


GOVERNMENT

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GOVERNMENT

BY

J. N. MCARTHUR



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
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


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GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

I HERE propose to formulate a system of government which I conceive to be based, as nearly as I can judge, upon first and true principles. I am led to do so because I believe that most methods of government as now practised are more or less wrong, and some radically wrong, in principle; and I think that I can offer some suggestions which may possibly help to a conception of a more systematic application of the science of government.

In the very simplest practical affairs of life the mass of men seem to act with fairly good judgment, but as soon as they are called upon to deal with more complicated matters they undoubtedly go much astray. This is, after all, little more than a statement of the truism that it is harder to do difficult things than easy. In this practical affair of governing themselves, they are self-confessedly much astray when the issues are large and complicated. There are few persons but will

confess, even although they also confess to seeing no remedy, that the government of their country is faulty in very many respects. They must confess to this because they see in it many maladjustments and many and continually recurring sources of friction; because they see that it tends to promote a want of moral rectitude in both electors and representatives; because they see that justice is often difficult to obtain, and that the public service is cumbersome and inefficient. They see these and many other defects.

The question is, Are these defects remediable? Undoubtedly everyone confesses that they exist more or less. But can they be cured? I maintain that they can.

I think man is a very unsystematic animal. He gets on very well in his very simple acts, because in these very little systemising is required; but as soon as he undertakes anything of a complicated nature he gets greatly astray, because he is bad at systemising.

When a man undertakes any practical affair of a complicated nature he should first calmly think out the principles upon which it should be worked. He should try to decide upon the *system* which he is going to adopt. He should try to think what would be done in a similar affair, but of a more simple nature, and he should try to so arrange it that he will act upon the same leading principles in undertaking this more complicated affair as if it were much simpler, making only those changes which are necessitated by the extra complications. This is but a scientific method applied to practical affairs.

In attempting to formulate a scheme of government

which may be applicable to the largest and most complicated cases, such as those dealing with national affairs, I think a close study should be made of the very simplest forms of government now in use by civilised men. These simplest forms consist of the committees, or governing bodies, of various small societies, such as village literary societies, cricket clubs, race clubs, mechanics' institutes, small joint-stock companies, and such like. These are bodies which govern themselves, and consequently have governmental constitutions of their own, equally with the larger national governments. The only difference is that the former are much simpler—are much less complicated. They are therefore very useful for ascertaining what are the first, the leading, the simple principles of government. Their methods of government are likely to be much more correct than those adopted by the larger bodies, such as nations, because men in their simple actions are far more likely to act correctly than in their more complicated ones.

I have drawn up the scheme of government here put forward chiefly by observing these simple governments, and thus endeavouring to get at true principles by eliminating unnecessary complications. I have drawn up my scheme for the more complicated governments by strictly adhering to the simple principles thus ascertained, merely altering the applications of the principles, not the principles themselves, when the larger and more involved nature of the matter necessitated it, but in no other case. In other words, for the larger and more involved governments I have always adopted the methods used by the simpler ones, unless there were

some reason why I should not do so, and even then, when I have altered the method from such necessity, I have endeavoured, nevertheless, not to alter the principle.

In these modern days much more progress has undoubtedly been made in the physical than in the social sciences. The chief reason for this seems to me to be that one great necessity of scientific research—namely, experiment—can easily be applied in the physical but not so easily in the social sciences. The physical scientist can usually, at very moderate cost, put his theories to the test of experiment, and thus satisfy both himself and the public as to their truth. But not so is it with the social scientist. He who theorises on a social problem, such as an ideal form of government, has no very satisfactory means of satisfying by experiment either himself or the public of its efficacy. The physical scientist can experiment on inanimate matter and the lower animals; and in nearly all cases his experiments on a comparatively small scale suffice for absolute proof as to efficacy on a larger scale. The social scientist, on the other hand, if he experiment at all, must experiment upon man in his social capacity; and man in his social capacity objects to being experimented upon. Besides, in social science experiments conducted on a small scale are not usually absolute proof of their efficacy on a larger scale. A person who has a theory of government, the efficacy of which he wishes to test by experiment, may have opportunities of testing it on a small scale, for he may possibly induce some small club or society to adopt it as its government; but, if he does this, it is the most he is likely to be able to do, for it is not likely that any large governmental

body, such as a nation, will allow itself to be experimented upon for the mere purpose of experiment. Thus he has no means of proving by experiment the efficacy of his theory on a large scale.

In this way the theory of government I here propose I have no opportunity of testing by experiment upon a large scale. I am not so dogmatic as to think that my readers should adopt at once, and consider worthy of experiment on a large scale, the theory I here propound. I am quite agreeable to take a more modest view of its value, and, leaving out of consideration in the meantime any claim it may have to pose as a scheme of national government, I would simply suggest that it might at least be of some practical use as a guide to those who are called upon to devise constitutions or rules for the government of such lesser institutions as, for instance, literary or sporting clubs, trades unions, employers' unions, joint-stock companies, and so forth. In the concrete illustrations and general treatment of the subject I shall dwell chiefly on national government, as being the most complicated and therefore requiring most treatment; but these examples will always be obviously applicable to the lesser institutions, especially as the whole gist of my argument is that the complicated includes the simple.

Many, perhaps most people, consider that great ends can be accomplished only by highly complicated means. I think the reverse. My scheme of government here proposed is simple. In the opinion of many people this will condemn it. In my opinion its simplicity is its chief virtue.

I am here endeavouring to lay down what I conceive

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to be the truth. I can therefore be no respecter of political opinions. I may offend the Radical politician by a condemnation of some of his favourite ideas, and I may possibly startle the Conservative both by proposing some novelties and by endeavouring to overthrow some ideas which I believe involve defects in the art of government—defects which seem to have been, and still to be, almost universally adopted in governmental constitutions, but which, notwithstanding their long prescription and their vast authority, I shall take the liberty of challenging. I may thus offend politicians of all shades of opinion. These adverse opinions, however, I cannot hope to avoid; but I feel sure they will be modified to my advantage if the reader will always remember to do me the justice to consider my scheme as a whole, and not condemn any one clause until he sees fully how it will work in connection with the entire plan.

My scheme is not a Utopia. Only by preliminary misunderstanding could it be so classed by the reader. It is simply a scheme of government applicable certainly to those states of society which may be called Utopias, as it is applicable to any other institutions formed by aggregates of men for certain pre-arranged purposes. It has nothing to do with what these purposes may be. Men may wish to join together for literary, or for sporting, or for business purposes, for purposes of national government on an individualistic basis as at present generally adopted by the nations, or for purposes of national government on a socialistic basis as suggested by many social reformers. But, for whatever of these or any other purposes any body of men may wish to join and

act together, then all I say is that my scheme is one which appears to me to embody the true principles upon which they, in this their aggregate capacity, should govern themselves.

In the next chapter I shall formulate my scheme by giving an abstract draft of the proposed constitution; in the chapter then following I shall give a concrete illustration of it; and the remainder of the book I shall devote to a *seriatim* illustration and defence of the various clauses, with a final chapter as a general summary.

CHAPTER II

THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION

THE following is an abstract explanation of the leading principles of the general governmental constitution that I would submit for adoption :

1. For purposes of government the whole given area to be governed should, if its extent require it, be divided, and these divisions, if necessary, further subdivided, and these again, in like manner, if necessary, subdivided, and so on, to any extent of subdivision that the circumstances of the case may require.

2. The whole area to be governed should be under one supreme central government, but this central government should concern itself only with matters which pertain to the interest of the area as a whole, leaving full liberty of local self-government to each of the divisions and subdivisions, if any, which it includes.

3 The divisions and subdivisions should be made with a view to similarity of local interests and convenience for their local self-government. Each division and subdivision should be self-governing in all matters which concern only itself as such, not interfering with the broader matters which concern either the higher divisions, if any, of which it forms a

THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION

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part, or the supreme government, nor with the purely local matters of those subdivisions, if any, which it includes.

4. Each government, whether the supreme or a divisional or subdivisonal one, should be conducted by elected representatives.

5. The electors of each governmental area, whether the whole or a divisional or subdivisonal part, should vote as one constituency, each and all of the representatives in each governing body consequently representing the electors of the whole governmental area which that body represents.

6. The system of election should be such that the representative body may reflect as perfectly as possible the various opinions of its electors.

7. Each government, supreme, divisional, or subdivisonal, should be unicameral.

8. The whole of the representatives of any one of the governing bodies should not be elected at the same time, but in batches with fixed periods intervening, these batches retiring at corresponding periods by rotation, and elections at the same time taking place to fill the vacancies; the result being that the personality of the representative body can be changed only by degrees.

9. The representatives in each of the governing bodies should not be more numerous than is absolutely necessary to ensure that body as a whole having a good general knowledge of the matters with which it has to deal.

10. The term for which representatives should be elected should not be so long as to allow them to lose

touch with those who elected them, nor so short as to prevent them having a reasonable chance of accomplishing results from their work as representatives.

11. Representatives should be repaid by their respective governments the expenses they are put to in acting as such, but in no case should they be paid at such a rate as to make it of pecuniary advantage to them to be returned as representatives.

12. The representative bodies should conduct their deliberations according to the well-known and necessary rules generally adopted by deliberative bodies, but should avoid encumbering themselves with any formalities which are not absolutely necessary.

13. Each representative body should elect from among its members a president and a vice-president. The former should preside at its deliberations, and act for it in all cases where necessary when it is not in actual session. The vice-president's duty should be to act when required as substitute for the president.

14. Every person of either sex, of mature age, of sound mind, not under criminal conviction by law, having a personal interest in the affairs of any government, whether the supreme, or a divisional or subdivisional part, and who contributes towards its expenses, should be allowed a voice in electing representatives to its governing body.

15. The qualifications for representatives should be the same as for the electors who are entitled to vote for them.

16. In each government, supreme, divisional, or subdivisional, each elector should have one vote and no more.

17. Elections should be conducted by open voting.

18. Each government, supreme, divisional, or subdivisional, should have a distinct staff of servants of its own.

19. The public service of each of the several governments should be directly responsible to the representative body of that government, and should, if necessary, be divided into separate branches as practical considerations may dictate. Each branch should be directly responsible to the representative body, and, if it consists of more than one employee, should have at its head a chief who has risen to that position by merit and by gradation in the technical knowledge required. These chiefs of branches should have full power over their subordinates, whether in appointing, remunerating, controlling, promoting, or dismissing them. These subordinates should in no way be interfered with by the representative body. Each chief of a branch should be directly and wholly responsible to the representative body for the efficiency of the branch under his control, and the representative bodies should hold these chiefs responsible for results rather than interfere with them in their methods of conducting the business of their respective branches.

20. Each chief of a branch, or sole employee if there should not be more than one, should personally attend, when required, the meetings of the representative body employing him, in order to answer questions, submit reports, offer suggestions and explanations, and generally to confer with the representative body upon the work of the branch of the service under his control. He should, when the representative body is not in session,

attend for similar purposes, when necessary, upon the president as its substitute.

21. The whole service, or each branch if it consist of branches, should, if necessary, be divided, and these divisions, if necessary, further subdivided, and these again, in like manner, if necessary, still further subdivided, and so on, to any extent of subdivision that the exigencies of the service may require. At the head of each of these divisions or subdivisions there should be a chief, who should have full power over his subordinates, whether in appointing, remunerating, controlling, promoting, or dismissing them. Each chief of a division or subdivision should be wholly and directly responsible for the management of that part of the service under his control to the superior chief who has the control of the branch, division, or subdivision next above his, and of which his forms a part; and in all cases superior chiefs should hold their respective subordinate chiefs responsible for results rather than interfere with them in the details of their management.

CHAPTER III

THE CONCRETE ILLUSTRATION

BEFORE entering into a detailed defence of my scheme I should like the reader to get as clear a conception of it as possible. With this view I shall now endeavour to further illustrate it by giving a brief concrete explanation which may serve as an aid to the abstract one given in the last chapter. At the same time I shall not in this chapter enter into any defence of the scheme, nor give any detailed reasons why and wherefore the various methods that I propose should be adopted. I shall leave this for the chapters following.

Taking, then, in the first place, national examples, and referring to the method of division and subdivision, the British Empire, for instance, the largest and most scattered in the world, would under the proposed scheme be divided and subdivided into probably four sets of governments. There would be, first, the supreme government, sitting probably in London. Then, secondly, the empire would be divided, as geographical considerations would naturally dictate, probably somewhat as follows: the British Isles, India, British North America, Australasia, African possessions, and the West Indies, each of these divisions having local self-government, small outlying British possessions being

attached to whichever of the large divisions they adjoined geographically. Then, thirdly, each of these divisions would be subdivided: the British Isles probably into England, Scotland, and Ireland; the others much as they are at the present moment actually divided for governmental purposes; India into its provinces; British North America into its provinces; Australasia into its colonies; the African possessions into the various colonies as now; and the West Indies into the various islands. Then, fourthly, each of these subdivisions would be further subdivided into municipalities, to a certain extent in the way they are actually now divided for similar purposes.

A small country like Switzerland, on the other hand, would probably require only two sets of governments—the supreme one, and one set of divisional governments. It would probably suffice, for instance, to have one national Swiss government, and then divide the country, much as it is now divided, into cantons, most of the cantons as now existing being in reality no larger than ordinary municipalities.

Thus there is nothing arbitrary about the divisions and subdivisions. Their adjustment and number will depend upon the area, population, compactness, racial differences, and other circumstances of the given nation.

For purposes of mere explanation, therefore, this matter of extent of division and subdivision need not be further discussed. As a concrete example to explain other matters in connection with the scheme we may, therefore, now take a nation and suppose it to have a fixed number of sets of divisions and subdivisions, or governments. For this purpose a nation divided into

three sets of governments will be the best to select, because it will give us for illustrations examples of the supreme, of the intermediate divisional, and of the lowest subdivisional governments. We require examples of these three—namely, the two extremes and a mean—but we do not require more than one mean, as nothing would be gained by it and it would only serve to complicate the explanation.

There is no nation whose divisions, as now existing, and general circumstances will suit precisely for illustration. To meet the difficulty I shall take an arbitrary case. The island continent of Australia will serve very well for all purposes if we will suppose, merely for the sake of convenience of illustration, that it is an independent nation.

Under this hypothesis, then, Australia, governed as I propose, would be under one supreme government, whose representative body would sit at one of the chief towns. The country would then be divided, as now, into the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia, each of these colonies or States being allowed local self-government. Each of these States would then be subdivided, as they are now, into municipalities, each of these municipalities being allowed local self-government.

The matters dealt with by the several governments would be just as we now find them allotted, as a general rule, by existing federal governments. The supreme government would attend to all matters which concern the nation as a whole. It would, for instance, support and control the national army and navy, conduct negotiations with foreign nations, collect and regulate

Customs duties, coin money, and generally attend to all those matters which concern the whole national welfare.

The State governments—that is to say, in the example we are dealing with, the governments of the several Australian colonies—would probably deal with such matters as taxation for their local expenditure, police, administration of justice, support of charitable institutions, State public works, administration of State lands and forests, and other matters of obvious State concern too numerous to mention.

Similarly, the municipalities would deal with all those smaller matters which concern their local interests, as the making and maintenance of roads, lighting and sewerage, administration of town commons, water supply, and such like.

In fact, the method of dividing and subdividing nations for purposes of government, and of allotting the duties to the various classes of government, must be more or less familiar to everyone, because every nation has been forced by circumstances to adopt, in a more or less systematic form, this method of federal government. The only thing I would impress upon the reader is that, as I would propose it, this method of division and subdivision, as also the method of allotting the various duties to the several governments, would be arranged on a more systematic basis than is usually at present found in the governments of most nations. There would, for instance, be no overlapping in any way either of boundaries or of duties. All divided areas would contain complete subdivisions, not any fractions of subdivisions. Then great care would be taken that all divisions and subdivisions should have full measure

of local self-government; and this local self-government would be undertaken by one, and one only, duly authorised and constituted governing body. This rule is generally greatly ignored at present in matters of municipal concern. We are much in the habit of appointing school boards, water trusts, vigilance committees, and the like in the various municipalities, instead of allowing these matters to be dealt with by the municipal councils; which latter is obviously the most systematic plan, because it is the most labour-saving, most simple, and most concentrated one. With these precautions as to systematic arrangement, the method I propose of divisions and subdivisions, and the allotment of duties to the various governments, would be exactly what we see around us in most nations as at present existing.

Passing on, then, to further explanations of our proposed government for an Australian nation, it would be representative, and arranged somewhat as follows: The national or supreme Parliament would consist of one chamber only, of, say, forty members, each of whom would hold office for, say, eight years, ten to resign, say, every second year, and an election to take place at the same time to fill the vacancies. Thus in eight years the whole of the personality of the chamber could be changed at the rate of a fourth every second year. The whole of the individual electors of Australia would directly and personally vote at these elections as one constituency, such a thing as the existence of any divisions being for the time entirely ignored, every member elected being thus returned by the whole of Australia, and being identified in no way with any

particular division of it. The elections, however, would be conducted on some such method as Hare's, whereby the representatives elected would, as a body, reflect practically the exact opinions of those who elected them. If, for instance, there were one million electors, of which five hundred thousand were classed as Liberals, four hundred thousand as Conservatives, and one hundred thousand as Independents, then the ten members returned should consist of five Liberals, four Conservatives, and one Independent. This would be in exact proportion to the opinions of the electors who returned them, and there are several ingenious but simple methods of election, notably that of Hare, whereby this desired result can easily be brought about.

The government of the States into which Australia is divided would be conducted on just the same principles. The Parliament of Victoria, for instance, would consist of one chamber of, say, thirty members, ten to retire and ten to be elected, say, every second year; thus six years being required to wholly renew the chamber. The whole of the electors of Victoria would vote at these elections as one constituency, each and all of the members of the representative body thus representing the whole of Victoria, and no one particular part of it. The elections would be conducted, of course, like those for the supreme legislature, by a method that would ensure proportional representation.

The municipal elections would be conducted on exactly the same principles. Each municipal governing body would consist of one chamber of, say, ten members, five to retire and an election to fill the vacancies to take place, say, every second year, so that the whole body could

be changed, half at a time, in four years. The electors of each municipality would vote as if it were one constituency, there being no divisions into ridings or wards, and thus, as in the higher governments, each and all of the municipal representatives would represent the whole municipality, and no one particular part of it. A method of election to secure proportional representation would, of course, be adopted as in the higher governments.

Referring to the election and duties of presidents and vice-presidents of governing bodies, the proposed national unicameral Parliament of Australia would elect its president and vice-president, the president to be the chairman at its meetings and to act for it when it is out of session, the vice-president to act as substitute for the president in any of these duties when, either from illness, excess of work, or from any other necessary cause, the latter should require relieving. The president, as substitute for Parliament, would undoubtedly be required to act as the national host in many ways, such as entertaining distinguished official visitors and so forth. For these purposes he should be allowed a certain sum of money while in office.

In exactly the same way the Parliaments of the States or colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia would each elect its president and vice-president, whose duties relatively to their respective Parliaments and States would be exactly as those of the president and vice-president of Australia to the Australian Parliament and nation.

Similarly with the municipalities. Each municipal

governing body would elect its president and vice-president, having duties to their respective municipalities exactly equivalent to that of the presidents and vice-presidents of the higher governments.

A number of the clauses of the abstract explanation require very little further concrete elucidation. The chief points stated in these are, that in all cases, whether for the national, State, or municipal government, the suffrage is to be universal; that the qualifications for representatives are to be the same as for those who elect them, which means that seats in the legislative or governing bodies are open to all; that each elector is to have but one vote in each government; that elections are to be conducted by open voting—that is to say, not by ballot or any such secret method; that representatives are not to be paid salaries for their services, but merely to be refunded their expenses as such representatives; that the deliberations of the governing bodies are to be carried on according to the ordinary and well-known rules generally adopted by deliberative bodies, such rules being found to be absolutely necessary for the conduct of business, but they are not to encumber themselves with many of the rules adopted by existing legislative bodies, which rules are often really useless.

The last four clauses of the abstract explanation deal with the public service. According to them, each government, national, State, or municipal, would have a separate staff of servants of its own. The supreme Parliament of the Australian nation would have a staff of servants to do the work which, by the constitution, it, as a Parliament, was created to superintend. It would divide this work into branches, having a chief over each.

There would be the Army, the Navy, the Customs, the Post Office, and such like, each having a chief over it who had risen to that position by merit and by gradation in the technical knowledge of his branch. Each of these chiefs of branches would attend the sittings of Parliament, or wait upon the president when it was not in session, whenever required, to receive instructions, give explanations, and generally to confer upon the business of his branch.

The State and municipal governments would also each have their staff of public servants subject to arrangements exactly similar to the staff of the national government. The staff of each municipality would, however, naturally be a very small one comparatively speaking, and would not require to be divided into many branches.

The public servants would, of course, be paid out of the revenue of the government under which they served.

The internal working of the service, as explained in Clause 21, is nothing but a statement of the method upon which most businesses, public or private, are always to a certain extent carried on. All businesses must be more or less carried on according to the rules there stated, and the more closely these rules are adhered to the better will the business be managed. In the public service the army may be taken as a branch which will serve to exemplify the system of division and subdivision here set forth. The army of a country is generally divided somewhat as follows: First into army divisions, then these divisions into brigades, these brigades into regiments, these regiments into battalions,

these battalions into companies, and these companies into squads or sections. Then, according to what I have laid down in this clause, the responsibility would be as follows: The commander-in-chief would be wholly responsible to Parliament for the management and efficiency of the whole army; the officers commanding divisions would be wholly responsible to the commander-in-chief for their respective divisions; the officers commanding brigades would be wholly responsible to the officers commanding the divisions of which their brigades respectively formed a part; and so on, the chain of responsibility would go on in the same way through the officers commanding regiments, battalions, and companies down to the sections into which the companies were finally divided. As a necessary corollary to this saddling of responsibility, the superior officers should interfere as little as possible with the details of their subordinates' management.

Finally, having given concrete examples of national governments, I think scarcely any explanation will now be required for the smaller or less involved kinds of governments, because these need be only simplified forms of the national examples. Below the national examples there are all degrees of simplicity. We have, for instance, those modern institutions, now almost of national extent, known as trades and employers' unions.

These being institutions of large extent, require to be governed almost exactly like nations. Under the system of government that I propose they would therefore require to be partitioned like nations into divisional and subdivisive branches having local self-government. They would require to adopt for their stability almost

all those precautions that national governments should adopt—such, for instance, as the election of their representatives by batches and by the proportional method. A small institution, on the other hand, like a village cricket club, could obviously dispense with some of the methods adopted by the larger. It need not be divided nor subdivided into various local administrations; nor, by reason of the very small importance of the issues at stake, need the precaution be taken of electing the committee-men by batches or by the proportional method.

In short, having explained as clearly as I can my proposed scheme as applied to national government, I think any further explanation of the lesser kinds of government would be unnecessary, because any person understanding my explanation of the proposed national government could easily, by following the rules I have given, form for himself a similar constitution for any simple government. All he would have to do would be, if it were an institution of a very simple nature, to strike out some matters which the very simplicity of the institution rendered unnecessary, and these matters would at once be obvious. And in doing this, I might remark, there would be no sacrifice of principle. It would merely be that the very simplicity of the case made it not worth while, for practical purposes, to set certain of the principles in motion. These principles would be just as true, although their application might judiciously be allowed to lapse in some practical affairs of extreme simplicity.

CHAPTER IV

THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE

CLAUSES 1, 2, and 3 of the explanation given in Chapter II. deal with what may be called the Federal Principle in government—that is to say, the principle of local self-government by divisions and subdivisions combined with federal government of the whole.

Some of the ancient philosophers—Plato and Aristotle, for instance—seemed to consider that for purposes of government it was necessary that a nation should be very limited both in area and population. Modern times have shown us, however, that nations of immense area and population can with considerable success be governed under one head. Of these immense nations, each under one government, are notably the British Empire, Russia, and the United States of America. These great nations are each governed, more or less systematically, upon the federal principle. Were it not so, they would be wholly unwieldy as nations.

The fact is, if we look round us, we shall see that all nations adopt this federal principle. Any nation of an area larger than that of a municipality is forced by that circumstance to adopt it, or it could not exist as a nation. For those nations which we are in the habit of

classing as under federal government are not the only ones that are so. We call the government of the United States of America a federal one. So it is; but so also are the governments of all those nations which are divided into municipalities (and all nations are at least divided to this extent), and thus they adopt the federal principle, although their divisions are only municipalities and may not be dignified by the title of States, as are the primary divisions of the great American Republic.

The federal principle is based upon two other great social principles the necessity and value of which are axiomatic—namely, personal liberty and combination of labour.

Local self-government is but a method of conserving as far as possible personal liberty. When men live together in a social community each must to a certain extent yield up his individual freedom of action for the common weal, but, by a psychological necessity which we all feel, as little as possible of this personal freedom should be so yielded up. By allowing comparatively small groups of persons to govern themselves locally as they choose, provided they do not interfere with matters which concern the larger community or communities of which they form a part, this personal liberty is secured to them as far as it practically can be so.

The combination of the smaller locally self-governed groups for purposes of government in connection with matters which concern them all as a larger community is nothing but the embodiment of the well-known principle of combination of labour treated of in political

economy. Combined action in large affairs is infinitely more effective than uncombined.

In fact, the advantage of the federal principle in securing personal liberty and effective combination is universally admitted. Further, the federal principle is for these reasons, no doubt, universally acted upon in all national and other governments of any considerable size. This unanimity in its favour makes any lengthy defence of it unnecessary here, and I shall not therefore waste the reader's time upon the matter. I shall simply refer to a few points in connection with federal government which seem to me to require a little consideration.

The rules for division and subdivision in accordance with similarity of local interests and facilities for local self-government are so varied, and are generally, indeed, so obvious in specific cases, that little treatment of them is here required. I would point out, however, that the lowest subdivisions, such as municipalities, should be small enough to enable the representatives in their governing bodies to have a personal knowledge of the matters with which they have to deal. They should be able to know of these matters by the evidence of their senses. There are certain matters in connection with government which cannot be dealt with effectively, and with due preservation of liberty to individuals, except by those who can acquaint themselves with all the circumstances by the evidence of their senses. All these things are matters which the lowest governmental subdivisions, such as municipalities, should take upon themselves. The area of municipalities will therefore vary, perhaps, more than that of the higher divisions,

because very thickly populated areas, such as those of cities, will require to be greatly circumscribed in comparison with those of rural districts, in order that the members of their governing bodies may be able to get sufficient personal knowledge, not only of all the municipal work of the area, but, as they should also do, of all the leading persons resident in it. On account of diversity of local interests, rural districts will always form separate municipalities from urban ones. A member of the governing body of a rural municipality could become personally acquainted with a very much larger area in connection with municipal work required than could a member of a city municipal body, because in the former there is infinitely less municipal work to be done acre for acre than in the latter. Hence, although great diversity in the areas of municipalities may generally be expected, they should never be allowed to be so large as to prevent the members of their governing bodies from being able to possess a direct personal knowledge of their affairs—that is to say, a knowledge not obtained second-hand through some other person.

Passing on to the higher or intermediate divisions, such as the States forming parts of a federal nation, having fixed upon the boundaries with a view to similarity of local interests, one of the chief points then in connection with their facility for self-government will be to see that they are not of so large an area or population as to prevent the members of their governing bodies from being able to acquaint themselves to the degree required with the circumstances with which they will be called upon to deal in their capacity as such representatives. They will not, as a rule, require to know of these circum-

stances personally by the evidence of their senses. Matters requiring this kind of knowledge are dealt with, according to the presumption here put forward, by the municipal representatives. What the representatives of the governing bodies of these higher divisions will require to have is rather a knowledge of the *general* circumstances of the area of the division—the *general* wants and the *general* temper of its inhabitants, its *general* physical features, and its *general* productive capacity. They will not require to know of all, or nearly all, its circumstances by the evidence of their senses; but, as they undoubtedly should be in a position to be able to have a good *general* knowledge of them, to this extent should the area of the division be limited.

CHAPTER V

REPRESENTATION

CLAUSES 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Chapter II. deal with representation.

Clause 4 simply asserts the principle of representation—a principle whose claims seem to require little urging, for this method of government by elected representatives seems to be the one universally adopted by civilised men.

The primitive method of conducting free government is that in which all concerned join for this purpose in free and open conclave. In fact, this is the primitive method adopted amongst savage tribes. But the immense waste of labour, and the cumbersomeness of the deliberative body which would be the result of the whole of the inhabitants of a State meeting thus for purposes of government, have so soon become obvious in anything like civilised society, that very early in such civilisation the representative principle has invariably come into use.

It is well for us, however, to remember that the primitive method is for all the inhabitants of the State to meet thus in a deliberative body for purposes of their own government. For by the primitive method is here meant the true and simple method according to

first principles of right and expediency. We adopt the representative system merely as a convenient substitute for it—merely to save labour. We should, therefore, always remember to make this representative system act for the ends of government as nearly as possible in the way the primitive method would act presuming we could get over the latter's one defect—namely, excessive laboriousness or cumber-someness.

The representative system, if properly carried out, may seem to have another advantage—namely, that it may enable the picked men of a community to be appointed upon the governing bodies, and thus ensure greater ability being applied to governing than if the masses undertook it themselves. This choice of the ablest men should undoubtedly be the result, as a rule, where the elections for representatives are conducted upon true principles. At present, as a general rule, they are not so conducted. But, if they were, the result they would bring about of securing the ablest men of the community as representatives would be a great advantage. It may, however, be considered an advantage falling under the head of saving of labour, for all it does is to eliminate inferior and mediocre talent from the deliberative bodies, which elimination is very conducive to that end. It may and does do more, but this also may be classed under the same head. The representative method may, and does as a rule, cause the chosen representatives individually to devote much more time to governing than the general body of the people could do, and thus they become more skilled in the work required than the general body of the people

would be. This is, by the extra effectiveness gained, a saving of labour.

Clause 5 asserts that the electors of each governmental area should vote as one constituency, each and all of the representatives in each governing body consequently representing the whole governmental area which that body represents.

This is one of the most radical alterations proposed in my scheme—radical in the sense that it is a proposed alteration of one of the most generally accepted ideas in the art of government, but an idea which, I assert, is on the face of it wholly and palpably wrong. By this erroneous system of division into and representation by numerous, or at least several, constituencies a man is elected by the voters of a certain one of these constituencies, and he is supposed to act in his representative capacity for the benefit of this particular constituency, and also for the benefit of his country or his State as a whole, notwithstanding the fact that in many cases the interests of his particular constituency and those of his country or State at large may be quite opposed. He is elected by his constituency, and this is the only part of the country that can oust him from his seat if he does not carry out its wishes. Allowing, even, that he is an honest man, and would sooner be ousted from his seat than give the slightest advantage to his constituency over his country, still, how is he to act justly when these two interests are opposed? For it must be remembered that he is not as a judge between them. He is the appointed advocate of one—the constituency—and therefore cannot justly be the judge of both. He was appointed to advocate the interests of his constituency

whenever they should clash with those of the country at large. If he was not, then what is the use of representation by constituencies? The fact is, the political immorality necessarily engendered by this method of representation by division into various constituencies or electorates is recognised by every observer of politics. That it is allowed to exist is only, I conceive, because it is generally considered to be a necessary evil.

Then, again, by it a man is elected to a seat in his country's Parliament, not because he is a statesman fit to be a representative in this national Parliament, but because he is considered a fit representative of a certain constituency or small portion of his country. In other words, by this system men fit only for municipal boards are elected to do work of national importance in national Parliaments. Undoubtedly a certain proportion of able statesmen are elected to their country's Parliament under this divisional system of constituencies, but not necessarily so, and, even when so, no thanks are due to the system. It is in spite of it. And it is by reason of it that true statesmen so seldom gain the positions due to them.

Finally, by this system a statesman having the confidence of an overwhelming majority of his countrymen is liable to be rejected from his country's councils simply because the one comparatively paltry constituency for which he has been nominated happens to want confidence in him; not only this, but rather because, perhaps, only a bare majority of the electors of this constituency are politically opposed to him.

The reason that this baneful system has been so universally adopted from ancient right through to modern

times seems to me not far to seek. It is because the true federal principle, and the full measure of local self-government therein involved, have never been fully realised nor acted upon. Federal government has been adopted to a greater or less extent all the world over, but in a very unsystematic and imperfect form. Local self-government always has been, and always is, too much restricted. To make up for this—for this want of full measure of local self-government—localities have been allowed special representatives in the governing bodies of the larger areas of which they form a part. In other words, local rights have been secured in a sort of half-and-half manner—namely, partly by locally elected governing bodies, and partly by these being allowed to send locally elected representatives to the central governing bodies.

This is palpably a wrong method. Local government should be undertaken by locally elected bodies which have to deal with these local affairs only. Each locality, having thus full measure of local self-government, should not require local representation in the higher government of which it forms a part.

In the method I propose the proper result is brought about. Presuming a nation to be divided into States, and these States further subdivided into municipalities; then, according to my system, each municipality would have all possible freedom allowed it for its local self-government, and, therefore, could not require to send any locally elected representatives to the State legislature. Similarly with the State. Each State, having full local autonomy, could not possibly require any State representatives in the national Parliament. For, by the

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presumption, it has been allowed every possible freedom for governing itself as long as it does not clash with the work of the national government. On this presumption it cannot possibly get any more freedom of local government by sending any special representatives to the national Parliament.

Then, looking at the matter from the point of view of the higher governments, the uselessness, and indeed disadvantage, of the existing system at once become obvious. For the national Parliament can have no concern with matters which it has already decided concern only the States; and, having for this reason allowed each of the States full local autonomy in these matters, the national Parliament can receive no possible advantage, but only disadvantage, from being composed of locally or State elected representatives.

Similarly, the State governments can have no concern with the purely local matters of the municipalities into which they are divided. This, by the hypothesis of the case, is wholly taken from the States by municipal self-government. Therefore there can be no possible reason why the State legislatures should be formed of representatives elected specially by the various localities or municipalities into which the States are divided.

For practically a similar reason—namely, that the municipalities are, by the presumption, made small enough for detailed local self-government—there can be no reason why they should be divided into several constituencies, such as wards or ridings.

And, as there is no reason why this local representation by constituencies should obtain, there is every reason why it should not. It should not, because it is

notoriously and palpably conducive to political immorality; because it necessitates representatives with capacity fit for dealing with mere local matters being entrusted with affairs of far higher import; because it tends to prevent men of high ability from succeeding to the higher positions of government; and because, generally, it does not in any satisfactory manner help to the ends for which it was created.

By the abolition of all election by means of division into constituencies, combined with full freedom of local self-government, as I would propose, great advantages would result. The national Parliament, being elected by the nation at large, without any regard to localities, would undoubtedly consist of most of the greatest statesmen the nation could produce, for it must be obvious that under this system none but the most prominent men of the nation could have a chance of election. So with the State. As one constituency it would elect to its Parliament the very ablest of its statesmen, for there would be no petty local matters for men of inferior ability to trade upon.

A representative, either national, State, or municipal, would have no irreconcilable claims upon him as such representative. He would have a straightforward and uncompromising course to act upon. He would be a representative duly and wholly responsible to, and punishable by, the nation, the State, or the municipality, as the case might be. There would be no such thing as being supposed to act for two of these and yet being liable to punishment by expulsion by only one of them.

Then, by this system, true statesmen would be produced with much greater facility than is generally the

case now, for there would be a natural gradation. Young men of ability, inclined to serve their country as legislators, would naturally, as a rule, be elected first to the municipal councils; then the best of these, as they gained experience, would be elected to the State legislatures; and the best of these, again, as they arrived at maturity in statesmanship, to the national Parliament.

In thus dispensing, however, with division into constituencies some method of proportional election must be adopted, otherwise a bare majority of the electors might fill with their nominees every seat in the legislative or governing bodies, leaving the minority, though perhaps almost equal in numbers to the majority, wholly unrepresented. There are several methods of election having for their object the realisation of proportional representation, and which are quite effective enough for all practical purposes in attaining this desired result. It would be unnecessary, and consequently out of place, for me to discuss these various methods here, as their authors have duly published them. Suffice it to say that one or other of them should be adopted in connection with my proposed scheme of representation.

Clause 7 asserts that all governing bodies should be unicameral—should consist of only one house or chamber—and Clause 8 asserts that the members of this unicameral governing body should be elected, not all at one time, but by batches with certain periods intervening.

The natural presumption is undoubtedly in favour of the unicameral as against the bicameral system of representation, for the former is the simpler. The bi-

cameral system should therefore yield to the unicameral, unless it can be shown to be the superior system.

The claims put forward on behalf of the bicameral system are well known. They are simply that delay in legislation is conducive to safety, and that the popular branch of the legislature requires steadying by the conservatism of a second chamber, which is elected on a basis of greater intelligence, brought about by the adoption of indirect election, or election on a restricted suffrage, or hereditary right, or some such method.

In all countries possessing free government, and having a second legislative chamber, either elected on a restricted suffrage or hereditary, the popular will must eventually prevail. The second chamber can only delay legislation. If the popular will is determined upon any matter for any length of time, the second chamber must yield.

A second chamber elected on a popular basis, but by indirect election, is naturally more powerful than one formed by a restricted suffrage or some such partially or wholly exclusive system. But even this popular second chamber, although itself improved by the method of indirect election, is never so powerful as if it were directly elected. Nor indeed is it advisable that it should be, for by the indirect method of its election it is not so amenable to the popular wish as if its election were direct.

By the method I propose, of a single chamber elected as by one constituency and by batches with periods intervening, I maintain that all the necessary qualities now supposed to lie in two chambers working on the bicameral principle would be combined in the single

one constituted as I propose. I maintain that this single chamber thus elected and constituted would be wholly and directly a popular one, and would yet be as efficient in guarding against the danger of hasty or ill-considered popular legislation as the staunchest Conservative could wish. I maintain, in fact, that it would be both more popular and at the same time more conservative of vested interests than any bicameral Parliament now in existence.

For it would be wholly and, directly popular, being elected by the direct vote of the people; and being elected by the nation, the State, or the municipality, as the case might be, as in single constituency, it is obvious that it would be as intelligent a body as could possibly be got together by any method of election direct or indirect, for it must be obvious that only the most prominent and able men would be elected, or even nominated, for that matter, with any reasonable chance of election.

Then, on the other hand, being elected by batches of only a half, or a third, or a fourth at a time, with considerable periods intervening between these elections, it would be as independent of any sudden popular outburst as we could possibly imagine. It could, and would naturally from its composition, delay when desirable the execution of hasty popular wishes as well as, or better than, the most conservative second chamber now in existence. It would be strongly inclined to oppose these rash popular outbursts for the very same reason that the second or upper chambers of the bicameral system are inclined to oppose them—namely, because its composition, as effected by the method of electing its members, would be the result and embodiment, not of

any particular popular outburst, but of the eventual and calmly expressed will of the people. This enforcement of delay is the only limit the best second chambers of the bicameral system can put upon the popular wish; and the single chamber, as I propose it, would be more powerful for this purpose than any of the second chambers of the bicameral system, for it could act with a boldness engendered by the feeling that it was a body representing the settled and calmly evolved feelings of the people as a whole. It would be more powerful in this respect than those second chambers like the Senate of the United States, although these latter are also representative of the whole people; for, being elected *directly* by the people, and being the *only* chamber, it would be still more popular, and consequently more powerful, than any one of such second chambers, which are, after all, only part of the legislature and formed by indirect election. And it would be infinitely more powerful than those second chambers formed on a basis of restricted suffrage; for these chambers do not represent the people, but only a class, and consequently must necessarily act with a certain amount of timidity. Such chambers are always necessarily weak by reason of their natural unpopularity. They are, in fact, more than weak. To a very great extent they defeat, by their natural unpopularity, the very ends for which they are supposed to exist—namely, the preservation of the conservative interest, or the stability of the social fabric. They do this because they are an irritant to the popular feelings. The masses always feel that they are being unjustly treated in the fact that a certain exclusive class has a second chamber all to itself—a chamber

which is in the habit of, and chiefly exists for the purpose of, opposing the popular wishes. Anything of this kind, which gives any exclusive political privilege to any one class of the community, always, to a certain extent, defeats its own ends, by thus raising the popular sentiment against this very class that it would wish to protect.

Not so would it be with the single chamber I propose. This would be wholly and absolutely popular. At the same time, by the exclusion of comparatively paltry local representation from its composition, it would be infinitely more intelligent, and consequently more circumspect in its actions, than the popular chambers of bicameral legislatures as now generally existing. It would combine this popularity with a true desire, engendered by the gradual method of its election, to carry out only the well-matured popular wishes.

Finally, there are advantages possessed by the unicameral over the bicameral system of government which, I think, will be made obvious by a mere reference to them.

The unicameral system is more simple and saves labour. It does so from the fact, that by it measures require discussion in only one chamber instead of two, and that only half the number of representatives are, on the average, required for one chamber that would be required for two. The unicameral system is less cumbersome, and can much sooner secure finality in legislation. Lastly, the unicameral system avoids duality of responsibility. In the bicameral system legislation is always undertaken in a slipshod manner, due to the fact of this duality of responsibility between the two

chambers. But a single chamber will always be careful of its measures, because it knows that it is wholly responsible for them. It feels that there is no other body to patch them up or in any way interfere with them. This feeling of fixed responsibility will, moreover, also naturally tend to make the individual representatives more careful and thoughtful in their work as such representatives.

I may state, before concluding this chapter, that the method of electing representatives by batches is one which is fully in accordance with first principles. I deem it advisable to state so, because it may at first sight appear that it is not so. Remembering that, according to the first principles of government, the whole people as one body should meet in deliberation, it might be said that Why, in the representative system, should the people, by this method of election by batches, forego that power, which they would possess in the primitive system, of carrying out their wishes at once and upon the spot, however hastily these wishes might be formed? To this I answer, that I would have no fear of allowing the people to carry out their wishes at once if they were in the habit of meeting and governing themselves directly, instead of through representatives. But since they have decided to govern themselves through elected representatives, the whole case is altered. By this action the people themselves have ceased to take an active part in the deliberation, and consequently have ceased to be well acquainted with the details of their government. They have deputed others, for the sake of convenience, to do their work of governing for them. Now, according to first principles of all action, it is very inadvisable in

all practical affairs to have any divided authority. If you appoint a person to do a certain thing for you, let him do it. Do not be continually interfering with him in his method of doing it. Rather than act thus, it would be far better that you should do the whole thing yourself, otherwise it is a case of neither one thing nor the other. He is not doing the work, nor are you. If, however, you are going to delegate the work to him, all you should do is to give him his general instructions and see that the general result is what you want, but do not interfere with his methods of detail in doing it.

Exactly so should it be with representative bodies. The people, by adopting the representative system, have delegated their governmental work, and have consequently ceased to be expert in its details, although fully cognisant of the general results they require. By the method of election by batches the people prevent themselves from suddenly removing their representatives by reason of differences of opinion in details, but at the same time retain the power of wholly removing them in a reasonable time if they do not produce desired results. In short, by this means the representative body is made as like as possible in its nature to what a governing body composed of the whole of the people would be if the people were always in the habit of thus conducting personally the affairs of their government.

CHAPTER VI

REPRESENTATIVE BODIES

CLAUSES 9, 10, 11, and 12 deal with some additional points in connection with the constitution and working of representative bodies. Clause 9 asserts that the representatives in each of the governing bodies should not be more numerous than is absolutely necessary to ensure that body as a whole having a good general knowledge of the matters with which it has to deal.

The British Parliament, including the two houses, the Lords and the Commons, consists of over twelve hundred members. I feel sure that the least consideration will show that *one* hundred, at the very most, would amply suffice; in fact, that one hundred would do the work much more expeditiously, and with less confusion, than does that cumbersome body of twelve hundred.

Not only the British, but nearly all existing national Parliaments, consist of far too many representatives. This, I think, is due, in the first place, to the habit that has grown up of local representation by division into constituencies. This habit, having come into very general use for reasons which I have before explained, has caused each locality, or constituency, sending re-

representatives to the governing body to be very jealous of being outnumbered in the matter of representatives by any of the other constituencies. Hence arises a very general tendency to keep up the number of representatives. Then, in the second place, the bicameral system increases the number of representatives, not only from the fact that in this case two houses have to be peopled with members instead of one, but also because there is a similar jealousy between the two houses, and also between the two classes that they respectively represent, in case the one should be unduly outnumbered in the matter of representation by the other. In the third place, by the system of representation by locality, more representatives are really actually required to ensure a general knowledge of the whole work of the country, or whole area to be governed, than would be the case of election by one single constituency, because in the latter case there would be full choice of all available candidates, but there is not in the former. Finally, the general lack of appreciation of the federal principle of giving the fullest measure of local self-government to the inferior governments, causes an immense and greatly disproportionate amount of work to be imposed upon the higher governments with the result that these higher governments do certainly require a reasonably large number of representatives. That this disproportion actually exists can be seen at once by noticing the difference in the amount of work required from different governing bodies. Municipal representatives have, as a rule, comparatively very little work to do. They meet comparatively seldom, and their sittings are but short; whereas the State or national Parliaments, which,

as a rule, sit many hours nearly every day during many months of the year, and which, besides, do an immense amount of work through their various committees, really impose a very great deal of work upon their members, and for this reason they certainly require a greater number of members than if much of their work were undertaken, as it should be, by the municipalities.

Thus, even if we allow that, with its method of representation by localities, its bicameral system, and its insufficiency of local government, one hundred members might scarcely suffice for the British Parliament, I think there can be no doubt but that, under the system I propose, with a unicameral Parliament elected by one constituency, and with full local self-government conceded to all its parts, this number would be ample, and perhaps more than ample, for the central government of the British Empire; for, with no petty local details, but only broad national matters to attend to, surely this number would be amply sufficient to ensure the inclusion of all the best available talent and knowledge required for the work to be done.

That the smallest number of representatives compatible with the efficiency of the representative body as a whole is the desirable object in this connection should go without saying. For to send a much larger number of representatives to a governing body than is actually required is a source of very great unnecessary expense and unnecessary labour, not only in connection with the expenses of, and labour undertaken by, the representatives themselves, but also in connection with their election, and their remuneration, or general necessary expenditure on the public account while

acting in their representative capacity. And, further than this, the greatest evil of all in connection with this excess of representatives is the fact that it makes the governing bodies cumbersome and unwieldy. It makes them talkative and unmanageable bodies, instead of working and systematical ones.

Clause 10 asserts that the term for which representatives should be elected should not be so long as to allow them to lose touch with those who elected them, nor so short as to prevent them having a reasonable chance of accomplishing results from their work as representatives.

This clause is simply the embodiment again of that principle which directs that, having once appointed a person to do a thing for you, you should leave him alone as much as possible until he has had time to do it. It would be neither one thing nor the other—neither representation nor non-representation—if we made the term of office of our representatives so exceedingly short as to give them no reasonable chance of being able to present us with general results from their work; and, on the other hand, it would be like giving up our freedom to them, instead of merely asking them to represent our interests, if we made their term so long that they might cease to care about our opinion of them. It is for this reason that we should try to strike some medium which will meet the case. There is no difficulty about striking this medium with enough approximation for all practical purposes in the specific cases with which, in actual government, we are called upon to deal. In the concrete example in Chapter III. I have given a rough idea of the length of terms that I would suggest under

the supposed circumstances. As will be noticed from this, the term of office is longer in the higher governments than in the lower. The reason I suggest this is simply because the higher the government the greater will be the affairs with which it has to deal, and consequently the longer, as a rule, will be the time required to develop them. The affairs of a national government will be much greater undertakings than those of a municipal government, and consequently will, as a rule, take much longer to complete. For this reason the term of office of the representatives of a nation should be considerably longer than in the case of a municipality.

Where elections take place periodically by batches, as in the system I propose, the term of office can be longer than when the whole body is elected at one time, for the simple reason that, when elected by batches, the touch between the electors and their representatives is almost continuously being kept up by these periodical opportunities of partially renewing the representative body.

Clause 11 states that representatives should be merely refunded their expenses as such, not paid a salary, or any such sum that would make it of pecuniary advantage to them to act as representatives.

It is but just that we should refund to our representatives the expenses they are put to in acting on our behalf. But that we should pay them as our salaried servants is quite another matter. The usual and obvious reason urged against the latter course is that it causes men to seek to be representatives, not from any desire to serve the electors as seems to them honest, but simply for their own private pecuniary ends.

It tends, therefore, to make them, by means fair or foul, anxious to retain their seats by acting in whatever way will secure them these positions, irrespective of whether or not they may consider their course of action to be for the ultimate good of those who elected them. Viewed from the point of first principles, the practice is equally reprehensible. For government may be divided into two distinct parts—first, the elected governing bodies; and, secondly, the public service. The work of government is thus carried out by our elected representatives directing the work of our paid public servants. We pay our public servants salaries for doing our work for us, but our representatives are distinctly not our public servants. They are appointed merely to give instructions to and superintend our public servants on our behalf. They represent *us*—they are really *ourselves* in contrast to our servants. To pay our representatives salaries would be like paying ourselves to superintend the work of our own servants.

If, then, our representatives be refunded merely what they are out of pocket in acting as such, this is all they are justly entitled to. For the time and trouble they take in acting for us they are amply rewarded in the honour which accrues to them by being elected to the positions of representatives. By a beneficent law of human nature men will work, and will endure even up to sacrificing their lives if necessary, for no other reward than that of honour from their fellow beings. There never is, nor ever will be, any trouble about getting enough fit persons to represent us, without any pecuniary inducement, in our governing bodies; and any man who is cynical enough to attach no honour to the confidence

thus placed by his fellow beings in an elected representative is for this reason himself unfit to be a representative. Those, therefore, who would not represent us unless we paid them salaries, because seeing no honour in it, are, by reason of their temperament thus exhibited, wholly unfit to represent us. Such men are, however, very few.

As a corollary to non-payment of representatives, it follows that the business of the representative bodies should be so arranged as to interfere as little as possible with the private occupation of its members. Where practicable, for instance, and if convenient to its members, these bodies should meet as far as possible in other than the usual hours of private business. Most of the Parliaments of the British Empire sit in the evenings, thus allowing their members time to attend to their respective private businesses.

Clause 12 asserts that representative bodies should conduct their deliberations according to the well-known and necessary rules generally adopted by deliberative bodies, but should avoid encumbering themselves with any formalities which are not absolutely necessary.

This clause requires very little explanation, and, I should think, also very little defence. I inserted it merely as a protest against some of the cumbersome and unnecessary formalities which are retained in many national governments. These formalities scarcely require enumeration. Suffice it to say that all such as are not included in the ordinary simple rules of debate are unnecessary. I am not one to cavil, as a rule, at the imperfections of the British Constitution, recognising as I do, in spite of its imperfections, the valuable service

it has rendered to the race ; but I must protest against many of its 'glorious fictions,' which are nothing, after all, but cumbersome formalities. It has had, and still has, many other kinds of unnecessary formalities: notably so was that one, only recently abolished by the wise adoption of the *clôture*, whereby it was considered necessary to allow an individual member to go on talking for ever, if he were able and were so inclined. Its rules of courtesy are also absurd. Instead of adhering to the old and now meaningless forms of centuries ago, it should suffice on this account if deliberative bodies in all cases, in whatever time or place, should simply insist upon their members adopting the conventional forms of politeness then and there in general use.

CHAPTER VI

THE EXECUTIVE

CLAUSE 13 reads as follows :—

Each representative body should elect from among its members a president and a vice-president. The former should preside at its deliberations, and act for it in all cases where necessary when it is not in actual session. The vice-president's duty should be to act, when required, as substitute for the president.

By this clause the executive power is vested in the president.

The meaning of executive power in government, and consequently the duties of 'the executive,' or body in which this power is concentrated, seem generally to be neither very clearly defined nor well understood.

The most generally accepted, but erroneous, idea of the matter appears to be, that the executive is a sort of intermediate body acting between the representative body and the salaried service under its control, the executive being responsible to the representative body for the work of the salaried service. This is not only the most generally accepted idea upon the matter, but it seems to be the idea which is acted upon by most national governments.

But the principle is quite wrong. No intermediate

body is required between the representative body and the public service. Where it is in use it serves only to clog the machinery of government. It prevents the true fixing of responsibility, which is one of the most necessary matters in the conduct of social enterprises. The cabinets, or executives, of most national governments possess a notoriety in this respect. The executives of the British type are cases in point. Here we have the technical work of the civil service controlled and interfered with by an ever-changing body of amateurs, to whom the professional heads of departments must bow in every detail. This body of amateurs is supposed to confer with Parliament upon the technical work of the public service. The Parliament refuses to confer at first hand with the professional, and therefore presumably skilled, heads of the various departments of the public service, but must get all its information and give out all its instructions second-hand through this band of unskilled amateurs. Strictly speaking, the heads of the various branches of the public service are supposed to be responsible to the respective ministers in charge of the branches; these ministers are responsible to the cabinet as a whole; and the cabinet as a whole to Parliament. But so inconsistent is the arrangement—so impossible is it to make an amateur responsible for shortcomings in technical matters—that common sense cannot make him so. Yet the amateur known as the cabinet minister has the power of interfering with the technical branch under his control, in fact is expected partly to manage it; and when Parliament or the cabinet, recognising the futility of holding this amateur responsible, tries to shift the responsibility on

to the professional head of the branch, this official has always the excuse, and a very reasonable one, that he cannot be held responsible for results, because he is so often interfered with by the minister. In short, this difficulty of fixing responsibility between the cabinet minister and the permanent head of the department under this minister's control is one of the primary causes of the generally admitted inefficiency of the public service. We have no reason to think that there is anything in connection with the personality of the civil service itself which is to blame for its admitted inefficiency. Nor can we say that cabinet ministers are deficient in ability. On the contrary, they are, as a rule, the ablest of our statesmen; and when I taunt the system with setting amateurs to rule professionals, I do not wish in any way to detract from the claims of general ability due to cabinet ministers; but what I wish to point out is the absurdity of the position they are placed in, and the absurdity of expecting them to do well in it, whatever amount of general ability they may possess; for it is obviously impossible for them, amateurs as they are, to superintend technical work. Thus, it is not the personal inefficiency of either the civil servants or the members of the cabinet that is the cause of the inefficiency of the public service, but rather the absurdity of the method whereby duties are imposed in such a way as to make it impossible to fix responsibility.

Another fault in connection with this kind of intermediate executive is that it causes the public service to be too far removed from the representative body, and consequently from the people themselves. The people's

representatives cannot control the public service except through the cabinet of ministers, which then has to act through its several ministers before these latter can duly communicate with their respective departments.

In contrast to this false, cumbersome, and unsystematic form of executive, the true form is, I think, that which I have laid down in the clause quoted at the beginning of this chapter.

The fact is, there should be no intermediate body between the representative body and its staff of servants. The president of the representative body should merely act as its substitute when required, but in no other way. This is all there should be of what is known as an executive. The president's work in this connection would be in no way intermediate—simply substitutional. The representative body cannot always be in session. The president is its representative while it is not in session, and he therefore acts for it in this case. Again, it would be inconvenient for all the members of the representative body to sign every document that might require evidence upon its face of the sanction of that body. The president, as its appointed substitute in matters of this sort, having merely satisfied himself of its sanction, either tacitly or openly expressed, signs these documents on behalf of the representative body. In fact the representative body may sanction his doing many things like this, which it is most convenient should be left to one man to execute.

But in no other sense should there be any executive power vested in any person or persons intermediate between the representative body and its permanent staff of servants.

That the president should combine the apparently unconnected offices of chairman of its meetings and executive substitute of the representative body is explained by the fact that the person most fitted for the one office is generally the most fitted for the other. A chairman of a deliberative body should be appointed because he combines as far as possible the qualities of being the ablest and most impartial man in it. He should, in short, be the most representative man in it—the man in whose person are combined in the greatest degree the general feelings or sentiments of the body. These very same qualities are obviously those required for acting as its substitute in executive work.

That this is the correct view of what is known as executive work in government, and that this is vested in the elected president of the representative body, is amply borne out by the analogy of smaller governmental institutions. In all our smaller institutions this is the simple method adopted. In our literary, or social, or sporting clubs, and in our municipal institutions, the elected representative body simply elects its president, who presides as its chairman, and acts as its substitute or representative when necessary. No other form of executive intermediate between the representative body and its servants ever seems to be adopted in these smaller institutions, and the plan works smoothly and never seems to be complained of. Why, then, do we depart from it in our higher branches of national government? I can see no reason, except it be that it has been brought about by acting upon that notion which most people seem to be imbued with—namely, that great affairs require complicated, cumbersome,

and unsystematic means to ensure their due execution.

The framers of the constitution of the United States of America vested the executive power in the President, but they could not have recognised the fact that these executive powers were merely a delegation to a substitute. For, if they had, they would have required that the President should have been elected by Congress itself, for it would obviously not be fair to expect a representative body to be responsible for the acts of its substitute if it had not the power to appoint that substitute. Undoubtedly the representative body should be held responsible to its electors for the conduct of its president when acting as its substitute, just as it holds the president responsible to itself; and therefore it should, of course, be itself allowed to appoint its president.

The uselessness, and in fact evils, of an intermediate executive power will, I think, be made still more evident when, in the chapter on the public service, I come to explain more fully the direct connection which I think should exist between this service and the representative body which controls it.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUFFRAGE

CLAUSE 14 asserts that every person of either sex, of mature age, of sound mind, not under criminal conviction by law, having a personal interest in the affairs dealt with by any government, and contributing towards its expenses, should be allowed a voice in electing representatives to its governing body.

This is simply a statement of the principle of universal suffrage.

This right of every person to have a voice in government is a logical deduction from premisses of incontestable truth. For, presuming normal conditions of soundness of mind, absence of criminality, and so forth, the syllogism is simply this:—Every man should be allowed a voice in matters which concern himself. His government is a matter which concerns himself. Therefore, his government is a matter in which he should be allowed a voice. The substitution of woman for man in the premisses cannot alter their truth; and with this alteration the inevitable conclusion is, that she should have similar rights in this respect.

We may safely dismiss with very little discussion the paragraphs of the clause we are dealing with which require mature age, sound mind, and absence of crimi-

nality as qualifications for the right to participate in government. That unsound mind and criminality should debar from the right of voting is a proposition which I think will be agreed to as a matter of ordinary common sense without further discussion. I would merely point out, however, that punishment suffered and over for a crime should be considered to have blotted it out. That children should not have a voice in electing representatives goes without saying, for their state of dependence and immature minds necessarily preclude such an idea. What age we are to fix upon as that which is likely to strike the advent of independence and maturity is hard exactly to say, simply because these qualities do not arrive all at once, but by degrees, nor necessarily do they arrive at the same age in different individuals. In practice, however, there seems to be no difficulty, nor much difference of opinion upon the subject. The age at which independence and maturity of mind are generally judged to commence seems to be the average one at which men or women go out into the world to act independently and with supposed mature judgment on their own behalf. This seems to be a common-sense view. In British communities the age generally so fixed is twenty-one years, and with this I have no fault to find.

With reference to the concession of the suffrage to women, there can be no logical doubt of their right to it if they desire it. But, as matters stand at the present day in most civilised countries, women do not appear, as a rule, to desire the right. Undoubtedly a few of them of what are called 'advanced ideas'—perhaps a few scores in each country—seem to do so, and are not

backward in urging their claims. But the number of these is so infinitely small that we cannot take them into consideration for practical purposes. In the practical affairs of life we must often ignore infinitesimal quantities as being practically non-existent. The number of women at present desiring the suffrage is a case in point in practical politics. It would undoubtedly be unwise from a practical point of view to alter the constitutions of countries at the request of an infinitesimally small number of women. The course which it seems to me should therefore be adopted is to withhold the right until some considerable number of women desire it, but whenever, if ever, this should happen, to concede it as a matter of common justice. It is not my province here to discuss the propriety or the fitness from a sentimental or from a social point of view of allowing women to vote, or to discourse in any way upon their qualifications, mental or physical, for such a right. It is sufficient for me, as a compiler of a proposed constitution and an advocate of freedom, to concede that right, which is logically unassailable, as soon as those concerned show, to any practical extent, that they desire it.

In reference to universal suffrage, or the right of every person to a voice in the management of his own affairs, the first question which seems to confront us is that of the test as to interest in the affairs of any particular government. To be entitled to a vote in the election of a governing body, it must be shown that the claimant for such has a recognised interest in the affairs with which that body deals. If there is a certain club, and you are a member of it, and have paid your sub-

scription, then you have a recognised interest in its affairs. If there is a certain company, and you are a shareholder in it, and have duly paid up the calls, you have a recognised interest in this company's affairs. In both these cases you have an undoubted right to vote at the election of their governing bodies. In these cases, also, there is no difficulty whatever about a test as to the right. The mere fact of membership and payment of the subscriptions or calls constitutes this right.

In those governmental institutions, however, whose affairs are far more general in their scope, such as municipalities, States, or nations, the test as to interest in their affairs seems not so easy of application. In fact, it is the question as to interest in these affairs that constitutes the different views as to the right of universal suffrage. Every one will agree that every person should have a voice in the management of his own affairs, but it is not so easy to agree as to whether or not certain persons *have* an interest in municipal, or State, or national affairs. It is said by the opponents of universal suffrage that a person having no real property in a country, but merely being a resident of it, has therefore no stake, or no interest, in the country, and should therefore have no vote, or no voice, in the management of its affairs. The upholders of universal suffrage, on the other hand, say that he *has* an interest in its affairs, and therefore *should* have a voice in its government.

There are cases, again, upon which both sides to the dispute seem generally to be agreed. Both sides agree that any person owning real property, or even renting such, has by this evidence a right to a vote in the election of the governing body under whose control this

property is. In fact, both parties seem to agree that in some cases these are the only persons who should be entitled to vote, for many municipalities grant the right of voting only to the ratepayers—that is, owners or occupiers of real property—these also being the only persons forced to contribute to the municipal funds. Those excluded from the right of voting in this case seem content to forego the point, knowing that this gives them immunity from contributing to the funds. The advocates and opponents of universal suffrage seem generally to agree in this case that the suffrage should be thus limited to the ratepayers.

The nature of the dispute, as shown by the general agreements and disagreements of the opposing parties, seems therefore to be in the matter of the test as to a person's interest in the affairs of his government, not as to his right to a vote presuming he can show that interest, which, if shown, settles the matter at once to the satisfaction of both parties.

Now, in the case of municipal, State, or national government the right to vote seems to me to lie in the fact either of residence or of ownership of real property, combined in both cases with contribution to the funds of the government in question. In other words, if you either reside or own real property in any governmental area, municipal, State, or national, and provided you contribute towards the funds of such government, then you are entitled to a vote for the election of its governing body.

Any person who lives in the country, even although he own no real property in it, and practically no personal property, has an undoubted interest in the con-

duct of its affairs. His interest in life is quite as great to him as that of much richer men may be to them. Since the government of his country deals with innumerable other matters than those of interest only to real property holders, it deals with matters which are of interest to him. By the amount he pays to customs duties, and in other ways, he contributes to the funds of his country's government. This contribution finally settles his claim to an interest, and consequently a voice, in its government.

In certain cases, however, there may be some little difficulty in deciding whether or not a person should be considered a resident of a certain governmental area, or whether, even allowing that he is so, the government of that area deals with matters which concern him. I pointed out that in some cases in municipal government it seemed to be generally agreed that no persons not being ratepayers should have a voice in the municipal affairs. If analysed, the reason in these cases appears to be, firstly, that it is considered that, on account of the smallness of the municipal areas, those persons other than ratepayers move about so much between different municipalities that they cannot be considered to be residents of any particular one, and consequently to have any particular interest in its affairs; and, secondly, that the work of the municipalities is of interest to ratepayers only, and not to other residents; or both these reasons combined may be, and very likely generally are, the explanation of the fact of the municipal franchise being often thus limited to the ratepayers—that is, owners or occupiers of real property.

As to residence in any particular municipality, there should be no difficulty about instituting a test of sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes. In the first place, where the claim is thus based upon a residential qualification, it should entitle the claimant to a vote in only one municipality, for the simple reason that it is a physical necessity that a person can be a resident of only one place at one time, and therefore at any one time—at any one election time, for instance—he cannot possibly claim qualification on a residential basis for more than one place. It being understood, then, that residential qualification can be claimed for only one municipality by the same person at the same time, the test of this residential qualification seems a simple matter. All that is necessary is that some reasonable common-sense evidence should be given that the claimant may be considered a *bonâ fide* resident of the municipality. If he is not the occupier of a house, for instance, he should be required, if necessary, to make a statutory declaration at the poll that he has resided at least for a certain portion of the last year, or last six months, within the municipal area. A method of this sort, or any other method that might better commend itself to the authorities concerned, could easily be instituted for the purpose of deciding the residential claim.

The test as to whether a particular municipality deals with affairs which concern others than the real property holders seems also easy of practical application. Let us imagine a municipality which deals with affairs that obviously concern no one except its real property holders. Let us then imagine this municipality extending the scope of its work until it deals with

affairs which are of undoubted interest to others of its residents besides its real property holders. We should then, without doubt, see an agitation amongst these non-property-holding residents for a voice in the municipal government. It is only a matter of the municipal government dealing with affairs of sufficient interest to these non-ratepaying residents, and they would thus agitate for a vote, even knowing that by so doing they would be required to contribute towards its funds, from which they had previously enjoyed an immunity. This agitation, therefore, combined with willingness to contribute fairly according to their means to the expense of government, seems to me to constitute a proof that these residents so agitating have an interest in the affairs with which that government concerns itself.

In short, then, I maintain that residence within the governmental area of any government instituted for general purposes, combined with willingness to contribute fairly towards its expenses, is sufficient practical evidence of personal interest in that government's affairs, and this interest should entitle the resident to a voice in the management of those affairs.

But it is not only residence that should carry a claim to the franchise. A person might obviously reside in one governmental area, and, by the possession of property in another, might be equally or even more interested in the affairs of the latter. He might own property in several governmental areas—in several municipalities, for instance. If he did, he would obviously be personally interested in the affairs of each of these municipalities, and for this reason he should undoubtedly be allowed a vote in each, seeing, of course,

that he would have contributed to the funds of each by taxation on these properties or leaseholds. To grant him this vote in each of these municipalities is as much and obviously his right as, supposing he were a shareholder in several different companies, it would be his obvious right to have a vote in electing the governing bodies of each of these companies. In the same way, a person owning or being in possession of real property in several States, or in several nations, should obviously be allowed a vote in each of these, irrespective of where he personally resides.

From the foregoing explanations it must be, of course, obvious that my interpretation of universal suffrage is simply the concession of the right of every person to a voice in the management of his or her own affairs. If this simple interpretation be taken as the true one, and it is based upon first principles of the most obvious truth, there should be no difficulty about its application.

Clause 15 states that the qualifications for representatives should be the same as for the electors.

The question is, Why should there be any difference in such qualifications? There seems to me to be no reason. In fact, it seems to me that, if you once grant that certain persons have a right to vote in the election of a certain governmental body, you therefore at once concede the right of each of these persons to a seat in this governmental body if his fellow electors choose to put him there and if he chooses to sit. And, moreover, by the same act you concede the right of these electors to choose any representative they may wish from among themselves.

For to limit the field from which to choose repre-

sentatives is practically the same thing as to limit the franchise. For how can a certain class be adequately represented in any representative body if members of that class be excluded from seats in such body? A non-property holder's vote, for instance, would be of comparatively little use to him as a defence against the influence of property holders if none but property holders were allowed a seat in the representative body for which he had a vote.

In many of the governments now existing it is stipulated that the qualifying age for representatives must be greater than that for the electors. For instance, when twenty-one years is fixed as the lowest age at which persons may vote, some greater age, such as twenty-five or thirty years, is stated as the lowest at which they may be returned as representatives.

This is done with the object, of course, of ensuring greater maturity of judgment in the representatives, and this object is certainly a laudable one in its intention. But it is undoubtedly, like all other restrictions of this sort, equivalent to a partial restriction of the franchise, and for this reason should not be tolerated. It is also, I think, of little moment in the matter of improving the representative body; for, having decided that a certain age, twenty-one years for instance, is one at which the electors should be possessed of mature judgment, surely we should therefore be able to trust them in the election of their representatives as far as the age, as well as other qualifications, of these latter are concerned.

Similarly with the question of the eligibility of women to representative bodies. The same arguments

which apply to the matter of according them the franchise appear to me to apply to their eligibility to seats in representative bodies. As long as only an infinitesimally small number of them desire to so act, it would be a matter of practical inconvenience to allow them to do so. But, if by their general wish they have received the franchise, then, by the same right, if any considerable number of them so desire it, they should be allowed to act as representatives. I do not offer any opinion upon their fitness to act as representatives, or upon the propriety of their appearance as such. By allowing them, as a body, to decide whether or not they should be conceded the franchise, as well as the right to sit in representative bodies, they themselves are constituted the judges in this matter. Surely they are the best judges; and they are, by this means, allowed, as everyone should be, to have a voice in matters which concern themselves.

Clause 16 states that in each government each elector should have one vote, and no more.

Those who claim the contrary—namely, that some of the electors should have more than one vote—do so on the ground of extra property qualification. In the government of any country, for instance, they say that the person who has more property than another, or has property while another has none, has therefore a greater interest in the country's affairs, and should therefore have a stronger voice in its government.

This contention I deny. I maintain that we have no reason to think, as a rule, and certainly no means, even approximate, of proving, that any resident citizen having less property than another under the control

of any government has therefore any less interest in this government's affairs.

The most extreme case in favour of those who advocate the opposite view—the case which seems most of all to stand as a proof of the truth of their contention—is in the matter of the difference of property held in joint-stock companies by the different shareholders. In a company of this sort it may be asserted that a person having a hundred shares has far more interest, and should therefore have far more votes, in its government than one who has only ten shares.

But even in this case I deny this extra right. The person with ten shares may have his all invested in them, while he with the hundred shares may be a millionaire whose hundred shares in this company are but an infinitely small portion of his total wealth. In this case it would be the person with the hundred shares who might be said to have less interest in the welfare of the company than the one with ten shares; and it would quite probably, therefore, be the former with his hundred shares who would be inclined to be the more reckless and less careful of the two in the management of this company's affairs.

Moreover, allowing that these two shareholders, with their ten and hundred shares respectively, were otherwise of equal wealth, I still assert that they should have an equal voice in the company's management. For, irrespective of the difference of the amounts they have each invested in it, the desire to have the company managed to the best advantage must be equally present in both. If you have ten pounds invested in anything, your whole desire is to make this sum as productive

as possible, just in exactly the same way as if you had a hundred pounds invested. The productiveness or unproductiveness of the hundred pounds would undoubtedly make more difference to you than that of the ten pounds; but, nevertheless, in either case the whole desire, the whole object, of your investment was to obtain the most productive result. The motive of your vote in the management of a company in which you had only ten pounds invested—the whole object of your recording it—would be for no other reason than for the company's good as far as you could judge it. You would not alter your vote if you had a hundred instead of ten pounds invested. In other words, in all cases as far as shareholders of a company are concerned their interests are the same—namely, the realisation of the best returns from their respective investments, whatever the amount of these investments may be. When we talk of 'interests being different' in this connection we use the word 'interest' in another sense, for by it in this latter case we simply mean the actual amount of the investment or property, which is, of course, different in respect to the different shareholders. But noting this ambiguity of the word, and using it in the former sense, where it means the subjective importance of the issues involved, we must confess that in all cases, as far as for practical purposes we can ascertain them, the interests of the different shareholders are identical.

But, if it is difficult to fix any difference of interest as between shareholders in a joint-stock company, it is infinitely more difficult to do so in other institutions. In the former case we have at least a definite number and value of shares allotted to each shareholder, which

may tempt us to think that, as a rule, the shareholders will be interested in its affairs in some approximate proportion to the value of their shares. But in other institutions, such as literary or sporting clubs, it would be obviously still more difficult to make the adjustment, for who could fix the amount of interest taken by each member in the affairs of the club? Who, at any rate, could fix this amount with any mathematical approximation to a corresponding allotment of votes?

But if it be difficult—in fact in practice so difficult as never to be done—to say that in the government of a club of this sort one member should have more power than another, how much more difficult must it be to assert any such difference in a government instituted for such general purposes as that of the control of a municipality, or a State, or a nation! In a cricket club we may perhaps imagine that the best or the most enthusiastic cricketers have more interest in the club's welfare than the other members have. It does not by any means follow so, still we might be tempted to think so, because there is but one primary object concerned here, namely, cricket, and it might appear to us that the best and most enthusiastic cricketers would be likely to have the greatest interest in the club's affairs. But in the government of a municipality, or a State, or a nation, the affairs dealt with are infinitely more general. To state that property holders have any greater interest in the general affairs of a country than those who hold no property is a very rash assertion. Property is only one of the innumerable affairs dealt with by the government of a country. I may own no real property in any country, and, if I had some strong reasons

for knowing that I would never own such, I might on this account have no interest in my country's affairs as far as real property was concerned. But, on the other hand, I may have some other interests in my country's affairs that many owners of real property have not. Irrespective of innumerable general interests that I may have at heart—of my interest, for instance, in the laws and their administration in connection with taxation, postal and telegraph service, the army and navy, coinage, patents, copyright, banks, marriage, criminal and civil jurisdiction, police, drink traffic, religious toleration, and so on—irrespective of all these I might, and probably have, as direct a personal interest in the legislation of my country as any property holder has. As a lawyer, or a doctor, or a tradesman, as a soldier, or a sailor, or whatever else my calling may be, I may require or be opposed to certain legislative reforms directly bearing on this my calling, as important to me as any legislation may be to any owner of real property. So innumerable, in short, are the affairs dealt with by a country's government that it is quite impossible to say that any one person in it has any greater interest in its affairs than another. It is, therefore, quite impossible to say that any one person has any right to a greater power in managing its affairs than any other; and, therefore, that any one person should have any more votes for the election of its governing body than any other.

While, therefore, it seems to me that it is by no means difficult, as I have shown before, to ascertain with practical accuracy whether or not certain persons have an interest in the affairs of a certain institution,

and therefore a right to a voice in its management, it is quite another matter to be able to state that some of them have greater interests than others. For, in the first place, their interests—that is to say, the importance to them of the issues involved—are far more equal than we are likely at first sight to think; and, secondly, even in cases where they are not equal, it is quite impossible, considering all the issues involved, to set down with any approach to accuracy a mathematical statement of this inequality.

In concluding this subject I would point out that the concession to persons having property, and consequently interests, in two or different governments of a vote in each is no infringement of the principle I am here upholding. The staunchest democrat and most thorough advocate of political equality must, I am sure, see the distinction, and could not, I think, object to allowing a person a vote in each of several municipalities or States in each of which he should happen to own property, and consequently in each of which he would have a direct interest. If you and I are electors of a certain municipality, and if, also, I have property in another municipality, in which you have no property, and which is perhaps away in some other part of the country, can it be any injustice to you that I should have a vote in that other municipality? Certainly not. According to my proposed scheme, we have perfect equality in voting in each governmental division in which we both are interested, whether municipal, State, or national; but if, in addition, I happen to be interested in something else in which you have no interest whatever, it cannot be any injustice to you, but an un-

doubted right to me, that I should have a voice in its management. It would be exactly as if you and I were shareholders in a certain company, say a railway company, and that I was also a shareholder in some other company, say a steamship company, in which you had no share. That I should have a voice in the latter, and that you should not, is a proposition whose truth requires no demonstration.

In fact, the concession to every person who owns real property in several governmental areas of a vote in each of these is simply the concession to these persons of a voice in the management of matters which concern themselves. This is the same truth upon which is based the undoubted justice of universal suffrage. The democrat who would deny these extra votes to these property holders must, to argue consistently, deny the whole foundation upon which is based the justice of democracy.

Clause 17 asserts that elections should be conducted by open voting.

This clause is directed against the practice of conducting elections by any secret method, as by ballot.

The clause refers, as the context of course shows, to the election of governing bodies.

Secret voting, or voting by ballot, is permissible only in matters of a personal nature; but the election of a governing body is essentially not a personal matter, it is a matter which concerns communities.

The election of members to purely social clubs is often, or generally, conducted by ballot, and rightly enough, because the admission of members to these clubs is recognised to be wholly a matter of personal

wish. A person joins such a club for his own personal pleasure, and because he expects to meet there only those persons, or at any rate that class of persons, whom he personally likes. Whether he votes for or against a candidate for admission to the club is, therefore, wholly his own personal affair. No one else has any right to ask or care how he votes on these occasions; and, to save unpleasantness, it is obviously better to keep the voting secret.

But the election to the *governing bodies* even of these social clubs, as of all other institutions, should be by open voting.

For such a vote, in addition to being a right due to the possessor of it, is undoubtedly a right which is given to him on condition that he exercises it to the best of his judgment for the benefit of the community as a whole. If it were not, there could be no possible objection to bribery; for, if a vote of this sort were a right given to its possessor solely to use for his own personal benefit, there is no possible reason why he should not be allowed to sell it to the highest or any bidder. There is no reason, in short, why he should not do exactly as he himself likes with it.

The universal condemnation of bribery proves beyond doubt the general acceptance of the proposition that the right to vote in the election of governing bodies is a right limited in its exercise to what its possessor judges to be for the general benefit of the community concerned—in extended cases known as the public good.

In public life, in cases of this sort, where persons have trusts to perform on behalf of the community, the

only safeguard against abuse of this trust is publicity. In matters of private business the only safeguard a person can have that another who is acting for him is acting honestly is the fact that all the doings of the former are exposed to the latter, or, what is practically the same thing, are continually liable to exposure. Analogous to this in public affairs the only safeguard the community has that its judges, magistrates, legislators, and others to whom it has allotted duties are performing these duties conscientiously is the exposure of their official acts to the public scrutiny. If by some means it could be kept secret what were the decisions of our judges and our magistrates, or in what way our legislators voted, we could not possibly control them to ensure their acting for the public good. Yet this would be exactly analogous to the case of expecting voters to duly recognise their public trust under the ballot system.

The only safeguard, therefore, to ensure honesty in voting, as to ensure it in connection with any other public trust, is publicity. For although by the publicity of open voting we could not, as a rule, definitely prove breaches of trust, and could not therefore punish apparent delinquents by depriving them of this trust, still, any observer of human nature knows quite well that punishment quite sufficient to ensure a very considerable degree of rectitude in the matter of voting can be meted out by the mere exercise of public condemnation. The fear of being thought meanly of by one's fellow men is a more potent incentive to rectitude of action than the whole paraphernalia of our law courts.

I am quite in sympathy with the original reasons for introducing the system of voting by ballot; for it was introduced for the purpose of shielding the weak from the undue influence of the strong, of shielding the poor from the power of the rich, the workman from the power of his employer. But, however matters may have been formerly, in these modern days, with equality of political power daily increasing, the original reasons in favour of voting by ballot are fast disappearing. When, for instance, in these days of trades-unions we see workmen fearlessly and openly speaking and acting in direct antagonism to their employers, it is evident there is no necessity for the system of voting by ballot in order to save the workman from the wrath of his employer.

However, the system of voting by ballot is one which partially cures itself, for, although wrong in principle, it generally comes out fairly right in the end by defeating its own intentions. For wherever most of the voters at an election have no objection to stating how they voted, and this is now generally the case in public elections in free countries, those few who wish to keep their action secret have great difficulty in doing so. Where the majority of the voters openly state how they voted, the refusal of a person to state how he voted generally betrays the very fact he would keep secret. To lie about it is demoralising, and does not by any means clear the culprit at least from suspicion of having lied. In fact, those who have had anything to do with the conduct of elections by ballot know quite well that the scrutineers can always tell with considerable accuracy how each person has

voted. Thus, it would be far better at once to adopt the true system of election by open voting.

Election of governing bodies by open voting is the method which is based on true principles. In small institutions, however, we often elect our committee-men by ballot. But we do this generally from a feeling of diffidence in choosing some men in preference to others, because the duties are so simple, and the issues at stake are so little in dispute, that the appointment of these representatives often becomes a sort of personal matter, or rather we imagine that it does so. We have very little or perhaps no choice amongst the nominees, and we merely choose from necessity of choosing. We feel, therefore, that to save any possibility of giving personal offence it is best to vote by ballot. I think, however, even in these cases, it is better to abide by the true principle and adopt the method of open voting. Wherever this is done I have always found that ordinary common sense sufficiently banishes any likelihood of personal offence being taken by the defeated candidates.

CHAPTER IX

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

CLAUSES 18, 19, 20, and 21 deal with the public or hired service of any governmental body.

Clause 18 asserts that each government, supreme, divisional, or subdivisional, should have a distinct staff of servants of its own.

This is a proposition so obviously and necessarily true in connection with the general scheme here proposed, and, moreover, is the embodiment of a principle so universally adopted, that I think any further defence of it is unnecessary.

Clause 19 reads as follows :—

The public service of each of the several governments should be directly responsible to the representative body of that government, and should, if necessary, be divided into separate branches as practical considerations may dictate. Each branch should be directly responsible to the representative body, and, if it consists of more than one employee, should have at its head a chief who has risen to that position by merit and by gradation in the technical knowledge required. These chiefs of branches should have full power over their subordinates, whether in appointing, remunerating, controlling, promoting, or dismissing them. These subordinates should

in no way be interfered with by the representative body. Each chief of a branch should be directly and wholly responsible to the representative body for the efficiency of the branch under his control ; and the representative bodies should hold these chiefs responsible for results, rather than interfere with them in their methods of conducting the business of their respective branches.

This clause deals with the connection between the representative body and its paid service.

I have already dealt in Chapter VII. with the direct connection which I insist should exist between the representative body and its paid service, and which involves the total exclusion of any intermediate executive body such as a cabinet of ministers. I shall not, therefore, require to deal with that phase of the question here, but, presuming this direct connection to be established, I can now treat of the method of that connection as set forth in the clause just quoted.

By this clause the paid service of any government, if the nature of the service is of sufficient extent, and requires variety of special or technical knowledge, should be divided into branches, and the chief officers of these branches should communicate directly with the representative body.

That it is absolutely necessary to divide any service into branches when it is extensive and requires variety of technical knowledge should go without saying. The service of a national government must be divided into the several branches of the army, the navy, the post office, the customs, and so on. One reason of this is, that the knowledge required for any high position in any one of these branches is a matter of special study

for most of a lifetime, and, consequently, unless they were kept as separate branches, and thus the opportunity given for those employed in the service to devote their whole life to one branch, it would be quite impossible to obtain professional proficiency in any one portion of the service. Another reason for the separation is, that the work of most of the branches has so little to do with any of the others that separation is a necessity from sheer lack of any natural connection. What connection in their internal work can there be, for instance, between the army and the post office?

Allowing, then, the necessity, where circumstances direct, of this division into branches, the question might now arise as to whether, instead of the several chiefs of branches personally attending upon and being directly responsible to the representative body, this personal attendance and responsibility might not better be undertaken by a chief of the whole civil service, to whom the chiefs of the several branches would be subordinate. Instead, for instance, in a national government, of the commander-in-chief of the army, the admiral commanding the navy, the chief of the post office, the head of the customs department, and so on, attending personally the sittings of Parliament, or the president when it was not in session, and being directly responsible to it for the management and efficiency of their branches, might it not be better and more systematic to have a chief civil servant—a commander-in-chief—over all these branches, to whom the several chiefs of these branches would be subordinate, and who alone would consult personally with Parliament, and who alone would be responsible to it for the efficiency of the several branches—the army, the navy, the post office, and the rest?

The advocacy of such a scheme would exhibit, I think, a total misapprehension of the principle I am here attempting to maintain.

Looking at it from a mere practical point of view, no person that we could appoint to such a position could have a technical knowledge of the work of the whole service. If we appointed a person who had had no previous connection with any branch of the service, he necessarily could not have such knowledge, and if we appointed the chief of one of the branches, he would be but little better. He would have the required knowledge in connection with his own particular branch, but would necessarily be profoundly ignorant of any other. The commander-in-chief of the army, for instance, would probably be as ignorant as anyone in the country of the technical work of the post office or the law department. He would be quite capable, although his special branch of the service might be the artillery, of commanding the army as a whole. For, although the details of cavalry and infantry drill are not exactly the same as those of artillery, still these various branches of the service are so closely allied that the drill in them all has much in common. Moreover, during the whole time that he has been in the higher positions in the army he has been studying the technical methods of working these several branches of the army in connection with each other for a common purpose. He is, therefore, quite capable, in spite of the fact that his primary training was that of an artillery officer only, of directing the operations of the army as a whole. But he is necessarily totally ignorant, as far as anything approaching professional knowledge is concerned, of

the technical work of any of the other branches of the public service—of any profession, in fact, except the profession of arms. He is, therefore, as unfit as any other amateur to have command of the other branches of the service, and is also as unfit as any other amateur to advise and consult with Parliament in connection with these other branches of the service. If, therefore, we adopted this course of appointing a chief civil servant, we should be no better off than we should be with the amateur cabinet minister as a medium of confusion between Parliament and the public service; and all the arguments which I have used in the one case in Chapter VII. would be equally applicable in the other.

As a matter of fact, what is required above all things in this case is that the representative body should be able to consult first-hand with the professional chiefs of the various branches of its service. The service should be divided, not into more branches than is necessary, but still into as many as are necessary to ensure each branch forming a profession in itself. The service, in other words, should be divided into as few branches as is compatible with the attainment of what may be fairly considered professional knowledge of the work of the whole of each branch by the employees in that branch.

Against this system of the heads of the several branches directly consulting with, and being severally responsible to the representative body, it might further be urged that there would be no co-ordination between the various branches of the service—that there would be no head to weld them together as one—to act as general director in those numerous cases in which the various branches must work together.

To this I reply that the representative body itself should be the general director. It should itself be so in all the more momentous affairs with which it has to deal; and in all the less momentous ones, or when it is not in actual session, its duties in this respect should be undertaken by its representative in the person of its president; and the absolutely routine work, as the clerical work, the keeping of all necessary records, such as minutes, reports, accounts of receipts and expenditures, and other such matters in connection with the general superintendence of the service as a whole, should be undertaken by a secretary, with a staff of under-secretaries or assistants if necessary, under the direction of the representative body, or of the president as its substitute.

This is the method obviously suggested by first principles. If you have a will of your own, if you have anything like a clear conception of what you want in matters of your own business, you naturally consult, as a rule, first-hand with the various professional men whom you wish to employ in your business. If you wish to build a house, you consult your architect; if you find yourself involved in a lawsuit, you consult your lawyer; if you are ill, you consult your doctor. You naturally consult all these professional men personally. So it should be with the representative body. This body represents its electors, who, if they have a will of their own, and they generally have, should naturally be able to consult directly with the professional men in their service. Moreover, the method I am here advocating is that which is adopted by all the simple governmental institutions, such as clubs, joint stock companies, and

municipalities. The governing bodies of all these directly control the various branches of their service, each merely delegating its president to act when necessary as its substitute, and supplying him with a secretary to do the routine and clerical work for him. This is the simple method universally adopted by simple governmental institutions. It is only when we get to the higher institutions that we seem to fly off to those cumbersome and illogical methods which appear to me to be a disgrace to human intelligence.

That the chiefs of the various branches should have risen to those positions by merit and gradation in the technical knowledge required, that they should in fact have commenced at the lower end of the ladder, and, by their own merit and industry in their particular professions, should have raised themselves to the top, is obviously necessary as an assurance that they are fit for their high positions.

That these chiefs should have full power over their subordinates, whether in appointing, remunerating, controlling, promoting, or dismissing them; that these subordinates should in no way be interfered with by the representative body, and that each chief of a branch should be directly and wholly responsible to the representative body for the general results of the management of his branch, are propositions whose truth should be exceedingly obvious. Yet apparently they are not so accepted. At any rate, they are not acted upon by our higher governments. These, as a rule, take quite the opposite course. They refuse to let the chiefs of the various branches of their service have full control over their subordinates, but the representative bodies them-

selves are continually interfering with these subordinates, and then as a consequence they naturally get into the habit of holding neither the chiefs nor anyone else responsible for the management of the service. Consequently, the service is mismanaged.

For the conduct of all enterprises it is absolutely necessary, in order to ensure good results, that responsibility can be fixed. We must be able to say to some certain person, 'You are responsible for this'; and to another, 'You are responsible for that.' If we set one man to do some work by himself, there is no difficulty about fixing the responsibility. We tell him what we expect him to do, and if he undertakes to do it, we hold him responsible that he executes it with ordinary skill and celerity. If he fails to come up to the ordinary or average standard, we blame him; if he exceeds it, we praise him. We judge him by the result of his work, and, if he is the only person employed in it, he is obviously the only person to be blamed or praised, as the case may be, for the result of the work.

If, however, the work be of such a nature that two or more persons have to work in conjunction at it in order to accomplish it, the result would undoubtedly be a very sorry one, especially in large and complicated operations, if we did not fix responsibility on some one person—if, in fact, we appointed no manager over them, but let them work as a disorganised band. It would undoubtedly soon be a case of all masters and no workmen.

We should certainly be on the way towards improving matters if we appointed one person as the manager of the business, and said to him, 'Now we hold you responsible for the management of this affair.' But

unless at the same time we gave him full power over his subordinates, and abstained from interfering with these ourselves, we should be very little better off than before, for how could we hold him responsible for results when we withheld from him the only power he possessed of accomplishing these results—namely, the control of his subordinates? How could a man in his position be held responsible for results when he had not the appointment of his subordinates, nor the right of dismissing them if they did not suit him? There is many a thing I would undertake to do with subordinates of my own choice, and who were under my own control, but it would be quite another matter if these subordinates were forced upon me whether they suited me or not, and I were obliged to retain their services unless they were very palpably negligent or disobedient, being bound to overlook anything except the most palpable delinquencies. Yet this is the position the chiefs in most government services are placed in with reference to their subordinates.

In most government services, as well as being personally interfered with in their choice and management of their subordinates by the representative body, the chiefs of branches are often further interfered with by regulations enforcing promotion by seniority. In other words, however unfit, consistently with doing the work at all, any employee of the service may be, he must have way made for him according to his seniority. He must be allowed to push aside and keep down men perhaps infinitely more capable than himself, simply because he has been longer in the service than they. Such regulations are obviously absurd, and are most disastrous to the efficiency of the service. They offer a premium to idleness, be-

cause they hold out no encouragement to any application to work beyond what is absolutely necessary to avoid dismissal. Such an arrangement would not be tolerated in any well-conducted private business, and is, moreover, less just, on the whole, to the employees themselves.

In fact, it is a matter of the most ordinary common sense that, to ensure satisfactory results, governing bodies, like any other employers, should hold their heads of branches responsible, and as a necessary corollary to this, should give them full power over their subordinates, and interfere as little as possible with the details of their management.

There is often a nervousness displayed about allowing this arbitrary power to be transferred from the representative body to individuals. People seem inclined to imagine that, where this power is allowed to the chief officers, the subordinates are likely to suffer injustice. But why should they? Why should the chiefs of the service be less just than the representative body? From their technical knowledge of the work of their departments, and from their much closer connection with their subordinates, these chiefs are much more likely to be able to judge truly of the merits or demerits of the subordinates than is the representative body. Besides, the whole interest of these chiefs is to retain all those that are worthy among their subordinates, and to encourage them to assiduity by treating them justly. For the very retention of these chiefs' own positions depends upon the efficiency of their subordinates; and every practical person knows quite well that no manager of any service can long keep it efficient unless he is exceedingly careful to be just to all his

subordinates. Again, if the service is a large one, or involving technical knowledge, these chiefs are not likely to have risen to a sufficiently high position in the service to be chosen as chiefs, unless they had shown through the most part of a lifetime that they were just and upright men. And, then, in any case, unless the representative body was satisfied of this, it would not have appointed them to the supreme positions of chiefs of departments. In short, one of the very reasons that the representative body appoints a man to be chief of a branch is because it believes him to be a just man—a man whom it can trust to deal out equal justice to his subordinates.

For it must be understood that the representative body should have full choice in appointing its chiefs of departments. It should not be bound by seniority, or any such restriction. When I say that the chiefs of branches, or departments, should have risen to that position by merit and gradation in the technical knowledge required, I would leave full choice to the representative body as to whom it considered had the highest merit, and had gone through the gradation of technical knowledge which made him best suited for the position of a chief of a branch. As a general rule it would naturally choose one of the men who were highest in the service, especially where much technical knowledge was required, but it must be remembered that it is not necessarily bound to do so. The representative body, in fact, is responsible to its electors for the efficiency of the service under its control; but it cannot justly be held so unless it has full choice in appointing the chief managers of this service. To put it another way, our

representative bodies represent us who elected them. They are *ourselves*, in fact, as far as the matters with which they have to deal are concerned; and undoubtedly we ourselves should have full choice in appointing the managers of our businesses. We possess, and invariably exercise this choice in private business. Why should we not do so in public?

Clause 20 reads as follows:—

Each chief of a branch, or sole employee if there should not be more than one, should personally attend, when required, the meetings of the representative body employing him, in order to answer questions, submit reports, offer suggestions and explanations, and generally to confer with the representative body upon the work of the branch of the service under his control. He should, when the representative body is not in session, attend for similar purposes, when necessary, upon the president as its substitute.

This clause is merely a common-sense corollary of the former one. It simply asserts the obvious convenience of these chiefs of branches completing the directness of their connection with the representative body by their personal attendance upon it when necessary, or upon its president as its substitute. No further discussion on the clause is, I think, necessary.

Having completed the discussion of the connection between the representative body and its paid service, we may now go on to discuss the internal management of this service. This is dealt with by Clause 21, which reads as follows:—

The whole service, or each branch, if it consist of branches, should if necessary be divided; and these

divisions if necessary further subdivided, and these again in like manner if necessary still further subdivided, and so on, to any extent of subdivision that the exigencies of the service may require. At the head of each of these divisions or subdivisions there should be a chief, who should have full power over his subordinates, whether in appointing, remunerating, controlling, promoting, or dismissing them. Each chief of a division or subdivision should be wholly and directly responsible for the management of that part of the service under his control to the superior chief who has the control of the branch, division, or subdivision next above his, and of which his forms a part; and in all cases superior chiefs should hold their respective subordinate chiefs responsible for results rather than interfere with them in the details of their management.

This clause treats of the internal management of the service, and is merely a further insistence that that proper adjustment of responsibility, which I have asserted should exist between the representative body and the service, should be kept intact right through the service, from the highest point where it connects with the representative body down to the humblest of its offices. This is, after all, merely the method which is always used in every well-conducted private business.

Let me further illustrate this method by a concrete illustration. Suppose, under a government adopting this method of management, I am appointed chief of some important department of a national service. I am, then, in the first place presumably chosen for this position by the representative body because I am considered by it, on account of my energy, honesty, tech-

nical knowledge, and other such qualifications, to be the most fit person in the whole department for that position. I know when I am appointed that I am to be wholly responsible to the representative body for the results of my management. It gives me general instructions as to the results it wishes and expects me to accomplish, allows me a certain amount of money to expend, and generally arranges the circumstances and conditions with which primarily and generally I have to deal. It does not, however, interfere with my subordinates, nor with the general details of my management.

Knowing, then, my responsibility, I proceed to cut up my branch into several divisions as circumstances may require. If it is a department which has been previously in existence and fairly well managed, I will, no doubt, adopt to a great extent, or most likely wholly, the divisions as they existed in the time of my predecessor. I then appoint the persons I consider most fit to be chiefs of these divisions. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, if the service has been previously in existence, and has been managed in anything like a satisfactory manner, I will retain in their positions the chiefs that were over them when I took charge. These chiefs I hold responsible for the efficient management of their charges, and I do not interfere with the details of their management, but merely insist that they shall conform to certain rules and regulations which are necessary for the uniform management of the department as a whole.

These chiefs whom I have appointed then proceed in the same manner to divide their charges, or retain divisions already arranged; and to appoint subordinates over these or retain those already appointed, holding

these subordinates responsible for results, and not themselves interfering with their management except in so far as this deals with general matters. And so on, this division and subdivision, and this unbroken chain of responsibility, go on down to the officers of lowest rank, and from these on still to the workmen, or the rank and file, who have no subordinates under them and are merely responsible, each for his own individual work, to the petty officer immediately over them. And it might be here pointed out that the duties of the lowest rank of petty officers should be the supervision of matters which come directly under the cognisance of their senses. And it might also here be pointed out that, to meet cases in which officers of equal rank may have to work together under the command of one of them, the usual course of fixing degrees of seniority for the same rank should be adopted. When officers of the same rank thus come together, the senior takes command.

This, then, is a brief recapitulation, in partially concrete form, of the method proposed. I shall now go on to explain further some points in connection with it, and defend some others referring to the theory of responsibility which may be liable to challenge.

Responsibility in the connection here used refers, of course, to results that may be reasonably expected under the circumstances from which they emanate. In holding any officer responsible for the doings and management of the branch under his command, we must, of course, take circumstances into consideration in pronouncing our verdict upon him.

The methods of division and subdivision do not require any further exposition, for we see their applica-

tion every day in both public and private services; and universal practical experience shows us that in all large services this division and subdivision must take place. It is an application of the theory of the division of labour treated of by political economists, and is a counterpart of the divisional and subdivisional method adopted in federal government. Practical considerations determine the arrangement of these divisions and subdivisions. They may be based upon locality, or differences in the nature of the work, or both combined. The army, for instance, is divided with a view to both these considerations. We see armies generally divided into army divisions, or brigades, according to locality, and these again into different branches, not according to locality, but according to the nature of their work, as artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineers, &c.

According to the theory I have pointed out, it might appear that, strictly speaking, all officers, from the highest to the lowest, should appoint their own subordinates. And so theoretically they should, and so for all practical purposes I would have it that they should. However, this result is brought about, as far as such purposes are concerned, if, however the subordinates may be appointed, it is clearly understood that their superior officers, immediately over them, may dismiss them at once and without question, if they deem them to be unsuitable, that is, dismiss them or have them removed from that particular division of the service under the dismissing superior's control. This comes to practically the same thing as if all superior officers had the appointment of their subordinates. And in many services, where there is much transfer from one division

to another, this alternative method is a very convenient one for all concerned. When this is done, however, as it generally is in large businesses or services, it must never be forgotten that no officer should be saddled with any subordinate against the former's will. Of course frivolous objections to certain subordinates can be met by calling upon the objector to fill the place himself, thus reverting, whenever necessary, as in a case like this, to the first principles of the method of appointment.

With reference to remuneration, all officers should, unless other strong considerations weigh against it, have full power in connection with adjusting the remuneration of their subordinates. An officer upon being put in charge of a department should be given or informed of the amount of money due to his department for the given time, whatever that may be. 'Here is your money,' he should in effect be told, 'adjust your expenditure as you choose, both in the matter of the salaries you pay your subordinates and in everything else; but you are expected to procure certain results from your management, and to keep your charge efficient. For this you are held absolutely responsible.' Or he might be told to manage his department as cheaply as possible, consistently with efficiency, without any particular sum being stipulated as his departmental allowance. The more economically he could manage it, provided he procured the desired results for which his branch existed, the more credit he would get. This is the plan chiefly adopted in private businesses, especially when the receipts, or the expenditure, or the amount of labour employed, or any or all of these, are variable. In other cases, where there is much uniformity in this

respect, as in the army and navy in time of peace, and in the post office at all times, other considerations may be of sufficient weight to make it advisable to fix a certain uniformity of salaries for the same grades throughout the whole service, this fixing of these salaries being undertaken by the representative body, or by the supreme officer of the particular branch of the service, or by the former with the latter as its adviser. It may be admissible to thus fix these salaries by reason of the greater convenience likely to accrue to all concerned by their being able to know always the exact salaries of certain grades; and from the fact that, on account of the uniformity of the work and capabilities required for the same grades throughout the service, it is easy to decide upon the labour value of these services, and fix it for the whole. In these cases, however, the power of fixing the remuneration of their subordinates is really, in principle, and for all practical purposes, not taken away from superior officers. For, since the circumstances are by the supposition so plain to all, whoever fixes these salaries will be sure to fix them at least approximately to this easily ascertained marketable rate. When, therefore, these salaries are thus fixed upon a uniform basis for a whole service, they are sure to be almost exactly the same salaries that each officer would have had to pay to his subordinates if he had had the fixing of them himself. In the army, for instance, if the salaries attached to each rank were not fixed by the higher authorities, but each officer and petty officer were allowed to fix those of his subordinates, it must be observed that there would be an irresistible tendency to equality of salaries for the same ranks throughout the

service, due to the exact similarity of the duties and qualifications required for these equal ranks. No officer or petty officer could secure reasonably efficient subordinates if he refused to give them the ordinary or most usual rate of pay, nor would he have any occasion to give them more than it; and this general equality thus necessitated would naturally rest at certain rates for each rank, which, by whomsoever fixed, would and must be regulated by certain economic conditions.

With reference to the concession to all officers, however inferior their grade, of full power over their subordinates in all matters connected with their official work, I know there is felt that same nervousness that there is in allowing representative bodies, in the first place, to delegate this same power to the chief of the service. There is a fear that officers, and especially petty officers, if allowed this full power, will be likely to use it tyrannically.

In the first place, however, it must be remembered that this power is merely the corollary of the responsibility of these officers to their superiors for the good management of the branches under their control. Being thus held wholly responsible, they have the most interested motives for managing their branches well; and they cannot possibly do this unless they have the co-operation of their subordinates, and this co-operation cannot possibly be obtained to any satisfactory extent except by justice to these subordinates. This is only a matter of plain common sense. Every practical person knows perfectly well that he cannot get good work out of subordinates unless, above all things, he is just to them.

Then, this same chain of responsibility in another way tends strongly to reduce the chance of injustice by inferior officers. For, from one end of the chain to the other, each link is welded by the influence of justice. The representative body appoints the chiefs of branches because, among other things, it fully believes them to be just men. These, then, appoint their subordinates for similar reasons; and so on, right down the line. It is, therefore, like a guarantee from one trustworthy person in favour of another. Every officer in the service is known, as far as human knowledge can tell, to be a trustworthy and just person upon the guarantee of his superior officer; and so on, this test may be applied from one to the other up to the highest officer in the service.

But, in any case, what reason have we to think that petty officers are likely to be more unjust than higher officers? They may be less skilful, may have less knowledge of the higher work of their professions, but why we should say they are less just, or more tyrannical by nature or by circumstances, I do not know. They are the same class of beings, the same humanity. As far, therefore, as this is concerned they are fully as likely to be just to their subordinates as are the higher officers. Then, as to the circumstances in which they are placed, they are far more likely than their superiors to act justly to their subordinates; for, being in closer connection with them, they are more likely to know of all circumstances in connection with them than are those officers who are several grades higher up, and are not in direct touch with these subordinates. A captain of a company of soldiers is, for this reason, far more

likely to succeed in doing individual justice to the soldiers of his company than is the general in command of the army.

This fear, then, seems to me to be wholly groundless. Moreover, we never seem to experience it in connection with private business. A petty shopkeeper employs an assistant. This shopkeeper has just as full power over his assistant as I would claim for each petty officer of any service over his subordinates. Yet we are not in dire fear of this shopkeeper's assistant being tyrannised over. A bricklayer or a carpenter employs another man to assist him in some small contract. Yet we do not fear for the safety of this assistant because there is no gorgeous official from some higher branch of the building trade sent to keep watch over him, and prevent the danger of mythical brutalities being practised upon him by his employer. Such fears are absurd, and are never entertained in connection with private businesses.

Then, again, there seems to be much nervousness generally exhibited by framers of public service regulations, not only in connection with this matter of allowing officers due power over their subordinates, but in granting them generally that authority which is due to their positions, whatever these may be, and which is essential to the efficient working of any service. For instance, in some petty branch of a government service, under a petty officer, when an expenditure of a shilling or two has to be made we generally see something of this sort:—The petty officer has to write a letter to his next superior, asking leave to incur this expenditure. This superior has then to write to his next superior, giving a report thereon, with his advice as to whether

or not he considers the expenditure necessary, or whether it may not be reduced from, say, two shillings to eighteenpence. Through how many more superiors this correspondence may go, until it finally reaches that august personage who possesses the awful authority of sanctioning it, depends upon how admirably intricate the methods of this particular service may be. The correspondence has then to go back from this august personage through all the other intermediate ones, until it re-arrives at the original petty officer. How often the correspondence on the subject may yet pass backwards and forwards in this manner depends upon how much convincing the august personage will require before he feels justified in allowing the expenditure. Then when he sanctions it, if he ever does so, and if the reason for the expenditure has not long since passed away, a similar amount of correspondence has to be gone through to get this money duly paid from the treasury, and then, finally, duly receipted. In fact, by the time the matter is settled, especially if the sum involved is a small one, the cost of the labour and the ink and the paper expended on it is probably twenty or a hundred times more than the value of the original sum under treatment. This is not an exaggerated case, ridiculous as it may seem. Officers in public services will recognise it as being the regulation method of dealing with such cases; for the regulations of management are, unfortunately, much the same in most large public services.

The remedy for all this is simply to recognise the responsibility of all officers in due proportion to their rank, and then to recognise their fitness for this responsibility, whatever it may be. In the supposititious case

above quoted it would be infinitely better to give the petty officer a certain small sum periodically—say, once a quarter or once a year—for his expenses, for which, of course, he would be expected to account periodically to his superior. By presumption, this petty officer would not have been chosen to this position unless he were a person likely to be trustworthy, at least in connection with small sums. We should have, therefore, quite reasonable grounds to expect honesty from him. We would certainly, at any rate, not be likely to lose more in the long run from dishonesty by this method than by the other cumbrous one. When, then, under this simple method, an expenditure of a few shillings has to be made in any petty branch of a service, it is done with practically no labour. The petty officer simply pays it at once out of his funds, just as is done in any private business. For this is the simple method adopted in private business, and is the method, also, which is in accordance with the clause I have drawn up on this subject.

And so the fitness for responsibility in proportion to rank should be recognised through all grades of the service. Higher officers, having presumably superior judgment, and having been longer in the service, and having, consequently, characters for honesty and capability well established, should be considered fit to be trusted with larger sums of money, and with the direction generally, on their own responsibility, of larger and more important issues than would inferior officers. But all officers should be trusted to do what the very fact of their being appointed to their positions should be a guarantee of their fitness to do. Why appoint an

officer to a certain position if you do not consider him fit to do the work of that position? For you cannot consider him fit to do it if you are afraid to let him do even the routine part of it on his own responsibility, but require that he should be eternally applying to superiors for their sanction. If you cannot trust him to deal with certain matters within the routine of his work upon his own responsibility, better far either to lower him a grade, or else take these matters out of his control and put them under the *direct* control of a superior officer. In short, decide what amount of trust as to honesty and capability you can put in certain officers, or certain ranks of officers, and then to this extent apportion them their work, and let them do it, as far as possible, on their own responsibility. The amount of what is known as 'red tape' rule in public services—that rule which causes such a disgraceful waste of labour and so much annoyance to all concerned—is simply the result of this fear of allowing officers due freedom to act upon their individual responsibility.

The baneful result of this system is exemplified in the treasury departments of most large public services. The delays and formalities that have to be gone through in connection with the receipt or payment of money in these institutions are something appalling. I shall not give examples. The fearful intricacies, the interminable signing of documents, the suspicious inquiries, the witnessing of signatures, the making of declarations, the swearing, often, of oaths, and the outrageous delays, are too well known to all persons who have to receive money from these public treasuries. And the formalities are generally just as laborious and awe-

inspiring when these institutions have to receive money. They seem to suspect that you must have some felonious designs upon them, even when you wish to pay them money instead of obtain it from them. In fact, whether you be their debtor or their creditor your patience is almost sure to be tried beyond all endurance. For all this trouble has to be gone through however small the sum involved. You know that in all private businesses you can pay or receive a sum of many thousands of pounds with less than a minute's work. A cheque and a simple receipt form are filled in and signed, and this completes the whole transaction. Why, in the public treasury, should there be almost interminable work over the transfer of even a few shillings?

Matters are made worse from the fact that the treasuries in public services, as a rule, deal directly with the subdivisional branches of the service. This should not be the case. There should in reality be scarcely any treasury department in any public service. It should be quite a small department under the control of the secretary to the governing body. Its whole duties should be to act as a sort of clearing house in connection with the several branches of the service. It should receive surpluses from departments which procure surpluses and have no use for them, and should pay such moneys out where necessary to other departments requiring funds. These transfers should be made only through heads of departments. For instance, the chief officer of the customs, this being a revenue-producing department, should pay into the treasury periodically the net revenue produced from his department. His subordinate officers should not do so. These should

pay customs duties as they receive them to the chief customs officer, who alone should pay the total net revenue from the customs into the treasury. Then the treasury, instead of paying salaries or other expenses directly out to all officers in all branches of the service, should simply pay lump sums for general expenditure to the heads of the various branches of the service. It should pay a lump sum quarterly or half-yearly or yearly to the commander-in-chief of the army; another lump sum to the chief of the post office, presuming this be not a self-supporting institution; and so on with the rest.

Then in the same way with the internal management of each branch of the service. The commander-in-chief of the army, for instance, should divide the allowance for his branch of the service amongst the officers commanding the primary divisions of the army, holding them responsible for its proper expenditure. These would then likewise further subdivide their respective allowances, and so on, till each colonel had received the allowance due to his regiment, and from him each captain that due to his company; and even further should the subdivision go if circumstances pointed to the advisability.

This method is in accord with the rules I have laid down in Clause 21; it is the method adopted in all well-managed private businesses, and if adopted in public services would reduce the labour of paying and receiving money by a hundredfold.

In conclusion, I maintain that these large public services will never be efficient unless they are managed in the same way that ordinary well-conducted private

businesses are managed. It is not the extensiveness of the operations of a country's public service that causes such extravagance, such confusion, such waste of labour, and such 'red tape' formalities in connection with its management. The principles of management which I here advocate, and which are applied in all well-conducted private businesses, are not such that the extensiveness of the operations involved can possibly affect them. If they are true as applied to businesses of small extent, they must be true as applied to those of large extent. There is nothing in the largeness of the business which affects them; and there is no reason, therefore, however large a business may be, why it should not be equally as well conducted and as proportionately efficient as a small one. Then, again, it cannot be fairly asserted that the inefficiency is due to personal inefficiency in the staffs. Our public servants are exactly the same kind of human beings as the rest of us. We have no reason whatever to think that they are not fully up to the average in honesty and capability. In fact, they are probably rather above the average, because public services are, as a rule, much stricter in recruiting than private firms. This is probably due to the fact that in public services there is so little control over the employees, by reason of the hopelessly unsystematic nature of conducting the business, that great trust must be placed in their individual honesty and capability. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that great care should be taken in appointing in the first instance only those who have strong credentials.

The admitted inefficiency of large public services is not due, then, either to the extensiveness of their

operations or to the personal inefficiency of their staffs. It appears to me, then, that it must be due to their system of management, for this seems to be the only thing in which they differ from well-conducted private businesses. The sooner, therefore, they adopt the true method of management the better it will be. I have endeavoured here to set forth and explain the rules upon which this system is based. Until they adopt this true system, with its rational adjustment of responsibilities and duties, no public services will ever be efficient.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

I HAVE now completed my exposition of what I deem to be the first principles of government. I have endeavoured to state these principles, and also to illustrate them by application to a proposed governmental constitution. In doing this I have endeavoured to be as brief as possible. I might have been tempted to make this a much more voluminous work; but as much, or perhaps more, for the reader's sake than my own, I have curtailed it as far as I possibly could consistently with what I considered was absolutely necessary to be stated for the proper understanding of my subject. I have done this because I can quite appreciate the value of any reader's time, and I have no wish to waste anyone's time, nor weary anyone's patience, by a long or voluminous argument when a short one will serve my purpose.

I would remind the reader, however, that the importance of a subject, and the truth of the argument supporting it, are not necessarily proportionate to the lengthiness of that argument. It does not follow, because I have treated this subject comparatively briefly,

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that therefore it is of little importance, or that my arguments are therefore weak.

I have endeavoured to attain this brevity by omitting, as I said before, everything that did not seem to me to be absolutely necessary for the proper exposition of the subject. I have omitted, for instance, all philosophical method of argument when a simpler method appeared to me to be sufficient to expose the truth to the reader. For instance, a very philosophical, and, if so, a necessarily lengthy, argument might have been undertaken to show that a vote for the election of representatives to a governing body was a public trust, and not only a personal right of the voter. I have, however, contented myself in this case by merely pointing out that, if a vote were nothing but a personal right of the voter, then there could be no possible harm in bribery. I have trusted to this direct appeal to the reader's consciousness to lead as surely to a conception of the truth as would the most lengthy philosophical argument. I have by this means saved much time.

Then, I have almost entirely omitted explanations as to the practical methods of working many parts of my scheme. I have omitted these explanations because I have thought they were unnecessary. I know myself that these matters are feasible, and I know how I could at once put them into satisfactory operation. I know, also, that to most people they will exhibit no lack of feasibility. There are, however, some people who, without even attempting to think of how new schemes are to be put into practical operation, condemn them at once as impracticable simply because they involve methods somewhat different to those which they have

been used to. For instance, as an example of such points, there are some people of this sort who would probably see visions of impracticability in carrying out elections under my proposed scheme. They would have notions of the impossibility of electors making a choice of several hundred desirable candidates out of a still greater number nominated. An Englishman of this class would have visions of having to elect six hundred members for the House of Commons all at once, as for one constituency, out of perhaps two thousand nominated; and not only this, but of having to put down the six hundred names of his choice on the voting paper in the order of his preference. But such an idea is, of course, absurd. The least consideration of my scheme should show that nothing of the sort would be required from electors, and that, in fact, elections would be carried on under it as simply as they are now. For, from the greatly reduced number of members of which I insist the representative bodies should consist, and from the fact, moreover, that they are elected in batches, and not all at once, ten or a dozen vacant seats would probably be the very most that would ever be required to be filled at one election for any governing body, this entailing at the very most twenty or thirty nominations. Presuming, then, that the elections were conducted on a scheme like Hare's, the voting papers would have these twenty or thirty names printed upon them. Each voter, upon presenting himself at the polling booth, would be given a voting paper, and would express the order of his preference for the candidates by simply writing numbers opposite their names in the order of that preference, putting number one opposite his first choice,

number two opposite his second, and so on. It would be advisable, perhaps, to avert the chance of other numbers being fraudulently inserted, that he should also run his pen through the names of any candidates whom he would not wish elected on any consideration—that is, to whose election he was wholly opposed, as, for instance, he would be, in a political election, to candidates of totally opposite political views to his own. With such a comparatively small number of candidates every intelligent elector would almost certainly know beforehand—would have arranged in his own mind—the candidates for whom he wished to vote. But, if it were considered necessary to assist him in his choice at the polling booth, candidates, upon nominating themselves, might be allowed, if they wished, to have added to their names on the voting papers a word expressive of their views, or their party, such as 'Conservative,' 'Liberal,' 'Freetrader,' 'Protectionist.' This would assist the voter to fix his choice if he should happen to present himself at the polling booth without being fully acquainted with the views of all the candidates. The whole work of the voter at the poll would thus occupy less than a minute, and be so simple that any person not an idiot could do it. Then, since under my scheme there would be far fewer seats to be filled in State or national Parliaments than there are now, and also since there would be only one chamber to be elected, the work in connection with the compilation of electoral returns for such Parliaments would be infinitely less than it usually is now.

Thus, the least consideration will show, I think, that the operation of conducting elections under my

scheme is perfectly feasible, and probably most people would grant that it is so. There are, however, some people who probably would not. But, for that matter, there are people who would combat the practicability of anything new, whatever it might be, however simple. There are hundreds of things in my proposed scheme the practicability of which is as easily explained as that of the method of conducting elections, but if I had had to stop to argue the practical feasibility of every small point in it, as I have just argued by way of example this matter of conducting elections, this work would have spread out to an enormous length. I have therefore preferred to spare the reader of ordinary understanding by not requiring him to wade through arguments which should only be necessary to dull and unenterprising minds.

I have also endeavoured to conform to brevity by excluding as far as possible, as being irrelevant, all matters in connection with the general work of the scheme which do not come strictly under the heading of what might be called its constitutional rules. I have also omitted to deal with matters which would be conducted under my scheme exactly as they are ordinarily conducted now, because on this account their discussion is unnecessary. I have, for instance, omitted any reference to the question of the functions of government—that is, to the question as to what matters general governments should or should not interfere with. I have omitted this matter as being irrelevant, because it does not strictly concern the matter with which I am dealing—namely, the constitution of government—as is made evident when it is remembered that I am offering

a scheme in conformity with which I assert every government should be conducted, whatever that government's functions may be. I have also, for instance, omitted any reference to the auditing of accounts, because this appears to me to be a matter which does not require to be adopted in the rules of a constitution merely illustrative, as is the one I have here drawn up, since auditing is simply one method of detailed administration for guarding against imposition. Moreover, I have no fault to find with the method of auditing accounts as now existing, and therefore have not deemed it necessary to take up time or space discussing it.

The reader will, therefore, understand that I have omitted many points of my subject for the sake of brevity. But I think they are all points which are not absolutely necessary, and the argument therefore should not lose anything by their omission.

Above all things, I would ask my readers to view my scheme as a whole, and not condemn it upon certain points which, if introduced separately into existing governmental constitutions, would no doubt be disastrous in their effects. I am not likely, I think, to be found fault with by the Democrat, as such, upon the general tenor of my scheme, for it involves absolute equality in governing power. By the Conservative, however—by which designation I mean the person who fears the rule of pure democracy—the scheme may be condemned from a fear of the democratic nature of some of the points involved. But I am sure that, if these points are always taken into consideration with the scheme as a whole—if, that is to say, the co-ordination of the whole scheme

is understood as it should be, then there should be no fear of it from the Conservative point of view.

It might be asserted, for instance, that my advocacy of the unicameral system is the advocacy of something dangerously democratic. I can quite understand that on this score I am likely to be accused of being in favour of the abolition of existing legislative upper houses. But I am in favour of no such thing. If the matter of abolishing the upper houses of legislature now existing were to be brought forward at this moment I would be one of its most strenuous opponents. For I am as great an opponent of mob rule—of the *misguided* rule of the masses led by demagogues—as any Conservative could wish me to be. I recognise the fact, much more, I fancy, than do the majority of Conservatives, that legislative lower houses as now generally existing are constituted in such a way that they are representative, not of the calmly-expressed judgment of the whole of the people, but of the passionate and hurriedly-conceived judgment of the mob misguided by the arts of demagogues. What I really propose in my scheme is, not the abolition of upper houses, but the amalgamation of the two houses of the bicameral system, the upper and lower, into one house, which will possess in itself all those qualities necessary for good government which are now supposed to exist in the two houses, but which, I assert, exist but imperfectly, and with much friction in their application.

Then, as to the insistence in my scheme of each elector in each government having one vote and no more, it might be asserted that in this I am upholding another dangerously democratic principle—namely,

absolute equality in voting power. But, taken in connection with my scheme as a whole, it should be obvious that this is not the case, the expression 'absolute equality in voting power' being used, of course, in the sense that the demagogue invariably claims for it—namely, absolute personal equality in voting power, irrespective of any personal or any other right to that equality. I am not advocating absolute equality in voting power, but I am advocating *justice* in voting power—equality where equality is due, and additional voting power where, although where only, additional voting power is due. In a State divided into municipalities, each resident of it, under my scheme, would have one vote, and one only, for the State legislature. So, also, for each municipality, each resident of such would have one vote, and one only, for the election of its governing body. But any resident of the State, in addition to any purely residential right he might have to a municipal vote in any particular municipality, would also have the right to a vote in any other municipality or municipalities in which he might happen to possess real property. This is based on the obvious right of every person to a voice in the management of his own affairs. And, since in my scheme municipalities would deal with far more matters than they generally deal with now, property holders should be amply enfranchised under these conditions. But it is not fair for either party to this dispute about equality or inequality of voting power to say that I am advocating any particular view of the matter as it applies to existing governments, for my whole scheme is so different in its general bearings from most forms of large govern-

ments now existing, that this method which it advocates of exercising voting power, like many others of its methods, is not applicable to existing governments. Perhaps the nearest approach that could be made to it in governments as now generally existing, with their divisions into electorates, would be, as is actually the case in some instances, to allow each resident in each electorate to have one vote and no more in that electorate, but in all cases to allow every possessor of real property to have one vote in each electorate in which he possessed such property. However, be this as it may, the matter as dealt with in my scheme should be taken with the scheme as a whole, and not treated as strictly applicable to any existing form of government.

In all cases of this sort, then, before accusing me of advocating dangerously democratic innovations, a careful examination should be made of the connection of any of my innovations with my scheme as a whole. They should not be treated as if each were a separate innovation to be introduced alone into some existing governmental constitution.

The Conservative should also notice that I call upon him, after all, to make but very small sacrifices to democracy over and above what he has already granted to it during the last few decades. He has already almost everywhere granted universal suffrage, and the right of the people to eventually obtain their wishes. This is practically pure democracy. The few further innovations in this direction that I propose would, I feel sure, not only be by their nature a gain to the cause of true democracy, but they would also be a safeguard to

what may be called Conservative interests. When, for instance, I propose such an innovation as the substitution for two houses, of which one is an unpopular one, of one house possessing all the elements of Conservatism and also all the elements of popularity that can possibly be desired, what sacrifice am I asking the Conservative to make? It appears to me none. But it also appears to me that, by the same concession, he gains immensely by the removal of a dangerous and disturbing irritant to the popular feelings; for the fact that a certain class has an upper house of its own, which often stands in the way of the popular wishes, must always act as an irritant to the popular feelings, and cause, in combination with other such class privileges, many measures of a Conservative nature to be condemned by the masses which might otherwise meet with their support. The power of the demagogue lies in the fact that his contentions are often partly right. The slightest injustice, however trivial, even to the extent of being practically inappreciable, serves him as a lever to raise up the dangerous elements of popular government. Deprive him of the possibility of being able to point out even the very slightest injustice in popular rights, and he is completely disarmed. And those points yet unconceded to democracy which are necessary to render it complete democracy—to render it absolutely just to the people as a whole—are now so few and so unimportant as concessions that they may quite well be granted without further ado. Besides, we are at a stage of civilisation at which the most conservative of us have been led to see that the march of democracy cannot, even if we wished it so, be successfully opposed. The

only course, therefore, left to us is to endeavour to so direct it that it may be worthy of humanity.

There is yet one point in connection with my proposed scheme which might be a source of trouble to lovers of orderly government. This is the matter of its practical introduction. Granting that it may be all very well as a theory, and granting also that it might be an excellent practical scheme if once fairly introduced and got into working order, still it might be asked, How are we going to first get it adopted as a State or national constitution? Would not its introduction as a national constitution cause violent revolutions, such as the forcible wresting of power from the nobility, the chopping off of kings' heads, and other such sanguinary measures?

I reply, of course, that such visions are absurd.

In the first place, I must assert that I am no sanguinary revolutionist, and in this I am in accord with the general common sense of the vast majority of civilised mankind. I, equally with the majority of my civilised fellow beings, would therefore rather never see my scheme come into operation if it could not so come by peaceable and constitutional methods—if it could not so come by the calmly considered general wish of those whom it affected. In fact, it can only be successfully worked, as only can any other form of government, if it meet with the general accord of those making use of it. It is therefore of practical value only if it can meet with this approval; for be it remembered that it is not merely claimed to be a rough-and-ready constitution formed in some particular case to supersede a worse one. Sanguinary revolutions have often unfortunately been necessary

to gain an improvement of this sort. But this is simply a constitution calmly proposed, not to overthrow any particular existing constitution, but generally as a suggested improvement in constitutions as now generally established. Unless any particular community has as calmly agreed that it is an improvement worth bringing into practical operation, that community should certainly not adopt it.

Thus, if ever adopted as a national form of government, it should be adopted constitutionally. It certainly involves, on the whole, extensive alterations of national forms of government as at present generally existing. Large and important alterations when adopted by constitutional means are generally adopted slowly, not by a sudden leap. These gradual steps are taken judiciously as opportunities occur. Very slowly are they embodied, as a rule, in old-established governments; but where new governments are being formed these new ideas can be adopted in a more wholesale manner.

So it would be with this scheme of government of mine, or any scheme like it, that the constitutionally and calmly expressed wish of the people might call for. If my scheme, or one like it, should thus meet with general favour, I can imagine it coming first into general use in the simpler forms of government, where indeed its provisions are to a very great extent in use at present. It would then get into use in municipal governments, then by degrees in State governments, and finally in national ones. In each of these governments I can imagine it being adopted very slowly and cautiously; and with this I would have no fault to find. For, although it would not do, as a rule, to adopt by

themselves certain single clauses of my proposed constitution, still, small groups of them could be adopted without it being necessary to include the whole scheme. For instance, most of those groups of clauses to which I have devoted a chapter of explanation could be adopted without necessarily taking in any others. The first three clauses, for instance, involving the federal principle of division, could well be so adopted; and so after it could the next group, dealing with the method of representation. Then the group relating to reform of the public service could be adopted without any other alteration of an existing constitution. Then those referring to the suffrage could be introduced singly, if so desired. And, in fact, even these clauses, or groups of clauses, need not necessarily be adopted at once as they stand. They could be gradually approached by legislation, instead of being adopted outright in the first instance. So that, on the whole, there would be no difficulty whatever in introducing the scheme as slowly and yet as surely as could be desired. So slowly and so peaceably can we, I think, imagine this being consummated that there should surely be no difficulty whatever in imagining even such apparent stumbling-blocks as our kings and our nobility slowly and peaceably and voluntarily melting away, as in fact they are now actually doing, into merely nominal parts of the constitution; and perhaps, in the still farther future, if there were thought to be any need for it, we can surely as easily imagine them as peaceably and as willingly yielding up even their nominal claim to an obsolete power.

In conclusion, this scheme of mine is in reality a compromise. It is a compromise between the extreme

political views held respectively by those whom we may call Conservatives and those whom we may call Democrats. Now, the stability—the very existence as such—of any community of mankind is based upon compromise. Men, in order to live together in peace, must be content to grant compromises to each other. They must give and take. Each man cannot have everything exactly his own way, or else he would be eternally clashing with his neighbours. Thus, compromise is an essential to social existence.

But it must not be maudlin compromise. It must not be the kind of compromise often urged upon two disputants by the affable, good-natured, but inane sort of peacemaker—the peacemaker who, merely for the sake of peace, and generally only of temporary peace, proposes some silly compromise which leaves both the disputants with their grievances against each other as great and as real as ever. No person is more liable to bring upon himself the contempt of both parties to a dispute, and to do less to remove the difficulty, than this kind of milk-and-water peacemaker—this merely affable proposer of compromises.

A compromise, to be a useful one, must be one which removes real causes for dispute between the parties concerned. To do this it must be one which, effectively grappling with the circumstances, secures equal justice to each as far as these circumstances will permit; and it must be one which can be clearly recognised by the parties concerned to be one based upon justice—to be one which, taking the circumstances into consideration, secures the greatest possible justice to all concerned.

This is what I have endeavoured to secure by my scheme. I have recognised that merely good-natured compromises are not necessarily effective in allaying social difficulties; but I have recognised that compromises logically arrived at by ascertaining the true means of dealing out equal justice in connection with the circumstances concerned are the true sources of social harmony. I have, therefore, to the best of my ability, ascertained how this equal justice to all concerned can best be obtained, and with this object I have proposed a scheme of government. In this proposal I may be right, or I may be wrong. But this much I am satisfied of: that, to effectually settle these questions of social government, the head, as well as the heart, must be brought into requisition. That is to say, something more than a kindly wish to see social concord existing is necessary to secure the existence of that concord. To this wish must be added a keen and strenuous mental effort to unravel the apparently complicated phenomena of social existence with a view to securing harmonious government. To this end, therefore, must the social or political reformer work; and no improvements in the art of government can be expected unless the most earnest efforts are put forward to thresh out the first principles upon which social communities should be governed, and to base upon these principles, and these only, the fabrics of our governmental constitutions.

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