


IQBAL

AND HIS CONTEMPORARY
WESTERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT



Kant(1764-1841)



Bergson, 1928



William James



Russell 1960



DR MOHAMMED MA'RUF

I Q B A L

**AND HIS CONTEMPORARY
WESTERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT**

Dr. Mohammed Ma'ruf

IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

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To

Prof. Hywel D. Lewis,

Whose thought is in many vital

Respects in line with

Allama Iqbal's.

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PREFACE

It has been quite in vogue to undertake a study of the thought of Allama Iqbal vis-a-vis the systems of such philosophical elites as Nietzsche, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Dante, Goethe and others, and this has produced some creditable literature both at home and abroad. In some cases, no doubt, this study has unfortunately been over-stretched in favour of Western thinkers, while presenting Iqbal as if playing the second fiddle, if not copying outright (the psychological explanation of this being none other than 'inferiority complex' on our part). There cannot be any denying the fact that these comparative studies have definitely added to an understanding of the ideas of the thinkers so compared and that it has added to our comprehension of Iqbal's thought also. But there is no warrant for restricting our study to the above-mentioned few selected Western thinkers only--a point which dawned upon me during my study of some of the early twentieth-century thinkers and philosophical systems which initiated me into undertaking the present study which, I was sure, would go some way to throw abundant light bringing home some very illustrative, though so far unknown, aspects of Iqbal's thought. This project, I sincerely felt, would place his thought in its true place and help in determining his position in the history of world philosophy; but for this study, I was afraid, his position vis-a-vis world

philosophy would have remained obscure and undetermined.

It was with this inspiration and initiation that the present project was undertaken some five years ago and an attempt has been made through these pages to accomplish the task delineated in the above paragraph, and it is sincerely hoped that this venture will not miscarry. Hence, the book is being offered with the pretensions that it will involve some service towards unravelling Iqbal's thought, in particular his religious thought which fortunately underlies his whole system.

Thanks.

(Dr. M. M.)

Introduction

One very popular way to study Allama Iqbal's thought and art has been to undertake a comparative study with some other thinkers and artists, especially the Western thinkers in the domain of philosophical thought and poetical creation. It has been a very popular exercise with both critics and admirers, to compare Iqbal's thought with that of Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Hegel in Philosophy, and his art with the poetic genius of Dante (his *Divine Comedy*) Milton (his *paradise Lost and Regained*), and even with Goethe (his *Faustus*) in the field of poetry both in the East and West . This is the practice with those who aim at criticising and belittling his genius as well as with those who wish to extol him both in the field of poetry and philosophy. However, in the field of poetry Sir Herbert Read's, a great critic of art in the times of Iqbal, appreciation of his poetical genius in his article "Readers and Writers", *The New Era* (1921), is more than sufficient; whereas in the field of Philosophy, while reviewing his *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* in *The Christendom* (Chicago, 1936), Dr. Sprengling has 'considered Iqbal in a class with the greatest Western Philosophers'.

The above were some stray comparisons which various writers and critics have undertaken from time to time, some taking to compare his concept of *mard-e-momin* with that of Nietzsche's Superman', his concept of 'time' and 'reality' with that of H. Bergson, and so on with the other poets and thinkers of an international repute. However, it was my casual study of some of the Western thinkers like Hegel, Dr.

McTaggart, Tennant. Howison, James Ward,, William James and many others who have written in the field of the philosophy of religion, and have turned out to be the contemporaries of the great Allama Iqbal, that the fascinating need for the present comparative study struck my mind and I roughly and tentatively thought of the possibility of undertaking such a study which, I somehow felt, would extend the scope of Iqbal studies beyond the present horizons. But it was my study of John Macquarrie's encyclopaedia entitled *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought* (Harper and Row paperbacks, 1963), which really goaded me on the way to undertaking and completing the present project which, I am sure, will be quite useful for those scholars who with a Western-orientation have a mind to study and examine Allama Iqbal's thought (especially his religious thought) on an international plane. They, I am sure, will find the present endeavour pretty helpful in connection with their higher research projects involving Iqbal's religious thought. I personally believe that a study of his thought can open newer vistas for those who intend to write a modern philosophy of religion because under the inspiring leadership of Prof. H.D. Lewis, Professor Emeritus and former Head of Philosophy department, King's College, University of London, an anti-empirical school in the field of philosophy of religion is making quick headway which I have chosen to call the 'realist-idealist school of thought'. The great Prof. Lewis during his visit to Lahore in 1979 in a personal talk told me that his own thought could be called in line with that of Allama Iqbal, for he was pursuing the same mission as the late Allama, i.e., both sought to counteract the over-

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empiricism and excessive rationalism of the West, especially in the field of religion.

The present volume comprises ten chapters, each entering upon a study of the basic ideas of Allama Iqbal vis-a-vis some modern philosophical movements which were in vogue during the time he went to England and Germany for higher studies, and also during his whole period of philosophizing terminating with his death in 1938. During this period Iqbal came into personal contact with some renowned teachers of his own time, e.g., Prof. Arnold, Prof. Brown, Dr. McTaggart, James Ward, most of whom were his teachers, and others like the famous French philosopher Henri Bergson whom he met in 1932. The present volume covers a vast spectrum of Western philosophical trends like idealism, naturalism, pragmatism and allied movements, historicism, realism, socio-biological philosophies, and philosophies of spirit in their various shades and modifications. What is really interesting, my study has brought out an illustrative comparison with as many as eighty-eight Western thinkers of a motley variety of ideas and schools ranging from the idealist traditions of the Hegelian as well as the personal types; the spiritual philosophies of Bernardino Varisco, Rudolf Eucken, Emile Boutroux; the Kantians and the new-Kantians; various shades of positivism and naturalism (including scientists and empiricist thinkers of the calibre of Einstein and James); historicists like Spengler, Dilthey and Cassirer; realists like Whitehead, Russell, Temple and Samuel Alexander (whom Iqbal appreciated himself); down to the sociological thinkers of the fame

of Atkinson, Freud, Durkheim, Marx and Lenin. This makes a very incisive and extensive study of Iqbal's thought vis-a-vis his contemporary Western thinkers who have shown interest in a philosophical study of religion. What is worth noting, Iqbal can hardly be accused of plagiarism when his thought shows affinity with as many as about a hundred thinkers--no one can copy or plagiarize the thought of such a company of thinkers, belonging to such a large variety of shades and schools of philosophy, having very little in common. This shows how rich and pervasive Iqbal's thought is, and how modern it could be--the aspects which go a long way to determine the dimensions of his thought. This study very convincingly alleviates the charge of plagiarism sometimes brought against Iqbal by the critics both at home and abroad.

The present study brings home to the reader the important aspect that Iqbal's thought partakes of almost all the chief classical and modern movements and schools of philosophy of the world, that it is complete in all respects, that it has depth and richness as well as expansiveness -- in short, it has an originality about it in so far as it can be said to partake of any school of thought individually, and of all the variety of schools taken collectively. No other single system, perhaps, can pretend to such a depth, richness and expansiveness. It may be added that the comparisons undertaken in it are apart from those generally entered upon by his critics. Consequently, it adds considerably to those dimensions of his thought which are already and commonly known to his readers.

The book will not only bring home some newer

INTRODUCTION

dimensions of Iqbal's thought, it will also provide a convincing retort to his critics like M.S. Raschid who, in his book *Iqbal's Concept of God* (London: Kegan Paul, 1981), has tried to prove that Iqbal's thought was basically and in the main Hegelian. He bases his such a sweeping opinion on a few excerpts fastidiously selected from Iqbal's *The Reconstruction*, especially his short discussions of Philosophical arguments for God. What he means to say is that Iqbal's thought loses sense when taken out of Hegelian setting and says, 'My aim here is the very modest one of trying to make sense of Iqbal's arguments in the context of Hegel's philosophy' (p.8). On his logic the present volume proves that his thought can be understood only in the setting of all the present-day schools and trends of thought-- a fact which convincingly disproves the pretensions of such critics as Mr Raschid.

In compiling this volume I am indebted to a large and motley variety of Western thinkers who have philosophised in the trends determined by the various schools of thought and philosophical movements. However, I am particularly indebted to Macquarrie's encyclopaedic work which has afforded me strong inspiration and direction in my undertaking the work. I have also drawn much inspiration from Allama Iqbal's own critical article on "McTaggart's Philosophy" (pb. *Indian Arts and Letters*, June 1932) who was amongst his teachers in the Cambridge University.

Lahore
April, 1987

Dr. Mohammed Maruf

Chapter One

IQBAL AND IDEALIST TRADITIONS-I

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1.1 Iqbal and Hegelianism

Generally speaking, idealism is the view that physical objects are referred to an all-embracing or absolute experience, in which our finite human minds are somehow included¹. This tradition, which flourished in Germany in the early part of the 19th century under the impact of Kant, was revived in the English-speaking countries in the beginning of the 20th century, the time when Allama Iqbal was in Europe for higher studies. It was, thus, natural for Iqbal to accept inspiration, consciously or unconsciously, from it, when most of his teachers there like Dr. J.M.E. McTaggart and James Ward were among this staunchest votaries of the movement. Iqbal's close association with Dr. McTaggart is fully confirmed by latter's letters to him.²

Iqbal agreed with the British exponents of Hegelianism in principle on certain very basic points. He agreed that the ultimate reality is rational. He described reality as 'a rationally directed life'³, though not agreeing with them that the Absolute and God of religion were two distinct entities. Iqbal would also agree that the ultimate nature of reality is spiritual⁴. He would also agree that the world is a manifestation of the ultimate spiritual principle⁵, which is for him God. He says that 'space, time, and matter are interpretations which thought puts on the free creative energy of God. They are not independent realities existing per se, but only intellectual modes of

apprehending the life of God'⁶. This, however, does not mean that material things are illusory; they are rather correlative to a spirit which realizes itself in and through the process of nature. In fact, they believe in the degrees of reality. Iqbal is quite clear on this point when he says that 'there are degrees in the expression of ego-hood'⁷. He adds, 'Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood until it reaches its perfection in man'⁸. The Ultimate Ego, according to Iqbal, is God.⁹

Iqbal would, again, agree with Hegel and his school of thought that reality is one. He elaborately discusses the oneness of God, the ultimate reality, in his chapter on "The Conception of God and the Meaning of prayer"¹⁰. He bases God's unity on the Quranic concept of '*tauheed*'. This unity, however is not abstract like the Parmenidean "plenum", but a unity-in-diversity, as the Hegelians would say. In fact, this absolute unity embraces all multiplicity and diversity in itself and what results is a concrete, higher type of 'Unity'. The idealists of the Hegelian school mostly believe that this unity does not preclude differences. As Macquarrie describes their position, 'Rather, the development of the absolute spirit involves differentiation, but in such a way that the differences are held together in a more comprehensive unity'¹¹. Edward Caird, a British neo-Hegelian contemporary of Iqbal, has compared this unity to that of a 'society'. Iqbal, on the contrary, has called it the unity of a 'Self' and says that a self alone combines the opposite attributes of change and permanence'¹² ... Further, he describes the Ultimate Reality as "an organic whole"¹³ which again means that

reality embraces a diversity of aspects or facets. He would thus agree with Hegel that reality is so much a unity that no individual fact can be fully understood except in its relation to the whole. In such a view, differences are in fact complementary, and according to the Quran even good and evil are complementary, and form part of the whole.¹⁴ All these differences are reconciled in a higher unity which is God to whom all things must in the end return, says the Quran.¹⁵

Iqbal and Caird agree on "the unity of man" also. Caird bases it on man's self-consciousness and his sharing in a common rationality¹⁶. He argues that since man is one, his religion is one, and the data for an understading of it must be drawn from the whole field of its varied manifestations, from primitive as well as from advanced religion, from non-Christian as well as from Christian¹⁷. Iqbal, on the contrary, bases the unity of mankind on the unity of God. He says, 'From the unity of the all-inclusive Ego who creates and sustains all egos follows the essential unity of all mankind.'¹⁸ He derives inspiration from the Quran which says that mankind was one nation¹⁹. According to Iqbal, the object of true religion is to bind humanity into one brotherhood which Islam envisages through its three fundamental social principles of fraternity, equality and justice.

Caird discerns three elements in human consciousness: viz.,

(i) Man can look outwards upon the not-self, the object'; (ii) 'he can look inwards upon himself, the subject; and (iii) he can look upwards to the unity

which embraces the cleavage of subject and object,..., the absolute principle of unity or God'²⁰. In his magnum opus *Javid Namah*²¹ Iqbal invokes three witnesses which have a conspicuous parallel to the above tripartite division of Caird's. He says:-

شاہدِ اول شعورِ خویشتن خویش را دیدنِ نورِ خویشتن

شاہدِ ثانی شعورِ دیگرے خویش را دیدنِ نورِ دیگرے

شاہدِ ثالث شعورِ ذاتِ حق خویش را دیدنِ نورِ ذاتِ حق

'The first witness is thine own consciousness--

See thyself with thine own light.

The second witness is the consciousness of an other ego than thee.

See thyself, then, with the light of an ego other than thee.

The third witness is God's consciousness-
See thyself, then,. with God's light'.²²

Again, Caird bases his three stages of development in religion on the tripartite division of consciousness discussed above; these three stages are (i) objective religion, (ii) subjective religion, and (iii) universal religion²³. It possesses at least a cursory resemblance

to Iqbal's division of religious life into three periods, viz., 'Faith', 'Thought', and 'Discovery'²⁴, Caird takes Christianity, while Iqbal takes Islam, for a true manifestation of 'universal religion'. Both again believe in "panentheism" rather than in "Pantheism" in its patent sense; though both occasionally appear to be lapsing into Pantheism. However their basic positions are panentheistic so long as they believe in God's 'transcendence'.²⁵

Iqbal will agree with Caird once again on the position that reason and intuition, science and religion, aim at the same goal. Caird says, 'Every rational being as such is a religious being,'²⁶ Iqbal expresses the same belief thus: '....the religious and the scientific processes, though involving different methods, are identical in their final aim. Both aim at reaching the most real'²⁷. He criticises al-Ghazzali on the ground that 'He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related ...'²⁸ Thought and intuition not only aim at the same goal, they even stem from the common source.²⁹ He goes on to say, 'Both seek concrete experience as a point of departure'.³⁰ Caird infers from this that religion needs neither a special revelation nor a mystical intuition; Iqbal, on the other hand, believes in an intuition though adding that we must 'not regard it as a mysterious special faculty; it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part'.³¹ Iqbal stresses the need for alleviating the severity of opposition between thought and intuition and believes that they should converge in their final quest. He does not agree with Henry Jones (1852-

1922), another of his contemporaries, that pure reason alone can take us to God.³² Iqbal may properly be called Kantian in his approach to thought or reason: his mission was rather the same as that of al-Ghazzali and Kant.³³ Though embarking on a rational analysis of the human experience in order to discover the underlying spiritual principle of the universe in his chapter "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience",³⁴ Iqbal will not agree with Jones that rational inquiry by itself is sufficient to reach the requisite principle.

Jones, too, advocates a panentheistic viewpoint in his treatment of God. He says, 'God is the world-process, yet as self-conscious and personal he is said also to transcend the universe.'³⁵ Again, Like Iqbal Jones does not conceive God as a Static perfection. He conceives 'God' as the perfect in process, as a dynamic progress from perfection to perfection, as the never-resting realization of ideals of goodness'.³⁶ Iqbal approaches the question by relating God to 'duration' which he conceives as a change not involving 'a succession of varying attitudes'.³⁷ He adds, 'To conceive the Ultimate Ego as changeless in this sense of change is to conceive Him as utter inaction, a motiveless, stegnant neutrality, an absolute nothing... God's life is self-revelation; not the pursuit of an ideal to be reached. The "not-yet" of man does mean pursuit and may mean failure; the "not-yet" of God means unfailing realization of the infinite creative possibilities of His being ...'.³⁸ Thus God's evolution is from within which occurs in pure duration, and not

external. Iqbal quotes a few lines from Goethe to bring home his own notion of God's change or evolution,

'In the endless self-repeating
for evermore flows the same.
Myriad arches springing, meeting,
hold at rest the mighty frame.
Streams from all things love of living,
grandst star and humblest clod.
All the straining, all the striving
is eternal peace in God'.³⁹

Iqbal and Jones both deny that the contrast between finite and the infinite is an ultimate one. Jones says, 'God is immanent in the human spirit,..., and our common life in God enhances rather than destroys individual personality'.⁴⁰ Iqbal similarly emphasizes that the human thought, though simulating finitude and inconclusiveness, 'is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite'⁴¹ adding that 'the finite ego must be distinct, though not isolated, from the Infinite'.⁴² He also agrees that 'It is with the irreplaceable singleness of his individuality that the finite ego will approach the infinite ego ...'.⁴³ In his *Javid Namah*⁴⁴ Iqbal says,

خویش را دیدن بنور ذات حق

.....

پیش این نور اربمانی استوار
حی و قائم چون خدا خود را شمار

'See thyself, then, with God's light.
If thou standst unshaken in front of this
light,
Consider thyself as living and eternal as
He;' ⁴⁵

Iqbal will again agree with Jones that the relation between the Absolute and man is better understood in terms of "love" and not "absorption", and 'this love assures us of immortality'. ⁴⁶ Iqbal holds that the ego is fortified by love (*ishq*). He,, however, understands the word 'love' in a unique sense as the 'desire to assimilate or absorb'-- that is, it is not to get absorbed in the infinite, but to assimilate its attributes in oneself. He says, 'In the higher Sufism of Islam unitive experience is not the finite ego effacing its own identity by some sort of absorption into the Infinite Ego; it is rather the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the Finite' ⁴⁷. Thus Iqbal never accepted the patent pantheistic doctrine of '*fana*'; he rather believed in the state of '*baqa*' as the final goal of human life and experience.

1.2 Iqbal and Absolutism

Absolute idealism of the Hegelian school was revived in Britain and America under the title 'Absolutism'. Its chief exponents in Britain were F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), and some lesser thinkers. In America it had its chief votary in Josiah Royce (1855-1916). They made a distinction between the Absolute of philosophy and God of religion and claimed that God was inferior to the Absolute of philosophy-- the two positions which Iqbal

would never agree to. However, Iqbal will agree with them that the Absolute is beyond 'rational description'. In his classical work *Appearance and Reality* Bradley relegates all relations and relational concepts to the position of appearance. He says, 'A relational way of thought must give appearance and not truth'.⁴⁸ On the basis of his criterion of reality he assigns to appearance space and time, motion and change, selfhood and personality, moral life, and even God of religion. He holds that even God and religion fall short of reality, for religion implies a relation between God and man, so that man stands over against God and God is therefore less than the Absolute. Iqbal, however, takes a very different view of this relationship. According to him, the act of creation was not a specific past event nor the universe a manufactured article which had no organic relation to the life of its maker. He says, 'The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to Him'.⁴⁹ He goes on to add that 'space, time, and matter are interpretations which thought puts on the free creative energy of God. They are not independent realities existing per se, but only intellectual modes of apprehending the life of God'.⁵⁰ Again for Bradley the Absolute is 'suprapersonal',⁵¹ while for Iqbal God is highly 'personal'.

Iqbal will agree with Bradley that there is 'the need of our nature to go beyond the region of ordinary facts to a more comprehensive view, and the need to guard ourselves against uncritical acceptance of false or inadequate views of the world'.⁵² He continues, 'Our orthodox theology on the one side, and our

commonplace materialism, on the other side vanish like ghosts before the daylight of free sceptical inquiry'.⁵³ Iqbal, however, will not endorse a completely free sceptical inquiry as he says in *Darb-i-Kalim*⁵⁴

آزادی افکار سے ہے ان کی تباہی
رکھتے نہیں جو فکر و تدبیر کا سلیقہ
ہو فکر اگر خام تو آزادی افکار
انسان کو حیوان بنانے کا طریقہ!

Unbridled thought is perdition to
immature mind;

Raw thinking makes beast of a man

[Tr. my own]

According to Bradley, to be real means to "fall within experience" and he proceeds to make his distinction between finite and infinite experience. For Iqbal, on the contrary, the real does not fall within the finite experience of man; it rather requires a special aptitude or sensitivity, called intuition or mystic experience, to comprehend the real which is God in his case. Bradley is forced to talk of an absolute or infinite experience 'in which all contradictions are resolved in a harmonious whole'.⁵⁵ For him the test of reality is "comprehensiveness and coherence". He admits that good has more reality than evil and that 'there is nothing more real than what comes in religion'; that he 'who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness seeks he does not know what'.⁵⁶ For Iqbal, on the other hand, religion

has an unreserved reality, it is a reality beyond all doubts (*la raiba fi*).

Again, Iqbal and Bradley come surprisingly close on the nature of relationship between religion and philosophy. For both it is a complicated relationship. According to Bradley, metaphysics is higher than religion in so far as it deals with ultimate truth; but religion is higher than philosophy inasmuch as it 'attempts to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being'.⁵⁷ For him metaphysics has something of the character of a religion. Iqbal similarly holds, 'Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science'.⁵⁸ Herein lies the ascendancy of philosophy. 'But to rationalise faith', he adds, 'is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over religion. Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms. While sitting in judgement on religion, philosophy cannot give religion an inferior place among its data...Thus, in the evaluation of religion, philosophy must recognise the central position of religion and has no other alternative but to admit it as something focal in the process of reflective synthesis'.⁵⁹ Thus both the thinkers have assigned their true places to philosophy and religion.

In his *Essays on Truth and reality* Bradley lays stress on the need for a new religion. He envisages the possibility of a religion not itself founded on

metaphysics but with a creed which metaphysics could justify; and this might come about by "modification" of the religion which we already have.⁶⁰ Iqbal, on the contrary, does not recommend any modification but a 'reconstruction' of religious thought which is Islam, in his case. However, like Bradley he recommends a "rationally-founded faith". But where he surpasses all the Western thinkers is his stress on the need for a faith which is an amalgam of reason and intuition. He says in *Javid Namah*.⁶¹

زیر کی از عشق گرد و حق شناس

کارِ عشق از زیر کی محکم اساس

عشق چوں با زیر کی همبستر شود

نقش بند عالم دیگر شود

Love-led can reason claim the Lord
and reason-lit love strikes firm roots.
When integrated, these two draw the
pattern of a different World'.⁶²

and again⁶³

.....
فقرت آں اصل شایسته است

فقرت آں خست لاط ذکر و فکر

فکر را کامل ندیدم جز بند کر

'The Quran inculcates a quality of
'faqr',
which is the very quintessence of
sovereignty,
a 'faqr' which inculcates
the fusion absolute of prayer and
thought.
No thought completes its reach except by
aid of prayer'.⁶⁴

Iqbal is champion of self or egohood. He believes that the highest degree of the Ego is also the highest reality. For Bradley, on the other hand, self was an appearance, at best having some degree of reality. Iqbal examines his position on 'Self' in his lectures thus: 'in his *Ethical Studies* he assumes the reality of the self; in his *Logic* he takes it only as a working hypothesis. It is in his *Appearance and Reality* that he subjects the ego to a searching examination'.⁶⁵ Though relegating 'self' to the position of an appearance on the whole, and despite the fact that his ruthless logic has shown it to be a mass of confusion, Bradley has to admit that the self must be "in some sense real", "in some sense an indubitable fact".⁶⁶ Iqbal concludes his examination with the remarks, that 'however thought may dissect and analyse, our feeling of egohood is ultimate and is powerful enough to extract from Professor Bradley the reluctant admission of its reality'.⁶⁷ He adds, 'The finite centre of experience therefore is real even though its reality is too profound to be intellectualized'.⁶⁸ Here is a very vital subject on which the two contemporaries have differed. For Iqbal, it may be said, the self is so real that even God,

his Absolute, is called the Ultimate Ego,⁶⁹ the Divine Self.⁷⁰ Iqbal conceives the ultimate reality as an organic unity in which thought, life, and purpose all interpenetrate, and he calls it 'the unity of a self--an all-embracing concrete self--'⁷¹

Bernard Bosanquet, another absolutist from Britain, concentrated on the problems of 'individuality' and 'value' in his book *The Principle of Individuality and Value*. He defined 'individuality' as 'the ability to stand by itself, freedom from contradiction, or, in a word, self-completeness'.⁷² He calls it positive criterion of individuality. Thus conceived, the term 'individuality' does not apply to an isolated self, but only to a "system" or a "world". He believed in degrees of individuality, and in the ultimate sense there could be only one individual, the Absolute.⁷³ He expounded two criteria of individuality, viz (i) negative and (ii) positive. On its positive side by individuality he meant "self-containedness". Henri Bergson (1859-1941), a French contemporary of Iqbal, put forward a criterion which is basically negative, viz., 'For the individuality to be perfect, it would be necessary that no detached part of the organism could live separately. But then reproduction would be impossible'.⁷⁴ He rather takes reproduction for the very negation of individuality. Iqbal, however, puts forward a set of more comprehensive criteria of individuality derived from the Quranic chapter "*al-Tauhid*"⁷⁵ which lays down five conditions of individuality, viz. (i) uniqueness, (ii) independence (*samad*), (iii) eternal and uncreated, (iv) above the process of reproduction (*taulid*), and (v) complete unity (*Wahdat*) which implies unity of

existence and essence, "That" and "What" of a thing or being.

For both Iqbal and Bosanquet criterion of value lies in individuality. Bosanquet holds that we ascribe value to whatever gives us satisfaction. The most enduring satisfaction is found in "What is self-consistent" and hence belongs to the Absolute only.⁷⁶ For Iqbal also those actions are good which are "ego-sustaining" and those bad which are "ego-dissolving",⁷⁷ and the former yields pleasure or satisfaction. Both agree that in order to attain full individuality and satisfaction, the finite self must go outside of its separate selfhood and identify itself with the whole of which it is a member. Bosanquet calls it "self-transcendence" which is complete surrender, a view very much close to that of Iqbal who believes in a complete surrender to the Will of God as the final goal of religious life. This complete surrender is the highest form of Love, according to him.⁷⁸

Bosanquet recounts three stages in the pilgrimage of the finite self on the way to perfection and complete surrender: viz (i) Stage of "the moulding of souls" which is comparable to Iqbal's stage of "Discipline"; (ii) The stage of "the hazards and hardships" of finite selfhood which is something similar to what Iqbal called the stage of "Thought"; and (iii) The stage of "stability and security" which can be attained only through "self-transcendence" which in the case of Iqbal is the stage of "Discovery".⁷⁹

Bosanquet and Iqbal fundamentally differ on their respective views of immortality. Bosanquet holds that

the destiny of the finite self is neither destruction nor immortality, but rather "transmutation" in the Absolute. He denies the need for any future life for the completion of perfection and human progress. He says, 'The greatest men leave little more than a name, because their work has blended with cosmic forces from which it cannot be separated for estimation'.⁸⁰ Iqbal, on the contrary, was a staunch advocate of 'immortality', though he did not believe in universal immortality. He held, 'Personal immortality,..., is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort'.⁸¹ To him it is by no means a posthumous fame, as held by Bosnquet, though agreeing with him that the process of perfection begins in this very life which is the doctrine of 'meliorism'. Iqbal raises a very pertinent question--' who knows how many different kinds of environment it needs for its organization as a perfect ego?'⁸² He is inclined to answer this question in the affirmative and thus offers a case for the life after death--a pretty convincing case under the present state of human knowledge. Thus, the human destiny is not bound up with this world only, according to him.

Both Iqbal and C.A. Campbell (1897-1947), a younger contemporary, be take to an analysis of the various forms of human experience, the former in his *Liectures*,⁸³ while the latter in his book *Scepticism and Construction*⁸⁴. However, Campbell draws agnostic conclusions regarding reality, whereas Iqbal is led to some positive resultes by his analysis. Again, Campbell's approach is purely intellectual, while Iqbal transcends intellectual realm into the sphere of love

and intuition.⁸⁵ Campbell is a "panentheist" like Iqbal in so far as he believes that religious experience has two terms: the soul and God. Again, self for him is a 'relatively abiding, active, spiritual entity',⁸⁶ rather than a mere concatenation of experiences held by the empiricists like Hume. Unlike Bradley, he did not assign to the self a merely "adjectival status."

Campbell holds that a rational theism is "internal inconsistency" and shifts towards Otto's doctrine⁸⁷ for whom the "numinous" transcends all rational concepts--a circumstance which forces us to use symbolic language in describing religious concepts. Iqbal will agree that our language about God is symbolic; but he adds that there is some affinity between symbols and what they symbolize. Thus, in their approach to religious language none of them was a literalist.

1.3 Iqbal and English Theologians

Among the English theologians who were Iqbal's contemporaries was J.R. Illingworth (1848-1915) who held that mind and body, 'however different these two may be, we always know them in combination'.⁸⁸ However, he advocated their combination on cognitive grounds, while Iqbal advocated it on volitional or conative basis. He said, 'Yet mind and body become one in action. When I take up a book from my table, my act is single and indivisible. It is impossible to draw a line of cleavage between the share of the body and that of the mind in this act. Somehow they must belong to the same system,...'⁸⁹ Iqbal holds that Islam 'cannot countenance any duality of the spiritual and the temporal. Matter and soul are not two different

entities, but different aspects of the same reality'.⁹⁰ He warns the Muslims not to accept the duality of spiritual and physical under the cultural impact of the West, lest they should sever themselves from their fountainhead of spiritual values and 'stultify Islam as a social movement and a way of life'.⁹¹ Both Iqbal and Illingworth assign a certain primacy to the spirit which uses matter for its purposes (Instrumentalism). According to Illingworth, God is the universal Spirit and is related to the material order like our soul to the body. Iqbal, on the other hand, conceives God as the Self and delineates His relation to nature thus: 'What we call Nature or the not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God... It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate self. Nature is to the Divine self as character is to the human self'. Nature and God are so related that, in the words of Iqbal, 'The knowledge of nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour'.⁹² Again, Illingworth calls God 'Suprapersonal' provided we include in this term 'the essential attributes of personality'.⁹³ In his book *Personality Human and Divine* he speaks of human personality as imperfect, a replica in the finite of the divine archetypal personality'.⁹⁴ Iqbal, however, does not take human personality for a mere replica of the divine; he is rather the "vicegerent" of God on earth,⁹⁵ as the Quran says. Like Iqbal, Illingworth was a "panentheist" who later developed the doctrine of "ecclesiastical authority" in his book *Divine Transcendence*.

R.J. Campbell (1867-1956), a younger contemporary of Iqbal, agrees with both Bradley and

Iqbal that the chief danger to man and religion 'arises from practical materialism on the one hand and an antiquated dogmatic theology on the other'.⁹⁶ He criticises traditional theology on the ground that it makes a bifurcation between divinity and humanity. He ironically remarks, 'This God is greatly bothered and thwarted by what men have been doing throughout the few millennia of human existence...'⁹⁷ Campbell takes Jesus for 'the standard of human excellance', which brought to light the unity of God and man. He holds that 'Christhood is a potentiality for all men, since all are of the substance of God and all human history is divine incarnation'.⁹⁸ According to him, Christ was not a "uniquely constituted being", he was only historically unique: there is no gulf between him and the rest of mankind. Iqbal also conceived the Holy Prophet as the standard of human excellance, a historically unique being, and a beautiful blend of divine and human (*lâhut* and *nâsut*). Campbell, however, conceived the kingdom of God in terms of 'immanence' and took to Socialism as a means to its realization.⁹⁹ Iqbal, on the other hand, never took to socialism for the realization of his final goal, because for him Islam was the best and sufficient means towards the realization of the Divine Kingdom on earth.

Like Iqbal, Ralph W. Trine (1866-1958) believes that, although reason is not to be neglected, the highest wisdom comes from "interior illumination" (which Iqbal calls '*qalb*'). Again, like Iqbal he advocates the doctrine of "*Wahdat-ush-shahud*" when he says, 'The great central fact of the universe is that spirit of infinite life and power that is behind all, that

animates all, that manifests itself in and through all; this spirit is what I call "God".¹⁰⁰ Again, in agreement with Iqbal, he holds that men are "partakers" of the divine life. Men do not differ from God in essence, but in degree: they are individualized spirits, while God is the infinite Spirit which includes them.¹⁰¹ Trine also preached 'a universal message of religion', as Iqbal did, which for both is "a conscious realization of our unity with the infinite Spirit".¹⁰² This changes one from mere man to a "God-man".

1.4 Iqbal and Absolutism in America

On many important points, Iqbal and Josiah Royce, an absolutist in America, agree considerably. Both believe that the Absolute is the absolute self which represents itself in the infinity of finite selves. But Iqbal will not agree with him that the Absolute is 'a whole that is an individual system of ethically free individuals...'¹⁰³ For Iqbal, on the other hand, God is Himself the highest Self rather than a system constituted by finite selves. The highest Self can be called a system in the sense in which a self as an organism is a system. Nevertheless, God is the person, according to Iqbal. Again, in agreement with Iqbal, Royce conceives the Absolute in terms of 'Will' rather than 'thought' in his Gifford Lectures. To Iqbal, God is 'a rationally directed life' and life he defined as 'a series of acts of attention',¹⁰⁴ which is predominantly volitional. In *The World and the Individual*, again, Royce defines 'individuality' in terms of purpose or will, and calls the Absolute "the only perfect individual", "the individual of individuals".¹⁰⁵ He holds

like Iqbal that the finite selves aspire for individuality, but they never approach it so long as they remain isolated. They move towards it as their purposes become wider and more inclusive, and they realise their unity with other selves, with nature, and with God.¹⁰⁶ He says, "all reality must be present to the unity of the Infinite thought".¹⁰⁷ Here Iqbal would agree with Royce in his basic thought. Like Iqbal, again, Royce holds that the world on the whole is absolutely good, that the presence of evil is no evidence against it. He argues that just as error implies absolute truth, so evil implies absolute goodness, and is overcome in the Absolute. Iqbal also holds that 'good and evil, therefore, though opposites, must fall within the same whole. There is no such thing as an isolated fact;....'¹⁰⁸

Again, Royce holds that the world is a series of interpretations: 'Every act of interpretation aims at introducing unity into life, by mediating between mutually contesting or estranged ideas, minds and purposes'.¹⁰⁹ For Iqbal also, as we have seen, space, time, and matter are interpretations which thought puts on the free creative energy of God.

Royce holds that a true religion is one of 'loyalty' which he defines as 'the willing and thoroughgoing devotion of a self to a cause, when the cause is something which unites many selves in one, and which is therefore the interest of a community'.¹¹⁰ It means rising above selfish and limited interests in the service of the whole community of mankind; Iqbal also cherishes a "kingdom of God" which is a community of

the whole mankind.¹¹¹ For both of them charity or love means the realization of the ideal community-- which is 'the expression of the divine on earth'. This ideal, though still invisible, is perfectly real, they hold.

Notes and References

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2. Letters dated Dec. 1919 & 1920, excerpts referred in his article on "McTaggart's philosophy", S.A. Vahid's *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, PP. 116f.
3. M.Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 78.
4. *Ibid*, p. 155.
5. *Ibid*, p. 14.
6. *Ibid*, p. 65.
7. *Ibid*, p. 71.
8. *Ibid*, pp. 71-72.
9. *Ibid*, cp. chapter on "The conception of God and the meaning of Prayer".
10. *Ibid*, pp. 62ff.
11. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
12. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67.
13. *Ibid*, p. 78.
14. *Ibid*, pp. 80-81.
15. *The Holy Quran*, ii: 210, etc.

16. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 25.
17. *Ibid*, p. 26.
18. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.
19. The Holy Quran x:19; ii: 213; xlii:8.
20. macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
21. Iqbal, *Javid Nama* (Lahore Sh. Ghulam Ali, 1974) p. 19.
22. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, (Iqbal's own Eng. Tr.), p. 198.
23. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
24. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
25. "Panentheism" is a blend of both "immanence" and transcendence" of God.
26. *The Evolution of Religion*, vol. I, p. 68.
27. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-96.
28. *Ibid*, pp. 5-6.
29. *Ibid*, p. 2.
30. *Ibid*, p. 25.
31. *Ibid*, p. 16.
32. *A Faith that Enquires*, p. vii--'where he says, 'Let man seek God by the way of pure reason, and he will find him'.
33. See my article "Mission of al-Ghazali, Kant and Iqbal", pb. *Daily The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, dt.20-10-1978.
34. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, Chapter II.
35. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
36. *Ibid*.
37. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
38. *Ibid*.
39. *Ibid*, quoted, p. 60.
40. H. Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p. 12.

41. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
42. *Ibid*, p. 118.
43. *Ibid*, p. 117.
44. *op.cit*, p. 19.
45. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, (Iqbal's own Eng. tr.), p. 198.
46. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
47. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
48. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 28.
49. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
50. *Ibid*, p. 65.
51. Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
52. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
53. Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
54. Iqbal, p. 74.
55. macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
56. Bradley, *op. cit.*, p. 398.
57. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
58. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
59. *Ibid*.
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61. Iqbal, p. 65.
62. Mahmud Ahmad, *Pilgrimage of Eternity* (an Eng. Tr. of *Javid Nama*) p. 54.
63. *op. cit.*, p. 80.
64. Mahmud, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
65. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p. 98.
66. *Ibid*.
67. *Ibid*.
68. *Ibid*.
69. *Ibid*. P. 71.
70. *Ibid*.
71. *Ibid*, p. 55.

72. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
73. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 68.
74. *Creative Evolution*, p. 16.
75. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
76. bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
77. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
78. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
79. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
80. Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, p. 264.
81. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
82. *Ibid*, p. 98.
83. *Ibid*.
84. C. A. Campbell, *Scepticism and Construction*.
85. *Bal-i-Jibril*, (Lahore: Ghulam Ali, 1976), P. 84.

گذر جائے تل سے آگے کہ یہ نور
چراغِ راہ ہے، منزل نہیں ہے!

'Transcend the value of intellect' as it illumines
the way, not the goal;

[Eng Tr. my own.]

86. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 34--Q. from Gifford
Lectures.
87. R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, pp. 7ff.
88. *Divine Immanence*, pp. 2ff.
89. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
90. Mahmud Ahmad, *op. cit.*, introduction, p. xii.
91. *Ibid*.
92. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
93. Illingworth, *op. cit.*, p. 158.
94. *Ibid* p. 216.

95. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
96. *New Theology*, p. 2.
97. *Ibid*, p. 18.
98. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
99. *Ibid*.
100. *Ibid*, pp. 11-12.
101. *Ibid*. For Iqbal see *Reconstruction*, p. 80.
102. Trine, *Ibid*.
103. *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 42.
104. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
105. Royce, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 339.
106. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
107. J. Royce, *On Selfhood and Godhood*, p. 433.
108. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.
109. *The Problem of Christianity*, vol.II, p. 286.
110. *Ibid*, vol. I, p. 68.
111. A. J. Arberry, *Javid-Nama* (an Eng. Tr. of Iqbal's persian verse with the same title), intr. p. 11.

Chapter Two

IQBAL AND IDEALIST TRADITIONS-II

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2.1 Personal Idealism

Personal idealism came as a reaction against absolute idealism. It concentrates on 'the nature of spirit from the spiritual life of persons', and 'it tends to think of God or the supreme Spirit as personal also'.¹ On this theory the stress on 'personality' comes to the fore. This form of idealism, though focusing its attention on the mental or spiritual, rejects the concept of the Absolute as the highest form of reality. Its prominent advocates were A.S. Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931), W.E. Hocking (1873-1964), George H. Howison (1834-1916), Dr. J.M.E. McTaggart (1866-1925), and Hasting Rashdall (1858-1924) and others. They all revolted against the Hegelian idea of the Absolute in which all other minds and selves are included as insignificant elements.

Pringle-Pattison, a contemporary of Iqbal, critically examined Hegelianism and allied English doctrine in his book *Hegelianism and Personality*. He found that the radical error of these systems of thought lay in 'the identification of the human and divine self-consciousness or, to put it more broadly, the unification of consciousness in a single self'.² On this point Iqbal would certainly differ with him because for him '*lahut*' (divine) and '*nasut*' (human) unify to form what he called '*Mard-i-Momin*'.³ In this respect, then, Iqbal may rightly be called an Hegelian and an absolutist. However, Iqbal would agree with Pringle-Pattison in regard to a finite self or 'person'. Both agree on the 'autonomy' and 'uniqueness' of a

person. Pringle-Pattison says, 'I have a centre of my own-- a will of my own--which no one shares with me or can share, a centre which I maintain even in my dealings with God himself'.⁴ This is "Panentheism" pure and simple. Iqbal emphasizes the uniqueness and autonomy of 'self' or ego thus: 'Another important characteristic of the unity of the ego is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of every ego'.⁵ What makes it unique is the absolutely unique mental unity which makes it up.⁶ And he adds like Pringle-Pattison that 'unitive experience is not the finite ego effacing its identity by some sort of absorption into the Infinite Ego; it is rather the infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite; And he finally says, 'The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it'.⁷ They will both agree that 'personality in God on the one hand and the dignity and immortality of finite personality on the other are both postulated by the religious consciousness'.⁸ Pattison's metaphysics converges, like that of Iqbal, on two basic tenets: i.e., the personality of god and the indestructible worth of human personality.⁹

Both Iqbal and Pattison will agree that nature, man and God form an organic whole so that any one of these three, taken in isolation, is an abstraction. The finite selves, though extremely unique and independent, are not to be taken in isolation from God and 'have no independent subsistence outside of the Universal Life which mediates itself to them in a world of objects'.¹⁰ Iqbal is, again, very clear and emphatic

on this point, when he says, 'The world, in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the "Great I am"'.¹¹ He continues, 'Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine Life'.¹² Regarding the intimacy of relationship between God and the universe Iqbal says that the universe is a moment in the life of God, and that nature is to the Divine Self what character is to the human self. And again that space, time and matter are the interpretations which the mind puts on the creative energy of God. In fact, Iqbal has conceived the whole existence, including matter, as consisting of egos, and even the Ultimate Reality is also conceived as an Ego; and says, 'I must add now that from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed'.¹³ Thus, God, man and the universe are so intimately related that none can be understood apart from a mutual reference. Pattison holds that philosophy cannot rest in any explanation which stops short of God. Even God 'becomes an abstraction', says he, 'if separated from the universe of his manifestations'.¹⁴ According to Iqbal, as we have seen before, reality lives in its own appearances, and as such cannot be understood apart from them.

On the subject of "creation" Pringle-Pattison takes a unique position. He holds that we should not think of God as a pre-existent deity who called the world into being by an arbitrary act of will. He says that the world is God's eternal manifestation rather than a creation which he could do without.¹⁵ Iqbal in his chapter on "The Conception of God and the

Meaning of prayer" propounds a cognate view. He quotes an episode imputed to the illustrious personality of Ba Yazid of Bistam. It is reported that one of his disciples put forward the common-sense view: "There was a moment of time when God existed and nothing else existed beside Him". The saint's reply was, "It is just the same now", said he, "as it was then".¹⁶ This endorses Pringle-Pattison's viewpoint on this crucial subject. In so far as the world is the manifestation of God, the question of there being an act of creation as a specific past event which once happened in history, does not arise. He remarks on the authority of the Asharite school that 'existence means nothing more than Divine energy become visible'.¹⁷ Again, Pringle-Pattison very pertinently remarks, 'Such finite personalities are not mere adjectives of the Absolute, nor can we think of them as created in the way that things are produced. They are members or incarnations of the Absolute'.¹⁸ Iqbal would confirm his view on the authority of the Holy Quran which uses two words, "Khalq" and "amr", to differentiate between the creation of man and the production of the universe.¹⁹ Again, Pringle-Pattison believes that finite selves are co-eternal with God, a view which Iqbal bears out when he says that God has chosen finite egos to be 'participators of his life, power, and freedom'.

Pringle-Pattison discusses the question of "immortality" in his book *The Idea of Immortality*. He holds that to say that personality is immortal does not mean that it has no beginning; 'it is emphatically something that must be won before there can be any question of its conservation'.²⁰ Iqbal also believes that

personality or individuality is to be earned through efforts, freedom and deeds. And also that 'Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it'.²¹ According to Iqbal, those deeds are good which may be called 'ego-sustaining', and those bad which are 'ego-dissolving';²² and it is through them that egohood and immortality are to be achieved. Rudolf Metz's remarks on Pringle-Pattison's position that it is "a half-way one",²³ however, do not apply to Iqbal's position so long as he adhered to the absolutist position in addition to his pluralism.

William E. Hocking, an American contemporary, holds, like Iqbal, that reality must have a mental or spiritual character, that this spiritual character is that of a Self. He says, 'For there is nothing higher than selfhood and nothing more profound'.²⁴ Like Iqbal, he rejects the notion of a finite God on the ground that 'God cannot be less than the Absolute'.²⁵ In the idea of God, he says, the Absolute 'is raised to the level of personality and moral quality'.²⁶ The concept of "personality" is deep and wide enough to include even the impersonal aspects of reality. He also admits that finite persons may be said to be in God.

Hocking believes, like Iqbal and Campbell, that scientific knowledge and mystic revelation must supplement each other for the sake of fuller knowledge. He says, 'The scientific understanding of nature as a self-contained entity is an abstraction which must be supplemented by the mystic's experience of nature as the communication to us of the

Divine Mind'.²⁷ Nature though created, is necessary to selfhood, both in God and in man. Iqbal will accept the Wardian position that a self is inconceivable without a 'not-self' even in the case of the Ultimate Ego or Divine Self. As he says, the human self needs a number of environments for his life and development. However, in the case of God, the 'not-self' or the universe is not an independent entity confronting and limiting Him; it is rather 'one continuous act' of God Himself 'which thought breaks up into plurality of mutually exclusive things'.²⁸

Unlike Iqbal, Pringle-Pattison believed in 'natural' religion. He rejected the 'abstract religion in general' advocated by the idealist philosophers on the ground that it lacks the concreteness of actual religions practised by man. However, his analysis of religion will appeal to Iqbal. He says that religion begins as an emotional response, but it is driven to seek an intellectual foundation in a world-view provided by idealist philosophy.²⁹ While analysing a religious state Iqbal also says that 'it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive thought'.³⁰ But he adds that 'it is the nature of feeling to seek expression in thought'.³¹ Both Iqbal and Pattison look for a universal religion, a world faith. For Pringle-Pattison, however, 'it was derivable from all the various religions in practice'; while for Iqbal Islam, in its true sense, is such a religion which can offer salvation for the whole of humanity. In his book *Living Religions and a World Faith* Pringle-Pattison remarks that Christianity holds that 'each life may achieve dignity and power'.³² According to Iqbal, it is

Islam which bestows dignity and power on each individual man by rendering him conscious of his place in the universe.

2.2 Pluralistic Personal Idealism

George Holmes Howison, originally an American neo-Hegelian, criticised Absolute Idealism on the ground that, by including finite selves in the Absolute, it 'has denied personality in the genuine sense both to man and to God'.³³ He also criticised it because its 'monotonous theme was the ineffable greatness of the Supreme Being and the utter littleness of man...'³⁴ He would, disagree with Iqbal when he says that there is not one all-inclusive Mind, but a plurality of minds. He, however, like Iqbal, identifies a mind with a person and holds that persons are free and self-active sources which are eternal and indestructible. However, he goes to the extreme of asserting, 'Not even divine agency can give rise to another self-active intelligence by any productive act'.³⁵

Howison appears to advocate innovatory ideas when he says that God is not the creator of spirits; he is the central member of the circle of minds, *primus inter pares* in the society of coeternal persons'.³⁶ Again he says that God does not govern by power and authority, but by light and reason.³⁷ He enunciates Christianity as demanding that 'God and man are reciprocally and equally real, not identical' and he adds that 'each person is drawn towards God as the realized ideal of his own personal being'.³⁸ However, his position loses its paradoxical look when followed closely. The spirit of man is indestructible for Iqbal

also, though he has rejected a possibility of its pre-existence. This explains why the Quran uses the word 'amr' for the creation of man as distinct from the production of the universe. Again, God being the highest degree of egohood should be treated for the ultimate goal of man who is striving for more and more integrated egohood. As Iqbal says himself in *Payam-i-Mashriq*³⁹

در دشتِ جنونِ من جبریلِ زبوں صیدے
یزداں بہ کمند آورائے ہمتِ مردانہ

'In my desert of frenzy, Gabriel is too mean a prey,
O manly valour; your lasso let fall on God Himself'.

Thus conceived Iqbal will agree with Howison that true religion is not "submission", but rather "aspiration" after a lofty ideal.⁴⁰ He envisages 'a republic of free and eternal spirits-- a restatement of the classic idea of the City of God'.⁴¹ Iqbal conceived a similar idea of the Kingdom of God on earth. A.J. Arberry remarks in his Introduction to *Javid namah*,⁴² 'Thus the kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth'. In his republic of more or less perfect egos Iqbal, however, retains a sure place for God; while Macquarrie remarks on the position of Howison that we have been brought 'to a type of personal idealism

which could dispense altogether with the idea of God'.⁴³

John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, a British contemporary and teacher of Iqbal at Trinity College, Cambridge, originated an atheistic pluralistic idealism. He was rated among the top thinkers of Anglo-American idealism. He expounded his religious ideas in his book *Some Dogmas of Religion*. Where he basically differs from Iqbal is his belief that the existence of a personal God is not essential for religion. Macquarrie describes his system as "religious atheism" which sounds paradoxical. McTaggart discusses the ideas of God, immortality, and freedom. Of immortality he declares that there are arguments strong enough to justify such a belief. He rather refutes arguments against immortality of the self⁴⁴. Iqbal, however, rejects his view that 'the self is elementally immortal'⁴⁵ on the ground that it participates in the elemental eternity of the Absolute, that 'the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute...'⁴⁶ To this Iqbal objects, 'To my mind such a differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself. Personally I regard immortality as an inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining *the tension of the ego*'.⁴⁷

However, he appreciates Dr. McTaggart because he 'emphasized personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in

Europe,...'⁴⁸ Iqbal compares him even to the great Muslim mystic al-Hallaj in this regard. He regards his position on immortality as "almost apostolic".

Like Iqbal and other idealists, McTaggart believes that the self is differently constituted from material things: He wrote to Iqbal in 1919, 'I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that the finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not that'.⁴⁹ Even if the body were regarded as a necessary accompaniment of the self, it might be the case that on the destruction of one body, the self passes to another body.⁵⁰ He believed in the possibility of "a plurality of lives".⁵¹ Like Iqbal he believes in the continuity of self and life: what is gained in one life may be strengthened, not only carried over, in the next life. However, unlike Iqbal, he believed in the "substance theory of the self".⁵² According to McTaggart, selves are the ultimate reality, a real substance. Iqbal remarks, 'All that I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the results of English Neo-Hegelianism'.⁵³

Again, unlike Iqbal, McTaggart believes in a finite God. He discusses God's omnipotence in this connection. He argues, 'An omnipotent person is one who can do anything', including altering the laws of thought or the multiplication tables.⁵⁴ Now in this sense omnipotence is incompatible with personality (which requires some thing existing outside of its own will), and irreconcilable with goodness (in view of the presence of evil in the world). This leads him to the

idea of a finite God who can be called personal, good, and even 'supreme' in the sense of having more power than any other being. He goes on to reject the idea of God on the ground, 'If all reality is a harmonious system of selves, it is perhaps itself sufficiently godlike to dispense with a God'.⁵⁵ Again unlike Iqbal, he believes that God cannot be a person or self, for no person can include another self. For him ultimate reality is eternal system of selves united in the harmony of a love 'so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystical rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection'.⁵⁶ He compares this system to a college, whose members have more reality than the college itself. Iqbal urges that McTaggart's position on the mutual inclusion of egos is based on his idea of love as a passivity. He says, 'Love is no passivity. It is active and creative'.⁵⁷ Dr. McTaggart's real difficulty stems from the position that the self is unique and impervious. How could one self, however superior, include other selves? Rumi, the mystic poet, felt the same difficulty. Iqbal concedes, 'Perhaps it is not possible intellectually to conceive this ultimate unity as an all-embracing self. It is my belief, ..., that McTaggart's Hegelian inspiration marred the vision which was vouchsafed him'.⁵⁸ For Iqbal the ultimate reality is 'a rationally directed life which,..., cannot be conceived except as an organic whole,...'.⁵⁹ He rather conceives God as an Ego, what he chooses to call, "the Ultimate Ego".⁶⁰

Again, time and matter are unreal for Dr. McTaggart. Iqbal subjects his concept of time to a searching criticism in his Lectures. He says, 'Time,

according to Dr. McTaggart, is unreal because every event is past, present, and future'. Thus each event 'combines characteristics which are incompatible with each other'.⁶¹ He begins his criticism by saying that 'the argument proceeds on the assumption that the serial nature of time is final... This is taking time not as a living creative moment, but as a static absolute, holding the ordered multiplicity of fully-shaped cosmic events, revealed serially, like the pictures of a film'.⁶² Iqbal replies to him that 'the future exists only as an open possibility, and not as a reality. Nor can it be said that an event combines incompatible characteristics when it is described both as past and present. When an event X does happen it enters into an unalterable relation with all the events that have happened before it. These relations are not all affected by the relations of X with other events which happen after X by the further becoming of reality. No true or false proposition about these relations will ever become false or true. Hence there is no logical difficulty in regarding an event as both past and present.'⁶³ Iqbal concludes with the remarks, 'Personally, I am inclined to think that time is an external element in reality. But real time is not serial time to which the distinction of past, present, and future is essential; it is pure duration, i.e. change without succession, which Dr. McTaggart's argument does not touch'.⁶⁴ Perhaps Dr. McTaggart's misconceptions regarding God and the ultimate reality stemmed from his defective concept of time.

McTaggart believes that religion needs 'rehabilitation' which can be effected only on the

basis of a complete metaphysics, proving that the universe is on the whole good.⁶⁵ Here he agrees with Iqbal who also embarks upon a 'reconstruction' of religious thought (in Islam in his case), and looks for a metaphysical basis. He says, 'Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science'.⁶⁶

Iqbal proposes the real test of a self to be its response. Does reality respond to us? His answer is "yes"; 'sometimes by reflection, sometimes by the act of prayer which is higher than mere reflection. He remarks, 'In McTaggart's case reflection took the place of worship'.⁶⁷ Iqbal adds, 'the truth, however, is that neither worship nor reflection nor any kind of practices entitle a man to this response from the Ultimate Love. It depends eventually on what religion calls "grace"'.⁶⁸ As said before, for McTaggart the self passes into another body after death, but he admits that there is no guaranty that this process will be endless; 'it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself, and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change'. In this eventually', says Iqbal, 'we come back to the Absolute again, and McTaggart's system defeats its own purpose'.⁶⁹

2.3 Personal Idealism in Theology

Hasting Rashdall participated in the war waged against both naturalism and absolutism. Like Iqbal and McTaggart, he defines a 'person' as consciousness which thinks as well as feels; which has a certain unity; which distinguishes itself both from the objects

of experience and from other persons; and which is a source of action. Iqbal will agree with him that even animals possess a rudimentary type of personality, for there are degrees of personality.⁷⁰ God is the fullest person; a person in the highest degree. Rashdall argues like McTaggart that God is not the Absolute, for no person can include another person. The Absolute cannot be a Person for it include another person. The Absolute cannot be a person for it includes both God and the souls-- it is rather a "society of persons". Since God is short of the Absolute, Rashdall concedes a limited God, though a God limited by his own creation. He is not omnipotent, but he is the strongest power in the world, says he like McTaggart. He writes in *Philosophy and Religion* that there is 'a real warfare with a real evil', that 'the victory cannot be won without our help', and that (he says like Iqbal) 'we are called upon to be literally fellow-workers with God'.⁷¹

Rashdall believes in a continuous divine revelation given in personal, moral and rational terms, culminating in life and self-sacrificing death of Jesus Christ. Iqbal, on the contrary, though agreeing that revelation (*wahy*), though personal, moral and rational in character, has a very important social import--a feature which distinguishes it from mystical states.⁷² Moreover, with him the revelation culminates in the Holy Prophet whom the Quran calls "the seal of Prophethood".⁷³ Iqbal, however, would agree with him that 'all human love, all human self-sacrifice, is in its way and degree a revelation of God'.⁷⁴ Again, both mean by 'salvation' the attainment of spiritual life

which is continued and perfected beyond death; Iqbal believes that 'life is one and continuous'.⁷⁵

Clement Charles Webb (1865-1954), an eminent theologian of the Church of England, tries to follow a middle course between the absolute and personal idealism. Like Iqbal, he holds that God is both absolute and personal. He says, 'God is both personal and identical with the all-inclusive Absolute'.⁷⁶ However, he adds that divine personality cannot be precisely the same as human personality. We can speak of a personal God, says he, if 'we could stand in personal relations with him'.⁷⁷ Iqbal's position is implicitly similar. Both face a crucial problem: if God is the Absolute and we are included in him, then how can we have personal relations with him? Both try to answer the question on panentheistic grounds. Webb suggests that we should distinguish between the relation of man to man in social experience and the much more complex relation of man to god in religious experience.⁷⁸ He adds that in religious experience God dwells in us and we in God, but in such a way that we preserve our distinctness and a genuine personal relation is possible. 'God must be both transcendent and immanent if personal relations with him are to be possible',⁷⁹ he says. Iqbal has very emphatically stressed the personal identity of the finite ego in the face of the Infinite as the final aim of life. Remarking on the relationship of God and man he writes that 'the finite ego must be distinct, though not isolated, from the Infinite'.⁸⁰ He also advocates the doctrine of "panentheism," i.e. both transcendence and immanence of God. Iqbal will agree with Webb that the relation of God to man in religious experience is

different from that of man to man in social intercourse, and that it is much more complex than the latter. However, it is very personal and intimate one as the Quran says.⁸¹

Notes and References

1. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
2. *Ibid.* p. 215.
3. See Iqbal's article "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded by Abdul Karim Al-Jilani", pb. *Indian Antiquary*, (Bombay, Sep. 1900), rep. S.A. Vahid; *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*(ed), pp. 3ff.
4. Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
5. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p. 99.
6. *Ibid*, p. 110.
7. *Ibid*, p. 198.
8. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
9. *Ibid*
10. Pringle-, *The Idea of God*, p. 314.
11. Iqbal, *op. cit.*,p. 71.
12. *Ibid*, p. 72.
13. *Ibid*, p. 71.
14. No, *op. cit.*
15. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p.47
16. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p.
17. *Ibid*, p. 68.

18. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
19. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
20. *Ibid.* p. 196.
21. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*, p. 389.
24. *Types of Philosophy*, p. 441.
25. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
26. *Meaning of God*, p. 207.
27. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*
28. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-66.
29. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
30. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
31. *Ibid*
32. *Ibid.* p. 268.
33. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*,
34. Cf. Symposium on *The Conception of God*, p. 60.
35. *The Limits of Evolution*, p. 289.
36. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
37. See J. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, p. 74 n.1.
38. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
39. *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, Payam-i-mashriq*, p. 166/336
[Eng. tr. my own]
40. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p. 98: where Iqbal says of ego, 'its nature is wholly aspiration after a unity more inclusive more effective, more balanced and unique'.
41. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
42. *Ibid.* page 11.
43. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, 52.
44. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 77.

45. Iqbal's article on "McTaggart's Philosophy", (ed.) S.A. Vahid, p. 122.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid*, p. 123.
49. Dr. McTaggart's letter to Iqbal written Dec. 1919, rep. *ibid*, p. 118.
50. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.
51. *Ibid*, p. 52.
52. Vahid, *op. cit.*, p. 121f. Iqbal rejected the "substance theory" of the Self in *Reconstructions*, pp. also my article on "Allama Iqbal on 'Immortality'", *Religious Studies*, vol. 18, No. 3, Sep. 1982.
53. Vahid, *op, cit.*, p. 121.
54. McTaggart, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
55. *Some Dogmas*, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
56. McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, vol.II, p. 479.
57. Vahid, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.
58. *Ibid*, p. 125.
59. Iqbal, *Reconstructions*, p. 78.
60. *Ibid.* p. 71,
61. *Ibid.* p. 57.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.* p. 58.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.*
66. *Ibid.* p. 2.
67. Vahid, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.* p. 127.

70. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
71. *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 86. Iqbal uses the word "participators" instead of "co-workers", *Reconstruction*, p. 80.
72. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 125. in *Christian Theology*, p. 449.
73. *Ibid*, p. 126.
74. *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, p.449
75. Iqbal, *Ibid*, p. 123.
76. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
77. *God and Personality*, p.73.
78. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
79. *Ibid*.
80. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
81. *The Holy Quran*, 'God is nearer to man than his jugular vein'-- (L:16); again the following verse brings out God's personal relation to man still more closely: '... I am indeed close (to them): I listen to the prayer of every suppliant when he calleth on Me: let them also, with a will, listen to My call, and believe in Me:...(ii:186).

Chapter Three

IQBAL AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF SPIRIT

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John Macquarrie has grouped together a class of thinkers and theologians whose systems of thought he has called the 'philosophies of spirit'¹. They have a very close affinity with the idealists in regarding spirit as the ultimate reality. However, they differ basically from most kinds of idealists on the following scores:-

1. In agreement with some forms of personal idealism they are inclined to 'interpret reality in theistic, personal, and ethical terms'².

2. Following the lead of thinkers like Lotze and Leibniz, they 'recognized a kind of hierarchy of spiritual beings. At the apex of hierarchy stands God;,,, '³

3. They tend towards "panpsychism" according to which, as Iqbal says, matter is a colony of lower order egos⁴ or "monads" using Leibnizian terminology.

4. They condemn idealism as 'too intellectualist and rationalist in its 'approach'⁵. Spiritualist philosophers lay stress upon "activity" as the distinguishing mark of spirit. Macquarrie so compares the two forms of philosophy: 'Idealism tends to understand spirit as the thinking subject,... the philosophies of spirit emphasizing the idea of spirit as the *agent* or source of action--...'⁶

5. Their approach is teleological and they reject 'a merely mechanical interpretation of nature, and think that for an adequate interpretation of the results of science we call to our aid the concept of purpose'⁷.

Thus some of the common features of the class of philosophies under discussion are panpsychism, activism, and teleological interest in natural science. Iqbal has a very close affinity with such forms of philosophies, despite his idealistic trends-- both absolutist and personalist--as discussed in the preceding two chapters of the present book. His approach is predominantly 'spiritualist' and may rightly be classed with what Macquarrie has called the "philosophies of spirit".

3.1 Continental 'Philosophies of spirit'

Among the contemporaries of Iqbal who advocated spiritualist philosophy on the continent were Bernardino Varisco (1850-1933), an Italian thinker; Rudolf Christoph Eucken (1846-1926), a German; and Emile Boutroux (1845-1922), a French representative of the type of philosophies under review. It is less possible that Iqbal read any of these thinkers during his stay in the continent, and there is seldom any reference to any of them in his works. However, it is quite possible that he came across their names or some references to them during higher studies abroad. Due to his predominant inclination towards spiritualist philosophies, I believe, there has emerged some affinity with these thinkers, which I deem quite understandable and natural.

Rudolf C. Eucken, a Nobel prizewinner for literature, regarded philosophy as a "practical creed"⁵; he rejected intellectualism and a speculative approach to the problems of philosophy. Iqbal in the very opening sentence of his preface to *The Reconstruction*

of Religious Thought in Islam says, 'The Quran is a book which emphasizes "deed" rather than "idea"'⁹. And again towards the closing of the book he says, 'the final act is not an intellectual act, but a vital act¹⁰' He calls his vital approach the "noological" method and writes in *The Truth of Religion* that speculative method deals 'with shadows of the living content and concreteness of reality. On the contrary, the *noological* method understands the particular out of an encompassing and basalwhole of life'¹¹. Eucken believes that 'truth must satisfy the requirements of the whole of life'¹². In the fashion of Iqbal who holds that the final act 'deepens the whole being of the ego, ...¹³, Again while analysing the nature of religion Iqbal says that 'Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man'¹⁴. And for Iqbal religion encompasses the whole being of man; it is among the most vital activities.

Eucken makes a distinction between man's natural existence and his spiritual being. Man's natural existence is marked by his biological, material and economic needs and values, 'and in which he is related only externally with other men'¹⁵. Like Iqbal he believes that 'it is the kind of existence towards which modern civilization is tending. He speaks of the "impersonal" character of modern civilization which makes men its instruments and 'ties them ever more securely to the visible world'¹⁶. Iqbal, too, has issued a timely and grave warning to the modern civilization at a number of places in his writings. He has examined in details its various facets and aspects, bringing out its

ills and causes thereof, and at the same time suggesting remedies for them. For instance, he has condemned the Western form of democracy, both capitalism and communism, and in particular its "one-sidedness" ensuing upon a purely empirical and rationalist approach. To put in very pithy terms, Iqbal says in *Javid Namah*¹⁷

غریباں گم کردہ اند افلاک را

در شکم جویند جان پاک را!

'The Westerners have lost the vision of heaven,

They go hunting for the pure spirit in the belly'¹⁸

The above lines explain very tersely the real diagnosis for the ills of the West, all other maladies issuing from it. He has condemned Western democracy on the ground that in 'a multi-national' country like the undivided subcontinent of India and Pakistan, it can only perpetuate the slavery of a people in minority, and therefore serves the purpose of the majority¹⁹. However, his criticism of the Western civilization is found to be as one of the most important topics for discussion. Iqbal, however, appreciates the Western advancements in the fields of science and technology, suggesting at the same time that the Muslims should approach it respectfully, though critically²⁰.

Like Iqbal again, Eucken emphasizes the vital aspect of man. He says, 'The life of spirit is essentially deed, action and struggle, so that the spirituality of man is not so much an eternal truth about man as something which man must continually gain and develop'²¹. In his system also primacy goes to spirit or mind. Again he agrees with Iqbal that the function of religion is not to be just one activity among other activities, it rather pervades all activity by holding up to us the whole spiritual life. Like all idealists he speaks of an absolute religion. He finds in Christianity the highest manifestation of the absolute religion as Iqbal finds it in Islam. However, he believes that 'Christianity must be purged of many of its transient and accidental features'²²; Iqbal, as said before, goes for the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, which includes purging of certain alien and uncalled for elements assailing it from other hackneyed systems like Hinduism.

Bernardino Varisco, like Iqbal, seeks 'to reconcile the scientific and religious views of the world'²³. He defines a subject (or man) as 'principally a centre of conscious activity'²⁴; though also a highly developed rational subject. He holds that 'everything leads us to believe that at a lower level there is an infinite number of "embryonic subjects" and that 'what we call inert matter might be reduced to an aggregate of such subjects'²⁵. How like Iqbal for whom, as said before, matter or physical organism was a colony of "sub-egos". He believes that there is a 'spontaneity' in the world, which he calls "alogical" factor in the world. The subjects change and develop due to the

spontaneous activity which is found generally, i.e. even in the dead matter. It is nothing but "panpsychism" which so clearly characterizes Iqbal's views. Moreover, he believes in the mutual interaction of 'subjects' for which he uses the term "interference". Iqbal calls it "interaction" and mutual strife. The subjects "interact" in regular ways and what results is an ordered universe and the multiplicity of subjects constitutes a unity'²⁶. This he calls the "logical" factor in the world. His account of unity through the idea of "being" is very much Hegelian and hence differs from Iqbal as from other spiritualist philosophers. He arrives at the idea of a "universal subject". However, his universal subject is not God of religion. He rather admits, unlike Iqbal, that 'the existence of a personal God appears to us an unjustified hypothesis'²⁷. Though in his later years he identified the universal subject with a personal God, yet a God who limits himself both in respects of power and prescience to render man free 'to cooperate with him in the work of creation'²⁸.

Emile Boutroux, a contemporary of Iqbal and the chief representative of spiritual philosophy in France in the beginning of the present century, was mainly interested in the relation between religion and natural sciences. He believes like Iqbal that the understanding of the world which natural sciences offer needs to be completed by a spiritual interpretation of nature'²⁹ He objects that the concepts of purpose and freedom, essential to the life of spirit, appear to have been excluded on the nineteenth-century scientific view of the world which is rigidly deterministic. He subjects the scientific method to a searching examination and

finds that the scientific account of the world is by no means exhaustive, for there is 'a certain degree of contingency'³⁰ as he calls it, which is irreducible to the scientific transcript. He adds that as we move from physics to biology and on to the study of human activities, the element of irreducible contingency keeps on increasing. Like Iqbal he believed in the emergence of new forms and levels, in which the higher cannot be described in terms of the lower. The element of contingency sets a limit to science, though it is not a merely negative or regulative (as held by Kant) idea. It directs us to seek the creative principle in nature³¹. For him, 'science consists in substituting for things symbols which express a certain aspect of them'³². Iqbal expresses this one-sidedness of science by bringing out its fragmentary and piece-meal approach; calling the sciences so many "vultures".³³

Boutroux takes 'reason' in a much wider sense and says that it should be distinguished from scientific understanding. He holds that this wider use of reason opens way to a spiritual interpretation of the world and renders the religious attitude possible³⁴. Iqbal is more elaborate and precise in his treatment of wider reason. He calls it the deeper movement of thought which is 'capable of reaching an immanent Infinite...'³⁵. He calls it 'as much organic as life'³⁶. However, Iqbal's treatment of thought in the domain of knowledge is much more profound and original than any of the Western epistemologists and philosophers³⁷. Boutroux agrees with Iqbal that religion is entirely conformable to reason in its wider sense as discussed above. He says like Iqbal that reason in this sense is

able to conceive 'a Being who is one and multiple--not like a material whole but like the continuous and moving infinity of a mind, of a person'³⁸. Iqbal may not agree with him in his total analogy, but he will, and has at places, admitted the possibility of the human thought reaching the Infinite. He stresses the need for a complementarity between the scientific attitude and the religious attitude, a need which Iqbal has emphasized over and over again.

3.2 Anglo American 'Philosophies of Spirit'

Among the contemporaries of Iqbal come under this category thinkers like the illustrious figure of James Ward (1843-1925); Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), an American disciple of Lotze like Ward; and Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884-1953), one of Bowne's successors in the American personalist school.

James Ward was the most important thinker as regards his impact on Iqbal. He was first a fellow (from 1875) and then a Professor of Philosophy (from 1897) at Trinity College, Cambridge, through the period when Iqbal was studying at Trinity for higher studies. As a result, Ward appears to have exerted one of the most direct and profound influences in determining the directions and main trends of Iqbal's thought; he may rightly be placed foremost among the Western progenitors of his thought. A comparative study of their respective systems will reveal the magnitude of impact which I am going to deal with briefly in this section.

Ward was' one of the most acute critics of naturalism and one of the most powerful defenders of

theism'³⁹, says John Macquarrie. He constructs a world-view in which the ultimate reality is "active Spirit"-- a surely vitalist position. He emphasizes upon concrete and whole experience, and condemns the abstract character of natural sciences, and like Iqbal, says that sciences are one-sided and fragmentary. The error of science, according to him, is that of 'ascribing objective existence to abstractions'⁴⁰. Again, like Iqbal Ward emphasizes the essentially practical and purposeful character of experience, in which conation is more fundamental than cognition. The theoretical subject is a bare abstraction from the organic unity of experience⁴¹. Of experience Ward says, 'in a word, it is life-- life as it is for the living individual'⁴². Ward's emphasis on concrete experience underlies his criticism of the mechanistic naturalism. Both Iqbal and Ward agree that naturalism fails because it concerns itself with a partial aspect of the concrete reality known in experience, and sets up this partial aspect as the whole of reality⁴³. Both assert that nature demands a spiritual interpretation. However, Ward holds that the requisite spiritual aspect is found in history; he claims that 'the historical is what we *understand* best and what concerns us most'⁴⁴. Only history can disclose to us a spiritual world of conative subjects striving for ends and realizing values'⁴⁵. For Iqbal, on the other hand, history is one of the three sources of knowledge amenable to man, the other two being Nature and "Qalb" i.e heart which is a kind of inner intuition or insight⁴⁶, he says. In other words, history, or for that matter any single source, alone cannot afford a complete knowledge of the ultimate reality.

Ward stresses the need for a spiritual interpretation of nature, which he believes, in company with Iqbal, is complementary to scientific interpretation. He says, "There is nothing in nature that is incompatible with a spiritualistic interpretation"⁴⁷. He presumes that nature is continuous and there are no gaps or leaps in it⁴⁸. This led both Ward and Iqbal to a doctrine of "panpsychism". Nature is teleological and there is some sort of rudimentary spiritual life even in the dead matter. This leads Ward to remark that "nature thus resolves into a plurality of conative individuals"⁴⁹. He, however, refuses to rest content with a pluralism and, like Iqbal, he moves to reconcile plurality of the selves with the unity of one reality which is God in the case of both. He argues that the unity and order in the world point to the doctrine of theism. He holds that God is at once the source of the spiritual world and the end towards which it moves.⁵⁰ In this connection Iqbal quotes from the Quran which describes God as 'the First and the Last,...⁵¹', that is, the beginning and the end. As said before, God is not only the source of everything, but also the destination to which each thing will return. Again he agrees with Iqbal that God is personal, and both immanent and transcendent (the doctrine of panentheism); that he has created free conative subjects and there by has imposed a certain limitation on himself, but this by no means involves his own diminution for by bestowing more freedom on his creatures he has enhanced his own greatness⁵². In the same vein Iqbal admits that 'the emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence

unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation on the freedom of the all inclusive Ego. But this limitation', he adds, 'is not externally imposed. It is born out of his own creative freedom...⁵³, They will both agree that men work together with God for the realization of his purpose, that is, men are co-workers with him: to use Iqbal's words, they are the 'participators of His life, power, and freedom'⁵⁴. Professor Ward also preached the doctrine of "meliorism" and held like Iqbal that men could better the world through love and their own concentrated effort; and in this mission, Iqbal adds, God is a helper to man, provided he takes the initiative⁵⁵. It may be noted that one distinct feature of the thought of both Ward and Iqbal is their reconciliation between absolutism and personalism, monism of the Hegelians and pluralism of the thinkers like Dr. McTaggart. This has bestowed immense depth and richness to their philosophical systems.

Borden Parker Bowne, also a contemporary of Iqbal and James Ward, thinks of the real as that which can act or be acted upon. He says, 'Things are distinguished from non-existence by this power of action and mutual determination⁵⁶'. Bowne goes on to add that only personal selves can satisfy this criterion of reality. Iqbal will endorse his point of view, may be with reservations, under the inspiration of the Quran, that the mark of a true self or reality is its capacity to respond to a call⁵⁷. Like Iqbal his thought pivots round the idea of 'personality' or egohood. He again tries to reconcile between the unity of God and the multiplicity of human selves. Reality for him is a system of persons related through God as the supreme

person'⁵⁸.-- a line of thought very much cognate to that of Iqbal for whom, as seen before, God is the Ultimate Ego while the finite egos follow from Him. However, Bowne resorts to the traditional proofs for the existence of God which Iqbal rejects in the beginning of his lecture on "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience,"⁵⁹ However, Bowne modifies the cosmological argument to prove the personal nature of God: he argues that the existence of persons is to be attributed to a cause which cannot by itself be less than personal, that is to say, to a supreme creative Person⁶⁰. He assigns, like Iqbal, a causal activity to God, and propounds a modified version of the teleological argument for the existence.

In his book *The Essence of Religion* Bowne discusses the relationship between God and man, God and the universe, and man and the universe. He says, 'Our God is not an absentee apart from the world in self-enjoyment, but he is present in the world, in life, in conscience and history, carrying on a great moral campaign for the conquest and training of the human will, and its establishment in righteousness';...⁶¹ The material world is dependent on the causal activity of God, on the one hand, and can be understood in relation to persons only, on the other. Finite persons, though creatures of God, he says, preserve 'a mutual otherness and relative independence'⁶². Like Iqbal he propounds a vitalist view of religion when he says that faith is attained not through speculation but through trust and obedience. For him religion is primarily

concerned with righteousness, that is, it is a moral activity.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman, an American heir to Bowne in the personalist school of thought, has followed Bowne's trend of thought in his system. Like Ward and Iqbal, he makes an appeal to experience as a whole, where fact is not disjoined from value, and where moral and religious experience is taken into account as well as natural science. His examination of experience leads him, like Iqbal, to the notion of God who is creative, supreme and personal; but unlike Iqbal, and in company with Ward, he is led to the concept of a finite or limited God. He follows Bowne's cosmological argument for God from the fact of personality to the supposition that there is "a cosmic creative person"⁶³. Again the concept of evolution in the world suggests 'a power that is achieving its ends in the face of what seems to be opposition'⁶⁴. Like Iqbal he goes on to believe that a God who is really involved in cosmic evolution must be one 'into whose very being time enters'.⁶⁵ He was, perhaps, one of the very few Western thinkers who conceived time as the reality of God rather than something external to him. How close to Iqbal who writes, 'The problem of time has always drawn the attention of Muslim thinkers and mystics. This seems to be due partly to the fact that, according to the 'Quran, the alternation of day and night is one of the greatest signs of God, and partly to the Prophet's identification of God with '*Dahr*' (time) in a well-known tradition referred to before'⁶⁶. Brightman draws the conclusion that such a God is not one of finished perfection, while⁶⁷ for Iqbal, on the

contrary, evolution does not any wise infringe on the perfection of God⁶⁸. Again Iqbal will not agree with him that there are passive as well as active elements in the divine nature; for Iqbal, God is all activity and perfection. In fact, Brightman thinks that a God who is involved in evolution cannot claim perfection and activity alone; he cannot have an unmixed nature.

Again, Brightman argues that since all existence exhibits conflict and duality, even divine existence must include struggle and victory over opposition. Iqbal will not agree with him, for this would be the position if God's creation was besides and outside of him, confronting him as an independent unity and limiting him.⁶⁹ He says, 'The world of matter,..., is not a stuff co-eternal with God, operated upon by Him from a distance as it were. It is, in its real nature, one continuous act...⁷⁰'; though by calling God the Self Iqbal admits that it 'combines the opposite attributes of change and permanence, and can thus be regarded as both constant and variable'⁷¹. Again in a truly Christian manner Brightman argues from religious experience to a God whose nature includes suffering, and redemption by a cross⁷². Iqbal will also argue from religious experience to an all-knowing, all-powerful God; not a God whose nature includes suffering, and he rejects the very idea of "redemption" as un-Islamic.

Brightman adds that God is not limited by anything external to himself, but by the "given" in his own nature. He holds that God increasingly masters the "given" in his own nature⁷³. Now this is something like the concept of 'meliorism' taught by Iqbal with certain

modifications. The latter agrees that God helps man in his mission of bettering the world, provided he (man) takes the initiative, as said before.

3.3 Ethical Theism and 'Philosophies of Spirit'.

Three prominent figures under this sub-head are William Ritchie Sorley (1855-1935), a professor at Cambridge 1900-1933 when Iqbal was a student there; Alfred Edward Taylor (1869-1945), a British idealist turned to spiritualist philosophy; and William George de Burgh (1866-1943), another British contemporary of Iqbal.

W.R. Sorley, most probably one of the teachers of Iqbal at Cambridge, agrees with Lotze that our point of departure should be moral experience. He reveals that he intends 'to inquire into the bearing of ethical ideas upon the view of reality as a whole'⁷⁴. He begins with the idea of 'value' given by moral experience. He agrees with Ward that "value" is taken into account in historical sciences, while completely left out in natural sciences. 'Individuality', he says, is much more exhibited in persons than in things, though in its completeness it belongs to reality as whole. Persons are the bearers of values. However, like Iqbal, he emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive approach than the one which natural science alone can afford. He holds that any complete view of reality must find room for the values as well as for the causal connections⁷⁵. Persons are as much a part of reality as things are. Sorley faces the problem of reconciling between the order of values and the order of causes. Naturalist philosophy cannot offer a solution in so far

as it ignores values, while idealism and spiritual philosophy can offer a whole range of solutions from pluralism to monism; it is theism which offers the completest solution by avoiding the extremes of pluralism and monism. I am sure, Iqbal will agree with him on this account, for he believes in a reconciliation between two realms and theism is the final truth⁷⁶. For both God is the bearer of values as well as the creator of the existent world; thus the requisite reconciliation is found in the person of God alone. However, Sorley is conscious of the difficulties involved in the solution. Unlike Iqbal, he finds it hard to reconcile God's goodness with the presence of evil in the world. This led him, like so many other Western thinkers, to the idea of a God limited by his own creation-- an extent to which Iqbal will never go with him. A true philosophy, Sorley believes, should be one which finds room for both values and facts. He says, 'if we are unable to reach a view of reality as a whole, then we have attained no philosophy'⁷⁷.

A.E. Taylor, a metaphysician best known as an authority on Plato, was strongly impressed by Bradley. He believes that in the concretely experienced world, facts and values are never separated. So ethics cannot be said to deal with values divorced from facts, he holds. Like Iqbal he believes that moral experience points for its completion beyond itself to religion⁷⁸. Moral life itself points to an eternal good. Taylor denies that man can attain the eternal good of himself. Unlike Iqbal who believed in the initiative of man, Taylor believes in 'the initiative of the eternal'⁷⁹ in the form of divine 'Grace'. Thus moral life finds

fulfilment in the life of religion. Like Kant, he bases 'immortality' of the self on moral grounds -- i.e. he is destined for an eternal good. However, unlike Iqbal, he believes in a natural theology, of God, grace and immortality⁸⁰. Like Ward and Taylor, Sorely was also impressed by history for its concreteness, and held that natural theology must be completed in a positive historical revelation⁸¹ -- a point on which he differs with Iqbal as said before.

W.G. de Burgh, like Iqbal and unlike his predecessors in the West, makes a clear distinction between religion and morality. Religion for him implies personal communion with God, whereas morality is possible even without a belief in an other-worldly order. However, he believes like Taylor that morality shows the need for completion in religion⁸². He holds in the Kantian fashion that morality shows certain antinomies such as the dualism of ethical principles, which cannot be resolved on the level of morality itself: 'Human actions are open to two different types of valuation, according as their motive is the sense of duty or the desire of good'⁸³. However, regarding the fulfilment of moral duty or the realization of the good, de Burgh is sceptical and pessimistic. He says, 'For all our striving, we remain to the end unprofitable servants'⁸⁴. Iqbal, on the other hand, was very optimistic and believed in the final triumph and attainment of the ultimate goal by man through efforts and deeds. The final goal according to him, is within the reach of man⁸⁵. Moral antinomies, de Burgh believes, are resolved in religion, in the idea of God. It is 'duty' which enables man to transcend moral realm.

He holds that our immediate duties lead us to the thought of universal duty as God's will for man⁸⁶. According to Iqbal, on the other hand, it is not only through the moral path that man reaches God, though morality is an aspect of all his legitimate efforts and strivings. Morality for him is one of the human activities.

His pessimistic position that it is not within man's power to achieve the final triumph with his personal efforts led de Burgh to the concept of "divine grace" and to the doctrine of the *virtus infusa* taught by St. Thomas Aquinas which springs from the love of God.⁸⁷ Iqbal, however, will agree that man cannot succeed in his mission without God's help and grace. Though laying so much emphasis on morality, de Burgh, like Iqbal concedes that the ethical approach needs to be supplemented by other approaches⁸⁸. In fact, reality is so concrete that any one approach can hardly suffice to do justice with it. What is unique in Iqbal is that religious experience, for him, is a highly concrete experience, which consists of cognitive, emotive, conative, and moral aspects or constituents.⁸⁹

3.4 Ethical Theism and Theology

Frederick Robert Tennant (1866-1957) a pupil of James Ward who was a Lecturer at Cambridge 1907-31 (perhaps the year when Iqbal had left Cambridge and shifted to Munich, Germany for his doctorate). John Macquarrie has described Tennant as a "philosophically-minded theologian"⁹⁰ whose main work was on the philosophical presuppositions of Christian theology where he attempted to show their

reasonableness. He taught "ethical theism" like his predecessors which involved three factors -- viz., God, soul, and the world. He says, 'God, man, and the world constitute a chord, and none of its three notes has the ring of truth without the accompaniment of the other two'⁹¹. Tennant adopts a strictly empirical method to establish this position, and here he fundamentally differs from Iqbal for whom 'dry' empiricism by itself cannot lead to truth or reality. He holds that the light should come from all the various sources, and not from any one single source, in order to have the knowledge of reality⁹². Even of Intuition (inner experience) Iqbal says that it is only one source of human knowledge. 'It is because of his recognition of all the sources of knowledge that Dr. Jamila desists from calling Iqbal an empiricist, a rationalist or an intuitionist'⁹³. Tennant infers from his position that there is no special faculty to provide a short-cut to the knowledge of reality. Iqbal also says of Intuition, 'We must not, however, regard it as a mysterious special faculty; it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word does not play any part'⁹⁴. In other words, for Iqbal intuition is whatever else it may be, at least a non-empirical way of knowledge.

Of God Tennant says that he comes first in the order of being, but is last in the order of knowing. Experience begins with the self and the world, the self implies a soul which is substantial, enduring and active⁹⁵. Here unlike Iqbal he believes in the 'Substance theory' of the soul. As we have said before, for Iqbal God is the first and the last in an

absolute sense, that is, in being and knowing both. He agrees with Iqbal that the world cannot be exhaustively described in mechanistic terms, but invites 'teleological' interpretation⁹⁶. He makes an appeal to a "wider teleology" rather than particular goals. Iqbal believes in a progressive type of teleology. He says, 'Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands'⁹⁷. Tennant does not make clear his notion of teleology, but for one thing, it does not appear to be progressive in the Iqbalian sense. He argues from the intelligibility of the world to human reason, the suitability of the environment to life and moral development, the aesthetic value of nature, and the inter-related organic structure of the whole to an intelligent and purposeful Creator⁹⁸. He advocates an ethical theism 'which takes the realization of personality and of moral values to be the *raison d'etre* of the world'⁹⁹. Iqbal will certainly agree with him on this point: for him also the integration of the ego and the realization of the good are the main purposes of human life and existence. Tennant used his "ethical theism," as a method of criticism against 'corrupt' aspects of theology. He believes like Iqbal in the 'reconstruction' of religious thought, though in their own respective religions. Again like him he rejects "predestination" (fatalism) as belittling personality in man and destructive of the personal ethical relation between God and man¹⁰⁰. He also rejects the traditional doctrine of "divine immutability"; for Iqbal

also God cannot be an "immutable" being. Again Tennant rejects the doctrine of the "original sin" on the ground that sin must be ethically conceived as 'moral imperfection for which an agent is, in God's sight, accountable'¹⁰¹. In this sense, the concept of "original sin" is self-contradictory. Iqbal, however, being a Muslim does not believe in this doctrine and the concept of "redemption". He rather rejects both of them.¹⁰²

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.58.
2. *Ibid.* Iqbal also understands ultimate reality in theistic, personal and ethical terms.
3. *Ibid.* Iqbal is very emphatic on this point when he says,
 'Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man' (*Reconstruction*, pp.71-72). God is the "Ultimate Ego" (*Ibid*, p.72).
4. *Ibid.* As said in the preceding chapter, Iqbal's main line of thought tends towards "panpsychism". He calls "physical organism" a 'colony of sub-egos' (*Ibid*, p.104)
5. *Ibid*, p.59.
6. *Ibid.* Iqbal fought against too much intellectualism and rationalism. He brought out the volitional nature of ego thus: 'The final act is not an intellectual act, but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego...(Ibid,p.198).
7. *Ibid.* Iqbal emphatically brings home the 'teleological' nature or reality through his criticism of Henri Bergson's view of "duration" (*Ibid*, pp.46-48, 52-55). According to him, reality being purely spiritual and rational, it has a teleological character. Again like the 'philosophers of spirit', he shows keen interest in natural science which for him is

supplementary to religious knowledge, as we have seen before.

8. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.60.
9. Page v.
10. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.198.
11. Page 180.
12. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.60.
13. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.198.
14. *Ibid*, p.2.
15. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.60.
16. *Ibid*.
17. *op.cit.*, p.64.
18. A.J.Arberry, *Javid-Nama* (an Eng. versified translation of Iqbal's Persian verse *Javid Namah*), p.57.
19. *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal* (Persian), [Payam-i-Mashriq] p.305/135
20. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p.97
21. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, pp.61-62
22. *Ibid*, p.62.
23. *Ibid*.
24. *The Great Problems*, p.96.
25. *Ibid*, p.216.
26. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.61.
27. Varisco, *op.cit.*, p.270.
28. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.62.
29. *Ibid*
30. *On the Contingency of the Laws of Nature*, p.4.
31. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.63.
32. *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, p.361.
33. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p.42.

34. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.63.
35. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.6.
36. *Ibid*, p.52.
37. See my book *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, ch. on "The Cognitive value of Religious Experience". pp. 185ff.
38. Boutroux, *op.cit.*, pp.393-94.
39. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.64.
40. *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol.II, p.66.
41. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.64.
42. Ward, *op.cit.*, p.111.
43. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
44. Ward, *op. cit.*, vol II, p. 280.
45. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
46. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p.15.
47. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p.20.
48. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.65.
49. Ward, *op.cit.*, p.21.
50. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.65.
51. *Reconstruction*, p.107.
52. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
53. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.79-80.
54. *Ibid*, p. 80.
55. *Ibid*, p.12.
56. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, p.40.
57. See last chapter of the book, footnote no. 81.
58. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-66.
59. *op.cit.*, pp.29-61.
60. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.66
61. Page 7, 254.
62. *Personalism*, p.277.
63. macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.67.

64. *The Problem of God*, p.126.
The tradition referred to reads 'Do not vilify time, for time is God. (لَا تَسْبُو الدَّهْرَ - إِنَّ الدَّهْرَ هُوَ اللَّهُ)' Iqbal has quoted this in his letter to K.G. Sayyidain, dt. 21.6.1936. See *Letters and Writings of Iqbal* ed. B.A. Dar [Iqbal Academy, P. 13]
65. *Ibid*, p.129.
66. *Reconstruction*, p.73.
67. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.67.
68. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.59-60.
69. *Ibid*, p.65.
70. *Ibid*, p.65.
71. *Ibid*, pp.66-67.
72. *Ibid*, p.95.
73. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.67.
74. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p.1.
75. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.68.
76. Iqbal did not say this overtly, but that seems to be the implication of his basic position, for as said before, he tries to reconcile between pluralism and monism, which is possible in the realm of theism only.
77. Sorely, *op.cit.*, p.500.
78. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.69.
79. *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol.I, pp.211ff.
80. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.70.
81. *Ibid*.
82. *Ibid*
83. *From Morality to Religion*, p.37. 84. *ibid*, p.67.
85. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.81.
86. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.71.

87. *Ibid*,p.71.
88. *Ibid*.
89. See my book, ch. on *The nature of Religious Experience*.
90. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.72.
91. Tennant, *Philosophical theology*, vol.II,p.259.
92. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.127.
93. See my book,p.189.
94. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.16.
95. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.72.
96. *Ibid*.
97. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.54.
98. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.72.
99. *Philosophical Theology*, *op.cit.*, p.258.
100. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.73.
101. Tennant, *The Concept of Sin*, p.245.
102. See my book for note on "Original Sin", pp.44ff.

Chapter Four

IQBAL AND NEO-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHERS

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4.1 Iqbal and Kant

When Iqbal was studying philosophy, Kant had a very potent influence in the fields of Epistemology and Metaphysics. He, in fact, laid down the fundamentals of knowledge on which modern Epistemology got its footings. Iqbal in the very beginning of his first lecture¹ endorsed the Kantian model of human knowledge thus: '... knowledge is sense-perception elaborated by understanding'². And again in the same lecture he brings out the conceptual nature of human knowledge thus: '... the character of man's knowledge is conceptual, and it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of Reality'³. Thus, human knowledge, in so far as it deals with 'Phenomena' (as stressed by Kant), is conceptual, i.e. involves concepts, and in the words of the Quran the superiority of man to other beings, including angels, lies in his capability to use concepts⁴. Again, what is really important in Iqbal is that according to him the model of all human knowledge, including the highest form of mystical or religious knowledge, is basically the same as the empirical knowledge⁵. This led him to reject the doctrine of patent 'Panthéism' to which the final goal of human experience is '*fana*', the abnegation of one's own 'individuality' and 'personality' in the Individual and Person of the highest Being; Iqbal affirms '*baqa*' as the final end of all human life and religion, as we have said before. In his model of knowledge, as that of Kant, the situation demands a necessary trio of elements, namely, (i) the subject, (ii) object, and (iii)

the relationship of 'sensing' to use a term from Spinoza. The same trio is involved even in the highest form of human knowledge. This position of Iqbal is really original.

Iqbal regrets that, like al-Ghazzali, Kant 'failed to see that thought, in the very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude'⁶. Kant's analysis of human thought or reason in his famous *First Critique* led him to the position that 'human understanding is limited to the phenomena of sensory experience'⁷, and was forced by his own premises to the impossibility of "rational metaphysics"; though he tried on practical and moral grounds to re-establish the ideas of God, freedom and immortality in his *Critique of Practical Reason* as working hypotheses having their utility for practical purposes. He failed to establish them on purely rational grounds or on the basis of any direct experience of man. Iqbal regrets that this great genius failed to capitalize on his great findings due to the limitations imposed on his thought by the Western "climate of opinion" within which he had to move and think. He puts forward two very potent pleas against Kant's agnostic position regarding Reality: (i) in the face of the more recent scientific developments the case for rational theology is not so hopeless and (ii) 'Kant's verdict can be accepted only if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible'⁸, says Iqbal. Imam al-Ghazzali undertook the same mission of curbing the excesses of reason centuries before Kant; but unlike the latter, he sought positive aspect of knowledge in mystic experiences which rendered the

knowledge of reality possible⁹. Iqbal, however, partly agreeing with both, surpasses them in his view of knowledge of Reality when he holds that it is not possible through any one single source only; knowledge of the real, according to him, is possible through all the three sources amenable to man, viz., Nature, History, and 'Qalb' (i.e., inner intuition), as said before. This renders his view of knowledge much more comprehensive and concrete.

Kant in his later two Critiques, *The Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Critique of Judgement*, laid ample stress on the importance of value. In his former Critique he concentrated on the Good Will as the Highest Good, while in the later Critique his discussion centered round the category of the Beautiful¹⁰ and the Sublime: the two great values in human life. Lotze and the neo-Kantians mostly based their thought on the axiological aspects of Kant's theory. Lotze held that our ultimate convictions are of three Kinds: (i) logical necessities, (ii) facts of experience, and (iii) the determinations of value¹¹. For him these convictions are all independent; whereas, as seen, before, for Iqbal values, facts and logical necessities all form part of the organic whole, and none can be understood independently. Both Kant and Iqbal agree that respect for humanity is one of the highest human values as well as the principle of conduct. Although respect for humanity is one of the chief subjects discussed by Iqbal, both in his prose and poetry, he reproduces Kant's second formula in his lectures when he writes: 'The principle of the ego-sustaining deeds is respect for the ego in myself as well as in others'¹².

Kant and Iqbal differ substantially on the concepts of space and time. Iqbal would certainly agree with him that we should approach them subjectively, and Kant was not without his Sufi predecessors in the World of Islam in this regard. But for Kant both space and time were the "Forms of Sensibility"¹³, the moulds which organize sense-data into rounded-off objects. He described them as both ideal and subjective. However, like other Westerners he takes them in a unilateral sense¹⁴. Iqbal, though taking both space and time subjectively, treats of them as veritable "realities"; for him they are the aspects of divine life, as said before. He agrees with Bergson that time, in its real sense, is the stuff of which the reality is made¹⁵. One can refer to the saying of the Holy Prophet quoted before, according to which God is Time. Again, Iqbal rejects the unilateral treatment of Kant and his followers. He agrees with the Muslim scholars Jala-ud-din Dawani (1427-1502) in his book *Zouira* and Shaikh Fakhr-ud-din al-Iraqi (d. 1287), the sufi poet of Baghdad, that time and space are both "multi-lateral". They conceive 'infinite varieties of time', says Iqbal, 'relative to the varying grades of being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality'¹⁶. Among the Muslim theologians and thinkers it was Imam Fakhr-ud-din al-Razi (543/1149-606/1209) who discussed time on multilateral basis in his book *Eastern Discussions*¹⁷. Again, they have conceived the concept of space on parallel multi-lateral basis, relative to the nature of the being or sphere to which it belongs. A similar view of time was advocated by Mir Muhammad Baqir;¹⁸ especially his view of real time is instructive.

However, as said before, Iqbal conceived time and space as the interpretations which thought puts on the creative energy of God. Thus, space and time both are subjective according to him and in this respect he agrees with Kant.

Regarding the question of 'immortality', Iqbal appreciates Kant's moral argument. He urges that in modern times the line of argument for personal immortality is on the whole ethical. Iqbal says, 'With Kant immortality is beyond the scope of speculative reason: it is a postulate of practical reason, an axiom of man's moral consciousness'¹⁹. According to Kant, man pursues the supreme good which comprises both virtue and happiness, the two heterogenous notions. As their confluence is not possible in the narrow span of an individual's ephemeral life, we are, says Kant, driven to postulate immortal life and the existence of God; it is the demand of justice that virtue and happiness must go together. Iqbal remarks on this position, 'it is not clear, however, why the consummation of virtue and happiness should take infinite time, and how God can effectuate the confluence between mutually exclusive notions'²⁰. However, Kant's theory implies that immortality is the lot of every individual human being (being a moral being); while as we have said before, Iqbal, like the great Persian sufi poet Jalal-ud-Din Rumi (604/1207)-672/1273) believes in the doctrine of "earned immortality"²¹, a concept not known to the West till as late as Dr. McTaggart. Again, for Kant and Iqbal both 'Self' is a reality; Kant calls it "*noumenon*" which is the subject of "rational psychology". And "rational

psychology" according to him was impossible. Iqbal will agree with him on the unintelligibility of the self when he admits that 'its reality is too profound to be intellectualized'²². However, Iqbal takes refuge in the sentimental (intuitive) approach and holds that we can reach the self in us through direct "feeling" (i.e., the feeling of 'I-amness', as he calls it²³) which is both "ultimate"²⁴ and "spontaneous"²⁵. Thus for Iqbal 'self' is not wholly unknowable as claimed by Kant. Also, both Kant and Iqbal reject the "simple substance theory" of the self, and, what is interesting, Iqbal follows his argument to show that self need not be a "simple substance" in order to be immortal.²⁶

Iqbal appreciates Kant's rejection of the Ontological argument for the existence of God. He uses his patent example of imagined one hundred thalers to prove that mere idea of a thing or being nowise leads to its existence²⁷. This argument is well popular with the students of modern philosophy who have studied this German genius. His criticism of the argument under review is based on his criticism of Descartes's fundamental position: 'Cogito ergo sum' (his famous saying which is also his basic philosophical proposition). Iqbal states his criticism in his lectures thus, 'The "I think" which accompanies every thought is, according to Kant, purely a condition of thought, and the transition from a purely formal condition of thought to ontological substance is logically illegitimate'²⁸. He endorses his line of argument as thoroughly convincing and may rightly be called as final against any line of thought following the pattern of the Cartesian first principle.

However, what is fundamentally different between Kant and Iqbal is the former's rejection of metaphysics as an impossibility. It was one of the ultimate conclusions drawn by Kant on the basis of his premises in the *First Critique*. He rejected the possibility of "rational cosmology", "rational psychology" and "rational theology" which ultimately led him to the rejection of all metaphysical knowledge. But his conclusions were based on his initial supposed bifurcation between "phenomenon" and "Noumenon", and that between, what he called, "sensible intuition" and "intellectual intuition",²⁹ which led him to the dogmatic conclusion that the "Noumenon" was unknowable to the human reason. Iqbal, on the other hand, as said before, was led to emphasize the need for a rational or metaphysical basis for religion. He says, 'Science may ignore as a rational metaphysics; indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself'³⁰. Thus for Iqbal what religion lacks today is a metaphysical foundation, and herein lies the fundamental difference between Kant and Iqbal.

4.2 Neo-Kantian Philosophers

The famous historian of philosophy Wilhelm Windelband (1848- 1915) dates the revival of Kantianism and the emergence of the movement called 'neo-Kantianism' around 1865 under the special impact of Lotze. Macquarrie remarks, 'By the beginning of the present century, both neo-Kantian philosophy and

Ritschlian theology were just about at the peak of their development,...'³¹ incidentally the time when Iqbal was studying in Europe, particularly in Germany. It is not improbable that Iqbal came into contact with Prof. Windelband during his visit to Heidelberg where the latter taught about the same time (i.e. 1903-1915). Though a large variety of thinkers come within the pale of neo-Kantianism, they all have one important feature in common -- i.e. they show a decided ethical bias. They further share in (i) retaining Kantian disjunctions between knowledge and faith, fact and value, the theoretical and the practical;³² (ii) laying stress upon the 'practical' thus sharing 'activist' tendencies of the philosophies of spirit;³³ and (iii) rejecting metaphysics³⁴ and thus forerunning the later positivists of various shades. As a natural result, their systems are ethically, rather than metaphysically, founded.

Windelband, a German contemporary of Iqbal who, as said above, might have come into contact with Iqbal during his stay in Germany for his doctoral thesis. Primarily famous for his work on the history of philosophy, he was the chief representative of the Baden school which found the main problems of philosophy in axiology. It may be noted that there is an axiological undercurrent in Iqbal's own thought, which may not be traceable to the Baden school, but which betrays an influence of Kant and Lotze. Windelband regarded the history of philosophy as itself a philosophical discipline; Iqbal did the same but decidedly under the influence of the great Spanish Muslim historiographer Ibn Khaldun, the author of the

renowned *Muqaddimah*³⁵. John Macquarrie remarks that Windelband shifted to neo-Kantianism because, he held, it could 'reconcile the implications of nineteenth-century natural science with "the demands of the heart"³⁶', how like Iqbal who also sought as a missionary to reconcile between science and religion, matter and spirit, knowledge and faith-- for which he found inspiration in the Quran³⁷. Windelband, however, like Iqbal, seeks to reconcile between the practical and the theoretical interests in man; though in his truly Western spirit, and unlike Iqbal, he first bifurcates them and then seeks to bring them closer, a task which is bound to miscarry.

Like Kant, Windelband's approach is basically volitional. He holds that all knowledge is bound up with willing; Iqbal's approach as we have seen, is also volitional, but it is by no means one-sided in which the other aspects of the human nature are ignored. For him man is a concrete and harmonious whole of which will is only one, by no means the predominant one³⁸. Windelband treats values on the lines of knowledge. Just as knowledge is a kind of 'relation' between the subject and the object, so value, according to him, again consists of a relation between a subject and an object to which the subject directs himself.³⁹ Thus, he has advocated a volitional theory of value. He holds that there should be a "logical consciousness in general"⁴⁰ whose demands are satisfied by truth, to account for the universal validity of truth; similarly there should be a "logical consciousness" in general⁴¹ to ensure universally valid ethical and aesthetic values. Like Iqbal, in his case the historical stands between

the natural, on the one hand, and spiritual or normative, on the other⁴². He says that in search of absolute values 'it seems necessary to pass beyond to historical manifestations of the entire human mind to some *normative* consciousness, for which these values are values⁴³'. However, for him the notion of a sovereign order of values is only a postulate and not a metaphysical truth. Iqbal will agree with him regarding 'a transcendent realm of values' which brings us to the theme of religion.

Like Iqbal, religion is not a value among other values, according to Windelband. It is rather concerned with 'the quest for a final synthesis'⁴⁴ -- an approach which is purely Kantian. For Iqbal also religion is not an activity among other activities, nor is it to be identified with any single aspect of the human nature; 'it is an expression of the whole man⁴⁵', says he. He, however, identified the "normative consciousness" with God or the holy, conceived as a transcendent reality in which all values are realized.⁴⁶ Iqbal will not agree with this identification which smacks of Jungian fourth aspect of Godhead. Since God is not conceived as a Person by Windelband, he faces the difficulties of taking him for 'the single principle of all things'⁴⁷. Again he conceives that 'will' needs the duality of fact and value as the condition of its activity⁴⁸, which leads him to approve of a state which must be short of fulfilment. For Iqbal there is no duality in will, and therefore the final stage of achievement by man must be the state of consummate fulfilment of all desire and purpose. It will not be a state of inactivity or passivity as erroneously thought by Windelband, but rather a

state of pure activity and bliss-- the state called in religious terminology the "Paradise": Heaven is not a holiday, says Iqbal. It 'is the joy of triumph over the forces of disintegration'⁴⁹. He will not agree with Windelband that the problem of religion is insoluble. Windelband says, of the religious problem, 'it is the sacred mystery, marking the limits of our nature and our knowledge'⁵⁰. This position is typical of those who maintain that normal experience is the only genuine form of human experience. To Iqbal, as seen before, reality is knowable not through empirical experience, but through, what is called mystic or religious experience which, according to him, is as genuine and cognitive as our everyday normal experience.⁵¹

Most of the representatives of the neo-Kantian school find justification for religion in its ethical content; they virtually subordinate it to ethics. For Iqbal, on the other hand, religion possesses an ethical aspect, like other aspects, but is not reducible to ethics or any ethical content; it is a system of concepts and practices which embraces the whole being of an individual, determining his thoughts, actions as well as emotions; it also colours his moral attitudes. It is, says Iqbal, an expression of his whole self. Iqbal will surely agree with Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) that religion is not a theoretical belief that the Kingdom of God is coming, but a practical belief in the Kingdom⁵². But he will not agree with him that such a 'practical belief' means only 'acting as if by our action the kingdom could be brought into being'⁵³. Iqbal was a meliorist who believed in a positive manner that the kingdom of God, as envisaged by him, could

be, and would in the end be, brought into being by the human efforts, and of course with the help of God⁵⁴. For him, unlike Vaihinger, it is not an hypothetical proposition, but a factual statement which is gradually finding its verification with the progress of human thought and understanding. Vaihinger, in fact, was a staunch advocate of the philosophy of 'as if'. Iqbal, on the contrary, advocated a categorical philosophy of religion in which religious entities are 'facts' and religious statements are 'factual' statements⁵⁵.

Another of Iqbal's German contemporaries, Harald Hoffding (1843-1931), discusses the mutual relationship between scientific explanation and religious explanation. He holds that religion satisfies man's quest for knowledge as well as his other spiritual needs. He maintains that religion offers an explanation both of particular events and of the world as whole by referring everything to God as the single principle⁵⁶. Science offers an explanation of particular events, but no explanation at all is offered for the world as a whole. According to him, the scientific way of explanation displaces the religious way, though still believing that the two ways are conciliable. Unlike Iqbal, for him both explanations are different from each other, and they aim at different kinds of unity. Iqbal, however, believes 'the religious and the scientific processes, though involving different methods, are identical in their final aim. Both aim at reaching the most real⁵⁷'. Again, unlike Iqbal, Hoffding holds that God stands over against the world. He also holds that religion cannot be justified as explaining anything.⁵⁸ Here he starts contradicting himself.

Further, he thinks that the intellectual element has a very subordinate place in religion. How different from Iqbal who assigns a very important focal place to thought-- of course, not to thought in its ordinary sense but in its non-discursive capacity.⁵⁹ In the sphere of religion, explanation is displaced by 'evaluation' according to Hoffding. Consequently he declares that 'the conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion' which he conceives at par with the conservation of energy in the physical world. And the principle of the conservation of value is identified with God.⁶⁰ Hoffding appears to have subordinated religion to ethics when he says that discovery and production of value belongs to ethics, while religion is only concerned with the conservation of value; so much so that even dogmas and myths of religion are taken for symbols of the principle of conservation⁶¹. Here again Iqbal will not agree with him; for him, as said before, ethical aspect is only one of the aspects of our religious life, and religion can never be subordinated to any such activity or discipline. For him religion is a concrete attitude to life and the Unseen which colours the whole life of man. However, Hoffding believes like Iqbal that 'Faith', however conceived, dispels pessimism in man, and gives him courage and optimism.

4.3 Ritschlianism in Europe and America

The school takes its nomenclature after the name of Albrecht Ritschl, who began as an Hegelian, but came to reject metaphysics as a distorting influence for religion and theology⁶². He held, unlike Iqbal, that religious assertions were not to be taken as

"disinterested statements of fact," but as "value-judgements"⁶³. Though basically a positivist, he recognizes 'mysteries in the religious life, but when anything is and remains a mystery, I say nothing about it'⁶⁴. He also made rigid bifurcations between knowledge and faith, fact and value, the theoretical and the practical after the fashion of the patent neo-Kantians. He was basically in the company of Kant and Lotze. A theological school emerged in Europe to apply his basic principles in the field of theology.

Ritschlian theology had its inception in the beginning of the present century with the writings of Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922) in Germany. Like the neo-Kantians, he rejects metaphysics and regrets that religion and metaphysics have been confused in the past. How unlike Iqbal for whom religion needs a rational foundation which only metaphysics can provide. Herrmann holds in *Systematic Theology* that religious dogmas are the result of the said confusion which must be abandoned. Now, Iqbal also believes that religion is neither dogma, nor yet ritual; it is rather a genuine human experience⁶⁵. However, he admits the utility of "dogmatic side" of religion, for a complete elimination of dogma from the sacred record led Germany to the utilitarian view of morality, and thus rationalism completed the reign of unbelief'⁶⁶. Herrmann admits that God reveals himself in the general religious experience of mankind, but then, unlike Iqbal, he shifts to the Christian doctrine of the Christ as God, and believes that it is through the person of the Christ that we arrive at God⁶⁷. He lays exclusive emphasis on the "inner life" of the Christ

which for him is the source of all religion. However, he holds like Iqbal that we experience this "inner life" as directly today as the first disciples of the Christ did⁶⁸. Iqbal would also believe that the Quran should be revealed on a true believer as it was revealed on the Holy Prophet himself⁶⁹. Iqbal will agree with him that metaphysics fails to establish the reality of God⁷⁰ which is assured on the ground of the communion with God (through the Christ in the case of Herrmann)⁷¹. Like Iqbal again, he does not believe that the "communion" is mystical in the sense of an exclusively "inner" experience of an individual; they both assign objectivity to it -- Hermann through the historical person of the Christ, while Iqbal holds that it is to be achieved through 'the purification of experience'⁷² as in the case of other human experiences. Iqbal's approach to religion is, thus, much more scientific and positive than any of these Western thinkers and theologians.

Theodore Halring (1848-1928), the next German Ritschlian, believes in the 'self-manifestation of God' in his book *The Christian Faith*⁷³, a view very similar to the doctrine of '*wahdat-ush-shuhud*'⁷⁴ taught by many Muslim sufis and by Iqbal. He refutes the immanentist tendencies in the Ritschlian thinkers who subordinated questions of fact to judgements of value, and holds that God is 'a power which transcends our consciousness and is independent of it'⁷⁵. Man cooperates with God, he says like Iqbal 'in the task of realizing the kingdom of God'⁷⁶. In his thought, however, like most of his predecessors and contemporaries, the Christian ideas dominate. Among

the Ritschlians it was Julius Wilhelm Kaftan (1848-1926) who assigned an important place to mysticism (like Iqbal). Again he does not subscribe to that 'merely ethical, immanentist view of religion which was characteristic of many of the neo-Kantian philosophers'⁷⁷. In his famous book *The Truth of the Christian Religion* he maintains that 'in religion it is not theory that is the essential matter, but feeling and will'⁷⁸. Faith, he adds, carries its own knowledge, i.e. the Knowledge of God. Here Iqbal will hardly find any reason to differ with him as regards the practical nature of religion: for he says that the ultimate aim of the ego is to *be* something, not to *see* something.⁷⁹ Kaftan, though rejecting the old dogmas, believes that 'the Church cannot be without dogma'⁸⁰ and he visualizes a new kind of dogma. Iqbal also recognizes some place for dogma in religion for, he fears, with the elimination of dogma came the utilitarian view of morality' in Germany and 'thus rationalism completed the reign of unbelief'⁸¹. Kaftan, however, tries somehow to reconcile the traditional Christian doctrine with a rational view of religion. Again, for him the Kingdom of God is 'not merely an ethical ideal to be realised *within the world*, but as a transcendent reality *above the world*'⁸². According to Iqbal, on the other hand, the kingdom of God has to be realized on the earth. As he wrote to Nicholson, by the Kingdom of God he means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth'⁸³. In other words, the Kingdom of God is a social concept or ideal which has to be realised on this very earth; it is a kind of human

society which may be called 'ideal' in the present state of social development. It is something within the reach of man in his earthly abode. In fact, the kingdom of God is the phrase used for that ideal society which can be founded on the Islamic principles of equality, solidarity, and social justice. Such a society is realizable and attainable by man. What is significant in the Ritschlian theology is the focal place its adherents assign to the doctrine of the Kingdom of God which, as said before, has much importance for Iqbal also.

Though primarily a German movement, Ritschlianism found its representatives in America also, besides finding advocates in Britain. In America we have the prominent names of H.R. Niebuhr who wrote *The Kingdom of God in America*, and Henry Churchill King (1858-1934), perhaps the greatest advocate of the theology of Ritschl in his own country. He was keenly interested in the philosophy of Lotze and the theology of Ritschl. He brought in the concepts of "reverence for "personality" and "the primacy of the personal"⁸⁴, but "personality" in his system was not so much a metaphysical concept as it was the source and principle of value. For Iqbal also it was not a matter of metaphysical interest; it was rather a matter of direct apprehension and personal experience,⁸⁵ as said before, a feeling of "I-amness". Both King and Iqbal will agree that religion is the most potent way to noble living. As King says in his typical Christian way, the 'love for Christ in a person has, as a matter of fact, proved the mightiest of historical motives to noble living'⁸⁶. King understands by the Christian phrase that 'Christ was at one with the Father in a moral and spiritual sense' that

'Christ was absolutely unique in his perfect response to the will of God'⁸⁷. Iqbal will agree with him because prophethood means that, i.e. in Islam it means a perfect submission to the will of God-- rather this is what the word 'Islam' means. Again like Iqbal he wishes, and rather strives, to bring out the social import of religion (Christianity in his case); the Ritschlian idea of the Kingdom of God 'reappears in King's interest in the relation of theology to the social consciousness'-⁸⁸ - how like Iqbal who also interpreted the Kingdom as a 'society' of more or less unique individuals'. Thus, both King and Iqbal emphasize the social bearing of the religion.

Notes and References

1. *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (ed) Dr. Javid Iqbal (Lahore: Ashraf, 1978).
2. *Ibid*, p. 12.
3. *Ibid*, p.13.
4. *Ibid*, p. 13.
5. *Contributions to Iqbal's Thought*, edited by the author. See his own chapter on "Iqbal's Philosophy of knowledge".
6. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.6-7.
7. John Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, (London: SCM Press, rev.ed. 1981), p. 75.
8. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.182.

9. See my article "Mission of al-Ghazzali, Kant and Iqbal", pb. *The Pakistan Times, Lahore*, dated 28.10.1978
10. In Kant, *The Critique of Judgement* (Eng. Tr. by I.c. Meredith), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, rep. 1978.
11. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.75.
12. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.119.
13. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, (Eng. Tr.) N.K.Smith, "Transcendental Aesthetic", [London: Macmillan, 1963], pp.65ff.
14. Western approach to all subjects is mostly unilateral. Their only difference lies in accepting or rejecting a position; they seldom approach a problem on more than one planes.
15. *Creative Evolution*, (Eng. Tr.) Arthur Mitchell, chapter on "Duration".
16. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.75.
17. English rendering of al-Razi's famous book (*المباحثه الشرقيه*) Hyderabad 1924.
18. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.76.
19. *Ibid*, p.112.
20. *Ibid*, p.113.
21. *Ibid*, p.119.
22. *Ibid*, p.98.
23. *Ibid*, p.56.
24. *Ibid*, p.98.
25. *Ibid*, p.106.
26. *Ibid*, p.101.
27. *Ibid*, p.30.
28. *Ibid*, p.101.

29. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, p.268.
30. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.2.
31. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.76.
32. *Ibid.* Iqbal did not believe in disjunctions between facts and values, knowledge and faith, practical and theoretical; to him they formed one single organic whole.
34. *Ibid.* Though an activist, Iqbal did not lay predominant stress on the practical at the expense of theoretical; in him they blend together in a balanced state.
35. Translated into English by Franz Rosenthal, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958), in two volumes.
36. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.77.
37. Iqbal, *Reconstruction* pp.9-10.
38. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.95f.
In calling man 'individual' and 'unique' Iqbal has implicitly brought home this important fact.
39. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.78.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, p.79.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *An Introduction to Philosophy*, pp.215-16.
44. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.79.
45. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.2.
46. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.79.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.123.
50. Windelband, *op.cit.*, p.258

51. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.185. Also see my book *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, Part II, chapters I & III.
52. Macquarrie, *op.cit.* 82.
53. *Ibid*
54. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.82: 'meliorism' is the view, according to Iqbal, 'which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces....
55. See my book *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, *Ibid*, pp.89-90
56. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.82
57. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.195-96
58. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.83.
59. My book *op.cit.*, pp.192 ff.
60. *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp.10, 384.
61. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.83.
62. *Ibid*, p.76.
63. *Ibid*
64. *Justification and Reconciliation*, p.607, n.1.
65. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.189.
66. *Ibid*, p.5.
67. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.85.
68. *Ibid*
69. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.181.
70. *Ibid*, pp.28-31.
71. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.85.
72. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.196.
73. Page 228.
74. 'Wahdat-ush-Shuhud' is the doctrine that the Universe and everything in it is the manifestation of the same being, i.e. God.
75. Haering, *op.cit.*, p.26.

76. *The Ethics of the Christian Life*, p.4.
77. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.87.
78. Vol.I p.8.
79. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.198.
80. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.87.
81. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.5.
82. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
83. Arberry, *Javid-Nama* (an Eng. Tr. of Iqbal's Persian verse with the same title), intr.p.11.
84. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.90.
85. *Reconstruction*, Ch.IV on 'The Human Ego--- His Freedom and Immortality'.
86. *The Ethics of Jesus*, p.19.
87. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.90.
88. *Ibid*, p.91.

Chapter Five

IQBAL AND NATURALISM IN RELIGION

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5.1 Positivism and Naturalism

The astonishing advancements and achievements of science since the later part of the nineteenth century could not fail to attract the envy of the experts working in other fields of knowledge. Even the theologian and the philosopher could not escape it. Consequently it came to be claimed that 'the natural sciences should have a greater part, or a definitive part, in shaping our philosophical ideas'¹. The term 'Positivism' is especially associated with the name of the French philosopher August Comte who distinguished three stages in human thinking: viz., (i) *the theological stage*, at which events are referred to divine agency; (ii) *the metaphysical stage*, at which they are referred to speculative causes; and (iii) *the positive stage*, which does not take us outside of observable and measurable phenomenon.² The last stage marks the highest development of human intellect. The positivist theories either reject any concept of 'supra-sensible' reality, may it be mind or spirit or any other denomination, or reduce it to a mere 'epiphenomenon'; in either case it loses its original and independent entity. Again, positivism accounts for higher stages of development in terms of lower stages, i.e., retrospectively and not prospectively like the idealists. However, positivism and naturalism do not exclude some account of religion, or even some appreciation of religion. Comte, for instance, put up a form of religion in which man replaces God as the object of worship. Again Spencer sought to reconcile science and religion by assigning to religion the realm of the unknowable.

Religion is treated by the naturalists as a natural phenomenon, at least in part a natural phenomenon, which should be studied as such, they hold.³

Among the representatives of this line of thought we have a number of scientists turned philosophers. Their approach is in the main empirical and non-spiritual. They are a variety of thinkers, including biologists, physicist, anthropologists, and psychologists. Some of them are Ernst Mach (1838-1916), of Vienna; Karl Pearson (1857-1936) an English scientist; Ernst Haeckel (1838-1919), E.B. Tylor, J.G. Frazer, and Salomon Reinach-- all contemporaries of Iqbal and showing keen interest in metaphysical and theological problems. Being basically scientists, their approach is naturalistic, although their account of philosophical and religious concepts is chiefly scientific. Thus Pearson in his book *The Ethic of Freethought* says regarding the religion, 'The pursuit of knowledge is the true worship of man-- the union between finite and infinite, the highest pleasure of which the human mind is capable'⁴. Again, Ernst Haeckel calls his system 'monism' and rejects all differentiation between God and nature, soul and body, or spirit and matter. In his view, there is a single substance which manifests itself both as matter and energy or body and spirit⁵. Iqbal, too, stresses upon the unity of mind and body, though basing his position on the fundamental unity of Islam which 'is at once a religion, a social movement, and a way of life. It, therefore, cannot countenance any duality of the spiritual and the temporal. Matter and soul are not two different entities, but different aspects of the same

reality'⁶. Again, Iqbal will agree with him that in the course of evolution the rudimentary psychical character of substance gradually advances to consciousness, though he will not agree that it is a purely natural phenomenon. Moreover, though life and consciousness evolve from matter (which Haeckel calls like Iqbal rudimentary psychical substance)⁷, life for Iqbal is 'a unique phenomenon and the concept of mechanism is inadequate for its analysis'⁸. Iqbal, thus, emphasizes 'the primacy of life'⁹. Of the consciousness he says, '... Consciousness is a variety of the purely spiritual principle of life which is not a substance, but an organizing principle, a specific mode of behaviour essentially different to the behaviour of an externally worked machine'¹⁰. Thus, though evolving from the same root, life and consciousness are "emergents" of a unique kind.

Again, Iqbal and Haeckel reject both materialism and spiritualism ; however, Haeckel's 'monism' is much closer to materialism in so far as he regards 'spirit' and 'energy' as synonyms, while Iqbal's monistic position is, as we have seen before, much closer to 'panpsychism' of the Wardian type. On the basis of his purely scientific premises, Haeckel rejects the concept of an independent, transcendent God, freedom and immortality-- the three religious notions which play a vital role in Iqbal's religious thought. Haeckel argues that these three are based on a 'mistaken dualism'. There can be no God apart from the universe: he says that an invisible God who thinks, speaks and acts would be a "gaseous vertebrate"¹¹, an impossible conception. How unlike Iqbal who believes in a personal,

transcendent God who thinks, speaks and acts, and enters into intrapersonal relationships with man and other creatures. again unlike Iqbal, Haeckel advocates a 'monistic and deterministic cosmos' in which there is no room for 'the immortality or the soul or freedom of the will'¹². Regarding God his position is pantheistic for in his system God is identified with nature', Iqbal, as we have seen before, advocated a 'panentheistic' position, admitting to God both immanence and transcendence.

5.2 Anthropology and Religion

The interest shown by anthropologists in religious questions betrayed itself into two directions, namely, a comparative study of human institutions and the discovery of link between some of the beliefs and practices of advanced societies with those of primitive groups. Such studies have an important bearing on our understanding of the religious beliefs and practices. Consequently, where they have shed ample light on the nature and evolution of some very important religious beliefs and practices, they have also undermined the very foundations of these beliefs and practices, and have paved a way to naturalistic conclusions.

In this category we have Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917), a British anthropologist and a contemporary of Iqbal, who was a professor of Anthropology at Oxford 1896-1909 including the period when Iqbal was studying in Europe. He may rightly be called the originator of Anthropology in Europe as a discipline of study. He wrote *PRIMITIVE CULTURE*, one of the earliest books on the subject. Tylor's two

basic assumptions will be acceptable to Iqbal, though with certain reservations and modifications. He will agree with him that human culture--including knowledge, art, religion, custom and the like--has its laws which may be scientifically studied, reason being that we find in culture as in nature 'the uniform action of uniform causes'¹³. Iqbal, however, assigns partial uniformity to culture as well as to nature. History he conceives' as a continuous movement in time,... a genuinely creative movement and not a movement whose path is already determined'¹⁴. Even ultimate reality, which is manifested in nature, appears in a fresh glory every moment, says the Quran¹⁵. Anyhow there is an element of uniformity which can be studied scientifically, as said by Tylor. Iqbal will accede his second assumption that the various grades of culture found in the human race can be exhibited as stages in a process of development or evolution¹⁶. Iqbal emphasizes the same point very strongly when he critically examines Spengler's views in his book the Decline of the West where his main thesis is 'that each culture is a specific organism, having no, point of contact with cultures that historically precede or follow it.'¹⁷ Iqbal rejects his discontinuous theory of cultures in favour of the continuity theory as advocated by anthropologists and historians like Robert Briffault and E.B.Tylor. Tylor holds as an anthropologist that religion grew out of 'animism' -- the belief in spiritual beings. He treats 'animism' as the minimal condition of religion. Higher religions and modern philosophies, he believes, have arisen out of "the matrix of primitive animism"¹⁸. This version,

however, is against the spirit of Islamic teachings and, therefore, cannot be acceptable to Iqbal who believes in the spontaneous and revealed basis of true religion which has not evolved from any other system or practice.

According to Tylor, superiority of religion lies in its ethical ideas. Higher religion needs reformation because 'there are "survivals" which have outlived their usefulness: he says that the science of culture is essentially a reformer's science'¹⁹. Iqbal also undertakes 'reconstruction' of religious thought in Islam to eliminate alien ideas and overtones and also because, he regrets, religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary during the last five hundred years²⁰. However, Iqbal will not agree with Tylor that anthropology can help in the task of reformation of religion.

James George Frazer (1854-1941), a British anthropologist and a contemporary of Iqbal, best known for his book *The Golden Bough* which discusses man's progress from savagery to civilization with the place of religion in it. He discerns three stages in the mental development of mankind: viz, magic, religion and science²¹. These stages are purely chronological and have nothing to do with the three religious stages discerned by Iqbal. Frazer pertinently remarks that 'religion, regarded as an explanation of nature, is displaced by science'²². Now this far is true; but it involves a misconception regarding the respective spheres and functions of science and religion. In this regard Iqbal's approach is more faithful and sincere

when he says, 'In the domain of science we try to understand its meanings in reference to the external *behaviour* of reality; in the domain of religion we take it as representative of some kind of reality and try to discover its meaning in reference mainly to the inner *nature* of that reality'²³. However, as said before, both are complementary processes. Iqbal goes on to add, 'Both are really descriptions of the same world with this difference only that in the scientific process the ego's standpoint is necessarily exclusive, whereas in the religious process the ego integrates its competing tendencies and develops a single inclusive attitude resulting in a kind of synthetic transfiguration of his experiences'²⁴. He suggests that we 'must make distinction between experience as a natural fact, significant of the normally observable behaviour of reality, and experience as significant of the inner nature of reality'²⁵. Herein lies the chief difference between the domains of science and religion respectively-- a distinction which the scientists-philosophers like Frazer tend to overlook. For them religion should follow the pattern of scientific knowledge and procedure.

Salomon Reinach (1858-1932), a French scholar and contemporary of Iqbal, believed that time was ripe for a 'science of religion'²⁶! He considers religion 'as a natural phenomenon, and nothing more'²⁷. According to him, higher religions, including Christianity, have a natural origin in such primitive ideas as God, spiritual beings, the infinite, etc. which are considered 'the true objects of religious sentiment'²⁸. Unlike Iqbal, he holds that human progress has taken place through the

gradual secularizing of elements which were originally dipped in the sphere of animistic beliefs. He calls such beliefs "scruples" 'which impede the free exercise of our faculties'²⁹. On the contrary, for Iqbal religion is one of the most important factors determining the vector-value of man's culture; it is by no means an impediment in the progress of man, in the development of his intellectual faculties, and in the emergence of human civilization through its various stages. Religion, according to Iqbal, is indispensable to human progress, -intellectual, moral and spiritual³⁰. Reinach, however, concedes some positive value to higher religion, though he is waiting for the inception of a science of religion.

5.3 Psychology and Religion

The naturalistic interpretation of religion received further inspiration from the development of psychology of religion. The methods of psychology afforded means for a scientific study of the religious experience. Among the pioneers in this field who were also contemporaries of Iqbal are James Henry Leuba (1867-1946), William James (1842-1910), Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), Carl Gustav Jung (1875- 1961). It may be noted at the outset that Iqbal has regretted that 'modern psychology has not yet touched even the outer fringe of religious life, and is still far from the richness and variety of what is called religious experience'³¹. He expresses diffidence regarding the present state of both biology and psychology and adds, 'Mere analytical criticism with some understanding of the organic conditions of the imagery in which religious life has sometimes manifested itself is not

likely to carry us to the living roots of human personality'³².

J.H. Leuba's approach to religion is more psychological than that of W. James, the author of renowned *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Leuba and Iqbal differ in their very fundamental assumptions, as for Leuba religion has more biological value than the objective truth;³³ while for Iqbal, on the other hand, religious 'entities' are among the objective truths and religious assertions are truly 'factual statements'³⁴. Leuba, however, puts forward a perverse argument to approve his basic assumption that religious concepts have a biological value. He argues that all arguments for the existence of God as a metaphysical entity have failed and there is an appeal to inner experiences. These inner experiences fail to establish the existence of a personal God, but they provide gratification for our affective and moral needs. He says, 'It is precisely because no other form of available belief satisfies so easily and so completely certain urgent needs of the human heart that the idea of God as Father remains among us'³⁵. Again Leuba seeks to account for mystical experience in psychological and physiological terms by means of three explanations: (i) by assigning it to the sublimation of the sexual passion in the ascetic life, (ii) by comparing it with the states of consciousness induced by certain drugs (in anticipation of A. Huxley), and (iii) by showing its affinity with such pathological conditions as hysteria and epilepsy, etc. He adds that 'religious mysticism is a revelation not of God but of man'³⁶. He concludes that none of the so-called

mystical phenomena can seriously indicate towards some transcendent cause.

Now, Iqbal's position on religious experience (mysticism) is quite divergent. For him religious experience is one among other genuine human experiences having a cognitive import³⁷. He rejects his explanation (i) thus: 'The two forms of consciousness -- sexual and religious -- are often hostile or, at any rate, completely different to each other in point of their character, their aim, and the kind of conduct they generate'³⁸. Regarding the explanation (ii), i.e. the contention that mystical consciousness is comparable to the states induced by certain drugs, R.C. Zaehner's book *Mysticism -- Sacred and Profane*³⁹ (Appendix A) has provided a convincing rebuttal. Against Leuba's explanation (iii) Iqbal contends, of course defending the position of Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam, that 'if a psychopath has the power to give a fresh direction to human history', and if his original experience 'has turned slaves into leaders of men, and has inspired the conduct and shaped the career of whole races of mankind. It must be a matter of great interest for the modern psychology. He adds, 'judging from the various types of activity that emanated from the movement initiated by the Prophet of Islam, his spiritual tension and the kind of behaviour which issued from it, cannot be regarded as a response to a mere fantasy inside his brain. It is impossible to understand it except as a response to an objective situation generative of new enthusiasms, new organizations, new starting points'⁴⁰. Iqbal adds in this connection, 'The truth is that in a state of religious

passion we know a factual reality in some sense outside the narrow circuit of our personality'⁴¹.

Leuba looks for a scientific religion which he calls a 'religion of the future' -- a blend of Comte's religion of humanity and Bergson's philosophy of creative evolution. However, he concedes some value to religion when he admits that man is so constituted that his religious needs are real and demand satisfaction.

Sigmund Freud, one of the most influential of Iqbal's contemporaries who swept religious and philosophical thought of his own time tried to study religion and religious institutions psychologically in his famous books *Totem and Taboo*, *Moses and Monotheism*, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, and *The Future of An Illusion*, which form a quarternity of classics. In the *Totem and Taboo* Freud bases his hypothesis of the origin of religion on the assumption of W. Robertson Smith who believed that 'totemism was the starting point of all religions'⁴². Freud holds that the deity or god (God) of higher religions are nothing but the improved substitutes for the totem animal⁴³. Again he assumes that the psychical development of humanity runs parallel to the mental growth in a child⁴⁴. On this he bases his main thesis in *The Future of an Illusion* that religion is the mark of man's immaturity which he is expected to outgrow with further development of his reason and intellectual capacities⁴⁵. Freud also assumes that "displacement" as it happens in the case of a child also takes place in the case of humanity⁴⁶. The origin of religion, rather all religion, he traces back to the "father-son

relationship", to the act of "patricide", and the emergent feelings of jealousy and sin.⁴⁷ Iqbal will not agree with him as regards the origin of religion; for him religion is one of the most normal activities of man which do not emerge from mere sexual jealousy as presumed by Robertson Smith and Freud. Nor will he agree with him regarding the future of religion because, according to him, religion grows in strength with the intellectual growth of man; it is one of the normal and rational activities of man. He holds that religious statements and experiences are amenable to intellectual test no less than scientific observations, as is obvious from his Lecture II⁴⁸. He admits that religious activities, like all other activities, have their psychological and physiological determinants, but this fact by no means detracts from the values of those experiences. He says, 'The truth is that the organic causation of our mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by which we judge them to be superior or inferior in point of value'⁴⁹. Again, God for Iqbal is by no means the 'magnified Father'⁵⁰ as advocated by Freud nor is religious belief essentially "infantile and neurotic". John Macquarrie, while writing on Freud's view of religion, remarks: '..., however revolutionary his discoveries in psychology may have been Freud's understanding of religion remained essentially that of the deterministic naturalism of the nineteenth century'⁵¹. It may be added here that E.O. James in his book *The Origin and Growth of Religion* and Bronislaw Malinowski in *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*⁵² have convincingly disproved the

anthropological basis of Freud's explanation of religion.

Carl Gustav Jung, one of the most promising of Iqbal's contemporaries in the field of psychoanalysis, comes closer to him on some very important points than either Leuba or Freud. In fact, Jung had mystical tendencies besides his psychological interests and practices. Though a Freudian in the beginning when he wrote *The Significance of Father in the Destiny of the Individual*, but later he changed his position drastically. He came to the conclusion that all religions have their psychological roots in the collective unconscious of the race⁵³. He affirms a definite relationship between God and the unconscious; he rather holds in his book *Psychological Types* that 'God is a function of the unconscious, namely, the manifestation of a split off sum of libido which has activated the God-imago'⁵⁴. He goes to the extent of saying in *Answer to Job*, 'We cannot tell whether God and the unconscious are two different entities'⁵⁵. Iqbal, however, will not agree on such a close relationship between God and the unconscious, which would reduce religious beliefs to repressed wishes according to Freud; but he will agree with Jung who appears to conceive "the unconscious" in a mystical sense, in the sense of "subliminal self"⁵⁶ as used by some of the leading Sufis in the world of Islam. Jung, however, cannot be accused of subjectivism in so far as he makes a distinction between God-imago and the Godhead⁵⁷ like Meister Eckhart, a great mystic of the Western world; he does not reduce God to a mere

fabrication of a mystic's mind as is sometimes erroneously thought.

Jung brings home the experiential nature of religion, a fact which Freud and his followers have conspicuously overlooked. His basic assumption is that what exists in the psyche exists in reality. Iqbal will agree with him in treating religion as basically an experience with God its object. Jung's clinical experience convinced him that all men live for some end, consciously or unconsciously-- the end which Jung calls the Self⁵⁸. He appears to take the Self in a conceptual sense and he also appears to identify it with God. Iqbal does the same when he says in Javid-Nama⁵⁹

در وجود او نہ کم بینی نہ بیش
خویش را بینی از او را از خویش

Thou seest the Lord through self and self
through Him.

Nor more nor less thou seest of God than
that⁶⁰.

Jung's position becomes more objective when he lays more emphasis on the "collective unconscious of the race" which means that the end is not the personality of an individual, but some over-all and transcendent personality which may be identified with God. For Iqbal, too, as we have seen before, God is the Highest Ego to which each person should try to approximate as closely as possible. Again, though he

attaches so much importance to the 'collective unconscious' the notion of 'individuation', like Iqbal, plays a vital and focal role in Jung's psychology. He holds that the primitive man was more or less identified with the collective psyche and it was much later that individuality developed from this psychological collectivity⁶¹. Jung would certainly agree with Iqbal that the ultimate aim of religious life is the 'discovery of the ego as an individual deeper than his conceptually describable habitual self-hood'⁶². He adds that 'the climax of this development is reached when the ego is able to retain full self-possession, even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego'⁶³. For both Jung and Iqbal, the end of life and religion is 'nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being'⁶⁴. Again they will agree that there is 'a craving for completeness' (to use a Jungian phrase) which generates desire for 'union with the Other', and hence is the "telos" of all religious activity⁶⁵.

Again, Iqbal will agree with Jung that the end of all activity, and also the ultimate end of religion, is 'the integration and development of personality,...'⁶⁶. For Jung 'self' is the resultant of the conflict between the world of collective consciousness and the world of individual awareness: this conflict is 'the old play of hammer and anvil: the suffering iron between them will in the end beshaped into an unbreakable whole-- the individual'⁶⁷. According to him, religion 'enables a man to reconcile aspects of his inner and outer life and thus to achieve a complete and balanced personality'⁶⁸. For Iqbal also, 'The life of the ego is a kind of tension

caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion'⁶⁹. For both, ego does not stand as a mere spectator outside this conflict; it is present in it as a directive energy (using Iqbal's own words)⁷⁰. Both again agree that 'the human life is characterized by the pursuit of some end and that it has some destiny'⁷¹. However, Jung and Iqbal differ basically in that the former is a psychologist, while the latter is a metaphysician. Consequently, Jung prescribes psychological means for the development of personality; whereas Iqbal suggests some metaphysical and spiritual means for the achievement of the end.⁷² Again, though agreeing with Jung on the development of personality as the ultimate goal, Iqbal, unlike his German contemporary, is quite mindful of the development in the social direction also; that is, development does not occur in the direction of 'individuation' alone, it moves towards a higher and further development of the society also. This is obvious from his pair of mathnavis jointly called *Asrar-o-Rumuz*.⁷³ Iqbal derives his inspiration from the Quran which lays much emphasis on the social aspects of human nature and takes care to inculcate social virtues among the believers the Quran condemned monasticism as unlawful.⁷⁴ Iqbal brings home the significance of social contemplation in the following verses⁷⁵

جلوہ حق چشم من تنہا نکو است

حسن را بے آئین دین خطاست

'My eyes seek not an isolated sight
of God: I hold it sin to contemplate,
without a congregation, beauty's view'.⁷⁶

Modern psychology fully appreciates the importance and indispensability of society for the development of the individual. Perhaps this emphasis on the social aspect has engendered socialism and communism in the present world. In Iqbal, however, a balance between individual and society is necessary for the optimum development of man⁷⁷

Iqbal in his lectures has appreciated Jung's contention that 'the essential nature of religion is beyond the province of analytic psychology... "A similar distinction", says Jung, "must also be made in the realm of religion; there also a psychological consideration is permissible only in respect of the emotional and symbolical phenomena of a religion, wherein the essential nature of religion is in no way involved,..."⁷⁸ However, he regrets that Jung has violated his own principle over and again. As a result, instead of giving an insight into the essential nature of religion, modern psychology has succeeded in giving us a plethora of new theories which imply that 'religion does not relate the human ego to any objective reality beyond himself; it is merely a kind of well-meaning biological device calculated to build barriers of ethical nature round human society in order to protect the social fabric against the otherwise unrestrainable instincts of the ego'⁷⁹

Notes and References

1. Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p.95.
2. *Ibid*, pp.95-6.
3. *Ibid*, p.97.
4. page 23.
5. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.100
6. Mahmud Ahmad, *Pilgrimage of Eternity*, intr.p.12.
7. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.100. As seen before, Iqbal calls 'matter' the colony of sub-egos (p. 106).
8. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.44.
9. *Ibid*, p.45.
10. *Ibid*, p.41.
11. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.101.
12. *Ibid*.
13. *Primitive Culture*, p.1
14. Iqbal, *op.cit.* p.141.
15. Lv:29.
16. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.102.
17. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.142.
18. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.102.
19. *Primitive Culture*, p.539.
20. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.7.
21. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.103.
22. *The Golden Bough*, p.712.
23. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.196.
24. *Ibid*
25. *Ibid*
26. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.104.

27. Orpheus, pre.p.vii.
28. *Ibid*, p.3.
29. *Ibid*
30. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.189.
31. *Ibid*, pp.192,194.
32. *Ibid*, p.194.
33. *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p.53.
34. See my book *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, pp.89-90.
35. Leuba, *op.cit.*, pp.265-266.
36. *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.*, p. 318.
37. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.189.
38. Iqbal, *Ibid.*, p.26.
39. See also my book, pp.5-9.
40. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.190.
41. *Ibid*, p.26.
42. *Religion of the Semites*, cf. also *Totem and Taboo*, pp.142-144.
43. *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 148-149.
44. *The Future of an Illusion*, pp.75-6.
45. *Ibid*, This is the central theme.
46. *Totem and Taboo*, pp.128-29.
47. See my book pages 23-26.
48. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.28ff.
49. *Ibid*, p. 23.
50. G.S. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, p.75.
51. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.106.
52. Pages 103ff & pp.167-8, resp.
53. Spinks, *op.cit.*, p.95.
54. page 300.
55. Page 55.

56. Jung understands by Self 'that which is wholly Other (das ganz Andere)... Such a Self appears to be a substitute for God.' cf. my book, p.54.
57. My book, p.53.
58. Spinks, *op.cit.*, p.94.
59. *Javid Nama op.cit.*, p.20.
60. Mahmud Ahmad, *op.cit.*, Lines 265-66.
61. Spinks, *op.cit.*, pf. "Individuation", pp.60-61.
62. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.184.
63. *Ibid*, p.118.
64. Jung, The Development of Personality: Collected Works, vol. 17, p. 171.
65. Spinks, *op.cit.*, p.61.
66. See my book, p.56.
67. Jung, the Integration of Personality, p.27.
68. Spinks, *op.cit.*
69. Iqbal *op.cit.*, p.102.
70. *Ibid*.
71. My book, p.57.
72. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.194.
73. The combined edition was first published in 1940.
74. *The Quran*, Lvii:27.
75. *Javid Nama, op.cit.* p.50.
76. Mahmud, *op.cit.*, vs.854-61.
77. See my article on "Organismic Model: Mutuality and Harmony Between Men and with Nature", presented to the meeting of the International Society for Metaphysics, held in London, July 1980.
78. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.191.
79. *Ibid*

Chapter Six

IQBAL AND NATURALISM IN RELIGION

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6.1 Modern Physics and Religion

In the beginning of the present century science in general, and physics in particular, was undergoing a kind of revolution and was presenting a different picture of the nature. Iqbal was quite mindful of these significant changes which coloured his religious thought largely. He discusses contributions of modern science-- biology, physics, psychology and chemistry-- to philosophy and religion in his Lecture-II entitled "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience"¹. The new science changed the concepts of matter, space, time which have been of central interest to philosophers in the modern times. What is interesting, the scientists we will discuss in this section are chiefly those which Iqbal has discussed himself in the lecture referred to above, a fact which renders the influence and affinity still more direct and bearing on his thought. Among the prominent physicists to be discussed are Max Planck (1858-1947), the founder of quantum theory; Albert Einstein (1879-1955), probably the most famous of modern physicists on account of his relativity theory; Werner Karl Heisenberg (1901-1976), known for his uncertainty principle; and Arthur Stanley Eddington (1882-1944), one of the best known physicists in the English-speaking countries. Iqbal not only benefits from their systems; he rather directly refers to most of them and quotes them at places, in his discussion on the nature of matter, space, time, and the man (The Crown of God's creation). They are some of the scientists who have influenced modern philosophy considerably and in

vital directions. Iqbal has consciously derived from the writings and theories of these scientists.

Max Planck, a senior contemporary of Iqbal and one of the leaders of new physics, believed in the continuity of scientific development and laid stress on the relation of the new physics to the old. Distinguishing three worlds-- namely, the world of sense- perception, the real world and the world of physics--he believes that the physical world keeps receding from the world of senses and approaching to the real world². He says, 'Modern physics impresses us with the truth that there are realities existing apart from our sense-perceptions, and that there are problems and conflicts where these realities are of greater value for us than the richest treasures of the world of experience'³. He holds that both moral and religious experience is compatible with the physicist's view of the world. Iqbal has quoted Planck's theory of Quanta in connection with his discussion of the movement of atom in space⁴, and the difficulties stemming from this problem.

Planck admits, like Iqbal, the religious interpretation of the world alongside the scientific one, stressing that both have their right in the balanced development of the human spirit. He says, 'There can never be any real opposition between religion and science, for the one is the complement of the other.'⁵ As we have seen before, Iqbal also believes that science and religion are complementary and adds, 'Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation'.

Albert Einstein, also a contemporary of Iqbal, was basically a metaphysician when he writes, 'Behind the tireless efforts of the investigator there lurks a stronger, more mysterious derive: it is existence and reality that one wishes to comprehend'⁶. He holds that sense-perception gives information of the external world indirectly, which we can grasp by speculative means. It follows from this that 'our notions of physical reality can never be final. We must always be ready to change these notions in order to do justice to perceived facts in the most logically perfect way'⁷. Iqbal derives inspiration from his thought while discussing the nature of reality in his famous Lectures. He appreciates Einstein's contribution in the following words, "the theory of Einstein has brought a new vision of the universe and suggests new ways of looking at the problems common to both religion and philosophy"⁸. Its impact is so substantial that 'the younger generations of Islam in Asia and Africa demand a fresh orientation of their faith'⁹. Commenting on his theory of relativity, Iqbal holds that it has dealt the greatest blow to the concept of matter. His discoveries 'have laid the foundation of a far-reaching revolution in the entire domain of human thought'¹⁰. He quotes Bertrand Russell remarking that it "has damaged the traditional notion of substance more than all the arguments of the philosophers... The old solidity is gone, and with it the characteristics that to the materialist made matter seem more real than fleeting thoughts"¹¹. On this view the matter is reduced to "a system of inter-related events", says Russell.

Besides, Iqbal has appreciated his theory of relativity also. In his verse *Javid Namah*, Iqbal's use of the concept of "Zarvan" which he calls "the Spirit of Time and Space"¹² refers to the space-Time relativity. And long before Einstein it was the great Imam al-Ghazali (d.1111) who propounded the relativity theory of Space-Time in his famous *Tahafat-ul-Filasifah*¹³ and may rightly be called a pioneer in the field. He not only believed that Space and Time were relative to the object, but also (to quote from him) 'There is no distinction between temporal extension-- which is described, in terms of its relations, as "before" and "after"-- and spatial extension --which is described, in terms of its relations, as "above" and "below"¹⁴. However, Iqbal subjects the modern theory to searching criticism. He urges that 'Einstein's theory which as a scientific theory deals only with the structure of things, throws no light on the ultimate nature of things which possess that structure'¹⁵. However, according to Iqbal his theory has a two-fold value for philosophy: (i) it dispenses with 'the view of substance as simple location in space' and (ii) it 'makes space dependent on matter'¹⁶. But there is one great difficulty in his theory, i.e. 'the unreality of time. A theory which takes time to be a kind of fourth dimension of space must, it seems, regard the future as something already given, as indubitable fixed as the past. Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory'¹⁷. He continues, 'the theory neglects certain characteristics of time as experienced by us,...'¹⁸ 'It is obvious that his time is not "Bergson's pure duration" nor is it serial time. Iqbal, however,

confesses that it is not possible for him to make out the real nature of Einstein's time. Einstein's view changes the nature of cause-effect relationship also.

Iqbal regrets that the 'more recent developments in European mathematics tend rather to deprive time of its living historical character, and to reduce it to a mere representation of space. That is why Whithead's view of Relativity is likely to appeal to Muslim students more than that of Einstein in whose theory time loses its character of passage and mysteriously translates itself into utter space'¹⁹. However, Iqbal appreciates his mathematical view of the universe in so far as it 'completes the process of purification started by Hume, and, true to the spirit of Hume's criticism, dispenses with the concept of force altogether. Iqbal continues,' the practical student of religious psychology has a similar purification in view. His sense of objectivity is as keen as that of the scientist in his own sphere of objectivity'²⁰.

Einstein, like a true scientist, finds the meaning of religion in his quest to know the real world. 'The faith that the world is rationally ordered', writes Macquarrie, 'is what Einstein calls "cosmic religion", and he regards it as an important inspiration to the creative power of the scientist'²¹. It is purged of all anthropomorphic concepts (what Iqbal has called 'objectivity' in religion). Einstein believed in an impersonal God as against Iqbal who believed in God as the Highest person. Einstein says, 'I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns

himself with the destinies and actions of human beings'²².

As said before, Kant affirmed the impossibility of metaphysics, though the scientist recognized its importance to knowledge. Iqbal remarks in his famous essay "Self in the Light of Relativity"²³, 'Physics cannot afford to ignore Metaphysics. It must recognise it as a great ally in the organisation of experience. Happily it is not a Metaphysician but a Scientist who justifies Metaphysics-- I mean Einstein, who has taught us that the knower is intimately related to the object known, and that the fact of knowledge is a constitutive element in the objective reality,...'²⁴ In fact, Einstein recognises the factual significance of 'Knowledge' which according to Iqbal is 'a fact among other facts of experience which empirical science claims as its exclusive subject of study'²⁵. It may be added that Iqbal has taken Metaphysics in this context in the sense of a theory of knowledge and has therefore emphasized its indispensability to Science.

Werner Karl Heisenberg, one of the junior scientist contemporaries of Iqbal who exerted a wide and deep influence on the philosophical as well as scientific thought of the current century. Iqbal was directly influenced by his prized and world-famous principle of uncertainty which he has referred in his Lectures²⁶. Like Iqbal (rather Iqbal took inspiration from him) he advocated 'a weaker kind of determinism' (to use a phrase from Macquarrie)²⁷. He clearly thinks that break with the old physics is more radical than it was thought by Planck and Einstein. He believes that the

hostility between science and religion arose from the too rigid and narrow framework for natural science which the nineteenth century developed-- a framework which left no room for concepts of "mind", "soul", "life", etc. He emphasizes that modern science had "dissolved" this rigid framework for it 'has profoundly modified its fundamental concepts'²⁸. Modern physics, he says, has known that we cannot speak about the atoms in ordinary language; 'we need a peculiar kind of language suited to a world of potentialities rather than to one of facts. Consequently, 'our attitude towards concepts like "mind" or the human "soul" or "God" will be different from that of the nineteenth century'²⁹. Heisenberg concludes that 'modern physics has perhaps opened the door to a wider outlook on the relation between the human mind and reality'³⁰. Thus modern physics has served to bring science and religion closer, or at least it has alleviated the hostility between the two--a position which must have helped Iqbal in determining his attitude towards the relationship between science and religion.

Arther Stanley Eddington, a physicist-Philosopher contemporary of Iqbal who again influenced the latter in determining his views on the nature of the physical world Iqbal has copiously quoted from Eddington in his Lectures at more than one place. Regarding the nature of the physical world Iqbal quotes a long passage from his book '*Space, Time, and Gravitation*'³¹. The purport of the passage is that "Mind filters out matter from the meaningless jumble of qualities, as the prism filters out the colours of the rainbow from the chaotic pulsations of the white light". Of this jumble the mind exalts the

permanent and ignores the transitory, and then applies it the laws of gravitation, mechanics and geometry to carve out the rigid world of matter. Eddington closes his passage with the remarks, "Is it too much to say that the mind's search for permanence has created the world of physics?". Iqbal appears to have derived his notion of potentialities from the said passage of Eddington while carving out his concept of 'time' and '*taqdir*' (Destiny)³². However, his approach to the physical reality is primarily mathematical, whereas Iqbal's is basically metaphysical, a fact which makes a large difference between the two contemporary thinkers. Iqbal appreciates the last sentence in the quoted passage calling it 'one of the deepest things in Professor Eddington's book'³³. He adds that the physicist has yet to discover 'something more permanent, conceivable only as a self which alone combines the opposite attributes of change and permanence, and can thus be regarded as both constant and variable'³⁴.

Like Planck and Einstein, Eddington also makes a distinction between the sensible world and the world of physical science. The latter is 'a symbolic world'. Starting from the world of senses, the physicist transcends it and 'the world of physical science becomes increasingly an abstract symbolical world'³⁵ which Eddington even calls a "world of shadows". For Eddington the world of physics is a 'construction of the mind'. It is constituted by thought and , he adds, 'We must attach our pointer-readings to a background of mental activity'. Eddington infers that the ultimate reality is spiritual. What is interesting is that Iqbal

also follows his argument for establishing the spiritual nature of the ultimate reality. He goes on to add that 'the idea of a universal Mind or Logos would be a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific theory'³⁶. Iqbal draws from this the idea of a personal, living God of religion,³⁷ while Eddington himself is very careful to draw any such implication. He rather recognizes that, if science makes the idea of a universal Mind plausible, 'such a Mind would be only a pale replica of the God of religion'.³⁸ It is dangerous to build a theology on the constantly changing concepts of science. He holds, like Iqbal, that the positive evidence comes from mystical experience which deserves our respect. He acknowledges the limitations as well as abstract nature of physical science in its approach to reality; thus there is much room for other approaches, says he like Iqbal. Modern science, he admits, can offer no proof for religion and is no substitute for the mystical experience; but (Iqbal would agree with him) by 'abolishing inert material substance, and strict universal determinism, it 'encourages a spiritual view of the world and lends its support to the mystical insight'³⁹. Iqbal has brought home partial nature of physics by quoting Eddington, thus: 'Is the purely intellectual method of overcoming nature the only method,' We have acknowledge, says Professor Eddington, "that the entities of physics can from their very nature form only a partial aspect of the reality. How are we to deal with the other part? ... We follow up the sense-impressions and find that they lead into an external world discussed by science; we follow up the other elements of our being and find that

they lead -- not into a world of space and time, but surely somewhere"⁴⁰.

6.2 Modern Physics and Theology

Among the Western theologians who were impressed by the findings of modern physics may be mentioned Burnett Hillman Streeter (1874-1937) and Ernest William Barnes (1874-1957), the two English theologians who were contemporaries of Iqbal. Streeter took to reconcile between Christianity and modern science and tried to reach a correlation between these findings and the theistic world-view taught by the Christian religion. He divides the world-views into two major types: viz., (i) 'mechanomorphic' and (ii) 'anthropomorphic'⁴¹ (to use his own terms). The former conceives the world as a machine and offers an explanation in terms of such categories as matter, force, cause and effect. Once this approach was very fascinating, but with the revolution in physics this explanation became quite inadequate. He says, 'That beautiful clear-cut simplicity which was once the main attraction of mechanistic materialism has today completely disappeared'⁴². Here he is confirming Iqbal's point of view for whom, the mechanistic explanation is quite inadequate and fails to account for such phenomena as life, consciousness, self, soul, etc⁴³. Iqbal was very clear on this point when he said, 'Life with its intense feeling of spontaneity constitutes a centre of indetermination, and thus falls outside the domain of necessity. Hence science cannot comprehend life'⁴⁴. The biologist studies lower forms of life, Iqbal says; if he were to study life in himself, 'he is sure to

be convinced of the inadequacy of his mechanical concepts'⁴⁵. Iqbal, as said before, emphasizes the primacy and spontaneity of life, which cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, a mechanism, and he bears out his position by quoting from such renowned biologists as J.S. Haldane and Hans Driesch⁴⁶. Streeter suggests that, after the mechanistic model is discarded, we should interpret the dynamic processes of nature on the analogy of life and its peculiar organization. Again like Iqbal and Bergson, he takes 'the world as a scene of creative strife-- a process which brings forth new and higher values, culminating in the manifestation of love'⁴⁷. Streeter again suggests like Iqbal that we must take life in its highest form, i.e. in mind and spirit of man. So he takes the 'anthropomorphic' point of view which he does not understand in a crude sense, but maintains that the highest human activities provide best clue to the nature of ultimate reality. Such an anthropomorphism lurks in Iqbal's system of thought also if we read between the lines⁴⁸.

Streeter again holds like Iqbal that reality or God, through transcending human comprehension, manifests in symbols and 'has its most adequate symbol or analogue in the ideal of human life'⁴⁹. Iqbal will agree with him that the ideal man is one whose life most fully manifested creative love. For Streeter it was Jesus Christ, for Iqbal the Holy Prophet (Mohammad) whom he calls the archetype and the end of humanity⁵⁰.

Ernest William Barnes who also took over the mission of reconciling between Christianity and the

new scientific theories. He holds like Iqbal, in his Gifford Lectures, that religious beliefs cannot be accepted only on authority of revelation, but must be submitted to rational testing. He proposes to begin with the world of science and then to ask if a theistic world-view seems plausible in the light thereof. Like Eddington and Iqbal he also believes that the findings of the sciences point to a spiritual rather than a materialist interpretation of reality⁵¹. Barnes goes to the extent of saying, 'A recognition of the important place which mental constructs occupy in physical theory, coupled with an understanding that thought, will and feeling cannot be wholly sundered from one another, has produced a widespread conviction that theism and science will in the end form a harmonious unity'⁵². Barnes recommends, not only to interpret the scientific understanding of the world so as to leave room for Christian faith, but also to reformulate faith suchwise as will not conflict with the presuppositions held in a scientific era. Here, of course, Iqbal will not follow him closely, because for him religious thought does not need any reformulation; it rather needs a reconstruction as said before. However, both agree that religion should be purged of all alien overcoatings and superstitious colourings.

Barnes holds that the miraculous element should also be purged from true religion. He says, 'Ignore the miracles of the New Testament and Christianity remains that same way of life, lived in accordance with Christ's revelation of God, which through the centuries men have been drawn to follow'⁵³. Iqbal, on the contrary, assigns special importance to miracles as a

necessary constituent of religious life and faith. He rather recounts miracles performed by sufis and saints to prove the power and genuineness of religious belief.

Notes and references

1. *Reconstruction*, pp.28ff.
2. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.243.
3. *Ibid*
4. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.69.
5. *Where is Science Going?*, p.168.
6. *Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist*, ed.P.A. Schlipp, p.249.
7. *Ibid*, p.248.
8. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.8.
9. *Ibid*, p.8.
10. *Ibid*, p.34.
11. *Ibid*.
12. page 21.
13. See my article "Al-Ghazali: the Pioneer of Space-Time Relativity", Daily *The Pakistan Times*, Lahore, dt.1-9-1978.
14. al-Ghazzali, *Tahafut-al-Falasifah*, (pb.Mutafa al-Babi al-Halbi, Cairo), p. 15; cf. Eng. Tr. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, pp. 38-39. See also my article "Muslim Contribution to Philosophy", presented to al-Hijra International Congress, Islamabad (1981).
15. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.38.
16. *Ibid*
17. *Ibid*, p.38.
18. *Ibid*, p.39.

19. *Ibid*,p.133.
20. *Ibid*,p.197.
21. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.245.
22. *Philosopher Scientist*,pp.659-60
23. *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, ed. S.A. Vahid, p.110 ff.
24. *Ibid*,p.111.
25. *Ibid*.
26. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.182.
27. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,pp.245-46.
28. *Ibid*,p.246.
29. *Physics and Philosophy*, p.172.
30. *Ibid*,p.173.
31. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.66.
32. *Ibid*
33. *Ibid*,pp.66-67.
- 34&35 Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.247.
36. *The Nature of the Physical World*,p.335.
37. Iqbal,*op.cit.*, This is the gist of his whole discussion on God, see chapter III.
38. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.247.
39. *Ibid*,p.248.
40. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.186.
41. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.248.
42. *Reality*,p.16. Iqbal had this book in his personal library.
43. Iqbal,ch.II.
44. *Ibid*,p.50.
45. *Ibid*.
46. *Ibid*,pp.43 & 44.
47. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.249.

48. It is obvious when Iqbal calls the ultimate Reality 'The Supreme Ego' or "rationally directed life", and so on.
49. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
50. Iqbal, *Javid Nama*, p.127. cf.

خلق و تقدیر و ہدایت ابتداست
رحمتہ للعالمینى انتہاست!

'Creation', 'Predestination', 'Guidance' are the beginning; a *Mercy unto all beings** is the end!
[Arberry, p. 98.

*It is the title of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.).

51. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
52. *Scientific Theory and Religion*, pp.593-94.
53. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.250.

Chapter Seven

IQBAL, PRAGMATISM AND ALLIED MOVEMENTS

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During Iqbal's lifetime some very important philosophical movements had their inception and headway, some of which had either direct or at least indirect impact on his thought. Important among these movements are Vitalism of Henri Bergson, Activism of Blondel, and Pragmatists like C.S. Peirce, W. James and John Dewey. These movements came as a reaction against excessive intellectualism which had gripped the Western thought by the end of the eighteenth century and towards the end of the nineteenth century. The advocates of these movements assigned primacy to 'will' or 'life' or 'emotion' or 'intuition' as against 'idea' or 'thought', and this reaction started during the second half of the nineteenth century when thinkers like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer upheld the primacy of the will. Commenting on them Macquarrie writes, 'All of these views have certain basic features in common. They unite in subordinating theory to practice, or thought to action, and in attacking what they call "intellectualism..." They reject equally the idealist and mechanistic pictures of the world as abstract and intellectualized conceptions which distort the dynamic reality'¹. Again, the biological approach is fundamental to them all. What is interesting, Iqbal finds a place in these movements, at least as a partial advocate.

7.1 Iqbal and Vitalism

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) a French contemporary of Iqbal, is best known to a student of philosophy for his vitalistic system which like Iqbal, rejects both mechanism and determinism. He following the

Copernican revolution claimed by Immanuel Kant in the field of epistemology, diverted his attention from the object to the subject for the study of the nature of reality. Bergson diverted his attention into his own consciousness to study the nature of time and reality. In his examination of reality Iqbal has referred to Bergson's principles and conclusions in his Lectures; he has also quoted the French thinker at places.

The fundamental concept in Bergson's system of thought is, that of time as 'duration', which he discusses in the opening chapter of his nobel prize winner book *Creative Evolution*². His whole system is inspired by his notion of 'duration'. Iqbal states and examines Bergson's view of time as duration elaborately. He agrees with him 'that conscious experience is that privileged case of existence in which we are in absolute contact with Reality³..... He quotes a passage from his French contemporary thus, "I pass from state to state, I am warm or cold . I am merry or sad. I work or do nothing. I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas--such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing⁴". Iqbal infers that ,there is nothing static in my inner life; all is a constant mobility,...Constant change, however, is unthinkable without time. On the analogy of our inner experience, then, conscious existence means life in time'.⁵Iqbal makes a very important distinction between what he calls 'appreciative' and 'efficient' sides of the self. On this basis he tries to account for Bergson's distinction between real and serial time. He

says, 'The time in which the efficient self lives is therefore the time of which we predicate long and short. It is hardly distinguishable from space'⁶. But this is not real time according to both Bergson and Iqbal we become conscious of the 'appreciative' side in the moments of profound meditation, says Iqbal, and adds, 'it appears that the time of the appreciative-self is a single "now"... Here is, then, pure duration unadulterated by space'⁷. Iqbal does not stop here but proceeds to elaborate his views into a complete theory of time in the light of the Quran and the modern science. On the one side, he links the notion of real time with human 'destiny' (*taqdir*) which he conceives as 'time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence-- ...'⁸ On the other side he conceives the nature of the universe as 'a free creative movement' on the analogy of our conscious experience⁹. He adds, 'according to Bergson, then, reality is a free, unpredictable, creative, vital impetus of the nature of volition...'¹⁰ Iqbal remarks here 'that the vitalism of Bergson ends in an insurmountable dualism of will and thought. This is really due to the partial view of intelligence that he takes. Intelligence, according to him, is a spatializing activity; it is shaped on matter alone, and has only mechanical categories at its disposal'¹¹. 'Again, in Bergson's view the forward rush of the vital impulse in its creative freedom is unilluminated by the light of an immediate or remote purpose. It is not aiming at a rest; it is wholly arbitrary, undirected, chaotic, and unforeseeable in its behaviour. It is mainly here that Bergson's analysis of

our conscious experience reveals its inadequacy. He regards conscious experience as the past moving along with and operating in the present. He ignores that the unity of consciousness has a forward looking aspect also'¹². He adds, 'Thus past and future both operate in the present state of consciousness, and the future is not wholly undetermined as Bergson's analysis of our conscious experience shows'¹³. On the premises of Bergson reality turns out to be 'a blind vital impulse wholly unilluminated by idea'¹⁴. Iqbal rejects this view and asserts that 'its nature is through and through teleological'¹⁵.

Bergson denies the teleological character of reality fearing that 'teleology makes time unreal. According to him "the portals of the future must remain wide open to Reality". Otherwise, it will not be free and creative'¹⁶. Iqbal urges against this position that time would be unreal only' if teleology means the working out of a plan in view of a predetermined end or goal...'¹⁷ He goes on to say, 'Such a view is hardly distinguishable from mechanism which we have already rejected.'¹⁸ There is another kind of teleology, says Iqbal. 'Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands'¹⁹. Iqbal's view of teleology is bound up with his view of time-process. He says, 'A time process cannot be conceived as a line already drawn.. It is a line in the drawing -- an actualization of open possibilities'²⁰. In his treatment of time, Iqbal regards Ibn-i-khaldun (1332-1406), one of the most

distinguished scholars of the Islamic culture, a great historian, sociologist and philosopher, as the forerunner of Bergson²¹.

Bergson further makes a very important distinction between 'intellect' and 'intuition' which are for him two divergent lines of development. Iqbal has slightly misconstrued Bergson's position on the subject when he writes, 'In fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect'²². According to Bergson's position as stated in *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory*, 'Intuition' and 'intellect' are two diametrically different agencies or faculties which grow on divergent lines of development the life impulse ('*elan vital*') takes²³. On his theory 'intuition' is the more developed form of 'instinct'. As Macquarrie has put it, 'The intellect is practical in its nature, and enables us to handle experience'²⁴. 'Intuition, on the other hand, is connected with instinct, and the essence of instinct is sympathy. Whereas the intellect looks at life from the outside, instinct shares in life'²⁵. He calls them the two principle lines of development. Bergson means by 'intuition' 'instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely'²⁶. This intuition gives us access to the very core of the living reality, says he²⁷. Iqbal, however, criticises Bergson for taking thought in its discursive sense only when he says, 'The nature of thought according to Bergson is serial; it cannot deal with movement, except by viewing it as a series of stationary points'²⁸. His approach, like most of the Western thinkers, is unilateral. Iqbal, on the other hand, takes thought in

three different senses: viz., (i) Pure Reason or Thought²⁹ (ii) Practical Reason³⁰, and (iii) thought in its 'deeper' or non discursive sense³¹. This approach enables Iqbal to solve most of the problems of metaphysical import, which the leading thinkers in the West failed to tackle, e.g., mind and body, God and the world, creation and destiny, determinism and free-will, etc.

Next, Iqbal quotes Bergson on the question of 'individuality'. Here he betrays a marked impact of his French contemporary, though he transcends his position under the inspiration of the Quran. He writes, 'As Bergson has taught us in his *Creative Evolution*, individuality is a matter of degrees and is not fully realized even in the case of apparently closed-off unity of the human being. "In particular, it may be said of individuality", says Bergson, "that while the tendency to individuate is everywhere present in the organized world, it is always opposed by the tendency towards reproduction. For the individuality to be perfected, it would be necessary that no detached part of the organism could live separately. But then reproduction would be impossible. For what is reproduction but the building up of a new organism with a detached fragment of the old? Individuality, therefore, harbours its own enemy at home". In the light of this passage it is clear that the perfect individual, closed off as an ego, peerless and unique, cannot be conceived as harbouring its own enemy at home. It must be conceived as superior to the antagonistic tendency of reproduction'³². It is 'one of the most essential elements in the Quranic conception

of God;...³³', says Iqbal. He transcends this criterion of 'individuality' when he quotes verbatim the Quranic chapter of "Al-Ikhlās". The chapter in review lays down four conditions for an 'individual' to be perfect which are, (i) 'Oneness' or Unity ('*tawhid*'); (ii) Independence while all else depends on him ('*samad*'); (iii) an individual is one who is not born of parents, nor does he beget any offspring-- he is above all that and (iv) uniqueness and peerlessness. Of these Bergson has stressed the third condition only³⁴. For Iqbal only God is such a perfect Individual, the highest being. He is the most perfect person. For Bergson the creative life force (*elan vital*) is God. He says, 'God, thus defined, has nothing of the already made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely'³⁵. Though totally different, his concept of God comes closer to Iqbal's in certain important respects. In the above passage he agrees with Iqbal that 'we experience it in ourselves when we act freely;

Bergson discusses religious and moral questions in his book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. In this book he makes a distinction between two types of religion: viz., (i) *Closed* or static religion, (ii) *Open* or dynamic religion³⁶. Closed religion is that of myths and ritual, and is a defensive social mechanism. Regarding the Open religion Bergson holds, like Iqbal, the 'religious genius breaks away from the mythical cults and enters the vital impetus, the absolute energy of creation, the spring of life and love which is God'³⁷. This he achieves through intuition rather than intellect. There is the danger of the higher, i.e., Open,

religion lapsing back into the lower, i.e. closed type.. However, the former is free and spontaneous, and culminates in the mystical union of the soul with God. This supreme religious insight called mystical union helps man to know 'the essential function of the universe,...'³⁸ Thus far Iqbal will follow him, but where he differs is the last part of the same passage, namely, 'which is a machine for making gods'³⁹, as for Iqbal the universe cannot be conceived as 'a machine for making gods'. For him the universe is 'one continuous act which thought breaks up into plurality of mutually exclusive things'⁴⁰. At another place he calls it 'a moment in the life of God'⁴¹. Again he calls nature the character of the Divine Self⁴². Moreover, Iqbal's division of the religious life into the three stages--viz., 'Faith, Thought' and 'Discovery'⁴³ is more thorough, although Bergson's two types generally correspond to the first and the last stages of Iqbal i.e. his 'close' religion corresponds to the stage of 'Faith, his 'Open' type to the stage of 'Discovery'. However, both Iqbal and Bergson agree that the highest form of religious life lies in seeking the mystical union with God, and also in understanding 'the essential function of the universe', as the latter has put it. As said before, Bergson's God with whom the union is sought is totally different from the God of religion, and for that matter from Iqbal's concept of God--⁴⁴ a fact which makes a big difference to their respective views on religion. The latter's approach to God is more personal and objective.

7.2 Iqbal and Activism

Maurice Blondel (1861-1949), whom Macquarrie describes as the 'Lay philosopher of the Roman Catholic Church'⁴⁵ was associated with the Modernist Movement. He agrees with Iqbal and Bergson in conceiving reality in dynamic terms, though he discards Bergson's naturalistic tendencies. Again, unlike the French thinker, his central idea is not 'life', but 'action' -- a position very close to Iqbal's who uses the terms 'life' and 'action' as synonyms for practical purposes. For Iqbal also, as he says in the opening sentence of the Preface, 'The Quran is a book which emphasizes "deed" rather than "idea"'.⁴⁶ Again he says towards the end of his lectures, 'the final act is not an intellectual act, but a vital act'⁴⁷ ... and he conceives life as a series of acts of attention⁴⁸. Again Blondel says, 'It is a question of the whole man, and it is not only in thought that one must look for man'.⁴⁹ How like Iqbal for whom as said before, religion was not a departmental affair but rather 'an expression of the whole man'. Both Iqbal and Blondel take 'action' in a concrete, rather than an abstract, sense; but for the latter 'we are always in the midst of action and that we cannot help engaging ourselves in action, although we do not know who we are or even whether we are, and although we have not chosen to live'⁵⁰. Iqbal, however, does not conceive human situation so passive and hopeless; for him all human action is purposeful and man is capable of taking initiative-- he is rather called upon by the Quran to take initiative. Again, although we have not chosen to live, we can choose none the less to live a certain type of life: man is even

free to accept a certain destiny or to reject it, according to Iqbal⁵¹. Both believe in positive solution of action. For Blondel the starting point of human life is 'the permanent dissatisfaction of human life' which he believes provides incentive for further action. There is a gap between action and its realization, and in an attempt to bridge it, the 'action may be seen as expanding in ever-widening circles, from self-regarding action through various forms of social action to the highest moral action which has regard to all humanity'⁵². For Iqbal, on the contrary, the starting point is the perception of 'the slender unity of the ego, his liability to dissolution, his amenability to reformation and his capacity for an ampler freedom to create new situations in known and unknown environments'⁵³. This perception, according to him, leads us to such religious experiences as 'affect the destiny of the ego as a possibly permanent element in the constitution of reality'⁵⁴.

According to Blondel, the demands of action themselves direct man from the natural to the supernatural; for Iqbal, as said above, it is the perception, discussed above, which necessitates a need for religious life. However, both Iqbal and Blondel advocate 'panentheism'; again both believe in the reciprocal action between God and man: as Macquarrie puts it, 'the tendency of action towards God is met by God's movement towards us, and human action is supplemented by grace and revelations'⁵⁵. Blondel believes in the 'discontinuity between the natural and the supernatural orders',⁵⁶ while for Iqbal there is no break between the temporal and the spiritual, as said

before, and 'Life is one and continuous'⁵⁷. As we have seen, mind and body form one unified whole; rather Iqbal would say like Spinoza that they are the two facets of the same reality.

Blondel holds that we can know God by 'action' rather than by 'thought'. He says, 'At the moment when we seem to touch God by a stroke of thought, he escapes, unless we hold him and seek him in action. Wherever we stop, he is not; wherever we move, he is. To think of God is an action'⁵⁸. In the beginning of his lecture on "The philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience" Iqbal also expresses dissatisfaction with an intellectual approach to God⁵⁹. He will agree with Blondel that the ultimate reality or God can be apprehended by action, conceived not in the sense of 'mere will or blind urge', but as 'the activity of the whole man', which includes thought⁶⁰. Blondel seems to grope for some higher sense of 'thought' though he is not clear about its nature. Thought he criticizes is the 'abstract intellectualism, while the thought he approves is the one which is included in action. Iqbal, however, is a pioneer in advocating a higher kind of thought which he calls "the deeper movement of thought", and which comes very close to intuition. Iqbal also conceives thought in a more active sense as is obvious from his view of mysticism⁶¹. As he expressly says, that it is possible to conceive thought 'as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material'⁶² -- a sense in which thought becomes one with action. However, at time Blondel appears to be running into, what may be called,

'over-activism'. Iqbal is an activist, while avoiding the danger of over-activism.

7.3 Iqbal and Pragmatism

"Pragmatism" and the related "instrumentalism" apply the notion of practical utility to the problems of truth and logic...⁶³ says John Macquarrie. Among its chief exponents we have Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), whom William James hailed as the father of pragmatism; Prof. William James (1842-1910), who exerted one of the deepest influences on Iqbal through his classic book *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, a book which was present in the latter's personal collection; and John Dewey (1859-1952), a great votary of 'instrumentalism' in America who wielded a profound influence on his contemporary thought in the field of philosophy and education.

C.S. Peirce, who called his own system 'pragmaticism' to differentiate it from that of William James. Basically a logician, Peirce betrays special leanings towards the practical import of an idea: he applies pragmatic test to meanings in his famous paper entitled "How to Make our Ideas Clear". He says, 'The whole function of thought is to produce habits of action... it is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function'⁶⁴. He adds, that if we want to get our meanings clear, we must 'consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have'⁶⁵. Iqbal will agree with him that thought must issue in action⁶⁶. Again according to Peirce a 'Belief' is 'a rule of action; that 'different

beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise'⁶⁷. Similarly, talking of 'imân' Iqbal says that it 'is not merely a passive belief in one or more propositions of a certain kind; it is living assurance begotten of a rare experience'⁶⁸. However, unlike Iqbal he rejects metaphysics which he describes as 'more curious than useful, the knowledge of which, like that of a sunken reed, serves chiefly to enable us to keep clear of it'⁶⁹. Peirce rejects deterministic or materialistic interpretation of nature. He discerns three stages of evolution which he calls (i) the *tychastic* stage which is the stage of chance, spontaneity and variability in nature; (ii) the *anancastic* stage where nature tends to become law-abiding and betrays the element of mechanical necessity; and (iii) the *agapastic* stage which is the stage of love, where attraction, sympathy and purpose appear in the evolutionary process⁷⁰. His stages of evolution are rather historical and chronological. However, the last stage, i.e., the stage of love, deserves some closer study to understand his position vis-a-vis Iqbal's position on the subject. For Iqbal also the stage of Love is the highest stage, though he understands this term in a special sense, i.e., as assimilation of attributes of the beloved which is God in his case. Love for him is the 'individuating' agent; it 'individualizes the lover as well as the beloved'⁷¹; he expressly says, "The Ego is fortified by love 'ishq'"⁷². Both Peirce and Iqbal teach the gospel of love as the only true theology. Peirce's *agapastic* doctrine is not to be held as mere theory about the world; it is rather a passionate belief 'which is a rule for action'⁷³. Again

Peirce presents God on pragmaticist grounds as a concept which has deep effects and inroads into the personal character of the believer. In short, God is a workable hypothesis for Peirce. Iqbal will partly agree with him when he appeals to the consequences of the message of the Holy Prophet. He says, 'judging from the various types of activity that emanated from the movement initiated by the Prophet of Islam, his spiritual tension and the kind of behaviour which issued from it, cannot be regarded as a response to mere fantasy inside his brain'⁷⁴. He agrees that a belief in God does lead to better consequences in this world (as well as in the Hereafter).

Prof. Willian James, a senior contemporary of Iqbal and one of America's most influential figures in psychology and pragmatism. His book *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is the pioneer work and a classic in the field. His impact in his own times was so profound that Iqbal has both critically examined his position and quoted from his famous classic, which, as the experts say, has been exerting deep influence in the field of psychology and philosophy of religion to this day now that well over half a century has elapsed. Prof. James was rightly proud of his presentation as his opening remarks amply show. Prof. Macdonald traces in the great Muslim social philosopher ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a true precursor of Prof. James in his treatment of psychology of religion⁷⁵. Then in company with James Iqbal recounts 'immediacy', 'unanalysability', 'incommunicability', and above all, the 'noetic' quality of the religious (mystic) experience. However, Iqbal holds that the mystic states, though unique, are not

discontinuous with the ordinary experience. He remarks in this connection, 'But this difference of the mystic state from the ordinary rational consciousness does not mean discontinuance with the normal consciousness, as Professor William James erroneously thought. In either case it is the same Reality which is operating on us'⁷⁶.

Again, while discussing that psychologically all states are organically determined, Iqbal quotes a long passage from Prof. James's *Varieties* thus: "Among the vision and messages", says Professor William James, "some have always been too patently silly among the trances and convulsive seizures, some have been too fruitless for conduct and character to pass themselves off as significant, still less as Divine. In the history of Christian mysticism the problem how to discriminate between such messages and experiences as were really Divine miracles, and such others as the demon in his malice was able to counterfeit, thus making the religious person twofold more the child of hell he was before, has always been a difficult one to solve, needing all the sagacity and experience of the best directors of conscience. In the end it had come to our empiricist criterion: by their fruits ye shall know them and not by their roots"⁷⁷. Iqbal commenting on this adds, 'The problem of Christian mysticism alluded to by Professor James has been in fact the problem of all mysticism. The demon in his malice does counterfeit experiences which creep into the circuit of the mystic state'⁷⁸. Iqbal agrees with James on his approach to the value of a given state of mind vis-a-vis its determination; and also that the question of sifting the

true from the counterfeit in the field of religious states is an imperative one which necessitates solution. In fact, Iqbal has followed the lead, it may safely be said, of his American contemporary, in finding a convincing solution for the said problem as is obvious from the above long quotation.

Iqbal was impressed by James's pragmatism. James calls pragmatism a new attitude in philosophy-- "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts"⁷⁹.

Prof. James, admitting that pragmatism has a very long history in philosophy, claims to have developed a pragmatic theory of truth. He lays down the criterion of truth thus: 'Any Idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things, satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labour, is true for just so much'⁸⁰. Iqbal, however, will not accede to this radically empiricist view of truth; what appeals to him is the pragmatic criterion of truth, and not their theory of truth. It is one of the tests of truth with Iqbal. However, he will agree with his American contemporary that truth is a matter of degree. Again, both James and Iqbal oppose 'intellectualist systems of metaphysics as well as positivism. Both will agree again that our beliefs are closely related to action'⁸¹. The workability of an idea, according to James, is incident upon its practicability. He applies this criterion to the case of religious belief in his famous

essay "The Will to Believe"⁸². To Iqbal, however, it is not mere practicability which is enough for determining truth-- and of course not the least in the case of religious beliefs, which are a matter of life and death significance for man. In his famous Gifford Lectures⁸³, James's approach to religious questions is empirical and psychological, how unlike Iqbal's in his famous Lectures⁸⁴. While James believes that psychology can go far towards explaining in natural terms many features of the religious life, Iqbal regrets over and again that modern psychology has not yet touched even the outer fringe of religious experience⁸⁵. In fact, Iqbal's approach to religion is much more concrete and comprehensive than James's in so far as he admits all the various approaches as complementary means to the ultimate reality and experience. Thus he partly accepts James's viewpoint, but far excels beyond him. As said before, light for him must come from all the various sources.

For his religious 'verities' Prof. James appeals to certain dimensions of existence. He says, 'The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and merely "understandable" world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. The unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in this world. But that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality itself. "God" is the natural appellation for the supreme reality,...⁸⁶' Iqbal will certainly agree with him to this extent-- i.e. to the extent of conceiving human life as touching a wider,

unseen, higher, spiritual region of the universe which is accessible to man through religious experience. However James himself realizes the limitations of his own empirical approach, admitting that his study 'supports only the belief in *something* larger than ourselves', and not necessarily an 'all-embracing absolute Spirit'⁸⁷. Though believing that some form of theism is the most "practically rational" solution, he prefers to think of God as finite like J.S. Mill; a reasoning in which Iqbal will hardly follow him and Mill, though he agrees with Iqbal that the universe is incomplete⁸⁸ (for Iqbal the universe is ever-expanding as taught by the Quran)⁸⁹. Where Iqbal will not follow him, James believes in a pluralistic universe. He argues that a pluralistic universe with a finite God accords with the sort of reality given to us in experience--'that distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of reality which we finite beings swim in'⁹⁰ '-- leaves room for genuine freedom, striving and action so important for James. Iqbal, however, believes that a supreme God who is Infinite is by no means incompatible with human freedom, striving and action; it is rather conducive to them, for it is God himself who bestowed freedom and responsibility on man and rendered him a really moral agent (as Kant said). In fact, God's sovereignty is not counter to man's freedom; he is rather a co-worker with man in his strivings and struggle towards the betterment of the universe (i.e. meliorism), as said before. Iqbal will agree with him in repudiating abstract and unconvincing metaphysical arguments for theism; both reject intellectualism and abstract metaphysics.

John Dewey, another influential contemporary of Iqbal, 'takes a more naturalistic and positivistic turn'⁹¹, says Macquarrie. His naturalism, however, is not of the mechanistic kind for it accepts 'the distinctively human'⁹², he adds. Dewey studies man qua man and not as an angel; he studies him in this world as his natural home and environment. Iqbal also shows full faith in the capacities of man and deems the universe as his natural abode, as he quotes from the Quran⁹³. Dewey draws his 'naturalism' from biology, psychology and sociology, and not from physical sciences; Iqbal also shows his inclination towards these sciences as well as modern versions of the physical sciences. This renders his approach more comprehensive and concrete. Iqbal presents a very beautiful blend of philosophy and modern science, of idealism and realism, thus anticipating such great modern thinkers as prof. H.D. Lewis of the University of London, who leads an idealist-realist school of thought in the West.

Like Iqbal, Dewey shows full faith in the concept of 'evolution' which plays a large part in their systems. However, Dewey understands evolution in the Darwinian naturalistic sense based on the notion of 'adaptation'; Iqbal, on the contrary, takes evolution in a more or less Lamarckian sense deriving from the notion of 'teleology' and 'purpose'. Here Iqbal and Jung, his German contemporary known in the field of psychology and psychoanalysis, would quite agree⁹⁴. Dewey holds that the function of the mind is to provide man tools or instruments for coping with the environment (his 'instrumentalism'). Iqbal will partly agree that our thoughts are tools for coping with the

environment. However, he will agree with Dewey that the aim of thought is not so much to 'know' the world as to 'control' the environment. Iqbal has emphatically stressed upon the Quranic injunction of the Conquest of Nature ('*taskheer-i-Kainat*')⁹⁵ as the chief object of human life. He will agree with Dewey that the task of philosophy should not be 'disinterested speculation on ultimate questions'; it 'has a much more practical function'. Both hold that the object of philosophy is to 'resolve' conflicts and co-ordinate the values that arise in any human society'⁹⁶. Unlike Iqbal, however, Dewey does not believe in absolute values and ideals.

Dewey's views on religion have some value to us. He is highly critical of traditional religion with its appeal to 'supernatural', fixed values and dogmas. However, he recognizes a 'religious attitude,-- an attitude which must 'surrender once for all commitment to beliefs about matters of fact, whether physical'⁹⁷, social or metaphysical'. This attitude will lead to natural piety in man. Iqbal feels the need for a reconstruction of religious thought, as said before, but he does not wish to introduce a view which is miles away from the religion as we find in actual practice; that would be complete abandonment of religious belief, which Iqbal never envisaged in life. Later Dewey appears to be abandoning religions in the sense of creeds and cults. As he says, 'Just because the release of these values is so important, their identification with the creeds and cults of religions must be dissolved'⁹⁸. Iqbal will agree as regards creeds and cults of religions, but not beyond it. He will not agree with Dewey's definition of God as 'an

imaginative unification of ideal values, a projected union of the ideal and the actual'⁹⁹. To Iqbal, on the other hand, God is an all-embracing, omnipotent, omniscient supreme Person who is a real unifying force rather than a mere 'imaginative' unifying concept. God with his perfections can serve as the best binding force for humanity. As the Quran says, it is the idea of '*tauheed*' (Unity of God) which is the ultimate principle of unity for mankind; every other concept short of God leads to division of mankind. Instead of being an 'imaginative' unifier, God for Iqbal is the highest reality, the most veritable existence, the supreme Ego. Both Dewey and Iqbal are humanists, though both decried anthropomorphism in religion. Both betrayed faith in science, intelligence and education.

7.4 Iqbal and Religious Modernism

Contemporaneous with Iqbal in the West is, what is called the Modern Movement. John Macquarrie remarks, 'Confronted with the task of reconciling the Catholic faith with modern thought, the Modernists in general believed that traditional theology had been too intellectualist in its approach, and they believed that the desired reconciliation might be achieved by abandoning intellectualism and by applying to the religious problem the new philosophies of life and action'¹⁰⁰. Iqbal too was an anti-intellectualist in the field of knowledge in general, and of religion in particular. Iqbal will also agree with the Modernists that (i) religious truth is the kind of truth that must be lived, (ii) it is immanent in religious experience and is always in the process of development, and (iii) it must

develop in the locus of the traditional religion¹⁰¹. Among the Modernists Alfred Firmin Loisy (1857-1940) criticizes the German scholar' Harnack's view of Christianity as presenting a static and dead view of religion which has nothing to do with actual life. Loisy asks, 'why not find the essence of Christianity in the fulness and totality of its life, which shows movement and vitality just because it is life'¹⁰² Iqbal also regrets that during 'the last five hundred years religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary'¹⁰³. As a result, the world of Islam, which originally provided inspiration to the West, is now itself spiritually moving towards the West¹⁰⁴. To make it active and alive what is needed is the 'reconstructing' of the religious thought in Islam, as Iqbal has suggested over and again. Both truth and reality are dynamic and evolving: Loisy says, 'The human spirit is always in travail. Truth is no more immutable than man himself. It evolves with him, in him, by him;...' ¹⁰⁵ 'Mutability' is for him the only condition on which truth depends. Iqbal will agree with him on most of these points, though with some reservations. Again Iqbal will agree that truths 'have an immanent origin in life and action'¹⁰⁶, or at least that they have a bearing on life and action and draw upon them. Both Iqbal and Loisy may rightly be called 'activists' in this sense.

Among the Modernists we have Lucien Laberthonniere (1860-1932) who was more philosophical in his approach. Also an activist and vitalist, for him the 'aim of every philosophical doctrine is to give sense to life, to human existence,...' Philosophy for him is not 'a collection of abstract

propositions linked together and derived from certain axioms or fundamental principles'¹⁰⁷. Iqbal will agree with him on this point, as for him the basic concept is "deed" rather than "idea". Again Iqbal will agree with him, 'Religious truths are of no value to us if they are merely external; they must be recreated in ourselves'. The external formulations of belief are to be taken into experience and their truth lived out there'¹⁰⁸. Iqbal quotes a Muslim Sufi as saying, "...no understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is actually revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet"¹⁰⁹. This is the sense in which higher religion can be conceived. Like Iqbal he believes in a panentheistic position for both the divine and the human meet in man. Laberthonniere believes in 'the prolongation of the divine life into the life of man'¹¹⁰, and similarly for Iqbal the divine and the human combine in man and, in the most perfect way, in the '*mard-i-momin*' (the Perfect Man'¹¹¹).

Among the other representatives of Modernism we have Edouard Le Roy (1870-1954), a disciple and successor of Bergson, and George Tyrrell (1861-1909), the principle representative of the movement in the British Isles. Tyrrell makes a distinction between 'a static, abstract, intellectualized theology' and 'the living, dynamic experience of religion itself'. Iqbal will agree with him in upholding an 'evolving theology which is continually tested by living experience'¹¹². again, although advocating the pragmatic test for religious beliefs, Tyrrell has laid stress, perhaps more stress, on 'its devotional and spiritual consequences'. He says, 'Beliefs that have been found by continuous

and invariable experience to foster and promote the spiritual life of the soul must so far be in accord with the nature and the laws of that will-world with which it is the aim of religion to bring us into harmony'¹¹³. The promotion of spiritual life is one of the chief criteria for the truth of a religious belief, according to Iqbal also. However, it may be added that Iqbal cannot be called a Modernist in the sense in which the term is commonly used in the West. In the first place, it was a religious, rather a Christian, movement; and secondly it is marked by a syhthesis between the essential truths of religion and the essential truth of modernity. Tyrrell defines a 'Modernist' as 'a churchman of any sort who believes in the possibility of a synthesis between the essential truth of his religion and the essential truth of modernity'¹¹⁴.

Notes and References

1. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.169.
2. Eng. Tr. by Arthur Mitchell, ch. 1.
3. *Reconstruction*, p.46.
4. *Ibid*, pp.46-7.
5. *Ibid*, p.47.
6. *Ibid*
7. *Ibid*, p.48.

8. *Ibid*, p.49.
9. *Ibid*,p.51.
10. *Ibid*
11. *Ibid*
12. *Ibid*,p.52.
13. *Ibid*,p.53.
14. *Ibid*.
15. *Ibid*.
16. *Ibid*, pp.53-4.
17. *Ibid*,p.54.
18. *Ibid*
19. *Ibid*
20. *Ibid*, p.55.
21. *Ibid*, p.141.
22. *Ibid*,p.3.
23. According to Bergson, 'instinct' and 'intellect' develop on two divergent lines, while 'intuition' is instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely. *Creative Evolution*, p.194.
24. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.171.
25. *Ibid*
26. *Creative Evolution*, p.186.
27. *Ibid*, pp. 186-187.
28. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.51.
29. Iqbal takes 'thought' in the theoretical sense when he says in *Baal-i-Jibril*, (p. 86)

خرد کی گتھیاں سلجھا چکا میں
میرے مولا مجھے صاحب جنوں کر!

- 'I have untangled the skeins of intellect,
Grant me madness, O my Lord!'
30. He takes 'thought' in the 'practical' sense when he says in *Baal-i-Jabril*, p. 84.

گُذر جاعتل سے آگے کہ یہ نُور
چراغِ راہ ہے، منزل نہیں ہے !

- 'Transcend the bounds of 'intellect'
because it shows the way, not the tavern'.
31. Iqbal takes 'thought' in a third and higher sense also which is a 'non-discursive' sense, and which he calls the 'deeper' sense-- cf. *Reconstruction*, p. 6, 52. See also my book pp. 193.f.
32. *Ibid*, p.62.
33. *Ibid*.p.63.
34. *Ibid*,p.62.
35. Bergson,*op.cit.*,p.262.
36. Macquarrie,*op.cit.*,p.172.
37. *Ibid*.
38. *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 275.
39. *Ibid*.
40. Iqbal *op.cit.*,p.66.
41. *Ibid*
42. *Ibid*,p.56.
43. *Ibid*,p.181.

44. See my article on "Iqbal's Concept of God: an Appraisal", *Religious Studies*, Sept. 1983.
45. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.173.
46. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, intr.p.v.
47. *Ibid*, p. 198.
48. *Ibid*, p.52.
49. *L'Action*, p.xxiii.
50. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.173.
51. *Ibid*, p.174.
52. *Ibid*.
53. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.192.
54. *Ibid*
55. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.174.
56. *Ibid*
57. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.123.
58. Blondel, *op.cit.*, p.352.
59. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.28-31.
60. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.174.
61. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.6,52.
62. *Ibid*, p.31.
63. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.175.
64. *The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings*, p.30.
65. *Ibid*.
66. See my book *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 128f.
67. Peirce, *op.cit.*, p.29.
68. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.109.
69. Peirce, *op.cit.*, p.40.
70. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.176.
71. R.A. Nicholson, *The Secrets of the Self*, (an Eng. tr. of Iqbal's *Asrar-i-Khudi*), intr. p.xxv.

72. *Ibid*
73. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.176.
74. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.190.
75. *Ibid*, p.17.
76. *Ibid*, p.18.
77. *Ibid*, pp.23-24.
78. *Ibid*, p.24.
79. *Selected Papers in philosophy*, "What Pragmatism Means", p.204.
80. *Ibid*, p.206.
81. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, 177.
82. *Selected Papers*, pp. 99-124.
83. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.178.
84. *Reconstruction*, where Iqbal's approach to religious question is idealist-realist-spiritualist.
85. *Ibid*, p.192.
86. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp.506-07.
87. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.179.
88. *Ibid*
89. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p.10. The Quran, xxxv: 1.
90. *A Pluralistic Universe*, p.213.
91. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.179.
92. *Ibid*
93. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.84. cf. The Quran, VII:9.
94. See my book, *Iqbal's philosophy of Religion*, pt.I.ch.3.
95. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.11. cf. The Quran, XXXI:19 XVI 12-14.
96. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.180.
97. *The Quest for Certainty*, 288-289.
98. *A Common Faith*, P. 28.
99. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.181.

100. *Ibid*
101. *Ibid*, pp.181-182.
102. *L'Evangile et l'Anglais* (Eng.tr.), p.16.
103. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.7.
104. *Ibid*.
105. Loisy, *op.cit.*, p.191.
106. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.182.
107. *Oeuvres*, vol.1, pp.1-2.
108. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.183.
109. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.181.
110. *Essais de philosophie religieuse*, p.xxvi.
111. "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded by Abdul Karim al-Jilani", pb. *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, (ed) Syed Abdul Wahid, pp. 3ff.
112. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.186.
113. *Lex Orandi*, p.57.
114. *Christianity at the Crossroads*, p.5.

Chapter Eight

IQBAL AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY

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The philosophies of history 'take as their theme man himself, as he is revealed in his history and in the cultures which he has developed'¹. We have already discussed philosophers like Windelband, for whom the problem of value was paramount and the history of philosophy was itself a way of philosophizing², James Ward who emphasized the concreteness of history against the concreteness of the natural sciences³. These philosophies draw upon the evidence of anthropology and psychology. 'Religion itself taken to be one of the manifestations of man's spiritual life, which is of a different order and differently accessible from the purely natural phenomena of the physical world'⁴. John Macquarrie remarks, 'Varying degrees of value are assigned to religion by the philosophers of history and culture'⁵. Iqbal may be called a philosopher of history in a real sense in so far as he concentrates on man (ego)⁶, and has shown keen interest in the history of cultures and nations, especially the Muslim culture vis-a-vis other world cultures⁷. His main interests have been the 'individual', the 'society' and a comparative study of the various world cultures as is obvious from his earliest *mathnavis* entitled *Asrar-i-Khudi*⁸ (1913) and *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi*⁹ (1915). His *magnum opus* entitled *Javid-Namah* (1932) presents a beautiful study of the various cultures prevalent in Iqbal's times¹⁰.

8.1 Iqbal and German Philosophers of History

Among the contemporaries of Iqbal we have some important philosophers of history and culture in Germany. Prominent among them are Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) whom Macquarrie describes as the greatest philosopher of history and culture;¹¹ Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), a very staunch advocate of relativism and historicism in Germany; and Ernest Cassirer (1874-1945) who is known for his philosophy of culture.

W.Dilthey, a senior contemporary of Iqbal, had a particular interest in Kant. He makes a basic distinction between the natural and the human sciences-- the former dealing with the external facts, the latter with man's experience itself, from the inside¹². Like Iqbal, he claims a priority for the human sciences. He says, 'The human studies have an advantage over all knowledge of nature in that their object is not a phenomenon given in sensation,..., but immediate inner reality itself,...¹³'. Again, like Iqbal he maintains that the reality is comprehended by 'the whole personality'¹⁴, as writes Macquarrie. He believes that psychology has failed to understand the higher activities of the human mind (including his spiritual activities)-- a view very much close to that of Iqbal, as said before. Consequently, he proposes 'a wider kind of psychology'¹⁵. And there appears to be little reason for Iqbal to differ with him on this point.

Again, like Iqbal, Dilthey recognizes an intermediate place for history between the natural and

the human sciences. It serves as a bridge between the two kinds of sciences. For Iqbal also, as said before, there are three sources of knowledge (which he says under the inspiration of the Quran)-- viz., Nature, History, and 'Qalb' (i.e., inner perception). In his case also history occupies an intermediate position, bridging the gulf between the two. Dilthey offers a peculiar position regarding the human and historical studies, namely, the human sciences deal with particulars and individuals, and history which is the product of what he calls "objective mind" unifies "the manifold forms in which the common background subsisting among various individuals"¹⁶... According to Iqbal also the historical generalization 'suggests the possibility of a scientific treatment of the life of human societies regarded as organisms'¹⁷. Iqbal will agree with Dilthey that history is a seeking for the soul and that 'The historian "re lives" the experience which belonged to others, and this involves understanding in the fullest sense'¹⁸. It makes me 'aware of my own individuality'.

Again, religion which is one of the manifestations of the human spirit for Dilthey is, as Iqbal believed, closely associated with 'the metaphysical consciousness, the awareness of the enigma of life and the quest for a comprehensive solution'¹⁹. Such a solution is offered in the idea of God, says he; though such a transcendent reality is beyond human comprehension. History discloses the relative nature of all metaphysical systems and what results is the three world-views: viz., (i) the *naturalistic*, (ii) that of *objective idealism*, and (iii) the *idealism of freedom*. The naturalistic view held by the materialists and

positivists makes reason supreme; the objective idealism held by the world idealists gives primacy to feeling and favours a 'pantheistic' understanding of the world; while the idealism of freedom,²⁰ the third view, 'puts the will in first place, exalts personality, and forms the idea of a personal God'²¹. Both Dilthey and Iqbal will advocate the third world-view, though at the same time assigning truth, may be partial, to all; they affirm 'sovereignty of the mind in face of each one of them,...'²². Iqbal's three stages of religious life may be said to correspond, at least roughly, to these three world-views, e.g., naturalistic view goes for what Iqbal calls 'Faith', objective idealism with 'Thought', and idealism of freedom with 'Discovery'.

Oswald Spengler, not only a contemporary of Iqbal, but one whose views on the history of cultures has been subjected to criticism by Iqbal, is the author of the classical work entitled *The Decline of the West*. In his chapter on "The Spirit of Muslim Culture", Iqbal discusses his two chapters devoted to the problem of Arabian culture. He urges that Spengler's views are 'based on a complete misconception of the nature of Islam as a religious movement, and of the cultural activity which it initiated'²³. He then discusses his main thesis 'that each culture is a specific organism, having no point of contact with cultures that historically precede or follow it'²⁴. What he purports to establish is that 'each culture has its own peculiar way of looking at things which is entirely inaccessible to men belonging to a different culture'²⁵. His main object, says Iqbal, is that 'this 'anti-classical SPIRIT of European culture is entirely due to the specific

genius of Europe, and not any inspiration she may have received from the culture of Islam,...'²⁶ Iqbal clearly appreciates Spengler's view of the spirit of modern culture, but adds that 'the anticlassical spirit of the modern culture is due to the inspiration which it received from the culture immediately preceding it,... I am afraid Spengler's anxiety to establish this thesis has completely perverted his vision of Islam as a cultural movement'²⁷. He accuses him of ignorance of Islam on the problems of 'time', 'self' as a free centre of experience, etc. as they figure in the religious experience of Islam.²⁸ Again, Spengler seems to think that Islam amounts to a complete negation of the self'²⁹. There cannot be a greater misconception of the Islamic view of 'self'. Iqbal alludes to Spengler's distinction between two ways of making the world our own, viz., one 'intellectual', and the other which may be called 'vital', and adds that the latter way of appropriating the world is what the Quran calls '*imân*'. To the above charge of 'self-negation' Iqbal replies, 'in the higher Sufism of Islam unitive experience is not the finite ego effacing its own identity by some sort of absorption into the infinite Ego; it is rather the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite'³⁰. He quotes the Holy Prophet saying that 'religious experience in Islam' 'consists in the "creation of Divine attributes in man"'.³¹ In fact, Spengler's position is based on a certain misconstruction regarding the Islamic view of 'time', 'destiny', and the nature of the 'self'.

In confirmation of his own position that the Muslim culture has decidedly inspired the modern Western

culture Iqbal quotes from another German scholar of his own time Dr. Robert Briffault, who wrote *The Making of Humanity*. It will suffice to quote here a part of the long quotation used by Iqbal in his lectures"... "The Greeks systematized, generalized, and theorized, but the patient ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive knowledge, the minute methods of science, detailed and prolonged observation and experimental inquiry were altogether alien to the Greek temperament... What we call science arose in Europe as a result of a new spirit of inquiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, observation, measurement, of the development of Mathematics in a form unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced into the European world by the Arabs"³². He adds that though science was 'the most momentous contribution of Arab civilization to the modern world', 'Other and manifold influences from the civilization of Islam communicated its first glow to European life'³³. He further adds, 'For although there is not a single aspect of European growth in which the decisive influence of Islamic culture is not traceable, nowhere is it so clear and momentous as in ...--natural science and the scientific spirit'.³⁴ All this suffices to refute Spengler's position on Muslim culture vis-a-vis Western culture.

Spengler holds that at the root of each culture lies a peculiar world-conception. As said before his view of culture is 'cyclical'; that historical unit is the 'culture' and each culture is self contained. Each culture has a peculiar symbol: e.g., the symbol for the Greek culture was 'proportion', he holds, and for

modern culture it is 'infinity'. He adds that the symbol of infinity leads to world-exploration, Copernican astronomy, Western imperialism, and so on.³⁵ Iqbal urges that it was the Muslim Culture which was marked by 'infinity' centuries before the modern culture had its inception. He points out that it was Nasiruddin Tusi (1201-74) who furnished a basis for 'the hyperspace movement of our time.'³⁶ The Quran had already laid foundation for the ever-expanding universe as against the static universe of the West. Al-Beruni utilized the idea of 'function' in a modern sense and thereby showed 'the insufficiency of a static view of the universe'.³⁷ Remarking on this Iqbal says, 'The function-idea introduced the element of time in our world-picture. It turns the fixed into the variable, and sees the universe not as being but as becoming'.³⁸ He adds, 'Spengler thinks that the mathematical idea of function is the symbol of the West of which "no other culture gives even a hint". In view of al-Beruni's generalizing Newton's formula of interpolation from trigonometrical function to any function whatever, Spengler's claim had no foundation in fact. Iqbal remarks that 'Al-Beruni took a definite step forward towards what Spengler describes as chronological number which signifies the mind's passage from being to becoming'.³⁹ In fact, all recent developments in the fields of science and mathematics owe much to the Muslim contributions in these fields. All this disproves Spengler's view of independent cultural units having no interrelations like the 'windowless monads' of Leibniz.

Spengler's view of religion stems from his general views on culture in so far as for him religion is one of the manifestations of culture. Consequently he holds that religion is relative to the culture to which it belongs and is meaningful only within that culture. His views have been endorsed by Ruth Benedict⁴⁰ in our own times. Spengler bases his position on his general theory of truth, which is, 'Truths are truths only in relation to a particular mankind.'⁴¹ Spengler's position on religion is acceptable only if we concede that it is one of the products of culture. Iqbal takes a reverse position and holds like T.S. Eliot⁴² that religion is among those factors and influences which go a long way to fashion and colour a given culture. According to him, Islam is not only a religion, but is in the main a cultural movement-- a fact which Spengler has completely ignored. It is religion as well as a complete code of life which colours all the various aspects of culture peculiar to the Muslim mind. Iqbal, as we know, has stressed upon the 'anti-classical' approach of the culture of Islam. He claims that it was the cultural movement initiated by the Quran which terminated in the birth of the modern empirical attitude.⁴³ Iqbal thus rejects Spengler's "cultural relativism" in the field of religion.

Ernest Cassirer also treats of religion as one of the elements within a diversified cultural life alongside science, language, myth, etc. Again he appears to relegate religion to a means to the goal of freedom and 'self-liberation'. He says, 'Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man's progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion,

science are various phases in this process'⁴⁴. Thus Cassirer has reduced religion to a mere element and means, while for Iqbal, as seen before, religion is an expression of the whole man rather than any of its aspects. Again where they will part ways: for Cassirer religion does not present a picture of reality; it only contributes to man's cultural life and to the world which his mind constructs. For Iqbal, religion is a means to reach reality, and not only to present it. Nor is religion one of the symbols only; it is one of the genuine human experiences capable of yielding cognition of reality.

8.2 Iqbal and Historicism, Historical Idealism

The two cognate movements appeared in the West around the beginning of the present century, namely, historicism and historical idealism. They had their exponents on the Continent and in Britain especially. Some names worth mentioning are Benedetto Croce (1866-1953) and Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) in Italy, and Robin George Collingwood (1899- 1943), Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975), Wilburn Marshall Urban (1873-1952) and Christopher Dawson (1889-1970), mostly Britishers. Their fundamental presupposition has been that history is the master-subject to which all other disciplines, including religion, should be reduced with a view to having a better understanding. Most of them also gave primacy to man and to his spiritual nature and self- knowledge.

Benedetto Croce, an Italian contemporary of Iqbal, may properly be called an historical spiritualist or

idealist. Briefly stated, his basic positions are: philosophy is identified with history, its theme is the spirit of man himself, and its aim 'self-knowledge'. He believes that spirit is the only reality, and denies that there is a nature independent of the spirit. Spirit is conceived as a purely immanent process and nothing is real outside of the process of spirit, and we have its highest manifestation in the spiritual life of man⁴⁵. Iqbal will agree with him so far as the primacy of the spirit is concerned, and also the position of nature vis-a-vis spirit. But he will not go with him when he rejects the idea of the transcendent Spirit or God; for Iqbal, on the contrary, God is himself the ultimate spiritual principle of the world. As he says acutely, 'Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self'⁴⁶. He expressly says that 'the ultimate character of reality is spiritual.'⁴⁷ 'According to him, God is the spiritual principle behind all phenomena and its ultimate ground'⁴⁸.

Iqbal will also agree that the world is the process of spirit, an eternal stream of events in which there is nothing fixed or permanent. Action, movement, development, creative becoming are the characteristics of this process. This position makes Croce both a spiritualist and an activist⁴⁹--the two epithets which justly and with same force apply to Iqbal also, for he also believed in spirit and in action or incessant struggle and movement. To quote his one verse out of many

بدریا غلط و با محوش در آویز
حیات جاوداں اندر تیز است

'Plunge in the sea and grapple with waves:
Eternal life consists in struggling so;
(Eng. Tr. M. Hadi Hussain, *A Message from the East*)

However, in his account of the spiritual life and its development, Croce does not go beyond moral life of man⁵¹ like so many other Westerners, and it was perhaps this position which led him to the rejection of a transcendent Spirit or God. In fact, like Nietzsche⁵² and other great Western minds Croce too was moored to the ground by the empirical and scientific traditions of the West. Consequently his spiritualism failed to rise above the ground and soar into the depths of the heavenly skies. Iqbal, on the contrary, believes in preying, not only planets and heavens, but even the Sublime Beauty, that is God. He beautifully says in a Persian verse,

در دشتِ جنونِ من جبریلِ زبوں صیدے
یزداں بہ کمند آورے بہت مردانہ

'Where I roam in my mad pursuit
The angel Gabriel is but small game.
Come, O my manly Courage, Cust,
A Lasso upon God Himself:'

[Eng. tr. M. Hadi Hussain]

Thus, according to Iqbal human development passes beyond all the various stages of development recounted by Croce into the realm of spiritual heights. Moral development for him is only a stage, though an indispensable stage, towards the final end. As a result of his half-way approach, Croce was led to deny a place to religion among the human activities. Religion for him is an imperfect and inferior kind of knowledge,⁵⁴ which is displaced by philosophy, says Croce. As said before, for Iqbal religion is not any of the departments of the human mind; it is rather an expression of the whole personality.

Next important philosophers of history and culture are Robin Collingwood, Arnold J. Toynbee, both British. Both reduce philosophy to history. The task of philosophy, according to Collingwood, is 'a critical review of the various forms of human experience'⁵⁵-- a task which Iqbal undertook in the Lecture-II of his book⁵⁶. He treats these various experiences as so many maps of same territory, but each map is in a different projection'⁵⁷. Iqbal also recommends the need for an examination of the various levels of human experience, and in the main lays stress on a need for examining scientifically and philosophically the peculiar experience called the religious or 'mystic' experience. In his last lecture on "Is Religion Possible?"⁵⁸ Iqbal, however, will not go with him that religion is, like other experiences, a "distortion" of the spirit's knowledge of itself,⁵⁹ though he will concede that if religion be taken for an inner experience only, then it

is equally partial in its attainment of the knowledge of reality. However, for Iqbal, religion is the whole truth, rather than a partial truth⁶⁰. Collingwood regards religion an important function of the human soul. Iqbal will not agree with him that even the ultimate religious beliefs and presuppositions are historically-conditioned, and therefore they cannot be regarded as true or false. Iqbal's position on this point, like that of William James (whom he quotes in this connection), is that the states or experiences may be historically or otherwise conditioned, but their value is none the less independent of that⁶¹. Again, for Collingwood religious beliefs 'simply reflect the historical or cultural climate' of the particular time to which they belong, though he adds that our attitude to them should be one of "unquestioning acceptance"⁶². Iqbal, however, will not concede this cultural relativist position on religion. To him religious truths are ultimate truths, having universal and unconditional import.

Arnold Joseph Toynbee, a renowned British historian and historicist of Iqbal's times, holds like Spengler that each society has its own independent history. In his monumental work, *A Study of History*, he recognizes twenty-six civilizations and undertakes a comparative study of them. Toynbee is usually criticised for his naturalistic approach to history. Thus Collingwood says, '...he regards the life of a society as a natural and not a mental life, something at bottom merely biological...; he regards history as a mere spectacle not experiences into which he must enter...' ⁶³ In fairness to Toynbee, he does not think of

the various societies as completely isolated and independent (as done by Spengler); there may be relations of affiliation among some of them. As compared to Spengler, he attaches more importance to religion which is not culture-bound as he conceded that religion can pass on from one civilization to another, and be strengthened in the process. Thus he suggests that while the movement of civilization is cyclical, that of religion may be continuous⁶⁴. Iqbal, however, though not accepting cyclical movement of civilization, will certainly be happy over the position Toynbee assigns to religion as against Spengler's cultural relativism. Again he concedes that all great religions have the same essence which consists in 'their recognition of a spiritual Presence higher than man himself in the universe...' ⁶⁵ He concludes that 'the missions of the higher religions are not competitive; they are complementary' ⁶⁶. Again something where Iqbal would go with him, and in also what follows next. That is, he preaches the need for co-existence among various religions, and for inculcating 'tolerance of the Eastern religions' ⁶⁷.

Christopher Dawson, another contemporary of Iqbal, holds, like Iqbal, that religion is the key to culture. He says, 'Even a religion which is explicitly other-worldly and appears to deny all the values and standards of human society may, nevertheless, exert a dynamic influence on culture and provide the driving forces in movements of special change' ⁶⁸. Unlike Spengler and Toynbee, Dawson believes that religion is profoundly influential in any culture. He alludes to

Asian cultures in which religion established a sacred social order which might endure unchanged for centuries. He shows through his analytical study that 'the driving force in Western culture is the spirit of Catholic Christianity'⁶⁹ despite all its so-called secular appearance. He believes that the Western culture is becoming more and more secularized and there has emerged a belief in a theory of 'automatic progress'⁷⁰. But the events of the present century have shown that the progress is not so automatic, and that the structure of this culture is so fragile that it may easily fall down. This consideration, says Dawson very rightly, should drive us to 'the spiritual roots of our culture'. He warns, 'It would be a strange fatality if the great revolution by which Western man has subdued nature to his purposes should end in the loss of his own spiritual freedom, but this might well happen if an increasing technical control of the state over the life and thought of its members should coincide with a qualitative decline in the standards of our culture'⁷¹. Thus religion continues to have a vital function, both as a 'principle of continuity' and as a 'creative source'⁷². His views will certainly appeal to one who has pretensions to a deeper study and understanding of Iqbal's thought, for Iqbal would certainly accept his views on religion vis-a-vis culture.

8.3 Iqbal and some thinkers on Theology, History & Culture

In this connection we have thinkers like William Ralph Inge (1860-1954), Friedrich Von Hugel (1852-

1925), and Friedrich Heiler (1892-1967), also contemporaries of Iqbal and interested in theology, history and culture.

W.R. Inge was a Professor at Cambridge towards the end of Iqbal's stay in the West--most probably the period when Iqbal was in 'Germany in connection with his doctoral work (i.e. 1907-8). He later became Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, London (1911-34). However, there is little possibility that Iqbal came into any direct contact with him during his stay abroad, though he might have known some of his ideas, maybe through reading, though there is little evidence for that either. However, there are certain fundamental ideas on which Iqbal and Inge agree considerably. Thus for both not 'material progress but the abiding spiritual values of truth, beauty and good-ness can provide a stable foundation for our society. These values however, are grounded in a transcendent God,...'⁷³ Both look for 'a religious and even a mystical interpretation of life, having as its climax the soul's inward ascent to God'⁷⁴. Iqbal's position is rather more elaborate and comprehensive when he suggests, 'Humanity needs three things today--a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import in the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis'⁷⁵.

Inge condemns modern rationalism as one-sided, like Iqbal, though both assigning 'reason' its due place. Inge again, like Iqbal, takes reason in a wider sense. Iqbal's treatment of reason, however, is more thorough

and comprehensive than any of the Western thinkers, including Inge. For Iqbal, as said before, reason is conceivable at three levels, namely, (i) theoretical reason, (ii) practical reason, and (iii) non-discursive reason which he describes as the deeper movement of thought in his lectures. Again like Iqbal, he advocates converging of reason and religion towards the selfsame goal. He says like his Muslim contemporary that 'there is in the last resort no essential difference between religion and philosophy:⁷⁶ commenting on his thought John Macquarrie says, 'The mysticism of which he speaks is no emotional subjectivism, but a controlled activity of the whole personality in which reason has its place'⁷⁷. For Iqbal also, as said before, religion is an activity of the whole man, and not a departmental affair. Iqbal rather more concretely believes that there should be an amalgam of reason and faith in a true religion which alone can afford a vision of the total and ultimate reality. He says in *Javid-Namah*⁷⁸,

زیر کی از عشق گرد و حق شناس

کارِ عشق از زیر کی محکم اساس

عشق چوں بازیر کی سہر شود

نقش بند عالم دیگر شود

'Only through love intelligence gets to
know God,
love's labours find firm grounding in
intelligence;
When love is companioned by
intelligence,
It has the power to design another
world'.

[A.J. Arberry P. 58]

Inge appreciates neo-Platonism, especially the thought of Plotinus, for realizing 'the ideal of combining rational thinking with a religious or mystical apprehension of God'⁷⁹. Inge remarks that Plotinus achieved the almost complete fusion of religion and philosophy. According to Iqbal the said fusion was best brought about by Islam which is not only a religion, but a code of life ('*shariah*'). Inge's guide was Plotinus, Iqbal's Jalal uddin Rumi and above all the Holy Prophet himself. Both Inge and Iqbal believe in the perennial philosophy. Inge believes that Platonism wedded with Christianity can afford real guidance for the modern civilization, Iqbal firmly believes that only Islamic teachings can put modern civilization on the right track and cure its ills. Both will agree that modern civilization needs be saved from both shallow rationalism and irrationalism; that what is required is a right blend of reason and faith both. As said before, for such a blend Inge looks to a fusion of Platonism and Christianity, whereas Iqbal has to look to Islam understood as a '*deen*' (religion) and a '*shariah*' (a code of life). The great German sage Goethe was

appreciating this completeness of Islam when he wrote to Eckermann, 'you see that nothing is wanting in this doctrine that with all our systems, we have got no further; and that, generally speaking, no one can get further'⁸⁰.

Friedrich von Hugel, a leading Roman Catholic thinker from Austria, *preached* tolerance among religions. He insisted upon 'the recognition, by any one religion, of elements of worth variously present in the other religions, together with the careful avoidance of all attempts at forced conformity'⁸¹. Iqbal will agree with him for Islam has laid great stress on mutual tolerance and forbade any coercion in religion: the Quran says, 'Let there be no compulsion in religion'⁸². He has appreciated the efforts of non-Muslim saints and reformers like Lord Buddha, Lord Krishna, Bhartari Hari, Guru Nanak, to name a few, and has recognized their place in the development and evolution of the world. Again Iqbal will agree that religion is 'the apprehension of the reality of God'⁸³. Both agree that God is 'given or revealed to us in experience'⁸⁴. To Iqbal religious experience is one of the genuine human experiences having cognitive import; that God reveals himself to man in religious experience⁸⁵. Iqbal will agree that God is 'an immensely rich and complex reality'⁸⁶. Our apprehension must always fall short of his actual reality and richness. There is mystery in God and, like Iqbal, Hugel was also interested in accounting for the presence of evil and suffering in the universe. He attaches much importance to the 'direct mystical apprehension of God'⁸⁷ though, like Iqbal, he insists on

the 'transcendence' of God--both Hugel and Iqbal were 'panentheists' and not pantheists.

In his analysis of the modern Western civilization, Hugel discerns three elements or influences, to be more precise, which go to form its warp and woof--namely, Hellenism, Christianity, and science. Hellenism gives 'thirst for richness and harmony', Christianity 'the revelation of personality and depth', and science 'the apprehension of fact and law'⁸⁸. He believes that all the three are mingled in right proportion. Iqbal, however, regrets that science has over-dominated the other two elements with the result that the modern civilization is plagued by 'excessive rationalism' and 'over-intellectualism'⁸⁹. He has traced all ills back to these two sources which have distorted the very skein of the fabric of this civilization. It has led modern man to materialism and atheism and the result is (using Iqbal's own words), '...the modern man has ceased to live soulfully, i.e., from within. In the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless egoism and his infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness'⁹⁰. Iqbal's analysis of the modern civilization is more realistic and thorough; it is basically diagnostic and prescriptive in its nature, whereas Hugel's approach was basically descriptive. Again, according to Hugel religion reveals itself in 'Historical forms -- in institutions such as the Church, and in sensuous media such as rituals,

sacraments and the like'⁹¹. According to Iqbal, on the contrary, 'religion, which in its higher manifestations is neither dogma, nor priesthood, nor ritual, can alone ethically prepare the modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves,...'⁹² For him religion is a genuine experience of man.

Friedrich Heiler, basically a Roman catholic, 'looks beyond the Christian Church to the spiritual bond which unites all men'⁹³. Like his predecessors he also resorts to a historical approach to religion which has produced in him a purely catholic attitude, says John Macquarrie. Iqbal will appreciate that Heiler for one has felt the need for going beyond the Christian Church, in the form in which we find it today, and a serious and sincere attempt at transcending would have taken him to Islam which is the purest form of religion and a confirmation of the *Christian* religion in its purer and original form as it was revealed to the Christ. His transcending will not of course mean the abandoning of all religion and going into the realm of secularism and irreligion: that Heiler would never recommend.

Heiler has shown special interest in the study of prayer and surveyed the whole history of prayer from its primitive to more developed forms in advanced religions. 'Prayer', says he, 'is the central phenomenon of religion, the very hearthstone of all piety'⁹⁴. He believes that wherever there is religion, there is prayer, and that any religion can be 'assessed by the prayers in which it expresses itself'.⁹⁵ Iqbal has also

shown keen interest in prayer in his lecture entitled "The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer"⁹⁶. However, they differ in their respective approaches to prayer. Heiler holds that the essence of prayer is 'the expression of primitive impulsion to a higher, richer, intenser life'⁹⁷. For Iqbal, on the other hand, prayer is by no means "a primitive impulsion" though it is one of the oldest institutions in human history. Heiler prefers 'the personal, dramatic, petitionary type of prayer as over against the more reflective, contemplative type which is associated with certain philosophical and mystical attitudes'.⁹⁸ According to Iqbal, 'The act of prayer as aiming at knowledge resembles reflection...'⁹⁹ Though he adds that it is by no means mere abstract reflection. It resembles reflection in being 'assimilative', 'but the assimilative process in the case of prayer draws itself closely together and thereby acquires a power unknown to pure thought'¹⁰⁰. What is unique in Iqbal, he regards prayer as 'a normal vital act by which the little island of our personality suddenly discovers its situation in a larger whole of life'¹⁰¹. Iqbal going a step further proclaims that 'all search for knowledge is essentially a form of prayer. The scientific observer of Nature is a kind of mystic seeker in the act of prayer'¹⁰². He further adds, 'In fact, prayer must be regarded as a necessary complement of the intellectual activity of the observer of Nature'¹⁰³. For Iqbal prayer is not only a cognitive act, but also a vital act, an act which, besides vision, bestows 'power' on the one who prays. On the one hand, it enables the searching ego to affirm 'itself in the very moment of self-negation'¹⁰⁴, says Iqbal; and on

the other hand, it helps fulfill 'the aspiration to realize this essential unity of mankind as a fact in life by demolishing all barriers which stand between man and man'¹⁰⁵. Thus for Iqbal prayer has a deep social import also as is obvious from congregational prayers on which Islam has laid so much stress. However, unlike Heiler, for Iqbal prayer is a reflective and meditative as well as a vital and social act which brings about cohesion between men of different races, creeds, and colours-an aspect of prayer overlooked by Heiler. What is unique in Iqbal, scientific observation of nature must be supplimented by prayer, for the former gives 'vision', the latter 'power'; and he adds, 'Vision without power does bring moral elevation but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity'¹⁰⁶.

Notes and References

1. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.121.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid*
4. *Ibid*, p.122.
5. *Reconstruction*, P.124.
6. *Ibid*, p.124.
7. *Ibid*, see "The Spirit of Muslim culture".
8. This small *mathnavi* in Persian discusses the principles which govern the development and fortification of the ego in man.

9. This *mathnavi* in Persian discusses the principles of social reconstruction and an ideal society.
10. See my paper on "Javid Nama: A Study of the World Civilizations" presented to the Second International Iqbal Congress, Nov. 9-11, 1983 (Lahore).
11. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.122.
12. *Ibid*, p.123.
13. H.A.Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey--An Introduction*, p.125.
14. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.123.
15. *Ibid*
16. Hodges, *op.cit.*, p.118.
17. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.139.
18. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.124.
19. *Ibid*
20. *Ibid*, pp.124-25.
21. *Ibid*, p.124.
22. Hodges, *op.cit.*, p.156.
23. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.142.
24. *Ibid*
25. *Ibid*, p.143
26. *Ibid*
27. *Ibid*
28. *Ibid*, pp.143-44.
29. *Ibid*, p.109.
30. *Ibid*, p.110.
31. *Ibid*
32. *Ibid*, pp.130-31.
33. *Ibid*, p.130.
34. *Ibid*
35. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.126.

36. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.132.
37. *Ibid*, p.133.
38. *Ibid*
39. *Ibid*
40. Benedict Ruth, *Patterns of Culture*, (London: Routledge, 1968).
41. Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Vol.I, p.46.
42. Eliot T.S., *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture*, (Saber & Saber, 1948).
43. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.17.
44. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, p.228.
45. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.128.
46. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.56.
47. *Ibid*, p.38.
48. *Ibid*
49. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.128.
50. *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal* (Persian), / *Payam-i-Mashriq*, p.215/45.
51. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.128.
52. Iqbal regrets that 'Nietzsche was a failure, and his failure was mainly due to his intellectual progenitors such as Schopenhauer, Darwin, and Lange whose influence completely blinded him to the real significance of his vision - *The Reconstruction*, p.195.
53. *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal* (Persian) *Payam-i-Mashriq*, p.336/166.
54. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.129.
55. *Ibid*, p.131.
56. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.28ff.
57. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.131.
58. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp.181ff.

59. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
60. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.2.
61. *Ibid*, pp.23-24.
62. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.132.
63. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, p.163.
64. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.133.
65. *Ibid*, pp.133-34.
66. Toynbee, *A Historian's Approach to Religion*, p.296.
67. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.134.
68. Dawson, *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture* *op.cit.*, p.7.
69. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.136.
70. *Ibid*, p.135.
71. Dawson, *op.cit.*, pp.6-7.
72. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
73. *Ibid*, p.148.
74. *Ibid*
75. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.178.
76. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.149.
77. *Ibid*
78. *Javaid Nama*, p.65.
79. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
80. *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann*, (Eng. tr. by j. Oxenford)), V.I., p.391.
81. Hugel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, Series I, p.66.
82. *The Holy Quran*, II: 265.
83. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.150.
84. *Ibid*
85. *Ibid*
86. *Ibid*

87. *Ibid*
88. *Ibid*
89. *Ibid*
90. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp. 187-88.
91. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 151.
92. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 189.
93. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
94. Heiler, *Prayer*, p. xiii.
95. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 151.
96. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp. 88-94.
97. Heiler, *op.cit.*, p. 335.
98. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 152.
99. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 90.
100. *Ibid*
101. *Ibid*
102. *Ibid*, p. 91.
103. *Ibid*
104. *Ibid*, p. 92.
105. *Ibid*, p. 94.
106. *Ibid*, p. 92.

Chapter Nine

IQBAL AND NEW REALISM

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New Realism 'is one of the most important philosophical developments in recent times -- certainly the most important in the English-speaking countries'¹. Undoubtedly it is one of the most important philosophical 'movements' in modern thought. This movement, as we find it in the West, is generally 'indifferent or hostile to religion, and so makes little contribution to religious thought. The movement itself', Macquarrie adds, 'marks a widening of gulf between philosophy and theology,...'² The word 'realism' stands for the 'view that we have knowledge of a real world which exists quite independently of our cognition of it. Realism is regarded as opposite to idealism,...'³ It is, in fact, a reaction against the idealist philosophy which was quite current during all these centuries. As John Passmore has remarked, 'the "New Realism" brought together these converging tendencies; it owed much to Meinong, more to Mach and James, and it acknowledged the help of Moore and Russell in the battle against idealism'⁴. This movement, which is a third force between idealism and materialistic naturalisms of the nineteenth century, had its inception at the run of the present century.

As said before, it is generally believed that New Realism is anti-religious, or at least incompatible with religious belief. This is obvious from its votaries and protagonists which are usually discussed under this head. However, as Macquarrie has actually remarked 'there is in realism no inherent predisposition against religion'⁵. In support of his contention he invokes the cases of Thomism, 'which is a moderate realism', and

Franz Brentano, 'one of the most influential pioneers of modern realism' who 'was a lifelong theist and for a time a Roman Catholic priest'⁶. However, he adds, 'the new realist movement contained strong analytical and anti-metaphysical tendencies which militated against traditional theology and philosophy of religion'⁷. Iqbal was a realist inasmuch as he believed in a 'factual reality in some sense outside the narrow circuit of our personallity'⁸, though he was deeply steeped in religious passion. In fact, he believes that true religion (Islam) 'is a harmony of idealism and positivism'⁹, rather than a mere reaction to a phantasy in the mind. In Iqbal we find a blend of the real and the ideal, thought and intuition, science and religion which gives rise to a type of 'realism' which may properly be called 'idealist-realism', a movement which is now gaining ground in the Western philosophy of religion advocated by prof. H.D. Lewis of London University (1910-) and his followers (during many of his conversations with the author he acknowledged that his thought was in line with Iqbal's)¹⁰. The modern 'neo' realists, being empiricists basically, have been atheistic and anti-idealistic, a point on which there is a wide gulf between them and Iqbal.

9.1 Continental Realists and Iqbal

In this connection we will discuss the Austrian thinker F. Brentano (1838-1917); and some renowned British thinkers like J.E. Moore (1873-1958), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), all contemporaries of Iqbal.

Franz Brentano, a clergyman, psychologist and philosopher from Austria and a very senior contemporary of Iqbal, believes in the objective and purposive nature of mind when he says, 'there is no hearing without the heard, no believing without the believed, no hoping without the hoped for, no striving without the striven for, no joy without the enjoyed, and so with other mental phenomena'¹¹. Iqbal also believes in the objective and teleological character of mind. As said before, he has rejected Bergson on his ignoring the teleological aspect of mind, though appreciating him for his keen study of time and consciousness. As Iqbal emphatically remarks, 'On the analogy of our conscious experience, therefore, Reality is not a blind vital impulse wholly unilluminated by idea. It is through and through teleological'¹². He stresses that ends and purposes 'form the warp and woof of conscious experience'¹³. He concludes that the mental life is teleological¹⁴. Like Iqbal, Brentano's realism was 'theistic', though deviating from the orthodox view¹⁵. In defence of theism he wrote his famous work *Von Dasein Gottes*. His idea of God also tallies with that of Iqbal, though with definite reservations. Like him, Brentano holds that God is not immutable, conceived as dwelling in eternity, 'but a God who has been brought into the temporal process and is subject to change. The imperfection of the world points to a God whose works are advancing towards perfection, and who must in some sense 'be himself developing'.¹⁶ Though Iqbal does not concede that God is changing in the ordinary sense of change, but Brentano qualifies this change with the phrase 'in

some sense'. However, Iqbal admits some form of evolution of the Absolute¹⁷, and bases his view that the universe is expanding and developing every moment on the verdict of the Quran.¹⁸

George Edward Moore was one of the most influential contemporaries of Iqbal's times.¹⁹ As Macquarrie remarks, 'Moore was one of the major influences in changing the course of British philosophy in the present century.'²⁰ What the modern philosophy owes to Moore is the important shifts from idealism to realism and also away from system-building towards analysis.²¹ He published his famous work *Refutation of Idealism* (1903) only two years before Iqbal left for England and Germany, and this book proved 'a turning-point in British philosophy'²², says John Macquarrie. He was, however, a one-sided realist -- a position which pushed him into many difficulties and scepticism. His basic principle in metaphysics (though he rejected metaphysics) was that we should distinguish between a 'sense-datum' and the 'act of sensing' which led him to the position that in an act of awareness 'its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if we were not aware'²³. Such a position led him to pluralism -- another anti-thesis of idealism. He completely rejected Hegelian absolutism. Iqbal 'however, was saved such an embarrassment by sticking to idealism, though at the same time advocating a realist position. Consequently, as said before, his position on knowledge or 'awareness' is Kantian rather than Moorean., and this makes a lot of difference in their over-all respective positions. John Wisdom tells how he went to Moore's lecture on the soul, hoping to

get some light on religious and metaphysical questions; but he was disappointed to find 'the minute analysis of ordinary statements, an analysis in which Moore excelled.'²⁴ He described it as "a game of logic". In his ethical views, however, Moore was a non-naturalist and an intuitionist. Macquarrie describes his ethics as 'a humanist one'²⁵. He describes his thought as 'realism, pluralism, analysis and humanism'²⁶. Iqbal's thought may rightly be called a blend of idealism, realism, spiritualism and humanism.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell, a British contemporary and an encyclopaedic philosopher. During Iqbal's time he had exerted very potent influence on world thought. He has written volumes for the technical philosopher as well as for the common educated reader. He can rightly be described as one of the most prolific philosophical writers in the world. It may seem both odd and interesting to the reader to undertake a comparison of thinkers from such a diverse lot as Russell and Iqbal; However, the latter has himself shown some interest in the former's thought, discussing some of his ideas in his lectures.²⁷ He has discussed in his second lecture Russell's treatment of 'matter' and 'movement'-- the two important metaphysical concepts, during the course of his own study of the nature of 'matter' and 'reality'. He quotes Russell, "The theory of Relativity by merging time into space-time", says Russell, "has damaged the traditional notion of substance more than all the arguments of the philosophers. Matter, for common sense, is something which persists in time and moves in space. But for the modern relativity physics this view is no longer

tenable. A piece of matter has become not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of inter-related events. The solidity is gone, and with it the characteristics that to the materialist made matter seem more real than fleeting thoughts"²⁸. In this passage Russell has appreciated Einstein's contribution to physics, and Iqbal has quoted him with approval. Again, Iqbal discusses Russell's refutation of Zeno's view of 'time', 'space', and 'movement'. Russell has based his refutation on Cantor's famous theory of Continuity. Iqbal says, 'Bertrand Russell's argument proceeds on Cantor's theory of mathematical continuity which he looks upon as one of the most important discoveries of modern mathematics'²⁹. Iqbal then quotes a long passage from Russell to prove that time and space are continuous and not infinitesimals as conceived by Zeno.³⁰ He adds, 'Thus Bertrand Russell proves the reality of movement on the basis of Cantor's theory of continuity. The reality of movement means the independent reality of space and the objectivity of Nature'³¹. Iqbal, however, subjects Russell's theory of space and time to the following criticism. He says, 'The mathematical conception of continuity as infinite series applies not to movement regarded as an act, but rather to the picture of movement as viewed from the outside. The act of movement, i.e. movement as lived and not as thought, does not admit of any divisibility. The flight of the arrow observed as a passage in space is divisible, but its flight regarded as an act, apart from its realization in space, is one and incapable of partition into a multiplicity. In partition lies its destruction'³². Thus he

concludes that 'the identity of continuity and the infinite divisibility of space', which is implied by Russell's theory, does not solve the difficulty.³³ We have already discussed Iqbal's objections to Einstein's theory of Relativity in the relevant section.

Russell being a dry empiricist and a thorough logician, it was but natural for him to reject most of the religious dogmas, i.e. Christian dogmas. Unlike Iqbal, he 'states a frankly materialistic view of the world, and rejects the religious interpretation...'³⁴ By applying his logic he rejects immortality and the existence of God. He argues that religion represents the cosmic powers as good, but 'the world of fact, after all, is not good'³⁵. Iqbal also looks at the presence of evil in the world as 'the crux of theism.'³⁶ Russell's fundamental position is, 'Our knowledge of the external world must be obtained by valid logical procedures, and while science is able to point to such procedures, religion is not'³⁷. He draws the inference that science and religion are poles apart, a position which is contrary to what Iqbal had said regarding the relation between the two³⁸. The difficulty with Russell is that he has confined himself to 'logical procedures' only for the acquisition of truth and knowledge for which there is no guarantee. As Iqbal has said, 'There are other levels of human experience capable of systematized by other orders of space and time-- levels in which concept and analysis do not play the same role as they do in the case of our normal experience'³⁹. The presence of other levels of experience and other kinds of objects of knowledge has recently been acknowledged by such eminent epistemologists as A.D.

Woozley in his book *Theory of Knowledge*⁴⁰ which is destined to become classic. In fact, modern psychology conceded other levels of experience as early as Freud who stressed upon the concept of 'sub-normal' mental processes, assigning them more importance than the normal levels, nay, even earlier than that⁴¹.

Again, in *Mysticism and Logic* Russell rejects mysticism as a way of knowledge; he calls it 'an emotional attitude to life' and denies 'that there is any mystical insight that can properly be called "Knowledge". "Insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth," says Russell.⁴² Consequently, he is led to reject belief in a supersensible reality, belief that the world is not a plurality but a unity, belief in the immortality of soul, and so on⁴³. He believes that even if scientific findings are probable, science is the only sure way of knowing, and it should guide even in the field of moral conduct. Russell regrets, 'Ever since Plato, most philosophers have considered it part of their business to produce "proofs" of immortality and the existence of God. In order to make their proofs seem valid, they have had to falsify logic, to make mathematics mystical, and to pretend that deep-seated prejudices were heaven-sent intuitions. All this is rejected by the philosophers who make logical analysis the main business of philosophy. They confess frankly that the human intellect is unable to find conclusive answers to many questions of profound importance to mankind, but they refuse to believe that there is some "higher" way of knowing, by which we can discover truths hidden from science and the intellect'⁴⁴. Having rejected intuition, Russell is

led to show such an immense faith in science as to say, 'In the welter of conflicting fanaticisms, one of the few unifying forces is scientific truthfulness'⁴⁵. Iqbal, however, cannot share in his religious scepticism. For him intuition is not a mere chimera. 'It is, according to the Quran, something which "sees", and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false'⁴⁶. For him it is not a 'mysterious special faculty', but rather 'a mode of dealing with reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part'⁴⁷. Not only this but that 'the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience'⁴⁸. Thus, religious experience according to Iqbal is one of the genuine forms of human experience capable of yielding knowledge of truth and reality. He treats 'religious fact' at par with other facts, qua facts, and 'in the capacity of yielding knowledge by interpretation'⁴⁹. He also holds that this region of experience should be as much open to critical examination as any other region. So, according to Iqbal there is nothing 'mysterious' or 'mystical' about religious facts and experience of those facts; they are as normal and genuine as any other. Thus Iqbal and Russell are poles apart in their respective treatment of the subject of religion.

In fairness to Russell, it may be said that for him the criterion of religion was the morals generated by it, and morality for him was scientific. In his famous book *Why I am not a Christian* his main argument against Christianity is based on moral considerations. Comparing the different great religions on moral grounds he remarks, 'Christianity has been

distinguished from other religions by its greater readiness for persecution. Buddhism has never been a persecuting religion. The Empires of the Caliphs were much kinder to Jews and Christians than Christian states were to Jews and Muhammadans'⁵⁰. Regarding Islam he adds, 'It left Jews and Christians unmolested, provided they paid tribute'⁵¹. On the other hand, he alludes to the various enormous atrocities perpetrated by the Christians between themselves and against the non-Christians to drive home his point that religion is not useful to humanity. He holds that the basis of religion is fear, conceit and hatred, and on the plea that religion adds to man's misery he condemns it as 'a force for evil'⁵². However, human experience with religion over the ages does not bear out his position. In his later writings Russell definitely recoils on his original position. In his essay on "The Essence of Religion" we find him delineating the four essentials of his own religion which are 'a sense of infinity, a sense of membership in the whole, resignation, and social justice'⁵³. By the sense of infinity he means 'the selfless untrammelled life in the whole which frees man from the prison-house of eager wishes and little thoughts'⁵⁴. This truly brings out Russell's own religion, because infinity and membership in the whole are the mystical qualities which most of the confirmed mystics will share with him. 'Resignation' is the very meaning of the higher religion (the word 'Islam' means 'submission to the Will of God')⁵⁵, while Russell means by it 'a submission to the service of others'. 'Resignation' leads to social justice, the last essential of religion (Islam stands for social justice⁵⁶). Again

Russell tells us that "'any adequate religion" will lead us to temper inequality of affection by love of justice, and to universalize our aims by realizing the common needs of man'⁵⁷. These four fundamentals form the very essence of the true religion. Thus, in his inwardness Russell was 'religious' though always dubbed a confirmed atheist, a religious sceptic.

Russell was, in fact, allergic to traditional and institutional Christianity; his polemic on religion was aimed at the 'religious' dogmatism, obscurantism, and fundamentalism. In his essay on "What I Believe" he is looking for 'a new religion, based upon liberty, justice and love, not authority and law and hell-fire'⁵⁸. Iqbal will agree with him on these specifications of a true religion, and Russell's praise of Islam is based on ground. It appears that Russell was groping for a true religion like Nietzsche, though his empiricist and 'logical' legacy kept him from finding one; but one thing is obvious that he was an impartial and 'unprejudiced' seeker after truth and reality. Iqbal, on the other hand, had a legacy which would permit him to tread on the straight and true path. However, the thoughts of Iqbal and Russell come quite closer in the end, though each following his own path.

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), originally a close associate of Russell in the development of modern mathematical logic, later diverged from him in his approach to knowledge. Like Iqbal he believed in a 'comprehensive synthesis of knowledge'⁵⁹. Iqbal has quoted him in his writings, particularly in his lectures. Again like Iqbal he diverges from a materialistic point

of view, and develops a non-materialistic philosophy, though remaining closely in touch with the natural sciences. Unlike Russell for whom religion was not so serious a venture, Whitehead thinks that the religious vision is 'the one element in human experience which persistently shows an upward trend. The fact of the religious vision and its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery'⁶⁰. He calls his philosophy a "philosophy of organism"⁶¹ which propounds 'a conception of reality in which all aspects of experience are interconnected--aesthetic, moral and religious interests as well as those ideas of the world which have their origin in the natural sciences'⁶². He rejects the concept of static 'substance' underlying the things of the world, and rejects the dualism of mind and body as two variant substances; he conceives a reality in 'process, Iqbal need not differ with him on this kind of world view for he also conceives a dynamic reality delineated by the Quran, as said before. Iqbal will also agree with him when he says that the world is made up of, what he calls, "actual entities"⁶³ which form a series ranging from God at the top of the scale down to the most trivial "puff of existence"⁶⁴. Iqbal also believes in a series of egohood, while God is the Ultimate Ego; however, 'the entire gamut of being' as he calls it, reaches its perfection in man so far as this life is concerned⁶⁵.

In his treatment of God we find that Iqbal was vacillating between a finite and changing reality which is itself evolving,⁶⁶ and the infinite God who is

transcendent, omniscient and omnipotent: a confusion which Whitehead has tried to resolve in a more convincing way. Rejecting the mind-body polarity and affirming that all every actual entity is bipolar--i.e. it has both a physical and a mental pole, he infers that being an 'actual entity' God is himself bipolar. The mental pole or "primordial nature" as he called it, which, is unchanging, complete, the source of all ideals and new possibilities'; while his physical pole or "consequent nature", as he says, 'shares in the creative advance of the world'⁶⁷. This side 'originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, everlasting, fully actual, and conscious'. According to Whitehead, while conceptual experience can be infinite, physical experience is necessarily finite, so in regard to his consequent nature God is limited and is involved in becoming. He is engaged in the battle to overcome evil, and is "the great companion, the fellow-sufferer who understands"⁶⁸. Now, Iqbal will certainly agree with him as regards God's relationship with and concern for man, and his participation in man's battle against evil, as we have seen before. At the other end of the spectrum stands "puff of existence" which is also bipolar for Whitehead. It has its mental pole which is, of course not conscious alongwith its more pronounced physical pole. Iqbal has described this lower form of existence as a 'colony of sub-egos'⁶⁹. Both Iqbal and Whitehead are, thus, led to panpsychism.

Iqbal appreciates Whitehead's version of relativity on the ground that it gives time its due significance. He says that the recent developments in the mathematics tend to deprive time of its living historical character, and to reduce it to mere representations of space'⁷⁰. He adds, 'That is why Whitehead's view of Relativity is likely to appeal to Muslim students more than that of Einstein in whose theory time loses its character of passage and mysteriously translates itself into utter space'⁷¹. Iqbal has also praised his view of the universe according to which it is 'a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous flow. This quality of Nature's passage in time is perhaps the most significant aspect of experience which the Quran especially emphasizes.....'⁷² Iqbal says that Whitehead 'has conclusively shown that the traditional theory of materialism is wholly untenable.'⁷³ 'In the words of Professor Whitehead', says Iqbal, 'the theory reduces one-half of Nature to a "dream" and the other half to a "conjecture". Thus physics, finding it necessary to criticize its own foundations, has eventually found reason to break its own idol, and the empirical attitude which appeared to necessitate scientific materialism has finally ended in revolt against matter'⁷⁴. Iqbal concludes that according to Whitehead 'Nature is not a static fact situated in an a dynamic void, but a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow which thought cuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time'⁷⁵. Iqbal, thus, has appreciated his criticism of matter and space-time

relativity on the basis of his own 'organismic' theory of reality. Again, Iqbal praises his analysis of a concrete and exhaustive experience which he calls "prehension". For him any event is concrete and complete; and denies that there is any mere awareness, mere emotion or mere volition; a "prehension" always 'involves causation, emotion, purpose and valuation'⁷⁶. For him every process has value.

Whitehead defines religion as 'the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach'⁷⁷. Thus, for him religion is a 'vision', a 'desire' or 'yearning', a 'great fact', and the final 'good'; or in other words it is a concrete state of mind involving all the three aspects of cognition, affection and conation plus morality. Iqbal cherished a similar concrete view of the religious phenomena.⁷⁸ Iqbal particularly appreciates Whitehead's 'efficient' view of religion. He says, 'Apart from this, religion on its doctrinal side, as defined by Professor Whitehead, is "a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended"⁷⁹'. Whitehead also recognizes the cognitive or rational aspect of religion when he says that 'the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism'⁸⁰. Iqbal, however, adds that 'to rationalize faith is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over religion'⁸¹. Iqbal concedes that philosophy has jurisdiction to

judge religion, 'but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms'⁸². Like Iqbal Whitehead too advocates for a reformation of theology and religion, though their respective approaches are different.

9.2 Iqbal and the Realist Metaphysicians

Among the realist metaphysicians of pre-eminence we have two very prominent names, viz. Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1850-1936) and Samuel Alexander (1859-1938), an Australian by birth, both contemporaries of Iqbal.

C.L. Morgan propounded a philosophy consisting of a naturalistic basis and a metaphysical superstructure. When Iqbal was studying at Cambridge, Morgan was lecturing at Bristol, and it is quite possible that Iqbal might have received some inspiration from his thought. 'The basic scientific part of Morgan's philosophy', says John Macquarrie, is a theory of emergent evolution'⁸³. Iqbal, no doubt, was impressed by this theory of emergent evolution though he appears to have taken it directly from Bergson, as we have seen before. Iqbal remarks on this, 'The emergent, as the advocates of the Emergent Evolution teach us, is an unforeseeable and novel fact on its own plane of being and cannot be explained mechanistically'⁸⁴. He tries to explain the dignity of life on the basis of this fact of emergence. He appreciated it because it was a great anti-thesis of mechanism. As Morgan himself says, 'The whole doctrine of emergence is a continued protest against mechanical interpretation, and very antithesis

to one that is mechanistic. It does not interpret life in terms of physics and chemistry. It does not interpret mind in terms of receptor-patterns and neuron-routes'⁸⁵. He further says that the application of the idea of emergence to the evolutionary process implies that in the process there are certain critical stages at which something genuinely new comes into being. This view of evolution appealed to Bergson and Iqbal both. However, to Morgan it implies that the nature is not continuous, while to Iqbal nature has no gaps and leaps despite the fact of 'emergence'⁸⁶. Iqbal prefers the theory of emergent evolution to all other versions, for it alone can explain how from lower origins things of the highest value and significance can emerge. Only this theory can account for the unique nature of life, mind and consciousness. Bergson applies it to the concept of '*elân vital*'⁸⁷ in the outer world, and to that of 'duration'⁸⁸ in the inner life of consciousness. Iqbal applies it equally to the whole process of being and life, to the inner as well as the outer realm -- in short, to all reality. However, Iqbal's application of emergence has a distinct character, i.e., it takes place because of the fact that the principle which makes the emergence possible is immanent in nature and that is the "Ultimate Ego"⁸⁹. This shows, that Iqbal is much more serious in his application of the concept of 'emergence' to reality than either Morgan or Bergson.

Both Morgan and Iqbal agree that there are three distinct levels in the evolutionary process, viz., matter or what Morgan calls the 'physico-chemical level', life or what he calls 'the vital level', and mind or what he calls 'the mental level'⁹⁰. Iqbal calls them the three

main levels presented by experience⁹¹. Unlike Iqbal, however, Morgan bases his theory of emergence on the evidence of natural sciences, as he says himself⁹². Iqbal takes it for a metaphysical theory rather than a scientifically proved 'fact'. Morgan's philosophy offers three hypotheses: viz., (i) 'the realist hypothesis' which intends that there is a real world apart from the fact of any mind's knowing it. Iqbal will certainly acquiesce in this position in so far as he believes in an independent world order (a denial of Berkeleyan Mentalism); (ii) 'the hypothesis of concomitance' which intends that 'the mental and the physical never exist apart from each other, and that the world is characterized through and through by both'⁹³. Iqbal will also agree to this position, not as a hypothesis, but as a practical 'reality', as said before; and (iii) 'the theistic hypothesis' which intends that 'the orderly process of emergents points to God as its author'⁹⁴. Of his own position Morgan says, 'I, for one, can and do accept the most thorough going naturalism. I, for one, still retain, and am confirmed in, my belief in God'⁹⁵. His position may well be characterized as an amalgam of naturalism and theism, of idealism and realism. Similar is the position of Iqbal for in his system also the various trends, some of them conflicting, blend to form a well-knit system which is concrete and complete.

Samuel Alexander was not only a contemporary thinker of Iqbal; Iqbal has definitely referred to him as one very close to his own thought. Alexander's famous book *Space, Time and Deity*⁹⁶ (in two Volumes) was in the personal library of Iqbal. Iqbal's appreciation of

this English thinker is very great. In his letter to Dr. R.A.Nicholson (dt. 24.1.1921), while commenting on the then fast spreading view that Iqbal took his idea of the perfect Man from Nietzsche, Iqbal wrote, 'The English reader ought to approach this idea not through the German thinker, but through an English thinker of great merit--I mean Alexander--whose Gifford lectures, delivered at Glasgow, were published last year. His chapter on Deity and God (Chapter I, Book IV, p. 341, Vol. II) is worth reading'⁹⁷. He adds, 'I do not agree with Alexander's view of God, but it is clear that my idea of the Perfect Man will lose much of its outlandishness in the eyes of the english reader if he approaches it through the ideas of a thinker of his own country'⁹⁸. What shows his real interest in Alexander's thought is the fact that he set out to critically examine it even in his said letter to Dr. Nicholson. After stating Alexander's view on God or Deity Iqbal acknowledges that 'Alexander's thought is much more bolder than mine'⁹⁹. He adds, 'I believe there is a Divine tendency in the universe, but this tendency will eventually find its complete expression in a higher man, not in a God subject to time, as Alexander implies in his discussion of the subject'¹⁰⁰. Iqbal urges that Prof. Alexander applied atomic time to God in his Gifford Lectures and 'conceived Him as a life in the making'¹⁰¹, and herein lies his chief error.

As a metaphysician Alexander propounds a more comprehensive scheme of emergent evolution than the one proffered by Morgan even. He extends the evolutionary process into both directions. Into the downward direction he regards the 'space--time

matrix' as the source of all reality and being. Where Iqbal has recommended his position is the primacy he gave to time. Iqbal says, 'A keener insight into the nature of time would have led Iraqi to see that time is more fundamental of the two; and that it is not a mere metaphor to say, as Professor Alexander does say, that time is the mind of space'¹⁰². Thus to him 'space-time is the primal stuff or matrix out of which everything that is arises'¹⁰³. Iqbal refers to his position with approval and has preferred him to Iraqi's¹⁰⁴ position even. 'In Alexander, the breaks between levels are less sharp than in Morgan, and there is more stress on continuity...¹⁰⁵', a position closer to that of Iqbal's. The qualitatively new emerges out of the complexity of things according to him. He says, 'Ascent takes place, it would seem, through complexity. But at each change of quality the complexity as it were gathers itself together and is expressed in a new simplicity'¹⁰⁶. Like Iqbal he holds that life and mind are not mere epiphenomena from matter, they are rather qualitatively new levels of complexity, the true emergents. Like great Muslim Sufi-poet Jalal uddin Rumi (1207-1273), the pir of Iqbal, Alexander maintains that the stage next to mind is that of 'deity'; that evolutionary process does not stop with mind as its final stage and acme. 'Thus, God, who stood outside of emergent evolution in Morgan's scheme is boldly brought by Alexander into the evolutionary process itself, as its highest goal'¹⁰⁷, says Macquarrie. This brings him very close to Iqbal who quotes Rumi's view of evolution of man, especially the lines

'Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.

Of his first souls he has now no remembrance, and he will be again changed from his present soul'¹⁰⁸.

Thus Iqbal praises Alexander as the only optimistic philosopher of evolution in the West like the great Rumi. Alexander's thought is realistic and naturalistic, though his naturalism is a different kind from the older varieties. For him everything has a physical basis in a space-time matrix, while for Iqbal everything in the universe has a spiritual basis: rather everything is spiritual in nature. For the former even God has a spatio-temporal aspect, a position which even Iqbal will not rule out of court in so far as God manifests himself in the spatio temporal frame-work of the physical world. Both agree that everything is dual in nature--i.e., physical as well as mental. Alexander acutely remarks, 'Time is the mind of space and any quality the mind of its body'¹⁰⁹. However, in his system 'the mental and the physical are somehow correlated throughout reality..¹¹⁰. For him, as said before, even God emerges from the space-time scheme. God is not a creator or the author of the universe in his scheme of things; that is, God is not *terminus ad quo*, but a *terminus ad quem*. To his critics who dubbed his views 'pantheistic' he replied, 'God is immanent in respect of his body, but transcendent in respect of his deity'¹¹¹. Thus in the end, his position, like that of Iqbal, turns out to be 'panentheistic' though the latter will not agree to his details regarding the nature of God.

However, he hit upon a very novel idea when he said that in respect of deity he is in 'that region of space-time which always lies ahead and to which, at any actual stage of the evolutionary process, one looks forward and upward, so to speak'¹¹². By divining that 'region of space-time which always lies ahead' Alexander has reminded of the views of some Muslim sufis on the multiplicity of space-time regions or orders, I mean, the views of Sh. Fakhr-ud-Din Iraqi (1287) in his book *Lam'at*, and Mullah Jalal-ud-Din Dawani (1427-1502) in his book *Zoura*¹¹³. Alexander's position on the relationship between God and the universe is much more complicated and confusing than that of Iqbal.

9.3 Some other European Realists and Iqbal

In this section I have chosen to discuss briefly those European contemporary realists who have shown some affinity with Iqbal's thought, I mean Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in Germany, and William Temple (1881-1944) an English theological thinker who advocated a realist position. Hartmann started in the Marburg school of new-Kantianism, but then he shifted from idealism to realism. Iqbal will agree with him that the object of knowledge is not constructed by thought but is given to thought and exists independently of thought¹¹⁴. In him, like Iqbal, we find a blend of idealism and realism in as much as he 'envisages a world in which mind and its activities constitute only one factor among others'¹¹⁵. Again, Iqbal will agree that 'there is an unknowable element in the world'¹¹⁶. Hartmann believes in the 'stratification' of reality like

Iqbal, though he did not believe in the doctrine of the 'emergent evolution' in which, as said before, Iqbal fully believed as the source of various layers or strata. Unlike Iqbal, Hartmann holds that the four strata of matter, life, consciousness and spirit are each one independent, each 'stratum has its peculiar categories of being'¹¹⁷. However, some categories of the lower strata penetrate into the higher strata (sofar Iqbal will agree with him), while the categories of higher strata do not penetrate in the lower ones (a point on which Iqbal will not agree with him), though Iqbal would agree that each stratum is unique and unforeseeable¹¹⁸. Thus Hartmann agrees with Iqbal that 'the higher strata are not wholly determined by the lower ones, but have autonomy in the face of them, and may make use of them'¹¹⁹. Again both agree on the unity of the world despite its heterogeneity, though the unifying principle for Iqbal is God himself¹²⁰ while the explanation of this unity in terms of a personal God seems to Hartmann a piece of anthropocentric megalomania¹²¹. As a result, the latter is led to reject theism, as he himself says, for ethical reasons. However, he advocated the religious sentiments of love, faith, reverence and gratitude. He advocated brotherly love as well as "love of the remotest"¹²², which involves 'faith of unique kind, differing from trust between man and man; a faith which reaches out to the whole of things'¹²³. Thus, ultimately he reverts, like Bertrand Russell, to some of the fundamental religious values or sentiments.

William temple was basically a churchman who became the Archbishop of Canterbury towards the end

of his life. He had some influence on Iqbal, it appears¹²⁴. An Anglican theologian though he had great reverence for revelation in a traditional sense, he held that 'this revelation must find its confirmation in reason and conscience. Thus he looked for a philosophical framework for his theology'¹²⁵. He acknowledges his indebtedness to his teacher Edward Caird, the British idealist, though later on he shifted to realism. He conceives the world, like Iqbal, 'as a process in which there have emerged distinct levels of being'¹²⁶. Again he discerns four levels: matter, life, intelligence, spirit. Unlike Hartmann and more in the fashion of Iqbal he holds that 'the higher can only exist by means of the lower; but, far from being controlled by that lower, takes control of it'¹²⁷. He insists that 'it is the highest stage in the evolutionary process which makes the whole process intelligible as a unity'¹²⁸. This is a teleological approach to the world, one which Iqbal has decidedly favoured in his writings. Iqbal holds that the reality is spiritual, while Temple says that 'we must turn back and interpret the unity of the whole process in terms of spirit'¹²⁹. Temple calls this the "dialectical realism". He again acknowledges that the 'spiritual interpretation of the universal process leads to theism, for the spirit which emerges within the process has a transcendent character which points to God as the unifying principle who controls and indeed creates the whole process'¹³⁰. Iqbal will certainly agree with him on this position inasmuch as God for him is the unifying principle, the soul of the universe¹³¹, as he calls it. He adds that 'the world has a sacramental character, manifesting in its natural

processes the values which have their source in the transcendent God'¹³². Iqbal expresses this sacramental character of the world by quoting a saying of the Holy Prophet: 'The whole of this earth is a mosque.'¹³³

Notes and References

1. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.226.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, p.258.
5. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.227.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.26.
9. *Ibid*, p.156.
10. Prof. Lewis expressed this view during his visit to Lahore in Dec. 1979, in his informal talks with the author.
11. Brentano, *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, pp.12-13.
12. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.53.
13. *Ibid*
14. *Ibid*, p.54.
15. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.228.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.10.
18. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, pp.228-29.
19. Prof. G.E. Moore starting teaching at Cambridge in 1911 three years after Iqbal had returned to India; however, his writings then

had a marked impact on the Indian students. He published his *Refutation of Idealism* in 1903.

20. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, pp. 228-29.
21. *Ibid*, p. 229.
22. *Ibid*.
23. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, p. 29.
24. *The Philosophy of G.E. Moore*, ed. P.A. Schilpp, pp. 423-24.
25. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 230.
26. *Ibid*.
27. Iqbal has quoted excerpts from Russell in his Lectures at pages 34-37.
28. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, quoted p. 34.
29. *Ibid*, p. 36.
30. *Ibid*, pp. 36-37.
31. *Ibid*, p. 37.
32. *Ibid*
33. *Ibid*.
34. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 230.
35. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 46-57.
36. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 80.
37. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 231.
38. As we have seen before, for Iqbal religion and science come very close: 'They spring up from the same root and complement each other'-- Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 2.
39. *Ibid*, p. 183.
40. *Theory of Knowledge*, (London: Hutchinson 1964), Chap. 1, 2.
41. Spinoza in Modern thought and Muslim sufis centuries ago had given the idea of subliminal self.

42. Russell, *op.cit.*, p.12.
43. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
44. Russell, *op.cit.*, pp.863-64.
45. *History of Western Philosophy*, p.864.
46. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.16.
47. *Ibid*
48. *Ibid*
49. *Ibid*, p.185.
50. page 176.
51. *Ibid*
52. *Ibid*, p.34.
53. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, ed.P.A. Schilpp, 552.
54. *Hibbert Journal*, 1912, pp. 46-7.
55. The word 'Islam' is derived from the verb 'salama' which means 'submission' or 'surrender'.
56. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.156: Islam emphasizes 'freedom, equality, and solidarity' the three necessary elements of "social justice".
57. Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 58.
58. *Ibid*.
59. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.263.
60. *Science and the Modern World*, A.N. Whitehead, p.275.
61. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.264.
62. *Ibid*.
63. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p.24.
64. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
65. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.72.

66. See my article on "Iqbal's Concept of God: an Appraisal", *Religious Studies* (Cambridge University Press, U.K.), vol. 19, Sep. 1983, p. 380f.
67. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
68. *Process and Reality*, 489.
69. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, 265.
70. Iqbal, *Op.cit.*, pp. 104, 106
71. *Ibid*, p. 133.
72. *Ibid*.
73. *Ibid*, p. 45.
74. *Ibid*, p. 33.
75. *Ibid*
76. *Ibid*, p. 34.
77. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 265.
78. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 275.
79. See my book on *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, chapter on "The Nature of Religious Experience", Part II, pp. 112ff.
80. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 2.
81. *Ibid*
82. *Ibid*
83. *Ibid*
84. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, pp. 260-61.
85. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 106.
86. Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* pp. 7-8.
87. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 54.
88. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, in which 'elan vital' is the vital life impulse.
89. *Ibid*, Chapter I.
90. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-107.
91. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p. 260.

92. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.31.
93. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
94. *Ibid*
95. *Ibid*.p.261
96. Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, p.1.
97. Iqbal had this book in two volumes in his personal library (its London, Macmillan edition, 1920)
98. Quoted by Iqbal in his letter to R.A. Nicholson, dated 24-1- 1921, pb. *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, ed. Syed Abdul Vahid, pp.93-498. *ibid*, p.94
99. *Ibid*
100. *Ibid*
101. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p.75.
102. *Ibid*, p.137.
103. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, 261.
104. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.75.
105. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
106. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, vol.II, p.70.
107. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.262.
108. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.122.
109. Alexander, *op. cit.*, P. 428.
110. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, pp.262-63.
111. Alexander, *op.cit.*, p.396.
112. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.263.
113. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.75.
114. *Ibid*, p.3.
115. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.267.
116. *Ibid*, p.268.
117. *Ibid*
118. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.11.
119. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*

120. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.60.
121. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
122. *Ibid.*
123. Hartmann, *Ethics*, vol.III, p.330.
124. Iqbal had this book *The Nature of Personality*, in his library.
125. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.269.
126. *Ibid.*
127. Temple, *Nature, Man and God*, p.478.
128. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.270.
129. *Ibid.*
130. *Ibid.*
131. Iqbal *Reconstruction*, p.60
132. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
133. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.155.

Chapter Ten

IQBAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHIES

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10.1 Sociological Philosophies of Religion

Comparing the philosophies of history discussed in the last chapter and the sociological philosophies which form the contents of the present chapter, John Macquarrie writes, 'Whereas history concerns itself with the description, classification and elucidation of particular series of events, sociology aims rather at establishing the general laws of man's social life. It pays attention to the structure and function of human society, to the conditions under which social changes occur....'¹ He adds, 'it is clear that religion must come within the purview of the sociologist, for although some forms of religion, such as the broodings of the lonely mystic, are solitary, most religions are social in their nature. The great historical religions have taken the form of religious communities..,and have been powerful social forces....'² Again, every theory of religion pays attention to its social role, 'what we have called the "sociological" theories of religion make the social aspect central in their interpretation.'³ Religion may even be treated as a 'Social phenomenon'. Iqbal also has shown special interest in the social aspect of man's life, and has devoted his full 'mathnavi' 'Rumuz-e-Bekhudi' (1916) to a sociological study, discussing the fundamental principles governing society, in particular an ideal society as envisaged by Islam⁴. The sociological theories of religion may be divided into two kinds: viz. those dealing with the origin of religion and those delineating the nature of religion.

10.2 Theories of the Social Origin of Religion

Some prominent thinkers who come under this category include Emile Durkheim, Max Weber (1864-1920), a German scholar; W. Robertson Smith who wrote the famous book *Religion of the Semites* (1889); F. Atkinson the author of the *Primal Law*; and Sigmund Freud who has written a number of books on the origin of the religion, some of which have become classics. These are some of the thinkers and anthropologists who have shown much interest in the origin and development of the institutions collectively called by the name of 'religion'. Emile Durkheim, Iqbal's French contemporary anthropologist, put forward, says Macquarrie, 'a complete philosophy, known as "sociological positivism"'⁵. His philosophy pivots round the idea of 'society' which supplies 'key' to an understanding of philosophical problems. Durkheim conceives society, not as a sum of the individuals included in it, but as 'a specific kind of entity which is the source of constraints governing the thought and behaviour of its members'⁶. Iqbal in *Rumuz-e-Bekhudi* conceives society in a more organic and systematic sense. He compares it to an individual taking birth as a child and then growing into a stout and mature 'person', following the same principles of growth as a human person⁷. His view of social organism is comparable to that of Spengler and Toynbee, the two famous historical philosophers of the West.

Durkheim traces the origin of all religion in 'totemism' which he puts up as the most primitive form of religion from which even the highest religions of the

world have grown. He holds that a 'totem' is 'the basis for the distinction of sacred and profane, which he takes to be the essence of religion'⁸. Macquarrie remarks, 'In some way, the life of the totem represents the life of the society itself, whose members occasionally regard themselves as descended from the totem'⁹, Durkheim's views on the origin and nature of religion have seldom been borne out by other anthropological studies undertaken by such eminent persons as F.O. James in his book *Comparative Religion* and Father Wilhelm Schmidt in *The Origin and Growth of Religion* (Eng. tr. by H.J. Rose)¹⁰. To quote a few lines from Schmidt, 'Totemism as a practice does not belong to the earliest forms of human development. People who are ethnologically the oldest have neither totemism nor totemistic sacrifice'¹¹. In fact, Robertson Smith's hypothesis was given prominence in the philosophy of religion by the writings of Sigmund Freud who tried to present, of course, in his usually convincing and forceful manner, higher forms of religion as stemming from totemism. He even applied this hypothesis to traditional Christianity, especially, the Christian doctrine of 'Original Sin' which is one of the fundamental and basic doctrines of traditional Christianity¹². It was Bronislaw Malinowski who first subjected to a thorough and searching scrutiny Freud's account of the origin and nature of religion on Smith's hypotheses in his book *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*. He urges, 'Culture and Religion..., do not spring suddenly into being as the result of a supposed historical event but are the slow accumulation of experience'¹³. He has also rejected 'Freud's patrilineal

explanation of the origins of religion by comparing such systems with the matrilineal forms of the Trobriand Islanders'¹⁴. Again, E. Fromm makes a very pertinent distinction between, what he calls, 'authoritarian' and 'humanistic' forms of religion in his book *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, and holds that at best only the former kind can be accounted for on Freudian hypotheses. Again, as I have discussed in my book *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, the Freudian explanation of the origin and subsequent developments of religion at best apply to Christianity but not to Islam which does not believe, rather rejects, both the doctrines of Redemption and Original Sin.¹⁵ Iqbal in his lecture "Knowledge and Religious Experience"¹⁶ rejects the 'sex-impulse theory' of religious consciousness expounded by the Freudians and other modern psychologists. He says, 'The two forms of consciousness- sexual and religious- are often hostile or, at any rate, completely different to each other in point of their character, their aim, and the kind of conduct they generate. The truth is that in a state of religious passion we know a factual reality in some sense outside the narrow circuit of our personality'¹⁷,.

Durkheim understands religion as a social phenomenon, a point on which Iqbal will agree with him. Durkheim says, 'when it is understood that above the individual there is society, and that this is not a nominal being created by reason but a system of active forces'¹⁸...., He holds that religion serves the needs of the society, that the object of its cult is the society itself. For Iqbal also religion aims at introducing an ideal society which he calls 'the Kingdom of God on

earth'¹⁹. Islam (which means 'submission to God'), the essence of true religion, aims at the human society as one people and envisages a universal (international) society. According to him Islam (or true religion) is a polity. He says, that 'Islam was from the very beginning a civil society, having received from the Quran a set of simple legal principles'²⁰. Durkheim holds that 'religion and society are so closely interwoven that religion is regarded as the matrix out of which other human activities, including science, have grown'²¹. His views here are un-Christian which has made a bifurcation between the spiritual and the material; they rather come very close to Islam and Iqbal who makes no division between spiritual and temporal. Iqbal says, 'with Islam the ideal and the real are not two opposing forces which can not be reconciled. The life of the ideal consists, but in the perpetual endeavour of the ideal to appropriate the real'²². He says at another place, 'The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular'²³. Again he says, that 'matter is spirit in space-time reference'²⁴. Lastly, like Iqbal, Durkheim holds that science by no means discredits religion. However, what is the basic idea in his thought is that 'the ideas of divinity and of society are at bottom the same'²⁵ - a view on which Iqbal has little reason to differ, as said before.

Max Weber, a German contemporary of Iqbal and a famous scholar, pushed forward Durkheim's view regarding the co-relation between religion and society.

His aim was 'to exhibit the correlation in any given society between religious beliefs and social institution'²⁶, says John Macquarrie. In fact, Weber's main concern appears to discover a correlation between Protestantism and the capitalist society as found in the West: his was in fact a search for a justification for the Western Capitalism. He maintains that 'the connection between Protestantism and capitalism is far closer and more potent than had been suspected'²⁷. Iqbal, however, has no interest in this type of correlation study, though he will agree with him that our 'whole social structure may be profoundly, if covertly, influenced by religious ideas, and indeed religious beliefs and social institutions may be correlative expressions of a single underlying attitude of mind'²⁸. For Iqbal, however, religion being a system of universal principles of life and society (as Islam is), religious beliefs should determine the social institutions of a people rather than otherwise, i.e., social institutions do not determine religious beliefs although they certainly colour them. This is obvious from the need for 'ijtihad' (reconstruction), in religious thought.²⁹ Where Weber and Iqbal differ is that the former shows more inclination towards the social term of the religion-society spectrum, while the latter decidedly gives primacy to religious beliefs and institutions in the above spectrum.

We have already discussed part of Freud's explanation of the origin of religion in Chapter Five. As said before, the originator of the psycho-analytic school bases his explanation on the anthropological theories (rather hypotheses) of his two

contemporaries, W. Robertson Smith and his disciple F. Atkinson. Starting with Smith's contention that totemism was the oldest form of religion, Atkinson develops the story of a clan in which there was only one adult male and a number of women and children, the adult 'possessing' all of them. He would drive away all the male children as soon as they came of age and could be his rivals. Then he depicts a scene of patricide perpetrated by the grown-up male children. This begot the sense of 'guilt' and the need for atonement. On this story Freud put up his psychological overcoatings and artfully transformed it into his own theory of the origin of religion. He based his 'theory' on the feeling of 'ambivalence' and the sense of 'guilt' engendered by the supposed act of patricide. Freud calls this the beginning of the institutions of 'sacrifice' and the 'prohibited degrees' which for him form the very pith of religion. He uses the concepts of 'projection' and 'displacement' to account for the idea of God as 'Surrogate Father' or 'Magnified Father'. Even such important Christian doctrines as the Original Sin and Atonement are artfully explained in the light of the above 'totemic' story of Smith and Atkinson, taking Christ's crucifixion as a son's atonement for the times old act of patricide assumed by Atkinson³⁰ in his famous book *The Primal Law*. Freud's two treatises *Totem and Taboo* and *The Future of an Illusion* may rightly be called as complementaries on their treatment of the subject of religion. Both trace religion back to the Father-son relationship. The two books, however, differ in the aspect of the relationship they emphasize.

In Totem and Taboo, for instance, it is the attitude of ambivalence which has been stressed, while in The Future of an Illusion what is emphasized is the provision and protection aspect of the Father-son relationship. Freud has discussed the same theme in his lesser works Moses and Monotheism, Leonardo da Vinci, and Civilization and its Discontents. However, he thinks that religion is the product of man's immaturity and irrationality.³¹ As said before, the very hypothesis on which Freud has based his theory has been refuted by other leading anthropologists like E.O.James, and Father Wilhelm Schmidt³². Again, for Iqbal religion marks man's stage of maturity and advancement; higher religion, like Islam, is the acme of human civilization and culture. It is the height of the human development,--spiritual, rational and moral as well as physical³³.

Again, in the Future of an Illusion Freud proceeds to call religion 'the universal obsessional neurosis of mankind'. He bases this position on a supposed analogy between the cultural development of a child and that of mankind through the ages; he calls religion a passing phase on the development.³⁴ The origin of this neurosis, as in the case of a child, is, holds Freud, 'in the Oedipus Complex, the relation to the father'³⁵. Freud, however, himself admits that analogies are usually misleading and partially helpful only. He says, 'The similarity between taboo and obsessional sickness may be no more than a matter of externals...; It would obviously be hasty and unprofitable to infer the existence of any internal relationship from such points of agreement as those,...'³⁶ Iqbal however, on the

contrary, as Dr. Nazir Qaiser proved in his articles, believes in the curative and therapeutic value of religion as against all mental and physical maladies.³⁷ Dr. Ian Suttie has acutely remarked that 'religion instead of being an obsessional neurosis of guilt was a form of psycho-social therapy....'³⁸

10.3 Iqbal and Western Marxism

Karl Marx enjoys a prophetic position among a big majority of the Western world. His is in fact a very strong and belligerent reaction against the Western Capitalist and racial society. He is credited with the founding of the famous school of 'dialectical materialism' which was later to have a complete sway over a larger area of the Western political and philosophical horizon. His views later came to be known the Marxist-Leninist view of the world, which is today one of the most potent philosophical traditions. Though denouncing his materialism, Iqbal has referred to the economic system stemming from his thought. He says in his Lectures, 'the new economic experiment tried in the neighbourhood of Muslim Asia, must open our eyes to the inner meaning and destiny of Islam'.³⁹ Iqbal has put up an unreserved appreciation for Marx, after Nietzsche, by calling him 'the Prophet without revelation' and said that 'his heart believed though his intellect was an infidel'.⁴⁰ He however, condemned both Capitalism and Communism as fattening the body, but failing to enlighten the 'heart' or 'soul'.⁴¹ The root of all this malady lies in the basic materialism which engendered atheism and 'irreligion'. The remedy suggested by Iqbal lies in a return to religion and

spiritual values:⁴² it will bring them, the Russians, as he says, back to their real roots.

In connection with the Marxist Western thinkers I propose to discuss A. Kalthoff (1850-1906), Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) and V.I. Lenin (1870-1924), all contemporaries of Iqbal who have expressed their views on religion. Albert Kalthoff, a Lutheran pastor in Bremen, was senior contemporary of the eastern poet-philosopher. Basically a Roman Catholic, he expresses his views on religion through his approach to Christianity and the Christ in his book *Die Entstehung des Christentums*. In this book he discusses the origin and social significance of Christianity. He looks for 'the origins of Christianity', says Macquarrie, 'not in the philosophies and mythologies current at that time, but in social movements capable of giving rise to the new Christian society'⁴³. Christianity arose out of the revolutionary forces and communistic ideas which were at work among the slaves and oppressed masses, the communistic ideas were contributed by the Jewish element. He holds that the organization 'was to some extent ready-made in the communistic groups among the masses'⁴⁴. For Kalthoff Christianity has no revealed basis in so far as it has arisen from the sociological conditions obtaining at the time of its inception. Iqbal, however, will not agree with him on this view. For him religion has a definite 'revealed' basis and has not arisen out of any sociological conditions or set of conditions, though it has a very important social import for mankind. Islam, he holds, is not the product of sociological or any other conditions; it has rather generated certain conditions conducive to its growth

and development as a social, economic and political system. He says, while discussing the personality of a prophet, 'In his personality the finite centre of life sinks into his own infinite depths only to spring up again, with fresh vigour, to destroy the old, and to disclose the new directions of life'.⁴⁵ Again, Iqbal will not agree with Kalthoff who rejecting both the orthodox and liberal interpretations of Christianity (religion), propounds 'the secularized Christianity of the future'⁴⁶. Unlike the former he does not believe in the 'reconstruction' of religious thought as the proper remedy.

Karl Kautsky, the German socialist and devout Marxist, was also a contemporary of Iqbal. However, though an editor of Marx's works, he quarreled with Lenin bitterly, as he 'stood for a democratic as against a dictatorial socialism,...'⁴⁷ says Macquarrie. None the less, he applied Marxist principles to the interpretation of Christianity. However, he appears to project restricted view of Christianity when he says that his aim is to contribute 'to an understanding of those phases of Christianity which appear most essential from the standpoint of the materialistic conception of history'⁴⁸. He accounts for this conception of history in the light of economic conditions rather than abstract ideas and ethical aspirations. Like Kalthoff, he regarded Christianity as essentially a social movement among the impoverished classes. He denies that Christianity was the work of an individual; he rather traced its genesis in 'proletarian social movements, and particularly in the fusion of communistic and messianic ideas'⁴⁹. He regrets that the present-day

Christianity is' the reverse of the original Christianity'. He says, 'In its victorious course, the proletarian, beneficial, communistic organization became transformed into the most tremendous instrument of domination and exploitation in the world'⁵⁰. He adds that 'Christianity is now an obstacle in the way of the proletariat, and present-day socialism,...'⁵¹ Iqbal will agree with Kalthoff and Kautsky that religion came as a panacea against exploitation and suppression of the masses. He says that Islam has converted the plebians into the masters of mankind.⁵² However, he rejects the materialistic basis of both his contemporaries. As said before, religion for Iqbal was not any social movement or, for that matter, a product of the then prevalent social movements; it came as a cure for the ills prevalent in the then society (This must be true of all true religion, including Christianity). For him religion is never 'an obstacle in the way of the proletariat'; it is in fact not conducive to the interests of any section or faction of the society: it is neutral and beneficial to all in the long run. Iqbal will also reject their materialistic conception of history; it should rather be interpreted spiritually. He writes, 'Humanity needs three things to-day a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis'⁵³.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a great exponent of Marx's thought in Russia and one of the founders of the modern Soviet regime on communistic basis, was one of the very powerful contemporaries, both politically and

philosophically, of Iqbal. He was the most important advocate of 'the unadulterated' communist teaching about religion.⁵⁴ He is deemed to be the most faithful and authoritative interpreter of Marx. Iqbal in his famous poem "Lenin in the Presence of God" has put forward an apology for Lenin's atheism and materialism, but has praised his condemnation of capitalism and the capitalist, as well as the churchman and the professional religious preacher. Lenin names it as the first principle of Marxism 'materialism' and calls it as 'the only philosophy that is consistent, true to all the teachings of natural science and hostile to superstition, cant, and so forth'.⁵⁵ However, it may be remarked here that true religion (as the Quran says)⁵⁶ is hostile to superstition and cant, a fact perhaps not known to Lenin and the Marxists. As said before, Iqbal will not accept the materialistic basis of his thought. Lenin then has combined this materialism with the Hegelian idea of the 'dialectic' which is the source of progress and development, an idea which may at least partly be acceptable to Iqbal. Again, Iqbal will acquiesce in his view that the matter is not static but eternally developing and dynamic.⁵⁷ Iqbal in this connection says on the basis of Einstein's theory: "Substance" for modern Relativity-Physics is not a persistent thing with variable states, but a system of inter-related events'.⁵⁸ He also refers to Whitehead's view on which 'the notion of "matter" is entirely replaced by the notion of "organism"'.⁵⁹ Again, he will not agree with Lenin on his view of history in terms of 'economic forces' and 'class struggle', though Iqbal attaches much importance to social competition and

interclass struggle which he calls over and again as the real spirit of life. He says in *Payam-i- Mashriq*,⁶⁰

بدریا غلط و بامو حش در آویز
حیات جاوداں اندر تیز است

[cf, Eng Tr. in Chap. Eight]

Lenin condemns religion as false, because Marxism is founded on 'a materialism which is absolutely atheistic and resolutely hostile to all religion'⁶¹. Again he adds that 'all modern religions are instruments of bourgeois reaction that serve to defend exploitation and to drug the working class'⁶². This is, however, not so much an objection against religion as against the misuse of a true religion which some vested interests always tend to indulge in. True religion as said before, aims at the complete emancipation of man from all fear and grief, says the Quran⁶³, and thus frees man of all exploitation and suppression: true religion changes the plebians into the masters of men. Iqbal will not agree that 'historical materialism' is the only explanation of the nature, origin and development of the human society; for him it needs 'basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis', as said before. However, Lenin himself admits that religion cannot be eradicated, although it is the product of 'the basic economic factors at work in society'⁶⁴. He hopes that the religion will automatically disappear when the

classless society is attained; but he acknowledges that a classless society is neither desirable nor fully attainable⁶⁵... it is just an ideal or a regulative idea. Iqbal, however, will not concede that the need for religion will diminish with advancement of the society; it will, on the contrary, be more needed with every development. As we view the modern society, every advancement in science and technology necessitates the need for religion as the binding spiritual force for the human society itself but for which it would fall asunder and into fragments. In the end, Iqbal does not favour an over-organized society. He says that 'the ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of individual men. In an over-organized society the individual is altogether crushed out of existence'⁶⁶. Hence for Iqbal the ideal is not a classless society in which there are no strata or tiers; he envisages an optimum development of the society firmly grounded in the principles of equity, justice and brotherhood.

10.4 Iqbal and the American 'Social Gospel'

Among the contemporaries of Iqbal in America who were theologians and showed keen interest in the 'Social Gospel' are W. Gladden (1886-1918), W. Rauschenbusch (1861-1918), and S. Mathews (1863-1941); they all tried to apply social principles to Christianity.

Washington Gladden, a congregational pastor at Columbus, Ohio (1882-1914), effected a combination of evangelical faith and sociological thinking. He stresses on the need for 'love' as the principle of redemption.

He says in his essay on atonement, 'As the sin that separates us from God weakens the social bond and gives us on earth the substance of hell, so the love that brings us back to God restores the social bond and gives us on earth the substance of heaven'⁶⁷. Iqbal is also known for his philosophy of love, though he conceives it in a more technical sense: he conceives it as an *assimilative principle* which helps integrate and fortify the individual ego or self of man.⁶⁸ Through assimilative process love brings man close to God and also strengthens the social bonds (Iqbal will agree with Gladden). Unlike the Christian view and in agreement with Iqbal Gladden conceives the 'Kingdom of God' on this very earth; it is conceived as 'an earthly' society'⁶⁹. He says, 'that kingdom that we find, here on the earth, steadily widening its borders and strengthening its dominion'⁷⁰ is in fact conceived, like Iqbal, as embracing in the end the whole of humanity. Iqbal, is much more clear when he writes to Prof. R.A.Nicholson that this Kingdom is 'the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth'. Thus for him also the Kingdom of God is on this very earth.

Gladden rejects the other-worldly interpretation of Christianity, though admitting its supernatural character. Iqbal will agree with him that the 'Kingdom of God includes all society and is a wider conception than the Church,...'⁷¹ Both will agree that the function of the Church is to ensure that the rich and poor come together within its fellowship and learn to care for each other'⁷². Iqbal, however, assigns a more comprehensive and exhaustive function and scope to

the mosque. He quotes the Holy Prophet saying, 'The whole of the earth is a mosque';⁷³ so much so that for him the Church is inseparable from the state⁷⁴ (again an anti-Christian idea). Gladden believes that the Church will reconcile between 'the labouring and capitalist classes';⁷⁵ while for Iqbal Islam has resolved the antithesis between these classes. However, Gladden adds that Christian society cannot be called 'communistic or egalitarian' for 'Christianity does not abolish the natural differences between men, or the inequality of conditions or possessions,...'⁷⁶ Iqbal has a similar notion about the human society on the ground that Islam recognizes these mutual differences⁷⁷. The former strongly opposes any alliance of the Church with the privileged classes, a situation which Iqbal will also disapprove as the very negation of the spirit of true religion. It is on this ground that he had denounced both 'mullah' and 'sufi' as exploiting forces. Walter Rauschenbusch, Professor at Rochester Theological Seminary (1897-1918), was more socialistic in his approach to religion and church than Gladden. He advocates an alliance between church and the working class, and declares that socialist solution is the only solution for the ills of the modern society. Iqbal, however, does not agree that socialism is the only and main solution; for him the real remedy for human ills is in following the teachings of Islam. He will agree with Rauschenbusch that the essence of religion (Christianity in the latter's case) is 'to transform human society into the kingdom of God by regenerating and reconstituting human relations'⁷⁸. Both regret that this fundamental purpose of religion

has always been thwarted and bypassed. Rauschenbusch has regretted that it has taken centuries to take to a sociological interpretation of Christianity, whereas for Iqbal Islam is a special polity. Iqbal will agree with the former that extraneous influences, like monastic otherworldliness, dogmatism, etc. have beset true religion.⁷⁹ Iqbal has regretted that religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary for the last five hundred years.⁸⁰

Iqbal and Rauschenbusch agree that true religion must aim at the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. The latter holds that religion 'must not only make room for the doctrine of the kingdom of God, but give it a central place and revise all other doctrines so that they will articulate organically with it'.⁸¹ For him the doctrine of the kingdom is the 'social gospel' though it has been neglected for centuries. However, both Iqbal and Rauschenbusch hold that religion, though this-worldly, has a supernatural character. The latter says, 'the Kingdom of God is divine in its origin, progress and consummation; it is miraculous all the way, and is the continuous revelation of the power, the righteousness and the love of God'.⁸² Iqbal explains this fact by asserting a unity of mental and physical in Islam. he says, 'In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains,... In Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at from one point of view and State from another. It is not true to say that church and state are two sides or facets of the same thing. Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your point of view varies'.⁸³ Islam views the state as 'only an effort to

realize the spiritual in a human organization'⁸⁴. Iqbal concludes, 'The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity! The spiritual finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being'⁸⁵.

Shailer Mathews, a leading representative of the Chicago school of theology and a Professor at Colby University, Maine, was an able exponent of the Social Gospel in America. He also thinks of the kingdom of God by which he understands 'an ideal social order in which the relation of men to God is that of sons, and each other that of brothers'⁸⁶. Iqbal will partly agree with him as regards the social aspect of his theory. He will also agree if by 'son' he means the symbol of obedience which man must show to God. Iqbal will also agree with Mathews regarding the possibility of union with each other as well as with God; the latter is possible in so far as God is conceived as a person. Jesus for him meant 'a Kinship between God and man'⁸⁷. However, in his treatment of this 'Kinship' he draws analogy from the interrelationship of two friends. He holds (where Iqbal will agree with him) that the relation with the divine life leads towards the social ideal of brotherhood⁸⁸. Mathews sees in all religions the pattern of the same kind of social relationships. He then proceeds to identify religion with social behaviour, a confinement which cannot be acceptable to Iqbal; nor will he agree that religion means the hope of gaining help from cosmic forces only. Mathews goes to the extent of holding that the idea of God arises in the social behaviour⁸⁹ which is the pith of religion,

according to him; and hence it is not 'a metaphysical absolute but an idea which changes with social advance'⁹⁰. He writes in this connection, 'the meaning of the word "God" is found in the history of its usage in religious behaviour'⁹¹. Iqbal, however, will not agree with him that the idea of God is a social product and that it changes with social advance. For him, on the contrary, it is a genuine idea of a Being who can be directly or indirectly experienced through religious consciousness, though he would agree that it is not a metaphysical absolute as envisaged by the Hegelian Absolutists. God is a concrete absolute person who can fall within human comprehension, partly at least, as claimed by the mystics and sufis all over the world. Iqbal, unlike Mathews, emphasizes that religious (mystic) experience is the only source of knowing God directly and internally; history and nature are indirect and external ways of knowing⁹². Mathews, however, admits that 'God is a cosmic reality'⁹³. He rejects the traditional idea of God as sovereign with men as his subjects. Again, for him, unlike Iqbal, God is immanent power in the universe; though he admits, like Iqbal, that we 'can have a personal and social relation with this God 'which is' a relation of cooperation rather than of subjection'⁹⁴. As said before, Iqbal has emphasized the mutual relationship of 'participation' between God and man. Mathews holds like Iqbal that to have 'a proper "personal adjustment" to "those cosmic activities which we know as God" to be "fellow-workers in the process",⁹⁵ entails a proper adjustment to our fellow-men and forwards the realization of the ideal society'. "We must live in harmony with our

neighbour as truly as with God."⁹⁶ Both believe that a right relationship with God leads or begets a right type of social order.

Notes and References

1. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*,p.155.
2. *Ibid*
3. *Ibid*
4. Iqbal's "mathnavi" *Asrar-o-Rumuz*, a combined edition first published in 1940
5. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*,p.156.
6. *Ibid*
7. Iqbal, *Rumuz-e-Bekhudī*, Eng. Tr. A.J. Arberry,p.60 f
8. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*,p.157.
9. *Ibid*
10. See my book *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, pp.28-30.
11. R. Smith, *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, Eng.Tr. H.J.Rose,p.103
12. See my book page 25. Also A "Note on the Original Sin" pp.44 ff.
13. G.S.Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, pp.83-4.
14. *Ibid*. p.84
15. See my book pages 32- 33.
16. *Reconstruction*, pp.1 ff.
17. *Ibid*, p.26.

18. Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p.447.
19. Iqbal's *Javid Nama*, Eng. Tr. by A.J.Arberry, intr.p.11.
20. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p.155.
21. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*,p.157.
22. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.9.
23. *Ibid*,p.155.
24. *Ibid*,p.154.
25. Macquarrie, *op.cit.* ,p.157.
26. *Ibid*,p.158.
27. *Ibid*, p.159.
28. *Ibid*
29. 'Ijtihad' translated by Iqbal as 'the principle of movement in the structure of Islam' is in fact a method to rejuvenate 'fiqah' in Islam. See Iqbal's chapter,*op.cit.*,pp.146ff.
30. See my book,*op.cit.*,pp.23ff.
31. *Ibid*,pp.24-27.
32. *Ibid*,pp.29-30.
33. *Ibid*, Pt. I, Chapter 3,pp.56ff.
34. *The Future of an Illusion* p.75.
35. *Ibid*,p.76
36. *Totem and Taboo*, p.26.
37. Dr. Nazir Qaiser "A Preface to Ego-Therapy-An Eastern Approach, "The Pakistan Philosophical Journal, Vol.XX, Jan-Dec.1983. Also, "Therapeautic Aspects of Iqbal's Thought", Iqbal Centenary Papers, (ed) Prof. M. Munawwar, (Punjab University Lahore, 1982).
38. Spinks G.S., *Psychology and Religion*, p.85.
39. Iqbal,*op.cit.*,p.179.

40. Iqbal, *Javid Nama* (Persian), p.69, Eng.Tr. my own.
41. *Ibid*, p.57.
42. Iqbal's diagnoses is: Humanity needs three things today-a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual and basic problems of a universal import directing the evolution of human society or a spiritual basis-Reconstruction p.179.
43. Macquarrie, *op.cit.* ,p.159.
44. *Ibid*, p.160.
45. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.125.
46. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
47. Kalthoff, *Dies Entstehung des Christentums*, 153
48. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
49. *Ibid*, p.161.
50. Kautsky, *Foundations of Christianity*, p.381.
51. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
52. *Ibid*
53. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.179.
54. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
55. "The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism" in Marx, Engels, *Marxism*, p.78
56. The Quranic attitude has been anti-superstitious. cf verses V:106 VI:138, 140, 143-44.
57. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
58. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.38.
59. *Ibid*
60. Page 45.
61. "The Attitude of the Workers Party towards Religion", quoted by Macquarie, *op.cit.*, p.162.

62. *Ibid.*
63. The Quran over and again mentions people who will be free of all fear and grief: XLIII:68.
64. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.162.
65. *Ibid*
66. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.151.
67. Gladden, in the Symposium The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought, p.225.
68. Nicholson, *Secrets of the Self* (an Eng.Tr. of Iqbal's Asra-e-Khudi), intr., p.XXVI
69. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*, p.163.
70. See "Where is the Kingdom of God?" in Burning Questions, p.243.
71. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
72. *Ibid*
73. Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p.155
74. *Ibid*
75. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
76. *Ibid*, p.164.
77. *The Quran.*
78. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
79. According to Iqbal true religion is neither dogma, nor priesthood, nor ritual.... *Reconstruction*, p.189.
80. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.7.
81. Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, p.131.
82. *Ibid*, p.139
83. Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.154.
84. *Ibid*, p.155.
85. *Ibid*
86. Mathews, *The Social Teaching of Jesus*, p.54.

87. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*,p.165.
88. *Ibid*
89. *Ibid*
90. *Ibid*
91. Mathews, The Growth of the Idea of God,p.210.
92. See my article "Iqbal's Philosophy of Knowledge", Contributions to Iqbal's thought, (ed Dr. Maruf),pp.4-5.
93. Macquarrie, *op.cit.*
94. *Ibid*,p.166
95. *Ibid*
96. Mathews, *Contributions of Science to Religion*,p.414.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Our discussion interspersed over ten chapters has revealed that Iqbal's system of thought has shown a variety of influences stemming from a motley variety of schools and movements of theologico-philosophical thought which were in vogue, when he was studying in Europe. The skein of his thought may rightly be said to have been woven out of the warp and woof of idealism and realism in the main--he may aptly be called an idealist-realist thinker, a line of thought represented by Prof. H. D. Lewis of the University of London in our times. He has also betrayed finers influences from different shades of naturalism, historicism, spiritualism, besides idealism and realism which form the basis for his whole scheme of thought. This variety of influences has bestowed richness and depth on his thought, and has added dimensions to a system which is basically 'synthetic' and may, in some sense, be called 'eclectic' (a term not carrying a good sense when applied to the rationalist systems of the Middle Ages). This renders his thought complete and comprehensive, and as such many-sided (as against one-sided) and dynamic. Very few thinkers in the history of thought have shown this richness and variety.

Even Iqbal's idealism is itself a blend of the Hegelian Absolutism advocated by thinkers like Caird, Jones, Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce on the one hand, and Personalism represented by such a variety of thinkers as Pringle-Pattison, Hocking, Howison and Dr.

MacTaggart (one of Iqbal's teachers at Cambridge with whom he had personal and intimate correspondence) on the other. On the Hegelian side Iqbal agreed with its British exponents that the ultimate reality is rational, spiritual, and One (a 'unity-in-diversity' as advocated by Caird) rather than an abstract unity taught by Hegel himself); that the world is a manifestation of the ultimate spiritual principle (God according to Iqbal); and that there are degrees of reality. He agreed that 'God is the world-process', that 'the contrast between the finite and the infinite is not final' (Jones), that 'the value lies in individuality' (Bosanquet), that 'mind and body are always known in combination (Illingworth). Like them he conceived of the Absolute in terms of 'Will' rather than 'Thought' (Royce). In fine, Iqbal was an absolutist in as much as he acknowledges the absolute reality of God.

However, Iqbal is more in line with the personal idealist in so far as he stressed upon the independent reality of 'persons', the finite centres of consciousness. He believes in the 'uniqueness' and 'autonomy' of the person, and emphasizes the essential privacy of each individual. Which is due to 'the absolute unique mental unity'. He agrees with Pringle-Pattison that the end of the ego's quest is its very 'individuality' and its fortification. He also agrees that the 'nature, man and God form an organic whole' and need mutual reference for a proper comprehension. Like Personalist and humanists, Iqbal stresses on the reality and significance of the human ego, that both personality and 'immortality' have to be won through

effort, deed and freedom (Pringle-Pattison). He believed in the 'plurality of minds rather than one all-inclusive Mind' (Howison) only; that 'scientific and mystical knowledge must supplement each other for a fuller and completer knowledge of the real. He agreed on the notion of 'personal immortality' and the 'continuity of self and life' (Dr. MacTaggart), of God as both personal and absolute (C. Webb), of 'Not-self' as 'indispensable to selfhood both in God and man'. He agrees with Pringle-Pattison that 'God is a co-worker with man' (provided he takes the initiative, says Iqbal), while man participates in His life, powers and freedom. However, Iqbal's reconciliation of the two kinds of idealism gives his system two important basic tenets: viz., (i) the personality of God which is absolute, infinite and most perfect; and (ii) the independent and unique nature of finite egos, including man, which proceed from the Ultimate Ego. Thus, he reconciles the Unity of the absolutism and the Pluralism of the personalism and thereby arriving at the notion of an Absolute Person.

Iqbal deviates from idealist traditions when he rejects 'intellectualism and a speculative approach to the problems of philosophy. In company with the 'philosophers of spirit' (which is not a regular denomination for such philosophers as discussed in this category) he preaches a philosophy which is "panpsychist", activist, teleological and spiritualistic. He holds that matter is 'a colony of lower order egos' (panpsychism), that "activity" is the distinguishing mark of the spirit (activism), that the 'final act' is not intellectual but "vital" (vitalism). Again, for him

religion is 'an affair of the whole man,' and not 'a departmental affair' (Eucken). Iqbal speaks of absolute religion and stresses the concepts of 'purpose' and 'freedom' as essential to the life of the spirit (teleology). Again, he takes reason in a very wide sense which opens way to a spiritual interpretation of the world and holds that religion is entirely conformable to reason in the wider sense (Eoutrou). This enables the finite person to reach the Infinite. Like the band of philosophers under study, Iqbal brings home the personal nature of God and advocates the doctrine of "meliorism". Spiritualistic philosophy takes reality for 'a system of persons related through God as the Supreme person-- a view which leads to 'spiritual pluralism' which Iqbal remedies by his faith in absolutism. However, unlike some of the idealists and spiritualist thinkers, Iqbal does not believe in a finite or limited God (William James and James Ward). He holds, like them, that time is real and it enters into the very being of God, that God, man and the universe form an integrated whole (Tennant).

However, in line with the idealist traditions in the West, Iqbal agrees with Kant on his "epistemic model" which consists of two basic principles, viz., (i) the character of human knowledge is 'conceptual', (ii) it is 'sense-perception elaborated by understanding'. Iqbal applies this model of knowledge not only to sensory knowledge, but also the highest form of 'mystical' or religious knowledge. On the basis of this model Iqbal rejected the pantheistic idea of "fana" or self-abnegation as the final goal of human life and religion.

Again, Iqbal appears to have been very much impressed by Kant's analysis of thought which led him to his own theory of 'thought' as a necessary constituent of knowledge. He hit upon a very original idea of 'thought' as playing an indispensable role in mystical or religious knowledge-- an idea unknown to his Western counterparts. Moreover, elaborating upon the Kantian principle of epistemology, and seeking inspiration from the Quran and such Muslim thinkers as al-Ghazzali, Iqbal stressed the need for three complementary sources of knowledge -- viz., Nature, History of *Qalb* or *Heart* (i.e., inner perception). However, he does not agree with Kant on his treatment of Space and Time, or go with him on his rejection of metaphysics (for he agrees with A. N. Whitehead that metaphysics is indispensable to religion. Again, he does not follow him in his disparity between knowledge and faith, fact and value, the theoretical and the practical reason. However, Iqbal agrees with neo-Kantians like Windleband in reconciling between science and religion, matter and spirit, knowledge and faith, and in taking religion for 'the quest for a final synthesis', though not agreeing to reduce religion to ethics. Like Iqbal, the neo-Kantians and Ritschlians reject the pantheistic position and uphold the 'panentheistic' view, that reality can be known through "communion" only which is a genuinely objective experience (W. Herrmann), that some of them assigned an important place to *mysticism* (W. Kaftan).

Iqbal struck a beautiful blend between idealism and naturalism (in its various form and shades). His view of knowledge (drawn from an inspiration of the

Holy Quran) assigns a due place to naturalism by recognising three sources of Nature, History and Inner Perception, thus adding a newer dimension to his thought. Iqbal will not agree with the naturalists in treating religion as a natural phenomenon or a mere epiphenomenon; but it is for him one of the genuine spheres of human experience alongwith other levels of experience. Thus, his approach is different from such scientist-turned-philosophers as Mach, Pearson, Haeckel, Frazer, Reinach, and so on. However, Iqbal rejects like Haeckel any differentiation between God and nature, mind and body, or spirit and matter, and also the concept of 'mechanism' as accounting for all phenomena, though agreeing that the 'higher' has emerged from the 'lower'. Again, unlike the naturalists, he rather acknowledges the truth of 'immortality' and 'freedom'. However, he agrees with Tylor that human culture and its products, including knowledge, art, etc., can be studied scientifically (of course, not naturalistically). For him science is not the highest product of human development, nor is there any rivalry between it and religion (the two being complementary and springling from the same root). This, however, should not be taken to mean that Iqbal was not influenced by his contemporary science as is obvious from his drawing inspiration from the views of Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg, Eddington and Driesch, all his famous contemporaries in the field of science. Their views decidedly influenced Iqbal's views on man, nature, and reality. Iqbal does not agree with psychologists like Leuba for whom religion was a biological truth, the Freudians for whom it is 'figment

of the mind', or with A. Huxley for whom it is product of the body chemistry. However, there is some very important affinity between the thoughts of Iqbal and Jung. The notion of 'individuation' plays a very vital role in their thoughts. Both lay stress on the 'discovery and fortification of the ego, the 'optimum development of the whole individual human being' as the ultimate aim of the religious life. The "telos" of all religious activity is for both 'union with the Other'. However, the Jungian approach was basically psychological, while the Iqbalian approach was metaphysical; while Jung ended with the 'individual', Iqbal moved on the 'society and social virtues as preconditions for the integration and development of personality. Iqbal, unlike Jung, does not indentify God with the Unconscious, though he emphasises the knowledge of the self as a precondition for the knowledge of God basing it on the famous saying of the Caliph Ali, the son-in-law to the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.):.

مَنْ عَرَفَ نَفْسَهُ فَقَدْ عَرَفَ رَبَّهُ

Iqbal's system has also shown marked affinity to some contemporary movements allied to naturalism and positivism. Viz, pragmatism, vitalism activism and religious modernism. All these movements unanimously lay stress on 'will', 'life' or 'action' as against 'idea' or 'thought', and attack 'intellectualism' and excessive rationalism. Like Iqbal, they all reject equally the idealistic and mechanistic pictures of the world and, in their turn advocate a dynamic view of reality. On this point, Iqbal would agree with Henri

Bergson, his French contemporary thinker, in so far as they have propounded a dynamic and vital view of life and the world. Both give special importance to time as "duration" which is for them the ultimate stuff of the reality. However, for Bergson reality was a blind, unilluminated force called "elan vital", while for Iqbal reality is teleological and illuminated by a pursuit of ends and purposes. Iqbal has appreciated him for his views on 'individuality' and 'intuition'. In his emphasis on 'action', Iqbal agrees with such activists as Blondel, and both were 'panentheists' in that they believed in the 'reciprocity of action' between God and man. However, they differ in that for Blondel God can be known or approached through 'action' rather than through thought; Iqbal, however, takes 'thought' in a more active and 'deeper' sense in which it is capable of reaching the Infinite.

There is a marked affinity between Iqbal and William James, the American Pragmatist. Prof. James is credited with the innovation of the "pragmatic test" in philosophy, Iqbal puts it up as one of the tests of religious experience and life in his Lecture-II, the other being the 'intellectual test'. Again, Iqbal seems to have been influenced by his contemporary's famous treatise on religious life *The Varieties of Religious Experience* in which he has made a sharp distinction between the "existential propositions" and the "propositions of value" which have to be kept apart. Also Iqbal would agree with his "pragmatic criterion of truth" and not with his "pragmatic theory of truth". However, Iqbal and James differ on the following central points:-

(i) James believes in the efficacy of psychology to understand and explain in naturalistic terms some very important features of religious, whereas for Iqbal modern psychology has hardly touched the outer fringe of the religious life and experience; (ii) Iqbal, unlike James, holds that the mystic states, however unique, are not discontinuous with the ordinary experience; (iii) Prof. James was led to the notion of a 'finite' or 'limited' God, while to Iqbal, God is 'infinite' and absolute. (iv) James was a 'pluralist' in his approach to nature, Iqbal was the champion of unity and system. However, to both the universe is incomplete; they agree on 'meliorism', rejecting intellectualism and abstract metaphysics.

Iqbal and the American contemporary John Dewey show some very close affinity on certain important points. Both have educational interest and show inclination towards modern sciences, especially the modern physical sciences. Again, both show full faith in the concept of 'evolution' which plays a vital role in their respective systems. They also agree that 'the aim of thought is not so much to "know" the world as to "control" the environment'. Also, both are the humanists of a high order and have full faith in intelligence and education, beside sciences. However, Iqbal presents a very beautiful blend of philosophy and science, idealism and realism, not found in Dewey, and thus anticipating such great thinkers of our times as Prof. H.D. Lewis of the University of London and his followers. Again, in their approach to evolution, Dewey was basically a Darwinian, while Iqbal was a Lamarckian in his approach. Iqbal shows faith in the

traditional religion thought voicing a need for the 'reconstruction', while Dewey was more dry and logical in his treatment of the subject even at the risk of abandoning religion.

Some important religious modernists of his time came closer to Iqbal in some very important respects. Alfred Loisy, la berthonniere, Le Roy, G. Tyrrell, and so on agree with Iqbal that (i) religious faith is to be lived, (ii) it emanates from religious experience and is in the process of development, (iii) it must grow in the locus of the traditional religion, (iv) the essence of religion is found 'in the fulness and totality of its life', which shows movement and vitality just because it is life', (v) they were activists who dilated on 'deed' rather than the 'idea' and (vi) some of them believed in 'panentheism' like Iqbal and held that the "human" and the "divine" must combine in the perfect Manhood. Iqbal agrees with Tyrrell that there should be an 'evolving theology which is continually tested by living experience', that religious belief should promote the spiritual life of man. His thought shows some important closeness to the thought of his contemporary theological thinkers like Ralph Inge, von Hugel, and F. Heiler. Both Iqbal and Inge condemn modern 'rationalism' as one-sided, though assiging due place to reason in religions of course, taking reason in a wider sense (with marked difference of approach). For them religion is an activity of the 'whole' man rather than a departmental affair; both emphasise a need for the unison between reason and faith. Iqbal will agree with Hugel on 'tolerance' in all religions, avoidance of 'forced conformity', and a belief in God as 'an

immensely rich and complex reality' which is transcendent, though will advocating the 'direct mystical apprehension of God'. For Iqbal and Heiler, religion should aim at nothing short of humanity, for religion should mean the 'spiritual bond which unites all men'. However, they differ fundamentally in their respective treatment of 'prayer' in so far as it is 'personal' and petitionary, for Heiler, while for Iqbal it is 'meditative, vital and social which binds men together leading to a universal humanity'. Iqbal's position that prayer and scientific observation 'must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity' is not known to the Western thinkers.

Iqbal has attached due importance to history and historical processes vis-a-vis the culture of Islam. He has shown deep interest in the works of Dilthey, Spengler, Cassirer and other contemporaries who have written on history, culture and religion in their mutual relationship. Iqbal straight away rejected Spengler's 'discontinuity theory of cultures. His main object, according to Iqbal was to prove that the 'anti-classical SPIRIT of European is not due to the Islamic impact; it is rather the product of the "specific genius of Europe"...' Iqbal, in this connection, quotes from Dr. Briffault's *Making of Humanity* to bring out Europe's indebtedness to Islamic culture. However, Iqbal agrees with Spengler in treating of culture as "organic". He rejects his "cyclical" view of history and his "cultural relativism" in religion as untrue. Iqbal and Dilthey show mistrust for the capability of psychology to study higher activities of mind (including religion and spiritual activities). Both interpret history spiritually.

Again, for both the 'Will' assumes the first place, exalting 'personality' and forming the idea of a 'personal God'. Again, Iqbal's three stages of religious life find a close, though by no means exact, parallel to Dilthey's tripartite scheme of the world-views and mind. Unlike Cassirer, Iqbal does not relegate religion to the position of a 'means to the goal of freedom and "self-liberation"'; religion for him is 'an independent whole reality' which colours life and culture both. Iqbal will not go with the historicists like Croce, Gentile, Collingwood, Toynbee, Urban, and others who assign history the "master-subject" status, though he agrees with Croce who assigns a spiritual nature to reality. Iqbal agrees on a need for a scientific and philosophical examination of the peculiar experience called religious or "mystical", though he will not agree with Collingwood that 'religion, like other experiences, is a "distortion" of the spirit's self-knowledge'. Dawson, like Iqbal, holds that 'religion is the key to culture', it exert 'a dynamic influence on culture' and provides 'the driving forces in movements of social change'. Both Iqbal and Dawson warns the West against its growing 'secularism' and diagnose their ills to it.

A deeper analysis of Iqbal's thought reveals a good blend of idealism and realism and it may rightly be described as "idealist-realistic" like the system of Prof. H.D. Lewis in present times. His thought may, qua realistic, be compared with such rigid realistic-empiricists as G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, A. Whitehead Morgan, and S. Alexander. Though showing a realistic trend, unlike Moore, Iqbal does not reject

Hegelian absolutism; his position on knowledge is Kantian rather than Moorean. However, Moore shares with Iqbal a humanistic touch in his ethical thought. In fact, he is too empirical to be called Iqbalian in a true sense. When we come to Russell, he seems to be poles apart from Iqbal, especially when one studies his rejection of Christianity in particular, and of religion in general. However, a deeper study of Russell would reveal that he was not so much against religion as against religious dogmatism, obscurantism, and fundamentalism, and here Iqbal would agree with him. In his later writings, Russell acknowledges four values -- viz., 'a sense of infinity, a sense of membership in the whole, resignation, and social justice' as the essentials of his 'religion'-- the four values which form a very vital part of Iqbal's religious thought. In fact, Russell was against traditional Christianity which he found in practice in history and in reality. Russell, like Nietzsche, appears to be groping for truth or true religion, but his empirical and 'logical' legacy kept him astray. Russell's main difficulty arose from the fact that he treated religion and science as poles apart (how unlike Iqbal's position).

Despite his rigid empirical and scientific approach, Whitehead comes much closer to Iqbal in his treatment of religion. Like Iqbal, he believes in a 'comprehensive synthesis of knowledge', and develops a "non-materialistic" world-view; in the fact of "religious vision" which is a cause of optimism. Also, his philosophy is "organismic" like Iqbal, and he propounds a 'conception of reality in which all aspects of experience are interconnected--' both reject the

static "substance" theory of the world and the dualism mind and body as two variant "substances", they conceive reality in process. They believe in a series of "actual entities" ranging from God at top down to the most trivial "puff of existence" which Iqbal called 'a colony of sub-ego's'. For them every "existent" is bipolar, for Whitehead even God is bipolar (a position where Iqbal will not follow him). Again, they will agree that the conceptual experience can be infinite, while physical experience is necessarily finite. Iqbal appreciates his version of "relativity" on the ground that it gives "time" its due place and significance. Iqbal quotes from Whitehead in his *Lectures* and endorses his "rationalistic" view of religion. He also appreciates his "efficient" view of religion, and his view of "matter" as 'a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous flow'. However, for Whitehead God is limited and involves "becoming", while to Iqbal He is infinite and unlimited. Again, for the former God is "the great companion, the fellow-sufferer who understands" (truly in the Christian spirit), while for Iqbal He is the "Co-worker". For both religion is a concrete state of mind involving all the three aspects of cognition, affection and conation plus morality.

With Morgan, Iqbal advocates the concept of "emergent evolution" which formed one of the basic principles of his whole scheme of thought. Iqbal rejected mechanistic theories on the basis of the concept of "emergence"; in fact, Iqbal's application of this concept is much more thorough than either of Morgan or of Bergson in as much as he applied it to all

reality. Iqbal will agree with Morgan that the emergent process points to God as its author. Both try to reconcile idealism and realism, though their approaches are different. However, for Morgan nature was not continuous, for Iqbal nature has no leaps and gaps. As regards Alexander, Iqbal himself suggested that in order to understand his concept of "Superman" the English reader should approach through Alexander and not through Nietzsche as is commonly held, though he has rejected his christian idea of "God-Incarnate". Iqbal prefers his idea of "emergent evolution" to Morgan's. Like Iqbal, Alexander given primacy to "time" calling it the "mind of space". Both believe that the nature is continuous, and that life and mind are true "emergents". For both evolutionary process ends with God or "deity" (As Alexander calls it). Iqbal praises him as the only optimistic philosopher in the West. However, for Alexander, 'everything has a physical basis in a space-time matrix', for Iqbal, on the other hand, everything in the universe has a spiritual basis. Again, Alexander's position on the relationship between God and the universe is much more complicated and confusing than Iqbal's, though both are "panentheistic".

Iqbal shows close affinity with the sociological thinkers like Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Robertson Smith, F. Atkinson, and Freud -- all contemporaries of Iqbal. Beside the 'individual', he has shown a keener interest in the study of 'society' in his famous mathnavi *Rumuz-e-Bekhudî* where he takes society in a more "organic" and systematic way, comparing it to an "individual" having a career like a child. Like him,

Spengler and Toynbee have called society "a social organism". Iqbal convincingly rejects the Freudian origin of society from "totemism" and the "sex-impulse theory" of religion and social organisation. Both Iqbal and Durkheim call religion a social phenomenon". They reject any division between the spiritual and temporal. They also agree that there is no opposition between science and religion. Again, Durkheim and Weber have tried to establish a positive relationship between religion and society, although their main object was to justify the Western capitalist society. Iqbal will, however, agree that 'religious beliefs and social institutions may be correlative expressions of a single underlying attitude of mind'. He rather goes a step further to hold that religious beliefs determine the social institutions of a people, though adding that social institutions in turn colour religious beliefs (i.e., the institution of *ijtihad* in Islam). Iqbal also discusses Marx and Lenin in their views of "society" and "religion".

In the end, Iqbal's views have also been compared with his American contemporaries like Gladden, Rauschenbusch and Mathews. Iqbal agrees with Gladden that "love" brings man closer to God, though the two understand "Love" in completely different senses. Both conceive the "Kingdom of God on earth" which in the end embraces the whole of humanity. Iqbal and Rauschenbusch that the true object of religion is 'to transform human society into the kingdom of God'; while for Mathews this kingdom is 'an ideal social order'. Iqbal, however, does not agree Mathews in identifying religion with social behaviour,

nor is God for him reducible to 'an epiphenomenon of social behaviour'. Again, Mathews was a "pantheist", while Iqbal a "panentheist" in their views on God. However, both agree that a right relationship with God leads to the right type of social order.

To conclude, the study undertaken in the foregoing pages amply proves that Iqbal's thought cannot be traced back to any one single system of thought; it is rather a very rich and comprehensive system which partakes of all the various systems and schools of philosophy which were in vogue during his life-time. In the main, however, his system of thought may be described as "idealist-realistic", as said before, and may be compared to that of Prof. H. D. Lewis, though there are important differences so far as their respective views on religion are concerned. Though partaking of all the various systems and trends, his thought cannot be called "eclectic" in so far as it is not a mere amalgamation of these various influences; his system is rather a unique organic whole in itself with definite character and direction. This assigns Iqbal a definite place in the history of thought.

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