<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Iqbal Review (April 1988)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editor</td>
<td>Mirza Muhammad Munawwar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Iqbal Academy Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDC (Iqbal Academy)</td>
<td>8U1.66V12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>14.5 x 24.5 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSN</td>
<td>0021-0773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects</td>
<td>Iqbal Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IQBAL CYBER LIBRARY**

(www.iqbalcyberlibrary.net)

Iqbal Academy Pakistan
(www.iap.gov.pk)

6th Floor Aiwan-e-Iqbal Complex, Egerton Road, Lahore.
# Table of Contents

**Volume: 29**  
**Iqbal Review: April 1988**  
**Number: 1**

1. PHILOSOPHY OF MAN ................................................................. 4  
2. THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY ........................................... 17  
3. RELIGIO - PERFECTUS AS THE ONLY PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS ............. 29  
4. HOW DOES PHILOSOPHY HELP SCIENCE? ........................................ 40  
5. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IQBAL ............................................. 47  
6. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF ISLAMIC RESURGENCE .......................... 60  
7. HAFIZ SHIRAZI AND BENGAL ...................................................... 81  
8. IS A LEARNED MAN NECESSARILY EDUCATED? ............................... 92  
9. MOORE ON COMMONSENSE ................................................................ 102  
10. MASS COMMUNICATION AND THE TECHNICALIZATION OF MUSLIM SOCIETIES ................................................................. 110  
11. IQBAL AND THE SAUDI SCHOLARS ............................................ 122  
12. ALLAMA IQBAL’S POETIC STYLE AND DICTION IN PERSIAN ............ 131  
13. MIRROR OF TE INTELLECT ........................................................... 141  
14. ALLAMA IQBAL – REFUSING TO BE CALLED A POET ....................... 164  
15. CRITIQUE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY ........................................ 188  
16. THE SPIRITUAL DIMENSIONS OF ISLAM ......................................... 204
“Man” seems to have been quite a neglected subject in the history of Western philosophy; more attention has been paid to God and universe than to man. Though there are many reputable histories of the specific branches of philosophy; and even of some of its special subjects such as logic ethics, aesthetics, politics, law and history, a “history of the philosophy of man” has yet to be written and even yet to be conceived. True “man” has sometimes been discussed as a part of this or that theory or system in ethics, politics or education, but such subsidiary discussions by their very nature remain controlled by the requirements and presuppositions of a particular theory or system.

All this strikes rather ironical in view of the fact that, to the great Socrates; first of the founders of Western philosophy, the central theme of philosophy was not the world, but man. Socrates’ deep concern for the well-being of man makes him look like a prophet moving amongst the Greeks. In the celebrated Platonic Dialogue; the Apology, Socrates is reported to have gone to God, only to be graced with a special message for his fellow men. This Divine message exhorted the Athenians to “take the greatest possible care of their souls and not to ruin their lives by letting the care of the body and of the “possessions” take precedence over the good of the soul. Nay, they must make their souls as good as possible, making them like God”.

Socrates is, however, better known to us for his detailed and meticulous analyses of the moral qualities of man; such as justice, goodness, courage, temperance and so on. But what is more important for us to note here is the woeful fact that nowhere in ‘all the twenty-eight platonic Dialogues, we find Socrates giving as a definition of man. Perhaps even for Socrates, man was too much of a mystery, and a veritable riddle to be comprehended through a philosophical definition.
Both Plato and Aristotle, after Socrates, ventured to give us definitions of man; but these definitions, with due deference to these two great masters, unfortunately, are no longer tenable on empirical grounds. Plato’s definition of man as a political animal, perhaps, reflects only the intensely political atmosphere of the city-states of his days. We in our own days know fully well that man in the pre-literate and primitive societies has neither state nor politics. Aristotle’s definition of man as a social animal, very sadly, casts a slur on his otherwise well-established reputation as “the founder of a systematic and comparative Zoology”. Sociability cannot be said to be the real hallmark of man to distinguish him from the animals. Some of the animals, at quite a lower rung of the evolutionary ladder, manifest as much sociability in their behaviour as man. The social insects like termites, ants, bees and wasps live in colonies and give clear evidence of group-integration and division of labour; they have their kings and queens and workers and soldiers much as the human beings have.

The definition of man as a rational animal not only carries the formidable authority of Aristotle but also the weight of a long tradition running throughout the ages. This definition of man, to my mind, is more prescriptive than descriptive. It exhorts man to think rationally rather than describe the fact of man’s actually thinking rationally. But it is an imperative or a command, and a good command indeed but for that very reason not a definition. It may be insisted that Aristotle, in his definition has made an empirical statement of the kind that man by virtue of the quality of rationality (differentia) inherent in him, always thinks rationally. In that case this definition is not satisfactory, because it is an incomplete definition which has taken “rationality” as the sole distinctive quality of man as it differentiates him from the animals. There are, however, other similar unique qualities of man differentiating him from the animals, which have been completely bypassed in Aristotle’s definition—qualities, for example, of artistic imagination and numinous sense of the presence of the Divine to all things. Aristotle’s definition could give us only a fragmented man as if a featherless biped.

Aristotle’s definition of man in terms of genus and differentia, Plato’s in terms of the tripartite division of the soul, and the great scholastic philosophers’ in terms of the indivisible soul-substance which does nothing to us nor we do anything to it; all of them seem to be some of the blind
alleys in the history of philosophy. These definitions, however, are not altogether meaningless; in any case they are better than Cartesians’ definition of man as an assembled organic machine ready to run, or behaviourists’ definition of him as a toy in the Watsonian box mercilessly caught between the stimuli and the responses. Classical philosophers’ definitions or conceptions of man are to be construed not through the detailed analyses of their philosophical terms but through a close and deep understanding of their whole philosophical perspective. In case their definitions continue to remain unacceptable to us, even then we are to change not the definitions but the philosophical perspective from which these definitions have emerged. This is much like moving from the geocentric perspective to the heliocentric perspective in astronomy. But the change of a perspective in philosophy, as in other domains of human knowledge, usually entails a change in the methods of its study, like, for instance, studying the moon, through a telescope and studying it by landing on its surface, or more precisely, as Max Weber puts it, like studying the cultural phenomena through the usual methods of scientific explanation and studying them through the method of “interpretative understanding”.

Quite a few new perspectives in philosophy and even the new methods of their study came to be keenly discussed and elaborated in some of the major universities in Germany such as Munich, Hamburg and Berlin, somewhere in the 1020’s. Some of these new perspectives or branches of philosophy and their methods may be roughly translated in English as: “Philosophy of Life”, “Study of the Human Sciences”, “Study of the Cultural Sciences”, “Method of Spiritual Interpretation”, Method of understanding (verstehn) in Human Sciences”, and “Method of Phenomenology”.

From the very titles of these new branches of philosophy, it becomes clear that they especially focus their attention on man. The method, that the proponents of the new sciences of philosophy employ in the study of man is a highly technical affair; broadly speaking, it may be characterized as an empirical method of the highest order. From the new undertakings and preoccupations of some of the distinguished German philosophers in the new philosophy, there emerged quite a few new disciplines such as a “Philosophy of Culture”, “Philosophy of Symbolism”, “Biographical Studies” and “Philosophy of the Human Sciences”. Among them was also
the philosophy of man as a very specialized and independent discipline; named as Philosophical Anthropology or Anthropological Philosophy. By 1940 there were quite a few chairs for philosophy of man in some of the renowned universities in Germany. After World War II interest in this discipline spread to Holland and France. Soon after it had its impact felt in the United States; possibly through the influence of the most distinguished German philosopher, Ernest Cassirer, who after having left Germany in 1933 had taught at Oxford and later chaired the Departments of Philosophy, at the universities of Yale and Columbia. He is perhaps the only German Philosopher to have been admitted to the distinction of the library of living philosophers.

Without any pretentions to originality the philosophers of man have acknowledged their great indebtedness to many of the philosophers of the past; notably to Blaise Pascal, Goethe, Kant, Herder, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, Nietzsche. They have drawn their greatest inspiration, however, from the works of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911); one of the greatest philosophers of history and culture. Dilthey is noted for his thoroughgoing empiricism and for the encyclopedic range of his academic interests. The most singular of his contributions to philosophy, however, is his construction of a new methodology for philosophy, and a Dew science of interpretation (Hermenutics) for the study of human sciences (Geisteswisseschaften). He is reported to have worked on these major preoccupations of his for forty years. Dilthey’s works, prepared by a team of editors, have appeared in eighteen volumes with more to follow. A six-volume English translation of his selected works is being published by Princton University since 1984.

Among the writers; specifically on the “philosophy of man” in Germany, by far the most active of its exponents, is Max Scheler whose work Man’s Place in Nature (Die Stellung des Mensehen in Kosmos. 1928) is perhaps the first ice-breaker. Scheler was also the first to employ an independent method of phenomenology to the study of religion. He, however, is better known in the Anglo-Saxon world for his pioneer work on Sociology of Knowledge, the great merit of which has been recognized by th Max Weber and Karl Mannheim.
Ernest Cassirer, generally known to us for being one of the earliest writers on Einstein’s Theory of Relativity (1921), is in fact the most distinguished philosopher of symbolism. His very original theory of symbolism as exhibited variously in science, art, religion, myth and language, is elaborately expounded in his three-volume work: Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: (Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen, 1923-1929). This theory has given the new philosophy of man a firm empirical base; it has also given to it a definitive starting point. Man, according to Ernest Cassirer, is essentially a symbolizing animal. It is man’s unique ability to use symbols, or in the language of the Quran, the ability to name things that differentiates man from the pre-human animals.

It is through this unique ability to use symbols that man learnt to assign to objects, persons and advents certain meanings such as could not at all be grasped through the sensations. So long as man did not become aware of symbols, he remained at a level of mental existence in which the world was dark and opaque and meant nothing. But the moment man started using symbols he was, as if through a magic wand, awakened to a new mode of consciousness; the consciousness of meanings. Man’s awareness of, so to say, capturing the things by assigning meanings to them through the use of symbols, lifted him literally to a new dimension of human existence. This exaltation of man to a new level of existence, verily because of his ability to use symbols; is referred to in the Quran i.e. verse: when Adam exhibited the ability to name things-- and this was beyond the angel’s spiritual dimension--angels prostrated themselves before him. It is interpreted sometimes to mean that it is verily through his ability to use words that man came to have a mysterious sway over everything that he touched or looked at.

In the symbolic’ comprehension of meanings, the words dog, rat, rabbit, are not merely sounds but meaningful sounds. The meanings, however, are not inherent in the sounds (or in the shapes or the configurations of the letters in case of written words) as such, but are arbitrarily or conventionally assigned to them by human beings. The point to be noted here is that, in an articulate speech, the sensory sounds of the words have no intrinsic relations to the meanings intended by the speaker; sounds or patterns of sounds are used
merely as symbolic instruments or vehicles for the meanings. This explains very largely that though the anthropoid apes, in the so-called great-ape-language-experiments, usually succeed in picking up short series of single words, they utterly fail to develop a sense of “contextual” relevance of words as also to acquire the ability to link the words syntactically or as the experimenters put it: “Apes are complete blank in grammar.”

How and when did man learn to use symbols or words continues to remain an open question. Plato was perhaps the first to broach the subject of the origin of language in his Dialogue The Cratylos. His discussion of the matter, however, was inconclusive as also were the speculative theories of many classical philosophers who ventured into unravelling the mystery of language. Inquiries into the origin of language are now quite out of fashion with the modern philosophers and linguists.

We must, however, note here the position on this issue taken by Edward Burnett Tylor. He was, admittedly, one of the most distinguished of the British anthropologists. He tells us that “at some point in the evolution of primates, a threshold was reached in some line, or lines, when the ability to use symbols was suddenly realized and made explicit in overt behaviour. There is no intermediate stage, logical or neurological, between symbolling and non-symbolling: an individual or a species is either capable of symboling or he or it is not. “ All that Tylor means to tell us here is that the ability to use symbols emerged through a kind of mysterious leap and is not the product of gradual and continuous process of evolution. This is clearly indicated by the, expression “suddenly realized” in the above passage. Instead of openly confessing his ignorance on the issue of the origin of symboling, i.e., language, Tylor seems here to cloak this ignorance by using the doubtful and debatable doctrine of leaps or jumps so popular with the Emergent and Creative Evolutionists. If both philosophy and science fail us in this matter, why not then accept the view given in the Scriptures that man learnt the names of things from God Himself and call it the divine theory of language. Even as scientists we are not to say that there are only perceptual symbols and completely ignore a whole class of symbols called the religious symbols. The religious symbols constitute a peculiar language of their own which is quite as meaningful as scientific language; only like the language of
art, it has its own unique method of interpretation or in Dilthey’s words a unique Hermenutics.

Having acquired the capacity to use symbols a bit more freely and having built up a sizable working lexicon of these symbols, man started his journey away from the physical world (merely a sensory world of the animals), created by the Lord, to a non-physical world, created by man himself as the Deputy of the Lord. Very briefly this new world of the Deputy is the world of, meanings and values; giving a broad classificatory description of it, it is the world of language, myth, art, religion, philosophy, and science. It is however more convenient to call it the world of culture. It is to be noted here that animals cannot possibly be admitted to man’s world of culture as earlier they could not be admitted to man’s world of symbols. Culture and symbols indeed are like soul and body to each other. Hence it would not be inappropriate to say that culture, born of the inmost passions of man’s psyche or spirit (Geist), always manifests itself in and through the dress of symbols. Much more important, however, is the fact that it is only through its symbolic dress that culture receives a tangible form so that it can be safely stored in libraries, galleries, museums, and places of worship. Soon, culture assumes a personality of its own, independent of man, its creator. It then begins to move from generation to generation, and from epoch to epoch and manages to stalk in man’s history as a power by itself. Culture thus comes to change its position with man and claims to be creator of man.

The way culture is transmitted from one generation to another is the most wondrous of all the cultural phenomena. Nietzsche observed in his usual inclisive way that culture could be possessed by man alone for man alone is born as an unfinished animal. The human infant as compared to the infants of other animals is biologically much less formed as if it were born premature and certainly it is too much of a weakling to face the slightest blows of nature. Moreover this creature has to go a long way before it can lay claims to be on its own - if ever it would! On the other hand the parents of this weakling are irresistibly attracted to it and extend to it the most affectionate care and love. The weakling’s helplessness for a long - stretched period of its infancy and the corresponding intense attachment of the parents (particularly of the mother) are some of the important constituents of a new phase of the human weakling’s life. This phase has been termed as the second gestation or
the extra-uterine gestation. It seems as if the infant at the time of its birth was released from the biological confines of the mother only to be thrown into the socio-cultural confines of the world. It has sometimes been said that most human animals move from the confines of one shell into those of another and never really are born, unless, of course, if they are helped through some kind of cultural maieutics or spiritual midwifery.

It is a well-known fact that a child learns his native language in the shortest possible span of time. By the age of six and even five most children would have learnt not only more than 90% of the basic vocabulary of their language but also its grammar, the correct form of its a lot of idioms, the right pronunciation, the proper accent or intonation, the appropriate choice of words to be addressed variously to parents, a sibling, a playmate, or a servant. This is amazing! How does the child learn all this? ‘I he simple and perhaps correct answer is: The child learns all this through its skin. The child starts being sensitized right from the early days of its birth by a deeply emotionalized inter-personal involvement with a number of persons around it. The most important of these persons, of course, is the mother who starts teaching the child a new scheme of conditioned reflexes, soon to be developed into an elaborate system of symbols, not merely through the words of mouth but also through the soft and warm touches of her body, her hugs, her fondlings, her caresses, and her one and hundred kisses. The language as if it were, was being injected into the child. As the child grows up through boyhood and adolescence right into adulthood this language stays with him and becomes the veritable part of his personality. It would not be for wrong to assert that the child gets enclosed for ever within the shell of its native language which it cannot possibly break through - unless it chances to be a Ghalib or an Iqbal.

It is exceedingly important to note here that the child imbibes its native culture through the same emotionally sensitized, subjectivized, internalized way as becomes available to it in learning the native language. Culture and language (scheme of symbols) are so closely tied to each other that it is well-nigh impossible to imagine a culture without its peculiar language; nor is it possible to think of a language without its culture. To have a language without a culture is tantamount to having words without meanings, which makes no sense. Thus child’s learning its native culture, and its learning the
native language are not two processes but one in which the two are interwined with each other for their very existence. Some leading modern psychologists, however, are of the view that the child learns the whole value and belief-system embodied in its culture much quicker than he learns the language. The process of imbibing the culture they hold is comparatively more sensitized, more subjectivized and more internalized; than that learning the language. Language on the other hand, is a bit more of a cognitive and schematic affair. Language further has more of an instrumental value to serve as a symbolic medium, while culture carries all the intrinsic meanings and values which are closest to the child’s heart. The child internalizes all the cultural meanings and values of his milieu and they become real powerful ingredients of his personality. In other words the child gets snugly enclosed in a fully fortified, double-walled shell of language and culture for the rest of his life. The notion of the second, i.e., the socio-cultural gestation of man is, thus, not to be labelled a mere speculation of the philosophical anthropologists but a doctrine well-rooted in the empirically grounded evidence.

The above process of acculturation through which every human child has to pass has led some American psychologist, notably Benedict Ruth and Margaret Mead, to advance their doctrine of cultural determinism. According to this doctrine, even though individuals think that they make personal choices, at least, in such trivial matters as buying an article of clothing or eating or not eating a particular food in the restaurant, their choices are, in fact, fully determined by the socio-cultural milieu in which they have been brought up. However bleak, gloomy or disheartening by this view of stark determinism might be, it is not easy to refute it. It carries weight in so far as it explains some important socio-cultural phenomena. Take, for instance, the strifes and conflicts between socio-cultural groups, small or big, belonging to this or that piece of land, in the south or the north, in the east or the west, subscribing to this or that religious view or ideological shibboleths. These social psychologists and culturologists tell us, are very largely due to the fact that the socio-political behaviour of the individuals and more particularly of their leaders is determined in the final analysis by the forces residing within their respective socio-cultural shells.
Cultural determinism as viewed by Ruth and Mead and even as conceived earlier by the behaviourists, the psycho-analysts and the historical materialists poses a real serious challenge to any philosophy of man. Philosophers like Dilthey and Scheler, however, insist that the solution to this apparently impossible problem is not theoretical but entirely practical and experiential. Culture, according to them, owes its origin, essentially to the extraordinary experiences and arduous creative work of the great prophets, the great artists, and the great philosophers and other great geniuses who have given new meanings and new dimensions to human life. These torch-bearers of life cannot be said to be passive product of socio-cultural forces of their milieu. The very fact that they have the capacity to take these socio-cultural forces into their own hand and direct them into new channels in the light of their Geist falsifies any such view. Dilthey, however, goes farther and urges us to absorb and internalize the extraordinary experiences of these humanaries of humanity to the best of our abilities; so that these may be re-lived to the maximum possible extent in our own humble souls, Thus alone shall we be born again and be released from the bondage of cultural determinism. This is, however, by no means, an easy, affair. Nevertheless, it is a real uphill task. It may be recalled that Dilthey worked for full forty years on the sciences of human spirit (Geisteswissenscha ften ); then he could arrive at their methodology.

This is a methodology, primarily, about transferring or transmitting the experiences of the great founders of human culture to the generality of mankind. Among other things, Dilthey has insisted on the experiential rather than the barely intellectual or academical interpretations (Hermeunities) of the great texts. It is through the former type of interpretation alone that we are enabled to have true intuitive comprehension (Verstehn) of the inner import of these texts. It is heartening to note that Allama Iqbal has advocated a method for the comprehension of the text. of the Quran which is almost identical with that of Dilthey. The Allama says in his Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam: “No understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet”.

This most remarkable statement, unique in the history of Islamic thought, is to be found in the opening’ passage of Lecture VII of the Reconstruction, a,
lecture addressed originally to the very learned audience of the Aristotelian Society in London (on the 5th of December, 1932). Though the Allama has ascribed this statement to an unnamed Muslim Sufi (sic), I, on the basis of my study of the Reconstruction and experience of expounding its text to a few generations of students for the last more than 20 years, beg to differ with him and aver that the said statement is positively his own. The Allama has ascribed it to an unknown Sufi, to my mind, only because he had great misgivings about the way it might be received by the traditional scholars of Islam.

Let me add that the statement is purely prescriptive and not descriptive in the usual sense; it does not refer to a fact, here a credal fact, i.e., a belief; it only exhorts us to do something in a certain way if we want to have a desired end. So, as a prescriptive statement, it strongly recommends to us a method for the true comprehension of the meanings of the Quran. It tells us that a true believer must so deeply interiorize the meanings of the Holy Book that he starts almost re-living certain “experiences” on account of which, these meanings were comprehended by or revealed to the Prophet. Thus, the reference here is essentially to a spiritual process or method through which alone (and the true believers have no choice in this matter) a true believer would comprehend the meanings of the Quranic text closest possible to the comprehension of the Prophet. This perhaps is the only, though very arduous, way of deepening or intensifying our Islamic consciousness. The statement, however, is open to the misinterpretation that in so far as it recommends the believer to do something which is very close to Prophet’s very unique way of doing it, it implies or suggests that the believer is raised to the status of the Prophet - and this is sacrilegious. It is to be noted that the true believer’s being raised in his status is purely and entirely epistemic or experiential which is a blessing, not ontic, real, or actual which is impossible, or, as James Wards puts it, the most impossible of all things in the world. We cannot be a Plato or a Shakespeare, how can we be an Abraham, a Moses or a Muhammad? May God forgive us for any such thoughts.

At the time of writing Lecture VII which embodies the above statement, i.e., September 1932, the Allama was very busy and much preoccupied in so many things - Javid Nama was to come soon in December; in October he was to leave for Third Round Table Conference and so on. He did not want
to be disturbed just because the great traditional scholars would not renderstand him on an important academic statement of his; so in haste he foisted it on a Muslim Sufi. Please note the rather unusual expression “the Muslim Sufi”, most unexpected of Iqbal, as perfect a master of English diction- as that of Persian. “The Muslim Sufi”, as if there could be also Christian or Hindu Sufis, betrays the very divided feelings or moments of hesitation at the time of thinking of this expression and tacitly nodding to it: “Let it go!” He was keenly aware of the profound religious meanings embodied in the above statement but also painfully aware of the spiritual opacity of his co-religionists who might be displeased with it. He was divided between pleasing his co-religionists and pleasing himself. So he chose to father the statement on a “Muslim Sufi” he would not name, and thus please both himself and his brethren in faith - nobody would know that the “Muslim Sufi” was he himself.

It is generally narrated that somewhere in early November, 1933, on way back from Afghanistan Iqbal told Syed Sulaiman Nadvi that the Sufi referred to in the above statement was no other than his own father. The very fact that the name of the author of the statement “popped up” signifies that the statement must have struck the Syed extraordinary. More notable, however, is the fact that the great Syed accepted Iqbal’s assertion as it was and did not comment on it nor added anything to it - not even later. He did not say, for example: “I am so pleased to know this”. But my dear friend, it is nothing very original, it may as well be found in Ghazali, Rumi, Ibn Arabi, Jili, Mujaddid Alit Thani, or any name like them. It looks rather odd that the Iqbal scholars have quietly agreed to foist such an important and methodologically most significant statement on a Sufi, who never had any pretensions whatsoever in the Sufi-lore nor in the subtle and profound ways of the Sufis.

The fact that Iqbal himself was the author of the statement given in the Reconstruction gets fully corroborated by the following verse from the Bal-i-Jibril:

تیرے ظمیر پہ جہب تکک نہ پو نزول کتاب
Unless the Book’s each verse and part
Be revealed unto your heart
Interpreters, though much profound
Its subtle points cannot expound.

Not only is the Allama the only Muslim thinker to have clearly enunciated the above Diltheyian method but also the first to have practiced it in his expositions of the many passages of the Qur’an. I have the privilege of having paid special attention to this aspect of Allama’s Islamic, thought in my annotated edition of the Reconstruction; the matter however needs the very special attention of the experts in the Quranic exegesis.

In the conclusion I would like to say that Philosophy of man is highly disciplined endeavour aimed at the discovery of man in the manifestations of his spirit at its peaks as these are embodied in the celebrated texts of the great prophets, the great poets and the great philosophers which texts are to be re-lived anew in every age through an interpretative method as recommended by philosophers like Dithery and Iqbal.
The problem of personal identity in life after death continues to attract serious consideration in the contemporary Western philosophy of religion. It is intriguing, however, to find that the issue has elicited very little attention in the Islamic philosophical tradition. This is especially so in view of the importance this problem received in the Holy Quran. Neither the Muslim theologians nor the philosophers (with few exceptions, of course) have cared to give a systematic account of the issue in the light of intellectual development of their time. The situation becomes serious when the modern Muslim is forced to face the challenge of recent Western discoveries in this field.

In the West the issue has been formulated in the following way: Does the death of the body destroy the person or does he survive (for a limited or unlimited period) as a continuing self, as a resurrected person either in physical or spiritual form? In other words the problem is that of the continuation or otherwise of the individual personality which can be identified after death. Here, the concept has been treated in a typically materialistic way with the assumption that the old mind-body problem can be resolved in such an interpretation. The identity-thesis is accepted to allow for the existence after death in some form of distinct mental processes, but these are nonetheless bound up with ‘this’ body or identical with it in the last analysis. What is involved here is the apparent causal dependence of mind over body and the logical indispensability of the body for a possible account of our continuous identity. In the more recent scholarship, body has assumed still greater importance for continuous personal identity.

But, is there an agreed criterion of personal identity? John Hick has mentioned previous-life memories, bodily continuity and psychological continuity of a pattern of mental dispositions. Thomas McPherson also points to memory and physical continuity (continuity in space and time). “At
a point we are to decide when we definitely have, or when we definitely have not, a case of ‘the same person’ in advance in general terms; but we may at least be certain that in trying to settle a difficulty of this kind we must appeal to this particular criterion.”[2] Taking as an instance George Samsa’s transformation into a strange monster from Kafka’s Metamorphosis, he concludes that in the case of death we undergo an altogether total change. Arguing from monistic theory of Mind/Body/Brain identity, he comes to believe in a total annihilation of the person in the event of death.

How does this criterion of personal identity fare in our normal life? When we say an old man is the same person as the baby born fifty years ago, we believe that the old man has material continuity with the body. Of course, material continuity establishes a one-one relationship --- and that is what Peter Geach seems to require to “rightly identify a man living ‘again’ with a man who died.[3]” For him, personal identity depends not on material ‘identicality’ but on material continuity which may not be much different from similarity.

In this context, Williams suggests that ‘same memories’ should be understood as a claim of exact similarity; but this is not a claim of identity. He says: “The only case in which identity and exact similarity could be distinguished.... is that of the body ---’same body’ and ‘exactly similar body’ really do make a difference. Thus I should claim that the omission of the body takes away all context from the idea of personal identity.”[4] So, the upshot of Geach’s argument cited earlier is that unless a man comes to life again by resurrection he does not live again.

Another forceful attack against the idea of life after death has come from the philosophers of language. As long ago as 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein made a remark about logical peculiarities of the concept ‘death’. “.... in death ... the world does not change but ceases. Death is not an event in life. Death is not lived through.”[5] Later critics of the calibre of Moritz Schlick and more recently A.G.N. Flew have come to the conclusion that the suggestion that we survive death is self-contradictory. Their theses. however, are not primarily concerned with the question of meaning. W.H. Poteat has made an attempt to bring out the meaning of concept ‘death’ by linguistically analyzing it with reference to ‘self ’ Or ‘I’. [6]
Poteat begins with the hypothesis that ‘death’ in certain of its commonsensually acceptable uses is a logically extended use and is hence an eschatological concept; and that ‘I’ when it is linked with ‘death’ in this logically extended use is also logically extended, and hence may be thought of as a kind of meta-concept; and finally that these logically extended concepts require and therefore legitimize and properly function within the structure of what he calls ‘myth’. Making it a point of departure that the verb ‘to die’ cannot be meaningfully conjugated in the past tense first person singular (I died); or if it is it cannot be used; he infers that empirical statements about the death of a self involves in certain circumstances a logically extended though commonsensical meaningful use.

Another recent trend is to reinterpret the concept ‘immortality’ in a sense confined to the kind of life a person is living. The exponent of this approach is D.Z. Phillips. His attempt, in essence, is to avoid the real issue of personal survival after death in the belief of immortality. “... it would be foolish to speak of eternal life as some kind of appendage to human existence, something which happens after human life on earth is over.” He goes on: “Eternity is not an extension of this present life, but a mode of judging it. Eternity is not more life, but this life seen under certain moral and religious modes of thought” As far as religious mode is concerned “eternal life for the believer is participation in the life of God.” in the light of his relationship to “beliefs in the iri Fatherhood and Love of God.” Here, the immortality of the soul refers to the “state an individual is in relation to the unchanging reality of God. It is in this way that the notions of the immortality of the soul and eternal life go together.”

It is in the face of this contemporary attitude towards the concept of immortality that the Islamic view has to be evaluated. The Quranic picture of personal immortality can be roughly drawn up as follow: God created man from earth, into it shall he return and from it shall he be brought out again. There shall be an interval (Barzakh) for everyone after death till the day of Resurrection when the dead shall be raiseod up again. As God produced the first creation so shall he create again? Every resurrected person shall remember his past deeds. Anyone who will have done an atom of evil shall see it. They shall also be able to recognize one another, though each will have too much concern of his own to be able to be of help to others.
In other words death leads to destruction of this body but the soul survives. It stays at the stage of Barzakh (interval) till it is resurrected with a new body. So, our present body is perishable while the soul lives for ever, projected in the form of a different body. This view is reinforced by tying it up with moral justification of human actions. It may be pointed out here that beliefs in life after death and consequently, reward and punishment, do indeed give a new perspective to life and a new meaning to one’s conception of moral values. What is more, it provides a quite realistic idea of man’s unique individuality which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another. His reward and punishment follow the mode of his action.

Such a view of personal immortality, no doubt, invites all sorts of criticism from positivists as well as linguistic philosophers. As pointed out by Sidney Shoemaker,[11] the view of immortality as an embodied existence is liable to more serious objections than the dualistic one. This prospect encouraged some Muslim theologians and philosophers to interpret Quranic verses in such a way as to deny the possibility of embodied existence in life after death. They stressed metaphorical and symbolic language of the Quran which according to them should not be taken literally. They also denied the physical nature of Hell and Heaven and conceived them as states of man’s soul (mind). Al-Ghazali stands out among those who challenged these philosophers and tried to maintain the original meaning of the Quranic verses without becoming too literal. But his main work is not concerned with the problem of personal immortality as such. The early Muslim thinkers, under the influence of Greek rationalism, appear to have stretched symbolic meaning of the Quran to an extent which the revealed book itself refuses to accept. They failed to appreciate that attributes of God, the truth of revelation, the angels, resurrection, paradise, hell, etc. are not meant to be brought into the realm of demonstrable truth. We can only reconstruct the picture of these ‘realities’ by remaining within the perspective suggested by the Holy Quran.

It is, of course, easier to give an account of personal immortality on the basis of disembodied existence (as does Iqbal, a contemporary interpreter of Islam). For him, “to exist in pure duration is, to be a self and to be a self is to be able to say ‘I am’.”[12] ‘Continuous and increasing tension to receive and interpret fresh stimuli is its vital characteristic. It is this state of tension which
makes the self immortal. For Iqbal the self is the criterion or standard of personal identity which has to maintain itself in a constant state of tension to attain immortality. “I regard immortality as an inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego” So, personal immortality is not a state but a continuous process. Yet “… when the ‘I’ ripens into a self, It has no danger of dissolution”  

For Iqbal, “it is the ego’s effort to be something that he discovers his final opportunity to sharpen his objectivity and acquire a more fundamental ‘I am’…”  

What does Iqbal mean by ‘I am’? Is his ‘ego’ the ‘self’ (mot) of Descartes by which ‘I am is what I am’? Not precisely. For Iqbal, unlike Descarte, is also concerned with the survival of consciousness and he cannot be subjected to exactly the same criticism that is applied to Cartesian dualism. While it is very difficult to find any principle of individuation in Descartes, this is not the case with Iqbal whose position is rather similar to that of Fichte. He seems to be saying: “The ego posits originally and simply its own being,” but for him ego’s act, though affirming himself, does not make him subject and object at the same time.  

Iqbal’s use of ‘I’ like Fichte’s seems to suffer from a certain grammatical confusion. The question is largely that of meaning. The word ‘I’ cannot possibly be employed in the -sense of a name representing a particular person. The ‘I’ in Iqbal’s ‘I am’ cannot be said to refer to something particular. But, can this purpose be served by converting ‘I’ into ‘it’ as Russell does. For him, since ‘I think’ creates problems, it is in the fitness of things to say that ‘It thinks in me’ just as we say ‘it rains here’. As Vesey points out: “The, word ‘I’ is no more used to name a person than the word ‘here’ used to name a place.” It is much more informative to say that ‘John thinks’ as does ‘It rains in London.’ Hence, self-identification in the sense of I am’ itself is illusory and cannot give meaning to view of personal immortality.  

Another difficulty arises when Iqbal accepts immortality “as a fact among other facts.” This claim takes him into the manifold problems of verifying and testing of religious statements. These apparently unsurmountable difficulties remain unsolved even in Hick’s peculiar notion of ‘verification in
principle’ who says: “What we rightly seek, when we desire the verification of a factual proposition, is not a demonstration of the logical impossibility of the proposition being false (for this would be a self-contradictory demand), but such weight of evidence as suffices, in the type of case in question, to exclude rational doubt.”[21]

What is actually meant by ‘testability in principle’? Broadly speaking whatever one person claims to know through non-sensory perception can be tested by someone else who has developed the faculty to a certain degree. It is claimed by Lesser that practical limits of such a testability are no greater than those encountered in testing scientific observation and ordinary perception.[22]

But while stressing that the check is possible in principle he fails to take account of differences of opinion among the recipients of such knowledge and the small number of people claiming such knowledge. This fact puts severe constraints on the degree of probability achieved through such tests.

Even if one were to believe that the demand for testability in principle is met in Hick’s argument, it does not follow that any mental life there might be left over after one’s bodily death would be sufficient for personal identity. For, if the ‘post-mortem’ existence is to be counted as personal, it will involve embodiment of some kind or other. For, a human personality conceived of as completely disembodied would obviously lack the social experiences (as understood in this life) necessary for maintaining individual personality.

Hick’s main argument boils down to the claim that the notion of having experiences in a resurrected body existing in a desperate realm of space is an empirically meaningful notion. But the problem is, as pointed out by Edwards, whether the notion is empirically meaningful now.[23] And the answer is obviously in the negative if Hick is to maintain his overall position. As Edwards puts it: “The difficulty is that the verifying experience could be had only then, whereas the problem to which Hick addresses himself is whether assertions about then are empirically meaningful to us now. Since verifying experiences are available only then, presumably we must conclude that the whole matter is meaningless to us now.”[24] For Hick must “already make reference to the very conceptions whose factual intelligibility is in question.”[25]
Similarly, Iqbal’s quest to put revelation to the test of reason operates on a rather weak ground. His application of intellectual and pragmatic tests to religious assertions do no more than to point out different meanings attached to religious concepts. Same is the case with many other Muslim rationalists who have tried to bring about harmony between reason and revelation.: Iqbal, I however, appears to have realized the impossibility of his position and in his later works laid greater stress on the non-rational character of religion.

The Holy Quran supports the view that statements about life after death are not empirically verifiable now but refuses to suspend judgment on this crucial matter. It is considered within the purview of God’s unlimited powers to effect, then, a new creation continuous with We created you. Will ye then admit the truth? Have ye seen that which ye emit? Do ye create it or are we the Creator?

We mete out death among you, and we are not to be outrun, that we may transfigure you (change you’re Form) and make you what ye know not.

And verily ye know the first creation.”

(LVI: 57-62)

But, is the phenomenon of life after death not meant to be perceived now? The occurrence is to take place then and normal criteria of verification cannot be applied now. Then, is Quranic concept of the Hereafter based on a mystery beyond the grave? This is, however, not the case. For, according to the Holy Quran, life after death has its beginning in this life though peculiar circumstances of human life keep most people oblivious of this ‘fact’. One feature of resurrection is said to be a complete removal of this veil of ignorance, for human perception will then be clearer with no material limitations to obstruct it. Recent tests on people with near-death experiences seem to support this view.

There is, in the Holy Quran, an elaborate outline explaining its concept of immortality. It includes a stage by stage development of human personality as if it were going through a process of attitude formation. And the process is said to start in this earthly life. The Holy Quran speaks of the growth of
spiritual life as if it corresponds to the physical one in its developments. The stages of physical life are spoken of as (i) state of being in the earth; (ii) that of being in the mother’s womb, and (iii) one in which the child is born. On the spiritual side the growth starts while man is still bound by physical limits and at this level he remains more or less unconscious of this development. With death he enters the second stage, that of Barzakh and spiritual life takes a definite form with some sort of realization that a change has taken place. A final development is brought about with the resurrection when one attains a clear consciousness and a total awakening to ‘the great truth.’

This full awakening and complete consciousness is made the criterion of personal identity by the Holy Quran. Awakening to a new spiritual experience immediately after death, the evil doer as well as the righteous become conscious of fruits their actions in the first life are reaping. There are verses suggesting that the ‘dead’ are even conscious of what they have left behind, and this establishes some sort of link between the two ‘lives.’

This connection is emphasized by distinguishing between two types of resurrection---- the spiritual resurrection and the great Resurrection of the dead. The spiritual resurrection is spoken of as one brought about by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and seems to be put forth as an argument or evidence for the great Resurrection. The point is made clear by mentioning the ‘self-accusing soul’ which marks the first step towards spiritual development in man. For when evil is done without ‘the voice of conscience’ asserting itself, it is a sign that the man is spiritually dead.

So, the cause of immortality is taken up on the basis of its relevance to actual life we live. Assuming that life has a purpose and good and evil must have their reward, resurrection is made a workable principle of life. Indeed, it makes life a serious concern and conducive to unlimited capacities of man. At the same time it urges him on to a life higher and still higher. So, it is in the fitness of things that human actions in this life should be the basis of resurrected person’s identity.

It is made very clear in the Holy Quran that angels have been appointed to record the good and evil deeds of man:
Alike of you is he who hideth the saying and he who noiseth it abroad, he who lurketh in the night and he who Goethe freely in the daytime.

For him are angels ranged before him and behind him, who guard him by Allah’s command.

Lo! Allah changeth not the condition or a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts.”

(XIII: 10-11)

And again,

“Nay, but they deny the judgment.

Lo! there are above you guardians (angels), Generous and recording,

Who know all that ye do.”

(LXXXII: 9-12)

So, a sort of inner self --- a parallel form is being built all along man’s career in this world. It is this inner self constituting his deeds and recorded by ‘guardian angels’ that assumes a definite form after death and shapes first the body in barzakh and then develops into the body in Resurrection. There is nothing to suggest in the Holy Quran that the present impure body will continue to exist or be resurrected after death in the same form. It is clearly asserted, on the other hand that it will be a new creation, devoid of all carnal impurities. Yet, though ‘dust returns to dust’, there is with God a ‘writing’ that preserves that is essential to development in the next life.

Whether it is the same body or a new creation, it is not made the criterion of personal identity in life after death. Apparently, the outer self, the physical body, perishes in the event of death, while the inner self, the spiritual body lives on and forms the basis of the higher life in Resurrection. The inner self is, in effect, man’s ‘book of deeds’ which is sufficient to identify him in the hereafter:

“Read thy book (of our own record), Thy soul sufficeth as reckoner against thee this day.”
The book is the collective impression of deeds done by man in this life which is not perceptible to our physical senses but which does have a kind of reality. And the change affected through a special act of God at the time of resurrection shall render it clearly visible to man. That will form the basis of identification in the hereafter.

This well-argued case of personal immortality as presented by the Holy Quran may still be brought within the purview of what is called the empiricist objection of being beyond verification. How do we know that all this ‘plan’ is going to take a concrete shape? The Quranic answer to this objection is that certain things are ‘secrets’ that shall be made known only after death… ‘things which no eye has seen, nor has ear heard, nor have they entered into the heart of man’.

So, the question is that of making a vital decision on the basis of faith. It is a question of either/or. There is no solution of the problem, only a way out. That is, at least in the present state of our knowledge, to consider the idea of personal immortality as a matter of attitude. For, the alternatives do not lie just between some prolongation of this temporal life span and a temporally bounded life viewed from the timeless character of God’s eternity. It is a belief in life after death, both viewed as facts. To take the concept ‘resurrection’ as meaning anything else takes the whole context away from the real issue. It depends on personal faith of the individual to believe in personal immortality and accept the accompanying consequences of such a decision.

Notes and References

Note: For references to the Quranic verses, their translation and interpretation please see Abdullah Yusuf All and Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall.


[8] Ibid., p.49.

[9] Ibid., pp.54-55.

[10] Ibid., p.55.


[19] Ibid., p. 305.


Philosophia Perennis (or perennial philosophy) is defined as one with qualities which assures its survival through time and change, and, therefore, by generalization, a permanently significant philosophy. It must be universal and inclusive, internally coherent, fruitful of new insights and applications, and reasoned so conclusively that attacks cannot refute, and written and presented so convincingly that reasonable minds cannot resist it. It offers a unity which relates the total plurality, in particular the theoretical and practical concerns of knowledge, wisdom, and piety. It must present a theory so comprehensive as to apply not only to the entire work of human reason but also fulfils the demands of his emotional, volitional and spiritual life. Though based on certain basic and simple concepts it must have the potential of supplying new visions not only to the natural and social sciences, but to every aspect of human life and endeavour. It aims to work out a universal metaphysics of eternal truths which, in Kantian terminology, leads man to an apodeictic certainty in all sphere of life. Theoretically it should be so complete and of such sufficient detail as to guide all future, generations of mankind to successful action in the world and in the life hereafter; if such a one exists.

In this context a glance at the history of human thought would reveal that almost all great world thinkers and philosophers from antiquity down to our own times have, in one form or the other, expressed commitment to this supreme ideal of the philosophia perennis by attempting finality in their philosophical task. The towering metaphysical systems of philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel have all aimed to work for this ideal. By an exclusive reliance on the powers of reason they attempted to justify beliefs about the most universal and fundamental features of ultimate reality viz., truth, beauty and goodness, and explicated the ultimate meaning and purpose of all existence. All their endeavours testify that the human mind or reason has always aspired to transcend this world and moved towards an ultimate through a process of unification of the plurality of all
things. In their search for truth each, in his own way, has attempted to interpret the Universe, history and society in the light of this Absolute principle for the definitive resolution of man’s problems. When, by employment of allegedly true principles, they have arrived at valuable conclusions, these conclusions have been looked on as belonging to the philosophia perennis. Thus the history of man’s intellectual life is the history of his orientation towards this time transcendent absolute which has served as a regulative ideal to direct him in all spheres of his life.

A question may now be raised whether philosophers, from the times of Thales down to our own days, have actually succeeded in achieving this coveted ideal of the philosophia perennis. Unfortunately the history of man’s philosophic endeavour is the history of his failure to give to the world a coherent, comprehensive and 'practical system of knowledge possessing the quality of unity, adequacy and time-transcendence. Almost each one of them failed to give answer to the existentialists’ question of the why and wherefore of all things. Nor could they bring peace and repose to the world-weary soul of man. It is perhaps because of this reason that almost none of the leading world philosophers could make any significant impact on the society of his times nor could he win any large adherents to his views.

But this was not something quite unexpected and surprising. Because the limitations placed on the philosophers by virtue of the restricted horizon of their spatio-temporal existence, and the natural bounds of their knowledge, have served as the greatest stumbling block to any objective search for the philosophia perennis wherewith they could not only analyze the phenomenal world but could peep into noumena to bring order, peace and harmony to man’s earthly existence. They could hardly present any comprehensive system of thought and action which could provide guidelines for practical morality and a coherent social order. The ultimate goal of the philosophia perennis to bring meaning into things, or rather to reveal the meaning which underlies all things eluded their grasp. The existentialists’ problems of man’s radical insecurity, the problems of life and death, man’s redemption and eternal felicity, remained unresolved at their hands. No wonder, therefore, the philosophers having failed in their prime pursuit to lay bare the fundamental ontological structure of all things, of late, adopted the role of a philologist whose sole concern is clarification of the meaning of terms and
propositions, and dissipation of linguistic confusions. The original status of
the philosopher as the spectator of all times and existence, for which
Socrates and Plato laboured all their life, thus suffered a serious setback.

But it was bound to happen like that, for the simple reason that no man
including the philosopher can ever claim to be an external spectator of all
times and existence. Philosophers do not think in a void. They too are the
outcome of their own milieu and an integral part of the life of the
community in which they live. Each one of them thinks within the context of
a definite historical situation. He is only the interpreter of the time and place
in which he lives, and his thought an expression of the scientific, moral,
religious and social outlook of his age. Even his private life and personality
exercises a potential influence on his philosophy. He projects his own nature
into it and fashions reality after his own temperament. Each of these
philosophers tackled his subject matter from his particular angle and made
up his frame of reference accordingly. According to Bergson a true
philosopher says only one thing in his lifetime, because he enjoys one point
of contact with the real. Whatever variegation and richness a philosophic
mind may possess, however extensive its interests and research, there is
ultimately one cardinal insight that it achieves, one decisive illumination on
which everything turns and which is the philosopher’s claim to truth.

As a matter of fact to view things from a particular vantage point is a general
feature of our lives. The ancient Greek philosophers were, no doubt,
courageous seekers after truth, ready to follow an argument to its logical
conclusions wherever they might lead, but their complete faith in order,
beauty and harmony largely determined the direction of their thinking.
Values for them were likely to determine facts. Only if the individual himself
were outside existence then alone he could perhaps find an absolute point of
view. The impossibility of any metaphysical system is entirely on account of
our immersion in existence, and due to this immersion we may be confusing
our own conditioned point of view with the transcendental Infinite. The root
of the trouble is that we have here entered into a non-sensuous realm where
we do not belong, and where in the nature of the case, truth is not to be
attained by logic. “Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadow,
because they go beyond the limits of nature where there is nothing they can
lay hold of with their dogmatically grasp”. Thus any attempt to use
understanding in a transcendent way outside the bounds of sensibility or beyond our experience is doomed to futility, since in such a situation understanding would have no object and there would be nothing to understand.

But if we are interested in seeing things as they actually are we had to take a neutral stance, distanciate ourselves from all preconceptions and suspend all judgment.

One may here be tempted to believe that if the problems of ultimate reality and human existence transcend human faculties, would it not be better to confine ourselves to things not too high for us. However in view of the existentialist situation of man the questions themselves are very much real and are of vital concern to mankind. The human mind, at any rate, feels the urge to find an answer to them not simply for want of any intellectual satisfaction, but due to the practical exigencies of his given human situation. Were man purely an intellectual being, he would perhaps content himself with the fragments of knowledge which scientific research gathers together. But he is not merely an understanding but also a willing and feeling being. The questions of the ultimate destiny of man and the why and wherefore of all things always lurk within his soul.

Now, though man’s own conscience and Nature do provide an intuitive evidence of a Supreme being as creator of this Universe, sheer examination of these phenomena cannot lead us to a knowledge of the transcendental Absolute, its nature and attributes, what He wills us to do, what is the ultimate destiny of man, and wherein lies man’s eternal felicity. The Absolute may be self-revealing in Nature, and in man’s conscience, but in none of these phenomena His intentions and purposes are overwhelmingly manifest and unmistakable. He has therefore willy-nilly to rely on the powers of his reason.

But man being a finite creature is obviously nothing in comparison to an Eternal and Infinite Being. To conceive of an Infinite, Transcendental and Eternal Being, one must have experienced a consciousness outside of time. But how can man comprehend by reason, which by its unaided effort, is unable to attain even the simplest knowledge of the natural world, the most incomprehensible mysteries of this Infinite Being. In the twelfth century al-
Ghazali demonstrated most remarkably the inconsistency of all philosophic views about the nature of ultimate reality. Kant also finds rationalism profoundly wrong in supposing that knowledge, if it has any content, can be deduced straightaway from the laws of logic and other self evident truths alone, and proves that any attempt to construct a metaphysical system is bound to dissolve into antinomies.

Such great philosophers as Parmenides, Plato and Leibniz have succumbed to this difficulty and fallen into contradictions. Kant emphasized on the universal and necessary and the architectonic which underlies his critique no doubt, supposes the ideal of a philosophia perennis. But as an honest and straightforward thinker he too professed complete ignorance when he came to discuss the nature of the noumenal world. As a consequence he could not work out any eschatology, nor could he speak with certainty about the ultimate nature and destiny of man. And lastly the existentialists have forcefully demonstrated that the Absolute of reason as enshrined in their philosophical systems can have no relevance to existence. That is a figment or dream of their own making; it is indeed a deed, empty idol that has nothing to do with a true God, a shadow deity that displaces the true God whom men usually fear and adore, and which alone is the foundain-source of the philosophia perennis.

Can the problem of human knowledge and existence be broached from a different angle is there any other avenue, over and above reason and intellect, for our knowledge of God and Ultimate Reality. We have to examine whether mysticism can offer a clue to the knowledge of God and the understanding of human situation as claimed by the mystics. Does there exist in the human mind any direct faculty of religious knowledge which can form the foundation of a philosophia perennis, by which we are enabled to decide independently of any Revelation from God as to what is His true nature, and wherein lies the ultimate solution of man’s situation. It is sometimes argued that knowledge of divine matters and ultimate truths is intuitive and immediate and the organ of communication with God is one which transcends the methods and processes of logic and grasps 'reality in its totality and true perspective. A characteristic common to all mysticism is the identification of the personal self with the transcendent reality. The mystic,
we are told, lives in the full light of the vision; what others dimly seek he knows with a knowledge which is sure, immediate and in its pristine form.

Now it is obvious that much wisdom is to be learnt from the mystic way of life, and it may be commended as a pious and dignified attitude towards life. The reality and power of mysticism, which alerts us to the presently unknown depths of human consciousness, cannot be doubted. The mystic may grasp vividly in a sudden flash of insight what is laboriously sought and dimly seen by lesser mortals. The sense of union, sacredness and ineffable peace characterize all mystic experience. This is the gift which the mystic receives after long and austere exercises aimed towards the purification of the soul.

Having said this much we can now examine the claims of mystic experience as a genuine source of knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. Unfortunately the mystic inspirations and experiences are too various, too uncertain, and sometimes too bizarre in content, to form ground for our knowledge of reality. Again the mystic emphasis on the rare moments of religious exaltation tore religion out of the fabric of everyday life of man. We may grant that mystic experience is a unique experience and some men are either gifted or can acquire special aptitude or susceptibility for religious intuitions, but it would be suicidal to grant mystic experience an evidential status for its account of transcendental reality and its objective values. It can offer no solution to our problems of life and death import, and least of all, serve as basis for a philosophia perennis. Mystic experience, at its best, is coloured by the religious and cultural orientation of the individual mystic (who usually makes use of a vocabulary and imagery of his own particular tradition), and at its worst is the result of a pathological state of mind resulting in all sorts of aberrations and hallucinations. Being uncertain, available only to few and sporadic its claims cannot be checked in a way we usually check possible cases of illusory experiences, and there is hardly any criterion left between veridical and non-veridical experiences. Truth here is not a publicly verifiable property. Therefore, in the frantic search for truth the individual has still to be assisted by some other source of knowledge which may provide him with a criterion of certitude. Without such a criterion he may legitimately entertain grave doubts with regard to any experience or activity of life. And among these faculties, reason has to remain as one of the most important universal
factor. Devoid of reason the individual’s own inwardness and caprice become the lone focus of truth and all objective content tends to vanish, communication between man and man becomes impossible, and all social dimensions of life seem to be violently excluded. Reason being an unbiased search for truth, the demand for reason is the demand for coherence and consistency. The unthinking person is more vulnerable to uncertainties, confusion and mistake. Reason should therefore continue as the surest guide of our life in the phenomenal world. One can play false with reason only at his own peril.

We should however, be clear in our minds that reason is of two kinds (i) Scientific reason and (ii) Transcendental reason. Since the tools and methodology of scientific reason are analysis, observation, logical consistency inference and prediction, it is most suited in its application to the phenomenal world. Transcendental reason, on the other hand, is that faculty of the’ apprehension of truth where the whole personality of man, not only his perceptual, intellectual, emotional and E., volitional, but also his entire spiritual faculties (which Pascal called the reason of the heart) are inextricably involved. It is a tool for our understanding of transcendental and noumenal realities. But it is the methodological requirement of the human mind that scientific reason and transcendental reason instead of being mutually exclusive should jointly work in the search for Truth. And though our scientific reason might have closed all doors leading towards the noumenal world at least the door to the phenomenal order is still wide open to us. And history is one of the most important feature of this phenomenal order. It is history which can perhaps provide a guide to the ultimate questions of human concern. It would therefore, be a grave omission, not to say a dereliction of duty, if nothing whatever is said about t the philosophical problems raised by so remarkable a claim. History should rather be regarded as the completion of philosophy, and philosophical speculation may be thought profitable only so far as it becomes a historical insight. The study of history, however, should not simply be devoted to the life of kings and their dynasties but should accord primacy to the analysis and comprehension of human ideals and institutions, and the undercurrents of the long enduring spiritual life of man. Once studied with this frame of mind we find in history a succession of wonderful men (generally known as the prophets) who delivered to mankind a message which we feel to be self - consistent,
involving lofty principles about God, His nature, and about the nature and
destiny of man - a message which they declare to be derived not from their
own reasoning or speculation but from the Infinite Himself speaking to them
through the intermediary of creatures of celestial realm so intensely and so
clearly that there could be no possibility of any, mistake about it. These great
luminaries are clearly conscious of two distinct currents or forces working
within them - the current of their personal feelings and thoughts at the
human level, and the overmastering effulgence of divine revelation
possessing their minds through the intermediaries of celestial realm in such a
way that they become the mouthpiece and spokesmen of the Infinite - His
character and attributes, His will and purpose. The revelations of these
prophets removed the veil which due to the finitude of human intellect, as
we have already seen, had precluded all possibility of any communication
from a finite intelligence to an Infinite Mind. Therefore this initiative for
communication from the Infinite towards the finite was not only logically
conceivable but also essential which, instead of violating, augments and
supplements the light of reason and supplies satisfaction and response to its
urgent questions. It would have really been a tragedy if man’s salvation
depended on the knowledge of God and what He wills us to do, and truth of
God would have been conditioned by the higher intellectual power of
scholars and philosophical experts. It would therefore be the most urgent
demand of reason to examine objectively the credentials of this group of
men and the veracity of the messages that they convey. But once the veracity
of a prophet and his Revelation has been firmly established, his teaching
alone can serve as the superstructure of any viable system of philosophy or
the philosophia perennis. This unbiased search of a perfect religion would
really be a major human enterprise. However, not all claims to prophethood
or revelation can be accepted as true because there have been true and false
prophets as there have been true and false revelations in world history. Since
subjective certainty can never become a criterion of the truth of any religion,
the credential of all authorities to prophethood and his revelation should be
critically examined.

We now propose to show that religio-perfectus (a perfect religion) alone can
stand the rigours of the test of a philosophia perennis on the basis of our
incontrovertible criteria of scientific and transcendental reason. A complete
philosophy which goes beyond the traditional fields of knowledge
metaphysics, physics, ethics, political theory, to embrace all possible knowledge, and which can do it by a unitary and certain method of combining empirical content with logical order, can alone be presented by a perfect religion alone coming as it supposedly does from an Infinite source itself through a process of divine Revelation. In such a religion eternity and time come to a close contact, and there is no time/eternity antithesis. This ends all compartmentalization between the temporal and the eternal, the secular and the religions. Here the material world serves as a channel for communication with the spiritual. God and the world are not rivals, the world rather becomes a “vale for soul - making. In a perfect religion God should not be the God of soul but also of body, of science as well as of faith. Its ideal for the individual should not be a retreat from the world but to play a forceful moral part in it. Religious and moral behaviour forms a vital unity. Kierkegard wrongly assumed that the religious and ethical move in different directions. Soren broke off his engagement with Regina Oslen because he felt the necessity of surrendering the life of the world in order to dedicate himself to the life divine. In the religio perfectus on the other hand, God wants the individual to come to Him by means of the Reginas He Himself has created, and not by means of any renunciation. Its religious ideal is no retreat from the world. The world according to it, is not a Maya or an illusion, and life is not a dream. Its laws are the universal laws of God and the whole world is filled with his glory.

If religion makes such impractical demands on our life and environment which the majority of mankind cannot stand, and feel a burden, there is something wrong with that religion itself. The laws of a tore religion should be akin to the laws of nature which the human mind is prone to accept ‘a priori’.

The religion-perfectus presents a coherent and comprehensive system pervading both the mundane and the transcendental with elaborate doctrines about God, man, nature, creation, redemption, in such a way that solves all the enigmas of the phenomenal and the noumenal eixisterice without involving itself in the so called antinomies of reason. A true faith must be clear and satisfying and its metaphysical doctrines should teach that Truth and Reality are one and the same.
One great criterion of a religio - perfectus is that it should be a powerful motivating force for action. Religion should not only be an individual affair but a serious call to social duty. A community is, therefore, a must for the religious development of man. Whitehead’s view that the essence of religion is what the individual does with his solitariness, entirely ignores this social and corporate dimension of religion. A perfect religion engenders in man what is noblest and best in him, leading him to a strengthening and cohesion of society at all levels. It should have an elaborate system of casuistry in which the right way of acting or serving in defined for every conceivable situation. It is a complete code and way of life where religious, political and social factors are bound together in an organic unity, capable of meeting all challenges of the advancing civilizations.

In the ethical realm a vital religion, such as we are talking about, is one which is a great standard-bearer of human freedom. For it is absurd to make anybody responsible for any act for which honestly he cannot assume any responsibility. Further, it tells us that not our overt actions but our motives and intentions are the axis of all moral life. Mankind is here considered as one community because they all owe allegiance to one Supreme Being. It demolishes all distinctions of caste, colour, creed or nationhood. Humanity being one spiritual brotherhood, the nation of patriotism is totally transformed in the religio perfectus.

In the spiritual sphere God is not treated as an elan vital or a blind force without knowledge and purpose. Unlike the Absolute of the philosophers who is simply a disinterested spectator of the drama of existence and who on occasions is simply introduced as a dues ex machind to save the existence of the physical world, a perfect religion envisages a direct relationship between man, and God who at every moment is concerned with the Supreme happiness of mankind. This divine human encounter provides man serenity, peace, courage and consolation in the face of grim realities of life.

Now, can there be a criterion to discover this religio - perfectus of this religio - perennis. It would not only be a travesty of the fundamental notion of Cod as the most just and veritable Being, but also disparaging to human reason, to suppose that God should either be conveying self-contradictory truths to mankind, or should arrange for the guidance of only a cross-section of humanity leaving the rest of mankind to grope in the dark. God, in order to
be just should leave no part of the world without his witness. Again, the need for guidance being a perennial one the institution of prophethood should go back to the very beginning of human life upon this earth.

This search of a religio - perfectus should not however be thought as a barren intellectual pursuit. In matters of such momentous import on which depends the eternal felicity or damnation of mankind we can fiddle with academic pastimes at our own peril. Consequently, once convinced of the truth of this religio-perficus after a thorough, unbiased and objective examination, it would be the most urgent demand of reason that we should be committed to it with all our soul and heart.

We therefore, conclude, that religio - perfectus being that sole public criterion of knowledge and the only perennial body of eternal truths and wisdom *which visualizes a complete unity of science, philosophy and revelation, where reason and faith are co-extensive, and where the theoretical and practical concerns of life are so resolved as to unite all peoples and all times in a universal vision, is the only philosophic perennis.
Before taking up the main subject I wish to begin with two very serious misconceptions about both philosophy and science which are as under:-

1. That both philosophy and science are far removed from actual life;

2. That they have nothing in common, the two being so discreet and independent.

The ensuing discussion is intended to bring home at the very outset that the above views are based on a certain misconstruing of both philosophy and science themselves. It is, therefore, necessary first to alleviate these misconstructions and then to go to the topic of discussion for today. The first misconception can, to my mind, be resolved by explaining the nature of both science and philosophy in the simplest terms understandable to all, the technical as well as the non-technical. Science in its commonest sense consists of those human activities which engage the mind in (i) explaining the events and happenings taking place in the world around and (ii) predicting the future events and happenings in the light of the past ‘explanations’ and knowledge. A common man is most of the time trying to explain the events and happenings taking place around him, and also to make predictions about the similar future events. For instance, he daily observes the behaviour of the clouds, tries to explain the phenomena of raining, and also makes an attempt to make some predictions regarding the possibility of raining from the nature and direction, etc. of the clouds. There are a host of events which a common man with a minimum intelligence tries to understand and explain in his daily routine (though the standard of his explanation depending upon his degree of intelligence). During these spans of time, when he is trying to explain and also to predict on the basis of his personal understanding, he may be said to be in the realm of science (of course, without his being aware of it). One can safely say that it was from such crude and elementary observations and explanations in the past that science took its origination.
Philosophy, on the other hand, again in the commonest sense, comprises those human activities which engage the mind in (i) evaluative and critical reactions and (ii) prescriptive and recommendatory functions. Also, common man, in his day-to-day life, is showing and approving or disapproving reactions towards some character, person, principle, a beautiful face or painting and calling some argument valid or invalid, etc. He is assessing some deed or piece of conduct as good or wrong, some person or character as evil or virtuous, some piece of painting or sculpture as beautiful, and so on. He is not only making an assessment of some situation, but is also suggesting cures and remedies for the ills detected. While busy in these activities, he is in the field of philosophy and in this sense, and to that extent, everybody is a philosopher. Thus, both philosophy and science are originally and basically normal activities which have their footings in the everyday normal life. These activities get removed from life when they rise above the normal experience into the realm of concepts, principles, models and theories; but they stem nonetheless from everyday normal experience and there is nothing weird about them. As soon as they rise into the conceptual sphere they go beyond the comprehension of the common man who has yet to be initiated into philosophy or science.

As regards the second misconception, i.e., philosophy and science have nothing to do with each other. This question I faced, at the hands of a member of the Punjab Public Service Commission who put me the curt question, ‘Should philosophy be studied alongwith the sciences keeping in view the great achievements of the modern science in the fields of discoveries and, in particular, inventions?’ I could do no better than bringing home to the questioner the basic misconception present in his mind as generally present in the mind of the people (including the educated who are not initiated into science or philosophy). I told him, that the two activities, the scientific and the philosophical, were so closely welded together, and therefore of such a complementary nature, that it was wrong to put them into separate water-tight compartments; that a philosopher was a scientist when he was making his observation and collecting data thereby, while a scientist was a philosopher (a logician) in so far as he was organizing his data and drawing general conclusions from them. Thank God! he got my point and I could make a score. This is how for the first time the relation between science and philosophy so clearly dawned upon me as well, because at that
time I was inspired by the Active Intellect”, to borrow a phrase from Muslim thought. Ever since I have been thinking on this relationship and am more and more convinced. But my deeper study of Modern logic, particularly the Boolean logic, has greatly added to my conviction that both science and philosophy not only stem from the same experience, but also are complementary to the extent of inseparability. This has alleviated many a doubt from my own mind also.

As said above, science is not simply the formulation of ‘explanations’ models and theories; it is also ‘predictive’ in so far as it seeks to predict regarding the similar future events and happenings. Popper puts this function of science thus:

Science creates ‘a bold, predictive theory which is then put to „ strict tests and even negative results are acceptable’. [2]

Now, these tests have been the function of philosophy to provide. For example, the ‘Verifiability Principle’[3] formulated by Logical Positivism can go a long way to help science in testing her ‘predictive theory’ as well as other theories which stand in need of testing and verification. Science starts with certain hypothetical propositions which are then put to tests and verification.

Prof. A.J. Ayer, who may be called the founder of Verification Principle, has proposed in his famous treatise Language, Truth and Logic[4] two kinds of verification procedures, viz., (i) direct verification which may also be called strict verification test, and (ii) indirect verification which is much more lenient and accommodating. This kind of verification is carried out on the consequences ensuing from the proposition to be verified. Philosophy is very useful in providing these checking-procedures for the scientific statements and truths. It helps science through its logical principles and procedures of testing: even the scientific method, which a scientist employs for his discoveries, has to be analyzed and formulated by logic. Thus, scientific propositions, models and theories are in the last resort to be checked and tested by the philosopher. Besides, the statements of science are themselves to be evaluated by philosophy which gives rise to the Philosophy of Science or the Philosophy of Sciences[5] according to terminology of A.C. Benjamin. In fact, philosophical statements are of two kinds: viz., (i) statements ‘evaluating ‘facts’ and ‘events’ as they occur in nature; and (ii) statements
evaluating the ‘statements of facts’, i.e., scientific statements. Such statements may be called ‘Second-Order Evaluative Statements’ or Just ‘Second-Order Statements’, and the philosophy of science comprises these Second-Order Statements.

Again, which is very important, philosophy ‘provides the scientist with a cover or over-all shell within which to fit in his scientific findings. A scientist has to work against the background of an all-inclusive picture of the universe which provides him a foothold. Till sometime back, a scientist used to be a metaphysician which would help him in undertaking his specific avocation as a scientist. Take that great trio of the scientists, I mean, Albert Einstein, W. Heisenberg and Max Planck; they were basically metaphysicians as is obvious from their world-views. For instance, Einstein’s theory of General Relativity, Heisenberg’s Principle of Indeterminacy, and Planck’s Quantum Theory are essentially metaphysical theories which can hardly be justified on purely scientific grounds. One has only to read Planck’s ‘Where is Science Going?’[6] and The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics,[7] Heisenberg’s Physics and Philosophy,[8] and the famous book Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist[9]—edited by I.A. P.A. Schilpp, to bear out my contention. Even Charles Darwin, who is known for his treatise on evolution The Origin of Species,[10] with his concepts of “Evolution”, “natural selection” and “adaptation” was fundamentally a philosopher as there is no scientific proof for his basic hypothesis “the survival of the fittest”. What is important, these scientists were known to everybody in the world, even to the layman who had some intelligence and education, alongwith their inventions and ‘discoveries’. Today with growing specialization, the scientist has confined himself within the limits of his laboratory working on a very limited scope, and has ceased to bother to evince any metaphysical interest in the over-all world-view. This approach has very much restricted his vision and as a result his findings have little to attract the common man’s interest, because the technical achievements of a scientist hardly influence his life deeply. The present-day scientific discoveries have been too technical to catch interest of the man in the street till they mature into some useful and startling inventions. However, the scientific ice was broken in the mid-1970s when Sir Norman Lovell, in his Presidential address to the International Scientific Conference in London, re-introduced the famous “Big Bang Theory” of the origin of the Universe which was in the’ main a metaphysical hypothesis,
which could not be ascertained through experimentation. In our own times we have A.N. Whitehead\textsuperscript{[11]} Henri Bergson\textsuperscript{[12]} and Bertrand Russell\textsuperscript{[13]} who presented a beautiful blend of a scientist/mathematician and a philosopher which reflected through their writings.

Further, philosophy has a prerogative over science as over arts, religion, etc. As I said before, it can treat the science as one of its objects of study which results in the ‘Philosophy of Science’. Allama Iqbal recognised this prerogative of philosophy in the very beginning of his Lectures\textsuperscript{[14]} where he said in relation to religion, ‘The spirit of philosophy is one of free activity. It suspects all authority. Its function is to trace the uncritical assumptions of human thought to their hiding places, and in this pursuit it may finally end in denial or a frank admission of the incapacity of pure reason to reach the ultimate reality,\textsuperscript{[15]} (as in the case of Kant). I-Iere, what Iqbal said regarding religion is equally, if not more, true of science, in my view. Today there is a philosophy of every subject--viz., Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Culture, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Education, and so on, which goes a long way to prove the above position. A.C. Benjamin of the University of Missouri has classified the problems of science with which philosophy deals into three ‘fairly well-defined fields’, viz., (i) ‘all problems related directly or indirectly to a consideration of the method of science.’\textsuperscript{[16]} It is the task of the philosophy of sciences to examine such notions as axiom, proof, postulate, theorem, deduction, induction, data, hypothesis, etc. (ii) Problems which ‘have to do with the analysis of the basic concepts and presuppositions of the sciences’.\textsuperscript{[17]} There are three types of such concepts: (a) those peculiar to its subject-matter, e.g., force, matter and motion for the physicist, (b) concepts which are presupposed by a science but not analyzed by the science itself, e.g., number, order, quantity in physics; and (c) concepts which are presupposed by a science but not analyzed by any science, e.g., time as used in physics. And (iii) problems which ‘may all be roughly described as concerned with the implications which science has, either in its content or in its method, for the other aspects of our lives’\textsuperscript{[18]} e.g., determinism in science and freedom in ethics. There is no doubt that philosophers have been showing keen interest in the methodology of sciences since ancient times and logicians are still interested in the subject; but recent philosophers have shown keener interest in an analysis of the basic concepts and presuppositions of the sciences, and also in the implications which findings
of sciences have for the other aspects of the human life, i.e., the impact of the scientific discoveries and inventions on the life of man and this includes the most modern warfare techniques and equipments vis-a-vis life on this planet. The regulation and control of these techniques falls to the lot of philosophy which has always aimed at the benefit of mankind.

---

**Notes and References**


[13] Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), British philosopher who studied mathematics and philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge. He wrote the


[15] Ibid., p.l.


[17] Ibid., pp. 544-45.

[18] Ibid., pp. 546-47.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IQBAL

PROF. SAID AHMAD RAFIQ

For nearly five hundred years, from the ninth to the thirteenth century, the Muslims virtually ruled over mankind’s intellectual domain. However, this intellectual development of the Muslims was arrested, on the whole, after the fall of Baghdad; and a downward trend was at once discernible thereafter. Centuries rolled by, and reigned over their intellectual life. During this long period not a single great thinker was born, in the Muslim community, commanding the ability to move the “millat” forward.

It was after five centuries long slumber, in the middle of the 18th Century that Mohammad-bin-Wahab in Arabia and Shah Waliullah in India started their puritan movements which aimed at awakening the Muslims of these countries, and following the simple teachings of the Holy Quran and the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). Unluckily none of the two movements proved a success; at least in the first phase of their struggle. The slumber was so long and so deep that the movements could not have the desired effect.

From the beginning of the 19th Century, however, collision between the Eastern and Western cultures was noticeable in the East. This conflict, born of several external and internal factors; and increasing in its sharpness with the passage of time, made the Muslims gradually conscious of their stagnancy, and began to awaken them from their age-long slumber. Various movements started, one after the other, in different Muslim countries; in Turkey, India, Egypt, Persia etc. in the 19th century. These movements were, generally speaking, national in their character and political in their nature. These movements were limited not only geographically in their sphere of influence, but they were also narrowly conceived in that they did not compass the different aspects of life. They did not and could not see the life in its totality. The need of change in the total scheme of life, in each and every aspect of it, was hidden from their ken.

Other type of movements were started in some Muslim countries. The main of these movements were the movements of Jamaluddin Afghani, of Khairuddin in Tunisia, the Sanusiyah movement in Tripolis; movements
sponsored by Anwer Pasha and Saeed Haleem in Turkey, of Mehdi in Sudan, of Abdul Qadir in Algeria, and the Naqshbandiyah movement against Russia. These movements were basically religio-political and tried to awaken the Muslims of their countries on the basis of Islamic laws and Tradition. These movements were not a success; no doubt, but the spirit of the Age and the inspirations of the Muslims all over the world were clearly reflected in them. One of the reasons of the failure of these movements, except that of Jamaluddin Afghani, was the absence of a great mind who could analyze the demands of the time, could inspire the nation and guide the people on proper lines. The spirit of the Age certainly demanded a great thinker to guide the life in all its aspects; to analyze all the new forces of the modern age and to interpret Islamic laws and principles afresh. Iqbal proved himself equal to this difficult task. He was a great scholar; possessing all the necessary qualities of head and heart, a man of profound knowledge -- religious and secular, and Eastern as well as Western. He was conscious of the demands of the time. He made an attempt; a great attempt no doubt, “to reconstruct the Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical tradition of Islam and the more recent development in the various domains of human knowledge”.

Before coming to his philosophy, I beg to say a few words regarding his medium of expression. Generally the thinkers have expressed their views in the prose. Simplicity, clearness and distinctness are the basic qualities of prose, and prose is a better medium of expression to achieve these aims. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is the basic attribute of poetry. Iqbal has expressed his views in prose too, but the major portion of his writings is in verse. Taking into consideration the national traditions and literal background of the nation, he adopted the verse as his medium of expression. He was convinced of the fact that a verse goes deep into the mind, and affects the audience and reader more deeply than many a sentence of prose. Ibn-Taimiyya raised his voice against Pantheism, and says Iqbal, “his profound logic had some effect, no doubt, but the fact remains that a logical argument cannot compete the charm and allurement of poetry… So I have not discussed this problem philosophically, but have presented it through imagination, so that the problem may be followed and understood easily”. Iqbal is really a great poet-philosopher; and just like Plato, Lucrisus, Rumi, Dante, and Goethe he put forward his philosophy in verse.
Iqbal has a definite point of view; and it is from this point of view that he studies the different problems and tries to solve them. He does not limit his study to some of the problems only, but studies nearly all of the social problems which Man of today has to face. All the great thinkers have a particular point of view. They survey the life; its phenomena, attributes and conditions; and wherefrom deduce their philosophic conclusions. Some of these Philosophers have their own ideals, based upon their point of view no doubt, and pass the judgments, normatively, upon the different aspects of life. Apart from these differences of point of view and the Method, some of them have thronged in the heart of some aspects of life only; while others have a totality of life in view. The thinkers who discuss, positively and normatively, only some aspects of life, have, of course, their own importance in those particular domains; but as compared to this the philosophy which takes the whole life in view is by far a greater contribution to life itself. Iqbal belongs to that class of thinkers who have taken the whole life in view, and have discussed nearly all its problems. He has discussed not only cosmological, ontological, epistemological problems etc. but also those problems which have a direct bearing upon our life-moral, political, social, educational, economic, aesthetic etc. He studies these problems not only positively, but some of them are discussed normatively too. This norm Iqbal finds in Islam and so he bases his standard on Islamic Ideology.

Islam is not a religion in the ordinary sense of the term. It is the code of life; the whole life. Islam provides us with the basic and fundamental principles of every aspect of life. Iqbal in his attempt to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy and in interpreting Islamic principles according to the spirit of Age, has discussed the different spheres of life from the Islamic point of view, and has given us the fundamental principles, which are basically Islamic. All the problems, whether purely speculative or comparatively practical, are discussed by him from the same point of view.

Islam is the basis of his thought. Reality can be known, according to Iqbal, through Intuition as well as intellect. But intuition is a better guide as it is “a higher kind of intellect”. “Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other”. “He (Imam Ghazali) failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must
necessarily stimulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time. The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge”. Their method of grasping Reality is, no doubt, somewhat different from each other. “The one grasps reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal and the other on the temporal aspect of reality. Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life”. So Iqbal, on the whole, relies upon the Intuition of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and regards it as the final word.

But what is this Reality which is sought by both intuition and thought? For Iqbal, as a true Muslim, Reality is one. The nature of the reality is spiritual. The whole life is spiritual, and cannot be divided into religious, moral, political, social, economic etc. “In Islam it is the same reality which appears as church looked at from one point of view and state from another”. “Islam is a single unanalysable reality, which is one or the other as your point of view varies”. “The Quran considers it necessary to unite religion and. state, ethics and politics in a single revelation”. “Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the Universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit; realizing itself in space and time”.

Iqbal bases politics on Religion and Morality. He condemns Machiavelli as he makes politics independent of Morality and Religion.
If politics is divorced from religion, then, according to Iqbal, it changes itself into tyranny.

He criticizes Luther too, as he also makes the distinction between Religion and Politics. “He (Luther) did not realize that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe, his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics”. “A careful reading of history shows that the Reformation was essentially a political movement, and the net result of it in Europe was a gradual displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by systems of national ethics.”
Islam is a religio-political system. The highest form of political organization i.e. State is an endeavour to transform the ideal principles into space-time forces, an inspiration to realize them in a definite human organization. State, as an abstract idea, exists for ever, but as a concrete institution, it is found in space and time. Man is a social being and cannot lead his life in isolation. It is only in a society that a man can live a normal human life.

The different organizations came into existence to make human life possible. The state was established as a concrete institution in space and time to organize the Government and to maintain the individual liberty; but its ultimate end is the prefection of humanity. Like some other great thinkers, in Iqbal also, we have a process of evolution of thought, particularly in the sphere of political thought. Iqbal, in the beginning regards a political organization as an end-in-itself. In one of his lectures delivered at the Stratchy Hall of the M.A.O. College, Aligarh, he emphasises rather, over-emphasises, the importance of state. Here he regards it as an end-in-itself. It exists independently of the individuals; the individuals depend upon the social organization for every right, even for life. In this lecture he discusses the laws and the principles which govern the life of state. The life of the social and political organism does not depend upon the individuals; but is higher, nobler and more important than that of the individuals. It is an organism having its own principles of growth and decay.
Plato and Hegel are also of the opinion that state is an end-in-itself, irrespective of any other function or purpose. Iqbal’s general trend during this period is, to a great extent, the same.
موج پر دریا میں اور بیرون دریا کچھ نہیں ہے کہ تھو نا آتشنا پر قاعدہ روزگار سے ملت کے ساتھ رابطہ، استوار رکھے پیوستے رہ شجر سے، امید پہار رکھے فرد و قوم آئینہ، یہ دیگراند ملک و گوپر کھچشن و اختر اند فرد تا اندر جماعت گرم شود 11 قطروں، وسعت طلب قلزم شود 11 در دلش ذوق نمود از ملت است بر کہ آب ازارزم ملت نخوردا شعلہ پائے نغمہ در عودش فسرد فرد تنها از مقصد غافل است قولش آئینتگی را مائل است قوم باضبط آشنا گرد اندش نرم دو مثل صبا گرد اندش پانہ گل مانند شمشادش کند[1] یادست و پابند و کہ آزادش کند
But in his later writings the State and individual are made interdependent. Here he maintains the balance between the two, and regards them as equally important. Individual cannot realize his self spiritually without the help of state, and state cannot maintain itself and cannot make any progress without the inner worth of individuals:

“...[vi]

“The ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of Individual man. In an over-organized society, the individual is altogether crushed out of existence. He gains the whole wealth of social thought around him, and loses his own soul”. For Iqbal the Summuni Bonum is the spiritual elevation of the individual; this end cannot be achieved unless he is given full freedom and liberty to realize his ownself. State can help and does help the individual in achieving this highest aim; and so state is an essential aspect of human life, but as a mean only, and not as an end-in-itself. The aim of a Muslim state is to eradicate evil and to perpetuate virtue in accordance with a specific ethical ideal, as laid down in the Holy Quran. So the importance of state, as a mean, and not as an end, cannot be over-emphasised.

It is because of this reason that Iqbal wanted to establish a Muslim state; a Muslim India independent of Indian state. He has expressed his views on the subject very clearly and vividly in his presidential address of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on the 29th December, 1930. “India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness… The Muslim demand for the’ creation of a “Muslim India” without India, is, therefore, perfectly justified, personally ‘ I would go further than the demands embodied in it; (the
resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi), I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state Self Government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State, appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of the’ North-West India”.

Really speaking this demand was based on the two-nation theory. Iqbal had been preaching this theory after his return from Europe in 1908. But we find the elements of the theory earlier than this; at least in one of the writings of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. For Sir Syed it was the language and not religion or politics which was the point of dispute. Some of the prominent Hindus of U.P raised their voice against Urdu. They wanted to replace it and make Hindi the popular medium of expression and instruction in India, particularly in U.P. Sir Syed raised his voice against this movement. In one of his discussions with Mr. Shakespeare, the Commissioner of Benares, he emphasized the fact that Urdu and Urdu alone was the Lingua franca of India and would be the National language of the whole country. He further expressed his views saying that the movement of popularizing Hindi would widen the gulf between the Hindus and Muslims; and then it would not be possible for the two communities to live together peacefully. How very true was his prediction!

Jamaluddin Afghani and Ch. Rehmat Ali, among so many others, also pleaded for a Muslim Home. The latter has given us the name of this homeland. During his stay in Europe, Iqbal had realized that nationalism and partriotism would ultimately result in tyranny, cruelty, despotism, aggression, -exploitation to other nations and to the humanity at large. So he turned against these ‘isms’, and after his return from Europe he preached against nationalism; based upon geographical boundaries, racial distinctions, linguistic differences etc.
In his lecture at Aligarh, referred to above, he had discussed the problem analytically and systematically. Here he emphasizes the fact that the Muslims and non-Muslims are two different nations; and the basic principles of this distinction are religion and culture and nothing else. Says he, “The essential difference between the Muslim community and other communities of the world consists in our peculiar conception of nationality. It is not the unity of language or of country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principles of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view of the Universe, and participate in the same historical traditions that we are members of the society founded by the Prophet of Islam.

“Islam adhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life-principles on the character and genius of a particular people; in its essence it is non-temporal, non-spatial. “The unity of religious belief on which our communal life depends is supplemented by the uniformity of Muslim Culture. Mere belief in the Islamic principle, though exceedingly important, is not sufficient. In order to participate in the life of the communal self, the individual mind must undergo a complete transformation. Just as the Muslim community does not recognize any ethnical differences, and aims at the subsumption of all races under the universal idea of humanity, so our culture is relatively universal and is not indebted for its life and growth to the genius of one particular people...
In order to become a living member of the Muslim community, the individual, besides having an unconditional belief in the religious principle, must thoroughly assimilate the culture of Islam. The object of this assimilation is to create a uniform mental outlook, a peculiar way of looking at the world and a certain definite standpoint from which to judge the value of things; which sharply define our community and transform it into a corporate individual; giving it a definite purpose and ideal of its own”.

Apart from this lecture, his presidential address of the All-India Muslim League and so many of his verses, Iqbal had expressed his views on the topic in his ‘letters’, particularly his letters to Quaid-e-Azam. In his letter of 28th May, 1937, he writes, “But the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam is impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states. This has been my honest conviction for many years and I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India …In order to make it possible for ‘Muslim India’ to solve these problems, it is necessary to redistribute the country and to provide one or more Muslim states with absolute majorities. Don’t you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived?” Again he writes on the 21st of June 1937, “The only way to a peaceful India is a redistribution of the country on the lines of racial, religious and linguistic affinities. Many British statesmen also realise this, and the Hindu-Muslim riots, which are rapidly coming in the wake of this constitution (of 1935) are sure further to open their eyes to the real situation in the country. I remember Lord Lothian told me before’ I left England that my scheme was the only possible solution of the troubles of India, but that it would take 25 years to come A separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslim. Why would not the Muslims of North-West India and Bangal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?”

It was on the basis of the two-nation theory that Iqbal demanded the “Muslim India”. The non-Muslims of India did not accept this two-nation theory, opposed it like anything, and so rejected the demand of “Muslim India”. But the ideal put forward by the great poet-philosopher was accepted by the nation as a whole. The Muslims demanded ‘Muslim India’ which was
renamed as Pakistan, and fought for it. India was divided and Pakistan was achieved in less than twenty years after the demand was put forward by Iqbal. It is perhaps the unique example in the history of the world that such a great ideal was achieved within so short a period of seventeen years! Pakistan-Zindabad!

Notes and References

[i] کلیات فارسی ص ۱۱۶
[ii] کلیات اردو ص ۳۳۲
[iii] اپشا ص ۴۱
[iv] کلیات فارسی ص ۱۱۸
[v] اپشا ص ۸۴
[vi] اپشا ص ۸۶
[vii] کلیات اردو ص ۲۶۲
[viii] اپشا ص ۲۶۵
Muslims have for about 200 years suffered a period of continuous and rapid decline in all fields of human endeavour--economic, social, political and intellectual--and have been surpassed by a rival and rather hostile civilization of the west. For the past two or three decades’ however’ Muslim history has entered a new phase.

The seemingly relentless speed of our decline has been arrested if not as yet reversed. The post-colonial nightmare is coming to an end and a new sense of direction and destiny is surging. But the processes of recovery and resurgence are going to be as painful as the processes of decline and defeat have been. Notwithstanding’ it would be appropriate first to analyze in depth the nature of western political and intellectual domination of the Muslim world and mind.

Global Domination of western thought:

The present age can rightly be described as the age of the predominance of western philosophical thought and knowledge. The western ideas about the nature of man and the universe are strongly upheld all around the world. Having taken shape roughly two hundred years ago’ these ideas were continuously affirmed and reinforced by theorists and philosophers. Though politically the present day world may be divided into a number of blocks’ one single philosophical point of view prevails throughout. This attitude has coloured all human civilization and culture at the global level. No doubt there are also found here and there some alternative viewpoints’ but they are of marginal importance. The people both in the Occident and in the Orient who really have a say in public affairs’ political as well as social and cultural’ are adhering to this viewpoint. The dominance of western cultural and philosophical thought is so pervasive and universal than even the point of view of the people struggling against it in some countries’ turns out on closer examination to itself greatly influenced by the west.
Indeed’ they are themselves to a great extent western in their approach and method and even in their purport ideology.

They too think in terms of western philosophy a ideology with the result that they lose their impact a efficacy to oppose it.

The thought pattern which is operative at the basis present-day culture and civilization was not hatched in day’ nor is it a simple and abstract phenomenon. Over the past hundred and fifty or two hundred years Europeans philosophers developed a number of schools of though about the nature of man and human life’ but one central attitude that persisted all through these variegated philosophical theories and went on gaining momentum ‘Was the disregard for ideational and transcendental concepts Concrete fact and physical phenomena became the core and object of human enquiry and philosophical quest. God’ soul and the life-hereafter gradually disappeared from t spectrum of thought. Yielding place respectively to discussions about the nature of the physical universe matter and human terrestrial existence. Though at t academic level it was said that we neither affirm n reject the doctrines about God’ soul and life after death yet this avowedly agnostic position quite understandably led to the gradual elimination of these ideas from philosophical enquiry and discussion.

God has imbued man with a great many capacities a mental faculties to exploit to his benefit any field domain. Every earnest research worker can explore a new world in the domain of his selected field of enquiry Compared with the vastness and grandeur of the university the shining sun itself is nothing more than a tiny spec while a tiny particle of dust may open up for a scientist’ realms hardly less in complexity and fascination than t shining sun. Similarly’ the universe’ matter and terrestrial’ existence may look extremely trivial in contract to God’ the soul and the life hereafter’ but if these mundane concerns are made the subject of study and research they may lead to boundless vistas of knowledge.

This was what actually happened in Europe. When the universe • and matter were brought under scientific investigation’ man gradually discovered to his utter astonishment a clue to power and energy in apparently deed and inert material phenomena. And this led to a new revolution in the realm of knowledge and technology. A series of scientific discoveries led to greater
control and exploitation of nature’ and a wealth of new inventions made Europe an invincible power. The great impact and efficacy of the properties of matter became reasons for focusing attention on physical laws in place of the spirit. As against the age-old discussions about God’ His attributes and spiritual entities’ the physical universe and its exploitation were given prime importance in human enquiry.

The newly acquired scientific knowledge and technical know-how gave to the west tremendous superiority in arms and military equipment. Its political power swept across the world in a very short time. Eastern nations and their governments crumbled before it like sand castles.

Since the Muslim states of the Near and Middle East bore the brunt of this attack’ the onslaught of the west struck Islam and Muslim nations the severest blow. The whole Muslim world was subjugated by western imperialist powers in a matter of a few years.

The west’s occupation of the Islamic world was two fold’ politico-military as well as ideologoco-cultural. But since the European attack was primarily and initially political’ the reaction against it in the Islamic world contained in its early stages a sense of revolt against political repression only. The painful realization by the Muslim world of the fact of European domination and the fragmentation of its own strength’ either in the form of annexation and direct political rule or in the guise of indirect involvement through puppet governments’ was expressed in heart-rending poems. The nostalgic memory of the glorious past and the passionate desire to regain the old strength and solidarity indeed the desire to set the clock backwards -- expressed itself at one time in the volatile personality of Jamaluddin Afghani and at another in the form of Tehrik-e-Khilafat. But power of the west prevailed over emotions’ and their political domination became an established fact.

Immediately after consolidating its political hegemony’ Europe started disseminating her ideological principles and point of view with a missionary zeal so as to capture and control the ideas and thoughts of Muslim nations. The material and scientific progress of the west had already dazzled the eyes of the world’s conquered people. Moreover any superior nation must have some fundamental human qualities which help her to achieve her
expansionist goals. The evidences of Europeans’ superiority contributed greatly to infuse defeatism in the minds of Muslims’ and a vast majority of them began to appropriate western ideas and values uncritically. Since the Europeans had themselves many schools of thought in the field of philosophy and social sciences’ there was some scope of debate’ counter-position and selective adoption in these fields. But as the findings of science had an element of absolute certainty’ and as its results were practical and tangible’ they were not open to dispute Science was therefore received with nearly as much enthusiasm as should be accorded to divine revelation’ and a large number of educated men in the Islamic world consciously or unconsciously accepted a secular and materialistic point of view. The entire Islamic world’ including its deeply religious core’ started giving more importance to material existence and worldly life’ and less importance to the religion and life hereafter. A radical change of emphasis from transcendental themes to material and worldly pursuits occurred not’ only in Islamic society in general’ but also in its religious leaders and scholars.

As a result of this’ religious beliefs were attenuated and their metaphysical concepts were reinterpreted in purely scientific terms. Syed Ahmed Khan in the Indian subcontinent and Mufti Mohammad Abduh in Egypt and their acolytes attempted to formulate modern interpretations of Islam to save it from anachronism and allow believers to make headway on the path of scientific progress like the Europeans. Their motives may have been sincere and their dedication genuine’ but through these attempts Islam undeniably lost its very spirit and elan. The influence of western materialism resulted in a non-religious version of Islam. Thus’ these attempts served only a negative purpose’ as the saving of those who were already completely Europeanised in culture and life-style’ from being called ‘un-Islamic.’ So and so their inclusion in the fraternity of Muslim brotherhood remained unchallenged’ and this new version of Islam was presented to the West on their behalf as an ‘apology’.

The Development of Social Sciences and Twentieth Century Islamic Movements:

The fundamentals of Western philosophy’ disguised as suspension of judgment or agnosticism’ were in fact based upon denial of God’ and the life hereafter. They caused the physical universe to replace the transcendental
concepts of God and soul from the centre of human concern and enquiry. Numerous scientific discoveries and inventions naturally followed from this exclusive emphasis on worldly interests. Eschatological doctrines of life after death were completely rejected as topics of research in favour of the immediacy of worldly existence. As a result of persistent and exclusive thinking about the multifarious aspects of worldly life a number of sociological and politico-economic theories were conceived and put forward. These theories gradually developed into full fledged ideologies and world-views confined to strictly academic discussion in the earlier stages’ these world-views were later made the social’ political and economic basis of nations. The age-old political systems based on traditional feudalism were replaced by nationalism’ dictatorship and democracy’ and ancient economic systems by capitalism and socialism. A number of new political and economic movements emerged in the wake of these changes.

The world of Islam also received the impact of western ideas in the field of social sciences’ and Muslims began to propound Islam as a system of life. Islamic teachings were projected as an all-embracing ‘system of life” and movements in different lands’ were launched to implement and put into practice this system of life.

These twentieth century revivalist movements started almost simultaneously in Muslim countries from Indonesia to Egypt. They were similar in a number of ways. Indeed it would not be far from true to say that they were all animated by a single conception of religion. It must be admitted’ in all fairness’ that these efforts imparted credibility to Islam as a code of life superior to other ideologies’ and have weakened the influence of the West upon the young.

There were other factors which helped to limit the influence of Western ideas and culture. The sweeping military and political victories of the Western colonial powers were checked with the passage of time and in many countries were met with forceful and sustained nationalist freedom movements. Consequently Western countries were forced to withdraw their political hegemony from occupied lands.

Though political influence and economic domination in the form of defense pacts or military and monetary aid programmers are still very much
there’ almost the entire Muslim block has got rid of the yoke of direct rule by imperialist powers. In many Muslim countries nationalist freedom and self-rule movements were launched’ and these invariably appealed to religious sentiments of the people for sparking off feelings of nationalism. There was no alternative to this’ as Muslim nationalism had no anchorage other than Islam. This appeal to religion’ however’ was more like a slogan than an article of Muslim faith. Yet it did strengthen the idea of the revival of Islam. At the same time’ the hollowness of Western civilization has been clearly brought out by the two disastrous world wars’ so that even the West has come to consider the foundations of its own culture as ill-conceived’ and misguided. Materialistic atheism reached its logical culmination in the forms of socialism and communism’ and moral as well as religious values were reinterpreted in purely economic terms. This alarmed Western peoples themselves’ and they began to propound a new philosophy of humanism which was quite sympathetic to spiritual values. In the realm of science new physical theories shook the very foundations of Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry. Matter was no longer considered something known and certain’ and the former absolute faith in mechanical laws gave way to less rigid views of the universe. This made easier to affirm metaphysical beliefs’ and gave support to religion.

Supported by these factors’ movements for ‘Islamic Renaissance’’ ‘establishment of government according to e will of God’ and ‘enforcement of the Islamic system of life’ were started in various Muslim countries. Of all these’ the ‘Ikhwan-ul-Musleemoon’’ which began in Egypt the most prominent in point of quantitative strength emotional fervour. The Indian subcontinent’s Jamaate-e-Islami’ however’ occupies a distinguished lace among these movements’ based as it is on a solid and strongly defended thought-system. But it is an irony of history’ that practically none of these movements has achieved any remarkable success. One may think that the .1 cause of the failure of these revivalist movements lies the impatience of their leaders. That is to say’ they perhaps hastily’ without first changing the minds of a considerable number of country’s intelligentsia’ took part active politics’ which resulted in premature clash with the national leadership and the so-called ‘progressive’ elements. But in truth their failure is a direct resultant of their misconceived notion of faith and the error of their view of Islam.
These movements’ understanding and view of Islam’ based on the same Western standpoint; preferring material existence and worldly pursuits to spirit and the life hereafter. Though the metaphysical beliefs of Islam which collectively constitute Muslim faith are affirmed in their studies of Islam’ they have not been properly stressed. Their gaze has been exclusively fixed on the teachings and precepts which Islam has laid down for the multifarious practical aspects of life and to which they’ve given the name of ‘Islami Nizam-e-Hayat’. Their interpretation of Islam affirms all the religious beliefs but. It lacks the inner state of deep faith in God --- ‘iman- billah’ --- which alone makes us know Allah as the only absolutely powerful agent and the ultimate initiator within Sand without. The belief in the hereafter is asserted but is practically devoid of the living faith’ which was described by the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) when he commanded:

کن فی الدنيا كائنات غريب اوحا برسبيل [الحديث]

(Be in this world like a stranger or wayfarer.)

Similarly’ the prophethood of Hadrat Mohammad (peace be upon him) is not denied’ yet there is no real love or heartfelt attachment to him. For the more progressive elements’ the prophet had a role hardly higher than that of a postman or a leader of the social life of the Muslim community. And even those who hold the ‘Sunnah’ as definitive and fundamentally important in religious matters’ have created a loop hole in it by making a distinction between ‘Sunnah adat’ and ‘Sunnah risalat’. This bifurcation has made it possible for its propounders to live freely at least their private lives in harmony with the fashionable trends of the times. In a word’ faith is upheld only to the extent which suffices for one to be called a ‘Muslim’ in the legal sense of the term. The inner experience of faith which truly fulfils and validates the propositions of Islamic belief is not present. Indeed nobody seems to be aware of its importance and indispensability.

It is an outcome of this very standpoint that the practice of the Islamic faith has come to be regarded as synonymous with the State’ and worship (عبادة) simply equivalent to obedience (إطاعت). The Prophetic statement that prayer (Salat) is the spiritual ascension of the believer is completely
disregarded. The attachment of the human soul to prayer to the degree that it becomes the only source of inner happiness and peace of mind. Contrary to this, the more progressive elements have identified the canonical prayer with the social order of the community. Some others assign importance to it only in so far as it is a comprehensive method for the organization of the Muslim community. The power of ‘Zakat’ the annual poor due’ to develop and purify the soul is regarded as secondary to its role in the Islamic economic system or national welfare scheme. Fasting is commonly said to be an exercise in self-control but its potency to vitalize the soul by relaxing the tyranny of the corporeal body upon it’ is either not fully realized or left unexpressed by religious teachers. The prophetic saying - ‘Fasting is like a shield protecting the soul against sins’ - is often reiterated in religious writings and sermons and a good deal of time is spent in its explanation. But the Holy tradition - ‘fasting is for the pleasure of Allah and He will Himself grant its reward’ - is mentioned briefly and cursorily if mentioned at all. Similarly it is common knowledge about pilgrimage that this provides the pivot of worship around which a vast universal brotherhood is organized. But its deeper religious significance and the spiritual blessings it brings are seldom expressed.

This new interpretation of Islam is a direct result of the universal domination of Western philosophical thought which has completely secularized the point of view of Muslims. Consequently the soul and its inner life is wholly discarded in favour of the affairs of worldly life which constitute the sole objects for thought and reflection. This has resulted in a arterialistic interpretation of faith and religion. Though at the theoretical level it is said that Islam is a comprehensive system of human welfare; concerned with both this world and the hereafter. But since their eyes are firmly fixed on the problems of this worldly existence’ Islam is in the final analysis reduced to a political and social system. Theological beliefs are considered as no more than a ‘veil’ ‘facade’ or outer crust. The real mission they have set for themselves is the establishment of this system of life and conduct. The yearning for communion with God’ His adoration and humble supplication before Him’ which are the real sense of worship’ are relegated to a peripheral status.
Even this state of affairs is to be found in rather traditional and conservative Islamic movements. Otherwise the more liberal and progressive elements’ under the impact of socialism and communism - the logical consequences of Western thought - have gone beyond accepting Islam as a socio-political system and consider it but only an economic programme. That is to say; for them Islam is co-extensive with a particular type of ‘niZelm-erabubiat’. In the explanation of religious metaphysical beliefs and tenets of ‘iman’ they take their start from where Syed Ahmed Khan had got at through his rationalistic strain. By interpreting paradise and hell in terms of the well-being or otherwise of life here on this earth’ and by interpreting ‘Qiyamat’ in terms of atomic explosions’ they have completely deprived Islam of its very spirit. In my view this is only the logical terminus of the materialistic interpretation of Islam. A critique of this view is not my objective here because’ even though it is given the label of ‘Quranic thought’ it is undoubtedly. gross’ crass and naked materialism and anti-Quranic in spirit. This incidental allusion to so-called ‘Quranic thought’ has been made in order merely to show as to what extent secular version of religion can be pressed.

The import of all these movements is more social and political than religious. They are more worldly-wise than other-worldly. They are distinguished from other political and economic movements only in holding the Islamic way of life as a better solution to human problem than the life systems enunciated by capitalistic democracy or communism. And this is tantamount to saying that the task of reviving the real values of Islam has not yet been started.

This is the reason why these Islamic revivalist movements are comparable to ships without anchors drifting to and fro on the waves. Quite often they behave helplessly like a traveller who neither knows his destination nor remembers where from he started.

**Revitalization of Faith - The Necessary Precondition of an. Islamic Resurgence:**

Modern rationalistic and pseudo-scientific interpretations of Islam are quite alien to Islam itself and lack a direct link with the original Prophetic mission. They are devoid of the spiritual message that is the heart of the
Quranic revelation. They fail to appreciate Islam as a spiritual and metaphysical tradition. But since Islam is essentially based on inward faith known in Arabic as ‘iman’ Islamic revival can never be brought about without first reviving and indeed revitalizing the faith of a large part of the Muslim community. There is no denying the importance of political freedom and the independence of Muslim countries’ and these have undoubtedly contributed to generate greater awareness of Islamic values and ideals. Similarly’ the idea of an Islamic way of life and confidence in its superiority over other ideologies has been useful to a limited extent and deserves our praise. The movements which have struggled hard in the past and are still engaged in advancing the- case for this are in fact contributing partially and in their own way. towards the revival of the Islamic message. But the most real and fundamental task in this regard still remains to be done. It is imperative for the entire intelligentsia of the Muslim world to pay attention to’ and whosoever realises its vital importance should strive for’ the cardinal principle that a forceful movement be launched for reviving and revitalizing the ‘iman’ in the whole of the Muslim community. In this way’ ‘iman’ must be transformed from mere verbal attestation (‘qal’) to an inward existential faith (‘hal’).

Iman is essentially attestation of and inner faith in some metaphysical truths. The first step towards attaining this faith is to believe more firmly in some truths even though they are not observable or perceptible’ and to hold the things heard by the heart to be more trustworthy than the things heard by the ear. Belief in the unseen - ‘iman-bil-ghaib’--is the first and foremost condition of iman’ and this requires a radical change in the thought system and in the point of view of the believer. According to’ this new perspective’ the whole order of creation should be taken as nothing more than a fleeting appearance of shadow’ whereas the existence of God should be felt as an eternally living Reality. Contrary to the view that the universe is a chain of eternally present and untreated causes and effects or the world of ‘natural’ forces and rigid mechanical laws’ the will of God and His design and purpose should be ‘seen’and felt in operation at all times and in all parts of the

---

1 The terms ‘qal’ and ‘hall are often found in the literature of Tasawwuf or Islamic mysticism Generally speaking’ when the avowed attestation of iman’ something spoken and verbal’ develops inwardly and permeates the entire being and activity of the believer’ the ‘qal’ deepens and enriches into ‘halt.
cosmos. Matter is looked upon as insignificant’ and the soul is thought to be man’s essence. The locution ‘insan’ is not to be attributed to man’s animal and corporeal body’ but to that divine spirit the presence of which makes man superior to angels. Worldly life should appear to be transitory and unreal’ and life hereafter should’ alone be taken as real and ever - lasting. The pleasure of God should be held as more valuable than the attainment of all the riches of this world. And’ according to a Prophetic saying’ the riches of the world should not be assigned more value than a mosquito’s wing deserves. Let it be clearly and distinctly understood that unless and until a major portion of the Muslim community really undergoes this profound transformation’ the vision and the fond hope of an Islamic’ renaissance can never be realized.

The most effective way to implant and inculcate faith in the hearts of the Muslim masses is the company and fellowship of such deeply religious persons whose hearts and minds are illumined by divine knowledge and by the light of faith’ persons whose hearts are untouched by conceit’ hypocrisy’ rancour and avarice. It was through ceaseless evangelist and disseminating work’ teaching and exhortation as well as practical examples portrayed through their conduct of life’ that a continuous chain of pious and God-intoxicated people kept the beacon of faith burning after the collapse of ‘Khilafat-i-Rashida’. Even though the winds of Western atheism and materialism are blowing high in Muslim lands’ yet one can find here and there persons whose hearts and minds are full of certitude (‘nur-e-yaqeen’) and staunch faith. The need of the time now is that the movement for Islamic faith and ‘Iman’ be popularized and extended far and wide ‘so that each and every inhabited piece of Muslim territory does have a few dedicated and selfless preachers whoes sole aim in life is the pursuit of Allah’s pleasure; men who’ in obedience to the teaching of prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him)’ make religious and moral guidance their sole aim and ambition in life.

Fortunately in the recent past there has emerged in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent a mass religious Movement the impact of which is visible on a vast multitude of people. It has led them to firm belief in Islam and the radical change of values that this entails. That is to say’ the Creator’ spiritual existence’ the human soul and the life hereafter are held superior to the
whole order of creation and worldly life. This movement is, the ‘Jamaat-e-Tableegh’. It is an off-shoot of the movement of Deoband. It was founded and initiated by persons of deep and inner religious conviction. Although more than a third of a century has flown past, its fervour and emotional zeal has not abated a bit. Though I do not wholly agree with its approach and methodology, there is no denying the fact that it has brought about a complete change in the thinking of a great many people. People who have started to feel that it is the Creator and not the created objects that should command our attention, and that the uncaused first cause and not finite causes is of prime importance. Similarly, they develop a strong belief that it is not food or water but the will of God that mitigates hunger and quenches thirst. Even the minor injunctions and precepts of the faith start appearing to them as of intrinsic worth and goodness without being grounded upon any logical argumentation or considered as part of a system of life or as means to establish it. The smallest details of the holy Prophet’s Sunnah appear to these people as pregnant with light—‘nur’—and splendour. They content themselves with the minimum material requirements of life and spend a major part of their time and energy in the propagation of Islam in their own way.

But as this movement addresses the sentiments and not the reason of the people, and its main emphasis lies on action and not on understanding, its influence and efficacy is limited. Those members of a community who hold reason and understanding to be superior to sentiments and action remain uninfluenced by this type of preaching. The very mental constitution of these people compels them not to appropriate passionately anything that does not satisfy the test of reason and critical enquiry. They cannot attain the deeper levels of religious life without first untying the intellectual knots of their minds. These are the people who constitute the intellectual minority of a society and who command leadership over its ideology and policy. A change and indeed a total revolution in their viewpoint and way of thought is therefore of paramount importance. If ‘iman’ and belief could not be enkindled in their hearts and they remained in the darkness of unbelief, faith

---

2 This is how philosophers have traditionally conceived of God as the ultimate being existing independently and in its own right.
occurring merely in the lower strata of society could not guarantee Islamization in a real and permanent sense.

**The Future Imperative:**

For this reason the most essential task to be undertaken is to launch a high-powered academic movement which brings about a real change in the educated elite and intelligentsia of the society’ taking them from the darkness of materialism and atheism to the light of faith and belief. This movement should be aimed at inducing in them a God-fearing attitude and a heightened self-awareness. This objective can only be achieved at a strictly academic level through a cogently reasoned presentation of Islamic beliefs and a strong refutation of atheistic and materialistic philosophies. In this connection a point must be borne in mind. Since in our age fast means of communication have considerably increased mobility and the whole world can be looked upon as one human family’ the aforesaid academic level of discussion will not be limited to one particular country. Rather it would be required to come up to the highest standard of sophistication found anywhere in the world. This colossal work must be extremely painstaking. But the vision of an Islamic revival which does not fulfill this requirement is a fool’s paradise.

The first thing essential for this movement is to get in its fold such intelligent and gifted young men who have a keen desire’ for knowledge and whose minds and souls are burning for the attainment of truth. These young men must experience an inner feeling that the ultimate reality is far from the realm of sensuous objects. The passionate desire in them for acquiring knowledge and discovering truth should be so intense that’ paying no heed to petty cravings for worldly comforts and bright professional careers’ they are prepared to dedicate all their lives for the achievement of this end.

These young dedicated research-workers will have to take a deep and critical look into the entire history of human thought from its earliest stages to the present day’ Logic’ metaphysics’ psychology’ ethics and theology would become the central subjects of their study and reflection’ though due attention will also be given to the social and physical sciences. Alongwith this

---

3 According to Quranic psychology’ a true knowledge of one’s own deeper self necessarily leads to awareness of the ultimate Self or God. There are also Prophetic sayings to this effect.
thorough and critical study of human thought’ it would be essential for them to study the holy Quran’ the last and most comprehensive divine revelation’ in order to discover its truths. And if after a long and labourious study of human knowledge and Quranic wisdom’ the beacon-birth message of the Quran becomes crystal clear to them’ their minds and souls vibrate with its statements’ the Quranic teachings about the nature of the outer world and of their own souls (aafaq-o-unfus) satisfy them completely and they experience an inner contentment as a result of this enlightenment; then the”’ will have attained true faith.

Only these men will. possess excellence in true knowledge and wisdom’ Instead of Mental disruption and moreal lewdness their knowledge will lead them to greater fear of God’s justice and punishment. Their personalities will be embodiments of the Quranic verse’ “The fear of God is found only in the hearts of men who have abundant knowledge”. Also their personalities and character will bear witness to the truth of a poetic line; ‘not merely a reader of the Quran’ a true Muslim is the Quran personified’. The essence of the holy Book lies in the particular gnosis which is called ‘iman’ or faith. No doubt the Quranic laws and precepts about the practical aspects of life are of immense importance in their own right’ But Compared with the essence which is constituted by its teachings regarding ‘Iman” the legal aspects of the Quran are of secondary significance. Without the prior acquisition of this inner faith’ deliberation upon the Quranic Iaws is of hardly any value. This point was very aptly conveyed in a statement of the prophet’s companion’ Hadrat Ibn-Abbas when he said: ‘We first learned ‘ Innun” and then we learned the Quran’.5

The difficult task of refuting Western thought and rooting out its civilization and culture can only be executed in the real sense by those who have drunk deep at the fountains of wisdom and knowledge that flow from

4 The Quranic- verse translated above is:

انما يَخَشُى اللَّهُ مِن عِبَادِهِ العَلَمَاء

5 The reported statement reads in the Arabic:

تعلمنا الإيمان ثُمَّ تعلمنا القرآن
the Quran. It would be possible for these men to write a new ‘Refutation’ of the philosophers of today and mount a crushing attack upon modern logicians. In a word’ they will check effectively the flood of atheism and materialism which has been carrying away the human mind for the last two hundred years.

Besides this’ they will have to undertake the positive task of initiating a new Islamic philosophical theology or ‘kalam’. So that the facts discovered in the domains of Mathematics’ Physics’ Astronomy’ Biology and Psychology may be assigned a proper place in the framework of Islamic beliefs.

There is no inherent contradiction between the facts of these sciences and the tenets of ‘iman’. The facts of physical sciences point partially to the same absolute reality which is comprehended intuitively through ‘iman” Forty years ago’ Doctor Mohammad Iqbal set a precedence for this sort of work through the seven lectures published under the title ‘Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam” the followers of Iqbal have rather inappropriately concentrated on the nature of law’ ijma and ‘ijtehad’ in ‘Islam’ which are in fact not directly related to the religious and philosophical aspect of his book. In fact his real purpose was the reconstruction and reformulation of the philosophical theology of Islam and his work is highly stimulating and thought-provoking in this regard. He did not claim that his book was final or perfect. He himself observed in the preface “As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened’ other views and probably’ sounder views than those set forth in these lectures’ are possible. Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human’ thought vid to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it”. Therefore if this task had been continued on lines suggested by Doctor Iqbal and some gifted and dedicated men had devoted their lives to Quranic research’ making it the hub of their intellectual activity’ quite valuable and substantial work would have been produced by now. Until and unless a considerable amount of really good work is available in the field Islamic theology or ‘kalam” the hope of

---

6 This refers to Imam Chazzali’s book ‘Refutation of Philosopher” in which he tried to refute the rationalistic philosophies of the eleventh century.
7 Here the allusion is to Imam Ibn-Taimiyya’s book entitled ‘Attack on the Logicians” in which he criticized and conclusively refuted the arguments advanced by the logicians of his time.
instilling in the intelligentsia a deeply religious point of view can never be realized.

After the development and reformulation of religious’ and philosophical thought’ the second most essential task would be to elaborate cogently in modern terminology the teachings of Islam regarding the practical aspects of life such as politics’ jurisprudence’ culture and economics. In this connection’ it was mentioned earlier on that during the past forty years or so some commendable work has appeared in Egypt and the Indian sub-continent. Both the Jamaat-e-islami and the Ikhwanul Muslimoon have made ‘Islamic way of life” and ‘Social justice in Islam’ the central themes of their published work. However’ this should only be considered as an appreciably good start in the right direction. It must be pointed out here that the current wave of plagiarism and publishing the old material under new titles will not at all serve the purpose. Pamphleteering by pseudo-scholars and immature writers and sale of publications among a particular group of people may bring livelihood to a few’ but surely this will render no positive and lasting service to Islam Itself. In the world of today in which people generally are pressed for time’ persons of high intellectual calibre cannot possibly find time and leisure for superficial and second-rate literature. It is’ therefore’ imperative that whatever material is brought out’ it should be of high standard without necessarily being voluminous. For this task’ as well’ besides critical knowledge of contemporary world affairs and social sciences’ a deep and sound understanding of the Quran and Sunnah is inevitably called for.

**The Modern Muslim’s Predicament:**

Modern media and means of administration define individuals as members of groups. In so far as a person accepts this definition of himself’ he is not free to surrender himself to God. Modern habit of defining laws for all things and then attempting to control them by these laws opposes sense of direct submission to a law-giver and a worshipful attitude towards time bringing everything to an intermediate level somewhere between law-giver and servant. Here probably the greatest danger is the depersonalization of the modern world-view’ Men are no longer related to God in their personality and actions. Despite’ this direct personal relation is essentially required in Islam.
The goal of Islam is primarily the salvation of the human soul’ and no resurgence which does not aim at this can be Islamic. Social’ political’ economic etc. reformer are surely needed’ but the goal is something quite different. In Islam’ fear of God’ His love and humility before Him must be felt genuinely and deeply’ but modern men’ Western-educated Muslim elite included’ appreciate them only intellectually’ remaining at a distance. Pessions are being increasingly directed towards politics and mass movements’ and individual religious emotions are considered neurotic… Many Muslim reformers wrongly think that the nation-state must first be established and then the individual reformed. The essential task’ ‘al-jihad al-Akbar’ however remains what it has always been’ viz’ ’ fighting against the satanic tendencies of one’s own inner being. Triumph of a nominally Muslim community is not necessarily the triumph of Islam or God. The community may well be dominated by completely non-Islamic impulses; in fact’ it predominantly is. In Islam’ it is the human self or soul which is unusually near to God’ and receptive and obedient to Him; so it should bear the burden of leadership and the ‘people’ are simply not qualified.

Unfortunately in most Muslim lands faith seems increasingly declining. Most Muslims living in predominantly Muslim states personally and voluntarily reject much of Islam’ such as prayer rite (salat), personal honesty’ etc. A person cannot be forced to have faith’ though he may be forced to be a hypocrite. Much of the pro-Islamic movements in the Muslim world is merely a search for a cultural identity in opposition to the more dominant western and communist social forces’ rather than a genuine relation to God. Because of the pressure of social and political movement in Muslim Asia and Africa. most Muslim reformers feel .they have little time to actually reform the heart of men; and many have almost no idea of how to do it. There is slavish imitation of western and communist models’ and parroting of their doctrines . and methodology. On the contrary’ according to one Prophetic tradition’ it is the purity and health of heart e-hieh guarantees the purity and propriety of the outward mindtm of a Muslim.

How can a man be educated to have sincere faith and puee and polished heart? A modern government has many techniques for controlling the minds of its citizens. How many of these techniques should actually be used? What is the difference between inculcating the faith and brainwashing? Is a sincere
relation to God actually teachable? These are important questions which Muslim philosophers and academicians must answer candidly. Tomind sufi techniques come into the question here. Sufism or ‘ihsan’ carries with it a strong religious attachment which can overside and often has overiddea more ordinar concerns. There have been numerous successful entrances of sufism into political and social affairs’ even in recent times. Sanusi’ National Salvation Party of Turkey’ founders of Ikhwan-al-Nuslimoon and Tableeghi Jamaat were sufies. Sufism places emphasis on character and individual spiritual development which is often missed by political parties. No wonder then that Sufism is spreading in the west more rapidly than other aspects of Islam.

Islam is not a novel religion that appeared in Arabia fourteen centuries ago’ preached by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). It is the religion God made known on the day when man first appeared on earth. He taught those first men the one sound way of living for all the human races. The prophets who are sent at intervals to different places’ came with the same summons: to submit to God; and this call’ in its perfect form’ was crowned by the mission of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). The Quranic verse’ ‘Religion with Allah is Islam’ embraces all the paths led by the different prophets. It breathes a universal spirit and includes many methods and obligations. A true Muslim’ according to the Quran’ must be clear of any taint of false regard for other than God he serves. He must be pure in both his beliefs and his actions. Religion that does not have this true character of Islam has been misused by men as a bond of nationalism’ or a tool of fanaticism’ or even a mean of worldly prosperity. Such false religion only adds to corruption. That is why the Quran says that those who do not follow Islam in its purity are permanently at a loss.

In general’ the religion of Islam has two aims. First’ to free the mind and spirit from involvements --- the invisible bonds that hold them in subjection to material things; and save people from a humiliating servitude: to others who are no better than themselves. Second9 to provide the right goal for all man’s actions and give him a purity of motive towards God and his fellow men. These are the twin sources of the Islamic spirit. At the present time they are a pointer to the universality of religion and its world-wide character since ‘There is no religion apart from Islam’.
The Quranic Methodology for Islamic Resurgence:

“God will not change the condition of a people they change what is in their hearts”.

This famous verse of the Quran must be pro. adhered to by people who aspire for Islamic resurgent Deep in Muslim thinking should be the conviction progress depends on the straightness of a man’s charst and the quality of his response to the will and purpose God. However complex’ dark and the situation’ interaction of God’s goodness sincerity effort brings hope. The Muslim':. :)e committed seeking salvation through comer’.:;ial action rath than a surfeit of individual prayers. Moreover’ methodology to be pursued by workers for is resurgence should be identical to the one mentioned in Quran for the Prophet in these two verses:

“Allah verily hath shown grace to the believers sending unto them a messenger of their own who reel unto them His revelations’ and causeth them to grow reform and teach the them the scripture and wisdom although before (he came to them) they were in flagr: error.

(Ale-Imran:16)

“He is Who hath sent among the unlettered ones messenger of their own’ to recite unto them revelations’ and to make them grow and purify’ and teach them the scripture and wisdom’ though there to for they were in error manifest”.

(al-Juma:2)

The above two verses of the holy Quran make crystal clear that we should follow the following four scheme of Islamic renewal:

(1) ‘Tilawat-e--Ayat’ or recitation of the holy Book.

(ii) ‘Tazkia’ or purifying or reforming both self and conduct.

(iii) ‘Taleem-e-Kitab’ or making explicit Divine injunctions.

(iv) ‘Ta’ leem-e-Hikmat’ or disseminating the wisdom and philosophy of Islamic faith.
Two things must be implemented immediately in order to launch this programmatic scheme:

Firstly, an organization should be established for the mass dissemination and exposition of the Quranic message. This organization should work for two objectives. It should strive to revive and revitalize the faith of Muslims in general to enlighten their minds and chaste their character. It should also provide through study circles and residential camps’ practical training and guidance for the intellectual, moral and religious enhancement of the people who respond to its call. It should convince those who sincerely aspire for an Islamic resurgence of the supreme importance of the academic movement referred to above. This organization; should also earnestly look for such brilliant young scholars who are willing to devote all their lives in the academic task required for them. It is no easy job to get hold of young and dedicated scholars in this age of exclusive pursuit for worldly gains. The problem of earning one’s livelihood has become so acutely difficult today that most young men spend all their energies and potentialities in this direction. In our society even when a person is able to manage his basic necessities he usually embarks on the never-ending process of raising his standard of life. But there are always in the world some pious and God-fearing persons. If some sincere and courageous men start this work with single-minded devotion they are with the help of Allah sure to find a good many intelligent and capable youths who will in accordance with a prophetic tradition make the learning and dissemination of Quranic wisdom the sole aim of their lives. The real need for the execution of a momentous tasks is always a strong inner urge for action which follows a particular emotion or idea. Once we have this inner urge new possibilities of success come up unexpectedly and the obstacles and difficulties are overcome. What needs to be done is to propagate with missionary zeal the necessity of the Islamic resurgence and revival. And if this is undertaken in earnest there is no reason why this movement should not attract devoted and persevering workers for its noble ideals.

8 The Prophetic saying reads:

خيركم من تعليم القرآن وعلمه [الحديث]
(The better amongst you are those who learn the Quran and teach and impart it to others)
Secondly, a Quranic research academy should be established so that it may start a popular movement for learning and teaching the Quran among Muslims themselves, that they may develop a fresh attitude of devotion to the study of the Quran. It is only when they come to cherish true faith and belief with a deep inward conviction that the light of the Quran will illumine their hearts and their feelings of reverence for the Holy Book will become profound. This Academy should educate and train such young scholars who have fully equipped themselves with both modern knowledge and Quranic wisdom, so that they may progress in the academic task before them.

As regards the exposition of Quranic wisdom and philosophy, as I have already mentioned earlier, there is an urgent need to revive a tradition of Muslim scholarship to produce a philosophical framework which is at least as articulate and rationally satisfying as all the other traditions of knowledge that are current today. No meaningful action to reorder Muslim societies is possible without the prior emergence of a new framework of knowledge and the adherence to it and of a substantial proportion of Muslims. That is to say, a prior commitment to Islam as an epistemology is a necessary starting point in the search for social, economic and political systems to be established in all Muslim societies.

**Note:**

[This paper was presented in the National Inter-university Seerat Conference held under the auspices of U.G.C. at Muzafferabad in June’ 1982.]

(A.J.K)

---

9 See page 19 above
After Sa’di, the great moralist, Shiraz produced another literary genius in the person of Shams al-Din Muhammad better known as Hafiz. Hafiz Shirazi was a great personality of his time in the realm of Persian poetry. His verses are marked with freshness of thought, simplicity of diction, sweetness of language and beautiful ideas. His name and fame spread beyond the border of Iran and, as a result, he was introduced to the European world also through the translation of his Persian Ghazals. The historians are of the opinion that he was invited by different rulers of the Muslim world. His contemporary Sultan of Bengal, Ghiyath al-Din A’zam Shah (792-812/1389-1409) was also among those who appreciated his sweet and sonorous Persian verses. He was sop of Sikandar Shah, an independent Sultan of Ilyas Shahi Dynasty of Bengal. He was not only a great lover of art and Persian Literature but also a patron of poets and scholars.

The circumstances leading to the correspondence of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din A’zam Shah with Hafiz Shirazi are as follows:

“Once the king fell dangerously ill and his recovery from his ailment was very slow in spite of the best efforts of his court physicians. In despair, he desired that he should be bathed by his three favorite concubines, Sarv, Gul and Lala. Fortunately, it so happened that as a result of the bath the king actually recovered. Naturally enough, he began to love the slave girls more than he did ever before. At this, the ladies of the ‘Harem’ and the other concubines of the king grew jealous of the aforementioned three concubines and began to taunt them as ‘Ghassalah’ (the bath-women of the king). When the king heard of this taunting remark, he composed extempore and recited the

2. Islamic Culture: Hyderabad Decan, Jan., 1953, pp. 15-16. In Prof. Mahfuz al-Haq’s opinion the story is untrue, but the main fact of correspondence is probable. He points out the inaccuracy in the current translation. (Riyad al-Salatin, pp. 105-106, quoted in History of Bengal, op. cit., p. 117)
Tarikh-i-Al-i-Jalayer ff (Tehran University, Iran 1345 Shamsi), p.387
following hemistich:

O cup-bearer! there goes the talk of the Cypress, the Rose, and the Tulip). But when he tried to complete the couplet he failed. He, then, ordered his court poets to complete the verse. It so happened that they too did not succeed to his satisfaction. He, thereupon, sent his envoy with rich presents to Hafiz, the illustrious contemporary poet of Shiraz and invited him to come to his court and supply the second homistich. Hafiz, however, did not come to ‘Sunargaon’, but sent a ‘ghazal’ of which the opening verse contained the above homistich as its first part to which he added the following homistich as the second part.

وین بحث با تَلَاثِه غِسْلَه مِیرود

‘And this discussion concerns the three bath-women’.

The poet intuitively referred to the three flowers as “Thalatha-i Ghassala” (the three bath-women). This versified reply of Hafiz that miraculously enough echoed a real incident of which he was unaware, is considered by some as showing the spiritual attainment of the immortal mystic poet of Shiraz”.

To ascertain the truth about the story that Sultan Ghiyath al-Din had three good looking maids in his ‘Karam’ called سرور (Gul), گللاه (Gul) and لاله (Lalah) is surely the function of a historian but the correspondence between Hafiz and the Sultan of Bengal is accepted as a strong probability by many well informed persons. The main object of this paper is to examine the authenticity of the statement of the author of ‘Riyad al-Salatin’ in the light of controversies among the historians and scholars of Persian Literature whether Ghiyath al-Din A’zam Shah referred to in the couplet of Hafiz Shirazi, was actually the King of Bengal or a King or a Prince of Kirman bearing the same name.

Maulana Shibli Nu’mani, an eminent historian and critic of Persian poetry, writes:

12 Shibli Na’mani Shir Ul-’Ajam, Vol.’ II (Taj Book Depot, Urdu Bazar, Lahore), p. 166. The date of succession is incorrect.
Sultan Ghiyath al-Din son of Sultan Sikandar, the King of Bengal who ascended the throne in 768 A.H., also wanted to enjoy and derive benefit from the poetry of Khwaja Sahib (Khwaja Hafiz). He, therefore, sent this verse ‘Saqi hadith-i Sarv-e-Gul-e Lala mirawad’ as a model and in reply to that Khwaja Hafiz composed and sent him this (‘ghazal’).

E.G. Browne, more or less, has accepted the views expressed by Maulana Shibli. He writes:

“Another Indian King, Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Ibn Sultan Sikandar of Bengal, stated by Shibli Nu’rnani (who is responsible for the story) to have ascended the throne in 768/1366, is said to have corresponded with Hafiz who wrote for him the ode beginning:

(O cup-bearer! there is a talk about the Cypress, the Rose and the Tulip,
And this discussion is going on among the three washer-maids
(as to who is the most charming).

M.A. Ghani, in his book ‘A History of Persian Language and Literature at the Mughal Court’, has also remarked that “Hafiz readily complied with his (Ghiyath al-Din’s) request and sent him the ode which not only was much appreciated by the Sultan but also considered as revelation. The lines bearing on the subject are as follows:

\[\text{O cup-bearer! there is a talk about the Cypress, the Rose and the Tulip,} \]
\[\text{And this discussion is going on among the three washer-maids} \]
\[\text{(as to who is the most charming).} \]

13 Ibid.
(O cup-bearer! there is a talk about the Cypress, the Rose and the Tulip;
And this discussion is going on among the three washer-maids
(as to who is the most charming.)
All the parrots (poets) of India will become sweet-tongued,
By virtue of this melodious Persian ode (Hafiz’s ghazal) which is being sent to Bengal.
Behold; how fast travels poetry annihilating space and time,
That this infant, though but one-night old, is undertaking a year’s journey.
O Hafiz! in the desire of (visiting) the court of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din
Be not silent, for your desire will be fulfilled by your lamentations and wailings.

Captain Charles Stewart in his ‘History of Bengal’ and Dr. Zahur al-Ding Ahmad in his book entitled ‘Persian Literature in Pakistan’ have also reproduced similar views.

Now it may be accepted as a historical fact that Hafiz of Shiraz did really send the ode under discussion to Sultan Ghiyath al-Din of Bengal. We find in history some references regarding invitations extended to Khwaja Hafiz by Mahmud Shah Bahmani (780-799/1378-1396) of Deccan and Sultan Ahmad Ibn-i-Uwuys (784-813/1382-1410) of Baghdad. But due to his

---

15 M.A. Ghani A History of Persian Language and Literature at the Mughal Court, Part-I (The Indian Press Ltd., Allahabad, 1929), pp.141-142.
16 Captain Charles Stewart: History of Bengal (Calcutta, 1813), pp. 92-93
18 E.G. Browne. op. cit. p.287 (Fn. I)
19 (i) Ibid.
sentimental attachment to Shiraz he could not accept the royal invitation as he himself observes:


(The exhilarating breeze of ‘Musalla’ and singing rivulet of ‘Ruknabad’ do not permit me to wander far away from them.)

On the other hand, Qasim Ghani, a renowned Iranian scholar and specialist on Hafiz, has ruled out the theory of Shibli and other aforesaid writers. His arguments are based on the following facts:

(1) The name of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din in the couplet of Hafiz actually refers to Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad bin Sultan Imad al-Din Ahmed of Muzaffarid Dynasty. The word Sultan is the part of the name of Ghiyath al-Din and not his title as it was a custom during the reign of Muzaffarid Dynasty.

(2) While referring to Sultan Ghiyath al-Din as one of the kings of India in the couplet of Hafiz, Shibli Nu’mani could not quote any authority to support his contention. It is believed that Shibli was misguided by the following couplet of Hafiz:


(All the parrots (poets) of India will become sweet-tongued, by virtue of this melodious Persian Ode which is being sent to Bengal.)

(3) E.G. Browne has also quoted this story in his ‘Literary History of Persia’ on the authority of Shibli but no reference to this is found anywhere.²⁰

(ii) Shirin Bayani p. 284
²⁰Qasim Ghani

Bahs Dar Athar Wa Afkar-i-Hafiz, Vol.1, Bank Milli Press, Tehran, Iran, 1361 A.H.), pp. 420-21
Late Pir Husam al-Din Rashidi has added a few more points in support of Qasim Ghani’s statement. He says:

(4) Sultan Ghiyath al-Din of Bengal ascended the throne in the year 792/1389, whereas Hafiz Shirazi expired in the year 791/1388. Under the circumstances there is no probability that Hafiz might have sent his ode to the Sultan of Bengal.

(5) The name of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din does not appear in any manuscript of ‘Raudat al-Salatin’ except in one which is found in Leningrad.

(6) On the basis of an article written by Dr. M.A. Ghafur, Professor, Department of Arabic & Persian, University of Chittagong, Pir Husam al-Din Rashidi expresses far-fetched meaning that the word ‘Bangala’ in the ode of Hafiz refers to trade relation that existed between Persia and India and that the Sugar-Candy referred to in the verse actually means ‘Sugar’ which was one of the main commodities of trade.

---


22 Pars (Quarterly journal), Karachi. Oct. 1967, p. 27
Now I would like to examine critically the views expressed by Qasim Ghani and his advocates in the light of recent researches and documentary evidences:

(1) Hafiz Shirazi has mentioned in his poetry the names of Shah Shuja, Imad al-Din Ahmed, Nusrat al-Din, Shah Yahya and Shah Mansur from among the rulers of Muzaffarid Dynasty. These king ruled in ‘Pars, Kirman, Yazd and Isphahan’ respectively and were surely in a position to patronise the poet. But there had been no king in Muzaffarid Dynasty by the name of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din as mentioned by Shibli, Browne, 1 C.E. Bosworth, 2 Muhammad Lane Poole, 3 Dr. Shirin Bayani 4 and Encyclopaedia of Islam. So the question of his patronage to Hafiz does not arise.

(2) The name of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din has been mentioned only once in Diwan-i-Hafiz. So it may, of certain, he referred to the king of Bengal. Had it any reference to the prince of Kirman whose name was Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad, it might have been, as a matter of fact, mentioned in the verses of Hafiz, more than once.

(3) Whether during the rule of Imad al-Din Ahmad his son Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad had attained such an age, literary ability and poetical understanding that he could appreciate the gazals of Hafiz and patronize him, is a matter of doubt.

(4) Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad was neither a famous political figure nor a literary personality of the Muzaffarid period and as such no historian has, at all, attached any importance to him.

---

23 (i) Shibli Nu’mani 
(ii) Shirin Bayani 4 op.cit, pp.162-64, 169 and 171. op. cit., p.386.
24 Shibli Nu’mani op cit., pp.162-171 
25 E.G. Browne op. cit., 161-170 
27 Lane Poole The Muhammadan Dynasties (Fredrick Unger Publishing Co., New York, 1965). pp. 249-250 
28 Shirin Bayani 4 op. cit., pp. 385-387. 
29 Encyclopaedia of Islam, pp. 798-800.
(5) Dr. Qasim Ghani has failed to cite an example from any authentic source that the word Sultan was used, in general or particular cases, for the princes during the time of the Muzaffarid Dynasty.

(6) With the reign of Imad al-Din Ahmad (father of Prince Ghiyath al-Din) the Muzaffarid Dynasty came to an end (in 795/1393) and all the princes belonging to this dynasty were killed by Timur,\(^{30}\) so the question of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad of this house ruling over Kirman and his relation with Hafiz can not be accepted.

(7) Even though the particular verse in the name of Ghiyath al-Din used by Hafiz is missing in the manuscripts of ‘Raudat al-Salatin’ other than the one preserved in Leningrad, the words ‘Hind (ہند) and ‘Bangala (بanga) in another verse of the same ode in the same manuscript do indicate the fact that this ode was composed for Sultan Ghiyath al-Din of Bengal.

(8) The mention of the names of three beautiful girls namely Sarv (سرو) Gul (گل) and Lala (لالہ) in the ‘harm’ of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din by the author of ‘Riyad al-Salatin’ also proves the fact that this ode was composed for Sultan Ghiyath al-Din of Bengal.

(9) Admitted that Shibli could not quote any authority while referring to the name of the Sultan of Bengal, similar is the case with Qasim Ghani. He also fails to cite any authentic source in support of his arguments. Moreover, he does not give any satisfactory explanation as to why Hafiz has used the word (ہند) (Hind) and (بanga) (Bangala) in his couplet addressed to Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad of Kirman (Iran).

(10) Apart from Shibli and Browne, we find the name of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din (of Bengal), to whom Hafiz has made a reference in his couplet, in ‘Riyad al-Salatin’ and ‘History of Bengal’ of Ghulam Hussain Salim and Captain Charles Stewart respectively. It may be noted here that these two works were compiled in 1788 A.D. and 1813 A.D. long before Shibli’s ‘Shi’r

\(^{30}\) E.G. Browne op. cit, p. 169.
al-Ajam’, and Qasim Ghani is not correct in saying that Shibli was the first author to point out the above fact.

(11) There have been discrepancies regarding the exact year in which Hafiz died. The contemporary and near-contemporary biographers and chroniclers of Hafiz such as Abdur Rahman Jami, Khund Mir, Fasih Ahmad Khwafi, Sudi and Allama Qazvini have accepted the date of death of Hafiz in the year 792/1389, whereas Pir Husam al-Din. Rashidi. has quoted the later sources in support of his statement that Hafiz died in 791/1388, the authentacity of which is open to doubt.

(12) Sayyid Ashraf Jahangir Simnani (d.808) who was a contemporary of Hafiz Shirazi and met him at Shiraz, while giving the description of the poets of that period in his book ‘Lataif-i-Ashrafi’, Vol. II (p.370) writes:

‘His poetry was considered as the ‘Voice of God (. V) and that he expired in the year 792 A.H, ‘’

(13) Another contemporary evidence in this connection is the writing of Gul Andam, a learned personality of the 8th century. He was not only a friend but also a class-fellow of Hafiz Shirazi who had first compiled Diwan-

31 Abdur Rahman Jami Nafahat al-UNS (Ed. Mandi Tauhidi pur Tehran, Iran, 1330 sh), p.614

32 Khund Mir Habib al-Siyar, Vol. III (Tehran, Iran, 1333 Shams’), p.316.

33 Fasih Ahmad Khwafi: Mujmal-i Fasihi (Ed. Mahmud Farrukh, Mashhad. 1339 sh), p.132.

34 Muhammad Afindi Sudi: Sharh-i Sudi Bar Hafiz (Tr. Ismat Sattar Zadeh, Arzang Press, Tehran, Iran, 1347 sh) p.s.

35 Allama Qazvini Please see (Fn.3 of S1. No 24) P.13/2.

i-Hafiz wherein he composed the following Qatah which gives the exact date of the death of Hafiz:

بسان با و صاد و زال ابجد
۷۷۰۹۲۴

زهر زجح میمون احمد
بسوی جنّی علی روان شد
فرید عصر شمس العین محمد

(14) According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, a, noted historian, coins prove that Ghiyath al-Din A’ zam Shah revolted against his father in 1388 A.D./790 A.H. and proclaimed himself as an independent ruler of Sonargaon. Subsequently, after the death of his father he finally succeeded him as the Sultan of the whole of Bengal in 1389 A.D./791 A.H.  

In the face of the aforesaid historical fact, the invitation of Ghiyath al-Din A’ zam Shah to Hafiz Shirazi can not be ruled out as improbable.

(15) It may be pointed out that Sugar Candy in Persian is called (قند پارس) (Qand-i-Pars) and not (قند پارسی) (Qand-i-Parsi). Qand-i-Parsi must, therefore, necessarily mean Sweet Persian ode. Moreover, the stress on the words زين قند پارسی (from this very sweet Persian Ode) is quite significant. It indicates that:

شكر شكن شوند همه طوطيان هند
زين قند پارسی كه به بنگال ميرود

(All the parrots (poets) of India will become sweet tongued. By virtue of this very sweet Persian Ode (Qand-i-Parsi) which is being sent to Bengal.)

38 J.N. Sarkar (Ed.): op. cit., p.114.
Hafiz Shirazi being a poet is hardly supposed to be so commercially-minded as to be interested to such a degree in the trade and commerce as to mention sugar in his verses.

(16) Another internal evidence from the same ode of Hafiz is the following couplet:

طَيِّبٌ مِّكانِ به بِينِ وَ زمانٌ وَرسوَكِ شعر
کین طفیل یکشته ره یک ساله میرود

(Behold! how fast travels poetry annihilating space and time, that this infant, though but one-night old is undertaking a year's journey.)

In this couplet "طفیل یکشته " (infant of one-night old) and (distance of a year's journey) refer to the ‘ode composed in one night’ and ‘distance from Shiraz to Bengal’ which may be covered in one year’s journey. If Qasim Ghani’s view is accepted that Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad referred to in the couplet of Hafiz, was the Ruler or Prince of Kirman and not of Bengal, the question arises: Is Kirman so far from Shiraz that it might take one year to cover the distance? Decidedly not.

The evidences produced above leave no doubt, whatsoever, that Sultan Ghiyath al-Din of Hafiz-i Shirazi was the same Sultan Ghiyath al-Din who ruled over Bengal (792-812/1389-1409). In the face of these conclusive evidences, both internal and external, I do not see any reason why a controversy should at all arise regarding the identity of Ghiyath al-Din, and why he should be mixed up with another person bearing the same name whose rule over Kirman is not proved.
IS A LEARNED MAN NECESSARILY EDUCATED?

DR. T.S.Y. SENGO

This paper tries to look into the notion of alienation as an aftermath of education. It attempt to see how education nurtures man and the way folkloric as well as modern education prepares him to fit into his community and gain a secure understanding of what the meaning of life is or ought to be and how ought men live their lives. Special interest is in the paradox of having a learned man who is not educated; e.g. a man who fails to live usefully in his own community.

Definitions

Education is the total sum of Knowledge Understanding, Experience and Appreciation Knowledge, consists of values, cognition, dispositions and socially and morally acceptable pedagogy.

Understanding deals with the content of education, the methodology and the justification for adopting the what, how and why of a certain education system.

Experience is the actual living of a person; his reality of things and the way he tries to live, with what, when, where, how and why questions.

Appreciation seems to be the highest level of education. It is the maturity capable of seeing abnormalities normal; and sometimes normalities abnormal. It is the ability to see similarities between differences and differences between similarities. It is the ability to bear and tolerate difficulties and situations, live and deal with almost everybody if need be, and deal critically and everlastingly with the self in fear of being spoilt with self-centricity-pomp, show-off etc. If anything, intellectual beauty is realized at this level whereat the individual could be considered for the qualities of a good man, a useful man to others.

Schooling:
For a person to acquire the excellences of education, schooling through the forms of Knowledge, Understanding, Experience and Appreciation is necessarily important. These Forms are a prerequisite for raising one’s intellectual ceiling and expanding one’s circle of experiences. A person’s ceiling and circle are two walls which seem to imprison him in a manner worse than an interrogating cell does. The upper the ceiling goes and the wider the circle becomes, the nearer to education and more free the person becomes. But the one sufficient condition on top of this, for one to qualify into the concept of the educated person is for that person to be useful both theoretically and practically to fellow human beings. In case of failure to meet this condition, the person could be called “great scientist”, “degree holder”, “a learned man” but not an educated individual.

The nature of man:

Is man “born with distinctive nature or that he acquires it through nurture and environment?” The answer is twofold. Partly, human nature is inborn. It is also acquirable. Neither is stagnant. Changes are continuously occurring in the biology and chemistry of the individual in his psychology as well as environment, culture and human life in general. The individual nature of man can therefore develop in one way or another by the kind of nurture to which one is exposed. The environment and its folkloric as well as the humanities within and without, have a lot to offer to the development of human nature. Putting it differently, man is both a natural as well as a social animal.

Man is distinguished from a goat or lion by one basic factor, that he has a mind which could be considered better than that of the natural animals. In fact he is meant to be the master of all creation in this world.

The variations in social men and in human communities or societies are mainly due to the potency of environmental and folkloric impact on the efficacy of deliberate nurture to develop a particular kind of nature. For example, a desert environment which is usually harsh due to its extreme heat, dust, wind, barrenness etc. will have an impact on the nature of its men. Folkloric institutions growing and flourishing from such nature could only

nurture men from the same footing. By doing that, folklore would certainly alienate men from their own natures as social animals, not only within their microcosms but also in the macrocosm of human race. Individually, one is faced with some inner conflicts of how to satisfy one’s desires, be they of nature or nurture.

**Folkloric education:**

Folklore is educational. It is full of general knowledge and it is experience itself. Its understanding is mainly aesthetical and its appreciative qualities are essentially on the human competence. The educational implications of folkloric values are usually those which seem to be necessary for leading a man to learn the wide range of human purposes and intentions and the conditions in which they are likely to occur. Man has to learn these things so as to understand oneself and other people in order to acquire the ability and interest as well as the methodology, if he wants to increase the sum total of human happiness.

Folklore, like literature, has a role in developing the human competence. This competence is the ability in man to increase one’s understanding of and sympathy with the ordinary man - especially showing how and why some men behave in extraordinary ways. Folklore is full of such extraordinary men in its folktales.

The competence also helps the individual to realize that there are people who are very different from ourselves and those we know, and gives us sympathy and understanding of them. The developed human competence enables one see the suggested life styles which could be very different from our own but very possibly much more interesting, exciting and profound.

And yet, folklore could be very destructive in terms of its other roles: inculcating senses of tribalism, nepotism, nationalism, hypocrisy, opportunism, slavery, assistantship, chieftainship and life-long adultery and fornication as a culture’s virtues.

In other words, folklore could easily deceive its active participants by its possible and very effective alienation; through which the individual could easily see one; s people as the only people and their values as standard and
static. One could easily worship miracles, wonderments, falsehood, deceit etc. instead of worshipping Allah (S.W), for that matter. One could easily find oneself lost, confused, even a life failure for no good reason at all.

Folklore and the nurturing of man:

How does folklore education nurture man? The notion of preserving and transmitting folklore should have a check point at which some serious criticism is allowed so as to make clear those values which are generally considered virtues and vices respectively.

By doing so, folkloric education could prepare man to understand his own self, his community, and the general public and what life really is to him and to others and his own role to be has to play.

The question of ‘how life ought to be’ could be attempted by one whose false conceit (i.e. negative or vicious folkloric effect) has been replaced by awareness and sincere acceptance of one’s ignorance, shortsightedness and small circle of experiences. This maturity in intellectuality and responsibility is vital if one has to attempt the battle against the established order; deception and misconceptualization of serious matters in life.

African traditional Education and the positive side of folklore have always aimed at the good life which “has been one of the most persistent concerns of men throughout history.”\(^\text{40}\) Education was to most African societies a means to an end and not an end in itself. Functionalism and practicalism was the order of the every day curricula. It was indeed an integrated experience which combined physical training, with character building, manual activities with- intellectual training, and its end objective was to produce an individual who was always and sincerely humble, honest, respectable, skilled, cooperative, understanding and ever useful to others.

While J.A. Majasan praises parents “who have been through the crucible of life patterns not through theoretical courses in institions and therefore can offer first hand information on how to go through life successfully”\(^\text{41}\)

though the platonic view considers most of them as incompetent in the real process of educating their children. Consider the examples of parents who are professional liars, gluttons, prostitutes, drunkards, racists, rapists, tribal sentimentalists etc. Most of such people would only want to transmit their own values to their children because they don’t have the eyes to see themselves as vicious, hence incompetent to give proper education to younger generations.

Folklore, like many other things, in twofold: its positive part is as good as that of modern education - especially on the one notion of usefulness as the end result and its negative part has clear weakneses which if not shown, could easily destroy a people, a nation or a whole race.

**Parents:**

Education is a multifarious concept. Many parents use the term “teaching” in a very loose way. They base their claim on “experience is the best teacher.” But teaching requires more than mere experience.

Certainly, most parents could instruct, indoctrinate, unpring, punish and control their children but not teach. Even the use of their experiences is questionable. “Many parents believe that only consious reality or pleasant and wish - fulfilling images should be presented to the child, that he should be exposed only to the sunny side of things. But such one-sided fare nourishes the mind only in a one-sided way, because real life is not all sunny.” This information implies the fact that such parents are ignorant of even their own folklore which is very rich in both the sunny and dark sides of life.

So before allowing parents to have anything to do with one’s child’s education, educationists of all specializations should properly educate the parents beyond one’s horizon. They should expose them well enough with the proper understanding of life and the right and desirable pedagogy so that they could serve as special tutors in the home based teaching and learning situations. Dynamism should be a quality inculcated into parents because “progress is only possible to one who is not linked today to what he was

---

yesterday, who is not caught for ever in that being which is already but can migrate from it into another”.  

**Folklore, education and modern man:**

With all its weaknesses, folkloric education, in the traditional sense, prepared man for practical life with some intellectual exercises. In the modern sense, folkloric education would include educational, artistic as well as aesthetic values of the modern man who is confronted with not only the advancement of science and technology but also with the enhancement of humanity. Science, and technology have done a lot for human development. Japan, United States of America and some European countries are good demonstrators of that success. But of course, remarks concerning the dehumanization of man and humanity in some of those areas, have been quite remarkable. Statements such as “there is everything in the States except humanity” are commonly spoken among African visitors.

Certainly, man cannot live on bread alone. Modern Science and technology has not yet been able to deal with sociological, cultural and spiritual predicaments of human nature by using formulaic means.

Folklore does help to solve some of these problems: for example, people perform stories “because the story has an appeal which is universal and has no age limits, it has been used by sages, prophets, and teachers through ages to pass on the great historical traditions and religious insights of a people, to awaken conscience, to spur, to action, to give joy and reflect beauty and to point up a truth by dramatizing it.”  

These roles of folklore are very educational and indeed very significant in man’s everyday life. Many people have little experience with outside world. As such the universal appeal is one very strong therapy for diseases such as tribal or colour sentimentalism. Great historical traditions, religious insights, imagination, conscientiousness, joy and reflection of beauty are extremely useful excellences which under modern education could only be inculcated into people by philosophically trained teachers.

---

The practical training, i.e. apprenticeship system stands as the cornerstone of folkloric education both traditional and modern. The impact of this training is also seen in sandwich system in engineering and internship in medicine, etc. That’s why J.A. Majasan concludes that “the apprenticeship system is the best way of producing competent professionals and it is the cornerstone technique in traditional education”.

It is because of the variegated exposures of real and possible imaginary experiences in folkloric life that folklore graduates can possibly be seer, to be part of and closer to their own communities and more able to bear famine, to fight a dragon, to understand surprises etc. In a better manner than a school learned man who is completely alienated from his own community by words and actions. Of course, as stated earlier, folklore is powerful in alienating its graduates into depth of darkness’s in which ignorance, foolishness and even stupidity are the permanent “friends”.

**Foreign education:**

Most African educational critics see the foreign model of education as a misfit to their circumstances; be it European, American, Asian etc. Because it carries with it most of its cultural and environmental seeds. It is usually a specialized education for the indigenous people which is meant to preserve and transmit relevant values of the respective societies. But colonial objectives of this education was planned to produce continuous “slaves” who would be in their own lands but negating their own values, skins, roots and refusing to work for their own countries. The same people, under a white or coloured master, would do extremely wonderful work. A good recent illustration of this fact was the Tanzanian employees of a Japanese firm known as Kajima. These people worked like bees to the surprise of the public. Certainly, there were other factors such as good pay, good care, and respect from the employer but the historical impact of foreign education haunted their commitments which would naturally differ if employed, let’s say, by the University. Mecco or Comworks. “It must be kept in mind that the Europeans, headed by the Church, “undertook the business of education not because it regarded education as good in itself, but because it found that it could not be its own proper work without giving its adherents, and

---

45 J.A. Majasan, op. cit., p.431.
especially the clergy, as much of the formal learning as was required for the study of the sacred writings and for the performance of their religious duties”. 46 This harsh remark has some relevance.

So education was reduced to the study of the sacred writings as understood by the foreigners, and blind obedience of performing religious duties some of which included disunity among same people, hatred between religions and social disorder of keeping pigs and selling pork in every street in communities’ which are heavily populated by Muslims isn’t this a religious right’s abuse and cause for social unrest?

**Modern education:**

Modern - education is a product of human effort, everywhere and throughout history. Its purpose is to really educate men of the world so that they can understand and appreciate their similarities as well as their ‘differences. Men who can live together and work together with love, order and peace.

In Africa today, we do not want the so-called modern education which is either heavily western or emphatically eastern; whose inner objectives and even the pedagogy are to Africa’s destruction. Africa is divided today more than ever before. Leaders who are supposed to meet regularly and discuss matters of mutual interest seriously keep aloof to each other because they belong to different soccer teams i.e. Washington, Moscow, Beijing and the like. Similarly, we do not need certificate holders “who are not only unemployable because of incompetence but also do not desire to exert themselves to earn their living”. 47

One would recommend a Universal but country-based modern education in which mankind and humanity would be the basis of thought, imagination and contributions. An education system which would liberate man from dependence on others, from physical and mental enslavement from spiritual anti ideological fanaticism and from fallacies of superiority versus inferiority complexes.

46 A.B. Fafunwa, op. cit., p.73.
The educated African of today, be here in Tanzania or elsewhere, must first and foremost acquire the qualities of a human being and accept wholly that he is a member of the global family of mankind. He must possess and demonstrate, not only knowledge, skill or knack but also somebody of knowledge: understanding of oneself of others of principles for the organization of facts, arguments and validation procedures. He must also show that he has the understanding and appreciation of the reasons an techniques of the how and why of things; i.e. ability to prove that he has acquired, the necessary “discerning mind and an active conscience” to justify one major objective of education, the “investment in the future.”

Mzee Jomo Kenyatta recommends that “an individualistic person had no place in the African Society. He would be considered a wizard, a person intending to do harm to his fellow men.” Professor A.B. Fafunwa recommends further that we need an education which must “release the springs of personality, development, - be concerned- with the individual child’s needs, emotions, wants and fears and intellectual, spiritual and physical growth into a mature adult capable of self-direction through self-discipline. It must be geared towards national (+ international) unity, national (+’African continental) reconstruction and social as well as economic progress.”

The educated versus the learned man:

The attempt of analysis done so far has raised a number of educational issues. For example, formal education has been emphasized because of peculiarity as a life long experience in Schooling. This nature of man has been shown to be complex because of its varied causes. Folklore has been suggested as an educational experience which could be incorporated into modern education. It has been an essential part of African traditional education and essentially the only basic education for the everyday life. Parents have been assessed and seen to require re-education if they are to assist their children in matters of Education Modern man has been seen to

49 Radiance No.5: September - December 1983 MSS Zone A Nigeria.
51 A.B. Fafunwa. op. cit., p.241 (emphases mine).
be more confused but complex to handle. So he requires a better system of education which re-directs him to a better useful role to others. Foreign education has been disapproved for reasons of irrelevance and destruction of its graduates, Modern education has been redefined to cater for all human beings.

The overall aim of this analysis has been to differentiate a learned man from the educated person. Not every learned man is a misfit to his community but according to this paper, a good number of such people, have acquired a lot of knowledge or skill, but have missed one or two things which are central to their everyday life, ‘For example, a Ph. D holder, be it in any field, ought not be seen as too high to reach, too busy to contact, too smart to touch, too pompous to look at, too rude to talk to, too academic to live otherwise; and worse still is for such a person to consider himself as the only personality, very special and very intelligent.

The educated man, after having realized that what he knows is very little compared to better knower, accepts the fact that he is just like any other human being and his role is to study, and as well as understand matters of life so that he can be more useful to other people. All he does would be disinterested because of his high-powered and deep-rooted objective of serving others, his nation, his continent and the whole world. Because of his understanding, his behaviour would demonstrate to the public his qualities of, being good, resourceful useful; hence educated.

In conclusion, a learned man could or could not necessarily be educated but an educated man ought to be learned on top his being good and useful.
The role of commonsense in philosophical inquiry has been very controversial. When the father of philosophy Thales declared water to be the ultimate substance, and Heraclites substituted it with fire, they deviated from commonsense. The Eclectics had a special distaste for commonsense. Parmenides looked contemptuously at the “way of belief” which is commonsense level of knowing. Zeno’s paradoxes were actually an attack on commonsense. They were meant to show the absurdity of commonsense level of conceiving things. Socrates often refuted some of the commonsensical or commonly held believe, e.g. life is preferable to death, with the help of his dialectical method. (See Apology and Crito) Plato discredited both the common man and commonsense world and instead declared the reality of world of Ideas revealed, in his opinion, to the philosopher. It was not until Aristotle that faith in some of the commonsense beliefs was restored. Aristotle was truly the first commonsense philosopher. He criticized Plato for duplicating the world, and endorsed the world accessible to common man.

In modern philosophy the picture is very different. Here we note that most philosophers, while arguing for or against any theory, feel prone to appeal to commonsense as their ultimate judge. Contradictory hypotheses have been maintained by these philosophers, each appealing to commonsense to prove his thesis. Descartes begins his Discourse on Method by glorifying commonsense in these words: “Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed.”

52 He often appeals to commonsense for rejecting commonsense beliefs. This is ironical Locke endorses Descartes’ faith in commonsense, and appeals to it frequently. Berkeley especially appeals to commonsense while rejecting the commonsense world.

In the contemporary British Philosophy, G.E. Moore is the strongest advocate of commonsense philosophy. The purpose of this paper is to delineate Moor’s position as a commonsense philosopher. While indentifying Moore’s position, I shall also underline different senses in which the word “commonsense” is understood.\textsuperscript{53}

**Section I**

1. Ordinarily by commonsense is meant a body of beliefs held in common by all men as true, including those who repudiate it. In his “Defence of Common Sense”\textsuperscript{54} Moore alludes to number of propositions which every one of us knows with certainty. A few such propositions are the following: “There are a number of human bodies existing which are like my body,” “My body is at a distance from that mantlepiece,” “The Earth has existed for several years in the past, and its inhabitants had been in contact with each other.” Moore argues that these propositions are believed to be true even by those philosophers who are out to refute them. These are some basic truisms which no philosopher can refute without absurdity. Philosophers frequently use such phrases as “we” or “us” while arguing for their theses. This shows that they already have a firm belief in their own existence and the existence of other people. Moore shows the absurdity involved in such assertions of a philosopher, as “No human being has ever known of the existence of other human beings with certain.” (Moore points out that this will amount to saying that “There have been many other human beings besides myself and none of them (including myself) has ever known of the existence of other human beings.” Indicating the absurdity of the above and similar assertions Moore tries to show that no philosopher can ever sincerely doubt these commonsense beliefs, though he might pretend to do so.

2. By commonsense is sometime meant acceptance of some beliefs that are commonly held though not universally held. Some examples of commonsense beliefs of this class are, belief in the existence of God, belief in


immortality of soul, and so forth. These beliefs can be appropriately classified as a common man’s beliefs. Moore does not plead for some such beliefs that a common man may hold. Moore is not interested in establishing or refuting them. He argues for those beliefs only which are held to be true by all men without exception. They are assumed even by those who reject, and question them.

3. Commonsense is many times referred to as a way of knowing such that it requires no evidence or proof to hold certain propositions. When some propositions are known indubitably and without any mental effort, they are said to be known by commonsense. Commonsense is often identified with intuition. It is sometimes understood to be a faculty of primary truths. Philosophers have sometimes meant by it an intuitively-based common consent. Moore accords to commonsense in this sense also. He draws a number of propositions (some of which have been alluded to before) about which he is confident that they are known with certainty and no extra effort of mind is required to understand them. They are ordinary truths that are known in the ordinary way. But the fact that such truths are ordinary and are known in the ordinary way does not disqualify them for being truths. Moore’s defence of commonsense is a defence of such ordinary truths which hardly deserve any mention, but disregard of which has caused a lot of misunderstanding and confusion about the nature of knowledge. Such ordinary truths as “I have a body,” or “my body is at a distance from that mantle piece,” and a number of similar truths about material objects are known with certainty to every one of us. They should not be ignored or disregarded simply because they are labeled as commonsensical. Moore sees no reason to disregard them. Nor does he think that he needs to draw any sophisticated logical arguments to refute those who disregard such simple unsophisticated truths.

4. By commonsense is often meant certain truths which cannot be made evident by deductive proof, but there is always absurdity in holding opinion contrary to them. Zeno’s paradoxes are a distortion of such commonsense truths. Such truths are easily distorted by dialectical reasoning and therefore it is hard to defend them by arguments, but their denial leads to absurd conclusion. Moore defends such truths when he defends commonsense. He shows the absurdity involved in some philosophers’ claim
that we cannot know with certainty that we exist or other people exist. Moore points out that if this is true, then all philosophical discussions and controversies should come to an end, because, it would imply that no one has ever held any views about these matters, as no one has ever lived. It would imply that since Moore’s fellow philosophers are never known with certainty to have lived, Moore can safely disregard what they supposedly have said. This is a very interesting conclusion which Moore shows to follow without any laborious reasoning. Moore’s philosophical opponents might feel irritated by such a reply. They might think that Moore is not serious. But Moore certainly does not want to make fun, and he is very serious. He wants the idealists, and his other philosophical opponents to realize that their views are queer and that commonsense view is not funny and stupid.

5. By commonsense is sometimes meant some propensities to believe in certain ways. Sometimes when definite reasons are lacking in favour of or against a certain proposition and when there is a state of indecision, as far as arguments go, we have a propensity to believe in a certain way about a certain matter. Our belief in free will would be an example of it. Whatever may be the arguments in favour of or against free will, but, that we all have a propensity to believe that we are free to some degree, can hardly be denied. Moore defends commonsense in this sense also. In “The Status of Sense Data”, Moore examines the question, whether sensible exist when they are not perceived? He writes:

“I think perhaps a certain amount of weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain kinds of sensible do” i.e. exist when unperceived.”

However, we are not sure as to what extent Moore would rely upon some of our propensities to believe. But he would, perhaps, rely upon these propensities more than on some sophisticated arguments through which we draw extravagant conclusions about reality. Here it is important to remember, that Moore is not a critical commonsense realist like Price. (Cf Sanders Pierce’s “Fixation of Belief”).

---

as true than what Pierce would admit as true on the basis of commonsense. Moore believes in a naive world accessible to laymen as well as to philosophers, despite the philosophers’ attempts to disown it.

Section II

Norman Malcolm in his article “Moore and Ordinary Language”57, comes up with a different interpretation of Moore. According to Malcolm, Moore’s defense of commonsense is, above all, a defense of ordinary language. In Malcolm’s opinion, Moore regards philosophical paradoxes as the result of rejection of ordinary language. When philosophers reject certain propositions such as “there are material things,” or “there are bodies,” they intend to imply that these propositions mean something different from what they are ordinarily, understood to mean. In doing this they are rejecting ordinary language. Moore is interested in pointing out that the above or similar propositions should not be taken to mean anything different from what they assert. There is no sophisticated meaning behind the ordinary meaning. Ordinary language is the correct language. To philosopher’s assertion “no material things exist unperceived,” Moore would reply “What you are saying is absurd, for no one perceived my bedroom while I was fast asleep last night and yet it. certainly did not cease to exist”.

Malcolm points out that when Moore gives such replies he is certainly not begging the question though apparently he might seem to do so. He thinks that the essence of Moore’s technique of refuting philosophical statements consist in pointing out that the philosophers’ sophisticated statements misrepresent the meanings of ordinary language statements. To the philosopher’s statement “we do not know for certain the truth of any statement about material things, “Moore’s reply would be, “Both of us know for certain that there are chairs in this room and how absurd it would be to say that we do not know but only believe it and that, perhaps it is not the case--how absurd it would be to say that it is highly probable and not certain.”

Now what kind of a reply is Moore giving in the above or similar statements? According to Malcolm, Moore is simply saying that in ordinary

language when we use such words as “material things”, we mean such objects as tables and chairs. In ordinary language “knowing” means knowing with certainty and not simply believing. Moore’s argument is that, it would be absurd to say that a person who is sitting on a chair is only believing that he is sitting and not really knowing it with certainty. Moore is indicating that ordinary language does not function the way philosophers understand it. If a child who is sitting on a chair says that is only probable that he is sitting on a chair and does not know with certainty that he is actually sitting on a chair, we shall immediately correct him and tell him that the word “probable” does not behave in the ordinary language in the way in which he is employing it, and that he should employ the word “know” instead of “probable” in the present case to express his thought. Ordinary language does not misrepresent facts: whereas philosophers distort facts by employing sophisticated language in interpreting ordinary language statements.

In Malcolm’s opinion, Moore’s argument is that Philosophical paradoxes arise when some ordinary language statement is misinterpreted. When Berkeley argues for “esse est percipi” he actually misinterprets ordinary language in which “there is an apple” means “an apple is physically present whether I take notice of it or not.” Most philosophical controversies are the result of attempt to find some hidden or sophisticated meaning behind the simple meaning of statements. When Moore defends commonsense he defends ordinary language as a satisfactory medium of representing facts.

However, if Malcolm is right, it might be asked of Moore, if ordinary language is suitable to express facts, then, what is the task of a philosopher? Is all philosophical activity fruitless? No. Moore thinks that the philosopher is still needed. His task consists in analyzing the meaning of the ordinary language statements. In “Some Judgments of Preception”, 58 and “The Status of Sense Data,” Moore himself undertakes an analysis of ordinary judgments such as “I see a table” or “I see a chair.” Here he attempts to explicate the meaning of such ordinary statements and comes up with his theory of sense

data according to which what we immediately see when we see an object is “part of the surface of the object,” and the rest we infer.\textsuperscript{59}

It seems to me that if Malcolm is right, and if philosophical task consists in analysis, then, in analyzing the meaning of ordinary statements, Moore is committing the same error for which he condemns the philosophers; viz., trying to find new and sophisticated meaning in ordinary statements. Ryle rightly points out that when we see an object we never see the sense data but the object itself.\textsuperscript{60} We see tables and chairs and not “part of the surface of tables,” or “part of the surface of the chair”. We do not see “patches of color,” or “glimpses of horse races.” No deep analysis required to understand what we mean by seeing “robins” or “horse races.” It is abundantly clear that we see “robins” and “horse races” and not their glimpses when we say that we see “robins” or “horse races”.

It is interesting to note that Ryle is also a defender of ordinary language. He is interested in eliminating all such theories or myths from our philosophical vocabulary which have no use in ordinary language. The theory of sense data is also the philosopher’s myth. In ordinary language we never say that we “observe” sense data. We never say that we observe “patches of color” or “glimpses of things”. If there were such things as sense data, there would have been common expressions appropriate to them.

Though Moore does not doubt the truth of the statements of ordinary language, he thinks it appropriate to analyze their meaning. But when he undertakes an analysis of statements such as “I see a table,” or “I see a chair,” he ends up with the same sophistication and deviation from commonsense for which he charges his opponents. It may be argued against him that his opponent, Berkeley, was also undertaking an analysis and interpretation of our commonsense notion of matter found in ordinary language when he asserted “esse est percipi.” In what way, then, is Moore different from his opponents?

\textsuperscript{59} Moore, however, complains that we have no appropriate word in ordinary language suitable for expressing sense data. “The Status of Sense Data” op.cit.

Berkeley, in his analysis of material things such as an apple, constantly appeals to commonsense. What is an apple? A jumble of qualities. It has some color, some shape, some size, some taste, and it feels hard. What is a color or a size? It is a sensation that I have when I see an object. What is taste? A sensation that I feel when I eat it. What is smell? An olfactory sensation. What are these sensations? Ideas in the mind. Thus, concludes Berkeley, an apple is nothing but a jumble of qualities or ideas in the mind\textsuperscript{61}.

Berkeley’s analysis of apple leads him to deny the physical reality of an apple independent of the mind. Moore’s analysis leads him to deny that the observer sees the table or the inkstand. Moore may be right in his analysis and Berkeley may be wrong. But the whole question is, is commonsense approach to reality perfectly satisfactory, or do we need a philosopher to tell us, with the help of his tools of analysis, what the world is like? If Moore thinks that we have a perfect access to reality through commonsense, which is represented by ordinary language, then I do not see how can he justify his sense-data theory which is another sophistication in philosophy and a deviation from ordinary language. If Moore is an ordinary language philosopher who does not allow any sophisticated meaning of ordinary statements, then, philosophical analysis becomes an illegitimate task.

One of the interesting convergences between Islamic modernist and Islamic fundamentalist or revivalist thought is the concept that the Muslim can separate and absorb modern technology without having to absorb the values that accompany it, and do so with relative ease. That it is all a question of niyyat: of intention.

But I doubt there are few areas of life subject to such radical technicalization as mass communication which could more readily disapprove that particular concept. Yet the concept has shown an amazing resilience since its appearance in the Muslim world - at first only within very limited circles in the earliest years of the 19th century, to flower more fully as part of otherwise rival ideologies (secular nationalist, Islamic modernist, revivalist) in the 20th century. In the West however this concept - in its basic or universal assumption about the relationship of spirituality and technology - has been profoundly shaken over the past few decades. 62

This paper offers a series of observations concerning the nature of the process and effects of modern mass communication as a particularly virulent

62 See the work of the Traditional School Guenon,, Coomaraswamy and similar but quite independently arrived upon analysis by the French Protestant social philosopher Jacques Ellul or the more related Catholic ethical Philosophy of E.F. Schumacher.

In the specific Islamic context the concept of the technological neutrality is most thoroughly challenged in the work of S.H. Nasr, Abu Bakr Siragadeen (Martin Lings) (see his particularly courageous 1964 lecture at Al Azhar, translated into English as “The Spiritual Function of civilization,” in The Sword of Gnosis (Baltimore, 1974). Gai Eaton.(Hassan Abdul Hakim), Syed Ali Ashraf, Syed Muhammed Naquib al-Attas, and Abdullah Nuridin Durkee elaborate upon or approximate this perspective. The boldest challenge to the concept (a challenge that is unfortunately marred by the author's evolutionary utopianism) and with particular reference to mass communication is to be found in the work of Marshal McLuhan. The Guttenberg Galaxy (Toronto, 1962) and Understanding Media (New York, 1965).
and distorting form of technicalization of Muslim society and contemporary Muslim consciousness. Or, to use a more specific vocabulary, this paper will propose examples of how mass communication technologies, regardless of their apparent content ("message") can distort or even subvert the spiritual environment of Islam.

1. The determinants of a mass communication are that the communication in question is addressed to a large and relatively undifferentiated audience and mediated by technology; a technology that renders the communication impersonal. Therefore mass communication is by definition a modern phenomenon, and to such an extent (as is closely argued in the critically important work of Eisenstein)\(^\text{63}\) that we might reverse the dictum and state that the modern world is to a great degree the result of an ever-expanding system or nexus known as mass communication.

The traditional or pre-industrial equivalent of mass communication - communication to a relatively large group of people but without benefit of mediation by modern technology - was the khutbah delivered in large mosques from an elevated position - the member or pulpit, and we would characterize the use of the pulpit today as ‘soft technology.’

In the West (where the technicalization of communication as an inseparable element of secularization occurs much earlier in time than in the East) it is again the sermon and the lesson, but delivered in the medieval cathedral.

The dawn of mass communication, then, is the late 15th -16th century overthrow of the pulpit by the printing press, and the overthrow of the priest by the printer-businessman as the arbiter of what is relevant information and what values inform that information.

I would suggest this is not a historic accident, nor that its duplication in the Muslim world from the 19th century onward is still another historic accident but an inescapable component of an axiom that the quantification (mass) and impersonalization ("hard" technology) of any human

\[^{63}\text{Elizabeth L. Eisenstein. The Printing Press. As an Agent of Change (Cambridge, 1979); The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1983).}\]
phenomenon is inescapably desacralizing, since the sacred is by definition personal and qualitative. And I hope to illustrate that axiom in the observations that follow.

The same dawn of mass communication --Guttenberg’s printing press, also heralds the overthrow of the scribe by the printer.

In Europe scribal culture was sustained by communities of monks, or groups of religious-educated laity working under the direct discipline of ecclesiastical authority. In Islam scribes were usually members of the ulema, or if not, then at least pious literate amateurs, whose efforts were invariably for the sake of other worldly reward.

In either case - Christianity or Islam - control (which is not so much the determination of what is written as of what is reproduced) rested in the hands of men specially trained in religious disciplines, who at the very least formally acknowledged what they took to be Truth rather than a printer’s profit as their fundamental pursuit.

I am not trying to suggest that printers are by definition impious (on the contrary the earliest Protestant printers were ultra-zealous in their faith and the first book to be printed was Luther’s bible) but that in no way negates the long term transformation, whereby the invention of movable type took news and literature out of their respective traditional “formats” - the pulpit and the scribal centre and into the print shop; which meant out of the hands of the moral and spiritual authority of Religion and into the hands of whoever and whatever the printer might be. And whatever else he might be, the printer was in business which meant that news and literature had at least as much significance as commodities for sale as they did as vehicles for truth and salvation.

Since most people in Europe in the 15th century were by contemporary standards deeply religious - much like the Muslim world in the late 19th century - even secularizing forces operated within a religious ambiance and the most popular books were religious in content, as to a certain degree they still are today in most of the Muslim world, Initially printers continued to publish many of the same religious books the monks once so painfully copied - again a situation which has held true in the Muslim world, even up
to present times, given the crumbling but still apparent consensus that the most spiritually significant and scholarly conscientious literature of our various Islamic religious sciences were almost all written prior to the introduction of the printing press.

2. The public address (p.a.) system that has been mounted in nearly every urban mosque - whether for use to call the neighborhood to prayer or to amplify activities within the mosque, both inside and outside the mosque - has had several disastrous results.

Obviously if the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in reference to the human voice told the Believers not to invoke Allah’s Name or recite Qur’an loudly, then a system that is louder than any imaginable human voice must be questionable. Even more so when we recall that the prophet (pbuh) specified that Muslims were to use the human voice rather than bells or horns - the mediation of technology - to call the people to prayer. But what we hear from a p.a. system is not the human voice - it is the electronic simulated reproduction of a human voice. The better the system (and most systems in Cairo, where I live, are very poor indeed) the less “noise” or distortion, the more the product of the p.a. system resembles the human be voice, but never is.

The ulema of the Indian subcontinent opposed the introduction of the loudspeaker in the mosque in the nineteen-thirties, but they were overwhelmed by both modernist and revivalist currents. However Egypt’s extraordinary Sheikh, Metwelli al Sha’rawi, continues the periodically to challenge the use of p.a. systems.

The human voice functions as a measure in two different contexts that relate to the mosque. Within the mosque its range is sufficiently limited (unless consciously extended by the soft technologies of pulpit projection sound-reflecting mihrab) so that any number of activities can occur simultaneously in a traditional living mosque of significant size between the hours of collective prayer. Throughout the mosque circles devoted to listening to lessons in fiqh, tafsir or hadith; to Qur’an recitation or to dhihr (invocation) are all mutally compatible.
The use of a loudspeaker at such moments destroys this rich spiritual diversity and imposes but one mode or religious practice in its place; the broad parameters of traditional orthodoxy replaced by a technological totalitarianism. When the p.a. system in turn carries the sound of prayer or sermon through the neighbourhood it synthesis breaches the privacy of the Muslim home, rupturing the concentration of Believers reciting their prayers, reading Qur’an or invoking the Name.

At the same time the use of a loudspeaker to call prayer distorts the spiritual geography of the neighborhood. According to Hassan Fathy, the limits of the human voice calling prayer from minaret or roof top, marked the point where a new mosque would be built in any expanding community. Since large mosques invariably had several high minarets, and, from the same perspective of architectural harmony, small mosque had small minarets, the mosque that was capable of sheltering large number of Believers had more minarets of greater height and thus greater range.

Today, the smallest neighbourhood “storefront” mosque in Cairo without visible roof or minaret can operate an amplifier that for reasons of tortuous pride can be heard a mile away.

Aside from the jarring clash of electronically distorted calls to prayer that abort the Prophet’s (pbuh) decision to make use of the beauty of the human voice, the effect sounds as If the quarter has far more mosques than It needs, when in fact Cairo, and probably most other of the growing cities of the Muslim world, have an insufficient number of mosques to handle the vast numbers who come to-the Friday communal prayers, and perform them in streets and on sidewalks outside the mosque for lack of space within.

3. Why was the printing press introduced at such a late date in the Muslim world, or never “developed” still further to the East in China, where movable to was Indeed first invented long before Guttenberg? Certainly not because of any inherent objection to adaptation and synthesis by Islam and the world civilization It produced. Prior to the colonial epoch and the post-colonial modern secularist epoch - epochs that share the experience of, imposed, artificial and subversive cultural synthesis forced upon Islamic civilization, Islam is recognizable as the great universal religious phenomenon that it is precisely because of its characteristic of racial and cultural synthesis.
Just as the last Prophet confirms all past prophecy so this last and most universal sacred civilization salvages the residual knowledge (including technique) of the ancient worlds. To this swooping generalization should be added two qualifications: That the synthesis was always in the service of an aware (and comfortably triumphant) Islamic consciousness, which was quite capable over a historic period of time to discriminate between those, natural and philosophical sciences on one hand that le themselves to Islamization, and tragic theatre naturalistic art on the other.

The second qualification: That the ancient worlds however much they may have differed in dogma from Islam, shared a sense of the sacred, and an adopted/Islamicized forms or techniques, if not purely Islamic, where nevertheless never intrinsically) decasualizing, e.g., the difference between the. inescapable impact and ultimate Islamization of Byzantine’ or Persian dynastic political forms on one hand, and t intrinsic revolt against Heaven and denial of God known the French Revolution on the other.

But one could argue from the perspective of control that the Ottomans had eyes and ears and were no fools and indeed the first Muslim writers to observe a, comment upon the French Revolution were universally) convinced that it was fitna (subversion, seditious dissent, and corruption).64

As Eisentein has so clearly documented, the print’ press was as inevitably the most potent weapon of eve subversive (or “progressive”) force in the West; of worldliness, licentiousness and secularism in the late Renaissance, of a plethora of sects splintering t religious unity of Europe during the Reformation; of the Enlightenment philosophers and their popularizers, who banished God from social and scientific discourse and paved the way for the French Revolution, and finally, the Revolution itself, primarily a product of journalists and publicists the discontented alienated class par excellence of 18th-century European society.

But I can only suggest that there was more Otooman distaste for the printed word than fear of subversion, and when printing in Turkish and

---

64 Unlike so many contemporary Muslims and specifically militant Islamic writers who appear so enamoured of a vocabulary and “dynamic” bequeathed by the French Revolution.
Arabic finally came to Istanbul it was first in the form of an official’ press. Rather we might, consider that The Book - and thus; by metapoetic understanding the father of all books, is t Untreated Word of God, which was transmitted to ti Prophet and then reproduced as sacred speech by t Prophet’s voice, to be preserved in its entirety in the memory of the earliest Believers, and, as a religious necessity, preserved however modestly in the memory of every Muslim for use in ritual prayer until the end of time.

Certainly there has never been a century in the 15 centuries of Islamic history when the written or printed text of Qur’an has been as cheaply and massively available as the century we now live in. But I cannot imagine even the most enthusiastic revivialist characterizing this century, in contrast to any of the preceding ones, as notably an age of faith and unity.

In Afghanistan, where the Muslims have waged one of the most extraordinary examples of popular resistance in defence of the Faith against outrageous odds, the number of printed Qur’ans in circulation until only a few decades ago was barely more than a handful; the extent to which the Qur’an was contained within the memory of the typical Afghan to his day is as extraordinary as the jihad waged for its sake.

(And to digress to an earlier observation, the memorizer of Qur’an does so metaphorically as well as literally at the foot of orthodox religious authority - the modern reader of Qur’an, so often self-taught, does so often at the danger of self indulgent and heretical interpretation).

I refer then to that dimension of Qur’an which transcends the conscious understanding of the meaning of the text by the rational intelligence, which is but one dimension of understanding - especially in Islam where belief in the Unseen is at the core of Islamic consciousness.

I refer then to Qur’an as sacred resonant speech, and in particular to the Beautiful Names of Allah, which are what Allah Reveals of Himself in Qur’an and whose recitation, according to authentic traditions of the Prophet (pbuh) are doorways to Him in this life and to His Paradise in the life to come. Perhaps that is why those Qur’anic passages that are particularly laden with the Mercy of His Names are inevitably the most popular for memorization and pious reproduction as calligraphy.
With this as context we can appreciate why the traditional Muslim would stop and examine any stray piece of paper that he passed by, in the event the paper contained one of the Names and as such was subject to desecration by dirt or any ritual impurity. Fikr tells us how to dispose legally of paper containing the Names.

Consider this aspect of traditional Islamic life; the reverence for Allah, for His Revelation that reverence: reflects and reinforces, and then consider the implications of a modern Arabic-language or Urdu or Persian language newspaper, containing in all its varied (and vocally sacralizing forms) the names of God, as direct reverence to Allah; as spiritual adab (insha allah, bismillah, masha Allah, subhanallah and in the customary forms of Muslim names e.g. Mr. Abdur-Rahman, Mr. Abad’Allah, Mr.Abdul Karim.

The oral opportunity for self-purification that each of these occasions promises-invocation of the Name, spinyitual adab, and addressing by, Name our brothers-In-submission to Him, becomes displaced in the context of a fast offset printing press capable of producing a quarter of a million copies of a ten or twenty page Arabic-script newspaper; displaced by this great processing plant for the desacralization of the Word and most particularly of the Names. At the very least, indifference to the Name by virtue of its mass and impersonal vehicle; at worst, the inevitable desecrating use of those millions of pages of daily newsprint for fishwrapping; for treatment as trash, A, desecration to which we are all at best unintending and unwilling accomplices, If we are to remain sane and functioning in a rapidly desacralizing world,

4. Several years ago an American Muslim film producer put together a project to make a movie about the Prophet (pbuh) originally called “The Messenger” and, eventually released under the title “The Message”. The script took note of the repugance of orthodox Islam to portraying any image of the Prophet (pbuh) (even Persian printing left the Prophet’s face blank or veiled his face in light) by not casting an actor as the Prophet (pbuh), Instead, in a curious way, the camera (which means my mind and the mind of every other viewer) “becomes” the Prophet (pbuh) for in specifically cinematic terms, as McLuhan reminds us, our mind is an extension of the camera.
The script was submitted to al-Azhar, and since this formula had been used successfully in earlier Arabic films approval was expected. Instead the late Sheikh al-Azhar, Dr. Abdul Halim Mahmoud (rahmatulla) rejected the script.

Sheikh Abdul Halim’s argument was essentially this: We do not portray the Prophet (pbuh) in cinema because his life is more than a life - it is a sacred commentary on the Qur’an. If we understand the Qur’an by virtue of the Prophet’s life, how then do we understand the Prophet? By virtue of his Companions; their lives are sacred commentaries upon his.

If we read about a Companion in hadith and sirah, or experience this material through someone’s recitation, we acquire a sense of his attributes, which are of meaning in - asmuch as they reflect the divine attributes. With those attributes literally in our mind, our spiritual imagination has the capacity to shape an image within our mind that cannot but be infinitely closer to the reality of the Particular Companion, than the image of the Hollywood or even Cairene actor hired to portray Hamza or Bilal - as in, the case of “The Message.”

But if we are exposed to that cinematic image, it is indeed the false-Bilal or the false-Hamza - an image that reflects the soul of an actor who could easily be an alcoholic, or a drug-user, a transmitter of AIDS, an atheist - which is implanted on our mind and into our subconscious, and not the result of our transcendent spiritual imagination. Consciously or not, Sheikh Abdul Halim was describing the brain-washing effect, and those who have had vivid movie-inspired nightmares or daydreams know from experience the troth- of his remarks... Film and video can only dilute the possibilities available to. us via our spiritual imagination.

The corollary of this is that “baraka does not track”\textsuperscript{65}.” Which is a way of saying that we cannot make visible what is present but invisible; what can even be overpoweringly present--such as a sense of sanctity and awe; the presence of angles or any other dimension of Allah’s Mercy.

\textsuperscript{65} To “track” is to record a sound or picture electronically on tape for reproduction.
There is a debate at this point about photography ---be it film or still photos for the photographic process, which is a mechanical reproduction of an image, does in its form as a negative “capture” the image with light before mechanically reproducing the image by printing. The X-ray negative can catch what is materially there but hidden; the controversial Kirlian technique can reportedly capture the image of an otherwise invisible aura projected by people with recognizable psychic powers.

Sometimes we look at black and white photographs of holy men --- I think of certain photographs I have seen ---and we are convinced we can see in their faces traces of the illumination of their souls visible as light.

But there are no such possibilities in electronic media-television and video--where even the visible world does not exist as a fixed image, captured chemically as light upon film. Instead the image is instantaneously broken down into color-coded electronic charges, and reassembled out of so many electronic “dots” on the screen. The ultimate screen is our mind where we reassemble those dots into the simulation of whatever was visible, but never seen. In video and TV everything is a screen; the cameraman looks at his viewfinder, not through it at what is there in front of him; he is looking at a tiny black and white TV screen which shows him a fuzzy simulation of what is visible.

Continuous efforts in my own professional work as a TV producer to record scenes that contained extraordinary intensities to me and to other Muslims when experienced personally always ended in failure. Those intensities or spiritual properties so-to-speak are invisible or “transvisible” and cannot be simulated by electronic media; my pictures never reflected my awareness.

What video and live TV does record and very well indeed, is movement and change which is manifest in visible and strong emotions, acts of violence, acts of passion and the facial expressions of turbulent souls that are not at peace.

Even the baraka of virgin nature and the cosmos does not track. Its essence, which makes it an ayat (sign) of Allah, is lost in the simulation that replaces image.
Attempts to produce a more contemplative video for educational television have for that reason failed. Somehow the same breath-taking scene of virgin nature that could hold the attention of even ordinary, uncontemplative modern man for many minutes or even hours fails to hold anyone’s attention after but a relatively few seconds on the television screen. Video and TV are intrinsically anti-comemplative. When we find a television film of the natural world to be satisfying it is invariably one that involves continuous movement and change of scene and camera angle—tropical fish, herds of wild animals on the run or even intimations of violence—sharks, lions, erupting volcanoes.

Video and TV are intrinsically anti-contemplative. But if religion, and in particular Islam, is by definition concerned above all with the Invisible world—with Allah, His Angels, Heaven, Hell, the Day of Judgement, then the limits of TV and video can only provide a picture of Islam that is profoundly distorted. Psychologically speaking, as any TV newsman knows, what you don’t have a picture of doesn’t “exist.”

Those limits inherent in the technology suggest that the tendency of international media to focus upon Islam as violence, upon Muslims as hysterical mobs and threatening, grimacing individuals, is not only an issue of unquestionable bias, and/or commercial exploitation of the sensational, but also in the nature of the medium; the technological nature.

The most powerful images I retain of a contemporary “Christian” experience from my years of professional video tape viewing, are the bizarre TV pictures of Reverend tone’s last days and the final scene of that mass suicide in the jungles of Guyana.

5. What then are our options? Especially for the increasingly centralized, urbanized Muslim world that has lost the protective traditional environment of rural or dispersed urban life? The backwaters are vanishing, and, as I have noted elsewhere in another context, the entire Muslim world is rapidly being incorporated into an international secular culture based on mass communication, that is breaching the cultural forms that protected Islamic consciousness.
I know a small number of highly educated individual Muslims who do not watch television or read newspapers. Some watch films; some do not. They very selectively read books, and spend as much time as they can in a spiritually reawarding contemplative universe. And they translate, edit, write and publish books that can be of invaluable assistance to others.

Another option is to work within the margins of this emerging international culture in order to suggest the possibility of other alternatives to Muslims who would be otherwise cut-off from the products of Islamic consciousness, as is increasingly the case. To produce as it were coded signals, much in the way that having experienced hajj and the ‘umrah the picture of the Ka’bah on television is a signal recalling an original experience that is inexhaustible.

The idea of narrative formats for television, which reduce the shallow surface satisfaction of action and movement, and through the dramatic effectiveness of the story-teller return the viewer to a more,auditory mode of reception, also interests me, for oral transmission. even simulated and lacking the baraka of the human voice still at least addresses the spiritual imagination and can be the vehicle for extraordinary messages. Cairo’s Qur’an Radio station is reoralization at its best.

To produce materials that serve as coded signs to call attention to and encourage participation in what remains of the traditional in the realm both of media and “message”; to point the viewer or reader towards the direct and personal religious experience. The recitation of the Qur’an and the simulation of the image of the Ka’bah can also be a most reasonable invitation to the the Muslim to make any number of journeys, and there to recover his sense of the real.

Note:

[This article was presented at the seminar Promoting, Understanding and Unity in the Islamic World. Istanbul, Turkey; organized by Council for the World Religions.]
“The personal conviction of mine has in recent years received historic support by the establishment of Pakistan”, stated Dr. Asad at the time of the emergence of Pakistan as Second Ideological Islamic State after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Since the birth of Pakistan, the two brotherly countries have had the singular distinction of maintaining the most cordial and friendly relations.

The two countries have common Islamic principles and aspirations, and share a common heritage and ideology and the scholars and writers of both the countries have played an important role in this regard.

It is an admitted fact that Allama Iqbal was introduced to the Western world in the early Twenties, and to the Arab world particularly Egypt, in the early Thirties. As far as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is concerned, Iqbal was known to the Saudi Scholars in the late Forties. The first Arabic translation of Iqbal’s poem by Al Saiyed Ahmad All appeared on the 5th February, 1950 in ‘Al Bilad Al Saudia’, an Arabic daily published from Makkah Al Mukarrama.

After the inauguration of the Pakistani Consulate at Jeddah, the first Pakistan Day was celebrated on the 16th August, 1949 which was attended by a large number of high ranking officials, and diplomats and Saudi scholars. Afterwards, whether it was 23rd March, 14th August, 11th September or 25th December, special functions were held under the auspices of the Pakistani Consulate which were attended not only by government officials and diplomats but also by Saudi literary personalities. On these occasions, tributes were paid to the memory of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad All Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and Allama Mohammad Iqbal, the Thinker of Pakistan. Saudi Radio broadcast special programmes and Saudi newspapers particularly ‘Al Bilad Al Saudia’ published special supplements.

The Pakistan Embassy held a function on the occasion of Iqbal Day on the 21st of April, 1954 at Jeddah. High ranking government officials, diplomats and dignatories attended the function. Glowing tributes were paid
to the memory of Allama Iqbal. This was the first Iqbal Day which was celebrated in the Kingdom.

The second Iqbal Day was celebrated on the 21st of April 1955 at Jeddah in which a great number of scholars and men of letters were present. His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Al Faisal, the Interior Minister, was the Chief Guest while Dr. Abdul Wahab Azzam, Ambassador of Egypt to the Kingdom, presided over. His Excellency Umar Baha-ud-din Al Ameeri, Ambassador of Syria to the Kingdom, spoke on the philosophy of Iqbal. At the end of his speech, Mr. Zia-ud-din Al Mosvi, gave a summary of the lecture in Urdu. Afterwards, Dr. Abdul Wahab Azzam in his long speech talked about the life and works and influence of Iqbal on literature. During his speech, he disclosed that he was going to translate into Arabic some of the rare books of Iqbal. Again, Mr. Zia-ud-din Al Mosvi, gave a summary of Dr. Azzam’s speech in Urdu. His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Al Faisal paid rich tributes to the Poet-Philosopher of Islam. At the end, Dr. Riaz ul Hasan, Charge de Affairs of the Pakistan Embassy, thanked His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Al Faisal, in particular, the other scholars and audience in general.

The most famous and remarkable Iqbal Day was held on the 24th March, 1957 under the auspices of Pakistan Emabassy. Khawaja Shahab-ud-din, a great lover of Iqbal, took personal interest and invited a large number of Saudi scholars and men of letters. His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Al Faisal, the Interior Minister, presided over the function.

Khawaja Shahab-ud-din, in his opening speech, discussed the importance of Iqbal Day and thanked His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Al Faisal and the Saudi Scholars. More than ten Saudi writers presented papers on this occasion. We will give a brief account of each for general interest.

His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah Al Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, (born 1341 A.H. = 1923 A. D.), the eldest son of the late King Faisal, a veteran poet and writer and is a great lover of Iqbal. “Mahroum; Min Wahye al Hirman” and “Hadith -e- Qalb” are his famous poetic writings. He was awarded Honorary Ph.D in 1981 by the World Academy of Arts and Culture. On different occasions, he spoke very highly about Iqbal. But on 24th
March, 1957 in his presidential address he paid rich tributes to Iqbal for his services for Islam and called him “Batle Khalid”.

Mohammad Hasan Awwad, (born at Jeddah in 1320 A.H. = 1902 A.D.) Member Board of Directors of Okaz Est., headed a delegation to Lebanon in 1954 in the First Arab Writers Conference, a poet and writer of repute and author of about one dozen books in poetry and prose, is one of those Saudi scholars who have written about Iqbal. In his paper presented on the Third Iqbal Day, he discussed in detail “Iqbal” and called him “Poet of Islam”, “Shakespeare of Pakistan” and “Muarri of the Modern World”.

Abdul Quddous Al Ansari (born at Madinah in 1324 A.H. = 1906 A.D.) is a well known journalist, poet and writer who has written more than 12 books on various subjects. He has been the Chief Editor of “Umm Al Qura” newspaper. He is the founder and Editor in Chief of “Al Manhal”, a monthly magazine which he started in Zul Hijjah 1355 i.e. February 1937. He is a great admirer of Iqbal and has deep understanding of Iqbal. In his paper entitled “Poet of Islam”, he presented on the third Iqbal Day, he discussed his philosophy and paid rich tributes for the services Iqbal rendered to Islam and for the Muslims.

Another well known personality who has written about Iqbal is Mohammad Hassan Faki, (born in 1331 A.H. = 1912 A.D. at Makkah). He is not only a poet, writer and journalist but also a diplomat of great repute. He has been Professor of Arabic Literature and Chief Editor of “Sout Al Hijaz’. He has written a number of books on different subjects. Besides, he has been one of the Members of Board of Directors of Al Bilad Est., and worked as its Director General. He participated in the Third Iqbal Day and contributed a paper dealing with the life and services of Iqbal. He called Iqbal as a “Great Reformer”.

Mohammad Omar Tawfiq, (born at Makkah in 1337 A.H.) is another well known man of letters and an intellectual who graduated from Dar Al Uloom Al Shariyyah (School of Islamic Sciences) at Madinah. He has studied Iqbal very deeply through the writings of Abbas Mahmood Al Aqqad, Dr. Mohammad Husain Haikal, Dr. Taha Husain, Ahmad Hasan Al Ziyat and Dr. Abdul Wahab Azzam. He has been a Member of Board of Directors of Al Madinah Establishment. He also read a paper entitled “Iqbal as a Great
Man”. He gave a review of the services rendered by Iqbal as a “Poet of Humanity”.

Al Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim Al Ghazawi, (born at Makkah in 1318 A.H. =1900 A.D.) a poet and writer of great fame and reputation, and one of the pioneer writers of “Umm Al Qura”, “Al Isiah”, and “Sout Al Hijaz”, who was given the title of “Sha’ir Jalat Al Malik Abdul Aziz Al Saud “ (Poet of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Al Saud) in 1351, is well known for “Qasidah’ writing. He also attended the Iqbal Day and recited a long “Qasidah” namely “Sha’ir Al Islam” in his typical way.

Another literary figure of great repute is Ahmad Mohammad Jamal, (born at Makkah in 1343 A.H. = 1925 A.D.). He has been Member of Shura Council, Professor of Islamic Culture, King Abdul Aziz University, Member of Endowments Council (Wagf), Member Cultural Committee of Muslim World League and Member International Islamic Organization, and has attended Islamic conferences in different countries and also in Pakistan. He has written a number of books on Islamic subjects which have won much recognition. He is a great lover of Iqbal. He also participated in the Iqbal Day and presented a paper dealing with the poetic and philosophic aspects of Iqbal.

Another literary personality worth mentioning is Mahmood Arif, (born at jeddah in 1329 A.H.). He has been a Member of Shura Council and one of the Members of the Board of Directors of Okaz Establishment. Moreover, he has been the first Chief Editor of “Okaz” newspaper. Being a lover of the “Poet of Islam” he also attended the Iqbal Day and contributed an article which dealt with the ‘Life and Works of Iqbal”.

Hasan Abdul Hai Gazaz is another outstanding figure who attended the Iqbal Day and presented a paper namely “Artistic picture of the Philosophy of Iqbal”. Mr. Hasan is a well known journalist who started a weekly journal entitled “Arafat’ from Jeddah. Its first issue was published on 21-7-1377 A.H. (i.e. 10-2-1958). Among others who contributed articles, were Mr. Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Ahmad Saleh Jamjoom, Abdul Aziz Al Rifai etc. Mr. Hasan has been associated with “Al Bilad Al Saudia” and is a Member of the Board of Directors of “Al Bilad” Establishment.
Other two Saudi scholars who had contributed papers, were Al Syed Ali Hasan Fad’ak, Member of the Board of Directors of Okaz Establishment and author of “Ayyam Fi Al Shark Al Aqsa”, and Abdullah Al Mazroo.

Every one of the abovementioned Saudi Scholars is the torch bearer of the literary history of Saudi Arabia. Besides, there are other distinguished literary personalities who are worth mentioning. Their Excellencies Abdul Hameed Al Khateeb and Riaz Al Khateeb who had been Ambassadors of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, were great lovers of Iqbal. His Excellency Abdul Hameed Al Khateeb (born in 1316 A.H. at Makkah and died in 1381 A.H.), Member Shura Council, was a good poet and writer. He was one of the pioneer writers of “Al Nida Al Islami” (started in Rabi Al Thani 1356 A.H. = June 1937 A.D.), alongwith Mohammad Hasan Awwad, Mohammad Husain Zaidan and Ahmad Abdul Ghafoor Attar. He wrote a few articles about Iqbal but we have been able to trace one “Qasidah” of Iqbal which he wrote after studying the book entitled “Life and Death in the Philosophy of Iqbal”. He has left behind him a legacy of four/five books.

His Excellency Riaz Al Khateeb was also a lover of Iqbal. During his stay in Pakistan as Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he presented a few papers on the occasions of Iqbal Day. In one of his papers, while paying glowing tributes to Iqbal, he said:

“In short, Iqbal was a great poet and philosopher.

He sacrificed his whole life and energy for the services of Pakistan, Islam and the Muslims. He dedicated his self, his philosophy, and his mighty pen for the cause of Islam.”

Mohammad Saeed Al Amoudi (born in 1323 A.H. at Makkah) is a well known journalist, poet and writer. He started his literary career by writing articles in journals like “Al Shura” and Al Hilal”. He became the Chief Editor of “Majallat Al Hajj” (afterwards “Al Tazamin Al Islami”) after the resignation of Hashim Yousaf in 1369 A.H. He also edited the journal namely “Sout Al Hijaz” in its beginning. He has been a Member of Shura Council. He attended a number of conferences. He has a great love for Iqbal and his writings. He has studied Iqbal very deeply. In his article “Sha’ir ul
Islam” which appeared in his book entitled “Min Auraqi”, he has discussed the life and philosophy of Iqbal. He has paid rich tributes to him for his services for the Muslims and Islam.

Dr. Mohammad Bin Saad Bin Husain, Professor and Head of Arts Faculty in the Imam Mohammad Bin Saud Islamic University is another Saudi scholar who has studied Iqbal deeply and written about him. In his article namely “Sha’ it-i-Pakistan, Mohammad Iqbal” which is included in his book “Min Shu’ arc. Al Islam”, he has given a comparative study of the Islamic Culture, Hindu and Western Cultures” in a beautiful way. Dr. Husain is an author of more than twelve books dealing with Arabic poetry, literature and biography.

Lastly, we would like to give a brief account of Dr. Abdullah Mubasher Al Terazi (born in 1938) who is currently associated with Faculty of Arts, King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah. Dr. Abdullah is the son of Sheikh Mubasher Al Terazi Al Husaini, a great scholar and thinker of the Muslim world. He had close association with Allama Iqbal and used to attend the annual conferences of the Anjuman-i-Himayat -i- Islam, Lahore. Dr. Abdullah has written a large number of books and articles both in English and Arabic on different subjects. Moreover, he has attended different seminars and conferences. Besides Arabic and English, he is well versed in Turkish, Persian and Urdu. He wrote a research work on the life and philosophy of Iqbal.

At present, he is writing a comprehensive book entitled “The Poet of Islam; Dr. Mohammad Iqbal: His biography and poetry, and his view about the outlook of Muslims towards the philosophy of ‘Al Jihad’ within their outlook towards the philosophy of life and death in the past and present.

Notes and References

1. Dr. M. Asad, Islam and Politics, Geneva, Islamic Center, 1963. (Series No.8), page 2.

3. Editor Fuad Shakir, Al Bilad Al Saudia (Arabic), Makkah al Mukarramah, dated 22nd April, 1954/19th Sh’aban, 1373 A.H., page 2.


Al Manhil (Arabic) Writers Number, Vol. 27, page 784.


ALLAMA IQBAL’S POETIC STYLE AND DICTION IN PERSIAN

DR. MUHAMMAD RIAZ

Iqbal is a great poet of Persian whose Persian Couplets exceed about 50% of his Urdu verses. His Persian Poetry contains almost all the forms. However, most of his Persian Couplets are in the forms of Mathnavis, Lyrics (Ghazaliyat), Rubai’s (actually Dobeties) ‘Qa’at (quatrails) and different patterns of Mustazadat. His first Persian Mathnavi Asrar-i-Khudi was published in 1915 when the poet was about 38 years old; Iqbal had started versifying this Mathnavi in Urdu but, as he himself writes, the incomplete Urdu versified portion was destroyed and he told the whole idea, which is his Philosophy of the development of individuality in Persian later. This Mathnavi was completed by the poet in the course of a few years. Sheikh Abdul Qadir in his preface to Iqbal’s first Urdu Poetry collection ‘Bang-e-Dra’ which was published for the first time in 1924, claims that Iqbal had started versifying in Persian during his stay for higher studies in Europe (1905 to 1908) and prior to that he had attempted his aptitude in Persian Poetry only once or twice but this statement cannot be verified as over 100 and further research may explore even more number of Iqbal’s Persian verses written prior to 1905. Dring the student days of Iqbal, Persian was a familiar language of the educated elite but it may be noted that Iqbal had never chosen this language as a part of his courses during his School, College or University education. In one of his letters he however argues that he had taken pains in mastering this language. Iqbal’s command over Persian language and literature, his lucid poetic style and well understood and forceful diction of the language need no defence by now. Besides the great masters, poets and researchers of this language and literature in Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere throughout the world appreciate his style and diction. His style is so innovative and unprecedented that it has been ascribed to his name; now Iqbal’s style is gaining ground and fame and it is being

67 Such verses are found in the Manuscripts of Iqbal’s Works in Iqbal Museum, Lahore.
added to the prevalent four styles of the Persian poetry which have been assessed as such on the bases of words, style, subject-matter and meanings in the universe of Persian criticism.

**Popular four styles of Persian Poetry**

These styles are described as Khurasani (Turkistani/Azarbaijani), Iraqi (Farsi), Indian (Isfahani) and literary revival return to the old styles of Khurasani and Iraqi. Some critics have sub-divided the Khurasani style as Azarbaijani and cited to the pattern of Qatran, Khaqani and Nizami but generally the first style of the Persian Poetry which begins with the advent specimen, of this poetry available from the beginning of the third century A.H. towards the end of sixth century A.H. is generally termed Khurasani as it was the Khurasan area where Persian Poetry flourished during the Samani period and then it reached other parts of ancient Iran. This very style is described as Turkistani, too. The style or ‘sabk’ as the poet laureate Muhammad Taqi Bahar (1951) has popularised the later, does not belong to geographical boundaries but it relates to some roughly estimated period. The Iraqi (Farsi) style or ‘sabk’ remained prevalent from the advent of 7th century A.H. till the middle of tenth century A.H. when a large number of Iranian poets and writers were attracted to migrate to India and thus a new style in Persian Poetry emerged which is termed as Indian (and also subdivided as Isfahani). The Iranian literatures of many a genre during the period of Quraysh were discussed and by and by, the poets tread retrospectively to the old styles of Khurasani and Iraqi as the subject-matter required. This style of literary revival is still in vogue in Iran while outside of the Center of Persian Poetry different styles may be envisaged. But Iqbal’s style is a unique one. It has been ascribed to him by the contemporary Iranian stylistic critic Prof. Dr. Hussain Khateebi and none else has differed with his findings; his article had appeared for the first time in 1952.

**Characteristics of the styles**

---

69 See any edition of his ‘Sabk Shinasi.
70 First issue of Majallah Danistikada Adabiyat, Tehran University.
Though Iqbal’s style has been ascribed to him as unique and it is true as far as the whole pattern of his poetry is concerned yet it does not necessitate that his poetry should not contain the elements of other popular Persian Poetic Styles. The critics have laid down the details of the main features and characteristics of the three styles of Persian Poetry. Here the details are not required. However to comprehend these points well, it seems proper to put the main points. The Khurasani style has been popular for its Qasidas characterized by their verbousity and high flown language. This has been a very forceful and vigorous style. The Iraqi style is the most beautiful style of the Persian Poetry. It is the style of Lyrics (the ghazals). The meanings may be deep and mystic but the words in Iraqi style are found to be of very lucid and fascinating nature. The great Masters of Iraqi style like Rumi, Saadi and Hafiz have used the Arabic words in such an artistic way that they appear to be mild and well-suited. Indian style is known for deep meanings and a complex way of saying. This style evokes thinking but some of the poets have indulged in exaggerations.

Sabk-e-Iqbal is very akin to Iraqi style. The *poet-philosopher has coined new terms and incorporated some new meanings in Persian language for the first time which has given a new name to his style. But Iqbal has some specimens of Khurasani and Indian styles too in his poetry. For example his ‘Saqi Nama’ is his ‘Payam-e-Mashriq’ reminds us of the eloquency and forcefulness of Khurasani style. And while rightly influenced by his era, and environment and by some poets of Persian following Indian style, couplets in his Persian Poetry may be found which correspond to Indian style.

In nutshell it seems proper to say that Iqbal’s Persian Poetry contains Iraqi style but the poet had to add new words and meanings which do not correspond fully to any of the prevalent style. Thus Sabak-e Iqbal i.e. Iqbal’s style has been added to the cluster of stars of the cosmos of Persian Poetry. The examples and further elucidations shall follow.

**New words and terms coined by Iqbal**

To respond to the demands of new meanings to be enunciated by him, Iqbal had to coin new phrases and words - structure; this shows his amazing command over both Persian and Urdu languages. Late Prof. Dr. Ahmed Ali Rajaii describes Iqbal’s poetic style as very near to drama and this he conjures
to be under the influence of German dramist poet Goethe (d. 1832). He highlights the new Persian diction coined by Iqbal. He cites from ‘Payam-e-Mashriq’ such examples that this book abounds in new terms. Here under is the list of such words as narrated by him\(^{71}\) and also by another researcher of repute late Prof. Dr. Sayyed Muhammad Abdullah in one of his articlees.\(^{72}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{رنگین بیان، } & \text{چگونه، پیغام خارجیی حرق ایفا، پیگاه خو، مؤگان گسُل،} \\
\text{اسکندر، فطرت، کم نظر، جهن زاد، خلوت آباد، صنن که، چاودو نوا، لاله زار، آئینه‌} \\
\text{تاب، خورگر، آتش گذار، کلار گیر، پیغام تدبیر، شعله گیر، صید بند، ادا فهم،} \\
\text{رمن آشناء زخمه ور، با خثر رنگ.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{آو خانه زاد، } & \text{گرّه خورده نگاه، حاضر آرائی و آئینه نگاری، طائری} \\
\text{پیشوش، حوصله زمزمه پرواز، زاده باغ وراغ، شور پریده رنگ، شعله نم ناک،} \\
\text{تهی ادراکی، چمن کده، تازه کاری- افسونئی رنگ، گران رکابی.}
\end{align*}
\]

The examples suffice for inference of Iqbal’s poetic calibre, though such new words are manifold in Iqbal’s work and I have already elucidated most of those in an Urdu article.\(^{73}\) His this taste and capability is noteworthy that he has framed new phraseology in Persian which was an acquired language for him. In the versified prelude of his first Mathnavi ‘Asrar-e-Khudi’, he describes Persian a suitable language to contain and impart his new thoughts, but still ostensibly he refers to the necessity of framing new phraseology:

\[
\text{ور نمی گنجی بجو عمان من}
\]

\(^{71}\) Majallah Danishkada Adabiyyat Mashhad, April 1967.

\(^{72}\) Monthly Illah-i-Nau, Pakistan, April 1956 and also in book Alaamat-i-Iqbal, Lahore, 1959.

\(^{73}\) Quarterly Iqbal Review, Lahore, April 1979.
My sea cannot be confined to a stream; My flood calls for oceans, Persian, as according to the loftiness of my thoughts, Befits the nature of my ponderations.

**The peculiarities of his diction and style**

‘Allama Iqbal is a versatile, thoughtful and world-recognised Persian Poet, but many aspects of the exotic splendour of his art and thought have yet to be arranged and studied. One such aspect is a comparative study of over seventy Persian poets, renowned as well as less known, mentioned in his poetry and prose-works. The writer knows of no other Persian or Urdu poet-cum-writer whose works may reflect such an amazing galaxy of poets of the fifth-thirteenth/eleventh-nineteenth centuries. As compared to Persian poets, the number of Arabic, English, German and ‘Urdu poets traceable in Iqbal’s books is rather insignificant, though he knew these languages, too. The reason is obvious: Iqbal had learnt Persian with great enthusiasm; and consequently emerged to be essentially a Persian poet. No doubt, in addition to about nine thousand couplets in Persian, Iqbal has versified nearly six thousand verses in Urdu, but his diction has remained explicitly Persian, as he had drunk deep at Persian’s fountain.

Iqbal’s Persian poetry started about the year 1906; till then he had been known for his Urdu poetry in the subcontinent, but his earlier Persian poetry too is well ‘attractive, though it didn’t make a part of his regular works.

The galaxy of Persian poets; reflective in Iqbal’s works, has different phases; the couplets of some poets are referred) in support of the use of certain correct rhetoric figures in poetry. The meanings of certain verses are appreciated and told by Iqbal in a different sense. There are allusions to the couplets of a number of poets; the meters, rhymes or rhythms of some poets

---

have been borrowed and used by Iqbal in his Persian and Urdu poetry, and finally there is a good number of poets certain hemstiches or couplets of whom have been inserted by Iqbal among his verses for appreciating or even contradicting of certain meanings or feelings.

In his preface to English rendering of Iqbal’s Zabur-i-Ajarn the late orientalist, Arthur John Arberry (d. 1969) writes:

“Iqbal accepted the ghazal as he found it, with all its age-long rigidity of form and matter; and with the true touch of genius, he took it one stage forward. While remaining absolutely true to both pattern and image, he gave the form the new meaning by making it express his individual message. The ghazal had been put to a variety of derived uses by the old masters; the panegyrists had taken the love-motive and directed it to patron-flattery; the mystics had used the language of human passion to express their devotion to God. Now for the first time the ancient form is made to clothe the body of a new philosophy. What that philosophy, is the reader... will find himself in a new world of thought and feeling, a world vibrant with hope and high endeavour, a world revealing the vision of a great thinker who saw in these sorely troubled times the dawn of a new age.”

What Arberry wrote about Iqbal’s ghazal applies to all his poetry in Persian. Again, in his originalities in style, however, his love for the Persian language is also evincible--the language which, according to his hint in the Javid Namah, even Martian speaks.75

Among the Persian poets of Khurasani style mentioned in Iqbal’s works are Firdausi, Manuchihri, Nasir Khusrani, Masud Lahori, Sanai, Anwari, Khaqani, Nizami and Attar while those ascribed to the style of Iraqi are Rumi, Iraqi, Saadi, Qalandar Panipati, Amir Khusrau Dihlavi, Hafiz Shirazi, Faghani Shirazi, Faidi and Urfi. Among the poets mentioned above Rumi, Saadi and Hafiz have special significance in Iqbal’s Art and Thought. I have already cited to the example in my English research76 article and the book in77

---

75 Talk with the Martian Astronome.
76 Quarterly Iqbal Review Lahore, April 1977.
77 Iqbal our Farsi Shu’ra Lahore, Iqbal Academy, 1977.
Urdu which has been abridged into Persian also. I requite\textsuperscript{78} the last portion of my English\textsuperscript{79} article:

“Iqbal cites from and treads on the poetic path of Muhammad Hussain Naziri Nishapuri (d.1021/1642), Nuruddin Zahuri Tarshizi (d.1025/1616), Kalim Kashani (d. 1061/1651), Sa’ib Tabrizi (d.1086/1675), Abdul Qadir Bedil (d.1133/1721), Ghani Kashmiri (d.1077/1666), Mahmud Shabistari (d.720/1320), and 1v.lirza Ghalib Dihlavi (d.1285/1869). There are instances where he refers to Wahshi Bafaqi (d.991/1583), Muhsin Tathir Tabrizi (d.1131/1719) and Tahirha Babia (d.1264/1848), but the following Persian poets mentioned ox cited in different writings of Iqbal don’t reflect any significant influence on him: Farrukhi Sistani (d.429/1037), Qatran Tabrizi (465/1072), Baba Tahir Hamadani (d. about 450/1058), Khawajah Abdullah Ansari (d.481/1088), Auhaduddin Kirmani (d.635/1237), Auhadi Maraghi (d.738/1337), Shaikh Chiragh Dihlavi (d.756/1356), Yahya Shirazi (d.782/1380), Kamal Khujandi (d.803/1400), Ghazali Mashhadi (d.980/1572), Mulla Arshi (d.989/1581), Sahabi Astarabadi (d.1010/1601), Anisi Shamlu (d.1014/1605), Malik Qummi (d.1024/1615), Zulali Khunsari (d.1024/1615), Mumin Akbarabadi (d.1034/1624), Talib Amali (d.1036/1626), Razi Danish Mashhadi (d.1076/1665), Izzat Bukhari (d.1089/1678), Faraj Tarshizi (d.after 1085/1674), Fauqi Yazdi, Hussain Gilani, Raqim Mashhadi (all the three of eleventh/seventeenth century), Thughra Mashhadi (d.1100/1688), Mukhlish Kashani (of twelfth/eighteenth century), Rasikh Sirhandi (d.1107/1695), Nasir All Sirhandi (d.1108/1696), Mukhlish Sialkoti (d.1165/1751), Hazin Lahijani (d.1181/1767), Jalal Asir (d.1040/1630), Mazhar Jan-i-Janan (d.1195/1781), Yahya Kashmiri (d.1181/1706), Azar Beg Isfahani (d.1195/1781), Nishat Isfahani (d.1244/1828) and Qaani Shirazi (d.1270/1853). Similar is the case of contemporaries like ‘Aziz Lucknavi (d.1334/1915), and Garami Jalundhari (d.1346/1927). However, Iqbal’s image of Bedil and Ghalib is worth mentioning.

Iqbal has appreciated Bedil’s symbolic couplets; he has quoted from him and inserted several of his verses. Though Iqbal’s response to Bedil’s lyrics is not negligible, Ghalib’s impact on Iqbal’s Persian as well as Urdu poetry is

\textsuperscript{78}Referred to above, in No. 1.
\textsuperscript{79} Reference 11 above, pp.30 to 33.
more intense; poem entitled “Ghalib” in Bang-e Dara, the firmament of Jupiter in Javid Namah, some couplets in Payam-i-Mashriq and statements in stray Reflections indicate Iqbal’s estimation of Ghalib. Ghalib is, no doubt, one of the greatest thoughtful Persian and Urdu poets of the subcontinent, and Iqbal rightly accepts him as his forerunner and literary model. A few examples of their different coincidences follow.

Ghalib

خونئی آدم دارم، آدم زاده ام
آشکارا دم ز عصیان می زنم

Son of Adam, I am habitual as my father was; I confess my sinfulness evidently.

Iqbal

لذت آدم، آدم زاده ام
غير خود چیزی ندیدن کار اوسط
زانکه می عصیان خودی ناپید بدست
تاخودی ناپید بدست، آپد شکست

Man’s concern is to taste the delight of rebellion, Not to behold anything but himself;

For without rebellion the self is unattainable, and while the self is not attained, defeat is inevitable.

Ghalib
The heart has burnt, how long to endure,
hot blood becomes colour to be poured. Iqbal

Iqbal

Each atom’s body like a spark
I set a-quivering,

Each atom quivers through the dark, And soars as on a wing.

And the following comments by Iqbal on Ghalib make an end to our quotations:

“As far as I can see A-Mirza Ghalib, the Persian poet, is probably the only permanent contribution that we Indian

Muslims have made to the general literature. Indeed he is one of those poets whose imagination and intellect place them above the narrow limitations of creed and nationality...Mirza Ghalib (and ) Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil… taught me how to remain oriental in spirit and expression after having assimilated foreign ideals of poetry”80

In conclusion, Iqbal’s quotations from, and appreciation of other Persian poets may not be misunderstood; like his thought, his poetic art is almost unprecedented and deserves to be called Iqbal’s own style (Sabk-i Iqbal).

Note:

80 Iqbal’s Stray Reflections edited by Dr. Javid Iqbal, Lahore, Sh. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1961, pp. 51-54.

Part one starts with an imaginative discussion on the Cosmological perspective. A study of the ‘seven liberal arts’ of the Middle Ages reveal the Medieval identification of science with art which ‘indicates the fundamental nature of the Cosmological perspective.’ ‘But the modern historians construe traditional cosmology as childish attempt ‘to explain the causation of phenomena’. Herein lies the basic error of modern scholarship in approaching the subject of sacred art and contemplative cosmology. The modern mentality further errs in ‘its attachment to the sentimental aspects of art forms; and in initiating a sharp cleavage between artistic intuition and modern science. As a consequence, both primodial art and the nature of things have fallen in oblivion. Traditional cosmology is impregnated with an aspect of ‘art’ in the primordial meaning of the word, whereas modern science is not only restrictive to its study of nature but it further dissects the contents of nature. The scientist’s emphasis on the ‘autonomous materiality’ of things fragments reality. Unlike modern science, the traditional art maintains fullness in unity, rythm and proportion thereby achieving unicity in everything. It is the genius of Titus Burckhardt who in line with the tradition of Rene Guenon and Frithj of Schuon, has successfully traced out the common descent of art and science in the Medieval perspective, and has shown the modern fallacy of restricting them to separate domains. Modern science by dint of profane methodology dissects the living heart of Reality. A piecemeal view of Reality, in principle, is secluded from a vision of
wholeness. And in the absence of artistic intuition, each part narrates a different story. The plethora of modern scientific knowledge is an immediate consequence of the initial breach between art and science. This epistemological disequilibrium tends to destroy the very foundations of knowledge. Unless the modern science learns to live in harmony with the traditional art, the question of restoring equilibrium in the body of knowledge does not arise.

The chapter on traditional Cosmology and Modern Science is the most important chapter of the book dealing with Cosmologia pererinis, modern physics, traditional symbolism and modern empiricism, evolutionism and modern psychology. Titus Burckardt presents a critique of modern science on the basis of criteria provided by traditional cosmology. Unlike various critics of modern science, his critical examination of the subject is founded on universal and immutable principles which, in turn, are inherent in human intelligence. He is placed at a traditional axis from where it becomes possible to unveil the intrinsic contradictions of modern science. He starts with a truism that genuine cosmology has a revelation basis. It gives birth to supra rational knowledge which, by nature, is timeless and sacred. In Christian cosmology, for example, there is no contradiction between Biblical myth of creation and Greek cosmology. The family resemblances of traditional cosmologies are not due to historical borrowings, but are always the manifestation of ‘a revealed doctrine of the Spirit or Intellect’. This argument tends to establish transcendent unity of traditional cosmologies. Western cosmology was, however, dethroned when the ancient geocentric system was replaced by Copernicus ‘heliocentric system.’ The heliocentric system itself admits of an obvious symbolism, since it identifies the centre of the world with the source of light. Its rediscovery by Copernicus, however, produced no new spiritual vision of the world; rather it was comparable to the popularization of an ‘esoteric truth’. The heliocentric picture of the universe did not correspond with subjective experiences of people, for in it man lost his organic place. Cosmology was reduced to cosmography. Titus Burckhardt attempts to re-capture the traditional vision of the world through the poetic works of Dante. He categorically commits that a modern cosmology is not possible, for it is based on the denial of the principle. Modern science of nature does not understand the correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm world. It remains tied to the corporeal domain, and has no
inkling of the supra-sensible reality. It fails to realize that objectivity is impossible without transcendent intelligence which alone has access to the permanent essence of things. Mathematical knowledge takes a quantitative view of the physical world, whereas true cosmology is founded on the qualitative aspects of things. Thus, the traditional vision is ‘static’ and ‘vertical’, whereas the modern one is ‘dynamic’ and ‘horizontal’. Titus Burckhardt faithfully follows the main argument of Rene Guenon; as set forth in ‘The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Times’, but adds his own beautiful insights to it. With the cessation of traditional cosmologies, modern science has come to assume an absolute position. It has encroached upon sacred areas of human experience. The very word cosmos meant ‘order’ and it reflected the ideas of unity and totality but modern cosmology has replaced it, with ‘disorder’, with corresponding disunity and partiality. Its main error consists in its severing itself from the principle. It neither refers to constant and universal qualities nor attaches the lower to the higher. It does not understand the symbolism of things but merely contents itself with studying their material and historical connections. Resultantly, man finds himself abandoned in an alien universe whereas the traditional man never felt alienated from the cosmos. The immensity of the universe did not eject him from his primordial home. The world of traditional cosmology was his permanent abode. He neither felt homeless nor suffered the infliction of de-personalization and de-humanization of his existence. He remained committed to the Truth which saved him. And what else is the treasure of life.

Titus Burckhardt then moves from cosmologia-perennis to a critique of modern physics and offers such a penetrating analysis of the subject that one is compelled to acknowledge that metaphysician is certainly higher than any modern physicist. The modern physics conceives the space as a void. Since mathematical thinking is insulated from a concrete intuition of things, it is therefore, constrained to posit the idea of a totally empty space. But the latter is non-existent. It is merely an abstraction envisaged in the mathematical model, Traditional cosmology, on the other hand, holds that the entire space is filled by ether. Modern physics denies the presence of ether on the ground ‘that it offers no resistance to the rotatory movement of the earth; but it fails to conceive that ether is the basis of material differentiations, and has no particular quality of its own’, The question of resistance does not arise in this
context. If the modern science accepts the reality of ether, it may be able to resolve the dilemma that, ‘whether light is propagated as a wave or as a corpuscular emanation’. There is possibility that its movement is neither of the fact that it is directly attached to ether and participates in the reality of the latter. Here we would like to point out that if modern science learns to re-examine its presuppositions in the light of traditional science it shall be able to overcome the crisis of modern physics. No serious physicist can afford to ignore the metaphysical foundations of science. The present crisis cannot be truly resolved within the ambit of modern science for it is precisely the very product of it. Moreover, philosophy of science moves in a vicious circle and ultimately ends in deepening the crisis. Its lack of intellectual method is primarily responsible for its being turned into a self-defeating discipline, and it is the metaphysics of science alone which can untie the knots of modern physics.

Einstein’s theory of Relativity considers space and time relative to the observer. The only constant dimension is the speed of light. Titus Burckhardt presents a metaphysical critique of the theory and poses certain decisive questions in this regard. ‘What is this famous constant number’ that is supposed to express the speed of light? How can movement, having a definite and its definition will always be a relationship between space and time----itself be a quasi-’absolute’ measure of these two conditions of the physical world? Is there not a confusion between the principal and quantitative domains here? That the movement of light is the fundamental ‘measure’ of the corporeal world, we willingly believe, but why should this measure itself be a number, and even a definite number? He further holds that the constant character of the speed of light shall be put in question. And once this constant dimension loses its absoluteness, the modern conception of the universe shall vanish like a mirage. We again reiterate the traditional point of view that it is only when one goes beyond physics that one can establish true physics. At present, the god of mathematics is being banished by the terrible gods of statistics and probability, and the cycle of this decadence is nearing a decisive turn but, if the modern man loses his intellectual possibility, then he may not be able to seize it for centuries to come.
Titus Burckhardt enlightens us on the nature of traditional symbolism and exhibits the limitations of modern empiricism. The ancient cosmogonies seem childish to the modern man for he erroneously takes their symbolism literally without understanding their deeper symbolic import. The modern theories about the origin of the world, on the other hand, are absurd. How human mind can be a witness of cosmic becoming when the mind itself is a chain in the event of becoming. The ancient man could have erred in his study of the sensible universe but he was fully conscious of the reality that the corporeal was not the total cosmos and the finite had its roots in the Infinite. The modern man, according to him, has absolutely lost the sense of the Infinite. He fails to realize that the entire universe is contained in the spirit or intellect. In the absence of primordial vision he is bound to live in a world of fantasy and illusion. It is by virtue of traditional symbolism that one understands the origin of the universe.

Titus Burckhardt puts the phenomenon of evolutionism to a searching criticism. He starts his metaphysical analysis with a pertinent observation that one can go on adding quantities to one another; ‘but a quality is never merely the sum of other qualities’. If one mixes the colours blue and yellow, one obtains green colour which is the synthesis of the two but at the same time it possesses chromatic quality that is new and unique in it.’ It is a kind of ‘discontinuous continuity’ which is more visible in the biological world. Modern science does not appreciate the ancient concept of ‘form’ which designates the non-quantitative aspects of things while pointing towards their immutable essence. Form is an archetype beyond limitations and change. A species is, thus, an archetype which is manifested by individuals belonging to it. The archetypal roots reside within being. The ‘material’ reflections of the archetypes create the concepts of multiplicity and quantity. ‘A species is in itself an immutable ‘form’, it cannot evolve and be transformed into another species, although it may include variants’. Darwin’s thesis of the evolution of species is based on a confusion between species and simple variation. The theory is further beset with contradictions when it tries to explain the absence of intermediate forms. Its explanation contradicts its own principle of selection. ‘The successive appearance of animal forms according to an ascending hierarchy - in no wise proves their continual and cumulative genesis’. Rather, a common model links the various forms to one another. Each essential form - or each archetype - includes, after its fashion, all the
others without any confusion; it is like a mirror reflecting other mirrors; which reflect it in their turn. Also, the postulate of evolution by leaps is logically absurd. Evolutionism errs in considering the physical dimensions as the sole reality. In fact, the process of materialization is from the supersensory to the sensory one. Teihardian evolutionism is like a spiritual integration of paleontology. It is ‘a purely mental sublimation of the crudest materialism’. Man occupies an intermediate place in evolution which starts from unicellular organisms and ends in transforming them into global cosmic entity united to God. The problem with this sort of evolutionism is that instead of opening ‘the heaven of real and transcendent unity’, it sinks man to the realm of lower psychism. It promotes a kind of pseudo-spiritual intoxication. In excerpts from two of the letters, he again shows the basic limitations in the evolutionary theory of Contra Teilhard de Chardin. If the spiritual faculty of man, the ‘noetic faculty’ is merely a stage in the continuity of biological evolution then how this phase can step out and have the grasp of the whole.

There is a confusion between the cerebral and ‘noetic’ faculties. It is erroneous to assume that intelligence has no immutable content and the spirit is in a state of becoming. The theory fails to make a distinction between proof and hypothesis. Evolution is a hypothesis without any valid proof. The ‘thesis of Teilhard de Chardin is in no sense original; its novelty lies in its being a Trojan horse to introduce materialism and progressivism into the very bosom of religion’. Titus Burckhardt’s critique of evolutionary theory poses a direct challenge to biology. It explodes the Darwinian myth and shows numerous absurdities involved in the hypothesis of evolutionism. It shall not be out of place to mention that number of similar thinkers including Martin Lings, Hossein Nasr, Osman Bakr, Michael Negus, Giuseppe Sermonet, W.R. Thompson and R. M Morrel have intelligently shown the pseudo-basis of evolutionary theory. Their criticism of the theory does not emerge from within the Western spectrum but arises from the traditional perspective. From the traditional point of view, the theory is nothing less than ‘a metaphysical absurdity’. It fails to account for the immutability of species. It is based on a wrong notion of man and his creation. It has not the slightest awareness of the multiple states of Being. A theory which has no understanding of the Absolute and the process of • Its Manifestation can
neither understand the essence of life nor its unfoldment in the spatio-temporal order.

After razing the fortifications of evolutionism, Titus Burckhardt assails the foundations of modern psychology. One may take an exception to his treatment of the subject on the ground that he has critically examined Jungian system alone, and has not discussed contemporary forms of psychology. But a careful study of his main argument reveals his rightness in attacking Jungian psychology for the latter, because it represents the essential character of modern psychology. The modern psychologist is trapped in the psychic and has no means to reach true objectivity. For Jung, the psychic realm is all-pervasive. He even places God and the supersensible realities in the psychic domain thereby denying their objective validity. Thus, he acts as a decoy for the people of the East. The Jungian trap is laid thus: ‘The object of psychology is the psychic; unfortunately it is also its subject’, Titus Burckhardt unearths this epistemological conspiracy and makes a subtle analysis of the entire syndrium. The psychologist is primarily concerned with the purely psychic. It is but his entire domain. It is a kind of Prometheanism which makes the psychic element the ultimate reality of man. It contaminates history, philosophy, art and religion, because when everything is termed as psychological, objectivity vanishes like a mirage. It is only intellect which can study the psychic but unfortunately the intellectual mode of knowledge is alien to modern scientific and philosophical thinking. Also, reason which is the mental reflection of the transcendent intellect, is not considered as a source of truth, but as a principle of coherence. ‘The soul, like every other domain of reality, can only be truly known by what transcends it’. Intelligence which guides our will, transcends both inward and outward phenomena. If it were purely a psychic reality, ‘then the question of transcendence would not have arisen. Traditional psychology is derived from above and it does not claim a priorian empirical character. Modern psychology has no means to attach the individual soul with the Divine Self. It has no understanding of cosmology and morality. It confuses traditional morality with a purely social or conventional one. Freudian psychoanalysis wants man to accept his ‘psychic entrails’ as his own, whereas man needs to detach himself from the internal depth of his psyche. All true knowledge stems from man’s transcendent self. ‘The psychic cannot be treated by the psychic’. Also it is wrong to trace a rite ‘to psychic dispositions of ancestral origin’ for, in the
process the timeless and superhuman meaning inherent in the rite or symbol is lost. ‘It is from the immutable and formless background of the Spirit that the subtle realities become detached as forms, and it is the soul, which, through its sensory faculties, knows the corporeal’. Modern psychology also fails to understand the hermeneutics of dreams for in order to validly interpret images, one must have knowledge of the supra-formal states of being and the level of reality to which they refer. Jung’s theory of the ‘collective unconscious’ holds that the non-personal zone of the soul is unconscious, therefore, ‘its contents can never become the direct object of the intelligence, whatever be its modality or however great its extension’.

Myths and symbols are taken as the product of ancestral psychic fund without any intellectual or spiritual foundation. This picture brings man nearer to the animal for the ‘collective unconscious’ is situated at the level of physiological instincts. The archetype are the source of being and knowledge and not, as Jung conceives them ‘unconscious dispositions to act and imagine’. The concept of the ‘self’ is also debased to a purely psychological and clinical level. This critique of Jungian thought is a masterpiece of traditional psychology. The horizontal progress of psychology has eclipsed the vertical dimension of man. This psychic addiction has eaten the roots of man’s being. Nothing short of a metaphysical exorcism is needed to get rid of the psychic evil spirit.

Titus Burckhardt names one of his chapters on Julius Evola’s book, ‘Riding the Tiger’. The book tends to show that how a traditional man ‘may not only survive in the antitraditional ambience of the modern world, but may even use it for his own spiritual ends’. The Chinese metaphor of the man riding a tiger signifies that, if the rider holds on to his seat, he shall finally gain an advantage over it. The tiger means a destructive force which starts operating towards the end of every cosmic cycle. It is futile to struggle for maintaining the forms and structure of a dying civilization. The only way is to carry the negation to its logical point without slipping into nothingness so that it may become the basis of a new formative activity. Titus Burckhardt spells out his points of agreement and disagreement with the author of the book and concludes thus: ‘According to all the prophecies, the sacred deposit of the integral Tradition will remain until the end of the cycle; this means that there will always be somewhere an open door. For men capable of
transcending outward shells, and animated by sincere will, neither the
decadence of the surrounding world, nor belonging to a given people or
milieu constitute absolute obstacles’. One needs to mark these words which
negate all philosophies of despair. Intellect never falls in despair. Its capacity
of transcendence unites it with the Universal Intellect. That all doors are not
closed is the joyful lesson which one learns from the tradition. Though the
destined hour of the human civilization is drawing near, yet by an act of true
choice man can creatively transform the moment into eternity.

Part two deals with Christian themes. Titus Burckhardt finds a
correspondence between the seven liberal arts and the ‘West door of
Charters Cathedral’. In the Medieval context, the seven sciences grammar,
logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, music geometry and astronomy were the
manifestation of the harmonious soul. Since they were not exclusively
empirical sciences therefore they were also called arts. Dante in line with the
ancient tradition compared the seven liberal arts to the seven planets. The
architects of the Royal Door of Charters were fully aware of this
correspondence and thus, they designed the structure accordingly. The
tradition has always been mindful of the fact that number, proportion,
harmony and rythm manifest unity in diversity. The medieval science was less
concerned with knowing numerous things but more committed with a
‘whole’ view of existence. Modern science has no way to link the terrestrial
world with the celestial one. We agree with the analysis that the modern
separation of sciences and arts has stifled the real understanding of things.
The modern man is totally captivated by the instrumental value of a thing
and has lost the appreciation of its intrinsic value. The modern mentality has
completely divested itself from the symbolic import of things and is thus
condemned to live in a barren world. The medieval architecture was
impregnated with a deeper meaning as against the modern one which is
bereft of all symbolism. The modern architecture represents the
impoverishment of the contemporary soul.

Titus Burckhardt has reflected a great understanding of the traditional
meaning and symbolism enshrined in Dante’s Divine Comedy. He has placed
the masterpiece in its true perspective. His great fascination for the work lies
in the fact that ‘there shines forth a timeless truth, at once blissful and
terrifying, in short, it is because Dante is right’. There is an intimate
relationship between knowledge and will. ‘Knowledge of the eternal truths is potentially present in the human spirit or intellect, but its unfolding is directly conditioned by the will, negatively, when the soul falls into sin, and positively when this fall is overcome’. He praises Dante for his condemnation of the Papal policy of his time which ‘led to the misfortune of the Lutherean secession and the secular explosion of the Ranaissance’. Dante’s chief spiritual legacy consists in the use of symbols and imagery which transcends the limitations of the spatio-temporal circumstances. It is the genius of Titus Burckhardt to have, entered the heart of the Christian Tradition. He has not only re-discovered Dante but has developed a keen insight into the world of Christian symbolism. In one of his chapters, he finds a correspondence between the Heavenly Jerusalem and the Paradise of Vaikuntha. He reproduces a miniature of the Heavenly Jerusalem taken from a manuscript of the eleventh century and compares it with the Mandela Of the Paradise of Vaikuntha. He examines their subtle details and tries to bring out the family resemblances of certain great traditions of the world. One is fascinated to see his immense power of deciphering the traditional symbols. In another chapter he considers two examples of Christian symbolism: the Wooden Chest and Gargoyles. The Wooden Chest due to its geometrical form is the symbol of the earth for like the chest which contains precious possessions the earth supports life. The Gargoyles are also symbolic in character. The grotesque masks on the outside world of Romanesque churches were meant to exercise evil spirits. Man could not detach himself from evil unless he understood it. The chapter on the Russian Icons carries a theological message. The icon has a permanent character with diverse manifestations. ‘The art of Icons is a sacred art in the true sense of the term i.e. it is nourished wholly on the spiritual truth to which it gives pictorial expression’. What a beautiful unveiling of the Christian spectacle. How pathetic is the condition of the modern Christian who under the spell of progressivism and scientism has forgotten his own tradition. Can a civilization survive which has lost contact with her own traditional symbolism.

Part three deals with symbolism and mythology. Titus Burckhardt establishes himself as the master of the subject. The discussion starts with the symbolism of the mirror. The symbol of mirror expresses the essence of mysticism and is essentially sapiential in character. ‘The mirror is the most immediate symbol of spiritual contemplation, and indeed of knowledge
(gnosis) in general, for it portrays the union of subject and object. Various meanings of a symbol refer to different layers of reality but at the same time - enjoy an inward coherence by achieving an harmony within the image which is of spiritual nature. The essence of a symbol is manifested in the multiplicity of meanings and thus has an advantage over rational definition. Symbol opens upwards and transcends to the level of supra-rational realities. The content of a symbol is supra-rational but psychologism considers it irrational thereby debasing it to the realm of ‘collective unconsciouses. The symbolism of the mirror can be construed in a way that mirror becomes the symbol of the symbol. ‘What is the mirror in which the symbol appears as the image of an eternal prototype? ‘It is the imagination if one takes into consideration the visual nature of the symbol as against abstract concepts. Then, mind with the power of discrimination and knowledge reflects the pure Intellect. Further, ‘the Intellect itself is the mirror of the divine Being’. Seen in the traditional perspective ‘The heart, centre of the human being, is, therefore, like a mirror, which must be pure, so that it may receive the light of the divine Spirit’. Its reflection is at the stages of symbols (isharat), spiritual qualities (sifat) or essences (‘ayan) and Divine Realities (hagia’q) . The same message is conveyed through the ‘sacred mirror which occupies a prominent place in Taoism and Shintoism. The heart by virtue of its reflective capacity of truthfulness attracts divine light. However, the law of reflection is such that ‘the reflected image is inverted in relation to its object’. It is correspondingly applicable to the spiritual process wherein ‘eternity appears as a sudden moment’. A reflection while having qualitative similarity to its object is materially different from it. Also, the shape and position of the mirror reflects the object accordingly. The process of knowing is not exhausted at the rational level. The process of reflection is the most perfect image of this reality. The mirror is what it reflects to the extent that it reflects. ‘In itself, without light, the mirror is invisible, and this means according to the meaning of the comparison, that in itself it is not’. Reflection does not exist outside Infinite Unity. It is Maya which gives rise to this illusion and the former is a pure possibility in the Infinite. Man is the mirror of God.

Speaking in higher esoteric sense, God is the mirror of man. The mirror signifies the knowing subject, ‘which as such cannot also b.e the object of knowledge’. Absolutely speaking, it is true of the Divine Subject alone. Titus
Burckhardt quotes from the works of Ibn Arabi, Meister Eckhart, Suha
dardi of Aleppo, Dante and Farid-ud Din Attar to spell out the symbolis
t of mirror. He successfully deciphers the inherent meaning of the most ri
chest symbol in the traditional literature. How unfortunate is the modern Age of sterility that it does not experience the life of symbolism. The man of spirit has been reduced to mere flesh and bones. The death of a civilization is the death of its symbolism. The superficiality of the modern mentality is manifest in its crusade against traditional symbolism. In the absence of symbols, the process of conceptualization itself becomes self defeating. An idea which does not contain limitless possibilities of conception is condemned to be ensnared in empiricism, scientism and pseudo-positivism. The horizontal flatness of the modern mind is an intellectual ugliness. Technology is a false substitute for a real understanding of the physical world. The lop-sided growth of technology has even destroyed the equilibrium of the scientific world. Human understanding is not merely instrumental, it is essentially participative. Since the modern man has ceased to look into the mirror, therefore, he has forgotten his own face. It is precisely due to this reason that he constantly faces Crisis of Identity.

Titus Burckhardt next turns to the symbolism of water. The modern world has forgotten the living purity of water. ‘The ‘life’ of the waters is symbol for the ‘life’ of the human soul’. When the Nature is in balance, ‘the earth’s waters themselves continually re-establish their purity, whereas, when this balance is lost, death and pollution are the result’. The split in modern consciousness has disturbed the natural balance of things, which is manifest in the longing of the city-dwellers to re-discover Nature. Beauty creates equilibrium. It helps us in a direct participation in things before they are caught up in the net of categories. Beauty and reality were united. There were sacred springs, rivers and lakes which reflected an aura of sacredness. The Medieval Christians accepted water as a symbol of grace and intimately linked, it with the symbolism of baptism. The sacred manifests the eternal and becomes the object of veneration and awe thereby enjoying absolute inviolability. As compared to earth, air and fine, it is water which can be violated so it requires special protection. The quality of water is characterized by humility and chastity. The river water takes different forms but it still retains its essential purity. It is likened to the image of the soul which, in spite of all impressions, remains essentially an undivided essence. ‘The soul
resembles water, just as the spirit resembles wind or air’. Water stands as a symbol of the materia prime of the whole universe. The Koran states that ‘at the beginning, the Throne of God was upon the water and God created every living from water’. Titus Burckhardt has beautifully shown the sacredness attached to water in the different traditions of the world. The Japanese, Hindus, Christians, Muslims and other traditional people portray a rich symbolism of water which sustains their respective civilizations. The modern world, on the other hand, gives a purely physical or biological meaning to water. It merely concentrates on knowing its properties in order to exploit it as a physical resource. It has neither the capacity nor the willingness to understand the essence of water. We would like to point out that Thales, the father of Western philosophy, took the symbolism of water from the ancient world but, unfortunately due to the method of speculative reason, could not appreciate its quintessence. ‘He considered water as the essence of universe bereft of traditional symbolism. The vertical dimension of water - symbolism was’ displaced by the horizontal one. It initiated a departure of Greek thought from the traditional world, the effect of which is clearly visible in the contemporary world. Except for the interlude of the Christian tradition, the Western world has remained faithful to the profane aspects of Greek philosophy. It is only the traditional water which can quench the thirst of the modern man.

‘Insight into Alchemy’ is a chapter which unveils another aspect of traditional thinking. Titus Burckhardt has made a special study of the subject and has written a marvellous book on Alchemy. He sums up the whole of the alchemy in this adage! ‘To make of the body a spirit and of the spirit a body’. The base metal is the consciousness bound to the body. This is the ‘metallic body’ from which must be extracted the ‘soul’ and the ‘spirit’ which are termed as ‘Mercury’ and ‘Sulphur’. The truth is that if the ‘body’ lacked inner reality, then it could not serve the material for the spiritual work. He explains the process of extraction in such a beautiful manner that one instantly transcends to the alchemical world. Spiritually speaking, alchemy turns base metal into gold. But what about the modern man who refuses to submit to the process and contents by remaining base metal?

Titus Burckhardt’s discussion on the symbolism of chess is yet another beautiful facet of traditional symbolism. The game of chess traces its origin
from India. Through the Persians and the Arabs it was passed on to the medieval West. At the time of the Renaissance some of the rules of the game were changed: the ‘queen’ and the two ‘bishops’ were given a greater mobility, and thenceforth the game acquired a more abstract and mathematical character; it departed from its concrete model and strategy, without however losing the essential features of its symbolism. In the original position of the chessmen, the ancient strategic model remains obvious; one can recognize two armies ranged according to the battle order that was customary in the ancient East. The form of the chess board resembles classical type of Vastu-mandala. This diagram symbolizes existence conceived as a ‘field of action’ of the divine powers. The combat symbolizes in the most universal sense the combat of the ‘angels’ with the ‘demons’. All other meanings are derivative from this primordial one. Light is represented by white army, whereas, black army stands for darkness. If the symbolism of the chess is transposed into the spiritual realm, then, the King symbolizes heart or spirit and other pieces represent the various faculties of the soul. The various movements on the chess board reflect various ways of realizing cosmic possibilities. Also, the relationship between will and destiny is revealed in the symbolism of chess. ‘Freedom of action is here in complete solidarity with foresight and knowledge of the possibilities; contrary wise, blind impulse, however free and spontaneous it may appear at first sight, is revealed in the final outcome as a non-liberty’. Wisdom is the knowledge of possibilities. The possibilities are all contained in the universal spirit. ‘The Spirit is Truth; through Truth man is free; outside Truth, he is the slave of fate. That is teaching of the game of chess’. Titus Burckhardt’s unveiling of the symbolism of chess provides an opportunity for the human intelligence or spirit to understand the essentiality of things. The contemporary world has divested itself from the archetypal roots of things and thus has ceased to understand the truth buried in the labyrinth of ‘facts’. The metaphysical/traditional mind had placed man in a meaningful universe. There was a kind of holy equilibrium which seemed to be all-pervasive. Human activity had a serious purpose. Each move of a person was spiritually calculative and it was committed to the higher ends of life. The primordial lesson of necessity and freedom was known by everyone. Life was construed as a game of possibilities. Intelligence was supposed to know the realm of possibility and the means to realize it. The modern man has transformed the
symbolism of chess ' into a mere worldly game which in the ultimate analysis remains meaningless.

Titus Burckhardt’s treatment of the sacred Mask reveals the symbolism inherent in the most ancient modes of sacred art. It is found in India, Japan and among the primitive people. The exception is the Semitic monotheism but it has been preserved in the folklore of the Christians and certain Muslim communities. ‘The sacred mask’ is above all the means of a theophany; the individuality of its wearer is not simply effaced by the symbol assumed, it merges into it to the extent that it becomes instrument of a superhuman ‘presence’. The analysis offered is significant to the extent that it provides an opportunity to understand the role of sacred mask within a certain tradition.

Titus Burckhardt re-discovers the symbolic element present in the return of Ulysses. The spiritual path of realization teaches man that he shun his every day self and discover his true, essential self. But this path is beset with great affliction, hardship and misery, and without sacrifice man cannot reach his primordial reality. The mythology and folklore represent this basic human vocation in the form of the royal hero who returns to his kingdom under different guises and then re-conquers the property by dispossessing the mean usurpers. The parallel theme of the myth is to liberate a beautiful woman from the clutches of hostile forces so that in the ultimate analysis she belongs to the hero. These mythological themes are present in Ulysses return to Ithaca where he retrieves his wife and property and makes the people know the master of the house. Homer reflects an understanding of the myths, that he was transmitting or adopting. And it is again the greatness of Titus Burckhardt’s vision to have re-discovered Homer. The Western philosophers, can never understand Homer who was a link between the ancients and the Greeks. But unfortunately, the Greek philosophers, by dint of their rational method, could not get any essential inspiration from him. Had they “understood his message, they would have positively contributed to the development of human thought.

Titus Burckhardt attended a Sun Dance held on the Reservation of the Crow Indians in Montana. He has beautifully described it from the beginning to the end with symbolic significance of each stage. Unlike Jung, he does not trace the common symbolism to the ‘collective unconscious’ but attaches it to a universal realm. For us, to celebrate the rite of the full moon is more
meaningful than the modern dance which celebrates perhaps, the eclipse of the sun.

Part four deals with Islamic themes. The chapter on the Traditional Sciences in Fez starts with a discussion on the difference between traditional and modern science. ‘The traditional science (al-imu’t-taglidi) and modern science have little or nothing in common; they do not have the same root and do not bear the same fruits’. Tradition transmits a message of non-human origin which reflects a spiritual continuity, and if ever this integral science is lost, it cannot be reconstituted by human efforts. The modern science, on the other hand, is based on sense-experience and in principle, it is open to all though, in practice, it is beyond the ordinary grasp. The reason being that the geometrical progression of scientific data and its conclusions has exceeded the normal limits of comprehension. Man’s integral nature is constituted of body, soul and spirit. The modern science commits the mistake of concentrating solely on the physical datum. It either remains silent on the question of Man or considers, him an animal with developed cerebral faculties. The play of chances cannot impute real meaning to the existence of man. The tradition) science replies to this basic question by help of metaphors about the creation of Adam. Man is considered a unique cause and his existence has a deeper meaning. It does not tie man in the chain of contingency but probes his real essence. The traditional understanding of Man stands transmitted till the present day. Titus Burckhardt further analyses the reduction of traditional sciences in Al-Qarawin but holds that these different branches of learning were homogeneous as against varying disciplines of modern education. There was concentration on grammar, hadith and fiqah; but reason was not the measure of all things. Also, there was an intimate relation between the master and the pupil, and both worked for the love of science. There was concentration on ‘Tasawwuf’ and certain classical treatises were taught to the pupils. There was a total commitment to the highest spiritual truths. When It came to traditional medicine, the point of equilibrium was always kept in the forefront. Alchemy was integrated in the Islamic tradition. Traditional art and craftsmanship was fully promoted. The above discussion is an eye opener for the modern educationists who finds nothing meaningful in the traditional selected. He fails to perceive man In totality. He fragments the reality of man and divides it into multifarious categories. We have written elsewhere that such a growth of knowledge has
diminished human understanding. The lop-sided growth of various disciplines amounts to a cancer in the body of knowledge. It is only the transcendent root of knowledge which can bear sacred fruits. Instead of imitating the modern West, we must look into our own traditional mirror.

The Prayer of Ibn Mashish (As - Salatul - Mashishiyah) forms an important chapter of the book. Abdas - Salam Ibn Mashish, the Moroccan Sufi, was the master of Abu’l Hasan ash - Shadhili; the founder of the Shadhili order. The prayer Is a summary of the -Sufi doctrine of Universal Man (al-insan al-Kamil). Titus Burckhardt translates the prayer and comments on its difficult passages. The ‘secrets’ and ‘lights’ are derived from the prophet. Both complement each other. The ‘secrets’ are understood as ‘latent predispositions of man or of the cosmos’ while ‘lights’ are construed as ‘emanations or flashes of Being which echo the ‘secrets’ by actualizing their potentialities without ever yielding up their ultimate depth.’ The concept ‘secret’ reflects the innermost part of the soul. It is an organ which contemplates ‘light’. This is similar to a mirror that reflects the divine realities and polarizes them in a certain fashion according to its own predisposition (isti’dad’). When situated on the side of the potentialities ‘secret’ plays a passive role in relation to the ‘lights’ but considered in its unfathomable depth, it is identical with that the ‘ Immutable essence’ (al-ayn ath thabitah) of the being, This archetypal reality or the archetype contains within itself ‘indistinctly everything that the individual consciousness realizes in existential and successive mode’. Thus, ‘secrets’ correspond to the archetypes whereas ‘lights’ stand for divine qualities. The archetypes, indistinctly contained in the Divine Essence, are distinguished first of all, in a principal manner, in the First Intellect (al’aqlal-awwal) and it is through it that they shine as it were into the cosmos; thus they ‘derive’ from it and, from this starting-point, are ‘split-up’. Likewise the Divine Light is broken by the prism of the Intellect into multiple ‘light’. The First Intellect can be likened to the ‘isthmus’ (barzakh) between the two ‘seas’ of the created and the untreated of pure Being and Existence the latter being relative’. The intellect is not different from the spirit (ar-Ruh). ‘In a certain sense,’the Intellect is like the consciousness of the spirit and the spirit is like the life of the Intellect’. The First Intellect is the universal Mediator, and it is with this that the prophet is identified by the very secret of his function’. ‘The First Intellect is to the whole cosmos what the reflected intellect is to man’.
‘Universal Man’ (al-insan al Kamil) is that whose intellect and universal nature is in intimate consciousness with the First Intellect Itself. It is through him that things ‘rise up’ in Unity and ‘the realities descend’ by the reflection of universal truths in the ‘human mind’. Mohammed is the ‘Universal Man’ for he represents ‘the most complete earthly manifestation of the Universal Mediator, the First Intellect’. Its basis is not ‘Incarnation’ or ‘Illumination’. ‘The Universal Mediator’ the First Intellect, is like a mirror that reverberates the Divine Beauty’. Different worlds are derived from the ‘light of Mohammed’ (an-nur al-muhmmadi). The graces (salat) which God confers on the Prophet are ‘irradiation (tajalli) of the Divine Essence, which eternally pours into the cosmos, of which Mohammad is the synthesis. To pray for God’s blessing on the prophet amounts to participation in the divine act and becoming receptive to the blessing of the entire universe.’ The ‘essential reality’ (haqiqah) of the Mediator is the first divine self-determination(taayyun). It reveals and veils Him at one and the same time. In unity in the sense of al-ahadiyah, all traces of the creature of the servant are effaced, whereas in Unicity in the sense of al-wandah, the creature appears in God i.e. multiplicity in unity and unity in multiplicity’. Titus Burckhardt takes us deep into the waters” of religious metaphysics and makes us understand the nature of the Absolute and the process of Its Manifestation. The entire prayer finds its axis in Mohammad, “Light of ivohammad”, Universal Mediator, Universal Man or the First Intellect; by whatever name one designates the process of Cosmic manifestation. The graces (salat) showered on the prophet both by man and God reveal their inherent meaning on the metaphysical plane. From our point of view these points towards a realm which is beyond physics but which can provide an ultimate foundation to physics. If the modern physicist starts understanding the “Light of Mohammad” it shall unravel numerous mysteries of the universe. Modern physics by its restricted methodology, solely deals with the world of bodies (alam al-ajsam). It has no means to link this world with the world of spirits (alam al-arwah), the world of omnipotence (alam al-jabarut) the world of analogies (alam al-mithal), the world of imagination (alam al khiyal) and so on and so forth. Einstein’s theory of Relativity remains tied to the world of bodies (alam alajsam). It holds that the velocity of light cannot be exceeded and it remains the same for all observers disregardless of their systems of movement. Thus, the theory of Relativity establishes an absolute and correspondingly builds a modern conception of the universe. But the rational
or scientific discovery of such an absolute cannot be guaranteed for all times to come. Physics needs and intellectual constant and that constant is the ‘Light of Mohammad’ (an-nur-al-muhammadi). It shall link the entire worlds in a metaphysical hierarchy and shall understand the manifested and non-manifested possibilities of the Absolute. It shall also realize the truth of the traditional notions of space and time. We are not proposing something imaginary, for the ‘Light of Mohammad’ is a recurring phenomenon in the universe and the graces on Mohammad provide a key to this metaphysical reality.

Concerning the Barzakh is another important chapter of the book. Titus Burckhardt states that the meaning of barzakh in Islamic theology pertains to ‘a certain intermediate state in the posthumous evolution of the human being’. Esoterism gives it a metaphysical meaning and interprets the following Quranic verses accordingly: ‘He bringeth forth the two seas, which meet: between them is an isthmus (=barzakh)’ which they do not go beyond. He it is who bringeth forth the two seas; one is fresh and drinkable, the other is salt and bitter; and He hath made between the two an isthmus (=barzakh) and a closed barrier’. The symbolism of the two seas is expressed thus: The two seas symbolize respectively, Quantity and Quality, or, according to other interpretations, the non-manifested and the manifested, the formless and the formal, immediate knowledge and theoretical knowledge, etc.’ Barzakh understood in a vertical sense is junction and separation, and on horizontal plane it is expressed by the alternations ‘of expansion and negation. Shahadah is ‘the doctrinal barzakh’ par-excellence’. We revert to our previous stand point and state that if modern physics starts accepting the metaphysical idea of barzakh then it may succeed in resolving certain dilemmas in the heart of physics. It is incumbent upon the modern scientist to accept the metaphysical foundations of physics.

Extracts from the commentary on the Divine Names by the Imam Ghazali is a fascinating chapter. Titus Burckhardt spells out the intellectual/spiritual meaning inhering in the divine Attributes. The study certainly raises one’s level of understanding the Divinity.

Titus Burckhardt is deeply committed to the idea of traditional art. He has developed a keen insight into the quintessence of Islamic art. The Role of the Fine Arts in Moslem Education is a chapter which examines the place
that Islamic art occupies in modern academic institutions mainly through the disciplines of archaeology and the history of art. But both these disciplines are derived from European humanistic philosophy ‘which reduces all spiritual values to their purely human aspect’. It is doubtful whether this science can understand the outward history of Islamic art alongwith its spiritual content.

‘Archaeology and the history of art are both founded on the historical analysis of works of art. Such an analysis may well deliver objective results, but it does not necessarily lead to an essential view of things’. Rather, it has a tendency to remain fixated on minor details at the expense of comprehensive views.

Modern scholarship, for instance, has committed the mistake of explaining the origin of Islamic art in reference to Byzantine, Sassanid, coptic or other art. Thus, it has ‘lost sight of the intrinsic and original unity of Islamic art’ and has ‘forgotten the ‘seal’ that Islam conferred on all borrowed elements’. The history of art makes a fallacious attempt to judge a work of art by ‘its real or presumed ‘originality’ or by virtue of its ‘revolutionary’ character; as if the essential quality of a work of art were not its beauty, and as if beauty were not independent of the psychological dramas of the moment.’ Most historians of art are more interested in the individuality of the artist then the spiritual truth which art conveys. The psychological impulse behind the artistic expression comes to dominate the entire horizon of art. Islamic art has no room for such individualism or psychologism. It remains primarily committed to the reflection of universal beauty. As a consequence, it remains serene and impersonal. In the western world ‘the image of man occupies the central position in all visual art, whereas in the world of Islam the image of man plays a secondary role and is altogether absent from the liturgical domain.... Islam banished all this ambiguous play of psychological mirrors at an early stage, thus preserving the primordial dignity of man himself’. The commitment of European art to image makes figurative painting and sculpture stand higher than architecture. The ‘decorative’ arts occupy a much lower position in the hierarchy of arts. Islamic art has no goal of imitating or describing nature. It is oriented to ‘the shaping of the human ambience’. ‘Islamic art does not add something alien to the object that it shapes; it merely brings out their essential qualities’. Thus, Islamic art is essentiality objective. ‘In Islam too man is the centre to
which all art refer, but as a rule man is not the theme of visual art’. In the hierarchy of the visual art in Islam, calligraphy or the art of writing occupies the highest place, for it, has the privilege of translating into visual forms the divine speech of the ‘koran’. Architecture is equally important. It has the vitality in ‘shaping the human ambience and making it congenial to Islamic baraka’. Minor arts attached to architecture include woodcarving, mosaics, sculpture. Major, minor and all utilitarian arts belong to the same principle. Islamic art promotes the qualities of unity, justice and generosity which are also the fundamental aspects of beauty. The role of the fine arts is ‘to manifest the hidden qualities of things’. Islamic art ‘is like a silent education’. In the traditional Islamic world no distinction was made between arts and crafts. The disappearance of the crafts, due to the invasion of the machine, has dealt a death blow to the Islamic arts. ‘The essence of art is beauty and beauty by its very nature is an outward as well as an inward reality’. Beauty is intimately linked with truth and vice versa. Modern European art offers a beauty which contains no wisdom, no spiritual grace. Titus Burckardt has very successfully pointed out the role of Islamic art in the educative process. Strictly speaking, there is nothing common between the modern European art and the Islamic art which is derived from Islam itself. The basic limitation of the profane art is that the artist has been locked up in his own psychic world and has no access to pure objectivity. His own psyche stands in the way of his essential self and the objective world. The element of transcendence remains conspicuous by its absene. Modern European art is the product of alienation and it correspondingly manifests alienation. It has no inkling of Divine Beauty which is the metaphysical foundation of Islamic art. Instead of revealing the essentiality of a thing, it conceals it. All philosophies of art fail to understand the metaphysical concept of ‘Beauty’ and ‘Truth’. Resultantly, art is deprived of the metaphysical/spiritual foundation.

Perennial values in Islamic Art is another chapter which further develops the concept of Islamic art. The unity and regularity of Islamic art is based on the intellectual vision of timeless realities. ‘This is also the meaning of ‘intellect’ (al-aql) in Islamic tradition; faith is not complete unless it be illumined by al-aql which alone grasps the implication of at-tauhid, the doctrine of divine Unity’. In a similar way, Islamic art derives its beauty from wisdom. It does not let anything ‘stand between man and the invisible presence of God’. Unlike modern European art, Islamic art creates a void; it
eliminates, in fact, all the turmoil and passionate suggestions of the world, and in their stead creates an order that expresses equilibrium, serenity and peace. Thus, architecture occupies a central position in Islamic art. “Islamic art is fundamentally derived from Tawhid, that is, from an assent to or a contemplation of Divine Unity. The essence of 'at-tawhid is beyond words; it reveals itself in the Koran by sudden and discontinuous flashes. Striking the plane of the visual imagination, these flashes congeal into crystalline forms, and it is these forms in their turn that constitute the essence of Islamic art’. Titus Burckhardt is at his best in describing the perennial values in Islamic art. How unlike the profane values which are trapped in human individuality, psyche and the temporal circumstances of an age. The latent possibilities of art were inherent in Islam itself and they started manifesting in different epochs and taught man the primordial link between man and God. Thus, Islamic art attained the level of a decisive discipline.

The Void in Islamic Art elaborates further the main argument of Islamic art taken in the previous chapter. ‘Strictly speaking, the forbidding of images in Islam refers only to images of the, divinity’. It is to avoid idolatrous polytheism which falsely associates the relative with the absolute. Sacred art, no doubt, is based on symbolism but it is not necessarily composed of images’. This void which Islamic art creates by its static; impersonal and anonymous quality enables man to be entirely himself, to repose in his ontological centre’. Sacred art needs to be studied by sacred criteria therein shall shine forth the timeless truth enshrined in Islamic art.

“The impart of the Arabic Language on the Visual Arts of Islam “is a very instructive chapter on the subject. The Arabic language is sacred and archaic and ‘has succeeded in preserving its primordial character. (The ‘Arab is a priori an auditive rather than a visual type. ‘He is dynamic and contemplative. ‘He finds access to unity by means of rythm, which is like the refraction of the eternal present in the current of time.’ The arabesque is the most clear expression of rythm in the visual order. The semitic nomads had no figurative tradition. Even the borrowed images could not be integrated within the tradition). Titus Burckhardt had reflected a great vision in determining the relationship between language and art. It is only the primordial languages which succeed in revealing the essence of art. The
Islamic tradition in particular finds a close connection between Arabic language and the corresponding art.

Part five, captioned as ‘Envoi’, consists of a letter on spiritual method. ‘There is no spiritual method without these two basic elements; discernment between real and the unreal, and concentration on the real’. The first presupposes a metaphysical understanding, whereas the second requires a support of sacred character that can be achieved within the framework of a normal tradition. The perpetual concentration on the Real presupposes a regular transmission such as exists only within a normal tradition. The master is attached to an initiatic chain and it is necessary for the disciple to obey him. The master transmits the spiritual influence, keys to meditation and ‘the sacred supports for perpetual concentration on the Real’. He is aware of the relativity of forms, for his knowledge transcends all forms. No true master puts himself outside a tradition. ‘In the spiritual life, there is no place for individual experiments; they are too ruinous’. Titus Burckhardt has very beautifully brought out the essence of spiritual method. Spiritual epistemology has its own methodology. The very presence of spiritual method indicates that the tradition stands for true knowledge and the spiritual master, by discerning true from the false, concentrates absolutely on the real. Thus, the way exists and it cannot be termed as an illusion.

Titus Burckhardt’s Mirror of the Intellect exhibits infinite reflections. These twenty five essays on traditional science and sacred art restore the intellectual vision which has been obstructed by modern science and profane art. The work alluded to shines as a pole star in the ‘dark night of the world’. It is a mirror in which both the traditional and the modern man can recognize their primordial faces. Viewed from all angles, it is not a psychic mirror but mirror of the Intellect which reflects the world of archetypes.

ALLAMA IQBAL – REFUSING TO BE CALLED A POET

PROF. MUHAMMAD MUNAWWAR

Late Sayyed Nazeer Niazi lays down in the biography of Allama Muhammad Iqbal that he was a born poet. Mr. Niazi maintains that Allama Iqbal, when still a school student, had begun to compose verses. It was something natural with him. It looked as if sentences flowing out of his mouth were regular and rhythmical. Continuing, Mr. Niazi relates that Allama Iqbal’s renowned teacher Maulana Sayyed Mir Hassan, to whom he was tremendously devoted, had a highly refined taste of poetry. He came to know that Iqbal composed verses. This made him happy and he encouraged him impressing upon to continue. Sayyed Mir Hassan had intuitively visualised that Iqbal’s fame as a poet was to overwhelm the whole world. It did not mean, that he encouraged every student to write poetry. Sayyed Nazir Niazi states that a certain classmate of Iqbal also made bold to approach Sayyed Mir Hassan and told him that he too was a poet, and if permitted he would recite some verses. At this the sage teacher who knew the boy’s worth took up his stick, gave him sound beating and warned him never again to indulge in composing verses. But the appreciative teacher continued attending to Iqbal’s verses, suggesting modifications and corrections where needed. As is obvious Sayyed Mir Hassan could very clearly distinguish between inborn talent for poetry and belaboured versification. Once Iqbal recited to the school audience in Sayyed Mir Hassan’s presence. Thus in his early youth, Iqbal had become known as a poet. There was in Sialkot a society of poets (پژم مشاعره) and Iqbal began to take part in poetic symposiums held under the auspices of that society. Sayyed Mir Hassan continued to guide Iqbal in respect of poetical delicacies, rhythmic niceties, prosody, graces of expression and its flaws. In short he, as a student at Sialkot, had learnt all about poetic art that he needed. Sayyed Mir Hassan, although he himself did not compose poetry, yet had keen inborn sense for the understanding of poetry and deep insight for appreciating poetic beauties. Iqbal admitted many a time that it was Sayyed Mir Hassan from whom he had learnt a lot about literary qualities. It was he who had
cultivated and refined his poetic talent. Iqbal eulogised this aspect of his teacher, saying “whatever Shahji (Mir Hassan) said was poetic”. But the matter had not been left at that by Sayyed Mir Hassan relating to Allama Iqbal’s upbringing as a poet. He looked around to find out some proper guide who himself should be a poet of high calibre. He chose for him Mirza Dagh of Delhi, one of the most accomplished poets of that era, as a mentor in respect of poetic excellencies.\(^{81}\)

As is a well-known fact, this relationship of teacher and disciple did not last long. Mirza Dagh wrote to Iqbal that he had attained sufficient mastery over the language as well as the art of poetry therefore he did not feel he could improve upon his verses. This meant that Allama Iqbal’s own inherent taste for poetry could very capably serve him as his mentor. Allama Iqbal by now come to Lahore to continue his studies and had joined the Government College, Lahore. In Lahore his poetry attracted the attention of all the literary figures and circles worth the name, in that city. He, during that period, wrote innumerable ‘Ghazals’ and a number of poems. His poetry, as it now began to appear at the pages of several newspaper, literary tracts and magazines, was now being appreciated and esteemed out of Lahore, rather even out of the Punjab as well. ‘Anjumani- Himayat-i-Islam’ Lahore used to hold its annual meetings where the national and literary heroes of those days came to deliver speeches, read discourses and recite poetry. This all was done for the good of Indian Muslims who had been left behind on almost all paths of life; education, trade, services; politics etc. Allama Iqbal attended these sessions of the ‘Anjuman’. By and by he began to recite his poems on those occasions. The first poem was “Nala-i-Yatim” in 1899. This Forum of the Anjuman enhanced his prestige as a poet, as a patriot and as a sympathizer of his community i.e. the Muslims of the Sub-continent. This sense of significance made him assess his lot of poetry ---was it worth while, especially what he wrote in the form of ‘ghazals’. He by now had started to feel his responsibility towards his country and particularly towards Muslims. In this regard his poem “سيّد كمي لوح تربت” (the tombstone of Sir Sayyed)  

\(^{81}\) Dana-i-Raz, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore 1979, pp.76-78-\(^{82}\) Bang-i-Dara, Ghulam All & Sons, p.52.
and “شاعر” (The poet) can be referred to. The former one contains many pieces of advice for the people. The last three verses are especially addressed to the poets. Allama Iqbal imparts his message through the Tombstone of Sir Sayyed’s grave to his comrades i.e. his coterie of poets. Poets, here, are reminded that they have been given a mighty pen that can work wonders. They have been given brilliant minds and pure hearts. They as poets are direct disciples of God, hence they should not compose anything which would undermine their prestige. It is their duty to wake the asleep peoples of their society with their miraculous verses. They, with the burning spirit of their poetry, should render all which is wrong into ashes.

As far the latter poem captioned “The Poet” is concerned, Allama Iqbal writes as under:

“Society is like the body and the individuals are like different parts of it. Those engaged in industrial works are the hands and feet of the society. The administrative organisation is similar to the beautiful face of the same, while a poet who writes impressive and colourful verses is like the observing eye. Whatever part of the body should ache, it is the eye that weeps. How sympathetic is the eye, to the whole body.”

This shows the extent of the responsibility of a poet towards his nation, society and the country.

When in Europe, Allama Iqbal composed a poem captioned “To Abdul Qadir” and then a ‘Ghazal’ which contained the message of hope for Muslims and was written in March 1907 as indicated by the poet himself. The poem begins thus:

The horizon of the East has darkened. Let us with the flames of song give light to the people of the East.

As far as the ‘Ghazal’ alluded to, is concerned, it was much expressive and direct. Its verses are like this:

---

83 Ibid., p.61.
84 Bang-i-Dara, p.132.
85 Ibid., pp.140-142.
“At last the silent tongue of Hijaz has announced to the ardent ear, the tiding that covenant which had been given to the desert-dwellers is going to be renewed in strong terms.”

“The lion who had emerged from the desert and had toppled the Roman Empire, is, as I am told by the angels, about to get up again (from his slumbers).”

“You the dwellers of the West, should know that the world of God Almighty is not a shop (of yours). Your imagined pure gold is about to lose its standard value (as fixed by you).”

“Your civilization will commit suicide with its own dagger.

A nest built on a frail bough cannot be durable.”

“The caravan of feeble ants will take petal for a boat. And in spite of all blasts of waves, it shall cross the river.”

“I will take out my worn-out caravan in the pitch darkness of night. My sighs will emit sparks, and my breath will produce flames. (And it will be light all around)”

Leaving aside the prophecies he made in this ‘Ghazal’ which, with the passage of time, unfolded into near reality, the most important declaration was his determination to give a lead to the Muslims of the world. He now had bent upon employing his potentialities to bring Muslims out of the dark dungeons of slavery and guide them to sunny vistas of independence and glory. This was a gigantic decision. It gave him a totally new light. He now had to re-evaluate his performance, especially as a poet; a quality he was renowned for. Here he found that almost all the ‘ghazals’ he had been writing smacked of something like a pass-time device, remote from realities of life, not embodying what the milieu demanded. After that he no longer displayed fondness of traditional poetry. Writing to one Mr. Shatir (شاطر صاحب) on August 29, 1908 i.e. not long after he returned from England, he stated:

“Sometimes I do compose some verses for the pleasure of others.
During the last three years I have written poetry very rarely.

And now the profession I am about to join, has no relation with poetry”\textsuperscript{86}(the profession alluded to was that of a Lawyer).

On July 7, 1911, he wrote in reply to a demand from Atiya Faizi in respect of a selection of his poetical works for publication.

“Selection (of poetical works) for publication is for me a hard task. During the last five to six years, my poems have been of private nature and I understand that public has no right to read them. Some of them I have already destroyed lest some body should steal and publish them. Anyway I will see what can be done in this regard. My respected and kind father has directed me to write a Mathnawi on the pattern of the Mathnawi written by Hazrat Bu-Ali Qalandar. I know the difficulties I have to face in the process of its completion. Anyway I have begun to write it.”\textsuperscript{87}

Some of the verses he wrote for that Mathnawi were later on included in ‘Asrar-i-Khudi’ which he had started writing in 1910.\textsuperscript{88} This clearly shows that what he had tried on the lines of Bu-Ali Qalandar’s Mathnawi turned out to be Asrar-i-Khudi in the long run.

It indicates he said good-bye to his old traditional poetry which consisted mainly of ‘ghazals’ expressing stray thoughts relating mostly to love, beauty, the cup of wine, the cupbearer, or the master of the wine-house, hopes and promises relating to meetings with the beloved and resulting frustration, the pangs of separation, deserts where the mad lovers roam about etc. These ‘ghazals’ did contain, here and there some pieces of advice and moral lessons too. But mainly it dealt with what was generally not real, having nothing to do with the hard facts of life and especially what the times and circumstances demanded.

Allama Iqbal had now as a responsible and a gifted poet forsaken his former style of poetry. ‘Ghazals’ he had composed in the style of Dagh and

\textsuperscript{86}Iqbal Nama, Vol.II, p.306.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., pp.148-149.
\textsuperscript{88}Gu f tar-i-Iqbal.
Amir, now looked to him of no value. This is why he discarded them when he

compiled Bang-i-Dara, keeping only a few of them just to show the stages he had passed through.

He took to a new path. It was not a sheer chance or an inadvertent action. It was his deliberate and well thought out decision. He formerly was a poet with stray thoughts, but now he no longer was a poet of that type. Writing to Sayyed Sulaiman Nadvi, he explained:

“In poetry, literature for the sake of literature has never been my aim. There is no time left to me to attend to the delicacies of art. The purpose is to revolutionise modes of thinking. That is all. Keeping this principle in view I try to express what I find useful. No wonder if the coming generations may not recognise me as a poet.”

This letter had been written on October 10, 1919. Allama Iqbal remained consistent in this regard and wrote to many people that truths pertaining to national welfare and Muslim Umma’s morals were much dearer to his heart than expression of art. To bring about a revolution in the thinking of Muslims had become his sole purpose because they were living in slavery of the British. They were overwhelmed by Hindus in all fields of life. Morally they had little knowledge of real Islam. They, according to Allama Iqbal, had fallen prey to rigid Mulas and greedy Sufis. Misguided guides were misguiding the blind followers. Educationally, the Muslim community had been left far behind by other nations, not only in India rather all over the world.

Explaining again and again this stance of his in writing poetry, he tried to bring into bold relief the purposes he held so dear. For example on August 20, 1935 while writing to Sayyed Nadvi, he stressed the same point:

“I have never known myself as a poet. Therefore I have no rival competitors and I do not recognise any as such. I have no interest in the art of poetry. Yes, I have some specified goals to achieve which I always keep

89 Iqbal Nama, I, p.108.
before me. I took to poetry to explain these goals with reference to the conditions and traditions obtaining in the country, otherwise

نه بيني خيرًا فرودست
كه برمن تهمت شعر و سخن بست

You will not find any good coming from that low-minded person who accuses me of writing poetry’’

Here we are face to face with an intriguing scenario. A great poet refusing to be called a poet. The why of it is sufficiently manifest. As already stated, Allama Iqbal believed that he had to perform some benevolent duty towards the society, the nation and then the humanity at large. A poet with a sense of responsibility and accountability to God is essentially different from the one who is just a poet. A poet with some definite message to impart to others is unlike the one who has no such message. A poet who finds purpose in life and follows some clear cut ideology is an entity separate from the one who is bereft of all such obligations. Allama Iqbal knew the difference. He knew perfectly well the distance between one sort of poetry and the other. For a poet it is the art of poetry which is the only requirement i.e. he composes poetry for the sake of poetry. For him poetic art is its own reward whereas for a poet with a purpose, a goal, an ideology and a message, makes use of poetic capability as a means to that end. Hence the difference, a poetry pure and simple confronting another which is a vehicle for the transmission of something beyond art. One sort of poetry pleases, the other one teaches. But one thing is still quite obvious that to make impressive, a poetry with a message, is much more difficult than to write pleasing and plausible verses relating to Love, Beauty, Nature etc. Generally the verses carrying moral lessons do not attract that much of attention as is earned by a fascinating piece of poetic composition which touches the chords of hearts with the key of sensual sentiments and emotions. Allama Iqbal changed over to a teacher-poet. His qualification is that he neither subordinated his poetry to his purpose nor did he do the opposite. Dr. Yusuf Hussain Khan writes:

---

90 Iqbal Nama, I, p.195.
“In the history of the world literature Allama Iqbal is amongst the very rare examples of a poet who left such a deep influence through his captivating songs; on a society so large as that of Indian Muslims. The cause is nothing but the fact that Allama Iqbal took those basic truths as subject-matter of his poetry which go a long way in shaping the behaviour of societies and lead to the abode of welfare and happiness.”

But this Allama Iqbal did artistically. Ethical, social and religious lessons he imparted, were clad in beautiful words that sang the meanings. To quote Dr. Yusuf Hussain Khan again:

“Usually the literature which aims at achieving some particular purpose is dry, tasteless and if artistically examined, of low degree. But Iqbal has put, forward his subjects in such a delicately colourful style which attracts the heart and vision.”

People who were not accustomed to this type of poetry proclaimed it as something unpoetic because for them it were the style, the words and the beauty of expression which was the real thing. They thought that purposive subjects suited only to prose and not at all the poetry. The trends of poetry inherited by the contemporary poets of Allama Iqbal, did not interpret hard facts of life around. In the words of Dr. M.D. Taseer:

“The poetry repudiated by Allama Iqbal is characterized by him as idolization and worship i.e. a poetry which in itself becomes the sole purpose, a poetry which is just old fashioned and traditional. It is a literature whose only aim is playing upon words wherein appreciation and applause consists in saying: “What a beautiful rhyme”, “how attractive is the style”, “how fascinating is the expression,” “what a befitting idiom,” “look at the purity of language” etc. Poetry that attracted this kind of appreciation was rejected by Allama Iqbal.”

Here it was the parting of the ways. For Allama Iqbal poetry, like all other human capabilities was to be used for the good of man, for making life healthier and more beautiful. It was a divine gift and thus it was light and

---

91 Rooh-i-Iqbal, Aina-i-Adab, Lahore, 1977, p.15.
92 Ibid, p.20.
power. This gift from God, if put to wrong uses, could do unimaginable harm to the society of human beings for whose good this faculty had been inculcated in human nature. This leads us to believing that there are two camps in respect of Art. One the “art for art’s sake” and other the “art for the sake of life”. Allama Iqbal belonged to the second camp. After he returned from England, he took up his poetry very seriously. Asrar-i-Khudi was the first book epitomizing the new look of Allama Iqbal upon poetry, its function and his own responsibility as a repository of this sacred treasure vested in him.

In his Foreword to Muraqqa-i-Chughtai, Allama Iqbal made this view manifest unequivocally:

“Unfortunately I am not competent enough to judge the technical side of painting, and refer the reader to Dr. Cousen’s admirable Introduction in which he had analyzed some of the more important forces that are shaping Chughtai’s artistic ideal. All that I can say is that I look upon Art as subservient to life and personality. I expressed this view as far back as 1914 in my Asrar-i-Khudi, and twelve years later in the poems of the Zabu-e-Ajam. I have tried to picture the soul-movement of the ideal artist in whom Love reveals itself as a unity of Beauty and Power.”

Continuing, Allama Iqbal takes a mighty step forward and declares:

“The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Attila or Changez. As the Prophet of Islam said of Imra-ul-Qais the greatest poet of pre-Islamic Arabia.”

94 Abdul Vahid Mueeni, Thoughts and Reflections of
(The best of poets and their guide to Hell)

As Allama Iqbal has himself referred to in the foregoing lines, it was ‘Asrar-i-Khudhi’, his first book coming out with his new ideas about the art of poetry.

“In this Masnawi I am not aiming at the display of my poetic talent. My aim is neither idol-building nor idol-worship.”

And while explaining the significance of a poet, as he desires him to be, he says:


95 Asrar-i-Khudi, p.11.
96 Asrar-i-Khudi, pp.35,36.
“In the heart of a poet divine beauty manifests its lustre. Lights of beauty burst forth from his Sinai.”

“His glance turns beauteous into more beauteous. Nature on account of his charms becomes more attractive.”

“His breath had taught the nightingale to sing. His rouge has set the rose aglow.”

“In his body is hidden the ocean and the earth. And his soul is the abode of innumerable new worlds.

“In his imagination there are tulips which have not yet budded and there are unheard of melodies as well as wailings.”

“His thought is as high as the moon and the stars. He keeps aloof from all that is ugly, he creates beauty.”
“He Is like Khizar, in his inner depths there lies the Spring of Life.”

“It is his bell that keeps the caravan moving. The caravan follows his melodies,”

“He invites the world to his dinner-table. ‘He makes his burning fervour as cheaply available as air.’

This briefly is Allama Iqbal’s conception of a poet. He showered unbounden applause on him. He holds a poet in such a high esteem.

God knows if any other poet has ever eulogised poets in such brilliant terms and extolled them so bounteously. How important is the existence of a poet for the good of humanity. The verses given above need no elucidation. They are self-explanatory. But we are aware of the fact that it is only one side of the coin. Allama Iqbal’s balanced temperament and view of life could not let go the other side of the coin unexamined. So here we have what Allama Iqbal offers pertaining to poets who do not jealously guard and improve upon the luminous element of this divine grace. How much dangerous can an artist-poet prove to be for the society if he behaves irresponsibly and especially when he stoops to bestiality and rat race. A mentally ailing poet is far more devastating than the invading armies at the uncivilized hordes.
Woe unto a nation who takes deed of death for life. This is a nation whose poet has become wearied of the taste for life.” “His mirror displays ugly things as fair. His honey hurts the heart like arrows.”

“His kiss deprives the rose of its fragrance. It takes away the urge to fly, from the heart of the nightingale.”

“Your nerves have been weakened by his opium. You pay with life for his subject-matter.”

“He highjacks the elegance of the sypress tree. His deep cold sighs turn the falcon into a partridge.”

“His songs steal away strength of your heart. You deem death as life on account of his ‘magic.’

It is crystal clear that Allama Iqbal held the faculty of poetry in high esteem. He knew that the positive aspect of poetry was of great use for strengthening a society as well as an individual. But alongwith it he was equally sure that a poet with an ailing spirit and a diseased brain could leave devastating effect on the society and the individual. The devastation could not be measured in terms of material loss or loss in honour only. A poetry portraying life as something to be shunned and death to be embraced was, on account of lyrical magic capable of inculcating defeatist attitude in the surrounding human groups.

---

97 Asar-i-Khudi, p.36.
If poetry can do lot of good as well as evil, it means poetry is a highly forceful skill vested in man. Every force can be used for doing good and creating good. Similarly every force can be put to wrong uses. That creates many sorts of trouble, turmoil and dismay. Allama Iqbal eulogised the skill of poetry as an endowment from above. He wished he, in actual fact could see poets as he visualized and depicted them. He himself, by and by, advanced towards the first cotery of poets whereas the overwhelming, not only that, rather almost the whole cotery of his contemporary poets who were innumerable, belonged to the second category i.e. the decadents who created decay. Only two or three honourable exceptions to that encompassing general rule can be sited e.g. Hall and Akbar and Zafar Ali Khan. In other words, in the light of prevailing attitude of poetry and poets this forceful endowment meant a source of escape, defeat and death. This made him declare, he was not a poet and hence should not be called as such. If a poet epitomised all that was soul-killing and depressing, all that was irresponsibility and loll he stood aloof from him. So he proclaimed he was not a poet. Apparently it is a paradox, but with reference to what Allama Iqbal stood for, the paradox evaporates. He was not a poet in the sense the poets were known to be. This is why he deploringly explained:

آشنائی من زمین پیگانه رفت
از خمستنام تهی پیمانه رفت
من شکوه خسروی او را دهم
تخت کسری زیر پائی او نهم
او حديث دلبری خواهد زمین
رنگ و آب شاعری خواهد زمین
کم نظریه تابئی جامن ندید
آشکارم دید و پنهانم ندید
حق رمزی ملك و دین برمن كشود
“Even he who was my friend did not know my reality hence he went away without having tasted of wine from my flagons.”

“I offer him imperial majesty and want to place the throne of Kisra under his feet.”

“He (on the contrary) demands from me the poetry pertaining to beauty and love. He wants from me decorated expressions (which are the hallmark) of poetry.”

“He is weak-sighted, hence could not see the agitation in my soul. He saw my appearance and could not visualize what it was within.”

“God has made manifest to me the riddles of rule and religion. God removed all ungodly imprints from the curtains of my eyes.”

“My verse is my blood. Hence my words make the rose-petal look more colorful.”

“Poetry is not a part of sheer madness and ends thereat. Do not think so; Madness, when perfect, becomes wisdom.”
“Lot of talent has been showered on me. But I have been put in India to be disgraced (because I have not been able to uplift the people here).”

“I am a singing bird, stranger ever in my own garden because the roses and tulips of this garden do not recognise me (and my worth).”

A man of faith and vision as Allama Iqbal was, he was placed among people who had lost all will to wake up from their slumbers in which slavery and lack of faith in themselves had lain them. They, therefore, liked things conforming to their state of nonchalant lethargy. Allama Iqbal wished he could drag people out of the den of their deathless demise but they as is naturally the behaviour of decaying societies refused to be disturbed. They were comfortable in their longed for disgrace. There plight had become their delight. Hence Allama Iqbal complained he had been made to live among people who were bereft of all sense of honour as against those societies alive to the situation trying rather striving hard to ameliorate their condition. This phenomenon upset him and at times he felt as if providence had given him over to such people only to feel low. Yet, the thoughts like this were just passing shadows of disquiet. Otherwise he never gave way. He had to perform his duty. It did not bother him whether he succeeded or went away unsuccessful. As a responsible human being and as an artist conscious of his accountability to God he went on disseminating his message till the last day of his life. He had foreseen something which others had not and could not. Therefore, he protested in vehement terms if people thought of him as a traditional poet, like other ones who were just professionals and had no notion of their duty towards their people.
“My eyes visualized another revolution brewing up. I could see a new Sun about to rise.”

“I uncovered the face of mystery (or hidden reality). I placed a sun in the hands of an atom.”

“Do not imagine I am like poets who show off as intoxicated even without drinking and like them have woven fictitious stories.”

“You will not find good coming from him who accuses me of writing poetry.”

“I have nothing to do in the lane of a beloved. I do not have a heart broken by the beloved and am not aggrieved on account of that.”

“My existence is not like the dust of a pathway. My earthen body has no restive heart in it (like that of a bumptious love addict).”

“My narration is what the arch Angel Jibril-i-Amin has been narrating.

---

98 Javed Nama, pp.146/538.
Therefore, I in traditional sense have no co-sharer in love, no messenger and doorkeeper at the door of the beloved.”

Aziz’ Ahmad in this very context says:

“Nowadays discussion on art for life had assumed lot of magnitude. This discussion came along with socialist impact on literature. But as far as Iqbal is concerned he had initiated it long before as an integral part of general mode of thought. According to Iqbal life is out and out an expression. It seeks expression likewise in poetry and picture drawing. Thought without it is nothing but death. What is vehemently needed is that art should help in the understanding of life. Not only that, it should support its evolution. It should assist life in the process of its growth and the manner it assumes shapes. To interpret it in different terms we can say that life is the touchstone on which the gold of literature is to be rubbed.”

As has been referred to above Allama Iqbal was a “progressivist” in respect of art much before the “progressivism” of the socialist impact which had appeared in the subcontinent or even in Europe. His Asrar-i-Khudi had come to light in 1915, but he had begun writing it since 1910, as mentioned in the foregoing pages.

Rumuz-i-Bekhudi was being shaped during years 1915-1917 i.e. before Socialist Revolution took place in Russia. For him literature was to be subservient to life. It were as if a part of his creed. In his letter to Prof. Nicholson written on January 24, 1921, he explained his viewpoint about life vis-a-vis Dickison’s points raised’ pertaining to his ideas of force and hardness. He quotes Prof. Mackenzie:

“We need prophets as well as teachers, men like Carlyle or Ruskin or Tolstoy, who are able to add for us a new severity to conscience or a new breath to duty Perhaps we want a new Christ. It has been well said that the prophet of our time must be a man of the world,’ and not merely a voice in the wilderness. For indeed the wilderness of the present is in the streets of our crowded cities, and in the midst of the incessant war by which we are trying to make our way upwards. It is here that the prophet must be.”

“Or perhaps our chief want is rather for the poet of the’ new age that for its prophet or far one who should be poet and prophet in one. Our poets of recent generations have taught us, the love of nature, and enabled us to find in it the revelation of the Divine. We still look for one who shall show us with the same clearness the presence of the Divine in the human. We still need one who shall be fully and in all seriousness what Heine playfully called himself “Ritter Von dem Heiliegen Geish”, one who shall teach us to see the working out of our highest ideals in the everyday life of world and to find in devotion to the advancement of that life, not merely a sphere for an ascetic self-sacrifice, but a supreme object in the pursuit of which all thoughts, all passions, all delights may receive their highest development and satisfaction.”

Prof. Mackenzie looks about in search of a poet who should do the job of a prophet, who should tell people to search within their own bosoms for knowing their own reality, which is a reflection of the Divine. That could teach man to realize his inborn faculties. Such a poet prophet-cum-teacher in Mackenzie’s view was essentially to be a man of the world and not an ascetic, cut away from the life in a society. These words of Mackenzie were certainly of Allama Iqbal’s liking. No person can grow into a useful individual of his society unless he gains experience pertaining to social problems by throwing himself into the turmoil of life’s trials. A person is truthful only theoretically unless proved practically as such. And he cannot do it without living in a society and without dealing with its people in different concerns. A person puts up with others if he lives in and with others. He is tolerant only when he tolerates vagaries of others with grace. He has a spirit of sacrifice but this spirit cannot be put into practice by a hermit who dwells in a cave. The spirit of sacrifice has to be demonstrated in a society. An individual can be accepted as a man of integrity with reference to his deeds and dealings with other individuals or groups then and then only it transpires that a particular person led a useful life… life of truthfulness forbearance, tolerance, integrity and selflessness. A hermit cannot concretize morals, cannot set a good model for it. Morals deal, with actions. Morals are not preserves of philosophy and hence are not kept at a respectable distance, high and dry, like philosophy itself.

100 Thoughts and Reflections, pp.95, 96.
Allama Iqbal was almost that poet prophet who, was desired by Mackenzie. He had variegated experiences of life in its so many aspects. His study of man was minute. His study of his own self was deep. He plunged into the down-reaching waters of the sea of soul. He came out with hands full of pearls which he scattered among peoples near and far. The question is how many of Allama Iqbal’s predecessors among poets had tried to read “man” so minutely including his ownself and then tried to bring about a healthy change in individuals as well as societies, convinced that it was his duty which he bad to perform as a person endowed by Almighty Allah with acute understanding and highly refined poetic capabilities.

Writing to Akbar Allahabadi on June 11, 1918 Allama Iqbal explains:

“I believe that the literature of Muslims in all Muslim countries needs to be reformed. Pessimistic literature cannot live for ever.

For a nation its literature must be optimistic and it is essential for the literature itself.”

\[101\]

\[\text{فَطَرَتُ شَاعِرُ سِراْبَا جَسَتِجُوِ اسْتَخْلَاقٌ وَ يُوْرَدُدَّرَ آرَوزٍوُسْتَ شَاعِرُ اَنْدَرُ سِيِّئَهُ مُلَّتُ چُوُدَلَ مُلَّتُ یُوْشَاعِرُ سِء َسْانَبَرَ گَلَ سَووزوُسْتَیِ نَقْشُ بَندِهٍ عَالمٍ اسْتَ شَاعِرَیِ یَ سَووزوُسْتَیِ مِسَاتِمِ اسْتَ}

\[\text{Iqbal Nama, Vol.II, p.56.}\]
“A poet by nature is always on the look out for something He is the creator of hope, its sustainer as well.”

“In a nation the place of a poet is like the heart in the breast. Without a poet a nation is like a mound of dust.”

“Burning and rapture can design a new world.

A poet bereft of burning and rapture is nothing but a funeral song.”

“If poetry aims at reconstruction of man (turning man into a genuine man) then this too is an heir to prophethood.”

There are many verses by Allama Iqbal carrying same connotation. Here is a couplet from Dharb-i-Kalim;

میں شعر کے اسرار سے محروم نہیں لیکن
یہ نکته یہ تاریخ امام جس کی یہ تفصیل
وہ شعر کہ بیغام حیات ابیدی یہ
یانغمہ جبریل یہ یا صور سرافیل

“I am not fully acquainted with the mysteries of poetry, yet (I may say) it is a subtle point of which the history of nations is the detail.”

“Poetry carrying the message of eternal life is either the song of Jibrail i.e. the guidance and light from Above or the Trumpet of Esrraphil i.e. it resurrects the dead.”

102 Kulliyat-i-Iqbal (Persian), pp.44/632 (Javed Nama).
103 Ibid., (Urdu), pp.132, 133.
This shows that poetry, when genuine, does two things. It guides and sustains. It enlivens and resurrects. It is life giving force. It invigorates. It exuberates and resuscitates the, dying forces of life and strengthens a society. But this all is the quality of a poetry which deserves praise and not the one which Allama Iqbal condemns. In an article captioned, "The literary opinions of the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) "Allama Iqbal refers to Imraul Qais (أمراه) about whom the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) had stated that he was the best of poets and their guide to Hell. This opinion he held on account of the brilliance of Imraul Qais, his mastery over the expression, his creativity on the one side and his lascivious, rapacious and dipsomaniac subjects on the other. His poetic magic could enthrall those who heard or read his verses, thus left unhealthy influence on minds, making it easy for the enthrawled to go astray.

The second opinion of the Holy prophet (S.A.S.) as quoted by Allama Iqbal was about a verse of Antra-ibn Shaddad, a poet of the Jahiliyya era, like Imra ul Qais. It is recorded that once the following verse of Antra was recited in the presence of the Holy Prophet:

وقد ابيت على الطوى واظلَّه
حتَّى اخال به الكريم المأكل

“I worked very hard whole nights, without going to bed so that I may earn an honourable meal.

Allama Iqbal adds that the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) on hearing this verse of ‘Antra was highly pleased. The only purpose of his prophethood was to make human lives graceful and turn the hardships and vicissitudes into something pleasant and natural. The Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) wished vistfully if he could see the author of that verse. He had been hearing praises of poets but about none he had felt the urge to see him.

In the words of Allama Iqbal, the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) had bestowed such a unique honour on ‘Antra because of one verse and which depicted a
life healthy and fresh as if life itself stood before us conversing. To earn one’s legitimate living by dint of one’s hard labour and to face the difficulties one has to, in this regard is a fact explained beautifully by ‘Antra. The praise which the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) bestowed on the verse, explains to us the principle that art is subservient to life and not its superior.

Every potentiality vested in the nature of man by the Divine Grace and all force man is invested with, must be used entirely for the sole purpose of turning national life into a sunshine, invigorative, perfectly efficient and fullblooded. The value of every art is to be determined with reference to its enlivening and invigorating aspect. All objects that make us lethargic and asleep, oblivious of all what goes on around us, are messengers of decline and harbingers of death. This worn out cliche that perfection of art is its own reward is a deceptive method invented only to deprive us of life and force in a treacherous manner. In short the veritable intuitive truth of the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) by recognizing the merits of Antra’s verse has set down the principle of all principles and it is that every art should evolve to perfection and the manner in which it should evolve.

With this arch-principle in view and with firm belief in its authenticity Allama Iqbal surveyed what was around him in the shape of poetry books and poets themselves. He felt fed up with all that. If that was all poetry which almost every poet in his country was persistently writing and reciting then he for one, was certainly not prepared to be called a poet. Now, we are in a position to understand his stance. And perhaps he was right. He had nothing common with traditional, professional and decadent poets who spread decay and dismay. He shunned to be one of them. He implores very humbly to the Holy Prophet in the following words:

104 Maqalat-i-Iqbal, pp.187-190. (The article was written in 1917 and published in a periodical Sitara-i-Subh issuing from Amritsar).
“Friends did not pay heed to the secret I disclosed to them. They did not pluck and eat dates from the branches of my tree.”

I seek justice from you, O! Lord of all nations my friends count me among the professional poets of Ghazal”.

BOOK REVIEWS

105 Kulliyat-i-Iqbal (Persian) Armughan-i-Hijaz, pp.43/925.
“More than a century after Darwin’s publication of The Origin of Species (which was first published in 1959), opposition to the theory of evolution still continues and in fact has been more widespread in the past several years. What is the nature of this opposition? There are many evolutionists who would like us to believe that whatever opposition there has been, has come solely from the nonscientific quarters; especially those who have their religious views and interests at stake. That such belief actually prevailed in the minds of most people for quite a long period of time and is still widely held, is due mainly to the evolutionists vast and well-established propagandas machine which ensures that no potential scientific opposition be given the opportunity to gain a foothold in the scientific establishment.  

Critique of Evolutionary Theory demonstrates that the theory of evolution is rejected for intellectual; and not sentimental reasons by a significant and ever-increasing segment of the western academic and scientific community. In this collection of essays the reader is presented with criticism of scientists and scholars from all different fields. If nothing else the most stubborn and impervious reader will be forced to admit that the theory of evolution, far from being an accepted fact in the intellectual and scientific forum, is a mounting controversy.

The book opens with an essay by a contemporary biologist, W.R. Thompson, who was formerly Director of the Commonwealth Institute of Biological Control in Canada. His essay, “The Origin of Species: A Scientist’s Criticism”, was written originally at the request of the publishers for the

---

introduction to the 1958 edition of Darwin’s The Origin of Species. Thompson states at the beginning of his essay, “But I am not satisfied that Darwin proved his point or that his influence in scientific and public thinking has been beneficial.” (p. 16). He acknowledges that his views will no doubt be received as “heretical and reactionary” by the establishment but remarks that in no field of science are heresy and reaction more desirable than in evolutionary theory.” (p. 16).

Thompson prefaces his actual criticism with a basic statement of the Darwinian and neo-Darwinian proposition:

“This is, that all the organisms that exist or have existed have developed from a few extremely simple forms or from one alone by a process of descent with modification”. (p. 17)

He then proceeds to describe the mechanism the evolutionists allege effect the supposed transformations; namely natural selection, whereby they purport that the progeny of an organism acquire traits of an adaptive value which are inherited by successive generations in a cumulative fashion. In other words, as E. Shute, author of Flaws in the Theory of Evolution,¹⁰⁷ which is frequently quoted throughout the essays under reviews, has said so succinctly: “micro-variations” lead to “macro-variations”.

Having stated what the evolutionary theory is, Thompson shows why it is biologically untenable. The first point he makes is that “the theory of modification by natural selection” is not proved by experimental evidence, but “by speculative argument” (p. 21)

Thompson continues: “The argumentation used by evolutionists, said de Quatrefages, makes the discussion of their ideas extremely difficult. Personal convictions, simple possibilities, are presented as if they were proofs, or at least valid arguments in favour of the theory. As an example de Quatrefages cited Darwin’s explanation of the manner in which the titmouse ‘might become transformed into the nutcracker, by the accumulation of small changes in structure and instinct owing to the effect of natural selection; and then proceeded to show that it is just as easy to transform the nutcracker into

the titmouse. The demonstration can be modified without difficulty to fit any conceivable case. It is without scientific value, since it cannot be verified; but since the imagination has free rein, it is easy to convey the impression that a concrete example of real transmutation has been given. This is the more appealing because of the extreme fundamental simplicity of the Darwinian explanation. The reader may be completely ignorant of biological processes yet he feels that he really understands and in a sense dominates the machinery by which the marvellous variety of living forms has been produced.” (p. 22)

In summation he remarks that Darwin doesn’t explain how natural selection happened, but simply how it “might” have happened. Thereafter, Thompson states that these speculations are no longer convincing, and he bluntly declares:

“We now know that the variations determined by environmental changes the individual difference regarded by Darwin as the material on which natural selection acts--are not hereditary. (p. 22)

He goes on developing his criticisms in detail; substantiating what he says. It is noteworthy that in The manner of a truly disinterested scientist, he calls upon biologists to disavow the dogma of evolution in the name of the integrity of science, deploring that for the sake of a baseless theory the progress of biology in being greatly impeded. He quotes another eminent biologist, Suyenot, to the effect that the obsession with natural selection “was to delay the progress of investigations on evolution by half a century.” (p. 32) Thompson further quois D’Arcy Thompson who was of the opinion that the Darwinian theory exerts a “stultifying effect” on the development of biology.

S.H. Nasr refers in “Eternity and Temporal Order,” (which is the seventh essay in the book we are reviewing) to a statement, similar to Suyenot’s and D’Arcy Thompson’s, made by R. Fodi, an Italian biologist and co-author of an anti-evolutionary book:

“Biology will not get any advantage out of the . attitudes of Lamarck, Darwin and the modern hyper-Darwinists; on the contrary, it must soon move out of the constraints and the blind alleys of the evolutionary myth, to
take again its safe way along the open and bright paths of Tradition.” (N. 13, pp. 111-112)

These several men are biologists of no mediocre calibre. They are otherwise proud of the science to which they dedicate themselves and simply want to see it rid of evolutionary biases because they are unscientific and unproductive.

In “Evolutionary Contradictions and Biological Facts,” (p. 65) we have another critique by a professional scientist, R.M. Morrell, an Australian fossil expert. Morrel tells us that Darwin knew that the fossil record did nothing to substantiate his theory, but he hoped that further research would bear his theory out. However, Morrell informs us that although since (1859 geologists have laboured to fulfil his expectation,” their labours have been in vain, for “the hoped-for evidence has not turned up.” (p. 65). He then quotes a distinguished geologist, Dr. John Challinor, to the effect that the fossil record doesn’t prove anything. (p. 65).

What evolutionists purport is that divergent taxa (taxonomic classifications) descended from common ancestors, and they postulate between a primitive taxonomic form and newer forms which supposedly descended from it; a complete range of intermediate forms with each successive form showing greater divergence. However Morrel insists that the fossil record provides such evidence of continuity. Perhaps the most embarrassing consideration for evolutionists which Morrell puts forward, is the sudden appearance in the geological record of fossils representing over 900 phyla (a major taxon comprehending genus and species) in the era known as Cambrian. In fact, the usual criteria employed in distinguishing the precambrian strata in geological deposits from the Cambrian is the very absence of fossils. Morrell remarks about the fossils which suddenly appear in the record:

“Many of these species are both complex and highly specialized and demand an evolutionary history, if the theory is to get off the ground.” (p. 67)

A third essay written by a professional scientist is titled “Life as non-Historical Reality.” The author, Guiseppe Sermonti is a leading
contemporary biologist in Italy, where he is Professor of Embryology at the University of Perugia. Sermonti is co-author of a book with R. Fondi, quoted above. The book, “Dopo Darwin, critical all-evoluzionismo” is highly critical of evolutionary theory and is an improtant work in the campaign against evolution. The essay on it in the book under review is so technical that much of it will pass over the heads of readers without a strong university background in life sciences, especially genetics and biochemistry. Semonti confirms what Morrell says about the sudden appearance of taxa. He writes: “The explosive ‘radiation’ of taxa, with all their subdivisions and the virtual absence of intermediate links, is the rule in paleontology (fossil study) (GRASSE, 1979).” (p. 95) He concludes his essay with the following statement:

“Since the beginning, life has an essentially constant genetico biochemical structure. Its morphological variability is moreover under the control of physico-mathematical constants also invariant in time. In both regards: the complexity present from the beginning and the geometrical rules present (as Widsom) outside time, life is non-histrocical.” (p. 98)

This statement is easier understood in light of remarks that Sermonti makes at the beginning of his essay; where he argues that the biochemical, genetic and palaeontological evidence is considered by an increasing number of scientists that once life originated a “stationary, balanced, cyclic situation” (p. 88) existed. He points out: “This emerging view opposes the evolutionary view according to which life as a general phenomenon is a progressive process……...“(p. 88)

Martin Lings has reviewed a book by the American biologist Dauglas Dewar, The Transformist Illusion.’ Much of the material in E. Shute’s important book mentioned previously (Flaws in the Theory of Evolution) is based on Dewar’s book. Indeed, Dewar’s book provides such an armory of thoroughly scientific criticism of evolutionism and, for this very reason, constitutes such an important landmark in the campaign during this last half of the twentieth century to dislodge the dogmas of evolutionary theory that it is quoted again and again in the essays of Critique. Douglas Dewar spells trouble and embarrassment for the evolutionist clique; indeed, they must regard him as a big tattler because as Martin Lings observes, he draws a “sharp line of demarcation between fact and theory” (p. 57).. For example
Dewar discloses to the layman in his chapter, “Alleged fossil links between Man and Non-Human Ancenstors,” that “there exist fossils of men of modern type which are far older than those of ‘Pekinman’ and other supposed ‘missing-links’.” (p. 57) Another characteristic tactic of Dewar is to render the high-sounding and cumbersome expatiations of the evolutinists in plain English intelligible to the layman so that he may see for himself the absurdity of their pretensions. For example, in his chapter, “Some Transformations postulated . by the Doctrine of Evolution,” he renders in plain English an account by Dr. R. Broom on how, supposedly, a mammal evolved from a reptile:

“Some reptile scrapped the original hinge of its lower jaw and replaced it with a new one attached to another part of the skull. Then five of the bones on each side of the lower jaw broke away from the biggest bone. The jaw bone to which the hinge was originally attached, after being set free, forced its way into the middle part of the ear, dragging with it three of the lower jaw bones, which, with the quadrate and the reptilian middle-ear bone, formed themselves into a completely new outfit. While all this was going on, the Organ of Corti, peculiar to mammals and their essential organ of hearing, developed in the middle ear. Dr.Broom does not suggest how this organ arose, nor describe its gradual development. Nor does he say how the incipient mammals contrived to eat while the jaw was being rehinged, or to hear while the middle and inner errs were being reconstructed!” (p.59)

Here Dewar is asking how the incipient mammals could bear or eat while these organe were supposedly developing. The point is that it can not even be imagined, let alone demonstrated on the basis of empirical facts, how the supposed animal could survive the period in which the transformation was coming about; for either the organs in question are perfect and useful or imperfect and useless, and in which case they would be devoid of any adaptative value. Elsewhere in an analogous way, Dewar challanges evolutionists to postulate what could be intermediary between an animal without sight and an animal with sight!

In the outlandish postulations of evolutionists we have something dramatically ironic. Dewar observes that evolutionists ask us again and again to believe in miraculous transformations, yet “one reason why the evolution theory was so readily accepted, was the belief that, while the theory of special
creation involves the miraculous, that of evolution does not.” (p.60) At this point it seems very appropriate to quote from Titus Burckhardt’s essay “Evolution and the Traditional Idea of Immutability of Species” where the celebrated biologist Jean Rostand is quoted:

“I firmly believe because I see no means of doing otherwise that mammals have come from lizards, and lizards from fish; but when I declare, and when I think such a thing, I try to avoid not seeing its indigestible enormity and I prefer to leave vague the origin of these scandalous metamorphoses rather than add to their improbability that of a ludicrous interpretation.”

(p.158)

Someone remarked somewhere after quoting this statement that what, in short, Rostand is advocating is an act of faith. Given the “enormous indigestibility” of such an act as he himself admits, one might fairly wonder why he cannot bring himself to put faith in the Divine origin of the world.

The essays in Critique include criticisms from other scientific disciplines apart from biology. In his essay, “The Nature and Extent of Criticism of Evolutionary Theory,” Osman Bakar describes critical works in the fields of mathematics and physics. In mathematics, Bakar cites the work of Richard Z. Thompson, “Mechanistic and Non-Mechanistic Science: An Investigation into the Nature of Consciousness and Form.” In this study, Thompson draws arguments from the field of information theory which employs theories of probability. Bakar writes:

“Thompson shows that configurations of high information content cannot arise with substantial probability in models defined by mathematical expressions of low information content. This means that complex living organisms, which possess a high information content, could not arise by the action of physical-chemical laws considered in modern science since these laws are represented by mathematical models of low information content.” (p.146).

Osman Bakar mentions that the British astronomer Sir Fred Hoyle and the astrophysicist Chandra Wickramasinghe, using information theory, arrive...
at conclusions similar to Richard Thompson’s. Bakar refers to the work produced by them jointly, Evolution from space: A Theory of Cosmic Creationism from which he quotes their conclusion: “the complexity of terrestrial life cannot have been caused by a sequence of random events but must come from some greater cosmic intelligence.” (p.147).

Seyyed Hossein Nasr points out in his essay in Critique, “Evolution: A Metaphysical Absurdity,” that the theory of evolution contradicts a fundamental law of physics, the law of entropty, whereby it is found that all things tend from a situation with a high amount of organization and work to a situation with the least amount of organization and work. (p.47) This second law of Thermodynamics maintains that the whole universe is running down like a wind-up clock. In his essay ‘Reactions to the Theory of Evolution” Michael Negus also describes the incompatibility of the theory of evolution with the second law of thermodynamics.

One may start to wonder upon realizing the seriousness of the criticism to which evolution is subject, viz. how it gained and how it can continue to claim so many adherents. A full treatment of this question requires an historical account of the intellectual regress (to use the term so aptly employed by Rene Guenon) by western man since the Renaissance. Able accounts have been provided, for example, by Rene Guenon in Crisis of the Modern World,108 Lord Northbourne in Looking Back on Progress109, Marting Lings in Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions110 and Huston Smith’s Forgotten Truth111 those readers who are interested in a comprehensive answer may refer to these works. In the essays in Critique for lack of space the answer has had to be given in brief and in passing. Basically evolution has provided a much-desired philosophical pretext. S.H.Nasr writes in his essay, “Evolution a Metaphysical Absurdity”:

108 Dehoff Publications, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, 1957
“Rarely in fact has a theory connected with a particular science had such wide acceptance, perhaps because the theory of evolution itself, instead of being a scientific theory that become popularized, began as a general tendency that entered into the domain of biology. For this very reason it soon gained acceptance more as a dogma than as a useful scientific hypothesis.” (p.43)

The “general tendency” to which Nasr refers here is the individualist spirit which was born during the European Renaissance and which rebelled against subordination to God and denied its dependency on Him. The individualist, with the aid of reason and its product i.e. science, sought its fulfilment in the greatest earthly good for the greatest number of people. When the theory of evolution came along, it showed as such potential for secularizing people’s world-view as no other idea could, and it was embraced en-masse. W.R. Thompson writes: “For the majority of its readers, therefore, the Origin (Darwin’s magnum work on evolution) effectively dissipated the evidence of providential control.” (p.36) S.H.Nasr comments in his essay, “Eternity and Temporal Order”:

“Moreover, this defence of evolution involves a battle for ‘faith’, not scientific truth; for it provides the only ‘secular’ means of providing some kind of seemingly acceptable scheme to enable man to live in this world amidst the bewildering variety of the forms of nature while forgetting God.” (p.106)

While evolution and the philosophies of which it was a product, enabled man to free himself from the service of God once the notion permeated thought in history, sociology and politics -- it also compelled him to believe that, and seek for his utopia on earth. S.H. Nasr writes:

“Materialistic and secular philosophies have been born, which are based on the view that the historical process is ultimately real itself, and that through material progress man is able to attain that perfection which was traditionally identified with the paradisal state...” (p.104)

Martin Lings observes that at the time Darwin conceived his theory, there was “a widespread belief that the nineteenth century European represented the highest human possibility yet reached. In the name of this
belief fortified by the notion of evolution Europeans overran, subjugated and attempted to acculturate the “inferior” peoples of Africa and Asia. With unprecedented arrogance they deemed, their aggression was part of a “civilizing mission”.

Once the theory of evolution was—properly instated in biology, another factor came into play in promoting the idea, and it pertains to what Cuenon has so aptly termed: “the superstition of facts”. Let us explain what this means. The fantastic results achieved through science has been the conscious or unconscious measure of its validity and the reason for its prestige. These impressive results have only been possible on account of science’s meticulous attention to detail and its accurate assessment of facts.

However, science in practice is more than just facts, for it all too frequently overreaches its rightful domain; the physical order, and trespasses in the domain of philosophy and metaphysics where for lack of the adequate tools of cognition, it flounders hopelessly. Speaking realistically, one should speak of “scientism” and not “science” for science is inextricably woven with philosophy. However, scientific philosophy also bears although unrightfully, the hallmark of objectivity the theory of evolution included. In this connection S.H. Nasr in “Eternity and Temporal Order” writes:

“Other speak in categorical terms of the scientific method, then defend evolution on scientific grounds without being at all aware that their manner of accepting evolution as scientific has nothing to do with their own definition of what science is.” (p.105)

Indeed, evolution is, what S.H. Nasr indicated it was a dogma, and its adherents are just as unreasonable as the adherents of any ‘false dogma can be. Nasr quotes a statement from E. Shute’s Flaws in the Theory of Evolution: “For in its turn, Evolution has become the intolerant religion of nearly all educated western men. It dominates their thinking, their speech, and the hopes of their civilization.” (p.105) W.R. Thompson refers to this intolerance when he remarks with respect to his militant views: “I am, of course, well aware that my views will be regarded as heretical and reactionary”. (p. 16) He alludes to evolutinists’ sectarianism when he refers to “the reckless statements of Hackel, and in the shifting, devious and histrionic
argumentation of T.H. Huxley (who along with Haeckel was a celebrated biologist).” (p. 3x)

Martin Lings writes in his essay, “Science Knows Nothing about the Origin of Man”:

“There is no doubt that many scientists have transferred their religious instincts from religion to evolutionism, with the result that their attitude towards evolution is sectarian rather than scientific.” The French biologist Professor Louis Bounoure (author of ‘Determinisme et finalite double loi de la vie,’ a book critical of evolution) quotes Yuen Delage, a former.

Sorbonne professor of Zoology: ‘I readily admit that no species has ever been known to engender another, and that there is no absolutely definite evidence that such a thing has ever taken place, nonetheless, I believe evolution to be just as certain as if it had been objectively proved.’ Bounoure comments: In short what science asks of, us here is an act of faith and it is in fact under the guise of a sort of revealed truth that the idea of evolution is generally put forward.” (pp.53-54)

The intolerant aspect of evolutionary faith is clearly demonstrated in the case of Douglas Dewar. Osman Bakar (p.2) and S.H. Nasr (n.3, p.45) refer to the difficulties that Dewar, an evolutionist who turned “heretic’ confronted in getting his monumental critique of evolution, ‘Transformist Illusion’ published. Both observe that some libraries which have all of Dewar’s earlier works, written while he was evolutionist, have apparently boycotted his critique. S.H. Nasr exclaims that ‘Transformist Illusion’ could only be published in an out-of-the-way town in Tennessee.

Evolutionists share another trait with sectarianists i.e. deviousness; W.R. Thompson cites its two cases:

“A striking example which has only recently come to light, is the alteration of the piltdown skull so that it could be used as evidence for the descent of roan from the apes; but even before this a similar instance of tinkering with evidence was finally revealed by the discoverer of Pithecanthropus who admitted, many years after his sensational report, that he had found, in the same deposits, bones that are definitely human.” (p.34)
Osman Bakar points out that those whose real purpose is objectivity welcome criticism. He then remarks that evolutionists’ “non-scientific behaviour and reactions towards criticisms can only be interpreted in one way: that they are harboring a certain fear.” (p. 4) Their position, prestige and beliefs are threatened.

**PART II**

So far in this review, we have paid attention to the scientific criticisms presented in Critique. This seemed appropriate, given how little Muslims in Pakistan and elsewhere even realize that such criticisms exist, being swayed by “the superstition of, facts” as we described above. Now it is necessary to turn to the metaphysical and philosophical criticisms advanced in Critique, for indeed, metaphysics provides the antidote not only to the theory of evolution, but to each every illegitimate notion which created the intellectual or, rather, unintellectual climate favourable to the conception of the theory in the first place.

Firstly, it is necessary to clarify what metaphysics is given, how rampant is the confusion about its meaning today. Osman Bakar quotes Nasr:

“Metaphysics is a science as strict and exact as mathematics and with the same clarity and certitude, but one which can only be attained through intellectual intuition and not simply through ratiocination. It thus differs from philosophy as it is usually understood. Rather, it is theoria of reality whose realization means sanctity and spiritual perfection, and therefore can only be achieved within the cadre of a revealed tradition.” (n. 11, p. 127)

Osman Bakar, in his essay ‘The Nature and Extent of Criticism of Evolutionary Theory, has included a section with the sub-title: “Metaphysical Criticisms of Evolution”.

(p. 130)

It comprises eight pages where he traces the history of the rediscovery of integral metaphysics in the West after the Renaissance and its application in criticism of evolution. S. H. Nasr, in both his essays: Evolution a Metaphysical Absurdity” and “Eternity and Temporal Order”, presents the metaphysical argument in general terms, while Titus Burckhardt, in his essay,
“Evolution and the Traditional Idea of Immutability of Species”, gives the argument in considerable and particular detail. Burckhardt observes that the eclipse of metaphysical knowledge was the factor which permitted the development of materialist and evolutionary thought in the first place: “In a word, evolutionism results from an incapacity peculiar to modern science to conceive ‘dimensions’ of reality other than those of purely physical sequences…” (p. 162). After remarking that “metaphysics criticizes evolutionary theory at its very root,” Osman Bakar quotes a passage from Frithjof Schuon in which Schuon observes that modern interpretations of the world are invalidated from the outset because they do not comprehend “the supra-sensible degrees of Reality, or of the ‘five Divine Presences.” (p. 135) Schuon in mentioning the Divine Presences is referring to the Islamic and traditional Doctrine of Emanation which, as Bakar explains, conceives of the universe as a progressive manifestation of the Absolute Divine Essence or Non-Being or Beyond Being, the self-determined Divine Being which is the ontological principle; the supra-angelic or angelic world; the subtle state and the corporeal or material state. He writes:

“Objects in the world ‘emerge’ from what is called in Islamic metaphysics the ‘treasury of the unseen’ (Khazan-i-ghaib). Nothing whatsoever can appear on the plane of physical reality without having its transcendent cause and the root of its being in divinis.” (p.136)

Bakar goes on to elaborate on form and matter explaining that species is an “idea” in the Divine Mind and an archetype not an individual reality which is first manifested as individuals belonging to it in the subtle state (Alam-i-Mithal). He describes the preexistence of animals in the subtle state and their “descent” into this world, remarking that the true genesis is this; the “vertical” genesis as opposed to the “horizontal” genesis that is effected within the physical order and not from beyond it, as postulated by evolutionists. Bakar makes it very clear when describing the “vertical” genesis of creatures that there is no question of transformation of species wherein lies the error of modern thinkers, for as Schuon says in the passage quoted by Bakar, the modern mind absurdly tries to replace the true causality which is the transcendent one with imagined causes from the material world.

Burckhardt explains the classical doctrine of hylomorphism (materialization of the subtle state) in even greater detail than Bakar. In this
doctrine as Burckhardt explains: “the ‘form’ of a thing or being; seal of its essential unity, is distinguished from its ‘matter’, namely the plastic substance that receives this seal while conferring on it a concrete and limited existence.”

(p. 154)

This form is “an indivisible essence”; “a reality that can neither be counted or measured”. Burckhardt observes that one consequence of the ontological unity of form is the fundamental and frequently particular similarities between taxa and species. This phenomena is nicely explained by the metaphysical approach..

Burckhardt further considers the phenomena of “mimicry”, of one species by another, of discontinuity” in the succession of species as evidenced in the fossil record, and of “missing links”, and he provides answers which show his characteristic and consummate ability to apply metaphysical principles to contingent and particular instances.

Whereas Bakar and Burckhardt have considered particulars, S.H. Nasr contents himself with the general criticism that the greater cannot come about from the lesser, so consciousness or spirit could never evolve from matter. Even W.R. Thompson who is a biologist and not a metaphysician, appreciated this argument for he wrote:

“Between the organism that simply lives, the organism that lives and feels, the organism that lives, feels, and reasons, there are, in the opinion of respectable philosophers, abrupt transitions corresponding to an ascent in the scale of being, and they hold that the agencies of the material world cannot produce transitions of this kind.”

(pp. 36-37)

Scientists restrict themselves to the *study of the material world, and so far as they remain within their rightful domain, their pursuit is legitimate. However, as soon as they turn to questions whose answers necessarily comprehend the transcendent order, they fail miserably because they are not equipped with the methodologies for knowing things of that order. Scientists would do well to leave metaphysics for metaphysicians and pay heed to the worthy advice of Douglas Dewar quoted by Martin Lings:
“It is high time that biologists and geologists came into line with astronomers, physicists and chemists, and admitted that the world and the universe are utterly mysterious and all attempts to explain them have been baffled .... “ (p. 55)

It should be fairly obvious that in the whole controversy there are only two possibilities: either evolution is true and the principle of life and speciation is to be found within matter, or evolution is false, for the principle of life is a conscious one, and outside and beyond matter. However, to add confusion upon confusion apologists have appeared seeking to reconcile the two mutually contradictory propositions. Bakar discusses this phenomenon with particular attention on Teilhard de Chardin under a section of his essay, sub-titled “Teilhard and the ‘Darwinization’ of Theology”. (pp. 112-117)

Bakar mentions that only in the Indian sub-continent, “as a result of Anglo-Saxon education with its heavy emphasis upon such evolutionary philosophies as Herbert Spencer’s there has appeared not only a figure such as Aurobindo but a whole army of evolutionary thinkers of lesser eminence.” (p. 113)

Although the main offenders to which Bakar is referring, are products of the Hindu tradition, “the army of evolutionary thinkers of lesser eminence” includes a sufficient number of men who are products of the Muslim tradition, but determined to show that evolution is something compatible with the Qur’an. From the contemporary scene here in pakistan we may cite the apologetic efforts of Dr. Israr Ahmed, Fateh Ullah Khan; author of “God the Universe and Man” and Dr. Wasiullah Khan: author of “Evolution and the Qur’an.” From France Dr. Maurice Bucaille, a new Muslim has written “Origin of Man” in which he too attempts to reconcile evolution with religion. Historically, Mohammad Abduh in Egypt and Sayyid Ahmad Khan in the Indian subcontinent were the first apologists to attempt the reconciliation of evolution with Islam. These apologists generally make the pretension that, although God originated matter in the first place, He brought about the diverse life forms through the mechanism of evolution. This proposition is reminiscent of Deism in which. God is regarded as having withdrawn himself from the creation which He originated. As S.H. Nasr mentions, Deism was an element in “the general philosophical climate of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe” (p.144)
Propitious to the development of the theory of evolution in the first place. It is true that when God speaks in the Qur’an of creating the universe in six days, this may refer to long periods of time or aeon; since, as the Qur’an itself declares,' a day with God is one thousand of fifty thousand years of human measure. But to insist that God created any of his creatures in a process is to attribute imperfection to Him and to contradict the Qur’an which declares that, when God wishes a thing to be, he says to it “Be!” and it becomes. The conciliatory proposition contradicts other Qur’anic texts including those which state that God made Adam from clay, and that He created from the substance of Adam his mate and brought forth from his loins all his descendents asking them: “Am I not your. Lord?”

Those apologists who exert themselves to reconcile the two mutually contradictory propositions are tempting Muslims to entertain what is perhaps the most pernicious bias which militates against faith in modern times, for evolution is the nefarious artifice which discounts the supreme proof of the Divinity: creation, which so articulately declares to be the handiwork of the Creator; indeed, creation has been termed the First Book of God (al-awwal hitabu Ilah). Legions of souls, beguiled by evolution, have lost their faith and many are on the verge of doing so.

Critique of Evolutionary Theory and books like it are therefore of incalculable importance in impressing upon those who have been indoctrinated in Western thinking that the theory of evolution is intellectually worthless. Since the idea is at the foundation of the notion of progress, when it falls, progress too “the idol of modernity” will topple. Then and only then will Muslims be able to turn in confidence and earnest to resurrect their own tradition. Evolutionary critique is one of the most important elements of an appropriate kalam for this age.

Muhammad Yusuf
Dry-as-dust books on Islam in English or English translation abound in plenty from the rationalist and activist viewpoint, stressing the supreme necessity for the political, economic and social reconstruction of the Muslim world on the basis of Islam. Too often all such efforts in this direction only result in more westernization and secularization under Muslim labels and slogans. As an inevitable consequence of this misguided literature, the non-Muslims or uniformed Muslims in the West may be easily convinced by hostile Christian missionary propaganda that Islam is a religion of worldliness and sensuality, intrinsically lacking in any genuine spiritual merits. This reminds the reviewer of an experience related by a very close Muslim friend who is a convert: “One summer years ago, “she relates, “ my family was travelling in Italy. My husband and I without children went into a magnificent old cathedral in Rome. The interior was dim and fragrant with incence. At the altar High, Mass was being chanted in Latin and the entire atmosphere was filled with holiness. In the midst of the deep spirituality of that church, my daughter asked me; “Why can’t Islam be holy like this?’ I was shocked by her words into the fact that it is just this same spirituality which is missing from the lives of so many of us contemporary Muslims busy as we are from morning to night in Islamic political “movements” and “activities, “ not because it is not basic and vital to Islam but because we have lost it or hidden it away from sight as something of which we feel ashamed.”

The present book under review offers itself humbly as the ideal antidote to this deadly poison. The first part deals with the roots of Islamic tradition as found in the Quran, Hadith, Sunnah, the life of the Holy Prophet and the deeper dimensions of Salat, Haj, fasting during ‘Ramadan and Jihad.’ The second part discusses the distinctions between Sunnism, Shi’ism, and also a fine essay on female spirituality in Islam. Part three deals with Sufism which the authors assert, far from being the result of alien influences and borrowings, was an integral part of Islam from its very beginning.
“Aside from the question of providential acquisitions which are part of
the normal growth of a traditional civilization, the Sufis are the most
implacably conservative element in the Islamic community. In other words, if
they necessarily yield to pressure from above, they have shown themselves
admantine in resisting pressures from below like those which demand
“conformity to the age in which we live”. Such slogans are paried by
Sufism...by the question, “Does the age deserve conformity to it?” The same
sense of values includes both the consciousness of all that is most essential to
the spiritual heritage of Islam and the will to protect it. For three generations
and more, the Sufis have been blamed throughout the Near and Middle East
for “centuries of stagnation in the Muslim world” and they have incurred
hostility from many sides as the last outposts of resistance to modernization
in every Muslim country. Only now is there a gleam of recognition, perhaps
increasing, that the Sufis were right! (p. 237)

The concluding portion is demoted to an explanation or the nature of
God, the angels, the cosmos and the natural order, eschatology and man.

“Many Western observers visiting the lands of Islam before modern
manners infiltrated the community and before modern dress with all it
implies in the way of vulgarization of the human form, was widely adopted,
have remarked upon the ‘priestly bearing’ of ordinary Muslims going about
their everyday business. This air of dignity, control, and self-containment as
of one who walks always in the presence of the sacred, relates directly to the
concept of vicegerency,, for it goes without saying that the representative of
God on earth must of necessity comport himself with dignity. (p. 371)

This work is quite unique in contemporary Islamic literature in that it is
characterized by a warm-hearted acceptance of the entire heritage of Islamic
history and culture in contrast to the activist type of popular books on Islam
which would contemptuously reject more than twelve centuries of Muslim
civilization as un-Islamic. But the greatest virtue of this book is its beautiful
spirit of love and faith which characterizes it from beginning to end. And the
product of that love in Islam is Daw’ah in its truest and noblest senses:-

“Many a soul-weary and broken-hearted person would find refuge in the
Khanqahs of the saints. The arms of the revered Sufis were ever open to
welcome those whom fate had jilted or who had been forsaken by their
Kinsmen or society. The dejected, the anguished and the outcast would come to them and find shelter, food, love and recognition... When the spiritual guide and mentor of Khwaja Nizamuddin Aulia was sending him off finally to settle in Delhi, he bestowed this blessing upon him. “You will be like a huge shady tree under which God’s creatures will find comfort....” Thanks to the Sufi saints there existed in (Mughul) India, hundreds of such huge shady trees under whose merciful shade, broken-down travellers used to find new life and hope.”

Islamic spirituality: Foundations is essential reading for all those in search of such heights of love and Divine blessings.

Maryam Jameelah

Note and Reference

Muslims in India, Abdul Hasan Ali Nadwi, Academy of Islamic Research & Publications, Lucknow, p. 64.
THE LAST DAYS OF OUR WORLD


The Hadith literature contains detailed prophecies concerning the dramatic signs of the last days, many of which have already been fulfilled. The extremes of moral and social deterioration of our times is unprecedented in all of history except during the decline of the Roman Empire nearly two thousand years ago. The Romans were saved by Christianity. Tragically, now all the religions and civilizations throughout the world have fallen victim to the same decay and deviations, there is no other vigorous traditional civilization which can replace the present one and halt the accelerating fall downhill.

The imminence of the Last Days is widely felt among religious people today all over the world in the west as well as the East. An intimate friend recently wrote the following to the reviewer in her last letter: “I am only praying that the Mandi will come soon to save us. I am convinced that the year 2100 A.D. will never arrive that it will be all finished by then. Believe me, so many people I know here in America are longing for that because our hearts and nerves are worn out by all the fasad and fitnah around us - terrible satanic energies preying on our being at a totally unseen level and grinding us down....” The Eleventh Hour by Martin Lings is completely devoted to this subject, which is the result of the spiritual crisis of contemporary life. With considerable eloquence he refutes and condemns the entire concepts of evolutionism and progressivism upon which our present-day culture and education of the young are based. The fallacious and erroneous theory that mankind emerged from a lower species of life is totally at variance not only with Islam but all the other authentic traditions of other peoples throughout the world which teach that, far from emerging from below, mankind came down from above in pristine perfection as the representative of God on earth. The subsequent history of mankind after the fall is not one of progress but retrogression.

Modern “Civilization” cannot rightly be called a “civilization” if we are to go on speaking of the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and Islamic civilizations, to take only four examples which are the most important. The purpose of all
these - and of their analogues - was to preserve such of man’s primordial heritage as had been partially restored by the Revelations on which their respective religions are based and to retard the inevitable process of degeneration. Of all they stood for, the modern “civilization” is the direct antithesis, for it is nothing other than an organized system of subversion and degeneration. Instead of trying to resist the natural downward tendencies of man the movement from the higher to the lower it welcomes and encourages them in the name of progress and evolution. (pp. 54-55)

Since (the thirteenth century A.D.), the Muslim world has suffered a gradual decline retarded on the one hand by the “renewers” Mujaddideen who have not ceased to come -- although there is less and less that they can achieve except in the domain of esoterism, that is, for a minority, and on the other hand, by human efforts of spiritual conservation which the west has been pleased to call “stagnation.” But it is precisely thanks to this “stagnation” that the Islamic civilization, unlike the Christian one, could still be pieced together, structurally. It would also probably be true to say that the mass of the people is still theocratically governable in most Islamic countries. But the active and dominant few are not. The call for one’s country to become a “modern” nation with an internationally acceptable government is altogether typical of the average “enlightened” Near and Middle-Eastern politician, industrialist, teacher and their like. Nor in any case could there be an effective return to the Islamic civilization in the true sense so long as the modern civilization exists since the two are incompatible. It would be altogether inadequate simply to change the legal system from profane law to Islamic law which many seem to think is all that need be done. A whole network of far-reaching changes would be necessary if the civilization were to be spiritually operative. Meanwhile a minority of intellectuals might re-establish a traditional framework for themselves and have the spiritual benefits it offers while keeping the modern world at bay by all sorts of compromises which only they would know how to make. But whole nations could become traditionally civilized only if and when the modern “civilization” is taken from them by force. (pp. 58-59)

Many devout Muslims will be enraged by Ling’s emphatic denial that any one religion can claim to be the sole repository of Truth to the total exclusion of all others. Lings thinks that none of the major world religions
was providentially ever meant to become global but each limited to particular geographic areas, despite their universal claims. Among the greatest advantages of being alive today is the easy accessibility of the total spiritual heritage of all mankind for any sincere seeker. The great danger for the less intelligent, which the author admits but has insufficiently restressed, is that of moral relativity that would lead to fatal indifference in religious practice and at worst, skepticism and cynicism. These dangers, he feels, can be avoided by staunch adherence to Orthodoxy, and a study of the traditional writers he recommends and wholehearted zeal on the esoteric (Sufi) path. It is astonishing that fundamentalists regard as anathema any suggestion that some of the spiritual truths of Islam may also be found in other traditions yet do not hesitate to appropriate the most secular and materialistic of modern “ideologies”.

Lings is convinced that the imminent destruction of this world, although catastrophic, will not be absolute but result in the recreation of a new and infinitely better world,’ once more restoring, to humanity spiritual normalcy and equilibrium.

Throughout this book the universality of absolute transcendental Truth is emphasized and its crucial relevance to the acute spiritual crisis which confronts us all today.

Maryam Jameelah