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


A STUDY IN
IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY

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A STUDY IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY



by
BASHIR AHMAD DAR, M.A.
Author of Iqbal's Philosophy of Society

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SHAIKH MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
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To
SYED ABUL ALA MAUDUDI

Whose bold and untiring efforts in
combating the forces of Ignorance
(*Jahliyya*) and in establishing
the Sovereignty of the Lord,
constitute a great dynamic force
towards a true Islamic renaissance

PREFACE

Anybody who studies Iqbal in prose or in poetry will agree that the message he delivered to us so beautifully promises to provide a great motive force for the resurrection of our society in India. No doubt we had among us the message of our holy prophet but unluckily Islam in its original purity and simplicity never had the chance to cross the Hindukush and, therefore, we in India never could enjoy the good fortune of witnessing in practice its moral and social code to the full.

There were two simultaneous currents in Indian religious life—one represented by reformers like Guru Nanak, Kabir and a few Muslim mystics who tried to discover some common ground for the two Indian religious groups in a sort of universal religion provided by the theory of *Wahdat-i-Wajud*. The *Din-i-Ilahi* of Akbar was perhaps the first and the last notable attempt to force it on the people of India under State patronage. Dara Shikoh's death at the hands of Aurangzeb, however, served to cut short the growth of this movement and this succeeded in averting politically the dangerous possibility of mental and moral paralysis of a large population of this country.

But unfortunately the attraction which the common man feels towards such a 'religious atheism' made its influence felt: it gradually unnerved the vitality of the Indian Muslims. The other current moved along with the first and was aimed at counteracting its destructive potentialities. It tried to represent Islam in its pristine simplicity shorn of all superficial wrapp-

ings. Mujaddid Alf-i-Thani (of Sirhind) and Shah Waliullah (of Delhi) dedicated their lives to this sacred cause. Their herculean efforts in stemming the rising tide of decadence, however, proved of little avail and the Indian Muslims continued to drift into the sea of destruction. The end came at last in 1857 and that memorable year witnessed the last scene of a not very glorious period of our history.

Since then several laudable attempts have been made to bring to life once again, after centuries of barrenness, the original message of Islam, and in our times, this sacred duty fell on the shoulders of Iqbal who, by the invincible magic of poetry, seems to have succeeded in winning the ears of a great majority of Indian Muslim to his call for revaluation and reinterpretation of the ideals of life in the light of Islamic principles. It is only by putting him in this perspective that we can assess the true value of his mission.

No movement, however, can hope to thrive at present unless it meets the challenge of the modern age—the challenge of atheism in different and more visible forms of modern science, nationalism, democracy and socialism. But the release of the inhuman forces of destruction in the West is a sufficient index that the modern age is crumbling to pieces sooner or later. Iqbal's ruthless criticism of modern institutions supplemented by an ideal of perfect manhood envisaged by him after the model of a true Muslim laid down in the Quran, gives his message a unique position in the regeneration of Islam as a vital force in the reshaping of the world.

I should like to express my deep sense of gratitude to my teacher, Qazi Muhammad Aslam, B.A. (Cantab.),

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IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF ART

"Oh, I swear by the afterglow of sunset, and by the night and all that it enshroudeth, and by the moon when she is at the full, that ye shall journey on from plane to plane." 84: 16—19.

The process of evolution starting with dead matter at some point of time passed into the realm of living organism. Life appeared in its simplest form on the universe. We are here not concerned with the problem of what Life exactly is : we can say at least that it is a principle which is irreducible to matter and to which the principle of mechanism does not apply. It found itself surrounded by material environment which imposed certain restrictions on its otherwise free movements. Therefore Life had to contend and fight against it. In this fight Life permeated or entered into matter and animated it. A living organism is nothing but an objectification of the principle of Life and as evolution proceeds these objectifications of Life assume forms higher than their predecessors. The word 'higher' indicates presence of a certain goal to which this process of evolution is directed. Thus a stage higher than the earlier one is where awareness of the universe and its contents is richer and deeper. In the case of plants, *e.g.*, awareness is limited only to the physiological changes in the

body necessitated by their need for nourishment and reproduction. In the case of animals, awareness advances a step further. They are aware of external objects such as tree, water, other animals and possess emotions, like fear and anger, etc. In the case of man this awareness has developed into the form of mind whose characteristics are thought and self-consciousness. While animals are able to perceive only external objects presented to their sense-organs, man, beyond this capacity of looking at particulars, has the capacity to proceed from particulars to generalisations. The fall of an apple makes him assert, on certain conditions, that all apples in future will fall to the ground when unconnected with the branch of the tree. The sun that rises from the east to-day and sets in the west at night will do so again next day and for many years to come. These generalisations are made by man through his capacity of thought and they go far beyond his daily experience. The edifice of different branches of modern science is based upon this very capacity of man. Self-consciousness is a further advance. Not only does he know but also knows that he knows, and, though to a certain extent, knows why he knows. Type of human awareness does not end here. There is another avenue of which man can be aware, though this is at present not the characteristic common to most people. There are certain minds who receive intimations of reality at particular moments of life, who, through attainment of a higher level of evolution, are able, in aesthetic, ethical or mystical experience, to know a reality which lies much beyond one of which we are aware in our normal experience and which is perhaps the ultimate goal of all evolution. At

present it seems that it is the main privilege of the mystic and to a lesser degree of the artist, to have an insight into this world of values. Ordinary people cannot be said to be completely devoid of this experience, for though they cannot create yet they have the capacity for appreciating an artist's creative works and thus partaking of some of emotions originally felt by the artist himself. Thus we see that the object of evolution is that we should rise from the lower level of awareness of matter by gradual stages to an awareness of the ultimate reality of which at present only rare intimations are attained by the mystics at certain moments and to a still lesser degree by the artist.

What is Life which we have described to be striving to express itself in such a variety of forms in its fight against matter? It is a question which on deeper analysis will be found to be beyond our capacity to answer. A definition must be one which should try to explain a thing less known in terms of what is fully known. A triangle, for instance, is a figure bounded by three sides. We know what we mean by side and what is to be bounded by three sides. Can life be described in such simple terms? We have seen and modern researches in biology have proved it beyond doubt that those bodies that are animated by life behave in a way that can, by no stretch of imagination, be explicable in terms of physical or chemical laws, as bodies composed of mere matter can be, without doing violence to facts. These established conclusions prove that life is a principle unique in itself and irreducible to any other principle so far known. As such, the term life cannot be adequately

defined. We know of course that it is a source of energy and movement in those who are animated by it but what its origin is, is beyond our limited knowledge to describe. We may pursue our study of different objectifications of Life and trace it back to its earlier manifestations in its simplest form, yet this mode of approach will hardly enable us to explain what life is as we find it at present.

Now let us see what our mental experiences are. Everybody knows them because they are the very part and parcel of our existence ; nothing, in short, can be more intimately known than these experiences. But when we come to the question of describing them, there appears before us a sort of blankness, some huge wall separating us from them ; so intimately felt and yet so out of our intellectual reach. You may assign reason, and there can be several, for this fleeting character of our experiences and yet it is a fact. These mental experiences thus share, in this respect, the elusive characteristic of Life ; they can be only lived through but cannot be known, grasped, described or defined. Just as we cannot shut our eyes to our mental experiences similarly we cannot ignore the presence of life which is the source of all energy and activity that is manifested by all living beings. Life, as if, moves us forward towards an end which is yet to be and towards which it has been moving since nobody can tell when and how long this process will go, nobody can divine. But this much at least is clear that it is constantly changing, moving further and further on a particular path of evolution towards a particular goal or end which though in its earlier stages may not be consciously pursued but is at least in its present mani-

festations being dimly visualised, a vision which had been the valued possession of mystics and prophets of all ages. Life is a purposive and creative force ; it is purposive in the sense that it has a certain goal to arrive at. In its march towards that goal it comes into contact with matter, tries to overcome its limitations and in this attempt penetrates it as an electric current enters a wire. It objectifies itself in different manifestations and through them tries to rise to higher levels of consciousness and reason, each higher than the preceding one.

But the process of evolution does not proceed smoothly. Just as biology has proved that a particular level of evolution, higher than its predecessor, was reached not slowly and steadily but mainly by a sort of 'jumps' which are technically called mutations, similarly, in the evolution of human race towards its goal, these mutations have played a great or rather the most prominent part. Just as according to the modern view in biology, a new species makes its appearance not by small and gradual variations caused by changing circumstances, as, *e.g.*, Darwin held or due to some hormic impulse of certain individuals of a species, as Lamarck held, but through a sudden change or jump on the part of the old, similarly in the case of men, a certain stage of development is reached not through the underground working of some age-long forces but through sudden jumps. These mutations in human history are produced by the appearance of a great man, endowed with certain super-normal capacities of mind or body or both, who stands out boldly as a particular manifestation of Life among his contemporaries. He is so gifted that he can see

light through an atmosphere of what to his contemporaries may appear utter darkness ; his insight grasps the full implication of the present to its core and on that basis perceives the path of its future development as clearly as daylight. His ideas are about the future ; he talks of what he wishes people to become ; he is the messenger of a new order amidst the advocates of conservatism. He brings a new message of life and vitality to a people who have grown insipid, weak and stale by leading a life based on obsolete platitudes. Such are the religious reformers, prophets, true poets and true artists. They are the objectifications of the very source of our life, the spiritual principle, created to become leaders of the human race in its journey to the destined goal. Humanity is marching on the road of evolution towards a destination. Being free and autonomous most of us are sure to go astray and thus impede, instead of helping in, our common struggle for the attainment of the object. It is also possible that a particular stage of this journey may allure us so bewitchingly that we may cry halt to our journey and stay for a period longer than desired. Life has devised certain methods by which we are made to rise from our slumbers and shake away laziness and once again take heart and march on. There are signposts to guide us along the path and if the presence of these is not sufficient, people appear time and again to goad us on incessantly. They are our teachers in the broad sense of the term. What they teach us is the very message of Life Force which it wants to convey to us at a particular stage of human development and with which it wants us to arm for our forward march. Just as we or the geniuses

have no say in being made its objectifications similarly there is nothing self-made in the message which these geniuses have to convey. This message, as if, flows of itself from the core of their hearts and waters the barren fields of humanity.

The Unconscious with which the psychologists have made us so much familiar as the nourishing ground of our desires and the seat of instincts, seems to be the very centre of the Life Force itself which operates from within and plays upon the keys which determine the human behaviour in all its diversities. The inspiration of a master-artist (using the word in a broad sense) is nothing else but a tangible appearance in consciousness of what has been pushed up, as if, from below. A study of almost all great people, poets and reformers, prophets and seers, testifies that they were inspired by a message which they must express willingly or unwillingly. They seemed to be 'possessed.' We have sufficient records of how the Holy Prophet felt when he was the subject of an inspiration. Objective symptoms as noticed by his followers were : (1) "Even on cold days sweat appears on his forehead." (2) "He covers his head, his colour grows red, he snores as one asleep or rattles like a young camel." (3) "He falls into a lethargy or trance." One of his Companions relates : "I was at his side when the *Sakina* (revelation) came upon him. His thigh fell upon mine so heavily that I feared it would break." Another time he was travelling on a camel when revelation appeared. The beast could not bear his burden and sat down there and then.¹ We have also records of several poets of emi-

¹ *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. IV, p. 1092, art. *Wahy*.

nence who composed their message in a state of mind which could hardly be called normal. It is, as if, a power, sitting behind a screen, forces something upon its 'object' which he cannot but give expression to. The message which it conveys is usually of a nature that is unpalatable to the people of the age. They live in the present with a burden of past traditions on their back, always being dragged back to the unhealthy but seemingly beautiful past with a distorted and bespectacled view of the present and its problems ; they have no solution to offer except relapse into the illusory sunshine of the beaten track which humanity has long since left behind. They tenaciously cling to the opinions and platitudes of a once great man who was equally challenged and ignored by his contemporaries. The genius has something tangible for them which is to be the inevitable part and parcel of their armoury on the journey into the future. But they cannot, by the very fact of their being not the leaders but the led, foresee the next stage and its requirements, while he sees it as clearly before his eyes as they see the present and, as the vehicle of Life Force, he is bound to deliver to them the much-needed message whether they like it or not. In such hostile circumstances every true poet and artist, prophet and seer, has succeeded in preserving the integrity of his character by refusing to humour his contemporaries. He stands out above their heads as the specimen of the highest and noblest in human nature. He bears all kinds of humiliation, ill-treatment, torture, penury and even death and bears them with a smiling face and a kind heart and yet he never for a moment feels doubt in the truth of his mission, never wavers in his convictions, never condescends to alter even an iota of what

he wants to deliver ; because it is not his own, not a creation of his own imagination, but an inevitable and eternal expression of the very Life Force itself, the fountain-head from which he and all of us have sprung, the source of all animation and vitality. "Even if you were to place the sun on my right hand and the moon on my left, I am not going to forego what I have to deliver", were the words of the greatest Prophet of the world when his contemporaries tried to dissuade him from delivering his immortal message, because it appeared to them unsuitable but which, as time alone proved, was and is the one and only one eternal refuge of the misguided humanity.

But there is a great difference between the prophet as a genius and the poet as a genius. A prophet is an original thinker *par excellence* devised by the Life Force to give expression to moral and spiritual ideas which are far ahead of the times in which they are born. While poets, on the other hand, are geniuses of a special type. They are, in general, not original in the sense in which prophets are ; their main function seems to lie in giving expression to ideas most suitable for the down-trodden humanity in their next stage of evolution which, though already delivered to them by the great geniuses, had remained unheeded or had gone into oblivion. He is not the originator as much as the interpreter of healthy ideas. His sphere is the world with all its multifarious problems of life ; he feels the common experiences of the people, he loves and suffers and gives expression to his subjective experiences in their relation to the objective needs. He deals with everyday life and its emotions and problems. But in all these he takes the prophets as the source of his ideas.

He makes use of their teachings and presents them in a mode which must appeal to the man-in-the-street. A great poet is a device of the Spirit to popularise the eternal message at various stages of human development. The Holy Quran is the repository of eternal truth for mankind for all times to come but each age requires a novel point of view in understanding that message ; it requires a new interpreter for every period of our history who may, through the guidance of God, be able to cull out of it pieces most neglected and yet most essential for humanity at that particular stage for its future equipment. That the Holy Quran is capable of such interpretation is borne out by actual historic facts. After a lapse of every hundred years since mankind received the final and eternal truth, there has been appearing on the face of this earth a spiritual seer, a great genius of marked ability to foresee the needs of future, who has been able to bring to light certain aspects of the Quran which were most essential to mankind at its next stage. To name only a few out of a host of such illustrious personages, we have Imam Ghazali, Imam Ibn-i-Taimiyya, Mujjadid Alf-i-Thani and Jamal-ud-Din Afghani. They were seers of first rank, who, without exception, derived their light of inspiration from the Holy Quran and the Holy Prophet and helped, in one way or the other, the evolutionary progress of the world. Besides these seers we have a number of great poets who did their best in disseminating the ideas of these geniuses in a form most agreeable to the people. Rumi, Attar and Sanai stand out prominently among these geniuses. The great *Mathnavi* of Rumi, several books of Attar, the *Hadiqa* of Sanai, are a few of the best

pieces of literature that are devoted to the exposition of the ideas of the Qurān most neglected by, although most essential for, mankind at a particular period in its history. They were poets of genius who expressed the message of the Qurān in the most attractive way for the people of their ages, according to the level of enlightenment. The Qurān is the eternal light which guides us on the path of evolution towards the destined goal and Rumi and others are the geniuses who reinterpreted particular aspects of it at a particular age.

In the *Jawaid Nama* Iqbal has referred to this comprehensive and universal aspect of the Qurānic message which the Life Force contrived through its vehicles to be expounded and interpreted according to the level of culture attained and in view of the needs of future. "Several new worlds are hidden in its verses and ever-fresh orders remain latent in its folds. Out of these only one order is sufficient for the present age. Have it, if you have a knowing heart ; when one order grows old, the Qurān supplies a new one for the people."¹ And then he enunciates certain fundamental principles of life on which such a future world should be re-created on the ruins of the present.

We thus see that poets are one of the devices of God to bring home to the common people the message that some previous original genius communicated to the world which, either the world at that time totally

¹ صد جهان نازہ در آیات اوست عصر ہا پیچیدہ در آفات اوست
 یک جہانش عصر حاضر را بس است گیر اگر در سینہ دل معنی رس است
 چون کہن گردد جہا نے در برش می دہد قرآن جہا نے دیگرش
 (P. 72)

rejected, or if accepted, has gone into oblivion.¹ In the *Asrar-i-Khudi* Iqbal describes the nature and function of a true poet. "He is a *Khizr* and amidst his darkness is the fountain of Life. All things that exist are made more living by his tears. Heavily we go, like raw novices, stumbling on the way to the goal. His night-ingle has played a tune and laid a plot to beguile us, that he may lead us into the paradise of Life, that Life's bow may become a full circle. Caravans march at the sound of his bell and follow the voice of his pipe, . . . his witchery makes Life develop itself and become self-questioning and impatient."²

Now the question is : in what does the appeal of a poet and a literary artist lie? It is often said, perhaps with justice, that poetry is a combination of form and content. It conveys certain meanings in rhythm and metre which make musical sound. But if we consider it minutely we shall see that neither of these functions individually is the prerogative of a poet. If the appeal of poetry is merely in its contents then there is no sense in conveying that through an arrangement of words that mystifies rather than clarifies the ideas of the author. If we wish to communicate a certain thought to others we see it most con-

¹ This point may not be construed to mean that there are no poets who are original. It is possible that poets and literary artists may be original thinkers and in that case they would be performing a double function.

² *Asrar-i-Khudi*, pp. 57-58. Eng. Tr., pp. 62-63 (Revised edn.).

ما گراں سپریم وخام و سادہ ایم در رہ منزل زیا افتاده ایم
 عند لیب اونوا پرداخت است حیلہ از بہر ما انداخت است
 تاکشد مارا بہ فردوس حیات حلقہ کامل شود قوس حیات
 کاروانش از درایش گام زن در پئے آواز نایش گام زن

venient and advisable to do so in easy and direct prose. Again, if the meaning, which the poets convey, is to be the sole criterion of its function then a paraphrase rendering of a beautiful verse of Hafiz or Ghalib would be equally sufficient. But we know and feel that paraphrase loses the true significance and value which is commonly attached to the unusual arrangement of words called poetry. On the other hand, mere rhythmical sound would be a poor substitute for the best form of music. Thus we see that the function of poetry is neither merely to convey meaning nor merely the creation of beautiful and musical rhythm; it is really communication of a certain idea in a musical way with a particular *emotional appeal*. An idea expressed in a poem appeals to our inmost nature and moves us much deeper than prose can do and this is the sole purpose of poetry.

According to Iqbal, therefore, the function of poetry is that it should be employed in the service of Life; it should be employed to communicate to people what is useful and essential for the coming stage of evolution; it must, in short, serve Life and never separate itself from it. Poetry and literature are, for him, mere tools devised by Life, to impress upon the negligent humanity what the great geniuses have to say to them. For him Life is the foundation and the criterion of all our activities, that which strengthens this impulse is good and that which hinders its healthy development is evil. Function of a true artist, a poet and a musician, is to express in the most beautiful way that which is beneficial, to which people must attend.

Here we may refer, in brief, to the old controversy about the function of art which is commonly known as "Art for Art's sake." During the middle of the last

century this problem was fully thrashed out and as a result the controversy now seems fairly settled. The doctrine of Art for Art's sake originated as a reaction against undue emphasis on the objective purpose and biological function of art in human society. Is art useful? Has it any utility in our life? Has it any survival value? The answer to such questions was given mostly genetically, with reference to its early history. Art and poetry, in early times, were often employed by the preachers and prophets and from this it was erroneously concluded that the function of art was to preach morality or religion. But this was, in fact, a conception most derogatory to art and the personality of the artist. A true artist has in reality no conscious object before his eyes which he wants to convey, at least in his early stages: he is a vehicle of Life which 'inspires' him every now and then. If we study the life history and particularly the happy moments when almost all great poets composed their works, we shall find no conscious effort on their part to compose something for merely preaching a certain lesson or for merely propagating a particular doctrine. You will never notice any of those things which you may see in a prose-writer who deliberates over his material in order to present to his readers a systematic theory about something. In the case of a poet of great genius, on the other hand, ideas seem to come to him all of a sudden, as if, out of the womb of reality; he is 'caught,' so to say, in a trance and then burst forth from him a series of utterances which reveal his personal reaction to the objective experiences. Inspiration is some unusual energy which is uninvited and clearly beyond one's control. Its appearance at a particular moment invests the poet's

mind with power which others lack and which the recipient at other moments of consciousness lacks himself. According to the point of view here advocated it can be easily accounted for ; it is a mode or device of Life by which it makes its vehicles express a particular thing. Thus we see that a poet does not use his poetry or an artist his art merely to express a certain philosophic doctrine. His art is not for the sake of mere moral preaching. He is a poet and an artist because he expresses his own personal experiences, his personal reactions at certain opportune moments, when he is brought face to face with some aspects of reality. In this sense at least we may say that the doctrine of art for art's sake is correct only if by it we mean that an artist or a poet reflects in his works his sincere reactions to some personal experiences without any thought to an ulterior objective. But, as a living human being, he must have certain definite points of view about different aspects of our complex life on this earth and beyond. His conscious and unconscious life must be of a particular pattern determined partly by his temperamental peculiarities, his education and his environment and his reactions towards his surroundings, hostile or otherwise. That will determine to some degree the contents of his inspiration. Life utilises our Unconscious for this purpose. An artist feels that he is giving expression to his personal experiences about some object or idea which, at a particular happy moment of trance, he sees vivid and clear before his eyes and which at other moments would have escaped his notice. At such moments he gives vent to the inner urge of his Unconscious ; his inspiration takes a particular form and, being the vehicle of Life itself, he expresses not only his perso-

nal experiences but his own personal views as well. As such, art has a certain function ; its value lies not merely in the expression of an artist's personal experiences but in the expression of his views about the problems of life in a particular way. It is subservient to life and not independent of it ; its utility lies in the fact that it imparts more value, more beauty and more life to what would otherwise be prosaic, dead or valueless. The more honest a poet is in the expression of his inner experiences, the more skilful is his handling of the material (of language or stone or colour) at his disposal, the more value will be imparted to his works. Croce, the Italian philosopher, thinks that art has no connection with life or morality. According to him, theoretical activity of man is twofold, intuitive and intellectual (conceptual). The first activity is what we call aesthetics and takes shape in the form of artistic creations where we deal only with the objective expression in concrete individual images of emotions felt, which is quite distinct from the second activity called intellectual, in which we collect and combine individual images and draw conclusions from them, which are general and abstract. This activity belongs to philosophical speculation. "Philosophy deals with concepts which are abstract and universal, while art creates images which are individual and concrete. As activities, there can be no connection nor comparison between them, because they belong to different grades of consciousness."

But all such views of "pure art" are based on a wrong conception of human nature. There can never be any absolute distinction between purely intuitive and purely intellectual activities ; you can never, however

much you may try, draw any line of demarcation between these two interdependent aspects of our nature. Psychologists have done sufficient research concerning conditions attendant upon the process of artistic creation. Professor Graham Wallace in his remarkable work, *The Art of Thought*, has exhaustively analysed this process. He enumerates four stages: (1) Preparation, a stage where the original thinker or artist is busy studying a particular problem in all its aspects. This is, in short, the intellectual activity of man. (2) Incubation, a period during which no conscious thinking is done. (3) Appearance of the 'happy idea,' the stage called illumination. (4) Verification, a stage which is filled with as much intellectual activity as the first stage. Here the artist is concerned with working out and execution of that 'happy idea' in his work. Thus we see that a work of art is the result not only of unconscious intuitive activity of man but also of conscious, intellectual effort; both are complementary. Genius, as is sometimes tersely said, is twenty per cent inspiration and eighty per cent perspiration. An artist can in no wise remain aloof from the day-to-day life of his time; his work must of necessity reflect his intellectual outlook towards life and its diverse problems, whether social, economic, religious or moral. Inspiration must be preceded by great intellectual effort and it must be succeeded as well by a similar effort for arranging and unifying the ideas in the material form. "The intellectual evaluation and arrangement is like the ground-work of art; there can be no superstructure without the ground-work, but the ground-work may be there without a superstructure. There may be a bad superstructure with a very good ground-work, but there is never

a good superstructure which has a rotten foundation."

Leaving aside those artists who are mere imitators and who never feel the liveliness of the inner realities of mind, we may say that two poets may be equally honest in portraying their personal experiences and reactions and yet they may be poles apart as regards the contents of their inspiration. Take, for instance, the poems of Hafiz or Umar Khayyam, on the one hand, and Rumi or Sanai, on the other. Both may be equally beautiful, may equally satisfy the most fastidious critics, equally fulfil the accepted canons of prosody, but still there will be a lot of difference between the two as regards the contents and the spirit conveyed by them. The significance of a work of art is mainly derived from the artist's attitude to life, the values he sets on things. The difference between works of different writers is most often a qualitative difference of values rather than a quantitative difference of extension. This distinction between two kinds of artists, both honest in the portrayal of their inner experiences, was drawn by our Holy Prophet. He once criticised Imru-al-Kais as "the head of poets but their leader towards hell." The whole stock of his poetry consists of nothing but love romances of most passionate kind, elegies of ruined and demolished cities and description of wild sandy deserts and this was in reality the main theme of pre-Islamic Arab poetry. Imru-al-Kais was one of the greatest poets because he was a master of his technique and employed a language that touched the heart of everyone who heard or read it. He used his mastery over language to poison the minds of his people, to lull them into sleep and to entrap their imagination by appeal to

sensuous taste instead of rousing their will-power ; he tried to make them forget themselves instead of goading them on to higher and nobler ideals. The criticism of the Holy Prophet illustrates the first essential principle of art in general and poetry in particular that mere mastery of technique in a poet does not entitle him to the position of a true artist. A poet may be great indeed, as regards the form or language of his poetry is concerned, and yet the contents of his verses may become the source of social decay.

Iqbal, in the first edition of the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, criticised Hafiz of Shiraz for the same reason. He said : " Beware of Hafiz, the wine dealer whose cup contains nothing but deadly poison. He, the leader of drunkards and parasites, is a sheep and has learned to sing and bewitch people. Avoid his wine-cup ; for he has *hashish* in it like the followers of Hasan-bin-Sabbah." ¹ The same opinion about Hafiz was expressed in equally vehement language by Hali in his *Life of Saadi*, that his poetry is inimical to social uplift. Not only Hafiz but a host of other Persian poets and perhaps most of Urdu poets during the later Moghal period (a period of social and political decline of Muslims in India) were equally decadent in this respect and Iqbal would bring them all under the same category with Imru-al-Kais as leaders of people to Hell, who hide from men the vision of high ideals, deaden their spirit and awaken their sensual appetites, and are constantly under the spell of

¹ هوشیار از حافظ صہبا گسار جامشی از زہر اجل سرمایہ دار
 آن فقیہ ملت میخوارگان آن امام ملت بیچارگان
 گوسفند است و نوا آموخت است فتنہ و ناز و ادا آموخت است
 بگذر از جامشی کہ در میثاثے خویش چوں مریدان حسن دارد حشیش

sex.¹

مری نظر میں یہی ہے جمال و زیبائی
 کہ سر بسجده ہیں قوت کے سامنے افلاک
 نہ ہو جلال تو حسن و جمال ہے تاثیر
 نہ نفس ہے اگر نغمہ ہو نہ آتشناک

According to me, the best testimony of the efficacy of beauty is that the heavens bow before power. If there is no power (of content) mere beauty (of form) is without any value and a song which does not fire one's imagination is less than worthless.

Thus, for Iqbal, true art consists not so much in the mere beauty of form as in the beauty of contents and the expression of the personality of the artist. In the *Zarb-i-Kalim*² he asks : " Why is music so intoxicating as wine ? Does this spell originate from the ' heart ' of the musician or does it arise from the wood of flute ? What is heart ? How does it gain so much power and ecstasy that it overturns the fortune of kings ? How is it that the life of society is intimately bound up with its life ? ... How is it that a man of ' heart ' does not see any value in mere temporal power ? It is only when these mysterious experiences of the ' heart ' are realised that a man can become a true

¹ چشم آدم سے چھپاتے ہیں مقامات بلند
 کرتے ہیں روح کو خوابیدہ بدن کو بیدار
 ہند کے شاعر و صورت گرو افسانہ نویس
 آہ ! بیچاروں کے اعصاب پہ عورت ہے سوار

artist.”¹ Merely to depict nature as it is, is, according to Iqbal, not the function of art. Nature is a raw material which an artist should utilize in order to express his own personality, his innermost heart. Referring to the Egyptian pyramids, he says that nature created only sand-dunes which change their places from time to time and then disappear, while the eternal pyramids before whom the very grandeur of the heaven is belittled, are the expressions of a really creative genius. True artist is not a slave but a master of nature who manipulates it in the service of his own personal expressions.²

It should not, however, be concluded that Iqbal has a very low opinion about technique of art and poetry as such. A man does not deserve to be called a poet simply for being sensitive. A sunset, an old story, an extraordinary event may fire his imagination and carry him into a world of rapture. But to be a poet he must be able to express his personal experiences in words capable of conveying to others exactly what he felt

1 آیا کہاں سے نالہ نے میں سرور سے
اصل اسکی نے نواز کا دل ہے کہ چوب نے
دل کیا ہے اسکی مستی و قوت کہاں سے ہے
کیوں اسکی اک نگاہ الثنی ہے تخت کے
جس روز دل کی رمز مغنی سمجھ گیا
سمجھو تمام مرحلہ ہائے ہنر ہیں طے

See also in this connection pp. 198-199 of *Jawaid Nama* where this theme is presented by Bartari Hari.

2 فطرت کی غلامی سے کر آزاد ہنر کو
صیاد ہیں مردان ہنرمند کہ نچیر
(ضرب کلیم صفحہ 115)

himself and hence the importance of technique without which no true artist or poet can properly fulfil his function. He refers to this most difficult stage of art in the following words : " Though the poetic content is inspired, yet the artist is not free from the preparatory intellectual effort. The tavern of Hafiz and the temple of Behzad both derived the strength of their structure through life-blood poured into them by their creators."¹ " Material at the disposal of the artist may be anything ; colour or brick and stone ; words and sounds or instruments ; in each case the miracle in art is the result of blood-nourishment. It is the drop of a heart's blood which transmutes a stone into a ' heart ' and which produces music and rhythm."² We may quote his own words which he wrote as a Foreword to مرقع چغتائی . He says : " The spiritual health of a people largely depends upon the kind of inspiration that their poets and artists receive. But inspiration is not a matter of choice. It is a gift, the character of which cannot be critically judged by the recipient before accepting it. It comes to the individual unsolicited and only to socialise itself. For this reason the

¹ ہر چند کہ ایجاد معانی ہے خدا داد

کوشش سے کہاں مرد ہنرمند ہے آزاد
خون رگ معمار کی گرمی سے ہے تعمیر
میخانہ حافظ ہو کہ بتخانہ بہزاد
(ضرب کلیم صفحہ 131)

² رنگ ہو یا خشت و سنگ چنگ ہو یا حرف و صوت
معجزہ فن کی ہے خون جگر سے نمود
قطرہ خون جگر سل کو بناتا ہے دل
خون جگر سے صدا سوز و سرور و سرود
(بال جبریل صفحہ 129)

personality that receives and the Life-quality of that which is received are matters of utmost importance for mankind. The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his songs, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Atilla or Chengiz. To permit the visible to shape the invisible, to seek what is scientifically called Adjustment with Nature is to recognise her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimuli and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance of 'what is' with a view to create 'what ought to be' is Health and Life. All else is decay and Death. Both God and man live by perpetual creation.

حسن را از خود بروں جستن خطا ست
آنچه می بایست پیش ما کجاست

To seek value in beauty outside ourselves is wrong ;
' what ought to be ' is not to be found in our external environment.

The modern age seeks inspiration from Nature but Nature simply ' is ' and her function is mainly to obstruct our search for ' ought ' which the artist must discover within the depth of his own being. . . . "

Nature for him is dead, static, devoid of beauty and value, which he describes by the epithet ' is '. It is the vital force of an artist's personality which imparts life, movement, beauty and value to the objective nature. It is a perpetual hindrance in the higher expressions of artistic personality and a true artist is one who forces his self on it and does not allow her to hold sway over himself. He looks upon her as a distinct entity from himself and wants to have full mastery over her. The more he strives to attain his end, the more perfection does he impart to his personality. This effort may be

painful : and yet, " in making that effort, we feel that it is as precious as, and perhaps more precious than, the work it results in, because, thanks to it, we have drawn from ourselves not only all that was there, but more than was there : we have raised ourselves above ourselves."¹ Just as art is a creative expression of human mind similarly nature is God's creative activity. But, according to Iqbal, it is doubtful whether God's creative activity is more beautiful, possesses more value than man's creative world. To him the value and beauty that we see in nature is not there in itself, outside us, but something imparted to it by our own personality. In the *Zabur-i-Ajam* he says : " You regard the world as existing outside yourselves while in reality this nature, though distinct, is yet intimately bound to us. It is our self which has imparted unity to its diversity. Our heart is mysteriously related to it : for every existent depends on being perceived by us. The world is nothing but the expression of our creative genius, for, without us, light and sound will have no existence."²

¹ *A New Study of English Poetry* by Henry Newbolt, p. 13.

² بروں از خویش می بینی جهان را
 در و دشت و یم و صحرا و کار را
 جهان رنگ و بو گلدسته ما
 ز ما آزاد و هم وابسته ما
 خودی او را به یک تار نگه بست
 زمین و آسمان و مهرومه بست
 دل ما را به او پوشیده راه است
 که هر موجود ممنون نگاه است
 جهان غیر از تجلی هائے ما نیست
 که به ما جلوه نور و صدا نیست
 (زبور عجم صفحہ 212-213)

This aspect of the problem was dramatically presented by Iqbal in his dialogue between God and man in the *Piyam-i-Mashriq*. God complains : ' I created world of the same clay and water but you divided it into different geographical units ; I created iron and you created arrows and swords ; I created gardens and plants and you made axes to pull them down ; I created birds of sweet songs and you entrapped them in cages.' Man answers : Your creation did not suffice and my genius demanded an equally creative activity to beautify my world. Can you definitely say which is better : yours or mine ? You created night and I created lamp ; you created clay and I made cups out of it ; you produced forests, sandy deserts and mountains, while I made gardens ; you made stone and I created mirror out of it ; you produced poison and I, antidote.¹ In another place he says that nature is static but it is the function of an artist to create a world as it ought to be.

گفت یزدان کہ چنین است و دگر هیچ مگو
گفت آدم کہ چنین است و چنین می بایست

God said : it is so and do not question further.
But Man said : it is so but it *should* be like this.

It is this role of nature as ' it is ' that comes in the way of man's creative activity. Man's superiority demands that he should control and achieve complete sway over it. This very struggle of man against nature's static obstacle enables him to express his personality to the best advantage and thus help himself in

¹ پیام مشرق صفحہ 132 - معاورہ مابین خدا و انسان

fashioning life as it 'ought to be':

هستی و نیستی از دیدن و نادیدن من است
چه زمان چه مکان شوخی افکار من است

Existence and non-existence are due to our seeing and not-seeing. Space and time are categories of our understanding.

Bacon once said that while science is a subjecting of the mind to things, art is a subjecting of things to the mind or personality of the artist. In the world of science man must adjust himself to the law of matter, to the sphere of utter necessity and as a result of that adjustment has reaped much practical advantages in the field of scientific discoveries. But the way of freedom lies in the other sphere, the sphere of imaginative art, in which man's personality reigns supreme, where he moulds matter to his own liking for the recreation of a new world of his own to his heart's desire, where he finds consolation and delight, not to serve as an escape, a refuge or an oblivion but a longing for a real transformation of life.¹

Once a certain verse of an Arab poet, 'Antara, (last decade of the 6th century of the Christian era) was recited before the Holy Prophet which may be translated as follows: "I have spent several days and nights in labour and toil that I may be able to secure lawful livelihood." On hearing this verse the Holy Prophet at once expressed his appreciation by saying: "Never has the praise of any Arab excited me so much as to desire to see him. But I instinctively wish to see the writer of this verse." This appreciation of the

¹ *A New Study of English Poetry* by Henry Newbolt, pp. 13-14.

Holy Prophet conveys the second great principle of literary criticism. 'Antara's verse depicts in a healthy manner the struggle for existence which our life on this earth demands and without which the evolution of humanity towards its destined goal would be impossible. The great principle which this appreciation brings to light is that art is subservient to human life and not its master. Iqbal says: "The ultimate end of all human activity is life, glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose, and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around, on the mastery of which life depends, is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power."¹ Thus we see that, according to Iqbal, art is a sort of device of Life, by means of which the artist is able to convey to his fellow-beings the message of hope and health and not despair and decadence. The ultimate end is Life, and art, like all other human activities, must serve that end. In the *Zarb-i-Kalim* he says that music, poetry, politics, religion and art are valuable activities in themselves but if they do not serve to preserve and strengthen 'self' they tend to lose their worth. Nations became decadent only when their literature became divorced from a living contact

¹ *The New Era*, 1916, p. 251, quoted in the Introduction to *Asrar-i-Khudi*.

with life.¹

In the *Zabur-i-Ajam* Iqbal criticises different arts as practised in India like music, painting and architecture. As regards music he condemns songs that produce in hearers a sense of depression and sadness, for they are a call to premature social death. He demands strong and virile music which may dash against the hearts of people like waves and raise them above ordinary levels. He emphasises content-value without which it would lose its significance. What are contents? He defines it, in terms of Rumi, as that which transplants man from the world of matter to that of spirit where he can see the reality face to face, free from its sensuous form; not that which fixes our attention on the form and matter and blinds us from the underlying reality. As long as our musicians are oblivious of the value of the content, their music is decadent.²

As regards painting, he gives a few typical instances

¹ سرود و شعرو سیاست کتاب و دین و هنر

گھر ہیں ان کی گرہ میں تمام یکدانہ

اگر خودی کی حفاظت کریں تو عین حیات

نہ کر سکیں تو سراپا فسوں و افسانہ

ہوئی ہے زیر فلک امتوں کی رسوائی

خودی سے جب ادب و دین ہوئے ہیں بیگانہ

(ضرب کلیم صفحہ 98)

² نغمہ می باید جنوں پروردہ آتش در خون دل حل کردہ

نغمہ گر معنی ندارد مردہ ایست سوز و آتش افسردہ ایست

معنی آن باشد کہ بستاند ترا بے نیاز از نقش گرداند ترا

معنی آن نبود کہ کور و کر کند مرد را بر نقش عاشق تر کند

(زبور عجم صفحہ 253)

of themes of modern Indian painters all of which, in different forms, present a most obnoxious and depressing attitude towards life. "A hermit caught in the net of worldly vanities; a beloved with an encaged bird; a king before a mendicant; a sturdy highlander with firewood on his shoulders; a lonely woman on her way to a temple; a hermit in a lonely hermitage; an old man bent down with age in whose hand the lamp has gone out; a musician enraptured by music and a nightingale who cried and broke the string; a youth struck by the love of a woman; or a baby on the neck of an old man,"—these and similar subjects, according to Iqbal, are the creations of artists who have lost faith in themselves, lost their personality, lost their power of creation and originality. He follows nature as it is and tries to discover beauty out of her which, in reality, is imparted to nature by ourselves.

A living artist, on the other hand, creates a new world for us out of the dead and static nature and by this creation imparts a new life to his fellow-beings, it being a complete and perfect expression of his own personality. Lack of initiative and originality, indifference to problems of future of humanity, always turning towards the past and following blindly the old obsolete standards, are a few of the signs of the modern decadent art.¹

As regards architecture, Iqbal believes that it is the only branch of the fine arts which has been brought to the highest pitch of perfection. For him

¹ کیش او تقلید و کارش آنری ست ندرت اندر مذهب او کافری ست
چشم او بر رفته از آئنده کور چون مجاور رذق او از خاک گور
(زبور عجم صفحہ 257)

the architectural creations of *Aibak* and *Suri* are the objective manifestations of their personalities which shine through them as if in a mirror. To him such heights of perfect art can be achieved only through love, a term which in Iqbal's philosophy is much more comprehensive than is ordinarily understood, the exact significance of which will be discussed in its proper place.

عشق مردان پاک و رنگین چون بهشت
می کشاید نغمه ها از سنگ و خشت

Love of men is as pure and enchanting as paradise and helps in producing 'songs' out of stones and bricks.

IQBAL'S PREDECESSORS

"And among those whom we had created are a people who guide others with truth, and in accordance therewith act justly." 7 : 181.

Every speculative system known to the world is invariably based on one or more fundamental principles which a thinker accepts as basic and on which he builds the whole superstructure of his philosophy. In the course of its exposition he is bound to be influenced by his predecessors, by the particular problems confronting him during his lifetime and the sort of training he has received. Plato, *e.g.*, was much influenced by the speculative tendencies of the early Greek thinkers. Being a pupil of Socrates he acquired a particular viewpoint and this coloured the spirit of his whole philosophy. Yet, being a genius he could not remain within the four walls of what he had acquired from others. He assimilated it and gave his own personal stamp to all and thus out of a chaos of contradictory tendencies produced a relatively better and more consistent philosophical system. The apparently incompatible elements represented by Parmenides' vague spiritualistic monism with its denial of change and multiplicity were harmonised by Plato with Heraclitus' materialistic atomism with its advocacy of change and multiplicity as realities. Taking these two independent theories as thesis and antithesis he succeeded in evolving a higher synthesis which gave Plato's system a value greater

than that possessed by any of his predecessors'. All great thinkers and artists owe much of what stands to their credit to their less fortunate brethren. Out of a medley of historical facts and fiction, which he borrowed from diverse sources, Shakespeare succeeded, through his artistic creative power, in producing immortal dramas. Study them critically and you will find much that is mere secondhand but his genius produced, out of this evanescent material, something that has permanent æsthetic value. This is always the mode of working of a genius. No thinker can be said to be absolutely original ; he is bound to construct his own system on the basis of what his predecessors might have done or attempted to have done. The sphere of philosophy is limited ; it deals with the nature of ultimate reality and as such each succeeding thinker must of necessity study the systems of those who have gone before him. Aristotle based his theories on those of Plato just as Spinoza's system was the culmination of the Cartesian mathematical method. They differed in their final conclusions but their differences had also points of agreement. No thinker can remain uninfluenced by the line of thought traversed by people before him or the level of cultural development reached by his contemporaries. Still we cannot deny that every thinker of outstanding merit must have some fundamental principle round which he weaves the whole system of his thought. That basic principle must be his own, though in its elucidation and application he may give free rein to his imagination and borrow material that he needs from whatever sources that come in his way.

It is often asserted that Iqbal has nothing original to

his credit and that his whole system is borrowed from the Western thinkers like Bergson and Nietzsche. We shall have time to judge the truth of this statement when we come to consider the tendencies represented by these two philosophers. At present we are more concerned with the general remarks about the relation of Iqbal to modern science and philosophy. Iqbal is a Muslim and as such he was thoroughly conversant with the cultural history of Islam in all its aspects. This culture he imbibed during his early years partly through the influence of his parents and mostly from his contact with his famous teacher at Sialkot. The study of the Quran, the traditions of the Holy Prophet and the Persian mystic writers, all these form the solid background of his thought. This atmosphere in which he was brought up served for him as the starting point and the critics shall be saved much misunderstanding if this basic fact is fully grasped. It was only after he had undergone this preliminary training that he began the study of Western philosophy and, of course, he studied it critically according to the particular point of view which Islam has engendered in him. He clearly saw that the spiritual and material decay of Muslims had been due, not to any basic defect in the Islamic teaching itself but, to the extraneous influences which Greek speculation, on the one hand, and the degenerate mysticism, on the other, came to exert on the general masses. Both of these hostile tendencies stood for a static view of the universe, according to which the supersensuous world was much more real than the temporal, renunciation and other-worldliness were much more essential than active participation in the present. In this they were more

in agreement with Christianity than with Islam. But these tendencies were now almost dead or at least had lost their force for the modern man. Much more important for him were the live forces that worked in a direction opposite to the former. While Greek philosophy in the form of Neoplatonism and mysticism tended to emphasize the spiritual at the cost of the material, modern science and philosophy represent a neglect of the spiritual for the sake of the material. This was another and perhaps greater challenge to Islam. In order to meet it Iqbal adopted the best course. He took up a critical study of western philosophy and science which revealed to him one important fact, *viz.*, that in its basic assumptions and methods it was not hostile to the Islamic spirit but rather was the logical consequence of the tendencies which Islam wanted to foster in mankind. A study of history told him that the position of such critics as Prof. Macdonald of America, who alleged that the Muslim philosophers had no original contribution to their credit, and that their whole work consisted of nothing but reinterpretation of Aristotle's work, was perfectly contrary to facts. He realized that the dynamic spirit of Islam reasserted itself in the spiritual Atomism of al-Baiklani, in Ghazali's strong refutation of Greek Philosophy and Ibn-i-Taimiyya's bold criticism of Aristotelian Logic. The true scientific spirit which is the characteristic of modern age and the resultant achievement of natural science with its experimental method, were all due to the influence of Muslim workers in different fields¹

¹ Cf. Briffault : *Making of History* ; J. W. Draper : *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* ; Hans Kohn : *Western Civilization in the Near East*, p. 48 ; Lange's *History of Materialism*, Vol. 1, Book I, Section 2, Chap. I, pp. 161-186.

and thus he came to the conclusion that modern science and philosophy are no bugbears to be feared and hated, but rather the continuation and the consummation of the spirit engendered by the Quran. With this realization, Iqbal undertook the study of modern philosophy. His conviction which he gained through historical study grew still deeper when he came across such thinkers as Nietzsche and Bergson, each of whom represented in his system something with which Iqbal was perfectly familiar after his deep study of Islam and Persian mystic writers. What these similarities are we shall soon see. But their presentation of these common elements had been vitiated on account of their cultural background and which, therefore, Iqbal could not but reject. The dynamic view of the universe, the belief that time and movement are the real modes of the Reality, the evolutionary development of humanity from lower organic states, with its logical conception of Perfect Man, the distinction between intellect and intuition, were all perfectly familiar to Iqbal and for these he had nothing to gain from either Bergson or Nietzsche. Their advocacy of these doctrines, in reality, only served to add greater strength to his conviction; they were already worked out by Rumi in his celebrated *Mathnavi*. Thus there is no paradox that a man of Iqbal's calibre who was deeply conversant with the spirit of modern philosophy should turn his back against it and seek peace and consolation in Rumi whom he regards as his spiritual guide. He recommends the study of Rumi to the modern youth¹ and in

¹ پیر رومی را رفیق راه ساز تا خدا بخشد ترا سوز و گداز
زانکه رومی مغز را داند ز پوست پائے او محکم قند در کوئے دوست
(جاوید نامہ صفحہ 244-5)

fact the whole *Jawaid Nama* is a living testimony of obligation which Iqbal owes to one of the greatest mystic poet-thinkers of Islam.

Rumi (604-672 A.H./1207-1273 A.C.) was born at a time when the three lines of thought that developed in Islam, viz., philosophy, Kalam and mysticism, had fully matured. Ibn-i-Sina, Farabi and Ibn-i-Rushd; al-Ashari, al-Maturidi and a host of their eminent followers; great line of mystics coming down to Ibn-ul-Arabi who was his contemporary, had contributed their share to the total thought-structure which they inherited. Above all, the great Imam Ghazali who combined in his personality all these three lines of development. Rumi was a mystic poet *par excellence* in the line of Sanai and Attar but he was at the same time fully familiar with the other two lines of thought. His great *Mathnavi* bears ample testimony that he had drunk deep at each and every spring. Like a true genius he assimilated everything and with these he constructed a complete system of thought, in consonance with his basic principles. His *Mathnavi* is looked upon as a unique exposition of the Quran and the whole message of Rumi was a reinterpretation of Islam according to the particular problems of his age.

The most fundamental idea in his works is that of Evolution. Ibn-i-Miskawaih (d. 421 A.H.) was perhaps the first Muslim thinker of renown who put down in definite terms this doctrine. The lowest level at which life appears on this earth is the mineral kingdom, a combination of primary substances. Then

Take Pir-i-Rum as your guide so that you may get, through God's grace, a 'burning heart': for Rumi is able to distinguish kernel from mere shell and he follows the path of the Beloved with a firm foot.

we come to the plant life, the lowest stage of which is reached by grass whose growth is spontaneous and which does not perpetuate its species by means of seed. This stage differs from that of the mineral by the possession of a limited power of movement which, however, gradually develops and appears in trees that grow trunks, leaves and fruit and which need better soil and climate for their growth. The last stage is reached by such trees as palm which border on the animal stage in that they possess differentiation of sexes. Intermediate between these two stages stand such creatures as coral and oyster that partake of both realms. Then begins the animal stage with the appearance of worms which possess power of movement and sense of touch : they are no longer rooted to the earth like the creatures at the first stage. Gradually we come to animals, who, in the process of development, acquire other senses ; till we come to those who possess all the five senses together. Then there begins to appear intelligence. "Animality reaches its perfection in the horse among quadrupeds and the falcon among birds, and finally arrives at the frontier of humanity in the ape which is just a degree below man in the scale of evolution."¹

This view of emergent evolution expounded by Rumi resembles in many respects the modern theory enunciated by several eminent vitalists. But there is a difference between Rumi and the modern scientists as regards their mode of approach. For Darwin and his followers the main problem was the explanation of the origin of man. They thoroughly studied the huge material of facts before them and by a gradual process of going back arrived at the conclusion that man has

¹ Iqbal : *Metaphysics*, pp. 33-34 ; *Lectures*, pp. 186-187.

his origin in animals. As the object of their whole research was genetic and having found an adequate answer by the study of data, they stopped there ; for them man was the highest product of evolution. They dared not go beyond, for it involved not facts but speculation or faith which was forbidden entry in the realm of natural science. Such an attitude brought with it pessimistic outlook on life. If man is the highest product of the evolutionary process, why, then, death ? Does it not mean that death destroys what has been achieved after such a long period of hard struggle against hostile circumstances ? But Rumi's point of departure was quite different. He starts with the belief, that in the beginning there was nothing but the Absolute. Human soul got separated from this primeval Unity ; how, nobody can tell. It is, however, conscious of this fall and hence life is an attempt at return to its origin ; it is journeying back to whence it started through a process of evolution. Our souls, the principle of Life in human body, started its career at the stage of matter and gradually rose higher in the scale. " First man appeared in the class of inorganic things, next he passed therefrom into that of plants. For years he lived as one of them, remembering nought of his inorganic state so different. And when he passed from the vegetative to the animal state, he had no remembrance of his state as a plant, except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers. . . . Again the great Creator, as you know, drew man out of the animal into the human state. Thus man passed from one order of nature to another, till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now. Of his first souls he has now no

remembrance, and he will be again changed from his present soul."¹

In another context he puts his view still more explicitly. "I died to the inorganic state and became a plant and then I died to vegetable state and attained to the animal. I died from animality and became man: why, then, should I fear? When have I become less by dying? At the next stage I shall die to man, that I may soar and lift my head amongst the angels; once more I shall be sacrificed and die to the angel: I shall become that which enters not into the imagination. Know death to be what the (Islamic) community are agreed upon, that the Water of Life is hidden in the Darkness."² As is clear from the above two quotations, Rumi does not stop at man as the last stage reached by evolution and death, biologically speaking, for him, is nothing destructive. The movement of the principle of Life, after permeating matter and rising higher and higher after a hard struggle, does not come to an end in man. It must continue. Rumi's mode of approach was teleological: this movement is not due to the influence of any external circumstances or chance variations. There was a purpose behind all this process spread over centuries of existence on this earth, and this purpose was the return of the fallen soul to its original abode of eternal happiness. Thus, contrary to the spirit of despair engendered by the naturalistic theory of Evolution, Rumi's theory is a message of hope and enthusiasm for life. For him death is never destructive: was it destructive when plant died to give

¹ *Mathnavi*: Book IV, ll. 3636-48. All references are to Nicholson's edition of the *Mathnavi*, text and translation.

² *Mathnavi*: Book III, ll. 3901-5.

life to animal or when animal died to give life to man ? Death, in his words, is the source of " eternal life " ; it is only surrounded by a valley of Darkness. In this respect even Nietzsche could not free himself from pessimistic outlook. Though he believes in a stage of evolution higher than one reached by man at present, yet he advocates the theory of Eternal Recurrence which can hardly be called creative evolution at all. Rumi's view in this respect is much more allied to that of Bergson than that of Darwin or other naturalistic writers. There is the inner urge, the will to live a higher and fuller life, the will to attain higher stages of evolution that determines the whole process of our development. " With Rumi there is no development by chance variations. For him development consists in the creation of an ever-increasing need for expansion and by assimilation into a higher organism."

The inner urge, the will to live a higher and fuller life, the whole force behind the process of evolution, is, according to Rumi, nothing but the manifestation of Love, the love for the Absolute, the Origin of all things, the end and object of the whole process of development. In the words of Iqbal, " the striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. . . . The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, assumes or, more properly, is made to assume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. . . . The same force of ' natural ' or ' constitutional ' love is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first Beloved—the

Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to, or distance from, this ultimate principle.”¹ Thus love is the force that keeps up the whole evolutionary movement from the lower stage to the higher. “The wisdom of God in destiny and in decree made us lovers of one another, because of that foreordination all the particles of the world are paired as mates and are in love with their own mate.”² In the absence of this underlying principle of love there would have been no creation at all.

The force of attraction that is visible in every atom for the other and the death of one form to be replaced by other higher forms, *i.e.*, assimilation, are all different manifestations of the principle of Love. He explains growth and development of life on this earth on the basis of this fundamental power of assimilation. There is a persistent desire in each and every living organism to rise higher in the scale of life and it is the presence of this desire and the consequent endeavour on the part of the individual for the attainment of the desired object that explains the whole process of evolution. “God put desire in man and woman in order that the world should be preserved by this union. He also implants the desire of every part for another part: from the union of both an act of generation results.”³

This force of love is present not only in the development of man from matter but also from man to higher beings. “Love is an (infinite) ocean, on which the heavens are (but) a flake of foam; like Zulikha in desire for a Joseph. Know that the wheeling heavens

¹ *Metaphysics* : pp. 39-41.

² *Mathnawi* : III, ll. 4415-16.

³ *Mathnawi* : III, ll. 4400-01.

are turned by waves of Love : were it not for Love, the world would be frozen (inanimate). How would an inorganic thing disappear (by change) into a plant ? How would vegetive things sacrifice themselves to become (endowed with) spirit ? How would the spirit sacrifice itself for the sake of that Breath by the waft whereof a Mary was made pregnant ? Every mote is in love with that Perfection and hastening upwards like a sapling."¹

Just as Rumi anticipates in a most astonishing way the creative and emergent evolutionary theories of modern vitalistic thinkers, similarly his conception about the ultimate ground of the universe and the mode of apprehending it, is an equally brilliant exposition of intuitive philosophies of the post-Kantian period. Kant's philosophy in the West was a sort of crusade against the monopoly of reason in apprehending reality. He started with the question : Is metaphysics (*i.e.*, science of knowing reality) possible ? and reached a negative conclusion. One of his greatest achievements was that he tackled the three famous logical arguments for the proof of existence of God formulated by Schoolmen and refuted them one by one and thus proved conclusively that human reason is incapable of knowing things that are above and beyond the categories of space and time. Similar work was done by Imam Ghazali in the East. The Muslim Rationalists (Mutazalites) started as exponents of religious creed and tried to defend Islamic faith against their opponents with the help of pure reason. But this mode of approach was sure to lead, as it did everywhere it appeared, to scepticism. Baiklani, the famous

¹ *Mathnawi* : V, ll. 3853-58.

Asharite metaphysician, constructed a unique atomic theory. This metaphysical system led them to the divine Will as the ground of all things: it was scepticism in its essence which tried to remove ground under the feet of reason so that people may be driven back to God. Ghazali, who inherited all the best traditions of both the metaphysicians and the Asharite thought, could not resist the logical conclusion. Doubting the validity of sense-perception as the source of our knowledge, he could not rest till he had become a thoroughgoing sceptic. He has related his experiences in full detail in his autobiography which is an interesting reading by itself. Once deprived of any certain basis for the knowledge of reality, he drifted towards mysticism and found in *Kashf* or Mystic Illumination (or Intuition) the surest method of approach to the apprehension of reality. This was one of his greatest contributions to the development of Islamic thought. Rumi, and for that matter every mystic poet, follows Ghazali in this respect. For them reason cannot help man in yielding any living contact with reality: for them intuition or, as Rumi calls it, Love, is the best and only mode of approach.

Though Rumi rejects reason or intellect as a guide in religious experience yet he does admit its utility in its own sphere. "Partial (discursive) reason is denial of Love, though it may give out that it knows the inner secret. It is clever and knowing, but it is not naught: until the angel has become naught, he is an Ahriman (Devil). It (reason) is our companion so far as actions and words (*i.e.*, scientific sphere) are concerned but when you come to the case of

(mystic) state (*i.e.*, ecstasy), it is naught."¹

The *Mathnavi* is full of such utterances as reveal the superiority of love to intellect but from these it should not be inferred that Rumi wants to discourage the use of reason at all even in scientific sphere. What he tries to emphasize is that if you want to proceed further, on your march towards the destined goal, then it is love and not reason that is going to help you. Same was the position with Ghazali. He accepted the validity of reasoning process so far as different sciences were concerned. He had nothing to say against the use of Mathematics and other positive sciences whose results are borne out by observation and valid reasoning. He even strongly advocated the use of logic and recommended it to the Muslim theologians as a forceful weapon in the defence of religion. But when it came to the religious experience of Reality, he could not but fall back upon the mystic intuition. Reality is one but the very process of intellect involves differentiation and analysis and therefore cannot by its nature overcome this difficulty and apprehend the ultimate Unity. Life cannot be known as an external thing ; it cannot be apprehended by the senses under a space-form and a time-form, shaped in the moulds that the intellect uses, but can be only immediately known. The intuition of life is knowledge of reality itself—reality as it is in itself. Life, because it is immediate, can only be felt and not described as a scientist, *e.g.*, can describe physical phenomena. Rumi, in several places, affirms that it is not possible to define or describe what love is nor can it

¹ او بقول و فعل یار ما بود چوں بحکم حال آئی لا بود
(مثنوی - دفتر اول - اشعار 84-1982)

be communicated. "Whatsoever I say in exposition and explanation of Love, when I come to Love itself, I am ashamed of it. In expounding it, the intellect lay down like an ass in the mire : it was Love alone that uttered the explanation of Love. The proof of the sun is the sun itself, if you require the proof, do not avert your face from it."¹ "What is love? The sea of Not-being : there the foot of the intellect is shattered. Would that Being had a tongue, that it might remove the veils from existent beings. O breath of (phenomenal) existence ! whatsoever words you may utter, know that thereby you have bound another veil upon it."²

According to Rumi, therefore, if we want to grasp the spirit of religion, if we want to live through an experience of religious type, it is intuition (love) alone that can help us : intellect is totally unsuited here. In one of his remarkable lines he says that love is the very nature of man while mere intellectual effort is a characteristic of Satan.³ This differentiation on the part of Rumi requires a thorough study of the nature of human ego and its destiny. Rumi's conception of human soul follows the line of thought expounded by most Muslim thinkers, though he has added certain mystic ideas of his own. Starting with the Quranic description of soul as 'coming from my Lord's Command' (17 : 87) he elaborates the non-temporal and non-spatial character of it. The Quran uses two different words to indicate the relation of God to the universe of extension, on the one hand, and the rela-

¹ *Mathnavi* : I, ll. 112, 115, 116.

² *Ibid* : III, ll. 4723, 4725-26

³ داند آن کونیکبخت و معرم است زیرکی زابلیس و عشق از آدم است
مثنوی - دفتر چهارم - شعر 1402

tion of God to the human ego, on the other, *Khalq* and *Amr*: the former is creation while the latter is direction. It means that the essential nature of the soul is direction as it proceeds from the directive energy of God. He believes that just as ultimate Reality is one, beyond space and time, similarly human soul is one in its essence; appearance of plurality arises from animal soul. "We were one substance, like the sun; we were knotless and pure, like water. When that goodly Light took form, it became (many in) number like the shadows of a battlement."¹ "The Sun, which is the spirit, became separated (broken into rays) in the windows, which are bodies. When you gaze on the sun's disc, it is itself one; but he that is screened by the bodies is in some doubt. Separation (plurality) is in the animal spirit, the human spirit is one essence. Inasmuch as God sprinkled His light upon them (mankind), (they are essentially one); His light never becomes separated (in reality)."² Again, Rumi, on the basis of the Quranic verse that God breathed His spirit into Adam, concludes that human soul is eternal and uncreated. In this respect he seems to go far beyond what is apparently warranted by orthodox interpretations of the Quran. The human soul is not created: God only "breathed" it into Adam. It was this divine spirit in man that, according to Rumi, led the angels fall before him in reverence.³ It is due to this notion that Rumi's conception of man is much more exalted than is often met

¹ *Mathnavi*: I, II. 687-88.

² *Ibid*, II, II. 186-189.

³ چوں ملک انوار حق دروے بیافت
در سجود افتاد و در خدمت شتافت
(مثنوی - دفتر اول - شعر 1247)

with in other mystic poets and writers. "The Adam like this whose name I am celebrating, if I praise (him) till the Resurrection, I fall short (of what is due)."¹

Similarly in the controversial question of Determinism, he holds man to be an architect of his own fate. He is the paragon of creation only because he has been created free in the choice between good and evil. Rumi does not enter into any metaphysical discussion about freedom of will, yet his treatment is highly interesting and convincing. Nothing on this earth or in heavens is promised reward for his good conduct or warned of punishment for his bad deeds except man; it is man alone who is given this chance and in this opportunity afforded to him by Nature for the exercise of his will in the selection of one out of different alternative courses open to him, lies the development of his personality, the unravelment of his inner spiritual forces. The intenser and oftener are such critical situations in the life of man, the more integrated and coherent does his personality grow and there is correspondingly a greater chance for him for immortal life. "Choice (free-will) is the salt of devotion, otherwise (there would be) no merit; this celestial sphere revolves involuntarily; hence its revolution has neither reward nor punishment, for free-will is (accounted) a merit at the time of the Reckoning."² With greater integration of his personality,

¹ ای چنی آدم کہ نامش می برم گریستایم تا قیامت قاصرم
(مثنوی - دفتر اول - شعر 1248)

² اختیار آمد عبادت را نمود ورنه می گردد بنا خواه این فلک
گردش اورا نه اجر و نه عقاب کا اختیار آمد هنر وقت حساب
(مثنوی - دفتر سوم - اشعار 3287-88)

his freedom also grows, and he becomes free from the play of external circumstances.

ہر کرا با اخترے پیوستگی ست مرد را با اختر خود ہم تگی ست

Everything in this world is governed by external influences. It is man alone whose destiny and whose whole future career is within himself, who is the sole arbitrator of his own fate. There are certain mechanical necessities which are, however, unalterable. Such are the laws of Physics which we may call laws of Nature. Everything possesses certain properties which it cannot forego and which we cannot ignore. Fire burns and we cannot be immune from any untoward consequences if we refuse to observe this principle. So far we are predestined and no attempt on our part can change this situation. These laws which the Quran calls 'ways of God' are unalterable and man must submit himself to them. Sugar is by nature sweet and gourd is sour; it is, however, your option to put any one of these in your mouth. Once you have chosen, the consequences are bound to follow as night follows day. After your choice there is left nothing but strict determinism. The consequences of evil actions, once you choose them, must flow from them and nothing can alter it. But the choice, the right and freedom to ponder over and weigh the alternatives before finally accepting one and rejecting others, is with you and herein lies your greatness. You may not take wine, that is your own choice and its consequence, soberness, of necessity, follows. But if you once take to drinking, you cannot forego the consequences of drunkenness which you cannot resist.

Thus freedom of will is the prerogative of a man

of highly integrated personality who, in pursuit of an ideal, subdues his whole body and soul in order to attain it. But freedom is not an end in itself ; it is a means for certain other ends. To regard freedom as intrinsically valuable is going astray and dissipation of one's physical and spiritual energy in pursuit of ends perfectly undesirable. Man is free because thereby he can choose the best course and thus help himself and his fellow-beings in their march towards the goal. But the mere potentiality of freedom in man to choose one way or other brings to light another very important question. As man is free to choose, he may choose the wrong path and the history of human evolution is full of records which eloquently speak of man's weakness in this respect. There is the temptation, a sort of blind pull in us, which drags us to do what is undesirable. Why so ? How to account for this element of wickedness, this glaring fact of the existence of evil in this world ? Rumi tackles this problem in a characteristic way and has reached a conclusion which distinguishes him from most of the mystics who preached a lesson of quietism and utter defeatism in the face of difficulties. While he accepts with Buddha and Schopenhauer that everything is not good on this earth, that there is evil, he does not subscribe to their view that man, by his very nature, cannot get rid of it, that his physical and mental make-up aggravates the situation instead of ameliorating it, that his desires and ambitions go a long way in strengthening the hold of evil on him. He says frankly that there is evil in this world and it is our duty to fight against it by the whole might of our personality and in this fight against evil forces lies the

whole future destiny of man. "Because nothing false appears without the true, the fool bought spurious coin in the hope of gold. If there were no current (genuine) coin in the world, how would it be possible to issue false coins? If there be no faulty things in the world, all fools would be shrewd merchants. Then it would be very easy to know the value of goods. When there is no defect, what is the difference between the incompetent and the competent? And if everything is defective, then wisdom is of no advantage and when everything here is common wood, aloes-wood is not to be found anywhere. He that says: all is good, is a fool and he that says that all is evil (false) is damned."¹ Appreciation of value and the endeavour to realize it requires that there should be things both valuable and otherwise. People who complain of evil in the world forget that those objects which are valuable can be appreciated only in reference to those which are undesirable. The presence of evil and perseverance with which he is engaged in struggling against it, is, therefore, the only criterion which helps a man to mark himself off from lower animals, that helps him in integrating his personality and thus attaining to levels higher than ever reached by anybody else. Man alone, of all creatures, is given this choice: he is free to choose evil and thus help himself in sinking lower than animals or choose good and help himself in attaining the destined goal of humanity, the end of

¹ آنکه گوید جمله حق است احمق است

و آنکه گوید جمله باطل، شق است

(مثنوی - دفتر دوم - اشعار 2939-42)

whole evolutionary development of life on this earth. "The High God lays upon our body, O man of fortitude, heat and cold and grief and pain, fear and hunger and impairment of wealth and body - all for the sake of soul's coin being brought into sight (so that its potentialities may become actualised)."¹

For these reasons Rumi perhaps stands alone amidst a great number of mystic writers for his preaching a life of constant activity and unending struggle against what is undesirable and hinders man's progress. Struggle against what lies across our path towards the goal is the very part and parcel of our fate, and 'this endeavour is not a struggle against Destiny because Destiny itself has laid this (endeavour) upon us.'² Rumi describes this subject of struggle with a great zest. He seems to relish this point, for in it he saw the right soil for the evolution of the Perfect Man. "When you consider this, world is all at strife, mote with mote, as religion with infidelity; one mote is flying to the left, and another to the right in search. One mote flies up and another down; in their inclination (movement) behold actual strife. War of nature, war of action, war of speech, there is terrible conflict amongst the parts. This world is maintained

¹ حق تعالی گرم و سرد و رنج و درد

بر تن ما می نهید ای شیر مرد

خوف و جوع و نقص اموال و بدن

جمله بهر نقد جان ظاهر شدن

(مثنوی - دفتر دوم - اشعار 2963-64)

² با قضا پنجه زدن نبود جهاد زانکه ایی را هم قضا بر ما نهاد

(دفتر اول - شعر 976)

by means of this war.”¹ “When there is no enemy, the Holy War is inconceivable; if you have no lust, there can be no obedience to the Divine Command. There can be no self-restraint when you have no desire; when there is no adversary, what need for your strength? Hark, do not castrate yourself, do not become a monk, for chastity is in pawn to (depends on the existence of) lust.”² “In reality every foe (of yours) is your medicine: he is an elixir and beneficial and one that seeks to win your heart. There is an animal whose name is *ushgar* (porcupine): it is (made) stout and big by blows of the stick. The more you cudgel it, the more it thrives: it grows fat on blows of the stick. Assuredly the true believer's soul is a porcupine for it is (made) stout and fat by the blows of tribulation. For this reason the tribulations and abasement (laid) upon the prophets is greater than (that laid upon) all the creatures of the world.”³

The ideal and the goal of evolution that Rumi has in view, so far as man's next stage of development is concerned, is the Perfect Man, an idea decidedly borrowed from, and influenced by, the theory of Logos, first propounded by Stoics, then Philo the Jew, and amplified by neo-Platonism. In Islam it first appeared in the Shiite doctrine of the Infallible Imam and through them influenced mysticism. Ghazali's *Mishkat-ul-Anwar* gives us a brief summary of this

¹ این جہاں جنگ است کل چور بنگری

نرہ با نرہ چور دیں با کافری.....

(دفتر ششم - اشعار 38-36 ; 47-46)

² *Ibid*, V, ll. 575-77.

³ *Ibid*, IV, ll. 94, 97-100.

doctrine but the clearest exposition of it is found in Ibn-ul-Arabi, the famous sufi Pantheist, the contemporary of Rumi and later developed into a full-fledged philosophical doctrine by Abdul Karim al-Jilli in his famous book, *The Perfect Man*. Starting with the alleged prophetic tradition that the Light of Muhammad was the first thing created and mixing it with the Greek metaphysical entity of Universal Reason as a cosmic principle, the theory of the Perfect Man was given an extraordinarily different shape by mystic writers. Perfect Man is the final cause of creation ; though chronologically the last to appear yet logically prior to everything else. "In form you are the microcosm, yet in reality you are the macrocosm. Externally the branch is the origin of the fruit ; intrinsically the branch came into existence for the sake of the fruit. Therefore in reality the tree was born of the fruit, (even) if in appearance the fruit was generated by the tree."¹ The angels prostrated before Adam only because he was potentially the Perfect Man for the realization of which the whole course of evolution was to run. The prophets are manifestations of the ideal Perfect Man, a stage in the evolutionary process, higher than reached by ordinary people. But logically it follows from Rumi's premises that if the goal of development is the appearance of Perfect Man, then it is possible for every individual to achieve it. As such it would be possible for any one to become a prophet—a proposition which can hardly be acceptable to orthodox Islam. But Rumi frankly admits the consequence of his theory.²

¹ *Mathnavi*, IV, ll. 521-22, 524.

² مکرکن در راه نیکو خدمتے تائبوت یابی اندر امتے

The last stage of evolution is reached when all things arrive at their Primal Origin, the very source of Life. Unlike Buddhism and several mystic thinkers, Rumi's conception of this last stage (technically called *Fana*) is nothing negative : it is by no means annihilation of individuality. He takes it rather as a sort of transformation. "Your existence in the life of the Origin of Life is like a base metal transformed in alchemy."¹ In its final stage no new principle is brought forward by Rumi to explain the relationship of individual to the Life Force itself. Just as matter died and got a new birth in the form of animals, similarly in the last stage "he becomes annihilated in this world and the next and is made divine in the disappearance of humanity". From inorganic to organic, from organic to animal and from animal to man, there is no total extinction involved ; there is only the transformation of the lower into the higher self. Similarly the transition from man to the final stage does not involve any sort of annihilation or extinction. The attributes may disappear in the face of the Light of Light but the individuality survives this stage. The analogies that he employs for illustrating this final stage of transformation all point to the fundamental principle that our individuality survives and is never annihilated. Stars disappear during the day but their disappearance is not existential, *i.e.*, they have not ceased to exist ; only the brighter light of the sun has encompassed their light in its own. Similarly when iron is heated in fire, it becomes to all appearances fire itself and yet it does not lose its indivi-

¹ هستی ات در هست آن هستی نواز هم چو مس در کیمیا اندر گداز

duality entirely. He never describes the ultimate state of union of man with God by the analogy of a drop sinking into the ocean. Man is thus immortal ; his soul being uncreated, breathed into man by God, is eternal ; it will never end. But this eternal state of union should not be regarded as something given to us as a right : it is rather to be gained by continuous struggle against odds and fruitful activity on the part of each individual. He does not enter into any metaphysical discussion about the possibility or otherwise of immortality. The evolutionary doctrine with which he started, coupled with the conception of an eternal soul, led him logically to the conclusion that there can be no end to the life of soul after bodily death. But just as not every animal is able to die to animality and emerge as man without qualifying for it after a life of hard struggle against odds, similarly it is not open to every man to attain to a higher life, as a new 'emergent', after his bodily death, until he has been able to strengthen his personality by a hard life of struggle against the overwhelming evil forces of the world.

This account of Rumi's philosophy, brief though it is, will be sufficient to convince the reader of its appeal to the modern man. He was born at a time when the political and social decay of Muslims had set in on account of the Tartar invasions during the seventh century of the Hegira. The whole western Asiatic mainland was overrun by the Mongols. Almost all the contemporary historians of the invasion of the Tartars describe the havoc which they caused with a half-suppressed pessimism about the future of Islam. Indeed the time required a reformer of out-

standing merit who would be able to tackle the situation in a prophetic way. Rumi fulfilled that role most successfully. He was brought up in an atmosphere in which philosophy and Kalam were given predominant place and he plunged deep into it. But the crucial moment in his life appeared when he came into contact with Shams-i-Tabriz, the fiery genius of a mystic. His influence on Rumi was the turning point in his life. Instead of a mere prosaic lecturer on divinity, he became a true teacher of humanity. Henceforth he set out boldly on his new mission of carrying the torch of Islam to the down-trodden people who had been drugged into a life of decadence on account of the pernicious influence of Greek philosophy. His celebrated Mathnavi was rightly looked upon as an exposition of the Quran with reference to the problems peculiar to his time. Iqbal's situation is similar. He appeared at a time when the political decay of Muslims in India had become complete at the emergence of the British rule. Socially they had been bankrupt since long. Certainly a reformer was needed with a breadth of vision, an insight into the true spirit of Islam and a thorough experience of the underlying principles of the Western culture. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, on the one hand, and several eminent religious reformers, on the other, all lacked one or other of these qualities. Feeling the necessity of change they tried their utmost but could not tackle the problem in a comprehensive way. The religious reformers had no lack of insight into the real significance of Islamic teaching but they had no experience and knowledge of the historical background of the Western culture. Sir Sayyid Ahmad and his followers seemed to lack both.

They had neither true religious insight nor any but superficial acquaintance with the new forces. The leaders of both these movements tried to solve the problem of social decay of the Muslims and the remedies suggested were contradictory, resulting in a great confusion of thought. The one group advocated a return to the old traditional mode of living and thinking, to a past wholly devoid of any living contact with the present. They persistently refused to see any value in the new learning which the West brought with it. They lacked breadth of vision and failed to assimilate whatever was valuable in the new forces. The second group went to the other extreme and advocated practically a sharp break with the past traditions for the sake of a total adaptation to the new movement. They failed to realize that the new forces stood for an ideal which was diametrically opposed to the spirit of Islam. It was therefore natural that both these movements failed to stem the tide of social decay among Indian Muslims. Iqbal fulfils this role in a remarkable degree. He possesses all the qualities that are required of a true reformer, and has done his job quite successfully. It was therefore not without reason that Iqbal turned towards Rumi for inspiration. Both had before them a society in the clutches of decadence due to political disintegration and the literature that they possessed administered opium to them. Both had passed through the crucible of fire set up by forces hostile to Islam and both had come out unscathed ; with the one it was the fire of Greek philosophy which had led people astray from the right path and with the other it was the overwhelming awe of Western science and philosophy coupled with its poli-

tical supremacy. The remedy suggested by both is a return to the Quran and the way of fathers with moral transformation through mystic or intuitive illumination and assimilation of whatever valuable there is in the new forces in consonance with the spirit of Islam. Both suggest the development of self rather than self-effacement. Both approached the problem of freedom of will in a peculiarly similar way, an approach which is psychological rather than metaphysical. Both are evolutionary thinkers but unlike modern science do not stop at man as the highest emergent. They suggest that there are untold possibilities for further development. Through a life of constant struggle it is possible for man not only to discover but to create new worlds for himself and attain to perfect manhood.

چو رومی در حرم دادم اذان من ازو آموختم اسرار جان من
به دور فتنه عصر کهن او به دور فتنه عصر رواں من¹

But Iqbal goes far beyond him in certain respects. Rumi, on account of the demands of his time, concentrated his attention on the reform of the individual. His interpretation of Islam is more intuitive or personal than social or cultural. Iqbal, on the other hand, presents a complete picture of Islam in all its aspects. No doubt Rumi had this position in mind as he refers to some of the social and cultural questions here and there in his Mathnavi, yet the problems of his day necessitated an exclusive attention to the

¹ "I have learnt the mysteries of 'Soul' from Rumi and so like him I have called the Muslims back to religion: he lived at a period which was as full of dangers to the Islamic community as the present in which I am born."

moral transformation of the individual. The problems that face us to-day as a result of our contact with the Western culture are not merely personal ; they involve far-reaching social consequences, some of which are definitely hostile to the fundamental principles of Islam. A reformer like Iqbal, therefore, could not confine his attention to mere individual welfare, and, of necessity, his interpretation becomes much more comprehensive than Rumi could give.

Nietzsche (d. 1900) stands at the cross-roads in the history of European thought. Assimilating almost all that was fruitful in his predecessors, he represented a tendency which was the logical culmination of the development of scientific thought on the one hand and philosophical criticism on the other. His mission was apostolic in that he delivered his message of freedom with boldness and frankness never met before in a thinker.

With the appearance of Renaissance in Europe the study of natural phenomena revealed to the people the hollowness of the speculative systems of the Schoolmen. But this sudden realization took a long time in expressing itself in clear and definite words. In its early stages philosophy as represented by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz was, more or less, an attempt to uphold Christian metaphysics on purely rational grounds. The English Empirical school, however, on the other hand, soon began to traverse a ground which was since long a forbidden area. Though the school paved way for so anti-religious a writer as Voltaire, yet its representatives themselves did not dare accept the consequences of their logic. In practice they were as

good Christians as common people. It was, however, Kant who in his *Critique of Pure Reason* threw overboard all that was held sacred so far. No doubt his blow was aimed not particularly at Christianity but against metaphysical inquiry as such ; yet the conclusion at which he arrived, that human reason is incapable of proving the existence of God, immortality of human soul or even life after death, was sufficient in itself to tear to pieces the already tottering fabric of the whole Christian metaphysical speculation. This bold and uncompromising attitude of Kant in the sphere of Metaphysics, however, was soon followed by a compromise on his part, where practice was concerned, which materially weakened his position. In morality, he granted an authority to human reason which he had denied in metaphysics. Where morality is concerned, he believes in liberty, in the inexorable law of duty, in the necessary harmony between happiness and virtue, and thus he practically committed himself to re-establishment of those very principles which he denied in his first *Critique*. This relieved the position for the time being though temporarily. The belief in Christianity revived but unfortunately this revival was ill-founded and soon a period of doubt superseded, giving place to a general discontent and despair in the hearts of people, giving rise in due course to pessimism.

There was another line of thought, working simultaneously with the first, which also culminated in the pessimistic outlook on life. With the downfall of medieval economic system and appearance of first Commercial Revolution and then Industrial Revolution, the doctrine of *Laissez Faire* came into full operation.

It was believed that there is a natural harmony of interests which will ultimately work itself out to the benefit of all. The daily expansion of the industries with the accumulation of huge capital in the hands of a few, was regarded by the sociological thinkers of the time to be perfectly compatible with the welfare of the wage-earners and common people. The society was conceived to be a sort of rational mechanism which would automatically work out to the benefit of all provided everyone was allowed perfect freedom to pursue his own interests. This was an age of optimism. Unbounded prosperity seemed to be within men's grasp only if they observed the law of natural harmony of interests. Soon, however, this vision of a golden future began to fade out of view. The growth of Industrial Revolution to its full capacity brought in its train the unending struggle among different classes of society. But the greatest element that contributed to the shattering of this optimistic outlook was the picture drawn by the biological theory of evolution which depicted the world as a continuous struggle for existence in which only the fittest survive. Thus the age in which Nietzsche was born witnessed the greatest 'topsyturvification' in the realm both of religion and morality as well as in the world of economic practical life. Byron, Schopenhauer and Leopardi voiced the sentiments of those who were at their wits' ends in a Godless world while Heine and Carlyle, to a lesser degree, gave expression to a qualified pessimistic attitude.

Nietzsche inherited this outlook. At first on studying the famous book of Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, he seemed to be enamoured of it

but fortunately he soon found a way out of pessimism. Schopenhauer accepted Kant's epistemological conclusion. Starting with the doctrine of the relativity of our knowledge, he developed it by attempting to show that although the world is only our idea, yet we can actually arrive at a knowledge of the things-in-themselves provided we study it from our subjective point of view, our immediate experience. It is impossible to solve the metaphysical problem by going from outside to inside, by examining first matter and then proceeding to examine thought. We must start with that which we know directly and immediately, *viz.*, ourselves. "We can never arrive at the real nature of things from without. However much we may investigate we can never reach anything but images and names. We are like a man who goes round a castle seeking in vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the facades." An analysis of our consciousness led Schopenhauer to the conclusion that it is not the intellect that is supreme in us but will, conscious or unconscious. The intellect may seem at times to lead the will but only as a guide leads his master; the will is the strong blind man who carries on his shoulders the lame man who can see. Will, thus, according to Schopenhauer, is the essence of man. He then proceeds to interpret the external world in the same terms and concludes that the ultimate factor in the whole universe, the much sought-for thing-in-itself, is Will. "Most existences are without consciousness; but they act according to the laws of their nature, *i.e.*, of their will." What is this Will, the hidden spring of all existence? He calls it the blind 'Will to Live.' Arriving at this

conclusion it was the next step for him to draw the picture of the world in most horrifying language. "Everywhere, in Nature, we see strife, conflict and alternation of victory. This unusual conflict becomes most distinctly visible in the animal kingdom for each animal can only maintain its existence by the constant destruction of some other. Thus the Will to Live everywhere preys upon itself, and in different forms is its own nourishment ; till, finally, the human race, because it subdues all the others, regards Nature as a manufactory for its own use. Yet even the human race reveals in itself with most terrible distinctness this conflict, this variance, of the will with itself ; and we find *homo homini lupus*." In man this blind Will has reached self-consciousness and therefore it is our duty to see that it is neutralized. He suggests renunciation, asceticism and the negation of will as remedies which can successfully arrest this abominable record of pain, disease and injustice.

Nietzsche adopts Schopenhauer's metaphysics and builds his own system on it. He admits that the essence of the world is will ; that this will is the same in all beings, and makes its presence felt in the entire creation. This will is a painful desire, due to which the life of man is a never-ending struggle. From the point of view of intelligence, which calculates that the amount of suffering is far greater than the amount of happiness, the world does not justify its existence. But Nietzsche stops there. As Schopenhauer turned in horror from the world he depicted, so his erstwhile pupil and admirer ultimately turned in horror from him. His study of philology had given him a deep insight into the nature of Greek culture and now

when he became disgusted with Schopenhauer he turned for inspiration to the past Hellenistic age where he succeeded in discovering an atmosphere most congenial to his temperament. The world may stand condemned from the purely rational point of view but it may and can be justified as an æsthetic phenomenon, as a supreme work of art, as the vision of a demiurge-artist. This transformation was visible to Nietzsche in Greek life. The Greeks were essentially a pessimistic race. For them this universe, as it is constituted, is frightful, unbearable, full of suffering and pain. The reply of Silenus, the companion of Dionysos, to King Midas who had asked him to reveal to him what was best for man, shows their true attitude to life. "Oh ! wretched race of a day, children of chance and misery, why do you compel me to say to you what it were most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is for ever beyond your reach : not to be born, not to be, to be nothing. The second best for you, however, is soon to die." They did not however shirk the consequences but tried to neutralize the effects thus produced by recourse to artistic creation. Their triumph over pessimism through art took two different channels, known as Apollonian and Dionysian. The first conception of life finds its concrete expression in the work of sculptor and painter or epic poet. The artist, through his creative activity, is able to produce an image (which is naturally a vision, a dream) of the external world, not only in its beauty and joy but also in its dreadfulness and sorrow. The artist creates this dreamland which he wishes to continue to dream and in which he takes full delight while fully

conscious of its unreality. It was the result of this impulse that the Greeks created the brilliant world of the Olympic gods. Their very presence in the universe which they were alleged to rule guaranteed to the Greeks the conviction that life once more was worth living. Thus "out of the original Titan thearchy of terror the Olympian thearchy of joy was evolved, by slow transitions, through the Apollonian impulse to beauty, even as roses break forth from thorny bushes. How else could this so sensitive people, so vehement in its desire, so singularly qualified for suffering, have endured existence, if it had not been exhibited to them in their gods, surrounded with a higher glory?" Thus by the creation of the Apollonian illusion the Greeks were able to withstand the pessimistic effects of ugliness and sadness of real life. Life is worthy to be desired because its image is beautiful.

Simultaneously with it there gradually arose the Dionysian or the 'tragic' culture which aimed to attain the same object, though through a different channel. The Dionysian cult was originally Asiatic and involved dreadful orgies in which man returned to the brute state, and gave himself up without restraint to his instincts of voluptuousness and cruelty. When adopted by Greeks, however, it lost much of its barbaric character. These festivals were meant to give man the basic realization that he was one with Nature. It is when in a state of intoxication and ecstasy brought about by drugs or by natural phenomena such as the return of spring, that man becomes suddenly conscious of the removal of the barrier of individuality which separates him from the rest of the

universe and feels his union with nature itself. This is what Nietzsche calls the Dionysian state, the natural language of which is music. In this state the individual perceives the universal suffering and misery prevalent but he also realizes his own eternity, inasmuch as his individual will is identical with the universal will. He escapes pessimism through the feeling that amidst the ever-flowing stream of phenomena, the source of life itself is eternal. Life is worth living because it is eternal.

Greek tragedy, according to Nietzsche, was a manifestation of the Dionysian state of mind coupled with Apollonian imagery and thus succeeded in securing a reconciliation between these two different modes of thought. In its personages, Greek tragedy realizes the Apollonian conception of life, of life as synonymous with beauty. In the choir of Satyrs, it realizes the Dionysian conception, life conceived as synonymous with strength and power. The tragedy proclaimed at once the beauty and the exuberant power of life, desiring eternity for the realization of its inner possibilities. "The psychology of the orgiastic state, interpreted as a feeling of life and exuberant strength, where grief itself acts as a stimulant, has shown me the path leading to the notion of the tragic feeling so greatly misunderstood by Aristotle, as also by our own pessimists . . . The affirmation of life carried even into its most formidable problems, the Will to Live exulting in the knowledge of its inexhaustible fecundity, in the presence of the destruction of the finest types of humanity, that is what I call the Dionysian spirit; and it is there that I found the key to the soul of the tragic poet. The tragic soul

does not wish to get rid of terror and pity, it does not wish to purify itself from a dangerous passion—by means of a violent explosion of this passion which was what Aristotle understood by it—no; it wishes, far above pity and terror, to be *itself* the eternal joy of the future, the joy which also understands the joy of annihilating." Thus Nietzsche was neither a pessimist nor a mere optimist. He was never blind to the suffering in this world. But, like the Greeks, he possessed sufficient moral strength to contemplate with serenity the woes of life. He believed, moreover, that the frequent exhibition of suffering and pain was a necessary factor in the combat against optimism, vitally essential to an understanding of the real value of life; for, in pain, he sees a great educating and ennobling force of Nature. For this reason he was hostile to all kinds of Hedonism in morals. Happiness, which the hedonist seeks, is a state to which an organism arrives when it is in complete harmony with its environment. This adaptation, in turn, presupposes that a particular environment is a desirable one. Pain, on the other hand, would mean an adaptation which is faulty, incomplete or totally lacking. The question whether we should pursue happiness or not resolves itself into the problem whether we should desire adaptation to our environment or not. Being a true Evolutionist, Nietzsche demands that we should alter our environment which is not suited to the expression of our infinite possibilities. The higher we rise in the scale of development, the greater would be the maladaptation and consequent suffering and pain and in proportion to them our efforts shall be intensified

towards the supreme end.

Negatively, Nietzsche's mission was a success. He was able to stem the rising tide of pessimistic outlook. The growth of natural science had undermined the glorious picture of the world depicted by Christianity and the attack of Schopenhauer's logic had destroyed the complacent optimistic belief of Leibnitz who had tried to revive the medieval picture in a rational garb. Nietzsche's genius saw that complete truth lay in none of these directions. He agreed with Schopenhauer in criticizing Leibnitz for his ill-warranted easy optimism. He disagreed with Schopenhauer for deducing a wrong conclusion from a premise with which he was in full agreement. He criticized the tendency represented by science as forcefully as he passed unfavourable judgment against Christianity. Prophet-like he was a unique idol-breaker. He destroyed so that he may be able to build anew on a surer and stronger foundation. The antidote that he suggests is the cultivation of creative art, that alleviates the ills of life by showing us the eternal and the universal behind the transitory and the individual. Music, the expression of Dionysian culture, is the creative art *par excellence*. It is, more than anything else, the direct expression of the eternal primordial Will, the complete image of this eternal desire which is at the bottom of the universe. This view of the importance of music was beautifully expressed by Rumi in the very beginning of the first book of his *Mathnavi* and became an indispensable element in most mystic schools. Nietzsche prefers this mode of approach to reality, instinctive, artistic, 'tragic,' to the rational approach introduced by Socrates and

followed up by Plato and Aristotle. The scientific attitude is as good a remedy against pessimism as the first two but its utility, he hastens to add, lies in the very act of search which science involves rather than in the truth found thereby. The scientific man destroys the utility of its pursuit when he begins to advocate that he cannot only know the world but guide and correct it as well, when he assumes that knowledge is the highest virtue and ignorance the source of all evil. Nietzsche chose Socrates for his attack only because he represented in his person a 'theoretical man,' anti-musical, anti-lyrical, anti-artistic, in short, anti-Dionysiac. Not only that Socrates was the first who made reasoning popular in opposition to instinct and intuition, but also because he condemned art, the highest creative activity of man and placed morality in its stead. He was the incarnation of reason while the Greeks obeyed the higher law of instinct; they desired life to be powerful and beautiful, he wished it to be logical and self-conscious. "In the name of his sovereign reason, conscious that he was the representative of a new civilization, he condemned the entire Hellenistic culture from top to bottom, without suspecting for a moment that the old world which he was casting down was infinitely superior to the new world which he was able to put in its place." Similarly Plato, though himself a great artist and a sort of mystic visionary, was led under Socratic influence to exclude artists and poets from his *Republic*. To Nietzsche who saw greater utility in the creative art and especially music, this attitude was unbearable and so he attacked Socrates with as much force as he

attacked Christianity: for both these stood in the way of the realization of his ideal. His attack against modern science, philosophy and history is not an attack against these branches of human knowledge as such but against the particular way in which they are studied. "Compared with a genius, that is to say, with a being who *creates* and *conceives*, in the highest sense of both words, the learned man, the scientific mediocrity, is something of an old maid; for, like latter, he is unable to understand the two most valuable achievements of man. That to which the whole of our modern philosophy has sunk, awaken nothing but suspicion and discouragement, if not ridicule and sympathy." About scientific and rational treatment of history, he says: "The clearness, naturalness and purity of the connection between life and history has vanished... Is the guilt ours who see it, or have life and history really altered their conjunction and an inauspicious star risen between them? There is such a star, a bright and lordly star, and the conjunction is really attuned by science, and the demand for the history to be a science." He characterized his age as Socratic which had lost touch with the primal source of life and his mission was first to destroy it and then to build it after the model of pre-Socratic Hellenistic civilization which knew how to face and solve the problem of existence.

People may hesitate to credit Nietzsche with any constructive theory of life yet they will agree that he was the most energetic and bold destroyer of old and often effete idols. Nothing escaped his attention. Religion, morality, state, philosophy and science, each had to pass through the fiery crucible of his penetrat-

ing scrutiny. Accepting Schopenhauer's doctrine that Will to Live is the most fundamental principle in the universe, adopting the Darwinian theory of natural selection that only the fittest survive, he enunciated his doctrine that it is not the Will to Live that is fundamental but the Will to Power which is the elementary expression of life, which operates in every sphere of Nature, organic or inorganic. The species not only strive to live but to realize life in all its infinite possibilities, to manifest life in all its integrity, to live wholly, to attain maximum of life. In order to achieve this end, life seeks those means which are best suited to that realization. Every condition that favours the development of life in this direction is good. Thus Nietzsche is able to evolve a standard of judgment. That alone is good which is useful to life at a given moment and in a given condition. Darwin applied the principle of natural selection to the organic world and after him it was extended with conspicuous success to the domain of inorganic nature but it was left to Nietzsche to push it further into the ideological world. The step proved most revolutionary in the history of philosophy. It meant the denial of almost all that humanity held sacred and believed to be beyond the pale of doubt.

It is commonly believed that there are certain fundamental laws which are immutable, eternal and independent of us. Notions of space, time and cause, for instance, were looked upon by Kant as given to us *a priori*, as having an existence in themselves. The thinkers of all ages have been engaged in the search for a Reality which they regarded to be true in its own right. The idealists have tended to deny the

reality of the phenomenal world only to affirm the noumenal as real while the materialists have denied the noumenal in order to affirm the validity of the phenomenal. The only thing common in all these attempts, in spite of profoundest differences in other respects, has been the belief that there is no doubt something unknowable which is true in itself. Nietzsche by his forceful dynamite brings down this whole superstructure. The history of philosophy has been, according to him, the history of an error. The error consisted in forgetting that these alleged eternal and immutable laws, the very instinct which compelled people to follow this will-o'-the-wisp, are all but the expressions of a force which has created them all. Humanity needed knowledge of the external universe in order to maintain itself and the ideas of cause, space and time proved most beneficial as means of acquiring knowledge. They have no reality in themselves, they represent truth under certain conditions and truth is an instrument in the struggle for existence. If the conditions governing our life to-day were to change, the truth of to-day would no longer be truth in the changed circumstances. The ideological world is a table of values ; its contents are not entities in themselves but represent each a certain value to humanity in the struggle for existence ; the only reality that they possess lies in their greater or less utility to us. " Knowledge acts as the instrument of power. " It follows therefore that knowledge increases according as our power increases. What is the meaning of knowledge ? Here the idea is to be taken in a strictly biological sense. In order that a given species may persist and develop in power, it must calculate its con-

ception of reality in such a way as to be able to construct by means of this conception a plan of existence. The usefulness of knowledge, not some abstract theoretical desire not to be deceived, is the real motive which underlies the development of the organs of knowledge; these develop themselves in such a way that by observing the results obtained by them, we are able to maintain ourselves in existence. In other words, a quantity of knowledge depends upon the degree in which the Will to Power of a species develops itself; a species conceives a certain quality and quantity of reality, in order to become master of that reality, in order to press that reality into its service." He adopts as his motto the symbol of the Order of the Assassins for whom he had nothing but praise and calls them freethinkers *par excellence*: "Nothing is true, everything is allowed."

Turning to the domain of morals his criticism is equally far-reaching. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* destroyed the ground on which scholastic metaphysics was based but in the field of morals his 'conscience' gained the upper hand. Denying the possibility of knowing the nature of ultimate reality, the thing-in-itself, he could not pursue his position logically to the moral sphere. Just as in the Middle Ages the postulates of Christian metaphysics had never been treated as problems but as already established facts, though later had been doubted and criticized by the predecessors of Kant, similarly morality was for centuries never thought to be a problem worthy of discussion. Long after belief in God and the supersensuous sanctions of morality had disappeared in Europe, thinkers had been untiringly trying to discover apparently rational basis

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for it. Some found justification for the old ethical system in a 'moral sense', some in the feelings of pleasure and pain and lastly Kant found it in the Categorical Imperative. No one, however, seemed to stop at the very words 'good' and 'evil' and ask what these terms signified. People took the traditional concepts of good and evil for granted and spent their lives in justifying them in the light of reason. It was left to Nietzsche to tackle this initial problem. His position here is identically the same as he adopted with regard to our conceptions of fundamental postulates of knowledge. Just as truth is an instrument in the hand of man to attain to maximum of life, similarly moral values are relative and utilitarian. Absolute good and absolute evil are myths. That is good which helps man in the attainment of power and strength, which enables him to rule and conquer; everything that hinders in the achievement of this purpose is bad. The only ultimate reality is our existence and instinctively everyone desires that life should be as exuberant, luxuriant and tropical as possible. Good, evil, truth and falsehood are all means towards that end. "If it be proved to me," says Nietzsche, "that those instincts labelled bad by present morality, such as hardness, cruelty, deceit, bold daring, pugnacious disposition, are likely to increase the vitality of man, I will say 'yea' to sin and evil; if it be proved to me that suffering as well as pleasure takes part in the up-bringing of human race, I will say 'yea' to suffering. On the other hand, I will say 'nay' to all that tends to diminish the vitality of the human plant. And if I find that truth, virtue, goodness, in a word, all the values hitherto respected and worshipped by man-

kind, are harmful to life, then I will say 'nay' to science and morals."

With this standard in view, Nietzsche investigates and analyses the moral values prevalent in Europe and discovers that they are all reducible to two fundamental types, two distinct classes of moral systems, which had been always in a state of perpetual conflict. There is a morality of masters and a morality of slaves. On the one hand is a class of people who are powerful, noble, strong and, on the other, those who are impotent, mean and weak. Being possessed of excess of strength, it is but natural on the part of the aristocrats to give vent to their power which may result in the destruction of the weak. As such they declare that to be good which expresses their will to self-aggrandisement. It pleases them to be strong and powerful, to be able to control others as well as themselves, to be hard on themselves as well as on others; as a consequence, they respect the same qualities in other people. The other class represents the different tendency. Being weak, they look upon all expressions of strength as evil. In one respect, at least, both these classes stand on the same footing. In order to keep the standard of their class intact, even to attain supremacy for their type, each tries to moralise and fix the significance of moral values according to its respective interests. To the lions 'eating lamb is good' while to the lambs themselves 'eating lamb is evil.' Whenever the lions have condescended to accept the moral values of lambs, they are sure to lose not only their predatory habits but their very existence as lions. In the master morality good means all that is strength, power, health, well-constitutedness,

happiness and awfulness ; bad applies to the coward and niggling one, to flatterer, mean and liar. In the slave morality, on the other hand, the table must be turned. Good is that which helps in the amelioration of their state of suffering, pity, warm heart, patience, industry and humility, for instance ; while all that is awful, strong and healthy is bad. To them the virtues of the rulers are vain and their happiness, delusion. He alone is good who is harmless, good-natured and perhaps a little foolish. Morality, in all its forms, is, therefore, merely a means to self-enhancement and to power. But, unfortunately, in modern Europe (of 19th century) both these moralities seem to be intermingled and confused, sometimes beyond recognition. Still his investigation reveals that the slave morality has got the upper hand which is the real cause of the decadence of modern culture. He traces the cause of this and finds that it is all due to the success of Christianity in Europe. Before considering his criticism of Christian religion and morality it will be better if we try to understand his position with regard to religion in general. He has nothing to say against religion as such. For him religious beliefs are as devoid of ultimate value as truth or goodness ; they are all, in his eyes, ' illusions ' or expedient devices in the hands of men for attaining power. He divides religions therefore into two classes, those that say ' yes ' to life and those that say ' nay '. Among the latter he puts Christianity and Buddhism whose moral systems had tended to destroy the vitality of superior races. He compares in this respect the Bible and the ' laws ' enunciated by Manu, the Indian law-giver. He says that the illusions created by the latter are far better

than those created by Christianity; for in their practical utility the laws of Manu respect procreation, marriage and woman, the institutions which Christianity always endeavoured to destroy. As such he has no quarrel with any religion so far as its metaphysical aspect is concerned. He does not move a finger to express the absurdity or otherwise of the claim of any religion. His only concern is about the moral values that it tries to promulgate, the type of man it has in view. His vehement attack against God is also directed against the 'moral God', the God who is represented as the defender of slave morality. His criticism of Christianity is motivated only on account of the moral system which it preaches. "All its legends and metaphysical beliefs might be a thousand times more incredible than they are, and I would have naught to say. But it is morality, underlying it all, which I regard as the great danger."

There had been attacks against Christianity before Nietzsche but their points of view had been different. Some directed their attack against the supremacy of the church, some doubted the relevancy of miracles, while others questioned the validity of the stories about the birth and death of Christ. But nobody had ever dared to call in question its theory of life, a theory which, Nietzsche thinks, historically considered, is a revolt of the weak and impotent against the strong and powerful, which destroyed all that was good in Greek and Roman civilizations. "He that loveth life, shall lose it, and he that hateth life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal." "Blessed are they that mourn; for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meek; for they shall

inherit the earth. Blessed are the peace-makers ; for they shall be called the children of God." " It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of God." " God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty. And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea and things which are not, to bring to naught things that are." In short, Christianity anathematised the real universe ; it opposed ' nature ', as the source of all evil, to God, the source of all good. It is the product of degenerate humanity, of a weary and suffering humanity which is tending towards pessimism, towards the negation of life, and aspires to return to nothingness. He says : " We must not embellish or deck out Christianity, it has waged a deadly war against the higher type of man, it has put in ban all fundamental instincts of this type, it has distilled evil, the Evil One, out of these instincts ; strong man as the typical reprobate, as outcast man. Christianity has taken the part of the weak, the low, the ill-constituted ; it has made an ideal out of the antagonism to the preservative instincts of strong life ; it has ruined the reason of the intellectually strongest natures, in that it taught men to regard the highest values of intellectuality as sinful, as misleading, as temptations." This attack of Nietzsche was similar in spirit to the attack made by Islam against Christian theory of life. The Quran definitely says ' yes ' to life in spite of its woes and sufferings ; it teaches the essential oneness of matter and spirit neither of which is the source of either good or evil.

Respect for life, lofty position assigned to Adam, conquest of Nature for the service of man, a nobler and higher ideal of man's evolution here on this earth, are a few of the things which Islam asserted with full force and with which Nietzsche is in full accord. No doubt Islam believes in all these possibilities as derivatives of belief in one God while Nietzsche, due to his instinctive hatred for Christian moral system, proclaims with full force that 'God has died.'

Besides the triumph of slave morality over master morality, as a result of Christian ethics, another very grave symptom of decadence is the almost general success in Europe of the democratic ideal. Christianity makes all men equal before God and democracy makes all men equal before the law. It aims at creating a society in which all men will have the same rights, the same duties, and an equal share of happiness, in which man will either obey or command, in which there will be neither masters nor slaves, neither rich nor poor. Similarly he regards the movement towards the equality of sexes as harmful for the future of mankind. Love in the case of man is merely a simple episode; the real instinct is the will to power while for woman love and children are everything. "Man's happiness," said Zarathustra, "is: I will. Woman's happiness is: He will." A woman is made to love and obey while man is destined to command and rule. Unfortunately, due to perfectly unhealthy influences, modern age has attempted to make woman divine just as it has done to glorify the slave. The consequences shall be disastrous in the one case as in the other.

All moral systems prevalent in the world desired to create a certain type of man and Nietzsche's criti-

cism of Christian morality was due to the fact that the particular type of man he had in view, what he calls the Superman, could not develop on that basis. In order to explain his position in this respect, he makes use of the theory of Evolution. But his adoption was qualified. The naturalist concerns himself with the origin of human species on this earth while the mystic's or a thinker's approach is teleological. Nietzsche's problem was : whither does man go ? He did not regard man as the highest being in the scale of evolution. If the process be a fact then logically there can be no limit to the aspirations of man. If it were possible for him to struggle up from barbarism, then there is no reason why he should stop there and not surpass it. If man has evolved out of ape, as the provisional apex of the pyramid of species, it is possible, rather necessary on the basis of evolutionary theory, that man should give place to a still higher species. Here we may note the similarity between Nietzsche and Rumi with this difference only that in Rumi's exposition the stage next to man is not definitely put down. Nietzsche, however, is very clear on this point. The next stage is to be the Superman, 'the meaning of the earth.'

The transformation by Nietzsche of the popular phrase of 'struggle for existence' into struggle for a nobler, stronger existence or struggle for power is not accidental. The alteration involves a perfectly new approach to the problem. It concerns the significance of the word 'fittest' in the phrase 'survival of the fittest.' When it is said that only the fittest survive in a given environment, it does not mean that the stronger or the better will survive. It means the sur-

vival of those who are constitutionally fittest to thrive under the conditions in which they are placed. In most cases it is the inferior who survive. Herbert Spencer says : " Superiority, whether in size, strength, activity or sagacity, is, other things equal, at the cost of diminished fertility ; and where the life led by a species does not demand these higher attributes, the species profits by decrease of them, and accompanying increase of fertility." In other words it means that it is the environment which determines what kind of species will thrive. If it is best suited to the temperament of mean and weak beings then only such beings will survive and the stronger and nobler will vanish. The conclusion, therefore, is apparent. We may be the ' fittest ' and yet degenerate only if our environment favours that particular type. Neitzsche, at once, points out the moral. " Mankind does not manifest a development to the better, the stronger or the higher in the manner in which it has at present behaved. Progress is merely a modern idea, *i.e.*, a false idea. The European of the present day is, in worth, far below the European of the Renaissance ; onward development is by no means, by any necessity, elevating, enhancing, strengthening." Nietzsche, therefore, in view of his ideal, demands that we should alter our environment so that the desired type of man may evolve. We create our conditions by means of our values of good and evil and as the situation into which we have drifted is hardly conducive to the development of Superman, we must alter our values wholesale. If man is to be a being worthy of respect in time to come, then we must change our ideals. If we wish to have a Superman who is to be the ideal of health and

strength, it can be achieved only through a transvaluation of all values.

'I teach you the Superman. Man is something that must be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him? All beings hitherto have created something higher than themselves and ye want to be ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man?

"What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame; and just the same shall man be to the Superman, a laughing-stock and a thing of shame.

"Ye have made your way from worm to man and much within you is still worm.

"He who is the wisest among you is but a hidden mutiny and a hybrid of plant and ghost. But, do I order you to become ghosts or plants?

"Behold, I teach you Superman!

"The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the Superman *shall* be the meaning of the earth."

The common search in which the philosophers had been engaged since Socrates concerned almost exclusively with the nature of the ultimate reality. The same had been the traditional function of religion and mysticism. No doubt certain thinkers started on their search with man, yet the end and aim had been always without exception a knowledge of the divine Reality. Nietzsche saw in this search a sign of decadence, a sort of snare which left us no time to study ourselves. He was so much enamoured of the ideal of Superman that he could not consistently believe in the existence of a God which stood in the way of its realization. Dioge-

nes, the Cynic, is well known in the history of philosophy for such a search of 'man.' Once, it is said, he was walking in the street, during daytime, with a lantern in his hand. On being enquired what he was searching he replied: 'Man'. "But are not all these people who surround you, men?" "Decidedly not," he replied; "they are creatures of a lower order. I want to find Man." This famous parable has been versified by Rumi who, as we saw, was equally interested in the evolution of man to a higher stage. In *The Joyful Wisdom*, Nietzsche has given an eloquent expression to this idea by relating to us the discourse of a man who runs about in clear daylight, with a lantern in his hand, looking for God: "Where is God?" he cried. "I will tell you, *we have killed Him*, you and I God is dead. God will remain dead. How shall we be consoled for this, we murderers of murderers? What form of expiation must we invent? Is not the very greatness of this act too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods to seem worthy of it? Never before was so great a deed performed—and all those born after us will, by that very fact, belong to a higher form of history than any that has hitherto existed." God being dead, man becomes responsible for himself. His search must now be directed towards a goal in manhood. He is left standing alone with no benevolent Creator to help and urge him on. He is now at liberty to find an ideal in this world and not in a world beyond, by means of which he may improve his race.

What is the Superman and how can we create him? In the words of one of the commentators of Nietzsche, Superman is "the state which man will

attain when he has renounced the existing hierarchy of values and rejected the Christian, democratic or ascetic ideals which prevail actually in Europe, and when he has returned to the table of values admitted by the noble races, by the masters, who create for themselves their own values instead of receiving them from outside." It does not, however, mean that we should reject all that progress in science and industry has taught us. Nietzsche does not wish us to lose any of the new advantages and power acquired in the course of painful experiences of centuries; what he demands is the transvaluation of old values which stand in the way of the Superman. The transition from man to this higher stage can be achieved through what Nietzsche calls self-suppression. He suggests grief for the first stage, though here he suffers only as an individual. This deep and painful disgust of himself leads him to asceticism and pessimism. This is the stage at which certain higher men have arrived and whom Zarathustra gathers round him in his cave. But their stage is transitory; it must be surpassed. So the prophet says to them: "Ye do not suffer enough to please me. For ye are only suffering from yourselves; ye have not yet suffered for man." It is only when this higher stage is reached that man, due to the very excess of suffering and pain, derives the necessary energy to annihilate himself in giving birth to the Superman and pessimism will become optimism.

What are the characteristic features of the morality of the Superman? The first point which Nietzsche wants to emphasise is that this code is not meant for the common people, the rabble and the mediocre. Zarathustra has come to preach this doctrine to the

chosen few of humanity, to the higher men who are disgusted with modern civilization with its democratic ideal of equality of all men. Being aristocratic himself, the Superman believes in the necessity of a hierarchy of ranks and values and so, as a consequence, he does not attempt to popularize his ideal. This will be apparent from the picture which Nietzsche draws of the ideal society, society divided into castes. To the lowest caste belong people who are engaged in handicraft, trade, agriculture and even science. A high civilization, according to him, is a pyramid and it can only stand upon a broad basis, a strong and consolidated mediocrity who are modestly content with obeying and carrying out their ordinary work with regularity and discipline. The State must provide an environment which would afford them a life relatively surer, quieter and above all happier than that of their superiors. Religious faith is for them an inestimable benefit, which teaches them humble self-contentment and peace of mind. Nietzsche therefore is the inveterate hater of Socialism which "undermines the working-man's instinct, his pleasure, his feeling of contentedness with his petty existence, which makes him envious, which teaches him revenge." The second in rank are the guardians of right, the keepers of order and security, the noble warriors, the king above all. They carry to some extent the coarser work of power. They serve as intermediaries between the will of the masters and the crowd of the slaves. They are the *liaison* officers between the masters and the slaves. Finally, the highest caste is that of the masters. It is for this caste that the morality of the Superman is devised. The wise man, according to Nietzsche, does not

subscribe to any ideal, he is essentially a creator of values. The world of reality has no value for him ; he must create the world that interests him, that is more according to his taste. He gives to the world a new table of values to be believed in and followed by others. He creates with full freedom and independence, heedless of good or evil, or truth or error ; he creates his own truth and his own morality.¹ He is a bold experimentalist who in the search for ever new fields for the expression of his creative genius, risks his life without trembling, a player of a terrible game with chance, the stake being life or death. Says Nietzsche : " What is good ?—All that increases the feeling of power, will for power, power itself in man. What is bad ?—All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness ?—The feeling that power increases—that resistance is overcome. Not contentedness but more power ; not peace at any price, but warfare, not virtue, but capacity." Zarathustra exhorts us : " You shall seek your enemy, you shall fight your fight, you shall do battle for your thought. And if your thought succumbs, your loyalty must rejoice at its defeat. You shall love peace as a means to new wars, and the short peace more than the long. A good cause, you say, sanctifies even war ; but I say unto you that a good war sanctifies every cause. For your enemies you must have hateful adversaries, not contemptible adversaries. You must be proud of your enemy. Then

¹ گر از دست تو کار نادر آید گناهی هم اگر باشد ثواب است

(پیام مشرق - صفحه 62)

(When you create something above the normal, it is hallowed though it may be sinful in the eyes of the common people.)

the successes of your enemy will also be your successes."

The first position, therefore, in the new table of values is assigned to the maxim: become hard. If the Superman has the ambition, and there is no reason why he should not have, to leave his stamp upon whole generations, even to mould the will of future humanity, he must pass through the crucible of severest training himself. He must hate the so-called virtues of pity and sympathy, he should have no taste for well-being, quietness and peace. Everything is in a perpetual flux and there is no possibility of any fixed and determined end. Life must always surpass itself. As such the Superman knows no rest. All peace for him is a means to new wars and his life is nothing but an endless chain of more and more dangerous adventures. He must be ready for supreme joy and supreme grief and therefore it will pay him to be hard. In the following he describes the ideal in a most beautiful way.

"Why so hard? asked once upon a time the piece of kitchen coal of the diamond; are we not near relations?—Why so soft? O my brethren, that is what I ask you; are you not my brethren?

"Why so soft, so tender, so conciliatory? Why is such self-denial in your heart? Such little consciousness of your Destiny in your look? And if your hardness cannot shine forth and cut and crush, how can you hope to *create* with me?—All creators are hard. And it must be a great joy to you to mould the face of centuries as if it were wax.

"Joy, to write your name on the will of centuries as if on brass—harder than brass, nobler than brass.

That alone which is the hardest is also the noblest.

"This new Table, O my brethren, I write above you: BECOME HARD."

But, according to Nietzsche, it is not sufficient only to become hard and not run away from suffering and pain; he must be able to inflict great suffering. "To be able to suffer is the least of things; weak women and even slaves can surpass them in that. But not to succumb to a feeling of distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suffering and listens to the shrieks of the sufferers, that is great, that is true greatness." It is the duty of the wise man to relieve the world of all those parasites who are weak in body and mind. He must hasten the end of those who are already nearing death and thus spare the future generations the depressing sight of misery and ugliness.

The last maxim for the Superman is that he must live according to nature, the life of a good-natured player coupled with the joyous innocence of a child while at play, contrary to the old moral precept which said, "Woe to those who laugh." Zarathustra advises the wise man to learn to play and to laugh. "Laughing have I consecrated; ye higher men, learn, I pray you—to laugh." The human soul, in its development, passes through three stages. The first stage resembles the camel which is famous for its capacity of carrying heavy burdens. The wise man at this stage patiently endures the worst trials and submits himself to strictest discipline so that he may be able to accumulate heavy load of experience. The next stage resembles the lion who unhesitatingly braves all danger in his path and destroys everything that tends to threaten

his liberty. The wise man at this stage is the destroyer of every idol that has been sanctified by tradition. There is no law for him except what he creates by his own will. The last stage is like the state of a little child. "Innocence is the child and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a self-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea." At this stage the Superman is the creator of new values after he had destroyed the old ones.

One other aspect of Nietzsche's remains to be considered, *viz.*, his theory of Eternal Recurrence, which he looked upon as at once the base and the coping stone of the philosophy of Superman. Without entering into the logical arguments that he tries to bring in support of his hypothesis, which, however, as he himself admits, came to him in a moment of poetic inspiration, we may summarize it as follows. Every single life is but an imperceptible fragment of the total cycle, hence every individual has already lived the same life an infinite number of times and will continue to live it again and again through all eternity. "This world has already attained to every state that it can possibly attain to, not only once, but an infinite number of times Man! Thy whole life, like the sand in an hour-glass, will return again and again and will continually run its course anew . . . And then you will once again find your various griefs and joys, your friends and enemies, every hope and every error, every blade of grass, every ray of the sun, and the same arrangement of all things. This cycle, of which you are but a single grain, will appear again. And in every cycle of human life there always comes an hour when one individual, at first, and then several, and then all, are

seized with the most powerful of all thoughts: the thought of the Eternal Recurrence of all things."

Nietzsche was himself aware that such a doctrine would hardly appeal to the people of his age who were under the influence of nihilistic tendencies represented by Christianity on the one hand and pessimism on the other. Therefore he claimed that such a doctrine was meant only for the Superman whose love of life and strength would be tested thereby. The Superman is a fatalist in that he believes that there is a universal determinism operating in this world; he is an illusionist, who has created several happy dreams of his, who entertains no hope of solving the eternal problem of humanity, for whom the world has neither aim nor sense nor justification in itself and our so-called ideals are all mere instincts in the struggle for power. But above all things he has been trained in the severest discipline to love life in its exuberance. Life is so rich with possibilities that eternity may not even exhaust it. A life full of adventures, risks, dangers, pain and suffering is worth eternity itself. Such a life is worth living not once, twice but over and over again, eternally, unceasingly because of the chance which it affords to the wise man of realizing its manifold possibilities.

Much controversy ranges round the point how far Iqbal was indebted to the German philosopher and extremist attitude is adopted by both sides. Nobody who has thoroughly studied Iqbal can deny the influence of Nietzsche though there would be no warrant in saying that whatever is nobler in him is totally derived from his predecessor. Before coming to the point at issue, we must note the fact that Iqbal was

fully acquainted with the history of mystic development in Islam long before he went to Europe (1905-1908) where he found the Nietzsche cult at its zenith. According to his own statement he had studied and contributed to a well-known English journal, *Antiquary*, an illuminating article on the philosophy of the Perfect Man as expounded by Abdul Karim Al-Jilli. When Iqbal studied Nietzsche he was undoubtedly impressed with the forceful advocacy of a doctrine which had been discussed and elaborated by Muslim mystics since the time of Bayazid of Bistam. Iqbal's exposition of this doctrine in the *Asrar-i-Khudi* reveals, as we shall soon see, that his attitude is more consistent with Islamic mystic traditions as, e.g., represented in the poetry of Rumi, than with Nietzsche's ideal. The only other element that impressed Iqbal was his criticism of Christian morality. The attitude which Nietzsche adopts in his attack is precisely the one which Islam had adopted before him. Christianity emphasised spiritual values to the detriment of the physical and regarded flesh or matter as the source of all evil, and consequently advocated a code of morality which confined its attention to the salvation of the individual, ignoring his social and cultural responsibilities. Even the code in that limited sphere was extremely one-sided. The causes which were responsible for such a partial and imperfect view of man shall be dealt with later. It is a fact that it urged its followers to renounce life as it was all evil, to prefer meekness, humility, poverty and uncleanness of body to strength, power, riches and health. Islam criticized this unnatural moral system and tried to establish a more harmonious code in its

stead. The very first thing that the Quran enunciates is that man is the highest of all creations, destined to scale heights undreamt of and possessing potentialities which would urge him on in his march towards the goal. It denied that Adam was sent to the earth as a punishment for his act of disobedience : in fact, Islam does not countenance any doctrine of Original Sin (the logical consequence of which is a pessimistic outlook on life) and therefore the need of redemption. As an individual he alone is responsible for his deeds, good or bad. The physical universe is a field which abounds in sufferings and pain (the element of Satan signifies that) but which is at the same time best suited for man. It is only through a life of trial and error that he can realize his latent possibilities. For the sake of his spiritual development it demands that man must say 'yes' to life with all its sorrows and joys. In contrast to the pacifist trend of Christianity, Islam not only legalized but exhorted its followers to fight to death any sign of disorder and blasphemy. It sanctioned material pursuits though reminding its followers to adopt an attitude of higher asceticism which while not disdaining the world of flesh, however, does not allow them to be corrupted thereby.

Iqbal was thoroughly acquainted with this moral system as expounded in the Quran and later by Rumi in his *Mathnavi*. His study of Nietzsche convinced him that the German Philosopher was on the right track and it is on account of this tendency in him towards a moral code in consonance with the spirit of Islam that in his *Lectures* he calls him the 'modern prophet'. He was surely prophet-like a great idol-breaker of contemporary world. Iqbal had to reinter-

pret this Islamic moral code to the modern Muslims, because, due to the assimilation of Platonic ideas, mysticism had tended towards an ideal which was, in essence, the very opposite of Islam. In order to reinstate the old table of values, it was necessary for Iqbal, therefore, to criticize the opposite tendency represented by Plato, who is justly regarded as the father of all mysticism. In this criticism of the Greek philosopher, Nietzsche and Iqbal tread on the same ground but their motives are quite different. Nietzsche attacked Socrates and Plato because they emphasized the role of reason and morality in our life to the detriment of Dionysian love for creative art. To Iqbal, on the other hand, Plato represents the tendency towards renunciation of the material world, preference for supersensuous in contrast to the sensuous that in the long run produced a moral and spiritual ideal which helped in developing a pure negative attitude towards life. No doubt, to Iqbal, as to Nietzsche, Reason occupies a secondary position in our life and he has fervently and with great warmth and frequency advocated the cause of love, but in this battle he does not select Plato as a representative of Reason: his attack is generally against all thinkers. In denouncing the negative attitude towards life Iqbal selected Plato for his attack while Nietzsche chose Christianity and no doubt both were correct. Iqbal had to fight against the particular tendency present in his people and that was Neoplatonic mysticism while Nietzsche had to contend against a similar philosophy saying 'nay' to life represented by Christianity.

In view of his prejudice against Christianity Nietzsche went to the other extreme. He was right

in so far as his natural instincts revolted against the unnatural morality of that religion but in his zeal for the advocacy of a new type of man, he subscribed to a table of values which can hardly be called natural and conducive to a harmonious development of the individual. It was unfortunate for Nietzsche that he was born at a time when religious faith was at the lowest ebb in Europe and materialism in one form or other was rampant. His hatred for Christianity led him to advocate a life of pure materiality in which there was no room for spiritual values. His vision of the Superman is, therefore, hardly acceptable in its totality. One of the critics says: "The biological truth is that constant self-restraint is a vital necessity for the strongest as well as the weakest. It forms the activity of the highest and most human brain centres. If these are not exercised, they waste away, *i.e.*, a man ceases to be man, the so-called Superman turns into a 'sub-man', a beast, in other words." If we review the moral qualities which Nietzsche thinks essential for the Superman, the criticism seems justified. Health and strength should no doubt be our ideals, but this does not mean that we should exterminate those who are weak in body and have lost their health. If this had been the universal practice, the world would have no doubt been deprived of the brilliant author of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* who spent most of his later life in a very bad state of physical breakdown. Self-assertion is as good a part of our instinctive nature as self-abasement and fear and love. Acquisition of gain and combative tendencies are as good a part of our natural make-up as sympathy and love. Christianity erred because it excluded one and Nietzsche erred because

he excluded other, an equally important aspect of our human nature¹.

Psychologically speaking, he is right when he asserts that all men are not equal. Heredity, environment and education, each leads individuals into different channels and perhaps it would be correct to say that no two individuals are equal either in their congenital make-up or as regards their acquired tastes. But, sociologically, the function of the State is that it should provide equality of opportunity for development to all without any restriction. The common man, merely because he belongs to a socially lower class, should not be necessarily deprived of those qualities which go to make up a man of high calibre. How many of the great men of the world, whom Nietzsche even enumerates as most approaching to his ideal of higher men, were descendants of the aristocratic class? Napoleon, whom he mentions again and again in most laudatory words, was one of the 'rabble' as regards birth and parentage. A historical review would convince any one of the falsity of Nietzsche's view in this respect. Iqbal in one of his articles criticizes this anti-democratic character of the Superman. "The Democracy of Europe—overshadowed by socialistic agitation and anarchical fear—originated mainly in

1. The following lines clearly set forth the difference between Nietzsche's ideal and Iqbal's:

تنے پیدا کن از مشیت غبارے تنے محکم تر از سنگین حصارے
 درون او دل درد آشنائے چو جوئے در کنار کوهسارے
 (پیام مشرق - صفحہ 18)

Build, out of a handful of clay, a body which is stronger and more impregnable than the strongest castle.

But within that body you must have a sympathetic heart—a stream, as if, flowing amidst mountains.

economic regeneration of European Societies. Nietzsche abhors this 'rule of the herd', and, hopeless of the plebeian, he bases all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an aristocracy of Supermen. But is the plebeian so absolutely hopeless? The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity; it is a spiritual principle based on the assertion that every human being is a centre of latent powers, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebeian material Islam has formed men of the nobler type of life and power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche?"¹ No doubt Iqbal has himself expressed in his writings a sort of dislike for the modern democratic method of counting heads in the discussion of political affairs; this dislike, however, is not against the basic principle of democracy as such, *viz.*, equality of all men in the eye of law, but against the method employed for ascertaining the wishes of the common people. The state in Islam, as we shall see, is both democratic and autocratic. It is democratic in that every individual including the Amir and the members of the Advisory Council, has equal rights in the eye of law. Nobody possesses any privilege merely because he holds any post of responsibility. The Quranic verse that Adam was made God's vicegerent signifies unequivocally that every individual has the right to attain to that highest status on the earth. There are no distinctions of race, birth or social status and nobody is debarred from enjoying his rights merely be-

¹ As quoted by Nicholson in the Introduction, p. xxix, to the English translation of *Asrar-i-Khudi*.

cause he belongs to one class rather than the other. It is autocratic in so far as the application of the fundamental laws of Islam is concerned. So long as the head of the State, once he is selected by the people according to the criterion laid down by the Quran, rules in conformity with the spirit of Islam, he has the widest powers conferred on him. But he is in no case absolved thereby of his responsibility towards the law or the people. He cannot go beyond the law in any case and if he does, every member of the society has the right to take him to task for that. Iqbal therefore cannot be anti-democratic. His hatred for democracy is due to the particular form which it has taken in the West and which, in Iqbal's eyes, is nothing less than the rule of a certain privileged class which knows no law except of its own making intended to usurp power for the exploitation of the weaker members of society. He is, therefore, contrary to Nietzsche, in full sympathy with Socialism which aims to provide equality of opportunity to all.¹

What are the characteristics of the Perfect Man, according to Iqbal? Under the title 'Divine Vicegerency' in *Asrar-i-Khudi* he describes him as the creator of new values,² as the upholder of brotherhood and love among mankind³; who will restore peace to the

¹ وائے بر دستور جمهور فرنگ مرده تر شد مرده از صور فرنگ

(جاوید نامہ - صفحہ 79)

² فطرتش معمور و می خواهد نمود عالم دیگر ببارد در وجود
زندگی بخشد ز اعجاز عمل می کند تجدید انداز عمل
زندگی را می کند تفسیر نو می دهد این خواب را تعبیر نو

³ خیز و قانون اخوت ساز ده جام صہبائے محبت باز ده

world that is gory with human blood shed in vain.¹ He is the completest ego, the goal of humanity.² But unlike Nietzsche's Superman, he is not beyond law. Iqbal regards him as the executor of the command of Allah in the world.³ In explaining the esoteric meaning of the names of Hazrat Ali, he describes the life of Perfect Man. He must control himself, his body and his passions. To become earth is the creed of a lowly creature like moth; he should be, on the other hand, the conqueror of earth, *i.e.*, his body⁴; he should become hard as a stone⁵; his ideal is a life of free and creative activity.⁶ He does not adapt himself to his environment but will mould the world according to his taste. If the world does not comply with his humour, he will try the hazard of war with Heaven. By his own strength he will produce a new world which will do his pleasure.⁷ He feels joy in a life of dangers and adventures for thereby he finds a great scope for the expression of his

¹ باز در عالم بیار ایام صلح جنگجویان را بده ایام صلح

² نوع انسان مزرع و تو حاصلی کاروان زندگی را منزلی

³ ع-در جهان قائم با مرلته بود (اسرار خودی - صفحه 72-76)

⁴ خاک گشتن مذهب پروانگی است

خاک را اب شو که این مردانگی است

⁵ سنگ شو اے همچو گل نازک بدن تاشوی بنیاد دیوار چمن

⁶ از گل خود آدمی تعمیر کن آدمی را عالم تعمیر کن

⁷ با جهان نامساعد ساختن هست در میدان سپر انداختن

مرد خود دارے کہ باشد پخته کار با مزاج او بسازد روزگار

گر نه سازد با مزاج او جهان می شود جنگ آزما با آسمان

می کند از قوت خود آشکار روزگار نو کہ باشد سازگار

creative powers.¹ He will hate any show of undue mercy or weakness or fear of any sort in the presence of any person or adventures.² He is the acme of life both in mind and body and his strength will determine the values for the people to follow. In another book he adds a few other characteristics. The most important of these is what he calls *Fakr* which he poetically describes as a look leading to the right path and a heart that is active and living. It is ecstasy and submission to the law of God. A perfect man will exploit the forces of nature and thus save himself and others from falling into snares of a life of superstitious awe. He himself is hard like a diamond and transmits his hardness to others. He is not afraid of anybody, not even of great kings, and leads a life of solitary confinement and yet it is only through him that people gain a new lease of life. His ideal is a perpetual Jihad against the world in order to establish the law of God on earth. The perfect man seeks God through the absorption of God into himself, *i.e.*, absorption of His characteristics, by the strengthening of his ego in the light of divine guidance.³ Power and

¹ آزمایید صاحب قلب سلیم زور خود را از مهمات عظیم
ممکنات قوت مردان کار گردد از مشکل پسندی آشکار
² ع-عفو بیجا سردشی خون حیات ع-ناتوانی زندگی را رهزن است
(اسرار خودی - صفحه 80-83)

³ ع-یک نگاه راه یابی، یک زنده دل ع-فقر ذوق و شوق و تسلیم و رضاست
فقر برکروبیایی شبخون زند بر نوامیس جہاں شبخون زند
بر مقام دیگر اندازد ترا از زجاج الماس می سازد ترا
اے کہ از ترک جہاں گوئی، مگو ترک ایی دور کہن، تسخیر او
فقر مومن چیست تسخیر جہات بنده از تاثیر او مولد صفات
مرد حق باز آفریند خویشی را جز بہ نور حق نہ بیند خویشی را
(پس چہ باید کرد - صفحه 23-27)

vision are both necessary for him. Power he will get through knowledge that he gains after the exploitation of the forces of nature and vision he will get through creating in himself the attributes of God. Vision without power does bring moral elevation but is socially useless as no new world can be created thereby. This is the state to which all Eastern religions or mystic systems have reduced themselves. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman and this is the ideal which Nietzsche tried to present to the world and which the West is following with its logical consequences. Both power and vision must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity.

دلبری ہے قاہری جادوگری ست دلبری با قاہری پیغمبری است

'Vision' without power is magic while with power it becomes prophetic, *i.e.*, creator of new values and cultures.

Bergson starts with the theory of evolution of life as a working hypothesis but he questions the adequacy of the two most prevalent interpretations of it. According to Darwin, evolution proceeds through chance variations in which individual organism has no part to play. Those variations which are most suited to the environment tend to survive and to reproduce themselves. According to Lamarck, on the other hand, adaptation to environment is the determining factor. With the change of environment species put forth new organs to adapt themselves to it. The new form of this doctrine, known as Neo-Lamarckism, even admits consciousness and will in the effort on the part of the organism. But Bergson has brought forth wealth of concrete examples by which he tries to prove

that both these theories can explain adequately only a limited number of facts. The principles of adaptation to environment and chance survival of the fittest, totally fail to explain the fact of transformism and especially the fact of abrupt variations known as 'mutations'. Bergson also attacks the mechanistic principle of explanation which both these theories, in spite of their differences in other respects, accept as fundamental. Mechanism regards life as different from matter, not in kind, but only in the degree of complexity and therefore is liable to be explained in terms of physical and chemical laws as inorganic matter is being successfully done at present. Mechanistic principle implies that given a fuller knowledge of past and present conditions determining it, everything can be exactly prejudged; nothing new appears in the universe. The contrary doctrine of vitalism views the whole process as teleological, as directed towards a certain defined end or purpose lying in the distant future which is to be fulfilled. Bergson, however, accepts neither of the two. For him Finalism or teleology is another form of mechanism.

In order to appreciate Bergson's view of evolution we must first briefly refer to two important facts which are discernible in every living form. One is that the life of every living organism is absolutely continuous with its past. Its present is not only determined by its past as the mechanists would say; it also carries the whole past with it in its present. The other is transformism, *i.e.*, there is a continuous change in the forms of living beings, adapting themselves to the changing conditions of life. These two facts may be named as *duration* of living forms and *creation* of

new forms respectively. In order to explain them Bergson asserts that there is a vital surge, a force (which he calls *Elan Vital*) behind evolution without which it is not possible to explain how and why the movement occurs at all. Evolution, therefore, according to Bergson, is not the adaptation of an organism to the external conditions, nor is there any purpose or final end which this process of evolution tries to realize ; it is rather due to an original impulse that lies behind it.

In order to elucidate the nature of this original impulse, Bergson turns to the study of human consciousness which is, for us, the surest field where we can feel and experience most intimately the working of this force. The commonsense view of our consciousness which was embodied in the old associationist psychology is that it consists of different psychic states succeeding one another and knit together by the unifying principle termed "soul" or "ego." Bergson rejects this notion as untrue. According to him there are no independent static psychic states. He gives us several illustrations of it. Take the most stable of internal states, the visual perception of a motionless object. The object may remain the same, I may look at it from the same side, from the same angle, in the same light : nevertheless, the vision I now have of it differs from that which I have had, even if only because the one is an instant older than the other. My memory is there, which conveys something of the past into present. My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration it accumulates. So he comes to the conclusion that 'we change without ceasing and the state itself is nothing but change.'

This change does not occur in anything that endures in the change ; for Bergson such a thing is unthinkable. There is change and there is no *thing* that changes. Thus there is no need of postulating any underlying ego-substratum which endures through change because there is nothing which does not change. From this fact Bergson asserts that the ultimate nature of the universe is change, 'becoming.' Just as in our examination of human consciousness we found that what appeared at first sight to be a series of motionless states, was in fact a continuous process of change, so the view of Reality which represents it as a series of bodies possessing qualities which similarly persist until they are replaced, is equally misleading. Universe is conceived by Bergson as one continuous flow or surge.

Constant change is, however, unthinkable without time and it is one of the greatest merits of Bergson that he has discussed the problem of time in a novel way and thus was able to resolve some of the famous paradoxes of philosophy. There have been several eminent thinkers, both ancient and modern, who regarded change, movement and time as unreal. Bergson, however, points out that this conclusion has been arrived at because they all looked at these problems from objective scientific point of view. Looked at subjectively, their conclusions would prove erroneous. Against the view that change and movement are divisible into different independent states and stages, respectively, Bergson advocates that all change and movement are indivisible. Commonsense believes that at each moment of its passing, the moving object passes over a certain point, and therefore we can dis-

tinguish in the movement as many stopping-places as we wish. From such a commonsense view arose the paradoxes of Zeno, the Greek thinker. To him an arrow cannot move nor can Achilles ever overtake the tortoise. The first is impossible because during the course of its flight, the arrow must be at rest in some point of space and in the second case, Achilles must traverse half the distance separating the two points and then again half of the half and *ad infinitum* and as there can be infinite number of points in the intervening space, it is impossible for Achilles to pass through an infinity of points in a finite time. But for Bergson these paradoxes do not arise because change and movement for him are indivisible. When my hand moves from A to B, it is one continuous movement and so cannot be divided into discrete points. The whole difficulty arises when we wrongly divide one single indivisible movement into parts. We tend to cut up one continuous flow into distinct parts and then raise them to the states of independent reality. Similarly in the case of time. Our commonsense view takes time as consisting of succession of independent moments and is based on, and derived from, our idea of space. We look at time as succession of events spread out in space: it is symbolised as the *distance* separating events in order of *succession*. As such it is hardly distinguishable from space. We conceive it as a straight line composed of spatial points which are external to one another, like so many stages in a journey, which we divide and cut off as past, present and future. Bergson calls this notion of time as scientific or mathematical and which he thinks is no part of the reality of the external world; it is simply a relation between

material things. There is another kind of time which he calls duration and for illustration he again refers to our conscious experience. Real time is, unlike homogeneous space, heterogeneous in character. We are aware of it in relation to ourselves. It has reference to our conscious states which, as we saw above, are not extended in space; they interpenetrate to such a degree that even the use of word 'state' is apt to be misleading—consciousness is not static but dynamic; it is a stream and in it lies the essence of Bergsonian Duration. He says: "Pure Duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assume when our Ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states." Real time is not susceptible to measurement, for it is qualitative in character. It cannot be measured by clocks or dials but only by conscious beings, 'for it is the very stuff of which life and consciousness are made.' It is our practical life which requires us to cut up this duration into fixed states. As an illustration of this difference in two points of view, Carr has given us an excellent example taken from physical science.¹ In the process of perceiving red it has been calculated that the frequency of waves reaching our eyes is four hundred billion per second. If it were possible for us to count these waves at the rate of 2,000 a second which is supposed to be the limit at which they could become perceptible, it would take 6,300 years to complete the enumeration of the waves which occur in one second. Thus we grasp or hold together in one single mental act of vision that which is practically incalculable. That is how the mental act transforms succession into

¹ Wildon Carr : *Philosophy of Change*, p. 37.

duration.

Bergson is thus led to the distinction of two selves in each of us—a fundamental self and a social self. Our social self is the self of our daily life which for practical purposes spatializes the flow of our consciousness into static states, which succeed each other in serial time; it cuts up the eternal flow of movement into solid 'events' which take place as if in a straight line. The fundamental self is realised only at very rare moments of profound meditation when the social self is in abeyance. Here the states of consciousness melt into one another. The unity of the fundamental self is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality but as a unity, in which every experience permeates the whole. This organisation of the facts of consciousness is the work of time, nay, it is the time itself. Time is the form which the succession of our states of consciousness assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former state, when on remembering these states it does not set them alongside its present state as one point alongside another, but unites them organically with it, as happens when we recall the notes of a melody, fused, so to speak, into one another. The greater part of our time, however, we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time. We live for the external world rather than for ourselves.

We are then brought to the problem of freedom of will. Bergson refuses to follow in the footsteps of ancient advocates of freedom. He starts from a new

point of view. The actions of our fundamental self are free, not in the sense that they are undetermined ; Bergson denies such freedom. It is not the absence or presence of compulsion that determines the lack or presence of freedom in an act ; it is rather the source of compulsion that decides the question. In a really free act, the compulsion is there but it is felt within us. We are called on to act with our whole self and our whole nature responds. The act of the fundamental self in its very nature is a free action, because it is the individual action of a self-contained whole springing from its inner nature and there is nothing external which can compel it. It is a free act because it is the expression of our self.

The difference in the behaviour of inorganic matter and living organism would be apparent if we analyse the experience of a man who is accustomed to driving motor-cars and horse-carriages. The conditions which precede conscious action, *e.g.*, of a horse, in contrast to the action of a car are incapable of ever being actually repeated in the same sense in which the purely mechanical conditions which precede a physical event can be repeated. For a conscious being every repetition is a new situation. If time is real, then every moment in our life is original, giving birth to what is absolutely unforeseeable. Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances, leaving on all things the mark of its tooth. As such, consciousness cannot go through the same state twice, history never repeats itself. "For a conscious being to exist is to change, to change is to mature, and to go on creating oneself endlessly." Thus for Bergson free

action means creative action. It is the nature of life to be creative and the individual taken as a whole is necessarily creative from the mere fact that he is alive. Being creative he cannot be regarded as determined by what went before : otherwise, there would be no sense in creating.

The method of philosophy since Plato had been the study of ultimate Reality through concepts, reason, intellect. Kant's criticism, for the first time, threw doubt on the efficacy of reason in performing this job. In the act of perception, he held, our mind supplies certain categories (such as space, time, causality) into which the data of sense are received. Thus what we perceive is not the object in its true nature but as it is coloured and affected by our mental categories and therefore Kant concluded that we cannot know things-in-themselves, the Reality that is ultimate, the very object and purpose of metaphysics. If knowledge is impossible, then metaphysics, according to Kant, was also impossible. But this would surely be the case if all knowledge would be the knowledge through intellectual apprehension. Bergson admits this position of Kant but he proceeds further and herein lay his own contribution, a new method of approach to the old problem. He suggested that there is another method of gaining a direct knowledge of Reality, the method called by him Intuition. The contrasts that exist, for example, between fundamental (or appreciative) and social (or efficient) selves, between real (or Duration) and serial (or the mathematical) time, between freedom and determinism, are all manifestations of these two different modes of approach to the apprehension of Reality.

What is intuition ? According to him, it is the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. Analysis is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known. But intuition is an act directly opposed to analysis, for it is a viewing of the object in totality ; it is a synthesis, not an analysis. In order to bring home the distinctive character of intuition, Bergson gives us several examples. Take the case of learning a language. First, I have to learn the most tedious and unpleasant grammatical aspect of it and the whole task seems appalling. But as soon as I begin to use the language, although I may have acquired only a rudimentary knowledge of it, I seem to enter into it. Take the case of an artist. His greatness as an artist consists in the fact that he sees in objects more than we ordinarily see in them and this something more which they are able to perceive and portray for us, is due to their power of entering by sympathy into their subjects. Similarly take the case of any musical composition. It may be regarded as merely an aggregate of various notes. But the other point of view looks upon it as the whole which is above and beyond the mere sum of its parts. The second view is the view of intuition by means of which we enter into and appreciate the meaning of the musical composition as an indivisible whole. If the intellect is unsuitable in apprehending the nature of ultimate Reality, what is the function which it performs ? Just as in the course of evolution our body has been endowed with special sense-organs by means of which we become aware of the external world, so intellect is a special adaptation of

mind which enables us to view the external reality in a particular way. Our sense-organ of eye is useful to us both on account of what it includes as well as what it excludes. If the eye were, for instance, to be limitless in its range of receiving stimuli, it would become perfectly useless. Its utility lies mainly in this that it limits the amount of light it admits and narrows the range of visible things. If knowledge of the ultimate Reality were the only end of our life, then of course the only method would be intuitive and intellect would serve us no purpose. But we have other ends besides that and hence the necessity of intellect. Just as the material tool is far superior in its practical advantages to the organic tool that nature supplies to all living creatures, so intellectual knowledge, for the same purpose, is better suited than mere intuitive knowledge. The nature of ultimate Reality given to us by intuition is a constant ever-changing flow, a pure duration. But such a view would be most injurious to our practical ends. At this stage evolution supplies us with another tool, intellect, which cuts across living flow of Reality and carves out of it solid objects and discrete states of consciousness. Reality is nothing but change; but the outlines of things, the grouping and arrangement of phenomena, the shapes and forms of things, are the modes of our apprehension, the lines that our intellect traces. We must, however, guard against one misapprehension. The view that intellect gives us of the external reality is not a fabrication: it is the real world that is revealed to us; it is only selected and limited due to our practical ends and interests. In order to illustrate this point Bergson has employed one

of his very happy illustrations. Intellect, he says, is cinematographical. The cinematograph takes views of a moving scene but the pictures it takes represent a succession of fixed positions. When a series of these pictures representing different fixed positions are passed across the screen in rapid succession, they present to us a moving picture. The view of Reality as perceived by intellect is like the views of the moving scene as represented in the fixed positions. But when movement is restored, we come to perceive Reality as it is. Thus intellect takes views across the moving scene, and these views are the things which present themselves to us as solid objects spread out in space.

Bergson has been criticised for his intuitive method which, being supersensuous, is looked upon as anti-scientific and anti-intellectual. But Bergson has tried much to elucidate his position. It is not anti-scientific and mystical. He says : " If by mysticism we understand a reaction against positive science, the doctrine which I am defending is from one end to the other nothing but a protest against mysticism, since it proposes to re-erect the bridge, broken down since Kant's day, between metaphysics and science." Nor is this method anti-intellectual. The intuition which Bergson advocates is neither distinct from the discursive intelligence nor can it dispense with it. He says : " Nowhere have I claimed that we should replace intelligence by something else, or prefer instinct to it. I have tried to show merely that when we leave the region of physical and mathematical objects for realm of life and consciousness, we have to depend on a certain sense of living, which has its origin in the same vital impulse that is the basis of instinct, although instinct, strictly speaking,

is something quite different." Intuition, according to Bergson, therefore, is not short of intelligence but ahead of it. It does not exempt us from intellectual work ; it crowns, completes and perfects that work. Intuition is almost always the result of a laborious intellectual work spread over several months. Yet, however valuable intellect may be, it is not final.

گذر جا عقل سے آگے کہ یہ نور

چراغِ راہ ہے منزلِ نہیں ہے

Pass beyond intellect ; for this light serves to illumine the path but is not the destination.¹

Anyone aware of the history of mystic thought in Islam and particularly its form as expounded by Rumi will see that there is nothing new in the contributions of Bergsonian philosophy. The distinction of intuition and intellect and the superiority of the former to the latter in apprehending the nature of ultimate Reality, the distinction between fundamental and social levels of self (corresponding to the mystic analysis of the states of Soberness—*Sahw*—and Intoxication—*Sukr*, as enunciated by al-Hujwari), the view of freedom, as the prerogative of a man of highly integrated personality, to be identical with creative acts, the theory of evolution, are all repeatedly discussed in the books of mystic writers and so Iqbal had nothing to learn from Bergson in this respect. No doubt his philosophy presented several new things but these were new for the West and not for the East. It served only to deepen his appreciation of Rumi's interpretation of Islam. The only thing for which he seems to be indebted to Bergson is his view of time as 'duration'. The analysis of con-

¹ *Bal-i-Jibril*, p. 119.

sciousness by means of which Bergson arrives at his dynamic conception of Reality was perfectly familiar to the mystics, and, as such, Iqbal cannot be said to be unaware of the distinction of efficient and appreciative selves. Yet the particular form in which Bergson presents his theory of time does not seem to have been hinted at by any mystic. But due to a fundamentally similar outlook Iqbal could not hesitate in accepting a doctrine which was, to him, a logical consummation of what the Quran had explicitly taught and the mystics had only vaguely expressed. Iqbal's study revealed to him that the Quran refers, in several places, to change as the characteristic feature of Reality and constant change is unthinkable without time. As to the nature of time, Iqbal found in the Quran two different modes of expressing the same act of creation. In one place it is said that God 'in six days created the heaven and earth and what is between them', (25 : 60) while at another place the act of creation is referred to as the result of one Command 'swift as the twinkling of an eye'. (54 : 50) The one and the same event is expressed first in terms which we often employ in our practical life, in the category of mathematical time which is divisible into present, past and future, and secondly, in terms which could be grasped only through our intuitive faculties. This difference in expression led Iqbal to Bergson's theory of time which brilliantly puts forth this distinction between serial time and duration. "Pure time is not a string of separate, reversible instants ; it is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but is moving along with,

and operating in, the present."¹ The organic wholeness of duration means that Reality is free and original in creation. Thus Iqbal agrees with Bergson in regarding the universe as a free and creative movement. But movement, according to common-sense view, can hardly be conceived without any material substratum. Movement is possible only when we talk of some 'thing' that moves. Iqbal thinks that it is the movement that is original and not the 'thing'. We can derive things from movement and not *vice versa*. It has been precisely the defect of Aristotle's view of the universe who conceiving it in static terms had later to bring in a Prime Mover. Modern physics is also led to believe in the primacy of movement. Our immediate experience, Iqbal thinks, gives us not things having definite contours; it is rather a continuity without any distinctions in it. It is thought, which, for its practical interests, breaks up and spatializes the continuity of nature.² What about change? Can we say that the ultimate Ego changes? Our hesitation in ascribing change to Him is due to the fact that our experience of life as a continuous change means a life full of attainments as well as failures and therefore change in this sense of imperfection cannot be applied to God. But there is another view of change which can be ascribed to Him. Our ego depends upon, and arises out of, the distinction between self and not-self. But the ultimate Ego, in the words of the Quran, "can afford to dispense with all the worlds."

¹Lectures, p. 67.

²Cf. James Ward: "Experience begins not with the integration of a manifold but with the differentiation of a continuum." *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 45.

To Him, who is the whole of Reality, the not-self does not present itself as a confronting 'other'; the phases of His life are wholly determined from within. The change therefore when applicable to Him does not mean a succession of varying attitudes but as continuous creation, and, as such, cannot be called imperfection. To deprive the ultimate Ego of the character of change in this particular sense of creation would be to reduce Him to "an utter inaction, a motiveless, stagnant neutrality, an absolute nothing... The 'not-yet' of man does mean pursuit and may mean failure; the 'not-yet' of God means unfailing realization of the infinite creative possibilities of His being which retains its wholeness throughout the entire process."¹

Though the distinction drawn by Bergson between Intellect and Intuition and the particular function which he assigns to Intuition are accepted by Iqbal as valid on independent grounds, yet he does not agree with him in accepting his point of view about intellect. To Bergson intelligence is devised by life as an evolutionary tool for the purpose of dealing with the world of matter and has only mechanical categories at its disposal. But for Iqbal the function of thought is much more comprehensive. It is commonly believed that thought is finite, and as such, cannot comprehend the Infinite. This is, however, only a partial view of intelligence. "In its deeper moments thought is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments. In its essential nature, then, thought is not static;

¹Lectures, p. 81.

it is dynamic and unfolds its internal infinitude in time like the seed which, from the very beginning, carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact.”¹ Though apparently thought breaks up Reality into static fragments, yet in fact it synthesizes the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents. It is as much organic as life. Secondly, Iqbal does not accept Bergson's view of evolution as neither mechanical nor teleological. That mechanism cannot explain life and consciousness is now almost an established fact. Bergson refused to ascribe teleology to Reality only because it is according to him another form of mechanism which will make time unreal. But here Bergson's analysis of our conscious experience, on which he based his theory of duration, proves defective. To him every present state of consciousness is not only continuous with, but carries, the whole past with it. He does not seem to realise that it is marked by a forward look as well, which implies the presence of some purpose or end. “The past, no doubt, abides and operates in the present; but this operation of the past in the present is not the whole of consciousness. The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness.”² Thus our present state of consciousness is a sort of an organic unity in which both past and future are intermingled; it is determined by what has gone before and contains the germs of what is yet to be. On the basis of this analysis, therefore, we are entitled to differ with Bergson and regard Reality not as a

¹ *Lectures*, p. 8.² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

blind vital impulse but as a rationally directed Will. If the conclusion of Bergson be true, we shall be logically bound to accept the pessimistic view of Schopenhauer who saw in the universe nothing but evil as a result of the working of a blind Power. The real reason why Bergson hesitated to admit the teleological character of Reality is that, in his view, this would make future to be predetermined and thus take away the whole force of its creativeness. No doubt, if by teleology we mean nothing but the working out of a plan according to a preordained end, it will not only make time unreal but reduce the universe to a mere reproduction of a prearranged eternal scheme in which almost everything has its fixed place and will make its appearance within the spatio-temporal order at its appointed time. Such a view, of course, is hardly in consonance with the spirit of Islam. In such a world there can be no room for free responsible moral agents. The enormous data of facts which modern psychology has collected will show that every living organism behaves as if it is determined by some end or purpose, conscious or unconscious.¹ It is the presence of this teleological element that distinguishes it as a class from inorganic substances which obey mechanical laws. But this purposive character in the behaviour of living organisms signifies not that there is any far-off distant goal towards which they move, but only this much that 'there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands...It is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character, and brings

¹ See, e.g., McDougall: *Outlines of Psychology*.

itself to some sort of a present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past.¹

The ultimate Reality therefore is a pure duration in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity, free and creative. It is spiritual in the sense of being an Ego. The reason why Iqbal conceives ultimate Reality as Ego is that He responds to our call. He accepts Royce's opinion that response is the test of the presence of a conscious self and then quotes the following verse of the Quran: "And your Lord says, call Me and I respond to your call." (40:62) In another place he says: "The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. Does Reality respond to us? It does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself—*i.e.*, the act of worship."²

How is matter related to the ultimate Ego? On account of the religious background of his speculation Iqbal is precluded from accepting any dualistic theory here. He cannot look upon matter to be an independent reality, co-eternal with, though acting in the opposite direction to, the ultimate Ego. The discoveries of modern physical science about the nature and behaviour of atoms, and still more, the truth established by the theory of Relativity, afford him an invaluable help in rejecting the belief in the primacy of matter. Modern physics does not look upon the world as consisting of hard and solid matter but only of point-events. In describing a material object, we are to take into account not only its

¹ *Lectures*, p. 74.

² *McTaggart's Philosophy* by Iqbal, an article reprinted in the *New Times* (Lahore), 4th July, 1937.

position in space, *i.e.*, length, breadth and height, but also its position in time. As such, no physical thing can be said to persist; it is continually changing and is literally a different thing at each moment of time. But if this be the constitution of the world, then how is it that we perceive it to be consisting of solid objects? Modern physicists of great eminence are of opinion that it is due to the activity of our minds which has a particular aptitude for selecting certain aspects of Reality. Similarly most of the physical laws, like that of gravitation and causation, are deprived of their universality; they may not be necessary factors of the world as it exists independent of mind. Most of these laws are relative to a mind and reflect not the workings of the external universe but the characteristics of the mind which imposes them on it. Modern physics, therefore, is inclined to the position that the primary element in the universe is not matter but mind or life. We may say then that the life was present in the particles of matter from the beginning. Modern biology is not able to draw any dividing line between living and non-living matter. Plants possess life and the researches of Sir Jagdish Bose show that even metals respond to stimuli, are subject to fatigue and react to poison in a manner which is different in degree but not in kind from the behaviour of a living organism. Thus modern science has established the truth of Iqbal's conclusion at which he arrived through an analysis of conscious experience, that the ultimate Reality is spiritual and must be conceived of as an Ego. From such an Ego, only egos proceed. Everything that exists in the universe from the lowest scale to the highest,

is an ego, though varying in the degree in which each possesses this characteristic of life. "Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man."¹ Thus he arrives at a form of spiritual pluralism like Ward's, with whom he has many affinities.²

Ward's philosophy represented a reaction against Hegelian Idealism. He refused to start with the 'One above' like Hegel, which is theoretically inaccessible. Being well-versed in biology and having studied medicine for some time, his attitude was in this respect more like the British Empirical school. This start from experience at once suggested to him pluralism, which assumes that the world is made up of individuals, each distinguished from others by his characteristic behaviour. But pluralism in itself cannot explain the ordered world in which to live; it cannot give us any clue to the understanding of the relationship which each ego or monad holds to the others. A study of nature gave him one clue. 'Contingency is inevitable' not only in human affairs, nor in animated nature only but in the psychical world as well. Yet there is a tendency to replace this mere contingency by a definite progression. As we rise higher in the scale of being, we find that there is greater and greater of guidance and direction. From this, Ward concludes that there is some relation between the monads. The lowest are most contingent while the higher are most purposive. From these suggestions Ward was led from pluralism

¹ *Lectures*, p. 99. See also pp. 147-48.

² For James Ward's philosophy, see the *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. 2, pp. 27-54 and *Ourselves and Reality*, Chap. X, by E. G. Braham.

to theism. There are monads higher than ourselves and above all there is the Supreme Monad—God. But Ward does not conceive God as severed from us. To him, He is one among many and not an Absolute including them all. The world is the joint product of these innumerable free agents mutually striving for the best *modus vivendi* and so fashioning a stable system analogous to a social order or state. Another anti-Hegelian tendency in Ward is that he stresses the reality of time and of the historic process. He believes in evolution not in the sense of unfolding what is already potential but as a creative synthesis in the spirit of Bergson, though he disagrees with Bergson in that he accepts the teleological character of Reality. "The final goal of evolution comes to sight, not as a pre-established harmony, but as the eventual consummation of a perfect commonwealth, wherein all co-operate and none conflict, wherein the many can become one, one realm of ends." But in this scheme where apparently the Supreme Monad is supreme, the individual is not relegated to an ordinary position. Ward holds that though God is the ground and creator of the world, yet in the creation of human beings He has created 'creators', possessing freedom and power of initiative. He has imposed limits on Himself. But this 'self-limitation of God means a living God with a living world, not a potter God with a world of illusory clay, not an inconceivable abstraction that is infinite and absolute because it is beyond everything and means nothing.'

From the above account it would be clear that Iqbal owed much to Ward besides others. But this

indebtedness in the field of philosophy is not looked upon as anything derogatory. Ward himself, in the account of his view of the world, admits that his attempt was clearly allied to that of Kant and Lotze.¹ Iqbal accepted Rumi as his spiritual guide because he found in him a poet of great genius expressing the same mystic philosophy. But above all, his attachment to Rumi was motivated because he had given expression to ideas which were advocated in modern times by Nietzsche, Bergson and James Ward. Nietzsche could not appeal to him thoroughly for his whole system was marred by his materialistic outlook. In the *Jawaid Nama*² Iqbal calls him Hallaj who had fearlessly proclaimed the old doctrine of *Anal-Haqq*, thereby advocating the assimilation of God into the human ego. Nietzsche, according to Iqbal, had this idea in mind when he identified his Superman with God. He became mad in the later part of his life but Iqbal thinks that his madness was not the result of any mental derangement. It was rather the expression of a mystic state known as *Jazb* (ecstasy).³ This state of Nietzsche required a perfect man (like Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind) who unfortunately could not be available to him in the West. Left unguided he lost the right path. His peculiar intellectual environment led him to think that his vision of the ultimate Ego could be realized in a world of space and time. What grows out of the inner depth of the heart of man he

¹ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Vol. 2, p. 54.

² Pp. 176—178.

³ Hallaj is also described by al-Hujwari as a follower of doctrine of *Sukr* (intoxication) on account of which Bayazid of Bistam refused to adopt him as his disciple.

proposed to create by an artificial biological experiment. He desired a unique combination of power and vision but due to his material outlook achieved only power without vision which could not be but destructive. Like Moses he wanted a vision of the ultimate Ego but reason is no guide in this sphere and so unfortunately he could not go beyond the Superman.¹ With Bergson he agreed to a great extent but he could not accept his dualism of thought and will. Moreover, he conceived ultimate Reality as an unconscious Will which was quite contrary to Iqbal's view. For him Reality is not only teleological but personal as well. His position is much more allied in this respect to Ward's theistic monadism which, he thinks, is compatible with the spirit of the Quran as well as with the best traditions of Muslim thought, especially as expounded by the incomparable Rumi and most of the Asharite thinkers.

نوع دیگر گفت آں حرف کہیں
بندۂ مجذوب را متجنون شمرد
صد خلل در واردات او افتاد
اختلاط قاہری با دلبری
ایں مقام از عقل و حکمت ماوراست
از مقام عبودہ بیگانہ رفت
نعرہ بے باکانہ زد: آدم کجاست
مثل موسیٰ طالب دیدار بود
تا رسیدے بر سرور سرمدے
(جاوید نامہ - صفحہ 176-178)

¹ باز ایں حلاج بے دار و رسن
ہم نشینی بوجذبۂ او پیے نبرد
راہ رو را کسی نشان از راہ نداد
خواست تا بیند بچشم ظاہری
آنچہ او جوید مقام کبریاست
او بہ لا در ماند و تا الا نرفت
چشم او جز رویت آدم نہ خواست
ورنہ او از خاکیاں بیزار بود
کاشی بودے در زمان احمدے

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF SELF

*Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.*

—TENNYSON.

We have seen above in the last section of the preceding chapter that self or ego occupies the central position in Iqbal's philosophy. The next question naturally arises : what do we mean by self ? How is it related to the human body and to the whole objective world ? What is its relation to the Supreme Being ? The problem of self is sufficiently important in its bearing not only on theoretical grounds for the metaphysician but also on account of its practical consequences : for a true appreciation of ourselves as members of a greater whole and as aspiring candidates for a future life, cannot be had without first understanding what self is. Hence naturally we find discussion of this problem almost in every age and in every country. Before, however, starting upon a short historical review it would be better if we give here, as briefly as possible, what we exactly mean by self. Self is a sort of system or unity of psychic experiences or activities. We may analyse our mental states, at any moment of our life, into certain elementary experiences but these experiences never exist in a vacuum ; they never float : they

are found as parts of an organic unity which, however, does not exist apart from its constituent states. The questions whether this unity is something above and beyond its contents, how these psychic activities are united, shall be treated in their proper place.

Beginning with Greek thinkers, we find that, according to Plato and Aristotle, ego is a substance to which our activities are referred, are related to it as qualities as whiteness, hardness, sweetness, for example, inhere in a certain way in material things. Again, just as a material substance is something above and beyond the attributes which it is said to possess, so the soul-substance is something above and beyond its experiences and activities. This substance, again, must remain unchanged, though its states are in a perpetual flux, in order to give us the basis of personal identity. It is also immaterial ; for its characteristic activity, *viz.*, thought, is by nature immaterial and can take cognisance of immaterial as well as material things, an activity which is incompatible with the nature of matter. Again, the soul is an absolute unity, and not a resultant of composite motions or beings. It is, therefore, a simple indivisible substance, and, as such, it is immortal, *i.e.*, it does not dissolve at the death of body but continues to exist in a disembodied state. With this we enter the sphere of faith which is beyond reason either to accept or to reject.

This theory of soul flourished during the Middle Ages in Europe and in Muslim thinkers like Ibn-i-Miskwaih¹ and Imam Ghazali.² In modern period Descartes, Locke and Berkeley also held the same theory

¹ *Ilm-ul-Kalam* by Maulana Shibli, pp. 134-141 (IV ed.)

² *Encyclopedia of Islam*, art. *Nafs*.

of soul-substance. It was Hume, the most consistent Empiricist, who first began to question its existence as a super-sensuous entity on psychological grounds. In one of his famous passages he says: "For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception . . . And were all my perceptions removed by death . . . I should be entirely annihilated."¹ This was the answer of Hume to those philosophers 'who imagine we are at every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self*; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.' But, as a matter of fact, Hume went in his introspective analysis too far. He failed to see the wood because of the trees. Surely from the purely analytical point of view, our experiences are nothing more than transient existents but considerations of other nature would have surely established, if he had cared to do, the nature of unity to which these experiences are related. Take, for instance, the human body which, according to modern physiology, is an apposite example of such a system. Every one of its constituents comes into being and then passes away and yet the human body as a system or organised totality endures. Not only that, this constant change of its constituent parts is essential for its proper function in response to its environment. Similar is the case with mental life. Surely its innumerable and diverse factors are transient—and so far

¹ *Treatise*, p. 252.

Hume was correct in his analysis—yet the totality that is formed by their combination is a *persistent system*. If Hume wanted this persistent unity to stand out before us as conspicuously as, for example, a mountain peak, at all times of our life whether asleep or awake, then surely such a unity cannot be discovered. But still there is such a unity though of a more subtle kind.

William James presents a similar theory of self. According to him, consciousness is a stream of thought which is constantly changing and consists of nothing but a sequence of changes, throughout which, however, there is a felt continuity. Just as the gregarious principle is at work in animal life, bringing them together in groups, so in consciousness the gregarious principle works. "Ideas have hooks in them." A certain 'warmth and immediacy' is the unifying process, and this special quality is possessed by past feelings, and on that account they are recognised as personal property. The question now is: How to explain this personal character of mental life? How can the train of thought explain the self which seems to own all its thoughts, and to be the centre of its feelings and desires, etc.? James admits that psychologically there is such a sense of personal identity but he rejects the theory of soul-substance as an explanation. Self, according to him, is a passing thought. The field of consciousness, at any moment, is given in its wholeness with feelings of relation and tendency and thus there appears to be no need of a unifying principle like the self. This field of consciousness includes in itself objects 'thought or felt, plus an attitude in regard to these objects, plus a sense of self to which this attitude

belongs.' The thinker is thought of as a postulate of the present thought. This thought which knows the preceding thought and finds it attractive by its 'warmth and intimacy' is the self. As every thought passes away it is taken up by a present one, which knows it, and transmits itself in turn to a successor. This trick of the present thought in appropriating the past constitutes the self. But this analysis of self is as unsatisfactory in explaining the persistent unity of self as it actually is, as was Hume's attempt. Consciousness is a presupposition of all mental life and not the effect of 'experiences reporting themselves to one another.' Again, the 'trick' of thought in appropriating the previous thought seems too much of a trick to be clearly intelligible.

Kant took up the problem quite independently of Hume. He did not deny the empirical unity of our consciousness. His sole concern was with the metaphysical problem of self as an immutable, simple and indivisible substance which he conclusively proved to be untenable. His first attack is against the form of theory as presented by Descartes. By means of his famous formula *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am), Descartes seems to prove the existence of a substantial soul to which all our processes of thinking belong. Because I think, doubt and image, therefore, this 'I' exists. But the reasoning is apparently fallacious. What is strictly logically proved is not that an immutable soul-substance exists but that the experiences of thinking, doubting, perceiving and imagining exist. To assert that there is a unity behind these experiences is to transcend the boundaries of logic. The *cogito* principle does not at all prove the reality of

self; it only proves the reality of process. Its truth cannot be logically demonstrated. The *ich denke* ('I think', cogito) is only a formal condition of all thinking; it is a form of thought recurring in every particular act of thought and nothing more and hence it is illegitimate, Kant showed, to transcend from a purely logical concept to an ontological substance, like soul. The second attack of Kant was directed against its alleged simplicity from which is inferred its indivisibility and hence its incorruptibility (or immortality). To this Kant retorts that if the pure ego were an indivisible substance, it may gradually disappear into nothingness in the same way as an intensive quality may disappear. Or, you may argue, that an indivisible substance might cease to exist all of a sudden. To argue from indivisibility to the indestructibility is cheating ourselves with mere words. This criticism of Kant, however, should not be misunderstood. He did not deny the existence of unity behind our experiences. What his arguments were intended to prove was that the existence of such a soul cannot be *logically* demonstrated by the sort of reasoning that was usually employed unless some evidence for its existence can be derived from the senses, internal or external.

Coming now to more recent times, we meet with writers of diverse schools holding important views about the subject as Bradley and McTaggart. Bradley's famous work, *Appearance and Reality*, is perhaps a unique example of logical consistency in the elucidation of metaphysical problems. Starting with the criterion that ultimate Reality must be free from contradiction, he applies the test ruthlessly. Primary and

Secondary qualities, Relation and Quantity, Space and Time, Motion and Change, Causation, Activity, Self, etc., disappear in rout and utter confusion. Reality is not to be found in any of these. Still what his ruthless logic has proved, he is willing to disbelieve. In the chapter on 'The Reality of Self', he says that 'one's own existence in some sense is an indubitable fact.'¹ In what sense? we may ask; but we get no answer. In the later editions of the book, we come across such utterances: "My whole view may be taken as based on the self . . . a self or system of selves is the highest thing that we have . . . I have contended that, starting from the self, we can advance to a positive result beyond it."² Similarly in his *Essays on Truth and Reality* Bradley seems to emphasise the indubitable reality of finite centres of experience. "Goodness, beauty and truth are all there is which in the end is real. Their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. But, in whatever world they appear, that world so far is real. And yet these eternal values owe their existence to finite wills, and it is, therefore, only each in our own world that we can come to possess them."³

Unlike Bradley, Dr. McTaggart accepts the Hegelian Dialectic as the most adequate method of grasping Reality and is the most consistent follower of Hegel in England. According to McTaggart all reality is Spirit and the Absolute Spirit is necessarily and eternally differentiated. Each differentiation, not being the whole, is finite—that is, determined by 'other

¹ Chap. X, pp. 89-104 (9th ed.)

² P. 497, Appendix, VIII. (9th ed.)

³ P. 469.

than self'. The totality of differentiations expresses the fundamental unity of the Absolute Idea. The only things capable of expressing this Absolute, according to him, are a society of selves, in perfect mutual relation with each other and with the whole. The Absolute is like a 'college of students', an eternal society of selves. But is it not conceivable that Absolute may consist of selves quite unlike ourselves? Are not the animals capable of being called its differentiations? The answer of McTaggart lies in Hegel's Dialectic. The category of life, to which the animals belong, is not sufficiently free from contradiction and needs further synthesis and therefore animals at this level do not partake of the nature of Absolute Spirit. It is only when we rise to the category of cognition (which includes the human consciousness) that the Absolute Spirit is adequately represented. The conclusion at which McTaggart arrives is that the Absolute must be differentiated into persons, because no other differentiation would have sufficient vitality to stand against the perfect Unity.

Self is finite. In other words, there is reality existing besides the self which determines it. But when we come to the question of distinguishing between 'self' and 'other than self', the difficulties arise and so McTaggart concludes that the nature of self is paradoxical. Yet in spite of these difficulties he affirms its reality in unequivocal terms. To him self is not a temporal reality (for, according to him, time is unreal), to be finally absorbed in the Absolute (as, *e.g.*, Bosanquet believed). Being actual differentiations of the Absolute, selves must be eternal and real. The universe is not an illusion, it is a system of

real selves which cannot be regarded as mere predicates or adjectives of the Absolute. Time being unreal, according to McTaggart, and self being an actual differentiation within the Absolute, the necessary conclusion follows that selves cannot change. This negation of change, however, for him, is not symptomatic of passivity ; it is rather an active point in an active whole. The Absolute is timeless and changeless and so are the selves which constitute it. Selves, therefore, for him do not begin, do not change and do not perish. There can be no substitution of a new self for a perished one. The separate individuality of each self cannot be regarded as transferable ; it would imply breach in the continuity of the Absolute. The selves are timeless and perfect and are substances. Is not this a departure from Hegel towards Spinoza? McTaggart is a staunch upholder of immortality for it follows from his premises. Selves are, by their very nature, immortal and before reaching the final state of an ideal timeless existence held together by the principle of love, may have passed through many lives.

Beginning as a true disciple of Hegel, he becomes a thorough defender of Spiritual pluralism of the Leibnitz type. The Absolute is not an individual but a unity. Love is that unity in which the particular individuals share, and which lives in them. This conclusion of itself brings out clearly that, according to McTaggart, human reason is not sufficiently endowed to realize the relationship among selves on the one hand and their relation to the Absolute on the other. Mystic intuition, for him, takes the place of intellectualism. Of the three fundamental

theses of religion—God, free-will and immortality—McTaggart rejects the first two and defends the last with real warmth and passion. But his arguments in defence of self as elementally immortal are too strained. From the mere fact that the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute, it by no means follows that, even in its finitude, the human self retains the character which belongs to its source alone. Its being a differentiation gives it only a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself. Man, according to Iqbal, is a candidate for immortal life which demands a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego.

Coming now to Muslim thinkers, we find that, according to the Asharite school of Mutakallimin, the world consists of infinitely small atoms (*Jawahir*) which cannot be further divided. The number of these atoms is not finite: fresh atoms are constantly being created by God. To them there is a single order of atoms: what we call the soul is either a finer kind of matter or only an accident. This purely materialistic view, however, did not gain any popular support and remained confined within a limited circle. But strangely enough we find this view echoed in al-Hujwari's *Kashful-Mahjub*, where, under one of the unorthodox sects of the sufis, he deals with the question of soul. He enumerates several views about *Ruh* (soul) which he rejects as defective. (a) It is the source of life whereby the body lives. This view reduces soul to a mere accident. (b) It is not the source of life yet life does not exist apart from it: they are inseparable. This view also reduces it to the position of a mere accident. In contrast to these two

views Hujwari approves the following opinion about soul which, as he says, is held by mystics. Soul is a substance and not an attribute. It is deposited in the body and may be separated from it as in sleep. It is a *subtle body* which comes and goes by the command of God. It is *corporeal* and hence visible though only to the eye of the heart.¹

Hallaj (244-309 A.H.) strikes quite a different note in his view about soul. Most of his works have been collected and published by M. Massignon, a study of which opens a new vista of his teachings. He seems to be fully conversant with different schools of Greek philosophy as well as with the Syriac literature embodying the religious doctrines of several Christian heterodox sects. Hallaj made use of the verse of the Quran where the problem of soul is briefly mentioned.² He developed the tentative view presented here into a more elaborate theory about creation and nature of man, using terms, which have been traced to Syrian Christian literature, *Lahut* and *Nasut*, corresponding to the World of Command and the World of Space (*Alam-i-Amr* and *Alam-i-Khalq*). He says: "God created an image of Himself with all His Attributes and Names. This image was Adam whom God glorified and exalted. Glory to God who manifested his *Nasut* wherein lay the brilliant light of His *Lahut*." From this account it clearly appears that Hallaj regarded man as consisting of two elements, the divine and the human. The mystics are almost unanimous in accepting this account of human

¹ *Kashful-Mahjub*, pp. 24-5 (Lahore ed.)

² "They ask thee concerning the soul. Say: The soul proceeds from the Command (*Amr*) of my Lord." (17 : 89)

"For Him is the Creation and Command." (*Amr*)

nature. The Quranic verse (15 : 29) where it is said that God, after creating man, breathed into him of His Spirit, is brought as an authority for this. But he went much beyond the implication of this verse. He held that these two elements, under certain mystic conditions, can become united and herein he seems to be definitely influenced by the Christian doctrine of Incarnation.¹

But the most important contribution of Hallaj was his famous cry of *Anal-Haqq* (I am the Creative Truth). His contemporaries and most of his successors (cf. *Tadhkira* of Attar) interpreted it in a pantheistic sense, though modern research has proved beyond doubt that he was no pantheist. He admitted creation *ex nihilo* and dwelt on the theme of personal relationship with the Lord which no consistent pantheist can hold. "The true interpretation of his experience, therefore," in the words of Iqbal, "is not the drop slipping into the sea, but the realization and bold affirmation in an undying phrase of the reality and permanence of the human ego in a profounder personality." His *Anal-Haqq* was thrown as a challenge to the whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was moving in a direction which tended to obscure the reality and destiny of the human ego. It was this divine aspect of the human ego, the *Lahut* in the words of Hallaj, that was obscured in the dry discussions of the Mutakallimin and Hallaj by emphasising it—though he was here following in the true spirit of the Quranic teaching about it—paid by his life.²

¹ *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhiyud-din-Ibnul Arabi*, pp. 13-15; p. 79 (footnote.)

² In the *Jawaid Nama* (p. 143) Iqbal expresses this idea through

All great mystic thinkers that came after him were greatly influenced by his ideas. Imam Ghazali (450-505 A.H.), *e.g.*, accepts Hallaj's division into *Lahut* and *Nasut* and emphasises in his discussion about *Ruh* its spiritual aspect which has heart (*Qalb*) as its source or locus. By 'heart' he does not mean the piece of flesh situated on the left of our bodies. It, on the other hand, belongs to the invisible world. Soul, according to him, is an individual essence belonging to the world of Command and not to the world of Creation.

On the basis of the Quranic verse (17 : 85) and its interpretation by the eminent mystic thinkers, Iqbal has formulated the basic conception of his system. He says : "The verse means that the essential nature of the soul is directive, as it proceeds from the directive energy of God The personal pronoun used in the expression *Rabbi* (My Lord) throws further light on the nature and behaviour of the ego. It is meant to suggest that the soul must be taken as something individual and specific, with all the variations in the range, balance and effectiveness of its unity. 'Every man acteth after his own manner : but your Lord well knoweth who is best guided in his path.' (17 : 86) Thus my real personality is not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, and held

the mouth of Hallaj :

بود اندر سینۀ من بانگ صور	ملته دیدم که دارد قصد گور
مومنان با خوئے و بوئے کافران	لا اله گویان و از خود منکراں
'امر حق' گفتند نقشی باطل است	زانکه او وابسته آب و گل است
من بخود افروختم نار حیات	مرده را گفتم ز اسرار حیات

together by the unity of a directive purpose . . .”¹

How does the ego as a unified system originate? Ribot in his work *The Diseases of Personality* suggests that the life of the ego is developed from the basis of the physical organism which, with its reflex arcs and other complex elements, begins to react to environment through the five senses and thus slowly builds up a systematic unity of experiences. But the problem of origins has often in the past misled thinkers. They have confused the origin of a thing with its present developed form.² It is one thing to say that human civilization developed out of the early attempts of our barbaric ancestors to form themselves into social groups and it is quite another thing to identify the present achievements of men with their original forms. Though such an apparently misleading view had been prevalent for a long time during the last century, it is now no longer held on scientific grounds with the appearance of what is called Emergent Evolution. If soul-life emerges from a physical level, it does not follow that the new emergent can be adequately explained in term of the physical; as soon as psychical life emerges in undifferentiated feeling in the organism, it is an entirely new thing. What makes the emergent emerge? Bergson would reply: the vital urge, non-mechanical, non-teleological. But, perhaps, Theism affords a comparatively better solution. According to it

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 143-44.

² حیران ہے بوعلی کہ میں آیا کہاں سے ہوں
رومی یہ سوچتا ہے کہ جاؤں کدھر کو میں ! (بال جبریل-199)
خردمندوں سے کیا پوچھوں، کہ میری ابتدا کیا ہے
کہ میں اس فکر میں رہتا ہوں، میری انتہا کیا ہے ! (ایضاً-81)

God is not only transcendent but also the immanent force which constantly produces or creates new emergents within the spatio-temporal order. Iqbal accepts this view and brings the Quranic testimony in support of it. "Verily We created man from a product of wet earth ; then placed him as a drop (of seed) in a safe lodging, then fashioned We the drop a clot, then fashioned We the clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones with flesh, *and then produced it as another creation*. So blessed be Allah, the best of Creators."¹ The life of ego had a physical basis and yet somehow God managed to produce a new emergent out of it, a creation of a new type altogether, qualitatively different from its original form.

The next important problem is: what are the contents of self? The data of psychology are our conscious experiences which, since the time of Kant, have been distinguished into cognition (awareness), feeling and endeavour. The common characteristic of all these is that they are all modes of reference to an object. This characteristic may be apparent in the case of cognition where we are said to know an object, judge it, doubt or believe it. In the case of feeling and endeavour, it has been often contended that they do not possess this characteristic. May there not be a blind striving? But introspective analysis of consciousness proves the falsity of this contention. Striving implies a prospective attitude: we will and endeavour to do something. Similarly our feelings of love, hate or desire imply a clear reference to an object. Feeling means being consciously affected by

¹ The Quran, 23 : 12-14.

an object. This argument will show clearly that cognition is adynamic in its nature; it does not seek to change its object: otherwise it would defeat its own purpose. In order to know an object, it is essential that it should remain unchanged. Feeling and endeavour, on the other hand, are dynamic, though each in a different way. Feeling is passive: here the subject is affected by the object while endeavour is active: here the object is affected by the subject. But it should be clearly realised that these three aspects are not isolated and unrelated, though they may be distinct. Each has its part to play in the economy of self and all are essential and complementary. Their intimate relationship can be expressed by the principle that endeavour is guided by cognition and prompted by feeling. If we just look at any cross-section of the life of self we shall clearly perceive a plurality of these experiences, fused, related and blended together in a unity. It is possible that at any particular moment in the life of an individual one of these experiences may predominate; but we are sure to find the others equally present. In a person engaged in solving a mathematical problem we may detect the cognitive attitude as the most dominant yet further analysis will reveal that the affective attitude (as, *e.g.*, in his experiences of suspense, pleasure at his success or pain at his failure, joy at the resultant effect on his fame etc.,) and the conative attitude (as, for example, his determination to do a work) are clearly, though less distinctly, present. Thus it is evident that at every moment of our conscious life, we find in any cross-section of the life of self, not a mere random collection of units, but very intimate connection of

different conscious experiences according to the principle above enunciated. Besides this togetherness and unity we also find that they are continuous and develop along a particular line in a certain relation. This togetherness and continuity of experiences is what we mean when we use the word 'I', self or ego.

The cognitive aspect of our conscious life, as every student of psychology would be aware, begins with perception and imagination and ends in the formation of concepts and general ideas. After this comes the stage when, with the help of percepts and concepts, one is able to infer and reason according to the well-known deductive or inductive type. When this stage of development is reached, systems of beliefs are formed which play a great part in the growth of personality. For the stability of personality, however, it is essential that these systems of belief should be organised into a coherent philosophy of life and more free these systems are from the tension caused by doubt the more stable correspondingly would be the personality. Ordinarily our life is so loosely organised that several contradictory systems of belief may exist side by side in a single individual. People differ among themselves due to the varying degrees of stability of their personality. There are some who go through life with no organised system of convictions while in others, one of them is quite at variance with the other. On the other hand there are people who have reached a stage of development where we meet a thoroughly integrated system of beliefs and their philosophy of life is woven into a sentiment. A sentiment may be defined as an organisation of

affective dispositions in relation to an object, so that various conative trends are modified in relation to this object. The object may be anything, animate or inanimate, concrete or abstract. We may illustrate the working of a sentiment by reference to love which will clearly show how the dispositions are organised. Self-abasement is felt in the presence of the loved object ; self-assertion at having won such a prize ; fear is felt lest it may be endangered ; anger against any approach of interference with our relationship to it ; tender emotion is felt in a desire to cherish and protect it ; curiosity to find out all about it in a comprehensive way. If the object of love is a person, male or female, the lover is open to suggestion from him or her and tries to imitate the beloved in all his or her actions, essential or inessential. A still higher stage is reached with the development of self-consciousness when a strong and enduring sentiment is formed round the idea of self which McDougall calls self-regarding sentiment.¹ The union of self-regarding sentiment with the philosophy of life results in the emergence of the complete personality where its extraordinary consistency and integrity enables its possessor to resist the common temptations of life which to most of us would be irresistible. Once this stage is reached, there will be left no dissentient voice, no danger of any impulse breaking loose ; all the 'lower' instincts will be subjected and assigned their place within its formal structure ; they will function as the good subordinates towards the end.

But this highest stage of personality may be

¹ McDougall : *Outlines of Psychology and Social Psychology*. This is exactly what Iqbal means by the term *Khudi*.

good as well as bad. It will all depend on the nature of the philosophy of life, the pattern, according to which individual behaviour is determined, which one adopts. The adoption and selection of a particular philosophy of life by an individual will be of great consequence to the people in general. Nobody can deny the presence of a highly integrated and organised personality in, *e.g.*, Confucius or Chengiz Khan but the philosophy of life adopted by the two was at variance with each other with different consequences to the world. All geniuses are men of high personalities in the sense of possessing a coherent system of beliefs but their ultimate social value depends upon the *nature* of beliefs that they accept as their guide. A great prophet, a great reformer—religious, political or social—a great artist, musician, poet or painter, a master-mind in the practice of criminology in all its various categories and a tyrant, would be, psychologically speaking, at the same level of development as regards the fixity of purpose, organisation of character and brilliance in the execution of their plan. The whole pivot of a healthy personality, thus, revolves round the nature of the philosophy of life accepted by each one of them.

Before dealing, however, with this practical aspect of self's development, which Iqbal has expounded in the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, it would be essential to touch briefly on a few other relevant problems essential for a complete comprehension of the meaning and significance of self. The first of these is the famous doctrine of the relation of body and mind. In modern philosophy this problem arose with the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind. Starting

with matter and mind as abstract terms, Descartes defined matter as essentially extension and mind as essentially thought (or consciousness). This beginning was in itself vicious for it started with an unreal separation and so of necessity ended in an unbridgable gulf between the two. The immediate successors of Descartes had to resolve this dilemma. Our common-sense reveals that body and mind are intimately related. Our minds gain knowledge of the physical objects, because these objects act on our bodies and correspondingly our minds act on physical objects through the voluntary movements of our bodies. Our minds seem to be intimately related to certain parts of our bodies, namely, our brain and nervous system. With their growth or decay, our minds seem to develop or decline; if they are injured through some accident or disease, mind may be correspondingly deprived of memory or self-control. Thus we see that our bodies act on our minds when, *e.g.*, a pin is pricked into our bodies, and a painful sensation results; and, on the other hand, our minds act on our bodies when, *e.g.*, a desire to move our legs occurs in our minds, and the movement generally follows in our bodies. Such a plain fact would be apparently incontrovertible and yet several thinkers have seen reasons to deny it on philosophical grounds. One of these attempts was due to the Cartesian inheritance of dualism and from this arose the theory of parallelism which says that events in brain correspond to events in mind and conversely, without any sort of relation subsisting between the two. But such a theory would reduce human soul to a mere passive spectator of the happenings of the body. The parallelist hypothesis is based

on the contention that mental events cannot be the cause of the physical events: physical processes can and should be explained by physical processes alone. This principle is the well-known doctrine of mechanism which was once regarded as the fundamental basis of physical science. But modern biological researches have totally rejected its applicability to the explanation of living organisms and even recent tendencies in physics itself seem to look askance at it. Human behaviour cannot be adequately explained by merely physical or physiological processes. So long as we fail to take into consideration the motives and the purposes, human conduct remains a mystery. It is just this element of purpose, the teleological factor in our behaviour, which the parallelist hypothesis ignores.

In view of these considerations, modern psychologists are inclined towards the common-sense view of interactionism. But one of the objections against this doctrine is based on the scientific principle of Conservation of Energy which is applicable to what is called a conservative system. A conservative system is one whose total energy is redistributed but not altered in amount, by changes that happen in it. It is contended that if mind is believed to act on body, it will lead to an increase in the total amount of energy in the conservative system of the body. Besides other objections which can be brought against this criticism, an enumeration of which will lead us into much more technical discussions, it may be said that it is just possible that the action of mind may be only directive. All that the principle of conservation of energy demands is that if mind acts on body, it must act in a way that

the energy should not be increased. It does not rule out the possibility of interaction: it may be said to rule out only that form of interaction which may lead to the increase or decrease of energy. Mind may have only directive influence; that is, it may influence my body in so far as it directs energy in a particular channel. My hand has the capacity to move; but it is my mind which directs the particular form of movement, whether I shall put it in my pocket or write something on the blackboard.

We have seen above that the life of the ego develops from the basis of the physical organism which begins to react to environment. The ego begins at this low level and at this stage it appears to be subordinate to body. As evolution proceeds, this situation is changed and gradually mind snatches from the body its dominance. In animals, lower or higher, the ruling partner is the body and its impulses, the mind being subordinate to its ends. But in human beings, on the other hand, the body is totally under the control and guidance of mind and the evolution of civilization from the state of barbarism is a clear testimony of this fact. From this it naturally follows that as the evolution will further proceed our minds may be able to shake off the limitations imposed upon it by body and thus the ego may become more independently organised. On the basis of this argument it can be safely asserted that the self, as it gradually attains to higher stages of development, may ultimately become capable of functioning apart from body. There is another point of view from which this problem may be approached. According to this view, matter and mind are not two distinct ultimate units which need to be brought to-

gether. They belong to the same category of being ; two faces of the same coin. Iqbal thinks that, according to the teaching of the Quran, they do belong to the same system. "To Him belong *khalq* (creation) and *amr* (direction)". It is just possible that they may have a common origin. Leibnitz, for instance, held that all reality is mental, that what we call matter simply consists of psychical centres of a low order. Similarly James Ward views that the subordinate monads which compose the body, are themselves 'mind'. Such a view is essential for any form of spiritual pluralism which Iqbal accepts, as the most plausible theory consistent with the best traditions of Muslim thought. Matter, according to Iqbal, is 'a colony of egos of a low order out of which emerge finite life and consciousness of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of complexity.... Nor is there such a thing as a purely physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality, elementally incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind and needing a transcendental Deity to impregnate it with the sentient and the mental.'¹

The second important problem before us is the relation of self to its environment, the external world.

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 147-148. In the *Zabur-i-Ajam* (pp. 216-17) he refers to this problem and thinks that the cause of frustration in western life is really due to this initial metaphysical mistake of her thinkers which gradually led them to bifurcate life in all its departments.

تن و جاں را دوتا گفتن کلام است	تن و جاں را دوتا دیدن حرام است
بتجارت پوشیده رمز کائنات است	بدن حالے ز احوال حیات است
بدن را تا فرنگ از جاں جدا دید	نگاهش ملک و دیں را ہم دوتا دید
بہ کار حاکمی مکر و فتنے یی	تن ہے جان و جان ہے تنے یی

Before coming directly to the question of this relation, it would be better if we first take up the problem of the nature of the physical universe. What is the physical object, for example, which we get to know in our act of perception? A definite answer to such a plain question, however, is sufficiently difficult: for it will involve us into intricacies too technical to be touched upon here. For the purpose of clearness we may here give just a summary account of the views of the two rival schools of thought, holding quite opposite views, *viz.*, Realism and Idealism. Ignoring the different sects into which Realists have been split up in the face of strong opposition and criticism against their view, we may say roughly that, according to them, the world apprehended in sense-perception is independent of the knower, that it has laws of its own and that its being perceived does not in any way affect its reality. Criticism has been urged against the ambiguous usage of the term 'independent'. Moreover they have not been able to solve satisfactorily the existence of error and illusion. To the Idealists, Bradley and his followers, *e.g.*, the external world is experience. But whose experience? To this they reply that it is not the experience of any particular individual but of the Absolute. But who can vouchsafe the validity of such a fact?

The failure of these attempts at explanation is mainly due to the wrong method of approach adopted. All distinctly philosophical problems have ultimate solution in the self but unfortunately it is this very 'self' which was and is still ignored. Every possible substitute for it as the explaining principle has been utilized and tested but of no avail. Another hindrance

in appreciating the true place of self in unravelling the problems of life has been the strong but wrong conviction that human reason must find solution of life's mystery in rational categories, in terms of thought. As all thought is abstract, it can at best arrive at some such comprehensive abstracts as force, system, experience or Absolute. History of philosophy reveals the constant but vain attempts of generations of thinkers trying to present world-views by accepting one or other of these abstract ideas as the basic principle of explanation. Some believe in force, conscious or unconscious; others in a pure self-regulative mechanism, while still others accept experience itself, all-inclusive and perfectly exemplifying the law of consistency, to be the key to nature's secret. All these suggestions (or you may multiply several others) are accepted and worked out by thinkers, who, for some reason or other, refuse to accept self as a starting point in their investigations. If, however, we take our first step with it, all our difficulties seem to evaporate. The external world is a world of physical things which have their reality in being the concrete responses of the mind to stimulations. They are what mind interprets the stimulations to be. They exist only because the mind attends, because it is interested, because it evaluates. Realism fails because it refuses to recognise the essential dynamic relation between the self and the source of stimulations whereby the objective world is seen to be their joint product. The view that external reality is value brings it within the human realm and makes it throughout the expression of selfhood. The material world is viewed no longer as something alien and antithetical to spirit, but as of

the very essence of spiritual activity. Nature as the expression of selfhood is seen to be the instrument of self-realization. As value, the objective world exists only for an evaluator. This points, on the one hand, to the creative activity of the self who evaluates and, on the other, to the co-operative activity of a Supreme Power, distinct from both the self and the world of values, yet vitally concerned in both.

This aspect of Iqbal's philosophy has much in common with the teaching of the German thinker, Fichte, who was a sort of a national and puritan reformer. Unlike Nietzsche he was a staunch believer in God and morality. His system of philosophy arose out of his criticism of Kant's analysis of our process of knowing which he looked upon as a construction of mind's activity in relation to an element which is quite alien to it, called thing-in-itself. Fichte rejects this alien element and is thus left with the knowing mind alone, the self. His first step thus is that the ego posits itself, *i.e.*, there must be a self that knows. But the process of knowledge requires that there must be something to be known and so the second step is that the ego posits non-ego. But this non-ego which the ego contemplates and which is necessary to make knowledge possible, is not something alien to the ego : its source is self itself. This not-self is posited by self in order to make evolution possible through moral struggle and achievement. Read the following few verses from the *Asrar-i-Khudi* :

The form of existence is an effect of the self,
Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the self.
When the self awoke to consciousness,
It revealed the universe of Thought.

A hundred worlds are hidden in its essence :
 Self-affirmation brings Not-self to light.
 By the Self the seed of opposition is sown in the
 world :

It imagines itself to be other than itself.
 It makes from itself the forms of others, in order
 to multiply the pleasures of strife.¹

It has often been alleged by certain religious thinkers as well as philosophers that nature is through and through inimical to man and therefore it must be our duty to escape it in order to save our spirit. It may have been the truth in the very early stages of human life on this earth when Nature appeared to man as standing against him, superior in power, capable of crushing him or his dear ones. His deification of different aspects of it was one of the ingenious ways to overcome this inherent conflict. By magic these people tried to control the mysteries of existence. They sought the mastery of nature but were chiefly conscious of dread powers, of cataclysm and disease, before which they could offer only ineffectual incantations. This situation gave rise, in due course, to one of the most pernicious ideas in the history of thought, *viz.*, the conception of eternal conflict between light and darkness, between spirit and matter and in certain cases it seems to affect even the supremacy of God Himself. The first noteworthy movement which accepted this

¹ ll. 187-196 (Eng. translation).

پیکر هستی ز آثار خودی است هر چه می بینی ز اسرار خودی است
 خویشتن را چون خودی بیدار کرد آشکارا عالم پندار کرد
 صد جهان پوشیده اندر ذات او غیر او پیداست از اثبات او
 در جهان تنخم خصومت کاشت است خویشتن را غیر خود پنداشت است
 سازد از خود پیکر اغیار را تا فراید لذت پیکار را

doctrine was Manichaenism, so-called after its founder, Mani. Strangely enough this movement spread not only in Persia and Central Asia but also in Eastern Europe where it greatly influenced Christian thought. This influence was first distinctly noticeable, in the field of philosophy, in Descartes' teaching of sharp dualism between matter and mind and, in the field of religion, when Christianity began to preach and recommend renunciation of this world for the sake of the next, to do away with matter (or flesh) for the salvation of spirit. This alleged incompatibility between the demands of matter and the demands of spirit, having once acquired religious sanction, gave rise to undesirable consequences in social and political life. The sharp distinction that is often emphasised between secular and religious, the position of religion as one's private affair, having no bearing on one's social, economic or political attitude, the complete separation of state from church, are some of the results of this unhealthy notion.¹

Such a harmful tendency towards disruption and ultimate destruction of what humanity had achieved in its long march of evolution, was once and for all stopped by Islam. One of the main purposes of the Quran is to awaken in man the consciousness of his true relation to the universe. According to Christianity the spiritual element of our life can be developed, not through the world external to the soul of man, but

¹ کلیسا کی بنیاد رهبانیت تھی سماتی کہاں اس فقیری میں میری
سیاست نے مذہب سے پیچھا چھڑایا چلی کچھ نہ پیر کلیسا کی پیری
ہوئی دین و دولت میں جسدِ جدائی ہوس کی امیری، ہوس کی وزیری
دوئی، ملک و دین کے لئے نامرادی دوئی، چشم تہذیب کی نابصیری
(بال جبریل - صفحہ 160)

by the revelation of a new world within one's self. Islam, however, while accepting this truth, goes further and asserts that this new world revealed from within is nothing foreign to the world of matter. Thus true self-development, according to Islam, would come not by renunciation but through a proper adjustment of man's relations to the external world in the light of inspiration received from the inner world. "Matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call the external world. It is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting . . . The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. . . There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit."¹ In other words, the material world is a field where the battle for the integration of self and its evolution is to be fought and won. The Quran explicitly and in numerous contexts refers its readers to a reflective study of Nature as one of the sources of knowledge. The inherent capacity of man to acquire knowledge in pursuit of his ends was insisted upon with the sole purpose that, once acquired, knowledge places man on a high pedestal over other creatures and enables him to control the forces of nature. The physical universe is capable of being completely subjugated by man provided he reflects and thus discover the means of realizing his conquest of

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 216-217.

nature as an actual fact.¹ Man is conceived by the Quran as the ever-developing spirit who, in his evolution towards the destined goal, progresses from one state to another. "Oh, I swear by the afterglow of sunset, and by the night and all that it enshroudeth, and by the moon when she is at the full, that ye shall journey on from plane to plane."² It is the lot of man to share in the deeper aspirations of the universe around him and to shape his own destiny as well as that of the universe, now by adjusting himself to its forces, now by putting the whole of his energy to mould its forces to his own ends and purposes. And in this process of progressive change God becomes a co-worker with him, provided man takes the initiative. "Verily God will not change the condition of men, till they change what is in themselves."³

The evolution of the human self, therefore, depends not upon turning its back to the material world, but by establishing a proper relationship with it and it is only through knowledge that this adjustment can be achieved. Knowledge is power is a common maxim but its deeper significance may have been little grasped. Knowledge fully assimilated means concentration of purpose and consequent integration of character.⁴ Man endowed with such a strong and powerful weapon is able to dominate his physical environ-

¹ The Quran : "See you not how Allah hath made serviceable unto you whatsoever is in the skies and whatsoever is in the earth and hath loaded you with His favours both without and within ?" (31 : 20). See also 16 : 12-15.

² The Quran, 84 : 16-19.

³ The Quran, 13 : 12. See *Lectures*, p. 16.

⁴ علم را بر تن زنی، مارے بود علم را بر جاں زنی، یارے بود

It is a line of Rumi which Iqbal quotes in *Bal-i-Jibril* (p.180) and in *Asrar-i-Khudi* (p. 111).

ment.¹ The sense-world begins in a welter of incipient experiences ; they are not yet an ordered world. Out of the chaos, the self constructs a more or less articulated cosmos. It is the self which by fixating, selecting, modifying, arranging, imposes order upon its world. The result is science in all its glory, science, the expression of man's constant endeavour to know and to master. One of the ways by which self seeks to overcome the hindrances in its way is the invention of instruments out of itself like senses and intellect etc. In Schopenhauer's philosophy we come across such an idea when he says that the body is the will made visible or objectified. The several organs of the body correspond to the principal desires through which the will manifests itself ; they must be the visible manifestation of these desires. Teeth, throat and bowels are objectified hunger ; the organs of generation are objectified sexual desire. The tiger's teeth and claws manifest his will to live by predation. Such an account has many similarities with the theory of evolution as advocated by Lamarck : function is first and structure is afterwards. The goat and the bull do not butt because they possess horns ; they have horns because they butt. Iqbal expresses the same idea in the most beautiful way. "What is the source of our wakeful eye ? Our delight in seeing hath taken visible shape. The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait, the nightingale's beak from its endeavour to sing . . . What

¹ ما سوا از بهر تسخیر است و بس سینه او عرضه تیر است و بس
 نائب حق در جهان آدم شود بر عناصر حکم او متحکم شود
 جستجو را متحکم از تدبیر کن انفس و آفاق را تسخیر کن
 (رموز بیهودی - صفحه 90-95)

is the essence of the mind that strives after new discoveries and scales the heavens? It is desire (will) that enriches Life . . . What are social organisations, customs and laws? What is the secret of the novelties of science? A desire which realized itself by its own strength and burst forth from heart and took shape. Nose, hand, brain, eye and ear, thought, imagination, feeling, memory and understanding—all these are weapons devised by life for self-preservation in its ceaseless struggle.”¹

As expressed in the Quran² in reference to the point raised by the angels as to their superiority over Adam, God establishes his greater worth by referring to his capacity for naming things. It means that man is endowed with forming concepts of things. To form concept is to ‘grasp’ them in the literal sense of the term grasp. With this weapon of ideational capacity of mind, of the ability to form images and ideas, and to weave the latter into trains of thought, man approaches the observable aspect of Reality. The greater is his capacity, the greater is his control and dominance of the environment. One misunderstanding should be cleared here. It may be asserted that ideation, thought, intellect, or intelligence are only abstract. But, as a matter of fact, these purely intellectual attributes of mind are always and inseparably related to action. The more fully developed are these attributes, the more properly effective will be our practical activity. Bergson also has emphasised the practical nature of intelligence. Intellect, according to him, is a tool and as such subordinate to activity ; we think in order to

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II, 289-305 (Eng. translation.)

² 2 : 28-31.

live, not live that we may think. It is this ideational capacity of human mind, therefore, that enables the self to become conscious of its environment in a systematic way ; it is thought that not only affects direct contact with reality but also achieves this contact on an ever-widening scale that has, in principle, no limits. It is this power of man that makes him dominate his environment.

From the evolutionary point, it is admitted by all that mind is a later product than matter ; that the material world serves both as the basis and as the environment of consciousness. Again, the essence of self, as we have argued so far, consists in its dominance equally over lower forms of psychical experiences and over matter. In view of these two facts it is clear that we must accept the concept of degrees of reality and value and as such we are bound to accord to self a high status of reality and value. Its capacity for dominance is of such a nature that it is impossible to conceive of any limit to its expansion.

In this connection it must be also noted that the relation of self to its environment which we have so far designated as domination, is mutual. While the self consciously and deliberately dominates over the external world, environment also brings about a corresponding continuous transformation of the dominating self. It changes definitely, permanently and often profoundly, simply because it merges itself more and more into its environment. This merging, however, is never to be interpreted as merely passive ; it is not like the slow dissolution of a rock into a quagmire but like the absorption of an artist in his work, where he is able not only to remain himself but actually

express himself more and more fully. Thus the increasing dominance of the self over its environment involves the continuous advance of self in the degree of its value and reality. Dominance and expansion are not to be regarded as two distinct processes that are somehow or other brought together, but rather two aspects of the same process. As expressed in terms of relation of self to its environment, it is the increasing dominance of self ; in relation to itself, it becomes its continuous rise in importance in value and reality.

Human knowledge, in the form of modern science, has helped us in acquiring control over our physical environment to a degree never achieved before. By the discovery of uniformity in the process of nature, science helped man in emancipating him from bondage to a life of superstition and false gods. As such it has fulfilled to a great extent the negative aspect of Islam's doctrine of *Tauhid*.¹ But it stopped short of its further development and did not like to pass over from the negative to the positive attitude and herein lies the whole tragedy of modern life. Confining himself to the object of domination, the modern scientific man has totally ignored the development of other aspects of his life. There is no room in it for our moral and religious aspirations. Being totally immersed in the current of the stream, it is hardly possible for an average man to form any clear and definite vision about the future course of the present tendencies. But anyone wishing to be illumined on this point had

¹ لبالب شیشہ تہذیب حاضر ہے، مٹے لا سے

مگر ساقی کے ہاتھوں میں نہیں پیمانہ الا

(بال جبریل - صفحہ 39)

better look back on the history of other cultures that flourished on the face of the earth and came to an end due to certain prepossessions that were one-sided. The Greek naturalism, that æsthetic sensitiveness to nature which gave to the world unparalleled artistic achievements, grew strong and powerful from an unbounded individualism which rendered the preservation of these very treasures of genius impossible: there was lacking the universality needed to pass on the fruit of labours so strenuously won. It succeeded and it failed by virtue of excess. Again, in the Middle Ages, the scholastic thought attempted to achieve a universal application but failed by its assumed completeness. It acquired this completeness not by insight but by leaving out the world of objectivity. There is a similar lack of balance in the attitude of the modern man. As the Greeks sought in Naturalism the best field of expression for the aspiration of man to the neglect of the social, as medievalism sought it in the spiritual to the neglect of the intellectual, as scholasticism sought it in the spiritual to the neglect of the material, so our age is seeking complete expression in the material by ignoring both the moral and the spiritual. The consequences of this one-sidedness are bound to appear as they inevitably did in other cases. There is no doubt that the splendours of this age will rank alongside, or rather superior to, the splendour of Greek Art, of the thought-systems of scholasticism, of Roman, Egyptian, Persian and Chinese cultures, but it will similarly be outlived, because of one-sidedness. Our mastery over nature, in the absence of moral and spiritual development in consonance with that mastery, constitutes the most powerful menace to the future

existence of the human race. Those who are living through the horrors of the present war and witness or hear the destruction of values that were attained after years of human labour and search, can best realize the gravity of the situation. All this has been the inevitable consequence of our short-sightedness as to the true function of science in the scheme of human life. Iqbal, years ago, gave expression to his conviction that modern culture, being built on sand, is bound to fall.¹ The situation can only be saved if we are willing to give allowance to the exercise of moral and spiritual ideals.² But will the modern man be able to do it? Future alone can say whether it will be or not: but as far as one can see, there is little hope for that. It is against this aspect of modern science and its consequences as manifested in modern life that Iqbal raised his voice of denunciation in the strongest terms possible. His protests against nationalism and internationalism, socialism and capitalism, democracy and its allied institutions, all of which equally suffer from a lack of proper appreciation of human needs and aspirations, arise from Iqbal's true and deep insight which he inherited from Islam, the only religion that sought to bring about harmony between the apparently opposite

¹ پیپر میٹخانہ یہ کہتا ہے کہ ایوان فرنگ

سست بنیاد بجلی ہے، آئینہ دیوار بجلی ہے

(بال جبریل - صفحہ 94)

² دل اگر بندد بہ حق پیغمبری است
 علم را بے سوز دل خوانی، شر است
 نور او تاریکی بہر ویر است
 لذت شب بخون ویلغارے ازوست
 سینهٔ افرونگ را نارے ازوست
 علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیاں
 علم با عشق است از لاهوتیاں
 (جاوید نامہ - صفحہ 82-83)

and contradictory demands of matter and spirit. The act of mind must be supplemented by the act of heart. The modern scientific observer of nature is exclusively busy with the act of mind and neglects to look after his 'heart': the first gives rise to power, dominance and control while the second gives rise to a beautiful vision of the total infinite which philosophy seeks but cannot find. A culture that is based on the synthesis of these two elements can alone aspire to survive.

قاهری ہے دلبری جادوگری است قاهری با دلبری پیغمبری است

Power without 'vision' is magic while with 'vision' it becomes prophetic, *i.e.*, creator of new values and culture.

To come back to our subject, we have concluded that nature is not alien to spirit, that therefore in order to realize our destined goal of self-development, it is not necessary to say 'no' to our physical environment, that the greater is our capacity for dominance over it, the greater will be the chance of self-integration. This course of action, however, involves great struggle on the part of the individual. We meet on every hand resistance to be overcome, forces to be subdued, thwartings and limitations innumerable. There are certain values that are near at hand and are so easily attained as to seem a free gift of nature. But such a case is very seldom. Often it is that the value we desire is embedded in other values which must be set aside. So far as our object is confined to the attainment of values that are easily accessible, self's development is at the lowest ebb. It is only when we make the choice and insist on having what we want, the values that are not easily accessible, that difficulties and thwartings and opposi-

tions are encountered. When the self rises to this higher stage, when it craves for the attainment of the values that require constant struggle and achievement, struggle and further achievements, that it is on its way to higher development. This struggle for the higher values and the consequent destruction of the lower is referred to in the following verses from the *Asrar-i-Khudi*:

"It (*i.e.*, self) is slaying by the strength of its arm
That it may become conscious of its own strength.
Like the rose, it lives by bathing itself in blood.
For the sake of a single rose it destroys a hundred
rose-gardens...

The excuse for this wastefulness and cruelty
Is the shaping and perfecting of spiritual beauty...
Its flames burned a hundred Abrahams
That the lump of one Muhammad might be
lighted."¹

This element of struggle is the very core of self, which, according to Iqbal, is a state of tension. The self lives only if that state is maintained. In order to maintain that state of tension, so necessary for the life of personality, it is our duty to see that it does not fall off into the opposite state of relaxation. For this purpose, Iqbal has suggested two remedies, positive and negative. Positive remedies against relaxation are two: (a) forming of ideals and bringing them to birth.² (b)

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 197-214 (Eng. transl.)

می کشد از قوت بازوئے خویشی	تا شود آگاه از نیروئے خویشی
بهر یک گل خون صد گلشن کند	از پیچ یک نغمه صد شیون کند
عذر این اسراف و این سنگینی دلی	خلق و تکمیل جمال معنوی
شعله هائے او صد ابراهیم سوخت	تا چراغ یک محمد بر فروخت

² *Asrar-i-Khudi*, pp. 23-27; pp. 24-27 (Persian).

cultivation of love.¹ Negative remedy is to avoid asking.² We have already touched upon in the early portions of this chapter³ the scheme of the development of self in brief. We have seen that the integration of self depends upon the formation of a coherent system of beliefs culminating in the appearance of the self-regarding sentiment and a correct and healthy philosophy of life. In order to achieve this end Iqbal has given us a thoroughly practical formula.

The first stage of this development is the creation of values and ideals and endeavour to realise them. The life of self depends on the formation of ever new ideals and continual struggle for their practical realization. "Life is latent in seeking, its origin is hidden in desire. Keep desire alive in thy heart, lest thy little dust become a tomb...From the flame of desire the heart takes life and when it takes life, all dies that is not true. When it refrains from forming desires, its pinion breaks and it cannot soar. Desire keeps the self in perpetual uproar, it is a restless wave of the self's sea. Desire is a noose for hunting ideals, and brings integration to one's deeds. Negation of desire is death to the living, even as absence of heat extinguishes the flame."⁴ In discussing the practical effects of desire and will, Iqbal accepts the Lamarckian interpretation of evolution which was also advocated by Schopenhauer, *viz.*, function determines structure of an individual and not *vice versa*. It is through desire of the partridge to have elegance of gait that it developed a

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, pp. 28-37; 43-47; pp. 28-35; 40-43 (Persian).

² *Ibid.* pp. 38-42; pp. 36-39 (Persian).

³ See above pp. 140-142

⁴ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, ll. 269-288 :

زندگی در جستجو پوشیده است اصل او در آرزو پوشیده است

particular form of legs and the desire of man to see and observe has resulted in our having eyes.¹ This creation of desire for overcoming the resistance offered by the material world resulted in the cultivation of science in all its aspects. The ever-expanding discoveries of science have relieved man of much of his false ideals and bondage to a life of superstition: 'it is a destroyer of ancient falsehoods.'² It has given him an invaluable help in surmounting the difficulties in the way of self's development: 'it is an instrument for the preservation of life and invigorating the self.'³

ما ز تخلق مقاصد زنده ایم از شعاع آرزو تابنده ایم

We live by forming ideals, we glow with the sunbeams of desire.

What should be the nature of our ideals? We have already seen that a self may be perfectly integrated and sound with regard to the formation of a coherent and harmonious system of beliefs. The individuality of a master criminal and a religious reformer may be on par as regards the fact of strength. Both have set before themselves certain ideals and their irresistible desire results in certain forms of behaviour peculiar to their nature. They are steadfast in their pursuits and suffer defeats and overcome resistance with a smiling face. But the consequences of their actions affecting other members of society are in no wise equally beneficial. Hence the importance of the question of the nature of ideals to be formed, the philosophy of life to be accepted as our guide, is apparent. In this connection Iqbal has given us only a rough idea about the nature of our ideals. The con-

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 289-291.

² *Ibid*, I. 319.

³ *Ibid*, II. 309-310.

crete form and the exact nature of these will come later in our discussion.¹ Here he simply gives us a formal statement about their general features. "An ideal (should be) shining as the dawn and a blazing fire (*i.e.* destroyer) to all that is other than God; an ideal higher than Heaven, winning, captivating, enchanting men's hearts; a destroyer of ancient falsehood, fraught with turmoil, an embodiment of revolution and change."² Thus we see that, according to Iqbal, an ideal should be (1) pure and noble like dawn and not base and low. It should not be confined to the attainment of mere pleasure, sexual or otherwise, of wealth and power, false prestige born of wrong division of natural resources, national aggrandizement and racial superiority, etc. The true ideal should not only not confine itself within these narrow limits but must also be able positively to destroy these false idols which serve to disharmonise the life of self in relation to its social environment by directing its energies into channels that lead it astray from its destined goal. Two fully self-integrated personalities but with different sets of ideals will result in the formation of two different characters. A Chengiz Khan or an Alexander, with an ideal limited in scope, would be the cause of great destruction of much that is of value in human eyes. An ideal of seeking or retaining world dominion, with the consequent amassing of wealth in fewer hands and attainment of power, had been and will be the inevitable forerunner of persecution of the weak and devastation of means of human livelihood, of

¹ For a detailed discussion of the philosophy of life, see chap. on the 'Conception of Society'.

² *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 319-320.

pursuit of pleasure in all its nakedness and neglect of, and positive contempt for, all that is noble in life. On the other hand, pursuit of a noble ideal, as represented in the life of world's great reformers and prophets, may similarly bring pain and suffering in its wake but such pain and suffering are in no way attributable to these geniuses themselves; they wanted and preached the peaceful method of persuasion. It was their opponents, again with baser ideals, who, wishing to retain their old rotten order, forced the issue upon them.

(2) Again, our ideals should not be stationary and fixed; they should move with the time. Life is a forward movement: you cannot stay its progress except for a while. But then if you succeed in staying it a little, it will burst out like the volcanic lava and destroy those conservative tendencies and bring forth a new generation which will move along with it. Our ideals therefore should be such as to be capable of responding to life's ever-growing demands. Humanity can never stop at one stage of its evolution for long and the ideals worthy of one stage, therefore, hardly suit the next higher stage; what was once of great utility at one period of our life may not be equally useful at a later period. Hence our ideals should be in conformity with the needs of the new situation instead of jealously clinging to what was once a useful device, 'an ancient falsehood', which is no longer required by the exigencies of the new order. Change and revolution are the very warp and woof of life and therefore our ideals should be the 'embodiment of change' and, as such, are of necessity bound to be 'fraught with turmoil'. All great movements in the

history of the world, religious, social, political and economic as a consequence of the realization of a high and noble ideal by a great genius, have been the harbingers of far-reaching changes and revolutions, peaceful and otherwise; they have been all great idol-breakers and as such have been the cause of great 'turmoil'.

Next we come to his doctrine of love. The theme of love is the most popular one in the whole mystic literature. In Rumi especially we find a most exhaustive account of it. He discusses it from two different points of view. First, Rumi looks upon Love as the great cosmic force which is at the back of the whole process of evolution. The processes of assimilation, growth and reproduction are all manifestations of it. "The striving for the ideal is Love's movement towards Beauty, which, according to Plato and Ibn-i-Sina, is identical with Perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all strivings, movement and progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non-existence and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The determinate matter is made to assume, by the inner force of love, various forms and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. The same force of natural love is working in life of beings higher than man." The central theme in the system of Rumi, as we saw, is the conception of life and its growth. In order to explain it he employs the analogy of organism and its functions of growth and assimilation. He believes that it is the cosmic force of love that enables an inorganic matter to die and later to appear as a plant and similarly can the plant be exalted into the still higher life of an animal by dying from its organic state. This qualitative

transformation is but the manifestation of love. On the basis of this analogy he argues that the same principle holds good from man to God.

The second aspect of the question is about the most suitable method in our search for the ultimate truth. The Rationalists believe that the ultimate ground of existence is rational and as such knowable through reason. Most philosophers belong to this category. The other group, mainly consisting of mystics and some philosophers, hold the opposite view, *viz.*, the human reason is incapable of comprehending the Reality and suggest, in its place, intuition or what Rumi and Iqbal call Love. To Rumi intellect is only a utilitarian product, devised by life so that the ego may be able to control and dominate its physical environment. Its nature is relational and dualistic; in order to think at all we must analyse, compare and relate. But the ultimate ground of existence cannot be treated in such a way; it can only be lived and felt. Again, according to Rumi, Satan is personified Intellect while Adam is personified Love. Adam's superiority over angels is due to the knowledge which God imparted to man and that knowledge was, according to him, of an intuitional character. Satan, as an embodiment of Intellect, is materialistic and thus incapable of appreciating the eternal value of man. He is also on the side of determinism as the natural corollary of his intellectualism. Adam, on the other hand, represents love and intuition and freedom.

داند آن کونیکبخت و محرم است زیرکی زابلیس و عشق از آدم است

The pious and wise man knows that intellect belongs to Satan and Love to Adam.

Rumi's protest against the purely rational method

of approach in comprehending the ultimate source and goal of life has found the greatest support in modern times in the philosophies of Kant and Nietzsche and Bergson. It is Bergson who agrees with Rumi in calling Intellect as a mere utilitarian tool which helps us in dealing with the world of space and time. Iqbal is a true disciple of Rumi as far as this problem of love is concerned. In one of his early poems he summarises his position as follows: Reason understands the secret of the universe, *i.e.*, apprehends it as it is manifested to us in the physical world while love enjoys a direct vision. Reason is limited to the categories of space and time while love is able to transcend these limits and come face to face with Reality. The object of reason and love is the same, apprehension of Reality. But reason's search is incomplete while love is the true guide on this path.¹

This search for the ultimate truth which is inherent in human nature, and the consequent adoption of the most suitable method for it, has far-reaching practical importance for Iqbal's philosophy which starts and ends with the conception and development of the human ego. The goal of the evolutionary

1 بانگ درا - "عقل نے ایک دن یہ دل سے کہا"

تاخرد پیچیدہ تر بر رنگ و بوست می رود آہستہ اندر راہ دوست
کارش از تدریج می یابد نظام من نہ دانم کہ شود کارش تمام
می نداند عشق سال و ماہ را دیروز و فردا و دور راہ را
عقل در کوہ شگافہ می کند یا بگرد او طواف می کند
کوہ پیش عشق چوں کاہ بود دل سریع السیر چوں ماہ بود
(جاوید نامہ - صفحہ 17)

زمانہ عقل کو سمجھا ہوا ہے مشعل راہ
کسے خبر کہ جنوں بھی ہے صاحب ادراک (بال جبریل - صفحہ 97)

process which has so far succeeded in the emergence of man on this planet, is, according to him, to strengthen and immortalize him. Reason is still incapable of realizing this destiny of man and throws doubt on its possibility. As such it is not of any great use in helping us achieve the object. Love, on the other hand, fully satisfies the requirement. The first essential stage for the attainment of this object is to dominate and control the forces of nature. So far reason is the best guide. But our search does not stop there; if it would, we would be the victims of the same destructive forces that have engulfed modern European civilization. We must go beyond that stage. We must leap beyond the limits of space and time. Reason cannot do this job. It is love alone which helps us here.

از شعور است ایی کہ گوئی نزد و دور
چیسٹ معراج؟ انقلاب اندر شعور
انقلاب اندر شعور از جذب و شوق
وارہاند جذب و شوق از تحت و فوق

"It is through reason that we are able to distinguish differences in space, of far and near. But further evolution of human species consists in transcending this reason, in revolutionising it. This abrupt change takes place only through love which enables us to become free from the limitations of down and above which reason imposes on us. (In other words, love can attain to heights which are inaccessible to reason)." ¹

This discussion about the relative value of reason

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, p. 20. See also *Bal-i-Jibril*, p. 119.

گذر جا عقل سے آگے، کہ یہ نور چراغ راہ ہے، منزل نہیں ہے

and love is no new subject; it has been the favourite theme in the writings of the old mystics, though Iqbal has the merit of viewing the problem from a new angle and giving it a broader basis. Moreover the logical conclusion at which Iqbal has arrived from this discussion is quite different from theirs. In the hands of the most mystic writers, especially poets, this antagonism between love and reason led to the contrast between Reality and Law (*haqiqat* and *shariat*), between the demands of love for the beloved and the demands of the Islamic law. The emphasis on the primacy and adequacy of love was bound to reflect on the other aspect. No doubt sober and orthodox mystics like Hujwari have tried to harmonise the conflict yet the tendency of one-sidedness, once started, was soon out of control. Realizing this dangerous position, Iqbal has taken pain to assert that competency of love should not be construed to mean that reason is a useless device. It has its value and of course it is not little. The control and dominance of the physical environment, as we have seen, is one of the essential stages in self's development and for this purpose 'reason is indispensable. It is our guide towards our path, it paves the way for love by creating in us a desire for the search of the ultimate Truth.

چشمش از ذوق نگه محروم نیست لیکن اورا جرأت زندانه نیست

"Its (*i.e.*, reason's) eyes are not devoid of the capacity for insight; only it lacks the required amount of impulsive nature."¹ Thus in the *Jawaid Nama* he advocates the use of both reason and love. A synthesis of the two is sure to bring harmony to a

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, p. 17.

self not only in its individual capacity but also as a member of a society.

عشق چوں با زیری همسر شود نقشبند عالم دیگر شود
 "When intellect is supplemented by love, it creates a new world."¹ Once this synthesis is achieved by the ego, it will be saved from the consequences both of materialism and antinomianism; materialism with its tendency to ignore the moral and spiritual demands of our nature and ending in the attainment of brute force which is bound to destroy the whole human race; antinomianism with its tendency to ignore the physical nature of man ending in the disruption of human society which is equally bound to defeat the whole object of evolution.

Iqbal also believes in love as a cosmic assimilative force which is the 'fountain of life'. Just as love is responsible for the evolution of organic out of the inorganic and of the animal out of the organic, so it helps the human ego in its development towards immortality. It is through love that the self "is made more lasting, more living, more burning, more growing. From love proceeds the radiance of its being and the development of its unknown potentialities."² But love must have an object to which its conative tendencies may be directed. For Iqbal that object of love can be no other than the Holy Prophet. "Learn thou to love, and seek a beloved.... Transmute thy handful of earth into gold, and kiss the threshold of a perfect man."³ As to the potency of love as a transformer of character Iqbal refers his readers to the

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, p. 71. ² *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 325-33.

³ *Ibid.* II. 337-40. Cf. the following line of Rumi:

یک زمانه در حضور اولیا بهتر از صد ساله طاعت به ریا

famous episode in the life of Rumi, *viz.*, his meeting with a perfect saint like Shams-i-Tabriz. We are not here concerned with the details and various versions of the episode as related by his biographers. What Iqbal wants to emphasize is that before the appearance of Shams-i-Tabriz, we see Rumi a man of the world, a scholar surrounded by a crowd of pupils, ambitious for fame and zealously engaged in the dry-as-dust legal hair-splitting. Shams-i-Tabriz appears and Rumi becomes a different man. His unbounded love for the new-comer changed the whole course of his future life. The great intellectual scholar is transformed into an ardent mystic, pursuit of knowledge gives place to intoxication of love, his scholarship is changed into a life of devotion and meditation. Iqbal believes that such a transformation is possible for every individual provided he cultivates love for the Holy Prophet, the most perfect of men. Such a love can be expressed in completely subjugating ourselves to him in words and deeds. We must follow in his footsteps; we must cherish what he cherished, hate what he hated, live as he lived; in short, must carry on in the world as he wished us to be. This constant devotion of a lover to his beloved is illustrated by Iqbal by the example of a famous mystic, Bayazid of Bistam (d. 875 A. C.) who refused to eat water-melon merely because he did not know whether the Prophet ever used it or if he did, how he ate it. Eating of a water-melon is, of course, one of the most trifling affairs in our daily life. But his love for the Prophet was so intense and so deep that he abhorred the mere idea of doing something that his beloved might not have done. Such an ideal of devotion,

according to Iqbal, is necessary for the true development of self. The culminating point in the education of the ego, as we shall see later, is the stage of divine vicegerency which cannot be reached without such a complete love. "By the might of love evoke an army and reveal thyself on the *Faran* of love, that the Lord of the Kaaba may show thee favour and make thee the true embodiment of divine vicegerency."¹

لشکرے پیدا کن از سلطان عشق جلوہ گر شو بر سر فاران عشق
تا خدائے کعبہ بنوازد ترا شرح انی جاعل سازد ترا

When once this cosmic force of assimilation (love) is brought into play, the ego attains to a height that is beyond one's imagination or comprehension and gains dominion over the outward and inward forces of the universe. In order to illustrate it, Iqbal has chosen a story from the life of a famous Indian mystic, Bu Ali Qalandar (Sharaf-ud-Din, d. 724) who lived during the reign of Tughlak Kings and was a contemporary of the famous poet of Persian language, Amir Khusraw. Once it so happened, that, while a governor of the town where Bu Ali Qalandar resided was going along a street on horseback, a disciple of his was warned by one of the governor's escort to be off the way. But the disciple was so much absorbed in his meditations that he did not listen to the warning and as a result received a serious blow on the head. Bu Ali Qalandar, on hearing this tale, at once wrote a letter to the king. "Thy governor has broken my servant's head; he has cast burning coal on his life. Arrest this wicked governor or else I will bestow thy kingdom on another."²

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II, 431-34.

² *Ibid.*, II, 517-520.

بنده ام را عاملت بر سر زده است بر متاع جان خود اخگر زده است
 بازگیر این عامل بد گوهرے ورنه بخشیم ملک تو با دیگرے

The king at once sought to plead for forgiveness and Amir Khusraw "whose harmonies flow from the creative mind and whose genius has the soft brilliance of moon-light" was chosen to be the ambassador. His song melted the saint's heart and the whole episode was thus peacefully brought to an end.

The negative remedy against the relaxation of the tension of personality is what Iqbal has termed 'asking'. "All that is achieved without personal effort comes under asking. The son of a rich man who inherits his father's wealth is an 'asker' (beggar); so is every one who thinks the thoughts of others.... Thus, in order to fortify the ego.... we should avoid all forms of 'asking', i. e., inaction."¹ As an example to be followed by every one Iqbal quotes an incident from the life of Caliph Umar who got down from his camel to take up the whip which had dropped rather than ask anybody to hand it over to him.² His abhorrence for incurring obligation is manifested in his works in other forms as well. He has severely criticized the ever-growing tendency in modern times, specially in the Eastern countries, of slavishly imitating the Western mode of life to the disparagement of their own ways of thought that are more congenial to their self-development. To Iqbal, it is one of the necessary and essential conditions of a true selfhood that it should draw inspiration from its own cultural

¹ Introduction (Eng.) to *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. xxvi.

² *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II, 443-44 :

خود فرود آ از شتر مثل عمر الکدر از منت غیر، الکدر

heritage and achievements.¹ It, however, does not mean that an individual should accept the position as it is, good or bad. He must possess full insight and capacity for understanding and assimilating other cultures and at the same time, if necessary, reconstructing his own in the light of new demands. In the *Jawaid Nama* he has discussed this problem in full detail. He refers to Iran's policy of reviving the old glory of ancient Persia. This, Iqbal thinks, is no doubt a sign of self-consciousness but still its expression has been warped by the western conception of nationalism. Lack of creative expression on their part and the consequent break in the continuity of cultural heritage, much of which they owed to the Arabs, does not augur well for their future.

روزگار او تہی از واردات از قبور کهنہ می جوید حیات

"His life lacks free and creative experiences and therefore he seeks inspiration from dead past."² Iqbal contends, moreover, that the real Persian civilization as represented by the Sassanid kings had lost all its vitality and was bound to fail as Roman civilization disappeared soon afterwards. It was, however, the work of the sons of the desert who, with their life-blood, watered the barren fields of Iran and gave her a new lease of life.

آہ! احسان عرب نشناختند از تشی افرنگیان بگداختند

Alas! they failed to appreciate the debt of obliga-

¹ In the *Bal-i-Jibril* (p. 181), in reference to the question that though modern man has acquired abundance of knowledge, eastern as well as western, he is still discontented, he says:

دست ہر نا اہل بیمار کند سوئے مادر آ کہ تیمارت کند

In other words, cause of illness can be removed only if we turn to our own culture for inspiration.

² *Jawaid Nama*, p. 204.

tion to the Arabs in their zeal for western ideal (of nationalism).¹

Similarly he condemns the modern movement in Turkey under the inspiration of Kemal Ataturk who did not possess sufficient insight to build a new world on the foundation of the old. In his desire for reform he transplanted the foreign seed of western culture and broke off from his own age-long proud and noble heritage. In absence of any impulsive urge from within and due to a mere superficial importing of foreign mode of living and thinking, no creative expression of their new life at present is possible. The Turks did not seem to possess enough vitality to create for themselves a new world of their own. Mere imitation does not hold any promise of a new life either for the individual or for the community.

مصطفیٰ کو از تجدید می سرود گفت نقش کهنه را باید زدود
نو نگردد کعبه را رخت حیات گرزافرنک آیدش لات و منات
ترک را آهنگ نو در چنگ نیست تازه اش جز کهنه افرنک نیست

Kemal Ataturk talked much of re-orientation and wished to efface every sign of old values. But if you bring idols from Europe to decorate the Kaaba, it will be old wine in new bottles, and will not infuse any new life into it. The Turk has nothing new or original to his credit and what he calls new is nothing but the old of Europe.²

Iqbal, however, does not mean to assert that the new forces as represented by the Western civilization should not be studied. What he is anxious to suggest is that our attitude towards it should be critical and not of slavish imitation. We should try to judge its

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, pp. 204-205.

² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

value-yielding capacity in relation to our natural demands and national requirements. It is the political power of the West that leads people astray in determining the true source of their superiority. On the basis of Iqbal's theory of self-hood, it is evident that such a dominance over physical forces of nature, as has been achieved in the West, is possible provided a true dynamic relationship is developed by the individual towards his environment. Such dominance is easy of access for all and its secret lies in the attainment of scientific knowledge in all its branches. But such a method, of course, requires patient and strenuous labour of days and nights, struggle against odds, calmness and perseverance in defeat. People, however, who seem to be glamoured of its political sway, instead of analysing and appreciating the situation in its true perspective, blindly adopt some accidental appendices of its civilization and seem to be satisfied at that. The political and economic superiority of the West is due neither to her musical revelries or dances of immodest girls, nor due to a particular form of dress or a particular cut of the hair. It is not her hatred for religious life or the adoption of Latin script that can justly be called the cause of their success in political field. It is rather the presence of many of these very things that bodes ill for the future of its civilization. Over-awed by the external and superficial glamour, the people of the East seem persistently to refuse to develop a critical attitude towards it and due to their age-long propensity for ease have been led to the acceptance of inessential at the cost of the essential features represented by the modern civilisation.

نقد جان خویش در بازد به لہو علم دشوار ست، می سازد به لہو

از تن آسانی بگیرد سهل را فطرت او در پیروی سهل را
سهل را جستن درین دیر کهن این دلیل آن که جان وخت از بدن

As the acquiring of knowledge is difficult, he (i.e., the man of the East, referring particularly to Turks) devotes his own life to pleasure-seeking. He chooses the path of least resistance through his love of ease to which his nature seems well adapted. To prefer a life of least resistance is a sign that a people have lost their vitality.¹

Thus for the true development of self-hood, it is indispensable that one should keep oneself safe not only from incurring obligations but also from slavishly imitating others. 'A live heart is a creator of new worlds and cannot compromise his spirit with mere imitation of others.'² A true self must be creative and original and as such cannot accept anything at second hand. He admits change as the fundamental principle in life and his ideals therefore move along with the varying conditions of time. But inspite of these changes, his relationship with his social and cultural environment is always kept up and never allowed to slip off his grasp. His creative genius finds the scope for expression not in a vacuum but always in reference to the cultural heritage which he gets from his forefathers. In order to illustrate this point Iqbal gives us a story of a Brahmin, who came to a certain Shaikh seeking advice and guidance. The Shaikh replies: "Oh inheritor of ancient culture! turn not thy back on the path thy fathers trod."³ A similar moral is

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, p. 210.

² *Ibid.*, p. 72:

جانش از تقلید گردد چه حضور
پشت پا بر مسلك آبا مزن
(اسرار خودی-صفحه 98)

زنده دل خلاق اعصار و دهور
اے امانت دار تهذيب کهن!

derived from another story which is in the form of a dialogue between the Himalayas and the Ganges. The mountain advises the river that 'to live is to grow in yourself and gather roses from your *own* flower-bed.'¹

Such a doctrine of self, as briefly enunciated above, brought Iqbal into conflict with certain tendencies of thought that represented the opposite doctrine. Starting with the presence of man on this earth, the question of his present plight and his future destiny has been the subject of all religions and most of the great thinkers of all ages but with different and often contradictory results. The representatives of the doctrine of the negation of self may be divided into two categories for the purpose of our discussion. To the first category belong such thinkers as Plato, Sankaracharya and Mohiy-ud-Din Ibn-ul-Arabi. It was necessary for Iqbal in the advocacy of his doctrine to criticise the opposite tendency in its various forms and he has done his job in an untiring and fearless way. In the *Asrar-i-Khudi* he has confined himself to criticising the tendency as represented by Plato who may be regarded as the father of all mysticism, eastern or western. The fundamental idea in Plato, with which we are here concerned, was his sharp distinction between the sensuous and the super-sensuous worlds, the latter called technically the world of Ideas. To him the only true reality is the Idea and the objects that we come across in the phenomenal world are mere copies of their original prototypes, the Ideas. Our sense-equipment is the most untrustworthy instrument in our hands which helps us live in an illusory and shadowy world

¹ زندگی پر جائے خود بالیدن است از خیابان خودی گل چیدن است
(اسرار خودی - صفحہ 101)

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(اسرار خودی - صفحہ 101)

and holds us back from a peep into the Reality. Our knowledge about the physical world is not something newly acquired but a mere unfolding, a mere recollection on the part of the human soul which had witnessed all and everything in the super-sensuous world before it was imprisoned in its material cage of the body. From such a position it naturally follows that if one were interested in the search for truth, in the attainment of the vision of the Real, one must try to live so as to be able to end this earthly course in as short a time as possible. Art, as portraying what is perceived and experienced in the temporal world, was thus copy of the copy of the Real, a dealer in second-hand affairs and therefore not worthy of cultivation and encouragement in an ideal society as depicted in the *Republic*. This attitude of Plato ¹—‘his sensuous love for the unseen’—was later taken up by Plotinus and developed to a great length. On this basis he built up an ethical code, the fundamental conception of which was the Katharsis, *i.e.*, the liberation of the soul from the entanglements of the body and all it stands for. It was Plotinus also who enumerated, perhaps for the first time, different stages in the growth and development of the human soul towards God, the last stage in his system being the same as the popular mystic stage of *fana* where ‘we lose all connection with the sensuous world, are elevated beyond thought and in a state of unconsciousness and ecstasy are absorbed in the Divine Light.’ His famous book, the *Enneads*, was

¹ We must guard here against a misconception. The above sketch of Plato's system was only an aspect of his philosophy which received attention at the hands of a group of his disciples, the notable among whom was Plotinus. The other aspect, of more philosophical value, received its due appreciation by Aristotle and through him passed into modern philosophy.

translated into Arabic under the title of *Theology of Aristotle* and thus the mystic tendencies of Plato and his disciples were introduced into the Islamic world in the name of Aristotle. Though he himself did not embrace Christianity which was making a great headway during his life, Plotinus exerted a great influence on early Christian thinkers, most of whom followed in his footsteps in preaching a doctrine of self-mortification and renunciation of the world. It was this movement, in short, which was the real source of all later mystic thought in Islam and therefore Iqbal takes up Plato, the real founder, as the target of his criticism. Plato had been the subject of severest criticism by thinkers of great eminence before Iqbal but for different reasons. Aristotle, his most favoured pupil at the Academy, criticised him purely on philosophical grounds accusing him of logical inconsistencies in his system. Nietzsche in modern times criticised Plato (along with his teacher, Socrates) mainly because he emphasized the role of reason and morality in human life and his denunciation of art. To a man like Nietzsche, Socratic code of morality, with equality and justice as the principal elements, was abominable. But Iqbal criticises Plato because he held a view about the destiny of human ego which was perfectly un-natural and one-sided. According to Iqbal, our sense-equipment, our intellect, our reason, our intuitive faculties, are all true guides in our life as it is lived amidst physical environment. It is equally wrong, on his theory, to look upon the material world as illusory and the super-sensuous world as alone real. To him one is as essential as the other: they are rather complementary; one paves the way for the other and there

is no inherent contradiction in accepting the two as belonging to one greater synthetic whole. He sees in Plato a forceful representative of all those tendencies which he regarded as the sole mission of his life to eradicate and destroy. Advocating with the full force and charm at his command that the human ego must partake of life in its fullness, he could not countenance a doctrine which taught that 'to die is the essence of life.' He ranks Plato as one of the 'ancient flock of sheep' who, according to the story related by him in the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, preached to the lions that 'life's solidarity depends on self-denial; paradise is for the weak alone; strength is but a means to perdition; penury is sweeter than princedom; to slay ourselves is to attain honour.'

قومها از سکر او مسموم گشت خفت و از ذوق عمل متحروم گشت¹

The other outstanding figure in the history of Muslim thought who belonged to the same category, was Mohiy-ud-Din Ibn-ul-Arabi, commonly known among the sufis as the Great Shaikh. He was the first prominent and systematic thinker in Islam who preached an unalloyed form of Pantheism which in Arabic terminology is well-known as *Wahdat-i-Wajud* (the Unity of Being). The philosophical system of Ibn-ul-Arabi is so abstruse that it would not be possible to do full justice to it here. A bare outline will suffice. The basic conception of his system is that God is the Absolute Being, besides whom there is nothing real; this Absolute Being is the source and cause of all existence. He is their essence; everything is God. This was a strange transformation of the Islamic doctrine of

¹ The peoples were poisoned by his intoxication; he slumbered and took no delight in deeds. *Asrar-i-Khudi*, ll. 671—672.

Tauhid. From the simple proposition that 'there exists no god but God' (the Islamic *Kalima*), Ibn-ul-Arabi infers an entirely different proposition that 'there is nothing in existence except God.' Pantheistic doctrine can assume two forms. Either the phenomenal world, as we know it, is a mere illusion and God alone the true reality. Or God is a mere fabrication of the human mind and the phenomenal world is the only reality. Both these forms of pantheism are equally wrong on Iqbal's ground but Ibn-ul-Arabi chooses the former type and accepts full logical consequences of the view. Starting with the assumption that God is absolute, infinite, eternal, the source and ultimate ground of all that is, was and will be, he comes to the conclusion that the phenomenal world is but a passing shadow of the Reality which lies behind it. Everything that is finite and temporal (including, of course, the human ego) is illusory and unreal. His system does not stop here. His conception of God is quite different from the one as depicted in the Quran. A religious God is always personal while a pantheistic God can be anything but personal. Again, if God be the ultimate ground of everything, there can be no distinction between good and evil, no question of moral responsibility, no problem of reward and punishment and, strangely enough, the Shaikh-i-Akbar accepts all the logical conclusions of his system with perfect equanimity but, of course, with certain reservations here and there just to humour the orthodox theologians. Such a dangerous doctrine, however, in spite of its apparent antinomian character, so deeply penetrated Muslim thought that you can hear it echoed and re-echoed in the *diwans* of any and every Persian poet.

Hafiz, Iraqi, Jami, Mahmud Shabistri, to name only a few, all preach and advocate the same doctrine in one form or the other. One can envisage the great task which Iqbal had set before himself. To fight against a tendency that had taken deep roots in the hearts of the people since centuries, hallowed by the sacred names of their exponents and expressed in the most melodious medium of poetry, was undoubtedly a herculean task. In the first edition of the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, he expressed his disagreement with this tendency by criticising the more popular and widely known moral and social philosophy of Hafiz in the most emphatic way. It created a great sensation in mystic circles of India. No doubt, several writers, like Hali, before Iqbal had raised their voice against this dangerous tendency as represented in the works of most Persian poets and specially Hafiz, yet it remained confined within a very limited circle. But with the appearance of the *Asrar-i-Khudi* in 1915, the problem was put before the Indian Muslims in all its nakedness with the full force of poetry behind it. It was the first sign of success for Iqbal's mission when it touched the hearts of the slumbering people and awoke them from sleep. The question of the relative merits and values of the two opposite doctrines began to be hotly discussed and several books and treatises appeared in refutation of Iqbal's position. But as time passed, his opponents began to melt one by one and his position remained unassailed. In one respect, at least, he met his opponents by omitting the verses referring to Hafiz from the second edition of his book, though his original position with regard to this tendency represented by him and his master, Shaikh-i-Akbar, remains the same.

Iqbal, however, is not the only thinker who raised his voice of protest against this pantheistic tendency of Ibn-ul-Arabi and a host of his followers. Two great eminent theologians of Islam had equally forcefully denounced them and their doctrine. The first to undertake this task was Imam Ibn-i-Taimiyya who, in the light of the Quran and the Traditions of the holy prophet, refuted his position. He looked upon Ibn-ul-Arabi as a heretic and a follower of the Ismaili sect known as Karamatians. The other man to accomplish this task was the most famous and greatest of Indian mystics, Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, better known as Mujaddid Alf-i-Thani. Being a mystic of the first rank, his criticism of Ibn-ul-Arabi's doctrine is more pertinent. He refutes his position not only in the light of the Quran and the Traditions but also in the light of his own mystic experience. His *Letters* published in several volumes in Persian (also translated into Urdu) are a standing testimony of the failure of the movement initiated by Ibn-ul-Arabi and his disciples.

A similar doctrine of pantheism was also held and advocated in India by the famous Indian thinker, Sankaracharya. He held that Brahman was the ultimate Reality with the implied belief in the Maya doctrine, the identity of the human soul and Brahman and the conception of merging of the former into the latter. On the practical side he advocated complete renunciation with its implication that meditation alone is the means of salvation. In the Introduction (Urdu) to the first edition of the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, Iqbal wrote: "In Indian (Hindu) thought we find a strange mixture of theory and practice. Some of their great thinkers

have deeply thought over the nature of human capacity for action. They arrived at the conclusion that the continuity in the life of self, which is at the root of all pain and suffering, is achieved through activity. In other words, the present position and experiences of the human ego are the result of its previous deeds. Given this law of action and reaction, the consequences must of necessity follow . . . Thus the Indian thinkers were able to solve the difficult problem of freedom of will. Philosophically, their attempt was praiseworthy. They, however, did not stop at that. They accepted all the logical consequences which followed from their initial position. When it is found that the nature of self is activity, then the logical conclusion to be derived, if one wishes to be free from the cycle of self's existence, is to abhor activity. This conclusion was apparently harmful for the individual as well as for society. At this stage Hinduism required a great seer who would stem this tide of disruption and on the basis of his keener and deeper insight, interpret to the people the true significance and value of a life of activity. This stupendous task was undertaken by Sri Krishna who criticised the philosophical traditions of his people in a most charming way. He pointed out to them that to abhor activity does not mean complete inactivity, as action of one sort or other is in the very nature of self. To abhor activity means to be indifferent to the deed and its consequences. Ramanujacharya followed the same line of thought but unfortunately the logical hair-splitting of Sankaracharya once again darkened the outlook.

"In Western Asia, Islam once again gave the

world a message of activity. Though, according to it, human self is created which can attain immortality through activity, yet we find a strange similarity in Hindu and some of the Muslim thinkers who thought over this problem of self. The point of view adopted by Sankara in the interpretation of the Gita was the same that was followed by Ibn-ul-Arabi in the interpretation of the Quran. The deep erudition and charming personality of the Shaikh-i-Akbar made the doctrine of Pantheism an indispensable element of Muslim thought-structure. Kirmani and Iraqi were most influenced by it and gradually all the Persian poets of the fourteenth century of the Christian era accepted it and gave expression to it with full force.

"But while in India Pantheism was a philosophical doctrine with its appeal to human reason, in Iran it went beyond its limits and in the hands of the poets it began to appeal to heart instead of head with the result that it reached every nook and corner of the Islamic world and became the main cause of social and political decay"¹

Iqbal's crusade against this doctrine, therefore, could not stop at criticising Plato or Hafiz alone. He took up the wiser course of attacking the whole Persian poetry which 'dresses gain in the garb of loss and makes everything praiseworthy blameful, plunges us in the sea of thought and makes us a stranger to action.'² He thinks that our literature henceforth should cease to follow in the footsteps of such

¹ دگر از شنکر و منصور کم گوے خدا را هم براه خویشتن جوئے
 بخود گم بهر تحقیق خودی شو انا الحق گوئے و صدیق خودی شو
 (زبور عجم - صفحہ 238)

² *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 739-42.

messengers of death as Hafiz and Iraqi. In their place he advocates a return to the Arabic life, culture and literature for inspiration 'that we may be fit for life's battle and that our body and soul may burn in Life's fire.'¹

The thinkers who belong to the second category reached the same conclusion but from different premises. Prominent among them are the Buddha and Schopenhauer. We are fully acquainted with the life of the Buddha who, on seeing death, misery, pain and want, renounced the world and arrived after a long life of meditation at the conclusion that life is not worth living. The element of pain and evil far outweighs the positive values of life and thus he was forced to advocate a complete suppression of desires of all sorts which were a prelude to the inevitable struggle and misery. It is only by saying 'no' to life that salvation is possible. Schopenhauer's philosophy, as we have seen, ends in the same strain. But it is strange that Nietzsche, who starts with the same premises, arrives at quite a different conclusion. Like the Greeks he accepted that the universe is not the best that could be created: it was full of suffering and pain. Yet he was willing to face the consequences bravely. His preference for Dionysiac ideal of life was a true index of his attitude. The cult of Dionyseus finds its best expression in music which awakens in us a love of life. The Greeks employed Tragedy as the best device by which they were able to overcome the evil forces of nature. They had the moral courage to witness a life of misery and pain enacted before them, which prevented them from falling into the snares of undue optimism. To

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II 813-14.

them pain and misery added zest, value and beauty to life. Thus, for Nietzsche, art is a great stimulant of life and serves the purpose of enabling man to face evil bravely and infusing greater vitality into him. For him, therefore, pain and suffering are the essential and indispensable conditions of a full enjoyment of life; the greater the suffering, the greater the development of artistic creation which helps man take his full share from the fountain of life.¹

The presence of pain and suffering in life cannot be denied and it has given rise to one of the acutest problems in the field of philosophy and religion, *viz.*, the problem of evil and the compatibility of its presence with the existence of a God who is good. We cannot, however, give any exhaustive account of it here and deal with individual philosophers who have attempted to solve it in their own peculiar way. Yet for a true appreciation of Iqbal's position in this respect it would be better if we start with Rumi who has offered us a very bold and original solution, one which is offered by some of the modern thinkers like

¹ In the *Piyam-i-Mashriq* (pp 234-35) Iqbal compares the conclusions both of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer in a story. A thorn pricked into the body of a bird who at once began to attack nature for its evil forces. Another bird, on hearing the lament, pulled out the thorn out of his body and added:

گفتش که سود خویش زجیب زبان بر آر
گل از شگاف سینہ زر ناب آفرید
درمان ز درد ساز اگر خسته تن شوی
خوگر به خار شو که سراپا چمن شوی

You should try to snatch good out of the evil forces just as a flower by splitting open its bosom produces pure gold. If you ever happen to be in untoward circumstances, try to make it the very source of cure for your ailments; for without encountering thorns it would be impossible to enjoy a garden.

Fichte. Rumi starts with the assumption that evil is a reality though only relative and phenomenal. The universe is a mixed product where you find right along with wrong, truth along with falsehood. The presence of both elements becomes necessary, according to him, to enable man to distinguish one from the other. If wrong and falsehood were not present, there would consequently be no right and no truth. Our search for what is valuable is only possible if there is in the world what is not valuable. "It is the very resistance of air that enables a bird to fly; no flight is possible in a vacuum." Our search for the ideal, therefore, in the very nature of the case, presupposes the presence of resistance and the consequent struggle and endeavour on our part. This negative element of life, in the eyes of Rumi, is our ally; it helps us in achieving our ideals, it actualises our hidden potentialities. "Heat and cold, grief and pain, fear and hunger, impairment of wealth and body—all these things are meant to bring out the value of soul." Fichte similarly held that the resistance offered by the non-ego has its source in the nature of the ego itself which can develop only through perpetual overcoming of resistance. To complain of evil, therefore, in the eyes of Rumi, is to defeat the very purpose of evolution of man; he is the paragon of creation only because he is offered a chance of choosing between good and evil, a chance which is denied to all else. It is up to him to submit to evil and become the 'lowest of low' or to resist and overcome evil and become 'the highest of high'. Iqbal accepts this position of Rumi and tries to elucidate it by reference to the Quranic legend of what is usually called the Fall of

Adam.¹ The teaching of the Quran, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is, according to Iqbal, neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism which recognises a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil. The legend is split up into two parts, one is of the 'Eternal Tree' and the other, of the 'Kingdom that never Fails'. The 'tree' was with the ancients a cryptic symbol for occult knowledge. Adam was forbidden to touch the fruit of this tree because the kind of knowledge suited to his nature, his finitude, his sense equipment and his intellectual faculties, was different from the knowledge that could be attained through occult processes. He needed a type of knowledge that required of him patient labour of observation and inference and sifting of truth from error after constant trials and errors. Satan, however, persuaded Adam to eat the forbidden fruit. He yielded because, being hasty, he wanted a short cut to knowledge. To correct this temptation the only remedy was to put him in a kind of environment where he must labour for the attainment of his purpose and either suffer defeat or be crowned with success in his attempt and thus enjoy continual growth and expansion. Surrounded by an environment which obstructs man's will at every step, his life depends upon the perpetual expansion of knowledge based on actual experience which is possible only through a method of trial and error. Hence 'error, which may be described as a kind of intellectual evil, is an indispensable factor in the building up of experience.' The placing of Adam in a painful environment

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 113-122.

should not be construed to mean that it is a sort of punishment; it was rather devised to defeat the purpose of Satan who wanted to deprive him of the necessary means for his self-integration. The second aspect of the legend brings into relief life's irresistible desire for a lasting dominion. To circumvent death, self tries to achieve a kind of collective immortality by self-multiplication through the gratification of sexual impulse. Yet the emergence of new individuals, each seeking its own dominance, results in the awful struggle for existence and supremacy. "But the acceptance of selfhood as a form of life involves the acceptance of all the imperfections that flow from the finitude of self-hood. . . . True manhood, according to the Quran, consists in 'patience under ills and hardships.' At the present stage of the evolution of selfhood, however, we cannot understand the full import of this discipline which the driving power of pain brings. Perhaps it hardens the self against a possible dissolution."

Such a view of life in which the element of evil is indispensable for the complete realization of the ideal of selfhood, leads naturally to the conclusion that struggle, endeavour and activity are the essential requisites for the attainment of our object and Iqbal, like Rumi and Nietzsche, seems never tired of emphasizing the necessity of hard struggle against odds. In order to illustrate this point he relates a story where a stranger comes to Pir-i-Hujwari asking protection against his enemies. The Pir, in reply to his request, advises him thus: 'Your enemy is your friend; his existence is a source of glory to you; whoever knows the states of the self considers a powerful

enemy to be a blessing from God. An enemy is like a raincloud to the seed of man for he awakens its potentialities. If your spirit be strong, the storms in your way are as water. . . . The sword of resolution is whetted by the stones in the way and put to proof (by its constant endeavour to reach the goal) after traversing one stage of the journey after another.¹ Following Nietzsche he gives us another story which takes the form of a dialogue between a coal and a diamond. The coal complains of its worthlessness and envies the fate of its comrade to which the diamond replies that earth "having been at strife with its environment is ripened and grows hard like a stone. It is this ripeness that has endowed my form with light and filled my bosom with radiance."² A similar story with the same moral is related by Iqbal in which he contrasts a diamond with a drop of dew. A bird, faint with thirst, sees a diamond and deceived by the sun-bright stone pecked at it thinking it to be a drop of water. The diamond at once retorts: "I am not a dew-drop, I give no drink. I do not live for the sake of others."³ Then the sorely-distressed bird saw a dew-drop upon a rose-twigg and flew to quench its thirst thereby. The dew-drop twickled into its mouth and lost its life. The moral in both stories is that you should cultivate hardness which is born of plunging

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, ll. 1119-28:

راست می گویم عدو هم یار تست هستی او رونق بازار تست
Rumi Says:

در حقیقت هر عدو داروئ تست کیمیائ نافع و دلجوئ تست

² *Ibid.*, ll. 1215-18.

³ *Ibid.*, ll. 1145-1190:

قطره آیم نیم، ساقی نیم من برائ دیگران باقی نیم

into a life of struggle and resistance.

در صلابت آبروئے زندگی است ناتوانی، ناکسی نا پختگی است

In solidity (hardness) consists the glory of life; weakness is worthlessness and immaturity.

But discussion of the problem of evil at once raises another problem of equal importance and difficulty. Is man born free? Is he capable by his nature to choose one of the alternatives before him, between good and evil? This question of free will (of *taqdir*) was very hotly discussed in the early days of Muslim religious thought. The Rationalists (Muta-zilites) advocated absolute freedom of human action and thus justified the existence of heavenly bliss for the good and the eternal tortures of hell for the wicked. But absolute freedom of the individual, to the opposite school, seemed to savour of putting a limit to divine omniscience and omnipotence. The Asharite school, therefore, declared that God is free in His actions and it is not necessary for Him to follow any law. The objects of the physical world do not possess any inherent qualities. Fire, *e.g.*, does not burn because it is in its nature to burn but because God creates a being burned when fire touches a body and burning is God's direct work. If, then, there is no fixed law about the behaviour of the physical universe, there can be no systematic knowledge at all. The answer is that God creates not only the objects of the world but also the knowledge about them in the human soul. Thus free will is nothing, according to the theory, except the presence in us of the power (*qudrat*) and choice (*ikhtiyar*) which are created by God, and then He creates in us action corresponding to the power and choice thus

created. Human actions are created by God as to initiative and production, though they are 'acquired' by the creature. This illogical notion of Acquisition (*kasb*) which was introduced as a mere screen to save moral responsibility, does not solve the problem. Shorn of all theological terminology, it is nothing but pure determinism. With the appearance of Ibn-i-Arabi's doctrine of pantheism, however, thinkers began to dispense even with this veil of 'acquisition' and preach openly the doctrine of utter dependence of human self on the Infinite. This theme became very popular amongst Persian poets who were never tired of singing man's utter helplessness. It was, however, left to Rumi to defend the freedom of human choice on a sounder basis. According to him the superiority of mankind over other creatures is due to the presence in him of this power of free choice between good and evil. No doubt man is determined in certain respects: he cannot change earth into water nor can water be changed to develop properties of honey yet he is perfectly free in changing his moral self. Laws of nature are laws of uniformity of behaviour of physical objects which hold good for ever. They are out of time or religiously speaking 'predestined.' But man's power of choice does not belong to this category. The form of law may be eternal but its contents are free and variable. In a particular situation it is for me to choose one way or the other but once I have decided in favour of one of the alternatives, the inexorable law will then come into operation and I shall reap the fruit of my action. "Man alone carries his star within himself; no earthly or heavenly influence can deter-

mine man's course of action." ¹

ہر کرا با اخترے پیوستگی است مرد را با اختر خود ہم تگی ست

In modern times the advocates of determinism derived support from the scientific law of Causation which, according to them, holds good not only in the physical realm but equally in the psychical world. Self is a complex product of growth; it started with a definite equipment of potentialities and tendencies which later on developed in relation to environment and thus appeared reflexes, impulses, habits, instincts, in short, what is commonly called the whole character of an individual. On this theory, character is nothing but the expression of the operation of causal laws. But, as a matter of fact, the whole position of the determinists so far as it is based on the support derived from this law, is flimsy. The law of Causation is only an assertion of orderliness in nature; it is an *a priori* assumption which is involved in our knowing of the world of experience. ² As a law of thought, it requires that we should so analyse a situation, however chaotic it may at first seem, as to exhibit orderliness. As such, we cannot conceive that it excludes freedom. The mechanical view of the universe does not at all presuppose any negation of freedom. On the other hand, it rather implies the perfection of intelligence and power. ³ In the absence of these our life would be impossible and a chaos would be the inevitable result. Causal law is only a law of thought which

¹ Iqbal says :

ترے مقام کو انجام شناس کیا جائے کہ خاک زندہ ہے تو، تابع ستارہ نہیں
(بال جبریل - صفحہ 67)

² Lectures, pp. 150-51. ³ J. E. Turner : *Personality and Reality*, chap. VII.

tries to satisfy its own ideal of order. If an individual is free, his whole effort will lie in the direction of realizing this ideal. The more does he succeed in this, the more free will he be. Thus the contention that the more order, the more determinism, should be changed into the opposite proposition that the more order, the more freedom. Again, in our study and effort for the attainment of truth we often come across error which it is one of our duties to eliminate. But how can we know this fact of error? Only in the light of criteria which the mind sets up in its endeavour to reach the truth. In other words, it means that we must be able to distinguish between truth and error in reference to a certain standard. This clearly implies the presence of freedom on our part. To know truth and discard error we must have power to apply a standard; otherwise every belief would be true merely because it existed. This fact conclusively proves that freedom in its positive sense does exist. The whole procedure adopted in any scientific investigation, *viz.*, critical review of previous thought, marshalling of new evidence, application of the 'trial and error' method, all imply the existence of freedom. Without being free an individual cannot acquire any scientific knowledge, cannot distinguish truth from falsehood. But the most damaging evidence against the determinist position as based on the authority of the scientific law of Causation, comes from the modern physical science itself. Eddington says: "It is a consequence of the advent of the Quantum theory that *physics is no longer pledged to a scheme of deterministic law*. Determinism has dropped out altogether in the latest formu-

lations of theoretical physics and it is at least open to doubt whether it will be ever brought back." Further on he says that the attitude of indifference which the physicists adopted towards the controversy between determinism and indeterminism was a few years later turned into an attitude definitely hostile towards determinism due to the acceptance of the principle of Indeterminism (a law which states that the behaviour of an electron cannot be predicted). He says: "The future is a combination of the causal influences of the past together with unpredictable elements—unpredictable not merely because it is impracticable to obtain the data of prediction but because no data connected causally with our experiences exist Science thereby withdraws its moral opposition to free-will."¹

The analysis which the determinists have given us of the human behaviour contains several elements of truth which we of course accept without any reservation. First, all the manifold activities of self are subject to law and are not arbitrary. Secondly, past experiences of a self do determine its present and future course of action. Thirdly, every free act of a self is completely motivated by the needs and interests of the self at the time. No act of self-expression occurs in a vacuum. But in spite of all these they seem to neglect one very important element in the behaviour of an individual which refutes their whole position. A careful investigation reveals that an intelligent behaviour of an individual, besides being the resultant of a chain of causally related events, possesses an element of 'insight' which may be looked upon as the ego's appreciation of temporal, spatial and causal

¹ *Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 293-5.

relation of things. Out of a complex whole a certain choice is made in view of particular goal which the ego intends to reach. When I struggle in the pursuit of a particular purpose and achieve my desired end, it is then that I am convinced of my efficiency as a personal cause. 'The essential feature of a purposive act is its vision of a future situation which does not admit of any explanation in terms of physiology.' Thus presence of this important element in the analysis of ego's purposive behaviour, which the determinists ignore to consider, the element, namely, of guidance and directive control, clearly proves that the ego is a free personal cause.¹

There is another kind of argument which the determinists often bring forward, argument based on metaphysical consideration, *viz.*, that the freedom of an individual is incompatible with divine omniscience. But here again they have been led astray by a wrong interpretation of the nature of knowledge as applied to God. Knowledge, as commonly understood in the sense of discursive knowledge, involves the duality of subject and object and as such cannot be predicated of the ultimate Ego who, being all-inclusive, cannot be said to be confronted by a 'non-ego'. He possesses a kind of knowledge in which the distinction of subject and object melts away, a kind of knowledge which also creates its objects. Certain thinkers like Jalal-ud-Din Dawwani and Iraqi in the past and Royce in modern times have given us an interpretation of knowledge as applied to God. To them divine knowledge is a single indivisible act of perception by which God becomes 'immediately aware of the entire sweep of history,

¹ Lectures, p. 150.

regarded as an order of specific events, in an eternal now.' But this interpretation, though it contains an element of truth, makes the future to be fully pre-determined, an unalterable order of events. It views the world as a finished product in all its details and God's knowledge as a passive omniscience. We may thereby save God's fore-knowledge of future events but only at the cost of His freedom. "Divine knowledge", therefore, "must be conceived as a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist in their own right are organically related.... The future certainly pre-exists in the organic whole of God's creative life but it pre-exists as an open possibility, not as a fixed order of events with definite outlines."¹ On the basis of such an interpretation it is not impossible to reconcile the two apparently conflicting positions, the freedom of the individual and the omniscience of God. No doubt the spontaneous activity of an individual; in a certain sense, imposes a sort of limitation on the freedom of God, but this limitation is born of His own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participators of His life, power and freedom.²

Coming down to our own times, we find in Bergson a most forceful champion of free will of the individual. His originality, however, lies in his novel point of view with which he approaches this vexed problem. His whole position with regard to this question is based on his conception of life and the function of intellect. He admits that if we view any single action of an individual, the position of the determinists becomes irrefutable : as such it can be logically proved to be entirely determined by what has preced-

¹ *Lectures*, p. 109.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 107-110, 151.

ed it. But then why should we take an individual action in isolation? It is the result of our intellectual outlook which always looks upon life as divided into states of consciousness, as if mutually exclusive. On Bergson's theory, life of an individual ego is a continuous and indivisible flow and when taken as such, it is free and undetermined. Divided into parts life becomes mechanical and automatic, one part and action determined by its preceding parts. But what is true of parts is not true of the personality as a whole. It is the nature of life to be creative and so the ego, as a whole, is creative merely because it is alive. Our belief in determinism arises on account of intellectual analysis of Reality which first dissects a whole and then tries to infer about it on the basis of its parts. Still, it is a fact that though our reasons may try to convince us that determinism is the only true belief, yet in our hearts of heart we never for a moment doubt our capacity for the exercise of free choice when confronted with a particular complex situation. The very reason that we believe in selfhood is when we find that our bodies obey the trend of our desires, when we find that our dreams have been realised. It is only when we experience a world conforming to our desires that we catch the first thrills of personality. Our selfhood is marked off as a definite centre of experience and power. Secondly, the existence of social organisation is another proof that we implicitly believe in free-will. The institution of punishment of crime would be a sacred farce in a world inhabited by people who are the helpless victims of impulses. All the institutions of society, social customs and conventions, education, business, family and state, are founded on the deep con-

viction that people are free to choose between different courses of action.

But we should, however, mention one important point in this connection. According to Iqbal this power of free choice is not a free gift of God : it is to be attained after a hard struggle. With the growth in us of the capacity to overcome obstacles in the attainment of our objects, the power to exercise freedom will develop. Human self appears to be conditioned on all sides by the physical universe which limits the expression of its freedom. Still this control of the physical environment is not absolute : it only serves to mark limits and prescribe method of action. Every time the self exercises its volitional activity with intelligent purpose, it actually changes the envioning conditions in the physical realm. Both through our bodily contact and by several indirect methods invented by the growing scientific research, we can and do affect nature over wide areas. With this change the scope and character of our freedom is modified. It is lessened when we sustain an injury and it is extended when we devise a new method of manipulating nature in accordance with our wishes and ideals. Thus the attainment of freedom depends on the removal of all obstructions in the way of the ego. It is partly free and partly determined and reaches further freedom only when it is able to act in a creative way upon the temporal series. It no longer remains mastered by a world of law and necessity : it becomes a creator itself and shares with the ultimate Power both the capacity and the responsibility of world ordering.¹ But

¹ چندی فرموده سلطان بدر است که ایماں درمیان جبر و قدر است
توهر مخلوق را متجبرور گوئی اسیر بند نزد و دور گوئی

our capacity to act freely and creatively does not always remain with us : there are moments when we are more mechanical than free. Fatigue, hunger, sustained attention and hundred other such causes restrain the scope of self's free expression. When freedom is at zero, the self becomes a part of nature and is completely determined by the law of causation. Iqbal thinks that Islam recognised this fact and was anxious to retain the power to act freely as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego. After a hard day's work and after sleep man tends to become mechanical. In order to protect the ego from these lapses, Islam devised a systematic method of worship at regular intervals during the day and night so as to restore or increase the capacity of freedom by bringing the ego into closer touch with the ultimate Source of life and freedom.¹

But freedom itself is not the end ; it is only a means to the attainment of an object. Freedom for the sake of freedom cannot be looked upon as the goal of man's spiritual development.² In the words of Rumi, it is only the slave who longs for freedom, the lover never craves for it. Our capacity to act freely must

و لے جاں از دم جاں آفرین ست بچندیں جلوہ ها خلوت نشین است
شبیخون بر جهان کیف و کم زد زمجبودی بہ مختاری قدم زد
چو از خود گرد مجبوری فشاند جهان خویش را چوں ناقہ راند
نگردد آسمان بے رخصت او نہ تا بد اخترے بے شفقت او
(زبور عجم-صفحہ 228)

¹ Lectures, p. 151.

² دہر میں عیش دواں آئیں کی پابندی سے ہے
موج کو آزادیاں سامان شیون ہو گئیں
(بانگ درا)

be made to compromise with a reasonable restraint—restraint not from without but one which wholly springs from the self-consciousness of the individual. Thus the development of the ego passes through three stages—the primitive stage of determinism where one is compelled to choose a course of action under the influence of certain external forces ; then the stage of free choice while the last stage may be called that of self-determinism, freedom plus restraint, which in the terminology of the Quran may be called *Iman*. It is only through the experience of love that such transformation is possible. Rumi has beautifully put the idea in the following words : “The nature of higher determinism is recognised only by those in whom God has opened an ‘inward eye.’ At this stage their determinism and freedom are transformed. Do not question how blood is turned into musk or base metal turned into gold. For you freedom and necessity are two contradictory thoughts, entering the souls of the lovers they are synthesized into pure light.”¹ Strong personalities alone are capable of rising to these heights and the higher fatalism implied in it. The famous utterances like *Anal Haq* (I am the Creative Truth) of Hallaj and “I am Destiny” of Amir Muawiya, are the expressions of such higher experiences. A living belief in such a higher form of determinism in no way implies any negation of self : it is rather assertion of one's ego to such a degree as to make all obstacles in its path look insignificant. “(Higher) determinism is the creed of a man of forceful personality ; it is the result of attainment of (spiritual) power. A mature man becomes through it more mature while for a

¹ *Mathnawi* I, l. 1463 ff.

weaker self it is almost death. Determinism of Khalid conquered the world while for us, it serves to weaken and destroy our personality."¹

جبر، دین مرد صاحب همت است جبر مردان از کمال همت است
پخته، مرد پخته تر گردد ز جبر جبر، مرد خام را آغوش قبر
جبر خالد عالم بر هم زند جبر ما بینج و بن ما بر کند

This stage of higher determinism, *i.e.*, surrender of one's power of choice for the sake of conformity with the fundamental law of one's own nature, is the first of the three stages which Iqbal regards as essential for the development of the ego. He calls this stage as 'Obedience to the law'. The detailed discussion about the true significance of law in the life of an individual as well as society will come in the next chapter. Here it may suffice to say that without a proper self-restraint, as is imposed by obedience, the freedom of choice enjoyed by the individual is sure not only to lead him astray and defeat the very purpose of evolution but it will be equally disastrous for the maintenance of social relationship without which an individual cannot hope to attain his desired end. If every body were to be absolutely free accepting what he thinks to be true or false, there would be no knowledge, no science, no morality and no religion. According to the Quran, all objects, lower in the scale of being than man, obey the law of nature and never, for once, swerve from the path laid before them. "The star moves towards its goal with head bowed in surrender to a law." But their obedience to the law does not arise out of their own free choice. It is man alone who is given full option to follow the path or go

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, p. 141.

astray. The two alternatives are open to him and the history of mankind affords sufficient evidence that man often chose to disobey the law of his own nature with, of course, unfavourable consequences. The Quran claims that the message which the ancient prophets brought to mankind at different stages of its history, was meant to give a concrete shape to the general law which God wished humanity to follow. In Islam this concreteness of law has assumed a final shape and therefore Iqbal recommends that an individual should surrender himself, of his own sweet will, to this law. "By obedience the man of no worth is made worthy and by disobedience his fire is turned to ashes."

شکوہ سنج ساختنی آئیں مشو از حدود مصطفیٰ بیرون مرو^۱

The second stage of the discipline is self-control which in the words of Iqbal is the 'highest form of self-consciousness or egohood'. In order to bring out the full realization of the spirit of law, it is essential that the individual should gain control over himself. In the absence of such control, obedience usually degenerates into a mere mechanical and automatic conformity. The real driving force in that case would not be the individual's volitional submission to the law but rather the idea of merely conforming to a spiritless social code and following habit formed under this external compulsion. Adam was born of clay and in his making, according to Iqbal, "love and fear were mingled; fear of this world and of the world to come, fear of death, of all the pains of earth and heaven; love of riches and power, love of country, love of self and kindred and wife." In him, "clay is mixed with water,

¹ "Do not complain of the hardness of the Law (Quran) nor try to transgress the limits laid down by the Prophet."

he is fond of ease, devoted to wickedness and enamoured of evil.”¹ All these elements of his nature are dragging him down to the lowest level of degradation. Immunity and protection against following these baser tendencies lies only in self-control and obedience to the law without which an individual's life will be a mere play-ground of blind instincts and capricious impulses. “He that does not command his own (lower) self becomes a recipient of commands from others.” Instead of controlling himself he will be under the control of his lower nature. In order to help an individual attain self-control, Iqbal suggests him to follow the moral and religious code of Islam in its entirety. First, belief in the fact that there is no supreme power in the world except God. This refusal on the part of an individual to accept any power in the world more supreme and more sublime than his Creator, destroys the possibility of submission to a life of fear and superstition. “So long as you possess the instrument of ‘there is no god but God’ in your hand, you can successfully break the spell of fear. Your heart becomes a shield against fear and no temporal power can overawe you.”

تا عصائے لاله داری بدست هر طلمسم خوف را خواهی شکست
خوف را در سینه او راه نیست خاطرش مرعوب غیر الله نیست

He then recommends all the four remaining obligatory acts of Islam. The daily prayer, in the hands of a Muslim, is ‘like a dagger that kills sin, frowardness and wrong’; fast ‘breaches the citadel of sensuality’; almsgiving ‘causes love of riches to pass away and makes equality familiar’; and fortifies the heart with right-

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 855-862.

eousness and while increasing wealth diminishes fondness for it'; pilgrimage 'is an act of devotion in which all feel themselves to be one' and 'which destroys attachment to one's native land'.¹ All these practices are a means of strengthening the higher nature of man and enable him to achieve full control over body and the baser tendencies. As a logical consequence of both these disciplines, obedience to the law of Islam and control of one's lower self through the prescribed means, the ego attains to the highest stage in life on this earth, viz., God's vicegerency. Such an individual "is the completest Ego, the goal of humanity,² the acme of life both in mind and body, in him discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end.³ He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth.⁴ Out of the richness of his nature, he lavishes the wealth of life on others⁵ and brings them nearer and

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 876-892.

² *Ibid.*, I. 958 :

نوع انسان مزرع و تو حاصلی کاروان زندگی را منزلی

³ *Ibid.*, 939-940 :

طبع فطرت عمرها در خون تپید تا دو بیت ذات او موزون شود

⁴ *Ibid.*, I. 902 : در جهان قائم بامرالله بود

⁵ "His genius abounds with life and desires to manifest itself; he will bring another world into existence . . . He makes every raw nature ripe . . . He teaches age the melody of youth. To the human race he brings both a glad message and warning and he is both as a soldier and as a marshal and a leader. He bestows life by his miraculous actions, he renovates old ways of life. Splendid visions rise from the print of his foot. He gives a new explanation of life." II. 905-916, 931-935, (*Asrar-i-Khudi*)

nearer to himself. The more we advance in evolution the nearer we get to him. In approaching him we are raising ourselves in the scale of life. The development of humanity both in mind and body is a condition precedent to his birth.¹ For the present he is a mere ideal, but the evolution of humanity is tending towards the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who will become his fitting parents. Thus the kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth."²

We now come to the last and most important question of personal immortality. This problem as well as that of free will are, however, both intimately connected with the conception of time without which it would not be possible to appreciate Iqbal's position in this respect. He has thoroughly discussed the question of time in his *Lectures* and to a greater or lesser degree seems to be much influenced by Bergson. In connection with our study of Bergson's philosophy, we saw his peculiar notion of time but in order to grasp Iqbal's theory about immortality (and freedom of ego) it is essential that we should here mention briefly his own views about it. In the history of philosophy several attempts had been made to comprehend the significance of time. But the attempts of most of the thinkers have been unsuccessful only because their method of approach had been merely objective. Iqbal thinks that a true conception about time can be had only if we look at it from the subjective point of view,

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II. 941-942 :

مشت خاک ما سر گردون رسید ز ی غبار آں شهسوار آید پدید

² Introduction (English) to *Asrar-i-Khudi*, pp. xvii—xxix.

viz., in the light of a psychological analysis of our conscious experience.

نغمہ خاموش دارد ساز وقت غوطہ در دل زن کہ بینی راز وقت

The song of time has a silent tune. If you wish to be acquainted with its secret, you must dive into your heart.

Here again we notice that failure of most of the thinkers is due to their refusal to accept the human self as the central point of departure in their discussion. If once we accept this method of approach most of our self-made difficulties would be no difficulties at all. Human self in the eyes of the Quran is one of the main sources of our knowledge, besides the world of nature and history, 'the days of God' in the Quranic terminology. We may doubt the existence of any and everything as Ghazali and Descartes did: what we cannot deny is our own self.¹ It is only in the light of our conscious experience that we can become aware of the nature of reality.

اسرار ازل جوئی؟ بر خود نظرے کن یکتائی و بسیاری، پنهانی و پیدائی

Do you wish to know ultimate Reality? Look at yourself. You are one and many, hidden and apparent.

Our ordinary mental picture of time is in reality a picture of space. To us space and time are two homogeneous media; as two realities in which all the

¹ اگر گوئی کہ 'من' وہم و گمان است نمودش چوں نمود این و آن ست
یگویدا من کہ دارائے گماں کیست؟ یکے درخود نگر آں بے نشان کیست
جہاں پیدا و محتاج دلیلہ نمی آید بہ فکر جبرئیل
خودی پنهان ز حجت بے نیاز است

یکے اندیش و دریاب این چہ راز است

(زبور عجم - صفحہ 237)

parts are of exactly the same kind, in which there are no qualitative differences and no actual divisions between one part and another part; it is the objects and events that fill them that are different and divided. In space, material objects lie outside one another; and in time, conscious states succeed one another. Our ordinary conception of time, as a medium in which events happen, or more properly speaking, 'take place', is only a symbolic representation of space. It is this spatial conception of time that makes us think of ourselves as made up of elements that can be measured and counted like material objects and of our activities as the play of these elements. In order to be able to appreciate the true significance of time, we must refer to the psychological analysis of conscious experience. In the words of Bergson, "I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold. I am merry or sad. I work or do nothing. I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas—such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing."¹ This constant change, which is seen to be the very texture of our conscious life, when viewed objectively, is nothing but succession of different states following one another as if lying one beside the other in space. But real change is not succession. States of consciousness do not lie outside one another; they in-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 1.

فریب نظر ہے سکون و ثبات تڑپتا ہے ہر ذرۂ کائنات
 ٹہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود کہ ہر لحظہ ہے تازہ شان وجود
 سمجھتا ہے تو راز ہے زندگی فقط ذوق پرواز ہے زندگی
 (بال جبریل - صفحہ 171)

terpenetrate and the whole individual consciousness changes without ceasing. In real change there are no states that change; everything is a living, moving present.

The objective way of looking at the problem of time and change is mainly confined to the scientific man who relies on his sense-perception and intellect and therefore has its utility within certain limits. We have seen that science has enabled man to control and dominate his physical environment and it is for this purpose that intellect, in the service of science, has seen fit to cut up the unity of flow of time and change into separate elements. But it is only when we rise higher and come to the sphere of intuition—and we saw that for the development of the ego we must step out of that limited outlook—that we can appreciate the true meaning of time and change. This basic distinction of two different stages of ego's development, intellectual and intuitive, gives rise to a similar distinction of two different levels of self, efficient and appreciative. The efficient self is the self of our daily life which for the sake of our practical needs looks at time and change objectively. As such, it seems to live outside itself and though it retains its unity as a totality, yet it manifests itself as nothing more than a series of specific and consequently numerable states. Therefore it is the time of the efficient self of which we predicate long and short. It is this view of reality that makes the human ego subject to the change of time and his activities as the result of external forces. The whole deterministic view of life, as science itself which supports this view, takes rise from this limited outlook of the efficient self. The tripartite division of serial

time by Indian thinkers eloquently speaks of the fatal consequences of a wrong notion of time. A certain period (*viz*, Kalajuga) in the history of mankind is such as would produce evil deeds in abundance. In other words, during that period humanity will be under the evil influence of certain external forces and as a result of that would be so much morally depraved as not to realize the difference between good and evil. If we view time as an extended line which we can divide into past, present and future and measure by night and day, the logical conclusion would be that man is ruled by time beyond which he cannot go.

اے اسیر دوش و فردا! درنگر در دل خود عالم دیگر نگر
در گل خود تنخم ظلمت کاشتی وقت را مثل خطہ پنداشتی
باز با پیمانہ لیل و نہار فکر تو پیمود طول روزگار
وقت را مثل مکان گسترده امتیاز دوش و فردا کردہ
اے چو بوم کردہ از بستان خویش ساختی از دست خود زندان خویش

"O you who are enthralled within the narrow limits of yesterday and to-morrow, look within your heart and witness a new world. You have sown the seed of darkness in your clay by imagining Time as a line. Then your thought measures time with the measure of day and night. You have extended time like space and distinguished yesterday from to-morrow. You have fled, like scent, from your own garden and made your prison with your own hand."¹

Just as it is essential to step beyond the confining

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, ll. 1549-1554; ll. 1571-1574.

خرد ہوئی ہے زمان و مکان کی زناری نہ ہے زمان نہ مکان، لا الہ الا اللہ
(ضرب کلیم - صفحہ 7)

See also *Zabur-i-Ajam*, p. 216 and *Jawaid Nama*, pp. 17-22

limits of intellect, similarly it is indispensable for the true evolution of the ego to leave aside the objective view of time and reach its inner significance by looking at the appreciative level of the self which, however, is not often manifest. In our practical pursuits after worldly objects, the appreciative self remains hidden and it is only in moments of profound meditation that we can catch a glimpse of it. It is only through this experience that we can understand time. Here we do perceive change and movement but they are indivisible and their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. The states of the appreciative self cannot be numerically separated nor is its unity, like the efficient self, quantitative. Its time is a single 'now' which the efficient self, in its dealings with the material world, cuts into a series of separate 'nows' like pearl beads in a thread. "Pure time, then, is not a string of separate, reversible instants; it is an organic whole, in which the past is not left behind, but is moving along with, and operating in the present. And the future is given to it not as lying before yet to be traversed; it is given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility. . . . If time is real, and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which makes conscious experience a delusion, then every moment in the life of Reality is original. *To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation.*"¹ We have seen in discussing Bergson that his analysis of conscious experience was defective in one respect. According to him, the vital force is not teleological and

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 67-68.

his conclusion is based on a wrong analysis of our experience which he interprets as the past moving along with and operating in the present. He seems to overlook the forward-looking aspect in the unity of consciousness. Besides the operation of the past in the present, there is also an element of purpose in it and it is this element which discloses a kind of future direction. "The past and future both operate in the present state of consciousness and the future is not wholly undetermined."

آسودہ وسیارم، ایسی طرفہ تماشا یابی در بادۂ امروز، کیفیت فردا یابی

Is it not strange that I am stationary as well as moving? In my wine of the present discern the sign of future.¹

In the following verses where he makes a distinction between a free and a bond man, he draws a dividing line between these two conceptions of time and their corresponding consequences: "A slave becomes naught within the limits of day and night while for a free man days and nights become naught. A slave likes to handle second-hand material and his life-experiences lack originality. A free man is constantly engaged in creating and singing new songs at every moment of his life. For a slave, time becomes his fetters and nothing but *taqdir* is on his lips. A free man on the other hand is a co-worker with fate and new events take shape at his hands. His present carries past and future in its sweep and his moments are expressive of 'ages'."²

¹ *Piym-i-Mashriq*, p. 102.

² Compare also the following:

خرد دیکھے اگر دل کی نگاہ سے جہاں روشن ہے نور لا الہ سے
فقط اک گردشِ شام و سحر ہے اگر دیکھیں فروغِ مہر و ماہ سے

عبد گردد یا وہ در لیل و نہار در دل حر یا وہ گردد روزگار
عبد را تحصیل حاصل فطرت است واردات جان او بے ندرت است
دمبدم نو آفرینی کار حر نعمہ پیہم تازہ ریزد تار حر
عبد را ایام زنجیر است و بس بر لب او حرف تقدیر است و بس
ہمت حر با قضا گردد مشیر حادثات از دست او صورت پذیر
رفتہ و آئندہ در موجود او دہرہا آسودہ اندر زود او

Iqbal thinks that it is only through love that an individual can attain this high position. In the *Jawaid Nama* he invokes the Spirit of time whom he calls *Zurwan*. This spirit declares that only he who adopts the principle: "I have a time with God" can be free from the all-pervading bondage of time. 'I have a time with God' (لی مع اللہ) refers to a famous tradition of the Holy Prophet who said: "I have a time with God of such a sort that neither angel nor prophet is my peer", meaning that he felt himself to be timeless.

Thus we see that the time of the ego in its appreciative level is fundamentally different from the time-span of the physical world. While the duration of the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact, the ego's duration is concentrated within it and linked with its present and future in a unique manner. True time-duration belongs to the ego alone. To exist in time is to be a self and to be a self is to be able to

کہو نہ جا امں ستحر و شام میں اے صاحب ہوش
اک جہاں اور بھی ہے جسمیں نہ فردا ہے نہ دوش
(بال جبریل - صفحہ 107)

اسی روز و شب میں التجہ کر نہ رہ جا
کہ تیرے زمان و مکاں اور بھی ہیں
(بال جبریل - صفحہ 90)

say 'I am'. It is the degree of the intuition of 'I-amness' that determines the place of a thing in the scale of being.

منکر حق نرد ملا کافر است منکر خود نرد من کافر تر است

He who denies God is an infidel in the eyes of theologians. But he who refuses to believe in (the infinite possibilities of) human self is a greater infidel in my eyes.

To be in pure time brings to the ego its freedom, creativity and immortality. Man who has attained a relatively perfect egohood, possesses a privileged position in the heart of divine creative energy and is capable of consciously participating in the creative life of God. "Endowed with the power to imagine a better world, and to mould 'what is' into 'what ought to be', the ego aspires to exploit all the various environments on which he may be called upon to operate during the course of an endless career."¹

If such is the position of the human ego in the divine creative activity, what is, then, the significance of death? The modern interpretation of the theory of evolution does not see any utility in this phenomenon. The naturalists started with the wrong assumption that the highest stage of evolution has reached in man and that there is no possibility of further advance. As a consequence, they could not see any biological utility in death. Thus the theory of evolution brought to the modern man nothing but despair

¹ Lectures, pp 100-101:

چوں زمین و آسمان را طے کنی
ایں جهان و آن جہاں را طے کنی
از خدا هفت آسمان دیگر طلب
صد زمان و صد مکان دیگر طلب
(جاوید نامہ - صفحہ 29)

about the future. Rumi's interpretation, however, was not vitiated by such a wrong assumption. To him the vital force of love that operates in the animal kingdom and transforms it into humanity is equally present in man and urges him on to higher spheres. Therefore on his theory death is not annihilation: it is only transformation of a baser metal into a purer form. Just as death from inorganic kingdom meant reappearance in the organic sphere similarly the phenomenon of death among human beings is of great biological utility. It is a door through which man must pass in order to attain still higher stages. This 'new birth'¹ is possible for all but is actualized only in the case of those who adopt in this life modes of thought and activity which tend to maintain the state of tension of the ego, who develop their self in a particular way. Thus immortality, in the eyes of Iqbal, is an ideal which may or may not be attained by all. Its achievement depends upon one's personal efforts. "Blessed is He . . . who has created life and death to test which of you is the best in point of deed."² Life offers to the ego a great scope for personal efforts to achieve the ideal of immortality and death is perhaps the first test whereby the synthetic activity of the ego is brought to trial.³ If our activity is directed towards maintaining the state of tension (egohood) the shock of death is not likely to

¹ See *Jawaid Nama*, pp. 15-17 where Iqbal describes this 'new birth' and means whereby to attain it:

زادن طفل از شکست اشکم است زادن مرد از شکست عالم است
آں یکے محتاجی روز و شب است وآن دگر روز و شب اورا مرکب است

² The Quran, 167: 2.

³ ہمیری، گر بہ تن جانے نہ داری وگر جانے بہ تن داری، ہمیری
(پیام مشرق - صفحہ 24)

affect it. It is its own mode of life which will determine whether the ego would be subject to dissolution at the time of death or enter a new life of fresh possibilities. For the latter, death is only a passage to what the Quran calls *Barzakh* or intermediate state which lasts until the Day of Resurrection. This intermediate state of consciousness enables the ego to adapt itself to a new order of space and time. With the dissolution of our physical medium (body) at the time of death, which seems to be greatly responsible for our present view of time, a change is bound to occur in our attitude towards the spatio-temporal order. Viewed thus *Burzakh* would be not a passive state of expectation but a sort of preparatory stage in which the ego learns to adapt itself to a new environment. Thus the struggle which was essential for the fortification of the ego against dissolution at the time of death, must continue after death till resurrection is won. "Resurrection, therefore, is not an external event. It is the consummation of a life process within the ego."¹ In the introduction (English) to the *Asrar-i-Khudi* Iqbal says: "Time is not an infinite line through which we must pass whether we wish it or not. This idea of time is adulterated. Pure time has no length . . . By breaking up time and movement we spatialize it and then find difficulty in getting over it. The true nature of time is reached when we look into our deeper self. Real time is life itself which can preserve itself by maintaining that particular state of tension (personality) which it has so far achieved. We are subject to time so long as we look upon time as something spatial. Spatialized time is a fetter which life has forged for

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 167-7 ff.

itself in order to assimilate the present environment. In reality we are timeless . . .”¹

تو کہ از صل زمان آگہ نہ از حیات جاوداں آگہ نہ
تا کجا در روز و شب باشی اسیر رمز وقت از لی مع الله یاد گیر
این و آن پیدا ست از رفتار وقت زندگی سرے ست از اسرار وقت
وقت ما کو اول و آخر ندید از خیابان ضمیر ما دمید
زنده از عرفان اصلش زنده تر هستی او از سحر تابنده تر
زندگی از دهر و دهر از زندگی ست لا تسبوا الدھر فرمان نبی است

“Knowing not the origin of Time, you are ignorant of everlasting life. How long will you be a thrall of night and day? Learn the mystery of time from the words ‘I have time with God’. Phenomena arise from the march of Time and life itself is one of Time’s mysteries. Our Time, which has neither beginning nor end, blossoms from the flower-bed of our mind. To know its root quickens the living with new life, its being is more splendid than the dawn. Life is Time and Time is Life; ‘Do not abuse Time’ was the demand of the prophet.”²

According to Iqbal the last stage of human evolution does not imply any loss of individuality. As the Quran says: “And each of them shall come to Him on the Day of Resurrection as a *single individual*” (19:95), man shall retain both his individuality and finitude. Immortality without the survival of one’s individuality would be nothing desirable. If our future life is not going to be continuous with our present, if our new experiences there will not be based on the experiences of this earthly life, then there can be no charm in that prospect of immortality. It would not be in any sense

¹ Pp. xxiii—xxv.

² *Asrar-i-Khudi*, ll. 1561-66, 1575-80.

survival, but the emergence of something totally new. Iqbal therefore suggests that, according to the Quran, liberation from finitude is not contemplated. The climax of this development is reached when the ego is able to retain full self-possession even in the face of direct contact with the all-embracing Ego. The Quran says of the Prophet's vision of the ultimate Ego: "His eye turned not aside nor did it wander." (53 : 17) This is the ideal of perfect manhood in Islam.¹

موسى ز هوش رفت به یک جلوه صفات
تو عین ذات می نگری، در تبسمی

Moses fainted away by a mere surface illumination of Reality: You see the very substance of Reality with a smile.

The finite ego must remain distinct, though not isolated, from the Infinite. He thus totally rejects the wrong notion current in Persian mysticism that the end of human evolution is final absorption into God. On the contrary, the perfect individual not only absorbs the world of matter; by absorbing it he absorbs God Himself into his ego.² Explaining this point, Iqbal

¹ Lectures, p. 163.

² Compare the following:

آنچه در عالم نگنجد آدم است آنچه در آدم بگنجد عالم است
(جاوید نامه)

به بتکرش گم شدن انجام ما نیست اگر او را تو در گیری فنا نیست
خودی اندر خودی گنجد محال است خودی را عین خود بودن کمال است
(زبور عجم - صفحہ 222)

چنان با ذات حق خلوت گزینی ترا او بیند و او را تو بینی
بخود محکم گذار اندر حضورش مشو نا پید اندر بتکرش
(زبور عجم - صفحہ 232)

says : " Maulana Rumi has very beautifully expressed this idea. The prophet, when a little boy, was once lost in the desert. His nurse was almost beside herself with grief but while roaming the desert in search of the boy she heard a voice saying :

Do not grieve, he will not be lost to thee ;

Nay, the whole world will be lost in him.

The true individual cannot be lost in the world ; it is the world that is lost in him. I go a step further and say :

در رضائش مرضی حق گم شود این سخن کے باور مردم شود

In his will that which God wills becomes lost :
How shall a man believe this saying ?"¹

It is this absorption of divine attributes, to which there is no limit, that raises an ego to the rank of Divine Vicegerency.

پیش این نور اربمانی استوار حی وقائم چوں خدا خود را شمار

If you remain steadfast before this Eternal Light, then you become eternal and living like God.²

¹ Introduction (Eng.) to *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. xx.

² *Jawaid Nama*, p. 14.

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY

Society is the standing wonder of our existence ; a true region of the supernatural ; as it were, a second all-embracing life, wherein our first individual life becomes doubly and trebly alive, and whatever of infinitude was in us bodies itself forth, and becomes visible and active.

—CARLYLE.

No society can be upheld in happiness and honour without the sentiment of religion.

—LAPLACE.

In the *Jawaid Nama*¹ Iqbal has enumerated three stages in the growth of the ego. The first is the realization of one's own self ; the second is to see oneself in the light of other selves while the third is the realization of God's personality and to see one's self in this light. We have already dealt in the previous chapter with the development of self in its first and third categories. The development of self in its second category is the subject matter of the present chapter.

It is commonly believed (and several writers of eminence seem to support this belief) that there exists a sort of opposition between the individual and society. Spencer, for instance, holds that the development of society is inimical to the development of individuality. There seems to be a strong opposition, according to him, between 'perpetuation' of race through family life and 'individuation', viz., full development of the powers of a particular member of the race. Similarly, according to Bosanquet, society is something above and beyond the totality of individuals composing it

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, p. 14.

and hence the purpose of society is something different from, and bigger than, the purposes of its members. But surely these are all misleading views. Society exists whenever living beings enter into or maintain willed relations with one another. Welfare of society is nothing beyond the welfare of its members. It is possible and sometimes it becomes inevitable that some individuals should sacrifice themselves for the good of others, for the welfare of society. But from this it does not follow that all individuals can be sacrificed for the common good: for there exists no good which can properly be called common and still requires the sacrifice of the individual members composing the community. Society exists only in its members. If we claim to pursue any social ideal which is something other than the good of social individuals, then surely our pursuit is nothing but a wild-goose chase. It was on the basis of such an incorrect conception of relationship between individual and society that certain practically harmful theories about the nature and function of state were formulated and practised. To Hegel state possessed some mystic and independent sovereignty which individuals did not possess and which they should in no case defy. Rousseau asserted that people as sovereign cannot err though as individuals they often go wrong. As a logical consequence of it we find Comte and Fichte advocating complete self-denial on the part of individuals for the sake of society. "There is but a single virtue—to forget oneself as individual. There is but a single vice—to look to oneself", said Fichte. This moral maxim, though apparently advocating the good of the whole, is really the negation of self-

development. It is not the complete end of our life to serve our fellows or our country or race. To reduce individuals to the level of mere means for the welfare of society does not seem valid thinking. We should rather follow the famous Kantian maxim and act in a way as to regard every individual (including, of course, ourselves) as an end in himself and not as a mere means. If I am striving for the good of others, it naturally means that I am trying to produce certain conditions of life which will benefit them as well as me. Nietzsche, on the other hand, seeks to elevate the individual and rob society of its true function. According to him, society is the cunning device of the weak to bind the strong. Contrary to what Comte and Fichte teach, he advocates that individuals should throw off the yoke which society (taken in abstraction as a hypothetical super-entity) imposes on them. The mistake here, again, lies in the wrong interpretation put upon social relationship. The very harmonious growth of an individual is not possible without society. Social relations are not nets in which personality is enmeshed but rather functions of the personality of each individual that comes into contact with others of his type. There exists no opposition between the two: individuals are all social individuals and the good of the one is the good of the other. Social relationship is not anything external to the individuals related like the couplings which join the railway carriages. For instance, the relation of a father to a son does not lie in some intermediate area between the two. It is a spiritual relationship based on the mutual appreciation of the sense of obligation and affection. The individual is the real unit of society

and the value and worth of society consists in the extent to which its individuals realize their personalities in it. Individuality and sociality are not mutually exclusive but collectively determine the growth of personality as well as society.

The individual comes into the world with several instincts. Comparatively speaking, the total store of impulses which he inherits are far less perfect than those which the animals, lower in the scale of evolution to him, possess. But, on the contrary, he is more plastic and educable. He possesses the two apparently opposite tendencies of individualism and collectivism and his development consists in a sort of compromise between the two which is achieved through education and general training. The more individualistic factors are concerned with the preservation and advancement of vegetative and animal life and as such are strong and self-seeking. But along with these there are certain tendencies in him which are of a gregarious type, that also develop along with the more egoistic impulses. Bashfulness, shame and jealousy are some of the fundamental tendencies rooted in the organic structure of the baby. Besides these there are certain other natural propensities in man more active in the life of children which positively contribute to the process of socialization, *viz.*, play and imitation. The period of play is afforded by nature only to human child and young ones of certain animals who at the time of birth are ill-adapted to meet the concrete situations of life; their wealth of inheritance is lower while their capacity for receiving training is higher. This period of utter helplessness is greater in the case of man. It is in play that the human children come into most fruitful social

relations with one another. It is one of the great meeting places of the forces of individualism and collectivism. Similarly the imitative impulse helps the child much in this process. He imitates his elders in their actions and behaviours and thus learns his own powers and limitations. By imitation he learns the language of the community to which he belongs and other tools of culture and thus enters into the social heritage. But imitation as a great socializing force is not to be regarded as a mere slavish following of what others do ; it is rather a means to further ends, a method by which the child assimilates what he requires from his environment and then employs it according to his own temper and genius.

Thus the individual is simply social by the same right that he is personal. He does not have two lives, two sets of mutually exclusive interests, two opposing selves : one personal and the other social. He has only one self which is personal and social in one by right of the essential and normal movement of his growth. The social relationship is nothing external, it is intrinsic to the life, interests and purposes of the individual. Thus self is personality woven of individuality and sociality both of which develop side by side. By individuality we mean the capacity for self-determination and self-direction which is the prerogative of only an autonomous being. A true individual does not slavishly follow the standards of conduct which have only external sanctions and is not bound by the blind forces of tradition, custom and authority. " It is the sense of the inner responsibility for conduct which alone can make man free. It is not selfishness or self-centredness. It is simply being oneself and individuali-

ty is great or small according to the strength and breadth of intrinsic purpose." Sociality, on the other hand, is the quality whereby people are able to establish wider and profounder relationships with one another, whereby they develop a deep sense of obligation to, and responsibility for, others. These two qualities are the inseparable elements of one's personality and develop together; the one is meaningless without the other. As no right exists without duty, no power without moral responsibility, no freedom without order, so there can be no individuality without sociality. Where individuality is more advanced, there social relations are more complex and intimate. The truly great man is not he who is independent of society; it is rather he who most depends on it. The individuality that cuts itself loose from social relationship in reality cuts the very chords of its life.

Human sociality is a composite impulse, the first ingredient of which may be said to be animal gregariousness, a mechanical response to a stimulus. But just as man is far above animals in most other aspects, similarly human sociality is not merely mechanical and so goes much beyond gregariousness. It has a positive psychological factor. It keeps the human mind intact; in other words, it maintains its sanity. It is true that some people fed up by constant companionship seem to yearn for solitude and, of course, for most people living in cities and towns such a change would be welcome; yet after a short time it is bound to become a torment and, in most cases, if this solitude assumes a sort of punishment in the form of solitary confinement, loss of mental equilibrium sets in. People who are accustomed to pass most of their

days in places away from human habitation and association, like sheep-breeders and herders, more often than not, assume queer habits. All these facts prove that the 'need for society is a need for some mental salt, without which this robust and seemingly self-sufficient thinking apparatus falls mysteriously out of order.' Besides, the rate and range of our flow of ideas depends on social intercourse. This will be evident when two persons meet together in conversation. Much of this effect depends on the amount of speaking done by both and defectiveness in speech often indicates deficiency in social instinct. Again, the value that we attach to certain objects and functions tends to increase in society and this rule is applicable both to positive as well as to negative values. Leaving aside certain types of enjoyment, as *e.g.*, sense-pleasure, which demand solitude for their fulfilment, we may say that the quality of our experience in society is different from that in solitude. Take, for instance, the enjoyment which people take in eating in company. Men have contrived to make meal-time a social occasion because the social context tends to enhance the food-enjoyment. Similary unpleasant experiences become less unpleasant and neutral experiences become positively pleasurable. The presence of an agreeable person often changes the whole quality of a work. What in solitude may be mere drudgery becomes a source of enjoyment when done in the company of a comrade. The well-known Persian saying: "The death of a crowd becomes an occasion for merrymaking"¹ is based on this psychological insight that companionship heightens pleasure and

¹ مرگ انبوه جشن دارد

decreases pain. "It is a psychological truth", says Iqbal, "that association multiplies the normal man's power of perception, deepens his emotions and dynamises his will to a degree unknown to him in the privacy of his individuality."¹

Psychologically speaking, the earlier form of human activity is the mental act of perception by which the child is able to find his way in the world. This act of perception is stimulated by the presence of objects situated in the first instance in the world external to him but has at the same time much that is contributed by the mind itself. This interpretation which the mind puts upon the physical objects is what we call perception. To perceive thus is to judge and there can be no judgment unless we have some sort of standard, however vague and indefinite at the first stage, wherewith to judge. When a child pronounces a stick to be crooked, he is employing a standard of straightness. Thus every activity of human self implies in one sense or other the application of standards. When a child becomes capable of companionship and enters the society of his friends, he often finds that several of his activities and hence his standards of judgment are challenged by others. As soon as we discover this divergence we set out to review the whole ground and try to sift the truth and thus arrive at a position which may be the rejection of our own standard and adoption of others' or rejection of others' point of view and retention of our own. When, on the other hand, our standard is found to correspond to other people's standards we take this fact as a circumstantial

¹ Lectures, p. 127.

evidence for the validity of our own. Thus we see that we depend on society for our self-measurement (*Ihtisab*). Our standards of judgment are ours and they are nothing if they are not our own, yet it is due to social contact alone that we come either to confirm them or modify them. It gives us a criterion by which we are able to measure our achievements.

فرد را ربط جماعت رحمت است جوهر او را کمال از ملت است
فرد می گیرد از ملت احترام ملت از افراد می یابد نظام
در دلش ذوق نمو از ملت است احتساب کار او از ملت است
پخته تر از گرمی صحبت شود تا بمعنی فرد هم ملت شود
فرد تنها از مقاصد غافل است قوتش آشفتنی را مائل است

"Social relationship is a source of blessing to an individual whose latent capacities are thereby actualized. His position is strengthened thereby and similarly society gets its organisation through its members (*i.e.*, there is a mutual give and take). He gets the power of self-expression and the capacity of self-measurement through it. He becomes saner through social contact. Without it an individual is unaware of ideals and value-judgments and his capacity for self-activity tends to deteriorate."¹ William McDougall says: "It would seem probable that, apart from the influence of society in moulding the characters of its members, the behaviour of all men would be as rude, as ruthlessly self-seeking, as unrestrained by any moral considerations as the behaviour of most other mammals."²

The law that individuality and sociality develop *pari passu*, that where individuality is less developed sociality will be less complex and correspondingly

¹ Ramuz-i-Bekhudi, pp. 2-3.

² W. McDougall: *Energies of Man*, Chap. VIII.

where individuality is more developed, sociality will be more complex, can be easily illustrated in the life history of the individual as well as that of society. Let us first take the aspect of individuality. In the lower scale of evolution, in plant life and in lower animals, the very first form of individuation, the physical demarcation between individuals, is incomplete. As life increases we find a corresponding increase in individuality, first physical and then psychical. The study of primitive society similarly reveals the insignificance of individuality. Each clan or tribe was represented by a sort of symbol (totem) with which each individual identified his personality—may that symbol be crow or cow, wolf or eagle. Such a form of primitive society was ruled by a complete uniformity of custom, divergence from which was never tolerated and always repressed. There was a particular mode of thought and life set for all the members to follow and no scope was allowed for the expression of individual's freedom of choice. There was only one religion which all accepted, one series of ceremonial observance from childhood to old age which all must keep, only one code of moral obligation which did not require the application of any individual's moral sense. The other great characteristic of the primitive societies was that they were too much under the influence of abstract ideals. The common belief that abstract ideas appear later in the history of man's intellectual development, does not seem to be verified on empirical grounds. For early people the type was more important than its manifestations and to them preservation of human type was so important as to necessitate the suppression of the

individual. The transition from the attachment to abstract ideals to the appreciation of the concrete values is a sure sign of progress.¹

Life of a child reveals the same characteristics. He is more self-centred and less self-determining and so his social relationship is correspondingly simple and external. As a member of family or school he feels strongly proud and loyal but his pride and loyalty are competitive. His family is better than others, his school is the best for which he wishes all good things and wants it to win in all contests with others. He seems to invest them with a form of bigger individuality. He has no sense of his own personality or of others. He only knows the type. He has sympathy for those who conform to the type and a sort of hatred or indifference towards those who diverge from it. His comradeships are momentary; his associations, the affairs of a day and his likes and dislikes, transitory. He is ruled by conventions and customs in everything.

The other aspect of personality is sociality. It is here that most confusing ideas are prevalent. It is often believed that as personality increases men become independent of society—a belief based on a totally wrong interpretation put upon the significance and value of society. It is not a mere mechanism but life itself and nobody can escape it without at the same time suffering the loss of the vital force of his

¹ This important point was grasped by the western world only with the growth of modern scientific spirit while the Quran, centuries ago, had emphasized the concrete in contrast to the abstract. It was this aspect of the Quran that in the long run brought about a revolt among the Muslim thinkers against the purely speculative philosophy of the Greeks. See *Lectures*, p. 182.

being. The quality of sociality is greater in those who possess a correspondingly greater capacity for growth : it is least in the lowest and increases with every increase of life. Thus the lowest animals are born with a full and complete paraphernalia of instincts and are ready at their birth to respond to the various stimuli of their environment. As we rise higher in the scale of life we find a gradual increase in the helplessness of the individual at the time of birth till we come to man. "Human nature is undoubtedly the most plastic part of the animal world, the most adaptable. Of all animals it is man in whom heredity counts for least and conscious building forces for most. His infancy is longest, his instincts least fixed, his brain most unfinished at birth, his power of habit-making and habit-changing most marked, his susceptibilities to social impressions utmost." All these factors clearly imply a great need for men to learn as well as facility for learning, in short, a great dependence on society. The more perfect are the instincts, the less social is the being ; the less perfect the instincts the more social is the being. Thus several institutions like family and school are particularly set up for the welfare of the new members of the society.

We have so far tried to establish that sociality and individuality are two complementary aspects of personality and neither can exist and grow without the other. Where the forms of social relationships have been less complex and more uniform, as in primitive societies, the individuality has not been allowed its full scope for free expression. There remains, however, one more point in this connection which needs full consideration. As individuals gradually learn to assert

their right of free moral choice independent of the prevalent code of conduct, the social relations have correspondingly grown to be more differentiated. By 'differentiation' we mean the process by which the different functions and aspects of society gradually become distinguished one from the other and separate associations begin to be formed for their fulfilment. The history of society is the history of the slow process in which various social forms emerged in their distinctness. In primitive societies there was no family, no religion, no state, in the present sense of the terms. Custom was law and law was custom. Custom and morality were one. As personality developed, it tended to dissolve the primitive coherence of all aspects of life. There have been periods, in the human history, coming at regular intervals, of restless transition which disturbed the prevalent order established by the majority, but which, at the same time, were directed towards the establishment of a form of society more suited to the growing demands of human personality. The family in primitive society, for example, was identified with the whole community. Blood-bond was the basis of the group, each member of which was related to others as brethren sprung from one ancestry. It helped, protected, and even avenged its members. This kin-bond was so strong that its survivals are still met with in certain races. The Hebrew levirate and the Hindu *niyoga* are a few remnants of that bygone age. But gradually, with the change of circumstances, some natural and some brought about by men themselves, the jurisdiction of family became less extensive. With the appearance of political and economic sense and the introduction of

the principle of division of labour, the distinctions of class and rank, well-born and base-born, began to operate and the tribe grew into a race. Members of a clan ceased to be regarded as members of one family bound together by ties of blood-relationship; the patriarch was no longer the sole law-giver for all. As this differentiation proceeded further the family lost its all-comprehensiveness. But, 'as it lost function after function it found its own. It became an association within which husband and wife became father and mother, bound by a simple tie, animated by a clarified emotion which begins in the love of the sexes and develops into the affection, intimacy and devotion of the circle of parents and children. What it lost in extent, it gained in quality.' More than anything else, woman in such a limited family ceased to be a kind of property and became a personality and acquired an equal status with man.

But this growing process of differentiation in society, which we have illustrated above in the case of family alone, brings with it a very serious problem. When the homogeneous primitive society breaks and gives place to different associations, political, economic, religious and cultural, it produces correspondingly, in the individual, a deep conflict between loyalties towards different institutions. In such circumstances he needs a coherent philosophy of life. So long as society was undifferentiated, its members could easily secure unity in their lives by following a single system of sanctions, custom and traditions. There was no occasion for the appearance of conflict between different standards and hence no problem. The homogeneity of the social environment afforded

simple devotion to one allegiance and this conformity supplied the much-needed stability and coherence to the individual. But with the break-up of this primitive form of social relationship, men found themselves torn away between devotions to different associations. A man often adopts a single profession where he may follow a particular standard of conduct established within that circle; but he also belongs to various other associations, family, club, church, economic group, etc. If unfortunately he possesses no consistent philosophy of life to guide him in all the multiform spheres of his activities, he may find himself in a serious predicament when he comes across almost contradictory standards and values in different associations. "Speaking generally, our (*i.e.*, Western) ethical capital consists of a heterogeneous collection of provincial moralities.... By means of them society keeps in motion, but in spite of enormous waste consumed upon the frictions which retard the motion, we have no universal ethical standard to which one class may appeal against another class and get a verdict which the defeated litigant feels bound to accept.... Suppose, for instance, we are in the midst of a labour conflict. It is proposed to arbitrate the difficulty. Representatives of the conflicting parties meet. A looker-on, if he happens to be a philosopher, soon discovers that the issue cannot be decided on ethical grounds, for the conflicting parties, and perhaps the arbitrating board, have each a different standard of ethics. The employers' ethics are founded upon conceptions of the rights of property. The employees' ethics take as their standard certain conceptions of the right of labour.... There is no common ethical appeal.

Neither litigants nor referees can convince the others that they must recognise a paramount standard of right. The decision has to be reached either by resort to force or by a compromise of claims, each of which continues to assert its full title inspite of the pressure of circumstances." ¹

This long quotation brings to the forefront the important problem created by the ever-growing differentiation of society especially in the present age, viz., the problem how to tackle and satisfactorily resolve the conflict arising out of different standards of conduct followed in different spheres of life, to all of which a particular individual belongs. But the seriousness of the situation need not be over-emphasized. The process of differentiation, as we saw, follows the growth and development of human self and this growth consists, not merely in the greater power of man over his physical environment but equally in the rise of his ethical autonomy, his sense of right and wrong, a free determination of his conduct unhindered by any static laws of behaviour fixed by others. Just as he learns more and more how to control and utilize natural forces to his own advantage, similarly he attains a level of moral consciousness, a freedom of choice, unburdened by the weight of blind allegiance to any particular social code, higher than ever reached by his ancestors. The solution of the problem lies, in short, in the emergence of man as a free moral and social agent. In primitive groups the principle of corporate responsibility was fully operative. The group was held responsible for the good or evil deeds of

¹ *General Sociology* by Professor Small as quoted in *Community* by Maciver, pp. 302-3.

its members; the whole family was to be punished for the mis-deeds of its units and sons were thought to suffer for the sins of their parents. In the pre-Islamic days in Arabia, a clan regarded its sacred duty to avenge the death of any of its units by slaying any member of the clan to which the murderer belonged and thus bloody warfares went on for centuries. The acceptance of such a law is a clear index that the people of that age hardly appreciated the ethical autonomy of the individual. Islam in a definite and emphatic way declared each man to be solely responsible for the good and evil deeds that he may do in life and not for those of others. It was the first ray of light in a dark period of moral decadence. It affirmed unequivocally that each man is a free moral agent. It is for him to follow the right path or to go astray and thus reap the fruit of his deeds for himself. "Lo! we have shown him the way; it is now for him to be grateful (by following it) or disbelieving."¹

Besides this doctrine of corporate responsibility which afforded, during the infancy of mankind, a sort of stability to the individual in his social life, another equally important device was employed. Not able to realize the true significance of, and use, moral autonomy, primitive people needed a rigorous super-social sanction for adopting a particular code of conduct. It was essential so long as autonomous personality had not awakened to its fullness. Primitive people are like children who have the intelligence to obey the law but cannot perceive the true reason of the law which they follow. So long as a group follows a particular code of behaviour merely because it has some social or

¹ The Quran, 76:3.

religious sanction behind it, it is primitive in character. The emergence of man as a truly free moral agent necessitates that he must see the reason of law and discover an inner sanction for it besides its extraneous justification. This stage is fully revealed in the conflicts, recorded by history, between a new ethical spirit and the dogmatised ethics of the past, which take the form of revolts by a particular individual against the corrupted form of an ancient religion that was once itself a bearer of a vital message of deliverance to the down-trodden masses. Christianity, for instance, was a symbol of a new ideal in contrast to the dogmatism of the degenerate Israelites. The main problem before its founder was a search for an independent content for spiritual life which the people of that age had lost amidst theological hair-splittings. Christ found that content in the very soul of the individual.¹ He declared that the only value on earth is the value of the 'souls' or lives of men and that systems and creeds are vain and corrupt except as they fulfil these values. But unfortunately the church was unequal to the spirit of this message and in due course fell victim to the same tendency which was Christ's life-mission to eradicate. It found service of God in the renunciation of the duties of life; it made acceptance of creed of more avail than the formation of character. It compromised with those very dogmatic and reactionary forces which Christ wanted to destroy. This reactionary step of the Church, quite inconsistent with the whole spirit of its founder, in order to ally itself with and keep in power, the ruling minority, destroyed the whole revolutionary character of

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 11-12.

Christianity in its endeavour to save humanity from its serfdom. The masses lost hope in the new movement which, instead of giving them any concrete help in their daily struggle, tried to satisfy their spiritual hunger by an offer of an after-world where streams full of milk and honey would be at the disposal of those who were poor and miserable in this life; in other words, who were willing to submit themselves to the unjust exploitation of the governing class.¹ Thus one of the greatest movements in the history of man's endeavour to throw off the yoke of dogmatism in the determination of his conduct and to elevate him as a free moral agent, finding in his very soul the universal criterion of resolving the ever-recurring conflicts of loyalties of practical life, remained fruitless either through a lack of proper insight on the part of early followers and disciples of Christ, or, as some people seem to claim, through some ulterior motives of certain interested persons. Whatever may be the true cause, there is no denying the fact that Christianity soon after Christ lost its revolutionary character and became one with the reactionary movements. The second and last powerful force of revolt against all dogmatised ethical code was Islam. Like Christianity it started with the basic conception that man has within his soul the making of a free moral being. "The Quran in its simple, forceful manner emphasises the individuality and uniqueness of man and has, I think, a different view of his destiny as a unity of life. It is in consequence of this view of man as a unique individuality which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another and

¹ M. N. Roy : *The Historical Role of Islam*, pp. 52-53.

entitles him only to what is due to his own personal efforts that the Quran is led to reject the idea of redemption."¹ Starting with this basic conception of man's capacity to judge for himself and decide ethical values, it gives us a universal code of morality based on the fundamental principle of the Sovereignty of *Shariat*. No doubt, thus, the sanction for moral behaviour remains supersocial and appears to be external, yet the spirit of the sanction is rooted in the very nature of the individual. A study of the Quran reveals that it does not say that "it is the law" with the conclusiveness of the primitive people, to be obeyed and followed without reason. It gives you rational grounds for its sanctions. It gives you laws as well as the reasons for those laws. In its infancy, mankind needed ready-made judgments and ways of action. But with the birth of reason and moral sense, such a blind guidance could not be tolerated. Islam helped greatly in strengthening this new tendency towards the development of critical faculty. It constantly appealed to reason and experience in support of its laws and laid emphasis on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge. As such it stands at the cross-roads, with one face to the past and with the other towards the future. In so far as the source of its moral code is concerned (as supersocial, revelational) it belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of its code is concerned, it belongs to the modern world. By declaring unequivocally the finality of prophethood, Islam suggested that man should in future be thrown back on his own resources which are limitless in expansion.

¹ *Lectures*, p. 133.

But still one important question remains. If Islam represents a revolt against non-rational modes of consciousness and appeals to the critical faculty of man for appreciation of the true spirit underlying its code, why did it not leave it to man himself to formulate this code in the light of his intellectual insight? If, as the Quran says, *anfus* (self), *afaq* (nature) and history are all possible sources of knowledge which man should study, was it not possible to let the matter stand there just as it was done in the physical realm? This problem indeed requires a careful study, particularly because the present age seems to refuse to believe in the efficacy of any supersocial code of morality for the solution of social problems that the modern man is facing.

If we can pursue the whole panorama of human history as it unfolds itself on this planet we shall unmistakably find that the primary motive underlying multifarious activities of man that resulted in the formulation of different branches of science and art, was to discover and understand the human nature itself and its relation to the environment amidst which man had to live. The very first thing that man observed with the awakening of consciousness, was the physical environment as something opposed to him, standing in the way of most of his desires. There was the soil on which he lived, the nature of the vegetation around him, the appearance and disappearance of sun, moon and stars, air, rain and storms. He discovered that without a thorough knowledge of the behaviour of most of these things he could not get on with the bare necessities of his life. Thus were laid the foundations of such sciences as physics, chemistry, astronomy,

geology and geography. All these helped man in understanding the environment on which he depended for the maintenance of his life. Then there were several kinds of animals and birds inhabiting the same earth. It was equally essential for man to understand their mode of behaviour. He utilized most of them to his own advantage ; from some he took help in cultivation, from others in travels and communication and learned to protect himself against the predatory habits of others. Gradually, however, he came to realize that his life and well-being depended not only on the knowledge gained about the behaviour of the physical and animate objects around him but equally on the knowledge of other human beings who seem to think, feel and act like him. His association with, and bondage to, the limitation of the bodily frame was another cause of reflection. The alternate periods of fatigue and recovery, illness and health and ultimately the loss of life in the form of death, necessitated a thorough knowledge of the structure and function of his own body resulting in the formulation of physiology and science of medicine. All these different branches of knowledge that arose in consequence of these primary needs of man, may be called psycho-physical. The one common element that characterises all of them is that they are mainly objective, the subject matter with which they separately deal is wholly or partially beyond human influence. He can know and pre-determine the movement of heavenly bodies but he can in no wise change their course. He can discover the exact time when winds, storms, earthquake and rain shall appear or fail to appear and devise suitable protection against them ; but he cannot wholly control

their operation to his advantage. The exact configuration of mountains, plains, rivers, deserts is there: he can understand their respective influence on the daily activities and habits of people but he cannot alter that influence at all. The limitation imposed by the bodily structure on the flight of his ambitions can, in no case, be overstepped. His power of seeing and hearing, his capacity for continuous work, both bodily and mental, has each a certain limit within which he may employ them as he likes, but when once that limit is reached, he is utterly helpless. He is equally powerless in that sphere of his mental life which he inherits from his ancestors, his native instincts and propensities. As soon as he is born into this world, he brings with him a jealously-guarded treasure of hereditary outfit which gradually makes its presence felt with increasing years. No doubt he gains much by experience and intelligence, yet the primary mould which determines the forms of his activities during the whole course of his life, is there which he cannot forego. In all these aspects of life man is determined by external forces on which he has little control and which he can hardly influence to a great extent. It was this 'external' and objective character of these forces that enabled man to understand their working in full detail. The facts and phenomena that were dealt with by the psycho-physical sciences were produced mechanically outside his will and so it was easy for man to observe and deduce laws of great practical importance with remarkable mental independence and impartiality. It was due to this advantageous position that these natural sciences have succeeded in affording incalculable help to man in the control of his environment. He was born helpless

and at the mercy of natural elements but science has supplied him with means not only negatively to protect himself against them but positively to put these very hostile elements to his own advantage. He succeeded in surmounting the limitations imposed by the vast extension of space by the invention of cars, airplanes, railways, and steamships; he invented telescope and telephone and radio and thus overcame, to a great extent, the natural limitations of his eyesight and hearing; he discovered the intricate mechanism of his own body and thus tried to undo the disadvantages that disease and illness brought in their train; he invented machines of different kinds to help himself overcome the disability imposed by fatigue and continuous work. He dispelled darkness by the help of artificial light; he counteracted the effects of heat and cold by the use of fans, fire and warm clothes. In short, the whole treasure of modern civilization is there to testify the increasing power which man has acquired to overcome the limitations imposed by the hostile forces.

But here the problem takes another turn. Are people, thereby, rendered more happy? But this is a question which does not seem to fall within the sphere of the psycho-physical sciences as defined above. This is a problem of value while these sciences deal only with facts. This aspect of human life, the aspect that concerns itself with the problem of good and evil, is dealt with by ethics. Natural sciences deal with man in so far as he is determined by forces outside him, over which he has little or no control; ethics deals with man in so far as he is free in determining the future course of his life, for better or for worse. It does not mean that ethics casts any doubts on the conclusions

reached by these sciences; it accepts them at their own value. Its contention, on the other hand, is that though the mould and form of human activity may be predetermined in a certain sense, yet the contents and material with which that mould is to be filled, is mainly at the free discretion of man to supply. Within certain limits man is determined; within certain other limits he is free. It is the business of ethics to supply us with certain criteria of conduct according to which we should use our freedom. Man, as a social and moral being, is in great need of general principles which should help him in determining what sort of activities he should pursue and what sort of activities he should avoid. He is related to the members of his family, to his neighbours, friends, enemies, strangers, to his officers, subordinates and colleagues. He is in need of knowing how to do his duty to all of them. Besides, he has his own personal ambitions and desires, some of which may conflict with those of others. He wants to know what he should eat and drink; how to utilize his hands and feet, his eyes and ears. Can ethics supply us any infallible and dependable criteria? Some claim that it can and try to formulate certain general principles for our guidance. An eminent writer on Sociology suggests the following: (1) "The final guide in morals must be the conscience of each, the sense which each man owns of right and wrong, of values."¹ (2) "In matters of policy affecting the whole of association or community all important decisions must depend on the will of a majority."² (3) In certain cases 'tradition' can also be

¹ R. M. Maciver: *Community* (2nd Ed) ., p. 318.

² Ibid., p. 317.

accepted provided "it is our tradition, the tradition that by its nature compels our allegiance."¹ But the inadequacy of these standards is quite apparent. The majority rule is now-a-days the greatest target of attack. It would be quite unreasonable to expect from a minority of 49 to be coerced into submission by a majority of 51. Mere preponderance of numbers cannot, by its nature, be the determining factor in the important field of human conduct and welfare. The history of modern democracies is too self-evident to need any lengthy comment and the reaction that has set in in the political field against this system of Government, is a sufficient proof that mere majority rule is hardly conducive to the peace of the world. The first criterion which makes each individual the sole judge for himself is equally fallacious. If man would have been so constituted as to see right from wrong and act accordingly, there would have been no need for the science of ethics. It arose only because man needed in spite of his high intellectual attainments, certain absolute objective standards of conduct which would be relied upon in all cases. Left to himself, he would certainly follow the course of least resistance as he actually does. Every evil act can be made to appear virtuous to others and interpreted as such to one's conscience. What can be said about those who subject women and children, old and infirm people, to untold misery and suffering before their very eyes for the sake of their personal gains? Such is the inevitable result of the policy of *laissez faire*—that each man must be left to his own conscience to decide what is right or wrong and we have, of course, decided to regard all those things that bring personal gain to be

¹ Ibid., p. 319.

right and everything else to be wrong. To follow the tradition is equally unsound. Tradition is nothing but the conduct and behaviour of earlier people sanctified, people who were equally fallible and subject to all those infirmities to which we are subject. The Quran definitely declares these three standards of value to be the greatest obstacles in the path of true social harmony. It tried to free man from servile bondage to his own baser self, to other people like him who have usurped power and authority and thus exploit him and to the empty and meaningless tradition of a dead past. "Have you seen him who chooses for his god his own *desires*? . . . Do you think that most of them hear or understand? They are but as the cattle—nay, but they are farther astray."¹ "They have taken as lords besides Allah *their rabbies and their monks . . .*"² "And when it is said unto them: come unto that which Allah has revealed and unto the messenger, they say: *Enough for us that wherein we find our fathers.* What! even though their fathers had no knowledge whatsoever and no guidance?"³

Are we, then, able to devise any universal law or laws for the guidance of mankind in the moral sphere as we have succeeded in evolving general laws in the physical realm? It is this very analogy which has led people astray. We have seen that the psycho-physical sciences deal with facts and phenomena while ethics deals with values. The scientific man refuses to recognise the immense difference between these two spheres of our life. Being greatly satisfied with the achievements in the physical realm (and he was perfectly justified in that), he wrongly concluded that he

¹ The Quran, 25 : 43-44.² Ibid., 9 : 31.³ Ibid., 5 : 104.

could equally succeed in the moral sphere with the result that in the present society we come across great intellectual freedom and acumen along with the basest moral degeneracy. The real cause of this discrepancy is that the fundamental difference between the study of facts and the study of value is ignored. Unlike the laws of natural science, the ethical laws are sentimental and subjective and afford little ground for positive formulations. "Man does possess the mental independence and impartiality necessary for deducing just conclusions from facts and phenomena which are produced mechanically outside his will, and on which his personal peculiarities have no hold. He can deduce from them rules and laws corresponding to the truth. But no sooner is it a question of studying the existence of man as a moral and social being, that is, as a factor thinking and acting on his own account, and of formulating the laws governing his conduct—then observation and reasoning, however disciplined their use, become uncertain and generally defective guides because they are always marred by the infirmities of him who employs them. The natural incapacity of man to discover the truth in this domain is manifested in a striking manner by the ignorance of the moral and social laws which correspond to natural principles, in which the peoples of the West, though ultra-civilized, are still plunged, and by the sufferings which are the result of that ignorance, at a time when their work has procured them so high a degree of knowledge of other natural laws."¹ Islam, therefore, refused to give to any man, in his capacity as an ordinary individual or as a member of a legislative body or as a dictator, the right

¹ Prince Said Halim Pasha: *The Reform of Muslim Society*, pp. 4-5.

to formulate the ultimate principles governing the moral conduct of people. According to it, that authority rests solely with God who is the true law-giver and His laws are embodied in practical form in the Shariat.

This fundamental principle—the Sovereignty of Shariat—recognises the basic truth that all existence, higher or lower, is subject to the natural laws peculiar to it. The whole physical realm, organic and inorganic, the lower animals as well as man (so far as he is dealt with by the psycho-physical sciences) follow the same natural laws and in this respect man stands on par with lower grades of creation, though with a more or less quantitative difference. On the strict following of these laws depends their life and existence. This submission of all (including man) to the natural physical law is described by the Quran in the following verses :

“And unto Allah fall prostrate whatsoever is in the heavens and the earth, *willingly or unwillingly.*” (13:15)

“Have they not observed all things that Allah has created, how their shadows incline to the right and to the left, making prostration unto Allah and show their lowliness? And unto Allah make prostration whatsoever is in the heavens and in the earth, *of living creatures* and the angels, and they do not disobey Him. They fear their Lord above them, and do what they are bidden to do.” (16:48-50)

“Have you not seen that unto Allah pay adoration whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth, and the sun and the moon,*and the stars and the hills and the trees and beasts, *and many of good men and many of those men who have become worthy of*

punishment on account of their evil deeds ?" (22 : 18)

As a logical consequence, the fruit of this submission, continuance and preservation of life, is equally universally distributed and there is no distinction of higher and lower in this. Those who follow it enjoy the fullness of life and those who are indifferent, tend to be eliminated from the struggle of existence. In this respect man has no qualitative superiority over lower creatures. Man, as studied by the psycho-physical sciences, is as determined in his behaviour as animals, organic or inorganic beings. He is free only as a rational and moral being. But this possession of rationality and moral sense is not itself the dividing line, according to the Quran, between men and animals. His capacity to use his reason is supplied to him only as a means towards an end which no other creature is required to attain, the end, namely, of understanding and realizing the natural moral law which he must consciously follow just as he submits unconsciously to the natural physical laws. In the terminology of the Quran that end is called *Ibadat* which is the complete submission of man to the natural moral law and a consistent application of it in all the different spheres of his life. It is only when man submits himself, of his own accord, to this law that he attains to the highest position under the heaven, the vicegerency of the Lord. The second stage in the development of self, Obedience, which we discussed in the last chapter, is not unconscious submission to the physical law in which capacity man is one with other grades of creation, but this volitional submission to the sovereignty of Shariat, that the ultimate authority lies with God alone, whose will is manifest both in the physical and the moral worlds. If he refuses to accept

this principle then he loses all the privileges that he would have enjoyed as a man and reduces himself to levels lower than animals. "Surely we created man of the best stature and (on account of his evil deeds) We reduced him to the lowest of the low." (95 : 4-5)

We are now in a position to answer adequately the question which we raised during the present discussion. Has the increasing control of environment which the modern man has achieved, rendered him more happy? Our answer must be in the negative. The control of physical environment is an achievement which belongs totally to the realm of natural physical laws in which we are one with animals. We have travelled sufficiently far from where we started but still the difference between civilization and the primitive state is only quantitative. Telescope and radio give us power of seeing and hearing greater than that possessed by animals; cars and railways enable us to move faster; airplanes and seaplanes have defeated birds and fish in the swiftness of their flight. Man has far excelled the beast in preparing defensive and offensive weapons. He has amassed wealth to provide himself with all kinds of pleasures and facilities which were not possible for animals. In short man's submission to, and understanding of, the natural laws has been deeper and correspondingly his fruit has been greater in extent and quantity. Qualitatively he stands on the same or perhaps lower level and 'happiness' is a question of quality, value and not of quantity. So long as he does not rise above the present level and accept, of his own accord, the sovereignty of the natural moral law, he cannot be truly happy and so long as the modern civilization persists in its present stage there can be no

hope of a lasting peace.¹

As a matter of fact, the guiding spirits of the present age are thinkers like Michaeveli who advocated a summary rejection of morality in determining social and political relationships. His famous advice to the Prince is : " You have to understand that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men are esteemed ; being often forced, in order to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity and religion." This dangerous doctrine which dismisses morality as of no value from the political field, held ground in Europe long before Michaeveli and is even met with in Aristotle who said, " It is not, perhaps, the same thing in every case to be a good man and to be a good citizen." This alleged opposition between ethics and politics is, in reality, fallacious. There cannot be two oughts, one ethical and the other political or social. If life has any meaning there can be only one ought which must be operative in all the aspects of our life. Iqbal has taken Michaeveli as a representative of this movement ; for it was his forceful advocacy which popularized this doctrine in Europe. He calls him a ' messenger of Satan ' who gave to the world a new scale of values, rendering everything evil and base praiseworthy, to whom the state was the sole object of devotion for the sake of which no moral consideration should be entertained.

باطل از تعلیم او بالیده است حیلہ اندوژی فتنے گردیدہ است
شب بپچشم اہل عالم چیدہ است مصلحت تزویر را نامیدہ است

Evil has spread through his advocacy and cunning

¹ ڈھونڈ رہا ہے فرنگ عیشی جہاں کا دوام
واٹے تمنائے خام ! واٹے تمنائے خام ! (بال جبریل - صفحہ 90)

and treachery are made into an art. His doctrine is nothing but darkness which designates deception as 'diplomacy'.¹

We thus conclude that an individual, in order to attain harmony in his life amidst a highly differentiated society, like the present, needs a universal moral code which he must follow in all the different spheres and activities of life, a code which must be the final arbitrator, not only for an individual in deciding a particular conflict of loyalties towards different associations, but also for the resolution of conflicts among different associations and communities. We also concluded that such a universal law of morality cannot be formulated by man as a rational and moral being. The sole authority for this rests with the Divine Will. It is this fundamental principle which we have called the Sovereignty of Shariat or the natural moral law on which a society must be based if the world is to attain a lasting peace.

In the *Jawaid Nama* Iqbal says :

عقل خود بین غافل از بهبود غیر سود خود بیند نه بیند سود غیر
 وحی حق بیننده سود همه در نگاهش سود و بهبود همه
 عادل اندر صلاح و هم اندر مصاف وصل و فصلش لا یراعی لا یتخاف
 غیر حق چون ناهی و آمر شود زور بر ناتوان قاهر شود
 زیر گردن آمری از قاهری است آمری از ما سوا الله کفری است

The self-centered intellect of man looks to its own interests and invariably tends to ignore those of others. The moral law based on Divine revelation is prejudiced in favour of none and has the welfare of all before it. It swerves from the path of righteousness neither in peace nor in warfare and enforces its provi-

¹ Ramuz-i-Bekhudi, pp. 49-51.

sions without favour or fear. But when a tyrant imposes his own laws on the people, the weak are exploited by the strong. The state derives its power through force and the state that is not based on Divine laws is the root cause of all disorders ¹

آدمی اندر جهان خیر و شر کم شناسد نفع خود را از ضرر
کس نداند زشت و خوب کار چیست جاده هموار و ناهموار چیست
شرع بر خیزد ز اعماق حیات روشن از نورش ظلام کائنات
گر جهان داند حرامش را حرام تا قیامت پخته ماند این نظام

In this world of mixed good and evil, man is hardly able to know what is beneficial to him and what is harmful. He is unable to distinguish between good and evil, between the right and the wrong paths. *Shariat* appears from the very bosom of Life and illumines the darkness of the universe. If the world were to accept its moral precepts, it would become eternal.²

What is the significance of religion in man's life? We are here not concerned with the problem of its origin; for the genetic method has never been able to determine the true value of the developed form. Historically speaking, religion may have arisen out of a crude 'polyatry' or a sort of vague fear in the alleged supernatural powers surrounding the primitive man (both of which theories are hotly contested by some), yet none of these is able to explain the important phenomenon of religion as it is felt and experienced in the advanced life of the modern man. However crude and however gross the superstitions with which it has often been associated, its omnipresence and centrality in the history of mankind are facts to be

¹ P. 178.

² پیسی چه باید کرد اے اقوام شرق pp. 38-39.

reckoned with. Its universal and constant appeal to man is a sufficient indication that religion is a psychological expression of human nature. The common notion that religion is the expression only of affective or emotive aspect of our life, is to be totally rejected as inadequate. Religion, as a fact of human experience, is neither pure feeling, nor pure activity, nor pure thought; it is all combined together in one organic whole. Whenever the feeling aspect is emphasised to the exclusion of others, it invariably tends to transform religion into mysticism. So far as mysticism represents a revolt against barren intellectualism and ritualistic formalism, it may be accepted as valuable; but as soon as it stays and in turn demands exclusive importance for feeling, it becomes dangerous. As William James says, "Feeling is private and dumb, and unable to give account of itself. It allows that its results are mysteries and enigmas, declines to justify them rationally, and on occasion is willing that they should pass as paradoxical and absurd To redeem religion from unwholesome privacy and to give public status and universal right of way to its deliverances, has been reason's task."¹ Iqbal has quoted the saying of a famous sufi which distinguishes the mystic attitude from a purely religious consciousness. "Muhammad of Arabia ascended the highest Heaven and returned. I swear by God that if I had reached that point I should never have returned."² This saying, as Iqbal himself remarks, is the best characterization of mysticism which tends to be exclusively affective and subjective. The religious consciousness,

1. W. James : *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), p. 432.

2. *Lectures*, p. 173.

on the other hand, must be objective. The great sufis like Shaikh Jilani and Shaikh Sirhindi, who, in spite of being mystics, grasped the true sense of religion, devoted their whole life to the service of mankind. The value of mysticism lies in the fact that it emphasises the role of feeling in religion : without this element worship becomes mechanical, cold, unreal and formal ; but this feeling must pass through the crucible of will as well as of intellect. It must be not only thought out, but lived out ; it must be, in short, translated into action. These religious activities, the outward expression of the inward feeling, take two different forms, the ceremonial and the ethical. The former, being performed by a group and so of social character, tend to be organised, fixed and uniform and repeated with little or no change from generation to generation. If religion be confined only to this aspect of activities, it loses its real vitality as a great force for the transformation of men. It degenerates into mere formalism and priestcraft. It is only here that the distinction of secular and sacred, as two watertight spheres of life, can be maintained. But the more important aspect of religion is the ethical, where the object is to transform the inner motives of human conduct which are beyond the range of mere cult. For it there is no distinction between the sacred and the secular, the whole life is sacred and nothing is profane. The proportion of emphasis on any of these two aspects of activities will determine the nature and status of religion. The greater the emphasis on the ceremonial aspect, the more primitive it remains ; the greater the emphasis on the ethical, the more developed it becomes. This basic difference is often illustrat-

ed in the ever-recurring conflicts between the priest, the jealous guardian of the cult, with his emphasis on the due performance of the ritual, on the one hand, and the prophet, the reformer, the mujaddid, the upholder of the spirit underlying the cult, with his emphasis on the basic moral law, on the other. It should not, however, be interpreted to mean that either of these can be dispensed with: since both are necessary for the true religious life. The problem is to synthesize the two so that the ritual is made a more adequate expression of the progressive spirit of man and is related more vitally to the ethical life. Mere ritual is ever in danger of becoming the strongest bulwark of conservatism and of vested interests. This tendency can be successfully curbed only if it learns to adapt itself to the increasing light of knowledge. The core of religious experience is, no doubt, feeling; but being subjective it needs to be supplemented by appropriate behaviour and thought, to become objective and to be communicated to others. As such it needs besides cult and ritual, theology. But like the ritual it too tends to be dogmatic and reactionary. What is of permanent value is the religious experience; the theological dogmas are merely the expression of that experience in the light of intellectual outlook of the day. As that outlook changes, the dogmas must go with that; their utility ceases with the change of time.

According to Hoffding, the essence of religion is faith in the conservation of values. By value he means 'the property possessed by a thing either of conferring immediate satisfaction or serving as a means of procuring it'. No value, in this sense, perishes out of the world. Thus religious attitude is opposed to

what he calls 'neutralism', the conviction that the universe is, as a whole, indifferent towards everything which we call value. But this faith in the eternal conservation of values is not merely passive, confined to those that already exist ; it also implies an experimental search for new values. They are new, however, not in the absolute sense, being quite distinct from the old ones, but in the sense that a deeper and richer content is being supplied to the older values. Thus the claim of the Quran, that the true religion (*Din*) is one, signifies that Islam does not claim to have pronounced any absolutely new values to the world. Its chief claim lay in the fact that it tried to give a richer and deeper content to the values already possessed by mankind through earlier prophets. In fact, it had been an indispensable part of the mission of every prophet to affirm his alliance with all those who had come before him for the guidance of mankind.

The second characteristic factor of religion is the intimate personal relation of individuals to God, regarded as the source and ground of all values. He is felt to be both Himself the supreme value and the standard and source of all other values. Thus we may say that religion involves a subject and an object and relation of subject to object. On the subjective side, it involves feeling, will and thought ; on the objective side, it assumes the existence of a divine Reality. The relationship between the two is maintained through worship and is determined by the purpose of conservation and enhancement of human values, both individual and social. Religion is a belief in a trans-subjective divine Reality as the seat and source of all values. It also implies emotional response and volitional reac-

tion to that reality with the result that the whole life of an individual becomes harmoniously adjusted towards that object. Thus every religion, in the words of Royce, is a "religion of loyalty"; it is loyalty of heart, will and thought to God and His ultimate moral law.

Once this interpretation of religion is accepted, there is no room for the distinction of religious and secular in our life. When the true genius of religion lies in the unification of life as a whole, there can be no cleavage between what is truly religious and what is non-religious. No doubt, the evolution of society has brought about a complex differentiation of different social functions with the result that science, art, commerce, industry, politics and education, each has carved out a separate sphere for itself, yet this very differentiation puts a greater demand on individuals and societies for greater harmony and unity. This basic demand which is growing ever intenser in the modern differentiated society, requires the services of religion which is best fitted to fulfil that end. This, however, does not mean that we should refuse to admit the autonomy of so-called secular aspects of life. The movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity has been the source of great social progress and humanity has gained much in the growing separation of different activities. Science and art, politics and business, should each be free to follow its own methods and laws; what religion demands is that this differentiation should not be allowed to become absolute separation. It requires that all these so-called secular activities must be pursued under its supreme control. Religion is not, as it is often claimed to-day, one function among

many, existing side by side with others on equal terms. It is the whole of life and thus naturally demands that all the different functions which exist in the present complex society, must follow its basic laws that have their source in God Himself. A man may pursue his business but he must do it under the guidance of the basic moral law. All the material and secular activities are re-interpreted and re-valued. In the words of Schleiermacher, "a man's special calling is the melody of his life and it remains a simple meagre series of notes unless religion, with its endlessly rich variety, accompanies it with all notes and raises the simple song to a full-voiced harmony." It stands to the credit of Islam that, for the first time in the history of the world, it enunciated such a comprehensive and universal significance of religion in the life of man. No other religion before it, not Christianity at least, as it will be shown conclusively later on, ever conceived human life as a synthesis of the secular and the religious. Iqbal says: "In Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life (*i.e.*, religion) behind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity.... The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, material, secular."¹

¹ Lectures, pp. 215-17.

Thus the distinction that we raised earlier between the two spheres of human life, the sphere dealing with facts and phenomena and the sphere dealing with values, ultimately coalesce in the higher sphere of religion which cannot rest satisfied with any ultimate dualism of sacred and secular. It demands absolute harmony and complete unification of life. 'First the natural, then the spiritual and finally the return of the spiritual to the natural that it may unite the natural to itself in holy partnership—thus is the circle of life made complete.' The solution of our problem, therefore, which the differentiation of modern society has raised with its greater power of control over nature as the result of science, lies in religion alone. The civilization has advanced beyond recognition but it has brought with it greater distress, misery, hunger, dissatisfaction, conflicts and revolts. People have become more powerful but less happy and contented.¹ The early confidence which the growth of science and industry engendered in men is fast disappearing. Civilization has proved helpless in bringing peace and happiness. It is at this stage that religion can fulfil its true function. At an early period in the human history, when

¹ زندگی را شرع و آئین است عشق

اصل تہذیب است دین، دین است عشق

(جاوید نامہ-صفحہ 129)

بیکاری و غریانی و میٹخواری و افلاس

کیا کم ہیں فرنگی مدنیت کے فتوحات

وہ قوم کہ فیضان سماوی سے ہو متحرور

حد اسکے کمالات کی ہے برق و بتخارات

(بال جبریل-صفحہ 146)

the conflict of civilization and religion demanded resolution, Christianity failed to rise to the occasion. It failed because it refused to accept the force represented by civilization and thus instead of resolving the conflict simply denied the very problem itself. It confined itself to the cultivation of spirit and remained indifferent to body, flesh, matter, civilization and thus gave birth to a dualism which had been the stumbling block not only for religion but for philosophy as well. This Christian dualism of body and mind, forming the intellectual background of almost all western thinkers and statesmen, mars their political, economic and social outlook. As long as religion is divorced from its true function and all the so-called secular activities allowed full and absolute sovereignty within their spheres, the present unsatisfactory condition is sure to continue. Bridge the gap and all the insoluble problems vanish into air. Islam, on the other hand, accepted the two conflicting forces and tried to resolve the conflict by bringing a harmony between the two. It, no doubt, emphasised that spirit is more basic of the two but, at the same time, it declared that the affirmation of spirit can be sought, not by renunciation of external forces of flesh or matter, as Christianity had done, but by a proper adjustment of man's relation to these forces. The key to that proper adjustment lies only in the Quran, the "store-house of immortal and eternal law, whose words are above doubt and change and whose verses are too clear to need any mortal's forced interpretation." "A society gets true stability only through God's law and when once this stability is achieved, the society becomes immortal (*i.e.*, the element of decadence which

is due to man-made laws is totally eliminated)."¹

ملت از آئین حق گیرد نظام از نظام متحکم او را دوام

According to the Quran, the ultimate spiritual principle of all life is eternal but it reveals itself both in variety and change. The ideal society, which is to derive its inspiration from this fundamental principle, must, of necessity, exhibit both these aspects. It must be guided by certain laws that are not subject to change and variation. This aspect is that of permanence. Here we shall be concerned with the conservative forces that make for cohesion and stability and bind the whole structure of society together. These regulative principles have their basis on our loyalty to God and since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature. As such, these principles are of a universal character and are part and parcel not only of individual mind but of human society as well. The second aspect is that of variation. The social structure is subject to constant change, growing, decaying, finding renewal, adapting itself to various conditions and undergoing vast modifications. These changes are caused by several internal and external factors. Economic necessity or political expediency brings different peoples together and their mutual intercourse reacts on both favourably or unfavourably, thus necessitating a sort of adaptation or assimilation. At such critical moments in the history of a society the stabilizing factors serve a useful function. The process of adaptation must proceed on the basis of these factors: otherwise the society is sure to lose its identity. Such

¹ *Ramuz-i-Bekhudi*, p. 65.

moments appeared in the history of Muslim society when it came into contact with Greek, Persian and Indian societies, each with its peculiar culture. But the most important of all is the influence of western ideals at present which has raised several fresh problems. The only course open to us, amidst this upheaval, is to review the whole situation in the light of these very regulative principles and judge for ourselves whether we can, consistent with these principles, assimilate all or some of these new forces and ideals working in the western culture.

Let us first consider the permanent element of society. The first principle on which Islam wants to found the ideal society is the doctrine of Tauhid, the unitarian conception of God. As the divine law was revealed to mankind through the Holy Prophet and found its practical and concrete form at his hands, the second principle for the stability of society is to accept his guidance in the interpretation and illustration of the moral law. The doctrine of Tauhid occupies a prominent place in the whole structure of Islamic religion. Though, as the Quran says, the earlier religions were based on this principle, yet, after a lapse of time, its true significance was lost. It stands to the credit of Islam that it cleared the whole ground and removed all kinds of ambiguities surrounding it. Its contribution lay in its attempt to define it both negatively as well as positively. Positive affirmation that God is one may be met with in almost all the religious books in one form or other but its negative aspect was lacking and it was this neglect which eventually became the cause of later corruption. Islam therefore started with the set purpose of defining and closing all

those avenues which had the possibility of developing into *shirk*.

The first step in this direction was to determine the nature of divine attributes. In the Old Testament, for example, God is often spoken of in a language which is too anthropomorphic to be acceptable to the modern man. The greatest defect in this form of representation, however, lies in the fact that the people took it in the literal sense and were thus led astray. The symbolism came to be looked upon as reality in itself. God disappeared from the scene: only His symbolic forms remained which were deified. The conception of God as father is often met with in the Bible in different contexts but this apparently harmless metaphorical language unfortunately led to the doctrine of divinity of Christ himself. Islam refuted this belief in symbolism by declaring: "Nothing is comparable unto Him." "Human vision does not comprehend Him." (6: 104). Some looked upon different attributes of God as separate beings and gave them independent existence. There is a god who creates, another who sustains and still another who destroys. There are separate gods of rain, growth, cloud, etc. But Islam again refused to admit this multitude of gods and merged them all into one all-powerful God who is the Creator, Sustainer and Destroyer of everything, Who sends rain and brings out for us all kinds of plants and fruit. He alone is the Lord of the sun, the moon and stars, of heaven and earth, of rain and clouds.

The mere affirmation of God's unity was much too abstract and indefinite a notion. Therefore the Quran defines it negatively as well. It not only emphasised that God is one but also asserted that none

else is like Him. He is one and also the only Being that deserves the worship of man; He alone should be invoked for help. Such a conception of God, according to the Quran, is the only true one and capable of appreciation by all. It accepted no distinction of high and low, educated and ignorant, amongst people and therefore refused to compromise on this point. In India, for instance, the educated classes accepted the doctrine of qualified Tauhid (though more philosophical than religious) which was, however, regarded as too abstruse for the common people to grasp. They were, therefore, allowed to accept symbolism as real and thus the worship of physical objects such as snakes and idols was allowed to grow. S. Radhakrishnan goes so far as to accuse Sankaracharya of neglect in this respect. He believed in one God and yet did nothing to curb the tendency towards idolatry practised in his days.¹ This deification of symbolic representations led people to deify their reformers and prophets. The most outstanding example of this is provided by Buddhism. The dying message of the Buddha was: "Never try to worship the last remains of my body. If ever you did this, be sure, the door of salvation shall be closed in your face." Yet Buddhism, perhaps, is the only religion whose advocates regarded the worship of the Buddha himself as the greatest good. Islam, therefore, emphatically refuted this doctrine and unequivocally declared that all prophets are men just like other people. A limit is put forward beyond which no human being can go; in no case can he become one with God.

To believe that none is worthy of worship ex-

¹ S. Radhakrishnan: *Heart of Hindustan*. (Essay on Islam).

cept God, is only one aspect of this doctrine : an aspect which the modern world does not seem to question. Nobody in the present age would be bold enough to advocate the worship of snakes, trees and other natural objects or idols. Yet the deeper significance of this doctrine is still ungrasped. It not only implies that He alone is worthy of worship, but it equally affirms that He alone is the ultimate source of all power and authority in the material as well as in the moral world. Without this aspect, the doctrine of Tauhid would be imperfect and meaningless. In the words of Abraham, God not only creates and guides me but equally 'feeds me and waters me and when I sicken, then He heels me and it is He Who causes me to die, then gives me life (again)'.¹ But the Quran goes still further. It does not stop merely at showing that belief in one God is incompatible with belief in the final efficacy of material causal link; it asserts that just as material things possess no inherent power except that which God wishes to grant, similarly no human being has any power or authority except that which they derive from God. It refuses to accept any authority except that of God. He alone is the source of all moral law. In the words of Joseph, who told his fellow-prisoners, "Are divers lords better or Allah the One, the Almighty? Those whom you worship beside Him are but names which you have named, you and your fathers. Allah has revealed no sanction for them. *The authority rests with Allah only* who has commanded you that you worship none save Him."² It is this lesson, the implication of the doctrine of

¹ The Quran, 26 : 79-81.

² Ibid., 12 : 39-40.

Tauhid, which the modern age needs. No doubt we have ceased to regard material objects as the source of good and evil and hence not worthy of our worship. Yet we do look upon persons like ourselves as the final source of power and bend our knees before them. Islam teaches that this position is as fallacious and harmful for social welfare as the former. Belief in one God means that He alone is the creator, sustainer and destroyer, He alone is worthy of our worship, He alone is the final law-giver whose law has been revealed to us through His prophets, the final form of which is incorporated in the Quran.

Iqbal has discussed the psychological significance of this doctrine in different parts of his *Ramuz-i Bekhudi*. In his exposition of the Sura of Unity he discusses it under different heads in accordance with the verses of the Sura. (1) *He is Allah, the One*. A society based on such a doctrine must be correspondingly one and the differences, if they ever arise, must be resolved with reference to the law which has its source in Him. Political, social, economic or racial divisions in such a society would be out of question; everything must be uniformly one serving the same end, the establishment of kingdom of God on earth. "Be not of those who ascribe partners (unto Him); of those who split up their religion and became schismatics, each sect exulting in its tenets."¹

چیست ملت؟ اے کہ گوئی لالی باہزاراں چشم بودن یک نگہ

O you who say: there is no god (except God), do you know what is society? It is to be a unity in diversity.

Practically speaking, the doctrine of Tauhid in-

¹ The Quran, 30 : 31-32.

volves three important social ideas of equality, solidarity and freedom. The Quran does not countenance the existence of parochial deities who divide one human race into conflicting groups, fighting each other in the name of their respective gods. As God is one, so human race is one; and the distinctions of colour, race or country create no fundamental differences. Belief in one God means universal brotherhood and peace and rule of one moral law while "if there were gods beside Allah, then verily both (the heavens and the earth) had been disordered".¹ *Shirk* naturally leads to disintegration and chaos. Not only does *Tauhid* create a sense of mere equality among mankind, it equally produces a comity of interests, ideas and actions, a sense of mutual dependence. Such a solidarity, holding together of all the members of a society, is an achievement higher than mere equality.

قوم را اندیشه ها باید یک در ضمیرش مدعا ها باید یک

A society should be based on a single ideological ground.

(2) *God the matchless*. This attribute when applied to God signifies that He is not dependent on anybody else in His work. As such, this conception refutes the naturalistic idea that matter is as eternal as God Himself and that His creative activity is nothing more than the shaping of a co-existing and co-eternal matter. It is He alone who should be invoked in time of need. A society based on this aspect of *Tauhid* accepts God alone as the first and last resort and frees itself from bondage to false gods. It refuses to believe in the efficacy of intermediate links: for it, only the final cause counts.

¹ The Quran, 21 : 22.

گر با اللہ الصمد دل بستہ از حد اسباب بیرون جستہ
بندہ حق بندہ اسباب نیست زندگانی گردش دولاہ نیست

"If you have accepted the principle 'God is matchless', you have overstepped the limits of causal chain. A true man-of-God does not believe in the efficacy of cause and effect; life does not depend upon the movements of heavenly bodies. (That is, it is free and creative)." Similarly, a society (as well as an individual) based on this doctrine would not condescend to compromise with principles antagonistic to its fundamental law. It would refuse to adopt other people's ideals and practices. God's law alone is worthy to be followed and accepted in its entirety.

فرد فرد آمد کہ خود او را شناخت قوم قوم آمد کہ جز با خود نساخت

An individual can be called an individual only when he comes to realize his own personality. A society similarly retains its identity only if it refuses to adopt anything except what is in consonance with its own basic laws.¹

(3) *He begetteth not nor was begotton.* When a society does not believe that God is related by any ties of blood or race to human beings, it ceases to regard race or blood as the criteria for determining human worth and value. The only distinction that Islam accepts among mankind is one that follows the acceptance or rejection of the divine law.

Moreover, the doctrine of Tauhid, according to Iqbal, is the most efficacious remedy against the dangerous diseases of fear and pessimism that often destroy the vitality of a people. He is never tired of

¹ See *Jawaid Nama*, p. 37 :

اے خوش آں قومے کہ جان او تپید از گل خود خویشی را باز آفرید

preaching hopefulness to his readers. To him fear and pessimism are identical with disbelief and *shirk*. A polytheist who prostrates himself before everything that comes in his way, a tree, a stone, a great man and fears these 'false gods', is not worthy of the name of man. His life is nothing but perpetual fear and anxiety, the necessary consequence of which is perfect lack of activity and ambition.

بیم غیر الله عمل را دشمن است کاروان زندگی را رهن است
هر شر پنهان که اندر قلب تست اصل او بیم است اگر بینی درست

Fear of gods other than Allah is enemy of action—it impedes the progress of life. Every secret mischief that is in your heart, has its roots in (this kind of) fear.¹

Tauhid alone is a remedy against these enemies of man. Believe in one God and there is no ground for fear and despair. The lightning and thunder, mountains and streams, planets and stars, are all created by God in the service of man. They are our servants and not masters. In order to illustrate the ennobling effect of Tauhid on the life of an individual, Iqbal relates an anecdote from the life of Aurangzeb. One day, early in the morning, the king was out walking in the wood. Seeing the morning beauty and hearing the hymns of the birds, he fell down in prayers and began to offer his thanks to the Great Monarch. While in this state of ecstasy, a lion attacked him from behind. An ordinary man would have cried and fallen helpless before the animal. But the king, who fearing God would never allow the fear of anything else enter his heart, remain-

¹ *Ramuz-i-Bekhudī*, p. 19.

ed firm at such a critical moment. He took out his dagger and plunged it into the bosom of the lion who fell down dead.

دیی ازو، حکمت ازو، آئینی ازو زور ازو، قوت ازو، تمکینی ازو
پست اندر سایه اش گردد بلند خاک چون اکسیر گردد ارجمند
بیم و شک میرد، عمل گیرد حیات چشم می بیند ضمیر کائنات
قدرت او بر گزیند بنده را نوع دیگر آفریند بنده را

Religion, wisdom and law ; power, supremacy and honour, are all its bye-products. A low person, under its influence, becomes high ; and the clay becomes as valuable as elixir. Fear and doubt die away, life becomes active and the eye sees the secret of the universe. It is through it that a man becomes miraculously transformed into a perfectly new being.¹

The second stabilizing factor for society is that of prophethood, a conception equally peculiar to Islam. According to Indian thinkers, a prophet is a god come down from his heavenly abode to the earth in the guise of man, for relieving people of the bondage of evil. Christianity holds a similar doctrine. It looks upon Christ either as god himself or as the son of God. But the Islamic conception of prophethood is quite different. According to it, a prophet is a man like so many other human beings, allied to them in instinctive tendencies, having the desire for food, drink, sleep and woman ; weak in body, subject to disease and death ; liable to error as all mortals are. But here the likeness ends. A particular man is selected by God for this mission even before he is actually born. The episodes of the lives of

¹ Ramuz-i-Bekhudi, pp. 12-13.

Moses and Christ as related in the Quran are ample proofs of this fact. As a necessary consequence of this pre-natal selection, he stands far above the level of a common man as regards his mental capacities and moral outlook. His intuitive susceptibilities are sufficiently advanced to enable him to arrive at right conclusions which would be almost impossible for an ordinary man to reach. And all this outfit, mental as well as moral, is the result of his own personal endeavour. A prophet is born with the capacity to perceive right from wrong and act accordingly and when this native characteristic is further developed from potentiality into actuality he is ready for the prophetic mission. The Quran refers to this extraordinary talent of the prophets in several places, in terms like *hikmat* (wisdom), *hukm* (power of decision), *ilm* (knowledge) and moral conviction (*basirat*). They are constantly under the direct control of the Almighty so that if they ever happen to err as human beings they are immediately warned of it. In contrast to the theories of earlier people, the Quran emphatically tries to establish the humanity of the prophets, but, at the same time, draws a line of demarcation between them and ordinary people by saying that the former receive inspiration from God and are thus able to see into the heart of things much more easily than anybody else. The honour of being a recipient of heavenly revelation is the greatest blessing which God can bestow upon anybody. A prophet is no doubt a man in his native propensities, yet in respect of his mental and moral equipment, he occupies a position not only above men but also above angels. The sanctity of the angels is not a matter of volition: they have to choose the path of good, not through a hard

struggle against the forces of evil ; they are instinctively virtuous and so their virtue brings them no credit. A prophet, on the other hand, is a man before whom the two opposite paths of good and evil are open and who chooses the former in spite of the hardest of toils and rejects the latter in spite of the greatest of comforts afforded to him. It is due to this herculean struggle against the forces of evil and their supernormal perseverance, that they have a claim upon the highest position among mankind, a position which is only next to God. Yet they are men. The great mission of prophets can be rightly appreciated only if we regard them as such.

What is the true function of a prophet in relation to the revealed books? It was, of course, possible for God to send His message by some other means. But He invariably sent prophets among mankind and delivered His message through them. This fact in itself is a sufficient proof of the great importance which the life of a prophet has for the true propagation of the divine law. The Quran asserts in clear words that he is commissioned to deliver the message of God revealed to him. But his mission is not confined to that. He is, and this is the primary aim of the prophet, to lead his life according to what he preaches. His whole life should be a perfect exemplification of his message. Without a prophet the law would be useless and to a greater extent impracticable. The law is a mere form and the prophet's life supplies content to it. Thus we need, besides the Quran, the invaluable treasure of the traditions which embody the day-to-day activities of the Holy Prophet without which it would be almost impossible to comprehend

the exact significance of the divine law. The major portion of the Quran is devoted to the elucidation of the code of beliefs and it is a fact that for this particular aspect, we do not stand in need of further light from any other source. Second to it, comes the moral code. Almost all the necessary moral laws are explained therein. But it is clear that mere theoretic discussions or exhortations are not sufficient: they require practical illustration in order to be fully effective. Thirdly, the Quran confines itself to giving only general principles concerning injunctions and prohibitions. The Holy Prophet put these general principles into practice and explained their full implications by his own activities and sayings. To this category belong those laws which are absolutely obligatory for every individual as, for instance, the laws concerning religious practices. The Quran says that the believers should say prayers. But the question how and when to pray is left ambiguous. The life of the prophet supplies the content to this formal law. Besides these, there are certain social and political laws which are not directly derived from the Quran but which the prophet enforced during his life. Those people who refuse to accept the Sunna of the prophet as an indispensable element of religion would be led, by their logic, to a position where every individual will be free to choose any mode of worship he likes. This lack of uniformity, the necessary consequence of individualism, instead of stabilizing, would go a long way in disrupting the already disharmonised Islamic society. In fact, the practical form which the entire system of Shariat has assumed, is due to the traditions which embody those fundamental principles on which Islamic

society was constructed by the prophet during his life and by his companions after him. The social, political, economic and cultural outlook of Islam, which directs the private life of an individual as well as the collective life of a society, is derived from these sources. The public and private life of the prophet, his character, his daily activities, his religious practices, his mode of education and propagation, his legal decisions, in short, his life in all the different aspects of a citizen, a reformer, a general, a statesman, a king, a friend (and similarly the reminiscences of his followers) are the raw material on which the whole structure of Islam as a complete system of life depends. If we were to reject the traditions, it would be tantamount to rejecting the whole cultural background of Muslim society. The very purpose of sending a prophet along with the book was, that he should live among his people according to the perfect and complete type of a 'Muslim' as enunciated in the Quran, and by guiding the people in their individual and collective affairs, should not only make them perfect men but also bring about an ideal society on the basis of a new ideology.

حق تعالیٰ پیکر ما آفرید وز رسالت در تن ما جان دمید
از رسالت در جهان تکوین ما از رسالت، دین ما، آئین ما
از رسالت صد هزار ما یک ست جزو ما از جزو ما لا ینفک است
قلب مومن را کتابش قوت است حکمتش حبل الوریڈ ملت است
فرد از حق، ملت ازو زنده است از شعاع مهر او تابنده است

God created our (Muslim society's) body Himself but infused life into it at the hands of the prophet.

It is through him that we received our religion, our law and organisation. Through him we are a unity in diversity and every part of us is inseparably related to every other part.

His book (the Quran) is a source of power to the (individual) Muslim while his traditions are a source of strength and unity to the society.

An individual lives through God but society through him, and shines through the reflection of his sun's rays.

In order to make this possible, it was essential that his life should be characterized by historicity, all-comprehensiveness and practicability. By historicity we mean that such a person must have behind him a strong historical evidence for his existence. He should not be a mere imaginary creation of mind, a body come out of the realm of mythology. But to be a historical personage is not sufficient; it is rather more essential that the pages of history must record his biography in full detail. There must be a continuous chain of events which, beginning with his birth, must go on to the time of his death. It is only then that his life can serve as an example to the people of the world. The youth and the age of a perfect prophet must be known in a valid way and it is only then that he can lay any claim to be the spiritual leader of humanity. Again, his all-comprehensive life must be a source of light to all classes of people. His life should illustrate the relations that can exist between man and God—the emotions of fear and love; of request and invocation; of thanksgiving and gratitude. Not only that, his life should also illustrate the relations which each individual must bear to his fellow-beings, his neighbours, relatives and his friends. He should be an ideal for a king and subjects alike; for a soldier and a general; for a trader and a statesman. Lastly, such a man must be characterized by practicability.

lity. Whatever he teaches must be illustrated in all activities of his own daily life. The law of God which he claims to be revealed to him would remain to a great extent quite useless without being supported by the examples of his life. According to the Quran, innumerable prophets were sent to the world but out of these, there are only a very few whose names are recorded in history and out of these, it is only the life of our holy prophet that comes up to these standards. The Quran which was revealed to him is as intact to-day as it was at the time of revelation, his Sunna is also in a wonderfully preserved state; both of these are sufficient to guide individuals and societies for all times to come. In short, they incorporate in themselves the final message of deliverance which humanity needed and still requires.

But the most important question in Islam with regard to prophethood is its finality, which means that, after Muhammad, God will no longer send any other prophet to the world, that the divine law, in the form of the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet, is sufficient for the moral and intellectual guidance of mankind. Iqbal has discussed the problem of finality both in the *Ramuz* and in his *Lectures* from two different points of view. In the former he looks upon the finality of prophethood as a remedy against the disintegration of the Islamic society. The idea that there is going to be no other prophet or society that shall be commissioned to establish the divine law on earth has a great psychological significance in making it strong. Almost all the pre-Islamic religions, Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity, looked forward for some prophet, 'Zoroaster's unborn sons, the Messiah or the

Paraclete of the fourth Gospel' to relieve them of the bondage of evil. In the Old and New Testaments there are several passages which indicate this expectant attitude.¹ But the Quran stops once for all this expectation and declares: "This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed my favour unto you and chosen for you as religion al-Islam." (5 : 3) In other words, it declares that the line of prophets which began since the beginning of humanity terminates 'now'; Muhammad is the last of the prophets and the series of divine revelations comes to an end in the form of the Quran. The socio-political organisation of Islam, as enunciated by the Quran and the traditions of the prophet, is perfect and eternal.

تا نه ایی وحدت زدست ما رود هستی ما تا ابد همدم شود
پس خدا بر ما شریعت ختم کرد بر رسول ما رسالت ختم کرد
In order to keep up the unity of our society and make its life immortal, God terminated His Law in the form of the Quran and stopped prophet-hood in the personality of our holy prophet.

The other point of view is presented by Iqbal in his *Lectures*. The attitude of expectation, on the part of the people, indicated that they were helpless in fighting the forces of evil and destruction surrounding them. They required a reformer, with superhuman capacities, perhaps a prophet sent by God, having the forces of heaven at his command. They felt continuously the necessity of revealed books which would

¹ In the last sermon to his followers, Christ is reported to say: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye can not bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you unto all truth: for he shall not speak of himself; whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak: and he will show you things come. He shall glorify me: for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you." (St. John, 16 : 12-14)

command them in some respects and forbid them of others. But there came a time in the evolution of man when God deemed it necessary to teach him for the last time and then to leave him to his own resources. Such a final message came in the form of the Quran which is meant for all people of all ages. "The prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In so far as the source of his revelation is concerned, he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of his revelation is concerned, he belongs to the modern world. In him life discovers other sources of knowledge suitable to its new direction. . . . In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in leading strings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness, man must finally be thrown back on his own resources. The abolition of priesthood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Quran, and the emphasis that it lays on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality."¹ Thus the cultural value of the idea is that it makes all claims based on super-natural authority groundless. 'I declare it to be the truth for it is revealed to me by God' is no longer acceptable after this idea. Everything is to be judged through one's critical faculties which this idea meant to create and mature. Even the Quran itself claims to be judged through the same faculty.

Thus the logical consequences of the two basic ideas of Islamic society are far-reaching. The first,

¹ *Lectures*, pp. 176-77.

Tauhid, negatively helped man in divesting the forces of nature of that divine character which was ascribed to them by earlier people; and positively helped him in creating and fostering the spirit of a critical observation of the laws of nature and thus enabling him to master these apparently alien forces to his own advantage. The second idea of finality, similarly, fostered in him a critical observation of his own inner experiences which are equally as wide and important as the experiences external to man. Both these fields, external as well as internal, are a great source of knowledge and the Quran, by its teaching, meant its readers to utilize them. Thus the doctrine of Tauhid led Muslims to develop inductive method and science in its present sense and to the study of natural laws perfectly devoid of mythology, though the full-fledged expression of this true scientific spirit remained for a long time suppressed under the influence of Greek philosophy. But when it once asserted itself it showed its full force first in the person of Imam Ghazali who, after a study of several years, succeeded in breaking the sacred halo which earlier thinkers had spun round the Greek speculative systems of thought. The idea of finality, similarly, relieves man of blindly believing in any personal authority claiming a supernatural origin. It, however, does not imply that the psychological experience of the mystics which is qualitatively of the same nature as that of the prophets, is of no value. This experience is as normal in its knowledge-yielding capacity as sense-perception; only we need the tool of critical scrutiny to judge its value, positive or negative. The ultimate criterion in all such cases would be the Quran and the authentic traditions. A pantheistic mystic like Ibn-ul-Arabi,

who believes that it is possible for a Muslim saint to attain in his spiritual evolution to a kind of experience characteristic of the prophetic consciousness, that knowledge of the laws of Islam which was revealed to the prophet is revealed in a similar manner and from the same source to some sufis, yet asserts very forcefully that such a mystic saint has a right to abrogate and alter any Islamic law based on Ijtihad but not those laws which were revealed to the prophet in the Quran or authentic traditions, for these are immutable and unalterable. The final standards for the Islamic society are, therefore, only these two.¹

¹ In the Introduction (p. xv) to the *Aspects of Iqbal*, Prof. Taseer says : " Iqbal is not 'religious' in the strict sense of the term. If you believe that certain doctrines are 'absolutely true', that certain acts are 'objectively good' in themselves, you are religious. But if you believe that acts and doctrines are good as a means to an end, you are not 'religious'. For Iqbal, personality is the measure of all things, the value of all values. There is no external law of values."

It is, however, a very superficial account of Iqbal's view. He is religious in the strict sense of the term. In the light of what has been said above with regard to the two fundamental principles on which Islamic society is to be based, Tauhid and prophethood, Iqbal's attitude towards the doctrine of value is clear. He believes that the Quran and the traditions of the Holy Prophet are the final source of all values and peace and security cannot be had without them.

گر تو می خواهی مسلمان زیستن نیست ممکن جز به قرآن زیستن
(رموزی خودی - صفحہ 62)
تقدیر کے پابند نباتات و جمادات مومن فقط احکام الہی کا ہے پابند
(ضرب کلیم - صفحہ 62)
آدمی اندر جہان خیر و شر کم شناسد نفع خود را از ضرر
شرع بر خیزد ز اعماق حیات روشن از نورش ظلام کائنات
گر جہاں داند حرامش را حرام تا قیامت پختہ ماند این نظام
(پس چہ باید کرد - صفحہ 38-39)

When Iqbal asserts that " Personality gives us a standard of values " (p. xxii *Asrar-i-Khudi*, Eng. Introduction), he does not mean that the Khudi of any and every man can assume that role. That Khudi alone can become the standard which has developed to its highest pitch after undergoing the prescribed training according to the Divine law of Islam. Thus in the last resort it is not the personality that is the final standard but the Quran and the holy prophet.

According to Iqbal, there were two main forces which militated against the growth of true Islamic spirit—the emergence of priesthood as a distinct institution and mysticism, both of which were the result, partly of Persian thought and partly of Greek philosophy which came through the Neo-platonic mill. This subject is, however, too extensive to be dealt with here satisfactorily. Still some of the salient points may be briefly touched upon. (a) The very first thing that strikes a student of Greek philosophy, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, is the static view of the universe and its dualism of matter and spirit. Unlike his predecessors, Socrates insisted on confining his attention to the world of human beings alone and did not consider the external world of nature as meriting his sublime contemplation. Plato, in the footsteps of his great teacher, despised the sense-world and, therefore, for him sense-perception yield nothing but ‘opinion’, *i.e.*, dubious knowledge. The ultimate ground of the universe, the Ideas, are static, immutable, universal and abstract and hence to explain the presence of movement in the universe, he had to bring in God. Islam, on the other hand, was anxious to establish a vital relation between man and the external world: for much of unwholesome asceticism prevalent at that time was due to a lack of proper appreciation of this relationship. For the Quran the external and internal worlds alike are the sources of human knowledge. It definitely asks its readers to ‘observe the perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of day and night, the cloud, the starry heavens and the planets swimming through infinite space’. Unlike the Greeks, the Quran affirms the reality of time and change and presents life as a continuous movement in

time. The early thinkers of Islam, Farabi and Ibn-i-Sina, who followed Greek thinkers, failed to realize the anti-classical spirit of the Quran and as a consequence the speculative tendency of Muslims for a long time failed to bring to surface the essentially dynamic character of the Islamic teaching.

The reaction at last came, as it was bound to come, in the person of Imam Ghazali. (450-505 A. H.) After a year of intense study he epitomised the whole Greek philosophy in a most lucid and clear language, avoiding the intentional ambiguous style of early thinkers. It was the very purpose of the Imam to make the problems of philosophy the property of the common man so that the halo of mystery and awe spun round it should be removed for ever. In the preface to one of his books, he wrote : "There are certain people in our time who think themselves to be much superior to the common man as regards their mental gifts and thus regard themselves above the limitations of religious law. While as a matter of fact they are mere henchmen of the worst type. They are overawed by the names of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. . . ." In his *Confessions*, he says : "Aristotle contended with success against the theories of Plato and Socrates and the atheists who had preceded him and separated himself entirely from them ; but he could not eliminate from his doctrine the strains of infidelity and heresy. We shall, therefore, consider them all as unbelievers as well as the so-called Muslim philosophers such as Ibn-i-Sina and Farabi who have adopted their systems." This revolt of Imam Ghazali was similar in nature and consequence to the revolt of al-Ashari who repudiated Rationalism and went back to the way of the Fathers. After him Rationalism

died its natural death. Ghazali's revolt was equally important. He demonstrated the barrenness of speculative method and based all knowledge and faith on immediate experience which God in His mercy grants to individuals. He based all religious certainty on ecstatic experience and interpreted all religious truth in its light. He called people back to the theological position of the Fathers; the source and criterion of all truth, whether religious or secular, was the revelation of the prophet and, therefore, he stressed with great emphasis a return to, and a deep study of, the Quran and the traditions, along with a moral transformation through mystic exercises.

(b) Mysticism. The true form of mysticism, as represented by some of the great sufis, was a wholesome revolt against the dry-as-dust subtleties of the theologians. It strove to emphasize the place of emotion in religion and thus saved the religious practices from falling into mere meaningless formalities. But, unfortunately, under the influence of certain non-Islamic forces, mysticism began to develop a speculative side which, in the hands of such men as Shaikh Mohiy-ud-Din Ibn-ul-Arabi, assumed a form perfectly hostile to the spirit of Islam. Gradually the distinction of *shariat* and *tarikah*, in consequence of the equally fallacious division of Appearance and Reality, led sufis to a life of renunciation and other-worldiness and thus 'obscured men's vision of a very important aspect of Islam as a social polity.'¹ From its high estate as a force of spiritual education, mysticism fell down to a mere means of exploiting the ignorance and the credulity of the people. It gradually and invisibly un-nerv-

¹ Lectures, p. 211.

ed the will of Islam and softened it to the extent of seeking relief from the rigorous discipline of its law.¹ The pantheistic doctrine, which became the essence of later sufism, logically led to a great laxity of morals among the people. But the greatest tragedy occurred when Persian poetry as a whole contracted an alliance with such mysticism and its new moral code began to reach the hearts of people in the most melodious language. Being the advocates of sloth and carelessness in the guise of 'peace' and 'resignation to the will of God,' of pessimism and blind determinism, it had a natural appeal to the common man in opposition to the more rigorous discipline of Islam. Thus with the decay of truly Islamic political and social thought (as a result of corrupted mysticism) came in Persian literature in its most decadent form of Epicureanism and moral philosophy of a slave nation as represented in Iraqi and Hafiz.

صوفی پشیمانه پوش حال مست از شراب نغمه قوال مست
آتش از شعر عراقی در دلش در نمی سازد به قرآن محفلش
گرتو می خواهی مسلمان زیستن نیست ممکن جز به قرآن زیستن

The Sufi, who wears the dress of *suf*, remains absorbed in himself (perfectly unconscious of what is going around him) hearing music.

He derives inspiration from the poetry of Iraqi but does not study the holy Quran in his assemblies.

If you want to live as a Mussalman, it is impossible for you to follow anything but the holy Quran.²

This Persian mysticism changed the whole trend of the future Muslim culture. Instead of the old Arab manliness and simplicity which contributed not a little

¹ Iqbal: *Islam and Ahmedism*.

² *Ramuz-i-Bekhudī*, p. 62.

to Islam's early expansion, it taught laziness, luxury and a hatred of the world. Shibli has well brought out the difference in the poetry of the two people. An Arab poet says: "A man who does not protect his tank with swords, will be at last swept away. He who does not rule over others shall be ruled by others." Another poet says: "When our children grow young, the great kings of the world bow before them. The world and whatever is in it, are ours. When we get hold of anybody, our grip on him is the strongest. People call us cruel and ruthless but we are not so; we rather seal the doom of all malicious persons." These are only a few passages taken at random from the voluminous works of Arab poets which clearly show that the whole Arab nation possessed the qualities of perseverance, firmness of mind, strength of will and courage. With the advent of Islam, these very attributes took the right channel for their expression. But the Persian mind, always liable to feebleness and love of ease, gave to the world quite a different line of thought. One poet says: "I am that insect which is trampled under the feet of the people: I am not a bee whose sting may be a source of pain to others." Another passage runs as follows: "There are no doubt many gems within the bosom of the sea; but, if you want peace and safety, it can be had only on the shore." Surely a slave-morality which changes masters into serfs. Such, to Iqbal, was the case with the Arabs who came out of their native land, fresh and vigorous, full of activity and energy. But the Persian morality and Neo-Platonic thought made them 'slaves' and so, according to the old Arab maxim, "when they left ruling others, they were ruled over by others." With the disappear-

ance of this noble character disappeared all their world-wide empire, all temporal and spiritual activities, all manly and courageous adventures and nothing was left of them except the bare memory of their glorious deeds in the pages of history and on the globe of the earth here and there.

آن نہال سر بلند و استوار مسلم صحرائی اشتر سوار
 آن چنان کاهید از باد عجم همچو نے گردید از باد عجم
 آن کہ کشتے شیر را چوں گوسفند گشت از پامال مورے دردمند
 آن کہ از تکیہ او سبک آب گشت از صغیر بلبے نے تاب گشت
 آن کہ گامش نقش صدھنگامہ بست پائے اندر گوشہ عزلت شکست
 آن کہ فرمانش جہاں را ناگزیر بر درش اسکندر و دارا فقیر
 کوشش او با قناعت ساز کرد تا بہ کشکول گدائی ناز کرد

That lofty and strong plant, *viz.*, the Muslim of the Desert, a rider of camels, became extremely weak through the influence of Persia.

He that would kill lion as if it were a sheep, came to weep over the death of the minutest insect ;

He whose *takbir* used to melt stone-hearted persons, began to feel uneasy at the song of a nightingale ;

He, who was able to create several new worlds for himself and for the people to live, adopted a hermit's life, away from people ;

His orders were irrevocable and at his door kings, like Alexander and Dariis, were only beggars. His life of active participation (in world affairs) was changed into 'contentment' so much so that he came to feel proud of his 'bowl of beggars'.

The best course, which Iqbal suggests to overcome this baneful influence, is to leave aside the Persian

mode of thought and to purge our new literature of this fatal philosophy. In its stead we should look towards Arabic writers for inspiration. It is from Arabia alone, the land of desert and sand, that the spirit of a true culture, in consonance with the principles of Islam, and a motive for a life of labour and endeavour, can arise. Shaikh Ahmad Rifai, as quoted by Iqbal, once said to one of his disciples that 'though Persian thought in its flight surpassed the boundaries of space and time, yet went beyond the limits set by the holy prophet'.¹

زانکه فکرش گرچه از گردون گزشت از حد دین نبی بیرون گزشت

(c) The last force that, according to Iqbal, has been a great cause of decay to the Islamic society, is the institution of priesthood. No doubt, the Ulema (theologians) have always been a source of great strength to Islam, yet, during the course of centuries, especially since the destruction of Baghdad by Tartars, they became extremely conservative and would not allow any freedom of *Ijtihad*, i.e., the forming of independent judgment in matters of law. As a matter of fact, we must concede that the theologians of that time were partially right in adopting this procedure. The rise of Rationalism, on the one hand, which began gradually to be identified with free thought and the political decay, as a result of foreign invasion, on the other, seemed to threaten the whole future of Islam. Under the stress of such circumstances, the theological thinkers, in order to save the integrity of Muslim society, focussed all their efforts on preserving a uniform social order for the people for which purpose

¹ *Ramuz-i-Bekhudi*, p. 70.

they made the structure of their legal systems as rigorous as possible. In the *Ramuz* Iqbal seems to accept this position as sound and tries to advocate *taqlid* (in opposition to *ijtihad*) for Muslim society in its present stage: for *taqlid*, according to him, serves to produce order and organisation.

اجتهاد، اندر زمان انحطاط قوم را برهم می پیچد بساط *Ijtihad*, in a time of decadence, tends to destroy the cohesive life of society.¹

But in the very next line he indicates that *taqlid* in such a decayed society is better than *ijtihad* only because of the presence of corruption among the theologians themselves.² In the *Lectures*, however, he clears the whole position and says that mere rigidity of organisation cannot save a people from degeneration. "In an over-organised society, the individual is altogether crushed out of existence. He gains the whole wealth of social thought around him and loses his own soul. Thus a false reverence for past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no remedy for a people's decay."³ The true course lies in giving a full scope for expression to every individual. It is only the worth and power of self-centred individuals that can change the whole nature of a society, raise it from a lower level to a lofty position of honour and power. Rigidity of organisation cannot be prescribed as a remedy for making a nation strong and healthy; it is rather the bye-product of a strong leadership. Still the pragmatic value of *taqlid* cannot

¹ *Ramuz*, p. 63.

² زاجتهاد عالمان کم نظر اقتدا بر رفتگان محفوظ تر

³ *Lectures*, pp. 212-13

be denied : it does constitute its quota of stability to the people. One of the necessary consequences of decadence is the loosening of the collective sanction and each individual tends to prefer his personal interest to that of the social. *Taqlid* helps a little in restoring the collective sense and make each individual realize his true position in relation to society and the debt of obligation which he owes for its stability. But this *taqlid* should not come into the way of an individual's right to judge critically for himself ; it must allow full scope for free expression, subject only to the ultimate criteria on which the Islamic society is based, *viz.*, the Quran and the traditions.

Tauhid, being the foundational principle of Islamic society, must also serve it as an ideal. The pursuit of an ideal is as essential for the preservation of a society as of the individual. As an ideal it serves as a great normative force which determines the whole outlook and attitude of its members towards the ever-recurring new problems that arise with the change of circumstances. Practically speaking, *Tauhid* implies the triple ideas of equality, solidarity and freedom and the great emphasis which the Quran lays on the unity of God is really meant to help in the formulation of a society based on these principles. It was through this that the whole life of the Arabs was metamorphasized. Those who were born with the ideas of inequality, enmity and hatred towards the members of another clan, became the great advocates of equality and brotherhood, justice and tolerance, towards one and other. They carried these principles to every place where they went ; to India, the home of Brahmanic supremacy and pariah's degradation ; to

Persia and Rome, the homes of aristocratic tyranny ; to the West, the home of ignorance and darkness. Iqbal illustrates these changes, wrought under the influence of this doctrine, by two instances taken from history. The first relates to the time of war against Persia during the reign of Caliph Umar. After the Persian army was defeated, Jaban, its commander, fell into the hands of a Muslim soldier who was unaware of his position and rank. Taking advantage of his ignorance, Jaban contrived to save himself by professing Islam before him. The ignorant soldier at once set him free. Later on, when it came to be known that it was Jaban, the soldiers raised a cry that he must be killed. But Abu Obaidah, the head of Muslim army, refused to accept this suggestion, saying that 'every one of us is a representative of society and so his peace and war with anybody means the whole society's peace and war The promise of an individual with the second party must be looked upon as the promise of the whole nation. Though Jaban has been our enemy, yet he has been set free by a Muslim. Therefore it is forbidden for all of us to shed his blood'.¹ The second instance is taken from the life of a certain king Murad who once ordered an expert architect of Khujand to build a mosque for him. Unfortunately the king was not satisfied with his work and got his hands amputated. The architect at once filed a suit

¹ هر يك از ما امين ملت است صلاح و كينش صلاح و كين ملت است
ملت ار گردد اساس جان فرد عهد ملت مي شود پيمان فرد
گرچه جابان دشمن ما بوده است مسلم او را امان بخشوده است
خون او اے معشر خير الانام بر دم تيغ مسلمانان حرام
(رموز-صفحه 35-36)

before the Kazi against this injustice. The king was duly summoned before the court and the judge pronounced his judgment against him.

گفت قاضی فی القصاص آمد حیات زندگی گیرد از بی قانون ثبات
عبد مسلم کمتر از احرار نیست خون شه رنگین تر از معمار نیست
پیش قرآن بنده و مولا یک ست بوریا و مسند و دیبا یک ست

"In retaliation lies life," said the Kazi. Life is strengthened by this law.

A Muslim servant is not lower in status than a free man; and blood of a king is not redder than that of a mason.¹

A society based on these fundamental creeds can alone bring peace and security to the miserable humanity that has been made to suffer only because its so-called leaders, at different periods of history, have thought it fit to enforce laws of their own making, meant to promote their own welfare at the expense of the rest of the people. As such, it becomes the incumbent duty of every member of the Islamic society to concentrate all his energies in propagating this noble ideal so as to relieve people of their bondage to false gods and thus to ensure peace on the earth. The question how to propagate this ideal naturally leads to the discussion and elucidation of the problem of *Jihad*, the term which the Quran uses for the method to be employed in propagating this ideal. This word has been invested with some very unpleasant associations due partly to the lack of understanding of the true position of Islam in this respect and partly to the mischievous propaganda carried on by the interested parties against it. Islam is not 'religion' in the

¹ Ramuz, pp. 36-39.

sense in which this word is commonly employed by western thinkers. If by religion we mean only a collection of a few dogmas and a particular mode of worship and ritual, then surely Islam is not religion. Taking religion in this sense, it would be quite true to say that it is a private affair of an individual who has every right to accept any creed he likes without any idea of seeing it established to the exclusion of the rest. Islam, on the other hand, is a movement which has its own ideology and a peculiar social and cultural system based on it which it wants to establish to the exclusion of all others. In order to achieve that end, *Jihad* is enjoined on all those who accept this ideology, as a means of revolutionary struggle against rival social systems which, according to the Quran, are based on man-made laws and hence are the cause of disorder and mischief in the world. In its literal sense *Jihad* means to exert oneself to the utmost limit in promoting a cause. Whether this cause can be promoted by the use of sword or pen or both can be left to the exigencies of circumstances but still the Quran definitely lays down its utmost necessity.

The revolutionary cry of Islam was nothing but the fundamental postulate that 'Ye people of the world, worship only Him who created you'. It claimed that true sovereignty rests solely with God and that no man has any right to rule over people like himself, to command or to prohibit. It is this evil usurpation of the right of authority by people in power, which Islam looks upon as the sole cause of mischief and misery. The doctrine of Tauhid was nothing short of a call for a social revolution. It was a strong blow against the vested interests in different

spheres of life: against religious classes as represented by priests; against political monopolies as represented by the different ruling parties; against economic interests as represented by landlords and the proverbial money-lenders; all of these had usurped power and used it for the exploitation of their weaker brethren. The declaration of Tauhid was a direct challenge thrown at all these privileged classes and whenever such a call for belief in the sovereignty of the Lord was made such a rising was all but natural. It was not a metaphysical proposition demanding nothing beyond a verbal acceptance or rejection; it was a call for an abrupt change, for revaluation of all that humanity had wrongly held sacred, a re-interpretation of life's ultimate goal and a new approach towards it. This revolution was quite different in its nature and consequences from revolutions that occurred later in France and Russia. The latter movements represented nothing original in their message as such; their call for revolution rose mainly as a reaction against the established systems of society but being devoid of true imagination and divine guidance, ended in the formulation of a gospel which was diametrically opposed to the one that they had striven to over-throw and were therefore equally defective. The motive working in all these movements was revenge and hatred. But the revolution represented by Islam was not motivated by a mere reaction against the *status quo*. It no doubt revolted against the privileged classes but this rising was not based on revenge or hatred against a particular class. It was not war of one class against another, oppressed against the oppressor; its scheme of social reconstruction did not intend to establish the power or

authority of one particular group over others. It wanted to establish the authority of the Lord who alone possesses the right to command and to prohibit, to formulate laws for the guidance of mankind without any inclination towards one class of people to the exclusion of others. It claimed to represent the golden mean, the advantages of which were open to all and everyone. Islam therefore is not to be regarded as a mere collection of certain dogmas and rituals; it is a code of life based on divine laws which wants to eradicate all social systems involving injustice and discrimination and substitute in its place a system based on justice, equality and fairplay. This change can be wrought only through what the Quran technically calls *Jihad*. Possessing a healthy code of life which it claims to be the harbinger of true peace and harmony on the earth, rule of justice and equality among people of all races and nations, Muslim society cannot tolerate that the authority of state should remain vested in the hands of those who constantly misuse it and thus bring disaster on humanity. Its first object after it attains sufficient strength is to wrest power from states based on laws that do not possess divine sanction and in their stead establish His authority over the people. "Ye are the best community that has been raised up for mankind, ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency and ye believe in Allah."¹ "And strive for Allah with the endeavour which is His right... He hath named you Muslims of old time and in this (Scripture), that the messenger may be witness against you and that ye may be witnesses against mankind. So establish worship, pay the poor-due, and hold fast

¹ The Quran, 3: 110.

to Allah.”¹ The object of *Jihad* is not to conquer other peoples' lands, to gain wealth or privilege for certain individuals, to convert others forcibly to one's own views; its only object is to attain power whereby the Muslim society may be able, by promulgating social laws enunciated by the Quran, based on equality and justice, to destroy the power of those who have usurped the true authority. Its blow is not against the people as such but against the power that represents a particular ideology hostile to the interest of humanity in general. For this purpose the use of sword is as necessary as the use of any other method provided the motive underlying it is untinged with personal ambition.² *Jihad* demands exclusive devotion of the people

¹ The Quran, 22 : 78.

² زنده رود : نقش حق را در جهان انداختند

من نمی دادم چسان انداختند ؟

حلاج : یا بزور دلبری انداختند

یا بزور قاهری انداختند

(جاوید نامہ-صفحه 153)

Zinda Rud : How did the Muslims establish God's law in the world ?

Hallaj : Through power or through persuasion.

لادیں ہو تو ہے زہر ہلاہل سے بھلی بڑھ کر

ہو دین کی حفاظت میں تو ہر زہر کا تریاک

(ضرب کلیم-صفحه 23)

If force is divorced from religion, it is more dangerous than poison; but if it is employed in the cause of religion, it is the remedy of all ills.

مومنوں را گفت آن سلطان دین 'مسجد من این همه روئے زمین'

الامان از گردش نہ آسمان مسجد مو من بہ دست دیگران

سخت کوشد بندہ پاکیزہ کیش تابگیرد مسجد مولائے خویش

اے کہ از ترک جہاں گوئی 'مگو ترک این دیر کہن' تسخیر او

(پس چہ باید کرد-صفحه 25)

to the divine cause: it is holy only so long as it is waged for the sake of God; it loses its sacredness when the motive becomes personal aggrandisement. Iqbal has tried to explain this distinguishing characteristic of the Holy War in *Asrar-i-Khudi* where he says that 'the *Jihad*, if it be prompted by land hunger, is unlawful in the religion of Islam'.

هر که خنجر بهر غیر الله کشید تیغ او در سینه او آرمید
Whoso shall draw the sword for anything except Allah, his sword is sheathed in his own breast.¹

Besides the preservation and propagation of the ideal, a society needs for its continued existence a national home. Islamic society, based as it is on a particular ideology, can in no sense be confined to any geographical area. It can claim no country to be exclusively its own. It is not a 'nation' in its modern technical sense; it is, adopting a modern terminology, an international party with its particular creed, which as it claims, is the sole remedy for all the ills that humanity has been suffering from. As such it is one of the most important elements of its creed that its members should see it spread all over the earth. For this purpose, it requires a centre from where the light of its doctrines should radiate in all directions, from where the multifarious activities of its members may be directed and controlled. Such a national home,

آنکه حرف شوق با اقوام گفت جنگ را رهبانی اسلام گفت
جنگ شاهان جهان غارت گری ست جنگ مومن سنت پیغمبری ست
(جاوید نامہ-صفحه 218)

مصلحت در دین ما جنگ و شکوه مصلحت در دین عیسی غار و کوه
(بال جبریل-صفحه 186)

¹ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, II., 1385-6.

in the peculiar sense explained above, is the Kaaba which was the birthplace and the first headquarter of the Islamic international movement started by Abraham, from where missionary propagandists went in all directions and to which they often returned for inspiration.

هم چنیں آئین میلاد امم زندگی بر مرکزے آید بہم
قوم را ربط و نظام از مرکزے روزگارش را دوام از مرکزے
در جہاں جان امم جمعیت است در نگر سر حرم جمعیت است

Similarly is the law of birth of nations ; life grows forceful by being centralised.

The organisation of society depends on a centre which will render it stable and eternal.

Unity is the soul of societies and the Kaaba is really a source of union to Islamic society.¹

The ceremony of Hajj was instituted for the very purpose that all those who have willingly submitted themselves to the sovereignty of God should, without any distinction of race or colour, gather round one centre and thus every year or at least once in their life renew their pledge to the movement to which they owe allegiance and whose cause they keep dearest to their hearts. The place of Kaaba in the world of Islam is similar to the position of heart in human body. So long as the heart is alive, man cannot die though his body may grow weak through different diseases. This heart of the Muslim society draws blood from far-fetched veins and after purifying it, sends it back in all directions. As long as this process continues year after year, it is impossible for the body to die however weak and fragile it may become. Yearly connect-

¹ Ramuz, pp. 77-82.

ion with the national home thus serves to preserve the society for ever. Iqbal illustrates this point negatively by referring to the life history of the Jewish people. The root cause of their downfall was that they lost in the early period of their career their national home, the central headquarter of their sacred movement. Being deprived of it, they scattered over different parts of the world and could find no peace and stability.¹

Another very important conservative force for a society is the preservation of its history which reflects its past in the mirror of the present and thus serves as a guiding principle for its future. In the Introduction (Urdu) to the first edition of *Ramuz*, Iqbal says: "Just as in individual life, self-acquisition for profit and self-defence against whatever is harmful, apportioning of one's field of work and search for ultimate truth, are essential for the growth, continuity, development and stability of the sense of self, similarly the life of societies depends on the same sense or in other words, on the preservation, development and stabilizing of the social self... In the case of individuals, the continuity of the sense of self is due to personal memory; in the case of societies this is achieved through the preservation of national history. Such a history is like the personal memory which relates the diverse experiences and activities of different decades into a single organic whole and thus serves to preserve the temporal continuity of social self.'

قوم روشن از سواد سرگزشت خود شناسی آمد زیاد سرگزشت
سرگزشت او گر از یادش رود باز اندر نیستی گم می شود

A society is strong and self-conscious only through

¹ *Ramuz*, p. 80.

its past history, If its past history is forgotten, it merges once more into non-existence.¹

According to experimental investigations in the field of abnormal psychology it has been revealed that the loss of memory often leads to the loss of personal identity. A person, who through some physical injury or otherwise, fails to bring his present life into organic relation with his past, ceases to be the same man. In the case of societies if the historical continuity is lost, it means nothing but the loss of its identity or destruction of what it had so far stood for. "Life moves with a weight of its past on its back . . . No people can afford to reject their past entirely; for it is their past that has made their personal history."²

What, then, is history and in what sense does it help a society? Almost all sciences are, in one sense or other, studies about man as related to the various aspects of his environment. Yet this study is mostly incomplete and relative: they study him in one or other of his aspects exclusively and the complete man is never their subject. History alone studies man in the concrete fullness of his being; it examines him in relation to the world forces which act upon him. The subject-matter of history is in reality the whole story of human destiny which is a complex of the actions of all the world forces. As such we can conceive of man as nothing but a historical being and history as nothing but the revelation of the destiny of the world focussed in man. Both are inter-dependent. To divorce man from history is to consider him in abstract and to study history as detached from man, *i.e.*, from a non-human point of view, is as impossible as the first. From this

¹ Ramuz, pp. 96-102.

² Lectures, p. 232.

it follows, as a logical consequence, that the most appropriate method for the study of history should not be merely objective. We must have an inner, profound and mysterious tie with the object of our historical study. Without a tie of this sort, that is, without this personal inner sense of participation in the historical process, we cannot truly apprehend it. "Each man represents by virtue of his inner nature a sort of microcosm in which the whole world of reality and all the great historical epochs combine and co-exist. He is not merely a minute fragment of the universe, but rather a world in his own right, a world revealed or hidden according as consciousness is more or less penetrating and extensive."

What is the nature of the historical movement? The Greeks were utterly ignorant of history as a continuous dynamic process. Neither Plato nor Aristotle nor any other great Greek thinker has left us such a conception of history. The reason was that, according to them, the world was a finite and harmonious cosmos and history had no issue, no goal, no beginning; in it everything was recurrent, eternally rotating and governed by a cyclic motion. It were the Semetic religions—Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam—which, for the first time, conceived the world as historical fulfilment in contra-distinction to the cyclic process of the Greeks. This progressive conception of history was the consequence of certain basic ideas which had no place in Greek thought. The first of these is the idea of freedom to choose between good and evil which each human self possesses and on account of which he is morally responsible for all he does. The story of Adam, as related by the Quran,

signifies that the very first act of Adam, after he attained to self-consciousness, was the act which he performed after his own choice and though he chose to disobey yet it paved the way for his future progress. A world in which there would be no evil, no freedom of choice, would be a world without beginning, mere fulfilment, the perfect Kingdom of God, a perfect cosmos, an idea contrary to the spirit of the Quran. In such a world, the conception of history as a dynamic process could not originate. The Greeks had no real knowledge of freedom. Submission to fate was the most prevalent idea in the whole Hellenistic speculation. To them form was always more important than content. In art, philosophy, politics, in every sphere of their life, principle of formal perfection always predominated over that of matter. The second basic idea on which this conception of history depends, is the doctrine of goal of life. It is absolutely essential for the elaboration of the idea of history, as a significant progression or movement, that we must have a definite doctrine of the goal of history, its issue and fulfilment. Without an elaborate eschatology it would be impossible to conceive and understand history as such; without a sense of an end, the process cannot be regarded as historical movement; without this eschatological perspective progression cannot be considered as history, for then it would lack inner purpose, significance and fulfilment. A progression, that neither leads towards a determinate end nor has any such end in view, tends to be governed by cyclic motion. The Greek mind had been dominated by the idea of frequency and recurrence of events while Semetic religious thought held that events were immediate,

non-recurrent and unique and this fact introduced dynamism to historical movement.

History, as thus considered, is both creative and conservative and the historical process would be incomplete without either. The conservative element means a tie with the spiritual tradition and an acceptance of the sacred heritage of the past. But it also demands a dynamic-creative element, a creative purpose, an urge towards self-fulfilment. Conservatism, pure and abstract, however, whose function is to preserve what has already been accomplished, would be utterly useless. On the other hand, a tie with the past and what is sacred in it, is one with the creative dynamism of life, fidelity to the covenants of the past is fidelity to those of our ancestors' creative and dynamic life. A tie with our ancestors, with all that is sacred, is one with the creative and dynamic process which is addressing itself to the future, determining the fulfilment and creation of new world and life, and effecting the union between the new world of the future and the old world of the past.

سر زند از ماضی تو حال تو خیزد از حال تو استقبال تو
مشکن از خواهی حیات لا زوال رشته ماضی ز استقبال و حال

Your present arises out of (the bosom of) past and your future is fashioned out of the present. If you desire an eternal life, do not break the link of future and present from the past.¹

When the social order is based on these two fundamental principles of Tauhid and prophet-hood, its attitude towards the physical reality is logically determined thereby. The belief in one God as the ground

¹ Ramuz, p. 102.

of all values and the source of all authority divests nature of its alleged capriciousness. The belief in the finality of prophethood does away with a life of superstition and magic as short-cuts towards the propitiation of the hostile forces said to reside in nature. They pave the way for a rational mode of approach in appreciating our relationship with both the physical and psychical worlds. In reply to the objection of angels against the creation of Adam, God taught him the names of things. Iqbal interprets this Quranic story to mean that the superiority of Adam lies in his capacity to acquire knowledge of the behaviour of objects and thus attain dominance over his physical environment. In this achievement lies his development as a true vicegerent of God on this earth. The Quran by its repeated references urges man to cultivate his power of observation and inference from facts of the physical world which move not arbitrarily but according to a fixed law determined by God. This appeal coupled with the conviction that matter and spirit are not alien, produced a healthy attitude among the people towards their environment. Unlike Buddha and Schopenhauer who saw nothing but pain and suffering and death in this world, Islam taught that life cannot attain its fulfilment without coming into fruitful contact with it. The placing of Adam in the so-called painful environment was not an act of punishment by a malicious creator but an act of favour pregnant with untold possibilities for his future benefit. Quite contrary to Christianity which, under the baneful influence of Manicheanism, held that the cultivation of spirit is totally incompatible with the cultivation of matter, Islam taught that true spiritual life is impos-

sible without a proper adjustment towards the world of matter. It was essentially this tendency in Islam that led to the cultivation and development of true scientific spirit in Muslim thinkers. "Although there is not a single aspect of European growth in which the decisive influence of Islamic culture is not traceable, nowhere is it so clear and momentous as in the genesis of that power which constitutes the permanent distinctive force of the modern world, and the supreme source of its victory—natural science and the scientific spirit . . . The debt of our science to that of Arabs does not consist in startling discoveries of revolutionary theories; science owes a great deal more to Arab culture, it owes its existence. The ancient world was pre-scientific. The Astronomy and Mathematics of the Greeks were a foreign importation never thoroughly acclimatized in Greek culture. The Greeks systematised, generalised and theorised, but the patient ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive knowledge, the minute methods of science, detailed and prolonged observation and experimental enquiry, were altogether alien to the Greek temperament . . . What we call science arose in Europe as a result of new spirit of enquiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, observation, measurement, of the development of Mathematics in a form unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced into the European world by the Arabs." ¹ Any reconstruction of the Muslim society must keep in view this important point and should develop the knowledge of the physical world in order to

¹ Briffault: *Making of History* (p. 190). See also Hans Kohn: *Western Civilization in the Near East*, p. 48.

gain control of its hidden forces and in this respect we shall have to learn much from the West.

We now come to the most important section of this chapter. It deals with problems that our contact with the western civilization has created, problems which are serious enough to threaten the future, not only of modern Europe, but equally of the rest of the world: for its political and economic dominance has led people of all countries, whether free or otherwise, to be strongly affected by its mode of thinking and living. Since the first decade of the twentieth century when Spengler wrote his famous *Decline of the West*, this problem has engaged the attention of several eminent reformers. At that time most critics disagreed with his conclusions for they still seemed to share the optimistic view engendered by the early phases of Industrial expansion. But the first Great War with its consequent economic and political disasters, resulting in the present war, destined to be the harbinger of a time still more barbaric and darker than the so-called Dark Ages, has disillusioned almost all. Writers interested in different spheres of life are looking at the crisis from their own particular points of view. It has been analysed and diverse remedies have been suggested. McDougall,¹ for instance, after a thorough analysis, arrived at the conclusion that the modern civilization is both top-heavy and lop-sided only because an undue prominence has been assigned to the physical sciences in our scheme of life. The remedy he suggests is that we should now begin to cultivate the sciences of life with greater energy and speed and thus restore the equilibrium. He complains that almost none

¹ W. McDougall: *World Chaos*.

of these sciences, *e.g.*, economics, politics, sociology, biology, has developed so far as to be properly labelled 'science' at all in the technical sense. This defect, according to him, is mainly due to the fact that we have not given enough attention to the basic science of life, namely, psychology. Thus he claims that if psychology were to develop as it should have done, the remaining sciences of life, sciences that deal with man in one aspect or other, would correspondingly develop along healthy and sound direction and this would surely save the civilization from its destruction. McDougall has indeed brought to the forefront one of the causes of the decay of modern society. But it is not the main cause: the roots of this disease lie somewhere else. It lies in the tendency which automatically led people of the West to adopt one-sided view of their life. Unless that basic tendency is removed, no superficial change of view can bring about the desired end. Again, it is difficult to see the point that a development of psychology as a science can remedy the defects in our present political and economic theory and practice. Psychology claims to be a positive science and there is no lack of positive knowledge at the present stage. What is really lacking is rather the knowledge of values and that is a sphere which is definitely beyond the confines of psychology. We do not so much want to know how men and women actually see, think, judge and act as how they *should* do all these things.

Joad,¹ another eminent writer of to-day, after brilliantly diagnosing the disease, suggests philosophy to be the wanted elixir. He says that positive sciences

¹ *Philosophy for our times* (First published in 1940).

deal with means while philosophy deals with ends, values. We have much of means which have given humanity control over nature greater than said to be possessed by the gods of antiquity. The only thing that can safely be recommended as antidote is the study of values, which, according to Joad, can be supplied only by philosophy. We may agree with him in his penetrating analysis of the present-day tendencies, marked by a positive indifference towards the field of values, but we cannot see any point in the suggested remedy. Philosophy has been notoriously deficient in practical utility and guidance and one can gain nothing but bewilderment after a thorough study of divergent philosophical systems.¹ Surely a sound knowledge of values can hardly be gained from philosophy. He then touches upon the topic of religion but seems to be too much obsessed with the anti-religious spirit of his times to suggest religious revival of any sort. Remedies of more practical nature have been the advocacy and practice of socialism, communism, dictatorship, League of Nations but with no tangible result. The destructive element of civilization continues unabated. Only emphasis has shifted from one extreme to the other. Alfred Cobban, in his book *The Crisis of Civilization*, thinks that the remedy for all our ills lies in the restoration of all the ideals that the period of Enlightenment stood for and which were unfortunately reversed during the French Revolution. He regards democracy and nationalism

¹ انجام خرد ہے ہے حضوری ہے فلسفہ زندگی سے دوری
افکار کے نغمہ ہائے ہے صوت ہیں ذوق عمل کے واسطے موت
(ضرب کلیم - صفحہ 10-11)

as the nourishing grounds of those tendencies (the conflict of capitalism and socialism, of democracy and dictatorship, of imperialism and nationalism) that have contributed to a sense of insecurity prevalent to-day. He begins his book with the following words: "There is a race of animals called the lemmings. It is said that at certain times, stricken with madness or the call of ancestral memory, they gather in large hordes and rush wildly and irresistibly, disregarding all obstacles, to their common destruction in the sea. The behaviour of the human race, as history records it, sometimes seems to parallel that of the lemmings."¹ This confession of utter pessimism as to the future destiny of

¹ Cf., for instance, what Iqbal says about the future of Western Civilization :

شعلہ افرونگیاں نم خورده است
چشم شان صاحب نظر، دل مرده است
زخمها خوردند از شمشیر خویش
بسمل افتادند چون نختاچیر خویش
سوزومستی را مچو از تاک شان
عصر دیگر نیست در افلاک شان

(جاوید نامہ - صفحہ 71)

دبا رکھا ہے اسکو زخمہ ور کی تیز دستی نے
بہت نیچے سروں میں ہے ابھی یورپ کا اوپلا

(بال جبریل - صفحہ 39)

پیر میخانہ یہ کہتا ہے کہ ایوان فرنگ
سست بنیاد بھی ہے آئینہ دیوار بھی ہے

(بال جبریل - صفحہ 94)

ہے نزع کی حالت میں یہ تہذیب جوان مرگ
شاید ہوں کلیسا کے یہودی متولی

(ضرب کلیم - صفحہ 141)

present civilization shows the intensity of the crisis through which the modern world is passing. The remedy which he suggests depends for its appreciation on an understanding of the history of transition from medieval to the modern period. It is, however, not possible to deal exhaustively with the whole range of facts and consequences involved. We shall, therefore, try to bring the variety of apparently divergent and unrelated events under two different categories, of security and freedom. Men desire both of them: security from dangers and vicissitudes of fortune; freedom for the development of their capacities and attainment of their ends. These two values, however, do not appear compatible. Security points to a protected environment, lack of enterprise and risk while freedom implies an open world with its attendant uncertainties. The medieval world was based on the principle of security and transition to the modern world meant a change from an atmosphere of security to that of freedom. The centre of gravity shifted from nature, society and God as guarantors of man's security to a world permitting the unlimited expression and expansion of the activities and interests of individuals. In other words, the modern world may be characterised as the manifestation of the spirit of Individualism.

The security of the medieval world originated from the principle of authority which people took as granted, the principle that was supplied to them by their religion. The varied activities and interests of men, their science, philosophy, art, industry and commerce, their social, legal and political affairs, all these moved within the orbit of religion. The Church

claimed and exercised an ultimate control over the entire range of human interests. This point of view can best be illustrated in the way in which economic interests and activities worked. The unit of medieval economic life was neither the individual nor the state but the Guild. It was the guild which regulated all the economic activities of the area, the growing of the corn and other raw material, buying and selling, the number of men engaged in any one occupation, the price at which commodities were exchanged. Their primary aim was to ensure the provision of necessities for the life and labour of its inhabitants. In the event of doubt or conflict it was the Church that had the last word. The economic considerations were subordinate to moral control. There was a 'just price' at which commodities were to be exchanged and this was not left to be freely determined by the play of purely economic forces, such as the law of supply and demand.

This scheme of life and society was based on a fundamental principle which the medieval age inherited from the Greeks, *viz.*, the law of Nature. In early stages the Greek morality was traditional or customary but with the appearance of Sophists it came to be severely criticised. Several questions began to be asked. What was the source of the principles governing their civilization? What determined the validity of the ideas and beliefs that they followed in their life? Were these principles, in the last analysis, capricious, arbitrary, mere subjective expressions of individual or class interests? Were they reasonable and objective, the embodiment of a rational order characterising the ultimate nature of things? To

these questions the Stoics answered that the world is ruled by universal laws which are discoverable by human reason. This new ethical conception led them to another assertion that as all people are under the same law, they all possess equal rights. They called it the Law of Nature, because, according to them, it was imposed by nature on all men and could be discovered by reason from the needs common to all mankind. Classical medieval thought and civilization inherited these ideas. It was supposed that there really were principles significant for human conduct and institutions which reason could discover because they were present in the very nature of things. They were natural principles, binding and authoritative. But their authority did not emanate from the capricious will of a sovereign despot, even though they possessed a super-human sanction. They are binding because they are the eternal principles of reason.

But a society based on such abstract metaphysical principles could hardly be said to be stable. The impact of new forces challenged the validity of this principle and it at once brought the whole superstructure based on it to the ground. Unfortunately the other basic factor of the medieval civilization, namely Christianity, was incomplete and could not come to the rescue and itself fell prostrate before the onrush of new ideas. What we call Christianity is really nothing but a bare collection of a few dogmas. It has no code of laws for the guidance of people in their social, political and economic problems. The moral system which it gave to the world was so much one-sided that no stable civilization could be evolved on

its basis. In the words of Nietzsche it was nothing but a code for the protection of slaves and parasites against their masters and he was not far wrong in this characterisation.

The one-sidedness in the Christian morality is due to the fact that Christ never claimed to preach a totally new religion. He often asserted that his mission was only to supplement what was already revealed to the Israelites in the Old Testament.¹ Christ strove only to remedy the moral defects that had appeared in the body-politic of the Jews. He never claimed to deliver any new independent message to the people at large. He definitely asserted that his prophetic mission was confined to those alone who accepted Moses and his religion.² It was, however, St. Paul who completely ignored all these explicit warnings of Christ. As long as Christ lived, and even for several years after him, he was a staunch opponent of his religion and waged a deadly war against its followers. But, all of a sudden, as he claimed, he saw the vision of the Lord and came to accept his religion. He had, however, never been in Christ's company and therefore could not be credited with possessing any insight into the real motives underlying Christ's message. Notwithstanding the opposition of several eminent apostles of Christ, like St. Peter and

¹ 'Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil . . . Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the Law, till all be fulfilled.'

St. Matthew, 5 : 17-18.

² 'For the Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.' St. John, 1 : 17. See also St. Matthew, 23 : 2-3 and St. Luke, 16 : 17.

³ 'Go not into the way of the Gentiles and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not; but go rather to the lost sheep of the Israel.'

St. Matthew, 10 : 5-6.

St. Barnabas,¹ who had advantage over him in being his early companions and thus possessing a greater opportunity of appreciating the real mission of Christ, St. Paul widened the scope of his message to the whole world, Jews and Gentile alike. In order to support his thesis, he declared that Christ after dying on the Cross came to his disciples and said: 'Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations.'² When this message was to be carried to the people in general, the question arose: was it necessary to enjoin Mosaic code as well?³ Christ had, as he claimed, not come to abrogate the law of Moses but rather to supply deficiencies and render it complete and up-to-date. St. Paul, on the other hand, declared that Christ's message was independent and that, while accepting Christianity, it was not indispensable to accept the law of Moses as well.⁴ This metamorphosis of Christianity at the hands of St. Paul involved far-reaching consequences. So long as it was confined within the fold of Israëlites who accepted and followed the ancient Law, it had every possibility of producing desirable results. But no sooner did it begin to be preached to the general populace the majority of which hated the Jews and their religion, than the lack of a balanced code of life, which Mosaic Law alone could supply, began to be severely felt. It possessed no Shariat (Law) which could help people of different classes in their daily problems of life. It had no social laws of any kind, it was rather a complete

¹ Millman: *History of Christianity*, Vol. I, Book II, Chapter 2, pp. 377-423.

² St. Matthew, 28 : 19.

³ Millman: *History of Christianity*, p. 392 ff.

⁴ See, e.g., Epistle of Paul to the Galatians, 2 : 16-21; 3 : 10-13; 3 : 24-25; 5 : 1-5.

negation of civilization. It confined itself to the problem of individual salvation and, strangely enough, the path which it prescribed for him was complete renunciation of the physical world. Such a religion could hardly withstand the impact of new ideas and as a natural consequence, with the birth of a new age, Christianity was relegated to the background. The rise of modern science, which, in fact, was not motivated by any positive hatred of religion as such at least in its earlier stages, was regarded by the Church as a blow against its prestige and so a conflict between religion and science began. As a matter of fact there is no field where their interests can be said to clash. The conflict arose only because science stood for freedom of research while Church represented blind allegiance to dogmas which, as we have seen, were not based on Christ's original teaching but had been inherited from Greek speculative systems. The result of the conflict was inevitable. The new age, unfortunately for itself, threw, not only Christianity but religion as such, to the winds and continued its work independent of religious or moral considerations. This total and complete separation between secular and religious affairs was the beginning of modern civilization. So long as Church was supreme, it held sway over all human activities, political, social and economic. But now the ideal of European unity, under the ægis of Church, was swept away and gave way to politically autonomous and sovereign states which did not countenance any extraneous interference. Thus the ideal of national sovereignty replaced the ideal of spiritual and political unity of mankind. Similarly commerce and industry struggled hard to

free themselves from their subservience to the laws of the Guild and Church and in this struggle enlisted the aid of the newly created national states. It was not, however, until the later part of the 18th century or well into the 19th, that the ideal of economic freedom, *laissez faire*, came to be victorious. The release of these major human interests, the outcome of a series of revolutions, involved far-reaching changes in the state of the individual. Henceforth the powers that reside in the individual became the source of laws, standards and institutions. The religious revolution (*i.e.* Reformation) of the 16th century, the scientific revolution of the 17th, the slow-moving economic and commercial revolution of the early modern period, the later industrial revolution and then the political revolution of France (1789), all of these are chapters and incidents in a continuous march of ideas and events. Each had something to contribute to the rise and spread of modern individualism.

The leaders of Reformation attacked the superstitious basis of almost all rituals which were prevalent at the time. They concentrated moral and religious values within the inner life of the individual. To them all the multifarious institutions and traditions that had grown up in the medieval Christendom possessed no objective moral or spiritual worth. Social structures and political or economic institutions were no longer to be considered as having any over-individual meaning and purpose: they were to be employed as mere instruments in the service of individual progress. It meant that secular interests ceased to have any particular connection with ethical and religious ideal which retreated into the inner life

of the individual, the seat of conscience and faith. The older conception of society as an organic community and sustained by mutual services and obligations disappeared and in its place appeared a society which was only to serve as a raw material to be exploited by the individuals in their own interests. The scientific revolution, through different channels, arrived at a similar bifurcation. According to the medieval thinkers, a view sprung from the fusion of the Christian traditions and the philosophy of Aristotle, the richly qualitative experiences, the meanings and purposes with which men are immediately concerned, were to be taken as the best clue to the nature of reality. In opposition to this, the scientific pioneers of the 17th century revived the older Greek naturalism. The secrets of nature can no longer be discovered in our direct and immediate experiences of shapes, colours, sound and the like, much less in our human purposes and meanings. The physical universe came to be defined in terms of mechanism. It was a world of quantitative determinants which could be completely and exhaustively described in such terms as mass, momentum and acceleration under the physical laws of motion. Thus both the religious and scientific revolutions resulted in engendering an almost analogous view of man and his relation to the external world. Each in its own way isolates the individual and his experiences from the external world. The Reformation tended to deprive social, political and economic institutions of any moral or religious significance. As such, they were allowed to be determined by temporal considerations. Morality, according to its advocates, has its seat in one's conscience and faith

while our relation to the state and concern in economic activities are matters of natural necessity and self-interest which have no connection whatsoever with the inwardness of morality and religion. The scientific revolution similarly drew a strict line of demarcation between the individual with his immediate experiences and the mechanism of the physical world. Thus the two revolutions converged in producing the same world view, of two radically separate orders of reality. The one consists of individual minds with their qualitative feelings, their values and their conscious purposes, the other consisting of a quantitative objective world of physical nature.

Gradually, however, the physicists tried to bridge the gulf thus created. They began to employ the category of mechanism in explaining the activities of an individual. The impressive successes and achievements of the new science, under the new interpretation, engendered the growing conviction that it could be equally employed successfully in dealing with a sphere which was at first thought to be purposive. This attempt at mechanistic interpretation of the human field was first applied to society. It was claimed that it is composed of autonomous individuals each of whom is the seat and protagonist of his own interests and rights. Each individual interest is to be free to expand and to seek its own satisfaction. While there is individual purpose which tends to control activities according to one's interests, there can be no social purpose that may control the interaction of individual interests: these interactions are mechanical. Society, in short, like the physical order, is a rational mechanism. There are principles of harmonious ad-

justment which are derived from the nature of things. Because of their presence and efficacy, any effort at social control is needless or even harmful. There is a natural harmony of interests. Each individual with his private interests is to be free to live his own life. If this freedom can be assured, there is a guarantee of ultimate security, order and progress. These were the antecedents of the economic theory of *laissez faire*. In a society, conceived as a rational mechanism, the duty of every individual was to organise his activities in the light of his own interests. There was felt to be no need for any intelligent control over the running of the machine as a whole. There was no need for any positive social purpose. "Restraint of every kind on the acquisition and the use of wealth was discredited, the doctrine that the man who seeks his private gain finds the public good was acceptable like a discovery of Newton's; progress was regarded as certain and it was believed that the Industrial Revolution was making the problems of life not more but less complex. The economist dismissed moral and religious impulses, finding in selfishness the driving power of industrial enterprise. This world seemed to be organised in such a way that the capitalist's desire for profit was really the best guarantee that the consumer and the workman would benefit by his activities."¹

Thus the secularisation of society, as a natural consequence of the two revolutions, resulted in stripping the commercial structure of any intrinsic moral significance and in its stead economic wealth became the touch-stone of all human values. Not beauty, not

¹ J. L. and Barbara Hammond; *The Rise of Modern Industry*, p. 217.

truth, not the disinterested search for knowledge but the pursuit of individual material gain became the pivot around which men's lives were centred. This was an age of optimism. An unlimited increase of wealth and happiness, unbounded progress, peace and security, all appeared within men's grasp if they could only be persuaded to observe the laws of natural harmony of interests. But unfortunately this optimism proved too short-lived. Soon the seed of evil that had been sown during the period of transition grew out into a spacious tree and spread its branches everywhere. A few decades later the fruit was found by people to be unexpectedly so bitter as to disillusion the whole age about the future destiny of their civilization. This realisation has grown with the appearance of ever new and more bitter fruit. The first factor that brought about this change of outlook was the maturing of the Industrial revolution. It shook the idea of individual freedom to its ground. The minute division of labour, the mechanising of industry, the expansion of local markets into a world market, the concentrated control of vast masses of labour and capital, produced a situation in which it was evident that individual interests were inter-dependant. Any picture of the present world in terms of self-contained autonomous interests could hardly be tenable. The rewards that come to an individual often depend upon world-wide factors upon which he has no direct control. The second element that contributed to this change of outlook was the biological theory of evolution. Darwin depicted the world as a continuous and unrelenting struggle for existence in which only the fittest survive and the weaker go to the wall. The victory and sur-

vival of one interest, of one individual or species, meant the defeat of its competitors. Not harmony but struggle and competition express the principles of natural processes. Thus we enter the 19th century, a world of competition, industrialism, and conflict of classes. These two movements of life and thought, the Industrial revolution and the theory of evolution, shattered the complacent simplicity of the system of natural harmony of interests. When society was no longer considered to be a perfect rational mechanism but subject to changes for better or for worse, then the attention of people, of necessity, came to be focussed on political, moral and social problems once more.

Another important result of the Reformation that was destined to prove of very great consequence to the present world, was the birth of the idea of nationalism and disruption of a central political authority under the Church. The political implications of this movement were as important as the religious or economic ones. It is held by some that the real motive force behind Lutheran revolt was the national feeling and it is no accident that Luther should be regarded as a pioneer of German national movement. The rise of the new merchant class with the development and expansion of trade demanded and insisted upon greater freedom from all kinds of external control. They therefore joined forces with local kings in overthrowing the Church autocracy in economic as well as in political matters. They succeeded and the result was the birth of true national spirit in different countries of Europe. Gradually, however, when the new middle class, after a period of free trade and commerce, had gained sufficient economic power,

it became politically conscious. So long as the fight was against the common enemy, the so-far omnipotent Church, it had entered into an alliance with the king. As soon as that enemy disappeared, the alliance came to an end. The same middle class now stood in the way of the king in his autocratic rule and demanded a share in the government of the country. Similarly the common man, so far perfectly unconscious of his latent power, came to realise his position in the state. He began to clamour not only for a share in the administration of his country but also equality of economic opportunities. Yet the full development of the ideals of nationalism, democracy and socialism had to await the French Revolution to become fully operative in their present significant form. In the post-revolutionary period, nationalism did not mean simply the existence of nations with their own cultural and communal life. There was nothing new in that. Democracy did not signify the form of government set up, for instance, in America and socialism, the mere humanitarian and reforming tendencies of the 18th century. The fundamental ideas at the root of these three movements, *viz.*, the belief that nations should be free, that people should govern themselves and that all should share justly in the wealth all produced, were perfectly sound and nobody would dare contest their reasonableness. But the justification which these ideas possessed seemed to disappear as soon as they came to be employed in practice. Passing from the realm of ideals to that of positive forces, their nature radically changed. This change occurred due to a theoretical principle which each of these movements accepted as its basis, the principle, namely, of

popular sovereignty. This principle operates with equal force in all these. "The people is the sovereign", said the democrats, protesting against the claims of the monarchy. "The people is the nation", cried the nationalists, defying the foreign rulers. "The sovereignty of the people must be extended to secure economic equality", declared the socialists.

Thus all these three factors of modern civilization arise from this basic principle and it is therefore essential that we should analyse and elucidate the idea. There are two elements in the theory of popular sovereignty, the idea of sovereignty and the idea of people. The first idea meant nothing but the presence in a society of a supreme arbiter capable of quelling the warring ambitions of rival factions in a state. It meant establishment of a strong, unified government whose authority would be exercised only in the interests of the common good. It did not imply that sovereign's power was absolute and that there was to be no check or control over it, whether of human or divine laws. Gradually, however, the kings began to acquire more and more power and their will came to be regarded as the law itself. Yet, so long as the principle of Natural Law survived, in some form or other, his will was still under control to some extent. The other element is the idea of the people. That the common man is an indispensable element in the government and that it is his interest which is the supreme end of political activity, would not be denied by any one. This idea was significantly employed as an antithesis to government. The people might well have been defined as the sum-total of those members of a political society who were not included in the government. Thus the

function of this idea was to limit authority. So long as the two ideas of sovereignty and people were in opposition, society was safe from both tyranny and anarchy. But when both these concepts were combined, a perfectly new theory came into being. The traditional argument for this new theory had been that government must be based either on consent or force¹ and since force cannot make right, a rightful government must be based on consent. But the fact that a million people consent to an act which is wrong does not make it any the less wrong. The rightfulness of any government's authority depends on its objects and on the way in which it is exercised. A will ought to prevail only if it is a good will; but this is dependent not upon whose will it is but upon its contents. The new theory, however, judged by its fruit, proved most disastrous. The change contemplated ended the dualism between the sovereign and the subject. The people was henceforth to be both ruler and ruled and it was believed that by this identification of the government with the governed, sovereignty could be reconciled with liberty. As a matter of fact, the identification produced quite contrary results. So long as the rulers and the ruled were different the power of sovereignty could be checked and kept under control through constitutional precedents and through a belief in the Natural Law. But as a result of this masterpiece of political alchemy all limitations on the authority became superfluous and henceforth sovereignty

¹ اصل شاهی چیست اندر شرق و غرب؟

یا رضائے امتان یا حرب و ضرب!

(جاوید نامہ-صفحة 192)

became absolute. Divine right of kings disappeared and gave place to the divine right of the people. Democracy, therefore, came to mean the government run according to a will that is common to all the members of a society or in the words of Rousseau, the General Will. But to attribute will to a collective whole like a society is psychologically impossible and nobody can explain how the wills of, say, forty million people of India can be represented as one will. Moreover, the appearance of parties with antagonistic programmes in modern democratic states is in itself a sufficient proof that there can be no General Will in a society, and that if this course is to be pursued, divergent interests are bound to arise. The only consistent result, if we are to accept the theory of popular sovereignty as the basis of democracy, is the formation of government on a one party system or headed by a single individual who represents in himself the collective will. The dictatorship is the logical consequence of the democratic theory of the General Will.¹

¹ وائے بر دستور جمہور فرنگ مرده تر شد مرده از صور فرنگ
(جاوید نامہ-صفحہ 79)

ہے وہی ساز کہن مغرب کا جمہوری نظام
جس کے پردوں میں نہیں غیر از نوائے قیصری
دیو استبداد جمہوری قبا میں پائے کوب
تو سمجھتا ہے یہ آزادی کی ہے نیلم پری

(خضر راہ-بانگ درا)

می کند بند غلامان سخت تر حریت می خواند او را نے بصر
گرمی هنگامہ جمہور دید پردہ بر روئے ملوکیت کشید
(پس چہ باید کرد-صفحہ 46)

(Contd. on next page)

Similarly the principle of popular sovereignty changed the doctrine of nationalism. Nations existed in the Middle Ages, though the claim that every nation has a right to political independence simply because it is a nation was not clearly established. Upto the end of the 18th century a people or state was regarded as being constituted by a collection of individuals under one government. The nation, on the other hand, was a society bound together by historical and emotional forces. It was during the French Revolution that transition was effected from the former to the latter, when the idea of nation was linked with the idea of the people. The basic element in nationalism is the belief that every nation has the right to political independence. But it does not stop at that. If the nation as people possesses absolute sovereignty, nationalism comes to mean that the rights of the nation are supreme over all other rights. The interests of individuals and claims of humanity alike disappear in face of the absolute right of the nation. Internally, the nation becomes supreme and all-embracing, externally it asserts the superiority of its claims over those of all other nations, and as soon as its power permits, in

جلال بادشاہی ہو کہ جمہوری تماشا ہو
جدا دیں سے سیاست ہو تو رہ جاتی ہے چنگیزی

(بال جبریل-صفحہ 62)

یہاں مرض کا سبب ہے غلامی و تقلید
وہاں مرض کا سبب ہے نظام جمہوری

(ضرب کلیم-صفحہ 164)

تو نے کیا دیکھا نہیں مغرب کا جمہوری نظام
چہرہ روشن، اندروں چنگیز سے تاریکتر

(ارمغان حجاز-صفحہ 218)

a bound it passes to imperialism. ¹ The same is the case with Marxist socialism as illustrated in modern Russia. Although the proletariat is substituted for the people, popular sovereignty reaches one of its highest manifestations in the conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat. "Thus, under the influence of the theory of sovereignty, democracy has led up to plebescitary dictatorship, nationalism has developed into imperialism, while socialism has produced omnipotent bureaucracy and autarky; the name that has been found for the combination of all these is totalitarianism. The democratic, nationalist and socialist movements have each in turn tried to utilize the principle of absolute sovereignty, and have in turn become the servants of the totalitarian state, which is now in process of eliminating the basic ideals of western civilisation from the world." ²

Our study of the western society has sufficiently revealed its inner character. Its evolution has been nothing but a series of gropings and experiments guided by the need and problems of the moment. The ideal of collective security, which dominated during

¹ آر چنار قطع اخوت کرده اند بر وطن تعمیر ملت کرده اند
تا وطن را شمع متکفل ساختند نوع انسان را قبائل ساختند
مردمی اندر چهار افسانہ شد آدمی از آدمی بیگانه شد
روح از تن رفت و هفت اندام ماند آدمیت گم شد و اقوام ماند
(رموز بیخودی-صفحه 48-49)

اس دور میں اقوام کی صحبت بھلی ہوئی عام
پوشیدہ نگاہوں سے رھی وحدت آدم
تفریق ملل، حکمت افرنگ کا مقصود
اسلام کا مقصود فقط ملت آدم

(ضرب کلیم-صفحه 54)

² See Alfred Cobban: *The Crisis of Civilization*.

the Middle Ages, gave place to the ideal of perfect freedom to the individual due to the pressure which circumstances came to bear upon it, and, in its turn, when this individualism began to threaten the external and internal peace of these countries, they began to search for new ideals tending towards socialism. There has been throughout these centuries no constant social ideal which guided its evolution. Ideals have not preceded but followed the changes, effected through external conditions and therefore the instability of the social order is the natural consequence. This lack of stability leads, of necessity, to a constant class struggle ; for it satisfied only one part of society leaving the other discontented and as such had to maintain itself only through violence and repression. Thus, whatever form the society may take, it may be monarchy assisted by feudal lords or democracy assisted by capitalist classes or dictatorship supported by strong military party cliques ; whatever ideal it may be governed by, it may be individualism resulting in the doctrine of *laissez faire* or collectivism resulting in the doctrine of Communism, the evil is only represented in other terms and under other aspects. There are only fresh abuses and fresh injustices in place of the old, in order to fight which future generations will have to form still newer ideals. A mere return to the ideals of 18th century, as is suggested by Alfred Cobban,¹ would not suffice to soften the bitter conflicts that are demanding solution.

The real cure lies only in the re-interpretation of the ideal of sovereignty. Authority there must be to ensure peace and stability in a society but Islam refuses

¹ *The Crisis of Civilization*, p. 71.

to delegate this final authority to any man, even to the prophets themselves. "They ask: have we also got any say in the direction of affairs? Say! All the powers of direction are with the Lord."¹ "Sovereignty lies only with God. His orders are: Obey none but Him. This is the right religion."² We have already discussed the implications of this belief. The fundamental ethical laws on which a society is to be based are formulated once and for all by God and no individual, class or group or even the entire population of a state, can amend or alter any of these. They are to be taken for granted. Certain limitations are imposed by God which consist of definite principles and laws embracing every sphere of human life beyond which, so long as we accept Islam, we cannot go. Their purpose is only to indicate the right direction for our journey, to guide us on the way to our destined goal and thus prevent us from being led astray through temptations of different sorts; so that a balanced system of social justice may be enforced for the good of all.³ With regard to its basis, the Islamic state is

¹ The Quran, 3 : 148.

² Ibid., 12 : 40.

زندگی را شرع و آئین است عشق

اصل تہذیب است دین، دین است عشق

(جاوید نامہ - صفحہ 129)

زمام کار اگر مزدور کے ہاتھوں میں ہو پھر کیا

طریق کوہکن میں بھی وہی حیلے ہیں پرویزی

جلال پادشاہی ہو کہ جمہوری تماشا ہو

جدا دین سے سیاست ہو تو رہ جاتی ہے چنگیزی

(بال جبریل - صفحہ 62)

(Cont. on next page)

not democratic in its technical sense. It does not accept the theory of popular sovereignty. It may, more properly, be called theocratic. But the theocracy with which Europe is acquainted is quite another thing. There theocracy meant the rule of a particular class of people, the priests and popes, like that of Brahmins in India. They, no doubt, claimed to rule in the name of God but Christianity, as has been amply shown, was founded, not as a political or civil unit, but as a monastic order in a profane world, having nothing to do with civil affairs. The priests had no infallible and complete code to follow and so they themselves fell prey to their own wishes. Thus theocracy in Europe was nothing but a means of preserving the vested interests of a particular class to the detriment of others; and, like all governments based on class-distinctions, it was bound to fail. Theocracy in Islam means complete submission of men to the laws of Shariat. The divine law cannot be prejudicial; it looks to the interests of humanity in general¹

یہ علم، یہ حکمت، یہ تدبیر، یہ حکومت
 پیتے ہیں لہو دیتے ہیں تعلیم مساوات
 بیکاری و عریانی و میٹھواری و افلاس
 کیا کم ہیں فرنگی مدنیت کے فتوحات!
 وہ قوم کہ فیضان سماوی سے ہو متکروم
 حد اس کے کمالات کی ہے برق و بتخارات

(بال جبریل-صفحہ 146)

میری نگاہ میں ہے یہ سیاست لادینی کنیز اہرمین و دون نہاد و مردہ ضمیر
 ہوئی ہے ترک کلیسا سے حاکمی آزاد فرنگیوں کی سیاست ہے دیوے زناگیر
 (ضرب کلیم-صفحہ 154)

¹ وحی حق بینندہ سود ہمہ در نگاہش سود و بہبود ہمہ
 (جاوید نامہ-صفحہ 78)

and, as such, no particular class can claim exclusive right of governance. There is no special priest-class in Islam. We can slightly alter the famous dictum of Lincoln which he employed to define democracy and express the theocratic rule established by Islam as "government of the Lord, for the people, by the people." The government is carried out by the people in the interest of human society but it is to be governed according to the laws formulated for ever by God. Men are never to be the sovereign, sovereignty is only God's. People are His representatives (Khalifas) who rule according to His instructions.

In its programme, Islamic state is universal and totalitarian. The jurisdiction of the state is not limited to the enforcement of law and order for the purpose of securing a peaceful environment in which people and associations may be allowed to do what their interests would lead them to. Its field of activity is co-terminus with life itself. On the basis of immutable laws revealed to our prophet in the Quran and practised by him in his life as reported in the traditions, every department of our life, social, political, economic and cultural, is to be shaped and modelled. Every sphere of our life is to be so moulded according to a particular pattern set by divine law as to secure the maximum of unity in our individual lives. There is to be no conflict of loyalties for a businessman to be honest in his private life, a model of gentlemanly behaviour towards his own folk and a tyrant in his business sphere, trying to suck blood out of poorer and weaker people. In such a state the basic principles are same which operate equally in all the manifold activities of our life. Nobody can say about anything

that he does, that it is his private and personal affair. The fundamental laws that are to determine our various interests are there, given to us for ever for our guidance from which there can be no escape.

This totalitarian nature of Islamic state bears many resemblances to our present-day Fascist and Socialist states. That both Fascism and Socialism have certain basic principles according to which the state is to be run, will be admitted by all. But beyond this merely abstract common denominator they part company. Fascism, in the form which it took root either in Italy or in Germany, has no message of hope for humanity at large; the value of its principles, if any, is explicitly confined to a people inhabiting a particular geographical area. Beyond that area, these principles are hated and hotly contested. The claimants themselves see no value in them beyond that area nor hold any hope for the miserable people waiting anxiously for uplift. Socialism, in its first stages at least, on the other hand, had a universal message which its exponents wanted to take to every nook and corner of the world. In this respect it was more like Islam. How far its principles can hold ground, we shall soon judge. But unfortunately due to its long historical association with western social and political ideals, it, very early in its career, foundered and became as much limited in its sphere as Fascism. But the totalitarian nature of these states manifests itself mostly in the practice of thorough regimentation of the individual. They follow the policy of producing a type and suppressing the individual's initiative. It is not for the individual to think and criticise, his is to hear and obey. It is perfectly un-Islamic. The

totalitarian nature of state in Islam is due to the all-embracing character of the divine law. The very purpose of the existence of state, *i.e.* authority backed by force, is to establish and enforce this law. There would be no gambling, no usury, no exploitation of the poor by the rich, no distinctions of classes, no adultery, no wine ; but beyond these, every individual would be free to think, feel and act. Every person is directly responsible to God for his good and bad deeds and so far as he is within legal limits, he has perfect liberty to choose his own way and direct his energies into channels towards which he has natural affinities. Islam explicitly tried to foster the spirit of liberal thinking and judging, and when a man is free to think he may agree or disagree with a particular point of view. Barring, of course, the fundamental and immutable divine laws, every man has an inherent right to think and judge the merits or demerits of what other people propose for him. A scientist in an Islamic state would not be coerced into supporting a theory of race which a dictator sees fit to announce as a political slogan for inspiring his followers ; he will carry on his research independent of any external pressure. The only condition to be imposed by state would be with regard to the use to which he puts his scientific knowledge and that limitation would be only so far as this use is not incompatible with the divine law, explicit or implicit. In modern totalitarian states, on the hand, other people are not allowed to think independently. Whenever there appears one with sufficient strength of character to judge adversely the values which the state wants to be accepted, he is at once hushed up. These states, no doubt, claim to

possess certain principles which their supporters proclaim to the world with a great paraphernalia of propaganda that modern civilization has afforded them, but they themselves seem to lack the moral conviction of their ultimate truth. These principles are in the last resort mere means which some men have devised for reform. As man-made they are fallible and therefore people may honestly differ from their upholders with regard to their efficacy. But to coerce them into submission by ruthless slaughter does not and cannot prove the validity of these principles : rather it goes to prove the moral hollowness of those who stand for them.

In Islam there can be no room for such indoctrination. Islam claims without any reservation that its principles alone are the means by following which humanity can hope, not only to fare well in the hereafter, but to steer its ship of life without any fear of storm or shipwreck here in this world. Still it stops there. It uses all the art of persuasion in convincing people following wrong courses but it does not stoop down to force down righteousness on them ; for human nature is not made that way. The position of unbelievers in the Islamic state illustrates this lack of regimentation. They lived and enjoyed all the rights of citizenship. Their differences with basic principles of Islam were never made an excuse of their suppression or extermination. Islam has perfect confidence in man's better nature : it was sure that, given a right atmosphere in which these principles are worked according to the divine will, any sane man is sure to see light. Doctrines cannot be made acceptable through force. Their acceptance depends upon the heart ; force, instead of

softening, hardens it all the more.

With regard to its aims and objects, the Islamic state is ideological. Islam as a religion, in the particular sense defined above, has a particular object in gaining political power in the form of state authority, the object, namely, of establishing a balanced system of social justice in every sphere of our life. With this object in view, it trains people who accept its principles and with their help it works out its programme. Western democracy had its own ideology during the French Revolution expressed in the famous slogan of equality, fraternity and liberty but the significance of these words was lost amidst an atmosphere charged with intensely emotional attitude of the common people. This ideological background of democracy soon disappeared and gave place to national states, based not on the idea of working out a particular programme with the help of any man subscribing to their creed but on the idea of nationalism which was first exclusive and defensive and then became aggressive. Communism perhaps is the only exception in our modern age which sought to establish a state according to a well-defined ideology. It tried to create an international party, members of which were drawn from different nations and races. It is the very characteristic of such a party that its membership should be open to all those accepting its basic principles without any further distinctions. But the attempt failed and Communism soon became national and thus lost its original character. Islam alone, in the history of the world, gives us a complete picture of a state which is ideological from one end to the other. It cuts across racial and geographical bounda-

ries. Any and every man is welcome to enter the party only if he accepts its creed ; and then he has every opportunity to hold responsible posts provided he shows his talent for it. Its object is not limited to benefit a particular class of people, the proletariat, and to exterminate the bourgeoisie ; it does not aim at making one particular nation the mightiest of the mighty and exploiting the rest for its interests ; it is absolutely beyond its intention to exalt a particular race of mankind as the super-race beside which all others are like slaves. Its mission, on the other hand, is for the whole mankind. It puts before them certain basic principles on which it wants to erect a state and a culture which, it claims, is beneficial to all mankind without any distinctions of race, colour, language or nation. It opens its gates to all and sundry and invites them to its fold. A history of religions would reveal that, in early stages, it was only national as the religions of India, Greece and Egypt. Then came a stage when it became racial as in the case of Judaism. To Christianity religion was nothing but a private affair and thus could play no part in the social life of its people. It was Islam alone which taught that religion is neither national nor racial nor individual or private but an affair of humanity in general. It aims not only at moral reformation of man but wants to produce a gradual, though fundamental, orientation in the collective life of mankind which may succeed in superseding the national and racial outlooks and help in creating a sort of pure ' human ' or international consciousness.¹

¹ اس دور میں اقوام کی صحبت بھلی ہوئی عام پوشیدہ نگاہوں سے رہی وحدت آدم (Contd. on next page)

In such an ideological state, the distinctions of race or colour or geographical areas are not only unimportant but positively harmful. Can we safely rely on these distinctions when we are required to determine an individual's moral qualities? National Socialism is much denounced for its doctrine of alleged superiority of Germanic race. But much the same thing was proclaimed in the last century by the British about the Anglo-Saxon race.¹ A race is thought of as a biologically different group representing a common and distinctive heredity. But strictly speaking, there are no pure races in this sense, no races whose blood is free from admixture with that which flows in other races. "In the endless vicissitudes of human migrations and conquests all the streams of human life, parted from some unknown and doubtless single source, have met and mingled and parted again." By no stretch of imagination can we claim that races are pure biological categories uninfluenced by environment and underived from the intermixture of diverse elements. Why, then, to have nationality on such a doubtful ground? Even if racial affinity has any charm, then, is it not better to look to our common human ancestry? As such, all humanity belongs to one race, descendants of same father and same mother whose blood runs in all without distinction. Similarly, the distinctions of colour and geography are merely

تفریق ملل حکمتِ افرنگ کا مقصود
اسلام کا مقصود فقط ملتِ آدم

مکے نے دیا خاکِ جنیوا کو یہ پیغام:

جمعیتِ اقوام کہ جمعیتِ آدم

(ضربِ کلیم - صفحہ 55)

¹ Nationalism, by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

arbitrary. Colour is the most unimportant element in determining an individual's merit. Differences of colour are partly due to heredity and partly to environmental conditions and none of these can be said to determine a man's character to a degree as to distinguish him from others. If one's place of birth is to be the criterion then Delhi is no more my native place than New York. Being born in a particular house in Lahore does not, on any reasonable ground, entitle me to claim that I am an Indian. What right have I, and any other person for that reason, to claim India as my national home? I was born in a particular place and quite arbitrarily I extended the area first to Lahore, then to the Punjab and then to India itself and then stopped there all at once. Why not continue still further. What harm is there if I claim that I was born in Asia? Some people would go so far as to accept my claim of being an Asiatic and then look down upon me as inferior. But there would be no logic either way. The barriers of mountains, rivers and oceans are arbitrary for this purpose. The most reasonable and perhaps most consistent attitude would be to claim world-citizenship in the literal sense. I was born on this earth as good as anybody else and all this expanse of water and earth is my home. This heaven and the earth and all that is between the two are God's and everyone of us born here has equal right everywhere.

هر ملک ملک ما ست که ملک خدای ما ست

These materialistic (sensuous) distinctions are all unreasonable. They all raise their head due to our ignorance of the deeper meaning of human life and destiny. Pragmatically judged they have all failed to satisfy the highest aspirations of mankind. Human

nature is alike everywhere. Modern civilization has created only an outer shell with which to mask the reality that would be, in no wise, different from the one which an uncivilised man keeps open. Islam therefore refused to be bound by these distinctions. The Quran reminds man that 'God created you from a single soul and from it created its mate and from these twain hath spread abroad a multitude of men and women!'¹ In another place it says that 'we have created you male and female and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another.'² The distinctions of nations and tribes merely serve to distinguish different groups of people from one another just as we put a name on a person to mark him off from others. There is nothing in a name that can tell you about a man and so there is no ultimate value in the other. After the fall of Mecca the holy prophet declared : Today I trample under my feet all the source of your pride, all the claims of blood and wealth. O Quraish ! God has destroyed your pride of the Days of Ignorance and your boast in the superiority of your race. O Mankind ! you are all the children of Adam and Adam was made out of clay. There is no value in racial pride. No Arab has any superiority over other races and *vice versa*. In the *Jawaid Nama*, Abu Jahl, a prototype of modern Hitler, expresses his dislike for Islam only because it does not accept these distinctions as basic.³

¹ The Quran, 4: 1.

² Ibid, 49 : 13.

³ We must, however, guard against one misunderstanding. People have been called since ancient time by their native lands and there is no harm in it. The verse of the Quran (49 : 13) quoted in the text shows that the distinction of one people from the other on the basis of geographical divisions is harmless so long as it is merely classificatory. Every individual has an instinctive love for his native land and Islam never meant to repress

مذهب او قاطع ملک و نسب از قریش و منکر از فضل عرب
احمران با اسودان آمیختند آبروئے دودمانے ریختند

Destroying all these arbitrary distinctions and bringing mankind to one level, Islam tried to put before them its message of salvation, the primary elements of which were the acceptance of God as the only and final authority, and Muhammad his last prophet, the interpreter of the divine law. Those who accept these principles become members of one party, to whatever race or country they may belong, however different in their colour or language they may be. Their acceptance of the basic creed and the resultant moral transformation, are sufficient to mark them off from the rest. Without any reservation they attain to all the rights and privileges that others enjoy. Islam no doubt accepts all the natural affinities that exist between members of a family, mutual obligations which one owes to one's friends, neighbours and acquaintances, duty which one has to discharge with regard to strangers, wayfarers and the weak. But all these things are subsidiary. They are important in themselves only in so far as they do not become incompatible with the discharge of his principal duty towards the party. But as soon as a conflict of loyalties arises, when obedience to parents, *e.g.*, means disobedience to the party pledge, when love of wife or children or one's native land stands in the way of the fulfilment of the ideal accepted, then it is not the party that is to go to the wall, it is rather these natural affinities that

this natural inclination. But in modern times, as we have seen, this distinction has developed into one of the most important principles of social and political life on the basis of which western society was reconstructed. It is this 'love of one's native land' as an exclusive and aggressive ideology that Islam cannot tolerate.

are to be suppressed and disregarded. No bond of blood-relationship, no patriotic love for one's country, no idea of monetary gain or loss, is of any value: the ultimate worth lies only in the Faith and the right conduct.

In its practical working, the Islamic state, as based on Tauhid, is democratic in the literal sense with its three-fold ideals of equality, solidarity and freedom. The Quran says: "Allah has promised such of you as believe and do good works that He will surely make them vicegerents¹ on the earth as He caused those who were before them"² Here the text is clear on one point at least. The promise of vicegerency is not limited to any one person or class but to the whole body of the believers. It means that all believers are equal in the eye of law and each of them has the same right to become Vicegerent or Amir, provided he is the best. Birth or social position, wealth or profession, none of these can stand in his way. The only condition is that he must be a man of highest personal attainments and character according to the standards set by the Quran. Superiority lies only in the way of faith, character and purity. "The best among you is he who is most God-fearing." The Amir is one in whom all these qualities are found to the highest degree relatively to his compatriots and so far as he retains these qualities, he is their head and possesses almost absolute power; he is, so to say, a dictator. No

¹ The word 'vicegerency' is very clear. State-control is not designated by God as sovereignty but as vicegerency. In other words, a ruler of Islamic state is not a sovereign in his own right. He has no authority to rule the people in his own name: he is only a representative of God in the sense that he is only to promulgate His law and is directly responsible to Him for his deeds.

² The Quran, 24 : 55.

doubt, he will have his Advisory Council but he can override its unanimous decisions, for he is directly responsible to God for his office. Still he is not a dictator completely. He is equally responsible to all the believers who have delegated their power, of their own accord, to him, everyone of whom has the authority to check and criticise him if he seems to go astray. His right to caliphate is not hereditary; his right exists only so long as he acts according to the spirit of the divine law. If he ignores these he automatically becomes a usurper: for dictatorship, in the sense of arbitrary rule without responsibility, is not countenanced by Islam. It is the law that is important and not the personalities. It is in reality the law that is to be obeyed and followed. State is only a means by which the law is being enforced for the betterment of society. In the eye of law, therefore, a Caliph is as good or as bad as any other ordinary citizen. He has no special rights. The Qazi, as the custodian of law, is responsible directly to God and, as such, the Caliph is as much under his jurisdiction as any other citizen, with no preferential rights whatsoever. In this connection the story which Iqbal has related in the *Ramuz* about a king Murad and a mason of Khujand shows the real democratic spirit underlying the Islamic state.¹

پیش قرآن بندہ و مولا یکے است بوریا و مسند دیجا یکے است

Thus Islam succeeds in bringing about a harmonious adjustment between the apparently diverse claims of individualism and socialism. There is an element of truth in both these doctrines, but the

1. *Ramuz*, pp. 36-39. See above pp. 294-5.

western social thinkers have drifted from one extreme to the other without being able to find any synthesis which could appeal to the people at large and thus relieve them of the resultant class-struggle. Individualism, with economic freedom as its natural consequence, has resulted in modern capitalist states while socialism is tending to suppress the individual for the sake of the abstract whole. Islam, on the other hand, does not countenance any strict regimentation of the individual for the sake of the collective whole nor does it leave the individual perfectly free to follow the path of his self-interest, thus jeopardising the life of his weaker brethren. It imposes certain basic limitations upon both the individual and society which should not be trespassed in any case. Both have the same end in view, the promulgation of the divine law and thus their interests harmonise. Being personally and directly responsible to God, an individual ought to develop his moral and spiritual qualities according to the standard set by the law, but along with this development of personality, there is a duty which he owes to the society and he fulfils it as naturally and without restraint as he does the first; for in the scale of values, the one is as good a duty for him prescribed in the divine law as the other. It provides to the people true freedom for the development of their talents unhindered by any unreasonable control of the state; it also gives them security of environment which a state based on divine law alone can afford to provide. An individual is free to follow the line which his natural aptitude suggests but the state sees to it that he does not trespass the divine limitations and thus saves him from falling into the snares of too

much individualism at the cost of others. He is allowed to enjoy the fruit of his labour but in no case can he be allowed to exploit others for his benefit. Each individual has an inalienable and equal right in the eye of the state and therefore no question of mutual antagonism or class-conflict has the chance of appearing. The individual freedom is thus rendered compatible with the security of environment, a harmonious synthesis which the West so keenly needs at present and which Islam achieved in evolving centuries before.

تازہ پھر دانش حاضر نے کیا سترِ قدیم
گذر اس دور میں ممکن نہیں ہے چوبِ کلیم

The modern age has once again recreated the ancient period of unbelief. It is not possible to live under present conditions without the help of Moses' staff (*i.e.* prophetic guidance).

One of the most important attempts that have been made in the contemporary world to prescribe a cure for the disease under which our modern age is suffering, is the Marxist Socialism. After a thorough analysis and criticism of the tendencies prevalent at the time, Marx arrived at conclusions which appeal to most people. But his analysis and the remedy both are marred by the extraordinary role which he assigns to economics in human life. In this respect Marx was a little justified. He was born in 1818 when the memory of the French Revolution was still fresh in the minds of people. He witnessed the great economic revolution that followed which was made possible by the extraordinary progress of natural sciences. The

transformation as a result of this industrial expansion was so enormous that people suddenly came to realise the importance of economics. This exaggerated emphasis on economics due to political and social situations of the time was responsible for Marx's one-sided analysis and an equally one-sided remedy. Just as the extraordinary success of physical science by the efforts of Newton and others, engendered the wrong idea among the people that such branches of human knowledge as psychology and biology should accept the lead of physics in applying the category of mechanism to the explanation of phenomena of life and mind, similarly the practical success of economic laws during the period of industrial expansion led people, equally wrongly, to elevate the new science to the most enviable position as the sole key with which every problem of human life could be solved. This tendency, however, which arose merely due to certain peculiar circumstances of later part of the 19th century had unfortunately persisted and almost every good of our life, religious, cultural and social, is judged in the light of economic value. As a matter of fact the economic problem is not the whole of our life nor even the most important aspect of it.

The philosophical background of Marx's thought is Hegel's theory of Dialectic as the most appropriate method in the discovery of truth. In his *Logic*, Hegel started to analyse the different concepts employed in the reasoning process, viz., the categories enunciated by Kant. The most important of these is that of Relation. Every idea is a group of relations without which it would be mere nothing. Of all the relations that can exist between different things, the most uni-

versal is that of opposition. Every idea and every situation in the world leads irresistibly to its opposite and then unites with it to form a higher or more comprehensive whole. Take, for instance, the idea of pure Being which at once leads to its antithesis 'not-being' for pure being, that is, being without any sort of relationship, when analysed logically, will of necessity imply 'not-being'. But then the dialectical process does not rest in this negation. It goes further and posits the conception of 'becoming' which includes both being and not-being in itself and yet has succeeded in achieving a synthesis at a higher level. The negation of the thesis by the anti-thesis, however, does not imply complete negation. It preserves in itself whatever of value was there in the thesis and similar is the case when both thesis and anti-thesis are transcended by the higher unity.

History, according to Hegel, is a dialectical movement, almost a series of revolutions, in which people after people, and genius after genius, become the instrument of the Absolute. Great men are not so much begetters as midwives of the future. Accepting the dialectical principle as the basis of history, change becomes the cardinal principle of our life. A certain set of ideas predominates at a particular stage of history which determines the religious, political and moral outlook of the period. But, then, after a time, a reaction sets in and a new set of ideas comes to assert itself which gradually gains the ascendancy over the old. The victory of the new ideas means a new stage in our history, a stage which, though negates its predecessor, is yet more comprehensive and universal because it incorporates in itself and preserves all the

values of its preceding ages. Marx gives us the example of Feudalism which, by its very success, tended to produce its opposite, capitalism, by creating the bourgeoisie who, due to the over-increasing expansion of industry, were compelled to destroy Feudalism. Similarly Capitalism, during the period of its great success, is tending towards its own ultimate downfall by producing a class-conscious proletariat, which will in turn lead to the establishment of Communism.

What is the motive force of this dialectical process whereby every movement is negated by the appearance within itself of those opposite tendencies which will overthrow it? At this stage Marx parts company with Hegel. He accepted his logical doctrine in its entirety. As pure logic, it is neither idealist nor realist, though Hegel himself used it as the basis of an idealist metaphysics. To Hegel, this motive for continual change was supplied by the developing ideas themselves. But to Marx, ideas are secondary and, as divorced from minds of individuals who cherish them, they are unreal. Moreover, he holds that ideas in the individual minds are the result of some external forces which he identified with movements and changes in the physical world. "With men, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into terms of thought." Thus he passes to materialism which dismisses the independence and initiative of mind in our life. But with Marx, it was not the dependence of mind upon matter which led him to materialism, it was rather the impossibility of disinterested thought and knowledge. The more essential consideration which led him to refuse to assign primacy to thought was not the contrast of

'idea' and 'thing' but the contrast of 'idea' and 'action.' To believe, with Hegel, that Reality is Idea, is to believe, for him, that thought is primary and action is secondary, that action is for the sake of thought and not thought for the sake of action. He believes, on the other hand, that things are prior to ideas and that action is primary and thought secondary, in the nature of things. The doctrine, namely, that theory and practice are one and are inseparably bound up, which is perhaps one of the fundamental doctrines of Communistic philosophy, though apparently incompatible with what has been said above, is the direct outcome of Marx's rejection of Idealism. When it is said that theory and practice have a necessary relation, it is not intended to convey that a man's practice can never be in contradiction with his theory. It only implies that if there is any contradiction, as is often the case, that discrepancy arises only on account of some practical necessity. In other words, practice determines theory.

With the help of these principles Marx formulates his theory of society and especially his theory of history, which is popularly known as the materialistic conception of history. Marx agreed with Hegel in accepting that the historical process is dialectical in nature. In other words, there is a constant change going on and our present society is a stage which it has reached through a process of development out of medieval stage. Society itself consists of persons in relation and the development of society is the gradual change in the form of human relationship, on the one hand, and the relation of men to things, on the other. What is the determining factor in this change of form?

Marx holds that it is the economic needs of a particular society. It is the power of society to provide for its economic needs (what he calls the means of production) that decide the broad movements of our social life. The governing factor in the process of history is the steady improvement in the means of production. This principle affects the relationship among people in that every one tries to control as much means of production as possible. This is the origin of what Marx calls class-struggle. This struggle aims at the exclusive control over the means of production and all other forms of struggle for power, for the supremacy of religion, or in short, for any particular ideal of society, are, in reality, mere disguised forms of this basic struggle. Human society, at each stage of its development, is always divided into two main classes, one that owns the means of production, the other, that is deprived of it and hence depends for its livelihood on the first class. The development of society from one stage to the other depends on the change in the relation of men to things ; that is, in the way men manipulate the raw materials in order to satisfy their economic needs. With the discovery of new modes of utilizing the infinite resources of the material world, form and structure of society also change. Lastly, moral and legal systems which prevail at a particular period in a particular society are determined, in the last resort, by the economic needs of the exploiting class. "Political institutions and legal systems and the political and legal ideas by means of which men justify and support them, are thus relative to and determined by the economic structure of society. They are at once its product, its prop, and

its mirror ... There are no such things as abstract right or absolute justice; there are only those standards of right, those conceptions of justice which reflect and justify a particular phase of economic development. Together with politics, law, religion and art, morals, individual no less than social, form a super-structure founded upon circumstance and modelled to the shape of its foundation."

We may accept Hegel's assertion that historical development is dialectical in so far as it works out due to a constant struggle between opposite forces. It is true that almost all societies, after developing to their zenith, had declined when coming face to face with cultures that had stood for new values. But it is hard to believe that this process takes place through an opposition of contradictories. To call a certain period by the name of feudalism and similarly its succeeding age as capitalism, and then to assert that the latter contradicts the first is, in reality, reading into facts which no scientific student of history would dare to do. We can look at a particular period of history from different stand-points and characterise it therefore accordingly. For instance, the 15th and 16th centuries in Europe may be looked upon as an age of religious reform, or, from another point of view, a period when national states were founded, or, still more, a period of great geographical discoveries. Similarly, the 19th century was the age of Industrialism or Imperialism or Nationalism, or of Intellectualism, according as one or other point of view holds our interest. Moreover, our selection of one phenomenon of a particular period as a contradictory to a phenomenon of a previous period is equally arbitrary. For

instance, at one time aristocracy and at another time dictatorship, or still more, liberalism may be called the negative of democracy. Communism may be said to be the contradictory of capitalism, but in what sense is capitalism the opposite of feudalism and feudalism, the opposite of slave-owning societies? As a matter of fact, capitalism was nothing but the developed form of feudalistic society. The historical evolution does not seem to proceed through a series of contradictions. It takes place 'by a transition from one state or one tendency to its opposite, and now in an unbroken and straight line, now at a rapid pace and sometimes very slowly, now gradually and peacefully and at other time through a series of violent conflicts and catastrophes. At times the entire evolution seems to come to a stand-still, and conditions remain almost identical for a long period, whereas at other time, they change at a feverish speed.'

Again, it is difficult to believe, in the light of historical facts, that in this process of change older values are preserved and that the new form of society which emerges after a hard struggle with its preceeding ones, stands on a level higher than its predecessor merely because it has been able to resolve their contradictory character into a relatively more comprehensive unity. What reason is there, on Marx's ground, that a particular economic system should negate the worthless and appropriate the valuable forces of the previous system? Does life follow any logical process? Political struggles have often resulted in the formation of societies much inferior in quality than those they had replaced. The conquest of the Roman empire by the barbarians and the expulsion of the Moors from Spain

did not give rise to more developed economic forms. Again, what reason is there that capitalism will give place to communism? "In actual fact, however, it may quite possibly lead to a series of wars in which, under modern conditions, there is a substantial chance that the whole of civilization, as we know it, will be destroyed. Hence not communism, but barbarianism, may well be the next stage in the development of human history." But supposing that communism is the next logical state, the question arises: what would be the stage next to it? History being dialectical in nature is nothing but a continual change. There can be no resting place for human society which will be continuously driven forward by the stresses which the dialectical process develops in the struggle of one class against the other. A socialistic society, being distinguished for its lack of class struggle, would not possess any motive force for change. There would be no political revolution for there would be no class struggling to own the means of production. What, then, becomes of the dialectical process of history? It may apply to periods before communism but it loses its power after it.

In his posthumously published work, *The Critique of Political Economy*, Marx puts his theory of history in the following words: "Conditions of production, taken as a whole, constitute the economic structure of a society—this is the material basis on which a superstructure of laws and political institutions is raised and to which certain forms of political consciousness correspond. The political and intellectual life of society is determined by the mode of production, as necessitated by the wants of material life. *It is not men's con-*

sciousness that determines the forms of existence, but on the contrary, the social forms of life that determine the consciousness." We may admit that economic factors do influence our political and intellectual life, as economic considerations are a part and parcel of our life. But Marx did not intend to emphasise this fact. What he wanted to convey was the finality and decisiveness of this factor in determining every other aspect of our life. He held that economic activity and social order do not result from man's intelligence, from his thoughts and feelings; rather our thoughts and feelings are determined by the economic activity and the resulting social order. This is in reality the reversing of the true position. Every productive force depends for its discovery and proper utilization upon human intelligence as the first pre-requisite. These forces existed in nature in a latent form. What put them into use was human mind with its constructive imagination. If it be objected that the primitive man came to discover certain forces of nature merely by chance, we may reply that such a chance was open to animals as well. The fact that the animals did not take advantage of this shows that they lacked necessary natural abilities for it. Chances were the same for all, men and animals, only the gift of constructive thought was lacking. If, moreover, it would be asserted that it was the economic need which developed human intellect, then we may equally affirm that the animals would but have to feel need in order to develop human intelligence.

In order to avoid this difficulty, Engels, the collaborator of Marx, tried to circumvent it by accepting the causal influence of human intelligence. He says: "The

image of a period, as reflected in man's intellect, is determined by the form of economics and by the social conditions produced by it. This reflected image forms, so to speak, a given intellectual environment, a *milieu* composed of thoughts and feelings, in which the single individual is brought up and from which he receives, according to his social position, his impressions, feelings and opinions." In other words, according to Engels, there are two stages in the process of causation. First, the form of economics determining the general ideology and this in turn determining the feelings and opinions of the individuals. But is this statement compatible with fact? Men belonging to the same class and brought up under exactly same conditions have different and often contradictory opinions and ideals. How is it that the founders of socialism and leaders of the modern labour movement have, for long years, come almost without exception from the bourgeoisie, from an environment which would have implanted in them views quite contradictory to the one they held? If environment were to determine the ideology, all men living in the same environment would necessarily have the same ideas and pursue the same ends. It would be strange that out of the same class, the same set and even the same family, there should arise original and revolutionary thinkers and the most conservative diehards. Even if these cases be called exceptions, the problem still remains to discover causes that account for these. The real fact is that these changes are determined partly by the inherent qualities of the individual and partly through his personal experiences and impressions acquired in his life. Thus we see that it is the personal gift and

intelligence of an individual that plays the more important role in bringing about social change. As a matter of fact, Marx's theory seems to oversimplify the course of history with its manifold and often mysterious links of cause and effect. Human affairs are not cut and dried as logic is cut and dried. Historical events are determined not only by the working out of certain fundamental principles and apparent underlying trends, but by a thousand and one irrelevant and disturbing factors which are hardly subject to analysis. "Personal intrigues, sexual jealousy and desire, love of power, thwarted ambition, slighted vanities and injured prides, religious enthusiasm, reforming zeal, party strife, even the disinterested desire for the public good, all these on occasion play a part in determining events."¹ Bertrand Russel has brought out this element of change in the determination of the future course of history in the following words: "Admitting that the great forces are generated by economic causes, it often depends upon quite trivial and fortuitous events which of the great forces gets the victory. In reading Trotsky's account of Russian Revolution it is difficult to believe that Lenin made no difference but it was touch and go whether the German Government allowed him to get to Russia. If the minister concerned had happened to be suffering from dyspepsia on a certain morning, he might have said 'No' when in fact he said 'Yes' and I do not think it can be rationally maintained that without Lenin the Russian Revolution would have achieved what it did."²

It seems that Marx was much influenced in the

¹ Joad : *Guide to Philosophy*, p. 480.

² *Ibid.*, p. 481.

formulation of his theory of his history by the materialism current in his days. No doubt he rejected the mechanistic conception of life, and in contradistinction to it, popularised the dialectical conception, yet in assigning to human consciousness a secondary role in our life, he was following the lead of naturalistic philosophies of the 19th century which derived their inspiration from physics and biology of their time. But strangely enough, the position has now changed. Modern physics seems to be inclined to a view of the universe which can hardly be called materialistic. Researches about the constitution of matter have revolutionised this view. "Modern matter is something infinitely attenuated and elusive, it is a lump in space-time, a 'mush' of electricity, a wave of probability undulating into nothingness; frequently it is not matter at all but a projection of the consciousness of its perceiver." Thus to the modern physicist, it is not matter but consciousness that is primary.¹ There is another tendency in modern thought which derives its inspiration not from physics but from biology. It likes to interpret universe in vitalistic terms. To them life is the most fundamental factor. It is free and creative in its activities and uses matter as an instrument to further its purposes. Thus Marxian theory of history with its emphasis on the primacy of material conditions in determining our life, is hardly acceptable in the light of these facts.

غریبان گم کرده اند افلاک را در شکم جویند جان پاک را

¹ Planck, one of the modern scientists, said in an interview: "I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything that we talk about, everything that we postulate as existing requires consciousness." Joad: *Guide to Modern Thought*, p. 91.

رنگ و بو از تن بگیرد جان پاک جز به تن کارے ندارد اشتراک
 دین آن پیغمبر حق ناشناس بر مساوات شکم دارد اساس
 تا اخوت را مقام اندر دل ست بیخ او در دل نه در آب و گل است

The West has lost sight of spiritual reality and therefore seeks life in the body. The human self as a matter of fact does not acquire its characteristic feature through body (*i.e.* it is not matter that influences mind); while for socialism body (*i.e.* matter) is the all-pervading force. The system of that athiest prophet (Karl Marx) was based on the equality of stomachs (*i.e.* equality of economic opportunity). As real equality has its locus in heart, its roots lie in 'heart' and not in 'clay'.¹

The main defect of Communistic theory is that it emphasises the role of economics in our life to a degree unjustified by actual facts. In this respect it is as much liable to condemnation as any other system of society which human mind contrived in the past or is experimenting with in the present. Each is marred by its extremist attitude in one form or other. It is but human nature. Dissatisfied and exhausted by the sufferences and difficulties of a certain social state, a system, a government, people are ready to reject all, even what is good and useful in it and expect salvation from something as new and as different as possible from their present system or state. Marx's criticism of capitalism was perfectly justified in that it represented one extreme but its remedy, however, cannot lie in adopting the other extreme. It is in reality

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, p. 69.

دگر گون کرد لادینی جہاں را ز آثار بدن گفتند جاں را
 (ارمغان حجاب-صفحة 49)

not due to any abstract and logical dialectical process of history that one movement comes to be superseded by its contradictory at a later stage. The real motive force in all these abrupt and destructive changes is the unnatural exaggeration of one element over the others in our social life. It is for this reason that Islam, because it stands for the 'middle course' and advocates a social system which, avoiding unnatural inclination to one-sidedness, incorporates all the apparently contradictory tendencies of human nature in one harmonious synthetic whole, cannot be surpassed or replaced by any other force. Its claim to finality is not a mere theological dogma but a fact which can be appreciated only if its social system is brought into full operation along with the conditions precedent to its establishment. Democracy represented a revolt against the absolutism of the kings but it emphasised individualistic tendencies to such a degree that the principles of authority and collectivism were completely lost sight of. Dictatorship and communism were its anti-theses in different respects but each, in its turn, committed the same mistake. Dictatorship got hold of the value of authority and destroyed the individual initiative while communism in its reaction against individual freedom of exploitation saw fit to revolt against the very principle of private property, a demand of human nature which can, in no sense, be called harmful for social welfare. Islam, as we saw, is democracy, dictatorship and, as we shall soon see, communism all combined together. It accepts all the values represented by them and thus achieves a unique harmony between the opposite tendencies of human nature. It was due to this comprehensive

nature of Islam that almost all the different ideologies that have been adopted by the people at different periods of history, have found their counterparts in it. When democracy was in ascendance in Europe, people thought that Islam was a democracy, though this was an overstatement of actual facts. When, later on, dictatorship appeared, people were surprised to find several features of Islamic political life analogous to it. Similarly when today socialism or communism have come to appeal to the people, we discover that its essential doctrine was preached to the world by Islam centuries before Marx. We may thus describe Islam, in the terms of Hegel, as the Absolute in which all the contradictory forces of the world are harmoniously synthesised ; it is perfect and timeless, in the sense that it is eternal. But unlike Hegel's Absolute or Communistic state of Marx it is not static and devoid of change and development. Marx assigned the element of change in human life to the presence of class-struggle, to the conflict between those who own the means of production and those who are deprived of it. In Islam, on the other hand, the motive force of change is supplied by the constant struggle between the forces of truth and the forces of falsehood, between belief and unbelief.

ستیزہ کار رہا ہے ازل سے تا امروز چراغِ مصطفوی سے شرارِ بولیہی

There has been a constant strife since eternity between the prophetic light (of righteousness) and the Satanic fire (of wickedness).

Coming now to the economic problem as it was viewed by Islam, we find that it avoids the extremist attitude of both capitalism and communism. It admits all those principles and institutions which were the

natural outcome of the growth of civilization and development of man's inherent powers. The division of people into rich and poor, the principle of division of labour, the latent desire of every man to own what he earns, the natural right of every man to be free to earn his living, are all accepted by Islam. It does not, like socialism, look upon private property as the source of all misery but justifies it as the result of natural craving on the part of every sane individual. If a man expects that the fruit of his labour must be his, that the place where he works, the tools with which he works, the field which he tills, should be his and after his death should go to those who are most near to him, there is nothing harmful in that. Nor does it find any inherent evil in the march of mankind from the state of barbarism to civilization : for it was the very destiny of man to develop. Science, mechanisation, industry are not looked upon as the sources of the present-day economic or political miseries. It does not, therefore, agree with those who wish us to cry halt to the ever-expanding spirit of the modern age. But unlike capitalism, it does not subscribe to the extreme view of Individualism which is the root cause of the present economic trouble. Individualism, as we saw, gave free rein to everybody to pursue his own good and even devised a philosophical doctrine whereby this unhindered pursuit of selfish interests was identified with collective welfare. It forbade any interference by the state into the affairs of the individual gain-seekers. No doubt, the natural differences among men in their capacity to work and earn, of necessity, led to the distinction of rich and poor—and Islam does not wish to destroy these differences

by any resort to force—but when this distinction is allowed to grow without any moral or political control, when the individual possesses no moral sanction except that of selfishness and when the state does not regard its duty to protect the right of the poor against exploitation, then, of course, such a distinction is sure to lead to disaster, as it, no doubt, has done. Islam, on the other hand, accepts the right of every individual to be free, yet promulgates a particular moral law whereby it wishes to keep their selfishness under control. In order to cover those cases where this law is not sufficient to produce the desired result, it delegates the inhibitory power to the state, which then enforces the law. But this element of force employed by the state is to be applied very sparingly. Most of the work is taken through the promulgation of the moral law itself.

The first essential element of that code is that it limits the spheres of an individual's sources of income. It draws a line of demarcation between what is allowed and what is disallowed.¹ It says that wine and all other intoxicants are not only disallowed on their

¹ تاندانی نکتہ اکل حلال
 آہ یورپ زین مقام آگاہ نیست
 او نداند از حلال و از حرام
 امتے بر امتے دیگر چرد
 از ضعیفان ناس ربودن حکمت است
 شیوہ تہذیب نو آدم دری است
 این بنوک این فکر چالاک یہود
 تا نہ و بالا نہ گردد این نظام
 بر جماعت زیستن گردد وبال
 چشم اوینظر بنور اللہ نیست
 حکمتش خام است و کارش نا تمام
 دانہ این می کرد، آں حاصل برد
 از تن شان جاں ربودن حکمت است
 پردہ آدم دری سوداگری است
 نور حق از سینہ آدم ربود
 دانش و تہذیب و دین سودائے خام
 (پس چہ باید کرد-صفحہ 37-38)

consumptive side but are equally unlawful on the productive side, *i.e.* nobody should think of earning his livelihood by producing and marketing these things. Income from bribery, gambling and speculation are all prohibited. It does not allow people to hoard the elementary necessities of life for gain nor does it like to grant the monopoly of the means of production to a few which may result in the economic strangulation of the common people. The second element of this code is that, accepting the right of an individual to own the wealth that he has thus accumulated through lawful means, he is not free to determine the mode of utilising it. All avenues of luxury, like the use of costly and silk clothes and gold, use of unnecessarily spacious and extravagantly furnished houses, are perfectly forbidden. Nobody is allowed to spend his income on wine, on gambling, on adultery, on musical feasts and on other equally socially harmful activities. It wishes people to adopt a moderate standard of life avoiding both extremes of miserliness and extravagance. Whatever is left after that should be freely given over to charitable institutions and to public welfare centres.

مرد درویش کا سرمایہ ہے آزادی و مرگ
 ہے کسی اور کی خاطر یہ نصاب زر و سیم

The whole wealth of a true Muslim is freedom and death; he cannot be subject to the religious incometax which is meant for an individual of quite a different type.¹

Such a moral code which looked upon spending

¹ با مسلمان گفت جاں بر کف بندہ
 ہرچہ از حاجت فزون داری بدہ
 (جاوید نامہ-صفحہ 91)

every surplus amount of money as the greatest good, may not appeal to the modern man who is compelled by his circumstances to hoard as much money as possible while he is able to earn. There are no provisions in the modern society for protecting an individual or his relatives against premature death, permanent physical disability or old age and, as such, he must save for the rainy days. But Islam, in its system, has amply provided for this. The institution of *Baitul-Mal* or the Public Treasury which derived its strength from taxing the wealth (amounting to $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ p.a.) of those people who persisted inspite of all moral persuasions to the contrary in hoarding money. With this institution at his back the poor labourer will have no fear to succumb to the dishonourable conditions of the capitalists and thus mortgage his physical health and spiritual freedom and happiness for bare necessities of life; for he shall have no fear of starvation. There will be no necessity for insurance policies, no need for bank deposits, no motive for investing our surplus money for profit either in usuary or in buying further means of production, the very factors which are most responsible for the creation of modern capitalistic society with its imperialist wars on the one hand and the reduction of a major population of the world to a state of destitution and starvation on the other.

کسی نماند در جهان محتاج کسی نکته شرع میبای این است و بس

Nobody remains destitute and dependent upon others: this is the implication of the Islamic Law.

The root cause of the whole economic problem is that the modern society has neglected to observe the divine moral law in this respect which declared that

'He made the earth for his creatures' (55 : 10). Iqbal suggests that the future society should be re-constructed on its economic side on this fundamental principle which alone will be able to check the harmful tendency implied in capitalism.

حق زمینی را جز متاع ما نگفت این متاع بی بهای مفت است مفت
 ده خدایا! نکته از من پذیر رزق و گور از و بگیر، او را بگیر
 باطن الارض لله ظاهر است هر که این ظاهر نه بیند کافر است

God made this earth our common property which is given to us gratis. O landlord! Get your livelihood and your grave out of it but do not try to claim any right of possession. The real significance of 'Earth is only for God' is clear and he who denies this is an infidel.¹

رزق خود را از زمینی بردن رواست این متاع بنده و ملک خداست
 بنده مومن امی، حق مالک است غیر حق هر شیء که بینی هالک است

It is lawful to get livelihood out of the earth for it is our property though in reality it belongs only to God. A Momin is a trustee while God is its real owner and to look upon anything except as Allah's is the source of destruction in the world.²

ارض حق را ارض خود دانی بگو چیست شرح آیه لاتفسدو
 ابن آدم دل به ابلیسی نهاد من ز ابلیسی نه دیدم جز فساد
 کسی امانت را به کار خود نبرد اے خوش آن کو ملک حق با حق سپرد
 ملک یزدان را به یزدان باز ده تا ز کار خویشی بکشائی گره
 زیر گردون فقر و مسکینی چراست؟ آنچه از مولاست می گوئی زماست³

¹ *Jawaid Nama*, pp. 80-81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

APPENDICES

1. REPLY TO MR. SMITH'S CRITICISM OF IQBAL
2. SELF IN THE LIGHT OF RELATIVITY—*By* IQBAL
3. McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY—*By* IQBAL

1. Reply to the criticism of Iqbal by the author of *Islam in Modern India*.

While a great part of the book was almost complete, *Islam in Modern India* was published at Lahore. The book is thought-provoking and the author has certainly succeeded in making it interesting. He is a socialist by conviction but his socialism seems to be marred by his Christian outlook on life. As a socialist he sees in economics the sole remedy for all ills. Every movement, according to him, has an economic cause and every insoluble problem has an economic solution. Like Jawahar Lal, whose tactics he seems to employ consciously or unconsciously, he is an enemy of 'conservatism' and a prophet of change which in reality means nothing but acceptance of and adaptation to the new industrial socialistic economy. The author quite complacently believes that nobody, except perhaps a few socialists and himself, has ever troubled to understand what socialism is. As brought up in Christian traditions, he finds no pragmatic value in accepting any Law to serve as a stabilizing factor in the ever-changing structure of modern society. Like St. Paul he believes that 'the Law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ.... But after that faith is come, we are no longer under a schoolmaster.'

¹ Epistle of Paul to Galatians, 3 : 24-25.

His sympathy with Islam is superficial, selfish, patronising while his hatred for it is deep-rooted, conscious and apparent. He appreciates when Islam is being identified with merely negative slogans of internationalism and humanitarianism (p. 146). He criticises and attributes motive when an attempt is made to revive it in its pristine purity (pp. 176-180; p. 168). He employs all the propagandist tactics, now so familiar to us, calling a movement reactionary and thereby relegating it to the limbo of unrequired commodities in the modern age of 'progress'. His knowledge of Islam as a religion seems to be poor to an unbearable degree, though being a Lecturer on history in a Lahore College, nobody can dare doubt his erudition in that direction.

We are here concerned only with his treatment of Iqbal as a thinker. His notice about him is divided into two parts corresponding to what he calls two divergent tendencies in him. The first he calls progressive, *viz.*, the tendency which, he thinks, is least religious and most modern; the second he calls reactionary where he is according to him most religious and 'conservative'.

(1) He says: "He (*i.e.* Iqbal) bitterly attacked the attitude of resignation and quiet contentment, *the religious valuation of contemplation*, passivity, and withdrawal from strife." (p. 115).

This statement is a perfectly correct description of Iqbal's mission except the italicised phrase. Iqbal attacked mysticism ruthlessly but his criticism was never directed against it as such but against that type of mysticism which emphasised the qualities described above. Iqbal, however, never denied the value of con-

templation, In discussing two different levels of our consciousness, which he calls efficient and appreciative, he reminds us that it is only in "the moments of profound meditation" that we can have a direct experience of reality. In his article on McTaggart's philosophy he says: "Does Reality respond to us? It does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself, *i.e.* the act of worship."

عطار ہو رومی ہو، رازی ہو غزالی ہو کچھ ہاتھ نہیں آتا ہے آہ سحرگاہی

(2) After describing in detail the theme of Iqbal's poem *Taskhir-i-Fitrat* (Conquest of Nature) in *Piyam-i-Mashriq*, in which Adam is presented as successfully fighting and overcoming the material forces of the universe for the full development of his personality, the author remarks: "Thus Iqbal has come a long way from the accepted moral attitude. In his view, the goal of humanity is not submission but supremacy. The chief end of man is to be the Vicegerent of God on Earth." (p. 118) This passage speaks eloquently not only of his ignorance about Islam but also of a great confusion of thought. Iqbal never turned his back against accepted moral code. The goal of humanity, according to Islam, is both submission as well as supremacy; submission to God and His moral law, and supremacy over the material forces of nature. "Whosoever surrenders his purpose to Allah, while doing good, his reward is with his Lord; and there shall no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve."¹ With regard to supremacy, the Quran equally profoundly refers to it. "Have you not seen how Allah has made all that is in the earth subservient unto you?"²

¹ The Quran, 2 : 112

² Ibid, 22 : 65

"See you not how Allah has made subservient unto you whatsoever is in skies and whatsoever is in the earth?"¹ Iqbal has similarly emphasised both these ideals in his poems and by this he has not transgressed the moral code of Islam. Submission to God is the basic creed while domination of the physical forces through the development of inductive method, much emphasised by the Quran, is regarded as an indispensable stage in the growth of the individual, an ideal which remained, for long, submerged due to the infiltration of Greek un-dynamic conception of the universe. Had Mr. Smith been acquainted with Rumi's *Mathnavi*, he would have realised that Iqbal is not the first to formulate this ideal. Similarly the doctrine of Vicegerency is not new in Iqbal. It is clearly set forth in the Quran as well as in the *Mathnavi* and other mystics. Iqbal's merit lies only in re-emphasising it.

(3) "Theologically.... he wrought the most important and the most necessary revolution of modern times. For he made God immanent not transcendent. For Islam, this is rank heresy. But for today it is the only salvation. Religion is life. And life, this mundane material life, is religious. The present world, of matter, time and space, is good." (p. 118).

In Islam the question of transcendence and immanence has been discussed in various forms. One of them is that of *tanzih* and *tashbih*, i. e. description of God's attributes. There has been a gradual movement in human thought in perceiving divine attributes away from *tashbih* towards *tanzih*. The description of God as met with in the Old Testament often conveys the impression of a human God. For instance, He is

¹ The Quran, 31 : 20

depicted as wrestling with Jacob, guiding the Israelites during their flight from Egypt in the form of a fiery and cloudy pillar, doing something under emotional stress and then repenting; His bewailing at the destruction of the Temple, etc. Similarly in the New Testament when Christ wished to convey boundless sympathy and love of God towards His creatures, he was compelled to employ the term 'father' which unfortunately was literally interpreted. The Quranic God is above all these similitudes and if He is so described, the readers are at once reminded that it was only a similitude and nothing more.¹ He is transcendent only in this sense that His attributes are in no way to be interpreted as human. Mr. Smith seems to be perfectly unaware of this aspect of the question and he therefore easily accepts the charge of Christian missionaries against Islam. The earlier Mutazalites emphasised the transcendence of God in this sense, in opposition to the immanence of the corporealists (who described God as possessing human attributes), a position which was to a great extent accepted by the Asharites. He sees and hears and knows but His seeing and hearing and knowing are not like ours. "Naught is as his likeness."² "Vision comprehends Him not, but He comprehends (all) vision. He is the subtile, the Aware."³ Compare, for instance, the description of the same event as related in the Old Testament as well as in the Quran. "And the Lord said, Behold, there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock: and it shall come to pass, while my glory

¹ The concluding lines of the verse where God is described as the Light are as follows: "And Allah speaks to mankind in allegories, for Allah is knower of all things." (24:35)

² The Quran, 42 : 11

³ Ibid, 6 : 104

passeth by, that I will put thee in a clift of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by. And I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts: but my face shall not be seen."¹ The Quran describes the same event in a more transcendent way. "He (i.e. Moses) said: My Lord show me (Thyself), that I may gaze upon Thee. He said: Thou wilt not see me, but gaze upon the mountain! If it stands still in its place, then thou wilt see Me. And when his Lord revealed (His) glory to the mountain he sent it crashing down."² In this respect Islam's conception of God is through and through transcendent and surely Iqbal has not transgressed this traditionally accepted point of view which, philosophically speaking, is much higher than the Christian or Judaistic conception. Immanence is 'rank heresy' for Islam only in this sense.

But there is also another aspect of this problem. Is God related to this universe of matter and of man or not? What kind of relationship is that? To Christianity this relationship is 'personal'. But the term personal is after all a human conception involving persons coming into psychological relations with one another. As such, Islam has never allowed the use of such anthropomorphically misleading terms in describing the relation of God to man. From the absence of this term in Islamic theological discussions, the Christian missionaries jumped to the conclusion that Islam recognises absolutely no relationship. God of the Quran as a matter of fact is both transcendent and immanent; He is in close personal touch with the universe and man and yet is far above them. Religion,

¹ Exodus, 33 : 21-23

² The Quran, 7 : 43

no doubt, must be transcendent but it cannot rest contented at that. The reason that the religious consciousness has not been able to find any solace in the mere Absolute of the philosophical type, proves that immanence of some sort is a great necessity for it. A religion is nothing if it does not satisfy the human heart for its craving to come into contact with the source of all life. He is therefore described in the Quran as nearer to man than his own neck-vein though this nearness is not spatial. He loves those who love Him, and answers the call of those who invoke Him, the best criterion whereby we can understand the existence of personal relations. "Say Allah is one. Allah is He on whom all depend; He begets not nor is He begotten. And none is like Him."¹ These verses clearly summarise Islamic conception of God, incorporating both transcendence and immanence. They refute polytheism and trinity in one breath and close all the avenues of conceiving any likeness of Him. But at the same time, it emphasises the most intimate relationship of God to the universe: it is He on whom all the world depends. 'He is immanent as well as transcendent. In spite of the fact that everything lives through Him nothing is like him and He transcends everything: He cannot be contained by the universe and cannot be bound by time and space. He is immanent because he is everything and specially in the soul of man because it was His own spirit which he breathed into man.' Pure transcendence leads to philosophy while pure immanence leads to pantheism, both of which fail to satisfy the religious consciousness. Iqbal has followed the Quran in emphasising both these aspects and thus

¹ The Quran, 112 : 1-4

saved himself from the unwholesome influence of 'abstract' thinking on the one hand and the 'nihilistic' tendency of pantheism, on the other.

Similarly religion cannot but be both dualistic and monistic. It is dualistic in so far as the problem is existential. It must stress the separate existence of man and the universe on the one hand and that of God on the other : they can and should not be identified. It was pantheism which alone bridged that gulf. It views One as the ultimate reality beside which everything is unreal. In contradistinction to this 'atheistic' conception,¹ religion asserts that God and the universe, including man, are both real and distinct and can in no sense be merged one into the other. But when the question is that of development of man, religion becomes monistic. God is real but Perfect while man is real but imperfect and his development consists in trying to look upon Him as the source and standard of all values. End of our life is a steady approach to Him. Though existentially religious consciousness is dualistic yet 'ideally' it must become monistic and it was to the credit of Islam that it achieved that harmonious synthesis. Islam drew a sharp line of demarcation between man and the universe on the one hand and God on the other and thus destroyed the tendency of human mind towards polytheism and incarnation. But in emphasising the dependence of everything on God as the ultimate source of life and authority and power and the final standard of value, it restored unity in our life. It emphasised that man and the universe, matter and mind, body and

¹It was Schopenhauer who called Pantheism 'the romance of Atheism.'

flesh, are ultimately one, as the expressions of one Reality and there is no inherent contradiction or opposition between them. Unlike Christianity, it pointed out that the full development of man can be achieved only through the dominance by man over the material forces surrounding him.

Mr. Smith does not seem to be clear in his mind about the true function of religion in our life and therefore a great confusion of thought runs throughout his criticism of Iqbal. Religion is dualistic as well as monistic as its God is transcendent as well as immanent and this unique synthesis was achieved by no other religion except Islam. Therefore there is no 'radical reversal of ascetic dualism' in Iqbal. If the Communist party and John Macmurray and other anti-religious people are opposed to religion merely because it is dualist and super-naturalist, as Mr. Smith asserts (p. 122), then they had better leave considering Christianity as their ideal religion and begin to study Islam with an unbiassed mind.

(4) His criticism of Iqbal's view about Immortality that 'he tries to reverse the old function of this idea as an opiate, and to transform even it into yet another call for struggle' (p. 120), is equally misleading. The spirit of the Quran, when referring to life after death, can in no way be interpreted as 'opiate'. We may here refer him to the following verses. "Lo! the Hour is surely coming. But I will to keep it hidden, that every soul may be rewarded for that which it strives (to achieve)." ¹ "And (remind them of) the Day when the Trumpet will be blown, and all who are in the heavens and the earth will start in fear, save

¹ The Quran, 20 : 15.

him whom Allah willeth. And all come unto Him humbled Whoso bringeth a good deed will have better than its worth, and such are safe from fear that Day."¹ "Have they not travelled in the land and seen the nature of the consequence for those who were before them? They were stronger than these in power, and they dug the earth and built upon it more than these have built. Messengers of their own came unto them with clear proofs (of Allah's sovereignty). Surely Allah wronged them not, but they did wrong themselves."²

(5) "Iqbal . . . in deploring the old static other-worldliness of religion, now certainly a sin, denounced it as un-Islamic and inherently evil. He treated it as if it had always been a sin and claimed that the Muslims' belief in it had caused their downfall and decadence after the Abbasi period." (p. 120-121) Mr. Smith thinks that Islam originally was a static and other-worldly religion but it was Iqbal who was, for the first time, compelled due to the pressure of circumstances to reverse the table of values. The substance of his argument is as follows. The other-worldliness of religion consists in this that being unable to help people in realising values in this world, it gives them hope that they will be realised in the next world, when pain and hunger are paramount and when there is no possibility of joy, truth and justice, religion saves man from feeling insignificant. But now when in the modern society these values are no longer beyond realization, then such a religion is decidedly reactionary and evil and so it was due to this change of circum-

¹ The Quran, 27 : 87-89.

² Ibid, 30 : 8-11. See also 30 : 42-43.

stances that "Iqbal was right in condemning as utterly evil all static and other-worldly religions." (p. 122).

First of all, is Mr. Smith sure that modern society, as it has emerged in Europe, after overthrowing 'the other-worldly and static religion', has created an environment more favourable to the realization of those values which were unable of achievement before? Has man been able to lessen pain and misery and remove the intensity of hunger and destitution? No student of modern history can hazard an answer to these questions in the affirmative. Rather, as we have seen, prominent thinkers are trying to re-consider and analyse the fundamental principles on which modern western society was based and are devising to formulate new ones in their stead on which to raise the future society so as to remove the incalculable amount of frustration and misery prevalent today.

Secondly, is Islam as a religion 'otherworldly' in the sense of Mr. Smith? It is no doubt otherworldly but in the sense that it postulates an hereafter where the good or bad deeds of individuals will be judged and rewarded accordingly. It does not introduce the other world merely as a refuge for the miserable and the hungry, where people will attain those values which they had been unable to achieve in this world of space and time. The Quran in several places refers to our present life as a field where we must strive our hardest to sow the most desirable seed and the hereafter, where we shall reap the fruit of our labours. "For those who do good in this world there is good, and Allah's earth is spacious." (39 : 10) This reward of our deeds is not confined to the hereafter alone : we shall get it even here. "Allah has promised such of you as believe and

do good works that He will surely make them to succeed (the present rulers) in the earth even as he caused those who were before them " (4: 55). But what is this rule of the earth for? "Those who, if we give them power in the land, establish worship and pay the poordue and enjoin good and forbid evil." (22: 4) That is, they will strive to establish the law of God among people and destroy the source of all confusion and disorder from the face of the earth by all means at their disposal, peaceful or otherwise. "And fight (the unbelievers) until confusion and tyranny (due to disregard of true religion) is no more and God's law is alone established in the world." (2: 193)

The real reason of Mr. Smith's criticism is that his ideas about religion are derived either from his study of Christianity or from the prejudiced accounts of Islam at the hands of missionaries. If he had ever tried to study the Quran with a fair mind, he would have discovered that Iqbal, in almost all cases, has done nothing more than re-emphasise what had been neglected by the Muslims during the long period of their decadence. Unlike Christianity Islam never taught a flight from the struggle of this material world nor is man, according to it, born 'sinful' so that, strive however he may, he cannot escape the fruit of sins except in the hereafter. I may refer Mr. Smith, for further elucidation in this respect, to Lange's *History of Materialism* (Book I, 2nd Sec., Chap. I, pp. 161-186). Lange explains that when Christianity appeared, the great majority of people had begun to revolt against their extremely sensual life of pleasure-seeking and had begun to take to an austere and self-denying life and Christianity "with its wonderfully fascinating doctrine

of the Kingdom that is not of this world, seemed to offer the most admirable support to these views." (p. 169). Its great emphasis rested 'on the sphere of moral purification through the renunciation of worldly desires, on the theory of redemption, and on the hope of the advent of Christ.' (p. 176) He further says that the darkest period of Materialism was when the dualistic tendency of the religion of the Zend-Avesta (rather than of Manicheism) in which the world and matter represent the evil principle, God and light the good, came to relate itself to Christianity in its fundamental idea and especially in its historical development.

But when the author comes to treat of Islam he says that "Mohammadanism is more favourable to materialism¹ than either Judaism or Christianity." After recounting all the achievements of Muslims in different spheres of our this-worldly life, Lange says that it was all due to 'the circumstance that the Monotheism of Muhammad was the most absolute and comparatively the freest from mythical adulterations'. (p. 184)

Thus it is not Iqbal who made Islam monistic and this-worldly and its God immanent and the goal of humanity supremacy but the Quran itself. We must admit, however, that these important elements of the Quranic teaching remained submerged due to certain unfortunate factors (which we had already dis-

¹ "When effort is directed not to transitory enjoyment, but to a real perfecting of our condition, when the energy of material enterprise is guided by a clear calculation, which in all things has ultimate principles in view, and therefore reaches its aim; then there ensues that giant progress which in our time has made England in two hundred years a mighty people." (p. 166). This is what Lange means by Materialism.

cussed at great length) and they needed the touch of a great thinker like Iqbal to bring them to surface once again.

By asserting "that the world-denying passivity and quietist supernaturalism were not the cause of social disintegration, but the result" (p. 121), Mr. Smith seems to show his ignorance of the early history of Islam. It was the imperialistic policy of the Ummayyad rulers who refused to listen to the persistent objections of the early believers that compelled some of the most brilliant people of that age to a life of meditation and seclusion and once this tendency was set up, there was no powerful force to check it. Rather the gradual infiltration of Neo-platonic philosophy intensified this tendency. Anyone aware of the history of mysticism will see that sufis of early period were ascetics but their attitude was not 'world-denying passivity'; it was only very late in its history that such doctrines came to be incorporated into it and gradually unnerved the whole Islamic world.

(6) Note the following assertions of Mr. Smith about Iqbal:

"He did not know, analytically and logically, what is wrong with capitalism." (p. 127)

"But the basic fact is that he never knew what socialism is." (p. 127)

"(He was) never able to see the moral and religious implications of socialism or the correct sociological implications, today, of a vital religion." (p. 128)

These dogmatic assertions are not worth any lengthy comment and show the author's lack of balanced judgment. He thinks that Iqbal by criticising socialism

because it 'has to do only with the body', fell a prey to the same dualistic mode of thought which he himself criticised so forcefully (p. 128). Iqbal's criticism of socialism was correct and his criticism only meant that by elevating economics to the highest position in our life and regarding it as the sole remedy for our ills, as socialism claims, no doubt, to do, it went astray. Iqbal did not intend to bifurcate mind and body himself but rather attacked socialism on account of this very dualistic tendency which sees reality only in the sphere of body and refuses to assign any value to spirit or mind.

(7) "Clearly one must do something, and vigorously. But what? It was not Iqbal's function to say precisely what. . . . It would be gratuitous to criticise Iqbal's lack of ethical clarity as a defect. . . ." (p. 123).

In the *Asrar-i-Khudi*, he lays down general principles of conduct for an individual which he divides into different stages of obedience (to the law of God) and self-control (according to the Sunna of the Holy Prophet). When he says :

شکوه سنج ساختنی آئین مشو از حدود مصطفیٰ بیرون مشو

Do not complain of the hardness of law and never overstep (in your conduct) the limit imposed by the prophet; and

توهمی دانی کہ آئین تو چیست ؟ زیر گردن سر تمکیں تو چیست ؟
آں کتاب زندہ قرآن حکیم حکمت او لایزال است و قدیم

Do you know what is your law by following which you can attain an honourable position in the world? It is the ever-living Quran that is eternal and final; then any lack of ethical clarity in Iqbal cannot mislead any of 'his followers'. It was this misunderstanding of the basic position of Iqbal in this respect that led Mr.

Smith to another wrong statement that "Iqbal never elaborated in his ethics the extent to which it is good to curb the development of one man's personality in the interest of the fulfilment of that of his neighbour" (pp. 131, 157). Iqbal's discussion of Islamic Brotherhood and its illustration by two anecdotes, his criticism of Michaevevelli who advocated extreme selfishness in political field in *Ramuz-i-bekhudi*, his criticism of capitalism and nationalism in the interest of harmonious development of all individuals in a society without any distinctions of rich or poor, of race or colour, are all different aspects of the same question of adjusting the relation of an individual to the other members of the society. But these are, after all, only general principles for the guidance of modern man while the rest can be easily supplied by the Quran and the traditions of the holy prophet.¹

In Chapter IV Mr. Smith discusses what he calls the reactionary aspect of Iqbal though his main objection against him, here, are directed against his political life, a field which is beyond the scope of this book.

(1) "Of Iqbal we can say that he himself was unable to see the full implications of his thought partly because he was not an economist and partly because of his natural prejudice in favour of the traditional Platonic idea of a primarily spiritual universe." (p. 155)

Mr. Smith is so much enamoured of economics that he thinks that nobody can be credited with any knowledge about the nature and function of society unless he knows it. But perhaps what he means to convey by the word 'economics' is really marxian

¹ See pp. 205-206 above.

socialism which, he thinks, can alone save the world, a statement with which not only Iqbal but several other eminent thinkers have seen reasons to differ. As regards his other point that Iqbal was prejudiced in favour of Platonic spiritualism, we may say that Plato by no stretch of imagination can be called a spiritualist. He no doubt believed in God but the world, according to him, was based on Ideas, static and eternal, which are as much spiritual as material and hence no history of philosophy ever includes Plato among Spiritualists. It is an innovation on the part of Mr. Smith. Yet Iqbal believed in a primarily spiritual universe because it is the fundamental principle of Islam and there is nothing in this belief that can stand in the way of Iqbal in understanding the problems of society, just as a primarily materialistic outlook did not handicap Marx, as Mr. Smith very boldly asserts. (p. 158)

(2) "Iqbal's mind was simply incapable, apparently, of dealing with men in community. He was excellent in thinking about the individual but he floundered badly when he approached questions of society. . . . He certainly tried to think about such questions. . . . But every attempt was failure ; he himself, the poet, knew that he was not all at home with practical complex affairs." (pp. 156-157)

Mr. Smith seems to confuse two different points of view. To think out and describe the basic principles of society in the light of modern problems as it should be reconstructed and actually to endeavour to achieve that ideal, are two different things. To argue from Iqbal's alleged incapacity to deal practically with complex affairs to his failure in enunciating any reliable

principles for the reconstruction of society is a feat which Mr. Smith alone has been able to perform.

(3) "He (*i.e.* Iqbal) attacked the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party because they are 'atheist' and, he inferred, lack entirely warmth and the spiritual values of religion. By this criticism he did not mean that in their actions the communists deny God—that is, deny love, deny brotherhood and justice, deny life and the human self and its development and creativity and joy and beauty. His point was that they theoretically deny God; and he never took the trouble to see whether or not they really do so." (p. 148)

This statement of Mr. Smith is a strange admixture of wrong statements and misleading inferences. It is a fact that communism denies God and hence denies the spiritual values of religion and no argument was needed to establish it; for Marx himself asserted that religion is an opium which the bourgeoisie have invented in order to make the proletariat submit to their exploitation by holding out an illusory hope of a future world. Denial of God, however, does not mean that the Communist Party does not believe in the values of love, brotherhood and justice, etc., which Mr. Smith has taken great trouble to enumerate. Belief in religion implies, no doubt, all these values but it implies something more as well. It involves and determines not only relations among individuals but equally relation of individuals to a spiritual principle, God, who is regarded as the source and ground of all values. Religion demands that all should submit themselves to His moral law and should seek to realise those values which He looks upon as values and in the way which He wishes us to adopt. In this

sense Communism does deny God and religion as a matter of fact and there was no need for Iqbal to investigate the matter. The real reason, again, why Mr. Smith misunderstands the whole situation is, that he is only aware of Christianity as a typical religion and not Islam.

(4) "He could denounce its (*i.e.* West's) capitalist system; but at times he spent his energy in denouncing rather the result, its frustration and soullessness, its 'materialist' outlook and its irreligion." (p. 159)

Here again Mr. Smith shows a great confusion of thought. Historically considered, it was hatred and indifference to religion that preceded the rise of capitalism and not *vice versa* as he seems to imagine. So long as the economic life of society was guided by the moral system of the Church, as in the Middle Ages, there was no fear of its becoming capitalistic. But when the hold of the Church became weak society at once fell prey to the gold-hunger of the rich. Thus by attacking materialistic outlook of Europe he was not attacking any by-product but rather the very root cause of capitalism. Strangely enough, Mr. Smith accuses Iqbal of attacking Europeanisation of morals and view-point which, according to him, led him to conservative traditionalism and reaction. Here again Mr. Smith reverses the true order of things. It was not his criticism of European life which led Iqbal to teach conservatism in morals; it was rather his conviction, born of actual experience, that the Islamic code of morals and view-point is far superior to anything which Europe could offer. This consideration naturally led him to criticise European moral

system which had been criticised before him by Nietzsche. Iqbal cannot be accused of reaction merely because he refused to accept the lead of Europe in the moral sphere and instead of it advocated that of Islam. This in itself is no reason why he should be criticised. Mr. Smith would have established his point only if he had compared the two moral codes and then proved the inferiority of the one over the other. A mere dogmatic assertion that Iqbal became reactionary and conservative because he accepted one in preference to the other, cannot be called a fair criticism.

ازان نمرود با من سر گران است به تعبیر حرم کوشیده ام من
(ارمغان حجاز-صفحه 90)

Discussing the same question in another light, Mr. Smith says that though Iqbal advocated *ijtihad* theoretically, he was in practice very much against it. (pp. 159-161). Here again he seems to misunderstand the whole position of Iqbal. By accepting Islam as the starting point of his system, he could not over-look its basic laws as enunciated in the Quran and the traditions. An individual has every right of innovation within a particular limit but when the question is that of the basic principles he cannot overstep them without ceasing to be a Muslim. If the Quran definitely asserts that wine and games of chance are forbidden then no Muslim can advocate these things merely because Europe has legalised them in its practice.

Though he often mocks at Iqbal for his lack of sociological insight and thus indirectly asserting his own knowledge of that science, yet Mr. Smith's criticism of Iqbal merely because he advocated the importance of conservatism as well as change in the reconstruction of society, speaks eloquently of his ignorance.

Mr. Smith would have been happy if Iqbal had thrown all the moral and religious principles of Islam to the winds and instead advocated an imitation of the west; he would have then been called a reformer, a progressive through and through. What, in reality, is implied in Mr. Smith's criticism of Iqbal is that Islam as a moral system is reactionary and static. But we want proof for this and not mere repetition of an obsolete propaganda device. The root cause of the 'frustration and soullessness' of western society is not merely capitalism, as Mr. Smith seems wrongly to think, for it is also one of the effects; but its neglect and indifference to any basic ideal on which to found its society. People of the west have allowed themselves to drift along with the current of time and have now come very near to foundering on a rock and they have so far drifted from their place of security that their reformers seem perfectly pessimistic of its salvation. And here is Mr. Smith who comes to preach to us to follow in the footsteps of that very 'soulless' and decadent society to destruction. Reform and *ijtihad* are no doubt valuable but only so far as they do not tend to destroy the basic principles on which Muslim society was raised. Islam as a religion is final only with regard to these principles which we enunciated in the last chapter of the book. European thinkers themselves are also in the present crisis searching in vain for some such basic laws on which to reconstruct their society.

(5) "Iqbal said that to take Islam to-day seriously, intelligently, progressively, is to recognise as righteous not the lip-service to the name of God or the name of Islam, nor yet the formal practice of an

outworn ritual, but the actual creative and value-yielding activity of progressive and vibrantly good men everywhere." (p. 162)

No doubt Iqbal criticised Muslims for the hollowness of their religious life but his criticism was in the spirit of the Quran which asserted that "it is not righteousness that ye turn your faces to the East and the West." (2: 77) This assertion of a general principle by the Quran, however, does not imply that we should not turn our faces to the Kaaba during prayers; what it emphasises is that the spirit of the observance is more essential than its formality. Similarly what Iqbal meant to convey by his criticism of the ritualistic side of Islam was not that we should leave it aside but that we should follow it in spirit without which it would be utterly meaningless. When Iqbal exhorted his readers that a mere lip-service to the name of God is not sufficient, he meant to remind them that their allegiance to Islam implied an acceptance of certain basic principles, one of which was that God is the only source of all values, that He alone possesses absolute sovereignty, that all should submit to His moral law and accept His sovereignty in life. It was in the light of this principle that Iqbal was criticising the so-called "out-worn ritual". Can we include "Socialists, communists, hearty pagans, 'atheist' medical doctors, Hindu famine relievers, Christian sanitary engineers, whoever is doing good", (p. 162), as Mr. Smith asserts, among the company of men who are 'really Muslim'? Here, again, Mr. Smith seems to identify religion with mere humanitarian work of one sort or other, and refuses to see its value for society beyond that.

(6) In criticising Iqbal's lecture *Is religion possible?* Mr. Smith says that he was totally wrong to think that ultimate Reality "is not knowable through science but is through religion". He further says that Iqbal, in this lecture, "has deserted his religious realism and pragmatic morality to define religion now as a method of establishing direct contact with the inner nature of reality." (p. 163)

As usual Mr. Smith's point is quite wide of the mark. His ignorance of the true nature and function of religion led him to one mis-statement after another. To Iqbal the function of religion is a direct contact with Reality and he holds this position not particularly in this lecture but perhaps in all his previous lectures which Mr. Smith seems not to have carefully gone through. The method of attaining this direct contact, according to Iqbal, is meditation and above all prayer which he calls a higher stage of reflection. What is the pragmatic value of prayer? Iqbal thinks that its value differs with different individuals. In the case of a prophet, it is creative. "For the prophet it is the awakening within him of world-shaking psychological forces, calculated completely to overhaul the world of concrete fact. The desire to see his religious experience transformed into a living world-force is supreme in the prophet In its creative act the prophet's will judges both itself and the world of concrete fact in which it endeavours to objectify itself." (p. 174) In another place (p. 124) he says: "Like reflection it (*i.e.* prayer) too is a process of assimilation, but the assimilative process in the case of prayer draws itself closely together and thereby acquires a power unknown to pure thought. In thought

the mind observes and follows the working of Reality; in the act of prayer it gives up its career as a seeker of slow-footed universality and rises higher than thought to capture Reality itself with a view to become a conscious participator in its life . . . Spiritual illumination brings fresh power by shaping human personality."

Thus Mr. Smith's criticism that Iqbal has changed his previous position and that here he comes to identify religion with mere reflective passivity loses its point. The function of religion, for him, is the same which he expressed throughout his several lectures and that function is primarily no doubt reflection in the form of prayer but ultimately it is to act in a creative way so as to build a new world out of the old.

He takes exception to Iqbal's statement that "the religious and the scientific processes, though involving different methods, are identical in their final aim." (p. 163). The reason for his disagreement is that "the ultimate aim of science is not to understand reality . . . Its object is action. Its object is the control of nature." (p. 163) He wishes that Iqbal, of all people, should have appreciated this. But he forgets that Iqbal accepts this position only with this difference that he believes that it is not only science that ultimately aims at activity but religion as well is after the same object. They both aim at knowledge whereby the world before them may be reconstructed on a sounder basis. He has given expression to this conviction in the *Ramuz-i-bekhudi* and in the *Jawaid Nama* only if Mr. Smith had cared to follow. But he seems to be aware of the destructive forces which the pursuit of science has brought in its train and here Mr. Smith seems to be right in asserting that "scienti-

fic activity might well be guided by some dynamic morality" of Iqbal's type. Iqbal says: "The scientific observer of Nature is a kind of mystic seeker in the act of prayer. Although at present he follows only the footprints of the musk-deer, and thus modestly limits the methods of his quest, his thirst for knowledge is eventually sure to lead him to the point where the scent of the musk-gland is a better guide than the footprints of the deer. This alone will add to his power over Nature and give him that vision of the total-infinite which philosophy seeks but cannot find. Vision without power does bring moral elevation but cannot give a lasting culture. Power without vision tends to become destructive and inhuman. Both must combine for the spiritual expansion of humanity." (p. 126).

دلبری ہے قاہری جادوگری است دلبری با قاہری پیغمبری است
(زبور عجم - صفحہ 264)

2. SELF IN THE LIGHT OF RELATIVITY

I

The ease with which we perceive external things hides from us the mystery of human perception. According to modern science all that is necessary for an act of perception happens inside the observer; yet the thing perceived appears outside, and even at an enormous distance from the observer, as in the case of a star. If the star is a mere interpretation of the happenings within, then, why does it look external? You may say that it looks external because it is external. I do not contend this point. The star may be a reality situated outside me in an absolute space. My point is that if the account of perception given by modern science is correct, the star ought not to look external.

II

But is the thing known independent of the act of knowledge? Or, is the act of knowledge a constitutive element in the making of the object? Objective reality as understood by Physical Science is entirely independent of the act of knowledge. Knowing does not make any difference to it. It is there whether one knows it or not. In studying its behaviour the act of knowledge can be ignored. Thus, Physics ignored Metaphysics in the sense of a theory of knowledge in its onward march.

But this attitude of Physical Science, though highly advantageous to itself, could not have been maintained for a long time. The act of knowledge is a fact among other facts of experience which Empirical Science claims as its exclusive subject of study. Physics cannot afford to ignore Metaphysics. It must recognise it as a great ally in the organisation of experience. Happily it is not a Metaphysician but a Scientist who justifies Metaphysics—I mean Einstein, who has taught us that the knower is intimately related to the object known, and that the act of knowledge is a constitutive element in the objective reality, thus confirming, in a sense, the idealistic position of Kant. A further advance in our knowledge of the relationship between the act of knowledge and the object known will probably come from Psychology.

III

The object known, then, is relative to the observing self; its size and shape change as his position and speed change. *But whatever the position and speed of the observer, whatever his frame of reference, something must always remain which confronts him as his 'other.'* What does this mean? Does it mean that there is something absolute in what appears to us as objective reality? No. We cannot construe ever-present externality to mean the total independence or absoluteness of what appears as external to the self. Such an interpretation would contradict the very principle which discloses its relativity. If, then, in view of the principle of relativity, the object confronting the subject is really relative, *there must be some self to whom it ceases to exist as a confronting 'other.'* This self must be non-spatial,

non-temporal—Absolute, to whom what is external to us must cease to exist as external. Without such an assumption objective reality cannot be relative to the spatial and temporal self. To the Absolute Self, then, the Universe is not a reality confronting him as his 'other', it is only a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite life. Einstein is quite right in saying that the Universe is finite, but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase (شان in the Quranic language) of God's extensively infinite consciousness and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite. The Quranic way of expressing the same truth is that the Universe is liable to increase. This simple truth mentioned in the Quran was the greatest blow given to the Deductive systems of thought that existed before Islam, and to the circular view of the movement of Time, common to all the Aryan modes of thought. But the age of the Quran was hardly ready to assimilate it.

IV

We have seen that the Universe does not confront the Absolute Self in the same way as it confronts the human Self. To Him it is a phase of His consciousness, to us it presents itself as an independent reality. But is the human self also phase of God's consciousness, or something more substantial than a mere idea? The nature of self is such that it is self-centered and exclusive. Are, then, the Absolute Self and the human self so related to each other that they mutually exclude each other? Pringle-Pattison deplors that the English language possesses only one word—creation—to express the relation of God and the Universe on the one hand,

and the relation of God and the self of man on the other. The Arabic language is, however, more fortunate in this respect. It has two words to express this relation, *i. e.* *khalq* and *amr*. The former is used by the Quran to indicate the relation of the Universe of matter to God, and the latter indicates the relation of the human self to the Divine self. All that we can say in answer to the extremely difficult question raised above is that the *amr* is not related to God in the same way as the *khalq* is. *The amr is distinct but not isolated from God.* But I confess I cannot intellectually apprehend this relationship any more than Rumi, who says :

اتصال ہے تغیل ہے قیاس هست رب الناس را با جان نامس

V

The next question is whether it is possible for the human observer to reach the Divine point of view, and to realise its freedom from the universe as a confronting "other." The mystic says it is possible to reach a super-intellectual standpoint, and his method is to escape from the conditions which make the movement of intellect possible. The mystic method has attracted some of the best minds in the history of mankind. Probably there is something in it. But I am inclined to think that it is detrimental to some of the equally important interests of life, and is prompted by a desire to escape from the arduous task of the conquest of matter through intellect. The surest way to realise the potentialities of the world is to associate with its shifting actualities. I believe that Empirical Science—association with the visible—is an indispensable

stage in the life of contemplation. In the words of the Quran, the Universe that confronts us is not "باطل". It has its uses; and the most important use of it is that the effort to overcome the obstruction offered by it sharpens our insight and prepares us for an insertion into what lies below the surface of phenomena. As the poet Naziri says:

نه هر مغزے که بوید نگهت از مصر و یمن گیرد
مشام نیز باید تا نصیب از پیرهن گیرد

A keen insight is needed to see the non-temporal behind the perpetual flux of things. The mystic forgets that reality lives in its own appearances, and that the surest way to reach the core of it lies through its appearances. The Prophet of Arabia was the first to protest against this unhealthy Asiatic mysticism, and to open our eyes to the great fact of change within and without through the appreciation of which alone it is desirable to reach the eternal. The Quran describes God as *کل يوم هو فی شان* and fixes our gaze on change and variety as the greatest "signes" of God. Thus the Quran has its own method for the elevation of the human self to the Divine standpoint. But I can only suggest this method in the following paragraph.

VI

"The impulse which drives me into the wide world is precisely the same as that which drives so many into monasteries—the desire for self realisation." So says Count Keyserling in his Diary recently translated into English. The Count is quite right. The world of matter which confronts the self of man as its "other" is an indispensable obstruction which forces

our being into fresh formations. I am afraid, however, that the Count's view of self realisation is one-sided. He tells us further, "I want to let the climate of the Tropics, the Indian mode of consciousness, the Chinese code of life, and many other factors which I cannot envisage in advance, to work their spell on me, one after the other, and then watch what will become of me." Now, such a process may bring about the realisation of our intellectual self. It may give us an acute thinker who can work out the spell of impressions into a coherent system of ideas, but it cannot shape our clay into an ideal human being. The intellectual self is only one aspect of the activity of our total self. The realisation of the total self comes not by merely permitting the wide world to throw its varied impressions on our mind, and then watching what becomes of us. It is not merely by receiving and intellectually shaping the impressions, but mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation.

3. McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY

I was reading the other day Mr. Dickinson's memoir of the late and lamented Dr. McTaggart, that philosopher-saint whose lectures on Kant and Hegel I had the privilege to attend as an advanced student of Trinity College, Cambridge, about a quarter of a century ago. I should like to note a few points which occurred to me while reading this interesting book, whose value is very much enhanced by the personal reminiscences of those who had the good fortune of coming into contact with that great thinker.

"As we have pointed out more than once", says Mr. Dickinson, "the origin of McTaggart's philosophy was not in his intellect but in his emotions." This is true—perhaps more or less true of all thinkers—if we look at McTaggart as a thinker torn asunder from the general current of British thought. In order to understand the true significance of his philosophy we must put him back into that current.

Agnosticism is not a permanent mode of thought. It comes and goes. The British mind tried to escape from it in two ways. One is the total elimination of what is called the ultimate Reality. The 'Unknown and Unknowable' of Herbert Spencer simply does not exist. Why, then, look for it? The universe is nothing but perishable phenomena without any eternal reality

behind it. The other way is that an Eternal Reality does exist behind the world of perishable phenomena, and is approachable by a purely speculative method. The first course was adopted by Hume, the second by Green. In opposition to British Phenomenalism, Green affirmed the existence of an Eternal Consciousness. The temporal process according to Green is unthinkable without a non-temporal consciousness, for consciousness of change cannot be identical with the process of change. But the Eternal Consciousness, so regarded, is nothing more than a kind of Newtonian space holding together the world of eternally inter-related appearances. This view makes it impossible to develop the living concrete self out of a dead immobile system of abstract relations. Bradley's philosophy is the logical outcome of Green. The criterion of reality is coherence and freedom from contradiction. Applying this test, the world of appearance—time, change, movement, multiplicity—turns out to be a mere illusion. The ultimate Reality is one and immutable. This is the ancient Hindu doctrine of Maya and the Greek Parmenides. But how did this illusion originate? Nobody knows. Bradley, however, admits in spite of the contradictions involved in the notion of self, that the human self must, in some sense, be real. In what sense is it real? He does not explain. McTaggart reaches the Absolute by means of Dialectic method, but he does not stop at the Absolute. The Absolute, according to him, further differentiates itself into concrete egos. The universe is not an illusion, it is a system of real selves, which cannot be regarded as mere predicates or adjectives of the Absolute. As he wrote to me in December, 1919:

"I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not that."

In this aspect of his teaching McTaggart is much more genuinely British than either Bradley or Green or Bosanquet. Indeed he was to Hegel as Leibnitz was to Spinoza. Thus the character of McTaggart's philosophy was determined, not so much by his private emotions as by the intellectual difficulties as well as the un-British character of neo-Hegelian thought in England. It was also determined by what he called the needs of his country. I quote from another letter of 1920, which he appears to have written after he had read Nicholson's English translation of my *Secrets of the Self* :

"I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much? Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a Pantheist and mystic.

"For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the ultimate reality, but as to their true content and their true goal, my position is, as it was, that that is to be found in eternity and not in time, and in love rather than action.

"Perhaps, however, the difference is largely a question of emphasis—we each lay most weight on what our own country needs. I dare say you are right when you say that India is too contemplative. But I am sure that England—and all Europe—is not contemplative enough. That is a lesson that we ought to learn from you—and no doubt we have something to

teach in return."

The point of interest in McTaggart's philosophy, however, is that in his system mystical intuition, as a source of knowledge, is much more marked than in the system of Bradley. The need of such a direct revelation is the natural outcome of the failure of a purely speculative method. An Italian writer describes McTaggart's philosophy as mystical degeneration of English Neo-Hegelianism. Nothing of the kind. Some of the greatest minds of the world have felt the need of a direct contact with the ultimate Reality, and have indeed, in some cases, achieved such contact. Plotinus, Ghazali, Schelling and Bergson are instances in point. In his spiritual evolution Kant himself reached that stage; but unlike Ghazali and others he was led to achieve the ultimate Reality as a regulative idea only. The result of his critical philosophy is that God cannot be proved to exist, but that we should act as if He does exist. Not William James but Kant was the real founder of modern Pragmatism. Will, then, the Italian writer referred to above describe Kant's philosophy as a pragmatic degeneration of German thought?

It must, however, be remembered in the case of McTaggart that the mystic revelation of Reality came to him as a confirmation of his thought. His system is deductive not in the sense in which the philosophy of Bergson and Plotinus is deductive. He started with a firm conviction in the power of human reason, and that conviction remained with him to the end of his days. His illumination came, I think, as an accidental confirmation of what he had reached through pure reason. That is why he had such an unshakable faith

in his philosophy. This is clear from the last words which he said to his wife: "I am grieved that we must part, but you know I am not afraid of death." Such a triumphant faith is the result of a direct revelation alone. And this revelation has nothing to do with what our psychology calls emotion; it is, as Mrs. McTaggart rightly insists, "an actual perception of the senses." Like a true mystic McTaggart rarely mentioned his experiences to others. The ultimate basis of religion is an experience which is essentially individual and incommunicable. It is because of its essentially private character that mystics see no use in talking about it except to experts, and that, too, for the purposes of verification only. In the history of Islamic mysticism we find many recorded instances in which some mystics have been reported to have travelled thousands of miles for the verification of a single experience. This is technically known as *tasdiq*, i.e. verification by an appeal to another man's experience. Knowledge and direct revelation are not mutually opposed: they are complimentary to each other. The philosophical theologian simply tries, for the sake of less fortunate persons, to socialize through reason what is essentially individual. When the mystic Sultan Abu Said met the philosopher Abu Ali ibn Sina he is reported to have said, "I see what he knows." McTaggart both knew and saw; but his vision, I believe, did not precede his system. It did not initially inspire his thought, though it did bring to him the warmth of conviction. This, to my mind, indicates a far more powerful intellect than that of Plotinus or Bergson. Yet the vision of McTaggart, in view of its static character, is not free from the unhealthy influences of his Hegelian

inspiration. But perhaps we possess no criterion to decide whether the universe in its ultimate essence is at rest or in motion.

Another point on which I would like to say a few words is McTaggart's view of the self. Hegel's indifference to personal immortality has more or less affected all those who received inspiration from him. With Bosanquet and Bradley the self is not a substance in the sense of Spinoza. It is a construction of thought, a mere predicate or adjective of the Absolute. And this self-hood, according to these thinkers, is further transcended in the Absolute. This account of self disregards even the elementary conditions of self-hood as known to living experience. The self, as known to experience, is much more than a mere predicate of the Absolute; it is a dynamic centre of experience. By this criticism of the common Neo-Hegelian view of the self I do not mean to argue for McTaggart's view. All that I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the results of English Neo-Hegelianism. To McTaggart the self is a real substance. He reached the Absolute through the method of Hegel. But with him the Absolute has further determinations—*i.e.* egos of actual experience which participate in the elemental eternity of the Absolute. This amounts to a total dismissal of the Hegelian Absolute. But the result of this dismissal is not a return to Empiricism. It gives us not a world of interrelated appearances, but a living world of interrelated egos. Mr. Dickinson thinks that it cuts out science at one stroke. It does nothing of the kind any more than the spiritual pluralism of Leibnitz. But while I agree that the self is more than a mere predicate of the Absolute, I cannot

agree with McTaggart in the view that the self is elementally immortal. From the mere fact that the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute it, by no means, follows that, even in its finitude, the human self retains the character which belongs to its source alone. To my mind such a differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself. Personally I regard immortality as an inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego. I venture here to translate for the English reader one or two passages from my poem called *The New Garden of Mystery* :

If you say that the 'I' is a mere illusion—
An appearance among other appearances—
Then tell me who is the subject of this illusion?
Look within and discover.
The world is *visible*;
Yet its existence needs proof!
Not even the intellect of an angel can comprehend it;
The 'I' is invisible and needs no proof!
Think awhile and see thine own secret!
The 'I' is Truth, it is no illusion.
When it ripens, it becomes eternal!
Lovers, even though separated from the Beloved,
live in blissful union!
*It is possible to give wings to a mere spark,
And to make it flutter for ever and for ever!*
The Eternity of God is elemental and not the reward of His action!
*That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul
Wins for herself by love's frenzy.*

Why fear that death which comes from without ?
For when the 'I' ripens into a self
It has no danger of dissolution.

There is a more subtle inner death which makes
me tremble !

This death is falling down from love's frenzy,
Saving one's spark and not giving it away freely
to the heaps of chaff,

Cutting one's shroud with one's own hands,
Seeing one's death with one's own eyes,
This death lies in ambush for thee !

Fear it, for that is really our death.

But while I disagree with McTaggart in his view of immortality, I regard this part of his work as almost apostolic. He emphasized personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in Europe, and when the European man was about to face death on an enormous scale. Indeed in this aspect of his work he may be compared to the great Muslim mystic Hallaj, whose undying phrase "I am the creative Truth" was thrown as a challenge to the whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was moving in a direction which tended to obscure the reality and destiny of the human ego. Hallaj never ceased to utter what he had personally seen to be the Truth until the Mullas of Islam prevailed upon the state to imprison him and finally to crucify him. He met his death with perfect calm.

There is one more point which I would like briefly to consider here—I mean his atheism. I used to meet him almost every day in his rooms in Trinity, and very often our talk turned on the question of God.

His powerful logic often silenced me, but he never succeeded in convincing me. There is no doubt, as Mr. Dickinson points out in his memoir, that he had a positive dislike for the transcendent God of Western theology. The Absolute of the Neo-Hegelian lacks life and movement. The Eternal Consciousness of Green is hardly distinguishable from Newtonian space. How could these satisfy him? In a letter already quoted he wrote to me :

"As far as the life of the individual remains the same in the course of amplification and expression, I am inclined to think (for an European, you know, can also be a mystic) that the solution rests in loving the same persons. But indeed it still seems to me, as it did when we first knew one another, that the solution of all problems is found only in *love*."

Indeed his description of love as the essence of Reality indicates that, in spite of his thorough-going intellectualism, his soul revolted against the inert Absolute of Neo-Hegelians. Yet in a letter from which I have quoted above he seems to oppose love to action. I do not see the opposition. Love is no passivity. It is active and creative. Indeed, on the material plane, it is the only force which circumvents death : for when death carries away one generation, love creates another. He tells us that this love which he regarded as the essence of Reality is just the love of one person for another, and further, it is the cause and not the effect of the proximity of two persons. Now it is because of its character as an active cause that, in spite of variety in content of the mutual loves of various persons, it is capable of being experienced as a unity embracing the entire universe. But the crucial point

is whether this central unity is an all-inclusive self. This was McTaggart's real difficulty. The self is unique and impervious. How could one self, however superior, include other selves? The mystic poet Rumi felt the same difficulty. "Between the individual egos and their Sustainer," he says, "obtains a contact which can neither be imagined nor intellectually conceived." In his *Idea of God* Professor Pringle-Pattison also regards this relation as inscrutable by human intellect. But is not the individual ego himself a colony of egos?

Shall I point the way to the eternal secret?

Open thine eye on thyself!

Thou art visible and invisible, many and one!

Perhaps it is not possible intellectually to conceive this ultimate unity as an all-embracing self. It is my belief, as I have pointed out before, that McTaggart's Hegelian inspiration marred the vision which was vouchsafed him. A more serious thing happened to poor Nietzsche, whose peculiar intellectual environment led him to think that his vision of the ultimate Ego could be realized in a world of space and time. What grows only out of the inner depths of the heart of man he proposed to create by an artificial biological experiment. He was taken as a mad man and was placed in the hands of those who administer drugs and mixtures. As I said of him in my *Jawaid Nama*:

A Hallaj! A stranger in his own land!

Safe from the Mulla's hit, killed by the Physician's hand!

The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. Does Reality respond to us? It does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself—*i.e.* the act of worship.

In McTaggart's case reflection took the place of worship. The orders of Muslim mystics have invented various rules and practices by which to come into direct contact with the ultimate Reality. The truth, however, is that neither worship nor reflection nor any kind of practices entitle a man to this response from the ultimate Love. It depends eventually on what religion calls "grace". The philosophy of McTaggart has in fact raised the great problem of the nature of Love. How will it be solved in Europe if at all? Surely analytic psychology will never be able to solve it. Its secret lies in the pangs of separation, detachment, or, as McTaggart would say, differentiation.

If the ultimate Reality—*i.e.* Love—has any significance for the life of its own ego-differentiations, it must itself be an all-inclusive ego which sustains, responds, loves, and is capable of being loved. In McTaggart's view there is no guarantee that the process of birth, death and rebirth will be endless. On the other hand, he himself suggests in his *Some Dogmas of Religion* that "it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself, and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change." In this eventuality we come back to the Absolute again, and McTaggart's system defeats its own purpose. The possibility of ego-differentiations merging again into a perfection transcending time and change must be counteracted, however remote it may be. And this can be done only by taking immortality as a hope, an inspiration, a duty, and not as an eternal fact.

My heart burns on the loneliness of God !
In order, therefore, to maintain intact His Ego-
Society,
I sow in my dust the seed of self-hood,
And keep a constant vigil over my 'I.'¹

¹ *New Garden of Mystery.*

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بال جبریل (طبع اول)

جاوید نامہ (طبع اول)

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
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