




$\frac{5}{16}$

M.A. SECTION





MIND, MEDICINE  
AND METAPHYSICS



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4

*London Edinburgh Glasgow New York*

*Toronto Melbourne Capetown Bombay*

*Calcutta Madras*

HUMPHREY MILFORD

PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY



# MIND, MEDICINE AND METAPHYSICS

*THE PHILOSOPHY OF A  
PHYSICIAN*

BY


WILLIAM BROWN

D.M. (OXON.), D.SC. (LOND.), F.R.C.P.


WILDE READER IN MENTAL PHILOSOPHY  
AND DIRECTOR OF THE  
INSTITUTE OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY IN  
THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD;  
HON. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGIST, BETHLEM  
ROYAL HOSPITAL

*Hos successus alit: possunt, quia posse  
videntur*

VERGIL, *Aeneid*, BOOK V, v. 231



LONDON  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS  
HUMPHREY MILFORD



BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE ESSENTIALS OF MENTAL MEASUREMENT. (*Jointly with Professor Godfrey H. Thomson.*) Third Edition. Cambridge University Press, 1925.

SUGGESTION AND MENTAL ANALYSIS. Third Edition. University of London Press, Ltd., 1923.


TALKS ON PSYCHOTHERAPY. University of London Press, Ltd., 1923.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SCIENCES. (*Editor and Contributor.*) A. & C. Black, 1924.

MIND AND PERSONALITY. University of London Press, Ltd., 1926.

SCIENCE AND PERSONALITY. Oxford University Press, 1929.

PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. Third Edition. Edward Arnold & Co., 1934.



PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN



## PREFACE

THIS book is a collection of essays and lectures composed during the last two or three years in diverse circumstances, but all dominated by the one intellectual purpose of achieving a philosophical synthesis of general viewpoints in psychology, medicine, and metaphysics.

Metaphysics was defined by William James as 'an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly', and by F. H. Bradley (in jest) as 'finding bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct'. But if it is defined as 'the science of Reality as such', and thus demands an advance, or an attempted advance, beyond the generalizations of the separate sciences about phenomena or appearances, then I would range myself by the side of Schopenhauer in his *credo*, 'I believe in a metaphysic'. Metaphysics cannot be avoided, any more than the speaking of prose. We must all ask ourselves these ultimate questions as to the nature of 'Reality as such', but we do not find in the generalizations of the individual sciences any adequate answers to them.

While holding that discordant 'appearances' can only find an ultimate explanation within a system of philosophical idealism where the principle of non-contradiction, or of harmonious

Gift  
Research



lishers of *The British Medical Journal*, *The Lancet*, *The Practitioner*, *The Times*, *Character and Personality*, the Congress Number (1934) of *The Journal of the Chartered Society of Massage and Medical Gymnastics*, *The Church of England Newspaper*, *The Churchman*, *The Congregational Quarterly*, and of the volume *The Meaning of the Groups* (Methuen), and the Committee of Management of the Drew Memorial Lecture Foundation (New College, London), for their kind permission to reprint material of mine which has appeared in their pages.

W. B.

*September 1936.*

# CONTENTS

I. PSYCHOLOGY AND MEDICINE . . . . .	1
II. SUGGESTION AND OTHER FORMS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY IN RELATION TO PHYSICAL TREATMENT . . . . .	21
III. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY .	39
IV. THE PROBLEM OF SEX CONTROL . . . . .	67
V. THE SEXUAL PROBLEMS OF ADOLESCENCE	89
VI. SLEEP, HYPNOSIS, AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE . . . . .	102
VII. CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY . . . . .	125
VIII. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . . . . .	129
IX. MORAL OBLIGATION AND FREEDOM IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOLOGY . . . . .	151
X. SELF-DETERMINATION AND FREE WILL .	177
XI. PSYCHOLOGY AND CONFESSION . . . . .	196
XII. PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION . . . . .	207
XIII. THE GROUP MOVEMENT, PSYCHOLOGI- CALLY CONSIDERED . . . . .	228
XIV. THE SURVIVAL OF PERSONALITY . . . . .	247
APPENDIX I. PSYCHOLOGY AT OXFORD . . . . .	273
„ II. THREE LETTERS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND PEACE. . . . .	280
INDEX . . . . .	287

## CHAPTER I

# PSYCHOLOGY AND MEDICINE

### PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE MIRACULOUS

THE methods and results of psychotherapy find their earliest beginnings in the primitive belief in miraculous healing, the expectation of some mysterious help not quite understood. This expectation is not really conviction, but something between doubt and certainty. There are degrees of certainty, and if the person were perfectly certain the situation would be different. It is because he is not quite certain—he hopes tremulously that something will happen, and that improvement will occur. He thinks something miraculous will happen, but its exact extent he does not know. That tremulous uncertainty and expectation of the mysterious and miraculous is the other aspect of the uncertainty that has produced the patient's illness. I may even say that the feeling of the mysterious and the miraculous is Janus-like. It looks in the direction of real faith and also towards superstition. Superstition is a falling away from faith, and the primitive mind has both possibilities. The primitive mind shows a tendency to feel in ways that may either develop into true religion, or

degenerate into superstition. In the origination of ill health superstitious fear, no doubt, plays its part. We must not be too ready to believe that modern medical science has the truth in general in regard to health and disease. The whole question of health and disease is still a problem in its most general sense. No one has yet dealt with it philosophically, no one has yet given a definition of disease of a philosophical nature. To a certain extent, for science, health and disease are on the same plane. The person who is healthy shows adaptation to his environment, with the machine working smoothly, but in disease there is some disturbance of the machinery; and the machinery is just as much machinery in the way it is disturbed as when it is working smoothly. But for philosophy, and possibly for psychology, we ought to draw a very pronounced distinction between health and disease. It is possible that health has to do with a right insight, so far as it goes, into the truth of existence, and a right appreciation of the values of existence, and that, instead of saying that truth depends upon health, philosophically we can say with equal *a priori* probability that health depends on a right outlook. As error is a falling away from truth, so disease is a falling away from health. Health is more *real* than



disease in the same sense that truth is more real than error. Although much illness can be thought of in terms of bacterial infection, &c., yet the vital reaction of the organism and its powers of resistance are decisive factors in recovery, and these probably have a nervous and mental aspect.

### SUGGESTION

That is where the word *suggestion* comes in. A simple elementary view at the present day is that a great deal of illness is due to the idea of illness becoming implanted in the mind, becoming fixed, influencing the imagination, and arousing feelings of fear and despondency, and so realizing itself. Thus it may be said that the patient becomes ill through bad self-suggestion, and that he can be cured by therapeutic suggestion, by good suggestion, either from without by another person (heterosuggestion), or by himself (autosuggestion).

There are several remarks to be made on this. One is that this ideo-motor action is a form of action that does not get much chance in the full glare of consciousness. If the idea is there in the patient's consciousness, it has not much chance of realizing itself because it has to compete with other opposing ideas. The patient's critical

faculty has a tendency to set one idea against another, and, therefore, the suggestion that is likely to produce illness is not suggestion in full consciousness so much as suggestion in the background of the mind, or in the subconscious. There is a subconscious desire present of one kind or another, or a subconscious fear, based on the desire for self-preservation. A fear lest injury may befall intensifies particularly the idea of ill health, and illness sets in, and develops insidiously beyond the margin of clear consciousness. And so with curative or therapeutic suggestion, the suggestion has to reach the background of the mind. You can talk with the tongue of men and angels about his hysteria to a functionally paralysed patient, and have no effect upon him whatever. You can tell him he is paralysed because of this suggestion, this fear of paralysis, and he will say, 'I have never been afraid of paralysis; it cannot be that.' In every case it is necessary to make clear this distinction between the conscious and the unconscious. At the present time the patient is consciously interested in his illness. He is not at the present moment experiencing those disappointments and fears which are the basis of his symptoms, but they are potentialities in his mind, and they can go on working while he



himself is thinking of other things. That is what is meant by saying that the patient is suffering from the subconscious idea of, e.g. an inability to walk.

#### HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION

In the further consideration of suggestion as a therapeutic measure, we cannot omit reference to the extraordinary and startling phenomena which may sometimes be observed in hypnotized subjects. But it would be a mistake to look upon hypnosis as something uncanny, mysterious, and occult. Although we have even yet no thoroughly satisfactory theory of hypnosis, we understand it in general terms, and can bring it into line with other facts and phenomena of psychology known in everyday life. The hypnotic subject, and the phenomena of hypnosis, can be explained firstly in terms of mental dissociation, of the tendency for certain forms of psychical activity to occur independently of the rest of the mind, independently of other considerations, and secondly in terms of suggestion, of increased suggestibility. And these two, the phenomenon of dissociation and the phenomenon of suggestibility, are not unrelated to one another. They are related, but not to the extent of being identical with one another. It was the Nancy

school of hypnotism, led by Bernheim, who considered that hypnosis could be explained entirely in terms of suggestibility. Charcot, working at the Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris, had previously explained hypnosis as an artificial hysteria—as a dissociation of the highest levels of the nervous system, a dissociation of mental and physiological activity at the higher conscious level. But the theory I am trying to sketch is a theory that combines both these statements. In my own view, based on the study of many hundreds of cases, hypnosis is explained both by dissociation and by increased suggestibility. We certainly do find increase of suggestibility occurring, partly explained in terms of dissociation, but not entirely so. On the other hand, the dissociation in its more pronounced forms may show itself independently of suggestibility. Which is the cause and which the effect of these two? Dissociation as a cause may bring with it increase of suggestibility. We can understand why that should be so. Does increased suggestibility on its side bring dissociation? It may tend to do so. A person who is in an increasingly suggestible state responds to just the one stimulus before him—it may be a stimulus from the outer world, or an idea aroused in his mind by the experimenter. He responds with his

whole mind and strength to the suggestion, and that concentration in one direction may be considered to cause collateral suppression of other modes of mental activity, which may otherwise occur simultaneously or immediately afterwards. And that suppression of collateral mental activity may be regarded as a precursor or cause of a certain kind of dissociation. If a patient is so fixed on what the hypnotist is saying and suggesting that he is oblivious of everything else, it would not be surprising if later on when his attention to the hypnotist is relaxed, and the rest of his mind, the other powers of his mind, have sway once more, memories of events that occurred during hypnosis would be absent. That is the tendency in deep hypnosis—for the person to forget completely the incidents of the hypnosis afterwards. In cases of artificial somnambulism, or what I call full hypnosis, the patient wakes up from sleep with no memory of what has occurred. We find that is the case in ordinary or spontaneous somnambulism. A person who walks in his sleep does not remember what has occurred when he wakes up. It must have been a dream that caused his somnambulism, but he is unable to remember it. Cases like these are just the cases that are hypnotizable. One can be certain to be able to hypnotize a patient who is frequently



walking in his sleep, and under hypnotism one can recall the dream he is living through, so that he then knows why he is walking in his sleep, and the result of the recalling of his dream and the reassociating of that part of his mind with his other memories is to abolish the somnambulism. I have found many cases of people who walk in their sleep who can be cured in this particular way, not by hypnotic *suggestion* but by using the dissociation and reassociation side of hypnotism. It is quite obviously a state of dissociation, and yet it is hypnotism which is most effective in overcoming the earlier dissociation.

Our central problem is the problem of suggestion, and I have only spoken of hypnosis as a stepping-stone or stage in the story of suggestion. I do not wish to give the impression that hypnotism is a method that is frequently used by psychotherapists; it is only in very special cases that hypnotism is used, and never without the consent of the patient. Indeed, the patient cannot be hypnotized against his will. The trouble is the other way. So many patients come and ask to be hypnotized and they cannot be hypnotized. With the best will in the world the hypnotic state cannot be produced in them. Indeed, the doctor knows almost at once whether the patient is likely to be a good hyp-

notic subject or not. Patients who are easily hypnotized are clearly those who are dissociated and are hysterical (in the scientific sense). And further, the degree of dissociation seems to be proportionate to the degree of hypnotizability. So, arguing from that generalization, one comes to the conclusion that the perfectly normal person would not be hypnotizable, and that any one is hypnotizable only to the extent to which this hysterical dissociation is present. That does not mean that all weak-minded people are hypnotizable. Far from it. The hysterical is not necessarily weak-minded. On the other hand, mental defectives are not as a rule hypnotizable. There are exceptions, however. One may find instances where a feeble-minded person who has a strain of hysteria can be hypnotized, but it would be wrong to generalize from that. Hence the theory that hypnosis is an artificial hysteria is the most plausible theory at the present time—that hypnosis is an artificially produced dissociation of a hysterical nature. As the patient gets free of his dissociation he becomes less and less hypnotizable. If hypnotism is used to overcome a patient's dissociation, you will find on a later occasion that he is not so easily hypnotizable. And—here I agree with Prof. Pierre Janet—the test of his cure is the extent to which he has

ceased to become hypnotizable. This test was verified by me in a whole series of cases during the War, cases who were found to be easily hypnotizable; the symptoms were cleared up under hypnosis, one reassociated the patients and then found them less hypnotizable than before. The sort of cases where repeated hypnotism is justified, are cases of drug addiction, alcoholism, and certain perversions of the instincts.

#### SUGGESTION WITHOUT HYPNOSIS

In most cases the ideal is to get the beneficial effects of suggestion without full hypnosis—to get the patient into a state of increased suggestibility without any *artificial* dissociation of the mind. And that, undoubtedly, can be done. There is such a thing as a normal state of increased suggestibility. It is a state we all pass through as we fall asleep. In that intermediate state whatever dissociation there is is normal, not pathological, and in that state suggestion may more readily take effect. The stock example is to give the suggestion to oneself that one will wake up at a definite time next morning. If you give that suggestion during the course of the day it may not work; but if you wait till night and make the suggestion to yourself in a calm confident way, you will find that it does tend



to work. If you are new to the experiment, you may find your sleep tends to be broken, and you will wake up earlier than the time fixed upon. In actual practice the simplest way to give suggestion is to ask the patient to lie on a couch with muscles relaxed, breathing slowly, deeply, and regularly, thinking of sleep and nothing but sleep—and then to put the necessary suggestions. If the patient has difficulty in concentrating his mind on sleep, I tell him to think about something neutral, something of an unemotional nature. Or again, if he says he cannot think of one definite thing, I ask him to turn passively away from thoughts as they come, just as a person who found a procession passing his window in which he took no interest would turn his eyes and thoughts away from it. The patient is dwelling on the idea of passivity, not worrying about anything or anybody. He does not listen to what the doctor says, although he hears what is said. And in that condition, which Baudouin calls a state of *contention*—concentration without effort—the background of his mind is accessible to what is said and will accept it and carry it out. It is remarkable what effects may be obtained in special cases—not only in cases of illness. One was the case of a leading musician, who had lost power of concentration, and all power to

compose. He came for treatment, and under the influence of suggestion he recovered his power to compose. He fell away again, and came a second time, and it worked in just the same way. After a course of ten hours he was able to compose once more. On two subsequent occasions the same result followed. The method is one way of removing unnecessary inhibitions. At the other end of the scale it works in improving memory and power of concentration, and may help a certain type of child who is backward in its lessons. All forms of suggestion effects, both pathogenic and therapeutic, have their ultimate explanation in deep-seated reactions of the subconscious and unconscious mind, often both complicated and distorted. An adequate unravelling of these hidden mental processes may entail a prolonged course of deep mental analysis, helped out by methods of 'free association', dream interpretation, and other procedures first invented by Sigmund Freud and constituting part of his technique of psychoanalysis.

#### RELIGION, VALUE, AND DEEP ANALYSIS OF THE MIND

As regards the bearing of deep mental analysis upon the question of religion, in the first place

we can say that it has a negative value of the utmost importance. Where there is a disturbance of the religious feelings the disturbance may show itself in pathological symptoms. It is through analysis that those tendencies will be understood and corrected. Or again where there is apparent failure of religious feeling, where a person has gradually lost all feelings of this nature, analysis may help to show why the change has occurred and may help the person to get back to a more normal condition.

But Freud and his followers go farther and undertake to explain away the religious sentiment in terms of the findings of psycho-analysis. Here one meets the contrast of explaining a thing and explaining a thing away. Much that one reads on religion by Freud and his followers seems to be simply an attempt to explain away the feeling. Instead of looking upon religion as an attitude of the mind which gives direct awareness of some reality, they seem to regard it as an attitude of mind that is somehow or another an illusion, a mistaken attitude, for which the mental cause must be sought and found.<sup>1</sup> They attempt to explain the nature and origin of certain religious attitudes in terms of earlier mental attitudes not in themselves reli-

<sup>1</sup> See S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*. Hogarth Press, 1928.



gious. Some psycho-analysts hold that the essence of the religious attitude is the *sense of sin*, and further assert dogmatically, that the sense of sin is based upon the Oedipus Complex, the sexual reactions of the child towards his parents in earliest years. They also hold that so-called mystical experience may be a result of returning to an earlier infantile attitude of mind, and involve an intensification of narcissism or libidinal self-love. But if we approach the question of religion from what I think is a truer angle—the angle of *value* instead of the angle of *sin*—the situation becomes less unsatisfactory. An essential characteristic of religion is the tendency to *worship*. That carries with it a feeling of value, an appreciation of value, a feeling of gratitude for value, and other attitudes following thereon—the appreciation of good, the readiness to fight for it, &c. And this appreciation of value is similar in nature to appreciation of truth—indeed, the appreciation of truth is the appreciation of one of these values. And certainly any scientist must believe in the appreciation of truth, must believe that there is some such thing as truth, and also truth-value. Any particular statement or fact may not be completely true, but still a scientist could not carry on his work without belief in truth as an

ideal. He must believe that somewhere there is truth, and that he is approximating more and more to truth as he proceeds in his science. Deep analysis and the theories based thereon are put forward as expressing a certain degree of truth. In that sense one may say that the facts and theories of psychology, as well as the facts and theories of the other sciences, are forms of a revelation of truth, a revealing of the nature of things to the individual. The religious attitude in its most general form is also a revelation of reality, a revelation of reality in the form of value, the satisfaction of aspirations, cravings, and desires. These desires and aspirations may not be entirely justified in many cases, so that a great deal of working of them over is necessary; a purifying of the mind is required, just as the intellectual side of the mind needs to be trained to think straight. There is an inborn tendency to think systematically, yet training is necessary. So it is with religion. I have heard one theologian say that religion is the gymnastics of the soul—the training of the soul. That seems to me only part of the truth about it. The essence of it is appreciation of value, but for that appreciation of value to be satisfactory, or less unsatisfactory than it would otherwise be, purification and training are necessary. If I am

asked what I mean by that, I would compare the central idea of religion—value—with one of its parts—appreciation of any particular art, like music. A person who wishes to appreciate music knows that he has to put himself through a certain amount of discipline. He has to listen to music, compare, disentangle, get rid of the effects of special experiences, or ordinary emotional reactions, get rid of sentimental banality, appreciate form with more and more abstractness, increase his power of abstraction and achieve re-synthesis. Only by listening to different kinds of music can he put them in a hierarchy of value. If he goes only to musical comedies and revues his taste for music will get fixed in that way. It will be stunted in its development. So it is in a more general way with all the other arts; and it is so with thinking. A person may be an ordinary common-sense thinker, thinking of matters of everyday life, very useful in rule of thumb work, and yet through mental laziness may not trouble to develop his mind along more abstract lines and so will be incomplete. His appreciation of intellectual values is incomplete, falls far short of what it might be. So it is with religion. Religion is the appreciation of value as such, with all these different values, ethical, aesthetic,



logical subsumed under it. Especially is it a personal thing. It has to do with reactions of the entire individual; it has to do with his character and it has as its object something that is also personal. Ultimately we feel that worship of an abstract value is an impossible thing. Values are values which belong to some personality (or super-personality). Just as in ordinary life personal relations between different persons are the highest, most concrete, and most satisfactory relations that we know, so we feel that there is this relationship of the individual to God, whom he considers *the concretion of all values*, the highest possible relationship. Thus, starting from this general point of view of value one can proceed to ask what are the various conditions in which an appreciation of value is hindered or disturbed. If we consider the sense of sin, &c., we see that the sense of sin is the feeling of a falling short of the ideal. Conscience is another word for the same thing, and we can also see that this feeling may be over-emphasized. It may become over-conscientiousness, for which an explanation may be reached by the use of deep analysis—probing deeply into the person's past history. Things must not be taken at their face value. Such over-conscientiousness may be explained in different ways by different people.

Freud has his own special explanation. It is really of a rather general kind. In his view such over-conscientiousness is due to the ego ideal or super-ego, built upon the model of the father-ideal, which is functioning too vigorously, too rigorously; and so Freud says straight out that psycho-analysis reveals to us that we are in our unconscious mind both far less moral and also far more moral than we think we are.<sup>1</sup> The use here of the word 'moral' is not entirely correct. Morality has little to do with the one thing or the other, has little to do with the urge of repressed tendencies from one side, or that harsh, mechanical, reactionary, repressing tendency of the early years on the other. Morality is a gradual growth. It develops in the course of life as the individual faces situations, faces things more and more successfully, faces himself and the world around him, and so builds up his own character as something which is ready to allow for the claims of others, ready to fulfil various social duties, and also duties to his higher self. That is something which is a conscious growth from beginning to end, and its essence is that it goes on consciously. Here, on the other hand, Freud is describing something which is happening very early in life indepen-

<sup>1</sup> *The Ego and the Id*. Hogarth Press, 1927.

dently of anything else. It is true that it was originally conscious, but the mechanism itself was unconscious. The individual is almost helpless in the matter. It is only during the development of his conscious mind that he works over the things again and really remakes himself, literally rising on the stepping-stones of his dead selves. The highest form of life is gained by that process of 'dying to live'. What we actually find when we analyse persons who suffer from these complexes is that there is no excess of morality, but, on the contrary, a tendency in the direction of mechanical organization.

All appreciation of values is of the nature of creation. What you do when you appreciate value is that you think of one thing in relation to another, and you choose one as compared with the other. And in actual conduct you choose one course rather than the other, and you act upon that. The result is that your character is changed. Creation is going on in your character—a development of the power of appreciating values and of acting upon such discriminative appreciation. So in any art like music, you choose the works of one composer, you choose one piece rather than another. You put one higher than the other. You may vary from one day to another. Ultimately you



achieve one objective scale of values, and as you react to that you are remaking yourself, you are making your own tastes in music, you are making musical values for yourself, you are learning to appreciate values. And so with intellectual development.

Two distinct questions arise in this connexion. 'Is creation simply one of the revelations of something that is true, out of time, belonging to God?' and 'How far is it possible for the finite individual?' The answer, probably, would be that creation is always creation from God, creation is something that comes to the individual from within, but nevertheless it comes to some individuals, and not to others, and to a certain extent in proportion to their own efforts. As regards character, moral value is the true proportion between effort, sincerity of thought, and result. In the other direction, however conscientious a person may be, if he is to become an artist, he needs to have 'the gift' for it. But if you take two people both gifted to the same extent, then again the same law holds good—the degree of sincerity, of determination and mental discipline, decides the result.

For a psychological theory of suggestion and personal influence, in contrast with those of McDougall and of Freud, see my *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, pp. 143-8, Edward Arnold & Co., 3rd edition, 1934.



## CHAPTER II

# SUGGESTION AND OTHER FORMS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY IN RELATION TO PHYSICAL TREATMENT

WHATEVER view we hold as to the relation of mind to body, we can be quite certain that psychology—the science of the mind—is an essential science in the development of medicine, physical as well as mental. Every part of the body is linked up with head-quarters in the brain, and is supplied with nerve-fibres; in that way the brain and the rest of the nervous system can serve as a middle factor in the relation of mind to body.

### ORGANIC AND FUNCTIONAL NERVOUS DISEASE

Whether we regard the mind as distinct from the brain, or whether we believe that mind is simply the product or result of brain activity when that activity has reached a certain degree of complexity, or whether we agree that the mental and brain activity in the cerebral cortex are two sides of the same reality—whatever view we hold as to the relation of mind and brain—we are perfectly certain that the relation of the brain and its activity with the rest of the

functional neurology lends itself better to the explanation of psychotherapeutic results.

It is the usual custom to distinguish organic nervous illness from functional nervous illness, and to maintain that, whereas organic disease cannot be benefited by psychotherapy, functional disease can. Even there we are in difficulties. Although this distinction is practically useful, it cannot be ultimately thought out, because you cannot ultimately separate structure from function, and function cannot show except through structure. If there is alteration of structure, there is alteration of function and vice versa. Probably it is the amount and kind of alteration of structure which is the important thing here. When structural alteration is a microscopical change of a chemical nature—probably *reversible*—there you have something which manifests itself mainly in functional symptoms and can respond to mental forms of treatment, such as suggestion.

Besides these so-called functional nervous diseases—hysteria (conversion hysteria and anxiety hysteria) and obsessional neurosis—you have the functional derangement of the different organs of the body. All the organs of the body are in relation to the cerebral cortex through nerve connexions and, if not direct, they

are indirectly connected through the sympathetic nervous system. So the disturbances of function of the heart, stomach, kidneys, or liver are linked up with the working of the nervous system, and therefore through that system they can be influenced by mental treatment. I would prefer to have for psychotherapeutic treatment a patient suffering from an acute gastritis or illness of some other organ of the body than a person suffering from severe organic illness of the nervous system itself.

#### HISTORY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

We find in the history of the subject that the practice of psychotherapy, or mental methods of healing, has come before theory. A theory has been gradually built up on the basis of the results of practice. The practice of psychotherapy began with the work of people like Franz Anton Mesmer, and later on James Braid of Manchester in the last century, dealing with so-called hypnotism, and gradually developing from the work of Charcot, Bernheim, and others to the modern method of suggestion as a method of influencing the functioning of the nervous system, and through that, influencing the functions of other parts of the body. This is one line of mental treatment.



The other line is still more recent, but more fundamental from the scientific point of view; it enables us to get a deeper understanding of the method of suggestion. This second method is the method of analysis, of digging down in the mind, getting at the background of the mind, revealing the underlying motives, impulses, and instinctive tendencies which are the moving forces of the mind, which determine what goes on without themselves necessarily showing in their true form in consciousness.

The originator of this method was Sigmund Freud of Vienna, towards the end of the last century. The method he originated was the method he eventually called psycho-analysis, including the method of free association. The patient lies on a couch in a relaxed state, talks out just what comes into his mind, especially in relation to the symptoms and onset of his illness—thus going back farther and farther in his life and gradually revealing how his illness originated. Freud found that these relevant mental forces had their origins very early in childhood. Only the true Freudians accept fully his psycho-analytic conclusions, but many people carry out analyses in much the same way with much the same result. The general principles of Freud's analytic method stand firm.



## FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

Going back to the question of hypnosis and suggestion in the light of analysis, we see a deeper meaning in it. The contrast between methods of suggestion and analysis may be stated in this way; they both deal with the subconscious and unconscious mind, the part that is out of consciousness, outside conscious awareness. In suggestion treatment you make a direct appeal to the subconscious or unconscious. In analysis you endeavour to bring up into consciousness what you can from the unconscious. By suggestion you hope to influence directly the subconscious or unconscious; by analysis you hope to influence the unconscious by changing it into consciousness, and giving the patient increased power over it in that way.

I have to keep to the subject-matter of my essay—the relationship of those two methods to the more prominently physical illnesses, and physical methods of treatment. Here I think that we can say that a *sine qua non*—an essential part of all medicine—is a certain amount of mental analysis; not a deep mental analysis which takes dozens of hours; that is only necessary in a small proportion of psychoneurotic cases. But in every form of illness, whatever it

may be, there is a mental reaction. The whole personality reacts to the illness, and a certain amount of analysis and investigation is necessary to discover how the patient is reacting to his illness. Whether the illness be neuritis, heart disease, lung trouble, or gastric trouble, I think we shall find that the doctor of the future, whatever his speciality, will do a certain amount of psychoanalysis. Not only this reaction of the mind of the patient to the developed illness, but also his state of mind accompanying the inception and development of the illness is important. We have reason to believe that the kind of illness that the person falls sick of, apart from infections, is related to his type of mind, and the organs of the body that may succumb may have definite relation to his mental make-up. In some cases it is a form of imitation. A person may fall ill in a certain way physically because his father, mother, brothers, or sisters had that illness. The alternative explanation there is the hereditary factor.

This view I have put before you may seem to you extreme. I do not want to present it in its extreme form; I do not accept it in the extreme form in which some people accept it. The late Dr. Georg Groddeck of Baden-Baden held the view in a rather extreme form, which I cannot

entirely support, but from the earliest inception of any form of illness the mind is accompanying the body, and unconscious mental processes are manifesting themselves physically in the illness.

A germ may in some cases produce the illness, but the way in which the organism resists the attack of the germ is important. In such a case as gastric ulcer—where there is a disturbance of the function of digestion involving temporary changes, which in their turn produce a vicious circle, leading to structural changes in the stomach—there the unconscious mental side is manifesting itself. That is a point of view which I more or less put to you as something to think about for yourselves. The reaction to any physical illness is an unconscious reaction in its early stages. There is often an unconscious motivation of the illness, an unconscious surrender to the illness in its earliest stages, and later on at the conscious level a strong reaction to the illness in one form or another. Among these reactions there are repercussions in all parts of the body; parts we are learning to regard as very important are the endocrine glands and the sympathetic nervous system that links up the endocrines with the central nervous system. The sympathetic or autonomic system and the endocrine glands, preserving the endocrine



balance, play an important part in the general vitality and vital powers of resistance of the body to illness of one kind or another.

We find that a very important psychological factor in an illness is fear. We are realizing this more and more clearly now from a physiological point of view. I am trying to think it out in terms of physiology, in a general way. It should be thought of in both ways at the same time, the physical and the mental; the unconscious mental and the physiological can be regarded as aspects of the same thing. The physical reaction of fear involves a disturbance of activity of the sympathetic nervous system; disturbed activity of the endocrine glands has a disorganizing effect upon the whole system and may diminish the powers of resistance to illness.

#### RELAXATION AND SUGGESTION

An opposite result is produced by the method of muscular relaxation and deep breathing, and I refer now to something which is of the utmost importance in treatment—namely that the patient should be encouraged to relax and become free from tension. Any tension on the part of the patient, whatever the illness, seems to lower resistance. To get rid of tension in a simple way, one asks the patient to lie on a couch,



relax the muscles, breathe slowly, deeply, and regularly, and let the mind dwell on the idea of sleep. As he breathes out, his muscles relax more. Letting the small muscles of the hands and feet relax, he will find a wave of relaxation spreading thence over his whole body, and after five or ten minutes on the couch he will have become thoroughly relaxed. His mind also relaxes and the result of the whole procedure is that the sympathetic nervous system gets calmed down more and more. This relaxation itself, for an hour at a time, is of the greatest benefit, and has a great health-giving power to the patient. It gives more benefit than an hour of ordinary sleep. He may fall into a hypnotic state, but whether he is hypnotized or not, benefit follows. I call it hypnotic sleep if he wakes up at the end without remembering anything said to him in the interval; on the other hand, if he does remember, he has not reached the deep hypnotic state.

That state of body and mind is recuperative, but it may be made more so if suggestion is given during the time. Every five minutes or so, give general suggestions to your patient, whatever the illness he is suffering from. Give him emphatic suggestions of health, suggestions that he will sleep soundly throughout the night and

wake up refreshed in the morning, with a good appetite and a good digestion. If he is a stammerer, suggest that he will be able to speak fluently and easily and that words will come readily to his lips. Give positive suggestions rather than negative ones. Avoid mentioning negatives or the illness itself; suggest all the time positive health, increased power, &c. By this method of intensive suggestion treatment, in the course of an hour a large number of suggestions can be given. The result may be, not only improvement in physical health, but an actual raising of the general level of function in various directions. You can thus improve powers of mental concentration and powers of memory; the response is often very pronounced indeed.

In one instance the patient was a man who was alcoholic, extremely restless, and a great nuisance to his household. One hour of treatment of that kind meant that the craving went completely; he had no desire or need for alcohol, and was perfectly well and free from nervousness. Actually, carried out in this way, the method of suggestion can produce permanent effects by one single suggestion, although repetition is generally necessary to establish a cure.

Eight years ago I decided to give up smoking, as I had always smoked rather too much.

Although I could stop it for a short time, at the end of, say, a month I was only too glad to get back to smoking again, and suffered from deprivation symptoms in the meantime. I therefore decided to try my own method. Having burnt my tobacco pouch and pipe, I leant back in my chair, relaxed my muscles, and thought of sleep—starting with the extremities, fingers, toes, hands, and feet, and reinforcing the relaxation by deep breathing. When in a thoroughly relaxed state, I silently affirmed to myself ‘I shall never smoke again; it means nothing to me. I shall feel no desire for it, no need. I shall never want to smoke again.’ I thought that for a few seconds and then went to bed. Next morning I did not even think about smoking, and have never smoked from then until now. By using this method I had destroyed the desire and need for smoking. It is a method, not of supplanting the will but of supplementing it. Indeed, I would go farther and say that it is a form of mind training whereby one reaches a completed will.

#### THE POWER OF WILL

Will is the highest form of mental activity. Coué said that it was not the will that needed to be trained, but the imagination. I would say

16471 | 3665



that the will needs to be trained by training the imagination. In order that an act of will may be complete, it must carry with it an imagination of success, and a feeling of certainty that success will come. It includes not only the entertaining of an idea and the wish that this idea will be realized, but also the feeling that one will bring about the result because one wills it. For that, imagination is required. By practice you can learn to imagine success in most directions. You can gain power over involuntary muscles, stomach, heart, or whatever it may be. I believe that we can get more and more power, through our sympathetic nervous system, over the different parts of our body, if in earnest about it, and if we carry out a certain amount of self-training. You can only convince yourself of this by doing it for yourself.

This is not hypnotism, but a genuine development and increase of the power of the will over the body. One can influence one's own digestion, heart-beat, the processes of elimination, and the general functions of almost every part of the body by resolution and calm determination. The important thing is to avoid spasmodic effort, to get muscular and mental relaxation; to imagine success with calm certainty, and then to affirm it with conviction. It may be called



suggestion treatment, but I think it is more than that. It might be called constructive suggestion or faith. The word suggestion seems to indicate a passive method, but this of which I am speaking is pre-eminently active.

It is will-power, a development of the power of the will over the body, and we realize that that needs thought and insight. As regards physical things it can be direct, but when dealing with mental symptoms you must be more analytic. Patients have to be taught to help themselves. You have to analyse them.

Things are not always what they seem in matters of mental illness. The apparent motives and reasons for the illness are not the true ones; you must get below the surface to the real forces. The patient has to learn to be really sincere with himself and to understand himself to the utmost. The illness itself is partly due to insincerity. The patient is often incapable of being absolutely sincere at that moment. Whether his illness is the result of shock or a gradual process of development, in either case the patient has to be taught to retrace his steps and to undo the mischief. Ask him to give you a further account, very precise and definite, of what really was the determining factor in his illness, and ultimately you get a story from him rather different from his first

story. When at last he really understands himself, he is well on the way to cure. For the cure to become complete he must do something active and develop his character further. Freud said that the discovery of the cause and treatment go hand in hand, but discovery of the cause alone is not sufficient. The individual has to redirect his mind, to realize what the goal was that he was following, and to appreciate that that goal was the wrong one. He must find the right goal and readjust his mind in that way.

On the analytic side, then, there is also needed an active form of therapy; the physician should be ready to carry this out, not by haranguing the patient, but by encouraging him to see things more clearly for himself, and to realize more definitely where he has gone wrong in the past, and how he can get back to his true 'life line'.

#### THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Analysis, which is a working out of the causes and antecedents, leads on to confession in the real sense, admitting a moral deficiency where such exists, and making a resolution to alter it. It is becoming increasingly apparent that there is an ethical or moral factor as well as a purely psychological factor in all psychogenic illness.

Analysis must take into account readjustment

in relation to one fundamental theme. This is the sense of guilt in its relation to the symptoms and treatment of hysteria and other forms of mental illness. It is also of great importance for physical illness, where we often find that the powers of resistance are diminished because of a sense of guilt. Much guilt-sense may be misplaced. A person may feel guilty about the wrong thing. Moreover, it is not always the most guilty who feel so most. Often the guilt-feeling dates from early childhood, when it was crude and unjustified. If that can be lifted, then the powers of resistance may increase, and physical or mental illness may clear up.

I, as a doctor, am becoming more and more convinced of the importance of psychology for physical illness. Mental illness is much more difficult; it often has a very pronounced hereditary factor. Many cases need prolonged analytical treatment for permanent cure: even the psychoneuroses are very ready to relapse. But in physical illness, where the mind is relatively normal, that mind can do wonders if adequately used.

We do not use our mental powers to anything like the extent that we might. No student learns his work as well as he could. Powers of mental concentration and of memory admit of great



improvement through the practice of autosuggestion and in other ways.

We find in prolonged mental analyses, where we bring up very early memories, that they have an extraordinarily beneficial effect upon the physical, as well as on the mental, health. If these deep analyses are carried out quietly, and are not forced, things come up quietly and gradually, the working over of these early experiences improves the physical functions of the body in a remarkable way. It all points to the intimate relation of the mind to the brain, whatever theory we may hold as to the nature of that relation.

Health means harmony, unity, and wholeness; everything points to the fact that that is the best word for it. Illness is due to disharmony, physical and mental conflict. Although character is built upon conflict, this conflict has to be resolved or cleared up, not in a crude way, as the hysterical person does by the path of repression, but by raising the mind to a higher level of mental activity where the claims of both sides of the conflict are met—in other words, by the path of sublimation.

#### PHYSICAL TREATMENT

In conclusion, I may indicate more directly the psychological value and importance of



physical treatment and massage in the domain of medicine. Massage is helpful quite as much on the mental as on the physical side. It produces relaxation and a calming of the mind as well as of the body. During that process of massage, wise suggestions can produce very beneficial effects.

Further, gymnastics of all kinds and eurhythmics have a definite psychological as well as a physiological effect. They produce harmony of working on the physical side, and give interest on the psychological side—a feeling of harmony. They reinforce the idea so important to us that the healthy life is the best and highest, and that the highest and best can be produced by health of the mind and of the spirit, which is the mind in its eternal aspect.

### CHAPTER III

## PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY<sup>1</sup>

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS as such is something very much wider than medicine, it is a branch of psychology—the psychology of the depths of the mind—and has its contribution to make, not only to medicine, but to anthropology, folk-lore, history, also to the problems attending modern life and conduct, to sociology, to politics, and to international relations. All these problems are illuminated by the findings of psycho-analysis. In medicine the subject is important, firstly, as a means of discovering more about the working of the mind in health and in disease, and, secondly, as affording an indication of the most satisfactory and scientific way of using the therapeutic art to rectify faulty mental function.

The relation of psychology to health and disease is a very wide subject. The mind and its workings represent—shall we say?—at least one-half of human life, and the condition of the mind is important in dealing with disease or

<sup>1</sup> *A British Medical Association Lecture* delivered to the Blackpool Division of the Lancashire and Cheshire Branch of the B.M.A. at the Hotel Metropole, Blackpool, on Wednesday, 13th November 1935.

dysfunction of any kind. We must not limit the application of psychology in medicine to the domain of the psychoneuroses and the psychoses. Psychology has a great deal to say in regions other than these. Every year we learn through psychology more and more about the way in which physical illness arises and develops. Just as we readily admit that physical disability, disturbance of endocrine activity, septic absorption, or an upset of various chemical or physico-chemical processes in the body will influence the mind and play a great part in the causation of mental illness, especially of the more extreme forms of insanity, so, on the other hand, we must be ready to admit the importance of psychological factors even in the most 'physical' of illnesses.

In illness we have to think not only of the infection but of the powers of resistance to the invading organism. Resistance to infection is the armament wherewith life continually defends itself, and when infection breaks down the resistance it is not only the assault of the organisms that has to be considered, but the condition of the defences, in particular from our point of view the condition of the nervous system (central and autonomic) which sends its fibres to every part of the body, and influences the liability to physical illness and the course which such illness,



once established, will take. The nervous system in its turn is most profoundly influenced by what is happening in its highest levels, the cerebral cortex and optic thalamus, and by the emotional as well as the intellectual side of consciousness. The general attitude of mind of the individual may be the deciding factor even in illnesses like typhoid or pneumonia which are considered wholly physical. This is no mystical theory of the direct action of the mind on different parts of the body, it is a straightforward inference from what we already know of the physiology of the nervous system and of what takes place on its highest levels, namely, those in relation to consciousness.

#### THE FIELD OF APPLICATION OF ANALYSIS

Mental analysis therefore—of which psychoanalysis is one special form—does not restrict itself to the treatment of obvious psychological illness, whether psychoneuroses or psychoses, but, of course, it does find an important application in these conditions, which include, among the psychoneuroses, anxiety hysteria, hypochondria, neurasthenia, and obsessional states, and among the psychoses, dementia praecox or schizophrenia, melancholia, manic-depressive psychosis, paranoia, and acute confusional

insanity. A bad family history is a great determining factor in making the diagnosis of a psychosis as distinct from a psychoneurosis; on the other hand, a psychoneurosis may also have a hereditary basis. Hysteria, for example, has a hereditary element. A person does not become hysterical merely through experiences in his own life, he is predisposed to hysteria just as others are predisposed to obsessional neurosis by heredity. In the psychoneuroses in general, however, heredity does not seem to be such a prominent causative factor and therefore not such a hindrance to the process of therapy as in the psychoses, and for that reason the prognosis is generally more hopeful in the former conditions.

The method of psycho-analysis was developed by Professor Sigmund Freud originally with special reference to the study of cases of hysteria and their treatment. He began in collaboration with Joseph Breuer, and the two of them showed that past emotional experiences had much to do with the causation of hysterical symptoms, and that the recalling of those past emotional experiences with great vividness was a definite therapeutic process and brought about improvement in the patient's state of mind. Freud went on to discover by further investigation that the emotional factor most prominent in these cases

was of a predominantly sexual nature, but here Breuer refused to follow him, so Freud went on alone, and it was in that divergence between Breuer and Freud that psycho-analysis was born.

Parenthetically let me explain that I myself am not a Freudian, nor a member of the Psycho-analytical Association, but I have been analysed to a certain extent by a leading Freudian, and for over twenty years now I have used the method in its general form, though not to the exclusion of other and less elaborate methods. I can verify from personal experience much that Freud has set out, though in other respects I am not in agreement, and I do not subscribe to all his points of emphasis.

Psycho-analysis is both a method and a theory. The original method used by Freud was hypnosis for recalling early memories, but he discovered that only a small proportion of people could be hypnotized, and that of those hypnotizable many failed to yield up their secrets, or, yielding in certain directions, developed greater resistance in others. Freud therefore abandoned that procedure, and in place of it he developed the method of free association, encouraging the patients to talk things out, to relate first of all their symptoms



and their onset and from that point to go deeper and deeper into their lives.

The method of analysis as usually practised at the present day is for the patient to lie passive on a couch out of sight of the analyst. In my own treatment I have a screen placed round the head of the couch which I can turn back on occasion in order to talk directly to the patient, but ordinarily the patient is not talking directly to me, and indeed does not see me. He just talks things out for an hour at a time, saying whatever comes into his mind. From time to time discussion is necessary in this process, as the resistances appear and the patient seems to find it difficult to communicate, or nothing comes into his mind at all. Then it is necessary for the physician to encourage him to continue and to point out the reward of his perseverance. One must be careful to ensure, however, that the patient avoids any exercise of his critical faculty. He must let his mind work spontaneously, with the critical faculty in abeyance.

#### TENDENCIES IN THE UNCONSCIOUS

In such a psychological situation mental tendencies below the threshold of consciousness have an opportunity to reveal themselves. They belong to the so-called unconscious, and under

analysis they manifest themselves in the conscious. Here a distinction must be made between the true or 'systematic' unconscious and what has been called the pre-conscious. The pre-conscious is just that part of one's past life which has fallen into the unconscious through the mere lapse of time and the demand of other matters upon the attention. It is not in a state of repression; it just remains below the conscious level until occasion arises, with some prompting of the memory, for it to come again into consciousness. It is no part of that true unconscious which is so important both in the theory of psycho-analysis and for the method of psychotherapy.

The systematic unconscious, on the other hand, consists of earlier tendencies and experiences that are in a state of repression, being kept away from clear consciousness by some repressive force. This repressive force, which Freud inferred from the resistance, he originally called 'the censorship'. A child, for example, who is brought for the first time against external authority is impelled to meet such authority with antagonism; he wants to get his own way. But because the authority is exercised by individuals whom he loves and respects he internalizes this external authority, making it part of

himself. This internalizing process in early years was given at first the name of the 'censorship', but it is now in Freudian terminology called the 'super-ego'. It is important to realize that this 'super-ego' is itself part of the unconscious, so that the true unconscious is not merely the repressed mental tendencies or libido, but it also includes the repressive factor itself. In other words, in addition to the repressed libido or 'id', the 'super-ego' which itself maintains the repression has to be considered as part of the unconscious.

The unconscious in a state of repression, therefore, is held in check by the active 'super-ego'. It is a wrong conception to suppose that the unconscious is endeavouring to elude analysis, and has, so to speak, to be chased and dragged up into consciousness. The analyst is not dragging up the unconscious into consciousness. On the contrary, the unconscious is always trying to be conscious, but is thwarted and held back by the activity of the 'super-ego'. The unconscious is an active principle, a set of instinctive urges of a primitive kind.

I suggest that this conception is of interpretive value not only in psychology, but also in the social sciences, and is of the utmost importance if we are to understand, for example, national



rivalries, the issues of war and peace, the persistence of what is called original sin and the manner in which it holds back progress. These phenomena are not properly understood unless there is realized this fact of the unconscious ready to come forward if it has a chance. It has its chance when the organization of the mind is weakened through general disease, through emotional shock, through sustained mental conflict. Symptoms arise which, properly interpreted, are these repressed tendencies beginning to show themselves in consciousness. They do not show themselves in their true form; the repressing 'super-ego' may have relaxed its vigilance, but it is able to prevent that. Nevertheless by analysis we discover in these states the unconscious forces pressing forward and the repressing forces not quite strong enough to hold them back, so that they appear in a distorted form.

Indeed, it is not necessary to suppose a pathological condition, for the same process occurs normally in dreams. A dream has been described by Freud as the disguised fulfilment of a repressed wish. The phenomena of dreams as we tell them to our friends are similar to the symptoms of hysteria. They are the manifestation of repressed tendencies which have to some

extent broken away from their repression because during the state of sleep the 'censorship' or 'super-ego' is diminished in power. But even in these conditions the unconscious tendencies have to disguise themselves; if they came up in their true guise the patient would wake in horror. An unpleasant or 'anxiety' dream is one in which the unconscious mental forces have broken into consciousness for the moment without their masks, and the shock is such that the dreamer wakes. Freud, in a picturesque literary allusion, likens these unconscious wishes to the shades in the *Odyssey* that come to life again when they have drunk blood. They are always pressing forward towards the gates of consciousness when the occasion arises to stimulate them.

#### REPRESSED TENDENCIES

I cannot over-emphasize this point, because in most of the popular literature on the subject it is not given its place. The reason why symptoms arise and can prove so intractable is that these unconscious forces are continually striving towards consciousness. When one is faced with such symptoms in a patient, something can be done to readjust the situation by persuasion, reasoning, appealing to moral

strength, and the symptoms will diminish again. But all that has happened is that the repression has been increased, the repressed tendencies are driven back to their lair, but they remain unsatisfied, and sooner or later will return again to the attack. They may reappear in the shape of different symptoms. The shutting up of certain safety-valves has only resulted in the forcing of others.

The scientific method is that of relieving the repression, giving these unconscious tendencies a chance of coming up into consciousness under the special conditions of the analysis. It will be said that this is to make the patient more primitive than he previously was, and no doubt in a sense that is so, the tendencies being primitive tendencies. But there is also given to the patient under such conditions the opportunity of sublimation. The two great words in the analytic system are 'repression' and 'sublimation'. Repression refers originally to the unconscious, not like self-control, which is conscious. Anything repressed is really not in a state of conscious control, it is mechanically held in check, and so long as the mental energy is in a state of repression it cannot to any great extent be used for higher cultural ends. But if the repression is relieved then there is an opportunity for the energy to become



sublimated, i.e. directed towards higher social and cultural ends.

The process will perhaps be clearer if we take a definite example. One primitive tendency is the self-assertive, showing itself in the form of aggressiveness, competitive rivalry, a readiness even to injure people, including those of whom the aggressor is fond, for the emotional satisfaction which it gives and the sense of power which it satisfies. That aggressive tendency is ordinarily held in check or repressed, but it may then show itself symptomatically in the strange form of over-conscientiousness, a morbid anxiety to avoid hurting other people's feelings or being the cause of their misfortunes. A common example is a man who, walking along the street, feels an irresistible inclination to go out of his way in order to remove every piece of orange-peel or banana-skin from the pavement. This over-conscientiousness may signify a well-understood and very intractable form of illness. On analysing the patient—and a very full analysis may be necessary, for a deep mental analysis may extend to sixty or seventy or a hundred hours or even more, otherwise the unconscious may not be given an adequate chance to come up into the conscious—this over-conscientiousness may be found to relate itself to a hidden

aggressive tendency belonging to the period of early childhood.

Years ago, just after the War, a patient came to me suffering from this very condition. He was unable to afford a lengthy treatment, so that the analysis could not be complete. But towards the end I could see what the real cause was, and I told him of the possibility that behind his over-anxiety not to do injury to others there might be, deep down in his mind, something just the opposite. There is a perversion named sadism in which pleasure is taken in acts of cruelty towards persons whom the aggressor loves. The Marquis de Sade, who flourished about the time of the French revolution, wrote notorious books which were banned from all the public libraries of France, with the result that they were to be found in every private library! This patient of mine, who was a bookseller, went back home and looked over his stock and found Sade's *Justine* and *Juliette*, and to his horror found himself held and fascinated by these books. He came to me two or three days later in quite a different frame of mind. 'They are appalling, I was horror-struck as I read them, but I could not stop reading them. I read them right through, and I am ashamed to say I was pleasurably stimulated by them, and now

feel better.' The process of reading those books had stimulated (or, rather, liberated) the sadistic tendency which was so strongly marked in him and had been so sternly repressed. It worked almost in a dramatic way, and it illustrated quite clearly the situation of the primitive repressed tendency held in check, to the impoverishment and enfeeblement of the mind, the personality being rendered timid, over-conscientious, unable to develop, and in general pusillanimous. On relieving the repression up comes the aggressive tendency again in full force, but it has now the opportunity of being sublimated.

It is natural for the sceptic to ask, 'Are you helping such a man by analysis? You have relieved the repression, it is true, but what if in place of the good-mannered if pusillanimous citizen you have substituted a savage?' But that is not what one has done, for the patient is already developed in certain directions, and when these primitive tendencies are let out and are seen for what they are, the rest of his mind can deal with them quite well. The thing to beware of is the reinstatement of the repression.

#### THE RELIGIOUS MOTIVE

For this reason one has to be very careful in the application of religious methods and motives



to a mental patient. The religious motive in its ordinary form, with its emphasis on duty, may lead to an intensification of repression, of the 'super-ego', a re-enactment of the situation which had already caused the trouble. Another reason for being very careful about religious and ethical motives at the start is that so much mental illness—and I will add, so much physical illness—is due to an unconscious primitive sense of guilt, not the same thing as guilt itself, because the people most sensible of guilt, speaking generally, have not very much real guilt on their conscience. A sense of guilt may derive from early childhood in relation to parents. It may arise within the domain of the Oedipus complex, where the little child, wishing to have his mother to himself, feels jealousy and hatred towards his father, hates himself for it, and reacts to it by enhanced respect and loyalty towards his father, introjects into his mind the father-ideal, and so develops the 'super-ego'. The more strong the Oedipus situation the more pronounced may be the development of the 'super-ego' which produces the sense of guilt, and that sense of guilt lowers the powers of resistance, breaks down the defences, so that the individual feels that everything that comes to him is deserved. In that condition illness may

set in, even in a young child, through a sense of guilt.

Another situation to be borne in mind is mother-fixation. A child wants to keep his mother's love and be continually sustained and nursed by her. Illness means that he gets more attention from his mother and more pronounced manifestations of her love, so that there is a tendency for him to cling to his illness. I have recently had a pronounced example of that kind, a summary of which is printed as an appendix in the third edition of my *Psychology and Psychotherapy*. A doctor came to me suffering from anxiety neurosis. He was subject to fears of all kinds, which prevented him from getting married. The analysis lasted for about two hundred hours, and in the process he went back to his earliest childhood. He could remember how, at the age of three, while on a farm, he had drunk a can of stout and became very ill, but he rejoiced in his illness because it meant having his mother completely to himself, away from his elder brother of whom he was jealous and towards whom he had an inferiority complex. He clung to this little illness, and later he got ill in other ways and remained ailing. There was a good deal more in the case than that, but as a result of the analysis everything cleared up, he

was able to get married, and was happy and successful in every way. The difficulties were clearly due to early repressions, the Oedipus situation, the sense of guilt, mother fixation, hostility to certain persons, and general self-punishment.

That is a situation we have often come across after the analysis has gone on for any length of time, and the 'super-ego' gradually comes within the field of view of the 'analytical microscope' and has to be dealt with.

#### TRANSFERENCE

I have not yet mentioned the important and fundamental factor of transference in analysis. This means the transference to the physician of the early emotional tendencies of the patient. The physician may find himself, in relation to his patient, temporarily in the position of a father-substitute or mother-substitute or both. He is rather like a lay figure on which all sorts of dresses are tried. He is conscious as the analysis goes on hour after hour that the patient, passing through stages of illusion, is attributing to him or projecting upon him characteristics which belonged to the patient's father or mother or nurse or other connexion. It is here that analytical work can be very exacting. The



analyst needs to be a sort of mental pugilist who does not mind receiving blows. He will never, of course, lose his temper, but he must also be careful never to allow himself to be caught up in the analysis, never to permit a counter-transference. He must not mind the 'temperamental' attitude of the patient towards him. The only way in which he can avoid allowing his own feelings to become engaged is by being analysed himself.

The physician who sets out to do analysis should first be analysed. The Freudians demand a 'complete' analysis (to be carried out by an analysed Freudian), which may last hundreds of hours, for they would say that the more normal the person the longer the analysis, the character being so closely knit that it takes more time to penetrate its meshes to the primitive forces beneath. Freud himself has not been analysed, but for the ordinary run of people a good deal of analysis from some one else is a necessary preliminary before self-analysis can proceed with any real efficiency. The self-analysis can be carried out to a great extent through dreams, the dream being a half-way house between the conscious and the unconscious. If one's dreams are studied night after night and week after week, with the associations

which they indicate, it will be found that more and more will be learned about oneself. That is the best way of working out a psycho-analytical autobiography. This was how Freud carried out his own self-analysis.

The analyst must himself be analysed. He must be free from complexes. A complex may be described as a set of repressed ideas tinged with emotion. From such complexes the physician must be free. His mind should be like a mirror, with no flaw or distortion, which he can hold up to his patient so that the patient can see himself. Otherwise a situation will arise in which patient and doctor will be exchanging complexes and getting more and more disturbed in the process. The problem of transference will also be intensified. If transference comes about with the interpenetration of two minds it is much more difficult to deal with the situation. The transference has to be resolved, which means that the patient has to be led still farther back in analysis so that he can realize whence comes the transference or fixation upon the physician. He is brought to remember his reactions to parents and nurse, brothers and sisters in earliest years.

What I have been setting forth hitherto is in harmony more or less with the general doctrine

of Freud. To place, as many people do, Jung and Adler in opposition to Freud is to do an injustice all round. The method that Jung uses is only to a small extent of a psycho-analytic nature. So far as it is reductive analysis, overcoming repressions, it is, no doubt, true psycho-analysis, but so much that Jung does is in the direction of working out the fundamental aims of the patient at the higher levels of his mind. It is rather startling to find Jung reported as recently saying that transference should not occur. When I read his recent remark to that effect I realized how far he had departed from the Freudian method. No one can employ that method without becoming most intensely impressed by the importance of transference in the process of recovery. With transference all the various repressions of the patient converge upon the physician. In place of their symptoms there is a fixation upon him, which they do not understand, of which indeed they are not fully aware, for it is more unconscious than conscious, although it manifests itself in their conscious behaviour. Their repressed tendencies are fixed upon the physician, and it is for him to resolve this emotional energy which is fixed upon him. I use the word 'emotional' rather than 'sexual', for I do not think the energy is entirely sexual,



and a wider term is needed. The patient has to be taken back again to his earliest experiences, so that he receives back again, as it were, the energy he has transferred, and then the physician can help him. The transference-situation can be used to help the patient towards sublimation. In a certain stage of the analysis the patient may become more and more discouraged and disappointed with himself, saying that life is too difficult for him. At that point one is justified in introducing a new method, which may perhaps be called re-education. With the benefit of the transference-situation the patient is ready to listen to the physician, and the latter can encourage him to think things out for himself in such a way as to arrive at a general philosophy of life. It is here that with great advantage ethical and religious principles may be introduced. Their proper place, as I have already said, is not at the beginning of the analysis, but after repressions have been relieved to a great extent and transference has been established.

But the process must not end there. Transference must be resolved. The patient must be made to stand upon his own feet. It is unfair to the patient and great harm can be done if the analytical method is carried out to the letter

and the patient is just analysed and sent away with no moorings, no anchor, no philosophy of life, no religious inculcation, no fixed point anywhere. His last state may then be as bad as his first, although in a different way.

What I have just been saying belongs rather to psychotherapy in general than to the narrower field of psycho-analysis. Psycho-analysis is a process comprehended within psychotherapy, and an essential process if the latter is to be a radical method of treatment. The counsel of perfection is always a long analysis. That has to be made plain to one's patients. My own longest analysis is now in its eighth year. The patient when he first came to me was suffering from severe mental illness with extreme obsessions. He comes still twice a week—he is, of course, earning his living—and the continued analysis is no 'drug' in his case, but a means of understanding himself better and better. A highly educated man, he is making copious notes of his case, and when complete the study will form a striking piece of psychological research.

#### SHORTER ANALYSIS

It follows that only a small proportion of patients can afford the full analysis, which makes great demands on their time. Moreover,

in such long analyses the mental strength of the patient has to be supported, just in the same way as his physical strength would need to be supported were he passing through an operation. In my opinion psycho-analysis is not to be taken as complete in itself, nor to be regarded as the only method of curing patients, though it may be the only method of understanding them to the full. Much can be done in psychotherapy, apart from what is technically psycho-analysis, to encourage the patient to get a philosophy of life and a religious fixity which will help him in his troubles. It is on this matter of the value of religion in psychotherapy that I part company with Freud. Freud is very uncompromising in this respect. He regards religion as an illusion, a wish-fulfilment, a temporary reaction to the crude difficulties of existence. Mankind according to him, by a process of projecting its wishes, has developed an ideal of God who can satisfy those wishes in a future life in which all injustices will be rectified and all difficulties solved. He is even ready to go farther and to consider the possibility of thought itself being a wish-fulfilment. Not only, according to him, is religion an illusion, but he is ready to say that truth as such is an illusion. But if truth is an illusion, then everything is an illusion, including



psycho-analysis itself. Further, if religion be an illusion, then those people who have strong religious convictions on which they organize their lives might be expected to be ultimately weaker than others, but that is simply not the case. Freud, however, is not a philosopher, he has apparently had no training in metaphysics nor shown evidence of a grasp of that subject, and he seems quite unable to rise above the point of view of determinism in psychology and a mere rationalism in science in general.

I must not enter further into that discussion, but it seems to me a great pity that Freud, who has done more than any other man to increase the freedom of the human spirit, should be himself such an uncompromising determinist and opponent of religion, which, taken in its widest sense, is that which justifies and establishes our belief in our own ultimate freedom and in the ultimate spiritual destiny of the human race.

#### SUGGESTION TREATMENT

So much for psycho-analysis in its strict form and in general outline. As I have said, the majority of sufferers cannot afford a full analysis. In such cases one does not undertake to give them analysis, but one can encourage them to talk out their lives, and get a clearer view of the

situation at the conscious level. It is not possible in such conditions to deal much with the unconscious forces or bring them up into consciousness to any great extent. But the patients can be helped in self-knowledge on the conscious and pre-conscious levels, and by suggestion and persuasion. This is where the method of suggestion comes in. Suggestion carried out within the framework of analysis is a constructive thing—I call it ‘constructive suggestion’. It is not a matter of just making the patient more suggestible so that he may be equally prone to bad suggestions and to good. I personally regard suggestion treatment as a stepping-stone to what may be called ‘faith healing’. In other words, the method is one which makes it more possible for a person to get into the faith state—a will to trust the noblest hypothesis and to act upon it—an active and not merely expectant state of mind. The method of suggestion treatment is really a method of training the will, carrying with it, in addition to the resolve to succeed, the power to imagine success. In the treatment by suggestion we train the patient’s power to imagine success, and ‘nothing succeeds like success’, meaning that with each success a further success is more ensured. ‘Possunt, quia posse videntur.’ Suggestion is therefore

a supplementation of the will, not something that takes the place of it.

The patient's suggestibility is increased by getting him to lie on a couch, with muscles relaxed, breathing deeply and regularly. His sympathetic nervous system in this way passes, I think, into a special condition. His emotions must be calmed down so that the emotional side of his life becomes accessible to suggestion. In that state suggestions may be given him to reinforce his self-confidence, not only that his symptoms will clear up, but that he will sleep soundly at night, wake up refreshed in the morning, with a good appetite, regular in all his physical functions, with calmed nerves and every part of the body in good working order, and that he will be thoroughly self-confident so that whatever difficulties may arise can be met without agitation or panic or fear.

On giving these suggestions, and repeating them, it will be found that in suitable patients—not in all—most pronounced results follow. A very usual result is to find pronounced benefit after the first time or two, followed by a period of reaction during which the patient seems almost as bad as at first. But if the treatment is continued the curve of improvement is upwards in spite of setbacks. The patient may



also be told to employ self-suggestion, to be quite passive and relaxed last thing at night, and to say to himself, 'I shall sleep well to-night, &c.', going to sleep with that idea. That can be applied to any set of circumstances, to facing the approach of anything disturbing, to improving one's memory, to mastering a difficult task.

Thus suggestion is of value to the normal person in increasing his powers, and surely its value in illness should be beyond cavil. Yet most if not all Freudians hold up their hands in horror at any proposal that suggestion should be used, they regard it as untrue to their method. But there is really no necessary conflict between the shorter forms of analysis, with 'suggestion treatment', and the full analysis. Furthermore, hypnosis may be used for recalling lost memories. Objections are taken to hypnosis on the ground of its dissociating action; nevertheless a mild hypnosis, breaking through the outer crust as it were, of the patient's personality, may be of real value in some cases, and reassociation is always possible.

I have desired in this lecture to make it clear that psycho-analysis is a method of discovering the fundamental causes of mental illness, but that it is not necessarily the only method of effective psychotherapy, and that procedures

which stop short of the full analysis may be of value in a given case. The aim of treatment is to secure such a unification of the mind as will give free play to the *vis medicatrix naturae*, that natural tendency towards healing without which surgeon and physician alike are helpless. In the presence of any illness, if the patient's mind is in a satisfactory condition—not only his conscious mind, but his unconscious mind, which is so very much more important in this respect—then healing may come about so completely and rapidly that in the case of some physical illnesses the word 'miracle' has been used. But there is no miracle in the sense of a violation of Nature's laws; it is only that, through the removal of an impediment, the normal equilibrium has been restored.

The most effective recent criticism of psycho-analysis, from a psychological point of view, is set out in *Psycho-Analysis and Social Psychology*, by Professor W. McDougall, F.R.S., Methuen & Co., London, 1936.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE PROBLEM OF SEX CONTROL

THIS problem is a part of the general problem of self-control—obviously one of the most important problems to which the mind of man can set itself: Is self-control possible? If so, how? Do we control ourselves, or are we just controlled by circumstances? If we control ourselves, what are the conditions, the favourable conditions, the essential conditions, of that self-control?

Control of sex is simply one part of the general problem of self-control, and it is a very big part indeed. I would even say that one of the essential conditions of control of sex is an adequate development of self-control in general, and that for education in sex control you need as a basis education in self-control from the cradle onwards; and we see especially the truth of this in the light of modern doctrine, because we are learning more and more, as we investigate patients and others as to their present state in relation to their earlier experiences, that sex, instead of beginning, as it used to be thought to begin, at adolescence or puberty, begins almost in the cradle: indeed it begins with life itself. There is a sexual tendency, or there are a number of sexual tendencies, which the child has,



which it does not itself recognize, of course, and which its parents and others around it do not recognize. So there is development of that side of its nature going on all the time, and at adolescence you merely have an outburst of further development—a precipitation, as it were, of sexual tendencies along special lines of biological significance and biological importance. It is at adolescence that the sexual instinct appears as of importance in the biological function of the continuation and preservation of the race. With sex there is linked up parental feeling. We should not be too ready to separate the one from the other: indeed, a great deal of the difficulties of the individual is due to these false distinctions, these abstractions, these separatings-off of one particular element from other elements. A very great danger is, of course, the separation of the physical element, the element of mere physical sexual pleasure, from other elements that rightfully belong to it. So, although there are problems, which I have not time to go into now, in early infantile sexuality and the necessary care that should be devoted to the young child in these what we know to be sexual manifestations of sadism, masochism, exhibitionism, sexual curiosity, &c., our problem begins at adolescence itself. Our problem begins

when the pressure of sex is strong, and for economic reasons cannot be satisfied at once; and not only for economic reasons, for social and spiritual reasons. The sexual impulse is there before the rightful object has been discovered and selected, and the problem of control arises at that point. A bad habit can set in at that time—the well-known bad habit of masturbation or self-abuse, which may be taught, which may be caught from others, may be learnt from others, or may occur quite spontaneously in the individual. The danger of the event is that it should become a habit by repetition, and *qua* habit, as a habit, become less and less easy to control. The thing itself, of course, is bad—must be rejected, must be disapproved of—but it must not be faced with fear or with horror or with contempt. It is almost a natural event in the sense that it is almost inevitable in a certain proportion—not in all, but in a certain proportion—of developing adolescents; and any feeling of fear and of horror in relation to it tends to complicate the whole situation, to distort the situation and make self-control more difficult instead of more easy. Why is that? Because one essential element in self-control is the ability to imagine success. If we wish to control any instinctive tendencies or any desires or impulses

or urges, just as if we wish to control any fears or apprehensions or worries, an essential condition is that we should expect to succeed; and if we are met with fear of failure, if we have fear of failure thrust upon us, if we have a discouragement, if we feel that people around us do not believe in us, or expect us to fail rather than to succeed—that is, if the individual feels that he is being watched and that people around him expect him to fail, and that he will only not fail by being prevented through this watching—that sets up a frame of mind that is inimical to success.

#### WILL AND WISH

Self-control is will control. What do we mean by the will? Will, or volition, is the highest form of mental activity. Starting with the lower stages of instinctive urge, natural propensities of one kind or another, impulses, interests, desires which all can occur at stages below the level of full consciousness, we pass on to the higher stage of wish. Wish does involve consciousness. Wish is desire relating to or tending towards an imagined satisfaction. An imagined situation is evolved in consciousness, and there is a feeling of tension between imagined satisfaction and the present feeling of dissatisfaction. That feel-



ing of tension alone is one aspect of desire, but the vivid impression of what we are desiring, awareness of what we are desiring—that is the aspect of wish. But wish is not the same as will. We can wish the impossible; we can wish to live for ever, but we cannot will to live for ever. In order that will should supervene, in order that the wish should develop further, pass through into the stage of willing, something must be added—namely, a belief that we shall succeed. So that we can define will as a desire qualified and defined by the belief that, so far as in us lies, we shall bring about the end that we desire because we will it. That is the state of mind in complete volition—notice I say *complete* volition. Much that is called volition or *will* is incomplete volition. Only very strong characters *will* adequately at all frequently. Napoleon had great strength of will. Many people of national importance that we could mention at the present day undoubtedly have great strength of will; but the majority of people are not strong-willed: when they are exerting will, or appear to try to exert will, they are literally *trying* to exert it: that is, their will is effortful will. Well, effortful will is incomplete will, and falls short of complete success. Will means that we have passed the stage of wishing, and gone on to the stage of

willing—that is, of determining, resolving to bring about the result; but we are checked by another element in our minds, namely, fear of failure. ‘I should like to, but I am afraid I cannot’—that is the state of mind that most people who have acquired this particular bad habit are in. Take any habit you like—we are talking about the habit of masturbation at the moment—which must be broken, which must be dealt with. It should be dealt with, it can be dealt with, and can only be dealt with by volition, by will power; but when I say that, I do not mean that the volition will arise full-blown and produce its effect. You will find, in these cases, that as soon as the habit has begun, there is incomplete volition, there is effortful will; and the more the patient, the individual, tries, the less he succeeds.

#### THE LAW OF REVERSED EFFORT

This situation illustrates the ‘law of reversed effort’: the more one tries the less one succeeds. It can be expressed more psychologically in the words that Coué and Baudouin used: ‘When the will and the imagination are in conflict, the imagination always wins’; but the word ‘will’ here is the French word ‘*vouloir*’, which also means ‘wish’; so I would say that where an

effortful will or an effortful wish and the imagination are in conflict, the imagination always wins. If we wish something but fear that we shall fail, then failure will be our portion. A straightforward example is this. Put a narrow plank along the ground. You start to walk along that plank. You can do it quite easily. You expect to do it and you can do it. You stride forward confidently. Put that plank across a ditch. If the ditch is not very deep you will manage it all right. Put that narrow plank across a very deep ravine, a deep cleft. The thought of the cleft, the thought of the depth, the thought of the result supposing you did slip, is so vivid in your mind, appeals so strongly to your imagination, that you get the imagination of possible failure: you imagine possibly slipping off that plank. You bravely proceed forward, but you find yourself wobbling; and you wobble as you cross a narrow plank over a deep ravine or cleft, or over a deep nullah, because there is this imagination of failure, an imagination that you will fall, conflicting with the beginnings of will. If, on the other hand, you have a rabid tiger after you and your mind is fixed upon the idea of escape; if then you come to a narrow bridge even across a deep nullah or a deep ravine, you make little of it: you get across that



bridge all right because your imagination is concerned with what is behind you, not what is below you. Sometimes it is better to be between the devil and the deep sea than facing the devil or the deep sea alone: the one will cancel out the other in their effect upon the imagination.

#### WILL AND IMAGINATION

Well, this is the situation. I have spent some time over it because, if you fully understand this situation, if you fully understand what will means, and the relationship between will and imagination, then you have the secret of self-control. It is an open secret, but nevertheless only a very small proportion of people hold it—can use it. Those who can use it will find that they have three times as great efficiency in any direction, any direction they like, as they had before: indeed, I would not put limits to what one can do by an adequate control of the imagination. It means, obviously it means, avoiding all fear. It means avoiding the thought of failure, fear of failure. It means encouraging in oneself the idea of success. It means imagining success. Now, one can do that in the conscious mind to a certain extent, but unfortunately there is not only the conscious mind but also one's subconscious mind, which contains all

one's past memories, the residues of one's past depressing experiences, failures, &c. Consequently, though you stride forward bravely, your unconscious pulls at you and reminds you that you failed before, and that you will fail again if you are not careful.

#### INFERIORITY FEELING AND INFERIORITY COMPLEX

That situation, where you fear failure, and you are expecting to meet failure, can be called an inferiority—not an inferiority complex, but a sense of inferiority, *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl* (to use the original German term). That inferiority feeling becomes an inferiority complex when you throttle the voice of your unconscious in various ways. For example, when you 'compensate'. You do not like to believe that you are inferior, and so you compensate for it by imagining all sorts of wonderful results and wonderful successes that actually you could not achieve at all; or you compensate for it by falling ill, feeling ill, and believing that that illness is a justification for your failure; or you compensate by becoming boastful and aggressive and bullying in order to distract yourself, and others, from this vacuum inside you, this feeling of inadequacy inside you. Those are the reactions you find tending to come up, one or another,

when you are fighting any difficulty of the will, any moral difficulty; and I do not want to speak too much of sex only: all I am saying applies not only to sex but to other things as well, and I wish to emphasize its general application, because, as I said at the beginning, if you get general self-control you will find sexual self-control easy. What we need is general self-control, which means understanding ourselves; not only understanding our conscious minds and our present mental state, but understanding how we have reached the stage that we have in our mental development, realizing the things we have passed through in earlier days and how we reacted, whether we have failed or succeeded on different occasions, linking up our experiences, unifying our minds in that way. Instead of letting our past work on its own as a dead weight, we should draw it up into our present; that is, we should understand ourselves.

#### AUTOGNOSIS OR SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Self-knowledge itself brings self-control; but self-knowledge means knowledge not only of our conscious mind but of the deeper desires and wishes, earlier tendencies, often of an infantile nature. We have to learn to grow up. None of us grows up adequately, because there is always



a part of our mind lagging behind; the child, the infantile in us, is lagging behind. The child is there, and we are childish, and we become more childish when we are up against difficulties which we are not fully equal to. It is one way in which we react to a difficulty, just as a horse shies at a high fence. We regress, or run back. We are up against a difficulty, we regress to a more infantile stage of mental activity; and often this habit of which we are speaking is a habit of regression, a regression to a more infantile form of sexual activity, a regression to an auto-erotic activity; and it is important for the individual to understand himself there, or for the doctor to enable the patient to understand himself there, to understand what this habit really is. It is often a running away from difficulties. If, on the other hand, instead of running away from difficulties he can adapt himself to his difficulties, then the tendency, the habit, the temptation will be less and may disappear. The energy, instead of regressing and intensifying just this auto-erotic urge, will go forward and enable the individual to carve out a career for himself, to be energetic and industrious, and make himself economically efficient so that he can ask the right girl to marry him and use his libido, or sexual energy, in the way in which it was intended, for the

building up of the family, not only on the physical side, of course, but on the mental and spiritual side too. Thereupon the energy branches forward, moves forward, towards wider and wider fields, wider and wider objects, objects that are perhaps at first personal, individual, but become eventually superpersonal, become spiritual. That is what we call sublimation.

### SUBLIMATION

Sublimation is the direction of any instinctive tendency to higher ends. Instead of being fixed upon the most primitive, the most direct form of satisfaction—a short-circuit physical satisfaction producing physical pleasure or just satisfying a crude momentary desire—the energy passes through higher levels of the nervous system and supports desires and wishes, hopes, aspirations, ideals of a wider and wider import, enabling the individual to live not merely for himself but for his family, for society, for his nation, for humanity in general, and ultimately for the universe. I do not think we can draw any bounds here. The energy ultimately should be directed towards the entire universe, which is, of course, the same as what we mean by God. The physical universe is God as He manifests Himself outwardly.

## GOD AND THE UNIVERSE

But the universe is not merely physical; it is mental and spiritual as well. We meet God not only outwardly in the physical world, but inwardly in these promptings and tendencies of all kinds; and therefore we know—we need not bemuse ourselves with all sorts of sophisticated arguments, agnosticism, scepticism, pessimism—we *know* that idealism is really the true theory of the universe. We know that our real duty is to fight for the spiritual. We know what the spiritual is. People often ask, ‘What is the spiritual?’—but we all really know that. We can put our friends in order of merit as regards their spirituality—the extent to which they can pass beyond their egocentricity and live and die for others. As Hegel said, ‘Die to live’; or, as Christ said, as we learn in our own religion, ‘He that loseth his life for My sake and for the Gospel’s sake, shall gain it.’ That is the way in which spiritual progress occurs. We do not lose anything. It is not effacement. We do not efface ourselves. We do not efface ourselves or deface ourselves, we realize ourselves in service for others. Now that is not just moralizing on my part. It has direct application to our central problem here of sexual control, and to the



control of any of our instincts. Moreover, our instincts are not separable from one another. You cannot say, 'The instinct of sex is here, the instinct of self-preservation is there, the gregarious instinct is here, the awareness of God is here, and these other instincts are there.' Man is not a bundle of instincts: the instincts are aspects of his fundamental urge, or *élan vital*, or vital impulse, which drives all creation along towards higher and higher things, towards greater and greater integration and organization of spiritual life.

#### THE GOAL OF LIFE

What is the aim? What are we all aiming at? What does it come to in the end? Of course, what we are aiming at really, when we are most truly ourselves, and not falling short and running away, running back to earlier stages—what we are all aiming at is the kingdom of God in the sense of a realm of souls, a realm of individuals who live according to universal law, obeying the moral law, as Immanuel Kant has so well set out in the words, 'Act so that the law of your action can be made law universal'—so that what is true for you and what is the rule for you is the rule for others. That is something that we know. When we face that ideal we realize its truth, and

we know that, if it is true, we must be able to follow it; and that is why Immanuel Kant said also, 'I ought, therefore I can.' The mere fact that one can have a feeling of obligation, of moral obligation that brooks of no denial—I do not mean any particular obligation to do this or to do that, because there may be special reasons why you will be excused that, or have some doubt about it, but that obligation ultimately exists—means also that freedom exists, freedom of the will; but that freedom of the will is not something that is given us in its completeness at the beginning of life, that we can use as we will, or misuse or discard: it is something that we are given the germ of but must develop for ourselves. We have to make ourselves free. One learns to be free through life.

#### SPIRITUAL FREEDOM

Spiritual experience, character and the soul, can only be developed in life through actual experience. You cannot get it otherwise. No one else can do it for you; you have got to do it yourself. Every soul has to be created by itself—of course, with divine help. The beginnings are given us, but we have to create it further ourselves. That is the only argument that I consider of any value in favour of immortality, of

continued existence—the only argument—that what is strong enough to survive will survive. As Browning says: ‘The soul doubtless is immortal—where a soul can be discerned.’ We have to make our soul. We can do just the opposite; we can kill our soul. It does not mean that we are sure of immortality in the scientific sense; we never can be; but immortality is a postulate, just as freedom and God are postulates of our existence. We never can prove them by intellectual arguments. Only through faith can we hold those views, and they imply one another in that order—God, freedom, immortality.

#### GOD, FREEDOM, AND IMMORTALITY

It is because we believe in God, because we believe in a spiritual universe, and see from our own experience that that spiritual universe, so far as we are concerned, means leading the moral life, that we believe in freedom, that we believe that our will is free; and because we believe that our will is free, we believe that it cannot be extinguished by anything physical, just as we cannot be prevented from doing our duty by anything physical—armies, or torture, or whatever it may be, or the state, or martyrdom of any kind. We can do it; and men have done it, not once or twice, but



thousands of times in the course of past history, and will continue to do it. For that reason we believe that there is a wider future for the soul than for the body. We know what happens to the body after death; it is no use sophisticating there. We know that the brain, as well as other parts of the body, disintegrates, and breaks up into its elements; but as to the mind, although it is linked up with the brain here, and its development runs parallel with the development of the brain here, still we consider that the very nature of mind, the very nature of the spiritual, means that it is capable—potentially anyhow—of surviving the body, of surviving bodily death; but it is an argument not for mere survival but for immortality, in the sense that whatever is really beyond mere temporal sequence, in the sense of ultimate value, of complete supratemporal value, that, by definition, will achieve the eternal.

#### THE ETERNAL

The universe is eternal. God is not in time; time is in God; and we, in so far as we seek God, and try to be in communion with Him, and try to identify the plan of our lives, as far as possible, with Him, we too are living the immortal life here and now. This implies—to come

back to the question of sex—an attitude of mind. If you really convince yourself of it, and get free from a lot of sophistical reasoning that hampers you; and if you can resolve to live the Christian life—and that means with your whole mind, not with reservations—then, of course, any getting rid of a bad habit of any kind is child's-play. It has been proved so again and again. One of the most difficult habits to get rid of is the alcoholic habit, or the drug habit, if it has been going on for a long time; but we know that a true spiritual outlook, once attained, is sufficient to overcome it; and as a stepping-stone to that we find the method of suggestion treatment is helpful. I have purposely not mentioned suggestion treatment in the beginning, because I do not want you to think of all this in a mechanical way; I want you to think of it in a spiritual way.

#### SUGGESTION TREATMENT

Suggestion treatment is a stepping-stone to the actuation of the spiritual. An individual has a bad habit. He tries hard to get rid of it. The more he tries, the less he succeeds. He prays about it and fails again; and the more frequently he fails, the more in the depths he is. But if he gets passive in mind, and lies on a couch, more or less relaxed, thinking of sleep, and then

calmly thinks to himself: 'I shall never give way to that habit again; that habit is not part of my universe; from now onwards for ever I have renounced it completely'—that is, if he renounces it without reservation, and renounces it not only with his conscious mind but with his subconscious mind—then the result will be complete success; and if he does not succeed at once he can repeat the process. This method, psychologically, is the method of controlling the imagination, enabling him to imagine success, so that, instead of making an incomplete effort of will, with the idea of failure always in the background, he can make a complete act of will—not an effort of will, but a calm act of will—with the complete belief and certainty, 'I shall succeed.'

#### PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE SPIRITUAL UNIVERSE

Of course, there, ultimately, I personally hold that the basis of all this is the spiritual universe. It is because we believe in the spiritual universe—that is, because we believe in God and the spirit—that we can make these affirmations to ourselves, and use this method with so much success as we do. On the other hand, we can use it as a form of witchcraft, a kind of incantation, and get some result thereby. If you repeat,



'Every day and in every way I am getting better and better', twenty times every night, as Coué advocated, you may get some result; but I think you get results straight away, without repetition, if you can get this other attitude; and I can tell you from experience that there is hardly any limit, within reason, to what one can do with it. Naturally, any one like myself, who is using this method, uses it on himself as well as on other people. He finds that he can get rid of unjustified fatigue thereby, and greatly increase his efficiency. Fatigue itself is a danger-signal, it is true, in certain cases: you have to husband your resources; but the truth of it is that all of us could do three times as much as we do. We feel mental fatigue far more often than we should, because we are acting against ourselves, like people who are trying to open a door and are pulling it in the wrong direction. We are tense, and thus lose a lot of energy in unproductive ways. Suggestion is one of the methods of increasing efficiency, and analysis is another. Analysis, leading to self-understanding, is one method of getting the mind harmonized—tuning up the engine so that the parts are not working against each other, so that the various cylinders are working in harmony with one another. Constructive suggestion, too, means

that you are getting rid of this counter-will from the unconscious—this fear of failure. You can sum it up as that. It all comes back to that—fear of failure—and often, unfortunately, not only fear of failure but desire for failure—because many people are like the alcoholic, the man in *Sweet Lavender*, who says, ‘Last time, Clemmy, my boy, last time’, for whom the latest drink is consciously the last, but subconsciously just one of a series of indulgencies—and he has not unreservedly given up the habit. So it is in all of these things, and so it is in this matter of the control of sex.

#### WILL WITHOUT RESERVATIONS

The principle of that is to believe in the will, but to make sure that you really are willing, make sure that you have no reservations, that you are not holding back in any way. Resolutely think out exactly what you do believe, and you will find that you must believe in the spiritual element; and that means that you have certain duties. If you are going to believe in the spiritual, you cannot go back to a more mechanical kind of life; you have got to live according to the spiritual laws, and you must make those laws your own, internalize them, impose them upon yourself and follow them gladly.

To help you in that you have besides, of course, all your religious feeling, and help of every kind on the conscious plane. But you should also look under the bonnet of your mental engine and see that the sparking-plugs are all clean, and that the connexions are adequately made and tightened up—that is, look into your unconscious self and see what are those underlying forces that do not show themselves fully in the light of consciousness, but may reveal themselves in dreams and may trip you up at a critical moment and make you fail.

So that the matter of will in sex control boils down to understanding and control of the unconscious and subconscious mind, and development of the conscious mind in relation to an ultimate ideal that can be harmonized with the ideals of all other people.



## CHAPTER V

# THE SEXUAL PROBLEMS OF ADOLESCENCE

AT the time of adolescence the boy or girl comes face to face with the vast problem of sex, the most difficult problem he or she has to meet. By a legal convention puberty is supposed to begin in boys at fourteen and in girls at twelve, but many instances of precocious puberty in both sexes are on record. Apart from the appearance of the signs of puberty, such as the 'breaking' of the voice and the growth of the external genitalia in the male and the beginning of menstruation in the female, a child may quite early in life, as a result of accidental contacts or innate disposition, become abnormally curious about sex and ask questions which call for special wisdom on the part of the parent if the truth is to be told as far as the child can comprehend it and no undesirable bias is to be given. Those whose task it is in older persons to analyse the unconscious through free association often find that in very tender years curiosity on this subject has been awakened, perhaps through watching parents or other adults who are not as careful as they ought to be in their sex relations in the

presence of a young child, or through unpleasant or inaccurate information imparted by older children or servants. Owing to the startling nature of these impressions and the receptivity of the individual, they may unhappily persist, influencing the imagination and even the conduct far into adult life. On the other hand, many children undoubtedly pass through their childhood untroubled by sex matters. They are so interested in school or other pursuits as hardly to be aware of this side of their nature. I know of one such child who reached college age before this question bothered him, and he certainly suffered no ill effects whatever through being allowed to remain in ignorance. Generalizations are the bane of sex literature, and one generalization to be certainly contested is that all children at an early age become unhealthily sex-conscious.

The technique of imparting sex knowledge has been the theme of innumerable books, some of them wise and some foolish, most of them, no doubt, well intentioned but, even so, mischievous in their effects. In past days young persons were generally left to find out these matters for themselves, but it is now the universal opinion that some help and preparation should be given. How, when, and by whom are important ques-

tions which, if answered in the wrong way, may lead to more harm than good being done. It is not always the parents who are best fitted to give the instruction; they may have their own sex difficulties, or may have a certain shyness in speaking to their own children on such a subject. Instruction may well come from the teacher, given the necessary personal equipment, and, intimate as the subject is, it may be better taught in special classes, where the child suffers less embarrassment than when addressed individually. Of late years the value of biology in introducing to children without undue shock the idea of sex differences has been appreciated.

It is important that sex instruction should be given before adolescence—sometimes, if it seems to be needed, as early as the age of nine or ten. At adolescence the child leaves a snug harbour for a sea of troubles. In various respects, not having to do with sex alone, or not directly with sex, he comes into conflict with the customs and traditions of his little world. He finds himself torn by interior strivings without knowing what they are all about. He is a source of perplexity and exasperation. At a time when he needs all the sympathy he can get, he alienates it by his strange behaviour. The consequence only too



often of the mishandling of the adolescent is that he shuts up within himself, and his affective impulses are forced to find a self-centred outlet, which they do by furtive sex-experience.

#### MASTURBATION

The great temptation of adolescence, prompted by the sexual development which is the distinguishing feature of the time, is towards masturbation. The child or adolescent may learn the practice from bad companions or he may acquire it by more or less accidental manipulation, in solitary curiosity, very much to his concern at first. Once indulged in, however, it is likely to be repeated, especially at any time of exceptional stress, or when the child's reactions are in more than usually violent conflict with conventional society, or when he has come across some suggestive incident, picture, or remark. In this way habit formation is brought about. It must not be thought, however, that this is the history of every individual. Masturbation itself has been the subject of too much generalization. Statements have been made that it is almost a universal habit, at least in boarding schools. Some writers have inferred from their own experience of a group of cases that the practice is almost inevitable in adoles-

cence. I am in a position to state unhesitatingly, on the basis of professional and non-professional experience, that masturbation is far from universal. Either by fortunate avoidance of associations or from the nature of their physical and mental make-up, a not negligible proportion of young persons do go through this stormy period without ever taking to the practice.

A clear understanding of masturbation and its implications in adolescent and later life is very desirable for the physician. In the last generation it was customary to lay stress upon the appalling physical and mental results which were supposed to follow indulgence. The idea was to frighten young persons by depicting the consequences as luridly as possible. It was said to cause a liquefying of the spinal cord, to point inevitably to the lunatic asylum, to induce venereal disease in its most dreadful form. Even when the habit was dealt with more reasonably, it was often treated in an anxious, frightened manner, which left the sexual sufferer worse than he was before. Fears and panics, instead of loosening, too often fixed the habit. To the harmfulness of masturbation itself came to be added the nervous ills induced among the victims by such teaching. The full effects were often not seen in the youth at the time, but in early

manhood, perhaps immediately after marriage, when the young husband, overwhelmed by new shame, imagined himself impotent, or, worse still, as likely to have afflicted progeny.

Nowadays the pendulum has swung the other way. It is said that masturbation, if not excessive, does not matter; some even declare that it is helpful as discharging an irritable surplus of sex energy. It is treated as a physiological incident of adolescence.

Now, it is necessary to lay down quite definitely, on several grounds, that the habit is harmful and ought to be shunned. Those who have never yielded to it have, in my belief, much more energy for use in other channels than they would otherwise have had. They have a surplus of sex energy which they can sublimate—in other words, turn to higher social and cultural ends. By such sublimation the adolescent is encouraged, not just to substitute sport or some other interest for the sex interest—which, after all, only postpones the problem—but to anticipate somewhat the better and greater part of sex, its spiritual and chivalrous side, the side which calls for sacrifice, self-control, and selfless love, which issues in many directions in social service and in the religion of humanity. ‘Sublimation . . . is an anticipation and an en-



couragement of the higher levels of sex feeling.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the persistence of masturbation, which is a form of self-fixation, means that the spirit is chained to the lower levels, and that violence is done to the ideal. It is important also to note the effect of the habit on the formation of character. It is accompanied on every occasion by a sense of shame. The youth feels that he must at all costs conceal his weakness. He becomes secretive, deceitful, underhand. Over the natural shyness and self-consciousness of the adolescent a darker cloud descends. The candour of youth is lost.

#### TREATMENT

But from the point of view of a physician this is a nervous illness to be scientifically treated. The practice is likely to set up in the nervous system an anxiety neurosis. Anxiety about bodily functions nearly always produces an effect upon those functions, but nowhere does the function respond with such sensitiveness to the suggestion of anxiety as in the realm of sex. The anxiety arises from lack of concord between stimulation and response. The masturbatory stimulation is much weaker than the normal sex stimulation of love (meaning a completely ideal

<sup>1</sup> Brown, W., *Mind and Personality*, London, 1926, p. 141.

as well as physical love), but the response is the same, and the response being thus out of all proportion to the stimulus—the stimulus being incomplete and the reaction complete—a strain is set up in the nervous mechanism. The results of such maladaptation may be withstood by many people over a long period without evident consequences, but the trouble comes when the nervous mechanism is assailed on another side, by illness or worry. The consequent break-down with anxiety neurosis may very likely be ascribed to illness or external circumstance which was the precipitating cause, but the ground was prepared by this long maladaptation.

The problem of breaking the habit of masturbation is a difficult one. Too many victims have to confess that, placing their confidence in an effort of will, they have been undone. They have only stirred up their minds to greater fear and panic, and, by the law of reversed effort, the more they have tried the less they have succeeded. To circumvent that law the method of autosuggestion previously published,<sup>1</sup> has been very successful.

‘... by autosuggestion is meant, concisely, a calm, effortless affirmation addressed, in a state of muscular

<sup>1</sup> Brown, W., *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, London, 1934, 3rd edition, p. 116.

relaxation, to the unconscious. Let the individual, the last thing at night, just before going to sleep, lie back in bed, close his eyes, and take a few slow, deep regular breaths. He will find that, as he breathes out, his muscles become more and more relaxed. Then, in that state of relaxation of muscle and mind, let him calmly think and say to himself, "I am completely free from this habit; I shall never give way to it again." If he does that sufficiently emphatically, and precisely, he can get rid of the habit by one single suggestion. That has happened to several persons within the writer's own experience. If one suggestion does not prove enough, it should be repeated every night.'

When masturbation is a fixed habit it should be treated as a definite form of illness, calling for an equally definite psychotherapeutic treatment. By analysis of the unconscious not only can the beginnings of the habit be discovered, but any unconscious material can be laid bare. The will can be strengthened by suggestion from the doctor, and the patient's own desire for self-discipline can be reinforced by autosuggestion. His 'imagination of success' can be stimulated, and the more he succeeds, the more he is likely to succeed in the future—'*rien ne réussit mieux que le succès*'. The patient must be made to understand himself, allowed to talk himself out in an atmosphere in which repugnance and



active censure are withheld. But the habit must stop, and stop at once.

#### OTHER PROBLEMS

It remains to add a word or two on other points in the sexual emergence of adolescence. Boys often worry in secret over nocturnal emissions, imagining that something very serious is happening to them. They should be told quite early that in adolescence such emissions are entirely natural, to be expected every three weeks or so, generally occurring in connexion with dreams of an erotic nature, and that they act as a safety-valve—and, let it be noted, an adequate safety-valve, none other being needed. They have only to be recognized for the natural phenomena that they are.

Far more important, and presenting grave difficulties, are certain abnormal manifestations of the sexual instinct which take their rise in adolescence—the so-called perversions and inversions. The masturbator may be said to be a person of normal though uncontrolled sexual impulses, while the sexual impulses of the pervert or invert are abnormal. At the same time, there is evidence that long continuance in masturbation, demanding ever increasing levies upon the imagination to obtain the physical

satisfaction, may encourage perversions, and cases of sadism, masochism, and exhibitionism may be intensified thereby. Homosexuality, when it shows itself at about the age of eighteen or twenty, whether in the active form of a perversion or passive form of an inversion, must be regarded as pathological and fraught with the gravest consequences to the individual. Certain forms of homosexuality are incurable; others may be cured by prolonged or deep analysis. Generally in masculine homosexuality the Œdipus complex is revealed in the form of mother-fixation. The adolescent, being unable to escape from his fixed mother-love to the love of other women, finds refuge in homosexuality.

One example of sexual perversion, not peculiar to the adolescent, but probably having its origin or at least finding its sex basis in adolescence, is a peculiar phase of masochism in which the boy or man—no instances appear to be on record of the practice amongst females—in order to obtain sexual gratification subjects himself to severe physical restraint, discomfort, or even pain. From time to time cases are reported of youths who have met their death through ‘experiments’ in tying themselves up. It may be that it derives from some nursery game in early childhood, but carried on into adolescence it

becomes of sexual significance. Sir Bernard Spilsbury<sup>1</sup> mentions three fatal cases which have come within his cognizance, two of them adolescents, the other a man of thirty-four. These persons had tied themselves up so completely that the binding might have been thought the work of another hand, and only by careful analysis was it proved to be the work of the individual himself. The cause of death was asphyxial suffocation, hanging, or strangulation—the sort of case which might have resulted in a coroner's verdict of 'suicide', or 'murder', but for the interpretation of masochistic practice.

Not long ago I had under treatment a man who for thirty years had suffered from this form of sexual perversion, tying himself up until he was almost helpless. The practice dated, in his case, from the age of eleven; he had learned it in his school dormitory, and as the years had gone on it had become increasingly compulsive and increasingly difficult to control. Psychotherapeutic treatment in youth would have saved this victim many years of most severe mental torture.

These perversions, however, interesting as they are to the psychopathologist, and difficult of eradication and cure, represent only a small

<sup>1</sup> Spilsbury, B., *Brit. Med. Journ.*, 1934, ii. 83.



fraction of the sexual difficulties which arise in adolescence, and which, with help or without, are more or less overcome, so that the individual leads to all appearances a normal life. Nevertheless, these early experiences bear some unhappy fruit in after years, even in middle age. Much can be done by way of careful instruction to root out these difficulties, but in their graver or more obstinate forms prolonged psychotherapeutic treatment may be necessary.

## CHAPTER VI

# SLEEP, HYPNOSIS, AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE<sup>1</sup>

### HYPNOSIS AND SLEEP

THE subject of hypnosis is now being carefully investigated by the methods of exact science in the psychological laboratory. A recent work by Professor Clark Hull, of Yale University, is based entirely upon results gained by the methods of experimental psychology, and serves to show how much scientifically assured knowledge has been accumulated.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, there are still many facts in regard to hypnosis which cannot be treated with adequate justice by the experimental method and are only to be observed in the domain of clinical medicine.

The word *hypnotism* was first coined by a Manchester physician, James Braid, in 1843, to emphasize the relation of hypnosis to sleep; yet he also emphasized the contrast between those two states, remarking on the fact that in sleep

<sup>1</sup> Abstract of an Address delivered in the Section of Psychology, British Association Meeting in Aberdeen, 7th Sept. 1934. (From *Character and Personality*, vol. iii, no. 2, Dec. 1934.)

<sup>2</sup> Clark L. Hull, *Hypnosis and Suggestibility* (New York, Appleton-Century, 1933).

the muscles are in a state of relaxation and in hypnosis in a state of tension or rigidity, and also that in cases of illness there was far less benefit obtained from normal sleep than from the hypnotic state. Mesmer himself had no occasion to mention the connexion of mesmerism (as it was called, after him) with sleep, and the first scientist to do so was the Marquis de Puységur, in 1784, who carried out much of his investigation with Victor, a subject easily passing into a state of artificial somnambulism.

Recent work in psychological laboratories in America has revealed definite distinguishing characteristics as between sleep and hypnosis. In sleep the knee-jerks become less pronounced and eventually disappear; in hypnosis, however deep the stage, the knee-jerks remain undiminished. Furthermore, whereas in ordinary sleep the subject is unable to carry out some simple voluntary act in response to a pre-arranged stimulus (e.g. to press a button every time a bell rings softly), yet even in deep hypnosis such voluntary response readily occurs.

These contrasts notwithstanding, we must still recognize a close connexion between the two states. Not only may sleep be induced by hypnotic methods, and some forms of sleeplessness be cured by hypnotic suggestion, but the



hypnotic state itself readily passes into the state of normal sleep. Conversely, normal sleep can be transformed into a state of hypnosis by a whisper from the hypnotist to the sleeping subject with whom he is *en rapport*. Dreamless sleep is a passive state, whereas the hypnotic condition is one of definite and potentially fruitful activity. Yet dreams may be a natural concomitant of normal sleep, and in their activity may resemble hypnotic manifestations. Mental dissociation with amnesia can occur in both conditions. Indeed, in sleep-walking we have the occurrence in spontaneous form of phenomena closely analogous to or almost identical with those of the artificial somnambulism which can be observed in any good hypnotic subject. Further evidence of the relationship between these two states is to be seen in the fact that the person who frequently walks in his sleep is exceptionally easy to hypnotize. In the hypnotic state the somnambulist's dreams may be recalled, and thus the patient may be cured of his sleep-walking.

Hypnosis may be of many different types, some of which have little or no connexion with the sleep state, but the simplest and most generally effective method of inducing hypnosis is to ask the subject to lie down on a couch, to engage

his mind with thoughts of sleep, and, as a rule, to fix his eyes on a bright light or other small object held in front of him. He is then told that it is becoming more and more difficult for him to keep his eyes open, that his eyelids are getting heavy with sleep. If he is a suitable subject he may then pass into a state of hypnosis, with a certain degree of catalepsy or tonic rigidity of the voluntary muscles; but, on the other hand, if one instructs him to relax his muscles while thinking of sleep and to breathe slowly, deeply, and regularly, the result may be a closer approximation to normal sleep. The total state, nevertheless, is one of hypnosis rather than of sleep, for it will be found that the knee-jerks are still present and that the subject retains the capacity for hearing what the hypnotist says to him and of reacting appropriately to his suggestions. In other words, his state may be described as one of partial sleep; he is asleep to outside influences, but vividly conscious of everything the hypnotist says to him, and able to concentrate to a high degree in his response to the suggestions made.

The close kinship between sleep and hypnosis becomes clearer when considered from the side of psychotherapy. If one desires to help a patient by means of hypnosis the best results

are obtained by suggesting a state of sleep and developing out of it the hypnotic state. Thus one may avoid the quite unnecessary phenomenon of catalepsy or muscular rigidity, and obtain access to deeper levels of nerve functioning, so that faulty action of various bodily organs may be rectified, or such readjustment made as to bring about a performance above the average level. The value of making therapeutic suggestions in the mild hypnoidal state as, for example, that the subject will, immediately on going to bed that night, go into sound sleep, and awake next morning refreshed and at the maximum of his powers, has been exemplified again and again in my experience. In *Psychology and Psychotherapy*<sup>1</sup> I have recorded in detail cases of war neurosis in which, the stage of light hypnosis having been obtained, I have been able, in a patient rendered mute and with retrograde amnesia as a result of some war experience, to get him to work off his repressed emotion, whereupon his powers of speech and recollection have been restored. It is the method of abreaction which is employed, not direct suggestion as in ordinary methods of hypnotism, but the preliminary condition is that the patient shall give

<sup>1</sup> William Brown, *Psychology and Psychotherapy* (3rd ed., London, Edward Arnold & Co., 1934).



himself up to sleep, and so there shall ensue that light hypnosis which is partial sleep or partial waking.

On the neurological side, the relation of sleep to hypnosis has received explanation in terms of the theory of I. P. Pavlov, according to which both states involve *internal inhibition* in the cerebral cortex, spreading to the subcortical centres in the case of sleep but limited to the cortex in the case of hypnosis.

The results of experiments by Scott,<sup>1</sup> which show that conditioned reflexes can be produced as readily in the state of hypnosis as in the waking state (or indeed more readily) may seem to be in conflict with this theory. The marked therapeutic results of rhythmically repeated suggestions, given to a patient for an hour at a time on successive days, do certainly remind one of the process of experimentally building up a conditioned reflex or a set of conditioned reflexes, and may be neurologically explicable in this way.

#### HYPNOSIS AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE

There are close relationships between the hypnotic state and the state of mediumistic trance. An important investigation of medium-

<sup>1</sup> H. D. Scott, 'Hypnosis and the Conditioned Reflex', *Journal of General Psychology*, iv. 113-30 (1930).

108 SLEEP, HYPNOSIS, AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE  
istic trance by the methods of experimental psychology, using the word-association method and the psychogalvanic reaction as objective tests, has been carried out on the well-known medium Mrs. Eileen Garrett during 1932 and 1933 by Mr. Hereward Carrington and others.<sup>1</sup>

More recent tests of the same medium, and also of Rudi Schneider and Mrs. Osborne Leonard, by the same methods but with improved statistical technique, have been applied by Mr. Whately Carington<sup>2</sup> with the help of Mr. Theodore Besterman and the Rev. Drayton Thomas, and reported to the Society for Psychical Research. It was Mr. Whately Carington who first suggested (*Measurement of Emotion*, London, 1921) the use of these psychological methods in the investigation of trance personalities, and it is scientifically satisfactory that he himself should have been able to carry them out and draw conclusions from them.

With the help of Mr. R. J. Bartlett, M.Sc., who manipulated the psychogalvanic apparatus,

<sup>1</sup> The results have been published in Bulletin I of the American Psychical Institute, 20 West 58th St., New York, under the title, 'An Instrumental Test of the Independence of a Spirit Control'.

<sup>2</sup> 'The Quantitative Study of Trance Personalities', Part I, Preliminary Studies: Mrs. Garrett; Rudi Schneider; Mrs. Leonard. By Whately Carington, M.A., M.Sc., *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, xlii (1934).

I have carried out experiments on Mrs. Garrett of a somewhat different nature. After devoting a few hours to the psychological analysis of her past life, getting her to recount all that she could consciously remember of her childhood days, the beginnings of her mediumship, &c., I hypnotized her and obtained further information about her life in this way.

During the experiment the medium was linked up by wires to a Wheatstone Bridge arrangement, with a small battery in the circuit and a galvanometer fixed up between the two pairs of arms of the bridge. When the subject's electrical resistance is balanced against the resistance of another arm of the Wheatstone Bridge, the needle of the galvanometer registers zero. But as soon as an emotion is aroused in the subject the galvanometer needle swings, showing that diminution of resistance in the subject has occurred. This diminution in resistance is possibly due to the occurrence of secretory processes in the sweat glands of the subject's skin, but more probably to circulatory changes. The swing of the galvanometer needle apparently varies roughly with the intensity of the emotion. On the other hand, a steady rise in the resistance corresponds to the quiescence of the feeling tone in the subject.



In the following verbatim report of one of the sittings, the reader will find the records of the variations in the medium's electrical resistance, as they occurred from moment to moment. Mr. Bartlett, who was in charge of the psychogalvanic reflex apparatus, observed and recorded the psychogalvanic deflexions which measure the variations in the medium's electrical resistance and may be regarded as a rough objective measure of her emotional reactions.

The full record of all our sittings will appear elsewhere, but I append the verbatim record of one sitting, which took place in my consulting room on Monday, July 16, 1934, 8.50 to 9.54 p.m., for the instructive light which it throws upon the reaction of a distinguished and successful medium to hypnotism. These results in no sense detract from the claim to any supernormal powers which may be made on behalf of the medium. Such powers can only be tested by objective comparison with independently ascertained facts, and in some of my other sittings I have obtained material which can be so tested. But the sitting which I report here bears solely upon the psychology of the medium and her reactions to hypnotism.

In her normal waking life Mrs. Garrett's memories of her childhood include those of

three imaginary playmates, a little boy and two little girls, whose names she did not know, but whose presence attained almost, if not complete, hallucinatory vividness in her times of solitude. When hypnotized, she was able to remember the names of the children, Elizabeth, Susan, and Bobby, and to identify them as two little girl cousins who, apparently, had died before she was born, but whose photographs she had seen, when a very young child, in a family album, and a little boy who had lived next door, or near by, and who was drowned. In hypnosis she also seemed to link up her control Uvani with a person, Yusof, who was apparently the friend, or the son of a friend, of her long-dead father.

Another important fact in this sitting was that, although I produced a deep state of hypnosis, I was unable to call up Uvani. On the other hand, Mrs. Garrett herself can do so in a few seconds, presumably by self-hypnosis. Her knee-jerks and other tendon reflexes remained undiminished, however deep the hypnosis produced by me.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I here gladly express my thanks to Mr. R. J. Bartlett, M.Sc., to Mrs. Eileen Garrett herself for the cordial and thoroughly scientific way in which she submitted herself to the experiments, and to Mrs. W. M. Crunden, whose friendly support and encouragement have made these and other experiments possible.

# 112 SLEEP, HYPNOSIS, AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE

## RECORD OF HYPNOTIC TRANCE: MRS. GARRETT, MEDIUM, QUESTIONED BY DR. WILLIAM BROWN

During hypnotizing, the following words of Dr. W. Brown with resistances and times were noted by Mr. R. J. Bartlett, superintending a *psychogalvanic reflex apparatus*, to the record of which the times given in the margin relate:<sup>1</sup>

Balance obtained at 9,000 initially at	8.52 p.m.
'Close eyes'	8.54
'Going - - - -'	
'Very drowsy - - - -'	8.55

RESISTANCE (in ohms)		TIME
	(Mrs. Garrett was hypnotized by Dr. Brown.)	8.50
9,000		8.52
	Rising. DR. BROWN: Directly my hand touches your forehead	8.55 +
15,000	Steady rise with slight variations in speed—no measurable falls.	
16,000		
18,000		
20,000		
	you will remember when first you saw those little children, that boy and those two little girls.	
	Directly my hand touches your forehead you will remember the very first occasion you knew about them. Now you can tell me. What do you remember? What were their names?	
	MRS. GARRETT: Elizabeth, and Susan, and Bobby.	8.56
	Bobby was not in the family. Bobby had been drowned.	
21,000	W.B.: Elizabeth and Susan, who were they? They must have been <i>cousins</i> ?	8.57
	MRS. G.: I think so. I never saw them. Only	8.57 +
22,000	the <i>pictures</i> .	
	W. B.: Where?	
	MRS. G.: In an album, and I was told not to look in the album, because, I suppose, <i>my father's picture</i> was in the album. I had not seen the picture of my father. There was one of my mother and Susan, a tiny little girl, and Elizabeth had grown up a little, and Bobby I knew.	8.58

<sup>1</sup> The shorthand notes were taken at 88 Harley Street, London, W., on Monday, 16th July 1934.



RESISTANCE (in ohms)		TIME
	W. B.: So you never saw them alive?	
	MRS. G.: No. I must have <i>seen Bobby before he was drowned.</i>	
23,000	W. B.: Did these die before you were born?	8.59
	MRS. G.: Yes—much later. Later than my other cousins. They were very sorry for me.	
	W. B.: When did you first see them?	
	MRS. G.: When did I first see them? I was three years old.	
	W. B.: And <i>how old</i> did they seem to be?	
	MRS. G.: Oh, <i>Bobby was eight. Susan was very delicate,</i> and she seemed to have <i>grown up.</i>	
	W. B.: And how old did she seem to be?	
24,000	MRS. G.: <i>Eight or nine.</i>	8.59 +
	W. B.: And Elizabeth?	
25,000	MRS. G.: Oh, much older still. A tall girl. I was afraid of Elizabeth. ( <i>Silence.</i> )	9.00
	W. B.: Now I want you to tell me the <i>next time people came</i> to see you by yourself.	
26,000	MRS. G.: My aunt, she had seen me when I was a baby. I think I must have been nine when she came again.	9.00 +
	W. B.: Tell me about that.	
	MRS. G.: It seemed as though I had been very wicked as a baby, but my aunt was very cross and said: 'Nonsense, that cannot be true. She is dead.'	
	W. B.: How long had she been dead?	
	MRS. G.: She had died just a little while before.	
	W. B.: But you did not know?	
26,000	MRS. G.: No; mother had been away. Sometimes I called my aunt 'Mother', but she was really my aunt. After she (the other aunt) had been away she came back with a baby in her arms.	9.01
	W. B.: A little baby?	
	MRS. G.: Yes, quite a little baby. I heard she had a baby, and the baby died. My aunt said	

No measurable falls.

# 114 SLEEP, HYPNOSIS, AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE

RESISTANCE

TIME

(in ohms) it was not true, it could not be true, that I told lies. I did not tell lies.

27,000 W. B.: Now, when I put my hand on your forehead you will remember the next time you saw the people whom you had never seen before.

9.02

MRS. G.: Only my uncle.

W. B.: Tell me about that.

MRS. G.: He had been very poorly. I did not think he could be there. But he came alone.

W. B.: Did he come on the day of his funeral?

MRS. G.: No.

28,000 W. B.: How long afterwards?

9.03

MRS. G.: How long?

W. B.: How many days—a *week* or two? How long?

MRS. G.: *Three weeks* after. He had been crying such a lot. He opened the door and came in.

W. B.: Where were you—in the sitting-room?

MRS. G.: In the account room.

W. B.: Did you hear the door open, or just see it?

MRS. G.: I *saw* it. I heard it. He was very well-dressed, and he had had his beard trimmed, and he said: 'I am living. Please don't cry. For two years you will live here, and then you won't be so unhappy.'

28,500

9.04

W. B.: Was that true?

MRS. G.: Yes, more or less. I left when I was over fifteen.

W. B.: You were thirteen when you saw him?

MRS. G.: Yes. . . . He was very nice, and I was sorry I had not put the flowers on his grave. But I could not. I did not think he was there. But he was there. Very much there.

28,500

W. B.: Now I want you to remember this *man* who came *when Babs was ill*. How old was she, by the way?

9.05

No measurable falls.

RESISTANCE (in ohms)		TIME
29,000	Mrs. G.: She was three then. The doctor said she could not get well. He said: 'Wrap her in cold <i>blankets</i> , damp blankets,' and I was so afraid. The doctor did not say it to me. He said it to my husband: 'Take her out.' When I went in, the blankets were round the door, and this <i>man</i> said laughingly: 'Take them down.'	9.06
Fall 500	W. B.: This new man: <i>Who</i> was he? What did he look like? Mrs. G.: Very shrivelled, very thin. W. B.: Did he say his name, or did you know his name? Mrs. G.: No. He said: 'Take down all the blankets.'	9.06 +
30,000	W. B.: Did you know his name? Mrs. G.: Abdul Lativ. He said: 'Take down all the blankets. Let there be air. Have her in your arms. She will be better.' Then I was ill. I forgot . . . do you know, I forgot? W. B.: Forgot that you had been ill? Mrs. G.: I forgot Abdul Lativ—did not remember him again. W. B.: When did he come again? Mrs. G.: Not to me any more. No, I never saw him. He came, and looked so thin, and I was very cross, he was so thin. He was so strange, and I was ill and had forgotten.	9.07
Fall 500	( <i>At this point Mrs. Garrett was re-hypnotized.</i> ) W. B.: Sleep. . . . When I put my hand on your forehead you are going to remember about <i>Yusof</i> , when you first saw him. It is all coming back to you. Mrs. G.: He came on a horse. He talked about father.	9.08
	W. B.: When was that? Mrs. G.: I don't know. W. B.: How many years ago? Mrs. G.: Oh, a long time ago.	9.09



## RESISTANCE

## TIME

- (in ohms) W. B.: Before Abdul Lativ?  
 MRS. G.: When I was a little girl.  
 W. B.: How many years old do you think you were?  
 MRS. G.: I don't remember.  
 W. B.: And he came on a horse and talked of your father?  
 MRS. G.: He said: 'I don't think much of you. You are a girl.'  
 W. B.: What did he say his name was?  
 30,000 MRS. G.: *Yusuf Ben Hafid Ben Ali.*  
 W. B.: Where did he come from?  
 MRS. G.: He left his horse outside.  
 31,000 W. B.: What was he dressed like?  
 MRS. G.: He was in brown, with lighter breeches, and his shirt open here, no colour. He had something round on his head.  
 W. B.: A turban?  
 MRS. G.: I don't think so. Not like a turban, not this way, that way (*illustrated with hands*). Do you see? He said he did not care for me very much.  
 31,000 I was only a girl, do you see?  
 W. B.: How long did he stay? When did he go?  
 MRS. G.: *He looked at me.* What was I doing? I was rather too fond of crying. He went away. Only a few moments. He could not help it. I never saw him any more.  
 W. B.: What was his *relation to your father*, do you think?  
 MRS. G.: I think he must have liked my father. I think he must have known him.  
 W. B.: Where did he see your father?  
 32,000 MRS. G.: I think he said something about *Cairo*.  
 Fall 1,000 I never saw him any more. He did not take care, did he?  
 W. B.: But he said he would take care of you. You have no reason to think that he has come back at all since?

9.11

9.12

9.13

9.14

## RESISTANCE

## TIME

(in ohms)

32,000

Mrs. G.: I don't know. Sometimes I thought *Uvani* must be *like him*, because, you see, *Uvani* said: 'I have known him. But I am at sea when I am on land, and on land when I am at sea. On sea I am land, and on land I am sea. If I am out there I am with you, and if I am with you I am out there.' Do you see? 'I am intangibly me. I am here, I am not here.'

9.15

W. B.: When did you first see *Uvani*?

Mrs. G.: I don't think I have seen *Uvani*.

W. B.: When did he first communicate with you in any way?

Mrs. G.: Oh, yes, I know—I know—I know.

W. B.: How old were you then?

33,000

Mrs. G.: I had cut my foot on a bottle.

9.16

W. B.: When you were a child?

Mrs. G.: A little one at school. On a green bottle, and I could not walk, and had to be carried, and then I think I saw somebody like *Uvani*, who said: 'It will get well. It won't hurt you.'

W. B.: When did you see him and where?

Mrs. G.: In the wood, and he came up and he said: 'There you go. It won't hurt you.' And then he went. Now, where did he go? I don't know—I have not really thought.

33,000

W. B.: What did he look like?

9.17

Mrs. G.: Dark, bad-tempered, all I could remember. He had his head-dress like the other man.

W. B.: The same head-dress as *Yusof*? Did he look like *Yusof*?

Mrs. G.: When he was cross—I have never seen him so cross.

W. B.: Although, he said, he did not think much of you?

Mrs. G.: Yes, but in a far-away manner, as

Slight variations in resistance at about 33,000. No 'falls'.

# 118 SLEEP, HYPNOSIS, AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE

RESISTANCE		TIME
(in ohms)	though it did not matter, as though it did not matter what I thought at all. He said: 'Look, you are in trouble again.'	
33,000	W. B.: When did you next see him after that? You saw him then when you were a little girl. When did you next see him.	9.18
33,000	MRS. G.: Did I see him? <i>Oh</i> , of course, <i>I cannot</i> see. It is coming <i>clearer</i> and clearer. It could not be hallucination. Yes. I remember this man put in my arms Bryan my <i>baby</i> brother. I held his little hands like this. Then I saw this man.	9.19
Fall 1,000	W. B.: He put him in your arms? MRS. G.: Like this.	
33,000	W. B.: That was Uvani, too, was it not? MRS. G.: It was the same man, yes. I did not try to find out where he came from.	9.20
	W. B.: Would you have known? MRS. G.: No, I should not have known.	
(Fairly rapid, steady rise to 34,000 while W.B. speaking.)	W.B.: When I put my <i>hand</i> on your <i>forehead</i> you will remember where he came from.	
	MRS. G.: I don't remember. He never terrified me. I liked him. But he did not like me. He did not talk to me much. He came again.	9.21
	W. B.: When did he come again? MRS. G.: I wonder if you would know. I have my hands like that. I have both arms and feet stretched out. I am very ill. ( <i>Yawning.</i> ) I am going to die. And I see him again, and I said: 'No, take him away. I <i>don't want</i> him to touch me.' Yes, now he is stayed.	9.22
Fall 2,000	W. B.: You got better? MRS. G.: He stayed, with the other doctors. Then I never saw him again. Babs was very sick, so was I.	
	W. B.: How old was she then? MRS. G.: That was the time when she was born.	
	W. B.: And he came then?	



RESISTANCE		TIME
(in ohms)	MRS. G.: I remember saying: 'If he does not go away. . . .' Very cross. Where has he been? And why did he come?	
35,000	W. B.: Did he say his name then?	9.23
Fall 2,000	MRS. G.: <i>Uvani</i> .	
	W. B.: When did you first hear that name?	
	MRS. G.: I did not know him by that name.	
	W. B.: He told you that name first?	
	MRS. G.: I know. I am too tired.	
35,000	W. B.: When I press my hand on your forehead you will remember.	9.24
	MRS. G.: . . . 1923. This old fellow <i>Huhnli</i> who said: 'I had you asleep, and sleep came to me, one calling himself <i>Uvani</i> .' I don't think he called himself that before. I did not believe him. I had not thought <i>Uvani</i> could be the one who came to me when I was a little girl, who came back to see me when I cut my foot. That is the same one.	
35,000	W. B.: Was that <i>Yusof</i> ?	9.25
	MRS. G.: I did not know before, but I realize it was.	
	W. B.: And this was the man who came on horseback?	
	MRS. G.: Yes.	
	W. B.: And came in the night you were in hospital when <i>Babs</i> was born. They were all <i>Yusof</i> ?	
	MRS. G.: Yes.	
	W. B.: Directly my hand touches your forehead you will remember why you thought <i>Uvani</i> was <i>Yusof</i> .	
35,000	MRS. G.: I <i>dreamed</i> always I saw this man <i>Yusof</i> . We go away—go away to sea. He must have said: 'No; I cannot find him.'	9.27
	W. B.: Yes, but why <i>Uvani</i> , why do you think <i>Yusof</i> was <i>Uvani</i> ?	
	MRS. G.: I did not, did I?	

## RESISTANCE

## TIME

	(in ohms)	W. B.: Yes; you told us so.	
		Mrs. G.: Why Yusof was Uvani? I know. I know. Oh, Lord, how simple. I know. When Huhnli said to me: 'You have an Arab with you,'	
36,000		I suddenly saw Yusof—see? And then I seemed to think to myself, why, he must have been an Arab. Yes, and it is one and the same. That is it.	9.28
		W. B.: You knew Yusof, but why Uvani? Huhnli gave you the name of Uvani?	
		Mrs. G.: He told me he was Uvani.	
		W. B.: Huhnli said: 'Your control, he was Uvani?'	
		Mrs. G.: Yes. I don't know. I thought, 'He sounds like Yusof.' I did not mind very much.	
36,000		I thought it must be he.	
	Fall 2,000	W. B.: Just <i>relax</i> (9.29) a minute ( <i>nothing but sleep</i> . . . 9.30) . . . very sleepy.	9.29— 9.30
		When I put my hand on your forehead Uvani will come. He will come in this room to you, and he will speak, and he will give us a message which will be taken down. It will be an important message—important in connexion with this research. Directly my hand touches your forehead he will come and speak to us through you. Uvani will come and send a <i>message</i> to us. Now <i>Uvani</i> is coming and <i>will speak</i> to us. ( <i>Pause.</i> ) Uvani is coming?	
	Fall 500	Mrs. G.: No.	9.31
		W. B.: Yes?	
		Mrs. G.: Yes, Uvani is here.	
		W. B.: Get him to speak. ( <i>Pause.</i> ) No Uvani?	
35,000		Mrs. G.: I <i>cannot find him</i> . Where is he?	9.32
	Fall 500	W. B.: Cannot you see him?	
		Mrs. G.: No, nothing but dark. No, no, no, I cannot see him.	
		W. B.: Can you see Yusof?	
		Mrs. G.: I see nothing.	
		W. B.: They do not come back, do they?	

## RESISTANCE

## TIME

	Mrs. G.: They may.	
	W. B.: Can you see Yusof now?	
	Mrs. G.: Why don't they come? No, it is me alone in here. ( <i>Lengthy pause.</i> )	
35,000	W. B.: Is there any other occasion when you saw people who were not there?	9.33
	Mrs. G.: Lots of times.	
36,000	W. B.: I will put my hand on your forehead, and you will tell us one of them. Just <i>describe</i> it, please.	9.34
	Mrs. G.: I see people every day; sometimes they do not see me. If they do they don't care. Every day some one. Every day. . . .	
	W. B.: When did you first begin to see some one every day?	
	Mrs. G.: As a little girl.	
	W. B.: Whom did you see first of all?	
	Mrs. G.: Yusof.	
	W. B.: Before you saw Elizabeth and Susan?	
	Mrs. G.: Yes.	
	W. B.: You saw Yusof first? That was when you cut your foot, or before that?	
	Mrs. G.: Before that.	9.35
	W. B.: Tell me about that first time.	
36,000	Mrs. G.: Sitting by a little <i>pond</i> in the garden. I had been crying, and I looked up and saw a man. He said: 'What is the matter?' I don't know him. He watched me crying, and he never said anything, and then he said: 'Oh, what a pity you are not a boy.' I said: 'Why not?' He said: 'Never mind,' and then he went away. Now why did he do that?	9.35 +
36,000	W. B.: He had his horse then?	9.36
	Mrs. G.: Yes.	
	W. B.: His horse outside?	
	Mrs. G.: Yes.	
	W. B.: Outside the garden?	
	Mrs. G.: Outside the gate.	



## RESISTANCE

## TIME

(in ohms)	W. B.: What coloured horse—or didn't you see it?	
36,000	MRS. G.: I must have seen him going away.	9.37
	W. B.: What was the colour of the horse?	
	MRS. G.: Brown.	
	W. B.: Did you tell your aunt about that?	
	MRS. G.: Yes.	
	W. B.: Just afterwards?	
36,000	MRS. G.: Yes; I asked where he had gone, to find him. She said: 'No, it is not true.' It was true. I saw him. You know I saw him?	9.38
	W. B.: Yes; we agree.	
	MRS. G.: You believe me?	
	W. B.: Yes; I believe you.	
	MRS. G.: No, he did not stay there. He was not there. I can think of him again, but he does not come.	
36,000	W. B.: When I put my hand on your forehead you will remember the <i>next time</i> .	9.39
	MRS. G.: I see all the children.	
	W. B.: How did they first come to you?	
	MRS. G.: In the garden.	
	W. B.: Were you crying then?	
	MRS. G.: Yes. They went away. They went home. I never saw him with them. I used to think of going home ( <i>Long pause</i> ).	
36,000	W. B.: When was the <i>next time</i> you saw some one?	9.40 +
	MRS. G.: My aunt and baby.	
	W. B.: How old were you then?	
	MRS. G.: I don't know—six. ( <i>Pause</i> .)	
36,000	W. B.: Now just <i>rest</i> . Go right away to <i>sleep</i> . Just sleep. ( <i>Pause of two or three minutes</i> .)	9.41-46
(Slow steady rise to 37,000, followed by a series of small falls as subject awoke with recovery after each)		
Fall 500 at 'Count four'.		
Fall 500		
Fall 520		
Fall 500	W. B.: Now I am going to wake you up.	9.46
	( <i>Mrs. Garrett awoke</i> .)	9.48
	W. B.: How much do you remember of all this?	

RESISTANCE		TIME
(in ohms)	MRS. G.: I do not remember anything. I feel I have been sleeping.	
37,000	W. B.: You remember nothing at all that you have been saying?	9.49
	MRS. G.: <i>No.</i>	
	W. B.: I suggested that you would be able to remember certain names. There is one important name—Yusof?	
37,000	MRS. G.: <i>Who is Yusof?</i>	9.50
	W. B.: That is what we would all like to know. Can you now remember any one who was Yusof?	
	MRS. G.: No; I cannot think.	
	W. B.: What else do you remember besides Yusof?	
	MRS. G.: I don't know. I only seemed to hear a name going round in my mind. My aunt did not like him. I don't know who he was.	
	W. B.: Did she see him? Did she know him?	
37,000	MRS. G.: She must have done, mustn't she?	9.51
	W. B.: Is she still alive?	
	MRS. G.: No . . . she never told me <i>anything about my father</i> . It was my younger uncle who told me.	
	W. B.: Did that younger uncle say anything about Yusof?	
	MRS. G.: He told me that my mother had met my father in Egypt, and that he had come to Ireland, and they were married in Ireland, and that he had only one sister. That sister wanted to adopt me, and my aunt would not permit it. That is all I know.	
38,000	W. B.: Who was your aunt?	9.52
	MRS. G.: My mother's older sister.	
	W. B.: And who was the aunt with the baby who came to you?	
	MRS. G.: She was the third youngest, also my mother's sister. My mother was the youngest, and this aunt was the next youngest, and the	

# 124 SLEEP, HYPNOSIS AND MEDIUMISTIC TRANCE

## RESISTANCE

## TIME

(in ohms)	aunt who stayed and lived on was the oldest of the family.	
39,000	W. B.: And you cannot remember where <i>Yusof</i> comes in at all?	
Fall 700	Mrs. G.: <i>No</i> , I do not remember <i>Yusof</i> at all. I thought I did, but it has gone.	9.53
Fall 800	W. B.: Do you remember anything further?	
	Mrs. G.: For the moment I thought I remembered about my aunt, but it is gone.	
41,000	<i>Seance terminated at 9.54 p.m.</i>	9.54



## CHAPTER VII

### CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY<sup>1</sup>

IN English usage the term 'character' refers to an organization of the affective and emotional aspects of the mind, leading up to the development of more or less tenacity of purpose and strength of will. 'Personality', on the other hand, has three different connotations, viz. (1) the sum-total of the powers of the individual, both inherited and acquired (German scientists use the word *Charakter* in this sense); (2) the more *dramatic* aspects of individuality, especially the power of the individual to stimulate and influence the imagination of other individuals in art, science, and public affairs; the psychology of leadership and the general problem of the psychology of personal influence fall to be considered under this heading; (3) the philosophical or metaphysical view of the individual as having the power to live in, or partake of, a super-individual and (to some extent) super-temporal world of values (the good, the beautiful, and the true), and to be capable of spiritual development in this sense.

It is in terms of the super-ego, a part of the

<sup>1</sup> Abstract of an Address delivered in the Section of Psychology, British Association Meeting in Norwich, Sept. 5, 1935.

unconscious mind, that personal influence is to be explained. The super-ego begins its development quite early in the life of the individual and goes on towards widening generalities. At first the individual identifies himself with those in authority about him, and incorporates the identification in himself by the so-called super-ego, the beginnings of conscience. With his own growth in sympathy and imagination it gains in depth and power. There are many, of course, who always rest in external authority, placing themselves under a leader and allowing their super-ego to be identified with him. Upon him they project their desires, let him do their thinking, and make him the keeper of their conscience. It is he who discharges their responsibilities. Such is the psychology behind dictatorship, ancient and modern, and because the dictator, however much he may strike the imagination, may fail in character, it is full of menace for the people under his sway and for many others besides.

To one who has training and aptitude to see the conflicts which take place below conscious levels little in the recent history of Europe comes as a surprise. The State is only the man 'writ large'. A knowledge of the repressed aggressive tendencies, which are linked with the funda-

mental instincts of love and destructiveness, enables one to foretell political events with fair assurance.

The great need, alike in dealing with individual inadequacy and with the sick mind of nations, is a deeper understanding of the forces at work below consciousness—forces which reveal themselves in consciousness only in distorted forms. If there were such an understanding self-deception would be avoided.

Man may be defined as the only creature who deceives himself.

In the treatment of obsessional neurosis or other mental trouble by analysis the repressed mental conflicts are encouraged to come to the surface in their true form, where they can be liquidated; a new synthesis then arises at a higher level, directed to social and cultural ends (sublimation). At the same time, by means of constructive suggestion, developing the capacity for imagining success, the individual will-power can be strengthened and the character built on a firmer foundation.

Something of the same order must be followed in dealing with war, or, more practically, with that precarious state of 'pre-war', in which psychological factors play an often disregarded but decisive part. War affords an excellent



illustration of the disguised workings of character and personality. Once it breaks out, the unconscious tendencies which have been repressed find unrestrained outlet, so that the mildest persons are heard uttering savage sentiments and the most cultured become violently intolerant. But these tendencies are present also in the pre-war state, a hidden toxin paralysing efforts after goodwill, frustrating the way of peace. Those in control of the policies of nations could not do better than study modern psychology in its treatment of the problems of the individual, and learn to relieve nationalistic repressions by something equivalent to the analytical process. Once relieved and brought to the surface—but not until then—these self-assertive tendencies could be sublimated and made to serve super-national culture and spiritual co-operation.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS<sup>1</sup>

THE psychology of international relations, otherwise the psychology of peace and war, can be adequately discussed only on the basis of a scientific knowledge of the structure and working of the human mind. A number of questions open out: how war is possible; how it can be carried on at all by civilized people; how peace can be achieved, this last only by a positive policy, never by *laissez-faire*.

Hobbes said that peace was merely an interval between wars, the wars being the real—meaning the normal—activity, and peace a breathing-space, a time when people are tired, disillusioned, and a little penitent. Those who take part in war customarily declare that when they have finished this business they will fight no more. The protestation has much the same value as that of the drunkard who exclaims as he lifts the glass to his lips that it is the last time.

<sup>1</sup> A paper read at the inaugural session of the Fourth Biennial Conference on Mental Health, held in the Central Hall, Westminster, on 23 Jan. 1936.

Speaking as a psychologist, not as a politician, I am convinced that the latest war is not the last. In saying this I do not mean to be pessimistic, I am merely speaking as I would about a manic-depressive patient who, after a state of deep depression, passes into one of exaltation and feels that never again will his old symptoms return. With a patient like that we know that he will have another relapse sooner or later, and that no amount of suggestion or encouragement will make any difference. It is of no use telling him or his relatives that 'All's right with the world'; a relapse is as certain as anything can be. In cases of manic-depressive insanity or the milder cyclothymia, as in other forms of psychosis as distinct from psychoneurosis, a radical cure has not been found. No psychotic has ever yet been completely cured by psychotherapy as such, although psychotherapy and psychology in general have enabled us to gain a deeper insight into the psychotic's state of mind, and sometimes to ameliorate the condition. We may cure or improve the hysteric, the psychoneurotic, but the psychotic still in the main escapes us—although improvement, and sometimes spontaneous recovery, may occur.

So it is with war and peace. We cannot pretend as psychologists that a solution has been



discovered at present. All we can do is to go on and disentangle the various forces which are at work to produce war. The causes of war are numerous, and many of them seem to have little to do directly with human nature. The economic causes of war spring at once to the mind. According to some systems of practical economics wars are inevitable and must occur from time to time. Conflicts of interests exist between nations and may become so severe that an appeal is at last made to the *ultima ratio*, the final court of trial by brute strength.

Again it is necessary to make the psychologist's position clear. As a psychologist I am not advocating any particular system of economics as distinct from others. We psychologists feel some sympathy with the economists, for we are in the same boat. Psychology and economics are the two sciences about which the man in the street thinks he knows as much as the expert. He is not going to be informed about his own mind, for who should know his own mind better than himself? He knows all about economics too, for does he not have to deal continually with credit balances and deficits? That is one reason why progress in the practical applications of these sciences is so slow.

## MAN'S REACTIONS TO HIS MIND

Deep down in the mind—in our ‘heart of hearts’, as we say—we are aware of the struggle for existence, the desperate fight between man and man, family and family, nation and nation, for security, position, and power, a fight variously disguised, halted by compromise and mutual adjustment, but at times flaming into open war. Schopenhauer in one of his ‘Occasional Essays’ likened human society to a number of hedgehogs that found themselves getting chilly in the winter and so got closer and closer together to keep one another warm, but as they drew closer their prickles hurt one another, and so they moved away and got cold again, and eventually by trial and error found an optimum distance from one another at which they could keep fairly warm and at the same time escape hurt. So it is with man in society. He finds it difficult to harmonize with others, and yet if he went ‘on his own’ his life would be ‘nasty, brutish, and short’, to quote Hobbes’s phrase, and so co-operation to a certain extent is forced upon him.

That, of course, is not a very close analogy, because society is not a matter of deliberate social contract, but has grown in relation to the

needs of individuals, and individuals have never existed by themselves, but always within some system or family, and thus their social instincts and their ego instincts have developed *pari passu*. We cannot deduce the social behaviour of man from his purely individual behaviour, and, in fact, there is no such thing as purely individual behaviour because man is always acting as a member of some group and generally as a member of a number of groups simultaneously. It is not that psychology deals with the individual man while sociology and anthropology and other sciences deal with his social relations. At every point the individual is reacting to the society to which he belongs.

A purely economic theory of the cause of war might have a corresponding psychological theory, very simple, and therefore inadequate—namely, that man gets annoyed when his interests are threatened, irritated when his will to live is thwarted, economic difficulties make him angry, and when his misfortunes and the reasons for them are declared to him by some demagogue he may in his irritated state become pugnacious and ready to fight. That theory is simple, as I have said, but very inadequate, because it takes practically no account of the structure of the mind. The individual mind has



developed through countless generations from the most primitive conditions with reference to a very real struggle for existence. We must accept in its general outline the Darwinian theory of natural selection and the survival of the fittest, for the mind as for the body. But although the mind has developed to a certain degree and it is possible for co-operation to supplement competition, and for man to become more and more co-operative and less and less competitive, nevertheless he still carries with him tendencies towards more primitive forms of mental reaction such as were appropriate to the early stages of national and social evolution, but are not so obviously appropriate now.

#### PRIMITIVE URGES

We observe this very clearly in criminal behaviour. A great deal of such behaviour is a relapse or a regression to a more primitive reaction of the organism. The murderer is not always some one whose reactions to life have been perverted, but often some one who, through disease of the nervous system or developmental degeneration, perhaps transmitted from parent to child, resulting in weakness of mental and nervous control, reacts as his primitive ancestors ages ago reacted in an environment where such

reactions would be accounted normal. He wants a man's watch, and the most direct method is to kill the owner. He yearns for the taste of roast pig, and so he burns down the house. Many of these severe cases of criminality resist every type of treatment, punitive or reformatory, because they are themselves primitive in this particular direction. In some ways they are a reversion to type, a 'throw-back' to a much earlier level of evolution.

All this means that civilized man, the modern *Homo sapiens*, carries with him possibilities of behaviour that are appropriate to the earlier stages of mental development, but are customarily held in check or superseded by more developed methods of reaction. On analysis one finds that most people who are regarded as normal still retain far down in their unconscious mind—that is, on the primitive levels of mentality—tendencies that were appropriate in the early stages of human development but are no longer allowed to be dominant.

One of these primitive tendencies is that of self-preservation, present in all of us, but held in check by higher considerations; in part such urges have been not destroyed or neutralized, but directed in the course of evolution to higher social and cultural ends. But a good deal of the

old urge remains at its most primitive levels, even in the most highly developed man, so that in certain conditions of great danger, especially when accompanied by ignorance of what exactly is happening, the urge for self-preservation may leap forward with overwhelming force, and he may take refuge in panic-stricken flight, to his own great disgust afterwards. It is the same with the urge not only to preserve our lives but to assert ourselves, to extend and enlarge our powers. This again may be held in check by various mental mechanisms of later development, by the grace of modesty, by self-criticism, by consideration for others, by a regard for what is decent, even by a sense of proportion in things, and, which follows from it, a sense of humour; yet nevertheless, deep down in the mind, some of this self-assertive tendency remains, and given the occasion may blaze out very much in its original form. This, again, can happen in the most highly developed of men.

One of the many occasions when these primitive tendencies can show themselves uncensored and unreprieved is in a great mass movement where the individual feels the safety and security of the crowd around him, all thinking in the same way, and his sense of responsibility to him-



self is greatly lightened. He does not deliberately give way to more primitive tendencies, but those primitive tendencies are always ready to come forward and manifest themselves through more complicated civilized behaviour. They are like a charge of electricity suddenly short-circuiting a delicate installation, overcoming all resistances, and lighting the landscape with a lurid flame. Thus a crowd may fall into a panic and in such a state take the slightest occasion for action utterly out of proportion to the circumstances. It may when aroused spring savagely like a tiger without reck or consideration even for its own safety. Yet in that crowd, moved by the same impulses and intent on the same wild course, may be men who individually would never dream of acting in that way. That situation was recognized long before any analytic work had been done upon the mind. The crowds of the French Revolution, for example, and the excesses which they committed were the subject long ago of psychological study.<sup>1</sup>

#### MASS PSYCHOLOGY

The possibility of mass mental reactions or mass psychosis has an obvious bearing upon the

<sup>1</sup> Gustav le Bon, *La Psychologie des Foules*.

problem of war and peace, but the deeper analysis of the mind in recent times inaugurated by Sigmund Freud has shown to how great an extent mental forces can continue to manifest themselves in an unconscious form, even while the conscious mind is fully alert and apparently in full control. All these forces that come up so obviously in mass movements are working also in the individual mind and showing themselves in distorted forms. Even mental reactions that the majority of people would recognize as perfectly normal and appropriate to the circumstances can by analysis be traced back to still more primitive tendencies from which they derive their energy. It is as if a person who belonged to a wealthy family used the leisure that his inherited wealth made possible to become highly cultured, deeply read, artistically appreciative, while yet the money which enabled him to do this came from the labour of many of his own species, hewing minerals from the bowels of the earth at great toil and risk and with little reward. The example that springs to the mind is that of Greek culture during the golden age in Athens, a culture which was, of course, founded upon slavery. Slavery was justified even by Aristotle. The arguments are familiar, they are biased, and can be used in different ways to

point to different conclusions. I am using it here only as an analogy, and indeed as an analogy it does not completely hold, because the forces in the unconscious in our highly developed cultural life are not in themselves good or bad, they just represent biological or mental energy.

Among them are these primitive forces of self-preservation and self-assertion. Both in their measure are needed. Unless we are able to preserve our lives we shall do no good to any one. Self-assertion, too, is obviously good in a general sense, though it can be directed in such a way as to be a curse to every one concerned. It is all a matter of direction, and in the cultured life it is directed adequately. With that cultured outlook on life these fundamental forces have to be kept at bay, under control, used as the powers of nature are used in an industrial civilization. Used in a different way they may result in institutions and forms of thought which are irreconcilable with ultimate peace between individuals or between nations. It comes to this, that he who wills the means wills the end. A certain outlook on life, a certain direction or misdirection of the internal forces may involve ultimately such a conflict as can only be settled by an appeal to force.



## THE RULE OF LAW

It is often said that war could be prevented in the same way as duelling has been prevented, by legal process. Might not the appeal to force as between nation and nation be brought to an end if it were declared illegal? But it must be remembered that a law, although ultimately it may be in harmony with the moral outlook of the great majority of individuals, needs force to sustain it. In separate communities it is sustained by police. An international law binding the nations would need to be supported by force at the present stage of human evolution. From a psychological point of view it seems to me an obvious implication that we need a super-national institution with adequate force at its disposal to support the decisions of international law. That is not within the bounds of practical politics at the present time. No nation would surrender its sovereignty to a super-state. Such quixotism is not to be found now upon the earth. The only alternative to this—I do not want to lecture on the subject, but to consider it only in relation to psychology—is a *pis aller* or second best, a system of collective security through the League of Nations.

For that to be really successful it should be

universal. The League of Nations must include the whole world, because peace is a matter which affects the whole world, especially in view of the rapidly extending lines of communication and the physical, economic, and cultural contacts of all countries. A true League of Nations must include every nation, and then the principle of collective security may be capable of being maintained and the primitive passions of separate nations held in leash. But as things are at present there is no immediate prospect of a complete League, and to the extent to which it is incomplete, psychologically speaking—and again I am not speaking as a politician—its prospects of success are greatly diminished. It is even a question whether, in such a situation, it is not better to recognize the difficulties, and seeing that there is not an adequate force at the disposal of the League to impose its decisions, to keep those decisions as expressions of moral opinion, otherwise the League may involve more fighting and not less. But the more courageous way is to organize economic (as distinct from military) sanctions to the utmost of which the nations now members of the League are capable, and thus to bring *forcibly* home to an aggressor the collective moral disapprobation of his aggression.

## MOBILIZATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

It may be asked how it is possible for any individual who has enjoyed the benefits of modern culture and has acquired self-control to be brought to such a state of mind that he can kill another with whom he has no personal quarrel. In the quiet and even friendly atmosphere of the laboratory a man may, in his scientific enthusiasm, concern himself with aeroplanes and armaments of various kinds, forgetting the use to which they are to be put; but how is it possible for him to fire the guns, explode the munitions, drop the bombs, release the poison gas, knowing that the result will be the killing and maiming of his fellow creatures? In other words, how is it possible for any one to take part in war? That is a psychological problem which each of us must put to himself. In the last war there were a number of people who refused to have anything to do with it. They were all classed together as conscientious objectors, though in fact the motives behind their refusal differed along a wide range. In fact, they had only this in common, a strongly individualistic turn of mind, and indeed it needed to be strong to withstand the tremendous mass suggestion which was surging around them.



But the great majority of people were swept along on the wave of popular feeling, and, I suppose, in the circumstances of 1914 as they presented themselves to the normal mind at that time, with all that people learned or were told of the events preceding the outbreak and those of the first months of the war, active participation in or support of the war seemed to be called for by the reason and conscience of the individual as well as by the authorities of the State. The unconscious was being mobilized at the same time as the mobilization of the army and navy.

Nevertheless, I think it may be stated that if the individual man were fully aware of all the unconscious forces at work his participation in war would at any rate be more hesitating, his mind more a prey to misgivings. Here let me say I am not approaching the subject of participation or non-participation from the point of view of ethics or religious conviction. Those are the ultimate courts of appeal, but we are not dealing with them at the moment. It is purely a question of the facts at our disposal and appropriate action on them. My contention is that we have not all the psychological facts at our disposal when we endeavour to sum up this question of our duty. If the psychological panorama were cleared of the smoke screen we

should not at all events have that terrible contradiction whereby opposing peoples take up arms against one another to the glory of God, each appealing to Him for victory.

#### FORCES ON LEASH

All this, I know, is a platitude, but it has to be mentioned in order that we may face up to the psychological problem. The unconscious urges which are demanding satisfaction have to be remembered. These are not just skeletons in the cupboard, they are very live and potent forces. The tiger is there, and the wolf, and the jackal, and the snake, and we must not forget the donkey. These are at all ordinary times held in check by our conscious aims and purposes, and in general by our culture, our sense of what is due to others and admirable in itself. But the working of these unconscious forces can distort our moral judgement, so that for example during the last war we had quite kindly and well-educated people uttering such sentiments as that 'the only good German is a dead German', though this became less pronounced as the war went on and weariness and disillusionment developed. We have to ask ourselves the question, what strange mentality settled upon them that they could deny all that culture and

social contacts had brought them and be as bloodthirsty as their primeval ancestors? It is true that the Germans had invaded Belgium; that and other things were fuel for the eager fire. Behind it all was the deep conviction that a man must be ready to fight for his king and country and to preserve the life and honour of his own.

Those were the motives on the surface, and it is true that once war had begun there was a certain responsibility upon the shoulders of every one to see that it was prosecuted with the utmost efficiency.

Theirs not to reason why,  
Theirs but to do and die—

and this they did, acting according to whatever plans were devised by the higher command. The whole nation was working as a nation on the principle of self-preservation. The individual was drawn up into the national life in a way which certainly that generation had never known before. His unconscious had the texture of the unconscious of all the other members of the nation.

The same thing happens in times of revolution. The leader, so called, at such times is really the man who stands for the unconscious of all the people whom he leads. People have the leaders they deserve or demand. The leader is



the man who satisfies not only their conscious demands but their unconscious urges. But that is a thing which is always overlooked and will continue to be overlooked by the mass of educated people for a long time to come.

#### PROPAGANDA AND 'PROPER GEESE'

It is seen fairly clearly now that if peace is eventually to be achieved economic science must give of its best, and what it gives must be acted upon; but it is not seen with equal clearness that psychological science must also give of its best, and that what it gives must be acted upon. Up to now there has been a good deal of perverted use of psychology in relation to war and peace—I refer to its use in connexion with propaganda. As soon as war breaks out no doubt it is morally right to use propaganda on each side to the utmost extent. It is the propaganda that takes place before war that is so devilish. By propaganda I mean here, to use a simple word, lying, the distortion of facts. Such propaganda is successful enough, given the proper geese, the people ready to accept the lies or the false emphasis. Propaganda for ulterior motives makes it difficult even for the best educated individual to arrive at the facts. He seeks for them and does not get them, whatever news-

paper he reads. One of the great needs of the world is for complete truthfulness, but lying and chicanery are part of the very art of war.

As an illustration of how psychological motives in war may work, in another country it was said that in the last war they had been brought in to support financial interests, the interests of people who had invested heavily and risked a great deal of wealth in support of other nations engaged in that war. I am not saying that that was true, but only that if it were true we should have a primitive motive—namely, the desire for gain, or the desire to escape financial ruin—supporting and energizing more lofty moral considerations.

But if it is possible, as indeed it is, on the fully conscious plane to have deliberate mis-statements and misdirection and deception and appeal to prejudice, and fixed ideas about the duty to fight, and the slogan 'My country, right or wrong'—if that is possible on the purely conscious level, how much more danger must there be in appeals directed to unconscious forces in the mind? I have spoken already of the instinct of self-assertion. The desire for power and prestige goes hand-in-hand with the sense of the importance of one's family, or college, or country, and so from the depths of the unconscious there

is a continuous line or channel of energetic mental development. Such self-assertion can be very rigid and intractable. It can be distorted in all sorts of ways and disguised in scarcely recognized forms. One of the most overwhelmingly successful ways of disguising it from ourselves is to moralize it, to say that we have a duty to this, that, or the other, and to let that sense of duty reinforce what is, when uncovered, the working instinct of self-assertion or desire for power of a ruthless kind—ruthless, I say, because it arises from some primitive state where the individual neither knew nor received pity.

Aggression pure and simple in the unconscious is a primeval factor, the kind of thing that enables the soldier to kill his enemy when he 'sees red'. The word 'sheep' has sometimes been applied to the soldier type of mind, but there is something much more positive than that about it. I am well aware, of course, that what I am saying is incomplete. On the other side there is the desire, equally fundamental, for fellowship, for love. It is from the refusal of love that a great deal of aggression springs. The little child wants to be loved and is ready to love, but if it does not receive love from its parents it is likely to become an intractable child, hostile and aggres-



sive. Such aggressiveness is not primitive, it is secondary to the denial of love.

I feel that it is the same between nations. One nation wishes the friendship of another; it would rather be the ally of the other than its enemy. But if its overtures are rejected a revulsion of feeling may take place such as that which overwhelms the scorned lover. There is thus a primary aggressiveness which comes out in battle and murder, but there is also a secondary aggressiveness which is very much more widespread and can manifest itself in its own way. There is the further danger in the situation that the primitive tendency to self-sacrifice, to injure oneself, may, when linked up with the ideal of national duty, supply a new fund of energy, and thus bring about war or keep a war going after it has broken out, and the cunning propagandist realizes this and appeals to that very sentiment.

All these are factors which provoke and sustain war. I hope I have made it clear in the compass of a short address how much dangerous and explosive material there is which will have to be dealt with and cleared out of the way before peace can be ensured. It is rightly said that moral disarmament must precede material disarmament, but even before moral disarmament

there must be a psychological assessment not only of those 'inward parts' which, on the highest of all authority, may be 'full of ravening and wickedness', but also of still more deep-seated or primitive mental tendencies that in themselves are neither moral nor immoral.

## CHAPTER IX

### MORAL OBLIGATION AND FREEDOM IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

NOTHING has been quite the same since Immanuel Kant wrote his *Critique of Pure Reason*. In that book he undertakes to show that space and time are forms of our powers of perception, that we know things in space and in time for that reason, our knowledge being universal and necessary; further, that in the 'categories' we have forms of understanding that determine the nature of our knowledge. His doctrine was revolutionary, and placed a completely new viewpoint before the world. The conclusion to be drawn was that everything happens in space and time under the form of necessary causality. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he found himself forced to make a distinction between the thing as we know it as a phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. The thing as a phenomenon we know as completely as may be; it is fixed and necessary, the events are necessary events, everything is determined on the side of phenomena. But as

<sup>1</sup> The substance of two lectures in the Psychological Course at Christ Church, Oxford, May 1934. Read to a medical audience of the British Institute of Philosophy, Thursday, 8 Nov. 1934.



for the thing-in-itself, or what is really at the back of the phenomena, we do not know, and we shall never know through our powers of thought because of the very limitations of those powers. For Kant the problems of God, freedom, and immortality were problems to be dealt with in a different manner, and he proceeded to deal with them in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, where he brought in at the back door, as it were, what in his first book he had formally and ceremoniously shown out at the front.

#### TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

One cannot consider the problem with which I have set myself to deal without mentioning the Kantian approach, but that is not the path I intend to follow. It is too abstract and uncertain. We psychologists prefer to be more concrete. It must be remembered that Immanuel Kant thought philosophically rather than psychologically—indeed, he was struggling all the time against any purely psychological argument. We who are interested pre-eminently in psychology declare this to be a matter of direct observation. We can imagine Kant saying, 'I have been greatly impressed by the moral law, and I accept that as a categorical imperative.

"I ought, therefore I can." I have freedom, and am able to do what I know I ought to do. That freedom cannot be explained in the terms of my *Critique of Pure Reason*, but it can be explained by making the assumption which I make in my *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant has divided the domain of Reality into two as with a hatchet, and his two books are extremely difficult to combine.

As psychologists we say that the world is for action before it is for mere thought, that thought ultimately may be shown to be fundamental, and only through thought can we get a consistent theory of the universe, but that we must not try to run before we can walk. We must prepare the mind adequately on the side of immediate experience. Our reply to the Kantian line of thinking is that the ground there has not been prepared adequately on the psychological side. There has been too great precipitancy in rushing to generalizations and working out the implications of experience before arriving at any adequate knowledge as to the exact content of such experience.

All direct investigation of experience emphasizes the value of the practical side. Experience is for action. The individual has to adapt himself to life.

It is on this practical side that concepts of morality arise quite early. In abstract ethics we are applying a highly refined logical system to our material, when, as a matter of fact, the whole conception of moral obligation in the race has been one of slow evolution and has taken place in close relation to results, in other words in actual practical adaptation to life.

The feeling of absoluteness about special ethical principles may not necessarily be fully justified. In psychology we have to question everything in this matter. We are encouraged to do so when we observe historically what different views on conduct have been held at different stages of mental and cultural development. Moreover, how great is the gulf often between the feeling of certainty about a fact and the actual fact itself! For example, it is not always those who are most certain that they are right who are most right, nor necessarily those most vividly conscious of guilt who are most guilty. This feeling of certainty is an important factor, of course, in logical thinking and in ethical values, but it is itself a psychological feeling which can have its own roots in earlier experiences of the race and of the individual. Nevertheless, unless we assume that there is a fundamental truth, that the whole universe is



a connected system, that there is a coherence in the whole of reality, it is hardly worth while speculating at all, as speculation can reach no definite issue. It may suffice to adapt ourselves, with the empiricists, from moment to moment and from day to day to our environment. We may have to give up all hope of getting the complete truth about anything. In the same way we may give up the hope of ever becoming completely certain as to what we should do or should not do.

As against that, we may justifiably take up this position, namely, that there is such a thing as truth and that truth has its own implications. That is a distinction similar to the one which we find in Immanuel Kant, but the facts that form part of truth have to be scrutinized carefully and gradually collated in as accurate a way as possible.

#### MORAL OBLIGATION AND POWER

Similarly on the ethical side there are principles of moral obligation, things we ought to do, things that ought to be followed out to the end, but actual circumstances alter cases, and the obligation of such principles in different situations and in different ages may vary, and the facts themselves may vary. We do not wish to

try to replace logic by psychology any more than we desire to replace moral philosophy by psychology, and yet we find more and more as ethics develops that it is the psychological side that is becoming predominant. Indeed, if one thinks of such a generalization on the ethical side as Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative, 'I ought, therefore I can', one is almost inclined psychologically to reverse it (without, of course, denying it) and to say, 'I can, therefore I ought'. That, indeed, is the kind of attitude we need at the present time to help things on in the world and to change what is unsatisfactory in the life about us. Instead of thinking so much in the terms of a theoretical and abstract 'ought', we should think more in terms of power. It is rather curious that we have a modern statement or definition which does tend to reverse the Kantian definition. Kant says 'I ought, therefore I can'. The modern social reformer says, 'To every one according to his need; from every one according to his power'—in other words, 'I can, therefore I ought'. That, perhaps, sums up the attitude of the psychologist in contrast with the attitude of the purely metaphysical moralist. It is not that the psychologist asserts that the other is wrong, but he claims that he has a new point of view, which has its own im-

portance. Any one who studies the mind in relation to its earlier stages of development, in the individual as well as in the race, is more and more impressed by the need of not too readily talking about duties, about what one ought to do, but of spending more time thinking what one can do, and the way in which one can increase one's power to do it.

It is not of any real practical help to create a situation in which there is an ideal of conduct, stated in abstract terms, difficult to achieve by the individual, without at the same time furnishing him with power to live up to the ideal so presented. I may take as an illustration a patient suffering from agoraphobia, who cannot walk in the street alone. Directly he goes out in the street he has an attack of anxiety, is in a state of panic. You may tell him to pull himself together, that he ought to resolve to go out to post the letter or make the call. He accepts the imperative, attempts to do what is demanded of him, but the more he tries the less he succeeds, whereupon his friends proceed to condemn him, criticizing him on the moral plane. We psychologists know that justifiable reference to the moral plane in such a case may be very slight. It is never absent, of course, for there is a moral aspect in every kind of action; but there is a



reason why it is particularly difficult for this man to do the simple acts which are required of him, and we have to discover that reason. We do so by working over his past, to find out what events have led up to this particular state of affairs. As he learns to understand himself, as he discovers whence comes this feeling of anxiety, and what were the difficulties in his past not adequately solved, or conflicts not adequately cleared up, he achieves greater will power. He is more able to do what is required. 'He can, therefore he ought.' We must enable him to do the thing before we thrust the duty upon him.

#### CONSCIENCE AND OVER-CONSCIENTIOUSNESS

Turning to a different aspect of conduct, there are patients who manifest a feeling of over-conscientiousness about certain aspects of duty. One of my patients was a student who felt strongly that he did not deserve his degree, because he thought he had copied other people, had overlooked some one else in the examination room. But when I encouraged him to tell me all about it his memory became vague, and it was impossible to pin him down to any particular moment at which he had copied from a neighbouring student. On the other hand, the

analysis showed considerable defects in his character in other directions, dating from very early years. The fact is that what he was worrying about was the wrong thing. He was allowing all his moral fervour (if such a phrase may be used) to converge upon the question of being thoroughly honest about the examination that he took for his degree. His real shortcomings on the ethical side were of quite another nature and of earlier date. When the trouble was worked out by analysis, this feeling with regard to his examination gradually diminished and eventually disappeared.

When we read in the newspapers that the Chancellor of the Exchequer acknowledges the receipt of a certain small sum—often a precise sum, down to shillings and pence—by way of ‘conscience money’, we psychologists think at once not of some misappropriation of that particular amount, or of any amount, but of some misdoing on a different plane altogether. It may, of course, have been the actual fact that the individual has kept back that money and now wishes to replace it, but the suspicion occurs to us that there are other things in his mind that are still wrong, and that instead of paying conscience money what he is really paying is blood money. He is ready to pay that money to salve

his conscience on the other account. I am not dogmatizing, and saying that that is so in every case or in any particular case; but we do find that just as in matters of the mind or of perception things are not always what they seem, so a man can get a false conscience, and see his moral nature as in a distorting mirror.

The only way is to get below the surface. This has a direct bearing, of course, upon the question of illness in relation to religion. Those who have read my books will be aware that I hold strongly the view that not only must ethics stand firm as a discipline of its own, but that religion is the most important branch of all human activity and experience. But if we find a person maladjusted to life, ill physically or mentally or both, and if we are too ready to bring to bear upon his conscious mind the truths of religion, however valid they may be, we may in certain circumstances do him harm rather than good. It often happens that a direct appeal to the religious motive—to faith—may handicap or hold back the progress of recovery instead of assisting it. I am speaking now not theoretically, but from practical experience of cases. My own practice nowadays is never to bring in the religious factor at the beginning of psychotherapeutic treatment. It is well to exercise



the greatest forbearance on the religious and ethical side until the patient himself brings it forward, and then to allow him to develop it along his own lines in the course of the analysis.

#### REPRESSION AND SELF-CONTROL

Many of the difficulties of the patient are accounted for by repression, which is not at all the same thing as self-control. It is a mechanical thing which occurs, much of it, in early life in a semi-conscious or unconscious way, partly through the impact of social ideas upon the growing mind, parental views of duty and of religion, accepted in a mechanical way by the individual, not assimilated in a full, healthy, or normal manner. If, later on, that person comes forward as a patient, suffering from illness, and is the victim of his repressions, if then one proceeds to stimulate his religious feelings and to emphasize them, one may be only emphasizing his repressions. If he did not suffer from repressions, it would be quite in order to stimulate his religious feeling, but because he does suffer from repressions the physician has to be most careful. I suppose none of us are completely free from repressions, for the obvious reason that when we were young our minds were not adequate to adapt themselves to the social environment.

The care that the young mind needs should be as often as not negative rather than positive. The parents' care should show itself in encouraging the child to live its own life. The parent should not endeavour to anticipate development, but to enter sympathetically into that particular stage of mental development which he or she can remember from his or her own childhood. If parents were more imaginative in that way and remembered their own childhood more vividly they would be of more help to their children and more inclined to stand aside and to exercise a negative care, not constantly repeating the formula, 'You must not'. The terms 'ought' and 'ought not' are rather questionable to a psychologically minded person. Actually most individuals are only too ready to apply moral judgements, if not to themselves, at any rate to other people. There is too much moral judgement rather than too little. Of course, we do not want to go to the other extreme. We have in the born criminal a person whose intellect has developed while his moral sense has been left in the undeveloped state, but in the case of the majority of people their troubles are due not so much to a defect in morality as to sheer stupidity. My object is to encourage the acquisition of psychological

knowledge in us all, to show those I teach that the acquisition is well worth while in all relations, alike those pertaining to moral wholesomeness and sin and to health and disease.

#### SIN AND DISEASE

Between sin and disease there is a connexion which every modern psychologist would admit, although hardly any trained psychologist would admit it in the sense in which the general public often take it or in the sense which the Gospel story is often misinterpreted to imply. Not by any means always is illness a matter of sin, but to a very great extent illness, physical and mental, is in direct relation to the individual's conception of what he ought to do and the extent to which he has fallen short of the ideal. But in this respect we can often be mistaken. We can worry ourselves by falling short of a false ideal. That is really the lesson of Freud's theorizing on the super-ego. The super-ego of Freud is that false conscience that develops in early childhood in a mechanical way in relation to the prohibitions and moral judgements of elders, and again in relation to the tendency of the young child to identify himself with older people who are in a position of authority, moral and other. Freud finds—as we all find who do analysis—that deep



down in the mind of the grown-up person there is this censorship, this super-ego which rules ruthlessly, unimaginatively, and irrationally the life of the individual.

Take the case of the melancholiac. If we study any case of melancholia we find the person worrying about the sorrows of the world, feeling appalled at all the wickedness around him, and seeming to be specially criticizing himself as the most worthless of men. But on examination it will be found that a good many of his criticisms against himself are really directed against other people—people about whom he has become disillusioned, or situations with which he cannot reconcile himself. It will also be found that there is an intensification of this super-ego dating from his early years. It is a mechanical thing, and instead of melancholia being the mark of a superior person from a moral point of view—as one might think it was, seeing that so much wrongdoing is due to self-esteem and self-assertion, and that these are the very things against which the melancholiac is abnormally sensitive—we find actually that he is at a lower level, and this is shown by the fact that as he gets well he ‘goes up in the air’, becomes overbearing and very self-assertive and shows all the opposite characteristics to those of his earlier stage.

In the melancholiac or the manic-depressive we have two separate fundamental tendencies acting separately at different periods of time which ought to be interlocked with one another and adequately adjusted. Much of it goes back to a sense of guilt. A sense of guilt is not the same thing as the guilt itself, and often people most free from guilt suffer most from a sense of guilt. The unfortunate thing is that the sense of guilt, whether there be real guilt or not, has the effect of lowering vitality and diminishing the powers of resistance.

What stronger breast-plate than a heart untainted!  
Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel just;  
And he but naked, though lock'd up in steel,  
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted.

That would be excellent if it were true through and through for the mind. Unfortunately, it is true of the unconscious mind in a somewhat different sense, and many people suffer undeserved illness in this way (or perhaps not entirely undeserved, in the sense that much guilt is displaced). The person cannot face his early sins and weaknesses, and so he shifts his ground, and blames himself for some other supposed misdoing or blames other people. We find a great deal of that going on in every one of us—a tendency to project upon others the

guilt that is really ours. Once the possibility of feeling guilt about the wrong thing and of the shifting of guilt is realized, then a good deal of the more unsatisfactory aspects of human nature begin to be explained. Censorious people are people who, instead of dealing adequately with guilt in their own minds and with their own shortcomings, are projecting it upon others around them. They feel the urge to get rid of it in that way.

I can give two instances from the observation of Dr. Georg Groddeck. A lady suffered from kidney trouble for many years—passing stones from time to time. At last she took her physician into her confidence and told him her life story. She explained how all this began after she had lost her father and mother. Her father, who suffered from kidney disease, died in distressing circumstances. One night, hearing him call out to her, she pretended not to hear; the next morning she found him dead. Her mother died shortly afterwards, and subsequently she began to get these attacks. As soon as she had talked this out with her sympathetic physician the trouble stopped, and she passed no more stones.

The other case is that of a man who suffered from corneal ulcers, which kept recurring.



Investigation showed that he thought he had blasphemed. He had spoken against Christ, and he thought he knew that the general punishment for blasphemy was blindness, and so became blind subconsciously. The subconscious suggestion did its work, and this trouble with his eyes set in and would not stop until he had talked things over thoroughly, after which the tendency to corneal ulceration disappeared.

These two cases illustrate how physical illness can be influenced directly by the mind, not merely by fears, but by a sense of guilt, and that indicates how careful we must be in any form of faith-healing and the like. In certain cases there may be real danger of intensifying the subconscious sense of guilt which has made the person ill. Analysis is evidently necessary in such cases before the other.

After a long series of hours of analysis we find that this feeling of guilt can come up very strongly indeed. It may not show itself in a short analysis, but after the patient has been analysed for a hundred or more hours it can appear in a very marked form. It may show itself in the feeling that the patient does not deserve to get well. That is a very difficult stage in the analysis. The analysis is held up, no progress is made, and

one finds oneself up against this super-ego. The analysis has to be pushed farther, to get round it or underneath it, and one gets underneath by bringing up still earlier memories in the patient's mind, taking him to a stage before the super-ego began to be developed. It is a process of real self-knowledge—autognosis. One can get to know oneself in no other way. Mere meditation on one's past is not sufficient for complete self-knowledge, although it may be sufficient in ordinary cases. I do not say that every one ought to be analysed, but I do say that deep analysis gives us knowledge about the mind that cannot be acquired in any other way, and we cannot claim to understand ourselves completely unless we have been analysed. A certain amount may be done by ourselves. I may quote Freud himself, who was never analysed, in his *History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement*.<sup>1</sup> He says, 'The analysis of myself, the need of which soon became apparent to me, I carried out by the aid of a series of my own dreams which led me through the happenings of my childhood years. Even to-day I am of the opinion that in the case of a prolific dreamer and a person not too abnormal, this sort of analysis may be sufficient.' His own self-

<sup>1</sup> Nervous and Mental Diseases Publishing Company, New York, 1916, Monograph Series No. 25.

analysis is to be found in his great book, *Die Traumdeutung*.

On the other hand, self-analysis may be dangerous for people who are on the verge of nervous break-down. I remember being called to a patient suffering from a severe attack of mania, and she kept repeating, 'Self-analysis is the best analysis', but her own state of mind showed how far from true that was. At the same time, after a certain amount of analysis with expert aid, the process can be continued by oneself. After one of my patients had been analysed he sustained a very severe riding accident, the horse bolted, and what appeared to be certain death awaited him. At length he managed, by dragging at the horse's mouth, to make it stumble just before it reached railings, so that both horse and rider fell. At first regarded as dead, he made a surprisingly rapid recovery, and within a fortnight he was riding again, with not a trace of difficulty, and has never felt any difficulty since. I am quite sure that would have been impossible to him if he had not previously been analysed. In that case, he would have had, following the accident, a persistent fear of horses and of riding, and he would have put it all down to the accident when in reality the fear would have been a fear



displaced from earlier unresolved mental conflicts. On the surface the accident was an unavoidable thing, but he knew from deeper analysis how it happened. He was thinking of buying a horse, and was trying a spirited mare. She was evidently a rogue. When my patient saw her he did not like her look, and immediately he mounted her she took the bit between her teeth, and all he could do was to stick on. Now, it so happened that that accident took place on a Sunday, and he had intended to ride on the previous Friday, but that day was an anniversary of some one's death, and for a general vague reason he thought he would not ride on the Friday, and postponed it for two days. The accident was in part a self-punishment. I think he could have avoided the accident, as he was a good rider.<sup>1</sup> But he had a certain sense of guilt about this person, the tenth anniversary of whose death it was—a sense of guilt which had not as yet been adequately worked out or expiated. He had talked it out in his analysis, but not adequately, and so he succumbed to this self-punishment.

#### ANNIVERSARIES AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

That brings me to the question of anniversaries. Anniversaries are very important in

<sup>1</sup> By preventing the mare from bolting at the start.

psycho-analysis. Much of our life is passed in a mechanical way, much of our memory is rote memory, or mechanical memory, in Bergson's phrase, as contrasted with 'pure' memory. We live from day to day, go on our road with blinkers over our eyes, and we do not often recapitulate the past for its own sake. We do it in analysis, and in that connexion an anniversary is a very important psychological event. The Armistice is of the utmost importance psychologically for all of us, because then we recall the events of the War, or some of them, as they occurred, not just as one thing after another in our past life. We see them in their true value—the value that they possess not only in themselves but also in their interconnexion with previous and later events.

I think you will see from what I have said how overwhelmingly important is deep mental analysis in determining the question of illness, accidents, sense of guilt, whatever it may be. It was very difficult for us psychologists to be told, when Freudian doctrines became more pronounced, that we should have to be analysed ourselves. It was a hard saying. I postponed it for years; but it was absolutely necessary and only through analysis can one discover oneself. The result, of course, is that the subject is

misinterpreted right and left, and the dangerous possibility of some more superficial method being put in its place is obvious.

#### SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-CONTROL

We say that self-knowledge gives self-control. How is that possible? Why does self-knowledge give self-control? If we could give an adequate answer it would help us greatly. I will try to give you a provisional answer. There are two kinds of knowledge—external knowledge and internal knowledge. In knowledge from the outside, we can watch another person and see how his actions are determined by his general mental tendencies, his temperament, conditions of life, and the like. We can know ourselves in that way. We can know how certain events occurred in our past lives, making us unhappy, and giving us a tendency to flinch in certain circumstances. But that is not the knowledge that gives full self-control. It is true that it does give some self-control, but not adequate and complete self-control. We shall continue to flinch. To take the illustration I gave above, if we have had a bad riding accident, we may feel unhappy every time we see a horse, or at least when we contemplate riding.

But internal knowledge is something different.



It means that we re-live the past, we re-live that riding accident, and earlier events that are analogous in one way or another or related in some degree, linked up with events for which one would blame oneself, rightly or wrongly, carrying with them anxiety, simply because the mind is not at one with itself. Anxiety always means mental conflict; it always means a repressed tendency, something not adequately dealt with, and still in a state of repression. The result may be a certain degree of disturbed physical innervation, so that a person may seem always to have a headache or always to be physically ill. That is the way some people get rid of anxiety. Others are always worrying, always with severe fears of their own. They cling to them as a drowning man would cling to a straw, because it is those things only which prevent them from seeing themselves as they really are.

Internal knowledge is the kind of knowledge we get as we talk things out, because, as we talk out our lives, we find emotion coming up, we give expression to it, and it passes and our mind is different afterwards. If it is done rightly these unhappy things do not recur. It is bad analysis if a person is made more susceptible by re-living his past unhappy memories.

## GUILT AND RESPONSIBILITY

To return to the question of moral responsibility and guilt. We are all guilty, and the conditions of our life are such that no one who is honest with himself can help feeling guilty. We have to live to some extent at one another's expense. Civilization certainly is trying to get away from that. It has already brought us from the cannibal stage, but much more remains to be done until we reach the stage of inverting that categorical imperative and saying not 'I ought, therefore I can', but 'I can, therefore I ought'. When we search for the sense of guilt in ourselves we go back to the little child, full of rage and annoyance and insulted dignity, which, if it is a good child, it crowds back, but if it is naughty, asserts in tantrums, and for these is punished, and so acquires further hatred, feels more guilty, and may project some of the guilt upon others. In that way the criminal may be made and assert himself against the world, or, if not the criminal, then the neurotic, he who has not the courage of the criminal, but runs away from the situation. Not that I would deny the high level of the neurotic type of mind. The neurotic often has as high a standard of real morality as the healthy person, and

suffers from it. I would not deride the neurotic as invariably an inferior product. The majority of the neurotics I have treated are at as high a level as the normal person. The criminal type, on the other hand, can be seen in many psychotic cases. These reveal self-seeking; the principle they follow is to swim no matter who else sinks. In their early childhood that feeling was not transformed in the crucible of experience through the influence of true sympathy. On the other hand, any one who has once learned true sympathy could not do injury even to those remote from themselves, any more than to their own brother or sister. That is the ultimate aim of civilization. When we hurt those who are near and dear to us we are ready to do anything to make amends, yet we often hurt those who are far away, and laugh it off. Laughter is often an effort of nature to avoid sympathy. We laugh in order not to cry, because if we sympathized too much with other people we should be too sad. I may remind you of Schopenhauer's view of morality as sympathy—*Mitleid*.

We could write a psychology of morals, but true morals—the essence and the heart of morality—are, of course, philosophical or metaphysical, and there is nothing we are learning in psychopathology to undermine them. Certain



people have special views of their own, partly because they have not been philosophically trained; but those who have been philosophically trained all hold much the same view, that the result of psychology should be to deepen our morals and our religion, and, indeed, it can have no other effect.

NOTE ON FREEDOM. It is sometimes argued that the modern 'uncertainty principle' in physics is in support of philosophical indeterminism. According to this physical generalization 'it is impossible to determine both the position and momentum of a particle with complete accuracy. Increased accuracy in the determination of one is accompanied by calculable decrease of accuracy in the determination of the other. It is to be noted that this principle applies only to the determination of the two quantities.' (Prof. Allan Ferguson, Presidential Address to Section A of the British Association, Blackpool, 1936.) The facts are in no sense a support of libertarianism or indeterminism. If the principle of causal determinism is widened to become the 'principle of sufficient reason'—viz. that there is always a sufficient reason why anything should happen rather than not happen (Leibniz)—then it covers the theory of self-determination in morals which I hold.

CHAPTER X

SELF-DETERMINATION AND  
FREE WILL

WE have still to struggle, however, with the problem of individual freedom and responsibility. So far as we deal with it psychologically we find, along Kantian lines at any rate, and according to Kantian views, the reverse of freedom. Individual man is determined by his antecedents, his heredity, his early life and environment. Every moment in his history is completely determined along those lines if we think of him as a natural being under the forms of space and time and under the categories of cause and effect, substance and accident, &c.

But Kant also says that man, in distinction perhaps from the animals, is able to rise above this. He finds the conception of duty and the claim of morality as such an absolute injunction upon him. The various scientific theories of morality, such as utilitarianism, are all inadequate. When we pass beyond them we find there is this command or injunction upon us, a moral law with which we identify ourselves. Instead of a hypothetical imperative 'Do this (if you wish to be happy)', there is a categorical

imperative, 'Do this (because it is your duty)'; and that categorical imperative, according to Kant, is only possible if we believe that we belong to two different worlds, not only this natural world of space and time, but also a spiritual universe, that we are members of a spiritual community, freely acting members among our peers, equal to one another, and equally subject to the moral law which we ourselves can impose. In this conception of morality there is posited a spiritual world of souls able to legislate freely for themselves. The law is not something external to them. To us as members of the physical universe it does seem to be something external. We seem to have some injunction bearing upon us from elsewhere, which we may follow with difficulty or with pain and irksomeness. But nevertheless we feel that that injunction is a part of us too, a part of our higher nature which resides in a supermundane, a noumenal or ultra-phenomenal world.

#### THE GOOD WILL

This categorical imperative involves also universality. If we are to act morally we must act according to a moral law which is universally true—true for every one in similar circumstances—an eternal law that can be true for every one



of a society of saints or souls. This possibility of moral action is evidence of freedom. The will is free in that sense. Kant said that there was nothing in the world that is unconditionally good except one thing, namely, a good will, not merely goodness of motive, but goodness of will, inner decision, or resolution, which makes itself apparent in the truly moral action. Actions are only moral if and because they proceed from the moral will, and the moral will is a will that is in complete harmony with the moral law. It is completely representative of an ultimate spiritual reality, a spiritual federation or society of souls who are in complete harmony with one another, who wish one another's good.

#### PHENOMENON AND NOUMENON

There are two difficulties in this position of Kant. One is the great chasm which it places between the phenomenal world and the noumenal world, the gulf between what we observe as phenomena and know under the form of the categories, and what we hold to be 'things-in-themselves'. The second is the nature of experience as we feel it in our more spiritual moments.

To give a concrete example of the reason why these abstract arguments of Kant about spatial

perception have to be taken with some reserve, I may instance the attempts at non-Euclidean geometry, such as Lobatchevski and Riemann, among others, have produced. We do not hear much of Lobatchevski's geometry because it is not so useful in physics, but we hear a great deal of Riemann's nowadays because it has been found helpful in the modern theory of relativity, assuming the curvature of space, and although the Kantians still fight that position the Riemannian geometry has established itself.

Similarly with time: a great deal of new work has been done on time, and indeed it is in grappling with the problem of time that the human intellect is at its weakest. There are problems which must have their solution in the future. We cannot accept the form of time as we have had it described to us by Kant. The theory of relativity has shown the intimate relationship of time and space—an intimacy of relationship one would not suspect from reading Kant.

#### TIME, PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

Besides these scientifically discovered facts of relativity there may be facts of a psychological order which throw light on the nature of time. For the physicist time is just a going on, one thing following on another. For the psycho-

logist there is a perception of time, an awareness of sequence which is much more than merely sequence. There is no doubt that this perception is linked up with changes occurring in our brains. In a vague way we may speak of it as including the immediate past, the present, and the immediate future, and the after-effect of previous stimuli resounding through our brains and influencing our future. But that alone is not an explanation of the consciousness of elapsing time, and further experiments have been and are being made as to the possibility of our anticipating the future, or the possibilities of precognition of what is to happen, not just by inference from the past, but by direct awareness. Perhaps a better term, 'pre-experience'—experience of something not yet taken place—might be adopted. I am referring to the work of Mr. J. W. Dunne on dreams, fragments of dreams which have been found to have reference to events later occurring. The evidence can be checked and tested by others. The only strict test that has yet been made was found to be negative. Researches were carried out a year or two ago among undergraduates at Oxford, and members of the Society for Psychical Research worked at it analytically and statistically and found no convincing evidence. In other words,



although there were in some cases correspondences of the dreams with future events, such correspondences were judged to be not more numerous than could be expected by chance. But in testing the theory one success is much more important than one failure, because success means a concatenation of corroborative detail, not just one event, but much detail surrounding that event which is in harmony with the dream. You cannot talk of that corroborative detail as a single event in a statistical argument. It comes under the rule of compound probability; it means that the probabilities against it having occurred by chance are enormously increased.

Of course, if this theory of precognition or pre-experience should be proved to be true, then it would give us still further tremendous difficulties of theory, and the possibilities are too great for the human mind at its present stage of development. But that they must be solved if we are to get an adequate intellectual knowledge of the world is pretty obvious to every one now. It is obvious to every one that reality is both temporal and eternal. We can no longer rest in the dictum that certain ideas and facts are eternal and others are temporal. That is not enough. We shall probably find that we must develop a conception of union of the temporal

with the eternal. Reality has probably both an eternal and a temporal aspect at the same time. The temporal aspect is prominent in the physical world, but in the psychological world the eternal aspect is obviously there with the temporal. We are held back by being too wholehearted supporters of the Kantian position. If we follow Kant too strictly here we abandon all hope of further investigation. Instead of saying that the whole thing is unknowable we shall, if we are wise, confess that it is our own mind with its shortcomings which is at fault, and in course of time the human race may be able to understand these things and pass beyond them.

#### KNOWLEDGE AND FREEDOM

If we reason like that in respect of space and time in regard to the Kantian philosophy, we shall reason in the same way about his doctrine of reality and freedom. We do not believe that a thing in itself is for ever unknowable in the physical domain, nor do we believe it of these other things, God, freedom, and immortality, which Kant says are matters of faith, which must for ever elude our knowledge. We have greater faith in knowledge than Immanuel Kant had. We see the difficulties, but we are not going to be discouraged by them or prevented from struggling

on. The reason why I have such respect for Bergson is that he has struggled on. In his writings he does not refer to Kant very much. His writings are definitely un-Kantian in the sense that he is dealing with reality all the time. He gives his own view of the nature of knowledge, a view that we need not necessarily accept in its entirety, but one which is full of suggestion. The intellectual side of our mind has to do with knowledge of matter, and besides that, there is the intuitive side which gives us direct insight. Time that has elapsed is different from time that is elapsing. After an event has happened we can look back upon it, and it is seen in temporal sequence and fitted into a causal scheme, and so what has happened seems to us bound to have happened, as if nothing else ever could have happened. Thus we get the impression that everything is determined, and that there is no such thing as freedom. But the moment of experience itself is a moment of freedom. We are free at that moment, in Bergson's view, so long as we are conscious at all. I do not accept that view. Consciousness may be very vivid and intense and yet freedom may be absent. The more intense the consciousness sometimes the less the freedom. The very vividness of the consciousness in a mental patient may be the measure of his *lack*



of freedom. On the other hand, freedom is given to us with knowledge and insight, and so far as we have insight we have freedom of activity.

This is shown indirectly by our psychological work in analysis. We find as an actual fact that analysis gives the patient greater freedom. Before being analysed he may have a certain knowledge of himself. He has an external knowledge. He knows that certain events have happened in his past and reacted on his temperament so as to produce difficulty or inability in certain directions, and his knowledge, instead of giving him freedom, seems to make his symptoms more apparent. If you take such a person and encourage him to re-live his past—for that is what analysis means, it means being a little child again—uttering words from time to time to give an indication of what is passing through his mind, you will find that as he lives it again the deadlocks of the past begin to open and the stresses and strains clear up, and as they clear up freedom comes to him. He gets more and more freedom. That is an actual direct experience. I think almost any one who has been analysed for any length of time would admit that. There comes a feeling of increased spontaneity. The Kantian might say that the feeling of spontaneity is not the same as freedom. Kant says

that one might as well talk about the freedom of a roasting-jack that goes on turning after it has been wound up. Spontaneity of the mind is just machinery going on working. He might say that a person with symptoms is a person whose machinery is out of order, with a certain amount of checking of the movements, and that when you analyse him, the movements go on more smoothly, but he is not any more free than he was before. My reply is that he is free because of the intellectual side. Reason is an element in the matter. The individual is free not only from his fear, but in so far as he has insight into his own mind he has a direct awareness of himself so that he is single-minded in the literal sense, and his different motives and tendencies all converge towards one goal. That is a slow process. We are all struggling after it. We would like to know what to aim at and do not always know. That is not immediately apparent to us. Analysis helps us to re-live our past in the light of what we now know, so that we understand ourselves better than we did before.

It might be said that this is simply an extension of the psychological argument and does not really touch the metaphysical. Here again one feels that there is too great a readiness to put gulfs, impassable barriers, between one mode of

thought and another. It is true that we must not mix up our categories, but the various categories or modes of thinking are in relation to one another, and any advance in psychology must have some influence upon our metaphysical modes of thinking and the theories that we may as metaphysicians produce.

#### THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND PSYCHO- ANALYSIS

To return to the categorical imperative, it is not surprising that Freud has disrespectful things to say about it. Freud says that the feeling of 'oughtness' has to be considered as of psychological origin in early life. It arises from identification of the child with the father, his acceptance of authority from without. It is reminiscent of the law of obedience in respect of which the child must not ask questions but just do as he is told. Some enthusiastic analysts would proceed, I think, to explain away all absoluteness in that way, and say that this is the feeling, for example, exemplified by Luther when he declared at an historic moment in history, 'Hier steh' ich. Ich kann nicht anders'. Freudians would compare that frame of mind with the frame of mind of an obsessed person or a person suffering from a compulsion neurosis, that he



must go on thinking or acting in certain ways without any help for it. And, indeed, there is real danger that some modern psychologists will make that identification, which is not justifiable at all, although there is some relation between the one and the other. Freud himself no doubt has linked them up in his conception of the super-ego as a part of the unconscious mind, carrying these moral injunctions, mainly of tabu, of forbidding. He would claim, I suppose, that he is giving a psychological account of the dawn of conscience in the child. Conscience begins in the child by taking authority from without. Where he has made a psychological contribution is in his emphasis upon the unconscious nature of some of those beginnings and the tendency for those unconscious beginnings to persist even into the adult mind. We find evidence for that when we analyse patients. When we get down deep enough we find that there still persists the irrational feeling of 'ought'. It is that irrational feeling of 'ought' we wish to get rid of in order to make place for the true feeling of 'ought'. We cannot criticize Kant from that point of view. Of course, there will be danger for the individual in thinking that certain feelings he has of 'oughtness' are absolute when they are not. They seem to come from outside and they really

come from the depths of his own unconscious. He feels that he must take a certain course and that may tend to make him narrow, harsh, censorious, limited in outlook, and even cruel.

That brings us to the defect in the Kantian position. In theory it may be true that there is this categorical imperative linked up with morality as such, yet we must be very careful in imposing that imperative in particular circumstances. We can be guided by his other rule of universality, but we cannot do without direct moral feeling, direct insight and sympathy with one another, and readiness to enter into one another's lives as far as possible, and understand them. If we submit ourselves to asceticism, macerate ourselves in our endeavours to obey the law universal, and at the same time impose the same law on others, we can be very harsh and unnecessarily hard. So here again the psychological aspect makes its appearance. Ethics is not the same as psychology, but ethics involves psychology at every turn. The human material is not only some social system of particular date. It is a mind or system of minds which has its own history and which has reached its present position after a long process of evolution. We cannot help looking ahead and thinking of the future as well as the past. Indeed, that is characteristic of

the thought of the present day. We recognize the importance of the past, but we know the past must be overcome. There are great possibilities in the future. We cannot lay down final laws at the present time. We have to move step by step with our eyes to the future and using the past simply as a guide. The past is past, and is dead, except so far as it is in relation to a possible future.

#### THE ETHICAL VALUE OF MENTAL ANALYSIS

One gets very much impressed with the truth of this as one analyses a patient. The past of the patient is only real and living so far as it is in relation to his present. The reason why the unconscious is so important is because it is living. The mere fact that when a patient is analysed these things come forward with great emotional vividness at the present moment shows that they still have vitality, and that vitality has to be taken up into the patient's present life to contribute to that urge into the future. Therefore clearly analysis has a very great moral or ethical as well as therapeutic significance. It is not only a question of helping people to get rid of symptoms, but it increases their mental power and deepens their ethical insight. When I read disparaging references to 'medical psychology' as getting its material simply from



intellectual and emotional cripples, I feel that the person who could write like that knows nothing whatever about the subject. The more normal a man is the better subject he is for analysis. We learn most from our most normal subjects. We are not building up a system of psychology on a study of morbid mental states. We are not taking those states into our system at all, or only doing so indirectly. Only in so far as we can get patients back into the normal have we material on which to build a system, so that the psychology we are developing from analysis is normal psychology. It is for a similar reason that with normal people we have to go on for a very much longer time, but we learn all the more from them. I am not saying that all analysts would agree with me in this; I am only speaking for myself here. The science has reached a state where it can only be adequately judged by those within the science who are getting extensive experience themselves. It must not be thought that the subject is just the systematization or codification of observations on pathological material. We are understanding more and more how to distinguish the normal from the pathological through our working insight. If the person doing this work is fairly normal himself and has himself been ade-

quately analysed, that fact does enable him to see more clearly the difference between the normal and the abnormal, and he may recognize in the patient something abnormal that might be thought at first to be normal. All of us have mental tendencies which are abnormal and which could be readjusted, and it is our abnormalities that are keeping us back.

#### PSYCHOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

It is because of this that the matter is so important from the point of view of world affairs. We speak sometimes of moral disarmament. We ought also to speak of psychological disarmament. Why do apparently normal people tolerate war? Why, when war breaks out, do normal people support it? How is it possible that they can contemplate the killing of others? Why not kill themselves instead? An excellent cartoon appeared in one of the newspapers some time ago, apropos of the future of the Disarmament Conference, in which a number of savage animals of the jungle were shown on a platform confronting an immense flock of sheep. The spokesman of the wild beasts was an alligator who, amid his tears, said to the sheep, 'We are so sorry; but we could not control your warlike passions'. It is amusing, but it is not true psycho-

logically. For the passions of those 'sheep' are the essence of the situation. It is a psychological way of escape to project the evil upon a system, upon a government or a civilization, and as long as we push what is our own responsibility back upon those who happen to guide us and speak for us we cannot get progress. If we took psychology seriously we should go along another line. Psychology as a science means the knowledge of the mind. You cannot get at that knowledge of the mind by mere introspection. You have to go deeper than that. We even want to go beyond such a position as the Kantian. The idea of the individual doing his 'duty' has brought immense trouble on the world. As I said earlier, instead of 'I ought, therefore I can', I prefer the imperative, 'I can, therefore I ought'. This is not preaching sentimentalism. There is nothing sentimental about psychology. It is pointing us on to a heroic future. Individuals have got to be heroic. They have to change themselves and to change one another in that sense. It cannot be a mere accident that when one seeks for words to express it the words which come to one's mind are from the Gospel—the story of the man who had an evil spirit, which was driven out of him, and his mind was empty and garnished, but because it was empty



there entered into him seven other evil spirits. That is what analysis teaches about the empty mind. The empty mind must be filled. There must be a synthetic process, a creative process. The mind must re-create itself. If it is not courageous enough to do that, having got rid of one devil, it will be tormented by seven. The mind is empty and ready to receive either good things or bad.

#### MENTAL ANALYSIS AND CONFESSION

The popular view about analysis, that it is similar to confession, is an entirely mistaken view. Analysis is different in principle from confession. In the course of analysis we are not asking the patient to confess, we are asking him to re-live his past life and thus to understand himself better. If we ask him to confess we may do him good through the confession, but we may be putting difficulties in the way as regards analysis, increasing the repressions, so that the things we really want to bring out—the repressed material which is doing so much damage—will not be released.

Nevertheless, in the course of analysis it is the general rule that the patient feels the need of confession. From time to time in the course of analysis the attitude of mind of the patient

changes. Instead of giving just an amoral statement of the situation or just a scientific narrative of what he feels, he begins to reproach himself or to feel the need of confession. One of the things we aim at in analysis is to enable the patient to admit faults and failures. The trouble with the patient is that he is always on the defensive. The symptoms are a self-defence mechanism to prevent himself from seeing himself as he really is. Eventually he has to see himself as he really is, and that involves confession. But to set out with the idea of confession is different from setting out with the idea of getting analysed. I am inclined to think that all confession would be better for a certain admixture of analysis. For example, a young girl confesses to her priest that she cannot get on with her mother. Her spiritual director bids her mortify the flesh and make up her mind that she will love her mother. But quite possibly with that direction she will get worse. Analysis may discover the reason for her difficulty. Much formal morality is too crude and too harsh. I repeat that we are not sentimentalists. Human nature has to harden itself and face its tasks and difficulties. But what makes us sad is to see how often the difficulties which people have to face are unreal ones, while the real difficulties are evaded.

## CHAPTER XI

### PSYCHOLOGY AND CONFESSION<sup>1</sup>

I CANNOT imagine a more important subject-matter of a discourse than this question of psychology and confession. When the Rev. C. M. Chavasse invited me to speak on it, I simply could not refuse, because my experience now for many years has convinced me that it really is one of the fundamental problems of psychology as well as of religion. What exactly do we mean by confession? What happens when confession occurs? In speaking to you, I want to say definitely that I am speaking as a psychologist, not necessarily as a philosopher or a theologian. I am speaking entirely from the psychological point of view. Psychology is in a difficult position. It is about to assume very much more power than it at present possesses. Its future is assured. It is like a young adolescent who has a great future before him, but who is, on occasions, over-impressed and over-stimulated by the thought of his future, and is tempted at times to presume upon his future and to anticipate it. That is the danger the

<sup>1</sup> The substance of an address given at the Oxford Conference of Evangelical Churchmen, at St. Peter's Hall, 1934. Published in *The Churchman*, vol. xlviii, New Series, Oct. 1934.



psychologist runs at the present day. Another danger is that psychology, because of its importance, will trespass on other domains. As long as psychology keeps its place it has a fundamental work to do. What is the task of psychology? It is the task of bringing scientific order into the temporal sequence of mental processes as observed in individuals. It is, as James Ward said, the science of experience, and experience is always individual experience and is something that goes on in time. Besides that aspect, there is the eternal aspect of experience, the aspect of values, and these values are classified under the headings, the good, the beautiful, and the true, which, in their essence, are beyond time but not out of time. The eternal is not something which occurs all at once, but something which, in some mysterious way, takes time into itself. We have that occurring in the individual mind. It is not a mystery which has to be accepted without being understood at all. In our ordinary life we are already rising above the immediate present, we are already rising into an eternal sphere, and so for the individual, the life of the eternal is there.

#### MIND AND SPIRIT

I would not dream of making distinctions

between the mind and the spirit, because I think all mind is spiritual. The distinction I would make is between the events occurring in time and the value of those events. You cannot say they are all at the same level. Psychology has to deal with value, but the determination of value from the point of view of psychology is not the same as that from the point of view of philosophy and religion.

It is because so many psychologists have no training in philosophy that there is so much confusion in this matter at the present time. The majority of psychologists are untrained in philosophy. They come to the subject from the point of view of mental processes in connexion with physical processes (in the brain), and no wonder they tend to explain everything in terms of what has gone before, and treat the mind in the way of a closed system.

To have inspiration means nothing objective to them because they cannot treat objective inspiration scientifically. We carry our science as far as possible, but we don't prejudge and prejudice the whole situation by giving our own inadequate account of reality. That is obviously the case in the writings of Freud in *The Future of an Illusion*. It is quite easy in that book to discover the original fallacy when you find him referring

to reality. He uses the word 'reality' in a way no philosopher would. He seems to assume that religion is a mixture of egotism, greed, and fear. The way to refute a doctrine like that is to give a more adequate psychological analysis of religious experience and its philosophic implications.

#### CONFESSION AND PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

For years now, people who have approached psycho-analysis and other forms of analytical psychology from the religious side have tended to think of analysis as a development of the practice of confession. Although there are similarities the differences are still greater. The differences are differences of point of view and of purpose. In confession the idea is to get the individual to admit that he has done wrong, to change his mental attitude and to get him to wish to do better and to be ready to make restitution for what he has done wrong. In analysis the purpose is quite a different one. It is to go over the individual's past in order to see how one mental process has led on to another in his life, until the present situation is reached. Psycho-analysis was devised to help patients suffering from nervous and mental symptoms. Confession deals more with normal people than with abnormal people.



But although there is a dividing line, a difference in quality between the normal and the pathological, in actual experience there is no complete separation. The most normal person has pathological trends which need to be tracked down and eliminated in a scientific way. The difference in point of view here between confession in religious practice and analysis in psychotherapy is in the adequate training and education of the normal person. In the case of confession, advice may be given at the end; in the case of analysis, advice is not part of the analysis. Analysis enables the individual to rectify wrong past mental attitudes. Analysis has discovered various mental mechanisms, mental reactions in the face of difficulties of one kind or another that are met with in the course of life. Such mental reactions are the reaction of compensation, the reaction of projection, the reaction of introjection, and the reaction of regression. The process of regression is a process of stepping back to an earlier or more infantile mental attitude towards life. This is apparent in most cases of patients suffering from mental illness.

This process of regression is important for religion because the process can take place in certain instances and produce a religious experience (such as an experience of 'conversion')

whose true validity is not quite the same as its apparent validity. The individual, if he is allowed to put too much weight upon that unthinkingly and blindly, may be hindering himself in his own true religious development, and he may, in a great emotional experience, be tending to fix himself at an infantile level. Besides regression, the process of compensation is generally admitted to be of frequent occurrence in the life of mental patients. The mind tends to rectify itself in face of a difficulty, but when inadequate to its task it may develop symptoms, i.e. morbid reactions of one kind or another.

Partly by endeavouring not to see one's deficiencies, one may run in different directions. Sometimes one may run to dogmatic agnosticism to escape duties which one does not feel equal to. At other times one may endeavour to emphasize other abilities one may possess and magnify one's pretended power in those directions to hide from oneself one's religious deficiencies. Analysis is a process of encouraging a patient to talk out his life for an hour at a time without any reference to righting a wrong or confession or absolution, but just to let his feelings come out. That is a very important process, because it enables him to work off repressions that have driven him into this false

position. If you make a frontal attack on him you may cause him to entrench himself in that false position still more firmly, and he may even use religion itself to the further entrenching of himself. In that sense analysis is needed to prepare the way for adequate confession.

I cannot identify confession with analysis. I have had patients for varying periods of analysis (my longest patient was for six years), and they talk at every level of conscious reaction and unconscious reaction. You find mental processes that do get outlet, and if they had not obtained that outlet, they would have produced distorted reactions in the conscious mind which would have continued to mystify the individual and those around him. The normal person, as such, does not need analysis. We only need analysis so long as there is something pathological in us; something which is not adapted in a scientific way to our environment.

When I say I don't distinguish the mind from the spirit, it does not mean that I don't distinguish our mental environment and our spiritual environment. We can make a distinction for any ordinary subject, and we have to do so when we make a distinction between mental illness and moral illness, although they run into one another. Although it is true that analysis is



different from confession, I have found, in almost every case I have dealt with, that sooner or later my patient has wanted to confess to me. They seem to feel the need for real confession. It is when one gets confession in the process of analysis that one sees the real difference between the two.

Here we must take into account Freud's recent doctrine of the 'super-ego'. The super-ego is the beginning of individual conscience, the taking up into the individual mind in early years of parental authority, of parental veto, or the veto of society. We have to allow for that in analysis. It is a further complication. When the patient begins to confess to you, you have to ask yourself: Is this blaming of himself just a mechanical action of his own super-ego, working unconsciously, but with a conscious reflection, so that he is blaming himself when he really should not? That can happen. A patient can, in the course of an analysis, begin to say, 'Really, I don't deserve to get better. I am rotten to the core.'

If he takes that line, one has to go on helping him. If one says, 'Yes, you are a miserable sinner, you have to confess', one may be putting too great a load on his shoulders. One may be taking things at their face value which should not be taken at their face value. All psychology

which is based on deep analysis emphasizes the fact that things are not always what they seem. It is true that many people who do this work seem sometimes in danger of forgetting that there is a conscious mind at all. That is an obvious mistake. But the unconscious mind is always working mechanically at the back of the conscious mind, in the form of a blind driving towards instinctive goals, of which the most fundamental are the 'will to live' and the 'will to power'.

The psychologist has to be fully aware of all that while he is listening to his patient. He listens, he does not talk. He tries to get the patient's confidence so that the patient can talk to him, but sooner or later the confession element does come in and the expert psychologist is able to distinguish between the true confession and the pseudo-confession due to the working of this primitive infantile conscience. Ultimately he has to explain to his patient the difference, so that the latter can gradually unravel it himself. But the patient must not think this is all super-ego, that it is all convention, or what not. He needs to be sustained in his search for an ethical standard, and we find that later on a logical standard becomes clear and ultimately a religious standard.

Again, speaking entirely on a basis of observed fact, I find that through analysis patients get a deeper view of religion instead of becoming sceptical of religion.

In analysis we are dealing with what is in our own individual minds all the time, but when we come to the true confession side we are passing beyond that. As scientists we feel it is our duty to allow as fully as possible for what has come through our past experience, but we are not justified in denying the possibility of spiritual help and inspiration from a higher source.

To sum up my short address, I would say that, for psychology, deep analysis of every kind is different from confession; but that if deep analysis is adequate, it may ultimately lead to confession, to a need in the individual for absolution and for a reorganizing of life in relation to a spiritual universe and in relation to religious experience. I have not yet met a single patient who has ultimately discarded religion as a result of analysis. They may say at the beginning, 'Religion doesn't mean much to me, I have drifted away, I don't seem to need it', but, after a long analysis where they have had to face fundamentals and the deeper metaphysical implications of existence, they admit that true



religion, as distinct from forms and ceremonies, is ultimately the one important thing in life.

The other matter in regard to psychology and confession is that we must always remember the existence of the unconscious mind as well as the existence of the conscious mind.

Finally, you may be wondering what application this has to modern methods of group confession. The conclusion can be drawn from what I have said, except that I have omitted consideration of the factor of transference. This is a transferring of emotional tendencies of early years to the person to whom you confess, or to whom you bare your mind. Transference occurs at once if anything is going to happen at all. It may be positive or it may be negative. If it is positive then the doctor or the physician has a great responsibility on his shoulders. If there is transference in the case of any form of confession, there again, the whole personality of the priest is of utmost importance. If you have multiple confession you have a complication of the whole situation which may sometimes be helpful, but which may be the reverse. You have uncontrolled transference. One of the things we have to learn in analysis is to know how to control the transference.

## CHAPTER XII

# PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION<sup>1</sup>

### THE SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE

IT is a great pleasure to me that I have been given the opportunity of speaking to an audience of Jews and Christians. Long ago I was told that there was no genius without some Jewish blood; and in those days when I was an undergraduate, I felt sad about this, as I knew that I had no Jewish blood, but was 'mere English'. Nevertheless, looking down the files of time, I must admit that the Jews have it in the direction of philosophy, art, and religion; that it is the race that first introduced the idea of Monotheism into religion; the race that produced that great philosopher and 'God-intoxicated' man Spinoza; the race that holds in its keeping the true aims of religion; and the race that has provided us Christians with our own Leader.

And so with that I turn to the consideration of a book written by a manifest genius, a genius of the Jewish race, namely Sigmund Freud, who has put, better than any one, the present-day intellectual case against religion. I am think-

<sup>1</sup> Notes of a Lecture given at the Montefiore Hall, St. John's Wood Road, N.W., to the Society of Jews and Christians, February 1935.

ing particularly of his book: *Die Zukunft einer Illusion* (The Future of an Illusion). I have read that book through four times, and every time with more pleasure and satisfaction than the last. And I have also read practically everything he has ever written from 1912, when I had the privilege of lecturing to the Listerian Society, King's College Hospital, on his 'Theory of Dreams', before any of his books had been translated into English. Since then I have done my utmost to understand his method and theory of psycho-analysis. I mention that because one can only deal fairly with Freud if one tries to understand him fully: and I shall try to present his case as fairly as possible to-night. I have no interest in religious dogma as such. I do not want to support any form of religion that cannot stand intellectual criticism. I want the truth. Any ideals in conflict with fact or with reason are no true ideals.

#### REPPRESSED INSTINCTS

Now regarding religion, Freud says it is an illusion. He carefully distinguishes illusion from delusion. An illusion is the view we take of the universe, or of any aspect of it, under the influence of a wish. And when Freud is speaking you may be quite sure that that wish is deep-



seated. He distinguishes it from a delusion in this sense. An illusion is the satisfaction of a wish, a wish-fulfilment, without reference to reality. A delusion is the fulfilment of a wish that is in conflict with reality, and so is manifestly untrue. You cannot say that an illusion is untrue: illusion is not error, it is neither true nor false. So that Freud is not saying that religion is an error, but he is saying that it is an illusion. He is explaining it in terms of a wish-fulfilment.

Let me give you a rapid summary of his general point of view. He considers the fundamental instincts which are at the base of human nature and human action—and he finds among those fundamental instincts, or fundamental motivations, some which are much more intensely and vigorously repressed than others: the most repressed motivations of the mind are those that show themselves indirectly in the symptoms of psychoneurosis, viz. the motivations of cannibalism, incest, and murder. These are tendencies present in all of us, and most of us have dealt with them, sublimated them: but in the neurotic they are repressed, and inadequately sublimated: and they show themselves in distorted forms, in the form of symptoms. My own experience in analysis, while it does not bear that out entirely, does bear it out to a

great extent. One may analyse a patient for as long as a hundred, two hundred, or three hundred hours, or for much longer, before reaching the underlying causes of his illness, i.e. before finding the true psychological explanation of his symptoms. But, of course, far shorter periods of analysis may produce benefit and even cure in many cases.

#### THE FACT OF FEAR

There are other motivations, less powerfully repressed, motivations that are in conflict with the dominant culture. Culture is the general adjustment of the individual and the race to the circumstances of its existence. A certain amount of culture is necessary for survival: but that culture has sometimes to be impressed upon the majority by a minority, and sustained by the latter's loyalty to it. Among those cultural elements, social, intellectual, and artistic, you have one fundamental aspect, viz. the religious aspect. According to Freud, the function of religion is to reconcile the individual to his hard lot, and to give him some kind of compensation, some kind of hope in the apparently hopeless struggle against the inhuman forces of nature: for, says Freud, the individual is a coward before these overwhelming forces of nature, and is terri-

fied, and is unable to stand up against them by himself; and even if he combines with others he is still frightened, and he can only get rid of his fear by producing a fiction, an illusion, an imagined satisfaction of his wish for safety, for the preservation of his values, and the conservation of all that he holds dear in life, love for those who are near and dear to him, and the love he has for himself.

To ensure that safety he produces subconsciously a belief, a faith in the gods, and, ultimately, in a God, moulded, fashioned after the type of his own father, with whom in his earliest years he found himself for the first time faced with another human being, an apparently super-human power with the control of his destiny. And this attitude towards his father, which is the beginning of his early life, is a mixture of fear and respect and worship. It is through his reaction to his father that he has internalized the moral code in the form of a super-ego which holds in a state of repression his libido, the affective and emotional energy which constitutes his infantile sexuality. That is Freud's view of what culture means, the frustration of the instincts. He uses the terms 'frustration', 'prohibition', 'privation', and he sees as a compensation for that prohibition, that privation, which we all have to



suffer to a certain extent, the idealistic world of our essentially religious values.

#### A READINESS TO SACRIFICE

Before I go any farther I would like to remind you that my speech will be divided into two parts, the first part which deals with Freud, and with the destructive side of the scientific analysis of religion: and the second part which will be constructive. At present with Freud I am destructive, and I consider that that destruction should be ruthless. In religion we should doubt all that we can doubt. I, for one, refuse to allow myself to be clogged up with all sorts of dogmas, many of them taught me in my youth, and many of them held by people in other directions. Religion for me is not dogma. I will give you my definition of religion. It is the attitude that the whole man takes up towards reality, or towards the determiner of his destiny: a religious attitude towards reality is an attitude from a special point of view, from the point of view of the determination of his own individual destiny. And not only individual, but also the determination of the destiny of his friends. He thinks largely of the destiny of those who are near and dear to him. This suggests one fundamental criticism that can be brought against Freud in

his treatment of religion. I am always left with the impression that for him religion is something feeble and weak, and is something which is based upon selfishness and cowardice.

#### CORE OF RELIGION

The central core of religion, according to Freud, is that of terror before overwhelming forces, and a great care about one's individual safety. That need not be so, and I do not see how any amount of analysis can prove that it is so. Here let me say that I have analysed many cases deeply, and that one of my cases of analysis has gone on now for over six years: and although there is plenty that bears out a good deal of Freud's doctrine, I do not find anything to force me to believe that the religious attitude one finds in the youngest child really as soon as the dawn of consciousness is merely fear and selfishness. 'It was fear at the beginning of things which created the gods.' We learn that as a Latin tag, but it is not true entirely. What does create religion? It is not fear. It is fear that produces superstition. With the development of religion one always has the possible development of superstition. For every form of religion one has a possible form of superstition. There is always the possibility of religion degenerating

into superstition. That does not mean that superstition precedes religion. I see no reason whatever to hold that. In the dawn of personal consciousness the individual forms bonds of love and affection with those around him, with his parents, and with his brothers and sisters, &c. At that very beginning not only is there selfishness and fear and aggressiveness and jealousy, but there is also love and affection and a readiness to self-sacrifice, which you should not depreciate by calling masochism, which is the pleasure that we take in being cruel to ourselves or experiencing pain at the hands of others, and sadism, which is the pleasure we take in injuring others—those whom we love. It is another matter if you use these same terms to explain and to describe the earliest beginnings of life. You are then begging the question.

#### A FORM OF WEAKNESS

And here I must say that Freud definitely exposes himself to criticism. You will find in another article he says 'Sympathy is the reaction to sadism', in other words, that sympathy is not original, but is a secondary reaction to cruelty. That is neither self-evident nor proved by analytic experience. If anything is primary, certainly aggressiveness and self-assertion are



primary: but so also is sympathy. Schopenhauer, one of the greatest philosophers who ever lived, and the real originator of all this modern school of the unconscious on the philosophical side, says that the basis of all morality is *Mitleid*, sympathy, and I agree with him. Unless you have sympathy your moral obligation and duties to others are mere emptiness. This sympathy is not something secondary. It may be called out more intensely by a realization of one's mistakes and blunders, and of one's stupid cruelty to people. You do not do anything to be merely cruel: it is done without thinking, and afterwards you feel extremely sorry and overwhelmed. And so your powers of sympathy are called out still more.

#### REACTIVE PROCESSES

Reactive processes of the mind are of the utmost importance. But when you use the word reaction there must be something that reacts. Freud's doctrine assumes that you have, to start with, some fundamental instincts, and then those tendencies become changed into other desires through reaction. Freud does not say what it is that reacts. The developed ego may be it, but not in the early stages. Anyhow, if he does believe that there is a reactive process of the

developed personality, as well as the fundamental primitive tendencies towards which the soul reacts, then he has given us something upon which we can develop a more constructive view of religion. What he has actually done, however, is to put up a man of straw and knock it down again in his book *The Future of an Illusion*. What I would say is, if that is religion, as he describes it, then certainly it is illusion, and the sooner it goes the better. But that is not religion: it is merely the outside of religion, a matter of forms and ceremonies. In moments of weakness, in moments of real moral and spiritual weakness the individual may use his religion as something to fall back upon, as dogmatic philosophy becomes a cushion for the lazy intellect, to quote Kant. There is always that possibility of falling away from the main line of spiritual progress. Where there is a falling away there you have superstition, and there you have neurosis.

#### MENTAL ACTIVITY

To say, however, that religion itself is a form of weakness is simply absurd—absurd because it goes against everything of a metaphysical and philosophical kind that we can say about existence here. Again what Freud has done, and does habitually, is what so many other scientists do,

viz., he keeps the whole argument on the purely scientific plane. Now what is the scientific plane? It is the plane of phenomena, of appearances as a sequence. Science deals with sequence in time. I will define psychology as the science of mental process, the sequence of mental activity in the individual mind. Now as regards physical science sequence is an important thing. In physics you can think of one moment as the present, as one definite moment, and preceding and succeeding moments as different from it, although there is a continuity in the first degree. If you take the mind of the individual man you will find that you cannot express the flow of consciousness, the stream of consciousness, by a line, because a line is a sequence of points indefinitely close to one another so that between any two you can put a third. That is a definition of mathematics, but that is not enough to describe the individual mind. You do it when you are dealing with psychology. You are considering it as a sequence. But actually you find that even the individual mind is transcending time all the time.

‘SOMETHING POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE’

Before I continue that line of argument may I remind you that besides psychology as a mental



science there are other mental sciences. There are ethics which deals with moral obligation and its conditions, and the nature of the good, aesthetics which deals with beauty, and logic which deals with thought not as a temporal sequence, but as a matter of validity: it deals with the validity of thought. These three—ethics, aesthetics, and logic—deal with the mental out of time. I do not mean in abstraction from time, but as transcending time. There is a transcending of temporal sequence. Let me give you an example. Take a symphony of Beethoven. You have to hear that in time, and yet as you hear it it is beyond time. The mind in musical appreciation transcends time. A moral obligation, a virtue of any kind, an act of heroism, transcends time: it is there for all eternity, a real act of will. Metaphysics, or the science of the real as such, likewise transcends time. Whereas time and space are the forms in which we do our scientific thinking, within the domain of the philosophical sciences, as distinct from psychology, we find the conception of *value*, which although originally defined by Adam Smith as satisfaction of desire (a psychological definition), when philosophically worked out takes on a super-temporal character. I wish you to contrast in your own minds the eternal

realm of values—the good, the beautiful, the true, and ultimate reality, which is eternal—contrast this point of view with that of psychology as the science of the sequence of mental processes in the individual mind. They do not seem to meet, and yet we can pass from one to the other. I contend that we can do this, even on the phenomenal plane, through the nature of the ‘specious present’ as a partial transcending of temporal sequence. We do not live from moment to moment. At any one moment we are aware of the immediate past and are looking forward to the immediate future. We are living through an interval of time. The specious present, as William James says, is not a razor-edge, but a saddle-back upon which one sits perched looking before and after.

#### CONSTRUCTIVE FORCES

And we get the idea of the beginning of something more than time in our individual experience. There is that beginning of the eternal. The philosophical values are eternal so far as they are values at all, as Browning made clear in his poetic vision. Eternal is not something that excludes time: it must take time up into itself. Reality is not in time: time is in reality. And actually, so long as we keep on the level of

time, we cannot think it out at all. We shall have to think of reality as involving both time and eternity simultaneously; eternity in the sense of transcending time: and that is the great problem of the near future in philosophy, and I think that psychology will make its contribution to that. All I wish to do here is to emphasize, not only the contrast between the temporal and the eternal, but their relationship. Freud's weakness in his theory of religion is that he keeps within the temporal domain all the time; he is thinking only of the miserable past, and the inadequate present; and he is looking to the future certainly as something that will be better, but something that is going on indefinitely, everything being scrapped and replaced as history proceeds: indeed one wonders sometimes whether that is any better than 'a vast drifting of cosmic weather', an indefinite and meaningless flux. There must be something beyond that, and we have all the time something beyond that in the eternal values pervading life.

#### RELIGION NOT NEGATIVE

Religion is not something negative, nor is it a mere consolation. It is something positive and constructive. If we look back on the history of the race we find all through philosophers, theo-



logians, saints, and great reformers, representing positive and constructive forces, moving forward, not moving backward. I grant you that Freud is correct in showing how we may be held back by retrospective tendencies, by fixation on the past, and we can, by using his methods and applying his knowledge, free ourselves from the fetters of our past, and move forward all the more quickly and effectively. And his method works not only with psychoneurotics, but also with relatively normal people. Every one is the better for being analysed. But it is a very different matter to say that religion is a thing that will pass and be superseded.

#### EMOTIONAL CONFLICT

Freud himself says very definitely that just as in the process of individual mental development the normal child passes through a phase of obsessional neurosis where he is struggling with the Oedipus situation, the emotional conflict within the bosom of the family, first inadequately, and later on adequately, and then passes on to grown-up life where he is no longer conscious of that obsession, that neurosis, so, says Freud, religion will pass, for religion at present is an obsessional neurosis of the race. The race, or culture, at the present time is

struggling with tendencies that are not adequately controlled, that are repressed. We cling to our religious observances in an obsessional way, and no amount of reasoning will shake us. But, apart from analogical argument, Freud brings forward no convincing scientific evidence in support of this view. Religion is something very serious. In our attitude towards the universe we find ourselves faced with mysteries so profound—pain, suffering, bereavement, the separation of loved ones, which is, of course, worse than anything else—that we cannot accept them with shallow optimism, although it is remarkable with what resignation we sometimes bear the sufferings of others! Actually we feel that we should appreciate that suffering, and we should not pass it by, nor should we take it and sweep it aside. But not, of course, to the extent that we should invite it, and encourage it, and bring it upon ourselves or upon others. Far from it. We should minimize it: we should minimize pain: we do not glory in pain. It is not a punishment. Punishment in early childhood does a lot of harm: but that does not mean that licence should be allowed and encouraged. What we encourage is discipline, self-control, self-knowledge, whereby in the course of time punishment will not be necessary.

## A GREAT PERSONALITY

To that extent we are moving away from the more cruel, hard form of religion: that harsh tendency to look upon God as a cruel taskmaster, or as a revengeful individual. A great deal of that, no doubt, is to be explained in Freudian terms as projections upon the universe. There is that conception of our parents that we have in early life; those of us who have been fortunate enough to live in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are only too grateful for the loving care taken of us, the real love and sympathy given us, and the beginnings of real faith—a faith that is not something spurious and doomed to disappear. It is very important that we should give our children the utmost love and affection, and should enable them to rely on us to the utmost. Not that we want them to be products after our own image. We want to give them the beginnings of faith from which they can develop the powers of the soul along lines of reverence and other-worldliness. I mean by other-worldliness, not asceticism, not a mechanized distinction and separation of the eternal from the temporal, but a development of the eternal aspects of temporal existence and an ever-deepening appreciation of the eternal values.



## CHILDREN AND RELIGION

Religion shows degrees of maturity. A little child has a childish religion. Freud would like to see all religious education in childhood abolished. Freud considers that the religious education that we deal out to children is enfeebling and weakening, and he contrasts the wonderful spontaneity and the intellectual eagerness of the young child with the poor, sickly intellect of the grown person. Freud explains it by the prohibitions and inhibitions imposed upon the individual by the religion thrust upon him from his earliest years onward. One would say in regard to that, that a child must be educated somehow. He must not only be educated intellectually. He has to learn a lot. He has to learn the rules of mathematics: he has to learn the irregular verbs. And on the emotional and moral plane he has to be led on. The little child thinks in terms of persons, of those around him, and the warmth of human values: and he must be taught a religion. And one would hasten to add that it is well to avoid teaching him dogma. I do not encourage my own children to dwell upon the sufferings of Christ and the misunderstandings of His life and death. I have learned from my own

patients the harm that can be done by dwelling upon the horror and the torture that He had to face. It is, of course, a doctrine of theology, that 'He died to save us all', but that is a doctrine that we can leave till later on: a little child cannot understand that. If a little child does seem to understand it, he has probably got a wrong impression of it.

I would say, therefore, teach him religion in a general way, and avoid these special doctrines. Teach him about God and goodness; teach him about the spiritual universe of which he is a part and in which he lives. Then I am absolutely convinced that we should renounce fear, just in the same way as we may give up alcohol or tobacco. Let us resolve never to fear again. We will never pay that compliment to these cruel and ugly forces by fearing them again.

#### SLUMS OF THE MIND

That is not flying in the face of nature. Some people think that nature itself is based upon fear. There is progress through struggle, it is true. There is what we may call the danger instinct, or the instinct of escape. We have every one of us a delicate nervous system which reacts to danger. It is this danger instinct which enables us to see where danger is, and to take steps to

meet it. That is at first accompanied by a feeling of fear, but if the fear is allowed to persist it gets in the way. It must be stopped at the beginning. When fear begins you must sweep it aside, and say, 'I will not fear'. But, nevertheless, you must respect your danger instinct. As you see danger you must avoid it in a calm way. The two are quite distinct, fear and the danger instinct. Fear has nothing good to its credit: it never does any one any good. Look back on the history of the world: think of the terrible persecutions, and wars, and rumours of wars, and internecine strife, the long-drawn-out martyrdom of man. Fear is at the basis of it all. It is something negative, not positive. Everything that is positive is good, even those aggressive instincts that we all have, that self-assertion that should carry us onwards and upwards.

#### STERNER FORMS OF LIFE

So I would say finally that religion is not something developed on the basis of cowardice and selfishness. It is something based upon the principles of love, affection, creativeness of all kinds, a determination to go forward. Civilization is only in its beginnings. We must be ready to reconstruct and replan, to make a world in which we can be more truly religious,



and can follow our highest ideals and develop them. We must abolish the slums of the mind just as we seek to abolish the slums of our cities. That is not sentimentalism. Psychology is introducing us to sterner forms of life. Heroism is what is asked of us. We must have the courage of our convictions and be ready to fight for them. And, remember, we do not need to wait till after death to live the life immortal. At every moment of our existence, in our work, and at all times, we are in contact with the eternal, so far as we are doing what we think we ought to do, opening our hearts to the good and the noble, and repudiating fear wherever we meet it—especially as we show courage and are unafraid. Such an attitude of mind is truly religious and is no illusion. It is when illusions die that ideals are born. ‘When half-gods go the gods arrive.’

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE GROUP MOVEMENT, PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED<sup>1</sup>

As one who is responsible for the teaching of psychology at Oxford, I find it appropriate to pay attention from the psychological point of view to the so-called Oxford Group Movement or Buchmanism. It is a movement that has made much stir in the world during the last few years, and has a very definite psychological background. I should, perhaps, preface my remarks by saying that I have intentionally kept outside that movement for psychological reasons, but I have had many opportunities now over a number of years of observing, though not as a participant, the effects of it and the reactions of individuals within it.

As regards the essential nature of the Movement, many books have been written, some better than others.<sup>2</sup> I suppose no one would deny that this is a method of bringing souls to

<sup>1</sup> The substance of a lecture in the course of Psychology delivered at Christ Church, Oxford, on Saturday, 4 November 1933. Published in *The Meaning of the Groups*, edited by Rev. F. A. M. Spencer, D.D. (Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1934.)

<sup>2</sup> *For Sinners Only*, by A. J. Russell; *What is the Oxford Group Movement?* by a Layman with a Note-book; *Inspired Children*, by Olive M. Jones.

God, of enabling individuals to get into right relationship with the Spirit of the Universe and to order their lives accordingly. It is a method that has been gradually codified by its founder, Dr. F. N. D. Buchman, and his co-workers. The four cardinal points of the Movement are absolute honesty, absolute unselfishness, absolute purity, absolute love; and its two fundamental methods are those of 'sharing' and of 'guidance'. I wish it to be clearly understood that my criticisms are made from the point of view of psychology, that is to say, the science of the mind, the facts and laws of which we have actually learned by unbiased study of the way in which the mind works. As we read these narratives of the changing of a man's life through the process of sharing and through striving after complete and absolute honesty, unselfishness, purity, and love, we see factors at work that, it so happens, we have been studying in great detail and with much thoroughness for many years within the domain of what I call deep mental analysis.

In deep mental analysis one goes below the surface of the mind, endeavouring to discover the hidden motives, the underlying forces that contribute towards the development of the conscious personality. In that method of deep



mental analysis, involving the use of 'free association' and other devices, there is an element of sharing, albeit one-sided if properly carried out. Here, incidentally, I may remark that if any one says to me: 'Why do you not subject yourself to the methods of the Group Movement? Why do you not confess your sins to others and in that way get a direct knowledge and experience of what the grace of God will do?' my reply is: 'What is the use? I have already shared my experience; not for two hours, but for ninety-two,<sup>1</sup> with another scientist who knows all that is yet known about modern mental analysis.' Moreover, I have analysed many patients for long periods—for months and in some cases for years. When a man follows that kind of sharing, he experiences at first a feeling of increased power and liberation, due to the disappearance of surface symptoms of psychological maladaptation to which he has been previously subject. But if the analysis is pursued still more deeply, the situation again becomes troubled, the skies are not so unclouded, and further difficulties arise from lower strata of the mind. All analysts, to whatever school they

<sup>1</sup> As a scientific experiment, and for training in the use of the method—not for the removal of symptoms, nor for the cure of any nerve trouble.

belong, if they are sufficiently trained, are finding that an adequate analysis requires many hours of this talking out—this one-sided sharing between one person and another. Shorter analyses may benefit a patient either temporarily or permanently, but a normal person who wishes to obtain adequate insight into the process must either continue for that length of time with another analyst or continue the process by himself. That is not an opinion; it is a definitely ascertained fact in psychology at the present day. Of course, quite short psychotherapeutic treatment involving suggestion, persuasion, and the arousal of faith, is often very effective, and may produce a change of heart and permanent recovery.

Furthermore, we find in this process of analysis that the phenomenon of 'transference' invariably occurs. That may be defined in various ways. Different people have different views of it, but that it occurs is undoubted, for it is of essential importance in the process of the analysis, in making progress in the analysis possible, and in bringing about a resolution of symptoms where these exist. This transference is something that develops in the course of the analysis through the working of the unconscious, but it is something that is there from the beginning,

and even before the beginning. Transference is making itself felt even before the patient finds his way to one's consulting room. It may spring up just through reading about the method or hearing about a particular individual who practises it.

What lesson has this in connexion with the Group Movement? Sharing must involve transference, but the difficulty from the point of view of psychology and psychotherapy is that it involves *uncontrolled* transference. Here, again, it is agreed by all analysts that the control and adequate management of transference require great experience and skill if satisfactory results are to be forthcoming.

We also know that in analysis, if a patient comes for a few hours and gets enthusiastic about it, and then goes away and breaks off the analysis, he may have done himself harm rather than good. People get together in groups and begin to share their experiences, their sins, their mental weaknesses of one kind or another, and transference springs up between them, relations occur, even unknown to themselves, in the depths of their unconscious, which may fetter them to one another rather than free them. No doubt they are estimable people who gather together in this way, so that such fettering has



not the deplorable consequences that it might have in other relations, but a possible disadvantage is that it may fix them at a particular stage in their own self-analysis and religious development, and prevent them from getting more deeply into their own minds.

I am doing my utmost here to avoid mere criticism for criticism's sake. My aim is to deal with the matter constructively, because it is only in constructive work in any branch of science that good is done. There is no reason here for criticism, either shallow or more profound, by itself. Psychology has something more to offer from a scientific point of view, though whether it is always better from the ethical and religious point of view is a matter for later consideration. At the moment I am dealing with the purely psychological aspect. This is a question of one whole body of experience being faced with another body of experience, between which there are analogies and parallels and even identities. In the process of sharing there are other psychological dangers too obvious to need mentioning.

So much for sharing in a general way from the point of view of deep analysis. What about guidance? This is a still more serious difficulty for the expert psychologist. When it is said to

be a question of 'listening-in to God', of having a 'quiet time' with note-book and pencil in hand and noting down what messages come, the expert psychologist cannot forget the widespread existence of illusions and delusions in mental patients, where merely subjective sensation and feeling are taken for objective reality, and even at times for divine revelation, the validity of which no one outside an asylum could possibly allow. Indeed, few of us have not had experiences at one time or another carrying with them complete conviction, which we have discovered afterwards could not be justified. The mechanism concerned is one well recognized in psychology, the mechanism of projection.<sup>1</sup> In projection it may happen that a person under the influence of his own unconscious activity gets the illusory impression of the objective fulfilment of his hopes or fears, or an apparently supernatural message.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, it is possible that individuals who pay great attention to these experiences of theirs and encourage them may increase their ten-

<sup>1</sup> The term 'projection' is also used in a more restricted and technical sense in psycho-analytical writings.

<sup>2</sup> In the practice of the Groups, 'guidance' messages are tested by reference to the four cardinal principles, and in cases of special difficulty are 'checked up' in consultation with other members of the Group.

dency to psychological automatism (based on the working of their unconscious mind) to their own detriment. In saying this I am not negatively criticizing guidance. I personally have always believed in guidance—guidance in the sense of influence of a higher Power, a spiritual universe of which we are parts, a 'Not ourselves making for righteousness', the 'Hound of Heaven' who relentlessly pursues us. Any one who has lived long enough can look back and realize the fact of guidance; how, for example, even his apparent failures were elements in his eventual successes. He may, for example, eventually understand how his failure to get a particular appointment was 'guided' because something better and more suited to his powers was awaiting him. Moreover, if we desire inspiration, even in a small way, we can have it. The artist succeeds, not so much through his own tense effort of will, as through giving himself up to the inspiration, preparing his mind for the inspiration that comes to him. In this field the very effort may stand in the way of success.

In that form of guidance I truly believe. It belongs to what we call intuition. But intuition may be partly natural and partly supernatural, taking those words in their ordinary sense. It



may be partly due to the accumulated knowledge and insight of one's own unconscious. Every one will admit that our conscious insight is a very small part of our real insight. We all of us know, if we stop to think about it at all, that our unconscious can give us greatly deepened insight. But, unfortunately, our unconscious can also give us distorted views and impressions that may seem to be uplifting and yet are not based upon anything higher than what has been achieved in our own individual past, especially through the experiences of early years. Much of our experience of illumination, our faith and confidence, comes from our own childhood, and there is no doubt whatever that the man whose childhood was spent in the care of loving parents and nurses gets a foundation of immediate hopefulness and real faith in the goodness of the Universe. That feeling may be overlaid by subsequent disillusioning experiences; yet it persists, and it is ready to come up under certain psychological conditions, sometimes in circumstances of stress and strain. The individual, when right at the end of his tether, feeling that there is no hope, and that he must end it all, may suddenly receive this illumination. Or it may come under happier auspices. It comes about through a well-known psycho-

logical process, that of 'regression', of stepping back to a more primitive attitude towards life. It is a revival of his own early experiences, unidentifiable because of its new surroundings and context, but indubitably belonging to his early years. We are certain of this because by prolonged analysis of patients we do sooner or later bring back these early experiences, and we get the actual quality of their emotions and feelings at that time. I myself can remember my own very early childhood, even at the age of three, or earlier, and the faith and confidence and love which were then engendered, and which never die. The little child is a very highly developed personality—all little children are. That is why Christ said: 'Unless ye become as little children ye shall in no wise enter the Kingdom of Heaven'. But we must distinguish that from the inference that we have a direct message to do this, that, or the other which has come to us from the supernatural. The two are distinct. We have to allow for what we know before we pass on to what we do not know. We have to allow for the working of this infantile reaction, this process of regression. It is true that there is something more than that, but I should feel myself a very slipshod psychologist indeed if I were to rush to evaluate the other

thing without taking note first of all of what is due to this process of regression.

There is another process concerned, the process of projection, to which we have already referred, and this process is specially important because a whole school of psychological thought holds that our belief in God is simply a projection of our own inner needs—the imagined fulfilment of these fundamental needs and aspirations. That view I would contest, but on the basis of allowing as fully as need be for projection. We must not deny all projection in the realm of religious experience. Projection is evidenced in the formation of mental symptoms. It appears in the symptoms of some forms of psychoneurosis, and of paranoia and other forms of psychosis. But does our knowledge of its working in these forms of mental illness justify us in saying that the feeling of Christ's presence is a projection?

The only way of testing it scientifically is again by deep mental analysis. We have learned about projection through analysis, and have discovered that by sufficiently deep analysis we can neutralize the abnormal effects of projection. Let us test our religious beliefs by that process. Will prolonged analysis abolish religious belief? My own experience is definitely



against such a view. In analysis we 'boil off' a great deal of emotion and sentimentalism, the influence of chance associations, the memory of beautiful cathedrals or of the village church in which we worshipped as children, the hymns we sang and thought we understood, the effect of the music—a great deal of all that is 'boiled off' under the influence of analysis. But what remains is a calm feeling of certainty that, of course, the Spiritual Universe exists, that we are parts of it, that, whatever happens to us individually, It is there eternally, and that our duty is perfectly clear, to follow the highest when we see it, that we must live for such ideals as we can perceive and appreciate, quite independently of our own personal welfare, and that so far as we feel all that and fall away from it, so far we have a pricking of conscience and an experience of lowered worth. And in the end, where certainty is impossible, we feel that the venture of faith—the will to trust in the noblest hypothesis—is the most reasonable attitude to adopt.

We come back to the Group Movement. Obviously our criticism of the Group Movement is that it does not go far enough. If it is to save the world it will need to deepen its foundations. Its leaders will find, as time goes on, that they will have to extend their knowledge of analytical

psychology and increase their skill in penetrating to the depths of the mind. They will then realize more clearly that their four desiderata—absolute honesty, absolute purity, absolute unselfishness, absolute love—with which, of course, I entirely agree, can hardly be achieved without deep analysis or the strict discipline of a self-denying Christian life.

That is a hard saying. I shall be told that I am putting deep analysis in the place of religion, in the place of God, of Christ, and His Gospel. There is no possible conflict between these two. Let me endeavour to give you a parallel. A man falls down and breaks his leg, and is in great pain through the fractured bone. A sympathetic person comes up and says to him: 'Poor fellow', and smooths his brow, and cheers him up, and reminds him that God looks after him. Well, it may serve for the moment, but meanwhile the pain in his leg is getting more severe. Presently a doctor comes along, a man who has studied the structure and function of the body; he brushes the crowd of sympathizers aside, he gets hold of some pieces of wood and adjusts the limb, and because he knows how the different muscles work he does it with accuracy and skill. The leg is put up in splints in the right way as far as possible, the fracture eventually unites,

and the man gets well. He gets well through the spiritual agencies which work through all Nature. The doctor is only the man who puts things in train for these spiritual agencies to operate. The doctor's activities are no slur of any sort upon the power of Nature, *vis medicatrix naturae*, but they are an essential supplementation. So it is with analysis.

Does it mean that every one has to be analysed deeply? Not at all. But it means this, that for our leaders and teachers, in whose care are to any extent the souls and consciences of others, analysis would be of benefit.

Undoubtedly all leaders should be analysed. They would thereby acquire a direct insight into the working of unconscious mental forces of the utmost importance in their work. For my part I do not expect the world to get better until the people in charge of public affairs understand themselves more than they do.

It will be recalled that Freud and Einstein recently interchanged letters on 'Why War?' and Freud was not at all optimistic about things, because his experience of analysis had taught him that love and hate are indissolubly mixed in the depths of human nature. They seem almost to involve one another. My experience of analysis does not force me to accept that view



in its entirety. But it does force me to see how much aggression there is in human nature, below the surface, and how the superficial over-emphasis of love, peace, loving-kindness, and the like can itself keep that aggression below the surface in a repressed state, from which it can surge up on special occasions.<sup>1</sup> We know from our patients how it can work in, e.g., obsessional neurosis. On the surface the patient suffers from over-conscientiousness, he may be almost paralysed by the fear of hurting people. One of my patients spent all his time pushing bits of banana-skin and orange-peel off the pavements, and worrying about coal-holes in case people should slip down them. You might think such a man a super-Christian, but in fact, if you analyse him you find that there is much aggressive self-seeking, and even hate, deep below the surface. If you let him 'boil it off' he gets better. You can sympathize with him, give him suggestion treatment, &c., and so produce some relief, but you need to analyse him for not less than a hundred hours, sometimes many hundred, before he fully recovers. So much for cases of psychoneurotic illness. But even in the case of

<sup>1</sup> I have dealt with this point, among others, in the new (third) edition of *Psychology and Psychotherapy*, chap. xii, Edward Arnold & Co., 1934.

an apparently normal individual, to expect or to claim to produce, as a general result, a radical and permanent change after mutual confession in a Group meeting or at a 'house-party', and a few hours' practice of the methods of the Group, is more than psychological science can allow.

It is not that sudden conversions do not occur. Plenty of people have eventually sailed into quiet waters after a stormy passage. They have reached a silent sea of quiet and confident faith. But they have done so, not through passivity, but as a result of the mental conflict in their unconscious. After such conflict things have fallen into their right place, and unification has suddenly appeared. They have been kept from that vision by certain difficulties in their own unconscious, at the back of their mind, and suddenly the difficulty has cleared up, perhaps through talking with a man of great personality and serene faith. The readjustment has been made at the level of conscious will. But to assess adequately an experience of this kind one needs to know all the facts that are available.<sup>1</sup>

The problem involved in the scientific estimation of guidance is similar to that involved in

<sup>1</sup> I have discussed the psychology of religious conversion in *Mind and Personality*, chap. xx, University of London Press, 1926.

the scientific estimation of telepathy and other psychic experiences. There is a tendency for us to remember the successes and to forget the failures. We remember when we were rightly guided and forget when we were not. If we content ourselves with recording successes only, we can get an impressive argument; whereas if we were to put down all the failures as well as the successes, with complete scientific conscientiousness, the result might be very different. So it is with telepathy. This does not mean that telepathy is impossible, nor does it mean that guidance is impossible. But there is another argument which works in the opposite direction. In telepathy the successes are more important than the failures, because the successes always involve a great deal of corroborative detail which makes them stand for more than one single case within the statistician's mathematical argument. Instead of saying: 'Here we have one success and so many failures', we have to admit that the one success is by no means on all fours with the individual failures. So it is with guidance. Just as we find that the evidence for spontaneous telepathy is very much more impressive than the evidence for experimental telepathy, so it may be found that the evidence for spontaneous guidance is very much more



impressive than for experimental guidance. This method of taking pen and paper and writing down results is dangerous because it may encourage psychological automatism and any tendency to projection which a person may have, but it is also misleading from the scientific point of view unless a full record is kept.

It may also be pointed out that to estimate the phenomena accurately one must take into account not only the ordinary conscious wishes and hopes of the individual, but the forces in his unconscious, and that is what makes accurate estimation so very difficult. It will not help on the cause of practical Christianity if we support the case by arguments that any trained psychologist could demolish.

All this is from the scientific point of view. It is one thing to acclaim it as a religious Movement; it is quite another thing to codify it as it has been codified on a definite but incomplete psychological basis. I hope I have not been unnecessarily critical. What I wish to make, rather, is a constructive criticism with a background of deep sympathy with the Movement. I hope that the Movement itself will become deepened as it goes on, and that the conversions or life-changes that occur will become consolidated by deep religious development and

adequate understanding of the individual mind. In this process it may undergo modifications such as would bring the whole method more closely into line with the proceedings of modern psychotherapy.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE SURVIVAL OF PERSONALITY<sup>1</sup>

THIS subject is not only the most important which can engage the human mind, but easily the most difficult of which to treat. It would be absurd for any one to attempt such a treatment without being adequately aware of its difficulties. The question of the survival of the personality is no matter for journalistic impressionism. It concerns every individual so deeply that the answer we give to the implied question makes all the difference to the attitude of our minds and the direction of our lives. Even if many of us are not in a position to come to any definite conclusion on the subject until our own lives are nearly over, the question remains one with tremendous implications for our generation and our race.

So far as humanity considers itself entirely mortal, to that extent its final destiny as attested by the telescope of science is only too apparent. We know what is going to happen eventually to our own world as certainly as we know the calendar for the coming year. This earth will eventually grow cold and be unable to support life of any kind. If that is the only result of the toil

<sup>1</sup> The Drew Memorial Lecture on Immortality, 1935.



and turmoil of human development, if the end is simply a frozen silence, if spiritually and mentally as well as physically the movement of life is to cease, the prospect of such a fate must have a profound influence on human outlook and conduct. I do not say that, even if that be the destiny, life is not worth living. So far as we are in life we do proceed to live it with some satisfaction, and get happiness out of it if we face it in the right spirit, even though it should end in complete tragedy. But our higher ideals, our hopes for something permanent, something that will transcend all that is petty and selfish in us, those ideals and hopes are doomed to disappointment. I do not range myself with Tennyson, who said that if immortality were not assured he himself would regard God as something malignant and would sink his head in a chloroformed handkerchief and end it all. I do not agree with that attitude, and I am sure that Tennyson himself on other occasions would not have subscribed to it, but in a wider sense this question of immortality represents for us the watershed dividing idealism from materialism.

#### PRIMITIVE BELIEFS OF SURVIVAL

In early times there was a belief in continuance, but little belief in survival of any great

spiritual value. The *Sheol* of the Hebrews and the *Hades* of the Greeks were simply realms for the attenuated shades of departed spirits. They represented mere continuance, and a continuance which was not desirable in itself. The reasons for believing in such continuance in those days are fairly obvious. The people misunderstood such facts of science and psychology as were presented to them. Dream phenomena and hallucinatory experiences had their most ready explanation in terms of animism, of a theory of the mind as something that duplicates the body, like reflections in water or from polished surfaces, or like shadows cast by material objects, and this was conceived as persisting after the body had reached its end.

In the Orphic mysteries we find the beginning of a slightly higher point of view, the conception of reward and punishment, and the need of purification of the departed spirit; and in some of the mysteries we have the beginnings of the idea of mystic participation, for example, in the hunting of the Maenads, the tearing of the victim limb from limb, the eating of the raw flesh, so absorbing and internalizing the virtue of the sacrifice. Later on, in Plato, we have an intense belief in survival as almost a first principle, in the soul as having a greater reality than the

body. But the arguments as we find them set out in the *Phaedo*, and less systematically in the other Dialogues, are really unsatisfactory; not a single one will stand the test of logical investigation, they are all merely verbal justifications worked out with quite other motives.

#### ARISTOTLE AND ETERNAL MIND

With Aristotle a more cautious attitude is adopted. The soul is the ἐντελέχεια, the functional completeness of the body; it is considered biologically, and its survival after bodily death is not for one moment recognized. But even in Aristotle we find that although the fugitive soul (ψυχή) in its entirety is not regarded as capable of survival, one part of the mind is regarded as transcending material existence, namely, νοῦς or reason. Towards the end of Aristotle's *Ethics* he exhorts his readers to be as far as possible immortal (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν) even in this life, living the immortal life through philosophic contemplation (θεωρία). So far as we participate in strict logical thinking, purifying our thought and making it more and more accurate, and are more thoroughly conscientious in our thinking, to that extent we transcend the doom awaiting us, we are beyond 'the changes and chances of this mortal life'.



That position, set out so clearly by Aristotle, is to be found down the subsequent ages among philosophers. We have it again voiced very eloquently by Spinoza, when he regards the eternal power of thinking as raising us above mere temporal existence; although really, for Spinoza as for Aristotle, this eternity of which they spoke, and which seems so attractive at first blush, is simply the necessity of thinking. It can be summed up by saying that the eternal nature of thought derives from the necessity of all thought. If we work it out according to the rules of logic, it follows that it is eternally true because it is necessary. The eternality is really the necessity of thought—the necessity, that is, apart from time and all temporal sequence.

In this historical survey I should here interpolate the eastern doctrine of *Karma* as illustrating again, just as the Orphic mysteries did, the emergence of a new viewpoint, namely, the moral or ethical viewpoint, the difference between right and wrong, the seriousness of sin and the necessity for its expiation, the correction of wrong conduct, the responsibility of the individual for his acts. Although the system or theory of *Karma* is found so attractive by many people in that it seems to rectify the difficulties

and injustices, the differences of fortune among people in this life, by an explanation of what they have been in previous lives, the great argument against it that cannot be countered is that the thread of memory is broken. These previous lives have no moral relation to the one lived at present. If we have lived before we do not remember our former existence, and if we are now being punished for a previous guiltiness, since we can by no means recall it the punishment has no moral value. It might equally well be visited upon a different person altogether. Indeed, in that sense the principle of *Karma* does hold good for those who, while not believing in immortality, believe that each individual inherits from all that has gone before, so that what is done wrong in one generation has to be expiated in the generations that follow, that any violation of the moral law brings its inevitable 'punishment', if not in the life of the wrongdoer, at all events in the shape of readjustments in the lives of those who enter upon his heritage. This is not according to any principle of vindictiveness, any principle of *lex talionis*, but it follows from the nature of things and of good and evil that any inadequacy in one generation works itself out in the generations that follow, just as the ill-functioning of some piece of

machinery may produce effects remote from the original cause.

#### KANT AND THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE

We come thus to the question of ethical principle in relation to immortality. This is most clearly set out in the writings of perhaps our greatest philosopher, Kant. He first cleared the ground in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which he showed how intellectual knowledge in terms of concepts cannot transcend experience and must work within the forms of space and time and the framework of the categories. Of God, freedom, and immortality we have ideas, but not concepts, and according to Kant any attempt to give a reasonable proof of the existence of God, or of freedom, or of immortality is for ever doomed to failure, because in making such an attempt we are using ideas in the wrong way. Ideas, as distinct from concepts, for Kant are 'regulative', but we in our sophistry attempt to use them in a 'constitutive' way.

In his *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant demonstrates that we can know only phenomena, we cannot know the thing in itself, neither 'the thing in itself' of the material world nor 'the thing in itself' of the mind. But in his *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant turns to the fact of



morality, of duty, the sense of moral obligation, and argues that the fact of morality proves that the mind of man is free. That freedom is not a freedom of phenomena; so far as the mind is considered as a sequence of phenomena in time, so far it cannot appear free. Every moment of experience is linked up by the mind's own activity with previous experience under the category of causation, so that everything seems inevitably due to previous mental changes, and those to still earlier mental changes, and so forth. But the mind itself as a 'thing in itself' may be free—Kant will not say it is free, but it *may* be free—and since morality is possible, then it is free, because morality comes to us in the form of a categorical imperative, 'I ought, therefore I can'. We are aware of obligation. Obligations change, but obligation itself remains. Duties change, but duty remains. If we accept that we have to accept—I will not say the hypothesis, for Kant does not deal with hypotheses here—the deeper fact of freedom. The soul is free and good: as Kant says in some other part of his writings, the only thing completely and absolutely good in this world or in the next is the good will. He argues thus on the ethical side in terms of obligation, and his categorical imperative, his version of the golden rule,

is summed up in other ways: 'Treat every one as an end and not merely as a means'; 'Act so that the law of thy action can be taken as law universal'. Such rules as those transcend mere opportunism of any kind, any relation to the fortune or misfortune that may at the moment come to the individual soul. The soul has to do good because it is its duty. The difficulty here is to decide exactly what is one's duty, and that thread of the argument I shall take up again later.

#### DUALISM, MONISM, AND MONADISM

Turning back somewhat in our historical survey, we may note that Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, was an interactionist, a dualist. He believed body and mind to be distinct—*res extensa* and *res cogitans*, with mutually exclusive characteristics. The only point where they came into contact, he considered, was the pineal gland, the only unpaired organ in the brain. We now know the pineal gland to be a vestigial remnant, having little or nothing to do with the nervous activity of the brain. In the sense in which Descartes separated mind and matter as with a hatchet it was impossible to bring the two halves together. It reminds one of the old conundrum: 'What is mind?

No matter. What is matter? Never mind.' Successive philosophers struggled hard with this problem. There were the so-called occasionalists, Geulincx and Malebranche, who believed that when a change in the brain took place, say, in sense perception, God arranged that the appropriate change in the mind should occur. Then, despairing over this solution, there came Spinoza to cut the knot and say, 'These two are not separate substances, but attributes of the same substance.' Mind and matter were considered different but parallel attributes of one universal substance. Leibniz at about the same time was working out his more complicated system of monadism and pre-established harmony.

#### AUTOMATISM OR EPI-PHENOMENALISM

In modern science we have these same possibilities presented to us. There are three fundamental theories of the relation of mind to brain, though there are many subsidiary possible forms of the theories. There is the theory of materialism or automatism, according to which matter is the only real agent, and complex changes in some parts of the brain, especially in the cerebral cortex, produce sensory or motor consciousness, which consciousness when pro-



duced has no real effect upon subsequent activity in the brain—for in this theory of materialism consciousness is rather like a will o' the wisp burning over the surface of a lake, or the shadow that accompanies the pedestrian without influencing his steps, or the melody that floats from the harp-string without influencing its rate of vibration. In this theory of automatism or epi-phenomenalism the mind is not active at all.

The second theory is the theory of parallelism. It follows almost automatically from our rejection of materialism. We reject materialism because it assumes causal relations nowhere else to be discovered in nature. It supposes that material changes can produce a conscious process, and yet that that conscious process in its turn is unable to produce anything else. In all other branches of science there is a continuous sequence of causation, so why should this be supposed to be different? Moreover, the materialistic theory can be easily refuted. According to any theory of materialism mental activity is illusory. If illusory, then intellectual activity, which is one form of mental activity, is illusory. If intellectual activity is illusory, the products of intellectual activity are illusory. One such product of intellectual activity is this theory of

materialism, and therefore the theory of materialism is illusory and contradicts itself!

#### PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM

In order to get over that difficulty the passage is made from materialism to parallelism, just as Spinoza made it more than two centuries ago. The modern theory of psychophysical parallelism is really Spinoza's theory that mental process and physical change are two aspects of the same thing. The cerebral cortex is the part of the brain in most intimate relation with consciousness. For parallelism consciousness is one aspect of brain activity. Consciousness or mental activity is the same activity seen from the mental side. This theory may take different forms—it would take too long for me to enter into it in detail—but in the form known as psychophysical idealism the mental process is regarded as 'the reality' and the physical process as the way in which that reality appears to any other individual or centre of consciousness. According to this theory the brain of any particular person may be regarded as simply the other aspect of his mind, which is the reality. Although the mind cannot be directly observed, one can deduce what is happening in different parts of the cerebral

cortex corresponding to different modifications of consciousness through which the individual is passing. But mind and brain could not both be observed simultaneously. The observer could not be directly aware of the other's mind, but he could, theoretically, see his brain. On the other hand, the person observed could be directly aware of his own mental processes but not of his own brain. That all fits in with the hypothesis that the reality is the mind and the brain is simply the other aspect of it.

According to both of these theories, materialism and parallelism, survival after bodily death is impossible. We know what happens to the brain at death; it disintegrates, and that, so far as materialism is concerned, is the end. According to parallelism likewise, knowing what happens to the brain, the mind, being the other aspect of brain activity, must be disintegrated also. If mind be but the other and invisible side of the complex process in the cerebral cortex, it follows that with the disappearance of that complex process there can be no survival of the individual mind.

#### PSYCHOPHYSICAL INTERACTIONISM

We come to the third general possibility, that of interactionism. According to this theory the



mind and the brain are in relation to one another, the mind being relatively passive in sensation and relatively active in thinking and volition, though to some extent it is always active. One of the greatest of the older interactionists was R. H. Lotze, who believed in the soul as something distinct from the brain. He did not say, in his interactionist theory, that the brain interacted with consciousness, but rather that the brain interacted with the soul, which is not consciousness, lacking indeed sensation and other forms of conscious activity. One of Lotze's great arguments for the distinction of soul from brain is that based on the unity of the soul or the unity of the mind as distinct from the brain. The mind is a unity and the brain is not. But actually a point of criticism must be made there, for the brain is a very complicated integration of nervous functioning, and that integration is a unity. It may well be that the unity of the mind is an integrated activity of the nervous system. Indeed, one is prepared to say that in one sense the two are in complete correlation with one another. We may dismiss psychophysical parallelism altogether, there being no completely adequate evidence of a point-to-point correspondence between certain parts of the cortex and special kinds of mental activity;

but, while dismissing that, we can nevertheless hold to the view of a correspondence between the unitary activity of the nervous system in its co-ordination of behaviour and the unitary activity of the mind. Even if we do not accept psychophysical parallelism in the technical sense we can believe in a psychoneural parallelism—a parallelism between the mental process and nerve-change, not a point-to-point correspondence, but a correspondence in general, the whole nervous system being taken into account.

There are logical difficulties in the way of interactionism in that it seems to assume a causal relationship between two entities or two forms of reality that are absolutely different from one another. Brain and mind are so distinct, nervous activity on the one side and mental process on the other are so different, that it is impossible to conceive a causal relationship between them. This argument, however, assumes that we understand the causal relationship in other domains of science, whereas actually we do not. So far are we from understanding causal relationship that the category of causality is tending to disappear from physical science, and science is concerning itself more and more with the expressing of events by means of differential equations, describing as accurately as may be

continuous changes in time, without reference to the causal concept.

The theory of interactionism may take many forms. The original form was that the soul was an indivisible indestructible substance, and that its unity had to be assumed in order to account for the unity of conscious life and thought. But Kant himself showed that the only unity of the mind of which there could be absolute certainty was the unity of the logical subject—the 'I think', or the subject of any proposition. It was the process of experience as distinct from the object experienced, the synthetic unity of apperception, which was timeless but not immortal—timeless in the sense of being a necessary implicate in all our knowledge, and so accompanying our knowledge, but not just for that reason immortal and sure to survive the death of the body. Kant illustrated the situation by an analogy. He assumed a number of elastic spheres, each sphere carrying its own 'consciousness', also its own energy of movement, and he imagined one sphere hitting a neighbouring sphere and transmitting to it both its consciousness and its energy, and that sphere in its turn hitting the next sphere, and transmitting consciousness and energy, and so on. Thus there would be, on that analogy, a continuance



of consciousness and energy, and yet with no unitary sub-stratum.

The same idea appears in William James's *Principles of Psychology*, in which he speaks of the passing thought as that which carries the unity of consciousness, the passing thought which is 'born an owner and dies owned', which takes up in itself the previous moment of experience, and, having made it its own, gives it up to the next moment of experience. Thus every passing thought is born an owner, owning what has previously passed, but it dies owned, the possession of the next passing thought. I have taken up this argument in order to dismiss the idea of the soul as necessarily a unitary metaphysical entity.

The only great philosopher in recent times who has held that view of the soul as something metaphysically original and indestructible is McTaggart. He held the monadistic view that the individual soul was there from eternity, from the beginning of time, and cannot be destroyed. But the argument that dismisses the rationalistic doctrine of the unitary and indestructible soul would also dismiss McTaggart's view. The soul is a process of development, of growth and organization, and we need not be afraid that in accepting that view we are handing ourselves over bound to the materialist who

considers that all that is being developed is a physical system which in process of successive generations becomes more and more complicated, and therefore becomes an increasingly complicated form of experience for the organism. The soul is in process of development in relation to the body. It is through the body that the soul gets its experience. It is through the body that the soul comes into existence, but theoretically that does not force us to the view that when the body begins to fail and ultimately disintegrates the soul must share its fate. That does not follow—I am speaking now theoretically and in terms of logical analysis.

#### EXPERIENCE AND VALUE

The soul as it is developed is described and explained to a certain extent by psychology, but as it is understood more deeply in the mental sciences of ethics, aesthetics, and logic it has the aspect of value-experience. Thought has a value, appreciation of beauty has a value, and moral obligation and appreciation of good has a value. As all these develop in the individual mind, although it is true that their development is in relation to changes in nerve fibres and in complexity of physical function, they may in the course of their development

achieve a degree of permanence and a degree of power that can survive the death of their physical partner, the partner that assisted in their birth. We may look upon the mind as the *ἐντελέχεια* of the body, as pervading the body, not necessarily surviving bodily death because it is mental, but if in its mentality it is able to rise above the stratum in which it is first unfolded and the attending sequence of experience, and to possess not only consciousness but self-consciousness, knowledge of itself, the ability to look before and after, self-control and organization, in a word, character—if it is able to do this, acquiring thereby the strength which can not only magnify the individual but through him affect societies and nations, then surely it has in it potent elements of survival.

#### PSYCHICAL RESEARCH AND SURVIVAL

The difficulty, of course, is to understand how the mind can survive the cataclysm of death. As we watch the approach of death in others we can see how, before the death of the body, the mind can be changed by disease, especially by toxic absorption working on the brain and producing different degrees of mental alienation or insanity. The mind seems to be disintegrating even before the body, and the person in serious



mental illness is 'not himself', as we say. No wonder we ask ourselves whether mind can survive bodily death when it seems so cruelly affected even by death's approach. This is where scientific investigation of whatever evidence there may be for the continued existence of the mind after death is not only justified but demanded of the human race. The science of psychical research is an essential science in the sense that we should investigate any kind of evidence, but take care to investigate it in a scientific way. We must remember also that whatever evidence we may find for the continued existence of the mind after death does not necessarily prove immortality, nor does it necessarily help us on the moral and religious side.

I have merely wished to refer in passing to this question of psychical research, but I must turn back to our greater theme, not of the possibility of the mere continuance of the mind after death, but of the reasons from an ethical and religious point of view which make us hopeful of continued existence.

#### THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS FOR SURVIVAL

These reasons are, first, ethical, in the sense that moral obligation seems something imposed

upon us in an absolute way. But here again, of course, we must realize that it is not easy to know what is the right thing to do. At the present day we may seem to see a tendency towards the loosening of moral integrity. But that is appearance rather than reality. If we look into the matter more deeply we see that it is just because the moral sense of the human race is deepening and moral values are being taken more seriously that changes are being demanded. The old tables of stone are being broken up, but only in order that they may be replaced by new. The modern attitude towards war, for example, as compared with the general attitude even just before the last war, shows what a tremendous advance has been made, at any rate by a large proportion of the human race, on the ethical side.

It is rather curious to find that with this intensification of moral earnestness there seems to enter a scepticism as to the possibility of survival, a scepticism with regard to the claims of religion altogether. I believe that this scepticism extends only to the old forms of religion and the old views of survival, the more mechanically accepted views, set up on the basis of a formal theology. Instead of considering that religion is less prominent than it was, we should say that

the whole human race is becoming more and more religious, more and more moral, in its outlook.

We may well consider it rather unfortunate that just now, when great advances are being made in our appreciation of moral problems and individual freedom, we should find a school of thought which launched us on our way taking a firm stand against religion—I am referring to the Freudian school. Religion, Freud says, is an illusion, a wish-fulfilment, it is man's crippling environment in the past that has produced the religious reaction, and with further insight into physical and mental science that religious reaction will disappear. It seems to me that Freud has here put up a man of straw to knock him down again. Freud's view of religious origins is not the view one finds among those who are truly religious either now or in previous generations. Had Freud been as great a philosopher as he is a psychologist he would never have written some of the things he has. He has made the mistake of talking about reality without giving any definition of reality, but implying that it means the harsh physical circumstances of our lives. He has failed to realize that reality includes everything, all our aspirations, all our courage, our strivings after good, our desire to



get beyond our self-centred selves, a process, indeed, which Freud has done more than any one else at the present day to facilitate, because the method of psycho-analysis is a method of gaining increased freedom of the mind from the more mechanical entanglements of the past. How does one acquire greater freedom? By changing the unconscious into the conscious, so that in true consciousness there is freedom. Although Freud himself is a determinist, and in his argument for determinism points to the part played by unconscious forces and repressed tendencies in our conscious choice here and now, nevertheless that is not the same thing as proving that our conscious choice is entirely determined and unfree. Indeed, the conclusion to be drawn is just the opposite. We find that when we analyse ourselves or others we or they become our true selves, more capable of directing our energies along the one channel with single-mindedness and according to a single motive. So with religion; all that analysis does of a destructive kind is to kill false religion, the short-sighted infantile outlook on life that may have held us back. It enables us really to grow up in our minds as we grow up in our bodies. As we grow in mind we do not see religion disappearing; on the contrary, it becomes

deepened, just as the sense of obligation becomes deepened. We feel more and more now, as regards obligation, ready to accept the view, 'To every one according to his need; from every one according to his power.' We tend to reverse the categorical imperative, 'I ought, therefore I can'; we psychologists would say, 'I can, therefore I ought'—that is to say, our obligation is according to our real power. Owing to the fact that so many people appear weighed down by fatuousness and weakness, dominated by worn-out views and attitudes towards life, so that the same misfortunes keep recurring to the individual and to the race, we may feel inclined to be pessimistic. But the more we study and trace the forces working within the mind, and the more ready we are to use and apply our knowledge, the more capable we make the mind of rising above its difficulties and carrying us on to higher things. That process in the individual and the race is the process of achieving freedom, and as a process of achieving freedom it is a process of achieving immortality.

One may recall the line of Robert Browning:  
The soul doubtless is immortal—where a soul can  
be discerned.

That will survive for each one of us which is capable of surviving, which is capable of

eternity. We can have that immortality now, and every one of us responds to that view when it is put to him—we can live in the eternal here and now. But that does not mean that therefore we do not survive all the same. The fact that we can live the immortal life, the truly spiritual life, here and now, rising above the limitations of mere material and biological reality, that very fact gives us hope that at death we shall survive, not because we love our own lives, but because we give importance to the eternal values. If we love the beautiful and true, in a social sense, not merely for the saving of our own souls, if we develop ourselves, realize our personality, not in a sybaritic or a pseudo-aesthetic way, but because these are parts of an ideal plan and system, we have hold of eternal life.

#### LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP

Perhaps what distresses the mind more than anything else in the face of death is the breaking of bonds of friendship. The friend has passed beyond. One wonders what has become of him, and what has become, too, of that very bond of friendship which made him so dear. Can God cause to spring up amongst us all these bonds of friendship and mutual insight that we have in



this life only to destroy them in the end? If we were merely egoistic, merely thinking of ourselves only, then no doubt we should deserve extinction at the end of our own petty lives. But we form part of an ideal system, a spiritual plan, a kingdom not of this world; we have a city in the heavens. Can that die? Is there not something there that far transcends death? Is not love greater than death? Death has never conquered love—true love. Words like that slip into consolatory speech, but they may not be mere words, mere metaphor; they may be abiding reality, the most assured and well-attested thing known to the mind of man.

## APPENDIX I

### PSYCHOLOGY AT OXFORD<sup>1</sup>

PSYCHOLOGY has had a long past, but a short history. Although it was recognized as a definite branch of knowledge in the times of the ancient Greeks, and was singled out by Aristotle for discussion in a distinct treatise, its general position until very recent times has been that of handmaid to philosophy (logic, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics), with but little independence of method and none of aim or function. Only within the last fifty years has it achieved any independent status comparable to that of the various physical sciences.

This general position is reflected in the history of psychology in the University of Oxford. Psychology has always had a place in Oxford education. The attention of generation after generation of her students has been drawn to the psychological aspects of mental processes and social behaviour. John Locke, author of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), who is acclaimed as the founder of modern psychology, was a son of Oxford and a student of Christ Church. His name is perpetuated in the John Locke Scholarship in Mental Philosophy (founded, like the Readership, by the late Henry Wilde, F.R.S.), for which psychology is one of the examination subjects. Psychology may also be offered as a special subject in the Honour School of Literae Humaniores, commonly called Greats. But apart from these two possibilities the subject of psychology does not figure in

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the *B.M.J.*, 30 May 1936, vol. i, p. 1121.

any of the University examinations. The whole subject has been a subordinate one within the School of Philosophy.

#### THE WILDE READERSHIP

The Wilde Readership in Mental Philosophy was founded and endowed in 1898. Its first holder was Professor G. F. Stout, who, after five years, proceeded to St. Andrews as professor of logic and metaphysics. He was succeeded at Oxford by Professor William McDougall, F.R.S., who held the position for seventeen years, relinquishing it eventually for Harvard, and later going on to Duke University, N.C., where he has been professor of psychology since 1927. These two names, of international reputation, prove that, however restricted and incomplete the facilities for study and research at Oxford in this subject may have been, the subject has been worthily represented in the persons of its teachers.

The term 'mental philosophy' for the purposes of the Wilde Readership is defined as 'the study of the human mind based on observation and experience as distinguished from experimental psychology'. Thus the teaching of experimental psychology is excluded from the sphere of the occupant of the post. Although the first director of the newly created Institute of Experimental Psychology is the present holder of the Wilde Readership, there is no permanent integral connexion between the two appointments, and the appointing body in each case is quite different. On the other hand, a bias towards the medical aspects of psychology is indicated by the



inclusion of 'illusions and delusions which are incident to the human mind' as one of the lines along which the Wilde Reader may properly direct the attention of his students.

Oxford has been singular among great universities in possessing no laboratory of experimental psychology. Since the first such laboratory was founded, by Wilhelm Wundt the German psychologist, at Leipzig in 1879, almost every university in Europe and America has come to include such a provision in its research equipment. Shortly before the war Professor McDougall made an attempt, for a while successful, to establish a laboratory of this kind at Oxford. It would no doubt have become a permanent institution but for war-time disruption and the abnormal conditions of the immediate post-war period, when the Reader found himself deprived of the necessary accommodation and other facilities, which were put to other urgent use.

In 1921 Professor McDougall was succeeded in the Wilde Readership by the present writer, who, incidentally, had been his first student and who, sixteen years previously, when an undergraduate at Christ Church, Oxford, was the first to avail himself of the method just mentioned, of taking psychology as a special subject in Greats, also becoming in the following year the holder of the John Locke Scholarship. After having worked since then for twelve years in charge of the well-appointed psychological laboratory at King's College, London, it was a disappointment to the new Reader to have no facilities of accommodation or

apparatus for experimental work on his subject. Another attempt to institute an experimental laboratory was made, but was unsuccessful. On the other hand, there was no mistaking the keenness shown by the students in the theoretical aspects of the subject, and in such of its practical applications as could be developed in the courses. On many occasions so large have been the attendances at the lectures—the students being drawn from theology, medicine, literae humaniores, biological sciences, and other faculties in the schools, including also those studying for the diploma in education—that no lecture room at Christ Church could accommodate them, and an adjournment has had to be made to the hall.

#### PLANS FOR THE NEW INSTITUTE

It was this evident interest of both graduate and undergraduate Oxford in the theoretical aspects of psychology—as wide as human affairs—and also a particular interest on the part of the benefactor in the clinical methods of prolonged or ‘deep’ analysis, where psychology finds its most direct application to the remedy of human ills, that encouraged a generous donor, Mrs. Hugh Watts, in 1935 to offer to the University through the Wilde Reader the sum of £10,000 towards the foundation of an institute of experimental psychology. The offer was gratefully accepted, and by an enactment of the University an institute has now been established, the University providing such accommodation as the curators of the University Chest may approve. Its management is in the hands of a committee, headed by the Vice-

Chancellor and including representatives of the Faculties of Medicine, *Literae Humaniores*, Biological Sciences, and Social Studies, and the Director. A sum of £500, together with an annual grant of £150 a year for five years, has been allocated to the institute from the Rockefeller Benefaction for Research in the Social Sciences.

Thus an objective which has been long in the vague distance has now been realized. Oxford students will be able not only to have instruction in the theoretical side of the subject but to pursue research and to observe how far, through experiment, the conclusions of psychology enter the realm of precision and verifiability. It will be possible to teach and survey the subject in better perspective and proportion. The institute will also serve as an important experimental adjunct to the work of the Institute of Social Studies, which, so far as research is concerned, is more especially interested in politics and international relations and in economics.

#### WHAT IS EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY?

The term 'experimental psychology' may convey little to some minds, and to others the idea of research in such a field may be slightly repugnant, suggesting the probe and measuring rule in the deep things of the human spirit. Experimental psychology is not so much a new science as an improved technique, and it is not, and never can be, the whole of psychology. Psychology has been defined as the science of the mind, with introspection as the fundamental method by which it acquires its data, and



experimental psychology is merely the carrying out of introspection under prearranged conditions.

In the performance of a psychological experiment the co-operation of two persons—the experimenter and a subject—is generally necessary, although in certain cases it can be carried out by one and the same person. The experimenter arranges the external conditions of the experiment, manipulates apparatus, or makes other adjustments whereby modifications are produced in the consciousness of the subject, while the subject observes these mental changes in himself by careful introspection, and records them with as much detail as possible. Thus the objective and subjective conditions of mental change can be accurately controlled, and the experiment can be repeated by the same or other workers in the same laboratory or elsewhere, and in this way results may be compared, and gradually, through closer and closer experiment, the general laws of mental reaction deduced.

Many illustrations could be given of the lines of research which may be usefully pursued in a laboratory equipped, as it must be, with special apparatus. Investigations may be made, for example, into the different forms of human perception and observational processes, also in the domain of memory and association of ideas, where the possibilities of experiment are wellnigh unlimited, and again into mental efficiency and mental fatigue. The measurement of thought processes and processes of volition may be undertaken, and the whole science of mental variation and correlation, and the interrelationship of

mental abilities may come under review. The practical application of these studies to industrial efficiency and vocational guidance is itself a vindication of the scientific status of experimental psychology. Another field of immense importance to be explored is medical psychology, in so far as experiments on normal individuals are necessary to furnish the standard whereby the pathological may be justly estimated.

The above gives only a rough indication of the field of experiment open to psychology. It is a field which is continually extending with the refinement of apparatus and methods, although, as already stated, a stage will never be reached in which the whole of psychology is covered by experiment. The theoretical side must always outrun the side of precise determination. Nevertheless, it is only through experiment that the deductions of psychology can be discussed in precise terms and its findings repeated and verified. Psychology sees new territories awaiting it, but it is as necessary for it as for any other branch of science to consolidate by irrefutable experiment the ground already covered. It is a great satisfaction to Oxford men that the University should soon be abreast of other seats of learning in its facilities for what has been called 'humane research', and that there will be a complete department of psychology where Oxford students and graduates from other universities—British, imperial, and foreign—will be able to study every aspect of a science which is concerned on so many sides, and so fundamentally, with human well-being.

## APPENDIX II

THREE LETTERS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY  
OF WAR AND PEACE<sup>1</sup>

## GENERAL SMUTS'S SPEECH

*PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS*

*To the Editor of the Times.*

SIR,—In the brilliant speech delivered by General Smuts at the dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs on November 12, with the substance of which I, as a psychologist, find myself in close agreement, certain psychological terms are used in senses which detract from the strength of the main argument and may be positively misleading.

General Smuts speaks of the 'fear complex' of the victors of the last War, and of the 'inferiority complex' of the vanquished. In modern psychological theory the term 'complex' refers to a system of ideas linked up with a conative and affective tendency which are in a state of repression and thus barred from consciousness. They manifest themselves indirectly by producing distortions in consciousness and disturbances in conscious activity, which if taken at their face value may be very misleading and quite mystifying.

Thus, in its strict sense, an inferiority complex is a personal inferiority (in some special direction) which an individual hides from himself as well as (less successfully) from those around. In neurosis we may find a repressed feeling of inadequacy to a situation

<sup>1</sup> Published in *The Times* on 23 Nov., 11 Dec., and 21 Dec. 1934.



being automatically and unconsciously transformed into a feeling of illness with all its logical consequences. Or it may be more actively compensated by a boastful swagger or a bullying demeanour. A 'fear complex', likewise, would show itself in consciousness in altered and distorted form, although there is more doubt about the significance and utility of this expression.

Germany is not suffering from an inferiority complex in the technical sense. She has no weakness which she is hiding from herself. She has just the opposite feeling of fundamental worth and power, shown in her military success against overwhelming odds during the War. Nor has she an inferiority feeling. She has, however, a feeling that she is at a disadvantage in relation to her late enemies and that she has been unjustly dealt with under the peace treaties, and was not the sole War-culprit. Her strong and untamed self-assertive instinct is reacting vigorously to the situation, and now that she is unified in her new political organization her aggressive and self-assertive tendencies can again show themselves in their true form. So far as these tendencies are kept in a state of repression they can produce in consciousness anxiety, depression, and even delusions of persecution.

The urgent psychological need in world affairs at the present time is to find some means of sublimating the self-assertive (and even aggressive) instinct that is so strong in every nation as well as in every individual, and to temper the very real dangers of

282      THREE LETTERS ON PSYCHOLOGY OF  
nationalism by arousing an urge towards a super-  
national culture and an all-embracing humanity.

Yours faithfully,

WILLIAM BROWN.

The Knoll House, Hinksey Hill, Oxford.

## PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR

### *INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS AND NATIONS*

*To the Editor of The Times.*

SIR,—In spite of much recent discussion the educated general public still seems to have a very inadequate grasp of the psychological difficulties involved in the preservation of peace and the prevention of war. These difficulties centre round the fact of the contrast between conscious and unconscious mental activity—the fact that in matters of the mind things are not always what they seem.

To this contrast between the conscious and the unconscious, popular thought remains wilfully blind, as is shown, e.g., by the persistent misuse of such a term as 'inferiority complex' (which should refer to an unconsciously motivated mental reaction or attitude) where the term 'inferiority feeling' is all that is meant. To judge from your correspondence columns, even medical men are not free from this weakness.

The matter is not one of pedantic concern with terminology (although accurately defined terms are necessary to clear thought), but one of empirically ascertained fact. Unconscious forces may reveal themselves in consciousness in distorted form, either

in the nervous and mental symptoms of patients or in the idiosyncrasies and weaknesses of so-called normal people. This is because they are in a state of repression and thus removed from conscious knowledge and control. If they are relieved from repression by a process of analysis they come into consciousness in their true form, and may then become sublimated—i.e. directed toward higher social and cultural ends. But if they remain in a state of repression no amount of coaxing or persuasion or exhortation will have any permanent effect upon them. A superficial and evanescent pacification is all that can be achieved.

Now the State is the man 'writ large', and its reactions to other States will be powerfully but unwittingly determined by the unconscious tendencies of its citizens acting through their conscious thoughts and feelings. It is these unconscious tendencies (of self-assertion, aggression, &c.) which boil up unrestrained when war breaks out, and produce a transformation scene as at the touch of a magician's wand. But the same tendencies are there, lying hidden but not entirely dormant, in times of peace. They become reinforced, fed, and directed by current events, and may produce a luxuriant growth of complexes which make international negotiations difficult and mutual understanding impossible. Deliberations at a round table fail to influence them, as the sweetly reasonable arguments of friends fail to influence a patient suffering from obsessional neurosis.

Not until the whole world has reached a much higher level of culture and individual self-knowledge



and a much deeper sense of neighbourly sympathy than is at present apparent will there be any real hope of progressive disarmament, or will pacification be anything but a surface-phenomenon. We must resign ourselves to the necessity of strong defensive forces for some time to come, unless we can discover rapid and effective means of influencing the unconscious mind, in the mass, such as we cannot even imagine at the present time.

Meanwhile our hope is to lift culture and science to a supernational plane, and to encourage the sublimation and spiritualization of all self-assertive tendencies and the banishment of fear right from the very earliest years of childhood onward through life.

Yours faithfully,

Oxford.

WILLIAM BROWN.

## PSYCHOLOGY AND WAR

### CONTROL OF THE MIND

*To the Editor of The Times.*

SIR,—While in complete agreement with Dr. Edwyn Bevan as to the objective dangers of the present international situation, I hold that we should not feel fear in relation to them, but should face them calmly and seek all means of controlling them. One serious difficulty here is that the individual mind, which is such an important factor in the situation, is itself only in part controllable. The repressed primitive tendencies and memories which make up the unconscious or night side of the mind are influenced,

not by reason and argument, but by suggestion and emotional appeals which may, in special circumstances, sweep it out of control and over the precipice of war. The unconscious reactions of politicians and diplomats of every nation, as well as those of private citizens, are of the utmost importance here.

Within each State or nation the conscious power of self-control of the individual citizen is supplemented by legal procedure, police control, &c., which have brought duelling to an end, and have checked tendencies to take the law into one's own hands and in general to give vent to one's unconscious antagonisms.

But as between State and State such legal procedure is rudimentary and police control is non-existent. Only if a super-State were developed, to which all existing States were subordinated, would the analogy hold, and this is beyond the bounds of practical politics. A true League of Nations, comprising all the nations of the world, is the only practicable alternative, but it is also obvious that some form of police system will need to be devised to enforce its decisions, and yet all schemes hitherto suggested are fraught with the gravest dangers to international peace.

On the psychological side much can be done through education. The young child of every nation should be brought up in such a way that repression is reduced to a minimum, and is replaced by conscious self-knowledge and self-control, so far as the child's development admits of it. Sympathy with

the needs and interests of other people and of other nations should be developed to the utmost at all stages of his education. As for the adult, he must learn to understand himself better, to be on guard against taking his conscious thoughts and feelings too exclusively at their face value, and to develop sincerity, sympathy, and true singleness of mind.

A mere orgy of pacifist sentiment will not take us far. Like prohibition, puritanism, and other such movements, it will meet its nemesis and fail of its purpose. Moral disarmament must be supported by psychological disarmament, and indeed is only possible in conjunction with the latter. The guns don't go off of themselves. Economic factors do not act *in vacuo* or apart from the workings of human minds. Geographical boundaries have no meaning apart from the national hopes and aspirations of inhabitants. National forms of government, no less than national honour and national prestige, have their psychological bases and their psychological meaning. Unless the world applies the science of psychology to its problems, as it has already so successfully applied the sciences of physics and chemistry, of physiology and pathology, its pursuit of peace will fail in the future as it has persistently failed in the past.

Yours faithfully,

WILLIAM BROWN.

Oxford, Dec. 18.

These three letters, published two years ago, are reprinted here without alteration, as their warning has been borne out by the recent course of world events.



# INDEX

- Adler, 58.  
 Adolescence, sexual problems of, 67-9, 89-101.  
 Aggressive tendency, the, 50-1, 126-8, 136, 139, 147-8, 164, 214, 226, 242, 281-4.  
 Agnosticism, 79, 201.  
 Agoraphobia, 157.  
 Alcoholism, 225; hypnotism and, 10; cured by suggestion, 31, 84.  
 Analysis, religion in, 13, 205, 238-9, 269; and over-consciousness, 17; and the unconscious, 25-6; method of, 35-7, 44; to relieve repression, 49-52, 201-2, 283; length of, 50, 54, 56, 60-1, 167-8, 210, 230-2, 242; transference in, 55-60, 206, 231-2; of the analyst, 56-7; 171-2; reductive, 58; re-education in, 59; and increased efficiency, 86; and homosexuality, 99; of nationalistic repressions, 128; and the super-ego, 163-4; and faith-healing, 167; and illness, 171; and freedom, 185; ethical value of, 190-2, 240; and the empty mind, 194; and confession, 194-5, 196-206; and 'sharing', 229-33; and childhood emotions, 237; necessary for leaders, 241.  
 Anniversaries, 170-2.  
 Anthropology and psychoanalysis, 39.  
 Anxiety hysteria, 23, 41; dreams, 48; neurosis, 54, 95-6.  
 Aristotle, 250-1, 273.  
 Asceticism, 189, 223.  
 Autognosis, 76-8, 168, 172-3, 222, 283.  
 Automatism, 256-7.  
 Autosuggestion, 3, 37, 96-7.  
 Bartlett, R. J., 108, 110, 111 *n.*, 112.  
 Baudouin, 11, 72.  
 Beethoven, 218.  
 Bergson, 171, 184.  
 Bernheim, 6, 24.  
 Besterman, Theodore, 108.  
 Bevan, Dr. Edwyn, 284.  
 Bradley, F. H., v.  
 Braid, James, 24, 102.  
 Brain, relation to mind, 21, 37, 257-62.  
 Breuer, Joseph, 42-3.  
 Browning, Robert, 219, 270.  
 Buchman, Dr. F. N. D., 228-9.  
 Buchmanism, *see* Group movement.  
 Carington, Whateley, 108.  
 Carrington, Hereward, 108.  
 Catalepsy, 105-6.  
 Categorical imperative, the, 177-8, 187-9, 193, 254, 270.  
 'Censorship', the, 45-8.  
 Cerebral cortex, the, 21, 23, 41, 107, 256, 258-60.  
 Character, creation in, 19-20; built upon conflict, 37; and personality, 125-8.

- Charcot, 6, 24.  
 Collective security, 140-1.  
 Compensation, 201, 210, 211.  
 Compulsion neurosis, 187-8.  
 Concentration, restored by suggestion, 11-12, 31; general undevelopment, 36-7.  
 Conditioned reflexes, 107.  
 Confession, 35, 194-5, 196, 199-206.  
 Conscience, 17-18, 126, 158-61, 163, 188, 239.  
 Conscientious objection, 142.  
 Consciousness, emotional and intellectual sides, 41; and sex control, 88; and freedom, 184.  
 'Conversion', 200-1, 243, 245.  
 Coué, 32, 72-3, 86.  
 Creation and the finite individual, 19-20, 81-2.  
 Critical faculty, avoided in analysis, 44.  
 Crunden, Mrs., W. M., 111 n.  
 Cyclothymia, 130.  
  
 Darwin, 134.  
 Deep breathing, 29-30, 97, 105.  
 Dementia praecox, 41.  
 Descartes, 255.  
 Disarmament, 149, 192-3, 284.  
 Disease, philosophically defined, 2-3; and sin, 163-70.  
 Dissociation and hypnotism, 5-11, 65.  
 Dream interpretation, 12.  
 Dreams, phenomena of, 47-8, 249; and self-analysis, 56-7, 168; the unconscious in, 88; J. W. Dunne on, 181-2.  
  
 Drug addiction, 10, 84.  
 Dualism, 255.  
 Dunne, J. W., 181-2.  
  
 Egocentricity, 79.  
 Ego ideal, 18.  
 Einstein, 241.  
 Emotional experiences, past, and hysteria, 42-3; satisfaction in self-assertion, 50; energy from repressed tendencies, 58.  
 Endocrine glands, the, 28-9, 40.  
 Epi-phenomenalism, 256-7.  
 Eternal, the, 83-4, 247-72.  
 Eurhythmics, 38.  
 Exhibitionism, 68, 99.  
 Experimental psychology, nature of, 277-9.  
  
 Faith-healing, 63, 167.  
 Father ideal, 18, 211.  
 Fear, 210-11, 225-7, 284; in illness, 29; of failure, 70, 72-4, 85, 87; complex, 280-1.  
 Folk-lore and psycho-analysis, 39.  
 Force and International Law, 140-1.  
 Free association, 12, 25, 43-4, 230.  
 Freedom, of will, 81, 270; spiritual, 81-2; Kant and, 153, 177, 183, 254; Bergson and, 184-5; individual, 268-9.  
 Freud, Sigmund, 12; and religion, 13, 61-2, 199, 207-17, 221-4, 238, 268-70; *The Future of an Illusion*, 13 n., 198-9, 208, 216; and over-

- conscientiousness, 18; *The Ego and the Id*, 18 n.; originator of psycho-analysis, 25, 42-3, 138, 171, 269; on cause and treatment, 35; and the censorship, 45-6; and the super-ego, 46, 163, 188, 203-4, 211; on dreams, 47-8, 168, 208; his self-analysis, 56-7, 168-9; and Jung and Adler, 58; and suggestion, 65; *History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement*, 168; and the categorical imperative, 187-8; letters to Einstein on war, 241.
- Functional nervous illness, 23-4.
- Garrett, Mrs. Eileen, 108, 111 n.; record of her hypnotic trance, 112-24.
- Geulincx, 256.
- Great War, the, 10, 171, 281.
- Groddeck, Dr. Georg, 27-8.
- Group confession, 206.
- Movement, the, psychologically considered, 228-46.
- 'Guidance', 229, 233-6, 234 n., 243-5.
- Guilt-sense, 14, 17, 36, 53-5, 154, 165-7, 174-6.
- Gymnastics, 38.
- Health, philosophically defined, 2-3; relation of psychology to, 39.
- Hegel, 79.
- Heredity, 177; in mental disease, 42.
- Heterosuggestion, 3.
- Hobbes, 129, 132.
- Homosexuality, 99.
- Hull, Prof. Clark, 102 and n.
- Hypnosis, explanation of, 5-6; 'artificial hysteria', 6, 9; memory in, 7, 104; and somnambulism, 7-8, 104; suggestion without, 10; Freud and, 43; and lost memories, 65; tension in, 103; relation to sleep, 102-7; voluntary response in, 103.
- Hypnotism, and suggestion, 5-10, 26, 30; Nancy school of, 5-6; subjects for, 8-9; and the weak-minded, 9; Mesmer and Braid and, 24, 102-3; relaxation and, 30; and the mediumistic trance, 107-24.
- Hypochondria, 41.
- Hysteria, 4, 130; artificial, 6, 9; and hypnotism, 9; conversion, 23; anxiety, 23, 41.
- 'Id', the, 46.
- Idealism, v, 79, 88, 95, 157, 163, 208, 227, 239, 248.
- Illness, mental, reasons for, 34-7, 65, 202, 280-1.
- Imagination, the, Coué on, 32-3, 72-4; control of, 85; and child upbringing, 162.
- Imitation in illness, 27.
- Immortality, 81-2, 247-72.
- Inferiority feeling and complex, 75-6, 280-2.
- Inhibitions removed by suggestion, 12; internal, 107; religious, 224.
- Insanity and psycho-analysis, 40, 42.



- Insincerity and mental illness, 34.  
 Inspiration, 198.  
 Instincts, control of, 80; the danger, 225-6.  
 Institute of Experimental Psychology (Oxford), 274.  
 Interactionism, 255, 259-64.  
 International relations and psychology, 39, 47, 129-50, 280-6.  
 Inversion, 98-9.  
 Involuntary muscles, 33.  
 James, William, v, 219, 263.  
 Janet, Prof. Pierre, 9-10.  
 Jews, the, 207.  
 Jones, Olive M., 228 n.  
 Jung, 58.  
 Kant, Immanuel, 80-1, 151-3, 155-6, 177-80, 183-6, 193, 216, 253-5, 262.  
*Karma*, 251-2.  
 League of Nations, the, 140-1, 285.  
 Le Bon, Gustav, 137 n.  
 Leibniz, 256.  
 Leonard, Mrs. Osborne, 108.  
 Libido, 46, 77, 211.  
 Lobatchevski, 180.  
 Locke, John, 273, 275.  
 Logic, 218, 250-1, 273.  
 Lotze, R. H., 260.  
 McDougall, Prof. Wm., 20 n., 66 n., 274-5.  
 McTaggart, 263.  
 Malebranche, 256.  
 Manic-depressive psychosis, 41, 130, 165.  
 Masochism, 68, 99-100, 214.  
 Mass psychology, 136-9, 142-3.  
 Massage, mental benefit of, 38.  
 Masturbation, 69, 72, 77, 92-8.  
 Medicine, psychology and, vi, 21, 26, 36, 39.  
 Melancholia, 41, 164-5.  
 Memory in hypnosis, 7; improved by suggestion, 12, 31, 65; general undevelopment, 36-7; loss of, 65; mechanical, 171; experiment in, 278.  
 Mental analysis, *see* analysis; laziness, 16; discipline, 20; illness, reaction in, 27, 39; concentration improved by suggestion, 11-12, 31.  
 — Philosophy, Wilde Reader-ship in, 274-6.  
 Mesmer, Franz Anton, 24, 103.  
 Mind, and brain, relation of, 21, 37, 257-62; man's reaction to, 132-4; and spirit, 197-9, 202; reactive processes of, 215-16; slums of the, 225-6; freedom of, 254; and matter, 255-6; control of, 284-6.  
 Miraculous, the, 1-3, 66.  
 Mob psychology, 136-9, 142-3.  
 Monism and monadism, 255, 263.  
 Moral obligation, 154, 215, 218, 254, 264, 266-8; development, 162; responsibility, 174-6; law, the, 178-9, 252; value of analysis, 190-2.


- Morality, 18-20, 144; in illness, 35, 202; conscious or unconscious, 154-8; in the neurotic, 174-5; psychology and, 176; Schopenhauer on, 215.  
 Mother-fixation, 54-5, 99.  
 Music, appreciation of, 16, 19-20.  
 Mystical experience, 14, 249.  
 Napoleon, 71.  
 Narcissism, 14.  
 Natural selection, 134.  
 Nervous disease, organic and functional, 21-4; system, the, 21-2, 24, 28, 30, 33, 40-1, 64, 225, 261.  
 Neurasthenia, 41.  
 Neurologists' antagonism to psychotherapy, 22-3.  
 Neurosis, anxiety, 54, 95-6; compulsion, 187-8; obsessional, 23, 41-2, 60, 127, 221, 242, 280-1, 283.  
 Neurotic, the, morality in, 174-5, 216.  
 Nocturnal emissions, 98.  
 Non - Euclidean Geometry, 180.  
 Normal and abnormal minds, 190-2, 200-1, 279.  
 Noumenon and Phenomenon, 179.  
 Obsessional neurosis, 23, 41-2, 60, 127, 221, 242, 283.  
 Oedipus Complex, the, 14, 53, 99, 221.  
 Optic thalamus, 41.  
 Organic nervous diseases, 22-4.  
 Original sin, 47.  
 Orphic mysteries, the, 249, 251.  
 Over - conscientiousness, 17, 158-61, 242.  
 Oxford, Group Movement, *see* Group Movement; Psychology at, 273-9.  
 Parallelism, 257-61.  
 Paranoia, 41, 238.  
 Passivity, 11.  
 Pavlov, I. P., 107.  
 Peace, 129, 140-1; Hobbes on, 149; three letters on war and, 280-6.  
 Personality and Character, 125-8; survival of, 247-72.  
 Perversion, 10, 68, 98-100.  
 Pessimism, 79, 270.  
 Phenomenon and Noumenon, 179-80, 253-4.  
 Plato, 249.  
 Pre-conscious, the, 45, 63.  
 Pre-experience, 181-2.  
 Pre-war state, the, 127-8, 143, 146.  
 Primitive urges, 134-9, 149, 150, 216, 284; beliefs of survival, 248-50.  
 Projection, 126, 165, 193, 234, 234 *n.*, 238.  
 Propaganda, 146-7, 149.  
 Psycho-analysis, Freud the originator of, 25, 42-3, 138, 171, 269.  
 Psychogalvanic reaction, 108-10.  
 Psychology and confession, 196-206; and religion, 207-27; and the Group Movement, 228-46.  
 Psychoneurotic cases, 26, 36, 40-2, 130, 209, 221, 238, 242.

- Psychophysical parallelism, 258-9; interactionism, 259-64.
- Psychoses, 40-3, 130, 137, 175, 238.
- Psychotherapy, primitive origin of, 1; and the miraculous, 1-3; place of hypnotism in, 8, 105-6; neurologists' antagonism to, 22-3; benefits functional nervous illness, 23-4; history of, 24-5; and psycho-analysis, 39-66; apart from psycho-analysis, 61; religion in, 61, 160-1; and the spiritual universe, 85-7; and perversions, 97-101; and psychoses, 130.
- Puységur, Marquis de, 103.
- Reality, v, 153, 183-4, 198-9, 209, 212, 219-20, 258, 267, 268, 272.
- Reassociation, 8, 10, 65.
- Re-education in analysis, 59.
- Regression, 77, 134-7, 200-1, 221, 237-8.
- Relativity, 180.
- Relaxation, and suggestion, 11, 29-32, 64-5, 84, 96-7, 105; and free association, 25; and self-training, 33; massage and, 38; in sleep, 30, 103.
- Religion, and the primitive mind, 1; mental analysis and, 12-13, 205; Freud's explanation of, 13, 61-2, 199, 207-17, 221-4, 238, 268-70; 'the gymnastics of the soul', 15; appreciation of value, 15-17, 212; and the 'super-ego', 52-3; in analysis, 52-3, 59-66, 161, 238-9; importance of, 160; psychology and, 176; 'conversion' and, 200-1, 243, 245; not negative, 220-1; and the child, 221-5.
- Repression, 37, 45-53, 55, 58, 194, 201-2, 209, 269, 283, 285; nationalistic, 128, 280; and self-control, 161-3.
- Resistance, powers of, 40, 53, 165.
- Responsibility and guilt, 174-6; and freedom, 177.
- Reversed effort, law of, 72-4, 96.
- Riemann, 180.
- Russell, A. J., 228 *n*.
- Sadism, 51-2, 68, 99, 214.
- Salpêtrière Hospital, 6.
- Scepticism, 79.
- Schizophrenia, 41.
- Schneider, Rudi, 108.
- Schopenhauer, v, 132, 175, 215.
- Sclerosis, disseminated, 22.
- Scott, H. D., 107 *and n*.
- Self-analysis, 56-7, 168-9, 233.
- Self-assertion, 50, 126-8, 136, 139, 147-8, 164, 214, 226, 242, 281-4.
- Self-control, 49, 67, 69-70, 76-7, 161-3, 172-3, 222, 285.
- Self-knowledge, 76-8, 168, 172-3, 222, 283.
- Self-training, 33.
- Septic absorption, 40.
- Sex, control of, 67-88; and adolescence, 67-9, 89-101;




- knowledge, imparting of, 90-1.
- Sexual nature of emotional factor, 42-3, 211; tendencies in children, 67-8, 76, 211; curiosity, 68, 89-90.
- Sharing, 229-33.
- Sin, sense of, 14, 17, 36, 53-5, 154, 165-7; and disease, 163-70.
- Sleep, suggestion and, 10-11, 64, 106; relaxation and, 30, 103; hypnotic, 30; relation to hypnosis, 102-7.
- Smith, Adam, 218.
- Smoking habit cured by suggestion, 31-2, 225.
- Smuts, General, 280.
- Society for Psychical Research, 181-2.
- Somnambulism, artificial, 7, 103-4; spontaneous, 7-8, 104.
- Soul, the, self-created, 81-2; future of, 83, 264; Plato on, 249-50; freedom of, 254; and brain, 260; unity of, 262.
- 'Specious present', the, 219.
- Spencer, Rev. F. A. M., 228 *n*.
- Spilsbury, Sir Bernard, 100.
- Spinoza, 207, 251, 256, 258.
- Spiritual, the, 79-80, 84, 87, 128, 198, 216; freedom, 81; universe, 85-7, 198, 205, 225, 239, 272.
- Stammering, suggestion and, 31.
- Stout, Prof. G. F., 274.
- Structure and function, 23.
- Subconscious mind, the, and suggestion, 3-5, 12, 26; and the success idea, 74-5; and sex control, 88.
- Sublimation, 49-50, 59, 78, 94-5, 127-8, 209, 281, 283-4.
- Suggestion, and illness, 3-5; conscious and subconscious, 3-5, 12, 26; and hypnotism, 5-10, 26; without hypnosis, 10-12; development of, 24; contrasted with analysis, 25, 26, 231; relaxation and, 29-32, 64-5; of faith, constructive, 34, 63-6, 86-7, 127; treatment, 62-6, 84-5, 231, 242; and increased efficiency, 86.
- Super-ego, 18, 46-8, 53, 55, 126, 163-4, 188, 203-4, 211.
- Superstition, 2, 213-14, 216.
- Survival, personal, 81-2, 246-72.
- Sympathy, 214-15, 223, 284.
- Tabu, 188.
- Telepathy, 244.
- Tendencies in the unconscious, 44-8, 135-7; repressed, 48-52, 58.
- Tennyson, 248.
- Thinking, 16, 251.
- Thomas, Rev. Drayton, 108.
- Time, 83, 180-3, 197, 218-20, 253, 262.
- Transference in analysis, 55-60, 206, 231-2.
- Truth, 14, 61, 147, 154-5.
- Unconscious mind, the, and suggestion, 12, 26, 63; Freud on 'morality' of, 18; and illness, 28, 166-7; mental and physiological, 29; tendencies in, 44-8; 'sys-

- tematic', 45; held back by 'super-ego', 46-7, 203-4; and sex control, 88; mobilization of, 142-4; and leadership, 145-6; and guilt, 165; important because living, 190; and 'guidance', 236; mental conflict in, 243.
- Uvani, 111, 117-20.
- Values, of existence, 2, 171, 197-8, 218-20, 223-4, 264; in religion, 147; of truth, 14-15, 197; appreciation of, 19-20.
- Volition, 70-2, 278.
- War, 226, 267; the Great, 10, 171, 281; neurosis, 106; and psychology, 127-8, 129-31, 138-50, 192-3, 280-6, causes of, 131-3.
- Ward, James, 197.
- Watts, Mrs. Hugh, 276.
- Wilde, Henry, F.R.S., 273-7.
- Will, the completed, 32; the power of, 32-7; trained by suggestion treatment, 63-4; control, 70-2; and wish, 70-3, 208-9, 245, 268; and imagination, 72-4; freedom of, 81; without reservations, 87-8; the good, 178-9, 254.
- Witchcraft, 85.
- Wundt, Wilhelm, 275.
- Yusof, 111, 115-17, 119-21, 123-4.



PRINTED IN  
GREAT BRITAIN  
AT THE  
UNIVERSITY PRESS  
OXFORD  
BY  
JOHN JOHNSON  
PRINTER  
TO THE  
UNIVERSITY









131. 324

R

B817M

This book was taken from the Library on  
the date last stamped. A fine of one  
anna will be charged for each day the  
book is kept overtime.

M.A. SECTION

15.12.12

16471/3665



ISLAMIA  
COLLEGE  
LIBRARY,  
LAHORE.

*Extract from the Rules:—*

Books are issued for  
fourteen days only.

A fine of one anna  
per day will be charged  
for each volume kept  
over time.

Borrowers will be held  
responsible for any  
damage done to  
books while in  
their possession.

