or burn it up and build anew. But in any case leave nothing undone to insure that the body is buried with all proper punctilio, for otherwise the soul will not rest in peace, nor will its survivors.

It is very natural for the soul to haunt its former dwelling; even more likely is it to hover over the spot where its body has been laid to rest. It were a great mischance

should it be buried along with the body. So Bona Meyer tells us of a cautious Holstein pastor who counselled his parishioners to lay each casket in a grave constructed with a chimney reaching up to the surface, so that, in case the soul of the deceased had not left his body, it might have a chance to do so.^o And even when the soul's after-lot is believed to be joyous and blessed, the graveyard or burial ground continues to inspire the passerby with awe; in the vicinity of tombstones men have ever felt the creepy presence of the hereafter, intangible and elusive but indubitable and immediate. "The soul stays near the Polynesian or the American Indian burial place; it dwells among the twigs and listens joyfully to the singing birds in the trees where Siberian tribes suspend their dead; it lingers by the Samoyed's scaffolded coffin; it haunts the Dayak's place of burial or burning; it inhabits the little soul-hut above the Malagasy grave, or the Peruvian house of sun-dried bricks; it is deposited on the Roman tomb; it comes back for judgment into the body of the later Israelite and the Moslem; it inhabits, as a divine ancestral spirit, the palace tombs of the old classic and the new Asiatic world; it is kept down by the huge cairn raised over Antar's body lest his mighty spirit should burst forth, by the iron nails with which the Cheremiss secures the corpse in its coffin, by the stake that pins down the suicide's body at the four crossway."^o

While in general ghosts have traditionally terrified the unsophisticated, family piety in many civilizations has made possible a relation between the living and the dead which has a certain pathetic beauty. The Chinese feasts his parents year after year. He has ghostly receptions to which he formally invites the souls of the dead, giving special attention to the blind and crippled, lighting lanterns to show the way to those who have forgotten the twists and turns of the streets, and saving food for the late-comers. The peasants in the Rhineland or Westphalia are careful not to slam their doors lest a soul be mashed. All Souls' Day only continues in Christendom immemorial

heathen feasts of the dead. The Russians pour vodka over the graves on Parents' Days, or slowly sip it themselves to 'eternal memory.' In Bulgaria on Palm Sunday or on Souls' Day sugar-cruled boiled wheat is eaten in honor of the dead, and a portion of each platterful is left on the graves. Similar customs are to be found in every Catholic land and throughout the primitive world.

In his eating and drinking in remembrance of the dead the pious worshipper often shows much subtlety. The Natives of Cochin China believe that the unseen ghosts partake of the unseen smell and savor of the food which the living worshippers consume. The Asiatics who thus distinguished between the seen and the unseen portions of the food were therefore, in the opinion of the Jesuit Father Cristoforo Borri, likely converts to Christianity, as they were not apt to have trouble with the doctrine of transubstantiation. Such customs and practices, even when they maintain themselves in the midst of high cultures, are yet based on survivals of very primitive ways of thought.

Primitive and tenacious is also much of man's thinking about Ghostland, the region of the dead. It is a far-away shadowy region, a land of twilight and of night. Often it is a distant island, an inaccessible mountain height. With tribes living on the plains it is the land on the horizon's edge; the entrance to it is where the sun goes down. Western Europe believed it to be beyond Gaul, in Britain or Ireland, or indefinitely somewhere across the Channel. The Irish located it in County Donegal, the famous St. Patrick's Purgatory. Medieval speculation on the subject, which reached its apex in Dante's vision, does not quite reflect the more primitive way of thinking. Man first thinks of the life of the dead simply as a replica of his own life, the only difference being that it is ghostly. In the realm of the dead "the soul of the dead Karen, with the souls of his axe and cleaver, builds his house and cuts his rice; the shade of the Algonquin hunter hunts souls of beaver and elk, walking on the souls of his snow-shoes over

the soul of the snow; the fur-wrapped Kamchadal drives his dog-sledge; the Zulu milks his cows and drives his cattle to kraal; South American tribes live on, whole or mutilated, healthy or sick, as they left this world, leading their old lives." °

Even though the modern Christian subscribes to subtly spiritualized conceptions of the hereafter he is inclined to imagine life in Heaven as a particularly comfortable Sunday afternoon. Man still thinks of his future in terms of his present, a primitive habit to which he clings tenaciously. The savage in our midst, of course, displays this tendency most readily. In a recently published poem Clement Wood has caught the Southern Negro in a characteristic mood as he contemplates his eternal bliss:

Dey'll broil forebber—I'll hear 'em groan,
Dar ain' gwinter be no night!
While I dusts off de Hebb'nly throne,
Oh Jubilee!

Only when we realize this simple primitive certainty that the life of the dead parallels that of the living, with similar occupations, desires, and needs, can we understand the motive of much savage funeral ritual which has outraged us by its ferocity. A warrior's sword and bow-and-arrow are buried with his body: simply in pious admiration? No, but rather because he is likely to require them for use. From the same motive his horse is killed and buried or burned with his body. But the dead chief needs also food and raiment,—servants, attendants, wives and concubines. There was more than wifely fidelity, spontaneous or enforced, in the custom of widow-burning in India; more than mere patriotic loyalty in the commission of harakiri by the Japanese warrior on the death of his lord and emperor. At the funeral of a Tonga king, his widows are strangled, that their ghosts may attend his ghost in the spirit-land. When the king of Dahomey died an entire court of attendants was dispatched along with his ghost into the hereafter; and as the new monarch counted

it his bounden duty to supply his parent with daily bulletins, a slave was brought each day, received the royal message, and was then drugged to death, and started on his courier-mission.^o

It is clearly apparent that to the uncivilized mind survival after death and ghostly existence are not the exclusive prerogative of human beings. The savage has no more difficulty in thinking of the spirit of his father's sandals or fishhooks than in thinking of his father's own spirit. Is not the ghost of Hamlet's father accompanied by all his ghostly trappings, armed from head to foot, his beaver up, his beard grisly, sable-silvered? "Is it not like the King?" asks Marcellus, and Horatio answers:

"As thou art to thy selfe,
Such was the very Armour he had on,
When th' Ambitious Norway combatted:
So frown'd he once, when in an angry parle
He smot the sledded Polax on the Ice."

The two points to be noted here are the primitive animism, and even more the apparent absence of the idea of retribution in these popular conceptions of life after death. Because we are accustomed to demand immortality ourselves on moral grounds, we naturally assume that men's first thought of another life was due also to a sense of unsatisfied justice over the common lot in this one,—an assumption moreover which has been challenged even by a number of modern students. To very primitive thought, however, ghost-life is simply a continuation and a duplicate of this life: more mysterious, to be sure, more peaceful or more blessed, or gloomier, or brighter; but whatever its character, it does not vary in accordance with man's moral conduct on earth.

The lot of souls after death is often thought to be the same for all, as Marillier has shown by copious citation.^o Very early in uncivilized thought, nevertheless, man's conception of the hereafter as a continuation of the present life naturally leads him to believe that the lot of souls after

death differs even as the lot of souls here on earth. Priest and chief look forward to a destiny appropriate to their rank. Their slaves and servants in this life are to be their slaves and servants in the next. The *Idaan* or the *Kuki* is assured that everyone whom he kills will become his servant in the hereafter.

Indeed man's birth, rank, or martial prowess may entitle him to existence in a wholly exclusive region after death. The South Sea Islanders have distinctively aristocratic notions of the after-life. Among the *Marquesans*, "the particular destination of a soul after death was determined, not by moral considerations, by the virtue or vice of the deceased, but by the rank he had occupied in this life." ° The *Tahitian* native had no hope of entering the airy paradise of *Raiatea* unless he belonged to the noble and exalted order of *Areois*; the *Maori* paradise is for the nobility; and only if they are aristocrats do the *Tonga* islanders proceed to the happy and marvelous island of *Bolotoo*; the common *Tongan's* soul perishes along with his body. The noble *Hawaiian* ascends to *Akea*; but the souls of the common folk go to the muddy lower regions of *Milu*. So the *Inca* *grandees* of *Peru* expected for themselves mansions in the sun, but for the everyday *Peruvian* either the dark underworld of *Cupay* was good enough, or else rebirth in animal shape. The fierce *Gnanji* of *Central Australia* settle the matter in simple male fashion: man's soul survives, but when a woman dies, that is the end of her.

A person's occupation in life and the manner of his death are often thought to affect his lot in the after-life. But we should be on our guard against reading a moral judgment of our own into the primitive attitude in this matter. Women who die in childbirth go to the happy other world. As for warriors killed in battle a curious disagreement obtains: sometimes they are assured of preëminent distinction in blessedness, but sometimes they are set apart in degraded seclusion, together with suicides, and with those mutilated or drowned or devoured by wild

beasts. The supreme example of the exaltation of the warrior is, of course, the old Norse conception of Valhalla, the heaven of dead heroes. The souls of those who have fallen in battle are brought by the Valkyries to the god Odin. They ride with him through the air; daily they stream out of the five hundred and forty gates of the divine mansion to fight a brave fight. This notion of the warrior eternalized did doubtless reflect the martial morality of the Northman for whom valor determined the value of a man. Thus the Hervey Islands warrior as he dances his old war-dances in heaven, looks down with contempt on the wretched souls who have died a natural death. Their fate it is to be eaten up by the grim hag Miru and thus to be annihilated. The award which elevates the brave warrior killed in battle to the highest rank of bliss in the hereafter may thus well be termed a moral verdict. But the verdict which excludes him from the society of his clansmen's ghosts, and groups him with others whose blood has been spilled or whose souls have suffered violence need not be motivated by moral conceptions: it may be dictated rather by magic or taboo.

In primitive thought, then, moral considerations do not as a rule determine the status that one may expect in the other world. Rather should we say, with Marillier, who at this point is expanding Tylor's judgment, that the soul's weal or woe after death, its destiny and its destination, even its existence or annihilation, are determined, not by its goodness or wickedness in this life, but by chance or arbitrary divine caprice, by its rank and position in society, by the way in which it has been separated from the body or by its success or failure in evading the perils that beset it on its ghostly journey.^o

III

How, then, does the idea of the future life among the lower races become gradually moralized? If we will take

care not to mistake Christian or Mohammedan importations for genuine primitive phenomena, we may be justified in expecting that the manner in which man's beliefs in a hereafter were moralized corresponds broadly to the general development of his moral ideas. If morality has its origin in the exaltation of custom and tribal *mores*, then we can well understand how the Tououpinambos, familiar to John Locke, should look forward to a blessed after-life if they had virtuously eaten an abundance of their enemies, or how the Carib, if he had been brave, should expect the hated Arawaks to serve him after death, but himself to serve the Arawaks, should he prove a coward. "The good are good warriors and hunters," said a Pawnee chief.

It will take us a step further into the grounds of moral approval and condemnation, if we seek for the origin of the idea of justice or of the demand for retribution in the desire for revenge. Then we are bound to be impressed by the lurking suspicion on the part of primitive man that he is not quite through with his enemies when he has killed them. A savage cuts off the hand or the head of the foe he has killed, to protect himself from the pursuit of the enemy's soul, which he believes thereby to be similarly mutilated and decapitated. Conversely, a man hopes after death to square accounts which have run against him in this life. Thus we are told of a poor Hindu woman who committed suicide in order to secure an opportunity to avenge herself from the other world on a powerful enemy who had defrauded her brother of forty rupees. Man is vindictive; he will not allow death to wipe off old scores; and his refusal to do so is the more natural because for him the after-life is but the ghostly continuation of this one. So man hopes to meet his enemies in the hereafter, or fears that his enemies may meet him.

The desire for revenge, in the course of social and moral evolution, slowly develops into the demand for justice; we should expect a corresponding development in

man's notions of the after-life. The settling of scores, here and in the hereafter, ceases to be any longer a merely private affair; and just as kings and king's courts protect the individual in his rights and punish the evil-doer, so in the realms beyond death divine justice rewards and punishes men according to their deserts.°

As already observed, our account of the way in which man's conception of the after-life has been moralized is likely to be influenced by our theory of the general evolution of moral ideas. It is therefore less important what specific opinion is adopted regarding the manner in which men come to think of their destiny as the moral fruit of their conduct, than to realize that, in this as in other respects, man's estimate of his life, present and future, becomes increasingly moralized with the increase of intelligence. As man grows in wisdom he comes to recognize himself more and more definitely as a being with a distinctively moral destiny. This does not mean that man's advance in civilization is marked by a deepening conviction of a continued existence after death; but it is marked by the increasingly moral tone of such belief in a hereafter as he does possess.

The doctrine of transmigration and the belief in the future life of the disembodied soul are both radically modified by the idea of retribution. The rebirth of the vagrant soul into a new body, human or animal, is to primitive man, as we have remarked, the natural result of the soul's need of a bodily dwelling and of the close kinship of human and animal existence. Naturally, again, the soul would seek reincarnation in a body appropriate to it. Here, as in the case of certain primitive notions of ghostland already noted, the idea that the individual's value determines the character of his destiny is indubitably present, but the estimate of man's value arrived at is not yet distinctly a moral one. Rank, wealth, sex, physical superiority, preëstablish the future rebirth of the soul. The Zulu chief expects to become a venomous serpent; the plain Zulu

becomes a plain non-poisonous snake; while old women turn into lizards.

When man once comes to think of his destiny in terms of moral retribution, the doctrine of transmigration develops into an elaborate system of moral judgment intended to account for the ills and inequalities in this world that have ever puzzled and anguished the human heart. So we find it in Brahmanic India, the classic land of retributive transmigration. The primitive mind recognized the fact of social inequality and maldistribution of fortune, and on that ground anticipated unequal fortunes in the after-life. This inequality and this maldistribution of fortune the Brahman undertook to explain. The Zulu reasoned: this man will be reborn a venomous serpent because he is a chief; his destiny is appropriate to his caste and rank. The Brahman asked: why is this man a chief: why was he born in this caste? "Who sinned, this man, or his parents, that he should be born blind?" The idea of transmigration is here no longer a speculation in regard to human survival; it is an essay towards a moral judgment of the universe.

In Brahmanism the body was regarded merely as the dwelling-place of the soul. The nature of a man's course of life in one body determines the direction of his future career. Whether one be a Brahman or a Sudra, well-formed and vigorous or deformed and pest-ridden, is not a matter of chance. The reasons for these differences are as real as the differences themselves. Man deserves to be what he is, argued the Brahman, complacently about himself, full-righteously about the wretch whose polluting proximity he so religiously avoided. This man with the foul breath was in a former existence a scandal-monger; this cripple was a horse-thief; this dyspeptic, a glutton. If repentance and reformation of life do not check their downward course, they will in time descend still lower in the scale of existence; they will be reborn in bodies as beastly as their characters are beastly. A swine's body awaits the

swinish soul; each soul seeks, and must find, a body appropriate to its character.

But retribution does not operate simply, nor is judgment immediately meted out. A man may live the life of a saint, and yet be reborn a leper,—in consequence of evil deeds done in the immemorial past. I reap what I have sown in some past life, but I cannot be sure of reaping in my next life what I am sowing at present. This thought was unutterably depressing to the Hindu mind. Hopeless so long as he remained embroiled in the meshes of rebirth, man's only path of salvation lay in escaping the cycle of individual existence by absorption into the Infinite. To earn this bliss in self-extinction was the goal of Brahman observance, devotion, asceticism, and mystic meditation.

Thus the soul that ponders on transmigration finds in it no final safe refuge for its hopes. This refuge, in one way or another, man has sought in the intimate presence of his God. To taste of this intimate presence man has been ready, and the Brahman has been eager, to resign his individuality. This mystic communion with the divine has expressed for the worshipper his own highest conception of moral perfection and personal bliss.

The ancient Egyptian conceptions of deity which were such a strange blend of lofty monotheism and pantheism, and the crassest and most lurid idolatry, reveal in their visions of the hereafter an inextinguishable desire for a taste of the Divine. *The Book of the Dead* was not the work of one man or of one generation; survivals, corruptions, accretions of savage and degenerate belief mar the conception of the after-life which it records; but, with all its fantastic magical paraphernalia, the Egyptian soul is disclosed therein as seeking union with its God and as demanding this union on moral grounds. After the soul has evaded the diverse perils and overcome the obstacles that beset it on the road to the sepulchral throne of Osiris, and it finally stands in the hall of the double Maati, in the presence of the forty-two gods who witness the weighing

of the heart in the balances of justice, it knows that its vindication or damnation is not a matter of blind chance or of divine caprice. Keenly aware that eternal justice rules human fate, the soul rests its trust on that justice and to that justice it appeals in calm assurance. "Homage to you, O ye gods, who dwell in your Hall of double Maati, who are without evil in your bodies, and who live upon right and truth, and who feed yourselves upon right and truth. . . . I live upon right and truth, and I feed upon right and truth. . . . I have given bread to the hungry man, and water to the thirsty man, and apparel to the naked man, and a boat to the shipwrecked mariner. I have made holy offerings to the gods, and sepulchral meals to the *khuis*. Be ye then my deliverers." °

The protestations of manifold virtue which the soul makes to the whole round of forty-two deities form a syllabus of Egyptian moral standards; they reveal also the thoroughly moral tone of Egyptian religious ritual, confused though it is by magic rigmarole and incantation. But they manifest no lively consciousness of sin. Although convinced that blessedness with God was conditional upon the attainment of virtue, the ancient Egyptian was yet confident of meeting the condition; ever-conscious that vice was a fatal barrier to salvation, he had no doubt of his ability to overcome it. His speech is the speech of moral attainment rather than the speech of moral aspiration. "I have not committed faults," he declares with sublime assurance; "I have not sinned, I have not sinned, I have not done evil . . . therefore let nothing evil be done unto me." There is no feeling of repentance here, no despairing sense of virtue sought and unattained. It is not further opportunity to strive that this paragon of moral achievement seeks in the society of Osiris and his forty-two gods. And this complacent poverty of the Egyptian's sense of moral perfection explains perhaps why his vision of life eternal, which he pursues on moral grounds, is in moral content so unsatisfying.

A bitter sense of sin, alien to all complacency and self-assurance, characterizes the ancient Accadian Penitential Psalms. The forebears of the Babylonians were aware of a divine judgment hanging over their heads, and their attainment seemed ever unequal to the lofty demand. Very likely the fear of God's wrath stirred Accadian souls even more than the remorse over virtue unattained; but their conviction of guilt and their plea for salvation are remarkable, considering the great antiquity of the Psalms:

O Lord. . . . Tear asunder my many misdeeds like a garment.
 O my God, my transgressions are seven times seven, forgive my
 transgressions. . . .
 Forgive my transgressions that I may in humility serve thee! °

It should be observed, however, that the punishment which the ancient Babylonian dreads, the salvation and blessings for which he pleads, are immediate and concern this present life. The waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates reflected no such monuments of man's meditation on life eternal as hallowed the banks of the Nile. The Babylonian netherworld is a dark, empty gloom of negation; the land of no return, the land of darkness, the house of shadows, without light, where dust and clay are nourishment and food. If the myth of Osiris exemplified to the Egyptians the inextinguishable life of man, assured of arising from the shroud of death into life everlasting and blessedness in God, the Lay of Ishtar's Descent into the Netherworld disclosed the arid hopelessness of man's hereafter in the view of the Babylonians. Seeking to recover her lover Tammuz from the bonds of death, Ishtar boldly hammers at the gates of Aralu. But the queen of death Ereshkigal visits dire punishment upon the proud goddess who has presumed to challenge fate. Stripped of one garment after another as she crosses the seven gates of Aralu, Ishtar is smitten with sixty pestilences, and the entire Babylonian pantheon has to intercede, to restore her and her life-giving powers to earth.

Eternal life was for the gods and for such rare blessed

favorites as Utnapishtin (the Babylonian Noah) and his wife, whom the gods select to exalt to their own station. Perhaps such blessed favorites are not so very rare; a vague passage in the Gilgamesh epic suggests a blessed after-life for the slain warrior:

He who dies the iron death, saw you such an one? I saw,
 Upon a bed of ease he rests, clear water he drinks.
 He who dies in battle, saw you such an one? I saw,
 His father and mother hold his head, and his wife bends over him.

But this is a spark of a fire that never burned to a clear flame. In another fragment Gilgamesh is counselled not to aspire beyond the present:

Whither goest thou?
 The life that thou dost seek, thou shalt not find.
 When the gods humanity did make
 For humanity did death determine,
 But life held in their own hands.

So this is man's one life and opportunity: here and now to worship God and be blessed by him. After death is endless void and gloom and negation. That the Babylonian sometimes drew a voluptuary's moral from this prospect, and decided to "daily make a feast of joy," was not strange; but his morality, even when it retained its vigor, appears in the end barren.^o

If the Egyptian thought of the after-life, conceived in terms of retribution, is strangely lacking in the spirit of moral aspiration, a troubled conscience and an alert and aspiring morality in Babylonian thought seem to have suggested no sense of intolerable limitation at the halting of man's moral career by death.

It is written,—is it not in the Talmud?—"The life of man is indeed a shadow; but is it the shadow of a tree or of a tower firm? Verily it is the shadow of a bird in flight. Away flies the bird, and there is neither bird nor shadow." The idea of the essentially transitory and unstable character of human existence has served to transform the pursuit of eternity into an endeavor to be rid

of self. So Brahmanic immortality is extinction of self and absorption into the eternal One. Even the ancient Egyptian, though he expected to meet in the after-life wife and children, parents and kinsfolk and servants, yet felt the ground of immortality to be the fact that he was one with the god Osiris. It is with Osiris, as Osiris, that he is to rise from death into life eternal. Not only in Babylonia was immortality believed to be a prerogative of the gods and of divine heroes. The life of man is three-score years and ten, or if there be strength four score years, or perhaps even the hundred autumns of the Hindu; but, all the same, wintry death is at its end.

What man is he that shall live and not see death,
That shall deliver his soul from the power of Sheol?°

A serpent snatches the magic life-prolonging plant from the hands of Gilgamesh; Adam and Eve are banished from Eden lest they taste of the tree of life; for to attain unto immortality is to become divine.

To the Greek, in particular, immortality was for those who feed on nectar and on ambrosia. When Calypso offered to immortalize Ulysses, that immortality was to make him divine, like unto herself. According to the Olympian religion, the gods were immortal, but man was not. We read in Pindar: "It behoveth to seek from gods things meet for mortal souls. . . . Desire not thou, dear my soul, a life immortal, but use the tools that are to thine hand. . . . Things of a day—what are we, and what not? Man is a dream of shadows. Nevertheless when a glory from God hath shined on them, a clear light abideth upon men, and serene life. . . . One race there is of men, and one of gods. . . . Yet withal have we somewhat in us like unto the immortals' bodily shape or mighty mind, albeit we know not what course hath Destiny marked out for us to run, neither in the daytime, nor in the night." Here we have the reflection of the popular thought, and a bold look ahead. The natural immortality of the soul,

an idea familiar to the reader of Plato, was quite foreign to the national religion. Before the belief in immortality could take root in the Greek mind, it was necessary to habituate this mind to the idea that man's soul was of one essence with the divine. This was the gospel of the Mysteries, which taught the Greek, citizen of this world and this life, to flee the illusions of the carnal manifold and to seek absorption in the One-and-All. The salvation preached by the Orphics led through asceticism and mystic exaltation into union with God. The chief aim and scope of the Orphic religion "was other-worldliness, its mission was the preaching of salvation, of an eschatology based on the dogmas of posthumous retribution, purgatory and of a succession of lives through which the soul is tried; and it promised immortal bliss obtainable through purity and the mysterious magic of a sacrament."

Is it on such a mystic view of the soul as essentially divine that philosophers are to rely in their argument for the soul's immortality? The ecstatic salvation from the bonds of impermanence is unsatisfactory because ecstasy is itself impermanent. Coming to oneself after having been a god is the inevitable disillusion awaiting the mystic. Though we do not question the principle that a simple substance is bound to be immortal, yet we feel ourselves to be not at all simple. The immortality that man craves is the immortality of his human everyday self. While the reason of the philosopher has found much to criticize in the Christian doctrine of life eternal, its appeal to the human soul has been permanent because it has assured man of his immortality as a man rather than as a god.

In no other system of ancient religious thought has this characteristically human Christian conception of immortality been so nearly approximated as in Zoroastrianism. The follower of Zoroaster was possessed of a passion for righteousness, a conviction of impending judgment, a sense of co-warriorship with God against the powers of darkness, a conception of divine worship as moral en-

deavor, and an absolute confidence in the ultimate destruction of evil. Burdened and corrupted as it may be by "a relentless ceremonialism and an overwhelming casuistry which confused the conscience," ° Zoroastrian eschatology nevertheless contained the seeds of lofty moral aspiration and deep spiritual insight. It is not of less significance and interest because these seeds did not mature in later Parsism.

Life to the Zoroastrian is a constant struggle with the Prince of Darkness and his evil host, and, as death hovers near, man's peril becomes desperate. For Ahriman, ever alert to destroy the soul as it leaves the body, sends a demon in the form of a carrion-fly to the deathbed, and endeavors in some way to pollute the spotlessly laid out corpse or the white apparel of the pallbearers. Accordingly the utmost care is required in the conveyance of the body to the tower where it is to be exposed to the elements, and for three days the bereaved must fast and pray, that the soul of the deceased, tender and helpless as a newborn babe, may make its way safely away from this earth.

On the third day, guided with due prayer by Sraosha, the soul reaches the bridge Kinvat, where its destiny is to be settled in the scales of eternal justice. Here rank and wealth are of little avail; king and beggar alike have to stand on their merits alone. High in the upper air the bridge of life and death stretches from the middle of the world to the top of Elburz. The sinful soul steps on it as on the edge of a sword, totters and falls into the yawning abyss. But to the righteous soul the bridge is as a highway thirty-seven fathoms broad; even as it walks across, it breathes the balmy air of paradise perfumed as with amber and musk. ° As it reaches at dawn the gate of heaven, "it seems to the soul of the faithful one . . . as if its own conscience were advancing to him in that wind, in the shape of a maiden fair, bright, white-armed, strong, tall-formed, high-standing, full-breasted, beautiful of body, noble, of a glorious seed, of the size of a maid in her fif-

teenth year, as fair as the fairest thing in the world. And the soul of the faithful one addresses her, asking: 'What maid art thou, who art the fairest maid I have ever seen?' And she, being his own conscience, answers him: 'O thou youth of good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, of good religion, I am thy own conscience! . . . I was lovely and thou madest me still lovelier; I was fair and thou madest me still fairer; I was desirable and thou madest me still more desirable; I was sitting in a forward place, and thou madest me sit in the foremost place, through this good thought, through this good speech, through this good deed of thine; and so henceforth men worship me for having long sacrificed unto and conversed with Ahura Mazda.' The first step that the soul of the faithful man made, placed him in the *Good-Thought* Paradise. The second step that the soul of the faithful man made, placed him in the *Good-Word* Paradise. The third step that the soul of the faithful man made, placed him in the *Good-Deed* Paradise. The fourth step that the soul of the faithful man made, placed him in the Endless Lights." ° Despite the Zoroastrian's failure to distinguish clearly moral depravity from negligence in matters of ritual, he held firmly that a man's future destiny is conditioned by his present moral practice. Of this truth the Mazdean was reminded twice daily by reading the following words: "All good thoughts, all good words, all good deeds lead to paradise. All evil thoughts, all evil words, all evil deeds lead to hell." °

But to the Zoroastrian the goal of salvation has not been reached when the righteous soul has entered unto bliss. Immortality and eternal life is personal, though eternal life consists in the union of the loyal worshipper with God; but the hopes of Ahura Mazda's warrior reach beyond his own redemption. His own vindication and triumph he has sought and attained, but he looks beyond it to the fulness of victory, to the utter defeat and extinction of evil in the universe. A day of days is coming when, led by

the savior Saashyant, the hosts of light and righteousness will utterly rout Ahriman the evil one. Then will there be resurrection of the dead and the last judgment; the world will be remolten and refashioned pure and bright and perfect, and evil will be no more.°

IV

Belief in the resurrection of Jesus has ever been the rock of reliance for the pious Christian believer in immortality. Christ is risen, therefore we shall rise in Christ: this Easter consciousness of jubilant assurance does not depend on demonstration and requires no argument to support it. In endeavoring to supply a reasoned proof, Christian theology has gone outside the New Testament, to Plato's Dialogues; the standard argument of orthodoxy is in essentials familiar to the reader of the *Phaedo*. But scholastic theology was obliged to revise the statement of this proof so as to bring its Platonic substance in accord with the Aristotelian form which it had adopted as the philosophic speech of orthodoxy. The soul is the form of the body, a form separate and incorporeal, a simple immaterial entity; it is therefore indivisible, incorruptible, imperishable, immortal. Shaken by the Renaissance unrest, and bolstered up again by the Cartesians, this sort of argument was permanently laid to rest, as far as serious philosophic thought is concerned, by the dialectic of Immanuel Kant. Kant,—and modern psychology and epistemology have here followed and corroborated him,—showed the futility of trying to treat the soul as a substantial entity beyond experience. The soul is the self, a process of self-conscious unity, a unity ever in process and meaningless apart from its empirical setting. To prove scientifically the immortality of the disembodied soul, therefore, carries us outside the bounds of scientific argument.

For Kant, this refutation of theoretic reasoning on the subject of human immortality only served to indicate the

true path of argument from which the theologian had strayed. We demand immortality on moral grounds; it is essentially a postulate of morals. The ethical rationality of the universe requires a balance of virtue and happiness which is nowise yielded by our present life; hence the moral necessity of a hereafter to consummate this balance. Thus Kant goes past Plato and Descartes to seek the true basis of the belief in immortality where the pious Christian has always found it; in the implicit confidence that God who had raised Christ is just, that he will not mock man but will judge him righteously at the end.

As radically ethical, and lacking the graver defects of the Kantian doctrine, is the theory of immortality proffered by modern ethical idealism. The very essence of the moral life, we are told, consists in the fact that it is a life of aspiration, a striving after perfection. But perfection is an eternal ideal; the essentially moral career of man is thus a career of eternal scope. Man's duty is never done, for its every fulfilment reveals higher goals of endeavor. The bliss itself is a bliss of aspiration.

In the evolution of the belief in immortality the moral factor has thus been increasingly accentuated. Man's thought of eternity starts with a crude belief in the lingering survival of a ghost that hovers about the corpse or the dead man's house; then it fashions ever more elaborate notions of ghostland, Hades, Sheol; and next the idea of retribution transfigures its eschatology. Hades becomes Heaven and Hell. Following up the other channel of man's meditation on the hereafter, the belief in the migrations of the nomadic soul, initially a chapter in animistic or totemistic speculation, comes to be more and more thoroughly an article in a moral judgment of the universe.

But this moral factor which has thus affected the conception of immortality is a factor which has become central in man's religion and has permeated his conception of God. As the kingdom of God becomes a moral kingdom, the eternal conservation and fulfilment of values becomes

the final idea and therefore the supreme postulate of religion. That this conservation and exaltation demand immortality has been ardently but not universally upheld. In modern philosophic thought immortality has been a certainty for mystics; to non-mystical thinkers it has remained at best a possibility, a hope, based on the judgment that life is eternally significant and worthwhile. There is an elusive filmy breath pervading man's body,—there is a substantial soul-entity—said the early dogmatism; it will not be dissipated, though the body perish. The modern thinker responds: there is in human life infinite value, eternally precious; its final frustration is inadmissible.

Troubled doubt and negation have not been silenced by the new gospel of eternal worth. The older doctrine of the soul as immortal because immaterial had been challenged by the materialistic analysis which resolved man into a merely material and unstable compound. So this theory of man's eternally realized worth is likewise called upon to establish its initial assumption. Are all lives eternally significant—indeed are some lives significant at all? Is not the Tonga islander on the right track when he regards kings and priests and similar folk as bound for the immortal isle of Bolotoo, but expects the everyday man's soul to perish along with his body? The aristocrat sees nothing in the common herd that it likely to outlast corruption. So Browning writes in "A Toccata of Galuppi's":

Dust and ashes, dead and done with, Venice spent what Venice earned.

The soul, doubtless, is immortal—where a soul can be discerned. . . . As for Venice and her people, merely born to bloom and drop, Here on earth they bore their fruitage, mirth and folly were the crop:

What of soul was left, I wonder, when the kissing had to stop?

So the lord. But herd and herdsman alike may reap doubt and disillusion here. The aristocrat may well worry

about his own destiny; for, the cynic observes, is any man's career really of eternal worth and scope? The positivist, scorning the miserable aims that end with self, sings of the choir invisible, of men who live again in minds made better by their presence; but this sort of survival seems to be too shadowy an emanation to afford permanent satisfaction. Life eternal in the memories of men is a monument of sand on the seashore.

The hope of theist, idealist, positivist are not the same, but they are all alike hopes only for him who regards life as fundamentally good. To the pessimist, for whom life is essentially tragic, a sorry jest, an irremediable evil, immortality is not a hope but a nightmare: such a man hopes for extinction, for utter annihilation. This type of man is rare in the West, though Schopenhauer, Leopardi, and the poet of *The City of Dreadful Night* are evidence that pessimism is not an exclusively Oriental phenomenon. But the hundreds of millions who have nourished on the Upanishads or found peace in Buddha should halt our own inclination to regard the hope of personal immortality as instinctive and the desire for extinction as abnormal. The sublimest vision of the Buddhist saint is not life eternal but Nirvana, the ineffable peace of selflessness, the bliss of extinguished individuality.

The idea of immortality thus falls naturally within the province of the ethical idealist at the point where morals and religion touch and tend to merge into one another. In an empirical medium, unstable and subject to decay, man is engaged in moral activities of eternal scope and implication. His life may be a poem of eternal worth, but is it not a poem written on water? How reconcile the eternal career to which he is committed with the patent impermanence of his material course? Is his empirical being but a shell hiding an indestructible soul—or is his vision of immortality a dream and an illusion? Or may it be that, despite all change and decay, personal activity in a mortal medium may attain a character unique and

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eternally significant, irreplaceable? How may we conceive of personal activity concretely and clearly in terms of value, and how may we be assured that value is an essential constituent of reality, and not merely episodic?

The problem before us concerns issues of far-reaching philosophical implications. Without undertaking a formal history of the idea of immortality, we shall have in the following chapters occasion to consider some of the more significant types of discussion to which this idea has given rise in the development of philosophic thought, in so far as such discussions contribute to our understanding of the nature of personal activity and enable us to estimate more intelligently the rôle of value in the constitution of reality.

CHAPTER II

HELL, PURGATORY, AND PARADISE°

I

As Dante paced the streets of Verona, the garrulous housewives observed his face, dark as it were with infernal fumes, and whispered to each other, "See, there goes the man that was in Hell." To the random reader, the *Divine Comedy* is the *Inferno*, and even beginning students of Dante are likely to confess a lagging interest in the Mount of Purgatory and the Ten Heavens, as compared with the Cavern of Hell. No doubt, the sacred poem is immeasurably richer in content and in form finer than any other vision of the hereafter that charmed and harrowed the medieval mind. But is it really different in kind as the expression of the human spirit? Ever since Ulysses sought the counsel of Tiresias under the shadowy darkness, Western fancy, pagan and Christian, had peered across the portal of death and sought a glimpse of the Beyond. Its visions revealed and reflected its view and its estimate of this life on earth.

The Greek was a citizen of this world. Hades was to him a region barren and desolate. The sweet smell of the sacrificial blood brings the shades eagerly trooping around the son of Laertes: it is the smell of this earth and of the life they crave. Tyro, Antiope, Alemene, Iphimedia recall their earthly amours with the Olympians; Agamemnon bewails his own piteous death; Ulysses' mother tells him about his home in Ithaca; Tiresias forecasts his future adventures. They are all like far-away exiles; their

thought, their interest is in the world of Ulysses. Their presence or life in Hades is to them nothing. "Nay, speak not comfortably to me of death," Achilles cries out. "Rather would I live on the ground as a hireling of another, with a landless man who had no great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead."

Dante honored Homer without knowing him. Virgil he loved through lifelong study and worshipped as guide and master. But it is not from Virgil that Dante learned the ways of eternity. As a spiritual document the sixth book of the *Æneid* is no different from the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*. *Æneas* voyages to the silent empire of ghosts, like Ulysses, on a necromantic mission, to inquire into terrestrial lots and destinies. The stage-craft is more elaborate here than in Homer; the play enacted is the same. The whole span of Greek civilization separates Virgil from Homer, and the fruits of Greek philosophy are gathered by the Mantuan; but his poetry has not been nourished on them as has the poetry of Dante. Hence the profound difference between the two in the very spirit of the poetic action, even if we take no account of the absence in Virgil of that divine wisdom that leads to Paradise.

Nevertheless, in spite of Dante's radically different attitude toward the hereafter, as compared with that of Homer and Virgil, external similarities in the landscape are not lacking. Tityus lies fettered down on a field of over nine acres, and a vulture with a horned beak is pecking at his immortal liver (Homer has two vultures). Tantalus stands in a lake up to his chin and forever reaches out for fruits forever beyond his reach; Sisyphus vainly rolls an enormous stone uphill that keeps rolling down again. Is not this the same in kind that we find in the *Divine Comedy*? In a sense it is, and the resemblances in the scenery of the hereafter become even more striking if we compare Dante's vision with those of medieval saints and friars.

St. Brandan and his crew sail to "an ylonde full derke

and full of stench and smoke," and there they hear "grete blowynge and blastynge of belowes"; sinners tormented by fiends, and Judas lying in Hell "in ful brennyng fyre with Pylate, Herode, and Cayphas." The priest Walkelin beholds in midwinter the ghastly pageantry of the hereafter; in his report he does not shrink from the gruesome, nor is he very reluctant in noting the tortures of his contemporaries, some of them bishops and abbots and noble ladies of his former acquaintance. Frate Alberico, when but ten years old, is taken to Hell by Saint Peter and two angels. In a terrible valley they see adulterers plunged in frost and ice which consumes them like fire. Women who had refused pity to orphans are transfixed through their breasts on spiked branches of trees. A serpent of infinite magnitude sucks souls like flies at each breath, and then blows them out scorched to sparks. Over a burning pitchy river a broad bridge extends, like the Kinvat of the Zoroastrians.^o As the sinner crosses over it, the bridge narrows down to a thin thread, and the polluted soul falls headlong into the boiling waves.

Were there occasion to digress at this point, abundant parallels could be found in Oriental lore. Zoroastrianism is particularly rich in visions of the hereafter. Pehlevi literature has its own Divine Comedy, the *Ardai Viraf Nameh*. In order to prove the truth and the sanctity of the Mazdean faith by some miracle, Ar dai Viraf, the most holy man in the empire of Ardeshir Babegan, drinks some consecrated wine, whereupon his soul leaves his body to roam through heaven and hell for seven days and seven nights. The Paradise of Ar dai Viraf's vision is aglitter with gold and silver and the whole catalogue of gems; in splendor and comfort and holy revel the souls of the righteous luxuriate in the Mazdean heavens. But the infernal landscape reeks with blood and filth and pestilential vapors; demons, serpents, centipedes, and scorpions torment the sinful souls; devils with long knives flay the persecutors of the righteous; the polluted souls there must

drink unspeakably nauseous draughts; the adulteress is suspended by her two breasts, and the termagant by her heels, with her tongue protruding out of the back of her neck; the wanton destroyer of animals is himself cut to pieces, and dogs tear him limb from limb; the miser is bound hand and foot and clamped as if in a press; the liar's tongue is beaten to a pulp on stones; reptiles and insects gnaw the vitals of the bearer of false witness; the wormy flesh of the schismatics and deceivers rots away from their bones; iron combs rake the body of him who breaks his contracts; over barren tracts of snow and ice, devils haul by the hair the woman who has marred the sacred fire; the sorceress bites her own flesh; the seducer and the cruel oppressor of his tenants carry mountains on their shoulders; the filthy-minded and those of unclean habits are buried up to their necks in snow and have to drink blood and filth. Enough: in its readiness to depict the horrors of damnation, Mazdean piety yields nothing to the Christian.

The Zoroastrian Kinvat, bridge of life and death, has parallels not only in other historic religions, but also in savage folklore. The Choctaw Indian knows that on his way to the land of the dead is a bridge, a pine-tree trunk, long and slippery; the pious man passes easily over it, but the bad man slips and falls into the river. Similar beliefs are shared by the Dakotas and by Canadian Indians.^o

Nightmare of this general character is not unfamiliar to readers of the *Inferno*. It possessed the medieval mind. Imagination fed in unrestrained piety on the horrible and the obscene: the painter's brush and the sculptor's chisel vied with tongue and pen in producing the more profound impression. Plumptre reads in Labitte that the architecture of France alone supplies not less than fifty illustrations of the *Commedia* by way of anticipation.^o The sinner shrank in holy horror from the visions of hell, to contemplate in wistful repentance the penances of purgatory and the bliss of heaven. Out of this wild chaos of

vulgar nightmare and monastic vigil, Dante, as Professor Grandgent says, "constructs an architectural Hades on a philosophical plan."^o The architecture of the hereafter in the *Divine Comedy* reflects Dante's imaginative genius; against the vague, or naïve, or disordered visions of his predecessors, his three canticles reveal a universe conceived in order and perceived with a clarity which Ruskin significantly contrasts with the vagueness of Milton.^o Far more important to us is the philosophical plan of the structure, Dante's philosophy of life. For to understand Dante's poetry, we must understand his ideas. In his philosophy of life Dante has precursors, just as he has precursors in his delineation of the landscape and the architecture of the Beyond. In both respects he has not only possessed himself of the treasures of others, but has transfigured and sublimated them. Let us examine, then, as briefly as we must, the doctrine of the soul in the philosophy and the theology which commanded the attention and the devotion of our poet.

II

What is the nature of the soul, its relation to the body, its origin and final destiny? Medieval thought in this entire field of inquiry may be traced back to Biblical-Christian and Greek-philosophical originals.

Like the Homeric Greek, the Hebrew was a citizen of this earth, of this life, but his conception of life was rigorously moral-religious: on this earth he was a chosen son of God. Confusion in dealing with Old Testament ideas may be avoided if we remember that life and death, to the believer in Jehovah, were terms preëminently ethical in connotation, not terms descriptive of physical states. Life is a certain state of relation to God, a prerogative and a privilege of man as compared with the beasts that perish. As Salmond puts it, "Life . . . is identified with God's favor and with righteousness."^o Death is the result of

man's departure from God; it is sin, disobedience that "brought death into the world and all our woe." Sheol is the shadowy underworld to which man is condemned by his sins and departure from God. As the prophets elevate the Hebrew religion from a ritualistic cult of a tribal, national deity to the moral worship of a universal God of righteousness standing in personal relation to each man, Israel's yearning for the restoration of Jehovah's favor finds ever more exalted expressions. Perhaps even death and Sheol, the valley of dry bones which Ezekiel saw in his vision, shall not prevail against God's power and God's infinite justice. Jehovah is the judge universal; by him will the righteous be vindicated; He will bring to life His own; indeed, He will bring all to final judgment. So "when at last Israel reached the great truth of monotheism, the way was prepared for the moralisation of the future no less than of the present."^o

These same two doctrines, the Resurrection of the Dead and the Last Judgment, are central in the more definite and solemn New Testament pronouncements on the final destiny of man. God is a spirit. The Kingdom of God is spiritual and not of this earth. Christ has come to save men and has returned afterward to the Father. But on the Last Day (and who knows how near it is!) He will come back to judge the living and the dead. The tombs will be opened; saint and sinner shall stand before the Son of God, and be judged, each according to his deserts. This doctrine of the resurrection of the body is reiterated in the Gospels, but it finds its most elaborate and positive statement in St. Paul's Epistles. Christ rose from the dead, Paul declares; and in Christ we shall all rise and live forever. This body is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump, the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. A note of supreme assurance dominates Paul's dark utterances. That the dead shall

rise, he has no doubt whatever; how they shall rise, in what precise manner, what the particular form and nature of the resurrection body, Paul does not state explicitly. "Behold, I tell you a mystery," he declares.

Satisfactory as it stood to the unspeculative or mystical mind, this doctrine was bound to stimulate and challenge the intellectually minded. The resurrection of the body was an idea so fertile in implications that in its light the doctrine of the soul had to be reformulated by the Church Fathers. In this reformulation the entire course of Greek speculation on the subject became involved. Catholic theology, here as in so many other cases, issued from the union of the Christian heart and the Hellenic intellect.

Wicksteed^o has well distinguished two lines of thought which the Greek mind followed in its conception of the soul and its relation to the body. The one proceeds from primitive notions to Orphic and Pythagorean speculations and finds its sublime expression in the philosophy of Plato. It views the soul as an entity which animates the body but is itself incorporeal: a shade, a ghost, a spirit, an immaterial, purely rational soul. Confined in the body as in a prison, Plato reasons, the soul seeks its pristine sphere of pure rationality, by pursuing the philosophic life, by thinking the universal, by loving and living according to reason. The bodily life is but an episode in the eternal career of the soul, which precedes birth and proceeds after death. Life in the flesh is a trial and a probation; death, the release and the return to the soul's destiny: to another term of probation, or to the realm of pure reason.

The positive advocacy of the idea of immortality in Platonism, and the Platonic exaltation of the spiritual, were elements of kinship with Christianity which the apologist recognized from the outset. But while the Platonist regarded the body as impermanent appearance and a shadow-shape, the Christian doctrine of life eternal was specifically a doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

Platonism and Neoplatonism, moreover, were suspected on account of their pantheistic leanings.

The other general Greek conception of the soul views it as somehow identical with the body's life or motive power—material or perhaps immaterial, but in any case essentially one with the body. It is the breath of life, the life-giving steaming blood, warm moist air, fire, the form or active principle of the body. We find it so in the Pre-Socratic physiologers, and, on an immeasurably higher plane, as a criticism of Plato's dualistic leanings, in the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul. The soul is not in the body as a pilot in the ship. There is no body *and* soul: what we always have is the living union of the two; the soul-form and the body-matter can no more be separated that concave and convex, the impression and the wax of the seal. A man's soul disembodied is not a man's soul; a lifeless body is not a man's body but a corpse. The soul is the form, the character of the living being with which we deal. The plant's soul is its vegetative activity, its growth through nourishment. An animal's soul is its animal functioning, not only feeding and growing, but also moving from place to place, desiring, feeling, perceiving. A man is a living body of still higher attainment: he feeds, grows, moves, desires, perceives—and thinks. In addition to the vegetative and the animal faculties, the human soul exhibits a distinctive function. Man is a rational animal.

The Aristotelian doctrine that soul and body are one was not likely to be neglected by the theologian. But there were real difficulties in the way of the Aristotelian. The immortal soul which he hoped to save could not be identified with the vital principle, the life of the body, which all plants and animals also possessed. When as a Christian he spoke of his soul, he was clearly bound, as an Aristotelian also, to think of his intellect, the distinctively human faculty. But what of this intellect, ac-

tive, creative reason, unmixed, immutable, eternal? Could it be regarded as strictly individual?

Aristotle's doctrine on this point has been the subject of endless dispute. Is the active intellect cosmic and impersonal? Then, if acting in a human individual, it would operate as potential intellect, realizing as full a measure of rationality as the conditions of human life allow. Reason would then be God-in-us. So Dante writes in the *Convivio*: "The soul of man which is endowed with the nobility of the highest faculty, namely reason, participates in the divine nature under the aspect of everlasting intelligence."^o But this is virtually to identify man's mind or intelligence with the divine. Dante, commenting on his canzone, "Amor che nella mente mi ragiona" ("Love, who in my mind discourseth to me"), goes on to say: "We can now see what is mind, which is that end and the most precious part of the soul, namely, deity."^o This position, however, besides its pantheistic implications, casts doubt on personal immortality. For the persistence of the active intellect as a person would depend in this reading of human nature on the persistence of the human organism in which it operates. When a man dies, the personal functioning of the active intellect in that man must end. So we might say: The work of God is eternal. Man has an opportunity to share in that work during his brief span of life. But it is, after all, God's work, not man's.

Arabian commentators went to great lengths in expounding these aspects and possible implications of the peripatetic philosophy, but Christian orthodoxy was repelled in many ways by Aristotelianism. The speculations in the *Convivio* and reminiscences in the *Paradiso* register Dante's struggle with the doctrine. Christendom was unpleasantly impressed by the predilection of Mohammedan, Jewish, and heretical minds for it, and regarded their versions of Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* with great suspicion. In 1209 the provincial council of Paris prohibited the public or private reading of Aristotle's books

on natural philosophy and commentaries thereon ("nec libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nec commenta legantur Parisiis publice vel secreto"). In 1215 the University of Paris, while ordering the study of Aristotle's logic, reaffirmed the prohibition of his natural philosophy and proscribed the *Metaphysics*. Pope Gregory IX in 1231 ordered that Aristotle's *libri naturales* be not used until examined and purified of error—a sign that a 'true' Aristotle, acceptable to orthodoxy, was on his way. In 1254, the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle were part of the Paris curriculum, and the time came later when to contradict Aristotle was to contradict the Church.^o

With this great victory of Aristotelianism, the outstanding philosophical achievement of thirteenth-century scholasticism, the Dominican order is associated, especially as represented by Albert the Great, who collected and surveyed the ideas, and St. Thomas Aquinas, who systematized the doctrine, infused it with the spirit of Christian tradition, and translated it into the language of Church orthodoxy. This purpose is accomplished, so far as concerns our present inquiry, by regarding the active intellect and the potential intellect of Aristotle, not as two activities, the one cosmic and impersonal, the other individual, but rather as two faculties of the human intellect. The pantheistic and absorptionist interpretations of Aristotelianism are thus ruled out, while the doctrine of the organic unity of soul and body allows ground for a philosophical formulation of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

III

Fix now in one glance the essential features of the doctrine of the soul and its destiny to which Dante subscribed. It is a doctrine emphatically Christian. It involves the separate existence of the soul after the dissolution of the body; it likewise requires the resurrection of the body at

the end of time, and its reunion with the soul to all eternity. Now to think, with Aristotle, of the soul as essentially united with the body, provides a philosophical basis for the doctrine of the resurrection, but it embarrasses you when you come to maintain the existence of disembodied souls in the hereafter until the Last Day of Judgment. On the other hand, to maintain, with Plato, that the soul is a being in its own right, capable of existing independently of the body, involves you in the disturbing idea of the soul's preëxistence. Thirteenth-century scholasticism, while professedly Aristotelian, as a matter of fact exploited both Plato and Aristotle in the interest of Christian belief, since much Platonism crept into its understanding of Aristotle. So, for instance, in Dante's words, "Man is compounded of soul and body; but to the soul . . . belongs that excellence which is, as it were, the seed sown by the divine virtue."^o But how may we think of the soul as in organic relation to the body at the beginning of its existence and throughout life, and yet as capable of existence after death apart from the mortal body for a long interval, the while requiring the resurrection of the body at the end of time? We could read the schoolman's answer to this triple question out of St. Thomas or St. Bonaventura; naturally, however, we turn rather to Dante himself.

And now I feel great misgiving. There are thirteen ways of going wrong in setting out to interpret a poet worth interpreting. How Dante must have smiled at the thought of all his future commentators!

O ye, who in some pretty little boat,
Eager to listen, have been following
Behind my ship, that singing sails along. . . .^o

It were impertinent to recall Dante's plea to Virgil:

Honor and light of other poets, now
May the long study and great love avail me,
Which made me search thy volume. . . .^o

But one may in any case follow humbly

Dietro alle poste delle care piante.
(After the prints of his beloved feet.)°

Man's soul comes into being together with his body, Dante declares, rejecting Plato's doctrine of the soul's pre-existence as given in the *Timaeus*, probably the only Platonic dialogue he knew.° In the process of conception, as the result of the commingling of the father's active and the mother's passive blood, coagulation and vivifying of matter take place, and the embryonic career of a new living individual begins. The future child ascends the scale of being: it is first plantlike in character, then like unto a sea-fungus, then distinctively animal. The time comes when the embryo has ripened and is ready to assume a human character. Up to this point nature has done her own work. Now, however,

The Primal Motor turns to it in joy
Over such art of Nature's, and inbreathes
A spirit that is new, replete with power,
Which draws all that it finds active there
To its own substance, making all one soul,
Which lives and feels, revolving in itself.°

Thus, in due time, is born a human being, an essential unity of soul and body, a mortal body conceived and generated according to the processes of nature, bearing an immortal soul infused by God. Consider the subtlety and the ingenuity of this doctrine which speaks with the voice of Aristotle and utters the words of St. Paul. Man's soul is one with the body, but it is not of the body; it is the body's entelechy and form, but is no mere bodily product. It issues from God, even as wine issues from the sun's heat when joined to the juice that distills from the grape.

By distinguishing the soul from the intellect, Aristotle and Averroës had cast doubt on personal immortality. In opposition to them, Dante maintains in the *Convivio*: "The soul as soon as ever it is brought forth receives the potential intellect from the virtues of the mover of the heaven; and

this in itself potentially introduces into the soul all the universal forms so far as they exist in the Producer of the intellect, and in a lesser degree in proportion as this intellect is remote from the Primal Intelligence.”^o Furthermore the soul, while having manifold faculties—vegetative, animal, rational—is nevertheless in its essence unitary. Through a multiplicity of faculties it acts as one. It has its seat in the blood; the brain is its treasury; as Ozanam, whom I follow in the order of my discussion at this point, well puts it, the soul “fashions the flesh to render it transparent to the interior lights of thought.”^o It utters itself in physiognomy and facial expression; with infinite delicacy it moulds the features; the eyes and the mouth, as Dante says, are the two balconies on which the soul shows itself, veiled.^o Throughout life it acts and must act in a bodily medium. In that medium it stoops to vice; in that it ascends to virtue. It reaches the normal height of its being in its thirty-fifth year, and its usual course is run in threescore years and ten, or, if there be strength, fourscore years. Old age sets in, and death, and the grave, and dissolution. And is this, then, the end?

“Of all brutal opinions that is the most foolish, vilest, and most pestilent which holds that there is no life after this.” So Dante declares in the *Convivio*,^o in ardent opposition to the materialists of his day, and their opposition was very real in Dante’s time. Italy was full of Epicureans who declared that man’s soul was material, generated with the body, and with the body perishing at death. Villani writes of Florentines fighting in the streets over this momentous question.^o To deny the immortality of the soul meant to lump spirit with the flesh, to treat man’s reason as a gross product of material nature. As Dante saw it, human wisdom and philosophy recoil from this amazing error. Man’s firm hope of immortality, were it baseless and futile, would itself prove human life the ghastliest irony, and existence the reverse of rational. The experiences of dreams and visions bear evidence to the

reality of the hereafter; and the most veracious doctrine of Christ confirms it, itself making us certain above all reasoning. "We behold the immortal perfectly by faith, and by reason we behold it, touched with the shadow of darkness which falls upon it owing to the mixture of mortal and immortal: and this ought to be our strongest argument that both one and the other exist in us. Thus I believe," Dante concludes, "thus I affirm, thus I am assured, that I shall pass to another better life after this."^o And in the sixth circle of Hell, as Sir Thomas Browne somewhat ironically observes in his *Urn Burial*,^o "Epicurus lies deep in Dante's Hell, wherein we meet with tombs enclosing souls which denied their immortalities."

No, life is not ended with death: the soul after its departure lives on without a break in a nature that is more than human. So Dante exclaims also in the tenth canto of the *Purgatorio*:

Do ye not comprehend that we are worms,
Born to bring forth the angelic butterfly?^o

This career of man beyond the grave Dante traced from the forest dark, savage, rough and stern of this world, to the nethermost pit of Hell, and up the arduous Mount of Purgatory to the Ten Heavens of Paradise.

This brings us close to the heart of our theme. When death comes to the body, the soul departs, bearing with itself what to it appertains. Memory, intelligence, and will are enhanced; but the faculties of mere sensibility are mute. The unrepentant soul is translated to the dismal bank of the sad river Acheron. The old boatman Charon appears with his boat. The sinful soul is ferried across, and, all hope abandoning, goes to its appointed circle in Hell, there to suffer forever the consequences of its sins. But even at the last moment of life, if man repents him of his sins and turns to God, his soul after death is assigned to the realm of expiation. As the sweet singer Casella explains to Dante, the penitent souls assemble at the mouth

of the Tiber, and are by the grace of God transported across the seas to the Mount of Purgatory, there to expiate laboriously their iniquities, be purged of their sins, and made fit for the sublimities of Heaven.

In ferrying the souls across to the hereafter, our poet is following old tradition, for souls were transported thus across the Channel to Britain, the land of death. As the live oarsmen begin their voyage from the French shore, the vessel lies low in the water, freighted with the souls which the flesh-and-blood boatmen, of course, cannot see. They reach the British shore; a voice is heard, calling out the names of the ghostly passengers. As they alight, the boat rises in the water. This notion of heavy invisible spirits does not agree with that of Dante. His account of the soul in the hereafter and the manner of its existence, is given in the twenty-fifth canto of the *Purgatorio*. As soon as space encompasses the soul that has reached its destination, in Hell or in Purgatory, it radiates a formative activity in the air about it, just as it radiated it in the living body. Sunlight, shining through air saturated with rain, forms a rainbow;

So here the neighboring air will shape itself
Into that form, which by its virtue now
The soul that stops there like a seal imprints.°

A subtle body is thus formed which can respond to the soul's sensible needs as did the earthly body. The inhabitants of Dante's regions of woe and expiation, like dead leaves fluttering in the wind, are strange compounds of the material and the immaterial, ghostly shades with shapes visible and recognizable, like unto the visitor in their midst in their sense-reactions to light and sound, heat, cold, and pain, and yet so utterly unlike Dante, also, that throughout Hell his living body makes him instantly conspicuous. The boat of Phlegyas does not seem freighted until Dante steps into it; and in Purgatory, alone of all the laboring throng of penitents, he obstructs the rays of the sun so as to cast a shadow.°

Thus the souls pursue their appointed after-careers, suffering the torments of punishment or the labors of expiation. Both their mode of existence and their capacities are often perplexing to determine. The heretics Cavalcanti and Farinata know the past and the future, while ignorant of the present. Some of the sinners recognize Dante's features; some hear his Tuscan speech, and call to him to stop and listen to them. But the misers and the prodigals are so darkened by their ignoble life on earth as to be unrecognizable in Hell. Ordinarily they are all human in appearance, though sometimes distorted and mutilated. Soothsayers, for instance, have their faces turned around and walk backwards. Evil counselors in the eighth pouch of the Malebolge are entirely wrapped up in tongues of flame; sowers of scandal and schismatics, in the ninth pouch, are unspeakably mangled and mutilated. Suicides are turned into trees, gnarled and knotty; dark are their leaves and thorny their branches; the Harpies build their nests in them. When Dante breaks off a branch, from the broken splinter words burst forth, and blood.

In Purgatory invisible shades move along with the visible. Voices speak to Dante out of the empty air; from the midst of a tree laden with sweet fruit are heard the praises of temperance. The penitents pursue the path that leads to their release. The course is long or brief, depending upon the sinfulness that is expiated. Repentance too long postponed in life, as in the case of Belacqua, lengthens the stay in Antepurgatory. So the repentant sinners ascend from terrace to terrace, pilgrims bound for Paradise. And in the vast sweep of the Ten Heavens, which defy speech as they ravish the imagination, the souls of the saved abide starlike in their radiance, in the serenity of their bliss.

The souls in Purgatory, to repeat, are obviously souls in transit; but while the souls in Hell and Heaven have reached their final destination, they have not reached the full measure of their destiny. Not forever will the Mount of Purgatory be peopled. When the last penitent has

mounted to Heaven, the end of time will be in sight, the day of Final Judgment and eternal confirmation of the destinies of men.

Each one shall find again his dismal tomb,
Shall reassume his flesh and his own figure,
Shall hear what through eternity re-echoes.°

For the shadow must yield to the full reality; the subtle body formed by the soul in the air surrounding it, which has served its purpose heretofore, must now be replaced by the old body in which the soul lived its life on earth, in which it sank to vice or rose in virtue. Created by God a unity of soul and body, man will rise on the last day once more complete, body and soul. From Heaven and Hell the souls shall gather and, united to their bodies, shall throng into the Valley of Jehoshaphat, to hear their eternal destinies proclaimed by the Eternal Justice. The woe of the damned and the joy of the blessed will then reach their utmost measure. The opened tombs will receive the souls and bodies of the Epicureans who denied the immortality of the soul and will then close forever. Forever will be sealed the consummation of bliss and woe in Heaven and Hell. The end will come of time, the end of becoming, of striving, of attaining. "The portal of the future shall be closed."° This is the celestial vision of the aspiring saint:

As long as the festivity
Of Paradise shall be, so long our love
Shall radiate round about us such a vesture.
Its brightness is proportioned to the ardor,
The ardor to the vision; and the vision
Equals what grace it has above its worth.
When, glorious and sanctified, our flesh
Is reassumed, then shall our persons be
More pleasing by their being more complete.°

IV

At this stage it might appear strange that such a vision of human destiny should have made Dante a guide of the

modern spirit in the ways of eternity. For grant the living power and glory of Dante's speech and imagery, the glamour of his spiritual romance, his religious ardor, and his deep moral earnestness—grant all this, and it remains true, nevertheless, that if the final word of Dante is the word we have heard so far, then the hold he has on our minds is indeed a mystery. Look for the river Acheron on your maps; you will not find it there; nor the Mount of Purgatory either; nor is the earth, as Dante believed, immovable and at the center of the universe. The topography of Hell, the Terrestrial Paradise, the Ten Heavens, Cocytus and Empyrean—all this is imagining, awful and splendid, but scientifically and philosophically deficient, or even crude and naïve. As Grandgent reminds us,^o Dante believed that seven thousand years separated the first day of Creation from the Last Day of Judgment. We have come to the last age of our world, he said, and expected the end of time to come in about five hundred years after his day. We have lived to commemorate the six hundredth anniversary of this visionary. On the Last Day of Judgment he expected that the suicides, changed to gnarled and knotty trees, would hang their resurrected bodies on their thorny branches, and would thus wear them to all eternity!

Now Dante's outworn medievalism cannot be ignored, for it is no mere scaffolding in the house of his spirit. The final essence of Dante's poetry is not in his words; it is in what he thinks. His ideas are poetry, as Santayana observes.^o By his ideas, by his ideal vision, must he be finally judged; by this, whether he can really teach us "how man becomes eternal."

O ye who have sound intellects, observe
The doctrine that is here, hiding itself
Beneath the veil of the unwonted verses!^o

Unwonted, strange, and mysterious are the verses, stranger by far than the real doctrine which is uttered in Dante. The Divine Comedy is a myth and a parable, like unto the parables in the Gospels, like the Myth of the Cave and that

strange and unwonted vision of Er the Pamphylian in Plato's Republic. Count it not a digression if I now turn aside from Dante to refer to this last myth with which Plato concludes his greatest dialogue. I can think of no better way to make this matter clear than thus to elucidate Dante by Plato.

Plato tells us in the myth of one Er, a Pamphylian, who was slain in battle. His body does not decay, and twelve days later he returns to life and narrates his vision of the other world. His soul had gone in company with others to a place of judgment. Er is told to observe what he may, for the enlightenment of mankind. Punishments he observes, and sufferings; likewise corresponding rewards and joys. Seven days he tarries; on the eighth the pilgrims resume their journey, and in five days they reach the column of light which binds together the universe. Here Fate gives the souls opportunity to choose their lives anew. The life which the soul chooses will be its destiny. "Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair." The recital of the choices made would take us too far afield. The choices are made, the Fates confirm them; the souls are sent up to earth, to be reborn into the lives they themselves have elected. This is the vision: a myth of preëxistence and transmigration, beautiful to read and imagine; but who would mistake it for the truth? And yet it is very truth of very truth; for, as Plato tells us, "the tale has been saved, and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken." This word, this central, saving idea in Plato's vision, is the same as the central idea in Dante's vision. Heaven and Hell are in man's grasp; life or death are offered him, himself to choose his destiny. This choice of man's spirit, how solemn, in consequences how ir retrievable; this the supreme opportunity, this the supreme peril of our human state!

The myth is about Er's vision of the other world; the truth is about our life here and now. So Dante's vision also is about Hell, Purgatory, and the Ten Heavens; but

the immortal truth of Dante likewise is in his vision of life here and now: his insight disclosing the forces in us that make for eternal worth, and the forces that defeat man's attainment of the ideal goal, that thwart and negate the human spirit. How does man become eternal, how is the eternal in his nature disclosed and attained?

Virgil describes Dante's journey as undertaken "to procure him full experience."^o Dante's supreme achievement is to be sought precisely in this: in his spiritual insight, in his revelation of the immortal values within the reach of man, and in his ardent espousal of these values. Thus, speaking the language of thirteenth-century scholasticism, he utters the truth of life, which is not merely medieval, but a truth for all time; just as Plato utters it while speaking the language of Greek myth and cosmology. Dante's doctrinal structure is medieval; the truth that lives in it transcends the boundaries of time. It is no arrogant assertion, but simple verity, to maintain that the full measure of Dante's spiritual message is clearer to our intellects today than it was to the medieval mind; clearer, perhaps, to our intellect that it was to Dante's own. It is of the very essence of supreme genius to perceive more of the spirit of man than it can intellectually grasp or formulate. To Dante we may say, in all humility, what Statius says to Virgil in Purgatory:

Thou didst like one, who walking in the night
Carries a light behind, not for himself,
But making wise those that do follow him.^o

In his letter to Can Grande della Scala, Lord of Verona and his friend and protector, Dante writes with reference to the *Divine Comedy*: "The subject of the whole work . . . taken in the literal sense only, is 'the state of souls after death' . . . allegorically the subject is 'man as, by good or ill deserts, in the exercise of the freedom of his choice he becomes liable to rewarding or punishing justice.'"^o

By his very nature and by his relation to God, man is

predestined to high things. As Ulysses urges his crew, so Dante pleads with mankind:

Consider of what origin ye are;
Ye were not made to live as do the brutes,
But to seek virtue and to learn the truth.^o

This is truly human life, a life of rational activity, revealing to man the goal of his being and directing his energies to the attainment of this goal. This is man's high destiny, to aim at the Divine, to reach unto God, and "of all his loves to reserve for God the highest." This is Heaven. And Dante saw all about him Hell. The Inferno is a miserable gallery of men who have failed as men. Dante is not drawing pictures of distant terrors. The very fact that he filled Hell with his contemporaries, with Florentines of his own generation, made Hell real, "immediate, actual, bodily . . . more distinct and natural," as Milman says.^o Boniface VIII is still Pope in Rome, and already the simoniacs in the third pouch of the Malebolge, in the eighth circle of Hell, are looking for his arrival. It is a harrowing idea, and the effect is one of overpowering immediacy. As we read Dante's *Inferno*, we feel Hell all about us, right here and now.

In this main point Dante's Hell differs from the Hells of his predecessors. Even St. Thomas is content to exhibit Divine Justice by showing that the sinner *deserves* the punishment he receives. But when Dante reads on the gates of Hell, "Justice incited my sublime Creator," his conception of Divine Justice is at once simpler and more profound. Hell is what the sinner himself *chooses*. The *Inferno* is not so much an account of how sin is punished; it is fundamentally a revelation of what sin *is*: essentially and in the full measure of its fruition. The wages of sin is death, we have been told. Dante's truth is deeper. Sin *is* death, he declares in true Biblical manner. He recalls Aristotle's words that, in man, life is the use of reason, and that for a man to part with this use of reason is the same as to be dead. So he writes, in the canzone inter-

preted in the Fourth Tractate of the *Convivio*, of a man "who while he doth walk the earth is dead"—dead as man but surviving as beast. Frate Alberigo treacherously has his brother killed. His soul goes to the traitor's pit in Hell, and goes there instantly. Above, on earth, his body continues its soulless existence; a demon takes possession of it until the time of its dissolution. This hideous degradation, the tragic horror of this death-in-life, Dante exhibits in his portrayal of Hell.

What is sin? It is man's great refusal to enter upon his divine inheritance, the betrayal of his high trust, the wilful rejection of God's love. So Christ charged the dealers in the temple: "My house shall be called a house of prayer; but ye make it a den of robbers." The lukewarm, Laodicean soul, lacking vigor to espouse actively either good or evil, is not admitted even to Hell; it is outside the dread portal, in nondescript, aimless confusion. After all, as Ibsen tells us in *Peer Gynt*, "Both vigor and earnestness go to a sin."

Sin is by Dante viewed as threefold, and these three kinds of sin are exhibited in the three great divisions of Hell. The high destiny of man is to pursue virtue and knowledge, rational devotion, love of God. Now man's emotions, instead of being guided and moderated by reason in the desire for earthly things, may be fired to excessive passion by unenlightened impulse and instinct. This is Incontinence, and in four circles of Hell we find the souls who have chosen to waste themselves in lust, in gluttony, in avarice and prodigality, in anger.

Lower sinks human nature, when instinct and impulse, instead of flaming in excessive passion for things unworthy, are employed to defeat the end of love. This is double negation of the soul's true humanity: reason is scorned and love is absent. These are the Violent; a high cliff separates them from the Incontinent in Hell. In three rounds we find the souls violent against their neighbors' persons and possessions; against their own persons

and possessions; against God, Nature, and Art. Here are the murderers, robbers, tyrants; here are suicides; here the blasphemers, sodomites, usurers.

A still vaster chasm of spiritual downfall marks the descent to Fraud. Here sin reaches its depth: intelligence is here bedeviled; malicious craft is employed to defeat the ends of love. Triply damned is the soul in this third division of Hell. Dante distinguishes Fraud Simple or Deceit from Treachery, which he regards as the devil's pit of sin. Deceit is lodged in the ten evil pouches of the Malebolge, in the eighth circle of Hell. Here are the seducers and panderers, flatterers, simoniaes, soothsayers, barterers, hypocrites, thieves, evil counselors, schismatics and scandal-mongers, falsifiers. The very heart of Hell holds the traitors of their kindred, of their country, of their guests and companions, and of their benefactors. Judas Iscariot, Brutus, and Cassius are at the very pit of the pit, writhing in the three jaws of Satan.

Now observe the moral consistency of Dante's treatment. The sinners are all at home in their proper circle in Hell; their punishment exhibits in sensible terms their inner character. According to the old Indian doctrine of transmigration, a swine's body awaits the swinish soul. So in the *Inferno* we see, not the punishment of the lustful, of the murderer, or the traitor; we see lust itself, or murder, or treachery; the sinful soul itself is disclosed to our view, and its very character is its punishment. In this exhibition of the real Hell, Dante's genius is marvelous. The misers and the prodigals spend all their strength rolling heavy weights against each other in the muddy marsh of the Styx. The wrathful souls tear and bite and smite each other. Murderers are clear up to their necks in the boiling, bloody river Phlegethon, and tyrants clear up to their eyebrows. Flatterers are immersed up to their lips in filth. Hypocrites, with painted faces, have to walk under the weight of hooded cloaks of lead, gilded on the outside. The cold, loveless souls of the traitors are at

home plunged in the frozen lake of Cocytus, frozen tears blinding their eyes. But perhaps the subtlest exhibition of Dante's profound insight is to be found in his incomparable account of the adulteress Francesca da Rimini and her lover Paolo. What is their punishment? Eternally to be driven through the air by the violent whirlwinds of passion, eternally in each other's arms. How many readers of Dante perceive damnation in Paolo and Francesca's lot? Eternally in the arms of love: is this Hell? Even so, answers Dante, himself a high-priest of love. "Unlawful love . . . is condemned to be mere possession—possession in the dark, without an environment, without a future. . . . A love that is nothing but love" is "in hell already." So Santayana interprets Dante. "Only an inspired poet could be so subtle a moralist. Only a sound moralist could be so tragic a poet."° Not only as poetry but as a revelation of spiritual insight, the canto of Paolo and Francesca is the jewel of the *Inferno*.

This is Hell: the abode of sin, the absence of God and of the love of God. What are we to do, then, to be saved? A repentant will is the first condition. The sinner is in Hell because he has chosen to be there: God Himself cannot save him against his will. The malicious soul actively rejects God, and malice is beyond God's saving grace. To be saved, man must eagerly turn to Christ in prayer and repentance. Be it even at the last breath of life, as in the case of Manfredi, God will not reject the penitent sinner. Once repentant, the sinner has rejected malice; but much purging is needed before he attains the purity and saintliness toward which his will has so ardently turned.

Of the three parts of the *Divine Comedy*, the *Purgatorio* is perhaps the most human. Virtue is forever beyond the reach of the sinner in Hell, forever attained in Heaven. Purgatory alone is a scene of moral endeavor after virtue. The Mountain of Purgatory is the visible exhibition of the soul's mounting from sin to Heaven through purgation and expiation. How does the soul mount from sin to salva-

tion? How are the brands of the seven deadly sins blotted out from the brow of man, until he stands at the threshold of Paradise, stainless and saved forever? Dante answers: By vigorously negating the sins to which, before repentance, the soul had yielded. In the seventeenth canto of the *Purgatorio* Virgil expounds to Dante the manifold nature of sin that is expiated on the Holy Mountain. Love alone is good, love well directed and in right measure. Man's love may be misdirected to evil; this is the case in the sins of pride, envy, and anger. Or else man may love the good, but not with sufficient ardor. This is sloth, spiritual sluggishness. Or, again, man may love excessively things that deserve only moderate attachment. This is the case in avarice and prodigality, gluttony, lust. From these seven vices the soul must be delivered through expiation and hard discipline.

The soul is purged of pride, by bowing down in humility under heavy burdens. The envious, covered with sackcloth, lean against each other, thus lending the mutual support they had refused during life. On earth their eyes could not endure the sight of another's happiness; so here their eyelids are transpierced with iron wire. Those who expiate anger are blinded by a thick veil of smoke, blinded as they had been by wrath. The slothful have to run the good course at top speed:

Swift, swift, that no time may be lost because
Of little love! . . . °

The misers and the prodigals are in tears, lying with their faces to the earth, to keep in mind their former depravity in devoting their lives to earthly things. The gluttons, pallid, withered, emaciate, with deep-sunken eyes, throng about a fruit-laden apple tree, but cannot satisfy their hunger. The lustful are purged in flames hot as their consuming passion. And while the sinners are thus being purged, all about them they see and hear praises of the

virtues which they seek to attain, and the air is sweet with the Beatitudes.

In Purgatory, as in Hell, the souls of men are where they belong, where by their own will they have chosen to be. So Wicksteed observes: "Never did Dante pierce more deeply into the truth of things . . . than when he told how the souls in Purgatory do not wish to rise to Heaven till they have worked out the consequences of their sins."° For until that time the soul, feeling itself short of the mark, is possessed with the torment and the longing of one repentant but not yet sanctified. It craves God, but has not yet attained unto his presence. But joy universal breaks forth when the sinner is at last purged and ready to ascend to Heaven. He drinks of the waters of Lethe and Eunoë; the memory of his sins is no more, but doubly blissful is the recollection of his virtue. No more is he repentant, no more struggling with evil. He can now take his own pleasure for his guide since all his pleasure is in God.

There is spiritual gravitation in the Universe. As St. Augustine tells us, "The soul is moved by love as the body is by its weight."° So Dante, in the *Convivio*: "The soul of man naturally desires with boundless longing to have being . . . and since God is the first cause of our souls . . . the soul desires most of all to return to Him."° The soul of Beatrice goes to "the only home that well befitteth her," Dante sings in the *Vita Nuova*.° Only in attaining unto the Divine Presence is real joy and peace possible for man, for only with God is the human soul really at home. His will is our peace, *E la sua volontate è nostra pace*.° This peace passeth all understanding and cannot be attained by human wisdom unaided. The wisest pagans are in Limbo, and at the portals of Heaven Virgil leaves Dante. His knowledge may lead to the attainment of those virtues which St. Augustine called splendid vices, but the full measure of faith, of hope, of Christian love that leads to God, is forever beyond him.

The ascent of the Ten Heavens in Paradise brings to a sublime climax Dante's return from the earthly love of the *donna gentile* to the heavenly love of Beatrice, from secular learning and knowledge to the divine wisdom of faith. It solemnizes Dante's recognition of an Infinite center of supreme, ineffable perfection, of a Value Absolute which the human soul perceives and worships, in which it finds its peace and its eternal home, but which transcends the capacities of reason to analyze and formulate. This transcendent sense of the Divine strangely challenges Dante's intelligence; humble in accepting the truths of faith, he is ever insistent in his effort to understand the mysteries of religion. Heaven is to him indeed the great adventure of the spirit. The *Paradiso* seems—only seems—imaginatively austere as compared with the first two canticles. Even more sublime than the marvelous play of imagery which holds us spellbound in the *Inferno* and the *Purgatorio*, is the play of ideas and living conceptions in which we may now share. The ascent from Heaven to Heaven is an ascent in spiritual vision. At every step Beatrice charges Dante to rise above his mortal, temporal outlook and to survey things in the light of the Eternal.

Spinoza speaks of the intellectual love of God, *amor intellectualis Dei*, which enables a man to see all things under the pattern of eternity, *sub specie aeternitatis*. So the love of God exemplified for Dante in his devotion to Beatrice reveals to him more and more completely, and with ever more immediate certainty, the living presence of God in each passing moment of mortality. Love of God is not only the saving force in man's life, it is the eternal dynamic in the universe. The truth of truths about the world is that it is attuned to *Good*, to God's love. So Plato taught when he found the supreme reality in the Idea of the Good.^o The whole world is but the reflection of God's beaming love; creation is the Divine Idea. In mastering the forces of evil in his nature, in yielding reason the victory, in pursuing virtue and knowledge, man attains the only real

happiness which this our mortal life affords. But he attains more: in godliness, in truth, in love, man allies himself and is one with that in the universe which alone is eternal. Love discloses goals of aspiration that defy the vicissitudes of time:

Light intellectual replete with love,
Love of true good replete with ecstasy,
Ecstasy that transcendeth every sweetness.°

In love of Good and godliness even this mortal body is made to participate in the immortal concerns of the spirit. In this sense perhaps even the resurrection of the body in Dante may have deeper significance. Our body, our every moment of mortality, is bound up with immortal possibilities; the eternal is here and now and is ever being realized in us.

Love of God leads man to scale heights which the intellect cannot reach. Again and again Dante is blinded by the luminous sublimities of Paradise, but love and Beatrice help him attain the brighter vision. There is no monotony of blessedness in Heaven. Each soul in Dante's Paradise attains eternally its utmost of bliss in the presence of God, but some souls are capable of more bliss than others. The Ten Heavens represent accordingly a sublime gradation of beatitudes, a gradual approach to unqualified perfection. The nun Piccarda, in the first Heaven, of the Moon, has been inconstant in her saintliness; the great lawgiver and statesman Justinian, in the second Heaven, that of Mercury, was ambitious; the ardor of the good lovers, in the Heaven of Venus, inclined to sensuality. The shadow of earth falls on these three Heavens, and a touch of the earthly is in their celestial bliss. The next four Heavens exhibit subtly Dante's scale of spiritual values. The theologians and the learned saints are in the fourth Heaven, of the Sun. Here is intellect directed to the understanding of the Divine. Higher than the wise theologian, in the Heaven of Mars, is the brave soldier of the faith, the holy

crusader, who battles for God and righteousness. Higher still, in the sixth Heaven, of Jupiter, are the kings who rule righteously, in the spirit of divine justice. But even more exalted than the wisdom of the theologian, or the fortitude of the holy crusader, or the justice of the righteous ruler, is the contemplative insight and vision of the mystic, sublime in the seventh Heaven, that of Saturn.

Thus it is that the soul becomes eternal, and aspires to topmost Heaven through the attainment of virtue. In their several spheres of beatitude, the souls of the blessed are all in the presence of Infinite Love, for all Paradise breathes the immediacy of the Divine. In the thirtieth canto of the *Paradiso* God is revealed to Dante as a river of fire in which the saintly souls are as flaming sparks, in and of the river yet distinctly themselves.^o In this vision of man's union with the Divine, love is exalted, but there is no detracting of intelligence. Socrates had said, "Virtue is knowledge," and, as we see, Dante ends with a paean of mysticism, with an exaltation of the higher intelligence more important even than love to the soul in quest of the eternal:

Blessedness

Is founded in the faculty which sees,
And not in that which loves, and follows next.^o

Dante has come from the human to the divine, from time to the eternal. In the presence of God, in the Empyrean "where every Where and every When are centered—*Dove s'appunta ogni ubi ed ogni quando*,"^o the language of intelligence fails, but in immortal clarity the passing confusions of his soul are transcended, and he sees things face to face, sees them with St. Bernard, in the light of mystic contemplation. In the passing flow of time and mortality he had sought the immortal. Athirst for God, he had sought the Divine Presence, had sought to learn how man becomes eternal. And he had seen how man is eternally damned, and how he is purged to the attainment

of eternal blessedness. His soul had sought to penetrate
"the Truth in which all intellect finds rest."^o

Too high was that for mortal wings to glide—
Till, stricken by a sudden-flashing ray,
My reason found its longing satisfied.
My soaring fancy here at last gave way;
But, like a wheel whose motion nothing mars,
Already wish and will, in even sway,
Were turned by Love, which moves the sun and stars.^o

CHAPTER III

MATERIALISM AND IMMORTALITY: A SURVEY OF NEGATION

I

THE modern materialist is prone to distinguish himself from all metaphysicians. He would sit in the seat of science. Yet the history of materialistic doctrine takes us back to the first beginnings of philosophic thought; its development is conditioned by the general course of philosophic speculation; and its predilection for the mantle of science, as well as its hostility to religion, can be understood if we understand the sort of metaphysics that it is.

The present chapter, accordingly, does not deal with the subject of science and immortality. What interests us primarily, in surveying the course of materialistic speculation, is to perceive the philosophical significance of the idea of immortality, the type of cosmology with which it is characteristically allied, and the light it throws on the disclosure of a world of values and on the philosophical conception of that world.

Examined with this end in view, materialism in its historical development manifests a characteristic indifference and a frequent hostility to the idea of immortality. The soul, the self, the person, is described as an impermanent material complex. Now if critical analysis should in the end lead us to the conclusion that materialism is a philosophy precluded by its peculiar view of the factual world from a due recognition of the world of values, we may be justified in suspecting a real connection between

this aspect of materialistic thought and the materialistic attitude towards personality and human destiny. It may then prove in the end necessary to reformulate the whole problem of immortality, in terms radically different from those used in the exposition of materialistic doctrine, and, be it noted, also in the conventional spiritualistic attacks on that doctrine. Is the real question of immortality a question of the factual dissolution or persistence of the soul-substance; is it a question of corporeal or incorporeal, extended or unextended entities: a question as to whether the self is a simple substance or a compound?

The intent of the present study should therefore be borne in mind: materialism is the subject of this inquiry, but its object and guiding purpose is the better understanding of the idea of immortality in its relation to the ideas of personality and value. This definite aim, stated at the outset, should explain our concentration on certain aspects of materialistic theory and the apparent neglect of certain other aspects.

II

While the first Pre-Socratics distinguish the soul from the body, they regard the soul, not as incorporeal, but as a higher type of body, a finer matter: breath, air, vapor. To Heraclitus it is fiery dry vapor, and its activity is affected by the body in which it is lodged. The soul is constantly being restored and nourished by breathing; a drunkard's soul loses self-mastery through excessive moisture. In Empedocles we have a fusion or confusion of materialistic cosmology and Orphic mystery. He ascribes mental qualities to bodily conditions and treats thought itself as a corporeal process. But his description of body and soul and their inter-related activities as a pageant of blends of earth, air, fire, and water does not mean that his world is one of brute, inert matter; for his conception of matter is animistic. The elements constituting man's being are im-

perishable, but the individual as an individual is a combination, unstable and impermanent. The soul's preëxistence and survival after death would seem even less admissible here than in the case of Heraclitus. Yet Empedocles is a high priest of the doctrine of transmigration. Each soul is a daemon descended into this sorry waste of mortal life, successively inhabiting a variety of bodily forms, wrapped in alien garments of the flesh and biding the day of its return home. Thrice ten thousand years is the span of expiation of the protean careering soul. Thus is man on earth a fugitive and a vagabond from heaven.°

There is no disentangling of these two views of the soul in Empedocles. But his description of the soul's activity in terms of bodily process helped to develop a more strictly materialistic tendency in Greek thought, in atomistic speculation. Democritus declares explicitly: nothing exists but atoms and empty space. Infinite in number, infinite in variety of form and ever mobile, the atoms fall and whirl in the infinite void; of this cosmic whirl are generated all masses in nature and the bodies and souls of men. The soul, although subtler and finer than the body, is nonetheless corporeal: soul-atoms are simply the most perfect atoms. Sensation is due to collision and contact of atoms: our impression of the world is the result of the way in which the world strikes us. With every breath the blend of soul-atoms changes; the last breath registers the body's dissolution and the soul's dissipation. This conclusion is imposed on the atomist; the Epicurean emphasizes it and proclaims it as a gospel.

In the Epicurean philosophy atomism is more than a cosmological formula: it becomes a touchstone of ethical values and a torch for the deliverance of man from the dark terrors of religious superstition. Rejecting the last vestige of mythology, Epicurus and Lucretius denied the supernatural explicitly and without qualification. The conception of the world as a self-propelled mechanism con-

taining within itself the principles of its explanation, this conception which distinguishes the thought of Democritus from the hesitant naturalism of the other Pre-Socratics, is now recognized as an idea essential to the attainment of moral perfection and spiritual peace, no less than to the understanding of the true nature of things. The doctrine of enlightenment becomes a gospel of salvation. The Epicurean doctrine of the soul, especially as we find it in the third book of Lucretius, is thus of particular interest as it is the first of many attempts made in Western thought to nourish moral enthusiasm and aspiration on a strictly naturalistic diet.

The Epicurean denied outright the notion of a supersensible, incorporeal, ideal principle in human personality. Man is a mechanical system of material particles. The soul-particles are the lightest conceivable: like the flavor of wine or the sweet breath of perfume, which, scattered in the air, leave the things themselves seemingly not a whit smaller, so it is with the soul-atoms in the body.

The constitution of the soul is analyzed and found to consist of four elements: wind, heat, air, and a certain fourth nameless element than which there exists nothing nimbler, finer, nor made of smaller or smoother particles. This last is essential to sensation. The motion of the fourth element is self-impelled and exhibits strikingly the spontaneity which Epicurus recognized as a characteristic of all atoms: the capacity to swerve from their downward course. Were it not for this swerving no collision or contact could take place in infinite space: there would be a universal rain of atoms, but no universe.^o This Epicurean doctrine of atomic declination has occasioned considerable controversy among commentators. Guyau subtly interprets Epicurus as saying: man is free, but not even his free will is groundless: it rests in the very nature of things, on atomic spontaneity. Masson would distinguish two Epicurean principles: rigid determinism in nature and free will in man. But Martha's reflection seems more to

the point. Impressed by the Lucretian reference to the fourth unnamed particle of the soul, he remarks: "It should be observed that the most determined materialism, in speaking of the soul, always makes use of a certain unknown. It is thus a witness to its impotence to explain everything in material terms. . . . Unwittingly it always leaves a place for the spiritualism which it is all the while repulsing."^o

Subtle and superlatively fine though they be, soul-atoms are corporeal, the fourth element as well as the rest, the *animus* or rational soul situated in the breast no less than the sensitive soul or *anima* whose atoms are diffused all over the body. Mind and soul alike are bodily in origin and nature and destiny. The soul cannot survive the disintegration of the bodily structure which follows death.

On this point, that the soul is mortal, the Epicurean is most positive and explicit. In the third book of *De rerum natura* Lucretius marshalls an imposing array of arguments to prove his thesis, arguments which anticipate most later materialistic reasoning on the subject. The soul's structure proves it mortal. It is more mobile than smoke or cloud; once outside its bodily container, it is bound to be dissipated. It grows and ages with the body; shares the bodily pains; disease, intoxication, shocks, medicine affect body and soul together. The soul cannot exist apart from the body any more than hand or eye or ear or nostrils can. The notion of a disembodied soul's existence is absurd. Could it see or hear or touch or taste or smell without bodily organs? If soul and body did not grow together, then hawks might flee the approach of doves, and beasts, not men, be sages, and children's bodies contain old men's souls. With the body the soul comes into being, with the body it ages and grows frail, and with the body it must die. Sum up all the conditions of immortality: the soul does not meet any one of them.

One note is of special interest in the Lucretian chant of mortality. To the typical Western mind the prospect of

life after death has usually been rated a boon; but the Epicurean negation of a hereafter lacks any suggestion of regret. Lucretius glories in his conclusion as would a Buddhist when proclaiming that the wheel of life is broken and the cycle of births is no more. Strange parallel this, of Epicurus and Gautama: and yet Epicureanism is, like Buddhism, a gospel of salvation through enlightenment. The popular religion of Rome, against which Lucretius revolted, was not the noble paganism of Greece: lust and cruelty, superstition and cringing terror tainted the piety which the poet defied. "The impious man," his master had said, "is not he who denies the existence of Gods like those commonly worshipped; on the contrary, the impious man is he who asserts the Gods to be such as the vulgar conceive them."° From the noisome gloom of blind worship Lucretius would escape and lead men into the clear light of knowledge. He would face the world firm and unafraid, knowing that law and not divine caprice rule the processes of nature. He would free mankind from its two sources of misery, both due to religious superstition: the cowering belief in divine interference with the course of nature, and the fear of death, the fraud of a hereafter. To man he would bring the peace that comes from understanding.

Motion, life, sensation, thought, all are operations of bodily compounds, and bodily compounds are impermanent. Immortality is a delusion; but just on this account death loses its terror, for with the end of life ends feeling. "There is nothing terrible in living to a man who rightly comprehends that there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live."° From what dark depths of dread and sensuality may not Lucretius have risen to follow his master who "rescued life from such great billows and such thick darkness and moored it in so perfect a calm and so brilliant a light."° There is grim atheistic enthusiasm in the lines of Lucretius as he contemplates the Epicurean achieve-

ment. The third book opens with an eulogy of his master, 'the bright star of the Greek race:'

Nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari
 Naturam rerum, divina mente coorta,
 Diffugiunt animi terrores. . . .

He who is no more cannot be wretched. All our terrors of death and bodily decay are due to the fact that we imagine ourselves as possible witnesses of our future dissolution. So the dying Hector cries out to Achilles: "Leave me not for dogs of the Achaians to devour!" Fancies due to the same superstition inspire the grief which men feel in anticipating their separation from loved ones, as if they were to exist in separation. Whatever the future fate of the atoms which once formed this my mortal soul, can be of no concern to me, once soul and body have parted, and I, their combination, am no more. Tremble not as a slave before unknown tortures, then, nor as a slave seek to sate the lust of the moment, but rather "study first to learn the nature of things, since it is . . . the state in which mortals must expect all their being, that is to come after their death."° Thus 'the triumph song over the mortality of the soul' ends with a trumpet call to the pursuit of truth and philosophy.

THE STOIC account of the soul appears to be as materialistic as the Epicurean. The soul is corporeal, breath-like, or fiery; it pervades the body and holds it together. Soul is body. The two are one and reciprocal in their activities and behavior; the injury or disease of the body affects the soul; with the soul's dismay the body shudders and pales, or reddens in shame. Not only is the soul-substance regarded as corporeal: the activities and attainments, virtues and vices of the soul are interpreted in bodily terms. Plato had taught that a man becomes just by participating in the Idea of Justice, but the Stoics required him to have the stuff of justice in his body.

Temperaments are fervid, frigid, dry, moist, according to the preponderance of fire, air, earth, or water. "An excess of cold makes a man timorous, and an excess of fire makes him passionate."^o

In declaring that the soul is body, however, the Stoics did not say that the soul is matter, in the Epicurean sense of the term. The "body" of the Stoics is not mere brute, inert matter, but a complex of forces, active, instinct with most various potentialities. Nor is the Stoic rigorously naturalistic, like Lucretius. His course of nature is no Epicurean dance of atoms; it is a divine pageant, a double drama of world-conflagration and world-refashionment, in which the cosmos is being continually coarsened and refined, and God is forever active in the least flutter of existence.

Eight parts of soul or soul-factors are distinguished: the five senses, the power of speech, the reproductive power, and the ruling or controlling part, called by many names, usually reason, or *τό ἡγεμονικόν*, the principate, as Arnold translates the term. This last, seated in the heart, dominates the rest; it is the center of thought-activity, the will, the self; it is God in us. There is no question of eternal life after death, but only of the soul's survival. The early Stoic view is that the soul continues to exist after death, but that it perishes in the end. According to Cleanthes all souls continue to exist until the world-conflagration. Chrysippus on the other hand held with Plato that after the dissolution of the body the soul carries away with it only its intellectual and moral nature and activity. Accordingly only those souls survived which excelled in those surviving elements: only the wise. Panaetius, however, rejected the doctrine of the creation and destruction of worlds, world-conflagration and world-refashionment; against Zeno and Cleanthes he asserted that the world is imperishable. The world is imperishable, but in the world things, bodies and souls, perish.

Roman Stoicism registers a progressive renunciation of

the idea of immortality. In Seneca, to be sure, it is a hope cherished and insistent; but in Epictetus we catch only an occasional glimpse of a renounced vision, while in Marcus Aurelius hope and vision are abandoned, and abandoned stoically.

The silence of the *Encheridion* on the subject of immortality is eloquent, though not necessarily eloquent of the disdain and the indifference with which Courdaveaux is impressed in Epictetus.^o If we are to judge from the *Discourses* recorded by Arrian, the attitude of Epictetus is one of uncertainty decidedly inclined to negation. Whenever Epictetus speaks explicitly he manifests no more belief in immortality than does Marcus Aurelius. "(God) gives the signal for retreat, opens the door, and says to you, Go. Go whither? To nothing terrible, but to the place from which you came, to your friends and kinsmen, to the elements: what there was in you of fire, goes to fire; of earth, to earth; of air (spirit), to air; of water, to water."^o Similarly Marcus Aurelius: "Just as on earth, after a certain term of survival, change and dissolution of substance makes room for other dead bodies, so the souls transmuted into air, after a period of survival, change by processes of diffusion and of ignition, and are resumed into the seminal principle of the universe, and in this way make room for others to take up their habitation in their stead."^o

Stoicism contemplated the material nature of all existence, the composite character of individual bodies and souls, and the instability and impermanence of any composition, and it reached the conclusion of calm acquiescence in the inevitable and of loyalty to virtue and to the gods throughout all. The necessity under which the Stoic felt himself, to introduce and emphasize the moral note in treating of the soul's destiny, reveals the conglomerate character of his doctrine, which is apparent also on other grounds. Stoicism is a philosophy whose estimate of the world-process imposes on it demands which its description of the world-content cannot meet nor allow. The Stoic

treatment of the ethical arguments for immortality is radical, and will receive closer attention in our ninth chapter.

III

Godless Epicureanism was obviously unavailable for Christian purposes, and the theologian recoiled also from the materialism of the Stoics. The early Christian doctrine followed mainly Platonic lines; its later course of development during the Middle Ages is dominated by Aristotelian and quasi-Aristotelian ideas. We need not here rehearse the commonplaces of patristic and scholastic philosophy: suffice it to consider the early theological attacks on materialistic psychology, and the theologian's effort to evade the subtler materialism of the Aristotelian doctrines of the soul which he took over from Jew and Arab and adapted to his Christian demands.

The doctrine of the resurrection in the Church, "while it strengthened her hold on the masses, was a great stumbling-block in the way of the educated." ° To the Greek who had learned from Plato to regard the body as the soul's dungeon, this notion of the soul's corporeal reinvestment was most perplexing. Must not the soul be itself material, then, if it found such reinvestment congenial? There were, to be sure, definite materialistic currents in patristic thought. Tertullian held on Biblical grounds that the soul has a beginning; with the Stoics he regarded it as corporeal, and of this he was further convinced by the interaction of soul and body. "Not to be corporeal is not to be." But there is subtle balancing here. The soul is highly refined matter, but it is not flesh; it is never separated from the body, but man is nevertheless dual in nature, and when his body ceases to be, his soul continues its course alone. So Lactantius opposes preëxistence, declares the soul incorporeal, but, when he comes to define its substantial character, "drops into the method that inevi-

tably leads to some form of materialism,"^o and conceives of the soul as subtle matter. This insistence on treating the soul as somehow immaterial and of divine origin and yet as bound to the body, without any rational view of the relations of material and immaterial—this confusion of Platonic and materialistic notions—is characteristic of patristic thought.

The dissatisfaction with materialism, explicit or covert, found expression in more emphatic declarations of the soul's immateriality. Thus Nemesius maintained, against Peripatetics and Stoics and atomists, the Platonic notion of an incorporeal, substantial, self-moving, eternal soul. Immaterialism, Platonic and Plotinian, looms large in the thought of St. Augustine, whose formulation of the Christian doctrine of the soul directs Catholic speculation through the centuries.

The important influence of Platonic and Aristotelian notions on the Christian doctrine of man has been noticed in the previous chapter. In the philosophy of the Lyceum the naturalistic and materialistic elements of Aristotelianism become increasingly apparent. Theophrastus recognizes no definite break in the scale of nature. Dicaearchus reduces the soul to a harmony of the bodily elements: it is nothing but a disposition of the body, and perishes with the latter. Strato abandons the view of reason as immaterial, locates it in the brain between the eyebrows, and denies its preëxistence and survival. A growing tendency is observed to reduce thought and the soul to movement, to force and matter.^o

The Platonic elements in Aristotelianism, however, are not so easily abandoned; they persist and involve Aristotelianism in endless dispute through the centuries. Aristotle's own works were not generally known in the West until the thirteenth century. The earlier Christian schoolman usually got his ideas about the Stagirite from Jews who had read or translated Arabian commentators, and these in turn had read or translated commentaries or

translations and retranslations from the Greek or Syriac made by Nestorians. For centuries Aristotle's name was connected with Neoplatonic, emanationist doctrines and works, and even after the Aristotelian writings had been made available for Latin scholars, the apocryphal, mystic-platonizing Aristotelianism persisted.

Primarily, then, medieval discussion of Aristotle's psychology is a discussion and dispute between disciples of conflicting Aristotelian commentators rather than between rival students of Aristotle himself. One went by preference to the commentator even after the original was available. Had not Avicenna himself read the *Metaphysics* forty times, to find meaning in it only when he proceeded to study Alfarabi's commentary? This does not mean that Aristotle's name was taken all in vain in Bagdad, Cordova, and Padua; but doubtless it was not altogether owing to the ambiguity of the Peripatetic doctrine that Averroist, Thomist, and Alexandrist all invoked Aristotle's name.

The medieval Aristotelian controversy centers about immortality. More technically, it concerns the problem of the nature of reason and its rôle in human life. "Is there but one Active Intellect (creative reason), the Divine Intelligence which unites itself for a period with the individual souls and leaves them at the time of bodily dissolution? Or is there also in the human soul an active intellect intimately bound with the vegetative, the animal, and the rational soul, which unites itself in certain cases with the divine intellect, but so as to conserve its individuality and to make the other parts of the human soul partake of immortality?" °

Leading authorities in this dispute are the Arabian philosophers, most illustrious among them Abu-l-Walid Mohammed ibn Achmed ibn Mohammed ibn Roshd (Averroës). In the name of Aristotle Averroës distinguishes the soul from the active intellect. The soul—nutritive, locomotive, appetitive, sensitive—is one with the body and

dies with it. But rationality in the soul, its conceptual power, indicates the operation of another principle, which is not a form of the body. The active intellect, like the ideas with which it deals, is immaterial, eternal; it transcends individuality; it is one and universal. In man 'reason' is a disposition, a capacity for conceptual knowledge, passive intellect, which become actualized when acted upon by the active intellect. But these two should not be separated too sharply: "in so far as (the intellect) makes intelligible forms, it is called *active*; in so far as it receives them, it is called *passive*; but these two are really one and the same."^o

From the doctrine of the unity of the active intellect, Averroës would thus seem to be led to the doctrine of the unity of the passive intellect. Intelligence, rationality is nowise individual; it is essentially divine and unitary. Does this mean that all human souls are one soul? Against this common interpretation of Averroës Renan rises in defense. "Certainly if there is a revolting absurdity in the world it is this alleged *unity of souls*, and if Averroës could ever have upheld such a doctrine literally, Averroism would have deserved to figure in the annals of lunacy and not in those of philosophy." By the eternal unity of the intellect, therefore, Averroës must mean the perpetuity of humanity, of civilization.^o In a characteristic Arabian manner, impressed more by unity than by multiplicity, Averroës deals with human thought rather than with the thoughts of men, and treats intelligence as a general phenomenon of the universe.

Rationality in man, then, is from above. The individual soul is the form of the individual body, comes into being with it, and with it passes away. Is personal immortality, then, admissible? Avicenna had held as the highest goal of human existence the union of the active intellect with a man's soul, and had professed to recognize in the soul a substance which even apart from the body conserves its individuality, and therefore proclaims loudly the

permanence of the individual. Carra de Vaux has maintained that, like Avicenna, Averroës refuses to deduce the destruction of the soul from that of the body. Averroës, he holds, admits that the soul may remain individualized after the death of the body. Unable philosophically to dispose of immortality, he seeks to retain it by help of religion and revelation. In this interpretation Carra de Vaux appears to differ from Munk, Renan, Stöckl, and De Boer. According to Averroës, as Munk understands him, "there is nothing eternal but the universal intellect. Man . . . attains nothing individually which passes beyond the limits of this earthly existence, and the permanence of the individual soul is a chimera." Likewise Stöckl, quoting from Averroës *De Anima*: "The human race is eternal and permanent, but transitory is its bond of union to a Socrates or a Plato." Certainly—and this is more significant for our purpose—it was as a denier of personal immortality that scholasticism received and criticized Averroës.^o

Translated by Jews into Hebrew and into Latin, the works of the Cordovan became the chief vehicle for Aristotelian exposition and Aristotelian controversy. So Dante recognizes him along with Avicenna in the fourth Canto of the *Inferno*, among the illustrious pagans:

Euclide geometra e Tolommeo,
Ippocrate, Avicenna, e Galieno,
Averrois che'l gran comento feo.

Until the translation of Aristotle's own works into Latin, and long after it, doctors and saints of the Church went to him to learn the Peripatetic doctrine. Nevertheless Averroism became also the synonym for infidelity, heresy, theoretical and practical libertinism. The first Averroës was honored; the second, bitterly opposed.

Thirteenth-century scholasticism adopted Aristotle and adapted his philosophy to the demands of Catholic orthodoxy. As Ozanam succinctly puts it, "it found, at the outset, two errors to destroy: one, which tended to mul-

tively souls in each individual; the other, to allow of but one soul common to the whole species."^o Orthodox Christian scholasticism, as we have seen, demanded one thinking soul in each individual, a soul that is the form of the body, but no mere product of natural generation. But this scholastic doctrine of a God-infused individual soul, a *forma separata* capable of disembodied existence, met with opposition from those who felt no constraint to prove immortality or to satisfy any other theological need, and who could therefore adhere more closely to Aristotle. The question of the soul's natural origin and destiny is not settled or closed; two hundred and fifty years after St. Thomas, in the school of Padua, the issue is raised again by 'the last of the scholastics and the first of the moderns,' Pietro Pomponazzi, in his treatise *De immortalitate animae* (1516), which, according to Höfding, has rightly been regarded as the introduction to the philosophy of the Renaissance.

IV

During the sixteenth century the University of Padua was the center of intellectual activity in Northern Italy. It shared its professors with Bologna; what Padua taught Venice printed, and the practical materialism of Venetian statesmen and merchants found in Padua theoretic expression. Padua was a stronghold of Averroism, a stronghold besieged. Some of the Italian Averroists, usually clerics, managed to keep orthodox by explaining away the Cordovan's heretical ideas; others had to recant. The appointment of Pomponazzi as professor in 1495 inaugurated a new era of philosophical teaching. Pomponazzi's predecessors had been grammarians and commentators; Padua was to have now an almost modern thinker. In his dealing with omens and portents, miracles and magic, fate and freedom, Pomponazzi insists on proceeding within the limits of the natural, and ever seeks to recognize a

universal causal order in nature. In his lectures and writings is the living spirit of his time.

The burning question of the day was the problem of immortality, and, to prove the destiny of the soul, authority was pitched against authority in violent controversy. Tommaso de Vio (Gaetano) and Bartolommeo de Spina, both Dominicans; Leonido Tomeo, first in Italy to expound Aristotle out of the Greek text and seeking to reconcile him with Plato; Pietro Trapolino, Pomponazzi's teacher, and Alessandro Achillini, his competitor, both Averroists, are some of the combatants:

Aristotile allegano e Platone,

as Pulci has it in his satirical sonnet.^o When a new professor began to lecture, his students, desiring to know where he stood, would call out to him the very first day: "*Quid de anima?*—What about the soul?" Pomponazzi met the challenge. His treatise on immortality maintains a respectful tone towards orthodoxy, and seconds the scholastic attack on Averroës, but only as a preliminary to his attack on scholasticism itself. He rejects the doctrine that the intellect is one in all men as a monstrous fancy wholly alien to Aristotle. Averroës splits human nature in two by his false separation of sense and intelligence; how are we then to explain the relation of thought to sensibility, how recognize the individuality and personality of the thinker? This dualism which from the start vitiates the Averroist theory of human nature had already been stigmatized by Dante:

Che per sua dottrina fe' disgiunto
Dall' anima il possibile intelletto.

An opponent of Averroës, Pomponazzi combats also the Platonic theory that in each human being an immaterial intellect operates in a material body, and makes a determined attack on St. Thomas; for all three regard intelligence as in some way separate from the soul: to Averroës it is a common intellect operating in individual

men; to Plato, an individual incorporeal intellect active in an alien bodily medium; to St. Thomas, an individual separate form, *anima qua intellectiva*. Against all three Pomponazzi maintains the doctrine of Aristotle: an animate body is all that experience discloses in us. The soul is really and without any quibbles the form of the body. To secure prestige for his position, Pomponazzi declares himself a follower of Alexander of Aphrodisias. A third party is thus in the field, Alexandrist, adhering to the real Alexander perhaps even less rigorously than the Averroist party adhered to the text of Averroës, but representing a second type of opposition to the Thomistic Aristotelianism of the Church.

Animals are in every sense material; the celestial intelligences are altogether immaterial: between the two stands man, a little lower than the angels. Pomponazzi reasons: the human soul, in its own essential nature as intelligence, is immaterial, but in its cognitive activity it is material and therefore mortal. "Concerning the intellectual soul, I hold in accordance with Aristotle that it essentially depends on body, both for its existence and for its intellection, and can neither exist without body nor operate without a corporeal organ." The belief in immortality is accordingly unwarranted: "there is no reason to suppose that we think after death."^o

Practical objections to the doctrine of the soul's mortality are not lacking; Pomponazzi considers eight of them and does not seek to minimize their importance. But he is convinced that to the attainment and justification of a moral life the mortality of the soul is no hostile belief. Indeed, he maintains, justice loses some of its nobility if it includes expectation of future rewards. Nor is a here-after essential to our felicity; the desire for immortality is an unreasonable desire, for it is inappropriate to man. "Mortals should not seek immortal happiness, for the immortal is not congruous with the mortal. . . . If a man is temperate, he will not desire the impossible nor will it

be appropriate to him; for to have immortal happiness is a prerogative of the gods who are not in any way dependent on matter and change.”^o

Fiorentino notes in Pomponazzi's writings a gradual tendency towards explicit materialism, from the *De immortalitate* to the *Apologia* and to the *De Nutritione*. Douglas regards this view as entirely beside the mark. Whether or not Pomponazzi himself turned decidedly to materialism, his influence was a factor in the spread of materialistic thought. Like the doctrine of his master, as he understood it, so his own tended to emphasize the materiality rather than the immateriality of the soul. The Alexandrists pursued the materialistic path; Renan calls their materialism absolute; and Picavet also contrasts the Alexandrist materialism with the pantheism of the Averroists. Indeed in comparison with the Alexandrist the Italian Averroist seemed a spiritualist.^o

Three years before the publication of Pomponazzi's book the Lateran Council had condemned "both those who say that the soul is not immortal, and those who pretend that it is one in all men, and also those who hold that these opinions, while contrary to faith, are true philosophically." Professors of philosophy were charged not to expound these doctrines without also undertaking to refute them. Pomponazzi's explicit rejection of immortality was shocking, and was not mended by his protestations that his argument claimed only philosophical, Aristotelian validity and nowise intruded on the province of faith and the pious truths of theology. *De immortalitate* was publicly burned in Venice. A number of writers undertook to refute Pomponazzi, among them Cardinal Contarini and Agostino Nifo, the latter writing at the Pope's order. Pomponazzi replied, suiting his tone to the manner of the attack: serene and kindly towards the sincere consistent Thomism of Contarini, keen-edged and contemptuous towards the venal uncritical erudition of Nifo.

The efforts to bring Pomponazzi under the Lateran con-

demnation were unsuccessful. Pope Leo issued a brief against the book, but he was in no mood to burn heretics; heresy was rather a fashion in the days of Leo the Tenth. The task of revising and correcting Pomponazzi's opinions were entrusted to Pietro Bembo, to a Papal secretary and a future cardinal who disdained the Epistles of St. Paul as not worth the attention of a serious mind! A new spirit was in Europe, dissolving orthodoxy; a thirst for novelty, a demand for radical reconstruction of old materials or indeed for building entirely anew. In this renaissance of old truths and ancient heresies, the godless materialism of the Epicureans was bound to have its chance.

V

Averroës, holding his conclusions as philosophically true, readily grants that theologically they may be false. Six days in the week Pomponazzi repudiates immortality, but on the seventh he devoutly believes. Bruno admits that as a philosopher he has advocated the teachings with which the Inquisition charges him, but *cattolicamente parlando* he abhors them all and piously submits to the Holy Office. This resort to the doctrine of double truth was often no doubt plain double-dealing. But it was also due to the inability of the medieval mind wholly to secularize itself; in its boldest flights it was at the beck of theology. Its deepest mood was religious. It began by recognizing the primacy and the finality of the spiritual, the Divine in nature: *l'Amor che move il sol e l'altre stelle*, as we have it in the last line of the Divine Comedy. Nicolaus of Autricuria might indeed regard the things and processes in nature as atomic structures and motions,^o but the rigorous and thoroughgoing elaboration of such a doctrine is not a medieval undertaking. It demands a naturalistic age.

The critical attitude which characterizes the Renais-

sance thinkers when dealing with the dogmas of orthodoxy is not so apparent when they turn to their newly discovered ancient doctrines. Rather do we find them enthusiastic and often uncritical exponents of Platonic, Neoplatonic, or Stoic ideas, or else, like the early Ionians, confidently attacking anew all the problems in the calendar, as if philosophy were then, by them, being first inaugurated. This adolescent mood, characteristic of Renaissance thought, accounts for its freshness and for its introspective, lyric quality, but it also explains its instability and its unsystematic character. Before modern thought had subjected itself to a rigorous logical method, in the dawn of the new day, Renaissance speculation recalled the speculation of Empedocles, mystical and naturalistic at once, half poetry and religion, half prose and science:—sceptical and worldly with Montaigne, worldly and cynical with Machiavelli, rigorously scientific with Galileo, occult with Paracelsus, mystical and devout with Jakob Böhme, venturing all and, with Leonardo, master of all.

The glorification of nature, of matter, which is so characteristic of Renaissance philosophy, should not mislead us. It represents a practical protest against the professed otherworldliness of the ecclesiastic rather than a theoretically attained materialistic metaphysics. In proclaiming himself a citizen of this world and a son of nature, the Renaissance man did not necessarily describe himself as a cluster of atoms. His naturalism and his conception of matter partook not a little of the occult.

Girolamo Cardano, one of the greatest successes and one of the greatest failures of the sixteenth century, rightly boasts of his originality and scientific spirit, yet lapses, as Hegel says, into all kinds of astrological and chiromantic superstition.^o The four elements of nature he reduces to three, regarding fire (warmth) as the cosmic motive power rather than as an element. Where fire (warmth) is there is life and light and soul. In his psychology Cardano begins as an Averroist, then turns

to expound the plurality of intellects, and then tries to reconcile the unity of the intellect with the multiplicity of its manifestations. How can the intellect be mortal? His body does grow weaker with age; not so his mind, which is ever clearer and more vigorous. Spirit is inexhaustible: the more it attains the more it endeavors. The soul is born and dies with the body; the intellect is immortal.^o

Bernardino Telesio's work, *De rerum natura juxta propria principia*, shares more than a similarity of title with the poem of Lucretius. Before him rival Aristotelian commentators had engaged in controversy; Telesio leads the revolt against Aristotle himself and undertakes to construct his own cosmology. Nature should not be studied as an occult hieroglyphic of God, or as an instrumentality to serve human needs; no extrinsic principle is required to explain its processes; it is the sole reality; it operates itself.^o When objectively studied, the world is disclosed as brute matter, moved and ordered by expansion and contraction, heat and cold.

According to Telesio, the soul depends on the body, and is itself tenuous agile stuff located in the brain. Pleasure, pain, perception, memory, imagination, understanding: these are all varieties of motion, elaborate expansions and contractions. The intellect is a higher development of the original capacities of matter. Man differs from the other animals as men differ from each other. The quality of one's thinking may be due to the sort of air one breathes, Telesio maintains, anticipating Holbach, Vogt, and Moleschott. What can be more materialistic? But note: heat and cold, we are told, are capable of feeling, "in order, each for itself to be able to offer resistance to the other opposing force, to mark its approach, and to feel satisfaction in its own existence and working."^o The materialist and the precursor of French sensualism, as Carriere calls him, discloses himself here as an animist.

After his explanation of soul-activity, animal and hu-

man, in material terms, Telesio seems forced to fall back on the old scholastic notion of a *forma superaddita* and to distinguish between the generated and the created, immortal soul. Is this a mixture of naturalism and mysticism, or is it a piece of irony, or a contribution to personal security? Telesio did die in his native Cozenza, full of years and glory, but all the same, five years after his death, his works were placed on the *Index*.^o

An interesting contrast in this connection is that presented by Bruno and Descartes. Bruno has been claimed for materialism, and not altogether without reason. Matter is for Bruno no mere passivity, it is always active. Nature is seen to do all things herself and entirely of her own accord, without divine interference. "From sand and water frogs are produced. . . . That which was seed, becomes herb; the herb, corn in the ear; the corn, bread; the bread, bile; bile, blood; blood, again seed." This is matter, the heart and soul of nature.^o Even in this exaltation of matter, however, the real spirit of Bruno's philosophy is revealed. He calls the world-reality 'matter,' but his conception of it is not materialistic. He might as well have called it spirit: it is a divine stuff, living, all-permeating, all-manifest God. The world-process is no mechanism, no mere atomic vortex. The soul of man is attuned to infinity; it hungers and thirsts after the intelligible world, which is its native land, its source and destiny.

On the other hand the first fact and the truth of truths in the Cartesian universe is Thought. One scarcely expects materialistic leanings from this philosophy which crowns reason, exalts deduction and mathematical methods, distrusts sensation, and proceeds from the infinite to the finite, from God to man. Yet Descartes conceives of the world-process in mechanical terms. Bruno may call the ultimate reality matter: his attitude towards it is one of religious rapture and poetic worship; while the view of nature deduced from the *Cogito* is mechanics, physics,

physiology. Even in his ethics Descartes would proceed as a physicist. We should not be amazed, therefore, if the Cartesianism on which Malebranche nourished could also father a LaMettrie. Not without reason did Leibniz complain that the Cartesian description of the animals had been applied by some philosophers to man. From the *Méditations* to *L'Homme Machine* only one step is needed.

The early chapters of modern thought recapitulate Greek philosophy. Every school of ancient speculation had its more or less consistent protagonists during the Renaissance. Materialism likewise, Democritean and Epicurean, had practical as well as theoretical exponents. Compared with the medieval attitude towards the godless hedonist, Laurentius Valla's treatment of pleasure in the *De voluptate et vero bono* is significant. In the view of Bacon, "the natural philosophy of Democritus" which "assigned the causes of particular things to the necessity of matter, without the intermixture of final causes, seems . . . to have been, as regards physical causes, much more solid and to have penetrated further into nature than that of Aristotle and Plato."^o A systematic reinterpretation and revision of Epicureanism we find in the writings of Pierre Gassendi.

GASSENDI receives scant notice in the histories of philosophy. His controversy with Descartes, especially over the ontological argument, entitles him to incidental mention; but aside from this he is listed as a somewhat belated Renaissance reviver of ancient doctrine. Even in special histories of atomism or of materialism he is not sure of extended treatment. Lasswitz gives him considerable attention, but Mabileau scarcely notices him. Masson, in his study of Lucretius, has reminded us of Gassendi's influence on Boyle and on Newton. Lange has deliberately sought to rehabilitate Gassendi: the Provençal philosopher is, according to Lange, the true regenerator of materialism. This estimate is challenged

by Brett, who brings to us a fresh interpretation based on a careful study of Gassendi's own six folios. Félix Thomas finds in Gassendi perhaps a materialistic view of the world-contents, but no mere materialistic view of the world-process and the world-order. The universe is composed of atoms, but it is divinely directed to order and harmony. Granting that Gassendi is scarcely an unqualified materialist, certain it seems that in his thought materialism looms large, and this materialistic phase it is of interest to examine, especially as it concerns the problems of soul and body and the final destiny of man.

A man of precocious and prodigious erudition, Gassendi rehearsed the entire course of philosophical speculation, and settled on Epicureanism as the least unsatisfactory account of nature. His disagreements with Epicurus should not be misinterpreted. If Gassendi did indeed show practical caution in burning five books of his *Exercitationes paradoxicæ adversus Aristoteles*, he had already evinced theoretical audacity in writing them. When, conversely, we find him sharply diverging from the Epicurean doctrine, we need not regard him as a time-server. The provost of Digne was an empiricist, and naturally found himself in conflict with Cartesian rationalism. But when he saw himself confronted with facts of experience which his Epicurean theory could not explain, then, instead of leaning on what he regarded as philosophical dogmatism, he sought the support of his theological faith.

Thus, with regard to the soul, the view of it as wholly immaterial is out of accord with the facts; for how can a purely unextended entity be capable of any connection and union with the body? On the other hand the activity of the soul reveals it as neither blood nor breath nor any other variety of perceptible matter, nor as a mere harmony or relation of material elements. The soul is attenuated substance, the principle and director of activity; the elements composing the soul may well contain the principle of sensibility without themselves being sen-

tient. God has so arranged things that through the composition of elements in the animal body that which is capable of sensibility becomes actually sentient.

Regarding the human soul, Gassendi says that in one respect it is like the animal soul—thus explaining its vegetative and animal activities; but in another respect wholly different—thus recognizing the intellectual capacities as distinguishing man from the brutes. The objection that man is conscious of being one soul, not two, Gassendi meets by answering that man's twofold soul is unitary in operation, just as the animal's soul and body are in fact one living being. So his distinction of *anima* and *animus* differs from the Lucretian: like the Epicurean poet, Gassendi maintains a distinction of functions, but, unlike the Lucretian *animus*, Gassendi's is incorporeal and immortal.

If emphatic statement counts for anything, there can be no doubt about Gassendi's belief in immortality. In his discussion *De animorum immortalitate*^o he surveys in his erudite way the opinions of his predecessors for and against a hereafter. Particular attention is given to Epicurean views, and the arguments of Lucretius are examined critically one by one. His own physical argument for immortality is simple and nothing new: the rational soul is immaterial, therefore it is immortal. To be sure, omnipotent Deity, which created it, can annihilate it; but there is nothing in its own being which permits its dissolution. The moral arguments are three: from the general belief in immortality, from man's innate demand for it, and from the necessity of an after-life, to consummate the just reward of virtue and punishment of vice.

Gassendi's insistence on immortality is of more moment than the validity of the particular arguments which he advances to demonstrate it. The central point in his revision of Epicureanism is his recognition of finality in the cosmos: the world operates on an intelligent plan.

Recognizing finality and intelligence as at the basis of things in the universe, he cannot dismiss human intelligence as episodic or treat the human soul as ephemeral. But the real problem, then, is whether a revision of materialism so far-reaching in its implications, does not reach even further and transform the very essence of the doctrine. Gassendi's estimate of the universe and of man in it is incompatible with his Epicurean description of the world. Here, as in the case of the Stoics, we observe the incapacity of materialism to meet the demands which the need for a moral interpretation of the world-process imposes on philosophy.

VI

In distinction from the Cartesian notion of an immaterial soul-substance, and differing likewise from Bacon's and Gassendi's doctrines of animal and rational souls, is Hobbes' thoroughgoing materialism. Philosophy he defines as the knowledge of natural causes; its subject-matter is body, matter-in-motion, occupied space. All substance is corporeal; an incorporeal substance is a round quadrangle. If the term soul has any objective content, it also refers to something corporeal; man's soul is the sum of his natural faculties and powers.

For Hobbes as for Lucretius, then, the soul's destiny should be one with the body's. So it is, Hobbes would say; but, whereas Lucretius teaches the dissipation of the soul along with the dissolution of the body, Hobbes thumbs the Holy Scriptures and excogitates therefrom a different doctrine supposedly in harmony with his own materialistic philosophy. At the Day of Judgment God will raise the faithful to life, with glorious and spiritual bodies, while the unrepentant are to suffer a second and everlasting death. This doctrine parades through the pages of Hobbes with a long train of Biblical quotations. Of its Scriptural warrant no judgment is attempted here; but Hobbes' adop-

tion of it leads one to question his consistency, or his intelligence, or his candor. How are bodies to be made spiritual and immortal? Hobbes seeks refuge in God's omnipotence. "God, that could give life to a piece of clay, hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, and renew his inanimate, and rotten carcase, into a glorious, spiritual, and immortal body."° The second is presumably no greater marvel than the first. But why expect, on Hobbes' materialistic premises, a different destiny for the righteous and for the wicked? One is moved to conclude that Hobbes is both intelligent and consistent, only his candor being ironic. There may be grim humor in the notice which he serves to his reader in his treatise *On Human Nature* that he passes from the discussion of things natural to things supernatural. There being no doubt regarding the doctrine of human destiny that follows logically from his materialistic account of the soul, he carves out of Scripture a teaching pious enough to meet the demands of caution, and yet certain to arouse the ire of theologians like Bishop Bramhall: man's soul is not naturally immortal, but omnipotent Deity can and will raise it to immortality on the Day of Judgment. The paradoxical doctrine of a corporeal God probably exhibits the same double action of surrender and aggression.

LOCKE regards the world-ground as necessarily spiritual. Thought, spirit, must be at the heart of things, for "matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought."° But, while God must be an immaterial cogitative being, Locke is not so certain that finite cogitative beings must also be immaterial. God's endowment of matter with the faculty of thought is no harder to conceive than his creation of a thinking substance.

Inability to prove the soul immaterial, however, does not rule out immortality. For immortality, as Locke conceives it, is not the bare continued existence and duration

of some entity, material or immaterial, but the continuance of intelligent activity. Future life cannot be demonstrated; it is a matter of faith and depends on God's will. In a fragment entitled *Resurrectio et quae sequuntur*, Locke sketches a prospect of man's destiny similar in essentials to that of Hobbes. The faithful and the saints shall at the last day be raised to life eternal; the wicked shall be extinguished at the last.^o Whatever may be said of Hobbes, no doubt is possible of Locke's piety. As Leslie Stephen observes, his candor "breathes in every line of his work. He has an unmistakable right to his place in that roll-call of eminent believers which is to this day thundered from pulpits against the pride of the infidel."^o And yet after him and in his name freethinker, infidel, and materialist challenged the eternal verities of religion and idealism.

John Toland found it intellectually reassuring and socially advantageous to lean on Locke, but Locke was annoyed by his follower and disowned him unequivocally. Toland's challenge of the supernatural led him occasionally to a materialistic conception of the world-process. Especially is this to be observed in his "Confutation of Spinoza" and "Motion Essential to Matter" published 1704 in the volume entitled *Letters to Serena*. Toland regards all matter as necessarily active as well as extended. Stop thinking of matter as essentially brute and inactive, and you need no longer resort to world-souls and other principles of animation in order to explain the ceaseless activity of the material world. To be sure, Toland represents the imputation of atheism. God could endow matter with activity as well as with extension.

In the Second Letter to Serena, on "The History of the Soul's Immortality among the Heathen," Toland undertakes to prove that the opinion about immortality had its beginning in Egypt, and, while paying his respects to Christianity as affording the best proof of a hereafter, proceeds to quote a volume of ancient argument against

immortality. He is piously outraged by Pliny the Elder, but cites three pages of him, and his defense of orthodoxy smells of irony: "In this consists no small Advantage of Believers, that tho they may be equally ignorant with others about the nature of a thing, yet they may have the greatest Conviction of its Existence, and make that use of this Discovery which is beneficial or convenient."^o

Is the soul necessarily immaterial, or is it possibly material, and does its immortality follow from its immateriality? Over these questions violent controversies are waged. Notorious and unending is the dispute between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins occasioned by Henry Dodwell's doctrine that man's soul is by nature mortal and that it is made immortal by God's loving grace through "the accession of an Adscititious Spirit," to wit, through a baptism by an orthodox divine. Clarke, leaning on the Cartesians but also utilizing Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, urges the immateriality and therefore the natural immortality of the soul. By natural immortality Clarke means that the soul is able to continue forever without the need of a Divine intervention: not that it can withstand a Divine act of annihilation. A distinction is thus made between man's natural immortality and the necessary eternity of God. Collins' criticisms of Clarke, repeatedly advanced in a series of pamphlets, to which Clarke answers in several *Defenses*, proceed from the Lockean view that the endowment of matter with thought is admissible. Collins argues further that the immortality of the soul does not follow from its immateriality. The controversy waxes warm as it proceeds, and taxes Clarke's charity; that unthinking particles should combine to form a thinking substance is plainly contradictory, he declares to Collins, "though I doubt not but you could argue upon it as acutely as any One."^o

We find this typical attack on materialism refashioned and reworded in a number of treatises, all bound for the same conclusion. Andrew Baxter, in his lengthy *Enquiry*

into the Nature of the Human Soul, sets out from the assumption that the one fundamental characteristic of matter is its state of essential inactivity (thus in direct opposition to Toland). All motion in the material world is accordingly due to the activity of an immaterial being. The percipient power of man thus evinces the activity of an immaterial soul, and this soul, being a simple substance, "must be indissoluble in its nature, by anything that hath not the power to destroy or annihilate it."° Between Locke's *Essay* and Kant's *Critique* is Andrew Baxter's *Enquiry*: "exhibiting," as Leslie Stephen says, "the effect of exploded metaphysic on a feeble, though ingenious intellect."° But, if exploded, this metaphysic is by no means extinct, and continues to find champions. So, in Thomas Brown's *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, it is argued with much pedantry and rhetoric that "the great inquiry . . . is, whether our thoughts and feelings be in the strictest sense of the term, *particles of matter*." They are not; and if particles of matter are not cogitative, systems of material particles cannot be cogitative either, for a system, we are informed, does not have a character which its constituents do not have.° And so on *da capo*.

The champions of the immaterial soul are not always entirely free from the insidious poison of the doctrine which they attack. A curious example of this is to be found in William Wollaston's *Religion of Nature Delineated*. The soul, according to Wollaston, is a thinking substance intimately bound to some fine material vehicle residing in the brain. Just how a cogitative and spiritual substance can thus be united to such a material vehicle, Wollaston admits his inability to determine; but he judges this particular union no more difficult to understand than the general relation of thought and body, and easier to grasp than the notion of a thinking faculty superadded to unthinking matter. Which is a view just the reverse of Locke's.

Like Clarke and Baxter, Wollaston regards this purely immaterial soul as "indiscerpible," as incapable of being dissolved and demolished. It can only perish by annihilation; and who is prepared to show that such a particular annihilation takes place at the death of every man? The very objection that the soul always requires the body as a medium of its thinking activity, may be turned to advantage and made an argument for immortality. That is, the soul may be conceived as acting under the limitation of the body. Death may then be simply release from the limitation. The soul which now sees only with two eyes (as it were through two windows) may, after its separation from the body, become all eye, see all around.^o This doctrine of a purely immaterial soul-substance localized in the brain and connected with the body through a subtle vehicle, and with the vehicle leaving the body at death to roam in the fields of heaven, is significant in view of the deep impression which its author made upon his time. *The Religion of Nature* reached a seventh edition within a generation.

DAVID HARTLEY'S piety was as indubitable as that of Newton and of Locke, from whom he garnered his fundamental ideas. The author of the theory of vibrations was also engaged habitually in the composition of prayers. As an analyst of human nature he is prepared for all eventualities. He admits that his theory may possibly involve materialism. But it does not involve it necessarily. Matter may think; human experience may be altogether a mechanical process; but he is not forced to this conclusion by his theory, although, if this conclusion should turn out to be true, his theory may well be squared with it.

The two doctrines of vibrations and association are combined by Hartley to explain human knowledge and activity. The immediate condition of all sensation and motion is in brain, spine, and nerve vibrations. Sensory vibrations

often repeated cause a disposition to what he calls vibratiuncles; sensations thus beget ideas; by means of association simple ideas run into complex: in this way is developed the whole complicated process of knowledge. Is not man, then, a mere machine? Hartley renounces metaphysics: enough for him, to demonstrate a certain connection between the sensations of the soul and the vibrations of the body. Content not to press to a final settlement the issue over the soul's immateriality, Hartley insists that this issue nowise involves that of immortality. For about the immortality of the soul he does have firm convictions, which he develops at some length in the latter part of his work. He recites a long line of familiar arguments providing a strong presumption in favor of a future life, but finds real and absolute assurance only in Christian Revelation. Scripture justifies him in expecting bliss for the righteous, and for the wicked sufferings both bodily and mental. The misery and the punishment of the wicked, however, cannot be eternal: in the end God's love will reclaim and restore all mankind.^o

In republishing *Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind* in 1775, Joseph Priestley did not retain the theory of vibratiuncles. Priestley's materialism, fully developed in the *Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit*, is explicit and pronounced, but theistic. His universe needs God and matter for its operation. Building on Toland's view that motion is essential to matter, and opposing Baxter's notion of matter as an inactive mass, Priestley reasons that the very connection of soul and body implies a certain community of nature between the two. A really immaterial soul could not affect the body in any way as it would really be nowhere at all. Any notion of intermediate substances or vehicles, is rejected by Priestley as unwarranted and of no avail, since "by whatever considerations it appears that a vehicle is necessary to the soul, the body must at least be equally necessary to the vehicle."^o Thinking demands brain and nerves, but does

not demand an immaterial soul-substance. Now death is a dispersion and decomposition of parts: is it then the end of soul and body? Not necessarily, Priestley assures us: for "whatever is *decomposed* may be *recomposed* by the being who first composed it," and Scripture leaves no doubt that such recomposition will take place on the Last Day.

The radicalism of Priestley is the radicalism of a theologian; the errors he opposes are the errors of those who misinterpret Scripture as well as the facts of life. That he is the more devout Christian as a result of his materialism need not prevent another man from using his bricks to erect an atheistic structure. So Duns Scotus, who had argued against Aquinas that the truths of theology transcended rational proof, being too high for reason, unwittingly caused these truths to lose prestige in the minds of some of his successors, and became thus a factor in the disintegration of scholasticism.

VII

In Gassendi's folios the Epicurean cosmology strangely assumes a Catholic garb; Locke's piety is not open to doubt; Hartley was to the end of his days "a well-affected member of the Church of England,"^o and even Toland was a professed believer; in Priestley's interest materialistic science is ancillary to liberal theology, and his *Disquisitions* contemplate the conversion of infidels to rational Christianity. Hobbes, we are told, exalted faith that he might attack theology, and his name was anathema to the devout and orthodox; yet even of Hobbes we can say, as of the other seventeenth-century materialists, that they were, if not theological conformists, at any rate ostensibly semi-believers. The seventeenth century lacks the paean of irreligious fervor which is familiar to the readers of Lucretius, while English materialism has never quite broken with piety.

For unqualified materialism, sensationalism, hedonism, atheism, all together, for the characteristic Lucretian note, we have to turn to eighteenth-century France. David Hume had never met an atheist until he came to Paris, to dine with seventeen of them at Baron D'Holbach's table. In France a spirit of scepticism and negation, less and less reluctantly irreligious, rebels against the Cartesianism which had been made acceptable to orthodoxy. It counters the rationalism of Descartes with the sensationalism of the British empiricists, and on the basis of the empiricist doctrine also it advocates a thoroughgoing materialistic anthropology, against the Cartesian dualism and the doctrine of the immaterial soul-substance. For the Cartesian ethics and the piety of Malebranche it substitutes egoistic hedonism and unblushing worldliness. With less and less apology it proceeds to dispense with God, freedom, and immortality. From scepticism it passes to affirmation: it does not merely doubt immaterialism or God's existence or immortality, but roundly declares: Matter is all in all, God is non-existent, and death is the end of us all.

Locke's empiricism is as it were a narrow ledge along which a tentative metaphysics may balance itself, hesitating between the headlong idealism of Berkeley and the sceptical incline of Hume. If all the contents of our experience are reducible to sensation, we may well doubt the existence of trans-perceptual realities, or we may rest content with chronicling the course of experience without any speculations about the ultimate. To Locke substance is a "somewhat I know not what"; to Condillac it seems to be supralapsarian. Prior to the Fall of Man, the soul was a simple and indivisible substance, and no doubt perceived without the use of a bodily medium, and had ideas prior to sensation. But outside of Eden God deprived the soul of its empire and made it dependent on the body.^o A safe doctrine for an empiricist abbot. But if Condillac's *Traité des sensations* retained the metaphysical

indecision and the pious proprieties of Locke's *Essay*, British empiricism was taking an increasingly materialistic turn. To be sure, Locke's conjecture that God could endow matter with the capacity to think might have led to the conclusion that thought is, after all at the heart of things: that even matter is possessed of thought. Actually it had the effect of a materialistic pronouncement: thought may be, indeed it is, a property of matter. In a letter to Clarke dated November, 1715, Leibniz had listed Locke with the materialists,^o and in the middle of the century Hyacinthe Sigismund, later Cardinal Gerdil, wrote a book on *L'Immaterialité de l'âme démontrée contre M. Locke*, undertaking to demonstrate it by the same principles by which Locke demonstrates the existence and the immateriality of God.

To those dissatisfied with Cartesianism, Locke's admission opened vast and inviting vistas of speculation. If matter can think, the hypothesis of a cogitative substance is superfluous. Of the Cartesian equipment—God, matter, soul—the last could be safely discarded, with a fair prospect of being followed by the first, leaving matter in complete possession. While inclining towards materialism, Voltaire is really a sceptic. The soul and its thinking, he would say, are material, but the ultimate nature of matter is a blank. This agnostic attitude is also D'Alembert's. Meanwhile Diderot's philosophic imagination led him gradually to a naturalistic hylozoism. An examination of Voltaire and Diderot as materialists would accord them a treatment too incidental to take account of the tremendous influence which they, together with Bayle, exercised in the general disintegration of religious belief, and, consequently, in disturbing the modern man's assurance of immortality. With John Morley we may think of Voltairism in France somewhat as we think of Catholicism or the Renaissance or Calvinism; but here we must pass by these cardinals of unbelief with barely a nod.

LA METTRIE'S unsavory reputation is due partly to the fact that he laid hands on Descartes himself and proclaimed him a materialist in disguise. Of the major materialists of eighteenth-century France, LaMettrie was the first and the most unbridled, and he fared ill with his contemporaries, pious and impious. Even those who agreed with his account of matter professed to be outraged by his manner, unwilling to accept from his hands what they were quite willing to have as their own.

Descartes' two substances LaMettrie reduces to one. Soul and body are one, that is, body. Matter is no mere passivity, but the source and ground of all being; it owes its activity to no Divine agency, being of itself ever mobile, and it is capable of sensation, feeling, and thought. Rely on the senses, LaMettrie exclaims, they are my philosophers. Man's thought is all derived from sensations; and if animals can see and feel without an immaterial soul, so can man. Sensation, and so thought, is always inextricably bound up with the brain and the nervous system: we require nothing besides matter to explain human experience.

We need experiment, observation, medical, clinical insight, to rid us of immaterialistic delusions. The soul is a most complicated machine, and our intellectual capacities as well as our moral character depend throughout on bodily conditions. "What were needed to change the intrepidity of a Caius Julius, a Seneca, a Petronius into pusillanimity and poltroonery? An obstruction in the spleen, in the liver, a clog in the vena porta. . . . A nothing, a small fibre, something that the subtlest anatomy could not discover, would have made two fools of Erasmus and Fontenelle." The character of man and of animals alike depends on temperament and environment, and depends also on diet; here LaMettrie anticipates Moleschott and Feuerbach: "Raw meat makes animals fierce, and men also; this is so true that the English people who eat their meat

not so thoroughly done as in France, but red and bloody, seem to partake of this ferocity."^o

Assured of the truth of his materialism, LaMettrie is also assured that it will always be caviare to the general. Clinging to life and unable to let go, man insists on believing that his own soul of mud is to be immortal. This obstinate conceit of the ignorant, LaMettrie tolerates with contempt; but when a Descartes speaks of immortality as a truth the knowledge of which is essential to virtue and happiness, LaMettrie observes that Descartes is simply prudent with a delicate topic. The mechanistic standpoint from which Descartes regards all creation, excepting man, logically comprehends man also. Descartes cannot have been unaware of this conclusion, and, assured that it could not escape the more penetrating of his readers, he proceeded to lull the Arguses of the Sorbonne with his doctrine of the immaterial, immortal soul-substance.

LaMettrie's review of the arguments for immortality (in Seneca, Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Pascal) is short and negligent. The moral argument is invalid: the sage requires no ulterior reward for virtue. The emotional argument, from the longing for immortality, invites ridicule. Nor is the belief in a future life as universal as some have imagined it to be; Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Democritus, Epicurus, Caesar, Virgil, Horace, Lucretius, Ovid, Pliny, Galen, and a score besides have trampled under foot the fears of a hereafter. Enough and more than enough about immortality, LaMettrie snaps irritably: "one could believe the soul mortal though spiritual, or immortal though material. . . . What difference is there between a man and a plant reduced to dust? . . . The man and the rose appear in the morning, and by evening are no more." Death is an end; after it, the abyss, eternal nothingness. "All is said, all is done . . . no more cares, no more fuss, no more playing a part; *la farce est jouée*," as said Rabelais. To LaMettrie the moral seems obvious. Eat, drink, and be merry; but, when you come to die, die un-

flinchingly. "These are my plans for life and death: throughout life and until the last breath, be a sensual Epicurean; but a firm Stoic, at the approach of death."^o

HELVÉTIUS' book, *De l'esprit*, attracted more general attention than any other work of French materialism. Its popularity was due in a measure to its style, which made philosophy attractive even to those who found it ordinarily dry as dust. The chief paradox was that a man like Helvétius should have written such a book. Easily generous, hospitable, munificent, a loyal friend, a devoted husband and father, the French paragon of benevolence, he paraded in his book as the cool champion of selfishness. Frederick in Berlin professed to wish that Helvétius had followed the dictates of his heart rather than those of his head, and so did the Parisians, in palace and cloister and university, who proceeded to treat him as a French Galileo. The persecution of Helvétius redounded to his fame; his book appeared in fifty editions; Berlin, London, and Stockholm lauded what Paris had condemned; even Rome succumbed. The book was read far and wide, and its views are reflected in later systems, in Bentham's, in Schopenhauer's.

Helvétius, who was roused to philosophical thinking by Locke's *Essay*, would go beyond Locke and put morals on an empirical basis.^o *Esprit* is nothing innate or occult; it is plainly and entirely the result of environment, of education; our intelligence, our character are the result of our experiences, and all experience is originally sensation. Our own interest determines our moral judgments; we seek and value what pleases us and serves our ends. Legislation should seek to reconcile the public interest with the private, and evil and vice would then cease.

BARON D'HOLBACH'S house was the headquarters of the Paris philosophers, an Institute before there was one, as Garat expressed it. Here assembled Diderot and La-

grange and Rousseau, Grimm and Buffon, D'Alembert, Turgot, Condillac, Hume, disagreeing with each other, but all agreed on philosophic independence. To this brilliant group Holbach was host, ready to listen and observe, willing to let others lead in the discussion in which diamond cut diamond after dinner. The wisdom and wit which Diderot's genius lavished, Holbach gathered to ponder; Naigeon and Lagrange gave him assistance; but few outside his most intimate circle suspected that the Maecenas of philosophers was himself a philosopher, and perhaps the most rigorous of them all in proceeding relentlessly from premises to conclusions. When he published his *Système de la nature* in 1770, he wrote on the title page the name of Mirabaud, a secretary of the French Academy dead ten years. Everyone was convinced Mirabaud had not written the book, but no one thought of charging Holbach with it.

Helvétius craved an author's fame, and paid for it by having to be evasive and by being persecuted notwithstanding. Holbach cared nothing about being known as the author of his book, and, secure in his disguise, could speak his mind freely, without reserve and without fear of annoyance. Here at last is Lucretian candor, Lucretian ardor and seriousness, Lucretian open hostility to religion: unqualified and thoroughgoing materialism, explicit atheism, blunt and circumstantial repudiation of the belief in immortality. "There is a book published in Holland in two volumes octavo, called 'De la Nature,'" says Hume. "It is prolix, and in many parts whimsical; but contains some of the boldest reasonings to be found in print."^o

Holbach plunges into his topic without apologies. We have to start with our experience of the material world. But matter has been wrongly conceived as coarse, passive and incapable of producing anything out of itself. The fact is, matter is self-moved and contains within itself all the factors necessary to its activity. Of this material world man is part and parcel. Knowledge, judgment, thought,

all go back to sensation, and sensation is essentially the result of movement. "Nature makes men neither good nor bad; it makes them machines more or less active, mobile, energetic."^o

LaMettrie had regarded Descartes as a dissembling materialist; Holbach, on the other hand, treats him as the founder of immaterialism. Prior to Descartes all the champions of spirit had regarded the soul simply as very subtle matter; even Plato. But the Cartesian notion of an immaterial substance active in the body is to be rejected on Cartesian grounds, since it is self-contradictory. How can an unextended being be mobile and set matter in motion? Instead of asserting that thinking substance is necessarily immaterial, and then concluding the immateriality of our souls from the fact that we think, is it not more reasonable, seeing that we are material beings and that we do think, to recognize that matter is under certain conditions capable of thinking? Holbach's argument thus unequivocally points to sensationalism, materialism, determinism, and atheism. The God of the deist is superfluous; that of the theist is full of contradictions. All that we really have is matter in motion.

What of man's destiny? "Matter is eternal and necessary, but its combinations and its forms are passing and contingent."^o Man is essentially a creature of this earth; his physical constitution would not permit his survival elsewhere. Notwithstanding the most convincing proofs that the soul is material and mortal, still nothing is more popular than the dogma of immortality. This desire for perpetuation has been used as an argument for immortality. But we desire also the continuance of bodily life, yet many die prematurely: how do we know that our desire for a life after death may not also be frustrated? When we speak of our soul's existence after death, what meaning can our words have? "To say that the soul will feel, think, enjoy, suffer after the death of the body, is

the same as to suppose that a clock broken into a thousand pieces can continue to sound and mark the hours."^o

Like LaMettrie, Holbach canvasses antiquity and finds among those who did not look forward to a future life the sanest and the most virtuous in Greece and Rome. Like Lucretius he undertakes to undermine and dissipate the fear of death. Philosophy is truly defined as a meditation on death. We should, not gloomily but in calm reason, familiarize ourselves with the inevitable, and face our prospect serenely. Death is the sleep of life, final and endless: no horrid dreams, no awakening. The realization that there is no after-life can inspire peace and vigor of soul and true virtue; while the belief in immortality makes for cowardly and servile cringing before the future. Priests have used this superstition to fasten their hold upon the masses; even philosophers have thought it necessary to frighten men into the path of virtue. Nor has the conqueror, priest or king, always shared his slaves' credulity. "When a proud monarch claims to be accountable for his acts to God alone, it is because he fears his people more than his God."^o

Not in a shadowy otherworld is the full measure of our being to be sought, but only here on earth. Holbach has heard the choir invisible, and advocates an immortality of fame and influence on posterity. Will men utter our names with love and veneration, or with curses, or not at all? Here is a thought that really makes for morality. So Holbach's argument leads him to rhetoric and exhortation: "Tremble, then, cruel kings who plunge your subjects into misery! . . . Be virtuous, oh man! Do good and you will be cherished; acquire talents, and you will be regarded, and posterity will admire you, if these talents are of use to it, and will keep alive the name by which your extinct being was once known."^o

MATERIALISM is the likely terminal of a medic who sets out on a metaphysical venture, and, since the days of

Lucretius, materialists have learned perhaps as much of their wisdom from their doctors as from any other source. The fact that bodily infirmities involve mental distress has been thought to warrant the conclusion that the problems of human life and personality demand preëminently clinical insight. LaMettrie is not the only Frenchman who would base metaphysics on medicine. Less shocking and more systematic in his thinking, less sensational than LaMettrie, but none the less a champion of sensation, is Pierre Jean George Cabanis. LaMettrie died from overeating; Cabanis, from overwork; but the ideas of the two differ less than their personal characters. Like LaMettrie, Cabanis undertakes to write the natural history of the soul. In his *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme* he maintains that the moral is simply the physical from a certain point of view. To understand man, we have to understand his body.

That sensation is the source of all knowledge, Cabanis deems it superfluous to demonstrate after Locke, Bonnet, Condillac, and Helvétius. The moral ideas and the character of a man depend on his stock of sensations and on his bodily state. The condition of a man's lower intestines may affect his entire mental life. Sound thinking is possible only in a sound brain. The stomach and the intestines digest; the liver secretes bile; even so the brain, the distinctive bodily organ of thought, operates in the production of ideas. This thought is to startle the readers of Vogt and Moleschott half a century later.

The sense-impressions, all-important to thought, are by the very nature of the case different in different individuals. Cabanis considers at length the various spheres of influence which determine the sense-experience of men and the development of their character: age, sex, temperament, health or sickness, regimen and manner of life, climate. After ten lectures on the influence of the physical on the moral, Cabanis devotes one on the influence of the moral on the physical. But this seems to come to the

reflection that the cerebral organ of thought-secretion exercises a great influence on the other organs. Cabanis is so arrested by the incontestable circumstance that man's life, thinking, and character are affected by the material conditions of his being, that he comes to regard this circumstance as central and all-sufficient basis for a philosophical account of human nature.° The history of materialism exhibits a continual rehearsal of this manner of logic. It is the logic of Corin the shepherd, whom Touchstone describes as a natural philosopher.

The materialistic conclusion is not enunciated by Cabanis with the explicitness and the ardor of LaMettrie and Holbach. Cabanis speaks ever as a physiologist, disdains metaphysical finalities, and seeks refuge in probabilism. Provisional in tone is his posthumously published Letter to Fauriel *Sur les causes premières*. On the definite question of a future life Cabanis is insistently undogmatic. The physical arguments against immortality appear to tip the balance; but the notion of perfect justice in the universe demands a hereafter, and this moral consideration, in Cabanis' judgment, swings this balance of probability in a discussion where no certitude is available. We really do not know whether death is a good or an evil; but, having thus learned wisdom from Socrates, we should learn more from him. Like him we should bring philosophy from heaven down to earth, should recognize the true basis of morality in the everyday life of man, and like Socrates should remain sure of one thing, that, whether death be evil or good, the desertion of the path of virtue is certainly evil. Thus the thought of Cabanis, professedly but not really content with clinical empiricism, urges itself along the Stoic path of noble resignation.°

VIII

Materialism successively invades and for a time dominates the thought of the four main Western nations. Six-

teenth-century materialism has its home in Italy. Seventeenth-century materialism is (in spite of Gassendi) dominantly Hobbist, British. In the eighteenth century, although official France proscribes materialistic thought and forces it to seek a Prussian asylum and a Dutch or English imprimatur, the materialism thus proscribed is natively French or (as in the case of Holbach) of French cultivation. Nineteenth-century materialism is mainly German.

Throughout its modern development materialism is, naturally enough, anti-theological. It is also in revolt against the dominant philosophy of its time. In Renaissance Italy it combats Aristotelianism and seeks its inspiration in Ionian or Atomistic speculation. Hobbism, likewise Anti-Aristotelian, directs its attack also against the newer orthodoxy of the Cartesians. It is this Cartesian orthodoxy, as adapted to the purposes of Catholic theology, which arouses the rebellious hostility of pre-revolutionary materialism in France. The dogmatisms and the intellectual orthodoxies and heresies of the Enlightenment are swallowed up and transmuted in the thought of Kant, and for a while European philosophy is guided by the spirit of critical reconstruction. In the short time of forty years, 1781-1820, German thought climbs several peaks of speculation, until in Hegel's *Logic* it demonstrates how far the single strength of thought can go. But Hegel's philosophy of spirit becomes itself a type of orthodoxy. Just as thirteenth-century scholasticism canonized Aristotle, and as French clericalism endeavored to adapt the Cartesian doctrine to the demands of faith, so nineteenth-century Protestantism sought in the Hegelian system the last bulwark of theology. The Hegelians of the Right, in their own way, were undertaking to do the work of Aquinas. Against this alliance with orthodoxy uprising the Young Hegelians of the Left; out of the folds of absolute idealism come some of the most significant upbuilders of German materialistic philosophy.

LUDWIG FEUERBACH was the leading factor in the reaction against Hegel. Originally dedicated to theology, he turned in 1825 to philosophy, and for a dozen years was nourished on Hegelianism. But even from the very start doubts assailed him. "How is thought related to being, logic to nature?" In his endeavor to answer these questions Feuerbach departs further and further from idealism and rationalism towards naturalism, empiricism, materialism, until, as his biographer Jodl says, he turns Hegel's pyramid upside down and makes its top his base. "It is not thought which posits being and nature, but thought grows out of nature, the absolutely existent."^o

In time of war industrial plants are transformed into ammunition factories; so the logical apparatus of Feuerbach's Hegelianism is utilized increasingly in the service of materialism. His humanism acquires a materialistic cast, and his later thinking registers a striking reversal of earlier judgment. A notorious illustration is supplied by his epigram about man. In the *Gedanken eines Denkers über Tod und Unsterblichkeit* (1830) we read: "Man also eats and drinks; is eating and drinking, however, a characteristic, essential vocation of man? Is it a fair definition of man to define him thus: Man is a being that eats and drinks?" With the very definition which he here condemns Feuerbach later scandalized Europe. So we find in *Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage vom Standpunkt der Anthropologie* (1846): "Can you set the head of a thinker or of a poet on a peasant's stomach? . . . Is what man is independent of what he eats?" Four years later, after reading Moleschott's *Lehre der Nahrungsmittel*, Feuerbach wrote his famous pun: "Man is what he eats: *Der Mensch ist was er isst.*"^o The inevitable scandal produced by the epigram did not disconcert Feuerbach; twelve years later he elaborated the pun into a dietetic theory of sacrifice: *Das Geheimniss des Opfers, oder der Mensch ist was er isst* (1862).

The problem of immortality engaged Feuerbach's atten-

tion his whole life long, and his discussion of it, historical, psychological, metaphysical, is highly significant. If mind, soul, psychic activity are, as Feuerbach holds, but the subjective aspects of states that objectively are physiological-physical, then the actual survival of a 'soul' after the dissolution of the body is naturally out of the question. Sensation is essential to my existence, and sensation is necessarily spatial-temporal and requiring a bodily mechanism. Feuerbach is not impressed by the arguments for immortality. The entire question demands reformulation. The problem is not: is the soul immortal, but: what is the source of the desire for immortality? In *Das Wesen des Christenthums* Feuerbach identifies this desire with the impulse towards self-preservation. Reason supplies man with arguments, but affords him no certainty of survival. This certainty and assurance man seeks from religion, and hence he believes in God.

Immortality is a declaration of worth, expressed in the language of the untutored infancy of the race, the religious consciousness. But what adult humanity requires now is to perceive wherein consists the true worth and dignity of human existence. It is not in any hereafter. "If I say of you, you are a living, perceiving, loving, willing, understanding being, then I assert something infinitely more, something infinitely more real and more definite and more profound concerning you than if I say of you, you are an immortal being. . . . How would you call a man who . . . when the sonata is over, would make its duration of fifteen minutes a predicate in his judgment of it, and, while the others, enraptured with admiration for its contents, seek to express in definite words its meaning, would characterize the sonata as a fifteen-minute sonata?"^o One might, of course, request Feuerbach's judgment of a three-hour sonata, or a three-minute symphony.

A deflection from idealism to materialism similar to Feuerbach's finds expression in David Friedrich Strauss' *Der Alte und der Neue Glaube*.^o In a world where every-

thing perishes man claims for himself eternal continuance, to assure just reward and punishment, to afford scope for the realization of his infinite potentialities. This is plain grandiloquence. All about us we see the orchards strewn with unripe windfalls, and the ocean would not hold the fishes were all spawn to hatch and mature. A sensible man should recognize the modest range of his capacities and, instead of demanding eternity for his career, should gratefully cultivate his little garden. Indeed the prospect of eternal continuance should inspire horror rather than longing; but in any case we know this: the so-called mental activities develop and grow together with the body, and especially in conjunction with the brain, strengthen and deteriorate with it, and cannot survive its dissolution.

The middle of the nineteenth century witnessed a rapid growth of materialism. Moleschott's *Lehre der Nahrungsmittel* provoked a controversy with its dictum: No thought without phosphorus: *Ohne Phosphor kein Gedanke*. Moleschott developed his position in *Der Kreislauf des Lebens* which, especially in later revised editions, attained great vogue. The famous formula is here somewhat expanded: "No thought without phosphorus, without fat, without water."^o A nineteenth-century Pre-Socratic, Moleschott is impressed with the cycle of existence. He observes that phosphate of lime is dug out of the earth, that the fields are fertilized with it, and as a result wheat is harvested, to feed man. Earth becomes plant, becomes animal, man—becomes flesh, brain, sensation, thought. Is this materialism? Moleschott declares that he is a materialist only in opposition to spiritualism, and prefers to designate his own position as monistic: "a true indivisible two-in-one." But as soon as he starts his popular exposition, the two-in-one becomes one, matter.

More violently materialistic is Carl Vogt in his polemic with Rudolph Wagner, following the latter's plea for an immortal soul-substance in his address at the Göttingen Congress of German Naturalists and Physicians, in Sep-

tember, 1854. Thought, Vogt declares in *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft*, is inextricably bound up with a cerebro-neural system; there can be no consciousness without ganglionic cells. In the manner of eighteenth-century materialists Vogt says that thought is to the brain as gall to the liver or urine to the kidneys: an analogy which we find also in Moleschott, but which Büchner thinks "might have been expressed with more refinement."^o Psychic activity develops and deteriorates concomitantly with cerebro-neural and general bodily activity. The soul's survival after the body's dissolution is thus utterly inadmissible.^o

In the case of Heinrich Czolbe an advance may be observed from uncritical materialism to somewhat new ground. Relying on Strauss, whom he regards as the father of contemporary materialism, Czolbe would erect into a moral system the contentment with the immediately perceptible world and the ready surrender of the transcendent. The strict exclusion of the supersensible in thought should be clearly recognized as the central principle of that philosophy which has commonly gone by the name of materialism. In calling it sensualism Czolbe would deliver it from its naïveté; instead of rehearsing atom-dogmas he would meet the problems which Kant's Critiques have imposed on materialistic metaphysics, by insisting on the reality of the sense-perceived world. His thought develops; from his opposition to idealism and his advocacy of a mechanistic world-order, he proceeds to a position mediate between these two, recognizing atoms, organic forces, and psychical elements as the fundamental constituents of nature.^o

BÜCHNER'S *Kraft und Stoff* (1855) and Haeckel's *Die Welträtsel* (1899) have proved the two most popular materialistic works during the last half century. A hundred years after Holbach's *Système* had been the declared Bible of materialism, *Force and Matter* became its New Testament. Haeckel's book appeared the year of Büchner's

death and has superseded it in popular favor as the latest word. Scarcely any other works on the philosophical shelves of public libraries are as thumb-soiled and dog-eared as these two. Both share the merit of disseminating a mass of valuable scientific information, all supposed to warrant their dogmatic metaphysics. The artisan's mind that gets its wisdom from them is thus enlightened in details and obscured in fundamentals.

Büchner is a romanticist in the service of naturalism. His brother described him as essentially an emotional man; ardor and rhetoric guide his argument as much as reason; in attacking religious zealotry he is himself a zealot. In the rhapsodic strain he yields the theologian nothing: "The Atom . . . is the God to whom all being, the lowest as well as the highest, owes its being; from eternity to eternity, existing and indestructible. . . ."° Forever railing at the obscurity of philosophers, he appears to have mistaken the superficial clarity of easy-going popular discussion for the inner lucidity of consistent thinking. The reader of *Force and Matter*, who is flattered by Büchner's manner of exposition and comes to believe himself a paragon of understanding, follows various lines of argument, all equally plausible. But do they all point the same way? Are thought and brain, mind and body, coördinate aspects of one reality, or is mind subordinate and indeed reducible to matter? These views are not the same view. Büchner chooses between them, and chooses both turnabout. His metaphysical prospectus adopts the former alternative; his actual exposition, the latter. Thus he declares roundly: "There is no mind without matter, but neither is there any matter without mind." Ten pages later Holbach's view that the world is simply matter in motion is pronounced to be "entirely borne out by modern science." Thirty-five pages further on: "Physical and mental laws must be identical." Is this Spinozism? We read a passage in which mind is compared to respiration and digestion in a way similar to Vogt's.° More striking exhibition of

Büchner's confusion in fundamentals is the following quoted by Höffding:° "Body and mind . . . as conceived by a materialistic monism . . . may perhaps be regarded as two different aspects or modes of that which underlies all things. . . . Psychological activity is, and can be, nothing but a radiation through the cells of the grey substance of the brain of a motion set up by external stimuli." That is to say, mind and matter are both aspects or modes of an underlying reality, and the underlying reality is matter.

Touching the problem of immortality, Büchner is unwavering. "By the destruction and breaking-up of its material substratum, and the dissolution of the combination by which alone it attained conscious existence and became a person, a period is also put to the existence of the intellectual being which we have seen grow up only upon this double ground and in closest dependence thereon."° The belief in a future life is not so universal and so native to the human mind as has sometimes been represented, nor is it essential to morality and religion. What we should really desire is continued living participation in the lives of others; like Holbach Büchner advocates immortality of fame and influence, of contribution to the life of the whole. "Be this contribution large or small, it cannot perish in the life of the whole, but works on to all eternity, just as in the eternal cycle of forces not even the smallest movement can be lost, without breaking the irrefragable law of cause and effect."° To make good this notion of karmic permanence so as to recognize the lasting values of human life in the constitution of the universe, however, requires serious revision of the materialistic description of the world and a manner of reasoning which is not to be found in *Force and Matter*.

HAECKEL'S *Riddle of the Universe* rests on a more solid empirical foundation, but the philosophical structure of the Jena zoölogist is as confused in architecture as Büchner's. It is of the first importance to recognize this con-

fusion in fundamentals; for what concerns us in Haeckel, after all, is not the correctness of his biology but the quality of the cosmology that he would deduce from the biology. Haeckel disclaims the title of materialist; he calls himself a monist and a pantheist, and basks in the sunlight of Goethe and Spinoza; but his monism is either a cloak for materialism or muddled logic. There should be no doubt on this point, so let us consider this alleged evolutionistic Spinozism. As Haeckel interprets Spinoza, "This universal substance, this 'divine nature of the world,' shows us two different aspects of its being, or two fundamental attributes—matter (infinitely *extended* substance) and spirit (the all-embracing energy of thought). All the changes which have since come over the idea of substance are reduced, on a logical analysis, to this supreme thought of Spinoza's; with Goethe I take it to be the loftiest, profoundest, and truest thought of all ages. Every single object in the world which comes within the sphere of our cognizance, all individual forms of existence, are but transitory forms—*accidents* or *modes*—of substance. These modes are material things when we regard them under the attribute of *extension* (or 'occupation of space'), but forces or ideas when we consider them under the attribute of *thought* (or 'energy'). To this profound thought of Spinoza our purified monism returns after the lapse of two hundred years; for us, too, matter (space-filling substance) and energy (moving force) are but two inseparable attributes of the underlying substance."^o

This passage is quoted in full, for it is a little museum and an epitome of Haeckel's chaotic metaphysics. Note the metamorphosis of Spinoza in Haeckel's philosophical laboratory. From "spirit (the all-embracing energy of thought)" we pass to "forces or ideas, when we consider them under the attribute of *thought* (or 'energy')," and so on to "energy (moving force)." Mind is thus identified with the energy of thought; that is, with forces or ideas;

that is, with thought (or 'energy'); that is, with energy (moving force). Thus is Spinoza's monism "purified after the lapse of two hundred years."

This inextricable confusion of spirit and thought with force and energy is central in Haeckel's thinking. Is spirit 'force'? Then we should presumably be in a position to write its laws in terms of mechanics. Or is force 'spirit,' and is all nature then animate, and Haeckel a hylozoist? He speaks readily of cell-souls, and once held all cells to be animate. Notwithstanding his protests to Du Bois Reymond, it is a fact that, basing himself on the notion of chemical affinity, on Goethe's and Empedocles' romancings, and on 'cellular psychology,' he expresses his "conviction that even the *atom* is not without a rudimentary form of sensation and will . . . a universal soul of the simplest character."^o Is Haeckel's view, then, that all nature is ensouled, but is conscious only in cases where there obtains a centralization of the nervous system? Between these two views, of spirit as force and force as spirit, Haeckel confusedly moves, inclining decidedly to the former.

What has Haeckel to say of man's destiny? The human soul, we are told, begins its existence at the precise moment when the complete copulation of the two sexual cell-nuclei takes place. This fact, in his opinion, "suffices of itself to destroy the myth of the immortality of the soul."^o Of the various arguments in favor of immortality Haeckel disposes seriatim; he draws up an imposing list of scientific proofs of the soul's mortality, and pronounces the idea of a future life the highest point of superstition, "a dogma which is in hopeless contradiction with the most solid empirical truths of modern science."^o

IX

The foregoing survey of materialistic opinion reveals a somewhat monotonous rehearsal of doctrine from Democritus to Haeckel. Modern materialism is only a more

completely annotated edition of the ancient teaching: the text is substantially the same. Yet there is a certain important revision. From the day when Lucretius wrote the third book of his poem to the present day, the effort to reduce the psychical to the physical, mind to matter, has been a major part of the materialist's undertaking. The controversy of which we have been rehearsing one side has been well described as "a battle for the soul."^o To the older materialist the doctrine that mind is matter meant that mind is a variety of material structure, smooth, fine, round, highly mobile. Psychic activity, sensation, emotion, reasoning, volition: these are due to movements of soul-matter, that is, of masses and tissues of soul-atoms, in contact with masses of rougher corporeal atoms.

To the modern materialist, this version requires revision. In its analysis of matter modern science disclosed a complexity transcending the wildest dream of the ancient atomist. The Democritean-Lucretian notion of minute particles, all qualitatively homogeneous, with hooks and pockets, projections and quirks and crevices whirling in the void, shoving and grappling each other into various clusters and masses and so combining to form this fair world of ours: this is a notion too crude and naïve to reflect the subtle composition of matter. The materialist of our day is not prepared to reduce chemistry to such rudimentary physics, nor, resting on the chemical analysis of matter, to pronounce all forms of it qualitatively homogeneous. He, therefore, abandons the old view that mind is a kind of material structure, and treats mind as functional in character. To him the formula 'Mind is material' is not analogous to the expression 'Iron is material,' but rather to the expression 'Rusting is a material process' or 'Digestion is material.' Thus we are told, and this is the sum and substance of contemporary materialistic pronouncement on the subject: immortality is inadmissible, since soul, mind, thought, self, consciousness are all functions of living matter; and, as Ostwald reports

the materialistic verdict, "the moment life ceases in an organized body the value of this function becomes zero, and there is no further question about immortality."° How is consciousness, how is personal activity to continue after death has rendered nerve-tissue no longer capable of the physico-chemical functioning essential to psychical activity?

This is one of the two difficulties which William James tries to meet in his Ingersoll Lecture.° James undertakes to remove the bar to belief in immortality which physiological psychology provides and cerebralistic materialism erects. Thought is a function of the brain; therefore no brain, no thought. Does the conclusion follow? It does, James answers, if we are bound to regard the function in question as necessarily *productive*. But are we compelled to regard this function as productive? It may conceivably be releasing or permissive or transmissive function. The trigger of a cross-bow functions releasingly; colored glass, a prism, a refracting lens functions transmissively. The psycho-physiologist has forgotten to read his Shelley:

Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity.

James believes that he has drawn the fangs of cerebralistic materialism. Physiological psychology cannot maintain that the function in the case is productive. All we can maintain, all we can record experimentally, is that certain conscious states vary concomitantly with certain cerebral changes. The cerebral processes may be only transmissive of the mental process, or they may even be only limiting conditions, and their cessation may conceivably mark, not the cessation of consciousness, but the beginning of its full measure of activity. This hope James proffers to his audience; less assured than St. Paul, but assuredly hopeful, he declares: Now we see as through a glass darkly, but then we may see face to face.

What is the substance of this new hope which James

would compel physiological psychology to release and set free? Consciousness, he says, which now exists in a certain bodily form in a certain bodily medium, may continue to be active beyond that medium. Destroy the organ pipes: music need not stop; it may swell more abundantly through a different channel. Perhaps it may; but will it any longer be pipe organ music? Is it not a hope of personal immortality which James undertakes to vindicate for us, and can he do it by means of his speculation? Grant for the moment that there is a transcendental consciousness which for a brief while condescends to operate in a cerebral, bodily medium, and after this brief while goes on its way rejoicing: what is that to you and me? You and I are of the brief while, even on James' theory. The transcendental consciousness may not require brain, nerves, body: we apparently do. Face to face the transcendental consciousness may be able to see: but we can see only through a glass darkly. If we crave assurance of immortality, "we are not interested in the everlastingness of the eternal 'Mother Sea,' call it God or call it what we will."^o

The defect in James' position is that he would encourage us to believe in personal continuance without being able to assure us that continuity of experience or consciousness of continuity appears probable. James treats personal, spiritual, inner life as the operation in us of a transcendental mechanism of some sort, just as bodily life is the activity and operation of the bodily organism. Conceive the essence of personality thus, argue thus the question of immortality, and cerebralistic materialism remains in possession of the field, with its fangs intact.

Deeper-seated are the shortcomings of materialism and mechanism. In so far as the world-process is one of physical facts, it admits of explanation only in terms of physical categories; but are not other views of the world-process available or calling for an interpretation than the view which reveals the world as matter-in-motion? The defect of the mechanistic theory lies in the judgment, more or

less explicitly expressed, that life and consciousness are 'merely' and 'nothing but' material-mechanical. It is possible and for certain purposes of natural science it is appropriate and necessary to regard life and consciousness as material systems. So to regard them, however, involves abstraction from aspects of life and consciousness which for other equally important purposes may be equally or more important, aspects which in any case may not be ignored if any at all comprehensive view of life and consciousness is to be had. That life and consciousness may be investigated in so far as they are congeries of material processes, and that they must then be explained mechanistically, is no doubt good science. That life and consciousness, personal activity, are just material systems, nothing further, is not a valid scientific conclusion: it is not a scientific conclusion at all. It is beyond the province of any science to make such a judgment. Here the materialist, the mechanist speaks in the capacity of a metaphysician, and a most dogmatic metaphysician. Resting on the admittedly partial success which the mechanistic theory has had in explaining life and consciousness as material systems, he proceeds dogmatically to assert that no other aspects of life and consciousness are available for study or demanding interpretation in terms of different categories. As well might I say, because I require ink for the prosecution of my present writing, that a supply of ink exhausts my present requirements.

Still, it may be argued, granted that the mechanistic-materialistic theory of life and consciousness is not the whole story, does it not at any rate express the main sum and substance? Has materialism seized or has it missed the central point in dealing with life and consciousness? In particular, is consciousness consciousness fundamentally in this, that it is a mechanical, material system?

In the very asking of this question it is partially answered. To the mechanistic account of life and consciousness and personal activity, the exclusion of purposive deter-

mination, unitary character of experience and response, evaluation, the pursuit of truth, goodness, beauty, teleology, in the broadest sense: the exclusion or neglect of all this is inevitable. It is either negated outright, as of mistaken or indifferent import, or is else transcribed into alien mechanistic alphabets. But is it not just in these elements and aspects of existence that the peculiar connotation of a conscious being (and in our case a self-conscious being, a personality) is to be sought? As I write, a certain amount of ink flows down through the pen-point onto the page. Shall I then describe my present writing activity as a course of flowing ink, an ink-stream? It includes the ink-flow, no doubt, but it is inevitably more than just an ink-stream, is characteristically and fundamentally something other than an ink-stream. As an ink-stream it neither meets nor fails to meet any standards of truth, or insight, or interest. As an ink-stream it is not essentially different from the ink-work of Kant or Dante or from the ink-work of my little daughter scribbling on a pad of paper in the next room. I scratch away with my pen, and so does my little daughter, and so did Kant and Dante: a hyper-expert in mechanistic metrics might conceivably calculate equal quanta of energy expended by each of us in staining certain paper-areas with ink-markings. But such a mechanical equation, would it not be but idle irrelevance in the premises? How futile and meaningless is this entire effort to express consciousness and personal activity in terms which ignore or openly negate the very activity which they undertake to describe and explain?

Physiology is physiology just in this, that it is not physics or chemistry, although it may for certain purposes make use of physics and chemistry. So psychology in turn is psychology, not physiology or chemistry or physics, although it may utilize and in certain respects rest on these. You can use me to prove the law of falling bodies; for this purpose I might serve no better than a cannon-ball. Or you can use me to investigate organic

processes and principles of nourishment, growth, heredity; and for this purpose I might give you as much food for thought as a banana-fly, and considerably more than a cannon-ball. Or else you might require me to learn from you, or to reveal to you, truth, goodness, beauty, love, ambition, hope, despair, understanding, loyalty, pity, piety. Now for these last purposes I and my kind shall be uniquely valuable to you, and irreplaceable.

The higher categories include the lower, but are not reducible to the lower. Man is so much occupied space. Understood less inadequately, less incompletely, he is so much matter and energy, thus active. Understood still less inadequately, he is a living organism. Adequately and completely understood, man is a personality. So with any human activity in detail. Man does not differ from the animals, as Descartes imagined, because he is an immaterial substantial soul while they are mere machines; but in this, that he does as a man what animals do as animals; in this, that his human nature comprehends the animal and discloses itself richer and more abundant in every detail. So "the love between parent and child, or man and woman, may be looked upon, by those who are not attempting to see further into reality, as mere organic instinct; but in nothing else does personality in its distinctive sense manifest itself more clearly, and through nothing else can character be judged more certainly. The person is the whole man, and the organic aspect of him is only an abstract or partial aspect."^o

A strictly mechanistic account of conscious activity (even in so far only as the latter is or involves a mechanism) is stupendously difficult. The real objection to it, however, is not that it is difficult, but that it is in a large measure irrelevant. It does not explain that which preëminently calls for explanation. Even if the mechanist could give us the exact formula of the physics and chemistry of a mind producing a Divine Comedy and of a mind producing a dime novel, that explanation would still fail

to reveal or to explain the difference between the two. It is a difference in value. Future biochemistry may conceivably be able to record, in pyramids of imposing formulas, what there is of mechanism in Nero as he watches Rome burn or in Giordano Bruno as he is about to be burned in Rome. Biochemistry may even tell us how our interiors operate as we condemn the one and admire the other. But biochemistry cannot show us what a contemptible or an admirable act is; much less, why it is contemptible or admirable. These differences and distinctions demand the use of non-mechanistic categories. "This world . . . is force; it is action; it is life; and more: it is conscious in me, self-conscious through me. *E pur si pensa!*"^o There is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in the mechanistic philosophy; for there is man, the real, complete man, a personality embodying, recognizing, conserving, creating values.

This recognition involves another. Not only is consciousness as a whole, personality, unintelligible on a mechanistic basis, but the adequate understanding of any individual human act, in so far as it is regarded as a human act, the act of an intelligent being, demands the use of non-mechanistic categories. Twenty-three centuries ago we had an opportunity to learn this truth from Plato. In the *Phædo* Socrates criticizes the man who, like Anaxagoras, while speaking of intelligence in general, makes no use of it in detail. "I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles,

I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture—that is what he would say; and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Bœotia—by the dog they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, of enduring any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking.”^o

Physical science is justified in proceeding on the assumption that of every process in nature a mechanistic account is available. Philosophy requires the supplementary assumption that the world of our experience is likewise a world of values. In certain fields of experience the interpretation of the world in terms of categories of value is less satisfactory and less informing than a mechanistic explanation. In the case of human activities it is far more informing and significant than the mechanistic explanation. Indeed, to establish its own truth as a theory, materialism requires the use of categories which it ignores and must in consistency reject. If the world is really such as the materialist describes it, nothing but matter-in-motion, then a ‘true’ materialistic *theory* would be impossible.

The materialistic account of man and of his destiny is thus beside the point. The materialist has stoutly maintained that man as an organism is a perishable compound. But man is more than meat and raiment, and with real human personality, with man as the bearer and creator of values, materialistic philosophy has shown itself incompetent to deal. That it ignores the real character of our being, is reason enough why we should doubt and even disregard its pronouncements on the subject of human destiny. But the deeper recognition of our character as beings of worth, which we have attained as a reaction against the materialistic account of man, now raises our inquiry into human destiny to a new level. To us the recognition and attainment of value is essential. Erase the recognition and the attainment of value from a man's life, and his life as a person is no more. But we are bound to ask: Are value and personality correlative throughout? Furthermore, are values lasting, or are they transitory cosmic episodes: can we maintain the Principle of the Conservation of Value? These are questions which we have learned to ask as we recoil from mechanistic metaphysics, and the effort to answer them leads us still further away from materialistic speculation.

CHAPTER IV

PLURALITY OF PERSONAL LIVES°

THE problem of immortality is normally central in a cosmology which conceives of the universe as a spiritual system. Is the spiritual system fundamentally and inevitably personal: a person or a society of persons? Are the careers of finite individuals but passing episodes in a timeless system, or its eternal constituents? In all these problems the issue of immortality is squarely raised. Failure to meet this issue squarely has involved many an idealistic theory in ambiguity and confusion.

Hegel's apparent indifference to the question of immortality, a source of surprise to many a student, is, in the view of Dr. McTaggart,° a defect in his philosophy. Dr. McTaggart, himself building on Hegelian foundations, attempts to improve on his master by giving the problem of immortality central place in cosmological discussion. In his *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology* he undertakes a metaphysical demonstration of the eternity of finite selves, and in *Some Dogmas of Religion* he examines three of the more usual arguments urged against immortality and also champions human preëxistence. The arguments which he advances in support of what he considers human immortality, the vigor with which he advocates the doctrine of the plurality of lives, the atheism to which he is finally led, are all very significant aspects of contemporary idealistic thought. An endeavor will be made here to formulate Dr. McTaggart's theory of immortality and preëxistence, and, in the light of this theory, to estimate his monadistic interpretation° and development of idealism.

I

From the point of view of materialistic monism, human spirit is merely one of the ways in which matter operates when it is in the special form of a human body. So regarded, of course, the immortality of the self would be no more credible than the immortality of digestion. But the independent existence of matter, Dr. McTaggart argues in familiar Berkeleian terms, is a perfectly gratuitous and superfluous hypothesis. Science is by no means committed to a materialistic metaphysic. The 'laws of nature' may quite as well be conceived as the laws according to which human sensations are related.

We are therefore not bound to regard the self as a mere activity of the body. Still, "granted that my body could not exist except for knowledge, it may be that the knowledge of my body, by myself or other selves, is a necessary condition of the existence of my self." Dr. McTaggart parries the objection to immortality implied in this second supposition as follows. Sensations do seem to involve some corresponding bodily modification; but this proves at the most that *some* body is necessary to my self and that "*while the self has a body, that body is essentially connected with the self's mental life.*" At the death of this my body, my self may conceivably transfer its manifestations to another body, either instantaneously or after "a state of suspended animation," analogous perhaps to dreamless sleep.°

Yet, after all, what reason do I have for believing that the self persists while all objects in nature change and pass away? Were the self a mere combination, Dr. McTaggart rejoins, it would be transitory; but, while resembling a combination in that it cannot exist without its parts, it is unlike a combination in that its parts cannot exist without it. It is a complex which cannot disintegrate; it can perish only through annihilation, and we are not justified in contemplating such an eventuality.

In thus meeting the more obvious and usual arguments urged against immortality, Dr. McTaggart has no illusion that he has reached positive certainty on the subject. Doubts beset us, and we look for more conclusive assurance. Some seek this assurance in 'psychical research.' While our author is not prepared to scoff at the ghost-seers, he expects no real proof of immortality from even the most authentic case of apparition. For a man might conceivably, before his death, initiate a chain of circumstances which would cause his apparition to be seen when he himself was really no more. Conclusive proof of immortality can come, if at all, only from metaphysics. If the general nature of reality involved the existence of finite selves, if the existence of finite selves, and of each finite self, were eternally necessary, the recognition of these truths would really assure us of immortality.

Such a metaphysical demonstration of human immortality is undertaken in *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*. All reality is spirit, and "it is the eternal nature of spirit to be differentiated into finite spirits."° Can we, in addition, maintain that each finite spirit is eternal—or is each differentiation a step, itself transitory, in an eternal series of differentiations? Moreover, granted the first alternative, is man such a finite spirit? On the answers to these two questions hangs the whole issue of immortality.

Taking the last point first: Are our selves among the fundamental differentiations of spirit? Reality, we learn from Hegel, is characterized by a certain unity of individuals: a unity which is wholly in each of the individuals (else they would lack the requisite reality); yet is not wholly present in each individual separately (else the unity of the individuals would itself be destroyed); nor is it present in the mere assemblage of them (else it would have nothing to do with them as individuals); nor again is it present only in the mutual determination of the individuals (for that would imply that the individuals have meaning of their own apart from the unity). It must be

a unity which is wholly in each of the individuals and is the bond that unites them. Unless we adopt this view we are forced to choose between undifferentiated unity (itself meaningless and making experience meaningless) and a plurality of isolated individuals (the inadequate view of the categories of Essence).

"The self answers to the description of the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute. Nothing else which we know or can imagine does so." A self is finite. It is not the only reality in the universe, yet you cannot draw the line separating it from the rest of the universe. This paradoxical nature of the self is explained only if we regard it as one of the fundamental differentiations of Reality. These differentiations involve the same paradox. Everything is contained in each individual differentiation, yet nothing is contained in each differentiation in such a way as not to be also outside it. "The Absolute must be differentiated into persons, because no other differentiations have vitality to stand against a perfect unity, and because a unity which was undifferentiated cannot exist."^o

Passing now to the second question: are our selves eternal? Granted that selves are fundamental differentiations of the Absolute, may it not be that the Absolute is "differentiated by means of an unending succession of individuals, each of whom has only a limited existence in time?" But how is it possible for the selves to perish? The individuals are what they are because of the unity which they embody: each of them is a characteristic embodiment of the nature of the unity. Suppose one of them were to perish, another must take its place. If that other were the same in nature, wherein would it be a different individual? And if it were a really new individual, of a different nature, we should be forced into an absurdity. For, unless we abandon the pure Hegelian view of the absolutely reciprocal relation of the unity and its differentiations, and hold with Lotze the view that the Absolute is something more and deeper than the unity of its dif-

ferentiations, we are compelled to recognize that a breach in the continuity of the fundamental differentiations would be a breach in the continuity of the Absolute—an unthinkable situation. Breach in continuity is admissible only if we conceive reality as "consisting of moments, of which one may change without affecting the other"—a characteristic of the categories of Essence, especially of the category of Matter and Form, which is transcended in the advance to the categories of the Notion.^o

Our selves are thus immortal. This conclusion, according to Dr. McTaggart, implies not only the continued existence of the self after death, but its existence before birth. An argument which disproved præexistence would jeopardize immortality. "If the universe got on without me a hundred years ago, what reason could be given for denying that it might get on without me a hundred years hence?"^o Why is it, then, that the typical Western mind has regarded the belief in præexistence as "strange and improbable"?^o Chiefly because we have no memory of any previous existence of ours. But, according to Dr. McTaggart, personal identity is not a matter of memory; it is an identity of substance. If at my death a self with the same attributes should come into being, the continuity of the attributes would be sufficient to preserve personal identity "not because it would be sufficient if the substance changed, but because it proves that the substance remains unchanged."^o What we have is not the annihilation of one self and the creation of another, but the continuity of the same self through experiences of so serious a character as death and rebirth.

The doctrine of the plurality of lives should appear reasonable to any believer in immortality. An endless, deathless existence in the future would bear so slight a resemblance to our present life as scarcely to deserve being regarded as its continuation. The adoption of the hypothesis of præexistence, moreover, enables us to explain in a more satisfactory way than is otherwise possible cer-

tain puzzling features of our present life. In the same environment different tendencies and qualities which we ambiguously call innate manifest themselves in different men. These tendencies and qualities are often of the sort which are due in the lives of other men to the condensed results of experience. On the theory of preëxistence these tendencies and qualities are naturally explained as being indeed the condensed results of experiences in past lives. This explanation is more satisfactory than the explanation in terms of heredity. Again, the usual explanation of the sudden growth of intimacy in certain personal relations, as due to the capriciousness of sexual desire, is inadequate, since the puzzling sudden intimacy is to be found in friendships which have no connection with sexual desire. "On the theory of preëxistence such relations would naturally be explained by the friendships of past lives."^o

Now, to be sure, unless we had reason to believe that the interests of spirit are so predominant as to find in the long run satisfaction, it would be impossible to see how a love constituting the chief value and meaning of a person's life could have its way after death: how two could love again unless chance brought them once more together, or how a love denied fruition could remain unextinguished through aeons of separation and new activities. (Though, to be sure, this embarrassment of love would seem to be the case whether we believed in preëxistence or in the more usual conception of immortality). Dr. McTaggart himself insists that the significance of love for spirit is very great, indeed that love is the finality and the perfect manifestation of the Absolute.^o He is therefore inclined to believe that love is not the effect of proximity in personal relations, but its cause.

From this way of viewing the universe *sub specie amati*, Reality is seen as essentially spiritual; it manifests itself as eternal selves. The Absolute is a system of selves-in-relation. Now, then, the question arises, If finite selves

are eternal, is the eternal Absolute a self? It is a unity of persons, Dr. McTaggart answers, but a unity or community of persons need not itself be personal. To be sure, the Hegelian Dialectic does not explicitly deny personality to the Absolute. That the Absolute may be a self remains possible under certain conditions, some of which Lotze attempts to point out in his *Microcosmus*.^o Lotze regards the opposition of the ego to a non-ego, not as essential, but rather as a limitation, to personality. In the being of the Infinite we do not find this limitation; accordingly perfect personality is in God only: our personalities are but pale copies thereof. But, while the consciousness of a non-ego (that is, in Hegelian terms, the consciousness of another ego) does not constitute personality, Dr. McTaggart insists that it is an essential condition of personality. The unity of the finite self, "by virtue of its simplicity and indivisibility . . . excludes its differentiations from itself in one sense, while including them in another. But the Absolute cannot exclude its differentiations from itself in any sense."^o

To be sure, if we broadened the term 'personality' to cover all spiritual unities, then we could speak of the Absolute as a person. But, in the first place, this would rob us of a term for personality in the narrower sense, in exchange for the dubious advantage of giving us two terms for spiritual unity. And in the second place, it would justify us in calling "every college, every goose-club, every gang of thieves" a person. Moreover, we are not bound to say that the impersonality of the Absolute makes it lower than a person. A finite individual's perfection is the perfection of a person. The Absolute's perfection is the perfection of a system or community of persons. The two are complementary. The Absolute is spirit, and "all Spirit is personal, but it is many persons, not one person, although it is as really one Spirit as it is many persons."^o

II.

This theory is indubitably and explicitly atheistic. To be sure, the majority of theists believe in immortality, and the majority of the believers in immortality are theists, and the usual view has been that unless one believes in God one cannot believe in the immortality of the soul. Dr. McTaggart sees no logical connection between the two beliefs. Indeed, far from strengthening the belief in immortality, consistent theism weakens it. If we postulate a Creator of the souls of men (on the supposition that finite beings could not have existed from all eternity) the belief in immortality is jeopardized. If my rôle in the universe is such that it does not involve my existence from all eternity, how can it be shown that it involves my existence to all eternity?° To be sure, that God, a benevolent Creator, should destroy, or allow to be destroyed, a human soul which He has once created, may be an evil; but there is evil in the universe, and it may include this particular variety for all that we are assured to the contrary. The more one recognizes the eternity of finite selves, the less necessity one sees for postulating a Creator of selves, and the less real does the theist's God appear. Thus we are led from the original view that atheism precludes the belief in immortality, to the view that it is rather theism which weakens the belief, and that the assurance of immortality consistently involves atheism.

The term atheism, used in connection with an idealistic system, need not appear strange. This position, defended unambiguously by Dr. McTaggart, is, in his opinion, similar to the position of Fichte in his earlier system and to the position of Hegel. On the other hand, Lotze, whom our author considers "of all the theists of the nineteenth century . . . philosophically the most important . . . regards immortality as quite undemonstrable and as very doubtful."° The view before us is thus the precise reverse of Lotze's. The only kind of God that Dr. McTag-

gart would admit at all is a non-omnipotent and non-creative one; and he sees "only one reason why we should not believe in his existence—namely, that there is no reason why we should believe in it."^o

The Absolute, then, is not a self. It is a society of selves, a unity of persons perfectly manifested in love—a sort of College.^o Selfhood and the love of selves are no passing phases of reality; they are the heart of the universe. Each finite self is a unique differentiation of the Absolute and is therefore imperishable as a finite self. Apparently we are offered genuine immortality in this theory; even more, preëxistence as well: the assurance of personal identity throughout. But on what terms? Not in terms of memory. I shall continue to exist after death as a self, but I-myself-here-present shall not then be aware of the fact. My self's successor will be myself, not because he remembers my experiences and recognizes them as his own, but because of a substantial bond uniting the two life-spans, which makes my later life-character share in the nature of the former. My self's successor will be just what I would have been in his place; in short, he will be myself.

Continuity of consciousness, and the consciousness of continuity, are thus renounced. But can one dispense so readily with the factor of memory? As Bradley puts it, "The man in the past or in the future who knows nothing about me, whatever else he is, after all will not be myself. . . . That what we have done in this life may cause our future love might be true, and yet, if nothing is remembered, individual continuance might to us then mean nothing."^o Dr. McTaggart would say that, while the second self will not feel that it is the same as the first, it will nevertheless be the same. One might well retort that, since the second self will not feel that it is the same as the first, it might as well not be the same.

Theists, believing that each man lives his one life on earth and is thereafter immortal, have been confronted

with the difficulty of contemplating the immense assembly of spirits that would thus be accumulated through the ages. William James, while he urges us to be forbearing and democratically tolerant with the endless throng of fellow-immortals, realizes the mental enormity of the task. "The very heavens themselves, and the cosmic times and spaces, would stand aghast . . . at the notion of preserving eternally such an ever swelling plethora and glut of it."^o

On Dr. McTaggart's theory we are perhaps spared these "Malthusian anxieties about the over-population of the spiritual world."^o Indeed, if selves are the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute, if their interrelated activities and loves constitute the Absolute system itself, how can we admit an increase in their number? An increase in the number of selves would involve an increase of the universe. The entire position of Dr. McTaggart would be menaced by the possibility of one real self's *beginning* its career in time. We thus seem compelled to accept the doctrine that the number of selves-in-relation constituting the universe is constant. The eternal existence of human individuals on earth, however, can scarcely be admitted; we are, moreover, assured that their number has been on the increase for some time. Are we to be asked, then, to conclude that multitudes of us have drunk the waters of forgetfulness in non-terrestrial regions before being reborn here on earth, and that this immigration of selves on a large scale is going on all the time? And is one to presume also that the self-in-transit is in a state of "suspended animation," and that the unsatisfied love-quests of certain souls on earth and their longings for they-know-not-whom are to be explained as due to the failure of certain other loving souls to follow them from one bodily field of operations to another? This difficulty is expressed in the space-time language of every-day speech, but stating the point in Dr. McTaggart's own language of mild immaterialism would not remove the difficulty.

We are involved in further embarrassments. According to the theory before us, the love of two people is "the expression of the ultimate fact that each of them is more closely connected with the other than he is with people in general." The existences of two such people are essentially bound up; they are "bound up with one another, not for one life only, but forever." Dr. McTaggart makes it quite clear that the love of two people for each other "would not involve their meeting in every life, any more than it would involve their meeting every day of each life. Love can survive occasional absences, and is often even stronger for them. And . . . the universe is on a large scale, which might require long absences." Does this supposition imply lifelong periods of lovelessness separating periodic resumptions of a relation which still remains central in the lives of the two selves: "passionate, all-absorbing, all-consuming love?"^o On Dr. McTaggart's estimate of the significance of love for self, this prospect of persons existing lovelessly for entire life-spans would seem seriously to embarrass his theory.

But are we bound to hold that a self's character admits of its being involved in such intimate communion with only one person? We are attached to many persons by different bonds; parent, spouse, brother, sister, child, friend evoke different affections and loyalties. Yet in each love the self's character is manifest. I who love my parents, my wife, my children, my neighbor love them each one in my own way. The negation of any one of these loves would be a negation of myself, though partial, yet as real as would result from a negation of them all, or from the negation of my one love were my love but one. So we may ask: Is Dante's communion with Beatrice, or Tennyson's with Hallam, such as to impose lifelong lovelessness to each in the absence of the other? Or may we suppose that Beatrice's lover might be, in a succession of life-spans, the lover of Laura and of Héloïse, and the places of these in the lives of subsequent Petrarchs and

Abelards be taken by the Donna of the *Vita Nuova*? This is our embarrassment were we to suppose that, despite possible lifelong absences, a Dante is bound up with a Beatrice, a Tennyson with a Hallam, "not for one life only, but forever;" that each of these is what he is precisely in the intimate relation to the other.

May we not think, however, that love allows not only of multiplicity, but of alteration? This view is not altogether outside Dr. McTaggart's horizon. Tastes change; as he remarks in a somewhat different connection, "a Viking or a Maori warrior might well find that the prospect of an immortality without fighting made the universe intolerable."° But in the course of time his demands may change. And so may his love. One of the great merits which our author finds in the plurality of lives is that it affords an opportunity for an eternal variety of self-activity. "We cannot spend our youth both in the study and in the saddle. . . . We cannot learn the lessons alike of Galahad and of Tristram and of Caradoc. And yet they are all so good to learn. Would it not be worth much to be able to hope that what we missed in one life might come to us in another?"° Presumably a self careering in turn through the life-experiences of a Tristram, a Galahad, a Caradoc, will not keep on realizing his life's meaning in the same Iseult,—unless indeed the nature of the latter exemplifies love's perennial adaptability! Thus Kipling is moved to reflect at the end of "The Finest Story in the World,"° dealing with the reincarnation of one Charlie Mears, erstwhile Greek galley-slave and Viking oarsman, now a twenty-five-shillings-a-week bank clerk in love with a tobacconist's assistant: "Now I understood why the Lords of Life and Death shut the doors so carefully behind us. It is that we may not remember our first and most beautiful wooings. Were it not so, our world would be without inhabitants in a hundred years."

The prospect of a plurality of loves in a plurality of lives is not altogether unwarranted by our observation of

human life and its impermanent loyalties. It suggests also that the self grows and consequently changes its appeals and its demands, its character. But, on Dr. McTaggart's theory, change and development here seem to involve the very essence of the self. How then is personal identity to be preserved notwithstanding? A Tennyson to whom *In Memoriam* is but something to read, a Dante to whom Beatrice is no more than she is to us,—these were odd successors to their former selves!

These perplexities involved in the view of the world *sub specie amati* only suggest the real difficulties in Dr. McTaggart's monadistic idealism. Perhaps the fundamental source of them all is to be found in his determination to equate reality with selfhood, and in his conception of selfhood. The cosmic process is described by him as consisting entirely of the interrelated activities of selves. This type of idealism is involved in an ambiguous account of the resistantly impersonal nature-medium in which selves seem to operate, and in a correspondingly ambiguous account of selfhood and personal identity.

Following in Berkeleian paths, Dr. McTaggart proves to his own satisfaction that "matter is only an appearance to the mind which observes it."^o This view, in the way in which it is presented, is inadequate, not in that it is entirely false, but in that it is incomplete. It is only half a view. The statement that matter cannot exist independently of spirit or, to be more precise in this particular connection, independently of selfhood, is true only in so far as it is completed by its corollary converse. If matter cannot exist independently of selves, it is because it is not a self-subsistent reality, but one fundamental factor in the cosmic process of experience, which it does not exhaust, but which 'selfhood' likewise does not exhaust.

To be consistent, Dr. McTaggart should have followed his negative answer to the question, Is my self an activity of my body? by a somewhat different answer than the one he gives to the question, Is my present body an essential

condition of the existence of my self?° Had the latter question read: "Is my present body an essential condition of the existence of my present self?" it would be difficult to see the possibility of an intelligent negative answer. But Dr. McTaggart, viewing the continual change of bodies, views the self as continuously identical. He can conceive of one self as the tenant of several bodies in succession; but it must be the same tenant notwithstanding. Now we may ask: Is not the self inevitably a tenant of some sort? That is to say, is not an impersonal, material medium or "body-appearance" of some sort as indispensable to its selfhood as is intercourse with other selves? It is surely as indispensable to the only kind of selfhood of which we have any knowledge.

Dr. McTaggart does not exactly evade the issue, but he does not meet it squarely.° He recognizes that "no self can be conceived as conscious unless it has sufficient data for its mental activity." But, he argues, "it does not follow, because a self which has a body cannot get its data except in connection with that body, that it would be impossible for a self without a body to get its data in some other way." That is to say, it does not follow, because a conscious self requires sufficient data for its mental activity, that a non-conscious self need be similarly limited. This may be incontestable; but what would be the content or the nature of the 'non-conscious self' so conceived? Are the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute, in Dr. McTaggart's view, 'conscious' or 'non-conscious,' in the above meaning of these two terms? Dr. McTaggart concedes that "*while the self has a body*, that body is essentially connected with the self's mental life." This concession is misleading and insufficient. Working for the time being on the theory that the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute are selves, we are bound to say: If mental life is not essential to selfhood, it matters comparatively little for our purposes whether a body be essentially connected with that mental life; but, if mental life is indeed

essential to selfhood, then the phrase "while the self has a body" is unwarranted.

The important question, after all, is whether a 'mental life' (in the above sense) is a *sine qua non* of selfhood. In a universe described as fundamentally a society of selves, what is the rôle and the content of the self "in a state of suspended animation in the interval between its possession of its two bodies?"^o How is it related to selves-with-bodies and to other selves "in a state of suspended animation?" Moreover, how is the reality of these two bodies to be conceived? If we cannot say, in Dr. McTaggart's phrase, that the self in suspended animation "has" either of these two bodies, how are they at all real, if body, or matter, as we have been told already, is "only an appearance to the mind which observes it?"^o To what mind are two such bodies present as appearance? Perhaps to a mind regarding them as the no-more and the not-yet body of the self in suspended animation? But, in that case, we must admit that selves-with-bodies may be in relation with selves in suspended animation. On this alternative Dr. McTaggart should give more countenance to psychological research and kindred phenomena than he appears to do. Indeed, it is not easy to see precisely what is intended in the theory before us by a self "in a state of suspended animation."

The philosophy of Dr. McTaggart is an attempted revision of Hegelian idealism in personalistic terms; yet in its very conception of personality it fails to utilize one of the chief gains of nineteenth-century idealism, and, instead of advancing beyond Hegel, it retreats to the pre-Kantian substantialist views of the self. To Dr. McTaggart the self, whose identity he traces and whose immortality and preëxistence he champions, is not fundamentally a transcendental unity of apperception or any other kind of conscious unity. The identity is an identity of substance; the preëxistence and immortality are the preëxistence and immortality of a continuous self-identical

entity. The hand is the hand of Hegel, but the voice is the voice of rational psychology and the scholastic simple substance.

Yet Dr. McTaggart recognizes and insists on "the continuous development of the self." But is this continuous development a development of the very essence of the self? Hegel's identity is an identity of process, an identity, not in spite of, but in and through, change and differences. For Dr. McTaggart personal identity is in the last resort an identity of substance. In all changes "there is an aspect which is permanent and unchanging, and it is on that aspect that our attention is fixed when we speak of identity of attributes through change." Accordingly the self's identity is not affected by its migration from body to body, nor by the periodic snapping of the thread of memory and consciousness generally. All these circumstances are really external. The very fact that there is no evidence of the continuous persistence of these is, to Dr. McTaggart, a proof that they are not, after all, fundamental. "We may lay down a general principle as to the continuity of external circumstances from life to life," he writes. "In so far as it is necessary to the continuous development of the self, it will be present. In so far as it is not present, we may be sure that it is not required for the continuous development of the self."^o

The above passage partakes of the dogmatic. What, after all, are all these selves which are solemnly declared to be the fundamental differentiations of the Absolute, but of which no known experience seems to be fundamental? Dr. McTaggart speaks of Reality as a society of selves, a system of personal relations, but his selves and persons are really monads, substantial entities. Hence, the unreal character of what he represents to us as personal identity and continuance, immortality and preëxistence. These scarcely seem to concern the concrete living self of experience. It is difficult to see "what special interest a man can take in the unknown series of

those who are to inherit his soul-substance, any more than in the equally unknown series of those who had the usufruct of it before him."° Leibniz asks: "What good, sir, would it do you to become King of China, on condition that you forget what you have been? Would it not be the same as if God, at the moment he destroyed you, were to create a king in China?"° And Principal Galloway rightly observes: "A life after death which had no conscious connexion with the life before death is not a life for which we could own ourselves responsible."°

Leibniz's monads are self-complete individuals, but the totality of them does not form a cosmos. Dr. McTaggart's monadism would overcome the difficulty which Leibniz tried, and failed, to meet with his preëstablished harmony, by conceiving of the finite individuals constituting the universe as selves. Selves, being necessarily in relation, do form a cosmos. But Dr. McTaggart's selves, conceived in too substantialist terms, fail to allow for an adequate recognition of the actuality of the impersonal factors in the world of self-activity, or for an adequate interpretation of the metaphysical rôle and significance of consciousness.

For a philosopher of experience—for a true idealist—Dr. McTaggart does scant justice to the 'nature' factor in experience, and for a consistent immaterialist he lacks the requisite boldness and capacity to ignore the facts of life. His championship of preëxistence is brilliant; his critique of theism, searching and to be reckoned with. But his theory of immortality is in the last resort a misnomer. A theory which views the destiny of the finite self in terms of the conservation and attainment of values may conceivably renounce the consciousness of continuity and personal identity after death, so long as the ideal causes with which the self has been identified and in which its whole being has found meaning and worth are assured of continued vitality and fruition, so long as the unique values of a self's life are being eternally conserved and realized.

But if the career of the finite individual is conceived in exclusively existential terms: if immortality of the self is thought of as the eternal continuance of a substantial entity of some sort, then continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of continuity appear indeed indispensable. An eternal continuity of the self's own existence which does not include the self-consciousness of continuity is, after all, in spite of the most brilliant dialectic, a continuity of too ambiguous a character to deserve the name immortality.

If, in spite of the above difficulties, Dr. McTaggart remains under the impression that his theory demonstrates the eternity of the self's career, this is clearly due to the fact that throughout his discussion he "substitutes for the living and concrete unity of self-consciousness, as manifested in experience, the numerical unity of a soul-substance or indestructible soul-atom on which the personal unity of experience is supposed to depend, or in which it is somehow housed."^o The Love which he regards as the supreme manifestation of Reality is a love of substantial selves which even in this most intimate communion resist real union and remain self-identical and distinctive throughout. His society of selves has no personal character as society; his "college" is in the last analysis an assembly, not a unity. Over-individual systems of selfhood and over-individual values receive inadequate attention in his thought. His conception of immortality and his treatment of God suffer in consequence.

CHAPTER V

THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL RECURRENCE.

I

MARK TWAIN recounts the adventures of one Captain Stormfield on his visit to heaven. It appears that the Captain's repertory of songs was decidedly limited, so that he was soon confronted with the embarrassing question whether eternity was not a rather long time to spend in singing his one little tune. The implication seems to be that, for the eternal occupation of the soul, an infinite variety of material is required. But the human mind, pondering the notion of eternity and overwhelmed by its inexhaustible vastness, has been unable to imagine variety correspondingly inexhaustible. The uniformity of nature, with its rounds of day and night, tides and moon-phases and seasons, must have occasioned a thought which found confirmation in the monotony of human life, a monotony accentuated by the demands of tradition which made the son's life a duplicate of the father's. All suns set—to rise again; one man dies, and another like him is born. Everywhere is impermanence and instability of the individual, and everywhere repetition and recurrence. There is nothing permanent here on earth, and nothing new under heaven.

The Chaldee astrologer, tracing the orbits of the stars from Babylonian temple-towers, and the Indian seer, meditating on the mysteries of metempsychosis or thrilled by the strange feeling that "this has all happened before," are both led to the notion of eternal recurrence, the cyclic

theory which in ancient Greece as well as in modern Europe has found philosophic or poetic exponents. Eternity is long and outlasts us all; sooner or later the longest songs and all possible songs are ended, and must begin again. Cosmological speculation on the formation and dissolution of worlds is thus allied to poetic-religious visions of transmigration and plurality of lives. The resulting complex of ideas is no less interesting than intricate, and invites examination as one of the alternative solutions of the problem of human and cosmic destiny.

Even in primitive civilizations the idea of cosmic eras, ages of the world, is not unknown. Thus in the rather elaborate cosmogony of the ancient Mexicans, four cosmic ages, separated by world-cataclysms, had already passed. Each of them was called a Sun and, according to the element preponderating, the four ages were respectively: Sun of the Earth, of Fire, of Air, of Water. The fifth Sun, in which the Mexican lived, had no special name, and the dreaded thought that it, too, was coming to an end terrified the Mexican mind. Reville^o accounts for this appalling consciousness of instability by the daily experience of a tropical, unsettled race, witnessing the spectacle of equatorial seas and volcanic regions, political and social revolutions, migrations of peoples, and being thus forced to the belief in "the caducity of the whole existing order." Four times thirteen years constituted a cycle in Mexico, and each fifty-third year (the last time in 1507, before the establishment of Spanish-Catholic power), the end of the world was expected; all fires were extinguished, and the entire population of the City of Mexico watched with bated breath for the reappearance of the Pleiades, the sign that the world-order would continue for another sheaf of fifty-two years.^o

Incomparably vaster is the pendular sweep of Oriental speculation. The Babylonian priest connected the brief round of terrestrial existence with the course of the stars in their orbits. The succession of day and night and of

the four seasons was caused by the celestial pageant; and in the movement of the planets in the zodiac the ancient astronomer saw the wax and wane of a vaster period, a world-year, a great year. A world-year itself was but a day in the life of the universe; world-foundation and world-destruction were viewed as succeeding each other time without end. So Berossus, who, under the Seleucids, was priest in the Marduk temple in Babylon, speculated that when all the planets come together and stand in a straight line in the constellation of the Crab, the world would be destroyed by fire, and when the same phenomenon occurs in the constellation of Capricorn, a deluge would destroy the world.° The Chinese attributed the Tao or course of nature to the vicissitudes of Yang and Yin, the two primal elements variously interpreted as Light and Darkness, Heaven and Earth, Male and Female. Day follows night; moon-phases and seasons succeed each other, and when, in some 129,600 years, the great cycle is accomplished through the exhaustion of the Yang, "the whole system is resolved into its constituent elements, and a new heaven and earth are called into being."°

In Indian cosmogony the Oriental passion for the immense found unlimited play. In terms of space and of time the Brahman and the Buddhist tried to stagger the mind with the vast and infinite, and thus perhaps to accentuate the disdain of the finite. The life of man is but a breath, and the life-story of a whole world is told in but one day of the infinite Brahman. A thousand times four million three hundred and twenty thousand years is but a day of Brahman, and his nights are as long. At the close of each such night, he creates the world anew.° Of such days and nights Brahman has one hundred years, half of which time has already elapsed. Buddhist speculation took this notion of periodic destruction and renovation of the universe and carried it to still greater heights of fantastic extravagance.° Its Kalpa or Great Period (*mahakalpa*) consists of four Incalculable Periods (*asankhyeyya*

kalpa): during the first a world is destroyed; during the second it remains destroyed; during the third it is renovated; during the fourth it stays thus remade and renewed. Each of these incalculable *asankhyeyya kalpas* is in turn divided into twenty intermediate or small periods (*antarakalpa*). So we may read in the *Aggannasuttam*:^o "O Vasettha, there is a season, at vast intervals in the lapse of time, when this world is dissolved. . . . Again there is a season, at vast intervals in the lapse of time, when this world is re-evolved." How vast intervals, the Buddhist mind tries to stagger itself conceiving.^o According to Chinese Buddhism, the longevity of man, starting with 84,000 years, is each century reduced by one year until it shrivels to ten years, and then is increased at the same rate back to 84,000 years. The period embraced in this double process is a small kalpa, or 16,800,000 years; the *asankhyeyya* is twenty times as long. But Buddhism has not remained satisfied with such modest magnitudes. A kalpa is like a mountain of mustard seeds. Imagine a great, solid, cubic rock, a league each way; if once a century a man were to stroke it with a silken veil, the rock would wear out ere a kalpa would elapse. Or were it to rain over the whole earth continuously for three years; the sum total of raindrops that would fall would still be short of an *asankhyeyya*. "Given a progression, $10, 10^2, 10^4, 10^8$,—*asankhyeyya* is the 104th term; to write the number of years thus described we should require three hundred and fifty-two septillions of kilometers of ciphers. . . ."

These incalculable kalpa-periods of world-destruction and world-refashionment succeed each other an incalculable number of times. "Ten quadrillion times a hundred quadrillions of kalpas" ago, as Spence Hardy learned from a Chinese legend, "there was a *chakrawartti* king."^o From eternity to eternity the world goes through this perpetual cyclic course, and always the spot where the Buddha is to attain enlightenment is the first spot of the new uni-

verse to be formed, and the last to be destroyed. A lotus flower appears on the primordial deep: there will be a Buddha born in the world period that is about to begin; or no lotus flower appears, and void of enlightenment will be the world that is about to be ushered in.^o

In developing this idea of cyclic destruction and renovation of the universe, Oriental speculation is preëminently concerned with the vast world-phases. The Greek mind develops the doctrine by characteristically turning its attention to the finite individual's career of reappearance on the stage of this world, cycle after cycle.

The notion of world-ages is, in Greek as in Babylonian speculation, connected with the idea that the world is getting worse. This is the dominant note in Hesiod's classic account of the Five Ages:^o Golden, Silver, Brazen, Iron. Between the Brazen and the Iron Age Hesiod inserts the Heroic Age,—out of place in and out of harmony with the traditional four-age scheme, and thus providing work for commentators without number. Turning from his account of this fourth Heroic Age, Hesiod exclaims: "I would then that I lived not among the fifth race of men, but either had died before or had been born afterward." Perhaps we have here already an anticipation of the doctrine of rebirth and recurrence which was to be developed in the later cyclic theory. The idea of world-ages and the idea of transmigration, the latter of which, as developed in Greece, was very likely of Orphic and initially of Egyptian origin, are combined in the cosmological doctrine of palingenesis or the eternal return of all things (*apokatastasis*). The Orphic mystic, and the Pythagorean who learned from him, taught metempsychosis, the career of the soul from one incarnation to another; salvation of the adept from this doleful prospect was the promise extended to disillusioned humanity by the Orphic cult. Here, as Erwin Rohde has pointed out,^o the notion of palingenesis was involved in that of transmigration; illogical was precisely that hope which made Orphicism a re-

ligion of salvation,—the individual soul's hope of breaking through the cycle of rebirths and finding release. But on the other hand Orphic salvationism, stimulating as it did the contemplation of the Golden Age yet to come, itself contributed to the development of the cyclic theory.^o

The ideas with which we are concerned had entered into the texture of philosophic speculation. In Pythagoreanism,^o in Heraclitus, in Empedocles, these ideas of the succession of world-ages and human lives, world-destruction and world-refashionment and metempsychosis, provide the materials for later Platonic and Stoic speculation on the subject. As we read in Plato's *Timaeus*,^o the perfect cyclic year comprehends the time "when all the eight revolutions, having their relative degrees of swiftness, are accomplished together and attain their completion at the same time." Then, it appears, a counter-revolution in the opposite direction begins, and this oscillating process of the cosmos determines the ages of the world and human destiny. Forward-moving is the Golden Age, with Kronos at the helm, an age of harmony and bliss, men are born old and grow young; there are no woes, no wars, no women. As the forward-moving process stops, the world drifts back into discord, disruption, and decay, and proceeds from bad to worse until it once more reaches the point of departure and the forward-moving swing is resumed.

The theory of world-destruction and world-refashionment, is an essential part of the Stoic conception of the world. Utilizing the Heraclitean notion of *ἐκπύρωσις* the elemental fire, source and destiny of all existence, the Stoics, stringently deterministic, reasoned that when, at the conclusion of a *magnus annus*, the cosmic order is reduced in the world-conflagration to the primal substances, necessity brings these gradually into their former relation to each other, and the universe begins as it were another life-span; a duplicate of the preceding one to the least detail. A new Hercules frees a young world from its

plagues; a new Socrates marries Xantippe, vainly pleads his cause before his accusers, and drinks the hemlock.^o The influence of later Orphic mystic and Neoplatonic speculation serves to give these notions an apocalyptic tone. The influence of the Sibylline Oracles is apparent in Virgil's fourth Eclogue where, in congratulating a patron on the birth of a son, the poet contemplates the speedy return of the Golden Age:

Iam nova progenies caelo demittitur alto.

The fact that this Eclogue was for some fifteen centuries regarded as containing a prophecy of the coming of Christ naturally serves to indicate the connection of Greek speculation on the subject with Jewish Messianic and Christian millenarian ideas.^o Thus in Gregory of Nyssa, whose thought in this respect reflects the influence of Origen, the idea of *apokatastasis* suggests the prospect of a final restoration of all souls to God's grace. The Neoplatonic note is strong in the speculations of the first medieval metaphysician, John Scotus Erigena. The world-process is a theophany: the unfathomable Godhead is alike the source and the final destiny of all creation, which returns to its fountain-head God.

In the fifth book of his *Scienza Nuova*,^o Giambattista Vico recalls the political theories of Aristotle and Polybius in his doctrine of the *ricorso delle cose umane*. The eternal ideal history of man follows a cyclic course; aristocracy is, through patrician oppression, involved in an uprising of the masses who establish a democracy; this in turn develops into an empire, which decays into barbarism, from which in turn the nobility forges ahead into an aristocracy, and so on *da capo*.

But, while ancient and Christian visions of palingenesis and eternal recurrence are of historical interest, this doctrine, in so far as it is a real alternative in contemporary cosmology, is preëminently associated with the name of Friedrich Nietzsche and with his masterpiece

Thus Spake Zarathustra. Indeed Nietzsche is often considered the author of the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Now it is interesting to observe that, owing perhaps to a revival of classical notions, or perhaps as a result of independent cosmological speculation, the idea of eternal recurrence is encountered with increasing frequency in the nineteenth century. This is particularly the case during the decade preceding the writing of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Identity or similarity of doctrine in several contemporary thinkers may well be a case of simple coincidence in the prosecution of similar intellectual tasks, and one may well be cautious in concluding that any dependence or borrowing or plagiarism is involved. And yet it is difficult, in the face of the available evidence, to accept Nietzsche's description of himself as "the first to teach this teaching,"^o or even to be satisfied with the explanation that his indebtedness was only to the Greeks.

II

Nietzsche was first really staggered by the idea of eternal recurrence during an intolerably luminous moment of inspiration. This poetic quality the idea retained even while Nietzsche sought for its scientific ground. In this intellectual enterprise he was unsuccessful, and Eternal Recurrence remained to him a poetic-religious idea, tragic, overwhelming, the terrors of which he undertook to exorcise by means of his Superman spell.

There are anticipations of the idea in Nietzsche's early thought. In his youth, when he was gradually breaking away from his traditional religious beliefs, we find him speculating about the possibly cyclic course of human existence. "The crises are inscribed on the dial-face; the hand moves on, and when it has reached the twelfth hour, it begins another series: it inaugurates a period in the history of humanity."^o If this notion of the young Nietzsche had not itself been occasioned by his reading,

he must yet have had opportunities enough to re-encounter it in his classical studies. Nietzsche's acquaintance with the Greek exponents of palingenesis and eternal recurrence can scarcely be open to question. Can we imagine him, a brilliant professor of classical philology, with philosophical interests, ignorant of the Pythagorean, Platonic, and Stoic speculation on the subject?° Nietzsche revives the Platonic notion of the great year, *magnus annus*, and in *Ecce Homo*, he grants that "the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence might . . . have been taught before," mentioning Heraclitus and the Stoics.° In *Thoughts out of Season*° reference is made to Pythagorean teaching that "when the heavenly bodies are in the same position again, the events on earth are reproduced to the smallest detail." Doubtless also Nietzsche remembered the second book of Lucretius.°

But we do not have here merely the all-too-common case of modern speculation with a classical background. As observed already, the idea of cosmic iteration is particularly in evidence during the nineteenth century. Poets reflect it in their modern echoes of antiquity. So the chorus sings in Shelley's "Hellas":

The world's great age begins anew,
The golden years return,
The earth doth like a snake renew
Her winter weeds outworn:
Heaven smiles, and faiths and empires gleam,
Like wrecks of a dissolving dream. . . .

A loftier Argo cleaves the main,
Fraught with a later prize;
Another Orpheus sings again,
And loves, and weeps, and dies.
A new Ulysses leaves once more
Calypso for his native shore. . . .

More directly do we have it expressed in the *Empedokles* of the morbidly sensitive poet Friedrich Hölderlin, a work highly prized by Nietzsche:°

Sterben? Nur ins Dunkel ist's
 Ein Schritt, und sehen möcht'st du doch, mein Auge! . . .
 Geh! Fürchte nichts, Es kehret alles wieder,
 Und was geschehen soll, ist schon vollendet.

Half-impatiently, half-wistfully Byron meditates along the same line in the ninth canto of *Don Juan*:

I have forgotten what I meant to say. . . .
 But let it go:—it will one day be found
 With other relics of a 'former world.'
 When this world shall be *former*, underground,
 Thrown topsy-turvy, twisted, crisped, and curl'd,
 Baked, fried, or burnt, turn'd inside out, or drown'd,
 Like all the worlds before, which have been hurled
 First out of, and then back again to chaos,
 The superstructure which will overlay us.
 So Cuvier says:—and then shall come again
 Unto the new creation, rising out
 From our old crash, some mystic, ancient strain
 Of things destroy'd and left in airy doubt. . . .

Heine writes in one of his additions to the *Reise von München nach Genua*: "Know, then, that time is infinite, but that the things within this time, the tangible bodies, are finite; they may scatter into tiniest particles, but these particles, the atoms, have their fixed number, and fixed also is the number of shapes which they must needs assume; let ever so long a time elapse, still by virtue of the eternal laws of combination of this eternal play of recurrence, all the forms which have already existed on earth will once again come up, to attract, repel, kiss, and lose each other as before. And so will it come to pass one day that once again a man will be born just like myself, and a woman will be born just like Maria; only let us hope that the man's head may hold a little less nonsense, and that the two may meet each other in a better land. . . ."°

If we are to trust Captain Marryat, then Mr. Muddle, the ship's carpenter of *Peter Simple* (1834), must also be reckoned among the original inventors of our doctrine.

'Philosopher Chips' was convinced that "the universe had its cycle of events which turned round, so that in a certain period of time everything was to happen over again . . . I have been as close to it as possible, sir, I do assure you, although you find fault; but 27,672 years ago you were first lieutenant of this ship, and I was carpenter, although we recollect nothing about it; and 27,672 years hence we shall both be standing by this boat, talking about the repairs, as we are now.' . . . This theory made him very indifferent as to danger, or indeed as to anything. It was of no consequence, the affair took its station in the course of time. It had happened at the above period, and would happen again. Fate was fate."

The doctrine of eternal recurrence is expounded likewise by philosophers or natural scientists, sometimes in arguments amazingly similar to Nietzsche's. Herbert Spencer in his *First Principles* is led to the conclusion that "Motion as well as Matter being fixed in quantity, it would seem that the change in the distribution of Matter which Motion effects, coming to a limit in whichever direction it is carried, the indestructible Motion thereupon necessitates a reverse distribution. Apparently, the universally co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes throughout the Universe, also necessitate rhythm in the totality of its changes . . . —alternate eras of Evolution and Dissolution. And thus there is suggested the conception of a past during which there have been successive Evolutions analogous to that which is now going on; and a future during which successive Evolutions may go on—ever the same in principle but never the same in concrete result."° The qualification contained in the last clause should not be overlooked. The Schopenhauerian Julius Bahnsen in his critical writing directed against Hegelianism and Eduard von Hartmann, *Zur Philosophie der Geschichte*, attacks the notion of unlimited progressive development and insists on regarding the world-process,

not as an eternal, infinite projection in a straight line, but rather as cyclic in character. "No matter how far the radius of this cycle of evolution be extended in time, still in the end the overflow of forces and the possibility of new combinations is bound to be exhausted, and the recurrent game will start all over again *a novo et ab ovo*." °

We have no reason for supposing that Nietzsche was acquainted with Spencer; it is likely, however, that he, a Schopenhauerian, was aware of Bahnsen's book. But perhaps neither Bahnsen nor Spencer are sufficiently explicit and elaborate. Louis Auguste Blanqui is both. Writing during his imprisonment, this French politician maintains in *L'éternité par les astres, hypothèse astronomique* (1872) that the infinity of the universe in space and time demands an infinite repetition of possible combinations. "Whatever one may have been here below, he is that somewhere else. Besides one's entire life, from birth to death, which one lives on a myriad of earths, ten thousand different editions of it are lived on still other planets. . . . That which I am writing at this moment in a dungeon of the Taureau fortress, I have written before and I shall write again during eternity, on such a table, with such a pen, in similar clothes and circumstances. And so with everyone else. . . . At the present hour the entire life of our planet, from birth to death, is displayed day by day on myriads of other stars, with all its crimes and woes. That which we call progress is immured in each earth and vanishes with it. Always and everywhere on the earthly stage the same drama, the same scenery, the same narrow scene: a blustering humanity infatuated with its greatness, believing itself to be the universe, and living in its prison as in an immensity, only to sink all too soon with the profoundest disdain under the load of its pride. The same monotony, the same immobilism in the alien stars. The universe repeats itself without end; it is a pawing horse. Eternity plays imperturbably the same pieces to infinity." ° Blanqui's theory is

explicitly mentioned by Lange in his *History of Materialism*, a work which Nietzsche had read repeatedly, prized very highly, and recommended to his friends.^o In his discussion of Lucretius, Lange, noting *De rerum natura*, II, lines 480-521, refers to Blanqui's hypothesis in the following terms: "Recently a Frenchman, A. Blanqui, has again in all seriousness advanced the idea that everything possible has been already and repeatedly realized in the Universe, and advanced it as the incontestable consequence of the absolute infinity of the world coupled with the finite and throughout constant number of the elements, whose possible combinations must likewise be finite. This last is also an Epicurean idea."^o

In 1878, at the Munich Congress of German Naturalists, Carl von Naegeli delivered an address on the Limits of Science, which attracted almost as much attention in Germany as the analogous *Ignorabimus* speech of Du Bois-Reymond, to which it explicitly referred. The celebrated Munich naturalist, holding nature to be infinitely extended and infinite in divisibility and composition, regarded the comprehension of the totality of things as beyond the reach of science. Laplace's hypothesis of an omniscient, scientific intelligence transgresses the limits of the conceivable. All our knowledge, of beginning, of end, of identity, of space and time, falls short of the absolute: we must be on our guard against ignoring the frame of the relative within which we are obliged to move, else we are involved in strange hypotheses. Thus "should we, in accordance with the very notion of space, regard celestial space as infinite, then celestial bodies would follow after celestial bodies, without end,—variable in size, in composition, in state of development; and since size, composition, and state of development remain within finite limits, the possible combinations form a number *infinitely great* according to the time-hallowed expression, but still not infinite. This number once exhausted, the same combinations should repeat themselves. We cannot avoid this

conclusion by objecting that sextillions of celestial bodies and celestial systems would not suffice to exhaust the number of possible combinations, for these sextillions are, in eternity, less than a drop of water in the ocean. We thus arrive at this conclusion, strictly mathematical but repugnant to our reason, that our earth, exactly as it is at present, exists a number of times, indeed an infinite number of times, in the infinite universe, and that the jubilee which we are celebrating today is being celebrated just at this moment on many other earths."° Fouillée, the first to quote from Naegeli's address in this connection,° observes here an alternative hypothesis which Nietzsche apparently had overlooked: the hypothesis of a simultaneous repetition *ad infinitum*, a sort of eternal recurrence in space. It had been involved also in Blanqui's speculations.

Three years later, in 1881, Gustave Le Bon, in the résumé of the second volume of his work *L'Homme et les sociétés*, maintained that "the possible combinations which a given number of atoms can form being limited, and time being unlimited, all the possible forms of development have necessarily been realized long ago, and we can but repeat combinations already attained."° This year, 1881, officially chronicled the birth of the idea of Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's mind. And here we have the most amazing of coincidences which Fouillée has studied at some length.° Fouillée notes that, without knowing it, he himself, Jean Marie Guyau, and Nietzsche had lived at the same time in Nice and at Menton. Guyau, he maintains, knew nothing whatever of Nietzsche's works, not even his name (we must remember it was Georg Brandes' article on Nietzsche in 1888° which first brought him and his doctrines to the attention of the public outside of Germany and even in Germany). Guyau was likewise ignorant of Blanqui's doctrine, Fouillée assures us. Nietzsche, on the contrary, not only knew of Guyau, but had read his works carefully and annotated two of them, *Esquisse*

d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction° and *L'irréligion de l'avenir*.

A striking coincidence of experience and doctrine connects the two men. During the same years when Nietzsche was having visions of eternal recurrence in the Engadine, Guyau also at San Moritz and Silvaplana was turning the same ideas over in his head and was abandoning himself to similar poetic and metaphysical inspirations. It was from spectral analysis and Laplace's cosmogony that Blanqui had sought to deduce eternal recurrence. Now in 1881 Guyau had published *Vers d'un philosophe*, one of the best lyrics in which is entitled "L'Analyse spectrale." Man had thought the stars different from this our earth; man had peopled the heavens with gods and goddesses. But spectral analysis has disclosed in the celestial sweeps worlds the same as ours, with the same stuffs and substances as those in the chemist's laboratory: iron, zinc, nickel, copper. There is nothing new under the sun:

Partout à nos regards la nature est la même;
 L'infini ne contient pour nous rien de nouveau. . . .
 Depuis l'éternité, quel but peux-tu poursuivre?
 S'il est un but, comment ne pas l'avoir atteint?
 Puisque tout se ressemble et se tient dans l'espace,
 Tout se copie aussi, j'en ai peur, dans le temps;
 Ce qui passe revient, et ce qui revient passe:
 C'est un cercle sans fin que la chaîne des ans.
 Est-il rien de nouveau dans l'avenir qui s'ouvre?
 Peut-être,—qu'on se tourne en arrière, en avant,—
 Tout demeure le même: au loin on ne découvre
 Que le plis et replis du grand serpent mouvant. . . .
 Mais, ma pensée, es-tu toi-même bien nouvelle,
 N'es-tu point déjà née et morte quelque part?

Lichtenberger° affirms with assurance that Nietzsche did not know Blanqui or LeBon; if eternal recurrence is expounded by so many others besides Nietzsche, that only shows that the idea was no mere individual production of a morbid imagination, but a real tendency of the modern

spirit. Now whether, in view of all our evidence, we have here a case of amazing coincidence, or else a case of cryptomnesia, as H. Bois would maintain,^o—illusion of novelty,—or plagiarism, as Benn bluntly asserts,^o certain it is that the idea of eternal recurrence did not descend upon Nietzsche with all its import and staggering implications until a day in August, 1881, in Sils-Maria, "6000 feet above the sea and far higher above all human things."^o He happened to be walking through the woods of the Lake of Silvaplana and he halted not far from Surlei, beside a huge rock that towered aloft like a pyramid. It was there that this thought came to him. "This life, as thou livest it at present, and hast lived it, thou must live it once more, and also innumerable times; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh and all the unspeakably small and great in thy life must come to thee again, and all in the same series and sequence,—and similarly this spider, and this moonlight among the trees, and similarly this moment, and I myself. The eternal sand-glass of existence will ever be turned once more, and thou with it, thou speck of dust!"^o It is a demon's idea, and an idea of divine import. It crushes him and it exalts him; so much pride and so much depression it has rarely been vouchsafed to man to experience simultaneously. To Fräulein Lou Salomé he confides his idea as a mystery unspeakable;^o to Peter Gast he confesses his woes, but to him he also writes on August 14, 1881: "My emotional intensities make me shudder and laugh. . . . On my horizon have risen thoughts such as I have not yet seen. . . . I really should live yet a few years."^o He has the overwhelming sense of impending creation. *Incipit tragoedia*, he writes.^o It is the tragedy and the triumph of Zarathustra.

Convinced of his prééminent originality in advancing the idea of eternal recurrence, Nietzsche recognizes precursors and possible heralds, but no peers in the field.

And, indeed, granting to the full the force of all the parallels and coincidences cited above, still we are bound to grant that the full import of the idea of eternal recurrence, conceived and brought to fruition in connection with the doctrine of the Superman, is Nietzsche's and no one's else. A recognition of this respect in which it *is* original, be it noted right here, may help us determine the central meaning of the doctrine itself for Nietzsche, his attitude towards it, and his use and estimate of it. Others had looked at that which he first perceived. With the Stoics, the idea of eternal recurrence is but cosmological speculation; the first chapter of *Ecclesiastes* is but a wail over the weary monotony of life: "That which hath been is that which shall be, and that which hath been done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun." Heine's aphorism is Gallic and frivolous: "*Mr. Colombe, entdecken Sie uns noch eine neue Welt! Mlle. Thais, stecken Sie noch ein Persepolis in Brand! Mr. Jesus Christ, lassen Sie sich nochmals kreuzigen!*"^o There is no trifling in Nietzsche, but death-earnest; nor is he satisfied with cosmological speculation, nor with wails, nor with mere poetic contemplation of the vanity of vanities. He would ground the new idea in firm science, and from the *tedium vitae* of the ancients he would extract tragedy and triumph.

III

Frau Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche records^o the scientific preparation of her brother's mind for the reception of the great idea. At Sils-Maria in the summer of 1881 he had discussed physics with the local pastor and teacher; during the entire previous year his mind had been occupied with physical, physiological, and mathematical studies: Helmholtz, Wundt's early works, the mathematician Riemann had engaged him, and especially the following three books: O. Schmitz-Dumont's *Die mathematische Elemente*

der Erkenntnisstheorie and *Die Einheit der Naturkräfte* and O. Caspari's *Der Zusammenhang der Dinge*. And we know from his letters that, while he was contending with the newborn idea and perhaps planning a systematic exposition of it, he proposed to himself, as an adequate preparation therefor, an extended course of study in Vienna, Paris, or Munich. He would retire as a writer, resume student life, and then come forward with his scientifically grounded philosophy of eternal recurrence.^o The plan was abandoned largely owing to the poor condition of his eyes. Experimental or strictly scientific demonstration of his idea Nietzsche did not advance; and such demonstration in the nature of the case was scarcely within his powers to give. But even in the brief or aphoristic statements of his doctrine, Nietzsche shows his determination to deduce it rigorously from fundamental principles of physical science, as well as to interpret and exploit it in his general philosophy of value.

A little storm of controversy has gathered about this point: did Nietzsche regard his eternal recurrence as a scientific, demonstrable theory; did his plans include such a scientific demonstration of it, and preparation therefor? Or was the idea of eternal recurrence from first to last a poetic-religious notion to Nietzsche? Those who write of Nietzsche's plans in 1881 to prepare himself for a scientific demonstration of the doctrine can find support in Frau Lou Andreas-Salomé's book, *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken*.^o Frau Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche in the biography of her brother has lost no opportunity to brand Frau Andreas-Salomé's work as an utterly false and unintelligent interpretation of Nietzsche's character, philosophy, and spiritual enterprise.^o Ernst Horneffer (whose monograph entitled *Nietzsche's Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunft und derer bisherigen Veröffentlichung* is mainly a polemical writing against F. Koenig's editorship of Nietzsche's works) maintains, against Frau Andreas-Salomé and those who rely on her statements, that

Nietzsche's manuscripts disclose him as holding eternal recurrence, not as a scientific, but as a religio-poetic idea. According to Horneffer, Nietzsche planned no natural-scientific demonstration of his doctrine. Koegel's 'discovery' of a proposed outline of a prosaic, non-aphoristic treatise on eternal recurrence is regarded by Horneffer as resting on Koegel's utter confusion in dealing with Nietzsche's manuscript sketch, which evidently refers to *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.^o Not as a scientist, then, but as the prophet of a new gospel is Nietzsche to be judged. Analysis and demonstration were little to his purpose. Nietzsche must have promptly realized that his doctrine required expression in no ordinary language but in a speech of religious, solemn fervor—the speech and the style familiar to every reader of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. *Zarathustra* is a symphony written on two main motifs, one of them eternal recurrence: "To this thought we are indebted for *Zarathustra*, the conception of which rests on it alone;"^o and no one can understand Nietzsche's doctrine who fails to appreciate the significance of the style of *Zarathustra*.

Nevertheless not all of Nietzsche's statements on the idea of eternal recurrence are of the oracular-prophetic variety. We do have approximations to systematic exposition of the doctrine in Nietzsche's works, notably in the *Will to Power*, 1053-1067, and especially in the *Notes on Eternal Recurrence*, probably an early statement as it is surely the most reasoned and least dithyrambic statement of the doctrine.^o

The idea of eternal recurrence, according to Nietzsche, is inevitably involved in the principle of the conservation of energy. Conservation of energy means that the quantity of force in the world remains constant, but this in turn can only mean that it is a finite quantity. To say that the amount of energy in the world is neither increased nor diminished and also to think of the energy as infinite, is the same as to speak, with Schopenhauer, of wooden iron.

Statements
alligned
for the
doctrine.

So the extent of universal energy is limited. Space is likewise finite, or rather, space is but an abstraction; like matter, it is a subjective form. The world is not *in* space, in the sense that unlimited space surrounds it. We cannot therefore admit the possibility of a gradual dissipation of energy in infinite empty space, for there is no such thing as empty space. Everything is energy. Time, on the other hand, is no mere subjective form, but real and infinite. The gateway of the present is two-faced; backwards and forwards stretch the two eternal lanes of the past and the future.^o

Here we are, then, with a world of limited energy, with only a limited number of possible qualities, operating in unlimited time. Can we admit a beginning or an end of this activity of energy? Was there ever an equilibrium and a first change; will there ever be a last change and an equilibrium? Nietzsche's answer is an emphatic negative. "Energy remains eternally the same and is eternally active."^o If stability were ever possible, it would already have been reached, and the equilibrium thus attained would have persisted: the clock of the universe would be at a standstill. The assumption is accordingly contradicted by the facts.

In the *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction*, Guyau criticizes teleology. "We believe that nature has a goal, that it is getting somewhere; it is because we do not understand nature; we take it for a river which flows on to its mouth and which will arrive there some day, but nature is an ocean. To set a goal before nature would be to cramp it, for a goal is a limit. The immense has no goal." And he goes on to speak of "nature with its endless undulations, its ebbs and flows, the perpetual changes of its surface which hide its deep and monotonous uniformity."^o So Nietzsche: the universe cannot have a final state, a goal; else in the infinity of time already past it would have been attained. Nor yet is the universe capable of self-renovation, for this would imply volun-

no goal of
nature.

tary self-increase of energy, an untenable and indeed an unscientific notion, like unto the old notions of world-creating and world-destroying gods. Precisely in opposition to all theism does Nietzsche advocate his doctrine. His universe is "a monster of energy, without beginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity of energy which grows neither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself but only alters its face. . . . For no instant in its career has it had rest; its energy and its movement have been the same for all time."^o

Finitude of energy—finitude or rather abstractness of space—infinity of time—no beginning or end of activity—no equilibrium—no goal. Now, and here is Nietzsche's main point, "if the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy, as a definite number of centres of energy,—and every other concept remains indefinite and therefore useless,—it follows therefrom that the universe must go through a calculable number of combinations in the great game of chance which constitutes its existence"^o—a game of "infinite transformations of energy, but not transformations infinitely diverse."^o In the eternity already past this calculable number of combinations must have been exhausted, and exhausted not once only but an indefinite number of times. In the eternity yet to come the combinations will be exhausted again and again indefinitely. "An infinite process cannot be conceived otherwise than as periodic."^o Everything that can take place has taken place repeatedly and will do so in the future. This is Nietzsche's conclusion: eternal recurrence is the course of nature. "Everything has returned: Sirius, and the spider, and thy thoughts at this moment, and this last thought of thine that all things will return. . . . Fellow man! your whole life, like a sand-glass, will always be reversed, and will ever run out again. . . . This ring in which you are but a grain will glitter afresh for ever. And in every one of these cycles of human life there will be one hour when for the first time one man,

and then many, will perceive the mighty thought of the eternal recurrence of all things:—and for mankind this is always the hour of Noon.”^o One does not recall another instance where a writer has thus explicitly recognized himself as the hub and center of the universe.

IV

We should not conclude from the above that the cosmic series is fixed and is repeated in a certain order, that a world ABCDE is followed, when completed, by a world ABCDE over and over. Nature need observe no such monotonous punctilio. Perhaps, before any particular situation recurs, all other possible alternative combinations must be exhausted. But Nietzsche is possibly not committed to such a view of a circular movement of absolutely identical series. Nor does he observe in the world any tendency to become more beautiful, more perfect, more complicated. Nothing of the sort. “All this is anthropomorphism! . . . There is no such thing as imperfection in the realm of mechanics. . . . Let us be on our guard against supposing that anything so methodical as the cyclic motions of our neighboring stars obtains generally and throughout the universe.”^o

We are obviously not in a position to describe in detail the mechanism of eternal recurrence, and therefore should not be dogmatic about it. In one order or in another, or in no order at all, one by one or in pairs, the beads of existence are told out sooner or later, and sooner or later each bead must have its chance over again. “Everything goeth, everything returneth; eternally rolleth the wheel of existence. Everything dieth, everything blossometh forth again; eternally runneth on the year of existence. Everything breaketh, everything is integrated anew; eternally buildeth itself the same house of existence. . . .” But there is no beginning or closing shuffle in this endless game. “Every moment beginneth existence. . . . The

middle is everywhere. Crooked (curved, *krumm*) is the path of eternity."^o

But now, if we reject all teleology as "anthropomorphism," if we refuse to allow any rationality as directive in the world-course, any real world-order; if we can only observe a course of existence and are unable to analyze the sort of course it is, then how are we able to know that this course is recurrent in any sense, whether on the whole or in detail? "Nietzsche," in Salter's judgment, "regards the general mechanical view as useful for purposes of investigation and discovery, but imperfect and provisional."^o Certainly no mechanical laws are imposed on nature; what laws or order it has must express the intrinsic, immanent order of things. But what justifies us, on Nietzsche's premises, in regarding nature as being any sort of a cosmos? Grant (as H. Bois insists, against Höffding) that Nietzsche does not advance a theory of *corsi e ricorsi* such as Vico's, or any theory of divinely appointed or rationally necessitated cyclic uniformity or rhythm in the universe, can we even say, as Bois himself interprets Nietzsche to say that "upon the exhaustion of the series of possible combinations, a second cycle begins, completely identical to the first?"^o

How can we know that any particular combination has had its chance in the world more than once? Must every actor reappear on the stage of existence? Why may we not conceive that, on that stage as on the theatrical, certain poor wights show their faces for one brief moment and then are seen no more, while others return again and again, in dialogue and soliloquy? But there must be an end to the whole play, and a repetition thereof? Why so? Is eternity too long for the repetition *ad indefinitum* of Act V of the drama of existence? That we start again with Act I may be demanded on aesthetic grounds, or that we start with a new piece altogether, as was suggested to Captain Stormfield; but is not this demand itself another sample of the anthropomorphism which Nietzsche

condemns? No more anthropomorphic and, for all we know, no less credible would be the view that, in its long course of existence, the world has acquired certain characteristics, has got into some habits, if you please, which make and will continue to make certain forms of behavior natural to it, and will preclude the recourse or return to certain other forms of behavior. In other words, if, with Nietzsche, we conceive of the universe as a finite quantum of energy eternally active in limited space, and of the number of possible energy combinations as calculable we may yet perhaps, while admitting the possible recurrence of some combinations, doubt the necessary recurrence of them all.

A Nietzschean may object to the repetition *ad libitum* of Act V, rather than a recommencement of Act I: Would we not then be regarding Act V as the goal to which the universe aspires, and would not this view be precisely the anthropomorphism condemned by Nietzsche? So we read: "The 'chaos of the universe,' inasmuch as it excludes any aspiration to a goal, does not oppose the thought of the circular process: the latter is simply an irrational necessity, absolutely free from any ethical or aesthetical significance. Arbitrariness in small things as in great is completely lacking here."^o

Nietzsche himself recognizes his difficulty. "Is not the existence of some sort of irregularity and incomplete circular form in the world about us a sufficient refutation of the regular circularity of everything that exists?"^o Shall we say notwithstanding that, be the combinations never so many or their sequence or rate of recurrence as irregular as you please, yet we have eternity for our ally: in eternity the law of chance will give us the combinations again and again, every one? But, with the whole universe as our metaphysical roulette, what do we know about the law of chance? Or is it 'more reasonable' to expect recurrence of all rather than only of some of the combinations? Perhaps, but in what way is superior reasonableness a dialectic-

tical advantage in a world-view like Nietzsche's? How can one be reasonable about 'the chaos of the universe'; what ground have we for preferring the view that each event, each combination must recur? In order to hold that every combination is recurrent, it would be necessary to regard the world-course as in its nature cyclic in detail; that, however complex the formula of its revolution, it is calculable; that there is a rationale in the world-process which in due time and order brings about the recurrence of every particular combination; in brief, that the universe is verily a cosmos, and not a chaos as Nietzsche holds. And even if Nietzsche held the world to be a cosmos, the demonstration of the eternal recurrence of all things would tax his, or for that matter anyone's, theoretic equipment.

All this, to be sure, implies the concession that the total amount of energy is finite, and that the number of different events possible in the universe is calculable. To Nietzsche those two assumptions seem to be identical; so he writes: "If the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy, as a definite number of centres of energy. . . ."° But, if the principle of the conservation of energy implies, as Nietzsche maintains that it does, that the total amount of energy in the universe is fixed and finite, does this idea in turn warrant the conclusion that the number of centers of energy in the universe is finite, and that therefore there can be only a calculable number of combinations, events, or states of existence?

The question before us means just this: Is a world of finite total magnitude necessarily one composed of a definite number of discrete particles, elements, atoms? A French believer in the scientific validity of Nietzsche's hypothesis has found it to rest fundamentally on the idea of the atom.° But the science upon which Nietzsche relied in urging his advance from the principle of the conservation of energy to the law of eternal recurrence has not supported his variety of atomism. The atom, once viewed as an irreducible bit of inert matter, is now disclosed to

us as itself a miniature system. From the analysis of the atom the astronomer of today seeks to obtain hints as to the probable constitution of celestial systems; the infinitesimal thus becoming a pattern and an analogy of the infinite. "The electron is an atom just as the solar system is an atom, comparatively speaking. To reason about electrons or other alleged ultimates as if they were fixed unities is as childish as to reason about the solar system or about the system of Sirius as if they were immutable individuals without internal sources of change. . . . All the terms of eternal recurrence are *unknowns*, impenetrable to science."° A scientific proof of eternal recurrence is therefore unavailable.

An infinite number of different events or states of existence is abstractly quite compatible with a finite total quantity of energy. So Pascal writes somewhere that there are no two square numbers one of which is double the other, while in geometry we can have a square twice the size of another. Space, we thus see, is not composed of a finite number of indivisibles, but is divisible *ad infinitum*. As Fouillée observes, the number of moves and positions which an atom may make and occupy in a finite volume of space may well be infinite, and infinite also the number of corresponding reconstitutions of the whole. It is only when we artificially devise a game of our own that we have a total of just thirty-two pieces moving on a chess board of just sixty-four squares. The kaleidoscope of the universe can be regarded as affording only a limited number of combinations, only provided the colored bits are all known and numbered, fixed and irreducible. A crack or break of any single piece of glass will give you a new set of patterns. The eternal world is eternally various. But Nietzsche preaches, on the one hand, eternal change; on the other, the eternal *Eadem sunt*. So "Heraclitus and Democritus are clashing in the ardent head of Zarathustra."°

Against Nietzsche it has been maintained° that physical

science warrants, not the doctrine of eternal recurrence, but rather the theory of a gradual diminution of the active energy in the world,—not the *perpetuum mobile* of Nietzsche, but a final state of frozen quiescence. But Nietzsche would retort: "If . . . materialism cannot consistently escape the conclusion of a (final) state, which William Thomson has traced out for it, then materialism is thereby refuted."^o If energetics really involves a state of final equilibrium, such a state in the eternity already elapsed would already have been reached. Hence physical science in this respect is contradicted by the facts, and the doctrine of eternal recurrence is imposed on our intelligence. But are these the only two alternatives—final frozen quiescence or eternal recurrence? It is possible, as Naegeli suggests, that when matter is solidified and condensed sufficiently "forces of which we have at present no inkling would become liberated and, perhaps by a sudden explosion, would bring back the solid mass to a gaseous state."^o Or, as Fouillée observes, "nature could have realized an infinitude of states which do not enter in the formulas of our incomplete science, it could therefore have found applications of energy which it is impossible for us to represent to ourselves." Or perhaps, even if we do proceed towards universal equilibrium, we may proceed only asymptotically: as we approach equilibrium our sensitivity to minor differences and variations may be increased; reconstruct our world to measure the size of a nutshell, but have all of us in it to scale: we should be aware of no difference.^o So in Tony Sarg's puppet-plays, our impression that the puppets are life-size is broken only when the manipulator himself, at the end of the show, steps inside the puppet-stage and is seen amidst his toy men and women.

When Nietzsche rejects empty space and insists that space is as finite as energy, he shows the influence of Kant. But when he writes: "Space like matter is a subjective form, time is not,"^o he shows that he has read his Kant,

but not enough. Theobald Ziegler rightly compares Nietzsche's proof to the "old Zenonian sophistries and false reasonings about the concept of infinity."° Nietzsche forgets that time is no more infinite than space; we are in no position to assign limits to either time or space; both are aspects of the world of experience.° And Nietzsche is versatile enough to use time cavalierly when it suits his purposes. What do we do between the time of our present existence and our next return? "Twixt your last moment of consciousness and the first ray of the dawn of your new life," Nietzsche says, "no time will elapse,—as a flash of lightning will the space go by, even though living creatures think it is billions of years, and are not even able to reckon it. Timelessness and immediate re-birth are compatible, once intellect is eliminated."°

In John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* we read how, during the mental crisis of his youth, he found relief in Weber's *Oberon*, only to be tormented by the thought of the exhaustibility of musical combinations. "The octave consists only of five tones and two semitones, which can be put together in only a limited number of ways; of which but a small proportion are beautiful: most of these, it seemed to me, must have been already discovered, and there could not be room for a long succession of Mozarts and Webers, to strike out, as these had done, entirely new and surpassingly rich veins of musical beauty."° It is amazing that Nietzsche should have failed to observe that the character of a thing is largely determined by its setting. *A*, reappearing in a new context, is no longer just *A*; and even Nietzsche's limited world affords unlimited variation of context: unlimited, if for no other reason, because of possible variation of temporal order and unequal frequency of repetition of individual constituents. Absolute identity is the less admissible the less abstract our view of things is. In reality each thing, each experience, especially each person possesses a certain inexpugnable individuality which only artificial thinking

can ignore. Even overlooking the difficulty that no memory bond of identity connects the recurrent individuals, the assumption that a true individual can ever be duplicated rests on a vain abstraction. "Not only Jehovah, but every real being can say: *Sum qui sum* or at least: *Sum quod sum*."°

V

Now it may well be protested that to treat Nietzsche's eternal recurrence as a scientific or cosmological hypothesis and to pick holes in it is idly to overlook its central significance in Nietzsche's thought, his own attitude towards it, or his estimate of it. We are told that Nietzsche himself did not regard his doctrine as unquestionable science, that he was not interested in it as a scientific, but as a religio-poetic idea, that it was its transfiguring power rather than its abstract correctness which made him cling to it. Nietzsche seeks to evoke, to create a certain state of mind, a certain spiritual mood. And he saw in this idea a lever for the exaltation of human life; what enraptured him was "not the idea itself, but what it meant to him as the Yea and Amen to his philosophy of world-transfiguration and world-apotheosis, and what effect he expected it to have on mankind."°

We need not demonstrate the validity of the doctrine; we need only vindicate its power and practical utility in the life of mankind. Does it work, is the main consideration; not, is it true? There is more than a streak of pragmatism in Nietzsche,° although it is interesting to observe that "the same Nietzsche who is so stirred up over the 'undemonstrable' suppositions of religion, would himself as it were burn into the living flesh of humanity an unproved doctrine."° But is the practical, ethical vindication of Nietzsche's doctrine possible any more than its theoretical demonstration?

The power, the gripping character of the idea which

confronts us can scarcely be questioned. Whether or not we accept Riehl's satirical analysis to the effect that Nietzsche accepted the idea of eternal recurrence precisely because it was "terrible and great,"^o it is not surprising that Nietzsche found this idea irresistible. The more it staggered him, the less he could resist it. Reject or ignore it, he could not; it becomes his aim to learn how to endure it. Tragically autobiographic is the chapter of the Third Part of *Zarathustra* entitled "The Convalescent." "Eternally he returneth, the man of whom thou art weary, the small man—so yawned my sadness, and dragged its foot and could not go to sleep. . . . Ah! man returneth eternally! Naked had I seen both of them, the greatest man and the smallest man: all too like one another—all too human, even the greatest man! All too small, even the greatest man! that was my disgust at man! And the eternal return even of the smallest man—that was my disgust at all existence! Ah, Disgust! Disgust! Disgust!" It is as if a serpent has crept into your throat, choking you; as if a demon has crept into your loneliest loneliness and crushed you with the prospect of the eternal monotonous recurrence—of dust!

But the demon is countered, the shepherd bites off the head of the serpent, spews it out and springs up—"No longer shepherd, no longer man—a transfigured being, a light-surrounded being, that *laughed!*"^o The most disgusting, horrible idea has become endurable, has become tragic, triumphant, through the transvaluation of all values in terms of the ideal of the superman, "the ideal of the most world-approving, exuberant, and vivacious man . . . insatiably calling out *da capo!*"^o "How can I bear my immortality, my perpetual return?" Nietzsche asks. It is a striking reversal of Kant's argument. Kant reasons: The moral ideal demands immortality. Nietzsche: What morality do I require to be able to tolerate immortality? For this determines the worth of a man, or of a people: the capacity to stamp the experience of a day with the

seal of eternity. In *Zarathustra* the doctrine of eternal recurrence has raised the question, What virtue is needed, eternally to be able to welcome existence? How is it that eternal recurrence is to be "the highest formula of a Yea-saying to life:"^o yea-saying to life, to life as a whole, for the sake of that wherein life is ennobled? So the most hideous man declares that one holiday with Zarathustra has taught him to love the earth, life, and death. So Zarathustra exclaims: "Pain is also a joy, curse is also a blessing, night is also a sun. . . . Said ye ever Yea to one joy? O my friends, then said ye Yea to *all* woe." This is the Drunken Song of Zarathustra, in the joy of life learning to welcome life's eternal recurrence:

O Man! Take Heed!
 What saith deep midnight's voice indeed?
 I slept my sleep,—
 From deepest dream I've woke, and plead:—
 The world is deep,
 And deeper than the day could read.
 Deep is its woe,—
 Joy—deeper still than grief can be:
 Woe saith: Hence! Go!
 But joys all want eternity,
 —Want deep, profound eternity!

So Guyau finds in the Alpine peaks of sublime experience the justification of the demand for immortality. It is our best moments we desire eternalized. "Suppose it were given you to be for one instant a Newton discovering his law or a Jesus preaching love on the Mount: the rest of your life would seem to you colorless and void; you would readily secure this instant at the price of all. Give one the choice between living over the monotonous length of his entire life or living over the small number of perfectly happy hours which he recalls: few men will hesitate."^o The contemplation of our noblest, of the superman, atones for the recurrence of our all. Through the contemplation of the superman, Nietzsche learned to endure the idea of the eternal return: "Verily a polluted

stream is man. One must be a sea, to receive a polluted stream without becoming impure. Lo, I teach you the Superman: he is that sea; in him can your great contempt be submerged."° So we read in *The Will to Power*: "If our soul has vibrated and rung with happiness, like a chord, once only and only once . . . all eternity, in this single moment of our affirmation, was called good, was saved, justified, and blessed."° Not turning away from this life and gloomily hoping for another, but making this life deserving of its own eternal recurrence: *Non alia sed haec vita sempiterna*—this is the text of superman morality; and this is its maxim: "Is this such a deed as I am prepared to perform an incalculable number of times?"°

A discrepancy appears in Zarathustra's gospel. On the one hand it is the gospel of the superman, a forward-looking gospel, the gospel of what is not-yet, a gospel of aspiration: "All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and ye want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man?"° A heroic morality this, for noble spirits that are to create a world which *is not* except in their wills to achieve it. Is this ideal striving strengthened by the assurance of the cyclic return of all things? Lichtenberger is scarcely convincing: "I shall take an interest in that marvellous interaction of combinations which has already produced so many good and beautiful things, which has given birth to man and which will, perhaps, likewise give birth to the Superman. I shall wish with all the fervour of my soul that this blind fate may one day realize, beyond man, some miraculous, dazzling success."° Why perhaps? Why some miraculous success? According to the doctrine of eternal recurrence all that is or can be has already been, incalculable times over. The lightning that is to lick you with its tongue, the frenzy with which you are to be inoculated, the heavy drops falling one by one out of the dark cloud that lowereth over man: the Soothsayer and

the Sorcerer and Zarathustra himself, ape and man and superman: all have been and gone time without count!

The contrast is eloquent. The superman gospel urges man toward a goal; but for the doctrine of eternal recurrence "the goal of humanity is . . . not evolution towards happiness or evolution towards blessedness, but *evolution*."^o Horneffer, to be sure, argues that only a victorious life could endure eternal recurrence.^o True; but is it as striving after superman that our eternal return is justified, or in being superman? What is the meaning of the command to rise upward to superman, when we have already done it countless times? Ah, but in the past as now, the idea of the eternal return has spurred me on to climb the heights of superman. Yes, but if I have climbed those heights it is only because, in spite of the doctrine of eternal recurrence, I have felt myself to be the heroic champion in battles new, the upbuilder of a new temple, a pioneer of value, the destroyer of old and the graver of really new tablets!

The ancient high priests of the doctrine of metempsychosis taught that man travels up and down the scale. This my present act is fraught with grave possibilities; it may exalt me in the hereafter, or hurl me down; in the hereafter that never was and is yet to be, which I am even now first fashioning for myself. But Nietzsche's eternal recurrence: "*not* to a new life, or a better life, or a similar life:—I come eternally to this identical and selfsame life, in its greatest and its smallest, to teach again the eternal return of all things,—To speak again the word of the great noontide of earth and man, to announce again to man the Superman."^o

Is there no unconscious irony in the solemn pronouncements: "The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is the turning point in history." "I gave you the most weighty thought: maybe mankind will perish through it, perhaps also mankind will be elevated through it inasmuch as by its means the elements which are hostile to life will be

overcome and eliminated." (Note the "maybe" and the "perhaps also!") Again: "My philosophy reveals the triumphant thought. . . . Those races that cannot bear it are doomed: those which regard it as the greatest blessing are destined to rule."^o Doomed and destined—times without number! Marcus Aurelius always bore in his mind the fleeting nature of all things, in order not to value them unduly and to be able to live in their midst. Nietzsche would "seek an eternity for everything;" yet his consolation is "that everything that is true is eternal: the sea will wash it up again:"^o as if eternal recurrence had aught to do with truth and value as distinguished from their opposites! The sea washes up everything.

Oscar Ewald has sought to overcome this conflict between Nietzsche's two main doctrines by treating eternal recurrence symbolically, and the superman, not as the realizable goal, but as the permanent possibility of evolution. In the *Drunken Song of Zarathustra*, the verses,

Joys all want eternity,
Want deep, profound eternity,

express the idea of eternal recurrence, while in the verse,

Woe saith: Hence! Go!

the doctrine of the superman is expressed. Ewald tries to make sense of Nietzsche by treating Zarathustra's utterances as symbolical. "The truth, the one truth, is the symbolizing of eternal recurrence and its identification with the superman. The error, the one error, is treating eternal recurrence realistically and the impossibility of harmonizing it with the superman."^o

Treat the doctrine of the superman as the parable of ideal aspiration; treat the doctrine of eternal recurrence as the deep perennial Yea of the soul to a career of ideal striving, and the two doctrines disclose their inner unity. This interpretation, however, implies that Nietzsche's view of nature and of human life is invariably one of ethical idealism, a consistently and unflinchingly heroic view.

But in Nietzsche's house of life heroic aspiration and a somewhat cynical fatalism try to manage together. He seems to vacillate aphoristically between vigilance and resignation.^o "Eternity is at stake!" he warns us. *At stake?* "Live so that thou mayest desire to live again—that is thy duty, for," he concludes, "in any case thou wilt live again!" Now here is a problem, and Nietzsche recognizes it: "If everything is necessary, what control have I over my actions?" Why do you urge me to do what I in any case shall or shall not do as a matter of course? My opinions, my thought, are just as much determining factors as land, birth, climate, nourishment. But my opinion, my thought—all this has already been! How do you urge me to be altered; it has all *been*, and you expect heroic ardor from me now, Satirist? "Let us stamp the impress of eternity upon our lives!" *Let us?*

Every utterance of the doctrine of eternal recurrence is as a blight to morality; morality withers and shrivels before it, for the life is gone out of it; the life of morality—not eternal recurrence, but eternal aspiration. Nietzsche is perhaps right in saying that only the vision of superman would make man endure eternal recurrence. But the superman is ever man's Beyond: the ideal goal of aspiration; and what man is thus taught to endure and welcome is not eternal recurrence, but eternal aspiration. But *Da Capo* without a real *Beyond* is not melody or harmony but tedious monotony, boredom insufferable, the Vanity of Vanities of Ecclesiastes.

"The highest thing of all would be for us to be able to endure our immortality."^o Yes, but not in the sense intended by Nietzsche. Not this, to endure the endless repetition of the masterpiece of life; but this, to endure, to welcome the eternal pursuit of the ideal, ever too high to allow of full attainment, the eternal devotion to a task ever too abundant to allow of completion. Nietzsche has been led to import into ethics, into the realm of values, mechanical notions of finitude, cycles, and revolutions. So

the truth has escaped him that with God a thousand years are as one day and one day as a thousand years, because God's work is always being done, and never done with. On the road of values the signpost reads ever: Beyond! Excelsior! There is no mere *Da Capo* in the symphony of God.

So Nietzsche's maxim requires revision. Not: Is this such a deed as I am prepared to perform an incalculable number of times? But rather: Is this such a deed as I shall an incalculable number of times bless myself for having performed? The goal in this second maxim is no more fixed and arbitrary, but it is ever a goal, ever stirring ardor, aspiration, ever rousing the fundamental response of man's moral nature. So *haec vita sempiterna* need not mean the monotonous eternal recurrence of this same life; it can mean that this our life, each moment of it, is a step in our eternal career, eternally significant in helping and determining that career:—a solemn but not a depressing thought. On this eternal road of ideals the pilgrim's call is ever the same: Is this step one which enables me more assuredly to take the next step—ever higher, ever forward? Such a call a creative spirit hears and answers; and only such a call. But the doctrine of eternal recurrence is out of harmony with a heroic doctrine of value. Arthur Drews's comment is decisive: "Nietzsche looks to the belief in eternal recurrence for a complete transformation of humanity. . . . As if the doctrine of eternal recurrence does not involve the purest fatalism, which destroys the foundation of any kind of morality."^o

Remarks -

- (i) wrong view of Energy
- (ii) wrong view of time - circular or straight?
- (iii) wrong view of Infinity - Infinite Process must be periodic
- (iv) Nietzsche inconsistent - Eternal repetition
• Eternal Recurrence inconsistent
- (v) Involves fatalism of the worst type

CHAPTER VI

POSITIVISTIC IMMORTALITY

I

IN John Stuart Mill's *Autobiography* we read how his father's views on religion were moulded by reading Butler's *Analogy*. Bishop Butler's argument, that our minds move necessarily in a region of probability and that orthodox theology is confronted with difficulties no graver than those which deism or natural religion must face, has strengthened traditional belief in some minds and made for scepticism in others. To James Mill's faith it proved a precarious bulwark. The logic of the *Analogy* did not convince him; it rather led him, away from dogmatic theism and atheism alike, to a recognition of the natural limits of human knowledge. "Concerning the origin of things nothing whatever can be known." ° This agnostic metaphysic did not keep the elder Mill from pursuing knowledge where it was to be had, but it did make his attitude towards religion decidedly negative. There is no reliable vision of the Beyond, and of the here-and-now a science is possible but no religion. So James Mill, in a Lucretian spirit, glowered at religion and cultivated his empirical-hedonistic garden.

This attitude was shared by John Stuart Mill and was in a measure responsible for the spiritual crisis of his youth recorded in the *Autobiography*. While the younger Mill succeeded in regaining a zeal for living by infusing his philosophy of life with something of religious enthusiasm, he remained to the end, despite occasional echoes of

halting mysticism in his posthumously published *Three Essays on Religion*, fundamentally suspicious of all traditional religiosity. One should not be misled by Mill's occasional apparent concessions to supernaturalism.^o On the central point he is quite firm: "The notion of a providential government by an omnipotent Being for the good of his creatures must be entirely dismissed." So likewise with regard to immortality: "To any one who feels it conducive either to his satisfaction or to his usefulness to hope for a future state as a possibility, there is no hindrance to his indulging that hope;" all the same "there is no assurance whatever of a life after death, on grounds of natural religion." Mill was not obstinately irreligious; he was far from insensible to the religious appeal of Humanity and Duty, and he hailed the prospect of a victory of the Good, and the work for it, as a "religion of the Future . . . with or without supernatural sanctions." But the least hint of the pontifical was sufficient to rouse his hostility.

This attitude of John Stuart Mill accounts for some of the severity with which, in his papers on *Auguste Comte and Positivism* he treats the founder of the positivist religion, whose contributions to philosophy and philosophical method he values so highly.^o The thought of the Mills, father and son, exhibits, in varying degrees, a tendency of the human mind to express its conviction that human knowledge is inevitably limited and relative by an agnostic indifference or at best by a halting concession to religion.

Now it is a distinguishing merit of Comte that he extracts strength from weakness and assurance from scepticism. What little religion Stuart Mill has is in spite of his empiricism and positivism in philosophy; it rests on a Great Perhaps. But Comte's religion is possible and assured and enthusiastic just because of his philosophic positivism. He is ardent, not resigned, and this his spiritual originality explains to a large degree the religious appeal of his doctrine. It is charged, not with a new,

but with a newly and freshly conceived sense of human values. Comte would stir our ardor for a destiny which we have usually taken for granted without being appreciably thrilled or satisfied therewith. It is this joyous devotion to humanity which characterizes the positivist, rather than any specific adherence to new ritual or doctrine.

This enthusiastic assurance of subjective survival, of an immortality of influence, I shall now undertake to examine. I am attempting here no erudite analysis of Comte's philosophy in detail, nor do I care for any erotic psychoanalysis of Comte himself. The reader will find in this chapter nothing whatever about Madame Clotilde de Vaux. My main interest is in the philosophical foundations and in the adequacy of the idea itself.

II

Paul Dupuy^o and other severe judges of Comte have treated him as a mere echo of Saint Simon. But a fundamental difference in method distinguished Comte from Saint Simon, Fourier, and the other Utopians. Christian socialism and phalansteries cannot really reform modern society, for they do not touch the heart of the trouble. This is an initial warning in Comte's *Philosophie Positive*: "The great political and moral crisis that societies are now undergoing is shown by a rigid analysis to arise out of intellectual anarchy. . . . Till a certain number of general ideas can be acknowledged as a rallying point of social doctrine, the nations will remain in a revolutionary state."^o Initially, then, Comte had no political or economic projects of reform, and certainly no panaceas. The salvation of mankind which he undertook was to be philosophic, through understanding. Thus unlike the programs of his Utopian masters, his was essentially the program of a theorist who recognized the first importance of sound thinking.

As a man thinketh, so is he. And Comte observed in man's thinking three stages of progress towards truth: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive-scientific. Man's primitive philosophy explains the course of events by tracing them to the immediate agency of supernatural beings. So when a pestilence ravages the Greek armies encamped before Troy, Homer ascribes it to the wrath of Apollo.^o This is the viewpoint of the mythologist and the theologian. As the human mind advances to the next stage, it postulates veritable entities and forces, that is, personified abstractions, and views them as inherent in all things and responsible for the course of events in nature. And just as in the theological stage the highest perfection is reached in the monotheistic ascription of all events to the agency of one Supreme Deity, so the last step in the metaphysical stage involves the referring of all phenomena to one Supreme Entity, Nature.

These two stages are both varieties of Absolutism. But gradually, in one field of investigation after another, the mind abandons "the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws, —that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance."^o This is the positive stage of human thought: the scientific study of particular phenomena replaces speculation about the world as a whole. The positive stage of thought is reached earlier by some minds than by others, and earlier in some fields of thought than in others, so that we find contemporary minds at different stages of thought, and an individual may be a true scientist in one department of his thinking, a metaphysician in another, and a theologian in yet another. The advance throughout is from the mythology and theology of the childhood of thought to the mind's maturity in science. The metaphysical stage is really transitional.

To understand the order of advance towards positive knowledge which characterizes the development of the

human mind, account should be taken of the hierarchy of the sciences. Abstract theoretical sciences are classified by Comte in the order of their generality, thus: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Social Physics. Each of these presupposes and rests on the sciences which precede it in the list, and cannot attain the positive stage unless and until the preceding sciences have attained it. The science of society, which Comte called Sociology, is thus bound to be the last to attain positivity. Whether Comte created Sociology, or only made its creation possible, as Mill maintained,^o assuredly it was Comte who preëminently realized the importance of a philosophical synthesis of the various sciences, a synthesis of which the creation of social science was the positive expression.

Comte observed in the thought of his time a clash between the positive spirit of science and the theological-metaphysical spirit of pre-scientific speculation. The several sciences seemed to pursue each its special course. But the mind of man demands, and rightly demands, a synthesis of knowledge in terms of some comprehensive point of view. This demand physical science has not been able to meet; this demand man has sought to satisfy by recourse to theological and metaphysical philosophies, essentially at variance with the spirit of positive science. Hence the fundamental spiritual crisis in modern life. There is only one way out of this difficulty: to realize the progress of the several sciences as leading up to a conception positive, synthetic, philosophic, and thus to transform positive science into a genuine philosophy of life.

The attainment of this aim depends upon the possibility of a science of human society. If the human mind, which has attained scientific knowledge of celestial, physical, chemical, and biological phenomena, can reach in its advance to a positive interpretation of man, of human life, human thought, then the mind's advance would be complete and all-along-the-line, then the thorough possession of the

mind by the spirit of science will resolve the fundamental spiritual crisis of our time.

It is only when we conceive in some such way Comte's essential purpose that we can appreciate the unbelievable tenacity and the religious devotion with which, undaunted by opposition and persecution, and banishing all else from his mind, he applied himself to that progressive analysis of the series of sciences which filled the six volumes of his *Cours de philosophie positive*.

III

Comte's object is to attain a positive philosophical synthesis by giving us a science of Man. Yet his list of the sciences does not include psychology, and he has naturally been censured for ignoring, in a human synthesis of knowledge, the science of human consciousness. Now, to be sure, we should not be led into a mere verbal confusion. The *psychologie* which Comte attacked was not psychological science, but "a pseudo-science entirely independent of physiology,"^o to wit, introspective intuitionism. Needless to point out, Comte's distrust of introspection (How can the mind which perceives observe itself as perceiving?)^o has not been justified by the more recent progress of experimental psychology. But we should quite misjudge his view of human nature if we were to conclude, from his condemnation of those who ignored the biologic basis of consciousness, that he was prepared to treat psychology as a mere chapter in biological science.

Here we should understand Comte's position better if we remember that, in his view, the superior science presupposes the inferior, but is not assumed or comprehended in it. As we advance from geometry to astronomy, to physics, chemistry, biology, we carry over into each of these sciences advantages of method and knowledge attained in the sciences preceding it on the list: A bar of iron is not subject to the laws which characterize the be-

havior of an ox; an ox is subject to the mechanical and chemical laws which concern the bar of iron, and to further biologic laws. Comte therefore criticized the intuitionists for relying exclusively on their interior observation, and thus ignoring the inevitable biological-chemical-physical basis of mind. But Comte himself did not commit the contrary error of regarding mind and human life generally as a merely biologic process, or psychology as simply a section in physiology. Precisely this bare reduction of the superior science to the inferior he rightly regards as the fundamental fallacy of materialism.

This point requires emphasis. Materialists have often proposed "an immortality of fame" as a substitute for the rejected immaterial hereafter; there is accordingly a danger of confusing this notion with positivistic immortality and, by unwarranted logic, proceeding to the further error of treating Comte as a materialist in his own view of man. So Büchner writes: "He who wishes for immortality must not desire it for himself or for his own poor individuality, which is but a single ripple in the vast ocean of existence, but for the share which he, as an individual, has contributed to the existence of the *ensemble*." So likewise Baron d'Holbach, before Comte's day, in his *Système de la Nature*: "The desire to be immortal or to live in the memory of men has always been the passion of great souls." But, as has already been observed in the chapter on Materialism and Immortality, it would be difficult to account for such aspirations and enthusiasms and values, if the world and human life were indeed what Holbach and Büchner conceive them to be. Comte is not to be confused with these men; he is no exponent of the physical theory of moral values. Quite the reverse: his doctrine is as much opposed to it as to the immaterialism of the orthodox theologian.

The anti-materialism of positivistic theory has been developed and brought out clearly by later writers. So John Stuart Mill observes: "The relation of thought to a

material brain is no metaphysical necessity; but simply a constant coëxistence within the limits of observation." To understand thought, more than the understanding of brain is needed: the recognition of all-important super-biologic factors. Biology and evolution are not all-comprehensive notions any more than mechanics and chemistry. So if any biologist imagines that "a more elaborate analysis of cerebral phenomena would ultimately enable (him) to tabulate the conditions of the rise of Christianity," the world laughs. There is more in man and his world than is dreamt of in biology. For man is a moral being. To be sure, moral activity has a physical basis. But this is only one-half of the story. An important half: recognition of it in Gall's phrenological theory is responsible for Comte's high estimate of Gall. But the results of Gall's inquiries are so meagre precisely "owing to the insufficiency of the individual, that is, biological, view of man." The other half of the story is that man, as man, is not a mere biological individual, but a social being. This double truth concerning human nature is expressed by an English thinker deeply influenced by Comte, George H. Lewes, in his formulation of psychological principles: "Man is not simply an Animal Organism, he is also an unit in a Social Organism. . . . Man apart from Society is simply an animal organism. . . . It is in the development of Civilization that we trace the real development of Humanity. . . . Mind cannot be explained without constant recognition of the statico-dynamical relations of Organism and Social Medium." The first of these points to the sub-human foundations of human nature; the second indicates man's characteristic establishment upon these sub-human foundations.

This is the central point in the positivistic doctrine of Man: 'human' is 'social.' To explain man we may not appeal to imagined immaterial entities, and we cannot limit our view only to biologic individual factors. We must perceive that man is no mere biologic individual, but

the product of and the agent in a social process, that human activity is social activity, and human advance social advance. This fundamentally social conception of man explains the place assigned to Sociology in Comte's philosophical scheme. It is involved and developed in the positivistic view of human destiny. It is exalted and invested with the halo of religion in the Comtean Cult of Humanity.

John Stuart Mill observes that no one before Comte has realized so fully as he all the majesty of which the idea of humanity is susceptible. It is humanity which modifies the world and dominates man; the individual, strictly speaking, exists only in the metaphysician's brain; he is a mere abstraction; fundamentally there is nothing real but Humanity. "The evolution of the individual mind can disclose no essential law: and it can afford neither indications nor verifications of any value unless brought under the methods of observation taught by the evolution of the human mind in general." Comte recalls Pascal's words: "The whole succession of men during the course of so many centuries should be considered as one man, ever living and continually learning."^o

Not in terms of individual man is society to be explained, but, conversely, individual man in terms of society. Comte is thus diametrically opposed to Hobbes and to Rousseau. The development of man is from the outset a social process, the march of humanity, and it is only through participation in this social process that man is man. Comte quotes Apostle Paul's dictum: We are members one of another. Furthermore humanity is not a mere assembly of individuals; it is a society of societies. The axiom of social statics is that society is composed of families and not of individuals.^o Comte's advocacy of *veuvage eternel*, his unflinching loyalty to the indissolubility of the marriage tie in spite of his own domestic infelicity, is eloquent proof of his single-minded devotion to the ideal championed in his sociological writings. Throughout he is

guided by the notion of social organization rather than by the idea of individual development.

We are sons and daughters, heirs and fruits of humanity. What we do or think is ever the result of social influence. Comte quotes with approval the lines from *Zaïre*:

"Jeusse été, près du Gange, esclave des faux dieux,
Chrétienne dans Paris, musulmane en ces lieux."^o

We are but waves and ripples in this immense stream of civilization; in it we live and move and have our being. "Generations pass, humanity endures; and yet our thought may enter the most distant past and the most distant future of this vast existence, and full contentedly our individual and passing life may flow into this collective and permanent life."^o Thus we have an Ultimate, in terms of which a universal synthesis is possible. Instead of being the ultimate 'in itself' of all thought and of all action, it is the ultimate term 'for us.' But this difference signifies simply that the new philosophy has abandoned the metaphysical for the positive point of view.^o

It is no reproof to the positivist to call his world-view anthropocentric. He admits it exultingly. His adopted motto is *Nihil humani a me alienum*. Comte explicitly declares: "The universe should be studied not on its own account, but rather on account of man, or rather of humanity. All other aim would be fundamentally as little rational as moral."^o A philosophic synthesis in terms of humanity is alone adequate. The human organism is the last bearer of a world-process of cumulative complexity: to understand man's individual equipment would tax all the resources of science, from mechanics to biology. You have understood all physical nature if you have understood man. But furthermore in man alone an understanding is to be sought of moral nature, of truth, of goodness, of beauty, of all this which is essential to a truly philosophical synthesis. It is man alone that sees beauty and harmony and majesty. "When we think we worship

Nature, we are really worshipping Homer and Shakespeare, Wordsworth and Shelley, Byron and Scott. . . . The Heavens declare the glory of Galileo and Kepler and Newton."° Man, man social, man-in-humanity: that is all ye know, and all ye need to know.

IV

The Socratic dictum, Virtue is knowledge, becomes in Plato's thought a fundamental principle directing the confluence of ethics and metaphysics, of theory of value and theory of reality. Reason reveals the Idea of the Good as the Supreme Reality; reason indicates the pursuit of the Idea of the Good as the supreme concern of any worthy life. In a lower key Comte's thought repeats the strain. Social science demonstrates to us that we live *in* humanity and *through* humanity; morality declares: so we must live *for* humanity. "Thence follow," Lévy-Bruhl continues, "a pedagogy, a statecraft, and a religion closely linked together, and based on the same principles."° This is the Comtean program of life: *Vivre pour autrui*.

Does Comte intend by this program of 'altruism' the denial and suppression of self? So Stuart Mill understood it. He interprets Comte as saying in effect: "We should endeavor not to love ourselves at all. We shall not succeed in it, but we should make the nearest approach to it possible." This is the sense in which Mill interprets Comte's favorite quotation from Thomas à Kempis: *Amem te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te*. This is scarcely fair to Comte's central idea, and Mill is severely taken to task by Frederic Harrison for this misinterpretation of his master.° *Vivre pour autrui* does not mean "Live for others" in the sense of "Neglect, sacrifice, mortify yourself." It means control, spiritualize, develop self; perceive truly your nature, that it is fundamentally social, and live your life accordingly. Have a social and not a narrowly individual standard of duty. Mill should not have

objected to this ideal; for it agrees with his own. *Vivre pour autrui* means, live a life rich in sympathy; it means that life, human life, industry, art, meditation, study, family life, public life, politics, science, religion, all alike belong to humanity. This does not exclude self; it includes it, but is not limited by it.

We may illustrate the point at issue thus: Aristotle conceived of man as distinctively a rational being. *Live rationally* is therefore his supreme moral precept. So Comte conceived of human nature as fundamentally social, and his precept is accordingly, *Vivre pour autrui*. But in Aristotle's ethics, as distinguished for instance from the Stoic, the emotional life, the irrational faculties of man are not stamped out and extirpated; they are subordinated to the rational, harmonized and ordered by Reason. Similarly Comte did not ignore the self-regarding sentiments and actions in the life of the individual. This individual self he would not, as he could not, extirpate, but he would ennoble it by fulfilling and completing its true being—in Humanity. The self socialized is the self completely human.

One should not be amazed at Mill's interpretation of Comte, for Comte's liturgical tone in chanting the Cult of Humanity is likely to mislead. But did not the Gospel of Jesus itself prove misleading? "He who loves father and mother *more than me* is not worthy of me." How easily was this revaluation of values turned into world-denying asceticism? *Vivre pour autrui—subsister pour autrui*: thus is man developed and completed; thus is man eternalized.^o In humanity alone is our future destiny secure. "He who has lived only for himself, who has sought life selfishly, has lost it; for death takes him entire. He who has lived for others, who has not sought his own life, has found it; for he survives in others. In the religions of the past salvation lay in union with God; in the positive religion salvation is to be found in union with humanity."^o

This is Positivistic Immortality, the natural survival of man in the thought and life of others: immortality of influence. In its obvious offhand sense this form of survival would be recognized by any man. But positivism has probed and analyzed the deep and far-reaching foundations of this idea in our nature and in the nature of our world; it has undertaken to erect upon these foundations a system of values in terms of which the immortality of influence, survival-in-humanity, is regarded as the only hereafter really available for us—the only available, and not merely obvious and offhand but indeed a majestic and a sublime, soul-stirring prospect. *On ne détruit que ce qu'on remplace.* This aperçu of Louis Bonaparte, which Comte regards as the most profound political sentence of the nineteenth century,^o we may apply to this own doctrine of human destiny. Upon the extent to which this idea satisfies, in minds disciplined by science, the universal hunger which, in pre-scientific minds, has fed on the hope of personal immortality, will depend the permanent appeal of the Religion of Humanity.

Survival-in-humanity, the positivist urges, is the only form of survival available, the only one to which man can look forward in the light of positive scientific knowledge. It is man's normal prospect. Goethe writes: "That which a virtuous man can accomplish cannot be accomplished in the short space of this life. And this is why he survives after his death and is as active as during his life; the good act, the beautiful word are immortally active as he was active during his mortal career."^o We are the bearers of the attainments, aims, and hopes of past lives, and our own lives only serve to make us participants and factors in the Greater Life of Man. Indeed we may truly say that only when the individual life has entered into the life of humanity is its permanent significance revealed. Man labors his whole life long—is it to no permanent purpose? We cannot say until his life's work has entered into the life of humanity. In a real sense we do not know what a man

is, or what his permanent significance, until he as an individual is no more.

This is assuredly the case on the higher levels of human experience. A great mind is like a mountain peak: he needs the vast foreground of posterity in order to reveal his magnitude, to be seen in true perspective. Schopenhauer wrote: "I must die before I can be born. My burial will be my baptism." Incorrectly do we regard our forebears as dead, for only in their lives are we ourselves alive as human beings. We look back on the humanity of the past as well as on the unborn future, with both of which we are at one, and a link binding the two into one.

Now if we once get a full measure of this sense of solidarity with the past, remembered or unremembered, but ever working in our lives, the distinction between the living and the dead is wiped out, or rather is transfigured in the new deep consciousness of oneness with humanity. The dead are living in us, for indeed it is only in and through them that we are alive. In every living soul their life-energy, their life's joy, hope, and aspiration palpitate, thrill, inspire and stir to worthy endeavor. So John Stuart Mill writes of his dead wife: "Because I know that she would have wished it, I endeavour to make the best of what life I have left. . . . Her memory is to me a religion, and her approbation the standard by which, summing up as it does all worthiness, I endeavour to regulate my life."^o

Painful is birth to the mother that is to bring forth a new life into the world; painful is death to man and to man's friends; but it makes possible man's birth into the vaster life of humanity:

Und so lang du das nicht hast,
Dieses: Stirb und werde,
Bist du nur ein trüber Gast
Auf der dunklen Erde.*

This is the prospect that thrills the worshipper in the

Temple of Man. It is the prospect of George Eliot's deathless lines:

Oh may I join the choir invisible
 Of those immortal dead who live again
 In minds made better by their presence; live
 In pulses stirred to generosity,
 In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn
 For miserable aims that end with self,
 In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,
 And with their mild persistence urge man's search
 To vaster issues. . . .

This is life to come,
 Which martyred men have made more glorious
 For us who strive to follow. May I reach
 That purest heaven, be to other souls
 The cup of strength in some great agony,
 Enkindle generous ardor, feed pure love,
 Beget the smiles that have no cruelty,
 Be the sweet presence of a good diffused,
 And in diffusion ever more intense!
 So shall I join the choir invisible
 Whose music is the gladness of the world.

V

Now we may ask: Is this prospect really eternal, is it not itself subject to terrestrial bounds and limitations? This is one part of Bosanquet's objection to Positivistic Immortality, which he does not fail to appreciate: that "ideas bound up with the future of the human race and of our globe, and dealing only with fragments of the personality, can give us no final satisfaction."^o

To the first part of this objection a positivist might perhaps answer in the words of Frederic Harrison: Is man too small a race, this earth too minute a home to arouse enthusiasm and inspire devotion? "It would be a craven soul indeed which should tell us that his mother was too ordinary a woman to love, his native place too petty to be remembered."^o

But this only answers how man can be stirred to devo-

tion; it still leaves unsettled the question, how far and high man may or even ought to aspire. One celestial collision, and the earth is no more; or a long, pitiless freezing of our little home, and humanity is extinct. What then is really the difference between the materialist who says that man's life is just three score years and ten or four score years, and the positivist? Merely a detail of ciphers: four score million years—"until, worn out beneath the equator, mocked by the last flames of dying heat, the exhausted human race is reduced to a single man and woman, who, standing in the midst of dead woods, surrounded by sheer mountains, livid, with glassy eyes watch thee, O sun, set across the immense frozen waste."^o

Is a terrestrial scale of values adequate to meet the demands of a real philosophic, cosmic synthesis? You may not say, all we can know are earth values, human values. If you profess to speak of a universe in your science, and if you think your philosophy of values is positive science, then you must be able to speak of value cosmically. When you brush aside the desire of the moth for the star, the hope of heaven in man's heart, you must meet (I do not say satisfy, but at least understand) the fundamental human demand that is expressed therein.

This is one point. The second has also been raised in Bosanquet's objection quoted above. Is the immortality of fame and influence on posterity an immortality personal in character, in flavor, an immortality that conserves and realizes personal values? You say that human nature is fundamentally social. Certainly it is a socialized consciousness, but all the same it is a self-consciousness. Who or what is it that survives-in-humanity? Pécaut, the editor of the *Catéchisme positiviste*, frankly recognizes grave difficulties here.^o Is man immortal because he is remembered by posterity, or merely because his life influences posterity? On each of these alternatives fresh difficulties confront us. Is not the memory of posterity selective, suppressive, transforming, creative? So thor-

oughly transforming and creative it is, that the very great lack authentic biographies, and of the greatest, like Buddha, like Jesus, even the historicity has been doubted. Is it Homer that lives in Plato's *Republic*? Is it the Aristotle of the Lyceum that lives in medieval Arabian and Scholastic commentators? The elect souls are so taken up into the life of humanity that they become to each alert soul its own self transfigured. With his heroes, man is as Bayard Taylor's soldiers with the old ballad-heroine:

Each heart recalled a different name,
But all sang Annie Laurie.

Comte himself wrote: "Homer, Aristotle, Dante, Descartes will never cease to live thus again in each brain capable of absorbing them, so as to produce in it results often superior to the results of their own objective lives."^o Shakespeare and Dante live in us, as the beauty and the tragedy of life live in them; each age has or makes its own Shakespeare and Dante. In what sense then is their survival-in-humanity their own personal survival?

Or shall we say that, however preserved in the memory of posterity, or even if quite unremembered, men do live on because their lives affect the lives of their successors? But in man's influence on posterity the impress of his own personality grows dim and disappears. Where influence is exerted without memory of the person exercising it, the influence is inevitably depersonalized. The concrete, entire self is not active, and is therefore not preserved. Imperial Caesar may influence the destinies of Rome; he also "might stop a hole to keep the wind away." His activity is likely to be as impersonal, fragmentary, and unreliable in the one case as in the other. The point at issue is scarcely to be met by branding the desire for personal survival as selfish. The positivist challenges "the hope of renewing in Heaven the little 'family circle' with all its idiosyncrasies and exclusiveness."^o But we must not forget: *On ne détruit pas que ce qu'on rem-*

place. The real question is not whether this personality survives, but whether anything personal survives. If the moral energies persist, must they not persist as personal energies? Frederic Harrison assures us that "the energies of an intellectual and moral kind are very largely continued in their organic unities. . . . They are not dispersed like gases. They retain their unity, they retain their organic character."^o How is this possible on a positivistic basis? If immortality is to be more than a hollow formula, must it not be something less fragmentary and precarious than the survival of the picked fragments of it which posterity utilizes? Overlook the hazard of the universe of values when bound up with terrestrial destinies; is the positivist's 'incorporation into humanity' a really personal incorporation?

Hazardous and ambiguous is positivistic immortality. Is it at any rate vouchsafed to all? On this point there seems to be divergent opinion.^o Comte regards humanity as consisting "of those only who are really assimilable. . . . Although all must needs be born children of Humanity, not all become its servitors." He goes further and recalls Ariosto's brutal words: "*Venuto al mondo sol per far letame.*" Dante had also written of those "*Che visser senza infamia e senza lodo.*" Unfortunately for us who are called upon to worship humanity, the fraction of mankind which seems destined but to fertilize the soil appears uncommonly large. Later positivists haltingly reach out further and hold out a prospect even to humble virtue. In the future of humanity, Harrison writes, not only the great but "the merely useful or the moderately virtuous share, provided their evil deeds do not positively outweigh their better deeds. . . . None are excluded but the utterly vicious and pernicious." Precisely here the difficulty seems most obvious. Grant that small-type virtue may be overlooked, is permanent vice so easily effaced? Are not Judas and Nero and Cesare Borgia remembered—are they not active in the present life of humanity? If Socrates

lives in us today, are his accusers and judges dead and gone? A more penetrating and a sterner view of life would recognize that all lives persist in humanity, the least as well as the greatest, the vile as well as the noble and saintly. And not every life but every act.

When this truth is once perceived, the limitations of the Comtean horizon become apparent, and the positivist notion yields to a notion vaster and more ancient: the Buddhist doctrine of Karma. Not merely we ourselves, in our personal identity, are immortal, but each act, thought, and feeling is immortal. "The kindly word, the clear thought, the brave resolve, does not end and die with itself. . . . For good or for evil the inevitable chain is set in motion."^o For good or for evil: that this is scarcely Comtean speech, Harrison is well aware: "I do not confine my language to the philosophy or religion of Comte—for this same conception of man is common to many philosophies and many religions. It characterizes such systems as those of Spinoza and Shelley, as much as those of Confucius or Buddha."^o

Now if you emphasize the eternity of each separate act, if you center your attention on the act, on the deed, how do you preserve man in his personal identity? And how can you then say that man neither lives nor dies like the sparrow? If you are led into recognizing the endless consequences and the unlimited causal heritage of an act, how are you to distinguish between the life of a man, or any act thereof, from the splash of a stone in mid-ocean? Ripples to everlasting in ever widening circles in both cases. But what remains, on this interpretation, of Comte's characteristically anthropocentric, sociological reformulation of philosophy? All these questions are raised when the positivist begins to recognize himself in Buddha. Has he forgotten wherein he is a positivist? Or has he perhaps perceived the fuller measure of his own meaning?

In his doctrine of immortality of influence, survival-in-

humanity, Comte formulated, in modern, humanistic, western-scientific, optimistic terms, a part of that truth which found vaster, more cryptic, sterner utterance in Buddha's doctrine of the eternity of Karma. The inquiry into this latter doctrine, to which we turn in the next chapter, may exhibit the more ultimate implications of positivistic immortality which Comtism does not express, and may also serve to reveal to us more clearly the fundamental nature, and also some of the basic difficulties of the central problem with which we are dealing.

CHAPTER VII

THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF KARMA

I

WRITING of Brahmanism and Hinduism, Monier Williams sharply observed that "Transmigration, or Metempsychosis, is the great bugbear—the terrible nightmare and daymare of Indian philosophers and metaphysicians. All their efforts are directed to the removal of this oppressive scare."^o While this doctrine has indeed found in India its classic and most elaborate utterance, it scarcely characterizes the primitive view of life of the invading hosts who made the valley of the Indus the first center of Aryan culture. Whether this Indian idea of rebirth and reincarnation had its source in the primitive, animistic beliefs of the non-Aryan indigenes of India,^o or whether its psychological origin is to be sought in "that curious trick of the memory, by which we sometimes feel so sure that sensations we are experiencing have been experienced by us before, and yet we know not how or when,"^o or else whether it is the result of philosophic speculation on the phenomena of instinctive knowledge, dreams, and sin,^o certain it seems that, as this doctrine of transmigration gradually spreads and gains possession of Indian thinking, the latter is characterized also by its increasingly pessimistic tenor. The adolescent flush of Vedic nature-worship assumes the ever paler cast of pantheism; religion becomes a disdain of human life and a tragic effort to be rid of it, and theology but a doctrine of deliverance from self.

Clearly then, we should not expect to meet the doctrine of transmigration in the Rig Veda, and scholars are generally agreed that it is not to be found there.° The Vedic *rishi* sang of hell's terrors, or else of Yama's realm,

Wo Wonne ist und Seligkeit,
Wo Freude über Freude wohnt,
Wo sich der Sehnsucht Sehnen stillt.°

When a good man died in Vedic India his voice went into fire, his breath into the wind, his eye into the sun—each part into its appropriate prototype; while the “unborn part” proceeded from the funeral fire to the world of the righteous.° The latest English translator of the Upanishads° observes that, in the *Chandogya-Upanishad*, neither Svetaketu, who has spent twelve years in the study of the Vedas, nor his father and instructor Gautama Aruni has heard of transmigration, and it is explicitly stated that “this knowledge has never come to Brahmans before you,” having been possessed by Kshatriyas only.°

This new knowledge was destined to take possession of the Indian mind. Instead of the one way leading to the heaven of Yama and Varuna, as known to the singers of the Rig Veda, the Upanishad seers know of two ways, “one leading to the gods and one leading to the fathers.”° One way leads to the Divine Presence, the other to return and rebirth on earth. To understand fully these two ways and to avoid the second becomes the chief wisdom of Brahmanic speculation. The Upanishadic seer views individual existence as a state of misery and illusion; a man's salvation lies in the perception of his fundamental unity with the universal soul and in the attainment of this unity. Metempsychosis, non-duality, salvation—Samsara, Advaita, Moksha—these are three moments of one central doctrine, the essence of which is the disdain of finitude. The alpha and omega of Brahmanic metaphysics is the identity of Brahman and the individual soul. This is the truth of truths taught to Svetaketu Aruneya in the *Chan-*

dogya: "That which is the finest essence—this whole world has that as its soul. That is Reality. That is Atman (Soul). That art thou, *Tat twam asi*, Svetaketu."° This is the doctrine taught by the master-seer of the *Brihadaranyaka*, Yajnavalkya; and another seer in the *Chandogya*, Çandilya, has given it perhaps its classical expression. "Whose substance is spirit, whose body is life, whose form is light, whose purpose is truth, whose essence is infinity—the all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting one, that embraceth the universe, that is silent, untroubled—That is my spirit within my heart, smaller than a grain of rice or a barley-corn, or a grain of mustard-seed; smaller than a grain of millet, or even than a husked grain of millet. This my spirit within my heart is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heavens, greater than all worlds. The all-working, all-wishing, all-smelling, all-tasting one, that embraceth the universe, that is silent, untroubled—that is my spirit within my heart; that is Brahman. Thereunto, when I go hence, shall I attain. Who knoweth this, he, in sooth, hath no more doubts. Thus spake Çandilya, Çandilya."°

Evil has its source and ground in individual existence. That the universal Brahman has become individualized into particular *jivatmanah*, into this world of transitory existence and misery is admittedly a misfortune. Far better were it had there been no multiplicity.° In this pessimistic condemnation of things as they are, Brahmanic thought is not hesitant. But it is reluctant to undertake an explanation of how or why Brahman should become thus individualized. On these points it contents itself with affirmation and lapses into mystery.° Why or however initially originated, here is the individual involved in the meshes of rebirth and reincarnation: of his woe there can be no doubt.

Intricate, universal, and inevitable is Karma for all who are caught in the net of individual existence. As a man lives, so will he be reborn, nor is the least item to be

overlooked in the reckoning, nor is the manner of reckoning to be perceived in advance. The mill grinds slowly but it grinds all, and it grinds exceeding small. No balance is struck after the evil has been reckoned off against the good, but each separate act must in the long run bear its own fruit. "A good man who has once uttered a slander may spend a hundred thousand years as a god in consequence of his goodness, and, when the power of his good actions is exhausted, may be born as a dumb man on account of his transgression."° "Either as a worm, or as a moth, or as a fish, or as a bird, or as a lion, or as a wild boar, or as a snake, or as a tiger, or as a person, or as some other in this or that condition, he is born again here according to his deed (karman), according to his knowledge."° "As a man himself sows so he himself reaps; no man inherits the good or evil act of another man. . . . With eye or thought or voice or deed," so it is written in the great epic of India, "whatever kind of act one performs, one receives that kind of act in return."° To perceive clearly this miserable prospect of transmigration is not easy; there is a tendency in the Upanishads to regard the doctrine of Karma as a mystery, as not for every ear. When Jaratkarava Artabhaga questions the master-seer Yajnavalkya about the hereafter, Yajnavalkya answers: "Artabhaga, my dear, take my hand. We two only will know of this. This is not for us two to speak of in public."°

But when once this truth is perceived the essential woe of individual existence is clearly disclosed: "In this sort of cycle of existence (samsara) what is the good of enjoyment of desires, when after a man has fed on them there is seen repeatedly his return here to earth?"° Man's whole thought is thus set on deliverance from the cycle of rebirth. And deliverance is to be had: "They who seek the soul (Atman) by austerity, chastity, faith, knowledge . . . they do not return."° Sacrifice and ritual are by themselves unavailing; salvation is to be sought in wis-

dom. The Brahmanic seer saw the soul as a caterpillar proceeding from one blade of grass to another, the same caterpillar, the same soul: a thread of soul-identity joining together lives necessarily succeeding each other as upon a rolling chariot wheel.^o And yet he saw that this individual soul, in its deepest reality, was one with the universal Brahman. Could it but perceive this, its unity with the All-One, it would be released from the bonds and woes of individual existence. Thus the Upanishadic gospel of salvation is a gospel of wisdom and, through wisdom, of reabsorption into the Infinite. Deliverance is in the vision of Brahman. So we have it in the *Katha Upanishad*:

What is soundless, touchless, formless, imperishable,
Likewise tasteless, constant, odorless,
Without beginning, without end, higher than the great, stable—
By discerning That, one is liberated from the mouth of death.^o

This is the lesson taught by Yajnavalkya to his beloved wife Maitreyi in *Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad*, one of the jewels of Brahmanic speculation. The deliverance from woe is the deliverance from the ground of woe: individual existence and rebirth. "As is a mass of salt, without inside, without outside, entirely a mass of taste, even so, verily, is this Soul, without inside without outside, entirely a mass of knowledge. Arising out of these elements, into them also one vanished away. After death there is no consciousness."^o And once more in the *Mundaka-Upanishad*:

As the flowing rivers of the ocean
Disappear, quitting name and form,
So the knower, being liberated from name and form,
Goes unto the heavenly Person, higher than the high.^o

II

Buddhism built on Brahmanic foundations. Gautama accepted all-important Brahmanic fundamentals: the woe

and vanity of individual existence, the tragic prospect of rebirth, salvation through insight. But all three are re-fashioned and reinterpreted and, in a radically different intellectual context, acquire radically new meaning.

The Buddha cannot have been insensible of the undeniable moral value of the doctrine of Karma as an explanation of the sufferings and the inequality of men. The idea of rebirth was the fundamental dynamic in Brahmanic religion; this idea Buddhism retained in practice but gave it a new theoretic foundation. For on the central point Buddhism ran counter to Brahmanism. The whole thought of the Brahmanic seer is centered on God: to be lost in God, to become one with God is the kernel and the shell of his wisdom; whereas Gautama proclaimed an atheistic gospel. Perhaps, as Oldenberg explains,^o this atheistic note in Indian religion is not as sharply new as it seems. In the Upanishads the bright living forms of the Vedic gods have faded away in the vast sweep of pantheistic meditation: the infinite All-One remains: "soundless, touchless, formless."^o "No song of praise and no prayer, no hope, no fear, no love."^o

But the radically novatory character of Buddhist teaching is not in its denial of God, but rather in its denial of Permanence. The Upanishadic seer yielded to none in his disdain of the finite or in his perception of the transitoriness, woe, and vanity of individual existence. But if he turned away from the transitory and miserable life of the many, it was to find eternal bliss in the vast, immutable One. The Heraclitean note is after all only introductory and incidental in Brahmanism; fundamentally and finally Brahmanism is a doctrine of Permanence. Now the first Buddhist principle is Transitoriness. Nothing persists. This fundamental contrast between Brahmanism and Buddhism once observed, we perceive its consequence all along the line. All along the line the Buddhist saw composition and decay, becoming and passing away, nothing fixed and permanent. The Brahman

seers thought of the same identical soul as a thread holding together the beads of successive rebirths. This "persistent specific soul-entity of the Brahmanic philosophy, be it Atman or Purusha, the Buddhists struck out as a superfluous assumption."^o

This is a second characteristic principle of Buddhism: the negation of an individual soul-entity. On this point Buddhism is emphatic, explicit, and elaborate. The belief in the reality of the individual soul is regarded by the Buddhist as a heresy; to break this fetter of delusion is a prime condition to the attainment of Nirvana. Individuality is a delusion; there is no ego. This is the first lesson which King Milinda is taught by the venerable Buddhist sage Nagasena.^o People address him as Nagasena, but whether Nagasena or Surasena or Virasena or Sihasena is a mere matter of appellation; in fact, there is no such permanent individual. Just as by the word "chariot" we mean to designate the compound of pole, axle, wheels, framework and yoke, ropes, spokes, and goad, so is Nagasena but a mere name for the compound of hair, brain, form, sensation. In a passage from the *Majjhima-Nikaya* quoted by Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids we read:^o "Consciousness is designated only in accordance with the condition causing it: visual consciousness from the seeing eye and the seen object; auditory consciousness from the hearing ear and the sound; . . . thought from mind and mental object. Just as a fire is different according to the kind of fuel." As a lamp burning through the night, so continuous is personal identity: is the flame of the first night-watch the same as the flame of the middle watch and of the last watch? So is the person at successive moments neither the same nor yet different.^o There is no soul entity that persists unchanged throughout.^o Strikingly is this denial of individuality expressed in a quatrain from the *Visuddhi-Magga*:

Misery only doth exist, none miserable.
 No doer is there; naught save the deed is found.
 Nirvana is, but not the man who seeks it.
 The Path exists, but not the traveler on it.°

Individuality is a delusion; the self is a compound. About the process of compounding a self, Buddhism has an elaborate theory, the doctrine of the *Skandhas*, aggregates. Without entering into any detailed examination of these five *Skandhas*, *rupa*, *vedana*, *sanna*, *sankhara*, *vinnana*,° it may suffice to observe that in its own Oriental way and context the Buddhist negation of the Brahmanic soul-entity corresponds to the substitution in Western thought of the psychology of conscious states and behavior and psychophysics for the older substantialist psychology of the schools. The self is a synthesis, not a substantial entity. The composition constituting the individual is transitory, nor are any of the constituent groups themselves permanent: "The first group, *material qualities*, are like a mass of foam that gradually forms and then vanishes. The second group, the *sensations*, are like a bubble dancing on the surface of the water. The third group, the *ideas*, are like the uncertain mirage that appears in the sunshine. The fourth group, the mental and material *predispositions*, are like the plantain tree (without firmness or solidity). And the last group, the *thoughts*, are like a spectre, or magical illusion."° Consciousness is possible only in connection with a body, and when my body dies the individual called myself must needs also pass away. From this the Buddhist draws no materialistic conclusion; neither body nor soul is substantial; both are transitory compounds of impermanent constituents.° If the soul is but a name and a label, the body is like the wind: there is no wind entity; it arises as a result of atmospheric conditions and with the cessation of these passes away.° Inevitably then is the person, body and soul, unstable and transitory. "No sooner has separateness, individuality begun, than dissolution, disintegra-

tion, also begins. There can be no individuality with a putting together; there can be no putting together without a becoming; there can be no becoming without a becoming different; there can be no becoming different without a dissolution, a passing away, which sooner or later will inevitably be complete."° We are betrothed to Dissolution. On his death-bed the Buddha repeats this doctrine to his beloved disciple: "How is it possible, Ananda, that whatever has been born, has come into being, is organized and perishable, should not perish?"°

In the light of this negation of Self, cosmic and individual, of this double repudiation of Brahmanic fundamentals, how is the Brahmanic doctrine of Karma to be viewed and how is it to be retained and utilized? Buddhism solves the problem by substituting for the transmigration of souls what Rhys Davids has aptly called the transmigration of character. In thinking of Karma (deed, act), Brahmanism centers its attention on the agent; Buddhism, on the act itself. Individual life chronicles, not the successive acts of one continuous, permanent self, but rather the successive necessary change and reconstitution of the complex of impermanent elements. So when man dies, what remains? Just what had existed; not an individual soul, but a complex of activities. The process continues with strict necessity.° Karma then no longer signifies a soul's successive career of rebirth up or down in the scale of existence, according to its moral deserts; rather is Karma, as viewed by the Buddhist, a mighty cosmic mechanism whereby all the necessary consequences of our acts are worked out in the process of existence. The rounds of successive births is simply involved in the operation of this cosmic mechanism. Kern quotes Childers' admirable statement of the Buddhist doctrine: "When a man dies, the khandhas of which he is constituted perish, but by the force of his Kamma a new set of khandhas instantly starts into existence, and

a new being appears in another world, who, though possessing different khandhas and a different form is in reality identical with the man just passed away, because his Kamma is the same.”^o

One man dies; as a result of his Karma another man is born; what is continuous in the process? A mechanism of necessary consequence. The identity is one of act, not of substance. What is reborn? King Milinda asks Nāgaseṇa, and the sage answers: Not the same individual, but another necessarily resulting from it. The mango put in the ground grows into the mango tree; the fire, kindled, burns up a man's house or field or the whole village; the betrothed girl-child grows up to womanhood; the milk turns to curds: in spite of apparent difference there is in each of these cases a real continuity, for the latter state of existence is in each case the necessary result of the former.^o

This mechanism of necessity is universal and inevitable. A deed once performed must bear its consequences: in insisting on the absoluteness of this law, the Buddhist is relentless. It is written in the *Dhammapada*: “Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if we enter into the clefts of the mountains, is there known a spot in the whole world where a man might be freed from an evil deed.”^o Even as the Psalmist saw God everywhere, so the Buddhist found himself enmeshed body and soul in the toils of Karma:

Whither shall I go from thy Spirit
Or whither shall I flee from thy presence?

But the omnipresence of Deity was, after all, no terror for the Psalmist; he could find refuge in the love, the grace, the forgiveness, of a Heavenly Father. None of these comforts are available for the Buddhist. There is no God to forgive; Karma is impersonal and unalterable.^o Project the law of causality into the moral sphere and observe man wriggling as a worm before the onward-

rolling wheel of necessity. Without a judge or court of appeal, condemned to live his own weary round of life, and thereby inevitably force his karmic offspring into the same weary round of life, alone against Karma: where is the individual to seek deliverance?

In himself, the Buddhist answers. "By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one suffers; by oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified. Purity and impurity belong to oneself, no one can purify another."^o The solution is so simple, only confusion of mind and ignorance keep us from perceiving it. Futile it is to pray or to seek salvation from the consequences of our deeds. We reap what we have sown: selfishness we have sown, the lust of the flesh, the lust of life, the love of this present world—and we have reaped ignorance, woe, illusion; we have reaped rebirth. The present reaping we cannot control, but the future harvest we can. Whether rebirth and woe and illusion, or whether release from the bonds of self and misery, enlightenment and bliss, it all depends on us. Salvation is by ourselves.

The sting of despair, however, is not so easily drawn. My wretched present is beyond recall, and what concern can I have for any future which precludes a memory of continuity? This sullen hopelessness, the Buddhist tells me, only indicates the ignorance and misery of self-engrossment. The universality of misery I can perceive: it is involved in every item of individual existence. But it is necessary to understand misery, its source and ground; it is grounded in the transitoriness of existence, in the succession of act and consequence, in the operation of Karma. In this operation of Karma, my past, present, and future are fundamentally one, but before I can truly perceive the full measure of this truth, I must be rid of that which causes my present misery and ignorance: self-engrossment, the delusion of individuality. The cessation of sorrow demands and inevitably results from the extinc-

tion of individuality.° This truth once clearly perceived, my thought, my acts, my life, are transformed and transfigured. Where formerly, a thrall of delusion, I miserably sought to quench insatiate cravings that make for woe and ignorance and rebirth, I have now become an agency of enlightenment, salvation and bliss. I have perceived the illusion: "Looking for the maker of this tabernacle, I shall have to run through a course of many births, so long as I do not find (him); and painful is birth again and again. But now, maker of the tabernacle, thou hast been seen; thou shalt not make up this tabernacle again. All thy rafters are broken, thy ridge-pole is sundered; the mind approaching the Eternal has attained to the extinction of all desires."° Thus is attained Nirvana, the state of blessed release from the lusts, the woes, the delusions of self—the peace that passeth understanding.

III

Nirvana has assuredly proved one of the most puzzling notions in Oriental metaphysics. Before inquiring into this goal of Buddhist meditation, we should first turn to a more careful analysis of the doctrine of Karma. From what does the Buddhist seek deliverance, and wherein is his aspiration consummated?

There are initial difficulties in the understanding of the doctrine, antecedent to any effort to estimate it critically. There has been a tendency, rightly deprecated by Hopkins,° to treat Buddhism as a modern scientific-philosophical religion and to interpret Karma as substantially equivalent to heredity. In heredity the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children; whereas in Karma I am my own father and child. Don Quixote has told us, "Each man is the son of his own works." Karma is *self-heredity*. "With this difference the Buddhist doctrine and the scientific doctrine of heredity seem very similar."° *With this difference*. For in the doctrine of

heredity notice is taken of cause and consequence in the organic realm: Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles? Neither in this generation nor in the next. No question of a persistent identity between heir and forebear arises here at all. In strict logic it should not arise in Buddhism either, for Buddhism challenges Brahmanism precisely in its doctrine of the persistent self; against this concession to permanence the Buddhist proclaims the transitoriness of all things. One would expect that a personality whose identity from day to day is but as the flame of a lamp during the several watches of the night could hardly be held as being reborn in any sense whatever. Overlook the lapse of memory:° the memory-bond was lacking in the Brahmanic doctrine also, but Brahmanism retained persistent identity as a mystery by its doctrine of the soul-entity. In Buddhism this mystery has been plucked. But if my continuous individuality from today to tomorrow is to be viewed as a delusion, how is one to characterize my karmic continuity of character from one birth to another? This is indeed the "incomprehensible mystery." Despite all efforts of the Buddhist to distinguish sharply between his own and the Brahmanic doctrine, his constant tendency to lapse into language reminiscent of the earlier view° indicates the ambiguity and elusiveness of his own position. If the ego is a delusion, is not the ego's karmic rebirth doubly illusory?

The Brahmanic theory was perhaps pure dogma, but Kern finds the Buddhist notion "beyond the reach of human reason."° The difficulty may be stated thus: There is ground and consequence in the universe, nothing happens without a cause, nor is the least consequence lost. Granted. My death blots out nothing; the effects of my thoughts and deeds go on to everlasting. Granted. But even the Buddhists see the difficulty of conceiving how the currents of activity released by my death are "not to be dissipated, as it were, into many separate streams, but to be concentrated together in the formation of one new sen-

tient being,—new, that is, in its constituent parts and powers, but the same in its essence, its being, its doing, its *karma*.”^o

To this identity of karmic self, nevertheless, the Buddhist had to hold, else he lost the only use he had for the doctrine of Karma as providing a moral explanation of the sorrows and stupidities of life. I reap now what I once sowed; how secure the moral advantage of this pronouncement while ruling out the doctrine of a persistent self? If Nagasena is but a name and there is no ego involved, why is this particular Nagasena expiating the evil deeds of some particular past Nagasena; or rather—the real question—wherein does this particular Nagasena deserve to expiate the evil deeds of some particular past Nagasena?

We are involved in further difficulties. If Karma is inevitable, how is salvation possible? Have I, with all my alleged enlightenment, any hold on the maker of the tabernacle? Am I not but the son and heir of my karmic forebear? What makes possible the presence in me of the wisdom that saves? Is that wisdom in me without cause or origin? To be sure this is the ever-present mystery of salvation, but in other religions theologians have provided Divine Grace and a supernatural mechanism for the purpose. In Buddhism we have the mystery without the dogma.

If all that I am is the result of past Karma, then my capacity, through enlightenment and the extinction of self, to attain Nirvana is also a result of past Karma; else each spiritual release would be an act of creation. But if in breaking up the tabernacle of rebirth, I am but working out the effects of past Karma, there is more in the constitution of the latter than we have been told of. Is the world-process one of possible, of inevitable enlightenment and self-overcoming? In that case, why this ever-emphasized necessity to negate, to countercheck a process which in some mysterious but assured way is making pos-

sible the attainment of the very thing we are urged to seek? Is Karma and the whole wretched machinery of rebirth and individuation but a sorry incident in the drama of being,—or is perhaps Karma itself an instrument in the consummation of the bliss of enlightenment?

Buddhist metaphysics is bold enough, yet Buddhist speculation professes scant interest in first beginnings or in eschatology. The novice is discouraged from asking questions about the ultimate whence and whither. How the primary Karma, the first link, was forged, we are not told, nor yet what comes after the attainment of Nirvana. All such questions Buddhism regards as idle; they tend not to edification. So it is written in the *Majjhima Nikaya*: The religious life does not depend on the dogma that the world is eternal, nor on the dogma that the world is not eternal; on the dogma that the world is finite or that the world is not finite; that the soul and the body are identical, or not identical; that the saint does or does not exist after death, or both exists and does not exist after death, or neither exists nor does not exist after death. Such knowledge "profits not, nor has to do with the fundamentals of religion, nor tends to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, the supernatural faculties, supreme wisdom, and Nirvana."^o

To this renunciation of metaphysics, cosmology, and eschatology the Buddhist is not invariably loyal. In the doctrine of Kalpas, or world-cycles, world-destruction and world-refashionment, Buddhism chronicles the recurrence of worlds and anticipates such recurrence in the future.^o As Spence Hardy has pointed out, "it is difficult to reconcile the unerring rectitude of Karma with the recurrence of events in uniform cycles and with the similarity of all the systems of worlds; unless it control, absolutely, the will of sentient being, in which case it is no longer a moral government, but necessity or fate."^o Here again is another instance of the same quandary in which Buddhist thought is repeatedly involved, a quandary due to a

duality of motive in its philosophical-religious enterprise: it undertakes a rigorously moral judgment of the world and human life, while at the same time it would negate personality.

IV

We observed above the Buddhist repudiation of the Brahmanic soul-substance doctrine and its description of personality as a compound, a confection. The motive of this repudiation and revision of Brahmanic speculation is to be sought in the Buddhist conviction of the transitoriness and instability of all existence. Yet if Buddhism found no *thing* in the world stable, body or soul, it found stability and permanence in the process. In this respect its similarity to the thought of Heraclitus is remarkable. All is in flux, but law governs this eternal flux and change. Stable and permanent and inevitable is Karma; as certain as the rebirth of a self-engrossed thrall of illusion is the deliverance from rebirth of the enlightened vanquisher of self. In the very extinction of the cycle of births the same necessity operates which rolls the wheel of existence. Karma and Nirvana alike exhibit the permanence of a world-order. Buddhism proclaimed the transitoriness and instability of *things*; it did not, as being a philosophy it could not, reject a cosmos. There is a stable cosmic order with which we must reckon and on which we can rely.

Buddhism, however, is not merely a cosmology; it is a religious interpretation of the universe, and it is dominated by the notion of a moral destiny in existence. Reward and punishment, good and evil, the entire ethical vocabulary is familiar to it. It does not ignore moral distinctions nor treat them as illusory. The cosmic order on which it insists must be a moral as well as a physical world-order. It is written in the first twin verses of the *Dhammapada*: "If a man speaks or acts with an evil

thought, pain follows him as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage. . . . If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him as a shadow that never leaves him."

In speaking of the immortality of Karma, of the deed, the act, the thought, the Buddhist cannot therefore be thinking merely of an event in the physical order; he has an ethical process in mind: the deed whereof he speaks has a moral valuation; it admits of being adjudged good or evil. But deeds so considered do not proceed single-file or abide as chains of beads, they proceed as complex systems and demand being considered always in context. The Buddhist has rejected the substantial soul, and rightly, but personality is not thus summarily disposed of. If there is a moral world-order, moral activity, then we are bound to admit the reality of complex systems of deeds, of persons in short,—their reality and their permanence. The permanence of the systems in question need not be absolute, but it is no less real than the permanence of the deeds constituting the systems. Analysis does not always add to our real understanding of things unless we bear in mind the fact that we are analysing. The reduction of a system of moral activity to an inventory of deed-items has only made our view of the system more artificial.

Individuality, selfhood is rejected by the Buddhist because in the life of self the Buddhist saw error, evil, woe, lust, anger, and ignorance. Surely these are all in the life of self, and they are surely got rid of if existence is depersonalized. But efface and extinguish personality, and is it only evil and error that have vanished? Can you then have good, enlightenment, truth, sweetness and light? Evil and good, sorrow and joy, delusion and enlightenment, these are correlative, and they involve personal activity and self-consciousness. Already in Brahmanism we may observe this tendency to reduce moral evil to metaphysical limitation. In place of the moral antithesis good-evil, Brahmanic theosophy would propose

the antithesis infinite-finite. "Evil is all that restrains Being, all that determines it, and, in determining, diminishes and negates it."^o *Omnis determinatio est negatio*. But if we thus baldly identify evil with individuality and finitude, then is not good wiped out entirely? For is not evil already imputed to the Infinite Being which becomes individualized and thus assumes finitude? But what becomes then of the distinction good-evil? Ultramaré well observes: "This moral agnosticism is the more remarkable seeing that all these schools without exception propose for themselves an eminently practical goal."^o So Buddhism has undertaken a moral, religious judgment of life, which its treatment of self renders nugatory. The doctrine of Karma is essentially an impersonal, unmoral conception of the world-process; and yet it is forced to do ethical service in the Buddhist religion. There is no self and no self's activity, and yet there must be moral action and moral destiny.

This fundamental duality of motive and demand involves the Buddhist mind in a variety of difficulties, some of which we have already noted. It serves to make the notion of Nirvana the astounding puzzle that it is, and not only to Western minds. In Appendix X to his *Hibbert Lectures*, Rhys Davids considers two possible meanings of Nirvana: (1) that it signifies the annihilation of being or the annihilation of the soul; (2) that it involves the eternal existence of the soul in a state of bliss. As against these two views, he supports an interpretation which he had already proposed in his little Manual on *Buddhism*, that Nirvana is "the extinction of that sinful, grasping condition of mind and heart, which would otherwise, according to the great mystery of Karma, be the cause of renewed individual existence . . . a sinless calm state of mind . . . perfect peace, goodness, and wisdom."^o That is to say, the notion of Nirvana concerns, not the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, but rather implies salvation from the lusts and sorrows of life, salvation here

on earth. Rhys Davids recalls Max Müller's judgment that the term Nirvana, as used in the *Dhammapada*, never must, and very seldom if ever can, be taken in the sense of annihilation,^o and observes the case to be the same in the other parts of the Pitakas. He finds particular support of his view of Nirvana in the studies of Oscar Frankfurter.^o Dr. Frankfurter quotes a number of passages from *Samyutta Nikaya*, both explicitly and repeatedly defining Nirvana as the cessation of lust, anger and ignorance. Hopkins^o finds this to be the meaning of Nirvana as used by Buddha himself. In that sense, of course, it raises no thorny speculative problems and is in any case of no direct interest to our inquiry. Perhaps Kern is right in regarding primitive Buddhism as not particularly speculative, and the doctrine of Karma as a later acquisition of Buddhist thought.^o Two other possible meanings both held by Buddhists have to be recognized: they are the two views not adopted by Rhys Davids: "eternal, blissful repose (such was the Nirvana of the Jains and in part of Buddhism), extinction and absolute annihilation (such was the Nirvana of some Buddhists).^o

Is Nirvana the fullness, the consummation of Being? In the Buddhist scriptures passages are not lacking in support of this view. We read in the *Sutta Nipata*: "For those who stand in the middle of the water . . . in the formidable stream that has set in, for those overcome by decay and death, I will tell . . . of an island. . . . This matchless island, possessing nothing (and) grasping after nothing, I call Nibbana, the destruction of decay and death."^o This is Nirvana, "cessation of natural desires, and happiness," "the highest happiness."^o But this is mostly eulogy, not statement or analysis. If this happiness, highest happiness, consummation of being, is to be experienced here in this life, this view reduces in substance to the one advocated by Rhys Davids, who accordingly does well to cite Max Müller. In that case, of course, this variety of interpretation of Nirvana would

interest us in this connection as little as that of Rhys Davids. But if eternal happiness and repose of soul is intended, then it is difficult to see how Buddhism is entitled to such a view in conformity with the doctrine of Karma. Are not misery and ignorance grounded in the illusion of individuality, involving the wretched round of rebirth? Does not salvation through enlightenment consist precisely in breaking up the tabernacle? To recognize the distinction between Nirvana and Parinirvana serves rather to emphasize the issue. What awaits the Arhat who has blown out the fires of the passions? Parinirvana, "extinction of all the elements or seeds of bodily existence,"^o absolute cessation. Now what rare irony is intended in calling the final cessation of existence the consummation of being and highest happiness? Certain it seems that, if Arhatship involves the release from self-engrossment, and this last implies extinction of individuality and, at death, the assurance of no further rebirth, then the notion of human destiny to which Buddhist theory is entitled is a fair synonym for annihilation.^o

We must not be misled by oracular half-utterances in which Buddhism abounds. Nirvana is styled a conquest of both birth and death; it "puts an end to pain;" it is "the supreme good;" he who enters upon it "does not grieve;" he has "gone to the immortal peace, the unchangeable state."^o But is one justified in concluding that he who has put an end to birth and death and grief is indeed experiencing bliss, or that this immortal peace or unchangeable state have any positive content whatever? In Nirvana, which has been achieved through the negation of sentient being, has anything but negation been achieved? The man who has attained Nirvana is "no more for this world," he has completed his last existence,^o he has been "completely extinguished."^o Koeppen, recognizing the more attractive and palatable view of Nirvana, wherewith Buddhism succeeded in conquering the most of Asia, yet regards the original and fundamental meaning of Nirvana

as annihilation, the complete extinction of the soul. Nirvana, he says, is "blessed nothingness: Buddhism is the Gospel of Annihilation."^o

Confronted as one is with a double and treble array of passages in which conflicting conceptions of Nirvana are given expression, one's interpretation is bound to be determined by the sort of interest with which one approaches the study of Nirvana. Are we mainly concerned in reconstructing in imagination the early age of Buddhism? Then we are bound to recognize the joy and exaltation with which the ascetic apostles of Gautama's gospel scaled Himalayas and crossed mighty rivers and vast deserts, bringing the glad tidings of deliverance to nation after nation. Could they have done this if they were the apostles of nothingness; is the spread of Buddhism explicable on the supposition that its ideal and goal was utter annihilation?^o Or again, as for instance in the present study, we may approach the idea of Nirvana seeking mainly to ascertain the notion of human destiny to which such a view of human life as the Buddhist is logically entitled. And in that case the doctrine of Karma and the Buddhist account of the soul, of personality, would seem to force us to the view that the Buddhist salvation from the woes of existence is consistently a Nirvana of utter extinction.

Some modern scholars have sought a way out of the maze of contradictory accounts of Nirvana in Buddhist Scripture by undertaking to probe the roots of Buddhism, Brahmanism, and the Sankhya philosophy in the soil of Indian speculation. In this general field the work of Garbe and Jacobi is, of course, memorable. Applying himself in particular to the study of Nirvana, Dahlmann is led to the conclusion that the Buddhist Nirvana is a torso, the fragment of an alien system of thought. The Upanishad sage sought salvation in the escape from the narrow confines of finitude. Brahma and Nirvana are kin notions: "the more distant goal is the one eternal un-

changing essence: Brahma; the nearer goal is deliverance of man's being from all opposition and all change: Nirvana. . . . One idea binds the inner sense of Nirvana, Buddha, Brahma: the idea of . . . absolute absence of qualities." Buddhism did not build entirely *de novo*; it rested on the Brahmanism against which it reacted; its use of the doctrine of Karma is suggestive of the ways in which it appropriated and transfigured what was to its purpose. The characteristic Buddhist reaction against Brahmanism, according to the view which Dahlmann represents, manifests the influence of the Sankhya school. In the sixth century before Christ two conceptions were battling for dominion over the Indian mind; against the theistic monism of the traditional religion, the Sankhya, resting on Brahmanism, was seeking an atheist's way out of the puzzles and woes of life. Now that which the Sankhya sought, we are told, Buddhism found in the notion of Nirvana. So the Nirvana ideal, which in the earlier thinking had expressed the blessedness of release from the limitations of finitude in the Infinite Presence of Brahma,—an ideal which is reflected in early Buddhist preaching and explains the joyous appeal of the gospel of Gautama,—this ideal is radically transformed under the influence of heretical ideas characteristic of Sankhya and Buddhist speculation.^o

However derived, the notion of Nirvana in Buddhism was radically affected by the views of Karma, soul, and personality which came to dominate Buddhist thought. That Nirvana comes to mean annihilation is natural enough; for, proceeding strictly from the theory of the five skandhas, as Kern maintains,^o it cannot but be a synonym for death. Hopkins quotes a passage from the *Upasivamanavapuccha*:^o "As a flame blown about by wind goes out and cannot be reckoned as existing, so a sage delivered from name and body disappears, and cannot be reckoned as existing. . . . But has he only disappeared, or does he not exist, or is he only free from sick-

ness? . . . For him there is no form, and that by which they say he exists for him no longer." "One would think," Hopkins reflects, "that this were plain enough." The interpretation of Nirvana as annihilation seems to be increasingly gaining ground among scholars,^o and one returns with fresh interest to Childers' discussion of the topic, in his *Dictionary of the Pali Language*. Childers defined Nibbanam as "extinction; destruction, annihilation; annihilation of being, Nirvana; annihilation of human passion, Arhatship or final sanctification." These two meanings he sought to reconcile by maintaining with assurance and with a large array of evidence that Nirvana in Buddhist thought means two things, different yet closely bound up: the annihilation of being, and the state of extinction of passion and blissful sanctification (Arhatship) which inevitably terminates in annihilation. "The bliss of the Arhat is chiefly based on the consciousness that he has rooted out Karma and may any day cease to exist. . . . The goal of Buddhism is annihilation, and . . . Nirvana is a brief period of bliss followed by eternal death."^o

For the Arhat who enters into Nirvana, his last breath registers the cessation of being. His world at any rate is no more. As the gospel of the Buddha enlightens and releases thrall after thrall from the shackles of self-engrossment and rebirth, there should accordingly be a progressive evanescence of the universe. When Gautama is enlightened under the Bo tree, Mara the Evil One, perceiving disaster to himself in the forthcoming career of the Buddha, endeavors to dissuade him from embarking upon it and urges him to pass directly into Nirvana. Avalokita in the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle resolves not to enter into the peace ineffable until he has been instrumental in leading all creation to the gates of Nirvana. But the prospect of this ancient prototype of Eduard von Hartmann^o would appear dismal enough: as we are taught in the Sankhya philosophy, the number of souls is infinite;

the total extinction of the universe through the deliverance of all souls into Nirvana is scarcely to be expected. Meanwhile you and I can gain Arhatship if we but pursue it diligently.^o

Very likely primitive Buddhism, only reluctantly speculative, satisfied itself with perceiving misery and the lusts of self and ignorance, and preached a release from them in the peace of Nirvana,—the calm and bliss of the sage who had seen through the vanities of life, had conquered desire, and quietly awaited death which for his released soul held no terrors, not looking beyond death and craving nothing. But the demand of squaring this notion with the doctrine of Karma involves the more elaborate Buddhist speculation in what seem to be insuperable difficulties. It is the moral worth of the Karma doctrine which commends it to the Buddhist; yet to fall in line with this doctrine, the notion of Nirvana must come to mean extinction of personality and thus, for the Buddhist, cessation of existence. For while the seer of the Upanishads could cease existing as a finite self and still find bliss unutterable in the infinite Brahman, no such absorption is available for the Buddhist, who is an atheist and for whom all existence whatever is involved in the web of finitude and transitoriness.

Thus Buddhism appears engaged in the difficult task of undertaking to nourish moral enthusiasm and to justify moral effort, while conceiving of the goal of moral endeavor as the irrevocable cessation of all possibility of moral or any other action. At least two philosophical plights are illustrated in Buddhist speculation: the plight of the morally vigilant theoretical nihilist or quietist; and, what concerns us more here, the plight of him who undertakes to preach a gospel of moral aspiration and teach a doctrine of moral attainment and who begins his spiritual enterprise by taking leave of personality.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY IN MODERN THEOLOGY:

A CONTEMPORARY SURVEY OF AFFIRMATION

A THEOLOGIAN is essentially an apologist and a protagonist rather than an inquirer. A study of his tactics may accordingly be most rewarding even when his conclusions fail to convince, for his choice of tactics reveals his estimate of the manifold strength or weakness of his position. The tenor of the theological discussion of an idea thus exhibits the secure or the precarious status of that idea as judged by the more critical religious consciousness of the times. Here is a point obviously untenable: need it be defended? Surely it is not vital to the security of the fundamental position. Ignore it then, or, if you may not, surrender it openly, and insist that it should never have been maintained. Here is an eminence attacked fiercely but not consistently: defend this eminence with ardor and defiance. Here is a possible new rampart, promising but unassured; scorn it you cannot, but neither dare you commit yourself definitely to its defence. Make the enemy aware of your new prospective resource, and at the same time impress him with your refusal to be reckless or precipitate in utilizing it. And meanwhile fortify yourself on the most nearly unchallenged ground that you afford, and from this ground seek to undermine the enemy's battlements.

There is nothing tricky in these tactics; they simply manifest in intellectual terms the demand of the religious

consciousness for firm reassurance of its cherished beliefs. Scarcely anything else indicates quite so clearly the definite general abandonment of a traditional philosophical idea as the increasingly negligent and slighting treatment of it by the theologians. Even critical religious discussion leaves much to be desired in logical rigor and objectivity, but the theologian in the van does have a genius for catching the characteristic tone of contemporary philosophical thinking and for reproducing it in his own new interpretation of old ideas. Thus the manner in which the modern theologian, seeking assurance of human immortality, is led to deal with materialism and ethical idealism, with Bible texts and psychical research revelations, the emphasis which he places on rational demonstration as compared with emotional demands and the assurance of the heart,—all these disclose the tone of the more or less reasoned opinion of the day on the subject before us.

The interest to be instructed regarding this opinion has led me to undertake the following survey. No completeness or exhaustiveness is in the nature of the case possible here, but I believe the symposium is characteristic. I have sought only informing discussion, and have considered both conservative and liberal views of human destiny.

I

The theology of the past undertook to demonstrate the immortality of the soul by conclusive speculative argument: the soul is a simple substance, an immaterial entity, hence indiscerptible, incorruptible, imperishable, spiritual, immortal. The collapse of substantialist notions in modern thought, as a result of British empiricism and Kantian critique, is reflected in the increasing abandonment by the modern theologian of the idea of a soul-substance. The desideratum is the permanent survival of the self, the per-

son, and modern thought has made clear that the self, the person, is no simple substance. To be sure, Bishop Well-don may rehearse old syllogisms that the soul, being im-material, is imperishable, that is, a *forma separata*, in its nature indissoluble, intrinsically active.^o But Newman Smyth's position is far more characteristic: "The better standing ground for belief in a possible continuance of life beyond death . . . is to be gained when we leave one side the common idea of the soul as a substance of some kind."^o Even more significant is the plain ignoring of the substantialist argument: the theologian neither advances nor repudiates it; his thought simply proceeds through other channels.

If Butler's thought is outside the current of living speculation in philosophy, it lives in the liberal theology of today. A theologian of the old school may judge this to be a sinister observation; but its accuracy is scarcely contestable. The typical liberal theologian of the present is no staunch rationalist; he eschews forbidding metaphysics and promises himself no indubitable certainties. Readily admitting that he has no theoretical demonstration of immortality, he declares himself content with probability, with the limited assurance of the empirical. When we consider immortality, we are told, "half the battle" is "what to expect upon a subject like this. . . . One must surrender at the start all hope of demonstration."^o But, then, where outside of mathematics is complete demonstration to be had? Are the facts of history conclusively demonstrable, or the doctrine of evolution, or the uniformity of nature?

This manner of procedure indicates no scepticism, nor is it a mere *tu quoque* to science. The theologian had been under the impression that he possessed proofs absolute of the soul's immortality, as absolute as the demonstrations of science. But, by Kant and others, his own demonstrations have been successfully challenged; and he is interested to observe that a deal of scientific truth may like-

wise, though not similarly, be challenged. His consequent change of tactics is perfectly natural. Ventures of faith are both science and theology, he now declares, but ventures of faith resting on solid fact. And his main present concern is to maintain that his facts are as solid as the scientist's. Personal activity is as real, and as truly demanding explanation, as electrical or organic activity.

The radical empirical or idealistic theologian has not quite subdued mysticism. Abstract rational demonstration he does not expect; he sets no value on it. He quotes Tennyson's Ancient Sage:

Nothing worthy proving can be proven,
Nor yet disproven.

The assurance of immortality must be a matter of intimate spiritual experience, and can be complete notwithstanding the inconclusiveness of the theoretical arguments advanced in its support. The intellect has been shown its place, and has meekly taken it, but all the more fervent becomes the mystic and moral assurance.

This aspect of theological thinking is evident also in the attitude taken towards psychical research and spiritism. The theologian is apt to reject it, as Gordon does: "Even if the reports of the spirits are accepted as authentic, still the fact that some men have survived death does not prove that all men must,"—any more than one sheep's swimming across the river proves that the whole flock will do so.^o The theologian feels that psychical research is on the wrong track, that immortality requires other than factual demonstration.^o Or else he may be hospitably inclined to postpone judgment, hoping that the evidence proposed, if proved authentic, will supply scientific support to a position which he maintains on other grounds. At any rate the thoughtful theologian feels that he does not have to be precipitate.

If modern theology is modest in its own metaphysical

pretensions, it is not slow to challenge any arrogance in the metaphysics of negation. No longer insisting that the soul is an immaterial entity, it cannot tolerate the materialist's insistence that personal activity is merely a mechanical process. The dogmatism of today, in dealing with the soul, is materialistic, and on this dogmatism the theologian wages relentless war, with all the borrowed ammunition of scientific evidence and philosophical analysis, and with its own weapons. If we hold that consciousness is nothing but a complex of physical forces, we are involved in amazing confusion. James Martineau strikingly illustrates this point. He is seated at church, quietly attending to the service, when someone steals behind him and whispers that his library is on fire. "I quit the church, spring into the cab before the door, send one messenger to the police station and another to the fire-engine house, and, as I come to the spot, organize a plan for saving the contents in the order of their value; and, finally, move hither and thither, from base to roof, to see it, as far as possible, safely carried out. Follow out the metamorphoses of energy that run through this process, and try to mark the successive equivalents. . . . Has the *consciousness of the meaning* of that whisper nothing to do with the amount of energy thrown into the transaction? Is the difference between 'The library is on fire' and 'The library is all right' only that of aerial undulation in two words? If not, then there is a difference,—a direct dynamic difference,—made by thought alone: one idea leaving me quiet in my seat, another snatching me impetuously from it."° John Caird insists further: Consider the problem of the materialist: "The matter out of which mind is to spring must be matter *minus* mind, matter into the constitution of which not the faintest ingredient of mind must be permitted to enter. . . . One does not need to be a votary of idealism to see that the task which materialism thus sets to itself is an impossible one."° So A. Clutton-Brock wittily observes: "The me-

chanical explanation of the universe would be quite satisfying, if only it were not we poor machines that had hit upon it.”^o

Materialism is also intolerable spiritually. “In a world without immortality it would seem that the only permanent forces are physical. They build themselves into solar systems and resolve themselves again, while life and character, knowledge and spiritual quality, the pride and glory of the race, are as transient as though like smoke rings they had been blown for a moment and had been dissolved. Without immortality physical force alone persists, the builder and destroyer of spirit, and at last the sole survivor and victor over all.”^o On this basis the moral-religious interpretation of the universe loses all meaning.

II

We should note clearly the ground on which materialism is rejected by modern theology. It is because on a mechanistic basis no genuine recognition of the world of values is possible: of character, knowledge, and spiritual quality. Gordon puts the substance of the argument thus: “The question of the immortality of man is nothing less than the question of the reality of man’s world, its integrity and worth for the universe. And this means simply the ultimate reasonableness or unreasonableness, the intelligence or brutality, of the Power that is responsible for our existence.”^o “A God who is the source and consummation of all value,” Principal Galloway points out, “cannot consistently be regarded as indifferent to the ethical values realised in human experience, or willing that they should vanish away and ‘leave not a rack behind.’”^o

We have an irrepressible faith in our survival value. Is this faith justified? Newman Smyth would approach the problem in a scientific spirit; without making any initial metaphysical assumptions about the soul, he would study its activity, and consider what this activity implies.

"How may we now best conceive of the supreme fact of personality?" He notes that modern science conceives of matter in terms of energy; "it does not . . . undertake to say what the ultimate nature of anything is; it recognizes different things by what they do. . . . Science has become a study of energetics; . . . the natural sciences, strictly speaking, are studies in conduct." We cannot and we need not give in advance a definition of spirit; we must simply observe its behavior. In the world we note mechanical activity; in the world we note also personal activity. "Modern science is not about to put the spiritual self out of existence because it has led us to abandon the traditional notion of soul atoms, any more than it puts matter out of existence because it has given up the received theory of material atoms. . . . In either case we know what is by what is experienced; we know what it is by what it does." So, then, "we are not . . . in our day to lose our own souls at the bidding of a partial science." For mechanical activity, mechanical energy, is not the only energy with which we have to deal. There is "the law of conservation of personal energy." Personal energy challenges us at every step, ever present and immediate and yet most elusive, "the best known and the least known of all the powers." What is personal energy and what does it involve? This question a reasonable interpretation of the universe can no more ignore than it can ignore the mechanistic questions of physical science.^o

However we explain the initial origin or the early genesis of personal activity in the world, we cannot ignore this activity nor overlook its fundamentally teleological character. Justice, truth, virtue, the reach for the ideal, bespeaking man's spiritual nature, reveal the constitution of reality as purposeful. And the maintenance of personal energy must be a self-maintenance, an individual wholeness of experience; otherwise confusion engulfs us. Sir Walter Scott's last entry in his Journal is: "We slept reasonably, but on the next morning——" There is no

meaning here. "Human life without an endless future is such a sentence. . . . Thus incomplete, unintelligible, and pathetic beyond expression, thus tragic and terrible, is life without immortality."^o

Are we here reasoning simply from the wish for personal survival? But the motive of this wish should not be ignored. The desire for immortality is the desire that the nature of man receive its legitimate consummation. It is strongest by the graveside of one whom we have loved. Against the idea that the change wrought by death is final, such poems as *Lycidas* or *Adonais* or *In Memoriam* are burning protests. The demand for eternal life expresses the conviction that the process of existence which has progressively revealed the central importance of the psychical, of personality, of value, justifies us in rejecting the idea that, after all, bodily dissolution is to terminate personal activity and nullify all value. It is an impious idea, for, even if we did not desire immortality and, like H. G. Wells, were content with this brief life, "it would not be to God's credit were He equally content."^o The Love that has exalted us and exalted itself in us has not exalted only in order more crushingly to humiliate. "The profound facts of human personality must belong to the integrity of the universe and must be safeguarded and not brought to confusion by its laws. This is just what we mean when we utter our hope of immortality."^o

III

Grant the fundamental assumption that the universe is reasonable and beneficent, and the presence of evil and frustrated endeavor may itself strengthen the confidence in a hereafter. This is "the argument which arises from the infinite capabilities of the human spirit, and their inadequate realization in this life."^o Were man devoid of a spiritual future, his present would lose in spirituality. So the Pope reasons in *The Ring and the Book*:

Leave the inferior minds and look at man!
 Is he the strong, intelligent and good
 Up to his own conceivable height? Nowise.

Man's ideal demands how lofty: how low, his attainment! Only the belief in immortality can resolve this paradox. The ideal task which man has undertaken is a task of eternity. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect!" "That," Otto Pfeiderer says, "is a brief, and it is the aptest, expression of the destiny of man."^o The demand for perfection is never met: each step forward brings clearer recognition of the height that is being scaled, and a corresponding loss of complacency. "Thus," Martineau observes, "the satisfactions of conscience are least known where they are best earned." He goes on to note the wastefulness involved in the extinction of great minds: "their gathered resources, their matured skill, their luminous insight, their unflinching tact, are not like instincts that can be handed down; they are absolutely personal and inalienable; grand conditions of future power, unavailable for the race, and perfect for the ulterior growth of the individual."^o

This mode of reasoning may be charged with anthropomorphism, a challenge which Fosdick is eager to meet. Anthropomorphic? "Can a man leap outside himself and look at the world through other than human eyes or conceive it in other than human terms? . . . Physical energy is just as much our experience of body read out into the world as personality is our experience of self-consciousness."^o Like the scientist the theologian has to reason on the best evidence he has, seek the best light. In the light of Christ's life the road lies plain and clear in our sight, and our doubts are gone. The assurance of Christ's resurrection is the apex of theological reasoning on the subject of immortality. Yet it should be noted that this argument appears precarious in proportion to one's determination to regard Jesus as God. That the God Christ was Victor over death need not assure us poor men of a like

victory. On the other hand, if we treat the risen Lord as man, doubts beset us regarding the resurrection story, so amazing it is. A theologian's treatment of Christ's resurrection is indeed a fair index of his general tactics in dealing with the problem before us. To Salmond, Christ provides indubitable assurance of a future life: "The words of Christ are to me the highest authority, beyond which I seek no other. . . . Christianity gives what philosophy cannot give—the consciousness of a personal relation to One who is akin to us, and who has carried our nature in victory over death."^o Dole is not so impressed with the reported fact of Christ's resurrection, but with its significance. "It is not necessary to believe that his risen body passed through closed doors and appeared to his disciples. The deeper fact is that his person seemed to those who knew him to be above the range of death. That which constituted him a person was not that which died."^o To a similar conclusion, although in a more orthodox vein, reasons Bishop Welldon: "Christ . . . is the archetypal man. . . . By His personal example (He) revealed . . . the Eternal Life as the prerogative of human nature. . . . Whatever Man has done, Man may aspire to do. Whatever Man has been, Man may hope to become."^o

Of man's eternal prospect, as already noted, the modern theologian is assured mainly on the ground of man's eternal value. The assurance of a hereafter is his main concern; about its topography he is not as well informed as the author of the Apocalypse, or Tertullian, or Dante. Of one thing he is certain: the immortality must be an immortality of persons. The positivist immortality of fame or influence over posterity, to which some materialists incline, is paltry to the theologian. In his insistence on the personal character of value, he turns away also from the pantheistic vision of absorption in the Infinite. The heart, he declares, craves individual immortality. Schleiermacher, to be sure, regarded this craving as selfish, as a preoccupation with self, as the sign of an irreligious dis-

position, to correct which is the proper function of religion. "In the midst of the finite to be one with the infinite, to be eternal every moment, that is the immortality of religion." Martineau, however, seeks to exhibit the hollowness of the pantheistic prospect by quoting from Schleiermacher's correspondence with Henrietta von Mühlentfels after the death of her husband. "His soul is resolved back,—quite melted away in the great All," she thinks, as she has learned to think from Schleiermacher; but then it is that she "feels the grasp of the sorrow too bitterly." "When I loved and knew God in my Ehrenfried, there were two objects of my love. . . . Now . . . are there still two lives or only one?" And Martineau comments: "Love,—knowledge,—where persons are not; can there be a greater contradiction?" Is it a selfish and vain fancy that demands reassurance of personal survival? Or is it the insistence on ultimate value, that it is always personal? Can the highest life be impersonal? "Without thought, without love, without reverence, without will, without objects (and none but personal beings can have these), what remains to fill the phrase 'highest life'?"

The ideas of preëxistence, reincarnation, and transmigration seem to have little attraction for the Christian theologian. And very naturally: these notions have ever been alien to traditional Christian thinking, for the exclusive emphasis on this one life is involved in the orthodox doctrine of the resurrection of the body. It is this life which is the preface to eternity, and in this one body we earn our immortal destiny. In the second chapter of this book the development of the doctrine of the resurrection in the history of Christian thought was briefly traced up to the time of Aquinas and Dante. Here we may observe only some contemporary reactions towards this notion. The old doctrine of the resurrection of the body is summarily rejected by a number of modern theologians. Lyman Abbott brushes it aside: "The only resurrection of the body is into grass and flowers and fruit. The

phrase does not exist in the New Testament. The conception is borrowed from paganism."° Though rejected in its crude sense, however, the doctrine of the resurrection is seen to contain an element of real truth which must not be lost. It derived its philosophical appeal from the Aristotelian notion that the real man, the real person, is one, soul and body, a rational animal. The soul whose immortality we demand cannot be an immaterial substance, alien to this embodied life of man: "a personal life must be not only a *social* but an *embodied* life."°

Modern theology has not resolved the difficulties which baffled medieval Aristotelianism. The theologian of today is willing to sacrifice the letter, if he can by so doing safeguard the spirit. The modern question is put thus by Newman Smyth: "What are the relations, present and prospective, between this energizing selfhood—this personal focus of mental and moral power—and the universe of external forces?" The value of the sensitive and perceptive embodiment to the inner life,—brain, power of speech, vision,—is truly priceless. "Matter and mind were made to exist together;" so "if embodiment is to be esteemed as a means of spiritual communion with nature, through which the personal life is greatly enriched, then . . . it is to be possessed as power that may be more fully realized in some freedom of activity and perfection of vision beyond our knowledge."°

IV

Divine Providence assures us of a hereafter; but regarding the specific operation of Divine Providence theologians appear to disagree today as much as ever. Is this life the only period of trial, which decides forever a man's future,—or is there probation, purgation, reclaiming of souls after death? Is immortality the natural destiny of each human soul, or is eternal life a guerdon, a prize won by God's faithful, the wicked and recalcitrant

being destined to eternal death in the sense of utter annihilation? Or are we to understand by eternal life and eternal death the eternal joy of the blessed in God's immediate presence and the eternal damnation of the evil doer? Or again are we to conclude, from our contemplation of God's infinite love, that no finite wickedness can eternally withstand its redeeming power, and that all souls will in the end be reclaimed, saved, and restored?

The issues indicated in the previous paragraph have involved theologians in controversies that are largely parades and counter-parades of Biblical texts. The pious Geiler of Kaisersberg who lies buried under the pulpit of the Strassburg Cathedral, had said with unintended irony: "The Holy Scripture is like a wax nose, every one twists it to suit his fancy."^o This turn of a theological dispute transcends my competence and interest, but I am concerned to understand the motives which send theologians to thumb their Bibles in search of certain kinds of texts. Of the three main alternative doctrines,—the doctrine of retribution, the doctrine of universal restoration, and the doctrine of annihilation and conditional immortality,—the first is preëminently the dogma of orthodoxy, the teaching of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Dante, of John Calvin and Jonathan Edwards, with the prestige of immemorial tradition, entrenched in the theology and the imagination of the Church. This is the doctrine of eternal bliss and eternal damnation. Tertullian contemplated with holy joy the wreaking of God's vengeance on the wicked; his full measure of blessedness required the spectacle of monarchs and magistrates in the pit of hell crying in agony as they burn in flames that consume them not.^o Thomas à Kempis recalls Dante in his portrayal of the hereafter. "In what things a man hath sinned: in the same shall he be the more grievously punished. . . . There shall the luxurious and the lovers of pleasure be bathed in burning pitch and stinking brimstone."^o "Tremble, hardened sinners, tremble before the vengeance

which pursues you!" Bossuet exclaims, and he describes the workings of God's vengeance and the agonies of the damned: "always living and always dying, immortal for their pains, too strong to die, too weak to endure, they will groan forever on beds of flame, wracked by furious and irremediable sufferings."^o Protestant orthodoxy is here in agreement with the Roman Catholic. A harrowing classic is Jonathan Edwards' sermon on "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God:" "The bow of God's wrath is bent, and the arrow made ready on the string, and justice bends the arrow at your heart, and strains the bow, and it is nothing but the mere pleasure of God, and that of an angry God, without any promise or obligation at all, that keeps the arrow one moment from being made drunk with your blood. . . . However you may have reformed your life in many things, and may have had religious affections, and may keep up a form of religion in your families and closets, and in the house of God, it is nothing but his mere pleasure that keeps you from being this moment swallowed up in everlasting destruction. . . . The God that holds you over the pit of hell, much as one holds a spider, or some loathsome insect, over the fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked: his wrath towards you burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but to be cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight; you are ten thousand times more abominable in his eyes, than the most hateful venomous serpent is in ours. . . . It would be dreadful to suffer this fierceness and wrath of Almighty God one moment; but you must suffer it to all eternity. There will be no end to this exquisite horrible misery."^o Heart-moving in his praise of God's love in Christ, Edwards is yet inflexible on the subject of man's essential wickedness and eternal damnation. "Wrath upon the Wicked to the Uttermost," "Men Naturally Are God's Enemies," "The Eternity of Hell Torments,"—these are headlines in the thought of this classic modern exponent of the doctrine of

retribution; and nothing is more instructive in determining our modern attitude towards this doctrine than the reading of Jonathan Edwards. Of the millions of little children dead, a certain number are saved, but the rest are so many immortal little vipers, destined to burn forever in the pit of fire and brimstone! Not without reason does Lecky call Edwards' *Original Sin* "one of the most revolting books that have ever proceeded from the pen of man."^o

This doctrine which harrowed Jonathan Edwards' contemporaries has been made abundantly clear and vivid to their descendants. In our own generation almost, Spurgeon wrought terror in the hearts of sinners with his lurid accounts of the eternally damned, and a thousand journeymen preachers of hell-fire today rehearse his maledictions in church and chapel and tent-tabernacle. It is true that Spurgeon later in his career modified his views of the hereafter;^o it is also true that God's eternal wrath is no longer the favorite text in the more intelligent pulpit. But the doctrine is still an article of orthodoxy, and even those reluctant to preach it or to hear it preached feel constrained to accept it. For, terrible though it be, the doctrine of retribution and eternal hell-torments is regarded as centered in the notion of God's eternal justice and man's responsibility. "That man's immortality is determined by the spiritual attitude to which he commits himself here, that the moral decision made in the brief opportunity of this life is final, and that the condition consequent on it in the other world is one of eternal blessedness or the opposite, is," we are informed, "a doctrine of almost unimaginable grandeur. . . . To an extent which can be claimed for no other view of man's future, it grapples with the real problems of God's providence, the dark enigmas of life, and the mysteries of man's moral nature."^o The more rational champion of the traditional doctrine advocates no harrowing materialistic hell; he would relieve the doctrine of all revolting accessories; he would recognize (with Dante) that wickedness is its own punishment and hell

the logical and complete development of the lust, violence, falsehood, pride, and envy of the wretched soul that has damned itself; he would admit degrees of reward and punishment, and insist on the principle of progress in the hereafter. All the same he would hold firmly to the idea that the decision made in the brief opportunity of this life is final. The direction of man's eternal career is determined now, and determined not to be changed.

But, within and without the Church, this doctrine has roused the most insistent opposition. The notion of an Almighty God punishing through eternity the wretched seed of Adam is denounced as a moral outrage and a blasphemy. Better idolatry and atheism than belief in such a divine malignity, Sismondi exclaims. "Just as Torquemada discredited the papacy, so the eternal torments dishonor the Gospel,"^o declares Petavel, and quotes Tennyson's poem "Despair," which was intended to stir the Church into disavowing the atrocious dogma:

But the God of Love and of Hell together—they cannot be thought,
If there be such a God, may the Great God curse him and bring
him to nought!

What sin of man deserves eternal torment, and what notion of omnipotent justice or divine love is compatible with the vision of hell-tortures of infants unbaptized and not elected to grace? "Who has ever really thought of his father or his child as eternally burning in the unquenchable fire?" And can God lack the forgiving insight of love and sympathy which even frail man possesses? *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*. From the time when Origen, reacting against Tertullian's hell-horrors, preached the reclamation of all souls and of Satan himself by the infinite love of God, there have been those who, especially since the Reformation, have resisted the Augustinian tradition and preached the universal restoration and restitution of all.

Those who champion the idea of universal restoration

set out from the assumption that every human soul is precious to the Divine Father. Is the Christian vision of life eternal more than a mere abstract notion of continued existence; does it contemplate life-everlasting for the real man, the complete person? Then it cannot ignore the possibility of human redemption after death. If a person survives death, if this life is but the prelude to future personal existence, what reason do we have for holding that any of the moral conditions of personal existence;—effort, temptation, repentance, salvation, enlightenment,—will be absent after death? What existence can exclude these and remain really personal existence? And what justifies us in holding that the sinner will resist eternally the infinite love of a Divine Father? The doctrine of hell everlasting makes for moral scepticism, and is really impious, for it maintains the permanent and ineradicable character of evil in the constitution of the universe. Manicheanism is disclosed here unvanquished by the Augustinian theology. Sin, to be sure, must loom large in the Christian doctrine, for it is a doctrine of salvation. The moral nature of man is pitted against evil; no doubt is possible of the actuality of evil, but moral aspiration and piety refuse to recognize the permanent status of evil in the constitution of things. The moral struggle is genuine, but it is not futile. Now, if evil is finite and good infinite, if furthermore every man's soul is precious to God, we seem inevitably led to the conclusion of the eventual salvation of all. So to a large number of modern men the idea of Hell and of eternal damnation is becoming increasingly intolerable, and doubt consequently arises as to its real Biblical warrant.^o Many who do not commit themselves explicitly to the universalist doctrine tend towards it and cling to the larger hope. F. D. Maurice and Dean Farrar are not the least in this considerable group.

Bishop Martensen finds in the New Testament an antinomy: before him are two collections of passages, one

collection appearing to teach the eventual salvation of all men; the other as certainly seeming to teach punishment eternal and irremediable. This antinomy he finds paralleled in human thought and experience. The teleology of God's love implies the redemption of all men; but anthropological, psychological, and ethical considerations on the other hand, observation of man's nature and man's choice of life, strengthen our sad conviction that for many the prospect is eternally dark. Martensen would resolve the antinomy by arguing with the Lutherans for an *apokatastasis a parte ante* (God's universal *Rathschluss* that all men be saved), but on the other hand, recognizing the factor of man's free will and its development in time, he would teach an *apokatastasis a parte post* only in so far as the latter may include the possibility of eternal damnation.^o Simpler is Dr. Paterson-Smyth's declaration: "We must believe that through all Eternity, if the worst sinner felt touched by the love of God and wanted to turn to Him, that man would be saved. What we dread is that the man may not want to do so, may have rendered himself incapable of doing so. We dread not God's will, but man's own will. Character tends to permanence. . . ."^o

The antinomy which Martensen tries to resolve by conciliating the two sides of a paradox is more bluntly solved by the champions of conditional immortality who reject both the traditional doctrine of eternal torments and the doctrine of universal redemption as unbiblical and unchristian. The doctrine of eternal punishment casts doubt on the eternal justice and love of the Almighty, outrages the moral nature of man and makes for scepticism and impious pessimism. The universalist doctrine, on the other hand, holding as it does that all, even Satan, will be saved in the end, weakens the moral fibre of man, makes him lax, lightly optimistic, indifferent to the urgency and solemnity of the moral choice. It is furthermore a flagrantly unchristian doctrine, for in proclaiming the

eventual security of all men, it also proclaims their present peril to be nowise dire, and should accordingly pronounce the mission of the Savior to be quite superfluous. How preserve man's moral awe before God and eternity without losing man's trust in God's eternal justice and love? The solution, we are told, lies in conditionalism: man is not naturally immortal; eternal life is a boon which man obtains through salvation and loyal surrender to God's love. The soul which chooses wickedness suffers after death the evil consequences of its choice; yet Divine Grace and the possibility of redemption are not refused to it. But a day of final judgment is coming, and the fate of the stubbornly recalcitrant soul which definitely rejects God's love is death eternal and absolute, the second death, annihilation.

The history of conditionalism is considerable. The authority of the early Church has been claimed for its support; the Apostolic Fathers have been cited as either ignoring or rejecting the natural immortality of man; and of the other early Fathers, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Arnobius, Lactantius, and Athanasius have been described as champions of conditional immortality. In more modern times Socinianism is conditionalist; Hobbes and Locke and Dodwell; even Isaac Watts inclines to the doctrine. It was not until the last century, however, that conditional immortality became a recognized alternative in the Christian solution of the problem of human destiny. Edward White's *Life in Christ* made a great impression and gained considerable following both lay and clerical. Along somewhat different lines of approach a number of important thinkers have been reaching the conclusion that immortality is not a natural endowment of man, but a guerdon to be won. J. B. Heard in England, Lotze and Richard Rothe, the great Heidelberg theologian, Charles Secrétan, Renouvier and Auguste Sabatier, Victor Hugo and Renan, Archbishop Whately, George G. Stokes, Henry Ward Beecher,

and Lyman Abbott are a few of the more or less definite exponents of conditionalism. E. Petavel-Olliff's work, *Le problème de l'immortalité*, which is the most adequate systematic exposition of this doctrine, contains an impressive survey of the voluminous literature on the subject which leaves no doubt as to the importance of conditionalism in contemporary religious thought.

The champions of conditional immortality declare that the Bible knows nothing of essential and natural immortality; the expression "immortal soul" is not to be found in it. According to Petavel, orthodox rabbinical opinion is against natural immortality, as witness Maimonides, Renan, Munk, and Franck, and Sabatier. The evidence of contemporary scholarship regarding the absence of natural immortality in the Bible appears impressive. Delitzsch's judgment is only one of many: "There is nothing in the Bible which implies native immortality."^o According to the Bible, we are told, "man is a candidate for immortality. Life eternal is the lot of him who unites himself to God in faith. The immortalization of man is the aim of redemption. The life of the obstinate sinner is transitory; prolonged beyond the tomb, it is bound ultimately to be extinguished."^o The wicked are fitted unto destruction, and will be as though they had never existed; as the cloud consumed and vanished away, as ashes trampled under foot, dashed in pieces like a potter's vessel, consumed away in smoke, like the whirling dust, as stubble before the wind.^o

The traditional view of the Church, it is therefore insisted, is not Biblical; on the subject of human destiny Saint Augustine teaches Plato, not Christ. The doctrine of restorationism is a misdirected effort to remedy the evils of hell everlasting. The conditionalist would recall the Church to its native primitive Christ-given promise. The doctrine of conditional immortality alone has Scriptural warrant; it permits a moral conception of God as eternally just and loving; it saves man from moral

scepticism and pessimistic impiety without releasing him to enervation and the moral perils of light-minded optimism. "In suppressing the scandal of eternal torments," Petavel declares, conditionalism "presents a God always true to himself and merciful even in the terrible punishment with which he threatens the obstinate sinner. . . . It humbles the presumptuous child of dust; it glorifies Jesus Christ. It is the basis of a new theodicy."° So likewise Richard Rothe, unable to tolerate the eternal torturing of the damned, or on the other hand to accept the indifferent reclamation of all, is led to the view that there is indeed an end to the punishment of the wicked, but it is the end of themselves, their annihilation.°

The doctrine of conditional immortality is sharply criticized by the traditionalists.° Salmond urges a reconsideration of the real meaning of 'life' and 'death' in the Bible. Life and death do not mean existence and non-existence. Life is "the good of being, the content of a moral relation, a condition of existence realized in conscious union with the Divine Fountain of life," and death is the opposite of this. The annihilationist doctrine is thus, according to him, weakest where it is most confident, in its reliance on Scripture. It assumes two classes of men: "differing not merely in character but in constitution," and it scarcely does honor to God's justice in believing that unrepentant sinners are to suffer punishment for a while and are then to be utterly destroyed.° Bishop Martensen also declares firmly against the doctrine of annihilation and conditional immortality. Scripture teaches, not the utter extinction of the recalcitrant sinner, but his damnation, his conscious, self-conscious death. Man, according to Martensen, is unconditionally immortal; conditional, however, is the character of his immortal career, depending on his acceptance or refusal of God's loving grace.°

Other puzzling questions continue to worry the modern theologian in his effort to represent to himself the here-

after. If the moral nature of man is a presumption of his immortality, is the distant anticipation of a moral sense which we observe in animals sufficient ground for the survival of animal souls? Gordon rejects the idea of animal immortality;° for Bishop Welldon it seems to have a genuine appeal; he returns to it repeatedly.° Furthermore,—a more important matter,—while we hold that death cannot put an end to personal relations, how are we to conceive of personal relations in the hereafter? “Will a man meet his mother as he remembers her when he laid her grey-headed in the grave, or will it be as his father saw her in the prime of life at the marriage altar, or will it be as his grandmother knew her a baby in the cradle?”° More particularly in regard to children, how are we to conceive of their future? Perhaps nothing indicates so strikingly the modern break with the past as the undisguised horror with which we reject the traditional vision of unredeemed infants broiling in fire and brimstone. But the new view has difficulties of its own. Children, we say, are not little immortal vipers, but neither are they paragons of attained virtue. Are they to have their chance and their trials in the Beyond; are they there to grow to mature personality? Or are they, entering the new life as children, to “remain the gay and innocent children of eternity?”°

In all this discussion and controversy, the modern liberal theologian appears strikingly free from the traditional otherworldliness. The values in which he places his confidence are eternal, but they are values measurably realized in the present moment. Preoccupation with the hereafter, we are now told, is liable to divert one's attention from present duty and so check the very activity which eternalizes our nature. “Too much thought about the golden streets of the new Jerusalem had allowed the streets of many a mediaeval town to be soiled and foul.”° Immortality does not begin after death; it is a continuous development and enhancement of present spiritual activi-

ties. "Immortality is worth having just because a noble earthly life has an intrinsic worth of its own."° "The indefiniteness of the picture we form of the future tends to check the inclination which becomes so dangerous, to revel to such an extent in pictures of the future as to forget the claims and the value of the present."°

But, active in this life and no alien to this world, man in this life and world can be a living witness to immortality. This is the essential value of a man's conviction of immortality: it verily eternalizes his life. The common tendency to think that no man can be good without believing in a hereafter may well be discounted. We resent Luther's explosion of folly: "If you believe in no future life, I would not give a mushroom for your God. Do, then, as you like! For if no God, so no devil, no hell, as with a fallen tree, all is over when you die. Then plunge into lechery, rascality, robbery, murder." A Saracen woman walked down the streets of Damascus, with a pan of fire in one hand and a jug of water in the other. "What are you about to do?" a monk asked her. "Burn up Paradise and put out the fires of hell, so that men may do good for the love of God." The demands of his moral nature man can not scorn even though he might lack assurance of immortality. All the same it is when man has perceived the eternal implications of his spiritual career that the career itself is transfigured and ennobled. "The man who lives as though he were immortal lives in a universe where the highest spiritual values are permanent . . . where personality, whether in himself or herself, is infinitely precious and has everlasting issues; where character is the supreme concern of life. . . . The truth of immortality makes great living."°

Faith it is in the last resort, the theologian admits, but faith nowise unwarranted, resting on the confidence in the reasonableness of the universe, and in the beneficence of God; faith to which the saints and sages of mankind have entrusted their lives and found them ennobled and trans-

figured thereby. In the last analysis the theologian of today insists on immortality as a postulate of morality, as involved in the spiritual nature of man, and as indispensable to the satisfaction of essential spiritual needs. "Acting . . . as an ideal which elevates, comforts, and encourages, and as an authority which rebukes and incites," Pfeiderer writes, "the hope of immortality is a motive so incomparably rich in blessings, that mankind certainly would not give it up even if theoretical grounds existed for doubting its possibility. This . . . is not the case, and this hope will remain an inalienable treasure of mankind for all times."^o

CHAPTER IX

ETHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALITY

I

CONTEMPORARY religious thought on the subject of immortality, as we have observed in the previous chapter, follows mainly ethical lines; it considers God's justice and goodness, man's deserts, the precious and irreplaceable worth of man's soul, Christ's revelation of man's infinite ideal possibilities. In his conclusions, as already noted, the theologian reflects the tone of philosophical discussion of the problem before us; or perhaps it were more accurate to say that philosopher and theologian both reflect and formulate the convictions and the embarrassments of thought, expressing them each in his own way, the philosopher in the deliberate language of the intellect, the theologian in the more dogmatic and more ardent speech of the heart. We may observe even closer parallels in the varieties of ethical argument advanced in secular and clerical discussions of immortality; and it is of interest now, after having been 'almost persuaded,' to follow, not in a Galilionic spirit, but yet somewhat more rigorously and with less predestined logic, the ethical reasonings on the subject of human destiny.

The distinctively moral argument finds its classical formulation in the philosophy of Kant and owes its dominance in contemporary thinking to Kant's advocacy of it, following his demolition, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, of the substantialist metaphysical argument for immortality. But the moral issue involved in Kant's argument is

neither first raised by him, nor is it settled by his dialectic. The temporally later is not always logically subsequent, and one can understand and estimate the Stoic position on the question before us all the better if one considers it after having examined Kant's critique and dismissal of it. Advancing as he does beyond the more narrowly juridical arguments of philosophizing theologians like Butler and Bossuet, Kant himself is nevertheless engaged in writing a theodicy, and the juridical note of rewards and punishments remains in his thinking. Even so his ethics of the categorical imperative does not quite outgrow the decalogue morals which it would replace. But all the same Kant towers in this entire discussion because here, as also in theory of knowledge, his thought is far more radical and fertile than his own formulation of it. Starting from Kantian premises, modern idealistic thought has been enabled to advance beyond Kant; without surrendering Kant's Stoical respect for the autonomy of moral value, it has made measurable strides in transcending the Stoic resignation to the scant range of the present. So immortality is urged, not on juridical but on teleological grounds, not in order to crown virtue with happiness, but in order rightly to realize the essentially eternal character of a career of moral aspiration.

The more careful examination of this course of reasoning in several characteristic systems of thought should serve to disclose the centrality of the notion of personal worth in any significant discussion of the problem of immortality, and may thus directly contribute to the progress of our inquiry in the three subsequent chapters of our work. We begin with a theologian preëminent in British ethics, Bishop Butler.

II

In spite of Gladstone's memorable edition of Butler's works and his challenge in their behalf, the *Analogy* does

not satisfy us as it satisfied the generations that nourished on it at Oxford. Butler is not a metaphysician, and when he does engage in metaphysics, as in his discussion of the problem of a future life, he is unconvincing. And he is unconvincing because his faith is as forward as his understanding is halting and modest. The meagerness of his philosophic demands appears to him to warrant assurance in theology. That the sun will rise tomorrow is a venture in probability; hence God's direction of the universe is scarcely open to serious doubt. Apologists have found him an uncertain champion; the argument of the *Analogy*, that in science as well as in theology we move in the twilight of probability, has not sapped appreciably the vigor and the confidence of the student of nature; but it has proved a dubious bulwark to orthodoxy, and has made for suspense of judgment and for scepticism.

Touching in particular the problem of a hereafter, Butler's argument is largely negative; we are not warranted in holding that we perish at death. Great changes of being are compatible with continuity of existence; worms become flies, birds and insects burst the shell of their habitation. How do we know that death involves a change more fatal to our living powers than birth, or than hatching does to a bird? Of course, the obvious retort is: and how do we know that it does not involve such a change? Butler, however, is content with the first challenge. Death may be no fatal change; the probability is enough; unless you can prove that death destroys me, my continuance after death is to be assumed. Coming to closer grips, Butler holds that consciousness is not discernible but a single and indivisible power, which we are not justified in regarding as dependent on the body or as perishing with it. The power of reflection may remain firm and unabated through wasting and mortal disease. Why need we hold that it is extinguished at the moment of death?

This proof of immortality, or rather of survival, is a venture in probabilities and a timid bit of metaphysics, not a moral proof. But Butler's interest in a hereafter is decidedly moral. The prospect of a future life is to him a prospect of rewards and punishments, of justification and censure. This explains his concern in the problem, and ours in his treatment of it; for if the initial speculative discussion is hesitant, the moral-judicial reasoning which follows, of human life as probation, is assured even if not convincing. In his argument Butler undertakes no demonstration of God's existence; he assumes it, and not unwarrantably, considering that his discourse is with deists and not with atheists. Do the experiences of our present life warrant our being confident that eternal justice characterizes the Divine plan, and awards to men weal and woe entirely according to their deserts?

Pain (= punishment) demands Butler's first attention. A great deal of misery in this world is the avoidable but natural consequence of men's folly and lack of foresight. Youthful rashness and thoughtlessness, bad habits and negligence bring ruin in their wake; opportunities are missed which we cannot later procure at will. Apparently we are here with Job on top of the ash-heap, and the argument seems but a rehearsal of the wisdom in which Job's friends excelled. Though men are not "always uniformly punished in proportion to their misbehaviour," yet the uniformity of punishment is "sufficient to show what the laws of the universe may admit." We may not be presumptuous; God is not mocked with impunity.

This does not carry us far enough. Grant for the time being that, in subtle ways and tortuous, evil is in the end confuted. A more important question remains: the question of Job. Is suffering, pain, always a punishment, the evil consequence of evil deeds? Butler has a clear idea of what is demanded. "Moral government consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their

actions, . . . but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked . . . in an exact proportion to their personal merits and demerits." Well, does such a government really obtain? Butler's own plea for the affirmative attempts no vindication of the moral government of our present life by the study of individual human careers. But he feels himself warranted in the claim that "there is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in fact produce them." If we rested our case on the observation of this present life, therefore, the concurrence of happiness and virtue would be scarcely complete enough to justify unwavering confidence in the invariable justice of the Divine Governor, or in His omnipotence; but the concurrence is sufficiently general to justify a presumption in favor of a moral government of the world. It is also sufficiently incomplete to demand further scope for full fruition. We can hear the verdict of Divine Justice, but we do not hear it entire. "And from these things together arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of government established in nature, shall be carried much further towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption that it will be absolutely completed."^o

Is any assurance of personal life eternal to be expected from the above contemplations? Would eternity be required for the complete accomplishment of a moral régime which is sufficiently realized in three-score-and-ten to justify Butler's presumption? And, if a hereafter is needed to balance individual accounts, will individuals then be retired to justified oblivion and dismissed from the attention of the Eternal as the Great Docket is gradually cleared? The expectation of a future life is for the author of the *Analogy* the result of a philosophy of life in terms entirely of final causes: human life conceived as under the government of God throughout; a view of

happiness and misery as normally consequent on virtue and wickedness; and a moderately optimistic view of the distribution of happiness and misery in human life: optimistic enough to justify the venture of faith in the morality of the world-order, and yet sufficiently moderate to recognize the incomplete attainment of tendencies and consequences of which it observes the beginnings in this life, and so to demand, for the full fruition and perfection of the moral order, a future life for man.

III

Butler's cautious understanding finds in the ways of God with man evidence sufficient to retain his confidence in the morality of the world-order and to justify his expectation of a Future Life. Virtue and vice receive their due, in a measure here on earth, completely and in appropriate distribution in a hereafter. It is the faith of one whose optimism has not been shaken by his observation of the present life.

But there are those who say with Job that God destroyeth the perfect and the wicked; that, if we ponder on God's justice with men, the all too common prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of the righteous have to be recognized, explained, and reconciled with the omnipotence and justice of God, with infinite wisdom and goodness; else we would be forced to conclude that God is doing the best He can, or indeed go further and doubt whether any Providence whatever watches over the apparently senseless course of human affairs.

A pessimistic view of human actualities would have disturbed Butler's undertaking to establish the Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Nevertheless it is possible to extract the sweet assurance of a hereafter from the very bitterness of despair in the present. Two generations

before Butler, Bossuet observed fools and libertines, and no doubt good men and true also, who were led to doubt Providence because of the apparent immorality of the world-order, because of the unjust distribution of weal and woe in our world. Libertinage has sought to find in the affliction of the innocent proof conclusive that there is no Providence, and that human life is a blind hazard. This challenge to religion Bossuet rises to meet in his two sermons "On Providence." Job's friends had attempted to meet the issue by ignoring it: "Who ever perished, being innocent, or where were the upright cut off?" But Bossuet learns a different truth from his observation of life and from Jesus Christ. The righteous are to suffer, and to suffer for righteousness. And it is well thus. For if only the just prospered, men would serve God for hire; if God punished all the wicked here and now, we would think His justice exhausted. But God's thoughts are not like the thoughts of men, nor are His ways our ways, or His wisdom and justice like ours. God is in no haste and works judgment in His own good time. He leaves the empire of the world to a Nero or a Domitian; he abandons the faithful to the cruel oppression of the wicked. How is one to escape from this thorny difficulty? There are pictures which at first sight appear but a medley-patch of color; but look at them from a certain angle and distance, and all the confusion is gone in the order and beauty of the design. The Divine design also requires an angle of vision to be truly perceived. Look at it from this angle, and the happiness of the wicked is shown to be vain and empty; transitory also the sufferings of the righteous. This apparent maldistribution of weal and woe in life is itself a proof of Divine Providence, of Providence operating, not in terms of this day and hour only, but in terms of Eternity. The very fact that justice of distribution is not attained in this life proves that there must be a hereafter in which it is to be completely and perfectly attained. "Con-

vinced by reason that there must be order in human life, and observing that it is not yet established, we are bound to conclude that man has something to expect. And this is . . . the whole mystery of God's counsel, the great maxim of celestial statecraft. God wills that we live in the midst of time in a perpetual state of eternity."^o

Butler advocates the juridical argument for immortality from the analogy of everyday experience in which he observes moral justice in operation. Less optimistic, but as loyal to Providence, Bossuet urges that the injustice in this world itself provides assurance of a hereafter in which God's integrity in his ways with man may be completely exhibited. This insistence that virtue and vice get their just desert is characteristic of theological ethics; in the moral philosophy of Kant an effort is made to reinterpret this demand for rewards and punishments so as to reconcile it with a Stoic purity of devotion to virtue for its own sake. This effort to require immortality as a postulate of an autonomous morality raises new problems and difficulties, and guides philosophic thought along new paths to larger truth.

IV

Paulsen calls the problem of immortality the ultimate goal in Kant's critical philosophy. Kant's treatment of this problem exhibits strikingly his characteristic advance: after criticizing the metaphysical presumptions of speculative reason, he urges the primacy of the practical reason. No one is less wavering in dismissing the speculative arguments for a future life; no one is more imperious in exacting immortality as a moral postulate. This view, towards which Kant's thought proceeds with increasing assurance, is manifest even in his pre-critical writings. It is anticipated in the *Dreams of a Ghost-Seer Explained through the Dreams of Metaphysics*. Here Kant, "in the

first place, sets before us the conception of a world of spirits alongside of the world of experience, *then* tears that conception to pieces in the spirit of a narrow Empiricism, and *finally* withdraws from the question as one the means for dealing with which are beyond our reach."^o Wisdom lies in recognizing the scope and limits of human knowledge, which are the scope and limits of experience. Nor is any precious human interest jeopardized by this recognition of our inability to know what is beyond experience. Morality does not demand the expectation of a future life, but conversely. "Hence it appears more accordant with human nature and the purity of morals to ground the expectation of a future world on the feelings of a well-disposed mind, than to attempt to base good conduct on the hopes of another world."^o Here already the position taken in the Critiques is anticipated.

Rational psychology rested its confidence in the immortality of the soul on the venerable argument from the soul's simplicity. Unlike material things, the soul is not a compound of parts, but a simple substance. It cannot therefore perish by disintegration, and is thus immortal. This argument was, however, precarious in that it ignored the possibility that the simple soul-substance may simply vanish. It is this defect in the traditional argument which Mendelssohn undertook to repair in his *Phädon*. "This acute philosopher," as Kant tells us in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "tried . . . to prove that the soul was not liable to that kind of perishing which would be a real annihilation, by endeavoring to show that a simple being cannot cease to exist, because it could not be diminished, and thus gradually lose something of its existence, and be changed, by little and little, into nothing (it having no parts, and therefore no plurality in itself), there could be no time between the one moment in which it exists, and the other in which it exists no longer; and this would be impossible." Kant points out that Mendels-

sohn overlooks the intensive quantity (or degree of reality) which the soul like other existent things possesses in addition to its extensive quantity. This degree of reality may be reduced by an infinite number of smaller degrees; the soul might then vanish, "not indeed through decomposition, but through a gradual remission of its powers, or, if I may say so, through elanguescence."^o

Even if the soul were a simple substance, then, its immortality would not necessarily follow. But the notion of the soul's simplicity is itself spurious and due to the confusion of reason. Rational psychology starts from the judgment "I think" and undertakes to treat of the self independent of all experience. But the self is always the self of experience; its unity is functional; it is self-consciousness, the unity of the process of experience; outside of this process it does not exist. As Kant had already shown in the First Analogy, and as he states the gist of the matter clearly in the *Prolegomena*, "permanence can never be proved from the concept of a substance, as a thing *per se*, but for the purposes of experience only. . . . The permanence of the soul can therefore only be proved where everybody grants it, during the life of man."^o

Immortality is thus an idea beyond the province of the understanding; in undertaking to attain unto this idea speculative reason transgresses the boundaries of knowledge and is involved in dogmatism, confusion, and illusion. The exhibition of this quandary of reason is but one moment in the larger critical thought of Kant: vindicating science but also outlining its scope and proper sphere, within the space-time world of experience; vindicating science, but also exhibiting its inadequacy as a substitute for metaphysics, and thus all along preparing the way for the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason. Immortality is not legitimately a speculative but an ethical notion, a postulate of morality. Even when Kant gives more recognition to speculative reasoning about the

future life, his final thought is guided by ethical considerations. So in the *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik* Kant's survey and estimate of the available arguments for immortality (transcendental, theological, moral, psychological, analogical) lead him to the conclusion that the important question is not whether we are immortal, but whether we are worthy of immortality. To make ourselves worthy is the main thing, and morality, itself always central in our careers as persons, is likewise the ground and goal of all our speculation about our destiny.

Kant's demolition of the dogmatism of rational psychology is final, and precisely here is to be sought his permanently valuable contribution to the problem of immortality; he has compelled the shift of the entire discussion to new ground. The question of immortality is to be answered, if at all, in terms of value; Kant would say, moral value. The importance of this advance in the understanding of our problem cannot be exaggerated. But when we turn to Kant's own positive reconstruction and attempted solution of the problem of immortality, the validity and the lasting significance of his thought seem open to serious doubt.

It is unnecessary to rehearse here the commonplaces of Kant's ethical theory. Suffice it to recall that he deliberately and solemnly proscribed experience as a basis of morals. As a member of the space-time world of experience, man is shown to be involved in the causal nexus, and his acts then do not admit of praise or blame. If my act is to be regarded as moral, it must admit of being viewed, not merely as the result of physical, physiological and other empirical conditions, but as the evidence of pure respect for the moral law. Man is a moral being in so far as he is capable of acting on principle. Now to act on principle means just this: to be moved by the categorical imperative irrespective of any empirical determination, or briefly, in a world of physical

necessity, to be a morally free agent. Moral freedom is thus the first postulate of practical reason. The moral agent's choice is a choice of pure devotion to virtue, the choice of the end, not of a means to anything ulterior; for instance, not a choice of the means to happiness. As a member of the realm of nature man is naturally bound to desire and seek happiness. As a member of the Kingdom of Ends man is morally free to pursue virtue for its own sake.

But this sharp dualism between virtue and happiness requires revision, and receives it when Kant turns to his doctrine of the *summum bonum*. What is the *summum bonum*? Kant finds the conception somewhat ambiguous, for "the *summum* may mean either the supreme (*supremum*) or the perfect (*consummatum*) It has been shown . . . that *virtue* (as worthiness to be happy) is the *supreme condition* of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the *supreme* good. But it does not follow that it is the whole and perfect good as the object of the desires of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also."^o While unhesitatingly excluding happiness from the moral motive, Kant regards its confluence with virtue as essential to the *summum bonum*, to perfection.

Here as in his treatment of the moral motive Kant regards virtue and happiness as two extremely heterogeneous notions, and rejects any effort to attain analytical unity of the two. We may not hold with the Epicurean that the notion of virtue is involved in the promotion of happiness, nor with the Stoic that the feeling of happiness is involved in the consciousness of virtue. The unity of virtue and happiness must be a synthesis of concepts. How is such a synthesis possible? To say that the pursuit of happiness leads to virtue is the reverse of the truth; nor may we hold that virtue causes happiness, for happiness is a state of being dependent upon natural

conditions and causes, among which the moral disposition of the will (which alone is involved in virtue) may not be included. The promotion of the *summum bonum*, implying the concurrence of virtue and happiness, is bound up with the moral law, but is unattainable in the here-and-now of experience. An ideal world-order is thus demanded for the completion and consummation of this unity of virtue and happiness, which speculative reason, while not warranting, does not preclude, and which practical reason requires.

Virtue leads to a consciousness of mastery over impulse, independence, rational contentment, the bliss of holiness. This ideal of the holy will, perfectly in accord with the moral law, is unattainable in the sensible world. But, since it is morally necessary, it demands the postulation of an infinite progress towards that perfect state. "Now," Kant proceeds, "this endless progress is only possible on the supposition of an *endless* duration of the *existence* and personality of the same rational being. . . . The *summum bonum*, then, practically is only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality, being inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason." Furthermore "the *summum bonum* is possible in the world only on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character."^o These are Kant's ethical arguments for immortality and the existence of God.

Kant's argument for immortality is really twofold, for there are really two respects in which this our sensible world falls short, which Kant feels morally bound to make good, and for the making good of which he demands the infinite progress of immortality. So we may ask: Why is immortality demanded—in order that the pursuer of virtue may attain the happiness rationally appropriate to his virtue, or in order that the pursuer of

virtue may attain virtue perfectly and completely? Using Kant's distinction between the *summum bonum* as *supremum* and as *consummatum*, is it in the interest of the supreme good or of the perfect good that he demands immortality?

If the perfect good requires virtue plus happiness, that good cannot be the same as the good the attainment of which is categorically imperative in Kant's morality. The moral agent cannot consummate this union of virtue and happiness, not only because such a task is beyond his powers as a member of the empirical order, but, more important, because it is outside his province as a moral agent. The virtuous cannot make himself happy just because virtue is essentially *per se* and not a means to or a cause of happiness. Hence Kant's need of a God to do from without what man cannot and what virtue from within may not do; match happiness to virtue.

When Kant rejects the analytical unity (identity) of virtue and happiness, regards them as extremely heterogeneous, and seeks their synthesis, he is following the logic of the categorical imperative. And when he seeks "a word which does not express enjoyment, as happiness does, but indicates a satisfaction in one's existence, an analogue of the happiness which must necessarily accompany the consciousness of virtue,"^o and finds this word in self-contentment, that is, the consciousness of mastery over and independence of one's inclinations, he is not so much engaged in attaining the confluence of virtue and happiness, as in discovering the springs of perfection within virtue itself. In this latter undertaking however, Kant had already been anticipated, notably by the Stoics, whom he rather misinterprets here. In holding 'happiness' homogeneous with 'virtue', therefore, the Stoic is not quite so guilty as Kant believes him to be of identifying heterogeneous concepts. The Stoic meant just this, that one need not go beyond virtue and the pur-

suit of virtue for any of the elements essential to human perfection. The more carefully we track Kant in his treatment of happiness as a constituent of the perfect good, *bonum consummatum*, the more clearly we recognize that, far from being alien to virtue, it must be in and of virtue, the *bonum supremum*, the inner fruit thereof, the Perfect Good being the fullest measure of good.

So it appears that the value, for the present discussion, of Kant's initial distinction between *bonum supremum* and *bonum consummatum* is open to grave doubt. And indeed when Kant comes to the point of advancing immortality as a postulate of practical reason, he lays chief stress on *holiness*; it is, after all, the supreme good which demands an infinite progress for its perfect realization, the immortality of the human soul. Kant appears to demand immortality so as to assure the perfect accordance of the will with the moral law. What is uppermost in Kant's mind is the discrepancy and the hostility between duty and inclination. To overcome this discrepancy and hostility, an infinite progress is required and is therefore postulated by Kant.

Kant found no moral value in acts prompted by impulsive love and benevolence; which provoked the irony of Schiller's famous quatrain. But even on Kant's super-empirical plane, virtue is essentially in conflict with inclination; precisely therein is moral life a life of duty. So we read in the *Grundlegung*: "No imperatives hold for a Divine will, or in general for a *holy* will; *ought* is here out of place, because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law."^o If my will were perfect, I *would* act thus and so; but since it is not perfect, I *ought* to act so and so. If now we are told by Kant that the necessary object of a will determined by the moral law is the attainment of holiness, if immortality is required to outgrow the dutiful *effort* of the will, which *is* virtue,

are we not really asked to maintain that morality demands its own extinction in perfection?

Kant demands an immortal prospect to contemplate the end of the moral struggle, the end of endeavor, of aspiration. But unless we are to regard this ideal as the complete emancipation *from* the moral self, we require a different estimate of the moral function of duty. The effort and the conflict with inclination cannot be regarded as mere defects to be overcome, but as instances of a fundamentally forward-reaching character. Thus man's moral nature cannot require eternal scope in order to become what it essentially is not; it may, however, require the eternal reaffirmation of its essentially aspiring spirit. In the speech of religion, if we are to be holy as our Father in Heaven is holy, it is, after all, because the Holy One is our Father, because most truly we are one and all children of God.

It is along this path of inquiry that some later idealistic thinking advances beyond Kant, and advances beyond him, to be sure, only because it has been fortunate in starting from him. The profound significance of this modern advance may be better appreciated if, in connection with our inquiry into Kant's ethics, we consider the ancient Stoic doctrine in which the conception of moral autonomy, while elaborated less systematically than in Kant, was yet retained more unflinchingly,—the firmer loyalty thus serving to reveal, to a modern mind, a loftier and more adequate view of its own nature and implications than was perhaps possible for the ancient wisdom to attain.

V

Margaret Fuller began her philosophy by declaring: "I accept the universe,—" an avowal which provoked Carlyle to remark: "Egad! She'd better!" In a real sense, and without sentimentality or romanticism, the

Stoics accepted the universe. Central in their thought is the idea of a Divine Providence; the world-course is directed by Eternal Reason, and all is determined in accordance with justice. Through all the changes in the philosophy of the Porch, this calm, unwavering confidence in the Universe remains profoundly characteristic of the Stoic sage.

But how, on this basis, are we to explain the obvious maldistribution of happiness and misery, of rewards and punishments? To the Christian theologian and philosopher who felt that virtue must be rewarded and vice punished,—if not in this life, or rather since not in this life, then in an eternal hereafter, the Stoic would have replied thus: You demand reward for the doer of good, punishment for the evil-doer, because you do not yet understand what good and evil really are. In spite of all your protestations of disinterested love of virtue and single hearted devotion to God, in spite of all your praises of holiness, you still mistake happiness or pleasure for good, misery or pain for evil. You are yet to be emancipated from hedonism. Now from Socrates I have learned, and hold fast, that the life of understanding, the examined, rational life, is a virtuous life, and that in virtue alone is to be found all man's good, that vice is evil and the evil. You are dissatisfied with this life's course, and long after another, you are even doubting the ways of Providence, because you have not yet attained unto real virtue.

The Stoic sees in the world pain and pleasure, poverty, wealth, folly, wisdom, vice and virtue,—and he is convinced that all is and proceeds to be as it inevitably must be. Pleasure and pain are the necessary consequences of certain conditions; in themselves they are neither good nor evil. Pain may be good; for virtue may, and indeed sometimes does, demand pain. Hercules would not have been Hercules had there been no lion, nor hydra, nor stag,

nor boar, nor unjust and bestial men to combat and subdue, had he wrapped himself up and dreamt away his life in luxury and ease. Had he been a nightingale, to do the part of a nightingale would have been his blessed lot; had he been a swan, a swan's part. Being a Hercules, his good was to be a Hercules truly and fully, through pain and strain and combat.^o

A certain life leads to pain, another to pleasure, a certain life leads to poverty, sickness, disgrace, another to wealth and health and glory. Which is good, which evil? We cannot say, Epictetus would answer, for in themselves these are indifferent to good or evil. So the Stoic does not demand a future life, for he does not require compensation or remuneration for virtue, finding it self-sufficient; nor ulterior punishment for vice, judging vice the ultimate evil. So Seneca, in the Seventy-fourth Letter to Lucilius: "Virtue . . . alone is sufficient; for the strength and beginning of all goods exist in virtue herself." Stilpo's property has been ravaged and his house burned by the victorious invader; his daughters have been ravished, his country enslaved. "Have you lost anything in the sack of Megara?" he is asked. "Nothing," he answers, "for I have all that is really my own. *Nihil, inquit, omnia namque mea mecum sunt.*"^o So Marcus Aurelius also writes: Die you must and will: wherefore complain? "You exist but as a part inherent in a greater whole. You will vanish into that which gave you being . . . Many grains of frankincense on the same altar; one drops sooner, another later—it makes no difference." This side of death is your life, and your opportunity is to live it as a sage and not as a fool. The path of life and the path of death, of pleasure and of pain, all are open to you, and freely and calmly and gladly you choose your path, if you first and foremost choose the path of virtue. This is alone noble and worthy, in ready dignity to await whatever Providence has in store: "O for the soul ready,

when the hour of dissolution comes, for extinction or dispersion or survival!"^o

Emancipation from the dread of death and from the craving for a hereafter is thus in Stoic doctrine the supreme evidence of man's attainment of a real sense and love of virtue. Instead of demanding immortality as a postulate of morality, the Stoic would regard the demand for immortality as indicating insufficient understanding of the nature of virtue and of moral autonomy.

That moral autonomy involves single-hearted devotion to virtue, is the great truth of Stoic ethics, the development of which in Kant lends solemnity to his notion of Duty. But the Stoic perception of this sublimity and autonomy of virtue calls for still further insight into the nature of the moral life. The range of moral aspiration is eternal: confine it to the brief span of this life, and it appears paltry: moral passion loses dignity by being disclosed as barren. So we read in an old volume of Sir Kenelm Digby: "If to an understanding man, some cause of action were proposed unto him, as better than that he were going about, or for the instant had a mind unto, he would relish it, as a great marchant, or a Banquier would doe, who dealing for Millions, one should presse him with earnestnesse, to make him change his resolved course, for a gain of a farthing more this way than the other; which being inconsiderable he would not trouble his head with it."^o

He who has perceived that unlike health and wealth and power and pleasure, virtue is a good not ephemeral and relative, but ever and intrinsically real, is bound to observe virtue more intimately still, the nature of its demands and the manner of satisfaction which it yields. The moral experience does not necessarily involve the self's possession or enjoyment or desire of something alien and aspiration of the self more fully and adequately to and ulterior to itself; it is ever and essentially the effort

realize the full measure of its own ideal character. Therein is the autonomy of virtue: self-dependent because self-expanding. Mine, of my will, in my power, the Stoic calls it, and such it is because ever it makes me more nearly what I truly am. Lose it I cannot, for precisely in it do I ever find my greater self. But such an interpretation of the moral career, and the prospect which it reveals to man, require a conception of man's constitution and man's world different from the psychology and the cosmology of the Porch. It is in modern idealism that the Stoic notion of moral autonomy, its significance deepened and made more fertile by the critical insight of Kant, matures in a nobler and richer view of man's character and destiny.

VI

Kant's critical limitation of science to the space-time world of causal relation guides the thought of contemporary idealism in dealing with problems of personality. Physical science proceeds on the assumption that the world is a system of causally connected events in space and time. The validity of this assumption has been amply vindicated by the modern scientist: the physical categories are incontestably legitimate and significant—so long as we do not forget that they are categories, points of view, and thus also limitations. The philosophy of physical science, the wisdom of its knowledge, consists precisely in this, that it ever bear in mind the abstract character of its procedure. It is *an* interpretation.

Of personality and its destiny physical science can give us no significant account, for its limited point of view does not allow it to recognize personal activity; it recognizes a human mechanism. If the scientist chooses to speak of development, of progress, when he means perhaps greater differentiation or adaptation to environment, his words

can refer to no attainment of value; for in what sense, for instance, is better adaptation *better* or at all valuable? The causal-temporal view reveals no real worth, and if the physical scientist makes use of the language of value, he does it not as a scientist, but in spite of his science, because as a man he requires, for the intelligent interpretation of his concrete experience, the expression of ideas which lie outside the range of his science.

Thus, according to Münsterberg, while the scientific view requires self-devouring time, duration is not more relevant to the real being of a person than is spatial extent or weight. The real problem of personal immortality cannot concern the limited or the endless duration of the self. The mere lengthening of existence would no more add to personal value than would the extension of one's arm's reach to the furthest star. Personal worth does not demand duration but significance. One great chord, truly struck, is truly eternal, eternally significant in the symphony of the Absolute. The life-work of man "from birth to death is in every valuable deed a whole, in every realization of values eternal, an eternally valuable part in the infinite atemporal all."^o

This summary dismissal of time is challenged by Josiah Royce. Time cannot be so meaningless or irrelevant to personality. The conceptual time of clocks and calendars and geologic epochs is, to be sure, an abstraction; but ultimately and fundamentally time is nothing apart from "the idea of a being who looks before and after, who strives, seeks, hopes, pursues, records, reports, promises, accomplishes."^o Time is to Royce an essentially practical aspect of reality; past, present, future have reference to deeds done, being done, to be done. "Time is . . . indefinable and meaningless except as the form in which a conscious will-process expresses its own coherent series of deeds and of meanings." Is endurance in time then no test of the worth of a personality? The intelligent listen-

ing to music is not timeless, but time-inclusive; nor are temporal sequence and duration at all irrelevant in the career of a person. Does personal activity admit of its work being *done*, or is it essentially ever yet to do? Our choice between these two alternatives will, to be sure, be determined by our further analysis of the concept of personality; but in either case personality will be seen to include rather than ignore time. Say that a person is not in time, *i. e.*, clock-time; yet time is ultimately of persons, *i. e.*, of deeds, of will-activities.

The question, Will I die and be no more, means accordingly this: Will I,—my deeds, acts, purposes, ideals,—be ever merely presupposed and taken for granted, dispensed with, quite ignored, or else done and continued by others than myself? For my extinction, if it comes at all, is bound to be as teleological as my personal existence actually is. The problem before us is determined by our view of the nature and rôle of the finite individual in the constitution of reality. Royce reports his own experience with the problem of immortality in the Preface to the Second Series of his Gifford Lectures on *The World and the Individual*. That the Absolute is consciously individual seems to have been clear to Royce from the very first; clear also "that, in the Absolute, all finite individual lives, wills, meanings are consciously recognized, fulfilled, and justly expressed;" not so clear, what these theses implied for "the continued existence of *this man* as he at present conceives himself."^o The thought which leads Royce to his doctrine of immortality is guided by the consideration that a person is a true individual and an ethical individual. In this sense, perhaps, we may say that, for Royce as for Kant, immortality is an ethical postulate; though the conclusion of Royce is far from being a restatement of Kant.

To Royce a discussion of immortality is necessarily a discussion of individuality. So even in his more popular

treatment of the problem, in his Ingersoll Lecture on *The Conception of Immortality*, the fundamental question for him is, What do we mean by an individual? The question about immortality becomes thus a mere incident in the course of the larger discussion. The real individual we say is unique and irreplaceable. But when we try to state what this unique individual is, we find ourselves actually and in abstract terms describing a type; the real individual remains endlessly and mysteriously elusive. This individual is beyond the ken of abstract psychological analysis; "the empirical ego, apart from the unity of life-plan, can be as truly called a thousand selves as one Self."^o The individual, the person, is not merely a thing to be observed, described, and analyzed; the individual is essentially moral, purposive, a pursuer of ideals. We recognize individuality in intimate human relationships: recognize, but never quite discover; for we always find, as the lover in Browning's lyric found, that an individual is a being that no finite search can find. "An individual, if not describable, is still sincerely intended or willed as the object of a devotion that, in us, can only express itself as the endless pursuit of a goal An individual is a being that adequately expresses a purpose."^o

Is this world, then, one in which purposes are adequately expressed and fulfilled, ideals and aspirations attained and perfected, values realized? Royce's argument, in his Ingersoll Lecture and in his Gifford Lectures, leads him to define the whole reality of things in terms of purpose. "What is real is simply, in its wholeness, that which consciously completes or finally expresses the very meaning that, in you, is at this instant of your human experience consciously incomplete Your finite defect is that you know not consciously, just now, the whole of what you even now genuinely mean."^o Personality is an essentially ethical conception; the self is an ethical category; the individual life is really a life of

aspiration; the true self is not a datum but an ideal. On these points Royce repeatedly insists.^o

On one side of his nature, to be sure, the self is a resultant of a process of natural generation. He has had a beginning in time. But, unlike the materialist who argues that what is generated must inevitably decay, or the spiritualist who, convinced of the soul's immortality, seeks to demonstrate its ungenerated origin, Royce holds a natural origin of selves perfectly consistent with an immortal destiny. However originated, I am in purposive, conscious relations with the Absolute, and in *this* my central capacity I shall "survive all the organic processes which were originally expressed in my life as this variation of the human stock."^o

So I am real in that I fulfill a purpose, ultimately the Absolute purpose. You and I are unique because we express in our own different ways the uniqueness of God's individuality and purpose. In the unique whole we play distinct and unique parts.^o But, in that case, if our own little lives are in their finality God's life, is this world then a moral world? Personality has been defined by Royce as a moral category: is Royce's universe one in which moral activity is possible? Does not morality involve a struggle with a real evil, not with an evil that is somehow good; pursuit of a perfect good unattained but always sought? Is not the best world for a moral agent "one that needs him to make it better?"^o And if this be the case, is not Royce's absolute optimism, in fact, moral fatalism?

In meeting this objection Royce seeks to extract strength from the apparent weakness of his position. The self is an individual, a moral individual. Being moral, it is committed to perfection. Being moral, it is in conflict with evil. There are defeats, but there is no defeat. Evil is real, and moral ill is done in the temporal order, and evil is not good; but it is made good, it must be atoned for,

somehow, somewhere, either by the evildoer himself, when he comes to himself, or by someone else. So again, "that which in the eternal order is directly manifest, namely, the perfection of the whole," is temporally ever being attained, and evil is thus "something explicitly finite."^o Evil is: it is to be overcome. I suffer. Why? Because my temporal present is not yet what I mean it to be. My sorrow is the sorrow of the unattained. My unattained perfection is even now ideally mine. Yet even for the Absolute my present unattainment is inevitable. "The sorrow is not only mine. This same sorrow, just as it is for me, is God's sorrow^o . . . In me . . . God is discontented with his own temporal expression. This very discontent I myself am. It constitutes me. This individual thirst for infinity, this personal warfare with my own temporal maladjustment to my own ideal—this is my personality."^o

In this aspiring, never-contented, moral nature of man Royce finds an earnest of human immortality. "I am this hatred of my own imperfection, this search for the future deed, this intent to do more than has yet been done."^o Immortality is demanded by the finite moral nature of man,—demanded, not in order that virtue and happiness may be balanced, for this task perhaps need not require eternity for its completion,—nor yet in order that reason may completely master inclination, for the attainment of this mastery, in registering the end of the moral struggle, will register also the extinction of morality, of striving, of aspiration, will register death indeed. Immortality is demanded, by Royce, because perfection, eternally attained in the Absolute, must (even from the point of view of the Absolute) be eternally sought by the finite individual. God attains it, not despite my endless search for it, but in and because of my endless search for it.

Death cannot end this pursuit of perfection, this our striving to become truly ourselves. For in a universe in

which purposes are fulfilled, death itself must somehow be a fulfilment. And it is. "The life that is ended is. . . viewed by the Absolute as followed, at some period of time, by another life that in its meaning is continuous with the first. This new life it is which says . . . 'My former self is dead, only in so far as my new Self sees the meaning of that death' . . . Or, in fact, the two Selves really form stages in the development of one Individual."° How and in what way "the deathless individuality sees itself as including and fulfilling the selfhood whose struggles death terminates," Royce does not claim to know.

Like Kant, Royce is led to an assurance of immortality by the contemplation of the Highest Good, of Perfection. But this contemplation reveals to Royce, not one vista, but two; on the one hand, eternal attainment of perfection; on the other, eternal striving after perfection. Only to him who sees clearly the two vistas can the two be revealed as truly one. In me God eternally struggles and aspires. In God I eternally win and attain. Thus "all moral battles get fought out. All quests are fulfilled . . . You yourself, and not merely another, consciously know in the eternal world the attainment of that goal."° But were I ever, in time, myself to attain the goal of my being, then my life would involve no future, no further. My life work would then be consciously and absolutely done, I would then truly be of the past only. This would indeed be my death. Now in the very nature of moral activity, this is never possible. Just because I am an essentially moral individual, my work can never be done and finished. "A consciously last moral task is a contradiction in terms. For whenever I act, I create a new situation in the world's life, a situation that never before was, and that can never recur . . . To serve God is to create new opportunities for service . . . The service of the eternal is an essentially endless service. There can be no last moral deed."°

So this is Royce's moral argument for immortality: the moral career is a career essentially of aspiration, of pursuit, of striving after the ideal which is unattainable in any finite or temporally limited experience. "No finite series of these deeds expresses the insatiable demand of the ethical individual for further expression. And this, I take it, is our rational warrant for insisting that every rational person has, in the endless temporal order, an opportunity for an endless series of deeds."° And this my endless moral career is *my* career. In this career the death of my body, as observed above, is a mere episode, however necessary. My personality is a progressive but never completed fulfilment of purpose, an ever-growing conscious realization of what I mean to be. Each step in this career is a step in my attainment of true individuality: my moral career is *my* career; precisely it is myself. "Since this is my duty, nobody in the universe—no, not God, in so far as God is other than myself—can do this duty for me. My duty I must myself do. And wherever in time I stand, I am dissatisfied with what is so far done. I must pass on to the next."°

If there is no end to a finite individual's career of aspiration, why then do we call him finite? Finite he is, Royce answers,° in that he has a temporal beginning; finite also in that "at any moment of time he has so far lived but for a finite period, has so far accomplished but a finite task, and seeks, as one whose life is unfinished, his own temporal future, which is not yet." But ideally, as fully realized and expressed in the life of the Absolute, the individual self is not finite but infinite. Infinite, yet not all inclusive, as the Absolute is. The ideally realized ethical individual, while infinite, that is, nothing lacking, is yet partial, that is, implying and requiring other similar individuals which are not himself and which with him are in the Absolute. Royce describes this infinite but partial individual, borrowing a phrase from Spinoza, as

"infinite in its own kind." Even as the collection of numbers which are powers of prime numbers are each of them as infinite as the 'entire' collection of whole numbers, but are yet partial and distinct from each other, so Royce considers the ethical individual "in the grade of complication of his activity or in the multitude of his acts of will" no less infinite in his own way, than is the Absolute. So the assurance of immortality is warranted, and ethics and metaphysics are brought together in "a system grandly architectural in its monumental lines," a system which Aliotta, even while criticizing it, is moved to call "the most momentous attempt ever made" to solve the problems of liberty, immortality, the existence of evil and error "by means of pantheistic intuition of an ethical and religious order."^o

The modern idealistic revision of Kant's arguments for immortality attests the attainment of a richer and more concrete view of personality, its character and implications. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant had vindicated physical science, causal necessity; but his effort to vindicate duty, the moral person, value, had involved him in a dualism subtler, but no less confusing than the dualism which he had combated. The moral life of man chronicles neither the activity of an immaterial soul-substance, nor yet the operation of a supersensible intelligible *as if*. Kant had shown how synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible in the world of experience. Modern idealism asks, after Kant, his second great question, How is morality—or more broadly, how is value—possible? But in undertaking to answer this question the modern idealist allows no doubt regarding the genuine reality of morality, of value. Value is no mere ambiguous *as if*. Accordingly a reinterpretation of the nature of experience is demanded, that would explain and would do justice to genuine personal activity. The resultant discussion is not limited to

morals, but concerns the larger problem of causal and teleological categories. The metaphysics of value and personality is not incidental but central in contemporary philosophical inquiry. Its development by certain British idealists will be the topic of our next chapter.

CHAPTER X

THE DESTINY OF THE SELF IN RECENT BRITISH IDEALISM°

THE Gifford Lectures on Individuality and Destiny,° delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1911 and 1912, in which Professor Bosanquet rounded out his philosophical system, represent a most significant application of British idealistic method to the problems of individuality and value, and especially to the problem of the rôle and destiny of the finite self. The theory expounded in these Lectures involves some of the most fruitful thinking in contemporary British philosophy and has stirred lively discussion within and without the idealistic camp. It should be of interest, therefore, to state concisely Professor Bosanquet's treatment of this problem in relation to his general philosophical position, to note some of the more important criticisms to which this doctrine has been subjected, and then to consider how far it does justice to the cosmic rôle of the finite individual.

I

In criticizing the notion of selfhood as myself-nobody-else-though-related-to-somebody-else, Professor Bosanquet defines individuality as logical stability.° The individual is "a world self-complete . . . that which must stand; that which has nothing without to set against it, and which is pure self-maintenance within." *The Individual* is therefore the Absolute. Instead of accentuating the

characteristic exclusiveness of finite selfhood, which the Absolute cannot share, Professor Bosanquet emphasizes the self-containedness and self-completeness which are fundamentally the Absolute's, but which each finite self shares in a measure and which "our fullest experience tends to approach."

There is no disposition in this theory to dismiss the bodily basis of mind by means of Berkeleyan arguments. To Professor Bosanquet, 'mind' is the self-guidance of the 'material' world at a certain level of organization. From the relation of one brick to another on which it rests, to the relation involved in a conscious system, the advance is immense, but it is continuous throughout and involves no change of principle; it is "growth towards individuality of the whole recognized by the center,"^o—that is, towards teleology as Professor Bosanquet uses the term.

Now if we regard mind as the higher form of apprehensiveness and responsiveness, which becomes possible when the world that appears as matter reaches a certain level of organization, are we to say that finite consciousnesses and their subjective teleologies are mere episodes in the story of reality? Or may it be that self-consciousness "furnishes a clue to the typical structure of reality?"^o

Finite selfhood involves the collision with the not-self. This collision is never absent from the determination of self as self; if it were utterly transcended, finite selfhood would itself be transcended and would lend itself to new arrangements and adjustments of a super-personal sort. But "our conception of self has two sources in its relation to the not-self, and not one only; . . . the sense of unity and reconciliation with the world beyond us is a far larger factor in our awareness of selfhood, and one which increases concomitantly with it, than is the sense of collision with the not-self."^o Finite selfhood is most perfect when most nearly infinite; while essentially characterized by collision with the not-self, it is nevertheless at

its fullest when it involves the least awareness of finite selfness and most shares through unity with the not-self in the nature of the Absolute. Thus in the *Divine Comedy* external nature (Italy and the spatial-temporal world as a whole) 'comes alive' as expression, character, emotion. The selves figuring in Dante's world are real selves, acting and thinking in Dante's real world, yet they are also constituent parts of the poet's mind, which utters itself through them all. The whole poem, again, is a single experience, yet it is a perfect union of mind and nature. Even so is the relation of the finite selves to each other and to the Absolute to be conceived.

The finite individual soul, then, is, "on the one hand, a *nisus* towards unity on the part of a world on its own level or below it; on the other hand . . . an element contributing to the absolute, isolated only in appearance by an impotence which constitutes its finiteness."^o In his second series of Gifford Lectures, Professor Bosanquet undertakes to examine the genesis, the adventure and the security of the finite self; the moulding of souls, the temporal genesis of finite mind through natural and social selection and through "the miracle of will"; the adventurousness of finite mind and the hazards and hardships which inherently attend upon it—the world of claims and counter-claims, pleasure and pain, good and evil; the stability and security of finite selfhood; the self-recognition of the self in the religious consciousness; and the worth and destiny of the finite self—the problem of immortality proper.

"Soul-making . . . is the leading function of the finite universe."^o We cannot determine precisely at what stage in evolution we are justified in speaking of souls; the beginnings are probably to be sought in "the gradual concentration of forms of sensitiveness in a living being."^o When in the correlation of organisms a certain *de facto* continuity of centers is attained, the vague recognition

of this continuity is attained in a number of centers, and through mutual recognition (mental environment) is gradually developed in them all *pari passu*. And while the soul is thus moulded through a double selection, it likewise remoulds and reshapes itself. This is the miracle of will: the soul's capacity vigilantly to elevate itself above the obvious complexes of its circumstances.

Man is a finite-infinite being. In his double nature are involved the hazards and hardships of his career. He is self related to God, to other men, to nature, with which he is "at arm's length." Claims and counter-claims arise between him and these; they leave the self unsatisfied; they do not express its real unity with the not-self, and are accordingly always breaking down. Of this clash-in-relation, morality is the central expression: the conflict of good and evil, the hardship of duties unfulfilled and rights unattained, pessimism and the sense of injustice. The self's striving after perfection implies obstacles to be surmounted; good implies evil. But the Absolute, while comprehending evil, is not characterized by it. "Good as good involves evil, but good as absorbed in perfection only involves evil as absorbed within good." To be sure, if good essentially concerns the finite individual in its venture towards perfection, it is hard to see how either good or evil can characterize the perfect experience of the Absolute. "Our highest form of judgment is not the judgment of good and evil . . . our highest judgment is the judgment of perfection."^o

The finite individual, moulded by nature and as a creative force eliciting its secret, is thus seen following his adventurous career as an apparently isolated being. But through this career itself man is brought to a clearer realization of his finite-infinite or self-transcendent nature; he grasps the meaning of his striving for the Beyond and recognizes himself as a member of a reality in which his own most real worth is stable and secure and

no longer "the plaything of hazard and the prey of hardship."^o This deeper conviction of our genuine, self-transcendent nature is manifest in the religious consciousness, and indeed constitutes the essence of religion. Religion is "devoutness, devotedness, devotion." It is not itself the perfect satisfaction (which would be "the possession of the Absolute as such, in short, to be the Absolute"^o); it is the present realization of perfect satisfaction. I recognize that, as finite, I cannot attain unto the Absolute perfection, yet I insist on my own unity with it in principle. I am not the Absolute, but I am in and of it. It is a self-transcendence that is the very opposite of self-sufficiency; an infinite exaltation and a finite's sense of humility through helplessness. So conceived, the religious consciousness does not involve a grasp of metaphysical theory,^o nor does it express itself in any special kind of devotion, nor is it exclusively bound up with the supernatural and divine.

"The finite mind so far as religious accepts as its true self an actual perfection, which alone is real, and in which evil is absorbed and annihilated." There is thus involved in the religious experience a paradox, a double make-believe. The self is most keenly aware of the existence of its finite imperfections, yet it counts them as naught. "It will not admit that it *really* is what it is *in fact*." It needs the ideal goal and it requires the barrier, and thus again is disclosed its finite-infinite nature. This paradox is further involved in the conception of God, as distinguished from the Absolute. God is perfect good overcoming evil. "The God who is worshipped in religion is the will for good as against evil, and a universe in which this antithesis is absorbed in perfection cannot be one with a God whom the religious consciousness thus presents to itself."^o

Professor Bosanquet's argument up to this point has been governed by what he calls the idea of Transformation.

It is to this idea that he appeals when he turns to consider more particularly the destiny of the finite self. "The self can and ultimately must identify itself with what transcends its direct personal experiences, provided it is of a qualitative texture to unite with the main web-tissue of our being."^o That it can so identify itself is evidenced by the many forms of belief in impersonal continuance which for countless millions have served the purpose of a belief in personal immortality. That it must so identify itself follows from the very nature of the self which is finite-infinite and self-transcending. Of the extreme forms of belief in impersonal continuance, Professor Bosanquet considers three in particular: the Comtist "subjective immortality," which he classes the causal continuance theory of a certain type of scientist, metempsychosis, and Nirvana. How far do these satisfy our desire for immortality?

We survive, the Comtist tells us, in the memories we leave behind us; or, as it is sometimes put, in the effects of our lives and actions. To be sure, these memories fade and blend into a vast impression on posterity in which the multitude of men have not recognized individual share, and "the greatest men leave little more than a name, because their work has blended with cosmic forces, from which it cannot be separated for estimation."^o The cathedral stands and dominates the lives of men, but of the individual builders remains no record or memory. Yet the cathedral is their work and the cumulative effect of their individual lives, and it stands or falls as each individual stone has been laid well or ill. My life is a factor that moulds the lives of others, whether they know it or not, and whether they know me or not. Now, to be sure, these forms of survival are fragmentary and contingent: "ideas bound up with the future of the human race and of our globe, and dealing only with fragments of the personality, can give us no satisfaction."^o But

they are no negligible symbols of the deep conviction that we realize our destiny in the preservation of what we really care about.

The belief just considered emphasizes the survival of contents of personality. In metempsychosis "we have a precisely complementary conception. Here, the bare subject or ego, the naked form of personality, the soul-thing, is supposed to persist; but no content of the personality goes with it. We are offered chains of personalities linked together by impersonal transitions." The satisfaction afforded by the belief in this kind of continuance is not easy to account for, if we emphasize the difficulty of accepting the impersonal transition. But, as Plato reminds us, one can drink the water of forgetfulness more or less, according to one's self-restraint; somehow one's present life will be the making or marring of the future life-span that is to be its successor. Of the sameness of these two, and of countless others before and after, we are not and shall not be conscious. Yet the conviction that they are the same is to us as it were a pledge that "what we have set our hearts on is continued from and beyond our life into the future of the universe."^o

The same underlying conviction is expressed quite as really, though not so obviously, in the notion of Nirvana. What is Nirvana? However positively we interpret it, it cannot be identified with the Absolute of idealism. It is not a real system of appearances, for in its reality all its appearances are rejected as illusory, Maya. This may be a defect in metaphysics, but it does not rule out the deep meaning of the central conviction underlying Nirvana, expressed fundamentally in a demand for liberation. The believer in Nirvana denies, and is accordingly eager to abandon, what he is accustomed to call his personality.

Thus we see what makes these widespread beliefs satis-

fyng to the hearts of men. They are several attempts to conceive of degrees of transformation compatible with what men desire in the way of personal continuance. What final destiny can we consistently desire? Is it simple unending prolongation of our present existence? In the first place, on what conditions are we to accept this offer? Our present existence is involved in unhappiness and insecurity which rouse in us the urge for the Beyond. But overcoming of insecurity and sin, relief from misery, bliss in God—the expectation of a destiny of which these are essential elements is not consistently the expectation of an endless lengthening of our present life. Another difficulty presents itself which is perhaps more than a matter of curiosity. Eternal prolongation of what particular state of our present existence—eternal infancy, youth, old age?° These are all essential stages of the only temporal existence we know. Lengthening them endlessly might give us endless adolescence or endless senility—a distortion rather than a real continuance of our present life. What we should consistently desire, therefore, is, not a simple prolongation of our personal here-and-now existence, but “whether accompanying prolongation or in the direct form of liberation, some affirmation of our main interests, or some refuge from the perpetual failure of satisfaction.” Fundamentally it is a problem of the conservation and fulfillment of values. “Our formal self, our self as given today, is not that of which we mainly and imperatively demand the continuance. We demand what we care for; and what we care for are interests and affections which carry us beyond our formal and exclusive Self.”°

And what of the future? Are the gates of the future always open, and time always real, as Bergson would have it—or are they to close one day and time to cease, as Dante anticipates? Is there always a better ahead, or

are we really to look for the far-off divine event, for absolute completed perfection? Professor Bosanquet repudiates both views. Time is an appearance only (*vs.* Bergson), but (*vs.* Dante) "an appearance inseparable from the membership of finiteness in infinity, and therefore from the self-revelation of a reality which as a whole is timeless."^o The true infinite involves a series, but is not a series. A man listening to a piece of music for the first time may follow the series of notes one by one. He enters into the larger experience of the music, however, not when he has counted off the last note and completed the series, but when the mood or spirit or atmosphere of the whole piece has entered his soul. And that inner character of the whole is not the bare series of notes, although it involves them. Moral progress is real and an eternally realized perfection is real: the two are compatible; but their reconciliation is not attained through the attainment of perfection by the finite at some future time.

Assuredly we have a future then, that is, a further, an expansion of our self towards perfection, a gain and a sense of gain in values, an increased recognition of self. But self-recognition involves renunciation; this is the lesson man has to learn. Hegel's "unhappy consciousness" and Mr. Bertrand Russell's "firm foundation of unyielding despair," point the same way: we must have the hazard and the hardship; in our reach we must seek to exceed our grasp; in losing our life we find it.^o This is the essence of religion and the most profound truth of experience, the double criterion of true progress. The sin against the Holy Spirit is "the self-satisfaction of the finite . . . the portal where hope vanishes."^o The true destiny of the finite self lies in the conservation of its true values through self-transcendence and transformation, and through approximation to the perfection of the ultimate Individuality which is the Absolute's.

II

It would be a misunderstanding of Professor Bosanquet's position to regard it as explicitly involving the final extinction of finite individuals into the vast impersonality of the Absolute. In emphasizing infinite Individuality rather than finite selfhood, Professor Bosanquet would not ignore the cosmic significance of the latter. This "vale of tears" is for him truly "a vale of soul-making," as Keats phrased it in one of his letters. What makes each self significant, however, is this: that it is in and of the Absolute. We are "trustees for the universe";^o its excellence must include ours, but our excellence and value consist in the contribution which each of us makes to the cosmic whole of which we are elements. We are in the Absolute now and always; in the realization of this our community with the Absolute is to be found our real worth as finite individuals.

This, in brief, is Professor Bosanquet's view of the value and destiny of the individual, and, as we have seen, it determines his whole treatment of the problem of immortality. This view may be described as the counsel of realization through resignation. Now is it precisely the hope of personal immortality which the soul is counselled to resign, in order to find itself in the hope of self-transcendence and transformation? Is man as man, finite selfhood, but a stage in the progressive, developing individuality, of which the medium, the perfect pattern and the goal is the Absolute? Professor Bosanquet's answer to man's plea for personal continuance after death is not a rude refusal (needless to point out, it is not an affirmative answer to the question as ordinarily asked); it is rather an effort to point out the deeper meaning of man's plea for immortality, in the light of the nature of selfhood. "The question . . . whether selfhood runs parallel with Individuality, or whether the former experience must

cease when the latter is at a maximum . . . is not necessarily of ultimate importance."° Before the question can be answered adequately, it must be adequately asked.

The doctrine of immortality appears to represent the effort of the self to describe its 'beyond' in terms of its 'here-present.' Such an effort is likely to share the fate of the effort to describe the Absolute in terms of the finite (the idea of God). Should we conclude that the vision of the destiny of men, like the peace of God, passeth understanding, the immortal hope may still persist; but in that case the problem of immortality would tend to give way explicitly to the problem which has already confronted us, concerning the cosmic rôle of the finite self. How essential a part of idealistic cosmology the solution of this problem is, appears clearly as soon as the question of immortality is raised in idealistic discussion. It is this problem which provides the subject for a Symposium in the Aristotelian Society led by Professors Bosanquet, Pringle-Pattison and Stout and Lord Haldane.°

Do finite individuals possess a substantive or an adjectival mode of being? Professor Pringle-Pattison, in his *Idea of God*, criticizes Professor Bosanquet's "grudging . . . treatment of . . . formal distinctness of selves" and charges him with treating finite selves as mere predicates of the Absolute. Together with Professor Bosanquet, Professor Pringle-Pattison would insist on the deep significance of "the universal in which the individual lives and from which he draws his sustenance." But, against Professor Bosanquet, he insists on the unique and impervious distinctness of the finite self. "It is of the very nature of a self that it thinks and acts and views the world *from its own center*."° Professor Bosanquet errs in insisting exclusively on the *content* of selfhood and treating finite selves as if they were ultimately "con-

nexions of content"° within the Absolute. Contents may overlap and connexions of contents may coalesce, but "the very meaning of (the self's) existence is that it is a unique focalization of the universe."° To speak as if the common contents of two selves affected their existential distinctness, is meaningless to Professor Pringle-Pattison. His criticism recalls a point made by Dr. McTaggart, that Bosanquet confuses distinctness and isolation. "Nothing finite is really isolated. But that need not prevent finite beings from being really and ultimately distinct."°

Now Dr. McTaggart treats selves in earnest as "really and ultimately distinct"; to him they are substantial in nature and eternal as finite selves. Professor Pringle-Pattison is not prepared to go as far. He would not hold, any more than Professor Bosanquet, "that finite selves . . . possess an inherent and inalienable immortality" as "unitary and indiscerptible substances."° This type of cosmology he regards as appropriately defunct since Kant. In Professor Bosanquet's preoccupation with the Absolute, it appears to Professor Pringle-Pattison, not only does the individual personality tend to disintegrate, but God's reality also becomes excessively ambiguous. But Dr. McTaggart's emphasis on the uniqueness and substantial independence of finite selves leads him frankly to atheism, and indeed to inevitable pluralism, in spite of his insistence that his monadistic universe is a "harmonious system of selves."° For how can we know or speak of a harmonious universe of selves, Professor Pringle-Pattison asks, if there is no center-mind or self? Indeed, Dr. McTaggart's reasoning that *sub specie aeternitatis* each self is perfect, is regarded by Professor Pringle-Pattison as the *reductio ad absurdum* of individualism, deserving of no further discussion.°

So, between the absolutism and pantheism of Professor Bosanquet and the "monadistic idealism"° of Dr.

McTaggart, Professor Pringle-Pattison, seeking perhaps a middle ground, appears to incline decidedly towards the former. He leans towards Dr. McTaggart just enough to secure the substantive nature and "relative independence of human personalities." But against both he maintains "the existence of God as a living Being."^o Now, to be sure, this assertion in the same breath of substantive, independent and impervious finite selves and of an existent infinite God, admittedly involves us in grave issues: "how the measure of individual independence and initiative which we enjoy is compatible with the creative function or the all-pervasive activity of the divine." But Professor Pringle-Pattison would not be troubled by any "speculative difficulties" in holding to his "primary certainty."^o This primary certainty scarcely includes explicit assurance of personal immortality, but it appears to save God's existence.

In his effort to assure himself of the reality of "a living God" and "a living self" by borrowing both from monism and from pluralism, Professor Pringle-Pattison is perhaps open to the charges of ambiguity and emotionalism. Thus Professor Bosanquet regards him as confusing God with the Absolute.^o On the other hand, Professor Pringle-Pattison undertakes to point out, in Professor Bosanquet's general theory, "the logical analysis of knowledge is substituted for an account of living experience. . . . In all his thinking, Professor Bosanquet completely fails to realize the elementary conditions of selfhood. In his theory there is no real self at all, either of God or man, but only a logical transparency called the Absolute."^o The self of living experience is not merely content, aspect or predicate of the Absolute, a logical contribution to the Whole, but rather unique as a knowing-feeling-willing focalization of the universe. It is not the less real because it is not the Whole. Indeed, Professor Pringle-Pattison

maintains, Professor Bosanquet "elaborately contends . . . that the finite individual is not a substance in the Spinozistic sense . . . not, in short, the Absolute."^o And, of course, we are reminded of Locke's words on a similar occasion, "it is but defining substance in that way, and the business is done." The finite self is not the Absolute; no long argument is needed to prove this; but the finite self is nevertheless a real individual, a substance in the old Aristotelian sense—not a predicate, but that of which universals are predicated.^o

In reply Professor Bosanquet leads to his own view by distinguishing two arguments urged in favor of the substantive mode of being of the finite individual. We may argue that finite individuals have a substantive mode of being because they are existent things, or because they possess the intentional character of spiritual beings as such, because of their pretensions and implications. Now, to be sure, this finite self, this man, is an existent thing, but so is his dog, and so is his dog's tail. What is to be our principle of selection? Is Sahara the substantive, the subject, or a patch of it, or a grain of sand in it? The first of the two arguments is invalid: it is evident that "a thing, . . . as an existence, can have no claim to be an ultimate subject." It is only a provisional subject, and "provisional subjects taken in their whole reality are best considered as characters predicate of the universe."^o If, however, we follow the second line of argument, we are led to recognize that the implications of our being as finite individuals point to the Absolute in which we share and wherein our true nature and our values are, through self-transcendence, realized. Professor Pringle-Pattison writes as if, in denying the self-existence of the finite self, Professor Bosanquet were questioning its reality. But, as the latter has pointed out in his *Logic*, "nothing is self-existent, but nothing is non-contributory."^o

III

"The question is whether, in considering the subordinate individual, the abstraction involved in attending to it *par excellence* is forgotten or is remembered. In the popular attitude—the attitude to which pluralist and semi-pluralist reasonings appeal—it is forgotten."° This point of Professor Bosanquet's seems to go to the heart of the matter. Assuredly the self has a degree of individuality, yet, as he expresses it in his *Logic*, "its real character consists not in individuality, but in a claim to it."° The reality of anything experienced involves its relation to the system or scale of which it is an element, a factor, a member; to deal with the individual as isolated is in a degree artificial. "I *am* substantive and subject . . . but only so far as I recognize myself to be adjective and predicate. If, forgetting the abstraction, I set up to be in myself a self-centered real, I become *ipso facto* in the main a false appearance and all but worthless."° The paradox in which Professor Bosanquet has expressed his idea may, but the idea does not, deserve Professor Stout's parody: "Given that I may call chalk cheese, I can truly assert that chalk is edible."° Professor Bosanquet does not intend that the finite individual is without qualification adjectival in character; what he seeks to remove is the error that it is substantive without qualification. It is only in relation to a system of experience of which it is an aspect, that the self is a real factor in that system; and only so long as we are not unmindful of the essentially adjectival character of the self, are we in a position to appreciate the 'intentional' substantiality of its being.° A theory like Dr. McTaggart's appears to involve just such a case of unmindfulness, in its preoccupation with finite selves as finite selves; hence the futility of his tireless monadistic dialectic.

But Personalistic Pluralism is only one case of for-

getting; Absolutism is the other.^o In attending to the Absolute *par excellence* we are apt to be involved in an abstraction perhaps more subtle, but none the less real. Everything breaks down somewhere; everything involves its Beyond; philosophy should beware lest it take any thing as final and ultimate in isolation. But beware lest it take *anything* as final and ultimate, whether you call it the Whole or the Absolute or what you will. The second warning is the necessary corollary of the first. Both warnings are essential to sound idealism. The second should have been emphasized in Professor Bosanquet's theory as explicitly as the first. Indeed, what can be the ultimate significance and value of a metaphysic which, in analyzing the various aspects of the only world we know, pronounces them one after another incomplete, and thereupon allows a way to be opened for the suggestion of doubts as to their genuine reality? Space and time are appearances, somehow in and of but not for, Reality; selfhood is transcended in the Absolute; good and evil are absorbed in Perfection; value reaches its apogee—and extinction—in the Whole. "Both the world of the intelligence and that of morality, both truth and goodness, turn into phenomenal appearances, that is, into things which manage to exist without being real, and which in becoming real and passing into the Absolute cease to exist."^o These are all echoes of the invariably subtle, but unsatisfactory, metaphysics of *Appearance and Reality*, which, as an American critic has suggested, has perhaps "done more to discredit Absolute Idealism in the minds of those not predestined to that way of thinking than all the polemics directed against British Neo-Hegelianism."^o

It may be doubted whether in the more or less emphasized contrast between Appearance and Reality, the former is, in the end, discredited as much as the latter. "The Absolute is not itself *quite* unknowable," Sir Henry Jones

observes wittily. "We find that it is static, cannot change, swallows and transmutes finite things. But we know nothing specially to its credit, since truth, goodness, beauty disappear in it."° Negative eulogy of the Absolute is not enough; nor is Reality made more real by being capitalized, if in this process of metaphysical proof-reading the small-type meaning of our experience is all deleted. For what, after all, can Reality, the Whole, the Absolute, be but the full measure of the very experience (space, time, matter, self, value) which we slightly treat as Appearance?° These are all appearances, but they are not on that account unreal in the sense in which anything else is ultimately real. There is nothing ultimately real simply because no thing is ultimately real. What is ever real is the process of experience.

Thus the Absolute is not *a* Reality or *the* Reality; for the only reality is experience, of which we can say that it is the source of all its apparent limitations, imposing them on itself, and delivering itself from them.° Hume set out on the path of empiricism; yet, because his notions of realness and objectivity were still largely dominated by the old category of substance, he was led to a sceptical conclusion. So the absolutist, in his subtlest analysis of experience, is inclined to question the reality of all he sees and knows, since perforce it is not, so to say, good enough for the unseen and unknowable, but alone real, Absolute. His analysis of experience may be right, but it is discredited by his wrong metaphysical estimate of experience. For, as Lord Haldane well points out, if you begin by criticizing the instrument of knowledge, you will end in scepticism. "If the only way of thinking is relational, and this way cannot be that of truth, what other path to the Absolute can there be?"°

Is the aim of metaphysics to give a final account of the world? The only final account of the world is that it always implies, but never includes, finality.° The

heart of reality is not an Absolute Perfection towards which the world-experience tends; the heart of reality is the intelligible, dynamic, conative, aspiring activity which is the world of experience—the only world we know or can know. Just as “a true self is something to be made and won,”^o so the Absolute can be conceived as “the perpetual reconstitution and victorious self-maintenance of the spiritual whole.”^o If this be so, then we are no more justified in postulating a *terminus ad quem* of this activity than in fixing its *terminus a quo*. Perfection is neither in Eden nor in the Absolute, in or out of time. Perfection is in the ever-living, ever-growing realization by the experiencing centers of their infinite, eternal scope of activity. In reaching for the beyond, which exceeds their grasp, the selves do really transcend their here-present attainment; but what they attain to is not on that account any the less truly their own nature. Indeed, as Sir Henry Jones has pointed out,^o one may doubt if Professor Bosanquet’s substitution of “self-transcendence” for “self-realization” is altogether a gain in metaphysics. The older term involved a clearer sense of the genuinely living identity of the progressively developing self. For a similar reason one may doubt the advisability of Professor Bosanquet’s substitution of ‘elements’ for ‘members’ as descriptive of the rôle of the finite individuals in the Absolute system.^o

Notwithstanding his refusal to recognize the human person as a true individual, Professor Bosanquet entitles his second course of Gifford Lectures, “The Value and Destiny of the Individual.” “Thus,” Professor Webb ventures to think, “does the common sense of language assert itself.”^o So, likewise, the above-cited comparison of the Absolute with Dante’s mind, as uttered in the Divine Comedy, is suggestive of the difficulties in Professor Bosanquet’s theory, and perhaps also suggestive of a way out. Does not this analogy clearly lead to the

conception of a personal Absolute? Dante's mind is a personal mind; and, note, Dante is himself one of the characters in the *Commedia*, communing with the rest. Do we not have here "an analogue to that personal intercourse with human souls which Religion ascribes to God, but which it seems to philosophers of Mr. Bosanquet's school impossible to ascribe to the Absolute, because human souls are included within the Absolute?"^o In Professor Webb's theism the importance of the religious experience of personal communion with God is emphasized, and it is from this point of view that he undertakes to consider the hope of a life beyond death. For "in the religious experience we may enjoy acquaintance with God, conscious of the freedom involved in this acquaintance, assurance of a life with and in him which lifts us above the changes and chances of mortality."^o

Now Professor Bosanquet would describe God as the way in which the aspiring self, in its religious moments, envisages the perfect Absolute. Perhaps one may say that the perfect Absolute is itself the way in which the aspiring self, in its metaphysical moments, conceives of the ideal of its own aspiring activity—tending towards, as it does, but never completely attaining, perfect order, unity, harmony, consistency. And just as genuine religious devotion cannot identify its lot with the lot of a dogmatic theology, so sound idealism, the undogmatic philosophy of experience, is not to be lumped with Absolutism. For sound idealism may perhaps be defined as the philosophy of experience which does not 'forget itself' or its abstractions, while Absolutism is touched with hypostasis, the insidious bane of metaphysics.^o

The issue in which we are involved has received much of Professor Bosanquet's attention. He regards it as "the opposition of the purely moralistic or ethical and the profoundly religious attitude . . . the dividing line and divergent aspiration of modern modes of thought."^o

The demand for the recognition of the finality of process has been characterized by the absolutist as indicating inability to overcome anthropomorphism in metaphysics. Yet it is not always the critic of absolutism but rather the absolutist himself who would make his private sense of defect a limit of the coherent nature of thought and would "stop the logical process at an arbitrary point, and say, 'I am tired, and I won't play any more; therefore, you must please stop the game.'"° Certainly the game is not to be stopped at an arbitrary point, but is it not arbitrary to stop it at any point? The logical process, or experience, may perhaps be called a game, if the intention is to describe its character as significant, dynamic, aspiring. But it may not be called a game if it is thereby to be distinguished from some Beyond-Experience as the real serious occupation for the philosopher. Every experience has its beyond; but the beyond is again experience: what else can it be? So stopping the game would itself be in and of the game.

The demand implied in this critique of absolutism is not rightly described as "the demand for the advance and alteration of the whole reality itself and as such."° It is rather a demand for the recognition of the abstraction involved in speaking of the Whole as such, or of any 'as such.' When you say that all advance and alteration is in Reality, in the Whole or Absolute, you may mean, and rightly, that all advance and alteration is advance and alteration of experience. But you may go on to say: it is of experience, in the Whole or Absolute, but not of the Whole or Absolute, in which all advance and alteration is absorbed and transcended. This last step is unwarranted, for it involves the distinction, not of any particular experience from the whole of experience, but the distinction of experience from a Whole or the Whole or the Absolute. And the meaning of this distinction is not apparent, nor its value for philosophy. Just because you

call Reality infinite or inexhaustible, you may not regard it as exhausting or absorbing that which you have proclaimed, and rightly proclaimed, to be the essence of experience: its advancing, aspiring, beyond-pointing character. Otherwise you are involved in a dualism, implied or overt, between experience and reality.

In Professor Bosanquet's profound revelation of the finite-infinite character of the self, in his caution against the forgetting of the abstraction involved in attending to the subordinate individual *par excellence*, in his characterization of selves as provisional subjects, in all his emphasis on the incomplete, conative, beyond-pointing character of the finite individual, we have evidences of a fundamentally true and deeply significant theory of experience. But the value of this profound analysis of experience is menaced if, while, *e. g.*, speaking of the self as a provisional subject, we imply, or, at any rate, fail to disclaim, that there is any real sense in which we can speak of an Ultimate Subject. Sir Henry Jones' summary of Professor Bosanquet's theory, "Appearance is more than illusion and less than reality, and partakes of the nature of both,"^o is to the point: it reveals alike the merits of the theory and the lurking danger of Absolutism, which is also criticized in Sir Henry Jones' Gifford Lectures: Bosanquet's Absolute should be left to Herbert Spencer, connoisseur of Unknowables. The true infinite "manifests itself in the events of the world, natural and spiritual, in which we live. That infinite is a process which never rests. . . . Mr. Bosanquet's Absolute is no less a fiction than the world of claims and counter-claims, whose existence he rejects."^o

The criticisms which this Absolutism has evoked are not uncalled for; but they are criticisms of what may be called a possible misapplication in Professor Bosanquet's theory of his main principle, rather than a criticism of that principle itself. His warning not to forget the ab-

straction involved in attending to the "subordinate individual" *par excellence*, demands for its completion the warning against forgetting the corresponding abstraction involved in attending to the Absolute *par excellence*. And the second warning is doubly significant because of the first.

All this was doubtless not new to Professor Bosanquet. His constant insistence that we are in the Absolute now and always; that in referring to the Absolute we should not be thinking of heaven; the whole implication, in particular, of the last lecture in the Second Series of his Gifford Lectures—to mention only a few of a multitude of available illustrations—all are compatible with, and indeed suggest, a non-absolutistic conclusion. Of this conclusion Professor Bosanquet was by no means unaware, but it is not formulated clearly and explicitly and emphasized to the exclusion of its opposite. May one intimate that the theory as a whole would have been even more satisfactory had there been more Bosanquet and less Bradley in it?

IV

The problem of immortality has too often been formulated as a question concerning the endless prolongation in time of a self's career, and so it has been involved in all the difficulties of the problem of time. But the predicates 'immortal' and 'eternal' are, after all, predicates of value rather than temporal or existential predicates. Of what possible relevance to a significant modern discussion of human immortality can be the assurance that, *e. g.*, the atom or the cell are immortal? It is not the existential, but the value-permanence of the self which really concerns us. It would be superfluous to elaborate this point here; it is fundamental in Professor Bosanquet's

theory which shows greater interest in the conservation of values than in the perpetuity of consciousness.

If the problem of immortality is explicitly translated into value terms, important issues are raised. We are then really asking whether the conservation—or, rather, the fulfillment—of value is involved in the teleological order of the universe.^o We speak characteristically of the hope of immortality, thereby implying an affirmative answer to this question. Yet a negative answer is not inconceivable, as witness oriental speculation and the oriental's attitude towards immortality.

And this question implies a further problem. Suppose that, being on our guard not to forget our abstractions, we conceive of the universe as a system of experiencing centers in a process of progressive self-realization. What assures us that the world-process is one of progressive attainment of personality, and that the self-realization of the experiencing centers is their progressive realization of selfhood? This is, of course, our old question about the cosmic rôle and mode of being of the finite self; but, considered in connection with the question concerning the fulfillment of values, it gains new significance. If the process of experience is one of progressive continuity, what justifies us in contemplating fulfillment of value throughout in terms of selfhood? Are all values "relative to value for, of, or in a person?"^o The ultimate criterion of value, according to Professor Bosanquet, is not personality, but individuality. Things possess as much value or satisfactoriness as they possess of reality and trueness, "and that is a logical standard, and a standard involving the whole,"^o and so leading us beyond the limitations of personality. "Man's reach should exceed his grasp." Indeed, we could not possibly be *satisfied* in a universe in which we could be *content*.^o But if we conceive of value as involving the reach for the Beyond, as conative,

aspiring process, ° how is it possible, in transcending selfhood, to retain value?

These, then, are the problems which now confront us: Are we justified in describing the world-process as a process of progressive self-realization, which is also one of progressive fulfillment of value? And, because, in thus raising the issue of optimism and pessimism, we are involved in considering the criterion of value, we are led to ask the second question: To what extent are we justified, while speaking of fulfillment of value, to think of the realization of selfhood? But these two inquiries call for separate treatment.

CHAPTER XI

PESSIMISM AND IMMORTALITY°

I

A THINKING man's attitude towards the prospect of immortality is likely to be conditioned by, and indeed to express, his estimate of the present life. The problem of immortality is thus necessarily bound up with the problem of evil, and the examination of the pessimist's view of the Beyond serves to disclose the springs of human experience which well up in the demand for immortality, the motives which largely determine the manner of the reflection and the course of the argument.

At the heart of the demand for a hereafter is a certain dissatisfaction with life as it is, a certain disappointed sense of inadequacy and incompleteness. Conceive of this present world as absolutely perfect in every detail: the demand for eternal continuance would lose its meaning. For it should be observed that perfection does not necessarily involve infinitude of extent or duration. Goethe's *Über allen Gipfeln* is eight lines long: who would have it longer? Do we want more than fourteen lines in a sonnet, or a sixth act of *Lear*; would we look under the frame-edge of the Sistine Madonna to see the rest of it, or draw out forever the symphony's finale?

Were our mortal lives fine works of art, perfect dramas with beginning, middle, and end mutually self-completing, no one could intelligently protest against the final curtain of death. If life were finite and perfect, its end would be a consummation devoutly to be wished, the demanded last

note of the perfect melody. It becomes clear, then, that we grope after a hereafter because we yearn after a perfection which is nowise realized in our finite lives, and just on that account are we led to believe that our careers are not really of finite duration and scope. This consciousness of the "disparity between man's possibilities and aspirations . . . and the narrow scope afforded them" in our present life, as Professor Ward expresses it,^o or, to put it more concisely, this consciousness of frustration, which characterizes us when spiritually alert, is at the heart of our thought about a Beyond.

A certain degree of pessimism, therefore, is a *sine qua non* of the idea before us. The course of our thought on the matter, and the nature of our ultimate demand and desire, would depend on the particular form which the consciousness of frustration assumes in our case. Despite a measure of empirical pessimism "our hold on those higher spiritual ideals" may be such as "forces us to think that we were not made to die."^o Or, on the other hand, we may be led to a conviction that the frustration is fundamental and final, involved in the very nature of selves and things, that life is inherently and utterly "a business that does not pay expenses," a thing that had better not be. To such a dark view of life the prospect of continuance is terrifying, and the hope, if hope there be, is for the extinction either of our finite individualities or of the whole wretched cosmos, or, darker still, hopeless unutterable gloom, the grim sense of the infinite vanity of all, which characterizes the absolute pessimist.

Pessimism has been called a modern malady. In the sense in which this view is often advanced, it is scarcely correct. All the deep wails of mankind are heard in antiquity. We need not go to the Orient, with its genius for seeing, and seeing through, the dark veils of illusion and misery. Even in Israel, Greece, and Rome, which we are apt to regard as fundamentally optimistic, the dolorous note is quite often dominant. "Vanity of vanities!" cries

Ecclesiastes, and Job curses the day of his birth. "Not to be born is, past all prizing, best," Sophocles declares in the *Oedipus Coloneus*; Seneca calls death "the best invention of Nature," and the grim view of life is quite familiar to all readers of Lucretius. Pessimists and historians of pessimism parade the names and utterances of the ancient prophets of doom and despair.^o "The knowledge that we had better not be," Schopenhauer maintains,^o is not only "the most important of all truths," but is of the oldest wisdom of mankind.

Nevertheless pessimism as a systematic philosophy of life is modern. As far as the West is concerned, the older pessimism is largely emotional: poetical-religious. The theory of pessimism in the West is a modern undertaking. True, it is Neo-Buddhistic in tone, but then Buddhism, and indeed all Hindu meditation, are modern factors in the thought of Europe. It is just one hundred years since, simultaneously in Italy and Germany, the modern doctrine of the vanity and suffering of life found sustained and systematic expression. Giacomo Leopardi and Arthur Schopenhauer have stated the main matter once for all. The others (Byron, Alfred de Vigny, Alfred de Musset, Heine, Lenau, James Thomson, Frauenstädt, Bahnsen, Mainländer, Renan—an incomplete list) are poetical or philosophical duplicates and echoes, fanatical or irresolute disciples, commentators and compromisers. In this assembly we should not class Eduard von Hartmann, whose systematic endeavor to find the way out of the miseries of life by marching forward through evolutionism instead of back to Buddhistic quietism entitles him to individual and careful attention in any discussion of modern pessimism. With these three men we shall mainly be concerned and with their dark views of life in so far as they bear on the subject of the self's destiny: Leopardi's idea of the *infelicità* of existence, Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Will-to-live, and Hartmann's theory of the Unconscious.

II

Most men read Leopardi only as a poet is read, feeling with him no doubt, but not thinking. Or else, as often, his views of life are ascribed to his personal woes: Leopardi's message of life is agonizing, not because life is necessarily an agony, but because Giacomo Leopardi's life happened to be agonized.

The first attitude can easily be appreciated by anyone who has fallen under the spell of Leopardi's poetry. The latter point of view is not much more difficult to understand. The story of Leopardi's life is a masterpiece of black misery, irony, and despair. His tragedy was also that of Pascal, with whom James Thomson compares him: "the tragedy of a powerful and energetic spirit in an imbecile body."^o Rickety and hunchbacked, his body undermined by consumption and dropsy, organic and nervous exhaustion, due to prodigious overstrain of a philological genius which made him a celebrity in his teens and an invalid for life, Leopardi was daily wracked by suffering and depression, and by an extreme and unexampled sensitivity, which made almost every action and sensation a pain. And in this deformed and crushed body dwelt a flaming soul, intense, energetic, craving love and light and finding none. To his brother Carlo he writes from Rome: "I need love, love, love, fire, enthusiasm, life."^o There is tragedy in the famished despair of Sappho:

The moon hath sunk, and the Pleiads,
And midnight is gone,
And the hour is passing, passing,
And I lie alone.^o

It is not only of the Greek poetess that Leopardi is thinking, in his *Ultimo Canto di Saffo*:

A'tuoi superbi regni
Vile, o natura, e grave ospite addetta,
E dispreziata amante, alle vezzose
Tue forme il core e il pupille invano
Supplichevole intendo.^o

To physical deformity and pain was added and super-added mental anguish. Denied parental understanding and sympathy, imprisoned in the rude town of Recanati, there to be envied and mocked by a coarse populace, he was forced to struggle in an alien world, experiencing what Alphonse Daudet rightly called "the worst of human miseries: to have had a childhood without tenderness."

E intanto vola

Il caro tempo giovanil; piú caro
Che la fama e l'allor, piú che la pura
Luce del giorno, e lo spirar: ti perdo
Senza un diletto, inutilmente, in questo
Soggiorno disumano, intra gli affanni,
O dell'arida vita unico fiore.°

Distinction is sometimes made between unreasoned and reasoned pessimism, or subjective and philosophical pessimism.° Now, to be sure, pessimism, like optimism, is a matter of emotional no less than of intellectual temper. But, if a man's temperament and experience have enabled him to perceive and reveal more vividly some one aspect of life, his views and disclosures are nowise to be discounted by any rehearsal of his private weals or woes. "I am a log which feels and suffers," Leopardi writes in the dedication of the Florence edition of his poems to his Tuscan friends. The clinical, scandal-mongering method of dealing with the modern pessimists does not quite dispose of their theories of life, any more than Job's questions are to be turned to ridicule because they are the questions of a man who never asked them until he found himself atop the ash-heap. Job's presence on top of that heap is itself a most relevant fact which does not detract but rather adds to the significance of his testimony in the matter under consideration.

So Leopardi himself repeatedly protests against those who busy themselves with his maladies instead of studying his observations and reasonings.° Leopardi is the true poet of pessimism, because he is also a philosopher;

Carducci rightly calls him the Lucretius of Italian thought.° He is not to be confused with the Byrons and the Chateaubriands, with the Werthers, the Evgeny Onyegins, and the Jacopo Ortises. These are romantic sufferers, conscious of a rare dolorous distinction by virtue of their rare griefs; of the world apart, they wrap themselves up in their melancholy mantles; they are the aristocrats of sorrow. Even of Alfred de Musset, Aulard says: "It is not sorrow that he chants, but his own sorrow."°

Leopardi's spirit is radically different. The misery is not that he is unhappy, but that no one can be intelligently happy. Genuinely lyrical as is the tone of his utterances, they are not mere subjective wails but convictions held on objective grounds, which Leopardi is prepared to defend also in terms of reasoned argument. The ardent lyrics of the *Canti*, the impassioned, the Stoical, the coldly cynical prose of the *Operette morali*, the more intimate and casual reflections in the *Epistolario*, the logical arguments and the aphorisms of the *Zibaldone* are but various expressions of Leopardi's daily attitude towards life, an attitude none the less carefully thought out because it was so intensely felt.° The key to his writings is not merely a particular personal experience, emotion, or mood; it is also a process of thought. The development of this thought leads him to the theory of what he calls *l'infelicità*, the essential infelicity of existence.

Man's life is an exhausting pursuit of sublime phantoms and illusory goods, from the attainment of which he expects what he never does and never can get: felicity. Life is essentially self-defeating, a vanity and futile misery.

Uso alcuno, alcun frutto
Indovinar non so.°

All the roads on which men seek felicity are blind alleys. Glory is a dear purchase; man's every gain is vitiated by its impermanence; all the labors, all the vaunted progress

of mankind only reveal to us the more clearly that vast abyss of nothingness which is life.

Arcano è tutto,
Fuor che il nostro dolor.°

Virtue itself is an illusory and a futile goal, *stolta virtù*; the world is getting worse:

In peggio
Precipitano i tempi; . . .°

All ambition is vain, and vain are all the ideals for which men spend their lives, as vain as is the faith in a divine Providence that watches over us.

Leopardi the poet, in the ecstasy of creation, would seek solace from the truth which his reason understands all too well, as if the perfection of his dolorous chant of life rendered life's misery felicity. But if the poet's divine protest does not unsay the agony and vanity of existence, it saves it from being pusillanimous. There is nothing mean or ignoble or petulant about Leopardi; he would have life on his own terms or not at all; and his terms are high. Life is evil, he writes; but the reading of him leaves you a better man. Alas, that the very exaltation of the spirit makes it realize the more poignantly the meanness of its native land; alas that reason coldly pricks the bubbles of poetic vision, tears the veils of celestial illusion, and shows us life as it is: wretched, petty, and futile!

The most precious and dominant of illusions is Love, the longest-lived phantom of all:

Amor, di nostra vita ultimo inganno.°

Without love life has neither bloom nor fruitage, and lacks both worth and meaning:

Pregio non ha, non ha ragion la vita,
Se non per lui.°

Can love, however, yield sure felicity? Leopardi has known, if not the satisfaction, yet the terrible empire of

love; if he who has been loved only in his dreams, if he can make certain of love's lasting beatitude, life will have an anchor to steady it and a beacon light. This light and anchor he seeks to find in love, and seeks heroically:

Dolcissimo, possente
 Dominator di mia profonda mente;
 Terribile, ma caro
 Dono del ciel; . . . °

But even here felicity is at heart delusive and vain. It is not only the common coquetry of Signora Fanny Targioni-Tozzetti that Leopardi is at last compelled to perceive; in the depth of his spirit he becomes convinced that love's blessedness is itself a dream and vain fancy, divine sovereign of man's soul, but death's own sister. This last dear delusion is finally renounced by Leopardi. In the short lyric *A se stesso* we have pessimism unqualified and absolute:

Omai disprezza
 Te, la natura, il brutto
 Poder che, ascoso, a comun danno impera,
 E l'infinita vanità del tutto. °

This pessimistic view of life, which is lyrically uttered in the *Canti*, Leopardi undertakes to maintain in reasoned terms. The very self-consciousness, which makes us at all capable of desiring felicity, makes felicity unattainable. For our self-consciousness is self-seeking, and its goal, happiness, recedes as we approach it: no sooner is one desire satisfied than the very satisfaction arouses a greater desire for a further happiness. To experience real felicity we require the perfect enjoyment of an infinite attained good. Such enjoyment is, in the very nature of things, impossible, and hence all striving after happiness is doomed to final disappointment. The disappointment is the keener the more actively conscious the individual is. So D'Alembert writes: "*Soyez grand et malheureux.*" °

Ask a man, would he live his life over again, without

any change? Who would consent to repeat the sorry tale? Yet man does crave another life. Why? Because he clings to the illusion that in the next life he would realize what he has so dismally missed in this.^o Therein is to be found the motive and the tragedy of the hope of immortality. The *Zibaldone* records Leopardi's early arguments for immortality: in all the world man alone is not and cannot be content with himself; therefore his existence cannot be limited to this life; indeed, man's unhappiness is itself a proof of his immortality, as it shows that he does not reach the natural aim of his being in this world. But is happiness the normal end of existence; is it so certain that existence is better than non-existence; is a future life to be craved or to be dreaded? Leopardi's mature thought, as it asserts the nullity of this life, consistently rejects the notion of a hereafter:

Peri l'inganno estremo
Ch'eterno io mi credei.^o

He does not believe in immortality, and he would not have it. Man's groping after the Beyond does not prove the reality of the Beyond, but only the miserable reality of the groping and striving after infinite, unlimited satisfaction.^o The infinite felicity sought is illusory, even the pain is really without any foundation. Genuine and ever-present is only the ennui of existence, *noia immortale*.

Immortality is a delusion; heart-breaking though it may be to most of us, we must face the truth. So in *Il sogno* the poet, seeing his dead love in a vision, by a supreme effort brushes aside the vain hope:

Or finalmente addio.
Nostre misere menti e nostre salme
Son disgiunte in eterno. A me non vivi,
E mai piú non vivrai . . .^o

It is scarcely warrantable to appeal to popular opinion. Antiquity has little to say on the subject. Indeed if men really believed in life after death, why do they mourn for

the dead? Is it because they believe them to be in hell? But Leccafondi, the moralist and patriot of the *Paralipomeni della Batracomiomachia*, discovers neither rewards nor punishments in the land of the dead. Besides, if the mourner thought of the dead as being in eternal torment, horror and aversion should enter into his sorrow. No, the dead are mourned because, in their inmost hearts, men feel that the departed are really gone; the thought that really crushes us is the thought of the futility of life, of which death is the visible manifestation—death, in the world alone eternal, as sing the mummies of Frederic Ruysch.^o

So we mourn the cessation of life. But why do we mourn it? How can death be regarded as an evil? Even if life were good, the question would be open, whether the prolongation of existence would be any more desirable than a never-to-be-ended sonnet. But "if life is not happy, as until now it has not been, it is better for us to have it short than long." Man is essentially incapable of felicity "in this world or in another." Besides, "heaven is scarcely an inviting place," and highly unreal and empty; for it can only be conceived after the fashion of this life, and like it is void of meaning. Ruysch's mummies can answer no questions save in terms of their earthly life; aside from which their existence is a void.^o

The disclosure that the hope of immortality is illusory reveals to us no terrifying prospect, but is really our only comfort: "death is our greatest good." Yet even if the prospect were terrifying in its misery, better far to face the truth and be miserable than to seek cowardly refuge in illusion. So Leopardi declares: "Whether these my sentiments are born of malady I know not: I know that, sick or healthy, I trample down the cowardice of mankind, reject every puerile consolation and illusion, and have the courage to sustain the privation of every hope, to regard intrepidly the desert of life, not to dissimulate to myself any part of human unhappiness, and to accept all

the results of a philosophy painful but true. Which philosophy, if good for nothing else, procures for strong men the stern satisfaction of seeing every disguise torn from the masked and mysterious cruelty of human destiny. . . . Hopes of glory and immortality are things concerning which even the time to laugh at has gone by. . . . I do not submit to my unhappiness, nor bow my head to destiny, nor come to terms with it, as do other men; and I dare to desire death and to desire it above every other thing. . . .”^o On the last page of the *Zibaldone* is a thought to the same effect: “Two truths which men generally will never believe: one, that they know nothing, the other that they are nothing. Add a third, which depends much on the second: that they have nothing to hope for after death.” So likewise in the last lines of *Il tramonto della luna*, dictated by Leopardi two hours before his death:

Ma la vita mortal, poi che la bella
Giovinezza sparì, non si colora
D'altra luce giammai, né d'altra aurora.
Vedova è insino al fine; ed alla notte
Che l'altre etadi oscura,
Segno poser gli Dei la sepoltura.^o

III

While, as we have seen, Leopardi not only chants the evil doom of existence, but also tries to point out the heart and ground of the universal misery, nevertheless it is true that Schopenhauer's philosophy is the first really systematic modern undertaking to establish pessimism on a metaphysical basis, not only to show that life is evil, but to demonstrate comprehensively why it must be evil, by pointing out the fundamental core of existence as blind, irrational, futile striving. The recognition of Schopenhauer's capital importance in the history of pessimism has made his main ideas generally known. No detailed rehearsal of the commonplaces of his philosophy will be

attempted here, but only a brief statement of his theory of human life in so far as it affects his view of human destiny.

To the world of experience Kant had opposed the thing-in-itself, which he treated as unknowable. Schopenhauer would go beyond Kant in emphasizing the metaphysically unreal character of the world of knowledge. It is illusory, it is the veil of Maya. But the reality it veils, the thing-in-itself, is not utterly beyond our ken. To be sure, the intellect cannot comprehend it, but we know it directly and intimately, we find it within ourselves as the will. It drives, directs, motivates all existence. Gravity, cohesion, inertia, magnetic attraction, crystallization, chemical affinity, vegetative force and reaction to stimuli, organic impulse, animal instinct, sexual desire, and the entire scale of passion, thought, and voluntary activity of men are simply various manifestations of the will-to-live.

Schopenhauer makes a sharp distinction between the primacy of the will-to-live and the secondary, derivative character of the intellect. The soul is no simple substance, he declares against Plato and Descartes, reaffirming and amplifying Kant's criticism in the *Transcendental Dialectic*. The thinking activity of the brain implies a substantial soul as little as digestion implies a stomach-soul. That to which we refer by the term soul is nothing simple; it is a complex twofold in character. Its two sources are intellect and will. The intellect is a function of the brain; it is one of the ways in which the will-to-live manifests itself when objectified in a human body. But the body itself, clearly, is a function of the will-to-live. In man, so constituted, the will-to-live manifests itself as ceaseless desire, forever seeking, yet never attaining, satisfaction, hence the fundamentally miserable character of existence. We are bound on a quest miserable and futile; we are the dupes of Nature. To Nature the individual is nothing, the species is all; yet, to attain the ends of the impersonal, irrational will, man is duped into pursuing ends which he

believes his very own. Generation after generation the curtain rises on a new act of the same old miserable play of life; men's passions forge the chains that enslave mankind.°

The life of individual striving, then, will never lead to light and happiness. This truth Schopenhauer learned from Buddhism. He finds it at the heart of other great religions. It is for him the truth of truths. Pain, illusion are not unfortunate incidents in human life; they are involved in it inevitably. The first fatal blunder is individual existence itself; in the words of Calderon, "The greatest crime of man is that he was ever born."

The illusion and the evil are one; one is also the truth and the deliverance. What does it mean to desire personal immortality? It means to desire the perpetuation of a phenomenal complex which is necessarily limited in space and time. He who craves immortality for himself desires the eternal existence of that which can only exist during the brief career of the human body, and which ought not to exist at all.° What is born will die; generation and death are two moments of the same process. Far deeper is the truth of the indestructibility of the essence of our being. Goethe and Lessing are sensible of the same wisdom which found exoteric expression in the doctrine of metempsychosis, but the inner meaning of which is better expressed by the terms palingenesis or aseity.° This is the meaning of the old wisdom of the Upanishāds: *Tat twam asi*; all the different individuals are fundamentally one; *haec omnes creaturae in totum ego sum, et praeter me aliud ens non est.*° Death is thus the apparent extinction of that which is really non-existent. "He will fear least to become nothing in death who has recognized that he is already nothing now."° Clearly we have here a modern reasoned statement of the old Buddhistic solution of the problem. The individual 'soul' is a mere phenomenal complex, compounded and recomposed at conception and birth and throughout life and dissolved at death. The

illusion of individual existence is at the heart of all self-seeking activity, at the heart of all the misery of existence. It motivates the desire for personal immortality, a futile and a wicked desire. The remedy which Schopenhauer proposes is likewise the Buddhistic remedy, enlightenment and quietism. Pierce through the veil of illusion; perceive the wretched truth of human existence. Refuse to be any longer the dupe of the will-to-live; in your own being curb, deny the tyrant-will; renounce self and the futile cravings of self; through sympathy and ascetic meditation reach after the truth. So there will be attained in you the blessedness of desireless contemplation, self-abnegation, the extinction of the fires of evil, infinite, selfless peace, Nirvana.

IV

Eduard von Hartmann's philosophic tone and the temper of his thinking are the tone and temper of Schopenhauer. But, while Hartmann lauds Schopenhauer's genius for keen perception,^o his admiration for his master is nowise uncritical. The keen perception of Schopenhauer, to which he owes his greatness, partakes of the insight of poetic genius: it lacks stability, breadth, and consistency of view, which are prime requisites of a philosophic system. One side of existence Schopenhauer saw clearly and portrayed once for all; of the other side he was conscious dimly; it imposes itself on his attention; he takes it in (as, for instance, in the doctrine of the Platonic Ideas), but does not see its meaning through and through. It remains a stepchild—a fifth wheel in his theory.

So Hartmann would correct and reconcile Hegel's pantheism of the Idea and Schopenhauer's pantheism of the will, by appealing to a world-principle more ultimate and fundamental than either of these. This world-principle is the $\pm A$ of Schelling,^o the unity of Will and Idea. This Unconscious, or Absolute Spirit, is at the heart of all ac-

tivity and of all consciousness. Will and Idea are its two moments. The one makes activity possible, the other determines the nature of the activity. *That* a stone falls, is due to the Will; that a stone *falls, i.e.*, in a certain way with a certain velocity, is due to the Idea.^o The Will is the basis of the *That*; the Idea, of the *What* and *How* of the world.

Existence is initially made possible by the spontaneous alogical will-activity of the metalogical Unconscious. Consciousness arises from the collision and recoil of opposed unconscious will-activities and the consequent experience of overmastering externality. The individual conscious will is overwhelmed by the world-process of which it thus becomes aware: "every process of becoming is, *eo ipso*, united with a certain displeasure."^o Pain would thus appear to be involved in the very constitution of conscious existence. This is clearly perceived by the man of vision and penetration. The genius sees through the vain follies and illusions of life and finds it unendurable. "The greatest minds of all ages"^o have condemned life in very decided terms. Plato, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and a host of others agree in this matter with Schopenhauer, but the generality of mankind labor on in miserable contentment, slaves of error and illusion. This great illusion has three main stages, corresponding to the three periods of human intelligence.

The first stage of the illusion is the childlike trust in the present. This is the Jewish-Greek-Roman point of view. "Happiness is considered as having been actually attained at the present stage of the world's development, accordingly attainable by the individual of today in his earthly life."^o

In undertaking to dispel this illusion Hartmann does not avail himself of Schopenhauer's doctrine that pleasure is always merely negative, a cessation of pain, and that therefore it is impossible in our lives to show a balance of pleasure.^o He admits the possibility of positive pleas-

ure, but maintains that it is far exceeded by the pain in existence. This thesis he undertakes to prove by referring to his theory of the origin and nature of individual consciousness and also by means of an empirical survey of life, under eleven categories. This dolorous inventory of life is executed in the Schopenhauerian manner and leads to Schopenhauerian conclusions. Life is a losing enterprise; the small profits are swamped by the enormous losses, not only in the world generally, but in each individual case.°

The second stage of the illusion manifests a weariness of the present life and a longing for a hereafter. "Happiness is conceived attainable by the individual in a transcendent life after death."° This is the comfort of the Christian idea, dominant in what may be called the adolescence of mankind. This is properly the hope of personal immortality, and to this hope Hartmann devotes his attention at every opportunity. He regards the hope as illusory, and he regards it also as evil, and both for the same reason, because the hope is bred by the belief in the reality of the phenomenal self and the desire to perpetuate that self.

Happiness is sought in a transcendent hereafter. What happiness? Whose happiness? The individual consciousness is a phenomenal complex inevitably bound up with a bodily organism and accordingly dissolved at death. Not even the theist's God can accord it immortality. Hartmann reaffirms Schopenhauer's doctrine of the destiny of the empirical self; but he goes on to criticize sharply Schopenhauer's notion of the pure subject of knowledge as inconsistent with his voluntaristic monism, as false and very misleading. He confronts Schopenhauer with this dilemma: If there are pure transcendent individuals, monism is false and should be replaced by a pluralism or monadism; if the All-One Will is really indivisible, then it is clearly contradictory to speak of pure intelligible individual characters.° Consistent monism is incompatible

with the doctrine of the eternity of finite selves. The individual consciousness is of space and time and mortality; it arises and passes away. "What is enduring is the substance that is manifested in this particular man, but this substance is not individual,"^o—palingenesis again!

Thus, then, the hope of personal immortality, according to Hartmann, proves to be an illusion; the belief in future rewards and punishments and the reliance on a Beyond for the righting of all present wrongs is shown to be unwarranted. The heavenward flight is checked; the sun of science melts the wax-wings of Icarus, and he falls to earth where he belongs.^o "The draft on the life hereafter, which is to compensate for the miseries of the life here, has only one fault: place and date of discharge are forged."^o In various tones Hartmann repeats the same cheerless refrain. But, he retorts, why do you call it cheerless? Cheerless it doubtless is to the egoist, for the doctrine of personal immortality is the faith and hope of the love of self: the emotional postulate of the grossest egoism. The heaven-craving egoism is no nobler than the earthly variety; indeed it is, as Hartmann says, "much more self-seeking."^o The Philistine, whose appropriate epitaph should be, "born, married, died," is the loudest in his clamor for personal immortality. For him no future has worth that does not preserve and perpetuate his own dear, precious self. Only for the egoist, therefore, is immortality a necessary emotional postulate without which life would be cheerless.^o "The sterling soul that puts its trust in self-renunciation and love does *not* find the result cheerless."^o

So Hartmann declares: happiness in a transcendent hereafter is an illusory and unworthy goal; as the human spirit approaches its maturity during the modern age, this conviction is gradually forced upon it. "That in all the important systems of modern philosophy (apart from Kant's inconsequence and Schelling's later declension)

there is no room for an individual immortality no one save the self-deluded can for a moment doubt.”^o

After its second disillusionment the soul of man is partially enlightened and takes a real step forward. Instead of seeking its own happiness on earth or its own blessedness in heaven, it breaks through the selfish bounds of its own individuality and seeks consolation in the hope of happiness for others. But on the other hand it retreats to its old childish delusion that happiness is attainable here on earth. This is the third and the last stage of the illusion which characterizes our age, the maturity of mankind: the faith in human progress, the hope of “happiness relegated to the future of the world.”^o

Is this hope any less illusory than the other two? Old age, some disease, dependence on the will and power of others, will always be with us, also want and discontent. Wherein, after all, does all this lauded progress of the world consist? Modern applied science, practical arts, railroads, steamships, telegraphs, factories, political and social advancement, these do not make men happier. They are of value only because they release for mental exertion energies which before were absorbed in the struggle with want. Intelligence is thus afforded a larger opportunity to penetrate life's illusions and seek the true way out.

So hoary humanity is gradually to be brought face to face with the wretched truth. “After the three stages of illusion of the hope of a positive happiness it has finally seen the *folly* of its endeavor; it finally foregoes all *positive* happiness, and longs only for absolute *painlessness*, nothingness, Nirvana.”^o

But how is this last hope of intelligent mankind to be attained? This is Hartmann's doctrine of salvation, which, as might be expected, involves him in another radical criticism of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's gospel of redemption is the gospel of the Buddha and the Hindu ascetics and mystics, the quietist gospel of will-denial and self-renunciation. But this doctrine is theoretically incon-

sistent with Schopenhauer's monistic metaphysics and practically inconsistent with his estimate of life as miserable-because-egoistic. How is the individual will to negate the One and Only Will, when the former is only a ray of the latter? Suppose that, through asceticism, mystic vigils and voluntary starvation, one certain egoistic will has been curbed, one self-engrossed consciousness obliterated, one individual organism dissolved, what has actually taken place in all this? "*No more and no less than happens at every decease.*"^o Indeed, "what would it avail, *e.g.*, if all mankind should die out gradually by sexual continence? The world as such would still continue to exist. . . . The Unconscious would . . . *fashion a new man or a similar type*, and the whole misery would begin over again."^o

In the will-to-self-redemption egoism is not overcome, for it is itself the last vestige of egoism. A more fundamental remedy is needed. If the root of evil is in self-seeking, no radical, adequate redemption is possible until self has been completely transcended.^o Redemption is not of self; it must be an act of each and all, not the act of man but of *mankind*; the denial must be all-comprehending and final, and should register, not the death of one man, but the end of the whole world-process.

What is Hartmann's own evangel of redemption? The world of experience is a grievous blunder, he affirms with the pessimist; but that grievous blunder contains within itself the factors of its correction. In this sense it is the best possible world, because it is capable of self-extinction. This is Hartmann's "evolutionary optimism."^o This end is not to be brought about by individual withdrawal from life. Active participation in the world-process is necessary, complete deliverance from all illusions, and firm determination unitedly to end the sorry play of life in which we are all unitedly active. When the world-denying will-power of mankind should come to outweigh the world-affirming power objectifying itself in the organic

and the inorganic worlds, humanity, permeated with the conviction of the miserable vanity of existence and yearning for the peace and painlessness of non-being, would be able, by one simultaneous common resolve at the proper moment, to vote the world out of being.°

V

Leopardi's writings register man's futile protest against the infinite vanity of all. Leopardi is no prophet of salvation, for according to him there is really no way out. Schopenhauer and Hartmann are not absolute pessimists: they both would save this wretched world,—by extinguishing it. Yet can they really save it in this way? In Schopenhauer's theory the human individual renounces himself as much as he can, since, of course, absolute self-annihilation is beyond man's power. Hartmann objects to this quietistic program as lacking finality. But is his own plan of redemption really final? Through the united simultaneous resolve of a humanity representing the majority of will-power in the universe, the world-creating Unconscious is to be extinguished as absolutely as it is possible to extinguish it, that is to say, not absolutely at all, since, to be sure, the Unconscious Absolute cannot be annihilated.

Vote the world out of being, let us suppose that you can: how would you affect the Unconscious by so doing? May it not again spontaneously initiate and perform the same cosmic cycle? Hartmann answers that, of course, such a repetition is not impossible. But the chances are, at worst, even: the probability that the Unconscious will groundlessly initiate a new series is just $\frac{1}{2}$. Further, considered *a priori*, the probability that this cycle will be repeated n times is $\frac{1}{2}n$. That is to say, he argues, the probability becomes less and less.° This reasoning is open to criticism.

But, after all, the important point is to be sought, not in Hartmann's admittedly tentative forecast of the specific

ways in which the goal is to be attained, but rather in the conception of this goal and of its relation to human destiny. If we inquire into the premises which lead to the pessimistic conclusions of the three theories which we have been examining, we find that all of them take hedonistic ground in passing judgment on existence. Non-existence is better than existence: why? Because existence is unhappy. Life is condemned because it does not yield a balance of pleasure. The whole course of the argument appears to turn on this one issue. From his doctrine that the essence of human nature is desire and unsatisfied striving Schopenhauer elaborately deduces the theory of the negative character of pleasure. Pain is the positive, and pleasure is but the temporary alleviation of pain, or, as Leopardi expresses it, in *La quiete dopo la tempesta*:

Uscir di pena
È diletto fra noi.

So likewise we find Hartmann, in his elevenfold survey of life, empirically demonstrating that life does not yield lasting happiness, as he had also endeavored to prove on metaphysical grounds from his theory of the origin and nature of consciousness. The conclusion is always the same: life is futile and vain because it does not attain its goal, which is a permanent balance of unqualified pleasure.

Now this type of argument may be met by questioning the validity of the hedonistic surveys of life which lead to the pessimistic conclusion. One might treat these proposed hedonistic ledgers with light pleasantry, in Paulsen's manner.^o It seems clear, at any rate, that all book-keeping here is bound to be individual, since pleasure-pain are essentially subjective, and no one can keep another's accounts. Hartmann, considering the fact that most men seem to be under the impression that life is quite endurable, would challenge their capacity to keep hedonistic books.^o

This sort of discussion, however, would miss the main

point. The important thing is not that the pessimist regards a permanent balance of pleasure as unattainable, but that he regards such a balance as the goal of life and the test of its value. So we read in Leopardi: "Man loves and desires nothing but his own happiness. Hence it is happiness that he always loves, not life. . . . A happy life is undoubtedly a good thing."^o Now does this mean that contentment is the supreme desideratum? So it would seem from Leopardi's notion of felicity as complete contentment in the present.^o Then the contented pig would be better than the aspiring philosopher? This should really be no *reductio ad absurdum* for the pessimist; indeed the lot of animals and plants should be the most esteemed.

While Schopenhauer and Hartmann do not readily go to such lengths, Leopardi repeatedly does. Thus in the marvelous *Canto Notturmo*, the nomadic shepherd of Asia envies his flock:

O greggia mia che posi, oh te beata
 Che la miseria tua, credo, non sai!
 Quanta invidia ti porto!^o

So also in *La Ginestra* (*The Broom*). The flower blooming on the arid slope of Vesuvius will one day also droop and wither under the molten deathflow of the volcano. But until that time it will be spared at any rate the dreams and desires and hopes that lure and torment the souls of men:

Ma piú saggia, ma tanto
 Meno inferma dell' uom, quanto le frali
 Tue stirpi non credesti
 O dal fato o da te fatte immortali.^o

Now it is surely becoming clear in modern ethical theory that, while pleasure is one moment, one essential aspect of the experience of attained desire, it is not to be identified with that experience, far less with the goal of desire. Undiluted pleasure cannot be the highest good,

nor is life to be pronounced evil merely because it is painful. Failure to recognize this truth is responsible for the fundamental confusion in Schopenhauer's and Hartmann's theories of value. Grant the premise of hedonistic pessimism (that a balance of pleasure is unattainable in life); the conclusion does not follow (that life is not worth living). The human spirit, nothing daunted, may protest with Caro: "Life, even if unhappy, is worth the pain of being lived."° The fundamental demand of man is not a demand for pleasure, but a demand for sheer being. Happy or unhappy, man would keep on. So Miguel de Unamuno confesses that what terrified his childhood was not the description of hell-tortures but the thought of utter extinction.° This furious hunger for being and the consequent "sacred passion of the second life" may not be as ardent in all men as it is in Unamuno and in Tennyson, but to normal man existence is itself an end, not a mere means to some ulterior end. So Tennyson sings in "Locksley Hall Sixty Years After:"

Gone forever? Ever? no—for since our dying race began
Ever, ever, and forever was the leading light of man.

The real issue leads beyond the hedonistic problem, whether pleasure is attainable; indeed it may conceivably raise the question whether pleasure is worth attaining,—a question which may be asked and answered in an optimistic as well as in a pessimistic sense. In this matter the Italian poet shows occasionally keener perception than the German philosophers. Worse than misery is spiritual stagnation, Leopardi writes in a letter to his father: "I would rather be unhappy than undistinguished: I would rather suffer than be bored: so much more injurious do I find boredom (*noia*), and in my case the mother of deadly melancholy, than any bodily disease."° Worse than misery is spiritual surrender, he declares in his poem *Nelle nozze della sorella Paolina*:

O miseri o codardi
Figliuoli avrai. Miseri eleggi.°

Indeed a study of Leopardi's pessimism is doubly interesting just because the unsystematic character of the poet's thought allows his keen perception of the realities of life more frequent expression, thus disclosing the artificiality of the strictly hedonistic conception of value. So in a sense Hahl is right in refusing to count Leopardi with the hedonists.° Even more accurately, however, it may be said that his poetic genius reveals concretely the defects of his abstract hedonistic theory. In all his wails against the misery of life, the ill of ills for Leopardi, it seems, is in the last analysis, not pain and misery, but the vanity and emptiness of life, boredom, tedium, ennui, *noia immortale*. This perception is by no means entirely alien to Schopenhauer and Hartmann, but Leopardi has expressed it more poignantly:

Non val cosa nessuna
I moti tuoi, né di sospiri è degna
La terra. Amaro e noia
La vita, altro mai nulla; e fango è il mondo.°

This is the real evil, then, which the pessimist regards as radical, incurable, and fatal: life is stupid and meaningless. Were it possible to live intensely, to live a life ever more abundant, to feel it ever richer in meaning, who would be discontented, even if it did involve pain? So the voyage of Columbus "endears life" because it "frees . . . from ennui."° So Leopardi eulogizes the birds, visible witnesses of the aspiring spirit.° But is not the life of ideal aspiration, after all, only a fair phantom? Each attainment proves the vanity of the quest. The man who has reached the summit of human happiness is the most miserable of mortals, for he has realized most clearly the futility of attainment. Show me in life one ideal eternally worth attaining, one challenge really worth answering, one problem worth solving, even one antagonist

worthy of my steel? You cannot, the pessimist declares, and this sense of the self-annulling character of life's activity is the sense that poisons all the joy of living and makes life a shallow mockery. So it has been chanted most dolorously in English by the poet of *A City of Dreadful Night*:

The sense that every struggle brings defeat
 Because Fate holds no prize to crown success;
 That all the oracles are dumb or cheat
 Because they have no secret to express;
 That none can pierce the vast black veil uncertain
 Because there is no light beyond the curtain;
 That all is vanity and nothingness.

But what is the meaning and the warrant of this nihilism of value? On what ground can a philosopher plant himself, in order to be justified in pronouncing the universe utterly evil and in seeking to speed its doom and destruction? Hedonistic pessimism is clearly inconclusive, but it is at any rate debatable. This latter variety of pessimism, however—blackness impenetrable, the negation of all values—is certainly unambiguous and absolute, but is it really unassailable? Reasoning cannot touch it only because, in the last analysis, it is itself not a reasoned truth. The very negation of value in the universe presupposes a process and a standard of evaluation, and it is not possible by a process of evaluation to reach a nihilism of value. A totally valueless universe would not admit even of being condemned, for the condemner remains, despairing of attainment because conscious of too lofty aspiration, and in the very intensity of his despair most keenly aware of his desire, divinely real amidst an infinity of nothingness:

Così tra questa
 Immensità s'annega il pensier mio:
 E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare."

In the realm of value, just as in the realms of existence and knowledge, absolute scepticism defeats itself. Value-

nihilism would correspond to the description of the universe as non-existent.

The theories before us, however, are not to be so easily ushered out of court. They are not, after all, bare negations of value. They condemn the world as valueless because in it there is no fruition of value. That is to say, the pessimist declares, each imagined pursued value, as it is attained, proves to be no real good at all. It is this conclusion which, not unnaturally, passes into a doctrine of value-nihilism. But it need not so pass. The proposition that nothing in our experience proves finally satisfying does not imply the infinite vanity of the universe; it does not even mean that our experience is unsatisfactory.

If we conceive of man's career as essentially one of aspiration, the reason for his failure to be finally satisfied at any stage of this career becomes quite clear. The standpoint from which an attained good is judged is more advanced and higher than the standpoint from which this good was prospectively regarded in aspiration. The very process of attainment proves to be a process of raising the standard of what is demanded. What promised satisfaction yesterday proves today no longer satisfying. This is assuredly the evidence of experience; but what ground for pessimism does it provide? Our very failure to be definitely satisfied with the attainment of our goal may indicate our more genuine attainment of the ideal—in aspiration. "It is not the goal, but the course which makes us happy," wrote Jean Paul Richter,^o and Lessing, even more positively: "Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand *Truth* and in his left hand *Search for Truth*, deign to offer me the one I might prefer; in all humility but without hesitation, I should request—*Search for Truth*."^o

In this spirit we might declare with assurance: the prospect of no situation would be more melancholy than of one in which a person finds himself finally contented. Such a situation would register the end of aspiration, spiritual stagnation and true death. This would indeed be the

hopeless tedium. In this sense, the pain and distress experienced by one whose feet fail to reach the altitudes surveyed by his eyes are not evil but the evidence of real good. A life abounding in such distress and dissatisfaction is the only really satisfactory life, the only life really worth living. "We could not . . . possibly be *satisfied* in a universe in which we could be *content*," as Bosanquet so aptly expresses it.^o The "self-satisfaction of the finite," that is the gloom of glooms, "the portal where hope vanishes."^o

The above portrayal of man as ascending the scale of values in aspiration is admittedly true to life at its best. But it does not fit all cases, and it may even be quite exceptional. More characteristic is the experience of defeat and disappointment. Now it is precisely this profound sense of incompleteness and frustration, it is this consciousness that the stage on which one is actually engaged affords no adequate scope for one's aspiring activity, that finds expression in the demand for and the belief in immortality. Immortality is a hope: it is the vision of a spirit dissatisfied but not despairing. Man demands assurance of unlimited scope in his striving after the Beyond. So Browning's Andrea del Sarto:

Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?

But still our utmost confidence in the eternal reality of the values to which we aspire quails before the thought that the ideal quest, which we would not end if we could, seems to be actually ended by death. The tragedy is not that our pilgrimage fails to reach its goal; the tragedy is that it seems to be cut short. *Ars longa, vita brevis*. And because the ideal has always presented itself to us as a quest, as the Beyond of an aspiring self, so it is quite natural that, confronted with the prospect of the apparent cessation of the quest at death, we demand enlightenment

as to the nature of this Beyond, of this system of eternal values.

Settle without doubt that the value of the universe is not to be measured in terms of the pleasure attainable by men; say that value is not to be located in any specific experience or type of experience; still the question remains: Is value (however defined in detail) essentially of and for persons? Can we say: no persons, no values? And, if so, does not the recognition that values are genuine, eternal aspects and elements of a real universe, involve the necessity of viewing personality in a similar way? That is to say, in affirming the eternal reality of value, are we correspondingly bound to affirm the eternal reality and significance of the individual person? Whether we answer this question directly, or whether we evade it and describe God, or else the Absolute, as the source and the ocean of values, the ultimate problem of value and personality confronts us. Upon the manner of its treatment depends in the last analysis the outcome of the present discussion of pessimism and immortality.

CHAPTER XII

VALUE, PERSONALITY, AND DESTINY

I

THE persistent inquiry about man's destiny has served to concentrate our attention on the ideas of value and finality, and so our study of the nature of personality has led us to one of the most ancient problems of philosophy. Pre-Socratic speculation was in the main a naturalistic undertaking; the early physiologers sought to understand nature and to analyze its factual properties. The dissatisfaction with their divergent results found expression in the rampant individualism and the anarchy of the Sophists. In his opposition to the physiologers the Sophist challenged the possibility of science; his own doctrine asserted the futility of philosophy. From this double peril Socrates saved human thought by his teaching that virtue is knowledge: virtue is no mere liking or fashion or convention; it is practical evidence of wisdom, of insight into nature and human nature. And knowledge is possible, Socrates in effect declared, provided you recognize that it is not apprehension of an unstable external world, but insight and conviction, active participation in an ideal process. Knowledge is virtue.

The fuller meaning of the Socratic dictum is revealed in Plato's synthesis of ethics and metaphysics. The real world is a scale of eternal principles made known to reason and culminating in the Idea of the Good. Real knowledge of the world-process, therefore, meant to Plato a recognition of it as a ladder to Perfection. Man's

ascent of this ladder is a rise in virtue as well as a growth in wisdom; intellectual and moral advance are not separate, but condition each other. Virtue is knowledge; the highest goal of practice is the ultimate object of theory; ethics and metaphysics are one. The exaltation of this idea is the theme of the *Symposium*; its systematic development and its application to the problem of human destiny are undertaken in the *Republic* and in the *Phaedo*.

The sublimity of this Higher Humanism almost justifies Emerson's hyperbole of enthusiasm, in his essay on Plato: "Burn the libraries; for, their value is in this book." But the criticism of Plato's philosophy centered in his doctrine of substance, the relation of reality to appearance, his account of the empirical order. In this criticism Plato's exaltation of value as fundamental to reality did not receive the sort of attention that it deserved. The Aristotelian system is a Higher Naturalism in which the flavor of Plato's thinking is lost. But if, in his criticism of Plato and in his attention to the mechanics of existence, Aristotle reminds us of the Pre-Socratics, the resemblance is only superficial. In its essence his philosophy develops Plato's emphasis on the purposive in nature. The atomist metaphysics is in his estimate but drunken stammer; the course of nature manifests the operation of final causes; the world-process is one of development and self-realization. The entire gradation of forms is called into being and sustained by the Pure Form: Plato's Idea of the Good.

Plato's teaching that value is the essence of reality and the world-course a ladder to Perfection, and Aristotle's idea of final causes, were translated by the Christian theologian into a doctrine of Divine Providence. The world-course is a *Divina Commedia*; it is God's Love which "moves the sun and the other stars." Essentially reluctant to admit the finality of science as an account of ultimate reality, the ecclesiastic advocate of Plato and

Aristotle earned for his masters the suspicion and even the hostility of the modern scientific spirit. By metaphysics Francis Bacon understood the science of final causes, teleology, and dismissed it as a virgin consecrated to God but barren.^o While Bacon, having preëmpted this world for mechanical science, piously assigned final causation to the cloistered regions of theology, and was prepared to do homage and obeisance to the sacred virgin thus isolated, Hobbes would have none of her on any terms. Spinoza's rejection of values as wholly subjective raised the question whether his metaphysics admits of a theory of morals, and whether his *Ethics* is not perhaps a misnomer.

It is only lately that idealistic theories of value have come to recognize their ancient, Platonic prototype. The modern discussion of the metaphysics of value, just as the modern discussion of the problem of human destiny, derives mainly from Kant. If the first problem and the crowning achievement of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the vindication of scientific knowledge, the task confronting the rest of Kant's philosophy, and philosophy after Kant, is the justification of the good, the problem of the metaphysics of value. How are God, Freedom, and Immortality to be understood and estimated by a philosophy that remains loyal to science? Kant met this issue, as is very well known, with his doctrine of the Primacy of Practical Reason; but the development of this doctrine into a systematic philosophy of value has remained a task for his successors. Modern discussion since Kant has proceeded along various lines: it has sought to analyze the judgment of value and to explain it psychologically; it has undertaken a survey and a tabulation of the whole field of values; or, more ambitiously and harking back to Plato, as, for instance, in Lotze's philosophy, it has undertaken to rank value above fact and to demonstrate that "the whole sum of Nature can be nothing else than the

condition for the realization of Good," and that "the true source of the life of science is to be found . . . in showing how *absolutely universal is the extent* and at the same time how *completely subordinate the significance of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world.*"^o

Recent idealism has been characterized by its critics as representing the religious tradition in philosophy. Whether this description is intended as a taunt or as a tribute, it is, at all events, just. Notwithstanding its conflicts with theology, idealism is the true bulwark of religion, just as materialism has always been its real enemy. A superficial mind might observe that all religions are varieties of anthropomorphism, and that idealism likewise proceeds on the assumption that man's little mind is the pit and kernel of the cosmos. (Did not Feuerbach write that man created God in his own image?) The analogy is deeper. The anthropomorphism of religion and the idealistic preoccupation with man are both evidence of a more fundamental kinship. In its insistence on the recognition of the metaphysical importance of value, contemporary idealism is expressing in philosophical terms the essential demand of all religion. Religion is faith in the supremacy and in the ultimate conservation and enhancement of value.^o Sacrifice, ritual, prayer, devotion, mysticism: these are but varied expressions of this fundamental conviction. Belief in God is belief that Worth is supreme in the universe; and the evolution of religion is the evolution of man's ideas of worth. In Greece, in Rome, in Israel, in the long history of Christianity, Goethe's lines hold true:

Im Innern ist ein Universum auch;
Daher der Völker löblicher Gebrauch,
Dass jeglicher das Beste, was er kennt,
Er Gott, ja seinen Gott benennt,
Ihm Himmel und Erden übergibt,
Ihn fürchtet und wo möglich liebt.

Man's worship of God has thus served to express concretely his devotion to worth. The idea of God has ever been the complete version of that which the religious man has felt to be central in all experience. In philosophy, likewise, recognition of value has concentrated the attention on the cosmic importance of personality. The life of the spirit looms large in the idealistic view of reality, for that life is the preëminent expression of value in the world that we know. Keenly alive to the cardinal fact of worth in the universe, the idealist has been unable to dismiss persons, the distinctive bearers of worth. That metaphysics, on the other hand, which has concerned itself with the mechanics of existence and has not been impressed with the necessity of accounting for its value, has very naturally described the world in terms of matter and force, and has treated personality as but a variety of material compound, and its career as incidental and episodic. And this second type of philosophy, dull to the recognition of value, has been consistently atheistic.

The support which the idealist's claims for value find in the religious thought of mankind is in itself, to be sure, no guarantee of their validity; although pseudo-scientific dismissal of idealistic theory as theology in disguise is as shallow as it is futile. Real difficulties confront the philosophy of value; it were best to take direct cognizance of these rather than to indulge in secular anathemas.

II

A distinction is often made between values and facts, brute facts. Facts are impassive, we are told, irrespective and not respecters of persons. Facts are facts, whether we know and recognize them or not. The existence of an object is not dependent on my volition and taste, but the value I predicate of it is a character which I myself

read into it, wholly subjective and likely to be conventional.

Now this distinction, in so far as it lays claim to metaphysical relevance, is quite misleading. To be sure, the world whose value I recognize is a world in which, as a person, I feel at home, and is thus quite 'subjective'; while the world of abstract mechanics, which does not seem to admit of evaluation, is somehow external and alien to me, and in this sense perhaps entirely 'objective.' But it is an error to argue from this, that the latter, rather than the former world, represents the completer, concrete reality. Even were it true that value requires recognition only in so far as the subject and its characteristic demands are to be vindicated, still we should nowise be justified in concluding that value is subjective, if we thereby mean to insinuate that it is somehow unreal. For personality and its values are as objectively real, and as much demanding recognition, as the mechanical constitution of things; while, on the other hand, description and analysis are quite as truly subjective operations as evaluation. "The heavens," Meinong declares, "are blue in no other sense than that in which they are beautiful; the difference lies merely in the nature of the subjective content by means of which they are apprehended."^o

The mind knows the world to be blue, solid, of a certain mechanical constitution; the mind also knows the world to be good and beautiful and true. Reference to the knower, in either case, is not to be ignored; the formula 'No object without a subject' must stand. For, however regarded, an object is an object of experience; its size and its color and its beauty or ugliness are all qualities of an experienced object. The tertiary or value-qualities are subjective, but so are the so-called primary and secondary qualities—and they are none the less 'objective' on that account.

The very recognition of the existence or reality of

anything involves a judgment of value. I say: I am inclined, I am bound, to think that such and such an object exists having such a character. A conclusion of this sort is imposed on my mind not by brute fact, but precisely by value considerations. A true judgment differs from error or illusion in its superior logical value; it has the virtue of coherence with the system of judgments into which it is introduced; the merit of being better, more adequate, more satisfactory than any other judgment which presented itself for acceptance or which could be made under the circumstances. That is just what we mean when we say: This is true, this is a fact.

In vain are we warned, *De gustibus non est disputandum*. All dispute and discussion is precisely about taste. The knowledge of an art connoisseur is a knowledge of tastes, and the history of art is the history of what men have liked or have been taught to like. The man whose aesthetic judgment I reject is the man whose taste I do not share. To be sure, in art, as in diet, unconventionality of palate is a hazard, but it is, likewise, the condition of enriched experience and of advance. The case is not very dissimilar in morals. "A bad man means, . . . in the first instance, nothing more nor less than a person whose sentiments and consequent approbations differ from those of the good man. The whole fabric of morality reposes upon a difference of tastes."^o If the drunkard who affirms the reality of the snakes which he sees is gabbling nonsense, while the physicist who proclaims the reality of the ether which he does not see is stating fact, the difference between the two may turn out to be one in quality of intellectual taste. The drunkard demands fewer virtues of his facts than the physicist; indeed, only one virtue: superior vivacity. He is an empiricist in delirium.

The hard and fast distinction between brute facts and values thus breaks down, for there are no brute facts.

Every fact is a judged fact, somehow significant in a system of experience, and a judgment of fact is itself a sort of valuation. The real world is one which the scientific, knowing mind is prepared to accept; just as the beautiful world is the one in which the aesthetic sense is content to abide; and the world of good and virtue, the world which the moral self approves and champions. Religion demands belief in God, and science presupposes the uniformity of nature: both postulates express a value-judgment intolerant of the chaotic. When Tennyson sings,

Thou wilt not leave us in the dust,

in which Büchner expects that we shall, indeed, all be left, the expectations of both result from judgments of value. Which one of the two reveals superior intellectual taste is a subsequent question; sufficient right now to recognize this kinship between the mystic and the medic.

It is inconclusive and irrelevant in this connection to protest that the facts of a Büchner or a Lucretius are real facts admitting of experimental test, whereas the alleged facts of *In Memoriam* or of Plato are imagined, arbitrary, undemonstrable. Inconclusive and irrelevant: not because the atoms of the former may possibly be intellectual phantoms no less than the ideal verities of the latter; nor yet because we may fairly claim that faith in the good and in God has been tested as widely and as long as the other variety. It is irrelevant for a different reason. He who ends by exalting force and matter believes that he started by looking through microscopes, telescopes, and test-tubes, by observing and thinking rightly. He who ends by putting his trust in God and in the good believes that he started by listening to the voice within, by looking into his own heart, by rightly judging and living and aspiring.

Which of these two types of method is more appropriate to the final judgment that is required, cannot be settled

offhand. The difference in the initial choice of method follows from different views regarding the beginning of wisdom, the satisfaction of different demands of the self. The mystic, to be sure, may claim that his own truths are everyway as good as the scientist's. We should be far from sharing his opinion nor need we despair of making a valid choice between the two methods for the purposes of a particular inquiry. The point here made is, that the choice between the two methods and the two sets of standards will itself in each instance result from a value judgment. It is therefore quite irrelevant to claim that what is judged to be undemonstrable in any one particular way is utterly vain and imaginary and no fact at all, and to imagine that such a judgment is a mere statement of fact involving no valuation. The very insistence on the sharp distinction between facts and values is a variety of appreciation. Not all thought is immediately evaluative, but all thought presupposes acts of valuation. The rejection of value is itself a value-judgment.

III

The philosophy of value thus seeks to understand the valuation presupposed in all thought. It seeks to understand itself. The psychological theories of value undertake an analysis of the process of valuation with the aim of arriving at a definition of value. Here, as might be expected, the argument is lively, but scarcely conclusive. Of the Austrian school, Meinong locates value in the feelings of worth, *Werthgefühle*, more precisely fixed as *Existenzgefühle*. The pleasure or the displeasure which I experience in judging that a certain object exists or does not exist determines the worth of that object for me. If it is pleasant for me to judge that object *A* exists, and unpleasant to judge that it does not exist, then object *A*

has for me positive value; contrariwise it would have negative value. The feeling of worth is not necessarily caused by the existent object, but may be the result of a judgment regarding the possible existence of an object. Value thus may involve assumption of existence, *Annahme*; it is bound up, not with actual, but with possible valuation: an object has value, not in that I do value it, but in that I could value it under normal intellectual and emotional conditions.°

Ehrenfels revises Meinong's definition by measuring the value of a thing in terms of its desirability. The more intensely I desire an existent object, or, in case I am not convinced of its existence, the more intensely I would desire it, did it exist, or the more intensely I desire its existence than I do its non-existence, the more value it is said to have for me. I desire to hear Beethoven's Fifth Symphony at tomorrow night's concert; I would desire to hear it tonight, were it to be given instead of the Third; I would rather have my little girl undergo that dreaded mastoid operation than risk not having the operation. These objects or experiences have value for me.°

Criticizing both of these definitions of the consciousness of value, Professor Urban maintains that in general "feeling of value is the feeling aspect of conative process, as distinguished from the feeling-tone of simple presentation; . . . the value or funded meaning of the object is its capacity of becoming the object of feeling or desire through actualization of dispositional tendencies by acts of presumption, judgment and assumption."° In a series of articles contributed to the *Journal of Philosophy* Professor Urban has developed further his theory of value, and the controversy occasioned by these articles has helped to clarify some of the main issues.° Urban regards value as indefinable in terms of matter of fact, in terms of being or existence: value is, according to him, "a wholly

unique and irreducible form of objectivity, like existence, but itself not a form of being." Value, positive or negative, is thus to be predicated of every object. Furthermore "every value stands in a system of higher and lower;" an isolated value is a contradiction in terms. According to Professor Urban, it is a misapprehension of the value-judgment that leads Benedetto Croce to regard it as either tautologous or absurd. The value-judgment is not, as Croce writes it, "A is as it ought to be," but, rather, this: "that A ought to be." "It is of the very nature of the value-judgment that it apprehends, not something completely given, but, rather something to be. Value is not a determination of being, but a direction of becoming."^o

Professor Sorley, in his study of moral values, would dismiss all psychological or naturalistic analysis of the value-judgment as irrelevant in so far as it is intended as final. Is the judgment 'This is good' simply equivalent to 'This pleases me,' or 'I desire this,' as has been held in one form or another by Hobbes and Spinoza and Hume, or by the Austrian school of axiologists? Is moral approbation, for instance, merely and fundamentally, a 'pleasing sentiment'? The whole history of hedonism exhibits its incapacity to extract the genuine essence of moral approval from the feeling of pleasure itself: that is, in terms of pure pleasantness to distinguish between pleasures so as to estimate them, to approve or condemn them. Or is appreciation of moral value a mere product of desire? To be sure, we desire what we value; but it nowise follows that the desire determines or measures the value of what we appreciate; else how could we, in terms of desire, prefer some desires to others, or, indeed, quite condemn certain desires, be they the intensest? Nor, furthermore, is it any more enlightening to hold moral value as simply the reflection of the social order, as custom and convention. Grant the social genesis of

the moral judgment: we have still to consider "the very different question of the significance of that judgment." Morality is not merely moral emotions—retributive, parental, sympathetic, or what not. It involves judgments about good and evil, right and wrong, and it raises the problem concerning the validity of these judgments. The judgment 'This is good' does not mean merely that the subject desires a certain object or is pleased with it "any more than the judgment of sense-perception means that he has certain sensations." The objectivity of moral judgments is thus not unlike the objectivity of scientific judgments. In all these views which he criticizes, Professor Sorley observes "a confusion between the process by means of which we become aware of value and the value itself, of which we become aware."^o

Value, in Sorley's view, is not reduced to an existential proposition, though it always implies a relation to existence, a relation to which the natural sciences are indifferent; value is not a quality of things, nor a relation between things, though certain relations are implied by it. "The ground for assigning value may be found in certain relations within the objective continuum to which interest is directed;" furthermore, "value always implies a claim upon, or postulate of, existence." While finding in nature and its laws the instruments for the realization of values, Sorley maintains that they are realized intrinsically only in personal lives, and are never realized completely, thus always involving a claim on further existence. Value is personal, and it is only by personifying Nature that we are enabled to commend or condemn it. But, while value is thus relative to personal appreciation, its reality is no more subject to doubt and dismissal than is the reality of facts of science, because they are, and have to be, apprehended by us.^o

Before turning to consider further some of the problems raised in these accounts and analyses of value, it

may be well to observe that, notwithstanding the controversies over niceties of definition and in spite of much fundamental disagreement, there is adequate recognition, in recent thought on the subject of value, of its essentially personal connotation. Green's conclusion is likely to stand, that values are always "relative to value for, of or in a person;"^o in the pragmatist's way of speaking, "value is a personal attitude, of welcome or the reverse, towards an object of interest."^o The realist is as positive; so, according to Professor Alexander, the repose or playfulness or dignity of the Hermes are qualities which the spectator reads aesthetically into the marble block. Value is not mere pleasure, but the satisfaction of the valuer's appetite for knowledge, or for doing, or for producing; it arises, therefore, in a relation between an object of value and a subject of valuation, a subject, moreover, related to and in certain conflict with other subjects. Values or the tertiary qualities of things thus involve "that co-operation and conflict of many minds which produces standards of approval or disapproval." It is in this way that things become for us true and beautiful and good.^o

In the emphasis on the personal element in value, it has been even held that the important thing, in valuation, is the reference to the valuing subject rather than to the valued object. This is Lipps' formula: "Personality-value is the only unconditioned value . . . The value of every pleasure is conditioned by a personality-value." Our psychic life is an interplay between us and the objects of our experience. This play allows our personality self-expression, and this self-expression constitutes, determines, measures value.^o

To say that valuation is personal—be it an act, a feeling, a dispositional tendency, an attitude—seems rather obvious; can we go further and describe all value as personal in content or reference? The description of the world

as valuable is a personal description of the world; is it a description of the world as personal?

Here once more we are likely to be confused by the subject-object dualism. Knowledge, we are sometimes told, is awareness or recognition or understanding of the factually existent. Thus my idea of *A* is true if it adequately represents or corresponds to *A*. May we, now, proceed to define valuation as in a similar way a recognition of values? Does the world have values which we may recognize and appreciate, just as it has a certain content and nature which we may observe and understand? Adams and Leverrier did not create the planet Neptune when they severally established that it must exist, nor were its nature and being constituted altogether by the astronomers' knowledge of it. Truth is what we demand, but it is also what we must accept. So Münsterberg speaks of nature as "simply another name for the totality of things which are by principle independent of any subject, and therefore without relation to any will, and therefore without any value."^o If nature thus conceived is alone the field of physical science, yet the possibility of science is itself proof that mechanical nature does not exhaust reality; for scientific activity, as the artistic and the moral, discloses the reality of value. But is the value thus disclosed simply another sphere of the factual? Shall we hold that value is of the world, there to be valued, but there all the same, whether valued or not? Granting that only persons can appreciate beauty, may we say that a poem or a primrose are beautiful whether are appreciated or not? Or are they beautiful in that they are appreciated? Is all good goodness?

We need not here be drawn again into a traditional epistemological debate. Attention should be called, however, to the inadequate analogy which gives rise to the confusion. Even if we admit for the moment that object *A* may exist whether it be experienced or not, we are

nowise justified in proceeding analogically to the conclusion that the value of *A* may likewise exist independent of all experience. For the value of *A* is a certain character which *A* has, the character of being appreciated or demanded, of being desirable, or worthy of being desired. Thus considered, the value of *A* which is manifest in valuation corresponds, not to *A*'s bare existence (whatever that may mean), but to those other characteristics of *A*'s nature which the knowledge of *A* discloses. The objects and facts of science are known objects, judged facts, interpreted data, and these are not independent of experience.

Kant taught us that it is the understanding which makes nature possible. More evident is the truth that the reality of value is conditioned by the process of valuation. Say that valuation is a recognition of value; still value is what persons recognize in the world. Cross the threshold of the ethnographic museum. Is all the painted, carved and moulded beauty, majesty and sanctity that is here assembled no longer real, or was it never real, or was it never more than conventional and therefore ever likely to prove illusory? The very asking of these questions serves to disclose the thoroughly personal character of the value-qualities. The ethnographic museum is really not a collection of things, but a chronicle of human experiences, a chronicle of folk-culture. Loyalty, fidelity, devotion: these cannot be good irrespective of the lives of citizens, friends, lovers. As well hold that the beauty of holiness is a reality whether persons be holy or not; as well say that a certain succession of words has a certain meaning whether or not any one ever intended or understood this meaning. Science would then become a Jabberwocky.

Beauty is precisely what is disclosed to the aesthetic consciousness; this picture, this sunset, this flower, are beautiful to him that really has eyes to see; to others they are as to Peter Bell:

A primrose by a river's brim
 A yellow primrose was to him
 And it was nothing more.

In reading a poem or in listening to a symphony we are allowed to penetrate and for the time being to possess the poet's or the composer's soul. The beauty which the artist expresses, the beauty which we enjoy and share, is the beauty of choice experience. Was not this the object of Dante's pilgrimage in the realm of values: "to procure him full experience"? On the condition of our sharing in this full choice experience, it is possible for this beauty to be real again in our appreciation of it. This truth Goethe has uttered once for all:

Wer den Dichter will verstehen
 Muss in Dichters Lande gehen.

Things in the world are nourishing in that there are organisms that can assimilate them to advantage; a universe altogether inorganic could not include nourishing substances. So the world has value in so far as it is valuable, in so far as it admits of being valued. A universe without valuers would have no value. In each concrete instance we are bound to recognize the personal content or reference of values. But, precisely because values are so real to us, we imagine ourselves bound to maintain that they are real anyhow, without reference to ourselves. It is as if we said: even if there were no organisms whatever in the universe, still such and such substances would be good food; they would be nourishing even if there were no one to nourish. In order to secure a certain prized objectivity, we abstract from the very experiences of which we must take account if our abstractions are to have any meaning whatever.

We say: unless values are real whether valued or not they would not be genuinely real even if valued. There is confusion here. What we really mean to say is that

values are real whether or not valued by us, by you. The primrose is beautiful in spite of Peter Bell. But in this assertion of the objectivity of value we really affirm the objectivity of a certain type of valuing person, in comparison with whom the Peter Bells are judged and found wanting. In undertaking to determine the beauty or the ugliness of, for instance, the pictures in the *Dial*, we are really essaying a judgment of the tastes which approve or reject these alleged works of art. We are judging valuers when we pass judgment on values. In the creation as well as in the recognition of value personality is invariably active. Nature is deaf and dumb and blind until in man it finds eyes and speech and ideal message. So in Browning's Abt Vogler :

Such gift be allowed to man,
That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star.

In describing persons as pursuers, conservers, creators of value, and value as essentially personal in content and reference, we are recognizing two aspects of the same reality as truly interdependent as the convex and the concave, as the wax and the seal's imprint. "It is personality which in the world of our experience invests all other things with value."^o Needless to point out, this does not mean that value is a mere invention of the subject; it is a character which personal experience inherently possesses and is therefore real just as personal experience is real. The problem, how a world without value comes to be a world of value, is simply the problem, how the world-process attains unto personality. Just as we can study the gradual attainment of personality in the world, so we may trace the genesis of value. We may come to regard value as "but the highest instance we know of a feature of things which extends over a much wider range;" but the idealist will agree with Professor Alexander that value in the form of the tertiary qualities, as truth, goodness,

beauty, "emerges . . . with reflective consciousness, or judgment."^o Value is Nature personally active, interpreted, refashioned and recreated. The interpretation of the world from the angle of personality and the interpretation of the world in terms of value are not really two interpretations but one. Persons are worthy and things have worth for persons.

IV

The recognition of conation, desire, demand, approval or rejection, suggests an element of Beyond and Not-Yet which is involved in all valuation. We have had repeated occasion to recall that persons are characteristically aspiring individuals. The question naturally arises, therefore: are we perhaps but poor passing sharers in a hope of perfection which in the Infinite is realized in eternal plenitude? This question may be countered with another: If valuation and values involve a Beyond, a Not-Yet, how are they predicable of an Absolutely Perfect Being? The effort to escape the religious difficulty which this question occasions, by holding God superior to all value, above good and evil, is likely to involve us in a double embarrassment. Not even Deity can stand excessive exaltation. God cannot be our Father if the loftiest speech of our spirit is too low for Him to comprehend.

Here is a paradox, then: religion cannot endure being divorced from morality and other finite values, and yet the highest reach of the religious spirit points towards an ideal of worth in which the aspiring process is itself transcended in Absolute Perfection. Try as it may to elude it, philosophical theism is entangled in a quandary by its absolutism. Although staunchly opposing the mechanist's conception of a universe wound up once for all, in which every conceivable event is but the necessary effect of antecedent causes, the theist is, in his own way, likewise a mechanist. If you postulate a Divine *Terminus a quo*,

an absolutely perfect Creator, all-prescient and almighty, a Providence watching over all and from eternity to eternity foreordaining the sparrow's fall and the salvation or damnation of men, then the goals of moral aspiration are all written in the Book, and the destiny which man would carve out for himself is after all fate.

The theologian's excess of zeal is thus liable to betray him into the hands of his opponent: while championing Providence against Brute Nature, his divinely ordered cosmos is likely to retain the very character which makes Nature brute, the character of a finished and settled universe in which value is frustrated because aspiration is illusory. For a philosophical interpretation of the world, mechanism is indispensable—as the groundwork of teleology, not as the substitute for it. The world-order of Leibniz is divinely preëstablished; Spinoza's excludes all teleology:—it is not due to the difference but to the similarity between these two that the ethics of both seem to suffer from non-existence.^o The philosophical moral of this is only accentuated as a result of the more modern advance of mechanistic thought. Conservation of mass and energy is the self-maintenance of a closed mechanical system; conservation of value is the self-propulsion of a conative system whose essence is that it is never closed. Precisely herein is disclosed the hollowness of Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence as a moral lever for the heroic upbuilding of men. Eternal recurrence is a mechanistic notion; mechanistically the world is always the same old story—we have the eternal *Da Capo*. Only in terms of a philosophy which recognizes the reality of value in the universe is it ever possible to look forward to a real Beyond, a real Superman, to a higher, more heroic perfection, to a goal of aspiration as yet unattained.

Any philosopher who, explicitly or implicitly, writes aspiring experience on one page and Absolute Perfection on the other, is bound to find that his two pages are not of the same book, that in his theory of reality he has two

universes, one of them of his own metaphysical fashioning. And yet this notion of Perfection is of venerable antiquity, of sanctity unutterable, and it is not hard to understand why. The aspiring self, intent on attaining its goal, continually views it as of all things the most precious and final. To be sure, once attained, any particular goal shows itself to be but the stepping-stone to another. Man comes to perceive that his goals lack finality and point beyond themselves; but still he demands, beyond the goals of this his mortal life and world, a Goal of goals, and this Goal of goals he exalts and worships in his religion and hypostatizes in his metaphysics.

In the contemplation and worship of the Ideal Absolute, the present aims and values, the manifold here-and-now, tend to retreat into the background. Having persuaded himself of the unique reality of his God, man is fairly in doubt of his own reality; because he has committed himself to a Value Absolute, he tends to discount his own values and valuations as merely phenomenal, illusory, *maya*. The Goal of goals becomes the capitalized Eternal Perfection, the One-and-All, Creator and Preserver, Fount and Ocean of all existence, *semper stans aeternitas*, Olympus standing "amid the pains and struggles of this life in absolute clarity, unmoving and unmoved."° Thus aspiring man has been lured to reify his own ideals until he has come to think of real Perfection as transcending aspiration and so as alien to the only sort of value and perfection with which he is actually acquainted. He has so far forgotten himself in his pious exaltation of his God that, unable any longer to think both God and himself truly real, and committed to the reality of his All-Perfect One, he must perforce disparage the perfection of his own humbler aspiring self, and even his own reality.

From this embarrassment of philosophical theism philosophy must deliver us. Such a delivery is possible if we adopt a truer view of perfection. Do we describe personal experience as conative, aspiring activity? Is

the significance and value of any finite experience to be judged and estimated in terms of these standards? Then Absolute Perfection cannot be the goal and consummation of all this aspiring activity, but rather its fullest measure. The more perfect is more perfect because of its larger basis and vaster retrospect, and also because of its broader and loftier outlook. We humble mortals may judge a piece of music fine, but not so fine as the Fifth Symphony. Could Beethoven, however, have composed a Fifth Symphony had not his genius pursued goals higher than the Fifth Symphony, had he not in aspiration reached out beyond the Fifth Symphony? So throughout experience the higher is higher because it reveals a higher than itself. The "Highest" is "the highest higher conceivable," not transcending experience but exhibiting its aspiring character in infinite abundance. Finality is ever demanded, ever implied, never attained or included, and experience affords no final solution because it has no final problem; as has been well stated, experience is at once eternal problem and eternal solution.^o

This point is of utmost importance in the development of our entire course of thought, and it requires somewhat more careful attention. The history of philosophy chronicles the gradual success of thought in emancipating itself from the substantialist bias when dealing with the human person: the gradual abandonment of the notion of a soul-entity and the recognition of the essential character of personality as a self-conscious center of worth. The substantialist bias and the mechanistic tendency are still very strong in the usual speculation about ultimates, and are particularly evident in the conventional conception of Ultimate Value, or Absolute Perfection. It would be well, therefore, to recall at this point more systematically the distinction between mechanism and value, to the end of attaining a notion of the apogee of perfection which is really warranted by the sort of value-character which our experience actually discloses.

The universe which science interprets is a world of generalized facts, of facts abstractly regarded as moments in a conditioned scheme of things. Just as from the standpoint of the law on the statute-books the individual person is one to put or not to put under a certain category, to keep in or out of jail, so for science "the Individual has no interest except as the instance of a Universal."^o The scientist concerns himself, not with the individual, but with the general, the universal. The Absolutist takes notice of the individual only in the antechamber of his thinking, quite prepared to dismiss him and his little aims as soon as the inner chambers of speculation are entered where dwells the unqualified and un aspiring perfection of the Absolute; chambers that are all entrance, without windows or vistas.

But while a science in its abstract procedure may well neglect the individual person, a philosophy deserving its name may nowise dismiss or ignore him. A philosophy is no philosophy if the heart and core of personal experience, its worth, its devotion, its aspiration, its embarrassments, its hazards and hardships, are finally to be chanted out of being in the Absolute pæan of negations, Brahmanic fashion. Personality must be central in the view of a true philosophy, central as it is in the world. If it be the fact that man has been made what he is by the world in which he lives, which had got on without him æons without count, it is also true that the world had not got on so well without him, and should have missed him if it hadn't, for only in man and in man's spiritual activity has the world begun to realize the full measure of its possibilities. In man nature has found itself, has found worth, dignity, finality-through-aspiration.

In understanding the worth-character of personal activity we are thus understanding more adequately the character of the universe. It is a universe in which process becomes self-conscious, purposeful, rational, worth-express-

ing, judging, aspiring. All this you learn about the universe when you have learned to know man, and you forget it at your peril as a philosopher. So philosophy must show *how* value-judgments are possible, *how* moral activity, aspiration, ideal endeavor, is to be explained and vindicated as real.

As has already been observed earlier in this work, the materialistic account of personality is inadequate and irrelevant precisely because it is a mechanistic account. It misses as it were the characteristic flavor of personality. But immaterialism may be betrayed into the same irrelevance. Man is a spiritual being, but we must nowise fail to appreciate the real meaning of 'spiritual.' Spirit does not mean immaterial substance any more than it means material substance. 'Spirit' connotes not substance but process, and not process in general but non-mechanical process, self-conscious, self-enhancing, worth-expressing, conative, creative, aspiring process.

Whether it resolves force into matter with the old materialism, or whether, with the new, it resolves matter into force or energy, mechanism is incapable of transcending the view of a world as it were wound up from the beginning, a world whose infinite variety is but variation of the same fixed manifold of units: rearrangement, rehearsal, reiteration, recurrence, reaction, reproduction—not production, not action, not creation or real enhancement or enrichment, not worth. "These units," Gentile writes, "can be variously added up but always give the same result, so that the possibility of a novelty which is not merely apparent and of a creation which is really new existence, is absolutely excluded."^o Let physical science revise its notion of the mechanical scheme as much as it may, in one respect it will remain ever the same; and so will its notion of cause. The result in a mechanical process is completely involved in the conditions that produce it. We may not be able to forecast the result, owing to the infinite complexity or variety or even variability of the

conditions; but when we do have the result we can and we must accept it as simply the result of *these conditions*.

Now what is it that we mean when we insist that morality, that worth-character demands freedom? We mean to declare that human activity, to be truly understood and appreciated, demands not one but two ways of looking at it. You may regard human conduct in the above mechanistic way, and not altogether without reason. In a sense it is correct that man is the product of certain determining conditions. Character is 'moulded' and 'formed' by such and such environmental and hereditary factors; virtue is the bloom and vice is the rust and blight of human life. But this is the beginning only, just as mechanistic science is only a beginning. A philosophy of human conduct must be one in which moral man can perceive himself and his self-recognition as free. And wherein is man free? In this that his acts are not mere results, no mere facts. This does not mean that man is free because his acts are unpredictable, or because they are irrational and unaccountable, but because they are acts, not of factual, retrospective, analytic interest only. They are likewise acts indicative of forward-reaching worth: therein are they free. In a mechanical process we have caused results: the determining factor is the given cause; in distinctive personal activity the dynamic is not in the past, in the given, but in the yet-to-be. Here the 'result,' the higher, is what elicits the rise of the lower up to itself. And here the 'result' accordingly involves real advance and growth and novelty; the real individual is the one before you who has made this step and who recognizes himself more fully in the making of it, and therefore holds himself responsible and free in having made it. Free activity is the activity of persons; it is the process in which personality progressively reaffirms and creates itself.

Personality is thus ever active process. The factual can never express real process, living activity, cosmic pioneering. Facts are ever *facta*, done and finished, past; the

true future, the real further of the spirit is always in the concrete personal activity, which is only crystallized and fossilized when we seek to encase it in a factual presentation. The living present is always forward-reaching into a not-yet future; retard it, arrest it, and you have no longer either present or future, but a past. The present which Faust would fix would only be a memory:

Zum Augenblicke dürft'ich sagen:
Verweile doch, du bist so schön!

The substantialist bias of so much modern thinking is due to the demand for a solid static basis of all change, and this in turn is owing to the habitually analytic tendency of thought, which treats its material as something *there*, to be analyzed into its constituent elements or attributes. There is thus subtle kinship between the various forms of absolutism, materialistic, immaterialistic, Spinozistic. Notwithstanding the modern absolutist's great dialectical subtlety which makes him less rigid in his use of terms and accordingly more elusive than Spinoza, yet the character of the Absolute may well be read out of the *Ethics*. This Spinozistic strain in the Neo-Hegelian absolutist has been clearly recognized. Writing to Henry Jones about Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, Edward Caird, finding it "hard to see thro' all his turnings and windings," observes that Bradley's "ultimate difficulty is apparently to admit 'process' in the absolute," and calls Bradley's theory "a new Spinozism."^o So likewise Sir Henry Jones speaks of Bosanquet's ultimate: "It is a dead Absolute, like the static substance of Spinoza. The living turmoil is all elsewhere."^o

Earlier in this book we noticed the embarrassment of thought with the notion of an ever-increasing stock of souls, and the tendency to conclude that the number of souls in the universe is constant. This conclusion is sometimes due to a subtly materialistic bias, as for instance in James' worry over the ever-swelling plethora or glut of

it, or in the reassuring report cited by Dr. Slattery that all the souls that have ever lived could be comfortably seated in the State of New Jersey—whatever that may mean! Or it may be due to the notion, still static if no longer materialistic, that the universe is *there*, given once for all, its nature and constitution analyzable and involving such and such fundamental elements. "We must remember," Mr. Bradley warns us, "that the universe is incapable of increase. And to suppose a constant supply of new souls, none of which ever perished, would clearly lead us in the end in an insoluble difficulty."° The difficulty presumably would be the difficulty of supposing the universe capable of growth and increase.

This same difficulty finds expression in the reasoning which to many minds has seemed conclusive against immortality: what has been generated and thus has an origin and a beginning must also have an end. If the universe got along without me a century ago it will get along without me a century hence. To avoid the fatal conclusion, champions of immortality have as a rule sought to revise the minor premise, by describing man's soul as not generated: either as an immaterial entity, a *forma separata* superadded by God to the embryo, or by introducing the notions of preëxistence and plurality of lives, thus in both cases endeavoring to maintain that the soul has no finite origin, the while admitting the major premise that what has origin must pass away.° But what compels us to admit the major, in a discussion where the destiny of individuals of worth is in question? Assuredly no mechanistic universe admits of increase or diminution. Does this hold true also of the universe of values? Must we treat man's soul as an immaterial entity, in the world but not of it, or must we resort to the mysteries of metempsychosis, in order to maintain personal immortality and the conservation and enhancement of value? May it not be just the truth, that in the world of value the generated may not be extinguished but forever serves to enhance the

worth of reality? If the conservation of the mechanistic universe, of mass and energy, means its eternal self-maintenance, may not the conservation of the universe of value mean its eternal self-enrichment?

The absolutist regards growth, increase as inappropriate to the Absolute, to the Whole, to the Universe. How can the whole change, grow, enhance? How indeed? Certainly not if, in spite of all your subtlety, you persist in regarding it as a mechanistic whole, of which alone may be said what Professor Bosanquet says of the Whole without qualification: "The whole cannot change. The whole I take to mean the universe; all that in any sense is. It cannot change, because any change introduces something that is, and this, *ex hypothesi*, falls within the whole. The whole, if it changes, was not the whole, but something less. All that is includes all that can be; there can be nothing more than it."^o This is conclusive—in physics; its conclusion is incontestable, but *ex hypothesi* only. The hypothesis, however, ignores the very field which engages our attention. To say "all that is *includes* all that can be" can have significance only if we regard the world mechanistically as a kaleidoscope eternally wound up. When, on the other hand, we do take recognition of worth-expressing activities, the central, the fundamental view is not the retrospective, to which attainment is a fact, and the attained is but the formal exhibition of what was potentially present from the outset; but rather the prospective view, to which aspiration, attaining is an act. Professor Bosanquet is right when he says that the universe cannot change. But ultimately and concretely it *is* change, process, activity; ultimately and concretely it never is and ever is to be; and it is this its truly fundamental character which can never change, so long as life, thought, beauty, goodness, aspiration remain realities and no mere words. When Professor Bosanquet declares that the philosopher called by him 'the progressist,' "will not understand that the infinite whole, in its wholeness, is a

life and self-enrichment,"^o he does the 'progressist' scant justice. The 'progressist' not only understands this truth, but he alone is really committed to it and will not abandon it on a later occasion. Nor are the novelty or the freedom which he demands irrational novelty and freedom; but of this truth he does, as he must, seek the rationale. *How* can this judgment of the whole be possible? This question he asks, and he is led to the conclusion that such a judgment of the whole cannot be possible in an absolutist philosophy which concludes by turning aside from aspiring personality to contemplate the icy pinnacles of Absolute Perfection.

V

It is of the essence of value, then, that it involves a Beyond. Consciousness here is inevitably self-transcending. Complete attainment and final quiescence are foreign to its being. Ever reaching out to achieve and continually enveloping the goal of its worship with the halo of finality, the intelligent self knows all the same that the object of its quest is no real terminal of its aspiration. "The best world for a moral agent is one that needs him to make it better."^o Just on this account, however, the idea of a final defeat and extinction of value in the universe is inadmissible. He who desires to end the quest by attaining its ultimate goal is likely to be disappointed; not he whose goal is the quest itself. We have already had occasion to ponder on the unstable foundations of absolute pessimism. Like epistemological scepticism, value-scepticism defeats and contradicts itself. If all valuation were in the end delusion, if the universe were absolutely worthless, the rejection of it would itself be ruled out; the utter condemnation would be undeserved so long as the universe still included the condemning judge. The absolutely worthless universe of the pessimist, like the absolute perfection of the theist, are thus mere abstrac-

tions. Perfection is ever the unattained, for no worthy quest is ever finished. This is the last wisdom of the dying Faust:

Ja! diesem Sinne bin ich ganz ergeben,
 Das ist der Weisheit letzter Schluss:
 Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben,
 Der täglich sie erobern muss.

The demand for eternal, unlimited scope of activity is thus based on the ever-aspiring energy of the self, rather than on the barriers which hem and limit it. The moral argument for immortality is wrongly stated, as by Kant, when the defects of the moral self are emphasized, when we treat man in the traditional manner as the sinner. The moral struggle then becomes an effort to overcome and deny the self, and the moral prospect and hope is of a complete reconstitution and new birth of the person, the complete vanquishment of evil, a perfect state of holiness in which the moral struggle is ended—and with it also morality. That Kant regards the task difficult enough to require eternity for its completion is nothing to the purpose. The goal is wrongly conceived. "To conceive a mind as initially perfect, or to conceive it as becoming finally perfect, is to conceive it as no longer a mind."^o The moral claim to personal immortality is not justified by the demand to complete the moral task, but by the recognition of the essentially eternal prospect of any morality deserving of the name. It is not justified because I need an eternity to overcome my empirical nature and to become holy and static, but because my every *now* involves a Beyond, because my characteristic activity as a person is aspiration, ever attaining and in attainment ever reaching out for life ever more abundant. "Within every man's thought," Emerson wrote, "is a higher thought; within the character he exhibits today, a higher character."^o

Assuredly this demand for the eternal recognition of personal aspiration may not be negated without negating

also morality in any ultimate and real sense. The absolutist's neglect of this demand has been attributed to his neglect of the moral. Professor Rogers ascribes to Royce's greater preoccupation with the moral life his concern to explain the unique focussing of reality in human selves.^o Bosanquet, on the other hand, would subordinate the moralistic to the religious attitude, as if religion really demanded the notion of static perfection. To be sure, as we have seen, aspiration is ever a pursuit of goals that are for the time being viewed as final; but even to the religious vision the ladder to Heaven fades away in indistinctness as it reaches higher and higher, and no last top-most step is to be seen. Higher, ever higher, is the note in religion as in morality. If we consider the Christian religion in particular, it emphasizes aspiration: "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." Christianity is in this sense, as Gentile calls it, "the intrinsically moral conception of the world. . . . Christianity . . . discovers the reality which is not until it creates itself, and is what it *creates*. . . . The whole world is a world which is what it would be, or a world, as we say, essentially moral."^o So the absolutist need not have forsaken morality in order to enter into the sublimities of religion.

The troubling problem here seems to be the acceptance of evil, of imperfection as an ultimate constituent of reality: the problem of frustration as inevitable and final. Can morality, or religion, admit the finality of frustration, or must they demand that attainment be in the end perfect through the complete extinction of evil?

At the grave of Bazarov, in *Fathers and Children*, Turgenev, contemplating all the pent-up energy and effort of his hero, destructive and nihilist genius though he was, is unable to admit the apparent nullification of it all. The denier cannot have been utterly denied; the frustration cannot be final. And Bazarov's fate, if meeting his own nihilistic expectations, would be intolerable, not because

his destructive aim in life would then remain unachieved, but because the very possibility of further aiming would be denied him. The tragedy of frustration lies, not in the defeat of achievement, but in the negation of endeavor. Herodotus is in the wrong, and Unamuno also when he quotes him with approval: "The bitterest sorrow that man can know is to aspire to do much and to achieve nothing."^o Far truer is Browning's Rabbi Ben Ezra :

What I aspired to be,
And was not, comforts me.

Comforts me, yes, and keeps alive in me the spirit which alone distinguishes and elevates my humanity. Man's worth is always prospective, and man always seeks, if he truly knows himself, not peace, not rest, but war and work: war with the meaner aims that end with self, and in ending with it deny and defeat the self's true being; war with the lesser self, the contented, the complacent, stolid, inert self; man craves to break through the sorry shell of his encased present and find his true being beyond :

Do ye not comprehend that we are worms
Born to bring forth the angelic butterfly?

On the gates of Hell Dante reads with true perception: "All hope abandon, ye who enter here!" *Lasciate ogni speranza!* That is the real hell, existence without prospect, eternal continuance of a character fixed for ever, negation of the aspiring spirit. And Unamuno returns to a truer idea near the end of his erratic book: "The soul . . . longs for something else, not absorption, not quietude, not peace, not appeasement, it longs ever to approach and never to arrive, it longs for a never-ending longing, for an eternal hope which is eternally renewed but never wholly fulfilled. And together with all this, it longs for an eternal lack of something and an eternal suffering." The pessimist who condemns life because it does not afford contentment would doubly condemn it, and justly condemn

it, if it did afford contentment. To be truly desirable, Heaven must be an eternal purgatory. "If in heaven there does not remain something of the innermost tragedy of the soul, what sort of a life is that?"^o

Who does not bewail Leopardi's tragic lot: his flaming spirit aching in his smothered body, lauded and loveless, with a father that could not understand and a mother coldly blind, a mother inexorably hoarding and reamassing the family treasures the while letting the one great treasure of the Leopardis be wasted and lost? And yet did she waste and lose it, after all? She gave the world its greatest pessimistic poet. Bless her we scarcely can, for her unintended achievement; nor joy in the manner of life that uttered itself in so eternally tragic song. And yet here is the fact, and here is our life as we have to live it: with tragic suffering and hatred man suffers, and he hates his lower self and the world that tolerates his lower self, that holds him back from his next, higher, truer self:

Myself, archtraitor to myself,
My hollowest friend, my deadliest foe,
My clog whatever road I go.^o

Man suffers and he hates the resistant, the unresponsive medium in which he labors; the world seems too much for him, as it seemed to Leopardi. And yet without the barrier there is no overcoming, and without the divine discontent there is no adventure of the spirit, and no Americas, and without evil there is no good.

Evil unmixed is not to be found in the heroic life. Pure evil, real nourishment for pessimists, is only in complacency; evil is one and one only: stagnation, sloth, the denial of man's true career of aspiration, the mechanization, the depersonalizing of persons. Complacency and stagnation are thus evil because they disclose blindness: the blind acquiescence in a world that demands transformation. So here again Socrates is right: Virtue is knowledge: the knowledge of the heroic soul that this world

needs to be battered into a better one; and vice is ignorance: the ignorance of the inertly complacent. But evil indeed this world would be, evil and irremediable, did it justify leisurely complacency. Then indeed the heroic soul might turn pessimist and weep as the Alexander called the Great wept when he thought that his father Philip would leave no lands for him to conquer. On a lower plane, it is not the discontent of the squalid masses that should disquiet us: that indeed is the cheering note in their existence. Gloomy is the insufficiency of their discontent: their acquiescence in their squalor and darkness: this is gloomy, that they still so supinely tolerate their woeful lot. Carlyle is right, and so is Malebranche: "If I held truth captive in my hand, I should open my hand and let it fly in order that I might again pursue and capture it."^o So Absolute Perfection, as the absolutist conceives it, would be no real perfection at all.

There is nothing complacent and cavalier in this disposal of the problem of evil. Much of the traditional complaint and bewailing of mankind is due to an inadequate perception of what man really is about in this world. The best possible world is a world in which there is struggle and overcoming, yes, and likewise defeat and humiliation; for how else could man take heart from victory if he never tasted defeat? A better world than this may well be an absolutely perfect world, but true man could not endure its blessed tedium. If there is to be a tragic element in our life,—and we are bound to have it, else life turns petty and contemptible,—then tragedy we must have, not the sort of farce Bottom the Weaver had in mind when he counselled how the gentle ladies in the palace were to be reassured that there was really no lion in the play at all, but that the lion was only Snug the Joiner.

"Is not the demand for a world that is better than the best possible an irrational demand? . . . The impossible is that the conditions of whose existence do not themselves

exist."° You want to live in a world without evil. But consider, in a world really without evil, without a lower to overcome and trample on in your ascent to the higher and unattained, in such a world you as a person could not exist at all. So, whether in your sluggish or mournful moments you bewail the evil or not, demand its presence you must, not because you want it or its persistence, but because your awareness of evil is just the obverse side of that wherein your blessedness and your living salvation consists: the recognition and the reaching after a higher, a better. In this sense Plato's words are eternally true: "Evil," said Socrates, "can never pass away; for there must always remain something antagonistic to good."°

VI

This manner of conceiving Perfection as process is not easily maintained. So accustomed have we become to think of the perfect according to the mechanistic pattern, as the complete; so ingrained is our tendency to conceive perfection in static terms that, even after a determined effort to expound the idea of moving active perfection, the mind is likely to slip back into traditional ways of speech. Even Sir Henry Jones, who combated the notion of static perfection as ably as any British idealist, and maintained that God is not static, that the Absolute is a process, and God the perfect in process, and the universe a scene of constant process, yet described God as "already perfect and possessing the future,"°—a misleading expression, involving as it does either the surrender of the critique of absolutism or else a verbal compromise with the conventional theology.

The retort may be made that inconsistency of this sort is only natural, for the relapse is only the return of reason since the new mode of conceiving perfection is essentially irrational and is mysticism in disguise. This challenge cannot be ignored. Is philosophy incapable of interpret-

ing the universe rationally as real process? Is a rational account of reality necessarily a mechanistic account, and does the genuine recognition of what we have come to perceive as essential to personal activity involve mysticism whether overt or implicit? This prospect, disturbing to some of our contemporaries, is frankly adopted by Miguel de Unamuno in his *Tragic Sense of Life*, a book which we have already cited and whose irresponsible Quixotism affords so many keen insights into the heart of human life and its deepest problems. "A terrible thing is intelligence. . . . In order to understand anything it is necessary to kill it, to lay it out rigid in the mind. Science is a cemetery of dead ideas. . . . All that is vital is irrational."° Unamuno would possess by a fiat of assertion what he declares to be unattainable through reasoning. Reason avails him not, so he must dispense with it. It is Tertullian's escape: *Credo quia absurdum*.

But this road leads to the marshes. There is no understanding a man who parts with understanding because he has mistaken the full measure or capacity of it. The right way out of the quagmires of philosophy is not by abandoning reason for will or intuition or some other allegedly irresponsible and easier, royal road. The right way out is by perceiving the abstract use which we have learned to make of our understanding, by realizing that not only the dead and the static and the factual and the wound-up is to be understood, but that the living, the dynamic, the valuable, the creative is also in and of the world and must likewise be recognized and understood. The mystic has forsaken his problem. What is wanted is not a mystical philosophy but a philosophy of mysticism, not pious ideas but an idea of piety, not moralizing but a theory that recognizes the inexpugnable reality of the moral self. The moral, the aesthetic, the mystical experiences are experiences to know and to understand, but they are not substitutes for knowledge and understanding. Browning's Abt Vogler is right, but his interpreter may be all wrong:

The rest may reason and welcome: 'tis we musicians know.

It is the task of philosophy to understand what Abt Vogler knows, nor may it neglect this understanding. But, once more, the final wisdom of the musician's knowledge is to be sought in a philosophy of music, not in a musical philosophy. Our plea is not for the abandonment of reason but against the unwarranted restriction and crippling of its activity.

Science has not completed its account and explanation of nature, nor will ever complete it. But each step in scientific knowledge confirms us in the assurance that the universe is an intelligible cosmos and serves to rule out the alternative that it will in the end turn out to be chaotic and unknowable. The moral career of man, which most adequately expresses his character as a valuer and himself a system of values, exhibits man as working on the supposition that in the world spiritual aspiration is appropriate and significant. Here again final satisfaction is never available, but every step which the aspiring self takes reassures it that its quest is not futile and will not in the end turn out to be illusory. The hypotheses which science formulates and proposes to itself are intended to render the intelligible, cosmic character of the world more clearly apparent. To meet an impasse, to avoid absurd and utterly untenable alternatives, science proposes alternatives often strange and hard to apprehend and accept. So the valuing self, the moral individual, demands that the universe be conceived as one in which moral aspiration and spiritual activity in general are integral, and to this end it also proposes hypotheses, it presents demands on the universe and seeks assurance of their justification.

Such a hypothesis and such a demand is the belief in immortality, the hope of life eternal. Science not infrequently perceives an idea fundamentally true, but through immature culture or corrupt intellectual motives is unable to apprehend its real drift and is thus entangled in futile

mazes of phantastic speculation. The medieval alchemist sought the philosopher's stone that would enable him to turn all metals into precious gold; the chemist of today, through better understanding of gold and of some other more interesting and radiant elements, is now able to work the alchemist's territory, but work it on a much deeper stratum and with prospect of mining precious knowledge. Even so the human spirit for countless generations, probing into its Beyond, dreamt dreams and saw visions and fashioned phantom theories of a hereafter, rightly seeking assurance that it was not to be snuffed out in the end, but not rightly understanding the soul whereof it sought the vindication in eternity. Richer spiritual experience, maturity in culture, and intellectual advance have made men better acquainted with himself. In meditating on the problem of human destiny we now understand more sympathetically what primitive man was trying to say than did our orthodox predecessors, but we no longer have to use the speech of either savage or dogmatic theologian.

Have I used many words and much roundabout argument in order to say merely that man desires immortality and must therefore have it? I think not. The argument from the desire for immortality has been much abused and has been deservedly criticized. Are we like children who have to be taught not to stretch out hands to grasp the moon nor run after the rainbow? Is man's dream of eternity but the desire of the moth for the star? A vain dream and a perilous desire, for the star may in reality be only a taper of illusion luring and consuming the energies of men:

Und zuletzt, des Lichts begierig,
Bist du Schmetterling verbrannt.°

But examine man's desire for immortality, or rather study the development of this desire: what does it reveal and demonstrate, not about man's destiny, but about man's

character? The hope of immortality is an expression ever clearer and more mature of man's self-recognition as a pilgrim in quest of eternal worth. In reasoning from the desire for immortality it is not so much what we desire that deserves attention, but rather what, in our desire, we are about, the direction and the orientation of our spiritual career. "Said the little colt, 'I am going to be a horse!'" The eternally forward-reaching character of man is a plain fact which demands recognition; no amount of mechanistic argument can reason it out of this world. No one can understand Dante who ignores the central experiences of his life which found expression in the *Vita Nuova* and in the *Divine Comedy*. So personal activity may not be ignored by anyone who would truly understand the nature of the world which includes such activity. In one way or another Dante came to be a pilgrim on the road to the *rosa sempiterna* of Paradise. In one way or another Nature has come to include human nature; the character which the universe has thus attained cannot be wholly extinguished; the attainment of it is an eternally significant attainment. The demand for immortality is the practical, if not the invariably well thought out, expression of man's self-recognition.

VII

Our reasoning so far has led us to several conclusions which seem fairly well grounded, and which it may be advisable at this point to bring together. Valuation is involved or presupposed in all thinking; it underlies even our determination of the factual; it is an essentially personal process, and is a recognition of a value-character in the world, of which character persons are the preëminent bearers. Values and valuation involve conation, aspiration, self-transcendence, and do not admit of being finally absorbed in Absolute Perfection; nor is the ultimate negation and extinction of value admissible as a reasonable

alternative. Similar to the intelligibility of nature, the worth of existence and particularly of human personality, proves to be a valid presupposition of thought and action. In the aspiring character of persons the universe reveals a constituent aspect of its nature, a permanent aspect.

Have we, then, proved, or do we yet claim, that Captain Stormfield is immortal? Not quite offhand. All that we seem warranted in holding is that valuation and pursuit of values, personal activity, may not be wholly negated or reasoned out of the universe. Does this mean your activity and mine? You and I are not to perish, but somehow to persist and to continue to be personally active. *How?* How is our continued identity to be assured beyond death's portal; how is it to be conceived? In contemplating our eternity we demand the continuance of our recognizable selves. We demand that we be the same, ourselves; no other prospect, we say, interests us. Now wherein are we the same; what constitutes our identity? If we face this question fairly we may be able to perceive and be rid of much error and confusion at this point.

I break two shredded wheat biscuits in my cereal bowl this morning. Let me not with an excess of ambition seek to trace in advance their identity as I saturate them with cream, eat and assimilate them, and on the strength of them continue the work on this chapter. Still, mixed as the two crushed biscuits lie in my bowl, it were no great feat of fancy to imagine the two separated and again reassembled as they were before I crushed them. So picked and reassembled, a shredded wheat biscuit would be the same as before, its own identical self. Some such picking and reassembling of the shreds of our mortal being on the Day of Judgment has been the expectation of many a naïve believer in the resurrection of the body.

But clearly this is not the sort of identity which we may claim for ourselves. No such continuous biscuit identity characterizes our being from one day to the next. The

shredded biscuit has not, since I ate it, altered as much as I have, yet here I am, the same person as before, back at my work. My identity is not an identity of material, a sameness of structure. And the doctrine of the resurrection was not so much intended to provide the same identical bodily frame, but rather to supply the bodily medium believed to be indispensable to the soul's adequate functioning. So we have ever been troubled, how we could be immortally ourselves unless we were in a position to remember that we were ourselves, and how continuance of memory and consequent self-recognition were to be possible despite the dissolution of our cerebro-neural storehouse of ideas. Here again the difficulty may be due to our reluctance or inability to relinquish earlier and inadequate conceptions of individuality. We continue to think of our bodily and mental apparatus, even though we speak of our personality.

My identity is not an identity of material or of structure. Persistence of the self cannot mean the continuous existence of the same combination of organic or cerebro-neural or psychic factors, nor the permanence of any soul-kernel. The older metaphysics sought to demonstrate personal immortality by insisting on the simplicity of the soul-substance. Kant disposed once for all of this mode of reasoning, and recent scientific progress has only strengthened Kant's main position. Spiritualistic atomism can secure personal immortality as little as materialistic atomism can preclude it.

But, in spite of its technical hollowness, the argument from the soul's simplicity was prompted by a sound motive. In emphasizing the difference between the composite character of material things and the simplicity of the soul, the older dogmatist was rightly aware of the unique individuality which characterizes spirit. True enough, the person is a self-conscious synthesis and not a simple substance; but just on this account is he an individual in a way that

no material thing is individual. Mix and blend the shreds and the currents of material existence; mass and energy are conserved through all metamorphosis. Material persistence is persistence of material or persistence of structure. But personality is not a structure at all, stable or unstable. It is a system of values ever distinctive and unique; therein is it individual; that precisely is its true simplicity.

This point should not elude us. The value-character of the universe is expressed in you, in me, in a manner which is nowise duplicable. That is just what I mean when I speak of my own self. In the realm of value alone is true individuality possible. You may imitate but you cannot duplicate a symphony, a sonnet, a Sistine Madonna. And the mortal insult to a person is just this: to have his unique distinctive worth ignored by being regarded as a certain specimen of a certain class, as such and such a character. Therein is the legal judgment of a man's life abstract and inadequate: the individual, the true person is not to be simply classified under a category. Browning's *Ring and the Book* is a capital commentary on this point. Real appropriate justice would require the judgment of the unique individual: the insight into his own soul which is ever itself and never a mere instance of a general type. The Lord alone could thus truly see into the hearts of men, religion declares. So Tolstoy wrote on behalf of the Lord, on the title-page of *Anna Karenina*: "Vengeance is mine, I will repay."

The true person is ever unique, and the attainment of a fuller measure of irreplaceable distinctive worth is just what we mean by the growth of personality: finding, discovering oneself, getting into one's stride. To be sure, individuality does not imply utter exclusiveness and alienation. Quite the contrary: "the more a man enters the life of others, the richer his own life."^o In this is God's life the richest, that in him we all live and move and have our being; farthest from being exclusive, God's being is

immanent in us all. And in any case it is obvious that persons great and small admit of being compared; they commune, share language and medium. But notwithstanding common speech each one has his own message. A Tchaikovsky symphony, we are told, is thus and thus like Beethoven's. List the resemblances and the differences; still in the end the trite fact remains, that Beethoven is Beethoven and Tchaikovsky Tchaikovsky. So you read Peer Gynt: how like Hamlet in infirmity of will he is, how like Faust in exuberance of fancy and in world-consuming passion, how unlike both in intellectual vigor! Yet these are vain words to him who does not know Hamlet, Faust, and Peer Gynt, and to him who does know them, little better than vain words. Were Ibsen's character produced according to a formula, he would not be the living being that he is.

Here literary criticism may teach us wisdom. The critic may well modulate his eulogy of an author in proportion to the ease with which he can analyze the author's characters and treat them as abstract types. The living characters of literary creation elude formal analysis even as their creators do. Faust is as hard to pigeonhole as Goethe. The genius of the literary artist breathes into his characters something of the individuality and inexhaustibility of living persons. They refuse to come under the rules or be imprisoned in the chamber-formulas of the intellect. Like Browning's lover in quest of his beloved, we may pursue them ever, but at no point are they under lock and key:

Range the wide house from the wing to the centre.
Still the same chance! she goes out as I enter.^o

So each generation has its own Job and Hamlet and Don Quixote. A great novelist is indeed likely to have trouble with his characters, for they have minds of their own and refuse to act according to prescription. Tolstoy the apostle is bent on preaching, but the artist Tolstoy's

characters ignore the preacher's texts and go their own way.

Religion and philosophy could supply us here with illustrative material quite as well as literature. How much variant thinking has found its parentage in Plato and Aristotle; to how many have Gautama and Jesus been revealed? Yet these four are as living and as inscrutable as ever, unique and surpassing the frame of any formula.

Personality is ever unique; it is characterized also by solidarity; it is never fragmentary; in its every moment the whole is uttered. Unlike the realm of nature, in the realm of values the whole is not the sum of its parts. The whole is here complete in each part, and each part transcends the whole, for in each part the whole is transcending itself. So the biography of a person is never finished, yet on each page the person is revealed entire. A great poem eternalizes a passing moment of experience, and in each great poem the whole of the poet's soul is characteristically uttered, and the whole of life and reality in one pulse and breath. Take Shelley's "*Lament*:"

O world! O life! O time!
On whose last steps I climb,
Trembling at that where I had stood before;
When will return the glory of your prime?
No more—oh, never more!

Is it like a thousand other lyrics? Yet not one of them quite matches it. You do not know it, nor do you know Shelley, if you think that anyone but Shelley could have written it. You may parody it, but you cannot by patching or altering make it Keats or Byron. And the more intimately you know it, and the more intimately you know Shelley, the more truly you perceive that it is Shelley and that Shelley is himself. Grammarians, to be sure, may dissect and analyze and pigeonhole; that is

their trade and they have their reward. They are the anatomists of genius.

Nature can utilize the materials of a compound despite the dissolution of the compound, can mix and unmix and perhaps manage to duplicate the compound. But a system of value is not to be utilized in any such way. It alone in the universe is monadic. The object of our devotion, the value-world in which we abide and aspire, is different for each one of us. How many Florentines sighed after Folco Portinari's daughter! Yet not one of them loved Dante's Beatrice. This love, this devotion to ideals is not to be duplicated or disposed of in any way; it is a unique moment of the universe; it is not a thing existent, which may pass away into something else, but a character attained and for all eternity significant.

As Croce tells us,^o it is futile to ask if Dante could have been born in our century and could have sung the Kantian philosophy instead of the Thomist. In vain do we try to describe the Dantesque or seek to fix it in a formula. The Dantesque is Dante, uttered in every moment of Dante's being and uttered nowhere else in the universe. And what is preëminently true of Dante is true of us humble mortals. Personality is not to be dissolved and preserved fragmentarily; it ever advances full-front. There can be no fragments, or aspects, or elements of the real concrete person; only in abstract analysis can we thus parcel the unique. When we come to ourselves we realize that the concrete person is one and indivisible. Every moment of Dante is Dante and it can be no one else. In this sense personality is indeed monadic, a miniature universe. Of his own self as well as of the universe could Tennyson have sung his "Flower in the Crannied Wall."

Thus we have seen that value is expressed and constituted in persons, richly various and ever unique, and that only in the permanence of persons is value to be conserved. If I am essentially a system of values, then my continued career must have the same character. Con-

sider again the shredded wheat biscuit. Perhaps I cannot in advance map out the specific transformation awaiting each shred, but I can tell the sort of destiny that awaits them all, the destiny of material compounds. Consider now a corpse. Need I, Hamlet-like, discourse upon the change that awaits it? Moist earth or dry, clay or dust, whether or not it stop a hole to keep the wind away, Imperial Caesar's body will fare as every other body, will fare as bodies fare. We know the *sort* of destiny that awaits it, the lot and career and destiny of material things.

Why, then, do we demand a different kind of assurance when we contemplate the hereafter of the soul, of personality? Realize once for all that you are an individualized devotion to ideals, a pursuer of values, charged with inexhaustible potencies in aspiration: that is what you are. What are you to be, then? That same and no other: that is to be the destiny of your self. But how can you be personally active outside the medium of your body? How indeed? "It is not yet made manifest what we shall be," writes St. John. Even in this brief life it is scarcely possible to anticipate in detail the career of a person, how he will turn out. Maybe the fuller measure of attainment to which you, perhaps unwittingly as yet, aspire, demands delivery from the limitations of your body. "I am tirelessly active to the end," Goethe told Eckermann in 1829; "Nature is then in duty bound to assign me another form of existence, if my spirit is no longer able to sustain the present one." Is this mystic and fanciful? No more fanciful than the butterfly vision of the caterpillar mystic.

Men are inveterate gossips and would rather know about persons than know persons. They want to hear whether or not Shakespeare's father had him baptized Francis Bacon, and meanwhile the open heart of Shakespeare lies unread on their shelves. Jesus the Christ is speaking to them, and they are moved to ask: "Is not this the carpenter's son? Is not his mother called Mary?" So we find ourselves justified in believing that worth-attainment,

striving after perfection, conservation of value, moral aspiration cannot be frustrated in the universe. We reflect that they are all essentially personal in character; that, unlike material things, persons are not in any sense compounds, but individualized systems; that if value is to be conserved, the character of the universe must include personal immortality. But still we are not quite satisfied with the prospect thus presented to us. We miss the traditional paraphernalia. General Naaman of Damascus desired to be cured of his leprosy. The important requisite apparently was to take a bath in the fulness of faith, and for the fulness of faith the river Jordan seemed abundantly adequate. But in the Jordan the general from Damascus felt out of his element; he could not imagine his Syrian person taking a bath elsewhere than in the rivers Abanah and Pharpar. Hence his initial chagrin with the prophet Elisha. So one to whom the new mysteries of radiochemistry were being expounded turned away quite disappointed: "I had understood that your new chemistry could manufacture radium from lead."

What sort of destiny satisfies us depends on what we expect of ourselves, and what we expect of ourselves depends on our view and estimate of our nature. One often hears it said that, for all its subtlety and lofty speculation, the idealistic theory of immortality does not satisfy the soul of man as does the older vision. It does not satisfy because, although in our knowledge of material nature we have attained scientific objectivity and insight, in our understanding and estimate of human nature we are still largely alchemists.

VIII

One real difficulty has embarrassed us throughout our discussion; it were best now at the end to face it squarely. We demand personal immortality because we do not admit

the ultimate frustration of value. Do we mean, however, the immortality of all persons? If we explain to others that immortality is not a biological or psychological matter but concerns the conservation of value, are we not forced to the conclusion that persons survive, not members of the group *homo sapiens*? If we do not require the perpetuation *in saeculo saeculorum* of a man's physiognomy to assure his personal immortality, are we required to hold that all who do have a certain human physiognomy are bound to be immortal? What evidence of pursuit of value is needed to assure an individual's immortality?

"The soul doubtless is immortal,—where a soul can be discerned." Your immortality and mine we can both understand; more difficult to contemplate, on the ideal score of aspiration and worth-attainment, is the eternal career of the man across the street. And what of the sickly infant that never survived, the born idiot, the hopeless lunatic, the swarm of negroes and coolies, the endless immemorial brood of man? James' tolerance of this vast glut and plethora of immortals was characteristically kind and generous; Royce, Adler and others have endeavored to demonstrate the permanent significance of all persons by reasoned argument.^o In the humblest of men there is worth induplicable and indispensable to the universe. This respect for the unique worth of each man is a cornerstone of Kant's ethics. On some such faith in the individual, whoever he be, the modern democrat would rear his system of politics. And is not this faith in man, the concern for "the least of these my brethren," a prime essential of the Christian gospel? The phrase "these my brethren" indicates the right attitude which enables a man to perceive worth in others. Man is not simply one of many, a cog in an industrial or a military machine; he is ever the friend, the lover, the son, the brother, and thus reveals himself as unique and of distinctive worth. Preliminary demonstration of fitness may not be exacted here; and

where is the contemptuous omniscience that discloses one's fellowman to be utterly worthless?

Airy disdain for the uncounted rabble has been sometimes accounted a mark of superior lordly virtue, of pagan, Hellenic nobility. "A people," Nietzsche declared, "is Nature's roundabout way of producing four or five great men." The builders of Utopias, however, have always found a seemly place in the ideal society for their own sort. Themselves they knew well enough to appreciate their own lasting value. Nietzsche in particular was so intimately acquainted with himself that he recognized himself as the hub and pivot of the whole cosmic process: as the first proclaimer of Superman and Eternal Recurrence. Conversely our contempt for others may indicate our own blindness to worth in others. Had we but eyes to see we too could have perceived that the Publican had really more to contribute than the Pharisee. A poet catches the eternal significance of moments of experience which to the rest of us had seemed indifferent and quite meaningless. Renan wrote: "*Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner.*" The deeper insight of a Dostoyevsky would, in understanding all, love and cherish and honor all. The prison bath-scene in *The House of the Dead*, which Turgenyev compared to Dante's *Inferno*, is unforgettable for its revealing, in the midnight black of hardened convict souls, human flashes of sunlight. So not only charity but also insight is manifest when Raskolnikov kneels before the prostitute Sonya.

Needless to say, one has to be on one's guard here against maudlin sentimentality. The humanitarian ladies who send flowers to the cells of cutthroats are quite likely to be negligent of more evident virtue. We are scarcely warranted in concluding that a man's soul is of sterling purity just because he belongs to the great unwashed. Certainly, if offhand scorn for the unchronicled multitude be a sign of shallow arrogance, the living trust in the eternal worth

of each man can only be an act of faith. But precisely here whole-hearted pursuit of the ideal humbles the spirit as it exalts it, and in revealing to man his own shortness of the goal, teaches him intelligent appreciation of others. "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone." This insistent respect for human nature is the obverse of genuine humility and is itself a chief article in the creed of moral aspiration. "Whosoever would be first among you, shall be servant of all." The man has not truly surveyed the path of life eternal who has not had a vision of the Ideal Mount lofty enough to reveal his own self and the humblest of mankind as but near roadfellows on the Foothills of Perfection.

IX

The conclusions to which we have been led in our studies of value, personality, and destiny imply logically a non-absolutist metaphysic and in religion a dynamic conception of God. The main features of the philosophy thus arising have already been indicated. Notwithstanding the risk of rehearsing earlier discussion, it may be advisable now to sketch in bold outline the conception of the Supreme Reality, of God, which appears to be warranted in a philosophy that takes due recognition of the cosmic rôle and significance of personal centers of worth.

The difficulty of conceiving adequately the universe of value and its apogee and center as active self-perfectible perfection is due to the fact that our minds have become addicted to the analytic habit. The method the use of which has enabled the mind to conquer the mechanical problems of existence has, by becoming the intellect's second nature, served to render the mind an alien to itself. To revindicate its own reality must now be the mind's task in any true philosophy; and, in the same way as in experimental and theoretical science man has relied

on his experience of the world and on his own logic for his account of the world-order in detail, so now when he undertakes to conceive what he terms Supreme Reality, it is again his mind and its full connotation that must serve him in good faith.

What determines 'higher' and 'lower' in the realm of value? Certainly not exclusiveness or lofty transcendence; rather should we say that reality is a constructive process in which the higher grasps what the lower reaches after. Nothing is lost: defeat is never final; it is in and of the battle and the victory. Only he recognizes a defeat truly who has already passed beyond it, and passed through it, to new frays and to conquest. This truth is evident in practical life. It holds valid of any form of spiritual activity. The value of any truth in science and philosophy is that it prepares the way for its replacement by a higher truth. The validity of this principle in the arts and in the moral life of man has received notice enough already.

In becoming infinite, perfection must retain its character; the maximum of perfection must be the maximum of *perfection*, the utmost of capacity, the utmost of comprehensiveness, the utmost of reach. God is infinitely more perfect than myself, not because he is ever complete and finished, but because an infinitely completer sphere of inadequacies are in him taken up and realized and transfigured, because problems infinitely more significant and penetrating and crucial challenge his endeavor, because the horizons of his vision, the ardor of his zeal for the Beyond, the wholeheartedness and the divinity of his discontent are amazingly infinite. This is what I worship when I worship God, if I truly understand what I am about: I worship the apogee of aspiration, of that divine discontent in my own being wherein my only salvation as a person is to be found.

Mazzini declared: "God is great because his thought is action,"²⁰ action, forward-looking, self-propelling, ever

realizing perfections ever new and greater. Such a God is indeed worthy of a moral man's worship; but, as Sir Henry Jones says, "a God conceived as a static absolute cannot do anything, and is as little satisfactory as a God who is limited and imperfect."^o God cannot differ from me in that I aspire and have a future while his tense is only a past or at best only a present absolute. God differs from me in this that, whereas my forward-reaching energy is halting, occasional, inadequate, his own is never-flagging, ever-vigilant, vigorous, and victorious. This is the meaning I attach to the thought that God is the supreme embodiment of the moral ideal, and this is the notion of God that I reach through a moral argument.

The religious speech is the speech of poetry, and man's vision of God is the concrete expression of his effort to utter the supreme in value. When it is maintained that a vision of God such as has just been attempted is one to which moral man is religiously entitled, it is nowise intended that such an idea of God is not subject to an intellectual critique, or that it can sustain it easily. All that is meant is, that if in mystic ecstasy I lift up my eyes to such a God, my worship springs normally from my moral life of aspiration.

We are deceived about our own true personality when we confuse its unique worth with factual exclusiveness. Yet progress in worth and in self-recognition leads us to learn the truth to which the average man is so blind, and which Peer Gynt learned in agony on the last brink:

Where was I, as myself, as the whole man, the true man?
Where was I, with God's sigil upon my brow?

Solveig answers:

In my faith, in my hope, and in my love.

Whenever divine discontent stirs a man to reach out for the better and truer and the more beautiful, the Divine is affirmed and is recognized. The ideal infinite perfec-

tion is an eternal symphony in which we are all players sounding eager notes that are so halting and random; in the all-swelling harmony that is ever being attained all our notes find their true tone and meaning, and not one is lost. The more completely man's life elicits the spirituality which is his life and destiny, the greater his attainment of freedom, of personality radiant through the shell of the factual, the more profound is the religious feeling of God's reality, the sense of co-warriorship with God and of attainment with him and in him. If the heart then leaps to worship him in proud humility as Lord and Father, though the reason may not capture him in a formula, yet it can know that what it reaches after runs not counter to but in the direct course of its truest endeavor. It is not an irrational quest, but the dizzy utmost of reason. Its worship is the radiance of a forward-piercing glance, the radiant sense of the infinite eternal ever-present Beyond.


THIS BOOK has been among other things a study in the history of philosophy, and the history of philosophy itself provides a fine symbol of Reality. Gentile, in a profound utterance, has declared that "*philosophy and its history are together one as process of mind.*" ° Now there is a sense in which the history of philosophy is a collection of facts which may be analyzed, classified and formulated, —or neatly labelled and arranged in a museum. In a certain sense the historian of philosophy may well report for duty at the department of archeology. In another sense, however, Socrates and Plato and Aristotle are not three ancients: they are our spiritual contemporaries as they will be the contemporaries of our children's children. The *Republic* will forever be the book of today and of tomorrow. Again, we can trace the logical development of ideas and problems; follow Platonist and Aristotelian; follow rationalist and empiricist as they enter Immanuel

Kant's study, and anxiously watch for them to issue forth. Or, if we have deserved of philosophy, we may come to feel in each system, and in the whole succession of systems, the mighty beat of one great movement of thought; instead of philosophies we may learn to perceive philosophy thinking itself out, crudely and haltingly and with simple naïveté at first, growing ever more clearly aware of its problem and of its aims, and ever less dogmatic and more critical and constructive. Then Aristotle is not after Plato, nor Hegel simply after Kant, but Plato and Aristotle and Kant and Hegel, and the least daysman in the history of philosophy are immortal distinctive moments in the one vast process whereby Reality thinks itself. Then indeed we learn what an eminent historian of our time recommended to his colleagues; instead of impeccably and uncontrovertibly recording the sequence of the telegraph poles that stretch across the vast desert of Gobi or Shamo, to read the message that goes over the wires.

May we now attempt to read our parable? Take the entire corpus of philosophic production, achievement, literature (always remembering that philosophy is still in the making)—that would be the universe. The bibliography of it, the analytic account of its contents, its syllabus and *Grundriss* manual, systematically ordered under appropriate headings: these would form the body of the mechanistic sciences. The philosophy in all the philosophies, the message over the wires, would be God; and the concrete recognition of it, religion. The intellectual reading of this message, as Thomistic Aristotelian or Cartesian or Kantian or Hegelian—that would be theology. The persistent effort to undertake such an account of it all, realizing throughout the oneness of philosophy and its history—that would be philosophy.

The parable may ill serve its high purpose; though if it did, the fault may well lie in the telling of it. But it

may help to suggest a rational platform on which mechanism and value may both receive the recognition due them, without prejudice to either; may it also allow a point of view and a prospect which will do justice to the unique worth and the eternal destiny of the person, and to man's hunger after God, and realize in a measure at least the deeper unison of the only superficially discordant strains of the moral and the religious.



NOTES

Of the two numbers preceding each note, the first refers to the page, the second to the line on the page.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

4:20. Frazer, *The Belief in Immortality*, Vol. I, p. viii. Of this vast historical survey two volumes have so far appeared, the first dealing with the belief among the aborigines of Australia, the Torres Straits islands, New Guinea, and Melanesia, the second with the belief among the Polynesians.

5:18. Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, especially Chapters xi-xiv, is a rich garner of primitive ideas about the soul, its nature and destiny. To Tylor and to Frazer I am indebted for a large share of the instances of popular belief cited in this chapter.

7:20. De la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, p. 296.

7:26. Cf. Frazer, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 12.

8:25. Cf. Flinders Petrie, *Egyptian Tales*, Second Series, pp. 36ff.

9:6. Alfred Nutt, *The Celtic Doctrine of Re-birth*, pp. 79, 84ff.

9:26. Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, Vol. I, pp. 227f; Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, p. 2.

10:34. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 247.

11:17. Tylor, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 21f.

12:6. *Die Idee der Seelenwanderung*, p. 16.

12:25. Tylor, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 26.

14:5. Tylor, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 69.

15:4. On the burial or burning of widows and slaves in old Teuton funeral ceremonies, see De la Saussaye's *Religion of the Teutons*, p. 292.

15:34. Marillier, *La survivance de l'âme et l'idée de justice chez les peuples non-civilisés*, pp. 2ff.

16:13. Cf. Frazer, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 363.

17:32. Marillier, *op. cit.*, pp. 26f. Cf., however, the beliefs of the Motlav natives in Melanesia (Frazer, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 354f) that in the true Panoi the souls of the good live in peace and harmony, while the souls of murderers, sorcerers, thieves, liars, and adulterers are not suffered to enter the happy land.

19:6. Marillier, *op. cit.*, pp. 43ff.

22:14. *The Book of the Dead*, translated by Budge, Vol. II, pp. 372f; cf. pp. 355f.

23:13. Jastrow, *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria*, p.

474.

- 24:24. Cf. Rogers, Article "State of the Dead (Babylonian)" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.
 25:14. Psalm 89:48.
 26:16. Farnell, *Greek Hero-Cults and Ideas of Immortality*, p. 402; Pindar, Pyth. iii; Pyth. viii; Nem. vi; cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, Vol. I, pp. 73f; Vol. II, pp. 2f, 37, 124ff.
 27:4. Salmund, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, 5 edition, p. 114.
 27:32. Cf. *Ardai Viraf Nameh*, pp. 11, 57, 105 (Pope's translation).
 28:21. Quoted from Max Müller's *Psychological Religion*, pp. 196ff. Cf. also *Ardai Viraf Nameh*, pp. 11f, 55f: the soul of the sinner is confronted with its evil genius, a form of the most demoniacal appearance, with teeth like an elephant, and nails on hands and feet like the talons of an eagle; his eyes like blood and his mouth puffing pestilential vapors. See likewise Söderblom, *La vie future d'après le mazdéisme*, pp. 82ff.
 28:28. Cf. Söderblom, *op. cit.*, pp. 108, 114f.
 29:5. Cf. Edv. Lehmann in *De la Saussaye's Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*, 3 edition, Vol. II, pp. 218ff.

CHAPTER II. HELL, PURGATORY, AND PARADISE

- 34:2. A public lecture on Dante's Idea of Immortality, delivered at the Rice Institute in the spring of 1921, in observance of the six hundredth anniversary of Dante's death, and reprinted from the *Rice Institute Pamphlet* for April 1921.
 36:18. Cf. Longfellow's *Dante*, Vol. I, pp. 425ff, 432ff.
 37:26. Cf. *Ardai Viraf Nameh*, translated by J. A. Pope; cf. also Söderblom, *La vie future d'après le mazdéisme*, pp. 14f.
 37:34. Plumptre's *Dante*, 1906, Vol. V, p. 45.
 38:3. Grandgent, *Dante*, p. 211.
 38:8. Ruskin, *Modern Painters*, in *Works*, Library Edition, Vol. V, pp. 269ff.
 38:35. Salmund, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 159.
 39:17. Charles, *A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, 2 edition, p. 157.
 40:14. *Dante and Aquinas*, pp. 165ff.
 42:11. *Convivio*, III, ii (Jackson's translation is used for the quotations).
 42:17. *Ibid.*
 43:12. *Ueberweg, History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 431f.
 44:17. *Convivio*, IV, xxi.
 44:31. *Paradiso*, II, 1ff (Longfellow).
 44:35. *Inferno*, I, 82ff (Johnson).
 45:3. *Inferno*, XXIII, 148 (Longfellow).
 45:7. *Convivio*, IV, xxi; *Purgatorio*, XXV; *Paradiso*, IV.
 45:22. *Purgatorio*, XXV, 70ff (Johnson).
 46:4. *Convivio*, IV, xxi.
 46:11. Ozanam, *Dante and Catholic Philosophy*, 2. edition, p. 178.
 46:15. Cf. *Convivio*, III, viii.

- 46:24. *Convivio*, II, ix.
 46:30. Cf. Scartazzini, *A Companion to Dante*, p. 217.
 47:9. *Convivio*, II, ix.
 47:11. Cf. Longfellow's *Dante*, Vol. I, p. 226.
 47:19. *Purgatorio*, X, 124f (Longfellow).
 48:24. *Purgatorio*, XXV, 24ff (Johnson).
 48:37. *Purgatorio*, III, 16ff.
 50:6. *Inferno*, VI, 97ff (Longfellow).
 50:24. *Inferno*, X, 106 (Longfellow).
 50:33. *Paradiso*, XIV, 37ff (Longfellow).
 51:14. Cf. Grandgent, *Dante*, p. 224.
 51:28. *Three Philosophical Poets*, p. 103.
 51:33. *Inferno*, IX, 61f (Johnson).
 53:8. *Inferno*, XXVIII, 48 (Longfellow).
 53:28. *Purgatorio*, XXII, 67ff (Johnson).
 53:36. Letter X; Wicksteed's translation, p. 348.
 54:5. *Inferno*, XXVI, 118ff (Johnson).
 54:17. Cf. Longfellow's *Dante*, Vol. I, p. 418.
 57:16. *Three Philosophical Poets*, pp. 119f.
 58:27. *Purgatorio*, XVIII, 103f (Johnson).
 59:9. Wicksteed, *Dante*, p. 156.
 59:22. Cf. Gardner, *Dante and the Mystics*, pp. 58f.
 59:25. *Convivio*, III, ii; IV, xii.
 59:27. *Vita Nuova*, XXXIII (Rossetti).
 59:31. *Paradiso*, III, 85.
 60:33. Cf. in this connection the concluding chapter of this book.
 61:8. *Paradiso*, XXX, 40ff (Longfellow).
 62:15. *Paradiso*, XXX, 61ff; cf. Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 503.
 62:24. *Paradiso*, XXVIII, 109ff (Longfellow).
 62:28. *Paradiso*, XXIX, 12 (Johnson).
 63:2. *Paradiso*, XXVIII, 107f (Longfellow).
 63:9. *Paradiso*, XXXIII, 139ff, translated by Grandgent in his *Dante*, p. 375.

CHAPTER III. MATERIALISM AND IMMORTALITY: A SURVEY OF NEGATION

- 66:12. Empedocles, Fragments 15, 126, 117, 115 (Leonard's translation).
 67:30. Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things*, II, 216ff, 284ff; III, 246ff.
 68:8. Martha, *Le poëme de Lucrèce*, pp. 148f; Guyau, *La morale d' Epicure*, pp. 71-102; Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, Vol. I, pp. 221ff.
 69:15. Masson, *The Atomic Theory of Lucretius*, p. 174.
 69:31. Diogenes Laertius, Book X (Yonge's translation, pp. 449, 469).
 69:35. Lucretius, I, 66f; V, 8f (Munro's translation).
 70:21. Lucretius, III, 1072ff (Bailey's translation).
 71:4. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, p. 244, quoting Seneca.
 72:9. *De l'immortalité de l'âme dans le stoïcisme*, p. 24.

- 72:18. *Discourses*, I, ix; III, xiii; II, v (Long's translation).
- 72:25. Marcus Aurelius, IV, 21; XI, 3; III, 3; XII, 5, 36 (Rendall's translation).
- 73:19. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, edition of 1913, p. 143.
- 74:1. Brett, *A History of Psychology, Ancient and Patristic*, p. 316.
- 74:29. Cf. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, Vol. II, pp. 469ff; Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, Vol. III, p. 395; Ravaisson, *Essai sur la métaphysique d'Aristote*, Vol. II, pp. 34ff, 50ff.
- 75:31. Picavet, *Essai sur l'histoire générale et comparée des théologies et des philosophies médiévales*, p. 312.
- 76:12. Quoted by Munk (*Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, p. 447) from Averroës' Medium Commentary on Aristotle *De Anima*.
- 76:25. Renan, *Averroës et l'averroïsme*, pp. 136ff.
- 77:19. Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne*, pp. 233ff, and Article "Averroës" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*; Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, p. 173; Renan, *op. cit.*, pp. 152, 158; Horten, *Die Hauptlehren des Averroës*, pp. 274ff; Munk, *Mélanges*, pp. 454f; Stöckl, *Gesch. der Phil. des Mittelalters*, Vol. II, pp. 117, 119.
- 78:2. Ozanam, *Dante and Catholic Philosophy in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 319; cf. Haureau, *De la philosophie scolastique*, Vol. II, pp. 137ff.
- 79:13. Fiorentino, *Pietro Pomponazzi*, pp. 153f, 212f, 223ff, 248ff.
- 80:25. *Comment. De Anim.*; cf. Douglas, *Pietro Pomponazzi*, p. 96.
- 81:3. *De immort. animae*, edition of 1534, p. 113.
- 81:17. Douglas, *op. cit.*, pp. 101, 110f, 116ff, 132f; Fiorentino, *Pietro Pomponazzi*, pp. 173ff; Picavet, *op. cit.*, pp. 312f; Renan, *op. cit.*, p. 357; Pomponazzi, *De immort. animae*, p. 18.
- 82:31. Cf. Lange, *History of Materialism*, Vol. I, p. 225; Lasswitz, *Geschichte der Atomistik*, Vol. I, pp. 256ff.
- 83:33. *History of Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 118.
- 84:8. *Opera Omnia*, Vol. II, pp. 481, 485, 536; Fiorentino, *Pietro Pomponazzi*, pp. 356f.
- 84:18. Gentile, *Bernardino Telesio*, pp. 67f; Fiorentino, *Bernardino Telesio*, Vol. I, p. 213.
- 84:34. Höfding, *History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 97.
- 85:8. Telesio, *De rerum natura*, V, 40; Fiorentino, *Pietro Pomponazzi*, pp. 387ff; Stöckl, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 342.
- 85:18. *Opere italiane*, Vol. I, p. 234; cf. Carriere, *Die Philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit*, (2. edition), Vol. II, p. 123; McIntyre, *Giordano Bruno*, pp. 164f; Hegel, *Hist. of Phil.*, Vol. III, p. 125.
- 86:21. *De Augm. Scient.*, IV.
- 88:19. *Opera*, Lyons edition of 1658, Vol. II, pp. 620-658, esp. pp. 628, 630.
- 90:7. *English Works*, Vol. III, p. 631; cf. pp. 613ff, 622ff, 437ff, 450, 456; Vol. II, pp. 306ff; Vol. IV, pp. 175, 300, 348ff.
- 90:29. *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Fraser's edition, Vol. II, pp. 192ff, 313ff.

- 91:8. Lord King, *Life and Letters of John Locke*, p. 322.
- 91:13. *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 3 edition, Vol. I, p. 94.
- 92:7. *Letters to Serena*, 1704, pp. 66f.
- 92:34. Clarke, *A Second Defense*, p. 15.
- 93:9. *Enquiry*, Vol. I, p. 239; cf. pp. 77ff.
- 93:13. *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 235.
- 93:23. Vol. II, pp. 461ff, 484.
- 94:13. *Religion of Nature Delineated*, 6th Edition, pp. 191ff, 197ff.
- 95:20. Hartley, *Observations on Man*, 1810, Vol. I, pp. 5, 23, 33ff, 60ff, 75, 113ff, 526f; Vol. II, pp. 394ff, 405ff, 433ff.
- 95:37. Priestley, *Disquisitions*, 1777, p. 77.
- 96:23. *Observations on Man*, Vol. I, p. ii.
- 97:34. *Oeuvres*, 1769, Vol. I, pp. 4ff; Vol. III, p. 65.
- 98:10. *Opera*, ed. Erdmann, p. 746.
- 100:2. *Oeuvres*, Berlin, 1775, Vol. III, pp. 19f, 24, 27, 32ff, 38f, 55.
- 101:3. *Oeuvres*, Vol. I, pp. 241ff, 247f, 251, 278f, 285, 295.
- 101:25. *Oeuvres*. Liège, 1774, Vol. I, p. ii.
- 102:30. Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, Vol. II, p. 196.
- 103:4. *Système*, 1781, Vol. I, p. 127.
- 103:25. *Système*, Vol. I, p. 70.
- 104:2. *Système*, Vol. I, pp. 222f.
- 104:21. *Système*, Vol. I, p. 243.
- 104:34. *Système*, Vol. I, pp. 255f.
- 106:7. *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme*, 1843, pp. 54, 61, 73ff, 93ff, 102, 122ff, 518f.
- 106:32. *Oeuvres posthumes*, 1825, pp. 17, 25, 74ff, 86ff.
- 108:12. Jodl, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 56.
- 108:32. *Werke*, ed. by Bolin and Jodl, Vol. I, pp. 55, 134; Vol. X, p. 22.
- 109:32. *Werke*, Vol. I, pp. 87, 90.
- 109:37. Pp. 81ff.
- 110:23. Vol. II, p. 599; cf. *Lehre der Nahrungsmittel*, 3rd edition, p. 110.
- 111:8. Moleschott, *Kreislauf des Lebens*, 5th edition, Vol. II, p. 603; Wagner, *Der Kampf um die Seele*, pp. 66f; Büchner, *Last Words on Materialism*, p. 140.
- 111:11. *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft*, 1855, p. 85ff, 90ff, 109, 118.
- 111:30. *Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus*, pp. 3, 186ff; *Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins*, pp. 2, 29, 52f; Höfding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 505; Lange, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 284ff.
- 112:16. *Natur and Geist*, p. 7.
- 112:37. *Force and Matter*, N. Y., 1913, pp. 56f, 66, 101, 239; cf. *Last Words on Materialism*, pp. 27f.
- 113:2. From an article in *Menschthum*, Gotha, 1889, No. 46; Höfding, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 503.
- 113:16. *Force and Matter*, p. 317.
- 113:17. *Force and Matter*, pp. 324f.
- 114:28. *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 215f; cf. pp. 20f.
- 115:15. *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 224f.

- 115:25. *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 188, 201.
 115:31. *Ibid.*, pp. 203ff, 210.
 116:8. Lange, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 85.
 117:3. *Individuality and Immortality*, p. 5.
 117:9. *Human Immortality*, pp. 7ff, 12ff.
 118:20. Howison, *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 288.
 121:28. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life, and Personality*, p. 122.
 122:14. Guyau, *L'Irréligion de l'avenir*, p. 433.
 123:22. *Phaedo*, 98f (Jowett's translation).

CHAPTER IV. PLURALITY OF PERSONAL LIVES

- 125:2. Published under the title "Immortality and Monadistic Idealism" in the *Monist*, April, 1920.
 125:14. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, pp. 5ff. Cf. Professor Baillie's criticism of Dr. McTaggart's interpretation of Hegel's attitude toward immortality, *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 379f.
 125:30. The phrase 'monadistic idealism,' I believe, is Professor Pringle-Pattison's. Cf. *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 197.
 126:27. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 103ff.
 127:20. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 7.
 128:20. *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 17.
 129:9. *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 32.
 129:17. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 114.
 129:19. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, pp. 47ff. Cf. Lotze, *Metaphysic*, Section 245. Dr. McTaggart attributes the characteristic Western indifference or hostility to this doctrine to the attitude of the Christian Church which has championed immortality and ignored preëxistence, although, in his belief, the former involves the latter, and although there is apparently nothing in preëxistence incompatible with fundamental Christian dogma. Cf. also *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 112ff.
 129:27. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 51.
 130:16. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 121.
 130:30. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 285: "The Absolute can only be perfectly manifested in a state of consciousness which complies with three conditions. It must have an absolute balance between the individual for whom all reality exists, and the reality which is for it—neither being subordinated to the other, and the harmony being ultimate. It must be able to establish such a unity between the self and the not-self, that the latter loses all appearance of contingency and alienation. And, finally, in it the separate and unique nature of each individual must be found in its connections with other individuals. We have found that knowledge and volition comply with none of these conditions. There remains only one other alternative at present known to us—love. I have tried to show that in this case all three conditions are fulfilled." The love of which Dr. McTaggart speaks is not "love of Truth, or Virtue, or Beauty, or anything else whose name can be found in a dictionary;" nor sexual desire; nor love of God, for God is not a personal unity; nor yet "benevolence, even in its most impassioned form," or widest extent,

for we cannot love "an indefinitely extended Post Office Directory." He means rather "passionate, all-absorbing, all-consuming love, . . . the love for which no cause can be given, and which is not determined by any outer relation, of which we can only say that two people belong to each other—the love of the *Vita Nuova* and of *In Memoriam*." (*Op. cit.*, pp. 260, 289, 290, 291.) So Dante, in the last line of the *Paradiso*: "L'Amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle."

131:7. Book IX, Chapter iv (English translation, Vol. II, pp. 659ff, especially pp. 678ff). Cf. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, pp. 64ff.

131:20. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 83.

131:36. *Ibid.*, pp. 214, 86.

132:15. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 277.

132:35. *Ibid.*, p. 278; (Cf. *Microcosmus*, Book IX, Chapters iv-v, also *Metaphysic*, Section 245).

133:4. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 260.

133:7. R. R. Marett dubs it "Trinity basking in a perpetual Long Vacation;" see *Mind*, N. S., No. 43, July, 1902, p. 391.

133:31. *Essays in Truth and Reality*, pp. 455, 457.

134:9. *Human Immortality*, p. 36. Dr. Slattery, however, learned that "all the people now alive and all who had lived could be seated comfortably in the State of New Jersey, with some space between the chairs!" (*The Gift of Immortality*, p. 180.)

134:12. Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 129.

135:17. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 260; *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 136.

136:13. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 52.

136:22. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

136:28. *Many Inventions*.

137:23. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 83; Cf. pp. 79ff.

138:1. *Ibid.*, pp. 79ff, 103ff.

138:16. *Ibid.*, p. 105; Cf. in this connection Wollaston's *Religion of Nature Delineated*, pp. 195f.

139:8. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 104.

139:15. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

140:25. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, pp. 52, 38.

141:3. Professor Pringle-Pattison in *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 200.

141:7. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 125.

141:10. *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 137.

142:19. *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 199.

CHAPTER V. THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL RECURRENCE

144:20. *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 114ff.

144:33. Cf. also Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Vol. IV, pp. 161f.

145:13. Cf. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, Vol. I, pp. 114f, 434; Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients*, 2. edition, pp. 63f; both quote Seneca.

145:21. Walshe, Article "Cosmogony and Cosmology (Chinese)" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

145:31. Deussen, *Die Philosophie der Upanishad's*, 2. edition, p. 202.

145:36. Koepfen (*Die Religion des Buddha*, 2. edition, Vol. I, p. 267) calls the chapter on the periodic destruction and renovation of worlds "eins der schwierigsten, widersprechendsten, und lückenhaftesten im ganzen populären Buddhismus."

146:6. Twenty-seventh Dialogue of the *Digha-Nikaya*, translated by A. J. Edmunds as "A Buddhist Genesis," *The Monist*, Vol. XIV, p. 209.

146:11. Cf. Rémusat, *Mélanges posthumes*, p. 103; *Dharma-pradipika*, quoted by Burnouf, *Le lotus de la bonne loi*, pp. 326f; *Samyutta-Nikaya*, Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, 1915, p. 315, Note; Koepfen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, Vol. I, p. 267; *Buddhava-tamsaka*, cited by De La Vallée Poussin in Article "Ages of the World (Buddhist)" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

146:34. *The Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, p. 154f.

147:5. Spence Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism*, p. 29.

147:15. *Works and Days*, lines 109-201 (Mair's translation).

147:35. *Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen*, Vol. II, pp. 123f.

148:5. Cf. in this connection Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, pp. 447ff.

148:8. "Der Aristoteliker Eudemos sagte einmal im Kolleg: 'Wenn man den Pythagoreern glauben will, so werde auch ich dereinst mit diesem Stäbchen in der Hand zu euch, die ihm wieder gerade so wie jetzt vor mir sitzen werdet, schwatzen, und nicht anders wird es sich mit allem übrigen verhalten'" (Ziegler, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 131).

148:12. *Timaeus*, Steph. 39; cf. also the *Republic*, Book. VIII, Steph. 545. Regarding the Platonic Number and its connection with the Great Year, see especially James Adam's edition of the *Republic*, Vol. II, Appendix I to Book VIII, pp. 264-312; cf. also pp. 201ff.

149:2 Cf. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, p. 11.

149:14. Cf. Kirby Flower Smith, Article "Ages of the World (Greek and Roman)" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

149:23. Fausto Nicolini's edition, pp. 957-1032.

150:16. *Werke*, large Leipzig edition, VI, 321; *Works*, ed. O. Levy, XI, 269.

150:34. Quoted from Halévy, *The Life of Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 31.

151:7. For this and several other observations about Nietzsche's alleged originality I am indebted to Fouillée. Cf. his *Nietzsche et l'immoralisme*, pp. 207ff; *Esquisse d'une interprétation du monde*, pp. 216f; *Revue philosophique*, May, 1909, pp. 519-525. Cf. Förster-Nietzsche, *Das Leben Nietzsche's*, Vol. II, Part ii, p. 379.

151:11. *Werke*, XV, 65; *Works*, XVII, 73.

151:12. *Werke*, I, 298; *Works*, V, 19f.

- 151:16. Cf. esp. lines 480-521.
- 151:37. Cf. Drews, *Nietzsches Philosophie*, p. 334.
- 152:35. Heine, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bibl. Inst. edition, Vol. III, p. 542. Nietzsche, it appears, could scarcely have been aware of this passage, as it is not to be found in the early editions of Heine. (Cf. the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of April 18th, 1899, quoted by Lichtenberger in his *Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 216).
- 153:32. Spencer, *First Principles*, pp. 549f.
- 154:6. Page 64.
- 154:37. Quoted from the extracts of the book published in the *Revue scientifique* for Feb. 17, 1872, pp. 801, 803. Cf. Geffroy, *L'Enfermé*, pp. 389ff.
- 155:3. See letters to Gersdorff, September 1866 (summarizing Lange's conclusions) and February 16, 1868, praising Lange's *History of Materialism* as "ein Buch das unendlich mehr giebt als der Titel verspricht." (*Gesammelte Briefe*, Vol. I, pp. 48, 97.)
- 155:13. *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 10 edition, Vol. I, p. 142.
- 156:10. *Revue scientifique*, April 13, 1878, p. 963.
- 156:11. *Nietzsche et l'immoralisme*, p. 208. Cf. also Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, pp. 100f.
- 156:23. Le Bon, *L'Homme et les sociétés*, Vol. II, p. 420.
- 156:27. Cf. *Nietzsche et l'immoralisme*, pp. ii, 151ff, 208ff, 219ff; *Revue philosophique*, May, 1909, pp. 520ff.
- 156:32. Brandes, *Menschen und Werke*, pp. 137-225.
- 157:1. The German translation, *Sittlichkeit ohne Pflicht*, contains in an Appendix Nietzsche's marginal comments.
- 157:34. *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, pp. 210, 216.
- 158:3. *L'Année philosophique*, 1913, p. 153.
- 158:4. *The Greek Philosophers*, p. 335, Note.
- 158:9. *Werke*, XII, 425; *Werke*, XV, 85; *Works*, XVII, 96f.
- 158:22. *Werke*, V, 265; *Works*, X, 270f.
- 158:27. Cf. her *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken*, p. 222; "Unvergesslich sind mir die Stunden, in denen er ihn mir zuerst, als ein Geheimniss, als Etwas, von dessen Bewahrheitung and Bestätigung ihm unsagbar graue, anvertraut hat: nur mit leiser Stimme und mit allen Zeichen des tiefsten Entsetzens sprach er davon."
- 158:31. Förster-Nietzsche, *Der einsame Nietzsche*, p. 136; Nietzsche's *Gesammelte Briefe*, Vol. IV, p. 70.
- 158:33. *Werke*, V, 266; *Works*, X, 271.
- 159:19. Heine, *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. VII, p. 448.
- 159:27. *Der einsame Nietzsche*, pp. 134ff.
- 160:9. Thus he writes to Erwin Rohde on July 15, 1882: "I am going in the fall to the University of Vienna to begin student life anew, as my former one was somewhat of a failure owing to a too one-sided preoccupation with philology. I have now a particular plan of studies, and back of it a secret aim of my own, to which the rest of my life is consecrated" (*Gesammelte Briefe*, Vol. II, p. 566). Cf. Salter, *Nietzsche the Thinker*, pp. 177, 494.
- 160:28. Cf. pp. 140ff, 224f; cf. also Drews, *Nietzsches Philosophie*, p. 326; Lichtenberger, *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, pp. 185f; Halévy, *The Life of Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 250; Orestano,

- Le idee fondamentali di Federico Nietzsche*, pp. 202f; Richter, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 2. edition, pp. 64, 276; Salter, *Nietzsche the Thinker*, p. 177; Ziegler, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 132.
- 160:32. Cf. especially Vol. II, Part i, pp. viiff; Vol. II, part ii, pp. 402ff.
- 161:9. Horneffer, *Nietzsches Lehre von der ewigen Wiederkunft*, pp. 3ff, 8ff, 26ff.
- 161:19. Förster-Nietzsche, *Das Leben Nietzsche's*, Vol. II, Part ii, p. 379.
- 161:29. *Werke*, XVI, 393-402; XII, 51-69; *Works*, XV, 422-432; XVI, 237-256.
- 162:11. *Werke*, XVI, 398; XII 51ff; VI, 231; *Works*, XV, 427; XVI, 237ff; XI, 190.
- 162:19. *Werke*, XII, 51ff; cf. 55ff; *Works*, XVI, 237; cf. 241ff.
- 162:34. Pages 51, 52.
- 163:10. *Werke*, XVI, 401; XII, 57, 63; *Works*, XV, 431; XVI, 244, 249.
- 163:19. *Werke*, XVI, 400; *Works*, XV, 430.
- 163:21. Orestano, *Le idee fondamentali di Federico Nietzsche*, p. 208.
- 163:27. *Werke*, XII, 370.
- 164:3. *Werke*, XVI, 62, 63; *Works*, XVI, 248, 250.
- 164:22. *Werke*, XII, 61f; cf. V, 147f; XVI, 401; *Works*, XVI, 248; cf. X, 151; XV, 430.
- 165:2. *Werke*, VI, 317; *Works*, XI, 266.
- 165:11. Salter, *Nietzsche the Thinker*, p. 493; cf. A. Wolf, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, p. 66.
- 165:23. Cf. *L'Année philosophique*, 1913, pp. 158f.
- 166:24. *Werke*, XII, 61; *Works*, XVI, 248.
- 166:28. *Werke*, XII, 58f; *Works*, XVI, 245.
- 167:21. *Werke*, XVI, 400; *Works*, XV, 430.
- 167:33. G. Batault, *Revue philosophique*, February, 1904, pp. 158ff, 163.
- 168:12. Fouillée, *Revue philosophique*, May, 1909, pp. 521f, 524.
- 168:36. Fouillée, *Esquisse d'une interprétation du monde*, pp. 220f.
- 168:37. Cf. Löb, *Deutsche Rundschau*, November, 1908, p. 268.
- 169:8. *Werke*, XVI, 400; *Works*, XV, 430.
- 169:19. *Revue scientifique*, April 13, 1878, p. 962.
- 169:29. *Revue philosophique*, May, 1909, p. 523.
- 169:37. *Werke*, XII, 54; *Works*, XVI, 240.
- 170:3. *Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 132.
- 170:6. Cf. Riehl, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, pp. 145f.
- 170:15. *Werke*, XII, 66; *Works*, XVI, 253.
- 170:27. *Autobiography*, p. 83.
- 171:6. Fouillée, *Revue philosophique*, May, 1909, p. 525.
- 171:23. Förster-Nietzsche, *Das Leben Nietzsche's*, Vol. II, Part 2, pp. 378f.
- 171:28. Cf. Drews, *Nietzsches Philosophie*, pp. 329ff; Naumann, *Zarathustra-Commentar*, Part I, p. 86; Horneffer, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
- 171:32. Rittelmeyer, *Friedrich Nietzsche und die Religion*, p. 65.
- 172:4. Riehl, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 146.

- 172:26. *Werke*, VI, 234; *Works*, XI, 193.
 172:31. *Werke*, VII, 80; *Works*, XII, 74.
 173:5. *Werke*, XV, 85; *Works*, XVII, 96.
 173:35. *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction*, 13.
 edition, p. 155.
 174:4. *Werke*, VI, 14; *Works*, XI, 8.
 174:8. *Werke*, XVI, 378; *Works*, XV, 407.
 174:14. *Werke*, XII, 64ff; *Works*, XVI, 252f.
 174:21. *Werke*, VI, 13; *Works*, XI, 6.
 174:31. Lichtenberger, *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, p. 188.
 175:7. Meyer, *Nietzsche*, p. 463.
 175:8. *Nietzsches Lehre von der Ewigen Wiederkunft*, p. 23.
 175:31. *Werke*, VI, 322; *Works*, XI, 270f.
 176:5. *Werke*, XIV, 264; XVI, 393; *Works*, XVI, 267, 279; XV, 422.
 176:11. *Werke*, XVI, 398; *Works*, XV, 428.
 176:29. *Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen*, p. 86.
 177:4. *Werke*, XII, 64ff; *Works*, XVI, 251ff.
 177:30. *Werke*, XII, 369; *Works*, XVI, 274.
 178:29. *Nietzsches Philosophie*, pp. 333f.

CHAPTER VI. POSITIVISTIC IMMORTALITY

- 179:16. *Autobiography*, 1908, p. 23.
 180:4. For instance, he says that "the rational attitude of a thinking man towards the supernatural, whether in natural or in revealed religion, is that of scepticism as distinguished from belief on the one hand, and from atheism on the other. . . . There is evidence, but insufficient for proof, and amounting only to one of the lower degrees of probability . . ." (*Three Essays*, p. 242). For the quotations in this paragraph, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 243, 210, 255f, 257.
 180:24. There is, to be sure, another fundamental reason for Mill's disagreement with Comte's later thinking: it was out of harmony with Mill's concern for the individual. This point will be taken up later.
 181:17. *Le positivisme d'Auguste Comte, passim*, esp. pp. 144ff.
 181:29. Harriet Martineau's version, Vol. I, pp. 15, 16.
 182:8. Cf. Watson, *Comte, Mill, and Spencer*, pp. 29f.
 182:24. *Positive Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 2.
 183:11. Cf. *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 124.
 184:19. *Système de politique positive*, Appendix to Vol. IV, p. 218, from a reprint of Comte's *Examen du Traité de Broussais sur L'Irritation*, 1828.
 184:22. Cf. *Cours de philosophie positive*, Vol. III, pp. 538ff.
 185:11. Cf. *Pol. pos.*, Vol. I, pp. 50ff.
 185:22. *Force and Matter*, pp. 324f.
 185:26. Vol. I, p. 252.
 185:36. Mill, *Three Essays*, p. 199; Harrison, *Philosophy of Common Sense*, p. 121; Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*, Vol. I, pp. 109, 125, 161; *Positive Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 397.
 187:21. *Cours de philosophie positive*, Vol. IV, p. 172; Comte,

- Synthèse subjective*, Vol. I, p. 36; *Positive Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 358; cf. *Pol. pos.*, Vol. I, p. 334; cf. also P. Barth, "Zum 100. Geburtstag Auguste Comte's" in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Vol. XXII, p. 183; Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 135.
- 187:32. Cf. *Pol. pos.*, Vol. II, p. 181; Vol. IV, p. 31; *Catéchisme positiviste*, p. 72.
- 188:7. *Catéchisme positiviste*, p. 94.
- 188:14. Littré, *Application de la philosophie positive au gouvernement des sociétés*, p. 112.
- 188:19. Lévy-Bruhl, *La philosophie d'Auguste Comte*, p. 383.
- 188:26. *Pol. pos.*, Vol. I, p. 36.
- 189:4. Harrison, *The Creed of a Layman*, pp. 195, 247f.
- 189:18. Lévy-Bruhl, *History of Modern Philosophy in France*, pp. 388f.; *Pol. pos.*, Vol. II, p. 371.
- 189:30. *On Society*, pp. 12ff, 233ff; *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 138; cf. *Catéchisme positiviste*, p. 31.
- 190:30. "Toute l'éducation humaine doit préparer chacun à vivre pour autrui, afin de revivre dans autrui." (*Pol. pos.*, Vol. II, p. 371.)
- 190:37. Lévy-Bruhl, *La philosophie d'Auguste Comte*, p. 392; *Pol. pos.*, Vol. I, pp. 346f.
- 191:15. *Catéchisme positiviste*, p. 3; cf. *Pol. pos.*, Vol. IV, p. 395.
- 191:29. Quoted from Kern's *Histoire du bouddhisme dans l'Inde*, Vol. I, pp. 382f.; cf. *Pol. pos.*, Vol. I, p. 411.
- 192:27. *Autobiography*, pp. 138, 144.
- 192:35. Goethe's *Westöstlicher Divan*, "Selige Sehnsucht"; cf. *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*, p. 186.
- 193:30. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 266.
- 193:37. *The Creed of a Layman*, p. 70.
- 194:13. Carducci, "Sul Monte Mario," quoted here from Unamuno's *The Tragic Sense of Life*, p. 102.
- 194:33. P. 71, Note. Cf. Maeterlinck's *L'Oiseau bleu*: "Le pays du souvenir."
- 195:15. *Pol. pos.*, Vol. IV, pp. 105f.
- 195:35. Harrison, *The Creed of a Layman*, p. 78.
- 196:8. *The Philosophy of Common Sense*, pp. 213, 214.
- 196:18. Harrison, *The Creed of a Layman*, p. 331; *Pol. pos.*, Vol. IV, p. 30; *Inferno*, III; cf. *Catéchisme positiviste*, pp. 68, 69. See in this connection Barth's verdict: "Had Comte been a greater psychologist, he would have elevated to the Divine throne, not humanity in which there is, to be sure, so much of little worth, but the Good itself, and the striving after the Good" (*Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Philos.*, Vol. XXII, p. 181).
- 197:14. Harrison, *The Creed of a Layman*, p. 86; cf. pp. 85, 219.
- 197:20. *The Philosophy of Common Sense*, p. 192.

CHAPTER VII. THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF KARMA

- 199:9. *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, p. 41.
- 199:15. Cf. Gough, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Chapter I; cf. also Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 74.
- 199:19. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 100.

- 199:22. R. E. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 55.
- 200:3. Cf., for instance, Windisch, *Buddha's Geburt und die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung*, p. 59; H. Kern, *Histoire du bouddhisme*, Vol. I, p. 11; Deussen, *Die Philosophie der Upanishads*, pp. 287, 367; Deussen, *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, p. 139; Hume, *Upanishads*, p. 54; Oldenberg, *Buddha*, ed. of 1921, pp. 46f; Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 166.
- 200:7. Rig Veda, 9, 113, 11; Deussen's translation, *Die Philosophie der Upanishads*, p. 289.
- 200:12. Cf. *Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad*, 3.2.13; cf. also Hopkins, *Religions of India*, pp. 145f; Deussen, *Die Philosophie der Upanishads*, pp. 285ff.
- 200:13. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, p. 54.
- 200:18. *Chandogya-Upanishad*, 5.3.7; cf. 5.3; 6.1.2.
- 200:23. *Chandogya-Upanishad*, 5.3.2. In quoting from the Upanishads I generally use Hume's versions. Deussen (*Die Philosophie der Upanishads*, pp. 283-304, esp. pp. 295ff; *Sechzig Upanishads des Veda*, pp. 139f) and Windisch (*op. cit.*, pp. 68f) have studied the successive views of the hereafter in Indian speculation, particularly as they affect the doctrine of transmigration.
- 201:3. 6.1ff.
- 201:21. *Chandogya-Upanishad*, 3.14.2ff; the translation is Professor Lanman's, quoted here from Moore's *History of Religions*, pp. 273f.
- 201:26. Cf. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 46.
- 201:31. Cf. Oltramare, *L'histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, p. 85.
- 202:10. Rhys Davids, *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 84.
- 202:15. *Kaushitaki-Upanishad*, 1.2.
- 202:19. Quoted from the Mahabharatta by Hopkins in "Modifications of the Karma Doctrine," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1906, p. 581.
- 202:27. *Brihadaranyaka-Upanishad*, 3.2.13.
- 202:32. *Maitri-Upanishad*, 1.4.
- 202:36. *Prasna-Upanishad*, 1.10.
- 203:5. *Maitri-Upanishad*, 6.28.
- 203:17. 3.15.
- 203:27. 2.4; 4.5.
- 203:32. 3.2.8.
- 204:15. *Buddha*, p. 56f.
- 204:20. *Katha-Upanishad*, 3.15.
- 204:21. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 57.
- 205:5. Windisch, *Buddhas Geburt und die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung*, p. 39.
- 205:14. *Questions of King Milinda*, II, 1.
- 205:23. *Buddhist Psychology*, pp. 15f.
- 205:33. *Questions of King Milinda*, II, 2.1.
- 206:4. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 146. Otto Schrader maintains that "we are not entitled to say that Buddha denied the soul, but only that for him duration in time was duration of a flux and not immutability in any sense, not the stability of a substance"

- ("On the Problem of Nirvana," *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1904-1905, p. 160).
- 206:10. The reader will find them listed and tabulated at length in Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, Appendix.
- 206:26. Spence Hardy, *A Manual of Buddhism*, p. 424; cf. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 90ff.
- 206:31. Cf. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp. 290ff.
- 206:35. Paul Dahlke, *Aufsätze zum Verständniß des Buddhismus* Vol. I, p. 93.
- 207:6. Rhys Davids in Article on "Buddhism" in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.
- 207:10. *Mahaparinibbana-Sutta*: Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 99.
- 207:25. Windisch (*op. cit.*, p. 46) calls it "eine Kontinuität des Daseins, aber ohne die Identität des Daseienden." Koeppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, Vol. I, p. 301: "Die Identität der Seelen in den verschiedenen Existenzen ihres Wallens ist damit aufgehoben, aber es bleibt ihnen die Continuität in der Lösung der sittlichen Aufgabe."
- 208:4. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 49.
- 208:17. *Questions of King Milinda*, II, 2.6.
- 208:25. Verse 127. Cf. Koeppen, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 285, 296f.
- 208:35. Hopkins observes (*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1906, pp. 583ff) that while "in Brahmanism itself Karma struck hard against the old belief in sacrifice, penance and repentance as destroyers of sin," yet the teaching of the *Bhagavadgita*, though starting with Karma, finally annuls the doctrine; God's grace and man's loving faith surpass the effect of antenatal sin.
- 209:9. *Dhammapada*, Verse 165.
- 210:1. Cf. Dahlke, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 23ff.
- 210:14. *Dhammapada*, Verses 153, 154.
- 210:27. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1906, p. 589.
- 210:35. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 211.
- 211:13. While no memory binds the lives that succeed each other, according to the law of Karma, in actual practice the Buddhist can remember previous existences. The classical example of this karmic reminiscence is, of course, abundantly illustrated in the *Jatakas*, wherein the Buddha's experiences in former births are narrated. Kern suggests that Buddha's memory of his past lives as *Boddhisatva* simply exhibit one of his supernatural faculties, whereby he knows the past as well as the future (*Histoire du bouddhisme*, Vol. I, p. 384; cf. Hopkins, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1906, p. 581).
- 211:24. Cf. Hopkins, *loc. cit.*
- 211:29. *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 50.
- 212:3. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 104.
- 213:24. *Sutta* 63: Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, pp. 117ff, 122.
- 213:29. This doctrine has received further notice in the Chapter on the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.
- 213:35. *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 396.
- 216:3. Oltramare, *L'histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, p. 148.

- 216:11. *Loc. cit.*
 216:34. Pp. 111f.
 217:4. *Buddhism*, p. 115, referring to Max Müller's introduction to "Buddhaghosha's Parables," p. xli; cf. *Dhammapada*, Verses 23, 32, 134, 184, 202-204, 225-226, 283, 285, 289, 368-369, 372; cf. also Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp. 305ff, 309f; Emile Senart "Nirvana," in *Album Kern*, p. 102.
 217:7. "Buddhist Nirvana, and the Noble Eightfold Path," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1880, pp. 548-574.
 217:10. *The Religions of India*, p. 321.
 217:16. *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 50.
 217:21. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, p. 321.
 217:30. 1092f.
 217:31. *Dhammapada*, 368, 23, 204; cf. Koeppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, Vol. I, pp. 304f.
 218:13. Monier Williams, *Buddhism*, p. 140.
 218:20. The notion of Nirvana has quite baffled some Western minds. Thus Guyau in *L'irréligion de l'avenir*, p. 417: "La notion panthéiste ou moniste du nirvâna échappe à toute critique, précisément parce qu'elle est une unité vide de tout contenu précis."
 218:26. *Sutta Nipata*, 31, 67, 78, 203, 208.
 218:33. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 137; cf. pp. 163, 346.
 218:34. *Sutta Nipata*, 765.
 219:3. *Die Religion des Buddha*, Vol. I, pp. 306ff.
 219:17. This point impressed Max Müller; cf. Dahlmann, *Nirvana*, pp. 7f.
 220:25. Dahlmann, *Nirvana*, pp. 23, 53, 75, 120, 135f, 184ff.
 220:31. *Histoire du bouddhisme*, Vol. I, p. 388.
 220:33. *The Religions of India*, p. 336.
 221:5. Cf. Otto Schrader, *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, 1904-1905, p. 157; Dahlmann, *Nirvana*, p. 5.
 221:21. *A Dictionary of the Pali Language*, pp. 265f, 268.
 221:36. See the Chapter on Pessimism and Immortality in this book.
 222:4. Cf. De La Vallée Poussin, Articles "Ages of the World (Buddhist)" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

CHAPTER VIII. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY IN MODERN THEOLOGY

- 225:5. Welldon, *The Hope of Immortality*, pp. 238ff, 247ff.
 225:9. *Modern Belief in Immortality*, pp. 8, 18f.
 225:26. Gordon, *Immortality and the New Theodicy*, pp. 3f.
 226:28. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
 226:30. Cf. Mellone, *The Immortal Hope*, pp. 61ff; Newman Smyth, *op. cit.*, pp. 73ff. Cf., however, McComb, *The Future Life in the Light of Modern Inquiry*.
 227:30. *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 313f.
 227:37. *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 283.
 228:3. *Immortality*, ed. by B. H. Streeter, p. 11.
 228:13. Fosdick, *The Assurance of Immortality*, pp. 21f.

- 223:26. *Immortality and the New Theodicy*, p. 17.
 223:30. *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 196.
 229:27. Cf. Newman Smyth, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 6f, 15f, 20f.
 230:4. *The Witness to Immortality*, pp. 27ff.
 230:20. B. H. Streeter in *Immortality*, p. 85.
 230:26. Dole, *The Hope of Immortality*, p. 27.
 230:33. John Caird, *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, Vol. II, pp. 275, 293.
 231:10. *The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. IV, p. 176.
 231:21. *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II, pp. 347ff, 364f, 356, 371.
 231:29. *The Assurance of Immortality*, pp. 109, 115ff.
 232:11. *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, pp. viii, 466.
 232:17. Dole, *The Hope of Immortality*, p. 24.
 232:23. Welldon, *op. cit.*, pp. 294, 298ff.
 233:21. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 344; cf. pp. 336ff; Schleiermacher's Second Speech *On Religion*, pp. 99ff; Pfeiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. IV, p. 169.
 234:2. *The Other Room*, p. 72.
 234:10. Mellone, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
 234:26. Newman Smyth, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 37, 47.
 235:15. Petavel-Olliff, *Le problème de l'immortalité*, Vol. I, p. 95.
 235:31. Cf. *De Spectaculis*, Chap. XXX.
 235:36. *Imitation of Christ*, I, xxiv.
 236:6. *Oeuvres oratoires*, Vol. II, p. 159; Vol. V, p. 373.
 236:31. Edwards, *Works*, Vol. II, pp. 9, 10, 11; cf. Vol. II, pp. 78ff, 83ff, 122ff, 130ff, 207ff, 515ff, 817ff.
 237:8. Cf. Edwards, *Works*, Vol. II, p. 11; Petavel-Olliff, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 281; Lecky, *Rationalism in Europe*, Vol. I, p. 368 Note.
 237:17. Cf. Petavel-Olliff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 26.
 237:33. Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 525.
 238:16. *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 85ff.
 239:31. Cf. C. W. Emmett in *Immortality*, pp. 170ff.
 240:16. *Die Christliche Dogmatik*, p. 455; cf. pp. 447ff.
 240:23. *The Gospel of the Hereafter*, p. 144.
 242:17. Petavel-Olliff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 106; cf. pp. 94ff, 136ff.
 242:23. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 16.
 242:28. *Rom.* 9:22; *Ps.* 2:9; *Ps.* 83:13; *Mal.* 4:3; *Ps.* 37:30; *Job* 7:9.
 243:8. Petavel-Olliff, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 250ff.
 243:13. Cf. *Dogmatik*, Vol. II, Part ii, pp. 146f, 158ff.
 243:15. And not only by the traditionalists: thus, for instance, Guyau finds contradiction in the idea of human beings created in order to be annihilated: "L'anéantissement n'est qu'un palliatif de la damnation: c'est la guillotine céleste substituée aux longues tortures d'avant la Révolution" (cf. *L'Irréligion de l'avenir*, pp. 454ff).
 243:27. Salmond, *op. cit.*, pp. 489ff, 495ff.
 243:35. *Die Christliche Dogmatik*, pp. 427f.
 244:5. *The Witness to Immortality*, p. 34.
 244:6. *The Hope of Immortality*, pp. 60, 188ff, 193ff, 259f.
 244:13. Canon Streeter in *Immortality*, p. 109.
 244:25. Slattery, *The Gift of Immortality*, p. 37.

- 244:35. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
 245:2. Mellone, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
 245:6. Pfeiderer, *The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. IV, p. 178.
 245:32. Fosdick, *The Assurance of Immortality*, p. 138; *cf.* pp. 22ff; Slattery, *op. cit.*, pp. 5ff.
 246:12. *The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. IV, p. 178.

CHAPTER IX. ETHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR IMMORTALITY

- 250:28. *Works*, Oxford, Vol. I, p. 52.
 251:24. *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 54, 58, 60, 63f, 67, 78.
 254:6. *Oeuvres oratoires*, ed. Lebarq, Vol. IV, p. 123, 127ff; Vol. II, pp. 150ff.
 255:5. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, Vol. I, p. 135.
 255:15. *Kants Schriften*, Prussian Academy edition, Vol. II, p. 373; the English version is Caird's.
 256:7. *Critique of Pure Reason*, transl. by Max Müller, p. 797; *cf.* Mendelssohn, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. II, pp. 121ff.
 256:22. *Prolegomena*, transl. by Mahaffy and Bernard, pp. 98f.
 258:21. *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, transl. by Abbott, p. 206.
 259:26. *Ibid.*, pp. 218f, 221f.
 260:25. *Ibid.*, pp. 214f.
 261:30. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
 264:7. Epictetus, *Discourses*, transl. by Long, I: 6, 16.
 264:24. Seneca, *De constantia sapientis*, quoted from Courdaveaux, *De l'immortalité de l'âme dans le stoïcisme*, p. 62.
 265:2. *To Himself*, II: 11, 12; IV: 14, 15; XI: 3 (Rendall's translation).
 265:27. Digby, *A Treatise of Man's Soul*, p. 86.
 267:22. *The Eternal Values*, p. 428; *cf.* *Philosophie der Werte*, pp. 434ff.
 267:30. *William James and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Life*, pp. 268ff.
 268:28. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. xiv.
 269:13. *The Conception of God*, p. 292.
 269:23. *The Conception of Immortality*, pp. 44, 48; *cf.* p. 28.
 269:34. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
 270:2. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, pp. 269, 287; *William James*, p. 289.
 270:14. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. 322.
 270:19. *The Conception of Immortality*, pp. 68f.
 270:27. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. 340.
 271:5. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 368, 395f.
 271:12. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 409.
 271:17. *William James*, p. 295.
 271:21. *Loc. cit.*
 272:8. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, pp. 441, 442.
 272:23. *The Conception of God*, p. 326.
 272:36. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, pp. 444, 445. *Cf.* *The Problem of Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 376; "The salvation of the

world occurs progressively, endlessly, in constant contest with evil, as a process that is never ended."

273:9. *William James*, pp. 296f.

273:21. *William James*, p. 292.

273:24. *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, pp. 446, 451f.

274:15. Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, p. 259.

CHAPTER X. THE DESTINY OF THE SELF IN RECENT BRITISH REALISM

276:3. Published in part in the *Philosophical Review*, January, 1920.

276:4. *The Principle of Individuality and Value; The Value and Destiny of the Individual*.

276:23. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 68, 69.

277:15. *Ibid.*, p. 198. Cf. Bosanquet, "The Meaning of Teleology," in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1905-06, p. 245: "When clear consciousness comes, it does not come empty or without presuppositions; it comes in possession of a content and a mechanism which its world has prepared for it."

277:23. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 221.

277:34. *Ibid.*, pp. 248, 250; cf. pp. 380ff.

278:17. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 2.

278:31. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

278:34. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

279:28. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

280:2. *Ibid.*, p. 224.

280:7. *Ibid.*, p. 226: "It is the surrender or completion of finite selfhood in the world of spiritual membership."

280:16. Cf. in this connection Dr. McTaggart's views of the rôle of metaphysics in religion, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, Chapter I, and Conclusion: "We need, for religion, to be able to regard the universe as good on the whole, and it does not appear how we could do this, except on the basis of a general theory as to the ultimate nature of reality" (p. 292).

280:34. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 245, 247, 250. Cf. p. 255: "The God of religion, inherent in the completest experience, is an appearance of reality, as distinct from being the whole and ultimate reality."

281:6. *Ibid.*, p. 261.

281:25. *Ibid.*, p. 264. Cf. Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 87: "Nearly all mankind rest in unvisited tombs, and leave behind them a common undistinguished work."

281:36. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 266.

282:22. *Ibid.*, pp. 267, 269.

283:16. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 286: "The mother longs for the child she has lost, not for a complete and perfected personality in Heaven. Yet we cannot consistently desire that for her sake the infant should remain an infant to all eternity."

283:31. *Ibid.*, pp. 275, 288. So Goethe in *Hermann and Dorothea*: "Our very wishes veil from us our objects; the things we prayed for

come to us, but not in the forms we chose" (quoted by Professor Bosanquet in *Social and International Ideals*, p. 231). See also *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 159: "Even to sacrifice personal existence for a supreme good which demands the sacrifice is also self-realization, and is one way of affirming or perfecting our being."

284:7. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 296.

284:27. Cf. Professor Bosanquet's article on "Plato's Conception of Death," *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. II, pp. 99ff. See also *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 178: "Man must recognize that he is always dying; that is, always losing parts of himself and his belongings. Also, he is always growing, that is, attaining and achieving something which he had not and was not."

284:31. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 324.

285:11. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. xviii; cf. p. 21.

286:2. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

286:20. "Symposium: Do Finite Individuals Possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being?" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, pp. 479-581.

286:33. *The Idea of God*, pp. 261, 262, 288. In Lord Haldane's view, both Professor Bosanquet and Professor Pringle-Pattison doubt the competence of thought to undertake the ultimate problems of the self's nature and its relation to the Absolute: "for in one view the finite individual is a construction of relational thought, which by reason of its inherent incapacity cannot attain to the path by which alone reality can be reached. In the other view the metaphors used seem . . . merely to disguise the suggestion that selves are in truth mutually exclusive units the relations of which can be truly assigned to positions occupied in time and space." (*The Reign of Relativity*, p. 209.)

287:1. *The Idea of God*, p. 272, quoting Bosanquet's *Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 253f. Cf. *The Idea of God*, p. 283: "There is subtle danger in the term content."

287:4. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, p. 513.

287:10. *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XXI, p. 424. "Our highest experience I take to be love. And in love it is just the particularity of the two selves which is the supreme element" (*ibid.*).

287:17. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, p. 514.

287:27. Cf. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, pp. 250ff.

287:33. Cf. *The Idea of God*, pp. 392f. "I doubt if individualism has ever been carried further than in this proposal to have as many universals as there are particulars."

287:35. Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophical Radicals*, p. 199.

288:6. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, p. 523.

288:15. *The Idea of God*, p. 391.

288:23. Cf. Bosanquet in *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XXVI, pp. 475, 478ff.

288:30. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, pp. 519, 517; see also *The Idea of God*, p. 271, and the same author's *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 235f: "The Hegelian system is as ambiguous on the question of man's immortality as on that of the personality of God, and for precisely the same reason—namely, because the Self of which assertions are made in the theory is not a

real but a logical self." Professor Pringle-Pattison criticizes similarly Dr. McTaggart's conception of the self; cf. his *Philosophical Radicals*, p. 202.

289:3. *The Idea of God*, p. 272.

289:10. Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 156: "In reading Professor Bosanquet or Mr. Bradley, we find ourselves wondering why, on their principles, there should be finite centres of experience at all, so uniformly disparaging is the tone adopted towards them."

289:26. Cf. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, pp. 480, 483, 487.

289:35. Vol. II, p. 253. "The doctrine of a single Individual Reality rests on the demonstration that no finite individuals are self-complete and self-contained, and that therefore none such can be self-existing substances or irreducible subjects of predication" (*ibid.*, p. 252).

290:6. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, p. 488.

290:11. Vol. II, p. 258.

290:18. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, p. 497.

290:22. *Ibid.*, p. 540.

290:30. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 488, 501.

291:1. "Thought sways between a Pluralism, disguised or undisguised, and a Pantheism which obliterates all real individuality" (*The Idea of God*, p. 390; see also pp. 265f).

291:26. Sir Henry Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 44.

291:32. Professor Albee in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVI, p. 655.

292:4. *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 100.

292:11. Cf. *The Idea of God*, pp. 216ff.

292:19. Cf. Lord Haldane in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, pp. 564f.

292:33. *Ibid.*, p. 555. Cf. p. 564: "While recognizing the great contribution which I think Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet have made to philosophy, I, for one, have never been able to follow the invitation to contemplate the Absolute as unintelligible to what is the only kind of thinking by which I can make any progress at all, or to which I can attach meaning."

292:36. "The universe is in no sense a finished fact; it is an act, a continuous life or process which (to speak in terms of time) is perpetually being accomplished" (*The Idea of God*, p. 413).

293:6. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 338.

293:8. *The Idea of God*, p. 413. Professor Pringle-Pattison is not always as free from Absolutism. Thus, when he describes the universe as "in the last resort . . . an Experience . . . resuming the whole life of the world in a fashion, which is necessarily incomprehensible save by the Absolute itself" (p. 390), he is travelling on the same road which he criticizes Professor Bosanquet for following. The last five words in this passage do not save it from implying scepticism; nor is the matter mended by the parallel incomprehensibility considered in the sequel. Cf. Lord Haldane's criticism, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, pp. 563, 565. In the

concluding chapter of his *Idea of Immortality*, after criticizing the Stoic subordination of persons to impersonal values, and insisting that "Truth, Beauty, Goodness . . . have no meaning apart from conscious experience," Professor Pringle-Pattison goes on to say: "They carry us therefore to a primal Mind in whose experience they are eternally realized" (p. 190).

293:18. *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XI, p. 907.

293:26. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, p. 490; *Mind*, N. S. Vol. XXVI, p. 479; *The Idea of God*, pp. 270ff.

293:32. *Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 229.

294:8. *God and Personality*, pp. 126f.

294:16. *Divine Personality and Human Life*, pp. 249, 287.

294:31. Cf. in this connection Professor Creighton's article on "Two Types of Idealism," in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXV, pp. 514-536, esp. pp. 524ff.

294:36. *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XXX, p. 98; cf. also Bosanquet's *Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*.

295:9. Cf. Professor Bosanquet's Discussion, in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, of my examination of his theory.

295:22. *Ibid.*

296:22. *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XI, p. 904.

296:31. *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 145. Thus also, from a different angle, Professor Rogers: "If for finite thought nothing can be wholly true, it is natural to expect the principle to work in the other direction also—for the Absolute nothing can be appearance; and for whom, then, if not for the Absolute?" (*English and American Philosophy since 1800*, p. 257).

298:7. This is Professor Stout's formulation of the question, in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, pp. 550f. Cf. G. E. Moore, in the same *Proceedings*, 1901-02, p. 196, and Dr. McTaggart, in *Mind*, N. S., Vol. XVIII, pp. 358ff.

298:26. Cf. T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Section 184, p. 218; *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 277ff.

298:31. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 317.

298:34. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 25.

299:1. Cf. Professor Stout in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1917-18, p. 549: "If I am to follow the clues supplied by experience I must regard all value as essentially relative to conative process. It does not, however, follow that it can exist only for finite individuals."

CHAPTER XI. PESSIMISM AND IMMORTALITY

300:2. Published in part in the *Philosophical Review*, November, 1920.

301:8. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 386.

301:19. *Ibid.*, p. 441.

302:7. Cf. Sully, *Pessimism*, pp. 16ff, 36ff; Caro, *Le pessimisme au XIX^e siècle*, pp. 1f; Schopenhauer, *Werke*, Deussen edition, Vol. II, pp. 670ff (Grisebach edition, Vol. II, pp. 690ff; Haldane and

- p. 85); cf. Drews, *Eduard von Hartmann's philosophisches System im Grundriss*, pp. 154ff.
- 314:20. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, p. 285 (Coupland, Vol. III, pp. 1ff). Cf. Leopardi, *Pensieri*, Vol. III, p. 471.
- 314:32. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, p. 295 (Coupland, Vol. III, p. 12).
- 314:37. For Hartmann's criticism of this doctrine, see *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, pp. 295ff (Coupland, Vol. III, pp. 12ff).
- 315:10. *Ibid.*, pp. 352 (Coupland, p. 76).
- 315:14. *Ibid.*, p. 355 (Coupland, p. 79).
- 315:37. *Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze*, p. 648.
- 316:5. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, p. 362 (Coupland, Vol. III, p. 88).
- 316:12. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. II, p. 41.
- 316:15. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, p. 363 (Coupland, Vol. III, p. 88).
- 316:22. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. II, p. 40.
- 316:28. *Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze*, pp. 154f.
- 316:30. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, p. 363 (Coupland, Vol. III, p. 88).
- 317:2. *Ibid.*, p. 389 (Coupland, p. 83).
- 317:13. *Ibid.*, p. 368 (Coupland, p. 94).
- 317:30. *Ibid.*, p. 389 (Coupland, pp. 117f).
- 318:10. *Ibid.*, p. 399 (Coupland, p. 129).
- 318:15. *Ibid.*
- 318:20. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VI, p. 232.
- 318:30. *Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze*, p. 153; *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, p. 284 (Coupland, Vol. II, p. 368).
- 319:5. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, pp. 402ff (Coupland, Vol. III, pp. 133ff).
- 319:33. Coupland, Vol. III, pp. 172ff; cf. Sully, *Pessimism*, pp. 141ff.
- 320:17. Mere relief from pain
Is counted joy by us.
- 320:29. *A System of Ethics*, pp. 289f.
- 320:35. *Ausgewählte Werke*, Vol. VIII, pp. 289f (Coupland, Vol. III, pp. 5ff).
- 321:7. *Operette morali*, p. 83 (Thomson, pp. 152, 153; Edwardes, p. 59).
- 321:10. *Pensieri*, Vol. VII, p. 122.
- 321:21. O flock of mine reposing, happy flock,
Of your own woe, methinks, quite unaware!
How do I envy you!
- 321:31. But wiser, but so far
Less weak in this than Man, that thou didst never
Deem thy frail stalk endowed
By fate or thee with power to live forever.
- 322:9. Caro, *Le pessimisme au XIX^e siècle*, p. 198.
- 322:14. *The Tragic Sense of Life*, pp. 9, 43.
- 322:33. Quoted from Bickersteth, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

- 323:2. Know that thy sons must be
Wretched or craven. Choose the first.
- 323:9. *Op. cit.*, pp. 104f.
- 323:21. *A se stesso*:
Nought is worthy
Thine agonies, earth merits not thy sighing.
Mere bitterness and tedium
Is life, nought else; the world is dust and ashes.
- 323:28. *Operette morali*, p. 198 (Thomson, pp. 238ff; Edwardes; p. 142).
- 323:29. *Operette morali*, pp. 201ff (Thomson, pp. 240ff; Edwardes, pp. 144ff).
- 324:35. *L'infinito*:
So
In this immensity my thought is drowned:
And sweet to me is shipwreck in this sea.
- 325:28. *Cf. Ward, op. cit.*, p. 329.
- 325:32. *Ibid.*, p. 373.
- 326:8. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 25.
- 326:10. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 324.

CHAPTER XII. VALUE, PERSONALITY, AND DESTINY

- 330:5. *The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. Robertson, p. 473.
- 331:6. *Microcosmus*, Vol. I, pp. xvi, 396.
- 331:25. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 10ff, 215ff.
- 333:24. Quoted by Urban in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, p. 457.
- 334:26. Alexander, "The Idea of Value," *Mind*, N. S. Vol. I, p. 42.
- 337:9. Meinong, *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie*, pp. 16, 21ff, 66ff. In his later writings Meinong was led to revise somewhat this reduction of the value-content of consciousness to pleasure-pain; cf. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 55, Note 2.
- 337:22. Ehrenfels, *System der Werththeorie*, Vol. I, pp. 52ff, 65.
- 337:30. *Valuation*, pp. 54, 53.
- 337:34. "Value and Existence," Vol. XIII, pp. 449-465; "Knowledge of Value and the Value-Judgment," *ibid.*, pp. 673-687; "Ontological Problems of Value," Vol. XIV, pp. 309-327; cf. also Vol. XI, pp. 113ff; Vol. XII, pp. 505ff; Vol. XIV, pp. 141ff, 169ff, 570ff, 701ff; Vol. XV, pp. 253ff, 393ff.
- 338:14. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, pp. 673, 675, 677, 687.
- 339:15. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, pp. 66, 72f.
- 339:34. *Ibid.*, pp. 78f, 128, 134, 498; cf. pp. 54-131. See in this connection, Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Introduction: "The idea of a Natural Science of Morals."
- 340:7. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Section 184.
- 340:9. Schiller, Article "Value" in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

- 340:22. Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 241; cf. pp. 288, 302.
- 340:32. Lipps, *Die ethische Grundfragen*, pp. 35, 77ff, 164.
- 341:20. *The Eternal Values*, p. 14; cf. pp. 22f.
- 344:23. Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 272.
- 345:2. *Space, Time, and Deity*, Vol. II, pp. 304, 311.
- 346:19. Cf. Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 197.
- 347:24. Höffding, *op. cit.*, pp. 225ff.
- 348:20. Spaventa: cf. Ruggiero, *La Filosofia contemporanea*, Vol. II, p. 146.
- 349:7. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 198.
- 350:31. *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, p. 170.
- 352:27. Sir Henry Jones and J. H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird*, pp. 193, 195.
- 352:30. *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 148.
- 353:11. *Appearance and Reality*, 2. edition, p. 502; cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, pp. 127ff.
- 353:27. Cf. Mahaparinibbana-Sutta: Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 99.
- 354:17. *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 177.
- 355:1. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
- 355:22. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, Vol. II, p. 340.
- 356:23. Gentile, *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, p. 40.
- 356:34. Quoted from McComb, *The Future Life in the Light of Modern Inquiry*, p. 94.
- 357:5. *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, p. 286.
- 357:22. Gentile, *op. cit.*, pp. 269, 270.
- 358:7. Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*, p. 140.
- 359:4. *The Tragic Sense of Life*, p. 256.
- 359:21. Christina Rossetti, "Who Shall Deliver Me?" quoted here from Haldane's *Reign of Relativity*, p. 408.
- 360:16. Quoted from Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 513.
- 361:1. Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 190.
- 361:13. *Theaetetus*, 176 a.
- 361:27. *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 209.
- 362:14. *The Tragic Sense of Life*, p. 90.
- 364:32. Goethe, "Selige Sehnsucht," *Westöstlicher Divan*.
- 368:35. Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 249.
- 369:31. "Love in a Life," quoted here from Royce's *Conception of Immortality*, p. 28.
- 371:16. *Filosofia della Pratica*, p. 67.
- 374:23. James, *Human Immortality*, pp. 31ff; Adler, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*; cf. the discussion of Royce's theory in our chapter on "Ethical Arguments for Immortality."
- 377:36. Cf. Unamuno, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
- 378:5. *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 29.
- 379:23. Gentile, *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, p. 213.

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