


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

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
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
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Research



PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM.

CHAPTER I.

THE FACULTY OF MEMORY.

1. *Reproduction, Memory, Recollection.**

WE possess our past in the form of images lying in our memory as copies of reality. Thereby is our empirical self-consciousness connected; the so-called pure self-consciousness, the feeling of personality, arises because we refer the succession of our experiences to an identical Subject which knows itself as permanent in all change of the feelings. Were the successive feelings divided and atomically isolated by loss of memory, personal consciousness could no more arise than if all these feelings were distributed among as many individuals. There would only be a constantly alternating consciousness; with every new feeling a new Ego would awake. An identical self-


* [Reproduktion, Gedächtniss, Erinnerung. 'Recollection' seems to me the proper English word to include the element of *recognition*, whereby the author distinguishes 'Erinnerung' from memory in general ('Gedächtniss'), which may be the mere 'reproduction' of a past impression, without the knowledge that it has been previously experienced. But 'Erinnerungs-vermögen,'—the faculty of memory in general—I sometimes translate 'memory' simply.—Tr.]

consciousness first comes into existence when the changing feelings are strung together on the thread of remembrance, and without remembrance it is not thinkable. Because, moreover, rational thinking and acting are dependent on the clearness with which we preserve past experiences ; and on the circumspection with which we conclude from them to the future, the faculty of memory must be recognised as the root of all higher intellectual powers. We accordingly see that with biological organic elevation there is growth of memory, while, on the other hand, the perturbed feeling of personality in madness is connected with disturbances of memory. This fact, pointed out by Schopenhauer,* had been already expressed by Augustine: '*Memoria enim mens est, unde et immemores amentes dicuntur*;'† and yet earlier, in the biography of Buddha, it is said that at his birth all diseased persons became sound, and all the insane received back their memory.‡

In the chapter on the scientific importance of dream, we arrived *deductively* at the proposition that should metaphysical individualism be true—that is, if our Ego extends beyond self-consciousness—with the emerging of that part of our being which lies behind self-consciousness, certain modifications of the faculty of memory must be connected. Thence, conversely, it follows that from the analysis of memory, and particularly of its occasional modifications, we shall arrive at the *inductive* proof that the self-consciousness does not exhaust its object, that is, that metaphysical individualism is true.

* 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' ii. 32.

† Augustinus: 'De spir. et an.,' c. 34. ‡ Salitavistara.



Now, if our Ego is more than our self-consciousness reveals, that is the same thing as to say that for this self-consciousness we can only unconsciously be this more. As the plant grows in the light, but its roots are sunk in the dark bosom of the earth, so would our Ego be sunk with a metaphysical root in an order of things lying beyond our knowledge.

For this kernel of our being the familiar word 'soul' might fitly be retained, but then it must be otherwise defined than hitherto. For the spiritualism heretofore prevailing divides man dualistically into body and soul ; in life the soul holds the body together, and provides the fabric of thought. Its most important function thus lies within the consciousness, or rather it is the consciousness. In death the soul is divided from the body, is spatially transferred to a world beyond, and called to other functions, variously depicted by religious systems.

But a monistic doctrine of soul must have quite another purport. There is no true antithesis of body and soul, force and substance—modern science, it may be added, has already, especially in the atomic theory, made important advances in this direction—there is, moreover, certainly a world beyond, that is, beyond our consciousness ; in other words, our sense-consciousness has its limits just in its senses ; we ourselves belong already now to that world beyond, so far as our Ego exceeds self-consciousness, thus as—but only relatively—unconscious being. We are not temporally and spatially divided from that beyond, are not first transposed there by death, but are already rooted therein, and what divides us therefrom is merely the subjective barrier

of the threshold of sensibility. This threshold thus limits consciousness and therewith self-consciousness. Since both are products of evolution, their capacity for further evolution suggests itself at once. With this the problem, from how much transcendental—not transcendent*—reality the threshold of sensibility excludes us, is as yet wholly unsolved, and can generally only so far be solved as the threshold of sensibility is removable.

Let us now see what results from a monistic doctrine of soul can be obtained from the analysis of memory.

Removal into the transcendental world can only be thought in a monistic sense as the displacement of the threshold of our consciousness and self-consciousness, whereby what was formerly unconscious rapport with nature becomes a conscious one. But if, when this happened, our normal rapport with nature was changed or suppressed, our normal consciousness and self-consciousness being diminished or even ceasing, that would in effect certainly resemble a spatial transfer into quite another world. Were our five senses to be suddenly taken away, and senses of an entirely different kind given to us, though standing on the same spot we should believe ourselves inhabitants of another star.

Now the life of man contains empirical conditions in which, by displacement of the threshold of sensibility, his normal consciousness disappears, and in the same degree his Unconscious comes to the front.

* [The distinction is between what is merely beyond the sphere of normal experience, but is to be conceived in connection with it, and what would belong altogether to a 'supernatural' order of things.—Tr.]

Every intellectual organisation has memory; this is a given fact. But to trace the changes of this endowment, we have to distinguish between memory, reproduction, and recollection. The faculty which the psychical organism has of reviving as a mental representation an impression of sense formerly experienced, is called Memory, which has imagination (*die Phantasie*) in its service. Memory is the *common* source of reproduction and recollection. If a representation revives in me without my recognition of it, that can only be termed reproduction; we only speak of recollection when there is at the same time recognition. In the latter case a further element is added to reproduction. Aristotle indicated in this fact the central point of the problem.* Reappearance of a representation in the imagination, and recognition of it, are obviously different things; the first may be thought as a mere physiological reflex-movement, the latter is a reflective judgment. There is often an intermediate state between reproduction and recollection, when, with the re-emergence of a representation, is connected an undefined feeling that we have had it before, without our being able to assign to it a determinate position in the past.

Our memory embraces by no means all the representations and feelings of past life. By far the greater number are forgotten, and relatively but few remain to us. How is that? Why do some representations adhere to consciousness while others sink down? Why, of those which are forgotten, can some be re-awakened and others not? Is the cause of this

* Aristotle: 'On Memory and Recollection,' c. 1. Cf. Johannes Huber: 'Das Gedächtniss,' 18, München, Ackermann, 1878. St. Augustine: Conf., x. c. 7.

in the consciousness, or in the representations—that is, in the things? Is the subjective factor of perception decisive, or the objective? One would expect our consciousness to be like a mirror, indifferent to the quality of the representations, or like the surface of water, on which all the scenes and occurrences on the bank are depicted with equal fidelity. But it is not so. Already in the perception of things we bring to them different degrees of susceptibility, and this subjective factor determines also our remembering or forgetting. This difference of susceptibility does not, however, lie in consciousness as such, which is indifferent to the quality of representations, but in our will. It depends on the relation of the representations to our interest, which is, as it were, the string on which part of our impressions are threaded, and forms the content of our empirical self-consciousness. That consciousness is connected with recollection lies in this: that we are not only knowing but also willing* beings, and since the will maintains its identity through the whole course of life, it belongs to the single personal self-consciousness. Were we merely knowing beings, then should we certainly resemble mere mirrors, and there would be no recollection. Schopenhauer says: ‘If we consider the thing deeply, we shall arrive at the result that memory in general needs the support of a will, as of a point of attachment, or rather of a thread on which the memories are strung and which holds them

* ‘Willing’ and ‘will’ are here, of course, not to be understood in the sense of mere *volition*, but refer, in contradistinction to pure intelligence, to that in the individual which is the source of all his emotional interest, of all the value (‘*Gefühlsworth*’) which his experiences or ideas have for him.

together ; or that the will is, as it were, the ground to which individual memories cleave, and without which they could not endure, and that therefore for a merely knowing, quite will-less being, memory cannot be conceived.* So far Schopenhauer is decidedly right in his conclusion ; the will determines the content of memory. It is like a sieve which drops by far the larger number of impressions. But the fact of reproduction and recollection is opposed to the opinion that this forgetting of impressions is equivalent to their loss. What can re-emerge, what can be remembered, must as much cleave to a support of some kind, as the unforgotten impressions to the will. And if such a foundation is not to be found within our self-consciousness, that again obliges us to say that our self-consciousness does not know our whole Ego, for the theory of the material brain-trace of every past impression is quite inadequate, and in the sequel will be sufficiently controverted.

Schopenhauer says that the will, as kernel of our being, is blind.† This opinion cuts away the foundation to be sought for the forgotten impressions—those, that is, which have disappeared from the outer con-

* 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' ii. c. 19.

† ['The will, which, considered purely in itself, is without knowledge, and is merely a blind incessant impulse, as we see it appear in unorganised and vegetable nature and their laws, and also in the vegetative part of our own life, receives through the addition of the world as idea, which is developed in subjection to it, the knowledge of its own willing and of what it is that it wills. And this is nothing else than the world as idea, life, precisely as it exists. Therefore we call the phenomenal world the mirror of the will, its objectivity. . . . Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world. Life, the visible world, the phenomenon, is only the mirror of the will.' Schopenhauer : 'The World as Will and Idea,' vol. i., p. 354 ; Haldane and Kemp's translation.—Tr.]

sciousness. But it can easily be shown that even if in self-consciousness we *find* only a blind will, it by no means thence follows that the will also *is* blind.

The mere conception of self-cognition presupposes in the knowing substance a duality of attributes, one of which is directed upon the other. Self-cognition implies a substance going apart into subject and object. This substance is subject in so far as it knows, object in so far as it is known. There is thus required, for the possibility of self-cognition, one attribute for the act of cognition, and a second for the content of cognition; and the latter is just the will. If these two attributes are severed in self-cognition, then the knowing attribute cannot find itself again in the act, but only the second attribute, the will, as the eye cannot see itself. Should this not suffice as answer to the supporters of a blind will, the following may be added: According to Schopenhauer, only the will in us is metaphysical, the primary; intellect is secondary. The brain, included in the phenomenal world, is itself only a phenomenon. But if the whole organisation, according to Schopenhauer objectified will, gives us information concerning the directions of this will, that must be true of every special organ, and the brain can only be the objectified cognition-impulse of our metaphysical substance. If, however, all cognition is wholly foreign to the will, it is not at all comprehensible how it should come by the cognition-impulse; though a substance having the two attributes, knowing and willing, might well acquire a cognition-impulse in a new direction. It would therefore follow from Schopenhauer's premises that the brain, since it corresponds to earthly things

as the eye to light, is the objectified will to know earthly things. The means by which this correspondence is established have since Schopenhauer's death been sufficiently discovered—struggle for existence, selection, sexual selection, increased adaptation in the biological process. Metaphysically regarded, intellect is therefore developed *for* earthly things:* scientifically regarded, it has been developed and adapted *by* earthly things. These two points of view are not inconsistent, but supplement each other, as end and means, teleology and mechanism.† Now, an intellect developed by earthly things themselves for adaptation to them must be limited to these objects—that is, can only be developed for cognition externally directed; but a secondary intellect never can know its metaphysical supporter, whose aspect as feeling only can be open to it, because desire and suffering are excited by earthly things.

* [The physical environment.—Tr.]

† [So Schopenhauer: 'The etiology and the philosophy of nature never do violence to each other, but go hand in hand, regarding the same object from different points of view.'—'The World as Will and Idea,' Haldane and Kemp's translation, vol. i., p. 183. What Schopenhauer's attitude would have been, or rather was, to the Darwinian Evolution doctrine must be apparent to everyone who understands his philosophy. For instance: the Will which objectifies itself in nature being one and the same, Schopenhauer does not admit a one-sided adaptation of organism to environment, but simply insists on its mutuality. Thus he says: 'We must not merely admit that every species accommodated itself to its environment, but also that this environment itself, which preceded it in time, had just as much regard for the being that would some time come into it . . . and the Ideas whose *manifestations* entered into the course of time earlier, according to the law of causality, to which, as phenomena, they are subject, have no advantage over those whose manifestations entered later; nay rather, these last are the completest objectifications of the will, to which the earlier manifestations must adapt themselves just as much as they must adapt themselves to the earlier.'—Op. cit., vol. i., pp. 208, 209.—Tr.]

A brain developed by the things of nature can, therefore, not be adapted to an object which lies outside the things of nature, any more than sexual selection can breed an insect proboscis corresponding to the calyx of a March blossom. A secondary intellect, applied to self-knowledge, can therefore perceive its metaphysical will-side through pleasure and pain, indeed, but a second attribute of its being, if such exists, must remain closed to it. It is hence again possible that in self-cognition we do not exhaust our whole Ego.

The application to memory is manifest. Granted that our metaphysical Ego has two attributes, cognition and will, it would well be possible that the will has to decide what impressions we should retain in the secondary intellect and what forget, that thus the content of our empirical self-consciousness would be determined by it, while yet in the other attribute is to be found the required foundation for all those impressions which can emerge, be reproduced, or recollected. In this case this second attribute would be the repository for all impressions without distinction. Forgetting would be limited to the earthly brain-consciousness, but would not apply to our transcendental consciousness, which in union with the will makes up our whole being.

As has been above shown, there are conditions of sleep in which our transcendental Ego can come forward; we must therefore attentively observe whether on these occasions ideas present themselves which do not adhere to the will—that is, which are forgotten, but which by their reappearance betray the existence of a second foundation that can be only

our transcendental consciousness. Such recollections must apparently arise from an exaltation of memory by the condition of sleep, not, however, as really reproductions, but revealed by the displacement in sleep of the partition-wall between the empirical and the transcendental subject. But especially will it appear that in these modifications of memory such ideas are introduced as were indifferent for the will ; or if the number of these should be very considerable, that would suggest the conclusion that there is no such thing as a real forgetting, but ideas having no interest for the will are only not retained by the secondary intellect, that is, disappear from external consciousness.

2. *The Exaltation of Memory in Dream.*

The content of our daily consciousness disappears for the most part when we fall asleep ; there is thus certainly no general exaltation of memory in dream. What shall here be shown is simply that in dream the conditions occur for reproduction of individual impressions which were once in consciousness, but were forgotten, this fact proving that memory is independent of the degree of interest which these impressions had for the will. Agreeably to the above distinction between reproduction and recollection, we have to consider whether only the reproductive power is exalted in sleep, or also recollection ; that is, the faculty of recognising reproduced impressions as earlier ones.

The content of our dreams goes over into the waking consciousness only by fragments ; it is therefore difficult to determine the degree to which memory

is exalted in dream ; it will, moreover, appear that many impressions are reproduced in sleep without being recognised. In this case mere reproductions are taken for productions, for original images—a further difficulty in determining how far the power of reproduction is exalted. All we can be sure of is that but for these two difficulties a still greater exaltation of memory could be proved.

It is at any rate easy to show that sleep frequently reverses the former process of forgetting. Forgetting is either partial, the possibility of reproduction remaining, though without recollection ; or complete, when the impression cannot be revived at all. And so the exaltation of memory reverses this process either partially or completely, memory rising either to reproduction alone, or to recollection. This will be made clear by examples.

Maury relates that he once wrote an article on political economy for a periodical, but the sheets were mislaid and therefore not sent off. He had already forgotten everything that he had written, when he was requested to send the promised article. On re-undertaking the work he thought that he had found a completely new point of view for the subject ; but when, some months later, the mislaid sheets were found, it appeared, not only that there was nothing new in his second essay, but that he had repeated his first ideas in almost exactly the same words.* Thus there was here only a half forgetting, the condition of reproduction remaining ; and the case is not to be confused with the frequent forgetting in a quantita-

* Maury : 'Le Sommeil et les Rêves,' 440.

tive respect, when the deduction is from the object, not from memory itself.*

The exaltation of memory in dream, since it reverses the process of forgetting, often stops half-way—there is reproduction without recollection. So Hervey once dreamed very vividly that he met a young man who seemed known to him; he went up to him, and shook him by the hand, and then both looked at each other attentively. ‘I don’t know you at all,’ said the other, and turned away; and Hervey had to own to himself with embarrassment that neither in fact did he know the other.† This dream is very instructive; there is the reproduction of an impression, but the dreamer cannot identify it, and only in the first moment is there an obscure recollection. Reproduction happens within the dream-consciousness; but that has not yet enlightened the whole depth of memory, there being an unconscious reserve still lower down; this is the psychological reason that the want of recollection is put into the mouth of another, *i.e.*, is dramatised; for when in dream any proceeding of it is dramatised, the fracture at which the Ego dramatically splits itself coincides with the partition-line between consciousness and the unconscious.

Leibnitz relates another such dream: ‘I believe,’ he says, ‘that dreams often renew old thoughts. When Julius Scaliger had celebrated in verse all the famous men of Verona, there appeared to him in

* [That is to say, when both elements of memory (reproduction and recognition) are present in as much of the matter as is remembered, but that is only partially recalled. This is, of course, by far the most usual case.—Tr.]

† Hervey: ‘*Les Rêves*,’ etc., 317.

dream one who gave the name of Brugnolus, a Bavarian by birth, who had settled at Verona, complaining that he had been forgotten. Julius Scaliger did not recollect to have heard him spoken of, but upon this dream made elegiac verses in his honour. Afterwards his son Joseph Scaliger, being on a journey through Italy, learned that formerly there had been at Verona a celebrated grammarian or critic of that name, who had contributed to the restoration of learning in Italy. This story is to be found in the poems of Scaliger, with the elegy, and in the letters of his son.* Now Leibnitz is doubtless right in thinking that Scaliger had formerly known of Brugnolus, and in dream only partially recollected the fact; but the proof that this explanation is correct must be afforded from the dream itself, and in fact lies therein. There is here, to begin with, reproduction, but no recollection; therefore the dreaming Scaliger did not recognise Brugnolus. Then, however, there enters the hitherto latent recollection; but as first it emerges from the unconscious, the dreaming Ego sunders itself, and the recollection is dramatically transferred to the mouth of Brugnolus. Had Scaliger slept more deeply, a further exaltation of memory would have taken place, the process of forgetting would not have been reversed by successive stages, but rather he would have immediately recollected the reproduced Brugnolus, the latter would not have complained of being forgotten, and would perhaps have remained quite silent.

We possess, therefore, in waking a latent memory,

* Leibnitz: 'Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand,' i., Kap. 3, § 23.

with the image in his memory, it was quite unknown to him. He fell asleep again immediately, the lady still before him, and again known to him, but at the same time he was conscious that on waking a few seconds before he had not recollected her. Surprised at this forgetfulness again recurring in the dream, he went up to the lady and asked her if he had not already the pleasure of her acquaintance. She assented, reminding him of the watering-place, Pornic. Struck by this word, he became quite awake, and now recollected accurately the circumstances of the acquaintance.

a In this dream reproduction was evidently associated with a recollection, not, however, extending to the place of the first acquaintance. On first waking, the momentarily exalted memory again receded, but only partially—*i.e.*, the reproduction remained, the recollection [recognition] being dropped. In the continuation of the dream, memory was still further exalted, the watering-place occurring to the dreamer; but as this emerged from the unconscious, the dream took on the dramatic form, and the dreamer's sudden suggestion, presented from the unconscious, is placed in the mouth of the lady. The vivacity of the suggestion, however, enabled the whole recollection to remain on the second waking. In a later section it will also appear that the second waking was merely the effect of this suggestion, that is, of the incursion of a memory which by association drew with it a whole succession of ideas, and thus also the waking condition which had been connected with them.

To this class belongs also the case of a friend of

Hervey, a distinguished musician, who in dream heard a remarkable piece of music performed by a band of singers. On waking he remembered the melody, and, delighted with his inspiration, wrote it down. But after many years, a sheet of old pieces of music falling into his hands, to his astonishment he found in it that which he had dreamed.* He could in no way recollect that he had ever heard or even read the piece before. And yet the dramatic form in which it was brought before him, proves that a reproduction had taken place in the dream.

All the easier is it to understand that impressions which had great interest for us, and were yet forgotten, are reproduced in dream. Reichenbach says : 'Waking, I cannot, with whatever effort, distinctly recall the features of my wife, who died some twenty years ago. But if I think of her in dream, and her image is represented, I get the same with such accuracy that I have again before me every expression of her fine features in all their loveliness.'† Pfaff had begun an oil-painting of his father, but the latter dying and other existing portraits not being of sufficient assistance, he had to leave it unfinished. Many years after he saw his father in dream, the features being so faithfully represented that on waking Pfaff at once sprang up, and was able to paint over and finish the dusty portrait.‡ Fichte mentions a musical amateur, a good composer, who happening once to omit noting down a melody which occurred to him, forgot it. He afterwards recollected it in dream,

* Hervey : 'Les Rêves,' 304-306.

† Reichenbach : 'Der sensitive Mensch.,' ii. 694.

‡ Pfaff : 'Das Traumleben,' 24, Potsdam, 1873.

with full harmony and instrumental accompaniment, and was able to retain it on waking.*

That sleep as such, in the physiological sense, cannot exalt memory, will become more evident as we proceed; it is not the cause, but only the occasional cause, of this phenomenon. There are other occasional causes of this kind, and the characteristic they have in common with sleep directs us to the actual cause of the exaltation of memory.

Memory is often much exalted in the delirium of fever, irrespectively of the psychical value of the impressions, or in the complete absence of such value. Coleridge mentions a maid-servant who in the delirium of fever recited long passages in Hebrew which she did not understand, and could not repeat when in health, but which formerly when in the service of a priest she had heard him deliver aloud. She also quoted passages from theological works in Latin and Greek, which she only half understood when the priest, as was his custom, read aloud his favourite authors on going to and from church.† A Rostock peasant in a fever suddenly recited the Greek words commencing the Gospel of John, which he had accidentally heard sixty years before; and Benecke mentions a peasant woman who in fever uttered Syriac, Chaldaean, and Hebrew words which when a little girl she had accidentally heard in the house of a scholar.‡

* J. H. Fichte: 'Psychologie,' i. 543.

† Maudsley: 'Physiology and Pathology of the Soul,' p. 14. Kerner: 'Magikon,' v., 364. [The above case is also cited by Dr. W. B. Carpenter, F.R.S., in support of his 'Unconscious Cerebration' theory. See his 'Mental Physiology,' p. 437, ed. 1881.—Tr.]

‡ Radestock: 'Schlaf und Traum,' 136. [The difficulty of explaining the above cases by reproduction is that the *original*

Now, as sleep beclouds the brain, and in the delirium of fever the brain is morbidly excited, these two opposite conditions could not well cause the same phenomenon, but can only be the occasional cause of exaltation of memory. It is common to both conditions that normal consciousness disappears in them; and as from this fact only forgetfulness, not exaltation of memory, can result, we must conclude that in this disappearance of normal consciousness lies the occasional cause of the emergence of the transcendental consciousness. In the Middle Ages such phenomena were frequently ascribed to the devil, as Jordanus, in his book on 'Divine Operations in Diseases,' citing many examples, affirms.*

One of the most remarkable instances—too long for quotation here—of extraordinary memory in an imbecile, is adduced by Schubert.† Even the condensation of ideas, their succession with the transcendental scale of time, has been observed among the deranged. All these instances prove that even if madness is connected with disturbance of memory, as Schopenhauer and St. Augustine say, yet the faculty of reproduction may experience an extraordinary exaltation.

impressions had not the strength—that is the distinctness—of the reproduction. An unknown language overheard is a mere sound; for the ear, unaided by any understanding, is incompetent to trace the articulation into the right distinction of words, etc. Even supposing, as is probable, that the recitations of the priest and of the scholar were slow and deliberate, they would have to be often repeated, and attentively listened to, even with some effort of intelligence, to be accurately imitated at the time of hearing. There is no doubt, however, that the involuntary reproductive power of dream is more accurate than the consciously imitative power in waking.—Tr.]

* Hauber: 'Bibliotheca magica,' iii. 641.

† Schubert: 'Geschichte der Seele,' ii. 66-68.

Such occasional causes, characterised in common by alteration of external consciousness, are very numerous; thus we find this exaltation of memory also in madness, hypnotism, in hysteric ecstasy, and in the incubation period of many brain diseases. Ribot mentions an insane person who could name everyone that had died in his parish during the past thirty-five years, with particulars of their age, and of the mourners who followed the coffin. Apart from this capacity, he was completely imbecile. Insane persons with whom no other impression abides are often very sensitive to music, and can retain melodies which they have only once heard.* A deranged person, who was cured by Dr. Willis, said that in his attacks his memory attained extraordinary power, so that long passages from Latin authors occurred to him.†

By the facilitation of reproduction in dream and its independence of waking interest, many cases are explained which might easily lead to superstitious notions were this principle of explanation not kept in view. A girl of seven, employed as neat-herd, occupied a room divided only by a thin partition from that of a violin-player, who often gave himself up to his favourite pursuit during half the night. Some months later, the girl got another place, in which she had already been for two years, when frequently in the night tones exactly like those of the violin were heard coming from her room, but which were produced by the sleeping girl herself. This often went on for hours; sometimes with interrup-

* Ribot: 'Les Maladies de la Mémoire,' 103, Paris, 1883.

† Reil: 'Rhapsodien,' 304.

tions, after which she would continue the song where she had left off. With irregular intervals this lasted for two years; then she reproduced also the tones of a piano which was played in the family, and afterwards she began to speak, and held forth with remarkable acuteness on political and religious subjects, often in a very accomplished and sarcastic way; she also conjugated Latin, or spoke like a tutor to a pupil. In all which cases this entirely ignorant girl merely reproduced what had been said by members of the family or visitors.

From the same author I take another case in which the constitution of memory is also very clearly seen to be independent of the intellectual life. A young uneducated lady, who had learned only to read and imperfectly to write, became insane, and in this condition perfected herself in writing even to dexterity. Rational intervals of several weeks' duration often occurred, but in these she could scarcely read and write, the faculty for both being quite restored to her with the return of insanity.*

The danger of a superstitious interpretation is still greater when such phenomena are associated with dramatic self-sundering, as in the above-mentioned dream of Scaliger, on which doubtless many spiritists lay hands.† Since in this dream there is, indeed,

* Brierre de Boismont: 'Des Hallucinations,' 342, 344.

† [It is perhaps to be regretted that the author does not define more precisely what he means by 'superstition.' The belief in 'spirits,' *i.e.*, in conscious personal intelligences without physical embodiment in our sense, seems to be a necessary adjunct to the acceptance of a transcendental individual subject of consciousness; for whatever the 'material' supporter (Träger) of this may be, it must be much more subtle than the physically apparent organism, and cannot hold to this the relation of a derivative. It

reproduction, but not recollection, it might easily seem that the dreamer perceived something that was not from himself, as he perceived it without consciousness that it was from himself. As, further, there was dramatic severance, and the latent impression was placed in the mouth of the dream-figure of the deceased Brugnotus, many might see in this a sufficient proof that we can have intercourse in dream with the dead. Exaltation of memory and dramatic severance are, however, everyday phenomena of dream-life; we are, therefore, of course obliged to prefer the simpler hypothesis with the help of these two principles of explanation.*

It may nevertheless be expedient to dwell a little longer upon these dreams.

When I put a question in dream which is answered by a dream-figure, or conversely, question and answer evidently proceed from the same mind, my own, that is to say, there is reproduction without recollection.

would therefore survive the dissolution of the physical body, and in that case there seems no evident reason why it should not communicate with organic principles similar to its own, though these may be still connected with an external body. I am not at all suggesting that such an explanation of any of the cases mentioned in the text is to be preferred, but am simply venturing a protest against the rather indiscriminate adoption of one of the loose phrases of modern 'enlightenment,' by an author who has been so careful himself to point out the unintelligent fallacy of such expressions, whenever they stand in the way of his own hypothesis.—Tr.]

* [It is, however, one thing to prefer a simpler hypothesis, even when that requires an assumption to be introduced into the evidence, and quite another thing to describe an alternative hypothesis as 'superstitious,' for no other reason than that it refuses to make an assumption of fact,—viz., that what is dreamed is a reproduction of past knowledge, and not wholly new—an assumption in some cases opposed to the most positive statements of the witnesses, or even also to all apparent probabilities.—Tr.]

But in dream we distribute in two mental store-houses what lies in one, and this division is then dramatically completed by the apparent objectivity of a second figure. Latent memory often shows itself very distinctly in the course of such dreams. To Maury there once suddenly occurred, when he was awake, the word *Mussidan* ; he knew it to be the name of a French town, but its situation had escaped him. He soon after dreamed of meeting someone who said he came from *Mussidan*, and on Maury's asking him where the place was, replied that it was the chief town of *Dordogne*. On waking, Maury doubted this information, but on consulting a geographical dictionary found to his surprise that his interlocutor in sleep was right.*

In other cases it is less clearly manifest that the apparent unconscious is only a latent impression, and such dreams then obtain a false significance. Büchner calls the following a supernatural dream : The widow of a preacher was sued for a debt of her deceased husband ; she knew that it had been paid, but could not find a receipt. Much disturbed, she lay down and dreamed that her husband came to her and said that the receipt was in a red velvet bag in a hidden drawer of the writing-desk. She verified the dream on waking.† Now certain as it indeed is that we cannot solve all dreams rationalistically, we must be careful not to draw the boundary line at the wrong place. Exaltation of memory and dramatic severance sufficiently explain as well the above dream as the following, for the explanation of which we require only the admissible assumption that exaltation of memory

* Maury, 142.

† Hennings : 'Ueber Träume und Nachtwandler,' 365.

can go still further. A landed proprietor in England was in expectation of a judgment against him for an alleged debt which he was firmly convinced had been paid by his father, who had been dead some years. No voucher, however, could be found. In dream his father appeared to him, and said that the papers were in the hands of a former solicitor, not generally employed by him, but who had been concerned with this particular business. But should this person have forgotten an affair already rather old, he was to be reminded of a Portuguese gold coin, in the valuation whereof a difference arose, which was settled by the two drinking it out in a tavern. This dream was so exactly verified, that the man of business in fact only recollected the circumstance on mention of the gold coin. The proprietor obtained possession of his papers, and won the suit which had been already half lost.*

It must here be remarked, by the way, that even when latent memory will not account for the content of a dream, the future, not the past, being disclosed, we are nevertheless not to infer that the dream was supernaturally inspired. The hypothesis of clairvoyance of the psyche itself would be more permissible, because simpler and possessing the same range of explanation; and even a dramatised clairvoyance would not far exceed the limits of the admissible explanation.

3. *The Wealth of Latent Memory in Dream.*

The question, how far exaltation of memory in dream extends, has to be examined with regard as

* Brierre de Boismont, 259.

well to the quality—that is, to the clearness—of the impressions, as to their quantity.

An impression reproduced from latent memory alone cannot be more distinct than the original ; but it is otherwise if the creative imagination adopts the object. This was the case in the above-mentioned dream in which a picture out of a journal of fashions became incorporated into a three-dimensioned living and acting being. Now since memory undoubtedly plays a great part in dream, but the dream-figures excel the usually very nebulous images of waking recollection by a freshness and palpability so great as completely to induce the illusion of reality, it must be inferred that memory and imagination combine in all these dreams wherein the dramatic course of the dream-action is not offered as a representation of the past, but is the independent invention of the dream-poet. When, on the other hand, the indefinite impression of the original perception remains indefinite in the dream, we may conclude that the activity of memory is unmixed. Hervey worked in a room from which he could see across the court and garden into the windows of a neighbouring house, at which a flower-maker often sat. She interested him, although from the distance her features were always undefined. She frequently came up in his dreams, but whether he saw her in them at a window, or seemed to meet her, or speak with her, her features remained always indefinite, as was not the case with the other dream-figures. The features also of a man who had once begged of him in the dusk of evening, appeared in dream undefined.*

* Hervey, 23.

Distinct perceptions, on the other hand, seem not to become less distinct on reproduction in dream. It appears, therefore, that in regard to their quality, reproduced impressions are equal to reality. This seems to be the case also with auditory impressions, even when, as with the before-mentioned neat-herd girl, the tones heard were neither attended to nor understood. The basket-maker, Mohk, observed by Varnhagen, once heard a fast-day sermon which deeply moved him. In the following night he got up and walked in his sleep, repeating with verbal fidelity the discourse he had heard. On waking he knew nothing of what had happened. These accesses recurred for many years often daily, either by day or by night, in company or alone, especially after drinking brandy. His sayings often contained reminiscences from the sermon which he had heard more than forty years before.* A servant known to Splittgerber had similar fits, sinking on the bed and repeating in fluent high German, which at other times he did not speak, the sermon he had heard, the church hymns, and indeed the whole Sunday service, almost literally.†

The somnambule Selma recited in the crisis a long comic poem a year after she had heard it delivered; afterwards Freiligrath's 'Mohrenfürst' which had been read to her the year before; and lastly she delivered a long youthful poem of her brother's, which he himself no longer knew and had lost for thirteen years.‡

These examples introduce the further question,

* Moritz: 'Magazin zur Erfahrungs-seelenkunde,' iii. 1, 42.

† Splittgerber: 'Schlaff und Tod,' i. 223.

‡ Wiener: 'Selma, die jüdische Seherin,' 55, 60, 120.

how far into the past dream memory can reach without the clearness of the impression being impaired? It seems, however, that time has no influence at all upon impressions lying in the transcendental consciousness; indeed, recollections from childhood are those which dream prefers. A friend of Maury's had been brought up at Montbrison. Five-and-twenty years later he proposed a visit to the scene of his childhood. The night before the journey he was transported in dream to Montbrison, and he was there met by a gentleman who introduced himself as H. T., and as a friend of his father's. As a child he had seen this person, but recollected no more about him than the name. Now, when he actually got to Montbrison, he was much astonished to meet there the gentleman he had seen in the dream, whose features however were somewhat *altered*. This latter circumstance shows that this dream-figure was merely a recollection from youth.*

Plato and Aristotle have remarked † that in old age the recollections of childhood are renewed. This suggests the question whether these early impressions only are preserved, being exempted from the general forgetfulness of senility, and therefore coming more frequently to speech, or whether memory has actually an exalted power of reproduction for them. At first sight the former opinion might be favoured, since impressions of youth, for the very reason of their remoteness in the past, would have been most frequently reproduced, and must thus have become firmly engraved upon the memory. But upon closer

* Radestock: 'Schlaf und Traum,' 135.

† Plato: 'Timæus,' 26 B. Aristotele: Probl. xxx. 5.

examination we must decide for the second view. What is so often seen in science, that a fact remains unexplained and unfruitful only so long as it stands in isolation, is the case here. The power of an old man's memory for the impressions of his youth can only first be rightly understood when it is associated with other related facts, and the true explanation can only be that which embraces the whole class of such facts. It will thus appear that these recollections are not merely characters remaining on the tablets of memory after all the rest have been washed off, but are due to an actual exaltation of memory, as they are frequently preceded by a long period of forgetfulness.

It is reported of Kant by his friend Wasiansky, that in his old age, notwithstanding his decadence and general infirmity of memory, recollections of his youth were renewed with great vivacity.* Of Heinsius it is related that of all his philological learning he retained only the fourth book of the 'Æneid,' which he had committed to memory in his youth.†

An old man at Gottingen, aged seventy-six, knew his wife and children all day long if they were pointed out to him in the morning, but next morning always had again to ask who they were. Along with this weakness and brevity of memory for the present, he could with remarkable ease sing the songs of his youth and narrate its incidents, while he had totally forgotten all his later experience.‡

Comparing these phenomena, which every reader

* Wasiansky : 'Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren,' 46.

† Radestock, 298.

‡ Perty : 'Blicke in d. Verborgene Leben,' 25.

will have observed in his own circle, with related facts in dream, somnambulism, fevers, and madness, it is easy to recognise in them a true exaltation of memory. A cashier of the Bank of Glasgow was busy with customers in his office, when another entered, and was so impatient that to get rid of him he was paid his money in haste. On making up the accounts, many months later, they did not balance by six pounds. In vain the cashier passed several nights endeavouring to find the error, when in a dream the above transaction, with all its details, was presented to him, and on waking he easily discovered that the sum paid to that customer had not been entered.*

If we consider how seldom it is that long dreams are remembered, and, moreover, that reproduction often occurs without recollection, we may infer that reminiscences from childhood are less rare in dream than they appear to be.

A lady during an attack of fever saw herself as a little child lying in a clay-pit, and a nurse standing by wringing her hands. She took this as a mere vision of imagination, till she learned from her father that she had in fact, by the fault of her nurse, fallen into a clay-pit.†

In many cases it cannot be doubted that long periods of forgetfulness have preceded the reproduction, so that momentary exaltation of memory must be conceded. It often happens in dream that we speak half-forgotten languages more fluently than in waking, and that there is here no illusion may be known from those cases in which this phenomenon

* Brierre de Boismont, 258.

† Kerner : 'Blätter aus Prevorst,' viii. 109.

occurs in a very exalted degree. Jessen mentions a peasant who having in his youth learned Greek, in the delirium of a fever, to the astonishment of the bystanders, recited long-forgotten Greek verses.* Lemoine knew an insane person who in one of his attacks wrote Latin letters with remarkable facility, though at other times he could do nothing with that language.†

Sir Astley Cooper gives an account of a soldier who in consequence of a wound in the head fell into a long stupefaction, being at length so far restored by an operation in the hospital that he could speak ; but no one knew what language he was speaking, till the admission of a Welsh milkmaid into the hospital led to the disclosure that he, who had been absent from Wales for thirty years, was now again speaking his long-forgotten native language quite fluently, whereas he could now not recollect a word of any other. When completely recovered, his Welsh was again forgotten, and he again spoke English.‡

Exactly the same thing is recorded of a Welsh girl.§ Dr. Rush mentions an Italian who at the beginning of his illness spoke English, then French ; but on the day of his death only his mother tongue.||

Dr. Carpenter speaks of a man who had left Wales in his childhood, his whole subsequent life being spent in the service of different members of the same family, and had so entirely forgotten his native language that he could no longer understand his

* Jessen : 'Psychologie,' 491.

† Lemoine, 313.

‡ George Moore ; 'The Power of the Mind over the Body.'

§ Passavant : 'Untersuchungen über Lebensmagnetismus,' 153.

|| Kerner : 'Magikon,' v. 364.

compatriots when they visited him. But after sixty years, in the delirium of a fever he spoke Welsh, of which, however, on his recovery he had again lost all recollection.*

A patient of Deleuze, forty years old, who when a child had come to France from St. Domingo, in somnambulism always spoke only the dialect of the negroes by whom she had been brought up.†

Anastasius Grün, in his biography of Lenæus, prefixed to his edition of the works of the latter, reports that that poet, when in the madhouse, sometimes spoke pure Latin, and, what he never did at other times, German with a Hungarian accent, as if he had been transported to the country of his childhood.

Similar observations have often been made with regard to idiots. According to Griesinger, psychical diseases are frequent, but not always connected with disturbances of memory, which is often complete, as well for events of earlier life, as for those during the illness.‡ Maudsley says: 'The remarkable memories of certain idiots, who, utterly destitute of intelligence, will repeat the longest stories with the greatest accuracy, testify also to this unconscious cerebral action; and the way in which the excitement of a great sorrow, or some other cause, as the last flicker of departing life, will sometimes call forth in idiots manifestations of mind of which they always seemed incapable, renders it certain that much is unconsciously taken up by them which cannot be uttered, but which leaves its relics in the mind.'

* Carpenter: 'Mental Physiology,' 6th edition, p. 437.

† Deleuze: 'Instruction pratique,' 152.

‡ Griesinger: 'Pathologie und Therapie der psych. Krankheiten,' 69.

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It is a truth which cannot be too distinctly borne in mind, that consciousness is not co-extensive with mind. . . . Consciousness is not able to give any account of the manner in which these various residua are perpetuated, and how they exist latent in the mind ; but a fever, a poison in the blood, or a dream, may at any moment recall ideas, feelings, and activities which seemed for ever vanished. The lunatic sometimes reverts, in his ravings, to scenes and events of which, when in his sound senses, he has no memory ; the fever-stricken patient may give out passages in a language which he understands not, but which he has accidentally heard ; a dream of being at school again brings back with painful vividness the school feelings ; and before him who is drowning every event of his life seems to flash in one moment of strange and vivid consciousness.*

Many readers may find this last fact difficult to believe, but it has been observed so frequently that there is no room for doubt. It will be referred to again later on.

Thus exaltation of memory occurs not only in dream, but also in several other conditions. Sleep is therefore not the actual cause of this phenomenon, but only an occasion. The true cause must be common to all those conditions, and is no other than the disappearance of the normal habitual consciousness and its content. Even the mere stopping up of the chief inlet of sense-impressions, blindness, as it usually exalts other psychical capacities, can also awaken the latent memory. A captain who had lost his sight

* Maudsley : 'Physiology and Pathology of the Mind,' pp. 15, 16, 17.

in consequence of wounds received in Africa declared that from this time wholly extinct recollections of certain places returned with the utmost distinctness.*

Without, at present, drawing conclusions concerning the nature of the processes denoted, but not explained, by the words 'forgetting' and 'remembering,' thus much is clear from the foregoing, that our self-consciousness does not exhaust its object. It is only a part of our psychical being of which we receive information, externally by sense-rapport with the external world, internally by our recollections. Every disappearance of normal consciousness in dream, fever, madness, narcosis, and blindness is at the same time connected with an extended consciousness of our psychical being in another direction. If this extension is an equivalent—as according to the analogy of the equivalence of physical forces in nature may be surmised—then is the figure which has been often resorted to, of two weights of a scale, to be understood in the exact sense. Now in somnambulism, disappearance of normal consciousness occurs in a higher degree than in the conditions already considered; it may hence be supposed that our transcendental consciousness will there be especially conspicuous, and will exhibit forgotten impressions in special abundance; for somnambulism is exalted sleep, and must therefore exalt the functions of ordinary sleep.

4. *Exalted Memory in Somnambulism.*

It is only in individual flashes that exaltation of memory reveals itself in ordinary dream, while in

* Maury: a. a. O. 152.

somnambulism all the content of waking consciousness appears accessible to recollection, or, at least, to be capable of reproduction. And that this re-emergence of old impressions has been preceded by a real and radical forgetting, is the less to be doubted that, as we shall see, on awaking they are forthwith again forgotten.

There often appears to be a certain opposition between the two halves of our consciousness, as, for instance, with the somnambule of Dr. Class, who in the crisis recollected just such songs as she had not learned by heart, whereas others which in waking were thus perfectly known to her, did *not* present themselves.* But it is far more usual for the somnambulic consciousness not only to embrace, but even to exalt the waking consciousness. Thus the physician Pezzi relates that his nephew once in waking wished to recite a passage from a discourse relating to the fine arts, but could not recall it. In his next somnambulic state he not only recovered the whole passage, but even gave volume, page, and line where it occurred.†

As in ordinary sleep, so in this state, impressions are frequently reproduced which, from their slight interest for the mind, have been quickly forgotten, or of which only the main purport has been preserved. Ricard knew a young man, a somnambulist of average memory, who in the crises experienced such an exaltation of it that he could recite almost verbally a book that he had read the day before, or a sermon

* 'Archiv f. thier. Magn.,' iv. 1, 76.

† Passavant, 148.

which he had heard.* Naudin received from a somnambule detailed particulars concerning the names, compositions, and quantities of the numerous medicines administered to her by different physicians in the course of her illness, though in waking she knew nothing about them. A somnambule of the physician Wienholt had a bad memory in waking, but boasted of its improvement in somnambulism, and recited several passages from a prose book that interested her, which the physician was certain she had read but once.† Medical-Councillor Schindler had under his treatment a somnambule who dictated to him the whole history of her disease, particular incidents of which he no longer recollected himself.‡ Councillor Becker's somnambule recollected in the magnetic sleep all the particular circumstances of her first meeting with him when he had treated her casually many years before. She knew more details of it than he did himself, but after waking had again forgotten everything.§ Puységur treated a patient who in his fourth year had had to have an operation performed in consequence of an injury to his head, who had accesses of insanity, and had lost his memory to such a degree that he did not know what he had done an hour before. In somnambulism he recollected everything exactly, described the former operation, and the instruments used in it, and predicted that he should never get his memory again in waking, as the result proved.||

* Ricard : 'Physiol. et Hygiène du Magnétisme,' 183, Paris, 1844.

† Wienholt : 'Heilkraft des thier. Magnetismus,' iii. 1, 252-293.

‡ Schindler : 'Magisches Geistesleben,' 90.

§ Becker's : 'Das geistige Doppelleben,' 51.

|| Puységur : 'Journal du traitement magnétique du jeune Hébert.'

But as in ordinary sleep, so in somnambulism, such reproduced impressions are not recognised; recollection fails. This is a source of illusion, for somnambules may take mere images of memory for new intuitions, bygone scenes in their life for clairvoyant visions, and may refer them to the future, no time being indicated in such intuitively represented images, and their knowledge not being in the abstract. The physiologist Mayo reports of a girl, who knew absolutely nothing of astronomy and mathematics, that she once in somnambulism wrote down whole pages of an astronomical treatise, with calculations and delineations. She was convinced that this was the product of intuition, but afterwards she found that the whole manuscript verbally coincided with a treatise in the 'Encyclopædia Britannica,' and she herself said in another crisis—for waking she knew nothing—she believed she had read it in the library.* The most faithful reproduction is therefore possible without recollection.

Another incident of dream, the reaching back into a remote past, belongs also to somnambulism. A somnambule is mentioned by Mauchart, who could

* Mayo: 'Truths in Popular Superstitions.' [One is tempted to ask here if the girl's 'belief' in the second crisis was not, perhaps, elicited by that sort of interrogation which the author has before (vol. i., pp. 304-5) described as so dangerous a source of disturbance to the pure activity of the inner consciousness. That the girl should have read through, even with only sufficient attention to obtain a correct optical impression, a long abstruse dissertation on a subject of which she was profoundly ignorant, and which therefore would have no interest for her, seems extremely unlikely; whereas facts of a similar character, known to those who have concerned themselves with the phenomena of trance-speaking and automatic writing, aggravate by their number the difficulty of the supposition required in each case to bring it under the above explanation.—Tr.]

not read or write ; in the magnetic sleep she once repeated a whole lesson, heard the year before, from a course of instruction preparatory to confirmation, with all the questions and answers, the clergyman's voice and the responses of the children being most distinctly imitated.* Dr. Nick's somnambule recollected in the crisis the most insignificant incidents of her illness, of which waking she knew little or nothing.† Wienholt's patient related scenes from her earliest youth, of which she knew nothing when awake, as the smaller details of her inoculation for small-pox in her second year.‡ Reichenbach says of sensitives, that they are almost without exception remarkable for weakness of memory, but he also observed the all the more remarkable exaltation of their memory in somnambulism.§

A somnambule extolled the improvement of her memory, which was particularly exalted by breathing upon her head.|| A young sleep-walker could sing correctly melodies which she had only once heard.¶ A somnambule who had only once seen the opera 'L'Africaine,' in the crisis sang the whole second act, of which she knew nothing waking.** The like has also been observed with persons under anæsthetics. Professor Simpson's patient said that during the operation she had amused herself by playing on the piano, and had performed quadrilles which she had

* Mauchart : 'Repertorium,' v. 79.

† 'Archiv,' etc., i. 2, 23.

‡ Wienholt : 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 2, 98, 208.

§ Reichenbach : 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 691, 721.

|| Wienholt : 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 293.

¶ Unzer : 'Der Arzt,' 74 Stück.

** Ladame : 'La Névrose,' etc., 105.

known in her youth, but had forgotten. Now she recollected them completely, and played them often.* When the physician Petetin placed his finger on the pit of the stomach of his somnambule, and dictated to her fifty French verses which she could not know, she repeated them without a fault; in the waking state her memory was so bad that it would have taken her two days to learn them.†

Lafontaine, a once celebrated predecessor of the magnetiser Hansen, on one occasion made a humorous application of this faculty of somnambules. In the theatre at Rennes a young actress had asked him to put her to sleep. Then, being called to rehearsal, she desired to be quickly awakened, that she might repeat the part she had only once read through. The magnetiser, however, persuaded her to go upon the stage in the somnambule condition; and, to the surprise of the other actors, she said her part without a mistake. Being wakened immediately afterwards, she had forgotten it again, and would not believe that she had just repeated it.‡

Lastly, there has also been observed in somnambulism the recollection of a forgotten native language, of which many instances (in delirium) have been already given. A somnambule of Lausannes, who had lived in France from her fifth year, spoke in her crisis the language of her childhood—the Creole patois.§ A man who when a child had lived in Poland, but afterwards had not spoken a word of

* Mrs. Crowe's 'Nightside of Nature.'

† Petetin: 'Electricité animale,' 256.

‡ Lafontaine: 'L'Art de magnétiser,' 324.

§ 'Archiv,' etc., ii. 2, 152.

Polish for from thirty to forty years, returned to this language on being put under æther ; speaking, singing, and praying for nearly two hours in Polish.*

It thus appears that the somnambulic consciousness, besides its own exclusive content, has also at its command that belonging to the waking state, and that indeed more faithfully and fully than the waking consciousness itself. On this point, also, the Committee of the Medical Academy of Paris reported in 1831.†

Memory, at every waking, links yesterday with to-day, so as to form an uninterrupted life, the dreams of the intermediate night being forgotten. So the somnambulic consciousness connects itself with earlier magnetic crises, with a survey of their content, yet without dropping the content of the waking consciousness. This will be discussed later on, but must be mentioned here as offering the only explanation of the remarkable fact that somnambulists in the crisis also remember what took place around them in previous swoons. So that in swoon also the disappearance of sense-consciousness is associated with the emergence of transcendental consciousness, which in a subsequent magnetic crisis can annex the impressions of that earlier state. To decline this explanation would be to go out of the frying-pan into the fire ; for then we must ascribe to a clairvoyant vision of the past what is here regarded as memory. A patient of Wienholt knew in somnambulism everything that had been done and said by others about her, or had passed within herself, during swoons in

* Ladame : 'La Névrose hypnotique,' 102.

† Dupotet : 'Traité complet de Magnétisme,' 156.

which, externally, she was quite unconscious ; and everything that had happened in her delirium, with all that was then said by herself or others. She was afterwards very sensitive about much which she had said in this state, and which neither in the magnetic sleep nor in waking would she have uttered.* Nasse has observed the like with one of his patients.† But even this phenomenon is not confined to somnambulism. Dr. Abercrombie relates the case of a boy of four years old, who was stunned by a fracture of the skull, and was trepanned. On recovery, he had no recollection either of his fall or of the operation ; but at the age of fifteen in an attack of fever he gave his mother an exact description of the operation, of the persons present at it, their dress, and many other particulars.‡

Jean Paul has expressed his admiration of this remarkable phenomenon : ‘ The magnetic clairvoyants manifest recollection, not only reaching back into the obscurest time of childhood, but even for what seems *not so much to have been forgotten as never to have been known*, that is, what has happened to them earlier in deep swoons or complete insanity.’§ It is not, however, seriously to be supposed that things never perceived can be recollected, as reproduction presupposes former perception. But if the view hitherto maintained throughout is correct, that the true cause of exaltation of memory is not in the different conditions in which it occurs (dream, fever, madness, somnambulism), but in their common sign,

* Wienholt : ‘ Heilkraft,’ etc., iii. 3, 433.

† Reil : ‘ Beiträge,’ etc., iii. 3, 329.

‡ Kerner : ‘ Magikon,’ v. 3, 364.

§ Jean Paul : ‘ Museum,’ etc., § 14.

the disappearance of external consciousness, it appears that with every sinking of this weight, the rise of the other, namely, the transcendental consciousness, is connected. Now, since this must also happen in swoon, it follows that on a later reappearance of the transcendental consciousness, it must recollect the impressions it had on the earlier occasion. That persons in swoon betray no signs of interior consciousness is a fact they have in common with dreamers, and their non-recollection of any transcendental consciousness on recovery is also constantly the case in somnambulism, and very naturally, just because this transcendental consciousness sinks when the external rises again. And as in somnambulism we can learn the ideas of earlier similar states, the same result may be anticipated in cases of swoon.

We have thus a constant confirmation of the fact that our external consciousness has another spiritual background, that the individual intellect has not for its supporter the blind Universal Will of Schopenhauer, that, therefore, with the disappearance of this intellect the conscious personality is by no means abolished, but the transcendental consciousness possessing as a focus its own Ego, and for which the word 'forget' has no application, is released.

5. *Memory in the Dying.*

Goethe relates a case known to him, in which an old man lying *in extremis* quite unexpectedly recited the most beautiful Greek sentences. In early youth he had been made to learn by heart all sorts of Greek sentences which could incite a promising boy to

emulation. He did not understand what had been lodged mechanically in his memory, and had not thought of it for fifty years at the time of his death.* So Dr. Steinbeck relates that a country clergyman, called to the bed of a dying peasant, heard him praying in Greek and Hebrew. Come to himself, the sick man said that as a boy he had often heard the parish priest pray in those languages, without troubling himself about the import of the sounds.†

This stretching back of memory to the time of youth is one of numerous analogies between the condition of somnambulism and that of the dying. But they are to be found also in other conditions, of which the common characteristic is privation of consciousness in a greater or less degree. Passavant knew a lady who suffered from violent headache; when the pain was at its highest, it suddenly ceased, and then she found herself in a pleasant condition with which, according to her statement, was associated an extraordinary memory, reaching back to her earliest years.‡ In the vision of a haschish-eater were represented friends whom he had not seen for years; with distinct particularity he saw a dinner he had been at five years before, and all the guests, and was unable to reconcile his definite recollection of the scene, as one already experienced, with its repetition in apparent reality.§ In the visions of an opium-eater scenes of his childhood appeared which he had so entirely forgotten that in his sound senses he

* Eckermann: 'Gespräche mit Goethe,' iii. 326.

† Steinbeck: 'Der Dichter ein Seher,' 463.

‡ Daumer: 'Der Tod,' etc., 34.

§ Moreau de Tours: 'Du Haschich et de l'Aliénation mentale,' 14-20.

would not have recognised them as belonging to his own past. But in the visions they were not only reproductions, but recollections.*

Now in the case of the dying, with the approaching total disappearance of external consciousness, the transcendental consciousness seems to emerge in equivalent amount, the transcendental-psychological functions often attaining a high degree of development. These phenomena are best vindicated against the doubts of so-called enlightenment by showing them to be the combination of constituents separately present in other conditions, and which only excite surprise in their union.

Thus we have, in an earlier chapter, made acquaintance with the remarkable phenomenon of the condensation of ideas. Fechner says: 'In dream the soul sometimes exhibits the faculty of eliciting in the briefest time a vast multitude of representations which in waking we could only develop successively in a long time.'† Thereby is proved a form of human cognition directing us to an Ego beyond the external consciousness. But if to this new form a new content also should be added, the acceptance of a transcendental subject would be yet more unavoidable. Such a content is offered by exalted memory in dream, somnambulism, and in the dying. Now the question is, whether this form and this content can be combined; that is, if the process by which the phantasms of dreams can be condensed is valid also for the true recollections which exalted memory introduces.

* De Quincey: 'Confessions of an Opium-Eater,' p. 259, ed. 1856.

† Fechner: 'Zend-Avesta,' iii. 30.

Now this combined phenomenon occurs with the dying very frequently, and exceptionally even in ordinary dreams. Uexhüll had for three consecutive nights a sort of vision in a succession of images. He saw his whole life from earliest childhood to the present so clearly and vividly that he could have drawn the scenes as they passed before him. He had at the same time in himself a consciousness continually corrective of any tendency to mis-construction of what he saw ; and with that was connected even a moral significance of the spectacle.* A dream of Seckendorf, in which latent memory functioned dramatically, is well known and often mentioned. There appeared to him in dream a man of ordinary figure and dress, who told him that he might ask one of two things, to have either his past or his future fate displayed in its successive order. Seckendorf chose the past, whereupon a mirror was held before him in which he saw even those incidents of his earlier life of which in waking he was scarcely aware, as distinctly and vividly as if they had just happened. He saw himself, for instance, as a child of three years old, with the utmost particularity, and with all the circumstances of his bringing up. Every school scene with his tutors, every vexatious incident, passed in that mirror vividly before his eyes. Soon after it represented, in the sequence of his life, his earlier residence in Italy, where he once left behind him a lady whom he would certainly have married had not fate called him suddenly away.† The vivacity with which his feelings in the dream were excited by

* Splittgerber : 'Schlaf und Tod,' i. 103.

† Moritz : 'Magazin,' etc., v. 1, 55.

departure from his beloved awoke him. The continuation of the dream as it was afterwards connectedly renewed does not here concern us. We find the characteristics, as in related phenomena, that the latent memory does not arise as abstract knowledge [as the mere knowledge *that* a thing occurred], but reproduces the earlier impressions; and that these are associated with the sentiments formerly attaching to them, which, however, is perhaps only the case when such reproductions are also recollections; finally, that the sequence of representations is connected with the transcendental measure of time, that is, are condensed without their particularity being impaired.

This exaltation of memory, associated with a transcendental measure of time, has also been experienced by persons in danger of drowning. A friend of De Quincey, having fallen into a river when a child, saw, in the interval before she was pulled out, the whole course of her life, down to the smallest circumstances, pass before her as in a mirror.* But the most explicit account of this nature is from Admiral Beaufort, who wrote it to Dr. Wollaston; an account the more valuable as Beaufort, being from his profession well acquainted with such phenomena in similar cases, was not much surprised at his own experience, adding that accounts of other sailors agreed with his own as exactly as could be expected from differences of condition and mental constitution.†

Exaltation of memory with condensation of ideas

* De Quincey: 'Confessions,' etc., p. 259.

† Fichte: 'Anthropologie,' 424; Haddock: 'Somnolism,' etc., 254.

thus affords to the dying the possibility of a complete and clear survey of their past life. But that these representations would stand to us in a quite objective relation is not probable; rather would the interest originally attaching to them accompany them more or less in the recollection, the difference between our present and former dispositions determining the measure of criticism with which we follow them up. In this way may well be interpreted that debtor account which, as the Bible says, is held before us at death: it is the content of latent memory, combined by the transcendental scale of time, which is revealed in dying.

Such a case was in the last century reported to the Prussian Government by the clergyman Kern, of Hornhausen: Johann Schwerdtfegur, after a wearisome illness, was near death, and fell into a swoon of many hours. Then he opened his eyes and said to his clergyman that he had had a survey of his whole life and all its faults, even those which he had long forgotten; everything being as present to him as if it had just occurred.*

This combined phenomenon, occurring with dying persons, of exalted memory and compression of its representations, may be still further complicated by the addition of the well-known incident of dream, dramatic self-severance. The particular form of the severance will naturally be derived from the individual's circle of ideas. Thus with John the Prophet of Fröschweiler, who fell into a violent illness with loss of consciousness, when he was supposed to be dead: in this condition he had a vision in which he

* Passavant: 'Untersuchungen über Lebensmagnetismus,' 165.

was carried by two angels first through a cloud and then through the starry heavens, and at length saw the Temple of God with the Ark of the Covenant. From this God took the Book of Omniscience and read out to him all his past sins.* One of the 'enlightened' of our days would be indignant at having belief in such a story imputed to him, but this indignation would result simply from his incapacity to do an addition sum. Were this combined phenomenon resolved into its elements and the latter shown to the enlightened one, he would recognise them; but add he cannot, nor recognise the factors in the sum-total. This sort of scepticism is very prevalent, and in such cases it is always well to offer the factors individually to the brain which cannot digest the total.

With the close relation of the conditions of somnambulists and of the dying, it should also be mentioned that the declarations of the former concerning the process of dying are in agreement with the accounts we have been considering. Thus Magdalene Wenger says that the whole life, even if lasting eighty years, appears to the dying quite briefly compressed, and everything is recollected with the utmost clearness.† Such a vision was that of the religious somnambule, the nun, Catherine Emmerich; in dying she saw her whole past life depicted, as though it had been that of another nun.‡

So Passavant cites a somnambule observed by him, who had a retrospect of her whole life, and related

* Splittgerber: 'Schlaf und Tod,' ii. 45.

† Perty: 'Myst. Erscheinungen,' i. 325.

‡ Perty, ii. 433.

incidents, which were verified, from her earliest youth; her moral condition, also, being revealed even to her most hidden thoughts, as she said happened to everyone in dying.* This corresponds to the phenomenon observed in other conditions, that the transcendental consciousness is not purely passive like a mere mirror, but with the impressions revive also the sentiments, and thus the recollected acts of life are accompanied by the movements of conscience which were associated with them.

This faculty which the dying have of phantasmagoric representation, wherein the events of years are crowded into a few seconds, and the several phases of life are surveyed in relation to its intellectual and moral development, has from the most remote times been known, and its psychical significance appreciated. Plotinus says: 'But in time, towards the end of life, there enter other recollections from the early periods of existence . . . then will she [the soul], being freed from the body, again acquire that of which she had here no memory.'† So John Baptista van Helmont:

* 'Passavant: Untersuchungen,' etc., 99.

† Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 3, 27. [In the latter sentence Plotinus seems rather to be referring to the Platonic reminiscence—the recovery by the soul of its transcendental knowledge—than to memory of the forgotten experience of the outer consciousness. But the complete recollection of the past existence after death is also a doctrine of Indian philosophy, where it is associated with prevision of the next incarnation. 'This same Self has two stations: any given present embodiment and the embodiment that is next to follow. And there is a third place—the state intermediate between the two—the place of dreams. Standing in the place of dreams, it sees both these stations, this embodiment and the embodiment next to come. In the place of dreams it steps on to the path it has made itself to the next embodiment, and sees the pains and pleasures that have been in earlier lives, and are to be in after lives,' etc.—'Brihad Upanishad' (Gough's 'Philosophy of the Upanishads,' p. 179).—Tr.]

‘Therefore the mind being separated from the body, doth no more use memory, nor the inducing of remembrance, by the beholding of place or duration (*non intuitu loci aut durationis*), but one only thing is now unto it, and there it containeth all things.’*

Thus does the inference become constantly more irresistible that the word ‘forget’ has only a relative sense; that everything that has ever been experienced can be again reproduced, since forgetting simply signifies the transition from the outer consciousness to the transcendental, which according to the degree of its emergence brings with it more or less of its content.

6. *The Forgetfulness of Somnambules on Waking.*

Everyone knows that it is easier to recollect narratives which are within the limits of probability, than when, as in Eastern tales of magic, the imagination of the reader is taxed with extravagances and impossibilities. In the first case, the ideas introduced stand in regular causal connection; in the latter, the law of causality is continually violated, and this circumstance makes recollection difficult; and so we have an æsthetic enjoyment of such fables which offer us a pleasant release from the monotony of the law of causality.†

* [Or: ‘It comprehends all things in a single Now.’ Van Helmont: ‘*Ortus Medicinæ; Imago mentis*,’ s. 23. I give the rendering in the text—not having the Latin work before me—from the old English translation by ‘J. C., sometime of M. H. Oxon,’ London, 1662.—Tr.]

† [The characteristic of magical tales—such as the ‘Arabian Nights’—is not the abrogation of the law of causality, but the introduction of imaginary causes. There is no *à priori* impossibility in tales of magic; on the contrary, it is the possibility of conceiv-

Now, in dream also there is a want of this causal connection of the individual representations; they succeed each other without inner coherence and without mutual support.

It is, however, not only the content of dreams that makes their recollection difficult, but this recollection depends on the faculties of the dreamers, not only because the strength of memory varies with the individual, but still more because there are different kinds of memory. That of a Cuvier, of whom it is said that he forgot nothing he had read, because he gave to everything its place in the system, is quite different from that of an expert in memory, who can repeat backwards and forwards a long succession of words or of unconnected figures. It seems, at all events, generally the case that the recollection of what was dreamt is less vivid than that of actual experience, for otherwise we must unavoidably confuse at least the coherent dream with reality. In fact that often happens, and I myself once went into barracks in parade uniform, having dreamed that I had been ordered to take the watch, and recollected the order, but not that I had dreamed it.

The usually very defective recollection of dreams is facilitated not only by their exceptional coherence,

ing them, even of giving ourselves up for the moment to the illusion, in which consists their power of amusing the imagination. To make common experience the test of possibility—that is, of the law of causality—is to commit the very error, so often denounced by the author, of the pseudo-scientific man who rejects without examination every alleged fact which he is unable to explain according to his empirical categories of causation. There is really no such resemblance as the author suggests between the *coherent* extravagances of a tale of magic, and the confused dream in which *no* principle of connection is apparent.—Tr.]

but also by other circumstances. Dreams in the course of which we have taken active part, as players on the stage, cling to memory better than those in which we were only spectators of images not concerning us. Recollection has also a proportion to the sentiment attaching to the images; interesting dreams, or such as appeal strongly to the affections, will be more easily reproduced on awaking than others. On this account the impression of dreams that have thus moved us, even if we have forgotten them, survives as a disposition. Our psychical condition on waking is by no means one of indifferent vacancy, to be first qualified by the daily consciousness, but is frequently a mood of seemingly unmotivated happiness or sadness of which no other explanation can be given than that it results from forgotten dreams. Thus Nebuchadnezzar awaked in terror from a dream which he had totally forgotten, but the feeling survived.*

The deeper the sleep, the more difficult the subsequent recollection. Now, those dreams in which the motions of the nerves extend to the motor system—evidenced by movements of the lips or limbs—may be regarded as approximations to the deep sleep of sleep-walkers and somnambulists; and in this case, since somnambulists wake without recollection, the dreams of ordinary deep sleep must also be forgotten. That is confirmed by Moreau, according to whom those dreams are the least remembered in which the dreamer speaks or moves.† Maury says also that he

* Daniel ii.

† Moreau de la Sarthe: 'Dict. des Sciences médicales,' article 'Rêves.'

had often suddenly awakened persons speaking in their sleep, who then never recollected their dreams.* The elder Darwin cites the case of the wife of one of his friends, who spoke often and audibly in sleep, but after such nights never recollected her dreams; whereas she could easily tell them when she had not spoken in them.† From these facts we again see that the absence of memory of sound sleep cannot be explained by the absence of dream.

It often happens that we awake without recollection, but in the course of the day a quite indefinite, impalpable intimation of dream, like a gleam of summer lightning, passes through the consciousness, and forthwith vanishes again. This transitory touch of recollection is no doubt elicited by some external impression, it may be only a word, or by a momentary mood corresponding to a fragment of the dream, or sufficiently related to it to refer us to it by association. But it only glances upon us, and next moment we try in vain to seize the fragment of the dream. This impression is too transitory to afford a proof, but in passing to its correspondence in the phenomena of somnambulism its significance will be apparent. For all the hitherto mentioned phenomena of dream-life we shall find in their exaltation in somnambulism.

That which is defect of memory in the case of dreams rises to complete oblivion after somnambulism. This phenomenon seems to be common to nearly all conditions of ecstasy; it was also observed in the oracular utterances of the Greeks, with the Sybils, in the demoniac conditions of the Middle

* Maury, 218.

† Darwin: 'Zoonomy.'

Agnes, in sleep-walking, and in the delirium of fevers. In the modern literature of somnambulism there is scarcely a book which does not speak of it. Dr. Valenti took from his somnambule her kerchief, hid it in the kitchen, and told her exactly the place. On waking she missed her kerchief, and looked for it in vain ; again, in the sleep she knew exactly the place of concealment, but at the second waking had again lost all recollection.*

Hundreds of such experiments have been made, and often very comical ones. The widow Petersen, whose illness is the subject of a long history, preferred to eat when awake than when in the magnetic sleep, because in the latter case she did not know after waking whether she had taken anything. A somnambule of Kerner's said : ' This morning in the magnetic sleep I drank elder-tea ; on waking I felt no taste of it. Waking, I ate meat, and then fell into a magnetic sleep. I then again had the taste of elder-tea, and not of the meat ; but on coming out of this sleep I had again the taste of the meat.' Kerner himself says of this patient : ' Shortly before the sleep she had drunk barley-coffee ; in the sleep she drank valerian-tea ; on waking, she had in her mouth the taste of the barley-coffee she had drunk when she was awake, but had not the least perception of the valerian-tea she had taken in the sleep.'†

There can even be an opposition of instincts in the two conditions ; as, for instance, in the case of the physician Pezzi's nephew, who in the crisis complained of want of appetite and nausea ; but on waking,

* ' Archiv,' vi. 1, 124.

† Kerner : ' Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 236-254.

immediately wanted to eat, the indisposition returning with the sleep.* Another somnambule had taken wine in the sleep, but on awaking had forgotten it; having, however, the taste still in her mouth, she asked if wine had been given her.†

Similarly, with regard to mental sensations, that also has been observed which we already know as a phenomenon from the ordinary dream, namely, the survival of a mood associated with it, and which is apparently motiveless, the dream itself being forgotten. Professor Beckers, who had under his observation a very remarkable somnambule, once told her what she had said in the sleep the day before, about a vision she had had of a deceased friend. She was much struck by this, saying that since that sleep she had, to her own surprise, felt completely at ease about the deceased, and to her former painful thoughts about her (deceased's) death, the conviction of her survival had succeeded.‡ A somnambule of Schelling's had in the crisis a presentiment of a death in her family, and begged her magnetiser to divert her mind from these thoughts as much as possible by cheerful conversation during the crisis, that she might have no recollection of them on waking.§ Melancholy impressions in somnambulism are especially apt to survive as a corresponding mood in waking, of which the patient can give no account, having forgotten the occasion. It is therefore desirable to give a cheerful direction to the thoughts before awaking him.

* Passavant: 'Untersuchungen,' etc., 148.

† 'Archiv,' iv. 1, 26.

‡ 'Das Geistige Doppelleben,' 26.

§ 'Jahrbucher der Medizin,' ii. 43.

The law governing waking recollection is that of association, by which an idea which has once been connected with another will draw the latter after it into consciousness. Thus Quintilian says: 'Returning after some time into a particular neighbourhood, we not only know it, but recollect also what we have done there, the persons we met, and even the silent thoughts we had there recur to us.'*

By the law of association ideas and recollections of similar psychical conditions are connected into an entire series. Our waking life forms a single whole, as does also the somnambulic life. If dissimilar conditions, as waking and somnambulism, alternate, recollection unites the similar conditions, bridging over the intervening periods of forgetfulness. Thus the thread of recollection runs uninterruptedly through the like conditions; with every return of the same condition its former ideas are reproduced, even though they have been forgotten in the interval. It is the same law that immediately repossesses us of our past life on waking from sleep, and includes in the somnambulic consciousness the ideal content of earlier crises. The more dissimilar the psychical states, the more completely are they divided; the more similar they are, the more prominent are the links of association. Ordinary sleep—the intermediate condition between waking and somnambulism—is not divided from waking by a sharply-defined partition; there is to some extent a play of memory between the two; we dream of our daily life, and partially recollect our dreams. On the other hand, the dissimilar states of

* Quintilian: 'Instit. orat.,' xi. 2.

somnambulism and waking are only exceptionally bridged over by memory.

We find here the explanation of the fact that many even common dreams are repeated or continued in successive nights—a phenomenon which doubtless occurs more frequently than is recollected upon waking. Treviranus mentions a student who regularly began to talk as soon as he fell asleep, the subject being a dream which he constantly took up at the point where it was broken off the previous morning.* Hervey dreamed of a scene of jealousy, concluding with a murder. He was awakened by his emotion, but forgot the dream so quickly that all he could enter in his journal was the fact of this sudden forgetting. Many weeks afterwards he dreamed of a trial in which he was examined as a witness of that murder, and he not only could state all the details of the occurrence, but had an exact recollection of the features of the murderer and of the victim.† Maury dreamed eight times within one month of an individual, a mere creature of his imagination, who always appeared with the same traits and continued the proceedings of earlier dreams.‡

In this noteworthy phenomenon of the connection of similar states by memory, I see an auxiliary to diagnosis, of which scarcely sufficient use has been made. We read, for instance, in the history of the disease of the widow Petersen, who often had attacks of insanity, that she once prescribed very successfully for a man afflicted with pains in the back, but was afterwards quite ignorant of the fact, not only in

* Boismont, 344.

† Hervey, 311.

‡ Boismont, 264.

waking, but even in somnambulism. It seems also, unless the observation was defective, that these prescriptions had been given in an access of insanity, as is also indicated by the terms she used. Now, that the insane can prescribe for themselves has been frequently observed; but the above case would show that they can also, like somnambulists, prescribe for others.

To illustrate memory between similar conditions from quite another province, even æsthetic diagnosis might profit by it. I have often observed that poets are of two sorts; some having a remarkable memory for their productions, which they could recite for hours upon invitation; whereas others can recollect nothing of their own verses. This, for example, was to my knowledge the case with Martin Greif. This is explainable if what has been produced in the condition of true poetic exaltation cannot be reproduced in the very different condition of waking reflection.* I can therefore easily credit Montaigne's account of a poet who was absolutely unconscious that it was his own

* [A friend to whom the MS. of this translation was submitted, objects here the instance of Virgil, who 'wrote five lines a day and knew the whole thing thoroughly.' As a test for 'æsthetic diagnosis'—for determining, otherwise than by æsthetic judgment of the performances themselves, their relative merit, the presence or absence of memory in the author is obviously worthless; for though the idea and its first expressive form may be the product of a different state from that in which the memory of ordinary consciousness resides, this would be usually supplied by the attention necessarily claimed by the product itself, and by the work of polishing, revision, etc. But for the same reason, the memory of many great poets for their own productions affords no argument, on the supposition of the transcendental source of their inspiration, for community of memory between a state of poetic exaltation and that in which the ordinary level of the 'threshold' is restored.—Tr.]

poems which another person was reciting.* It is said also of Linnæus that in the decay of his memory in old age he was delighted by the reading of his own works without recognising them.† Walter Scott composed 'Ivanhoe' in a fever; when he recovered he had only the general idea of the romance which was in his mind before he fell ill.‡ That, on the other hand, memory is extraordinarily facilitated in similar psychical conditions we have a proof in the case of the soldier, who during a carouse lost an article belonging to his superior, and afterwards did not know where even to look for it; but in his next

* Muratori: 'Ueber die Einbildungskraft,' i. 195.

† Ribot: 'Maladies de la Mémoire,' 41.

‡ Ribot, 41. ['Ivanhoe' is a mistake for 'The Bride of Lammermoor.' The following, from Lockhart's 'Life of Sir Walter Scott,' is a particular account of this interesting phenomenon: 'The book' (says James Ballantyne, Scott's printer) 'was not only written but published before Mr. Scott was able to rise from his bed; and he assured me that when it was first put into his hands in a complete shape, he did not recollect one single incident, character, or conversation it contained! He did not desire me to understand, nor did I understand, that his illness had erased from his memory the original incidents of the story, with which he had been acquainted from his boyhood. These remained rooted where they had ever been; or, to speak more explicitly, he remembered the general facts of the existence of the father and mother, of the son and daughter, of the rival lovers, of the compulsory marriage, and the attack made by the bride upon the hapless bridegroom, with the general catastrophe of the whole. All these things he recollected just as he did before he took to his bed; but he literally recollected nothing else—not a single character woven by the romancer, not one of the many scenes and points of humour, nor anything with which he was connected as the writer of the work. "For a long time," he said, "I felt myself very uneasy in the course of my reading, lest I should be startled by meeting something altogether glaring and fantastic. However, I recollected that you had been the printer, and I felt sure that you would not have permitted anything of this sort to pass." "Well," I said, "upon the whole, how did you like it?" "Why," he said, "as a whole I felt it monstrous

bout recollection returned and he found it.* In like manner a porter, having when drunk delivered a parcel at the wrong house, forgot it when sober, but easily remembered it when he got drunk again.†

The somnambulic conditions are connected with one another by a remarkably sharpened memory. Braid, whose fame as the discoverer of hypnotism has recently revived, observed that hypnotised patients remember with great exactitude everything that has happened in earlier crises, often years before, while knowing nothing of it in the waking interval.‡ With every new crisis the course of ideas of earlier ones returns, is continued, and is often taken up at the point where it was broken off by waking. When Professor Lebret's somnambule was wakened while singing, she looked about her in surprise and perplexity; but as soon as she fell asleep again she resumed the song in the same key, and at the same syllable at which she had been interrupted.§ With the Seeress of Prevorst this connection of similar states was strikingly manifested, and was a certain indication of the great difference between waking and the magnetic sleep, thus of

gross and grotesque; but still the worst of it made me laugh, and I trusted the good-natured public would not be less indulgent." I do not think I ever ventured to lead to the discussion of this singular phenomenon again; but you may depend upon it that what I have now said is as distinctly reported as if it had been taken down in shorthand at the moment; I should not otherwise have ventured to allude to the matter at all. I believe you will agree with me in thinking that the history of the human mind contains nothing more wonderful! P. 402.—Tr.]

* Joly: 'De l'Imagination,' 47.

† Perty: 'Blicke,' etc., 35.

‡ [Braid, *Op. cit.* See also Carpenter's 'Mental Physiology,' in which Braid's conclusions and experiments are summarised.—Tr.]

§ 'Archiv,' etc., ii. 2, 115.

the high development of her somnambulism. Her magnetic dreams are distinguished by their sensible and poetic course from the ordinary ones, not offering the motley confusion of images of the latter. Broken off in one night, they resumed in the next at the point of interruption. There once being brought to her a lithographed copy of the mysterious delineation she called the 'circle of life,' she immediately noticed a point too many in one of the marks, and on Kerner fetching the original prepared by herself, the comparison confirmed what she had said.*

This phenomenon, the failure of the somnambulic interval in the supplementary memory, is here for brevity and convenience called loss of memory. But there is, in fact, no real forgetting; the transcendental consciousness, in which lie the somnambulic ideas, retains them after the waking; this consciousness itself with its whole content remaining undisturbed, but being in waking overlaid, as it were, by another, the external consciousness. That the latter in its waking knows nothing of those somnambulic ideas is natural, for it never had them, and can therefore not be said to have forgotten them. At the waking of somnambulists there is thus no actual forgetting, but a relief of one person of our subject by the other, which also has another circle of ideas. If the ideas apparently forgotten in waking re-emerge in every later crisis, that is no new production of them, but a proof that the consciousness to which they pertain has preserved them. And laying the accent on the dualism of the two persons of our subject instead of on the identity

* Kerner: 'Seherin von Prevorst,' 128, 168.

of the subject in the change of persons, even the semblance of a forgetting falls away.

The most instructive cases in illustration of the above are those in which the apparent loss of memory extends to things immediately antecedent to waking. Thus Gmelin asked his somnambule if a gentleman present might waken her instead of himself. She assented; but, being immediately wakened, was surprised and embarrassed by seeing a stranger near her.* The physician Petetin's somnambule, being in the crisis, once undressed her sister, dressed her hair, plaited it, brought her shoes and stockings and silk ball dress from the chest; then, suddenly waking, she asked her sister with astonishment where she was going in such a toilette.† Such cases are instructive, in which a consciousness extending through long periods sinks down with the cessation of somnambulism. A somnambule had prescribed for a patient for a disease during seventeen months; but becoming afterwards acquainted with her patient, and the latter giving a history of her sufferings, she had no suspicion that she herself had been the physician.‡

The psychical condition is not always the same in somnambulism; and especially there is an exaltation of the latter, called the deep sleep (*Hochschlaf*), distinguished from ordinary somnambulism by difference of the visions. Between these dissimilar conditions there is likewise a failure of memory. Wienholt says of his somnambule that the purport of her deep sleep

* Gmelin : 'Materialien für Anthropologie,' ii. 95.

† Petetin : 'Electricité animale,' 283.

‡ Deleuze : 'Instruction,' v. 406.

was as much lost in the subsequent state of somnambulism as that of the latter in the waking state.* According to Dupotet, if ordinary somnambulism succeeds to the deep sleep, memory of the latter is present, indeed, but only for a few minutes, which can be utilised for the most instructive elucidations; it then disappears.†

Seeing that somnambulist states follow each other immediately with a closure of memory, it is easy to understand that somnambules, waking without memory, are thus relegated to their former reckoning of time. Hôhne, for instance, had been continuously in the magnetic sleep from the 1st January to the 10th May, and on waking exhibited a comical surprise that spring had arrived since she had lain down—as she supposed—the day before.‡ Kerner's somnambule, also, reckoned time when she awoke as in the same hour in which she had fallen asleep. She knew nothing of what had happened with her during eleven months, while she remembered well all earlier events; during her magnetic sleep she had been removed to another place, and she could not find her way about the house in which she had nevertheless for weeks been performing household duties, apparently in a waking state; the rooms were quite strange to her.§ A young lady lamented in somnambulism the death of her mother, of which they had told her. She was kept for some months, till her

* Wienholt: 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 2, 208.

† Dupotet: 'Traité complet,' etc., 253.

‡ Perty: 'Mystische Erscheinungen,' i. 305.

§ Kerner: 'Gesch. zweier Somnambulen,' 343.

recovery, in the magnetic state, and on waking she only knew that her mother was ill, and had been sent into the country. As she would not be restrained from a visit to her, they were obliged to tell her of the death, when she again burst into tears.* Chardel mentions a certain count, flying from the Revolution, who wished to take ship from Brittany, but was first obliged to put his wife into somnambulism, as only in this state was her great horror of the sea alleviated. When, after landing in America, she was awakened, she had no remembrance of the journey, and supposed herself to be still in Brittany.† Two sisters, magnetised by Chardel, desired that they might be kept in somnambulism with their eyes open. In this state he found them the next day, though meanwhile the night sleep had intervened. Some months thus passed; spring had come, and Chardel took the sisters, who had been put to sleep in the depth of winter, into the open air to a charmingly-situated place, and awoke them. They seemed to themselves as under a spell, eagerly inhaled the spring air, rolled in the grass for delight, and ran about after flowers. Of the whole period of their somnambulism they knew nothing, and indoors sought the feminine occupations which had employed them at the fireside four months earlier.‡

On waking from even common sleep we do not know its duration; and could we not judge the hours elapsed from our regular habits, or from some recollections of dream, we should resume our last reckoning of

* Billot, i. 110.

† Chardel: 'Essai de Psychologie,' 344.

‡ *Ibid.*: 'Esquisse de la Nature humaine,' 237, 239.

time. The somnambulic sleep does not occur regularly at determined hours, and leaves behind it no recollections; thus those waking from it have no measure of its duration. Kerner says of the Seeress that by a change within the somnambulic state a magnetic period of six years and five months was almost wiped out of memory. But some time after, memory returned, and indeed so completely, that she recollected the most insignificant things of that period. Kerner adds the true observation, that with old people also, such forgetfulness of long periods often occurs.*

A somnambule of Wienholt, knowing in the crisis that on waking she would reckon time as before, gave instructions to those about her to behave so that she should learn nothing of her somnambulic state. Her mother was on the Saturday, the day of her waking, immediately to speak of the household work belonging to that day, to cut short her objection that it was Tuesday, and go on to talk of other things. On waking she was alarmed to hear that it was Saturday, but became composed again, and the prescribed conduct had the desired effect.†

The same thing has been remarked with the insane. Dr. Pritchard observed a lady who was subject to sudden accesses of delirium, and who, on coming to herself again, resumed the conversation at the sentence or word interrupted by the attack.‡ The same physician relates the case of a man who was engaged in splitting wood with a mallet and wedge. In the

* Kerner : 'Seherin v. Prevorst,' 196.

† Wienholt : 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 3, 28, 29.

‡ Perty : 'Blicke,' etc., 25.

evening he hid these tools in a hollow tree, and told his sons to go with him next morning to make a hedge. In the night he became insane. Being suddenly restored many years afterwards, his first question was whether his sons had brought home the mallet and wedge. They replying that they had not been able to find them, he got up, went to the field where he had been working so many years ago, and found in the hiding-place the wedge and the iron ring of the mallet, the wood part having mouldered away.*

In the records of Christian mysticism, also, we find memory similarly estimating the somnambulic interval, as in the case of Maria von Oignys, who lay three days in ecstasy, and to whom after waking this period seemed only a moment.† In the Middle Ages, moreover, somnambulism was frequently regarded as a work of the devil, and oblivion of past things was accounted one of the secondary symptoms of possession.‡ Maria Garcia, who was tormented by evil spirits for seven years, had no recollection of it after her cure.§

Somnambulism being the common point of divergence of very different conditions, for all phenomena which it offers, even for those which are exceptional, we can point to analogous phenomena in other conditions. Such an exceptional case, for instance, is when the forgetfulness on waking includes not only the somnambulic interval, but also a fragment of the

* Kerner: 'Magikon,' v. 3, 364.

† Gorres: 'Christl. Mystik,' ii. 276.

‡ Cf. Springinsgut: 'Disputatio theologica de horrenda et miserabili Satanæ obsessione,' 1656.

§ Gorres: a. a. O. iv. 126.

preceding state. A village schoolmaster, put into somnambulism by Puységur, on waking remembered being asked by his wife to go to Puységur ; but what happened from the moment of his resolution to do so, how he went to him, and by what way he reached the house, he had forgotten.* It cannot well be supposed that the mental tension, the expectation of somnambulism, anticipated that condition, and then became involved in the forgetfulness. Such anticipations do no doubt occur. An Englishman, who had often made the railway journey from London to Dover, assured me that passengers intending to cross the Channel were often seized with sea-sickness in the carriage. But the retrogressive prolongation of forgetfulness must be otherwise occasioned, since it has been observed by physicians as a consequence of swoons and injuries to the brain from accidents, when there can be no question of anticipation. A horse bolted with a man who was driving his wife and children ; he was thrown out, and sustained a concussion of the brain. The last recollection of this drive which remained to him afterwards was the circumstance that he had greeted a friend in the road when still two miles from the place of the accident. Of the bolting of the horse, his own exertions to stop him, and the alarm of his family, he knew nothing.†

7. *Alternating Consciousness.*

When states connected by the bridge of memory are very sharply divided from others which have their

* Puységur : 'Mémoires,' etc., ii. 81, 83.

† Ribot : 'Maladies de la Mémoire,' 63. For similar cases, Farlet : 'Dictionnaire encyclopédique des Sciences médicales' : 'Amnésie.'

own coherent material of consciousness, this distinction becomes exalted into a change, and by repetition into a formal alternation of consciousness. Now, since it is by memory that we know our personal identity through all mental modifications in time, the cases now in question form an interesting contribution to the fact that an identical Subject can fall apart into a duplicity of persons.

It may here at once be remarked that it is this fact which in a later study will be applied to the foundation of a monistic doctrine of the soul. For in the alternation of consciousness we have first the psychological fact that one Subject can appear successively in two different Persons. Next, from this fact of double consciousness, it results that beneath this succession of persons there must be a simultaneity, so that the change of persons is only a change of *manifestation* of the underlying Subject, the apparent succession depending merely upon the failure of memory as between the two thus mutually unconscious persons. The material of memory of the identical Subject is distributed between the two Persons of the alternating consciousness, and that material which for the externally functioning consciousness is latent, is yet simultaneously present, though in relative unconsciousness.

Now, if this psychological principle, indispensable for the explanation of the fact of double consciousness, can be regarded as metaphysically applicable to the solution of the human problem, the foundation-stone of a monistic doctrine of the soul would thus be laid. This is not the place to develop such a doctrine; but the facts following are already to be considered with

reference to the end in view, though we can draw only a provisional inference, that the falling apart of one Subject into two Persons, which is a fact in the empirical sense, is at least possible in the metaphysical sense. It may seem a paradoxical suggestion that the man of manifest consciousness is only one person of a Subject, whose other person belongs at the same time to another order of things—to a metaphysical world ; but the fact of double consciousness within the empirical personality shows at least that there is no *psychological* difficulty in the conception.*

In this sense, therefore, is to be regarded the following observation, pointing simply to a void in scientific speculation: Science and philosophy, that is to say, have put aside the dualistic doctrine of the soul, and have passed over into materialism and pantheism, without sufficiently entertaining the third possibility, a monistic doctrine of the soul.

Haller mentions a man who at alternate but regular intervals lost and recovered his memory ; and he himself knew a young girl who was subject to the like condition at the physiological periods.† Griesinger relates the case of a lady, who in the

* [In accordance with the above view may be quoted the opinion of one of the acutest and most accurate of inquirers into the obscurer facts of psychology, the late Mr. Edmund Gurney : 'I may recall the undoubted phenomena of what has been called 'double consciousness,' where a *double* psychical life is found connected with a *single* organism. In these cases the two selves, one of which knows nothing of the other, appear as *successive* ; but if we can regard such segregated existences as united or unified by bonds of reference and association which, for the partial view of one of them at least, remain permanently out of sight, then I do not see what new or fundamental difficulty is introduced by conceiving them as *simultaneous*.'—'Phantasms of the Living,' vol. i., pp. 69, 70.—Tr.]

† Huber : 'Das Gedächtniss,' 46.

midst of a conversation sometimes suddenly broke off, and began to talk of other things, but after some time again took up the first subject with the word at which it had been suspended, without any consciousness of the interval.* Hermogenes, of Tarsus, was already a teacher of rhetoric in his fifteenth year, and an author in his eighteenth, but in his twenty-fourth he suddenly forgot all his knowledge, so that the sophist Antiochus said of him that he was an old man in his youth, and in his later life became a child.† Van Swieten mentions a boy of eight, who in the hot summer days forgot all that he had learned, recollecting it again in autumn and winter.‡ This was perhaps the same boy of whom Tissot speaks, a premature genius who completely lost his memory in the dog-days, but recovered it after a few days of cool air.§ The inhabitants of the Valais, according to Zimmermann, send their children in summer to the hills, because in the valleys they would lose their memory.|| A case of regular alternation of consciousness by disappearance and return of memory is reported by the elder Darwin. He knew a young lady, who every other day was in a condition of ecstasy, lasting nearly the whole day. In these accesses the same ideas recurred of which she had spoken on the former occasions, while on the intervening day she knew nothing of them. She thus seemed to her relatives like a being with two souls.

* Spärner: 'Physiologie der Seele,' 289, Stuttgart, 1877.

† Perty: 'Blicke,' etc., 25.

‡ Steinbeck: 115.

§ Tissot: 'V. d. Gesundheit der Gelehrten,' § 74.

|| Muratori: i., 196.

In the crisis she saw and heard nothing of what happened about her, discoursed connectedly and very intelligibly with absent persons whom she believed to be present, declaimed poems, and if she was in want of a word, it was in vain that those near tried to help her by loud and distinct repetition of it—she had to find it for herself. If anyone held her hands, she complained, without knowing how she was restrained, as also if anyone closed her open, staring eyes.*

Another case of alternating consciousness is when one of the subjective persons lives in the past; as, for instance, that lady who had been many years married, and, who often during the day fell into a condition of insensibility to every sound, and received visits, as she supposed, from her deceased mother. She conversed with the latter over her own state of health, in reference to her approaching marriage, replied to apparent objections, and desired that a physician might be consulted. She resented the familiarity of her husband, who sat on her bed and called her his dear wife, and treated him with maidenly reserve, as only engaged to her.†

The celebrated Dutch alienist, Schröder van der Kolk, cites the case of a girl of twenty, who after long illness fell into a remarkable condition, which had lasted already four years. After waking in the morning, a kind of St. Vitus' dance occurred at a definite hour, the patient beating about with her hands to right and left. This lasted half an hour, when she recovered, but she conducted herself quite like a child. On the following day the spasms re-

* Erasmus Darwin : 'Zoonomy,' ii. 136.

† Lorry : 'De Melancholia,' i. 78, Paris, 1765.

turned ; after their cessation the patient again behaved like a sensible girl. She spoke French and German well, and showed herself well-informed. But she knew nothing of the preceding day, her memory attaching itself to the one before that, the so-called clear day. On the childish days she had begun to re-learn French, without making much progress, while on the clear days she spoke it fluently. Schröder had visited this patient on fourteen days, which were all childish days, and she always recognised him. But when he came for the first time on a clear day, he was quite a stranger to her, and she could not remember to have ever seen him. This change occurred during the four years with such regularity, that its hour could be appointed. Once during this time the girl fell into an intermittent fever, which, being intentionally allowed to run its course, lasted into the clear days, when she did not know what was the matter with her, and behaved as though she had had no attack. During the summer, she went with her parents into the country, the childish day being chosen for the removal. On waking next day, she was much surprised at the change of residence, and knew not how she had come to the place.*

A similar case is reported by Dr. Mitchell: Miss R. enjoyed naturally very sound health, and entered her marriageable years without having suffered any considerable illness. She had very good abilities, and easily acquired knowledge and accomplishments. Besides domestic and social education, she was very well read, and could express herself well in writing. Her memory was well stored, and variously em-

* Spomer : 282.

bellished. Unexpectedly, and without any warning, she was one day overcome by a deep sleep, which lasted many more hours than usual. On awaking, she had clean forgotten every trace of her attainments. Her memory was a blank. She learnt again to spell, read, write, and reckon, and made quick progress. Some months later, she fell into a similar sleep, from which the former subjective person awoke, with no knowledge of the intervening time. Now was developed a double existence. Her former one, she named the old, the later, the new condition. She had no more consciousness of her double character than two different persons of each other's nature. In the normal state she possessed her former attainments; in the new one only what she had learnt in it. In the old state, she wrote fluently; in the new one, her writing was undecided and unformed. These states had alternated already for four years, and every time the change followed upon a long and deep sleep. The conduct towards her of the other members of the family came to be regulated entirely with regard to her condition for the time being.* Such cases involuntarily remind one of those generations in the animal kingdom, when an organism appears to be drawn apart into a diversity of individuals, as here a psychical subject into two persons.

Gmelin describes a patient who in a change of consciousness took herself for a totally different person, a French emigrant, and tormented herself with imaginary misfortune. She then spoke French and only broken German, took parents and friends for sympathetic strangers, and recollected nothing

* 'Archiv,' etc., iii. 168.

referring to her true personality, yet displayed a more than ordinary activity of intellect. On awaking, she knew nothing of her other person, but was restored to her old condition.*

In the case of the somnambule Julie, fourteen years of the past disappeared from her memory, as though during that time she had been another individual. She had four distinct states, each of which had its own memory and its own life, connected, as the Court physician Köhler said, with the similar ones preceding and following it. News which she heard in the one condition interested her in the highest degree when repeated to her in another.†

It is evidently only to this alternation of consciousness that Thucydides refers, when he says that after the celebrated pestilence in Greece, some people lost their memory to such a degree that they no longer knew their nearest friends, or even themselves.

Schubert reports, from verbal information from the historian Leopold Ranke, that the Marchesa Solari spoke French in Venice in her childhood—her mother having been a Frenchwoman—but afterwards forgot it. But during a fever she forgot her later acquired Italian, and now spoke French fluently. After her recovery, she again forgot French, and spoke Italian. The latter, again, she lost in her old age, and returned to the language of her childhood.‡ Schubert mentions the case of an apprentice in a book-shop, who, being scolded by his master, fell into a dream-paroxysm,

* Gmelin : 'Materiellen für Anthropologie,' i. 3.

† Strombeck : 'Geschichte eines allein durch die Natur hervorgebrachten animalischen Magnetismus,' 114, 139, 169, 206 ; Braunschweig, 1813.

‡ Schubert : 'Geschichte der Seele,' ii. 203, 207.

similar to catalepsy, in which he took himself for a paterfamilias with wife and child to provide for. In the waking state he lived as an apprentice; in every new paroxysm he went to his business as a paterfamilias. Both states took their separate course; in the dream, he never thought of himself as an apprentice, nor in waking as the father of a family; on the other hand, the similar phases were connected. If in the one condition anything associated with the other was mingled, he took it for a dream.* Bertrand's somnambule had three different states besides the waking one; in the latter she knew nothing of either of them; but her somnambulism embraced the two others.† More recently, cases of alternate consciousness are reported by the physicians Azam and Dufay: A woman who in her normal state was serious, reserved, and industrious, often fell into a sleep, on coming out of which she was as if changed, exhibiting unrestrained hilarity, heightened imagination, and coquetry; completely remembering all former phases of this state, but also of her waking state. After a longer or shorter time she fell again into torpidity, from which she awoke into her normal condition, when she had no memory of the other condition. The older she became, the shorter and rarer were these normal phases, and whereas formerly the change was only gradually induced, it now occurred with the utmost rapidity. Similar was the case of another patient, whose memory in somnambulism included both her states, and who spoke therein of her other

* Schubert: 'Geschichte der Seele,' ii. 72.

† Bertrand: 'Traité du Somnambulisme,' 308.

‘stupid state,’ which had only its own exclusive memory.*

Even insanity can be interrupted by another—a normal consciousness. Dr. Steinbeck mentions a cretin who, like all his kind, was idiotic, and in his normal state was deaf and dumb. But without any external occasion he fell into a clairvoyant condition, and in this he spoke very clearly and with intelligence.† If such phenomena can be induced by even momentary encroachments in the organism, there is thus proved the existence of a transcendental consciousness which only needs opportunity to manifest itself. An instance of this is the case of the Swedish peasant, who in 1771 lost speech, sensibility, and consciousness, only in the summer of 1782 recovering by degrees the use of some senses. On a day in August of that year, while washing his head with cold water, he suddenly felt a spasm through all his body, and exclaimed in a weak voice, ‘Herr Gott ! this is wonderful ! Where have I been so long ?’ There were slight effusions of blood from different parts of the head ; he recovered his understanding, knowing all whom he had formerly known, and being surprised at their aged appearance ; while he knew no one who had first come to him during those twelve years, however often seen. He regarded his illness as

* *Revue Scientifique*, May, July, September, 1876 ; Nov., 1877 ; March, 1879. [There is also the more recent case of Louis V., a full account of which, compiled by Dr. A. T. Myers, will be found in the *Journal of Mental Science*, for January, 1886. Mr. F. W. H. Myers has made this and similar cases the theme of very curious and interesting speculations (‘*Multiplex Personality*’) in the *Nineteenth Century*, and in the ‘*Proceedings*’ of the Society for Psychical Research, x. 2.—Tr.]

† Steinbeck : ‘*Der Dichter ein Seher*,’ 110.

an actual sleep, and knew not how long it had lasted, having forgotten everything which had happened in this long interval, though all that was anterior returned to his memory. He remained sound henceforth.*

To alternating consciousness are to be referred also many cases of 'possession.' Kerner describes the maid of Orlach as denoting by the word 'I' the monk by whom she was possessed, while she spoke of the maiden—that is, of herself—in the third person.† Alternation of consciousness is thus by no means confined to somnambulism, which is only one of its occasional causes. Notwithstanding, therefore, that these occasional causes are for the most part morbid, the psychological possibility of this alternation must have its foundation in the nature of man; and as these phenomena clearly evince the possibility, at least, of a duality in man, we are justified in asking whether they are available for the solution of the human enigma. This inference had already been drawn by Plotinus, when he said: 'All that goes through the body ends in the soul; the rest belongs to the soul alone, if the soul is anything in itself, if it has a determinate nature and a peculiar operation. . . . If the souls are united (in somnambulism) then they possess their memories together (that is, somnambulism comprehends also the waking consciousness); if they are and remain separate (in the waking state), the one keeps its own property a long time, that of the other only a short time.'‡

* 'Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Sweden of the year 1786.'

† Kerner: 'Geschichte Besessenerer Zeit.'

‡ Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 3, 26 and 27.

A remarkable double consciousness was exhibited by the young Hebert, whom Puységur magnetised. Owing to a severe blow on the head, in his fourth year, an operation was necessary. Attacks of insanity supervened, and he lost his memory, knowing nothing of what he had done an hour before. But as soon as he entered upon the magnetic crisis, not only did the attack of insanity cease, but his memory returned, and he knew accurately the events of his life. He described the inception of his illness, the operation, in which his brain had been injured, the instruments employed for it, and asserted that magnetism would restore him from insanity, but that he would never recover his memory, as in fact was the case.*

A somnambule of Dr. Wolfart, being asked as to her future health, always fell into a state of terror, in which she spoke of the misfortune impending over her. Years afterwards, she was crippled in the feet, and by a succession of mishaps so impaired in intellect that she knew no one, and could only utter incoherent sounds and words. In this condition Wolfart found the patient after an absence of thirteen years. When he had put her into the somnambulic state she knew him at once, spoke quite coherently, recalled her former prognostication, but then awoke again in her disordered condition. He succeeded a second time in putting her into somnambulism, with the like good result, but on her awaking the improvement was again lost.†

Desault relates that a man after a blow on the head could at first remember only recent events, but

* Puységur: 'Journal du traitement du jeune Hebert.'

† Wolfart: 'Erläuterungen zum Mesmerismus,' 283.

not long after, by an inexplicable change, lost memory of such, while he could recall all the occurrences of his childhood.*

Le Camus reports the case of a weak-minded, almost imbecile, youth, upon whom all instruction in languages and sciences was thrown away. After a fall on his head he became distinctly clever, intellectual, and highly cultivated, quickly seizing what had been taught him in vain before, and was afterwards, as Père Bouhours, a celebrated scholar of his century. The same author cites Pope Clement IV. as having to thank a wound in the head for his eminent memory; and also the case of an insane woman, of whom he knew, who was completely cured through a leap down into the street.† Carresi observed the case of yearly recurrent mania, which was completely cured by a fall on the head.‡ An insane woman, who believed herself to be possessed, chattered incoherently, and imitated the cries of animals for hours at a time, would often be suddenly and incomprehensibly changed; all foolish ideas then disappeared, as if blown away, and she spoke rationally and instructively to the astonished company.§ That insane persons often shortly before death recover their understandings, and appear entirely changed, has been frequently observed.||

All these cases stand in striking contradiction to the materialistic opinion, that consciousness is a product of the material brain. All that materialists can

* 'Frorieps Notizen,' xxii., No. 12, p. 188.

† Le Camus: 'Médecine de l'Esprit.'

‡ Steinbeck: 209.

§ Boismont: 124.

|| Freidreich: 'Handbuch der allgemeinen Pathologie,' 497.

adduce on their behalf is limited to this, that diseases of the brain often, but by no means always, are accompanied by diseases of the mind, that is, by disorders of the consciousness which is mediated by the senses and brain. The transcendental consciousness, however, remains as undisturbed thereby as the sight of the eye remains undisturbed by the dimming of the spectacles. If madness can be interrupted by a second and sound consciousness, whose brightness and clearness often break through the obscured brain-consciousness, then is madness a phenomenon restricted to this brain-consciousness. As has been already elucidated in many cases, the obscuration of the sense-consciousness is the condition of the emergence of the transcendental consciousness, however this obscuration may be induced, whether by sleep, fever, or somnambulism. Now, since madness itself likewise resembles such an obscuration of the sense or brain-consciousness, it is conceivable that it can awaken faculties which remain latent in the sound, normal condition. This appears to have been the case with a page in the service of a distinguished Spaniard, who was considered to be of infirm mind. Some time afterwards he became insane, when he answered excellently everything that he was asked, and discoursed on many important subjects, especially on the art of government—for he believed himself a king—with such arrangement and novelty of thought, that even his master heard him with the greatest pleasure, and begged God to leave him in that state. And so the physician who restored the patient to health received neither from the page nor from the master the thanks he had deserved and expected ; for with his restoration

of health the page lost those high faculties, and his old slowness of intellect returned.*

If memory must be regarded as the root of all mental development, it is self-evident that the transcendental consciousness cannot be considered merely as a latent faculty of memory—the storeroom for all the impressions which penetrate the sense-consciousness—but that also all intellectual faculties of ordinary life have their transcendental root. Thence are to be explained the cases adduced, in which a faculty, not only of memory, but of thought, latent in the normal condition, breaks through even the insanity of the brain as developed for the relations of earthly existence.

We have seen that loss of memory marks the partition dividing the somnambulic from the waking state. That, however, is to be taken only as the general rule. Exceptions are frequent, and the consideration of them is the more imperative, since they open the possibility—if as yet only distantly—of an experimental psychology, by which hereafter clear rays of knowledge may be thrown on the metaphysical well-spring of our intellectual being, which the physiological school still and for ever vainly seeks.

Recollections from the somnambulic state can be preserved for waking consciousness, either immediately or indirectly, by a prior reproduction in dream. Ordinary sleep being a condition intermediate between waking and somnambulism, and the latter being only its exaltation, it is presumable that the threads of memory are more easily spun between the similar states of dream and somnambulism, than between the

* Meimers: 'Ueber d. thierischen Magnetismus,' Lemge, 1788.

extremes of waking and somnambulism, which, being dissimilar, are for the most part divided by loss of memory.

From the relationship of conditions it results that forgotten dreams re-emerge much more easily in later sleep than in waking. Sir Humphry Davy, who experimented with nitrous oxide, which he inhaled, says of his condition that he gradually lost all perception of external things, while on the other hand lively recollections of earlier experiments presented themselves.* In like manner an insane person remembered in her illness only the events of that state, but after her cure only the experiences of her health.† Representations belonging to the magnetic condition are often reproduced in ordinary dream; and that would undoubtedly appear much oftener, if every reproduction were also a recollection. But as recognition does not always happen, such reproductions are taken as originating in dream. This reproduction in dream extends as well to the inner visions of the somnambulists as to their external impressions during the magnetic sleep. Somnambulism and dream appear often so closely related that they pass into one another, and that even faculties which are usually peculiar to somnambulism are prolonged into dream. Dr. Cless says of his somnambulists that the material of their dreams was always derived from occurrences in their magnetic sleep, or at least had reference to them: the dream-images even partially completing the presentments and obscure knowledge of the somnambulist state. And Kerner's somnambule said towards the

* Hibbert: 'Phil. of Apparitions,' 162.

† Jessen: 'Psychologie,' 567.

end of her illness, that even after the cessation of her magnetic state the proper medicaments would still occur to her in ordinary dreams, and the memory of these dreams would survive into the waking state.* Auguste Müller once indicated a medicament imperfectly, and with the remark that she would dream it further in the night between eleven and twelve o'clock.† In the case of a patient of Dr. Nasse, external occurrences during her crisis passed over into dream still more distinctly. Though in the waking state there was no direct memory of the events of the crisis, these survived in sleep as dream, and thus often passed into the waking memory. Thus she related as a dream of the night how a plaster had been placed over both her eyes, and she had notwithstanding detected coloured paper; how she had felt out metal discs buried in the sand; and she wondered at the absurdity of this dream, these things having been in fact only experiments. Her reproductions in dream went often to the smallest detail, with complete repetition of particular acts and speeches.‡ The guarantee that in these cases a dream really intervened, excluding the supposition that the actual events of the somnambulic state were remembered, and only represented as dreamt, consists not only in the fact of the memory, but also in the circumstance that the somnambule knew beforehand of this reproduction in dream, and often predicted it in the case of striking particulars.

In a narrative of the physiologist Burdach, also,

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 260.

† Dr. Maier und Klein: 'Geschichte der magnetisch hellsehenden Auguste Müller,' 9.

‡ Reil's 'Beiträge,' etc., ii. 3.

dream appears as a bridge for memory. One of his friends heard one morning that his wife had been seen the night before walking in her sleep on the church roof. He took the opportunity of her mid-day sleep to question her, directing his mouth to the pit of her stomach, when she gave him a full account, and mentioned that the ball of her left foot had been hurt by a nail on the roof. On waking she answered with surprise the question, whether she felt pain in the place which had been indicated, in the affirmative, and on seeing the wound was unable to explain its origin.*

The absence of memory in somnambulists is thus all the more the rule, since in the exceptions we can so frequently presuppose the mediating instrumentality of dream. A true exception can only then be admitted when memory exists immediately after waking from somnambulism ; in all other cases it can be assumed that what is remembered is not the original image or event, but merely a copy in dream. Distinguishable from the cases in which a dream-reproduction is interposed between somnambulism and waking, dream being thus the bridge between two dissimilar conditions, are other cases in which the visions and incidents of somnambulism are remembered directly, the somnambulist being, however, under the illusion that they had been only dreamt. That as regards external occurrences this is sometimes the case is apparent from the above instance of Nasse's somnambule. That subjective visions are taken after waking for dreams is all the more intelligible, and happened, for example,

* Radestock: 'Schlaf und Traum,' 168. [Speaking is not a usual incident of ordinary sleep, and it is presumable that in the above case the mid-day sleep partook of the somnambulic character.—Tr.]

in the case of Auguste Müller. She said in the crisis that her landlord's son should partake of a tea, the preparation of which she would know and prescribe after waking as by a dream. When she woke she asked if anything had happened to this boy; she having dreamed that he had fallen ill, and that she had got for his restoration a warm tea, the composition of which she then described.* But not only the experiences, internal and external, of somnambulists, but also their own acts during the crisis, appear to them after waking as dreams. A sensitive of Reichenbach mentioned on waking a dream which she had just had; the content of this dream was, however, nothing else than what she had been saying to the bystanders.† Kerner's somnambule sprang up in the crisis exclaiming that she must have a bunch of seven grapes, rushed through the courtyard into the garden and up to the top of a high ladder which stood against a grape trellis, and so on to the town wall, two stories high, to a grape-stock, and returned with a bunch of seven grapes, which she ate. At coffee in the morning she said she had had a strange dream of going up a ladder and reaching a bunch of seven grapes, and eating them with great enjoyment.‡

For a future experimental psychology it is very important to observe this distinction, whether the somnambulists have a direct memory after waking of their experience in the crisis, only mistaking them for dreams, or whether they remember indirectly by means of a really intervening reproduction in dream.

* Maier und Klein: 'Gesch. d. Aug. Müller,' 80.

† Reichenbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 693.

‡ Kerner: 'Gesch. zweier Somnambulen,' 294.

When they are left to themselves, their somnambulism passes off into ordinary sleep—when reproduction in dream becomes possible—but if artificially awakened, memory, if it occurs, is direct. That was the case with the thirteen years' old somnambule Hennig, who on awaking knew clearly and accurately all that had happened in the magnetic sleep.*

Often the mere intention of the somnambulists suffices to carry the memory into waking life. Passavant knew one who could at will retain or not retain her visions.† According to Faria, recollection only occurs with those who in the crisis are conscious of being in a dreaming condition, and these are very few.‡ Dr. Steinbeck knew a somnambule who when suddenly awakened did not remember her visions, but easily remembered them when gradually awakened.§

The connection of representations occurring in waking and sleep alike, according to laws of association, these are a means by which somnambulists can secure recollection. A somnambule of Hufeland to this end did as we often do : she made a knot in her handkerchief, and when on waking her eye fell on it, the intended recollection occurred.|| Another tied a ribbon round her arm, or a thread round her ring-finger, when she wished to transmit to waking memory an idea from her somnambulic state.¶

The more developed the somnambulism, the more dissimilar is it from the waking state, and the more

* 'Die Somnambule in Nebelin in der West-Priegnitz,' 4th edition, Perleburg, 1846.

† Passavant : 'Untersuchungen,' etc., 95.

‡ Faria : 'De la cause du Somneil lucide,' 228.

§ Steinbeck : 'Der Dichter ein Seher,' 439.

|| Hufeland : 'Ueber Sympathie,' 172.

¶ Ennemoser : 'Mesmerische Praxis,' 498.

difficult is memory. As the sickness progresses, the crises are more intense than in the period of convalescence, and often after complete recovery the susceptibility to magnetic treatment ceases altogether. Memory is accordingly easier during recovery than in the height of the disease. But as the ordinary dreams of deep sleep are forgotten, and only the confused dreams of light sleep are remembered, so the remembered visions of somnambulism are less instructive, because they presuppose a greater approximation of the otherwise divided states. There are, however, exceptions, so that on this point also a future experimental psychology will not be without profit. Dr. Nick vouches for the following case: A somnambule said in the last crisis of her illness: 'A month hence, I shall remember not only all that I have seen in my crisis, but shall be able to find my way to the different places where I have been, but which I have seen from here.' Her somnambulism, exalted to clairvoyance, had been utilised by obtaining from her information as to the illnesses of distant persons. And when, later, she was completely restored, and in the enjoyment of blooming health, she remembered her visions on visiting the places which she had clairvoyantly seen, and she was able, without inquiry, to find the residences of those persons to see whom she had been directed from time to time in the crisis.* Another somnambule, of whom Van Ghert reports, obtained in the crisis the vision of the father and of a friend of her magnetiser, and described them in such exact detail, that the latter was obliged to admit the accuracy of the description at once, or later

* 'Archiv,' ii. 2, 46, 49.

as regarded changes in the friend, whom he had not seen for eight years. Some days afterwards, the father came for the first time to the town, when the somnambule, who had never seen him, immediately accosted him as the father of the magnetiser, with the remark that she must have seen him somewhere, though she knew not where. And subsequently there was the same recognition of the friend. In a later crisis, however, the recollection was complete, and she declared that she had in the earlier sleep seen both as distinctly, and in the same aspects, as afterwards in waking.*

When somnambulism is profound—the deep sleep—it is divided from the lower degree by the same partition as is the latter from waking. Apparent exceptions are to be explained by imperfect exaltation of the state, the two conditions being still so far related that not all the threads of memory are severed. And when visions of the profound sleep are reproduced in somnambulism, there are often only indefinite recollections, as in a dream. Often also they are distinct, but only in the first minutes,† just as in the morning we often have a transient memory of a dream, but seek it in vain a few minutes afterwards.

Memory connects divided states according to the same psychological laws by which the past and present are connected in waking life. Impressions revive each other according to laws of association, and this occurs the more readily the greater the interest of the exciting impression. That the reproduction of impressions is connected with the interest originally felt

* 'Archiv,' iii. 3, 63, 64.

† *Ibid.*, x. 1, 106.

are awakened by the magnetiser. In many cases his mere order suffices for the preservation of a somnambulic impression. Werner—whose work contains interesting observations, but who misses the principle of explanation afforded by the dramatic severance of the Ego in somnambulism—brought to a somnambule, as the present of a third person, a rose and a short letter, which he read to her. In reply to his question as to a means of carrying over this incident to her waking memory, she said that his earnest injunction would avail. On asking her next morning if she had received a present, she at first knew nothing about it, but then related as a very vivid dream that someone had sent her a rose and a letter, the contents of which she verbally repeated. She was extremely struck when they now brought her the rose and letter, and from this recollection fell again into the somnambulic state—a phenomenon of frequent occurrence, which has still to be spoken of.

This case is one of numerous instances in which the will of the magnetiser can control and direct the somnambulist at pleasure. The suggestion that this is only thought-transference is at least not in all cases maintainable: the will of the magnetiser alone explains, for example, the fact of a somnambule at his command retaining from her crisis the memory of a matter forgotten by himself, that matter alone being recalled.

To excite recollections, the magnetiser often makes use of the association of ideas, connecting the impression to be revived with some object, the sight of which on waking calls up the memory. So far Tandel seems to be right in explaining the absence of

memory of somnambulists from the want of associations of thought between the two conditions,* though, indeed, this is less a solution of the problem than a further definition of it.

The will of the magnetiser can suppress an impression as well as excite it. A girl who, in the waking state, had met in the street a criminal who had murdered his wife, was magnetised to allay her agitation. Her magnetiser put her to sleep, and ordered her to forget the whole thing, and when she was awakened no trace of it remained in her mind.†

Van Ghert connected the impression to be revived with an object or a number; on naming the number in waking, the recollection followed. As we may preserve an idea in memory by associating it with a knot in a handkerchief, so can the somnambulist by similar arbitrary signs, a ribbon round the neck, a wafer stuck to the nose, etc.‡ One somnambule desired that a little ribbon round her left ear should be pulled, in order to revive the idea associated with it. By this means, after waking, she repeated without a mistake a dictation, the writing of which had filled a large sheet.§

Thus association of ideas not only facilitates memory in a similar psychological condition, but also as between dissimilar ones in which it is not spontaneous, and is usually absent.

This principle might undoubtedly be utilised in experimental psychology. All systematic education

* Perty: 'Die Myst. Erscheinungen,' i. 254.

† 'Archiv,' iv. 1, 131.

‡ Kieser: 'Tellurismus,' ii. 250.

§ *Ibid.*: 'Magikon,' iii. 1, 65.

associates the new instruction with the existing circle of ideas. In the training of animals the principle of association is employed. In the education of children it is even applied as between waking and sleep, as when a child is punished for uncleanness in sleep, and is thus successfully restrained in that state. Muratori says : ‘ By a resolution made during waking to refrain from certain acts to which we are accustomed in dream, the habit is overcome. The idea of the resolution is by the imagination linked with that of the act, both having been associated in waking consciousness. The idea of the resolution, again, recalls the sentiment with which we conceived it in waking. And this sentiment either awakes us, or imparts to us sufficient circumspection to withstand the incitement to the proscribed act.’*

It is only a step from this to the ‘ magnetic ’ education. The somnambule state being connected with the suppression of the sense-life, the instincts and dispositions which depend on this sensibility can be suppressed by frequent application of magnetism, and by subjection of the mental activity alien to the induced state. Champignon treated a somnambule who was an excessive drinker of coffee, and who could not renounce the habit, although her disease was referable to it. He detached her from it by an

* Muratori : ‘ Ueber die Einbildungskraft,’ i. 258. [The character of our dreams can also be thus controlled, at least negatively. The translator, when a child, being occasionally troubled by afflicting dreams, added to his nightly prayer for his family a petition that he might not dream of any misfortune to those dear to him. The dreaded dreams never recurred, and afterwards, when he came to reflect that the prohibition was really self-imposed, he found a simple resolution before going to sleep equally effectual in shutting out all distressing dreams of a nature at all *anticipated* by the prohibition.—Tr.]

energetic command in the crisis, and by a firm determination that she in waking should conceive a regular dislike to this beverage. The opponents of magnetism insist much on the possibility of its misuse to immoral purposes. If this cannot be denied, as indeed it is the case with all earthly things, justice demands the admission that on the like psychological grounds the somnambulist may be morally influenced. The influence of the magnetiser upon the senses and thoughts of the somnambulist is undeniable, and this influence can be employed for good or for evil. Champignon knew a girl who led an irregular life with her magnetiser, and whom he resolved to reform. In somnambulism, according to his wish, she felt, for the first time, a violent remorse and made the best resolutions. Awake, she was as dissolute as ever. The inclination to improvement lasted only until she met her former magnetiser and allowed herself to be put to sleep by him. Henceforward there was no difference between her disposition in somnambulism and in waking. A similar attempt, but with better results, was made by Deleuze.*

This educational value of somnambulism is the less doubtful, since somnambulists can be induced by the magnetiser to undertake acts, of which the motive is not apparent to them in waking. I refer to the strange but well-established fact of the magnetic *promise*. I can vouch for the following case.

Hansen had made the acquaintance of a family in

* Champignon, 238, 239. [Mr. F. W. H. Myers has called attention to this subject in articles in the *Nineteenth Century* which have been reprinted in the 'Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research,' parts x. and xi.—Tr.]

Vienna, of whom one, the husband, was very susceptible to magnetism. On a Wednesday, two days before Hansen's departure, they were together, and it was agreed that they should go to Hansen again, for the last time, on Friday. But the husband having been put into somnambulism by Hansen, the latter, by agreement with the rest, obtained from him a promise that he would come on Thursday at 5 p.m. On awaking, he knew nothing of this, and on leaving said: 'We shall meet again on Friday.' On Thursday it suddenly occurred to him to visit Hansen, but on his wife reminding him of the arrangement for Friday, he dropped the idea. In the afternoon, when they were taking a walk, he reverted to his proposition, which the wife turned him from again, as before. But when 5 o'clock struck, he left his wife standing in the street, and ran to Hansen's. Arriving at the door of the house, he asked himself what he was doing there, and was perplexed, till Hansen accosted him by saying, 'I have expected you,' and explained.

Thus the magnetic promise operates, notwithstanding the absence of memory, as an obscure impulse to an act, apparently voluntary, but from which there is no escaping. The will of that gentleman, to fulfil the promise, came from the transcendental region and reproduced the idea of visiting Hansen, which, however, the normal consciousness could not recognise as memory. The philosophical kernel of the problem lies therefore in this, that from our transcendental individuality, cognitional and volitional beyond the sphere of our self-consciousness, there can enter our life the impulse to acts which seem to us our free determinations. For immediately behind the act is

the will of the magnetised person to fulfil his promise ; and that this can be elicited by an overpowering foreign will is a different problem.

Mouilleseaux exacted from his patient, when in the crisis, a promise to pay next day, at a particular time, a certain visit for which she was indisposed. He then awoke her, taking every precaution that she should not be reminded of her promise ; and at the appointed hour stationed himself with some friends in the neighbourhood of the house she was to visit. As the clock struck, the somnambule made her appearance, walking about undecidedly, and at length entered with evident embarrassment. When now Mouilleseaux informed her of the promise, she told him that the thought of going had been continually haunting her since the morning, that all her disinclination had been in vain, and that she could only get rid of her inward restlessness and disquiet at the appointed hour, when she set out.*

Dr. Teste once ordered his somnambule to heat the oven in her room next day at noon—it was in July—to light two candles, and wait for him with her embroidery for an hour. When he arrived, she had done all exactly as directed. Motive for her absurd proceedings she could not assign ; and when, as the hour was struck, she extinguished the fire and lights, and laid aside her work, she knew just as little why she did so.†

A magnetiser gave a boy-somnambulist a coin, with directions to buy pears with it. He accepted it, laughingly producing from his pocket another coin.

* 'Exposé des Cures de Strasbourg,' iii. 70.

† Teste : 'Le Magnétisme animal expliqué,' 431.

Asked, on waking, how much money he had in his pocket, he was surprised to find two coins in it, but on going out at once bought some pears.*

Thus can the ideas and will of somnambulists be directed, and dispositions or indispositions, lasting into the waking state, can be implanted in them, they being ignorant of the cause of their impulses.

Deleuze forbade a patient to look at her feet after waking—leeches, of which she had an abhorrence, having been applied to them—and, in fact, she remained in complete ignorance of what had been done. Another patient requested her physician to impose upon her his will, that when in the waking state she should be about to partake of food which would not agree with her, she should be inspired with an uncontrollable distrust of it, which happened with success.† In this way patients can be determined in the waking state to take medicines which they detest; nor do they then know that they are only obeying a command. This result can also follow on their own firm resolution, and Bertrand says generally, that if they undertake to do anything in waking at a definite hour, they carry it out, without knowing why.‡ Such a will-impulse, acting on the waking life from the transcendental region, can, it seems, even take on the dramatic drama-form, as was the case with that extraordinary girl-somnambule, about whom Billot corresponded with Deleuze. This girl had prescribed resin fumigations to be undergone at a certain hour. It was forgotten, and she was admonished by an

* 'Archiv,' iii. 2, 83.

† Deleuze: 'Instruction pratique,' etc., 138, 435.

‡ Bertrand: 'Traité du Somnambulisme,' 183.

hallucination, a thick cloud rising before her eyes from a censer, the odour of which brought the prescription to her memory. Another time the hallucination was of a squirt, whereby she was reminded of her prescription.*

The common objection that in all such cases the absence of memory is only feigned, is set aside by the consideration that the magnetic promise is only a special case of the dependence of the thought upon the will of the magnetiser, and that for this there is not even required an actual state of somnambulism. Hansen laid his hands on his sleeping schoolfellows, and then formed different mental representations, which were transmuted by the sleepers into dream-images, as was proved in the morning when he asked them their dreams. In a company at Berlin, by general agreement, he caused the jeweller Ehrenwerth, who had gone out into the shop to serve a customer, to bring back with him three valuable diamond rings and place them in Hansen's hand.† An eye-witness told me of an evening party in Norderney, at which a magnetiser compelled a lady to fetch a sponge from a neighbouring apartment, and to wash the face of one of the gentlemen with it. Notwithstanding all her visible reluctance, she could not withstand this mental command. Sceptics of the physiological class, if not convinced by the magnetiser Hansen, will perhaps be more disposed to credit the testimony of Braid upon this point.‡

* Billot : 'Recherches psychologiques,' i. 74.

† Zöllner : 'Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen,' iii. 556, 532.

‡ Preyer : 'Der Hypnotismus. Ausgewählte Schriften von Braid,' Berlin, 1882.

The fact that a human brain can convey its impressions by mere will to another, and that the memory of them survives even the change of psychical state, is of such great philosophical importance that its value indeed is inestimable. If man can believe himself to act independently, while he may nevertheless be receiving the impulse from another, unexpressed, will, in this relation of mankind even the problem of human history may possibly find a solution. To some, the history of humanity, like the life-history of individuals, seems to be the resulting product of the interaction of individual wills, equivalent, in dependence on the potencies of Nature, climate, food, etc., to a natural mechanism; others see biological and historical development guided teleologically to an end, and determined by a cause, which we know not. That the latter view is reconcilable with the former, or even if not, is still logically admissible, is apparent from the above cases; for there is only a difference in the mode of conceiving one and the same thought, whether we refer the hidden impulse of our actions to a transcendental Ego, or to Schopenhauer's Will, or to Hartmann's Unconscious, or to the Christian God. We may be of this opinion or that, yet since the impulse to action does not always lie in our sense and brain consciousness, we may agree with Lichtenberg, that 'On this globe we serve an end, the attainment of which cannot be hindered, though all mankind conspired against it.'

8. *The Association of Psychological States with Ideas.*

Loss of memory on waking, with revival of the former ideas of the sleep on return to it, is a

mark of the completely-developed somnambulic condition. The more dissimilar the psychical states, and the more decidedly they are divided, the more exclusive of each other is the circle of ideas ; in other words, the closer is the association of particular states with the ideas awakened by them. In accordance with this rule are the phenomena of recurrent and continued dreams in ordinary sleep. A hypnotised person was made, by whispering, to dream that he was engaged in the anatomy of a section, and then that he was frightened by a lion in the Zoological Gardens. Being hypnotised a second time on the same day, all the gestures and motions recurred, and in the same order, as in the dream of the morning ; and on waking it appeared that the whole dream had returned. In the night it recurred for the third time in normal sleep.* The same or a related state thus draws after it the same ideas ; and, on the other hand, this association explains the fact that every revived idea tends to induce the state by which it was before excited. Nor is that difficult to understand, for no recollection is isolated, but draws after it, according to the laws of association, many others with which it was once connected ; and as all these ideas revive with more or less of their original interest, the earlier psychical state to which they belonged must be more or less excited by them. This is seen not only in the ordinary dream, but even in waking life, which is by no means uniformly the same psychical condition, since every impact of memory tends by its interest to restore the state to which it refers.

Sitting in public, and given over to our own

* Heidenhaim : ' Der sogenannte thierische Magnetismus,' 58.

thoughts, it is possible to apprehend nothing of a loud conversation at a neighbouring table. Attention is not aroused by it, but that the clatter of words has nevertheless reached our ear is at once apparent if the conversation takes a turn interesting to us, or if one's own name is mentioned. This name, associated with so much of our ordinary life, is the most effective of memorial impacts, bringing us at once out of the state of absorption to one of attention and circumspection. Thence it happens that sleep-walkers awake if their name is called, often to their destruction, if the normal Ego has not grown into the situation of the moment. Many somnambules, also, can be awakened by the utterance of their names. Next to our names, those ideas are best adapted to excite the state formerly associated with them, which are of particular interest to us and have once deeply moved us.

It often happens that we suddenly wake out of our first sleep, because in the incipient dream an object intrudes, which, being an actual memory, recalls the psychical condition (waking) of its former perception. Other ideas will often suffice to awaken us, when they lead by association to the memory of real life. If sleep has reached a certain depth, this impact of memory will only produce the effect in case the idea is of psychical importance, and elicits our desire to awake. If of a painful nature, our eyelids are even slowly raised, as often as this easily excited idea is suggested. The thoughts which prevent sleep are also those which interrupt it, resembling those attendants in the cell of a prisoner condemned to death by sleeplessness, who recall him to consciousness as soon as he closes his eyes.

Now, this phenomenon, that fragments of memory from a dissimilar condition tend to reproduce that condition itself, is exalted in the relation of somnambulism to waking life. By the same law, according to which an access of waking memory in sleep awakens, conversely, somnambulism returns with the recurrence of a somnambule memory in waking. A somnambule after her recovery knew nothing of her magnetic state, but whenever inconsiderately reminded of it, she immediately retired and slept. On every conversation about her condition, not only in her presence, but if only in the house, she either became uneasy or fell asleep.* A somnambule of Kerner, having in the crisis announced the arrival of her father, and then awakened, fell again into somnambulism on some one inadvertently saying that it did not seem as if her father would come that day. The same thing happened during a walk in the garden, when a child who was with her spoke of a knife lying in the manure-pit, of which she herself had spoken in the crisis.† On one occasion in the crisis she was much amused by a clairvoyant perception of the maid plucking a duck in the kitchen of the upper floor. She indicated parts where the roots of the feathers had been carelessly left in, her account being confirmed when they went up to look. Sitting at tea in the evening with the family, that duck was served up, when she suddenly cried out : ‘ There are the roots in the duck of which I dreamt last night ! ’ sprang up and hastened, in a state of somnambulism, to bed.

* ‘ Archiv,’ iv. 1, 83, 86.

† Kerner : ‘ Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,’ 320, 288.

She explained that the sight of the duck had re-induced the condition.*

The same relation rules between the deep sleep (Hochschlaf) and somnambulism. Werner's somnambule having passed from the latter condition to the former on hearing music, returned to her ordinary somnambulism when it ceased, having then no knowledge of her words in the deep sleep, and said that even Albert (her visionary guardian, product of the dramatic severance) would not tell them to her, for if she heard them she would at once fall again into the deep sleep, which was not good for her.†

That other states also can be induced by fragments of memory from them is shown by the insane. It is necessary to avoid speaking to them, after their recovery, of their earlier illness, because not only are they thus disquieted, but they may even relapse. A young man had become insane from seeing, after many years' separation, his affianced bride, whom he had believed faithful, the wife of another man, and a nursing mother. Being cured, he knew nothing of his early love, but the whole memory returned on once seeing a woman suckling an infant.‡ The Abbot Eleutherius had adopted a 'possessed' boy, who while with him was freed from his delusion, but relapsed when the abbot once made an incautious allusion to it.§ This further exemplifies the relation between madness and somnambulism, supporting the opinions of Mesmer and Puységur, that madness is in general only a dis-

* Kerner: 'Gesch. zweier Somnambulen,' 277, 280.

† Werner: 'Schutzgeister,' 180.

‡ Schubert: 'Symbolik des Traumes,' 178.

§ Görres: 'Mystik,' iv. 331.

orderly somnambulism, which can accordingly be cured by rightly regulated magnetic treatment.

It seems to me that some light is also thus thrown upon the still unexplained witches' sabbath. It is said that nothing was more harassing to the witches when prepared for their journey than the cry of the night watchman or the ringing of the church bells. At the sabbath itself, no one could make the sign of the cross or utter the name of Jesus; in both cases the spell was broken and the whole assembly disappeared, to the glory of the religion so detested by Satan.* It is easy to see that the broken spell signifies only the awakening from the somnambulic visions, effected by the impact of memories which in the Middle Ages were associated with the most intense interest, even for apostates.

Whoever examines the literature of somnambulism, with its indispensable yet undigested material of observations, will find much in it to convince him of the mischief in magnetic treatment, resulting from the neglect of this association between ideas and the psychical conditions which support them. If somnambulism is to be rightly guided, it must be kept completely separate from the waking state; every impact of inappropriate memory must be avoided, otherwise both conditions will be disturbed by admixture, and the valuable faculties which emerge in somnambulism will either be lost or not developed in their purity. Kerner says: 'Somnambulists should never be told what they have done and said, if their

* Rosskoff: 'Geschichte des Teufels,' ii. 219. Görres: 'Mystik,' v. 248.

clairvoyance is to be preserved.’* It had a very bad effect on the Seeress of Prevorst to be told after waking out of the magnetic sleep what she had said in it, and she then often relapsed into it.† Dr. Wienholt, supposing the crisis to have begun, asked his somnambule if she would be magnetised again in the evening. This occasioned a strong swoon, for hitherto, according to her wish, it had been concealed from her in waking that she was a somnambule. Another subject of the same physician being asked by what signs she knew that her sleep was becoming less complete than formerly, replied that recently she had remembered a great deal from it in waking.‡ A somnambulist said that a magnetic sleep, the full memory of which remained, was of no use for health.§ Of the extraordinary boy, Richard, his brother and physician said after the recovery : ‘Richard could never hear or read anything relating to what had passed in the peculiar state of magnetic clairvoyance; even remote references, or expressions which had been then used with a special signification, excited his aversion, though he was conscious of no reason. Thus he got hold of some notes of mine, in which something about his sleep was remarked in an illegible hand. He tore up the paper as soon as he touched it. Casually and thoughtlessly turning over the pages of my poems, he stumbled upon the “Wunderblume,” which he had recited in the magnetic sleep, and he flung the innocent little book on the

* Kerner : ‘Blätter aus Prevorst,’ xii. 21.

† *Ibid.* : ‘Seherin von Prevorst,’ 105.

‡ Wienholt : ‘Heilkraft,’ etc., iii. 3, 207, 286.

§ ‘Archiv,’ xii. 1, 89.

floor in a rage.* Fischer, praising the successful treatment by which a clergyman had restored a cataleptic girl, adds that the chief points of this treatment were: never disturbing the patient in any somnambulic action, but rather assisting her in whatever she would do; while in the waking state treating her as quite well, and encouraging her to uninterrupted occupations with her duties.† He thus kept the two conditions completely apart by preventing all retrospection. Ennemoser recommends that neither in sleep nor waking should somnambulists receive praise or blame for their seership;‡ and Champignon cites an instance of the dangerous results from communicating to a somnambule the phenomena of her sleep, which excited her anxiety.§

Their own instinct often suggests to somnambulists precautions for keeping the two dissimilar conditions apart. A patient of Kerner desired to be left alone that she might arrange her room again in the same way, even to the smallest trifles, in which it had been previous to her illness. She must so see it on waking, that she might not relapse. With wonderful rapidity she now put away all the apparatus belonging to her condition as a sick person; she flung the medicines out of window, got rid of phials, etc., and placed the table as it had been before her illness. A chair which had then been there she fetched at night up a flight of steps, springing with it into her room without a light and without collision. They were to give her a cap

* Görwitz: 'Richard's natürlich magnetischer Schlaf,' 145.

† Fischer: 'Der Somnambulismus,' iii. 128.

‡ Ennemoser: 'Mesmerische Praxis,' 482.

§ Champignon: 'Physiologie,' etc., 269.

on her waking, and say that her hair had been cut off by order of the physician. She then lay down in bed, and her somnambulism passed into ordinary sleep, from which she awoke. There was only one person left with her, and she expressed her satisfaction with the cap recommended by the physician. The next day, however, she became again somnambulant, a passer-by in the street pointing her out to another, saying that was Miss St. —, who was now no longer a somnambule.* Another patient desired that she might not have the report of the physician on her complaint given her to read till after the lapse of a year, as it would trouble her, and she would fall back into the former state.† Regard must also be had to the rapport still partially subsisting between patient and physician even after recovery, as is shown by the instance of a patient who fell into somnambulism again, the physician, eight days subsequent to her recovery, and after she had left, having spoken of her illness.‡

From the necessity of keeping the two conditions separate, it follows, of course, that somnambulists who in the crisis are occupied with the ideas and interests of their daily life, are injured in health, or at least in the development of their somnambulant faculties. Somnambulists who are remunerated for their pre-

* Kerner: 'Gesch. zweier Somnambulen,' 293. [There was in this case a very clear somnambulant memory of antecedent circumstances, since she was able perfectly to re-arrange her room. And as that is commonly the case, the patient often referring in this state to the normal one, it would seem that the same memories which would awaken from light sleep have not that effect in the deeper sleep of somnambulism.—Tr.]

† 'Archiv,' v. 1, 42.

‡ *Ibid.*, vii. 2, 144.

scriptions must gradually lose the gift, even if it had existed, since to connect this state with a pecuniary consideration is to associate it with the waking state, or to bring it to memory in the latter when the recompense is received. Here, also, the good deed must carry with it its own reward. Puységur, in allowing a somnambule to be placed in rapport with patients for the purpose of prescribing for them, rightly therefore made it a condition that there should be no remuneration, nor even thanks, since such reminders of the somnambulic state must excite her surprise and displeasure. The complete separation of the two states is the chief condition for the pure development of somnambulism. And so Puységur recommended, that even when somnambulists prescribed for themselves, the origin of the prescriptions should be concealed from them. It is not easy to persuade an intelligent person, who has neither anatomical nor physiological knowledge, that any benefit could accrue from following prescriptions self-given in sleep, since the absent knowledge must appear indispensable without such an explanation of the health-instinct, and of its development in the particular case, as would build a bridge of memory between the two states. The somnambulist should therefore be left in the belief that the prescriptions are due to the insight of the physician, and the latter should be allowed to accept the credit.*

9. *Theory of Memory.*

As a sentence written on a clean surface is more legible than if new letters are confused with old ones,

* Puységur: '*Recherches*,' etc., 369, 407.

so, for the reception of a theory, the head should first be cleared of antagonistic views. To evince the existence of a transcendental consciousness it must therefore first be shown that the facts of memory are not explicable from the ordinary consciousness.

Plato, in the 'Theætetus,' compares memory with the impression left by a seal upon wax. We think and know what has been impressed as long as the copy of it lasts ; but if that is obliterated, or if the impression could not be made, there is forgetfulness or ignorance.* This image, which Plato uses, not to explain, but to illustrate, physiologists who recognise only the sensory consciousness must needs take literally. According to that, memory would depend on material brain-traces, left behind by impressions ; by the act of memory such traces are continually renewed, re-chiselled as it were, and so there arise well-worn tracks, in which the coach of memory is conducted with especial facility.

The deductions from this view had already been drawn by the materialists of the last century. Hook and others reckoned that, since $\frac{1}{3}$ of a second sufficed for the production of an impression, in 100 years a man must have collected in his brain 9,467,280,000 traces or copies of impressions, or, reduced by $\frac{1}{3}$ for the period of sleep, 3,155,760,000, thus in fifty years 1,577,880,000 ; further, that allowing a weight of four pounds to the brain, and subtracting one pound for blood and vessels, and another for the external integument, a single grain of brain-substance must contain 205,542 traces.† This calculation is about

* Plato : 'Theæt.', § 33.

† Huber : 'Das Gedächtniss,' 21.

correct in figures, which, however, certainly proves the incorrectness of the hypothesis. If the presupposition that memory has to be explained from the senses and brain-matter leads to such whimsicalities, pretending to be exact science, then every unprejudiced person will give up the presupposition as untenable, and will rather believe in a transcendental consciousness, independent of the brain-matter, than in millions of carbon and nitrogen atoms in the brain, preserving material traces of all impressions, and transmitting them to their successors in the continual regenerative process of our life.

Moreover, our intellectual life does not consist in mere impressions ; these form only the material of our judgments. These brain-atoms do not help us to judgment, notwithstanding their magical properties, so that we must suppose that whenever we form a sentence or a judgment, the impressions are combined, like the letters in a compositor's box,* these atoms, however, being at the same time compositor and box.

We will therefore abandon the materialists to their 'exact' amusements, and seek the true theory in the bare analysis of the process which takes place in memory. We have already seen the necessity of distinguishing between reproduction and recollection ; and evidently, even if the theory of material brain-traces were true, it would at most explain the reproduction, the re-emergence of an impression, but not at all its recognition. The brain-traces can thus not at all dispense with this latter subjective factor. Re-emergence of an impression and recognition of it are

* Huber, 53.

by no means identical conceptions. The confusion of them was long ago censured by the Greek philosophers. Aristotle says distinctly, that memory is more than the bare return of an old image, being at the same time a knowledge about another image, which is no more present; in memory a present image is known as the copy of an earlier one. Memory—*μνημόνευμα*—is no mere image of phantasy—*φάντασμα*—but is connected with the thought that this image is the repetition of an earlier perception.* So also Plotinus says that memory depends, not on the survival of sense-impressions, but on an intellectual activity, the soul being not passive in memory, but active.†

An organ is therefore indispensable, by which the reproduced impressions are also recognised; but this recognition is only possible by comparison, and presupposes that the earlier impression is still present, that is, was not forgotten. The ordinary consciousness does, however, in fact, forget; and we are thus constrained to admit a transcendental consciousness, an organ which not only preserves, but also judges. This organ, as well as all other faculties, may no doubt be ascribed to the carbon atoms; but atoms with such properties are themselves souls, and the materialist escapes from one soul to accept millions of them. And still it remains unaccounted for, how from millions of atoms a *single* consciousness should result. The theory of material brain-traces leaves therefore, at all events, an unexplained residue: recognition and the unity of consciousness; it only

* Aristoteles: 'On Memory,' c. 1 and 2.

† Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 6. 3.

explains less than the soul theory, but this less at a much greater expense of explanatory means, coming in the end to this, that in place of one soul an accepted millions of atoms, indistinguishable from souls, but which, to save appearances, have been rebaptized by a materialistic name. Thus this theory offends against the most elementary rules of logic, and it again appears that even exact methods of research, when they dispense with logic and philosophy, can lead only to scientific license.

In truth, reproduction occurs very often without recollection, as for instance in the already mentioned dream of Scaliger; the distinction between the acts is therefore no arbitrary one, nor a mere ideal division of a process in reality single, but belongs to the nature of the fact. All recollection happens, moreover, according to the laws of association even between psychically dissimilar states. But if ideas can elicit each other of themselves, the indispensable laws of association make the brain-traces superfluous, and the theory is thus guilty of useless multiplication of principles of explanation.

In short, without a psychical organ behind the sense-consciousness, the process of memory is inexplicable, and it is manifestly the simplest hypothesis to regard this organ, the transcendental consciousness, not only as the storehouse of impressions, but likewise as the active principle in the recognition of them.

There can be no right theory of remembering without the right theory of forgetting. The phenomenon of alternating consciousness shows that very clearly. It is only when we know what becomes of an impression

when it is forgotten, that we can answer the question whence it comes to memory.

Now, what is the process of forgetting? It is a disappearance from the normal sense-consciousness. There can be no destruction of the impression, or its reproduction would be impossible. Excluding the brain-trace theory, there must be a psychical organ, preserving *the faculty of reproduction*, even if the impression, as *product* of its earlier activity, should be destroyed. This organ lying beyond the self-consciousness belongs to the unconscious. If, however, this organ had simply the latent faculty of reproduction, and did not rather draw into itself and preserve unchanged the impression as product, we should have again within this organ to distinguish between the conscious and the unconscious. The hypothesis would thus explain nothing, the difficulty being merely pushed back and transposed. There is therefore no alternative but to say that this organ is not in itself at all unconscious, but only so from the standpoint of the sense-consciousness; that it is not merely a latent faculty of reproduction, but takes up into *its* consciousness the impression, as the latter disappears from the external consciousness. By this admission of a transcendental consciousness, the possibility of memory is explained by the mere transposition of the psycho-physical threshold, with every retreat of the boundary between the sense and the transcendental consciousness. If a forgotten impression sank into a real unconscious, it would not be apparent how in memory this unconscious should suddenly become again conscious. The forgotten, therefore, cannot thereby cease to belong to a con-

sciousness, and since forgetting is the disappearance from the sense-consciousness, we must admit the existence of a second. And so to say that an impression is forgotten means that it has passed over from the sense-consciousness to the transcendental.

The two theories may be compared by application of an image. Materialists say that every impression leaves behind a material brain-trace. Every memory would thus amount to an *extension* of the *sense-consciousness*—none other being recognised by the materialist—beyond its former sphere, whereby that old trace is brought to light, being otherwise in darkness. But since in fact it is in the state of *sleep* that memory is exalted, and that the more as the sleep is deeper—that is, the greater the *suppression* of the sense-consciousness—this exaltation cannot depend upon an extension of the sense-consciousness, as if the sun by augmentation of its rays should throw them further into a dark room. This image must be a false one, and we must look about for another. Compelled to admit a double consciousness, and to represent forgetting and recollecting alike as a transition from one consciousness to the other, we are driven to the comparison of the sun in relation to a star. When the sun, the sense-consciousness, enlightens, the star is invisible. Nor does it become visible when the extended light-sphere of the sun reaches it; but on the contrary, it is when the sun goes down (when the sense-consciousness is suppressed) that the light of the star is visible; not that it is now first produced, but that it is now first apparent. The double-consciousness is held together by the bond of a common Subject; that is, to continue

the similitude, sun and star form a double star, and move about a common centre of gravity. In somnambulism, as we have seen, the ordinary consciousness is not only preserved, but by revival of forgotten impressions is completed ; whereas the ordinary consciousness knows nothing of the transcendental, being divided from it by absence of memory.

Whoever is not content with words in the place of ideas, will agree with me that every theory of memory is unintelligible which speaks of impressions becoming unconscious (in forgetting), and becoming conscious again (in recollection). Such a proceeding can, indeed, as Shakespeare says, be on the tongue but not in the brain.*

Now, as this chief difficulty disappears in the theory here represented, that theory is simpler than any other. In forgetting there is nothing whatever changed in the idea, and this has not in some inconceivable way become unconscious, or even obliterated, but something is indeed changed in the Subject of the man. This Subject has a double-consciousness, so that it falls asunder into two persons, and in forgetting, as in remembering, what takes place is simply a transfer of possession of an idea between these two persons. Not the idea is unconscious, but only one of these persons, the Ego of ordinary consciousness, is unconscious as regards the idea. The theory of remembering thus results from the theory of forgetting, and the greater simplicity of this conception is shown also in this, that it does not present two problems, remembering and forgetting, for solution, as if

* [‘Such stuff as madmen
Tongue, and brain not.’—Tr.]

they were two fundamentally different psychical acts, but reduces both problems to one, memory and forgetting alike depending on the continual fluidity of the boundary-line between the two persons of the *one* Subject. Both acts take place only for the sense-consciousness. What we forget is not obliterated as an idea, but remains in the transcendental consciousness ; what we remember is not newly produced as an idea, but only emerges into the sense-consciousness.

CHAPTER II.

THE MONISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL.

1. *The Janus-Aspect of Man.*

THE transcendental-psychological faculties of man are not his normal possession ; they are manifested only in exceptional conditions, which from the standpoint of sense-consciousness and normal existence appear as more or less morbid, but that by no means implies the morbid nature of the faculties themselves. Yet are these exceptional states not to be regarded as a higher condition of man, since the transcendental-psychological faculties are far from completely developed in them, but only emerge as a partial illumination of the psychical world, or like a faint glimmering of the stars in twilight, when they are not yet visible in their pure splendour.

The imperfection of these faculties admits different interpretations of them in relation to their importance ; for either this imperfection is inherent, or it is only that the conditions of their manifestation are insufficient, as twilight is insufficient for the bright light of the stars. In the latter case, the faculties being in themselves complete, and only the conditions of their appearance defective, the problem belongs at once to the philosophy which has to explore the transcendental being of man ; but in the former case,

if these faculties are as incomplete in themselves as they are defective in experience, the problem is in the first instance biological. For even if these faculties have no importance in themselves, and are not to be taken into account for the earthly existence of the individual, they might still be evolutionary, and thus of importance for the race.

In this case we shall understand them by comparison with other indications of the biological process, in common with which they exhibit abnormality, dispensability for the earthly existence, and incomplete development. Now every organism shows such indications, and it is the teaching of Darwin that has thrown light upon them. They are intelligible only from the standpoint of the theory of evolution.

✓ Both views, the philosophical and the biological, must be here examined, and it will then appear whether we have to choose between the two, or whether, perhaps, both are right. A third view is also to be mentioned, since it is an historical one—the mystical. ✓ According to the doctrine of the mystics, man is either an angel who by a metaphysical sin has fallen into earthly existence, or at least a man fallen by sin in paradise, who has lost a higher earlier state, to regain which is his task. So that while for biologists the transcendental-psychological faculties are evolutionary germs, the mystic regards them as rudiments which have not been condemned to utter obliteration, but are rather the plank from which the lost condition can be again reached. We can here pass by the question, whether the individual can attain this condition either wholly or partially within the duration of his earthly life; but admitting that man has this

task, his regeneration is attainable only on the same path of the biological process, which biology assigns to the race. Whether we regard the transcendental-psychological faculties as evolutionary germs or as re-developable rudiments, the end remains the same ; in the one case we have to gain, in the other to regain.

The question, therefore, is of the relation of transcendental-psychology to evolution, and then to philosophy.

The theory of evolution has hitherto drawn only *one* of the conclusions inherent in it respecting man ; the other has been left out of consideration, and yet it is not only the more important, but it also liberates the theory from the false position by which it has fallen into materialism. Materialism has reinforced itself from Darwinism, whereas it will appear that the Evolution theory does not support, but vanquishes, materialism.

Selecting from the evolutionary succession of earthly life-forms any member whatever, two sides of it come into view. Every life-form in its whole organisation, in its structure, instincts, and habits, refers back to the biological past in which it is rooted. Comparison with past animal forms shows the gradual development of Nature. But on the other side, every plant and animal form is again, as it were, prophetic, and shows the direction in which development by modification of structure, by further differentiation of organs, by changes of habits and instincts, will proceed. As in the reptile-like fishes the later kingdom of actual reptiles is, as it were, pre-announced, so in the kingdom of birds by the numerous kinds of

Pterodactyles dug up in the Jura ; the *Amphioxus* is, as it were, a general programme for the succeeding vertebrate kingdom ; and in the family of apes is the final member of the biological evolution announced : man, related by his foot to the gorilla, by his hand to the chimpanzee, by his brain to the ourang—the best proof, by the way, that he descends from no one of these forms.

Now if we would not treat the evolution theory one-sidedly, if we would be logical, we must consider man also from the double point of view. Darwinism has thrown a retrospective glance upon the history of development of the earthly life, but is at no trouble to discover in human nature those indications which are prophetic, and which must be as present with the *existing* final member of evolution, as with every earlier one. As to every product of nature the indications of future development, no less than the rudiments of the past, are attached, so must man also have his Janus-aspect.

But as a further development of physical organisation beyond the human is highly improbable,* it is to psychical indications in man that we have to look for the field of future evolution. Darwinism has thus dealt with but one half of the task prescribed by the doctrine of evolution ; to solve the other, the abnormal functions of the human psyche must be drawn into consideration, and these as appertaining to cognition no less than to will. But as with all earlier life-forms the future development only

* See Wallace's 'Contributions to Natural Selection,' and the author's 'Planetenbewohnern' ('Darwinist. Schr.,' viii., Leipzig, Ernst Günthen Verlag.).

announces itself as from behind a veil, so is it also with man; his more important, biologically prophetic, tendencies can only be seen in germ, and also exceptionally; and we should even antecedently expect that there must be a disturbance in the normal equilibrium of the psychical man, in order that these germinally slumbering tendencies may be disengaged. We have already seen that in dream, somnambulism, in various morbid states, as the delirium of fever, and even in insanity, such phenomena are abundantly observable. In these conditions there come to light capabilities of human consciousness and will which in normal conditions remain latent.

The 'mystical phenomena' of human nature, as Perty names them in his excellent compilation, are thus a necessary consequence of the doctrine of evolution. We must expect, in accordance with analogy, that such germinal tendencies slumber in us, and obtain expression with opportunity.

The above point of view appears to be the only one by which these 'mystical phenomena' can obtain sense and intelligibility. They point prophetically to the future, like organs forming in the embryo, whose functions come partially into operation years later, or like those germs of larva-life which attain maturity only in a later condition. The alternate generation of animals also presents analogous phenomena.

Now even if,—by an unwarrantable restriction,—such phenomena should be recognised as established only when they are reported by physiologists, psychologists, and physicians of the insane, we should still have an extraordinary wealth of material at our disposal. Yet it must be insisted, that the *number*

of such cases can be only of slight importance for the honest investigator. If in the North-German plain but one erratic block had been found, geology would have drawn from it the inference that the glacier-world of the north had once advanced its gigantic tongues thus far. And when the first and then single *Archæopteryx* had been dug out of the Solenhofer slate, all naturalists were agreed that this *one* example proved the descent of birds from reptiles. Honesty therefore demands that just such importance should be ascribed to a well-proved case of extraordinary function in the human psyche, even were it but *one*. Just in that case, indeed, if only one single fact of this kind were uncontested, it would have to be preserved in our handbooks of physiology and psychology as carefully as the *Archæopteryx* in the Museum at London. But honesty demands yet more: if possibly by one such fact our whole materialistic conception of the world should be upset, not only should we not therefore be justified in ignoring it, but rather must it *just therefore*, if possible, be graven upon marble, for on account of its singularity would it be incomparably more important.

About this there can be no doubt, that we encounter facts within our experience which prove that the principles of explanation of our present science must be multiplied, and in regard to which the words of Schelling apply: 'It is no longer speculation, but Nature herself that disturbs the repose of the old hypotheses.'*

Unhappily this honesty towards facts which directly threaten dominant materialistic conceptions is now

* Schelling: A. ix. 362.

very rare. We have laid down a system of the world like a Procrustes-bed. What fits into it is accepted, what does not is misdealt with till it does, or is altogether ignored. Facts shall be accommodated to our understandings, and it is just exact science which substitutes its subjective horizon for the objective horizon of nature, quite regardless of exactitude in the boundary given it. Every professional scholar allows only that to be possible which is possible according to the laws prevailing in his special department, and thinks himself entitled to apply his short measure even to philosophical problems. But to know the world, he needs, not the microscope, but the telescope; and since the world is an organic whole and every separation of special province is arbitrary, and justified only by the limitation of our energies, to every specialist will apply the saying of (I think) Lichtenberg: 'Whoever understands chemistry alone, does not even understand that.'

Scientific integrity, on the other hand, sounds in what Herschel said: 'The perfect observer will keep his eyes open in all divisions of knowledge, that they may be struck at once by every event which according to accepted theories ought *not* to happen, for these are the facts which serve as clues to new discoveries.'* This golden precept is, alas! not followed, because, as Schopenhauer said, a framed hypothesis makes us lynx-eyed for all that confirms it, and blind for all that contradicts it. That is unfortunately only too human, but the searcher after truth loses his superiority if he shares this weakness,

* Herschel: 'Introduction to Study of the Natural Sciences,' § 27.

and if he applies his individual faculty of conception as measure to high Nature, she will never reveal to him her greatness.

Men of science with a larger survey, and who are free from the narrowness of the professional specialist, usually meet with less prejudice phenomena which can only be called 'mystical' from the standpoint of our scarcely awakened understanding of nature. Even cultivated laymen bring to them a greater pliability of intellect than the systematist whose intelligence is often trained into a groove. But with the former also we commonly find that they content themselves with an admission that the facts are 'remarkable,' and a quarter of an hour later have forgotten them, simply because they can make nothing of them.

Science has opened up departments in which all the perceptible phenomena are deducible from a few laws. This achievement is most notable in astronomy. Passing on to more complicated fields of phenomena, she has here also exposed a great number of laws. Our most circumspect men of science are far indeed from asserting that there are no facts which fall outside these principles of explanation; they admit that there are other laws than those which we have skimmed from the bare surface of phenomena in the swift advances of science since the time of Bacon. But for the ordinary materialist, the true principle of science, that everything in nature happens according to law, has been converted into another principle, that everything happens according to such laws as we already know in matter, and that other laws there are not. Facts not to be explained by push and pull shall not

exist. But if mankind had always proceeded on this narrow principle of materialists, we should be now still at the standpoint of the Botocudos ; and it may from this be inferred how far such a principle would bring us on our future way.

From the fact that man's knowledge about the world has received continual additions, it immediately follows that to *every time* other truths are given than those hitherto demonstrable. Nevertheless, every generation has been under the prejudice that it stood on the apex of the pyramid, and has supposed all phenomena of nature to be deducible from just those laws known to it, so that all future generations had the mere subordinate task of dragging new stones on to a structure of which the architectural conception was complete. But true progress is not extensive, but vertical ; and so it has always been such investigators as were free from this prejudice who have been destined to make revolutionary discoveries. In philosophy this prejudice is termed *à priorism*, and 'exact' science has been foremost in casting ridicule upon it. Yet this science, if it fails to see that the far more important part of its task is not to subject further phenomena to known laws, but to discover unknown laws, is quite like the *à priorist* Hegel, who proved that there could not be more than seven planets. 'That which opposes the discovery of truth,' says Schopenhauer,* 'is not the false appearance proceeding from things and misleading to error, nor even immediately the infirmity of intelligence, but preconception, prejudice, setting its *à priori* back to truth, and resembling a contrary wind, which drives back

* Schopenhauer : 'Parerga,' ii. § 17.

the ship from the direction in which alone land lies, so that now helm and sail work in vain.'

It cannot be enough insisted upon, that no phenomena are mystical in a true sense, and that it is only we who are this ; for possibly even one of so great a mind as Aristotle's would have spoken of mysticism had he been told that in this century an instantaneous correspondence between habitants of different quarters of the world would be possible. Under this protest we can retain the word, and inquire how the mystical phenomena are to be explained. When the spiritualist of the Middle Ages interpreted them religiously, or ascribed them to demoniacal influence, that, at least, was only a false exposition ; but far greater is the fallacy when science simply denies them, and that upon *à priori* grounds. The right relation to them lies midway ; we must investigate such phenomena scientifically.

In the whole of nature we find the greatest harmony between the structure of life-forms, their instinctive tendencies, and vital relations, so that from one of these factors the rest can be inferred. Each shows itself an inclusive whole, when it has attained the condition of adaptation. Exceptions are but apparent, only proving that every adaptation is the work of time, that every form occupies a middle station in the kingdom of nature : organs which are more or less obsolescent point to the past ; accordingly germinal indications and psychical beginnings are prophetic of the future. We have no right to make man an exception ; he also according to his middle station has two sides.

If from rudimentary forms of his anatomical

structure we infer his biological past, we are also obliged to recognise abnormal functions of his Psyche as veiled indications of the future. It can at most be asked, to whom this future belongs, there being logically only three possible hypotheses. The mystical phenomena either denote a higher life-form which will one day exalt the race on earth, or, all nature being conceived as a rising scale, we may suppose that such forms are already to be found on other stars ; lastly, our own individual future may be signified in the abnormal faculties.

All three hypotheses are logically admissible, and even compatible ; for if man be destined to emerge, like a butterfly, from his present caterpillar state, when the transcendental faculties, of which in his earthly existence he has but an indistinct glimmering, would be his normal possession, this might easily be the very same result to which the biological process on earth is leading. This direction of the biological process would even be the inevitable one, if, as is always conceivable, the theory of transmigration of souls has a germ of truth. If the transcendental subject were destined to return repeatedly into the earthly existence, if these successive existences were so connected, according to the law of Conservation of Energy, that we brought our moral and intellectual dispositions from one existence to the other, these dispositions and the physical aptitudes being a co-operating factor in the formation of the organism with which we clothed ourselves, then would our individual development have at the same time the aim of preparing the future type of planetary man. But the second hypothesis is also consistent with the other

two ; for from the different ages of the different planets result also differences in the elapsed periods of the biological processes upon them, so that we can suppose both stars which have not yet arrived at the earth's organic stage, and others which have already surpassed it.

The abnormal functions of human consciousness claim therefore the same regard as their counterpart, the rudimentary organs. They cannot be a complete contradiction in the human soul, since such contradictions are to be found in no living being. Nor can it be denied, on the other hand, that they do not quite harmonise with the earthly existence, which could dispense with them. The explanation of them can therefore only lie in the fact that our existence is an intermediate condition. Phenomena of an unconnected and meaningless character in this there cannot be, and it is therefore in the future that we must place their significance. If we leave out of consideration the butterfly of the future, the chrysalis change of the caterpillar will also seem to us meaningless. Whenever we meet with such irrationality we should always be disposed to ascribe it, not to Nature, but to her interpreters.

As the young boar, before his tusks have grown, pushes about him already as if they were there, or as

‘Before the calf’s projecting horns have shown upon its front,
It pushes angrily therewith attacking foes,’*

so similar phenomena, which might be added from the early life and embryo state of organisms, reveal their meaning only to those inquirers who keep the

* Lucretius : ‘De naturâ rerum,’ v. 1034.

future of organisms before their eyes. This, however, is the standpoint which we have to take up in regard to analogous cases from our psychical region, if we would relate man seriously to nature, and would be in earnest with the evolution theory. For as Kant says : ' All natural dispositions of a creature are destined to complete and teleological evolution. With all animals this is confirmed as well by external as by internal or anatomical observation. An organ without a function, an aimless arrangement, is a contradiction to the teleological doctrine of nature ; for if we depart from that principle we have no longer conformity to law, but an aimlessly sportive nature, and disconcerting chance takes the place of the guidance of reason.'*

However highly we may estimate the exaltation of human consciousness through the historical progress of the sciences, the exaltation of those mystical accessions is only to be attained by a biological change in the human life-form, or of the brain, and such, that sensibility is exalted by a further displacement of the threshold. But if the human species is in the biological sense capable of evolution, this disposition must exist also in the single individual, *i.e.*, the threshold of sensibility must be movable. There must thus be the possibility of realising this disposition, of an actual removal of the threshold, and from this must evidently result important conclusions concerning the nature of things, and of man who reacts upon their influence.

It was Anton Mesmer who discovered this capacity of sensibility, and he was very clear as to the results

* Kant, vii. 1, 319.

to which it led. He adduces examples from the displacement of the threshold of taste and smell.*

Now if sleep is the condition of this displacement, the degree of the latter must depend on the depth of the former, the magnetic sleep being thus especially favourable. But this phenomenon can only be utilised for science when the sleeper can inwardly awaken and communicate his feelings. This happens in somnambulism. Mesmer does not speak of this in his books, but from his Aphorisms it is clear that he knew it.† He kept silence upon this knowledge, as did formerly the Egyptian and Grecian priests of the temple of Æsculapius. This is expressly confirmed by his pupil Christian Wolfart, tutor at the Berlin University.‡

The mystical phenomena thus become intelligible from the movability of the threshold of sensibility. They are transcendental faculties, reactions of the soul, conformable to law, on external influences which remain normally unconscious because going on below the threshold. When these influences are unfelt, there is also no reaction, and therefore it is one and the same threshold which hides from our consciousness the transcendental world, and from our self-consciousness the transcendental subject.

The mystical phenomena of the soul-life are therefore anticipations of the biological process, and so there is an intimate connection between Darwinism and transcendental psychology.

Darwinism has become a determining idea for the

* Mesmer: 'Aphorismen,' §§ 250-252, 255, 259-261, 263, 282, 283.

† *Ibid.*, §§ 254-257, 264.

‡ Wolfart: 'Erläuterungen zum Mesmerismus,' Vorrede.

natural science of our day. I have truly nothing to object to this, and prejudice against this doctrine can scarcely be imputed to me, since in both my treatises on the *Philosophy of Astronomy** I have not only attempted to prove indirect teleological selection within cosmical physics, and to sketch cosmical biology in the sense of a monistic theory of development, but am also much disposed to accept the capability for evolution of the transcendental Subject in the sense of a metaphysical Darwinism. But it is not to be denied that, in our feverish anxiety to measure nature with the Darwinian scale, we are in danger of forgetting that Darwinism is only one half of the Evolution theory, and that thus it does not offer us the only and decisive word, when the question is of man's place in nature. It is a merely arbitrary proceeding, to accept a theory, but to detach from it its weightiest consequences. That, however, is what is done by the materialists, therein resembling people who retail an anecdote but forget the point.

We can now turn to the philosophical consideration of the transcendental faculties, in which they appear as anticipations of our future existence.

2. *The Transcendental Subject.*

The materialistic hypothesis that the human mind is dependent on corporal matter, primarily the brain, is supported by as many phenomena as the opposite spiritualistic hypothesis, which makes body depend

* 'Entwicklungsgeschichte des Weltalls,' Leipzig, Ernst Günther, 1882. 'Die Planetenbewohner,' Leipzig, Ernst Günther, 1880.

on mind. It follows that there is no general causal connection between body and mind, neither being conditioned by the other, but that there is merely a parallelism of their changes, which is only possible if both are derivative from a common cause; we must therefore accept a pre-established harmony in the sense of Leibnitz.

The dualism of body and mind is only a special case of the dualism of matter and force, to resolve which is the task of natural philosophy, and only secondarily of transcendental psychology. If the dualism of matter and force is resolvable, is thus not objective in the nature of things, it must reside subjectively in the nature of the Psyche. Matter and force in their disunion, as dead matter and immaterial force, are mere abstractions of the mind, are therefore never in experience found apart, and their apparent dualism is referable to a dualism in our powers of perception, since it pertains to the position of the psycho-physical threshold whether the force side or the material side of the nature of things is perceived, they being always present together, and only distinguishable in thought. Every force acting upon us must thus have its material side, even if it is not sensible to us. What is for us insensible is not therefore immaterial. And it is only a being for whom the action of some forces does not pass the threshold of sensibility, for whom they are thus not sensibly, but only intelligibly apprehended, that can accomplish this ideal separation of force and matter; such abstractions, on the other hand, being impossible to a being that is not dualised by a threshold of sensibility, for whom therefore all forces acting on

him would arrive at sense perception. For such a being even thought directed upon him must be represented materially, resembling, perhaps, an hallucination. Where, on the contrary, there is a threshold of sensibility, it must depend on the intensity of the action whether we perceive nothing or have palpable matter.

Until this view prevails, we have no right to call ourselves monists; but least of all is materialism monistic, for force and matter are its last words in the analysis of every natural phenomenon, and thus it remains in a dualism which for it is unresolvable. It moreover appears that exact science itself leads to the monistic conception in the above sense. In the writings of Crookes and Jaeger* there seems to be already indicated a physical and chemical science, in which force and matter no longer appear as heterogeneous things, inextricably coupled, but only as the extreme terminal forms on *one* line. If, however, the dualism of matter and force is suppressed, all metaphysic must from the standpoint of another faculty of perception be only physics, and the question, whether to man metaphysical insight into the nature of things be possible, must be answered in the affirmative, if the threshold of his sensibility should prove to be displaceable.† But this is the case in somnambulism; in which condition, therefore, forces are sensibly perceptible, as, for instance, the odic streams of light connected with magnetic passes. We cannot, however, assign the boundary of the possible; and

* Crookes: 'Radiant Matter.' Jaeger: 'Die Neuralanalyse' ('Entdeckung der Seele,' ii.), Leipzig, 1884.

† [This must not be taken to mean that the 'thing-in-itself' is penetrable, *i.e.*, that ontology is attainable, by any possible sense, *all* sensible representation being necessarily phenomenal.—Tr.]

if all matter is visible force, and all force invisible matter, it will then depend simply on the position of the threshold, whether I can read the thought of another, or whether I not even feel its impact.

Thus if materialists apply to the conception of matter just the scale of human sensibility, holding reality and perceptibility to be coincident, that is purely arbitrary, with equal right could matter be measured by the scale of another sensibility, with the assertion that there is neither gaseous nor fluid matter, and that only such things are material by which a head can be broken. But it is just as inadmissible to conceive as supersensuous, in the spiritualistic meaning, what is imperceptible; for from the standpoint of another sensibility the hippopotamus might be called supersensuous.

Our senses, therefore, are a quite arbitrary and relative scale by which to assign the boundary between matter and force, body and mind. Each sensibility—that is, each threshold of sensibility, draws the boundary at a different place. Below all senses there must be the insensible, and the aggregate conditions of solid, fluid, and gaseous are only condensed products of a fourth aggregate condition, which Faraday and Crookes term radiant matter, and in which matter—from the standpoint of our sensibility,—appears volatilised into bare force.

The ultimate elements of matter thus require to be highly condensed in order to be perceptible by our sensibility. But the more the material side of a thing presents itself to us, as in a block of granite, the more its force side disappears from us, and we then speak of dead matter. The more, on the other

hand, the force side emerges, as, for instance, in thought, the more its material side disappears, and we then speak of immaterial forces. But it is quite inadmissible to regard this ideal distinction of force and matter, mind and body, as a real separation, and to hypostasize these two sides of a thing as independent.

The normal condition of man depends on the normal position of the threshold of his sensibility, which determines the given boundary for him between force and matter. Now, as by every displacement of the threshold this boundary also is displaced, the solution of the dualism between force and matter must result from the study of transcendental psychology in the special case of the opposition of body and mind ; since the transcendental Subject must be regarded as the common cause of body and mind. If I think a thought, this is a proceeding of which only the force side lies in my self-consciousness ; on the other hand, could this process be observed from without, what would be perceived would be merely molecular changes in a brain, the material side of the process alone being visible. The interior observer will the more easily incline to spiritualism, and deny the material side ; the external observer more to materialism, and to denial of the force side. In truth, the two sides of the process are indivisible.

If by the displacement of the threshold in somnambule conditions there ensue not only new influences of things upon us, but also new reactions of our Subject upon these influences, our psychical Subject therein shows itself in greater extension than in waking. Therefore in our self-consciousness is re-

vealed, not our whole Subject, but only our Ego posited in the phenomenal world, only those psychical reactions to which occasion is given by the influence of sensibly perceptible things, while those faculties which correspond to influences remaining below the threshold remain ordinarily latent. We have therefore to distinguish our transcendental Subject from the Ego, the self-consciousness of sense. Now in this Subject, *à priori* to our whole sense-phenomenon, the dualism between our organism and organically mediated consciousness is certainly annulled; but in its place there arises only another and deeper dualism, that between the transcendental being on the one side, and our organic phenomenal form with its sense-consciousness on the other side. In this dualism a geometrical problem is thus as it were changed into a stereometric one, and the task is now before us, first closely to show the existence of this stereometric dualism, but then to resolve it monistically.

Not only philosophy, especially Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious, but the natural sciences themselves, in their investigations concerning reflex movement, the curative force of Nature, instinct, genius, unconscious inferences in sense-perception, etc., have sunk posts to some depth into the dark region of the Unconscious, raising long since a suspicion that the weightiest problems may there issue in solution, and particularly the question how the Unconscious is to be conceived, whether pantheistically, or individually through proof of a transcendental Subject, with readoption of the doctrine of soul in a modified form. If in this Unconscious a Will side is encountered, we shall first fall into the

arms of Schopenhauer ; if, on the other hand, we encounter ideation, the tendency will be first to Hartmann. But if both aspects are demonstrable in our Unconscious—and otherwise it certainly ceases to be individual—then between our sensuous phenomenal form, and the still thinkable all-one World-being, a transcendental Subject will be interposed. But from this all-one World-Substance a merely willing transcendental Subject would differentiate itself much less distinctly than one which was also ideational, and therefore in transcendental-psychological researches the accent must be rather upon the ideational side, *i.e.*, prominence must be given to the dualism between sense-consciousness and transcendental consciousness, even should the monistic solution of this opposition be thereby rendered more difficult.

Transcendental psychology has therefore chiefly to investigate the transcendental consciousness lying beyond the normal consciousness, as the former is observable in exceptional cases by the displacement of the threshold of sensibility. Its manifestation being, as a rule, at the expense of the sense-consciousness, in sleep and related conditions, sleep it is, or rather dream occurring in sleep, that forms the portal to the dark region where we are to find the metaphysical root of man.

It has already been remarked, that one very usual phenomenon of sleep-life forces the inquirer in this direction. That is, since every dialogue in dream is evidently only a dramatised monologue arising from a severance of the dreaming Subject, it is logically thinkable and psychologically possible that the human Subject might even in reality be dualised

into two persons, of which one only would be accessible to our self-consciousness. It is thus by appeal to a fact of nightly experience that the possibility is first expressed that the sundering of one Subject into two persons might be the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man. The inquiry concerning 'dramatic self-sundering in dream' is thus the foundation of all transcendental-psychology.

But through the further inquiry concerning 'the metaphysical application of Dream,' to the bare *possibility* of a transcendental Subject in us, is now added its great *probability*. As the consciousness, so also the self-consciousness can only in course of gradual biological evolution adapt itself to its object. The principle of the psycho-physical threshold of sensibility, which, since Fechner, has played so large a part in the theory of consciousness, must thus be applied to that special case of consciousness which we name the self-consciousness.

The falling asunder of our Subject into two persons would, however, be not only possible and probable, but it would be certain, and would be therefore the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man, were faculties of the soul, exceeding those of the sense-consciousness, demonstrable. In this case the *reality* of the transcendental Subject would be proved. Even for this our past inquiries have prepared us. In the chapter on 'The Transcendental Measure of Time,' we have learnt to know this Subject in relation to the *form of cognition*. The doctrine of Kant, that time is a form of our consciousness, was confirmed, but so far limited to the sense-consciousness as the swift course of representations in dramatic dreams affords experimental

proof of a transcendental measure of time. This result has value also in another respect. For Kant says, that in all phenomena only so much true science is to be found as they contain mathematics, that therefore the doctrine of the soul remains remote from the rank of a true science, because mathematic is not applicable to the laws of the inner sense, for one would have to bring into statement the law of continuity in the flow of its inner representations . . . for the pure inner intuition, in which the phenomena of the soul should be constructed, is time, which has only one dimension.* But now if we see that these representations do not always run off with equal rapidity, and that in dream there takes place in them a process of condensation, we are led to suspect a relation between the rapidity of the flow, on the one side, and the strength of the excitation, as well as the not in all conditions similar sensibility, on the other side. The hope, justified moreover by Fechner's Psycho-physics, may therefore be entertained that the doctrine of the soul also may still be capable of mathematical treatment.

But even in regard also to the *content of the cognition*, the reality of a transcendental Subject has already resulted from the foregoing chapters. In that on

'Dream a Physician' it has been shown to possess a cognitional content which is wanting to the sense-consciousness. It is indifferent to the main purpose, whether we refer these inner representations to the ganglionic system itself, which plays so large part in somnambulism, or whether we will recognise only

* Kant: 'Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,' Vorrede.

the brain as an organ of ideation. In the latter case the ganglionic system would be simply the place of origin of those excitations which are at the foundation of the new cognitional matter, while these excitations, the ganglia being no longer isolated from the brain, would be transmitted to the latter, and would there evoke their echo, as it were, in the form of ideas. Now since for this brain the ideas emerge from the unconscious,* they must unavoidably take on the form of the dramatic sundering of the Ego, that is, be placed in the mouth of the inspiring guides and guardian spirits of the somnambulists. That happens in fact very often, but not always, and therefore the question as to the organ of these ideas remains an open one.

The explanatory formula of the 'dramatic sundering of the Ego' has therefore a remarkable double aspect. On the one hand it has a highly sceptical application; for if in dream the dreamer's Subject can apparently fall asunder into two persons, the guardian spirits of the somnambulists can be similarly explained. But if in the somnambulant dream should be mingled ideas which could not have had their origin in the sense-consciousness, we must, whether they take the form of dialogue or not, admit an Ego lying behind the self-consciousness, an *alter Ego*, and then the severance of the Subject into two persons would be truly the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man. Now, 'Dream as physician' has exhibited ideas of this foreign nature; thus must our

* [That is, are not associated with any antecedent consciousness. It seems desirable to point to this as the test of ideas, etc., impelled into the consciousness mediated by the normal organ.—Tr.]

Subject necessarily exceed the periphery of self-consciousness, that is, the reality of the transcendental Subject is proved.

Finally, in the chapter on 'Memory,' we have had to attribute to the transcendental Subject a peculiar cognitional content. It has thereby become manifoldly clear that psychical man can be subjected to experiment. We can thus entertain the hope that psychology also will attain the rank of an experimental science, on an equality with physics and chemistry. Only so, however—as appears from the chapter on 'Somnambulism'—shall we be able to solve the riddle of man. As certain as it is that without these means that riddle must always remain dark, so probable is it that with this aid of experimental psychology we shall yet solve it, in agreement with that fine sentence of Bacon's: 'As the genius of a man is not known or valued till it is excited to display; or as Proteus did not assume his different forms till it was attempted to bind him, so Nature, stimulated and confined by art, shows herself more manifestly than when abandoned to herself.'*

Now, the condition in which the Protean transcendental Subject can be stimulated is somnambulism. It is not alone animal magnetism which can awaken this condition; there are other causes which also introduce it: as disturbances of the cerebral life, a high tension of imaginative power, profound internal agitation, and likewise inspiration of certain vapours, the use of different vegetable substances, and the influence of minerals. So that somnambulism is by no means historically confined to the knowledge of

* Bacon: 'De Augmentis Scientiarum,' 51, 2.

animal magnetism. We find it in all times. Somnambulism is the fundamental form of all mysticism. It explains to us different phenomena of remote and classical antiquity, it delivers to us the key to the understanding of the most remarkable documents of mankind : the Vedas and the Bible. But especially is it the period of mediæval culture, from the comprehension of which our modern enlightenment is more remote than ever, which we learn to understand in the study of somnambulism. Without this, not only enchantment and witchcraft, but also Christian mysticism, remain problematic ; for it is from somnambulism that magic of whatever quality sets out.

Although the foregoing inquiries yield not much more than the bare proof of a transcendental Subject, nevertheless their results have already supplied sufficient data for gradually laying the foundation for that conception of the world which results from the premisses hitherto obtained.

If there is no true dualism of force and matter, then neither can the transcendental Subject be a pure spiritual being, nor the transcendental world a pure immaterial world. There can thus be no pure spiritual rapport between this being and this world, but transcendental physics on the side of nature will awaken transcendental psychology on the side of the Subject.

As, then, to our sense-organism correspond the laws of physics known to us, so to our transcendental Subject correspond those properties of things, conformable to law, which for us are transcendental, and can only be perceptible by a displacement of the threshold of sensibility (whether through somnam-

bulism or through biological exaltation), whereby the barrier of our present sensibility is thrust back ; for biologically, it is only a question of time, when the supersensuous will obtain sensible evidence, and the transcendental faculties will become normal.

Following the lead of a celebrated man of science, there is in recent times much talk of the bounds of natural knowledge, because there are still men of science who consider it unnecessary to study Kant. Kant has shown that and why there are not bounds of natural knowledge, but certainly limits,* and that the difference between these two conceptions is very real and important. He says: 'As long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous, determinate bounds to it are inconceivable. In mathematic and in natural philosophy human reason admits of limits, but not of bounds, viz., that something indeed lies without it at which it can never arrive, but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal progress. The enlarging of our views in mathematic, and the possibility of new discoveries, are infinite ; and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws, by continued experience and its rational combination. But limits cannot be mistaken here, for mathematic refers to *phenomena* only, and what cannot be an object of

* ['Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a space existing outside a certain determinate place, and enclosing it ; limits do not require this, but are mere negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is not absolutely complete.'—Kant's 'Proleg.', § 57. I have had recourse here, and in the text, to Mr. Mahaffy's translation of Kant's 'Prolegomena,' though our word 'limits' does not seem to give the full sense of the German 'Schränken' in this place, nor to express the distinction from 'bounds' (Grenzen).—Tr.]

sensuous intention, such as the concepts of metaphysic and morals, lie entirely without its sphere, and it can never lead to them.*

Limits of natural knowledge are therefore given by the very nature of our organ of cognition, sense, and brain, and are only surpassable so far as there is a shiftability of the threshold of sensibility. Boundaries of natural knowledge can be overcome in the historical progress of science, because herein 'the knowledge of nature is homogeneous;' limits, on the other hand, apart from somnambulic conditions, can only be overcome biologically.† In somnambulism the limit is individually movable, in the process of nature biologically; at the foundation of both processes is the movability of the threshold in relation to consciousness. Thus in somnambulism we belong

* Kant: 'Prolegomena,' § 57.

† [Kant, however, was speaking of the distinction between phenomena and 'things-in-themselves.' The biological process might indeed, by providing new subjective conditions of perception, bring within the field of phenomena *for us* what are at present no such objects; but this enlargement of the sphere of our cognition would not reveal the thing-in-itself, in place of the mere 'object,' unless our cognition ceased to be conditioned by forms (Time and Space) which are referable to the Subject. And though Kant distinctly recognised the *possibility* of an understanding other than ours, which should be *intuitive* of the thing in itself, exempt altogether from the necessity of determination by sense for intuition of objects (and which would thus penetrate to the very truth and being of things), it would be a complete misconception of his meaning to suppose that any exaltation of sensibility, or any alteration of the subjective *measure* of time, revealing a new phenomenal world, would transcend the '*limit*' of cognition, or do more than push back its provisional boundaries. The author is undoubtedly right in quoting Kant against those who talk of irremovable boundaries of knowledge, when they mean that our present sensuous cognition cannot be transcended; but on the other hand, the 'limit' affirmed by Kant is not surpassable by any 'biological process.'—Tr.]

individually to that transcendental world* which must also be disclosed by biological exaltation of consciousness.

Biological exaltation of consciousness signifies a gradual adaptation to the as yet still transcendental order of things ; in this adaptation there must therefore happen an approximation to the condition of consciousness of those beings who belong to that transcendental order of things. We are ourselves, however, as Subjects, in this position ; the biological exaltation can therefore only take place by appropriation from the transcendental consciousness. The sixth sense of the eventual man of the future could only be such as we already possess as transcendental beings ; it is one and the same world in which we are as transcendental beings, and to which the future man will be adapted. Both somnambulism and the biological process change stimuli below the threshold into feelings above it. Therefore in the faculties of somnambulists lie not only veiled indications of the nature of our Subject, but also of the future earthly life-form, and—as far as this may be elsewhere already realised—of the inhabitants of other stars.

The reader who is acquainted with my work on ‘The Inhabitants of Planets,’ will now understand that by this work I was necessarily introduced to the problem of mysticism ; no great mental transition being required to see that our abnormal faculties might be normal for other beings ; and especially from the standpoint of the Evolution theory, the extension, cosmically, of the conception of the movable

* [Which is not to be confounded with the *noumenal* world.—Tr.]

threshold of human sensibility in abnormal states, and in the biological process, is very natural. Therewith is the ground-plan sketched for a monism of the cosmical life, showing an interior connection of the different phenomenal forms of life in the kosmos, as physical astronomy has restored an outer connection for the scene of life by the discovery of gravitation, and the proof by spectral analysis of the similarity of cosmical substances.

If there takes place biological adaptation to the same transcendental world to which we as Subjects already belong, the identity of both worlds being apparent from the fact that this Subject is the true quintessence and supporter of our phenomenal earth-form, then must this quintessence, as the monistic cause at once of our bodily phenomenon and of our earth-consciousness, determine, both organically and mentally, the future man, and conduct him further and further into the transcendental mode of existence. The difficulty that we are so disposed to think of every supersensuous existence as immaterial, and of every material existence as one of gross substance, disappears when we recognise the dualism of force and substance as existing only for the mode of perception. If force and substance are only two inseparable sides of one thing, we cannot disclaim materiality altogether for our transcendental Subject, even if only in the sense of a fourth aggregate condition ; we can but conceive in the bosom of the biological future an organism of a mode of existence like that of our Subject. If thus considering the question we proceed from nature, we can already recognise in the succession of her kingdoms, from the stone, through the

vegetable and animal up to man, a continual material attenuation ; proceeding from the transcendental Subject, we cannot logically represent its existence, as we attain to it in death, as diametrically different from the earthly. The distinction between the condition before and after death must be taken to be as slight as it is admissible to think it ; according to logical rules, it is the greater, not the lesser, difference which requires proof. But this difference is relatively small if there is no dualism of force and matter, and so the latter must be attributed to the transcendental Subject ; whereas it would be great were the transcendental being a purely spiritual nature. Of a pure spirit, however, we can form no conception, as Kant shows in the beginning of his 'Dreams of a Ghost-Seer ;' immortality first becomes conceivable when we reject all dualism of force and matter, body and mind. Beckers says : 'The bare general conception of immortality, without any conception of the how, can have no scientific signification ; were it therefore really impossible scientifically to conceive post-mortem existence, immortality must be given up altogether as an object of possible knowledge, for both doctrines stand in indissoluble connection, the "if" not being here to be solved without the "how." '*

Now, if we drop the dualism of force and matter, this 'how' will no more be quite unintelligible ; but the transcendental existence will be brought still nearer to the earthly if we consider that the faculties of that existence are not first acquired at death, but

* Beckers : 'Mittheilungen aus Valentin Löschers,' etc., ii., Vorrede, Augsburg, 1835.

are already unconsciously possessed, and that in somnambulism, as an anticipation of death, we have already an intimation of them. Death cannot bring about a fundamental change in our physical substance, contradicting the continuity which we find in all nature; but it can indeed disclose latent faculties, since it removes the obstacle to their disclosure. Now, this obstacle is the bodily organisation and its consciousness; the somnambulic faculties do not obtain expression by means of the body, but in spite of it; it is therefore superfluous ballast for the supporter of our transcendental faculties, as for the future biological life-form. To both the latter we can only attribute such a materiality as from the standpoint of our gross senses would appear bare force. This representation of the future man does not, indeed, admit of strict proof. If biological progress on the earth should be historically solved (perhaps on the condition of continual brain-development), then could transcendental psychology and Darwinism be harmonised with Schelling's doctrine of immortality, which rests on the idea of a succession of *three* conditions of the collective human life; the first step being the present one-sided natural life, the second the one-sided spiritual mode of existence, the third the union of the natural and the spiritual life.* In this third life the transcendental faculties would thus be in normal possession within a planetary mode of existence.

As for the condition of the Subject, so also for that of the transcendental world, the least possible difference from the world of sense must be adopted; it cannot be *toto genere* different from the latter, but

* Beckers: 'Die Unsterblichkeitslehre Schellings,' 56-58.

must in its sort be likewise material. If we would be really monists, and would drop the dualism of force and matter, we must assent to Schelling's statement that 'every other or spiritual world must in its nature be as physical as this present physical world in its nature is spiritual.'* A closer representation of that world is, however, not possible, because it would require senses corresponding to it. There still sticks to us the prejudice derived from the catechism, of conceiving the transcendental world as a kingdom of spirits, and as a 'beyond' specially separated from the 'here ;' and now because this conception has been exploded by modern science, we have 'shaken out the child with the bath,' and are become materialists. But as the transcendental Subject is itself in us, and rules the unconscious soul-life, so also is the transcendental world in the world of sense. The 'beyond' is only a beyond for our threshold of sensibility, a mere complementary part of the here ; as biologically constituted, we are only adapted to *this* part of the here, while the beyond is related to our cognitional apparatus as the experimentally provable prolongations of the solar spectrum to the eye, whose adaptation has extended only to the rainbow colours. We cannot limit the conception of the threshold of sensibility to the particular senses, but must have regard to our total organisation as a limit to cognition. As the oyster, for instance, possesses in its organism a threshold which shuts it out from the greater part of our sensible world, so also the human organism forms a thresho'd against the transcendental world. Of a spatial beyond we can only so far speak as, combining

* Schelling : Werke, A. ix. 94.

Kant and Darwin, we must recognise in space-dimensions biologically acquired cognitional forms, so that we approach the thought of a fourth dimension into which the transcendental world would still extend itself. If our organism draws a barrier across the actual, that concerns not only our particular senses, but also their central seat, the brain, with its cognitional forms of space and time. Other grounds, moreover, there are for the hypothesis of a fourth dimension ; Kant contributes philosophical, Gauss and Riemann mathematical, and Zöllner cosmological, reasons for it, and with such patronage it can dispense with the approval of the so-called 'enlightened.'

The question, from how much of reality the threshold of sensibility shuts us off, must refer not only to consciousness, but also to self-consciousness. That is to say, it is one and the same threshold which excludes the transcendental world as also the transcendental Subject. Kant himself was very clear upon this. In relation to self-consciousness, he has, as we shall see later on, set up the profound distinction of our Subject from our Person ; in relation to consciousness, however, he says :

'As it cannot be said that something is a part of a whole, if it has no connection whatever with the other parts (for otherwise there would be no discoverable difference between a true and an imaginary union), but the world is truly composite ; a substance unconnected with anything in the whole world will belong not at all to the whole world—it is no part of it. If there are many such beings out of connection with things of the world, but having relation among themselves, there arises from them another particular

whole ; they form a whole particular world. That is therefore not truly said which is taught in the lecture-rooms of philosophy, that in metaphysical understanding only one world can exist. . . . The mistake here made has arisen inevitably from the fact that the explanation of the world has not been kept strictly in view. For the definition includes that only in a world which is truly related with other things ; but the theory forgets this limitation, and speaks of all things in general existing.* Here Kant removes all requirement of a habitat for the transcendental Subject.

Now, since this other world, to which as beings of sense we are not related, but to which as Subjects we belong, must be thought as likewise in its nature material, the like being true also of our Subject, the transcendental psychological faculties lose their miraculous character and receive a natural one. Those forces, conformable to law, which govern the supersensuous world, are the same by means of which the Subject in that world informs itself and acts. The law of causality avails, therefore, also for this supersensuous world and its relation to our Subject ; only that the conception of causality must be widened, and cannot be merely concerned with forces of the world of sense. It is the application of this false scale of our known natural laws to the transcendental world which suggests that hackneyed phrase of rationalism, that the phenomena of somnambulism contradict the laws of Nature. They contradict only the laws of the sensuous half of the world, but

* Kant : 'Von dem wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte,' § 8.

in their nature are just as conformable to law as the fall of a stone. It is therefore thoroughly unwarrantable to attempt to discredit them by the term miracles. What is a miracle from the standpoint of one half of the world can belong to law from the standpoint of the universe. The clairvoyance of somnambules is therefore a miracle for 'enlightened' journalists, much as telegraphy is a miracle for savages. In this sense Augustine long ago defined miracle when he said, 'A miracle does not happen in contradiction to nature, but in contradiction to that which is known to us of nature.'* So Kant: 'If it is asked, what we are to understand by miracles, they can be defined (since the question really refers to what they are *for us*, that is, for our practical reason) as events in the world, the operative laws of whose causes are, and must remain, utterly unknown to us.† Only the transcendental operative laws must, however, 'remain utterly unknown' to us; on the other hand, there is no miracle if the question is only as to an historically or even merely individually drawn boundary of natural knowledge in relation to modes of operation within the empirical world.

The condition of sense-consciousness depends on the retention of the threshold of sensibility in its normal position; the mystical phenomena of the human soul can therefore only be explained by the movability of this threshold. Only thus is it conceivable that our cognitional forms can be modified, that we can experience heterogeneous influences of things, and can heterogeneously react upon them;

* Augustinus: 'De civitate Dei,' xxi. 8.

† Kant, x. 101 (Rosenkranz).

in short, that the veil can be lifted which hides the transcendental world from consciousness, and the transcendental Subject from self-consciousness.

Upon the basis now obtained, we can gradually proceed to investigate the relation of the 'here' to the 'beyond,' and to explore the problem of death—that mystery which stands at the partition of the two worlds. To this end some further excursion will still be necessary.

The self-inspection of somnambulists could not be critical without the possession of a standard of comparison; that is, without the conception of the normal bodily system; the prognosis of somnambulists would not be possible without intuitive knowledge of the laws of the inner life; the prescriptions of somnambulists would be of no value if they did not come from the same Subject which accomplished the critical inspection and knew the laws of the development of disease. But all these phenomena would be impossible, *were not the transcendental Subject at the same time the organising principle in us.* But it does not follow from this that a metaphysical principle is set up in place of the factors of Darwinian evolution; the significance and operation of these factors remain quite undiminished and undisturbed by our reduction of them to mere means of which the organising principle avails itself. This principle must respect the laws of the matter on which it is to act, and therefore can itself only be expressed in conformity to law.

With the transcendental Subject thus revive two problems—Teleology and Vital Force—which are prescribed indeed in modern science, but they by no

means revive in the old form. In the long strife of opinions on this point I can see only an idle verbal contention, as conceptions are notoriously very ductile, and the first question is what we mean by Teleology and Vital Force, which can both be so conceived as to avoid the objections of opponents. It is wholly illogical to set up the conformability of matter to law as contradicting teleology. The contrary to teleology is chaos, but not conformity to law, which is rather in itself first rightly teleological, and all the more as the mechanism is the more perfect. The better the mechanism of a watch, the more perfect is its teleology.

Just as little is the vital force to be conceived as opposed to the laws of organic matter. Materialists think they have disposed of the vital force when they resolve it into its factors, whereas it is just those factors which it includes in itself. The sum 12 is not disposed of by showing that in it are the ingredients $4 + 5 + 3$. The organism consists of material substances, and the material forces act in it. But these forces act in the organic kingdom convergently, and mechanically produce a teleological product. Chaos must be declared permanent without such a teleological principle in the organism; and if chaos could be overcome for the mechanism of nature at all, this nature must have succeeded in just the opposite direction to the exaltation of organism. Let us first hear a man of science upon this.

Professor Barnard says: 'Supposing that all the substances of which the earth consists were thrown together in their elementary form, it is possible that with the first operation of affinity there would be

many weak combinations ; but it is also certain that these must successively give place to stronger ones, till all were united in forms having the absolute maximum of *stability*, unless the process was arrested by a stiffening of the masses making further movement impossible. But in the combinations arising during the growth of animals and plants, *just the opposite* of the process takes place ; that is, we see a rising from the lower to the higher level, the introduction of the weaker instead of the stronger, the non-stable instead of the stable. And animal combinations—that is, those which are formed when the type of life is highest—are as a rule far less stable than the vegetable ones. The presence of the life-principle in organised bodies causes the physical forces, effecting the changes in such bodies, to act in a manner in which they do not act as soon as this fails.*

Thus, if we analyse the changes in our organism, we first encounter physical substances and forces. It is not only false to set up a vital force in place of these, but it is also false to introduce among them such a vital force as co-ordinately active on the same level. We do not find the vital principle on the same level with the natural forces, but first deeper, behind the natural forces, and these are subordinate to it, as the law of gravitation is subordinate to the architect when he constructs an arch. It can be shown that this arch consists materially of lime, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, etc. ; but that is not to say that the arch has arisen of itself.

In the inorganic kingdom, therefore, we find tend-

* Barnard : ' Progrès des Sciences.'

ency to stability ; in the organic kingdom, notwithstanding that the substances and forces are the same, tendency to instability, differentiation, organic exaltation. Therefore in the organic kingdom must necessarily be given a principle comprehending these forces, utilising and subjecting them ; not a vital force among these forces, but a vital principle behind them. Indirectly this is proved by the fact that the problem of life even more evinces its scientific insolubility, only materialists holding it for solved, because they confound the conditions without which life does not appear, with the causes of its appearance. The direct proof of the vital principle lies on the other hand in this, that in its absence there are no organic forms, notwithstanding that the substances and forces are the same. Had we in both kingdoms these same substances and forces without a *plus* on the side of the organic kingdom, organic parts could not always appertain only to organisms, and it must at least as accidental misformation be possible, that boughs of trees should terminate in finger-ends, or eyes and ears occur in plants.

If, as the older vitalists asserted, there existed a vital force co-ordinated with the other forces of matter, then would it only act like these, uniformly according to definite plan.* Therefore must we seek this life-principle, not within the course of nature, but behind it in the transcendental region. This conclusion is unavoidable. For organisms can be regarded in two different ways—causally, by the man of science, and teleologically, by philosophers ; and the latter all the

* Hartmann : 'Gesammelte Studien und Aufsätze über die Lebenskraft.'

more, that the factors of Darwinian evolution are quite unable to elicit other characteristics than those which are for the time most favourable. That this antinomy of the judgment, this duality of the point of view in regard to organised beings, actually exists, has been proved by Kant,* and his reasons, being logical, will always remain valid. But antinomies find their solution only in a deeper region than that in which they are present, as geometrical antinomies are only stereometrically resolved. Now, if in the organic kingdom the mechanical and the teleological judgment are alike unavoidable, while each yet seems to make the other superfluous, the principle which makes both explanations possible must be sought in a region outside them both, thus outside the representation of Nature, yet containing the ground of that. As, therefore, the principle is sought in which the two heterogeneous principles of explanation agree and originate, Kant—not with a mere subjective logic, but investigating the faculty of reason itself—comes to the conclusion: ‘Now, the common principle of the mechanical on the one side, and of the teleological derivation on the other, is the *super-sensuous* which we must place beneath the nature of phenomena.’†

We have now the materials for a definition of this life-principle. It is transcendental nature, and as in somnambulism it exhibits the faculty of critical self-inspection and curative functions, it must also be the organising principle in us, thus a willing not less than a cognitive being. In a word, the life-principle in us is the transcendental Subject. Its transcen-

* Kant: ‘Kritik der Urtheilskraft,’ §§ 63-65.

† *Ibid.*, § 77.

dental faculties are not mediated by the sense-organism, but are evinced in spite of it ; they are not effects of this organism ; for, from every monistic point of view, on the contrary, the organism with its apparatus of sense must be the product of this transcendental Subject, which fashions the organism according to the laws of matter and governs its functions. As organising principle in us, it is for the organism, *à priori*, prior to it, from which it necessarily follows that our earthly phenomenal form is only a transitory form of the transcendental Subject.

We can now first determine the significance of death for the transcendental Subject ; the organism of sense is necessary for it as the means of just that mode of operation and knowledge in the phenomenal world, which is our mode ; but not for operation and knowledge in general. The senses determine the quality of the consciousness, but not the capacity for consciousness, as coloured spectacles determine the quality of seeing, but not sight in general. Since the transcendental faculties are independent of the apparatus of sense, and even presuppose its possibility, the falling away of this apparatus in death cannot affect our true being. Death deprives us of sense-consciousness, but because we belong essentially to the transcendental order of things, it must bring to free development those transcendental faculties of which in somnambulism we obtain only intimations, the organism hindering their development. In this sense speaks the Apostle of the transcendental faculties of the illuminated who ' have tasted of the powers of the world to come.'*

* Paul : Hebrews vi. 5.

The latency of these powers in us is only from the standpoint of the sense-consciousness ; they are germinal only from the standpoint of the earthly phenomenal form, and also so far as, without regard to the continuance of our transcendental individuality, they are destined to arrive at biological maturity in the man of the future. Death thus peels off the earthly phenomenal form from that true individual being which shows itself biologically in the capacity for evolution of the human type. We can therefore say with Schelling, 'Death might thus be not so much a departure as an essentialisation, wherein only the accidental disappears, but the being, the true man, is preserved.'*

Thus if with Plutarch we can already call ordinary sleep 'the lesser mysteries of death,' that is true in a higher degree in somnambulism, and as in sleep the sense-consciousness is extinguished, but an inner waking takes its place, so in death the sensuous world-image, the world as representation, sinks, but the transcendental consciousness, the transcendental world remains. When Sterne says : 'I must be a fool to fear thee, O death ! for as long as I am, thou art not, and when thou art, I am not' ; we may apply this not only in the materialistic sense, but rather in that of transcendental psychology, which distinguishes between the phenomenal Ego and the Subject.

Analysing the earthly consciousness, we necessarily come upon the transcendental as its foundation. The organically mediated consciousness, to which the senses deliver its empirical content, is left to be

* Schelling : Werke, B. iv., 207. Conf. A. vii. 474-476.

explained by physiology, whose jurisdiction here is not to be diminished ; but the pure consciousness, which is unitary, notwithstanding the spatial multiplicity of cells, is transcendental. So the sense of personality of the phenomenal Ego is physiologically conditioned ; but the pure self-consciousness which is single, and notwithstanding the temporal change of cells expresses the identity of the Subject, is transcendental. In the self-consciousness there lies a cleft, because we therein appear as well subject as object ; and this is only possible if a transcendental Subject distinguishes the phenomenal Ego from itself as object, like the somnambulists, who speak of themselves in the third person.

Science itself tends continually to the recognition of consciousness and self-consciousness as outside its principles of explanation ; it is in nowise to be seen how, from the stratification of atoms and their changes of position, sensibility and unity of consciousness should arise. But still less susceptible of physiological explanation are the phenomena of transcendental consciousness, which we find in somnambulism. Now as principles of explanation must always be adopted with proportion to the phenomena to be explained, so that neither shall the phenomena exceed the principle nor the principle the phenomena, we must seek the causes of somnambulic faculties, not in the physiological region, but in the transcendental. This necessity has been recognised by pantheistic systems, but in describing that which is not physiologically explicable, as the product of the monistic world-substance, their principle of explanation as much exceeds the phenomena, as for

materialists the phenomena exceeds the principle. The pantheistic scale is too large, the materialist too small. We must therefore reclaim for the transcendental Subject what pantheists seek too far off, materialists too near. Idealism prevents the recognition of this Subject by pantheists; but by Kant, the founder of this idealism, it has been recognised. He calls it the intelligible Subject, because it is not sensible, that is, is not found in our self-consciousness, and can only be intellectually inferred.* If stress is more laid upon the other circumstance, that it is divided from the supporter of my phenomenal consciousness only by a movable threshold, yet is thus exceptionally sensible, we can name it, as we have already done, the transcendental Subject.

When Plotinus says, that there are as many archetypes as individual beings,† the unconscious in man stands for the transcendental Subject; when he says that their self-knowledge is of two kinds, that it relates either to the cognition of the soul—*διάνοια ψυχικὴ*—or to the intellect—*νοῦς*, and in the latter case one knows one's self not as a man, but quite otherwise,‡ he thereby recognises that self-consciousness does not exhaust our being. When he says that by complete withdrawal from the external, and self-absorption, the union with the Intelligible is possible, but that such a condition can only be transitory during the earthly life, and no ecstatic can long maintain it,§ he there indicates somnambulism, which shows that we can

* Kant: 'De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis,' § 3.

† Plotinus: 'Enneads,' v. 7.

‡ *Ibid.*, v. 4, 8.

§ *Ibid.*, iv. 8, 1; vi. 9, 3, 11.

indeed provide conditions under which the transcendental Subject can display its activity, but that this activity is not at the command of our will, but presupposes the passivity of our will and consciousness. When the Stoics in general name the soul the *dæmon* of man, it is from the presentiment that apparent inspirations proceed from the transcendental Subject. When Hamann somewhere says, 'Not man has reason, reason has him,' and similarly Marcus Aurelius defines the internal life* of the soul as its intercourse with the *dæmon* within it,† here, too, underlies the presentiment that impulses of the will and representations can pass over from the transcendental region into organic consciousness, as some facts in the chapter on 'Memory' have shown. If we add the *Archæus* of Paracelsus, the *homo internus* of Van Helmont, the *homo noumenon*, or the Intelligible Subject of Kant, or the *Original Ego* (Ur-Ich) of Krause, what is common to all these views is that the essential kernel of man is not to be thought pantheistically, but as individual, herein agreeing with the popular conception of the soul; but they have also in common a distinction from this conception, in that the latter regards Soul and Ego, Subject and Person, as identical; whereas for the former only the personal Ego lies in the self-consciousness, the Subject beyond that in the Unconscious, but by no means *as* an Unconscious. That from this difference must result wholly different views on life and death, although belief in survival is common to both, is clear.

* [Fürsichsein. A strict philosophical rendering of this Hegelian phrase is not here required.—Tr.]

† 'Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius' (translated by Long, 1881), ii. 12, 17; iii. 6, 12, 16; v. 27.

Now it is very remarkable that all philosophers who have hit upon the distinction between Subject and Person, have also admitted the possibility of the mystical phenomena of the soul-life. In the popular doctrine of soul they are likewise not denied, but the transcendental being is here exchanged for a transcendent one, as with somnambulists when they speak of their guides, the intercourse between two persons of one Subject being to them an intercourse with spirits. But mystical phenomena are denied by the physiological psychologists ; in their system, which knows only the Person of the man, but not the Subject, and which therefore takes the half for the whole, there is no room for such phenomena, and so they think that there is no room for them in nature. This opinion is, as I have shown above by two examples, as a rule the more rigid and unyielding, the greater the ignorance of the facts of somnambulism.

On the other hand, whoever has informed himself in this province will hold mystical phenomena to be possible, because it can be proved by facts that the soul is richer in ideas than the consciousness, and that the threshold dividing soul and consciousness is movable. Thus also may be understood those phenomena of the soul-life, not less mystical than clairvoyance, and for which physiological explanation leaves always an insoluble residue—the will to live, genius, and conscience. These most precious expressions of the human spirit spring from the same source as the transcendental faculties generally—the Unconscious ; but they also show most clearly the imperfections of the philosophical systems of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, the former defining this

Unconscious as blind will, the latter characterising it as ideal also, but both erring in conceiving the Unconscious pantheistically. The will to live affirms the value of the individual life, without prejudice to the denial of it by the earthly consciousness.* But in genius and conscience likewise is the sense of individuality exalted, even if this is not so with the earthly consciousness, in which willing and knowing frequently take a direction quite opposed to the transcendental.

Still less is materialism competent to explain this transcendental enigma of the human spirit. We move in a contradiction if we see ruling in all expressions of the spirit only blind forces of nature. To admire genius, which by its penetration illuminates the essence of things, and yet to account blind and stupid the nature which brings this genius forth, is a logical contradiction; for as Augustine says: *Omni miraculo, quod fit per hominem, majus miraculum est homo.*† It is a logical contradiction for materialists to admire the intellectual force of a Kant more than the force of gravity of the table at which he wrote, to prefer the poet to the commonplace man, the sister of mercy to the Promoter,‡ the saint to the sinner. And accordingly, consistent materialists, teachers and pupils alike, deny ethic and æsthetic, in

* [That is to say, the will to live is imposed on the Person by the transcendental Subject, the personal (or earthly) life being for its advantage, though perhaps burdensome to the Personality, or though the understanding of the latter may embrace the pessimistic view of human life. Suicide is the occasional, relatively rare, rebellion of the personality against the transcendental will.—Tr.]

† Augustinus: 'De lib. arb.,' x. 12.

‡ [Gründer.—Tr.]

theory and in practice. Schuricht, who examines the expediency, at most, of murder and robbery, but finds the question of their permissibility quite unintelligible*—wherein he is more honourable, because more candid, than those materialists who flatter the recognition of morality—is as consistent as the Socialists and Anarchists who carry over the doctrine of 'Force and Matter' into practical life, negating with dagger and dynamite the restrictions of human brutality, who see only a chemical difference between holy water and petroleum, and apply the latter, when they are free to do so, to libraries, picture galleries, and churches. So a Dubois-Raymond, whose book on Goethe's 'Faust' shows that a highly-cultivated understanding is compatible with an entire absence of æsthetic development, is in his way as consistent as the cynics in modern art.

From the standpoint of the earthly consciousness, all inspirations of will and thought, of philosopher, artist, and saint, from the transcendental region, are wholly and utterly aimless. That is undeniable, but it is their patent of nobility. Therefore is the æsthetic ideal attainable only when we regard the things of nature not in their relation to the Person, but to the Subject—though not will-less, as Schopenhauer thought†—and the ethical ideal is attainable only

* Richard Schuricht: 'Auszug aus dem Tagebuch eines Materialisten,' Hamburg, 1860.

† [As Schopenhauer did not recognise transcendental individuality, his denial of will in the æsthetic attainment of genius referred solely to the personal will. Thus, he says: '*Genius* is simply the completest *objectivity*, i.e., the objective tendency of the mind as opposed to the subjective, which is directed to one's own self—in other words, to the will . . . genius is the power of leaving one's own interests, wishes, and aims entirely out of sight,

when in life we do not seek the advantage of the Person, but of the Subject. In artistic inspiration, as in the voice of conscience, our consciousness is that of the transcendental Subject.

So through our whole life is protracted the strife between our earthly phenomenal form and our true transcendental being. What is beautiful from the point of view of the Subject is not beautiful from that of the Person, and therefore remains caviare for the multitude ; and actions, ethically valuable from the standpoint of the Subject, are worthless and unintelligible from that of phenomenal Egoism. Nay, life itself, from the standpoint of earthly consciousness a vale of tears, is from the standpoint of transcendental consciousness a valuable possession, not in spite of suffering, but on account of it. But we who are to participate in the transcendental order of things, should not surrender ourselves to the illusions of the earthly consciousness, this veil of Maya ; we should bring the earthly will to silence in the æsthetic contemplation of nature, in the ethical formation of our life, and should regard this earthly existence as a transitory phenomenal form in correspondence with our transcendental interest.

thus of entirely renouncing one's own personality for a time, so as to remain *pure knowing subject*, clear vision of the world. . . . But when some external cause or inward disposition lifts us suddenly out of the endless stream of willing, delivers knowledge from the slavery of the will, the attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing, but comprehends things free from their relation to the will, and thus observes them without personal interest, without subjectivity, purely objectively, gives itself entirely up to them so far as they are ideas, but not in so far as they are motives.'—'The World as Will and Idea,' vol. i., pp. 240, 254 (Haldane and Kemp's translation).—Tr.]

3. *The Dualism of Consciousness.*

Every dream in which I ask a question, the answer to which surprises me, or wherein I carry on a controversial dialogue, shows a dualism of persons who are nevertheless, as subsequent waking makes known, formed by *one* Subject. In these ordinary dreams, however, it is only the content of our waking consciousness that is dramatically distributed. But this consciousness, reunited on waking, is again to be regarded as only half the comprehensive consciousness, whenever surprise at the answer received survives the waking, for the information obtained from the answer then betrays a foreign source, even from the standpoint of the waking life. A dramatised memory surprises, indeed, the dreamer, but not the awakened person, who recognises his former possession ; but a dramatised clairvoyance surprises also the awakened person, who, on combining the consciousness of the figures of the dream, finds therein this inexplicable ingredient, exceeding all the capacity of the waking consciousness, and the latter has therefore to be supplemented by a transcendental consciousness which is ordinarily latent. This view mediates between the superfluous Spiritualistic explanation of somnambulic dreams, and the physiological explanation, in which the problem is mutilated, if not summarily and wholly denied. If, for instance, we find somnambulists clairvoyantly aware of the course of their diseases, it is certainly in accordance with the psychological laws of dream that such a revelation, emerging from the Unconscious (*i.e.*, from the transcendental consciousness), should be placed in the

mouth of their guardian spirits ; but by this time we know that what comes from beyond the consciousness need not therefore come from beyond the soul, but that such revelations may be derived from transcendental consciousness. On the other hand, we shall not deny the possibility of such clairvoyant dreams of somnambulists, for every displacement of the threshold of sensibility must necessarily evoke new faculties, and the remainder of the problem, the passage of a transcendental idea across the threshold and into the sense-consciousness, offers no difficulty.

The admission of a transcendental Subject implies the admission that this Subject stands to nature in other relations than those of sense, since otherwise the sensuous self-consciousness must exhaust the whole Ego, and there could be no subjectivity transcending it. But from the phenomena of somnambulism it results, that these relations with nature are far more intimate than those of the sense-consciousness, suggesting that in nature all acts upon all, and all on us. From the standpoint of the historical limits of our natural knowledge, there is only in nature an action of some upon some, as from the standpoint of the biological barriers of knowledge only some acts upon us. Since nevertheless the historical limits are continually being thrust back in the progress of the sciences, and the biological advance of consciousness is possible only on the ground of an already existing transcendental relation of the organism to nature, we are forced to conclude that in nature all acts on all, and therefore all on us. This consideration deprives the transcendental faculties of

somnambulists of their apparently miraculous character.

To interpret the dualism of consciousness, and therewith of the two halves of our being, an antagonism between them must be shown in relation, first, to the time of their activity, secondly, to the material of it.

If I ask a person in the magnetic sleep if he is asleep, he will deny it, and rightly, for, like every dreamer, he is inwardly awake. It thence follows that this inwardly awake somnambulist believes himself or herself to be *not identical* with that person who lies there with closed senses, while yet the identity is indisputable.

The counterpart of this phenomenon is the following. When a somnambulist reawakens to the life of sense, the bridge of memory is withdrawn, which, if it connected the two conditions, would let the bearer of the transcendental consciousness be known as identical with that of the sense-consciousness, and the two persons of the Subject would flow together into one. But since they remain separate, there is a dualism of consciousness, thus of persons, the sphere of the Ego being defined by the range of memory.

Now, if we take both these phenomena, observable in somnambulism, without any preconception, as they are ; if we let them speak for themselves and accept their expressions, even though they seem paradoxical ; if we simply define these phenomena, conceiving them in a merely analytical judgment, we must then say : the human Subject consists of two persons. Now, it is the office of transcendental psychology to verify this dualism of persons, yet on the other hand, as the

demand of the understanding for a cause will not suffer it to rest in this dualism, to recombine both persons to one Subject.

From the beginning of time, from the oldest records of humanity in the Vedas to our own day, through all religious and philosophical systems, there runs in ever-changing form the assertion of an inner kernel of being in man, which can be brought to manifestation. But the means of awakening this inner man were always such as should suppress the sense-life of the soul. As, therefore, the transcendental being was brought to activity only at the expense of the life of sense, the suppression of the latter being the condition, not the cause, of the emergence of the former, an antagonism appeared between the two halves of the being in relation to the time of their activity, and their mutual relation resembled that of two weights in a scale, the one rising in proportion as the other sinks. The means applied were partly those of slow efficacy, such as mortifications, fasting, and asceticism, whereby the conversion of the moral nature was aimed at—designated regeneration in Christian mysticism—partly they were external and of momentary operation, herbs or gases, by which deep sleep as the condition of the inner wakening was most speedily attained. Even if by long exercise this precondition could be dispensed with, yet must the external man be sunk in a state of passivity that the inner man might arise; this passivity with the Indian Yogis and Christian anchorites coming to be more or less habitual. According to the Buddhists, the external man cannot know the true nature of things; only a Yogi, by means of ecstasy and concentration of thought, can attain intel-

lectual intuition of eternal principles, even if but incompletely during bodily life.*

Now, what since Mesmer has been called artificial somnambulism is an essentially similar form of that phenomenon which extends through all ages, and is little distinguished from other ecstatic conditions ; but there is scarcely a doubt that even the means rediscovered by Mesmer for awakening the inner life, the magnetic pass, was already known in antiquity, and was applied in the temple-sleep.

Even of this artificial somnambulism that may be said which the Apostle Paul wrote : ‘ The more our outward man dies away, the more living is the inward.’† Here also, as in historically antecedent analogous states, appears the temporal antagonism of the two halves ; the greatest passivity of the sensible man brings the highest ecstasy, that is, the clearest inward awakening of the transcendental—or in Kant’s expression, the intelligible—man, while in the energetic abandonment of the personality to the phenomenal world, the inward man is reduced to silence. That which a suggestive myth of Tiresias reports, that he first received the prophetic sight after Juno had blinded him ; what Philo meant when he said, ‘ When the divine light shows itself, the light of man is hidden, not appearing again till the divine is hidden, as the prophets said : ‘ Your spirit departs, as it were, when the spirit of God comes, and only returns when this withdraws ;’ what Plato makes Socrates say, ‘ If we would have pure knowledge of anything,

* ‘ Brahma-Sutra,’ iv. 4, 7.

† Cor. ii. 4, 16. [In our version : ‘ Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.’—Tr.]

we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold all things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after death;’* that, finally, which is always recurring in different forms of Christian mysticism, ‘*Sensuum occasus veritatis exortus est*’†—all are but different expressions of one and the same knowledge, confirmed also by somnambulism, that the inward sense of man is only manifested when the outward senses are suppressed; that the higher powers of the soul rise in proportion as the life of sense is depressed.

In principle, our ordinary behaviour is according to this knowledge, since for intellectual work we seek silence and solitude, excluding every distraction, and sometimes close the eyes in deep thinking; and the fable that Empedokles blinded himself, that freed from sense perception he might be better able to think, need not be true to be significant. Artists, poets, and philosophers of all times agree that in the greatest abstraction from outward life there at length arises an unconscious productivity, the sole source of intellectual results of enduring value, not in spite of its being the easiest, but because of that, though indeed not to be voluntarily induced. This sounds paradoxical; but we are not to understand the unconscious production in the quite literal sense, which indeed has never yet yielded a fine idea. Literally, this unconsciousness is applicable only to the faculties of sense and reflection, and only in proportion to the unconsciousness of these can the underlying transcen-

* Plato: ‘Phædo’ (Jowett’s translation).

† J. Bona: ‘Principia vitæ Christianæ,’ i. 25.

dental consciousness emerge. Genius is not reflection at its highest, but a qualitatively different mode of knowledge, an intuition. There is the utmost confusion in the materialistic supposition that genius, the highest of phenomena, can be explained by mechanical molecular changes in the brain; nor is it logical to take conclusions concerning this mode of production from those who do not speak from their own experience, instead of giving credit to those who have only to look into the depths of their own mind to describe the derivation, so far as it is accessible to their self-consciousness in general. Such descriptions, by philosophers and poets, are sufficiently numerous.

But if the transcendental mode of cognition occurs exceptionally even in waking, as in the case of genius, yet its qualitative speciality proves that while physiological conditions can conduce to it, this mode of cognition is not through the sense-consciousness, but in spite of it. The threshold of sensibility, as a partition-wall dividing the two beings in us, cannot therefore be regarded as an insuperable barrier preventing all communication, seeing that these two beings form but one Subject; the exceptional emergence of the transcendental consciousness in waking is therefore not more wonderful than that the reflective mode of production—as, for instance, solution of mathematical problems—also happens exceptionally in sleep.

But it remains the rule, that if not exactly deep sleep, yet the greatest passivity of sense-consciousness is the condition of the emergence of the transcendental consciousness, its ideas being the clearer the more the senses are obscured, as a light shines

brighter the darker its neighbourhood is. The same condition can also be provided by diseases, as was expressed by a somnambule of Professor Becker, who in the crisis said of the two persons of her Subject: 'The more ill *your* body, the stronger *I am*; the more healthy that is, the weaker is my appearance.'*

So, also, Dr. Mayer said of one of his somnambules, that when her gaze was to be directed to a distance or to penetrate deeply, or, in general, when her spiritual part would meditate upon an important subject, to investigate the condition of her own body or that of others, and the means of cure, she put herself into a *state of abstraction of the inner from the outer person*, represented by a deep corporeal swoon or apparent death, the duration of which varied, according to the difficulty of the matter under consideration, from several minutes to some quarters of an hour, whereupon, usually with a deep breath, she recovered life, colour, speech, and movement.† This description is only incorrect, in speaking of a difficulty of consideration, in the sense of reflection. Only an intuitive mode of cognition takes place, not in itself to be called difficult, but merely in so far as its condition, the deepening of sleep, does not immediately occur in sufficient degree. A star has not in itself difficulty in shining, but so far only as there is still wanting the conditioning, but not causative, nocturnal darkness.

Christian mysticism, also, offers numerous examples in which protracted diseases that diminish the powers of the external man promote the release of the trans-

* 'Das Geistige Doppelleben,' 108.

† Kieser: 'Archiv für thierischen Magnetismus,' vi. 1, 31.

cedential faculties.* And in the same sense Kant says, 'that impressions from the intelligible world—to which we also ourselves, as transcendental Subjects, belong—are not possible "so long as all goes well";'† that is to say, as long as the normally healthy condition is maintained.

Such phenomena can be elicited, not only by long illnesses, but even in health, by sudden attacks. In the history of martyrs we frequently meet with cases in which the faithful, in the midst of the greatest torture, fell into a state of rapture and inward bliss, often with release of the transcendental powers of the soul, a phenomenon which was ascribed to a special divine grace. When, on the other hand, the same phenomenon occurred in the witch trials of the Middle Ages, and the witches during the severest suffering on the rack fell into a peaceful and visionary sleep, then was this 'witch-sleep' attributed to the devil. But with martyrs and witches alike the unendurable agonies produced a deep swoon, providing the condition for the inward awakening of the transcendental being.

All magnetisers are agreed that magnetic sleep is the more recreative and beneficial the deeper it is, but also that the clearness of the inward waking is proportional to the depth of the sleep.‡ Conversely, the depth of the sleep is to be inferred from the clearness of the inward waking.

Now, if this antagonistic relation justifies us already in speaking of two persons of our Subject,

* Görres: 'Die christliche Mystik,' i. 388-402.

† Kant: 'Träume eines Geistersehers, zweites Hauptstück.'

‡ Dupotet: 'Manuel de l'Etudiants,' 156.

which retreat before each other like day and night, this justification is yet more incontestable when we see that the somnambule dream is by no means a chaotic reproduction of the waking experience—(like the ordinary dream)—and that, further, the sense of personality in this deep dream is by no means suppressed, nor does the individual melt away pantheistically—as it assuredly must if the earthly being had its roots immediately in the undifferentiated world-substance. On the contrary, not only is there exaltation of the sense of personality, but the psychical functions emerging therewith are also qualitatively different from those of normal waking consciousness. One of Wienholt's somnambules said, that when she went over from ordinary into somnambule sleep, by degrees other ideas pressed forward; her self-consciousness was first weaker, and then continually *stronger*. And another somnambule of the same physician said that she often passed into the magnetic from the ordinary sleep, which she observed by the attainment of full consciousness and true and vivid ideas. Yet more significant is the expression, that in somnambulism *her fundamental character came out stronger*.^{*} But such an exaltation of the psychical individuality, instead of its resolution into the general life of nature, is antecedently presumable, if the view here presented is true, that between the phenomenal individual and the All-One, there is interposed the transcendental Subject.

But the right to speak of two persons of our

^{*} Wienholt: 'Heilkraft des thierischen Magnetismus,' iii. 3, 40, 275, 398.

Subject is most strikingly apparent from the fact that their antagonism extends to the material of their activity. In the first place, disease and its cure are in somnambulism quite differently judged than in waking. A somnambule of Deleuze repeatedly declared in the sleep that only magnetism could save her; while in waking she had the greatest repugnance to it.* Another sighed over her unbelief in magnetism, and prescribed the means of overcoming her dislike to it.† A somnambule in the crisis prescribed for herself copious bleeding, but predicted quite truly that when the proposal should be made to her awake, she would be vehemently opposed to it, but in resisting it would fall into a swoon—an opportunity of which advantage should immediately be taken to bleed her.‡

Puységur reports the case of a somnambule who in waking always received her magnetiser in ill humour, reproaching him with the inefficacy of his treatment; sleeping, she begged his forgiveness with tears, and called him her preserver.§ Similar repugnance was shown in waking by a woman who in the crisis had prescribed for herself an operation in the neck, although she was told that she had herself advised it.|| The boy Richard very unwillingly followed in waking the diet which he had prescribed for himself, but in sleep reproached his friends for not having prevented his dietary trans-

* Deleuze : 'Histoire critique du Magnétisme animal,' ii. 104.

† *Ibid.*, ii. 172.

‡ Dupotet : 'Manuel,' etc., 110.

§ Puységur : 'Du Magnétisme animal,' 394.

|| Dupotet : 'Manuel,' 3.

gressions.* Kerner's somnambule said that immediately after waking she would want sour milk, which was to be absolutely refused her.

Somnambulists thus reject in one state what in another they desire, and conversely ; their sympathies and antipathies change with their condition, and they blame in one what they did in the other. The two states are as much opposed—as the Report of the Medical Academy of Paris says—as the states of two different persons could ever be. Remedies to which, waking, they have the strongest repugnance, they in sleep prescribe for themselves, and require that they shall be forced to take them ; while on the other hand they insist on having denied to them what is disadvantageous, even if they should express the greatest desire for it.† Wienholt's somnambule, besides sleep and waking, had a third state, which she called 'wild shuddering ;' in this she often longed for what in somnambulism she had prohibited, and if it was given to her she put it in her mouth, but immediately spat it out again, as wine, meat, chestnuts, etc.‡ So that the transcendental will persisted in this state. Auguste Müller, who stayed at Wildbad for treatment, was in the crisis quite satisfied with that residence, but in waking it displeased her, and one afternoon she ordered a coach for her departure. As the appointed hour approached, she fell into the magnetic sleep, went into the open air and up a hill in the neighbourhood, where, waking in the evening, she was much

* Görwitz : 'Richards natürlich magnetischer Schlaf,' 39.

† Ennemoser : 'Der Magnetismus nach d. allseitigen Beziehung,' etc., 134.

‡ Wienholt : 'Heilkraft,' etc., iii. 355.

surprised to find herself in a wholly unknown place.* A second attempt to leave the wells was similarly frustrated by herself. It would be interesting to know whether on both occasions somnambulism only accidentally supervened just before the intended journeys, and then gave occasion to this remarkable severance of the Subject, or whether, as would almost appear to be the case, the occurrence of somnambulism arose from this severance, and was thus induced by an impulse of transcendental will.

Especially remarkable, and to be found in most books on somnambulism, is the case of the woman Plantain, who in 1829 was operated upon by Dr. Cloquet for cancer in the breast. In waking she could only speak with terror of the impending operation, which she had herself advised in sleep. Having been put into somnambulism for the operation, she spoke of it calmly, took off her clothes herself and sat down in the chair. With the same tranquillity she went on speaking during this frightful operation, and no gesture, no accelerated breath or pulse, betrayed the slightest feeling. Such instances prove that the transcendental being considers the personality of sense in a purely objective relation, in an attitude of as much indifference to its fate as to that of a stranger—as it must be, since the two halves of the being lie this side and that side of a threshold of sensibility. Dream already shows us this mutual objectivity of the two persons of a Subject in relation to ideation and will. It is on this that the phenomenon of the dramatic sundering of the Ego depends, when I am astonished by the thoughts of a

* Klein : 'Geschichte der Auguste Müller,' 92.

second dream-figure, or remain indifferent to its reverses.

But if in the transcendental consciousness the pleasure and pain of the ordinary man are regarded objectively, and estimated according to a standard of its own, there arises the weighty philosophical question, whether this transcendental indifference does not extend to the whole sum of our fate in life. In fact, there is nothing to exclude this inference. Since, moreover, we now know that the fruits of this life are not lost for the comprehensive consciousness of the transcendental being, it looks as if this being itself had chosen this lot, not being moved by the sufferings of our earthly life, but yet enjoying the fruits of it. Should we in this way conceive the earthly life, notwithstanding its preponderant suffering, as a transcendental prescription, then—and only then—disappear at once the contradictions encountered by theistic and pantheistic systems between the miseries of existence and providence; and the complaints of man against nature, which no philosophical system can seriously contend to be groundless, are silenced.

The dualism within the human soul further shows itself in this, that in somnambulism there emerges also a moral side, which in waking is either absent altogether, or is not found in the same degree. Already is the ennobling of the language, so often to be observed, perhaps a sign of this. A somnambule of Deleuze, speaking in the crisis on religion, morality, and metaphysics, gave utterance to opinions quite different from those held in the waking state.* A somnambule

* Deleuze : 'Hist. critique,' etc., ii. 173.

treated by Champignon, who wished to devote herself to the stage, thought quite otherwise as soon as she was put into the sleep. Asked why she wished to go upon the stage, she replied : 'Not I, but she.' And when the physician, acquiescing in this assumption of distinct personality, suggested that she should dissuade her, she replied : 'What would you? she is a fool!'*

Reichenbach had a somnambule who had concealed from him that an officer was courting her, but in the sleep, in an access of greater candour, she betrayed to him the secret, but with the request that he should say nothing about it to her in waking.† She therefore not only knew that she would be less disposed to confidence in waking, but also that she would awake without memory. The widow Peterson was never guilty of falsehood in the 'deep sleep,' though ordinarily not indisposed to it; in this condition, she said, it was not possible for her to deceive her physician. Also in the deep sleep only once was she angry about a trifle.‡

It is not indeed easily supposable that somnambulism could bring to pass an actual moral elevation, a qualitative change in the moral constitution, but we may well admit that latent moral dispositions attain expression by a change of condition, because it is just by this change that the interests of the two persons of the Subject are known to be not identical. The merely intellectual exaltation in somnambulism might awaken of itself this moral dualism by chang-

* Champignon : 'Physiologie, Médecine, et Metaphysique du Magnétisme,' 341.

† Reichenbach : 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 686.

‡ 'Archiv,' x. 1, 108.

ing the relative weight of motives. Lastly, a moral opposition can be introduced by the change of sympathies and antipathies in regard to others which we find in somnambulism. For in waking, our judgment of men is apt to be biased by their intellectual superiorities, to the neglect of any rigorous moral criticism. In somnambulism, on the contrary, no importance is attached to this external tincture of the understanding, which belongs only to the earthly personality, and it is the inner moral constitution of the transcendental being which determines sympathies or antipathies. In like manner somnambulists esteem chemical substances of the mineral and vegetable order, not according to their effects on the normal man, but according to those which more manifest the inner nature of the things.

If, however, somnambulism is accompanied, more or less expressly, but almost universally, by a moral change which, at least from the standpoint of the earthly person, is an elevation, this phenomenon stands in apparent contradiction to the notorious experience, lamented, not only by the fathers of the Church, but previously by the Greek philosophers and poets, that in sleep we are less moral than in waking.* I can satisfy myself with none of the explanations of this fact in dream-literature, but believe that the following sufficiently accounts for it. Dream is pictorial ; it endures no abstract thoughts, and does not abide in movements of the will. Every agitation, however gentle, of thought or will is converted into image and action. These agitations, often

* Plato : 'Republic,' ix. 1. Sophocles : 'King Œdipus,' 981. Augustine : 'Confessions,' x. c. 11.

originating only in bodily condition, cannot be imputed to the man as a moral being, and are in waking suppressed, but live on in dream as long as their flight of images is still determined by physiological conditions. But the deeper sleep becomes, the more are these confused dreams put to silence, the transcendental half of man's being determining their lapse in proportion as the organ of the confused dreams is reduced to insensibility. The qualitatively quite different dreams of somnambulism thus belong to the transcendental Subject, and the moral opposition of the being of sense and the transcendental being must also mirror itself in the difference of the dreams appropriate to each. The apparent moral deterioration in confused dreams, which is further strengthened by the image-language of dream, and, on the other hand, the moral elevation of the somnambulist dream, are therefore explained by the dualism of persons of our Subject, and are, in fact, one of the best proofs of this dualism. Were dreams of one quality only, were there no change of persons with the deepening of sleep, then assuredly the dreams of somnambulism also would continue and even exalt the tendency of the light dream, and the above-mentioned opposition would be not only apparent but real. Were man monistically constituted in the sense of materialists, no opposition in the moral character of our dreams would arise from a mere deepening of sleep; but this is easily explained if we admit a dualism of the soul within the metaphysical monism. Upon interrogation this dualism is also confirmed by somnambulists themselves, who must indeed know more about their own condition than one who stands without,

and is confined by the barriers of sense. They all speak of their magical Ego, which they differently denominate, or of a being instructing them which they say they see, or perhaps only hear. So long as the transcendental being suffices for the explanation of this inspiration, it would be illogical to admit a transcendent being; so that the expressions of somnambulists need not mislead us. As in dream it is impossible to detect in a dialogue a monologue, that is, to recognise in the other dream-figure one's own double, so is it impossible in somnambulism, in which the difference between self and double appears deeper. But it is very evident from these inspirations that the dramatic severance of the Ego is not to be applied only in the sceptical sense, for the utter rejection of them, but that it is in fact the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man, whose inner being makes itself known exceptionally even in waking, as, for instance, in the case of the genius of Socrates.

A somnambule of Kerner said: 'That which goes out from me into another whose interior I am to examine, I cannot more fitly describe than by saying, it is my magnetic self, all the forces of the soul.'* Even in the involuntary actions of somnambulism this dualism betrays itself. A somnambule of Reichenbach had ordered some linen to be made up, which was delivered while she lay in the magnetic sleep. She conversed therein vivaciously with the sempstress, and showed great delight when she displayed the linen; but then desired that she might be awakened, just as another girl might have called for a friend to show her the needlework. Being

* Kerner: 'Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,' 192.

awakened, she knew nothing of what had happened, and had again to be told that the linen had arrived.* So also in locating their perception in the ganglionic region of their solar plexus, somnambulists imply this dualism. They frequently act as if another person was speaking to them from the region of the stomach.† It is reported of a French somnambule that she rubbed this part with her finger to excite its activity, and then bent down her head as if to listen. In this wise she exactly described what was going on in the next house, and predicted what would happen to her up to the end of her illness. At the same time she suffered violent pains in the stomach—spasms being often the condition of the inner waking—and got angry as if with a third person, whom she entreated with tears to be silent. Throughout this state she distinguished the person inspiring her from herself.‡ Similarly, that somnambule whose magnetic self in the dramatic severance seemed a visible genius, which she always named 'Messkuss,' desired her magnetiser to put some questions to him, and on his refusing, because 'Messkuss' knew nothing, her injured feeling dramatising itself, she said that Messkuss had been made angry by that speech, had gone away, and would not return.§

Diminution of sense-consciousness, the condition of the emergence from latency of the transcendental faculties, being common to insanity, 'possession,' and somnambulism, it is to be expected that the dualism of consciousness would find expression also

* Reichenbach: 'Der sensitive Mensch,' ii. 689.

† Schindler: 'Magisches Geistesleben,' 134.

‡ Kieser: 'Archiv,' ii. 1, 159.

§ 'Archiv,' x. 3, 40.

in the former conditions. Thus a 'possessed' person replied to the admonitions of her confessor that the latter was not her confessor, but Trine's, that being her own name.* Insane persons frequently speak of themselves in the third person.† Even in ordinary diseases, it happens that the patients speak thus of their own selves in the past, when there is a failure of the continuity of consciousness.‡ An insane person had an exact memory of her past up to the beginning of her disease, but these reproductions were not recollections, and she ascribed them to another. Speaking of herself, she used the remarkable expression, 'The person of myself,'§ which designates with philosophical accuracy our earthly phenomenal form.

This severance occurs also under chloroform. A nursemaid who was lately sent to a dentist, screamed during the operation, but at the same time asked herself the question—as she related after waking—who it was that was screaming so violently. The double feeling is very pronounced with somnambulists in the 'deep sleep,' so that they speak of themselves in the third person. To the question, 'Why she, not thou?' the answer of one of them was, 'She is the body which thou seest and touchest, the spirit is the I, and its body is now the soul, which at other times is carried by *her* body; this is also the reason why double sleepers|| speak of themselves in the third person.'¶

* Reichard: 'Beiträge zur Einsicht in das Geisterreich,' i. 316.

† Ladame: 'La Névrose hypnotique,' 43.

‡ Griesinger: 'Krankengeschichte,' 341, etc. Leidesdorf: 'Lehrbuch der psychischen Krankheiten,' 117.

§ Leuret: 'Fragments psychologiques,' s. l. folie, 277.

|| [The 'double' sleep is the condition known as 'deep-sleep' (Hochschlaf).—Tr.]

¶ 'Archiv,' xii. 1, 159.

After all the reasons adduced, which oblige us to recognise a dualism of the soul, it is scarcely necessary to add that we are already justified in this by the one logical reason, the want of continuity of consciousness which is insisted upon by Griesinger. Without memory no Ego, as was observed by St. Augustine, who, praising the miracle of memory, said that it was his soul, his self, and that without it he could not so much as name himself.* Several threads of memory, however, signify a severance of persons within one Subject. Therefore, says Leibnitz, 'Could we suppose, either *two* different and unconnected *faculties of consciousness* to be alternately active in *the same body*, the one always during day, the other during night, or the same consciousness to be active at intervals of time in two different bodies, the question must arise whether in the first case the day man and the night man—so to say—would not be two persons as different as Socrates and Plato, and whether in the second case there is not a single person in two different bodies.'†

The first of these suppositions actually happens in somnambulism, which therefore proves the dualism of our Subject. Every personal consciousness is held together by the memory connective of its ideas, and the bridge of memory failing between two psychical conditions, we must logically speak of two persons.

This question is definitely decided when we see that somnambulists in the change of condition *feel* themselves as different persons. Kerner says of one:

* 'Confessions,' x. c. 6.

† Leibnitz: 'Neue Untersuchungen über den menschlichen Verstand,' ii. 427, s. 23.

‘Before she let herself be wakened, she took leave of me as usual before wakening, as though she were now going away, and after awaking appeared another person ; it was her magnetic self, the self that was my intimate, that, as it were, took leave of me.’ And of another he says : ‘She greeted me on entering the magnetic sleep, and took leave of me before her other, waking, self reappeared.’*

Now, as the interests of the two persons of our Subject are not identical, somnambulists request their physicians, and indeed insist, that the two halves of their being shall be kept as much apart as possible. Thus Dr. Kluge reports of a young lady, that in the magnetic sleep she would take off her superfluous clothes, that she might more conveniently work at the embroidery frame ; but as soon as the time for waking approached, she always laid the embroidery aside, re clothed herself, and resumed exactly the same position in which she had been before falling asleep, that she might not be frightened on awaking by her unusual appearance.†

That this double consciousness can even be simultaneously present, we have the testimony of Van Helmont, who having tasted root of wolf’s-bane with the tip of his tongue, fell into an ecstasy, in which he saw his condition as objectively ‘as though it belonged to a man from another world.’‡

At the highest point of this objectivity occurs that extraordinary phenomenon, the seeing by somnambulists of their bodies as apart from themselves, a

* Kerner : ‘Geschichte zweier Somnambulen,’ 151, 172.

† Kluge : ‘Darstellung,’ etc., 386.

‡ J. B. Van Helmont : ‘Demens idea,’ etc., §§ 12-16.

special case of the so-called 'double,' as also happens in severe illnesses and especially with dying persons. Such a case at Frankfort is related by Schopenhauer : 'How do you feel ?' asked a physician here not long ago of his patient. 'Better now, since we have been two in the bed !' was the answer, the patient dying soon after.* A similar case was reported to me lately by Dr. Billinger in Munich. He was treating for *pneumonia notha* a man of eighty, who to the doctor's question, 'How are you feeling ?' a few days before his death replied, 'One of us quite well, the other miserably.' Now, this happens at the height of somnambulism, in the so-called 'deep,' or double sleep. The very clear inward wakening associated with this state thus produces also the greatest opposition of the two persons of our Subject, and somnambulists then speak of their body as of a foreign object, although there is often still a feeling of identity. A somnambule, who thus saw her own body lying before her, said to her physician that it was repugnant to her to rejoin it. Another, describing her ecstasy, said she at first fell into a somnambulic state, but then saw her body apart from her, motionless, cold, and pale like a corpse, while she appeared to herself as a mist, but yet thought apart from her body. In this condition she saw and understood far more than in somnambulism. After a quarter of an hour at most, the mist moved towards her body, she lost consciousness, and the ecstasy came to an end.†

Rightly to judge of somnambulism, we must always remember that it is by no means an exaltation of

* Schopenhauer : 'Ueber Geistersehen.'

† Champignon : 'Physiologie,' etc., 100, 101.

the ordinary intellectual and moral consciousness, this ordinary consciousness being on the contrary suppressed ; moreover, that it can by no means produce new psychical faculties, but affords merely the suitable condition for the emergence from latency of the transcendental person in us, with which these apparently new faculties are associated. Somnambulism is only the condition of these faculties, not their cause ; they are already latent in us, and emerge with favourable opportunity. If, however, psychical faculties exist latently in us, that is equivalent to saying that normal self-consciousness does not exhaust our Ego, a second person of our subject being beyond the former. But this dualism is the more to be asserted, as these two persons only emerge alternately, their activities not mingling. This at least is the rule, and therefore the conditions, in which the transcendental side of our being is available, are those of sleep. Thus Van Helmont says, that the magical powers of man are dormant, and need only to be awakened ;* and the mystic Tauler expresses the same when he says : ‘If man is to act inwardly, he must retract all his powers, as into a corner of the soul, excluding all images and forms ; his state must be one of forgetfulness and imperception (*nichtwissen*) ; there he may work.’† Conversely, the transcendental person is again latent, when the ordinary person awakes. The sensuous comprehension connected with the earthly existence is, as Philo says, produced like Eve, while Adam, the spirit, sleeps.‡

* Helmont : ‘*De Magneticâ vulnerum curatione*,’ § 159.

† Görres : ‘*Christliche Mystik*,’ i. 468.

‡ Philo : ‘*Leg. Alleg.*,’ ii. 1092.

Somnambulists themselves similarly represent the fact. The somnambulist boy Richard, whose physician was his brother, having predicted something of the future, and being asked by his friends why they also had not such knowledge, excellently replied : ‘ You really know it also, but do not know that you know it.’* In other words : the transcendental man is clairvoyant, but the earthly man knows nothing of it because his sense-consciousness isolates him from his own essential being.

The unconscious in us accordingly obtains further definition as individual, and not, like a drop in the sea, to be pantheistically resolved ; and moreover as in itself conscious, but independently of the sense-organism. It is not our whole Subject, as the dualists suppose, that is now engaged with the functions of sense, first hereafter applying itself to transcendental functions ; but both halves of our being are *contemporaneously* active, though the transcendental remains concealed for the earthly person.

In the dualistic doctrine of the soul, the sense-consciousness is its present function, while the organ serving this function—senses and brain—belongs to a body in itself dead. According to this conception, if the transcendental Subject is represented in a circular form, this circle to divide our head from the trunk, we should penetrate the circle with the sense-consciousness, the dead mass of the body remaining outside it.

But for a monistic solution of the dualism of body and sense-consciousness, we cannot ascribe a special bodily function to the soul, and the instrument of

* Görwitz : ‘Idiosomnambulismus,’ 136.

this function to the body ; rather must both, the body and the earthly active soul, proceed from a common principle : the transcendental Subject. The ordinary mode of cognition must thus—and so far the materialists are in the right—certainly be regarded as a function of the brain ; but for this body along with all its conscious and unconscious functions the transcendental Subject is *à priori* ; it has built itself, on behalf of its immersion into earthly things, the corresponding bodily instrument, and provided this with the necessary cognitional apparatus for its information. Be it only remarked by the way, that this conception, referring only to the metaphysical significance of biological processes, forestalls no possible physical explanation of these processes, therefore not, in particular, the modern theory of evolution.

If, however, it is the transcendental Subject itself, that forms for itself the earthly body, then again does it appear as highly probable that the immersion in earthly things is a voluntary act of this Subject.

4. *The Bi-Unity of Man.*

Thus there lies, unrevealed to our self-consciousness, a transcendental Subject in the background of our being, the root of our individuality ; it is distinguished from the sense half of our being by form as well as content of cognition, as standing in other relations to Nature, that is, receiving other impressions from her, and so reacting otherwise on them, than the sense-man.

But this confronts us with a philosophical problem which imperatively demands solution : the problem

of the bi-unity of man. It has appeared, indeed, that the two halves of our being do not in our experience simultaneously function; they stand, that is, in temporal antagonism; but this difference of time is only optical, as it were, like that of the sun and the stars; notwithstanding the dissimultaneity of functions there must therefore be simultaneity of existence, and as a functionless existence is unthinkable, it may be said, continuing the analogy: as the stars still shine by day, though not for our sight, so also the transcendental Subject functions constantly, though unconsciously for the earthly man. Were the dissimultaneity of functions not merely optical, but real, we should be driven to admit that somnambulism originates transcendental faculties. But this is not thinkable; it can only elevate above the threshold of sensibility what was already latent beneath it. This latency, however, exists only for the brain-consciousness, for which indeed the whole Subject is transcendental, that is, latent.

Now if the Subject must be considered as constantly active, then sense and transcendental functions go on side by side together, that is, we are beings of simultaneous membership of the world of sense and of the transcendental world. The chief distinction between dualistic and monistic doctrines of the soul is here indicated; we are not first at death transported into the supersensuous world; but we live in it now already, only that as earthly persons we know nothing of it.

That brings us to the point at which the possibility of mystical phenomena is first provable. It is upon the problem of mysticism that the dualistic doctrine

of the soul is historically wrecked, the historical result being that both were given up. Now, if instead of being wrecked upon this problem the monistic doctrine of the soul would explain it, then were the possibility of mysticism demonstrated for the multitude of those who ignore its reality by simply not looking into it.

If the two persons of my Subject be *successive*, as is asserted in the dualistic doctrine of soul, then no mysticism is possible, except perhaps by intervention of superterrestrial beings, be they angels or devils. Herein the Middle Ages were quite consistent.

If, on the other hand, we are simultaneously members of both worlds, then transcendental psychology results at once from the mobility of the threshold, and, notwithstanding the stability of our sense-consciousness in the phenomenal world, our involution with the transcendental world must frequently be betrayed.

The simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject is thus the foundation of all mysticism, and is presupposed in every change of their forms; mysticism stands or falls with the bi-unity of man. From this formula the least that can be inferred is that between the two persons of my own Subject, the unconscious and the conscious, mystical relations may arise; for since sense-consciousness isolates us from the totality of Nature more than it connects us with it, whereas the transcendental consciousness is far more intimately involved in this totality, it follows that with the mobility of the threshold of sensibility faculties must come to light, which from the standpoint of sense appear impossible.

In this respect we can with Görres call somnambulism 'a magical relation of man to himself';* *i.e.*, a relation between the persons of our Subject. The real mystic, no doubt, goes still further, asserting that we not only come into magical relation with our transcendental Subject, but through this Subject also with other transcendent beings.

That these magical faculties are not first acquired at death, but are already latent in us, is a very old doctrine. Hindu philosophy recognises the magical powers of Psyche, called *arta ahancarasya*—that is, the powers of my Ego. The emergence of the transcendental Subject in ecstasy is described with remarkable precision in the Upanishads of the Vedas, and in India, Mesmer and Puységur would certainly not have enjoyed the fame of discoverers. With evident reference to the solar plexus which plays so large a part in somnambulism, it is said: 'In the hollow of the heart resides the immortal Person.'†

The knowledge of the magical powers of man has never been lost in India. But it is only the exoteric constituents of this knowledge which we hear of in the extraordinary performances of the Indian fakirs;‡ though it is said that members of the 'Theosophical Society,' which consists of Indians and Europeans, and professes the investigation of the magical powers of man, are being partially instructed in esoteric doctrines.

* Görres: 'Die Christl. Mystik,' iii. 316.

† [With all respect to the author, it is nearly certain that no such reference was intended. Similar expressions are frequent in the Upanishads, but to give them a physiological sense would be contrary to the whole spirit of the philosophy, and to its poetic expression.—Tr.]

‡ Jaccoliot: 'Voyage au Pays des Fakirs charmeurs.'

In the Agrouchoda-Parichai verses, it is ordered that seventy priests, all over seventy years of age, should guard the 'law of the lotus'; that it should remain concealed from the people; and that not only priests revealing the secrets to the public, but even he who should reveal the secrets of a higher degree to an initiate of the proximate lower degree, should be put to death. Against such secrecy there is in principle certainly nothing to object, as the result of degrading science to the popular level may be seen in the materialistic demoralization of our generation, and as in like manner many aspects of American Spiritualism show the result of popular contact with occult mysteries.

The magical powers of man were also well known to the Greek philosophers, especially to the Alexandrian school, Porphyry, Jamblichus, Plotinus, etc., and in the Middle Ages we find this knowledge in Paracelsus, Van Helmont, Porta, Cardan, Maxwell, Robert Fludd, Agrippa von Nettesheim, Wirdig, Athanasius, Kircher, Campanella, etc. Thus our century stands alone in its ignorance of the positive side of our Unconscious.

First in Hartmann's 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' is the problem of the Unconscious again taken up, and the main lines of its different emanations have been sketched; but for him the transcendental Subject resolves itself into the world-substance. On the other hand, in Kant, who in this, as in so many respects, has not been overtaken, we find this Subject strongly accentuated. His epoch was very little disposed to admit magical powers in man. But Kant held the thing to be

possible, because as an approved logician he knew that everything is possible except what contains a logical contradiction, that therefore we can prescribe nothing to experience, but must accept what it offers, be it ever so astonishing. So that when Kant heard of the magical powers of his contemporary Swedenborg, he not only collected accurate information about him, but determined also to read the works of this mystic. That happened which must always happen in such cases—an acute and exact understanding is in no sympathy with the uncontrolled presentations of intuition. But Kant was highly astonished at the similarity of the theory of the transcendental nature of man, which he had himself deduced from pure reason, to that of Swedenborg.

Because Kant spoke not without self-irony of his deceived expectation, his 'Dreams of a Ghost-seer' has been chiefly regarded from its negative side, and to the overlooking, or with the wish to overlook, its very positive statements. Among the latter is that which expresses the fundamental problem of the monistic doctrine of the soul: 'I own that I am much disposed to assert the existence of immaterial natures in the world, and to place my soul itself in the category of these beings.' And that there may be no doubt that he meant the simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject, he adds: 'The human soul should therefore be regarded as already in the present life connected at the same time with two worlds, of which, so far as it is confined to personal unity with a body, the material only is clearly felt.' Finally, he expresses definitely his belief: 'It is therefore as good as proved, or, to be diffuse, it could

easily be proved, or, better still, it will hereafter be proved, I know not where or when, that the human soul even in this life stands in indissoluble community with all immaterial natures of the spirit-world, that it mutually acts upon them and receives from them impressions, of which, however, as man it is unconscious, as long as all goes well.' In pregnant language, however, is the monistic doctrine of the soul expressed as follows: 'It is therefore truly one and the same Subject which belongs at the same time to the visible and to the invisible world, but not just the same person, since the representations of the one world, by reason of its different quality, are not associated with ideas of the other, and therefore what I think as spirit is not remembered by me as man.'*

Similarly Swedenborg taught: 'Man is so constituted that he is at the same time in the spiritual world and in the natural world. The spiritual world is where the angels are, and the natural world is where men are; and because man is so constituted, he has an interior and an exterior, the interior by which he is in the spiritual world, and the exterior by which he is in the natural world.'†

In the introduction to his 'Dreams of a Ghost-seer,' Kant says, with reference to Swedenborg's clairvoyance, that 'amazing inferences would have to be drawn if only one such event could be supposed to be proved.' At present, therefore, the matter stands thus: Since Kant's death the magical powers of somnambulists have been so confirmed that only for ignorance is scepticism any longer possible. Now,

* Kant: Werke (Rosenkranz), vii. 45, 52, 53, 59.

† Swedenborg: 'Leben und Lehre,' Frankfurt, 1880.

since Kant would confess to-day that hundreds of such facts are proved which 'lead to amazing inferences,' we are logically obliged to put up with just those inferences. The above citations contain them. But those citations do not exhibit what might possibly have been a merely transient phase in Kant's development; for he never abandoned his opinions on the *homo noumenon* whom he referred to an intelligible world. By his solution of the problem of freedom*—which solution, according to Schopenhauer, is among the most profound that man has ever uttered†—Kant shows that throughout his whole life he had the same belief which he has expressed in his 'Dreams of a Ghost-seer,' and which goes upon the double nature of man. The monistic doctrine of the soul accordingly has the support of Kant's principal work, and, indeed, as Schelling also has recognised,‡ of the profoundest parts of it.

The systems of our century—Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Hellenbach—are only developments of Kantian germs, which prove their extraordinary productive powers again in this, that also the monistic doctrine of the soul is preformed in them.

But from the history of philosophy also, it appears that the bi-unity of man is unavoidably concluded from the magical powers of the soul. The Alexandrians, who not only knew of these powers, but

* 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' (Rosenkranz), 418-427. 'Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,' 224-231. 'Metaphysik der Sitten,' 80-100.

† 'Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie.'

‡ Schelling: 'Ueber das Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit' (Werke, vii.), 333-416.

themselves experienced them, were also led immediately to inferences agreeing remarkably with those of Kant. According to Plotinus, the soul is not totally sunk in the body—as is asserted in the dualistic doctrine of the soul—but ‘only a part of us is imprisoned by the body, as if one stood with his feet in water, the rest of the body being out of it.’*

According to him, man has a double soul, a double Ego ; the higher abiding purely in the supersensuous, and the lesser involved in the body and its activity.† The higher soul does not depart from the intelligible, it remains in the intelligible even during the earthly life, and lets down only the lower soul, which is, as it were, dependent from it, into the world of sense.‡ This conception recurs in Plotinus in a great variety of expressions ; he places true realities in the intelligible world, and says that a part of the soul never comes forth from it. ‘If finally I should venture to declare my conviction, contrary to the opinion of others, freely and decidedly, it is that our soul is not totally immersed, but a part of it remains continually in the intelligible ; only the part existing in the sensuous when it is predominant, or rather when it is overpowered and confused, prevents us from attaining to the perception of that which is beheld by the superior part of the soul.’§

The Alexandrian philosophers came to the front at a time when Greek philosophy had resolved itself into scepticism. In despair of finding truth by way of discursive thought, and attributing the fault to the

* Plotinus : ‘Enneads,’ vi. 9, 8.

† *Ibid.*, i. 1, 10 ; vi. 7, 5.

‡ *Ibid.*, iv. 3, 19 ; iv. 8, 8 ; iii. 4, 3 ; iv. 7, 13 ; iv. 3, 12.

§ *Ibid.*, iv. 1, 1.

sensuous character of our cognition, they sought to attain truth in conditions of ecstasy liberated from sense. 'Therefore,' says Plotinus, 'souls are to a certain extent amphibia, because necessarily alternating they lead a life divided into this side and that side.'* Now, from the simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject, it follows that with the suppression of sense the transcendental consciousness forthwith emerges, and is not then first produced. This also is perceived by Plotinus, who says that on turning away from sense the supersensuous spontaneously presents itself without any further process being needed to elicit it. As soon as the obstruction—the sense-consciousness—is removed, the natural activity of the soul, which is directed to the supersensuous, is apparent.†

The Neo-Platonic Ammonius Sakkas also teaches the bi-unity of man. He says that the soul is partly on earth and thinks through sense, partly in the intelligible world (*ἐν νοητοῖς τόποις*) in immediate thought.‡ Plutarch expresses himself still more distinctly; indeed, it sounds as though he were already prepared to indicate the sundering of the Ego as the formula for the explanation of man, warning against mistaking the second person of our Subject for an alien Subject—as somnambulists for the most part do—when he says that the reason is that part of the soul which, in the sinking of the latter into body, is not engulfed by matter; it is therefore in truth not in the man but outside him, and it were more correct *to name it*

* Plotinus: 'Enneads,' iv. 8, 4.

† *Ibid.*, i. 2, 3, 13; i. 6, 6.

‡ Zeller: 'Greek Philosophy,' iii. 2, 436.

the demon than the reason.* In the Christian conception of the world which followed, this inner demon of man is changed into a guardian angel, and the transcendental Subject is confused with a transcendent Subject.

If we take any of the mystics of the Middle Ages, we find there also the same views. In the 'Theologia Germanica'—of which the author is, I believe, still unknown—which was discovered by Luther, and by him, as by Schopenhauer, was highly prized, it is said: 'Now, the created soul of man hath also two eyes. The one is the power of seeing into eternity; the other of seeing into time and the creatures. . . . But these two eyes of the soul of man cannot both perform their work at once, but if the soul shall see with the right eye into eternity, then the left eye must close itself and refrain from working, and be as though it were dead. For if the left eye be fulfilling its office towards outward things—that is, holding converse with time and the creatures—then must the right eye be hindered in its working—that is, in its contemplation. Therefore, whosoever will have the one must let the other go; for "no man can serve two masters." †

Sense and transcendental cognition stand thus, it is true, in temporal antagonism, but not in the sense of the dualistic doctrine but of the monistic, that is, they are both possible within the earthly existence. This antagonism, and the high estimation of transcendental cognition, which runs through all mysticism, have always been conducive to asceticism, and con-

* Plutarch: 'De genio Socratis.'

† 'Theologia Germanica,' c. 7 (tr. by Susanna Winkworth).

tempt for the body and its earthly impulses, among the mystics of the Middle Ages, as before with the Indian and Alexandrian philosophers, whose ideal of incorporeity (ἀσωματία) was so extreme that Plotinus, ashamed of his body, refused to sit to Amelius for his picture, and even concealed his birthday and origin.*

Thus we find an agreement of views, not only among all mystics who observed the transcendental faculties in themselves, but also among all philosophers who discovered these faculties in abnormal organizations, or in normal ones in abnormal states. Hence the inference from these phenomena to the double nature of man is logically compulsory. When, moreover, we see that Kant, independently, as it seems, of any experience of this nature, by mere penetration of his extraordinary intellect into the human problem, was driven to similar conclusions, which he retained throughout his life, the concurrence of these three lines of thought may well be regarded as a striking voucher for the truth of the monistic doctrine of the soul.

Now if between man and the thing-in-itself, call we that God, or Pan, or Nature, there must be interposed the transcendental Subject, then the problem of our existence appears in a completely new light. Neither theism, with the dualistic doctrine of the soul, nor pantheism, nor materialism, gets over the contradiction between man's instinct for happiness and the sufferings of his earthly life. These sufferings cannot be ascribed to his deserts in any system in which man *by foreign power* springs from nothing into

* Porphyrius : ' Vita Plotini.'

existence at birth, that is, first at birth obtains individuality. To relieve us from this contradiction, we require a system in which pessimism is allowed its incontestable truth, and yet birth appears as the free act of a being whose individuality can therefore not first arise at birth, and who is thus of more than phenomenal significance for the brief period of [physical] life. With the recognition of pre-existence, the chief difficulty falls away, because then desert and punishment are still logically thinkable ; but the hypothesis most immediately suggested is that the will of our transcendental Subject has itself brought about our incarnation, which will must be regarded, in the metaphysical sense, as free.

In the history of philosophy it is an often-recurring opinion that man, as a pre-existing being, freely betakes himself to the earthly existence. According to Philo, souls, impelled by attraction to bodily materialization, are continually descending from heaven to earth,* their connection with a body being thus their free act.† According to Plotinus, also, the soul is not united to the body by a foreign power, but every soul enters a body corresponding to its condition and its will ; each determining its position in life by its own act and inclination.‡ At birth we lose recollection of the transcendental existence, as somnambulists lose recollection of their sleep life on waking ; but this loss of memory applies only to the earthly person ; only for this is it true that, as Plotinus says, one of our two existences is concealed

* Philo : 'Quod a Deo mittuntur somnia.'

† Zeller : 'Philosophie der Griechen,' iii. 2, 492.

‡ Plotinus : 'Enneaden,' iii. 2, 12 ; iv. 4, 45 ; iv. 8, 5 ; v. 1, 1.

from us. 'This activity, however, is not concealed from the whole self, but only from a part of it ; just as, when the vegetative function is active, the perception of this activity by the faculties of sense is not transmitted to the general consciousness of the man.'*

Now if, as indeed is admitted by Fichte and Schelling, the Ego is my own act, that is only conceivable if there is a dualism of persons in my own Subject. In this sense only can I be cause of myself ; every other conception would amount to the *causa sui*, i.e., suggests (as to Schopenhauer) Baron Münchhausen, who lifts himself out of the bog by his own cue.† My transcendental Subject may be cause of my earthly personality ; it is thus not the individuality that begins at birth, but only the sensuous, the earthly-conditional Ego.

Twice already, in the course of the foregoing exposition, have we approached this conception of the earthly existence as a free act. In principle it follows from the proof of a transcendental Subject as organising principle in us ; this Subject, however, in which the dualism of body and sensuously-conscious soul is monistically suppressed, we encounter at last, in the analysis of all psychological and physiological functions. Now, as we have seen, to these real grounds for the spontaneity of our earthly existence there accedes a logical reason. For if materialism, pantheism, and the dualistic doctrine of the soul involve us in ethical contradictions, by making in-

* Plotinus : 'Enneaden,' i. 4, 9.

† ['The materialist is like Baron Münchhausen, who, when swimming in water on horseback, drew the horse into the air with his legs, and himself also by his cue.'—'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' vol. i., p. 34 (Haldane and Kemp's tr.).—Tr.]

dividuality originate at birth and emerge out of nothing by a power foreign to it ; after dismissing these aimless, because contradictory conceptions, there remains only the teleological conception, removing these contradictions, and deriving the earthly life from the impulse to incarnation of a transcendental Subject. The true proof of this conception can indeed only be afforded by facts, and evidently we can only find these in analysis of that occurrence which introduces our earthly existence—birth, and of that mystery which antecedes birth : the metaphysic of sexual love.

If organic being originated only in physical and chemical relations, it must be within the province of biology to solve the problem of life. But to this task it has not grown. Life cannot be explained from matter, but requires life again for its explanation, and presupposes *omne vivum ex ovo*. Nor has the future any promise, since biology as such can always show only the conditions without which life does not arise, never the causes from which it arises. This confusion between condition and cause is, it is true, common enough in biological text-books.

We are therefore directed beyond the physiological process of birth, in order to obtain from the analysis of sexual love the positive proof of the spontaneity of our earthly existence.

The metaphysical significance of love has been known by only a few philosophers. It seems as if this investigation has been refrained from upon grounds of decency, without regard to Bacon's words, that what is worthy to be is worthy to be known.*

* 'Novum Organon,' i. s. 120.

Schopenhauer, by deep penetration of this problem, knew that love is metaphysical, *i.e.*, that its quality, intensity, and direction are determined by a metaphysical will, calling into existence the child to be expected from the connection of these particular parents.* This metaphysical will is not distinguished by Schopenhauer from a universal blind will. But as behind the human phenomenal form we have found first the transcendental Subject, the coincidence of the love of the parents with the impulse to incarnation of the pre-existing child is immediately suggested.

To perceive the instinctive source of love, it is necessary first to exhibit its relation to the universal sexual impulse, the instinctive character of which is manifested most distinctly by many prearrangements in the animal kingdom. Every instinct refers to an aim of Nature external to the individual acting and to its consciousness; nor is this at all affected by the Darwinian conception of instinct as originating through biological habit. Now this aim of Nature betrays itself in the results of the instinctive act. We have therefore to ask wherein the result of love is distinguished from that of the sexual impulse. This difference must show whether in both cases there is an instinct, or not. Now, in the animal world the result is the quantitative multiplication of individuals; variations from the specific type are so slight, showing themselves first as cumulative after so many generations, that we may neglect them in comparison with the much greater variations of the human posterity. *After* quantitative multiplication of individuals in the animal world, the struggle

* Schopenhauer: 'Ueber die Metaphysik der Geschlechtsliebe.'

for existence acts unfavourably to this quantity, but favourably to quality, since only the fittest survive, and by transmission of peculiarities the race is by little and little improved. Selection thus ensues first within the already existing generation. So that in the animal world the sexual impulse is indiscriminate—at least, we may here neglect the cases of sexual selection described by Darwin—and accordingly individuals of the posterity are almost only general, and repeat the parental type. But now, with the selection of the parents themselves by a breeder, the process of improvement of the race would be considerably shortened and hastened—that is, differences in the posterity which naturally would proceed at a minimum rate would be already accumulated in every new generation. Now this is Nature's own proceeding, resembling in this artificial breeding, when instead of the sexual impulse she introduces love. Love is a natural selection as between the parents. Thus in man the sexual impulse is specialised—and the more individuality there is in the man, the more individuality is there in the selection—and therefore, also, his posterity vary from the common type. And so the result of love reveals to us its natural aim. If I love just this maiden, but my friend just that one, and we would both strongly decline an exchange, the upshot is that the aim in both is posterity, and that not children in general (for such identity of result would not explain the difference of means demanded by instinct), but children of different sorts. A difference of parents, a difference of children. Thus, since in man the general sexual impulse becomes love, what is changed in the world is just the con-

stitution of the next generation, and nothing else. Love, therefore, anticipates the next generation in regard to quality ; the sexual impulse only in regard to quantity. In the animal kingdom, improvement is indirectly aimed at, the supplementary struggle for existence first making the selection ; but in man it is directly aimed at, because already, without going beyond the parents, there is selection, though not by the parents, we, indeed, choosing our wives ourselves, but in the sense of nature, that is, instinctively. The subsequent struggle for existence completes in humanity only that result which love has already prepared. Therefore is it that love is a force so potent and glorified, because it denotes the point at which the quality of the next generation is determined. In the animal kingdom, the general impulse, supplemented by the struggle for existence, suffices to maintain the racial type, perhaps even to educe new species and kinds ; in man, on the other hand, the new means of definitely-directed choice, acceding to the general impulse, reveals a new aim of Nature : accelerated variation from the race type. We are not, however, to infer that through this reinforcement of means the development of the human form to new species and kinds must be accelerated ; for it may well be that the individualization of posterity, provisionally at least, is in substitution of the further modification of the human race as such. Nature having highly developed the human brain and highly differentiated the prehensive organs—that is, changed them into hands—man has become, biologically, stationary ; technic inventions dispensing with organic perfection. Therefore Aristotle calls the hand

the instrument of instruments. And so it may be said that humanity, the general impulse being converted into love, has become biologically stationary, because the individualisation of posterity satisfied the purpose of organic change.

Thus with the multiplication of Nature's means we are to conclude an alteration of her aim. Schopenhauer says: 'As the being, the *existentia*, of these future persons is absolutely conditioned by our sexual impulse generally, so is their nature, *essentia*, by the individual selection in its satisfaction, *i.e.*, by sexual love, and is in every respect irrevocably fixed thereby.' But this 'in every respect' is dropped by Schopenhauer himself, since he especially refers to the bodily constitution of the next generation. This, therefore, is not to the purpose, because the individualisation of posterity is much less corporeal than in the diversity of characters and abilities. As psychical differences appear, in the result—the new generation—the centre of gravity in the means applied must be also psychical. Although bodily beauty certainly determines the choice, that is only because it is the outward expression of a particular psychical quality which unconsciously attracts us, and therefore in the unconscious physiological regards by which we are led we attach the greatest value to the countenance—in which the psychical quality attracting us finds its most marked expression—and only secondary value to the rest of the form.

Love being an instinct having its aim outside the lover, its problem is not to be explained from the consciousness. The particular direction of the passion lies in unconscious motives. Beauty, far from being

the ultimate explanation, is only the conscious means to instinct for its unconscious aim. It is, however, quite another question whether marriage is contracted from love. Marriage is often decided by passion, but this is by no means always the case, especially in our time; so that Bahnsen was quite right in saying that there are two principal sorts of marriages, the physical and the metaphysical,* those which spring from worldly motives, and those in which we are led by the Unconscious. Thus what Spinoza says of the affections generally, 'That man strives after nothing, wills, longs for, or desires nothing because he esteems it good, but, on the contrary, esteems that therefore as good which he strives after, wills, longs for, or desires,'† is certainly true of the object of love. We do not love a maiden because we find her beautiful, but because we love her we find her beautiful. In love the earthly consciousness of our person confounds cause and effect. We, limited in our sensuous consciousness to the earthly order of things, hold that for the essential of love of which we are conscious: the pleasure in a particular individual of the other sex. But as the sufficient cause of a proceeding is known only from the effect, and this is also true of instincts, the peculiar significance of the sexual impulse can only lie in this, that a living being feels impelled by an affection difficult to overcome, to deposit the material of a germ-cell in a place suitable for its development, love adding the further condition that not every place is regarded as alike suitable, a

* Bahnsen: 'Die Widerspruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt,' ii. 174.

† Spinoza: 'Ethik,' iii.; 'Lehrsatz,' 9.

selection consequently being made. As in every instinct, so here also there is consciousness of the means without consciousness of the aim ; that we know beforehand the consequence makes no difference ; for this knowledge of the consequence, which is not always desired, will not explain the affection, even if the consequence is desired. The underlying will is a metaphysical one, which by no means always coincides with the will of our earthly person.

The mystery of love thus lies in the Unconscious, and even more than in the common sexual impulse, because though we know the consequence, generally, of our act, we do not at all know the speciality of the consequence in the particular case. We know that offspring will follow, but not at all what offspring. The transcendental origin of the instinct is shown as well by its power as by its opposition to our earthly interest. The particularity of the result thus consists in the individual constitution of the offspring ; love accordingly anticipates the quality and individuality of the offspring, and therefore every lover holds this special maiden suitable to himself. There are no two passions whose individualisation would be quite similar, as, also—which, metaphysically, is the same thing—there are no two men completely resembling one another. Every lover considers his love as unique of its kind—a feeling which is no deception ; for even if different men may love in the same degree, the quality of the love is still not the same, but rather in each particular case is distinguished by undefinable shades. Every true passion exists in its subtlest character and effusion as a unique phenomenon. To this singularity of the cause corresponds the singularity of the

effect, the thoroughly specialised individuality of the child. It is therefore a profound saying of Schopenhauer: 'As inexplicable as the entirely special and exclusively appropriate individuality of every man, is also the wholly peculiar and individual passion of two lovers—nay, at root the two things are one and the same: the first is that *explicite* which the latter was *implicite*.'

As love is an instinct, the derivation of it from conscious motives must fail. With all gradations of love, the corresponding advantage is for the earthly person more or less the same, but not for the Unconscious, whether we call that the Universal Will (Weltwillen) with Schopenhauer, or transcendental Subject. Not with the happiness of the earthly person is love concerned. Were passion determined by beauty in itself, were it only consciously motivated, marriages following upon the most passionate love must be the happiest, which is not the case. Therefore it is love, not marriage, that is the proper theme of poetry. When a passionate lover is unfortunate in marriage, he is surprised because he supposed the foundations of his love to be in his consciousness, where they are not at all, and hoped to attain his personal ends, whereas he has only furthered transcendental ends.

Consciousness is often in opposition to the passion, and so betrays that it has no part in it. Therefore in love occur the most striking antinomies of feeling. It may happen that qualities which would repel us in friendship, in love do not sober, but ensnare us, though we well understand that they may be objectionable for marriage life. Love is indifferent to the doubts of consciousness; it judges the loved

object according to its own standard. Many an one loves a maiden not only in spite of faults condemned by his consciousness, but on account of those faults, which are agreeable to the Unconscious. Such, for instance, are expressions of feminine humour and levity, which may promote passion, while we recognise them with misgiving. We may call to mind Philina in 'Wilhelm Meister.' Such characters are frequent among actors, not merely because the life of the stage develops them, but also because such dispositions are likely to take to the stage, and yet notoriously it is to just such actresses that the powerful considerations of social position are unhesitatingly sacrificed, notwithstanding the warnings of experience against such marriages. The highest degree of antinomy of feeling in love is shown in the fact that it is compatible with hate, nay, contempt—as in the case of Des Grieux and Manon Lescaux. Such a realised dialectical cleavage is only to be explained from the cleavage of consciousness and the Unconscious. When Ovid somewhere says, '*Odero, si potero, si non, invitatus amabo,*' he is wrong in supposing that love and hate are alternatives; for in all love there is the *invitatus amabo*, and it is also compatible with hate. Therefore are we impressed with the psychological truth of the scene in which Othello, possessed with hatred and contempt for Desdemona, first kisses and then kills her. This real-dialectic of feeling is an inexhaustible theme of love.

The unconsciousness of the motive in love appears in this also, that we attach so little importance, as regards maidens, to the development of their consciousness, that is, to their cultivation. For the off-

spring, cultivation is of no importance whatever as not being hereditary. On the contrary, the less defined, springing more deeply from the Unconscious, are the psychical qualities, as is peculiarly the case with the female sex, the more the charm works upon us.

Since nature in humanity acts according to the principle of individualisation, the sexual impulse loses its general character and proceeds with choice, and even with such exclusive speciality of choice, that the general impulse is quite silenced. This is the important distinction between impulse and love, expressed mythologically by Plato in speaking of the primitive man whose divided halves longingly seek each other and strive for union, which may perhaps be considered as an obscure suggestion of hermaphroditism as a primitive biological form.*

Schopenhauer's theory is thus undoubtedly the true one; but it needs correction and completion. The individualisation of man concerns particularly the psychical qualities, character and intellect, and so love must particularly anticipate these, not merely the definite bodily constitution of the next generation. Now, as these psychical qualities determine the historical condition of humanity, here also history again appears as the continuation of biology. It would therefore be inconsequent to suppose that the Will underlying love only introduces our existence, then leaving us free, that is, abandoning us wholly to the play of our conscious motives. We cannot suppose the organising principle in us to have provided us with an apparatus of brain whose functions it has not designed; and as little can it be supposed that

* [The latest and most serious revival of this idea will be found in L. Oliphant's 'Scientific Religion' (Blackwoods, 1888).—Tr.

the metaphysical Will would have projected the definite constitution of the next generation, yet without troubling itself about the use of the qualities produced. Moreover, we have already had frequent occasion to see that man can be motivated from the transcendental region without the mediation of his consciousness, and that may also well be the case in history.

As biology reveals an unconscious end in the elevation of forms and their consciousness—science not disturbing this conclusion by its discovery of conditions and means—so also must history have a teleological significance. Undoubtedly therefore the metaphysic of sexual love is related to history, and if the generation for the time being has a definite historical function, its definite constitution will be anticipated in love with reference to this function, whether that concerns the revolutionary deeds of historical heroes, who so strikingly appear as the right men at the right times and in the right places, or the revolutionising thoughts of intellectual heroes. To the remark, that many able men have had able mothers, it may perhaps be added, that the mothers of able men have been passionately loved. In the brain of the discoverer, and already in the love of his parents, is anticipated the high-hanging intellectual fruit which is to be plucked, as in the long neck of the giraffe the high-hanging tree fruit is anticipated. Schopenhauer, who admits the latter, should consistently have admitted the former, and he would thus have attained to a deeper conception of history, though that would have contravened the blindness of his Universal Will.

Schopenhauer, however, must be supplemented. The metaphysical Will underlying love is incontestable ; but if between man and the world-substance there is the transcendental Subject, then obviously the metaphysical Will is to be placed in such a Subject, and the love of the parents coincides with the incarnation-impulse of a transcendental, pre-existing Subject. With that, the theory of Schopenhauer, which is constantly incompatible with the blindness of the Universal Will, becomes clear, this Subject being not blind, and being better adapted to the remarkably astute arrangements which Schopenhauer imposes upon the Universal Will. The biological view, which lets individuality be determined according to physiological laws of heredity, does not interfere with the transcendental view according to which the Subject can take into account these laws of heredity, and just by reason of them incarnate itself through particular parents. For the rest, the question certainly arises, whether the transcendental Subject is exactly reflected in its human phenomenal form, or whether this is modified by the material of the germ-cell. Many phenomena of somnambulism favour the latter view.

The metaphysical Will, which Schopenhauer has discovered in love, is therefore the individual will of a transcendental Subject, which seeks the earthly phenomenal form not only for objective reasons, to further the aim of the race, but also for subjective reasons, to advance itself. Thus this point of departure, taken from the metaphysic of sexual love, also leads us to the monistic union of biology with transcendental psychology, because man, as the common

point of differentiation of both directions, advances the development of the race, as of his own transcendental subject.

We shall first have a true philosophy of history when we conceive it, according to this double tendency, as a teleological problem, instead of attributing to it a merely earthly aim, a possible golden era of the future, such as Socialists dream of in their fallacious optimism. History must certainly be regarded as a continuation of biology, in which the struggle of ideas and the survival of the fit, that is the true, ideas will more and more take the place of mere struggle for the means of existence; but the transcendental view has also its validity. It is a prejudice of our century to believe that the teleological conception of history cannot co-exist with the mechanical—to which the mechanic of ideas also belongs. Mechanism and teleology would only be irreconcilable opposites if there could be no teleological mechanism—an assertion most inappropriate to the century of machines. From the instincts of animals we learn the psychological possibility of acts of which the aim is unconscious while the means are conscious. We have seen further that somnambulists, either from their own design or from a so-called magnetic promise, perform acts in waking, of both the means and aim of which they are conscious, while yet the impulse behind them does not belong to their earthly will. Thus, looking to the parallelism of life with the waking state, and of our pre-existence with the somnambulant sleep, the psychological possibility is not to be denied, that human history is composed of acts motivated by ideas and impulses

transcendentally derived ; while we, like somnambulists, are immovably convinced of our own deliberate agency.

There remains, then, only the question, whether the multitude of these will-impulses of individuals are dissipated without rule or connection, or are combined by a single principle which through the conflict of particular directions seeks the diagonal direction. To discover this single principle is perhaps for ever interdicted to the human intellect ; but we cannot doubt its possibility, since even in the transactions of ant-hill or bee-hive, in the division of labour among Hydromedusæ, or in the conduct of tentacled Polype fighting among themselves for booty, the presence of a unitary bond in a multitude of individuals is very evident. If, therefore, the question of the prophet : ‘Leavest thou men as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler ?’* must, as regards human history, be answered in the negative, it only remains to ask to whom this question is to be addressed : to the personal God, to the single Universal Will, or to the plurality of transcendental subjects, whose consciousness of their solidarity, however, must, with the continual development of the purpose of history on a large scale and in the whole, have grown into antagonism to the will of the earthly individual. Practically, it is indifferent which address we suppose for this question of the prophet, and if only we do not, like the materialists, deny that it has any address, we should join hands over all other differences of opinion, with a common faith in human solidarity, instead of contending, as

* Habakkuk i. 14.

unhappily those do who have nevertheless still a belief in metaphysics generally—the religious and the philosophical. It is not really a question of the form of metaphysic, be it this or that religion or philosophy, at a time when a common danger has to be encountered in the total rejection of metaphysic, with the already alarming consequences of that rejection.

Thus the metaphysical explanation of sexual love, which is a tributary to the teleological conception of history, is only a logical inference from the philosophical conception that our life and our nature are our own act. This free act, if it extends not only to the *existentia*, but also to the *essentia*, must originate where the individuality is determined : in the love of the parents. Therefore it was necessary to bestow some remarks on the metaphysic of sexual love, especially as the present time is so disposed to regard love and marriage merely as an affair of our earthly personality, as an *égoïsme à deux*, as the French call it.

The conception of life as a free act is logically compatible with either the optimistic or the pessimistic estimate of earthly existence ; for the act can be either on account of the value of the earthly existence, or notwithstanding the contrary, life in the latter case having still an educational value. Whoever recognises the dualism of Subject and person will not, even if a pessimist, see a contradiction to pessimism in the impulse to incarnation.

In somnambulism it is very apparent that the will of the transcendental Subject does not coincide with that of the waking person, and may even be in express opposition to it. Now if, following Buddha and Christ, the saints of all religions, and the majority

of deep thinkers and poets, we regard the world as a vale of tears, we must conceive the earthly life just as a transcendental self-prescription, similar to those prescriptions of somnambulists, in which they have no consideration for the pleasure of their waking person. The opposition between transcendental will and earthly will, which in somnambulism appears only in relation to particular circumstances of life, must extend itself to the total content of life, in so far as the same does not correspond with the earthly desires. The impulse to incarnation is only explicable if the sufferings of life are of transcendental advantage to the Subject, which has wholly different interests from the earthly person. The transcendental advantage of the earthly life appears even on two sides to be greater, the more evil we experience. Necessity is the mother of inventions, but also of Christian sympathy ; so that necessity advances both the historical progress of the race and the moral progress of the individual. The evil in the world, which the struggle for existence brings with it, is therefore in the result optimistic ; for this struggle advances the biological elevation of the life-forms and their consciousness, and advances individual development intellectually and morally ; even in periods of crass materialism, reckless egoism, looking only to the earthly advantage of the individual self, though useless for the educational value of existence, will further the progress of civilisation, if not of culture.

Thus pessimism is true for the earthly individuals, but optimism for the race and for the transcendental Subject, which enters on the inheritance of the earthly

life. We may therefore be sure that we are on a right standpoint, when upon it an *aut-ant* of opposed opinions, as optimism and pessimism, is changed into an *et-et*, and that not eclectically, but by monistic reconciliation, for truth is represented by the hypotenuse, not by the perpendicular.

It was shown in the chapter on 'Memory' that the transition from consciousness to the unconscious signifies, strictly regarded, a transition to transcendental consciousness. That is not to replace Darwinism by transcendental psychology. Darwinism confesses that its understanding ends with the transition to the Unconscious, and therefore leaves heredity a problem. Thus transcendental psychology begins at the point where Darwinism ends. But what is true of the becoming unconscious of memories must avail also generally of ideation, the condensed amount of which constitutes our psychical faculties and dispositions. The transcendental subject thus appears to be the heir of our psychical attainment in life, and therefore also we must insist rather on the moral than on the intellectual powers, because with the change in organic form at death, the mode of cognition changes, while the moral relations in the transcendental order remain the same. Agreeably to which, we see also that somnambulists, frequently in very striking opposition to the waking condition, estimate men, according not to intellectual, but to moral cultivation, their sympathies and antipathies being thus determined.

Hellenbach,* whose philosophical works are of

* Hellenbach: (a) 'Philosophie des gesunden Menschenverstandniss;' (b) 'Der Individualismus;' (c) 'Die Vorurtheile der Menschheit.'

weighty importance for the monistic doctrine of the soul, and who, like the Buddhists in their doctrine of Karma, pursues the law of the conservation of energy, in its intellectual and moral application, into the transcendental world, expands into a transcendental optimism when he says : ‘ When by little and little intellectual labour has become converted into talent, and moral conquest into good dispositions, then is the earth, though a vale of tears indeed, yet not a purposeless one ; then can the common understanding apprehend the value of the struggle of this life, in which alone character can be developed and formed ; then is material welfare—the single aim of materialists—only the means, though, truly, not unessential means, to a far higher aim.’* Hellenbach is eminently a monist, and far more consequent than our men of science, when he says : ‘ The magical formula, which gives a moral foundation to the world, is called Conservation of Energy, Capitalisation, thus just the principle which we find in astronomy, in the evolution of plants and animals, as of culture and social science ! On this fundamental principle science will rear its edifice of monism ; only for morals, for the development of the noblest creature of earth, it shall have no recognition, the force accumulated in man shall be lost.’†

That the process of life has not for its aim the bringing ephemeral beings into existence, and then destroying them again ; that also the truth is not with pantheism, in allowing the individual to be reabsorbed at death into the world-substance, like raindrops in

* Hellenbach : ‘ Phil. d. ges. Menschenverstandniss,’ 235.

† *Ibid.* : ‘ Vorurtheile,’ etc., ii. 257.

the sea, has been already proved by somnambulism, which reveals rather the strengthening of individuality, and the exaltation of consciousness. At the strengthening of individuality must also the earthly existence be aimed ; we find the same in the biological succession of animal forms ; and in the relations which are already repeatedly coming to light between biology and transcendental psychology, we must recognise this exaltation as the aim with which the transcendental Subject incarnates itself ; for the earthly man is the common point, determining on the one hand the development of the transcendental Subject, on the other that of the race.

But the accent is laid exclusively on the race, if with the materialists we suppose that the acquirements of individuals are stored up only in their germ-cells, determining only the type of ensuing generations, species and kinds, while the transmitting individuals themselves are laid aside by death. Much more, evidently, would be accomplished by heredity, if one and the same life-process should secure the development of individuals in their transcendental survival, and that of the race in its earthly continuance. This arrangement would be very conformable to the economy of nature, so significant in all provinces ; whereas if biological and historical progress should consist simply in what we bequeath objectively, whether children, or works of arts, or philosophical thoughts, everything, however, being lost which we have gained subjectively as faculty, the law of economy would be altogether contravened. Should Kant and Goethe, Buddha and Christ, have laboured and suffered only for the race, without

thereby at the same time advancing a transcendental subject of their own, nature would be in the highest degree wasteful.* If, on the other hand, to the physiological inheritance is added the transcendental, that would be the very ideal of the economy of nature, since nature would then be comparable to a machine, which in turning out its products continually improved itself, and acquired capability for the production of higher results.

As the fruits of our existence, its moral results, the Karma of the Buddhists,† as well good as evil, are transmitted to the transcendental subject, the transcendental world is connected with the world of sense by the two greatest generalisations of modern science—Conservation of Energy and Evolution. In pantheistic systems the individual labours more or less in foreign service, and only partially for self-advantage, being only a transitory part of the world-substance. In materialism, which attributes to the individual only a phenomenal significance, and denies every metaphysical significance, the individual labours just *pour le roi de Prusse*, that is, for the next generation, and so on to the latest, when it will appear that the whole labour has been in vain. In the monistic doctrine of the soul, on the other hand, our life has first of all an individual aim, but then also a general one, which may even fall due in one's own lifetime, for every one of us plays a part, if not in the external history of mankind, yet in the psychical history of others.

Schopenhauer very rightly explains our attach-

* Cf. Hellenbach : 'Vorurtheile,' ii. 181.

† Olcott : 'Le Bouddhisme,' Paris, 1883.

ment to life, notwithstanding the preponderance of suffering, by the fact that we not only *have* the will to live, but *are* this will. The monistic doctrine of soul retains this view with slight modifications ; life is a transcendental self-prescription of our Subject ; attachment to life rests upon a transcendental act of will which must accompany us throughout life, persisting with the same intensity even when it conflicts with the will of the earthly being. Had we only the earthly will, without being metaphysical will, such a contradiction would not occur, that we should consent to life long after we had condemned its substance ; rather would attachment to life rise with its joys and desist with its sufferings, and suicide must follow at the moment when the weight of suffering obtained the least preponderance. Suicide could cost us not even an effort, if we consisted only of the atoms of the materialists, and had accordingly only a degree of will to live exactly fixed by what life contained for us, instead of being a metaphysical will to live, which remains the same whatever may be the life's content ; for even suicide takes place not because that will has ceased, but in spite of its continuance. The transcendental Subject holds itself indifferent to the sufferings of the earthly person, reckoning them even for its own advantage ; it therefore insists on this existence, as somnambulists in the crisis may desire an operation from which they shrink in waking life. All apparent contradictions are therefore removed when we admit the dualism of subject and person, whereas for materialists they are quite insoluble.

With Schopenhauer and Hartmann, the world-

process, which has for its aim the denial of the will, is at bottom a protracted suicide of Pan, and our existence is our own work only inasmuch as we are ourselves that Pan. But if, with Schopenhauer, we recognise that we are the metaphysical will to live, with only the correction that we are will in the individual sense, then is this another way of saying that we have ourselves chosen our existence in the proper sense of the word, namely, as Subjects, not as Pan ; that thus, also, the attachment to our existence, which so often survives the esteem of life, is explained by the persistence of the transcendental individual will, we, like somnambulists, as Subjects willing what as persons we dislike.

But if birth is a free act of will, then already must the love of the parents be identical with the impulse to incarnation of a transcendental being, and the parents cannot be regarded as the producers, but only as the adoptive parents of their children, which explains at once the futility of all attempts to deal with the problem of life as one of physical and chemical relations. It is difficult to justify marriage from the standpoint of pantheism, but from that of materialism, which regards love and marriage as only physical, it appears positively as a sin (of which opinion also Alexander von Humboldt seems to have been*) ; for parents have no right for their own satisfaction to bring into this existence a *new* being—a fraud upon it, if it has no metaphysical background. Only if love is identical with the transcendental act of will of the being pressing into existence, if marriages ‘are made in heaven,’ are they also justifiable.

* Mainländer : ‘ Philosophie der Erlösung,’ i. 349.

Thus the monistic doctrine of soul, distinguishing between Subject and Person, sets the man altogether on his own feet, which neither pantheism nor materialism succeeds in doing ; it silences not only complaints against those by whose means we enter this life of preponderant suffering, but also complaint of life itself.

But this self-establishment of man introduces two further problems for solution, of which one is not considered by Schopenhauer, while he has started the other in opposition to his system, and is the first to attempt its solution. These questions are : our attachment to individuality, and design in the fate of the individual.

The attachment to individuality, such that we should insist on the preservation of our own, even in a desired exchange of our circumstances for those of another, (a desire really contradictory, it being the individuality itself which determines the whole lot,) must have a metaphysical foundation ; for radically, even without a correction of Schopenhauer's premisses, it is identical with the particular individual direction of the parents' love. Attachment to individuality must thus depend on the fact that as transcendental beings we already possess this individuality. The question then arises how we obtained it.

In somnambulism, the transcendental Subject shows a very decided individuality. We appear therein as willing and knowing beings, as in waking, only the nature of the knowledge and the direction of the will are different from our person's ; all the faculties of the latter reappear in somnambulism, and indeed in striking exaltation ; our feeling

is deepened, sympathies and antipathies are much more decided, intellectual powers and moral consciousness often impressively elevated. The whole spiritual individuality is exalted, and the contrary happens to what the presuppositions of pantheism or materialism would lead us to expect. Especially observable, however, is the energetic activity of imagination, which already in our ordinary dreams is so productive that it seems quite insufficient to refer it to the imagination of the waking person, and a special dream-organ must be admitted. If there is, as none will deny, a difference between the products of waking and dream imagination, then, notwithstanding the essential similarity of function, we must distinguish between the activity of the imagination of consciousness and that of the Unconscious, *i.e.*, of the transcendental Subject; and even if in both conditions the activity of imagination should be connected with a material substratum, yet the difference of the products at least compels us to suppose another seat of activity in dreams, which we should perhaps have to seek in deeper layers of the brain, justifying the expression 'dream-organ.' The higher productivity of the unconscious imagination of the dream-organ is the more to be admired, that, as has been sufficiently shown, it is never in unmixed manifestation in ordinary dreams. We cannot properly speak of a mere exaltation of the imagination of consciousness by sleep (though for convenience the expression may be allowed), because the consciousness, and with it all its psychical faculties, are depressed by sleep, while the powers of dream are awakened inversely as

the deepness of the sleep. That, however, is true of all apparent exaltations of psychical powers in dream and somnambulism. We cannot speak of an exaltation of the warmth of the sun when the mists of morning, too dense to be fully penetrated by its beams, are swept away by a fresh breeze; and when the threshold of sensibility, admitting to our consciousness only a small measure of the activities of the transcendental Subject, is depressed by a deep sleep, there is no true exaltation of psychical activities. The real point of radiation of all psychical faculties, even in waking, lies deep in the Unconscious, and they are only observed closer to their common point of origination—the transcendental Subject—when the threshold of sensibility is depressed in dream and somnambulism. In waking consciousness they are mediated, but not produced, by the differentiated organs of sense; thus for materialism man falls to pieces into a psychical mosaic, but in somnambulism, as also in works of genius, they are attached to the undivided psychical unity of the transcendental Subject.

Now, if in this Subject are rediscovered the psychical faculties of waking life, and only feelers, as it were, are extended by it into the material world, the capability of psychical development of the personality of sense must belong also to the transcendental Subject; that is to say, the latter must be able to take up into itself the deposit of our conscious activity, and experience a growth, as the stem of a tree obtains growth by means of its outstretched boughs and leaves. Now, if the real heir of our attainments in the world

of sense, of all, that is, which in Darwinism is thrown to the Unconscious, is the transcendental Subject (as in the chapter on 'Memory' appeared most strikingly to be the case), and inasmuch as this Subject possesses essentially the same psychical powers as its projection, the man of the senses, the capacity of the transcendental Subject for development cannot be limited to the single case of the earthly existence, but the marked individuality which we already bring with us into this existence must have been acquired in a similar way to that in which it is augmented in this life. The transcendental Subject must, therefore, have become that which it is by a succession of different modes of existence.

From the strength of the impulse to incarnation, or, what is the same, of sexual love, is to be inferred a great advantage from immersion into the world of sense, and the consequent desirability, in the interest of the Subject, of the repetition of this mode of existence, so that the unconscious attainments of one existence may be transmitted to the next. The hypothesis of a transcendental consciousness, which many followers of Darwin might repudiate, is therefore completely compatible with Darwinism. The 'Unconscious' is merely a negative term for that which is positively denoted as transcendental consciousness, so that the content of both is obtained by the same biological processes. When the Darwinian says that activities and excitations tend to unconscious aptitudes, dispositions, and talents, the transcendental psychologist indicates the same process in saying that the transcendental Subject is the heir of the person. The Darwinian says that such dispositions are for the

person unconscious ; but the transcendental psychologist adds that they are unconscious only for the person, not for the Subject. Darwinism is not overturned, but only cosmically extended, when the eminently Darwinian saying, 'Habit is second nature' is converted into, 'The first nature, that which is introduced with existence, is biological habit.' If Palingenesis takes place, we can go even further, and grant to Darwinism that this biological habit is that of our ancestors ; for in that case those ancestors would be just transient phenomenal forms of the same transcendental Subjects which in later generations came again to incarnation.

Fundamentally, it turns upon what we mean by the word 'heredity.' According to Darwin, habits are transmitted to the germ-cells, and so to all later generations, species, and kinds ; according to the transcendental psychologist, habits pass as predispositions to the transcendental Subject, and so determine its later phenomenal forms, which these later generations just are. These two views are not opposed to each other ; they may both be true, only in that case there is the question whether principles of explanation are not unnecessarily multiplied, a double cause being accepted when perhaps one suffices. The proof of the Darwinian process lies very close at hand : referring to the resemblance of children to the parents ; but the proof of the transcendental psychological process is still nearer, namely, in ourselves ; it occurs as often as an idea passes over from ordinary into transcendental consciousness, as was shown in the chapter on 'Memory.'

Palingenesis is an idea wholly distinct from that of

transmigration of souls, against which the Darwinian of our day can adduce no better reasons than had already been adduced by Aristotle against Plato.* Just therefore is Palingenesis only thinkable on the foundation of a metaphysical Darwinism, and in this form it is unavoidable for everyone who still retains the conception of the soul at all, and recognises, besides, the truth of Darwinism. It is not the proper place here to pursue this in greater detail. But though, no doubt, Palingenesis is an idea which for the present has gone much out of fashion, that does not prevent our returning to it, as Lessing returned to it.† In Darwinism, well understood, there lies the germ of Palingenesis; to the materialist, of course, it will seem not only paradoxical, but (as usual) 'impossible'; though Voltaire (I think it is) somewhere observes: 'Not to be twice-born, but once, is wonderful.'

Those who think the metaphysical Darwinism, tending to Palingenesis, a crude explanation of individuality, should consider that the alternative explanations offered by materialism and pantheism are by no means less crude. They do not simplify the problem of life, if only because they do not seek in it unity; it returns with every birth; and becomes permanent when in every birth they see a new creation.

The doctrine of transmigration needs to be corrected in this also, that re-birth can only be regarded as the exception, not as the constant rule, as is, indeed, inferable from the simultaneity of our earthly

* Arist. : 'De Animâ,' ii. c. 1 and 2.

† Lessing : 'Erziehung des Menschengeschlechtes.'

phenomenal form with the antecedent Subject underlying it. Moreover, from the finitude of planetary relations, the advantage to be derived from reincarnation cannot be regarded as endless and inexhaustible, necessitating eternal re-births ; and, finally, the biological process appears to aim at a gradual expansion into the transcendental mode of existence, even without the supposition of Schelling's third Phase as the consummation of times.

So that not only the existence of man in general, but also individuality, is metaphysically determined, and is our own work ; and the attachment to this individuality, which as transcendental Subjects we possessed already before birth, is thus explained.

With respect to the further problem of an individual life-aim, to such an opinion the system of Schopenhauer is highly unfavourable ; yet to it was this honest inquirer driven by a profound investigation of the problem of human existence.* It is difficult to see how the blind Will of Nature should come to a purposeful disposition of our fate in life, even to particulars ; whereas the solution is easier on the hypothesis of a transcendental Subject. Nevertheless, the idea is still so paradoxical, that even the mere psychological possibility of a disposition of our fate by our own Subject must appeal to analogous facts of inner experience before it can be admitted. Such facts are really at hand ; in an earlier chapter dream has actually afforded us the proof of the psychological possibility of a falling asunder of the Subject into two persons ; and again it is dream that

* Schopenhauer : 'Parerga I. Ueber die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit im Schicksal des Einzelnen.'

teaches us that the individual disposition of a life's fate is possible outside dreams, since in dream it really happens; and all the more as in both cases the same agency has to be admitted—the transcendental Subject. It has been already pointed out that, and why, the waking imagination is insufficient to explain the dream images, that we are therefore driven to the admission of a special dream organ, even if we can only understand by that the imagination of the Unconscious—that is, of the transcendental Subject. Schopenhauer shows the reason for admitting a special organ of dream: 'Moreover, the images of imagination are always introduced by association of thoughts, or are motived, and are accompanied by consciousness of their voluntary character. Dream, on the contrary, presents itself as a complete stranger, obtruding itself, like the external world, without our assistance, and even against our wills. The entire unexpectedness of its proceedings, even the most insignificant, impresses on them the stamp of objectivity and reality.'* Now, in the chapter on 'Dream, a dramatist,' we have found that this unexpected and objective obtrusion as from without is always the sign of a dramatic self-sundering in dream, and always happens with the emergence of impressions from the Unconscious, the threshold of sensibility being the place of cleavage of the Subject into two persons. And this applies not merely to the personages of our dream, but also to the dream-stage, in which not only is there a falling asunder of our Unconscious on its physical side—with which Scherner dealt—but the psychological Unconscious also

* Schopenhauer: 'Ueber Geistersehen.'

comes into play, as, for instance, when in dream we are lost in contemplation of an evening scene by Lenau, or a bright landscape lies before us. The dream-organ, therefore, the transcendental Subject, determines not only the incidents of our dream, but also the scenic decorations, though as dreamers we know it not.

Now this is for Schopenhauer a point of departure for his transcendental speculation on Design in the Fate of the Individual: 'And indeed it is this analogy with dream which enables us to see, if only in the nebulous distance, how the secret power, which rules and bends the external circumstances affecting us, may nevertheless have its root in the depths of our own unfathomable being. For in dream also the circumstances, which are there the motives of our acts, come together casually as external and independent of us, nay, often as repugnant to us; yet have they a secret and teleological connection; because a hidden power, to which all the incidents of dream are obedient, directs and adapts these circumstances, and that simply and solely with reference to us.'

Now it is easy to see that, transferring this dream-relation to actual life, the transcendental Subject affords an incomparably better explanatory cause than the blind universal Will. To be convinced of that, we have only to hear Schopenhauer further:

'But the strangest thing is that this power'—he is still speaking of dream—'at last can be none other than our own will, yet from a standpoint not falling within our dreaming consciousness; therefore it is, that the proceedings of the dream so often take

a direction wholly opposed to our wishes in it, striking us with amazement, grief, nay, terror and mortal agony, without the fate, which yet secretly we ourselves control, coming to our rescue. . . . Yet these impediments are provided, and our eager wishes are frustrated by blow upon blow, by our own will ; though from a region lying far beyond the representing consciousness in dream, so that it emerges in the latter as inexorable fate.'

Now as in the foregoing Schopenhauer infers a particular dream phantasy, so by transferring the dream-relation to life, in what follows he infers a fate-will independent of our consciousness and hidden from it ; only that the will of a transcendental Subject is far more suggested than that of the transcendent universal will : ' Now may there not be, in analogy with what is disclosed in dream, a similar state of things in the fate of real life, and in its conformability to scheme, which perhaps everyone, in the course of his own life, has remarked ? ' Schopenhauer next speaks of the hard ' buffets of fate,' which we so often experience in the frustration of our earthly wishes, and says : ' Now it is often afterwards manifest, that the frustration of such a plan has been thoroughly conducive to our true good ; this, therefore, may also be the case when we are not made aware of it, especially if we seek our true good in the metaphysical-moral region.'*

Schopenhauer far outstrips the thought of his

* Schopenhauer : ' Ueber die anscheinende Absichtlichkeit,' etc., 231-233. [It is interesting to compare this whole view of the providential, or teleological, character of the individual fate in life, with the Buddhist conception of it as the result of Karma. The two may not be irreconcilable.—Tr.]

century, when at the close of his treatise he assigns to the distant future of philosophy, the problem of which Kant prepared the solution by his distinction between the thing-in-itself and its phenomenon; namely, the reconciliation of the opposition between free-will and necessity, mechanism and teleology, course of nature and providence. But whereas the conception of an aim of individual life has certainly a paradoxical sound in the system of Schopenhauer, it will be much clearer as soon as we distinguish the Ego from its phenomenal form, the transcendental Subject from our earthly person. As beyond our dream-consciousness we are in dream not only poet and manager, but even scene-painter, so also the threads, by which fate leads us through life, unite in our transcendental Subject, even if nothing of this is betrayed to our ordinary consciousness. Our transcendental Subject thus not only introduces us into life and determines our particular individuality, but also leads us through life; but it cares only for our transcendental good, and is regardless of our wishes, just as in dream we, the secret directors, are regardless of our wishes in the dream.

That striking thought of Schopenhauer will thus not remain as a mere product of idle speculation in the history of philosophy, but will form one of the root-conceptions in the philosophical and religious consciousness of the next century. One need only read Hellenbach's important work, 'The Magic of Numbers,'* to perceive that this speculation is supported by manifold analogies even from the province of mechanics in nature. In this remarkable work

* Wien: 'Die Magie der Zahlen,' 1882.

Hellenbach shows the true kernel of the Kabalistic doctrine of the design of our fate, he frees Schopenhauer's thought from its false position in the system of that philosopher, thereby making it capable of development, and himself profoundly extending it. Journalistic criticisms, indeed, the function of which seems now only to extol, in market cry, the products of mediocrity, passes over such books with a silence most favourably explained by want of intelligence.

The view, that the earthly existence rests upon a transcendental self-prescription, is only the complement and logical development of the doctrine of the intelligible character and of the intelligible freedom, as we find it in Kant and Schelling. Every view which regards the earthly birth as beginning of existence generally, and then, notwithstanding the dependence of our existence upon foreign factors, will yet elicit from it sense and significance, ends in contradictions which disappear when for these two premisses we substitute pre-existence and transcendental self-prescription. Schelling says: 'The being (Wesen) of man is essentially his own act,'* citing Fichte: 'The Ego is its own act.' Only on this principle is the possibility revealed of reconciling necessity and freedom; but the only way to save freedom, without which, according to Schelling, 'philosophy would be wholly worthless,'† yet for which there is no room within the causal connection of natural things, is through the Kantian philosophy. 'Idealism first has raised the doctrine of freedom into that region where it is alone comprehensible. The intelligible nature of every thing, and especially

* Schelling, A. vii. 385.

† *Ibid.*, vii. 338.

of man, is consequently beyond all causal connection, as beyond or above all time. We can therefore never be determined by any antecedent whatever.'*

If not psychologically, we can yet be metaphysically free. Kant has already declared that the question of the possibility of freedom does not properly concern psychology, but transcendental philosophy. To man as phenomenon of the world of sense freedom cannot be attributed ; only therefore can freedom be saved, if phenomena are not things in themselves, if they have an intelligible cause what is not phenomenon, and can thus not be determined in their causality by other phenomena of nature. Only in this case can an act be regarded as a necessary phenomenon, and yet at the same time as free in relation to its intelligible cause. Now within the world of sense man is subjected to the law of causality, his acts proceed as necessary from his empirical character. As every natural thing has an empirical character, determining its reactions upon external influences, so also man. Motive and character are the two factors from which the act, as necessary product, results. On the other hand, man is for his own self-knowledge in the inner determinations of his acts not an object of sense, but an intelligible object ; the empirical character must therefore be phenomenon of an intelligible character. 'So then would freedom and nature, each in its entire significance, be encountered in the very same acts, and without any contradiction, according as their acts are compared with their intelligible or with their sensible cause.'† 'It may be conceded, that could we see so deeply

* Schelling, A. vii. 383.

† Kant, ii. c. 25.

into a man's mentality, as shown by internal as well as by external acts, that every, even the smallest, springs were known to us, as also all the external occasions acting on them, his relations to the future would be calculated with as much certainty as an eclipse of the moon or sun, and yet it might still be maintained that he is free.*

Regarding man as a mere product of nature, it may be objected to Kant's doctrine of freedom that it gives man an exceptional position in distinction from other natural objects. But this is by no means the case; for in *every* natural thing we have to distinguish a sensible and an intelligible side. Thus we may say with Schelling: 'If freedom is the positive conception of the in-itself in general, the inquiry concerning human freedom is universalised, because the intelligible, upon which alone it was founded, is also the nature of things-in-themselves.† We must therefore carry over this positive conception of the in-itself to other natural objects. The intelligible in natural things is force; Kant designates the intelligible in man, reason; Schopenhauer, will, another reason for uniting both attributes in the transcendental Subject.

It is quite indifferent for our inquiry whether we go a step further with Schopenhauer, and assert the identity of force and will. The man of science will decline to call every force will, but certainly not to regard every will as a force. But force, the last word of all science, is a metaphysical conception, and belongs to the intelligible side of man, as of all natural things.

* Kant, vii. 230.

† Schelling, A., vii. 332.

The doctrine of freedom, therefore, by no means assigns to man an exceptional position in nature ; for not only in him, but in everything, we have to distinguish a phenomenal and an intelligible side. Schopenhauer, who so greatly admired this doctrine of Kant, has shown that there is only a difference in degree of evidential distinctness between the intelligible, the will, in man and in things. His comparison, in this respect, contains, in my opinion, the deepest thought of his philosophy, and, perhaps, the most expository glance that has ever been thrown upon the springs of nature. 'The old error is : where there is will there is no causality, and where causality, no will. But we say : wherever there is causality there is will, and no will acts without causality. The *punctum controversiæ* is, therefore, whether will and causality can and must coexist simultaneously in one and the same occurrence. What makes the knowledge, that this is so, difficult, is the circumstance that causality and will are known in such fundamentally different ways ; causality wholly from without, mediately, through the understanding ; will wholly from within, immediately ; so that the clearer in any given case is the knowledge of the one, the more obscure is that of the other. So that where causality is most evident we perceive least the existence of will ; and where will is undeniably apparent, causality is so obscured that the immature understanding can venture to deny it. Causality, however, as we have learned from Kant, is nothing more than the *à priori* cognisable form of the understanding itself, and thus the being of the *Representation* (*Vorstellung*) as such, which is one side of the world : the other side is

Will: it is the thing-in-itself. Every inversely related manifestation of causality and will, every alternate emergence and retreat of them, depends on this, that the more a thing is presented to us merely as phenomenon, *i.e.*, as representation, the more distinctly apparent is the *à priori* form of representation—causality: as in inanimate nature;—but conversely, the more immediately conscious we are of will, the more the force of representation, causality, retreats: as in ourselves. Thus the more prominently one side of the world emerges, the more we lose sight of the other.’*

Now, as in all natural things forces are constantly present, and, in a certain sense, active; as they are not first roused by the changes which are their occasions, but their activity is only diverted into another direction; as the gravity of a stone acts when the stone is at rest, and not first when it falls; so also must the intelligible in us, though latent for our self-consciousness, be present, and in an unknown way be active in us at every moment of the earthly existence. That, however, is to assert the simultaneity of the two persons of our Subject, and so Kant’s doctrine of freedom expands, not into the dualistic doctrine of the soul, with its *succession* of persons, but into the monistic doctrine, in which they are contemporary. Now, it is clear that Kant was logically necessitated to admit the possibility of magical relations between two persons of our Subject, and to investigate the case of Swedenborg upon this supposition. The transcendental Subject is a settled

* Schopenhauer: ‘Wille in der Natur’ (‘Physische Astronomie’).

thing for Kant, and just because he says, that 'the transcendental Subject is empirically unknown to us,'* would it have been illogical to deny to this unknown a particular faculty, *e.g.*, clairvoyance. What connects the two persons is the unity of the Subject; what divides them is—in the language of modern psychology—the threshold of sensibility, which cannot, however, be regarded as an insuperable barrier, since it is, in fact, displaceable. When these displacements occur, the faculties of the transcendental person are projected into the sensuous person, and now it is only to be asked, whether there are organisations which in this respect vary so greatly from the normal type, that the threshold, which for the latter is only displaceable, is for them constantly displaced. Kant did not, indeed, answer this in the affirmative, but he held it to be possible, and is sufficiently logical to infer from that: that between the two persons of our Subject direct magical relations are possible; that between our transcendental and other transcendent beings—should we think of these as connected in a community like earthly beings—direct relations can likewise exist; and thus that indirect relations between these transcendent beings and our sensuous being are possible through mediation of our transcendental being. Of the actuality of such phenomena Kant could not convince himself in the case of Swedenborg. We, who know somnambulism, which Kant did not know, we who know the magical relations between the two persons of our Subject, could no longer rightly say that 'the transcendental Subject is empirically unknown to us.' We should be very

* Kant: ii. 428.

illogical if with this *greater* logical necessitation we were *less* decided than Kant in drawing the inferences which he drew. But this logical fallacy is committed by the so-called Enlightenment, in denying the bare possibility of magical phenomena of which we obtain knowledge in somnambulism.

In a contradiction of principle to these facts stands, besides, only materialism, which denies all metaphysic in general, and especially the soul. But it is not difficult to show that this denial, according to the present standpoint of science itself, is an anachronism, because it resolves itself, when analysed, into many particular assertions, the refutation of which materialists themselves have already undertaken, so that only the absence of logical circumspection can reconvert the result of the addition into the sum opposed to it. For the denial of the human soul affirms that self-consciousness exhausts its object, the Ego, which contradicts the capacity of consciousness and its special case, self-consciousness, for biological evolution. If the Evolution theory is true, then must man have a double aspect, and show not only the rudiments of his biological past, but also the tendencies to higher faculties of his Psyche, which will be manifested by the displacement of the barriers of his consciousness—that is, of the threshold of sensibility. It is just modern physiology that has shown the existence of this threshold for each of our senses, so that there is a transcendental world upon whose influences our transcendental Subject reacts, though the sense-consciousness knows nothing of it. For the possibility of a biological exaltation beyond

man by alteration of form, or at least of exaltation of consciousness by alteration of the cognitional apparatus, material processes in the external world must be given, in which this process of adaptation has taken place. For consciousness to ascend there must be the requisite supports, but also the latent faculty of consciousness for higher psychical products. To see that needs only scientific knowledge of theoretical physics and the physiology of the senses. The basis of materialism is the assertion that only sense is real. This basis of their system materialists themselves have destroyed, but they will not see that the system has been consequently overthrown.

That may be truly said of the materialists which Brentano said of the Philistine, that he only understood four-cornered things. When they have got a round thing, they first make it four-cornered—only that even with this quadrature of the circle there remains an irresolvable residue. They make the metaphysical problem of the macrocosm into a mechanical problem, and the problem of the microcosm, bristling with metaphysic, they make into a chemical one. According to them, the first is to be solved in the crucible, the second in the retort.

The monistic doctrine of the soul, however, shows—and is thus applied against Pantheism—that with the disappearance of consciousness, and in proportion to this disappearance, new faculties of the Psyche appear, whence it immediately follows that our self-consciousness has not information of our whole soul, that therefore there is a transcendental Subject

underlying our sensuous being, infinitely richer and deeper than it displays itself in our sensuous consciousness.

Now, if in those conditions in which the transcendental Subject emerges—the fundamental form of them being somnambulism—multiplied relations between us and Nature occur, with new mode of reaction of our Subject, what appears is the exaltation of our individuality within the unconscious, but no pantheistic solution of it in the world-substance.

Finally, the monistic doctrine of soul must be opposed to the soul-doctrine of religious metaphysic. This allows the soul to originate at earthly birth, and yet ascribes to it immortality. But immortality logically implies pre-existence; Aristotle has demonstrated that only an unoriginated being can be intransitory.* Dogmatism arrives further at its idea of the soul—as Vaihinger shows in his excellent commentary on Kant†—by the confusion of an analytical judgment with a synthetical one; from the analytical cognition that the Ego denotes a logically simple substratum, it forms the synthetical proposition that the thinking Ego is a simple and therefore immortal substance. But if in our consciousness there is only a logical Ego, a real Ego can only be behind consciousness as transcendental Subject, which cannot be found if the soul is entirely sunk in the body and is wholly comprehended in the self-consciousness. The dualistic doctrine of soul presupposes both, not, however, as proved facts, but as

* 'De Cælo,' i. 12.

† Vaihinger: 'Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft,' i. 250.

petitio principii. It allows the soul to be first wholly on this side, then wholly on that, thus successively earthly and transcendent, whereas according to the monistic doctrine it is simultaneously earthly and transcendental. We thus simultaneously lead both existences, a proceeding the psychological possibility of which is apparent in every dream wherein we ask a question of someone which the latter answers ; for as my Subject comprises both dream-figures, and only dramatically sunders itself in them, a monism is at the foundation of this apparent dualism. This psychological formula for the explanation of dream is also the metaphysical formula for the explanation of man. In dream, as in waking, the threshold of sensibility forms the dividing line between the two persons of the Subject, and so the idea of the Neoplatonist, that man is a double being placed at the boundary between the sensuous and supersensuous world,* obtains a scientific support.

Now, as in the dramatic severance of dream the Subject is drawn asunder into simultaneous persons face to face, so in other cases the Subject falls asunder in a temporal succession of persons. Such are the cases of alternating consciousness, of the dualism of butterfly and caterpillar, and of the generation-changes of animals. But even in these cases, there is a fundamental simultaneity of persons, the butterfly being always latent in the caterpillar, the later condition in the earlier. It is therefore natural that the comparison of the transcendental Subject with a butterfly which lays aside the caterpillar body should be found in the earliest times. Perhaps priority

* Zeller : ' Philosophie der Griechen,' iii. 2, 434.

belongs to Nong-ssee, the commentator of the oldest Chinese philosopher Laotse, who says : ' The human body resembles the chrysalis integument of the caterpillar or the slough of the snake. We assume it only for a brief time as a place of residence. When the caterpillar-hide dries up, the caterpillar is not therefore dead ; when the snake has sloughed, it is not therefore dead.'*

Man, a double being, is therefore not defined by assigning his position in earthly nature. Important as this position may be, because we form the organic summit of this nature, the words of Job apply to it : ' Man that is born of woman is of few days and full of trouble. He cometh forth like a flower, and is cut down ; he fleeth as a shadow, and continueth not.'† But whoever recognises the transcendental Subject in us will see that the earthly misery is for our transcendental advantage, and that this earthly existence is our own act. Neither the vain contents of our life nor its transitoriness can mislead us with reference to the position of man in the world ; for if the sense-consciousness knows nothing of the transcendental Subject, then also the loss of the sense-consciousness cannot injure this Subject. This is the meaning of the experience, that the transcendental consciousness the more prevails as the sensuous disappears. Certain now as it also is that the activity of the transcendental Subject within the earthly existence cannot attain to a normality of function—the result for which mystics and saints have always striven—yet must it be pos-

* Laotse : ' Tao-te-King. Aus d. Chinesischen übersetzt von Plänkner,' 166 (Leipzig, 1870).

† Job xiv. 1, 2.

sible, if we submit man to the experiment, to learn to know this transcendental Subject much more exactly. The first thing is to show that the dualism of soul and body is untenable, because the body also is psychical, and even organic processes are accompanied by transcendental consciousness. That is proved by the critical self-inspection of somnambulists, and the curative force of nature acting ideationally, that is, in health-prescriptions. The organising and the thinking in us are thus identical ; the transcendental Subject is the common root of soul and body, which it forms and maintains according to an ideal plan in itself. The dualism of soul and body is therefore not real, but exists only from the standpoint of our self-consciousness. Thereby also will the frequently-alleged division of man into spirit, soul, and body, be monistically resolved. That also is true only from the standpoint of our self-consciousness. In the self-consciousness we know the spirit only in so far as it is soul, that is, as it feels and thinks by means of organism. Soul is our spirit within the self-consciousness ; spirit is the soul beyond the self-consciousness.

Man, an amphibium of a higher sort—as is fundamentally every being, nay, the atom itself—is thus a monistically double being : monistic as Subject, dualistic as person.

The monistic doctrine of the soul, as it has solved the enigma of life, has also solved that of death.

The problem of immortality receives its solution in like manner as all philosophical problems in the history of philosophy are solved : the *either-or* of parties in the strife of opinions is changed into the

as-well-as. Death dissolves the connection of the two persons of our Subject. It destroys one of the persons, and so far materialists are right; but as the Subject at death only lays aside its earth-spectacles, as it were, it remains unaffected by death, and so far the spiritualists are right. Were our Ego wholly comprehended by the self-consciousness, were the soul in its totality sunk in the body, there could be no immortality; for the sense-consciousness must cease with the senses. Only what is beyond sense can survive death; that is, immortality is only possible if the soul exceeds the consciousness, if there are in man powers independent of the body, and therefore not to be destroyed with the body. This excess is very distinctly manifest in somnambulism. That remarkable phenomenon, that somnambulists in the crisis know no fear of death, is thus not only intelligible, but appears as necessary. Somnambulists, who in the crisis are conscious of themselves as transcendental Subjects, know that in death they only lose a consciousness for which the transcendental consciousness offers more than a compensation. The deeper they are sunk in the transcendental existence, in which they feel themselves freed from the burdens of life, the greater is their repugnance to return to the sensuous consciousness and to reunite themselves with the body which they see objectively lying before them. Notwithstanding they awake without memory, they can still estimate the condition they have just left from its after effects in feeling—as often happens on waking from beautiful but forgotten dreams—and then lament their wakening. Especially is this the case with the ‘deep sleep,’ from which they unwillingly

return to the waking state. Deleuze says there are somnambulists who in self-inspection describe their condition as very dangerous, and yet are so indifferent that they refuse to name the remedy.* Only in the lower degrees of somnambulism is there still fear of death, but in the deep sleep, the symptoms of which often dangerously approximate to those of dying, somnambulists frequently oppose resistance to the will of the magnetiser to awaken them.†

Now, if death has for somnambulists no sting, it follows that the voluntary incarnation of the transcendental Subject happens in no optimistic conception of the earthly existence, but in spite of its sufferings. This is no slight voucher for the truth of pessimism, but a much greater voucher for the fact that from the transcendental standpoint pessimism is not the last word, as, moreover, we may already learn from the consideration of earthly things. The earthly misery is not only of transcendental advantage, but even in its *results* on this side it is optimistic, because it gives an impulse to progress and to charity. Since the intellectual and moral acquisitions of life are the inheritance of the transcendental Subject, the earthly sufferings must be esteemed as necessary means to transcendental ends. Of very few men can it be denied that they would make a bad and, even for their sensuous nature, disadvantageous use of earthly possessions. Wealth without idealism is a great danger; and if oxen had plenty of money, they would still only buy plenty of hay. But we should all as transcendental beings pay the penalty were we to gain the objects of our earthly egoism.

* Deleuze: 'Instruction,' etc., 121.

† Chardel: 'Esquisse,' etc., 282.

Thus death cannot harm our transcendental Subject. Only the sensuous consciousness is bound to this form of organisation, but the dissolution of this form leaves untouched the cause, of which this organisation with its consciousness is the effect. So in death we shall find ourselves again as transcendental beings, as we awaken from sleep as sensuous beings. Transposition to the other side is only a figure of speech to express another organisation, for which, indeed, the world, as our present representation, disappears. Materialism says that we die and the world remains. The contrary is true; we remain, but our world sinks.

Schopenhauer was right in saying that the utterances of somnambulists about the other side are worthless reminiscences of their religious instruction. That is frequently the case, but even when not so, their revelations can possess only an allegorical or symbolical value, because with death the forms and means of cognition change; so that many somnambulists themselves say that they cannot find the right words, their expressions are only to be taken figuratively, as translations, as it were, from the language of the transcendental world into that of the world of sense. Negatively, the condition of the transcendental Subject can be defined by saying that what is true of its connection with the body does not apply to it; but positive indications are only to be found in the study of the higher grades of somnambulism, yielding, indeed, very rich results, the statement of which I reserve for another occasion.

In the consciousness embracing the whole life, we have already found one of the most important con-

stituents of the transcendental consciousness, that which preserves the spiritual unity of the Subject, notwithstanding the changes of the forms of existence, of which the earthly existence is only a limb. Intellectual and moral education in this change is only possible if the thread of memory does not break off. 'The practical power of the transmigration theory as motive stands and falls with belief in the essential identity of the person of my successor with me, and is not preserved by the mere continuance of the hypostasised sum of merit.'* But for this educational end it suffices that the person should be contained in the Subject—consciousness, as happens with somnambulists; on the other hand, the simultaneity of Subject and person does not require that both should have the same range of memory. Should anyone desire that the persons also of the Subject should be connected with one another by memory, so that we should be like Pythagoras, who was conscious of having lived as Pyramus and as Midas, and of having been killed as Euphorbus by Menelaus,† and who recognised the shield in the temple of Juno at Argos,‡ such a wish requires the standpoint of the dualistic doctrine of the soul; in the monistic doctrine its fulfilment would be a doubling of consciousness.§

* Hartmann: 'Das religiöse Bewusstsein,' 344. [This refers to the doctrine of Karma, as to which a prevalent opinion among European Orientalists is that the only link between the individual who is said to be 're-born' and his successor is inheritance of merit or demerit, or their consequences. The doctrine of transcendental subjectivity, comprehending, as offshoots, the successive personalities, is essential to the intelligibility of the idea of Karma.—Tr.]

† Iliad, xvii. 59.

‡ Diogenes Laertius, viii. 4.

§ [This remark seems not well considered; for if the memory

The belief, as presentiment, in immortality, which we find almost everywhere and always, and which is only lost in decaying periods of culture, by generations sunk in terrestrial materialism, could not have this extraordinary prevalence, temporally and spatially, were it not, what perhaps all presentiments are, a weakened certainty across the threshold of sensibility, such that, the ideational character failing it, there remains to it only a presentiment with the associated interest for feeling—the wish for continuance. If the idea of immortality thus originates, then must this mere presentiment of the sensuous consciousness be encountered again as firm persuasion, as soon as the transcendental consciousness emerges. Now this immovable conviction of immortality is a constant characteristic with all somnambulists, and even with those among them who are already believers, it is much more decided than in waking. It would therefore be an interesting experiment to put a decided materialist into somnambulism; and it may be predicted with certainty that in every true ecstasy he would deny his theory.*

Thus the monistic doctrine of the soul solves many contradictions and removes many difficulties. That, on the other side, it presents new problems is not to be denied, for that is in the nature of things,

of a former submode of existence—terrestrial personality—resides in the transcendental consciousness, why may it not be communicated, by means of a ‘displacement of the threshold,’ to the consciousness of a subsequent personality?—Tr.]

* [For such an experiment to be of any value, it would be necessary that the magnetiser should also be a materialist, or at least not decidedly otherwise-minded, or the result would be ascribed to his influence.—Tr.]

every new insight raising new problems, and usually more than it settles. If the phenomena of somnambulism are ascribed to a transcendental Subject, as against this multiplication of problems the physiological interpretation is doubtless simpler; but this greater simplicity is only apparent, for it is quite arbitrarily obtained, not corresponding to the nature of the phenomena, which cannot be deprived of their peculiar character. Problems are not solved by hiding their difficulties; the supposed profit very soon turns to loss. Kant says: 'If a science is to be advanced, all difficulties must be disclosed, and even latent ones must be sought out, for each of them demands a remedy which can only be found by growth of the science, either in range or definiteness, so that thus even obstacles promote the profundity of sciences. On the other hand, if difficulties are intentionally concealed, or even evaded by palliatives, they break out sooner or later in incurable mischiefs which destroy science in a complete scepticism.'*

If, for instance, Leverrier had neglected and not first rightly disclosed the irregularities in the motions of Uranus, 'the remedy' would not have been 'demanded,' and the discovery of Neptune would have waited for an extension of the range of astronomical science in some other direction; but as he made a special study of the difficulty before him, 'the obstacle promoted profundity,' and Neptune was discovered even before eye of man had seen him.

In psychology, on the other hand, the method of concealment is very injurious, and especially is this the case with the physiological interpretation, or

* Kant: viii. 235.

rather mistreatment, of transcendental-psychological phenomena. Theoretically, this is shown in the fact that problems, which are solved by the monistic doctrine of the soul, pass for unsolved, because the materialistic or the dualistic solution is insisted upon. But still weightier is the prejudice practically.

Somnambulism, as the fundamental form of all mysticism, is the single opportunity for obtaining knowledge of the transcendental Subject. This opportunity having been neglected, that is, transcendental psychology not having been recognised as the substitute for the critically shattered dualistic doctrine of the soul, the most recent generations have tended inevitably towards materialism, with results becoming constantly more apparent in our social conditions.

Whenever we encounter social evils, we find the ultimate cause in erroneous popular opinions. Now, if we ask which of the existing systems of thought is responsible for these erroneous and practically injurious opinions, undoubtedly it can only be the one which has the least ethical motive power. But materialism has none whatever ; for if the world is only a physical problem, and man only a chemical one, then has morality no significance.

If, however, all social evils can be traced back to false views, so must true views draw after them good conditions. Now, certainly I have never intended to excogitate a system adapted to the practical benefit of society, and only theoretical grounds have forced me into the monistic doctrine of the soul. But as this doctrine, being the mere exposition of somnambulism, is theoretically unavoidable, while practically it offers

to the individual very powerful ethical motives, it forms a further proof of the agreement of the true and the good. As materialism acts injuriously, because it gives man a false consciousness of himself, so, on the contrary, in the monistic doctrine of the soul is Schelling's saying verified: 'Give man the consciousness of what he is, and he will soon be what he ought.'*

5. *Our Position in the Universe.*

Our transcendental Subject being contemporaneous with its terrestrial phenomenal form, it results that our cosmical position is not defined by assigning to the earth its astronomical rank,[†] and to man his biological rank upon the earth.[‡] If Nature and man have a metaphysical side, then must the problem of cosmical position be much more deeply conceived; it becomes that of the relation of our terrestrial to our transcendental position; philosophy and religion appear as necessary complements to the sciences. Ethic itself, a social problem only while man is considered simply as a terrestrial being, first becomes a true metaphysical problem when it is admitted that our position has an extra-terrestrial projection. Now, with our present sufficiently clear perception that the solution of the social problem is everlastingly frustrated by terrestrial egoism, or at least will everlastingly have to contend with it, that thus a radical solution is only possible through an ethic which itself first emerges as a problem upon the supposition that

* Schelling, i. 157.

† Proctor: 'Our Position in the Universe.'

‡ Darwin: 'Descent of Man.'

man has a cosmical position, the question here occupying us appears to be one also of eminent practical importance. For man as a citizen of the universe, an ethic is possible ; but if he is only a citizen of the earth, then is there no ethical problem, but only a social one. Ethic stands or falls with the assertion or denial of our position in the universe. The education of mankind for citizenship of the universe is the task of philosophy and religion. True, there have been philosophers for whom philosophy has only the task of reflecting the world in thought, not the education of the human race. But the two tasks are inseparable, for their final aims coincide, and both find solution in the same way. If his place in the universe is made clear to man, therewith also is his task as an ethical being appointed ; and, on the other hand, unless he knows his place in the universe, unless it is made clear to him by philosophy, he cannot act conformably to it. Theory and practice, therefore, do not admit of separation, and philosophy must educate man to citizenship of the world just because she shows him his position, though in her often purely ideal striving she may not herself be conscious of this final aim.

So far it may be said, that all speculations from the oldest times turn upon the question of man's place in the universe. Every religious and every philosophical system solves this question in its own way. Therefore to all religions and all philosophies we have still provisionally to oppose Pascal's words : *'Tu varies, donc tu n'est pas la vérité ; la vérité n'est q'une.'*

It cannot, however, be denied, that in the succession

of all these systems, the question itself, if not the answer, has been made continually clearer, and that the attempted solutions, notwithstanding their partial opposition, are still supplementary to each other. That is even the case where the opposition seems to be one of principle, as, for instance, between optimistic and pessimistic systems. The phenomenal world, in fact, offers points of support for both views; the conceptions of a Leibnitz and a Schopenhauer do not wholly exclude each other, but are complementary. Regarding the world with the eyes of the astronomer, in the movements of the stars we see the highest harmony and conformability to purpose. The materialist says there is only conformability to law, and that is so far true, that the astronomer *as such* will never find God or the universal reason among the stars. But it is a fact that astronomers, almost without exception, not only believe in this reason, but are even theists, because only for a dull eye is research concluded by discovery of the laws of the kosmos. To him who does not lose sight of a question as soon as it is pushed back, the cosmical laws eliciting results so remarkable become themselves the problem, and he tends naturally to optimistic conceptions.

Every effect has a cause, which must indeed be equivalent to the effect; thus the intelligent effect must have a cause somehow to be conceived as intelligent. It may be a fallacy to individualise or even anthropomorphise this cause, but it is a still greater fallacy to see in laws the *ultimate* explanation of all phenomena. As we can imagine a world-pulp, in chaos and yet ruled by physical and chemical laws, as consequently law can preside as well over chaos as

over harmony, therefore the cosmic laws do not coincide with the concept of law, but are a special case of it, and though the astronomer cannot be contradicted in his reference of phenomena to laws, and is not to be interrupted during his statement, yet to his last word the question can and must be annexed—how comes it that just the harmonic special case of conformability to law is presented? And that it is presented, optimists will always explain in favour of their own view.

But now opponents will rightly say, that it is not only a question of the harmonic motions of the planets about the sun, but also of what living figures this sun shines upon; and with this comes the turn of pessimism. It is not to be denied that the systems of Hartmann and Schopenhauer have a solid empirical basis, thus must pessimism also be relatively in the right. Now as the fundamental cause of all earthly suffering we find Darwin's struggle for existence, and this must incline us to Schopenhauer's side; but, on the other side, it is just this struggle which is the driving-wheel of all cosmical, biological, and historical development, so that again the result seems optimistic. Now, as both conceptions rest on experience, that only can be a true comprehension of Nature which is just to both sides.

Corresponding to the results of the struggle for existence, optimism remains valid for the biological and historical capacity of the race for development; pessimism is limited to the individual. If, further, there accedes to man, besides his terrestrial place, a place in the universe, then pessimism has the further limitation, that it is valid only for the earthly phase

of our existence. Then would pessimism, with all its justification, be only a partial aspect within the optimistic view.

Now whether man has such a place in the universe besides his earthly place is only another form of the old question, whether religious and philosophical systems are true, or materialism. The disproof of the latter makes way for the place in the universe, and this disproof is easier than to decide what is truth in religion and philosophy; for in these attempts to solve the world-problem, truth is not to be found as a ripe product, but only as a distant ideal.

No wonder that mankind from time to time is lamed and sceptical, and then sets itself more limited tasks by turning to investigation of the things of sense. This is the case with recent generations, whose application to this task has been successful beyond precedent. But in such periods religion and philosophy are slightly esteemed, at least by those whose historical knowledge of philosophy is defective, and who, because the world's riddle is unsolved, overlook the other fact, that in the successive attempts at solution a progress is to be noted. In this case scepticism is the greatest, and its full expression is just materialism, which upbraids philosophy, not only as slow, but as altogether wrong.

All men of science of great eminence are in recent times certainly far from identifying themselves with materialism, which they even rather contest, whereas among the public the popularisation of the sciences has only advanced materialism. The public will thus answer the question as to the universal place of man by denying the problem. So that I shall not only

find readers who ascribe to man a position in the universe other than that supposed by me, but also others who deny the problem itself, man, as individual and as race, being limited to earthly existence. To these I shall appear—as the ancient Greeks said—like a man who with one hand milks the he-goat, and with the other holds a sieve underneath.*

In such a state of things it only remains to attack the opponent on his own domain. Since materialism has its root in the sciences, it is thus just from these that the existence of the problem must be proved, and upon their foundation must its solution be attempted.

The natural sciences, emphasising the irrefragability of their results, call themselves the exact sciences. It is undeniable that if in an experiment nature answers, as it were, a question put to her, this answer cannot further be doubted, but must be regarded as decisive; for if the laws of nature are unchangeable, in every question the single experiment suffices. On the other hand, it is clear that by physical experiments only physical problems, and by chemical experiments only chemical problems, can be solved. Philosophical problems lie not at all in the province of the natural sciences; the latter can thus contribute no positive content to philosophy, but only negatively limit it by their veto upon philosophical dicta which are contrary to the sure results of natural research. Further, the incontrovertibility of the experimental sciences does not extend; therefore do we see opinions

* [Kant also makes use of this simile to denote the case of one proposing an absurd question and another attempting an answer. —'Krit.' d. r V. (Tr. Logik).—Tr.]

differ also among men of science, as soon as problems are touched which cannot be solved in crucibles and retorts. With all the respect which Häckel and Bär enjoy as men of science, they get small thanks from their colleagues for the circumspect confession that the sciences are piece-work, and force and atom metaphysical concepts.

Among extreme materialists differences are indeed never profound; they can only relate to things not so much the subject of controversy as of wager, since it is the retort, not the understanding, that has to decide. This harmony is easy to attain by a general denial of all philosophy. But the latter, driven from the province of research, re-enters by the back door; for when the materialist asserts that our senses and organism reveal to us only a limited number of substances and forces, and that, therefore, there can be in great Nature nothing else, with the huge 'therefore' a mere branch of knowledge inflates itself to a conception of the universe, containing, indeed, a very poor philosophy, but still just a philosophy.

More strikingly than philosophy herself can demonstrate her justification, is this proved by the exact sciences in our time. The characteristic of all philosophy is the sentiment that the perceptible world, the world-image flowing through our sense channels, is only the product of our organisation, that we know not the reality of things, but only the modes in which our senses react upon reality. From Protagoras, who named man the measure of all things—*πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος**—to Kant, who has stated the problem more comprehensively and deeply than

* Aristotle: 'Metaphysic,' x. i.; Plato: 'Theæt.,' 152.

any other man, this truth has been constantly preached in philosophy. Materialism, on the other hand, takes phenomena for things in themselves. Were they really so the explanation of the world would be easy. But that reality is by no means identical with its reflected image in our consciousness—thus that philosophy is indispensable—the exact sciences, theoretical physics and the theory of sense-perception, have now themselves experimentally demonstrated. Every educated man of science knows now that the so-called qualities of things are in fact only qualities of our organisation, thus that enlightenment upon this organisation is by no means enlightenment upon the objective world-problem. Our representation of objects is conditioned by the peculiarities of our senses : quantitatively because our senses do not approximately report all natural processes ; and qualitatively because the external influences of things are changed by the senses. Ether-vibrations, for instance, are first perceived by us in million-fold condensation, and then not as vibrations, but as light and colour.

The world is therefore our representation. Materialism is self-refuted by its latest researches ; it has sawn away the bough on which it sat. Thus that materialism still exists is an anachronism, and it could not be, if everyone reflected.

It is therefore on this problem, which philosophy has always accentuated, and whose experimental solution science has facilitated, that the lever must be set, in order to come to an understanding on the position of man in the universe. The relation of reality to our organism must be established, for the materialist standpoint, that all reality is sensuous,

that perceptibility and reality coincide, is fundamentally contradicted since the theory of evolution was brought by Darwin on to a firm track. The whole biological process, the exaltation of sense and consciousness, signifies a constant increase of perceptibility. It is this subjective factor that has continually increased, not the objective things. Perceptibility and reality were thus never conterminous, and in their identification by materialism the course of the biological process is as though the objective highway grew in length with the advancing footsteps of the traveller, or the wall grew with the plant climbing it.

If man is a member of the biological series, then must he also have his Janus-aspect. If man has five senses, corresponding to definite processes of nature—which may all be referred to modes of motion of matter and of the ether—it does not follow that in objective nature there are no more modes of motion. We have no organ for perceiving electricity and magnetism—unless they are first changed into equivalent amounts of other forces—so that there are more things than senses. To conclude from the number five of the senses to the number five of modes of motion is a logically fatal leap. The number of the forces prevailing in Nature is thus unknown to us, and the external process of the few we know is converted in perception, *e.g.*, atmospheric vibration into sound.

The denial in principle of a supersensuous world is thereby definitely set aside. Therefore did Protagoras add to his judgment that man is the measure of all things the weighty words: ‘of things that are, that they are; of things that are not, that they are

not'—*πῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστω.* The human senses change: forthwith there is a quite different world; our senses multiply; forthwith will Nature appear far richer.* The sight is lost; forthwith the greatest part of Nature vanishes. Now as not only each particular sense, but also every collective organism, has its barriers of sense, and perceives only a fragment of reality, evidently the materialistic edifice resting on this fragment is anything but a solution of the world-problem. With equal right could a blind man declare his world to be the whole world. There was in the year 1876, in the medical hospital at Leipsic, a patient to whom almost all sense and muscular feeling were wanting; only through the right eye and left ear was he in relation to the external world. If these senses were closed, he fell asleep. He could not be awakened by shaking, but only by calling into his left ear and by light thrown on his right eye.† This patient has just the same relation to the normal human individual, as the latter would have to a being with more than five senses; and if the sense-material of such a patient is inadequate to explain our world of sense, just so is the sense-material of a Vogt and a Büchner likewise inadequate to explain the whole world-problem.

Spectral analysis proves that the colour-spectra of stars, thus also the chemical constituents and their combinations, are very different. That is first true of the suns, the fixed stars, but in analogy with our

* Conf. du Prel: 'Die Planetenbewohner,' cap. vi.; 'Ueber die Intellektuelle Natur der Planetenbewohner.'

† 'Archiv f. d. ges. Physiologie,' xv. 573.

system must be true also of the to us invisible detached planets of the stars. According to the adaptation doctrine, the inhabited stars must thus be populated by very diverse organisations. Supposing the materialistic school to be represented on all these stars, and that a cosmical congress of materialists were to be appointed, to which each star should have deputed its Ludwig Büchner ; and supposing further a possible communication by a common language at this congress, yet would this not by a long way afford the means of a common understanding. If one only sees a rose, the other only smells it, they will have no common understanding about the subject, but each will conclude the other to be speaking of something quite different. Our Ludwig Büchner would in this congress of the universe speak of his five senses, but could only be understood by those who had senses similar and of the same number. Now, should the inhabitant of another star begin to speak, our Büchner would shake his head, and advance the celebrated theory of illusions and hallucination ; should however a third, who happened to have the same sensibility as the second, support him against Büchner, the latter would now advance the still more celebrated theory that hallucinations are sometimes infectious. But next a fourth shall come, of such a material constitution as to be perceptible by none of the human senses. Now, would Büchner hear words, but see no speaker, he would therefore say that he himself was now also suffering from an illusion of hearing, and was undoubtedly infected. But should all the rest of the party assert the visibility of the speaker, that again Büchner must explain as an infection of them by the

speaker ! In short, in such an assembly, each would be reduced *ad absurdum* by the mere existence of the rest, and they would break up in tumult, unless perhaps some philosopher, acquainted with the cognition-theories of all stars, were present. He could enlighten them, and convert all from materialism by making intelligible to them the incontrovertible truth, that objectively, certainly, there is but *one* world, subjectively, however, just as many worlds as modes of existence and sensibility. But without such a philosopher, the assembly would as little come to an understanding as a company of fools.

Hence it is apparent that materialism must surrender if only it understood itself, and could reflect on the bearing of its own theory of perception. And it is quite useless to dispute about the universe and man's place in it with an opponent who is not thoroughly acquainted with the results of physiological and philosophical theories of cognition ; he is not qualified for controversy.

The simplest conception of the position of man in nature is that it is only individual, subjective, and limited to the earth spatially and temporally. The first objection to this is that even the individual existence has an influence at least in its effects on the general history of man, thus in a certain sense survives. By the co-operation of individuals mankind has hitherto accumulated, and will continue to accumulate, civilisation. This view is recognised by the Arabs, in their rule that every one must either plant a tree, or write a book, or leave behind him a child. From this standpoint, indeed, the single life has as yet no

metaphysical significance, but still an historical one in regard to the race.

But how stands the matter also with respect to this race ?

The life of the earth will have an end, and the earth itself will have an end. Of mankind and its world will it at some time be said : *Fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium*. Of what use is it, for every world to produce its peculiar culture, if it is sometime to be buried and forgotten ? Of what use is our culture-history, if, nevertheless, the earth is always to remain an isolated star, and the history of man is never to debouch into the general stream of cosmic history ? May not rather that conception of history which, since Lessing, Herder, and Hegel, has become the common property of the cultured, receive a cosmical extension ?

It is difficult to see how such a process should come to pass, but logically it is well admissible. In that case our planet would be for a time indeed an isolated star, a cosmic island in the ocean of space, but would yet at length be drawn into the general stream of universal history, as many an island in the seas of our world remained isolated till the age of discoveries. It is not necessary to take the comparison literally, and to fancy future journeys to the moon or Mars. True, it may be conceived that only for the present do we stand so helpless before the atmospheric ocean, as primitive man before the great water, till at length—with triple brass about the breast, as Horace says—he ventured on planks upon the waves. Attached by our original organisation to the earth's floor, we have nevertheless the capacity for inventions by

which also the water and the air may become our elements. But with the limits of the atmosphere is a limit also drawn to our power of existence, and even if we could get quite beyond the attraction-sphere of our planet, we could still not live on a Mars or Jupiter.

Materially, our earth is not isolated from the kosmos, otherwise, to say nothing of the bond of gravitation, no beam of light could reach us from other stars. It is thus a question whether, with a better employment of the connecting forces, human thought, at least, might not be able to traverse space. That we cannot represent to ourselves the 'how' of such an intercourse, proves nothing at all against its possibility; even to an Aristotle it would have been still incomprehensible, that without crossing the ocean we should exchange thoughts with our antipodes. It is not inconceivable that the spectral-apparatus, which at present only informs us of the chemical constituents of the stars, will in time be developed to a cosmical telegraph. Moreover, we know not by far all the forces of nature; there may thus possibly be other means of telegraphy, the application of which would be more hopeful.

Astronomically regarded, the universe is a whole, held together by the bond of gravitation. Now, shall this unity and harmony of the kosmos apply merely to the mechanical side of nature, shall, in fact, every world remain condemned to atomic detachment? If the most important phenomenon of nature is not matter, but mind in its different phenomenal forms, if thus mind seems evidently the aim of nature, then is it hard to believe that the unitary bond of nature should

embrace only the material masses of the stars. Mind would be a very useless appendage of the universal order, if its development, likewise, did not tend to solidarity. Whoever would sooner believe in the senselessness of the expounders of Nature, than in the senselessness of Nature herself, will find the thought that in universal development there is no other aim than the play of mechanical forces of gravitation, as strange as the assertion that the essential significance of a great city lay in its aggregation of houses, and not in the collective mental life of its inhabitants. So also is it to be presumed that Nature's accent is laid on the mental beings, not on their habitations.

What remarkable revolutions, socially, have steam and electricity brought after them ! But we cannot at all guess the number of still unknown forces ; we may, however, suppose it all the larger, as Physics teach that all natural forces are metamorphoses of an unknown primitive force, so that each can be changed into each according to equivalent relations. Even if, therefore, we already knew all the *present* forces of nature, still new metamorphoses of them might occur by the mere further development of the globe, as perhaps chemical combinations began when the earth had attained a definite stage of cooling.

Now, since it is evidently illogical to say that forces *unknown* to us could introduce phenomena only up to a limit *known* to us, at least the possibility of cosmical intercourse must be conceded. That opens the prospect, that even after the dying out of man upon the earth when it has become wholly cold and uninhabitable, the attainments of human culture might be preserved. Mankind would

find its historical heir in the kosmos, and even though the earth itself should plunge into the sun, could it still be said : *non omnis moriar* !

But the philosopher's quiver contains yet other arrows for despatch, should this one miss the mark. Hitherto the question has not been suggested, whether it is precisely to man that this task must be confided. The prospect of the realisation of a cosmical history perhaps only therefore seems so bad, because we suppose the attainment to depend on man. Yet not only is it possible that on the earth itself man may be relieved by a still higher organic form, better grown to the task, but also that the initiative in the introduction of cosmical history may proceed from inhabitants of another star. These possibilities also have to be examined.

When from the foremost of the ships, with which Christopher Columbus sailed across the Atlantic, there sounded the sailors' cry of 'Land!' the signal was given that from this moment the history of the old world associated itself definitely with that of the newly-discovered region. The initiative came from Europe, or rather from Columbus alone, in opposition to all the learned, since it was considered absurd, the earth being round, to try to go uphill with ships. As is well known, Columbus did not suppose himself to have discovered a new world, but rather to have reached the east coast of Asia ; but at least he had gone upon the right idea, that in his way the earth could be circumnavigated, and had only mistaken the dimensions of the globe. From the America of that time the attempt had never been made ; from Europe it succeeded, because there the necessary

presuppositions were given ; there came an enterprising spirit, gifted also with correct insight into the physical relations of the globe, and European civilisation had in respect to navigation advanced to the point that the means for execution also offered.

Let us transfer this relation to the kosmos, always remembering that the connection of stars need only be telegraphic. Our neighbour-planet, Mars, was detached from the sun earlier than the earth, and its geological and biological development must have proceeded more rapidly than on the earth, for not only has it, with its smaller diameter, evolved more quickly—as is proved by its extended region of polar snow—but also the distribution of land and water is more favourable ; it has relatively more land than the earth. The obstacles to continuity of history were thus less upon Mars than with us. Its inhabitants accordingly attained earlier to general co-operation, and its civilisation must therefore have advanced more rapidly. Thus the inhabitants of Mars may well have conceived a future connection with earth as less paradoxical than it seems to us. It might even be that Mars in its biological evolution has already surpassed man. Its inhabitants have perhaps not only the scientific disposition of forces of which we are ignorant, but even higher senses than we have. Phenomena of electricity and magnetism which we prove by apparatus, they may perhaps perceive organically. The sense of sight is perhaps more efficient than our eye armed with the telescope ; their solar spectrum has perhaps more than seven colours, and they perhaps see colours on this side of the red and on that side of the violet end of the spectrum.

Inhabitants of Mars who might in this way possibly be informed even of the general activity of mankind might thus appoint their Columbus for Earth, while Earth's culture might comparatively still be similar to that of the Americans before the discovery.

Now suppose the Europeans, without entering America, had succeeded in causing a sound there like that now produced by a cable telegram, such a rattling would have remained quite unintelligible to the savages. They would not have recognised it as a sign of correspondence from remote inhabitants of the Earth, but would have taken it to be senseless, or a miracle, or a swindle; while the Europeans, unable by application of other forces to make themselves understood, could not have complied with the demand from the other side for more rational signs of communication.

So also would the quality of a message to us be not at all at the choice of the inhabitants of Mars, but would be dependent on their knowledge of nature and on the existing relations of nature. Suppose they were at some time in a position to produce on our earth some very slight, but yet quite inexplicable effect, in the frequent repetition of it we should ourselves see anything but an intelligent communication, whose defective quality was first conditioned by the poverty of the means. Our learned men would begin by disputing the credibility of the reports of a phenomenon, according to all *known* laws impossible; they would next perhaps talk of hallucinations, or take the affair for a colossal swindle of a delinquent. They would require that rational inhabitants of Mars should telephone across a decided 'good-morning,'

and they would pronounce the actual correspondence-signs irrational, instead of referring them to the great limitation of the means of correspondence. Those who suspected the true state of the matter would be treated with smiles of superiority. In short, that would happen which has happened everywhere and always : the professed learned would do everything to suppress the new truth. 'In the sciences also,' said Goethe to Eckermann, 'what has been laid down and learnt at the schools is regarded as property. Comes now one with something new, opposed to, or even threatening quite to subvert, the *Credo* which we have for years repeated after others, and again handed on to others; passions are excited against him and all means are employed to suppress him. He is resisted in any way possible; by pretending not to hear, not to understand, by speaking of the thing contemptuously, as not at all worth the trouble even to look at and inquire into it; and so a new truth may be kept long waiting till it has made a path for itself.'*

Hitherto only the possibility of an interplanetary intercourse has been spoken of, and I do not at all complain of the sceptic, if he refuses to be satisfied thereupon; we shall, however, arrive not only at the probability, but even at the certainty of a place of man in the universe, in the degree that we fulfil the already prescribed task of striking materialism on its own ground.

For this purpose we must return again to man. Should the initiative in the bringing about a cosmical intercourse proceed from him, there are only two

* Eckermann : 'Gespräche mit Goethe,' iii. 20.

ways : he finds the means either in the forces of external nature, which he at present knows too little, or he finds them in himself, inasmuch as he is an evolutionary organism. In the latter respect we have now to apply to our question the attainments of Darwinism.

Darwinists, who conceive the biological part of the Earth as a process of evolution, fall into contradiction with their own theory, if instead of future organic development they suppose perpetual arrest.

Theories of evolution and Darwinism are not necessarily identical. The doctrine of evolution affirms the *succession* of higher and higher forms ; Darwinism affirms their derivation, their descent from antecedent forms.* We have not to enter upon this controversy. For our purpose, two facts, not contested by anyone, suffice. It is certain that an exaltation of forms has taken place ; the earliest strata of the Earth show the simplest ; the latest, the highest organisations. But it is also certain—and without this fact the doctrine of descent would never

* [The antithesis in the German is *aufeinander—auseinander*. It is not easy to understand how any theory which does not recognise the descent of forms from antecedent ones can be described as a theory of evolution. There is doubtless room for other theories of evolution than the Darwinian. Teleology, for instance, is not recognised in the latter, which works entirely with the struggle for existence and natural selection, or the survival of the fittest for an environment. But teleological evolution recognises the emergence of higher from lower forms—thus descent—as fully as does Darwinism, but postulates an ideal immanence of the higher forms in the ancestral types, and raises the question whether there is not an evolutionary adaptation of the environment itself to the germinal forms which develop as the external conditions become more suitable to their life. Certainly this view is more agreeable to a monistic conception of Nature, whose phenomena find therein the perfect harmony and correspondence to be expected from the unity of their source.—Tr.]

have arisen—that in the long chain of animal forms each member in its structure and functions is adapted in general to its environment, but that it betrays deviating characteristics in a double direction, those recalling preceding stages in the biological past, and germinal dispositions which point to the biological future. This holds true of the fœtal life and of developed conditions, of the structure of organisms and of their mental peculiarities, as perhaps in the girl's play with dolls already a future stage of development is indicated. Every life-form has thus a Janus aspect, looks back to the past and forward to the future. Already this appears in inorganic nature: the so-called nebulous stars—cosmic mist with bright shining kernels of light—point back to the diffused misty condition with uniform illumination, and again the future solar system finds itself preformed in them.

The Darwinist cannot stop with man; he must grant the possibility of a higher form of life, or at least of an exaltation of human faculties of sense beyond the present threshold of sensibility, and the evolution of new senses. But since the world, as represented by us, is a product of our sensibility, every exaltation of sense, every development of a new sense, must change the world-picture. The oyster represents the world differently from man, and from the oyster up to man a continual multiplication and exaltation of sense-faculties has taken place. This process was just as continuous as gradual. The threshold of sensibility has in the biological process been continually thrust forward; the senses became susceptible to constantly weaker degrees of physical influence. This was accompanied by division of

labour ; from the general sensibility spread over the surface of the skin arose separately localised centres of sensibility differently functioning. By this division of senses consciousness, and with it the world-image, were continuously enriched, points of contact between the external reality and organisms continuously multiplied.

Taking from the chain of life-forms an intermediate member, its representation of the world is much less opulent than ours ; but the world as present to our organism was already objectively present when that intermediate member still represented the organic apex. Only for that consciousness was it not, subjectively was it not yet ; it was then quite truly a supersensuous world. The Evolution doctrine thus necessitates the admission that for us men also there is a supersensuous, or, as Kant says, a transcendental world, which we are travelling towards, but which is first, perhaps, perceptible to a higher form of life.

The transcendental world is therefore a consequence for Darwinism and for the physiological theory of cognition. Physiologists themselves have, it is true, a very defective apprehension of this result of their own premisses ; but at least they cannot complain of philosophy if she speaks out a word placed upon her tongue by themselves.

Hereby is the whole uncertainty of human speculations on the world-problem at once clear. We would philosophise upon the world knowing it only in part, the transcendental part being closed to our consciousness. Could the curtain be lifted which divides us from it ; could we at once acquire all senses, the potentiality of which is in the bosom of Nature and

which perhaps are enjoyed in the stars ; should our organism suddenly come into sensible rapport with every point of reality : we should believe ourselves transferred to quite another world.

We see the world as we are sensible of it ; we judge concerning the world as we see it. The more modes of sensibility we had, the nearer should we come to true cognition. The same world which is known by five senses in a five-fold different way, would by a sixth sense again be perceived quite differently. But who will assert that the whole reality is exhausted by five senses ? The physiologist has no right to say so, the Darwinist still less ; but least of all will the philosopher make this pretension, if he belongs to the Kantian school.

The deficiency of our senses is even experimentally demonstrable. In electricity and magnetism we have forces to which no sense corresponds ; we know of ether vibrations upon which our organ of sight does not react, atmospheric vibrations which are not perceptible to our ear. Since, moreover, the things change in perception, the senses certainly do not inform us of the substance of things which can only be one and the same. With other senses we should have other representations, thus other concepts, another language, another philosophy.

If, therefore, the materialist asserts that there is no transcendental world—which yet for all sub-human organisms he must admit—that nature does not extend beyond the human threshold of sensibility, that our senses apprehend the whole world, that our representation of the world is the exact copy of the true world, he is to be refuted out of every text-book

of theoretical physics and physiology. If, further, materialists like Vogt and Büchner so misunderstand the common place, that philosophy must rest upon experience, as to take the experience of five human senses for that experience on which exclusively true philosophy should stand, and then to set up the materialistic system as this true philosophy—a philosophy so unintellectual, that in it the feat seems to be performed of solving the maximum of problems with the minimum of intelligence—such teaching, indeed, may find followers in a time of intellectual mediocrity; but our posterity, studying this time with historical criticism, will set up a laugh over this materialism announcing itself as a philosophy—a laugh which will be Homeric.

As against materialism it must, therefore, rather be asserted that the whole content of reality is not disclosed to us, and that we only incline to regard the circle of nature as bounded—and just so bounded that it can be measured by the radius of human sensibility—because the human organisation itself is bounded; but that this is a simple substitution of the subjective for the objective horizon, and not a whit more rational than when the child runs to the point where the rainbow falls; that reality in the course of the biological process has revealed continually new sides of being, and that it is still richer than our representation of it. In short, it is to be asserted that with the increase of organs of perception, things themselves increase, not objectively, but subjectively.

From the foregoing it is clear that to be able to speak the last word upon the world-problem, nothing less is necessary than that we should have ceased to

be men, that we should have learned one after the other all possible modes of feeling and existence ; for even were reality according to quantity wholly compassed by the human senses, yet physical things and processes receive by assumption into consciousness such qualitative change, that no longer the least similarity exists between, for instance, a beam of light and the ether-vibration at its foundation. The whole of nature, as we see it, would thus even then remain a mere symbol of reality, whose true significance would be concealed from us.

As we see, science itself in its ultimate issues turns into philosophy, first in theory of cognition, the critique of sense and reason lifting materialism clean off its hinges ; physiology itself refuting the identity of the sensible and the real, which materialism presupposes. Materialists have thus deprived of its foundation their own conception of the world, without recognising the consequent downfall of all their conclusions ; for if one fells an apple-tree, one cannot say that the apples still hang in the air.

As we are unable to adopt at pleasure other modes of feeling, in order to get nearer the nature of things, with some right may the attempt to penetrate the transcendental world be declared unprofitable, but that world can be denied only in a quite subjective sense, as the blind may dispute the existence of colours, or the deaf that of melodies.

If our image of the world is known to be dependent in quantity and quality upon our senses, it may in some degree be determined, what changes in it would happen through modifications of our senses. Astonishing is the multitude of modes of perception

thence inferable. But I need not enter more into detail here, as I have attempted this in my book, 'The Inhabitants of the Planets.' Men of science of the rank of Bär and Wallace have gone into the subject;* on the other hand, our ordinary materialists dismiss the question very summarily; their logic culminates in the assertion that because on the Earth there are only protoplasmic creatures (*Eiweissgeschöpfe*), there are only such in all the Kosmos. They thus transfer their own barrenness of imagination to high Nature, and lag behind even the father of materialism, Democritus, who knew that man does not perceive much that is perceptible, and that other beings might have senses which we want.†

Like a red thread there goes through the biological process a continuous displacement of the boundary line between the actual and the transcendental world; what to us men is actual was to earlier stages partially supersensuous, transcendental. The senses have developed and multiplied, *i.e.*, the biological process signifies exaltation of consciousness. But if, now, every life-form always already in germinal dispositions announces the next stage, it is presumable, that for man the veil which hides from him the transcendental world will, at least exceptionally, be somewhat pushed back, and that he may then be able to cast glances into this region, so far as these germinal, developable dispositions qualify him. Of this region philosophical and religious mystics have always reported, and the occult sciences of all times

* Ernst von Bär, 'Reden.' Petersburg, 1873. Wallace: 'Scientific Aspects of the Supernatural.'

† Zeller: 'Greek Philosophy.'

have been occupied with it, without sure results having ever been obtained. Such can first now be hoped for by the application of experimental methods of investigation, and will not fail to appear. The study of somnambule states alone already reveals that in numerous cases man is qualified for perceptions which could never be conveyed to him through the apparatus of sense. Nay, he who has no leisure to survey this province for himself, can still, from observation of his own dream-states, gain the insight that there is for human consciousness a source exceptionally independent of the organism of sense. The natural somnambulist, the sleep-walker, the magnetic sleeper, often even the common dreamer, reveals with closed senses, powers which with open senses are impossible. Far-seeing in time and space, somnambule clairvoyance, veridic dreaming, presentiments, second sight, etc., are phenomena which occur it is true only abnormally, but yet have already been proved a thousand times, and indeed principally by physicians, who certainly were equipped with the necessary scepticism. All these states prove that between man and nature another rapport, at least in tendency, is given than that mediated by the senses and the brain, the central seat of all sense-impressions. Our sense-impressions, which are conveyed from the peripheral nerve extremities to the brain, are the normal sources of our consciousness ; but this brain consciousness is only one of the possible forms of consciousness in general, only, as it were, our everyday terrestrial aspect. We bear in us also the dispositions to yet another consciousness, both as to content and form. When a future event is dreamed,

or information is obtained in dream of an occurrence unknown to the dreamer,* such a consciousness, as to *content*, is independent of the sources of sense; but when, as in the case of a more common experience, a dream of a few minutes seems to fill months, here the *form* of consciousness is abnormal.

Now, how are these phenomena connected with our question of the place of man in the universe?

From the theory of sense-perceptions and from the evolution theory, resulted inferences concerning the nature and perceptive modes of cosmical beings, whose senses are adapted to another reality than that which we perceive, or are adapted to our reality in another mode than ours. But the abnormal functions of human consciousness afford facts which are incomparably better suited to enlighten us concerning the cosmical possible forms of cognition. Since, however, these modes of cognition announce themselves, if only germinally, in our own soul-life, it is not only probable that the height of terrestrial organisation is not yet reached with man, but it is certain that in man himself there is a kernel, to which the laws of sensibility do not apply—an organ for which the cognitive forms of space and time avail differently than for the sense-consciousness. Since, finally, the functions of this organ attain to freer activity in the degree that the sense-consciousness is *suppressed*, so that the latter shows itself to be a hindrance to the development, it follows that the total annulment of the sense-consciousness can only be looked upon as a

* Such a case, viz., the discovery of murder by a dream, was recently again judicially proved, as is reported by the *Neue Wiener Tageblatt* of 13th January, 1881.

total removal of this hindrance ; thus death does not affect the true substance of man ; nay, it permits the cognitional mode which was suppressed in the earth-life again to attain unimpeded activity. If, therefore, it is just with dying persons that these abnormal functions of consciousness are so frequently to be observed—for many instances we have only to refer to one of Wieland's works (xxx. 236)—such a fact is impossible according to the current physiological psychology, but necessary* according to the theory here represented. Theories, however, have to address themselves to facts, not the reverse.

Now, from the fact of abnormal consciousness in somnambulist sleep, and more rarely in ordinary sleep, in dying, in second sight, and in similar states, result different consequences for our question, in which we have to distinguish between man as race and man as individual.

For humanity results from the abnormal powers of the human psyche the consequence, that these faculties belong to that side of the human Janus aspect which is turned to the biological future ; thus in human nature there lie already veiled indications of the next higher stage of being, and since we cannot suppose that we men are cosmically at the summit of life-forms, it may be further inferred, that wherever the biological process may have outstripped the earth's, there are beings having those powers normally, which with us are manifested only in abnormal, more or less morbid, conditions. It is, however, clear that such beings will be better fitted than we to take the initia-

* [In fact, although the *manifestation* of such consciousness by the dying must be exceptional.—Tr.]

tive in the introduction of a cosmical history. Accordingly, it would not be we who would send the Columbus, but he would land, as it were, among us.

For man as individual, on the other hand, results the following : If the human psyche, not by exaltation of sense-consciousness, but on suppression of the same, reveals powers which physiologically are quite inexplicable, then is the soul something else than the mere effect of the organism, thinking is something else than a mere secretion of the brain. Material the soul even then can still be thought, but this materiality nevertheless stands as high above that of our body as the latter above the materiality of the stone. This substance of man belonging to the transcendental world, existing behind the sense-consciousness, and only exceptionally encroaching upon it, is thus the prime cause of the organism, and if materialists will recognise in the soul only the last effect of the organism, the truth is thereby just turned upside down.

Soul and consciousness are not identical concepts. The soul, in so far as it belongs to the transcendental world, is unconscious, but not in itself, only in regard to the brain consciousness. The magnetic sleep, which on one side elicits the phenomenon of clairvoyance, is on the other side associated with such a suppression of the brain consciousness, that in this state the severest surgical operations can be performed without pain. This relatively, but not in itself, unconscious soul, as the true substance of the individual, is connected with the Ego of the man, the supporter of the normal ordinary consciousness, as one Subject, but this Subject splits itself into two

personalities. The man who alternately wakes and dreams is only *one* Subject, but this Subject has two alternating consciousnesses, which have only a few points of contact with each other. A still better analogy for the relation of the two persons of the *one* Subject is afforded by the somnambulist sleep, because the somnambulist indeed possesses completely the memory of his ordinary consciousness, but after waking knows nothing more of his somnambulist consciousness.

The definition of man cannot be confined—as materialists confine it—to one of the two persons, but must embrace the whole Subject. When physiologists infer, from the dependence of the ordinary consciousness on senses and brain, that man is destroyed when these are gone, they resemble those somnambulists who in the waking state deny the visions of their clairvoyance; as person they are right, but not as Subject.

Somnambulist clairvoyance, already known to Plato and Aristotle, in the temple sleep and in the old mysteries, and in recent times established by a whole succession of experiments, is now just a fact which must be reckoned with, and to which our systems must adapt themselves. This obligation is not diminished because this fact, though always recurring in time, has a relatively rare distribution.

But now if the personal consciousness of the ordinary man is only one of the possible forms of the individual soul-consciousness, then is man not only called, as part of the race, to co-operate in cosmical history, he is no transient phenomenon, made by some fatality serviceable to an aim which is

foreign to him, but is himself, as individual being, perfectible in the succession of his soul's possible forms of consciousness. As in the erection of a building there is not only the gain of the building itself, which arises, but also the architect's advantage in the furtherance of his experience and science—so in human history it is not only civilisation as such that progresses, but also every co-operator. Pessimism of the terrestrial order of the world is therefore not the last word of philosophy, but perhaps corresponds to the great difficulties of an architectural building, which are just suited to advance the architect.

According to the current conception of history, the work of one generation is always only for the profit of succeeding ones, and even should the golden age bloom in the future, it would still be only the latent generations that would enjoy the collective product; but at last, after man had died out, the futility of the whole game would be exposed. Here, however, man is his own heir, the Subject inherits from the person, and what I have acquired morally and intellectually remains with me. The law of the Conservation of Energy, by which all physical processes of Nature are brought to their simplest expression, avails also for the psychical world.*

So should we again arrive at the oldest of philosophical conceptions of man, the migration of souls; but this old theory would be revived in a new and incomparably higher form, which could only be described as palingenesis. This would have to be conceived, not as transplacement into another objective space, but rather into a subjectively different

* Hellenbach: 'Der Individualismus.'

world ; it would not be change of place, but change of perceptual mode. The content of a human existence on earth is determined by our five senses ; the combined mode of reaction of these senses on external impressions determines our image of the world. Now we might suppose this earthly existence drawn apart into five successive existences, to each of which one of these senses should be allotted, and we should then have a quantity of soul-migrations into a subjectively different world, which yet objectively would always be the same. Suppose, now, there were altogether only five modes of perceiving terrestrial things—which is certainly not really to be thought—so would the human soul by these five successive modes of existence have exhausted the terrestrial existence. Transfer this relation to the kosmos, then would the cosmically possible modes of existence be first run through, when the sum of the perceptible, qualitatively and quantitatively, had been exhausted on the side of the soul, the evolutionary process of the objective world extending the spatially appointed task also temporally.

To materialism, death is transition from being to non-being ; to the old theories of migration of souls it was a transition from being to another being, whether to another body or to another star ; here, on the other hand, death appears as transition from a being to a being-otherwise, as a displacement into quite another world, into that transcendental world which is veiled from our sense-consciousness. To existence in this transcendental world would correspond those faculties which remain in general latent during our earthly existence, only partially emerging

in abnormal states. Death would be comparable to somnambule waking within sleep, *i.e.*, during the abeyance of sense-consciousness.

So that perhaps we need not have been at the trouble to deduce man's place in the universe from the possibility of our planetary intercourse ; for as Subjects we stand already in the transcendental world ; our metaphysical substance is rooted in it, and in view of that it seems of no importance that in a transient phase of existence we have no presentiment of this connection of the whole ; for these halves of the world, divided for our sense-consciousness, flow together again as soon as this consciousness is discarded.

That besides the physical world there may be a metaphysical one, will not be recognised by our generation, intoxicated by a one-sided scientific culture. For a Kant this idea was a matter of course. For a Kant it was also well conceivable, that as Subject we may belong at the same time to the visible and to the invisible world, and yet as person only to the one. For him it only remained a question of proof by facts ; and as it seemed to him that such were wanting, he trusted to the future in the words already cited : ' It will hereafter yet be proved, I know not where or when, that the human soul even in this life stands in indissoluble association with all immaterial natures of the spirit-world, that it reciprocally acts on them and receives from them impressions, of which, however, it is as man not conscious as long as all goes well.' From which it may be inferred what language Kant would have used if he had had the opportunity of observing even only the phenomena of somnambulism.

I do not conceal from myself that in the foregoing only the most general hint of a scheme of things is given, and that the fundamental ideas require further development to induce the reader's conviction. I do not intend to decline this duty, but must here confine myself to a concluding remark, consideration of which by the sceptic seems much to be recommended. Our present science recognises each *singly* of the factors from which results the spiritual conception of the world here attempted, which is simply a synthesis of the theory of cognition and of Darwinism. If, that is, the theory of cognition be true—say as it is represented by Wundt in his 'Contributions to the Theory of Sense-perception' (Leipzig, 1862)—then is there a transcendental world; if Darwinism, or, to speak generally, the Evolution theory, be true, then for every stage of organisation there is a different boundary line between the real and the transcendental; then it is only a question of time when the dividing-line existing for a particular stage of organisation is thrust still further back; then it is for us men also only a question of time, when sensible evidence will be obtained for what is to us at present still super-sensuous. Add the recognition of abnormal states of human consciousness, in which already the laws of the transcendental world gleam through, then have we all the necessary supports for this spiritualistic conception. But if science has already recognised each particular item, on what ground could she still neglect the addition, and object to the complete sum?

6. *Ethic.*

What is the aim of our earthly existence? The answer to this question is made relatively easy in the monistic doctrine of the soul, and is not abandoned to arbitrary speculation. For from the past we know that the aspect of the human Janus-head which is turned to the individual future looks in the same direction to which biological progress also tends. The dispositions to transcendental faculties which are shown in states of ecstasy, are at the same time anticipations of our transcendental existence, and germs of development of the biological man of the future; these dispositions depend on influences of natural things which lie below the threshold of sensibility, and for which just therefore there is no organ of sense-perception. Without such influences below the threshold the biological process would not be directed, and could also never even come to organic beginnings; with such unconscious influences, on the other hand, a definite direction is also imparted to the biological process: it has to convert influences below the threshold into feelings above it, which is equivalent to a constantly progressive adaptation. First the material organism is subject by nature to the grosser influences of the external world, and to these our cognitional apparatus has adapted itself, so that thus it is just the finer influences of nature that are accessible indeed to the unconscious, the transcendental Subject, but have still elicited no biological organ of adaptation, by which our sense-consciousness could be extended to this transcendental section of the world. If we consider the immense increase in

perception of nature in the formation of an organ adapted to the light-vibrations of the ether—the ‘solar’ eye of which Plotinus* and Goethe speak—it is supposable that an instrument attuned to yet finer influences must raise us to an unsuspected biological stage.

Now since the biological process is to raise the unconscious into the conscious, to make the possession of the Subject the possession of the person, and its ideal consummation coincides with the transcendental existence of our Subject, the transcendental faculties of the latter, of which states of ecstasy give us at least an indication, offer the single opportunity of anticipating in thought the biological progress also. This progress presses into a world which in its kind is likewise material and subject to law, and to which as Subjects we already belong, not as pure spirits, but as beings whose activity can depend only on transcendental knowledge and on the use of transcendental forces conformable to law, for just because our consciousness as well as our self-consciousness leaves over an unconscious, is the sundering of the Ego, the monistic duplication, the explanatory formula, not only of our dreams, but metaphysically of man himself.

But now, if the indications of transcendental faculties, revealed by somnambulism, are at the same time the germs of biological evolution, the biological aim of our existence coincides for the race with this transcendental aim for the individual. The biological process shows in the succession of life-forms an exaltation of beings and of their intellectual and

* Plotinus : ‘Enneads,’ i. 6, 9.

moral consciousness ; the transcendental aim of earthly existence can, however, be no other than the exaltation of our transcendental individuality, which is attained by the heirship of the Subject to the terrestrial personality, and its terrestrial attainments in faculty and dispositions. Now herewith is given the transition to Ethic.

Even in pessimistic systems life is of transcendental advantage, in so far as the will to live is impelled to renunciation. What leads to this is the exaltation of consciousness, which according to Schopenhauer should drive the individual, according to Hartmann the race, to renunciation. For the monistic doctrine of the soul the means are the same, but the end is different ; by the intellectual and moral exaltation of the terrestrial person the transcendental individuality should be exalted with it. We thus attain the aim of earthly existence when we subordinate the interests of our person to those of the Subject. The whole content of Ethic may be comprehended therein, that the person should be serviceable to the Subject ; every revolt of the person, in its own favour, against the Subject is immoral.

The theoretical distraction with regard to the moral principle has perhaps never been so great as at present. That is seen with terrible clearness in its reflection : distraction of our practical morality, and the thick overgrowth of terrestrial egoism. Now since Ethic is the proper touchstone of a conception of the world, systems must be judged by their fruits, because the true and the good—*consensus boni et veri*—are as indivisible as error and evil—*consensus mali et falsi*—and the monistic doctrine of the soul has to give an

account of itself herein, whether it can set up a moral principle which is theoretically unassailable, and the recognition of which could result beneficially for our social relations. 'The measure of value of a philosophical conception,' as Hellenbach says,* 'is ultimately the moral principle which proceeds from it.' And it must be so, if the *consensus boni et veri* is a truth.

Whoever would learn the present position of the theoretical problem of Ethic cannot do better than inform himself from Schopenhauer and Hartmann.† He will there see clearly, that in relation to the ethical problem we are in presence of an antinomy which is far too little emphasised. Schopenhauer has already shown that the Kantian 'Thou shalt,' the categorical imperative, rests on a *petitio principii*, and not less clearly has Hartmann shown generally that no authoritative moral principle fulfils its office. But, on the other hand, it is a fact of our consciousness, that the voice of conscience has really this imperative form. An irrefragable demand of logic stands therefore in contradiction with an indubitable fact, and it is for Ethic to solve this contradiction.

Now the single possibility of this solution lies in the monistic doctrine of the soul, in the distinction of our Subject from our terrestrial person.

We find, in fact, in our consciousness the imperative 'thou shalt'—a foreign authority opposed to our earthly will. For the dualistic doctrine of the soul this foreign authority means God. 'When thou

* 'Vorurteile der Menschheit,' ii. 238.

† Schopenhauer: 'Ueber das Fundament der Moral.' Hartmann: 'Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins,' 53-63.

sayest, I am alone with myself, there dwells ever in thy heart that highest Being as attentive and silent observer of all good and all evil ; this judge, who dwells in thy soul is a strict judge, an inflexible requiter.* For materialism, on the other hand, this foreign authority means: customary thought. Thereby, of course, nothing at all is explained. The question is not whether the 'thou shalt' has arisen through customary thought, but whether it is *obligatory*. This is the ethical problem, and for this materialism has no answer ; it can prove no distinction of value within our acts. The question is not as to the existence of a conscience, but as to the duty of obeying it ;† not how moral development has proceeded, how social ethics have arisen, but whether there is a metaphysical ethic, whether the moral development of mankind, which might just as easily have been a false development, is a progress, and has its ground in the ethical significance of the world.

For the monistic doctrine of the soul, the moral imperative comes ultimately from the transcendental Subject. Thus the authority ceases to be foreign,

* 'Gesetzbuch des Mann.'

† [That is, whatever may be the nature of the apparent or supposed authority, is moral obligation generally conceivable, and how ? In the usual terminology of the subject, it is a question not of the standard, but of the sanction. Theology is just as incapable of supplying a truly moral sanction as is materialism. The juridical conception of obligation is essentially self-regarding, and it can only be transferred to Ethics by an enlargement of the conception of Self, either as suggested in the text, or better still, by an ultimate identification in thought of the Self with the Universal or Supreme, whereby the distinction of wills is theoretically sublated, the separate interest of the individual being seen to rest upon a fallacy—a solution which is common to Indian religious philosophy and (with a metaphysical modification) to Christian mysticism.—Tr.]

but as authority remains ; and even though proceeding from our own Subject, it is still not to be presupposed as *petitio principii*. There remains as before the question how such a conflict of two wills in us is possible, and of the obligation to obey the transcendental will. The existence of a conflict presents no difficulty ; the situation of a pre-existing Subject, a member of the transcendental order of things, is so thoroughly different from that of its transient phenomenal form in the world of sense, that a difference in the directions of the wills must result of itself. If now the Subject, by reason of its better acquaintance with things metaphysical, appears in a world of moral significance as the better part of us in the voice of conscience, yet must the reverse be likewise possible ; the Subject also, according to its moral nature, is a product of development ; we can therefore by no means ascribe to it a sanctity of nature in opposition to the unholy nature of its earthly phenomenal form. Were the greater morality always on the side of the Subject, and were every revolt of the person against the Subject already, as such, immoral, then could the terrestrial existence have no educational value, the Subject could not be enriched by the moral fruits of this existence, the earthly phenomenal form could not advance it. Our moral consciousness can thus erect itself against the innate dispositions as the higher, and in each of its conquests there is a progress aimed at in a righteous revolt of the person against the Subject. So that, if the revolt of person against Subject is in the interest of the latter, it then ceases to be immoral.

Subject and earthly phenomenal form are in the

monistic doctrine of soul by no means radically different substances, so that morality is limited to the Subject, immorality to the person, which would preclude all moral progress in the terrestrial existence. Rather may the reverse also occur, and in Sanctity especially the moral progress of the terrestrial being is the more intense—that is, its revolt against the Subject is justified.

In its own interest, therefore, the transcendental Subject can in all acts of virtue be subordinate, *i.e.*, the revolt of the person against the congenital nature can be a righteous one; on the other hand, in all cases of sin the conscience is to be regarded as the higher authority, only that it must first be shown how the voice of conscience can be prohibitive for us, and why revolt against it must in all cases be regarded as immoral.

First, it is clear that conscience, although the voice of one's own Subject, can appear to us as foreign authority only in the same sense as in dream we place the answer to a question in a strange mouth. The seat of conscience is in the unconscious; its voice must therefore always take on the form of the dramatic sundering, which is just why it appears as a foreign authority. There is no reason for limiting this form to the domain of thought; it must just as surely occur also in the domain of will, and if so, then the earthly 'ought' resolves itself into a transcendental 'will,' which, just because it comes from the unconscious, that is, belongs to the Subject, must needs in the sensuous consciousness appear as an 'ought' dictated by a foreign authority. Conscience

is thus a will-impulse from the transcendental region, like others we have already recognised. By the same psychological laws, according to which a memory suddenly occurring in dream is placed in a strange mouth, and the transcendental will of somnambulists represents itself in their health-prescriptions as an injunction of the guardian spirit, must also the moral will of the transcendental Subject take on for the earthly consciousness the form of an 'ought.' The apparent presence of this foreign authority is only wanting because the dream-state is wanting, but it is presumable *à priori*—though no dream of this sort occurs to my memory—that agitations of conscience in dream and somnambulism must be represented as teachings or commands from a strange mouth.

The monistic doctrine of the soul consequently annuls the antinomy indicated above, and therewith the stumbling-block of all ethic, since it explains the imperative 'ought' as an appearance, resulting from the dualism of our consciousness, from the distinction of the Subject from the person. The 'ought' ceases to be a *petitio principii*, and because it proves itself to be a transcendental will, not only is the alien character of the authority, but the authority itself removed. On the other hand, however, in this way the motive force of the 'thou shouldst' is not only not diminished, but is even for the first time rightly grounded. This is best seen from the apparent exaltation of the moral consciousness in somnambulism, in which the tendencies of the waking life are often energetically opposed by it.

The monistic doctrine of soul thus affords a moral principle full of value, which stands firm of itself, without requiring to lean upon further presuppositions. This is also the case, no doubt, with Pantheism, because it also seeks the moral authority in ourselves as individual phenomenal forms of the world-being, thus resolves the 'ought' into a metaphysical will. The transcendental consequences of our acts, without which ethic generally cannot be founded, are given in Pantheism; but the moral motive force derivable from the unity of the world-being is very slight. Solidarity with other beings, by reason of the unity of the world-substance, can indeed be logically demonstrated, but the logical conviction does not attain the requisite interest. The motive force of a moral principle depends on how near me is the nature for whose redemption I am called to co-operate, and from which the moral authority proceeds—and this proximity is the greatest possible, if a transcendental Subject is supposed; it depends, further, on the nearness of the aim to be reached by moral action, and this nearness also is the greatest possible, when I already experience the transcendental results of my acts by discarding my earthly phenomenal form through death. If, on the contrary, this nature is too far divided from us, as the world-substance from our phenomenal Ego, and if the aim is first attained at the consummation of the world-process, the retardation of this process by my immoral action can signify little to me, especially if there is a failure of the bridge of memory, connecting the succession of existences in which I shall yet

emerge in the world-process.* On the other hand, I am in the highest degree concerned to submit myself to the moral 'ought,' if it is a will of my own Subject, springing from my own transcendental deliberation. Therefore, this moral motive attains validity already within terrestrial existence, in somnambulism, and that much more energetically than in waking.

An unconscious world-substance, splitting itself into milliards of individuals in space and time, neither can, as unconscious, find the means for its redemption, nor with the constant change of consciousness can the redemption be specially desirable to it. The positive condition of the world-substance, as long as it is unconscious, is completely equivalent to the negative condition of not-being which is to be attained, as a pain below the threshold of sensibility is equivalent to the painless state. But attributing to the world-substance a consciousness before the sun-dering, or along with it, there still remain unaffected by that the spatially and temporally divided individuals, on whom is imposed co-operation in the work of redemption.

The contemporaneity of the transcendental Subject with terrestrial person is thus the foundation, not only of all mysticism, but also of all Ethic, because only then can the moral 'ought' be a transcendental will. Ethic with a metaphysical significance is itself

* [The re-emergence here is not that of an individual re-incarnation, the 'I' that shall re-emerge in terrestrial personality being not a transcendental *individuality*, but the universal being or spirit which in pantheism is the only true Subject, which continually rephenomenalises itself, and is thus *first* differentiated.—Tr.]

mysticism, and must be similarly founded. Conscience is transcendental nature; if it belonged to the terrestrial soul, it could not be directed against the impulses of the latter; it could not oppose our strongest inclinations, and subject the terrestrial soul, as somnambulism subjects the person to the Subject.

Kant, in his 'Dreams of a Ghost-seer,' has declared Mysticism possible, supposing man to be 'a member at once of the visible and of the invisible world.' It is therefore antecedently presumable that he would give the same foundation to his Ethic. And in fact in his 'Metaphysic of Morals,' the resolution of the 'thou shalt' into a transcendental will is expressed with a distinctness leaving nothing to be desired, and which was unavoidable, since Kant in fact looked upon man as a being belonging simultaneously to the intelligible world and to the world of sense. He says: 'And so categorical imperatives are possible thereby, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world, so that were I such alone, all my acts *would* be at all times conformable to the autonomy of the will, but since I regard myself as at the same time a member of the world of sense, they *should* be conformable. . . . The moral "ought" is thus his own necessary will as member of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as "ought" in so far as he considers himself as at the same time a member of the world of sense.'*

Now the moral principle of the monistic doctrine of the soul is certainly open to the reproach of eudæ-

* Kant, viii. 88, 89.

monism, inasmuch as it strives for the good of our Subject; but this eudæmonism is a transcendental one, and the concern of all Ethic is to combat earthly egoism, *i.e.*, to advance the good of fellow-men. Now if the transcendental interest of my Subject coincides with the collective earthly interest, because the first is attained by action which advances the latter, then transcendental eudæmonism, which moreover attaches to the theistic and pantheistic conceptions, cannot be placed on the same level with the earthly eudæmonism; for whereas the former might change earth into a paradise, the latter has often made a hell of it, and will do so again, unless the ethical consciousness is revived. All that has as yet been done to combat the bestialism threatened in the social revolution turns upon symptomatic cures, whose relative value is still not to be denied; but a radical cure is only possible by improving humanity from within, and for this it is before all things requisite that we restore to it that of which materialism has deprived it: the consciousness of its place in the universe, and therefore with the ethical conception of the world.

In the monistic doctrine of soul man is product of his own development; his character, his life itself, and even his fate are his own work. Hence the moral responsibility for our acts, which fails if birth is the beginning of our existence, life, character, and fate having been conferred by foreign causes. And as our earthly phenomenal form is the product of our intelligible character, so also after stripping off this phenomenal form we shall be that which we have made ourselves through the earthly existence, whether we have thereby advanced or injured our Subject.

This is the transcendental justification, before which all human complaint of terrestrial injustice is dumb.

In death we shall be participant in the order of the transcendental world; but it cannot be our task to try for participation in it here, as the mystics of all times have striven. Of our free decision we have entered on this earthly world, and our task therein can only be continual moral and intellectual progress. The fulfilment of this task, which deposits and sublimates the unconscious precipitate of intellectual and moral dispositions, therewith also exalts or injures the heir of these, the developable transcendental Subject. We thus determine by our conduct on earth at the same time the constitution of our future phenomenal form, and therein lies the transcendental justification of palingenesis. It is in our own power to lengthen or to abbreviate the process of this palingenesis, and to determine its proximate constitution, till we are participant in an order of things to which in death we transitorily and certainly only partially attain. 'We have,' says Hellenbach, 'only to understand by Hell and eternal punishment the biological process, and by eternal joy the emancipation from it, in order to bring the doctrine of migration of souls into harmony with Christianity.'*

We must, therefore, work out the earthly existence on behalf of the transcendental Subject, and this does not happen if we withdraw from its struggles, or fold our hands on our lap in earthly resignation. Our will to live has not an earthly motive, but is a transcendental willing of our Subject; therefore is it present, even when the contents of the life are not

* 'Die Vorurtheile,' etc., ii. 185.

correspondent to our earthly wishes ; this transcendental will of the Subject is for the earthly person an 'ought;' therefore is there in the life of ascetic penitence, and in that of Indian and Christian anchorites, as in the daily increasing suicides among civilised peoples, a misconstruction, springing from accentuation of the life here, of our position in the universe, and of our task, an immoral revolt of the person, knowing only the earthly phenomenal form, against the striving of the transcendental Subject for our true good.

Fechner has propounded a remarkable idea, that the conscious individuality of man is by death first resolved into the conscious individuality of the globe. He justly extols this conception, in that 'No view can offer a stricter, more complete, more inviolable, natural justice, none can better answer to the words, that everyone shall sow what he has reaped.'* There are, however, different objections to this idea. One is expressed by Hellenbach: 'As the cells of our body form the organism which has a higher consciousness, so may Fechner conceive of the earth-spirit, of which we, as it were, form the cells; but then it is necessary to carry out the analogy: we shall know just as much of the existence of the earth-soul and its consciousness as the cells of us.'† Now, this transcendental justice, by reason of which we are

* Fechner: 'Zend-Avesta,' iii. 287. [I cannot refrain from recommending here a later and much smaller work of the same author, entitled 'Buchlein vom Leben nach dem Tode,' which has been excellently translated into English by a German friend of Fechner's, Herr Hugo Wernecke ('On Life after Death,' London, Sampson Low, 188, Fleet Street, 1882).—Tr.]

† 'Vorurteile,' ii. 210.

not—as in the dualistic soul-doctrine—required *for* our works, but—as Fechner will have it—*by* our former works, exists in a still far higher degree, and is not exposed to Hellenbach's objection, if our own Subject-consciousness accompanies the consequences of our acts, instead of the consciousness of the earth-spirit, and if the Subject can form no other organism than one completely homogeneous to its own nature, and only the external expression of its inner nature. All transcendental psychology, however, proves the existence of such a Subject-consciousness, and that along and simultaneous with the sense-consciousness, and especially in the chapter on 'Memory,' it has moreover been found that for this consciousness there is no forgetting, that we thus carry over the consciousness of our acts into the transcendental existence. Transcendental justice is therefore present in such a degree that we can speak of a moral order of the universe.

Another objection may be raised to Fechner's conception. Apparently, indeed, it greatly simplifies the problem, because in it the single consciousness is taken up at death into the consciousness of the next higher circle of nature, which again on its side forms a constituent of the divine universal consciousness. Thereby the transcendental or intelligible world-order coincides with that of sense. But therein lies just the difficulty, that sense is made the measure of reality. Every world is this particular world only for the particular organisation, and every change of organisation changes the world-picture. We must thus from the evolution theory conclude that the barrier between sensible and intelligible worlds is a

fluid one, and, indeed, by reason of the biological process, temporal, and by reason of the different but contemporary phases of this process, also spatial. To the plurality of worlds on this side, depending on the plurality of different forms of organisation, must thus also correspond a plurality of worlds on that side, as these could not be for all beings coincident. Neither death, therefore, nor, undoubtedly, re-birth, can have the same significance for every being ; both events transpose different beings also into different relations. If the boundary-line between sensible and transcendental worlds is temporally and spatially fluid, then it is not the same boundary that is overstepped by every being at death and at re-birth. But for the same reason we cannot so oppose the two worlds to one another, as, with Kant and Schopenhauer, to place freedom in the intelligible world, and necessity in the world of sense ; rather from the fluidity of the frontiers results the fluidity also of the boundary between necessity and freedom ; and if in the earthly phase of our life we see ourselves spell-bound in the realm of necessity, yet must our life as a whole be regarded as a gradual transition from necessity to freedom, in which we enjoy only so much freedom as we have won by our progress, and thus deserved. Already our earthly relations show that freedom may be either the greatest furtherance to development, or a hindrance to it, and a 'gift of the Greeks.'

The sufferings of life, which incite us to acts of progress and love of neighbour, are also means to the advancement of the Subject. But they have also a yet more direct aim ; they have in themselves already that purifying power of which pessimist poets and

philosophers speak in accord with Christianity.* We can constantly uphold the saying that by earthly sufferings the will should be brought to renunciation, but that refers only to the earthly will, and the Nirvana to be striven for is not annihilation, but the transcendental order of things, which is also not attained by quietism, but rather by restless activity on the battle-field, on which we ourselves have set ourselves. Therein lies the metaphysical significance of suffering, to which the Subject destines us in its transcendental indifference to the fate of its earthly phenomenal form. Therefore, says the mystic Eckhard, 'The swiftest steed that bears you to perfection is suffering ;'† and in the Book of Ecclesiastes, ascribed to Solomon : 'Sadness is better than mirth ; for by sadness is the heart bettered.'‡

That our earthly existence is a mere means to a transcendental end, that no value attaches to it for its own sake, is distinctly enough indicated by the vanity of our whole earthly striving in every direction, by the restlessness which, insatiably endeavouring, sees in every step attained only the foothold for a further spring, lasting satisfaction never being achieved. Distinctly enough, also, is this vanity of the earthly motive indicated in history, every people, when it has performed its task in civilisation, retiring from the scene. Here, also, in the historical as in the individual life, the objective result may appear a failure, inasmuch as no state of blessedness, nor even of completion, is found ; yet by our co-operation in this

* Schopenhauer : 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' ii. c. 48.

† Eckhard : 'Werke,' i. 492.

‡ Eccl. vii. 3.

process a transcendental aim of existence and of history is attained, for the Subject thus advances itself to and makes itself capable of higher form of the phenomenal life, because not only the race and its culture, but also the organising principle itself are perfected. Just because this work is always to be carried further, it leads to no earthly rest. And this thought allows no lament over the disillusion of the life of the individual and of nations.

Only *one* thing we see really attained by our earthly existence: the exaltation of individuality. This alone, therefore, by reason of its transcendental consequences, can be the aim of existence,* and here indeed the individual aim for the transcendental Subject coincides with the historical aim for the race. Not in itself, therefore, should the will to live be renounced, though indeed every stage of progress attained by it should be renounced, not in favour of the nothing, but in favour of a higher stage, and that this may happen have we placed ourselves in this world of preponderating suffering. 'There is only *one* inborn error,' says Schopenhauer, 'and that is that we exist in order to be happy.' Life is something 'which should be disagreeable to us, and from which we, as from a mistake, have to return.' It would be more true—as he says—'to place the aim of life in our woe than in our welfare.' He even says right out that we 'have more to hope for our salvation and redemption from what we suffer than from what we do.†

If in our earthly infatuation we hope in life and

* Cf. J. H. Fichte: 'Psychologie,' i. 119-125.

† 'Welt als Wille,' etc., ii. 49.

history to reach an ideal finality, and see in all phases of development only an approximation to an earthly point of rest, so that thus the whole aim lies in this extremity, on the other hand, the transcendental view teaches us that the aim of life as of history fulfils itself *on the whole line*, though not in the earthly sense. The aim of the individual life is the same that Hartmann assigns for the biological process and for history: the elevation of consciousness intellectually, æsthetically, and ethically. Earthly ills and moral evils are the objects to be overcome by this elevation of consciousness in continual labour. Our generation, which emphasises alone the earthly, and has lost almost every presentiment of its transcendental place in the universe, is restlessly troubled to repress physical ills by intellectual exaltation of consciousness in the progress of natural science and appliances. The one-sidedness of this striving is, however, signified in this, that avoiding the Scylla of *ills* we already run the risk of wreck on the Charybdis of *evil*. We are thereof urgently warned by the grave social mischiefs of the present time. But if every sin hides in itself an error, if every social mischief is rooted in erroneous conceptions of the place of man in the universe, then can the moral evil, which acts in this mischief, only be overcome by such an elevation of consciousness as enlightens us also in the transcendental sense.

But if materialism, knowing only intellectual and earthly progress, is one-sided, so also religions incline to one-sidedness in the opposite direction, since they only teach the overcoming of wickedness. Certainly the moral man stands higher than the intellectual, but religions miss their own ideal if they ignore in-

tellectual progress. It is not served by preaching only morality ; it is preached to deaf ears if morality is not grounded ; and that can only happen when it is derived from our transcendental place in the kosmos, which on its side can only be perceived by elevation of consciousness. Our vocation is thus as well moral as intellectual ; the first was emphasised in the Middle Ages, now the last. But we shall only attain a true culture when we recognise both sides as justified and indivisible, and each is freed from its exclusive emphasis, that is, when we learn to perceive that the apparent substitution of science for religion is only a process of differentiation, a division of labour.

There are two possible courses for explaining the enigma of things. Either one proceeds from the world in order to explain man, or from man in order to explain the world. Heretofore, in the development of the sciences the former way has been followed far too much, to the neglect of the latter. Truth certainly is to be found in both ways, but both must be pursued in order to establish their agreement. Without disputing that the one-sided point of departure, from the consideration of objective things, can lead us to ideals of religion, philosophy, and art, it is not to be denied that the consideration of objective things carries us easily into byways. So we see that just in our time, notwithstanding the surprising progress of the natural sciences, respect for the great world-problem has continually diminished ; and yet only on the ground of this respect can religion, philosophy, and art thrive. Always more wonderful sides of sensible nature have been disclosed to us, but the view of the other side of things we have there-

upon so far lost, that perhaps in no historical century has the metaphysical indifference of the masses been so great as now. The spread of the materialistic view of the world is only another expression for this metaphysical indifference. We have ceased to think largely of the world and of man, and therefore are we without large and ideal conceptions. If in the world is seen only a heap of chemicals and sherds on which man also leads a merely chemical existence, there is no room for great ideas. The modern man, when he sees in the heavens at night

‘Wie das Uebermass der Sterne
Prächtig uns zu Häupten glüht,’*

(‘How the excess of stars glows splendid overhead’),

is no longer excited metaphysically by this complication of flaming worlds, but only scientifically; he sees only the one side of things, the law of mechanics according to which it all moves, as on our star he recognises only laws of physics and chemistry. He resembles one in whom the execution of a symphony occasions only speculations upon vibrations of atmospheric waves. We have lost respect for nature, and in vain self-conceit we at best retain respect for the expounders of nature, as Comte has expressed it forcibly enough: ‘Aujourd’hui pour les esprits familiarisés de bonne heure avec la vraie philosophie astronomique les cieux ne racontent plus d’autre gloire que celle d’Hipparque, de Kepler, de Newton, et de tous ceux qui ont concourus à en établir les lois.’† It is only remarkable, and for Comte an insoluble contradiction, that the intellectual heroes he

* Goethe: ‘Der Brautigam.’

† ‘Philosophie Positive,’ ii. 25.

names did not think as he does. We have thus admiration for the mind which penetrates nature, but no longer admiration for this nature herself, of which yet our mind is only a part. And yet must mind and nature be of equal value, because only so much mind can be applied to nature as is latent in herself, and that all the more if she reveals herself according to eternal laws. As little as a landscape ceases to be beautiful by being painted, because, as Shakespeare says, 'The art itself is nature,'* as little does nature cease to merit our respect, when we have succeeded in explaining her. The labours of genius do not degrade nature, but raise her, because genius itself is nature's work. Greater than Newton appears the world of stars which he explains, and in which he is included; greater than Linnæus is the wonderful vegetable world, and higher than the science of psychology is its object, Man; for in intellectual labour nature explains herself, as she only adorns herself in the artist who purely displays her. Therefore should every recognition of genius lead us to recognition of nature. What will be attained when once science has accomplished its whole task? The true significance of this world, ourselves included, will not be thereby revealed, as the symphony is not explained by the mere laws of acoustics. After, as before, the world will carry in it a metaphysical note of interrogation; nay, a world wholly explained scientifically will then appear all the more clearly as an unsolved philosophical problem. Therefore in science itself, which has narrowed the true representation, lies the corrective, by means of its capacity

* 'Winter's Tale,' iv. 3.

for development, again to extend this representation. When once its aim is attained, it will even thereby clearly perceive that it has explained only the phenomenal world, and is able to deliver nothing in reply to the questions, whence we come, whither we go, and what we are. Thus if the first results of natural science have been to take away our respect for the world-problem, the later results will be again to exalt it. And, finally, we shall see that we were mistaken in regarding nature as something thoroughly irrational and dead, in which everything occurs according to blind laws, reason on the contrary being something merely subjective, characteristic merely of that piece of nature we call man.

The consideration of objective nature does therefore not silence our metaphysical consciousness and need; rather is nature an object highly fitted to produce in us that Faustian craving for knowledge which cannot rest at the mere discovery of the conformity of phenomena to law. Therefore also can this Faustian urgency not be placed in us as an inward contradiction; it must be destined to work itself out; it cannot be condemned to disappointment, and if it remains unsatisfied in this life, there is in it a guarantee of transcendental persistence; it cannot be there subjectively, without an object corresponding to it objectively, and we can as surely infer from this Faustian urgency a metaphysical world, as *à priori* from the abnormally elongated insect proboscis a corresponding calyx in flowers.

But if the objective view may indeed conduct us to metaphysic and ethic, yet we reach the end more quickly by changing the point of philosophical

departure, and if, proceeding from man, we go on from him to the explanation of the world. According to our conception of man will the world then appear in a particular light; one conception of the world will result if we consider man only according to his sensuous nature, another if we preferably emphasise his mystical properties, as in this book. But that is only to pursue the task of which the foundation was laid by Kant. He has given us the perception, not again to be lost, that we must criticise reason, before we criticize the world. But if we proceed from man in order to explain the world, it must be the whole man; the deeper we explore him, the deeper also will seem to us the significance of the world; and if in somnambulism, as the fundamental form of all mysticism, we find a transcendental kernel of our being, then shall we penetrate also into the transcendental order of things.

If thus, supplementing the problem of external cognition, we apply diligently to self-cognition, this is the shortest way to revive our demand for metaphysics, without which no religion, no philosophy, no true art is thinkable.* And stronger than ever must this demand revive, if we will apply the

* ['Behind the reproach of atheism, in itself absurd, and for the most part malicious,' says Schopenhauer, 'there lies, as its inner meaning and truth, which gives it strength, the obscure conception of such an absolute system of physics without metaphysics. Certainly such a system would necessarily be destructive of ethics; and while Theism has falsely been held to be inseparable from morality, this is really true only of *metaphysics in general*, i.e., of the knowledge that the order of nature is not the only and absolute order of things. Therefore we may set up this as the necessary *Credo* of all just and good men: "I believe in metaphysics."']—'The World as Will and Idea,' vol. ii., p. 380 (Haldane and Kemp's translation).—Tr.]

safe methods of the sciences of cognition to self-cognition of the mystical kernel of our being, without thereupon losing sight of objective nature. But every generation which shall be at the same time just to both problems will have found the transition from mere civilisation to true culture, and will find itself in that disposition which the immortal Kant denoted when he said : ' Two things fill the mind with ever-new and increasing admiration and reverence, the oftener and the more persistently they are reflected on : the starry heaven above me, and the moral law within me. '*


* ' Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,' Beschluss.

THE END.

ERRATA.

Throughout: For the words 'somnambule,' or 'somnambules,'
read 'somnambulist,' or 'somnambulists.'


Vol. ii., p. 150, *note*, for 'dem' read 'der.'





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