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# THE MERCIFULNESS OF: THE MESSENGER OF GOD

Abu Bakr Siraj ad-Din

MARTIN LINGS

The mercifulness of Sayyidunā Muhammad (P.B.U.H.) is affirmed in the Quranic verse: ‘We sent thee not save as a mercy to the worlds’ Another verse speaks of him as being a mercy unto those who believe, and in yet another verse he is expressly described as merciful - whence the name Rahim in the litany of his noble names. Moreover when Hadrat A’Ishah was questioned about the Holy Prophet in after years, she answered: “His nature was like the Qur’an: and every chapter of the Holy Book, with only one single exception, begins with the Basmalah which contains the two names of mercy, ar-Rahman and ar-Rahim.

It would be possible to enlarge on this characteristic of Sayyidunā r-Rasul by giving any number of illustrations of it. But for our talk the theme of his mercifulness was chosen above all because it enables us to dwell on a very important aspect of Islam which is concerned more with the roots of his mercy than with its earthly manifestations. This brings us to another of his names, ash-Shafi, the Intercessor (between God and man). It was on the authority of the knowledge implicit in this function that he was able to say: “God hath a hundred mercies, and one of them hath He sent down amongst jinn and men and cattle and beasts of prey. Thereby they are kind and merciful to one another, and thereby the wild creatures incline in tenderness unto their offspring. And ninety-nine mercies hath God reserved unto Himself, that therewith He may show mercy unto His slaves on the day of the Resurrection.”

Other names closely related to ash-Shafi which are to be found in the litanies given in such books as Dala’il al-Khayrat are Miftah ar-Rahmah, the Key of Mercy, and Miftah al-jannah, the Key of Paradise. In a sense these two names are identical for there is no Paradise without Mercy and there is no Mercy - at least of the ninety-nine mercies - which does not result in Paradise. But it may be said: These are names which rightly belong to every God-sent Messenger, for there is not one of them who was not sent above all for the purpose of guiding souls to the Mercy of Paradise. That is true; but there is none the less something unique about our Prophet in this respect

which gives, him a very special entitlement to that name - a right which he shares with no one else. According to the Torah Sayyiduna Idris and Sayyiduna Ilyas ؑ were taken directly from this life to Paradise. The same is true of Sayyiduna Isa and his Mother But Sayyiduna Muhammad ﷺ is alone in having been taken from this life to paradise and in having been sent back again from paradise to this life, to live with his people and to guide them on the basis of his direct experience of paradise, that is, of the 99 Mercies of God. Here lies the very essence of his mercifulness.

From this essential level it can be seen that there is a close relationship between mercifulness and other seemingly, unconnected characteristics of the prophet ؑ such as his unfading youth and beauty. To be the 'Key of Mercy means being of a paradisaal nature, and many things in the prophet's life suggest that once the Mi'raj had taken place Heaven refused to relinquish him altogether, and that it still clung to him after he had returned to earth. His sayings confirm this: we read for example in Sahih al-Bukhari that on one occasion he was seen to stretch out his hand as if to take something, and then he drew it back. When his companions questioned him about it he said: "I saw paradise, and I reached out for a cluster of its grapes. If I had taken it, ye would have eaten of it as long as this world endureth". To take another example, he said from his pulpit in the Mosque on the day when his last illness began: "I go before you and I am your witness. Your meeting with me is at the pool, which I see from here, where now I stand."

When we study his Sirah we cannot help noticing how many crucial moments in his life, and therefore in the history of the foundation of Islam, are directly dominated by his function of Mercy-how often at such moments it is the key of Mercy and of Paradise who acts and speaks.

One of these crucial moments was at the pledge of the second 'Aqabah which led directly to the Hijrah and to the establishment, in Medina, of the first Islamic state. When this immensely important transaction was about to be concluded, the men of Medina said to the Prophet (P.B.U.H.) "What shall be ours, O Messenger of God, if we fulfill to thee our pledge?" "Paradise", he said, and they said: "Stretch forth thy hand". He did so, and they pledged their oaths. The pact was thus sealed with the word "Paradise", and by the prophet as Key of Paradise

Let us take another event, politically less decisive but of incalculable spiritual *significance*, the battle of Uhud. The Prophet was wounded twice,

once to the point of losing *consciousness*, but this and the fact that the battle was, militarily speaking, a defeat and not a victory, appear to have been for him as nothing compared with the happiness of being able to exercise with such amplitude the function that we are speaking of in virtue of which he was mediator between this world and the Next. When the tide of battle had turned against the Muslims and when the enemy were pressing in on all sides, for him it clearly meant above all that Heaven also was pressing in on all sides. "Know that Paradise is beneath the shadows of the swords". The Sirah gives us an inescapable impression that for him Uhud was a day of great rejoicing, because it was, for so many of his followers, the day of their entry into paradise. Moreover, although as martyrs they had no need of his *intercession*, not one of them could have attained to martyrdom if it had not been for his guidance, so that even for them he must be considered as the key of Paradise.

Let us take another example where the circumstances are very different, but where the same dominant principle prevails. The effect of this principle is here unusual from an earthly point of view, for it seems natural that a lover should prefer to die before his beloved rather than suffer the grief of seeing her die. Yet the Holy Prophet's expression of the opposite preference is at the same time, in all that it implies, one of the most eloquent declarations of love that the history of mankind has recorded.

It was on the already mentioned day when he began to feel the first symptoms of the illness which he knew would be fatal. This was not a day that belonged to Hadrat A'ishah, but wishing her to know that he was ill, he went to tell her and found that she also, like himself was suffering from a severe headache. On his entry she said: "O my head! He looked at her searchingly, and feeling that her illness was not as his, he said: "Nay, but it is, "O my head". Then he said: "I wished that it might be"- he meant her death-"whilst yet I was alive, that I might ask forgiveness for thee and invoke mercy upon thee and shroud thee and pray over thee and bury thee". Once again, it was the Key of Mercy and of paradise who spoke.

In conclusion let us remind ourselves that during the years of his mission, the Holy Prophet brought many men and women from disbelief to faith not only by the Revelation itself, and by arguments drawn from it, but also by his own person. He was himself, mysteriously, an incarnation of the transcendent realities of the Afterlife in which many had ceased to believe. He spoke to his contemporaries of Paradise, and his powers of persuasion

were incalculably increased because he was there, before their eyes, something of a living proof of the reality of Paradise, from their which- he had himself recently come and which still clung to him both in body and soul. Now the purpose of this Congress is to recall him to us, insofar as this is possible and by deliberately dwelling on the roots of his mercifulness, I have thereby dwelt on his Paradisal nature with a view to recalling the presence of a soul which, like Paradise itself, was woven of Mercy. This brings us to stress a fundamental and universal truth upon which Islam is especially insistent and that is that this world is not man's home- or rather, that man's home is Paradise. And the Prophet's belonging to Paradise enabled him- and can still enable him by God's grace to convince men of the certainty of this truth. Allah has said. *This lower life is but a diversion and a game; and verily the abode of the Hereafter, that, that is life, did they but know* (XXIX, 64); and the same teaching is reiterated again and again throughout the Holy Quran. We may quote also the saying of the Prophet (May peace be upon him): "Be in this world as a stranger or as a passer- by". And he likewise said: "What have I to do with this world? Verily I and this world are as a rider and a tree beneath which he taketh shelter. Then he goeth on his way, and leaveth it behind him".

These saying must not be taken to imply that this world is to be neglected. Islam does not admit of any scission between the sacred and the secular. But it is too often forgotten that this unity of purpose is not a license for dragging down the sacred to the level of the secular. On the contrary, the otherworldliness of the Prophet is an implacable reminder that the secular must be drawn up in the direction of the sacred. All worldly acts must be spiritualized, that is, they must be performed with a view to the next life, in the certainty that only the Hereafter is of lasting value. That is why our acts must be *bismi Llāhi ar-Rahmani ar-Rahim*, or they must not be at all, which brings us back to our main theme, for the formula of consecration, the bismillah, is itself winged for Paradise with its two Names of Mercy, ar-Rahman and ar-Rahim.

At the Congress for which this theme was chosen we were asked to make our talks especially relevant to the modern world: and I could certainly claim that what I have said so far is no less relevant to our times than it is to any other period of Islamic history. It has however a particular significance for the present day -- a significance which will become more apparent if we consider that most of the troubles of our age spring, directly or indirectly,

from lack of faith, or weakness of faith, and from the consequent neglect of principles which depend on faith for their maintenance. But even when faith seems to be lost, something of it remains in a form which does not at first sight seem to be connected with religion. I am referring to a need which is an essential part of man's nature, but which is liable to be lost sight of in later years, though it is normally apparent in children who are in some respects wiser than their elders. A little child will not willingly accept a story which does not end with the words: "And they lived happily ever afterwards." Adults respect this need in their children, but they smile at it and say that it is unrealistic. But in truth it is the children who are more realistic than their parents; for God has rooted deeply, in every human soul, the imperative desire for perfect happiness that will never end; and the existence of this desire is a proof --not logical, but intellectual or metaphysical -- that man was originally made for Paradise, as all religions teach. In other words, Divine Providence has as it were built into man's soul a faith-basis which he cannot lose and which, even if it is not recognized as such, is perpetually within reach. It is always possible for man to retrieve a partially lost faith by meditating upon the vast dimensions of his own faculty of desire which can never be fully satisfied in this earthly life because it was made, precisely, to be adequate to nothing less than Paradise. Now any such meditation by man upon his own mysteriously transcendent appetite can be immeasurably helped by recalling that aspect of the Holy Prophet which we have dwelt on here, his fidelity to Paradise as man's one and only homeland, the fidelity in virtue of which he was "in this world as a stranger or as a passer by."

This fidelity to Paradise is in a sense Islam. For Islam is the religion of primordiality, *din al fitrah*, and the primordiality of man, that is, his first Adamic state, is Paradise. I close this paper with our greeting, which is the greeting of the people of Paradise: as-Salamualaikum wa-Rahmatu-Llahi wa-Barakatu-Hu.

(This talk was given at the International Seerat Conference in Islamabad in 1985, by al-Hajj Abu Bakr Siraj ad-Din)



# GOD AND THE UNIVERSE IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHY

Dr. Riffat Hassan

## Concept of God

For Iqbal the ultimate ground of all experience is a rationally directed will or an ego. He points out that in order to emphasize the individuality of the Ultimate Ego, the Quran gives Him the proper name of Allah.<sup>1</sup> As Bergson has stated in *Creative Evolution* individuality is a matter of degrees and is not fully realized even in the case of a human being.<sup>2</sup> "In particular, it may be said of individuality," says Bergson, "that, while the tendency to individuate in everywhere opposed by the tendency towards reproduction. For the individuality to be perfect, it would be necessary that no detached part of the organism could live separately. But then reproduction would be impossible. For what is reproduction, but the building up of a new organism with a detached fragment of the old? Individuality therefore harbours its enemy at home."<sup>3</sup> According to Iqbal, the perfect individual. God, cannot be conceived as harbouring its own enemy at home, and must therefore be regarded as a superior to the antagonistic tendency of reproduction.<sup>4</sup> "This characteristic of the perfect ego is one of the most essential elements in the Quranic conception of God; and the Quran mentions it over and over again, not so much with a view to attack the current Christian conception as to accentuate its own view of a perfect individual."<sup>5</sup>

Iqbal refers to the Quranic verse which identifies God with light: "God is the light of heaven and earth: the similitude of his light is as a niche in a wall, wherein a lamp is placed, and the lamp enclosed in a case of glass, the glass appears as it were a shining star." (24:35).<sup>6</sup> We have already noted that Iqbal denies the pantheistic interpretation of this verse. He uses this verse to support his own personalistic conception of God as the Absolute "No

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<sup>1</sup> Iqbal, M., *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1934, Lahore, 1962. p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Bergson, H., *Creative Evolution*, (translated by Mitchell, A) London, 1911, p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp 62-63.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p.63.

<sup>6</sup> Sale, G., Translation of *The Koran*, London, no date, p.267.

doubt,” says Iqbal, “the opening sentences of the verse gives the impression of an escape from an individualistic conception of God. But when we follow the metaphor of light in the rest of the verse, it gives just the opposite impression. The development of the metaphor is meant rather to exclude the suggestion of a formless cosmic element by centralizing the light in a flame which is further individualized by its encasement in a glass likened into a well-defined star.”<sup>7</sup> In “Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadid” Iqbal writes:

جو مطلق  
دریں دیر  
مکافات  
کہ مطلق  
نیست جز  
نور السموت<sup>8</sup>

Professor Schimmel refers to the Naqshbandi mystic Khwaja Mir Dard of Delhi (1720-1784) who reached the conclusion that the metaphor of light for God suggests both Absolutism and Omnipresence which covers both transcendentalism and all-immanency of the Supreme Being.<sup>9</sup>

For Iqbal then, God is a Person. God is an ego also because God responds to our reflection and our prayer; for the real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self.<sup>10</sup> Iqbal, however refutes the charge of anthropomorphism: “Ultimate Reality,” he says, “is a nationally directed creative life. To interpret this life as a personality is not to fashion God after image of humanity. It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid but an organizing principle of unity-a synthetic activity which holds together and focalizes the dispersing dispositions of the living

<sup>7</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> Iqbal, *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal* (persian) p.546 (Do not seek the Absolute in the monastery of the world, For nothing is Absolute but the light of the Heavens.)

<sup>9</sup> Schimmel, A. M., *Gabriel's Wing*, Leiden 1963, p. 100.

<sup>10</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 19.

organism for a creative purpose.”<sup>11</sup>

Iqbal thus, conceives of God as a Person. The question then arises: does not individuality imply finitude? According to Iqbal, “God cannot be conceived as infinite in the sense of spatial infinity. In matters of spiritual valuation mere immensity counts for nothing.”<sup>12</sup> True infinity does not mean infinite extension which cannot be conceived without embracing all available finite extensions its nature consists in intensity and not extensity. “The ultimate limit, “says Iqbal, “is to be sought not in the directions of stars, but in an infinite cosmic life and spirituality.”<sup>13</sup> In contrast to the classical conception of God, Iqbal emphasizes the idea of a changing God.<sup>14</sup> For him “the infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of his creative activity of which the universe as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word, God’s infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series.”<sup>15</sup> Iqbal writes:

درویش خالی از بالا و زیر است

وے بیرون او وسعت پذیر است<sup>16</sup>

Iqbal’s universe is dynamic. The Ultimate Ego is essential creative. By means of His Creativeness, He affirms His Reality. God is not a more contriver working on something given. Iqbal believes that God created the world out of Himself. In orthodox Islamic theology, however creation always means creation ex nihilo.<sup>17</sup> Professor Whittemore observes “On this point it may well be that Iqbal has reconstructed Islamic religious thought somewhat more extensively than the original architects would care to acknowledge.”<sup>18</sup>

Iqbal points out that we are apt “to regard the act of creation as a specific past event, and the universe appears to us as a manufactured

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 60-61.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p. 64.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* p. 132.

<sup>14</sup> Bausani, A., “Iqbal’s Philosophy of Religion, and the West” in *The Pakistan Quarterly*, 1952, Volume 11, No. 3, p. 18.

<sup>15</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 64.

<sup>16</sup> Iqbal, kulliat-e- Iqbal (Persian) p. 546. His inside is void of Up and Down, But His outside is accepting Space. (Translation by Schimmel, A. M. *Gabriel’s Wing*, p. 99.

<sup>17</sup> Schimmel, A. M. *Gabriel’s Wing*, p. 99.

<sup>18</sup> Whittemore, R., “Iqbal’s Panentheism”, In *Iqbal Review*, 1966, Volume VII, No. I, p. 73.

article....Thus regarded the universe is a mere accident in the life of God and might not have been created... from the Divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of a specific event having a 'before' and a 'after'.”<sup>19</sup> Creation is a continuous and continuing process in time.

ٹھہرتا نہیں کاروان وجود  
کہ ہر لمحہ ہے تازہ شان وجود<sup>20</sup>

Professor Bausani states that in Muslim thought, utmost importance has always been given to creation, even going so far as to consider human acts as created in order to save the idea of the absolute creativeness of God.<sup>21</sup> The Ash'arites, in order to abolish the Aristotelien “causae secundae” which could compromise the freedom of the creative act of God, elaborated the theory of atomism.<sup>22</sup> According to the Ash'arites, the world is composed of 'Jawahir' -infinitely small parts or atoms which are indivisible. The essence of the atom is independent of its existence i.e. existence is a quality imposed on the atom by God. Before receiving this quality, the atom lies dormant. Since the creative activity of God is ceaseless, fresh atoms come to being every moment and therefore the universe is constantly growing.<sup>23</sup> Iqbal too, as we have seen, believes in a growing universe, but unlike the Ash'arites, he thinks that the universe changes not “in an atomistic development moving from point to point but in a never ceasing organic movement in the Divine Ego itself. This is proved, for the philosopher poet, by the Quranic attestation that God adds to Creation as God pleases (Surah Fatir, 35:I) which hints at the ever fresh possibilities that may emerge from the fathomless depths of the intensive, Divine life and be manifested in the created serial time”<sup>24</sup> In a well-known couplet, Iqbal says:

<sup>19</sup> The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 65.

<sup>20</sup> Iqbal, Kulliyat-e-Iqbal (Urdu) p. 418.

(The caravan of being does not stop, for every instant there is a new phase of God's Being.)

<sup>21</sup> Bausani, A. “Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion and the West” p. 19.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 68-70.

<sup>24</sup> Schimmel, A. M. *Gabriel's Wing*. p 100.

یہ کائنات ابھی ناتمام ہے شاید  
کہ آ رہی ہے دمام صدائے کن فیکون!<sup>25</sup>

and in a letter to Professor Nicholson, “the universe is not a completed act: it is still in the course of formation.”<sup>26</sup>

Opposing the Ash’arites’ ideas on substance and creation, Iqbal points out that “they used the word substance or atom with a vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like Berkeley found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God.”<sup>27</sup>

The Ultimate Ego is omniscient. In the case of finite beings, knowledge even if extended to the point of omniscience, must always remain relative to the confronting ‘other’ and cannot, therefore be predicates of the Ultimate Ego who, being all-inclusive, cannot be conceived as having a perspective like the finite ego.<sup>28</sup> Discursive knowledge cannot be predicted of an ego who knows and who also forms the ground of the object known.

For Iqbal omniscience does not, however, mean a single indivisible act of perception which makes God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history, regarded as an order of specific wants, in an eternal ‘now’, Dawani, Iraqi, and Royce conceive of God’s knowledge in this way<sup>29</sup>. Iqbal observes, ‘there is an element of truth in this conception. But it suggests a closed universe, a fixed futurity, a pre-determined, unalterable order of specific events which, like a superior fate, has once for all determined the directions of God’s creative activity.’<sup>30</sup> Divine knowledge is not ‘passive omniscience’ but ‘a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist in their own right are organically related.’<sup>31</sup> If God’s knowledge is conceived as a kind

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<sup>25</sup> Iqbal, *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal* (Urdu) p. 320. (Perhaps this universe is still incomplete, for each instant there can be heard the cry of “Be, and it came into being”.)

<sup>26</sup> Iqbal quoted by Nicholson, R. A. Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, Lahore, 1964, p.xvii.

<sup>27</sup> *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, London, 1908 and Lahore, 1964.

<sup>28</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 77.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* p. 78.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* p. 78.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* p. 78-79.

of a mirror reflecting preordained events, there is no room left for initiative and free creativeness. We must, therefore conceive of His knowledge as a perfectly self-conscious living, creative activity -an activity in which knowing and creating are one.”<sup>32</sup>

Iqbal points out that omnipotence, abstractly conceived, is merely a blind, capricious power without limits. The Quran finds Divine omnipotence closely related to Divine wisdom, and finds God’s power revealed, not in the arbitrary and the capricious, but in the recurrent, the regular and the orderly. Simultaneously, the Quran conceives of God as holding all goodness in God’s Hands.<sup>33</sup> ‘If, then, the rationally directed Divine will is good,’ then, asks Iqbal, ‘how is it...Possible to reconcile the goodness and omnipotence of God with the immense volume of evil in His creation. The painful problem is really the crux of Theism.’<sup>34</sup> Iqbal wonders if, with Browning, one is to regard God as all-good, or, with Schopenhauer as all evil.<sup>35</sup> According to Iqbal sin or evil is not something which hangs over mankind as a curse. It is looked upon as a challenge. It is the presence of evil which makes us recognize good, and acts as a whetstone for the development of personality. Iqbal’s point resembles that of William James.<sup>36</sup> (as indeed he intends that it should since he adapts James’s language to his purposes).<sup>37</sup> ‘The teaching of the Quran, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognizes a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man’s eventual victory over evil.’<sup>38</sup> Professor Bausani points out that in Iqbal’s conception of a continuously creative God there ‘lies also hidden a new solution of the old problem, the crux of theism, i.e. the problem of Evil. Nature is neither bad nor good in itself, it is one of the first exercises of God.’<sup>39</sup> As the Quran says: ‘Say, Go through the earth, and see how he originally produceth creatures afterwards will God reproduce

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<sup>32</sup> Sharif, M.M. *About Iqbal and His Thought*, Lahore, 1964, p. 22.

<sup>33</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 80.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>35</sup> Sharif, M. M., *About Iqbal and His Thought*, p.21.

<sup>36</sup> James, W., *Pragmatism*, London, 1910, especially pp 165-194.

<sup>37</sup> Whittemore, R., “Iqbal’s Panentheism”, p. 76.

<sup>38</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 81.

<sup>39</sup> Bausani, A., “Iqbal’s Philosophy of religion, and the West” p. 18.

another Production.’ (29:19)<sup>40</sup>

God is eternal but not so in the sense in which a thing is supposed to last for all time. This implies a wrong view of time making it external to God.<sup>41</sup> Iqbal’s God is a changing God but change does not mean serial change. God lives both in eternity and in serial time. To Iqbal the former means non-successional change, while the latter is organically related to eternity in so far as it is a measure of non-successional change. ‘In this sense alone it is possible,’ says Iqbal ‘to understand the Quranic verse: ‘To God belongs the alternation of day and night. (23:82).’<sup>42</sup>

## God and the Universe

According to Iqbal ‘the universe does not confront the Absolute Self in the same way as it confronts the human self.’<sup>43</sup> It is a fleeting moment in the life of God. ‘It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behavior, and as such organic to the Ultimate self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phase of the Quran it is the habit of Allah.’<sup>44</sup>

Nature is ego as event and act. ‘Reality’, says Iqbal, “is...essentially spirit. But, of course, there are degrees of spirit...I have conceived the Ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must add now that from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed. The creative energy of the Ultimate ego, in which deed and thought are identical, functions as ego-functions.

The world, in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the great revelation of the ‘Great I am’<sup>45</sup>.

Iqbal supports Einstein’s view that the universe is finite but boundless.<sup>46</sup> It is finite because it is a passing phase of God’s extensively infinite consciousness, and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite.<sup>47</sup> Nature has no external limits, its only limit is the

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<sup>40</sup> Sale, G. Translation of *The Koran*, p. 298.

<sup>41</sup> Sharif, M. M., *About Iqbal and His Thought*, p. 23.

<sup>42</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.

<sup>43</sup> Vahid, S.A. (Editor), *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore, 1964. p. 112.

<sup>44</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 56.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.

<sup>46</sup> *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, p. 112.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*.

immanent self which creates and sustains the whole<sup>48</sup>. According to Iqbal the universe is liable to increase.<sup>49</sup> He translates the Quranic words “Inna ila rabbika al-muntaha”(53:43) as “And verily towards God is thy limit.” Professor Bausani comments: “This is a good instance of a characteristic of Iqbal, that of interpreting in modern terms some Quranic passages which no doubt mean something else if literally translated. So here it seems that a literal translation would amount simply to say that every being’s end is in God, a return to God. However, the metaphysical implications Iqbal wants to find in the verse are in no wise, in my opinion, contrary to the spirit of Qur’an.”<sup>50</sup> Since Nature is organically related to the creative self, it can grow, and is consequently infinite in the sense that none of its limits is final-nature is organically finite only towards the innermost essence of God.<sup>51</sup> Iqbal expresses this thought thus in “Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadid”.

حقیقت لازوال و لامکان است  
مگر دیگر کہ عالم بے کران است  
کران او درون است و برون نیست  
درونش پاست بالا کم فزوں نیست<sup>52</sup>

The relation of the Ultimate ego to the finite ego may be conceived in several ways. For instant the Ultimate Ego or God may be regarded as the sole reality absorbing all the finite egos, or as holding the finite egos within God’s own Self without obliterating their individuality, or as existing apart from finite egos.<sup>53</sup> The first of the afore-mentioned positions is rooted in pantheism even though it attributes personality to Ultimate Reality. It is an

<sup>48</sup>. Dar, B. A. *Iqbal’s Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid and Bandagi Namah*, in *Zabur-e-Ajam*, Lahore, 1964

<sup>49</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 68

<sup>50</sup> Bausani, A. “The Concept of Time in the Religious Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal,” p. 162.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> Iqbal, *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal*, (Persian) p. 546. Reality is beyond time and space, Don’t say any more that the universe is without a limit. Its limit is internal, not external, There are no distinctions of low and high, more or less, in its internal aspect (Translation by Dar, B. A. *Iqbal’s Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid and Bandagi Namah*, p. 23.

<sup>53</sup> Enver, I. H., *Metaphysics of Iqbal*, pp. 80-81.



advance on those pantheistic modes of thought which regard the ultimate nature of Reality as being impersonal in character e.g., light or force.<sup>54</sup> However, it negates the individuality of the finite egos. Professor Sharif points out that in the first period of his thought, extending from 1901 to about 1908, Iqbal's writing had a pantheistic tinge. "God is universal and all-inclusive like the ocean, and the individual is like a drop. Again, God is like the sun and the individual is like a candle, and the candle ceases to burn in the presence of the sun. Like a bubble or a spark, life is transitory-nay, the whole of life is transitory."<sup>55</sup>

The first part of Bang-e-Dara contains several poems referring to the doctrine of the immanence of God (wahdat-al-wujud). Nature from being the Word of God becomes God. God's immanence is described thus:

وہی یک حسن ہے، لیکن نظر آتا ہے ہر شے میں<sup>56</sup>

At this stage, Iqbal's God is Beauty rather than Love and the same Beauty manifests itself in all things; here it is Light there it is Sweet smell.

حسن ازل کی پیدا ہر چیز میں جھلک ہے  
انسان میں وہ سخن ہے، غنچے میں وہ چمک ہے  
کثرت میں ہو گیا ہے وحدت کا راز مخفی  
جگنو میں جو چمک ہے، وہ پھول میں مہک ہے<sup>57</sup>

This idea is delicately expressed at one place when the poet refers to the 'promise' of God to reveal God self on the Day of Judgment. Since God is visible in everything, he asks:

دیکھنے والے یہاں ہی دیکھ لیتے ہیں تجھے

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* p. 81.

<sup>55</sup> Sharif, M. M., *About Iqbal and His thought*, p. 11

<sup>56</sup> Iqbal, *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal*, (Urdu) p. 76. Beauty is One though it is seen in all things.

<sup>57</sup> Iqbal, *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal*, (Urdu), p. 85. Visible in everything is Beauty everlasting, it is speech in humans and a sparkle in the bud. The secret of One has become hidden in the Many, the fire-fly's glow is the flower's scent.

پھر یہ وعدہ حشر کا صبر آزما کیونکر ہوا<sup>58</sup>

In 'Shama' (The Candle) Iqbal states the doctrine of "wahdat-al-wujud" in much the same way as Ibn 'Arabi might have done i.e. he makes the beloved identical with the lover, since he considers the relation between the world and God as one of identity<sup>59</sup>.

صیاد آپ، حلقہ دام ستم بھی آپ!<sup>60</sup>

Iqbal's position here resembles that of Ghalib:<sup>61</sup>

اصل شہود و شاہد و مشہود ایک ہے  
حیراں ہوں، پھر مشاہدہ ہے کس حساب میں

Iqbal's pantheistic ideas derive from Plato's conception of God as Eternal Beauty which is manifest in all things." This Platonic conception, as interpreted by Plotinus, adopted by the early Muslim scholastics and adapted to pantheism by the pantheistic mystics, came down to Iqbal as a long tradition in Persian and Urdu poetry, and was supplemented by his study of the English romantic poets".<sup>62</sup>

Iqbal however, soon outgrew his pantheism. His old teacher at Cambridge, McTaggart wrote to him on reading Nicholson's translation of Asrar-e-khudi, "Have you not changed your position very much?, Surely, in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a pantheist and mystic."<sup>63</sup> This remark is very illuminating. For Iqbal, in his later thought, the relation of the finite to Infinite ego is one in which "true infinite does not exclude the finite," but rather "embraces the finite without effacing its finitude and explains and justifies its being."<sup>64</sup> "It is clear", says Professor Whittemore, that Iqbal does not intend that the Infinite be

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<sup>58</sup> Iqbal, Kulliyat-e-Iqbal, (Urdu), p. 100 Those who have sight can see you even here, how then is the Promise of the Last day a test of patience?

<sup>59</sup> Faruqi, B.A. *The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid*, Lahore, 1940, p. 91.

<sup>60</sup> Iqbal, Kulliyat-e-Iqbal, P. 46. The hunter and the object of the hunt are the same.

<sup>61</sup> *Diwan-e-Ghalib*, Lahore (Taj Company Edition), p. 99. The object, witness, and witnessing is all the same thing, I'm wonderstruck what, then, can "vision" mean?

<sup>62</sup> Sharif, M. M., *About Iqbal and His Thought*, p. 11.

<sup>63</sup> McTaggart quoted by Iqbal in *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, p. 118.

<sup>64</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam*, p.29.

regarded merely as an abstract totality of finites.”<sup>65</sup> Iqbal’s doctrine is not pantheism (meaning by this term the doctrine that the world is identical with God). This is confirmed by the fact that nowhere in his philosophy does Iqbal refer to God in terms of featureless totality.<sup>66</sup> Referring to Farnell’s view on the attributes of God, Iqbal remarks that the history of religious thought discloses various ways of escape from an individualistic conception of the ultimate Reality which is conceived as some vague, vast, and pervasive cosmic element, such as light. this is the view that Farnell has taken ... I agree that the history of religion reveals modes of thought that tend towards pantheism: but I venture to think that in so far as the Quranic identification of God with light is concerned Farnell’s view is incorrect... Personally, I think the description of God as light, in the revealed literature of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, must now be interpreted differently... The metaphor of light-as applied to God... must, in view of modern knowledge, be taken to suggest the absoluteness of God and not His Omnipresence which easily lends itself to pantheistic interpretation.”<sup>67</sup> Iqbal always refers to God in terms such “Ultimate Ego”, Creative Self,” “Omnipsyche” and to the finite in terms of egos or selves. “The reference is always plural. Even in his doctrine of transformation (transmutation) Iqbal is at pains to stress his conviction that the individual is neither in time nor eternity lost in God.”<sup>68</sup> In Iqbal’s words, “the end of the ego’s quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it.”<sup>69</sup>

Iqbal rejects deism, the view that the world is separate from God. Outside of God there is nothing, so deism is meaningless.<sup>70</sup> Neo-Platonic ideas resembling the Buddhist Vedantas culminated in the famous doctrine of Monism. This doctrine preached the belief in an immanent God and considered the world as a mere incarnation. It substituted pantheistic deism for the personal and transcendent God of the Qur’an, and led to the

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<sup>65</sup> Whittemore, R., “Iqbal’s Panentheism”, p. 71.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 71-72.

<sup>67</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp 63-64.

<sup>68</sup> Whittemore, R., “Iqbal’s Panentheism”, p. 72.

<sup>69</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 198.

<sup>70</sup> Whittemore, R., “Iqbal’s Panentheism”, p. 72.

blossoming of pseudo-mysticism.<sup>71</sup> Iqbal attacked Monism on practical ground also. For him “all life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life.”<sup>72</sup>

Iqbal's view is panentheistic, panentheism being the doctrine that the world is not identical with God, nor separate from God, but in God, who in God's divine nature transcends it. Iqbal's view is panentheistic because “according to it God as individual, while not other than that universe which is His physical being, is more than the sum of egos and sub-egos of which this universe is composed.”<sup>73</sup>

The relation of the Ultimate Ego to the finite egos in Iqbal's philosophy has been summarised thus: “the Ultimate Ego holds the finite egos in His own Being without obliterating their existence. The Ultimate Reality must be regarded as of the nature of the self. But further this self does not lie apart from the universe, as if separated by a space lying between Him and ourselves. The Ultimate Self, therefore is not transcendent, as is conceived by the anthropomorphic theists. He is immanent, for He comprehends and encompasses the whole universe. But he is not immanent in the sense of the pantheists of the traditional type, because He is a personal and not an impersonal reality ... He is in short immanent and transcendent both, and yet neither the one nor the other. Both immanence and transcendence are true of the Ultimate Reality. But Iqbal emphasizes the transcendence of the Ultimate Ego rather than His immanence.”<sup>74</sup>

In his rejection of the doctrine of unityism or ‘wahdat-al-Wujud’ Iqbal was deeply influenced by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, also known as Mujaddid-e-Alf-e-Sani. In a letter written in 1917 Iqbal said “I have very great respect in my heart for Mujaddid Sirhind.”<sup>75</sup> Like Iqbal, the Mujaddid passed through ‘wujudiyyat’ or unityism and reached ‘abdiyyat’ or servitude.<sup>76</sup> The Mujaddid stressed the transcendence of God. “He is beyond all ‘shuyun-o-i’tibarat’ or modes and relations, all ‘zuhur-o-butan’ externalisation and internalization,

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<sup>71</sup> Maitre, L.C. *Introduction to the Thought of Iqbal* (Translated by Dar, M. A. M.), Karachi. 1962. pp 6-7.

<sup>72</sup> Iqbal quoted by Nicholson, R.A., in *Introduction to Secrets of the Self*, p. XV11.

<sup>73</sup> Whittemore, R., “Iqbal's Panentheism”, p. 72.

<sup>74</sup> Enver, I. H., *Metaphysics of Iqbal*, pp 85-86.

<sup>75</sup> Letter to Nadvi, S. S. quoted in Ahmad, M. M. “Allama Iqbal and Mujaddid-i-Alf-i-Sani”, *Iqbal Review*, January 1964, pp 112-113.

<sup>76</sup> Faruqi, B. A. *The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid*. p. 118.

beyond all ‘buruz-okumun’ or projection and introjection, beyond all ‘mawsul-o-mafsul’ or realisable and explicable, beyond all ‘Kashf-o-shuhud’ or mystic intuition and experience; may even beyond all ‘mahsus-o-ma’qul’, empirical and rational, and beyond all ‘mawhum-o-mutakhayall’ or conceivable and imaginable ... He the Holy One is beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond, again beyond the Beyond.”<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* pp 119-120.

# MUSLIM CONTRIBUTION TO PHILOSOPHY

Dr. MOHAMMED MA'RUF

Even the most prejudiced of the Western scholars will not gainsay the invaluable contribution of the illustrious Muslim thinkers like al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun, down to Allama Mohammad Iqbal to the philosophical fund of the world. In the beginning, no doubt, the Muslim genius received initial inspiration from the Greek masters whose works they transliterated into Arabic; but the true Islamic philosophy stemmed after they comprehended the real spirit of the teachings of the Holy Quran, realizing that it was, to use a phrase from Allama Iqbal, 'anti-classical'<sup>78</sup>. The Muslim thinkers thence forward made some meritorious original contributions in the diverse fields of Epistemology, Psychology, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Religion, which continue exerting marked influence to this day on modern thought in these very fields. For my today's presentation I have selected some of their contributions in the following four directions, bringing out here and there their impact on current thought in the West:

1. Theory of the Nature of Soul or Mind;
2. Mind-Body Relationship;
3. The Doctrine of Intellect;
4. The Space-Time Framework.

1. Regarding the nature of Soul or Mind, the Greek genius showed two trends: (i) like Aristotle, it conceived of Soul or Mind as an 'Entelechy' or a mere Function of the Body rather than anything independent of it; (ii) they conceived of the Soul as a compound entity after the Platonic fashion, analysable into various faculties. The Muslim mind, though ascribing various faculties to the Soul took it, in general, for a unique 'Simple Substance', existing independently of the body. the first of their lineage, al-Kindi (respected as Father of the Muslim philosophy), though better known for his transliteration work, affirmed the simple and uncompounded nature of the Soul in his *Rasa'il al-Kindi al-Falsafiyah*,<sup>79</sup> al-Farabi followed him in calling the

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<sup>78</sup> Iqbal Dr. M., *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore: Sh. M. Ashraf), P. 128.

<sup>79</sup> Atiyeh George N., (Eng. tr.) *Al-Kindi: the Philosopher of the Arabs*, Q. *Rasa'il al-Kindi*, (Rawalpindi: Islamic Research Institute, 1966), P. 100.

Soul rational which was simple, incorporeal substance (*cf. al-Thamarat al-Mardiyyah*);<sup>80</sup> Ibn Sina urged the ‘incorporeal substantiality’ of the Soul (*cf. Kitab al-Shifa. Pt. V*)<sup>81</sup>; and al-Ghazali called it ‘Form’ (*cf. Tahafut*)<sup>82</sup>, which is again simple in nature. The modern Western thinkers like Prof. H.D. Lewis<sup>83</sup> and his followers, who call themselves ‘anti-Ryleans’ and ‘anti-Empiricists’, have not only followed the Muslim thinkers in describing the Soul as a Simple Substance, but have also followed them in their argument that if the Soul were compounded, it would have met its end by decomposition.<sup>84</sup> Even the opposite view held by Prof. Bernard Williams and others, following the lead of Dr. J. b. Watson, who advocate the ‘corporeal theory’ of the Soul, are not without their Muslim predecessors in Abu Bakr al-Razi and the Mutakallimin. Again, Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (606/1209)<sup>85</sup> has ardent followers among the modern idealists and anti-empiricists both in America and in Europe who identify ‘man’ or ‘individual’ with Soul or Mind.

2. As regards the relationship between Mind and Body, the ‘unitarian’ approach advocated by Prof. Gilbert Ryle (d. 1976), the author of the famous ‘Category Mistake’<sup>86</sup> in England who had very strong backing in early fifties in the whole of Europe, was itself initiated by Islam which makes no bifurcation between the spiritual and the temporal, the Invisible and the visible, the Church and the State -- a bifurcation which stemmed from the Christian approach itself in so far as it fixed its gaze on the ‘Otherworldly’, rejecting ‘this-worldly’ as profane and unworthy. This Christian dogma, perhaps, had its philosophical predeceasing in the Platonic condemnation of the ‘sensory’ as illusory, yielding mere ‘opinion’. However, the Rylean

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<sup>80</sup> Sharif M.M., *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), Vol. I, cf. “Theory of the ten Intelligences”, PP. 457 f.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. cf. Ibn Sina’s *The Mind-Body Relationship*, PP. 487f.

<sup>82</sup> al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al-Falasifah* (pb. Mutafta al-Babi al-Halbi, Cairo, n. d.), p. 80; cf. Eng. tr. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali, (Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1958) pp. 227.

<sup>83</sup> Lewis H.D., *Persons and Life After death* (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 103; also his lectures on “Personal Identity” arranged by me at Government College and Punjab University, Lahore in 1979, which now form part of his book in press *The Elusive Self* (Macmillan).

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. He propounds the argument in question at page 111 and also in his subsequent writings.

<sup>85</sup> Ma’sumi M.S.H., (Eng. tr.) *Imam Razi’s Ilm al Akhlaq*, (Islamic Research Institute, 1969), p. 113.

<sup>86</sup> Ryle Gilbert, *The Concept of Mind*, (Penguin Books 1949), cf. chapter on “Category Mistake”.

doctrine could not find inspiration either from Christianity or from the ancient Greek thought whence the Westerners claim their thought to have originated. It was Islam which first initiated the need for a study of the various facets of Nature, placing due reliance on the 'reports' of the senses.<sup>87</sup> This bears out Dr. Robert Briffault's concession that science is the most momentous contribution of Arab civilization to the modern world.<sup>88</sup>

Even in their 'dualistic' approach to the Mind-Body problem, the present-day anti-Ryleans we have been discussing above, owe greater inspiration to the basic position of the Muslim thinkers. Despite the fact that Islam does not appear to make a bifurcation between Mind and Body, the Muslim genius, perhaps realizing some intellectual difficulties inherent in a 'unitarian' position, was led to a rigid 'Dualism'. The Father of Muslim philosophy al-Kindi said, "the soul is separate from the body and different from it".<sup>89</sup> Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina followed him in this dualistic position, the latter affirming its independence of the body in his *Kitab al-Shifa*. The selfsame position was held by Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi in his famous treatise *Kitab al-Nafs wal-Rub*. The aforesaid Muslim thinkers made this 'dualistic' position the very basis of and pre-condition for their view of 'disembodied survival'.<sup>90</sup> What is interesting for us here is that the present-day idealists (who call themselves 'anti-empiricists') not only follow the Muslim thinkers in their 'dualistic position'; they also follow them in affirming it as the very basis and pre-condition for the possibility of 'disembodied survival'. One can refer to the positions of Prof. H.D. Lewis<sup>91</sup> of the University of London, Prof. Sydeny Shoemaker<sup>92</sup> of Cornell University, and Prof. Antony Flew<sup>93</sup> of the University of Reading. This shows what a marked influence is the Muslim thought exerting on the current Western philosophy, especially in the field of the philosophy of religion.

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<sup>87</sup> *The Koran*, N.J. Dawood's Penguin Classics Eng. tr., 11: 164; X:101 XXX11:9.

<sup>88</sup> *The Making of Humanity*, (Islamic Book Foundation 1980), p. 202.

<sup>89</sup> Atiyeh, op. cit., pp. 100-01.

<sup>90</sup> This was the position of all those Muslim thinkers who believed in 'disembodied survival', e.g., al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, etc.

<sup>91</sup> Lewis, *Persons and Life after Death*, p. 133.

<sup>92</sup> Brown C.S., (ed). *Reason and Religion*, (London, Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 259f.

<sup>93</sup> Flew Antony, *The Presumption of Atheism*, (London: Pemberton 1975); cf. also see prof. Lewis's *Persons and Life After Death*, chapter on "Survival". N.B. Though not believing in "Immortality", Both Flew and S. Shoemaker admit that 'dualism' is a necessary pre-condition of immortality'.



3. One of the most influential doctrines of the Muslims was their theory or 'Intellect'. Though taking initial inspiration from the Greeks, the Muslim genius must be credited with important original contribution, thereby paving the way to modern science of Epistemology. Even al-Kindi, made some very momentous re-adjustments leading towards a full-fledged theory of knowledge.<sup>94</sup> It were, however, al-Farabi<sup>95</sup> and Ibn Sina<sup>96</sup> who must be credited with bringing home full epistemological implications of the doctrine of 'Intellect' unknown to the Greek world. In fact, the Muslim mind has shown special interest in the 'theory of knowledge' inspired by the basic teachings of the Quran in which God enjoins the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) to say: 'Lord, increase my knowledge'.<sup>97</sup> It took the West centuries to acquire such an interest, rather as late as John Locke (1632-1704 A.D.)<sup>98</sup> or, perhaps later still when Immanuel Kant, a renowned German thinker, wrote his famous *First Critique* in 1781. Al-Kindi divided 'Intellect' into Primary and Secondary kinds, former being the same as Aristotle's 'active intellect'. The Secondary Intellect he divided into three kinds: (i) the 'Intellect in Potency' which is comparable to Aristotle's 'possible intellect'; (ii) the 'Acquired Intellect', which is almost the same as Alexandar's 'intellectus habitus'; and (iii) the 'Demonstrative Intellect', which was al-Kindi's own addition and he conceived of it as something more dynamic than the 'Acquired Intellect': the latter was conceived as a 'Skill', whereas the former was the 'skill put to use'. Modern psychology follows this important distinction in what it calls 'capacity' and 'achievement'.<sup>99</sup>

Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina stole yet another very important lead when they used the Doctrine of Intellect for epistemological purposes, giving an invaluable initiation to modern Epistemology. Al-Farabi believed that the intellect development of man consisted in rising from the 'intellect in Potency' through 'intellect in Action' to the 'Acquired Intellect', till it reached the level of communion, ecstasy, and inspiration. At this level, reason and intuition would become one, and rational knowledge coincided with ecstasy

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<sup>94</sup> Sharif, op. cit., see al-Kindi's "Soul and Intellect", p. 432f.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, cf. al-Farabi's "Theory of the Intellect", p. 460f.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, cf. Ibn Sina's "Theory of knowledge", p. 492f.

<sup>97</sup> *The Koran*, XX:114 (last portion)

<sup>98</sup> Locke John, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (N.Y. Dover publications, 1959).

<sup>99</sup> Kimble G.A., *Principles of General Psychology* (N.Y. Ronald Press, 1963), pp. 88-9.

and inspiration.<sup>100</sup> In whole of this development the First Intellect plays an indispensable role. Thus, for Farabi, all knowledge, however mundane and empirical, must have an ‘a priori’ and ‘intuitive’ element, thus forestalling Kant and the later epistemologists. Moreover, Farabi’s concept of ‘Acquired Intellect’ is original and alien to Aristotle’s, for “it is almost identified with the separate intelligences, and serves as the link between human knowledge and revelation”<sup>101</sup> (cf. *al-Thamarat al-Mardiyyan* and *al-Madinat al-Fadilah*). In Ibn Sina we find a fully developed theory of knowledge, which clearly anticipates some more recent theories of knowledge propounded by epistemologists like A.D. Woozley in his treatise *theory of knowledge*<sup>102</sup> which is considered as a land-mark in the field of Epistemology. Ibn Sina talks of the various grades of knowledge or knowing processes, and the various grades of abstraction corresponding to them. For him, the progress of knowledge depends on the degree of abstraction,<sup>103</sup> a fact which Kant and his followers learnt centuries later to emphasize. Under the inspiration of the Holy Quran, Ibn Sina held that perception was an important and indispensable stage on the way to acquisition of knowledge. His mechanistic theory forestalled modern schools of Epistemology.

4. The Muslim mind showed keen interest in the problem of Space and Time also. It may, in one definite sense, at least, be regarded as pioneer of the Space-Time Relativity theory. This theory, one of the most prized achievements of the modern Science, found its elementary exposition, at any rate, in the writings of al-Ghazali (d. 1111) who paved a way to the modern version of theory. Al-Ghazali, through a semantic analysis of the words ‘Was’ and ‘Will be’ in modern fashion, first established relative nature of both Space and Time in respect of object,<sup>104</sup> a fact acknowledged by Dr. De Boer.<sup>105</sup> He not only believed that Space and Time were relative to the object, but also (to quote from him ) “There is no distinction between temporal extension --which is described, in terms of its relations as ‘before’ and ‘after’ - and spatial extension -- which is described, in terms of its relations, as

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<sup>100</sup> Sharif, op. cit., cf. “Farabi”, pp. 461-62.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 462.

<sup>102</sup> Woozley A.D., *Theory of Knowledge*, (London: Huchison University Library, 1964.).

<sup>103</sup> Sharif, op. cit., cf. “*Ibn Sina*”, pp. 493f.

<sup>104</sup> al-Ghazali, op. cit., p. 15; *Sabih Ahmad kamali’s Eng. tr.*, pp. 37-8.

<sup>105</sup> De Boer, op. cit., p. 160.

‘above’ and ‘below’”.<sup>106</sup> This shows that they were conceived as relative to each other in the manner of modern version of the theory. Some centuries later, a Sufi poet and scholar Fakhr ud-Din Ibrahim al-Hamadani al-Iraqi (b. 686/1287) in his book *Lam’at* and Jalal ud-Din Dawani (830/1427-908/1502) in his book *Zoura* added that there were different levels of Space and Time relative to the nature of the object or being.<sup>107</sup> Thus, these Muslim scholars established a ‘multi- relativity’ of Space and Time centuries before the modern theory had its inception. What is interesting in this connection is that over five centuries after al-Ghazali, Sir Isaac Newton, the renowned European mathematician, was still advocating the concept of absolute Space and Time and, consequently, the West was adhering to the Newtonian view of the ‘fixed’ Universe (a notion derived from Aristotle), enclosed by illimitable void. It was not until the present century that Albert Einstein (b. 1879), the renowned European physicist, made the West appreciate the relative nature of Space and Time. In this way, al-Ghazali forestalled one of the primest geniuses of modern physics, I mean Dr. Einstein, who has been credited with the discovery which, it is asserted, has revolutionized the whole view of the nature of the Universe. Moreover, modern science has succeeded in probing into one dimension of relativity only; it has got only a limited view of relativity and has yet to probe into that ‘multi-relativity’ which the Muslim thinkers envisaged centuries ago. This partial view of science has led into some serious difficulties and, as a consequence thereof, modern version differs from the Muslim theory in the following respects:

1. It gives primacy to ‘space, relegating Time to one of its dimensions, i.e., its fourth dimension, as opposed to Muslim thinkers who have primacy to Time; and this modern approach is mainly responsible for the present-day materialism both in science and philosophy;
2. It has yet to discover some other, more important, dimensions of Space-Time relativity which, when discovered, may further revolutionize the world-view of Science. It may lead modern physics to undiscovered spiritual aspects of reality which, at present, fall beside its scope owing to its own limitations. In fairness to modern genius, however, it may be said that thinkers like Woosley have admitted the possibilities of various levels or

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<sup>106</sup> al-Ghazali, op. cit., p. 15; Eng. tr., pp. 38-9.

<sup>107</sup> Iqbal, op. cit., p. 75.

grades of being;<sup>108</sup> though they certainly have their Muslim predecessors in the field, as shown in the course of discussion.

In the above few pages I have tried to present before you, the learned assembly of the Muslim scholars, who have traveled from far and wide to my country and to the venue of this present Conference, my humblest broodings on some of the aspects on which our Muslim scholars have made invaluable and meritorious contributions to the world fund of philosophy, especially those whose views have exerted marked impact on some very recent schools of thought in the West.

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<sup>108</sup> Woozley, *op. cit.*

# IQBAL'S GOD AND GITA'S LORD

PURUSOTTOMA BILIMORIA

*Preamble:* In this paper I attempt to make some comparisons between Iqbal's conception of the Ultimate, with reference to some idealist notions he was introduced to, and a conception that appears in the celebrated Hindu scripture, the *Bhagavadgita* (*Gita*).

I show that in both conceptions there is tension between the immutable-absolute and the dynamic-personal, and that Iqbal and the Gitā resolve this in somewhat similar ways. Why I chose to compare Iqbal with the Gitā is because Iqbal said he had been “inspired” by the Gitā.

As though Muhammad Iqbal had borrowed the pan-idealist symbolism of the self (and not-self), he believed that the ultimate is best described in terms of the Ego (*Khudī*) which he used interchangeably with self. The supreme is conceived as the ultimate ego. The term “ego” is appropriate, he believed, because it refers to a centre of experience and all experience must have a centre if it is to be distinguished as experience.<sup>109</sup> The individual ego is distinguished from ultimate ego as the centre that marks the focus of experience at the cosmic level and is given the proper name Allah in the Qur'an. But “Allah as a distinct individual or person is conceived in terms of “pure duration” and it is in terms of pure duration that we can conceive of “thought, life and purpose”, and hence, to exist in pure duration gives us ultimate organic unity which can be called a self.”<sup>110</sup>

This dense ontology needs unpacking. Let us look at it another way. Personal identity is best explained in terms of “I am”. “I am” or ego as the centralizing focus of experience that is self-referentially identifiable *qua experience*.<sup>111</sup> All self is distinguished from not-self by virtue of this capacity for self-referentiality, but the Ultimate ego exists in pure duration with not-

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<sup>109</sup> *Asrar-i-Khudi* See his Preface to: (1915) tr. Nicholson, R.A., *Secrets of the Self*, London, MacMillan, 1920; and especially, *Bang-e-dara* (*Song of the Craven-bell*) *Kullayati-i-Iqbāl* (Urdu) Lahore, 1963. P. 289, and *Iqbāl Namah, part 1*, Lahore, 1945. George Nordgulen, "Theistic Ontology in Radhakrishnan and Iqbāl", *Iqbāl Review*, journal of the Iqbāl Academy, Lahore, Oct. 1984 pp. 51-65, p. 54 See next few notes.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> Iqbāl, *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Delhi, Kitab Publishing House, 1974. p. 56 (Hereafter Recons).

self in organic unity. Iqbal gives a phenomenological with not-self in organic unity. Iqbal gives a phenomenological elaboration: "To exist in pure duration is to be a self, and to be a self is to be able to say" "I am". Only that truly exists which can say "I am". It is the degree of the intuition of "I-amness" that determines the place of a thing in a scale of being."<sup>112</sup> The "I-amness" of the individual marks the limits of the particular experiences.

In the cosmic vastness there is the ultimate ego or self which is the centre of all experience since it is the ground for the possibility of any experience; this transcendent Self also expresses itself as "I am"; therein lies its personal identity. There is a fundamental distinction to be made between our inner sense of the ego and that of God's: "We too say" "I am". But our I-amness is dependent and arises out of the -distinction between self and not-self. The individual self, though possessed also of volition, is limited in its freedom and is dependent on the world, while the ultimate self, in the words of the Qur'an "can afford to dispense with all the worlds".<sup>113</sup> And unlike the individuated ego, the ultimate ego never changes into something else, and this accounts for the permanency and stability (*thubut or thabat*) of the universe. Allah is therefore best characterized as the cosmic personality, its source and sustainer and this is not an anthropocentric conception either.<sup>114</sup>

Nor for that matter is this a pantheistic outlook, because we cannot say that there is a straightforward identification of God and the world, or that God is the world, or alternatively that God as absolute alone is with the world merely as his mirrored illusion. Consequently, Iqbal resolves that Allah has both a permanent and a *relative* or dynamic nature. As permanent Allah is the ultimate ego; as *relative* Allah is the evolving and changing nature *qua* God's presence as the organic unity of the whole in pure duration, Reminiscent of Rumi's evolutionary spiral, and not unlike Alexander's conception of 'Emergent Evolution'. This is essentially a finite conception of deity because durational change is admitted in the absolute; if God is infinite, should we not look separately at the transcendent, the absolute beyond all change? To be sure, however, for Iqbal there is no *absolute* that goes over the ultimate ego: The absolute is the ultimate ego integrated through Personality and inclusive of the universe; thus there is no separation, of the absolute

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<sup>112</sup> *Ibid* p. 56

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid* p. 59: Quotes Nâsr All Sirhindi: "Thou hast made me after thine own image! After all what hast thou seen beyond thyself!"

from the personal God. The ultimate is *transcendence-cum-immanence* in such a way that the world or rather the creative order of nature is within God's being. Yet it is not quite clear whether the identity of the world and God established through His presence is one of essentiality or of substantiality. It seems he might mean both.

In any case, it is strictly a *panentheistic* view. As Vahid puts it: "By regarding the Universe as the ego, Iqbal parts company with the pantheists; and the fact that he holds the Ultimate Ego to be a personality with the attributes of creativeness, omniscience and eternity make him a theists. But Iqbal's God comprehends the whole universe and in Him alone the finite egos find their being...in short God is personalistic, theistic and pluralistic"<sup>115</sup>.

There are analogues to this in the notion of the essential inseparability of *paramātman* and the world as *Isvara's sarira* in the Hindu-Vedanta philosopher, Ramanuja<sup>116</sup>, but more significantly in Hegel's doctrine of the dialectical evolution of the Spirit. One can trace a fair deal of Hegelian influence on Iqbal, as well as the Hegelian impact on Whiteheadian 'process philosophy' which has its religious Counterpart in 'process theology' (more recently popularised by Charles Harthshorne in the West and Keiji Nishitani in the East (Japan)). Whitehead portrayed God as having a "primordial" and a "consequent" nature, that is, He is integral to the universe and vice versa; *He* develops, to some extent at least, in the development of the universe. *He* might be said to be transcendently immanent in it.<sup>117</sup>

Iqbal claims his source to be orthodox and refers to a verse in the Qur'an: "And it is He Who hath ordained the night and day to succeed one

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<sup>115</sup> Syed Abdul Vahid, *Iqbāl His Art and Thought*, London, John Murray, 1953, p. 55. Iqbāl confirms this further: 'The universe does not confront God as an 'other' existing per se... From the standpoint of all-inclusive Ego there is no 'other'. In him thought and deed, the act of knowing and the act of creating, are identical. (p. 77).

<sup>116</sup> See Klaus Klostermaier *Body of God*, colloquium, Charles Strong Memorial Trust Lecture, Queensland, 1983. J.A.B. van Buitenen, *Ramanuja on the Bhagavadgita*; Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1974. Cf. J.J. Lipner 'The World as God's Body: In Pursuit of Dialogue with Ramanuja', *Religious Studies*, 20,5,Nov. 1984 p. 145-161.

<sup>117</sup> Winston King, Foreword to Keiji Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness* Berkeley, Uni. of California, 1983, pxxi. Also, A.N. whitehead, *Process and Reality*, Cambridge; and his, *The Concept of Nature*, Cambridge, 1971. Cf. Hegel *The Phenomenology of Mind* in W. Kauffman Hegel London, 1966. Whitehead is invoked in Iqbāl, Recons. P. 34

another for those who desire to think on God or desire to be thankful”.<sup>118</sup> From this Iqbal argues for the notion of ultimate reality as pure duration “in which thought, life, and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity.” (*Ibid*) This is anything but the ‘Unity of Being’ doctrine that the Sufis since Ibn-al Arabi had made popular. The Sufis considered the world of phenomena to be as waves of an ocean that emerged from the Infinite Being only to sink back into God, thereby erasing the distinction between being and non-being, time and timelessness. Far from a pure Oneness of Being, with its implications of illusionariness of the world in time, this unity in Iqbal is conceived as a “Unity of a self - an all-embracing self the ultimate source of all individual life and thought”.<sup>119</sup> The “Unity of Appearance” that Sirhindi upheld in re-interpreting al-Hallaj’s controversial and unorthodox proclamation of *aria al-haqq*<sup>120</sup>, (“I am Truth/God”) is here integrated with the “Unity of Being”, (*wadat al-wujud, al-tawhid*) to form as it were two sides of the self-same concrete reality, thereby giving ontic status to the ‘Unity of Appearance’. Iqbal takes over from Bergson the distinction between (finite) time and pure duration, which helps to refute the absoluteness of- time and space postulated by Ash’ari (d. 953). But Iqbal criticizes Bergson for conceiving pure duration as prior to self, to which self is predicated (i.e. a priori condition for the ground of existence); Iqbal locates the self in a pure space-time continuum but not separate from it. This may be comparable to Spinoza’s notion of Extension as one of the two attributes of God that makes causality a real possibility (*Ethica 11 passim*). Unlike Bergson, Iqbal would argue that: “It is the appreciative act of an enduring self only which can seize the multiplicity of duration - broken up into an infinity of constants-and transforms it to the organic wholeness of a synthesis”.<sup>121</sup>

Thus, unlike McTaggart’s time, which is essentially unreal, Time for Iqbal is ‘an element of the ultimate reality’ itself, and it is the *a priori* condition for the unity of the organic whole as it is for the unity of apperception of the ultimate ego. Iqbal looks to Einstein, and Haldane amongst others to evolve this view: “Time conceived as Pure duration ‘is a

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<sup>118</sup> Qur’ân 25.26: *Recons.* p. 55, P. 73

<sup>119</sup> *Recons.* p. 56

<sup>120</sup> Yohanan Friedmann, *Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi An Outline of His Thought and a Study of His Image in the eyes of Posterity*, Montreal/London. McGill University Press, 1971. See chapter 3 ('The Self-Image of Ahmad Sirhindi') p. 23 ff.

<sup>121</sup> *Recons.* P. 57



kind of device by which Reality exposes as ceaseless creative activity to quantitative measurement.<sup>122</sup> This reveals, to Iqbal, as M.S. Rascid acutely observes, the meaning of the Qur'anic verse, "And of Him is the change of the night and of the day" (Qur'an 15:161).<sup>123</sup> Indeed Kṛṣṇa also speaks of the 'Night and Day of Brahman' (BG VIII 17-19). Rascid has criticized Iqbal for reading pure duration as coextensive with self, and argues that Iqbal is operating here with a limited and to some extent mistaken notion of time—this is a problem indeed. But Rascid's criticism rests basically on his observation that (a.) Iqbal has taken Bergson further than Bergson would go, and (b) the verse that Iqbal invokes from the Qur'an to support the view does not really lend itself to such a metaphysical interpretation<sup>124</sup>. Rascid may be right; but what to me is significant is the affinity there is between this view and some things said in —the *Gītā* as Kṛṣṇa attempts to convey a sense of *his* ontic magnitude to an inquisitive Arjuna.

### **The Bhagavad Gita**

The divine Personhood in a non-absolutists sense is a notion that is also asserted in the *Gītā*. Arjuna suggests to Kṛṣṇa that He is— the supreme *Brahman*, the supreme abode, the divine and eternal Person, the primordial god, unborn and "yet", observes Arjuna, "You permeate the world by your divine ubiquities."<sup>125</sup> Thus Kṛṣṇa can say that "All the world is strung on me in the form of the Unmanifest (*avyakta*); all creatures exist in me, but I do not exist in them". That is, god is immanent in nature by inclusiveness (BG XIII. 27) and, paradoxically, "the creatures do not exist in me... while sustaining the creation and giving them being, my self does not exist in them" (BG IX.4-6) That is, God transcends nature by exclusiveness: this imperishable is transcendent because of its beginningless and its being beyond the *gunas*. (qualities) (BGXIII.31). Iqbal's world of created nature, as we saw, is not so different: "What we call Nature or not-self is only a fleeting moment in the

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid* p.

<sup>123</sup> 58M.S. Rascid, *Iqbal's Concept of God*, London/Boston, Kegan Paul Int. Books, 1981. Rascid, *Ibid*

<sup>124</sup> Rascid, *Ibid*

<sup>125</sup> Before we even get to the *Gītā*, there is an interesting treatment of time in Patanjali's *Yogasutras*, which as we know is based on Samkhya ontology, and there might be some reason to suggest that *Gītā* assumes the Samkhya position in question. See Klaus K. Klostermaier, 'Time in Patanjali', *Philosophy East & West*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 april 1984, pp. 205-210.

life of God. His “I-amness” is independent, elemental, absolute”. It is doubtful, though that by ‘absolute’ Iqbal would have us understand that God is an absolute being, impersonal and of single unity or Oneness, for, as we remarked, the duration of being allows the possibility of an organic growth of nature inseparable from the ultimate self. “Nature... is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self,”<sup>126</sup> or in Gitā’s less personalised metaphor: Self is the hub of the wheel of saṃsāra set in endless motion. Iqbal ventures another oblique analogy: “In the picturesque phrase of the Qur’an it is the habit of Allah “<sup>127</sup>. This does remind us, again, of Ramanuja’s suggestion of the world as though it were the sarira, organic body, of God which Ramanuja had read into these very verses of the Gitā. Although, we must point out, the special ontological status that individuated self or “soul” qua jīvātman is accredited with in Ramanuja, in respect of its identity-cum-difference relation to Isvara, entails a much more sophisticated metaphysical doctrine of being than the ‘unity of organic nature’ doctrine could cope with. At least Ramanuja is clearer in this respect in that there is for him essential identity but substantial differentia. What makes communion possible in Iqbal is the fact of the ‘ego’ or personhood as the centralising focus of experience that both the human and God share. Man shares equally the creative activity of God, but beyond that man is intricately part of nature, albeit the organic unity of nature. The total oneness of God and man is conceivable at an expistemological level, but not at a metaphysical level, for Iqbal does admit appreciative intuition (of which ‘we have a first-hand knowledge...from within’), which “reveals life as a centralizing’ ego’. This knowledge constitutes ‘a direct revelation of the ultimate reality’<sup>128</sup>.

Notwithstanding these ‘facts of experience’, Iqbal is aware of the limitations of the human mind in being able to fathom the complete mystery of being, and so “from the human point of view it is an interpretation which, in our present situation, we put on the creative activity of the Absolute

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<sup>126</sup> BG X. 12; translation used in this work are predominantly from, or cross-checked with J.A.B.Van Buitenen (tr and edited), *The Bhagavadgita in the Mahabharata* (A Bilingual Edition), Chicago/London, The University of Chicago University press, 1981.(hereafter BG)

<sup>127</sup> *Recons.* p. 56

<sup>128</sup> *Recons.* p. 61

Ego”.<sup>129</sup> But at best it is an inference. He is almost suggesting that we end up with an anthropocentric view of the ultimate. Or is Iqbal alluding to what Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna: “The deluded disregard me in my human form, being ignorant of my higher nature as the great lord of the creatures.. [they do not understand that] I am the eternal source of the creatures (created nature, sarvaḥ huṭānam).<sup>130</sup> Clearly though, the self-affirmation in respect of the “I-*amness*” that only an higher transcendental being is capable of recurs several times over in Kṛṣṇa’s sermon - thus for instance, Kṛṣṇa makes it plain to Arjuna: “I am the eternal source of sacrifice, I am the libation too.. I am the fire... I am the father to this world, its mother...source, destruction and continuity, container (and) imperishable seed. I *am* immortality and death... the existent and non-existent<sup>131</sup> (IX. 16-19). The apparently contradictory juxtapositioning of existence and non-existence is also not a difficulty for Iqbal, for he finds a verse in the Qur’ān that says something like that: Naught is like *him*; yet *He* hears and sees. [Emphasis added to distinguish from individual subjectivity]<sup>132</sup>

Is this assertion of “*I-amness*”, however, of the same order as Iqbal would have his ultimate ego pronounce. I think so, if what we mean by this statement is that the “*I-amness*” reflects the profoundly subtle and self-conscious but at once detached organising principle in synthetic unity with the created or self-emanated collective, i.e. Nature, intending it towards a purposive in teleological goal. That God has a purpose for his creation is beyond a shred of doubt in the Qur’ān: ‘God is equal to his purpose, but most men know it not’ (12:21). Kṛṣṇa expands further on his identification with organic unity of the world by elaborating on the divine ubiquities by which he is permeated in the world, i.e. the extent of his spirit-immanence in the world of matter: “I am the self that dwells in all beings, I am the beginning, the middle, and the end of beings. Of the Vedas I am the Samaveda, of the gods I am Vasave, (Indra) of the senses the mind, of the creatures of the consciousness ... I am the wisdom of self among all wisdom, I am ‘A’ among syllables, I am everlasting Time, the Placer who looks everywhere, and the how of things to be. I am victory, the resolution (will), the courage of courages...not a being standing or moving can exist without

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<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>130</sup> BG IX.11

<sup>131</sup> *Gītā* IX/16-19

<sup>132</sup> *Recons.* p. 56 and p. 88 respectively.

me. There is no limit to my divine ubiquities..." (BG X. 20-42) Kṛṣṇa speaks as though there were infinite time, and the spirit stretched out, as it were, throughout its boundless limits, in which his Will and Thought played sport, and when he gets tired then: "I am Time, grown old [resolved to] destroy the world". (BG.XI. 32).

In the thirteenth chapter Kṛṣṇa explains that this body is called the field and the one who knows calls this "field" the "guide" to this field. ('I am the *ksetrājña* in the *Ksetra*'). This is *buddhi* in its *māhāt* form in its role of directing "field" in reflective synthesis. To Iqbal, thought *qua* intuition has the function of moving into the infinitude of knowledge or organic unity.

Now I am not suggesting that what Iqbal says on nature and the relation of nature to divinity is exactly what the *Gītā* postulates. One can't, though, but be impressed at the distinctive resemblance in the two characterizations. Iqbal's idea that "nature is not a pure mass of materiality occupying a void, but is a structure of events and a systematic mode of behaviour", albeit determined from within the absolute ego, is, as we saw, not alien to the *Gītā*'s view. Further, the unity of thought and will, intelligence and vitality, and the boundlessness of the creative extension of the ultimate ego in which nothing limits its finality, may be stretched into Kṛṣṇa's assertion that "Resting on my own nature I create, again and again, this entire aggregate of creatures involuntarily by the force of my own nature (BG IX.9).<sup>133</sup> Elsewhere Kṛṣṇa attribute immeasurability, infinitude and monopoly to this power. (11.25; x. 39-42) Nature, then, must be understood as a living, ever growing organism whose growth has no final external limits. Its only limit is internal, i.e. the immanent self which immanently animates and sustains the whole. Or, as Iqbal would put it, "The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge is immanent in nature, and is described by the Qur'ān as the First and last, the visible and the invisible"<sup>134</sup>. Indeed, how much this sounds like the 'manifest' and the 'unmanifest' of the *Gītā*. But what are the limitations of the immanent and what causes them? Iqbal is not so clear here,

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<sup>133</sup> In this regard The Quran says: "Could we, then, be [thought of as being] worn out by the first creation? Nay-but some people are [still] lost in doubt about [the possibility of] a new creation!" Surah QAF (I),V.15 (Asad translation). See also "every day He manifests Himself in yet another [wondrous] way". Surah *The Most Gracious* (LV) V. 29 (Asad Translation) *Editor's Note*.

25-a. Recons. P. 56 and P. 88 respectively

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid* p. 107

though he agrees that “all activity is a limitation without which it is impossible to conceive God as a concrete operative Ego”<sup>135</sup> *Gitā* is more specific about the internal constraints, which have largely to do with the wheel of *Karma*, set rather early in motion, a bit like the divine clockwork of Spinoza’s God. There is further constraint as a result of people not adhering to *dharmā* and therefore bringing about disequilibrium in the universal retributive system. To Iqbāl, ‘the twin fact of moral and physical evil stand out prominent in the life of Nature.’<sup>136</sup> The increase in *adharma*, according to *Gitā*, it seems, upsets the efficiency of the ultimate ego and impels it as it were to gather its expansive unmanifest force, like the tentacles of an octopus, into its centre only to burst upon nature in some manifest form: this is the avatara-thesis of the *Gitā*. (BG IV 4-8) Indeed, this is not unlike Iqbāl’s near admission to the plausibility of the buruz of Muhammad, (suggested by the Qadiyanias), - or lahut-nasut of Hallaj- as though he were a re-incarnation in the Aryan sense, for the purposes of bringing prophethood to its finality. But Iqbāl rejected this claim on some other grounds.<sup>137</sup>

Was Kṛṣṇa a Prophet? Sirhindi did not deny that India had been sent prophets, but lamented that the messages of the prophets were either rejected at immense cost to the land, or they were misused by Brahmins in their selfish claim that the divine dwelled within them as a means to attracting favours and worship from the people<sup>138</sup>. Iqbāl might have been happier and to settle for Kṛṣṇa as a pre-Qur’anic prophet than as an avatara, whatever that might mean.

The picture that emerges, in Iqbāl at least, has the absolute ego as the whole of reality. But the imperishable, unchanging, and permanent reality also has another side to it, but no apart from it, which is dynamic, changing, located in space and time in a non- finite continuum. But change is not interpreted as a perishable series of appearances: the ultimate ego exists in pure duration wherein change ceases to be a succession of varying attitudes, and reveals the true character as continuous creations; untouched by weariness; not ‘unseizable’ by slumber or sleep.<sup>139</sup> Indeed, Kṛṣṇa describes

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<sup>135</sup> *Ibid* p. 80

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid* p. 80

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid* See also Annemarie Schimmel, 'The Place of the Prophet of Islam in Iqbāl's thought', *Islamic Studies* (Karachi), 1.4, 1962.

<sup>138</sup> Friedmann, op. cit p. 71.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid* p.60

himself as though he were the first unmoved mover, ceaselessly engaged in action that, however, does not bind him since he remains disinterested in their fruits (IX. *ibid*) Like Gitā, Iqbāl could not conceive the ultimate ego as changeless for this would be “to conceive Him as utter inaction, a motiveless, stagnant neutrality, an absolute nothingness”. To us change might imply imperfection - as it certainly did also to Plato - but to the:”Creative Self change cannot mean imperfection. he remains untouched by it as the calm in the centre of a whirlpool”. God’s life is one of continuous self-manifestation. And when Kṛṣṇa utters that “I am the source of that which is not yet”, Iqbāl would say in the same vein that the “not-yet” of God means unfailing realisation of the infinite creative possibilities of his being, which retains its wholeness throughout the entire process.<sup>140</sup>

Iqbāl concludes that “Ultimate Reality is a rationally directed life. To interpret life as ego is not to fashion God after the image of man. It is only to accept the simple fact of experience that life is not a formless fluid, but an organising principle of unity, a synthetic activity which holds together and focalizes the dispersing disposition of the living organism for a constructive purpose<sup>141</sup>. This sort of teleological basis for the existence of nature is something Kṛṣṇa tries hard to convey to Arjuna with all the optimism of an Iqbāl drunk not on an intellectual view of life - which he says is necessarily pantheistic - but on an intuitive-pragmatist vision. Though in points of analysis, I find it difficult sometimes to distinguish Iqbāl’s ontology from a pantheistic one; perhaps, as we suggested earlier, panentheistic is a better designation for his view. The symbolism that comes to mind here is that of the upside down *asvatthā* tree with its roots above and fruits below (BG XV.I). But Iqbāl would have the roots descend and entwine more and more into the world of the fruits; and yet God might be a mystery far beyond human comprehension. But it is the link between God’s personality and our own personality that makes the bridge less formidable, and thus in the “I-thou” relation there is a distinct possibility of union between man and divine. On this point at least, Iqbāl and the Gitā converge.

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According to the Qur’ān, "and we have indeed created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them in six aeons, and [that] no weariness could ever touch us." Surah QAF. (L) v.38 (Asad Translation) Editor's Note.

<sup>140</sup> Recons. p. 60

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*.

# THE SELF

Dr. S. ATAUR RAHIM

The discussion of the nature of the self will be divided into two parts: firstly, in what sense can we say that the self is distinct and separate from body and mind? Here we will be concerned with the analysis of the various uses of 'I'; secondly, we shall examine three theories about the self: the no-ownership theory of the self, the inner-elusive self and the self as a person.

## Various uses of 'I'

To show that the self is distinct and separate from body and mind, we shall examine the various uses of 'I' because 'I' is synonymous with the self, or it is its concrete expression. When we get clear about the use of 'I' we shall also be considering an analogy with a physical object e.g. a car.<sup>142</sup> As a human being possesses mind and body, a car has bodywork and an engine. As a question arises: how is the self related to mind and body? a similar question can be asked: how are the bodywork and the engine related to the car?

(A) First take the normal uses of 'I' and 'my body' where there is a sense of possession-'I have a body' 'This body is mine' 'This is my body.' Sometimes we identify 'I' with 'my body' in this way, but sometimes we do not. Similarly, we identify 'I' with mind, but sometimes find it difficult to do so. When we say that the car has a bodywork and an engine, we make a similar identification. A crucial issue arises in both cases: whether or not 'I' can be identified with body and mind, or the car with the bodywork and the engine.

(B)(Bi)'I see, hear, taste, touch, etc...'

(B2)'I sleep, dream, imagine, etc'

Can we here say that the body does all these things, or the mind does them, or are these the activities of the 'I' or the self? Can we say that 'I' do these things with the help of the body and the mind? In (B<sub>1</sub>) 'I see' cannot be replaced by 'my body sees' (though 'my eyes see' will be more appropriate), yet 'I see with the help of the eyes' will be a normal expression. The case of (B<sub>2</sub>) is rather different. We cannot say 'my body sleeps' or 'my mind dreams

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<sup>142</sup> Similarly we can consider an other analogy with some animate object, say a horse, or a flower. I think that the results in such cases will be the same as they are in the case of a car.

or imagines,' but that 'I sleep, dream or imagine.' Here also we can say that 'I dream or imagine with the help of the mind.' Ryle examines some such uses of I. "'I am warming myself before the fire, the word 'myself' could be replaced by 'my body' without spoiling the sense; ...'"<sup>143</sup> He further says: "There are even some cases where I can talk about a part of my body, but cannot use 'I' or 'me' for it. If my hair were scorched in a fire, I could say 'I was not scorched; only my hair as,' though I could never say 'I was not scorched; only my face and hands were.'"<sup>144</sup> For Ryle<sup>145</sup> there are cases where 'I' or 'me' certainly cannot be replaced by 'my body' e.g. 'I remember' cannot be replaced by 'my head remembers', nor can we say my brain does long divisions' or 'my body battles with fatigue.' He says:" It makes perfect sense to say that 'I caught myself just beginning to dream, but not that 'I caught my body beginning to dream.'"<sup>146</sup> Similarly, we say that the car is moving and not the bodywork is moving; the car is running and not the engine is running (sometimes the engine may be running but the car may be still e.g. when we start a car). 'The car rattles' cannot be replaced by 'the bodywork rattles.'

(C) Now examine cases where 'I' can be identified with the body. 'I am naked or clothed.' 'I am hungry or thirsty.' Apparently we cannot say: 'my body is hungry but I am not,' 'my body is naked but I am not; In the former case, however, there is a sense in which I can control my hunger and so differentiate 'myself' from any body, but in the latter case it is difficult to do so. One cannot say that my body is naked but in the latter case it is difficult to do so. One cannot say that my body is naked but I am not, because this will be injuring the common sense use. But in the above cases there is something more. It is not any body which is naked or hungry, but it is my body which is so and this 'my' brings in the sense of possession, that I possess this body. Without such a reference to its relation to me, the sense is not complete. C. Lewy says: "I cannot explain what I mean by 'my body' without bringing in reference to myself, whereas the meaning of 'myself' cannot be

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<sup>143</sup> Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p.180.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p.180. here H.D. Lewis would disagree with Ryle and say that there is a sense in which we can say 'I was not scorched' because 'I' cannot be identified with either face or hands. We shall examine his views later on.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, p.181

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p.181



further explained in terms of a body...”<sup>147</sup> In the above examples ‘I’ can be understood as some conscious subject who has these experiences and can talk about them.

Similarly in the analogy of the car, we cannot say that the bodywork is painted (or smashed or rusty), but the car is not. Also we cannot say that the engine is still but the car is not; the engine broke down but the car did not. The bodywork and the engine refer to the car, as mind and body refer to ‘I’.

(D) We shall now examine two very different uses of ‘I’ which are crucial to our whole discussion.

(D<sub>1</sub>) I have a body. (D<sub>2</sub>) I am a body.

I have a mind. I am a mind.

I have a mind and a body. I am an embodied mind. I am a person.

The sense of ‘having’ in (D<sub>1</sub>) is clear as we normally use the expressions, but in (D<sub>2</sub>) there is the question of identification. In (D<sub>2</sub>) the first two are extreme theses, which cannot both be accepted, as the one excludes the other; but the third one is a compromise between the two, and the last one seems to be the most appropriate, as it is an advancement on the third one.

In the car analogy the position is as under:

(D<sub>1</sub>) The car has a bodywork. (D<sub>4</sub>) The car is the bodywork.

The car has an engine. The car is the engine.

(D<sub>3</sub>) is acceptable but (D<sub>4</sub>) is not. We cannot identify the car with the body or the engine. Neither can we say which is more important for the car, the engine or the bodywork. A bodywork can be without an engine, or an engine can be without a bodywork, but neither one can be called a car. The car is a unity of both. There can be no question of the elusiveness of the car, as it is alleged in the case of ‘I’.

Mind and body are said to be qualitatively different from each other, and if ‘I’ is identified with both of them (embodied mind), a question arises: to which of the two is it more near, mind or body? And here opinion differs.

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<sup>147</sup> C. Lewy, "Is the notion of disembodied existence self-contradictory?" *Proceedings of – the Aristotelian Society*, 1942-43, PP. 62-63

For example, Campbell and Lewis think that mind is more near to the self; for Schlick, Ayer and Hampshire the body is the essence of the self. For Stout and Moore, 'I' is an 'embodied self or mind'. This has been more appropriately put by Ryle and Strawson in the view that 'I' or 'self' is a 'person'<sup>148</sup>. We shall briefly summarize these views and will discuss the theories which they give rise to.

Among those who identify 'I' with mind, Campbell says: ...it can be granted that mind at any rate belongs to the essence of the self ... and one can ask: does also body belong to the essence of the self? ..."<sup>149</sup> He calls the union of mind and body within the self a "merely de facto union ... and not an essential one."<sup>150</sup> For H.D.Lewis "my real self is my mind and it is only in a derivative and secondary sense that my body is said to be myself at all."<sup>151</sup>

Schlick, Ayer and Hampshire identify 'I' with the body. They want to account for self-identity in terms of the body alone. Though Ryle talks of the 'systematic elusiveness of I', he treats 'I' as a 'person'. For him all personal pronouns are "index words." "I' is not an extra name for an extra being; it indicates, when I say or write it, the same individual who can also be addressed by the proper name of 'Gilbert Ryle'<sup>152</sup> He says: "'I' in my use of it always indicates me and only indicates me. 'You', 'she', 'they' indicate different people at different times."<sup>153</sup> The utterance of an 'I' sentence, he calls a "higher order performance" of self-reporting, self-exhortation,..."<sup>154</sup> What is elusive in his sense is body's self which perpetually slips out, though he says that "my last year's self, or my yesterday's self, could in principle be exhaustively described and accounted 'for,...'"<sup>155</sup> What is important for our purpose is that 'I' or 'self' cannot be identified with body or mind. It is 'I' which is capable of both physical and mental acts and is better known as a 'person.' Strawson tries to give a unitary account of 'I' or the self as a person. His thesis is that we ascribe physical and mental characteristics to the

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<sup>148</sup> Hegel also treats 'I' as a person. He says: "By the term 'I' I mean myself, a single and altogether determinate person....While the brute cannot say 'I' man can, because it is his nature to think...." *The Logic of Hegel*, trans. by W. Wallace, p. 48

<sup>149</sup> C.A. Campbell, *On Selfhood and Godhood*, p. 95.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>151</sup> H.D. Lewis, *The Elusive Mind*, p. 151.

<sup>152</sup> Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 180.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187.

‘person’ and do not ascribe them either to the pure ego or to the body alone.

The above three views can be put in the form of three theories of the self: The no-ownership theory of the self, the inner-elusive self theory and the self as a person.

### **The No-ownership Theory of the Self**

This theory is held by Mach, Wittgenstein and Schlick. It has two theses: one is the extreme one that “primitive experience is absolutely neutral,”<sup>156</sup> and the other is that of the ‘Elusive I’ of Wittgenstein in the Investigations. He says that ‘I’ is not the name of a person. All three agree to the extreme thesis. Mach denies that original experience “has that quality or status, characteristic of all given experience, which is indicated by the adjective ‘first person.’”<sup>157</sup> The unique position of the self is not a basic property of experience. Mach says: “The primary fact is not the I, the ego, but the elements (sensations). The elements constitute the I. I have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the elements no longer occur in their ordinary, familiar way of association.”<sup>158</sup> For him body and ego, matter and mind are “intellectual abridgements and delimitations which have been formed for special, practical purposes and with wholly provisional and limited ends in view.”<sup>159</sup> He regards the ego not as a real unity but as some kind of a practical unity.

Wittgenstein presents two views about the self, one in the Tractatus and the other in the Investigations. The Tractatus view is the ‘no-ownership view’- “... the philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, limit of the world-not a part of it.”<sup>160</sup> In the Investigations, he talks about “I” in the way which later on Ryle characterised as the ‘systematic elusiveness of’ I’, Wittgenstein says: ‘I’ is not the name of a person, nor ‘here’ of a place, ... But they are connected with names. Names are explained

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<sup>156</sup> Schlick, "Meaning and Verification," p. 162.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., quoted by Schlick, p. 162.

<sup>158</sup> Mach, "Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations," Body and Mind, ed. G.N.A. Vesey, p. 177

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, p. 174

<sup>160</sup> Tractates, 5,641

by means of them.”<sup>161</sup> “When I say ‘I am in pain...,’ I do not point to a person who is in pain, I do not name any person. Just as I do not name any one when I groan with pain.”<sup>162</sup> Here he is objecting to the view of (W. James) which claims an introspective knowledge of the self i.e. we can look inward and see the self. He says: “you” that after all you must be weaving a piece of cloth: because you are sitting at a loom even if it is empty and going through the motions of weaving.”<sup>163</sup>

Schlick starts with the presumption that ‘primitive experience is absolutely neutral.’ But what about the secondary level when we speak of the self (mind) and body? He seems to give importance to the body over the ego at the secondary level. He says: “‘All experience is first-person experience’ will either mean the simple empirical fact that all data are in certain respects dependent on the state of the nervous system of my body M, or it will be meaningless. Before this experience physiological fact is discovered, experience is not ‘my’ all, it is self-sufficient and does not ‘belong’ to any body. The proposition ‘the ego is the centre of the world’ may be regarded as an expression of the same fact, and has meaning only if it refers to the body.”<sup>164</sup>

The no-ownership theory is purely negative. When it talks of ‘primitive experience being neutral,’ it does not give any positive answer. But the moment it attempts to give some positive answer as to who owns the data in the secondary sense, there could be three answers, that the body, or the mind, or the person owns the data. We have seen that Mach needs body and

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<sup>161</sup> Investigations, 410.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 404

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 414.

<sup>164</sup> Schlick, "Meaning and Verification," p. 168.

mind for 'practical purposes' at the secondary level. But Schlick wants to say that the data depend on the body M alone and cannot belong to the ego or the self. For him the says: self or the ego of the solipsist is absolute empty. 'my' indicates possession;<sup>165</sup> "but he wants to restrict it as referring to the body M. and the ego is denied any owner-ship. But normally ' my' is not defined with reference to the body alone, but also to the mind or mental acts as 'my thoughts,' 'my imaginatio", 'my feelings,' 'my motives,' ect. In all cases 'my' can be easily substituted for 'his' or 'yours' (which is the purpose of Schlick in such a manoeuvre). Schlick in denying any ownership of mental and physical acts by the self and giving all to the body seems to be moving to the other extreme end of physicalism, though he actually does not.

### **The Inner-Elusive Self Theory<sup>166</sup>**

In this theory the self is given a primary place and the body a secondary one. It is held that the self is qualitatively different from the body (as consciousness belong to it) and it is that which is responsible for our physical and mental acts. It exists independently of the body and its processes cannot be translated into any bodily process. The self is characterized as something inner and elusive. The theory has three theses: (a) the self is qualitatively different from the body; (b) the body is causally and not logically dependent on the self, and (C)the self is elusive.

(a) According to this thesis, I or the self is qualitatively different from the body. The body is something physical, whereas the self is not. Even those who talk of 'primitive experience as neutral' have to concede that even as constructions, mind and body are qualitatively different at the secondary level. Some acts are called mental and some physical. Though there is no border line between two, yet a clear distinction is there. Even Hampshire who tries to show that the analysis of the concept of action can be done purely in physical terms constantly speaks of I-'I control,' I manipulate,' etc. What is 'I' here. It is but the self which is distinct from the body and which acts and uses the body as an instrument. C.S. Sherrington Says that in the awareness of an action there are tow parts: a sensual and bodily part which is perceived as the body acts, and there is the awareness of 'I-doing' which is

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<sup>165</sup> Schlick.,MV, p.167.

<sup>166</sup> In the form I have put it the theory is not held by any one in particular. It is a combination of two complementary views about the self as something inner and elusive.

not derived from sense. "It is the I's direct awareness of itself acting"<sup>167</sup> so the self in this sense is not an entity or a thing, but it is the subject of experience or the agent who acts.

(b) As regards the second thesis that the body is causally and not logically dependent on the self, we can

(c) take our experiences of seeing, hearing, etc. We can say that such experiences causally depend on the existence of the body. Other mental acts such as imagination, intention, motive, etc. do not depend on the body but on the mind. Campbell takes the union of body and mind within the self as a "merely de facto and not an essential union"<sup>168</sup> with the result that their separation is at least conceivable. He says: "It can be granted that mind at any rate belongs to the essence of the self, so does or does not body also belong to the essence of the self?"<sup>169</sup> For him "the self to which self-consciousness testifies is a self which has, rather than is its experiences."<sup>170</sup>

(c) H.D. Lewis<sup>171</sup> holds the thesis that the self is 'elusive.' There are two things to be noted in his theory. What does he think the self is an entity or a person, etc.? and how does he characterize it by calling it elusive? He says that the self is not to be identified with its characteristics or its experiences and it should not be thought of as existing "in a void"<sup>172</sup> without experience or nature or character of any sort. It is not a substance which has a nature over and above the fact of being a subject who thinks or feels. When he wants to characterize it as 'elusive', he says: "I am not strictly related to my experiences in the way external things are related to one another. I am in my experiences in a much more inclusive way and yet I am not to be reduced to my having this or that experience... I am more than my having a particular experience, but no indication of this 'more' can be given beyond the awareness that every one has of it in his own case in having any kind of experience."<sup>173</sup> He talks of the unique sense of self-identity by saying that

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<sup>167</sup> C.S. Sherrington, *Man on his Nature*. Selection reprinted in *Body and Mind*, ed. Vesey, p. 324.

<sup>168</sup> Campbell, *On Selfhood and Godhood*, p. 95.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p.95.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>171</sup> Lewis seems to hold views similar to Ryle and Strawson, but he differs from them with regard to the self and so I have put him in this group rather than that of the person theory.

<sup>172</sup> *The Elusive Mind*, p.245.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, p.233.

other persons can identify me by my birth-place, date education, profession, etc., “but I could inwardly know myself to be the person I am if all these things were different. They do not give the uniqueness of my being the person I am in any experience whatsoever.”<sup>174</sup>

We shall now examine the three theses of the inner-elusive self theory. The theory claims that the self is logically different from the body. According to Lewis “By material standards mental entities are odd, for although they take time, they are not in space and extended at all. This is what makes them so elusive,...”<sup>175</sup>

A difficulty with the inner self is that it is conceived as a substance or a thing which cannot be introspected or known. A better way suggested by Hegel is to treat it as a subject which has experiences. Veer is right that Hegel’s saying that the self is a subject and not a substance “ was meant as a warning against Hume’s error of treating the self as a ‘thing.’”<sup>176</sup> Hegel said: “By the term ‘I’ I mean myself, a single and altogether determinate person... While the brute cannot say ‘I’, man can, because it is his nature to think...”<sup>177</sup> “The ‘I’ is the primary identity- at one with itself and all at home in itself ....The ‘I’ is as it were the crucible and the fire which consumes the loose plurality of sense and reduces it to unity.”<sup>178</sup> Veer says: “... one need only

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<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p.244.

<sup>175</sup> Lewis disagrees with Ryle about the two different senses of 'exist.' He says it is not that there are two different uses of exist when applied to mental and physical, but that the nature of things (mind and body) is different, and existence in both the cases is the same. Ibid, p.43 [Ilabis mine]

<sup>176</sup> Vander Veer, Bradley's Metaphysics and the Self, p.212.

<sup>177</sup> Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, trans. by Wallace, p.48.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p.88.

claim that there is a 'subjective reference' in all experience, that any description of experiences that omits it will at least be felt to be incomplete,..."<sup>179</sup> This is also what Broad calls the 'unity of a centre. ' He says: "Our self does seem to have the unity of a centre. This is when I see or hear or introspect, there does seem to be a relation between the object of these states and something that perceives and that I call 'I'<sup>180</sup> The self so far considered as embodied is not difficult to characterize as something qualitatively different from the body, but a difficulty appears when we went to speak about its 'disembodied existence.'" <sup>181</sup>

Something more needs to be said about the elusive self as characterized by Lewis. I agree with Lewis that 'I am tall' is only about my body and not about my mind, but some difficulty arises in his other example 'I am bald.' He says: "... in the strict sense I am not bald at all, and cannot be; it is only part of my body that can be bald, my body is not something that I am but something that I have...." <sup>182</sup> Consider the two experiences 'I am bald' and 'I have a bald head. 'Can we say that my head is bald but I am not bald; cases)? Certainly not. But perhaps a part of the clue is here i.e. I can both be bald and have a bald head. In terms of our earlier car analogy we can say that the car is rusty and that the car has a rusty body. Earlier we pointed out that sometimes 'I' can be substituted for the body or a part of the body and by this no common sense expression is violated. Lewis's aim is to characterize 'I' as different from the body, and in the above example he does not succeed. On the other hand, if he is interpreted as characterizing 'I' as a person, then 'I' can be taken as more than the body. Let us see what happens when we refer to personal characteristics, attitudes and other experiences. Take some examples: 'I am honest, I am kind, I am benevolent,' 'I am lonely, I am happy. Here 'I' does not refer to body or mind but to a person who has these characteristics, or who goes through these experiences. Thus 'person' becomes a biosocial unity of mind and body in a social setting. There does not seem to be anything elusive in the idea of a person, in the way Lewis wants to characterize it with regard to the self. Lewis, no doubt, draws a sharp distinction between mind and body"<sup>183</sup> and wants to think of ourselves

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<sup>179</sup> Veer, BMS, p.196.

<sup>180</sup> C.D. Broad, *Mind and its place in nature*, pp.569-70.

<sup>181</sup> This will be discussed in connection with immortality.

<sup>182</sup> Lewis, EM, p.151.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., p.16



as “composite entities, as being (or having) a mind and a body”<sup>184</sup>, and he denies that “the self can be some kind of an entity other than the person that thinks, perceives...”<sup>185</sup> yet he wants to say that”... a person is his mind in a way in which he is not his body. I can say in seriousness that I have a body, but in serious thought it would be odd to think of my mind as just belonging to me’, I am my mind in a quite fundamental sense.<sup>186</sup> But I think that such an identification of person with mind is not correct. Why identify the self with mind or mental states? Contrast ‘I have a mind’, I have a good memory or imagination,’ ‘I had a sudden thought,’ etc. What status we can give to mind or body with reference to person is the issue which leads us to examine the theory of the self as a person.

### **The Self as a person**

Before I discuss Strawson’s theory of a person, I think it desirable to discuss the embodied self theory of Stout and Moore, which I think can be interpreted as a precursor of the theory of a person. Stout hinted at this when he said: “What we are primarily aware of is the individual unity of an embodied self. It is this which is signified by the personal pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’....We cannot, at any rate without a radical change of meaning, substitute for the personal pronoun in the statements either ‘my body’ or ‘my mind.’”<sup>187</sup> He further says: “In cases where ‘I’ and ‘my body’ can be used interchangeably ... ‘I’ has no longer its proper and primary, but only a transferred and derivative meaning. I may say indifferently that ‘I’ or ‘my body’ will sometime be moldering in the grave. But I readily cognize that the dead and buried body will not really be I. I continue to speak of it as ‘I’ or even as ‘my body’ only because it is thought of as connected by a continuous history with my present individual experience as an embodied self.”<sup>188</sup> So Stout here seems to give ‘I’ (mind or self) a primary sense and it is derivative when ‘I’ can be replaced by ‘my body.’ On the other hand when he talks of the individual unity of the embodied self, He could have attributed that unity to the ‘person’ (here at least one can move towards the person theory).

Moore says: “... that I am an entity, distinct from every one of my

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p.17.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., p.227.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p.23.

<sup>187</sup> G.F. Stout, *Mind and Matter*, selection in *Body and Mind*, ed. Vesey, p.260.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p.260.

mental acts and from all of them put together;...” but he continues that “... even if I am such an entity, it does not follow that it is a mental entity. There is still an other hypothesis,... that this entity which hears and sees and feels and thinks is some part of my body.<sup>189</sup>” He thus offers a compromise conclusion which comes to the embodied mind thesis, “that ‘my mind’ was the collection of my mental acts; and that what made them all ‘mine’ was not any direct relation they had to one another, but the fact that they all had a common relation to my body.<sup>190</sup> Here also lies the germ of the person theory.

We can now move to Strawson’s theory of a person. At the very start Strawson<sup>191</sup> says that we ascribe to ourselves ‘actions and intentions’ ‘thoughts and feelings’ ‘perceptions and memories and attitudes’, and not only temporary conditions, states and situations but also enduring characteristics including physical characteristics such as height, colour, etc. What he means by the concept of a person is that it “is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation, etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.<sup>192</sup> What is important is that both the mental and physical characteristics are ascribed “to the very same thing ...”<sup>193</sup> A consequence of all this is that “the concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. The concept of a person is not to be analyzed as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima.”<sup>194</sup> The concept of pure individual consciousness- the pure ego “cannot exist; or, at least cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analyzed. It can only exist, if at all, as a secondary, non-primitive concept, which itself is to be explained, analyzed, in terms of the concept of person.”<sup>195</sup> He says: ‘I’ never refers to this, the pure subject .... It refers, because I am a person among others.<sup>196</sup> Strawson presents his thesis that “self-ascription depends on other

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<sup>189</sup> G.E.Moore, "The Subject Matter of Psychology," *Body and Mind*, Vesey, p.244. The above article originally appeared in *PAS*, 1909-10

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, p.245.

<sup>191</sup> Strawson, "Persons," *Minn. Studies in the Phil. of Science*, Vol II p.331.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, p.340.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, p.340.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, p.341.

<sup>195</sup> Strawson, "Persons," *MSPS*, Vol II p.341.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p.341.

ascription” with the example of depression. “X’s depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt, but not observed by X and observed but not felt by others than X.”<sup>197</sup>

Strawson’s theory cuts across different views about a person, and those who are affected naturally criticize him. When Strawson tries to establish his theory of a person, he is criticized for not establishing it. One great difficulty is that his concept of a person cannot stand where he wants it to i.e. at the primitive level, because every body wants to go from the primitive concept of a person to its secondary level, where the mental and physical characteristics are ascribed, and here lies the real difficulty. Ayer finds the primitiveness of the concept of a person in the “presupposed ownership of the body” by which he claims all his experiences as ‘his.’ Lewis wants to hold that “my real self is my mind. “Both Lewis and Veer object to the ascription of mental and physical characteristics “to the very same thing or being”, and they ask who is that or what is that same being? So according to Veer, the concept of a person on its primitive level appears to be ‘empty’ and on its further analysis at the secondary level it dissolves into mind and body. We shall now examine their criticisms.

Veer sees the merit of Strawson’s theory in the fact that it accounts for the unity of mind and body “without denying their differences.”<sup>198</sup> For him it is a compromise<sup>199</sup> between the two extreme claims of Ryle and Cartesianism. The basic aim of Strawson seems to be that “if we take ‘person’ as our basic notion, we shall avoid certain problems associated with ‘self’. We shall stop referring to an imaginary entity called the ‘self’ and shall instead concentrate on what really exists,

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<sup>197</sup> Individuals, p.109.

<sup>198</sup> Vander Veer, Bradley’s Metaphysics and the Self, p.291.

<sup>199</sup> “... a compromise between the two extreme claims of Ryle (that one knows his mental states & one knows those of others, that there is no privileged access, and so forth) and the equally extreme results of Cartesianism (that one can never know of the existence of other minds, that the self has its own identity and so forth)” Ibid., p.282.

namely persons.”<sup>200</sup> This seems to be all right, but does Strawson succeed in his attempt? The main objection is that mind and body are qualitatively different. When they form a unity of what he calls a “person” what is that ‘single thing’ or single unity called ‘person?’, what is to be both a body and a mind? When we analyze a person, it dissolves into body and mind. Strawson says that ‘I’ does not suffer from ‘type-ambiguity.’ I does neither refer to a pure ego nor to a certain body but to a person about whom both kinds of ascriptions are possible. But Veer asks: “What or who is the person who is the same and yet so different?” Mind and body are two mutually exclusive categories and here a ‘third thing’ (person) seems to unify them. But “person’ is from this standpoint in danger of being an empty “promissory’ note....Whether on analysis does not ‘person’ also dissolve into somehow related entities?”<sup>201</sup> Lewis says: “my real self is my mind and it is only in a derivative and secondary sense that my body is said to be myself at all.”<sup>202</sup> “My body is not strictly myself, or some part of me. It is something to which I am very specially related, no more...”<sup>203</sup>

As regards the ascription of mental and physical characteristics, Strawson seems to reverse the Cartesian order of ascription. But is he justified in doing so?

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<sup>200</sup> Veer, BMS, pp. 281-82.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., p.284.

<sup>202</sup> Lewis, *The Elusive Mind*, p.151.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p.159.

There may not be pure ego or pure individual consciousness, as Strawson says, but from this it does not follow that we are not acquainted with something called an 'inner self'. To deny it is surely to "contradict the most convincing empirical testimony we have."<sup>204</sup> Veer says that the self is not to be described as different from me or possessed by me etc., but that "the self is me and is so recognized in action"<sup>205</sup>. In his explanation of the concept of depression to clarify how both mental and physical characteristics can be ascribed to the very same being, Strawson does not move to the other extreme of physicalism, but he wants to have some 'logically adequate criterion' of behaviour to do the job of ascription. But here too a distinction' remains between 'my feeling of depression' and its observations by others through behaviour. My feeling of depression does not belong to my behaviour in the sense in which others can observe it. Others observe my behaviour and from that infer that I am depressed. There seems to be a way from outward behaviour to inner psychological processes, but it is not always easy and clear. Certain emotionally charged states of mind may be observed, but other subtle mental processes such as thinking out a plot for a story composing a poem, doing a mathematical sum (in ones mind and not on paper) elude detection, unless

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<sup>204</sup> Veer, p.285.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid., p.286.

one tells others about them. In Veer's opinion the evidence is in favour of a dualism of self and body and arguments from analogy, and Strawson's claim that "person is more basic than self"<sup>206</sup> cannot be accepted.

Ayer has his own disagreement with Strawson. He summarizes Strawson's argument as: "...if my experiences are identified as mine only in virtue of their dependence on this body, then the proposition that all my experiences are causally dependent on the state of my body must be analytic;..."<sup>207</sup> Ayer tries to reformulate it in such a way that the charge of analyticity is removed. This is done by presupposing the ownership of the body.<sup>208</sup> He says: "...in referring to myself at all I am presupposing my ownership of this body; in claiming an experience as mine, I imply that it is dependent on this body and not any other... The identification of the body, which carries with it the numerical identification of the experience is a problem for other people, not for oneself..., but given that this is the body by which I am identified, it is a necessary fact that this body is mine."<sup>209</sup> For him personal identity depends on the body and consciousness bears a causal relation to the body. He says; "I am, however, inclined to think that personal identity depends upon the identity of the body and that a person's ownership of states of consciousness consists in their standing in a special causal relation to the body by which he is identified."<sup>210</sup> As a criticism of Ayer, all that can be said is what we have said with regard to the inner-elusive self, that mind cannot be given a secondary status in the unity of a person. I have only to say this much, that in the sentence 'I have a body', I am quite different from the body, and it is 'I' who possesses or claims to possess the body and not that the body claims to possess 'I' or me.

After discussing the above theories and weighing them against each other, I think that the concept of a person can better do the job which was previously

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<sup>206</sup> Ibid., p.288.

<sup>207</sup> Ayer, *The Concept of a Person*, p.116.

<sup>208</sup> In Ayer's sense the body will be a 'logically primitive concept.'

<sup>209</sup> Ibid., p.126.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p.126.

assigned to the self. The concept of a person is not as 'empty' as Veer supposes, and not as 'elusive' as Lewis wants to characterize it (though he himself talks of the self as a person who thinks, feels, etc., but does not develop it on that line). For him the self is elusive and so will be the person. I need not normally call myself a person (though there is nothing objectionable in doing so), but others call me a 'person'. If we take an individual as a bio-social unity of physical and mental characteristics i.e., as having a personality, it is better to call him a person than a self. One has a self which is known to oneself, but one as a person is known to others. When Veer asks: "What or who is the person who is the same and yet so different?"<sup>211</sup> he seems to be looking for some kind of a 'third entity' over and above the two entities of mind and body. Though a person is not a third entity, it is said to exist as a unique and systematic unity of the two, which exists in its own right. Though it makes use of mind and body, it cannot be reduced to either of them. The fact is that if we look for any such unity and move from the physical to the mental and the social, we come across something tangible in the case of the physical, but not so tangible in the case of the mental and the social. For example H<sub>2</sub>O is a unity which is observable, and has its own characteristics. The body is a unity of different parts. Mind is a unity of

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<sup>211</sup> Veer, BMS, p.284.

mental acts, but it is not observable like the body. 'I' is another such other unity which is present in all our acts and yet in Lewis's sense is 'elusive,' and another is person,<sup>212</sup> which according to Veer is 'empty' But we can say that neither 'I' nor 'person' is elusive or empty. As 'I' always indicates me and me alone, so 'person' always refers to an individual being, what I call a bio-social unity of mind and body. In ordinary life we refer to a person, talk to him, talk about him (in his presence or absence). We talk about real persons of flesh and blood; of fictitious persons in stories and novels; of persons in history; in their different roles in social life, etc. We can talk of persons when they are alive or dead. In all such cases when we refer to a person, we refer to him as a being who has or had such and such qualities, and has or had done such and such acts. These qualities of mind and body combined with the acts characterize him as a person. When they are known, they make him good or bad, famous or notorious. It is important to note that when a person dies, his acts do not die with him (and here is a sense of immortality which refer only this world). They are left behind him and it is by reference to these that he is remembered and is considered immortal in certain respects at least. When we talk of him, we take into account his acts, talents, abilities, and whatever is directly or indirectly

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<sup>212</sup> Other elusive concepts are: nation, group, group- mind, etc.



known about him. Here lies an answer to Veer's objection: what or who is the person. I say it is the person who acts. His acts may be divided into mental or physical, but as a person he is always there. Acts belong to the person and not to the mind or body. He rather uses mind and body for his acts. What we earlier concluded, namely, that 'I' cannot be replaced by 'my body' or 'my mind', seems to be true. Veer's claim that the substitution of mind and body is the only alternative and in doing so I or person disappears is not correct. Let us see whether we can make substitution in the following examples:

- (a) I sit, I stand, I walk. Here we cannot substitute my body for I, because the body is used by me for a certain act.
- (b) I think, I imagine, I remember,. Similarly my mind cannot be substituted for I.
- (c) I try, I assert, I fail. No substitution of either mind or body is possible for I.

As a conclusion I can say that we can talk of a person as a bio-social unity of mental and physical characteristics which is manifested in his actions. Here a question arises: Is my bio-social unity of a person logically the same as the unity of a whole and its parts? I should say yes. It is the way in which every proper noun unifies its parts. Here we refer back to the analogy of the car. We said that the car is a unity of the bodywork and the engine. We cannot identify the car either with the bodywork or with the engine alone. As we can talk of a person, we can talk of the car and its parts. The car is rusty or its bodywork is rusty. The car broke down or its engine broke down, etc. There can be no question of the elusiveness of the car, as there can be about that of a person. We can talk of the car in its absence or presence, or even when it is no more. A smashed car is still a car. As we can talk about a man's acts, we can talk about the functioning of the car.

# DANTE AND MUHAMMAD (P.B.U.H.)

## SHER MUHAMMED SYED

Dante, the national poet of Italy of the middle ages of Europe is famous for his 'Comedy' to which his admirers later added the epithet 'Divine' so that it came to be known as the Divine Comedy'.<sup>213</sup> It has three sections i.e., Hell,

Purgatory and Paradise. In it he describes his imaginary visit to the three regions of After-Life, guided in the first two by the ancient poet Virgil while in the last by Beatrice with whom as a young boy of about 9 years he had passionately fallen in love which Continued not only after h marriage to another man but also after her death.

I. In Canto No. 28 of 'Hell', Dante described his imaginary meeting with "Mahomet" (Muhammad, peace be upon him). Misled by the utterly false and baseless stories circulated by ill-educated and prejudiced Christian and Jewish historians of those dark ages of Europe, Dante quite wrongly assumed ' Mahomet'<sup>214</sup> and 'Ali'<sup>215</sup> to have been fomenters of Schism in Christianity and in his misguided zeal proceeded to assign to both of them a place in his imaginary hell. He tarnished both in the said verses which offend against all moral and ethical standards and are too sordid and profane to be reproduced here. One who so desires may read them In any standard translation of Dante's Inferno. English rendering by Dorothy Sayers, published as a Mentor publication is a popular book.<sup>216</sup>

In fact, the Mahomet and the Ali of Dante's conception were not the real and historical Muhammad (peace and blessing be upon him) the Prophet of Islam, and Ali (the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of Hazrat Muhammad), but were as we shall prove hereafter phantoms of the brains of the so-called historians of the Middle Ages of Europe.

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<sup>213</sup> *A Short History of Our Religion*, Somervell; G. Bell and Sons, London; 1922, p. 185 and note thereunder.

<sup>214</sup> Dictionary of Proper Names & Notable Matters In The Works of Dante, Paget Toynbee, Oxford, 1968, pp. 422-423 and pp. 28-29. Some commentators of Dante have stated that All was nephew of Muhammad.

<sup>215</sup> Dictionary of Proper Names & Notable Matters In The Works of Dante, Paget Toynbee, Oxford, 1968, pp. 422-423 and pp. 28-29. Some commentators of Dante have stated that All was nephew of Muhammad.

<sup>216</sup> The Divine Comedy of Dante: I. Hell; Penguin, England; 1960, verses 22-45, pp. 246-47. Translation by Dorothy Sayers.

II. Let us first examine the general nature and intrinsic worth of the sources of information of Dante with particular reference to Hazrat Muhammad and Hazrat Ali (peace be upon them).

It is a hard fact and stern reality that during the middle ages of Europe when Dante lived (1265-1321), the knowledge of history and of other branches of learning which go to make up culture and civilization was deplorably poor. Buckley has reported that during the period in question ill-educated Christian priests monopolized the writing of history and that their main aim was to increase "general credulity, since it was the basis upon which their own authority was built." They had no scruples to circulate baseless legends and even to distort facts with which they fired the pseudo-religious zeal and puerile imagination of the illiterate laity. The result was that the history of Europe became corrupted to an extent for which there is no parallel in any other period. Properly speaking, there was no history and unhappily, men, not satisfied with the absence of truth, supplied its place by the invention of falsehood. For the sake of brevity we omit many instances of the ludicrous fictions which have been cited by Buckley in support of his assertion in this behalf, but would confine ourselves to giving a minimum of such instances as deal with the 'Origins of Historical Literature of Europe' during the period in question with side-lights that they throw on Islam and on Muhammad<sup>217</sup> (peace be upon him).

(a) Mathew Paris was the most eminent historian during the Middle ages. This celebrated historian informs us that on one occasion Muhammad appeared to have gorged himself with food and drink until he fell unconscious on a dung-hill and a litter of pigs saw him in that disgraceful condition and attacked and suffocated him to death. This is why the Muhammadans abominate pigs and refuse to partake of their flesh.<sup>218</sup>

(b) Let us now turn to another absurd legend which obviously led Dante to believe that Hazrat Muhammad caused schism in Christianity and then proceeded to found his own sect of Muhammadans. It runs thus: "It was well-known that Muhammad was originally a cardinal, and only became a

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<sup>217</sup> Vol.1 of History of Civilization In England: Buckley; Longmans Green and Co. London; 1901. Chapter VI dealing with 'Origin of History And State of Historical Literature During The Middle Ages' is worth reading and in particular its pages 309 & 315-16.

<sup>218</sup> Vol.1 of History of Civilization In England: Buckley; Longmans Green and Co. London; 1901. Chapter VI dealing with 'Origin of History And State of Historical Literature During The Middle Ages' is worth reading and in particular its pages 309 & 315-16.

heretic because he failed in his design of being elected pope". This baseless fable was a favourite in the Middle Ages and is said to have been a rabbinical invention.<sup>219</sup> It was later taken up also by many Christian priests regardless of the fact that the Quran eulogised [as per verses 91 and 12 respectively of surah-i-Al-Anbia (xxi) and At-Tahrim(LXVI)]<sup>220</sup> Hazrat Maryam for her chastity and the virgin Birth of Hazrat Isa (Jesus Christ) while the Jews calumniated both as borne out by notes in Col. 2968 of Encyclopedia Biblica (Vol III)<sup>221</sup> They castigated Hazrat Maryam by alleging that (God forbid) she had illicit relations with a soldier named Stada or Pandera and that Hazrat Isa (Jesus Christ) was born of that illegitimate union.

(c) A few more samples of absurd medieval fables about Muhammad (peace be upon him) needs must be given to establish lack of knowledge of the so-called historians of the period of Ignorance of the Middle Ages of Europe for details of which reference is invited to La Leggenda di Maomette in Occidente by A.D.' Ancona.<sup>222</sup> Based on these legends Miguel Asin states: "The Christian historians of Dante's age out-vied one another in weaving the most extravagant and contradictory tales about Mahomet. According to some, he was a pagan; to others a Christian. He was given in turn the names of Ocín, Pelagius, Nicholas, and Mahomet. Some depict him rightly as illiterate; others, as a magician or even a scholar of Bologna. He is represented as having been a Spaniard, a Roman or even a member of the family of Colonna. Some historians, again confuse the prophet with his mentor, the Nestorian monk Bahira,<sup>223</sup> and make him a deacon or cardinal

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<sup>219</sup> Vol.1 of History of Civilization In England: Buckley; Longmans Green and Co. London; 1901. Chapter VI dealing with 'Origin of History And State of Historical Literature During The Middle Ages' is worth reading and in particular its pages 309 & 315-16.

<sup>220</sup> Surah Al-Anbiya (XXI,91) and Surah-Tahrim (LXVI,12) which are quoted below: "And she who was chaste, therefore We breathed into her (Something) of Our Spirit and made her and her son a token for (all) peoples." 91/XXI "And Mary, daughter of Imran, whose body was chaste, therefore We breathed therein something of Our Spirit. And she put faith in the words of her Lord and His Scripture and was of the obedient." 12/LXVI

<sup>221</sup> *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, Adam & Charles Black, London, Vol. III 1902.

<sup>222</sup> *Islam And The Divine Comedy*: Miguel Asin; John Murrey, London 1926; pp. 260. In addition *Dictionary of Proper Names* etc., mentioned at 2 and 3 above: Paget Toynbee; Oxford; 1960; pp. 423 the portion within brackets.

<sup>223</sup> The statement that the Nestorian monk named Bahira or Sergius etc. was the mentor of Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him) is contradicted by De Bunsen at pp. 131 of 'Islam or True Christianity' published by Trubner & Co., London in 1889 and also by Carlyle at pp. 48 of his *Hero-Worship* published by Chapman and Hall, London in 1889.

who aspiring to the papacy, set out for Arabia from Constantinople, Antioch or Smyrna.”<sup>224</sup>

IV. It is a pity that as has been brought out above, Dante’s knowledge of Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him) was based on the then current fabricated falsehoods set afloat by grossly ignorant and prejudiced priests of his day. Had the papal authorities of those days not proscribed the Quran in Christendom and had Dante been fortunate enough to be acquainted with its teachings, he would have formed a correct opinion of Al-Islam, the universal religion which the Omniscient and Omnipotent Allah, the sole Creator of the whole universe, had revealed to all His prophets, the last and greatest of whom was Muhammad (peace be upon him).

IV (a) Finally, we assert with all the emphasis at our command that Muhammad (peace be upon him) did believe in the prophethood of Jesus Christ (Hazrat Isa, peace be upon him) as also in all other prophets and never preached any schism as misconceived by Dante in common with other Europeans of those Ages. The mention in his ‘Hell’ of his supposed meeting with Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him) is, therefore, the result of only his gross ignorance coupled with unjustifiable prejudice generated by the sad memories of the disastrous Crusades in the second of which Dante’s only notable distant ancestor named Cacciaguida had been killed.<sup>225</sup>

(b) According to some of Dante’s critics, “the libel that he was a peevish political exile who indulged in his petty spites and prejudices by putting his enemies in Hell and his friends in Paradise persists with the tenacity of an evil weed”.<sup>226</sup> Be that as it may, we have fully established that his views about Muhammad and All (peace be upon them) were absolutely wrong and therefore, his narration of their state in After-Life was quite perverted and distorted.

(c) It will not be out of place to mention that as proved by the researches of Miguel Asin and Francesco Gabrieli, Dante did not display any originality in conceiving the plot and the general scheme of his epic for which he had drawn inspiration from various accounts of the Mi’raj of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) published in Moorish Spain. These accounts became very popular and were widespread in Europe and

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<sup>224</sup> *Islam And The Divine Comedy*: Miguel Asin; John Murrey, London 1926; pp. 260.

<sup>225</sup> Please refer to the note on Cacciaguida in *Toynbee’s Dictionary* referred to at notes 2 and 3 above, page 122.

<sup>226</sup> Page 10 of Dorothy Sayer’s Introduction to the book mentioned at note 4 above .

particularly Italy before and during Dante's life time as has been established by Miguel Asin in *Islam and the Divine Comedy*<sup>227</sup> and by Francesco Gabrieli in his paper entitled "New Light on Dante and Islam."<sup>228</sup> There is, however, a world of difference between, i) "the account of the terrestrial cum celestial Mi'raj of the Prophet who was guided by the Arch-angel Gabriel meeting en-route various prophets e.g. Adam, Moses, Jesus Christ etc. etc.; ii) the epic of the lay poet (who had been condemned and aberrant) describing his imaginary journey through the three regions of After-life guided partly by the unbaptised Virgil and partly by Beatrice, another man's dead wife.

VI. Before concluding, we quote from "Mary's Place in Christian Dialogue"<sup>229</sup> in order to indicate how deep-rooted and wide-spread is the unjustifiable bias of the Christian world (against Muhammad and Islam) which took roots in the middle ages and persists up to the modern times:

"The average Christian's knowledge of Islam is still woefully weak. In many cases it is grotesquely distorted because of age-old prejudices and misconceptions. Emotions too, have played their divisive role, emotions excited and exacerbated by factors which have been political and 'economic' rather than religious. This is true, not only of average Christians, but also of highly educated Christians, and even of many Christians who hold responsible positions in their Churches."

It is high time that during the present Age of Enlightenment, the Christians and Jews alike shed their ignorance and prejudices and study Muhammad (peace be upon him) and Islam with an open mind. That will be to the general benefit of mankind at large. How truly has Iqbal said:

بمصطفیٰ برساں خویش را کہ دیں ہمہ اوست  
اگر بہ او نہ سیدی تمام بولہبی است

<sup>227</sup> Please see notes 8 and 10 above.

<sup>228</sup> *The Diogenes*: Spring 1954; published by "The International Council for Philosophy And Humanistic Studies; New York pp. 61-73.

<sup>229</sup> *Mary's Place In Christian Dialogue*, edited by Alberic Stacpoole, published by St. Paul Publications, England, 1982.

# IQBAL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Dr. KHURSHID ANWAR

The epistemology of Iqbal is in fact the epistemology of the Quran. Like the Qur'an, Iqbal makes full allowance for all kinds of experiences. Such as sense-perception, reason, intuition (Love), prophetic revelation... all these sources are various means to acquire knowledge. For Iqbal 'Knowledge' is not a deterministic nor limited concept which would have had only one or two sources. He regards knowledge as a great boon. He starts from sense-perception, passes through intellect arrives at his distinction, love. Thus we will categorize his theory of knowledge in terms of sense-perception, reason and Love. This last word he understands in its broad sense of religious experience, intuition and prophetic revelation.

He defines knowledge as "sense-perception elaborated by understanding".<sup>230</sup> In order to vindicate his claim he takes some quotations from the Qur'an, emphasizing the point that man is endowed with the faculty of naming things, (as the Quran says "O Adam inform them of the names") that is to say forming concepts of them is capturing them.

Thus the character of man's knowledge is conceptual and it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of reality.<sup>231</sup>

But what is this "observable aspect of reality" which, according to Iqbal only be approached through man's conceptual knowledge? It is the universe, it is "nature". After a reflective observation on the nature, man has, consciousness of what this nature symbolizes.

Iqbal further points out that the Qur'an sees signs of the ultimate reality in the sun, the moon, the lengthening of the shadows, the alternation of day and night, the variety of human colours and tongues...in fact in the life of nature as revealed to the sense-perception of man. And that the Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs and not pass by them as if he is deaf and

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<sup>230</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, M. Iqbal p. 12.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.* p. 13

blind.<sup>232</sup> On another place Iqbal says: 'It is through thinking that our knowledge grows and thinking is determined by our sensuous experience. So when the nature of our senses undergoes a change, the world is changed for us. Rest, Motion, Quality and Quantity take a new significance'.<sup>233</sup>

Why was Iqbal so strongly concerned of the fact that knowledge is actually based on sense-perception. One reason could be that he was greatly shocked by Greek thought which had influenced the Muslim's thinking for centuries and the impressions of which are still existing.

Referring to this fact Muhammad Iqbal asserts that "the cultures of Asia and, in fact of the whole ancient world failed because they approached Reality exclusively from within and moved from within outwards".<sup>234</sup>

The first object of Iqbal's condemnation was Plato who regarded imagination and fantasies as true while he disbelieved knowledge furnished by the natural instruments (like the eyes and the ears). Iqbal was also hostile to the teachings of Socrates, Mutazilites and other idealists who looked upon this world as of no use and value; Socrates' inquiry restricted itself to the moral problems of mankind. To him the proper study of man was man and not the world of plants, insects and stars. How unlike the Quran, which sees in the humble bee a recipient of Divine inspiration and constantly calls upon the reader to observe the perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of day and night, the clouds, the starry heavens and the planets swimming through infinite space.<sup>235</sup>

Similarly Plato, considers sense-perception as incapable of giving real knowledge, it can only give mere opinion. He fashions and moulds his supreme Reality out of his ideas. For him only ideas give the true and infallible knowledge of the ultimate Reality.

Sense-perception is for him a mere illusion. Therefore Iqbal violently attacks Plato at various places in his works. He says that Plato despised sense-perception which in his view, yielded mere opinion and no real knowledge. How unlike the Quran which regards "hearing" and "sight" as the most valuable Divine gifts and declares them to be accountable to God

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<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 127-128

<sup>233</sup> *The New Rose Garden of Mystery and the book of Slaves.* By M. Hadi Hussain pb. M. Ashraf Lahore, 1969. P. 38.

<sup>234</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* by Iqbal pp. 14 -15

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.* p.14.



for their activity in this world”.<sup>236</sup> Iqbal named Plato one of the “Flock of Sheeps” who actually exploited the former Muslim students of the Quran who studied under the classical speculation and read the Quran in the light of Greek thought. Iqbal has given us a very vivid poem in his “Secrets of Self” and likewise warned us to beware of such a Flock of Sheep. It is necessary here to reproduce that poem in order to fully understand Iqbal’s thoughts about the visible aspects of reality. He maintains that:

“Plato the Prime ascetic and sage was one of that ancient flock of sheep, His Pegasus went astray in the darkness of idealism, and dropped its shoe amidst the rocks of actuality.

He was so fascinated by the invisible that he made hand, eye, and ear of no account. “To die”, said he “is the secret of life: The candle is glorified by being put out”.

He dominates our thinking, His cup sends us to sleep and takes the sensible world away from us.

He is a sheep in man’s clothing,

The soul of the Sufi bows to his authority. He soared with his intellect to the highest heaven

And called the world of phenomena a myth. Twas his work to dissolve the structure of Life And cut the bough of life’s fair tree asunder. The thought of Plato regarded loss as profit, His philosophy declared that being is not-being.

His nature drowsed and created a dream His mind’s eye created a mirage.

Since he was without any taste for action, His soul was enraptured by the non-existent.

He disbelieved in the material universe And became the creator of invisible Ideas. Sweet is world of phenomena to the living spirit:

Dear is the world of ideas to the dead spirit:

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<sup>236</sup> *Ibid* p.4.

Its gazelles have no grace of movement,

Its partridges are denied the pleasure of walking daintily.

Its dewdrops are unable to quiver,

Its birds have no breath in their breasts, Its seed does not desire to grow,

Its moths do not know how to flutter. Our recluse has no remedy but flight:

He could not endure the noise of this world. He set his heart on the glow of a quenched flame

And depicted a word steeped in opium. He spread his wings towards the sky

And never came down to his nest again. His phantasy is sunk in the jar of heaven:

I know not whether it is the dregs or the brick of the wine-jar.

The peoples were poisoned by his intoxication:

He slumbered and took no delight in deeds”<sup>237</sup>

Iqbal also attacked Ibn-i-Rushed and Al-Ghazzali because Ibn-i-Rushed defended Greek philosophy while Ghazzali attacked it. Both for Iqbal have trodden the same path as far as the avoidance of sense-perception is concerned.

Ibn-i-Rushed through his doctrine of the immortality of the active intellect, a doctrine which once influenced France and Italy and which is opposed to the view of Quran, has taken notice of the value and the destiny of the human ego. And thus for Iqbal “Ibn-i-Rushed lost sight of the ideas of Islam” which obscured man’s vision of himself, his God and his world.<sup>238</sup> Similarly the Quran does not justify al-Ghazzali’s philosophic scepticism. Al-Ghazzali was a reaction to the extreme rationalism. He was a great protagonist of intuition, mystic experience and religious experience. Iqbal has

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<sup>237</sup> *The Secrets of the Self*, translated by Reynold A. Nicholson, pp. 56-59

<sup>238</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* by Iqbal pp.4.

the following opinion of al-Ghazzali: "That Ghazzali finding no hope in analytic thought moved to mystic experience and there found an independent content for religion. In this way he succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist independently of science and metaphysics. But the revelation of the total infinite in mystic experience convinced him of the finitude and inconclusiveness of thought and drove him to draw a line of cleavage between thought and intuition. He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily stimulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time.

The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge".<sup>239</sup>

To give a better explanation of what he means by knowledge; he writes in a letter, "that I have generally used the word 'knowledge' in the sense of knowledge based on the senses. It gives man power which should be subordinated to religion. If it is not subordinated to religion it is a satanic force. This knowledge is the first step to true knowledge as I have pointed out in 'Javid Noma'. The knowledge of truth is gained first through the senses and then through direct realization. Its ultimate stages cannot be encompassed within consciousness.

Knowledge which cannot be circumscribed within consciousness and which is the final stage of truth, is also called love or intuition<sup>240</sup> He emphasizes the sense perception as the first source of knowledge through which he sees the ultimate Reality. For him the reality shows itself in its own appearances and "man in his obstructing environment cannot afford to ignore the visible".<sup>241</sup> He awakes the people from their slumbers and asks them to get up and open their eyes and not to consider this necessitated world as mean.

Because "This world of colour and fragrance is worthy of contemplation. And in this green valley there are so many flowers awaiting

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<sup>239</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>240</sup> *Iqbal's Educational Philosophy*. M. Ashraf Lahore By K.G. SAIYIDAIN, 8th edition. 1977 pp. 88-89.

<sup>241</sup> *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Iqbal pp.14.

thy recreation”.<sup>242</sup> He replies to those who regard this world as of no value and use, that the spirit and the matter are not opposed entities, and that this world for him is not a torture hall where an elementally wicked humanity is imprisoned for an original act of sin”.<sup>243</sup> For him the ultimate Reality is spiritual and its life is wholly consisted in its temporal activity”. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material and secular... There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self- realization of spirit. All is holy ground”.<sup>244</sup> All this means that Iqbal strongly defends his views about the visible and concrete reality. He does not agree with the opinion that only man’s speculative and contemplative spirit will lead to the extent of the ultimate reality. And he does not encourage man’s (withdrawal) from the world of matter, since it is with its temporal flux and shifting phenomena, organically related to the ultimate reality”.

There is no possibility of thought emerging from concrete experience. On the contrary, one should take one’s start from here because it is the intellectual seizure of and power over the concrete that makes it possible for the intellect of man to pass beyond the concrete.<sup>245</sup> For he who does not see these signs in this life, will remain blind to the realities of the life to come. They are the manifestations of Divine effulgence and reflective observation leads into their ultimate nature and reveals the secret of Divine Reality”.<sup>246</sup> For him the “knowledge of nature is the knowledge of God’s behaviour”.<sup>247</sup> Iqbal believes in sense-perception, which he regards as the normal level of experience and he sees the ultimate Reality through sense-perception. Still he believes that the ultimate Reality is lying outside the normal level of experience, inaccessible to sense perception and pure reason. And for him the only question is whether the normal level is capable of yielding knowledge. Certainly not because the normal level (sense-perception and intellect) is not capable of approaching ultimate Reality parse.

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<sup>242</sup> *Rubaiyat of Iqbal*. by A.R. Tariq. Pb. Sh. Ghulam Ali & sons, Lahore 1973 p. 76.

<sup>243</sup> *The Reconstruction If Religious Thought in Islam*, p 85.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*. p. 155.

<sup>245</sup> *The place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal*: by DR. JAMILA KHATOON PP. 5.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid* p.5.

<sup>247</sup> *The Reconstruction*, p. 57.

For Iqbal “intellect merely lights the way but it is not itself a goal nor a destination”<sup>248</sup>. Kant is supposed to have ruined the importance and necessity of Pure Reason. Therefore he is still influential in the history of philosophy “as God’s greatest gift to his country”.<sup>249</sup> Iqbal says about Kant that “His Critique of Pure reason revealed the limitations of human reason and reduced the whole work of the rationalists to a heap of ruins”<sup>250</sup> But the approach of Kant to pure reason was based on his failure to see that thought in the very act of knowledge passes beyond its own finitude. The finitudes of nature are reciprocally exclusive not so the finitude of thought which is in its essential nature, incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned in the narrow circuit of its own individuality.

In the wide world beyond itself nothing is alien to it. It is in its progressive participation in the life of the apparently alien that thought demolishes the walls of its finitude and enjoys a potential infinitude. Its movement becomes possible only because of the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite, which keeps alive within it the flame of aspiration and sustains it in its endless pursuit. It is a mistake to regard thought as inconclusive, for it too in its way is a greeting of the finite with the Infinite”<sup>251</sup> The real problem for Iqbal was that he wanted to see religion garbed in the attire of rationalism.

In this regard he got some help from Whitehead an English philosopher and mathematician, who once said that “The ages of faith are the ages of rationalism”<sup>252</sup>. Iqbal believes that the attempt of doing so is not new, it has begun with the Prophet of Islam. The Prophet of Islam, in a broad sense, was himself the foundation of rational thinking in religion (Islam). Iqbal claims that “The search for rational foundation in Islam may be regarded to have begun with the Prophet himself. His constant prayer was: “God! grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things”<sup>253</sup>.

Let us not overlook the following sentence of Iqbal that “The birth of Islam is the birth of inductive intellect”<sup>254</sup>.

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<sup>248</sup> *Rubaiyat of Iqbal*. Rendered by A.R. TARIQ pb. Sh. Ghulam All & sons, 1973 P. 201.

<sup>249</sup> *The Reconstruction* PP. 5.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid* p. 5.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid* Pr. 6-7.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid* p. 2.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid* p. 3.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid*. P. 126.

As we have already mentioned Iqbal's epistemology is constructed on the pattern of Quranic epistemology, in which sense-perception and reason are the imitations to the acquisition of knowledge. These two sources are insufficient as far as the knowledge of the ultimate Reality is concerned. As a consequence they need to be completed by another source of knowledge, on which Iqbal, following the Quran, puts most emphasis. He identifies this source of knowledge with love (ISHQ) and intuition and religious experience. For him love, intuition, religious experience and prophetic revelation are just the same in their very nature. This kind of knowledge is direct, immediate and will unveil to him new spheres of illumination, wherein vistas of reality, comprehending Divine presence itself. In contrast, the knowledge yielded by intellect is fragmentary because it is involved in the labyrinth of space and time.

The Knowledge through intuition is not imparted partially and indirectly.

It is grounded in the deeper and higher self of man. "It is incorporeal and eternal and leads directly to the incorporeal and the eternal".<sup>255</sup>

The main characteristics of the mystic experience are the following:

1) The mystic experience is immediate experience. This kind of experience, Iqbal says, does not differ from other levels of human experience which supply data for knowledge. It gives the direct apprehension of ultimate Reality. Mystic experience or love or intuition apprehends the ultimate Reality as the sense-perception perceives the sensible reality. As regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense-data for knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God. The immediacy of mystic experience simply means that we know God just as we know other objects.

"God is not a mathematical entity nor a system of concepts mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience."<sup>256</sup>

2) The mystic experience is an unanalysable whole. This is a sort of giving reality an indivisible organic unity. As in normal experience innumerable data of experience fall into a single experience and selected data which fall into the order of space and time, will be referred to a certain

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<sup>255</sup> *The place of God man, and universe in the Philosophic system of Iqbal.* p. 9.

<sup>256</sup> *The Reconstruction*, p. 18.

sensible reality. But in mystic state, Iqbal says “that this kind of analysis of stupendous experience is not possible”. William James thinks the the mystic experience is some kind of mysterious faculty and having discontinuance with the normal consciousness. It is the same reality operating on us. It is unique, unanalysable and indivisible.

The ordinary rational consciousness, in view of our practical need of adaptation to our environment takes that reality piecemeal, selecting successively isolated sets of stimuli for response. The mystic state brings us into contact with the total passage of reality in which all the diverse stimuli merge into one another and form a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist”.<sup>257</sup>

3) The ultimate Reality is transcending, encompassing the whole universe. It is the unique other self or what Iqbal regards as the Ultimate Ego. And the mystic state is the moment of intimate association with this ultimate Reality or unique other self. This mystic state, Iqbal says, is highly objective. It is the unique other self transcending and encompassing the private personality of the finite individual.

Our experience of other minds is immediate and direct.<sup>258</sup>

4) Iqbal says that mystic experience cannot be communicated. Mystic experience is feeling rather than thought. The content of mystic or religious consciousness can be communicated to others in the form of propositions, but the content it self cannot be transmitted.

This kind of experience has two aspects a non-temporal and a temporal one. The non-temporal is feeling and the temporal is idea. Feeling is outward-pushing, as idea is outward reporting and no feeling is so blind as to have no idea of its own object. Every direction has some objective.

A feeling has some direction as an activity does, therefore feeling cannot be regarded without a direction.<sup>259</sup>

5) Iqbal says that this mystic experience, though it is intimately associated with the eternal, cannot break the relation with serial time.

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<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 18-19.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid* pp. 20-21.

Mystic state is related to the normal experience. And this is why Iqbal maintains that the “Mystic’s condemnation of intellect as an organ of knowledge does not really find any justification in the history or religion”<sup>260</sup>.

When this mystic experience is finished, it leaves a sense of authority behind it. This means that experience is experienced during a certain period. Though this period is not fixed (concerning its where and when). Once happened will “be fraught with infinite meaning for mankind”.<sup>261</sup>

Love or intuition means knowledge through the heart, wherein we have change but not success,- pure duration but not serial time. This experience which he also calls religious experience, is ranked among the other existing normal levels of experience. Iqbal says: “the facts of religious experience are facts among facts of human experience and in the capacity of yielding knowledge by interpretation one fact is as good as another”.<sup>262</sup>

What is a heart which is supposed to be the seat of love or religious experience? If love comes from the heart and intellect from the mind then we are authorized to raise a question: “What is the difference between heart and mind?”

Until now, we have heard of a dualism between mind and body but not of a battle between mind, body and heart. Still the question asked above suggests this three dimensional man. Actually heart and mind are the same; heart is the seat of loving and hating, thinking and doubting, cognition and feeling. For Bergson intuition (Love) is only a higher kind of intellect.<sup>263</sup> Al-Ghazzali, a mystical philosopher, defines heart in the following words “The first step to knowledge is to know that thou art composed of outward shape called body and the inward entity called the heart or soul. By heart I do not mean that piece of flesh situated in the left of our bodies, but that which uses all the other faculties as its instrument and servant. In truth, it does not belong to the visible world but to the invisible and has come into this world as a traveler visits a foreign country for the sake of merchandise and will

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<sup>260</sup> *Ibid* p. 22.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid* p. 23.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid* p. 16.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid* p. 3



presently return to his native land, It is the knowledge of this entity and its attributes which is the key to the knowledge of God”.<sup>264</sup>

Iqbal has put forward views about the meaning of the heart not different from those of Ghazzali or the Quran. For him (Iqbal) “The heart is a kind of inner intuition or insight which in the beautiful words of Rumi (a Persian mystic poet whom Iqbal considers his spiritual leader), feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of reality other than those open to sense-perception. It is, according to the Quran, something which “Sees” and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false. We must not however, regard it as a mysterious special faculty: it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part. Yet the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience”.<sup>265</sup>

The question is, why this kind of experience is not generally acknowledged by everybody in contrast to sense-perception for instance which is open to everybody. Why do people still consider it a mysterious kind of faculty? The answer to these questions is based on the fact that if all knowledge had come to heart in this easy way, the idea of seeking by reason would have gone to perdition. There would have been no empirical knowledge, no quest for the comprehension of this universe.

Everything derives from human seeking and struggle. Everything is based on the human desires. When you desire something you start seeking for it and your desiring and seeking for that something brings you in an intimation with it. As Iqbal asserts:

“Life is preserved by purpose

Because of the goal its caravan bell tinkles. Life is latent in seeking,

Its origin is hidden in desire.

Keep desire alive in thy heart,

Lest the little dust become a tomb.

Desire is the soul of this world of hue and scent.

The nature of everything is a store house of desire.

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<sup>264</sup> *Glimpse of Iqbal's Mind and Thought*, by H.H. Bilgrami 1966. p.50-55.

<sup>265</sup> *The Reconstruction*, pp. 15-16.

Desire sets the heart dancing in the breast.

And by its glow the breast is made bright as a mirror.

It gives to earth the power of soaring.

It is a Khidr to the Moses of perception.

From the flame of desire the heart takes life,

And when it takes life, all dies that is not true.

Then it refrains from forming desires,

Its pinion breaks and it cannot soar.

Desire keeps the self in perceptual uproar. It is a restless wave of the self's sea".<sup>266</sup>

The whole philosophy of Iqbal rests on the foundation of love. His work, especially his poetry, is the exhortation of love. And for him love is the ultimate, clear and distinct source of knowledge. He has shown to us that the Ego or self can be strengthened by the force of love. By love an ego can be made more lasting, more living, more burning and more glowing. Whatever disease exists in the mind of human beings, love can heal this sickness very easily and remove all the doubts there of. Iqbal defines love by asking:

“What is love? It is to hurl unity, At your heart like a thunderbolt and then to hurl your self at every obstacle”.<sup>267</sup>

And again some where else he defines it as follows:

“What is love? It is journeying without a break, transcending limits, ending ends. Love knows no ending, no finality; Its morning has no evening in its wake.

Its path like wisdom's has its turns and bends.

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<sup>266</sup> *The secret of the self*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>267</sup> *The New Rose Garden of mystery and the book of slaves* as mentioned above, p. 60.

But it goes forward instantaneously unerring”.<sup>268</sup>

Iqbal has at many places in his works compared love to reason. He says for instance:<sup>269</sup>

“A true Believer exists by “Love” and Love exits by his being  
Whatever is “impossible” for us. Is quite possible for “Love”  
“The only Substance with Reason Is “Fear” and “Doubt”.  
But a firm Faith and Determination Are indispensable to “Love”

“Reason says: “O Man

Be always happy.

And enjoy your Life to its Less

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<sup>268</sup> *The New Rose Garden of Mystery and the Book of Slaves* Trans. By M. Hadi Hussain, Pb. M. Ashraf, Lahore, 1969.

<sup>269</sup> *Secrets of collective life*. pp. 69-71.

But Love says:

Be obedient to God.

And then enjoy a perfect Freedom Reason's a knot-resolving slave, Faith  
mid convention's lard to grave, For in the breast there beats a heart, The  
unseen target of love's dart".<sup>270</sup>

Therefore this does not mean that Iqbal has fully demolished or belittled  
the value of reason.

Though he considers reason alone a satanic force which leads humanity  
astray still is a divine light if wedded with love. So reason and love together  
create a new world. This idea of Iqbal can be seen in the following verses:

“For westerner doth reason furnish all accoutrement of life and for the  
East love is the key of mystery.

Love-led can reason claim the lord and reason-lit love strikes from roots.

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<sup>270</sup> *Persian Psalms*. A J ARBERRY. Pb. M. Ashraf 1961, 14.

When integrated, these two, draw the pattern of a different World.

Let love and reason intermixed be to chart a world all new”.<sup>271</sup>

“If it be diversified from love.

Then knowledge is but satan’s progeny;

But if it blends with love, it joins the ranks of high celestial spirits. Love-bereft

All knowledge is but cold as death, the shaft of intellect its target fails to reach.

But let love’s sight restore a vision to one who is blind and so in darkness gropes;

And make a Hayder of this Bu-lahab”.

Both are in quest of the Ultimate Reality. Both are indispensable to each other as he indicates in his verse:

“Both are in quest of one abode

And both would lead upon the Road.

Reason tries every strategem,

But love pulls gently by the hem”.<sup>272</sup>

The same idea can be found in the following lines;<sup>273</sup>

“(both intuition and reason) are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek vision of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life”.<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>271</sup> *Pilgrimage of Eternity* by Sheikh Mehmud Ahmad. 1961. p. 54.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.* p. 66.

<sup>273</sup> *Persian psalms.* P. 14.

<sup>274</sup> *The Reconstruction.* P. 3.

# THE PORTRAIT OF AHMED SHAWQI

*(A Modern Egyptian Muslim Arabic Poet 1868-1932)*

Dr. Z. I. OSENI

The clash between the technologically advanced West and the culturally decadent Arab lands at the close of the 13th century C.E. brought in its wake radical changes in Egypt and other Arab countries. This clash was, at the outset, military. In his bid to fight the British in all fronts Napoleon Bonaparte of France invaded Egypt in 1798. Though his stay in Egypt was short-lived, it served as a fillip to cultural renaissance in Arab Lands. It dawned on the Arabs that for centuries they had been in a state of torpidity, and that the flag of learning and enlightenment had been snatched away from them by the West.

As a reaction to this reawakening there were internal changes in the area as well as attempts to imitate the West. The Muslim majority looked inwards and concluded that they were backward because they were not practicing Islam the way it ought to be practiced. The new environment produced pan-Islamic scholars like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, to name only two, whose revolutionary impact on Modern Muslims and their attitude to modernization is great<sup>275</sup>.

The changes also produced literary scholars and poets who were bent on ridding Arabic literature of the rigidity and decadence with which it had been afflicted for centuries since the fall of the Abbāsid Empire in 1258. Such scholars include Nāsif al-Yāzījī (1800-1871),

Ahmad Faris al-Shidyāq (1804-1887), Butrus al-Bustani (1819-83) Abdullāhī al Nadim (1844-1896), Ibrahim al-Muwaylihī (1845-1904) and his son Muhammad al-Muwaylihī (1868-1930), Marun al-Naqqash (1817-1855), Mahmud Sami al-Barudi (1839-1904), Hafiz Ibrahim (1871-1932) and Ahmad Shawqi.

This paper is essentially a study of the last mentioned personality, namely, Ahmad Shawqi. It is divided into four sections. The first one dwells

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<sup>275</sup> For a detailed account of the results of the clash between the West and the Arab world, see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798 - 1939*. (London, Oxford University Press, 1970).

on the life of the poet while the second section covers his literary works. These include his diwan (anthology) called al-Shawqiyyat, his poetic plays and his prose works. The third section treats the poet's attitude to religion, particularly Islam. The last section is the conclusion. Notes and references as well as an appendix containing the Arabic original of quoted extracts are given after the conclusion.

It is hoped that the article will throw some light on Ahmad Shawqi the African Arab Poet, his literary activities and his milieu. It is also hoped that it will help students of Arabic literature, literary historians and critics to understand more about the personage called Shawqi and his place in modern Arabic literature.

### **Ahmad Shawqi's Life**

Ahmad Shawqi is a well known modern Arabic poet among the neo-classicists who were bent on reviving the cherished traits of classical poetry after half a millennium of decadence (inhiyat) and rigidity (Jumud) in Arabic poetry.<sup>276</sup> Born in 1868 of fairly wealthy parents of mixed Arab, Turkish, Circassian and Greek origins, he was brought up in the modern secular schools of Egypt in addition to his Qur'anic training. After his secondary education in Egypt, he was sent to Europe by the Khedive 'Tawfiq,' ruler of Egypt (1879-92) to study law and literature. The poet was to spend two years in Montpellier and two years in Paris. On the day of his departure from Cairo, the Khedive gave him one hundred pounds and promised to pay him a sum of sixteen pounds monthly. He warned the Paris bound budding poet not to worry his parents whenever he needed money and that he was ready to take full responsibility of all his financial needs.<sup>277</sup> This undoubtedly had a great impact on the mind of Shawqi. Little wonder then that he showered his encomiums upon the Khedive and his successor, Abbās Hilmi (reigned 1892-1914) whose attitude towards the poet was not less favourable.

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<sup>276</sup> M. M. Badawi, *A Critical Introduction to Modern Arabic Poetry* (London, Cambridge University Press 1975), p. 29.

<sup>277</sup> Fu'ad Ifram al-Bustani, *Ahmad Shawqi, Al-Rawa'i XLVIII*, (Beirut, Catholic Press, 1959), p. iii.

When the poet returned to Egypt in 1891, he was appointed to a high office in the court and soon became the favorite bard of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi. As M.M. Badawi puts it:<sup>278</sup>

“He composed panegyrical poems on official occasion such as the anniversary of Abbas’s accession to the throne and expressed the Khedive’s official poetry in his poems praising the Ottoman Caliph or criticizing British policy in Egypt.”

In September 1894, Ahmad Shawqi was delegated to represent Egypt in the conference of Orientalists held in Geneva<sup>279</sup>. During the conference, the poet recited an elegant poem captioned “Kibar al-hawadith fi wadi al-Nil” (Great Events in the Nile valley), in such a brilliant manner that won him the hearts of his audience<sup>280</sup>. Thus much of the poet’s time “was consumed by his office at the court which he occupied for over twenty years, and which, although conferred prestige and power”<sup>281</sup> upon him as ‘shair al-Umara’ (poet of the princes) in Egypt, also cost him some of his freedom. Nevertheless, Shawqi tried at the same time to compose a multiplicity of poems which were outside the scope of his official functions.

When the first World War broke out in 1914, the British government prevented the Khedive, Abbas from entering Egypt. He was deposed in his absence while on a visit to the Ottoman Caliph in Istanbul. The action was due to the khedive’s known solidarity with the Ottoman government which was in alliance with Germany, Britain’s deadly foe<sup>282</sup>. Sultan Hasayn Kamil (1914-17) was appointed in his place. The British promptly annexed Egypt and declared it a protectorate.

Ahmad Shawqi’s attachment to the Khedival court and his sympathy for the Ottoman Caliphate were no secret. He could not pretend to be neutral, for his vituperative attacks on the British in his much publicized poetry were clear evidence of his stand. As a security measure, the British wanted to exile him to Malta in 1915, but some state dignitaries interceded for him; he was

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<sup>278</sup> Badawi, op.cit., p.29 Hanna al-Fakhuri, *Tarikh al-Adab al-Arabi* 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition Beirut, Matbaat al-Bulsiyyah, 1953), p. 984.

<sup>279</sup> Al-Bustani, op.cit., p.v.

<sup>280</sup> Badawi, op.cit., p.29.

<sup>281</sup> Al-Bustani, op. cit., p. ix

<sup>282</sup> Al-Fakhuri, op.cit., p.984.



then given the option to choose where he would like to be exiled to.<sup>283</sup> He chose Barcelona in Spain, and was promptly sent there in the company of his family. He was allowed to return to his home country towards the end of 1919.<sup>284</sup>

In Spain the poet's virtuosity was enhanced. He developed great interest in Spanish Arabic poetry, particularly that of Ibn Zaydun. He composed many poems on the past glory of the Arabs in the Iberian Peninsula and gave vent to his deep nostalgia for Egypt in meditative and highly emotional poetry.<sup>285</sup>

At the end of the war, the poet returned to Egypt. At this time he was no longer the partly restricted poet of the court. He became more and more attracted by the nationalist aspirations of his people. He, like Hafiz Ibrahim, became one of the mouth-pieces of Egyptian nationalists more especially in the 1919 insurrection by the youths against British imperialism.<sup>286</sup> Thus it was evident that Shawqi's exile to Spain was a blessing in disguise. He learnt much and perhaps, discovered his natural talents more than ever before, and strove vigorously to attain the title of Amir al-Shu'ara (the prince of poets). "Why should he not strive to attain such a coveted title?" one may ask. Was he not known as Shair al-Umara (the poet of princes) right from his youthful days as a poet laureate at the Khedival court? Have the Arabs not been saying that Kalam al-muluk muluk al-Kalam (the words of kings are the kings of words), and that adat al-sadat Sadat al-adat (the habits of masters are the masters of habits)?<sup>287</sup> This second phase of the poet's life was also noted for the writing of his poetic plays, the only exception being Ali Bayk al-Kabir (1893).<sup>288</sup>

The poet was married to a young lady from a well-to-do family. She brought a lot of wealth to the matrimonial home from her father. This further augmented his comfort and stability. He had three children by her; a girl,

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<sup>283</sup> Al-Bustani, op.cit., p.x.

<sup>284</sup> Badawi op.cit., p.29.

<sup>285</sup> See A. Hourani, op.cit., pp.193-244. A talented Egyptian novelist Najib Mahfuz (Naguib Mahfuz) has aptly fictionalized this period in his Bayn al-Qasrayn, the first of his Trilogy.

<sup>286</sup> Al-Bustani, op.cit., XLIX, p. xii.

<sup>287</sup> Badawi, op.cit., p.30

<sup>288</sup> Al-Fakhuri, op.cit., p.973.

Aminah, and two boys whom he named Ali and Husayn respectively.<sup>289</sup>

The poetic life of Shawqi's rose to its apogee in 1927 when a conference was held in Egypt by literary scholars from all over the Arab world, and the title of Amir al-Shuara' was conferred upon him. Long and impressive speeches were made to show how unparalleled the poet's position was in the art of Arabic poetry.<sup>290</sup> It was on that occasion that Hafiz Ibrahim, another talented Egyptian poet (1871-1932) described Shawqi thus:

“O Prince of rhymes, I've come to pay (you) homage and these are

The groups from the East who joined me in paying (you) homage”.<sup>291</sup>

Shawqi continued to enjoy an unmitigated flow of poetic inspiration and the adoration of Egyptians and other Arabs until his death in October 14<sup>th</sup>, 1932. Funeral citations were made in the Royal Opera House under the auspices of the Ministry of Education and a group of literary dignitaries. Many scholars from all over the Arab world were invited to the ceremony and the Egyptian monarch, King Fu'ad, was represented at the ceremony.<sup>292</sup>

### **SHAWQI'S LITERARY WORKS**

The poet's literary productions are many and varied. They include his al-Shawqiyyat (an anthology in four volumes), a number of poetic works on drama, an historical piece in verse and many prose works. Below is a brief introduction:

#### **1. The Shawqiyyat:**

The poet published the first volume of his poetry captioned al-Shawqiyyat in 1898.<sup>293</sup> His poems, like his contemporaries', generally

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<sup>289</sup> Abbas Hasan, *Al-Mutanabbi wa Shawqi wa Imarat al-Shier*. (Cairo, Dar al-Ma-arif, 1073), pp. 7-8, and 387 - 9.

<sup>290</sup> Al-Bustani, op.cit., XLIX, p. xii. One may question the sincerity of this declaration on the part of Hafiz Ibrahim in view of the reference to his disguised criticism of Shawqi's poetry in R.C. Ostle (ed.) *Studies in Modern Arabic Literature*. (London, S.O.A.S., University of London 1975) pp. 1-13. For the Arabic original of the verse, see the Appendix, Number 1.

<sup>291</sup> Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, *Tarikh al-Adab al-Arabi*. 21<sup>st</sup> Edition. (Cairo, Maktabah Nahdah Misr, n.d.) P. 501.

<sup>292</sup> I have not been able to obtain a copy of this edition. Shakib Arslan, a close friend of Ahmad Shawqi, suggested the title al-Shawqiyyat to the author.

<sup>293</sup> See Ostle op.cit., p. 3.

appeared first in the newspapers, magazines and journals of the time such as al-Ahram, al-Mu 'ayyad, al-Liwa, al-Majallat al-Misriyyah, Ukaz, and al-Zuhur.<sup>294</sup> It was much later that his selected works were published in four volumes called al-Shawqiyat.

In the new edition of volume I of al-Shawqiyat (1925) which was introduced by Dr. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, the most spectacular poems in this collection of sixty-one poems are Kibar al-hawadith fi wadi al-Nil (Important Events in the Nile Valley), Sada al-harb (the Echo of War), and Nahj al-Burdah (in the manner of the Mantle) which is a eulogy of the Prophet Muhammad meant to be read during the Mawlid al- Nabi celebrations.<sup>295</sup>

Treated in this part also are socio-political and historical themes such as poems on Mustafa Kamil's victory over the Greek, a lamentation of the abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kamal of Turkey, a halt at the graveside of Napoleon Bonaparte, and a poem entitled al-Andalus al-Jadidah (The New Spain).

The second volume of the Diwan (1930) contains one hundred and seven poems arranged under three headings: (a) al-Wasf (descriptive poems), (b) al-Nasib (elegiac reminiscence at the beloved one's deserted encampments), and (c) Mutafarriqat (miscellaneous odes).<sup>296</sup> Poems in each section are arranged alphabetically. Conspicuous among the poems in this part are

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<sup>294</sup> Badawi, op. cit., p. 30

<sup>295</sup> Mawlid al-Nabi is the celebration of the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) which is observed every year all over the Muslim world. In composing his Nahj al-Burdah, Shawqi imitated the celebrated panegyric composed by Muhammad al-Busiri for the Prophet Muhammad which is called al-Burdah (the Mantle). The title is said to have been taken from the mantle which was given to al-Busiri in a dream by the Prophet when he was afflicted with paralysis. After the receipt of the mantle, he was miraculously healed. This is how his eulogy for the Prophet which he captioned "al-Kawakib al-Durriyyah fi Madh Khayr al-Barriyyah" came to be known as al-Burdah. It should be recalled that originally the Prophet gave a mantle of his to Kab b. Zuhayr b. Abi Sulina, a young poet of his time who first satirized him and later composed the famous Banat Su'd to praise the Prophet. See art. "Burdah" in The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition. Vol. I (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1960) p. 1314. Ahmad Shawqi dedicated his own poem to "our master, al-Hajj Abbas Hilmi II" to commemorate the Khedive's holy pilgrimage to Mecca in 1909. Al-Bustani, op.cit., XLIX, p. v.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid. p. vi.

“Ayat al-asr fi sama’ Misr” (the sign of the Time in the sky of Egypt), “al-Busfur Ka-annaka tara-hu” (The Bosphorus as if you are seeing it), “al-Siniyyat al-Andalusiyyah” (The Andalusian Ode in S-Rhyme), and “Khada’uha” (They Deceived Her). Paregyrical poems have been omitted from this part, but the *nasib*, as has been mentioned, remains. It is here that one finds Shawqi’s famous elegant verse which summarizes a typical love story:

“A look, then a smile and greeting Followed by talking, dating, and then meeting”.<sup>297</sup>

This volume of the Shawqiyyat also contains “Marra’ al-Lurd Kitshinar” (The Fall of Lord Kitchener), “al-Nasr al-Misri” (The Egyptian Eagle), and Saqr Quraysh (the Hawk of Quraysh) which is a story about Abd al-Rahman al-Dakhil in strophic Andalusian verse.<sup>298</sup>

In 1936, the third volume of the poet’s anthology was published; this contains fifty-nine elegiac poems. It was befitting tribute to Ahmad Shawqi that his elegies on notable personalities both in the Arab and Western worlds were published in one volume four years after his demise. These elegies follow the traditional pattern, and the bard’s neo-classicist proclivities are glaringly noticeable here as in many other genres of Arabic poetry he treated. Some of the elegies are on people like Hafiz Ibrahim, Said Zaghlul, Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Abduh, Qasim Amin, Jurji Zaydan, Victor Hugo, Tolstoy, Verdi, Tharwat Pasha, Yaqub Sarraf, Sultan Husayn Kamil, al-Manfaluti, Butrus Ghali, and the poet’s own mother who died when he was away in Spain.<sup>299</sup>

The fourth volume appeared in 1943. The 129 poems in this volume are classified under the following headings:

- (a) Mutafriqat fi al-siyasah wa al-tarikh wa al-ijtima (Miscellaneous poems on political, historical and social issues);
- (b) Al-Khususiyyat (personal notes);
- (c) Al-Hakayah (Fables);<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> The Arabic original of this verse is in the Appendix, Number 2.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid., pp. vi - vii.

<sup>299</sup> Badawi, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>300</sup> The fables are fifty-four in number, and contain 709 verses covering sixty-five pages of the fourth volume of al-Shawqiyyat pp. 94-158. See Z.I. Oseni, “Sources of Ahmad Shawqi’s Fables in verse,” NATAIS: Journal of the Nigerian Association of Teacher of Arabic & Islamic Studies, Vol. II no. 2 Dec., 1981, p. 54.

- (d) Diwan al-Atfal (Children's Anthology);
- (e) Min Shir al-siba (Of childhood verses), and
- (f) Mahjubiyyat (Light-hearted poems on his good friend, Dr. Mahjub Thabit)<sup>301</sup>

In 1961, a scholar named Muhammad Sabri published two further volumes entitled "Al-Shawqiyat al-Majhulah" (the Unknown Shawqiyat), but the authorship of some of the poems in the book, according to Dr. M.M. Badawi, has not yet been established beyond all doubt.<sup>302</sup> Until the authenticity of the volume's content is proved, by further research, let us be contented for now with the known shawqiyat.

## 2. Shawqi's Other Poetical Works

Besides the Shawqiyat, the poet published the following plays in verse:

- (a) Ali Baykaw ma hiya Dawlat al-Mamalik (1893), the revised version of which was published as 'Ali Bayk al-Kabir ("Ali Bey the Great) in 1932)
- (b) Masra Kilyubatrah (The Fall of Cleopatra), 1929<sup>303</sup>
- (c) Qambiz (Cambyses), 1931.
- (d) Majnun Layla (1931) which is a dramatisation of the well-known desert romance of Qays narrated in al-Isbaharu's Kitab al-Aghani.<sup>304</sup>
- (e) Antar (1932). This deals with the ancient Arabic romance of love and chivalry.
- (f) Al-Sittah Huda (a one-verse comedy about a contemporary Egyptian lady). This was published long after the poet's death.

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<sup>301</sup> It should be noted that in this study, the editions of al- Shawqiyat used are later ones volumes I & II are bound together in one book (Cairo, Matba't al-Istiqamah, 1958) while volumes III & IV are also bound together in another volume (Cairo, Matbaat al- Istiqamah, 1956)

<sup>302</sup> Badawi, op. cit., p. 30. See also Ahmad al-Hufi, Al-Islam f i Shir Shawqi. (Cairo, The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs of Egypt, 1972) pp. 8-9 where some poems which are not in al-Shawqiyat are quoted. The poems were earlier published in Egyptian magazines. All these findings further attest the greatness of this poet.

<sup>303</sup> A study of this play had been undertaken in M.A. Bidmus, "Masra' Kilyubatrah of Ahmad Shawqi - A literary study and an English Translation", an unpublished M.A. Degree Project (Ibadan, Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan, September, 1980).

<sup>304</sup> This work has been studied and evaluated in B.A. Omotoso, "Majnun Layla of Ahmad Shawqi: Its place in modern Arabic Literature," an unpublished B.A. Hons. Degree long essay. (Ibadan, Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan, June 1968).

In addition to the above plays in poetic form, the poet wrote and published a historical work in verse. The book is captioned *Duwal al-Arab Wa Uzama' al-Islam* (The Arab States and the Notable of Islam). This work saw the light of the day after the poet's death.

### 3. Shawqi's Prose Works

Ahmad Shawqi is known all over the Arab world as a poet who tried his hand at every imaginable poetic theme known in Arabic literature. In addition to his undying fame as a poet, he wrote the following five prose romances:

- (a) *Adhra al-Hind* (1897). This work introduces the reader to the ancient history of Egypt.
- (b) *Ladiyas* (1899). This romance is about the last of the Pharaohs of Egypt.
- (c) *Shaytan Binta'ur* (1899); this was published in *al-Majallat al-Misriyyah*.
- (d) *Waraqat al-As* (1904). This work has less rhyming prose than others. It treats ancient history as far back as the time of Sabur, the King of Persia.<sup>305</sup>
- (e) The poet also wrote an ornate work of rhyming prose entitled *Aswaq al-Dhahab* (the Markets of Gold). The book appeared in 1932. It contains articles in which the writer<sup>306</sup> expressed his views on topics like freedom, the nation, Suez Canal, the pyramids, death, the unknown soldier, etc. It also contains proverbs and aphorisms some of which are drawn from Shawqi's personal experience.<sup>307</sup> The title of the book reminds one of al-Zamakhshari's work *Atwaq al-Dhahab* (The Collars of Gold) which is a classical collection of proverbs written in the early part of twelfth century C.E.
- (f) He also wrote a play in prose captioned *Amirat al-Andalus* (The Princes of Andalusia), 1932. The events in the play are said to have happened in Spain & Morocco in the eleventh century C.E.<sup>308</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> Al-Fakhuri, op. cit., p. 987.

<sup>306</sup> Badawi, op. cit., p. 30

<sup>307</sup> Al-Fakhuri, op. cit., p. 988.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid., p. 1021.

### III Islam in Shawqi's Works.

Islam as a religion and way of life influenced the poet greatly in his literary works. He was learned in Islamic Studies such as the Qur'an, Sirah (the biography of the Prophet Muhammad) and the Hadith (the Traditions of the Prophet P.B.U.H.). Shawqi's knowledge of these branches of Islamic Studies was not just a superficial one'. Rather his Shawqiyyat are replete with Islamic elements which portray his Islamic background. In the poems which are specifically devoted to the Prophet Muhammad, e.g. Nahj al-Burdah - a poem of 190 verses composed in 1910; Dhikr al-Mawlid (1911) which contains 99 verses; and al-Hamziyyat al-Nabawiyyah (1912) which contains 131 verses, the poet's deep knowledge of the Sirah of the Prophet is indubitably established. In these works, Shawqi showered all imaginable praises upon the Prophet in a manner that equaled the renowned al-Busiri's. Take for instance the following verses from Nahj al-Burdah:

The full moon is beneath you in beauty and honour

And the sea is below you in goodness and generosity;

The mountain's heights become low when you measure yourself against it;

And whenever you compete with the bright stars you win.

The lion in its daring enterprise is below you in courage,

When you walk up to a man armed to the teeth.

The hearts of heroes and stalwarts yearn to you

Even when you cause them to bleed during the war.

5. God has indeed put His love and honour on the son of Aminah in all encounters.

Your face amidst dust is like the full moon of the night, shining whether covered or not;

A full moon rising at Badr: its light is comparable to the light of victory which illuminates the darkest of nights.

You're mentioned in the Qur'an as a (lonely) orphan as a mark of respect

For the value of a hidden pearl is in its (lonely) uniqueness.

While God shared people's sustenance amongst them

God you were given the choice of sustenance and shares.

10 If you say 'No' or 'Yes' about any matter,

God's choice will be the 'No' or 'Yes' emanating from you.

Your brother, Jesus, raised a dead man to life

While you gave life to generations from decay.

Ignorance is death; if you're given a miracle

Raise (people) from ignorance or from the tomb.<sup>309</sup>

In his humble conclusion of Nahj al-Burdah, Shawqi says:

If my sins are too enormous to forgive, I have hope

In God which put me under the best protector;

And I meet my request as the protector is dear to Him,

Who removes all anxieties and grief's in the two worlds.<sup>310</sup>

The poet believed very strongly in God and did not fail to express this unshakable belief in his poems<sup>311</sup> He also loved Islam very much and tried not to compromise his faith whatever be the situation. Hence he regarded Islam as the seal of religion thus:

“Those are the signs of the Criterion which God sent as light and by it guides whomsoever He wills.

The signs abrogated the way of the Prophets

And Apostles as light overshadows lesser lights.”<sup>312</sup>

The poet was not, however, an Islamic fanatic; he composed poems to eulogize Jesus as a prophet of God. An example is:

“Jesus, your way is mercy and love,

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<sup>309</sup> Ahmad Shawqi, al-Shawqiyyat, I, p. 241. For the Arabic original see the Appendix, Number 3.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., I, p. 244. For the Arabic original see the Appendix, Number 4.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid, I, pp. 10 and 30 and II, pp. 36 and 120.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid, I, pp. 15 and 24. See the Arabic original in the Appendix, Number 5.



Purity and peace in the universe.

You were neither a shedder of blood

Nor a man who looked down on the weak and orphans. “<sup>313</sup>

He attacked the followers of Jesus who were belligerent and oppressive, and reminded them that their ways were different from Jesus’ own. He says:

“Jesus and his disciples wash their hands of them;

Could the followers of the compassionate Jesus be harsh? They’re hostile to a religion, not to an empire;

Their pretension and complaint are false.”<sup>314</sup>

Thus Shawqi made sure that he did not overstep the bounds of Islam in his eulogy of Jesus. He pleased the Copts and the Christian Arabs as well as his Muslim brothers. Perhaps, his education in Europe and his contacts with many people from different climes and faiths contributed to this much liberal attitude in his consideration of Christianity.<sup>315</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> Ibid, I, p. 287 - See the Arabic original in the Appendix, Number 6.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid, I, p. 188. See the Arabic original in the Appendix, Number 7.

<sup>315</sup> See al-Fakhuri, op. cit., p. 1001 and Badawi, op. cit., p. 40

Nevertheless, the poet saw the Sultan of Turkey as the symbol of Islam and consequently eulogized the Ottoman Caliphs in Istanbul in a number of poems. Addressing a Caliph he says:

“You’re always the Refuge of Religion and the Guide

By whom we intimately move near to God”<sup>316</sup>

This explains why he was shocked to the marrow when Mustafa Kamal (Attaturk) abolished the Caliphate in 1924 in an attempt to modernize Turkey along European lines. Shawqi lamented the abolition passionately in a poem entitled *Khilafat al-Islam*.<sup>317</sup>

He composed beautiful lines on Salah (formal prayer), Zakah (poor-rate), and Siyam (fasting), and practised them with zeal in his life-time. In his *Aswaq al-Dhahab* he describes Salah as follows:

If it were not the head of acts of worship, it would have been regarded as a righteous religious act, an exercise of the body, purification of clothes, a means of baring the emotion, and (a pointer to) various good qualities on which young girls and boys should grow.<sup>318</sup>

The poet was generous and paid his Zakah and even exceeded the normal

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<sup>316</sup> See al-Shawqiyat I, pp. 92, 108 and 198 and II, p. 39. See also a poem entitled “Dajj al-Hajj” with which he appealed to the Caliph Abd al-Hamid to deal with the Sharif (ruler) of Mecca, Aʿn al-Rafiq’ who terrorized innocent pilgrims in 1904. Ibid, I, p. 254. See also al-Hufi, op. cit., pp. 172-3. For the Arabic original of the above line, see the Appendix, Number 8.

<sup>317</sup> Al-Shawqiyat, I, p. 106.

<sup>318</sup> Al-Hufi, op. it., pp. 40-41. For the Arabic original of this passage see the Appendix, Number 9.

rate to express his gratitude to God for His grace and mercy.<sup>319</sup>

In spite of his religious disposition, one is not suggesting that Shawqi was a perfect Muslim. The poet used to drink wine and has a number of Bacchanalian verses in his Diwan.<sup>320</sup>

One finds it difficult to defend the poet on this issue, especially if one recognise the fact that he advised workers not to take alcohol.<sup>321</sup> This is the same poet who, despite his picturesque poem on pilgrimage to Mecca captioned *Ila Arafat Allah* (to God's Arafat) in which he piously discussed the pilgrimage, and petitions God to have mercy on His servants, refused to perform the holy pilgrimage in 1911 when the Khedive asked him to accompany him in the holy journey. He never performed this obligatory duty in his life.<sup>322</sup> It is said that he dreaded riding on a camel and that, this is why he did not follow the Khedive to Mecca.<sup>323</sup> One must emphasis the indefensibility of Shawqi's act here. In view of the Khedive's exalted position, no Hajj could be more comfortable to the poet than accompanying him to Mecca. He looked for excuses and failed to perform the Hajj but went to spend his summer holiday in Europe and Lebanon almost every year until his death in 1932.<sup>324</sup>

As a versatile artist, he frequented social gatherings, cinema and dance houses. But as he advanced in age, his appetite for these fleeting things decreased.<sup>325</sup> In his last days, he had dramatically cut down his hedonistic engagements. He contented himself with the study of Islamic religious books such as al- Ghazali's and repented fervently for his past indulgences.<sup>326</sup>

## CONCLUSION

To sum up, Ahmad Shawqi has proved through his poetic experimentation

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<sup>319</sup> This was confirmed by his close friend, Shakib Arslan. Ibid pp. 41 and 44. In the *Shawqiyat* I, p. 26, the poet refers to Zakah as a socialistic element which God introduced through Islam.

<sup>320</sup> *Al-Shawqiyat*, I, p. III and II, p. 8, 92 and 145.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid. I, p. 95

<sup>322</sup> Al-Hufi, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid.

<sup>324</sup> Al-Fakhuri, op. cit., p. 984.

<sup>325</sup> Ahmad al-Iskandari et al, *Al-Mufasssal fi tarikh al-Adab al-Arabi*, Book II. (Cairo, Ministry of Education, n.d. P. 284.

<sup>326</sup> Al-Hufi, op. cit., p. 11.

in Arabic that the language is capable of expressing almost everything under the sun appropriately. He used the classical language to express modern terms and this he did admirably.

He is known in modern Arabic literature as Amir al-Shuara, (the prince of poets) whose poetry is more comprehensive than any other poet's - both past and present-as far as the Arabic language is concerned.<sup>327</sup> There is no doubt that in addition to his poetic virtuosity, his contact with some other cultures, particularly French and English, helped him in no small measure to widen his horizon and fertilise his ideas. A close look at the second section of this paper reveals his versatility in the poetic art though owing to space economy, it has not been possible to give elaborate illustrations of the various themes on which he composed. The ease with which he described modern inventions like the aeroplane in his poetry while using old Arabic idioms, for example, is fascinating.

Shawqi proved in his works that he was a threnodist, eulogist, didactic poet, social critic, outspoken politician, bucolic singer, bacchanalian bard, fabulist, writer of juvenile stories, play-wright, historian, and Islamic Scholar with a bias to the field of Sirah (biography of the Prophet Muhammad P.B.U.H.). Indeed his emergence as a poet marked the maturation of modern Arabic poetry, a phenomenon whose foundation was laid by literary figures like Nāsif al-Yazīji, Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq and al-Barudi in the early years of the renaissance of Arabic literature.

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<sup>327</sup> Abbas, Hasan, op. cit., pp. 7-8 and 387-9.

(١) أمير القوافي قد أتيه مبايعا وهدي جموع الشرق قد بايعت معي  
 (٢) نظرة فانتسامة فسلام فكلام فموعد فللقار  
 (٣) البدر دونك في حسن وفي شرف والبدر دونك في خير وفي كرم

شم الجبال إذا طاولتها انخفضت والأخيم الزهرما واستمرتا تسهم  
 والبث دونك بأما عند وثبته إذا مشيت إلى شاكي السلاح كمى  
 تهفو إليك - وإن أدميت حبثها في الحرب - أفئدة الأبطال والبهم  
 محبة الله ألقاها وهيبته على ابن آمنة في كل مصطدم  
 كأن وجهك تحت النقع بدر دجى يضيئ ملتثما أو عبر ملتثم  
 بدر تطلع في بدر فغرت كفرة النصر تجلو دجى الظلم  
 ذكرت باليتم في القرآن مكرمة وقيمة الأولئ المكنون في اليتيم  
 الله قسم بين الناس رزقهم وأنت خيرت في الأرزاق والقسم  
 إن قلت في الأمر لا أوقلت فيه نعم فخيرة الله في لأمك أو نعم  
 أخوك عيسى دما ميتا فقام له وأنت أحييت أجيالا من الرمم  
 والجعل موت ملن أوتية معبرة فابعث من الجهل أو فابعث من الرمم

(٤) لأن جل ذنبى عن الغفران لى أمل في الله يجعلنى في خير معتصم  
 ألقى رجائى لدا عز الجير على مفرج الكرب في الدارين والغم

(٥) تلك أي الفرقان أرسلها الله ضياء يهدى به من يبتلى  
 نسفت سنة النبیین والرسل كما ينسخ الضياء الضياء

(٦) عيسى سبيلك رحمة ومحبة في العالمين وعصمة وسلام  
 ما كنت سفاك الدماء ولا امرأ هان الضعاف عليه والأيتام

(٧) تبرأ عيسى منهم وصحابه أتباع عيسى ذى الحنان جفاة ؟  
 يعادون ديننا لا يعادون دولة لقد كذبت دعوى لهم وشكاة

(٨) فلا زلت كفف الدين والهادى الذى إلى الله بالزلفى له نتقرب

(٩) لولم تكن رأس العبادات لعدت من صالحة العبادات رياضة  
 الأبدان طهارة الأبدان تهذيب وجدان وشدة فضايل

# PSYCHE: A TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE

## PART III

NAUMANA UMAR

In the previous chapters, we have discussed the six greatest traditions of the world in reference to their views on psyche. We have attempted thus to present what amounts to a traditional view of psyche. But this attempt can not be complete unless we compare these different perspectives and their respective theories. In the following pages we will endeavour to do precisely that.

In the introduction, we had mentioned a -common characteristic shared by all traditions which became the criteria and excuse for treating them jointly. Now comparing them one is again struck by the significance of this criteria. For as must be apparent by now, under the apparent multiplicity and variety, of forms which these tradition assume there lies a startling similarity which one cannot help noticing. As soon as the study of a specific tradition is started the same views begin to emerge; one comes across similar concepts and identical principles. It is as if one basic story is being told, over and over again with new names, and places, each time in different styles and languages, or a play being enacted repeatedly with a fresh cast and new setting each time but keeping essentially to the same theme. So much so that by the end of it one knows the whole story by heart. This by no means guarantees that viewer has understood this too symbolic a story. It is far too elusive for comprehension; all one can grasp is an overall picture or outline. To supply this picture with details, would require another study, tenfold the volume of this work and yet it would be incomplete. Such is the nature nature of the topic which we attempted to study and yet the gist of it can be explained in one short sentence:

“He is the Self within and without; yea, within and without.  
(UPANISHAD).

“He is the first and the Last and the Outward and the Inward and He knows infinity all things”.

Quran.

(LVII,3)

or

“For the kingdom of Heaven, may rather the king of Heaven is within you”.

(PSALMAS)

or

“In truth I say to you that within this fathom high body ...lies the world and the rising of the world and the ceasing of the world.

(THE BUDDHA)

One could go on endlessly. But the point is made. All sacred traditions, based on revelation, point towards one direction; and that is the direction of the Divine, the Absolute, the One. They see God as the ultimate reality and the cosmos as theophany. To see the cosmos as theophany is to see the reflection of the one self in the cosmos and its form. As Dante has described in the depth I saw in gathered bound by love in one single volume, that which is dispersed in leaves throughout the universe: Substances and accidents and their relations, as though fused together in such a way that what I tell is but a simple light!

It is this vision of reality which the traditional societies held which penetrated all activities and was projected in all sciences, arts, crafts, artifacts, patterns of life etc. Apart from the spiritual man to whom this vision was directly available through the intellect, the average man was constantly reminded of it through the sacred forms which surrounded him serving as symbols of Reality and revealed wisdom was available to him in the form of sacred scriptures as well as in sciences which studied cosmos as a theophany; as the theophany of that Reality which resides at the centre of the being itself.

The traditional sciences while studying nature and natural laws in the cosmos always remained aware of the essential unity of all phenomena as manifestation of the One Reality and of the harmony between the physical, subtle and spiritual realms of being which make the life of the cosmos possible. The ultimate Reality which is both Being and supra-being is at once transcendent and immanent. It is beyond everything, and at the very heart and centre of man's soul. Scientia sacra can be expounded in the language of

one as well as the other perspective. It can speak of God or Godhead, Allah, the Tao, Brahma, or even Nirvana as being beyond the world, or forms or samsara, while asserting ultimately that Nirvana is samsara and samsara, nirvana. But it can also speak of the Supreme self, of Atman compared to which all objectivization is maya. They were able to see unity in multiplicity. One could say that they possessed knowledge of essential principles and absolute realities which is totally absent from modern sciences, since it has lost sight of the wisdom contained in revelation. It is easy to see how various traditions coincide in their view of a reality. The Divine Essence, Self, Brahma, Tao or primordial One is manifested at various levels of Being, (recall five Divine presences of God according to the sufi doctrine).

The law fundamental to all sacred sciences is the law of correspondence between hierarchial levels of being. As we have had the occasion to see in the course of this study, this law is, applied everywhere, together with the law of inverted analogy. This same law can be seen working behind the traditional doctrine of correspondence between man and the cosmos. To be sure, the image of man as depicted in various traditions has not been identical. Some have emphasized the human state more than the other (the example of the former could be Christianity and Islam), and envisaged the eschatological realities differently. But there is no doubt that all the traditions studied here, agree upon the centre and origin of man and see his end in a state which is other than his terrestrial life. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the traditional doctrine of man is based, in one way or the other, on the concept of primordial man as the source of perfection, the total and complete reflection of the Divinity and the archetypal reality containing the possibilities of cosmic existence itself. Man is the model of the universe because he is himself the reflection of these possibilities in the principal domain which manifested themselves as the world. The world is not seen as the reflection of man qua man but of man as being himself the total and plenary reflection of all those Divine qualities whose reflections comprise the manifested order albeit in a scattered manner.

The situation of man as a bridge between Heaven and Earth is reflected in all of his being and his faculties. Metaphysically speaking man has his archetype in that primordial 'perfect' and universal being of man who is the



mirror of the Divine Qualities and Names and the prototype of creation. In Islam the correspondence between man, the cosmos and the creator is central to the whole religion. As the Quran says “we shall show them our signs upon the horizon and in their souls ----” Not only is man a part of the cosmos, he is a cosmos in himself, a microcosm. The levels of cosmic reality, correspond in man to spirit, (Infinite), psyche (intermediate) and body (terrestrial/material).

The traditional sciences have spoken at length about the inner structure and faculties of man as well. On the first level of understanding the human microcosm, one must take into consideration the tripartite nature of the human being consisting of spirit, soul. and body - the Spiritus, anima and corpus of Hermetism and Grecian thought and Ruh, nafs and jasad of Muslim psychology. Whereas in Hinduism we find the distinction of Shatula sarira (subtle body) and suksanasaria (gross body) whereas jivatma is the living soul as manifestation of universal Atma. However, in contrast to this we do not find the concept of a supreme entity in Buddhism but void takes the place of Divine Principle and Nirvana as prototype of the soul, and consciousness as totality of psychic functions as well as spiritual awareness.

Buddhi, Intellect, Logos and ‘Aql are four words signifying the same faculty that is intuitive intellect in man. It is at the same time, a transcendent faculty. whereas reason is bound to the psychic realm. Sankhya psychology has attributed the power of decision, resolution and will to Buddhi whereas in the Islamic sciences, will is the noblest of man’s faculties yet it is not a part of ‘Aql or Intellect.

Almost all traditions have elevated the function of Buddhi and attributed it to heart, similarly heart is also the seat of emotion and desire, and mind is only assigned to a second place. Centre of our consciousness or egoic consciousness is also not mind or brain but our spirit which is the centre of our self. Buddha compares mind to a bird, flying at different levels or to monkey who jumps from branch to branch. Whereas heart, as the seat of Buddha, is peaceful, and tranquil.

Prana or vital spirit (ar-ruh) is another concept which we find in almost all traditions. One thing must be kept in mind, the similarities that we see between Hermetism, Greek thought and Islam are also due to the fact that

Islam and Greeks have been greatly influenced by the former. However, a later tradition borrows from an earlier one only what fits the frame-work of it's essential principles. Islam has done the same and Islamic sciences are richer for that.

The human body consists of three basic elements: the head, the body, and the heart. The heart which is the invisible centre of the both subtle and the physical body, is the seat of intelligence and the point which relates the terrestrial human state to the higher states of being. In the heart, knowledge and being meet and are one. the head and body are like projections of the heart: the head whose activity is associated with the mind is the projection of the intellect of the heart, and the body is the projection of being.

Man also possesses numerous internal faculties, a memory which has an every day and a sacred function, an imagination which has the power to create forms corresponding to cosmic realities and plays a central role in religious life. Man's gift of speech is a manifestation of the Logos which shines in his heart at the existential level and enables him to voice the word of God (Kalimah).

It is evident from what has been discussed so far that man is seen as a tripartite being by all traditions. The psyche is his subtle self but not the total subtle self. The highest or deepest level of man's self is his spirit or Intellect which is normally not available to his consciousness. In previous chapter we had broached the issue of the unconscious. Now we will try to explain it:

In our discussion of the consciousness, we have seen that Guenon has attributed a far greater ability of extension to the human consciousness than it is normally thought to possess. Dreams, since they belong to the psychic realm, and organic consciousness, both are thought to be extensions of consciousness., since the psyche is reabsorbed in the universal psychic realm during sleep it perceives the forms inherent in this realm and is conscious as far as it's pure consciousness is concerned; it is only in reference to the sensible world that it has suspended or withdrawn it's functions. As explained earlier, the psychic realm is prone to influences of infernal as well as angelic forces and dreams are penetrated by both kinds of contents. Notwithstanding those dream-contents which are mainly formed of memory or

personal experiences, if we presume that all other dream contents come from the unconscious, then, unconscious necessarily comprises of divine as well infernal impulsions. In this regard, T. Burckhardt says that there are some psychic “events” whose repercussions traverse all the degrees of the subtle world “vertically”, sine they touch the essences; others are the ordinary psychic movements that only obey the “horizontal” coming and going of the psyche; lastly there are those that derive from the sub-human depths (here we must remember that some medieval cosmologists place the hells symbolically between heaven and earth). The first of these do not lend themselves entirely to expression - they include an element of “mystery” - and yet the forms which they evoke occasionally in the imagination are clear and precise such as those characterizing the sacred arts (calligraphy, music etc). The third kind, the demoniac “inspirations” are unintelligible by their very forms, as well as obscure.

Hence it follows that the influences from these two dimensions can penetrate the psyche anytime and they are equivalent to what is called the unconscious by psychoanalysis, but only in one sense. Freud did not recognize the angelic inspirations or the positive side of the unconscious. Burckhardt explains further that there is a distinction between, on the one hand, a more or less darksome layer of consciousness lying beneath every day consciousness (which layer in any case cannot be completely unconscious in that it some how does enter consciousness) and on the other hand, the true, purely passive and thus in itself unformed, ground of the soul. The darksome layer which was referred to is filled with the sediments of psychic impressions and behavioral modes. The true ground of the soul on the other hand is in itself neither dark nor light nor it is a brooding volcano of irrational eruptions. On the contrary, when it is not completely veiled, it can mirror it's complementary pole, the universal spirit, and the truths reaching from the realm of the spirit that sometimes acquire the form of symbols.

Hence we have seen that psyche receives influences from it's lower as well higher realms; from sub-human depths as well as from the spirit.

Now coming back to the concept of the unconscious, what can be inferred is that among the two poles or realms that encroach the psyche, spirit is said to be the core of being but man is not conscious of it nor it can reach it in any way except through the intellect. It is as Eckhart says “something in

the soul which is uncreated and uncreatable". Spirit is like a lamp and when the lampshade becomes dusty its light is only dimly seen by others. Huston Smith points out that spirit is actually the part of ourselves which can be called unconscious. He calls it the sacred unconscious.

Jung: We have been discussing traditional sciences and their doctrines on psyche, and we have found out that it is perceived as an intermediate or border line are between the spirit and body and which partakes of both and is connected to them; to the former through intellect and wham, to the latter through the sense faculties. It perishes with the body in the terms of sense faculties but that part of the soul which is attached to the spirit survives independently of the body after the dissolution of the body. It has the functions of knowledge, being and action, which it carries out through its sense faculties <sub>A</sub> (internal as well as external). Brain is not the seat of intellect as is generally thought but heart which is to other senses what sun is to the other planets. So far we have found out that traditional sciences bear a concept of the psyche, entirely their own and as is obvious, contrasts sharply with the theories of modern psychology. We would not venture into the detailed comparative analysis, which is a study of its own, but merely point out the important ways in which hypotheses of modern psychology differs or agrees (whatever may be the case) with the traditional psychology. Among the trends of modern psychology we are mainly concentrating on the Jungian theory with passing reference to other systems. As mentioned earlier the most fundamental chasm that separates two approaches to the psyche is their view of man or rather, one should say, their view of the ultimate reality. Whereas traditional thought treats man as a manifestation of the Divine self and a reflection of the universe, modern outlook studies him in isolation from these levels of reality; the first approach is primarily cosmic whereas second is merely individual; the latter cuts off man from the vertical dimension of his existence and confines him to the horizontal plane only.

Jung says, "the object of psychology is the psychic; unfortunately it is also its subject". According to this opinion, every psychological judgment inevitably participates in the essentially subjective nature of its object for according to this logic, no one understands the soul except by means of his own soul and the latter, for the psychologist precisely belongs only to the psychic and to nothing else. No psychologist whatever may be his claim to

objectivity can escape from this dilemma. Thus it follows that relativism is inherent in modern psychology. This relativism is also a kind of promethium that would make of the psychic the ultimate reality of man. But despite the admitted precariousness of its view point modern psychology behaves like any other science. It utters judgments and believes in their validity. If we are to observe, that the psychic is subjective, that is to say, dominated by a certain egocentric bias imposing on it certain limits this is to say that there is something in us which is not subject to same limits or tendencies but exceeds and dominates them in principle. That something is the Intellect and this is what provides us with the criteria whereby the fluctuating and uncertain world of the psyche can alone be illuminated.

As we have discerned again and again during the course of this work the traditional doctrines place intellect much above reason and thus it is able to study the psyche objectively. Whereas reason which is itself a faculty of psyche without being guided by intellect proves entirely insufficient when it comes to describing the world of the soul. All the chaos of the inferior, mostly unconscious, psychic possibilities escapes rationality, and so do those which stand above the rational i.e. the spiritual or metaphysical realm hence as T. Burckhardt observes “psychology finds itself facing a domain that overflows in all directions the horizon of a science built on empiricism and the Cartesian dualism”.

The thesis of traditional psychology stands on the law that the soul like any other compartment of reality can only be truly known by that which exceeds it, otherwise objectivity is not possible. If intelligence was no more than a psychic reality and was not guided by the intellect, it would not be possible for man to rise above his subjectivity. He says that what modern psychology lacks is criteria allowing it to situate the aspects or tendencies of the soul in their cosmic context. In traditional psychology these criteria are provided by two principal dimensions namely, on the one hand cosmology that “situates” the soul and to modalities in the hierarchy of the states of existence and on the other hand a immorality directed towards a spiritual aim. This immorality is not unnatural or suffocating since it reviews man’s-psyche in a cosmic context and thus makes rules based on a objective knowledge of psyche. As we have seen all traditions relates man’s psychic possibilities to his spiritual nature and envisage tendencies of his psyche as

compared to the cosmic tendencies, and universal principles. Traditional psychology thus as we have seen, has one “static” dimension namely cosmology and another personal and “operative” dimension namely morality. It is said in Sufism that “the genuine knowledge of the psyche results from the knowledge of one’s self. He who by the eye of his essence is able to “objectivize” his own psychic from by that very fact knows all the possibilities of the psychic or the subtle world. “This is the vision which goes into the making of a traditional science of soul. As we have observed in the previous chapter, traditional science of soul, proclaims that only higher can know the lower thus, spirit knows soul in it’s psychic forms and soul through sensory faculties knows the corporeal.

As Jung has expressed many times, what we know of reality is all that reaches us through the “images” of it that our mental faculty is able to keep hold at. It is in vain to try to know what the world is outside the subtle web of our memories, impressions, and expectations. So far traditional psychology agrees with Jung but he further says that world is nothing outside our consciousness of it and there is no absolute principle. Whereas the traditional view of reality points towards an absolute reality which is also the centre of man’s being.

What appears in the previous chapter as a whole-some concept of reality, denotes that it is not the individual soul but the entire subtle order that contains the physical world. The logical coherence of the latter implies the unity of the former, as evident from the fact that the multiple individual visions of the sensible world, fragmentary though they are, coincide in substance as part of formal existence. In ancient Hindu mythologies, it is compared to the atmosphere surrounding the earth and pervading all porous bodies and acting as a vehicle of life.

Comparing concepts in Jung’s theory to the traditional cosmology and mythology, one discovers that he had borrowed immensely from traditional doctrines of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism and Greek, as well as from mythologies of many diverse cultures. He saw in mythological symbols and in the art the unconscious expression of a collective, universal psyche. The reader will no doubt recall that in traditional societies arts and crafts are efforts to express an in- expressible ultimate reality in form of symbols. It is obvious how Jung has attached his own interpretation to the sacred forms.

Dr. Gerhard Adler narrates an old Cabalistic legend. Let's hear it and then we will see how it is interpreted differently by Jung and by the traditional thought. This legend describing the "Formation of the child" says that at the moment of creation, the seed of the future human being, is brought before God and he decides what its soul shall become man or woman, sage or simpleton, rich or poor. Only one thing he leaves undecided that is whether it be righteous or unrighteous. Then the soul protests and begs not to be sent to the world where upon God rebukes her and tells her that she was made for the earthly life. After this soul is initiated into all the mysteries of other world and knows the Beyond as well as the hell and paradise. On coming to the world the angel extinguishes the light of knowledge burning above it and the soul enclosed in its earthly envelope enters this world having forgotten its lofty wisdom but always seeking to regain it.

By now reader must be well acquainted with traditional perspective and can see what this legend implies, as regards soul's destiny, a purpose of its creation and its original source. As we have seen in previous discussions of the traditional concepts, soul is a manifestation of God or the Divine principle, and before entering the body it lived in the world of archetypes and human intellect seeks to recapture the knowledge of those archetypes of immutable possibilities. Now hear the Jungian explanation: it says that "the soul is made only for earthly life and the Beyond from which the soul originates is the repository of the ultimate secrets of heaven and hell, light and darkness, above and below, positive and negative in other words it is the world of the collective unconscious from which we all originate".

So now we come face to face (only figuratively) with the most fundamental, and famous (or notorious) concept in Jung's theory of psyche i.e. the collective unconscious. Starting from the analysis of dream - contents, he observed that a certain category of dream images could not be explained on the basis of residual personal experiences; this led him to distinguish within the unconscious domain between a personal zone" whose contents represent the other face of individual's psychic life and a "collective" zone made up of latent psychic dispositions of an impersonal character such as never offer themselves to the direct grasp of the consciousness but manifest themselves indirectly through symbolic dreams and irrational" impulses "Just as the human body displays a common anatomy independently of racial

differences, so also the psyche possesses beyond all cultural and mental differences a common substratum that I have named the collective unconscious". So far it looks plausible but soon enough his theory takes an arwinian turn and asserts that "it is here (in collective unconscious) that the psychic parallelism with the animal is situated – Ithe different lines of psychic evolution starting out from one truth and roots plunged through all the ages". It follows from this theory that the archetypes are an expression of an ancestral psychic fund that brings man near to the animal! what has been said so far and what can easily be concluded after reading what Jung has written on the topic, it becomes clearly visible that, for Jung, the "collective unconscious" is situated "below" at the level of physiological instincts. The basic term collective unconscious could carry a wider or in a way spiritual meaning, if Jung had retained the original meaning of the term archetypes' and also placed the concept in it's cosmological hierarchy. The resemblance of Jung's collective unconscious to the materia prima of Hermetic tradition is quite acute now. In this regard T. Burckhardt has provided a most illuminating analysis of the issue: He says that symbolically materia prima lies "below" because it is completely passive and it appears "dark" because as the absolutely unformed it eludes every advance of the intelligence. This is the source of misunderstanding which confuses the materia prima of the alchemists with the "collective unconscious" of modern psychology. Materia, however unlike that ill-defined psychic domain is not a source of irrational and more or less exclusively psychic impulses but the passive basis of all perception.

As for the archetypes, they do not belong to the psychic realm but to the realm of pure spirit as we have seen already, they nevertheless are reflected at the psychic level - as virtualities of images - but they are not innate complexes which can possess a man nor are they irrational since they come from the supra rational realm. Burckhardt also emphasizes that in every individual two poles of being are present (yin yang or purusha- prakrati one feminine, one masculine or one passive, one active etc.) Hence in every human individual there is to be found a man, a woman, a father, a mother, a child and an elderly person etc. It is not possible here to go into the details of these concepts. It suffices to show that though Jung has taken many essential concepts from traditional wisdom, he has used them and interpreted them in



his own manner which is radically different from their original usage.

Burckhardt explains that under certain condition the soul is able to take on the function of a mirror that reflects in a purely passive and imaginative manner universal truths contained in the intellect. Hence Jungs's thesis that motives and forms common to all men manifest themselves in dreams as well as in myths and symbolism. But such "inspirations" are rare as in the case of dreams which announce future events.

Hence if the conscious is defined as all that lies outside ordinary consciousness - then it is made to include inferior chaos as well as the superior states. The definition of the unconscious therefore in no wise delimits a concrete modality of the soul, whereas "depth psychology" operates with the "unconscious" as if with a definite entity. Another concept which Jung interprets differently is that of the self. He considers it not as a transcendent principle but as the outcome of psychological processes.

From the comparison of traditional perspective with the modern view point it has become clear that as far as the traditions are concerned, there is intra-traditional variety in expressions and forms but no disparity or contradiction in essential principles. They seem to be expressing the same truth. They are in the words of F. Schuon "paths leading to the same summit". Whereas modern science differs essentially from the traditional perspective and interprets the reality of human psyche in a totally different context.

## **CONCLUSION**

From introduction to conclusion, it has proved to be a long journey. But a most fascinating one; taking the researcher into unfamiliar terrains and providing the glimpses of unseen landscapes. Though a travel diary of this Journey has been presented in previous pages, it still remains to be synthesized. What has the researcher accumulated during this Journey, not only in the form of individual souvenirs but also as a collective experience. Let's look at it.

In the introduction, it was stated that self knowledge is the most vital kind of knowledge for man, and then we made an attempt to see what the sciences which are concerned with man's self, have to say in this regard. That is how do they view the inner self of man. At the end of this research, with a

wonderfully revealing data in our hands, we can say no more than, this, that the outcome of this research has elevated as well as depressed us. The exploration and rediscovery of the traditional wisdom has been a wonderful and enriching experience, as well as a cause for rejoicing because it opens new doors and vistas, which can free the modern mind from stagnation of a horizontal and profane “wisdom”, but it also gives rise to apprehension. In the light of what we learnt during the course of this research, it seems that inspite of all the claims to the contrary, man is far from the centre of his self and all the time rushing away from it.

At the beginning, we formulated two hypotheses that; all traditions share a more or less common view regarding the nature and composition of man and that modern approach was in conflict with the traditional view. Both our hypotheses stand confirmed. And the conclusions to which they lead are many, and extremely significant.

Firstly, if all the traditions are paths leading to the same summit (theosis) and all human beings stem from the same root, then knowledge of this fact can enable man see beyond the multiplicity of forms, the unity of essence and rise above the inter-religious prejudices and differences (though on the same time adhering to the forms of its own religion). Secondly it implies that all traditions believe in one truth, and point towards one direction and have done so since ages. How can such a huge section of humanity and with wise and pious men among them, be wrong? If it is right then what should be our attitude from now on.

Besides these general inferences there are those which concern the science of psychology itself. As we mentioned in the introduction psychology seems to leave most of the psychic phenomena unexplained and what it does explain i.e. behaviour is not at all conclusive. Neither does it exert any profound influence on the inner self of man. Same can be said of psychotherapy, which was a diversion we deliberately avoided because it could have led into extra-long details. However from the discussion given above, it is evident that in the traditional societies, to cure the illness of soul was not the job of a psychologist as such, but of the medical and spiritual authorities and if the medicine of traditional civilizations knows nothing analogous to modern psychotherapy, this is because the psychic cannot be treated by means of the psychic. It can only be cured by something situated

outside and above it.

From the traditional point of view modern psychology is a standard case of psychic trying to grasp the psychic and isolating it from its cosmic dimensions. Whereas traditional psychology for example sufi disciplines, do not separate the soul either from the metaphysical or from the cosmic order. This provides it with qualitative criteria wholly lacking in modern psychology, which only studies the dynamic character of the phenomena of psyche, and their proximate causes. More over it confuses the psychic with the Spiritual. What is the solution? S.H Nasr says that it is possible to integrate the knowledge of the soul contained in the traditional doctrines with the resources of modern psychology and evolve a new, better and truly objective science of the soul. We fervently hope that it will be brought out. So much in the future of humanity depends on this.

# IMPULSE OF WORSHIP GONE ASTRAY

Prof. MUHAMMAD MUNAWWAR

Human beings have been worshipping since time immemorial. They have worshipped their ancestors; carved, built and shaped idols signifying forces of Nature. Sometimes the idols were made of wood or clay, sometimes of stone and brick. Metals also were used for making idols, from iron and brass to silver and gold. Precious stones too of different colours, were availed of, especially when idols were carved in miniature. The grandeur of idols lay in the capacity of the adorers i.e. as to how much they could spend. The worshippers brought even sun and moon down to earth and placed them in temples specified for them. Thus they localized, rather, nationalized the universals.

For instance, here is an account of how the Hindus of India looked upto their gods.

“It’s (India’s) gods and goddesses are no doubt world forces philosophically, but practically and socially they are Indian. Most Indians cannot realize yet what an advantage it is for them as a nation, to be compatriots of their gods and goddesses.”<sup>328</sup>

The book quoted above was written in 1946. It swacks of idolatrous religion that prevailed in India and out of India about four thousand years ago. Others, most of them if not all, have changed. Now for them, their idols are not more than pieces of art. But in India gods are still worshipped. They are still deities, for the over whelming majority of the Hindus.

Why do human beings worship at all? Psychologists say it is fear or the instinct of self preservation that makes them worship idols possessing symbolic attributes. But others think otherwise. For example, religious peoples whose religion is based on revelation believe that worshipping is ingrained in human nature. To be afraid of something is one thing, to worship quite another. Human beings worship because they are created to worship their Creator. But this instinct, as it is the wont of all instincts when corrupted or handicapped by social surroundings or other circumstances find

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<sup>328</sup> Savitri Devi, *A Warning to the Hindus*, Calcutta, p. 13.

other modes for its unfolding. It falls upon false gods. Idol worship, it seems, is a false or corrupted expression of man's impulse to worship God.

Man grows physically and mentally, depending on how an individual is brought up. He is not mere body nor mere soul; He is both body and soul. And both body and soul need suitable nourishment. Apart from environment and social factors, the body hungers for material food. The soul hungers for non-material belief, categories for its nutrition. Among these are love, belief, worship. Material food makes man grow like all other breathing existences. Love, belief and worship make man develop and progress as a human being. Man's physical growth, as the growth of all living bodies has categorical limits. But his mental and spiritual progress has no limits. Man can rise to any spiritual heights, can become boundless. He possesses an atom of Divine Light, as his soul. It is God's breath, says the Quran.

Man's beginning is no doubt overwhelmed by nature but his uppermost reach is God Himself - God who has created the universe out of nothing, who sustains, and is the fountain-head of all that existed, all that exist and all that is being added to the universe every fraction of a moment. That is the creative will of God. Man is capable of creating a fellowship with his creator. In the words of Allama Iqbal;

Indeed the evolution of life shows that though in the beginning the mental is overwhelmed by the physical, the mental as it grows in power tends to dominate the physical and may eventually rise to a position of complete independence.<sup>329</sup>

This gradual progress is to be earned. Man has to toil for it. What is naturally given is the potentiality to rise higher than all matter. This upward effort on the part of man is in fact the effort towards the realization of his self. As long as an individual remains earth-rooted, he remains, as if, without a self - the self of a man. He can find himself in his belief in and worship of God. The Quran commands;

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<sup>329</sup> The Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam, 1944, p. 106.

Set your face truly and steadily to the Faith. (This is) God's handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made mankind. That is the standard Religion. But most mankind understand not."<sup>330</sup>

Man is created innocent. He is by nature pure, free from sin. According to the Quran, nobody is born with the burden of any of original sins on his neck. He is born a man-baby. If not misguided, his true nature leads him to God, otherwise he falls upon the meshes of the society he is related to and his soul gets corrupted. The result is that the way of his God-ward journey becomes barricaded. Hence his true nature can not find a vent. The Holy Prophet (may peace be on Him), according to an authentic reports has said;

Every infant is born in a state of conformity to the natural deposition with which he is created in his mothers womb, it is parents that make him a Jew, a Christian, and a Magian.-There Shall be no changing or altering of the religion of God.<sup>331</sup>

True religion is that God is one. He does not beget. He is not begotten. The one is absolutely one. In Judaism there are two, in Christianity three and in Magian belief it is an element i.e. fire, which is worshipped. There from the path opens for other and still other things created by God to share Divinity, one becoming many. This worship of many gods went on adding to the number of gods till they become innumerable. One thing is obvious. All such things were tribal, clanish, territorial, racial, special, regional and seasonal. They kept their worshippers, and natural so, alien to other clans, tribes, societies, nations. Rather they kept their adorers of one caste, class and entity against those of others. Every society, rather, class had its own gods to worship. All those who worshipped other gods could not be treated as kins. As many gods as many kinds of human beings. Thus human beings cannot be visualized as one "mankind" as long as they do not believe in and bow before one God.

The ingrained faculty of worship and belief in one God gone astray can play havoc with the adorers. Idols begin to live in their minds. Their vision narrows down to the bounds of the images, moulded, carved and shaped by

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<sup>330</sup> al-Quran, 30:30.

<sup>331</sup> Faiz-ul-Qadeer, ed. Muhammad Hasan Zaif Ullah, Mustafa al-Babi, Cairo, p. 243, (Vol. II).

themselves. The idols deprive their adorers of their selves. They become, so to say, soulless. The worship of material idols made them materialist. As the gods, so the devotees. It is a good old Arabic saying that if you worship wood you become wood. And so on, so forth. The object worshiped must affix its stamp on the mind of the devotee and snatch away his spiritual individuality which was to soar higher than all material levels.

No doubt the nature of man tried at best to categorize gods, though it could not easily rise above the level of related milieu. After all, all the idols could not be equal in power and prowess. Some were surely better than other. Then why could not there be one better than all, the best and the greatest of all the gods, the God of gods.

With almost all of the adolatrous societies, this idea remained at work and the amazing phenomenon is that every society characterized the sun as the biggest of all gods, rather the god of them all. Yes the Sun was the biggest, the brightest. No wonder then that in Egypt, India, Babylonia, Persia, Japan etc., it was the Sun that was held in the highest esteem.

The Sun atleast gave them the idea of one that was, above all. The point is that from many gods to one particular god, though a long journey, was natural. It can be presumed that the Sun stood for a bridge between the many and the one. Why after all, all the societies entertained the idea of one god who could be supposed to be the god of all other gods, if the idea was not implanted in their nature. "Pascal contends that men know that there is a God, without knowing what God is. Men can never mention the last number."<sup>332</sup>

With the help and guidance of intellect only, human beings could not go beyond this. The first sentence and the only sentence preserved from a book of Protagoras entitled "On the Gods", reads thus;

"With regard to the Gods I can not know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in appearance, because the factors preventing knowledge are many, the obscurity of the subject and the brevity of human life."<sup>333</sup>

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<sup>332</sup> Master-pieces of World Philosophy, p. 412.

<sup>333</sup> God, Man and State, Kathleen Freeman, p. 39.

It was the revelation through prophets of Almighty Allah that told mankind whom they sought after. They were always not many who ventured to listen to the prophets. Their fixation with false gods made them run away from paying heed to the Truth. They rather mocked at the messengers of Allah they stoned, even killed them and behaved like savage patients who pounce upon those who try to cure them.

Anyway it were the prophets of Allah who preached the unity of God and the equality and fraternity of all mankind. That was the gist of the message delivered by all prophets. It is only they who made human beings understand that the universe is one, it is so only because the Creator of the universe is one.

It is through Allah the Creator that human beings are not castes, or classes or kinds but one mankind. Mankind can never attain self-consciousness except through His grace. The universe in the ontological sense is one circle. It can not have more than one centre. Without One God as the controlling centre, there can be no harmony in the universe, and also in human beings.

Man cannot evolve into a perfect unity without his belief in god because only according to the law and purpose of God can man shape his behaviour and destiny. Say Willian Temple;

“Life cannot be fully integrated about the self as centre; it can only be fully integrated when it becomes God centered, for God is the real centre of the real world. His purpose is its controlling principle, only in Him, therefore can all creatures find a centre which bring them all to harmony with one another.”<sup>334</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Philosophy of religion, p, 328.



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# **CONCEPT OF SELF AND SELF IDENTITY**

## **IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY**

Dr. Absar Ahmad

Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore 1986.

Price: Rs. 125/-

PP.384

Dr. Absar Ahmad has done an able research work 'Concept of Self and Self-Identity in the Contemporary Philosophy' which has been published by the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan Lahore.

The problem of self is very old and important. Dr. Absar Ahmad supports the Cartesian dualism of mind and body and treats self as a mental substance. He surveys and critically examines three important trends in contemporary philosophy which define self in different terms opposed to that of his.

The analytical and behaviouristic trend was activated by Ryle's classic work 'The Concept of Mind' which was extremely anti-Cartesian. Descartes' concept of mind was understood as the 'ghost in the machine.' Ryle tried to reduce mind to body behavioural terms. Dr. Absar has criticized Ryle at length and has said that mind cannot be understood as bits of bodily behaviour. He also examined the claims of the Identity Theorists which identify mind with brain or the central nervous system. In his opinion all this attempt is futile.

Hume's serialist or bundle view of the self and self as a logical construction have been examined and a case has been presented for self as a substantial subject of all mental experiences. In this connection, the

nature of memory and self-knowledge has also been examined, where a persistent and identified self is presupposed in all mental experiences.

The theory of self as a person has also been examined and the views of Ryle, Ayer, Wittgenstein and Strawson have been examined. This view has also been rejected.

An attempt has been made to interpret Iqbal's conception of the self along the Cartesian lines and inner or deeper self has been called the ego in Iqbal which is the same as the substantial self of Dr. Absar.

I have to make some comments in this connection.

1) I agree to most of what Dr. Absar said in his book, but I have a feeling that with his dualism he is moving to the extreme end of reading mind totally away from and independent of body, whereas all the others (serialists, identity theorists, analysts, linguists) are moving to the one end of reading mind into bodily states. Throughout the book Dr. Absar pleads that self or mind is distinct from body but this does not imply that mind is logically independent of body. Alongwith dependence, distinctness can also be maintained.

When we talk of self, it is understood in human terms as a human self. A human self cannot be understood without reference to a body (a bodiless self and its immortality are different questions) I agree to what Dr. Absar says in criticism on identity theorists and the like-minded ones, but I would also not agree to his substantial self which is totally divorced from *body*.

2) Of particular interest to me are his discussions on 'I' and self as a person. To say that I is the substantial self which is conscious of mental states, it is not clear what that 'I' is? (Descartes called it a 'thinking thing' and Hume looked for it and did not find it).

3) Dr. Absar says, "I' has a concrete referential force in self-intuition... Our knowledge of our own self-identity and mental states is in truth a non-linguistic or pre-linguistic one..." (pp. 313-314), but this self-identity is purely empty without any content. It is only the public

language and interaction with other beings that fills the self with content. As Kant related concepts with percepts, self needs to be related with other selves and the public language.

4) In my opinion self as a person is a better theory than the rest of all. (Here I agree with Strawson but have some differences with him as well). The concept of a person is better than that of the self. It is neither empty, nor elusive like the self. Others call me a person, and I call them 'person'. One as a self is known to oneself but one as a person is known to others. In ordinary life we refer to a person, talk to him, talk about him (in his presence or absence), talk about real or imaginary persons, etc. Thus a person is a *bio-social entity of mental and physical* characteristics which is manifested in his *actions*. It is also important to note that when a person dies, his acts do *not* die with him (here is a sense of immortality which refers to this world). Acts belong to a person, but not to the mind or body. He rather *uses* mind and body for his acts. 'I' cannot be replaced by 'my body' or 'my mind'. Let us see whether we can make substitution in the following examples:

a) I think, I imagine,  
I remember

My Mind cannot be  
substituted for I.

b) I sit, I stand, I walk

'My body' cannot be  
substituted for I, because the

body is used by me for a certain  
act.

c) I try, I assert, I fail

No substitution for either mind or  
body is possible for I

Thus self as a person is a bio-social unity of mental and physical characteristics manifested in his actions.

In the end I congratulate Dr. Absar Ahmad for his able, painstaking and critical study and the Iqbal Academy of Pakistan for publishing it for the benefits of students, teachers and those interested in philosophy.

