

IQBAL AND THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHERS

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IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

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Dedication

To my son,
Dr. Shahzad Qaiser
who is committed to the
tradition of Philosophy

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PREFACE

Allama Muhammad Iqbal was a well-read person. He had not only acquired a wide and intimate knowledge of both Eastern and Western philosophies but had also developed a sympathetic appreciation of them all. This constituted, what we may call, after Whitehead, his 'climate of opinion' which, like the physical climate he was bound to recognize, breath in and assimilate: he could not simply do without it. Continuing this phrase, he had, so to speak, a local weather' too which was equally irresistible and essential. It stood for his personal point of view, the angle of vision with which he reacted to the 'climate' and in consequence put forth his own philosophical standpoint. This 'angle of vision', in the profoundest and the most basic sense, was provided to him by nothing but the Qur'anic teachings. On many occasions during his poetic and prose writings and in his speeches as well, he unequivocally affirmed his faith in, and a living assurance of, the inviolable veracity of these teachings.

Look at the force of his acclamation when, addressing the Holy Prophet (peace be on him), he says:

The present book on Iqbal and Western Philosophers is, as the title shows, a specialized and so an in-depth study. It comprises an elaboration and critical evaluation of the Western philosophical thought and an attempt to place it in the right place vis a vis the thought-system of Allama Iqbal Eastern philosophical thought, which is equally, if not more, important, is outside its prescribed universe of discourse. The author, Dr. Nazir Qaiser, is well-known as a versatile scholar and a prolific writer on Iqbal studies. He has already established his credentials, being the author of such learned books as and a number of research articles published in the national press and also in journals of international repute. He has an infatuation for Iqbal of which he makes no secret. But despite this he

would avoid all hyperbolic statements in regard to him and, instead, have a cool, unbiased, and straightforward approach to the understanding of various aspects of his thought. Further, he never confounds his readers by the use of difficult, intricate and imprecise language and invariably means what he says. Whatever he proposes to write on, he would first of all seriously plan it, taking cognizance of all its details, conceive in his mind the entire line of reasoning and only then start writing. And he does his job with immaculate care and meticulousness. His writings, in general, are well-documented and well-argued and the views expressed are properly escorted by a robust confidence and a sense of accountability. Dr. Nazir Qaiser has maintained all these traits of his scholarship in the present work also.

As regards the theme which is the subject-matter of the book some critics have subjacently given the impression that Iqbal was exclusively inspired by some thinkers in the West or even that he borrowed various concepts of his philosophical system from one of them or the other. For example, it is said that he took his concept of ego from Fichte, of the Perfect Man from Nietzsche, of evolution from Bergson and so on. This, absolutely speaking, is not correct. Nor, incidentally, would it be correct to say that the fabric of his views was entirely woven by Eastern ideas, for instance those of Rumi, Ibn Arabi, Al-Jili and others. Such impressions have been occasioned by the resemblances that some views of Iqbal do have with the view of these thinkers or even by the mutually identical terms and phrases used. The fallacy committed by these critics is technically known as *Non Causa Pro Causa* i.e. what is not the cause is erroneously taken to be the cause. The real state of affairs is that, having been originally inspired by the Qur'anic world-view, theory of knowledge and eschatology, Allama Iqbal had to express himself in the colloquial and terminology that could be understood and appreciated by the educated man of his day, specially those who had a background of Western and Eastern philosophies. This is the most obvious and patent fact that no one can deny. The critics, referred to above,

simply read into this obvious fact more than what it actually permits.

Dr. Nazir Qaiser's treatment of the subject duly grants to this fact the place that it deserves. In the case of every Western philosopher included in the book he first of all identifies various aspects of his philosophy and then in regard to every aspect points out where Iqbal agrees with him and where he differs. After this comparative study he formulates what he considers to be the actual position. The recurrent note in the entire book is that Allama Iqbal, as said above, received his inspiration primarily from the Qur'an and we can say, secondarily from some Muslim thinkers to the extent to which they were inspired by the Qur'an.

The writing of this book has put Dr. Nazir Qaiser under an obligation. The story of the elaboration of his basic thesis that 'Allama Iqbal was inspired neither by Western nor by Eastern philosophers but by the Qur'an is only partially told by him. In order to relate the whole story, he will have to write another book, on the same pattern, regarding Iqbal's affinities and differences with the relevant Eastern philosophers and still another one delineating the Qur'an source of his various philosophical views. If he does not have time to do all this, the beautiful, methodical way in which he has completed one third of the project will, I am sure easily provoke someone among the Iqbal scholars to do rest of the job. Requiring of course an Herculean effort, this work will be encyclopaedic in nature and will go a long way to place Iqbal's thought in the right perspective.

Dr. Abdul Khaliq

President

Pakistan Philosophical Congress.

FOREWORD

Allama Muhammad Iqbal Philosophised in the context of early twentieth century and he had studied Muslim and Indian philosophies beside the Western thought. Many writers and critics have tried to compare his thought with some of the prominent Western thinkers like Hegel, Nietzsche, Fichte, Schopenhauer in order to put Iqbal's thought in its true perspective, but a deeper study of their theses amply show that most of them had not studied the Western thinkers they were comparing Iqbal with, the result being that both the thought of these thinkers and that of Iqbal have been considerably distorted. I can quote instances where the critic has tried to understand those Western thinkers through the writings of Iqbal and they have only succeeded in projecting the impression that Iqbal has been doing nothing but plagiarizing them; this has been highly unjust to Iqbal. Taking one instance, Iqbal's "Merd-i-Momin" has usually been compared to Nietzsche's Superman, when the former says that he read Nietzsche about 20 years after he had formulated the idea of his "Merd-i-Momin". Such detrimental attempts have been made not only in this country, but in India and other countries also.

The present author has the distinction of undertaking the comparisons after studying thoroughly both Iqbal and the thinkers he is comparing Iqbal with. He has been a student of both English and Persian literature before he took to philosophy and finally opted to settle in it. Consequently, his comparisons with Western thinkers are much more true and faithful, and the reader will find that he has successfully absolved Iqbal of the charge of plagiarism. He has amply proved that Iqbal was more inspired by the teachings of the Qur'an and such Muslim thinkers as Rumi, Ibn Miskwaih, etc. who were themselves called the interpreters of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. He has succeeded in placing Iqbal through his true paces for which he deserves congratulations.

Dr. Mohammed Maruf,

July 2, 1999.

INTRODUCTION

There is a misunderstanding among certain erudite that Iqbal (1877-1938) raised the edifice of his thought on the foundations of Western philosophy. The Western philosophers like Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844-1900), William James (1842-1910), Henri Bergson (1859-1941), and John McTaggart (1866-1925), are referred to in this context. Some cursory readers go to the extent of regarding Iqbal's thought as an imitation of the above philosophers. Unfortunately, a few scholars of Iqbal have also stumbled on this false notion as they too consciously or unconsciously, partly or wholly, appear to endorse the same opinion. How far these critics are right? This is a fundamental question on which hinges the originality, creativeness and genuineness of Iqbal's thought. It has been a serious concern for me to divest Iqbal's thought from such faulty notions. The present book is neither an apology nor a defence but is an attempt to analyse Western sources of Iqbal's philosophy in order to place the works of Iqbal in their true perspective.

Iqbal is a unique thinker in the sense that he is well versed with the Islamic heritage of learning and the modern science and philosophy. He derives his originality of thought from Islam the fountainhead of Knowledge and presents a critique of modern thought. His basic frame of reference essentially is Islamic which helps him to bring out the strong and weak points of the thinkers he is dealing with. There is no denying the fact that one can discern some affinity on certain points in his thought and other philosophers but this affinity is more or less ephemeral and its cannot speak of their identity of thought. The differences in their approaches is so great that it is against the spirit of true scholarship to consider Iqbal as a

camp follower of any of those Western philosophers. Iqbal uses the modern terminology in English but he keeps the Arabic, Persian and Urdu terminology in tact which is spread out in his various works in different languages. Whenever he uses the philosophical terminology in English he is conscious of enshrining its real, true and full meaning impregnated in the Islamic concepts.

Iqbal himself keeps a critical and independent view on the development of human thought and wherever he finds a pearl of wisdom in any philosopher, he hastens not only to appreciate it but also to acknowledge it with an unflinching commitment to the principles of Islam. This is precisely the reason that he critically examines both Eastern and Western philosophers on different scores and only accepts those universal elements in human thought which are in consonance with the Islamic Spirit. To sum up: Iqbal's primary source and frame of reference is the Qur'an, Islamic tenets, the genuine concepts of Muslim thinkers and the thought of the higher Sufis especially Maulana Jala-ud-Din Rumi whom he regards as his 'Murshid' and his 'Mathnawi' as "The Qur'an in Persian".

Iqbal's concepts are qualitatively different from those of the Western philosophers. Let me take a few examples:

By ego, *Fichte* means pure ego that is un-derived and prior to objectification or assuming any specific or definable thing, substance, or process. It is the first principle of philosophy, the Science of Knowledge. It is unlimited activity - not even something, which acts. For him, ego is an abstract idea. He does not tell us as to what the individual ego itself is. Iqbal, on the contrary, says that the ego "develops on the basis of physical organism - that colony of sub-egos through which a profounder Ego constantly acts on me, and thus permits me to build up a systematic unity of experience." It is unity of mental states. "All life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life."

Schopenhauer says that the universe is through and through will. All spheres inorganic like stones and living beings like birds, animals and men are the manifestations of will. This all-pervading and universal will is manifested in ideas, which

assume objectification in individual objects. Thus an individual man is phenomenal presentation or a copy of the idea of man as species. But Iqbal does not consider man as the copy of eternal Ideas. He considers the human ego as 'Amr' of God. Next, Schopenhauer's will is purposeless, blind and impulsive, but Iqbal's human ego is purposive. Rather purpose is the core of life.

The fundamental principle of *Nietzsche's* philosophy is the will to power. In all creations, competitions, artistic creations the basic desire is to get greater power. "A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength- life itself is Will to Power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results thereof." On the contrary, Iqbal considers mere power as capricious phenomena. He believes in both *Jalal* (Divine Majesty) and *Jamal* (Divine Beauty). His concept of power is combined with elegance, tenderness and kindness. He says:

Vengeance and forgiveness, piety and power -

These are four things which make up a Muslim.

William James believes in indeterminism, which maintains that some volitional decisions are uncaused and unmotivated. Indeterminism is the other extreme of thoroughgoing determinism, which pronounces human freedom ineligible. But Iqbal approves neither thorough-going determinism nor indeterminism. He believes in self-determinism- a middle way between the two extremes.

Bergson takes *Elan Vital* as the only reality. It is identical with Duration - a continuous time. Thus, self does not occupy the primary position. In other words, to *Bergson* duration is prior to the self. Selfhood is not an end in itself. But Iqbal considers self as prior to time. Also, there is no concept of time without ego. It is ego, alone which can apprehend its activity in time. Iqbal says "The form of existence is an effect of the self."

McTaggart believes in Absolute, which is society of individuals. He does not believe in God of religion. Therefore he is rightly considered as an atheist. On the other hand, Iqbal takes God as ultimate Reality who is Ego or Personality,

Omnipotent, Omniscient and Infinite. He has definite relationship with the society of selves, but he is not the society of selves Himself. God is both Immanent and Transcendent.

Taking examples of affinity, Fichte believes in Ethical Monism that pleads the combating of obstacles, which are the natural result of man's vocation to act and to fulfil his obligation. Non-ego is necessary material for the finite ego's fulfillment of moral vocation; 'it is the sensible material for the performance of our duty'. Iqbal also says that the finite ego cannot develop without obstacles or checks, created by non-ego or the external world. He says, "The Ego attains to freedom by the removal of all obstructions in its way." About the universe he says, "Its shifting actualities force our being into fresh formation. The Intellectual effort to overcome the obstruction offered by it besides enriching and amplifying our life, sharpens our insight,...." But Iqbal's source of this idea is not Fichte. It is the Qur'an. He repeatedly refers to the Qur'an, which reveals:

And for trial will we test you with evil and with good. (Sura 21-36)

Schopenhauer believes in the objectification of the will. For him body is an objectified will and visible expression of our desires. He says, "The parts of the body must... completely correspond to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself; they must be the visible expressions of these desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire; the grasping hand, the hurrying feet, correspond to the more indirect desires of the will which they express." Iqbal also believes it. He says:

What is the source of our wakeful eye?
Our delight in seeing hath taken visible shape.
The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait,
The nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing.

But this lesson is taken from Rumi, who centuries before Schopenhauer, said:

Wine in ferment is a beggar suing for our fermenting;
 Heaven in revolution is a beggar suing for our consciousness;
 Wine became intoxicated with us, not we with it;
 The body came into being from us, not we from it.

Again, that need is the force behind objectified self is expressed by Rumi thus:

Because without need the Almighty God does not give any thing to any one,
 Need, then, is the noose for (all) things that exist:
 Man has instruments in proportion to his need.
 God has not put eyes in the mole, because it does not need eyes for (getting) food.

Nietzsche, undoubtedly, is a dynamic philosopher. He condemns the idea of segregation from society. He criticises Christian monks, who lead a segregated life. But Nietzsche is not the forerunner of this view. The Prophet of Islam had said:

There is no monasticism in Islam. You are enjoined JIHAD (holy war) and that is the monasticism of my UMMA PEOPLE.

William James has vehemently discussed the characteristics of religious experience such as immediacy, intimate association with Reality, and incommunicability. There is a semblance of both these views but Iqbal learnt the basic lesson from the Islamic tradition and was not a camp follower of *William James*. *William James* says that the quality of mystic experience “must be directly experienced...” But in sufi literature it is common to come across such views. It is called as “Shahud (consciousness, the quality of witnessing), and “Kashf” (The raising of curtain or veil). Again, to Al-Ghazali (1058/59-111), it is “like an immediate perception, as if one touched its object with one’s hand.”

Bergson believes two aspects of the self, which he calls social and fundamental. The time of the social self, according to *Bergson*, is serial time, and the time of the fundamental self is pure time, which he calls ‘Duree’. Iqbal endorses *Bergson*. But this is what Rumi has already said:

Thought is of the past and future; when it is emancipated from these two, the difficulty is solved.

Again:

When for a while I had taken part with that elect company in contemplation (of God) and had been separated from myself.

At that very hour my spirit was freed from hours (of Time); (I say 'freed') because hours make the young old.

Again, regarding serial time Iqbal says, "The Ash'arite theory of time is perhaps the first attempt in the history of Muslim thought to understand it philosophically. Time, according to the Ash'arite, is a succession of individual 'nows'."

McTaggart, says that the universe is a concrete fact and not an illusion or something subjective. Iqbal endorses *McTaggart's* view. But this is what the Qur'an said several centuries before *McTaggart*. In the light of the Qur'anic teachings, Iqbal says, that the universe "is a reality to be reckoned with." Here Iqbal quotes the Qur'an 'Verily in the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding; who,... say "Oh, our Lord! Thou has not created this in vain."

Iqbal pointedly says in *Armghan-i-Hijaz*:

I tasted the wine from the Western tavern;
I swear on my soul I purchased a headache;
I sat in the company of the virtuous men of Europe,
I found no other day without burning more than that.

The affinity between Iqbal and Western thinkers speaks more of the impact of Islam on Western philosophy than vice versa. Wherever any Western thinker succeeds in catching a glimpse of truth, he consciously or unconsciously has to testify the truth of Islamic vision. Bertrand Russell in a different context spells out the idea in these words:

Our use of the phrase the "Dark Ages" to cover the period from 600 to 1000 marks our undue concentration on Western Europe. From India to Spain the brilliant civilization of Islam flourished. What was lost to Christendom at this time was not lost to civilisation but quite the contrary.

Iqbal himself contends that "European culture on its intellectual side is only a further development of some of the

most important phases of the culture of Islam. While writing to Abdullah Chughtai, Iqbal suggests "If you meet a young scholar in Paris please persuade him to compare Descartes's famous book "Methods" with Ghazali's *Ihaya-ul-Ulum*: and to show European scholars how far Descartes is indebted to the Muslim Scholars." Iqbal maintains further that Dante's book "The Divine Comedy owes so much to Ibnul Arabi's thought which was generally known in Europe, and the leading scholars and thinkers were on the whole acquainted with the main trends of Islamic thought." Iqbal further says, "It was Jahiz (d. 255 A.H.) who first hinted at the changes in animal life caused by migrations and environment generally.... Ibn-i-Maskwaih (d. 421 A.H.),... was the first Muslim thinker to give a clear and in many respects thoroughly modern theory of the origin of man." Iqbal refers to Briffault who says: "The debt of our science to that of the Arabs does not consist in startling discoveries of revolutionary theories; science owes a great deal more to Arab culture. It owes its existence." Besides, on the side of mathematics Tusi and Al-Beruni are the torch bearers to European Mathematical thought.

In the end, it seems worth while to answer a pertinent question: Why some critics have been misled into considering these Western philosophers as anticipators of Iqbal's thought? There are, perhaps, two main reasons for this misconception:

- (1) These critics themselves have neither sufficient knowledge of the Qur'an and Islamic tenets nor of Muslim thought and sufi concepts. Tara Chand Rastogi, a writer of India, who is the author of "*Western Influence on Iqbal*" can be quoted as one of the examples. This, however, is not restricted to non-Muslims only. Even a group of the Muslim critics does not take into account Iqbal's Islamic frame of reference. Again, probably they have not thoroughly studied Rumi's thought. An in-depth study of Rumi's thought can dispel all false impressions pertaining to Iqbal's thought vis a vis the West.

(2) Iqbal's own discussion and appreciation of certain views of the above Western philosophers have not been understood in their true context by the critics of Iqbal. Iqbal has discussed and appreciated some of the views expressed by the Western thinkers only to show that they have also caught some glimpses of the ancient Truth as imbibed in the Islamic Tradition. It does not mean that he abandoned his original frame of reference and started imitating the Westerners.

In reply to criticism levelled on his *Asrar-i-Khudi* by some superficial critics, Iqbal himself cleared his position in his famous letter addressed to Dr. R.A. Nicholson. He said:

In my notes which now form part of your introduction of *Asrar-i-Khudi*, I deliberately explained my position in reference to Western thinkers, as I thought this would facilitate the understanding of my views in England. I could have easily explained myself in the light of the Qur'an and Muslim Sufis and thinkers, e.g., Ibne-Arabi and Iraqi (Pantheism), Wahid Mahmud (Reality as a Plurality), Al-Jili (the idea of the Perfect Man) and Mujaddid Sarhindi (the human person in relation to the Divine Person). As a matter of fact, I did so to explain myself in my Hindustani introduction to the first edition of the *Asrar*.

I claim that the philosophy of the *Asrar* is a direct development out of the experience and speculation of old Muslim Sufis and thinkers. Even *Bergson's* idea of time is not quite foreign to our Sufis. The Qur'an is certainly not a book of metaphysics, but it takes a definite view of life and destiny of man, which must eventually rest on propositions of metaphysical import.... It is unfortunate that the history of Muslim thought is so little known in the West. I wish I had time to write an extensive book on the subject to show to the Western students of philosophy how philosophic thinking makes the whole world kin.

This reply is not merely restricted to *Asrar-i-Khudi*; it is applicable to whole of Iqbal's thought.

Undoubtedly, no thinker can develop his thought in isolation from the intellectual climate in which he is placed. He has to use the terminology of the times in order to be

communicable and understandable. In the ultimate analysis, one has to see the frame of reference of a thinker. If his frame of reference is original then that thinker is creative, great and precious. Iqbal never betrayed his original frame of reference and it was the Qur'an, which gave him the fundamental lessons of metaphysics, religion and philosophy.

The fact, however, is that Iqbal occupies a distinctive position among the philosophers of the world. Tremendous work on his thought and poetry is being done in many parts of the world. It is time for us to recognise the philosopher, in his true perspective, who is rightly regarded as "touched by Gabriel's Wing" and whose concepts bear "universal appeal". His message has, undoubtedly, potentials to make us a great nation. We should remove all misconceptions about his thought and give him due place as an original thinker.

Dr. Nazir Qaiser

FICHTE AND IQBAL

I. The EGO

1. The Absolute Ego and the Non-Ego

Johann Gottlieb Fichte used the term 'ego' or 'self', which has deluded some erudite into taking Iqbal as the follower of Fichte. Fichte is actually a highly ambiguous philosopher both in form and in content. He has often used the word 'ego' with small 'e' for both the absolute ego and the finite ego, combined with his perplexed style. This is mainly the cause of confusion and misunderstanding. In his own time, he was compelled to say, "People have generally understood the theory of science as attributing to the individual effects which could certainly not be ascribed to it, such as the production of the whole material world... . they have been completely mistaken: It is not the individual but the one immediate spiritual Life which is the creator of all phenomena, including phenomenal individuals."1

DIFFERENCE

FICHTE

i. The Absolute Ego

The ego i.e. the absolute ego is Fichte's basic concept. What is this absolute ego? Fichte is an Idealist. To him, "the pre-eminent truth of idealism is that it begins with the ideal activity itself. As Goethe's Faust expressed it, "In the beginning was the Act."2 Thus the ego is unlimited activity - not even something that acts. "It is intended to express that Act which does not and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but

rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible.”³ It is free but unconscious ego.

Fichte says that the ego is *the pure ego*: it is un-derived and is prior to objectification or assuming specific or definable thing, substance, or process. He further says, “Our task is to discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge. This can be neither proved nor defined, if it is to be an absolutely primary principle.”⁴

The ego is universal life. “We cannot think of individual selves without ascribing to them all the same reason, the same universal processes of thought.... It is a reality, above all persons, over individual; it is the universal active reason, the same in all persons....”⁵

The ego is purposive. It is potentially and morally active; self-realization is its purpose. “We cannot conceive of the universal life process or pure activity purposeless; it would be meaningless if it were not dedicated to an ethical goal.”⁶

It is what it is. It posits itself, which means that the ego posits its own existence. “This is a sort of metaphysical version of the logical law of identity: ‘A is A.’”⁷ The reality and basically existent ego is the ego in its self-affirming activity. “The absolute self of the first principle is not *something* (it has, and can have, no predicate); it is simply *what* it is, and this can be explained no further.”⁸ It is immediately and absolutely posited. It “exists because it *posits itself*, and *posits itself* because it *exists*. Hence *self-positing* and existence are one and the same.”⁹ It is the source of all reality. In the words of Fichte: “the ego posits itself”. He calls it the first principle of his philosophy.

ii. The Non-Ego

The absolute ego evokes and sets within itself a field of the non-ego to act. Unless and until there is the non-ego, which puts hindrance to unlimited activity, the infinite ego will not become conscious. “The absolute and infinite activity evokes and sets for itself a field in which it is to act.”¹⁰

It is important to note that this non-ego is objectivity in general rather than a definite object or set of finite objects. As such non-ego is unlimited. The second principle of Fichte's philosophy is that "the ego posits a non-ego."¹¹

IQBAL

Fichte's philosophy of absolute ego is quite different from that of *Iqbal's*. Iqbal absolute ego is God of religion. He does not believe in the ultimate ego apart from God. But Fichte's absolute ego is unconscious activity or pure ego, and not God. Copleston rightly maintains that in this period, "...while Fichte is primarily engaged in transforming the system of Kant into idealism and in deducing experience from the transcendental ego, it would hardly occur to him to describe the ego as God. For, as the very use of the word 'ego' shows, the notion of the pure, transcendental or absolute ego is so entangled, as it were, with human consciousness that such a description necessarily appears as extremely inappropriate.

"Further, the term 'God' signified for Fichte a personal self-conscious Being. But the absolute ego is not a self-conscious being. The activity, which grounds consciousness and is a striving towards self-consciousness, cannot itself be conscious. The absolute ego, therefore, cannot be identified with God. What is more, we cannot even think the idea of God."¹²

It may be true that Fichte, in his later philosophy believes in God, which may be a further development of his concept of absolute ego. But that too, is diametrically different from Iqbal's concept of God. Even God's attributes are different from the above-cited traits of Fichte's ultimate ego.

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

The question arises that even if we take absolute ego as God, the Creator, who posited non-ego for becoming conscious, Fichte cannot be regarded as the originator of this idea. According to a Hadith in Islam, dating many centuries before Fichte, God says:

I was a hidden treasure, I wanted to be recognised. Hence I created the world.¹³

Various Muslim writers have often quoted this Hadith.

II. THE FINITE EGO AND THE NON-EGO

For *Fichte*, there is further differentiation within the ego and the non-ego.

According to him the infinite ego and the non-ego cannot remain unlimited. If both the absolute ego and the non-ego “are unlimited, each will tend, as it were, to fill all reality to the exclusion of the other. They will tend to cancel one another out, to annihilate one another. And consciousness will be rendered impossible. Hence, if consciousness is to arise, there must be reciprocal limitation of ego and non-ego. Each must cancel the other out, but only in part. In this sense both ego and non-ego must be divisible.”¹⁴ As regards the infinite ego it has already limited itself by setting or positing the non-ego a range for its activity. Thus there is further differentiation within both the ego and the non-ego.

There can be no consciousness unless the absolute ego and the non-ego are further differentiated and the absolute ego does not produce within itself the finite ego and the finite non-ego, reciprocally limiting and determining one another.

Fichte explains as to how the infinite ego differentiates itself into the countless individual selves by drawing the analogy of light. “As light is broken by an obstacle and reflected or turned back to its source, so the universal activity must be reflected, or turned back upon itself, by some obstacle. There could be no consciousness, no self-consciousness, no self-determining thought, no knowledge, unless the infinite activity met with some check: it can become conscious of itself only in finite form, in an ego limited by opposition to other finite egos. And since universal life is infinite, it cannot exhaust itself in finite form but must go on, infinitely, producing egos, and become conscious of itself in this process of separation or individuation.”¹⁵

Fichte calls it the third principle of his philosophy i.e. “The Ego posits a limited ego in opposition to a limited non-ego.”¹⁶

Let us now take into account the finite ego and the finite non-ego.

1. The Finite Ego (Man)

DIFFERENCE

FICHTE

i. The Finite ego is a means to moral self-realization

The absolute ego is an unlimited activity, which strives towards consciousness through moral self-realization. It is potentially, morally active ego. But as said before the absolute ego becomes conscious only in finite form. To elaborate “self-consciousness, in *Fichte’s* view, must take the form of finite self-consciousness, and the infinite will’s self-realization can take place only through the self-realization of finite Wills.”¹⁷ The importance of a multiplicity of finite selves or rational and free beings cannot be ignored. The finite ego becomes self-conscious by overpowering the finite non-ego, which offers to serve the cause of the absolute ego.

Fichte says that the absolute ego is present in the individual ego as pure impulse. The absolute ego commands the self to overcome the opposition of (the finite) non-ego enabling man to act for realizing the purpose of the absolute ego.¹⁸ “We can accomplish what our nature urges, or impels us to do.”¹⁹ In this regard Fichte is highly influenced by Kant. “Fichte based his entire philosophical theory upon Kant’s idea of a moral nature in man which has the right to make certain definite demands. Starting with the moral nature of man, he built a philosophy which would satisfy the demands of this nature.”²⁰

ii. Moral act brings synthesis

A moral act brings synthesis. We have seen that ‘oppositing’ of the first and second principles have created “opposition-in-relation of the knower and the known” It offers the subject-object dualism between the finite ego and the finite non-ego caused due to the resistance of the latter in

the activity of the former. Then, how to weld this subject-object dualism? Can cognition help? No. It is only a moral act, which can achieve synthesis. The “cognition cannot weld this cleavage of subject-object and achieve a meaningful unity. The object is also a resistant— only in moral activity can we see the way to a true synthesis. A moral act spans the subject-object dualism. The endeavour to achieve justice is an objective event; it is a striving to overcome that to which we object, namely, injustice; and in its active expression it is the subject’s self-revelation and self affirmation.”²¹

iii. Good and Bad

The ego, as we have discussed, achieves self-realization through moral self-realization of the finite wills. Hence the importance of the moral vocation of the finite selves cannot be underestimated.

Man’s vocation is, therefore, to perform his duty, consciously and voluntarily, for achieving highest good.²² “I do not understand my complete vocation; what I ought to be and what I shall be transcends all my thinking. I know for certain at every moment of my life what I ought to do in it: I ought to develop my intelligence and acquire knowledge in order to extend the sphere of my duty. I ought to regard body soul and myself merely as a means to the end of duty.”²³ The aim should be universal and not for one’s own selfish motive. Man has to “turn his gaze toward the universal moral end.” Fichte says that conscience does not err.²⁴ So man should choose vocation according to the dictates of his conscience.²⁵ Man has to respect the rights of other persons. He says, “Limit your freedom through the concept of the freedom of all other persons with whom you come into relation.”²⁶

Now, what is evil? According to Fichte the laxity of moral will is evil. This laxity gives birth to cowardice and falsehood. “Evil essentially consists in the laxity or disloyalty of the moral will. Any placidity or routine self-contented stagnation is a denial of our moral career. Any easygoing or cowardly compromise with our bounden duty is a betrayal of our quest.

These two evils are in corrupt kinship: laxity and laziness lead to cowardice, and from these two basic vices issues the third, falseness. Fichte's ethics made no concession to the least departure from unqualified veracity."²⁷

In connection with his theory of good and evil, following Kant, Fichte gives a moral condition: "Act always according to your best conviction of your duty or act according to your conscience."²⁸ That is good which fulfils this formal condition and that is bad which does contrary to it.

IQBAL

But *Iqbal's* concepts are much different from the above. In the first place, the pivotal point of Iqbal's philosophy is human ego whereas Fichte's is the ultimate ego. Iqbal pointedly says, "To my mind, this inexplicable finite center of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe."²⁹ In other words, whereas Fichte starts from ultimate ego, which becomes conscious through the non-ego, Iqbal starts from individual ego to reach God i.e. from within to outward. He says:

Life seeks to manifest itself, to gain
 External evidence to prove its worth.
 When this assembly was arrayed by God
 Existence found a witness for itself.
 Art thou alive or dead or dying fast?
 Three witnesses should testify thy state.
 The first as witness is the consciousness
 Of self, to see thyself by thy own light.
 The second is another's consciousness
 That thou may'st kindle thus to see thyself.
 And thy third witness is God's consciousness,
 A light in which thou may'st see thyself.³⁰

Secondly, Iqbal comprehensively discusses the 'what' of the ego whereas Fichte does not tell us as to what the individual ego itself is. He simply talks of the functional aspect of the ego. For Iqbal, there are two aspects of the self-efficient and appreciative. The efficient is concerned with phenomena and serial time while the latter is tied with

internal life or experience and Duration. Iqbal says "The ego reveals itself as unity of what we call mental states."³¹ And the unity of directive purpose holds together the self. He says, "My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, and held together by the unity to a directive purpose. My whole reality lies in my directive attitude."³²

Iqbal throws sufficient light on the ego's emergence within the spatio-temporal order. The appreciative self develops on the basis of physical organism. He quotes the Qur'an:

Now of fine clay have we created man: There we placed him, a moist germ, in a safe abode; then made We the moist germ a clot of blood: then made the clotted blood into a piece of flesh; then made the piece of flesh into bones: and we clothed the bones with flesh; *then brought forth man* of yet another make.

Blessed. Therefore, the God--the most excellent of makers (23:12-14)³³

Though man is 'of yet another make' he "develops on the basis of physical organism — that colony of sub-egos through which a profounder Ego constantly acts on me, and thus permits me to build up a systematic unity of experience."³⁴

Iqbal states that the ego emerges out of the sub-egos when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of coordination.³⁵ That the higher ego emerges out of the lower egos is not unworthy for the former. "It is not the origin of a thing that matters, it is the capacity, the significance, and the final reach of the emergent that matters. Even if we regard that basis of soul-life as purely physical, it by no means follows that the emergent can be resolved into what has conditioned its birth and growth.... Indeed the evolution of life shows that though in the beginning the mental is dominated by the physical, the mental, as it grows in power, tends to dominate the physical and may eventually rise to a position of complete independence. Nor is there such a thing as a purely physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality, elementally incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind, and needing a transcendental

deity to impregnate it with the sentient and the mental. The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge is immanent in nature, and is described by the Qur'an as 'the First and the Last, the visible and the invisible.'³⁶

Thirdly, even the function of Fichte's ego is too limited as compared with Iqbal's ego. Iqbal considers human ego as not morally active only, as Fichte believes it so. To him, its role is much more important and vital. Not only man shapes his own destiny but also the destiny of the universe. Through intuition and mystic experience man brings spiritual order and not only moral order in the world. Iqbal lays great stress on the development of the ego. The developed ego earns status of ruling the material and spiritual world. The ego is developed through Ishq, intellect, action, and Faqr, but if not cared for it is disintegrated. Imitation, slavery, fear, disappointment, segregation from community is the factors leading to its disintegration. Iqbal's criterion of good and evil is respectively connected with development and disintegration of ego. Iqbal says "That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad."³⁷

Iqbal states that the perfect man is that who is "the completest Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body..."³⁸ "The object of Faqr is the purity of the heart and the vision."³⁹ Spiritually, he has direct contact with God. In the words ³⁹of Iqbal:

The perfection of life consists in seeing the Essence,
The way of achieving it is to free oneself from the limits of time
and space.
You should enjoy privacy with the Divine person in such a way.
That He sees you and you see Him.

... ..

He who 'saw' is the leader of the world.

We and you are imperfect; he alone is perfect.⁴⁰

And how this perfection is achieved? According to Iqbal it is by absorbing the Attributes of God. Man achieves the

moral and religious ideal “by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique. The prophet said, ‘*Takballaḡu bi-akḡlaḡ Allah*,’ ‘Create in yourselves the attributes of God.’ Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique Individual.”⁴¹

Such views are alien to Fichte’s philosophy of the human self.

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

i. Individuality of man

Fichte’s concept of individuality of man is very close to Iqbal’s concept. According to Fichte, every individual ego is to realize the purpose of the infinite ego that is moral order. To him, every individual performs his duty to contribute to this order. “Each individual has come into the world with a unique *Vocation* which only he can perform. He should feel his responsibility and respect his own moral worth and dignity.... Most individuals are slothful, unawake to their full responsibilities and opportunities.”⁴² Fichte, therefore, emphatically asserts ‘Always fulfil your moral vocation.’⁴³ But here too the Qur’an inspires Iqbal. The Qur’an says, “No burdened soul shall bear another’s burden. Man hath only that for which he laboureth; his labour shall be seen and afterwards he shall be most fully rewarded.”⁴⁴ Iqbal holds, “The Qur’an in its simple forceful manner emphasizes the individuality and uniqueness of man, and has, I think, a definite view of his destiny as a unity of life. It is in consequence of this view of man as unique individuality which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another, and entitles him only to what is due to his own personal effort....”⁴⁵

ii. Freedom of will

The principle of freedom is central to Fichte’s philosophy. To him, man is a determining free agent. Otherwise man’s moral nature will not be able to achieve moral purpose.

Fichte says “man is fundamentally a free agent, not a mere link in a predetermined chain of material events. Self-determining activity is the supreme characteristic of man. Fichte sought to prove this thesis by a method similar to that of Kant. He argued that, although theoretical reason cannot prove the primacy of freedom, we must accept such a principle as ultimate because only by so doing can we satisfy the demands of our moral nature, give to life value and meaning.”⁴⁶

Now a subtle question arises as to how human ego is free agent when he is merely an instrument for realization of the purpose of the Absolute ego? “Fichte’s answer was to the effect that we can decide whether we will be blind tools of this absolute ego or will be conscious, willing instruments of its purpose. In making this choice we as individuals are free. But, having made the choice, we are no longer free. My freedom lies, then, in my choice as to whether I will willingly or unwillingly serve the Absolute ego. It is freedom of choice.⁴⁷ However, when we once decide to perform our duty and to realize the universal purpose we make ourselves the instruments of the absolute and determine our moral life.

Iqbal also states that “... goodness is not a matter of compulsion; it is the self’s free surrender to the moral ideal and arises out of a willing co-operation of free egos. A being whose movements are wholly determined like a machine cannot produce goodness. Freedom is thus a condition of goodness.”⁴⁸

The Qur’an alludes to the freedom of human will. According to the Qur’an:

Verily never will God change the condition of the people until they change it themselves (with their own souls)(xiii,II)⁴⁹

If ye did well, ye did well for yourselves; if ye did evil, (ye did it) against yourselves.(xvii7)⁵⁰

Iqbal is a staunch believer of the Qur’an and says, “Islam recognizes a very important fact of human psychology, i.e. the rise and fall of the power to act freely, and is anxious to retain the power to act freely as a constant and undiminished

factor in the life of the ego. The timing of the daily prayer, which according to the Qur'an restores 'self possession' to the ego by bringing it into closer touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanizing effects of sleep and business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom."⁵¹

The Qur'an believes in the free choice of man. Iqbal alludes to the Qur'an. "Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice; and that is why, according to the Qura'nic narration, Adam's first transgression was forgiven."⁵²

iii. Unity of thought and being, subject and object.

Both Fichte and Iqbal believe in the unity of thought and being and subject and object. To them subject and object are distinguished in consciousness; but are not separable. These are ultimately one. Fichte says "In vain shall we look for a link of connection between subject and object, if they are not the first and simply apprehended as a unity... The Ego is not to be regarded as subject merely, but at once as subject and object."⁵³ The third Principle stands for synthesis of dualism of subject and object within the Ego.

Rejecting the ontological and the teleological arguments to prove the existence of God, Iqbal says that we fail because we bifurcate idea and being and subject and object. Iqbal maintains "It is possible...to take thought not as a principle which organizes and integrates its material from the outside, but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end...Every act of human knowledge bifurcates what might in proper enquiry turn out to be a unity into a self that knows and confronting 'other' that is known."⁵⁴

But Fichte is not the originator of this idea. Several centuries before Fichte, Rumi, the illustrious guide of Iqbal, said:

The cause of narrowness is composition (compoundness) and number (plurality): the senses are moving towards composition. Know that the world of Unification lies beyond sense: if you want Unity, march in that direction.

The (Divine) command kun (Be) was single act, and the (two letters) N and K occurred (only) in speech, while (inward) meaning was pure (uncompounded).⁵⁵

Both Rumi and Iqbal appear to be influenced by the Qur'an which Iqbal himself pointedly refers to in support of his above argument. He says, "This is possible only if we carefully examine and interpret experience, following the clue furnished by the Qur'an which regards experience within and without as symbolic of reality described by it, as 'the First and the Last, the visible and the invisible.'"⁵⁶

2. The Finite Non-Ego (The Sensible World)

DIFFERENCE

FICHTE

Sensible world is only for moral purposes.

We have seen that according to Fichte, the fundamental reality is the absolute ego (universal activity), which posits the non-ego. And the non-ego is objectivity in general, and unlimited. It is further differentiated into the finite ego and the finite non-ego---man and sensible world. "This ego, this universal activity, express itself in man and in nature. The tree, the table, the beast, and man are all expressions of this fundamental principle. Man is the highest expression of the creative ego..."⁵⁷

As already discussed, the non-ego exists for moral purposes. It is a field of the finite ego for action to perform duties and realize vocation. It is the material for the fulfillment of man's duty. In ethical language, it gives content to pure ought.

The finite non-ego like the finite ego is instrument to help, realize moral purpose of the absolute ego. It serves as a field

of action to the finite ego. The purpose of the finite ego and the sensible world is the same. The latter too “is a means of realizing the ego. It is the same absolute ego that expresses itself in man and nature, in the individual self and in the non-self. Events in the world of nature and acts of individual selves are the visible expressions of the ultimate moral purpose; we can understand them only as such; they have no reality except as instrumentality’s of the moral purpose of the universe.”⁵⁸

Fichte’s view leaves much to be desired. “Fichte seemed to over-emphasize the ego and to minimize the reality of the outer world, which after all has some claim to reality on its own account. It was hard to believe that every thing in nature exists merely in order that men may do their duty.”⁵⁹

IQBAL

On the contrary, Iqbal considers the function of the sensible world as not limited to moral purposes only. The external world is conducive to moral as well as material and spiritual development. Not only this, unlike Fichte to whom non-ego is only to serve as a field for action, Iqbal commits non-ego is also liable to be improved upon by man. Iqbal says, “It is the lot of man to share in the deeper aspirations of the universe around him and to shape his own destiny as well as that of the universe... .”⁶⁰ By his inventions and discoveries, man has made commendable improvements on the universe. Such views are alien to Fichte.

Iqbal states that Islam stresses the importance of external world for the entire development of human ego. He says, “Islam, recognizing the contact of the ideal with the real, says ‘yes’ to the world of matter and points the way to master it with a view to discover basis for a realistic regulation of life.”⁶¹

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

i. Objective Universe

Fichte, being an objective idealist, believes in the reality of objective universe. The external world is not an illusion;

without it one cannot fulfil one's moral vocation.⁶² Iqbal also considers the universe as a reality and not an illusion. Iqbal like Fichte does not deny the existence of an extra-mental world.

But this is one of the basic Qur'anic concepts about the universe, which Iqbal fervently quotes:

We have not created the Heavens and the earth and whatever is between them in sport: We have not created them but for a serious end: but the greater part of them understand it not. (44:38)⁶³

Iqbal says that the universe "is a reality to be reckoned with."⁶⁴ It is not at all illusion. Iqbal again quotes the Qur'an:

Verily in the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding; who, standing and sitting and reclining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and say: "Oh, our lord! Thou hast not created this in vain."⁶⁵

ii. Ethical monism

Undoubtedly, there is another striking affinity between Fichte's and Iqbal's thought. Fichte believes in Ethical Monism, which pleads the combating of obstacles, which are the natural result of man's vocation to act and to fulfil his obligation. It is why to Fichte non-ego is necessary material for the finite ego's fulfillment of moral vocation; it is 'the sensible material for the performance of our duty.' "The moral law implies freedom, freedom implies overcoming of obstacles and this implies a sensible world."⁶⁶ Iqbal also states that the finite ego cannot develop without obstacles or checks, created by non-ego or the external world. He says, "The ego attains to freedom by the removal of all obstructions in its way."⁶⁷

He further says in beautiful verses:

He that hath a sound heart
will prove his strength by great enterprises.

The potentialities of men of action
Are displayed in willing acceptance of what
is difficult.⁶⁸

But Iqbal's source is not Fichte. He alludes to the Qur'an, which says about the universe, "Its shifting actualities force our being into fresh formations. The intellectual effort to overcome the obstruction offered by it besides enriching and amplifying our life, sharpens our insight..."⁶⁹

The Qur'an lays much stress upon the importance of action and overcoming the hardships. Iqbal repeatedly refers to the Qur'an, which reveals:

And for trial will we test you with evil and with good.
(Sura 21-36)⁷⁰

III. THE ULTIMATE REALITY

Main Characteristics

DIFFERENCE

FICHTE

The primary interest of *Fichte*, as we have seen earlier, has been evoking consciousness of and achieving moral goal for the absolute ego. He was primarily concerned with ego-philosophy. God of traditional theism occupied no place in his idealism, because to him Christian God was a personal God, and personality according to him made God finite and a material substance. He considered God as active moral order a "supersensible moral world order, which fulfils itself in and through man."⁷¹ For him "Every belief in a divine being which contains more than this concept of the moral order is to that extent imagination and superstition."⁷²

But when he was accused due to the above views by the theists, (as decidedly these were contrary to the traditional Christian thought.) he went beyond ego-philosophy and started giving moral order an ontological status. He called it the eternal and "infinite Will." or "infinite dynamic reason"⁷³ which was Life or Being to him. According to him "Being and Life are one and the same."⁷⁴ It is not divisible. This infinite Will is behind appearance. It "is the one true Being behind the sphere of presentation, creating and sustaining it through finite selves which themselves exist only as

manifestations of the infinite Will.”⁷⁵ It externalizes itself in the life of human race through time. Thus, this divine Idea is “the ultimate and absolute foundation of all appearance.”⁷⁶ This external manifestation gives rise to distinction of division because consciousness keeps in its wake the subject-object relation. “In consciousness the divine Life is inevitably transformed into an abiding world.”⁷⁷ In other words, “Being is objectified for consciousness in the form of the world.”⁷⁸ The human mind cannot know this externalization. The human mind “can at least know that the world of consciousness is the image or schema of the Absolute.”⁷⁹

It is, however, reversal of Fichte’s first position upheld in his philosophy of knowledge. Previously an activity was immanent in consciousness and pure ego was not behind it. Now absolute Being is prior to consciousness. And “Knowledge is certainly not merely knowledge of itself... it is knowledge of a Being, namely of the one Being which truly is, God.”⁸⁰ To him now “all knowledge presupposes.... its own being.”⁸¹

With the development of philosophy of Being Fichte’s stress is shifted from moral activity to love of God and fulfillment of God’s will. Now moral activity is love of God.⁸² He says, “We exist only in and through God, infinite Life and the feeling of this union is essential to the religious or blessed life.”⁸³ However, he remains far from traditional concept of God. Truly, “... if a writer who admires Fichte for his use of the transcendental method of reflection or for his ethical idealism proceeds to interpret his later philosophy as clear statement of theism, he is going beyond the historical evidence.”⁸⁴

Undoubtedly, here moral atmosphere still prevails. “If it is asked in what this true life precisely consists, Fichte’s reply is still given primarily in terms of morality. That is to say, true life consists primarily in man’s fulfilling his moral vocation, by which he is liberated from the servitude of the sensible world and in which strives after the attainment of ideal ends.”⁸⁵ Thus he did not break with idealism. Copleston rightly says, “In any case we may well feel that though in

recent times there has been a tendency to emphasize Fichte's later thought, his impressive vision of reality is his system of ethical idealism rather than his obscure utterances about absolute Being and the divine *Dasein*."⁸⁶

Now a pertinent question arises: was Fichte's philosophy of God as Being, in his later thought, the development of his philosophy of ego? It divides the critics in two camps - for and against. Without entering into this controversy, as it does not concern our theses, let us pass on to Fichte's belief of God as (i) Impersonal, (ii) Infinite, and (iii) Absolute.

i. Fichte does not grant personality to God, because to him personality is finite, as said before, and limited and thus cannot be applied to God. He is eternal and infinite Will or dynamic Reason; but not personal.

It may be noted that in religion God is believed as personal God in the sense that he responds to the calls of the individual ego. Personal God cannot be abstraction or idea because, as Webb holds, "only so far as PERSONAL RELATIONS are allowed to exist between worshipper and his God, can that God be properly described as personal..."⁸⁷ Rightly, according to Professor Farmer, it is "one of the prerequisites of true religions."⁸⁸

ii. Fichte considers God as infinite. He takes a common sense view of Being's infinity. Being's infinity is spatial and temporal which speaks for extensiveness.

iii. Fichte's view of Being is pantheistic according to which God is everything and everything is God. The concept of infinity of God leads him to regard God as absolute. God's infinitude encompasses everything and thus nothing is apart from God. Hence the absoluteness of the sole Being is guaranteed. We have seen that for Fichte Being and life are one; God externalizes itself; divine life, is inevitably transformed itself into an abiding world; and the world of consciousness is that image or schema of the Absolute. Further, he says that "only one Being exists purely through itself, God...And neither within him nor

outside him can a new Being arise.”⁸⁹ Even the schema or picture of God is ‘God’s Being outside his Being.’⁹⁰

IQBAL

As compared with the above, *Iqbal’s* concept of God appears diametrically different from that of Fichte.

Firstly, Iqbal’s God is not simply a moral order. He is a spiritual Reality with numerous Attributes. God is not an abstraction. He believes in personal God. He is concrete personal Reality with personal attributes. Iqbal regards “the Ultimate Reality to be a rationally directed life which, in view of our experience of life, cannot be conceived except as an organic whole....”⁹¹ God responds to our calls and prayers. In support of his statement he quotes the Qur’an:

And when my servants ask thee concerning Me,
then I am nigh unto them and answer the
cry of him that crieth unto Me. (2: 182)⁹²

With the denial of personal God, Fichte has closed the door of prayer, which is immensely important for Iqbal. According to Iqbal prayer is the agency through which one achieves the association of God.⁹³ The mind, “in the act of prayer.... rises higher than thought to capture Reality itself with a view to become a conscious participator in its life.”⁹⁴ Again, towards the development of human personality prayer plays a tremendous role. To him, by prayer “the little island of our personality suddenly discovers its situation in a larger whole of life.”⁹⁵

Iqbal says that it is due to God’s personality that man develops his ego by absorbing His Attributes. “The greater his distance from God, the less his individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person.”⁹⁶

Secondly, Iqbal’s God is not Infinite in the spatial sense, as Fichte holds. Iqbal says that God’s infinity is intensive and not extensive. He says that “In matters of spiritual valuation mere immensity counts for nothing.”⁹⁷ Again, he says, “the Ultimate Ego is, therefore, neither infinite in the sense of spatial infinity nor finite in the sense of the space-bound

human ego whose body closes him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of his creative activity of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series.⁹⁸

Thirdly, Iqbal is not pantheist. God is "a unique Other Self" with whom "the mystic state is a moment of intimate association." Replying to the question as to how God is experienced as an Independent Other Self, Iqbal refers to the analogy of our daily social experience. He says, "We possess no sense for the experience of other minds. The only ground of my knowledge of a conscious being before me is the physical movements similar to my own from which I infer the presence of another conscious being."⁹⁹ According to Iqbal, there is tangible relationship of God with man and the universe. He pointedly alludes to the Qur'an: "The main purpose of the Qur'an is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his manifold relations with God and the universe."¹⁰⁰

Iqbal considers as God both immanent and transcendent. He is neither the one nor the other alone.

He beautifully sums up the transcendence and immanence of God in *Asrar-i-Khudi*. He says to God:

O Thou that art as the soul in the body of the universe
Thou art our soul and thou art ever fleeing from us.¹⁰¹

How God is both immanent and transcendent? God is Immanent in the sense that He is the ideal of human ego and is present in it as a possibility. Again, he is Immanent because man and the universe are not 'other to him'. "He is Creator from within".¹⁰² God is transcendent also because man develops his self by assimilating the attributes of God. The question of assimilation would not have arisen if God were not transcendent and were only Immanent. Not only this man can retain his personality even in the presence of God. Iqbal says in Javid Nama:

That man alone is real who dares-
Dares to see God face to face

No one can stand unshaken in His presence.
And he who can, verily, he is pure gold'.¹⁰³

But still he is neither immanent nor transcendent in the absolute sense of the word. Absolute immanence will mean pantheism through and through while transcendence will reveal God as sitting on throne in the Heavens far away from man. Iqbal ironically tells the believers of such God:

O pious man! you have made God sit on 'Arsh', but
what is that God who shuns the company of men.¹⁰⁴

Iqbal believes in Individual God. He does not believe in universal life, which leads to pantheistic interpretation. He says, "All life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life. God Himself is an individual: He is the most unique individual."¹⁰⁵

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SCHOPENHAUER AND IQBAL

I. THE WILL

Both Schopenhauer and Iqbal are voluntarists. Will to Schopenhauer and ego to Iqbal are the ultimate constituents of reality. It may be noted that in modern terminology will is “a term denoting the activity or motor tendencies of the organism. In a more restricted and personal sense, *Will* refers to a person’s ability to perform voluntary acts.... The Will is the person expressing himself in action.”¹ Probably this is why some observers consider Iqbal as the follower of Schopenhauer with regard to the former’s concept of ‘Human Ego’. But this is not the fact. If we minutely study Iqbal’s thought, its sources and the nature of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, we will immediately discover the unsoundness of such opinions. Actually, there is a great difference between Schopenhauer’s concept of human will and Iqbal’s view of human ego.

The Human Will

DIFFERENCE:
SCHOPENHAUER

Fundamental Principle

For Schopenhauer, whose whole system is founded on two basic principles — Will and Idea, the will is Will to live.² It is thing-in-itself. It is noumena which transcends the world of phenomena. It is neither space-and-time-bound nor subject to the law of causation. It is beyond one’s perception. Schopenhauer says, “Thing-in-itself signifies that which exists independently of our perception, in short that which properly

is. For Democritus this was formed matter. It was the same at bottom for Locke. For Kant it was = X. For me it is Will.”³

Again, Schopenhauer says that the world, which is universe,⁴ is through and through Will.⁵ All spheres inorganic like stone⁶ and living beings like birds, animals and man⁷ are the manifestations of will. “By *Will*, Schopenhauer means to include not only consciously reasoned volition, but also all subconscious and unconscious inward impulses and desires, the whole striving and conative side of nature.”⁸ He says, “every definite and fixed grade of objectification of will is Idea.”⁹ How the Will works? According to Schopenhauer, this all pervading and universal will is manifested in ideas, which assume objectification in individual objects. Thus an individual man is phenomenal presentation or a copy of the idea of man as species, just in the sense of Plato’s Ideas. Schopenhauer explains it thus: “... these different grades of the objectification of will which are manifested in innumerable individuals, and exist as their unattained types or as the eternal forms of things, not entering themselves into times and space, which are the medium of individual things, but remaining fixed, subject to no change, always being, never becoming, while the particular things arise and pass away, always become and never are, - that these *grades of the objectification of will* are, I say, simply Plato’s Idea.”¹⁰

Thus in order of being first comes the universal will, then, the unchanging Ideas. Then the universal will individuates itself into the particular ideas of persons and things.

IQBAL

Iqbal, on the other hand, says that it is ego, and not will, which is the reality of being. Unlike Schopenhauer’s Will, the ego is a concrete reality. *Iqbal* says, “The ego reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states do not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another. They exist as phases of a complex whole, called mind.”¹¹

Unlike Schopenhauer, *Iqbal* as discussed in previous chapter, does not believe in universal ego. *Iqbal* believes in

individuality and uniqueness of each human ego. He says that the “important characteristic of the unity of the ego is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of every ego. In order to reach a certain conclusion all the premises of a syllogism must be believed in by one and the same mind. If I believe in the proposition ‘all men are mortal’, and another mind believes in the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’, no inference is possible. It is possible only if both the propositions are believed in by me.”¹² He further says, “My recognition of a place or person means reference to my past experience, and not the past experience of another ego. It is this unique inter-relation of our mutual states that we express by the world ‘I’”¹³

Again, for Iqbal man is not the copy of eternal Ideas as Plato believed. The human ego is ‘Amr’ of God.¹⁴

SCHOPENHAUER

Salient Features

Schopenhauer considers will as purposeless, blind and impulsive. He says, “The will, which, considered purely in itself, is without knowledge, and is merely a blind incessant impulse...”¹⁵ The human will, which is the mirror of the Will,¹⁶ is blind and purposeless. It has rightly been said about Schopenhauer’s will that “it moves without cause, has no goal; it is desire itself, striving, yearning, wanting without rhyme or reason.”¹⁷ Also, it is not free; it is determined. He says that “every man is to be regarded as specially determined and characterised phenomenon of will...”¹⁸ Besides, the human will is mortal. “Before us there is indeed only nothingness.”¹⁹ Death means total extinction.

To elaborate, the universal Will is free and immortal, but the individuals in whom the former is individuated or differentiated are neither free nor immortal. As compared with universal will whom there is nothing to determine, the individuals are secondary, derivative, and determined. There is no personal immortality. “This basal will... manifests itself in eternal, immutable types, which Plato calls Ideas. The

different organic species, for example, are eternal immutable types. The species do not change; the individuals belonging to the species grow and die, but the will-type or the species endures. These types form an ascending scale, a graduated series or hierarchy, rising from the lowest stages of matter to man. Individuals may come and individuals may go, but will goes on forever. Hence, the fundamental part of us, the will, is immortal; the particular, individual form in which it expresses itself is mortal.”²⁰

IQBAL

But *Iqbal* considers the human ego as purposive. Rather purpose is the core of life. He says, “Life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious.”²¹ Alluding to the Qura’nic verse quoted above, Iqbal says, “The verse.... means that the essential nature of the soul is directive, as it proceeds from the directive energy of God;..”²² Further, Iqbal is a great champion of freedom of ego. He argues, “Man’s first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice; and that is why, according to the Qur’anic narration, Adam’s first transgression was forgiven.”²³ Also, to Iqbal immortality is earned only through action and deeds. He says: “Immortal life for us lies in constant travelling.”²⁴

SCHOPENHAUER

Relationship with the Ultimate Reality

Schopenhauer thinks that the individual ego has no concern with the Ultimate Will, the thing-in-itself. He says “the will itself, as thing-in-itself, is by no means included in that multiplicity and change. The diversity of the (Platonic) Idea, i.e. grades of objectification, the multitude of individuals in which each of these expresses itself, the struggle of forms for matter - all this does not concern it, but is only the manner of its objectification, and only through this has an indirect relation to

it, by virtue of which it belongs to the expression of the nature of will for the idea.”²⁵

IQBAL

Iqbal's human ego on the contrary is very much concerned, and that too directly, with the Ultimate Ego (God or Reality). Human ego is dependent on God, Who is the source of all guidance, inspiration, betterment, and achievements of the ego. The development of the ego is not possible without God. He says: “Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine Life.”²⁶

SCHOPENHAUER

Values

Schopenhauer speculates that the will to live is constant war and strife, which generate pain, life weariness and suffering. He says, “the basis of all willing is need, deficiency, and thus pain. Consequently, the nature of brutes and man is subject to pain originally and through its very being.”²⁷

Schopenhauer concludes thus: “The more intense the will is, the more glaring is the conflict of its manifestation, and thus the greater is the suffering.”²⁸ According to Schopenhauer, therefore, will is the root of all-evil. To him, true solution lies in the negation of will, without which deliverance from life and suffering is not possible.²⁹ He says that “with the free denial, the surrender of the will, all...phenomena are...abolished; that constant strain and effort without end and without rest at all the grades of objectivity, in which and through which the world consists; the multifarious forms succeeding each other in gradation; the whole manifestation of the will; and, finally, also the universal forms of this manifestation, time and space, and also its last fundamental form, subject and object; all are abolished. No will, no idea, no world.”³⁰

Schopenhauer recommends two ways of escape from the slavery of the Will. First is ‘Aesthetic contemplation’. He thinks that poetry, art and music give escape from pangs and

sufferings of the Will. When man “gives up the four-fold principle of sufficient reason as a way of knowing things and assumes the aesthetic mode of contemplation, he derives a peculiar pleasure from that mode in varying degrees depending upon the aesthetic object...This is the state of pure contemplation that the great Greek philosophers spoke of.³¹ But for Schopenhauer it is a temporary escape. The second way is permanent. It is the way of asceticism, celibacy, self-mortification, fasting etc. Schopenhauer thinks that asceticism, as “as an end in itself, is meant to serve as a constant mortification of will, so that the satisfaction of the wishes, the sweet of life, shall not again arouse the will, against which self-knowledge has conceived a horror.”³² Again, through fasting and self-afflicted torture one “may more and more break down and destroy the will, which he recognises and abhors as the source of his own suffering existence and that of the world.”³³

Also, through sympathy one can permanently escape the slavery of the will and negate the will to live and principle of individuation. “This conception of sympathy, that is to say, to share the sufferings of others, forms for Schopenhauer the foundation of morality. And the feeling of sympathy is not to be confined to human beings alone but must embrace all living creatures. Thus, the metaphysical pessimism furnishes the basis of Schopenhauer’s ethics. If man recognises in all human beings his own ego and in the sufferings of others his own sufferings, he would shudder to enjoy life. And when all turns against itself, the attachment of the individual to physical life becomes weaker, he becomes enlightened, and denies life.”³⁴

Schopenhauer, however, does not appreciate committing suicide. “Suicide would, however, not help, because death touches only the body, the appearance of will and not the will itself.”³⁵

From the above it is obvious that pessimism pervades Schopenhauer’s thought through and through. Some thinkers rightly regard him as a “European Buddhist”.³⁶ William Kiley

Wright says, "The pessimism in Schopenhauer may be claimed to be based on a false analysis of desire...The joy in life is something positive; struggle itself is welcome if it is reasonably often successful and leads to further growth. Schopenhauer is right that nothing desired will permanently satisfy anybody. The remedy, however, is not to cease endeavors, but ever to seek new ends which previous attainments have brought within one's horizon."³⁷ Again, Will Durant pointedly comments, "It never occurred to Schopenhauer that it was better to have fought and lost than never have fought at all... Everywhere he saw strife; he could not see behind the strife, the friendly aid of neighbours, the rollicking joy of children and young men, the dances of vivacious girls, the willing sacrifices of parents and lovers, the patient bounty of the soil, and the renaissance of spring."³⁸

IQBAL

Unlike Schopenhauer, *Iqbal* is full of hope, determination and inspiration. Unlike Schopenhauer to whom the will is the root of all evil, Iqbal's ego is positive force behind life. He says:

The form of existence is an effect of the Self,
 Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the Self.
 When the Self awoke to consciousness,
 It revealed the universe of Thought."³⁹

Against Schopenhauer, therefore, Iqbal gives the lesson of self-realization and development of the self where action plays one of the dominant roles. He says that "if he (man) does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter."⁴⁰ He further says, "His (man's) career, no doubt, has a beginning, but he is destined, perhaps, to become a permanent element in the constitution of being... When attracted by the forces around him, man has the power to shape and direct them; when thwarted by them, he has the capacity to build a much vaster

world in the depths of his own inner being, wherein he discovers sources of infinite joy and inspiration. Hard his lot and frail his being, like a rose leaf, yet no form of reality is so powerful, so inspiring, and so beautiful as the spirit of man.”⁴¹

Iqbal believes in constant struggle. Even the destination does not satisfy him. He says:

Don't seek the end of the journey, for you have no end;
As soon as you search the end, you lose your soul.⁴²

In this respect, Iqbal loves tension and pain, which come in the process of self-realization. He says:

If even a jot is lessened from the tension of existence,
I will not buy eternal life at this cost.⁴³

It is logical consequence of the above that unlike Schopenhauer, who recommends aesthetic contemplation and self-mortification as escape from life, Iqbal advocates positive view of art, and preservation of ego.

Iqbal states that poetry, music and art are lifeless if they are not conducive to self-realization and cannot generate struggle and action. He says:

Nations do not revive without miracles
And art, which lacks the vigour of Moses's strike, is dead.⁴⁴

Iqbal does not believe in art for art's sake. Instead he believes art for the sake of life. He says, “That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion and ethics must be judged from the stand-point of personality.”⁴⁵

Iqbal considers asceticism, mortification and scourging also condemnable because they teach escapism. Fasting and other disciplines advocated in Islam are to purify and develop ego and not to weaken the spirit. In a beautiful verse he stresses on the preservation of ego. He says:

Never for an instant neglect self-preservation:
Be a diamond, not a dewdrop!⁴⁶

Iqbal's own criticism of Schopenhauer is note worthy. He regrets that “to the pessimist Schopenhauer the world is one perpetual winter wherein a blind will expresses itself in an

infinite variety of living things which bemoan their emergence for a moment and then disappear for ever.”⁴⁷ Again, in his poem “Schopenhauer and Nietzsche” Iqbal says about Schopenhauer:

A bird flew from his nest to the garden;
A thorn from a rose ran into his delicate body,
He spoke ill of the nature of the garden,
He bewailed about his own as well as of others' griefs,
Said he, “In this world whose foundation has been laid amiss,
There is no morning which is not followed by evening.”⁴⁸

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION:

i. Objectification of the Will/ Ego

However, there is some similarity between the ideas of the two philosophers. Schopenhauer believes in the objectification of the will. To him, body is an objectified will and visible expression of our desires. He says, “The parts of the body must... completely correspond to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself; they must be the visible expressions of these desires. Teeth, throat, and bowels are objectified hunger; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire, the grasping hand, the hurrying feet, correspond to the more indirect desires of the will which they express.”⁴⁹

Iqbal also says:

What is the source of our wakeful eye?
Our delight in seeing hath taken visible shape.
The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait,
The nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing.”⁵⁰

But this view is reminiscent of Rumi, who centuries before Schopenhauer, expressed nearly the same view in the following lines:

Wine in ferment is a beggar suing for our ferment:
Heaven in revolution is a beggar suing for our consciousness
Wine became intoxicated with us, not we with it:
the body came into being from us, not we from it.⁵¹

Again, Rumi expresses the force of need behind objectified self thus:

Because without need the Almighty God does
not give any thing to any one.
And if there had not been need of the heavenly spheres also,
He would not have created from non-existence the Seven Skies.
Need, then, is the noose for (all) things that exist:
Man has instruments in proportion to his need,
God has not put eyes in the mole, because it
does not need eyes for (getting) food.⁵²

ii. Inorganic matter possesses the Will / Ego

Further, there is another striking affinity between the views of Iqbal and Schopenhauer, For *Schopenhauer*, even an inorganic matter possesses will; and there are different degrees of will from inorganic to organic nature. Schopenhauer says, "I must recognise the inscrutable forces which manifest themselves in all natural bodies as identical in kind with that which in me is the will, and as differing from it only in degree."⁵³ Again, he says, "I... consider the inner being, which alone imparts meaning and validity to all real necessity (i.e. effect following upon a cause) as its presupposition. In the case of men this is called character; in the case of a stone it is called quality, but it is the same in both. When it is immediately known it is called will. In the stone it has the weakest, and in man the strongest degree of visibility, of objectivity."⁵⁴

Iqbal, too, does not believe in the inertness of matter. He agrees with modern relativity-physics according to which, "A piece of matter has become not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of inter-related events. The old solidity is gone, and with it the characteristics that to the materialist made matter seem more real than fleeting thoughts."⁵⁵ To him also there are degrees of ego. He says, "Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man."⁵⁶

However, it is not Schopenhauer's discovery, for Rumi had earlier stated that the ground of all being was spiritual. He was a spiritual monist. There was no inert matter according to him. He said:

Air and earth and water and fire are (His) slaves:
with you and me they are dead, but with God they are alive.⁵⁷

Again, as regards the degrees of the self, this concept is also Islamic. The Qur'an says: "And it is He Who hath made you His representatives on the Earth, and hath raised some of you above others by various grades, that He may prove you by His gifts. (6:165)"⁵⁸ According to the Hadith, "Men are mines like mines of gold and silver." i.e. they have different natures and capacities."⁵⁹

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AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

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NIETZSCHE AND IQBAL

I. THE WILL AND HUMAN VALUES

DIFFERENCE

1. The Ego

NIETZSCHE

Ego is fiction

For *Nietzsche*, the belief in the body is more fundamental. He says “The belief in the body is more fundamental than the belief in the soul: the latter arose from the unscientific observation of the agonies of the body. (Something, which leaves it. The belief in the *truth of dreams*.)”¹

Again, Nietzsche considers ego merely a fancy. He says, “The “subject” is nothing given, but something superimposed by fancy, something introduced behind. — Is it necessary to set an interpreter behind the interpretation already to hand? Even that would be fantasy, hypothesis.”² Nietzsche does not believe in the spiritual fact of the ego.

For this matter, Iqbal also refers to Nietzsche’s *Will to Power*, Vol 2 No.12-20.³ Iqbal says that Nietzsche has taken an intellectual view of the fact and followed Kant in this regard. “According to Nietzsche the ‘I’ is a fiction. It is true that looked at from a purely intellectual point of view this conclusion is inevitable. Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* ends in the conclusion that God, immortality and freedom are more fictions though useful for practical purposes. Nietzsche only follows Kant in this conclusion.”⁴

IQBAL

Iqbal considers the ego as a spiritual fact and not a fiction. *Iqbal* expresses that it is a fact in these beautiful verses:

If you say that the "I" is a mere illusion—
An appearance among other appearances—
Then tell me who is the subject of this illusion.
Look within and discover.⁵

Again, *Iqbal* understands it as a spiritual reality. He says that 'it proceeds from the directive energy of God'⁶. To him, "the Qur'an is clear on this directive function of the ego:

And they ask thee of the soul, Say: the soul proceedeth from my Lord's "Amr" (Command):
but of knowledge, only a little to you is given. (17:87)"⁷

Iqbal himself throws light upon his view of ego on which he bases his book, *Asrar-i-Khudi* (the secret of the Self). He says that "in its essence '*Asrar-i-Khudi*' and Nietzsche are diametrically opposed to each other. '*Asrar-i-Khudi*' wholly depends on the factum of "*hadi*" in which Nietzsche does not believe."⁸

2. Immortality

NIETZSCHE

Eternal Recurrence

Both *Nietzsche* and *Iqbal* believe in immortality of man. But their concepts are diametrically different. *Nietzsche* believes that there will be no soul after death. The soul will be dead even sooner than the body. He ruthlessly says to the believers of immortality, "Do you wish to be a perpetual burden on the shoulders of time."¹ *Iqbal* says, "he (*Nietzsche*) was led to say this because he had a wrong notion of time, and never tried to grapple with the ethical issue involved in the question of time."²

Nietzsche, however, believes in immortality, which is purely of materialistic nature. He considers immortality as eternal recurrence of energy centres. He believes in Eternal Recurrence, which means that no person is lost after death.

Not only man, every thing will recur again and again after some intervals of time. He bases his views on purely scientific hypothesis, according to which time is unending and material energy, being fixed, is never lost. He maintains:

Now do I die and disappear,' wouldst thou say,
and in a moment I am nothing. Souls are as mortal as bodies.
But the plexus of causes returneth in which I am inter twined -
it will again create me! I myself pertain to the causes of the
eternal return.

I come again with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with
this serpent - not to a new life, or a better life, or a similar life:
I come again eternally to this identical and selfsame life, in its
greatest and its smallest, to teach again the eternal return of all
things, -

To speak again the word of the great noontide of earth and
man, to announce again to man the Superman."³

Frank N. Magill has beautifully explained Nietzsche's view by quoting Nietzsche's famous lines: "Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being." Magill explains it thus: "Whatever is happening now will happen again and has happened before. The great things of the world recur, but so do the small. The recurrence of the small things, of the men farthest removed from the overman, seems at first impossible for Zarathustra to accept. That the return is exactly the same - not that the best returns, not that the part returns, not that all except the worst returns, but that *all*, best and worst, return - is difficult for him to acknowledge. But at last he is willing to abandon the doctrine of progress for the truth of eternal recurrence."⁴

It is a terrible concept of immortality. It is probably due to Nietzsche's interpretation of modern physical science. But it has no authentic sanction behind it because "even if there were only a very few things in a finite space in an infinite time, they need never repeat the same configuration. Imagine three wheels of equal size, rotating on a single axis, one point marked on the circumference of each and the three points lined up in one straight line. If the second wheel rotated twice as fast as the first and if the speed of the third was 1/w of the

speed of the first, the initial line-up could never recur. In his books Nietzsche attempted no scientific proof of this doctrine but stressed its potential ethical impact and, even more, the experience of believing it - the horror that will be felt as long as one's life is all-too human and the joy that can be felt by the exceptional person."⁵

Iqbal's own comments on this idea of eternal recurrence are very pertinent. Iqbal says, "His (Nietzsche's) enthusiasm for the future of man ended in the doctrine of eternal recurrence - perhaps the most hopeless idea of immortality ever formed by man. This eternal repetition is not eternal 'becoming'; it is the same old idea of 'being' masquerading as 'becoming'."⁶

Further, he says, "Such, is Nietzsche's Eternal Recurrence. It is only a more rigid kind of mechanism, based not on an ascertained fact but only on a working hypothesis of science. Nor does Nietzsche seriously grapple with the question of time. He takes it objectively and regards it merely as an infinite series of events returning to itself over and over again. Now time, regarded as perpetual circular movement, makes immortality absolutely intolerable. Nietzsche himself feels this, and describes his doctrine, not as one of immortality but rather as a view of life, which would make immortality endurable. And what makes immortality bearable, according to Nietzsche? It is the expectation that a recurrence of the combination of energy centres which constitutes my personal existence is a necessary factor in the birth of that ideal combination which he calls 'superman'.⁷

IQBAL

Iqbal's idea of immortality is qualitatively different from that of Nietzsche. Unlike Nietzsche Iqbal's view of immortality is of highest aspiration. He says "I look upon immortality as the highest aspiration of man on which he should focus all his energies, and consequently, I recognise the need of all forms of activity, including conflict, which tend to make the human person more and more stable."⁸

Iqbal believes in *individual immortality*. "It is highly improbable that a being whose evolution has taken millions of years should be thrown away as a thing of no use."⁹ He quotes the Qur'an, "The Qur'an argues the phenomenon of re-emergence of the ego on the analogy of his first emergence:

Man saith: "What! After I am dead, shall I in the end be brought forth alive?" *Doth not man bear in mind that We made him at first when he was nought?* (19:67-8)¹⁰

However, Iqbal says that the re-emergence of man will not involve his physical body on the day of Resurrection. To him, resurrection is not an external event. He regards it as "the consummation of a life process within the ego".¹¹ Iqbal refers to the Qur'an: "What when dead and turned to dust, shall we rise again?

Remote is such a return. *Now know we what the Earth consumeth of them and with us is a book in which account is kept.* (50:3,4)¹²

Iqbal's concept of individual immortality is based on the Qur'anic verdict. The Qur'an says:

Verily there is none in the Heavens and in the Earth but shall approach the God of Mercy as a servant. He hath taken note of them and remembered them with exact numbering: *and each of them shall come to Him on the day of Resurrection as a single individual;* (19:95,96)¹³

Next, Iqbal believes in the *progressive immortality* of the self, which recognises "the ego's past achievements and his future possibilities."¹⁴ Iqbal consider it as "A colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of coordination. It is the world reaching the point of self-guidance wherein the ultimate Reality, perhaps, reveals its secret, and furnished a clue to its ultimate nature".¹⁵ Alluding to the Qur'an, Iqbal says: "Thus in his inmost being man, as conceived by the Qur'an, is a creative activity, an ascending spirit who, in his onward march, rises from one state of being to another."¹⁶

Further, Iqbal is a great upholder of *conditioned immortality*. To him, immortality is not man's right; he is only a candidate

for it. It is only the fully developed self, which earns immortality. In a beautiful Persian verse he says:

Why fear that death which comes from without?

For when the 'I' ripens into a self it has no danger of dissolution.¹⁷

Again, he says, "Even the scene of 'Universal Destruction' immediately preceding the Day of Judgement cannot affect the perfect calm of a full-grown ego".¹⁸

But how is this immortality earned, or, in other words, which self is fully realized and developed to win immortality? Iqbal says, "Life offers a scope for ego-activity, and death is the first test of the synthetic activity of the ego. There are no pleasure-giving and pain-giving acts; there are only ego-sustaining and ego-dissolving acts. It is the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution, or disciplines him for a future career.... Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it."¹⁹ To him, lack of tension or state of relaxation is ego-dissolving act. He pointedly says, "That which tends to maintain the state of tension tends to make us immortal".²⁰ Death in such case, therefore, is passage from one state to the other. He says, "... death, if present action has sufficiently fortified the ego against the shock that physical dissolution brings, is only a kind of passage to what the Qur'an describes as "Barzakh".²¹

Iqbal's own 'Notes on Nietzsche' throw further light on the matter of earned immortality. He says, "The question which ought to be raised in my opinion is whether this weak, created and dependent Ego or 'I' can be made to survive the shock of death and thus become a permanent element in the constitution of universe. The answer that *Asrar-i-Khudi* tries to give to this question, of course in a poetical way and not in a philosophical manner, is this that the human ego can be made permanent by adopting a certain mode of life and thereby bringing it into contact with the ultimate source of life. The various stages of its growth are mentioned in the *Asrar-i-Khudi*."²²

3. The Will to Power

Nietzsche

i. Will to power-a primitive force behind all motives

The fundamental principle of *Nietzsche's* philosophy is the will to power. Behind all the motives and actions of human life is to collect greater power. Will to power is primitive force out of which all other motives have been derived. In one word, for Nietzsche will to live is will to power. In all creations, competitions, artistic creations the basic desire is to get greater power. "A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength - life itself is *Will to Power*; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results* thereof."¹

Again, Nietzsche's will to power yields all the values. "All valuations are only the results of, and the narrow points of view in *sering*, *this* one will: valuing in itself is nothing save this, --*will to power*."² Further, "The will to *accumulate force* is confined to the phenomenon of life, to nourishment, to procreation, to inheritance, to society, states, customs, authority. Should we not be allowed to assume that this will is the motive power also of chemistry? - and of the cosmic order?"³ Nietzsche believes that the will of every centre of power is to become stronger. He says, "Not only conservation of energy, but the minimum amount of waste; so that the only reality is this: the *will of every centre of power to become stronger* - not self-preservation, but the desire to appropriate, to become master, to become more, to become stronger."⁴ Again, to Nietzsche, "The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power."⁵

ii. War carries a great value

Nietzsche thinks that in this connection, war carries a great value. He recommends wars and condemns peace, in order to attain power.

Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars-
and the short peace more than the long.⁶

Again

Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause.⁷

War and courage have done more great things than charity. Not your sympathy, but your bravery hath hither to save the victims.⁸

It is, therefore, in alignment of his philosophy if Zarathustra, Nietzsche's mouthpiece, selects the symbols of eagle and serpent. For Nietzsche the eagle is a symbol of pride and the serpent is a symbol of wisdom.⁹

This concept of power and war is, undoubtedly a capricious and cruel idea. "One must wonder where were Nietzsche's eyes when all Europe was forgetting, in a slough of selfish wars, those cultural habits and acquisitions which he admired so much, and which depend so preciously on cooperation and social amenity and self-restraint."¹⁰ Again, "Whether there actually has been a generation of the European peoples during modern times is doubtful; the implications of biology certainly do not indicate the desirability of wars in which the flower of youth is destroyed."¹¹

IQBAL

Iqbal also vehemently champions the cause of strength and power. But it is much different from Nietzsche's view of power. His concept of power is not devoid of moral values. He believes in both *Jalal* (Divine Majesty) and *Jamal* (Divine Beauty). His concept of power is combined with elegance, tenderness and kindness. He says about the man of power:

He is the dewdrop, which cools the liver of the Poppy flower; and he is that storm which makes the hearts of rivers shiver.¹²

Again, he says:

Vengeance and forgiveness, piety and power -

These are four things which make up a Muslim.¹³

Iqbal believes in waging war but not in the sense of Nietzsche's views which champion war only to get power and strength. *Iqbal's* concept is based upon the Islamic concept of *Jihad*, which is to wage war only against the evil. *Iqbal* calls "War as the asceticism of faith"¹⁴ which refers to a saying of the Holy Prophet: "Jihad (lit: striving, includes the idea of fighting in a noble cause) is the asceticism of Islam."¹⁵

It is pertinent to mention that when Iqbal was criticised by *Dickinson*, for his philosophy of '*Be Hard*', which appeared similar to that of Nietzsche's thought, Iqbal pointedly cleared his own position. He said, "According to my belief, reality is a collection of individualities tending to become a harmonious whole through conflict which must inevitably to mutual adjustment. This conflict is a necessity in the interests of the evolution of higher forms of life, and of personal immortality.... I recognise the need of all forms of activity, including conflict, which tend to make the human person more and more stable. And for the same consideration, I condemn speculative mysticism and inactive quietism. My interest in conflict is mainly ethical and not political whereas Nietzsche's was probably only political."¹⁶

Iqbal condemns Nietzsche for his lopsided view of power. Iqbal calls him: A mad man who went to a glass factory.¹⁷

4. Morality

Nietzsche

i. Power is good weakness is bad.

Nietzsche holds that it is good which is powerful and that is bad which is devoid of power. He says that in real life it is only a question of strong and weak wills. "All that proceeds from power is good, all that springs from weakness is bad."¹

Like religion, morality and reason have no place in Nietzsche's theory. He says that:

Philosophy, religion and morality are symptoms of decadence."²

Again, "Reason, to be sure, is an instrument of the will to power."³ Nietzsche's notion of morality is the outcome of, and closely connected with, his philosophy of power. "Against this passion for power, reason and morality are helpless; they are but weapons in its hands, dupes of its game."⁴ To Nietzsche the men of higher ranks are above the codes of morality. These codes are actually for the weak and down trodden.

Nietzsche, therefore, emphasizes the need of transvaluation of all values prevalent in traditional codes of morality. He recommends adopting the old values of nobility and aristocracy to whom, "goods" meant persons like themselves, splendid "blond beasts," rich and mighty lords, rulers, owners. Such were brave, outspoken, truthful, pure-minded, unwilling to mate with the lower classes. For the masters, "bad" meant the folk whom the nobles had conquered, the dark-complexioned, ill-favoured, stupid, servile, cowardly, lying treacherous people fit only to be slaves and engage in economic labour to support the masters in their free lives of adventure and culture. For the slaves on the other hand, "good" meant to be like themselves - poor, impotent, needy, suffering, sick, ugly, meek, lowly and simple-minded; while "evil" meant to be like a noble man, - wicked, cruel, lustful, domineering, powerful.⁵

ii. Evil is necessary

Evil, because of being conducive to power, is appreciated by Nietzsche. Evil with all its kinds is not only allowed but is necessary for the strong. 'Greed, envy, even hatred, are indispensable items in the process of struggle, selection and survival. Evil is to good as variation to heredity, as innovation and experiment to custom; there is no development without an almost criminal violation of precedents and "order". If evil were not good it would have disappeared. We must beware of being too good; 'man must become better and more evil.'⁶ Thus there is no wonder if, instead of the acknowledged code of morality, voluptuousness, passion for power, and selfishness are virtues to him: He says:

Voluptuousness, passion for power, and selfishness: these three things have hitherto been best cursed, and have been in worst and falsest repute - these three things will I weigh humanly well.⁷

Again, Nietzsche argues that the vice or evil which is commonly considered as such is not so in reality. 'What are often considered evils turn out on close examination by Nietzsche to be goods. Sex, which is cursed by 'all hair-

shirted despisers of the body', is a virtue for the free and innocent. Lust to rule, which destroys civilizations, is a fit activity for the over man. Selfishness, a vice only of masters as seen by their slaves, is a necessary virtue of great bodies, and great souls. The first - commandment is to love your-self; the great law is "*do not spare your neighbour!* Man is something that must be overcome."⁸

iii. Master and slave morality

On the basis of such views Nietzsche puts forward his theory of 'master morality' and 'slave morality'. He says that the master morality belongs to the strong men, whom he gives the right of becoming the ruling class. They are above traditional morality; and build their own system of morality. He says that "when it is the rulers who determine the conception "good" it is the exalted, proud disposition which is regarded as the distinguishing feature, and that which determines the order of rank. The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this exalted, proud disposition displays itself: he despises them."⁹ The aristocrat looks down upon the common people. For him, 'it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are untruthful. "We truthful ones" - the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves.¹⁰ The aristocrats are the creators of values.¹¹ Slave morality, on the contrary, generates humility, pity, helplessness, and altruism, which is begging for help. It is love for security, peace, and cunningness; and leads to secret revenge. It has no place for strength, bravery, and warlike attitude, and love for danger. He says, "Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis "good" and "evil":- power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being despised. According to slave-morality, therefore, the "evil" man arouses fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely the "good" man who arouses

fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being.”¹²

This kind of morality, sympathy, kindness and humility are regarded as virtues. He says that “according to the servile mode of thought, the good man must in any case be the *safe* man: he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a little stupid, *unbonhomme*.”¹³ It is also called herd morality because it keeps the needs of a herd in view. Behind slave-morality too there is love for power. The slaves revolt and want to curb the power of the masters. Their resentment against the authority of the masters is because of their desire to get power themselves.¹⁴

For Nietzsche, another fundamental *difference* between master morality and slave morality is: “The desire for *freedom*, the instinct for happiness and the refinements of the feeling of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals and morality, as artifice and enthusiasm in reverence and devotion are the regular symptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and estimating.”¹⁵

Nietzsche’s whole theory of master and slave morality may be summed up in Harold Titus’s words thus: “Real progress will come, according to Nietzsche, not by raising the weak and emancipating the masses, but through the cultivation of a superior race of men. The superman must rise above the masses, not sympathize with them. Gradations of rank and not equality and equal rights are among the decrees of nature. The inferior groups may continue to retain their illusions; they are needed as a foundation on which the superior man can build. The masses may continue to follow their slave-morality. However, the superior man, in whom the will to power has come to fruition in courage, beauty, and culture, may “reject the categorical imperative” and live beyond good and evil.”¹⁶

IQBAL

Unlike Nietzsche, for whom the criterion of good and bad is power and weakness respectively, for *Iqbal* the criterion is integration and disintegration of personality. The factors,

which integrate personality, are good, and which disintegrate it is bad.¹⁷ For Iqbal an integrated personality is not devoid of *Jamal* as said above. Evil being conducive to cruelty is condemned by Iqbal.

Undoubtedly, Iqbal too believes in master and slave morality, but it is from different angle. Unlike Nietzsche, who bases his concept largely on biological difference in men Iqbal bases it on personal failures and achievements. Their values are measured with the yardstick of their deeds. Unless they prove otherwise they are equally precious. Luce Claude Maitre rightly says, "Nietzsche teaches that there are two races of men, the masters and the slaves. In the eyes of Iqbal, all human beings are equally precious."¹⁸

5. Aristocracy

NIETZSCHE

i. Elevation of superior man

Nietzsche believes in Aristocracy, which is a class of superior men possessing power and strength. Biologically, they are born as such. Nietzsche recognizes dignity only to them. He asserts, "Not mankind, but superman is the goal."¹ He believes that, "the goal of human effort should be not the elevation of all but the development of finer and stronger individuals."²

ii. No respect for common man

According to him, common people, women folk and state or society at large dwindle into insignificance as compared with Aristocrats. To Nietzsche there is no respectable place for common beings, which are 'herds' or 'corpses' according to him. He says through Zarathustra, the mouthpiece of his thought:

Fellow-creators, Zarathustra seeketh; fellow reapers and fellow-rejoicers, Zarathustra seeketh:

What hath he to do with herds and herdsmen and corpses.³

These concepts of Nietzsche are unacceptable to civilized and cultured societies. Countless philosophers have bitterly criticised Nietzsche for such inhuman concept. Bertrand

Russell regrets, that according to Nietzsche “the happiness of common people is no part of the good *per se*. All that is good or bad in itself exists only in the superior few; what happens to the rest is of no account.”⁴

William Kelley Wright says that it is not true that a strong man will always produce strong individuals as Nietzsche claims in case of Aristocrats. Wright says that “many thoughtful minds believe that the population is too often reproduced by the less fit elements in the stock. It is to be hoped that an accurate science of eugenics will sometime develop that will be able to determine who should and who should not be sterilized or practice birth control. No very reliable scientific information is available on the subject now.”⁵

Will Durant refutes Nietzsche’s thesis thus: ‘It is common delusion that the great periods of culture have been ages of hereditary aristocracy: on the contrary, the efflorescent periods of Pericles and the Medici and Elizabeth and Romantic age were nourished with the wealth of arising bourgeoisie; and the creative work in literature and art was done not by aristocratic families but by the off spring of the middle class; — by such men as Socrates, who was the son of a midwife, and Voltaire, who was the son of an attorney, and Shakespeare, who was the son of a butcher..... And so in politics: it would be suicidal to exclude from statesmanship such genius as lacked aristocratic pedigree; the better formula, surely is a “career upon to talent” wherever born; and genius has a way of getting born in the most outlandish places.’⁶

Iqbal is critical of Nietzsche on this account. He says, “Nietzsche, ... abhors this ‘rule of the herd’ and hopeless of the plebeian, he bases all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an Aristocracy of Superman. But is the plebeian so absolutely hopeless? The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of extension of economic opportunity; it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of

the plebeian material Islam have formed men of the noblest type of life and power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche.”⁷

iii. His hatred toward women

Next, Nietzsche equally looks down women folk, acknowledged weaker sex. He openly expresses his hatred against them. He says:

Give me, woman, thy little truth!’ said I

And thus spake the old woman:

Thou goest to woman? Do not forget thy whip!⁸

Nietzsche regards woman merely a means for recreation.

He says:

‘Man shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior: all else is folly.’⁹

Again, he gives expression to this contemptuous attitude when he says, “We take pleasure in woman as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate and more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet creatures who have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their minds! ‘They have always been the delight of every tense and profound male soul.’”¹⁰

Nietzsche, therefore, adds “Woman has so much cause for shame: in woman there is so much pedantry, superficiality, schoolmasterliness, petty presumption, unbridledness and indiscretion concealed — study only woman’s behaviour towards children! — which has really been best restrained and dominated hitherto by the *fear* of man.”¹¹

Not only this, Nietzsche does not believe in chastity of woman. He says:

Is chastity not folly? But the folly came unto us, and not we unto it.¹²

They are only to give birth to children and are only source of recreation for the warriors and aristocrats. “What is great is the passion of love between men and women, for all creation is the result of passion. The solution to all women’s problems is child bearing; and this is the only interest women ever have in men. A man needs two things, danger and play. His interest in woman is that she is “the most dangerous

plaything.”¹³ Again, “Men are merely evil, but women are bad. That is why they are dangerous. Men can overcome them only by subjugating them completely.”¹⁴

Nietzsche brackets woman with animals like cats and cows. “Nietzsche asks, women are only half human at best, more like cats or cows.”¹⁵

This view of Nietzsche also has invited bitter criticism. For instance, Bertrand Russell’s comments on this view of Nietzsche are worth perusal. He says about Nietzsche, “His opinion of women, like every man’s, is an objectification of his own emotion towards them, which is obviously one of fear ‘Forget not thy whip’ - but nine women out of ten would get the whip away from him, and he knew it, so he kept away from women, and soothed his wounded vanity with unkind remarks.”¹⁶ In fact, “Foiled in his search for love, he turned upon woman with a bitterness unworthy of a philosopher, and unnatural in a man; missing parentage and losing friendship, he never knew that the finest moments of life come through mutuality and comradeship, rather than from domination and war. He did not live long enough or widely enough, to mature his half-truths into wisdom. Perhaps if he had lived longer he would have turned his strident chaos into a harmonious philosophy.”¹⁷

iv. No place for society

Nietzsche is a thoroughgoing individualist. By individuality he means the individuality of aristocrats. He hates state or society. He says:

Insanity in individual is something rare but in groups, parties, nations and epochs it is the rule.¹⁸

He calls the state “the coldest of all cold monsters.”¹⁹ To him the state is one of the greatest enemies of man.

He hates state because it mars the individuality of ‘type’ by granting equality of aristocrats and multitude. He calls it ‘forced equality.’ For him, the state is one of the greatest enemies of men; by its regulations, it replaces his individuality with its own.²⁰ It is unmorality organised. He says, “The State, or unmorality organised, is from within — the

police, the penal code, status, commerce, and the family; and from without, the will to war, to power, to conquest and revenge."²¹

Again, he considers aristocrats as most indispensable and superior class. He says:

There, where the state ceaseth - there only commenceth the man who is not superfluous: there commenceth the song of the necessary ones, the single and irreplaceable melody.²²

There, where the state ceaseth - pray look thither, my brethren! Do ye not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the Superman?²³

About the commoners Nietzsche says:

Destroyers are they who lay snares for many, and call it the state: they hang a sword and a hundred cravings over them?²⁴

For Nietzsche the fundamental error is "to regard the herd as an aim instead of the individual! The herd is only a means and nothing more! But nowadays people are trying to understand the herd as they would an individual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated personalities. Terrible mistake! In addition to this, all that makes for gregariousness, e.g. sympathy is regarded as the more valuable side of our natures."²⁵

Will Durant rightly expresses Nietzsche's view that "the aim of all the experiments is not the happiness of the mass but the improvement of the type. Better that societies should come to an end than that no higher type should appear. Society is an instrument for the enhancement of the power and personality of the individual; the group is not an end in itself."²⁶

S.E. Frost says that according to Nietzsche, "society is merely a field in which the strong have a chance to demonstrate their strength and win their rewards, while the weak are defeated and dragged from the arena to be disposed of completely. Since inequality is characteristic of nature and the natural state of man, it is unnatural to replace it with a forced equality."²⁷

IQBAL

Iqbal's philosophy is diametrically different from Nietzsche's concepts. He does not believe in aristocracy to rule. He condemns any hereditary kingship or class of aristocrats for this matter. He regards humanity with respect, acknowledges proper place for woman and recognizes

contributions of the state or society for the development of human personality.

Iqbal, a great believer of self-realization, had a great faith in man's capacities. With right ideology and action all the human beings have open possibilities to develop inner potentialities. It is not a lot of particular individuals or peculiar class. For him the self is not a datum, it is to be developed. "If he (man) does not take initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter."²⁸ He beautifully says in verses:

When the grass found a means of growth in its self,

Its aspiration clove the breast of the garden.²⁹

When Life gathers strength from the Self

The river of Life expands into an ocean.³⁰

Again, for Iqbal "the emergence and multiplication of individualities, each fixing its gaze on the revelation of its possibilities and seeking its own dominion, inevitably brings in its wake the awful struggle of ages."³¹

The Qur'an emphasizes the self-realization and development of every individual. The Qur'an says, 'By the soul and He Who hath balanced it, and hath shown to it the ways of wickedness and piety, blessed is he who hath made it grow and undone is he who corrupted it.' (91:7-10)³².

Iqbal considers man as a respectable being irrespective of his status. To Iqbal, humanity is respect for man. He says:

What is humanity? respect for man!

Learn then the true status of man..."³³

Loftier than the heavens is the station of man,

and the beginning of education is respect of man."³⁴

Iqbal quotes the Qur'an:

See ye not how God hath put under you all that is in the Heavens, and all that is on the earth, and hath been bounteous to you of His favours both in relation to the seen and the unseen? (31:19)³⁵

And He hath subjected to you the night and the day, the sun and the moon, and the stars too are subject to you by His behest; verily in this are signs for those who understand.' (16:12)³⁶

Iqbal quotes the verses of the Qur'an regarding the prostration of angels in order to emphasize the status of man.³⁷

By man Iqbal means 'mankind' and not a particular section. To him only he is the best man whose actions are in accordance with God's wishes.

Further, woman is not less respectable. True that sometimes he has ironically depicted the un-Islamic ways of modern women but as a class they are admired and given full importance. He says:

The colour in the picture of the universe is due to woman:
The inner burning of life is due to her instrument!
In dignity her handful of dust is superior to the pleiades,
For all dignity is the secret pearl of this precious box."

Cannot write the dialogues of Plato but Plato's sparks are from her fire.³⁸

Next Iqbal's view of individual and society is quite different from that of Nietzsche. Here Iqbal's concept of state or society is noteworthy.

He considers community as *Rahmat* (boon). He says:

The link that binds the Individual
To the Society a Mercy is;
His truest Self in the Community
Alone achieves fulfilment. Wherefore be
so far as in thee lies in close rapport
With thy Society, and luster bring
To the wide intercourse of free-born men."³⁹

Again, he says:

The individual owes his existence to social cogency and is
nothing aloof,
The wave exists only in the river and is
absolutely nothing outside.⁴⁰

6. Superman

NIETZSCHE

In the spirit of his philosophy and in consonance to his thought, *Nietzsche* puts forward his concept of superman or overman. For Nietzsche superman is the most perfect

aristocrat. He depicts the portrait of the features of such man as follows:

i. Incarnate to Will to Power

The superman “is essentially incarnate will to power.”¹ *Nietzsche* says, “The object is to attain that enormous *energy of greatness* which can model the man of the future of means of discipline and also by means of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which can yet avoid *going to ruin* at the sight of suffering created thereby, the like of which has never been seen before.”² He is a governing aristocrat who is only power drunk and only a symbol of cruelty. “... *Nietzsche* wishes to see what he calls the ‘noble’ man, by no means as a universal type but as a governing aristocrat. The ‘noble’ man will be capable of cruelty, and, on occasion, of what is vulgarly regarded as crime; he recognizes duties only to equals.”³

ii. Born noble man

The superman according to *Nietzsche* is a born noble man. Without good birth superman is not possible. Though hard training and severe schooling is must for the superman, good birth is primarily necessary for him. He is always from amongst the aristocratic class, and not from middle or lower class. *Nietzsche* says that the superior few whom the superman belongs to “have usually been a conquering race or hereditary aristocracy - and aristocracies have usually been, at least in theory, descendants of conquering races.”⁴

iii. Recognizes only material value

The superman recognizes only the material values. Religious or spiritual values carry no significance for him. He is atheist. Rather he is the substitute of God, who is dead according to *Nietzsche*.

iv. No brighter future

Nietzsche's superman has no brighter future. He will return in this world after death, as he is in the present being, according to Nietzsche's Law of Recurrence. It is nothing but a mechanical process devoid of aspiration. Such portrait of superman has opened a great chapter of criticism. Bertrand Russell pointedly urges and traces psychological problem behind Nietzsche's theory. He says, "It never occurred to Nietzsche that the lust for power, with which he endows his superman, is itself an outcome of fear. Those who do not fear their neighbours see no necessity to tyrannize over them."⁵

Bertrand Russell further comments, "There are two sorts of saints" the saint by nature, and the saint from fear. The saint by nature has spontaneous love of making; he does good because to do so gives him happiness. The saint from fear, on the other hand, like the man who only abstains from theft because of police, would be wicked if he were not restrained by the thought of hell-fire of his neighbour's vengeance. Nietzsche can only imagine the second sort of saint; he is so full of fear and hatred that spontaneous love of mankind seems to him impossible. He has never conceived of the man who, with all the fearlessness and stubborn pride of the superman, nevertheless does not inflict pain because he has no wish to do so."⁶

IQBAL

However, *Iqbal's* perfect man is totally different. He is neither power drunk nor a born aristocrat. As compared with Nietzsche's superman who is power personified and devoid of pity and love, Iqbal's perfect man is synthesis of *Jalal* (Divine Majesty) and *Jamal* (Divine beauty). He is the real ruler of mankind. He is powerful, but not to bring war and terror. He gives code of morality; brings about social and economic justice and love irrespective to the status of human beings, whereas Nietzsche grants equality only among supermen and looks down upon commoners.

Nietzsche states that the superman is a born aristocrat. He is biologically superior to his subjects, as men are superior to domestic animals. But Iqbal's perfect man earns superiority - even freedom and immortality, because of self-actualisation. He is superior to others because of his deeds and not because of his birth.

Unlike Nietzsche's superman who is atheist, Iqbal's perfect man is God fearing and devoted religious man. This makes a fundamental difference. Faith in God goes a long way to develop human personality. Against Nietzsche's superman who has no brighter future, Iqbal's perfect man earns resurrection. Iqbal considers resurrection as not an external event. He regards it as "the consummation of a life process within the ego."⁷ It is "a kind of stock-taking of the ego's past achievements and his future possibilities."⁸ Iqbal states that there is no return in evolution. Every thing is on its upward march towards the realization of the ego, as we shall see in the chapter of 'Evolution'.

Again, for Iqbal "Life is one and continuous. Man marches always onward to receive ever fresh illuminations from an Infinite Reality which 'every moment appears in a new glory'. And the recipient of Divine illumination is not merely a passive recipient. Every act of a free ego creates a new situation, and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding."⁹

Commenting on the return of superman, Iqbal says, "But the superman has been an infinite number of times before. His birth is inevitable; how can the prospect give me any aspiration? We can aspire only for what is absolutely new, and the absolutely new is unthinkable in Nietzsche's view, which is nothing more than a Fatalism worse than the one summed up in the word 'Qismet'. Such a doctrine, far from keying up the human organism for the fight of life, tends to destroy its action-tendencies and relaxes the tension of ego."¹⁰

With these *differences* between Nietzsche's superman and Iqbal's perfect man one wonder as to how one can say that

Iqbal followed Nietzsche. The matter of fact is that Nietzsche's concept was entirely different from that of Iqbal.

Undoubtedly, Iqbal has great admiration for vitalists including Nietzsche but he was not inspired by Nietzsche's concept of superman. The idea of the Perfect Man is not new for Iqbal. Besides Rumi who is probably the first Muslim thinker who has presented a complete picture of the Perfect Man there are other Muslim thinkers also who have put forward theories of the Perfect Man. Ibn-i-Maskawaih, undoubtedly initiated the idea which found its culmination in Rumi. Ibn-i-Arabi and Jili can be quoted as subtle examples, though on important points Rumi differs from them. Professor M.M. Sharif rightly maintains, "Iqbal had undoubtedly admiration for the vitalism of Nietzsche, but Nietzsche was not his real inspirer. The idea of the perfect man is an old one in Muslim philosophy. I believe it had its roots in Plato's conception of the philosopher-king and Islamic idea of a prophet, but it found its highest development in the speculations of Ibn-i-Arabi, Al-Jili and Rumi. It would be travesty of facts to regard Nietzsche-made atheist as Iqbal's ideal or guide. It is true that he would like Nietzsche to believe in God, in social equality, in immortality of the soul, in spiritual rather than physical strength, in struggle for moral ends within the limits of moral rules and in war only as a defensive measure; but then all this would make a world of difference."¹¹

Luce Maitre believes, "The idea of the superman runs through the Qur'an. Man is capable of an endless progress and he will succeed in making himself master of the universe. The more he advances in his evolution, the more he resembles God. ("He who knows himself knows God" - "Create in yourself the Attributes of God": the comparison here is particularly significant.)"¹²

In the end, it is worthwhile to refer Iqbal's own statement. He himself clears his position in a letter to Dr. Nicholson. He regrets, "some of the English reviewers, however, have been misled by the superficial resemblance of some of my ideas to

those of Nietzsche.”¹³ He, however, says, “I wrote on the Sufi doctrine of the Perfect Man more than twenty years ago, long before I had read or heard anything of Nietzsche. This was then published in the *Indian Antiquary* and later in 1908 formed part of my *Persian Metaphysics*.”¹⁴

Iqbal is highly impressed by Rumi’s idea of the Perfect Man. For both Rumi and Iqbal, the Perfect Man is a highly developed ego with radiant characteristics. He is having an enviable status, and possesses immense pragmatic values for the world at large.

RUMI

Concept of Perfect Man

i. A highly developed ego

The Perfect Man, according to Rumi, is a developed ego. Dr. Nicholson explains it thus: “The individual soul, when impregnated (like the oyster-shell by the rain-drop) by the overflowing radiance (Tajali, fayd) of the Universal Spirit, produces the Perfect Man,....”¹⁵ Being highly developed the Perfect Man is regarded as the last fruit of humanity. He is macrocosm, though he appears microcosm in form.¹⁶

Rumi believes that it is difficult to find a perfect man. Rumi beautifully says:

Yesterday, the Master went roaming about
the city, a lantern in his hand,
Saying: ‘I am tired of demons and beasts.
I am eager to meet a man!
My heart is weary of these weak-spirited
companions;
I want to see the lion of God and Rustam,
son of Zal’.
I said: ‘He is not to be found, we have sought him long.’
I replied: ‘A thing that is not to be found - that is what I am in
search of?’¹⁷

It is pertinent to note that the above “verses of Rumi, the great Persian mystic, appear on the fly-leaf of the combined

edition of *Asrar-i-Khudi* and *Ramuz-i-Bekbudi*. Iqbal has not chosen them arbitrarily: his entire philosophy is in effect a quest and, it may even be said, a conquest of man.”¹⁸

For Iqbal also the Perfect Man is highly developed ego. To Iqbal the *na'ib* (vicegerent) of God on earth or the Perfect Man “is the completest Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony”. Iqbal also believes him to be “the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come to the end.”¹⁹

Iqbal also believes that the Perfect Man has not ceased to exist, and is very much needed in the present age. He says:

Today the world needs that true Mahdi, whose vision produces a commotion in the world of thought.²⁰

But it is difficult to find such a man. Iqbal says:

Narcissus weeps for many years over its sightlessness;
(only then) with great difficulty a person with vision is produced.²¹

Iqbal too accepts Rumi’s view, and quotes him in this respect:

Once in the days of Bayazid there was
A worshipper of fire. A Muslim true
Did say to him, ‘How fortunate it would
Be if thou couldst accept the faith, for then
Thou wouldst be saved and thou wouldst sway.’ Spake he,
Disciple, if faith means what Bayazid
Reflects, then I completely lack the strength
To face it, for it is for past the reach
And straining of the soul²²

ii. Characteristics of the Perfect Man

Firstly, being highly developed the self of the Perfect Man stands the test of any ordeal. The Perfect Man’s individuality is not annihilated even when he comes face to face with Reality. Rumi says:

When you have thrown an ounce of vinegar into two hundred maunds of sugar, and it has become dissolved therein,

The flavour of the vinegar, when you taste (the sugar), is non-existent, (though) the ounce exists (as a) surplus when you weigh.²³

For Iqbal also “the climax of this development is reached when the ego is able to retain full self-possession, even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego.”²⁴

Dr. A. Schimmel rightly observes, “The faithful who has realized in himself the Divine call to vicegerency, and who has consolidated his ego so much that he is able to have a person-to-person encounter with his creator is, for Iqbal, the Perfect Man, the Free Man.”²⁵

Secondly, being a truly developed ego, the Perfect Man has earned freedom and immortality. Rumi says:

He that is overpowered (overwhelmed) in Our grace is not ompelled;

Nay, he is one who freely chooses devotion (to Us).²⁶

Again, Rumi believes that the Perfect Man, due to his developed personality, earns complete and true freedom. “Rumi asserts that although the power to choose good and reject evil is not annulled by Divine Omnipotence, complete freedom belongs only to the Perfect Man whose self-will has been extinguished and submerged in the will of the Beloved.”²⁷ Next, Rumi says that the developed personality earns everlasting lives. He says:

(The person denoted by the word) *mubdarun* (brought into the presence) is not non-existent (ma’dum). Consider (this) well, that you may gain certain knowledge of the everlasting life (*baqa*) of the spirits.

The spirit debarred from everlasting life is exceedingly tormented; the spirit united (with God) in everlasting life is free from (every) barrier.²⁸

To Iqbal also true freedom belongs to the Perfect Man. The Free Man is synonymous with the Perfect Man.²⁹ Also, the Perfect Man earns immortality. Iqbal says:

That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
Wins for herself by love’s fenzy.³⁰

Thirdly, for Rumi the Perfect Man is a pleasant blend of Ishq and Intellect, Rumi says:

(Since) they have polished their breasts (hearts) in commemoration (of God) and meditation, that the heart's mirror may receive the virgin (original) image.³¹

For Iqbal also:

He is Reason's last goal, he is the harvest of love in the wide world he sets all spirits ablaze.³²

Fourthly, the Perfect Man has no fear. No difficulty can upset him. Rumi says:

If you see thou (the Perfect Man) in difficulty, (consider it to be superfluous); they have no fear nor grief.³³

Even physical death looks pleasant to him. Rumi says:

Even so, to those who know God (*'arifan*)

the wind of Death is soft and pleasant as the breeze (that wafts the scent) of (loved) ones like Joseph.

The fire did not set its teeth in

Abraham: how should it bite him, since he is the chosen of God?³⁴

Iqbal also says:

When Moses strides

Before the Pharaoh, steadfast is his heart

As he remembereth *Though shall not fear*.³⁵

For Iqbal also death cannot frighten the Perfect Man, because of the developed state of his ego. Iqbal says:

What is the sign of the faithful man?

When death comes, he has a smile on his lips.³⁶

Fifthly, for both Rumi and Iqbal the other name of the Perfect Man is *Faqir*. Thus all the qualities of *Faqir* are found in the Perfect Man according to Rumi and Iqbal. He is not an idle mystic; he is full of action. He earns lawful livelihood. He may be poor in appearance but he is owner of countless treasures; there is no greed to him. He has a great social import. He is not segregated from the Community. He contributes in bringing about a healthy social order. He combines in his behavior *Jamal* (Divine beauty) and *Jalal* (Divine Majesty) as a true *Faqir*. Both Rumi and Iqbal are clear in this respect. According to Rumi: "Divine mercy is prior to Divine wrath....., and both attributes are displayed by the Perfect Man. "Red and green" (spring colours) typify

mercy which like the rainbow brings a message of hope to souls in darkness.”³⁷ About his quality of *Jalal*, Rumi says:

The wrath of the (spiritual) kings has overthrown hundreds of thousands of cities, O, ye wicked who have lost the way.

At their beck the mountain splits of itself into a hundred fissures; a sun goes round (the sky) like an ass-mill.³⁸

Iqbal says about the Perfect Man:

He is the dew drop which cools the liver of the Poppy flower; and he is that storm which makes the hearts of rivers shiver.³⁹

Again:

Vengeance and forgiveness, piety and power -

These are four things which make up a Muslim”.⁴⁰

Iqbal says about Rumi:

From the Flute of Rumi, the *Jamal* of *Ishq* takes share from the *Jalal* of Beloved.⁴¹

Sixthly, the perfect man believes in higher religion. His message is universal and his love is for all the human beings. Rumi says:

The Mosque that is built in the hearts of the saints,

Is the place of worship for all, for God dwells there.⁴²

The history of true Perfect Men tells us that love for humanity was their hallmark. For instance, Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jillani, Mujjaddid Alaf Sani and Ali Hajweri (Data Ganj Bux) among many others - were well known for their love for humanity.

Iqbal also counts this as one of the most vital characteristics of the Perfect Man. He says:

The slave of *Ishq* takes lesson from God;

he becomes kind equally both with infidel and believer.⁴³

Seventhly, for Rumi knowledge of the Perfect Man is not derivative. Because heart is the place of God, his knowledge is intuitional. “Pir sees things as they exist potentially in God’s eternal knowledge before they are actualised”. As the organ of Divine consciousness, “he knows the entire content of past, present, and future existence, how everything came to be or is coming or will come to be, and why the non-

existence does not exist: all this he knows both synthetically and analytically (Jill in SIM, 85)⁴⁴. Rumi says:

The man of God is made wise by the Truth,
The man of God is not learned from book.⁴⁵

In *Gulshan-i-Razi-i-Jadid*, Iqbal puts a question: "Of whom shall I say that he is the Perfect Man."⁴⁶ It has beautifully been replied in the light of Iqbal's own view:

The perfection of life consists in seeking the Essence,
The way of achieving it is to free one self from
the limits of time and space.
You should enjoy privacy with the Divine Person in such a way,
That He sees you and you see Him.

... ..

He who 'saw' is the leader of the world,
We and you are imperfect, he alone is perfect.⁴⁷

It is significant to note that Iqbal, in *Jarid Nama*, makes Rumi's remarks about the Perfect Man:

No one can stand against His beauty bright,
Except the one who has perfection reached.⁴⁸

Lastly, the Perfect Man's love for God is sincere. He loves God neither for the sake of gardens and Houris of Heaven nor for fear of Hell. Rumi says:

His faith is (held) for the sake of (doing) His will, not for the sake of paradise and its trees and streams.

His abandonment of infidelity is also for God's sake, not for fear lest he go into the Fire.⁴⁹

Similarly, for Iqbal, the Perfect Man does not love God for the traditional pictures of 'Heaven'. Rather the Houris complain against the indifferent behaviour. Iqbal beautifully says:

The angels say: The faithful is gracious. But the Houris complain: the faithful does not mix with us.⁵⁰

iii. His status

The Perfect Man has developed his ego to such extent that he has attained control over (A) spiritual and (B) material worlds.

Spiritual world

The Perfect Man is highly elevated spiritually. He experiences Mi'raj at every moment. Rumi says:

Every moment he hath an ascension (to God) peculiar to himself: He (God lays upon his crown a hundred peculiar crowns"⁵¹

As regards the control of spiritual world, the Perfect man, due to his developed ego, dictates his terms to angels and prophets and God. Rumi says:

Under the towers of His Majesty there stand men who capture angels and prophets and God Almighty Himself.⁵²

Again, in short, the Perfect Man of Rumi attains the power to control the spiritual world to the extent that his order becomes the order of God, though he retains his separate individuality. This is tantamount to 'capturing' or 'preying' God. Rumi has beautifully discussed this power of the Perfect Man:

God has declared that his (the Pir's) hand is as His own, since he gave out (the words) the Hand of God is above their hands. The Hand of God causes him (the child) to die and (then) brings him to life. What of life? He makes him a spirit ever lasting.⁵³

It alludes to the Qur'anic expression "Thou didst not throw when thou threwst, but it was God who threw" (Sura 8/17, of)⁵⁴

Another Hadith in this connection is that God "is the eye, ear, and hand of those whom He loves".⁵⁵

Rumi acknowledges the great power of heart in this connection. Rumi expresses a very bold idea "of an old Sheikh who says to the Sufi Bayazid, when he was going on a pilgrimage: Go around me: that will be equivalent to going round the ka'ba; although the Ka'ba is the house of God, destined by him for the accomplishment of religious rites, my being is superior to it as the house of his secrets."⁵⁶

It reminds us of "the Hadith-i-qudsi.... "Neither My earth nor My heaven contains Me, but I am contained in the heart of My faithful servant".⁵⁷

For Iqbal also, the Perfect Man attains to such power that his wishes become the wishes of God and his hand becomes the hand of God. Iqbal says:

A Perfect Man's arm is really God's arm,
Dominant, creative, resourceful, efficient...⁵⁸

In the spirit of Rumi, Iqbal believes that the persons with their power over spiritual world "Capture angels and God Almighty Himself". He says:

In the jungle of my madness Gabriel is an ordinary prey.
O courageous one, cast thy noose on God Himself.⁵⁹

Iqbal, in agreement with his guide, says:
My heart appears sometime as *Kaaba* and sometime as *Arsh*
O'God! whose destination is the abode of my heart?⁶⁰

Material world

As a result of this spiritual power he gets control over the material world also. Rumi says:

Gabriel is wonderstruck (after seeing your status);
Whole of the world is at your command.⁶¹

And it is natural because:

He who has become acquainted with the secrets of Hu (God),
what to him is the secret (in most consciousness) of created
beings?"⁶²

At the hands of the Perfect Man even earth becomes gold.
Rumi says:

If a perfect man (saint) takes earth, it becomes gold; if an
imperfect one has carried away gold; it becomes ashes.⁶³

Again, the world is lost in him, "The Perfect Man can never be lost to the world since, he has assimilated and, as it were, absorbed into himself the Divine attributes which constitute the reality of the worlds".⁶⁴

Iqbal agrees with Rumi that the universe is absorbed in the Perfect Man and not the other way round. Iqbal says, "The true person not only absorbs the world of matter; by mastering it he absorbs God Himself into his Ego".⁶⁵

Iqbal beautifully sums this up in an Urdu verse:
The sign of an infidel is that he is lost in the world;
The sign of the believer is that the world is lost in him!⁶⁶

That Iqbal is highly impressed by Rumi is clear. Iqbal quotes Rumi in reply to his own question:

He whose walk is on the sphere, how should it be hard for him to walk on the earth?⁶⁷

iv. His pragmatic value

In the light of the above facts, the pragmatic value of the Perfect Man is quite understandable. According to Rumi the Perfect Man gives code of morality; brings about social and economic justice; and shows the ways of life — spiritual and material. He elevates the spirit of the human being and makes him superior in all respects.

Further Rumi says:

“Hark! for the saints are the Israfilis of the (present) time: from them to the dead comes life and freshness.”⁶⁸

Again:

Though you be rock or marble, you will become a jewel when you reach the man of heart (the saint).⁶⁹

Again, true knowledge also comes from the Perfect Man:

If thou desire (spiritual) poverty, that depends on championship (with a Shaykh): neither thy tongue nor thy hand avails.

Soul receives from soul the knowledge thereof, not by way of book nor from tongue.⁷⁰

Thus with his personality, the Perfect Man aims at changing the destiny of the human beings at large. He has no prejudice and is above class-distinction.

This is diametrically different from the code of Hindu ethics, which “is a compromise between the principle of humanity and the demands of aristocratic, privileged, upper-class groups. Caste distinctions are a handicap to cooperative living and the development of democracy and education. Caste also interferes with normal marriage relations between individuals. Out of caste distinctions grow elements of cruelty.... and the belief in Karma and transmigration. The over-all attitude is one of escape and denial, with tendencies toward resignation, quietism, and a tolerance of the status

quo. There is an easy tolerance of evil, since it is not felt necessary to change the world".⁷¹

That the 'discovery' of mystic has also pragmatic value is clear from "How the dervish excused himself to the Shaykh". The dervish (mystic or saint) says:

Purposely I come down from the lofty zenith
that those of base degree may attain to me.⁷²

Dr. Nicholson comments "The prophet or saint is not always rapt in contemplation of Reality; at times he descends to a lower plane in order that common men may come into contact with him and be purified by his guidance and teaching (Cf. v 200-227)".⁷³

For Iqbal also the pragmatic value of the Perfect Man is immense - both for the development of individual and society at large. To Iqbal the Perfect Man "is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth. Out of the richness of his nature he lavishes the wealth of life on others, and brings them nearer and nearer to himself".⁷⁴

Iqbal believes in the pragmatic value of the Perfect Man. He says:

The English people should study my view of the Perfect man in the light of such ideas. Our agreements and *panchayats* cannot banish war. Only top-ranking personality can bring these troubles to an end.⁷⁵

Iqbal yearns for the incoming of the Perfect Man for the latter's immense pragmatic value. He says:

Appear, O rider of Destiny!
Appear, O light of the dark realm of change!
Illumine the scene of existence.
Dwell in the blackness of our eyes!
Silence the noise of the nations,
Imparadise our ears with thy music!⁷⁶

Rumi is probably the first Muslim thinker who has presented the picture of a Perfect Man as depicted in this chapter. Ibn-i-Miskawaih, undoubtedly initiated it. But it can be regarded just a movement which culminated in Rumi. Some other great thinkers in Muslim Philosophy, for instance, Ibn-i-Arabi and Jili also have propounded the

theories of the Perfect Man. But Rumi's Perfect Man is different from that of Ibn-i-Arabi and of Jili, to whom the Perfect Man is merely a metaphysical being. "Ibn-i-Arabi has cut off the idea of Perfect Man from that of the Prophet and has put it at the beginning of his system so that God, world, and man become only the three aspects of the same concept and the Perfect Saint identifies himself with the Perfect Man completely and becomes himself the vicegerent Lord of the Universe...."⁷⁷

II. THE UNIVERSE

1. Main Features

NIETZSCHE

i. The Universe is space, matter and energy

Nietzsche considers the universe as merely a phenomenal reality. It consists of space, matter and energy, which are finite and limited in amount, and wherein time is unlimited and unending.

ii. Will to power is inner reality

The will to power is inner reality of the universe, which is obvious in its manifestations. Nietzsche says, "It is our needs that *interpret the World*; our instincts and their impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power; each has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the other instincts as their norm."¹ Again, he says, "The triumphant concept "*energy*", with which our physicists created God and the World, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an inner will which I characterise as the "*Will to Power*"."²

Copleston has beautifully interpreted Nietzsche's theory thus: "Everywhere, in everything, we can see the Will to Power expressing itself. And though one can perhaps say that for Nietzsche the Will to Power is the inner reality of the universe, it exists only in its manifestations. Nietzsche's theory of the Will to Power is thus an interpretation of the universe, a way of looking at it and describing it, rather than a

metaphysical doctrine about a reality which lies *behind* the visible world and transcends it.”³

IQBAL

On the contrary, for *Iqbal* the universe is a spiritual reality. He believes every atom to be an ego. He says, “The world, in all its details, from mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the ‘Great I am’. Every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego.”⁴

It is spiritual, also, in this sense that it leads to the belief of God. In this connection Iqbal refers to the Qur’an:

Verily in the creation of the Heavens and earth, and in succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding; who, standing and sitting and reclining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and say: “Oh, our Lord! Thou has not created this in vain. (3:188)”⁵

Iqbal states that the universe is not made of inert matter, as it was believed in the nineteenth century. Being a spiritual monist Iqbal believes that there is no inert matter. Endorsing the relativity - physics he says that according to its findings, “A piece of matter has become not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of inter-related events. The old solidity is gone, and with it the characteristics that to the materialist made matter seem more real than fleeting thoughts.”⁶ Iqbal further says: “The criticism of the foundations of the mathematical sciences has fully disclosed that the hypothesis of a pure materiality, an enduring stuff situated in an absolute space, is unworkable.”⁷

Iqbal discovers the universe as a free creative movement. He says, “We can derive, ‘things’ from movement; we cannot derive movement from immobile things.... In fact, physical science has reduced all things to movement. The essential nature of the atom in modern science is electricity and not something electrified.”⁸ He further says, “The universe which

seems to us to be a collection of things is not a solid stuff occupying a void. It is not a thing but an act.”⁹

Iqbal believes in an expanding universe as we have discussed, in “William James and Iqbal.” He maintained, “It is not a block universe, a finished product, immobile and incapable of change. Deep in its inner being lies, perhaps, the dream of a new birth.”¹⁰ In an Urdu verse Iqbal beautifully says:

This creation is perhaps still unfinished. For every moment arises the cry ‘Be’, and it becomes.¹¹

2. Evolution

NIETZSCHE

i. Evolution is horizontal

Nietzsche believes in Eternal Recurrence, as discussed before. His theory of evolution is horizontal and not vertical. To explain it again, it is summed up as “The extent of universal energy is limited; it is not “infinite”: We should beware of such excesses in our concept! Consequently the number of states, changes, combinations, and evolutions of this energy, although it may be enormous and practically incalculable, is at any rate definite and not unlimited. The time, however, in which this universal energy works its changes is infinite — that is to say, energy remains eternally the same and is eternally active: — at this moment an infinity has already elapsed, that is to say, every possible evolution must already have taken place. Consequently the present process of evolution must be a repetition, as was also the one before it, as will also be the one, which will follow. And so on forwards and backwards! In as much as the entire state of all forces continually returns, everything has existed an infinite number of times.”¹

ii. Will to Power behind evolution

Next, to Nietzsche it is Will to Power, which is the source of evolution. Will to Power is behind everything. William Kelly Wright has beautifully assessed this view. He says, “The

strife between different species, and between individuals of the same species, is not for Nietzsche as it was for Darwin, a struggle for mere existence, and it is not the outcome of the survival of those whose chance variations have happened to conform to the environment. Nietzsche rejects mechanism and materialism entirely. He believes that fundamental impulsive force in nature is the will for power.... The will for power is an active force, which shapes and creates forms; it uses and exploits the environment for its own ends. Nutrition and procreation are processes by which the will for power maintains itself and overcomes obstacles.”²

This is the reason that Nietzsche pointedly criticises Darwin, to whom external circumstances dominantly contribute in shaping certain organ or quality. Nietzsche says, “The influence of “environment” is nonsensically *overrated* in Darwin: the essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous inner power to shape and to create forms, which merely *uses, exploits* “environment”.”³

IQBAL

But *Iqbal's* view of evolution is diametrically different. His concept is neither of horizontal progress nor he believes in will to power as force behind the process of evolution.

For Iqbal evolution is vertical and progressive. To him, there is no return in evolution. Every thing is on its upward march towards the realization of the ego. He says, “Creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of mechanical action.”⁴ Iqbal beautifully says through Living Stream:

For life abominates
All repetition and, beneath the sky,
It hates to retrogress,⁵

The present life is the result of our past evolution. He asserts, “Life is a passage through a series of deaths.”⁶ Thus life is continuous. He further says, “But there is a system in the continuity of this passage. Its various stages, inspite of the apparently abrupt changes in our evaluation of things, are organically related to one another.”

Discussing the evolution of the self Iqbal says that the self evolves in the total process of evolution. It emerges out of sub-egos. The will that assumes the shape of sub-egos by becoming self-conscious, reveals itself in higher egos or personalities. Iqbal says, "The fact that the higher emerges out of the lower does not rob the higher of its worth and dignity. It is not the origin of a thing that matters; it is the capacity, the significance, and the final reach of the emergent that matters.... Indeed the evolution of life shows that though in the beginning the mental is dominated by the physical, the mental, as it grows in power, tends to dominate the physical and may eventually rise to a position of complete independence."⁷

Iqbal finds the support of his thought from the Qur'an. Alluding to the Qur'an, he says, "Thus in his inmost being man, as conceived by the Qur'an, is a creative activity, an ascending spirit who, in his onwards march, rises from one state of being to another:

It needs not that I swear by the sunset redness and by the night and its gatherings and by the moon when at her full, that from state to state shall ye be surely carried onward. (84:17-20)"⁸

Next according to Iqbal love and not will to power is the driving force behind evolution. About love Iqbal says:

The whole campaign of the universe is by the heat of love,
Knowledge is the stage of attribute, love is the seeing of essence.

Love is peace and stability, love is life and death,
Knowledge is an open question mark, love is a secret answer".⁹

Iqbal says that love is "the desire to assimilate, to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realise them."¹⁰

It is worthwhile to quote Iqbal's own comments on Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. He says, "It is clear that there can be no dissipation of energy in an infinite empty space. The centres of this energy are limited in number, and their combination perfectly calculable. There is no beginning or end of the ever-active energy, no equilibrium,

no first or last change. Since time is infinite, therefore all possible combinations of energy-centres have already been exhausted. There is no new happening in the universe; whatever happens now has happened before an infinite number of times and will continue to happen an infinite number of times in the future. On Nietzsche's view the order of happenings in the universe must be fixed and unalterable; for since an infinite time has passed, the energy-centres must have, by this time, formed certain definite modes of behaviour. The very word 'Recurrence' implies this fixity.¹¹

In fact Iqbal is highly impressed by Rumi's theory of evolution. For him, like Rumi, the present man and the universe are the result of gradual process or many past deaths. He says:

This ancient creature, that men call the world,
 Out of the mingling of the elements
 Derived its body; a hundred reed-beds sowed
 That one lament might burgeon; bathed in blood
 A hundred meads, to yield one tulip-bloom
 Many the shapes it fetched and cast and broke
 To grave upon Life's tablet the design;
 Many laments it sowed in the soul's tilth
 Till sprang the music of one call to prayer.¹²

Referring to Rumi's process theory of evolution he says at a place: "The formulation of the theory of evolution in the world of Islam brought into being Rumi's tremendous enthusiasm for the biological future of man. No cultured Muslim can read such passages without a thrill of joy."¹³ Here Iqbal quotes in his own translation a passage from Rumi's *Mathnawi*. This, on one hand, shows Iqbal's appreciation of Rumi's view and, on the other; it throws further light on Rumi's process-theory of evolution. The passage is:

Low in the earth
 I lived in realms of ore and stone;
 And then I smiled in many-tinted flowers;
 Then roving with the wild and wandering hours,
 O'er earth and air and ocean's zone,
 In a new birth,

I dived and flew
 And crept and ran,
 And all the secret of my essence drew
 Within a form that brought them all the view—
 And lo, a Man!
 And then my goal,
 Beyond the clouds, beyond the sky,
 In realms where none may change or die—
 In angel form; and then away
 Beyond the bounds of night and day,
 And Life and Death, unseen or seen,
 Where all that is hath ever been,
 As One and Whole.”¹⁴
 To Rumi also Love is a force behind evolution.

He says:

Though outwardly it appears that love is born from me:
 Yet you know that in reality, love gave birth to me.¹⁵

Again:

Know that the wheeling heavens are turned by waves of Love:
 were it not for Love, the world would be frozen (inanimate)¹⁶

III. THE ULTIMATE REALITY

Atheism vs Theism

NIETZSCHE

i. No transcendental Reality

Nietzsche does not believe in transcendental reality. As said before he is empirical through and through. He is faithful only to the earth. He says, “I conjure you, my brethren, *remain true to the earth*, and believe not those who speak unto you of super earthly hopes! Poisoners are they, whether they know it or not.”¹ He says,

I love those who do not first seek a reason beyond the stars for going down and being sacrificed, but sacrifice themselves to the earth, that the earth of the Superman may hereafter arrive.²

It is rightly said that, according to Nietzsche, “Man is poisoned by those who teach that salvation is found not in this world but in the next...”³

ii. No religion and God

Thus there is no wonder if Nietzsche does not believe in religion and God for this matter. It is rightly stated that “personally he rejected all religions. He considered supernaturalism opposed to reason, sought the roots of otherworldliness in a resentment against this world,.....”⁴

For him, “Dead are all the Gods: now do we desire the Superman to live. — Let this be our final will at the great noontide!- Thus Spake Zarathustra.”⁵

Through Zarathustra Nietzsche says:

For the old Gods came to an end long ago. And verily it was a good and joyful end of Gods:

They did not die lingering in the twilight, - although that lie is told. On the contrary, they once upon a time - laughed themselves to death:

That came to pass when, by a God himself, the most ungodly word was uttered, the word “there is but one God!

Thou shalt have no other gods before me”.

An old grim-beard of a God, a jealous one, forgot himself in such wise:-

And all the gods then laughed, and shook upon their thrones, and exclaimed: “Is it not just divinity that there are gods, but no God?”

He that hath an ear let him hear. ⁶

iii. Superman in place of God

In his philosophy, Superman has taken the place of God. He says,

Dead are all God; now we will that Superman lives.⁷

It may be noted that belief in God, according to Nietzsche is highly detrimental for the development of human life. Actually, for him religion is symptom of decadence.⁸

IQBAL

For *Iqbal* religion is a “potential type of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness.”⁹ It is a type of consciousness, which opens up “possibilities of life-giving

and knowledge-yielding experience....”¹⁰ Further, he says that higher religion “is essentially experience and recognized the necessity of experience as its foundation long before science learnt to do so. It is genuine effort to clarify human consciousness, and is, as such, as critical of its level of experience as Naturalism is of its own level.”¹¹

By Religion, Iqbal means higher religion “which is only a search for larger life.”¹² It is essentially a mode of actual living. It is “a capacity to centralize the forces of the ego and thereby to endow him with a new personality.”¹³ To Iqbal, “The climax of religious life... is the discovery of the ego as an individual deeper than his conceptually describable habitual selfhood.... Strictly speaking, the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of Logical categories.”¹⁴ But it takes the view of man in entirety, and not sectional. It “is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of whole man.”¹⁵

Iqbal is a great upholder of the validity of religious experience. He maintains, “The whole religious literature of the world, including the record of specialists’ personal experiences, though perhaps expressed in the thought-forms of an out-of-date psychology, is a standing testimony to it. These experiences are perfectly natural, like our normal experiences. The evidence is that they possess cognitive value for the recipient....”¹⁶

Iqbal considers God as a concrete Reality; and not “a mathematical entity or a system of concepts mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience.”¹⁷

For him, God is Ultimate Ego. He says, “Our criticism of experience reveals the Ultimate Reality to be a rationally directed life which, in view of our experience of life, cannot be conceived except as an organic whole, something closely knit together and possessing a central point of reference. This being the character of life, the ultimate life can only be

conceived as an ego.”¹⁸ Again, he believes Him as a Personal God, Who responds to our prayers and calls. Iqbal refers to the Qur’an:

And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh unto them and answer the cry of him that crieth unto me.’ (2:281)¹⁹

Iqbal believes God as the source of human ego. He says that ‘human ego proceeds from the ultimate Ego.’ Also, He is the destination of man.²⁰

Iqbal considers God’s role very important in the search for larger life. God is a Unique Other self with attributes, the absorption of which is the source of personality integration. He says, “It is in contact with the Most Real that the ego discovers its uniqueness, its metaphysical status, and the possibility of improvement in that status.”²¹ The man who absorbs the attributes of God and loves Him for the sake of love, develops his personality. He says, “The Prophet said, *‘Tak hallaqu-bi-ak blaq Allah’* Create in yourselves the attributes of God. ‘... Physically as well as spiritually man is a self-contained centre, but he is yet a complete individual. The more he is away from God the less he retains his individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person.”²²

Comparing Nietzsche’s views with those of Iqbal, Claude rightly observes, “For Nietzsche the “will to power” is the lever which gives an impetus to entire creation. It is from this standpoint that religion; moral, art and science must be explained. Iqbal explains them from the point of view of personality which is for him the pivot of Reality.”²³ Again Claude says, “Nietzsche is an atheist and Iqbal a believer; the one wants to establish the kingdom of God on the earth while the other proclaims that God is dead. Divine revelation is, according to Iqbal, the supreme reward of man, for Nietzsche religion is nothing but a drug strong enough to lull the masses to sleep.”²⁴

Nietzsche’s views, devoid of morality and religion, are criticised by Iqbal himself. Iqbal says with regret:

Had that Western Majzoob been alive today

Iqbal would have taught him what the station of God is²⁵

Again, Iqbal comments, "Nietzsche was a failure; and his failure was mainly due to his intellectual progenitors such as Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Lange whose influence completely blinded him to the real significance of his vision. Instead of looking for a spiritual rule which would develop the Divine even in a plebeian and thus open up before him an infinite future, Nietzsche was driven to seek the realization of his vision in such schemes as aristocratic radicalism. As I have said of him elsewhere:

The 'I am' which he seeketh,
Lieth beyond philosophy, beyond knowledge.
The plant that groweth only from the invisible
soil of the heart of man,
Growth not from a mere heap of clay.²⁶

For Iqbal, therefore, it was Nietzsche's lack of spiritual vision, which drove him into sheer failure. Iqbal, however regrets, "Thus failed a genius whose vision was solely determined by his internal forces, and remained unproductive for want of external guidance in his spiritual life. And the irony of fate is that this man, who appeared to his friends 'as if he had come from a country where no man lived', was fully conscious of his great spiritual need. 'I confront alone,' he says, 'an immense problem; it is as if I am lost in a forest, a primeval one. I need help. I need discipline: I need a *Master*. It would be so sweet to obey. 'And again: 'Why do I not find among the living men who see higher than I and have to look down on me? Is it only that I have made a poor search? And I have so great a longing for such.'²⁷ It is why Iqbal has said about Nietzsche:

The earthly men he had despaired, and searched
For vision, as did Moses. How I wish
That he had lived in Ahmad's day, for then
A consummation he could have attained.²⁸

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

There is a great difference between the thoughts of Nietzsche and Iqbal as discussed above. However, there is some superficial affinity, which seems to have deluded some erudite into believing Iqbal as the follower of Nietzsche. These are mentioned below alongwith actual position.

i. Rejection of Racialism and Nationalism:

Nietzsche does not believe in Racialism or Nationalism, because it generates hatred among nations. He praises heroes like Napoleon and Ceasar Borgia who belonged to other than Germany. He recommended intermarriages among different races and nations of Europe. He wanted 'One Europe'. He says, "Owing to the morbid estrangement which the nationality-craze has induced and still induces among the nations of Europe, owing also to the short-sighted and hasty-handed politicians, who with the help of this craze, are at present in power, and do not suspect to what extent the disintegrating policy they pursue must necessarily be only as interlude policy - owing to all this, and much else that is altogether unmentionable at present, the most unmistakable signs that *Europe wishes to be one*, are now overlooked, or arbitrarily and falsely misinterpreted."¹ His heroes "are akin, fundamentally akin, in all the heights and depths of their requirements; it is Europe, the One Europe, whose soul presses urgently and longingly, outwards and upwards, in their multifarious and boisterous art - wither? into a new light? towards a new sun?"²

But Islam, many centuries before Nietzsche condemned Racialism. Rather, Islam's anti Racialism is in much broader perspective than Nietzsche envisages. Islam believes in oneness of mankind. The Qur'an says: God created all mankind from a single individual (39:6) and that God is Sustainer of the East as well as the West (73:9). Thus Islam smashes all the idols of Nationalism and Racialism. In Islam to establish kingdom of God on earth is to unite mankind on 'Iman' and human values and not on race or nation. It is why

Islam gives the concept of *Milat*, which is one community of Muslims. Islam regards it *Milat* because all the members possess similar belief in *Taubid*, Muhammad the Prophet (P.B.U.H) and other tenets of Islam, irrespective of geographical boundaries, colour and culture. Iqbal says in *Ramuz-i-Be-Khudi*, a beautiful poetry book, where he develops in full his ideas on nationhood:

Our Essence is not bound to any place;
 he vigour of our wine is wine contained
 n any bowl; Chinese and Indian
 like the sherd that constitutes our jar,
 urkish and Syrian alike the clay
 orming our body; neither is our heart
 f India, or Syria, or Rum
 or any fatherland do we profess
 xcept Islam.”³

Dr. R.A. Nicholson rightly explains it by quoting the Hadith: “*al-muminuna ka-nafs in wahidat in*”, “the Faithful are as one soul.” Iqbal believes Racialism as un-Islamic. Replying to Mr. Dickinson’s letter he says about Islamic society; “This society has so far proved itself a more successful opponent of the race-idea which is probably the hardest barrier in the way of the humanitarian ideal... In the interests of a universal unification of mankind the Qur’an ignores their minor differences and says “Come let us unite on what is common to us all.”⁴ Further, for Iqbal, the social system of Islam lays great stress upon equality and rejects the distinction of caste, rank and race.⁵

ii. Criticism on Christianity

Nietzsche accuses Christianity for depreciating the body, instincts, impulse and passion and aesthetic values,⁶ Locating the cause of Nietzsche’s hatred toward Christianity, Copleston says that it “proceeds principally from his view of its supposed effect on man, whom it renders weak, submissive, resigned, humble or tortured in conscience and unable to develop himself freely. It either prevents the growth of superior individuals or ruins them, as in the case of Pascal.”⁷

Christianity eventually hopes that the weak and submissive people will rule over the masters. In the words of Wright, "The secret motive of Christianity is the hope of the slave for vengeance upon his masters and ultimate domination over them; this is promised to the Christian in the Biblical book of Revelation and in the patristic writings; he shall triumph over his masters in the next world, and in enjoyment of the felicities of Heaven he will exult as he watches them writhing in the eternal torments of Hell."⁸

Nietzsche's antipathy about Saintliness is well known. According to Nietzsche he is invalid and lacks vitality. William James rightly remarks, "For Nietzsche the saint represents little but sneakiness and slavishness. He is the sophisticated invalid, the degenerate Par excellence, the man of insufficient vitality: His prevalence put the human type in danger."⁹

But all the charges, which Nietzsche levels against Christianity, were already levelled by Islam. For instance, Islam also criticises the duality of spiritual and material, ideal and real, adoption of monasticism and segregation from community. Iqbal believes that these features are contrary to the teachings of Islam. He says, "The great point in Christianity is the search for an independent content for spiritual life which, according to the insight of its founder, could be elevated, not by the forces of a world external to the soul of man, but by the revelation of a new world within his soul."¹⁰ Islam agrees and emphasises the important place of spiritual life. But also recognizes the importance of 'real' of the world of matter. He, therefore, holds. "It is the mysterious touch of the ideal that animates and sustains the real, and through it alone we can discover and affirm the ideal. With Islam the ideal and the real are not two opposing forces, which cannot be reconciled."¹¹ Against monasticism it is a well known stance of Islam: There is no monasticism in Islam.¹²

iii. Other factors

Undoubtedly, there are certain passages of Nietzsche's works, which allude to Nietzsche's emphasis on sublimation,

and some of the authors like Kaufman refer to such passages. These expound that Nietzsche also stresses self-control. But even if Nietzsche believes in the role of sublimation does it lead to conclude that Iqbal took lesson from him? From our point of view it is certainly no. Without entangling ourselves into controversy whether or not Kaufman was right in taking such lenient view of Nietzsche's thought, our point of view is clear and the fact remains as it is i.e. Iqbal was not camp follower of Nietzsche. The idea of sublimation is not new to Iqbal. Islam is a great advocate of sublimation. We have already discussed that Islam immensely emphasizes the blend of *Jalal* (Divine majesty) and *Jamal* (Divine beauty). As regards self-control Iqbal explains the five pillars of Islam - Faith in *Tauhid*, (Oneness of God), prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, almsgiving, as highest sources of self-control. He explains in *Asrar-i-Khudi* as how one is restrained to bend before false gods; leaves every thing, and prays; overcomes hunger and thirst; leaves his country and faces difficulties to perform pilgrimage; and does not fall prey to the love of riches and greed.¹³

Some erudite are deluded into taking Iqbal as follower of Nietzsche perhaps because the former praises Nietzsche by calling him Hallaj and Majdub. Iqbal says:

Once again this uncrucified Hallaj
 Deliver the same old message in a new way.
 His language is outspoken, his ideas magnificent,
 The West is torn as under by the sword of his oratory;
 His contemporaries could not appreciate the
 significance of his experience
 He was a *majdhub*, but was regarded as mad."¹⁴

The reason for this tribute is not difficult to understand. Iqbal himself explains, "In modern Europe Nietzsche whose life and activity form, at least to us Eastern, an exceedingly interesting problem in religious psychology, was endowed with some sort of a constitutional equipment for such an undertaking.... That a really 'imperative' vision of the Divine in man did come to him cannot be denied. I call his vision

‘imperative’ because it appears to have given him a kind of prophetic mentality which, by some kind of technique, aims at turning its visions into permanent life-forces.”¹⁵

But we should not overlook Iqbal’s view that Nietzsche’s “mental history is not without a parallel in the history of Eastern Sufism.”¹⁶, and that “in the words of Iqbal Nietzsche has arrived at the viewpoint of Islam in his own disbelieving way”¹⁷.

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¹⁷ A. Majid Dar's trans. of Rumi's Verses qt. by Iqbal before Prologue of Arrar-i-Khudi (in his translation of Luce claud maitre's *Introduction to the Thought of Iqbal*, p. 14.
¹⁸ M.A.M. Dar, trans. op.cit., p. 14.
¹⁹ R.A. Nicholson, (trans. of Iqbal's *Asrar-i-Khudi*). Intro., p. xxviii.
²⁰ Iqbal, *Zerb-i-Kalim*, p. 40 (trans.)
²¹ Iqbal, *Bang-i-Dara*, p. 306 (trans.)
²² Mahmud Ahmad, op.cit., (trans. of Iqbal's *Javid Nama*), p. 114.
²³ R.A. Nicholson, trans. of Rumi's *Mathnawi*, iii, 3674-3675.
²⁴ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 118.
²⁵ Annemarie Schimmel, *The Gabriel's Wing*, p. 118.

- ²⁶ R.A. Nicholson, trans. of Rumi's *Mathnawi*, iv, 401.
- ²⁷ R.A. Nicholson's *Commentary* on Rumi's *Mathnawi* I, II, p. 59.
- ²⁸ R.A. Nicholson's trans. of Rumi's *Mathnawi*, iv, 445-446.
- ²⁹ Annemari Schimmel, trans. op.cit., p. 118.
- ³⁰ Iqbal's own trans. qt. by B.A. Dar in trans. of *Gulshan-e-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 52.
- ³¹ R.A. Nicholson trans. of Rumi's *Mathnawi* i, 3154.
- ³² Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril*, p. 132 (trans.)
- ³³ Rumi, *Mathnawi*, vol. iv, p. 89 (My own trans.)
- ³⁴ R.A. Nicholson, trans. of Rumi's *Mathnawi*, i, 860-861.
- ³⁵ A.J. Arberry, *The Mystries of Selflessness* (trans. of *Iqbal's Ramuz-i-Be-Khudi*), p. 15.
- ³⁶ Iqbal, *Armghan-i-Hijaz*, p. 165 (trans.)
- ³⁷ R.A. Nicholson's *Commentary* (op.cit.,) I & II p. 297.
- ³⁸ Rumi, *Mathnawi*, iii, 2814-2815.
- ³⁹ Iqbal, *Zarb-i-Kalim*, p. 57 (My own trans.)
- ⁴⁰ Iqbal, *Zarb-i-Kalim*, p. 57 (trans.)
- ⁴¹ Iqbal, *Armghan-i-Hijaz*, p. 106 (My own trans.)
- ⁴² Whinfield Masnavi, p. 100 qt. by Dr. R.A. Nicholson, in *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*, p. 78.
- ⁴³ Trans. of Iqbal's verse qt. in '*Tashbihat-i-Rumi*' by Khalifa Abdul Hakim, p. 358.
- ⁴⁴ R.A. Nicholson's *Commentary* on Rumi's *Mathnawi* I & II, p. 242.
- ⁴⁵ Rumi, *Divan-i-Shams* Tabriz, pp. 28.
- ⁴⁶ Bashir Ahmad Dar, op.cit., p. 45.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 232.
- ⁴⁸ Mahmud Ahmad, op.cit., p. 12.
- ⁴⁹ Rumi, *Mathnawi*, iii, 1911-1912.
- ⁵⁰ Iqbal, *Zarb-i-Kalim*, p. 41 (My own trans.)
- ⁵¹ Rumi, *Mathnawi* i, 1580.
- ⁵² Rumi, *Divan-i-Shams Tabriz*, qt. by Shibli Naumani, in *Sreeneh Maulana Rum* ed. by Syed Abid Ali Abid, p. 72.
- ⁵³ Rumi, *Mathnawi* i, 2972-73.
- ⁵⁴ *The Qur'an*, cf. referred to by Dr. A. Schimmel op., cit., p. 312.
- ⁵⁵ The Hadith qt. by Dr. R.A. Nicholson in *Commentary*, I & II, p. 77.
- ⁵⁶ *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (vol. I pt. 2) Ed. by the Houtsma, T-W. Arnold., R. Basset & R. Hartmann, Leyden - 1913 - London.
- ⁵⁷ R.A. Nicholson's *Commentary*, I & II p. 83.
- ⁵⁸ Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril*, p. 132.
- ⁵⁹ Iqbal, *Piyam-i-Mashriq* p. 198 (My own trans.)
- ⁶⁰ Iqbal, *Bang-i-Dara*, p. 54 (My own trans.)
- ⁶¹ Rumi, *Mathnawi* ed. by Maulvi Muhammad Nazir Naqashbandi, p. 384-
- ⁶² Rumi, *Mathnawi*, ii, 1481.
- ⁶³ Rumi, *Mathnawi*, i, 1609-

- ⁶⁴ R.A. Nicholson's *Commentary* III - VI verse 976.
⁶⁵ R.A. Nicholson, *The Secret of The Self*, op.cit., Intro. p.xix.
⁶⁶ Iqbal's *Zarb-i-Kalim*, p. 39 (trans.)
⁶⁷ Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril* p. 190 (My own trans.)
⁶⁸ Rumi, *Mathnawi*, i, 1930.
⁶⁹ Rumi, *Mathnawi*, i, 722.
⁷⁰ Rumi, *Mathnawi*, v, 1063-4.
⁷¹ Harold H. Titus, *Ethics For Today*, p. 508.
⁷² Rumi, *Mathnawi*, ii, 3562.
⁷³ R.A. Nicholson's *Commentary* on *Mathnawi* Book II, p.362.
⁷⁴ Iqbal, qt. by R.A. Nicholson, *The Secret of The Self*, Intro. p. xxviii.
⁷⁵ Iqbal. qt. by Mazher ud Din Siddiqi in *The Image of The West*, p. 1.14
⁷⁶ R.A. Nicholson, trans. of Iqbal's *Asrar-i-Khudi*, op.cit., p. 83-84.
⁷⁷ Qt. by Dr. A. Schimmel in *Gabriel's Wing*, p. 120.

THE UNIVERSE

Main Features

- ¹ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, op.cit., p. 13.
² Ibid., p. 110.
³ Copleston, op.cit., p. 181.
⁴ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p.71-72.
⁵ The Qur'an, qt. by Iqbal, Ibid., p. 10.
⁶ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, 34.
⁷ *The Reconstruction*, pp. 34-35.
⁸ Ibid., p. 51.
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ Ibid., p. 10.
¹¹ Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril*, p. 44 (trans.)

EVOLUTION

- ¹ Nietzsche, 'Eternal Recurrence', in *The Twilight of The Idols*, p. 237.
² William Kelley Wright, op.cit., p. 393.
³ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, op.cit., p. 127.
⁴ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 50.
⁵ Mahmud Ahmad, op.cit., p. 182-83.
⁶ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 54.
⁷ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 106.
⁸ Ibid., p. 12.
⁹ Iqbal, *Zarb-i-Kalim* p. 13 (trans.)
¹⁰ Iqbal, qt. by Dr. R.A. Nicholson, in *The Secret of The Self*, Intro. p. xxv.
¹¹ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 115.
¹² A. J. Arberry, trans. of Iqbal's *Ramuz-i-Bakhudi*, (Combined Ed. with *Asrar-o-Ramuz*), p. 53-54.

- ¹³ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 186-187.
¹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁵ Rumi, *Divan-i-Shams Tabriz*, qt. by A. Reza Arasteh, *Rumi The Persian*, p. 74.
¹⁶ *Mathnawi*, v 3854.

THE ULTIMATE REALITY

- ¹ Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, pp. 6-7.
² Ibid, p. 9.
³ N. Magill, *The Masterpieces of World Philosophy*, (Ed.) p. 687.
⁴ *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, p. 512.
⁵ Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 83.
⁶ Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 202.
⁷ Qt. by B.A. Dar in *Iqbal Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan* ed. by Hafeez Malik op. cit, p. 205.
⁸ Nietzsche, *Will to Power*, Book Three and Four, p. 96.
⁹ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 185.
¹⁰ Ibid., p. 185.
¹¹ Ibid., p. 182.
¹² Ibid., p. 182.
¹³ Ibid., p. 189.
¹⁴ Ibid., p. 184.
¹⁵ Ibid., p. 2.
¹⁶ Ibid., p. 189.
¹⁷ Ibid., p. 18.
¹⁸ Ibid., p. 78.
¹⁹ Qt. by Iqbal. *The Reconstruction*, p. 20.
²⁰ Ibid., p. 71, 106-107.
²¹ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 184.
²² Iqbal, qt. by Dr. R.A. Nicholson in trans. of *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. xviii-xix.
²³ M. A. M. Dar, trans., op.cit., p. 34.
²⁴ Ibid., p. 33.
²⁵ Khalifa Abdul Hakim (trans. Iqbal's verse, Bal-i-Jibril) in *Iqbal As A Thinker*.
²⁶ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 195.
²⁷ Ibid.
²⁸ Mahmud Ahmad, *Pilgrimage of Eternity* (trans. of Iqbal's *Javid Nama*), p. 141.

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

- ¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 217-218.
² Ibid.
³ A.J. Arberyy, op.cit., p. 29.

- ⁴ Anwar Beg, *The Poet of The East*, p. 316-317.
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 118.
- ⁶ Copleston, *History of Philosophy*, Vol.7, p. 177.
- ⁷ Ibid., p. 179.
- ⁸ William Kelley Wright op.cit., p. 396.
- ⁹ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 364.
- ¹⁰ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p.9.
- ¹¹ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 9-10.
- ¹² Khalifa A. Hakim, *Iqbal As A Thinker*, p. 177.
- ¹³ R.A. Nicholson, trans. of Iqbal's *Asrar-i-Khudi*, op.cit., p. 72-78.
- ¹⁴ Iqbal, *Javid Nama*, p. 176-177.
- ¹⁵ Iqbal, *The Reconstruction*, p. 194-195.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 195.
- ¹⁷ Khalifa A. Hakim, op. cit., p.177.

WILLIAM JAMES AND IQBAL

I. THE HUMAN SELF

1. Nature of the Self

DIFFERENCE

JAMES

i. Pure Self

William James does not believe in self as substance or entity. Also, to him self is not transcendental as we find in Kant's philosophy. He does not approve either the old atomistic psychology of the English school, according to which thought is regarded as "a series of separate ideas mechanically associated." For instance, Locke and Berkeley, think, "the objects of perception consist of a number of distinct and separate sensations or impressions." For Hume, "the mind ever perceives any real connection among distinctive existence."¹

James puts forward the theory of the self, which he calls 'pure Ego.'² This is free of the above limitations. "For James, the activity in the spiritual self, so called, was actually found to be, not spiritual, but rather a sort of obscure body process generally localized within the head. Attending, accepting, negating, making an effort - all seemed to James to involve these head movements."³

James, like most of the philosophers of today, does not believe self as substance or entity. Unlike Kant he does not consider self as transcendental. He does not agree with the old atomistic psychology of English school according to

which thought is regarded as a series of separate mental states mechanically assembled.

ii. Passing thought is thinker

For William James, the self, which is 'pure self', is principle of personal identity. It is passing thought, and the only thinker, superimposed in some mysterious way on the brain.⁴ In one word, the self, to James, is thinker and not an object of thought. He says, "Consciousness...as a psychological fact, can be fully described without supposing any other agent than a succession of perishing thought..."⁵ How does passing thought operate and maintain its unity and continuity? For James, the succession of perishing thoughts is endowed with function of appropriation and rejection.⁶ There is a felt unity. The thinker is the postulate of the present thought. The present thought knows the past thought due to latter's 'warmth and intimacy' Every thought passes away leaving itself to the next thought. Thus a certain "warmth and intimacy" is the unifying process. For James, "Ideas have hooks in them. Each later thought, knowing and including thus the thoughts which sent before, is the final receptacle- and appropriating them in the final owner- of all that they contain and own. Each thought is thus born an owner, and dies onward, transmitting whatever it realized its self to its own later proprietor."⁷ William James explains it further by comparing "the 'experiences' of a single person to a herd of cattle all of which bear the brand: but whereas in the case of the cattle, the brand signifies that they have a common owner who is not identical with any one of them, in the case of the experiences, the 'title of ownership is passed around among themselves."⁸

iii. Stream of Consciousness

Again, for James, consciousness is continuum and not chopped up in bits. He says, in the words of Will Durant that "thought is not a series, it is stream, a continuity of perception of feeling, in which ideas are passing nodules like corpuscles

in the blood.”⁹ Further, ‘we have mental “states” (though this is again a misleadingly static term) that correspond to prepositions, verbs, adverbs and conjunctions, as well as “states” that reflect the nouns and pronouns of our speech; we have feelings of *for* and *to* and *against* and *because* and *behind* and *after* as well as of matter of men. It is these “transitive” elements in the *flow* of thought that constitute the thread of our mental life, and give us some measure of continuity of things.’¹⁰

However, James believes this self as physical phenomena. Robert I. Watson, Sr. rightly says, “To introduce a “knower” beyond... is to proceed beyond psychology into metaphysics.”¹¹

To Will Durant, “The direction of his thought is always to things; and if he begins with psychology it is not as metaphysician who loves to lose himself in ethereal obscurities, but as a realist to whom thought, however distinct it may be from matter, is essentially a mirror of external and physical reality.”¹²

William James’s views, as described above, do possess some inherent limitations. Firstly, it is not understood as to how the thought, which plays as unifying agent of one’s experiences differ from the rest of the stream of thought. Dr. Absar rightly says, “the agent, which unifies the stream of one’s experiences and represents them as the experiences of one and the same self is itself a particular chunk of thought from amongst the stream of thought. It is, however, not at all explained how and in what way it is different from the others whom it knows and appropriates in a *deus ex-machina* fashion.”¹³

Secondly the subtle question is as to how the thought can explain the self as subject? Obviously the ‘passing thought’ cannot explain the characteristics and unity of the self. “Assuming that the present pulse of the stream is able to exercise all the functions attributed to the self or ego at any moment, the question arises, How are we to account for its special characteristics, and for the selection made out of the total complex presented at any moment, and thus account for the concrete unity then manifested. The ‘passing thought’

cannot possibly be made to explain this, for it has no substantial identity with it.”¹⁴

Thirdly, James’s theory of consciousness is not satisfactory. It misses the relatively permanent element in experience on one hand and fails to make unity on the other. Iqbal has pointedly criticised William James on this point. He says, “Consciousness is something single, presupposed in all mental life, and not bits of consciousness mutually reporting to one another. This view of consciousness, far from giving us any clue to the ego, entirely ignores relatively permanent element in experience. There is no continuity of being between the passing thoughts. When one of these is present, the other has totally disappeared; and how can the passing thought, which is irrevocably lost, be known and appropriated by the present thought?”¹⁵

From this point of view James could neither give unity to the stream of consciousness, nor ignore the need of the concrete self. Robert I. Watson. Sr. rightly says, “in his exposition of the consciousness of self he dismissed the soul as an unnecessary burden upon psychology. Nevertheless, in dealing with other topics postulating the soul, it became the “least objectionable” of the available hypotheses. There was a selective consciousness within the self by which certain experiences could be disregarded.”¹⁶

IQBAL

Iqbal’s concept of the self is much different from that of William James. James’ self is nothing more than a thinker. It is physical phenomena, whereas to Iqbal the self is a spiritual reality. Iqbal considers the self not just a ‘Thinker’. For him it is ‘illuminous point’. It has a permanent element though it is not an entity, substance or transcendental self. It is spiritual and proceeds from “Lord’s Amr (Command) - “the directive energy of God.”¹⁷

Iqbal calls it ‘appreciative self’ or ‘appreciative side of the self’¹⁸ We can intuit it only in profound meditation. Iqbal says, “A deeper analysis of conscious experience reveals to us

what I have called the appreciative side of the self.... In life-process of this deeper ego the states of consciousness melt into each other.”¹⁹ The self lives in duration i.e. non-serial time. He says, “the ego lives in eternity by which term I mean non-successional change.”²⁰

According to Iqbal self is not above the inner experience. He says, “I do not mean to say that the ego is over and above the mutually penetrating multiplicity we call experience. Inner experience is the ego at work. We appreciate the ego itself in the act of perceiving, judging, and willing. The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience.”²¹

For Iqbal, though the ego emerges within the spatio-temporal order it reaches the status where ultimate reality reveals its secret. James could not realize this vision. Iqbal bases his view on the Qur’anic teaching He quotes:

Now of fine clay have We created man: There We placed him, a moist germ, in a safe abode; then made We the moist germ a clot of blood: then made the clotted blood into a piece of flesh; then made the piece of flesh into bones: and We clothed the bones with flesh: *then brought forth man of yet another make.* Blessed, therefore, the God- the most excellent of makers.’ (22: 12- 14)²²

In the light of the above, he says that the “‘yet another make’ of man develops on the basis of physical organism--- that colony of sub-egos through which a profounder Ego constantly acts on me, and thus permits me to build up a systematic unity of experience.”²³

Iqbal cogently throws light on the process of emergence of the self. For Iqbal there is no inert matter. It is “A colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of co-ordination. It is the world reaching the point of self-guidance wherein the ultimate Reality, perhaps, reveals its secret, and furnishes a clue to its ultimate nature. The fact that the higher emerges out of the lower does not rob the higher of its worth and dignity. It is not the origin of

a thing that matters; it is the capacity, the significance, and the final reach of the emergent that matters... The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge is immanent in nature, and is described by the Qur'an as 'the First and the Last, the visible and the invisible.'²⁴

Iqbal calls it real self. It cannot live or develop without contact with external reality. As said before, it is formed and disciplined by its own experiences. Thus it has 'efficient side' also, as Iqbal denominates it.²⁵ The efficient side of the self, though organically related with the appreciative side of the self, concerns with external world. It belongs to the world of space. Explaining the nature of the efficient self, Iqbal says, "on its efficient side it enters into relation with what we call the world of space. The efficient self is the subject of associationist psychology- the practical self of daily life in its dealing with the external order of things which determine our passing states of consciousness and stamp on these states their own spatial feature of mutual isolation. The self here lives outside itself as it were, and, while retaining its unity as a totality, discloses itself as nothing more than a series of specific and consequently numerable states."²⁶ He says that the efficient self "lives in serial time, which I conceive as organically related to eternity in the sense that it is a measure of non-successional change."²⁷ Referring to the Qur'an he says, "In this sense alone it is possible to understand the Qur'anic verse: 'To God belongs the alternation of day and night.'²⁸

Next, contrary to James's passing thought which lacks continuity of being, for Iqbal the self possesses unity and continuity. It "reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states."²⁹ For him, "The unity of the appreciative ego is like that unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is unlike the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly qualitative. There is change and movement, but this change and movement are indivisible; their elements inter-penetrate and are wholly nonserial in character."³⁰

Unlike James's stream of consciousness Iqbal believes thought as organic. It is identical with life. Iqbal's thought also moves beyond physical sense. He says, "...thought has a deeper movement also. While it appears to break up Reality into static fragments its real function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels, which experience presents. It is as much organic as life. The movement of life, as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of its various stages. Without this synthesis it will cease to be organic growth... In conscious experience life and thought permeate each other. They form a unity. Thought, therefore, in its true nature, is identical with life."³¹ Iqbal further proves the unity of mental states by taking thought and being as ultimately one. Thought "is a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate ground and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self determined end."³²

Again, Iqbal states that the unity of directive purpose holds together the self, which is an act. He says that "my real personality is not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, and held together by the unity of a directive purpose. My whole reality lies in my directive attitude."³³

The above comparative study reveals a great *difference* between the concepts of Iqbal and William James. It is easy to understand that William James, being a thoroughgoing empiricist, could not have the vision of appreciative self, deeper movement and potency of thought, which keep the internal unity of the self intact. It was lot of a visionary like Iqbal whose genius was inspired by the Qur'an.

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

Despite this *difference* Iqbal seems to follow William James on a certain point. Reason and percept are supplementary to

each other according to both James and Iqbal. William James says, “we hang concepts upon percepts and percepts on concepts interchangeably and indefinitely; ---- The world we practically live in is one in which it is impossible, except by theoretic retrospection, to disentangle the contribution of intellect from that of sense. They are wrapt and rolled together as a gunshot in the mountains is wrapt and rolled in fold on fold of echo and reverberative clamour.”³⁴ Iqbal also believes that both reason and perception are important and supplement each other. He says, “complete independence of thought from concrete experience is not possible.”³⁵

But Iqbal bases his view on the verdicts of the Qur’an. He says, “The search for rational foundations in Islam may be regarded to have begun with the Prophet himself. His constant prayer was; ‘God! Grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things!’”³⁶ But he does not believe in abstract logical entities. The construction of concepts is raised on the foundation of sense perception. It is why he condemns Greek philosophy for not taking into account physical phenomena, like the starry heavens, changes of the winds and alternation of the day and night, etc. as elaborately discussed earlier.

2. Freedom of Will

DIFFERENCE

JAMES

i. Indeterminism

William James believes in indeterminism, which maintains that some volitional decisions are uncaused and unmotivated. Indeterminism is the other extreme of thoroughgoing determinism, which pronounces human freedom ineligible. Determinism is a scientific postulate according to which nature and man are subject to law of causation; and human behaviour is the result of antecedent events. The agent’s character and external pressure determine man’s choice. On the contrary, according to indeterminism, in the words of

D.D. Runes, “volitional decisions are in certain cases independent of antecedent physiological and psychological causation.”¹ Again, “A free-will in this sense is at least partially uncaused or is not related in a uniform way with the agent’s character, motives and circumstances.”²

ii. Chance, novelty and spontaneity

William James advocates the place of chance, novelty, and spontaneity. He says, “Indeterminate future volitions *do* mean chance.”³ Again, in his essay, “The Dilemma of Determinism” he says that the universe is a pluriverse, which contains objective possibilities of novelty. He insists that future is not entirely the product of the past. According to James there are ambiguous possibilities hidden in the womb of the future.”⁴ And future generates new directions which cannot be “deduced” from the past.”⁵ Beyond the facts of heredity and environment or law of causation man exercises his freedom of will. In the words of William Kelly Wright “In his psychological works James finds that in voluntary attention, in addition to what is determined by heredity, environment and past habits, there remains a certain freedom of choice exercised in a *fiat* which is our own.”⁶

In a nutshell, for William James future is ambiguous and some human volitions are uncaused and unmotivated and so also are the characteristics of spontaneity, novelty and chance.

IQBAL

Iqbal’s concept is qualitatively different from that of William James. Iqbal approves neither thoroughgoing determinism nor indeterminism. He believes in self-determinism— a middle way between the two extremes. Self-determinism, as D.D. Runes observes, consists “in decision independent of external constraint but in accordance with the inner motives and ideals of the agent.”⁷ According to Harold Titus, self determinism maintains that “man as a self-conscious being has the ability for personal initiative and response, that he is a centre of creativity, and that within

limits he is able to reshape himself to influence the behaviors of his fellows, and to redirect the processes of the outer world.⁸ Again, for Harold Titus, human freedom is “the ability to act on the basis of self-chosen ends, which are themselves influenced by experiences, thoughts, motives, desires, and needs.”⁹

For Iqbal, our decisions are not uncaused and unmotivated. It is our ego or self which motivates our actions. It is above the mechanical law of causation. He calls it “a free personal causality”, which is, to him, ‘a special kind of causality’¹⁰ To Iqbal, the future is not capricious and ambiguous. Iqbal is undoubtedly a committed believer of spontaneity and novelty but to him it does not mean that future is not ‘grafted with the past’ or the ego’s activity is blind or purposeless. Man’s activity is self-determined. He forms fresh ends and purposes according to his inner motives and ideals. Abrupt changes do not mean that these are not organically related. The present fulfilment does not exclude the past. While commenting on Bergson’s concept of teleology Iqbal pointedly says, that we shape and change ends and purposes and are reciprocally governed by them, according to the needs as life grows and expands. “We become by ceasing to be what we are. Life is a passage through a series of deaths. But there is system in the continuity of this passage. Its various stages, in spite of the apparently abrupt changes in our evaluation of things, are organically related to one another. The life-history of the individual is, on the whole, a unity and not a mere series of mutually ill-adapted events.”¹¹ Iqbal continues to say that time process “is a line in drawing - an actualization of open possibilities. It is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character, and brings itself to some sort of present fulfillment by actively preserving and supplementing the past.”¹²

Iqbal adds to his argument that man’s efforts and success in achieving his goal prove him as a casual agent. He says that the “sense of striving in the experience of purposive action and the success which I actually achieve in reaching my ‘ends’

that convince me of my efficiency as a personal cause. The essential feature of a purposive act is its vision of a future situation which does not appear to admit any explanation in terms of physiology.”¹³ Iqbal pointedly says, “the element of guidance and directive control in the ego’s activity clearly shows that ego is a free personal causality.”¹⁴

This should not delude us to conclude that Iqbal denies the place of physical law of causation. In fact, Iqbal believes it as an essential vehicle for ego’s development. For him the streams of casualty flow into it (ego) from Nature and from it to Nature.”¹⁵ He says, “The ego is called upon to live in a complex environment, and he cannot maintain his life in it without reducing it to a system which would give him some kind of assurance as to the behaviour of things around him. The view of the environment as a system of cause and effect is thus an indispensable instrument of the ego... Indeed in interpreting Nature in this way the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom.”¹⁶ Iqbal simply says that law of physical causation is “not a final expression of the nature of Reality.”¹⁷

Iqbal does not stop here. He goes much farther. He builds two other concepts of freedom of ego relating to self-determinism, which too reveal him pole-asunder from William James... These are: (1) earned freedom and (2) synthesis of freedom and determinism.

(1) Iqbal believes in earned freedom. About the acquisition of freedom of the ego Iqbal says, “the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom.”¹⁸ Again, writing to Dr. R.A. Nicholson, Iqbal explains, “The ego attains to freedom by the removal of all obstructions in its ways.”¹⁹ To elaborate, proper understanding and mastering of environment and removal of obstructions imply more love for goal, self-consciousness, intelligence, knowledge of actual situations, struggle and creativity. These factors ensure freedom of ego. The more one is adorned with these qualities, the more free he becomes by shunning passivity, ignorance,

superstitions and fear. It is obvious that the above positive qualities cannot be earned without self-determinism.

- (2) For Iqbal, freedom and determinism go hand in hand with self-determinism. It is revealed in a highly developed personality, wherein both freedom and determinism are synthesized. Man of God, who attains height of freedom by binding himself by laws of God and His love, is really a free man. Iqbal beautifully says:

Endeavour to obey, O heedless one!

Liberty is the fruit of compulsion.

By obedience the man of no worth is made worthy;

By disobedience his fire is turned to ashes.²⁰

Again, Iqbal says:

The one prostration (before God), which you do with such a heavy heart,

Saves you from a thousand prostrations (before others)²¹

It is obvious that this obedience cannot occur without personal causality. Hence the indispensable place of self-determinism cannot be ignored in this context.

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

Iqbal agrees with James so far as the latter's stance against Determinism is concerned. But his philosophy of Self-Determinism is quite different from that of James.

Actually, Iqbal bases his concept of freedom of the ego on the Islamic tenets, as said before. He turns to Islam in support of his arguments. He says, "Islam recognizes a very important fact of human psychology, i.e. the rise and fall of the power to act freely, and freely, and is anxious to retain the power to act freely as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego. The timing of the daily prayer which according to the Qur'an restores 'self-possession to the ego by bringing it into closer touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanizing effects of sleep and business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom."²²

That man is the trustee of a free personality, which involves hardships and perils, is a Qur'anic concept. Iqbal quotes:

Verily We proposed to the Heavens, and to the Earth, and to the mountains to receive the "trust", but they refused the burden and they feared to receive it. Man undertook to bear it, but hath proved unjust, senseless! (33:72)²³

Also, the Qur'an is clear on man's status as self-determinist and free causal agent. Iqbal refers to the Qur'an as follows:-

Verily God will not change the condition of men, till they change what is in themselves. (13:12)-²⁴

If ye do well to your own behoof will ye do well: and if ye did evil against yourselves will ye do it (17:7)²⁵

Iqbal acknowledges that Islam adopts middle way of self-determinism. In this connection he refers to the Tradition of the Prophet. Describing the nature of the self he says:

What should I say about its character?

Outwardly it is determined, inwardly it is free.

Such is the saying of the Lord of Badr.

That faith lies between determinism and indeterminism.²⁶

Also, the acquisitions, and the synthesis of freedom of will and determinism, are Islamic concepts as discussed before. According to Iqbal, only God's men are truly free. The more they determine themselves according to the orders of God the more they are free. And this is the place where freedom and determinism are synthesized.

II. THE UNIVERSE

1. Empiricism

DIFFERENCE

JAMES

Radical experience

William James is not a mentalist. He is an empiricist; actually he is a radical empiricist, as he calls himself. He believes in radical experience or pure experience that is an

experience before being touched by conceptual thinking. He says, 'Pure experience' is the name which I give to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories...an experience in the literal sense of that which is not yet any definite what... Its purity is only a relative term, meaning the proportional amount of unverballed sensation which it still embodies."¹ Frank Thilly beautifully explains James's radical empiricism thus: "We must take experience as it exists before it has been manipulated by conceptual thinking - experience in its purity and pristine innocence - if we would reach reality. We must go behind the conceptual function altogether and look to the more primitive flux of the sensational life for reality's true shape. Philosophy should seek this kind of living understanding of the movement of reality and not follow science in vainly patching together fragments of its dead results. Philosophy is more a matter of passionate vision than of logic; logic only finds reason for the vision afterwards."²

IQBAL

Iqbal, undoubtedly, recognizes the importance of perception. He argues that man, who has to maintain his life in an obstructing environment, cannot afford to ignore the visible.³ For him perception is the 'observable aspect of reality'. As we shall discuss later, Iqbal refers to the Qur'an, which emphasizes the need of sense perception.

But Iqbal is not an empiricist like Western empiricists who would recognize the place of perception only. He is not a radical empiricist either like James. Iqbal considers empiricism as the base of knowledge, wherein (1) reason and (2) intuition also play important roles.

(1) Iqbal states that perception contributes to develop reason and unless the latter organizes the former the object is not properly knowable. Iqbal maintains, "Knowledge is sense-perception elaborated by understanding."⁴ Iqbal, thus, gives due place to intellect. For him man, "by coming into contact with the dynamic and concrete environment, has

developed intellect and thus made a great contribution toward the enhancement of culture and civilization.”⁵ It is not out of place to mention that Iqbal is not against intellect or reason, as it is generally believed by some erudite. He opposes only ultra-intellectualism, which is discursive and plays no role in religious knowledge.

- (2) Iqbal does not stop here. For him Intellect is amenable to further development. When developed it paves the way for intuition without which perception and intellect are unable to grasp reality. Iqbal says “intellectual effort to overcome obstruction offered by it, besides enriching and amplifying our life, sharpens our insight, and thus prepares us for a more masterful insertion into subtler aspects of human experience. It is our reflective contact with the temporal flux of things, which trains us for an intellectual vision of the non-temporal. He further says, “The scientific observation of Nature keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality, and thus sharpens our inner perception for a deeper vision of it.”⁶ To Iqbal, thought has deeper movement also. He says, “In its deeper movement... thought is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments. In its essential nature, then, thought is not static; it is dynamic and unfolds its internal infinitude in time like the seed which, from the very beginning, carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact.”⁷

For Iqbal, thus, perception is not the only reality. To him the trio of sense perception, Intellect, and Intuition make an organic whole without which a comprehensive and complete vision of reality is not possible. This trio is organically related and each is the integral part of the whole experience.

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

Empirical views

However both James and Iqbal are empiricists. But Iqbal is not follower of James. Iqbal obviously gets inspiration

from the Qur'an. That perception develops intellect is a Qur'anic concept to Iqbal. He refers to the Qur'an:

God causeth the day and the night to take their turn. Verily in this is teaching for men of insight. (24:44)⁸

He says, "the immediate purpose of the Qur'an in this reflective observation of Nature is to awaken in man the consciousness of that of which Nature is regarded a symbol."⁹ Further, Islam advocates synthesis of reason and love. He says, "The Qur'an, recognising that the empirical attitude is an indispensable stage in the spiritual life of humanity, attaches equal importance to all the regions of human experiences as yielding knowledge of the ultimate Reality which reveals its symbols both within and without"¹⁰. Again, Iqbal has exhaustively referred to the Qur'an.¹¹ Iqbal continues to draw our attention to the emphasis, which the Qur'an lays on the observable aspect of Reality: He quotes:

'Can they not look up to the clouds, how they are created; and to the Heaven how it is upraised; and the mountains how they are rooted, and to the earth how it is outspread? (88:17)¹²

Undoubtedly, William James is an empiricist and lays great emphasis on the value of experience. For him, empiricism is not alien to true religion. He says, "Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin."¹³ For Iqbal also, empirical experience plays a vital role in religion. It is one of the three sources of knowledge. He says, "The scientific observation of Nature keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality, and thus sharpens our inner perception for a deeper vision of it."¹⁴

But Iqbal's source of inspiration is obviously the Qur'an. In this context his comments on Greek Philosophy are significant. Criticising Socrates he says, "Socrates concentrated his attention on the human world alone. To him the proper study of man was man and not the world of plants, insects, and stars. How unlike the spirit of Qur'an,

which sees in the humble bee a recipient of Divine inspiration and constantly calls upon the reader to observe the perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of day and night, and clouds, the starry heavens, and the planets swimming through infinite space!"¹⁵ In the same manner, Iqbal criticises Plato who "despised sense-perception which... yielded mere opinion and not real knowledge."¹⁶

2. Pluralism

DIFFERENCE

JAMES

Pluralistic World

James believes the world as pluralistic. He calls it 'multiverse'. As our experience reveals multiplicity, diversity and plurality, so also there is plurality in the universe. For William James it is an unfinished world. It ensures individual freedom and meets the demand of moral nature.

Pluralism is contrary to monist's claim according to which all men and matter are the effect of the primitive nebula or infinite substance or omnipotent deity. For monist the world is an absolute unity in every respect. It is complete unified and undifferentiated and absolute; and all differences and oppositions are reconciled."¹⁷ This monistic world is thus, determined and we are puppets in the hands of the absolute substance. It snatches individuality, freedom, moral responsibility struggle, and effort. It negates individual choice and novelty. Monism "creates a problem of evil; it does not account for change; and it is fatalistic."¹⁸

In consonance of his philosophy of freedom of will, William James' concept of multiverse champions the cause of action and choice. Explaining James' view point Will Durant says, "The value of multiverse, as compared with a universe, lies in this, that where there are cross-currents and warring forces our own strength and will may count and help decide the issue; it is world where nothing is irrevocably settled, and all action matters."¹⁹To James, as Will Durrant further

explains, "We can write some lines of the parts we play, and our choices mould in some measure the future in which we have to live. In such a world we can be free; it is a world of chance, and not of fate; everything is "not quite"; and what we are or do may alter everything. If Cleopatra's nose, said Pascal, had been an inch longer or shorter, all history would have been changed."²⁰

But there is no unity among plurality of things in James' scheme of thought. James admits there is some degree of organisation in the world. But it is just so much as we can find pragmatically. It is linked together as we experience it. "The world is one just so far as we experience it to be concatenated, and it is many just so far no definite connection obtains between its parts. James is therefore *Pluralist* understanding by pluralism the denial that the world is an absolute unity in every respect, as the monists claim."²¹ Actually James, like other Western empiricists confine his empiricism to physical sense perception only. Thus the unity, which he tries to give to the objects, including man, is external. Thus it is a superficial unity.

IQBAL

On the contrary, for *Iqbal*, unity of things is internal. According to him, every thing from higher to lower is ego (even the matter is lower ego). Iqbal maintains unity of things by rejecting the view of inert matter. Iqbal believes modern theory of Relativity, which negates the concept of inert matter. He endorses Russell who says, "Matter, for common sense, is something which persists in time and moves in space. But for modern relativity-physics this view is no longer tenable. A piece of matter has become not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of inter-related events. The old solidity is gone, and with it the characteristics that to the materialist made matter seem more real than fleeting thought."²² In this sense Iqbal is spiritual monist. But he does not believe Monism in the sense of pantheism, which means

every thing, is God. This, of course makes the universe as block universe and all things eternally fixed.

Iqbal states that each soul is derived from the directive energy of God.²³ Thus the unity of things is internal.

For him, Islam does not believe in Absolutism. For his concept of pluralism Iqbal pointedly refers to the Qur'an. The Qur'an acknowledges the multiverse thus:

See ye not how God hath put under you all that is in the Heavens, and all that is on the earth, and hath been bounteous to you of His favour both in relation to the seen and unseen (31:19).²⁴

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

i. Expandable Universe

For James, the universe is expandable. It is not a closed universe; it is a growing universe. He believes that novelties occur and future is having new directions.²⁵ Iqbal also believes in expansion of the universe. But the source of this idea is not James. Rather it is the Qur'anic. Iqbal says, "the universe is so constituted that it is capable of extension:

He (God) adds to His creation what he wills.' (35:1).²⁶

Again, Iqbal maintains and refers to the Qur'an. "It is not a block universe, a finished product, immobile and incapable of change. Deep in its inner being lies, perhaps, the dream of a new birth:

Say - go through the earth and see how God hath brought forth all creation: hereafter will He give it another birth.(29:19)²⁷

Iqbal holds that this concept of expandable universe is one of the fundamental points, which differentiates Islamic thought from the Greek thought. He says that this is the Qur'anic idea which "eventually brought Muslim thinkers into conflict with Greek thought which, in the beginning of their intellectual career, they had studied with so much enthusiasm." Further, he says, "Einstein is quite right in saying that the universe is finite but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase (shan in the Qur'anic language) of God's extensively infinite consciousness and boundless, because the creative power of

God is intensively infinite. The Qur'anic way of expressing the same truth is that the universe is liable to increase. This simple truth mentioned in the Qur'an was the greatest blow given to the Deductive systems of thought that existed before Islam, and to the circular view of the movement of Time, common to all the Aryan modes of thought."²⁸

Iqbal briefly asserts "To my mind nothing is more alien to the Qur'anic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a preconceived plan."²⁹

ii. Meliorism

James believes, like Iqbal, in Meliorism. Meliorism is a view, "that the world is neither completely evil nor completely good, but that the relative amounts of good and evil are changeable, that good is capable of increase. Human effort to improve the world can be effective in making the world better and probably the trend of biological and social evolution tends in that direction. Opposed to Optimism and Pessimism. The term was coined by George Eliot."³⁰

William Kelly Wright has pointedly explained it thus: 'Associated with James' belief that our wills are to some extent free and undetermined is his insistence that by exercising our choices we can help to make the world better. This is *meliorism* (from *melior*, better), the doctrine that while the world is not absolutely good (optimism) nor absolutely bad (pessimism), it is capable of improvement. We as empiricists must face the facts as we see them. Many facts are good, and many are bad. We must not, with the absolute idealists, try to explain away evil, and rationalize ourselves into thinking that it is already part of an eternal good. We must not, with Schopenhauer, try to explain away the good, and rationalize ourselves into thinking that all existence is evil. We must frankly recognize the world for what it is, a mixture of good and evil. But since we have free choices, and are living in a changing, budding universe, we can help in our humble way to make it better.... We are free men in a world of novelty which we can at least try to improve."³¹

IQBAL

For *Iqbal* though it is difficult to put weight on the side of optimism or pessimism at the present stage of our knowledge of the universe, the teaching of the Qur'an is meliorist. He says, "To the optimist Browning all is well with the world; to the pessimist Schopenhauer the world is one perpetual winter wherein a blind will expresses itself in an infinite variety of living things which bemoan their emergence for a moment and then disappear for ever. The issue thus raised between optimism and pessimism cannot be finally decided at the present stage of our knowledge of the universe. Our intellectual constitution is such that we can take only a piecemeal view of things. We cannot understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoc, and at the same time sustain and amplify life."³²

The source of Iqbal's view is the Qur'an. He says, "The teaching of the Qur'an, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognizes a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil."³³

III. THE ULTIMATE REALITY

Main Characteristics

DIFFERENCE

JAMES

God – Wider Self – Pragmatic yardstick

William James thinks that God is only 'more' or 'wider self'. For him, "the believer is continuous, to his own consciousness at any rate with a wider self from which saving experiences flow in,"¹

Again, God is some super human life. He says that "the drift of all the evidence we have seems to me to sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious."²

He measures the validity of God's existence with the yardstick of pragmatism. For him this is the only test. He upholds "the instinctive belief of mankind: God is real since He produces real effects."³ For *James*, pragmatism's "only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us to what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demand, nothing being omitted. If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly deny God's existence."⁴

In the words of Titus, "Certain doctrines, like the doctrine of the belief in the existence of God, are comforting and strengthening; their usefulness establishes their validity. Men have a right to accept certain beliefs as hypotheses and to test them in the process of living; if they lead to favourable consequences, they are valid. In this way pragmatism was used to justify some traditional and orthodox belief."⁵

James' concept of God is disappointing from religious point of view. He does not define what of God. He believes in existence of God only because it is a useful idea. He believes Him as 'other' with some superhuman life. He is not personal God with attributes of infinity, omnipotence, omniscient and eternity etc. Bertrand Russell rightly says, "James is interested in religion as a human phenomena, but shows little interest in the objects which religion contemplates. He wants people to be happy, and if belief in God makes them happy let them believe in Him. This, so far, is only benevolence, not philosophy; it becomes philosophy when it is said that if the belief makes them happy it is 'true'. To the man who desires an object of worship this is unsatisfactory. He is not concerned to say, 'If I believed in God I should be happy'. He is concerned to say, 'I believe in God and therefore I am happy'. And when he believes in God, he believes in Him as he believes in the existence of Roosevelt or Churchill or Hitler; God, for him, is an actual Being, not merely a human idea, which has good effects. It is this genuine belief that has the good effects, not James emasculate substitute. It is obvious that if I say 'Hitler exists'

I do not mean ‘the effects of believing that Hitler exists are good’. And to the genuine believer the same is true of God.”⁶ Will Durant comments that James’s God is just an article put on sale. He says, “James talks of God as of an article to be sold to a materialistically-minded consumer by every device of optimistic advertising; and he counsels us to believe as if he were recommending long-term investments, with high dividends, in which there was nothing to lose, and all the (other) world to win. It was younger American’s defense-reaction against European metaphysics and European science.”⁷

Again, for William Wright, James’ is a materialistic approach of a businessman. He believes in God only for getting benefits. “*In other cases*, neither scientific nor moral, as in *religion* for instance, James is more vague. What he seems to mean in essays like “The Will to Believe” is that in fields in which exact scientific knowledge is at present unavailable, we have a *right* to accept, on our own risk that we may be mistaken, such beliefs as most appeal to our emotional natures and appear likely to prove fruitful in our lives. If belief in God, for instance, will give a person courage and confidence, and make him a happier and more useful man, he has the right to believe in the existence of God. There are even cases in which belief in an idea leads to conduct that makes the idea become true in the end, whereas want of confidence would have caused the idea to provide untrue.”⁸

Further, “The evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experiences. This evidence must be balanced by that of all our other accepted truths, and they by it. Our final opinion can be settled only after all the evidence has been straightened out. This illustration shows that for James, pragmatism is not concerned exclusively with the immediate consequences of a belief; the ultimate fate of human life on the earth is a matter for pragmatic consideration.”⁹

IQBAL

Though *Iqbal* believes God as Ultimate Ego, God is not just ‘other’ or ‘super’ human self. He is personal God with

attributes like Eternity,¹⁰ Creativeness,¹¹ Omniscience,¹² and Omnipotence.¹³ He is immanent as well as transcendental.¹⁴

Again, Iqbal's belief in God is not just pragmatic as advocated by James. Though belief in God carries a great pragmatic value for the development of human personality, yet love of God for the sake of love remains basic in Iqbal.

Further, as M.M. Sharif rightly says, "William James considers faith almost instinctive with every man. Iqbal goes further and finds in the prayer of the faithful a proof for the existence of God. Prayer seeks fellowship with God. Once a true seeker gets that fellowship, he gets a sweet intuition of Reality — an intuition of God, and desires no further proof of His existence."¹⁵ The culmination of this intuition is that the Prophet of Islam (p.b.u.h) experienced Reality face to face in Ascension. Iqbal says:

Moses fainted away by a mere surface illumination of Reality:
Thou seest the very substance of Reality with a smile.¹⁶

Finitude of God

For James, God is finite and not all-powerful. He is limited "either in power or in knowledge or in both at once."¹⁷ If he were powerful and infinite, there would be no evil and the question of our freedom to combat evil would not arise. He says that "the Creator himself would not need to know all the details of activity until they came; and at any time his own view of the world would be a view partly of facts and partly of possibilities, exactly as our is now."¹⁸ Again, God is "not all-embracing."¹⁹

IQBAL

But Iqbal pointedly differs with James. For Iqbal, God is not finite in the sense of James. To Iqbal, God's Infinitude is intensive and not extensive²⁰ without eclipsing man's freedom and action. There is nothing, which is external to God "The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him."²¹ Again, "Nature or the not self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God."²² He is

omnipotent but His omnipotence is not devoid of Divine Wisdom. "All activity, creational or otherwise, is a kind of limitation without which it is impossible to conceive God as a concrete operative Ego. Omnipotence, abstractly conceived, is merely a blind, capricious power without limits. The Qur'an has a clear and definite conception of Nature as a cosmos of mutually related forces. It therefore, views Divine omnipotence as intimately related to Divine wisdom, and finds the infinite power of God revealed not in the arbitrary and the capricious, but in the recurrent, the regular, and the orderly."²³

Polytheism

James does not believe in one consistent will due to the diversity of the world. He maintains, "It is useless to say that this chaos in which we live and move is the result of one consistent will; it gives every sign of contradiction and division within itself. Perhaps the ancients were wiser than we, and polytheism may be truer than monotheism to the astonishing diversity of the world. Such polytheism "has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still today."²⁴

William Kelley Wright has analyzed James's polytheism thus:

At times, owing to his pluralistic leanings and his dislike of the Absolute, he even half playfully suggests that there may be several gods in the universe, instead of only one.²⁵

IQBAL

On the contrary, for Iqbal Tauhid (The Unity of God) is the first pillar.²⁶ About Tauhid he says,

*There is no God but God: this is the soul
And body of our pure Community,
The pitch that keeps our instrument in tune,
The very substance of our mysteries,
The knotted thread that binds our scattered thoughts.*²⁷

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

JAMES

i. Personal God

However, there is some affinity between William James and Iqbal's concepts. For instance, we find some similarity between their concepts of 'personal God'. For James, He is a 'superhuman person.'²⁸ We know God as we know some other person. He says, 'It is as if there were in the human consciousness, *a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call "something" there, more deep and more general than any of the special and particular "senses" by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. If this were so, we might suppose the senses to waken our attitudes and conduct as they so habitually do, by first exciting this sense of reality; but any thing else, any idea, for example, that might similarly excite it, would have that same prerogative of appearing real which objects of sense normally possess.'²⁹

Iqbal also believes in Personal God. He regards "the ultimate Reality to be a rationally directed life which, in view of our experience of life, cannot be conceived except as an organic whole, a something closely knot together and possessing a central point of reference. This being the character of life, the ultimate life can only be conceived as an ego."³⁰ Further, Iqbal states that God is "a unique Other Self" with whom "the mystic state is a moment of intimate association."³¹ Again, replying to the question as to how God is experienced as a Independent Other Self, Iqbal refers to the analogy of our daily social experience. He says, "We possess no sense for the experience of other minds. The only ground of my knowledge of a conscious being before me is the physical moments similar to my own from which I infer the presence of another conscious being.... Response is, no doubt, the test of the presence of a conscious self...."³² Thus, the ultimate Ego is personal as He responds to our calls and prayers.

But, for this too, Iqbal has not banked upon William James. The Qur'an is replete with numerous expressions, which speak of God's responses to our calls and prayers. In connection with the above views, Iqbal himself quotes several verses from the Qur'an, For instance he quotes:

And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh unto them and answer the cry of him that crieth unto Me. (2:182).³³

ii. Rejection of Pantheism and Classical Theism

James is against pantheism as it makes God immanent. It leaves no freedom for will of man, evolution, change and progress. It mars active, social and moral life of man. James rightly says that "on the monistic or pantheistic view, evil, like everything else, must have its foundation in God; and difficulty is to see how this can possibly be the case if God be absolutely good."³⁴ Also James rejects classical theism or transcendentalism, which is "inherited from Scholastic theism."³⁵ Iqbal too rejects pantheism³⁶ and classical theism, which makes God transcendental.³⁷ My book, *Rumi's Impact on Iqbal's Religious Thought*³⁸ discusses it in detail. It is, however, important to note that he does not stop here. For him, God is both immanent and transcendental though He is neither the one nor the other alone. Answering to a question Iqbal says:

The life of the ego is to bring non-ego into existence, The separation of the knower and known is good.

... ..

To sever ourselves from Him is our nature,
And also to be restless and not to reach the goal.

... ..

Neither He without us, nor we without him.

How strange! Our separation is separation-in-union.³⁹

Here Iqbal is obviously influenced by Rumi who also rejects pantheism⁴⁰ and classical theism.⁴¹ Rumi through a beautiful example of iron and fire explains that God is both immanent and transcendent. The iron, when put into fire

assumes the colour of the latter, but still is not fire, it is different from it.

iii. Religious Experience

Some critics think that Iqbal has followed William James in the main trend of his thought. It is due to some affinity which they find between James' and Iqbal's thought especially pertaining to (I) the characteristics of mystic experience; (II) its pragmatic tests.

A. Characteristics of Religious Experience

There are about five characteristics, which James and Iqbal have commonly discussed. Undoubtedly, there is striking affinity among their views. But was James the originator of these concepts? Do we not find such views expressed by Sufi thinkers much earlier than William James? Below is given the comparative trio study in order to reply these questions and to prove the justification of my above stance.

Immediacy

Immediacy "contrasted with representation is the direct presence to the mind of object of knowledge."¹ James and Iqbal have taken immediacy in the same meaning. For James, the quality of mystic experience "must be directly experienced".² According to Iqbal, "The immediacy of mystic experience simply means that we know God Just as we know other objects."³

But in Sufi literature it is common to come across such views. It is called as "Shahud" (consciousness, the quality of witnessing), and "Kashif" (The raising of curtain or veil). Jalaud-Din Rumi (C.E. 1207-1273) calls it 'Didan'⁴ i.e. Beatific vision, which means "a direct apperception of God, not through a glass, darkly, but face to face, with all the veils of sense stripped aside..."⁵ Again, to Al-Ghazali (1058/59-1111) it is "like an immediate perception as if one touched its object with one's hand."⁶

Incommunicability

According to James, "The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words.... No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of it consists."⁷ For Iqbal, "Since the quality of mystic experience is to be directly experienced, it is obvious that it cannot be communicated. Mystic states are more like feeling than thought. The interpretation which the mystic or the prophet puts on the content of his religious consciousness can be conveyed to others in the form of propositions, but the content itself cannot be so transmitted."⁸

But Abu Bakar Wasti discussed this characteristic saying, "He who knows God is cut off from all things, nay he is dumb and abject, i.e. he is unable to express anything and all his attributes are annihilated."⁹ Again, Rumi expressed it thus:

Would that Being had a tongue, that it might remove the veils from existent beings,

O breath of (phenomenal) existence, whatsoever words thou mayst utter, know that thereby thou has bound another veil upon it (the mystery).

That utterance and that state (of existence) are the bane of spiritual perception: to wash away blood with blood is absurd, absurd.¹⁰

Further, Rumi says:

That which one looks perceives, 'this impossible during years to show it forth by the tongue.¹¹

Noetic quality

It means that mystic states are also states of knowledge. James says, "Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a

curious sense of authority for after-time.”¹² For Iqbal, “The incommunicability of mystic experience is due to fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect. It must, however, be noted that mystic feeling, like all feeling, has a cognitive element also;...”¹³

In Sufi literature there are two kinds of knowledge-‘Ilm-i-Zahir’ and ‘Ilm-i-Batin’. Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi explains it thus, “Ilm-i-Zahir’ is knowledge in general, such as Tafsir, Hadith, Fiqha, and ‘Ilm-i-Kalam’. ‘Ilm-i-Batin’ is cognition attained through mystic efforts.” Hence the distinction of Ulama-i-Zahir, those well versed in learning, theologians and Jurists, who are guided by the word of the Qur’an, etc., and not the spirit as the initiated or the mystics who are therefore called ‘Ulama-i-Batin, who try to have the direct experience of God and eternity.”¹⁴ It is Ilm-i-Batin, which comprises mystic states.

Transiency

James maintains, “Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. Except in rare instances, half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they fade into the light of common day”.¹⁵ For Iqbal also.... “the mystic state soon fades away, though it leaves a deep sense of authority after it has passed away.”¹⁶

The Sufis call it a stage of ‘hal’. As compared with ‘maqam’, which is an acquired station and possesses consistency, the ‘hal’ in the words of A.Reza Arasteh, “is a subjective state of mind, dependent on sensations and not under the control of volition. It is revealed to the novice (salek) and is understood in a different way.... It is analogous to the flash of lightening which appears and disappears, or like snow flakes which fall on the water and vanish in a moment becoming a part of the current.”¹⁷

Next, Ali Hujwiri quotes Junayd Baghdadi who says: “states’ are like flashes of lightening: their permanence is merely a suggestion of the lower soul (nafs)”¹⁸ Hujwiri further

says that to some mystics 'States' "vanish almost as soon as they descend (tahillu) on the heart."¹⁹

Passivity

James says about the mystic "... indeed sometimes as if he (mystic) were grasped and held by a superior power"²⁰ Iqbal also says that "to the mystic the mystic state is a moment of intimate association with a unique Other Self, transcending, encompassing, and momentarily suppressing the private personality of the subject of experience."²¹

It is common view of all mystics and one finds striking example of passivity in Moses's experience. Dr. Maruf rightly states that "all the mystics, whether Indian or Muslim or Christian, Catholic or Protestant, however, are agreed that in many cases the recipient is totally passive during the mystic state, and in extreme cases some times loses consciousness altogether like Moses on the Mount of Sinai."²²

Union

For James, "overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we become aware of our oneness."²³ Iqbal also believes, as quoted above, that "the mystic state is a moment of intimate association with a unique Other Self..."²⁴

The concept of union is not a discovery of William James. In the history of Muslim mysticism, it is called 'Qurb' (nearness). "Qurb literary means nearness. Mystics have taken the term from the Qur'anic verse:---We are nearer unto him than his life artery (50 : 16). Ibn Arabi holds that Qurb of God is identity with God. The Mujaddid denies this and maintains that the nature of Qurb is not known."²⁵

B. Pragmatic Test of Religious Experience

For James pragmatism is "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories', supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences,

facts.”²⁶ Thus the pragmatic test is judging the value of a thing by its fruit. Applying it to mystic experience, James says that the value of mystic experience should not be judged by its roots but by its fruit, because there are varieties of experiences some of them are too fruitless’. Thus, he says, “In the end it has come to our empiricist criterion: by their fruits ye shall know them and not by their roots.”²⁷ Iqbal too applies the pragmatic test to evaluate the prophetic experience. Iqbal says, “For the mystic the repose of ‘unitary experience’ is something final; for the prophet it is the awakening, within him, of world-shaking psychological forces, calculated to completely transform the human world. The desire to see his religious experience transformed into a living world-force is supreme in the Prophet. Thus his return amounts to a kind of pragmatic test of the value of his religious experience.”²⁸

Iqbal has not followed James; he has adopted the pragmatic test for judging the truth. Pragmatism is not a theory of philosophy; it is our ‘empiricist criterion’ as James said above. W. Kelly Wright pointedly holds that “as a method...pragmatism affirms simply that the test of the truth of an hypothesis is to be found in observation of the consequences that follow if one acts upon the assumption that the hypothesis is true. Such a position is a form of empiricism, putting chief reliance on observation, and using deduction merely as an auxiliary method for thinking out the implications of an hypothesis and not for determining the truth”.²⁹ So Iqbal has just used it as a measure to prove the validity of prophetic experience. Otherwise Iqbal emphatically differs with James with regard to latter’s theory of truth, as every student of philosophy knows it.

Again, the pragmatic test is a universal criterion of judgement. James is not originator of this test. In Islamic world, among many other thinkers, Rumi said the same - rather in a better way over about six hundred years before James. Addressing the perfect man Rumi says :

Therefore in form thou art the microcosm,
 therefore in reality thou art macrocosm.
 Externally the branch is the origin of the fruit;
 intrinsically the branch came into existence for the sake of the
 fruit.
 If there had not been desire and hope of the fruit,
 how should the gardener have planted the root of the tree?
 Therefore in reality the tree was born of the fruit, (even) if in
 appearance it (the fruit) was generated by the tree".³⁰

Overview

William James' approach to mystic consciousness was not a guideline for Iqbal. Sufi literature is replete with such ideas, as it is obvious from the above. Iqbal was undoubtedly aware of it. He says that "the first Muslim to see the meaning and the value of the Prophet's attitude was Ibn-i-Khaldun, who approached the content of mystic consciousness in a more critical spirit and very nearly reached the modern hypothesis of subliminal selves."³¹ Even some of the Western thinkers thought it so. Iqbal quotes Professor Macdonald who said, 'Ibn-i-Khaldun had some most interesting psychological ideas and would probably have been in close sympathy with Mr. William James's Varieties of Religious Experience.'³²

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BERGSON AND IQBAL

I THE HUMAN SELF

1. Nature of the self

DIFFERENCE

BERGSON

i. Self is not mental states

Bergson does not believe in the ego of the traditional order, according to which there is within us some unchanging ego which threads with it psychic states. He considers it an erroneous thought. According to him actually, it is our attention which “Imagines,... a formless *ego*, indifferent and unchangeable, on which it threads the psychic states which it has set up as independent entities”. He continues to say that “it perceives distinct and, so to speak, *solid* colors, set side by side like the beads of necklace; it must perforce then suppose a thread, also itself solid, to hold the beads together.”¹ For Bergson, there is in fact nothing which endures through change because there is nothing which does not change. “For an ego which does not change does not *endure*, and a psychic state which remains the same so long as it is not replaced by the following state does not *endure* either.”²

Then what is self according to Bergson? To Bergson self, as conscious experience reveals, is nothing but mental states which are all the time continuously changing. Thus self is changed without ceasing. It is continuous change. “The truth is that we change without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but change.”³ He says: “ I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold, I am merry or sad, I work or do nothing, I

look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas—such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then without ceasing.”⁴ He further says, “For a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.”⁵

ii. The self is not purposive

The self is not purposive according to Bergson. It does not have forward dimensions. He says, “Our personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing. Each of its moments is something new added to what was before. We may go further: it is not only something new, but something unforeseeable... For to foresee consists of projecting into the future what has been perceived in the past, or of imagining for a later time a new grouping, in a new order, of elements already perceived. But that which has never been perceived, and which is at the same time simple, is necessarily unforeseeable.”⁶ Here Bergson gives an example of the finished portrait. He says that “even with the knowledge of what explains it, no one, not even the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced — an absurd hypothesis which is its own refutation.”⁷ It is equally applicable to life. He says, “Even so with regard to the moments of our life, of which we are the artisans.”⁸

iii. *Elan vital* — prior to the self

Next, to Bergson *Elan vital* is prior to the self. Because to him the fundamental reality is *Elan Vital* (Vital Impulse or Vital Impetus). This is the immanent principle common to all living beings and directive of all organic evolution. Personality “is not an end in itself, it is nothing but an instrument at the service of the *Elan* which gropingly seeks to conquer its freedom. Moreover, it is nothing but a temporary phase, a transitory form of the *Elan*; it has no genuine reality

because it does not exist outside of itself: it is nothing but a projection, a projected shadow.”⁹

IQBAL

Iqbal's concept of the self is much different from that of Bergson. Iqbal agrees that the ego is not a soul substance. He says “we see that our conscious experience can give us no clue to the ego regarded as a soul-substance; for by hypothesis the soul-substance does not reveal itself in experience. And it may further be pointed out that in view of the improbability of different soul-substance controlling the same body at different times, the theory can offer no adequate explanation of such phenomena as alternating personality, formerly explained by the temporary possession of the body by evil spirit.”¹⁰ Also, Iqbal believes that mental states change without ceasing. He quotes the above passage of Bergson with endorsement.¹¹

But Iqbal develops the idea further and maintains that there is unity and centre of mental states. He says that ego is the “finite centre of experience.”¹² It “reveals itself as a unity or what we call mental states.”¹³ He explains: “Mental states do not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another. They exist as phases of a complex whole, called mind. The organic unity, however, of these inter-related states or, let us say, events is a special kind of unity.”¹⁴ This unity “is like the unity of the germ in which the experience of its individual ancestors exist, not as plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole.”¹⁵ Also, Iqbal thinks that though consciousness is constant change, it is also an ‘organising principle.’¹⁶ It is continuous but there is relatively permanent element in experience.¹⁷

Further, Iqbal is great upholder of purposive self. Neither conscious experience nor self is forward rush without purpose. He says that the “end and purposes, whether they exist as conscious or subconscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of our conscious experience. And the notion of

purpose cannot be understood except in reference to the future. The past, no doubt, abides and operates in the present. But this operation of the past in the present is not the whole of consciousness. The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness. Purposes colour not only our present states of consciousness, but also reveal its future direction. In fact, they constitute the forward push of our life, and thus in a way anticipate and influence the states that are yet to be. To be determined by an end is to be determined by what ought to be. Thus past and future both operate in the present state of consciousness, and the future is not wholly undetermined as Bergson's analysis of our conscious experience shows. A state of attentive consciousness involves both memory and imagination as operating factors. On the analogy of our conscious experience, therefore, Reality is not a blind vital impulse wholly unilluminated by idea. Its nature is through and through teleological."¹⁸

In this respect, Iqbal's criticism, on Bergson's view is pertinent. He says "In Bergson's view the forward rush of the vital impulse in its creative freedom is unilluminated by the light of an immediate or a remote purpose. It is not aiming at a result; it is wholly arbitrary, undirected, chaotic, and unforeseeable in its behaviour. It is mainly here that Bergson's analysis of our conscious experience reveals its inadequacy. He regards conscious experience as the past moving along with and operating in the present. He ignores that the unity of consciousness has a forward aspect also."¹⁹

Next, unlike Bergson, Iqbal fully emphasizes the importance of assigning fundamental place to the self. For Bergson as we have seen, the fundamental Reality is *Elan Vital*. For Iqbal, the self is prior to every thing. Even ultimate Reality is self, and only self proceeds from the Self, that human self is core of every existence is expressed by him in beautiful verses thus:

The form of existence is an effect of the Self,
Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the Self,

When the Self awoke to consciousness,
It revealed the universe of Thought.²⁰

It is important to note that unlike Bergson, who does not have a concept of individual self — its uniqueness and privacy, Iqbal lays much stress on these features of the self. Iqbal says with reference to the Qur'an, "The Qur'an in its simple, forceful manner emphasizes the individuality and uniqueness of man, and has, I think, a definite view of his destiny as a unity of life. It is in consequence of this view of man as a unique individuality which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another, and entitles him only to what is due to his own personal effort, that the Qur'an is led to reject the idea of redemption."²¹

About the privacy of ego, Iqbal says, "Another important characteristic of the unity of the ego is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of every ego. In order to reach a certain conclusion all the premises of a syllogism must be believed in by one and the same mind. If I believe in the proposition 'all men are mortal' and another mind believes in the proposition, 'Socrates is a man', no inference is possible. It is possible only if both the propositions are believed in by me. Again, my desire for a certain thing is essentially mine. Its satisfaction means my private enjoyment. If all mankind happen to desire the same thing, the satisfaction of their desire will not mean the satisfaction of my desire when I do not get the thing desired."²²

Bergson, thus, does not give a central place to human self. This is the reason that immortality of the self is not a significant issue in his philosophy. He considers life as endless and eternal but not individual. On the contrary, Iqbal's whole philosophy revolves around the self, and Iqbal believes in personal, progressive and earned immortality of the self.²³

*AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION***i. The self can only be intuited**

Bergson believes that the self can only be intuited. Intuition leads us to the very inward of life. He says that “of ourselves, our perception is internal and profound.”²⁴

Iqbal also believes that self is only to be intuited. He says, “With our absorption in the external order of things, necessitated by our present situation, it is extremely difficult to catch a glimpse of the appreciative self. In our constant pursuit after external things we weave a kind of evil round the appreciative self which thus becomes completely alien to us. It is only in moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience.”²⁵ However, he maintains “We have a first-hand knowledge of the appreciative aspect of life from within. Intuition reveals life as a centralizing ego. This knowledge..... is a direct revelation of the ultimate nature of Reality.”²⁶

But has Iqbal imitated Bergson in this respect? The answer is certainly no. Iqbal has taken the fundamental inspiration from the Qur'an as in other cases. That the self cannot be comprehended by intellect is obvious:

They ask you about the soul; say the soul is from the Command of my Lord. And you have little knowledge. (xxii 89)²⁷

That ego is not captured by reason is put by Rumi thus:

Would that Being had a tongue, that it might
remove the veils from existent being!

O breath of (phenomenal) existence, whatsoever
words thou mayest utter, know that thereby thou
hast bound another veil upon it (the mystery).

That utterance and (that) state (existence)
are the bane of (spiritual) perception: to

wash away blood with blood is absurd, absurd.”²⁸

ii. Two aspects of the self

Further, Bergson believes that there are two different aspects of the self, one of which is social and the other is fundamental. "The self with which psychology deals is the social self which is viewed in spatial terms. We say that states succeed one another and can be quantitatively measured and determined. The time of the social self is the time of which we predicate long and short and can be conceived as a straight line composed of spatial points which are external to one another like so many stages in a journey. But when we look into deeper self, we find that the boundaries of 'states' gradually melt away, the multiplicity of definitely outlined feelings, volitions, images become less definite, less a multiplicity. The unity of the fundamental self is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality but as unity in which every experience permeates the whole. This organisation of the facts of consciousness is the work of time. It is time itself."²⁹ It is duration.

Iqbal also states that there are two sides of the self-efficient and appreciative, as we have discussed earlier. The efficient self is related with the world of space. It is concerned with daily life and external aspects of things. The appreciative side of the self, though it is organically related with the efficient self, is revealed only by deeper analysis of conscious experience, and that too in the moments of profound meditation, 'when the efficient self is in abeyance'. It is the inner centre of experience. To Iqbal it is the real self. Iqbal joins the chain of Sufis in his understanding of the self.

It is common among Sufis to believe in fundamental and social aspects of the self. Rumi also believes in two sides of the self- phenomenal and nominal. He says:

Thou in (thy) body art an animal, and in (thy)
spirit thou art of the angels, so that thou mayst
walk on the earth and also in the sky;
So that the seer with heart divinely inspired
may be, in appearance, a man like yourselves.

His body of dust (is here), fallen upon the earth; (but) his spirit (is) circling in yonder highest sphere (of Heaven)³⁰

Also, for his idea of life or self as a flow Bergson has many precursors like Abdul Qadir Bedil. "Iqbal is so enamoured of Bedil that he at times quotes his verses and lays bare certain features of his poetry and at times exhorts his friend Kishan Parshad Shad to edit the Divan of Bedil."³¹ Iqbal pertinently quotes Bedil, with regard to life as a flow. He says:

"In the domain of heart (i.e. life) both the road and the destination are like waves and bubbles, in perpetual motion"³²

Again,

The restrictions which association with a body imposes on us cannot obstruct the flow of life, only you do not see the movement of this prisoner of earth.³³

2. The Nature of Time

DIFFERENCE

BERGSON

Priority of Time

For Bergson *Elan Vital* (*Vital Impetus*) is the only reality. *Elan¹ Vital* is identical with Duration - continuous time. As self is just transitory form of *Elan*, the former is secondary to the latter. In other words, to Bergson duration is prior to the self. Our "personalities and selves, too, are means of freedom for the *Elan*— The *Elan* is supra-personal or impersonal. Selfhood, therefore, is not end in itself- It is means to attain freedom for the *Elan* — for itself."²

Iqbal on the other hand considers self as prior to time and space. Iqbal says that there is no concept of time without ego. It is ego alone, which can apprehend its activity in time and space. Iqbal takes self as the core of all life. The essential nature of life lies in egohood. Iqbal believes in "the ultimate Reality as pure duration in which thought, life, and purpose inter-penetrate to form an organic unity."³ For him, the organic unity of pure duration itself is the unity of the self.

He says, "We cannot conceive this unity except as the unity of a self - an all embracing concrete self - the ultimate source of all individual life and thought."⁴ Activity i.e. the moving aspect of Elan, which Bergson has emphasized so much, is only one side of the ego, according to Iqbal.

IQBAL

Iqbal regards Bergson's view as erroneous. He says, "I venture to think that the error of Bergson consists in regarding pure time as prior to self, to which alone pure duration is predicable."⁵ Iqbal argues, "Neither pure space nor pure time can hold together the multiplicity of objects and events. It is the appreciative act of an enduring self only which can seize the multiplicity of duration - broken up into an infinity of instants - and transform it to the organic wholeness of synthesis. To exist in pure duration is to be a self and to be a self is to be able to say 'I am' only that truly exists which can say 'I am'."⁶ Even on higher level, the Ultimate Self or Ego is prior to Time. Iqbal believes that the Ultimate Reality is God who is Self, the source of becoming. Time is the creative activity and revelation of the hidden possibilities of God.

AFFINITY AND THE ACTUAL POSITION

Despite the above striking difference between the views of Bergson and Iqbal there is close affinity between their thought.

i. Two sides of the self and two aspects of Time

Bergson's two aspects of the self, which he calls social and fundamental, live in two kinds of time. The time of the social self, according to Bergson, is serial time, which is the product of our intellect that makes it measurable and undistinguishable from space. Bergson says, "Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially, we take snapshots, as it were, of the passing

reality....”⁷ To Bergson the time of the fundamental self is pure time which he calls ‘Duration’ according to which past endures and is not lost. In Bergson’s words it is ‘continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future’.⁸ Comparing pure time with serial time Bergson says, “When we speak of time we generally think of a homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged along with one another as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity If time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space... it follows that pure duration must be something different.”⁹

Iqbal’s two sides of the self - efficient and appreciative also possess two levels of time. The efficient self lives in serial time, which is predicted by ‘long’ and ‘short’,¹⁰ whereas the appreciative self lives in pure time or ‘duration.’¹¹ Iqbal says, “The time of the appreciative self is a single ‘now’ which the efficient self, in its traffic with the world of space, pulverizes into a series of ‘nows’ like pearl beads of a thread.”¹² Comparing the pure duration with serial time i.e. the time-span of the ego and the time-span of the physical event, Iqbal says, “The duration of the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact: the ego’s duration is concentrated within it and linked with its present and future in a unique manner. The formation of a physical event discloses certain present marks, which show that it has passed through a time-duration; but these marks are merely emblematic of its time-duration not time-duration itself. True time-duration belongs to the ego alone.”¹³ Also, “pure time is unadulterated by space.”¹⁴ Iqbal believes that time is much more important and fundamental than space. It is mind of space.¹⁵

Here we find the Ash‘arites and Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, among many other Muslim thinkers as precursors of Bergson. The

time of efficient self i.e. serial time which is related to spatial world and is termed as long and short was postulated philosophically by the Ash'arites much earlier than Bergson. Iqbal says, "The Ash'arite theory of time is perhaps the first attempt in the history of Muslim thought to understand it philosophically. Time, according to the Ash'arite is a succession of individual 'nows'."¹⁶ Next, Rumi made the distinction between serial and non-serial time — many centuries before Bergson. Rumi believes in two sides of the self-phenomenal and nominal.

To Rumi the phenomenal self is time bound. It has morning, evening, years which are the time of the common sense."¹⁷ But the nominal self is timeless. He says:

You are of where, (but) your origin is in
 Nowhere: shut up this shop and open that shop.¹⁸
 Thought is of the past and future; when it is
 emancipated from these two, the difficulty is solved.¹⁹

Again:

when for a while I had taken part with that elect
 company in contemplation (of God) and had been
 separated from myself.

At that very hour my spirit was freed from hours (of
 Times); (I say 'freed') because hours make the young old.

All changes have arisen from the hours: he that
 is freed from the hours is freed from change. When for an hour
 you escape from the hours, relation abide not: you become
 familiar with that which is without relation.

The hours are not acquainted with hourlessness
 (timelessness), because for him (who is conscious
 of time) there is no way thither except bewilderment."²⁰

Here Rumi "relates a spiritual experience in which the spirit transcends our spatially interlinked serial time and enters a dimension of Being wherein the mutually exclusive diversity of psychological process is negated and a man's causal thinking, with the problems that it creates and attempts to solve, exists no more. As it is a spaceless reality that manifests itself into extended and divisible spaces, creating

the illusion for separated things and events, so it is timeless spirit that creates the categories of serial time with the illusory division of past, present, and future. It is possible for the human spirit to enter this non-dimensional dimension of consciousness and reality. Such an experience does not give one knowledge in the ordinary senses; it is a consciousness of wonder.”²¹

Again, Iqbal quotes Iraqi to reveal that his main sources are mystics like Iraqi. Iraqi “conceives infinite varieties of time, relative to the varying grades of being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The time of gross bodies which arises from the revolution of the heavens is divisible into past, present and future; and its nature is such that as long as one day does not pass away the succeeding day does not come. The time of immaterial beings is also serial in character, but its passage is such that a whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of an immaterial being. Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach Divine time- time which is absolutely free from the quality of passage, and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence, and change. It is above eternity; it has neither beginning nor end.”²²

In the light of the above views Iqbal rightly remarks, “From this summary of Iraqi’s view you will see how a cultured Muslim Sufi intellectually interpreted his spiritual experience of time and space in an age which had no idea of the theories and concepts of modern Mathematics and Physics.”²³

Bedil’s concepts of real and unreal time, duration and serial time, though he did not use these terms are noteworthy. He deserves to be called forerunner of Bergson, He says,

In the metre of the life- verse which is wholly a flow the idea of unreal time is nothing more than a hiatus! “The time of the external world is only delays compared to the brisk movement (of life).”²⁴

Again,

The poet further emphasises the continuousness and indivisibility of time in the following verses:

The mist of past and Future rises up from thy present; Subject your tomorrow and yesterday to a searching analysis and you will find them lost in your today.²⁵

Iqbal explains these two verses thus: “The poet tries a poetic solution of a psychological problem i.e. how we spacialise time and suggests that the idea of “not-yet” is either the mental fall of sluggish nature in its pursuit of false hopes, or a mere illusion of expectation engendered by our immobilization of what is in its nature mobile and creative. Iqbal pertinently remarks, “To Muslim thinkers the idea of an ever-creative Reality is not new. According to the theologians of Islam who conceived the deity as an Infinite personal power, the creative activity of God has not exhausted itself in the Universe..... Beyond the actual present, there is nothing. What we call “there” is only a “here” in disguise,...”²⁶

Actually the roots of these concepts of serial and real time are traced to the Qur’an, which clearly throws light on the creation of the ‘heaven and earth’. Iqbal vehemently quotes the Qur’an:

And put thou thy trust in Him that liveth and dieth not, and celebrate His praise Who in six days created the Heaven and the earth, and what is between them, then mounted His Throne; the God of mercy. (25 : 60)²⁷

All things we have created with a fixed destiny; Our command was but one, swift as the twinkling of an eye. (54 : 50)²⁸

The same act of creation is expressed in two different modes of expression. The former is in serial time the latter is in duration.

Again, a famous tradition alludes to the concept of duration. Iqbal pointedly refers to it, according to which the prophet said *li m’a Allah waqt* i.e. ‘I have a time with God where even Gabriel has no access’²⁹ — This means that sometimes the Prophet passed through a state when he lived in pure duration and transcended serial time and space.

Iqbal, also, considers the Time of God as duration. He says, “If then we accept the guidance of our conscious

experience, and conceive the life of the all-inclusive Ego on the analogy of the finite ego, the time of the Ultimate Ego is revealed as change without succession, i.e. an organic whole which appears atomic because of the creative movement of the ego.”³⁰

Iqbal appears to base his view on the above verse of the Qur’an, which regards the act of creation as the result of one Command.

ii. Time is subjective

Bergson, holds time to be subjective though real, because when seen objectively time becomes serial. The duration can easily be felt on the analogy of our conscious or inner experience. Duration is a constant flow without ceasing just as there is change without ceasing in our inner experience.³¹

He says, “Let us then concentrate attention on that which we have that is at the same time the most removed from externality and the least penetrated with intellectuality. Let us seek, in the depths of our experience, the point where we fell ourselves most intimately within our own life. It is into pure duration that we then plunge back, a duration in which the past, always moving on, is swelling unceasingly with a present that is absolute new.”³²

Iqbal also considers time as subjective. Iqbal maintains, “A purely objective point of view is only partially helpful in our understanding of the nature of time. The right course is a careful psychological analysis of our conscious experience which alone reveals the true nature of time..... Thus the character of our conscious experience - our point of departure in all knowledge - gives us a clue to the concept which reconciles the opposition of permanence and change, of time regarded as an organic whole or eternity, and time regarded as atomic.”³³

Iqbal says:

Our Time which has neither beginning nor end, Blossoms from the flower - bed of our mind.³⁴

Look, o thou enthralled by Yesterday and Tomorrow, Behold another world in thine own heart.³⁵

Dr. A. Schimmel rightly says, "This conception... corresponds to a great extent to Iqbal's own idea on serial and nonserial time, and it is just the subjective experience of time as held by the great mystics - he even quotes Ibn-Arabi in this respect several times with approval - which Iqbal himself wanted to underline."³⁶

Bergson is not an originator of this view. Sufic literature is full of such views. In mystic experience "Relations of time and space, like all other relations are merely subjective (i' tibari) and vanish altogether in the Sufi's experience of Unity."³⁷

iii. Duration is creative

Bergson thinks duration is continuous movement. It is creative and novel. He says, "The more we study the nature of time, the more we shall comprehend that duration means invention, the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new."³⁸

Bergson thinks that it is contrary to Physics, which takes no account of time-invention. Physics is "restricted as it is to the cinematographic method. It is limited to counting simultaneities between the events that make up this time and the positions of the mobile T on its trajectory. It detaches these events from the whole, which at every moment puts on a new form and which communicates to them something of its novelty. It considers them in the abstract; such as they would be outside of the living whole, that is to say, in a time unrolled in space. It retains only the events or systems of events that can be thus isolated without being made to undergo too profound a deformation, because only these lend themselves to the application of its method. Our Physics dates from the day when it was known how to isolate such systems."³⁹

Iqbal also regards duration as creative and novel. In his famous poem, *Time is sword*. Iqbal expounds this creative feature of time thus:

At one stroke thereof water gushes from the rock.
 And the sea becomes land from dearth of moisture.
 Moses held this sword in his hand,
 Therefore he wrought more than man may contrive.
 He clove the Red Sea asunder
 And made its waters like dry earth.
 The arm of Ali, the conqueror of Khaibar,
 Drew its strength from this same sword.”⁴⁰
 Phenomena are the result of the creativity of Time.
 Iqbal says,
 Phenomena arise from the march of Time,
 Life is one of Time’s mysteries.”⁴¹

Again:

To Know its root quickens the living with new life:
 Its being is more splendid than the dawn.”⁴²

Iqbal bases his view on the diction of Imam Shafi (Time is sword).⁴³ He compares Time to sword, which continuously and dynamically creates by overcoming all the hindrances of the way. To compare Time to sword is undoubtedly an Islamic view. Ali Hujwari also compared time to sword. Dr. Annemarie Schimmel says, “Time is a cutting sword” was used by Hujwari meaning that it makes unmindful or forgetful of the care of past, present and future. He said that Time “cuts the root of the future and the past, and obliterates care of yesterday and tomorrow from the heart.”⁴⁴ Iqbal, thus, is not taking guideline from Bergson. His source is undoubtedly the Islamic thought.

Actually, as Iqbal says, this view of creativeness of time is based on the Qur’anic view of the ‘alteration of day and night.’ (3:188)⁴⁵ To him it is “a symbol of the ultimate Reality which ‘appears in a fresh glory ...every moment. “⁴⁶Again, Iqbal quotes, ‘Every day some new work employ Him.”⁴⁷

iv. Time and the Ultimate Reality

Bergson considers *Elan Vital* as the Ultimate Reality. It is identical with Duration, which is change without succession. He says, "The flux of time is reality itself, and the things which we study are the things which flow."⁴⁸

Iqbal also says, "Beyond Him and apart from His creative activity, there is neither time nor space to close Him off in reference to other egos."⁴⁹ He says:

Na hai zaman na makan; La ila il - Allah.⁵⁰

(There is neither time nor space; nothing exists absolutely except Allah)

Iqbal seems to trace the origin of the above from the saying of the Prophet. "The Prophet is reported to have said, "Don't vilify Time, for Time is God,"⁵¹ Iqbal expresses it in a beautiful verse:

Life is of Time, and Time is of Life:

Do not abuse time! was the command of the Prophet.⁵²

It is important to note that in his meeting with Bergson at Paris, Iqbal himself says that Bergson was pleased to hear the Holy Prophet's above cited saying.⁵³ In the words of Dr. Annemarie Schimmel, Iqbal had "even surprised Henri Bergson with this quotation whom he estimated highly."⁵⁴

Now a subtle question arises: When God as Self is prior to time, how can then time be God. It is important to note that for Iqbal time of God is not separate from God. It is born with God's act of creation. "The infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of his creative activity...⁵⁵In other words, "He is creator from within.... creation for the Ultimate Ego is the unfoldment of his own inner possibilities."⁵⁶

Iqbal says, "This is what Mir Damad and Mulla Baqir mean when they say that time is born with the act of creation by which the Ultimate Ego realizes and measures, so to speak, the infinite wealth of His own undermined creative possibilities."⁵⁷

This unfoldment of God's inner possibilities is without break. It is like a flow i.e. change without succession. This is what Iqbal means when he says that God's time is duration.

Thus, inspite of the similarity, Iqbal has different approach due to his own Islamic frame of reference, which Bergson could not conceive.

From the above discussion on the Nature of Time, it is crystal clear that Iqbal's concept of time is derived from the Islamic doctrines and not from Bergson's thought. Iqbal himself says, "In the history of Muslim culture.... we find that both in the realms of pure intellect, and religious psychology by which term I mean higher Sufism, the ideal revealed is the possession and enjoyment of the Infinite. In a culture, with such an attitude, the problem of space and time becomes a question of life and death."⁵⁸ He pointedly acknowledges the contributions of the Sufis and the Muslim thinkers. The Muslim mystics have always focussed their attention on the problem of time. Here he particularly mentions, "Even Bergson's idea of time is not quite foreign to our sufis."⁵⁹

Iqbal, appreciated Bergson's view of time. But it was due to its being very near to Islamic view. Dr. Annemarie Schimmel rightly says, "Personally, I would rather prefer to stress the religious importance of his (Iqbal's) ideas about time; for what he wanted was surely not to add a new system of scientific explanations to this most difficult problem, but to draw the attention of the Muslim world back to the contact with the Living God. Through a reevaluation of the twofold aspect of time he aimed at an actualization of this burning but a long forgotten issue for Muslim religious life."⁶⁰

3. Freedom of Will

DIFFERENCE
BERGSON

Freedom without purpose

Bergson is a great champion of free will. "According to him, 'the portals of the future must remain wide open to Reality.'

Otherwise, it will not be free and creative.”¹ Bergson thinks that will is free so much so that it moves even without plan, goal and purpose. He does not believe in teleology because it makes time unreal.² Iqbal rightly observes, “In Bergson’s view the forward rush of the vital impulse in its creative freedom is unilluminated by the light of an immediate or remote purpose. It is not aiming at a result; it is wholly arbitrary, undirected, chaotic, and unforeseeable in its behaviour.”³

IQBAL

For *Iqbal* the portals of the future cannot remain wide open to Reality. Reality is Ego and is not blind force. The ultimate Reality is “a rationally directed creative life”⁴ and purposive.”⁵ On human level too, reason and purpose cannot be excluded from man’s life. Through intelligence and purpose man makes his choices. These give directions. His future thus cannot remain wholly undetermined.

Iqbal says that intelligence and purpose are a unified whole. He says that life “is determined by ends and the presence of ends means that it is permeated by intelligence. Nor is the activity of intelligence possible without the presence of ends. In conscious experience life and thought permeate each other. They form a unity.”⁶ Both help man determine his future.

Iqbal’s own criticism on Bergson’s views of ‘thought’ and ‘purpose’ are pertinent. He says, “The vitalism of Bergson ends in an insurmountable dualism of will and thought. This is really due to the partial view of intelligence that he takes. Intelligence, according to him, is a spacializing activity; it is shaped on matter alone, and has only mechanical categories at its disposal.”⁷ He clearly says, “On the analogy of our conscious experience... Reality is not a blind vital impulse wholly un-illuminated by idea.”⁸

Further, he comments that “past and future both operate in the present state of consciousness, and the future is not wholly undetermined as Bergson’s analysis of our conscious

experience shows. A state of attentive consciousness involves both memory and imagination as operating factors.”⁹ Again, Iqbal says, “Bergson’s analysis of our conscious experience reveals its inadequacy. He regards conscious experience as the past moving along with and operating in the present. He ignores that the unity of consciousness has a forward aspect also. Life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious. Even our acts of perception are determined by our immediate interests and purposes.”¹⁰

Bergson takes one-sided view of teleology. Criticising Bergson’s view of teleology, Iqbal says, “There is, however, another sense of teleology. From our conscious experience we have seen that to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands.”¹¹

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

Undoubtedly there is a great similarity between the views of these two contemporaries, for which some erudite are deluded to regard Iqbal as a camp follower of Bergson.

i. Critique of Determinism

Championing the cause of freedom, Bergson condemns the concept of determinism. “Bergson admits the contention of the determinists that, if we consider any single action in isolation, it is possible to prove by irrefutable reasoning that it is entirely determined by what has preceded it.”¹² To Bergson it is not true interpretation. This is because of our false intellectual abstraction, which takes action in isolation. Rightly, “the life of the individual is not to be regarded as a succession of changing states; the life of the individual is a continuous and indivisible flow, and it is precisely when taken as such that it is seen to be free and undetermined. Divide the

individual's life into parts, consider the individual's actions separately, and you will find that each part and each action is determined by its predecessors. But what is true of the parts is not true of the personality as a whole."¹³

Iqbal is also a staunch believer of freedom of the ego but he bases his view on the Islamic tenets.

Iqbal explains this by referring to the Qur'anic verse already discussed in the chapter on "Fichte and Iqbal" that though man develops on the basis of physical organism he is of "yet another make."¹⁴ Again, Iqbal says, "The element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity shows that the ego is a free personal causality. He shares in the life and freedom of the ultimate Ego who, by permitting the emergence of a finite ego, capable of private initiative, has limited this freedom of His own free will. This freedom of conscious behaviour follows from the view of ego-activity, which the Qur'an takes. There are verses, which are unmistakably clear on this point:

And say: The truth is from your Lord: Let him, then, who will, believe: and let him who will, be an unbeliever., (18:28)

If you do well to your own behoof will ye do well: and if ye do evil against yourselves will ye do it.' (17:7)¹⁵

Further, as said before, Iqbal regards the Islamic institution of prayer and its timings as great sources of restoring self-possession to the ego.¹⁶

ii. Personality - creative and free

Though Bergson denies teleological character to personality, it is creative, new at every moment to him. He says, "It is the nature of life to be creative, and the individual taken as a whole is necessarily creative from the mere fact that he is alive. But if his life is creative, and creative in each moment of it, it is clear that it is not determined by what went before. If it were so determined it would only be an expression of the old, and not a creation of the new."¹⁷ Bergson further says, "We are creating ourselves continually.

This creation of self by self is the more complete, the more one reasons on what one does.”¹⁸

Bergson expresses that each moment of our personality is new thus: “Our personality, which is being built up each instant with its accumulated experience, changes without ceasing. By changing, it prevents any state, although superficially identical with another, from ever repeating it in its very depth. That is why our duration is irreversible.”¹⁹ Again, Bergson pointedly says that each of our moments is “something new added to what was before.”²⁰

For Iqbal also personality is creative and free. But he derives inspiration from the Qur’an. He says, “In his inmost being man, as conceived by the Qur’an, is a creative activity, an ascending spirit who, in his inward march, rises from one state of being to another:

It needs not that I swear by the sunset redness and by the night
and its gatherings and by the moon when at her full, that from
state to state shall ye be surely carried onward.’ (84:17-20)²¹

Rumi also believes that there is no regression and every moment of life is new. He says:

No full-grown grape (ever) became a young grape;
No mature fruit (ever) became premature fruit.”²²

4. Intellect

DIFFERENCE
BERGSON

i. Limitation of Intellect

For *Bergson* Intellect cannot take the whole view of reality; its view of reality is always limited. The intellect has only spatialising activity. It forms only clear idea of immobility alone. Bergson says, “the intellect represents *becoming* as a series of *states*, each of which is homogeneous with itself and consequently does not change.”¹ It is cinematographic which takes snapshot views of things. It is only the operator’s apparatus, which gives movement to the things. Intellect “always starts from immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality: when it tries to form an idea of movement, it does so

by constructing movement out of immobilities put together".² Wildon Carr rightly says, that the intellect's view of reality is limited.³

This theory of Bergson has widely been criticised. It is rightly maintained that Bergson "attacks on the extent and accuracy of intellectual knowledge, and in particular his assumptions that the intellect must distort and that it is the blind captive of its own distortion, seem too extreme."⁴

Will Durant also disapproves Bergson's disregard of intellect. He holds that Intellect also plays a vital role in human life. To him "Man exists by instinct, but he progresses by intelligence."⁵ Again, to him, "Bergson presumes too much in supposing that the intellect catches only the states and not the flux of reality and life..."⁶

C.E.M. Joad, says that this is "a philosophy which begins to look askance at intellect soon finds itself on dangerous ground: for the despised intellect is the tool with which the philosophy is constructed, the weapon with which it asserts its claim... But if there is so, then Bergson's philosophy, which is assuredly an intellectual view of reality, is a false philosophy; so that it turns out not to be true that the intellectual view of reality is false. In proportion therefore as Bergson discredits intellect, he discredits his own arguments: in proportion as he proves his point, he disproves his philosophy."⁷

IQBAL

Iqbal accepts that intellect divides reality into bits and cannot understand it as a whole or in its true perspective. He also agrees, "The nature of thought is serial; it cannot deal with movement, except by viewing it as a series of stationary points".⁸

But for *Iqbal*, the function of intellect is not always to divide Reality into bits. To him the real function of intellect is to synthesize also. He says, "While it appears to break up Reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable

to the various levels which experience presents. It is as much organic as life. The movement of life, as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of its various stages. Without this synthesis it will cease to be organic growth.”⁹

Iqbal pointedly differs with Bergson and maintains that the intellectual view of reality is not always false. As discussed in the chapter of ‘James and Iqbal’, “The scientific observation of Nature keeps us in close contact with the behaviour of Reality, and thus sharpens our inner perception for a deeper vision of it. The truth is that all search for knowledge is essentially a form of prayer. The scientific observer of Nature is a kind of mystic seeker in the act of prayer.”¹⁰ It is why he believed thought having a deeper movement also. To add, according to him, “The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason, unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge.”¹¹

Dr. Maruf rightly says that Bergson takes thought in its discursive sense only. “Iqbal, on the other hand, takes thought in three different senses viz., (i) Pure Reason or Thought (ii) Practical Reason, and (iii) thought in its ‘deeper’ or not discursive sense. This approach enables Iqbal to solve most of the problems of metaphysical import, which the leading thinkers in the West failed to tackle, e.g. mind and body, God and the world, creation and destiny, determinism and free-will etc”.¹²

Iqbal’s criticism on Bergson with regard to latter’s view is important. He says that Bergson takes the partial view of intelligence. “Intelligence, according to him, is a spacializing activity; it is shaped on matter alone, and has only mechanical categories at its disposal.”¹³ It is why; Iqbal asserts, “The vitalism of Bergson ends in an insurmountable dualism of will and thought.”¹⁴

ii. Intellect vs. Intuition

Next, *Bergson* regards intellect diametrically different from intuition. These differ in kind and not in degree. “Intuition

and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development.”¹⁵ Again, to Bergson, intellect differs from intuition on the analogy of matter and life. He says that “intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former towards inert matter, the latter towards life. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more completely the secret of physical operations; of life it brings us, and moreover only claims to bring us, a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness of life that *intuition* leads us... ..”¹⁶

IQBAL

But for Iqbal intellect and intuition are not diametrically different. Iqbal seems to advocate the difference of intuition and intellect in kind only when by intellect he means ‘discursive intellect’ and not in its higher form.

For Iqbal, intuition cannot reach its destination without having firm grounding in intelligence. He says;

Only through love intelligence gets to know God,
 love’s labours find firm grounding in intelligence;
 when love is companioned by intelligence,
 it has the power to design another world.
 Then rise and draw the design of a new world,
 mingle together love with intelligence.¹⁷

It is why Iqbal emphasizes the need of both intuition and intellect, Iqbal says: “Vision without power does bring moral elevation but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity.”¹⁸

For Iqbal, Bergson himself conceptualizes reality, and contradicts his own views about intuition. He puts pertinent questions:

Is not the system of Bergson himself; he may be imagined to argue, a kind of conceptualization of reality? Are we not in the practical attitude towards reality, suggested by him, employing the same conceptualist intellect which by its very nature decomposes and spatialises the original flux of things? Does the practical attitude of Bergson amount to anything more than the possibility of acquiring more profitable short-cuts, artifices and arrangements? Can empirical science give us anything more than this? If the two tendencies forward and backward, are implicit in the psychic flow and the real nature of life in its onward rush, why should we not reject the schematic or diagrammatic representation of it altogether and centralize all our hopes in intuition alone? Have we to live in a Universe as it is, or a Universe constructed by intelligence and distorted in the construction?¹⁹

By answering these questions, Iqbal sums up:

When it is admitted that our distributive experience has another aspect, i.e. the aspect of absolute continuity which reveals reality itself, then it follows that the highest knowledge is the work of intuition and not the result of patient observation however profitable. Rationalism and empiricism are equally worthless though the latter, by suggesting fresh artifices may extend the range of our hold on things and bring us happiness and comfort which can never justify our desire for the ultimate knowledge of the nature of reality. The highest ideal of man, then, is not to wade through the concrete expressions of reality - but to extinguish ourselves into its vast flow by conquering forces i.e. which sever us from it."²⁰

For Iqbal, Bergson's condemnation of intellect means regression in the scale of evolution:

In the system of Bergson (I am using the word system carelessly; as a matter of fact Bergson's philosophy is not a system). Intelligence is a kind of original sin, the commission of which resulted in giving life a distorted view of itself; and in order to see itself as it is, life must revert to its preintelligence state and put itself by a kind of regress, into the animal or plant consciousness or perhaps lower down into protozoa-

consciousness where materiality reduces itself to almost vanishing point. Is such a regress possible to a form of life which has developed intelligence and clothed itself into matter? It would perhaps be possible to forms nearest to the original impulse of life, surely it is not possible for man who by developing a highly complex organism stands higher up in the scale of evolution. But assuming that we can, by an effort of sympathy, put ourselves just at the point where materiality emerges, what does this act of sympathy bring us? In Bergson's system all that it gives us is a mere hypothesis which we have subsequently to corroborate by an empirical study of the facts of Evolution.²¹

It is interesting to note that Bergson's idea of intellect, with all its incapability of understanding Reality in entirety as a flow, was discussed much before Bergson. Iqbal himself has quoted Bedil's (1664-1720) verses with English translations and enunciation. He explains thus; "Our intellect can touch only the surface of Reality, it can never enter in to it. Bedil is never tired of emphasising this fact:

The wave and the foam cannot see in to the depth of the ocean:
A whole world is restless for the knowledge of Reality,
Yet does not possess the necessary qualification.²²

Physical science armoured with logical categories decomposes the Real with its conceptualization of it. It is only a kind of post-mortem examination of Reality and consequently cannot catch it as a living forward movement:

All these arguments which blossom out of thy
investigation are nothing more than tiny star-lamps in
the lustrous residence of the sun.²³

To Bedil also:

Our awareness turned the Absolute Purity into dist; the Vital
impulse seeking its own interest thickened into body.²⁴

In the race-course of Reality there is no obstruction; even the
benumbed foot (i.e. arrested motion) serves along this patch as
a milestone.²⁵

In this verse, Bedil employs the very metaphor (i.e. milestone) which some of the Bergsonian writers have employed to illustrate their meaning. The poet means to say that the heart of Reality is perpetual movement; what appears

to arrest or obstruct this motion serves only as milestone directing further movement.

It is our mirror (i.e. intelligence) which tells scandalous tales about the nature of Reality!

Now it reveals Reality as inattention (i.e. extension) now as vision.²⁶

Bedil says, "The apparent duality which we find in the unity of Reality is due only to our way of looking at it. We see it through the spectacles of our intelligence which mars our act of perception and reveals a sharp duality nowhere existing in the nature of the Real."²⁷

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

i. Intellect — as source of knowledge

According to Bergson intellect does not enjoy that status which Iqbal gives it, yet to Bergson it is a source of knowledge- may be with great limitations. For him it yields knowledge besides the knowledge of intuition. He endorses the opinion of those philosophers who believe in two different kinds of knowledge. The first implies going around it, the second entering into it. The first depends on the viewpoint chosen and the symbols employed, while the second is taken from no viewpoint and rests on no symbol. Of the first kind of knowledge we shall say that it stops at the *relative*; of the second that, wherever possible, it attains the *absolute*.²⁸

Iqbal also believes in the useful role of scientific knowledge. Thus he also believes in intuition and intellect as two sources of knowledge. But it is not something new and for which Iqbal has to follow Bergson. The Qur'an advocates two sources of knowledge *anfus* and *afaq*. The former is the inner consciousness of man and latter is the outer world of nature. According to the Qur'an, God gave man hearing and heart.²⁹ Also, according to a famous Hadith "knowledge is of two kinds: Knowledge in the heart, and that is useful,

knowledge of the tongue, and that is useless.”³⁰ Again, the history of Sufic thought is replete with such views.

5. Intuition

DIFFERENCE
BERGSON

i. Intuition – a higher form of instinct

Bergson holds intuition to be a higher form of instinct. It is “instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely.”¹

Bergson thinks that intuition is the simple and privileged case of knowledge by sympathy, which corresponds with the instinct of insects and animals. Wildon Carr explains it thus: “Intuition is that sympathetic attitude to the reality without us that makes us seem to enter into it, to be one with it, to live it. It is in contrast to the defiant attitude that we seem to assume when in science we treat facts and things as outside, external, discrete existences, which we range before us, analyze, discriminate, break up and re-combine.”²

This ‘knowledge by sympathy’ is a capacity or ‘mode of thinking’ and not a spontaneous flash to insight. Bergson’s later philosophy is an ample proof of it. T.A. Goudge has pointedly explained it thus, “Bergson subsequently modified this doctrine in certain respect. He came to emphasize the cognitive character of intuition instead of its immediacy, and even spoke of it as a mode of thinking. As such, it is not a spontaneous flash of insight but an act that is engendered by mental effort. To achieve an intuition, we must turn our attention away from its natural concern with action. This act demands concentration of thought. Even when we are successful the results are impermanent. Yet the intellect can effect a partial communication of the results by using “concrete ideas,” supplemented by images. “Comparisons and metaphors will here suggest what cannot be expressed.” Consequently, the knowledge attained by intuition is not

altogether ineffable. Nor is it, in the strict sense, absolute, for intuition is a progressive activity that can widen and deepen its scope indefinitely. Its limits can be fixed a priori.”³

Probably it is Bergson’s later philosophy, in Dr. Ishrat Hasan’s view, when he remarks that for him (Bergson) “intuition is essentially ‘intellectual sympathy’. Mere sympathy, however, strictly speaking, is not intuition. Sympathy does help us in ascending to intuition; it is not intuition itself. Intuition is a ‘direct perception’ of reality. Perception involves two factors, the perceiver and the perceived. Mere sympathy tends to negate the perceiver...Bergson touched only the outer fringe of Intuition. He did not grasp its essential nature.”⁴

IQBAL

But Iqbal does not regard intuition as a higher form of instinct or simply a kind of intellectual sympathy. To him, it is direct perception of reality by virtue of heart. “The ‘heart’ is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense perception. It is, according to the Qur’an, something which ‘sees,’ and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false.”⁵

Iqbal bases his concept on the verdict of the Qur’an. He says that intuition is the perception of what the Qur’an describes as ‘Fuad’ or ‘Qalb’, i.e. heart:

God hath made everything which He hath created most good; and began the creation of man with clay; then ordained his progeny from germs of life, from sorry water, then shaped him, and breathed of His spirit unto him and gave you hearing and seeing and heart; what little thanks do ye return”, (32:6-8)⁶

ii. Intuition in man is feeble

Bergson says that intuition in man is feeble and discontinuous, whereas intuition in the animals is continuous and all pervasive. This leads to the logical result, as Bergson

insists, 'Intuition in man is "relic" and "residue" and in the animals as guide to truth.' Before discussing Iqbal it seems worthwhile to see the validity of this view. To most of the critics this is certainly negation of intuition. C. M. Joad's comments on this point are pertinent. He says, "presumably therefore, as evolution proceeds, this residue will diminish to vanishing point, and the faculty of intuition will remain a prerogative of animals. This reasoning suggests the conclusion that the apprehension by intuition of the true nature of reality, including the appreciation of Bergson's philosophy which alone correctly asserts the true nature of reality, will in course of time die out among human beings."⁷

IQBAL

Iqbal's view is, however, diametrically different from that of Bergson. For Iqbal intuition in man is very strong and of much higher quality than that of the animals. The ecstasy and emotion, which are attached with the heart are, however, not the lot of animals, whose intuition have been given such a high place by Bergson. For Iqbal it is never 'relic' and 'residue' in man. It is diminishing to vanishing point. It is always present in man and is open to development. Due to intuition one becomes a perfect man about whom Iqbal says,

A Perfect, creative arm is really God's arm,
Dominant, creative, resourceful, efficient.⁸

This creates a great gulf of scopes between Bergson's and Iqbal's concepts of intuition. For Bergson, intuition grasps *Elan vital*, which is the flow of life, whereas Iqbal's intuition grasps the ultimate Self. This makes Iqbal's scope of intuition much wider than that of Bergson. Iqbal's intuition (religious experience) helps man develop his personality by absorbing the attributes of God. The return of the Prophet from intuition in whom there is higher form of intuition "may be fraught with infinite meaning for mankind."⁹ It is "to insert himself into the sweep of time with a view to control the forces of history, and thereby to create afresh world of ideals."¹⁰ Again, "for the Prophet it is the awakening, within

him, of world-shaking psychological forces, calculated to completely transform the human world.”¹¹ But Bergson’s intuition does not have such a vast and deep scope of intuition.

Discussing Bergson’s theory of intuition Iqbal himself concludes thus “This intuition is not a kind of mystic vision vouchsafed to us in a state of ecstasy. According to Bergson it is only a profounder kind of thought. When M. Le Roy suggested to Bergson that the true opposition was between intellectual thought and thought lived, Bergson replied - “That is still intellectualism in my opinion”. “There are”, says Bergson, “two kinds of intellectualism, the true which lives its ideas and a false intellectualism which immobilises moving ideas into solidified concepts to play with them like counters.” True intellectualism, according to Bergson is to be achieved by eliminating the element of space in our perception of ‘Pure Duration’ just as physical science eliminates the element of time in its dealing with external reality.”¹²

Iqbal continues to say that Bergson’s intuition is not more “than the flash of genius which sometimes suggests theory when only a few facts are immediately before us. Bergson himself tells us that his intuition comes to us by a long and systematic contact with reality in all its concrete windings. It seems to me that Bergson’s intuition is not at all necessary to his system and may easily be detached from it without injuring his main thesis which, on careful analysis, reveals itself as a kind of empiricism with a hue of Idealism not likely to last long. However, I have no objection to intuition in the sense of supplying us with workable hypotheses; the trouble begins when it is set up as a vision which would satisfy all the demands of our nature.”¹³

That Iqbal bases his views on Islamic foundation is beyond all doubts. In Islam, intuition is compared to the light of God. The tradition about spiritual insight is noteworthy here.

Fear the insight of the believer, for verily he sees with the light of God.¹⁴

However, Bergson's intellectual intuition does not reach such high level. It is probably the reason Iqbal advises the son of Sayyid not to follow Bergson. He emphatically says:

If thou hadst not lost thy own Self - altogether,
 Thou wouldst not have been a follower of Bergson. Attach thy heart to what the Prophet said;
 O son of Ali! how long from Bu Ali?
 When thou hast no eyes that can see the way.
 The Qarshi leader is better than a Bukhari!¹⁵

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

However, there are some important ideas on which Iqbal has a striking affinity with Bergson. For instance, (i) the supremacy of intuitive knowledge over intellect, (ii) and its grasping of objects in immediacy.

i. Supremacy of intuitive knowledge

Bergson believes in the supremacy of intuitive knowledge over intellect. It is through intuition one enters into the core of an object.¹⁶ Intellect only takes a partial view of the objects.

Iqbal also believes in the supremacy of intuition, as discussed before. But he needs not get guidance from Bergson. Nearly all the Sufis regard intuition as superior to the intellectual knowledge.

For Bedil also, only intuition is capable of experiencing Reality. He says that:

Lose thy thought for a moment or two,
 Prolong the thread of sympathy:
 Then sweep freely from Eternity to Eternity
 in God's vast domain of life!"¹⁷

Explaining this verse, Iqbal says, "It is in the moments of intuition that we are identified with the eternally rapid march of life."¹⁸

Again, Bedil questions, "When then is the proper method for a vision of the Real? He himself replies:

O Bedil; look within,
 It is here that the 'Anqa (a fabulous bird
 standing in Sufi terminology for a symbol of
 Reality) falls a victim to the fly"¹⁹

Iqbal clearly appears to get inspiration from Rumi. When Iqbal in *Piyam-i-Mashriq* is disturbed by the confusion of Hegel's philosophy, Rumi appears to say:

You tread the path of love with the help of intellect
 you are trying to look for sun with the help of a candle."²⁰

ii. Intuition and immediacy

For Bergson, intuition grasps Reality as indivisible whole, as we grasp sympathy as a whole, which is above the total sum of its isolated and separate notes. "The work is an individual, indivisible whole which the composer has created and the performers apprehend, and not the aggregate of discrete sounds into which it can at any time be decomposed. It is known directly in one intuition."²¹ Iqbal calls it "unanalysable wholeness"²² and rightly considers it as one of the characteristic of mystic experience. To him, intuition or mystic state "brings us into contact with the total passage of Reality in which all the diverse stimuli merge into another and form a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist."²³

But this is a view about which even a casual student of religious philosophy, nearly in all the religions, knows that it is not a unique view put forward by Bergson. Wildon Carr rightly observes, "Intuition is not a new sense revealing to us unsuspected things or qualities of things. It is an aspect of conscious existence recognized in every philosophy. All that is new in Bergson's theory is the emphasis laid on intuition, and the suggestion that in it lies the possibility of the solution of the intellectual puzzle. What is new is not the recognition that there is an immediacy of feeling that precedes, forms the basis of or is the substance of discursive thought, and accompanies it. What is new is the exhortation not to turn our backs on this immediacy in order to follow the method of

science in the hope and expectation of finding a profounder and richer reality in the concepts of the understanding, the frames into which our intellect fits the reality, but to use the intuition to seize the reality itself, to make of intuition a philosophical instrument, to find in it a philosophical method.”²⁴

Rumi pertinently says that it is the *Ishq*, which understands the mysteries of God. “Rumi.... always calls this immediate intuition as ‘*Ishq*’....

The lover’s ailment is separate from all other ailments: Love is the astrolabe of the mysteries of God.²⁵

II. The Universe

1. Main Features

DIFFERENCE

BERGSON

i. Life and matter

For Bergson, life and matter are two different principles. According to Bergson, the *Elan Vital* is life and impulsion of endless duration. But it does not continue without interruption. This interruption makes the movement inverse like the recoil of a spring. This inverse movement is matter, which is relatively inert. Bergson says, “In reality, life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these two movements is simple, the matter which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track. Of these two currents the second runs counter to the first, but the first obtains, all the same something from the second.”¹

This view of life and matter has invited adverse criticism by many critics, and rightly so, due to its dualism of life and matter. Collingwood thinks that this dualism of life and matter in Bergson’s Philosophy is irreducible. These remain ununified.² S. Alim Khundmiri says that “how can a by-

product obstruct the flow of that of which it is a by-product? Unless matter is presupposed to be prior to life, it cannot perform this necessary function of obstruction.”³

Again, C.M. Joad comments on Bergson’s concept of life and matter thus, “Matter is described as a reverse movement of the flow of reality, due to an interruption of the flow. But there can be no interruption without something to interrupt. What, then, is the something that interrupts? It cannot be the flow, because the flow could only interrupt itself in virtue of some stoppage in itself, and the stoppage would then be the interruption which it seeks to explain; nor can it be matter, since matter proceeds from the interruption and is not therefore the interruption which causes matter. We are driven, then, to suppose that the real must contain the seeds of division in itself; that, instead of being a featureless becoming, it is variegated and articulated, and that, instead of being pure change, it contains elements other than change, which are able to interrupt the change.”⁴ Further, for Collingwood this view of matter and life is another name of subjective idealism. He says, “If we cannot seriously accept Kant’s theory that nature is a by-product of the thinking activity of the human mind, because we are sure that the opposite is nearer the truth, how can we accept Bergson’s similar theory that the world of physics is a by-product of the self-creative activity of life? This is a new form of subjective idealism, of which we might say what Hume said of Berkley’s, that the argument might admit of no answer, but it produced no conviction.”⁵

IQBAL

On the contrary, *Iqbal* takes a unitary view of life and matter. Iqbal considers reality as spirit. There is no dualism of life and matter according to Iqbal. Iqbal is a spiritual monist. For Bergson the reality is *Elan Vital* i.e. creative life whereas according to Iqbal reality is God the Ultimate Ego who is spiritual. Matter is also ego on a lower degree. He says, “Reality...is essentially spirit. But of course, there are degrees

of spirit.... I have conceived the Ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must now add that from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed.... Only that is, strictly speaking, real which is directly conscious of its own reality. The degree of reality varies with the feeling of Egohood".⁶

Again, Iqbal explains God as all-inclusive and Nature is His habit. He says, "What we call Nature or the not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God. His 'I-amness' is independent, elemental, absolute.... Now a self is unthinkable without a character i.e. a uniform mode of behaviour. Nature.... is not a mass of pure materiality occupying a void. It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate Self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phrase of the Qur'an it is the habit of Allah. From the human point of view it is an interpretation which, in our present situation, we put on the creative activity of the Absolute Ego."⁷

Thus the dualism of life and matter "is absorbed into the Unity of God Who is an all embracing personality."⁸ Unlike Bergson, Iqbal's Nature is not a different reality. It is organism itself and is organically related to God.

ii. Purposeless Universe

We have seen that Elan Vital is a blind and undirected will and that human will has no goal or purpose ahead, according to Bergson. In the same way, for Bergson, the universe, through which Elan Vital runs, is not purposive; it is a continuous flow or surge having no purpose ahead. He says, "To speak of an end is to think of a pre-existing model which has only to be realized."⁹

IQBAL

Iqbal thinks that the universe has a purpose, which is the provision of an arena for the harmonious development of human personality. He says:

All otherness is only to subdue,

Its breast a target for the well-winged shaft;
 God's fiat Be! made other manifest
 so that thy arrows might be sharp to pierce
 the Steely anvil

... ..

O thou who slumberest, by dull opiates drugged,
 And namest mean this world material,
 Rise up, and open thy besotted eyes!
 Call thou not mean thy world by Law compelled;
 Its purpose is to enlarge the Muslim's soul,
 To challenge his potentialities;"¹⁰

He says, "According to the Qur'an... The universe has a serious end. Its shifting actualities force our being into fresh formations. The intellectual effort to overcome the obstruction offered by it, besides enriching and amplifying our life, sharpens our insight, and thus prepares us for a more masterful insertion into subtler aspects of human experience. It is our reflective contact with the temporal flux of things which trains us for an intellectual vision of the non-temporal."¹¹

Iqbal's view of a purposive universe can easily be traced to the Qur'an, which he emphatically quotes. He quotes: 'Verily in the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and the day, are signs for men of understanding; who, standing and sitting and reclining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and say: "Oh, our Lord! Thou hast not created this in vain." (3:188)"¹². Again: 'We have not created the Heavens and earth and whatever is between them in sport; We have not created them but for a serious end; but the greater part of them understand it not. (44:38)"¹³

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

The striking affinity which one finds in their views is pertaining to (i) philosophy of change, and (ii) the growing, moving and expanding universe whose workings are not preconceived.

i. Philosophy of Change

Bergson considers change as fundamental in the universe. To him reality is becoming and changes on the analogy of our conscious experience.¹⁴ Bergson says, that “there is no feeling, no idea, volition which is not undergoing change every moment; if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow.”¹⁵ Even in case of visual perception of a motionless external object there is continuous change. He says, “The object may remain the same, I may look at it from the same side, at the same angle, in the same light; nevertheless the vision I now have of it differs from that which I have just had.... The truth is that we change without ceasing and that the state itself is nothing but change.”¹⁶

Iqbal also believes that every thing in the universe changes. He says in a hemstitch of rare eloquence: only change is permanent.¹⁷ To Iqbal also it is on the analogy of conscious experience, though “the future is not wholly undetermined as Bergson’s analysis of our conscious experience shows.”¹⁸ With this regard, undoubtedly, he endorses Bergson when the latter says, “I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold. I am merry or sad. I work or do nothing. I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas - such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing”.¹⁹ Iqbal concludes, “Thus there is nothing static in my inner life; all is a constant mobility, an unceasing flux of states, a perpetual flow in which there is no halt or resting place”²⁰

This affinity is incidental. Actually the Qur’an influences Iqbal. He says that the universe is not incapable of change. Deep in its inner being lies, perhaps, the dream of a new birth. He quotes the Qur’an in this respect:

Say - go through the earth and see how God hath brought forth all creation: hereafter will He give it another birth (29:1)²¹

Again, in this connection, Iqbal refers to the Qur’an, which says,

He (God) adds to His creation what he wills. (35:1)²²

ii. Growing Universe

Bergson infers from his philosophy of change that universe is moving, growing and in the process of becoming universe. Now things come into being every moment. Bergson characterized the universe as a process of creative evolution, a becoming in which new things appear. The cause of this is the creative nature of the universe. He says that “... the universe is not made, but is being made continually. It is growing, perhaps, indefinitely, by the addition of new worlds.”²³

It is the same with Iqbal. He maintains, “The universe is so constituted that it is capable of extension.”²⁴ “It is not a block universe, or a finished product, immovable and incapable of change.”²⁵

Here too Iqbal resorts to the Holy Qur’an. He pointedly says, “To my mind nothing is more alien to the Qur’anic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a preconceived plan. As I have already pointed out, the universe, according to the Qur’an, is liable to increase. It is growing universe and not an already completed product which left the hand of its Maker ages ago, and is now lying stretched in space as a dead mass of matter to which time does nothing and consequently is nothing.”²⁶

2. Evolution

DIFFERENCE

BERGSON

i. The process-theory of evolution

Bergson’s theory of evolution is pluri-dimensional, which means that “the life force is conserved in every line of evolution of living beings, causing all of the numerous varieties of living forms, creating all new species, and dividing itself more and more as it advances.”¹ The universe is a flow and evolution is the movement of the flow according to Bergson. Guided by vital impulse, which is blind force behind evolution, the latter carves its ways spontaneously. It began

its terrestrial career in the original protoplasmic jelly. The vital impulse passed through different routes - plants and animals. While passing it assimilated inorganic matter and built up organisms. In plants the vital impulse has become torpid; it has gone asleep, but not entirely unconscious like a stone. On the other direction, the vital impulse has passed through animals who are able to move about to find their food. Evolution on this direction has proceeded in four main directions. "Two of these directions, terminating respectively in echinoderms (e.g., star fish) and molluscs turned out to be blind alleys; surrounded by hard protective sheaths and shells, movements were constrained and partial slumber ensued, although this slumber was not so profound as that of plants. Arthropods (e.g. insects) and vertebrates moved in more successful direction: they were able to throw off their ancient armor and move freely. So the vital impulse attained two different kinds of consciousness: *instinct*, most highly developed in ants, bees, and wasps; and *intelligence*, present in vertebrates, most notably in man."²

IQBAL

On the contrary, Iqbal's theory of evolution is unilinear. For him, there is no inert matter. There is ego even on its lowest scale. He says that matter is "A colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of co-coordination."³ Again, to him, there is ego in every object from a lowest to the highest though with difference of degrees. He says, "The world, in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am'. Every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego."⁴

Iqbal's process theory of evolution is closely connected with his philosophy of the self. The self is the source of physical expression. It shapes the not-self according to its needs, or, in other words, body takes shape according to the

requirement of the self. Thus it is the self, which completes the matter (not in the sense of inert matter) to become life. Again, there are degrees in the expression of egohood. As discussed before, "Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man."

ii. Purpose of evolution

For Bergson, as we have seen, the universe has no place of purpose and goal. So, naturally, there is no purpose of evolution, which is the movement of the flow, according to Bergson. He says, "Never could the finalistic interpretation... be taken for an anticipation of the future."⁵ He does not believe in teleology in this connection. For him, there is no purpose behind evolution because "any mention of purpose will make evolution less creative."⁶

IQBAL

But for Iqbal, evolution is purposive in the sense that it is selective in character. This is what he means by teleology, as explained earlier. He, however, endorses Bergson's view to some extent and then disagrees with him. He says, "The world process, or the movement of the universe in time, is certainly devoid of purpose, if by purpose we mean a foreseen end - a far-off fixed destination to which the whole creation moves. To endow the world process with purpose in this sense is to rob it of its originality and its creative character. Its ends are terminations of a career; they are ends to come and not necessarily premeditated. A time-process cannot be conceived as a line already drawn. It is a line in the drawing- an actualization of open possibilities. It is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character, and brings itself to some sort of a present fulfillment by actively preserving and supplementing the past."⁷

Now what is the purpose of evolution? For Iqbal the purpose of evolution of the universe is to establish kingdom of God on earth or in other words Divine Vicegerency

through 'naib' "The *na'ib*... ..is the vicegerent of God on earth. He is the completest Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth. Out of the richness of his nature he lavishes the wealth of life on others, and brings them nearer and nearer to himself. The more we advance in evolution, the nearer we get to him. In approaching him we are raising ourselves in the scale of life. The development of humanity both in mind and body is a condition precedent to his birth. For the present he is mere ideal; but the evolution of humanity is tending towards the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who will become his fitting parents. Thus the kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth."⁸

The 'naib' will attain to this position by becoming nearest to God after absorbing His attributes. "The moral and religious ideal of man is not self-negation but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique... Not that he is finally absorbed in God. On the contrary, he absorbs God into himself. The true person not only absorbs the world of matter; by mastering it he absorbs God Himself into his Ego."⁹

iii. Scope of evolution

Bergson's evolution, as we have seen, is restricted to this world. Bergson has no concept of immortality and hereafter.

But Iqbal's evolution of the self continues. Even death, in general, is not the end of man. For Iqbal, death is only a kind of passage to *Barzakh* which is a state of some kind of suspense between Death and Resurrection.¹⁰ For him, it is a passive state. It is a conscious state where the ego's attitude towards time and space is changed.¹¹ Actually, "it is a state in which the ego catches a glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality, and prepares himself for adjustment to these aspects."¹² Resurrection to him "is nothing more than a kind of stock-taking of the ego's past achievements and his future possibilities."¹³

Notwithstanding, God is the destiny of man. For him, "The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge is immanent in nature, and is described by the Qur'an as 'the First and the Last, the visible and the invisible.'¹⁴

To reiterate, three points are important to note from Iqbal's philosophy of evolution. Firstly, unlike Bergson's view the evolution is not impersonal and it emerges from lower to higher.¹⁵ The self is the centre of evolution. Secondly, whereas Bergson's evolution is blind - no goal ahead, Iqbal's evolution is purposive. Thirdly, the scope of Iqbal's evolution is not limited like that of Bergson. For Iqbal, God is its destination as discussed before.

Actually Iqbal is highly influenced by Rumi's concept of Evolution.

For Rumi also man is the central point in Evolution. The soul, "in order that its inherent potentialities may be developed and exhibited, descends into the world of matter, where from the lowest phases of soul-life it gradually rises to the highest end, having traversed the whole circle of existence and thus attained to the utmost perfection which it is capable, gives itself up to God and realizes its essential unity with Him."¹⁶ Rumi says:

I died to the inorganic state and become endowed with growth,
and then I died to (vegetable) growth

I died from animality and became Adam (man): why, then,
should I fear? when have I become less by dying?

At the next remove I shall die to man, that I may soar and lift up my head amongst the angels;

Once more I shall be sacrificed and die to the angel: I shall become that which enters not into the imagination.

Then I shall become non-existence: non existence saidth to me, (in tones loud as an organ, verily, unto Him shall we return.¹⁷

From the above it is quite obvious that evolution to Rumi is not impersonal. It is the “selves or egos from the very start which are perpetually engaged in self-realization.¹⁸ Next, the self emerges from lower to the higher state i.e. from inanimate through animals to man and beyond “Unto Him shall we return.” It is the soul, which shakes the matter. In passing it may be kept in mind that for Rumi too the matter is not inert. He says:

Air and earth and water and fire are (His) slaves:

With you and me they are dead, but with God they are alive.¹⁹

Thus it is crystal clear that Iqbal was inspired by Rumi’s concept of evolution and not by that of Bergson. That Iqbal appreciates Rumi’s theory of evolution further supports my thesis. Iqbal pointedly says, “It was only natural and perfectly consistent with the spirit of the Qur’an, that Rumi regarded the question of immortality as one of biological evolution, and not a problem to be decided by arguments of a purely metaphysical nature, as some philosophers of Islam had thought. The theory of evolution, however, has brought despair and anxiety, instead of hope and enthusiasm for life, to the modern world. The reason is to be found in the unwarranted modern assumption that man’s present structure, mental as well as physiological, is the last word in biological evolution, and that death, regarded as a biological event, has no constructive meaning. The world of today needs a Rumi to create an attitude of hope, and to kindle the fire of enthusiasm for life”.²⁰

Again, referring to Rumi’s process theory of evolution Iqbal says at a place: “The formulation of the theory of evolution in the world of Islam brought into being Rumi’s tremendous enthusiasm for the biological future of man. No cultured Muslim can read such passages.... without a thrill of

joy.”²¹ Here Iqbal quotes a passage from Rumi’s Mathnawi (in Thadani’s translation), which expresses Rumi’s process theory similar to the above from the inanimate through animals to man and beyond.

Further, Iqbal pays tribute to his guide-Rumi, in beautiful words thus:

Rumi... . has put a heart gripping flame on my grass!.²²

iv. The force behind evolution

We have already seen that Elan Vital is a force, which is behind the evolution. According to Bergson there is an immanent principle i.e. the thrusting force behind evolution, which he calls vital impetus or vital impulse. It is “a current of consciousness”. For Bergson, vital impulse persuades and drives and without it there is no evolution. Bergson says, “All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, as one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in a overwhelming chargeable to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles; perhaps even death.”²³

In the words of Will Durant, “Our struggles and our sufferings our ambitions and our defeats, our yearnings to be better and stronger than we are, are the voice and current of the *Elan Vital* in us, that vital urge which makes us grow, and transforms this wandering planet into a theatre of unending creation.”²⁴ “The vital impulse is not necessarily a conscious effort, for it is present in plants. It is not an *individual* effort, for it is common to all the members of a species, as De Vries has shown in his experiments upon the evening primrose in which mutations into new species were found to occur among many individuals at the same time. The vital impulse is common to all living beings; it is the immanent principle directive of all organic evolution.”²⁵

IQBAL

But for Iqbal love is the driving force behind evolution. He says:

The whole campaign of the universe is by the heat of love,
 Knowledge is the state of attribute; love is the seeing of essence.
 Love is space and stability; love is life and death,
 Knowledge is an open question mark, love is secret answer.²⁶

Love for Iqbal is “the desire to assimilate, to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realise them.”²⁷

Here too Iqbal appears to be impressed by Rumi, the illustrious guide of Iqbal. For Rumi, love is the force behind evolution. He says:

Though outwardly it appears that love is born from me;
 Yet you know that in reality, love gave birth to me.²⁸

Again:

Know that the wheeling heavens are turned by
 waves of Love: were it not for Love, the world would
 be frozen (inanimate)²⁹

For Rumi also love is the desire to assimilate and to absorb. Rumi uses *Ishq* in the meaning of desire to assimilate and absorb which results in growth and evolution. By assimilation Rumi means one form of life losing itself in another. He says:

If there had not been Love, how should there have
 been existence? How should bread have attached itself
 to you and become (assimilated to) you
 The bread became you: through what? Through (your)
 love and appetite; otherwise, how should the bread have
 had any access to the (vital) spirit?
 Love makes the dead bread into spirit: It makes the
 spirit that was perishable everlasting.”³⁰

In other words, “Rumi finds the principle of growth and development through the organic power of assimilation as the highest principle of explanation.... Reality presents to us nothing but qualitative transformation. Fuel turning into fire and bread turning into life and consciousness point to the incommensurability of the cause and the effect.”³¹

*AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION***Creative Evolution**

However, there is a great affinity between Bergson and Iqbal regarding their views of creative Evolution. Creative evolution is a creative process. It means that mechanical laws do not predetermine evolution. For Bergson there is continuous becoming creating all of the numerous varieties of forms, and new species. He says, "Reality is a perpetual growth, a creation pursued without end.... Every human work in which there is invention, every voluntary act in which there is freedom, every movement of an organism that manifests spontaneity, brings something new into the world."³² Further, for him "to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly."³³ Again, for Bergson evolution is not mechanical as we find in the theories of Darwin and Lamarck. For Darwin, in the process of evolution 'change variations' play dominating part. Only those species survive and reproduce themselves who are most suited to their environment. 'Another fact that Darwinism failed to explain is why living things have evolved in the direction of greater and greater complexity. The earliest living things were simple in character and well adapted to their environments. Why did the evolutionary process not stop at this stage? Why did life continue to complicate itself "more and more dangerously"? To appeal to the mechanism of selection for an answer was, Bergson thought, insufficient. Something must have driven life on to higher and higher levels of organization, despite the risks involved.'³⁴ According to Lamarck, in evolution, adaptation to environment is the determining factor. With the change of environment species put forth new organs to adapt to the environment. The more the species accomplish the necessary adaptations, the more these are successful in surviving. In case of inability they die out. "Yet it involved accepting the principle that acquired characteristics are transmitted from one generation to the next, and empirical evidence is heavily against this.

Furthermore, the Lamarckian notion of a conscious “effort” is too limited to serve as an explanatory device. It could perhaps operate in case of animals but hardly in the case of plants or microorganisms. To make the notion work, it must be broadened and deepened.”³⁵ The common factor in these theories is that the whole process of evolution works on mechanical lines. These mechanistic theories of evolution did not satisfy Bergson. The theories of Darwin and Lamarck do not explain the transformism or the occurrence of variations in species, and peculiar types of abrupt variation i.e. mutation and are unable to account for such phenomena. The mechanists determine the direction of evolution at any given moment, but they cannot explain the reason as to why evolution takes place.³⁶

Bergson further says, “There is no doubt that life as a whole is an evolution, that is, an unceasing transformation. But life can progress only by means of the living, which are its depositaries. Innumerable living beings, almost alike, have to repeat each other in space and in time for the novelty they are working out to grow and mature.... Heredity does not only transmit character; it transmits also the impetus in virtue of which the characters are modified, and this impetus is vitality itself.”³⁷

Iqbal also believes in creative evolution. He says, “The universe is a free creative movement.”³⁸ We have seen that to Iqbal the evolution is from lower to higher, without which evolution would become mechanical. To him every thing is on its upward march towards the realization of the ego. He says, “Creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of mechanical action.”³⁹

But Bergson is not the originator of this thought. Here too Rumi appears to be the torchbearer. About seven hundred years before Bergson, Rumi said:

Every moment the world is renewed, and we are unaware of its being renewed whilst it remains (the same in appearance).⁴⁰

In fact the foundation of both Rumi’s and Iqbal’s thought is the Qur’anic injunction which reads: ‘It needs not that I

swear by the sunset redness and by the night and its gatherings and by the moon when at her full, ye be surely carried onward.⁴¹ Iqbal pointedly refers to the Qur'an and says: "Thus in his inmost being man, as conceived by the Qur'an, is creative activity, as ascending spirit who, in his onward march, rises from one state of being to another."⁴²

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MCTAGGART AND IQBAL

I. The Human Self

1. The nature of the self

DIFFERENCE
MCTAGGART

i. The selves are differentiations

Mctaggart follows the Hegelian principle of differentiation. According to him, the human selves are differentiation. (parts) of the Absolute¹ which is system or society of selves² or a college of students.³ The selves are the only differentiations of the Absolute. "They, and they alone, are primary parts. And they, and they alone, are percipients."⁴ The selves are the primary parts of the Absolute. The secondary parts are perceptions, which are the contents of the selves.⁵ There is no Absolute apart from the society or system of selves.⁶ For Mctaggart, therefore, there is no problem of relations between finite selves and the Absolute. These differentiations do not disintegrate the unity of the Absolute.

ii. The self is a substance

Mctaggart pointedly argues that the self is a substance. That which exists cannot be existence in itself. The existent cannot be without quality. We cannot resolve 'something' without residue into qualities. He says, "at the head of the series there will be something existent which has qualities without being itself a quality. The ordinary name for this, and I think the best name, is substance."⁷

iii. The self is spiritual

Further, according to McTaggart self i.e. substance is spiritual, time and matter are unreal. He says that “the only existence are the spiritual substances which we call ‘persons’ or ‘selves.’⁸

iv. The Absolute

It is imperative to comprehend McTaggart’s concept of the Absolute. McTaggart calls the ultimate Reality as the Absolute⁹ of which the selves are differentiations. “The stress is on the pluralism of spiritual substances, but we may also think of one substance, the Absolute. This, however, is not an all-inclusive Self, since no self can include another self, nor is it in any sense God; it is simply the system. The explanatory model is that of a college, whose members have more reality than the college itself.”¹⁰

Again, “Ultimate reality.... is spiritual: It consists entirely of individual minds and their contents. He understood this in a way that excludes space, time, and material objects from reality. What appear to us as being these things are really minds and parts of the contents of minds....”¹¹

According to McTaggart Absolute is spiritual which has the quality of content of one or more selves. He says, “I propose to define the quality of spirituality by saying that it is the quality of having content, all of which is the content of one or more selves....”¹² He says, “There is indeed no demonstrative proof that nothing exists save spirit. For there might probably be a form of substance, which we have never experienced or imagined, which would satisfy the requirements for being a substance and yet not be spiritual. But we have no positive ground for claiming that there is such a substance. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that all substance is spiritual.”¹³

v. The selves are real

Again, to McTaggart the selves are really real.¹⁴ Neither they are illusion nor they are adjectives or predicate of the Absolute. Writing to Iqbal, McTaggart says:

I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not that.¹⁵

According to McTaggart the selves are eternal for they have neither beginning nor end. These are elementally eternal, as we shall see in the chapter of immortality.

However, only the human selves are the differentiations of the Absolute,¹⁶ because the former alone truly and wholly represent the Absolute. The human selves alone possess secondary quality i.e. cognition and perception and can have. The animals cannot have such quality. They are synthesis. They are not free of contradictions and, thus, are unable to stand against perfect unity.

McTaggart's ideas have considerably been criticised. That the absolute is differentiated in to human selves appear to be unconvincing to some critics. "Most people at any rate find it difficult to believe that reality consists of a system of selves, the contents of which are perceptions. 'Ingenious but unconvincing', is likely to be their verdict about McTaggart's arguments."¹⁷

Pringle-Pattison says, "It is strange to find so profound a student of Hegel using substance throughout as the ultimate category in speaking both of the self and of God. The perdurability of substance naturally refers just as much to the past as to the future. Substance, indeed, is conceived as that which can neither be created nor destroyed. Mr. McTaggart believes accordingly that our present existence has been preceded by a plurality of lives, and will be followed in like manner by a plurality of future lives."¹⁸

IQBAL

However, according to *Iqbal*, the selves are neither the differentiations of the Absolute nor the Absolute is mere

community. He thinks that God is the ultimate Ego from whom the finite egos proceed. He says, "I have conceived the ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must add now that from the ultimate Ego only egos proceed.... Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life."¹⁹

Next, unlike McTaggart, who believes in substance theory of the self, Iqbal rejects the substance theory.²⁰ The self is only Command of Allah, which is above the understanding of human knowledge. He quotes the Qur'an:

And they ask thee of the soul. Say: the soul proceedeth from my Lord's "Amr" (Command): but of knowledge, only a little to you is given' (17:87)

For Iqbal, unlike McTaggart, the self is not a spirit. It is obvious from his view of the ego's emergence. He says, "How does the ego emerge within the spatio-temporal order?"²¹ The teaching of the Qur'an is perfectly clear on this point:

Now of fine clay have We created man: There We placed him, a moist germ, in a safe abode; then made We the moist germ of clot of blood: then made the clotted blood into a piece of flesh; then made the piece of flesh into bones: and We clothed the bones with flesh: then brought forth man of yet another make. Blessed, therefore, the God - the most excellent of makers. (23:12-14)

The 'yet another make', of man develops on the basis of physical organism - that colony of sub-egos through which a profounder Ego constantly acts on me, and thus permits me to build up a systematic unity of experience."²²

Iqbal explains further and says, "The ego reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states do not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another. They exist as phases of a complex whole, called mind. The organic unity, however, of these inter-related states or, let us say, events is a special kind of unity. It fundamentally differs from the unity of a material thing; for the parts of material thing can exist in mutual isolation".²³

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

Notwithstanding the difference, there is a striking affinity between the concepts of these two thinkers on the reality of the self. The selves are neither illusion nor predicate or adjective of the Absolute; they are real.

Iqbal is also a staunch believer of the reality of the self. Rather it is the basic concept of his whole philosophy. His entire book, *Asrar-i-Khudi*, is based on this concept. He says in *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*:

If you say that the "I" is a mere illusion—
 An appearance among other appearances—
 Then tell me who is the subject of this illusion.
 Look within and discover
 The world is visible, yet its existence needs proof!
 Not even the intellect of an angel can comprehend it;
 Then "I" is invisible and needs no proof!
 Think while and see thine own secret!
 The "I" is truth, it is no illusion;"²⁴

But he bases his concept on the verdicts of the Qur'an, which regards ego as a fact. He alludes to the Qur'an on countless places. For instance, referring to the Qur'an, he says, "The personal pronoun used in the expression *Rabbi* ('My Lord') throws further light on the nature and behaviour of the ego. It is meant to suggest that the soul must be taken as something individual and specific, with all the variations in the range; balance, and effectiveness of its unity."²⁵

No doubt, Iqbal compares McTaggart to Hallaj, but it is because both affirmed "the reality and destiny of the human ego" and their respective community for this matter accused both. And not Iqbal followed McTaggart, as Rastogi erroneously claims.²⁶ Iqbal's position becomes crystal clear when he discusses personal immortality.

2. Immortality

DIFFERENCE

McTAGGART

i. The selves are immortal

Being the differentiations of the Absolute, which is eternal the selves are elementally immortal,¹ according to McTaggart.

In other words, the selves participate in the elemental eternity of the Absolute,² and are not annihilated even by death. These neither begin nor perish. No new self takes place of a perished self.

ii. Reincarnation

McTaggart believes in transmigration of soul or reincarnation. He believes in "plurality of lives."³ According to him the self passes into another body after death.⁴ In other words, he believes in reincarnation. "Despite the unreality of time, McTaggart argued, there is an important sense in which it is true to say that individual persons are immortal and that they are reincarnated in a succession of (apparent) bodies."⁵

According to McTaggart, "there is a plurality of lives, and that each man's existence before and after his present life would be divided into many lives, each bounded by birth and death. Death brings forgetfulness, but this does not break the continuity of a self. The continuity is not that of consciousness, but of a substance and its attributes. What is gained in one life - for instance, love - may be preserved and strengthened in a future life, though there is no memory of the former one."⁶

Pringle-Pattison has nicely expounded and criticised McTaggart's theory of immortality. He rightly says, "The obvious objection to this theory is the fact that we retain no memory of those previous lives, and Mr. McTaggart, it is to be noted, does not imply that in the lives to come we shall have any memory of our present existence."⁷

For McTaggart, as discussed, the soul-substance is eternal and indestructible. The personal unity depends on it. Pringle-Pattison says, "I cannot help feeling that throughout the discussion Mr. McTaggart substitutes for the living and concrete unity of self-consciousness, as manifested in experience, the numerical unity of a soul-substance or indestructible soul-atom on which the personal unity of

experience is supposed to depend, or in which it is somehow housed".⁸

The soul-substance passes on the mental and moral qualities of this life to the next incarnation and thus keeps the two lives continuous. "This soul-substance forms, as it were, the vehicle by which the mental and moral qualities acquired by an individual in the course of a single life are transmitted to the next incarnation to be his working capital and the starting-point, possibly, of future advance. The two lives are thus continuous in the sense that both have the same metaphysical substrate, and the identity of substance manifests itself, on Mr. McTaggart's theory, in identity or continuity of attributes."⁹

Commenting on it, Pringle-Pattison rightly observes. "But even so, it is surely paradoxical, or rather simply misleading to speak of this continuity as "personal identity," and to say that in spite of the loss of memory it is "the same person who lives in the successive lives. The identity that exists is the identity of an object for an onlooker; it does not exist for any one of the successive incarnations. Each self is the realised unity of its own separate life, and if the new life is not consciously knot to the old, it is unmeaning to speak of the new individual as the same self."¹⁰

IQBAL

But Iqbal does not believe ego as elementally mortal. Also, he rejects the idea of transmigration of soul.

Iqbal does not believe the self as elementally immortal. Instead, he believes in earned immortality, which means that immortality is not the lot of every individual; it is earned through deeds. Refuting McTaggart's concept that man is elementally immortal, Iqbal pointedly says, "But while I agree that the self is more than a mere predicate of the Absolute, I cannot agree with McTaggart in the view that the self is elementally immortal. From the mere fact that the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute it by no means follows that, even in its finitude, the human self retains the

character which belongs to its source alone. To my mind, such a differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself. Personally I regard immortality as an inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego.”¹¹

Iqbal states that it is only the fully developed self, which earns immortality. In a beautiful Persian verse he says:

Why fear that death which comes from without?

For when the ‘I’ ripens into a self it has
no danger of dissolution.”¹²

For Iqbal, the fully developed self survives even the universal destruction. Emphasizing his view of earned immortality, he says, “Even the scene of ‘Universal Destruction’ immediately preceding the Day of Judgement cannot affect the perfect calm of a full-grown ego....”¹³ Then how the self is fully developed? Iqbal maintains, “Life offers a scope for ego-activity, and death is the first test of the synthetic activity of the ego. There are no pleasure giving and pain-giving acts; there are only ego-sustaining and ego-dissolving acts. It is the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution, or disciplines him for a future career.... Personal immortality, than, is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it.”¹⁴ To him lacks of tension or state of relaxation are ego-dissolving acts. He pointedly says, “That which tends to maintain the state of tension tends to make us immortal” Death in such case, therefore, is a passage from one state to the other. He says, “death, if present action has sufficiently fortified the ego against the shock that physical dissolution brings, is only a kind of passage to what the Qur’an describes as ‘Barzakh’.”¹⁵

Iqbal says that the Qur’an is quite clear in its view of earned immortality. Iqbal quotes:

By the soul and He who hath balanced it, and hath shown to it the ways of wickedness and piety, blessed is he who hath *made it grow* and undone is he who *corrupted it*. (91:7.10).¹⁶

As regards transmigration of soul Iqbal does not endorse the concept. Iqbal states that the re-emergence of man will not involve his physical body even on the day of Resurrection. He says, “.... the nature of the universe is such that it is open to it to maintain in some other way the kind of individuality necessary for the final working out of human action, even after the disintegration of what appears to specify his individuality in his present environment. What that other way is we do not know. Nor do we gain any further insight into the nature of the ‘second creation’ by associating it with some kind of body, however subtle it may be. The analogies of the Qur’an only suggest it as a fact; they are not meant to reveal its nature and character.”¹⁷

Iqbal says that even the concept of reincarnation in itself, as put forward by McTaggart is not free from serious limitations. Iqbal says ‘In McTaggart’s view there is no guarantee that the process of birth, death and rebirth will be endless. On the other hand, he himself suggests in his *Some Dogmas of Religion* that “it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change.” In this eventuality we came back to the Absolute again, and McTaggart’s system defeats its own purpose. The possibility of ego-differentiations merging again into a perfection transcending time and change must be counteracted, however remote it may be. And this can be done only by taking immortality as a hope, as inspiration, a duty, and not as an eternal fact.”¹⁸

McTaggart’s concept of transmigration of soul or reincarnation appears to be a sort of mechanism. According to this concept one soul is transmigrated from one body to another after the former is annihilated. But it is without consciousness. The subject is not conscious of the previous life. Thus it is reduced to a mechanistic process. It may be noted that there is no concept of transmigration of the soul according to the Qur’an.

When death overtaketh one of them, he saith, “Lord! send me back again, that I may do the good that I have left undone!” By

no means. These are the very words, which he shall speak. But behind them is a barrier (Barzakh) until the day when they shall be raised again. (23:101, 102).¹⁹

Besides, Iqbal's concept of progressive immortality, which is alien to McTaggart, makes the former notably distinct from the latter. This is Qur'anic concept. Iqbal's progressive immortality means that the ego is immortal and all the time is progressing; even after death its progress is not finished. According to him the state of 'Barzakh after death and before Resurrection is not a passive state. It is conscious state. It prepares to win Resurrection. "The records of Sufistic experience indicate that Barzakh is a state of consciousness characterized by a change in the ego's attitude toward time and space."²⁰ To him, "The state of Barzakh... does not seem to be merely a passive state of expectation; it is a state in which the ego catches a glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality, and prepares himself for adjustment to these aspects."²¹ To Iqbal, it is a state wherein one struggles to win resurrection. He says, "However, the ego must continue to struggle until he is able to gather himself up, and win his resurrection. The resurrection, therefore, is not an external event. It is the consummation of a life process within the ego. Whether individual or universal it is nothing more than a kind of stock-taking of the ego's past achievements and his future possibilities."²²

He bases his view on the Qur'anic verdicts of which the following may be regarded as a specimen:

And by the moon when at her full, that from state to state shall ye be surely carried onward. (84:19).²³

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

Personal Immortality

McTaggart, believes in personal immortality. Iqbal appreciates McTaggart's belief. He says, 'I regard this part of his work as almost apostolic. He emphasised personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of

Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in Europe and when the European man was about to face death on an enormous scale.”²⁴ For this matter Iqbal compare McTaggart to Hallaj. He says, “Indeed in this aspect of his work he may be compared to the great Muslim mystic Hallaj, whose undying phrase - “I am the creative Truth” - was thrown as a challenge to the whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was moving in a direction which tended to obscure the reality and destiny of the human ego. Hallaj never ceased to utter what he had personally seen to be the Truth until the Mullahs of Islam prevailed upon the State to imprison him and finally to crucify him. He met his death with perfect calm.”²⁵

Like a really great thinker Iqbal appreciates others. But this is only to the extent of appreciation. With regard to personal immortality the Qur’an had already given him firm conviction as is reflected from the Qur’anic verses. He vehemently quotes as follows:

And by the moon when at her full, that from state to state shall ye be surely carried onward. (84:19)²⁶

‘The germs of life - Is it ye who create them? Or are We their Creator? It is We who have decreed that death should be among you; yet are We not thereby hindered from replacing you with others, your likes, or from creating you again in forms which ye know not! (56:59-61)’²⁷

‘Verily there is none in the Heavens and in the Earth but shall approach the God of Mercy as a servant. He hath taken note of them and remembered them with exact numbering; and each of them shall come to Him on the day of Resurrection as a single individual.(19:95,96)²⁸

Rumi also believes in the personal immortality of the self.²⁹ To my mind Iqbal has based the edifice of his views on the foundation of the Qur’anic concepts, and taken guidance from his illustrious guide — Rumi. He has clearly acknowledged:

The guide Rumi who is Murshid (guide) with purity has opened the secrets of life and death on me.³⁰

Thus this affinity does not eclipse Iqbal's position. The Qur'an and Rumi remain his basic guides.

3. The Nature of Time

DIFFERENCE

McTAGGART

Time is unreal

McTaggart considers time as unreal. McTaggart says, "I believe that nothing that exists can be temporal, and that therefore time is unreal."¹ According to him it is self-contradictory and inconceivable, and its characteristics are incompatible with each other.² In Iqbal's words, "Time, according to Doctor McTaggart, is unreal because every event is past, present, and future. Queen Anne's death, for instance, is past to us; it was present to her contemporaries and future to William III. Thus the event of Anne's death combines characteristics which are incompatible with each other."³ The self-contradictory and incompatible character of time makes it unreal, as McTaggart maintains.

IQBAL

But according to Iqbal it is serial time, which McTaggart has discussed so vehemently. Beyond this there is another aspect of time, which is real time. For Iqbal, McTaggart's difficulty arises due to his assumption of the serial nature of time as final. This regards past, present, and future as essential parts of time. It is like a straight line, part of which have been travelled and some of its parts remain untravelled.⁴ For Iqbal "This is taking time, not as a living creative moment, but as a static absolute, holding the ordered multiplicity of fully-shaped cosmic events, revealed serially, like the pictures of a film, to the outside observer. We can indeed say that Queen Anne's death was future to William III, if this event is regarded as already fully shaped, and lying in the future, waiting for its happening."⁵

For Iqbal, however, this serial aspect of time is not the whole truth. According to him there is another aspect of time that alludes to real time, in which “a future event, — cannot be characterized as an event. Before the death of Anne the event of her death did not exist at all. During Anne’s life the event of her death existed only as an unrealized possibility in the nature of Reality which included it as an event only when, in the course of its becoming, it reached the point of the actual happening of that event.”⁶ Answering to doctor McTaggart’s argument Iqbal, thus says, “the future exists only as an open possibility, and not as a reality. Nor can it be said that an event combines incompatible characteristics when it is described both as past and present.... Hence there is no logical difficulty in regarding an event as both past and present.”⁷

For Iqbal real time is ‘duration’ which is not serial time. It is change without succession. He says, “Personally, I am inclined to think that time is an essential element in Reality. But real time is not serial time to which the distinction of past, present, and future is essential; it is pure duration, i.e. change without succession, which McTaggart’s argument does not touch. Serial time is pure duration pulverized by thought - a kind of device by which Reality exposes its ceaseless creative activity to quantitative measurement. It is in this sense that the Qur’an says: ‘And of Him is the change of the night and of the day.’⁸

4. Love

DIFFERENCE

McTAGGART

i. Love is opposed to action

In the first place McTaggart’s concept of love is opposed to action as Iqbal maintains, “For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the ultimate reality, but as to their true content and their true good my position is, as it

was, that is to be found in eternity and not in time, and in love rather in action.”¹

IQBAL

Iqbal’s view is diametrically different from that of McTaggart. He does not appreciate this idea and says, “I do not see the opposition. Love is not passivity. It is active and creative. Indeed on the material plane it is the only force which circumvents death for when death does away one generation, love creates another.”²

ii. Mutual love of two persons

Secondly, for McTaggart though love is essence of Reality, remains “just the love of the one person for another; and further, it is the cause and not the effect of the proximity of two persons.”³

IQBAL

But for Iqbal, besides the above, love is love for God, and love with one’s goal. It fortifies and develops the Self. “Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and endeavours to realise them.” He says:

By love it (the Self) is made more lasting,
 More living, more burning, more glowing.
 From Love proceeds the radiance of its being.
 And the development of its unknown possibilities.
 Its nature gathers fire from Love,
 Love instructs it to illumine the world.

.....

Love makes peace and war in the world,
 Love is the Fountain of Life, Love is the flashing sword of
 Death.

The hardest rocks are shivered by Love’s glance:

Love of God at last becomes wholly God...⁴

Its results are numerous. In brief.

“When the Self is made strong by Love

Its power rules the whole world.

.....

Its hand becomes God’s hand,

The moon is split by its fingers.”⁵

Iqbal states that Ishq is assimilation and absorption. He says: it “means the desire to assimilate, to absorb.... Love individualizes the lover as well as the beloved. The effort to realise the most unique individuality individualises the seeker and implies the individuality of the sought, for nothing else would satisfy the nature of the seeker.”⁶

Even as cause it is an active cause. He says, “Now it is because of its character as an active cause that, in spite of variety in content of the mutual loves of various persons, it is capable of being experienced as a unity embracing the entire universe.”⁷

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION.

Love is the solution of all problems

To some superficial critics, McTaggart’s concept of love may have great affinity with that of Iqbal. For instance, he says in his letter to Iqbal, “the solution of all problems is found only in love.”⁸

And that love is “the essence of Reality.”⁹

But McTaggart cannot be regarded as pioneer in this respect. Such views have repeatedly been expressed in Sufi literature. Not only this the ecstasy and emotion which one finds in Sufic expression are alien to McTaggart. In Sufic literature one finds much more burning and ecstasy, which cannot be dreamt of by McTaggart. Especially the pangs of separation and comparison of Ishq with Intellect, which are the central points of such literature, are foreign to McTaggart’s thought.

In this context, the mystical poet Rumi, can be quoted as one of the subtle examples. I have pointedly discussed this matter in my research work, *Rumi’s Impact on Iqbal’s Religious Thought*. I have specifically devoted one chapter under the caption of ‘Ishq’ in this work. The striking affinities of Iqbal’s views with those of Rumi have clearly been traced. However, to expound the lead of Rumi in this matter, I quote some of

Rumi's verses in translation though the translation cannot convey, in full, Rumi's beautiful expression of thought, ecstasy and emotion.

As regards Rumi's thought, several centuries before McTaggart, Rumi had said:

Hail, O Love that bringest us good gain - thou
that are the physician of all our ills.¹⁰

Again:

Through love thorns become roses, and
Through love vinegar becomes sweet wine
Through love the stake becomes thorne,
Through love the reverse of fortune seems good fortune.
Through love a prison seems a rose bower,
Through love a grate full of ashes seems a garden
Through love a burning fire is a pleasing light
Through love the Devil becomes Hourii¹¹

Further, Rumi's *Divan-i-Shams Tabriz* is full of ecstasy and emotion. To him, all voices are like the noise of drum as compared with those of love. Rumi says:

Save the melody of love,
Whatever melody I heard in the world
Was the noise of drum"¹²

The taste of love is dearest to Rumi. No taste of any other thing stands in comparison with that of love:

I tasted everything,
I found nothing better than you.
I opened all the casks,
I tasted from a thousand jars,
Yet none but that rebellious wine of yours
Touched my lips and inspired my heart.¹³

Iqbal's own acknowledgement of Rumi's lead removes all the doubts He says:

He (Rumi) solved all difficulties of this worthless one,
His alchemy transformed dust into gold!
The flute of this flute-player of thought
Revealed to me mysteries of love and frenzy¹⁴

II THE UNIVERSE

Main Features

DIFFERENCE

McTAGGART

A complete universe

According to McTaggart the universe is compound substance and its associate members or individuals are parts. This compound substance is called the universe.¹ It makes an organic unity wherein “all that exists, both substances and characteristics, are bound together in one system of extrinsic determination.”²

In other words, according to McTaggart the universe is an association of individuals, which present a definite order and design. To McTaggart, this orderliness and design are eternally there in the universe. This means that the universe is a complete and finished product.³

On the contrary, for Iqbal the universe is not a complete and finished product. Its design and orderliness is not eternal. It is to be completed with human efforts. He pointedly explains, “the orderliness and adjustment which we find in this association is not eternally achieved and complete in itself. It is the result of instinctive conscious effort. We are gradually travelling from chaos to cosmos and are helpers in this achievement. Nor are the members of the association fixed; new members are ever coming to birth to co-operate in the great task. Thus the universe is not a completed act: it is still in the course of formation. There can be no complete truth about the universe, for the universe has not yet become ‘whole’. The process of creation is still going on, and man too takes his share in it, inasmuch as he helps to bring order into at least a portion of the chaos. The Koran indicates the possibility of other creators than God.”⁴The Qur’anic impact on Iqbal’s thought is quite obvious. According to the Qur’an:

God multiplieth in creation what He wills”⁵ (Surah xxxv verse 1) and “Every day in (new Splendour Doth He (shine))!.”⁶

Again, for Iqbal, on the analogy of our conscious experience, “the universe is a free creative movement.”⁷ He explains, “The essential nature of the atom in modern science is electricity and not something electrified.”⁸ Again, the universe does not possess an independent reality. He says, “The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him.”⁹ The universe is only partial expression of God’s infinite creative activity.

AFFINITY AND ACTUAL POSITION

Reality of the Universe

According to McTaggart, the universe is a concrete fact and not an illusion or something subjective. “The universe is not an illusion; it is a system of real selves, which cannot be regarded as mere predicates or objectives of the Absolute.”¹⁰

Iqbal endorses McTaggart’s view. But this is what the Qur’an said several centuries before McTaggart. In the light of the Qur’anic teaching Iqbal says that the universe “is a reality to be reckoned with”.¹¹ He quotes the Qur’an:

Verily in the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding; who, standing and sitting and reclining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and say: “Oh, our Lord! Thou has not created this in vain.”(3:188)¹²

Iqbal’s criticism of Socrates and Plato is very significant in this respect. Unlike the spirit of the Qur’an they despised sense perception¹³, which proves the reality of the universe. Further, for him, man’s existence proves the reality of the universe. He says, “It is the lot of man to share in the deeper aspiration of the universe around him and to shape his own destiny as well as that of the universe, now by adjusting himself to its forces, now by putting the whole of his energy to mould its forces to his own ends and purposes. And in this process of progressive change God becomes a co-worker with him, provided man takes the initiative.”¹⁴ Here too he quotes the Qur’an:

Verily God will not change the condition of men, *till they change what is in themselves*. (13:12)¹⁵

II. THE ULTIMATE REALITY

Atheism vs. Theism

DIFFERENCE

McTAGGART

i. Ultimate Reality is Absolute

We have already discussed that like Hegel, for McTaggart, the ultimate reality is Absolute. It is spiritual and eternal. The Absolute is differentiated into selves. It is the society or system of selves. McTaggart likens Absolute as a college of students who are related with one another and with the whole. The Absolute underlies the differentiations as a principle of unity. And the differentiations do not destroy the unity of the Absolute. Again, this is not all-inclusive Self, since no self can include another self.

For most of the thinkers, such system of selves is unconvincing as already discussed.¹

ii. Absolute is not God of religion

McTaggart's Absolute, however, is not God of religion. In other words, McTaggart is an atheist. He says, "The Absolute is not God, and in consequence there is no God."² In the words of J.B. Schneewind, "There is, however, no God in this heavenly city, for McTaggart did not think there is any reason to believe that there is or even can be an overarching mind that includes individual minds like ours but is still in some sense an individual mind itself."³

According to McTaggart, the cosmological argument, which regards God as the First cause does not help prove God's existence. "The cosmological argument from the necessity for a first cause, he points out is powerless. If we suppose that God exists in time "then we have a substance which has persisted through an infinite past time." If one substance could be uncaused, the possibility of others could

not be ruled out. If God did not need a creator, why should “a man” or “a pebble” require one? On the other hand, if God’s nature is timeless, then it is incapable of change, and the creation of the universe at a particular moment cannot, therefore, be explained from the nature of God.”⁴

Iqbal relates, “I used to meet him (McTaggart) almost every day in his room in Trinity, and very often our talk turned on the question of God. His powerful logic often silenced me, but he never succeeded in convincing me. There is no doubt, as Mr. Dickinson points out in his memoir, that he had a positive dislike for the transcendent God of Western theology. The Absolute of the Neo-Hegelian lacks life and movement. The Eternal consciousness of Green is hardly distinguishable from Newtonian space. How could these satisfy him?”⁵

iii. Absolute is Impersonal

Further, for McTaggart Absolute is impersonal Reality. He says, “I believe that it would be difficult to find a proof of our own immortality, which did not place God in the position of a community, rather than a person...”⁶ To him God is not personal God because this makes our existence dependent on His will and consequently on unforeseeable decisions of this Will. Also, this leads to believe in all-inclusive God, which is not acceptable to McTaggart. To him, no person can include another self.⁷

iv. Not Omnipotent

Again, he does not approve the idea of Omnipotence of God. For him, an omnipotent God is one who is capable of doing every thing what he wishes to do; even the altering of laws of thought and multiplication tables⁸ are subject to the dictates of his power. He argues, “that the existence of evil in the world is incompatible with the belief in an omnipotent being who is also good.”⁹ God is not omnipotent, because He is not capable of removing evil in the world. The omnipotence and goodness of God do not go together in the

face of presence of evil in the world.¹⁰ Therefore to resolve the dilemma of God's goodness and the presence of evil McTaggart rejects omnipotence of God. He says, "the ultimate reality is as an eternal system of selves united in the harmony of a love so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystical rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection."¹¹

Pringle-Pattison regards such arguments of McTaggart as profitless. He says, "It must be said that the discussion in this chapter is, on the whole, rather profitless, because Mr. McTaggart insists on taking omnipotence as implying the power to make contradictions true. It may be undesirable to use the word at all, but as those whom he is attacking never assert omnipotence in the sense of ability to override intellectual and moral necessities, the polemic is rather in the air. It is no pertinent answer, for example, to the argument that the evil in the universe is the result of free will, to say that "a God who cannot create a universe in which all men have free will and which is at the same time free from all evil is not an omnipotent God, since there is one thing which he cannot do."¹²

IQBAL

On the contrary, Iqbal is a staunch believer of God as a "unique Other Self."¹³ For him, the universe is habit of Allah¹⁴ and not Allah-Himself. To Iqbal, "The ultimate Reality, according to the Qur'an, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity."¹⁵ God has definite relationship of transcendence and immanence with man and the universe.¹⁶ Unlike McTaggart, to Iqbal God is Personal and Omnipotent.

That God is a 'Unique Other Self' is obvious from his concept of God as the source and the destination of the selves. He is source because to him "the Ultimate Reality" is an Ego and human egos proceed from the Ultimate Ego.¹⁷ He is our destination because to Him we return after death.¹⁸ Not only this, God plays a very important role in the development of the self. The man who absorbs the attributes

of God develops his personality by creating in him the attributes of God.¹⁹

Iqbal's view of God as "Unique Other Self" is further obvious from his discussion of the mystic state. He says, "to the mystic the mystic state is a moment of intimate association with a Unique Other Self, transcending, encompassing, and momentarily suppressing the private personality of the subject of experience. Considering its content the mystic state is highly objective and cannot be regarded as a mere retirement into the mists of pure subjectivity."²⁰

Next, according to Iqbal, God is personal. God is an Ego. He calls him "the Ultimate Ego."²¹ The Ego responds to us sometimes by reflection, sometimes by acts of worship, and above all by His grace. He argues, "The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. He questions: "Does Reality respond to us? To him, "It does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself - i.e. the act of worship. In McTaggart's case reflection took the place of worship. The orders of Muslim mystics have invented various rules and practices by which to come into direct contact with the Ultimate Reality. The truth, however, is that neither worship nor reflection nor any kind of practices entitles a man to this response from the ultimate Love. It depends eventually on what religion calls "grace".²² In this connection, unlike McTaggart, Iqbal believes God as all-inclusive Ego. He calls Him, "the ultimate Love" To him, "If the Ultimate Reality i.e. Love, has any significance for the life of its own ego-differentiations, it must itself be an all-inclusive ego which sustains, responds, loves, and is capable of being loved."²³

Iqbal regards "the ultimate Reality to be a rationally directed life which, in view of our experience of life, cannot be conceived except as an organic whole, a something closely knit together and possessing a central point of reference."²⁴

Also, Iqbal believes in the Omnipotence of God. But God's Omnipotence is not capricious. Referring to the

Qur'an he says that "It... views Divine omnipotence as intimately related to Divine wisdom, and finds the infinite power of God revealed, not in the arbitrary and the capricious, but in the recurrent, the regular, and the orderly."²⁵ God's limitation, therefore, is not due to his impotence. It is only due to his wisdom. "All activity, creational or otherwise, is a kind of limitation without which it is impossible to conceive God as a concrete operative Ego."²⁶ Evil and pain are relative and not absolute. These are conducive to the development of human ego.

Iqbal says that God's omnipotence is not a hindrance to the freedom of man. To Iqbal man is self-determined. He is free to get away from evils. God Himself has chosen human selves to be participators in His life due to His own creative freedom. He says, "The truth is that the whole theological controversy relating to predestination is due to pure speculation with no eye on the spontaneity of life, which is a fact of actual experience. No doubt, the emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation on the freedom of the all-inclusive Ego. But this limitation is not externally imposed. It is born out of His own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His Life, power, and freedom."²⁷

McTaggart's whole concept of God is due to his misunderstanding of time as unreal. To Iqbal "time is an essential element in Reality. But real time is not serial time to which the distinction of past, present and future is essential; it is pure duration, i.e. change without succession, which McTaggart's argument does not touch. Serial time is pure duration pulverized by thought – a kind of device by which Reality exposes its ceaseless creative activity to quantitative measurement. It is in this sense that the Qur'an says: 'And of Him is the change of the night and of the day!'" I agree with Dr. Maruf who says, "Perhaps Dr. McTaggart's misconceptions regarding God and the Ultimate Reality stemmed from defective concept of time."²⁸

In the end, it may be noted that Iqbal believes God as well as immortality of human ego whereas McTaggart denies one and believes the other. "Indeed, the tendency of modern thought is rather to make the conviction of immortality dependent on the doctrine of God. But for Mr. McTaggart the one doctrine excludes the other."²⁹

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