



A Critical  
Exposition of

**Iqbal's  
Philosophy**



**Ehsan Ashraf**

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S. E. ASHRAF



ASSOCIATED BOOK AGENCY  
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*A Critical Exposition of Iqbal's Philosophy*

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## PREFACE

The present work is an humble attempt to understand and interpret Iqbal's philosophy. I cannot claim to have done full justice in presenting Iqbal's thought as thoroughly as it actually deserves. This was inevitable because for understanding, one has to be fully conversant with the vast philosophical literature, ancient and modern, Islamic and Western.

There are three sources of Iqbal's philosophy—The Quran, the Muslim philosophers and mystics, and the Western philosophy and science.

In Iqbal's writings, we find a good commentary on European thought from Greek philosophers down to Einstein and Whitehead. Iqbal wanted to point out the mistakes committed by some of the greatest Western thinkers who under the increasing influences of materialism. But his (Iqbal's) intention was to re-adjust Muslim views in the light of fresh advancements of thought. Errors of many Muslim thinkers also have been pointed out by him. He is thoroughly a religious man, and is at no time unaware of the traditions of Muslim thought and culture. The Quran is the book of guidance for him for the solution of different problems. But he does not, however, ignore the achievements of modern science and philosophy.

These problems which have been dealt with by him are not new. They are as old as philosophy itself, and they will continue to perplex the human mind any time, no matter, what degree of progress our culture and civilization attains.

In this work my main aim is the study of Iqbal, but one reason for studying him is that through his works one can easily come to grips with the central problems of Western and Islamic philosophy. In my references to other philosophers, I have tried to be short and precise but in such a way that their basic approach to the problems is not misrepresented. My endeavour in the

present work is to examine the reconstruction of Muslim thought from the point of view of Iqbal.

In recent times a question has been posed regarding the very utility of religion itself. Are we going to discard the intuitive experiences and 'revelations' of prophets and mystics which have, infact, changed the courses of history, as non-sensical and meaningless? I have examined this question and tried to make my presentation as non-technical as possible. I do not hold that the language of philosophy should be intelligible only to the selected few.

Though there are many works on Iqbal, I have not come across any which presents a study of his entire philosophy in a systematic way. I have tried to deal with all the important aspects of Iqbal's philosophy. But this is a tremendously difficult task.

This work has been divided into three parts. The first part deals with Iqbal's metaphysics, the second with his political philosophy and the third with aesthetics. But I have given more space to metaphysics because his metaphysics is the foundation for the rest of his philosophy. The human personality is the basic point in Iqbal's philosophy. And it is in dealing with this problem that many other issues find their way.

In the first chapter, the nature and existence of self and its relation with body have been discussed. In the second chapter it has been pointed out that a proper relation has to be established between man and his world. In the third chapter I have discussed the destiny of man, determinism and indeterminism in reference to the theory of action. The topics of obedience to law, self-control and divine vicegerency have also been dealt with. The fourth chapter deals with the nature of universe. The fifth chapter is devoted to space and time. It has been pointed out that space and time though real, vary according to the decrease or increase of psychic powers. The sixth chapter discusses the unity of God and His essential attributes. Thus the metaphysical part deals with man, universe and the ultimate Reality.

In the second part, the political philosophy of Iqbal has been examined. Such topics as the relation between individual and society, the nature of state and form of Government, internationalism versus nationalism, the place of religion in politics etc., have been critically discussed.

Aesthetics is also an important branch of philosophy. Iqbal has contributed a great deal to it. Being an eminent poet, a study of his works will not be complete, if it is ignored. In the third part of this work, I have tried to discuss his philosophy of art.

In this work I have not adopted any narrow conception of philosophy. I still feel that philosophy should not shun its responsibility of synthesising and co-ordinating (of course, not always) the different branches of knowledge. A philosopher, today, cannot remain indifferent to the discoveries of natural sciences, and the vast studies made in other fields of knowledge. Philosophy is not merely an arm-chair's speculation, it is linked up with our innermost aspirations and ideals.

My objective, here, is primarily to present the views of Iqbal in an impartial way, though without stopping to offer critical remarks when called for. His views have been particularly examined critically and evaluated in the concluding chapter.

I frankly confess, I have expressed what I sincerely felt or understood after a careful observation or let me say that I am inclined to react certain views after Iqbal himself.

In the completion of this work, I had to face many difficulties and hardships, but they were after all overcome. Firstly I express my deep sense of gratitude to my respected teacher Professor Dr. Rajendra Prasad for supervising my research. It was with him that I have learnt a good deal of Western thought and methodology. His very kind interest and help in my work facilitated my work in many ways.

I am also thankful to Prof. B.P. Sinha, Head of the Department of Political Science, College of Commerce, Patna for giving me opportunities to discuss with him, on several occasions.

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*S. E. Ashraf*



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## ABBREVIATIONS

- I. T. D. Indian Thought and its Development.  
R. R. The Reconstruction of Religious  
Thought in Islam.  
S. S. The Secret of the Self.  
B. J. Bal-i-Jibril.  
B. D. Bang-e-Dara.  
I. M. H. Islam in Modern History.  
I. A. T. Iqbal as a Thinker.  
M. C. Muraqqa-i-Chughtai.  
Z. K. Zarb-i-Kalim.  
Z. A. Zaboore-e-Ajam.

## THE NATURE OF THE SELF

The problem of self is very important for both philosophy and religion. It is quite natural that man finds himself very much interested in questions relating to the self. Almost in every age and in every country great minds have given their attention to it. What do we mean by self? Can its existence be proved? If it exists, what is its nature and relation with the body, world and God, (if we also accept the existence of God)? Intellectuals in the east as well as west have been provoked by these problems and have tried to solve them in their own ways. The philosophy of Iqbal moves around this basic problem. Many other problems arise out of it and he tries to solve them also. He begins his philosophical and theological enquiries with the discussion of the nature of human personality as a separate entity and possessing certain potentiality.

There are thinkers who believe in the spiritual order of things but conceive it in such a way that the importance of man

or human personality is very greatly undervalued. Such a view causes great harm to the development of human personality and society because man is considered to be like a shadow, illusion, manifestation or fragment of some supreme being. This is what happens in pantheistic systems, which refer, if they refer at all to the individuality of man, in a very subdued tone.

Iqbal in a very clear and loud voice, emphasises the importance of the individuality of man. He thinks that this pantheistic conception of the self destroys human capacity for action. He is, therefore, against all those systems of thought which instead of affirming the importance of self preach for its effacement. He says :

“Will there remain any lustre in the sun,  
if it grows indifferent to its rays” ?<sup>1</sup>

He throws himself with all his might against pantheistic conceptions of self and emphasises the value, the individuality, and uniqueness of self. His conception of self does not stand in harmony with the traditions of pantheistic mysticism which regard absorption in a universal life or soul as the final aim and salvation of man.<sup>2</sup> In Indian pantheism, such a view can easily be found. To quote Tagore, “In India there are those whose endeavour is to merge completely their personal life in an impersonal entity which is without any quality or definition....This is considered to be the ultimate end of yoga, this cult of union, thus completely to identify one's being with the Infinite being who is beyond all thoughts and words. Such realization of transcendental consciousness is a time-honoured tradition in our country...”<sup>3</sup>

Further, Islamic mysticism has also its own history with emphasis on asceticism, intellectual flights and most of all, the message of renunciation. The mystical poetry in Persia reached its zenith at a time when Persia was laid waste and desolate after the great upheaval brought about by Chingiz and his successors. To quote Dr. Nicholson's words, “The Mongols did their work of destruction so thoroughly that no seeds were left from which a flourishing civilization could arise.”<sup>4</sup>

Mysticism was, no doubt, a subject of early Persian poetry but it was mainly theoretical and formal. During the Mongol period the ideas enshrined in mysticism and Sufism were not only conceived but realized by mystic poets of the period and they began to believe really what life meant, what universe was composed of. The impermanence of life and the emptiness of the world were emotionally and intellectually realized by the mystic thinkers and Sufi poets. A current of despondency ran throughout the entire Muslim world. The Muslims lost their zest for life and an aversion against this world was experienced by most of them. All this brought about a great intellectual calamity. Iqbal argues that only by being convinced of the importance of khudi (selfhood, individuality, personality) and by leading a life of self-affirmation, self-expression and self-development, a nation can rise. He, therefore, writes, "The moral and religious ideal of man is not self-negation, but self-affirmation."<sup>5</sup>

This is the philosophical basis of his *Israr-i-khudi* (secrets of the self) and a major portion of his other poetical works also deals with it.

The importance of self-affirmation has drawn the attention of many and has been even recognized by the lovers of pantheistic systems of thought. We find a considerable discussion of this problem of world and life-affirmation and world and life-negation in Mr. Schweitzer's book 'Indian Thought and its Development' with the idea of self-affirmation and self-negation is also closely associated the idea of world-affirmation and world-negation. Mr. Schweitzer is right in holding the view that 'world and life-affirmation point out that man regards existence as he experiences it in himself and as it has developed in the world as something of value.'<sup>6</sup> World and life-affirmation is deeply rooted in us. It is natural because it corresponds with the instinctive will to live which is in us.<sup>7</sup> World and life affirmation urges men for the service of their fellows, society, nation and mankind and indeed all that lives, with their utmost will and lively hope of realizable progress.<sup>8</sup> World and life-negation on the other hand is non-ethical. It consists as regarding existence as something meaningless and sorrowful. In world

and life-negation, man takes no interest whatever in any realizable purpose nor in the improvement of conditions in this world. He, therefore, resolves to bring life to a stand-still in himself by mortifying his will-to-live and secondly, renounces all activity which aims for improving the conditions of life in this world.<sup>9</sup> We find the problem of world and life-affirmation and world and life-negation being discussed both in Indian and European thought. But while in Indian thought, world and life-negation is pre-dominant principle, in European thought world and life-affirmation is more considerable.<sup>10</sup> Mr. Schweitzer, however, agrees that Indian thought is not completely governed by world and life-negation.<sup>11</sup> The Indian emphasis on world and life-negation is found as early as in the hymns of Rig-veda. This idea of world and life-negation was not of much concern to the common people. It was emphasised only by those who were priests or magicians. We also find this idea being worked out in the Upanisads and the Vedanta. Brahman is said to be the ultimate reality and everything else besides Him is claimed to be unreal, possessing only temporal reality. The ultimate end is the realization of union or identity with the Brahman, for which sometimes a complete renunciation of the world is recommended.

The doctrine of Maya and Avidya in the philosophy of Upanisads and Vedanta are well known to the students of philosophy. According to the Maya doctrine, our life is an illusion and the world is a Lila (game) played by God. Yet we have to note that even the cult of Brahmanism leaves room for world and life-affirmation. In Buddhism and Jainism, the emphasis on world and life negation started with a great force. This is something different from that of Brahmanism; we find, here, the doctrine of re-incarnation. 'It was only when the idea of re-incarnation, began to interest the masses, and when the fear of constantly returning to existence began to rule men's minds, that there arose a great movement towards renunciation of the world which then continued for centuries.<sup>12</sup>

Mr. Schweitzer argues that ethics is incompatible with the emphasis on world and life negation, for man cannot engage in ethical activity in a world with no meaning.<sup>13</sup> Then how are we

to reconcile Buddha's ethics with his life-negation ? Ethics takes interest in the welfare of beings that belong to this world, and 'this regard for terrestrial affairs points to world and life affirmation, however slight the tendency towards it may be.....The Buddha thought, he could combine ethics and world and life negation, but in reality he became through ethics untrue to world and life negation, which still dominated him.'<sup>14</sup>

Radhakrishnan in his 'Eastern Religions and Western Thought' sharply reacts to Mr. Schweitzer's views.<sup>15</sup> He tries to show, here, and in his other philosophical works, what the Indian philosophers mean by world and life negation. The Indian thinkers and saints were motivated by a transcendental aspect of Reality, but this does not mean that the life and the temporal world have no meaning and value for them. Radhakrishnan says "In the higher religions of mankind, belief in the transcendent and work in the natural have grown together in close intimacy and interaction. Religion is the soul's attitude, response, and adjustment in the presence of supreme realities of the transcendent order; ethics deal with the right adjustment of life on earth, specially in human society...Religion springs from the conviction that there is another world beyond the visible and the temporal with which man has dealings, and ethics require us to act in this world with the compelling vision of another."<sup>16</sup> It is true that those Indian thinkers who were moved by this idea of a transcendental Reality, could not totally deny the individual ego and the world. They were, however, inclined not to give a very serious attention to the value of an individual ego and this world.

Iqbal feels that culture and civilization will confront a great crisis if the value of self is denied and the world is renounced. Self-negation has been the common feature of many systems of thought, and this negative approach has resulted in social decay of many nations. Iqbal thinks that negation of the self is a doctrine invented by the subject races of mankind so that they may weaken the character and strength of their rulers by this weapon.<sup>17</sup>

Life is manifested everywhere. There are different forms of life. But highest form of life appears in man in which

the individual becomes a self-contained exclusive centre. Every object possesses an individuality, and in the scale of life, the status of every object is fixed according to the extent it develops its individuality and gain mastery over the environment. Individuality attains highest development in man and here it becomes personality. Iqbal goes against the pantheistic conception of life. There is no such thing as universal life. On the other hand all life is individual. God himself is an individual. The universe, according to McTaggart is an association of individuals; but the adjustment and orderliness which we find in the association is not complete in itself or eternally achieved. It is the result of conscious effort. And the members of the association are not fixed. New members are ever coming to cooperate and help in the great task of achievements. We are thus gradually travelling from chaos to cosmos. Our universe is not yet complete. It is in the course of formation and development. Man is also a sharer in it.<sup>18</sup> Iqbal thus thinks that man possesses a prominent position in this universe.

### *The Reality of the Self*

Now the question is : How is the human ego created ? How does it emerge in the spatio-temporal order ? The teachings of the Quran, says Iqbal, are perfectly clear on this point. "And they ask these of the soul, say : the soul proceedeth from my lord's Amr (command) but of knowledge, only a little to you is given" (17 : 87). In an another passage, Quran says the following about the creation of man :

"Now of fine clay we have created man. Then we placed him, a moist of germ in a safe abode; then made we the moist germ a clot of blood into a piece of flesh; then made the piece of flesh into bones : and we clotted the bones with flesh; then brought forth man of yet another make. 'Blessed, therefore the God'—the most excellent of makers". (23 : 12—14) The 'yet another make' of man develops on the basis of physical organism. The physical organism is not opposed to the soul as it is a colony of lower egos. Man is created out of dust. It means that man has gradually emerged out of this world. Life in its present form has to pass through various stages. The evolution of life



shows that in the beginning the mental is dominated by the physical, but when consciousness grows in power, the physical, comes under the dominance of the mental. The emergence of human ego has gone through a process of change and transformation. It is not the case that man has fallen to this earth from a supernatural paradise, as the Muslim mythology says, with regard to the fall of Adam. It has a symbolic meaning, and has to be interpreted as such. The idea of evolution is perfectly consistent with the teachings of Quran. Iqbal says : 'According to the Quran, man is not a stranger on this earth. "And we have caused you to grow from the earth', says the Quran".<sup>19</sup> The story of Adam described in Quran is a symbolic expression of the creation of man. The theory of evolution implies the gradual appearance of man on earth, while the Quranic legend of Adam gives the account of first appearance of man as sudden. According to it man is supposed to have fallen on this earth from an eternal paradise, his exit being the result of his disobedience. The story, thinks Iqbal, has nothing to do with the origin of man or the emergence of man on this planet. He says : "I am inclined to think that 'Jannat' in the Quranic narration is the conception of primitive state in which man is practically unrelated to his environment and consequently does not feel the sting of human wants, the birth of which alone makes the beginning of human culture....The purpose of Quran is rather to indicate man's rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of free self..."<sup>20</sup>

The self exists. There can be no doubt about it. The complete denial of the existence of the self is impossible. All have accepted in one sense or another the existence of the self. They differ only with regard to the nature of the self.

In modern philosophy Descartes' theory of soul is of epoch-making importance. He says : "All that I have up to this moment accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed, however, that these sometimes misled us, and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived."<sup>21</sup> It is just possible that God who is all powerful may have created us so that we are always deceived in

the things we know best. I suppose, accordingly, that all the things which I see are false (fictitious); I believe that none of those objects which my fallacious memory represents ever existed; I suppose that I possess no senses; I believe that body, figures, extension, motion and place are merely fictions of my mind. What is there, then, that can be esteemed true? Perhaps this only, that there is absolutely nothing certain."<sup>22</sup> It is difficult to trust on the senses. To use Descartes' words. "How often have I dreamt that I was in these familiar circumstances, that I was dressed, and occupied this place by the fire, when I was lying undressed in the bed?...I cannot forget that, at other times, I have been deceived in sleep by similar illusions; and alternatively considering those cases, I perceive so clearly that there exists on certain marks by which the State of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep, that I feel greatly astonished, and in amazement I almost persuade myself that I am now clear dreaming."<sup>23</sup> It has been found in dream and when awake that two and three are equal to five. Yet this may be false. Descartes thus found it theoretically possible to be sceptical about every thing—the testimony of his senses, waking experiences, dreams and imagination, memory, the existence of the external world and even the truths of mathematics. Perhaps nothing in the world can be said to be indubitable. But one thing is certain, namely the fact—the act of doubting. 'We cannot suppose in the same way that we, who doubt these things are not; for there is a repugnance in supposing that what thinks exists not at the very time it thinks'.<sup>24</sup> One cannot doubt namely the fact of his own existence. Hence this proposition, *ego cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore, I am) is the first and most certain of all that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly manner. To use Descartes' words: I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in this world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not therefore persuaded that I did not exist far from it; I assuredly existed since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived,

and let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something".<sup>25</sup>

Iqbal's argument seems to be very much similar to the Cartesian view. He says : Every thing in this world can be doubted: It may be said that there doesn't exist a world of colour and smell; the earth, heavens, palace and corridors do not exist.

It may be said that it is all a dream or a spell of magic, which makes a veil for the face of the unique Being.

It may be said, it is all an illusion of consciousness and a mirage created by the eye and the ear.<sup>26</sup>

But the existence of that which doubts the existence of every thing is certain :

'If you say, 'I' is an illusion or delusion, its manifestation is like that of this and that, then let me know, who is the one that has this illusion ? Look into yourself a little and think, who is that traceless doubter ? The hidden self doesn't need reason; consider a little and find out this secret.'<sup>27</sup> In a poem called 'The new garden of mystry', Iqbal says :

If you say that 'I' is a mere illusion—  
An appearance among other appearances—  
Then tell me who is the subject of this illusion ?  
Look within and discover the world is visible  
Yet its existence needs proof ;  
Not even the intellect of an angle can comprehend it;  
This 'I' is 'invisible' and needs no proof;  
Think a while and see thine own secret.<sup>28</sup>

At another place he says:

I am silent as to existence and non-existence.  
If I speak 'I am', I am worshipper of the self,  
But whose simple voice is it ?  
Some one in my heart says 'I am.'<sup>29</sup>

Both Descartes and Iqbal believed in the existence of self on the basis of intuition. But the meaning of intuition is not always the same for Descartes and Iqbal. In Descartes, intuition is

logical, intellectual or rational. For Iqbal, it is of the nature of love. It is poetic and illuminating.

### *Nature of the Self*

The nature of the Self has been conceived by different thinkers in different ways; for example, Descartes says that the self is that which thinks, that is "a thing that doubts, understands, (conceives), affirms, denies, wills, refines, that imagines also and perceives."<sup>30</sup> A thing which does all these must be a soul, a spiritual substance whose principal attribute is thought. Such a view finds no support in Iqbal. He does not believe like Descartes that the principal attribute of soul is thought which is totally opposed to extension of the body of the attribute.

Among the empiricists it is Hume who is most famous for denying the substantiality of the soul on psychological grounds. He writes : "For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure, I never can catch myself at any moment without a perception...and were all my preceptions removed by death, I shall be entirely annihilated."<sup>31</sup>

If the self is of the nature of the flux of perceptions, how is personal identity possible? Hume explains it on the basis of memory—the experience and repetition of similar ideas. He thus points out that it is not the case that there is some entity, permanent and separate from the body which holds all our perceptions, thoughts and ideas. The Self is nothing but a series of our mental states. Hume, on perceptual ground, was unable to say anything about the real nature of self. This position is, of course, not acceptable to Iqbal. Hume's study of the nature of the self was very limited. Our conscious experience, through a series of mental states, cannot reveal the depth of our personality. It is through intuition alone that one can go into its real nature.

The position of William James is also no better. James stands against rationalistic psychology which assumed the

existence of mind as a permanent spiritual substance behind all mental phenomena. For James self is no more than a 'stream of consciousness'. Our conscious life is but a 'stream of thought' with change and continuity. Iqbal rejects this view also. He says 'The appropriation of the passing pulse by the present pulse of thought, and that of the present by its successor, is the ego. This description of our mental life is extremely ingenious, ...consciousness is something single, pre-supposed in all our mental life, and not bits of consciousness, mutually reporting to one another.'<sup>32</sup> This view of consciousness thinks Iqbal, does not give us any clue in understanding the nature of self. It, on the other hand, ignores the permanent element in experience. By this Iqbal does not mean to say that the ego is something over and above the multiplicity of mental states. He maintains that behind all the multiplicity of experiences, there is a unity. Inner experience is the ego at work.<sup>33</sup> The ego is appreciated in the act of perceiving, willing and judging.

Coming to the recent western idealists, we find that Iqbal is no less critical of the views of Bradley, Bosanquet and McTaggart. It is true that even then pantheists could not deny completely the reality of the self, though they committed the mistake in describing its nature. Bradley thinks that experience takes place in finite centres. But in the end the finite individuals are inexplicable. They lose their finiteness and distinctness in a unity called Absolute. The finite centre is, therefore, only an appearance. Bradley starts with the criterion that ultimate reality must be free from contradiction. The test of reality is all-inclusiveness. Since the canon of thought in its nature is relational, and all 'relations involve contradiction', we find that finiteness is infected with relativity and contradiction, and thus the ego is a mere illusion. Yet Bradley had to admit that one's own existence in some sense is an indubitable fact.<sup>34</sup> But he gives no answer when we ask him in what sense it is indubitable.

It is true that the ego is finite and imperfect as a unity of life. But on that ground, argues Iqbal, we cannot reject the ego as a mere illusion. Its nature is to aspire, after a unity more inclusive,

more effective, more balanced and unique. Due to our imperfect knowledge, we cannot say how many kinds of environments are needed by the ego for its perfect unity.<sup>35</sup> But at the present, this inexplicable, finite centre of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe.<sup>36</sup>

Iqbal, at one place, criticizes both Bradley and Bosanquet in the following words :—“With Bosanquet and Bradley the self is not a substance in the sense of Spinoza. It is a construction of thought, a mere predicate or adjective of the Absolute. And this self-hood according to these thinkers, is further transcended in the Absolute. This account of self disregards even the elementary conditions of self-hood as known to experience is much more than a mere predicate of the Absolute, it is a dynamic centre of experience.”<sup>37</sup>

Among the neo-Hegelian thinkers, it is McTaggart who holds that the individual self is real. He believed that individual selves are differentiations of the Absolute. Being differentiations of the Absolute, they possess reality. McTaggart reaches the absolute by means of the Dialectic method. The Absolute, further, differentiates itself into concrete egos. The universe is not an illusion, it is a system of real selves, which cannot be regarded as mere predicates or adjective of the Absolute. In the earlier phase of his thought, when Iqbal believed in pantheism, he was impressed by McTaggart's view of self. Mr. McTaggart wrote a letter to Iqbal in December 1919 in which he says : “I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not.”<sup>38</sup>

But the agreement between Iqbal and McTaggart did not last. The impression of McTaggart's philosophy was not lasting on Iqbal. He very soon changed his position. After his return from Europe he was no more a pantheist. He became the advocate of his own philosophy of life, which was individualistic and activistic in nature. He criticised Bradley, Bosanquet, McTaggart and many other pantheists. In a letter addressed to Iqbal in 1920 after the publication of *Israr-dikhudi*, McTaggart writes :

"I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much? Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a pantheist and mystic.<sup>39</sup> For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the ultimate reality, but as to their true content and their true goal, my position is, as it was, that that is to be found in eternity and not in time, and love rather than action."<sup>40</sup>

It would be interesting to discuss the views of a few Muslim thinkers about the nature of the soul here. Ibn Maskawih, while discussing the independent existence of the soul, examines the nature of human knowledge. The essential property of matter is such that it cannot assume two different forms at the same time. When a silver-spoon is transferred into a silver-glass, the spoon-form ceases to exist. This is the common characteristic of all bodies, failing which a body cannot be regarded as a body. On the examination of perception, we find that there is a principle in man, which has the power to perceive a number of objects at one and the same time, and can assume simultaneously different forms. This principle goes against this fundamental characteristic of matter. This is the soul principle. Ibn Maskawih therefore desires that soul can be a function of matter. A thing assuming different forms and states cannot be regarded as one of those forms or states. The soul, in its perception of various objects, assumes different forms and states; therefore it cannot itself be one of those forms. Secondly, mental states are certainly changing; therefore behind this sphere of change, there must be some permanent substratum, otherwise personal identity will be impossible.

Ibn Maskawih tries to prove that soul is essentially immaterial. There is certain power in us which unifies all knowledge, rules over physical organs and correct sense-organs. The immateriality of the soul further shows its immortality.<sup>41</sup>

Ibn Maskawih also commits the mistake of assuming the existence of some permanent substratum over and above the changing mental states.

The jurist, physician and philosopher Avicenna is specially

interested in discussing the nature of the soul. But he finds it difficult to define its nature. The soul, according to him, appears in different planes of existence and as such manifests different powers and tendencies in the different grades of existence. He points out that it is not necessary for the soul to possess a body. Though the soul and body go together, they are totally opposed in their respective essences. The soul, therefore, is not annihilated after the disintegration of the body.

This view is also not tenable, because, soul is not entirely opposed to body. Though it is different from matter, yet it is related to it.

According to Asharite School of Mutakallamins, the world consists of infinitely small atoms (Jawhar) which cannot be further divided. The number of atoms is not fixed—fresh atoms are ever coming into existence by the will of God. What we call soul is either a fine kind of matter or only an accident. This view is purely materialistic. 'It is my belief', says Iqbal, 'that the Asharite view that the "Nafs" is an accident is opposed to the real trend of their own theory which makes the continuous existence of the atom dependent on the continuous creation of accidents in it.'<sup>42</sup>

According to Ghazali, the self is simple, indivisible, and immutable. It is entirely different from the group of our mental states and unaffected by the passage of time. The soul, according to Ghazali, perceives things. But perception as an attribute can exist only in a substance which is absolutely free from all the attributes of body. Ghazali points out why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul. It is because ordinary men and thinkers have their own way of looking on the nature of the soul. The ordinary man who looks upon materiality as a condition of existence cannot truly understand a totally immaterial thing, while the thinkers in discussing the nature of soul, sweeps away all the differences between individual soul and God. Ghazali felt in this enquiry a pantheistic drift. He, therefore, preferred silence with regard to ultimate nature of the soul.<sup>43</sup>

Whatever view is given by Ghazali about the soul substance, it is none the less defective. Experiences cannot be regarded



as the qualities of the soul and moreover it is difficult to point out how they inhere in this soul-substance,<sup>44</sup> which remains unchanged during the flux of its qualities.

Hallaj holds quite a different view. What did Hallaj mean when he said Ana'l-Haq, (I am the creative truth) : The word 'Ana'l Haq' occurs in an extraordinary book, the *Kitab-al-Tawasin* composed by Hallaj and edited in 1913 by M. Louis Massigon.

God created Adam in His own image. From this Hallaj deduced a doctrine of deification. God imprinted his image on Adam, who objectified the whole divine nature—both the lahut and nasut. Some interpretations of Hallajian's theory were made pantheistically. There are of course, evidence for this. For example, the following verses :

Glory to God who revealed in His humanity the  
Secret of his radiant divinity,  
And then appeared to his creatures visibly in the  
Shape of one who eats and drinks.<sup>45</sup>

At another place, he says :

Thy spirit is mingled in my spirit even as  
Wine is mingled with pure water.  
When any thing touches Thee, it touches me.  
Lo, in every case Thou art.<sup>46</sup>

Yet Hallaj's view is not pantheistic. Nicholson says "It is entirely opposed to pantheism, for it makes the human nature as image of the Divine."<sup>47</sup> The Sufi pantheism developed much later than Hallaj chiefly due to Ibnu'l Arabi. Mr. Nicholson says that the utterances like "Glory to me" of Bayazi<sup>d</sup>, the Ana'l Haq 'I am God' of Hallaj and Ana Hiya 'I am She' of Ibnu'l Farid are not in themselves any evidence for pantheism. "So long as transcendence is recognized, the most emphatic assertion of eminence is not pantheism but panentheism—not the doctrine that all is God, but the doctrine that all is in God, who is also above all."<sup>48</sup>

The true interpretation, thinks Iqbal, of the experience of Hallaj is not the drop slipping into the sea, but the bold affirmation of an underlying reality. Iqbal here realizes the difficulty of the modern student of religion, for such an experience points to the unknown level of consciousness, and modern psychology has not yet been able to investigate into the mystic level of consciousness.<sup>49</sup>

With the help of the above analysis of the nature of Self by some western and Muslim thinkers, we can understand the position of Iqbal in a better way. Now there is no disputing the fact that the Self exists. The difficulty is only with regard to understanding its true nature. Purely dialectic approach to this problem can not be of much help. The ego is beyond the domain of matter, yet it has some connection with matter. It is true that we cannot assume the existence of some permanent substance merely on the ground of different mental states as its attributes. We cannot even place the ego over and above the mental states. Though there is a continuous, unbreakable flux of sensations and perceptions, there is unity behind all this multiplicity. It is this unique inter-relation of our mental states that we express by this word 'I'.<sup>50</sup> Our perceptual analysis, of course, cannot reveal the inner recesses of our personality. It is through intuitive experience alone that the great importance of human ego and its ultimate destiny can be revealed. It is true that the self is finite, and imperfect. But its nature is wholly aspirational. It is moving in some 'direction' with higher purpose and ideals. That is why the essential nature of the of the Self, thinks Iqbal, is directive. It is individual and specific.

What are the characteristic features of the ego ? Iqbal Says : "The ego reveals itself as a unity what we call mental states. Mental states does not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another...It fundamentally differs from the unity of material things, for the parts of material things can exist in mutual isolation. Mental unity is absolutely unique."<sup>51</sup>

There is, then, another important characteristic of the unity of ego. This is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of every ego. Our pleasures and pains, feelings of hatred

and love, desires and ambitions are exclusively ours. They form a part and parcel of our private egos alone.

According to Iqbal, the self has two aspects—the appreciative and the efficient. The appreciative ego knows and feels the inner secret and mystery of life and the universe. The efficient ego acts upon the external environment. It is our practical self and studied by psychology. The appreciative aspect of the self is often ignored by us. Appreciative self can be known only in moments of profound meditation and contemplation.

### *Relation between soul and body*

The discussion of the relation between soul and body, mind and matter, throws further light on the nature of the self. In modern philosophy we find it discussed by Descartes and Spinoza outright of Leibniz he does not make any mention, though there are points of differences between them.

According to Descartes there is a diametrical opposition between mind and body. The soul is absolutely immaterial and the body absolutely soulless. The attribute of soul is thought, and that of body extension. There is thus nothing common between the two. Yet we see that the body is affected by the soul, and the soul by the body. There is a good deal of discussion in the meditations explaining why mind (soul) feels sorrow when the body is hurt. Thus in spite of the opposition between the two we find certain facts which point to an intimate union between soul and body. He says: "I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity. For if this were not the case, I should not feel pain when my body is hurt."<sup>51</sup> Mind receives stimulations from the body and also initiate bodily movement. But how does the 'interaction' between soul and body occur when there is nothing common between them? Descartes thinks that there is only one point at which the soul and body meet. The probable location pointed out by him is the 'penial gland' otherwise there is no causal connection between soul and body. He points out the distinction in this way. Body walks, eats, breaths; soul suffers, enjoys,

desires, loves, hopes, fears and dreams. It is on certain occasions that the two meet in 'Penial Gland'.

Spinoza is a pantheist. He believed that there is only one substance. It is the only being. Substance consists of infinite attributes. They constitute the essence of the substance. Among innumerable divine attributes, human mind is capable of knowing only two—Thought and extension (mind and matter). Substance is thus a thinking and extended thing. As against Descartes, matter and mind are not two opposite substances, but they are different ways of expressing one substance. They are two different forms of one and the same thing. Everything may be said to be mental and physical both. States of mind correspond to bodily processes, the two are like two parallel series.

We find that Spinoza supersedes Cartesian philosophy in some respects. He destroys the substantial dualism of the universe found in Descartes' philosophy. Soul and body, mind and matter are here the manifestations of one common principle. Though matter and mind are distinct, yet they are inseparable attributes of one and the same substance.

Iqbal does not accept Descartes' position regarding the interaction of mind and body. He is not a believer in dualism. Nature does not bifurcate itself into the mental and physical.

Spinoza's theory of mind and matter, is rather nearer to Iqbal. Both believe that matter and mind, though distinct, are nevertheless inseparable from each other. They are manifestations of one common Reality. Yet the difference between Iqbal and Spinoza is great. Spinoza is a pantheist and Iqbal is a monotheist. Moreover, in Spinoza system the difficulty is how to reconcile his theory of substance with the theory of attributes. Substance has been defined as an absolutely undetermined being. And then Spinoza also points out that substance has infinity of attributes. The question then arises: are attributes purely subjective or also they have objective reality? Some critics have pointed out that attributes are mere modes of human thinking. It is the intellect which perceives of attributes as constituting the essence substance. But other critics are of the opinion that attributes are not mere modes of

human intellect but they are expression of God's nature. They are possessed by God.

Besides this controversial issue, there are other difficulties in Spinoza's system for how can the same substance be extended and thinking i.e. in-extended? Does not here Spinoza violate the Law of Contradiction?

Leibniz however improves upon the position of Descartes and Spinoza. He paves the way for concrete spiritualism by saying that the essence of matter consists not in extension but in force. Body for Leibniz is nothing but a collection of monads. To them, he attributes, not only force but also perception. All these monads have more confused perception than those of the soul. According to Leibniz everything in the world is made up of monads. And, as such, there is no great difference between body and soul. The difference is only in the degrees of perceptual abilities of monads. But, there is one difficulty. If each monad, according to Leibniz, is independent of the other, how can there be a unity in the universe? How can there be a unity among the individuals and interaction between soul and body? Leibniz tries to remove the difficulty by his theory of pre-established harmony. God has constituted the universe in such a manner that a perfect mechanical connection is possible. There is thus a correspondence between soul and body as a result of this pre-established harmony.

According to Iqbal, "the theory of interactionism and parallelism are both unsatisfactory."<sup>53</sup> And though we find both in Iqbal and Leibniz, the idea of degree of Reality, there are some obvious differences. In Leibniz's scheme a real relation between soul and mind is impossible. These relations which seem to exist are metaphysical or ideal, and are therefore, intellectually apprehended. Secondly, each monad is independent and windowless. The perceptions of the monad do not extend beyond it. All the monads represent or perceive the universe in its own way and according to its graduation in perfection. It is very difficult to accept such a view. Iqbal believes that there is inter-relation and inter-dependence among

egos. It is not the case that things interact due to some 'pre-established harmony' established by God.

It is thus clear that Iqbal does not accept any opposition between soul (mind) and body (matter). They are not two distinct entities opposed to each other. They belong to the same system according to Quran. Iqbal studies this problem in the light of Quran.

There are passage in Quran which speak of reward and punishment in the life to come after death. The descriptions of heaven and hell mention not only mental but also bodily states. The Quran emphasises importance of the concrete personality of man here and hereafter. In the history of mankind till the present day, we find that many religions other than Islam have attached a great value to the 'soul' apart from body which has been looked down upon. It has been considered as if there is an unholy alliance between soul and body. The soul as long as it is imprisoned in the body, is not to enjoy the fruits of eternity. The soul, at the time of death, leaves the body and casts aside the garment. Man's entire cultural heritage has been saturated with this false distinction even in higher religion, philosophy and poetry.

"Body divorced from soul or mind" says Mr. Hamid,<sup>54</sup> is against the very spirit of the Quran. The message of God contained therein is for the entire man, for his whole organism or personality, his whole Being. The reward should also be for the whole Being. There is no man apart from the 'body' and resurrection (hashr) is for man, not for bodyless soul or soulless body. 'soul' and 'body' both of them are abstractions from the concrete Reality that is man. In the Quran, there is therefore, no doctrine of the immortality of the soul—the message is that of the continuity or immortality of man."

Iqbal thinks that it is wrong to regard mind and matter as two different and opposed things. Then how can we differentiate matter from spirit? What is matter? Iqbal replies; "Matter is a colony of egos of a lower order out of which emerges finite life and consciousness of a higher order when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of

complexity.”<sup>55</sup> It is, therefore, misleading to say that matter and mind have nothing in common. They are rather two faces of the same coin. To quote Dr. Iqbal “Matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call external world. It is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting.”<sup>56</sup> In actuality there is no real opposition between mind and matter.

Every object, according to Iqbal, however, low in the scale of existence is an ego. Egos vary only in degrees of reality. Ultimate Reality is also an ego. And from Ego only egos should proceed. Whitehead also would not support any such theory which bifurcates the universe into physical and mental, material and spiritual, ideal and real. The samething is material from one point of view and spiritual from another. The samething, which is a subject, can also be an object from another point of view. Matter is, in fact, not a hindrance. Iqbal thinks that all the immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of the spirit. Spirit emerges out of matter the lower colonies of egos. It is through the resistance of matter that it can further rise to higher planes of existence. Man is a combination of both soul and body. It is for him to decide whether he makes spiritual progress by conquering matter or remains satisfied with remaining of the material plane.

### Notes

1. “Chamak Suraj me keya baqi rahegi  
Agar bezar ho apni kiran se.”  
Iqbal, *Bal-e-Jibril*, (Lahore, Taj Co., Ltd., 1935) p. 26.
2. Iqbal, *The Secrets of the Self*, (Trans. by Nicholson, Lahore 1955) p. xviii cf. his note on “Islam & mysticism” (The New Era, 1916. p. 250).

3. Tagore, R., *The Religion of Man*, (Published by London, Unwin Books 1961) p. 74.
4. Nicholson, R.A., *A literary history of the Arabs* (Cambridge University Press, 1953.) p. 443.
5. S.S. (Lahore 1955) p. xviii.
6. Schweitzer, A., *Indian Thought and its development*. (New York, Henry Holt and Company 1936) p. 1.
7. *ibid.*, p. 3.
8. *ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
9. *ibid.*, p. 7.
10. *ibid.*, p. 6.
11. *ibid.*, p. 3.
12. *ibid.*, p. 42.
13. *ibid.*, p. 60.
14. *ibid.*, p. 117.
15. Radhakrishnan, S. Chapter III "Mysticism and Ethics in Hindu thought" in *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*, London, 2nd Ed.).
16. *ibid.*, p. 82.
17. S.S., p. 48.
18. *ibid.*, p. xviii.
19. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (London, 1934) p. 80.
20. *ibid.*
21. Descartes' Meditations I, p. 98 (*Discussion, Method, Meditations of Descartes*. Translated from the original texts by John Vietch-William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh & London. 13th Ed).
22. *ibid.*, p. 134.
23. *ibid.*, p. 99.
24. *Descartes' philosophical writings*, selected and translated by N. Kemp Smith (Macmillan 1952), Principles. vii.
25. Descartes' *Meditations II*, p. 105 (Trans. by Vch)
26. Twan guftan jahan-i-rang-o-boo neest  
Zamun-o-asmano kakh-o-hoo neest  
Twan guftan ki khabe ya fasoone ast  
Hijah-i-chehrai-aan be chagoone ast



Twan guftan hama nairang-i-hosh ast  
farebi pardarhai-chashm-o-gost ast

Iqbal, 'Gulshan-e-Raze jadeed' in *Zaboore-e-Ajam*.

27. *ibid.*

\* Agar goi ki mun wahm-o-guman ast  
namudush chun namud-i-in-o-aan ast,  
Bago ha man ki dara-i-guman kust ?  
Eki dar khud nigar an benishan kust.  
Khudi pinhan za hejrat be neyaz ast.  
Eki andesh-o-dar yab een che raz ast.

28. Iqbal, *Essay on McTaggart's Philosophy* in *A study in Iqbal's Philosophy* Lahore, B.A. Dar.

29. Iqbal, *Pyam-e-Masriqui*, (Sk. Mohd. Ashraf, 1944). p. 408.

30. Descartes, *Meditations* II p. 109 (Vch).

31. Hume, David., *A treatise of Human Nature*, BK. 1, PPB. IV, Sec. 6, (London : Oxford University Press, 1928) p. 252.

32. R.R. pp. 96-97.

33. R.R., p. 97.

34. Bradley, F.H., *Appearance and Reality*.

35. R.R., p. 93.

36. S.S., p. xvii.

37. Iqbal's article on *McTaggart's Philosophy*. (included in *A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy*—B.A. Dar, Lahore, 1944). p. 407.

38. & 39. Reference of letters. *ibid.*, p. 404.

40. *ibid.*, p. 404.

41. Iqbal, *Metaphysics of Persia*, (Bazme-Iqbal, Lahore, 1959) pp-29-32.

42. R.R., p. 67.

43. Iqbal, *Metaphysics of Persia*, p. 60.

44. R.R., p. 96.

45. *Kitab-al-Tawsin*, (edited by Massigon 1913) p. 130.

46. *ibid.*, p. 134.

47. Nicholson, R.A., *The idea of personality in Sufism*. (Cambridge University Press—London 1923), p. 31.

48. *ibid.*, p. 27.

49. R.R., p. 91.

50. R.R., p. 95.
51. R.R., p. 93.
52. Descartes *Meditations*, Chap. VI, p. 160. (The Method, Meditation and selections from the principles—edited by John Veitch) William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh & London, 13th Ed.
53. R.R., p. 100.
54. Hamid, Khawaja Abdul, *The 'body versus soul' fallacy and the Quran* (Article published in Islamic culture Oct 1940) p. 424.
55. R.R., p. 100.
56. R.R., p. 147.

T W O

## MAN AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD

### *Man's Environment*

Individuals do not exist in a vacuum. They live in a material world. They are confronted with an environment in which thoughts, beliefs and actions have their natural occurrences. The question, then, naturally arises : In what relation does man stand to the external world ?

The fact about my personal existence is absolutely certain. I am not in a state of dream or *maya*. I eat, drink and live, suffer, enjoy and think. Where do all these occur ? Wherein does my existence lie ? Some environment is there in which I have my being. It is ridiculous to think that I exist but my existence is nowhere. Iqbal points out that the development of the self is possible only through a proper relation established between it and its environment. He says, after Quran, that the following points should be taken into consideration.<sup>1</sup>

- (1) That man is the chosen being of God.

(2) That man with all his faults, is meant to be the representative of God on earth.

(3) That man is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril.\*

(4) Man has uniqueness and individuality in him.

The external world exists. It is impossible to deny the very things which we see, feel and hear in our day-to-day life. The denial of the external world and self-negation have only brought an intellectual calamity to the eastern people. The idea of other-worldliness and renunciation is very injurious for self-development. Self can realize its potentiality only through the immensity of a material world. We have therefore, to establish a proper relation with the world we live in. It is not a world we have to escape from, our highest aims can be fulfilled only through this world. The world is a medium for reaching a higher goal.

Plato, one of the earliest Greek thinkers, was mad after a supersensuous world. He said that our world was a shadow of the real external world—the world of ideas. This attitude of Plato, his disrespect for the sensuous world, and love for the supersensuous was later taken up by Plotinus, who developed this theory to a great length. The ideas of Plotinus infiltrated into Muslim mysticism.

Such an attitude of retirement was never healthy for any nation. Iqbal, therefore, severely criticizes Plato. Plato did not touch the rock of actuality. He rather fell down in the darkness of a vague and obscure idealism. The invisible world of ideas so much fascinated him that he made no account of the eye, ear and hand. To him, the world of phenomena was a myth. The revelation of the secret of life, according to him, was possible only after death. Iqbal sharply reacts to this view. He thinks that since Plato was devoid of any taste for action, he disbelieved in the material world, and became the worshipper of an invisible world. Iqbal says :

Sweet is the world of phenomena to the living spirit.  
 Dear is the world of idea to the dead spirit.  
 He (Plato) could not endure the noise of this world.  
 He set his heart on the glow of a quenched flame.  
 And depicted a world steeped in opium.  
 He spread his wing towards the sky.  
 And never came down to the nest again.  
 His phantasy is sunk with the jar of heaven.<sup>2</sup>

For Iqbal, the world is not illusory. And the secret of life does not consist in death, self-negation, and other worldliness, but in desires and ideals.

### *Desires*

Iqbal says that the life of the self depends on creating everlasting desires and ideals. By such a life he means one which knows no rest and exhibits in a ceaseless manner new ideals and desires. Desires, and ideals are closely associated with a dynamic life. It is through desires and ideals that we become active. They make our life enthusiastic and energetic. They are varied and multitudinous. They may be positive and good, or negative and bad. Iqbal, of course, does not use the words 'desires' and 'ideals' in the latter sense. For the progress of humanity, good desires have to be cultivated. Life is enriched through desires and ideals. We live by forming new ideals, and glow with the sun-beams of desires. They keep the self in perpetual uproar.

It is very difficult to define a desire because of its changeable nature in different circumstances. Psychologically speaking, desire is something lying between instinct and volition. It is a conscious emotional form of activity with a definite purpose. Such a definition can perhaps, be neither denied by the atheist Buddha nor by any theistic Muslim.

Dr. Archer has rightly said that even those systems of thought which preach for the negation of desire are motivated by desire which make them act in a particular way. He makes a comparative study of Buddhism and Islam in which we find

entirely opposed views about the nature and importance of desires: To use Mr. Archer's words "Both have been exalted through desire. Both have experienced through desire some significant transformation. What can the Buddhist mean if he proposes to eradicate desire by desire, or if reminds us that Buddha sought to ban desire?" Dr. Archer is right in holding the view that a modern Buddhist cannot ignore the presence of desire in the Buddhist order. And it is not easy for a Muslim to account the desire in Islam as a major means for religious and moral good to humanity. Buddha regarded desire as the enemy of man. Muslims accepted it and found ways to discipline it. But unlike Buddha, Prophet Muhammad did not offer an elaborate theory of desire, though he did say what must be desired and what sort of desires have to be avoided. Such a view also has a great value.

'Every man has desire, such as it is' Shakespeare makes Hamlet say: It is a fact that some desire is essential for maintaining life and keeping it in motion. Some have objected to entertain any desire, thinking it to be the cause of life's miseries.

The position of Iqbal is this. First of all he accepts the presence of desires and its various manifestations in human life. He then argues for the cultivation of good desires for the achievement of man's highest possible aspiration.

What are the Social Organizations, Customs and Laws? What is the secret of novelties in science? How has science developed to such and extra-ordinary proportion? There is no doubt that mankind has progressed materially to a great extent. Science has brought all the comforts and luxuries to life though it also has produced some evil consequences. At the back of all these progress we find nothing but human desires. Our life is dancing on the tune of desires. The nature of life depends upon the nature of desires we cultivate. According to Iqbal, the negation of desires is the negation of life, just as the absence of heat extinguishes the flame. Life of the self comes from forming ideals and bringing them to fulfilment.

Thus says Iqbal :

Life is latent in seeking  
 Its origin is hidden in desire  
 Keep desire alive in thy heart  
 lest thy little dust become a tomb.<sup>3</sup>

We do not yet know all the clues to life's mystery. In order to solve the mysteries of life and universe, we should get ourselves intoxicated with the wine of an ideal,—an ideal as shining as the dawn and even higher than heaven.

The life of desires pre-suppose the necessity of an environment. "Self-affirmation brings 'Not-Self' to light."<sup>4</sup> All that is not-self constitutes our external world and our environment. But this does not mean that the external world is opposed to the self. Mind, body and world make a union with one another. They interact upon one another. The Quran tries to awaken in man a consciousness of his true relation to the universe. The holy book also in many passages emphasises the importance of a reflective study of nature. Material world does not stand in opposition to the self. Our highest aspirations cannot be fulfilled by renouncing the world of phenomena. It is true that the human ego, for achievement of its desire, is confronted at every step by the non-ego. "Yet nature is not evil", says Iqbal, "since it enables the inner powers of life to unfold themselves."<sup>5</sup>

The material universe gives ample opportunities to the spirit of man to test its power and potentialities. The human ego should struggle to conquer matter. Iqbal very greatly encourages man to evoke in him the scientific spirit.

"There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit."<sup>6</sup> Even our enemy is a boon to us in some way as he gives us an opportunity of realizing our strength. Iqbal relates a story about a young man of Merv who came to Saint Ali Hujwiri for help. The young man complained to the saint that he was oppressed by his enemies. He was like a glass in the midst of stones. The young man wanted the suggestion of

the saint as how he should lead his life amongst enemies. The saint told him that one should dispel all fears of others. Every body has a dormant force in him. And if he does not realize this fact, his personality is sure to be decayed. The moment the stone supposes itself like a glass, it becomes a glass and breaks away. Similarly, the man who becomes ignorant of his inner potentialities and thinks himself weak, he suffers and turns out coward. But when he becomes conscious of his inner power and strength, he can create miracles. "Why be angry with mighty men? Why complain of enemies? I will declare the truth; thy enemy is thy friend;...He awakens thy potentialities."<sup>7</sup>

Thus in order to gain mastery over the environment, one should be bold and courageous. In realizing our desires and ideals, we should be bold physically and morally. Fear, if any, should be dispelled because it paralyses human personality.

### *Love*

As the life of self depends upon creating desires and ideals, the self is strengthened by the power of love.<sup>8</sup> The word 'Love' has been used by Iqbal in a very wide sense. This word to my mind, has been used by him in three broad senses—metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical.

In the metaphysical sense, love has been defined as a mysterious, powerful weapon of man and also as an inherent force in the course of the evolution of the world. In the epistemological sense it has been identified with intuition which is considered to be the highest form of knowledge. It is shown, that intuition (i.e. love) is superior to intellect and capable of solving the deeper problems of our life and universe. In the ethical sense, as Iqbal tries to show, love is a power which alone can save the suffering humanity. He admits that knowledge is power, but mere intellectual knowledge, he holds, is devoid of faith, and is a tool of the satan. It is, therefore, bound to bring disaster on mankind at large. But intellect enthused with love can create miracles. He (Iqbal) believes that a major crisis and catastrophe, which is at every moment hovering over mankind, can be avoided by this forceful weapon of love.



Iqbal discusses this topic of love in great detail. A major portion of his poetry is devoted to this subject, yet all this does not exhaust what he wanted to say.

In Iarar-i-khudi love has been described as the desire to assimilate and to absorb. Its highest form is exhibited in the creation of values and ideals and in endeavours to realize them. It releases a unique force in the personality of the seeker. Love individualises both the lover and the beloved.

Poets, mystics, and philosophers in all ages have been fascinated by this topic of love. It is beyond our scope here to discuss the views of all of them. Our account will, however, be incomplete if we ignore the work of the Persian poet and philosopher Rumi, and the mystic literatures of Islam to which Iqbal's philosophy of love owes a great deal. He is in fact, a true disciple of Rumi in this matter.

In the mystic literature of Islam we find innumerable discussions of love. The Sufi mainly adhered to the philosophy of love. Sufism was essentially a religion of love. For the Sufi poet "there was a voice that sounded in man and woman, in mountains and in seas, in the beasts of the jungle and the swinging of the stars. It was the voice of love, the great beckoning in the hereafter to which all things must go. That voice to the Sufi was God calling His lovers into one chamber, one mighty love feast."<sup>8</sup> The Sufi was deeply fascinated by the love of God. To him God is all. Love typifies his intense joy and utmost desire to have a union with God. Every thing fades away, but the love of God is eternal, when the unitive state is experienced, that is God finding himself in you, and you in Him. Such is the supreme teaching of Sufism—the religion of love. In the mystical poetry of Islam, the aspiration of the soul towards God is expressed in a figurative and mysterious style. What kind of symbolism each mystic prefers depends on his temperament and experiences.<sup>10</sup>

The mystical poetry of Persia has a charm of its own. The theme of love is so much emphasized as to ignore almost completely the rational aspect of life. Love was to a great extent over-emphasised even to the neglect of reason and intellect. And, it even reached to the point of ecstastic forgetfulness,

letting the world go on its own track. Iqbal would never go to such an extent. Such a poetry was the product of the political despondency of the Muslims. Iqbal, like Rumi, tries to restore a balance between reason and love and assigns to love what he thinks to be its true place.

According to Rumi reason is only a guide of man and not the goal of his life. It is the servant of love. It is only a means and not an end in itself. It is the power of love alone that can realize what is true and good.

True love cannot be expressed in words. Love can be defined only through love. According to Rumi the great love is silent. It is indescribable. It is in silence that we shall be able to understand the true significance of love.

Rumi Says :

Love is the astrocable of God's mysteries  
 A lover may hanker after this love or that love.  
 But at last he is drawn to the king of love,  
 However, much we desire and explain love.  
 When we fall in love we are ashamed of our words.  
 Explanation by the tongue makes most things clear,  
 But love un-explained is clearer.<sup>11</sup>

Rumi believes that love is the essence of life as well as the essence of the universe. 'This love here forms the centre which expands on all sides and into all regions.' (Hagel).

Parents love their children. A family rests on the basis of mutual love and affection among its members. Great patriots sacrifice their lives for the dignity of their country. Love for the whole race of mankind enlightens the minds of many men.

Rumi thinks that love is such a powerful weapon as to become the cosmic principle, on the basis of which the whole process of evolution takes place. "But of course" says Rumi, "There is secret in the melody of the flute which if divulged would upset the whole scheme of things."<sup>12</sup>

The evolutionary process is driven by a force, the nature of which he says, is love. It is what Bergson calls 'Elan Vital'. According to him, it is the will to live a higher and fuller life;

it is the will which creates new organs. Like-wise Rumi holds that love is ever dissatisfied by its present achievement. It always wants to go ahead of what it possesses at the present moment. So it creates new desires and new values. Iqbal means the samething when he says that love in its highest forms creates values and ideals and endeavours to realize them.<sup>13</sup>

Rumi describes the evolutionary process as follows : "I died as a mineral and rose a plant, I died as a plant and rose an animal. I died as an animal and arose a man."<sup>14</sup>

All these developments is not the result of chance variation. It is rather the result of an ever-increasing need for expansion and assimilation into a higher organism. Growth and progress is due to an inner urge of love. Among the early Persian philosophers, Avicena presents a good discussion on the nature of love. He also believed that there was a universal operation of the force of love in nature. There are things which have attained the highest point of perfection, and there are also others which are still progressing towards perfection. "This striving for the ideal is love's movement towards beauty which, according to Avicena, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualizes all striving, movement, progress. Things are so constituted that they hate non existence and love the joy of individuality in various forms."<sup>15</sup> The indeterminate matter rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty by assuming various forms with the inner force of love. This force even works in the vegetable and animal kingdom and man towards better unification. According to Avicena, all things move towards the first beloved—the Eternal Beauty. The worth and value of a thing has to be considered by seeing its nearness or distance from this ultimate principle.

In the absence of love there would have been nothing in the universe, no movement, no struggle, no strife, no assimilation, no growth and no progress, no organization and no civilization. The world without love would have been barren and unworthy of living. According to Rumi, had there not been the force of love, the world would have been frozen to death. It is only

through love that the inorganic thing disappears into plant, and the plant loses itself into the animal and so on. It is the principle of love that brings greater achievement by the process of dying and losing.

Iqbal fully seems to accept Rumi's theory of evolution. Both believe that love is the primary urge in existence. The reproduction, growth and assimilation towards higher and higher plane are not chaotic, undirected and devoid of any ideal. The 'love' as advocated in Rumi and Iqbal, is thus not the same as the 'elan vital' of Bergson. Bergson believes that whatever is there in the world is the evolution of a common life-force, which he calls the vital impulse or the elan vital. The elan-vital is expressing and manifesting itself in diverse forms. The evolution, says Bergson, is creative in the sense that at every stage of evolution something new comes. But Bergson's theory of evolution is not at all teleological. It does not admit of any plan, purpose or teleological principle which governs the process of evolution.

As we find that love is a great force in the evolutionary process, so it is for the individual. Knowledge is power. And this power can be achieved not by reason alone but by intuition (love). But how much can we know? To what extent the human mind is capable of knowing things? Our reason or intellect is certainly a helper in the attainment of a fuller and higher knowledge. Yet reason is not very helpful in the solution of the deeper problems of life and universe. In the west it was Kant who declared boldly the incapacity of reason. In his '*Critique of Pure Reason*', he raises the question, 'Is metaphysics possible?' and answers it in the negative. Before Kant, the Muslim philosopher Ghazali was also perplexed with many philosophical and religious questions. He tried to answer them with the help of reason. But he failed. He, therefore, later on in his philosophical career, turned to mystic experience, and with the help of intuition attempted to solve successfully many of the baffling problems which he had earlier failed to solve. But this does not mean that reason is absolutely useless. Man is a rational animal. He has got his superiority over other beings of the world only because of his rational faculty. What we

mean to say here is that reason by its very nature is incapable of grasping the ultimate Reality because of its dualistic and discursive nature. It always differentiates between subject and object and separates one from the other. But love binds together even things which are heterogeneous. It goes beyond how and why. It requires no proof. It is self-certifying.

The philosophy of intuitionism developed in the west when the insufficiency of reason was recognized after the revolt led by Kant against empirical and rationalistic thinking. Bergson is a leading exponent of intuitionism. According to Bergson, the different modes of knowing are the outcome of one common principle of evolution i.e.—the life-impetus, the *elan vital*. There are the stages of torpor, instinct and intelligence in the paths of evolution. The instruments of instincts are living tools. Instinctive actions are quite prompt and easy. But instinctive actions are not easily changeable. They cannot be changed with the changing circumstances. Intellect does not use living instruments but artificial tools for its operation. Of course there are sense-organs necessary in the exercise of intelligence, but the important thing is the artificial instrument. And because intellect uses artificial instruments, intellectual actions are not quick, perfect and immediate. As regards perfection, intellectual actions are less perfect than instinctive. Intellectual actions are also much more complicated than instinctive. But the advantage of intellectual actions over instinctive is that they are easily adjustable. They can be made to fit with the changing events of time. This is the reason that intelligence is more helpful in our day-to-day life. But they cannot be regarded as the source of knowledge. They are means of adjustment with the environment. At this point Bergson is quite opposed to many thinkers who have accepted either instinct or intelligence as means of knowledge. He (Bergson) is an anti-intellectualist. If instinct and intelligence cannot give us knowledge, then how can we get knowledge? Here, Bergson gives the theory of intuition. Both sense and intellect fail to grasp the real nature of reality. They are helpful, no doubt, so far the interests of our practical life are concerned. But, they give us a misleading appearance of reality through a fragmentary and static notion

in reference to space and time. Reality is identical with change. This basic flow, therefore, is not immediately grasped by sense and intellect because of its slow movement and discursive and disintegrating nature. The immediate awareness of Reality is possible only through intuition. Intuition alone can have a direct apprehension of reality. The "very inwardness of life" is known through it. It, however, does not mean that Bergson denies the importance of intellect or considers it as opposed to intuition. He accepts the utility of intellect in our life and feels the inter-dependence of intellect and intuition despite their differences. Intuition is not only helped by intellect, it is instinctive and inquisitive. According to Mr. Hakim, "one cannot help noticing striking resemblance between Rumi's views of love and the various types of philosophy of intuition developed in post-Kantian idealism. As his conception of pure ego is fundamentally the same as that of Fichte, so his utterances about that ultimate intuition which he calls love have a marked similarity with the intuition of Schelling and Bergson."<sup>16</sup>

For Rumi love is the very nature of man while mere intellectual effort is the characteristic of satan. He does not want to dwell on words and superficialities. He wants a burning heart, kindled with the flame of love.

According to Rumi intellect lies in the very domain of love. It is only when intellect does not take recourse to love that it becomes materialistic, satanic and unable to realize the eternal values of life. Reason pretends to know the inner secret though it does not. It is our companion so far action and thinking (in scientific sphere) are concerned, but in the mystic state it is not helpful. The mystic always tries to seek union with God. He claims to have the glimpse of Reality, not with the help of reason, but with that of intuition. Generally, the mystic, in his ecstatic state, does not notice that the intellect is completely swamped and the sense of reality is lost sight of. The life of the sense is despised and history becomes an illusion. The final goal is the merging of this individual soul in a qualityless Absolute. The love of the absolute happens to be a suicidal love for the individual, just like the love

of the moth for the flame. Rumi is also a mystic but he fully understands the utility of reason. And his mysticism can not be fully identified with absolute monism on the one hand and quiteism on the other. Both Iqbal and Rumi are opposed to this form of mysticism.

Mr. Hakim in an article<sup>17</sup> compares Rumi and Iqbal as such.

Both believe that love is a force for creative evolution. All the cases of progress, growth and assimilation can be satisfactorily explained only through the force of creative love. Both are fighters against quietistic mysticism. Both realize the importance of struggle in the stream of existence. Both of them consider love to be free and immortal. Both of them are irrationalists and consider intuition more valuable.

Though Iqbal is anti-rationalist, he is not opposed to reason as such. He does not mark a hard and fast line between intuition and intellect, despite he believes in the superiority of the former. Sometimes he emphasises too much the supremacy of love in his poetry, so much, so that a superficial study may create a suspicion in the mind of the reader that Iqbal is against all use of reason. It is true that he always presents a contrast between intuition and intellect, but he never offers a wholesale condemnation of intellect. He realizes the value of both intuition and intellect. Reason is the organ of mind, and intuition is the property of heart. They are not entirely opposed to each other. Both of them belong to the same category, despite their difference in powers and achievements. Love brings higher knowledge, while reason's search for knowledge is incomplete and partial. In a poem, Iqbal differentiates between intellect and intuition very beautifully as follows :

Intellect one day tried to show its supremacy over intuition. Though intellect is an earthy thing, it soars to sky. The flights of reason can reach great heights. It has a capacity to lead the world and explain the book of life. Intellect thus claimed to be the expression of divine grace. To this the heart replied as such :

‘Thou guesseth the secret of life,  
But I see it with mine eye.

Thou art concerned with sensuous appearances.  
 But I know the innermost realities—  
 Shallow knowledge to Thee but the understanding  
 Of fundamental realities is due to me.  
 Thou seekest God but I hold him up to gaze.  
 Knowledge culminates in septicism and uncertainty,  
 I am the remedy of this disease'.<sup>18</sup>

It thus becomes clear that love (intuition) stands higher than intellect. In the following verses we also find a beautiful contrast between intellect and intuition.

The capital of intellect consists of doubt and fear,  
 But determination of faith are the essence of love.  
 The former builds with a view to demolish,  
 The latter destroys in order to construct.  
 Intellect is cheap and common as air,  
 But love is rare and invaluable.  
 Intellect's prop is the why and the how,  
 But love is free from such questioning.<sup>19</sup>

Iqbal is fully aware of the limitations of intellect and believes in the sublimity of intuition. Yet he grants the utility of the former. Its (reason) eyes are not devoid of the capacity for insight; only it lacks the required amount of impulsive nature.<sup>20</sup> What he wants to emphasise is that reason by itself is unable to lead to our final goal. It gets itself involved in doubt and hesitation. But love does not suffer from fear and doubt. It is ready to face anything courageously. Love jumps into the battlefield, heedless of consequences.<sup>21</sup>

Thus Iqbal believes that intuition stands higher than intellect, but intellect is not entirely useless. It is in fact so often employed in the service of intuition. This is in short Iqbal's position concerning the relationship between intuition and intellect.

Radhakrishnan who is a staunch supporter of intuitionism, rightly says. "It is unfortunate that insistence on intuition is often confused with anti-intellectualism. Intuition which ignores intellect is useless. The two are not only not incompatible but vitally united....intuition is beyond reason though not



against reason.”<sup>22</sup> Iqbal also writes, “Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring from the same root and compliment each other. The one grasps reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness.”<sup>23</sup> Thus both intuition and intellect, thinks Iqbal, are in need of each other for mutual regeneration. The difference lies in their degrees of approach. Both seek the vision of the same reality in accordance with their functions. Intellect fixes its gaze on the temporal aspect of reality, while intuition on the eternal. In fact, Bergson holds, points out Iqbal, intuition as only a higher kind of intellect.<sup>24</sup> \* What Bergson calls ‘intuition’ is the haqqul-yaqin (highest certainty) of the Sufi, the other two itmul-yaqin—inferential certainty (i.e. by reason), and ainul yaqin—perceptual certainty. In other words, in Sufism also, we may distinguish between intuition (haqqul-yaqin), itmul-yaqin (reason) ainul-yaqin (perception) as different forms of knowledge.

Iqbal considers intuition as the organ through which alone one can attain the highest kind of knowledge and thus extend the range of man’s power in the right direction. It is the quality of intuition not to mislead. It always points to the right and the good. Righteousness and goodness make our action and faith dignified and majestic. Intuition stands above the levels of both reason and perception. Iqbal mentions the following “characteristics of intuition.”<sup>25</sup>

1. Intuition (mystic experience) is immediate. In this respect it does not differ from other normal levels of experience like perception. As other levels of human experience supply data for knowledge, so does intuition. The other varieties of normal experience give us a knowledge of the external world, but the intuitive experience supplies us with the knowledge of God. ‘The immediacy of mystic experience simply means that we know God just as we know other objects.’

2. Secondly, intuitive experience is unanalysible. When we have the experience of a table, innumerable data of experience merge into the single experience of the table. Of this wealth of data only those things are selected that fall into a certain order

of space and time and then we take them in reference to the table. In the mystic experience, however, such an analysis is not possible. Here thought is reduced to the minimum. The ordinary rational consciousness views reality piecemeal, while the mystic state sees it in its entirety, and in it the distinction between subject is obliterated.

3. Thirdly, the mystic in his intuitive experience, while transcending his self, momentarily suppresses his personality and effects an intimate association with a unique self. It is not true to say that the mystic state is highly subjective. The fact is that the mystic state is also objective. It belongs to the same category as that of the normal experience. It has a cognitive content. Our knowledge of the external world by sense-perception is not the only type of knowledge. We know the existence of other selves and even of God by other methods.<sup>26</sup> Not only our fellowmen but even God respond to our call. And response is no doubt the test of the presence of a conscious self. In spite of the fact that our knowledge of other selves remains to some extent inferential, yet we feel the immediacy of our experience. Though intuition seems to be highly personal, we find that it has objective reality.

4. Fourthly, intuition is a matter of feeling. Therefore the content itself of an intuitive experience cannot be transmitted. It is incommunicable when an attempt is made to communicate this experience to other in the form of propositions, it cannot be communicated to them with its original intensity and warmth. According to Quran it is psychology and not the content of experience that is given.<sup>27</sup> The mystic experience is incommunicable because it is untouched by discursive intellect, and is essentially a matter of feeling. Yet like all other forms of feeling, mystic feeling has a cognitive element. It seeks its expression in thought.

5. Fifthly, mystic's intimate association with the eternal does not mean complete break with the serial time. Unreality of serial time may be felt for sometime. But the mystic state does not last long. Both the mystic and the prophet return to the normal level of experience with the difference that prophet's

return from a mystic state is a boon for mankind, while the mystic wants to remain always in the same state. For the purpose of knowledge, mystic experience is as real as any other form of knowledge. It "can not be ignored merely because it cannot be traced back to sense-perception nor is it possible to undo this spiritual value of the mystic by specifying the organic conditions which appear to determine it."<sup>28</sup>

Thus it can be said that intuition "is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be communicated except in the form of a judgment."<sup>29</sup> But, how can we believe that this judgment is true? Do we possess some test which would determine it? We may point out two tests—pragmatic and intellectual. Moreover had the personal experience been the only ground for acceptance, religion would have been the possession of a few and the whole history of religious experience a 'myth'. But it is not the case. We find that mankind has got a wealth of spiritual thought and has been elevated by the act of intuition. Had intuition been meaningless, nonsensical, it could not have done a great service to mankind in the different fields of religions, politics, art and literature.

The Holy Book recognizes the empirical attitude as an indispensable element in the spiritual life of humanity. It attaches equal importance to all the levels of human experience. Naturalism of Quran indicates that man has to exploit natural forces for his interest and progress. But that exploitation must be in the interest of mankind as a whole and it should not be destructive. Intellect, therefore, should be supplemented by love.

In short, Iqbal thinks of love as a powerful weapon—a weapon of transforming both the individual and humanity. It can save the humanity from disaster, and it can exalt the personality of the individual. He says :

The luminous point whose name is the self  
Is the life-spark beneath our dust.  
By love it is made more lasting,  
More living, more burning, more glowing.  
From love proceeds the radiance of its being.  
And the development of its unknown possibilities.<sup>30</sup>

The nature of love is such that it fears neither sword nor dagger. The self is strengthened by sparks of love. It can gain dominion over the inward and outward forces of the universe. Iqbal narrates an incident of Bu Ali Qalandar, the famous saint, as an instance.<sup>31</sup>

One day a young disciple of Bu Ali went to the market. He was intoxicated by the wine of Bu Ali's discourse. The governor of the city was coming along on horse back. The Dervish was forbidden in an ill-manner not to come in the way of governor's escort. But the Dervish was sunk in the sea of his own thoughts. His head was, therefore, seriously injured by the staff bearer who was drunken with pride. The Dervish stepped painfully out of the governor's way and came to Bu Ali with a heavy heart, and complained of the incident with tears in his eyes. The Sheikh, hearing, lost his temper. He poured forth a fiery torrent of speech. He ordered his secretary to write a letter from a dervish to a Sultan, complaining 'Thy governor has broken my servant's head. He has cast burning coals on his own life. Arrest this wicked governor or else I will bestow thy kingdom on another.' A mighty king received this challenge from a lonely saint. He began to tremble with fear. The Sheikh was furious. The king obeyed his command and dismissed the governor. He (king) sent Amir Khusro, one of the celebrated persian poet, to Sheikh in order to pacify him. Khusro in his sweet voice, played his lute in Bu Ali's presence, and this made him soft.

Iqbal, thus attaches great significance to love.

### *Action*

Iqbal does not define the word 'action'. He seems to have used it in its usual significance. He says :

"As love fortifies the ego, asking (Su'al) weakens it. All that is achieved without personal effort comes under Su'al. The son of a rich man who inherits his father's wealth is an 'asker' (beggar); so is every one who thinks the thoughts of other."<sup>32</sup>

Iqbal uses the term 'asking' i.e. Su'al in the sense of inaction. He pleads to avoid all forms of asking i.e. inaction. In

order to fortify the ego we should cultivate love—the power of assimilative action. The lesson of assimilative action is given by the life of the Prophet, atleast to a Muslim. The whole life of Muhammad was of action. His actions justified his ideals. It is thus through action that we can achieve our aspirations and rise to a higher level of existence.

Iqbal is an enthusiastic advocate of the importance of activity and creativeness in life. In fact, all our creativeness comes through action. No action, no creativity. And without creativity no progress is possible. Not only man but even God is active in order to be creative.

Inaction is against the very basic principle of life. Imitation suppresses the creative faculty of life. To imitate is merely to follow the doings of others in a passive way. Both inaction and imitation bring decay into the human ego. A thing cannot develop in a stagnant position. Any relaxation on the part of human personality leads to harmful consequences. Iqbal, therefore, writes, "Personality is a state of tension and can continue only if that state is maintained. If the state of tension is not maintained, relaxation will ensue."<sup>33</sup> Personality is a valuable achievement of man; he should, therefore, see that the state of relaxation does not come to him. Asking i.e. inaction brings disintegration to human self. It deprives the self of the light of illumination. Anything, achieved without personal effort, is deterrent to the progress of the self. A thing obtained by one's own labour is more pleasing than the one got by asking (begging).

A whole ocean if gained by begging, is  
but a sea of fire;

Sweet is a little dew gathered by one's own hand.<sup>34</sup>

Action is a necessity of life. It makes our personality strong. It leads us to far reaching consequences. Perhaps man's highest aspiration is to enjoy the fruits of eternity. How to achieve this personal ambition? Not by mere desire, but it is possible only through action. Iqbal says "you can have it if you make an effort to achieve it. It depends on our adopting in this life

modes of thought and activity which tends to maintain the state of tension.....If our activity is directed towards the maintenance of a state of tension the shock of death is not likely to affect it."<sup>35</sup> This is the importance of action from metaphysical stand-point.

We may also consider the worth and value of action from social, moral and national points of view. A positive ethics should not be ethics of inaction. Rather, it should always take interest in improving the conditions of world. For the welfare of humanity, the ethical norms have to be translated into practice. Islam, as a religion of humanity, is deeply interested in the moral development of mankind by means of its active participation in both the spiritual and material spheres. It is the law of nature that so long as a nation is active in the right way, it is bound to progress.

A question may be raised here : Do we improve merely by becoming active ? Certainly not. The difficulty arises because Iqbal has not defined the word action clearly, and we can argue that even misdeeds come into the category of action. Considering the spirit of Iqbal's philosophy, one can infer quite justifiably that whenever he uses the word 'action', he attaches a moral significance to it. He seems to be fully aware of the fact that great nations of ancient times have decayed and lost power only due to their misdeeds. Perhaps no other thinker in the past has advocated so much the importance of action than Iqbal. Islam, gave a stirring call to the people, and gave the world a message of activity for many years, but Persian Sufism very much weakened this emphasis on action. To quote Dr. Iqbal: "we find a strange similarity in Hindu and some of the Muslim thinkers who thought over this problem of the self. The point of view adopted by Sankara in the interpretation of Gita was the same that followed by Ibn-Arabi in the interpretation of Quran."<sup>36</sup> Both Sankara and Ibn-Arabi preferred the life of retirement as the ultimate aim. They were pantheists and did not attach much importance to the human self. Sheikh Arabi possessed a charming personality and he was a great scholar. He made the pantheistic doctrine an indispensable element in the Muslim thought structure. Kirmani and Iraqi were very

much influenced by him and gradually all the persian poets of the fourteenth century were moved by it and expressed it with full vigour, with the result that it reached every nook and corner of the Islamic world and became the main cause of political and social decay. The mystical poetry of Persia was primarily the product of the political despondency of the Muslims. It could hardly give any inspiring note to the nation; we find here that frailty becomes an object of beauty and the idea of renunciation, a source of consolation. All this is but, natural. When a nation is defeated in the 'survival of the fittest', it tries to cover its faults in such ways.

Coming to the Indian thought, I would like to quote a long passage of Iqbal :

"In Indian thought we find a strange mixture of theory and practice. Some of their greatest thinkers have deeply thought over the nature of human capacity of action. They arrived at the conclusion that the continuity in the life of the self, which is at the root of all pain and suffering, is achieved through activity. In other words, the present position and experiences of the human ego are the results of his previous deeds. Given this law of action and reaction, the consequences must necessarily follow. Thus the Indian thinkers were about to solve the difficult problem of the freedom of will. Philosophically, their attempts were praiseworthy. They however, did not stop at that. They accepted all logical consequences which followed from their initial position. When it is found that the nature of the self is activity, then the logical conclusion to be derived, if one wishes to be free from cycle of self or existence, is to abhor activity. This conclusion was apparently harmful for the individual as well as for the society. At this stage Hinduism required a great seer who would stem this tide of disruption and on the basis of his keener and deeper insight, interpret to the people the true significance and value of activity or *Karma*. This stupendous task was done by Sri Krishna."<sup>37</sup>

Sri Krishna criticized in a most discerning manner the philosophical traditions of his people. He pointed out to them that one should not abhor activity, for action of some sort is the

very nature of the self. One should only remain indifferent to the consequences of actions. Ramanuja followed the same line of thought. But unfortunately the logical hair-splitting of Sankara again distorted his outlook.

Iqbal dislikes the pantheistic mode of thinking, for it gives very little scope for action and responsibilities. He is a teacher of dynamic life and wishes to evoke an eagle-spirit in man. He admires the practical life as inspired by the Quran. Man has to actively participate in the deeper aspirations of the universe by adjusting himself to the forces of nature and also moulding these forces in his own interest and the universe. In this great task God helps him as well. But if man does not feel for one of the dynamisms in life and evolve his latent potentialities, his spirit is likely to be hardened and thus he would be degraded to this level of dead matter.<sup>38</sup> Quran has clearly stated :

'Verily God will not change the condition of man, till they change what is in themselves'. (13 : 12). This is applicable not only to the individual but also to nations.

Iqbal hates weakness and regards inactivity as a course for the individual and society. He thinks that a victim of tyranny is as much blameable as a tyrant. It is because he creates an opportunity for the practice of tyranny. Iqbal, therefore, pleads that we should try to 'be hard' and gain power. Power is the dominating feature of his philosophy. But the power, as advocated by him, is not mere power. It should be associated with a broader vision. The attainment of power is necessary because man is challenged by the forces of nature and the forces of evil, and he has to resist them in order to achieve his higher ideals and aspirations. Iqbal feels regret at the fact that the spirit of 'Jihad' which is an essential teaching of Islam is no more found to be effective in the Muslim world. The Muslims have become inactive and weak. They have politically declined. Iqbal would, therefore, like to see the revival of 'Jihad' among the Muslims. What is Jihad? We should not misunderstand the word. It does not mean the blood-shed of mankind. It means constant struggle for eradicating evils from the world, an activity for the betterment of mankind. It ordinarily means 'fight'. And one is directed to fight against



one's self, against the evils and the infidels. It is possible only by remaining vigilant and active. If one is weak, one will be tyrannised or crushed by others who are more powerful.

The judge of destiny has decreed from eternity that the crime of weakness is doomed to death.<sup>39</sup>

Iqbal preaches the youth to create a spirit like that of the falcon. The falcon (Shahin) is a symbolic expression in his poetry. He selects this bird because of certain qualities it possesses.<sup>40</sup>

Its position is the highest among all the birds. It flies higher than any other bird and it wants to remain in such a state. It knows no idleness and slackness. It is a courageous bird. It earns its food by its own labour. It aspires to remain ever fresh and blooming. It does not care to make an abode. It has a broad vision. And the whole world is its abiding place.

Iqbal would like to see the youth hardy and active. Rest and pleasure in decorated houses and mansions should not be their ideals and aims.

“You have not your abode in an imperial palace, you are falcon and your resting-place lies in the rocks of the mountain.”<sup>41</sup>

Iqbal never forgets the past glories of Islam. Who does not know that Carvoda in Spain was once the centre of civilization for the entire world? The glorious chapters in the history of Islam belong to those period in which the Muslims were an active nation. But now, for the last five hundred years, as a nation of the world they have politically and socially declined. What is lacking in them is the very spirit of action and determination and belief in their faith. Iqbal very earnestly wishes the repetition of Islamic history. He feels that now the people in the East are awakening from their deep slumber. Life-impulse is being created in them. They are becoming aware of the world-forces. But as the philosophy of action is basically

opposed to imitation, he warns the eastern people not to be slavish imitators of the west in their urge to adjust the fast changing ways of life. He advises them to be critical to western modes of life and thinking. By this he does not mean to undervalue the intellectual developments of the west. He means that in leading an active life, we should also be aware of some of the serious defects of modern civilization. Lack of a high ideal and broad vision diminishes the moral value of an action. The western people, no doubt, are active in the various fields. But perhaps they seem to have lost sight of the ideals of life. That is why humanity today is faced with the great challenge of the demon of destruction.

In discussing the ethics of action, Iqbal does not give a detailed analysis of what actions are good or bad. But he considers that all those actions are valuable which add something to the cultural advancement of mankind and all those actions are bad which obstruct the development of the self and make humanity suffer. We have therefore to act in the best interests of the self and humanity.

In the history of philosophy we find two trends of thought regarding the nature of life. These are optimism and pessimism. The former believes in the value of life and holds that it can be made happy. According to the latter, life is a vast vale of tears. It is full of sufferings and not worth living. Iqbal is neither a pessimist nor an optimist. To him, life is neither pain nor pleasure on the other hand he considers life as synonymous with activity. The nature of life is determined by the nature of the activity indulged in.

“Life is made by action, a hell or a heaven. This earthly creature (Man) is neither a product of light nor of fire.”\*12

Life on its forward march, proceeds through action. All the progress and achievements in human civilization have been effected by constant struggles and endeavours. But man should not stop anywhere. It is his nature to experience new desire and foster new values. He should not get contented even at

the sight of an utopia. All the human progress and achievement will stop if mankind felt fully satisfied. Life will become dreary and monotonous. In fact there is no end to desires and aspiration and so there is no end to our activities. Thus Iqbal say :

Ask khizr, what is the secret of life.

He would say, every object lives by incomplete endeavours.<sup>43</sup>

### Notes

1. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1934) p. 90.

\* (i) Quran—After his Lord chose him (Adam) for himself and was turned towards him, and guided him (20 : 144).

(ii) 'when thy Lord said to the angel' verily, I am about to place in my stand on earth, they said, will thou place then one who will do ill therein and shed blood, when we celebrate thy praise and extol thy holiness'? "God said verily I know what your know not" (2 : 28) And it he who hath made you the representatives on earth and hath raised some of you above other by various grades, that he may prove you by his gifts (6 : 165).

(iii) verily we proposed to the Heavens, and to the Earth, and to the mountains to receive the trust but they refused the burden and they feared to receive it. Man undertook to bear it but hath proved unjust, senseless (33 : 72).

2. Iqbal, *The secrets of the Self*, (Trans. by Nicholson, Lahore, 1955) pp. 58-59.

\* Dr. Archer, John Clarke, *Desire under the Palm and Fig-tree—comparative Study of Islam and Budhism*.

(Published in Islamic Culture, Jan, April, July, Oct 1951), p. 18.

3. S.S., Ch. II, p. 23.

4. ibid., p. 16.

5. ibid., p. xx.

6. *R.R.*, p. 147.
7. *S.S.*, Chp. XI, pp. 95—98.
8. *ibid.*, Chap. III.
9. Davids, F. Hadland., *The Persian Mystics—Rumi* (London, John Murray, 1920) p. 25.
10. Nicholson, R.A., *The Mystics of Islam*, (London, 1914) p. 103.
11. Davis, F.H., *The Persian Mystics—Rumi* (London, John Murray, 1920) p. 69.
12. See *Masnavi Book I 'Description of Love'*, Trans. by Whinfield, E.H., (London, Kegan Paul, 1898) p. 5.  
 "Sar pinha ast andar zer-o-bam  
 Fash gar goem jahan barham zanam."  
 (*Masnavi, Book I. p. 4.*)
13. *S.S.*, p. xxv.
14. *Masnavi-Book III*, (Whinfield's Trans., London, Kegan Paul, 2nd Ed.) p. 159.  
 cf. Earth losing its form becomes vegetable, vegetable again perishes to feed and be transmitted into animal, and in like manner animal becomes man....
15. Iqbal,—*Metaphysics of Persia*, (Bazm-i-Iqbal, Lahore, 1959) p. 33.
16. Hakim, Khalifa Abdul, *Metaphysics of Rumi*, (Lahore, Sk. Mohd. Ashraf, second impression). p. 61.
17. Hakim, K.A., *Concept of Love in Rumi and Iqbal*, (Articles published in *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad, July, 1940) p. 266.
18. Iqbal, 'Aq'l aur dil' in *Bang-i-Dara*, (Shk. Mubarak Ali Tajir—Lahore, June, 1939 4th Ed.) p. 28.
19. Aql ra Sarmaya az beem-o-shak ast  
 Ishq ra azm-o-yaqeen laonfik ast  
 Aan kund tameer ta veeran kunad  
 Een kunad veeran ke abadan kunad  
 Aql choon bad ast azan dar jahan  
 Ishq kameyab-o-bahaye-u-givan  
 Aql muhkam az asas chun-chand  
 Ishq urzian az lebas-e-chun chand. (Iqbal) *ibid.*
20. (Iqbal, *Jawaid Nama*)—Choshmash az nigat, mahroom-i-nust  
 Lekin in bechara aan jurrate-rindana neest.

21. Bekhatar kood para aatish namsood me ishq; Aql hai mahve—  
tamashae labe-bam abhi.
  22. Chap. 'Spirit in Man' in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Edited  
by Radhakrishnan & Muirhead, London, George Allen & Unwin  
Ltd., 1936) pp. 268-9.
  23. *R.R.*, p. 2.
  24. *ibid.*, p. 3.  
\*Iqbal here seems to have misconceived the Bergson's notion of  
intuition. Bergson does not think that intuition is a higher form  
of intellect.
  25. *R.R.*, pp. 17-26.
  26. Quran—'And your Lord Saithi call me and I respond to your  
call' (40 :62).
  27. Quran, 'It is not for man that God should speak with him, but by  
vision or behind a veil' (45 : 50).
  28. *R.R.*, p. 22.
  29. *ibid.*, p. 25.
  30. *S.S.*, Chap. III, p. 28.
  31. *S.S.*, Chap. V, p. 44.
  32. *S.S.*, Introduction, p. xxvi.
  33. *S.S.*, p. xxi.
  34. *S.S.*, Chap. IV, p. 41.
  35. *S.S.*, pp. XXIII-IV.
  36. *S.S.*, Introductory notes by Iqbal in 'Mazamine-Iqbal' edited by  
Mr. Taj, Ahmedia Press, Hyderabad. (362 Hijri) p. 50.
  37. Iqbal, Introductory notes on *Israr-i-khudi* in *Mazemin-e-Iqbal*,  
p. 49.
  38. *R.R.*, p. 12.
  39. Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril*. (Taj. Comp. Lahore 1935). p. 210.  
"Taqdeer ke qazi ka ye fatua hau azal se,  
Hai jurm-i-zaefi ki saza marg-e-mufajat".
  40. In a poem 'Shahin' in *Bal-Jibr'il* Iqbal mentions all these quali-  
ties. p. 218.
  41. "Nahin tera nashuman qasr-i-Sultani ke gunbad par  
Tu shahin hai basera kar paharon ki chattana par".  
Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril*, (Lahore, 1935) p. 163.
- \* "Amal se zindagi banti hai jannat bhi jahannam bhi

- Ya khaki apnai fitrat me na noon hai nari hai".
42. Iqbal, *Bang-e-Dara*, (Sk. Mubarak Ali Tajir, Lahore, June 1939) p. 13.
43. Raz-e-Hyat poochh le khijrl khijsta gam se  
Zinda har ek chuz hai koshish natamam se.

The poem "Koshish-e-Natamam" in *Bang-e-Dara*, p. 131.

\* Khizr is a mysterious figure, commonly supposed to be a special messenger of God, who is roving throughout the world since time immemorial and guiding the seekers of truth by his knowledge of the secrets of life specially given to him by God

### THREE

## MAN AND HIS DESTINY

### Freedom of Will :

The philosophy of action is very much linked up with the controversy between determinism and freedom.

The question is : Is man free to act or he has to act according to a pre-destined plan ? If man's actions are pre-destined by God, there is no sense in talking about human freedom and responsibility, and in speaking of his hopes and aspirations being realized by constant struggle. The idea of pre-destination undermines the very basis of the philosophy of action.

The orthodox Muslim theologians, in their anxiety to declare the absolute sovereignty of Allah, do not reflect upon this fact that there is great inconsistency between human responsibility and fatalism. Human responsibility and fatalism are in fact incompatible with each other.

The free-will and fatalism are discussed in ethics as well as theology. In theology fatalism is interpreted as pre-destination and free-will in ethics is considered as self-determination.

Some of the European commentators on Muslim theology have pointed out that there is "crass determinism"<sup>1</sup> or "dark fatalism"<sup>2</sup> in Quran. But perhaps there is nothing definite in the Quran about this problem. We find in the Holy Book of passages which say that man has freedom of action, and also passages which favour the idea of fatalism or pre-destination.<sup>3</sup> Therefore it will be wrong to search for a detailed and logical analysis of this problem in the Quran or even in other revealed scriptures.<sup>4</sup> This matter has been made controversial due to differing interpretations of the Quran. But supposing that the Quran teaches both free-will and fatalism, the question arises, can we reconcile the two ?

According to the traditions, the Prophet is reported to have discouraged the discussion of this topic because more often mere argumentations lead us astray.

'So said the Victor of Badr : Correct belief lies between Jabri (Fatalism) and Qadr (Free-will).'<sup>5</sup>

The early Muslim thinkers were not involved in this problem and their efforts were mostly concentrated in emphasising the role of action. But later on with the spread of the faith and the increasing influence of philosophy, people had to take interest in the problem of free-will and determinism. The three important Muslim sects which are to be referred to in this connection are the Jabrians, the Qadarians and the orthodox group. Iqbal does not belong exclusively to anyone of these groups. The Jabarians who are believers in the Absolute Sovereignty of Allah, plead for complete fatalism. God is all-powerful. Everything happens in this world as determined by His will. The wind blows, the fire burns, the rains fall, nay every happening is determined by the will of God. This philosophy of fatalism developed out of the vested interests brought about by the political expediency of the period. At the time of opportunist Ommayad—the rulers of Damascus, a civil war among Muslims broke out. Some of the saints were very much disgusted with this bloody war among their own brethren and abhorred the opportunism of their rulers. What happened in Karbala was the most tragic incident in the history of Islam. And Ommayads attributed all these acts to



the decree of God. Whenever any complaint against any action was made, they ascribed every action to God who is all-powerful and does everything. Such a morally degraded philosophy of fatalism was in accordance with their own plans and programmes. Hasan of Basra, once being asked about them replied, 'These enemies of God are liars'.

In this age a group of rationalist thinkers of Islam called Mutazallites appeared on the scene. They denied fatalism and pleaded for human responsibility and freedom.

According to them man is undetermined in a world determined by strict laws. He is the doer of his own actions over and above any external agency, necessity or compulsion. They argued that had not man be the doer of his own action, there were no question of admiration and condemnation, and the religious ordinance and heaven and hell would have become entirely meaningless; for there is no sense in punishing a man for some action, when he, himself, had no control over it. Moreover many of the actions of man like infidelity, injustice, etc., are ugly, and as such these could not be done by a wise and just being. We also find that man eats and drinks when he feels hungry and thirsty. Thus he acts according to his own volition. Lastly, had God been the real doers of all the actions of man, actions of infidelity and injustice should have been attributed to God, but they infact do not manifest the characteristics of God. Mutazallites thus concluded that man is free to choose between good and evil, both courses being open to him. The position of Mutazallites is quite acceptable to modern European moralists. As Mr. Martineau says "we can not pause to pursue through its subtle windings the controversy between liberty and necessity. The only position which for the moment we are concerned to make good, is this alternative one,—that either free-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion."<sup>6</sup>

The orthodox school led by Ash'arite is opposed to Mu'tazila on the free-will controversy. Against him, the proponents of this school point out that actions created by God do not mean that He is characterised by them. For example, red colour created by God in an organism does not mean that

God is also qualified with particular colour. In this way an infidel person is one who does infidelity and not he who created it. The Ash'arite adopt a middle course between the extreme fatalism of the old school and the extreme libertarianism of the rationalists.<sup>7</sup> They maintained that free action of man is possible under the power of God. God's will is already planted in the will of man. But when they were questioned why a man should be held responsible for his misdeeds when he has no control over his action, they offer their doctrine of acquisition (Kash). According to this doctrine God has given man both power and choice. So far as the existence of action is concerned, it is created by God but produced through the agency of man. Thus man possesses the power of acquiring the different modes of activity.

Fakhruddin Razi even does away with the idea of acquisition' and openly maintains in his commentary on the Quran, the doctrine of necessity. The Matridiyya school on the other hand, though an anti-rationalist adopt the rationalist position and as against Ash'arites, believes that man has absolute control over his actions.

Iqbal is not the follower of any of these schools. His position is vehemently opposed to the Jabarians who are advocates of extreme fatalism, which in fact goes against the very spirit of the philosophy of action and fails to explain human responsibility and dignity in the universe. It would only mean that men are just puppets made to play from behind by some external agency. Religion and our endeavours for achievement and progress will become then sheer mockery. Iqbal is fully convinced of the fact that Quran never and does not teach such a fatalism. Even Ash'arite doctrine is only another form of disguised fatalism. In their anxiety to emphasise the complete omnipotence of God, they opine that the will of God is absolute, and therefore nothing can happen against His will. As against this, Iqbal would give the concession of maintaining this view, that God himself has brought limitation upon His will. Moreover, there is no question of willing or not-willing. These things are applicable only in the human spheres, where man feels his limitation and therefore aspires something higher.

Iqbal, then, does not believe with the Mutazila that man has absolute freedom of action. His contention is rather this that man has freedom under certain limitations; and freedom of man is determined according to the extent he develops his personality.

Our account will, however, be incomplete if we miss Rumi here. Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim, has elaborately, picked up his views on 'freedom of will' from his masnavis'. I am giving below the substance of what he says.

Among the creatures of God, man alone is endowed with freedom of choice. The grace of God is bestowed upon him in accordance with his endeavours. But there is no question of reward or punishment for the heavenly bodies which move under compulsion. Freedom of will in man does not mean that he can make the impossible possible. The nature of things is such that earth cannot become water and water cannot develop the properties of honey. Man is, however, free to do what is possible. He has to choose between possible and impossible. His deliberation however, is a proof of his freedom within certain limitations. Yet, it is true, he has got superiority over other objects of nature. Every other thing, is controlled by outside influences. Man alone carries his star with himself. His course of action is not determined by earthly and heavenly bodies, unless what he wants to do is impossible. In a world of obstruction man is free to act in accordance with his plans. Thus the question of admiration and condemnation would have been nonsensical if man would have been determined. He has to struggle for higher and higher objectives. But his struggle does not mean that he is striking his head against fate, rather it is the very fate of man to struggle. Struggle against destiny is his very destiny. It is in this way that he can realize his inner potentialities. In short, according to Rumi, The pen of destiny has written once for all that every action shall have a reaction corresponding to it. If you choose crooked path, the inexorable law of destiny would lead you into error. Truth as well as error are governed by law. The pen of destiny did not move by an arbitrary will. Good and evil are pre-destined to have consequences corresponding to them. That the thief shall be punished

and that wine shall cause intoxication, are pre-destined."<sup>9</sup>

In this controversy we find that Rumi's position seems to be quite reasonable. Perhaps there is nothing in this argument which goes against Iqbal's contention upon this issue. Iqbal also believes that man carries his star with himself and external forces do not completely determine his fortune. He, himself has to shape his destiny. He is the architect of his own fortune. He can change, not only his destiny but also that of the society by his free-will and understanding.

Iqbal regrets that a most degrading type of fatalism prevailed in the world of Islam for many centuries. It has a history behind it which requires a separate treatment. It may be pointed out, however very briefly, that this kind of fatalism which has been summed up by the European critics in the word 'qismat', was "due partly to philosophical thought, partly to political expediency and partly to the gradually diminishing force of life-impulse, which Islam originally imparted to its followers."<sup>10</sup> Iqbal goes to a searching examination in order to find a solution of the problem of fate. He studies this problem in the light of Quran and human psychology.

Quran says : (1) "And say : The truth is from your Lord, let him, then, who will believe : and let him who will, be an unbeliever." (18 : 28)

(2) "If you do well to your own behalf you do well ; and if you do evil against yourselves will ye do it" (17 : 7)

From these two verses it becomes clear that Islam favours a free activity of the ego. Man is free to believe or disbelieve, act properly or improperly. But in what way does the ego become active ? Does the ego determine its own activity ? If so, how is the self-determination of the ego related to the determinism of the spatio-temporal order ? Is personal causality a special kind of causality, or only a disguised form of the mechanism of nature ? Iqbal raises these questions and tries to answer them.

It is said by some that the human act of deliberation is not due to ego's inherited tendencies but the effect of external forces acting on his mind. And the final choice is determined by the

strongest force exercised on him. Thus, all our actions are determined by our physical environments. Iqbal rejects this view. He says : "I am firmly of the opinion that the controversy between the advocates of mechanism and freedom arises from a wrong view of intelligent action which modern psychology, unmindful of its own independence as a science, possessing a special set of facts to observe, was bound to take on account of its slavish imitation of physical sciences. The view that ego-activity is a succession of thoughts and ideas, ultimately resolvable to units of sensation, is only another form of atomic materialism which forms the basis of modern science. Such a view could not but raise a strong presumption in favour of a mechanistic interpretation of consciousness."<sup>11</sup>

Mechanism regards the law of causality as unquestionable. It explains things in terms of cause and effect. The law of causality does not leave room for the scope of freedom, as according to it, every event is determined by a preceding one. A majority of physical sciences (or all physical sciences) accept such a view. And, even most of the modern psychologists have accepted it.

Thus, according to mechanism all our activities are determined by material and physical agencies. Our thoughts are also explained mechanistically, one thought causing another. Iqbal does not accept the mechanistic interpretation of our thoughts and activities. He feels some relief at the development of a new German psychology known as configurationism. It has tried to secure the independence of psychology as a science, and does not interpret the human act of deliberation in a mechanistic way but admits the role of 'insight' in the resolution of conflicts of motives and in acts of deliberation.

Insight is not determined by the law of causality. Any judgment, therefore, based on insight clearly indicates the fact that man is free to think and act in his own way. Iqbal was of the opinion that it is insight, some strong inner urge and not external force, which determines our course of action. Our thoughts and activities are purposive. We act with some purpose; we want to reach some goal, which is not fixed before-

hand by mechanical necessity, but is determined by us. Iqbal, thus, writes "This 'insight' is the ego's appreciation of temporal, spatial and causal relation of things—the choice, that is to say of data, in a complex whole, in view of the goal or purpose which the ego has set before itself for the time being. It is this sense of striving in the experience of purposive action and the success which I actually achieve in reaching my ends that convince me of my efficiency as a personal cause. The essential feature of a purposive act is its vision of a future situation which does not appear to admit any explanation in terms of physiology."<sup>12</sup> The ego's activity is not determined by a system of causes and effects. The law of causality is rather a device for ego's own convenience in order to master the environment. Man has to live in a complex environment. He has, therefore, to interpret and understand nature by reducing it to a system of cause and effect, as it is in this way that he can know the behaviour of things and thus maintain his life. Gradually this leads to his mastering his environment to acquire more and more freedom.<sup>13</sup>

Man, unlike an animal, does not simply accept the material conditions which frequently obstruct and hamper his movements. He goes to transform his environment according to his like and dislike. It is, therefore, wrong to think that man is a mere puppet in the hands of nature. He is free to act in his own way. And, this in no way is a challenge to God's omnipotence. Man is related to the Absolute. Therefore, he partakes in the Divine freedom. There is also the element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity which clearly proves that the ego is a free personal cause. To quote Dr. Iqbal, "He shares in the life and freedom of the ultimate ego who, by permitting the emergence of a finite ego, capable of private initiative, has limited this freedom of His own free-will. This freedom of conscious behaviour follows from the view of ego-activity which the Quran takes."<sup>14</sup> God by granting man the ability to choose and act freely has prevented the concepts of morality, reward and punishment from being utterly insignificant.

Now, what do we mean by pre-destination? How to

interpret these words of Quran : "God created all things and assigned to each its destiny ?" We have already seen how does Rumi explain them. Iqbal's position is not very much different from his.

Laws of God are applicable both in the material and spiritual realms. But the material realm is, so to speak, strictly determined by these laws, while the pre-destination in the spiritual realm is different from what it is in the material one. Laws in the material world rule over everything. It is the destiny of the flower to fade always in the autumn season. But man's 'pre-destination' does not mean that his actions are determined entirely by some external law. He has been endowed with both potential and actual freedom. He has the capacity to convert his potential power into the actual. Hence he is responsible for all his actions. The pen of destiny has written that 'every action shall have a re-action'. Good-doings will be rewarded and bad-doings will be punished. Man has to follow only God's rule as written by the pen of destiny. It is in this sense that pre-destination can be understood in the spiritual realm—Iqbal says : "Dependent upon fate are plants and minerals. The Faithful depends only on the Commands of God."<sup>15</sup> The destiny of a seed is to become a tree. It is a natural law; it cannot become a tree if it does not get proper nourishment or if it is exposed to fire. Such is not the case with man who, unlike material objects, can master his own situation. But he is to be on guard that if he does not actualize his inner possibilities, if he does not make his environment agreeable to his needs, his decay is certain. But if he acts in accordance with the law, he can make appreciable progresses. It is now for him to decide whether he will sink to the levels of animal and inanimate matter or rise to the status of angels. Iqbal writes : "The destiny of a thing is then not an unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion."<sup>16</sup> Iqbal, thus completely rejects entertaining a passive attitude towards destiny. He reconciles destiny with time. Time is not like a line which has

already been drawn, and upon which all of us have to traverse. It is on the other hand, a store-house of possibilities. The future exists as an open possibility and not as a reality.

Iqbal thus believe that the destiny of man is not fixed. It can be changed. And man is the architect of his own fortune. But he can never be absolutely free like God, as that will challenge the absolute sovereignty of Allah. Iqbal, however, wishes that man should try to develop to such an extent that even God may feel proud of him.<sup>17</sup>

In short, we may say in the words of Iqbal, "The ego attains to freedom by the removal of all obstructions in its way. It is partly free, partly determined, and reaches fuller freedom by approaching the individual who is most free-God. In one word life is an endeavour for freedom."<sup>18</sup> The Prophet said 'Create in yourselves the attributes of God' in order to become more and more like the most unique individual. This is not like a drop merging itself in the ocean but like its developing the properties of the ocean. The more unique an individual becomes, the more he becomes free.

The ego in its movement towards uniqueness pass through three stages :

- (a) Obedience to law.
- (b) Self-Control.
- (c) Divine-Viceregency.

### *Obedience to Law*

We have already seen that man's freedom is not absolute as there is a limit to it. He has to work in an environment the complexity of which he has not been able to master completely. That is why his freedom is so often challenged by an alien environment. But surely he is struggling for freedom in order to be more powerful and happy. With this aim in view, he has to act in accordance with some law, in a world which exhibits and manifests the law of causation. In fact acting without any law is to bring in lawlessness and a world-wide chaos.

Iqbal feels that it is due to the obedience to law that even



a man of no worth can become quite worthy. The reign of law makes our life significant and valuable. If man aspires to master the sun, the stars and the moon, he will have to become the prisoner of law. His highest purposes and ideals can be achieved by obeying some law. The air becomes fragrant by having imprisoned in the flower-bud. The star moves towards its goal with head bowed in surrender to a law. The grass grows up in obedience to the law of growth; when it does not follow this law, it is trodden under feet. It is by law of union that drops of waters are converted into sea, and grains of sand into Sahara. Thus who can deny that there is great strength and vitality in law. We, would therefore be great fools if loose this great source of strength.<sup>19</sup>

Iqbal thus advises the Muslims to act according to the religious law of Islam. And, they should not complain of the hardness of the law even if they have such a feeling. They should be obedient like camel, the traits of which are service and toil, patience and preserverence.

Iqbal points out that freedom of man also implies a kind of restriction. "Liberty is the fruit of compulsion."<sup>20</sup> It is through the imposition of restriction on us that freedom is attained. Freedom from all restrictions is the negation of freedom.

But the question arises how can indeterminism come out of determinism? There are passages in the Hadith and the Quran which say that if man completely devotes himself to God—the mighty and the glorious—he is saved from all troubles. If one is a believer and relies upon God, He is sufficient for him. Finding such passages in the religious books of Islam, there are critics who point out that Islam teaches a complete negation of the ego, as it points out to complete self-surrender. Such a criticism is not well founded. A child during the period of his infancy acts on deterministic principles. Then comes in the life of man a stage of free-choice. After it he may pass to higher determinism, when his freedom of will and determinism are synthesised. But determinism again is of two types—forced compulsion and free compulsion. Forced compulsion comes

out of external forces. Iqbal, however, believes in free-compulsion which man himself has imposed upon him. Man is here compelled not to follow any course irrespective of his will, but to choose his actions under certain limitations brought about by himself for his spiritual development. It is by the virtue of love that his free-will is transmuted in accordance with the Divine commands which he feels in the heart of his hearts. It is perhaps in acting such a way that he can reach some higher goal, some higher ideal.

The love of God makes a man obedient to His law. But a lover does not feel compelled or forced. On the other hand his love becomes more impatient and more emergising. This higher form of determinism is not of the common type or like an external compulsion. It arises from within in order to have an association with the truth—God. It is not the compulsion of the lower egoistic self. The nature of higher compulsion is revealed only to such persons in whom God has opened an 'inward eye'. When the divine knowledge is assimilated in the knowledge of the saint, he becomes more exalted than what he was before. He partakes in the divine freedom, acts with the illumination of divine faith. Iqbal says that this type of fatalism is found in higher Sufism of Islam and it is not the negation of the ego.

Our intellect makes us understand the world as a rigid system of causes and effects while the vital way is the absolute acceptance of the inevitable necessity of life which has been described in Quran as 'Iman'. 'Iman' does not imply a passive attitude. It does not mean to accept things as they are. But it starts with the faith that things can be changed and re-modelled in accordance with the law. It is a kind of higher determinism when man creates in himself divine attributes, and becomes a staunch believer in God. Whatever he does and thinks, it is in accordance with a divine vision. He may even offer his prayers (like Rumi) calmly in the battle field when bullets are showering around him. But the average man is not ordinarily capable of attaining such a state. For this purpose he has to develop his personality because "Strong personalities alone are capable of rising to the experience and higher 'Fatalism' implied

in it.”<sup>21</sup> In the history of Islam, we find many strong personalities other than Prophet Muhammad, like Hazrat Ali, Hazrat Umar, Bayazid, Hallaj, Khalid Bin Valid, Tariq Bin Jamil etc., who realized the higher determinism in their life. They were all along active and enthusiastic in propagating the truth and establishing the laws of God on the earth.

Thus, obedience requires conviction in the unity of God and His laws. And it is necessary at least for a Muslim to follow in true spirit the ideal character of Prophet Muhammad and to cultivate his love in his heart. Bayazid of Bistam who was unique in his devotion, once refused to take water-melon, saying that he had no assurance whether the Prophet had ever tasted that fruit.<sup>22</sup>

### *Self-Control*

Self-control is an essential element in the education of the ego. It is brought about through faith, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage etc. So long as one believes “There is no God but He\*” all fears are dispelled from one’s mind.

His neck is not bowed before vanity.

Fears find no way into his bosom,

His heart is afraid of none but Allah.<sup>23</sup>

The Muslim conception of prayer is not only a process for self-purification, but it has also got its social and political significance. The conception of Tawhid i.e. belief in one God is highly pre-dominant in Islamic prayer. God is the only object of adoration for the Muslim. He denies every object of worship except Allah. Like other religions, the prayer in Islam signifies that the individual tries to establish a kind of intimacy with the ultimate reality. But Islamic prayer is much more than that. The Quran gives us one hundred attributes of God, and it is our contemplation of these names in order to clothe our character with them which has been called worship in the Quran (7 : 180).<sup>24</sup> It means that we have to imbue ourselves with the Divine character. We have to refrain from doing all that is evil, that is far from truth and that makes us bound extremely to the love of riches and power, love of self

and kindred and wife, leaving aside the highest ideals of life and the universe. It is through prayer that we can restore a balance in our soul and save it from egoistic impulses and mean desires. The Muslim prayer consists of three parts— (1) Physical cleanliness (2) Certain gestures and movements (3) Recitations of the holy passages. Physical cleanliness is only an index for spiritual purification. A Muslim has to cleanse the various parts of his body five times a day. This suggests that he has not to commit any sin or remain in dirtiness. The movement and postures of body symbolize our inner feelings. The raising of our hand means that we renounce all ungodly things. The standing with folded hands indicates that we are ready to receive the orders and the commands of God. Leaning forward and touching the ground with our head means that we wish to maintain honour and dignity on the earth. The posture thus gives a picture of complete humility and submission to the Divine will, not for the betterment of the individual alone but of mankind at large. We, then, recite holy passages declaring our belief in the goodness and greatness of God, and promising to follow the path shown by Him.

Iqbal discusses other importance and significance of prayer in Islam with enthusiasm. Prayer for a Muslim is like a dagger which kills all sins, selfishness and wrongs. Fasting makes an assault upon hunger and thirst, and weakens our sensuality. Pilgrimage is a source of enlightenment to the soul of the individual. It makes us separated from the attachment of one's home, one's native land, and all that we love with our lower ego. We assemble there with the spirit of renouncement and a feeling of oneness. Pilgrimage is an act of devotion. Through alm-giving, our love for wealth and riches pass away and makes us realize the importance of equality. It creates in us the attitude of righteousness,<sup>25</sup> for if we cultivate the habit of parting with our lawful possession, how can we try to obtain the things of others unlawfully?

Prayer in Islam serves different purposes, spiritual, political and humanistic. We pray not to exalt, glorify or please God by repeating his praises, for God is above all such things. Allah, the God of the Quran, needs no worship nor does he

require any praise or thanks-giving. ( 17 : 15 ; 31 : 12). If we worship Him, we do so for our own good ( 17 : 7 ). In the act of prayer the human ego establishes a kind of direct contact with the ultimate reality. It is a source of spiritual illumination. It is man's inner yearning for a response in the lawful silence of the universe. It is a unique process of discovery whereby the searching ego affirms itself in the very moment of self-negation, and thus discovers its own worth and justification as a dynamic factor in the life of the universe.<sup>26</sup>

Prayer is instructive to the heart of man. Man cannot but pray. For psychology, prayer is still a mystery. William James Says : 'It seems probable that in spite of all that science may do to the contrary, men will continue to pray at the end of the time'. In an industrial world mechanism plays a havoc on man's mind. Some of the physical and environmental conditions are necessary chains around him. He feels himself weak in a big universe and often falls a prey to circumstances. He is chained by a routined-life. Realization of such experiences is painful to him. Iqbal thus says : "The timing of daily prayer which according to the Quran restores 'Self-possession' to the ego by bringing it into closer touch with ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanising effects of sleep and business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom."<sup>27</sup> Thus psychologically speaking, prayer is instructive. It is also reformative from the ethical point of view. The real object of prayer is, however, better achieved when it becomes congregational. All true prayers possess a social value. A congregation is an association of persons who share a faith and are motivated by the same desires and aspirations. They concentrate themselves on a single object. It is psychologically true that the normal man's power of perfection and his will are multiplied and dynamised in association. But they remain latent in the privacy of his own individuality. "With Islam" Says Iqbal, "its socialization of spiritual illumination through associative prayer is a special point of interest. As we pass from the daily congregational prayer to the annual ceremony round the centre mosque of Mecca, you can easily see how the

Islamic institution of worship gradually enlarges the sphere of human association."<sup>28</sup>

We can easily trace out the social significance of Islamic prayer. If Muslim does not participate in daily congregation at a mosque, he should at least attend the Friday congregation prayer in his locality. Then in year comes the 'Id prayer', when most of the Muslims of a village or town are expected to assemble at one place. Such an assembly fosters a fellow-feeling and make them aware of the problems of their brethren. Thus the annual ceremony around the central mosque of Mecca besides being a get-together has also a great political value as these Muslims of different countries assemble at one place having a common faith. In a Muslim institution the ideas of fellowship and brother-hood are supposed to be very important. Essentially in prayer any such distinction of caste, creed, language and race is missing. A king and a slave may offer prayer, side by side, on the same carpet. The choice of a particular direction in Islamic worship is meant for securing a unity of feeling, and tends to destroy the feeling of superiority of race or rank. In prayer all Muslims are bound together by one thread. We find, then, that the idea of Tawhid—belief in one God plays a dominant role in a Muslim's life. From the unity of God follows the essential unity of mankind. Iqbal thus rightly says 'The Islamic form of association in prayer, therefore, besides its cognitive value, is further indicative of the aspiration to realize this essential unity of mankind as a fact in life by demolishing all barriers which stand between man and man.'<sup>29</sup>

Prayer, thus makes a man a worthy being in the universe, one who is imbued with higher purposes and aspirations. He restores dignity and honour in the universe and lightens his individuality.

When the human ego is strengthened and educated, one becomes capable of attaining divine vicegerency, as the germs of vicegerency are already present in him. The Quran, also says 'lo, I will appoint a Khalifa (vicegerant) on earth.' Iqbal, like all other Muslim theologians and religious men, is very emphatic in advocating the ethical, social, political and

spiritual value of Islamic prayer like other forms of prayer in different religions. Islamic prayer is also a source of spiritual illumination and contentment to the soul. It does awaken sense of political and social unity among the Muslims. But it is difficult to understand, why this sense of social and political unity is soon destroyed in the field of action. History also confirms the fact that political unity of the Muslims was disrupted even in the earliest times. Does it not mean that Islamic prayer could not be as forceful as it supposed to be? Perhaps there is something vice, inherent universally in the very nature of man which the prayer could not remove.

#### *Divine Vice-gerency*

To use Dr. Nicholson's words: "Here Iqbal interprets in his own way the Sufi-doctrine of the *Insan-al-Kamil* or perfect man, which teaches that every man is potentially a microscope, and that when he has become spiritually perfect, all the divine attributes are displayed by him, so that as saint or prophet he is the God-man, the representative and vicegerant of God on earth."<sup>30</sup>

Iqbal studied Sufi literature with a great devotion. The idea of Al-Karim Jili about *Insan-al-Kamil* was sure to draw his attention. The theory of Anul-Haq as advocated by Hallaj was of paramount importance. God created Adam in his own image. This was interpreted by Hallaj meaning that God manifested his radiant divinity in Adam who objectified the whole divine nature—both the *lahut* and *nasut*. Ibnul Arabi, in the 13th century A.D. and Jili in the 14th century, brought forth the Hallajian theory to a far reaching speculation.

Jili says "you must know that perfect man is a copy of God. That is so because God is living, knowing, mighty, willing, hearing, seeing and speaking; and man too is all these.... Further you must know that the divine names and attributes belong to the perfect man by fundamental and sovereign right in virtue of a necessity inherent in his essence...."<sup>31</sup>

Twenty years before when Iqbal had not been acquainted with Nietzsche's views on superman,<sup>32</sup> he was very much

impressed by this Sufi-doctrine. The Prophet said "create in yourselves the attributes of God. (Takhallaqubi-Akhlaq Allah)." Thus man becomes unique becoming more and more like the most unique individual....He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. Not that he is finally absorbed in God, on the contrary he absolves God in himself.<sup>33</sup>

This idea was also beautifully expressed by Maulana Rumi. Once the Prophet, while a boy, was lost in the desert. His nurse Halima became very anxious, and while she was roaming in his search, she heard a voice as such :

Do not grieve, he will not be lost to thee;  
Nay the whole world will be lost in him.<sup>34</sup>

Thus the true individual cannot be lost in the world; it is the world that is lost in him. In his will the will of God will be lost.

It is, perhaps, with this background that Iqbal's doctrine of superman is propounded. Later on, he also studied the philosophy of Nietzsche, who attracted his attention very much. It is definite that Iqbal was very much fascinated by the spirit of his philosophy, but he parted with him with the regret that he (Nietzsche) became a misguided thinker because of his atheism and unsympathetic attitude towards the masses. Let us have an elaborate picture of Nietzsche's views on superman, so that we may understand the points of difference and affinity between Iqbal and Nietzsche in a clear way.

Life, according to Nietzsche, is essentially a play of the force of self-assertion. Evolution i.e. the ascent on the line of life is the victory of strength over weakness. The course of evolution is determined by the will-to-power which is fundamental in the universe. Life everywhere and in all its forms, tends to manifest itself and endeavour to realize itself in all its plentitude. To use Mr. Hill's words "Nietzsche is an enthusiastic and passionate advocate of the life in force and beauty. His ideal is the Greek ideal, the ideal of Dionysis and Apollo; life at any price, life with all its woes and joys and hopes and fears, worshipped, glorified, cultivated; the overman as supreme



type incarnating this Dionysian and Apollian vision of life, incarnating the beauty and purity and symmetry of form, the power and force and strength of the unrestrained and unmoral will of power, such is Nietzsche's ideal."<sup>35</sup> There is but one obligation of man, that is to stress his power by all means in order to become superman. Christianity, thinks Nietzsche, is the greatest hindrance in the realization of this ideal. The God of Christianity is the symbol of negation. He is for all those who suffer and are tending towards death. Zarathustra perpetually teaches that 'God is dead'. He is the destroyer of God. He appears to be the best enemy of Jesus Christ. He tries to give humanity a new aim, a new ideal. Jesus Christ died for the redemption of the world, for the poor, the weak and the suffering. Zarathustra has no sympathy for them but only contempt. The redeemer is not one who dies for the suffers and sinners of the world; but the real redeemer, according to Nietzsche, is he who, by self-affirmation and self-assertion, opens out new horizons and shows out infinite possibilities. Man has not to submit passively to his environment. That would be the very opposite to life.

Any existing state of decadence does not lead to nothingness. It is a prelude to regeneration. Man must suffer in order to climb the highest heights. Man has to give birth to superman, by self-elevation and by all the methods of trial, pain, suffering or cruelty. From the highest degree of pain and suffering, man will draw impetus for a higher form of existence. The earth must not be inhabited by the sick and suffering, for them the healthy man will perish in sheer disgust. Let all those be killed to whom life is suffering, and let us have the courage to pull down the falling man so that may he fall even quicker.

Man, according to Nietzsche, is a link between the animal and the superman. He has, so far, traversed long from the earth-worm to the ape, and from the ape to the man and now being overpowered by tortures and conflicts, he is seeking to stabilize himself either for higher form of existence or the negation of life. But man is something to be surpassed for emergence of the superman. "What is the ape to the man?"

A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the superman a laughing stock and a thing of shame. "Lo, I teach you the superman : The superman is the meaning of the earth. Let you will say : the superman shall be the meaning of the earth."<sup>36</sup> The morality of superman will predominantly differ from the morality of man who seeks for the equality among men and pleads for sympathies for the suffering and the sick. Nietzsche distinguishes between master-morality and slave-morality. The moral of the master signifies that his is powerful, strong and beautiful, while slave-morality stands for piety, humility, cowardice, suffering and all that which is despised by the morality of the masters. Nietzsche laughs at the slave-morality which declares that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the "Kingdom of Heaven." The slave-morality recommends for voluntary offer the second cheek to the aggressor after being struck on the first. The moral code of the masters on the other hand, demands an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth, and even destruction for a vital end. Its slogan is : Destroy in order to create. Creation is the great aim of the superman. It proposes to change the Christian norms and ideals and to present a new order of values.

In his ever forward movement of life and power, the master will not know any piety. He will create his own morality. He may exploit others for the achievement of his own end. He will be hard towards himself and towards others. He will be ready for every risk in life. He will not be a pacifier or peace-loving man. He will rather exhort people to war, for it is a powerful instrument of progress and strength. In short his life is an endless chain of more and more dangerous adventures.

But strangely enough Nietzsche destroys the spirit of his own philosophy by producing the theory of Eternal recurrence. It is nothing but a worst type of fatalism, for according to it every pain and joy, every tear and every moment of suffering, and every hour would perpetually recur again and again. We are now told that life is not perpetual becoming, but it is something eternally fixed. What hopes can, then, be realized by this eternal repetition, if the fate of humanity is eternally

sealed? Thus according to this theory the superman has been evolved infinite number of times before. To use Dr. Iqbal's words "His birth is inevitable; how can the prospect give me any aspiration? We can aspire only for what is absolutely new, and the absolutely new is unthinkable in Nietzsche's view...."<sup>37</sup>

Thus we find that philosophy of Nietzsche is aristocratic in nature. He glorifies his superman as exemplifying the supreme type of aristocracy. The superman has contempt for the masses. He is unsympathetic, hard and egoistic. He knows neither tenderness, nor justice nor pity. He is aware of only one law, that is the law of his own will. He does not feel any mercy for the poor and the sick and tramples them under his feet in order to become more and more powerful. All this is so because the 'will-to-power' is the only motive of his actions and thoughts. He is not the deliverer of humanity in the sense in which Iqbal thinks ought to be. In fact, Iqbal's concept of superman is very much opposed to that of Nietzsche specially because Nietzsche's superman becomes an object of terror for the multitude. Though Nietzsche had a glimpse of an ideal race, the members of which will be the befitting parents of mankind, yet "his atheism and aristocratic prejudices", says Iqbal, "marred his whole conception."<sup>38</sup>

Thus, there is every reason to believe that Iqbal initially differs from Nietzsche. Though he is interested in the spirit of his philosophy and the mode of his expression, but he finds that his genius traversed a wrong path. Iqbal is, in fact more akin in this matter to Alexander, than to Nietzsche.<sup>39</sup>

Alexander holds space-time to be the matrix of all things. From space-time emerges matter, life and consciousness. Evolution is tending towards the possibility of giving birth to the emergence of the Deity.<sup>40</sup> But such a view is not acceptable to Iqbal firstly because it makes God a possibility and secondly because God is bound by space-time limitation. Iqbal, on the other hand believes that God is a reality and evolution is taking place to give birth to a divine vicegerent, who is not bound to the fetters imposed by space-time limitation. Iqbal points out following characteristics of his superman.<sup>41</sup>

The 'superman' is the divine vicegerant of God on earth. He represents the last stage of human development upon our planet. The goal of humanity is to be realized in his personality. He is the complete ego, both in mind and body. He will possess the highest power blended with highest knowledge. All the painful trials of evolution are justified as he is bound to come. He will bring with him the Kingdom of God on earth. He is the real ruler of mankind. Out of the richness of his nature, he lavishes the wealth of life on others and brings them nearer to Himself. The more we are advanced in the scale of evolution the nearer we are to him. For the present he is mere ideal to us, but the evolution of humanity, both in mind and body, is tending towards his emergence.

The appearance of the divine vicegerant will be the beginning of a new age. He will be the glory of the world, and the soul of the universe. Pitching his tent in this wide world, he will execute the command of Allah all around. A number of beautiful worlds will spring up and blossom from the meadows of his thought. He will infuse everything with the melody and radiance of youth. He will give humanity a message of happiness; He will offer a warning, as a soldier, marshal and prince. His knowledge will be unfathomable and time will be under his domination. He will give a new explanation of our life and its dreams, its masteries and aspirations. The future of the present sick race of mankind is dependent upon the ideal of a coming humanity—the superman. They will bring once more the days of peace to the world and give a message of peace to those who seek battle in the world."<sup>42</sup>

This is Iqbal's concept of 'superman'. This 'superman' seems to be definitely better than that of Nietzsche when considered from the human point of view. We feel enthusiasm for the arrival of such a 'superman', but perhaps not for that of Nietzsche's variety, specially because of his theory of Eternal-Return which teaches a deadly fatality. However, I think that there is an important matter in Iqbal's concept of 'superman' which must be discussed here. If humanity is tending towards the production of an ideal race or superman, then it means that

mankind has not yet the privilege of welcoming the 'superman'. But what about prophets referred to by the Quran, and ultimately Muhammad? Were not they perfect men? They cannot be imperfect men for in that case they cannot be claimed to have done the highest possible services to humanity. If Prophet Muhammad and all other previous prophets were example of perfect men, then how is it that they come as perfect men from time to time when humanity is in the process of evolving 'superman'? If supposed, however, that such 'supermen' do appear from time to time in order to save the world from sins and vices prevailing in a large scale, then the question may be asked, have not they been unsuccessful and disappointed in their mission occasionally, for humanity, for a short period listened to their advice, but soon begin to follow its usual track of sin and vice? Moreover who wanted the prophets to come and preach to the people? If it is God, one feels sorry for his ideal not being fulfilled, for prophets are considered to be the messenger of God. Then the question is: is there any difference between a prophet and a 'superman'? We do not find replies to these questions in Iqbal's philosophy.

### *Immortality*

Tagore has said that life is so dear to man that he does not want to die even after death. Death is inevitable. Is death, then the termination of entire career of man? Man is very much interested in knowing the final fate of his existence. Death is a great abyss towards which all of us are marching and none who has entered the frontier of death has even returned to narrate his experience. We can only speculate but not with certainty as to what does actually happen after death. There are thinkers who are sceptic about the renewal of life (individual's) after death. And some of them totally deny the possibility of life after death.

The Hindu philosophers, with the exception of the Charvakas, always considered man to be immortal. The theory of law of Karma is a prominent feature of Hindu philosophical and religious thought; our present life is determined by our

previous actions. And the actions of the present life determine the scope of future life. Man either degrades or elevates himself by taking a new birth. But of our previous life we have no remembrance.

The Hindu philosophers were never very seriously interested in the existence of life on this earth. They were aspirant for a transcendental world which was really real and meaningful. That is why they looked with contempt at the repetition of the cycle of existence. They suggested that the cycle of existence can be stopped, provided the forces of Karmas are burnt by controlling our desires and passions. True immortality and highest perfection are attained after self-realization. The Vedanta philosophy has repeatedly up to this day emphasised the importance of self-realization. By self-realization most of the vedantists mean the recognition of the identity between the individual self and Brahman—the only reality. Man by his own foolishness has made himself subject to death, disease and decay. He can enjoy an immortal and blissful life in the bosom of the ultimate reality only after his ignorance is removed. That is why we see the Hindu sages and saints of India advocating for Moksha (salvation) of the individual.

In Islam the law of Karma is not accepted. According to Quran : Man cannot return again to this earth after once being dead. This is clear from the following verse :

“When death overtakes one of them, he saith Lord ; Send me back again. That I may do the good that I have left undone. By no means. These are the very words which he shall speak. But behind them is a barrier (Barzakh) until the day when they shall be raised again” (23 : 101, 102). The individual, after his death, remains in a period of suspense for some time to proceed later on to a different state. This is the journey of the soul in a different sphere not known to our visible universe of hue and colour.

Iqbal is right in saying that purely metaphysical arguments cannot create positive belief in the idea of immortality. He criticizes all those philosophers who have discussed this problem from purely metaphysical or ethical angle, and do not take into

consideration the religious or the biological standpoint. Iqbal is aware that, no other age as ours has produced such a vast literature on the idea of immortality, and this literature is immensely increasing in spite of the victories of modern science.<sup>43</sup>

Among the Muslim thinkers, Ibn Rushd approached the question of immortality purely from the metaphysical point of view. But he could not succeed in his attempt. From two words 'Nafs' and 'Ruh' he drew a distinction between sense and intelligence. He believed that intellect is universal and eternal and transcends individuality. Hence intellect which appears in finite persons, does not suffer death or decomposition. But such a view, does not support personal immortality, rather it indicates the everlastingness of humanity and civilization.

In the history of modern thought Kant and Nietzsche have discussed this problem from the ethical standpoint. According to Kant speculative reasoning cannot throw much light on the problem of immortality. He, therefore, discusses it on ethical grounds. Man, as an individual, cherishes infinite desires, and aspires after the Supreme good, which of course cannot be realized within the short span of worldly life. We must therefore postulate immortality for infinite progress of the individual. It is, however, not clear why the supreme good comprising both virtue and happiness should take infinite time. And if it happened, it will happen at some point in future instead of infinite time. This proves that infinite time is not required for the accompaniment of perfect virtue with perfect happiness. This obviously shows that the soul will be unable to become immortal. Iqbal rejects Kant's argument on these grounds.

Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Return tries to create a positive belief in the idea of immortality. He proceeds on the scientific assumption that energy is never lost, and the quantity of energy in the universe always remains the same. Nietzsche believes in an ever-active energy which is beginningless and endless. Energy-centres recur again and again. Every joy and every sorrow, nay every moment, will eternally recur. According to Nietzsche, there is no new happening in the universe;

whatever happens now has happened before infinite number of times, and will continue to happen in future indefinitely. Thus if I am writing today at this moment, I will write it again infinite number of times which will again be read by you in infinite number of times. My writing of today and your reading my writing will recur again and again. Our whole life will always be renewed. Such a view is not all acceptable to Iqbal. He thinks that "it is only a more rigid kind of mechanism."<sup>44</sup> It makes immortality absolutely intolerable.

Bergson conceived immortality in accordance with his principle of 'elan vital' life is ever manifesting itself for the realization of richer and fuller life. There is always an inner urge to advance forward. In its onward march, life is endless and eternal. It is an unbreakable chain of new manifestations. But the Bergsonian view proves the immortality of life in general and not that of the individual ego. Mr. McTaggart argues that the self is elementally immortal on the ground that the individual ego is the differentiation of the eternal absolute. But from this argument, points out Iqbal, it does not follow that even in its finitude, the human ego would retain the character which belongs to its source alone. Such a differentiation is only plausible to give it a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself.<sup>45</sup>

Iqbal thus finds that all such arguments are not of any great help. He seeks the direction of Quran in this matter. According to him, Quran throws light on the destiny of man in a partly ethical and partly biological way. "I say partly biological because the Quran makes in this connexion certain statements of a biological nature which we cannot understand without a deeper insight into the nature of life. It mentions, for instance, the fact of 'Barzakh'—a state, perhaps of some kind of suspense between Death and Resurrection. Resurrection, too, appears to have been differently conceived. The Quran does not loose its possibility, like christianity, on the evidence of actual resurrection of an historic person. It seems to take and argue resurrection as a universal phenomenon of life, in some sense true even of birds and animals."<sup>46</sup>



According to Quran resurrection is possible of single individuals. This indicates that our personal existence is not vapoury. The Quran also points out that man has to pass through many states. 'And by the moon when at her full, that from state to state shall ye be surely carried onward. ( 84 : 19 ). But materialism does not accept the continuance of human life after death. To it human life is the last note in the universe, beyond which it is not bound to proceed. It is the most depressing error of materialism that it believes in the cessation of finite consciousness."<sup>47</sup>

Death is only a passage which Quran describes as Barzakh. If the ego has been sufficiently fortified by action, it is likely to tolerate the shock caused by physical dissolution. Records of Sufistic experience indicate that 'Barzakh' is such a state of consciousness in which the ego's attitude towards time and space is characterized by a change. And there is nothing wrong in it. Helmolz discovered that nervous excitation takes time to reach consciousness. "If this is so, our present physiological structure is at the bottom of our present view of time, and if the ego survives the dissolution of this structure, a change in our attitude towards time and space seems perfectly natural. Nor is such a change wholly unknown to us. The enormous condensation of impressions which occur in our dreamlife, and the exaltation of memory which sometimes take place at the moment of death, disclose the ego's capacity for different standards of time."<sup>48</sup> The State of Barzakh is thus not merely a passive state of expectation. The ego rather catches here fresh aspects of reality and prepares itself for new adjustment. It is likely to be a state of great psychic unhingement and specially for those full-grown egos who have developed a definite modes of operation in a specific spatio-temporal order. The ego has, however, to struggle till it succeeds in gathering himself and winning resurrection. The resurrection is not an external event, but rather the consummation of life-process within the ego.<sup>49</sup>

Thus in order that the ego must survive, and it may be able to tolerate the shock of death, it is necessary that the ego must be fortified and strengthened. It must be invigorated by the power of love and incessant action. Personal immortality for

which we aspire, can be achieved only through our efforts and ways of thinking, and acting practised in this present life. Iqbal says, "If our activity is directed towards the maintenance of a state of tension the shock of death is not likely to affect it. After death there may be an interval of relaxation, as the Koran speaks of a barzakh or intermediate state which lasts until the Day of Resurrection. Only those Egos will survive this state of relaxation who have taken good care during the present life."<sup>50</sup>

Iqbal does not believe that immortality is man's birthright. He can have it if he tries hard. Personality is a state of tension. If that state is maintained, it will continue. If not, relaxation will bring decay into personality. We have, therefore, to see that our personality is strengthened. Good actions fortify the ego and bad actions weaken it. The Quran says :

1. "Blessed is He in whose hand is the Kingdom; And over all things is He potent, who hath created death and life to test which of you is the best in point of deed; and He is Mighty and forgiving." ( 67 : 2 ).

2. "By the soul and He who hath balanced it, and hath shown to it the ways of wickedness and piety, blessed is he who hath made it grow and undone is he who hath corrupted it." (91 : 7-10).

Iqbal regards personality as an aspiration and not something finally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortality. The candidature involves ceaseless struggle for maintaining the tension of the ego.<sup>51</sup> In his poem translated by himself titled "The new garden of mystery", he says :

The 'I' is truth, it is no illusion.  
 When it ripens it becomes eternal;  
 Lovers, even though separated from the beloved,  
 live in blissful union;  
 It is possible to give wing to a mere spark,  
 And to make it flutter for ever and for ever;  
 The eternity of God is elemental and not  
 the reward of this action;  
 That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul

wins for herself by love's frenzy;  
Why fear that death which comes from without ?  
For when the 'I' ripens into a self,  
It has no danger of dissolution.<sup>52</sup>

Iqbal means to say that it is not reasonable to hold the view that in spite of all the best efforts and actions and a strengthened personality, man's career would come to an end with the shock of death.

One can very easily notice here the apparent contradiction in Iqbal's thought. At one place he argues enthusiastically for the immortality of soul, and then says that it is not our birth-right. It can be achieved by effort, and only by those individuals who have fortified their egos. It may be asked how many strong personalities can be claimed to have existed in the world. Perhaps their number would be very low in every age. Thus, if we accept Iqbal's view, we are bound to conclude that a vast majority of mankind will be incapable of attaining immortality. Such a view will only move towards materialism. Moreover it is very difficult to suggest the ways of fortifying and strengthening the ego. Is it to work according to Islamic ideology or Christian principles or Hindu mysticism ? If strengthening of personality in accordance with Islam is advocated, we exclude good men of other religions and even rule out of their being immortal. Besides this the very idea that immortality is an aspiration, would be against the Quran where it has been clearly pointed out that each individual shall be rewarded or punished according to his deeds. Or, are we justified in using the word 'immortality' in the sense of enjoying an eternal blissful life in the flow of divine energy ? Perhaps the correct meaning of immortality is the continued existence of the individual even after death. Then according to this definition, even weak personalities will be liable to become immortal. But Iqbal says that only strong personalities can tolerate the shock of death. Then it means that men of weak personalities wither away with the shock that physical dissolution brings about. In that case the question of hell or even of the experience of Barzakh does not arise. Iqbal's position thus does not seem to be very convincing.

He, then, discuss the problem from the biological point of view. As far as emergence of man is concerned, it may be traced out in Quran as well as in some other Muslim works. Jahiz was first to point out the changes in animal life caused by migrations and environmental conditions. This view was further amplified by 'Brethren of Purity'. But Ibn Maskawih was the first Muslim philosopher who presented a modern theory of the origin of man. Shibli sums up Ibn Maskawih's theory as such.<sup>53</sup> "The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the lowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the vegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants and various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border-land of animal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal characteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom, there is a certain form of life which is neither animal nor vegetable, but shares in the characteristics of both (eg. Coral). The first step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of the power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny forms which crawl upon the earth. The sense of touch owing to the process of differentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane of higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in ascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further development, and gradually develops erect stature and power of understanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins." Rumi also developed the theory of evolution mostly on the same line. Darwin's theory of evolution has striking resemblance with Maskawih's and Rumi's. Darwin considered man to be the highest product of evolution, and he could not go beyond that. To use Iqbal's word, "The theory of evolution, however, has brought despair and anxiety instead of hope and enthusiasm for life to the modern world. The reason is to be found in the unwarranted assumption that man's present structure, mental as well as physiological, is the last word in biological evolution, and that death, regarded as biological event has no constructive meaning. The world of today needs Rumi to create an attitude of hope and to kindle the fire of enthusiasm for life."<sup>54</sup>

Rumi anticipates the modern theory of evolution, which is regarded by him as the realistic side of his idealism. He took up the question of immortality as one of biological evolution and not merely to be decided by mere argumentation. Such an attitude is also perfectly consistent with the spirit of Quran.<sup>55</sup> The inimitable verses of Rumi run thus :

“First man appeared in the clans of inorganic things,  
 next he passed therefrom into that of plants.  
 Remembering naught of his inorganic state so different;  
 And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal  
 state,  
 He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,  
 Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants;  
 Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;  
 Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,  
 which know not the cause of their inclination to breast;  
 Again the great creator as you know,  
 Drew man out of the animal into human state.  
 Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,  
 Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is  
 now.  
 Of his first souls he has no remembrance,  
 And he will be again changed from his present soul.”<sup>56</sup>

Rumi thus believes that each death is a furtherance or transformation to a higher life. Then why should man be afraid of his death, for in the next stage he would be lifted to an angelic state? Iqbal looks with appreciation at Rumi's concept of evolution. But we are faced here with one difficulty. Rumi is not clear, whether every object, after its death, is transformed to a higher state or only a few. If it is argued that only a few rise to a higher state after death, and the others descend to a lower form, then such a view will support the Hindu theory of Karma which Islam does not accept. But if the general tone of Rumi seems to suggest that there is growth or transformation after each case of death, the problem of sin will remain unsolved; then the sinful persons will also rise to a higher state after death. Thus whatever position, out of the two alternatives,

Rumi is said to hold, his theory of evolution is not free from objections. Being very enthusiastic, he has become more poetic than logical. Iqbal is impressed by his theory of evolution because it offers a hope that man's life is not the last note in the scale of evolution. Had it not been so, all his highest aspirations and moral values would not have survived. His heart speaks, somehow, to him, of an immortal life. Self-production and self-preservation are testimonies to the fact that there is an urge in him to immortalize himself. Sometimes he feels bewildered at his final fate. The Quran, thus, says :

“Thinketh man that he shall be left as a thing of no use ? Was he not a mere embroy ? Then he became thick blood of which God formed him and fashioned him; and made him twain, male and female. Is not God powerful enough to quicken the dead”? (75 : 36-40).

2. “Man Saith ; What ; After I am dead, shall I in the end be brought forth alive ? Doth not man bear in mind that we made him first when he was naught.” (19 : 67-8)

3. “Yet we are not thereby hindered from replacing you with others your likes, or from producing you in a form which you know not; you have known the first creation ; will you not reflect?” (56 : 60-2).

Thus on the analogy of the first emergence of man, Quran argues about the phenomenon of the re-emergence of the ego. “It is highly improbable” says Iqbal “that a thing whose evolution has taken millions of years should be thrown away as a thing of no use. But it is only as ever-growing ego that he can belong to the meaning of the universe.”<sup>57</sup> However, Iqbal could not see that continuation, growth or manifestation of different forms of life, tends more towards the immortality of life in general than that of individual life. And, that seems to be more convincing. But such a belief would go against religious traditions. And, Iqbal was a deeply religious man.

Man is no doubt finite. But his finitude is not a misfortune, thinks Iqbal. The ego can retain his self-possession uniqueness and individuality even in the contact of all embracing ego. Man

has not to live as a dew-drop, but like a pearl in the divine flow. This is the true immortality of man according to Iqbal.

### Notes

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2. Sell, *Faith of Islam*, p. 277.
3. Alavi, *Fatalism, Free-will and Acquisition as viewed by Muslim Sects*, (Published in Islamic Culture, Jan. 1954).
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5. "Chuni Farmudai Sultan Bedr ast  
Ke Iman darmiyan jabor-o-qadr ast. (Iqbal, Zaboore-Ajam).
6. Martinea, Lames., *Types of Ethical Tneory*, vol. II, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1901), p. 41.
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8. Dr. Hakim, Khalifa Abdul—*Metaphysics of Rumi*, (Chap.—'Freedom of Will') (Lahore, Sk. Muhd Ashraf, Second imp.) pp. 71-103.
9. *ibid.*, p. 88.
10. R.R., p. 104.
11. R.R., pp. 101-2.
12. R.R., p. 102.
13. *ibid.*, pp. 102-3.
14. *ibid.*
15. "Kismat ke hain paband nabadat-o-jamadat,  
Momin faqat ehkam-i-Ellahi ka hai paband".  
Iqbal., *Bang-e-Dara*.
16. R.R., p. 47.
17. \* "Khudi ko kar blund etna ke har taqdir se pehle,  
Khuda bande se khud poochhe bata teri raza keya hai"  
(Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril*).

18. S.S., p. xxi.
19. S.S., Chap. II, pp. 73-74.
20. S.S., p. 73.
21. R.R., p. 104.
22. S.S., p. 36.
- \* The first article of faith in Islam.
23. S.S., Chap. IX, p. 76.
24. Ahmad, K., *Islam and the Muslim Prayer*, (The working Muslim Mission and literary Trust-June 1932) p. 34.
25. S.S., p. 77.
26. R.R., p. 87.
27. R.R., p. 103.
28. R.R., p. 87.
29. R.R., p. 88.
30. S.S., pp. 78-9.
31. Nicholson, R.A., *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, (pp. 106-7).
32. Iqbal repudiates the criticism in a letter to Dr. Nicholson that his views on superman originally owes to Nietzsche (Urdu trans by Chiragh Hassan Hazrat, Paigham-i-Haq, Iqbal Number, vol. 12).
33. S.S., p. XIX.
34. S.S., p. XIX.
35. Hill, Georges Chattertum, *The Philosophy of Nietzsche; An exposition and an appreciation*. (John Onseley Limited, London 1912) p. 253.
36. Nietzsche, Friedrich, *Thus spake Zarathustra*, trans. by Thomas Commoo, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 5th ed. May 1923) pp. 6-7.
37. R.R., p. 109.
38. S.S., p. xxviii.
39. This has been pointed out by Iqbal himself in a letter to Dr. Nicholson, (Paigham-i-Haq, Iqbal number).
40. See Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*.
41. S.S., pp. xxvii-viii.
42. S.S., p. 83.
43. R.R., p. 105.
44. R.R., p. 109,



45. Iqbal's essay on '*McTaggart's Philosophy*' in B.A. Dar's 'A study in Iqbal's philosophy', (Lahore, 1944), p. 408.
46. R.R., pp. 109-10.
47. R.R., p. 113.
48. R.R., p. 113.
49. R.R., p. 114.
50. S.S., p. xxiv.
51. Iqbal's Essay on '*McTaggart's Philosophy*', in 'A study in Iqbal's philosophy' (Lahore, 1944), p. 408.
52. *ibid.*
53. Shibli, *Ilm al Kalam*, (Hyderabad) p. 141.  
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54. R.R., p. 115.
55. *ibid.*, p. 114.
56. Rumi's *Masnawi*, trans. by Whinfield, E.H., (London, Kegan Paul, 1898) pp. 216-17.  
Cf. R.R., p. 114.
57. R.R., p. 112.

## FOUR

### THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

The important questions, which are enquiry into the nature of the universe, are the following :

What is the character and general structure of the universe in which we live ? Is it grounded or anything permanent ? Is it fixed, static and pre-planned ?

Iqbal points out, after the Quran, that the universe is not the result of a mere creative sport. It is enthused with a serious purpose.

'We have not created the Heavens and the Earth and whatever is between them in sport : We have not created them but for a serious end : but the greater part of them understand it not'. (44 : 38).<sup>1</sup>

The world is not unreal, illusory or Maya. Iqbal, influenced by the Islamic ideas, rejects all those theories which speak of this world in negative terms, and regard it to be as insignificant and the result of mere creative sport or Maya, deserving only

to be renounced. He bitterly criticizes Plato and other thinkers who are mad after a supersensuous world and denounce this world of sense-experience. The world can not be rejected as false or unreal. It is a reality to be reckoned with.<sup>2</sup> In it lies the fulfilment of the dreams and aspirations of those who inhabit it.

“Verily in the creation of the Heavens and the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding, who standing and sitting, and reclining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the Earth, and say : Oh; our Lord; Thou has not created this in vain.” (3 : 188).

Iqbal holds that the world of material objects is not meaningless. There is a lot to be learnt from the moon and the stars, the sun and the showers, the rivers and mountains. Even the least important thing carries a meaning for those who see it and try to understand it. Our experience reveals to us three main levels—the level of matter, the level of life, and the level of consciousness—the subject matter of physics, biology and psychology respectively. The existence of an object which we see, feel, touch and smell, cannot be challenged. The material world in which we live exists before us, and is shaped and remodelled by us.

The reality behind the universe, according to Iqbal, is an all-powerful consciousness. He calls it self or Khudi. This entity is the creator of the world. It means that the universe is the result of the creative activity of the world-self. And it is through this activity that the world-self is striving to realize the ideal of bringing about the birth of perfect man and the society of perfect human beings. We are thus not to underestimate the material world.

Physics studies the material world—the world revealed by the senses. What do we mean by the matter? The physicist may postulate the theory of imperceptible entities called atoms. He does so because he cannot otherwise explain his sense-experience. The investigation of physics, like any branch of natural science, is empirical. It deals with the facts of experience,

that is to say, sense-experience. The physicist proceeds with the help of observation and experiment, without which it would not be possible to make his conclusions verifiable. It thus becomes clear that the role of religious or aesthetic experience in understanding [the nature of the world is excluded from the field of physics, for the obvious reason that it studies the material world by which we mean the world of things we perceive.<sup>3</sup>

But what are the things we perceive in the material world? We may of course mention innumerable things, we see, feel and touch around us. We may point out such familiar objects as tables, chairs, mountains, sky, etc. When it is further asked, what we exactly perceive of these things, we will answer—their qualities. In sky, mountain, chair etc., we may easily point out certain qualities which we observe. Thus a distinction is drawn between a thing and its qualities. On the evidence of our sense-experience, we support such a theory of matter.

But the consequences of a purely empirical approach are well known to the students of philosophy. Locke, Berkeley and Hume present a very good example of empiricist's thinking. Each one of them tries to overcome the difficulties present in his predecessor's work on grounds of logical consistency, but all of them miserably fail. They are driven to different conclusions. According to Locke, it is through sense-experience that we collect all the materials of the knowledge of the external world. He draws a distinction between a thing and its qualities, and admits of two sorts of qualities, primary and secondary.<sup>4</sup> He pointed out that the holder of qualities is surely something 'we know not what'. Matter is thus according to him, as an unknown substratum of qualities.

Berkeley being a religious minded person, highly refuted the Lockian theory of matter. "It was the philosopher Berkeley" says, Iqbal, "who first undertook to refute the theory of matter as an unknown cause of our sensations."<sup>5</sup> Berkeley pointed out that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is incorrect. If knowledge comes through sense-experience alone, then we do not perceive any such substance which is unknown to us and an unknown substratum of qualities. A thing is nothing, but in fact, a collection of qualities.

Berkeley rejects the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. He argues that it is not correct to say that primary qualities (like extension, figure, solidity etc.) exist in the thing and secondary qualities exist in the perceiver's mind. In fact all our perceptions are subjective. A thing is, therefore, nothing but a collection of certain qualities. Take for example an apple. It possesses certain colour, taste, etc., and the combination of these qualities constitute that particular fruit. A quality is what is perceived by a perceiver. Berkeley regards qualities to ideas and therefore every object, being a collection of qualities, is declared to be subjective or mind-dependent. In this way existence of all objects consist in their being perceived by the individual mind. We see that Berkeley goes one step further than Locke in denying completely the existence of matter as an unknown substance. Hume goes further to Berkeley and denies in the same manner, the existence of soul and God and matter. For how can we know the existence of the soul and God through experience? Thus the Berkelian efforts to discard Lockian materialism for a sounder spiritual foundation collapse before the logic of Hume. On examination of empiricism what we find is that Locke was vague materialist, Berkeley an idealist or mentalist, and Hume a sceptic. This proves that merely our sense-data are not competent enough to give us an adequate explanation of the universe. The empirical way of understanding the nature of the world does not appeal to Iqbal. Iqbal is not a mere empiricist or rationalist or intuitionist. In his philosophy we find that sense-perception, reason and intuition are given their proper places. Though, intuition is regarded as the highest form of knowledge, sense-perception and reason are in no way underestimated. In the same manner sense-experience devoid of reason or intuition is regarded to be of no great value. It may give us only a superficial study of a thing. This way of studying the world is not proper.

Generally speaking, the universe experienced by us, "as a collection of finite things, presents itself as a kind of island situated in a pure vacuity to which time, regarded as a series of mutually exclusive moments, is nothing and does nothing."<sup>6</sup> Such a perceptual or common-sense view of the universe,

according to Iqbal, leads the reflecting mind nowhere. The thought of a limit staggers the movement of the mind. 'And verily towards thy God is the limit' says the Quran. The universe is not extended and limited in an absolute space. That is why atomism of Democritus never became popular in the world of Islam. Ash'arite were, on the other hand, inclined to develop a different kind of atomism, which tried to overcome the difficulties of perceptual space in the same way as modern atomism does.

Every culture, says Iqbal, develops a form of Naturalism peculiar to its own world-feeling. And, furthermore, every form of Naturalism ends in some sort of atomism. We have the examples of Indian atomism, Greek atomism, Muslim atomism, and modern atomism. The rise and growth of atomism in Islam, presents one of the most interesting chapters in the history of Muslim culture. Iqbal points it out as the first important indication of the intellectual revolt against the conception of a fixed universe advocated by Aristotle. Aristotle has penetrated deeply into the philosophy of evolution. Then how his universe is fixed? The existence of universe is a scale of being lying between the two extremes—the formless matter at the bottom and matterless form at the top. The world-process is a passage from matter to form. But Aristotle's theory of evolution is logical not temporal. Hence in effect the universe is fixed.

According to Ash'arite, the world is composed of infinitely small atoms (Jawahir) which cannot be further divided. But the number of atoms is not fixed. According to Quran the universe is liable to increase. Creative activity of God is ceaseless, and therefore, fresh atoms are always being added to the world, leading to its expansion and growth. Atom is independent of existence. Existence is a quality imposed upon atom by God. Before this, atoms lie dormant in the creative energy of God. An atom in its essence, therefore, possesses neither magnitude nor any position in space. It is by aggregation and accumulation of atoms that a thing becomes, generating space and extension. The critic of atomism, Ibn Hazm says that in the divine activity there is no difference between

the act of creation and the thing created. A thing in its essential nature is the accumulation of atomic acts. But it is not possible to form even a mental picture of the idea of atomic act. Modern physics, too, conceives as action the actual atom of a certain physical quantity.

The Ash'arite theory of creation also supports the doctrine of accident. Though Iqbal does not argue much against this view, he rejects it thinking it to be a kind of materialism. He, however, agrees with the Ash'arites that nothing has a stable nature. He appreciates the Ash'arite theory of continuous creation. To quote him, "I regard the Ash'arite thought on this point as a genuine effort to develop on the basis of an ultimate will or energy a theory of creation which, with all its short-comings, is far more true to the spirit of Quran than the Aristotelian idea of a fixed universe. The duty of the future theologian of Islam is to reconstruct this purely speculative theory, and to bring it into closer contact with modern science which appears to be moving in the same direction."<sup>7</sup>

Now the verdict of modern science is worth noticing. The scientist has recently realized the difficulties by maintaining the previous theory of matter. Iqbal very much appreciates, rather follows the views of Whitehead and Einstein in this respect to a great extent. Professor Whitehead has tried to show that the traditional theory of materialism is wholly untenable. Whitehead's conception of nature is deeply influenced by the latest theories in physics, specially, the theory of relativity. The idea that the ultimate constituents of the world are some unchanging substance like atoms which undergo change after being mutually related, but in themselves they do not, was maintained in science till recently. But recent physics after a conclusive analysis of the ultimate constituents of nature, rejected the prevalent atomic theory and pointed out that the ultimate entities are electrons and protons. And electrons and protons are forms of energy. Thus "Matter has been identified with energy, and energy is sheer activity; the passive substratum composed of self-identical enduring bits of matter has been abandoned, so far as it concerns any fundamental description."<sup>8</sup>

Objects then, are nothing but bits of processes or energies. Whitehead goes against the common view that objects are created at particular positions in space and time. He points out that any object, say a table or chair, is also a "form of process" or energy but apparently it seems stable because "some elements in the nature of a complete set of agitations may remain stable as those agitations are propelled through a changing environment. But such stability is the only case in a general, average way."<sup>9</sup>

It is to be noted that Whitehead's philosophy of Nature can be well understood after grasping his epistemology. Our common sense views involve some serious mistakes. Whitehead strongly protests against epistemological dualism. There is nothing like apparent nature and real nature. Nature as it really exists, and nature as perceived are not two but one. According to traditional theory of materialism or epistemological dualism since the time of Locke colours, sounds etc., are subjective states only, and form no part of Nature. Objects have only the power to produce certain sensations. What enters the eye and the ear is not colour or sound, but invisible ether waves and inaudible air waves. Nature is not what we know it to be. Our perceptions are not the genuine disclosures of Nature. The theory bifurcates nature into mental impressions on the one hand, and the unverifiable imperceptible entities on the other. It creates a gulf between nature and the observer of nature, which it tries to bridge over by resorting to doubtful hypothesis of some imperceptible thing or things occupying an absolute space, and causing sensations by some kind of impact. Whitehead vehemently opposes any such view which maintains bifurcation of nature.<sup>10</sup> Thus objects are not subjective states of mind, caused by something imperceptible; they are in fact genuine phenomena constituting the very substance of nature. Otherwise, the theory reduces one half of nature to a 'dream' and the other half to a conjecture'. Thus physics finding it necessary to criticize its own foundation, has eventually found reason to break its own idol, and the empirical attitude which appeared to necessitate scientific materialism has finally ended in a revolt against matter.<sup>11</sup>



The concept of matter has received the greatest shock by the hands of Einstein. Iqbal agrees with Russell that the theory of relativity by merging time into space-time has damaged the traditional notion of substance more than all the arguments of philosophers. Matter, according to the popular view, is considered as something which persists in time and moves in space. But for modern relativity this view is no longer acceptable.

Iqbal points out that Prof. Whitehead is right in holding the view that "nature is not a static fact situated in a dynamic void, but a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow which thought cuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time. Thus we see how modern science utters its agreement with Berkeley's criticism which it once regarded as an attack on its very foundation."<sup>12</sup>

The scientific view of nature as pure materiality is associated with Newtonian idea of an absolute space in which things are situated. Now the Newtonian idea of absolute space is no more accepted. "The criticism of the foundations of the mathematical sciences has fully disclosed that the hypothesis of a pure materiality, an enduring stuff situated in an absolute space, is unworkable."<sup>13</sup> The view that substance is a simple creation in space led classical physics to maintain its own theory of materialism which has now been discarded by Einstein's theory of relativity. "Substance for modern relativity physics is not a persistent thing with variable states, but a system of inter-related events. In Whitehead's presentation of the theory the notion of matter is entirely replaced by the notion of 'organism'. Secondly, the theory makes space dependent on matter. The universe, according to Einstein, is not a kind of island in an infinite space; it is finite but boundless; beyond it there is no empty space. In the absence of matter the universe would shrink to a point."<sup>14</sup>

Iqbal is critical of the Einstein theory. Being a scientific theory, it deals only with the structure of things. Iqbal raises the point that it throws no light on the ultimate nature of

things which possess that structure. There is no doubt that the scientific view of the world has certain difficulties. It does not fully explain our world, and its ultimate structure, because religious or aesthetic experience are beyond its scope. Science does not deal with the ultimate structure because speculation is not the method of science. There is, however, a good deal to learn from the sciences for correct philosophical interpretation of the universe. The recent discoveries in physics and other branches of natural science have only strengthened Iqbal's faith in spiritualism. We have seen that the traditional notion of materialism has been totally rejected. Even the theory of atom has been replaced by the theory of ether-waves and energy. Iqbal would, therefore, believe that the ultimate character of Reality is spiritual. Reality is essential spirit. But of course there are degrees of spirit....The world in all its detail from the mechanical movements of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am'. Every atom of divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradual rising note of egohood until it reaches perfection in man."<sup>15</sup>

Iqbal thus believes in the degrees of reality. But he does not claim to be the first thinker in this respect. In the history of Muslim thought the theory of degrees of reality appears in the writings of Shahabuddin Saharwardi. We find this idea being worked out by Leibnitz, Hegel, and many modern neo-Hegelians though their treatment is quite different from that of Iqbal. Leibnitz believes in the different cadres of monads which are windowless and have different grades of consciousness. He brings out, unscientifically, the conception of a deistic God who is the creator of monads. If the monads are windowless, then how does interaction take place among them? We see, therefore, that the monadology of Leibnitz is not better than the rigid form of atomism. For Iqbal, the world is a system of inter-related events. Hegel, on the other, believed in the evolution of categories on different planes. The idealism of Hegel seems quite barren to Iqbal, as in his philosophy, the material world goes into insignificance.

The Ash'arite scheme of atomism has been turned out into a spiritual pluralism in the best critical traditions of Muslim thought. In recent philosophy James Ward also maintains spiritual pluralism. Such a view has to be further elaborated, thinks Iqbal, by the future theologians of Islam.

Elsewhere we have found Iqbal saying that there is a gradual rising note of egohood until it reaches perfection in man. That is why Quran declares the ultimate ego to nearer to man. Iqbal thus conceives this universe as an ego. And on the analogy of our conscious experience, he points out that the universe, too, is a free creative movement. Freedom, creativity and movement are three important aspects of this universe.

Islam objects the old static view of the universe, and propounds a dynamic view. The universe is so constituted that it is capable of extension.

'He (God) adds to His creation what He wills' (35 : 1).

Whatever appears to us as fixed and stable is, infact, in the process of change and development. There is no object of nature which is not affected by the universal law of change and variation. Nothing is of a stable nature. This does not mean that at every moment of history an entirely new thing is being formed. On the other hand, things are undergoing a series of changes.

Mr. Qadir rightly says that "the most striking feature of Iqbal's philosophy is its emphasis on the dynamic character of everything around us. The principle of this change and dynamism is 'Ishq'. For Iqbal, Ishq is the very soul of existence. It can be safely gathered from Iqbal's verses that Ishq is the principle of cosmic dynamics. Iqbal is quite emphatic on this point. For him every moment, constructive change, and all the cases of development are manifestations of Ishq. Instances of this can be found in the spiritual as well as in the natural world.<sup>16</sup>

The movement of the world is not taking place according to a fixed plan, for in that case it will not be creative. How can we conceive of a movement independent of the concrete

thing that moves? It is not the case that things are derived from movement or movement is derivative from immobile things. The fact is that things and movements are not two distinct objects. Physical science has reduced all things to movement. The essential nature of atom according to modern science is electricity and not something electrified. To quote Dr. Iqbal, "What we call things are events in the continuity of Nature which thought spatializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for purpose of action. The universe which seems to us to be a collection of things is not a solid stuff occupying a void. It is not a thing but an act."<sup>17</sup>

This does not indicate that Iqbal denies the reality of physical objects like tables, and chairs, rivers and mountains etc. He means to say that these things are events in the continuity of Nature which have been spatialized by thought. The world of physical objects is not a dead slice of history. Everything is moving fast and manifesting itself in newer forms. To talk about things is to talk about events or processes or energies. Does it not seem, then, ridiculous to say that this table of chair, is an event or my two pair of hands hanging round my shoulder are pair of energies? Suffice it to say that perhaps our earthly languages are inadequate to describe the physical world. Bergson has rightly pointed out that the nature of thought is such that it cannot deal with movement, except by viewing it as a series of stationary points. It is because of the operation of thought with static concepts that it regards things as immobile which are essentially dynamic in their nature. Staticness is only an appearance, every atom in the universe is restless.<sup>18</sup>

It was Heraclitus who conceived the world from a dynamic point of view. His mistake was that he considered the movement of the world as mechanical and unpurposeful. In modern philosophy Bergson suggests<sup>19</sup> that the movement of the world is creative. But he also denies the teleological character of reality on the ground that 'the portals of the future must remain wide open to Reality.' He is, therefore, driven to a conclusion which is not acceptable to Iqbal. He says "Bergson's view of the forward rush of the vital impulse in its creative freedom is

illuminated by the light of an immediate or remote purpose. It is not aiming at a result; it is wholly arbitrary, undirected, chaotic, and unforeseeable in its behaviour."<sup>20</sup>

The process of the world is not mechanistic but teleological. There are two senses of teleology. If by teleology, we mean the working out of a plan with a fixed and pre-determined goal, it does make time unreal. With such a view, opines Iqbal, we reduce the universe to a mere temporal reproduction of a pre-existing eternal scheme or structure in which specific events have already got their proper places, and waiting for their respective turns into the temporal sweep of history. All is already given somewhere in eternity. And they are reaching themselves one after another. Such a view is no better than mechanism or rigid determinism or veiled materialism.<sup>21</sup> If we regard the world as a process realizing a pre-destined goal, then it can not be said a world of free, responsible moral agents; it becomes only a stage on which puppets are made to move by a pull from behind. 'Teleology', may however, be used in another sense. From our conscious experience, we find that to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Our mental life may be said to be teleological, in the sense that while we are not moving towards a distant goal, we find a progressive formation of ends, purposes and ideal scale of values with the gradual growth and expansions of life. The world-process or the movement of the universe in time is certainly devoid of purpose, or teleology, if by purpose or teleology we mean movement according to fixed plan a fore-seen end. To endow the world process with this ideal is surely to rob it of its originality and creative character. Its end merely indicate the terminations of a career.<sup>22</sup>

The world is thus not moving in such a time-process which is already drawn. It is a line being drawn on and on. The movement is towards the actualization of open possibilities and not pre-determined destination. It is purposive and selective in character. "To my mind" writes Iqbal, "nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the universe is the temporal working out of a pre-conceived plan....It is a growing universe and not already completed product which left

the hand of its maker ages ago, and is now lying stretched in space as a dead mass of matter to which time does nothing and consequently is nothing."<sup>23</sup> The universe is yet not complete. The process of creation is still going on. And man too, takes share in bringing orderliness in it.<sup>24</sup>

As regards the creation of the universe, it is considered by the common sense to be a specific past event. And it is quite possible that it might not have been created. It is just a mere accident in the life of God.

Such a view, thinks Iqbal, is incorrect, from divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of specific event, having a 'before' and an 'after'. The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to God.<sup>25</sup> Like many other theists, Iqbal did not merely believe in the theory of creation. According to him, creation takes the form of evolution, but when did creation start, it cannot be said. Sometimes creation and evolution are intermingled with each other by him. Thus in spite of his best efforts, Iqbal cannot be saved from the charge that the evolution of the world for him is not free and creative. It is somehow determined by the divine will or desire.

We have seen that he conceives the universe to be an ego. A self is unthinkable without a character, i.e., uniform mode of behaviour". It (nature) is a structure of event, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate self."<sup>26</sup> Since it is organic to the ultimate creative self, it is liable to expand. Nature is a living, ever-growing organism whose growth has no external limit. It is finite but boundless. There is no limit to its extension.

"Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human Self. In the picturesque phrase of the Quran it is the habit of Allah."<sup>27</sup> Thus Iqbal would like to give a fresh spiritual meaning to physical science. The knowledge of Nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour. In our observation of Nature, we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the Absolute Ego; and this is only another form of worship. The world with all its detail, is not a final abode of existence. It is just

a halting place of the human ego, a state for its reformation and development. Iqbal says :

“This world, this riot of colour and sound,  
 This universe which is subject to the rule of death,  
 This world which is only a temple created by eyes and  
 ears,  
 Where in life consists of naught but eating and drink-  
 ing,  
 This the first halting stage of the ego,  
 O’ traveller, this is not meant to be thy abode,  
 Advance on after breaking this great barrier,  
 Solving the mysteries of time and pace,  
 There are other words unseen,  
 And the essence of existence is not yet void.”<sup>28</sup>

Iqbal believes in the possibility of other worlds too. There are even worlds beyond the stars.

Besides the earth, there are other planets yet to be charted by man. This is not just a wishful thinking or a poetic prediction of Iqbal. In our own times, we are not surprised to see how the scientists of today are experimenting for successful space flights in order to reach moon and Mars and other planets.<sup>29</sup>

### Notes

1. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 9.
2. Ibid.
3. R.R., p. 31.
4. Locke’s “Essay concerning Human understanding, (published in the selection “The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill—

- edited with an introduction by Edwin A. Burth,—Modern Library, New York, 1939), p. 265.
5. R.R., p. 31.
  6. R.R., p. 125.
  7. R.R., pp. 66-7.
  8. Whitehead, A., *Nature and Life*, (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, second impression, March 1935), p. 12.
  9. Whitehead, *Nature and Life*, p. 13.
  10. Whitehead, A., *The concept of Nature*, (Cambridge University Press, 1926) Chap. II, p. 26.
  11. R.R., p. 32.
  12. R.R., p. 33.
  13. *ibid.*
  14. R.R., pp. 36-7.
  15. R.R., p. 68.
  16. Qazi A. Qadir—*Physical word and the principle of Cosmic dynamics* (Article contained in *Iqbal Review*—Iqbal Academy, Karachi, April 1961), p. 45.
  17. R.R., p. 49.
  18. "Fareh-e nazar hai sakoon-o-Babat  
Tarapta hai har zarrae kayenaat."  
Iqbal, *Bal-i-Jibril*, (Taj Comp. Lahore 1935) p. 171.
  19. Consult Bergson's work "*Creative Evolution*", (authorised trans. by Arthur Mitchell, Macmillan & Co, Ltd., London 1914), Chapter I.
  20. R.R., p. 50.
  21. *ibid.*
  22. *ibid.*, p. 52.
  23. R.R., p. 52.
  24. I.I.,—Introduction, p. xviii.
  25. R.R., p. 62.
  26. R.R., pp. 53-4.
  27. *ibid.*
  28. "Ye aalam ye hangama-i-rang-e-saut  
Ye aalam ke hai zer farman maut,  
Ye aalam ye but khana-i-chashm-a-gosh  
Jahan zindagi hai faqat khurd-o-nosh  
Khudi ke ye hai manzile aualeen  
Musafir ye tera nasheeman nahin,



Barhe ja ye koh giran tor kar  
 Tilsumn-o-zaman-o-makan tor kar,  
 Jah aur bhi hain abhi be namud  
 Ke khali nahan hai zamir-e-vajood."

(Iqbal, Saqinama in *Bal-i-Jibril*, Taj Co. Lahore 1935),

p. 166.

29. "Sitaron se aage jahan aur bhi hain,  
 Abhi Ishq ke imtihan aur bhi hain."

Iqbal,—*Bal-i-Jibril*, (Lahore 1935), p. 89.

## FIVE

### SPACE AND TIME

The problem of time, says Iqbal, has always drawn the attention of Muslim thinkers and mystics. This is because of two main reasons—firstly, because according to Quran, the alternation of day and night is one of the greatest signs of God, and secondly, because of the Prophet's identification of God with time—the wellknown tradition called the 'miraj' of Prophet Mohammad in which he felt himself to be timeless, having a time with God of such a sort that neither angel nor prophet was his peer.

Some of the greatest Muslim Sufis believe in the mystic properties of time (Dahr) Muhyuddin Ibn-Al-Arabi entertains the view that time (Dahr) is one of the beautiful names of God. In the history of Muslim thought it is the Ash'arite theory of time which is perhaps the first attempt to understand this problem philosophically. It is akin to our common-sense view of the nature of time in which it is regarded as wholly objective and external to us, flowing in a line having 'after' and 'before' or 'long' and 'short' intervals. The Ash'arite also conceives time

as a succession of individual nows. From this view, it may be easily concluded that between every two individual 'nows' or moment of time, there is an unoccupied moment of time, that is to say, void of time.<sup>1</sup> It is for this reason that Iqbal is not in agreement with the Asharite view. He points out that the Asharites reached at this absurd conclusion because they started their enquiry from a purely objective point of view and took no lesson from the history of Greek thought which had adopted the same point of view and reached no result. Though the Greeks looked upon time as external and objective, they came to the conclusion that time is unreal. They believed, that only those things are real which are permanent and constant. Those things which change and move are not real. And, change and movement take place in time. Hence because change and movement are unreal for the Greeks, time also becomes unreal. That is why we see that the Greeks could develop only the science of statistics and geometry and not dynamics. Greek arts, we therefore, find exhibited a great amount of calmness and tranquility. It must, however, be admitted that the practical Arab mind could not regard time as something unreal as the Greeks did.

Newton's view with regard to the nature of time is also objective and external. He considered time as something which in itself and from its own nature flows equally. He believed that all motions may be accelerated or retarded only, the flow of absolute time cannot be changed. The same duration and the same persistence occurs in the existence of all things, whether the motion be rapid, slow or zero.

According to Iqbal the metaphor of stream implied in this description suggests serious objections to Newton's equally objective view of time. "We cannot understand," says Iqbal, "how a thing is affected on its immersion in this stream, and how it differs from things that do not participate in its flow. Nor can we form any idea of the beginning, the end, and the boundaries of time if we try to understand it on the analogy of a stream. Moreover, if flow, movement or 'passage' is the last word as to the nature of time, there must be another time to time the movement of the first time, and another which times

the second time, and so on to infinity. Thus the notion of time as something wholly objective is beset with difficulties."<sup>2</sup>

However, we cannot wholly deny the objectivity of time. It is a kind of flow, and has, as such genuine objective, that is to say, atomic aspect, though we do not possess any sense-organ to perceive this nature of time. The verdict of modern science moves in the same direction as that of the Asharite. The recent discoveries in physics, regarding the nature of time, assumes the discontinuity of matter. Iqbal confirms his views by quoting the following passage from Prof. Rongier's 'Philosophy and Physics'. "Contrary to the ancient adage, *Nature non-facit saltus*, it becomes apparent that the universe varies by sudden jumps and not by imperceptible degrees. A physical system is capable of only a finite number of distinct states. Since between two different and immediately consecutive states the world remains motionless, time is suspended, so that time itself is discontinuous : there is an atom of time.\* "The mistakes of both the Asharite and modern thinkers," for Iqbal, lie in the fact that "their enquiries in this respect lack psychological analysis. Due to this shortcoming, they totally fail to perceive the subjective aspect of time." "It is due to this failure that in their theory the systems of material-atoms and time-atoms lie apart, with no organic relation between them. It is clear that if we look at time from a purely objective point of view serious difficulties arise."<sup>3</sup>

Among the Muslim theologians, Fakhruddin Haz, also, after giving his most serious attention to the problem of time, admits that the solution of time is a difficult problem. In his 'Eastern Discussion' he examines all the contemporary theories and finds himself unable to reach any conclusion. He could not be able to discover anything really true with regard to the nature of time. His book simply explains what can possibly be said for and against each theory without any spirit of partisanship, which he generally avoided, especially in connection with the problem of time.

Later Muslim theologians fully realized the difficulties in regarding time as objective. Though they did not ignore the objectivity of time, they, however, treated it as relative.

“Mulla Jalal-ud-din Dawani in a passage of his *Zourra*, which reminds the modern student of Prof Royce's view of time, tells us that if we take time to be a kind of span which makes possible the appearance of events as a moving procession and conceive this span to be a unity, then we cannot but describe it as an original state of Divine activity, encompassing all the succeeding states of that activity. But Mulla takes good care to add that a deeper insight into the nature of succession reveals its relativity, so that it disappears in the case of God to whom all events are present in a single act of perception.”\* The Sufi poet Iraqi treats the problem in a similar way. He conceives the relativity of time in a variety of ways. Time varies according to the different grades of being intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. “The time of gross bodies which arises from the revolution of the heavens is divisible into past, present and future; and its nature is such that as long as one day does not pass away, the succeeding day does not come. The time of immaterial beings is also serial in character, but its passage is such that a whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of an immaterial being. Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach Divine time which is absolutely free from the quality of passage, and consequently does not admit of the divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity, it has neither beginning nor end. The priority of God is not due to priority of time, on the other hand the priority of time is due to God's priority. Thus divine time is what the Quran describes as the ‘Mother of Books’ in which the whole of history, freed from the net of causal sequence, is gathered up in a single ‘super-eternal now.’<sup>4</sup>

But our difficulties do not end by considering time as absolute and static presenting events serially. In this way we picture time as a straight line divided into past, present and future. McTaggart was faced with this difficulty. “Time, according to Dr. McTaggart's argument is unreal because every event is past, present and future. Queen Anne's death for instance, is past to to us; it was present to her contemporaries, and future to William III. Thus the events of Anne's

death combines characteristics which are incompatible with each other.”<sup>5</sup> How can time be past, present and future at the same time? It seems to be obvious that McTaggart's argument proceeded on the assumption that serial nature of time is final. “If we regard past, present and future as essential to time” says Iqbal “then we picture time as a straight line, part of which we have travelled and left behind, and part lies yet untravelled before us. This is taking time, not as a living creative moment but as a static absolute, holding the ordered multiplicity of fully shaped cosmic events, revealed serially, like the pictures of a film, to the outside observer.”<sup>6</sup> Iqbal tries to refute McTaggart's argument. Anne's death as future to William III can be regarded as an event only when it is fully shaped, only waiting for its happening. Iqbal agrees with Broad who points out that a future event cannot be characterised as an event. The event of Queen Anne's death did not exist at all before her death. In her life time this event remained only as an unrealized possibility, which reached its point at actual happening. Iqbal thus writes, “The answer to Dr. McTaggart's argument is that the future exists only as an open possibility, and not as a reality. Nor can it be said that an event combines incompatible characteristics when it is described both as past and present when an event\* does happen it enters into an unalterable relation with all the events that have happened before it. These relations are not at all affected by the relations of X with other events which happen after X by the future becoming of Reality. No true or false proposition about these relations will ever become false or true. Hence there is no logical difficulty in regarding an event as both past and present. It must be confessed, however, that the point is not free from difficulty and requires much further thinking”.<sup>7</sup> It is really very difficult to solve the mystery of time. Augustine's profound words are notable when they were uttered that if no one questions him of time, he knew it; and if he would explain to a questioner, he knew it not. Iqbal is inclined to think that “time is an essential element in Reality. But real time is not serial time to which distinction of past, present and future is essential; it is pure duration change

without succession, which McTaggart's argument does not touch."<sup>8</sup>

The adoption of a purely objective point of view, thinks Iqbal, in understanding the nature of time is only partially helpful. Therefore, "the right course is a careful psychological analysis of our conscious experience which alone reveals the true nature of time."<sup>9</sup> At this point Iqbal seeks the company of Bergson, who helps him to a great deal in the solution of this problem. "Among the representatives of contemporary thought" points out Iqbal "Bergson is the only thinker who has made a keen study of the phenomenon of duration in time."<sup>10</sup>

There is no doubt that the universe persists in time. But it is quite possible to be sceptical about its existence since it is external to us. It seems, therefore more desirable that in order to grasp fully this persistence in time, we must study some such privileged cases of existence, about which we cannot doubt, and which gives us assurance of a direct vision of duration. My perception of external things may be superficial, but my perception of my own self is intimate, internal and therefore, unquestionable. To quote Dr. Iqbal "It follows, therefore, that conscious experience is that privileged case of existence in which we are in absolute contact with Reality, and an analysis of this privileged case of existence is likely to throw a flood of light on the ultimate meaning of existence."<sup>11</sup>

What do I find when I fix my gaze on my conscious experience? In the words of Bergson "I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold. I am merry or sad. I work or do nothing. I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas—such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing."<sup>12</sup> Thus there is nothing static, argues Iqbal, in our inner life; all is a constant mobility, an unceasing flux of states, a perpetual flow in which there is no resting place or halt. Constant change, is however, unthinkable without time. On the analogy of our inner experience, then, conscious experience means life in time. And, Iqbal believes that there are two aspects of self—appreciative and efficient. Efficient self is our practical self of daily life. The

appreciative self lives in pure duration i.e. change without succession. But for our practical purposes we make a kind of veil around our appreciative self. "The life of the self consists in its movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect and atomic time is born out of this movement."<sup>13</sup> But the time of the efficient self is not true time. The time in which the efficient self lives is therefore like, a line which we can describe as short or long. Like space we conceive time as a straight line composed of spatial points, external to one another.

Thou hast extended Time, like Space,  
And distinguished Yesterday from To-morrow.  
Thou hast fled, like a scent, from thine own garden,  
Thou hast made thy prison with thine own hand.  
Our time which has neither beginning nor end,  
Blossoms from the flower-bed of our mind.<sup>14</sup>

Thus existence in spatialized time, as Bergson points out, is spurious existence. In our deeper analysis of conscious experience, and in moments of profound meditation, we catch a glimpse of our appreciative self, which throws light on the true nature of time. "In the life process of this deeper ego the states of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly qualitative. There is change and movement, but this change and movement are indivisible; their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. It appears that the time of the appreciative self is a single 'now' which the efficient-self, in its traffic with the world of space, pulverizes into a series of 'nows' like pearl beads in a thread. Here is, then, pure duration unadulterated by space."<sup>15</sup>

The Quran with its characteristic simplicity speaks of the serial and non-serial aspects of duration in the following verses. 'And put thou thy trust in Him that liveth and dieth not, and celebrate His praise who in six days created the Heavens and



the earth and what is between them, then mounted this Throne; the God of mercy' (25 : 60).

our command was but one, swift as the twinkling of an eye' (54 : 60)

The analysis of our conscious experience gives us a clue to the nature of time regarded as an organic whole or eternity and time regarded as atomic. If on the analogy of our conscious experience, we conceive the life of the all-inclusive ego, the time of the ultimate ego is revealed as change without succession in an organic whole which appears atomic because of the creative moment of the ego.<sup>16</sup> According to Mir Damad and Mulla Baqir, then, time is born with the act of creation. It is time through which the ultimate ego realizes His creative possibilities and measures the extent of His own undetermined wealth. Thus the ultimate ego, on the one hand, lives in pure duration i.e. eternity. By this Iqbal means non-successional change. On the other hand, 'it lives in serial time...organically related to eternity in the sense that it is a measure of non-successional change'.<sup>17</sup> It is in this sense that Quran says : 'To God belongs the alternation of day and night.' These are the differences between divine Time and serial Time. The processes of creation lasting through thousands of years is a single indivisible act, swift as the twinkling of an eye. From another point of view, if intellectually apprehended, i.e. the moment of creation looked from outside, one divine day, in the terminology of Quran and the old testament, is equal to 1000 years, and thus the process of creation lasts through thousands of years. It is however, impossible, says Iqbal, to explain this inner experience of pure duration through words, for our daily efficient life affects the language shaped on the serial time line. To elucidate the point, Iqbal gives an illustration. Physical science believes that the cause of the sensation of red is the rapidity of wave motion the frequency of which is 400 billions per second. If this tremendous frequency is observed from the outside, and counted at the rate of two thousands per second, which is supposed to be the limit of the perceptibility of light, it will take more than 5000 years to finish the enumeration. Yet one holds together in the single momentary mental act of perception

a frequency of wave motion which is practically incalculable. "That is how mental act transforms succession into duration. The appreciative self, then, is more or less corrective of the efficient self, in as much as it synthesises all 'heres' and 'nows'—the small change of space and time, indispensable to the efficient self—into the coherent wholeness of personality. Pure-time, then, as revealed by a deeper analysis of our conscious experience, is not a string of separate, reversible instants; it is an organic whole in which the past is not left behind, but is moving along with, and operating in, the present. And the future is given to it not as lying before, yet to be traversed; it is given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility."<sup>18</sup>

It is this organic conception of time, says Iqbal, which Quran describes as destiny. "Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence—the diagrammatic character which the logical understanding imposes on it. In one word it is time as felt and not as thought and calculated."<sup>19</sup> Two events are contemporary with each other, not because they were pre-planned events waiting to happen in some near future, at the same time, but because among infinite possibilities, the two possibilities were to be realized at the same period. It is in this sense that the Quran says "God created all things and assigned to each its destiny." It does not however mean that events are fixed beforehand. To quote Dr. Iqbal "The organic-wholeness of duration does not mean that full-fledged events are lying, as it were, in the womb of Reality and drop one by one till the grains of sand from the hour-glass. If time is real and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which make conscious experience a delusion, then every moment in the life of Reality is original, giving birth to what is absolutely novel and unforeseeable. 'Every day doth some new work employ Him' says the Quran. To exist in real time is not to be bound by fetters of serial-time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation. In fact, all creative activity is free activity."<sup>20</sup>

Thus it is quite evident from the above mentioned arguments that Iqbal does not regard time as unreal like the Greeks. At the same time he does not believe in the purely objective and external conception of time, though he does accept this view that time has a genuine objective aspect too. But a purely objective view of time is not the complete view. It is only partially helpful. Iqbal therefore goes to the subjective aspect of time, and finds that pure-time is something like an organic-whole in which past, present and future are inter-related. He then even goes to some of the recent discoveries of science and philosophy, as that of Einstein and Whitehead where time is not regarded as something independent and separate from space but rather as component of the space-time continuum.

It seems therefore necessary to throw some light upon the development of theories about the nature of space. What do we mean by space? We generally think that space is something given an independent void, in which things are situated, and it would remain intact even if all things were withdrawn from it. According to ancient Greek philosopher Plato, space is that in which objects are situated. It supplies room for objects, and itself cannot be annihilated. All things that exist must be located somewhere. That which is not located at any place is nothing.

This is the static conception of space as found in classical Greek philosophy. All things may change, but an absolute space remains the same. That is why the Greeks could develop only science of statics and geometry in which motion plays no part. The views of the ancient Greek philosopher Zeno are of far reaching consequences. According to Zeno movement in space is deceptive. This amounts to challenging the existence of independent space. In support of his contention, Zeno states two arguments. Zeno conceives space to be infinitely divisible, consisting of infinite points. Before the moving body could reach its destination, it must pass through half the space intervening between the point of start and the point of destination and before passing through that half, it must cover the half of that half and so on to infinity. Thus Zeno contends

that it is quite impossible to pass through infinite points in a finite time. Zeno further argues that the flying arrow does not move, because at any time during the course of its flight it is at rest in some point of space. Thus Zeno held that movement is only a deceptive appearance and that reality is one and immutable. The unreality of movement means the unreality of an independent space.

The problem posed by Zeno persisted for long in the history of thought. In our own times Bergson and Russell have tried to refute Zeno's arguments. According to Bergson movement, as true change, is original and the fundamental reality. Bergson thinks that the paradox of Zeno's argument is due to his wrong conception of space and time, which may be regarded only as the intellectual view of movement. The nature of thought, according to Bergson is serial; it cannot deal with movement, except by viewing it as series of stationary points. It is therefore, the operation of thought, working with static concepts that gives the appearance of a series of immobilities to what is essentially dynamic in its nature. The co-existence and succession of these immobilities are the sources of what we call space and time.

Bertrand Russell argues with reference to Cantor's theory of mathematical continuity. According to it between any two points (supposing P & Q) however, close to each other, there are infinite number of points. Thus it cannot be said that the point Q is next to P nor any other point can be said to be next to another. Zeno's argument was based on the assumption that space and time consists of infinite number of points and instants. On this assumption it can be easily argued that since between two points the moving body will be out of place, motion is impossible, for there is no place for it to take place. But Cantor's discovery has shown that space and time are continuous, and the infinite divisibility of space and time do not mean that points are mutually isolated, in the same of having a gap.

Zeno asks : how can you go from one position at one moment to the next position at the next moment without in the transition

being at no position at no time? It may be answered, argues Russell, that there is no next position to any position, no next moment to any moment, because between any two there is always another. If there were infinitesimals moment would be impossible: but there are none. Russell accepts that Zeno is so far right in saying that the arrow is at rest at every moment of its flight, but he is wrong in inferring that therefore it does not move, for there is a one—one correspondence in a movement between the infinite series of positions and infinite series of instants. According to this theory, it is thus possible to affirm the reality of space, time and movement and solve the paradox in Zeno's argument.

Thus a moving body will be observed at a number of positions at a number of instants. What is called movement, is this mental unique relation or correspondence between the sequence of positions and sequence of instants. Russell, thus, on the basis of Cantor's theory of continuity proves the reality of movement, and thereby affirms the independent reality of space and objectivity of nature. But Iqbal thinks that "the identity of continuity and the infinite divisibility of space, is no solution of the difficulty. Assuming that there is one-one correspondence between the infinite multiplicity of points in a finite portion of space, the difficulty arising from the divisibility remains the same. The mathematical conception of continuity as finite series applies not to movement regarded as an act, but rather to the picture of movement as viewed from the outside. The act of movement, i.e. movement as lived and not as thought, does not admit of any divisibility. The flight of the arrow observed as a passage in space is divisible, but its flight regarded as an act apart from its realization in space, is one and incapable of partition into a multiplicity. In partition lies its destruction."<sup>21</sup>

Among the Muslim thinkers, Asharite too has tried to resolve the paradox of Zeno. The Asharite did not believe in the infinite divisibility of space and time. With them space, time and motion are made of points and instants which cannot be further subdivided. Thus their endeavour is to prove the possibility of movement on the assumption that infinitesimals

do exist, for if there is a limit to the divisibility of space and time, movement from one point of space to another is possible in a finite time. According to the Asharite, space is generated by the accumulation of atoms, and motion is nothing but the atom's passage through space. But it does not mean that a body in its moving stage has to pass through all the intervening points. This would lead to the belief in the existence of vacuum as an independent reality. Hence they put forward the theory of "tarfa" (jump) which has also been advocated in the form of quantum jumps by Bohr and Planck.

According to Ibn-i-Hazm, the theory of Asharite is not sound enough to resolve the paradox of Zeno. He does not accept that space and time made up of points and instants, cannot be further subdivided. He rejects the Asharite motion of infinitesimals. There is no gap between any two points and instants. Between the two points A and B, there is always a next and so on. This view is also advocated by Cantor's theory of mathematic continuity to which we have referred to above and pointed to its difficulties.

According to Iqbal, "the thought of a limit to perceptual space and time staggers the mind...In order to overpass its bounds the mind must overcome serial time and the pure vacuity of perceptual space."<sup>22</sup> Iqbal explains why the atomism of Democritus never became popular in the world of Islam. The reason is that it involves the assumption of an absolute space. The Asharite were, therefore, driven to develop a different kind of atomism and tried to overcome the difficulties of perceptual space in a manner similar to modern atomism. According to Asharite, space is generated from the aggregation of atoms. But the numbers of atoms are not fixed. Fresh atoms are ever coming up; God adds to his creation what he will. Therefore, the world stretching out in space is liable to increase.

It was Nasir Tusi who, after realizing the necessity of abandoning perceptual space, first disturbed the calm which prevailed in the world of mathematics for about a thousand years. He thus, furnished, points out Iqbal, a basis, however

slight it may be, for the hyperspace movement of our time. Beruni again felt the insufficiency of a static view of the universe—a further more deviation from the Greek thinking. He tackled the problem from a purely scientific point of view. His approach was akin to the modern mathematical idea of function. In words of Iqbal, “The function idea introduces the element of time in our world-picture. It turns the fixed into variable, and sees the universe not as a being but becoming. Spengler thinks that the mathematical idea of function is the symbol of the west of which no other culture gives even a hint. In view of Al-Beruni’s generalizing Newton’s formula of interpolation from trigonometrical function to any function whatever, Spengler’s claim has no foundation in fact.”<sup>23</sup> The transformation of the Greek concept of number from pure magnitude to pure relation has really started with Khawrazm’s movement from Arithmetic to Algebra. Al-Beruni seems to be taking a definite step forward towards what Spengler describes as chronological number which signifies the mind’s passage from being to becoming. We find that the more recent developments in European mathematics tend rather to deprive time of its living historical character and to reduce it to a mere representation of space. That is why Whitehead’s view of Relativity, thinks Iqbal, is likely to appeal to the Muslim minds more than that of Einstein in whose theory time loses its character of passage and mysteriously translates itself into utter space.<sup>24</sup>

Iraqi tries to show that space is a dynamic appearance and varies according to the different grades of being. He takes a relative standpoint. He points out there are three kinds of space—the space of material bodies, the space of immaterial beings and the space of God. The space of material bodies may be further divided into three kinds. “First the space of gross bodies of which we predicate roominess. In this space movement takes time, body occupy their respective places and resist displacement. Secondly, the space of subtle bodies i.e. air and sound. In this space too bodies resist each other, and their movement is measurable in terms of time which, however appears to different to the time of gross bodies. Thirdly,

we have the space of light. The light of the sun instantly reaches the remotest limit of the earth. Thus in the velocity of light and sound time is reduced almost to zero."<sup>25</sup>

It is therefore, clear that space of light differs from the space of air and sound. We can put forward, however, a more effective argument than this. The light of a candle spreads in all directions in a room without displacing the air in the room; and this clearly proves that the space of light is more subtle than the space of air which has no entry into the space of light. "In view of close proximity of these spaces, it is very difficult to distinguish the one from the other except by a purely intellectual analysis and spiritual experience. Again in the hot water the two opposites—fire and water—which appear to interpenetrate each other cannot, in view of their respective natures, exist in the same space. The fact cannot be explained except on the supposition that the spaces of two substances though closely proximate to each other are nevertheless distinct. But while the element of distance is not entirely absent, there is no possibility of mutual resistance in the space of light. The light of a candle reaches upto a certain point only and the lights of hundred candles intermingle in the same room without displacing one another."<sup>26</sup>

Secondly, we have the space of immaterial beings e.g. angels. "The element of space is not entirely absent from these spaces, for immaterial bodies, while they can easily pass through stone walls, cannot altogether dispense with motion which according to Iraqi, is evidence of imperfection in spirituality. The highest point in the scale of spatial freedom is reached by the human soul which, in its unique essence, is neither at rest nor in motion. Thus passing through infinite varieties of space we reach the Divine Space which is absolutely free from all dimensions and constitutes the meeting point of all infinities.<sup>27</sup> Similar was the view of Iraqi with regard to time already dealt with.

This is in short the summary of Iraqi's view. He tried to interpret his spiritual experience of time and space in an age which had not the knowledge of modern physics and mathematics. Though Iraqi's thought moved in a right direction,



yet he could not understand the full implication of his thought. Iraqi is wrong in supposing that space is something given and varies according to the different grades of being. The mistake done by him was partly because of two reasons; firstly, "he was not a mathematician"<sup>28</sup> and secondly, "because of his natural prejudice in favour of the traditional Aristotelian idea of a fixed universe"<sup>29</sup> combined with a lack of physiological analysis.

According to Iqbal space is also dependent upon our subjective constitution. In the light of Ouspensky's thought he points out that our space is not an objective reality. The space of some animals—like that of snail—is one dimensional, for it the whole world consists in a line. The space of others is two dimensionals, and then there is three dimensional space of human beings—length, breadth and height. Iqbal however could not agree with Ouspensky's conception of time, according to which time is regarded as a spatial phenomena—the fourth dimension of space. Iqbal conceives time not as spatial but durational. Now coming to Einstein, space for him is real but relative to the observer. He rejects the Newtonian conception of an absolute space. Likewise, Einstein also believes in the reality of time. The passage of time cannot be the same to two persons placed in different situations. Pleasant moments of one hour can be felt as passing too swift like five minutes for a person A; while one long hour—a completely troublesome and boredom can be felt by another person B as if the passage of time is too slow. It is not possible to develop here at full length, the theory of relativity as enunciated by Einstein.

We can say, in short, that according to the theory of relativity space and time are not absolute but relative, not separate from each other but mutually dependent. There is thus a single space-time continuum. Our three dimensional world has become four dimensional i.e. length, breadth, height and time. The universe according to Einstein is not lying in an infinite space; it is finite but boundless, beyond it there is no empty space. In the absence of matter the universe would shrink to a point. Space time thus according to Einstein is not absolute but relative to the 'observer.'

Iqbal points out that the theory of relativity may lead to certain misunderstanding. He says, "the use of the word 'observer' in this connection has misled Wildon Carr into the view that the theory of relativity inevitably leads to monadistic idealism. It is true that according to this theory the shapes, sizes and durations of phenomena are not absolute. But as Prof. Nunn points out, the space-time frame does not depend on the observer's mind; it depends on the point of the material universe to which his 'body' is attached."<sup>30</sup>

Iqbal, however, raises one objection against the theory of relativity. He thinks that this theory makes time unreal. It regards time as a kind of the fourth dimension of space which makes future lying somewhere fixed. But it is difficult to believe that time in Einstein theory is not real, and future is already given. Accepting this position perhaps a rigid-determinism would prevail in the world of science. Iqbal was aware that he could not fully understand the meaning of this theory. He says that it is not possible for us laymen to understand what is real nature of Einstein's time.<sup>31</sup> But it must be admitted that this theory neglects certain characteristics of time as experienced by us. It is however obvious, points out Iqbal, that Einstein's time is not Bergson's pure duration. Nor can we regard it as a serial time.<sup>32</sup>

Thus finally, according to Iqbal, space and time though real, are not absolute but relative. Space and time, as Kant had believed are not the fixed and unvarying modes into which all our knowledge is moulded. There may be a grade of experience in which there is neither space nor time. Space and time, thinks Iqbal, vary according to the decrease or increase of psychic powers. He therefore asks for a further self-development so as to conquer space and time instead of becoming a slave of them.

## Notes

1. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Oxford University Press—1934). p. 69.
2. R.R., p. 70.  
\* Cf. R.R., p. 70.
3. *ibid.*, p. 71.  
\* *ibid.*
4. *ibid.*, p. 72.
5. *ibid.*, p. 54.
6. *ibid.*, pp. 54-5.
7. *ibid.*
8. *ibid.*, p. 55.
9. *ibid.*, p. 72.
10. *ibid.*, p. 44.
11. *ibid.*
12. Bergson., *Creative Evolution*.
13. R.R., p. 72.
14. S.S., p. 137.
15. R.R., pp. 45-6.
16. R.R., p. 73.
17. *ibid.*
18. R.R., p. 47.
19. *ibid.*,
20. *ibid.*, p. v. 48.
21. R.R., pp. 35-6.
22. R.R., p. 125.
23. R.R., p. 126.
24. *ibid.*, p. 127.
25. *ibid.*, p. 129.
26. *ibid.*, pp. 129-30.

27. *ibid.*, p. 130.
28. *ibid.*
29. *ibid.*
30. *R.R.*, p. 36.
31. *R.R.*, p. 37.
32. *ibid.*

## SIX

### THEORY OF GOD

There are three main arguments put forward by scholastic philosophy to prove the existence of God. They are cosmological, teleological and ontological. Iqbal examines all these arguments one by one and raises serious objections against them.

According to the cosmological argument, there must be some cause of this world. The argument proceeds from the effect to its cause. In order to show that the world as a finite effect has some cause, the thinking mind passes through a series of causes and effects, and has to stop at some place to avoid infinite regress. In this way it proclaims that there must be some cause which is the first, and itself an uncaused cause by means of which we may be able to explain the entire process of cause and effect. Furthermore, proceeding from a series of infinite causes and effects to the first uncaused cause, the latter is elevated to the status of an infinite cause. Iqbal, therefore, says. "It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can only give

a finite cause or utmost an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an uncaused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds. Further the first cause reached by the argument necessarily excludes its effect. And this means that the effect, constituting a limit to its own cause, reduces it to something finite."<sup>1</sup> Then, again, according to the law of causation, the relation of cause and effect is necessary. So the first uncaused cause does not prove itself to be a necessary being. But the main defect, points out Iqbal, is this that "the argument really tries to reach the infinite by negating the finite. But the infinite reached by contradicting the finite is a false infinite, which neither explains itself nor the finite which is thus made to stand in opposition to the infinite. The true infinite does not exclude the finite, it embraces the finite without effacing its existence and explains and justifies its being. Logically speaking, thus the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in toto."<sup>2</sup>

The teleological argument proceeds on the assumption that there are order, harmony and adjustment in the universe. It deduces the existence of an invisible creator from the visible features of the universe. According to teleology the world is not governed by mechanistic forces. But it sees purpose and adaptation in the entire scheme of things. It, therefore, infers the existence of a conscious intelligent being who is working from behind to scatter the seeds of His wisdom in appropriate manner.

The most prominent feature of this argument is to refer to the regularity of movement and structure and the gleams of beauty which are clearly visible in nature. Joseph McCabe says "In a controversy with Sir Oliver Lodge, I found that his reply took the form of asking me how can we know that we have explained everything when we explain a sunset, a beautiful scene, a flower, a graceful figure. It is quaint logic...."<sup>3</sup> It is as superficial as the impression of a man who seeing the sunrise on the Alps, exclaims that there must be a God...." Science studies

nature with an impartial eye. It finds ugliness as well as beauty, disorder as well as order. There is much sunshine, and happiness and beauty in nature, there is also much gloom and pain and ugliness, whatever made the one made the other. This difficulty has always reduced the theist to a melancholy silence."<sup>4</sup> Thus we cannot say that there is only beauty and happiness in nature. We also find immeasurably pains and sorrows in the world and such sights of pity that we cry are these the works of God? "It is true that there are parts of the earth's surface which are admirably suited as habitations for living beings. But there are nevertheless, large areas which appear to be entirely useless for such a purpose. What is the use of the enormous desert stretching across the two great continents of the old world. Could not Sahara have been left out? It certainly might have been omitted without any great difficulty. We admit the configuration of Greece and Europe, but it seems as though all art and care had been exhausted upon them and little or nothing had been done for the immense expanses of country in Asia, Africa and Australia."<sup>5</sup> Sir O. Lodge and some other theists argued that things are improving; that this world may yet be a world in which even God will take pride. To this Dr. Mallock had bluntly replied that whatever be the God's future, we cannot forget His past.

There are thus many objections against this argument. But the main defect which has been pointed out is that it only proves God as designer and not creator. Iqbal says, "The teleological argument is no better. The argument gives us a contriner only and not a creator, and even if we suppose him to be also the creator of his material, it does not credit to his wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material, and then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its original nature. The designer regarded as external to his material must always remain limited by his material and hence a finite designer whose limited resources compel him to overcome his difficulties after the fashion of a human mechanician. The truth is that the analogy on which the argument proceeds is of no value at all."<sup>6</sup>

The ontological argument, as commonly stated, finds in the

very idea of God the proof of His existence. The thought of God in mind demonstrates His being. The conclusion from thought to being constitutes the gist of the argument. Anselm was the originator of this sort of argumentation. He reasoned that the fool may say in his heart, that there is no God; but he only proves thereby that he is a fool, for what he says is self-contradictory. Since he denies that there is a God, he has in his mind the idea of God, for it is the idea of being than which a higher cannot be conceived. That than which a higher cannot be conceived cannot exist merely as an idea.

Descartes also uses this argument. "Because we find within ourselves the idea of a God, or supremely perfect being, we are able to investigate the cause which produces this idea in us, but after, on considering the immensity of the perfection it possesses, we are constrained to admit that we can consider it only as emanating from an all-perfect being that is from a God who truly exists. For, it is only made manifest by the natural light that nothing can be the cause of nothing whatever, and that the more perfect cannot proceed from the less perfect...."7 Hence I, myself, cannot be the cause of the idea of God for I am a finite imperfect and the idea of God is the idea of a perfect and infinite being. Hence the idea must have been placed in me by one infinite being or God and therefore God must exist. This proof is not purely ontological but cosmological or casual which has already been criticized. But Descartes also offers the ontological argument in a straight forward manner. If God did not exist, I could not possibly be what I am nor could I have an idea of God. The idea of God, I have received from God. To use Descartes's words: "that the existence of God may be rightly demonstrated from the fact, that the necessity of His existence is comprehended in the conception which we have of Him.

When mind afterwards considers the diverse conceptions which it has and when it then discovers the idea of a being who is omniscient, omnipotent and absolutely perfect, which is far most important of all; in it recognizes not merely a possible and contingent existence, as in all the other ideas it



has of things which it clearly perceives, but one which is absolutely necessary and eternal. And just as it perceives that it is necessary involved in the idea of the triangle that it should have three angles which are equal to two right angles....In the same way from the fact that it perceives that necessary and eternal existence is comprised in the idea which it has of an absolutely perfect being, it has clearly to conclude that this absolutely perfect being exists."<sup>8</sup> Thus the argument of Descartes is a slightly modified from the ontological proof of St. Anselm. In whatever manner the idea of God must have developed, it is clear that such an idea could never have been proceeded by the human consciousness. There must have been an adequate cause to produce it.

The ontological argument has been very critically discussed by several authors.

Flint says: "The argument merely assumes that he who denies God must have an idea of God."<sup>10</sup> In words of Caird "To argue that because a notion in my mind includes existence as one of its elements, therefore, a being corresponding to it must actually exist, seems to be only a foolish play upon words."<sup>11</sup> Mr. Caird argues that a notion or conception of existence is not a proof of actual or objective existence, any more than a notion of food or clothing can conjure a banquet on to an empty table, or persuade us that a naked body is warmly clad; or as it is put in Kant's well-known illustration that the notion of 300 dollars in my mind proves that I have them in my purse. If existence is an element of perfection, no doubt, the idea of a perfect being must include the idea of his existence; but the presence in my mind of the idea of existence or of anything else, says nothing as to its objective reality.<sup>12</sup>

It is quite true that from the mere idea or conception of a thing in our minds, we cannot infer objective existence.

The ontological argument, thinks Iqbal, creates a gulf between the idea of a perfect being in the human mind and the objective reality of that being which cannot be bridged by the transcendental act of thought. The argument is in fact a *petitio-principle*, because it assumes at the very beginning the

reality of God which it is going to prove. There is a difference between the idea of an object and its objective reality. A thing merely does not exist because we entertain an idea of it even universally. Also there are many people who are atheists and have no faith in the existence of God.<sup>12</sup>

The teleological and ontological arguments as ordinarily stated carry us nowhere. The reason of their failure is that they look upon thought as an agency from without. This view of thought suggests that God is a mere mechanic in one case, and creates an unbridgeable gulf between the ideal and the real in the other.

But, yet, the movement of thought encircling these arguments is not totally meaningless. They point out, however, that all the immensity of life and world does not satisfy the craze of mind which is every moment out to search the ultimate principle of world and life. To quote Dr. Iqbal, "The true significance of the ontological and teleological arguments will appear only if we are able to show that the human situation is not final and that thought and being are ultimately one."<sup>13</sup> By identification of thought and being as ultimately one, Iqbal perhaps means to point out the utility of religious or mystic experience.

Iqbal's faith in the existence of God is based on the testimony of Quran, the mystic literature of Islam and other religions. The latest discoveries of modern science in the domain of physics and biology have also strengthened this faith. "We should carefully examine and interpret experience," he says, "following the clue furnished by Quran which regards experience within and without as symbolic of reality described by it, as the first and last the visible and invisible."<sup>14</sup> God is prior to all existing things; even when all the things will perish, the one Reality, that is, He, will remain. He is thus the first and the last. God is even invisible as we cannot see him by our eyes and cannot form an adequate conception of him. He is visible in so far as we mark His prints in the visible aspects of nature and see Him by the eye of our heart. The approach of Quran to this important topic is both intellectual and emotional. "The Quran sees signs of the ultimate Reality

in the 'Sun' and the 'Moon,' 'the lengthening out of shadows,' 'the alternation of the day and night,' 'the variety of human colour and tongues,' 'the alternative of the days of success and reverse among peoples'—in fact in the whole of nature as revealed to the sense-perception of man. And the Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs and not to pass by them 'as if he is deaf and blind, 'for he who does not see these signs in this life will remain blind to the realities of the life to come.'"<sup>15</sup> According to Quran there are signs of the existence of God for the people who try to understand it. 'He is one who causes life and who causes death and to him belong the alternation of day and night. Why do you not understand them' (23 : 80) asks the Quran. God has evolved many objects of benefit for man. He gives him hearing and sight and mind. It is He who makes the night and the day, and the sun and the moon which float on their respective orbits. (22 : 33). Who causes the growth of the green fields, palm trees, grapes and all kinds of fruits? In all this there is a proof (of the existence of Reality) for the people who understand it. There are also proofs for the men who think over the law of the night and the day, the sun and the moon. Similarly there are proofs to realize the truth in all that has been spread on this earth for the various species. (16 : 10 to 14). But strangely enough, man is yet ungrateful and little thanks does he pay for all this. The Quran declares :

"Such is the Real, your vital principle.

There is no deity but He—the maker of all things.

Therefore pay reverence to him,

For He is the charge of all things.

No vision (physical and spiritual) contain Him.

And he contains all visions,

For He is all subtle, all aware.

Surely, to you has now come vision from your vital principle.

Therefore whoever has a vision has it for its own good,

And whoever is blind to it, is blind to his own harm.

And (Say O, Mohammad), I am not a guardian over you."

(6-103 to 105).

There are many such verses of Quran which tried to evoke in man, faith in God. Moreover there are also mystics who

claim to have an intuition of God. Iqbal accepts all normal sources of knowledge. But he does not accept that normal knowledge is the only knowledge possible. He, therefore, gives recognition to mystic or religious experiences. He argues that the records of the specialist's personal experiences, as found in the history of the religious literature of the world, cannot be totally rejected as false, meaningless, or mere phantasies of erratic minds. These experiences have in fact exerted a great force in the history of mankind and even changed the course of evolution to a great extent.

The investigations of modern science in some branches of knowledge like physics and biology, thinks Iqbal, do not weaken our faith. Rather, science makes us more convinced about the spirituality of ultimate Reality. A number of scientists now feel the 'limitations of science' and have lately expressed their views in unequivocal terms. The relation between religion and science is still a baffling problem. Mr. Brown\* uses the words 'intellectual ignorance' 'intellectual cowardice' and 'intellectual dishonesty' in his discussion of the conflict between religion and science to characterise the various shortcomings in the attempts made to relate the two. We may accept either religion or science whole heartedly and ignore the importance of the other. But this, in fact, is an attitude of intellectual ignorance, in view of the accumulating evidence that truth is not contained in science alone. Scientists regard themselves as 'agnostics' meaning thereby that they are undecided about the nature or existence of God. Similarly, religious people who do not take in to account the existing body of scientific knowledge in the formation of their religious faith, also suffer from intellectual ignorance. Then we find watertight compartments being made between science and religion. The two are placed on different footings, as if there is nothing common between the two, as if the two are contradictory and hostile to each other. No attempt is thus made to reconcile the two. This is nothing but intellectual cowardice. Then the other way, Mr. Brown discusses is intellectual dishonesty. One may accept wholeheartedly any of the two (religion or science) and add to it such elements from the other which causes no

trouble to the other. But taking advantage of some such elements from any, does not take us far but leaves many things unexplored. For example, a scientist may believe in the conception of the first cause as the ultimate originator of all things, and may tell that religion, by this way, has been given its due place, but strangely enough, he does not seem to accept the validity of religious experience. Like-wise a religious person might give his lip-service to science and its belief in the causation theory, but in spite of this he refuses to appreciate the theory of biological evolution agreed upon by all scientists. Religion and Philosophy in order to be more rational, convincing and truthful (of which they claim) have to recognise the importance of the investigations of modern science. Science has also to note that it has a sphere determined by itself. There are such some stages in the sphere of science beyond which it finds itself incompetent and helpless. Religion and Philosophy in this respect, can go beyond science, after having taken inspiration from the scientific investigations.

Mr. Brown tries to reconcile science and religion. Both religion and science have made their best efforts for an intellectual search of unity in the universe. The unity of God is one of the fundamental tenets not only of Islam, but even of Judaism and Christianity. Mr. Brown does not mention the fact that the conception of the unity of God had never been so vigorously and assertively emphasised before Islam. It has enormously moved the followers of this faith all around the world. Mr. Brown is right in saying that beside christianity, Judaism and Islamic idea of the unity of God, something like it has also been approached by the philosophers of Greece and Hinduism. And science is also in search of a unified universal law.

One of the chief aim of modern science is to seek unity in the apparent divergencies of the universe. The Greeks classified substances under four heads—earth, air, fire and water; and scientists, by their more accurate research admit of some ninety chemical elements. Recently these chemical elements have been considered as being built up of electric charges.

Even the ancient Greeks, in their search for unity, were led to the conception of one pervading spirit or an all ruling God



critical interpretation of the sequence of time as revealed in ourselves has led us to a notion of the ultimate Reality as pure duration in which thought, life and purpose inter-penetrate to form an organic unity. We cannot conceive this unity except as the unity of a self—an all embracing concrete self—the ultimate source of all individual life and thought....To exist in pure duration is to be a self, and to be a self is to be able to say, 'I am'. Only that truly exists which can say 'I am'. It is the degree of intuition of 'I amness' that determines the place of a thing in the scale of being. We too say 'I am'. But our 'I am-ness' is dependent and arises out of the distinction of the self and not-self. The ultimate self, in the words of the Quran, 'can afford to dispense with all the worlds'. To him not-self does not present itself as a confronting other."<sup>16</sup> Iqbal, thus, feels that of such a self, it is impossible for us to form an adequate conception. The Quran says, 'Naught' is like Him,\* Yet 'He hears and sees'. But His hearing and seeing are not to be understood in ordinarily human terminology. Now a self is unthinkable without a character i.e. uniform mode of behaviour.

In observing nature with its vast phenomena of life and other objects, we may be able to have a glimpse of God's behaviour, and His untiring activities. But when we examine natural phenomena, we always mark a constant flux, change and movement. Everything is changing from moment to moment. Some philosophers were thus inclined to think that behind this change and movement there must be some underlying eternal principle—God who is permanent and everlasting.

The question arises. 'Is God static'? All metaphysics suffers from the defect that its inquiry is the pre-determined journey for the search of the fixed, static, and permanent. Iqbal believes that not only the world is a continuous flow, but even God is ever active. He never sits idle for a single moment. Quran says : "Every day He is employing Himself in an affair of some kind." As every moment He is busy in some affair, He cannot be said to be a static God. It is a wrong idea to believe that because every thing perishes, therefore God remains static.

Life means continuity, activity and progress. We change

from one situation to another. We have desires and ideals. We have successes and failures. Life, from our point of view, is change and change always points to imperfection.

The Spanish Muslim theologian, Ibn-i-Hazm was thus afraid of ascribing life to God. The difficulty of ascribing any life to God has arisen to Ibn-i-Hazm, thinks Iqbal, due to the fact that he would have taken life as a serial change in obstructing environment. Serial change is surely imperfection. In serial change, the organic situation is always changed. A thing becomes something which it had not been before. This type of change is not possible in the life of God. In Him change is internal. His life is wholly determined from within. Change and movement do not affect Him, because He is the whole of Reality. As sciences say energy changes and transforms, but energy as a whole remains constant.

Iqbal says, "The ultimate Ego exists in pure duration where-in change ceases to be a succession of varying attitudes, and reveals its true character, as continuous creation, 'untouched by weariness' and unseizable 'by slumber or sleep'. To conceive the ultimate Ego as changeless in this sense of change is to conceive Him as utter inaction, a motiveless, stagnant neutrality, an absolute nothing. To the creative self change cannot mean imperfection. The perfection of the creative self consists, not in a mechanically conceived immobility, as Aristotle might have led Ibn-i-Hazm to think. It consists in the vaster basis of His creative activity and the infinite scope of his creative vision. God's life is self-revelation, and not the pursuit of an ideal to be reached. The 'not-yet' of man does mean pursuit and may mean failure; the 'not-yet' of God means unfailing realization of the infinite creative possibilities of His being which retains its wholeness throughout the entire process."<sup>17</sup>

A criticism of experience in its all accounts including its efficient and appreciative side, points out Iqbal, draws us to the conclusion that "the ultimate Reality is a rationally directed creative life, which in view of our experience of life, cannot be conceived except as an organic whole, a something closely knit together and possessing a central point of reference. This



being the character of life, the ultimate life can only be conceived as an ego."<sup>18</sup>

The interpretation of life, thinks Iqbal, as an ego is not to fashion God after the image of man. We are, rather, simply accepting the fact that life is not a formless fluid. It is an organizing principle of unity which holds together different elements of the organism and then synthesizes activity for some constructive purpose and end. The true nature of life is very often darkened by our limited outlook. It conceives it as a kind of universal current flowing through all things. The intellectual view of life, thus, necessarily leads us to a pantheistic conception. "But we have a first hand knowledge of the appreciative aspect of life from within. Intuition reveals life as a centralizing ego. This knowledge, however, imperfect as giving us only a point of departure, is a direct revelation of the ultimate nature of Reality. Thus the facts of experience justify the inference that ultimate nature of reality is spiritual, and must be conceived as an Ego."<sup>19</sup>

Iqbal, then, does not believe in the pantheistic interpretation of life. According to him all life is individualists. There is no such thing as universal life. God Himself is an individual. But He is the most unique individual and most true.<sup>20</sup>

He (Iqbal) speaks in the language of Bergson that individuality is a matter of degrees and not even fully realized in the case of human beings. We find that a tendency to individuality is everywhere present in the organised world; a thing common with each individual is that it harbours its own enemy at home. That is to say, it is opposed by the tendency towards reproduction. A father is the cause of his son's birth. And his son may become even greater than his father. The son that is his own blood, may live quite separate from his father or mother. But for the individuality to be perfect, it would be necessary that no detached part of the organism could live separately. In that case a reproduction would be impossible. For what is a reproduction but building up of a new organism with a detached fragment of the old? Individuality, therefore

harbours its own enemy at home.<sup>21</sup> Iqbal, thus, points out that the perfect individual cannot be conceived as harbouring its own enemy at home, and should be regarded as free from the antagonistic tendency of reproduction. This is also one of the most essential characteristics of the most perfect individual according to the Quranic conception of God. The Quran, thus says :

“O prophet, inform the people that God is unique, He is free from all desires, He is born of none and He has given birth (like human beings) to none and there is no share in His authority and there is none like Him.”

Of such a unique individual, it is difficult for us to form an adequate conception. The Quran has emphasised on several occasions the uniqueness, the individuality and oneness (unity) of God, and gives Him the proper name of Allah. Before Islam, there had been many religions which believed in many Gods. Islam for the first time, declared in bold and clear voice that God is one and not many and we should pay reverence to and bow before only one God. It tried to destroy the polytheistic irrational faith.

There was also an intellectual effort on the part of some thinkers who speculated about ultimate Reality in terms of pantheism. Even Islam's monotheistic conception of God was coloured by pantheistic modes of thought by many Muslim mystics. Their main purpose to interpret the ultimate Reality pantheistically was perhaps to emphasise the absoluteness of God and His omni-presence out of religious fervour. But even the individualistic conception of God does in no way try to hamper the absoluteness of God. It, on the other hand, saves our life and universe from being evaporated in a pantheistic God and from thus becoming illusory. Deistic conception of God is also not to be acceptable because it so much emphasises the transcendence of God that it makes the world quite apart from Him who becomes merely a mere contriver. Iqbal believes both in the immanence and transcendence of God. But he does not emphasise too much on the immanence because it easily leads to pantheism. His presence can be witnessed in

the world and yet much more beyond this universe. How does God, then make His presence expressed in our universe? What does His infinity mean? To this Iqbal replies "God cannot be conceived as infinite in the sense of spatial infinity... Moreover spatial and temporal infinities are not absolute... The ultimate Ego, is, therefore, neither infinite in the sense of spatial infinite nor finite in the sense of space-bound human ego whose body closes him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the ultimate Ego consists in the infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity of which the universe as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series."<sup>22</sup>

What Iqbal means to say, can perhaps be represented in the following mathematical terms :

$$1 = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{16} + \frac{1}{32} + \dots\dots\dots$$

The greater is the distance from God, the less is its spirituality. Man is, therefore, said to be nearest to God in the scale of existence and reality. The unity of God is expressed through a multiplicity of things. He expresses Himself through his endless activity. To quote Dr. Iqbal, "I have conceived the ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must add that now from the ultimate Ego only egos proceed."<sup>23</sup> There are ego units in the creative activity of God.

"The world in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of this 'Great I am'. Every atom of divine energy, however, low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches perfection in man. That is why Quran declares the ultimate ego to be nearer to man than his own neck-vein. Like pearls do we live, move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life."<sup>24</sup>

As regards the attributes of God, it is difficult for us to give a comprehensive account. Our knowledge is very limited in this matter. However, from a purely intellectual point of view, we may point out the following essential characteristics of God—omnipotence, knowledge, creativeness, eternity etc.

#### IV

(i) Omnipotence : What does omnipotence mean ? Omnipotence, abstractly conceived, is merely a blind, capricious power without limits. God is surely not omnipotent in this sense. He does not act arbitrarily. His activities are creational, not mechanistic. His creational activities are not whimsical so as to obliterate all kinds of human freedom. He imposes a kind of limitation on His own part in order to provide a scope of freedom to other finite egos. But this limitation, says Iqbal, is not externally imposed. It is born out of his own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participants in His life, power and freedom.

Now divine omnipotence is not directed towards cruelty and evil designs. It is rather intimately related to divine wisdom. The energy of God is not destructive but constructive. The infinite power of God is revealed not in the capricious and arbitrary but in the regular, orderly and recurrent. But if God is the possessor of all goodness in his hands, as the Quran speaks, why do we find so much of sufferings, and pains, and worries in this world ? Our experience testifies to their existence every moment. Is all this not, then contrary to the goodness of God ? How to reconcile the goodness and omnipotence of God with immense volume of evil in his creation ? This difficult problem is the crux of theism. Iqbal admits that there are many wrong doings and pains for which man himself is responsible. But who can deny the presence of evil, suffering and pain to which man is so often subjected and of which he is not the cause ? Consequently such an universal experience seems to undermine our faith in a good God who is also infinitely powerful and wise. Schopenhauer declares this world to be the worst possible world—a vast vale

of tears, or a perpetual winter wherein the blind will express itself in a variety of ways. But according to Leibniz, this world is the best of all the possible worlds. And, the Victorian poet Browning says that all is well with the world. Then how to decide between these two conflicting views when we have accepted the fact of universal suffering? In seeking a solution to this problem, Iqbal does not go to the extremes of pessimism or optimism. He chooses a middle course. He believes that our world is yet not a complete world. It is still being completed. We can not, therefore, expect from an incomplete world full satisfaction and consolation. Moreover our intellectual constitution is such that we can take only a piecemeal view of things. To quote Dr. Iqbal, "we cannot understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoc, and at the same time sustain and amplify life. The teaching of Quran, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism which recognizes a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual victory over evil."<sup>25</sup>

(ii) Creativeness : If God would have lacked this element of creativeness, He would have been a static God and could not have revealed himself in a magnificent manner. A poet, a painter, a writer, a dramatist, all reveal their personalities through some creations of their own. Because God is not a static thing, He also reveals Himself in a variety of unlimited ways. Man's creational activities have got to be exhausted and point to a limit. But God's creational activities are infinite and boundless. God is never inactive for a single moment. In the human career, the creative faculty of man begins and ends at a certain period of time. But our anthropomorphic conception cannot be applied to God. There is no beginning or end of His creativity.

The question of creation once arose among the disciples of the well-known saint Bayazid of Bistam. One of the disciples pointed out the common sense view that there was a time when God only existed and nothing else existed besides Him. The saint's reply was equally pointed. 'It is just the same now,' said he 'as it was then'. All such meaningless theological

controversies arise from the narrow conception of creation which regards the act of creation as a specific past event, and maintains that the universe was produced at a certain period of time, its production being a mere accident in the life of God which very well might not have been created. But the creativity of God is not accidental. Creation is continuous, perpetual and dynamic. And at the same time we cannot narrate divine creation in terms of specific events having 'before' and 'after.' His creation also does not stand in opposition to him. The universe, as a partial expression of God's creativity does not confront Him as His 'other.' The universe and God are not independent realities.

The life of God is dynamic. He is, then, not only a mere speculator of the thing He creates; He also takes active interest in it—His creation is from within. The energy of God is engaged in the unfoldment of his infinite creative possibilities.

(iii) Knowledge : Knowledge of the ultimate Ego being all inclusive, cannot be conceived as having a perspective as is true of a finite ego. The knowledge of a finite being always moves round a veritable 'other' and is always discursive. Such a knowledge even extended to the point of omniscience will not be free from 'relativeness'. We shall know a thing and yet not know it completely. Such a knowledge cannot be predicated of God. The universe does not exist as the 'other' to God. For the all inclusive ego, there is no 'other'. In Him thought and deed, the act of knowing and the act of creating, are identical. He knows and at the same time forms the ground of His knowledge. Unfortunately our language fail us how to describe this. The concept of divine knowledge, as presented by Dawani, Iraqi and Prof. Ryoce, is omniscience in the sense that God becomes immediately aware of the entire sweep of history as a sequence of events in an eternal 'now,' in a single invisible act of perception. There is an element of truth in this conception. But God's knowledge cannot be taken as a passive omniscience. That is, all events are determined fixed and alterable in God's creative activity, and he has only to take note of it. Divine knowledge is not like a mirror in which things are reflected. If history

is regarded merely as a gradually revealed picture of the pre-determined order of events, in that case no room is left for novelty, initiative and freedom. The future exists only as a possibility—operative in the consciousness of God. He creates as He knows : He knows as He creates. This is the meaning of saying that His knowledge is creative. Divine knowledge is a living creative activity to which the existent objects are organically related. God's knowledge is active omniscience.

(iv) Eternity : God is eternal. He is not fettered by time. Time is not external to Him. He is rather the source of time. It is through time that the ultimate ego realizes and measures, so to speak, the infinite wealth of His own undetermined, creative, possibilities. It is in this sense that God is related to time. But time, as we ordinarily conceive, dividing it into past, present and future, is not applicable to the life of God. It is serial time and raises various difficulties. No beginning we are prepared to call the first beginning and no end, the final end. Moreover, in the distinction of past, present and future we implicitly compare time with a line which was, is and has to be traversed. But serial time is not the real time. Real time is not a line already drawn, but a line being always drawn. On the analogy of our experience, we can very well understand time as a pure duration in which there is change without succession and the distinction of past, present and future melt into each other. God exists in pure duration. That is to say, He uses time as an instrument for realizing His infinite wealth of creation, while Himself remaining prior to all time. Time does not affect Him, but He affects the time. There is no beginning and end to the life of God. He is, therefore, eternal. He is 'first' and 'last'.

## Notes

1. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Iqbal*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 27.
2. *R.R.*, p. 28.
3. Joseph, McCabe., *Existence of God*. (London, Watts & Co. 1937, Third Imp.), p. 75.
4. Joseph, McCabe., *Existence of God*, pp. 81-2.
5. Paulgen, *Introduction to Philosophy*, (Trans. by Thilly, New York, Henry Holt & Comp. 1924), pp. 167-8.
6. *R.R.*, p. 28.
7. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, Trans. by Haldane & Ross Voll (Cambridge University Press, 1931) p. 226, Principle XVIII.
8. Descartes '*Principle*'-XIV, Trans. by *R.R.*, p. 224.
9. Flint, *Theism*, (London, William Blackwood, 1918), p. 278.
10. Caird, *Philosophy of Religion*, (Glasgow : Printed at the University Press by Macle House & Co. Ltd., 1880), p. 145.
11. *ibid.*, p. 146.
12. *R.R.*, p. 29.
13. *ibid.*, p. 30.
14. *R.R.*, p. 30.
15. *ibid.*, p. 121.
- \* Brown, Rev. Lawrence E., *The conception of the unity of God in Islam and other religions in the light of modern science*. (Published in *Islamic Culture*, Jan. 1955), p. 18.
16. *R.R.*, p. 53.
- \* The Vedantists describe Him by 'Neti Neti'.
17. *R.R.*, p. 57.
18. *R.R.*, p. 74.
19. *R.R.*, p. 58.
20. *S.S.*, Introduction, p. xvi.



21. See Bergson's creative Evolution. *R.R.*, p. 59.
22. *R.R.*, p. 61.
23. *R.R.*, p. 68.
24. *ibid.*
25. *R.R.*, p. 77.

SEVEN

## POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IQBAL

Iqbal's political philosophy is embedded in Islamic ideas and thoughts with his views upon other subjects. It is, therefore, necessary while examining his political ideas to see how far they are Islamic and to what extent they have been stimulated by modern political thoughts, if any. To quote Dr. Aziz :

“Of recent years there has been a tendency on the part of the Muslim writers to identify Islam with every form of modern political theory, however conflicting they may be in their nature and contents. If socialism is in vogue, they say it is found in Islam. If communism comes into prominence, it is passed on as Islamic. If democracy is much talked of, it is claimed that Islam stands for democracy. If nationalism is praised, they gladly condescend to think in terms of nation and nationality. If the modern secular States are under discussion they are content with saying that the Islamic State is theocracy. Some hold that political system of Islam is based on dictatorship. Then there are extreme views regarding Islam; some hold that there

is no politics in Islam; other believe that Islam is all politics. If they are reminded that Islam is a 'religion of peace', they atonce, say yes, Islam teaches toleration. The confusion arises out of the true nature of Islamic political theory and a wrong method of interpreting Islam through the medium of western ideas, terminology and technique."<sup>1</sup>

Iqbal, though appreciates some of the good aspects of the west, is generally critical of the western civilization. He denounces Capitalism, Communism, Facism and Democracy which he thinks are the outcomes of western material civilization. He also bitterly attacks the narrow idea of nationalism and the imperialistic tendencies and the expansive schemes of powerful nations. He bases his political ideas an the teachings of Islam.

In *Israri-i-khudi* (secret of the self) he expounds the doctrine of the human ego. He emphasised, after the Quran, the individuality of man. But he did not stop here. He was not an individualist and his motto was not, 'let alone'. He did not favour the development of egoistic impulses at the cost of other regarding aims. In his second book '*Ramuz-i-Bekhudi*' (mysteries of the selflessness), he deals with the relation of the individual and society, visualising and describing his theory of Islamic society, its basis, aims and ideals.

Individuals and society act and react upon each other. A society is strong only if its individuals are strong, and the individuals are weakened if the society is declined. While it is essential that one has to develop his individual ego, he has also to create in himself a social awareness. Man is a social and political animal. A proper relation between individual and society has to be established for the fruitful achievement of both. A good society is that which does not block the individual's freedom and development. "In an organised society"\* says Iqbal, "the individual is altogether crushed out of existence. He gains the whole wealth of social thought around him and loses his own soul. The only effective power, therefore, that counteracts the forces of decay in a people is the rearing of self-concentrated individuals. Such individuals alone reveal the depth of life. They disclose new standards in the

light of which we begin to see that our environment is not wholly inviolable and requires revision."<sup>2</sup>

To develop personality is not to cut one's relation with social affairs. Rather it is the duty of an individual to enrich the society by the wealth of his thoughts and actions, otherwise his individual existence is worthless and meaningless. He says :

“Attachment to society is a blessing for the individual.  
His worth attains its zenith through society. Keeps  
the prophet's saying as charm for life,  
That the devil lives far away from society.  
The individual acquires position and prestige through  
society,  
And society arranged through individuals.”<sup>3</sup>

An individual should not even refrain from any sacrifice if the society gains something from it. A Muslim is not a true Muslim apart from the Islamic society. In Islam there is no gap between the spiritual and social order.

The spirit of total other-worldliness in later sufism obscured man's vision of a very important aspect of Islam as a social polity, and offering the prospect of unrestrained thought on its speculative side it attracted and finally absorbed the best minds in Islam.<sup>4</sup>

The conservative thinkers of Islam, and our modern allamas, points out Iqbal, do not realize that the ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of the individual men.<sup>5</sup>

These individuals have to work in the best interest of their society. In a civilized world, any strong society which occupies certain part of the world, wants to establish its own State on socially and politically justifiable grounds. A state always refers to some geographical boundary and intends to ensure its own law and order among its people so that no body is allowed to suffer injustice, tyranny and oppression. The functions of the state are thus carried through a Government. This Government may be of any type—democratic, communistic, fascistic etc.

In Islam, the state, millat, Government Imam and individual are inter-related. It will, therefore, be wrong according to Islamic political theory to regard an Islamic state as an independent polity.

There are many conflicting theories regarding the relation between the individual and the state and the type of Government needed. One school of thought believes in the supremacy of the State. Socialism believes in state-control. According to it individual freedom and welfare can better be secured through state-action. Individualism on the other hand advocates for "maximum possible liberty of the individual." Government for the individualist, although an evil, is necessary for mankind on account of man's selfishness. The extreme form of individualism is anarchism, which is opposed to every kind of forcible government and authority of the state. Idealism, on the otherhand, takes a milder attitude. It tries to bring a reconciliation between individual and state and remove the conflict between them. The state, according to the idealist, is an ethical institution. Bosanquet says that institutions like the state are embodiments of ethical ideas. The state according to Islam, thinks Iqbal "is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization."<sup>6</sup>

Philosophically speaking, Islamic political theory as enunciated by Iqbal, is normative in its character. It is concerned with a specific ethical ideal—the raising of the humanity to the highest well-being, both materially and morally by means of an extensive common wealth built up on the belief of one God, whose sovereignty is supreme.<sup>7</sup> The State from Islamic point of view, not only secures the rights and welfares of the individuals but also tries to awaken spiritual and moral consciousness among the persons ruled. The head of the state in a Islamic state is called an Immam, Calliphate or Amir. He is considered responsible to God in every act while discharging his temporal responsibilities. Dr. Aziz Ahmad writes "what is the State activity in Islam ? The Islamic state is not marked by controversy between the state and the individual, so that it may believe that state is nothing else but the individuals themselves in another capacity. Nor does Islam believe that human

beings have reached that state or Government, that they can only tolerate a free Government. Islam postulates a universal polity founded on fundamentals or the first principles revealed to the prophet. It was prophet's religious experience which created a distinct social order. The religious ideal of Islam is organically related to the social order and the social order to the Islamic polity. Islam is not a church, it is an organised life conceived a contractual organism, long before Rousseau thought of it and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man as spiritual being possessing rights and duties under a social mechanism."<sup>8</sup>

The Islamic state is a state of Almighty God. The sovereignty of Allah extends to the entire universe, the whole humanity, and all organization. From the unity of God, then springs the doctrine of the unity of the human race. All men are alike. Man is freed from the slavery of man. The Muslim state being extraordinary God-conscious is permeated by a religious control which extends to every sphere of human conduct. No individual, no Amir, and not the whole millet can lay claim to the sovereignty of the state. The legislative power, thus according to Islam is not absolute. The supremacy of the Divine Law is one of the fundamental tenets of Islamic polity. Not man, but God is the real ruler of mankind. There are passages in Quran which supports this view. Islam rejects blood-relationship as a basis of humanity. Blood-relationship is earth-rootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the preception that all human life is spiritual in its origin."

Iqbal was thus inspired by a vision of a world-wide Islamic state of a unified Muslim millet, no longer divided by racial or territorial considerations.<sup>10</sup> He thinks that racial and territorial considerations are the root cause of disruption in humanity, dissensions between nations and nation, and hostilities between one state and another. Islam, points out Iqbal, finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of 'Tauhid'. Islam as a polity is only a practical means of making this principle

a living factor in intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to the God not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature."<sup>11</sup>

Dr. Yusuf Hussain has rightly pointed out that according to Iqbal, submission to state is not slavery, but it is a submission to man's own noble trends. By this way man does not become a subject of man but to God, and does not distort his humanity and gentleness. The ruler has to be respected not because he possesses power but because he is safeguarding the laws and rules of God.<sup>12</sup>

The essence of 'Tauhid' as a working idea, writes Iqbal, is equality, solidarity and freedom. The state, from the Islamic standpoint is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility.<sup>13</sup> Thus ordinarily speaking we cannot label Islamic state as theocracy. The head of the Muslim state has not to consider himself as a representative of God on earth but a representative chosen among men to serve them and translate the rule of God into action. The head is, thus, responsible to God for every act he does in the exercise of his authority. Neither hereditary kingship, nor autocracy, nor uncontrolled authority is acceptable for the head of the Islamic state. The holy Quran says: "And their rules is by counsel among themselves" (42 : 38). Iqbal was thus in favour of spiritual democratic state.

The holy prophet used to take counsel from his followers in the affairs of the state. "Pardon them and ask protection for them and take counsel with them in affairs of state." (Quran 3 : 158). The period of Khilafat-e-Rashida, atleast for thirty years shows that Islamic state was in fact a "spiritual democracy" in the true practical sense. The first successor to the holy prophet was Abu Baker who was elected as the head of the State by the consent of all. Hardly any Muslim political thinker

can ignore the remarkable first address of Abu Baker about the necessity of State organization and the constitutional position of the head of the State.

“You have elected me as Khalifa (successor to the holy prophet as temporal head of the state), but I claim no superiority) over you. The strongest among you shall be the weakest with me until I get the rights of others from him, and the weakest among you shall be the strongest with me until I get all his rights....Help me if I act rightly and correct me if I take a wrong course....obey me so long as I obey God and His messenger. In case disobey God and His messenger I have no right to obedience from you.”

The head of the Islamic State had to carry on the work of the administration with the help of the ministers. The head of the State may even be disposed of.

The state was needed to stop the aggression of man against man, to protect the weak against the strong and ensure justice between man and man. But where do we find all this in the civilized State? The State in the west, whether it is Democratic or Fascist or Bolshevik, stands for expansion, for aggression and for suppressing the weak who are considered to be unfit to take care of themselves. It is not machiavelli alone with whom “consideration of justice or injustice” carries no weight and “every scruple must be set aside” when the safety of the State is at stake. . . . The result is the deadly conflict of the different states and a burning passion to destroy one another. The responsibility of this state of things rest entirely with the materialistic conception of the State. The state and nation became two chief idols before which the modern man has fallen prostrate; and by this way international morality has become a mockery.<sup>14</sup>

The present state of affairs, exists because of the separation of church and state, religion and politics. In Christendom, State and Church confronted each other as distinct powers with interminable boundary disputes between them. At last State separated itself from the church. Machiavelli separated ethics from politics, and proclaimed the supremacy of State in all



matters. He thought of religion as the private affair of the individual with which state has nothing to do. He believed that the state has to increase its powers by all means and ways. But this only resulted in more harmful and dire consequences. It is to this fact that Iqbal refers to sarcastically.

“Politics liberated itself from religion, the head of the church found himself powerless. As soon as religion and politics became separated, greed became the ruling power, king and minister both.”<sup>15</sup>

Machiavelli in fact, did a disservice to humanity by separating politics from the realm of religion and ethics. Iqbal is critical of Machiavellian principle of expediency which has brought disunity among nations because of the advocacy of modern nationalism and state-craft.

“He wrote a seroll for princes, and so shattered  
in our clay the seed of conflict, his fell  
genius decamped to darkness.....  
.....his novel faith proclaimed the state only worship-  
ful;  
His thoughts the ignoble turned to praiseworthy  
So, when the feet of this adorable  
He kissed the touchstone that he introduced  
To test the truth was gain.....  
.....Dark night he wrapped  
About the people's eyes, deceptive called,  
In his vocabulary, expediency.”<sup>16</sup>

Iqbal mentions that one line of thought represented by the Nationalist party of Turkey was that “State is the essential factor in national life which determines the character and function of all other factors. They therefore reject old ideas about the function of State and Religion, and accentuate the separation of church and state.”<sup>17</sup>

Iqbal does not believe that “the State is more dominant and rules all other ideas embodied in the system of Islam.”<sup>18</sup>

Iqbal seems to have appreciation for the Religious Reform party led by Halim Pasha who did not believe in State-craft

and any father-land. He points out that the Turkish Nationalist party assimilated the idea of separation of church and state from the history of European political thoughts. In west the separation of the church and State arose because of the mistake of separating matter and spirit as two distinct realities. "Primitive Christianity" says Iqbal, "was founded not as a political or civil unit, but as a monastic order in a profane world, having nothing to do with civil affairs, and obeying the Roman authority practically in all matters. The result was this that when state became Christian, State and Church confronted each other as distinct powers with interminable boundary disputes between them.

Such a thing could never happen in Islam, for Islam was from the very beginning a civil society, having received from the Quran a set of simple legal principles. The nationalist theory of State, therefore, is misleading in as much as it suggests a dualism which does not exist in Islam."<sup>19</sup> Such a dualistic theory of State which deprives religion, morality and ethics out of its domain, does not find favour in the political philosophy of Iqbal. Such a separation according to him, is the root cause of all evils spreading in our world today. The power-hungry politicians, try to remain always in power and prominence enjoying all sorts of advantages, by applying varieties of foul means and tactics. Such a politics divorced from spiritual obligations have in fact become a menace to humanity. Iqbal says :

Crown shine or Republic glitter from religion  
Divorced, the State with Changiz eyes will glare.<sup>20</sup>

Lasting culture cannot be simply established with the help of merely power-loving politicians. Iqbal is therefore of the view that power should be supplemented by vision. Both vision and power are essential for the material and spiritual well-being of mankind; otherwise, power devoid of religious aspirations is bound to bring and in fact has brought only catastrophes and sufferings to mankind. He says :

"The history of nation teaches this lesson. If you are

wise, beware of the intoxication of power for it is a dangerous possession.

Before its blind, world embracing rush and fury, Art and Science and reasons are all alike powerless dust. Power, cut adrift from religion is a deadly poison; wedded to religion, it is an antidote for all poisons."<sup>21</sup>

It is with this conception that Iqbal points out that "in Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains, and the nature of an act, however, secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it.....in Islam it is the same reality which appears as church looked at from one point of view and state from another."<sup>22</sup>

This is in brief his plea for the combination of religion and politics, State and church and his dislike for State-craft and State worship at the cost of the wider interests of humanity.

To the idea of State-craft, is closely attached the idea of nationalism against which Iqbal has vehemently reacted. In the early phase of his career, he was an ardent nationalist. During this period his poems—like 'Tasweer-Dard', 'Tarana-e-Hindi', 'Hindustani Bachchon ka Quami geet', and 'Naya shuwala' show his nationalistic fervour and deep emotional attachment with his own country. But after returning from Europe, his ideas were revolutioned regarding intense nationalism. He did believe in patriotism and expression of patriotic sentiments. But he reacted vehemently against the trends of modern nationalism and aggressive patriotism which he believed, have become menace to humanity and threat to international peace.

Though the air was surcharged with the voice of internationalism and universalism, due to the present horrible tensions of the world, the ground was yet to be prepared for it, so as to lead the ship of civilization to a safer corner and save it from being wrecked. Iqbal found that Islam, itself, has preached enthusiastically the gospel of internationalism. He therefore, tried to remind the Muslim people in particular so as to make

these work further on this ideology for the unity of Islamic countries and entire humanity. His anti-nationalistic sentiments find expressions in the following verses :

“The narrowness of local patriotism leads to destruction. Live in the ocean, free from local attachment, like a fish. Migration from home is the sunna of the prophet. Be a witness, therefore, to the truth of prophethood.”

“The rivalry of nations is due to this, subjugation through commerce is due to this. If politics is devoid of truth, it is because of this. If the weak is plundered, it is because of this.”<sup>23</sup>

Iqbal points out that there is a basic difference in the theory of nationalism as defined by west and Islam. According to the western theory, any collectivity of persons inhabiting a certain country is a nation. Generally speaking country, language and race constitute the elements of nationality. Islam is opposed to such a view.

Thus the nationalism as believed by Islam, is not founded on race, country or language but on religion.<sup>24</sup> Islam is a religion of universal brother-hood, discarding racial and territorial differences. National and territorial considerations are recognized by Islam, only for facilities and references' sake. Otherwise, according to the prophet of Islam, there is no superiority of Arab over non-Arab, or one nation over other, but because of virtues. “O Men : we have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families that you may know each other; the most honorable of you with Allah is the one among you who is most careful of his duty” (69 : 13). And so with the nations.

The Islamic conception of nation as one, after entertaining the particular faith, outstepping geographical boundaries, and diversity of races, colours and languages is an outstanding contribution to human civilization and society. Iqbal thus says :

Our essence is not bound by any place;  
The vigour of our wine is not contained

In any bowl; Chinese and Indian  
 Alike the chord that constitutes our jar;  
 Turkish and Syrian alike the clay of India or  
 Syria or Rome;  
 Nor any father-land do we possess except Islam.<sup>25</sup>

Iqbal points out that the prophet's migration from his homeland, is a symbol at least for a Muslim to make himself free from local attachment and stand for a broader ideal to which Islam advocates. Iqbal refers to this fact in the following verses :<sup>26</sup>

Why fled he, (prophet) then, from his ancestral home ?  
 Suppose thou he ran before his foes ?  
 The chroniclers, ill understanding what  
 The flight portends have had from us.  
 Flight is the law that rules the Muslim's life,  
 its meaning is to leap from shallowness;  
 to quit the dew, the ocean to subdue  
 Transgress the bloom; the garden in thy goal,  
 The loss of less more vastly gain adorns.  
 The sun's greatest glory is in ranging free;  
 The sky arena lies beneath his feet.  
 Be not a stream seeking wealth from rain,  
 Be boundless : quest no limit is the world  
 The frowning sea was once a simple plain,  
 played being shore, and liquified of shame.  
 Have thou the will to master everything,  
 That thou mayest win dominion over all,  
 plunge like a fish, and populate the sea :  
 Shake off the chains of too constricted space.  
 He has burst from all dimensions, bonds  
 Ranges through all directions, like the sky.

Iqbal is however pained to see that the internationalism of Islam is lost sight of because of the western emphasis on nationalism. He refers in this connection in his lectures to the views of the grand vizier of Turkey. "As there is no English Mathematics, German Astronomy or French Chemistry,"

says the Grand vizier "So there is no Turkish, Arabian, Persian or Indian Islam. Just as the universal character of scientific truths engenders varieties of scientific national cultures which in their totality represent human knowledge, much in the same way the universal character of Islamic varieties creates varieties of national, moral and social ideals."<sup>27</sup>

He again says that the modern culture based on national egoism is also another form of barbarism. He deplores that during the course of history moral and social ideals of Islam have been gradually de-Islamised through the influence of local character and pre-Islamic superstitions of Muslim nations. These ideals today are more Iranian, Turkish or Arabian than Islamic.

The ideals of Islam have been lost through a process of localization. The only alternative open to us is to tear off from Islam, the hard crust which immobilized an essential dynamic outlook on life, and to re-discover the original varieties of freedom, equality and solidarity with a view to rebuild our moral, social and political ideals out of their original simplicity and universality.<sup>28</sup> These are the views expressed by Grand vizier of Turkey. The Religious Reform party of Turkey, led by Halim Pasha also insisted on the fact that Islam as a harmony of idealism and positivism, and a unity of the eternal varieties of freedom, equality and solidarity, has no father-land.

But there were other trends of thoughts in Turkey, which were becoming more popular and gaining ground in that country. As against universal caliphate, the turks are supporting nationalism. Modern Turks, points out Iqbal, are watching the situation with realistic eyes. They argue that in their political thinking, they must be guided with past political experiences. Since the idea of universal caliphate has failed in practice, it is now much more necessary to look after self-preservation than after the international solidarity of Islam which it is not possible to fulfil at the present moment. The idea of universal caliphate, was a workable idea, so long the Empire of Islam was intact. After the disintegration of Empire State of Islam, nation-States have arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and

cannot work as living factor in the organization of modern Islam. Far from serving any useful purpose it has really stood in the way of a re-union of independent Muslim States.<sup>29</sup> Even Muslim States are involved in conflicts and rivalries. The nationalist poet Zia of Turkey poses the question. Is there any hope for re-union of Muslim states? He is not pessimist in this matter. He says that if this thing is not possible to-day, one has to wait. Let the independent Muslim States, strengthen themselves, and other Muslim States, which are under foreign subjugation and domination, try to achieve independence one by one. This may help the re-union of Muslim States. Iqbal also makes a slight concession in this concern. He says that every Muslim nation for the present must do self-analysis in order to achieve the internationalism of Islam. To quote Mr. Smith "wherever nationalism has been adopted in the Muslim world, and in whatever form, the nation concerned has been a Muslim group. No Muslim people has evolved a national feeling that has meant a loyalty to or even concern for a community transcending the bounds of Islam.... Nationalism or Muslims, is everywhere a Muslim Nationalism."<sup>30</sup>

The other consideration, then regarding Muslim nationalism is its relation to pan-Islamism.

Mr. Smith says, "The two are different. But they are not essentially in conflict. They can become on occasions practical alternatives, as when any Muslim or a body of Muslims must choose whether to give prior loyalty to one particular section of the Islamic world or to the whole. They can even come temporarily into conflict. If the interests or apparent interests of the part conflict with the whole, equally they can be or seem to be complementary or stages in one larger process or aspects of one whole; this regeneration of Islam throughout the world may be seen something to be practically attained in manageable sections....It is only a few Muslims here and there who disagree with the modern consensus that the rehabilitation of Islam through out the world is taking place and ought to take place in terms of local rehabilitations. The pan-Islamic vision today is essentially envisaging of each of the Muslim nations or communities—The Arab world, Turkey, Iran,

Pakistan etc., individually regenerated, revitalized, prosperous and strong. Such a vision adds to the particular nationalisms of each region only the hope or the presupposition—that these would all cooperate in friendly mutuality. The *locus classicus* for this view is now the expression of Iqbal.”<sup>31</sup> Iqbal writes in his lectures :

“For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics.”<sup>32</sup>

But it would be a misconception to suppose that while emphasising the internationalism of Islam, Iqbal is influenced by a narrow communal approach. In his religious exclusiveness, he thought only of the Muslim world. But there are evidences which show that he was an internationalist and humanitarian in the true sense. As against the charge of Mr. Dickens that Iqbal's message lacks universality as it was addressed primarily to the Muslims, Iqbal clears up his position in a letter written to Dr. Nicholson :

“The object of my Persian Masnevi is not to attempt an advocacy of Islam. My real purpose is to look for a better social order and to present a universally acceptable ideal (of life and action) before the world, but it is impossible for me in this effort, to outline this ideal, to ignore the social system and values of Islam whose most important objective is to demolish caste, creed, color and economic status. Islam has opposed vehemently the idea of racial superiority which is the greatest obstacle in the way of international unity and co-operation; infact, Islam and racial exclusiveness are utterly antithetical. This racial ideal is the greatest enemy of mankind and it is the duty of all well-wishers of the human race to eradicate it. When I realized that the conception of nationalism based on the differences of race and country, was beginning to over-shadow the world of Islam also and that the Muslims were in danger of giving up the universality of their ideal in favour of narrow patriotism and false nationalism, I felt it my duty as a Muslim and as a well-wisher of humanity, to recall them back to their



true role in the drama of human evolution. No doubt I am intensely devoted to Islam but I have selected the Islamic community as my starting point not because of any national or religious prejudice but because it is the most practicable line of approach to the problem.

“.....In my opinion, Mr. Dickens has not still freed his mind from this age-long idea of the Europeans that Islam teaches bloodshed and cruelty. The real fact is that the kingdom of God on earth is not the special privilege of the Muslim. On the other hand, all men can become its participants provided they give up the worship of race and nation and respect each other's personality.”

Mr. K.G. Saiyidain in his article “Progressive trends in Iqbal's thoughts” writes : “He (Iqbal) is essentially international and humanitarian in his attitude and rejects unhesitatingly the claims of the nation-state to regiment and regulate the ideas, feelings and loyalties of its subjects. For this view Iqbal draws his inspiration from the teachings of Islam and its Holy Prophet who stressed in unmistakable terms the oneness of mankind and dethroned ruthlessly the false ideals of race, color and country which had gained ascendancy all over the world.”<sup>33</sup>

Iqbal is pained to find that mankind has been divided into warring camps and blocks and people are in severe conflict with each other, trying to destroy the other. The verses thus run :

“Greed has split up mankind into warring camps; so speak the language of love and teach the lesson of brotherhood;

“What are all these distinctions—Indians, Afghans, Turanians, Khorasanis ? Thou art bound to the shore, keep forward into limitless freedom;

“Thy wings are overlaid with the dust of color and race;

“Bird of the Haram, shed these wings before thy upward flight.”<sup>34</sup>

He, further, expresses his dissatisfaction over growing trends of nationalism and apathy over the distortion of humanity :

Now brotherhood has been so cut to shreds  
That in the stead of the community  
The country has been given pride of place  
In men's allegiance and constructive work;  
The county is the darling of their hearts,  
And wide humanity is whittled down  
Into dismembered tribes....  
Humanity is but a legend, man  
Become a stranger to his fellow man  
The spirit has departed from the flesh,  
Only the seven disjointed limbs remain,  
Vanished in human kind there but abide  
The disunited nations....<sup>35</sup>

Iqbal is anxious to point out that the solidarity and internationalism of Islam is not to be overshadowed by the uprising trends of nationalism. In the following verses, Iqbal addresses the Muslims thus :

“What is the ultimate end of nature and the inner secret of Islam ?

The universality of brotherhood and the abundance of love;

Shatter the idols of blood and color and race and absorb thyself in the millet;

Abolish all distinctions between the Turanians, the Persians and the Afgans;<sup>36</sup>

Islam can yet become a force in civilizing different conflicting forces and give fresh message to bewildering humanity.”

Prof. Gibb writes :

“But Islam has yet a further service to render to the cause of humanity....No other society has such a record of success in uniting in an equality of status of opportunity and of endeavour. So many and so various races of mankind. The great

Muslim communities of Africa, India and Indonesia perhaps also the small Muslim communities in China and this still smaller community in Japan show that Islam has still the power to reconcile apparently irreconcilable elements of race and tradition. If ever the opposition of the great societies of the East and the West is to be replaced by co-operation, the mediation of Islam is an indispensable condition."<sup>37</sup>

In having a discussion of nationalism vs. internationalism, we also try to seek a solution to the problem of war and peace. Since Iqbal wrote against nationalism, western political thought too is moving towards internationalism in the hope of establishing a world-Government and an international community in order to safeguard the mutual rights of nations and establish peace on earth. The step is moving towards that direction, but the path is not free from thorns. Rivalry among powerful nations have not ended. Though they talk in terms of a united nations, oneness of humanity in the true sense of the term is lost sight of. Each nation wants to thrust its own views and tries to get in advantageous position by all means. The proposed moral support of the 'League of Nations' was nothing but a farce; it was rightly called by Iqbal—a league of thieves because each one of the participants had but one desire in his heart of hearts, how to steel away material advantages for his own nation; and not one of them was inspired by the noble idea, how to wield the different nations into one humanity. In a poem, "Mecca and Geneva" Iqbal says :

"The association of nations has become a common place of occurrence these days, but the unity of mankind remains hidden. The disruption of human communities is the object of Frankish State-craft; the object of Islam is the unity of man. Mecca gives the message to the soil of Geneva :

"A league of nations or—league of human beings."<sup>38</sup>

Thus oneness of humanity is more essential than a mere collection of different nations. After the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations Organisation has been established, having New York as its centre. Long before the League of Nations and U.N.O. were established, Islam pointed to

Mecca as the central place of Muslims in resolving their social, political and theological differences in a selfless spirit for advancing the cause of humanity. In the following verses, Iqbal points out the universality of his religion (Islam) in which no special privileges are guaranteed to Muslims alone but a passionate appeal for the respect of entire mankind :

“What is humanity ? Respect for man, Learn then the true status of man; Sin is it to utter a single harsh word, for both the Muslim and non-Muslims are the creatures of God. The man of God learns his way from God himself. He is gracious alike to all men, whether Muslim or non-Muslim; walk in the path of friendship for man lives by mutual co-operation.<sup>39</sup>

Iqbal's humanism thus reaches its highest pitch. The world is in need of such a peace which Islam proposes to give. To the problems of the modern world, Iqbal seeks a solution through religion. He writes in his lectures “Humanity needs three things today—a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe has no doubt built idealistic systems on these lines, but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation can alone bring. This is the reason why pure thought has so little influenced men, while religion has always elevated individuals and transformed whole societies.”<sup>40</sup> It is the conviction of Iqbal that spiritual force, regenerated, can alone bring lasting culture and peace in the world. “Surely the present moment,” Says Iqbal, “is one of the great crises in the history of modern culture. The modern world stands in view of biological renewal. And, religion which in its higher manifestations is neither dogma nor priesthood nor ritual, can alone ethically prepare the modern men for the burden of this great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves ...”<sup>41</sup>

Advocacy of Pakistan : Islam is opposed to nationalism as such i.e. evolving a feeling of particular attachment

to a certain country. The striking test, we note, has been India in this concern. The conflict arise among certain section of the people whether nationalism in India is one, two or many. Gandhiji argued that the Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, etc. belong to one nation, whereas Mr. M.A. Jinnah formulated his two-nation theory. Iqbal points out that the problem of India was not national, but international. India being the land of many nations, cannot have peace until the constituent elements got the opportunity of developing without breaking with the past. Thus he seems to suggest that unity in diversity can be brought only when each one gets equal opportunities to develop in its own way, unhampered by the majority group. But with the growth of nationalism, communalism also developed side by side.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the late Prime-Minister of India writes in his book, *Discovery of India*—“Nationalism, was in fact the dominant force in Asia as elsewhere, and in India the nationalist movement had grown powerful and challenged British rule repeatedly. The nationalism had a strong appeal to the Muslim mind in India and a larger number of Muslims had played a leading part in its struggle for freedom. Yet Indian nationalism was dominated by Hindus and had a Hinduized look. So a conflict arose in the Moslem mind.

“This I imagine, was the background out of which, in recent years arose the cry for a division of India. There were many reasons, many contributory causes, errors and mistakes on every side, and especially the deliberate separatist policy of the British Government.”<sup>42</sup> But behind all this there was also the psychological background. It is said that Iqbal was an ardent supporter of the division of India. But an impartial and comprehensive study of the partition of India is yet to be made and we have to find out the real causes and persons behind the scene.

Jawaharlal Nehru writes, “Iqbal was one of the earliest advocates of Pakistan and yet he appears to have realized its inherent danger and absurdity. Edward Thompson has written that in the course of a conversation, Iqbal told him that he had

advocated Pakistan because of his position as a President of the Muslim League Session, but he felt sure that it would be injurious to India as a whole and to Muslims specially. Probably he had changed his mind or he had not given much thought to the question previously as it had assumed no importance then. His whole outlook on life does not fit with the subsequent developments of the idea of Pakistan or division of India"<sup>43</sup>

Dr. V. P. Verma in his book *Modern Indian Political Thought*, writes: "He (Iqbal) proposed the formation of a 'consolidated Muslim State.' He said 'I would like to see the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. The North-West Indian Muslims would thus possess, the full opportunities of development within the body politic of India and would be defendants of India against military and ideological attacks.' Thus he supported this demand for Muslim India within India!"<sup>44</sup>

Dr. P.S. Muhar says, "Iqbal did not want to surrender the unity of India by creating two independent States of India and Pakistan as was done later in 1947. All that he wanted was, that an autonomous Moslem State in North-west be brought into existence, so that the Muslim could develop their culture and personality unhindered by their Hindu Majority."<sup>45</sup>

There are thus evidences to show what Iqbal actually wanted was a Muslim India within India, where the Muslims may not feel hindrance for the development of their culture and language. And he believed that India will have peace only when the spirit of 'unity in diversity' is properly looked after.

Critic of capitalism, imperialism and western democracy :

Islam is not a democracy of the western type. So Iqbal criticized the western type of democracy as such. Democracy as a type of Government has been variously described. According to Plato, the Greek Philosopher, democracy is a system of Government which is controlled by group of selected, trained and qualified leaders. Utilitarians like Bentham and Mill meant by democracy as a type of Government ruled by the majority group which tries to seek "the greatest good of the

greatest number," not to the detriment of the minority. Dicey defined democracy as a "form of Government in which the governing body is a comparatively large fraction of the entire nation." Bryce Bary thinks that the democracy is a Government in which the will of the majority of qualified citizens to constitute the greatest bulk of the inhabitants. But among all these, perhaps the most popular definition is by Abraham Lincoln that "democracy is a Government of the people, by the people and for the people."

In Islamic polity, democracy is not such a system of Government, in which law may be changed, modified or enforced at the sweet will of the majority or changing public opinion. It is a rule of God, to establish the rules and laws of God, and the tradition of the holy prophet, with the changing condition or one's own party's judgment (Ijtihad) in matters of legislation which does not come in conflict with basic principles of Islamic polity. This type of Government, thus, tries to ensure justice and laws in all sphere with a spirit of truthfulness.

Iqbal is opposed to western democracy because it is governed by the majority of the unintelligent section of the people. A complete "sovereignty of the masses" is advisable only when there is sufficient sense of moral value and responsibility and also an educational back-ground. Democracy, however, elevated in principle, may not be suitably applicable where these things are lacking. Even the west is not honestly following the democratic spirit. Iqbal thus says :

A western seer has exposed this secret even though  
wise men do not usually do so,  
Democracy is a form of Government in which men  
are merely counted and not weighed;<sup>46</sup>

He says "Flee from the style of democracy, human thinking does not come out of two hundred asses."<sup>47</sup>

His abhorrence, furthermore, grows when he sees that the present day democracy is ruled by the capitalists and the exploitation of the weak and the poor, and economic disparity do not come to an end. He says :

"These democratic institutions of the west  
 Are but the old wine in bottle new;  
 Except then be a corresponding reality behind  
 There is very little in names  
 When cords are touched of this new fashioned lyre,  
 The music that flows from it, doth ever partake  
 of the same age-old imperial strains.  
 colossal oppression masquerades in the roles of  
 democracy, and with iron feet it tramples down the  
 weak without remorse, but in thy ignorance thou  
 Takest it as through it were the blue goddess  
 Off all the freedom the world."

"There are edifying dissertations on the rights  
 of men, impassioned speeches from the forum  
 on the sacred duties of citizenship; and stormy  
 Debates in the Houses, But all these are no more  
 Than so many subterfuges to get hold of the world's  
 wealth  
 Just a series of gigantic frauds worked by old adopts  
 At the game, who privately agree among themselves  
 To the share of each in the common spoils."<sup>48</sup>

But Iqbal is aware of the rising tide of democracy. He is not in favour of suppressing of the democratic feeling of the people who are oppressed and tyrannized. He is against all forms of exploitation and imperialistic tendencies. As a democrat, Iqbal refers to the Sovereignty of the masses." In his lecture also he writes, "The appointment of an Imam or Khalifa is absolutely indispensable. Should the caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey ijti had is that according to the spirit of Islam the caliphate or Immate can be vested in a body of persons, or an elected assembly. The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India have not yet expressed themselves on this point. Personally I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. The republican form of Government is not thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but it also becomes a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam."<sup>49</sup>



As against western democracy, what Iqbal is anxious to point out is this that the democratic ideals should be based on spiritual foundations of life. In his lectures, he says, "The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich. Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement.

In view of the basic idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation binding in man, we ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated people on earth.....Let the Musalmans of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles and evolve, out of the better to partially revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam."<sup>50</sup>

Iqbal, thus seems to suggest that the western type of democracy will not suit the Muslim world in particular and Asia in general. According to the principles of spiritual democracy, he wants the Government, to be led by thoughtful and God-fearing men and women and not to leave it in the hands of those who are unintelligent and opportunist. He is thus like Plato, in favour of controlled democracy. He does not believe in "arithmetical democracy" but the democracy of the talents." It is his conviction that the true democracy is yet an expectation to be fulfilled by the higher stages of the development of mankind. In 'Secret of the Self', he writes, "the world is tending towards the reproduction of more or less unique individuals who will be the befitting parents of mankind.....The Kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individuals possible on this earth."<sup>51</sup>

Laws and rules for the democracy in Islam have to be followed according to the spirit of Quran. The primary source of the law of Islam is Quran. "The Quran, however, is not a legal body. Its main purpose is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his relation with God and the Universe."<sup>52</sup> The

second source of the Mohamman Law is the tradition of the holy prophet, the third source of Mohamman Law is Ijma, perhaps the most important legal notion in Islam. Iqbal in his lecture points out : "Its (Ijma) transformation into a permanent legislative institution was contrary to the political interests of the kind of absolute monarchy that grew up in Islam immediately after the fourth Caliph. It was unfavourable in the interests of Omayyad and Abbaside Caliphs to have the power of Ijtihad to individual Mujtahids rather than encourage the formation of a permanent Assembly which might become too powerful for them. New world forces and the political experience of European nations are impressing on the mind of modern Islam the value and possibility of Ijma. The growth of republican spirit and gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great step in advance."<sup>53</sup>

The transfer of power of Ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim Legislative Assembly is the only possible form Ijma can take place in modern times. (d) The fourth basis of Fiqh is Qiyas i.e. the use of analogical reasoning in legislation. The above arguments, thus, make us believe that Iqbal was a democrat at heart, and the charge of fascism brought against him is not at all tenable. He was a staunch critic of imperialism and capitalism. His spirit revolted against the subjugation of mankind anywhere, on earth, and against all forms of injustice, tyranny, oppression and exploitation. He says :

Man is still a miserable prey to exploitation  
and imperialism, in it not a grievous calamity  
that man should prey on man ?

The glitter of the modern civilization dazzles the eyesight;

but it is merely an artist of false beads;

Science, on which prided the wise men of the west,  
is but a sword of battle in the blood-stained grip of  
greed;

No magic of political policy can strengthen  
a civilization which rests on the quick sands of capitalism."<sup>54</sup>

Iqbal is also critical of the so-called 'Democratic Europe' drunk with the wine of imperialism and exploitation which under the garb of aggressive nationalism, is following the same spirit in a new form. When fascism was rising its head in Italy under the leadership of Mussolini, Europe criticized the role of Mussolini, being unaware of its own faults and limitation. Iqbal, thus refers to the points in the following verses :

Why do you condemn my imperialistic ambitions ?  
 Have you not shattered the egg-shells of many weaker  
 nations ?  
 whose imperialism has worked these amazing wonders ?  
 Rulers and their kingdoms have gone—only their empty  
 capitals remain;  
 Have you not plundered the tents of the desert-  
 dwellers,  
 The fields of the peasants and the crown of the rulers ?<sup>55</sup>

But Iqbal is not ignorant of the fact that the days of capitalism and imperialistic designs are fast approaching death. They are losing the grounds under their feet. The world is no more prepared to accept those old ideal which suppresses the spirit of man. His eyes fall on a new social order—that of socialism and communism. He was attracted towards Socialist Russia which has brought a tremendous revolution on its soil. Iqbal's sympathy grew with the depressed and poorer classes. He says :

“The labourer clad in Khaddar and dripping with  
 sweet  
 Toils to clothe the idle Khawaja with silken robes;  
 The church fattens on his blood like the beach  
 And the State grows all-powerful through his exploited  
 strength.”

He supports the cause of the labourers and the workers and speaks thus :

“Go, my friend,  
 And to the poor, unfortunate

Misused labourer  
 Take my message, which is not my message alone  
 But the voice of the universe,  
 And the supreme lesson which history can teach  
 Tell him this from me  
 The burning viles of the capitalist  
 Have been thy ruin :  
 Thy great and noble trust has been  
 rewarded with a gross betrayal  
 For all these loyalties of Nationalism and Blood,  
 The church and the Empire of colour and culture  
 Have in fact been no more  
 Than ingenious opiates,  
 Designed by the masters and Rulers,  
 To simplify the task of seasonal exploitation."<sup>56</sup>

Iqbal's heart was full of love for the poor and labourer classes. His humanism does not tolerate of any class to be oppressed and exploited in the interest of the rich. In his poem "God's command to the Angels," He addresses :

"Go and awaken the poor and the dispossessed of my  
 universe  
 And shake the walls of the rich man's  
 palaces to their foundations,  
 Let the favour of self-confidence warm up  
 the blood of the slaves,  
 Let the frail sparrow hurt itself against the eagle;  
 The day of the sovereignty of the masses approaches  
 fast,  
 Demolish the old relics wherever you find them  
 Is there a field which yields no livelihood  
 to the peasant ?  
 Go and burn to the ground every grain of wheat in it;  
 God is (often) sold away for a 'Sijda,' the ideals  
 for circumambulation,  
 Better put out the lights of the mosques and temples;  
 I am disgusted with all these places of worship  
 built in marble,  
 Go and built a lovely hut of clay for my worship."<sup>57</sup>

It is no surprise that Iqbal was at times disgusted with religion itself, because of its failure and decaying spirit in shaping things effectively for the advancement of humanity. He felt that internationalism of communism was in its place, gaining ground; yet his faith in religion is deep. Though he is impressed by the mighty revolution going on in Russia, he does not lose his faith in Islam. He points out in the following verses :

“It comes to me, observing how our Sovereign States  
 proceed,  
 That not without utility was Russia's speed.  
 Man's mind is bent on fashioning new thoughts, because  
 it must;  
 The ceremony of outworn days has stirred the word's  
 disgust.  
 Things that men's ill ambition kept as buried mystery  
 Now slowly, slowly come to light and move before our  
 eyes.  
 May Allah—but for this first plunge yourself in your  
 Quran;  
 Open new road of action to your feet, O Musalman.”<sup>58</sup>

Iqbal thus could not even favour socialism and communism because of his faith in spiritualism.

In a letter addressed to Mr. Saiyidain dated 17th October, 1936, Iqbal writes :

“Followers of socialism are everywhere opposed to religion and spiritualism. They consider religion to be a kind of opium. The first to use this word in connection with religion was Karl Marx. I am a Muslim and God willing, I shall die a Muslim. In my opinion the materialistic interpretation of history is totally wrong.”

Iqbal in fact, opposed to Dialectical Materialism of Marx, according to which innumerable material forces are shaping the course of history, and man is not a partner and co-worker in the evolution of things. He, too is carried onward by irresistible

opposing forces. Iqbal, as against, communism, believes in the creative role of man in the scheme of things. Atheistic socialism of Russia or elsewhere does not find support from him.

In his lecture, Iqbal says "Neither the technique of medieval mysticism nor nationalism nor atheistic socialism can cure the ills of a despairing humanity."<sup>59</sup>

As Mr. Saiyidain has rightly pointed out, "when Democracy or Socialism based on a purely materialistic conception of universe come into conflict with the more fundamental laws of religion and the spirit of man, he (Iqbal) challenges them with courage."<sup>60</sup>

In a poem, showing the conversation between Kaiser, William and Lenin, in which the latter hails the victory of communism, putting to an end all forms of oppression, Kaiser William says :

"Man carves out new Gods when he becomes tired of old ones. Even if the crown of monarchs is put on by the masses, the same old fights continue to be fought. Greed does not die in the heart of man. The same old fire burns in the fire place." About Karl Marx, Iqbal says :

"Author of the *Capital* descended from Abraham, a prophet without Cibriel. He, whose falsehood contains an element of truth. His heart a believer, his mind full of disbelief. The westerners have missed the skies and sought the mystery of life in the stomach. Life does not acquire its aroma from the body and communism has no concern except with the body. The faith of that unrighteous prophet bases itself on the equality of stomach."<sup>61</sup> Yet Iqbal seems to believe that the experimentation of socialism brought about by Russia on an international plane, possesses some salient features of Islam itself. In a letter addressed to Mr. Sir Francis Younghusband, Iqbal writes:

"Since Bolshevism plus God is almost identical with Islam, I should not be surprised if in the course of time either Islam would devour Russia or Russia Islam."<sup>62</sup>

According to communism, a classless society is in the course of formation through Dialectical process. When the social evolution is complete and a classless Society is established, the question naturally arises, what will be the further courses of development in the human sphere? Perhaps from the outer-plane, man's attention will be turned to the inner. He will sink into his own heart, after a lot of developments brought about by material civilization.

It is the conviction of Iqbal, that the western civilization or communism which are yet on this negative plane, are bound to pass to a positive stage. As the Quran says: 'There is no God but God'.

In the following verses, Iqbal expresses his feeling thus: "See how in the Frankish age, the lower classes revolted against their masters. From Russia's heart gushed forth red blood, and the word 'no' kept forth from her lips. She has destroyed the old special order and pierced the world with a sharp dagger. I have looked into her and found the voice uttering 'no kings', 'no church', and 'no God'. Her thought remained enclosed within the tempestuous gale of 'no'. She has not divine her steed towards a 'yes'. There will come a day when she will take herself out of this gale. Life does not rest in the stage of 'no'. The universe moves slowly a 'yes'. 'No' and 'yes' are the equipment of nations. Negation without affirmation is the death of Nations."

Under the title *Message of Afghani to the Russian Nation*,<sup>63</sup> Iqbal writes :

The goal of the Quran is something else, the custom and principle of Muslims is something else. You have laid the basis for a new departure. You have rejected the old way of life. Like the Muslims, you have demolished despotism. Take lesson from our history, if you are to light new torch. You have given a short thrift to false Gods. Now pass beyond 'no' to a 'yes'. You can live only by building something positive. O! you who yearn from a new world order; seek a stable basis for it."

Iqbal is thus a strong critic of Capitalism and Imperialism. He is neither a follower of Western Democracy nor atheistic Socialism. He is a Muslim Democrat, where Spiritual Socialism finds its full place.

### Notes

1. Dr. Ahmad, M Aziz; "Islamic polity & Modern political system;" preface.

\*Every society has to be organised. Iqbal, however, means to say a regimented or too much organised society.

2. *R.R.*, p. 144.

3. Fard ra rabt-i-Jamaet Ruhmat a Ast  
Jaahar woo ra Kamal az millat ast  
Harz jan kun Gufta Khairul Bashar  
Hast Shaitan az jamaet door tar  
Fard me girad za millat chatram  
Millat az Ifrad me haed Nizam —Ramuz-e-Bekhudi

4. *R.R.*, p. 143.

5. *ibid.*

6. *R.R.*, p. 147.

7. Dr. Ahmad Aziz, *Iqbal's Political Theory* in "Iqbal as a Thinker," p. 229.

8. *ibid*; p. 234-5.

9. *R.R.*, p. 139.

10. *I.A.T.*; p. 235.

11. *R.R.* p. 139.

12. Dr. Hussain, Yusuf, *Ruhi-Iqbal*.

13. *R.R.*, p. 139.

14. Md. Ali; *The new world-order*, p. 132.

15. *Seyasat me mazhab se peechha chhoraiya, Chali Kutch ne peer-e-kalesa ki puri, Hui deen millat me jis dum judai Hawas ki vaziri, hawas ki amiri.* B.J.



16. B.J.
17. R.R., p. 146.
18. ibid.
19. R.R., p. 148.
20. V. Kiernen, Poem from Iqbal (Bombay 1949) p. 60.
21. Fareekh umam ka ya peyam azli hai, Sahib-e-nazran, nisha-e-quwwat hai khatarnak. Is Sail-e-Sabuk Sair-o-Zameen geer ke aage, Agl-o-nazro Ilm-o-hunar hain khas-o-khashak, La deen ho to hai zuhre halahal se bhi barh kar, Ho deen ki hefazat me to har zahr ka tiryak.—Iqbal.
22. R.R., p. 146.
23. Jo qaid moqami to nateeja hai tabahi  
Rah bahr me azad-e-watan surate mahi  
Hai tark watan sunnate mahboobe Ilahi  
De tu bhi nabuwat ki sadaqat par gavahi  
Gaftar-e-Seyasat men watan aur hi kutchh hai  
Irshad nabawat men watan aur hi kutchh hai  
Iqwam-e-jahan me to raqabat hai isi se  
Taskheer hai maqsood-e-tejarat to isi se  
Khab hai sadaqat se Seyasat to isi se  
Kamzor ka ghar hot-e-hai gharat to isi se  
—Iqbal; "Wataniyat" (B.D.)
24. Apni millet par qeyas Iqwame Uaghrif se na  
khas hai tarkeeb me qaume rasool-e-Hashni  
Un ki jamiat ka mulko-nasab par inhasar  
Quwwat-e-mazhab se mustakham hai jamiat teri  
—Iqbal; "Mazhab" (B.D.)
25. Iqbal, Eng. Trans. by Arther J. Arberry; *Mysteries of selflessness*, p. 29.
26. ibid; pp. 30-31.
27. R.R.; p. 148.
28. ibid; p, 149.
29. R.R., p. 150.
30. Mr. Smith, W.O.; *Islam in modern history*. (1957 Princeton University Press—New York) pp. 77-79.
31. I.M.R.; pp. 81-2.
32. R.R.; p. 151.
33. I.A.T.; p. 64-5.

34. Havas ne kar diya tukre nau-e-Insan ko  
 Akhuwat ka beyan hoja mohabbat ki zaban hoja  
 Yeh Hindi woh khrasani yeh Afghani woh turani  
 Tu ai sharmindai-sahil uchhal kar bekaran hoja  
 Ghubar aloodai-rango nasab hain balo-par-tere  
 Tu ai murghe haram urne se pahle purfeshan hoja  
 —B.D.
35. Iqbal, Eng. trans; Arberry, Arther J; *Mysteries of selflessness*,  
 (London, John Murray Publishers Ltd. 1953) p. 32.
36. Yehi maqsoode fitrat yehi ramze musalmani  
 Akhuwat ki jahangiri mohabbat ki faravani  
 Butane rango khun ko tor kar millet me gum hoja  
 Na toorani rahe baqi na irani na Afghani  
 —B.J.
37. Gibb; *Whither Islam*, p. 379.
38. Is daur men Iqwam-e-ki Sohhat bhi hui aam  
 Posheeda nigahon se rahi wahdate adam  
 Tafruq-e-millat hikmate Afrang ka maqsood  
 Islam ka maqsood faqat millat Aadam  
 Mecca ne diya khake Geneva ko ye paigham  
 Jamiat-e-Iqwam ke jamiate aadam.
39. Aadmiat, chatrame aadmi  
 Ba khabar shu az moqame aadmi  
 Harf-e-bad ra bar lab avardan khetast  
 Kafir-o-momin hama khalq khudast  
 Bandai haq az khudo geerad tareeq  
 Me shavad har kafir-o-momin shafuq  
 Aadmi az raht-o-zabt tan ha tan  
 Bar taruqe dosti gahe bazan  
 —Iqbal, *Javed Nama*
40. *R.R.*; p. 170.
41. *ibid*; p. 178.
42. Nehru—*Discovery of India* (The Signet Press—Calcutta first, edi-  
 tion March 1946) p. 418.
43. Nehru—*Discovery of India* (The Signet Press, Calcutta-1st edition  
 March 1946).
44. Dr. V.P. Verma;—*Modern Indian Political Thought*—(Iqbal—  
 p. 547).
45. Dr. P.S. Muhar—'Political Philosophy of Iqbal'. published in  
*Journal of political science*, 1957.

46. Is raz Ko ek mard-e-farangi ne keya fash  
Har chand ke dana use khola nahen karte  
Jamhooriat ek tarze hukumat hai ke jis men  
Bandon ko gina karte hain taula nahin karate.  
—Iqbal, Zarb-e-Kaleem.
47. Iqbal; Pyam-i-Mashriq.
48. Iqbal; Khizr-i-Rah.
49. R.R.; p. 149.
50. R.R.; p. 170.
51. S.S.; Preface.
52. R.R., p. 157.
53. R.R.; pp. 164-5.
54. Abhi tak andmi zaide zahoon-e-Shahr-i-yari hai  
Qeyamat hai ke insan nau-e-insan ka shikar hai  
Nazar ko kheera karte hai chamak tahzub hazir ki  
ye sannai magar jhoote nagoon ki reza kari hai  
woh hikmat naz tha jis per khiridmandane maghrib ko  
Havas ke panja-i-khuni me teghe kar-e-zari hai  
Tadahhur ki fasun kai se mohkam ho nahin sakte  
Jahan me jis tamaddun ki hena sarmaya dari hai.
55. Mere sauda malukiat ko thokrate ho tum  
Tum ne kiya tore naheen kamzor qaumon ke zahaj  
ye azaeb Sholide kis ki malukiat ke hain  
Rajdhani hai magar baqi na raja hai na raj  
Tum ne loote he newa sehra nasheeno ke kheyam  
Tum ne loote khete dahqan tum ne lute takht-o-taj.
56. Iqbal, *khizr-i-Rah* trans. by A.Q. Niyaz (Lahore, Friends in Counsel  
Publication, 1952) pp. 27-8.
57. Farman-i-Khuda, in *Bal-i-Jibriel*.
58. V. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal*, (Bombay, Kutub Publishers,  
1947), p. 103.
59. R.R.; p. 178.
60. I.A.T.; p. 89.
61. Sahin-e-Sarma-e-az nast-e-khalil  
Yani aan paighamhare jibriel  
Na aan ke haq dar hatil woo muzroir ast  
Qalb-e-wor momin dimaghast kafir ast  
Gharhan guon karda andar iflak ra

Dar Shikam joinda jaan jaan hak ra  
 Rang-o-fu az tan nagirad jan hak  
 Jaz ha tan kare nadarad Ishtrak  
 Dein aan paighamber-e-Haq na shanast  
 Dar mosawat-e-shikam darad Asas

—Jawaid Namah.

62. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 157.

63. Iqbal—Jawaid Namah.

## EIGHT

### PHILOSOPHY OF ART

In the evolutionary process of mankind, there came a stage when man developed his aesthetic sense. It is through his aesthetic sense that he gives expression to the deepest aspirations of his heart. The purpose of this aesthetic expression is, perhaps, to achieve something which makes life beautiful and good. The yearning for beauty and goodness gives rise to some special kind of desires. Beauty is the creator of desire's springtide.

Desire is nourished by the display of Beauty.<sup>1</sup>

Further, it is desire which makes the blood of man run warm and makes life worthliving. Art, in the broad sense, includes music, painting, architecture, poetry and literature. An artist may express his feelings through any one of these forms. He wants to realize the ideal, and makes the real even more lasting and more unique. Art is the mirror of our life. It pictures our failures and success, our hopes and disappointments, our

joys and sorrows, and our aims and aspirations. By looking at the art and literature of a certain period in the history of a certain country, we actually come to know the spiritual content and discontent of its people during that period. For any country, art is essential for the spiritual health of its people. Art, in general, keeps the lamps of desires burning in our heart, and makes us aspire after "whatsoever is good and fair and beautiful."

Art is thus intimately bound up with our life. It is neither created nor exists in vacuum. Art is always in the service of man. It adds beauty to man's soul. It gives him power and strength. To quote Dr. Iqbal "All that I can say is that I look upon Art as subservient to life and personality. I expressed this view as far back as 1914 in my *Asrar-i-Khudi* and twelve years later in the last poem of the *Zabur-i-Ajam* wherein I have tried to picture the soul-movement of the ideal artist in whom love reveals itself as a unity of beauty and power."<sup>2</sup> Now, what does Iqbal mean by unity of beauty and power in art? Beauty, is the special domain of the artists and has been expressed in various ways. Iqbal, too in the first stage of his thought, entertained a Platonic view of beauty. God is the Eternal Beauty who reveals Himself through various objects of nature. Everything is beautiful because it is pervaded by God.

It is easy to trace how the Persian mystic poets, during the time of their social and political decline, came in the grip of Plato and became mere worshippers of beauty. Their literature became barren and escapist. They could not provide any guidance to their people in these gloomy days. To them even weakness was something to be adored and appreciated. Iqbal, after returning from Europe, appears on the scene with a changed attitude of mind and heart. He has now a definite conception of art. He thinks that everything should be judged from the point of view of personality. He says "The idea of personality gives us a standard of value; it settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good, that weakens it is bad. Art, religion and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality."<sup>3</sup> Iqbal makes a distinction

between good art and bad art in the following way. A good art is that which strengthens the ego, whereas a bad art brings relaxation in personality, and is therefore, undesirable. He seeks beauty in a spirit of manliness.

“Iqbal’s conception of beauty” says Dr. Vahid “is distinctly original. Whilst he saw beauty in everything, the beauty which appealed to him most was the beauty of power and perfection. Everything powerful and perfect fascinated him.”<sup>4</sup> This view may, furthermore, be supported by the following verses of Iqbal :

“According to me, the best testimony of the efficacy of beauty is that heavens bow before power. If there is no power (of content), beauty (of form) is without any value; and a song which does not fire one’s imagination is less than worthless.”<sup>5</sup>

Iqbal, as an artist, derives more pleasure from the objects which symbolise power and perfection. Art also should proceed in that direction.

Artistic activity, according to Iqbal, is designed not merely to amuse us. Like other human activities, creative activity is also purposive and suggestive. Iqbal writes, “The ultimate end of all human activity is a life-glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose, and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life-yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to the reality around us, on the mastery of which alone Life depends, is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power.”<sup>6</sup> Art is thus not merely a source of enjoyment in our leisure, but a guide in our dark and gloomy days. It has to awake higher and nobler sentiments in man. Art has to be utilised in the service of man in order to make life more glorious and more beautiful. Art loses its significance and value if it fails to grasp the real problems of life. The function of the artist is to unfold the truth in order to provide

a guidance to humanity. The artist must have the courage to come face to face with reality. In this respect, an artist is also an intimate follower of the prophet who reveals the truth to mankind and offers them a solution of the different baffling problems of life.

But the function of art is not only to preach morality of religion. The artist is not a mere propagandist of a particular doctrine. The materials of his works are his deep-felt feelings at certain moments of his life. It is the function of art to help us in attaining the "warmth of life immortal". Iqbal thus says :

"O men of vision; It is well to have the thirst for  
vision,  
But what is a vision that faileth to grasp the reality of  
things.  
The object of all art is to attain the warmth of life-  
immortal,  
What availeth a breath or two that vanishes like a  
spark.  
Without a miracle nations cannot rise—  
What is an art without the stroke of Moses."7

It is the artist's attitude towards life and reality, which exhibits the significance and value of his art. According to Mathew Arnold, the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful ideas to life—to the question : How to live ?

The artist cannot remain in his 'ivory tower' for a long time. Building of castles in air imparts no value to his art. A living contact with reality is essential for the artist. Iqbal says :

"Music, poetry, politics, religion, and art are valuable activities in themselves. But they do not serve to preserve and strengthen the 'self' they tend to lose their worth. Nations have been humbled under the sky only when their literature was divorced from a living contact with life."8



Every object of nature, thinks Iqbal, can be of immense value to the artist. It is for the artist to find how even nature can beautify and vitalize our life. He says :

“The azure sky overhead, the air charged with joy  
Even the birds will not stay in their nests’  
And behold yonder the mountain stream leeping,  
Conquering obstructions, swaying and crawling;  
See it jumping over or slipping by obstacles and then  
eddying on,  
Rushing forth in spite of many curve and twist’  
Just behold, O Saqui, bright faced’  
How the stream conveys the message of life.”<sup>9</sup>

The function of art, points out Iqbal, is not merely to depict nature as it “is.” Nature is a raw material upon which an artist has to work in order to express his inner-most feelings. “The modern age”, Says Iqbal, “Seeks inspiration from Nature, but Nature simply ‘is’, and her function is mainly to obstruct our search for ‘ought’ which the artist must discover within the depth of his own being.”<sup>10</sup> It is the function of art to recognize the difference between “is” and “ought”. The artist has to work on something real and objective, but he has the right to turn it in the manner he thinks best.

Concerning the function of the art, one is inclined to ask, whether the value of a poetic or literary work depends solely on its content or form. If a poet is anxious to express some ideas, why should he be so careful in expressing them in a beautiful form ? The artist has liberty to express his ideas in any form, but we must be perfectly clear about the fact that if the form that the artist employs is bad and rough, then the charm of the content will also be lost and it will become unattractive. The function of art is, thus, not merely to convey certain ideas, nor merely to give some beautiful form; but, to say the truth, to combine both form and content in a harmonious way. This implied an emotional appeal as well as an intellectual effort on the part of the writer. Iqbal says :

“Though the poetic content is inspired, yet the artist is not free from the preparatory intellectual effort. The tavern of

Hafiz and the temple of Behzad both derived the strength of their structure from the life-blood poured into them by their creators,"<sup>11</sup>

The content (matter), however, is the primary thing, but the artist cannot do his work without some medium of expression i.e. form. True to say, that it is the wine that intoxicates, and not the cup, and then again the wine cannot be taken without the cup.

It is necessary for the artist to see that the thoughts which he expresses, are placed in a right and appropriate form, otherwise his art will suffer. The shoe of language, must fit the foot of inspiration, else the foot is bound to suffer. Though, Iqbal seems to suggest more the value of content, he never means to under-rate the importance of form, technique or style. He strongly feels that a good art must satisfy certain conditions. Firstly, the content should be life-yielding. Secondly, it must have an appropriate form. Thirdly, in any creation of art, the life-blood and tears of the artist should be assimilated. Fourthly, the artist should express his own feelings, emotions and reactions and should not be a mere imitator of others; his approach should be subjective. Fifthly, the artist must be sincere in his expression. All this is very nicely expressed in the following verses of Iqbal :

“A melody must be nourished on madness of love,  
It should be like fire dissolved in life-blood.  
A melody that has no meaning is lifeless.  
Its warmth is only from a dying fire’  
The skilful master improves upon nature.  
And reveals his search to our gaze’  
He creates a new world—  
And gives a new life to our being”<sup>12</sup>

At another place he says :

“Material at the disposal of the artist may be anything, colour or brick, stone or words, sounds or instruments; in each case the miracle in art is the result of blood-nourishment. It is the drop of a heart's blood, which transmutes a stone into a 'heart' and which produces music and rhythm.”<sup>13</sup>

Iqbal points out that all art is subjective. By the magic touch of an artist, a thing is made more lively and more glittering. As against arrowing down a thing, he expands it more and more. "The artist who is a blessing to mankind defies life. He is an associate of God and feels the contact of time and eternity in his soul. In the words of Fichte, he sees all Nature full, large and abundant as opposed to one who sees all things thinner, smaller and smaller and emptier than they actually are."<sup>14</sup> The artist, with his subjective approach, as against mere imitation, can display something original and unique out of the depth of his personality, Iqbal says :

"If you (the artist) see this world with thy own eyes, the mysteries of skies will come to light by the prophecy of your vision. (let the artist's vision be such) That the sun might absorb light from the radiance of your spark, and the moon might reflect the brightness of your own forehead. And the hollows of the sea might be created by the forms of thy pearl, and the nature itself may feel shy at the miracle of your thought."

The world with its manifold objects, would be devoid of beauty, if the eyes of artist do not fall upon it.<sup>15</sup>

"Our heart is mysteriously related to it (world) : for every existent depends on being perceived by us. The world is nothing but the expression of our creative genius, for without us, light and sound will have no existence."<sup>16</sup>

The artist, no doubt, works upon the objective nature, but he does not represent a thing as it 'is'. The objectivity of the things takes the subjective colour of the artist's personality. The artist's effort is not for 'is' but for 'ought'. The artist, according to his personal feeling and aspiration, concentrates on 'ought' and wishes to shape things in accordance with his liking.

God said : it is so and do not question further.

But man said : it is so but it should be like this.<sup>17</sup>

Beauty is something subjective. Different persons conceive beauty in different ways and different measures. The artist should also take note of it.

“To seek value in beauty outside ourselves is wrong; ‘What ought to be’ is not to be found in our external environment.”<sup>18</sup>

Beauty is not objective. Beauty resides in the soul of the artist.

“ ‘Tis in the poet’s breast that beauty unveils,  
 ‘Tis from his sinai that beauty’s beams arise,  
 By his look the fair is made fairer,  
 Through his enchantments Nature is more beloved.”<sup>19</sup>

Iqbal too, in his artistic efforts, voices his own personal feelings and emotions.

Iqbal was a philosopher and also a poet. The question naturally arises, can there be a fusion of poetry and philosophy?

Two conflicting views regarding Iqbal’s position have been maintained. Dr. Sinha says, “In the philosophic English poets, philosophy is subordinate to poetry, while in Iqbal’s poems philosophy seeks to oust poetry which is a serious defect from the literary critic’s view point.”<sup>20</sup>

Prof. Sharif says : “Iqbal’s poetry and philosophy are both great. Perhaps his poetry is so because of his philosophy and his philosophy because of his poetry. In Iqbal, philosophy and poetry are indissolubly blended as they have never been before in any great thinker—not even in ‘Dante’.”<sup>21</sup>

We are, here, not to enter into a discussion on which of the views just mentioned above is correct. Our purpose is to show whether philosophy and poetry can join together hand in hand. May be that Iqbal’s conception of art is biased because of his philosophy; but it is no defect in itself. All great critics and poets have their own points of view to express. W.H. Hudson says :

“We do not, therefore, quarrel with any poet who offers us philosophy in the fashion of poetry. We require only that his philosophy shall be transfigured by imagination and feeling, that it shall be shaped into a thing of beauty; that it will be brought into true poetic expression, and that thus in reading him we shall always be keenly aware of difference between his

rendering of philosophic truth and any mere prose statement of it. These conditions fulfilled, we welcome the poet as a teacher and novelist, because we know that in his hands the truth of life and conduct will acquire a higher potency and value."<sup>22</sup>

Mr. J.C. Shaira points out: "It is true that poetry refuses to be made the handmaid of anyone, philosophy or view of life or system of belief, but it is equally true that it naturally allies itself only with what is highest and best in human nature; and whatever philosophy or belief there is contained, thence poetry will draw its finest impulses."<sup>23</sup>

It is really difficult for a poet to create a master piece of art without having a background of splendid thoughts and highest moral perceptions. Ruskin says :

"That art is the greatest which conveys to the spectator by any means whatsoever, the greatest number of greatest ideas."<sup>24</sup>

If a philosophic poem is rated inferior, it is so rated not because it is philosophic, but because it does not satisfy the conditions of poetry or it is not at all poetry. In philosophic poetry we have to see if the poet succeeds in giving certain thought a poetical rendering with a due emotional appeal and heightening effect.

While studying Iqbal's art, we have to be clear about the poet's faith in limitless development of human personality and man's superior position in the universe i.e. divine vicegerency on earth. He says "In so far as the cultural history of Islam, is concerned it is my belief that, with the single exception of Architecture, the art of Islam (Music, Painting and even Poetry) is yet to be born—the art, that is to say, which aims at the human assimilation of Divine attributes gives man infinite aspiration and finally wins for him the status of God's Representative on earth."<sup>25</sup>

A good part of Iqbal's poetry is, therefore, metaphysical. The following definition of metaphysical poetry of Prof. Grierson, is of great help to us :

"Metaphysical poetry, in the full sense of the term, is a poetry which, like that of the Divine Comedia, the De Natura

Rerum, perhaps Goethe's Faust, has been inspired by a philosophical conception of the universe and the role assigned to the human spirit in the great drama of existence.<sup>26</sup>

Iqbal is never disappointed to see the failures and sorrows of man. Rather it becomes his duty, as an artist, to give man an optimistic note, and hold him from falling down. To use Gurubachan Singh's words :

"The world sometimes proves too strong for him (man). He is bewildered and is completely overcome by the chaos and darkness of the world. Very often he loses sight of his own greatness and divine origin, and is awed by the spectacle of the apparently stupendous difficulties and troubles facing him. These are the moments in which Iqbal comes to man's help and points to him how great and nobly born he is and how easy it is for him to spurn with his foot the troubles and difficulties, the pleasures and temptations of this world and to rise to the height of the empyrean where he properly belongs."<sup>27</sup>

Iqbal makes a distinction between a true artist and a pseudo-artist. The pseudo-artist "shows beauty as ugliness" and his "kiss robs the rose of freshness." The nightingale forgets "the joy of flying"<sup>28</sup> at his voice. His song is dull, monotonous, and devoid of the warmth of life. The pseudo-artist is a messenger of decay and death.

His melodies steal firmness from thine heart,  
 His magic persuades thee that death is life.  
 He takes from thy soul the desire of existence,  
 He extracts from thy mine the blushing ruby.  
 He dresses gain in the garb of loss,  
 He makes everything praise-worthy blameful.  
 He plunges thee in a sea of thought.  
 And makes thee a stranger to action.  
 He is sick, and by his words our sickness is increased.<sup>29</sup>

The pseudo-poet remains indifferent to humanity and its problems. He follows age-old-conventions and lacks initiative and originality. But it is quite possible, even for a pseudo

poet, to have a mastery over language and technique and attract the heart of the people. Such types of poets and artists are very dangerous especially for a declined people, whose energies are even more weathered and by the undesirable magic of their art. Mere mastery over language and technique, however, does not credit a poet to be good and great unless he is also a messenger of life-force. Imru-al-Qais, one of the greatest Arabian poets, was for this reason criticized by the Holy Prophet as "the head of the poets but their leaders towards hell." A poet may be great, but if his songs become a source of social decay, then his greatness is at stake. He shares with the pseudo-poets who poison our heart and snatch our will-power. No country and no age is free from such pseudo-poets, but they are mostly found in abundance during the time of a nation's slavery and downfall. So says Iqbal :

"Philosophers, poets, scholars, all bound in the period of a nation's slavery; it is certainly not an empty age.

But all these good people have only one object though they are past masters in the art of interpretation;

(And what is the object ?) It is, better to teach the lions to flee like the deer and thus consign to oblivion the tradition of the lion's courage ?

They pretend to interpret problems (of art, religion or philosophy) but are really preoccupied with making slavery acceptable to slaves."<sup>30</sup>

Art flourishes in liberty. Art, religion and ethics become spiritless in a period of slavery. They rather become a source of escapism in an atmosphere of despondency. And the pseudo-poet or musician does not incite the dormant energy of his people. It is for this reason that Iqbal criticizes not only Hafiz, but a lot of other Persian and Urdu poets.

Addressing the Urdu poets and writers, he says :

"They hide from the people the vision of high ideas.  
They deaden the spirit and awaken their sensual  
appetites. O' the poets and writers of India, how long  
wilt thou be under the spell of woman (sex) ?"<sup>31</sup>

From the later Moghul period, a period of social and political decline of Muslims in India, Urdu poetry was sunk deep with exaggeration and artificiality. There was a need of some reforms in Urdu literature. And it started with Hali, Sir Syed Ahmad and Shibli. Hali can be regarded as the leader and inspirer of the movement for a striking development in modern Urdu literature.

On the initiative of Sir Syed Ahmad, Hali wrote his famous poem "Madd-o-Jazr-e-Islam" (ebb and tide of Islam) popularly known as *Mussadas "Hali"*, to arouse the Muslims from their deep slumber, and also criticized the age-old conventions of Urdu poetry in his book "*Muqqadma Sher-o-Shairy.*"

Hali, as a leader of the new movement in Urdu poetry, sought way of diverting it to fresh channels. He enthusiastically pointed out the artificiality, and untruthfulness, which were sucking the very life-blood of literature. Iqbal, as a Urdu poet, made new openings and brought high thoughts in Urdu for the first time. He strongly feels the dreadful effect of a decadent art. The history of literature is the history of spiritual struggle of mankind. Iqbal, thus, writes: "The spiritual health of a people largely depends upon the kind of inspiration that their poets and artists receive. But inspiration is not a matter of choice. It is a gift, the character of which cannot be critically judged by the recipient before accepting it. It comes to the individual unsolicited and only to socialize itself. For this reason the personality that receives and the life-quality of that which is received are matters of utmost importance for mankind. The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his songs or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than the whole battalions of an Attila or *Changez.*"<sup>32</sup>

In the last poem of '*Zabur-e-Ajam*',<sup>33</sup> Iqbal discusses the art of the slave nations. He points out that both their music and painting (or poetry) are devoid of value-content and life-force. Their creations bring a depressing effect on us.

A true artist, on the other hand, thinks Iqbal, changes the destiny of mankind by creating new values and ideals. His art



possesses power and beauty—a beauty which he creates from his own heart and does not merely borrow from the outside world. In *Zarb-e-Kalim*, Iqbal says :

“From where does come in music, the intoxication of wine ?

Does this spell originate from the heart of the musician or does it arise from the wood of flute ?

What is heart ? How does it gain so much power and ecstasy that it overturns the fortune of the Kings ?

How is it the life of the society is intimately bound up with its life ?

It is only when the mysteries of the heart are realized, that a man becomes a true artist ?”<sup>34</sup>

Iqbal points out some of the important characteristics of a true artist. He says : “His music breathes o’er us a wonderful enchantment. His pen draws a mountain with a single hair. His thoughts dwell with the moon and the stars. He creates beauty and knows not what is ugly. He is a Khizr, according to the legend, discovered the fountain of life in the land of darkness and amidst his darkness is the fountain of life. All things that exist are made more living, by his tears. That he may lead us into life’s paradise, and that life’s bow may become full circle. Caravans march at the sound of his bell, and follow the voice of his pipe.”<sup>35</sup>

The true artist does not confine himself to nature, but extends the bounds of nature. Nature is not static and has the capacity to develop. Similarly human ego possesses infinite potentialities. Art has, therefore, no fixed boundary. Its journey goes beyond race, country or colour and even leaves the earth and reaches other planets.<sup>36</sup> In short, art is limitless. There is no particular tune prescribed for lamentation, and the cry is not bound by the flute.

A hundred new words, thinks Iqbal, are concealed in the artist’s heart. The artist is ever restless and ever burning; and he should remain in such condition. It will be the death of the artist, if he is fully satisfied any moment and stops at the sight of a certain Utopia. At the glimpse of an Utopia,

he should rather begin to seek another Utopia. The restlessness of an artist is beautifully portrayed in the verses of the following poem 'The Houri and the Poet'. The Houri says :

"You neither care for wine nor look at me  
Tis a wonder you know not the art of love making."

The Poet replied :

"What am I to do ? My temper does not get reconciled  
to a place,  
I have a restless heart like the prenze in a popy field,  
When my vision is arrested by a beloved's beauty,  
My heart begins yearning for a more beautiful face,  
I seek a star from the spark and a sun from the star,  
I do not think of destination, as rest means my death,  
A lover's heart loses all zest in eternal Paradise—  
There is no song of the forlorn, no grief and no sym-  
pathizer in this place."

### Notes

1. S.S., p. 61.
2. Iqbal. *Murraqa-i-Chaughtai*, Foreword, (Jehangir Book Club, Chabuk Sawaran, 21st July, 1928).
3. S.S., p. xxii.
4. Dr. Vahid, A., *Iqbal, His Art and Thought*, pp. 199-200.
5. Meri nazar me yahi hai Jamal-O-Zebai, Ke Sarisijda hain  
quwat ke samne aflak Na ha jalal to husn-O-jamal  
betaseer,  
tera nafas hai agar nughma na hona atishnak. Iqbal.
6. Iqbal's note on "*Our Prophet's criticism of contemporary Arabian poetry*" (The New Era 1916, p. 251) cf. S.S., p. xxii.
7. Ai-ahle nazar zauq khoob hai lekin  
Jo Sha-i-Ki haqiqat Ko na dekhi woh nazar keya.  
Maqsood hunar Soz-e-heyat abhi hai,

Yah ek nafs ya do nafs misl-e-Sharar keya;  
Be maazza duniya men ubharti nahin qaumen,  
Jo zarb-e-Kabimi nahin rakhta woh hunar keya.

Iqbal, *Zarb-e-Kaleem*  
(Ed. I, Lahore), p. 117.

8. Surodo-Shero-Seyasat, Kitab-o-din-o-hunar  
Guhar hain unki giraft me tamam ek dana  
Agar Khudi Ki hifazat karen to ain-i-heyat  
Na kar saken to sarapa fsoon-o-afsana, Hui haizer eflak  
Ummatton ki rusvai, Khudi se jab adab-o-deen hue hain  
begana Z.K.; p. 98.

9. Feza Nibe Nibe hawa me Suroor, Thaharti nahin Ashiyan  
men Teyur  
Woh jue kohistan uchakti hui, Atakti lachakti Sarakti  
hui,  
Uchhalti phisalti sambhalti hui, Bare pach Khakar-  
nikalti hui  
Zara dekh Ai Saqi-e-lala fam, Sunati hai yah zindagi ka  
peyam

Iqbal, *Saqi-Nama*, in 'Bal-e-Gibril'  
(Lahore, Taj Comp., 1935), p. 165.

10. M.C., Foreword.

11. Har Chand ijad maane hai khudadad  
Koshish se kahan mard-i-hunar mand hai azad  
Khoone rage-memar ki garmi se hai tameer,  
Maikhana-e-Hafiz ho ke butkhana-i-Bahzad.

Z.K., p. 131.

12. Naghma mi bayad janoon-e-parwarda  
Atishe dar khoon-e-dil hal karda  
Naghma gar mani nadarad Murda cest  
Aan hunar mande ke har fitrat fazood  
Raz Khud ra bar nigah ma kashood  
Afrunad Kacynate-esdeegre  
Qalab ra bakhshad heyat-e-deegre.

Iqbal—Zaboore-e-Ajam.

13. Rang ho ya khisht-o-sang, Chang ho ya harf-o-soot,  
Maazza-e-fan  
ki hai khoon-e-jigar se namood, Qatra-e-khoone jigar sil  
ko  
Banata hai dil, khoone jigar se sada sozo suroor-o-  
surood. B.J.; p. 129.

14. M.C., Foreword.
15. Dekhe tu zamane ko agar apni nazar se, Iflak mannawar  
hon  
tere noor-e-sehar se, Khursud kari kash-e-zea tere sharar  
se,  
Zahir teri taqdir ho seema-e-qamar se, Dariya mutlatim  
hon  
tere mauj-e-gohar se, Sharminda ho fitrat tere ejaz-e  
hunar se  
—Z K., p. 120.
16. Dil ma ra ha az poshida rahi ast, Ke har maujood mam-  
noon-e-nigahe ast, Jahan ghair az tajalli hae neest, Ke  
he ma Jalwa-e-noor-o-sada neest.  
—Z A.
17. Guft-e-yazdan ke chunin ast-o-digar hech magar  
Guft-e-adam ke chunin ast-o-chuni mi ba ast.
18. Husne za khud baroon jastan khitast  
Aanchi me hayest pesh ma kujast. M.C., Foreword.
19. S.S., p. 61.
20. Dr. Sinha, S.N. *Iqbal—His poetry and His Message*, p. 201.
21. Sharif, M.M. *Iqbal's conception of God* (Published in 'Islamic Culture', July, 1941. Also in 'Iqbal As Thinker,' Lahore 1944, p. 106.
22. Hucson, W.H. *An Introduction to Study of Literature*, p. 124.
23. Shairap, J.C. *Aspect of Poetry*, p. 129.
24. Ruskin, *Modern Painters*, Part I, Sec. I, Chap. III.
25. M.C.; Foreword.
26. Grierson, H.J.—*Metaphysical Lyrics and poems of the seventeenth century*, p. xiii.
27. Singh, Gurubachan, *Man in Iqbal's poetry*, (Article in 'Aspects of Iqbal) pp. 67-68.
28. S.S., p. 64.
29. *ibid.*, p. 65.
30. Shair bhi hain paida ulma bhi hukma bh Khali ahin qaumon  
ki ghulami ka zamana, Maqsad hai magar un allah ke bandon  
ke magar ek, Har ek hai go sharha-i-mani me agana, B:htar hai ke  
sheron ko sikha den ram-e-ahoo, Baqi na rahe sher-o- Shairi Ka

fasana. Karte hain ghulamon ko ghulami pa razamand, Taweel-e-masad ko banate hain bahana. —Z.A.

31. Chashm-e-Aadam se chhipate hain moqamat-e-buland, Karte hain rooh ko khabida badan ko bedar, Hind ke shairo suratgaro afsana nawees, Aah bechare ke sab par aurat hai sawar.

—B.D.

32. M.C.; Forword.

33. See '*Dar beyan-e-Ganoon-e-Lateefa-e-Ghulaman* (Zabur-e-Ajam, p. 21.)

34. Aeya Khan se nala-e-nai me suroor-i-mai, Ash iski mai newaz ka dil hai ki chob-e-nai ?

Dil keya hai ? iski quwwat-o-masti khan se hai ? Keyon iski ek nigah ulatli hai takht-e-kai ? Keyon iski zindagi se hai ewam me heyat ? Keyon iski wardat badalte hain pai ba pai ?

Jis roz dil ki ramz moghanni samajh gaya  
Samjha tamam marhala hai hunar hai tai.

—Z.K.; p. 113.

35. S.S.; p. 62-63.

36. Iqbal himself takes a spiritual flight to different planets with Rum as his guide, as Virgil was to Dante.

(See Javednama)

## CONCLUSION

Philosophy requires independent thinking and free attitude of mind. We cannot say that the philosophical views of Iqbal are biased or determined unreflectively by Islamic ideology. It is true that the Islamic faith in Iqbal was already there and was all the more strengthened by a critical study of western science and philosophy. He might have rejected his Islamic faith, but he could not give it up because he found in it all possible richness of thoughts and the best possible guides to life.

Iqbal is a Muslim philosopher out and out. But he does not treat philosophy as the hand-maid of religion. It is, however, truism to say that his philosophy is a religious philosophy. It would be wrong to say that Iqbal's philosophy is only a collection of thoughts from several philosophers. Resemblance of one's views with some other philosophers' is not a guarantee that he has been influenced by them or that he has borrowed his views from them. He is one born as an original thinker. He learns a good deal from his environment and predecessors. Originality in writing does not mean that one is completely indifferent to the views of others. Iqbal is not a mere exponent of Islamic thought. He criticizes the views of many Muslim thinkers. His intuitionism gives a fresh interpretation to Islam. He also criticises and refers to many western thinkers ancient and modern. But he is not overpowered by the

views of any. His system of philosophy emerges out of the various criticisms made by him of other thinkers. Mr Hakim says : "Inasmuch as thought is concerned, he has not followed wholly either Rumi or Nietzsche or Bergson, Karl Marx or Lenin. In weaving the tapestry of his thought he has borrowed some coloured threads and a few sketches from this thinker or that, but the completed tapestry is not a copy of any of theirs; in building the edifice of his thought he has utilized their ideas only as bricks and stones. Iqbal belongs to the category of those philosophic poets who have their own standpoint and their own philosophy of life which cannot be explained by reference to ideas derived from this source or that."<sup>1</sup>

Iqbal is a bitter critic of Plato. He is perfectly right in holding the view that a demarcation between the phenomenal and the transcendental is a great philosophical mistake. Plato could never bridge the gulf between them. That is why in his philosophy we find an unbridgeable dualism between ideas and matter, thought-world and sense-world and of soul and body.

Both Iqbal and Descartes have recognized the value of intuition in proving the existence of self as the most fundamental reality of the universe. In Iqbal, however, intuition is poetic and more of the nature of love, which in Descartes, it is purely logical.

Iqbal widely differs with Descartes in his views about the relation between mind and matter. Descartes erroneously conceived them as two substances diametrically opposed to each other.

Iqbal is not a monist even like Spinoza. God in Spinoza's system is not the God of religion, but the absolute of metaphysics which is not likely to appeal to the religious mind. He, like Spinoza, did believe that matter and mind belong to one system, but they do not according to him, run parallel to each other.

Iqbal tries to make definite improvement over philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, specially in his philosophy of matter and mind. Mind and matter are not

opposed to each other: they belong to one system. Physical and mental events correspond to each other. Popular metaphysics divides the world into matter and mind and human beings into soul and body. Some materialists have said that matter alone is real and mind is an illusion. The idealists have taken the opposite view. In this sense Iqbal is neither a materialist nor an idealist. He is a spiritualist. He believes that reality is essentially spirit but never denies the reality of matter. He believed in the degrees of reality. The idea of degrees of reality is also marked out in the writings of Shahabuddin Saharwardy.

As empiricists say, experience is necessary for knowledge. Islam also recommends the empirical attitude. This however, does not mean that we have to underestimate reason. Iqbal believes and perhaps rightly that experience cannot give a deeper insight into the nature of things. It cannot lead us into the deeper recesses of our own personality.

Among the recent philosophers Bergson (1859- ) is a great exponent of intuitionism. Long before Bergson, Ghazali and Rumi had emphasized the importance of intuition. Rumi made a very deep impact on the mind of Iqbal. Iqbal thinks that intuition cannot be regarded as merely subjectivism. The experience of great religious experts, prophets and sages cannot be rejected as non-sensical and false. In fact, they have played a major and decisive role in changing the course of human destiny. It is to be noted that unlike Bergson's intuition, Iqbal has a deep religious significance.

Iqbal has a great appreciation for Bergson because of the very dynamic spirit of his philosophy. But there are basic differences between Iqbal and Bergson. This vital impulse which is also God for Bergson is very much different from the God of traditional theology. Iqbal believes in evolution, but thinks that there is plan and purpose in it. It is not undirected and chaotic as Bergson believes it to be. But by teleology he does not mean the working out of a fixed plan, but of fresh possibilities. Iqbal's concept of evolution is very much akin to Rumi's view upon this subject. For Darwin, man is



supposed to be last product of evolution. In Rumi and Iqbal's scheme, evolution possesses a serious end. Death is not the termination of one's carrier. Life is a passage through a series of deaths. There is gradual rising note of ego-hood, even it reaches the angelic state. Real time is pure duration where the distinction between past, present and future is not possible. Iqbal seems to have been impressed by Bergson, and accepts the idea of duration without any comment. Mr. Sharif says: "Iqbal, getting his cue from a saying of the prophet of Islam in which time is identified with God, accepts Bergson's theory of pure duration with some modification and thereby not only succeeds in explaining Divine eternity but also in laying greater emphasis on the dynamic aspect of reality."<sup>2</sup> With the idea of time is closely associated the idea of space. Some Muslim thinkers Al-Ashari, Mulla Dawani, Ibn Hazm, Turi and Iraqi have made genuine contribution to its study. Some of their studies are very much akin to modern discovers on this subject. We have already discussed them in the chapter of space and time.

Iqbal disagrees with Muhiuddin Ibn Arabi who interpreted Quran in pantheistic spirit as vedantist thinker Sankarcharya did in his interpretation of the Gita. Iqbal thinks that pantheism, if logically carried, destroys human capacity for action, and the existence of the human self is very much under valued. To this effect, Iqbal's interest is evoked in the philosophy of Nietzsche (1844-1900). It was mainly the bold and courageous spirit on his (Nietzsche) philosophy which attracted Iqbal's attention, otherwise Iqbal finds his views faulty at various points viz. his idea of eternal recurrence, his atheism and his view upon religion and morality, his hatred for democracy and his concept of Superman with an aristocrat and tyrannical temperament. His views upon 'Eternal Recurrence' is, in fact, a rigid form of determinism and it destroys all the dynamism of life or the enthusiasm for the arrival of the 'Superman,' for according to this theory, whatever happens has happened before and would continue to happen in future. As such there will be no novelty or possibility of fresh events but only the cyclic repetition of events time and again. Iqbal

feels that the failure of Nietzsche was mainly because of the deep influences of Schopenhauer, Darwin and Lange upon him. The fact of his intellectualism with a prophetic mentality can not be denied. Tragically however, Nietzsche himself felt a great spiritual need, wanted a master to guide him his lost way. Iqbal wished if he could have helped Nietzsche, had there been a contact with him.

It has been very wrongly supposed that Iqbal's concept of 'Superman' has been borrowed from Nietzsche. Iqbal, himself has pointed out in a letter to Dr. Nicholson that long before he studied Nietzsche, he was well aware of this subject in the writings of Al Karim Jib (767 A.H.) and Sufi literature, and the egoist thinker Alexander. It has been suggested quite in clear terms by Islamic Sufism : create in thyself the attributes of God. Al Jib's famous work 'Insan al Kamil' (printed in Cairo) is a notable contribution in this direction. It seems more reasonable to believe that Iqbal is nearer to Alexander than to Nietzsche in his view upon the Superman and space and time. Yet Alexander's conception of God is not an actuality but possibility. Even if Alexander points to God as an actual existence, God is identified with the whole world with its rise towards deity. Such a view leads to complete naturalism or pantheism, perhaps devoid of religious fervor or if there is always a religious yearning for the higher and higher, it will be very vague to worship an ideal Being who remains for ever an unrealized possibility. Of the more recent thinkers Whitehead (1861-1947) and Einstein have made very deep impact on Iqbal. It might possibly be a pleasure to him to find that some of their views even strengthened his Quranic faith.

Einstein, primarily being a scientist, does not elaborate any system of philosophy. It is his theory of relativity which has moved the scientists and the philosophers alike. In him, the traditional notion of matter gets a severe blow.

The theory of relativity has far reaching consequences. Iqbal too is rightly indebted to this theory. However, he feels that this theory, being completely a scientific theory, does not throw any light on the ultimate intrinsic structure of things. Metaphysical speculation is not the function of any scientific theory.

Whitehead is against any kind of bifurcation of nature. Philosophy has divided the world into various groups, such as subject and object, conscious and nonconscious, phenomenal and non-phenomenal, ideal and real etc. Whitehead is against all these bifurcations. The world according to Whitehead is a continuous process of events. It is a big organism in which every thing is indispensable to everything else.

As against any kind of bifurcation of nature, Whitehead also expresses his disapproval of space and time being treated as two separate entities. His own position is that space and time are not entities. They stand for certain relation. Spatial relations depend on temporal relations and vice-versa. There is space-time-continuum.

Einstein, Whitehead, Russell and Iqbal have a similar way of looking at the structure of the physical world. All of them believe in the dynamic aspect of reality. Iqbal attempts to reconstruct Muslim thought with due regard to the traditions of Islam. Such a reconstruction was not possible without having studied faithfully the recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge.

The human personality is the central topic of philosophy for Iqbal. He discusses with keen interest the problem of self, its existence, nature and relation with body.

Iqbal is opposed to all those systems of thought which undermine the value of human self. His conception of self is opposed to pantheistic mysticism which regards absorption in universal life as the final aim and salvation of man. Iqbal firmly pleads for self-affirmation, self-expression and self-development.

Bradley thinks that experience takes place in finite centres and wears the form of finite thisness. But in the end it is inexplicable. This finite centre is only an appearance which is transmitted to a higher unity in the Absolute. As against this view, Iqbal believes that the finite centre of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe. He pleads for the fuller growth of the individuality of man and emphasises its value and implication for both the individual and society. Man,

Iqbal believes, possesses a prominent position in the universe. This view is also perfectly consistent with the teachings of Quran. He holds that a purely idealistic approach to this problem cannot be of much help. The ego is beyond the domain of matter, yet it has some connection with it. Permanent substance merely on the ground of different mental states that we express by the word 'I'. It is through intuitive experience alone that the great importance of human ego and its ultimate destiny is revealed. The ego is finite and imperfect. But it is not a misfortune. Its nature is to aspire towards higher purposes and ideals. That is why the essential nature of soul, thinks Iqbal, is directive. Soul and body are not opposed to each other; rather they belong to the same system. He believes in degrees of reality and as such points out that matter is a colony of lower egos out of which emerges finite life and consciousness when their interaction and association reach a certain degree of complexity. Man is not a stranger to this world. He has gradually emerged out of it. Iqbal thus accepts the idea of evolution which is also perfectly consistent with the teachings of Quran. Long before Darwin, Jahez (255 A.H.), Ibn-i-Maskawih (d. 421 A.H.), and Rumi advocated quite a modern theory with regard to the origin of man. Iqbal says that the essential nature of self is directive and is known by intuition. The importance of intuitive apprehension may also be granted. But intuitive apprehension is not something very clear. Different persons possess it differently. Then the word 'directive' is also well-defined and explained. It would have been more convenient for us if Iqbal could have elaborated its meaning in detail. Yet as views upon the nature of soul is of value, it attempts to make improvement upon previous theories of soul substance. Iqbal has tried to show that the distinction between soul and body is spurious. Iqbal is vehemently opposed to the ideas of self-negation and renunciation. The secret of life does not consist in death, self-negation and other worldliness but in desires and ideals. Apparently Iqbal seems to be opposed to mysticism. Iqbal does not favour any such mystic thought which comes out of depression, which undermines human existence or preaches for self-negation and renunciation and

recommends a life of retirement. Iqbal is a follower of the great mystic Rumi. There is a bold affirmation of human ego even in the lesson of infinite Ego.

As love, according to Iqbal, fortifies the ego, 'asking' or 'Su'al' weakness it. He abhors inactivity. Perhaps no other Eastern thinker has so greatly emphasised the importance of activity. The philosophy of action leads to the question of free-will and determinism. As against the views of fatalist Muslim thinkers of Jabrians, and the Mutazalities, the advocate of free-will, Iqbal believes that man is partly free, partly determined. His life is an endeavour for fuller and higher freedom. He reconciles destiny with time. Time is not like a line which has already been drawn upon which all of us have to traverse. It is a store house of possibilities. The future exists as an open possibility and not as a reality or lying somewhere in distant as an accomplished fact. The ego in its movement towards freedom and uniqueness, has to pass through three stages viz. Obedience to law, Self-Control and Divine Vicegerency. He points out the meaning and significance of higher determinism, in which, one by submitting himself to the Divine will, partakes in the Divine freedom, and becomes stronger.

Iqbal's theory of self-development is more imaginary, one sided, abstract, theoretical and formal. Its value is, however, great in the sense that it tries to give considerable impetus to the education and development of the human ego. One may be reminded of the preachings of Geeta which speaks of Karma Yoga, Bhakti Yoga and Jnana Yoga. It is through action, love and knowledge that development of self is possible. This does not mean that Iqbal, then, must have been influenced by Geeta. If we go into the details, we find many differences between Iqbal and the Geeta. Iqbal is certainly an admirer of Lord Krishna who advocated the great value of action for the self development, but pitiable it was that the logical hair-splitting of Sankra dwindled this outlook.

Iqbal's views upon immortality are quite interesting. It is difficult to believe, how a thing can be wiped out as a thing of no use whose evolution has taken millions of years to produce

to. But this can only show the everlastingness of life, and not of the individual life. Moreover, man is only a candidate for this. We can achieve this if we adopt an attitude in this life and realize the inner initiative of our soul, failing which we are likely to be hardened into the material plane.

Iqbal emphatically denies all such views which advocate the unreality or illusory nature of the universe. In this respect he is opposed to the Vedantists, and also to those western idealists who does not attach much importance to this world. The world for Iqbal, is real and dynamic and possesses in it a serious purpose.

Iqbal believes in the gradual rising of ego-hood. On the analogy of our conscious experience, he points out that the universe, too, is a free creative movement which knows no limit. It is a growing universe and not already completed product. Iqbal is a believer in the theory of evolution, which is not inconsistent with the teachings of the Quran. But religious literature does speak of creation. The creative process may be in the form of evolution. There is no contradiction in it. Again we speak of creation only from human point of view. We cannot say that the world was created at a particular point of time. There is no creation, as such, from Divine point of view. The conception of God as discussed by Iqbal, is based on Islamic faith. He vigorously asserts the unity of God as expressed by Islam. He recognizes the value of the different forms of arguments to prove the existence of God.

The political philosophy of Iqbal is the practical side of his philosophy. Iqbal is not an individualist who only speaks for self-development. The individual realizes its potentiality only in a society. In his system, the individual, society, State, religion, morality and law all are united in an organized whole. In an Islamic state, the Sovereignty of Allah is supreme. The head of the Islamic state is supposed to establish divine law in the society. That is why separation of religion and politics, church and state are not recommended. There is conflict between states and states, nation and nation, and mankind is

open to all forms of tyranny, subjugation, injustice and horrors of a nuclear war. Iqbal feels it strongly that such a state of affairs can only be removed if we unite politics with religion, power with vision. He is an admirer of Islamic internationalism and dreams of a world wide state based on Islamic principles.

Iqbal, mistakably, thought that all wrong doings are due to lack of religion. Even in the period of great religious conviction, there were religious wars and religious persecution. What is religious or not-religious is interpreted from one's own point of view. Iqbal does not appeal when he wishes to unite state with religion fundamentally on Islamic principles.

Iqbal presents the ideal of one state which seems to be not feasible. How can humanity be organised in one nation (on the lesson of one religion) with so many heterogeneous elements? Religion cannot, and should not be the basis of state or nation. This is a fascist idea or communalistic idea.

Iqbal with all his mind and heart, is great believer in the value of religion. He regrets that modern man has ceased to live soulfully. In pursuit of his intellectual activities, man has made unpredicted victory over the forces of nature, but has been robbed of his faith in his own future.

Art has also a deeper significance for life. The value of art too has to be judged from the point of view of personality. Art should be pervaded by ethical sense, meaning thereby that the total effect upon its reader should be such as to help the development of his personality and human society. But the function of art is not merely reformative. The artist, is not necessarily always interested in highly intellectual or ethical values of life.

### Notes

1. Hakim, Dr. Khalifa Abdul, Rumi, Nietzsche and Iqbal, article in *Iqbal as a Thinker* (Lahore 1944) p. 196.
2. Sharif, M.M., 'Iqbal's conception of God' article in *Iqbal as a Thinker*, (Lahore 1944), p. 126.

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## **GANDHI AND MARX : An Ethico-Philosophical Study**

**K. N. Singh**

Marx and Engels have written comparatively little directly about ethical problems but their system implies fairly definite ethical theory. The present book is intended to make a comparative study of the ethical ideas of Marx and Gandhi in a scientific and analytical manner and deliver the two opposite ideologies in a dovetailed shape.

## **HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF BUDDHISM**

**S. K. Singh**

Based mainly on Pali canonical and exegetical literature, and archaeological sources, the purpose of the book is to trace the history of Buddhism and to discuss its principal tenets. It furnishes a detailed and comprehensive account of the society, the religious beliefs, political situation and economic condition of India in the 7th century B. C. It also puts forward the reasons that led to the expulsion or disappearance of Buddhism from India. The philosophical portion of the book is a valuable contribution to the available Buddhist literature.