

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IQBAL

DR. KHURSHID ANWAR

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IQBAL

Dr. Khurshid Anwar

IQBAL ACADEMY PAKISTAN

All Rights Reserved

Publisher

Prof. Dr. Baseera Ambreen

Director

Iqbal Academy Pakistan

Government of Pakistan

National Heritage & Culture Division 6th Floor, Aiwan-i-Iqbal, Edgerton Road, Lahore

Tel: 92-42-36314510, 99203573

Fax: 92-42-36314496

Email: <u>info@iap.gov.pk</u> Website: <u>www.allamaiqbal.com</u>

ISBN: 978-969-416-585-1

1st Edition : 1996

2nd Edition : 2022 Quantity : 500

Price : Rs.860

Printed at : Fareedia Art Press

International, Lahore

Sales Office:

Ground Floor, Aiwan-i-Iqbal Complex, Lahore.

To my father Alhaj Said Qamash Khan

Ä

CONTENTS

Intoduction	1
Muhammad Iqbal: Life and Works	5
What is Knowledge	37
Human—Divine Knowledge	75
HumanNon-Divine Knowledge	111
The Ultimate Ego	139
The Finite Ego	169
Conclusion	219
Bibliography	221

INTRODUCTION

Iqbal's Reconstruction plays the role of an arbitrator between Tahafat al-Falasifa of Al-Ghazzali and "Tahafat al-Tahafat" of Ibn-i-Rushd. Iqbal neither parts with the former nor with the latter but brings rejuvenation between the two philosophers.

Much work has so far been done on Iqbal, practically on every aspect of his philosophy, but no one has paid sufficient attention to his epistemological work.

The purpose of this thesis is to find out his views on the theory of knowledge, possibly clear if not exhaustive. For this purpose we have taken a critical scrutiny of his major concepts namely, intellect, intuition, the Ultimate Ego and the finite ego.

Initially, I have given the epistemology of the Qur'an in order to clarify the relation between this epistemology and that of Iqbal.

The conclusions that I have drawn are based almost on his original work. He was a prolific writer and used three languages: Urdu, Persian and English which were all alien to him. My scant knowledge of Persian made me unable to read his Persian work in the original. So I consulted the most authentic English translations instead.

Iqbal the poet-philosospher of Pakistan was born on November the 9th, 1877 at Sialkot. He was a Kashmiri

Brahman. His grandfather became Muslim. He had two sons, Nur Muhammad and Abdul Quadir. Iqbal was the son of Nur Muhammad. Iqbal started his education in a mosque with Mir Hassan as his teacher. In 1893 he went to college at Sialkot. Afterwards he came to Lahore for his graduation, where he got his Master of Arts in Philosophy. He went to Europe for his higher studies. He obtained his Doctorate in Philosophy from Munich in 1907, and came back to Lahore starting his career as a professor of philosophy but soon he resigned and began practicing law. He gave a great incentive to the politics of India. His poetry aroused the sense of encouragement in the distressed Muslims at that time. He died on the 20th of April 1938.

As philosopher He was a modernist as Muhammad Abduh was in Egypt or Jamaluddin Afghani in Afghanistan. Iqbal's philosophy is mostly called "the philosophy of ego". In the present work we have elaborated his theory of knowledge. His epistemology is based on the Qur'anic epistemology. The Qur'an is unequivocal on the notion of knowledge. It admits the sources of knowledge as sense-perception, reason and religious experience. All these three sources are substantiated by the Qur'an. Iqbal's views about the concept of knowledge are the same. He is in full agreement with the Qur'anic concept. He harmonizes all these three categories of knowledge. For him all the sources of knowledge are indispensable to each other. All the sources taken together, reach the Ultimate Reality. He further brings the distinction between the two sources: intellect and intuition. Intuition is called "Human Divine knowledge". For him this is the only source which leads one to the Ultimate Reality. Intellect is a source which is named "Human non-Divine knowledge" and which cannot alone comprehend the Ultimate Reality. Igbal thus doubts the certainty of this source as was the case with Al-Ghazzali, Hume and Kant. Iqbal, therefore, brings out the bond between the two. Both must, according to him, function in mutual rejuvenation.

Furthermore, Iqbal's conception of ego is also connected with his theory of knowledge. He stresses the point that ego

comprises the unity of mental states. These mental states are based on sense-perception, intellect and intuition or, in Iqbal's words, "love". Such ego is free from will and thus immortal. Immortality, he says, is not ours by right, we have to be candidates for it. His ordinary ego goes higher and higher till it reaches its perfection. This ego he calls "finite ego".

There is Ultimate Ego too, which is God. Iqbal rejects all the traditional proofs given for the existence of God. He introduces his own proofs which are based on the modern theory of relativity in physics. His God is personal and individual.

We shall see that Iqbal combines all these three sources of knowledge so that they work together to create the perfect ego.

It is my duty here to acknowledge the debt of gratitude to all those people who have really rendered this work possible. I am specially indebted to Professor Dr. Hubert Dethier who accepted me as a Doctoral student in the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy. Professor Dr. Jacques Ruytininx is also thanked for his being the official supervisor of this work. I owe much gratitude to Dr. Julien Balliu for his discussions and suggestions in connection with my work.

This work started under the inspiring guidance of Professor Dr. F.J. Vandamme. He is a very human, very kind and very sincere person. He helped me not only in this work by giving invaluable suggestions and guidance but also in the other walks of my life. This work would not have been possible without his gracious help. I am really grateful to him and his whole family.

It remains for me to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Hosam Elkhadem of the National Center for the History of Sciences, whom I met at the eleventh hour. He has gone through the whole work and corrected it where it was necessary. As a generous and very kind person, he made invaluable suggestions and corrections, I am really very thankful to him.

I also owe gratitude to the Government of Pakistan, especially, the Ministry of Education, for providing the opportunity for me to study abroad.

The Government of Belgium, especially the Ministry of Culture and Education, Brussels and the O.C.M.W. in Mechelen are thanked for the financial support during my stay in Belgium.

The Embassy of Pakistan in Brussels is also thanked for their sincere cooperation in providing me with the materials for this work.

Last but not least, I am very thankful to my parents for their blessings and constant encouragement.

CHAPTER ONE

MUHAMMAD IQBAL: LIFE AND WORKS

"A SEER DOES NOT APPEAR IN A GARDEN EASILY, FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS THE NARCISSUS CRIES ON HER LIGHTLESSNESS".1

LIFE

His Family

Muhammad Iqbal was born on November 9, 1877 ² at Sialkot in the province of Punjab, Pakistan. His forefathers were Kashmiri Brahmans and his sub-caste was Sapru. The Pandit ancestor who embraced Islam was given the Muslim name "Salih". His name was Laljoj and he embraced Islam some four hundred and fifty years ago. It is believed that Iqbal's ancestors must have migrated because of political persecution or economic distress. His grandfather was Shaikh Rafiq who left his ancestral village of Looehar in Kashmir not long after 1857 and came to settle in Sialkot along with his three brothers.

He was a peddler of Kashmiri shawls whose two sons Nur Muhammad and Ghulam Qadir were born in Sialkot.

Shaikh Nur Muhammad, probably born in 1840, was educated in tanning and embroidery, while his brother Shaikh Ghulam Qadir was appointed as a unskilled worker in the Department of Immigration. Neither of them acquired a formal or proper education. Shaikh Nur Muhammad was respected by his peers because of his religious piety and mystic temperament. He gained mystic knowledge from his sufi friends. He was called an "unparh phalsafi", i.e. "untutored philosopher". He was married with a religious and pious woman, Imam Bibi. She too was uneducated in the formal sense but she learnt and studied the Our'an and some kinds of prayers. Shaikh Nur Muhammad, the father of Muhammad Iqbal was highly skilled and got a reputation very soon. A local deputy wazir once purchased especially for him a new Singer sewing machine. Imam Bibi, his wife, mistrusted the legitimacy of the income and believed that the larger part of it had been derived from un-Islamic and illegal pursuits and thus refused to spend any part of her husband's income on herself. Shaikh Nur Muhammad eventually left this job and started the embroidering of Muslim women's hoods. He soon became so popular in making these caps that he had to hire few servants for his assistance. He left the job at the time when his illustrious son Muhammad Iqbal proved to be a great poet and philosopher of Islam. Igbal compelled his father to resign from the job and take rest.

Shaikh Nur Muhammad was an accomplished sufi and was believed to have possessed intuitive knowledge of future events. Iqbal was hardly eleven when the following incident happened. "One night I awoke", Iqbal says, "from a deep sleep and saw my mother going downstairs and I followed her. Finally we stood in front of a half-opened door of a room and saw rays of light streaming out of the room. Mother went in and she peeped through the window; I also did the same. We saw that my father was sitting in the open courtyard surrounded by a halo of soft light. I wanted to go to my father but mother put me to bed with some explanation of this

incident. Next morning I rushed to father and found mother sitting nigh to him hearkening to his intuitions. 'I intuitively comprehended, said my father, that a caravan had come from Kabul and was encamped some miles out of Sialkot. There was a sick man among the people intensively in need of great help. I felt I should go to their help.' Then the parents proceeded to the camp of the caravan where the father inquired from the head of the caravan about the sick man and asked to be taken near his bed. Father discovered that the patient was in critical and miserable condition due to a severe infection. Then he took out something from his pocket which looked very much like ashes and rubbed it on his infected limbs. Father said insha Allah (God willing) the patient would recover soon. No one believed it but within twenty four hours the condition of the sick man turned better".3 This incident was told to Abdul Majeed Salik by Muhammad Iqbal himself. Another eminent poet and scholar and a close friend of Iqbal, Khalifa Abdul Hakim said that "Igbal did not develop his philosophic weltanschauung through philosophic speculations, but had inherited it from his parents".4

Iqbal's mother died on November 9, 1914. He composed a very long poem on her death, a poem of great philosophical significance for both Muslims and non-Muslims and one which sheds light on his philosophy of death. The following lines are part of it:

Who would wait for me anxiously in my native place Who would display restlessness if my letter fails to arrive? I will visit thy grave with this complaint; Who will now think of me in midnight prayers? All thy life thy love served me with devotion, When I become fit to serve thee, thou hast departed.⁵

Iqbal's father died on August 17, 1930 at the age of 93. He saw Iqbal in his life-time as a philosopher and a poet of international repute.

Shaikh Nur Muhammad had two sons and four daughters. The sons were Shaikh Atta Muhammad and Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal. Atta Muhammad was born in 1860. After

completing his education, he qualified as an Engineer and served in that capacity in the Military Department till his retirement.

It was Shaikh Atta Muhammad who financed the education of his younger brother Muhammad Iqbal in Europe. In the poem which he composed on the death of his mother, Iqbal also alluded to the service of his elder brother towards him. Thus he admired him in the following lines of the same poem:

That youth, who is just like a cypress in his heights, And who was fortunate enough to serve you more than I,

And who has been very helpful to me in my worldly struggle,

My arm, and the image,

Of your love.6

He died on the 22nd of December, 1940, 80 years old, two years after the death of Muhammad Iqbal, which occurred on April 21, 1938.

HIS EDUCATION

In the days of Iqbal, and even now, the Muslim children are educated in mosques under the supervision of some celebrated maulvis. The mosque is the first substantial and essential school where a Muslim child can obtain knowledge. Igbal too, like other Muslim children started his primary education in a mosque. Fortunately he was introduced to an accomplished and celebrated teacher Syed Mir Hasan "who proved very helpful for the progress of the young student who attracted the interest of literary and religious circles very early".7 This acknowledged scholar, who was the friend of Nur Muhammad, was chosen to teach Iqbal. He was born in the same city Sialkot on April 18, 1844, and died on September 25, 1929. First he worked as a tutor of children in a mosque, He was a genius and excelled in Arabic and Persian. He was appointed as a professor of Oriental literature at the Scotch Mission College, Sialkot, which was established in 1899 by the

Western Missionary, particularly by the Church of Scotland and the Netherlands, and which is now named Murray College. Iqbal afterwards called himself the "Living Book" of his master and earned for him a knighthood as "Shamsul Ulama". He also pays tribute to his beloved teacher in the following lines,

That light of the exalted house of Ali Whose threshold will always be like the ka'ba to me, Whose breath enabled the bud of my desire to blossom, Whose kind enlightenment my critical faculty.⁸

He has also alluded to the greatness of his teacher in another place:

I, Iqbal, received the illuminations from the house of this Syed (Sayed Mir Hasan). And those who fostered and flourished under his guidance are something unique". 9

Iqbal finished his primary education in 1891. After matriculating in 1839, he was registered as a first year student to Murray College. In these days Iqbal started writing poems and his revered teacher Mir Hasan encouraged him in almost every way.

It is said that Iqbal's teacher had in his memory thousands of Arabic, Persian and Urdu verses of well-known poets. Although he himself never composed a verse, he taught Iqbal the techniques of classical Urdu and Persian poetry. When he finished his intermediate classes in 1895, he immediately came to Lahore, got admission to the Government College to continue his higher education. He received his Bachelor of Arts in 1897 from this College. He was granted a scholarship and a medal in Arabic. He took his Master of Arts degree in Philosophy in 1899. This time he won a gold medal for being the first among the successful candidates. He himself wrote about this:

During the course of my University career I had the good fortune to win several gold and silver medals and scholarships.". 10

He also took a law examination which he chose as a second alternative. (the first being the philosophy course). He unfortunately failed in the examination. He appealed to the Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab to allow him to take the examination without being obliged to attend the lectures again but the Justice's verdict was not in his favour. He took another examination called Civil Service Examination or Competitive Examination to allow him to become an Extra Assistant Commissioner in his home province, Punjab. But the doctors saw that he was unfit for this job for some medical reason. A Muslim journal criticized the Medical Board and the procedure of the examination. The periodical wrote.

The elders of the Muslim nation know several promising young men including Shaikh Muhammad Iqbal, M.A., who has achieved a considerable reputation for his unmatched intellectual ability.¹¹

It should be stated here that Iqbal not only made contacts with the most famous names in the field of philosophy, but also increased his activities in the field of poetry and approached some of the then poetical geniuses.

Iqbal needed someone to correct his verses and Dagh, a well known poet in India at that time, served this purpose. Iqbal used to send his verses to Dagh who corrected some of them. Afterwards Dagh wrote back to his pupil that his poems needed no more correction. Dagh's life was long enough to see Iqbal acquire popularity and he often referred with pride that one time he had corrected Iqbal's verse. When Dagh died, Iqbal composed a poem on his death and paid homage to this Urdu scholar:

Today, o fellow being, the whole garden is mourning, the candle of light is extinguished. The circle of the poets is mourning.

I weave the beads of tears onto my verse. Cry o the clay of Delhi as I am crying for Dagh. 12

We know Lahore to be the centre of great intellectual activity. Iqbal took the benefit of it and regularly attended the

great poetical symposia (mushairas, as called in Urdu). In a literary society formed in Lahore, Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam, Iqbal recited his well-known poem "Himaliya". This poem was greatly applauded by all the people who attended the Society. First, Iqbal refused to publish it, but in 1901 he published it in the newly started Urdu journal Makhzan. This journal made him popular throughout the whole country. Soon, other journals and newspapers began to approach him for the publication of his verses.

At Government College, Lahore, Igbal met another accomplished Western scholar Sir Thomas Arnold. From Syed Mir Hasan Igbal learnt an insight into Muslim culture and philosophy, while his subtle mind was introduced to Western thought by Sir Thomas Arnold. When Thomas Arnold Left Lahore and settled in London, Igbal composed a lamenting poem on separation from his revered teacher. This poem is entitled "Wailings of Separation". In it he expressed his agony about his teacher's separation; he referred in this poem that once he would break the chains of Punjab i.e. his native Province and reach his teacher in London. 13 At last he "broke these chains" and went to London in 1905 where he met his teacher. He got registered at the Trinity College, Cambridge and studied under the famous Neo-Hegelians Mac-Taggart and Tames Ward. He also enrolled himself as a member of the Lincoln's Inn for law studies. He got his Tripos and stayed in England for three years. Afterwards he went to Germany where he submitted his thesis entitled "The Development of Metaphysics in Persia" to the University of Munich on the 4th of November 1907. He was exempted from the rule requiring a stay in the University for at least two years. He was also permitted to submit his thesis in English. His thesis, for which he used some unknown manuscripts especially from Berlin, is important for the history of religions". After obtaining his Ph. D., he went back to England in 1907. In Europe he developed hatred for the narrow and selfish nationalism. It was in Europe too that his views underwent some important changes: firstly, he started to admire life, action and struggle; secondly, he started to wrote his poetry in Persian.

Once Iqbal wrote to his friend Sir Abdul Qadir, "I have made up my mind that I give up Poetry; instead, I would devote my time in the pursuit of something more useful". 15 It is not known what useful thing he had in mind other than what he give us through his poetry and philosophy. Sir Abdul Qadir and his teacher Sir Thomas Arnold made Igbal change his mind and he again started writing poetry "to uphold the cause and inspiration of Muslim people". In a dinner party Abdul Qadir said that "his host asked Igbal to recite his Persian verse and the poet had to confess that he never composed more than a verse or two in Persian.¹⁷ The other day he recited two fresh lyrics to Abdul Qadir . This change from Urdu to Persian was brought about in Europe. His Magnum Opus or what ranked him among great Muslim philosophers had been written in Persian. And this change also won him the title of the Poet of the East'.

Iqbal used three languages for his works: Persian, Urdu and English. All his works show a masterly command of these languages. These languages were all alien to him and he never used his mother tongue, the Punjabi, for any of his works. That is why he appeals to the readers of his work in the beginning of the "Secrets of the Self" which is written in Persian to excuse him:

I am an Indian, and Persian is not my mother tongue, I am like the crescent, Whose cup is empty!

Do not expect the charm of "style" of Khansar and Isfahan from me.

Though the language of India is sweet as sugar, Yet sweeter is the taste of Persian. 18 Dari. 18

At the end of the prologue to the "Secrets of Self", he requests the reader:

Therefore, O reader! please do not find fault with the goblet, but enjoy the taste of the wine in it.¹⁹

In Europe he also met two outstanding Orientalists R.A. Nicholson and E.G. Brown. R.A. Nicholson, the first translator of Iqbal's "Secrets of the Self", writes about him.

Iqbal is a man of his age and a man in advance of his age; he is also a man in disagreement with his age.²⁰

While Igbal was in Europe he met Miss Faizee, a brilliant Indian woman. She came from the cultured Fyzee branch of the Fyzee Tayabjee family. She asked him: "Why did you come to see me?" Because of your travelogue (serially published in India) You have become so famous both in Indian and Britain that I could not help looking you up", he said. Miss Faizee said: "I cannot believe that you travelled that distance just to pay me that homage".21 Once Miss Faizee was waiting outside of his room with some German friends and Iqbal was inside pretending' as she called it, to be in a trance. Finally, she entered his room and found that Iqbal's gaze was fixed upon some books and that his eyes had a dreadful glazy state. Some thought that he had frozen to death during night. Miss Faizee shook him by his shoulders and shouted at him: "wake up; you are not in India where an antic like this can be tolerated". Iqbal gave an explanation for this strange act:

I was up in the heavenly sphere.²²

When Miss Faizee again visited Europe in 1908, she met Iqbal and was there with him for some time. Iqbal wrote a few verses in the autograph album of her sister-in-law, He also sent some verses to Miss Faizee after she left Europe. "The poems fourt with candor of earthly emotions of man for woman". Later on, when Miss Faizee accused Iqbal of "indifference" and "hypocrisy", Iqbal wrote in reply:

" If opportunity comes I shall certainly show you how intensely I have my friends and how deeply my heart feels for them all. People hold life dear and rightly so I have got the strength to give it freely away. No! do not call me indifferent or hypocrite, not even by implication for it hurts my soul and makes me shudder at your ignorance of nature. I wish I could turn inside outward in order to give

you better view of my soul which you think is darkened by hypocrisy and indifference".²⁴

HIS MARITAL LIFE

Iqbal's parents married him to karim Bibi in 1892, when he was hardly 15 years old. She was the daughter of the exceedingly affluent Khan Bahadar Ata Muhammed Khan, a physician in Gujrat, Punjab. Iqbal had three children from her, Miraj Begum, the first child, was born in 1895 and died in 1914 after a long disease. His second child was Aftab Iqbal, born in 1899. He was educated, in London and like his father obtained Bachelor's and Master's degrees in philosophy from the University of London. Then he studied for the Bar at Lincoln's Inn, London; after becoming a barrister, he practiced law in Karachi. His second male child died soon after his birth. Iqbal Lived with Karim Bibi until 1916, the time when he became popular due to his magnum opus "Asrar-i-Khudi" (The Secrets of Self). In the same year they agreed upon divorce. Once Iqbal wrote to Miss Faizee:

my life is extremely miserable; they forced my wife upon me.²⁵

And again he wrote to her showing his embarrassment:

I have written to my father that he had no right to arrange my marriage, especially when I had refused to enter any alliance of that sort. I am quite willing to support her, but I am not prepared to make my life miserable by keeping her with me.²⁶

Iqbal probably wanted to marry Miss Faizee with whom he had developed a friendship since their acquaintance in Europe. Karim Bibi died on the 25th of *February*, 1944. Iqbal supported her till 1938. In 1909 Iqbal was betrothed to Sardar Begum. Soon after he left her, having received some anonymous letters which blackened her character. It is said that Nabi Bakh, a lawyer who wanted his son to marry Sardar Begum had sent these letters to Iqbal. Under these circumstances Iqbal married another woman, Mukhtar Begum who died in 1924. However, before the death of his second

wife Iqbal remarried Sardar Begum. Before this marriage she had written a letter to Iqbal asking him to marry her, Thus she writes:

I was married to you, a second marriage is now inconceivable to me. I will remain in my present state till I die, and on the day of judgement will hold you responsible for ruining my life.²⁷

When he got married to her and was coming with her from Sialkot where they has stayed for a couple of days after marriage, he told one of his friends, Mr. Jalal-ud-Din, who was awaiting for them at the station:

I am perfectly satisfied; I am in heaven.²⁸

Sardar Begum had no children until 1924. There is a story about the birth of his first child that once Sardar Begum was feeding a parrot. When he looked at her, he prayed:

"O God, the state of motherhood has been generated in her, now give her a male child".²⁹

And a few months later Javid Iqbal, his first son, was born, the year being 1924. This son also narrates a story concerning his own birth. He says:

A year or so before I was born (1924) father visited the mausoleum of Shaikh Ahmad Sarhind, also known as Mujaddid Alf Thani ... At the mausoleum, my father prayed for a child, a son, whom he could bring up in accordance with his own ideals of religion and morality. If God did grant him a son, he promised the Saint, he would one day bring him to the mausoleum.³⁰

Iqbal also had a daughter who was born in 1930. Her name is Munira Begum. Javid Iqbal got his Doctorate degree in political Science from London University and is presently retired as Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan. "Javid Nama" is named after him. Sardar Begum, Iqbal's third wife died on may 23, 1935. After her death Iqbal prepared for a further marriage but, on his friends' advice he abandoned this idea. One of his friends, Mirza Jalal-ud-din, a barrister, says that

Iqbal received many anonymous letters from girls offering themselves for marriage but he did not pay any attention to such letters. He Mirza Jalal ud din further asserts that Iqbal had changed after the writing of the "Asrar-i-Khudi", and after his marriage with Sardar Begum, the mother of Dr. Javid Iqbal.³¹

Ali Bakhsh, his life-long, faithful servant, says that when all the three women were living together with Iqbal, he never discriminated among them and that his behaviour towards them was based on the principle of justice and equality.³²

HIS PROFESSIONS.

Before going to Europe for higher studies, Iqbal was appointed on the 13th of may 1899 a Macleod Reader in Arabic in the Oriental College, Lahore. This was also the year when he took his Master of Arts degree in philosophy with distinction. He taught in Oriental College, Lahore, till the 2nd of June, 1903. On the third of June 1903 he was appointed Assistant Professor of philosophy at Government College, Lahore. He remained at this post till October 1903. He taught Philosophy, English, History and Political Economy. In 1905 he went to England on a study leave. In October 1907, he got his degree from Cambridge and his doctorate from Munich and passed his Law examination. Then he taught Arabic at the University College, London for six months between 1907 and 1908. When he returned to India in July 1908, he resigned his job at the Government College, Lahore and began practicing law. These days Igbal received letters from the Department of Education asking him to continue his job as a Professor and he was told that the department would appoint him in the Imperial Service. But he refused it. The Department of Education had persistently been influencing Iqbal to accept the offer as a part-time Professor and to deliver lectures on philosophy for at least two hours. Eventually he agreed to this condition but there was a difficulty because he had to be present at the court in the morning while at the same time he was required at the College. Therefore the Department of asked the Punjab Government to request the authorities of Chief Court to take Igbal's cases only in the after

noon.³³ Government of the Punjab later on approved his appointment as a professor in the Indian Educational Services at Government College, Lahore. It is obvious from Iqbal's poetry that he did not want himself to be constrained in the British Services and so he resigned the professorship. After his resignation he told his friend and servant Ali Bakhsh:

there were many difficulties for me if I remained in the British Services. I could not convey easily to my people the message I have in my heart. Now I am free.³⁴

In 1918 when the professor of philosophy at Islamia College, Lahore, died, the Anjuman-i-Himayat-l-Islam, to which Iqbal had much devotion, requested him to fill the gap and teach philosophy to the Master's degree classes. He accepted the request and started teaching there, but after two months he resigned this post. He practiced as lawyer from 1908 to 1934. He was very successful as he took keen interest in the cases he was defending. In 1909 Aligarh Muslim University offered him a Professorship of History but he refused to accept the invitation. Once he wrote in a letter to Miss Faizee:

the Lieutenant Governor was willing to recommend me to the Secretary of State for India for the vacant Professorship in the Lahore Government College, but I gave up the idea of standing as a candidate, much against my personal inclination. Force of circumstances compells me to consider things from (the) financial point of view... a point of view which was revolting to me a few years ago. I have decided to continue that legal profession trusting in God's help.³⁵

It is said that Iqbal never earned more than he actually needed for his survival.

Due to poor health Iqbal stopped practicing law in 1934. Although he was invited to Oxford as Civil Rhodes Lecturer in 1935, weakness of health prevented him again and compelled him to refuse the invitation.³⁶

HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

"It was a great achievement for the Muslim League that its lead came to be acknowledged by both the majority and minority provinces. Sir Muhammed Iqbal played a very conspicuous part, though at the time not revealed to public, in bringing about this consummation".³⁷

These words confirm the active part Muhammad Igbal played in politics. Though he was not interested in politics at first, a great genius like him could not remain aloof from practical politics. Therefore in April 1926 he started his election campaign to become a member of the Provincial Assembly. He won this seat by 300 votes, becoming the Member of Legislative council. The British government formed a Commission in 1927 seeking Constitutional reforms in India. Sir John Simon presided over this Commission which was the "Simon Commission". As this henceforth called Commission consisted only of British members and no Indian ones, the outrageous people of India decided to boycot it. Sir Muhammad Iqbal emerged as a great political leader and, together with a few eminent politicians, he issued a statement in favour of the Government. He stated that the Muslims would harm their own interests if they boycot the Commission.38

In 1930 he was appointed President of the annual session of the Muslim League. In his Presidential Address, he gave Indian Islam a sense of separate destiny.

His Presidential Address, important for its philosophical significance, runs as follows:

Man, says Renan, is enslaved neither by his race nor by his religion, nor by the cause of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation. Such a formation is quite possible though it involves the long and arduous process of practically remaking men and furnishing them with fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in

1.5

India if the teachings of Kabir and the divine faith of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the people of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognize facts as they are and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as of Asia really depends, India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in The East, and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India it will bring peace and mutual good-will to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of India. It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating, each other. Perhaps in the higher interests of mutual cooperation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly simulating a larghearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps we are unwilling to recognize that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still feel hopeful.³⁹

And it was in the same Presidential Address that he declared:

I would like to see the Punjab North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state, Self Government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North West India. 40

The British Government invited Iqbal to attend the Round Table Conferences in 1931. He attended the second and the third sessions as a member of the Minorities Committee. On December 15, 1931, he also addressed the House of Commons in England. While sailing back to India, he met some outstanding persons and visited many historical places.

In France he visited Henri Bergson and had lively discussion with him. In this meeting Iqbal told Bergson a hadith of the prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him), The hadith runs as follows:

Do not vilify time (God says), I am time.

It is said that Bergson was shocked and asked Iqbal time and again if it was true. Iqbal also visited the grave of Napoleon and composed a poem on the character of this French soldier. He went to Spain where he met Professor Palacios Asian, the renowned author of "Divine Comedy and Islam". He also delivered some lectures at the Spanish universities at their request. From Spain he went to Italy where he got a warm welcome from the intellectuals. He also met with Mussolini, a meeting which deeply impressed him and made him compose a poem on Mussolini.⁴¹

He arrived at Lahore in February 1933. He was appointed President of the Punjab Parliamentary Board in 1936. Iqbal strongly supported Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and gave him his "invaluable support" as Muhammad Ali Jinnah himself acknowledges:

His (Muhammad Iqbal's) views were substantially in consonance with my own and had finally led me to the same conclusions as a result of careful examination and study of the constitutional problems facing India, and found expression in due course in the united will of Muslim India as adumbrated in the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League, popularly known as the "Pakistan resolution" passed on 23 March 1940. 42

Iqbal has written many letters to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to assist him in the field of politics. These letters are, of great importance to the Muslim world.

Iqbal was not only considerate towards the Muslims in India, but also towards the Muslims in the rest of the world. In a letter to the 'Founder of Pakistan' he expresses his feelings as follows:

The Palestine question is very much agitating the minds of the Muslims. We have a very fine opportunity for mass contact for the purpose of the League. I have no doubt that the League will pass a strong resolution on this question and also by holding a private conference of the Leaders decide on some sort of a positive action in which masses may share in large numbers. This will at once popularize the league and may help the Palestine Arabs. 43

He takes this matter so seriously that he further says, in the same letter:

personally I would not mind going to jail on an issue which affects both Islam and India.⁴⁴

He says in his notebook that "Nations are born in the hearts of poets, they prosper and die in the hands of politicians". In exactly the same way the nation of Pakistan was born in the heart of the poet Iqbal and prospered in the hand of the politician, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

HIS LAST DAYS

It is said that Iqbal caught cold during a visit to the famous Badshahi Mosque in Lahore in 1934 which caused him

the loss of his voice. The illness was diagnosed as a local paralysis of the laryngeal nerves. He stayed in Bhopal for medical treatment. The Nawab of Bhopal offered him his help; it resulted in a friendship which was much like the relation that existed between the Duke of Weimer and Goethe. 46

In 1935 his wife, the mother of Dr. Javid Iqbal, died which put further burden on his ill-health. Javid and Munira were left to the care of their handicapped father. Still the father was not indifferent to his children and he appointed a German lady to take care of them. In 1936 his friend Sir Ross Masood died. It was a severe blow to his health, which was already impaired by a developing heart disease. In 1937 a cataract deprived Iqbal of his eyesight. Inspite of all these troubles, he never ceased planning new books; he always engaged himself in contemplations to seek the betterment of his fellow beings.

Iqbal very much desired to go to Mecca to perform the obligatory pilgrimage (Haj). However this desire was never fulfilled because of his poor health and his busy life. In his last days he used to say to his valet Ali Bakhsh that when he would go to pilgrimage he would write a book on his way to it and that book would be his last one.

Although he did not perform the pilgrimage, the book, which he wanted to write, did appear posthumously in 1938. The poet of Islam gave his last message of new year on the First January 1938 through All India radio. He said that:

Only one unity is dependable and that unity is the brotherhood of man which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accused nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialise. Let us therefore begin the New Year with the prayer that God Almighty may grant

humanity to those who are in places of power and Government and teach them to cherish mankind.⁴⁷

In March 1938 his illness became very severe and all hopes of recovery were shattered. His last visitor in Lahore was his German friend H.H. von Veltheimostrau with whom he discussed German philosophy. Iqbal died on the 21st of April 1938. He was not a prophet. "No body will assert that he was prophet that would be both wrong from the point of view of history of religions and incompatible with the Islamic dogma of the finality of prophethood-but we may admit that he has been touched by Gabriel's Wing". 48

Just before his death he recited the following lines:

The departed melody may recur or not, The Zepher may blow again from Hijaz or not, The days of this Faqir have come to an end, Another seer may come or not.⁴⁹

He also said to his brother when he was lying on his death-bed

I tell you the sign of a momin when death comes there is a smile on his lips.⁵⁰

One of the Indian Muslim poets has discovered in advance the Chronogram of his death in the poem Musafir (the Traveller) in the line:

There remained no longer sincerity, purity and clearness, the numerical value being 1357/1938".⁵¹

The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah sent a message to his son Dr. Javid Iqbal:

To me he was a friend, guide and philosopher, and during the darkest moments through which the Muslim League had to go, he stood like a rock and never flinched one single moment.⁵²

Rabindranath Tagore's message is also a touching one. He said:

Iqbal's death creates a void in literature that like a mortal wound will take a long time to heal.⁵³

Iqbal is buried near the gate of the Badshahi Mosque at Lahore, Pakistan

WORKS

Iqbal started writing poetry in the beginning of his life; his revered teacher Maulvi Mir Hasan gave him the motivation and the courage to express his thoughts in verse. He has left us a voluminous work on different subjects in both poetry and prose.

His first book "'Ilm al-Iqtisad" (the Science of Economics) was written in Urdu in 1903. For the correction of the language Iqbal had sent it to Akbar Allahabadi, a well-known poet and the then Judge.

His second book was Tarikh-i-Hind (The History of India).

His third book was *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, published in 1907. It was his Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Prof. F. Hommel on the 4th of November 1907 in the University of Munich in Germany. This book is a valuable help for the history of religion and especially for the history of Persia. Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, a mystical poet of Persia, of the twelfth century had been reintroduced to the European scholars by means of this book.

Asrar-i-Khudi (The Secrets of the Self) was his fourth book. As we have already mentioned, Iqbal's own language was Punjabi. Nevertheless he composed poems in Urdu, because Urdu was a much more sophisticated language than his own mother tongue and it was also considered the language of all people in India. Bu when he left for London he changed his medium of expression from Urdu to Persian and the result was the appearance of that magnum opus "The Secrets of the Self" in 1915, which brought out the fame of Iqbal from the borders of India. In this book he explains his philosophy of Ego in verse. The book caught the attention of the Orientalist R.A.

Nicholson, who was the first to study this book. He said about it:

The Asrar-i-Khudi was first published at Lahore in 1915. I read it soon afterwards, and thought so highly of it that I wrote to Iqbal whom I had the pleasure of meeting at Cambridge some fifteen years ego, asking leave to prepare an English translation.⁵⁴

In India it raised a storm of criticism against Iqbal for his indictment against the Wahdat al-Wajud i.e. pantheistic school of sufism.⁵⁶

His fifth book was Rumuz-i-Bekhudi (The Mysteries of Selflessness). This book, which is indispensable for Asrar-i-Khudi, appeared in 1918. It deals with social and collective life without which an individual cannot be successful in any walk of life. The English Orientalist, A.J. Araberry was the first to render it into English. He writes about the book that Iqbal was in search of a caliphal centre to which 300.000.000 Muslims of the world could gravitate spiritually and politically.⁵⁷

Afterwords these books (Asrar-i-Khudi and Rumuz-i-Bekhudi) were published under the single title of Asrar-o-Rumuz.

His sixth book, *Payam-i-Mashriq* (The Message of the East) appeared in 1932. It is Persian verse and written in answer to Goeth's Westostlicher Divan. He dedicated the book to King Amanullah of Afghanistan and wrote a beautiful long poem on the character of the King.

In the introduction he gives a concise history of the oriental movement in Germany. Annemaire Schimmel, a German Orientalist, remarked:

It is indeed remarkable that after the centuries old influence of Persian poetry on western and especially German thought which culminated in Goethe and Rucker, we have here, for the first time, a genuine attempt of a qualified Eastern poet, endowed with wide knowledge

of Western literature and thought, to respond to this poetical movement and enter into a dialogue with Europe.⁵⁸

This work represents the development and the maturity of his philosophical thought, which also contains the philosophy of life already developed in his Asrar-i-Khudi. "Payam-i-Mashriq" was criticised by hostile intellectuals and one of them, Karimudin Barq, published his own Payam-i-Aftab (The Message of the Sun). According to this writer:

Payam-i-Mashriq was of mean mentality, self praise and ignorance of Persian literature and was also much expensive.

But the work of Iqbal defeated its critics and is "now perhaps the best known Persian work of Iqbal which also quickly gained fame outside India".⁵⁹

A Turkish poet, Mehmet Akif, once wrote:

I compared the poet to my self. Iqbal, who has read the whole poetry of the great sufis which were brought up in the East and then, having gone to Germany, also digested well the Western philosophy, is indeed a very strong poet... In the *Payam-i-Mashriq* there are very beautiful pieces and ghazal (lyrics). One or two of his ghazals made me shout in intoxication.⁶⁰

A.J. Arberry translated this book into English in 1947 under the title "The Tulip of Sinai". Other translations in French, Spanish, Russian and Arabic have followed. This work has earned for Iqbal the title of "The poet of the East".

Bang-i-Dara (The Caravan Bell) was his seventh book. The work appeared in its definite form in 1924. It is a compilation of his earlist verses which he read in the poetical symposia and from time to time published in various magazines, especially in "Makhzan" founded by his friend Sir Abdul Qadir, who also wrote a foreword to it. The book is in three parts. The poems of the first part were written before 1905, the second part was composed between 1905 and 1908, and the third part, after

1908. Every poem in Bang-i-Dara portrays Iqbal's love for Islam while the "Complaint" and the "Answer" in this book must be looked upon as the best of all his Urdu and Persian poems. These poems came as result of his visit to Europe where he realized the distinction between the Muslim and the Europeans. (i.e. both the mental and material distinction).

In 1907, when he was in England for his higher studies, he composed some verses depicting the weakness of the European civilization as if it is perched on a frail bough and likely to fall down. Thus he says in the following lines:

O residents of the West, God's earth is not a shop; The gold you are thinking to be genuine Will now turn to be of low value; Your civilization is going to commit suicide with her own dagger;

The nest which is made on a frail branch cannot but be insecure.⁶¹

In the same poem there are some verses which express his rage for the indifference and ignorance of the Muslims of India. He believes them to have fallen into decadence and servitude. The poem which contains these stirring verses is entitled "TasviriDard (The Picture of Pain). The title itself shows how much pain Iqbal had in his heart for the condition of the Muslims in India. Thus he bursts out in the following lines;

"Think of thy country, O thoughtless! trouble is brewing in heavens, there are designs for thy ruin

See that which is happening and that which is to happen.

What is there in the stories of olden times, If you fail to understand this, you will be exterminated, O people of India,

Even your story will not be preserved in the annals of the word 62

Zabur-i-Ajam (Persian Psalm) was Iqbal's eighth work. It was published in 1927. In this book he has reached the highest standard of Persian lyrical poetry. It is regarded as one of the

best mystical and ascetical books. It consists of two parts. The first is composed of short poems and lyrics, the second, consists of one long poem written on the pattern of the Gulshan-i-Raz (The Rose Garden of Mystery). This is a mystical question-and-answer poem of Mahmud Shabistari, a Persian pantheist mystic of early 14th century. Consequently Iqbal named this part "Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadeed" (The New Secrets of Rose Garden). This Persian psalm was the work which was the dearest to Iqbal himself. He knew its importance and therefore urged the Muslims to read it especially in the loneliness of the night. As he referred to it in his Urdu poems:

If you have a desire, read the Persian Psalm in solitude, Because mid-night voice is not without a mystery.⁶³

A.J. Arberry in his translation declares that the reader:

...will find himself in a new world of thought and feeling, a world vibrant with hope and high endeavour, a world revealing the vision of a great thinker who saw in these sorely troubled times the dawn of a new age.⁶⁴

"The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam" was lead's ninth book. Like his dissertation Development of Metaphysics in Persia, this book also appeared in English prose in 1930. It is actually the amalgamation of seven lectures which he delivered from time to time in Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh, he prepared these lectures in two years. Here he emerges as a scientific scholar in his conception of the reconstruction in Islam, lead showed the purpose of these lectures in the following lines:

The philosophy of Islam will be shown in terms of the modern philosophy, and if there are imperfections (defects) in the old ideas then they shall be removed. My task in merely constructive and in his construction I shall take into consideration the best traditions of Islamic philosophy.⁶⁵

These lectures are basically the elucidation of both oriental and occidental thoughts. He has ingeniously elaborated, discussed and analysed the pros and cons of Islamic thought and

presented to us an interpretation of the Qur'an in the light of modern science. He should be called a "religious scientist". In the preface to these lectures he says:

In these lectures which were undertaken at the request of the Madras Muslim Association and delivered at Madras Hyderabad and Aligarh, I have tried to meet, even thought partially, this urgent demand by attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical tradition of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge.⁶⁶

He even hoped that someone would present sounder views than the ones he put forward in these lectures, because according to him:

There is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking.

Somewhere else he said about this book that:

If this book of mine had appeared during the reign of (The Abbasid) Khalifa (Caliph) Mamun-al-Rashid (813-833) it would have had profound repercussion in the entire intellectual world of Islam.

Iqbal's tenth book, Javid Nama (The Eternal Pilgrimage), was named after his son Dr. Javid Iqbal. It was published in 1932. The book shows the imaginative ascension of Iqbal to the heavens. This work is lika Dante's 'The Divine Comedy'. Iqbal meets some outstanding personalities during his mystical journey. Jalal-ud-Din Ruma is his spiritual leader who introduces him in heavens to modernist reformers like Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and Said Halim Pasha, to so-called heretics like Hallaj and the Bahai Martyr, Tahira, to traitors to their nations like Jafer of Bengal and Sadiq of Mysore. He also introduces him to imperialists like Lord Kitcher, and thinkers and poets like Nietzsche, Ghalib of India, Tahir Ghani of Kashmir and Bhartari Hari. Iqbal once said that "its translator will gain fame in Europe". He wrote a letter to his friend Khwaja Shuja explaining his views about this work in the following lines:

My latest poem is going to be Javid Nama Which probably would consist of two thousand verses. It is not as yet complete and would most likely be finished in March. This is a sort of Divine Comedy written according to the pattern of Rumi's Mathnavi. Its introduction will be very interesting and would contain many new things for India, Persia, and for that matter for the entire Muslim world.⁶⁷

Javid Nama has already been rendered into various languages. It was first translated into Italian by Prof. Alessandro Bausian under the title "Poem celesta" (19542). Professor A. Schimmel translated it into German verse as , Buch der Ewigh (Munich 1957). A French version was made by E. Meyer Owith and Muhammad Moki under the title "Le liver de I 'Eternite' (Paris 1962). It was also put into English verse, by A.J. Arberry: (London 1966).

Bal-i-Jabriel (Gabriel's wing) is Iqbal's eleventh work. He published it in 1936. After having been writing in Persian for a long time, Iqbal returned to writing in Urdu. The book shows the maturity of his Urdu, the charm of his style and the richness of his thoughts. It elucidates his philosophy of the ego. The poems "Great prayer in Cordova" and the discussion of "Lenin with God" are of great significance. He dealt with a variety of subjects in this book, for instance, time, space, love and knowledge.

Pas Chi Bayed Kard Ai Aqwam-i-Sharq (What is to be done, O! Nations of the East) is Iqbal's twelfth book, the book, written in Persian, also appeared in 1963. It mainly deals with religion, for instance, the subject of Moses and the Pharaoh. Further on it contains a poem conceived in connection with Italy's attack on Abyssinia. It also includes a poem entitled Musafir (the Traveller), which he composed after a visit to Afghanistan in 1932 together with his friends Syed Sulaiman Nadvi and Sir Ross Masood. These scholars were invited by the then King of Afghanistan, Nadir Shah, to suggest reforms in the education system and to advise the King on the establishment of a university at Kabul. This poem is composed

Muhammad Iqbal: Life and Works

of the impressions he brought with him from Afghaistan after visiting the graves and the shrines of outstanding personalities.

Zarb-i-Kalim (The Rod of Moses) was Iqbal's thirteenth book. This book too was published in 1963 in Urdu. It was considered by the author as a "Declaration" of war against the modern age. It concerns itself with modern age and its problems. It has strongly criticized the West for the frailty of their culture and civilization. As he says in one of his poems:

Un bridled luxury, state pomp and pride rich; commerce; but to dwell inside that lampless breast all tranquil thoughts refuse,

Dark is the white man's country with the grim of engines no valley that might see splendor descending on a burnig tree.

A civilization sick before its prime,

At its last gasp-leaving maybe,

for caretakers of civilization, the Jews. 68

The last book Armaghan-i-Hijaz (The Gift of Hijaz) was published after Iqbal's death in 1938. It consist of two parts: one in Urdu, the other in Persian.

His son Dr. Javid Iqbal compiled all his works in two volumes, an Urdu volume and a Persian volume. these volumes together are called *Kulliyat-i-Iqbal*.

Muhammad Iqbal wanted to publish a work called Aids to the Study of the Qur'an. He had also in his mind to write a book like Nietsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra under the title of The Book of an Unknown Prophet. He has written many articles and papers in various international periodicals.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. Iqbal's Life and Time, Dr. Lini S. May, p. 182.
- 2. He has written on this thesis (The Development of Metaphysics in Persia) the date according to Islamic Calender, 3rd., Dhu Qa'd, 1294 A.H. It corresponds to the Christian Calender as 9th Nov., 1977.
 - 3. Iqbal: Poet Philosopher, edited by Hafeez Malik, p. 7.
 - 4. Ibid, p. 7.
- 5. 'In Memory of My Mother" in longer Poems of Iqbal, translated by A.R. Tariq, p. 105.
 - 6.Ibid., p. 105
 - 7. Gabriel's Wing, A. Schimmel, p. 35.
 - 8. Iqbal: His art and Thought, S.A. Vahid, p. 5.
 - 9. Riwayat-i-Iqbal, Muhammad Chughtai, p. 13.
 - 10. Glimps of labal, pp. 192-193.
 - 11. Iqbal, Peot-Philosopher of Pakistan, p. 14.
 - 12. Kulliyat-i-lqbal, pp. 89-90.
 - 13. Political Philosophy of Iqbal, Parveen Feroze Hasan,p. 3.
 - 14. Gabriel's Wing, A. Schimmel, p. 38.
 - 15. Iqbal, Peot-Philosopher of Paksitan, p. 16.
 - 16. Roozgar-i-Faqir, S. Waheed-ud-din, p. 61.
 - 17. Iqbal, Peot-Philosopher of Paksitan, p. 18.
 - 18. The Secrets of Ego, A.R. Tariq p. 61.

Muhammad Iqbal: Life and Works

- 19. Ibid, p. 62.
- 20. The Secrets of The Self, translated by A.R. Nicholson, p.

31.

- 21. Iqbal, Poet-Philosopher of Paksitan, pp. 20-21.
- 22. Ibid, p. 22.
- 23. Ibid, p. 22.
- 24. Ibid, p. 23.
- 25. Ibid, p. 14.
- 26. Ibid, p. 14.
- 27. Ibid, p. 25.
- 28. Riuyat-i-Iqbal p. 126.
- 29. Ibid.
- 30. Poet-Philosopher of Paksitan, p. 56.
- 31. Riuyat-i-lqbal pp. 128-129.
- 32. Ibid, p. 17.
- 33. Poet-Philosopher of Paksitan, p. 15.
- 34. Riwyat-i-Igbal p. 82.
- 35. Poet-Philosopher, p. 26.

36.

- 37. Letters of Igbal to Jinnah Foreword, p.5.
- 38. The Political Philosophy of Ighal, p. 9.
- 39. Iqbal: His art and Thought, p. 29-30.
- 40. Igbal's life & Time, p. 204.
- 41. Iqbal, Poet and Philosopher, p. 29-30.
- 42. 37 Letters of Ighal to Jinnah, p.6.
- 43. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, p. 27.

- 44. Ibid, p. 27.
- 45. Stray Reflections, p. 125..
- 46. Iqbal: His art and Thought, p. 32.
- 47 Gabriel's Wing, p. 59.
- 48. Gabriel's Wing, p. 387.
- 49. Iqbal: His art and Thought, p. 34.
- 50. Ibid, p. 36.
- 51. Gabriel's Wing, p. 59.
- 52. Iqbal: His art and Thought, p. 29.
- 53. Gabriel's Wing, p. 60.
- 54. The Secrets of The Self, translated by R. A. Nicholson, p. 7.
 - 55. Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Pakistan, pp. 19-20.
 - 56. Ibid. p. 20.
- 57. The Mystery of Selflessness, A.J. Arberry, Quoted by Parveen Feroze Hasan in her "Political Philosophy of Iqbal, p. 19.
 - 58. Gabriel's Wing, p. 44.
 - 59. Ibid, p. 45.
 - 60. Ibid, p. 46.
 - 61. Iqbal: His art and Thought, p. 14.
 - 62. Ibid, p. 8.
 - 63. Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 331.
 - 64. Persian Pasalm, translated by A.J. Arberry, p. 8
- 65. Preface to the Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam by Muhammad Iqbal, p. V.
 - 66. Ibid, p. 6.

Muhammad Iqbal: Life and Works

- 67. The Political Philosophy of Iqbal, pp. 22-23.
- 68. Zarb-i-Kalim (The Rod of Moses), Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, pp.315-316.

.

CHAPTER TWO

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE

PART I

The Espistemology of the Qur'an

The espistemology of the Qur'an is a global one. It starts from sense-perception, acknowledges the power of reason, reaching inspiration and prophetic revelation. This epistemology is like a light which cannot be determined from one direction only but gets its illumination from all directions. We can derive three categories of knowledge from the Qur'an. These three categories of knowledge are the substantial instruments for the acquisition of knowledge. They are interrelated categories; the absence of one will lead to sheer doubt and disbelief of the others.

The three categories are called by the Qur'an:

'Ain al-yaqin, which literally means the certainty of the senses,

'Ilm al yaqin, which means the certainty of reason.

'Haqq al-yaqin, which means absolute certainty.

We will discuss these three categories in detail in order to clarify the Qur'anic meaning of knowledge.

Ain al-Yaqin: the knowledge by sense-perception

The Qur'an is very clear on the notion of perceptual knowledge. The senses are given to mankind as the first instruments to look on things in this universe. As the Qur'an asserts:

It is He (God) Who has created for you (the faculties of) hearing, sight, feeling and understanding.1

In the Qur'an God alludes to the same faculties time and again e.g. when He maintains that:

...and He (God) gave you hearing and sight and intelligence and affections (hearts).²

We can find the same allusion towards these faculties in the following lines:

...He gave you (O man) the faculties of hearing and sight and feeling (and understanding).³

These three and other numerous verses from the Qur'an substantiate the certainty of the knowledge of sense perception.

The faculties of sight and hearing are especially emphasized by the Qur'an because they enable us to see the universe, and thus the glory of God since this is proclaimed in the universe. The following verse clearly elucidates that these faculties, endowed to the human beings, are required to see this cosmos; it also proves their functions and uses.

Behold! in the creation of the heavens and the earth, in the alternation of the night and day, in the sailing of the ships through the ocean for the profit of mankind, in the rain which God sends down from the skies and the life which He gives therewith to an earth that is dead, in the beasts of all kinds that He scatters through the earth, in the change of the winds and the clouds which they trail like their slaves between the sky and the earth (here) indeed are the signs for a people that are wise. *

The Qur'an invites men time and again to see and observe this universe; we can find the same thought about vision and hearing in the following verses:

Behold! in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alternation of night and day there are indeed signs for men of understanding.⁵

Those people who reject the signs present in the universe are, according to the Qur'an, deaf and dumb.

Mankind is appealed to contemplate upon this universe.

And contemplate the (wonders of) creation in the heavens and the earth (with the thought).⁶

The Qur'an exhorts men to meditate upon the natural phenomena as we can see from the following lines:

It is He (God) Who sendth down rain from the skies; with it We produce vegitation of all kinds from some We produce green (crops) out of which We produce grain, heaped up (at harvest) out of the date palm and its sheaths (spathes) (come) clusters of dates hanging low and near and (then there are) gardens of grapes and olives, and pomegranates each similar (in kind) yet different (in variety) when they begin to bear fruits, feast your eyes with the fruits and the ripeness thereof. Behold! in these things there are signs for people who believe.⁷

The more we study the Qur'an the more we understand the notion of universe. This universe consists of things, each of which refers to the Creator. The Qur'an urges us to behold that:

Allah is He Who raised the heavens without any pillars that ye can see is firmly established on the throne (of authority).

He (God) has subjected the sun and the moon (to His law). Each one runs (its course) for a term appointed.

He doth regulate affairs explaining the signs in detail that ye may believe with certainty in the meeting with your Lord 8

And again the Qur'an adds to the substantiation of the usefulness of sense-perception:

And it is He (God) Who spread out the earth and set thereon mountains standing firm and (following) rivers and fruit of every kind, he made in pairs two and two. He drawth the night as a veil over the day. Behold! Verily in these things there are signs for those who consider.⁹

And in the earth are tracts (diverse though) neighboring and gardens of vines and fields sown with corn palm-trees growing out of single roots or otherwise.

Watered with the same water yet some of them we make more excellent than others to eat. Behold! verily in these things, there are signs for those who understand. 10

In the next verse we are again told the purpose of the eyes and its great usefulness:

It is we who have set out the zodiacal signs in the heavens and made them fair-seeming to (all) the beholders. 11

The Qur'an emphasizes the importance of observation and contemplation by asking that:

Do they not look at Allah's creation (even) among (inanimated) things. 12

There are multifarious sings in this universe which need to be carefully observed and understood in order to reach the Ultimate Reality. Science has undertaken this job and it Claims to be the sole source of knowledge. At certain moment this empirical science will vindicate the claim of religion.

This universe, according to the Qur'an, is not yet finished, consummated:

He (God) adds to creation as He pleases. 13

The Qur'an affirms the scientific quest as a part of the worship of God, in fact it regards it as inseparably complementary to the religious quest. This idea can be confirmed by the following verses:

Surely in the creation of the heavens and earth in the alteration of night and day there are signs for men possessed of minds who remember God, standing and sitting and on their sides, and reflect upon the creation of the heavens and the earth, our Lord Thou hast not created this for vanity.¹⁴

... And their Lord answers them, I waste not the labour of any that labours among you, be male or female, the one of you is as the other. 15

Even the stars in the heavens are not useless they have got a definite purpose which the Qur'an describes as being beacons for human beings in order that these may guide them through the dark spaces of land and sea.

The universe is pregnant with massive signs which allude to their Creator. Our powers of seeing and hearing are persistently called upon to see and observe in this universe. God has created every thing in the Universe that man would contemplate upon it. Mankind is supposed to see the signs as described by the Qur'an in the following verses:

It is He (God) Who sends down rain from the sky, from it ye drink and out of it (grows) the vegetation on which ye feed your cattle. ¹⁶

With it He (God) produces for you corn, olives, datepalms, grapes and every kind of fruit, verily in this is a sign for those who give thought.¹⁷

The Qur'an is the explanation and the interpretation of the universe, and thus it is a useful guide for every human being. There is not anything in this world which the Qur'an

has not reckoned with. It strongly emphasizes sense-perception. Heaven, earth, sea, everything in this universe needs to be observed; as the Qur'an maintains:

It is He (God) Who has made the sea subject that ye may eat thereof flesh that is fresh and tender and that ye may extract therefrom ornaments to wear and thou seest the ships therein that plough the waves, that ye may seek (thus) of the bounty of Allah and that ye may be grateful.¹⁸

The ayah above describes man's power over the things which are in the sea, in heaven and on the earth. This power of man is in itself knowledge which results from a sense-perception, enhanced by reason and validated by revelation. In order to reach the Ultimate and Absolute Reality we must set out this world of matter and discover everything inherent in this universe be it animated or inanimated in nature.

The Qur'an also draws our attention to the facilities of transportation. They are signs which must be given considerable thought. About this kind of facility the Qur'an declares:

and He has created horses, mules and donkeys for you to ride and use for show and (He) has created (other) things of what ye have no knowledge.¹⁹

The ayah speaks about donkeys, mules and horses which were used as means of transportation in the early period of Islam. The last sentence in the same ayah is of extreme importance:

And he has created (other) things of what ye have no knowledge.

A few centuries after the birth of Islam this last sentence has been affirmed by the discoveries of modern transport (such as cars, trains and aeroplanes).

And about the cattle, which were used to carry heavy loads to other counties which the people otherwise could not reach, the Qur'an maintains:

And verily in cattle (too) will ye find the instructive sign.

From what is within their bodies between excretions and blood we produce for your drink milk, pure and agreeable to those who drink it.²⁰

And from the fruit of the date-palm and the vine, ye get out wholesome drink and food. Behold! in this also is a sign for those who are wise.²¹

Two other signs are day and night. About day and night and their alternation the Qur'an says:

We have made the night and the day as two (of our) signs. The sign of the night have we obscured while the sign of the day we have made to enlighten you that ye may seek bounty from your Lord, and that ye may know the number and count of the years; All things have We explained in detail.²²

In other places in the Qur'an these two signs are explained:

It is He (God) Who created the night and the day and the sun and the moon, each in its round course.²³

It is Allah Who alternates the night and the day; Verily in these things is an instructive example for those who have vision.²⁴

See they not that We have made the night for them to rest in and the day to give them light. Verily in this are signs for any people that believe.²⁵

Similar thoughts about day and night are expressed in the following lines from the Qur'an:

It is Allah Who has made the night for you that ye may rest therein and the day as that which helps (you) to see. 26

From all the quotations from the Qur'an we are able to draw conclusion that the first step in achieving knowledge is senseperception.

Though this source of knowledge cannot be denied as a first step, still it cannot be held to be a complete nor a sole source either. It must be accompanied by the faculty of reason.

Sense-perception in unison with reason imparts knowledge of this material world. In the following section we will prove the importance of reason.

'Ilm al-Yaqin: the knowledge by reason

In the first three quotes from the Qur'an, mentioned in the section above, we have observed, that man is not only granted the faculties of hearing and sight but also of feeling and understanding. We can see the same idea in the following verse:

Say it is He (God) Who has created you (and made grow) and made for you the faculties of hearing, seeing, feeling and understanding.²⁷

Animals are also given the faculties of hearing and seeing but history proves that animals have not yet contributed to this world. It is clear that hearing and sight alone are not sufficient for the acquisition of an indubitable knowledge. As a consequence these faculties must be accompanied by the faculty of "Reason".

After having explained every thing in this universe, man is urged by the Qur'an to contemplate upon the creation of God.

And contemplate the (Wonders of) creation in the heavens and the earth.²⁸

With his intellectual capability man is time and again invited to reflect upon the mystery of the creation of this world. Everything in this universe is subjected to man so that he may create, invent or discover something in it, as the Qur'an emphasizes:

He has made subject to you (man) the night and the day, the sun and the moon; and the stars are in subjection by His (God) command. Verily in this are signs for men who are wise.²⁹

Mankind is clearly discriminated against every thing in this world. The highest and most sublime position is bestowed upon him. Wisdom and knowledge was conferred on him alone. Nothing else in this world was able to receive inspiration and wisdom. Man alone accepted this burden of wisdom, as the Qur'an verifies in the following verse:

We did indeed offer the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains. But they refused to undertake it being afraid thereof; but man undertook it. He was indeed unjust and foolish.³⁰

The last sentence in the above verse of the Qur'an deserves to be elaborated. It means that man should undertake the God-like attributes (in however small a degree) of will, for forbearance, love, and mercy. This brought him nearer to God than was possible for any other creature. This all was part of God's will but little did man realize what a tremendous task he was undertaking to question himself whether he would be equal to do it. How did man generically undertake this great responsibility which made him vicegerent of God²⁰¹. As the Qur'an declares:

Behold! thy Lord said to the angels: "I will create a vicegerent on earth.32

This vicegerent (man) now creates and unveils this universe as a co-worker of God. God, because of this vicegerency, declares man as a creator:

We created man of an extraction of clay then We set him a drop in receptacle secure, then We created of the drop a clot, then We created the tissue, then We created of the tissue bones then We garmented the bones in flesh; Thereafter We produced him as another creator, so blessed be God the fairest of creators!.33

From the last sentence it is sufficiently clear that besides God there are other creators and that those creators are human beings. Thus human beings are the only creatures to whom God has given the power to create.

Together with the faculty of reason, man also enjoys a limited freedom of will. Precisely this limited freedom of will creates discrepancy among the thoughts of human beings. This freedom of will leads man to adopt a criterion on the basis of which he enjoins good and forbids bad. The freedom of will is also emphasized by the Qur'an:

Do what ye will (i.e. act as you choose in accordance with your freedom of will), verily He (GOD) sees closely all that ye do.³⁴

We have shown him (man) the way (of right and wrong); (now it rests on this will) whether to be grateful (by using the right of free will in the service of God) or ungrateful (by serving evil through this free will).³⁵

Say the truth is from you Lord; let him who will, believe and let him, who will, reject.³⁶

It was an easy task for God to make all human beings believe in one God, but it would have been for man as a nonrational being, a mere stuff of no meaning. The Qur'an is very clear on the point of human free will. Thus it says that:

It had been thy Lord's will, they (men) would all have believed,- All who are on earth! wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe.³⁷

This verse of the Qur'an clears all ambiguities about the free will of man. To believe and not to believe is a characteristic of human beings. As he is a rational being, he has to know the distinction between good and bad, right and wrong and adopt a criterion to judge between these terms through the power of his intellect.

All the parables and illustrations which the Qur'an has vouchsafed are intended to show man's power of reason which implicitly as well as explicitly carries with it the import of free

will. This free will of man further provides him with the capability of searching and researching so that he may reach the ultimate truth.

The people who are not using their understanding are called deaf and dumb and even the Qur'an declares them the "vilest and the worst of beasts".:

Surely the vilest of beasts in Allah's sight are the deaf, the dumb, who understand not.³⁸

Such people are equalled to cattle who have all the faculties of hearing, seeing and intellect but do not use them in a proper way:

And certainly We (God) have created for hell many of the jinns and the men (because) they have hearts (minds) wherewith they understands not, and they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears where with they hear not. They are as cattle; nay, they are more astray they are the heedless ones.³⁹

Or thinkest thou that most of them hear or understand? They are but as the cattle, nay, they are farther astray from the path.⁴⁰

This idea of not using the intellectual faculty is further elaborated by the Qur'an. Those people are called blind who do not realise the usefulness of reason. They are put in contrast with seeing. The Qur'an says:

Can the blind be held equal to the seeing? Will ye then consider not.⁴¹

Those people who are actually giving thoughts to this universe and draw a rationally-founded conclusion, are regarded as the men of God; while the others are only the ordinary blind men who do nothing save creating confusion in the minds of others. The Qur'an further explains the concepts of "seeing" and "blind" by showing that the seeing is not the one who can see things through his physical eyes but the one who can see things through his heart (i.e. mind) and similarly the blind is not the one who cannot see things through his

physical eyes but the one who has ceased to see through his mind.

Truly it is not their eyes that are blind but their hearts which are in their breasts.⁴²

As we have mentioned above in our first section, all physical sciences are the outcome of sense-perception and reason which have undertaken the job to discover all the mysterious things in this world. It is beyond doubt that the empirical sciences will once prove the claim of religion which the Qur'an declares in the following verse:

Soon will we show them our signs in the (furtherset) regions (of earth) and in their own souls, until it becomes manifest to them that this is the truth. It is no enough that thy Lord doth witness all.⁴³

If a man is endowed with a pair of eyes to see and observe, he is also given a pair of lips and a tongue to discuss and argue about the intricate problems of this universe. As the Qur'an asks:

Have we not made for him (man) a pair of eyes and a tongue and a pair of lips.⁴⁴

Man is given power of intelligence and speech and through speaking, arguing, doubting and believing, he will be able to understand what religion has so far claimed, the Qur'an declares that everything in this world (specially) the claims of religion can be known through the certainty of mind and that is through reason. We can see this in the following lines:

But nay, ye soon shall know (the reality, again, ye soon shall know!

Nay, were ye to know with certainty of mind, (ye would beware). 45

So the certainty of mind or the knowledge through reason and the certainty of sight or the knowledge through senseperception are both strongly emphasized by the Qur'an and are regarded as the basic and the most important sources of knowledge.

These two sources, when used together, provide the basis for our empirical sciences.

The Qur'an strongly condemns blind following. It says:

And when it is said to them 'Follow what Allah (God) has revealed'. They say, 'Nay, we follow that wherein we found our fathers'. What ! even though their fathers had no sense at all, nor did they follow the right way. 46

Nay, they say, we found our fathers on a course, and surely we are guided by their footsteps.

And thus We sent not before thee a warner in a town, but its wealthy ones said: Surely we found our fathers following a religion, and we follow their footsteps:⁷

And the one who just rejects the faith on the basis of blind following and not using properly the faculty of reason, is like "dumb driven cattle" who can merely hear calls but cannot distinguish intelligently between shades of meaning or subtle differences of value. 48

The Qur'an gives parables of such people who merely hear and see but do not ponder over what they hear or see:

The parable of those who reject Faith is as if one were to shout like a goat-herd, to things that listen to nothing but calls and cries: deaf, dumb, and blind, they are void of wisdom.⁴⁹

The verses quoted in this section show that "Reason" is the most fundamental source of knowledge. Still it cannot be considered as the sole nor an independent source of knowledge. Thus it must be wedded with another source of knowledge, which can be called "Revelation".

The section following will reckon with this category of knowledge as emphasized by the Qur'an.

Haqq al-yaqin: The absolute knowledge or the knowledge through revelation.

The last two sections were dealing with the material sources of knowledge. In this section, we will explain the spiritual source of knowledge. Revelation, according to Qur'an, has three modes of communication:

It is not fitting for a man that God should speak to him except by inspiration or from behind a veil, or by the sending of a Messenger to reveal with God's permission what God wills; for He is most high and most wise.⁵⁰

In this verse we can distinguish three kinds of revelations. The first kind of revelation implies a direct communication with God. Inspiration could be the suggestion or the infusion of some ideas (as is the case with the ordinary man) or, secondly, inspiration could mean the absolutely clear inspiration (as is with a Prophet and a messenger from God). The second kind, which the Qur'an describes as "from behind the veil", implies direct communication from God to his prophet and messenger, to the exclusion of other categories of human beings: a communication where a voice is heard, as happened in the case of Moses. The third kind of revelation is "by sending a messenger" which means that God chooses a messenger whom he sends to the person he wants to speak to. In the case of Muhammad, (peace be upon him) Jibreel, an angle, was used to deliver the message of God.

The Qur'an is itself a revealed book granted to the Prophet of Islam through the Messenger Jibreel. Thus it belongs to the last kind of revelation in the fore-mentioned verse. There are no doubts about this book and it is a sure guidance. It imparts knowledge which is beyond reproach. Thus the Qur'an challenges those who doubt the words of God in the form of the Qur'an:

And if ye are in doubt as to what We have revealed from time to time to our servant, then produce a sura like thereunto; and call your witnesses or helpers (if there are any) besides God, if your (doubt) are true.⁵¹

The revelation always addresses to the heart; it is totally unrelated to sense-perception. It can be imparted to man in the form of a suggestion or infusion of ideas. In this way revelation becomes a universal fact. The Qur'an regards it as the ultimate source of knowledge immune from any possibilities of doubt.

Though there appears to be no relation between reason and revelation a little consideration would make it clear that revelation comes to the rational beings only and not to the non-rational ones. This revelation was given to the hearts and minds of the people as the Qur'an maintains:

To thy heart and mind that thou mayst admonish.52

Inspiration given to a man depends on the will of God; for He has to choose a man on whom He wants to put the highest honour. The Qur'an refers to that in the following verse:

Raised high above ranks (or degrees) He is the Lord of the Throne (of authority). By His command doth He send the spirit (of inspiration) to any of His servants He pleases, that it may warn (men) of the Day of Meeting.⁵³

Again we can see in the following lines of the Qur'an the nature of inspiration which is not something produced by human minds but by God only:

They ask thee concerning the spirit (of inspiration). Say: the spirits (cometh) by command of my Lord. Of knowledge it is only a little that is communicated to you. And thus have we by our command sent inspiration to thee. Thou knowest not (before) what was revelation and what was faith; but We have made the (Qur'an) a light wherewith We guide such of our servants as We will; and verily thou dost guide (men) to the straight way.⁵⁴

The last verse shows that Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, was not educated in the formal sense of education. He was an unlettered man, whom God chose to be His Messenger for the guidance of mankind. The Qur'an is clear enough about this:

Those who follow the Apostle, the unlettered prophet ...⁵⁵

Muhammad was asked by the angel Jibreel to

read in the name of thy Lord, Who created "56

The Qur'an has been revealed to the prophet with a clear purpose as we see in the following verse:

And We sent down the book to thee for the express purpose that thou shouldst make clear those things in which they differ and that it should be a guide and a mercy to those who believe.⁵⁷

A revelation is like a new life given to some one after his death. When someone is being surrounded by sins or "when the sin well-nigh kills the soul, the fertilising shower of God's revelation from above puts new life into it.58

This point can be superfuly illustrated by the following parable given in the Qur'an:

And God sends down rain from the skies, and gives therewith life to the earth after its death: Verily in this is a sign for those who listen (the revelation in the form of the Qur'an).⁵⁹

Revelation as a source of knowledge is very unique. Although it cannot be communicated still it can be seen and analysed by reason. Reason has thus an intimate relationship with revelation. When revelation reaches a few chosen people, it is called special revelation. It can also be called general if all human beings contemplate upon the whole universe. The revelation of nature to Muhammad can be called an outward revelation. The general or the outward revelation for the one who possesses knowledge is described in the Our'an as follows:

And of His signs is that He created you of dust; then Lo! you are mortals, all scattered abroad.

And of His signs is that He created for you of yourselves spouses that you might repose in them He has set between you love and mercy. Surely in that are signs for a people who consider. And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and earth and the variety of your tongues and

hues. Surely in that are signs for all living beings. And of His signs is your slumbering by night and day and your seeking after His bounty. Surely in that are signs for people who hear. And of His signs He shows you lightning, for fear and hope and that He sends down out of heaven water and He revives the earth after it is dead. Surely in that are signs for a people who understand.

And of His signs is that the heaven and earth stand firm by His command; then When He calls you once and suddenly out of the earth, Lo! you will come forth. To Him belongs everything that is in the heavens and on earth: all are devoutly obedient to Him. ⁶⁰

The Special kind of revelation is somewhat construed in the following verses of the Qur'an:

We have revealed to thee (o Muhammad) as We revealed to Noah, and the Prophets after him, and We revealed to Abraham, Ismael, Isaac, Jacob and the tribes, Jesus and Job, Jonah and Araon and Solomon, and We gave to David Psalm, and Messengers We have already told thee of before, and Messengers We have not told thee of; and unto Moses God spoke directly ... Messengers bearing good tidings and warning so that mankind might have no argument against God, after the Messengers; God is All-Mighty, All Wise. But God bears witness to that He has sent down to thee, He has sent it down with His knowledge; And the angels also bear witness; and God suffices for a witness.⁶¹

Revelation in its general sense must be wedded to, and thus supported by, reason. Believe that the Qur'an itself is consummation of the special kind of revelation granted to Muhammad The Qur'an itself clearly indicates this in the following lines:

It is He who sends down upon thee (o Muhammad) the book (the Qur'an) wherein are verses clear that are the essence of the Book, and others ambiguous. As for those in whose hearts is perversity, they follow the ambiguous

part desiring dissension, and desiring its interpretation; and none known its interpretation save God. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say, "We believe in it (the Qur'an) all is from our Lord; yet none remembers but men possessed of mind.⁶²

The great scholars and philosophers have here been described as "those firmly rooted in knowledge".

The question arises whether revelation or inspiration does come to every human being or, to put it differently, is it possible for every human being to have inspiration?"The answer is "yes".

Revelation as we know it, is regarded as a religious experience. And this religious experience is the "quest for God" (Jehad fi-Allah). This religious experience is based upon love, as the Qur'an asserts:

But only he (will prosper) that brings to God a sound heart. 63

Remember me I will remember you.64

At another place, the Qur'an emphasizes the reciprocal relation of man and God:

Call unto Me I shall answer your prayers.65

The above mentioned verse illustrate that religious experience is implicitly implied in religious quest. "This religious quest is to be pursued on the basis of the Qur'an and the sunnah (i.e. the dynamics of the holy Prophet Muhammad's personality) together with an ever-deepening understanding of nature and history as repositories of the signs of God".66

To God belongeth the dominion of the heavens and the earth; And God has power over all things.⁶⁷

We can find two sources of religious quest in the Qur'an, on the basis of which we can have religious experience. These are "faith" and "reason".

O ye who believe!

When ye are told to make room in the assemblies (spread out and) make room; (ample) room will God provide for you. When ye are told to rise up, rise up: God will raise up to (suitable) ranks (and degrees) those of you who believe and who have been granted (mystic) knowledge, and God is well-acquainted with all ye do.⁶⁸

Faith and reason are not different branches of knowledge. They are interdependent and complementary to each other. "The time -honoured dichotomy of faith and reason which has played havoc in the history of Christian West, is also a false notion. Cognition (knowing) and conation (feeling) are no antithetic, both being the dimensions of the same human consciousness; faith and reason have also, therefore, to go together to function in unity. Faith without reason lands human being in superstition; reason without faith deprives humanity of the highest values. Taking up this problem in very first revelation, the holy Qur'an has emphasized the unity of faith and reason and has projected the ideal of rationally-oriented faith. This idea can be beautifully apprehended in the light of the Qur'an:

And so amongst men and crawling creatures and cattles are they of various colours.

Those truly fear God among his servants who have knowledge; for God is exalted in might, oft-forgiving 70

We can also refer here to a saying that has been attributed to Muhammad (P.B.U.H) that the first thing created by God was Intellect.⁷¹ To conclude, we can say that the bond between faith and reason (or revelation and reason) must be substantiated by the circumstantial evidence which the finality of Prophethood in Islam has sufficiently provided:

Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but (he is)

The Apostle of God, and the seal of the prophets, And God has full knowledge of all things, 72

PART-II

Iqbal's Interpretation of Knowledge

The epistemology of Iqbal is in fact the epistemology of the Qur'an. Like the Qur'an, Iqbal makes full allowance for all kinds of experience, such as sense-perception, reason, intuition (love), prophetic revelation—all these sources are various means to acquire knowledge. For Iqbal "knowledge" is not a deterministic or limited concept which would have had only one or two sources. he regards knowledge as a great boon. He starts from sense-perception, passes through intellect, arrives at his destination, love. Thus we will categorize his theory of knowledge in terms of sense-perception, reason and love. This last word he understands in its broad sense of religious experience, intuition and prophetic revelation.

He defines knowledge as "sense-perception elaborated by understanding".⁷³ In order to vindicate his claim he takes some quotations from the Qur'an, emphasizing the point that man is endowed with the faculty of naming things (as the Qur'an says, "O Adam inform them of the names"). Forming concepts of things is capturing them.

Thus the character of man's knowledge is conceptual and it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of reality?

But what is this "observable aspect of reality" which can, according to Iqbal, only be approached through man's conceptual knowledge? It is the universe, it is "nature". After a reflective observation of nature, man has consciousness of what this nature symbolises.

Iqbal further points out that the Qur'an sees signs of the ultimate reality in the sun, the moon, the lengthening out of the shadows, the alternation of day and night, the variety of human colours and tongues—in fact in the whole of nature as revealed to the sense-perception of man. It has been enjoined that the Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs and not pass

by them as if he is deaf and blind.⁷⁵ At another place Iqbal says: "It is through thinking that our knowledge grows and thinking is determined by our sensuous experience. So when the nature of our senses undergoes a change, the world is changed for us. Rest, Motion, Quality and Quantity take a new significance".⁷⁶

Why was Iqbal so strongly concerned with the fact that knowledge is actually based on sense-perception. One reason could be that he was greatly shocked by Greek thought which had influenced the Muslims' thinking for centuries and the impressions of which still exist. Referring to this fact He asserts that "the cultures of Asia and, in fact of the whole ancient world failed because they approached Reality exclusively from within".77 The first object of lqbal's condemnation was Plato who regarded imagination and fantasies as true while he disbelieved knowledge furnished by natural instruments (like the eyes and the ears). Iobal was also hostile to the teachings of Socrates, Mu'tazilites and other idealists who looked upon this world as of no use and value; Socrates' inquiry restricted itself to the moral problems of mankind. "To him the proper study of man was man and not the world of plants, insects and stars. How unlike the spirit of the Our an which sees in the humble bee a recipient of Divine aspiration and constantly calls upon the reader to observe the perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of day and night, the clouds, the starry heavens and the planets swimming through infinite space".78

Similarly, Plato considers sense-perception as incapable of giving real knowledge, it can only give mere opinion. He fashions and moulds his supreme Reality out of his ideas. For him only ideas give the true and infallible knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. Sense-perception is for him a mere illusion. Therefore Iqbal violently attacks Plato in various places of his work. He says that "Plato despised sense-perception which, in his view, yielded mere opinion and no real knowledge. How unlike the Qur'an which regards "hearing" and "sight" as the most valuable Divine gifts and declares them to be accountable to God for their activity in this world". Iqbal named Plato one of the "flock of sheeps" who actually exploited the former Muslim students of the Qur'an who studied under the classical

speculation and read the Qur'an in the light of Greek thought. Iqbal has given us a very vivid poem in his "Secrets of Self" and likewise warned us to be aware of such a "flock of sheep". It is necessary here to reproduce that poem in order to fully understand Iqbal's thoughts about the visible aspects of reality. He maintains that:

Plato the prime ascetic and sage was one of that ancient flock of sheep, His Pegasus went astray in the darkness of idealism, and dropped its shoe amidst the rocks of actuality. He was so fascinated by the invisible that he made hand, eye, and ear of no account. "to die", said he "is the secret of life: The candle is glorified by being put out". He dominates our thinking. His cup sends us to sleep and takes the sensible world away from us. He is a sheep in man's clothing, The soul of the Sufi bows to his authority. He soared with his intellect touch highest heaven And called the world of phenomena a myth. *Twas his work to dissolve the structure of Life And cut the bough of life's fair tree asunder. The though of Plato regarded lose as profit, His philosophy declared that being is not-being. His nature drowsed and created a dream his mind's eye created a mirage. Since he was without any taste for action, His soul was enraptured by the non-existent. He disbelieved in the material universe And became the creator of invisible Ideas. Sweet is world of phenomena to the living spirit: Dear is the world of ideas to the dead spirit: Its gazelles have no grace of movement, Its partridges are denied the pleasure of walking daintily. Its dewdrops are unable to quiver, Its birds have no breath in their breasts, Its seed does not desire to grow, Its moths do not know how to flutter.

Our recluse had no remedy but flight:
He could not endure the noise of this world.
he set his heart on the glow of a quenched flame
And depicted a word steeped in opium.
He spread his wings towards the sky
And never came down to his nest again.
His phantasy is sunk in the jar of heaven:
I know not whether it is the dregs or the brick of the wine-jar.

The peoples were poisoned by his intoxication: He slumbered and took no delight in deeds. 80

Iqbal also attacked Ibn-i-Rushd and Al-Ghazzali, because Ibn-i-Rushd defended Greek philosophy while Ghazzali attacked it. Both for Iqbal have trodden the same path as far as the avoidance of sense-perception is concerned.

Ibn-i-Rushd through his doctrine of the immortality of the active intellect, a doctrine which once influenced France and Italy and which is opposed to the view of the Our'an, has taken notice of the value and the destiny of the human ego. And thus for Jobal "Ibn-i-Rushd lost sight of a great and fruitful idea in Islam"81 which obscures man's vision of himself, his God and his world. Similarly, the Qur'an does not justify al-Ghazzali's philosophic scepticism. Al-Ghazzali was a reaction to the extreme rationalism. He was a great protagonist of intuition, mystic experience and religious experience. Igbal has the following opinion of Al-Ghazzali: "That Ghazzali finding no hope in analytic thought moved to mystic experience and there found an independent content for religion. In this way he succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist independently of science and metaphysics. But the revelation of the total infinite in mystic experience convinced him of the finitude and inconclusiveness of thought and drove him to draw a line of cleavage between thought and intuition. He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily stimulate finitude inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time. The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable

to capture the infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge".63

To give a better explanation of what he means by knowledge, he writes in a letter: I have generally used the word 'knowledge' in the sense of knowledge based on the senses. It gives man power which should be subordinated to religion. If it is not subordinated to religion it is a satunic force. This knowledge is the first step to true knowledge as I have pointed out in 'Javid Nama'. The knowledge of truth is gained first through the senses and then through direct realization. Its ultimate stages cannot be circumscribed within consciousness. which cannot be circumscribed consciousness and which is the final stage of truth, is also called love or intuition.84 He emphasizes sense-perception as the first source of knowledge through which he sees the Ultimate Reality. For him reality shows itself in its own appearances and "man in his obstructing environment cannot afford to ignore the visible".85 He awakes the people from their slumber and asks them to get up and open their eyes and not to consider this necessitated world as mean because "this world of colour and fragrance is worthy of contemplation. And in this green valley there are so many flowers awaiting thy recreation". 86 He replies to those who regard this world as of no value and use and says that the spirit and the matter are not opposed entities. and that this world is not a torture hall where an elementally wicked humanity is imprisoned for an original act of sin".87 For him the Ultimate Reality is spiritual and its life wholly consists in its temporal activity. The spirit find its opportunities in the natural, the material and the secular... There is no such thing as a profance world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit. All is holy ground".88 All this means that Iqbal strongly defends his views about the visible and concrete reality. He does not agree with the opinion that only man's speculative and contemplative spirit will lead to the extent of the ultimate reality. And he does not encourage man's (withdrawal) from the world of matter, since it is with its temporal flux and shifting phenomena, organically related to the ultimate reality".

There is no possibility of thought emerging from concrete experience. On the contrary, one should take his start from here because it is the intellectual seizure of, and power over, the concrete that makes it possible for the intellect of man to pass beyond the concrete⁸⁹. For he who does not see these signs in this life, will remain blind to the realities of the life to come. They are the manifestations of Divine effulgence and reflective observation leads into their ultimate nature and reveals the secret of Divine Reality".90 For him the "knowledge of nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour".91 Inbal believes in sense-perception, which he regards as the normal level of experience and he sees the Ultimate Reality through senseperception. Still he believes that the ultimate Reality is lying outside the normal level of experience, inaccessible to sense perception and pure reason. And for him the only question is whether the normal level is capable of yielding knowledge. Certainly not, because the moral level (sense-perception and intellect) is not capable of approaching ultimate Reality per se.

For Iqbal "intellect merely lights the way but it is not itself a goal nor a destination".92

Kant is supposed to have ruined the importance and necessity of pure reason. Therefore he is still influential in the history of philosophy "as God's greatest gift to his country"3 Igbal says about Kant that "His Critique of Pure Reason revealed the limitations of human reason and reduced the whole work of the rationalists to a heap of ruins".94 But the approach of Kant to pure reason was based on his failure "to see that thought, in very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude. The finitudes of nature are reciprocally exclusive, not so the finitudes of thought which, in its essential nature, is incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned in the narrow circuit of its own individuality. In the wide world beyond itself nothing is alien to it. It is in its progressive participation in the life of the apparently alien that thought demolishes the walls of its finitude and enjoys a potential infinitude. Its movement becomes possible only because of the implicit presence, in its finite individuality, of the infinite, which keeps alive within it the flame of aspiration and sustains

it in its endless pursuit. It is a mistake to regard thought as inconclusive, for its too in its own way is a greeting of the finite with the Infinite". 95 The real problem for Iqbal was that he wanted to see religion garbed in the attire of rationalism.

In this regrad he got some help from Whitehead, an English philosopher and mathematician, who once said that "The ages of faith are the ages of rationalism". He light believes that the attempt of doing so is not new, it began with the prophet of Islam. The prophet of Islam, in a broad sense, layed himself the foundation of rational thinking in religion (Islam). Iqbal claims that "the search for rational foundation in Islam may be regarded to have begun with the prophet himself. His constant prayer was: God! grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things". Let us not overlook the sentence of Iqbal that "The birth of Islam is the birth of inductive intellect". Philosophia is the birth of inductive intellect.

As we have already mentioned, Iqbal's epistemology is constructed on the pattern of Qur'anic epistemology, in which sense-perception and reason are the initial stages of the acquisition of knowledge. These two sources are insufficient as far as the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality is concerned, As a consequence they need to be complemented by another source of knowledge on which Iqbal, following the Qur'an, puts great emphasis. He identifies this source of knowledge as love (isha) and intuition and religious experience. For him love, intuition, religious experience and prophetic revelation are just the same in their very nature. This kind of knowledge is direct. immediate and will unveil to him new spheres of illumination, wherein there are vistas of reality, comprehending Divine presence itself. In contrast, the knowledge yielded by intellect is fragmentary because it is involved in the labyrinth of space and time. The knowledge through intuition is not imparted partially and indirectly. It is grounded in the deeper and higher self of man. "It is incorporeal and eternal and leads directly to the incorporeal and the eternal".98

The main characteristics of the mystic experience are the following:

- 1) The mystic experience is immediate. This kind of experience, Iqbal says, does not differ from other levels of human experience which supply data for knowledge. It gives direct apprehension of Ultimate Reality. Mystic experience or love or intuition apprehends the ultimate Reality as the sense-perception perceives the sensible reality. As regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense data for the knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God. The immediacy of mystic experience simply means that we know God just as we know other objects. "God is not a mathematical entity nor a system of concepts mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience."
- 2) The mystic experience is an unanalysable whole, It discovers reality as an indivisible organic unity. In normal experience there are innumerable data. Out of them selected data, which fall into an order of space and time, are referred to a certain sensible object. But in mystic state, Ighal says "such an analysis is not possible. William James wrongly thinks that the mystic experience is some kind of strange faculty discontinuous with the normal consciousness. It is in fact the same reality operating on us. It is however, unanalysable and indivisible. The ordinary consciousness, in view of our practical need of adaptation to our environment takes that reality piecemeal, selecting successively isolated sets of stimuli for response. The mystic state brings us into contact with the total passage of reality in which all the diverse stimuli merge into one another and form a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist". 100
- 3) The Ultimate Reality is transcending, encompassing the whole universe. It is the unique other self or, what Iqbal regards, the Ultimate Ego. And the mystic state is the moment of intimate association with this Ultimate Reality or Unique Other Self. This mystic state, Iqbal says, is highly objective. It reveals the Unique Other Self transcending and encompassing the private personality of the finite individual. Like our experience of other minds, it is immediate and direct. ¹⁰¹

4) Iqbal says that mystic experience cannot be communicated. Mystic experience is feeling rather than thought. The content of mystic or religious consciousness can be communicated to others in the form of propositions, but the content itself cannot be transmitted.

This kind of experience has two aspects a non-temporal and a temporal one. The non-temporal is feeling and the temporal is idea. Feeling is outward-pushing, as idea is outward reporting and no feeling is so blind as to have no idea of its own object. Every direction has some objective. A feeling has some direction as an activity does, therefore a feeling cannot be regarded without a direction.¹⁰²

5) Iqbal says that mystic experience, though it is intimately associated with the eternal, cannot break the relation with serial time. It is related to the normal experience. And this is why Iqbal maintains that the "Mystic's condemnation of intellect as an organ of knowledge does not really find any justification in the history of religion". When mystic experience is over it leaves a sense of authority behind it. This means that it is experienced during a certain period, though this period is not fixed (concerning its where and when). Once affected, it will "be fraught with infinite meaning for mankind". 104

Love or intuition means knowledge through the heart, wherein we have change but no succession, pure duration but no serial time. This experience, which he also calls religious experience, is ranked among other existing normal levels of experience. Iqbal says: "the facts of religious experience are facts among facts of human experience and in the capacity of yielding knowledge by interpretation one fact is as good as another". 105 What is a heart which is supposed to be the seat of love or religious experience? If love comes from the heart and intellect from the mind then we are authorised to raise a question: "What is the difference between heart and mind?"

Until now, we have heard of a dualism between mind and body but not of a battle between mind, body and heart. Still the question asked above suggests this a three dimensional man. Actually heart and mind are the same; heart is the seat of loving and hating, thinking and doubting, cognition and feeling. For Bergson intuition (love) is only a higher kind of intellect. Al-Ghazzali, a mystical philosopher, defines heart in the following words: "the first step to knowledge is to know that you are composed of outward shop called body and the inward entity called the heart or soul. By heart I do not mean that piece of flesh situated on the left in our bodies, but that which uses all the other faculties as its instruments and servants. In truth, it does not belong to the visible world but to the visible and has come into this world as a traveller visits a foreign country for the sake of merchandise and will presently return to his native land. It is the knowledge of this entity and its attributes which is the key to the knowledge of God". 1066

Iqbal has put forward views about the meaning of the heart not unlike Ghazzali or the Qur'an. For him (Iqbal) "The heart is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi (a Persian mystic poet whom Iqbal considers his spiritual leader), feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of reality other than those open to sense-perception. It is, according to the Qur'an something which "sees"; and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false. We must not, however, regard it as a mysterious special faculty: it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part. Yet the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience." 107

The question is, why this kind of experience is not generally acknowledged by everybody in contrast to sense-perception for instance which is open to everybody. Why do people still consider it a mysterious kind of faculty? The answer to these questions is based on the fact that if all knowledge has come to heart in this easy way, the idea of seeking by reason would have gone to perdition. There would have been no empirical knowledge, no quest for the comprehension of this universe.

Everything derives from human seeking and struggle. Everything is based on human desires. When you desire something you start seeking it and your desiring and seeking for that something brings you in an intimateness with it. As Iqbal asserts:

"Life is preserved by purpose

because of the goal its caravan bell tinkles.

Life is latent in secking. Its origin is hidden in desire. Keep desire alive in thy heart, lest the little dust become a tomb. Desire is the soul of this world of bue and scenu. The nature of everything is a store house of desire. Desire sets the heart dancing in the breast. And by its glow the breast in made bright as a mirror. It gives to earth the power of socking. It is a Whiser 108 to the Moses of perception. Form the flame of desire the heart takes life. And when it takes life, all dies that is not true. Then it refrains from forming desires. Its opinion breaks and it cannot soar. Desire keeps the self in perceptual uproar. It is a restless wave of the self's sea", 109

The whole philosophy of Iqbal rests on the foundation of love. His work, especially his poetry, is the exhortation of love. And for him love is the ultimate, clear and distinct source of knowledge. He has shown to us that the Ego or self can be strengthened by the force of love. By love an ego can be made more lasting, more living, more burning and more glowing. Whatever disease exists in the mind of human beings, love can heal it very easily and remove all the doubts thereof. Iqbal defines love by asking:

"What is love? It is to hurl unity, At your heart like a thunderbolt and then to hurl your self at every obstacle". 110

and again somewhere else he defines it as follows:

Iqbal has in many places of his work compared love to reason. He says for instance:

"Momin and love are mutually interdependent, What is impossible to us is possible for love the capital of the intellect is apprehension and doubt,

of love Faith and resolution!
Intellect builds that it may destroy
Love destroys that is may rehabilitate!
Intellect says 'Live happy and content'
Love says 'learn submission and achieve freedom'.
Reason's a knot-resolving slave,
Faith mid convention's lard to grave,
For in the breast there beats a heart,
the unseen target of love's dart". 112

Therefore this does not mean that Iqbal has fully demolished or belittled the value of reason. Though he considers reason alone a satanic force which leads humanity astray still it is a divine light if wedded with live. So reason and love together create a new world. This idea of Iqbal can be seen in the following verses:

"For Westerner doth reason furnish all accourrement of life and for the east love is the key of mystery. Love-led can reason claim the lord and reason-lit love strikes from roots.

When integrated,
These two, draw the pattern of a different World.

Let love and reason intermixed be to chart a world all new". 113
'If it be diverse from love,
Then knowledge is but satan's progeny;

But if it blends with love, it joins the ranks of high celestial spirits. Love-bereft
All knowledge is but cold as death, the shaft of intellect its target fails to reach.
But let love's sight restore a vision to one who is blind and so in darkness gropes;
And make a Hayder of this Bu-lahab*.114

Both are in quest of the Ultimate Reality. Both are indispensable to each other as he indicates in his verse:

"Both are in quest of one abode and both would lead upon the road. Reason tries every stratagem, But love pulls gently by the hem". 115

The same idea can be found in the following lines:

"(both intuition and Reason) are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek vision of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life". 116

In our next chapter i.e. "Human Divine Knowledge" we will discuss the notion of love more fully, while in the fourth chapter we will elaborate the notion of reason.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. XXIII-78, (THE HOLY QUR'AN, TEXT, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, by A. YUSUF ALL.)
 - 2. Ibid., XVI: 78.
 - 3. Ibid., XXXII: 9.
 - 4. Ibid., 11: 164.
 - 5. Ibid., III: 190.
 - 6. Ibid., III: 119.
 - 7. Ibid., VI: 991.
 - 8. Ibid., XIII: 2.
 - 9. Ibid., XIII: 3.
 - 10. Ibid., XV: 16.
 - 11. Ibid., XV: 16.
 - 12. Ibid., XVI: 48.
 - 13. Ibid., XXXV: 1.
- 14. Ibid., III: 189, (THE QUR'AN INTERPRETED: A.J. ARBERRY.)
 - 15. Ibid., III: 190.
 - 16. Ibid., XVI: 10.
 - 17. Ibid., XIV: 11.
 - 18. Ibid., XVI: 14
 - 19. Ibid., XVI: 8.
 - 20. Ibid. XVI: 66.

- 21. Ibid., XVI: 67.
- 22. Ibid., XVII: 12.
- 23. Ibid., XXI: 33.
- 24. Ibid., XXIV: 44.
- 25. Ibid., XXVII: 86.
- 26. Ibid., XL: 61.
- 27. Ibid., LXII: 23.
- 28. Ibid., III: 191.
- 29. Ibid., XVI: 12.
- 30. Ibid., XXXII: 72.
- 31. Ibid., p. 1130.
- 32. Ibid., II: 30.
- 33. Ibid., XXIII: 14. (A. J. Arberry, The Qur'an Interpreted.)
- 34. Ibid., XLI: 40.
- 35. Ibid., XXVI: 3.
- 36. Ibid., LXXVIII: 39.
- 37. Ibid., X : 99.
- 38. Ibid., VIII: 22.
- 39. Ibid., VII: 179.
- 40. Ibid., XXV: 44.
- 41. Ibid., VI: 50.
- 42. Ibid., XXII: 46.
- 43. Ibid., XLI: 53.
- 44. Ibid., XC: 8-9.
- 45. Ibid., CII: 3-5.
- 46. Ibid., II: 70.

What is Knowledge

- 47. Ibid., XLIII: 22-23.
- 48. Ibid., p. 67.
- 49. Ibid., II: 171.
- 50. Ibid., XLII: 51.
- 51. Ibid., II: 23.
- 52, Ibid., XXVI: 194.
- 53. Ibid., XL: 15.
- 54. Ibid., XLII: 52.
- 55. Ibid., VII: 157.
- 56. Ibid., XCVI: 1.
- 57. Ibid., XVI: 64.
- 58. Ibid., p. 675.
- 59. Ibid., XVI: 65.
- 60. Ibid., XXX: 20 ... 26.
- 61. Ibid., IV: 162-166.
- 62. Ibid., III: 7.
- 63. Ibid., II: 152.
- 64. Ibid., XL: 2.
- 65. The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society. Vol. 1 p. 141.
 - 66. Qur'an, III: 189.
 - 67. Ibid., LVIII: 2.
- 68. The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society, Vol. 1 p. 161-162.
 - 69. Qur'an, XXXV: 28.
 - 70. Reason and Revelation; by A.J. Arberry, p. 79.
 - 71. Qur'an, XXXIII: 40.

- 72. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, by M. Iqbal p. 12.
 - 73. Ibid., p. 13.
 - 74. Ibid., p. 128.
- 75. The new Rose Garden of Mystery and the Book of Slaves, translation of Iqbal's GULSHAN-I-RAZ-I-JADID and BANNDAGI NAMMAH by M. Hadi Hussain, p. 38.
- 76. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, by Iqbal p. 14:15.
 - 77: Ibid., p. 3.
 - 78. Ibid., p. 4.
- 79. The Secrets of The Self, Iqbal's ISRAR-I-KHUDI, translated by Reynold A. Nicholson, pp. 56-59.
- 80. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, by Iqbal p. 4.
 - 81. Ibid., p. 4.
 - 82. Ibid., pp. 5:6.
 - 83. Iqbal's Educational Philosophy, by K.G. Saiyidain, pp. 88-89.
- 84. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Iqbal, p.
- 85. Israr-i-Khudi (The Secrets of The Self), translated by Reynold A. Nicholson, p. 118.
- 86. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Iqbal, p. 154
 - 87, Ibid., p. 155.
- 88. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Ighal by Dr. Jamila Khatoon, p. 5.
 - 89. Ibid., p. 5.
 - 90. The Reconstruction-, p. 57.

What is Knowledge

- 91. Rubaiyat of Iqbal, rendered into English by A.R. Tariq, p. 193.
 - 92. The Reconstruction, p. 5.
 - 93. Ibid., p. 5.
 - 94. Ibid., pp. 6-7
 - 95. Ibid., p. 2
 - 96, Ibid., p. 3.
 - 97. Ibid., p. 126.
- 98. The Place of God, Man And Universe in the Philosophic System of Ighal by . Dr. Jamila Khatoon, p. 9.
 - 99. The Reconstruction, p. 18.
 - 100. Ibid., p. 18.
 - 101. Ibid., p. 20.
 - 102. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
 - 103. Ibid., p. 22.
 - 104. Ibid., p. 23.
 - 105. Ibid., p. 16.
- 106. Glimpses of Iqhal's Mind and Thought by H.H. Bilgrami, pp. 50-51.
 - 107. The Reconstruction, pp. 15-16.
- 108. Cf. Qur'an ch. 18 VV:64-80. Khizer represents the mystic seer whose actions are misjudged by persons of less insight.
 - 109. The Secrets of The Self, p. 23-27.
- 110. The new Roze Garden of Mystery and The Book of Slaves, translated by M. Hadi Hussain, p. 60.
 - 111. Ibid., p. 22.
 - 112. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

- 113. Persian Psalms. Translated by A. J. Arberry from Iqbal's Zabur-i-Ajam, p. 14.
- 114. Pilgrimage of Eternity, translated by Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad from Iqbal's Javid Nama, p. 54.
 - 115. Ibid., p. 66.
 - 116. Persian Psalms, p. 14.

CHAPTER THREE

HUMAN - DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

A. The Nature of Divine Knowledge

The whole work of Iqbal is replete with three words, corresponding to one same meaning (and significance). They are love, intuition and religious experience, Sometimes these words are replaced by the word "Ego", the pivot or key concept of his scientifico-metaphysical Philosophy.

In his poetic work, love (isbq) is the dominant word whereas his prose has the more philosophical concepts, i.e. "Religious Experience "and" Intuition. The word love is more akin to the eastern philosophy while religious experience and intuition are western concepts. These words i.e. love, intuition and religious experience will be given here a fresh and more appropriate name which we will follow throughout this chapter. The name we want to ascribe to these three concepts is "Human-Divine Knowledge". This name will, I believe, be more acceptable to the epistemologists than the three various names which seem to belong to the department of psychology. Iqbal has defined this "human-Divine knowledge" by the following words: "it is neither mere thought nor mere feeling nor mere action, it is an expression of the whole man". He further explains that this human-Divine knowledge is a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part?

This knowledge goes directly to what the Qur'an describes as "fuad" or qalb", i.e. heart. That is to say, heart is the seat of this special knowledge. According to Iqbal "heart is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception" Underhill explains the word heart, as used in mystic literature as follows: By the word heart of course, we here mean not merely "the seat of the affections, the organ of tender emotions and the like; but rather the in-most sanctuary of personal being, the deep root of its love and will, the very source of its energy and life".

In Iqbal's works the human-Divine knowledge always supersedes the other sources of knowledge such as Intellect, history etc. Intellect only gives a partial knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. This partial knowledge is the observable aspect of Reality. Intellect, according to him, is incapable of attaining to the Ultimate Reality. Iqbal always urges us not to seek the guidance from the intellect but "come to love, which excels by the singleness of its purpose".

It is love which teaches the art of illumination to intellect. For Iqbal, human-Divine knowledge cannot be circumscribed within consciousness; it is supposed to be the final stage of Truth: It is a first the final stage of God-like attributes in man and thereby man becomes like God Himself. Iqbal explains this in his *Javid Nama*: "It is a different thing which, when it soaks the soul, doth change it all and, with the soul transformed, the world as well is shaped anew. Both immanent and clear, both open and concealed, it is a thing quite like the Lord Himself; abundantly, enduringly alive and bursting forth in utterance supreme"?

For him love is the basic principle of life without which the being by man would be futile, stagnant, a mirage.

Perfection of love is perfection of life. "Love sublimates all passions and invests with worth much that is worthless. Without love life is a funeral, a joyless thing, a celebration of

1. A

decay and death. Love meliorates man's mental faculties and business a state into a mirrior . §

This Divine knowledge of man is the "force which brings man nigh to God and consolidates the ego and which sometimes even corresponds to intuition. It is the fiery element, which enables the growth of the personality, and without which real life cannot exist". Love is not a mere feeling and affection, "is the driving force of all evolutionary progress, a principle of life and creativity, a source of moral uplift and spiritual advancement in human history. Love as described by Iqbal is not a physical, sexual, or biological principle. It is the inward drive of all life to attain to its full maturity and development. It is the primal urge to live, to progress and to bring out all the inner wealth and resources of being. Every phenomenon and activity that is not related to this primal urge and does not subserve its purpose, leads to stagnation and decay". 10

Iqual holds love responsible for the whole process of evolution of the universe and especially of man which leads him from mortality to immortality, from imperfection to perfection. It is like "a cosmic assimilative force which is the formation of life just as love is responsible for the evolution of organic out of the inorganic and of the animal out of the organic, so it helps the human ego in its development towards immortality". 11

Human-Divine knowledge or love is the ultimate source of all knowledge. Empirical knowledge is a means to end, while love is an end in itself. It is eternal and infinite.

Love is cosmic power but, at the same time, it is the source of cosmic power and even more than that. "It is spaceless and timeless; it is the source and ground of space and time. It is the eternal illumination of space and time. It is the eternal illumination and eternal light; it is the source of existence. It is divine in essence, is immanent and transcendent, is the ultimate end". Love has no boundary, no limit, no temporality but "eternality is in its backside and is in front of it. So it has no boundry in any direction". 13

Iqbal asserts that every man has the essence of Divine light; for him intellect is only a beam of that light and one should burn his intellect by this Divine light (love) in order to attain to the Ultimate Reality. This Ultimate Reality is beyond the grasp of intellect or reason which, he says, "is confused in the riddle of courses, but love is a player in the field of action. Love can catch its prey by the strength of its own arm but reason being cunning can only throw her net.

The only substance with reason

is only fear and doubt but a firm faith and determination are indispensable to "love". Reason builds a certain thing to destroy it, But love first destroys it to rebuild it! Reason is as cheap in the world as wind but love is very rare and its price is very high! Reason is strengthened on the basis of "how"? and "how many" But love would never wear such old and rotten garment! Reason says: surrender yourself to your enemy! But love says "Strike hard and test your strength! Reason makes friends with others than herself.

But love by its extensive knowledge is always selfchecking

Reason says "O man; be always happy, and enjoy your life to its lees!

But love says "Be obedient to God and then enjoy a perfect freedom.

Iqbal further identifies love with the breath of Gabriel and the heart of Muhammad. According to him, love acts as a messenger of God. Man is only clay if not enlightened by the spirit of love. If a person is really enlightened by this spirit and constructs his ego on the basis of love then death will never touch him and the cultivation of his ego by love will be Godlike. The ego or self, "is more fortified and is made more lasting, more living, more bursting, more glowing. From love proceeds the radiance of its being and the development of its unknown possibilities. Its nature gathers fire from love, love instructs it to illumine the world.

Love fears neither sword nor dagger, love is not born or water and air and earth. Love makes peace and war in the world. Love is the fountain of life, love is the flashing sword of death.

Love of God at last becomes wholly God. 15

If the self is strengthened by the fire of love, Iqbal asserts "then the whole world will be under his sway. His hand becomes God's hand, the moon is split by his fingers". 16 Every human being is endowed with this divine light or knowledge. Iqbal says in one of his poems:

"O! what a strange light does the human bosom bear A light which, though unseen, is nevertheless there! Man is a planet as well as a star.

True he is light, but he is also fire.

And what a light! It sets aglow his heart, his soul.

One beam of it is big enough to make the sun look small". 17

Religious experience or human-Divine knowledge is such that it transcends and transgresses the boundaries of intellect. It cannot be captured in the net of magical tricks of logic. It "is not a conceptually manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact. an attitude consequent on an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories". 18 The fact is "that a really imperative vision of the divine in man did come to him cannot be denied".19 The credibility of this Divine knowledge is as good as that of the concrete experience. As far as the certainly of religious experience is concerned, Ighal asserts that it may not be less than the certainty of concrete experience or natural experience. He says that "the facts of religious experience are facts among other facts of religious experience and in the capability of yielding knowledge by interpretation, one fact is as good as other".20 Further on lobal claims that 'the region of mystic (religious) experience is as real as any other region of human experience and cannot be ignored merely because it cannot be traced back to senseperception" 21

Love has no boundaries, it is a limitless stream and it is unceasing. "It is journeying without a break, transcending limits, ending ends. Love knows no ending, no finality. Its morning has no evening in its wake".²² This endless love is only possible when the heart is feeling warm under its influence. Then this Divine love will be alive by the heat of our heart. As a consequence lqbal prays for warmth of heart: "Grant madness now an inward zeal that has its source in love".²³ He exhorts us to light this fire (love) in our heart; because as long as it lies dormant, the whole mankind will not receive any inspiration from it. Iqbal expresses his thoughts in the following line: "there is mere breath within thy chest, but no heart's warm palpitation; and thy breath too doesn't impart to mankind any inspiration".²⁴

Iqual identifies love with feeling. This sort of feeling, however, is not merely a psychological one which comes and immediately passes away, it has also a cognitive aspect which "links up the finite individual with infinity: and its validity lies in the inner certitude of the mystic". The Qur'an describes it

as "something which sees and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false". 26 It is a living creative activity and not a mere feeling; it is a feeling with a creative power which "has, in the case of Muhammad, given a fresh direction to the course of human history and which has turned slaves into leaders of men and has inspired the conduct and shaped the career of whole races of mankind".27 The force of love makes kings out of beggars. Iqbal says: "when great and mighty force of love at some place its flag doth raise, beggars dressed in rags and sacks become heirs true to king Parwez. (Parwez was an emperor of ancient Persia that is, Iran). Man can reach the high heaven with the force of love. Love or human-Divine knowledge is a genuine and authentic insight with which a philosopher might come (and some philosophers have come) to the considered conclusion that reality is supra-rational, that it is in its ultimate nature amenable to conceptual understanding, that putative religious insight is, some-times, authentic religious insight that is genuine revelations of the ultimate Reality that is God".28 Love is timeless and spaceless. It is not caught in the chains of days and years, mornings and evenings. It is boundless and eternal. Love knows no past, no present and no future. Present, past and future is the handiwork of intellect. Igbal exhorts that:

"In the maze of eve and morn, O man awake, do not lost; Another world there yet exists that has no future or the past".²⁹

In another place Iqual gives an excellent explanation of the eternity of love:

"You want to know how you can experience the real within you.

Then come down to the stage of (bewaiting) intuition. Throw away your days and nights for eternity and cast away your reason.

Love always seeks infinity and goes beyond the finite things and in this sense beyond time and space, which are characteristically finite. "Love defies the month, the year, all

space and time. When faced with mountains, reason will just hack and cut and cleave but love sweeps them away like straw, love like the moon doth swiftly sail. Love's target is the infinite, love moves beyond; it enters not the grave. Its strength is muscles strong nor water, wind nor earth. Love earth, Love eats black bread but breaks the khybar fort, love cuts the moon in twain and 'Namrud' shead. Love smites without a single stroke, and routs the pharoah hosts within a war. Love dwells within the soul as sight doth in the eye, within and without. It is both the fire that flames and ashes cold. It is greater than one's knowledge and one's faith. The final plea is love and both the worlds are love's empire. Love doth transcend both time and space and yet the far and the nigh, the future and the past proceed from love. When love the ego seeks from God it sways the world, establishes the place of heart and breaks the ancient spell of this old idol-house".31

Iqbal attaches much importance to the problem of time and space, which, according to him, has caused a great havoc to the life of matter. Especially, "the concept of matter has received the greatest blow from the hands of Einstein".32 For Ighal as for Bergson, religious experience is "Pure Duration". A duration in which there is change but no succession. Generally, Inbal agrees with Bergson. He asks the question: "What do I find when I fix my gaze on my own conscious experience?". He answers in the words of Bergson that "I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold. I am merry or sad. I work or do nothing. I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which clour it in turns. I change then without ceasing". He adds to it that: "there is nothing static in my inner life; all is a constant mobility, an unceasing flux of states, a perpetual flow in which there is no halt or resting place. Constant change, however, is unthinkable without time. On the analogy of our inner experience, then, conscious existence means life in time".33

This conscious experience or self or ego, according to Iqbal, has two sides: the "efficient self" and the "appreciative self"

When on its efficient side, the self enters into relation with the physical world of time and space. The efficient self is "the practical self of daily life in its dealing with the external order of things which determine our passing states of consciousness and stamp on these states their own spatial feature of mutual isolation. The self here lies outside itself as it were, and, while relating its unity as a totality discloses itself as nothing more than a series of specific and consequently numerable states. The time which the efficient self loves is therefore the time of which we predicate long and short".34 But this time is not true time. There is another kind of time which is the true one and which Igbal relates to the "Appreciative Self". This self lives in pure duration that is change without succession. When we absorb our selves in profound meditation, our efficient self is completely in abeyance. And thus we "sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience. In the life process of this deeper ego the states of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of the appreciative self or ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly qualitative. There is change and movement but this change and movement are indivisible; their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. It appears that the time of the appreciative self is a single "now" which the efficient self, in its traffic with the world of space, pulverizes into a series of "nows" like pearl beads in thread".35

Iqbal gives some allusions to the serial and non-serial aspects of the self. In the Qur'an we can read an explanation of the serial and the non-serial self in the following verse:

"And put thou thy trust in Him that liveth and dieth not, and celebrate His praise Who in six days created the heavens and the earth and what is between them, then mounted His throne, the God of mercy. (25:60)³⁶

This verse alludes to the serial time or to the efficient self, in which time is dimensioned by six days; these six days are Divine days; one day in the terminology of the Qur'an equals 1000 years of our calendar. Another verse form the Qur'an gives, however, view opposite to the above-mentioned verse. In this second verse the Qur'an says:

"All things We have created with a fixed destiny. Our command was but one, swift as the twinkling of an eye". 54:50).³⁷

This verse is an example of the appreciative aspect of the self in which there is pure duration. Here "swift as the twinkling of an eye" means that the process of creation was a single indivisible act.

Pure duration cannot be expressed in words because "language is shaped on the serial time of our daily efficient self".38 In order to illustrate this point, Iqbal gives a scientific example. According to physical science the cause of your sensation of red is the rapidity of wave motion, the frequency of which is 400 billions per second. If you would observe this tremendous frequency from the outside and count it at the rate of 2000 per second which is supposed to be the limit of the perceptibility of light, it will take you more than 6000 years to finish the enumeration. Yet in the single momentary mental act of perception, you hold together a frequency of wave motion which is practically incalculable. That is how the mental act transforms succession into duration. The appreciative self, then, is more or less corrective of the efficient self in as much as it synthesizes all the "heres" and "nows" - the small change of space and time indispensable to the efficient self - into the coherent wholeness of personality".39

Pure time is an organic whole, in which the past is not left behind but is moving alongwith, and operating in, the present. And the future, which is not supposed to be lying ahead, is in its nature an open possibility. So in pure duration, which is the characteristic of human-Divine knowledge, lies the Ultimate Reality: God. To sum up, we can say that the ego lies in

eternity that is in non-successional change and, on the other hand, that it lies in serial time as well.

Religious experience or love sees reality in pure duration that is change without succession.

The same character, that is, the Divine character of time, can also be seen in his (Iqbal's) poetry. He has given verses to explain the appreciative aspect of self. The following verses are taken from his *Bal-i Jibrael*; (Gabriel's Wing):

The chain of days and nights is an engraver of great events! The chain of days and nights is a root of life and death! The chain of days and nights is a bicolour fibre of silk of which God weaves the cloak of His attributes! The chain of days and nights is the harmony of the musical instrument of eternity, when by God shows the ups and downs of the possibilities of His power of creation! The chain of days and night tests and tries me and thee. because it is a great tester of the whole universe! Therefore, if anyone of us proves to be worthless in the test He is then destined to die! What is the Reality of the chain of days and nights? Just a continuous flow of time, wherein there neither a "Day" nor a "Night"! Oh! All the miracles of art Are momentary and transitory things There is nothing everlasting in this world!

The imprecision of such a person is enlightened by his live! For live is the root of life and death can never touch it. 40

In Payam-i-Mashriq, that is, "The Message of the East", the poem "The Voice of Time" contains Iqbal's whole philosophy of time. In this poem he regards time as the efficient and the appreciative aspects of the self. The serial time is relative to a fourth dimension of space - time continuum. But only time regarded as destiny is real and the very essence of things. The poem tells the whole drama of the creation of the universe and the life of man. Thus Time speaks:

I have the sin and the stars in my skirt! If you look into me, I am nothing:-But if you look into yourself; I am your spirit. I am in the city, I am in the desert, I am in the palace And I am in the night chamber of the kings! I am the malady, and I am the remedy. I am a source of great pleasure I am a world - burning sword, And I am the spring of life! The invasions of changhez khan And the victories of Tamurlane are just a handful of dust caused by my speed! The world-dominating oppression of great Britain, is only a spark springing out of my blazing flames. Man and his world are the paintings and impressions of my brush, And the blood of the liver, of courageous men serves as a paint, For my peerless pictures!

I am the all-burning fire, and I am garden of paradise. At a time, I am stationary, and I am marching quickly; What a wonderful show it is! Just see the event of to-morrow in the mirror of my to-day Behold! a thousand beautiful worlds are hidden in my heart! Behold! there are countless moving stars, and green domes behind the veil of my chest! I am a dress for man, and I am a cloak for God! "Luck" is my magic work and "pluck" is your magic work! you are a lover or "laila" (A symbolic name for beloved). And I am a desert for your crazy wanderings! I am as pure and clean as a spirit, And I am beyond your discussions on "What"? "Where"? and "How"? As a matter of fact. You are my secret, for I appear from your soul, And then disappear into the same! I am a passenger and you are my destination! I am a farm, and you are my produce! You are a musical instrument. with a thousand fascinating tunes! undoubtedly, you are the chairman in the assembly of this world! Alas! You are lost in the beauty of this material world! Now find out the elevated abode of your heart. And then see how a boundless ocean of "Time" has been kept in a small cup;-For it is your high wave which has given birth to my irresistible storm¹⁴

There are also verses from Iqbal's Asrar-i-Khudi (The Secrets of the Self) which shed light on the nature and the effect of time. In it Iqbal exclaims about the human mentality that instead of mastering time, man becomes slave to it. And it is the serial time or the efficient side of the self which human beings have assimilated in themselves. He urges that it is the appreciative side of the self which makes man the master of time and thereby the master of his own destiny. Destiny is time regarded as one organic whole that the Qur'an describes as "taqdir" "Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure off its possibilities. It is time free from the net of causal sequence. It is time as felt and not as thought and calculated. One who masters the secret of time masters the destiny".42

Iqbal further discloses the secret of time with the following words:

"Ah! Your intellect is bound to the distinction of "Yesterday" and 'To-morrow'; - vet you can see a different world (of eternity) in your heart! You have sown a seed of darkness in your soul, and you consider time as a straight line. Then, with the measurement of 'Day' and 'Night' Your reason measures the length of time. You wear this conception of yours, like the "Sacred Thread" on your shoulders. Professing and promoting evil, like the idols! You were an alchemy, But turned a handful of dust You were born as a secret of God But became untruth (by wrong conception of time) If you are a true Muslim (believer) Get rid of this thread and be a candle.

people! of free the assembly ĭπ Because you are not aware of the root of time. of eternal life! cannot realize the secret Every thing in this world has appeared from the speed of time; and our life too. is a secret of time. Never forget that time is not founded on coming and going of sun. For time is eternal. But sun is not? It is time which gives birth to pleasure and sorrow and it is time, which imparts light to sun and moon! But alas! you sprad time as a 'space' limited for you make distinction between Yesterday and Tomorrow! Our Time which has neither any beginning Nor any end has really grown from the garden of our heart! A living person becomes livelier, by the realization of the essence of time and his life becomes more luminous than the dawn! However, the musical instrument. of time produces very low tunes! Therefore dive deep into your heart so that you may see the secret of time. In short 'life' appears from time, and time appears from life, that is why the Holy Prophet said 'Do not abuse time for the root of time is Allah (God).43

In Javid Nama, his other philosophical masterpiece, he depicts "Zarwan" as the spirit of time and space, explaining that it is time which sways the whole world and which is the predominant factor in capturing the Ultimate Reality. Hence "Zarwan" the spirit of time and space carries Iqbal to the highest heaven by the following words:

"Zarwan" I am who holds the world In thrall at once concealed and visible. All effort are related to my fates. I have thus enslaved the eloquent, the mute. For me the beauteous bud upon the branch doth bloom and sign the bird in nest, I fly and give its growth to gain, with union crown The lover's separation, I rebuke and I reward: I cause the pangs of thurst until I bring the wine. I symbolise both life and death and resurrection too; I am the judement and heaven and hell. All men and angels are my captives mere. This six-day world is but a child of mine. I am the rose thou pluckest from the branch, It is my breast that sucks every thing. Imprisoned in my magic is the world, Which, with my breath, grows old and doth decay. That valiant soul alone can break my charm Whose heart proclaims, "I have a time with God". If thou dost wish that I may not remain Between, let thy heart too announce the Words", 44

B. The Characteristics of Human-Divine Knowledge

The characteristics of Religious experience have already been briefly mentioned in the preceding chapter. In this chapter we are going to illustrate and give a more extensive elucidation of these characteristics. In his philosophical lectures, Iqbal has mentioned only five principal characteristics. They are the following:

1. Religious experience is immediate, direct. The Ultimate Reality is immediately and directly reflected in this experience. Religious experience is entirely different from reason, in that the Ultimate Reality is not grasped piecemeal but in its wholeness. The knowledge through religious experience is immediate, whereas the knowledge through reason is mediate and indirect. Iqbal regards immediate experience as the only trustworthy guide and the only solid satisfaction".45 As we

experience perceptible reality in our sense-experience so, we perceive God or Ultimate Reality in our religious experience. In both kinds of experiences, that is, "sense-experience" and "religious experience", the objects remain present as long as we are attending to them. The degree of our attending to these objects determines the duration. This duration some times lasts for a minute and some times for an hour.

The only difference between "normal experience" and "religious experience" is that in normal experience all our sense-organs are directly involved and nothing can be perceived without the senses while in religious experience all sense organs are passive and have nothing to do with the apprehension of the Ultimate Reality as such. Iqbal claims that "as regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense-data for our knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for the knowledge of God. The immediacy of mystic experience simply means that we know God just as we know other objects. God is not a mathematical entity or a system of concepts mutually related to one another and having no reference to experience".46

2. The unanalysability of religious experience. Religious experience is characterized as an unanalysable whole. The ultimate reality itself must be understood as unanalysable and unbroken. Only in thought, analysis is a prerequisite in order to grasp reality. In mystic experience thought is always reduced to the minimum. Mystic experience apprehends Ultimate Reality as an indivisible organic unity. Iqual illustrates this in the following words: "When I experience the table before me innumerable data of experience merge into the single experience of the table. Out of this wealth of data I select those that fall into a certain order of space and time and round them off in reference to the table. In the mystic state however vivid and rich it may be, thought is reduced to the minimum and such an analysis is not possible ... The ordinary rational consciousness, in view of our practical need of adaptation to our environment, takes that reality, piecemeal, selecting successively isolated sets of stimuli for response. The mystic state brings us into contact with the total passage of reality in

which all the diverse stimuli merge into one another and form a single unanalysable unity, in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist" 47 Commenting on these lines Dr. Maruf tells us that "thought does not reduce to the minimum in a mystic state—nay, it simply cannot, for then no knowledge would be possible, for thought is the faculty that puts interpretation on the perceived data and gives it meaning. Moreover, no knowledge is possible unless the data have been analysed and broken up into these bits, the mere mass of the given, unanalysed by thought will never yield us any knowledge. Thought must analyse it and, after selecting its revelent data, interpret it referring it to some object which is believed to be divine. Only then a mystic state will be cognitive and instructive and a knowledge of God possible. The one distinctive feature of lqbal's philosophy of religion is that he acknowledges that in its deeper movement or which comes to the same, in its non-discursive application, thought is a necessary element in religious knowledge". 48 Admitting that thought must analyse and classify the whole in order to give meaning to it, still, Dr. Maruf Probably forgets that religious experience has not the function to analyses the whole but see it immediately and directly as unanalysable.

If we admit thought as an essential element in religious experience then God as a Reality would not have been a controversial personality especially in the minds of the philosophers. The deeper movement in thought means that thought can also attain to a stage where religious experience and thought become one. Thought is dynamic and progressive and while on the way to the highest stage it "demolishes the walls of its finitude and enjoys a potential infinitude. Its movement becomes possible only because of the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite, which keeps alive within it the flame of aspiration and sustains it in its endless pursuit". 49 Analyses and classifications are not essential to thought when "thought is capable of reaching an immanent infinite in whose self - unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments. In its essential nature, then thought is not static, it is dynamic and unfolds its internal

infinitude in time; like the seed which, from the very beginning, carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact". To I think, Dr. Maruf considered the kind of 'thought' which is non-discursive. A discursive thought could not have helped us in a religious experience and would have been reduced to a minimum in a non-sensuous experience.

3. A third characteristic is the objectivity of religious experience and of the Ultimate Reality. "The mystic experience creates a moment of intimate association with the other self, transcending and encompassing, and momentarily suppressing the private personality of the subject of experience. Considering its content the mystic state is highly objective and cannot be regarded as a mere retirement in the mists of pure subjectivity".⁵¹

When the mystic submerges himself in the presence of the Ultimate Reality and becomes passive and completely loses his consciousness, then he finds himself in communion with God as an independent Other Self and a Personal God. To the question "how immediate experience of God, as an independent other self, is at all possible", Igbal replies that this question arises in the mind because we assume, without criticism, that our knowledge of the external world through sense-perception is the type of all knowledge. If this were so, we could never be sure of the reality of our own self. However, in reply to it, I suggest the analogy of our daily social experiences. How do we know other minds in our social intercourse? It is obvious that we know our own self and nature by inner reflection and senseperception respectively. We possess no sense for the experience of other minds. The only ground of my knowledge of a conscious being before me is the physical movements similar to my own from which I infer the presence of another conscious being" 52 Although we cannot bring the Ultimate Reality into the circle of out mystic experience because He is beyond and the beyond of the beyond, still God is an Ego and the Ultimate Reality Who could be apprehended by His response to the subject. "Response is, no doubt, the best of the presence of a conscious self" 53

In order to vindicate his arguments, Iqbal quotes from the Qur'an some verses which run as follows:

And your Lord saith, Call Me and I respond to your call. (40:62) 54

And when my servants ask thee (Muhammad) concerning Me, then I am nigh unto them and answer the cry of him that cries unto Me". (2:182)⁵⁵

In such associations with God the mystic seems to be completely passive. But his passiveness is in reality his activeness, since he is at that very moment participating in an act wherein both object and subject address to each other. R.S. Woodworth, a modern psychologist, has explained the word "activity". He says that "any manifestation of life can be called an activity. No matter how passive an individual may seem to himself in watching a game or listening to music, he is really carrying on an activity. The only way to be completely inactive is to be dead".56

Evenly Underhill asserts that "True mysticism is active and practical, not passive and theoretical. It is an organic life process, a something which the whole self does not something as to which its intellect holds and opinion" ⁵⁷ Further on she remarks on the passivity of the Mystic that "the great mystics tell us, no how they speculated, but how they acted. To them the transition from the life of sense to the life of spirit is a formidable undertaking which demands efforts and constancy. The paradoxical "quite" of the contemplative is but the upward stillness essential to inward work. Their favorite symbols are those of action: battle, search and pilgrimage" ⁵⁸

Iqbal further maintains about the objectivity of the mystic experience that we can never entertain any doubt about the reality of this knowledge because of its inferential quality He suggests that the mystic experience is parallel to one social experience and therefore "has some sort of resemblance to our normal experience and probably belongs to the same category".⁵⁹

4. The fourth characteristic of religious experience is its "Incommunicability". Iqbal emphasizes that Mystic states are feelings rather than thoughts. Mystic states are always inarticulate feelings, untouched by the discursive intellect and therefore can not be communicated. The mystic or the prophet can convey the interpretation of this feelings in the form of propositions but the content itself he cannot transmit. According to Iqbal, mystic feeling has also a cognitive element, this cognitive element takes on the form of idea. Because of this, mystic feeling has two aspects: a temporal and a non-temporal one. Feeling is the non-temporal aspect while idea is the temporal one.

Iqbal further explains this idea by quoting Hocking that "feeding is instability of an entire conscious self; and that which will restore the stability of this self lies not within its own borders but beyond it. Feeling is outward-pushing as idea is outward - reporting and no feeling is so blind as to have no idea of its own object". 60 He also says that "a feeling without a direction is as impossible as an activity without a direction. And a direction implies some objective". 61

Idea and word are the creation of feeling. "It is no mere metaphor to say that idea and word both simultaneously emerge out of the womb of feeling, though logical understanding cannot but take them in a temporal order and thus create its own difficulty by regarding them as mutually isolated. There is a sense in which the word is also revealed". Iqbal substantiates his arguments of the incommunicability of the mystic experience by quoting some verses form the Qur'an:

It is not for a man that God should speak with him, but by vision or from behind a veil or He sendth a messenger to reveal by His permission what He will; for He is exalted, wise. (42:51).

By the star when it setteth, your compatriot erreth not, nor is he led astray.

Neither speakth he from mere impulse.

The Qur'an is no other than the revelation revealed to

On strong in power taught it him, endowed with wisdom.

With ever balance stood he in the highest part the horizon.

Then came he nearer and approached

And was at the distance of two bows or even closer-

And he revealed to the servant of God what He revealed.

His heart falsified not what he saw;

What! will ye then dispute with him as to what he saw? he had seen him also another time.

Near the sidrah tree which marks the boundary:

Near which is the garden of repose.

When the sidrah tree was covered with what covered it.

His eye turned not aside, nor did it wander.

For he saw the greatest of the signs of the Lord.⁶³ (53:1-18)

Normal experience and religious experience are just the same thing as far as their contents are concerned. In normal experience, too, the content cannot be transmitted except in the form of a judgement, to give an example: the experience of my toothache cannot be conveyed to the doctor, who has not himself experienced it; the only alternative is to form ideas; these ideas then lend themselves to the form of propositions and are thus conveyed to the doctor. Ibnul-Arabi says: "you can no more explain the knowledge revealed by mystical experience to a person who has not gone through the experience than you can explain what "red" means to a blind man". 64 In fact there is no appropriate language in which the content of mystic experience can be conveyed to others, for the language of the mystic is vague and unintelligible to the

All the mystics every where in the world understand each other, as Professor J.B. Pratt aptly remarked: "To be sure all the mystics of every land and century may in the sense be said to speak the same language; they understand each other and no one else fully understands them".65

From the incommunicability of mystic experiences one should not conclude that this sort of knowledge is purely

subjective and private. "They are communicable, provided there is a communication of experience between the reporter and the one to whom it is being reported" 66

Furthermore, the whole history of religion is the standing testimony to the communicability of prophetic or mystic experience. Professor Pratt has devised some reasons for the incommunicability of mystic experience. "One is that the mystic is not usually interested in exact description and never thinks of taking the psychological point of view. Poor introspection on the part of many is another reason. Most fundamental of all is the fact that exact psychological description of an emotional experience must necessarily be in sensuous terms, while the mystic often feels that sensuous terms are unworthy to be applied to his purely "spiritual experience" ⁶⁷

To these Dr. Maruf adds another important reason namely the "lack of community" between the experiences of a mystic and those of the man in the street which renders experiences of the former incomprehensible to the latter".68

5. Transiency is the fifth fundamental characteristic of religious experience. Mystic states are very short and soon fade away; they do not last for a long time. They are like normal experiences which are also changing and cannot be perpetuated in the mind. William James says that "except in rare instances, half an hour or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they fade into the light of common day". He adds that "often, when faded, their quality can but imperfectly be reproduced in memory, but when they recur it is recognized and from one recurrence to another it is susceptible of continuous development in what is felt as inner richness and importance".69 Religious experience gives us a vision of the reality as an "eternal now" and it disconnects itself from serial time. Soon, however, this connection with serial time is reestablished. And this is why "that both the mystic and the prophet return to the normal levels of experience...."70

It is not only the mystic experiences which are ephemeral but also the mental states in general. They all fade away and do not persist in the mind for ever. "Not a single perception or

sensation, feeling or volition is eternally present in the mind. Mind being a continuous flow, it is not possible for a mind to perpetuate any of its states; the states must go on changing and replacing each other and this is a relentlessly and unitermittently continuous succession, a change ceasing;.... "71 The only difference is that the mystic experience has a breach with serial time while it is going on, while normal experience stays in serial time and does not break with it. The former changes from serial time to pure duration or eternal time while the latter occurs and dies in serial time. It is erroneous to say that transiency refers to the infirmity and the imperfection of the human mind because with an infirm and imperfect mind prophets and mystics would never have changed the direction of the history of mankind. It only refers to the fact that the mystic experience occurs in the minds of human beings and not in something of a higher level than human beings. Another reason might be that the human beings are living in serial time, so that they have to come back to the normal level of experience. 'The normal level of experience' is then the root of mystic experience or, to say it in the words of the Our'an "the certainty of senses".

C. The Sources of Human Divina-Knowledge

In every human being lies the germ of "Divine knowledge" for the soul of a being, according to the Qur'an, is from the command of God. Thus the Qur'an say: "Say: the spirit (cometh) by command of my Lord"? Now this "Command of Lord" will bring man into direct communion with its Lord, that is, the Ultimate Reality, provided he so desires. There are at least four stages of spiritual training, Iqbal says, through which man should pass if he desires to rise above the common herd and realize his union with the ultimate source of all things. They are the following:

- 1. Belief in the unseen. Belief is the first step in the hierarchy of spiritual training. Without it the whole life of man becomes pointless.
- 2. Search for the unseen. Having reached that primer belief, man should quest for the unseen.

- 3. Knowledge of the unseen, a third stage in the spiritual training, is reached by looking into depths of our soul.
- 4. The realization. This results, according to higher sufism, from the constant practice of justice and charity.⁷³

As we have mentioned before this knowledge is present in every human being; it seems dormant in the heart of man but the quest will make it more burning. It only requires "connection" and "meditation" to attain to that higher experience that is mystical experience.

When a man starts with deep concentration then "concentration and action follow successively, and that action is the expression of the inner yearning of the ego for a higher stage". 74 How can we bring our mind to this kind of concentration? The only possible means which Islam emphasizes, is "Prayer" or Yoga in Hinduism. Prayer is the only agency through which the association with Ultimate Reality can be achieved. Igbal says: "The agency through which this association is achieved is the act of worship or prayer ending in spiritual illumination. The act of worship, however, affects different varieties of consciousness differently. In the case of the prophetic consciousness it is in the main creative: that is it tends to create a fresh ethical world wherein the Prophet, so to speak, applies the pragmatic test to this revelation... In the case of the mystic consciousness it is in the main cognitive".75

Prayer should not be taken to be a mere exercise of the body; it should be considered as an act of the soul, the result of which is the ascension to the Ultimate Reality. Prayer is useless if not attended by the presence of the heart. Or as Professor Pratt claims "Probably the most important of these methods is the practice of the presence of God—the habit, diligently cultivated, of keeping constantly either in the fringe or in the centre of one's mind the thought that God is present or that He is even within one". Prayer means a quest for the Ultimate Reality. It establishes in the pursuer's consciousness the experience of "Divine presence. "As for those who pursue most earnestly the quest in us for God We surely guide them in

our paths".77 Prayer is a dynamic reciprocal relationship between man and God. It is not a mere reflection or an abstract thought but "a creative dialogue between man and his Lord".78 "The act of prayer as aiming at knowledge resembles reflection. Yet prayer at its highest is much more than abstract reflection. Like reflection it too is a process of assimilation, but the assimilative process in the case of prayer draws itself closely together and thereby acquires a power unknown to oure thought. In thought the mind observes and follows the working of Reality; in the act of prayer it gives up its career as a seeker of slow-footed universality and rises higher than thought to capture Reality itself with a view to become a conscious participation in its life. There is nothing mystical about it. Prayer as a means of spiritual illumination is a normal vital act by which the little island of our personality suddenly discovers its situation in a larger whole of life".79

We have already discussed the two aspects of the self, that is, the appreciative and the efficient self. The appreciative self is the inner self whereas the efficient self is the outer self. In prayer the efficient self, for a moment, ceases to be the outer aspect of self, while the appreciative self reaches the experience in question that is mystic experience. "It is only in the moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abevance, that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience".80 The act of prayer, Iqbal quotes from William James, is a higher attitude of mind which every soul has in some degrees. James says: "It seems probable that inspite of all that science may do to the contrary, men will continue to pray to the end of time unless their mental nature changes in a manner which nothing we know should lead us to expect. The impulse to pray is a necessary consequence of the fact that whilst the inner most of the imperial selves of a man is a self of the social sort it yet can find its only adequate socious (its "great companion") in an ideal world most men, either continually or occasionally, carry a reference to it in their breasts. The humble outcast on this earth can feel himself to be real and valid by means of this higher recognition. And, on the other hand, for most of us, a world with no such inner refuge

when the outer social self failed and dropped from us would be the abyss of horror. I say "for most of us" because it is probable that men differ a good deal in the degree in which they are haunted by this sense of an ideal spectator. It is much more essential part of the consciousness of some men than others. Those who have the most of it are possibly the most religious men. But I am sure that even those who say they are altogether without it deceive themselves, and really have it in some degree". S1

Iqbal is willing to admit that mysticism and metaphysics have not so far disclosed the vistas by which the modern man satisfies his mind; for the modern man's mind, with its habits of concrete thanking, demands a concrete living experience of God. "And the history of the race", Iqbal further adds "shows that the attitude of the mind embodied in the act of worship is a condition for such an experience".⁸²

In fact prayer is a quest for knowledge. "The observation of the universe", according to Iqbal, "is a form of prayer and hence the scientific observer of nature is a kind of mystic seeker in the act of prayer. In the scientific observation of nature the art of prayer becomes an attitude which fully embodies the mind and is complemented by the sense-perception. Similarly in the act of prayer the mind is embodied in the apprehension of ultimate Reality. And this act of Prayer will be such that in which you should enjoy the privacy of the Divine self so that He sees you and you see Him".83

When this situation is created, the situation wherein man and God are face to face, then the ego is at work. According to Iqbal "ego is inner experience which is at work".⁸⁴

That prayer, which as an inner act, has found expression in a variety of forms, should not become a matter of dispute. The prayer means the inner yearning for God, the source of creation, of communion with God. "It is a unique process or discovery whereby the searching ego affirms itself in the every moment of self-negation and thus discovers its own worth and justification as a dynamic factor in the life of the universe".85

The Qur'an is clear on this point, namely, that every human being has been appointed various forms of prayer:

"To every people have We appointed ways of worship which they observe Therefore let them not dispute this matter with thee (Muhammad) but sid them to thy Lord for thou art on the right way, but if they debate with thee then say God best knoweth what ye do! He will judge between you on the day of resurrection, to the matters wherein ye differ". (22:66.9)".86

Whatever the form may be, the real object of prayer is knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. Still the form of the prayer in Islam has created the idea of a unity and a brotherhood among its followers. In this way it has influenced the rest of the world. "This regular prayer", says one Western sage, "has proved one of the greatest forces of Islam. (And) has always deeply impressed non-Muslims". The prayer in Islam does not need any particular place to be performed; because:

"The east and the West is God's therefore whichever way ye turn, There is a the Face of God". 88

In another place the Qur'an is much more clear on this point that whatever direction you turn your face to, is not essential to the spirit of prayer. We find this expressed in the following lines:

There is no piety in turning your faces towards the East or the West but he is pious who believeth in God and the last day and the angels and the scriptures; who for the love of God disburseth his wealth to his kindred and to the orphans, and the needy, and the wayfarer, and those who ask and for ransoming, who observeth prayer and payeth the legal alms, and who is of those who are faithful to their engagements when they have engaged in them, and patients under ills and hardships in time of trouble: Those are they who are just and those are they who fear the Lord. 89

In order to create a unity and a brotherhood among the followers of Islam prayer should be observed in one

Human Divine Knowledge

congregation, in one place which Islam calls mosque and facing one direction which is qibla, the sacred city of Mecca.

Iqbal says that "the real object of prayer, however, is better achieved when the act of prayer becomes congregational. The spirit of all true prayer is social. Even the hermit abandons the society of men in the hope of finding in a solitary abode the followship of God. A congregation is an association of men who, animated by the same aspiration, concentrate themselves on a single object and open up their inner selves to the working of a single impulse. It is a psychological truth that association multiples the normal man's power of perception, deepens his emotion and dynamizes his will to a degree unknown to him in the privacy of his individuality". 90

He further illumines this point of associative prayer by asserting the following: "With Islam, however, this socialization of spiritual illumination through associative prayer is a special point of interest. As we pass from the daily congregational prayer to the annual ceremony round the central mosque of Mecca, you can easily see how the Islamic Institution of worship gradually enlarges the sphere of human association". 91 He adds that "the choice of one particular direction in Islamic worship is meant to secure the unity of feeling in the congregation and its form in general creates and fosters the sense of social equality in as much as it tends to destroy the feeling of rank or race-superiority in the worshippers".92 The real significance of congregational prayer is that it leads man form mechanism to freedom. A mechanistic life cannot be considered a free activity and hence cannot be supposed to share in the life of the Ultimate Reality. Therefore, Ighal claims: "Indeed Islam recognizes a very important fact of human psychology, that is, the rise and fall of the power to act freely, and is anxious to retain the power to act freely as a constant and undiminished factor in the life of the ego. The timing of the daily prayer which according to the Qur'an restores self-possession to the ego by bringing it into closer touch with the ultimate source of life and freedom, is intended to save the ego from the mechanizing effects of sleep and

business. Prayer in Islam is the ego's escape from mechanism to freedom".93

Thus we see that prayer is the only possible means to tear down the veil between man and (his Lord) God. It must, however, be observed in some form, whether individual or associative, in order to comprehend the Divine effulgence. "Prayer then, whether, individual or associative, is an expression of man's inner yearning for response in the awful silence of the universe". 94 In distinguishing between philosophy and religion, Iqbal says that "philosophy is an intellectual view of things; and as such, does not care to go beyond a concept which can reduce all the rich variety of experience to a system. It sees reality from a distance as it were. Religion seeks closer contact with reality. The one is theory; the other is living experience, association, intimacy. In order to achieve this intimacy thought must rise higher than itself and find its fulfillment in an attitude of mind which religion describes as prayer..."35 The Qur'an time and again urges upon all human beings in general and Muslims in particular to be steadfast in their prayer and make it a habit. The Qur'an says:

"Guard strictly your (habit of) prayers". 96 (\$.11:238)

And be steadfast in prayer and regular in charity and whatever good ye send forth for your souls before you, ye shall find it with Allah: for Allah sees will all that ye do. (The Qur'an; S. 11:110)⁹⁷

Prayer teaches us the perfect way and guides us to the knowledge of God.

The first chapter in the Qur'an is always read out in the Muslim from of prayer. "It teaches us the perfect prayer. For if we can pray aright, it means that we have some knowledge of God and His attributes, of His relations to us and His creation, which includes ourselves, that we glimpse the source from which we come and that final goal which is our spiritual destiny under God's true judgement: Then we offer ourselves to God and seek His light".98

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 : The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Muhammad Iqbal.
 - 2: Ibid., p. 16
 - 3: Ibid., pp. 15-16
 - 4: Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion, p. 205.
 - 5: The Message of the East (Payam-i-Mashriq) p. 194.
 - 6: Iqbal's Educational Philosophy by K.G. Saiyidain, p. 190.
 - 7 : Javid Nama, p. 74
- 8: The New Rose Garden of Mystery and The Book of Slave., translation of Iqbal's Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid and Bandagi Namah by M. Hadi Hussain, pp. 65-66.
 - 9: Gabriel's Wing by A. Schimmel, p. 128.
 - 10: A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy by B. A. Dar, pp. 162-163.
- 11: The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqhal by Jamila Khatoon, pp. 50-51.
 - 12 : Ibid., pp. 50-51
 - 13 : Bang-i-Dara, p. 199.
 - 14: The Secrets of the Self translated by A.R. Tariq, pp. 61-67.
 - 15: Ibid., pp. 28-29.
 - 16: Ibid., p. 47.
 - 17: The New Rose Garden of Mystery, p. 7.
 - 18. The Reconstruction, p. 184.

- 19: Ibid., p. 195.
- 20: Ibid., p. 16.
- 21: Ibid., p. 23.
- 22: The New Rose Garden of Mystery, p. 22.
- 23 : Javid Nama., p.4.
- 24 : Gabriel's Wing, Iqbal's Bal-i-Gabriel, p. 20.
- 25: Iqbal as a Thinker, p. 193.
- 26. The Reconstruction, p. 16.
- 27: Ibid., p. 190.
- 28 : Campbell, C.A. pp. 13-14,
- 29 : Gabriel's Wing, p. 151.
- 30: Study in Iqbal's Philosophy by B.A. Dar, p. 213.
- 31 : Javid Nama, p. 16.
- 32: The Reconstruction, p. 34.
- 33 : Ibid., pp. 46-47.
- 34 : Ibid., p. 47.
- 35 : Ibid., p. 48.
- 36 : Ibid., p. 48.
- 37 : Ibid., p. 48.
- 38 : Ibid., p. 48.
- 39: Ibid., p. 49.
- 40 : Bal-i-fibreel, translated by A. R. Tariq, pp. 123-125.
- 41: Longer Poems of Iqbal by A. R. Tariq, pp. 169-172.
- 42. Iqbal as a Thinker, p. 37.
- 43: Longer Poems of Iqbal by Tariq, pp. 169-172.
- 44 : Javid Nama, pp. 18-19.

Human Divine Knowledge

- 45 : Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion, by M. Maruf, pp. 141-142.
- 46: The Reconstruction, p. 18.
- 47. : Ibid., pp. 18-19.
- 48: Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion, p. 143.
- 49: The Reconstruction, p. 7.
- 50: The Reconstruction, p. 6.
- 51 : Ibid., p. 19.
- 52: Ibid., p. 19.
- 53 : Ibid., p. 19.
- 54 : Ibid., p. 19.
- 55 : Ibid., p. 20.
- 56: Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion, p. 148.
- 57: Ibid., pp. 148-149.
- 58 : Ibid., pp. 148-149.
- 59: The Reconstruction, p. 20.
- 60: Ibid., p. 22.
- 61: Ibid., p. 22.
- 62 : Ibid., p. 22.
- 63: The Qur'an, 53:1-18.
- 64: Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion, p. 137.
- 65 : Ibid., p. 137.
- 66: Ibid., p. 137.
- 67: Ibid., p. 138.
- 68 : Ibid., p. 138.
- 69 : Ibid., p. 145.
- 70: The Reconstruction, p. 23.

- 71: Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion, p. 145.
- 72: The Qur'an, 17:85.
- 73: The Development of Metaphysics in Persia by Iqbal, pp. 85-86.
- 74. Gabriel's Wing by A. Schimmel, p. 107.
- 75: The Reconstruction, p. 89.
- 76: Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion, p. 155.
- 77: The Qur'anic Foundation and the Structure of Muslim Society by M. Fazl-ur-Rehman, p. 139.
 - 78: Gabriel's Wing by A. Schimmel, p. 172.
 - 79: The Reconstruction, p. 90.
 - 80 : Ibid., pp. 47-48.
 - 81 : Ibid., p. 89.
 - 82 : Ibid., pp. 90-91.
 - 83 : New Rose Garden of Mystery, p. 34.
 - 84: The Reconstruction, p. 102.
 - 85 : Ibid., p. 92.
 - 86: Ibid., p. 93.
 - 87. Gabriel's Wing, by A. Schimmel, p. 171.
 - 88: The Qur'an, 2:199.
 - 89: The Reconstruction, p. 93.
 - 90 : Ibid., p. 92.
 - 91 : Ibid., p. 92.
 - 92: Ibid., p. 93.
 - 93: Ibid., p. 109.
 - 94 : Ibid., p. 92.
 - 95 : Ibid., p. 61.

Human Divine Knowledge

96: The Qur'an, II:238.

97 : Ibid., II:110.

98: The Qur'an, Introduction to Sura I by Abdullah Yousafali, p. 13.



CHAPTER FOUR

Human - Non-Divine Knowledge

In the previous chapter we have discussed the "human-Divine knowledge" which consists of love or religious experience. The nucleus of the present chapter is the aspect of man's knowledge which is mostly regarded as "non-Divineknowledge", the foundatain-head of which is "reason" or "intellect".

Knowledge through reason only concerns this phenomenal world, which means that it is bound to space and time and cannot transgress it, and therefore can rightly be called human non-Divine knowledge.

Undoubtedly, reason has been playing a dominant role in the whole drama of man since his birth. Though dominating this world, it has not yet succeeded to escape from its critics. Some intellectuals have totally disbelieved reason (they are called sceptics), while some other have partially acknowledged the importance of reason. Iqbal, in this sense is a sceptic. I just refer here to his attitude towards intellect as expressed in his poetry. His prose work too, though an attempts to provide a "rational method of philosophy to religion", shows this scepticism. We see this in his `Reconstruction". He asserts in this book that "the spirit of philosophy is one of free inquiry. It

suspects all authority. Its function is to trace the uncritical assumptions of human thought to their hiding places, and in this pursuit it may finally end in denial or a frank admission of the incapacity of pure reason to reach the Ultimate Reality. The greatest philosophers of the world have admitted the incapability of human reason to attain to the Ultimate Reality. Al-Ghazali, a medieval philosopher and a mystic was the greatest sceptic; he has brought grievous criticism against rationalism. Before turning to the philosophy of Iqbal about reason, we will first discuss the attitude of Al-Ghazali towards reason or philosophy.

Al-Ghazali expounds his views on knowledge thus: "I said to my self I am seeking knowledge of what things really are; so I must know what knowledge is. I saw that certain knowledge must exclude all doubt and the possibility of error, indeed even the supposition of this. The person who performs miracles should not be able to shake one's conviction of the truth of such knowledge. For example, if some one says three is greater than ten, and the proof is that I shall turn this rod into a serpent and if he actually does it in my presence, I still do not doubt my knowledge but only wonder how he achieved the transformation. From such considerations I realized that only where I have an unshakable conviction of this kind is my knowledge certain knowledge". Al-Ghazali further sets forth that "When I examined my knowledge, I found that none of it was certain except matters of sense-perception and necessary truths. It further occurred to me, however, that my present trust in sense-perception and necessary truth was perhaps no better-founded than my previous trust in propositions accepted from parents and teachers. So I earnestly set about making myself doubt sense-perception and necessary truths. With regard to sense-perception I noticed that the sense of sight tells me that the shadow cast by the gnomon of a sundial is motionless; but latter observation and reflection shows that it moves and that it does so not by jerks but by a constant steady motion. This sense also tells me that the sun is the size of a coin, but astronomical proofs show that it is larger than the earth. Thus sense makes certain judgements and thus reason

comes and judges that they are false". In order to prove that the judgements of reason are also spurious, he argues: "I said to my self, since my trust in sense-perception has proved vain perhaps all that is to be relied on are rational propositions and first principles, such as that ten is more than three, that negation and affirmation cannot both be hold of anything that a thing cannot both originated-in-time and eternal, both existent and non-existent, necessary and impossible. Then sense-perception said: "Do you not expect that your trust in rational propositions will fare like your trust in sense-perception? You used to trust in me, but judge Reason came and showed I was false". Perhaps beyond rational apprehensions there will be another judge; when he appears he will show that reason is false. The fact that this supra-rational apprehension has not appeared yet, does not show that it is impossible"?

Al-Ghazali further substantiates his arguments as follows: "While my self was hesitating about the reply to this, senseperception increased its difficulties by a reference to dreams and said 'In dreams you imagine things and you believe that they are real and genuine so long as you are in the dream-state. But when you wake you know that what you have been imagining has no basis in reality. How are you sure of the real existence of all that you believe in your waking state through seines or reason? It is there in relation to your present state but another state may come upon you, whose relation to your present waking state, in short your present state will be like a dream in relation to that state. If this state comes, you will be certain that all your rational suppositions are baseless imaginings. Perhaps this is the state of the sufis (mystics) in which they claim that they see things which are not in accordance with rational principles. Perhaps this state is death and perhaps this life is a dream in relation to the life to come, so that when a man dies, things will become apparent to him which are contrary to what he now observes".4

The above paragraphs clearly show Al-Ghazali's bitter criticism on sense-perception and reason. He doesn't believe in the sole guidance of reason; for him reason has not so far achieved the ultimate principle and cleared all doubts which

have been lingering in the minds of people for centuries. "Reason by itself", he argues, "cannot prove that the world has a creator, that two Gods are impossible, that God is not a body, that He knows both others and Himself, and that the soul is a self-subistent entity". To base all knowledge on reason or rational propositions is to create a world of doubts, since knowledge based on reason provides an uncertain knowledge.

Al-Ghazali violently attacks the philosophers in his 'Tahafat-ul-Falasifa' (The Destruction of the Philosophers). According to him, there are three kinds of philosophers. The first one is the Dahris (Materialists) who believe in the eternity of matter and deny the existence of a Creator. The second group consists of 'the Naturalists or Physicists', who believe in the existence of a Creator but think that the human soul once separated from the body ceases to exist; therefore there is no accountability for human actions. These two types of philosophers are both infidels in contrast to those of a third group, who are Theists. "These have completely refuted the doctrines of the first two, and God has saved thereby the true believer from the battle. But they must be pronounced infidels: and so also Muslim philosophers who have followed them, especially al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, for their philosophy is so confused that you cannot separate the true from the false so as to refute the latter. From what we can discover of the writings of these two men, knowledge may be divided under three heads; one group we are bound to prounce as infidel, another as heresy and about the third we need say nothing".6

Al-Ghazali's intention was to show the limitations of reason but in doing so he overshadowed the importance of it. According to him reason is incapable of ascending to the Ultimate Reality and therefore "his scepticism may be seen as a realization of the incapability of reason (or human planning) to set things right". He draws a line between reason and prophetic revelation by illustrating that "just as the medicine for the body produces an effect in gaining health through a property in them, to which the intellect cannot attain, but with regard to which physicians must be believed who have learned that property from the prophetic property, so it became plain

to me that the intellect could not attain to the mode of the working of the medicines of the heart which are exercise of devotion in their definitions and amounts defined and prescribed by the prophets but that with regard to this the prophets must be followed who attained unto those properties by the light of prophecy and not by means of reason.... In a word, the prophets are the physicians of the diseases of hearts; and the only use and authority for reason is that it should teach us this and should bear witness to the truth of prophecy and to its own inability to attain to what the eye of prophecy can reach; and that is should take us by our hands and commit us to prophecy, as the blind are committed to their guides and the sick to their physicianes. This is the work and bound of reason and beyond this it may not go except to make know what the physicians have thought it".8

Al-Ghazali in his book 'The Deliverance from Error', describes the true nature of prophecy and the compelling need of all creation for it. He maintains that man was created in bareness and simplicity and that he in this state has been given no information at all about the will of God. Man's information is based on the faculty of perception by means of which he may gain some knowledge of the world. Al-Ghazali argues that "the first thing created in man was the sense of touch and by it he perceives certain class of existents such as heat and cold. moisture and dryness, smoothness and roughness. Touch is completely unable to apprehend colours and noises. These might be non-existent so far as concerns touch. Next there is created in him the sense of sight and by it he apprehends colours and shapes. This is the most extensive of the world's sensibles. Next hearing is implanted in him, so that he hears sounds of various kinds. After that, taste is created in him and so on until he is completed as to the world of sensibles. Next, when he is about seven years old, there is created in him discernment (or the power of distinguishing—tamyiz). This is a fresh stage in his development... From this he ascends to another stage, and Intellect (or Reason) (aql) is created in him. He apprehends things as necessary possible, impossible, things which do not occur in the previous stages. Beyond Intellect

there is yet another stage. In this, another eye is opened, by which he beholds the unseen what is to be in the future and other things which are beyond the ken of intellect in the same way as the objects of intellect are beyond the ken of the faculty of discernment and the objects of discernment are beyond the ken of sense. Moreover, just as the man at the stage of discernment would reject and disregard the objects of intellect were these to be presented to him, so some intellectuals reject and disregard the objects of prophetic revelation. This is sheer ignorance. They have no ground for their view except that this is a stage which they have not reached and which for them does not exist; yet they suppose that it is non-existent in itself. "When a man blind from birth, who has not learnt about colours and shapes by listening to people's talk, is told about these things for the first time he does not understand them nor admit their existence" 9

Al-Ghazali further illustrates the possibilities of prophecy by giving us some proofs: "The proof of the possibility of there being prophecy and the proof that there has been prophecy is that there is knowledge in the world the attainment of which by reason is inconceivable; for example, in medical science and astronomy. Whoever researches in such matters knows of necessity that this knowledge is attained only by Divine inspiration and by assistance from God most high. It cannot be reached by observation. For instance there are some astronomical laws based on phenomena which occur only once in a thousand years; how can these be arrived at by personal observation? It is the same with the properties of drugs. This argument shows that it is possible for there to be a way of apprehending these matters which are not apprehended by the intellect. This is the meaning of prophetic revelation. That is not to say that prophecy is merely an expression for such knowledge. Rather, the apprehending of this class of extraintellectual objects is one of the properties of prophecy; but it has many other properties as well. The said property is but a drop in the ocean of prophecy. It has been singled out for mention because you have something analogous to it in what you apprehend in dreaming and because you have medical and astronomical knowledge belonging to the same class, namely, the miracles of prophets, for the intellectuals cannot arrive at these at all by any intellectual efforts".¹⁰

Ghazali's mind was looking for something which could help him to ascend to the ultimate truth which he failed to find in reason or sense-perception; finally he succeeded in achieving knowledge of the ultimate truth "by a light which God most high cast into his breats". According to one scholar "Al-Ghazali was well aware of the limitations of human intellect and very often he felt that the methods of arriving at knowledge of God were "too obscure to the ordinary intelligence". He has therefore left them and dealt only with the methods which can be comprehended".11 Furthermore, the same scholar explains that "Al-Ghazali has two aims in mind when he was degrading the faculty of intellect: firstly, He wanted to make the scholastic ulema realize the futulty of the different aspects of knowledge and the absurdity of taking pleasure in intellectual symnastic and useless discussion which has created more of bitterness than any proper understanding; secondly, he wanted to make people feel the meaning and grandeur of the inner life; to give men time to reflect on the glories of nature that were around them so that they might long for the realization of a lasting happiness instead of indulging in the idla pursuit of listening, in scholastic discussions beyond their comprehension".12

The philosophy, which Al-Ghazali has given us, earned him a place in scepticism and in it he "anticipated Decartes in his philosophical method; and seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the edge of his dialect". 13

"Al-Ghazali reduced reason to the principle of causality and causality to mere sequence..."

14 His analysis of causality is greatly similar to Hume's. It was Al-Ghazali's theory of causality which influenced Nicholas of Autrecout, who has been called "The medieval Hume".

15 These two philosophers, Al-Ghazali and Hume, resemble in so far as the theory of causality is concerned; both refuse the relation between cause and effect as a necessary connection. Here we give in brief the

analysis of causation given by Al-Ghazali. He disputes with the philosophers on the very notion or concept of "necessity of the causal connection".

In our view, Al-Ghazali asserts the connection between what are believed to be cause and effect as not necessary. The reason that he offers for the justification of his position is that the relation between cause and effect is not that of logical entailment. The affirmation of the one does not imply the affirmation of the other. Neither the existence nor the nonexistence of the one is necessarily presupposed by the existence or the non-existence of the other. The relation between quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating burning and fire or light and sunrise etc; is not a necessary relation, for in no case does the one logically imply the other. There is nothing logically contradictory in assuming that fire may not burn, and drinking may not quench thirst and so on. The alleged necessity of the causal connection is not logically warranted because through no amount of logical reasoning can we deduce the effect from the cause. At best it is based on observation or experience. We observe that objects succeed one another or that similar objects are constantly conjoined. Now, this proves succession, not causation or conjunction or connection. The fire which is an inanimate object has no power to produce the effect of burning. "Observation shows only that one is with the other and not that it is by it, i.e., the effect happens with the cause and not through it". Causal connection is not a necessary connection but a constant repetition. "It is only Al-Ghazali who enumerates clearly when something possible is repeated over and over again (so as to form the norm) that its pursuance of a uniform cause in accordance with the norm in the past is indelibly impressed upon our minds". For Al-Ghazali cause is something to be the sum-total of many contributory factors, some of which are positive while others negative and all of which have to be considered in conjunction".16

We must remember that Al-Ghazali has close affinity with David Hume. Hume's theory of causation is so like Al-Ghazali's that it could even be called a copy. Hume's view on

Human Non-Divine Knowledge

causation is that the idea of causation is derived from some relation among objects. "This relation", Hume asserts, "is contiguity". He means that the things which we consider to be causes and effects are always immediately contiguous; for there may be a chain or series of causes between thing A we call a cause, and thing z, which we call an effect. But it will be found that A and B are contiguous, B and C are contiguous, and so on. A second relation is that of temporal priority. The cause must be temporally prior to the effect.

One may not be contented with these relations. As Hume says "Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession as affording a complete idea of By no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause. There is a necessary connection to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance than any of the other two abovementioned".

Hume asks "Why do we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects, and why do we form an inference from one to another. The answer is concluded in psychological terms, referring to the psychological effect, observation of instances of constant conjunction. This observation produces a custom or propensity of the mind an associative link, whereby the mind passes naturally from, say, the idea of flame to the idea of heat or from an impression of flame to the lively idea of heat".

So causation can be considered either as a philosophical or as a natural relation. Considered as a philosophical relation it can be defined as follows? A cause is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and when all the objects resembling the former are placed in like manner relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter. Considered as a natural relation, "a cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another and so united with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.".

That is, in a nutshell, the philosophy of Hume. The two philosophers both discarded the traditional law of causation. Ighal agrees with these two philosophers. He not only agrees but also highly appreciates their views on causality. He regards the notion of cause as an essentially false one. He argues that 'a fixed quantity of A is the cause of, or produces, another fixed quantity B' is a proposition which, though convenient for scientific purpose, is apt to damage all inquiry in so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions lying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an historical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due to the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other forces of a different character that tended to the split up of the political unity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as the cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have assimilated as it actually did to a certain extent the so-called cause is a procedure that no logic would justify". I Iqual further sheds light on the problem of cause and effect by connecting it to the problem of the relation between body and mind which were once regarded by Desecrates as two independent entities. It is sometimes believed, he say, that "the cause must have some resemblance with the effect. But there need be no resemblance between cause and effect. If my success in life causes misery to another man, my success and his misery have no resemblance to each other".18

Iqbal says that the self or ego must live in an environment. This environment is an artificial construction of the ego for its own purpose. He regards this environment "as a system of causes and effects which is an indispensable instrument of the ego and not the final expression of the nature of Reality". The problem of destiny or fatalism also results from the problematic relation between cause and effect. Iqbal supposes that the idea of fatalism has prevailed in the Islamic world for many centuries. He states that "Philosophy, searching for the meaning of cause as applied to God and taking time as the essence of the relation between cause and effect, could not but reach the notion of a transcendent God, prior to the universe,

Human Non-Divine Knowledge

and operating upon it from without. God was thus conceived as the last link in the chain of causation and consequently the real author of all that happens in the universe. Now the practical materialism of the opportunist Omayyad rulers of Damascus needed a peg on which to hang their misdeed at Kerbala and to secure the fruits of Amir Muawiya's revolt against the possibilities of a popular rebellion. Ma'bad is reported to have said to Hassan of Basra that the Ommayyads killed Muslims and attributed their acts to the decree of God. 'These enemies of God', 'replied Hassan, 'are liars'. Thus arose, in spite of open protests by Muslim divines, a morally degrading fatalism and the constitutional theory known as the accomplished fact in order to support vested interests".²⁰

The notion of causality, I am inclined to believe, had caused a great havoc in and out of the world of Islam. Perhaps Al-Ghazali was the first to realize this problem and to reckon with it systematically. Seven centuries after this Hume cut the bond of causality and justified Al-Ghazali's claim on this problem. Cause and effect, I suppose, are two aspects of the same reality or to put it differently, one event is cut into two different things of which one is called cause and the other effect. For example, fire is cause and burning is effect but one must not forget the fact that fire must always burn; that is, fire and burning are one and the same thing and not two things, for fire cannot exist without burning and burning, without fire.

Iqbal admired Hume for his theory of causality. He regarded Hume's analysis of causation as the first attempt of modern mind to purify the scientific process. For Iqbal "Hume's criticism of our notion of cause must be considered as a chapter in the history of science rather than philosophy. True to the spirit of scientific empiricism we are not entitled to work with any concept of a subjective nature. The point of Hume's criticism is to emancipate empirical science from the concept of force which, as he urges, has no foundation in sense-experience. This was the first attempt of modern mind to purify the scientific process".²¹

Iqbal too like Al-Ghazali, protests against 'Intellectualism'. Notwithstanding the fact that he was a leading figure in philosophy he studied his whole life,he was alive to the limitations of philosophy and therefore his whole poetical work is pregnant with hostility towards philosophy. "In some of his verses, he is so unsparing in his condemnation of reasoning faculty that an impression has come to prevail about him that he represents some of the modern schools of thought which are saturated with anti-intellectualism".²² On some grounds Iqbal repudiates the claim of idea or reason to represent the reality of life to be its sole creative force. In this he is opposed to Hegelianism as well as the intellectualism of early Greek philosophy which saw nothing in the universe but the activity of Reason".²³

For Iqbal philosophy is something which keeps you away from life.²⁴ He himself says "that philosophy leads us away from life and reason is always beset with doubts and hesitation". And finally he is so disgusted with the insoluble enigmas posed by the intellect that he prays for a life of supreme unreason".²⁵ He acknowledges the incapability of reason to attain to the Ultimate Reality; however, philosophy is the result of reason: reason has achieved and will achieve power over the universe, a clear indication of the loss of faith in the Unseen. The achievements of reason lead people astray.

While acknowledging the truth of mathematics and logic, Al-Ghazali maintains some drawbacks to the precision and the clarity of its demonstration.

(a) The first one is that every student of mathematics admires its precision and its clarity of demonstration. This leads him to believe in the philosophers and to think that all their sciences resemble this one in clarity and demonstrative cogency. Furthermore, he has already heard the account on everyone's lips of their unbelief, their denial of Gods attributes and their contempt for revealed truth; he becomes an unbeliever merely by accepting them as authorities and says to himself "if religions were true, it would not have escaped the notice of these men since they are so precise in this science. Thus after

Human Non-Divine Knowledge

becoming acquainted by hearsay with their unbelief and denial of religion, he draws the conclusion that the truth is the denial and rejection of religion".

(B) "the second drawback arises from the man who is loyal to Islam but ignorant. He thinks that religion must be defended by rejecting every science connected with the philosopher, and so rejects all their sciences and accuses them of ignorance; he even rejects their theory of the eclipse of the sun and moon, considering that what they say is contrary to revelation. When that view is thus attacked, some one hears of it who has knowledge of such matters by apodeictic demonstration, but, believing that Islam is based on ignorance and the denial of apodeictic proof grows in love for philosophy and hatred for Islam".²⁶

Once again we return to Igbal's attitude towards reason. He feels more despondent and desperate than Al-Ghazali when he thinks of the functions of reason. For Igbal reason has ruined whole of the inner life of man, and his yearnings for Ultimate Reality. This perhaps is the most important reason why Igbal attempts to reconstruct religious thought and tries to philosophize and rationalize religion, namely, that people are more inclined to believe in philosophy than in religion. He says that "with the birth of reason and critical faculty, however, life, in its own interest, inhibits the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at an earlier stage of human evolution. Man is primarily governed by passion and instinct. Inductive reason, which alone makes man master of his environment, is an achievement; and when once born it must be reinforced by inhibiting the growth of other modes of knowledge"?

What are these other modes of knowledge? They are based on religious experience, which we have discussed in our previous chapter. At another place Iqbal expresses the same idea concerning the power of reason over universe and the harm reason has done to the souls of human beings. "The modern man with his philosophies of criticism and scientific specialism finds himself in a strange predicament. His naturalism has

given him an unprecedented control over the forces of nature, but has robbed him of faith in his own future"?8 And he goes on: "thus wholly overshadowed by the results of intellectual activity, the modern man has ceased to live soulfully; that is, from within. In the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself".29 In this way Igbal is a sceptic, an Al-Ghazali of the twentieth century. He condemns the faculty of reason, because reason cannot go beyond the boundaries of space and time which are its own creation for its own purpose. Space and time is the greatest achievement of reason by which it has bounded man. He can but succumb to it. Reason begets natural science which is by nature sectional. "It cannot, if it is true to its own nature and fountain, set up its theory as a complete view of reality. The concepts we use in the organization of knowledge are therefore sectional in character and their application is relative to the level of experience to which they are applied".30 Iqbal even seems disgusted when he declares: "it (reason) is not aiming at a result, it is wholly arbitrary, undirected, chaotic and unforeseeable in behaviour".31 For him reason alone is something destructive and therefore he urges us to pass beyond reason for "It is like a lamp which illuminates the way but is not itself the aim".32 "It is always busy in the measurement of the dimensions of space and time".33 "Reason is lost in space and time, in fact there is no space and time but only God".34

Here we see the extreme scepticism of Iqbal. Reason or non-Divine knowledge as we call it is only a utilitarian product devised by life so that the ego may be able to control and dominate its physical environment. Its nature is relational and dualistic; in order to think at all we must analyse, compare and relate". 35

Commenting on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Iqbal says that "it revealed the limitations of human reason and reduced the whole work of the rationalists to a heap of ruin".³⁶

Iqbal pronounces publicly that he is the great critic of reason and hence stands among the sceptics. In a letter he clarifies his position in philosophy and the system of philosophy. In this connection he emphatically asserts" as a matter of fact I hate systems of philosophy nor do I trust principles and conclusions of philosophy. No man has condemned the human intellect more than I that is, as applied to the ultimate realities of religion. No doubt I talk of things in which philosophers are also interested. But with me those things are matters of living experience and not of philosophical reasoning".³⁷

He expresses the same idea in his poetical work *The Secret of Collective Life*. He says "I could not learn a single letter of 'Firm Faith' and kept wandering about the boubt-breeding valley of philosophy". For him thought only breaks reality into pieces and then tries to reach it. But reality when broken is no reality. Thought only breaks matter, which is one continuous act, into a "plurality of mutually exclusive things".³⁸

In describing the function of philosophy, Iqbal asserts that "philosophy is an intellectual view of things and as such, does not care to go beyond a concept which can reduce all the rich variety of experience to a system".³⁹

Actually reason is so highly praised and given paramount importance by the philosophers who have seen some wordly achievements of reason; now they are content with every thing reason vouchsafes to humanity. These things are, I suppose, materialism and atheism. Reason, indeed has a greater role to play than sense-perception and is a higher faculty than senseperception; still it must be considered with its own limits. Reason alone cannot solve the problems of man. Up to now Reason has only given to man science and technology. What is more it has snatched from him, his religious aspirations, his moral elevation and his sense of discernment between good and bad and right and wrong. All these are the outcome of the fetishism of reason. Igbal sharply reacted against this excessive worship of reason as being dangerous to that force of history when it is accompanied by a rational insight into life. He believed that Western rationalism, whatever its other merits, was likely to impair the vital springs of activity in his community which drew its strength from the dynamism of

early Islam and the ideal of personality set up by Muhammad and the followers.

"Iqbal sometimes went too far in disparaging reason and his poetry on the whole gives the impression that he was preaching the anti-intellectual philosophy of Bergson..., He was only voicing in protest against the perversion of human understanding for inhuman ends. He seems to have held that reason in itself was ethically neutral and gave no definite standards for moral evaluation. To keep it on the right tract and prevent its misuse he would place it under the supervision of 'ishq', that is, love".40 the function of reason, as we see in our every day life is, the breaking up, analysing and synthesizing of things. And this procedure we call science and this science is a promising source of knowledge of this world. But scientific investigation and analytic thought is never complete and exhaustive. Dr. Jamila Khatoon aptly remarks that "scientific investigation and analytical thought have inherent limitations which are unavoidable. Scientific analysis is never complete and exhaustive in its nature. Reality is an organic whole. Its parts are united by vital internal connections. This underlying relationship confers wholeness on diversities and pluralities. Analysis would select a part of reality which when taken apart, would become lifeless, shorn of the qualities it has by virtue of its integral position within a whole. It is rendered meaningless apart from its relations, as a part separated from its pattern, a single dot or line taken out from the whole picture. Besides, analysis, because of the immense complexity of its object can never attain ideal completeness. The ideal analysis involves the apprehension of all the constituent elements of a subject. It fails if any single element eludes the grasp or the units reached in the process are not ultimate. However, such an ideal cannot be accomplished, hampered as we are by our inherent limitation. If we go a step further, we find that any deficiency in analysis would inevitably distort the synthesis which is based upon it. Thus the incompleteness of analysis results in incompleteness of synthesis. It is obvious that a conclusion arrived at in this manner is not what it actually is but merely what it is subjectively".41

The deep study of philosophy made Igbal septical about the attainability of reality through reason. His ambitions and hopes were not realized. like those of Al-Ghazali, through reason but through restless soul. For him, the present age is shackled by the claims of Intellect. 42 Igbal condemns Intellect or Reason so much because it is only a source of non-divine knowledge. It only grasps reality piecemeal and is not able to apprehend the ultimate reality. For him, non-divine knowledge or, in other words, mundane knowledge is acquired through sense-perception, with the support of intellect. Hence both together impart knowledge. But this knowledge is not certain and infallible for the capital of the intellect is apprehension and doubts.⁴³ He is strictly against the "proud but shallow rationalism" which procreates this modern knowledge; and what is this modern knowledge? "He states that "modern knowledge is the greatest blindidol-worshipping, idol-selling, idol-making. Shackled in the prison of phenomena, it has not overleaped the limits of the sensible. It has fallen down in crossing the bridge of life. If has laid the knife to its own throat. Its fire is cold as the flame of the tulip: It flames are frozen like hail. Its nature remains untouched by the glow of love, it is ever engaged in joyless search".44

Reason's predominant role in the whole life of man has increasingly overawed him, cut him off from the rest of society. His soul, wholly spiritual and eternal, became inspired with extreme naturalism, so that there was no room left for God; in other words, reason has made man" the measure of all things", complete and perfect: He is all in all. In a sense reason has misled humanity instead of guiding and ushering, made him cease soulfully, and perhaps here Iqbal rightly says: "if Reason be thy guide throw it from self away". The kind of knowledge we get from Reason cannot be denied. Still we must not forget that this knowledge will be a satanic knowledge; as some one aptly put: "If it is not made to serve spiritual purposes apart from the material it becomes a satanic force, carrying man down to annihilation. Today, in the atomic age, we may well ponder over truth of Iqbal's conviction".

Iqbal in his poetry has time and again spoken about the limitations and the incapabilities of the intellect. We could say that Iqbal's poetry is an overt protest against intellectualism. He himself says: "Intellect is but a chain shaking the feet of this age; whose is the restlessness of spirit that is mine. Behold the universe with the eyes of love, if you wish to discover its secrets. Viewed with the eyes of intellect, it is nothing but an illusion and mirage". He cannot doubt the knowledge through reason; it is what we call human non-Divine knowledge. Iqbal emphatically says: "your reason has been misled by the magic of six-directions and cannot find its destination of divine love". And he further says: "Friends! I have complaints against the shallowness of my wit (Reason)".

The blame he puts on reason is that "reason cannot discriminate between right and wrong and is never content with her own reason. The spirit of faithfulness she never possessed but always behaved with wickedness and treason. Oh, only God knows what has happened to me: my reason hates my heart and my heart hates my Reason".⁵⁰

Iqbal acknowledges the painstaking job of reason according to which, reason has to analyse and cut things and to synthesize and bring them together again; all these actions are involved in the process of reason. Because reason in itself cannot perceive the infinity, the intellect just multiplies pure unity; lame, it likes to stand still, and blind, it gives up the kernel for the shell. The stars and planets that we see are fragments of reality. Creations of intellect which must dissect the intellect, build space upon the void and girt itself with time as if it were a sacred thread".⁵¹

Schimmel explained the concept of Reason in her book 'Gabriel's Wing". In it she says that "the use of the term reason is very wide in Iqbal's work. As contrasted to the sanctuary of the fire of love of the believers, it is not only 'the church of the philosophers' it is also the analytical power which can approach reality only step by step and which never enters the essence of God but is contented with describing His attributes". 52 She further explains that reason has still bound

the Magian-girdle which means not only that it creates new idols before which ignorant people prostrate but also that it is still limited by the spell of serial time which hinders man from grasping the fulness of Divine time". 53 Commenting on Al-Ghazali's philosophical scepticism, Iqbal asserts that Ghazali, finding no hope in analytic thought, moved to mystic experience, and there found an independent content for religion. In this way he succeeded in securing for religion the right to exist independently of science and metaphysics. But the revelation of the total Infinite in mystic experience convinced him of the finitude and inconclusiveness of thought and drove him to draw a line of cleavage between thought and intuition. He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily stimulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time.

Iqbal gives a further substantiation to this claim that thought is not inconclusive, by explaining that "the idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge, it is the inadequacy of the logical understanding which finds a multiplicity of mutually repellent individualities with no prospect of their ultimate reduction to a unity that makes us sceptical about the conclusiveness of thought. In fact the logical understanding is incapable of seeing this multiplicity as coherent universe. Its only method is generalization based on resemblances, but its generalizations are only fictitious unities which do not affect the reality of concerted things".⁵⁴

With these lines Iqbal only tries to show that intellect though incapable of reaching ultimate Reality is not static but dynamic in its nature. The universe unfolds its internal infinitude in time like the seed which, from the very beginning, carries within itself the organic unity of the tree as a present fact. Iqbal here certainly bifurcates Reason. The one aspect could be called analytical (reason), the other is a kind of intuition. For him reason has a deeper movement and this deeper movement, I suppose, is the kind of intuition where "thought is capable of reaching an immanent infinite, in whose

selfunfolding movement the various finite concept are merely mements. And he goes on: "Thought must pass beyond its own finitude and it is in its progressive participation in the life of the apparently alien that thought demolishes the walls of its finitude end enjoys a potential infinitude".55

When thought reaches that deeper movement in itself it gets so mixed up with intuition that the two merge into one. Reason loses its present nature, or, what we call, its alliance with serial time, and becomes entirely different, what we call intuition. But this transition from one state to another is only possible because of the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite, which keeps alive within it the flame of "aspiration and sustains it in its endless pursuit" ⁵⁶

The same ideas are expressed in his "Javid Nama". There he is more doubtful about the endless pursuit by reason to attain that highest point which is Ultimate Reality. He seems more despondent and hopeless when he says:

"Although man's reason too assails the world and breaks its spell, finds stones to reason as books and listens to the clouds, and doth possess the seeing eye, yet reckless valour lacks.

It gropes its way just like the blind and moves as slow as snail.

So long as reason winds itself around mere scent and hue, the path of love it reads but haltingly.

It works but gradually, for truth, I do not know if it will ever complete its task".⁵⁷

Then again he maintains: "experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone can bring. This is the reason why pure thought has so little influenced men while religion has always elevated individuals and transformed whole societies".⁵⁸

Analytical reason or what we call pure reason, is incapable of reaching the highest ascension where only religion claims to

reach. Pure reason does not go beyond what is strictly verifiable and demonstrable. In other words, scientific, analytic reason rests on, and craves for certainty. What is not absolutely certain, that is not born out of facts, it rejects as unprovable" Iqbal is unwilling to give leadership to reason because of its incapability. Poor denuded reason is unfit for leadership. If conjecture and surmise is its guide, life is a looser" 60 At another place he says: "The intellect is satisfied with just a part the outer frame. The intellect is mortal... The intellect counts every breath with a clock's hand, as if breath were time's unit.

So it can never comprehend and take the measure of infinity. It only fashions night and day, imaginary parts of time. It gathers sparks alone".61

He also describes the true nature of reason in his Poetry:

"Of the chain of Today and Tomorrow, reason could never be free; and to the worship of idols of eyes and ears, she induces Me and Thee, as she has hidden idols under her sleeves. For she is the daughter of a Brahman (member of the highest Hindu priestly caste) and promotes Infidelity". 62

Iqbal resembles Ghazali when he says: "pass beyond intellect and grapple with the waves in love's ocean, for in intellect's shallow rivulet there are no pearls".⁶³ From plato till Russell and from Russell till the present day, none of the philosophers have proclaimed reason to be the sole faculty through which the consummation of knowledge could be procured.

Both theists and non-theists share in this regard the view that reason cannot be taken to be the source of perfect knowledge. Still reason has marked a great difference between theists and non-theists. The former finding no hope in reason turned to another source, a higher source, and—according to them the ultimate source, of ultimate things. Thereby they called themselves theists. the latter too, i.e. the non-theists, could not find any hope in reason to reach that ultimate knowledge of ultimate things. Still they remained contented with the faculty of reason and thereby called themselves non-

theists. Reason to both theists and non-theists is insufficient and hence needs to be rejuvenated by some other source. Most of the philosophers have been misled in the sense that they tried to pooves spirituality in terms of temporality or Divine knowledge in terms of non-Divine knowledge, this is the state where every human being somehow or other is lingering. Those who pass this ordeal and reach the Ultimate Truth are the most perfect, for they posses all the sources of knowledge. The ones who remain in this ordeal and have difficulties to get out of it, are most sceptic of the higher source of knowledge, sometimes even of their own being. Al-Ghazali once was in this unfathomable ordeal of reason and was a complete sceptic. He tried to find a remedy for this. It didn't prove an easy task. He say s that "they could not be disproved, for a proof had to be based on first principles and here it was the truth of first principles which was in question. The illness proved a difficult one. It lasted almost two months. During this time I was a sceptic in fact, though not in outward expressions. Then God healed me from this disease. My self was restored to a sound and a balanced condition. The necessary truths of reason became once again accepted and trusted in with complete certainty. That did not come about through proof or argument, but by a light which God cast into my breast; that light is the key to most knowledge. To suppose, that the understanding of profound truth rests upon marshalled arguments is to narrow unduly the broad mercy of God. As Muhammad said, 'God created the creatures in darkness and latter sprinkled on them some of His 'Light'. It is form this light that deep understanding must be sought. That light floods out from the divine generosity at certain times and one must be on the watch for it".64 The above question simply shows that every thing was solved by some 'Light' and not by marshaled arguments. If it had been Divine or the source of Divine knowledge it would never have received the host of criticism from any philosopher; and would have made agnostic philosophers, such as Russell, the most fanatic believers. To try to solve the Divine problems by reason is indeed, "to narrow unduly the broad mercy of God".

Igbal, too, tried to solve the problems of reason in his latter life but he did not succeed in it, as he clearly expresses in one of his writing: "I am solving the problems concerning reason in vain".65 He never gave a separate importance to reason because it is based in phenomenal knowledge. Igbal did not deny the fact that reason as a dynamic force has elevated man from his animal status to the "human being" status. Man due to reason has captured the power of nature and this power over nature has given man a new faith and a fresh sense of superiority over the forces that constitute his environment. "New points of view have been suggested, old problems have been restated in the light of fresh experience, and new problems have arisen. It seems as if the intellect of man is outgrowing its own most fundamental categories, time, space and causality. With the advance of scientific thought even our concept of intelligibility is undergoing a change. The theory of Einstein", Iqbal further asserts, "has brought a new vision of the universe and suggests new way of looking at the problems common to both religion and philosophy"66

As far as the non-divinity aspect of this knowledge is concerned, Iqbal gives paramount importance to it. Following the Qur'an he emphasizes that "the empirical attitude is an indispensable stage in the spiritual life of humanity, Qur'an attaches equal importance to all the regions of human experience as yielding knowledge of the ultimate reality which reveals its symbols both within and without. One indirect way of establishing connections with the reality that confronts us is reflective observation and control of its symbols as they reveal themselves to sense-perception."

The main idea of this paragraph is that Iqbal treats reason as an indirect way to reach the ultimate reality. This indirect way, establishes connections with the phenomenal world that reason as a non-Divine knowledge cannot transgress to comprehend the whole of reality, both observable and, consequently, spiritual. Reason could be supplemented by heart, i.e. religious experience or intuition. Concerning this, Iqbal says the following: "In the interest of securing a complete vision of reality, therefore, sense-perception must be

supplemented by the perception of what the Qur'an describes as fu'ad or qalb, i.e. heart".68

Al-Ghazali likewise admits this fact and puts reason in the subordination of intuition". He had come to the conviction that reason is not self-sufficient in either theology or philosophy, but is in a sense subordinate to a "light from God" shed in the heart which is somehow connected with light given to men by prophetic revelation".

It must be mentioned here that the inconclusiveness of reason is vindicated by the fact that reason has not so far provided a conclusive proof for the existence of God. Probably it was the inconclusiveness of reason which led Russell to answer a question asked at a public meeting i.e. as to what he would say if after his death he found himself confronted by his Maker. He replied "God! why did you make the evidence for your existence so insufficient". Russell is perfectly right because in reality it was his intellect which was insufficient to make evidence for the existence of God. Lenin, too, was once in the presence of God and told God that "he could not know whether or not God existed, for it was reason which had always undergone changes".

All the above facts must not be taken to mean that reason, being inconclusive, is absurd and baseless. It is reason which has elevated man to the status of vicegerent of God on this earth and made him a co-worker of God in this universe. Science and scientific research is the creative result of reason. "Science is an instruments for the preservation of life, science is a means of establishing the self". We saw in brevity the philosophy of Al-Ghazali, Hume and Iqbal, concerning the law of causation and now we dare to call Iqbal a great sceptic like the other two by giving his last words in his personal diary in 1910:

"Human Intellect is nature's attempt at self-criticism".72

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by Muhammad Iqbal, p. 1.
 - 2. Ibid.
- 3. Muslim Intellectual (a study of Al-Ghazali) by B.W.M. Watt, p. 49.
 - 4. Ibid, p. 49.
 - 5. Ibid, p. 49.
 - 6. The Spirit of Islam by Ameer Ali, p. 449.
 - 7. Muslim Intellectuals, p. 56
- 8. Book of Al-Ghazali's Ihya Ulum al-Din by L. Zolondek, pp. 10-11.
- 9. Philosophy in the Middle Ages, edit by Arthur Hayman and James J. Walsh, pp. 279-280.
 - 10. Ibid, pp. 279-280.
 - 11. Bilgrami, p. 48.
 - 12. Ibid, p. 49.
 - 13. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia by M. Iqbal, p. 59.
- 14. The Qur'anic Foundation and the Structure of Muslim Society by Dr. M. Fazl-ur-Rahman Ansari, p. 211.
- 15. A History of Muslim Philosophy, edited by M. M. Sharif, vol. 1, p. 615.
- 16. A History of Muslim Philosophy, vol. 5, part. 11 by F. Copleston, pp. 82-83.

- 17. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, p. 77.
- 18. The Reconstruction, p. 104
- 19. Ibid, p. 108.
- 20. Ibid, pp. 110-111.
- 21. Ibid, pp. 196-197.
- 22. Studies in Iqbal's Thought and Art, p. 152.
- 23. Ibid, p. 153.
- 24. Kulliyat-i-Iqbal (Urdu), p. 480.
- 25. Studies in Iqbal's Thought and Art, p. 170
- 26. Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 269-270.
- 27. The Reconstruction, pp. 125-126.
- 28. Ibid, p. 186.
- 29. Ibid, p. 187.
- 30. Ibid, p. 42.
- 31. Ibid, pp. 125-126.
- 32. Kulliyat-i-Iqbal (Urdu), p. 376.
- 33. Ibid, p. 485.
- 34. Ibid, p. 477:
- 35. A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy by B.A. Dar, p, 132.
- 36. The Reconstruction, p. 5.
- 37. Eminent Muslamans, Madras, vol. 4 no. 4, p.
- 38. The Reconstruction, p. 66.
- 39. *Ibid*, p. 61.
- 40. The Image of the West in Iqbal, p. 127.
- 41. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal by Dr. Jamila Khatoon, pp. 6-7.

Human Non-Divine Knowledge

- 42. Javid Nama, pp. 2-3.
- 43. The Secret of Collective life by Igbal, p. 65.
- 44. The Secret of Self, pp. 129-130.
- 45. Javid Nama, p. 157.
- 46. Studies in Iqbal's Art and Thought, p. 21.
- 47. Iqbal's Educational Philosophy, p. 189.
- 48. Rubaiyat-i-Iqbal by A.R. Tariq, p. 189.
- 49. Ibid, p. 163.
- 50. Ibid, p. 79.
- 51. The New Rose Garden by Iqbal, p. 16.
- 52. Gabriel's Wing by A. Schimmel, p. 136.
- 53. Ibid, p. 135.
- 54. The Reconstruction, pp. 5-6.
- 55. *Ibid*, pp. 6-7.
- 56. *Ibid*, p. 7.
- 57. P. E. pp. 14-15.
- 58. The Reconstruction, p. 179.
- 59. Studies in Iqbal's Art and Thought, p. 75.
- 60. The Image of he West in Iqbal, p. 124.
- 61. The New Rose Garden, p. 31.
- 62. Rubaiyat of Iqbal, p. 31.
- 63. Iqbal's Educational Philosophy, p. 91.
- 64. Muslim Intellectuals, p. 50.
- 65. Rubaiyat of Iqbal, p. 78.
- 66. The Reconstruction, p. 7-8.
- 67. Ibid, p. 15.

Epistemology of Iqbal

- 68. Ibid, p. 15.
- 69. Muslim Intellectuals, p. 59.
- 70. Kulliayat-i-Iqbal, p. 398.
- 71. The Secret of Self, p. 31.
- 72. Stray Reflection by Iqbal, edited by Javid Iqbal, p. 3.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ULTIMATE EGO.

A. The Refutation of Traditional Proofs of God offered by Scholastic Philosophy.

Before we expose the proofs for the existence of God offered by Iqbal, we should first discuss the three traditional proofs given by the scholastic philosophers. These arguments, though lacking logic, betray a real movement in thought and are looked upon as the first philosophical proofs for the existence of God.

After critical discussion and examination these traditional proofs were refuted. These three proofs are the Cosmological, the Teleological and the Ontological.

Iqbal, too, never avoided a critical examination of these three proofs. He first discusses the Cosmological argument. The Cosmological argument as restated by Professor Thompson in this book "A Modern Philosophy of Religion" shows that everything in this world is contingent. According to him everything seems to depend on other things for its own existence. He says "It is because they all change, without interruption and without exception, that they are all contingent". He concludes: "we have now found that the real world of actually existing things and events is neither self-existent nor contains anything self-existent as a part of itself".

Epistemology of Ighal

But "anything which neither exists of itself nor contains anything self-existent as a part of itself depends for its existence upon something which exists in and of itself and does not in turn depend on anything else". He claims that the cause of the world cannot be of the same kind as the contingent causes in nature. Consequently, he says: 'It is impossible for any contingent thing to be a cause of existence. Contingent causes are causes of change alone". He further adds: "The cause of nature is a cause of existence". Nothing can act except in accordance with its own nature and from this it follows that something which so acts as to bestow existence must itself be something whose very essence of the cause of nature must be existence itself". Only God can be such a cause of nature. He being a Necessary Being. "God's existence is His nature... it is the very nature of God to exist. Existence is not a part of His nature, nor is it something which happens to His nature. Existence is His nature. God is not self-caused for He needs no cause, not even Himself. That God is, does not flow from what He is. What He is, is that He is".

This argument shows small deviation from his original theory which is strictly based on the law of causation.

The argument presents the world as an interwoven whole of cause and effect. Every effect must have its cause. Ighal says that "the world, in this argument, is viewed as a finite effect and passing through a series of dependent sequences related as causes and effects stops at an uncaused first cause because of the unthinkability of an infinite regress. It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can only give a finite cause or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an uncaused first cause is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds". Iqbal further says that "the first cause reached by the argument necessarily excludes its effect. And this means that the effect, constituting a limit to its own cause, reduces it to something finite. Again, the cause reached by the argument cannot be regarded as a necessary being, for the obvious reason that in the relation of cause and effect the two terms of the relation are

equally necessary to each other. Nor is the necessity of existence identical with the conceptual necessity of causation which is the utmost that this argument can prove. The argument really tries to teach the infinite by merely negating the finite. But the infinite reached by contradicting the finite is a false infinite, which neither explains itself nor the finite which is thus made to stand in opposition to the infinite." He therefore, concludes that "the true infinite does not exclude the finite; it embraces the finite without effecting its finitude, and explains and justifies its being. Logically speaking, then, the movement form the finite to the infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument fails in toto"?

In this case Iqbal completely agrees with Kant and Russell. For Kant too, the idea of an uncaused first cause was illogical and hence impossible. Kant argues "that if the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions, it must be a member of the empirical series, and like the lower members have its origin in some higher member of the series. If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the chain and cogitate an intelligible being apart form the series of natural causes... how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter form the former?

All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and the object of the sense-world and apart from them, are without significance".

Russell, in his debate with father Copleston brings forward the fallacy involved in such reasoning: "I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother but obviously the human race has not a mother... that is a different logical sphere". Russell adds "The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things; I see no reason whatsoever".

The second traditional proof is the Teleological one. Iqual asserts that the Teleological argument is not much better than the Cosmological one. According to him "it scrutinizes the

Epistemology of labal

effects with a view to discover the character of its cause. From the traces of foresight, purpose, and adaptation in nature, it infers the existence of a self-conscious being of infinite intelligence and power. At best, it gives us a skilful external contriver working on a pre-existing dead and intractable material the elements of which are, by their own nature, incapable of orderly structures and combinations". Igbal proceeds that "the argument gives us a contriver only and not a creator, and, even if we suppose him to be also the creator of His material, it does no credit to His wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material and then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its original nature. The designer regarded as external to His material must always remain limited by his material and hence a finite designer whose limited resources compell him to overcome his difficulties after the fashion of a human mechanician. The truth is that the analogy on which the argument proceeds is of no value at all. There is really no analogy between the work of the human artificer and the phenomena of nature. The human artificer cannot work out his plan except by selecting and isolating his material from their natural relations and situations. Nature, however, constitutes a system of wholly interdependent members. Her processes present no analogy to work which, depending on a progressive the architect's isolation and integration of its material, can offer no resemblance to the evolution of organic wholes in nature"5 Kant, commenting on this argument, tells us that "the argument depends on a contrast between a free and intelligent cause and not a blind all-powerful nature, which produces the beings and events and fills the world in unconscious fecundity". It robs God of his power and omnipotence. Wisdom and contrivance are shown in overcoming difficulties and there is no room for them in a being for whom no difficulties exist. It means that the Author of the cosmos worked under limitations that he was obliged to adapt himself to conditions independent of His will and attain His ends by such arrangements as those conditions admitted of. "The arrangement of means and ends", according to Kant, "are entirely foreign to the things existing in the world—it belongs to them merely as a contingent

attribute". "Kant further elaborates", Dr. Jamila Khatoon says, "that this idea essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our reason and prescribing the very law of its operation, impels us to regard all order in the world as if originated from the intention and design of a supreme reason. It is in relation to this supreme reason that we have a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a teleological connection, which we do not attempt to anticipate or predetermine. The aim of this regulative principle is the discovery of a necessary and systematic unity in nature. Thus Kant transfers the ideas of purpose to the whole as a systematic and intelligible unity. This unity appears to us as external, contingent and superinduced upon the course of nature due to our discursive understanding which always proceeds from the parts to the whole".

The third argument, the Ontological one which seemed more convincing has also received a serious blow of criticism form various philosophers. "This argument was first designed by the medieval philosophers Al-Farabi, St. Augustine, St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure and later on were supported and developed by Descartes and Spinoza"?

The Cartesian form of the argument is the following: "To say that an attribute is contained in the nature or in the concept of a thing is the same as to say that the attribute is true of this thing and that it may be affirmed to be in it. But necessary existence is contained in the nature or the concept of God. Hence it may be with truth affirmed that necessary existence is in God, or that God exists".8 The same idea is supplemented by another argument: "We have the idea of a perfect being in our mind. What is the source of this idea? It cannot come from nature, for nature exhibits nothing but change. It cannot create the ideas of a perfect being. Therefore, corresponding to the idea in our mind there must be an objective counterpart which is the cause of the idea of a perfect being in our mind". Igbal agrees with Kant by saying that the conception of existence is no proof of objective existence. As in kant's criticism of this argument, the notion of 300 dollars in my mind cannot prove that I have them in my pocket. All that the argument proves is that the idea of a perfect being includes the idea of his existence.

Epistemology of Iqbal

Between the idea of a perfect being in my mind and the objective reality of that being there is a gulf which cannot be bridged over by a transcendental act of thought. The argument, as stated, is in fact a petitio principii; for it takes for granted the very point in question i.e. the transition from the logical to the real". Iqbal further says that both Ontological and Teleological arguments carry us nowhere. Their failure is due to that they look upon 'thought' as an agency working on things from without. This view of thought gives us a mere mechanician in the one case and creates an unbridgeable gulf between the ideal and the real in the other. It is, however, possible to take thought not as a principle which organizes and integrates its material from the outside but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Thus regarded thought or idea is not alien to the original nature of things; it is their ultimate eround and constitutes the very essence of their being, infusing itself in them from the very beginning of their career and inspiring their onward march to a self-determined end. But our present situation necessitates the dualism of thought and being. Every act of human knowledge bifurcates what might on proper inquiry turn out to be a unity into a self that knows and a confronting other that is known"?

Dr. Jamila Khatoon criticizes both philosophers (i.e. Kant and Iqbal). She says that "both the thinkers overlook the necessary implication of the perfect idea. The idea in order to be perfect must be self-consistent and the self-consistency of thought means that necessary implication in thought involves a similar implication in reality. The existence of 100 dollars (Kant says 300 dollars) cannot be proved from their notion in the mind because here the implication of the idea does not express a similar implication in reality. The idea is not self-consistent. The idea of God as perfect as presented by the Ontological argument is not a mere fabrication of imagination. According to Descartes, it is organic to the very structure of inteiligence and is knit-up indissolubly with the consciousness of finite self. It is the positive idea of the Absolutely Perfect in the sense that it includes all that is real in the finite. The idea of

God, as we have it, requires God for its cause and He, therefore, exists*.10

On this I have to make some observations: Firstly, the Ontological argument cannot be rejected merely because of the fact that the idea of God is a fabrication of my mind or that the notion of 300 dollars in my mind cannot prove that they are in my pocket. As far as the example is concerned, i.e. the notion of 300 dollars being in my mind, it can be said that if I have 300 dollars in my mind then they must not necessarily be present in my pocket; but maybe they are present somewhere else. Therefore it is proved that the 300 dollars do exist. Consequently, the idea of 300 dollars in my min and the existence of their being outside of my mind does imply a necessary relation. If this "consistency" could be found, then the ontological argument would be the best proof of the existence of God. Secondly, we cannot reject Ontological argument merely on the basis that the idea of God does not come to infants, mad men, and in general all the atheists; it is illogical to do so because the idea of 360 dollars does not come to the infants and mad men either. Similarly, the ones who do not believe in God cannot say that they have not got the idea of God in their minds; on the contrary, they do have the idea but they are incapable of creating a consistency between their idea of God and that of His existence. Here Ighal plays an important role for he bridges the gulf between the idea and the Being. For him the Ontological and the Teleological arguments are significant and true when idea and being are ultimately one. Ighal emphasizes religious experience with the promise of a direct contact with the Ultimate Reality. In his work he furnishes a philosophical justification of this experience.

B. Iqual's Proof of the Existence of God.

Iqbal starts with a critical examination of experience. For him experience, when unveiled in time, has three levels: the level of matter, the level of life and the level of mind and consciousness. He begins with the level of matter which asserts that "the sense-objects (colours, sounds etc.) are states of the

Epistemology of Iqbal

perceiver's mind and as such are excluded from nature regarded as something objective",

According to this theory the quality of a physical thing is found in the perceiver's mind and not in the thing itself. So this theory regards nature as the illusion of one's mind. lobal rejects this theory by telling us that "if physics constitutes a really coherent and genuine knowledge of perceptively known objects the traditional theory of matter must be rejected for the obvious reason that it reduces the evidence of our senses, onwhich alone the physicist, as observer and experimenter, must rely to the mere impressions of the observer's mind. Between nature and the observer of nature the theory creates a gulf which he is compelled to bridge over by resorting to the doubtful hypothesis of an imperceptible something, occupying an absolute space like a thing in a receptacle and causing our sensations by some kind of impact". This theory is further associated with the Newtonian view of space as an absolute void in which things are situated. Is space an independent void in which things are situated and which would remain intact if all things were withdrawn. Zeno, the Greek philosopher, tackled this problem by showing that the movement in space is unreal. He presents two arguments. The first being that Zeno took space to be infinitely divisible for to him movement is space is impossible. "Before the moving body can reach the point of its destination it must pass through half the space intervening between the point of start and the point of destination and before it can pass through that half it must travel through the half of the half and so on to infinity. We cannot move form one point of spacer to another without passing through an infinite number of points in intervening space. But it is impossible to pass through an infinity of points in a finite time". His second argument is that "the flying arrow does not move, because at any time during the course of its flight it is at test in some point of space" 12 Thus Zeno proved the unreality of movement; and the unreality of movement in space is therefore a further disproof of the independent space. This theory of Zeno was first attacked by Muslim thinkers. According to them "the infinite

divisibility of space and time does not at all exist. Space, time and motion are made of points and instants which cannot be further divided. Thus they proved", says Iqbal, "the possibility of movement on the assumption that infinitesimals do exist. for if there is a limit to the divisibility of space and time, movement from one point of space to another point is possible in a finite time". 13 Russell also refuted Zeno's theory and proved the reality of movement in space. Russells argument is based on Cantor's theory of mathematical continuity. Russell asserts that Zeno's argument lies "on the assumption that space and time consist of an infinite number of points and instants. On this assumption it is easy to argue that, since between two points the moving body will be out of place, motion is impossible; for there is no place for it to take place. Cantor's discovery shows that space and time are continuous. Between any two points in space there is an infinite number of points, and in an infinite series not two points are next to one another. The infinite divisibility of space and time means the compactness of the points in the series; it does mean that points are mutually isolated in the sense of having a gap between one another. Russell's answer to Zeno, then, is as follows: Zeno asks how can you go from one position at one movement to the next position at the next movement without in the transition being at no position at no moment? The answer is that there is no next position to any position, no next moment to any movement because between any two there is always another. If there were infinitesimals, movement would be impossible but there are none. Zeno, therefore, is right in saying that the arrow is at rest at every moment of its flight, wrong in inferring that therefore it does not move; for there is one - one correspondence in a movement between the infinite series of positions and the infinite series of instants. According to this doctrine, then, it is possible to affirm the reality of space, time and movement, and yet avoid the paradox in Zeno's argument".14

Iqbal, however, objects to this and says that the identity of continuity and the infinite divisibility of space is no solution of the difficulty. Assuming that there is one-one

Epistemology of labal

correspondence between the infinite multiplicity of instants in a finite interval of time and an infinite multiplicity of points in a finite portion of space, the difficulty arising from the divisibility remains the same. The mathematical conception of continuity as infinite series applies not to movement regarded as an act, but rather to the picture of movement as viewed from the outside. The act, of movement, i.e. movement as lived and not as thought does not admit of any divisibility. The flight of the arrow observed as a passage in space is divisible, but its flight regarded as an act, apart from its realization in space, is one and incapable of partition into a multiplicity. In partition lies its destruction".15

The theory of relativity rejected Newton's view on absolute matter and regarded space as real but relative to the observer. "The object observed is variable; it is relative to the observer, its mass, shape and size change as the observer's position and speed change. Movement and rest, too, are relative to the observer. There is therefore, no such thing as a self-subsistent materiality of classical physics". 16

Iqual further describes the twofold philosophical value of the theory of relativity. "First, it destroys not the objectivity of nature, but the view of substance as simple location in space—a view which led to materialism in classical physics. Substance for modern Relativity physics is not a persistent thing with variable states, but a system of inter-related events... Secondly, the theory makes space dependent on matter. The universe according to Einstein, is not a kind of island in an infinite space; it is finite but boundless; beyond it there is no empty space. In the absence of matter the universe would shrink to a point".¹⁷

However, Iqbal criticizes this theory, because, according to him, it "takes time as unreal and a theory which regards time as a kind of fourth dimension of space, must, it seems, regard the future as something already given, as indubitably fixed as the past. Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory". 18 "This view is not correct, that time is a fourth dimension, not of space but of the space-time continuum.

Thus relativity gives as much reality to time as to space. It goes still further. In pure space there is no way of distinguishing between an absolutely backward and an absolutely forward position. But in time there is a way of determining the past and the future. The second law of thermodynamics, namely, the law of a constant increase of entropy, gives us the means of finding out which of the two events is before and which is after. The theory of relativity leaves the direction or the sense of flow of time from past to future, unaltered. The chronological order of events is not relative to the observer; it is the same for all of them. 19

Iqbal admits that it is not possible for us laymen to understand what is the real nature of Einstein's time. He says "relativity time" is neither serial time, the essence of causality as defined by Kant, nor Bergson's pure duration. He believes in, and agrees with, Whitehead's definition of the 'universe'. According to Whitehead, "nature is not a static fact situated in an a-dynamic void, but a structure of events, possessing the character of a continuous creative flow which thought cuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time".20 Igbal rejects the mechanistic explanation of universe. For him the universe is a free creative movement. "But how can we", he asks, "conceive that a thing moves?" He answers that "The notion of a 'thing' is derivative: we cannot derive things from immobile things. If, for instance, we suppose material atoms, such as the atoms of Democritces, to be the original reality we must import movement into them from the outside as something alien to their nature. Whereas if we take movement as original, static things may be derived from it. In fact, physical science has reduced all things to movement. The essential nature of the atom in modern science is electricity and not something electrified".21 Furthermore, the universe is not a mere collection of things, for these "things are events in the continuity of nature which thought spacializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for purposes of action. Hence, the universe is not a thing but an act. "Bergson regards", Ighal says "thought as serial which cannot deal with movement. "It is, therefore, the operation of thought, working with static

Epistemology of Iqbal

concepts that gives the appearance of a series of immobilities to what is essentially dynamic in its nature. The coexistence and succession of these immobilities is the source of what we call space and time".²²

The analysis of our conscious experience shows that the nature of Reality is teleogical, i.e. purposive. Indeed Iobal claims, that the unity of consciousness has a forward looking aspect also. He points out that "life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious. Even our acts of perception are determined by our immediate interests and purposes".23 Igbal further substantiates his words by saying: "thus ends and purposes, whether they exist as conscious or sub-conscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of conscious experience. And the notion of purpose cannot be understood except in reference to the future. The past, no doubt abides and operates in the present but this operation of the past in the present is not the whole of consciousness. The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness. Purposes colour not only our present state of consciousness but also reveal its future direction. In fact they constitute the forward push of our life, and thus in a way anticipate and influence the states that are yet to be. To be termined by an end is to be determined by what ought to be".24

Bergson does not believe in the teleological character of Reality because it according to him, makes time unreal. To Bergson "the portals of future must remain wide open to Reality. Otherwise it will not be free and creative". Iqbal clarifies the confusion, created by Bergson, that if we mean by teleology some predetermined or foreseen end then it does make time unreal, then the whole universe is reduced to a temporal reproduction of a pre-existing eternal scheme. He says that "teleology has another sense. Mental life is teleological in the sense that while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands". These ends and purposes are not predetermined still they are to come. "A time process", he says,

"cannot be conceived as a line already drawn. It is a line in the drawing, an actualization of open possibilities. It is purposive only in this sense that it is selective in character and brings itself to some sort of a present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past".²⁷

Now there arises another question that the inverse persists in time but as it is external to us, it is perhaps possible to be sceptical about its existence. Igbal takes the privileged case of existence being conscious experience. As we have discussed in our previous chapter, conscious experience has two aspects, i.e. the efficient and the appreciative self. Conscious experience on its efficient side enters into the world of space or what we call serial time. But when we look into the depth of our conscious experience, we find ourselves the appreciative self. "It is only in the moments of profound meditation when the efficient self is in abeyance that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience—the unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as a plurality but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly qualitative. There is change and movement but this change is indivisible; their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character". 28 This is then pure duration. This pure duration Igbal describes as the Ultimate Reality in which thought, life and purpose interpenetrate to form an organic unity. But this organic unity cannot be conceived without a self, an all embracing concrete self, the ultimate source of all individual life and thought. Furthermore, this concrete self is prior to time to which alone pure duration is predicable. Both pure time and space cannot hold together the multiplicity of objects and events. However, there is something else which can do so and this is "the appreciative act of an enduring self only which can seize the multiplicity of duration broken up into an infinity of instants and transform it to the organic wholeness of synthesis".29

Epistemalogy of Iqbal

Iqbal's real self exists in pure duration and therefore He is a self who is able to say "I am".

Iqbal says "that we too say 'I am'. But our 'I amness' is dependent and arises out of the distinction between the self and the not-self. He substantiates his arguments by the words of the Qur'an which says that the Ultimate Self can afford to dispense with all the worlds. To Him the not-self does not present itself as a confronting 'Other' or else it would have to be, like our finite self, in spatial relation with the confronting 'Other'". Furthermore, Iqbal says that what we call nature or the not self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God. Therefore His "I amness" is independent, elemental, absolute". 30

The second proof for the existence of God is based on the relation between body and mind. According to Descartes body and mind are two independent things. Starting with matter and mind as abstract terms, Descartes defined matter as essentially extension and mind as essentially thought or consciousness. 31 Are then the soul and its organism two things, as in the sense of Descartes, independent of each other, though mysteriously united?. Igbal replies to his own question that the hypothesis of an independent existence is perfectly gratuitous. He further says that it can only be justified on the ground of sensation of which matter is supposed to be at least a part cause other than my self. This something other than my self is supposed to possess certain qualities, called primary which correspond to certain relations in me and I justify my belief in those qualities on the ground that the cause must have some resemblance with the effect. But there need be no resemblance between cause and effect. He argues by assuming that body and mind are two independent things. If they are mutually independent and do not affect each other then the changes of both run on exactly parallel lines, owing to some kind of pre-established harmony, as Leibniz thought. This reduces the soul to a merely passive spectator of the happenings of the body. If, on the other hand, lobal argues, we suppose them to affect each other, then we cannot find any observable fact to show how and where exactly this interaction takes place, and which of the two takes the initiative. The soul is an organ of the body which exploits it for

physiological purposes, or the body is an instrument of the soul, are equally true propositions on the theory of interaction. He contradicts Lange's theory of emotion which tends to show that the body takes the initiative in the act of interaction. "If we suppose," Iqbal says, "that even if the body takes the initiative, the mind does enter as a consenting factor at a definite stage in the development of emotion and this is equally true for other external stimuli which are constantly working on the mind. Whether an emotion will grow farther, or that a stimulus will continue to work, depends on my attending to it. It is the mind's consent which eventually decides the fate of an enotion a stimulus". Thus he rejects both the parallelism and the interaction theory. According to Igbal "body is not a thing situated in an absolute void. It is rather a system of events or acts. The soul also is a system of events or acts, this does not obliterate the distinction of soul and body, it only brings them closer to each other".32 He further explains that "the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind by which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity".33 Body and soul are one. The body is the outer or external surface of the soul and the soul is the inner background of the body. The body is the accumulated action or habit of the soul; and as such undetachable from it. It is permanent element of consciousness which, in view of this permanent element appears from the outside as something stable.

What is then matter? Iqbal defines it as "a colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of co-ordination. It is the world reaching the point of self-guidance wherein the Ultimate Reality, perhaps reveals its secrets, and furnishes a clue to its ultimate nature". In his conclusion, Iqbal reaches that point where body and mind become one. For him body and mind become one in action.

Epistemology of Iqbal

For instance, he-says "when I take up a book from my table, my act is single and indivisible. It is impossible to draw a line of cleavage between the share of the body and that of the mind in this act. Somehow they must belong to the same system". Idbal confirms his above mentioned arguments by providing a proof from the Qur'an. The Qur'an, as we know, asserts that "to Him belong khalq (creation) and amr (direction). Here we give some of his poetic inspirations which will further shed light on the problem of body and mind.

To see in soul and body a duality is boubt and unbelief and heresy.

The secret of creation lies hidden in the soul; the body is one of life's stages not its goal. The bride of meaning henna-decked its hands with form

The better to display its beauty charm.

Reality wears veils to hide its face because it lives to show itself in subtle ways.³⁶

In his Javid Nama, too, the same thought is expressed:

O thou who sayst the body contain the soul, see secret of the soul and the of the body be not proud.

Tis not the soul's abode, but is an aspect of the soul. What is the soul? It is a blissful zeal, an anguish and a body fire that seeks to make assault and conquer firmagents.

The body takes to space and comfort seeks and finds in scent and tint. Both far and nigh proceed from consciousness, whereas the "flight" means transformation of this consciousness, brought forth by urge and zeal, liberating us from far and nigh, the body cannot stop or check the soaring soul from onward flight.³⁷

C. The attributes of God as Stated by Igbal.

God is an Individual. Iqbal conceives His as an Ego, meaning to say that He is an individual, a unique and a perfect personality. However, this perfect Individual Reality is not

subject to the process of reproduction. Concerning this, Bergson says the following:" Individuality is a matter of degrees and is not fully realized even in the case of apparently closed off unity of the human being. In particular, it may be said of individuality that while the tendency to individuate is every where present in the organized world, it is always opposed by the tendency towards reproduction. For the individuality to be perfect, it would be necessary that no attached part of the organism could live separately. But then reproduction would be impossible. For what is reproduction but the building up of a new organism with a detached fragment of the old? Individuality, therefore, herbours its own enemy at home" 38 But Iobal's Individuality of God must not be understood in the sense of human individuality where the biological principle of reproduction could be applied. It is quite opposed to that individuality. It is a superior individuality where detachment of a part of the organism and its reproduction is, obviously, impossible. In agreement with Bergson he asserts that "the perfect Individuality, closed off as an ego, peerless and unique, cannot be conceived as harbouring its own enemy at home. It must be conceived as superior to the antagonistic tendency of reproduction. This characteristic of the Perfect Ego is one of the most essential elements in the Qur'anic conception of God; so much with a view to attack the current Christian conception as to accentuate its own view of a perfect Individual".39

Both al-Ghazali and al-Ishraqi followed the Qur'anic verse "God is the light of the heavens and the earth" and thereby conceived their philosophy as a pantheistic one. Here we give Al-Ishraqi's philosophy of God. He says that "the Ultimate principle of existence is "Nur-i-Qahir" the primal absolute light whose essential nature consists in perpetual illumination. Nothing is more visible than light and visibility does not stand in need of any definition. The essence of light, therefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute superadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no visibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in itself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence that something other than light is more visible than light. The

Epistemology of labal

primal light, therefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is other than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible".⁴⁰

A-Ghazali in his book 'Mishkat al-Anwar' substantiates the Qur'anic verse "God is the light of the heavens and the earth". Light for him is the only real existence; "and there is no darkness greater than non-existence. But the essence of light is manifestation: it is attributed to manifestation which is a relation". Al-Ghazali further says that "the universe was created out of darkness on which God sprinkled his own light and made its different parts more or less visible according as they received more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being dark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated from one another. There are some who illuminate other beings and for this reason the perfect is named "The Burning Lamp" in the Qur'an". 41

The verse which has been so far misunderstood in the terminology of philosophy runs as follows:

Allah (God) is the light of the heavens and the earth. The parable of His light is as if there were a Niche and within it a lamp the lamp enclosed in glass: the glass as it were a brilliant star: lit form a blessed tree, an olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil well-nigh luminous though fire scace touched it. Light upon light Allah doth guide whom He will to His light: Allah doth set forth parables for men. And Allah doth know all things. 42

Now this verse is erroneously taken to mean that God is light with the implication that He is omnipresent in the universe. Therefore it gave many philosophers the idea of pantheism. In fact, this verse shows that nothing escapes God for every thing belongs to Him. "God is omnipresent in the universe" does not mean that He is every thing. To be omnipresent and to be every things are different states. Light reaches every corner of the universe, illuminates everything, but is not that thing. Therefore, light should not be taken as the basis of pantheistic philosophy. The parable of light in the Qur'an cannot affect His individuality and personality. Iqbal

explains: "no doubt the opening sentence of the verse gives the impression of an escape from an individualistic conception of God. But when we follow the metaphor of light in the rest of the verse, it gives just the opposite impression". "The development of the metaphor", he further says, rather to exclude the suggestion of a formless cosmic element by centralizing the light in a flame which is further individualized by its encasement in a glass likened unto a welldefined star". Igbal adds that "the teaching of modern physics is that the velocity of light cannot be exceeded and is the same for all observers whatever their own system of movement. Thus, in the world of change, light is the nearest approach to the Absolute. The metaphor of light as applied to God, therefore, must, in view of modern knowledge, be taken to suggest the Absoluteness of God and not His omnipresence, which easily lends itself, a pantheistic interpretation".43

The individualistic conception of God is emphasized elsewhere in the Qur'an also. The Qur'an says: "Say: Allah is one, All things depend on him, He begetteth not and He is not begotten; and there is none like into Him". Here we see that God does not give any parable but speaks merely of Himself as such' "The nature of God is here indicated to us in a few words, such as we can understand. Here we are specially taught to avoid the pitfalls into which men and nations have fallen at various times in trying to understand God. The first thing we have to note is that His nature in so sublime, so far beyond our limited conceptions that the best way in which we can realize Him is to feel that he is a personality and not a mere abstract conception of philosophy.

Secondly, He is the One and the only God, the only One to Whom worship is due; all other things or beings that we can think of as His creatures are in no way comparable to Him.

Thirdly, He is eternal without beginning or end, Absolute not limited by time or place or circumstance, the Reality before which all other things or places are mere shadows or reflections.

Epistemology of Ighal

Fourthly, we must not think of Him as having a son or a father for that would be to impart animal qualities into our conception of Him.

Fifthly, He is not like any other person or thing that we know or can imagine. His qualities and nature are unique".44

lobal further elaborates his views on the individuality of God. His individuality is not like the individuality of human beings because human individuality is bounded and limited in space and time. It is temporal, while God's Individuality is limitless, boundless, and is over and above space and time. His individuality should and must not be taken to involve finitude. His is Infinite. Someone could ask: "Does not individuality imply finitude: "if God is an Ego and as such an individual, how can we conceive Him as infinite?" Igbal answers that "God cannot be conceived as infinite in the sense of spatial infinity. In matters of spiritual valuation mere immensity counts for nothing". Moreover, "temporal and spatial infinities are not absolute". Furthermore, "space and time interpretations which thought puts upon the creative activity of the Ultimate Ego. Space and time are possibilities of the ego, only partially realized in the shaps of our mathematical space and time. Beyond Him and apart from His creative activity, there is neither time nor space to close Him off in reference to other egos. The Ultimate Ego is, therefore, neither infinite in the sense of spatial infinity nor finite in the sense of the space bound human ego whose body closes him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the Ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of his creative activity of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series".45

Creativeness: Creativeness is the most fundamental attribute of God. We as finite minds see the universe as independent and existing per se. But the Ultimate Reality is a dynamic creative will which has a relation to the universe as its Creator. A layman may regard the the Creator as a mere spectator of the universe, the act of creation as a specific past

event and the universe "as a manufactured article which has no organic relation to the life of its maker, and of which the maker is nothing more than a mere spectator". Thus conceired the universe would be "a mere accident in the life of God and might not have been created".46 The universe, in fact does not confront God or come in opposition to Him. If it does, it will bring both. God and universe, to the level of finitude. It is simply impossible because "from the Divine point of view, there is no creation in the sense of a specific event having a 'before' and an 'after'. The universe cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to God. This view of the matter will reduce both God and the world to two separate entities confronting in the empty receptacle of an infinite space.... space, time and matter are interpretations which thought puts on the free creative energy of God. They are not independent realities existing per se, but only intellectual modes of apprehending the life of God"47

Iqbal further says that the matter is not something coeternal with God which He operates from a distance. It is actually one continuous act which thought breaks up into a plurality of mutually exclusive things." 48

In addition to all this, Iqbal explains the Ash'arite theory of creation which is atomic. He holds it to be the creative method of Divine activity. The creative activity of God proceeds to the work of creation on the basis of atomism. Iqbal elucidates this theory in the following words:

"According to the ash'arite school of thinkers, then, the world is compounded of what they call 'Jawahir', infinitely small parts or atoms which cannot be further divided. Since the creative activity of God is ceaseless, the number of the atoms cannot be finite. Fresh atoms are coming into being every moment and the universe is, therefore, constantly growing. As the Qur'an says: 'God adds to His creation what He wills'. The essence of the atom is independent of its existence. This means that existence is a quality imposed on the atom by God. Before receiving this quality the atom lies dormant, as it were, in the creative energy of God, and its

Epistemology of Ighal

existence means nothing more than divine energy become visible. The atom in its essence, therefore, has no magnitude. It has its position which does not involve space, it is by their aggregation that atoms become extended and generate space". lobal adds that "Ibn-i-Hazm, the critic of atomism, acutely remarks, that the language of the Qur'an makes no difference in the act of creation and the thing created. What we call a thing, then, is in its essential nature, an aggregation of atomic acts... "Modern physics too," Igbal asserts, "conceives as action the actual atom of a certain physical quantity. But, as professor Eddington has pointed out, the precise formulation of the theory of Quanta of action has not been possible so far, though it is vaguely believed that the atomicity of action is the general law and that the appearance of electrons is in some way dependent on it... Since the Ash'arites regarded space", Iobal further says, "as generated by the aggregation of atoms, they could not explain movement as a body's passage through all the points of space intervening between the point of its start and destination. Such an explanation must necessarily assume the existence of void as an independent reality". In order, therefore, to get over the difficulty of empty space, Nazzam resorted to the notion of 'tafra' or jump; and imagined the moving body, not as passing through all the discrete positions in space, but as jumping over the void between one position and another. Thus, according to him, a quick motion and a slow notion possess the same speed; but the latter has more points of rest... The modern atomism has found the similar difficulty and a similar solution has been suggested. In view of the experiments, Igbal comments, relating to Planck's theory of Quanta, we cannot imagine the moving atom as continuously traversing its path in space. Whitehead says that an electron does not continuously traverse its path in space. The alternative notion as to its mode of existence is that it appears at a series of discrete positions which it occupies for successive durations of time. It is as though an automobile moving at the average rate of 30 miles an hour along a road did not traverse the road appeared successively at the successive continuously but milestones remaining for two minutes at each milestone.

Another feature of this theory of creation, lobal says, is the doctrine of accident, on the perpetual creation of which depends the continuity of the atom as an existent. If God ceases to create the accidents the atom ceases to exist as an atom. The atom possesses inseparable positive or negative qualities. These exist in opposed couples as life and death, motion and rest, and possess practically no duration. Ighal derives two propositions from this theory. First, nothing has a stable nature and secondly, there is a single order of atoms i.e. what we call the soul is either a finer kind of matter or only an accident. As far as the first proposition is concerned, Igbal regards it as genuine and true, because it is true to the spirit of the Our an. He says: "I regard the Ash arite thought on this point as a genuine effort to develop on the basis of an ultimate will or energy a theory of creation which, with all its shortcomings, is far more true to the spirit of the Qur'an than the Aristotelian idea of a fixed Universe". "The second proposition", he says, "looks like pure materialism. It is my belief that the Asharite view that the 'nafs' is an accident is opposed to the real trend of their own theory which makes the continuous existence of the atom dependent on the continuous creation of accidents in it. It is obvious that motion is inconceivable without time. And since time comes from psychic life, the latter is more fundamental than motion. No psychic life, no time; no time no motion. Thus it is really what the Asharite call the accident which is responsible for the continuity of the atom as such. The atom becomes rather spacialized when it receives the quality of existence, Regarded as phase of divine every it is essentially spiritual. The nafs is the pure act; the body is only the act becoming visible and hence measurable, lqbal concludes this theory of creation by saying: "I have conceived the Ultimate Reality as an Ego; and I must add now that from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed. The creative energy of the Ultimate Ego, in whom deed and thought are identical, functions as ego unities The world in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the "Great I am". Every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego.

Epistemology of lqbal

But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man. Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life".⁴⁹

Eternity, The Ultimate Reality which is a creative dynamic and a rationally directed will is also eternal. Igbal uses the Ash arites' theory of time as his point of departure. They regarded time as a succession of individual 'nows'. It follows from this that there is an unoccupied moment of time or void between every two nows. Newton, too, regarded time as objective which is something has in itself and from its own nature flow equally. Ighal objects to this objective view of time and says that "we cannot understand how a thing is affected on its immersion in this stream, and how it differs form things that do not participate in its flow. Nor can we form any idea of the beginning, the end, and the boundaries of time if we try to understand it on the analogy of a stream. Moreover, if flow, movement or 'passage' is the last word as to the nature of time, there must be another time to time the movement of the first time, and another which times the second time, and so on to infinity".50

Iraqi, a Muslim philosopher, "conceives infinite varieties of time, relative to the varying grades of being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality. The time of gross bodies which arises form the revolution of the heavens is divisible into past, present and future; and its nature is such that as long as one day does not pass away the succeeding day does not come. The time of immaterial beings is also serial in character but its passage is such that a whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of an immaterial being. Rising higher and higher in the scale of immaterial beings we reach Divine time—time which is absolutely free form the quality of passage and consequently does not admit of divisibility, sequence and change. It is above eternity. It has neither beginning nor end. The eye of God sees all the visibles and His ear hears all the audibles in one indivisible act of perception. The priority of God is not due to

the priority of time; on the other hand, the priority of time is due to God's priority. Thus the Divine time is what the Qur'an describes as the Mother of Books in which the whole of history, freed from the net of causal sequence is gathered up in a single super-eternal 'now' 51

Iqbal analyses conscious experience and holds that the self has two aspects: the appreciative and the efficient, which we have already discussed in detail, The appreciative self lives in pure duration i.e. change without succession. The life of the self consists in its movement form appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, and atomic time is born out of this movement. Thus permanence and change is regarded as an organic whole or eternity and time is regarded as atomic.

"It then we accept the guidance", Iqbal says, "of our conscious experience, and conceive the life of the all-inclusive Ego on the analogy of the finite ego, the time of the Ultimate Ego realizes and measures, so to speak, the infinite wealth of His own undetermined creative possibilities. On the one hand, therefore, the ego lives in eternity, by which term I mean non-successional changes; on the other, it lives in serial time, which I conceive as organically related to eternity in the sense that it is a measure of non-successional changes; on the other, it lives in serial time, which I conceive as organically related to eternity in the sense that it is a measure of non-successional change".⁵²

Knowledge and Omnipotence. The knowledge of human beings is different from the knowledge of God. Human knowledge is based on sense-perception and reasoning which is called discursive. It is a temporal process which moves round a veritable "other" supposed to exist per se and confronting the knowing ego. This knowledge cannot be predicated to the Ultimate Ego or God because if we extend it to the point of omniscience it will always remain relative to the confronting "other". This knowledge bifurcates the knowledge phenomenon into the subject who knows and the object which is known. The relationship between the subject and the object is called knowledge. Without the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, knowledge is impossible. Hence in

Epistemology of Iqhal

human knowledge the object must exist per se, independent of its subject. God's knowledge, on the other hand, is all-inclusive and the universe cannot be regarded as existing per se in opposition to Him. For Him there is no `other', "In Him thought and deed, the act of knowing and the act of creating are identical".⁵⁴

The universe as we have seen is not in opposition to God but it is the manifestation of Him. This creates a problem. According to Iqbal: "the ego, whether finite or infinite, is inconceivable without a confronting non-ego and if there is nothing outside the Ultimate Ego, the Ultimate Ego cannot be conceived as an Ego". Iqbal answers that "logical negations are of no use in forming a positive concept which must be based on the character of reality as revealed in experience". Our ciriticism of experience reveals the Ultimate Reality to be rationally directed life which in view of our experience of life cannot be conceived except as an organic whole, a something closely knit together and possessing a central point of reference". 55

"If we suppose", lobal says along with Jalal-du-Din Dawani, Iraqi and Professor Royce, "that omniscience is a single indivisible act of perception, which makes God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history regarded as an order of specific events in an eternal 'now'", it will suggest "a closed universe a fixed futurity, a predetermined unalterable order of specific events, which like a superior fate has once for all determined the directions of God's creative activity", 56 labal, however, denies the fore-knowledge of things to God as it will, according to him cost Him His freedom and creativity. His knowledge is not like a reflecting mirror which reflects the already finished structure of things. In I here misunderstands words knowledge confuses the and Foreknowledge does not mean that things are known by God and hence are already awaiting for their turn. On the contrary, God knows them, but they are not yet created. So God's knowledge does not rob Him of His creativity. The foreknowledge of events and the creation of them — both taken together comprise the fundamental point which differentiates

The Ultimate Ego

human knowledge from the knowledge of God. Iqbal further points out that the fresh emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action ... is a limitation on the freedom of the all-inclusive Ego. Without the limitation the omnipotence is merely a blind and capricious power. But this limitation is not externally imposed but from out of His own creative freedom whereby He has chosen finite egos to be participaters of His life, power and freedom.⁵⁷

Iqbal further characterizes God as Supreme Goodness. He is omnipotent but also wise and good. The Qur'an views Divine omnipotence as intimately related to Divine wisdom, and finds the infinite power of God revealed not in the arbitrary and the capricious but in the recurrent, the regular and the orderly. 58

Epistemology of Iqbal

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion by Dr. Muhammad Marul, pp. 63-64.
 - 2. The Reconstruction, pp. 28-29.
- 3. From Critique of Pure Reason. Quoted by Jamila Khatoon in her book The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqhal, p.26.
- 4. Russell's Why I am Not a Christian, quoted by Dr. Muhammad Maruf, p. 64.
 - 5. The Reconstruction, pp. 29-30.
- 6. The Place of God Man and Universe... by Dr. Jamila Khatoon, pp. 27-28.
 - 7. Ibid, pp. 27-28.
 - 8. The Reconstruction, p. 30.
 - 9. Ibid, p. 30-31.
- 10. The Place of God Man and Universe..., Dr. Jamila Khatoon, p. 30.
 - 11. The Reconstruction, p. 33.
 - 12. Ibid, p. 35.
 - 13. Ibid, pp. 35-36.
 - 14. Ibid, pp. 36-37.
 - 15. Ibid, p. 37.
 - 16. *Ibid*, p. 37.
 - 17. Ibid, p. 38.
 - 18. Ibid, p. 38.
 - 19. Iqbal as a Thinker, p. 28.

The Ultimate Ego

- 20. The Reconstruction, p. 34.
- 21. Ibid, p. 51.
- 22. Ibul, p. 51.
- 23. Ibid, p. 52.
- 24. Ibid, p. 53.
- 25. Ibid, p. 54.
- 26. Ibid, p. 54.
- 27. Ibid, p. 55.
- 28. Ibid, p. 48.
- 29. Ibid, pp. 55-56.
- 30. Ibid, p. 56.
- 31. B. A. Dar, p. 111.
- 32. The Reconstruction, pp. 105-106.
- 33. Ibid, p. 154.
- 34. Ibid, p. 106.
- 35. Ibid, p. 105.
- 36. The New Rose Garden and Mystry, p. 14.
- 37. Javid Nama, p. 17.
- 38. The Reconstruction, p. 62.
- 39. Ibid, p. 63.
- 40. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, pp. 98-99.
- 41. Ibid, pp. 62-63.
- 42. The Qur'an, translated by A. Yousaf Ali XXIV:35.
- 43. The Reconstruction, pp. 63-64.
- 44. The Qur'an, translated by A. Yousaf Ali, p. 1806.
- 45. The Reconstruction, p. 64.

Epistemology of Ighal

- 46. Ilnd. p. 65.
- 47. Ibid. p. 65.
- 48 Ilnd, p. 66.
- 49 Ibul, pp. 68-72.
- 50. Ilud, pp. 73-74
- 31. Ibid, pp. 75.70
- 52. Hud, p. 77.
- 53. flud, p. 77.
- 54. The Reconstruction, p. 77.
- 55 Ibid, p. 78.
- 56. Ibid, p. 78.
- 57. Ibid, pp. 79-80.
- 58 Hud. p. 80.

CHAPTER SIX

THE FINITE EGO

The evaluation of lqbal's work follows a critical scrutiny of his conception of "ego". In fact, the entire philosophy of Iqbal hinges directly or undirectly on the philosophy of human ego. It is his pivotal and key concept. This evaluation will consists of three points: 1. the perfection of ego, 2. his freedom of will, and 3, his immortality.

To begin with, we have to define ego in the words of lgbal. The characteristic feature of the ego is, lgbal says, that it reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states do not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another. They exist as phases of a complex whole, called mind. The organic unity, however, of these interrelated states or, let us say, events is a special kind of unity. It fundamentally differs from the unity of a material thing for the parts of a material thing can exist in mutual isolation: mental unity is absolutely anique". This mental unity, in the words of William James, is a stream of thought. Inbal further defines this mental unity as a consciousness whose "function is to provide a luminous point in order to enlighten the forward tush of life. It is a case of tension, a state of self-concentration, by means of which life manages to shut out all memories and associations which have no bearing on a present action. It has no welldefined fringes; it shrinks and expands as the occasion

Epistemology of labal

demands". He further says that "this consciousness must be regarded as an independent reality otherwise it will no be a source of all knowledge. To describe it as an epi-phenomenon of the processes of matter is to deny it as an independent activity and to deny it as an independent activity is to deny the validity of all knowledge which is only a systematized expression of Consciousness"2 This consciousness or ego is not space-bound. It is completely independent of space, because "my thought of space is not spatially related to space. Indeed the ego can think of more than one space-order. The space of waking consciousness and dream-space have no mutual relation. They do not interfere with, or overlap, each other. For the body there can be but a single space. The ego, therefore, is not space-bound in the sense in which the body is space-bound. Again, mental and physical events are both in time but the time-span of the ego is fundamentally different to the time-span of the physical event. The duration of the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact, the ego's duration is concentrated within it and linked with its present and future in a unique manner. The formation of a physical event discloses certain present marks which show that it has passed through a time-duration. These marks are merely emblematic of its timeduration itself. True time duration belongs to the ego alone"?

The second important characteristic of the unity of the ego is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of every ego. In order to reach a certain conclusion all the premises of a syllogism must be believed in by one and the same mind. If I believe in the proposition 'all men are mortal', and another mind believes in the proposition 'Socrates is a man', then no inference is possible. It is possible only if both the propositions are believed in by me. Again, my desire for a certain thing is essentially mine. Its satisfaction means my private enjoyment. If all mankind happen to desire the same thing, the satisfaction of their desire will not mean the satisfaction of my desire when I do not get the thing desired. The dentist may sympathize with my toothache. My pleasures, pains and desires are exclusively mine forming part and parcel of my private ego alone. My feelings, hates, and loves, judgements and resolutions

What is Knowledge

- 47. Ibid., XLIII: 22-23.
- 48. Ibid., p. 67.
- 49. Ibid., II: 171.
- 50. Ibid., XLII: 51.
- 51. Ibid., II: 23.
- 52. Ibid., XXVI: 194.
- 53. Ibid., XL: 15.
- 54. Ibid., XLII: 52.
- 55. Ibid., VII: 157.
- 56. Ibid., XCVI: 1.
- 57. Ibid., XVI: 64.
- 58. Ibid., p. 675.
- 59. Ibid., XVI: 65.
- 60. Ibid., XXX: 20 ... 26.
- 61. Ibid., IV: 162-166.
- 62. Ibid., III: 7.
- 63. Ibid., II: 152.
- 64. Ibid., XL: 2.
- 65. The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society. Vol. 1 p. 141.
 - 66. Qur'an, III: 189.
 - 67. Ibid., LVIII: 2.
- 68. The Qur'anic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society, Vol. 1 p. 161-162.
 - 69. Qur'an, XXXV: 28.
 - 70. Reason and Revelation; by A.J. Arberry, p. 79.
 - 71. Qur'an, XXXIII: 40.

Epistemology of Iqbal

qualities we cannot discover how they inhere the soul substance. Thus we see, Iqbal adds, "that our conscious experiences can give us no clue to the ego regraded as soul-substance; for by hypothesis the soul substance does not reveal itself in experience. And it may further be pointed out that in view of the improbability of different soul-substances controlling the same body at different times, the theory can offer no adequate explanation of such phenomena as alternating personality, formerly explained by the temporary possession of the body by evil spirits".

Iqbal also differs from Hume. Hume defines the reality of soul as having some metaphysical entity, because conscious experience gives no clue to it. He says: "there are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call the other self, that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence, and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch my self at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, I could neither think, nor feel nor see nor love nor hate after the dissolution of my body"?

In another place Hume says "Consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception".

So we see that Hume has no respect for man, whom he regards just as a bundle or a receptacle of perceptions. He forgets that the receptacle of these perceptions is a philosopher, a scientist and, above all, a creator whose existence is the main purpose of this universe and without whose existence there would not have existed anything at all. For William James, as we said before, consciousness is a flow or stream of thought, a conscious flow of changes with a felt continuity. He finds a

kind of gregarious principle working in our experiences which have, as it were, 'hooks' on them and thereby catch up one another in the flow of mental life. The ego consists of the feeling of personal life and is as such part of the system of thought. Every pulse of thought, present or perishing, is an indivisible unity which knows and recollects. The appropriation of the passing pulse by the present pulse of thought and that of the present by its successor is the ego"?

lobal disagrees here with James and asserts that consciousness is not something composed of bits of perception but is something single, "James' theory as bits of consciousness ignores", Igbal holds, "the permanent element in experience. There is no continuity of being between the passing thoughts. When one of these is present, the other has totally disappeared and how can the passing thought, which is irrevocably lost, be known and appropriated by the present thought. I do not mean to say that the ego is over and above the mutually penetrating multiplicity we call experience. Inner experience is the ego at work. We appreciate the ego itself in the act of perceiving. Judging and willing. The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as a directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience".10

Iqbal's work on the nature of self is his famous book *The Secrets of Self*. He is very proud of the fact that he has unriddled the secrets of the self as he says in the book:

No one hath told the secret which I will till, Or threaded a pearl of thought like mine. Come, if thou would'st win both earth and heaven! Heaven taught me this lore, I cannot hide it from comrades.¹¹

This heaven-taught lore, which he cannot hide from us, is his poetical philosophy of the self:

The form of existence is an effect of self, Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the self,

When the self awoke to consciousness. It revealed the universe of thought. A hundred words are hidden in its essence: Self- affirmation brings Not-self to light. by the self the seed of opposition is sown, the word; It imagines itself to be other than itself. It makes from itself the forms of others in order to multiply the pleasure of strife. It is slaying by the strength of its arm That it may become conscious of its own strength... Its self-deceptions are the essence of Life; Like the rose, it lives by bathing itself in blood For the sake of single rose it destroys a hundred rose gardens And makes a hundred lamentation in quest of a single melody. For one sky it produces a hundred new moons. And for one word a hundred discourses, The excuse for this wastefulness and cruelty Is the shaping and perfecting of spiritual beauty. The loveliness of sharing justifies the anguish of Farhad. One fraught navel justifies a hundred musk-deer. 'Tis the fate of moths to consume in flame: The suffering of moths is justified by the candle. The pencil of the Self limned a hundred to-days in order to achieve the dawn of a single morrow Its flames burned a hundred Abrahams That the Lamp of One Muhammad might be lit. Subject, object, means, and causes - All these are forms which it assumes for the purpose of action. The Self rises, kindles, falls, glows, breathes, Burns, shines, walks, and flies. The spaciousness of Time is its arena, Heaven is a billow of the dust on the road. From its rose-planting the world abounds in roses; Night is born of its sleep, day springs from its waking. It divided its flame into sparks And taught the understanding to worship particulars. It dissolved itself and created the atoms

The Finite Ego

It was scattered for a little while and created sand. Then it wearied of dispersion And by re-uniting itself it became the mountains. 'Tis the nature of the Self to manifest itself: In every atom the might of the self. Power that is expressed and incre Chains the faculties which lead to action. In as much as the life of the universe comes from the power of the self, Life is in proportion to this power. When a drop of water gets of self's lesson by heart, It makes its worthless existence a pearl. Wine is formless because its self is weak; It receives a form by favour of the cup. Although the cup of wine assumes a form, It is indebted to us for its motion. When the mountain loses its self, it turns into sands And complains that the sea surges over it; The wave, so long as it remains a wave in the sea's bosom. Makes itself rider on the sea's back. Light transformed itself into an eye And moved to and fro in search of beauty: When the grass found a means of growth in its self, its aspiration clove the breast of the garden. The candle too concatenated itself And built itself out of atoms: Then it made a practice of meeting of melting itself away and fled from its self until at last it trickled down from its own eye, like tears. If the bezel had been more self secure by nature, It would not have suffered sounds, but since It derives its values from the superscription, Its shoulder is galled by the burden of another's name. Because the earth is firmly based on itself, The captive moon goes round it perpetually. The being of the sun is stronger than that of the earth; Therefore is the earth fascinated by the sun's eye, The glory of the red beech fixes our gaze. The mountains are enriched by its majesty:

Its raiment is woven of fire, Its origin is one self-assertive seed. When Life gathers strength from the self, The river of Life expands into an ocean". 12

Iqbal thinks of the ego as inner experience. So it is something unique but not existing in time. It is the amalgamation of acts. It is these acts which constitute a personality. He says that "it is meant to suggest that the soul must be taken as something individual and specific, with all the variations in the range, balance and effectiveness of its unity. 'Every man acteth after his own manner; but your Lord well knowth who is best guided in his path". Thus my real personality is not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another and held together by the unity of a directive attitude. You cannot perceive me like a thing in space or a set of experiences in temporal order; you must interpret, understand and appreciate me in my judgements, in my will attitudes, aims, and aspirations". ¹³

Ighal himself robs the creativity and the originality of the ego of which he is thought to be the chief exponent. According to Bergson the ego (within ultimate or finite) has no teleological character, because it makes time unreal. Bergson says: "The portals of the future must remain wide open to Reality. Otherwise it will not be free and creative". No doubt" Iqbal says, "if teleology means the working out of a plan in view of a predetermined end or goal it does make time unreal. It reduces the universe to a mere temporal reproduction of a pre-existing eternal scheme or structure in which individual events have already found their places, waiting, as it were, for their respective turn to enter into the temporal sweep of history. All is already given somewhere in eternity. The temporal order of events is nothing more than a mere limitation of the eternal mould".14 Iqbal says that this view of reality is nothing but determinism. There is no room left for the freedom of the ego. He gives another sense to teleology. He maintains that "mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there are no far-off, distant goals towards which we are

moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends. purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands". 15 We do not understand exactly what Igbal really means by the concept of 'purpose' or 'end', since he himself also says "that the world process or the movement of the universe in time, is certainly devoid of purpose, if by purpose we mean a foreseen end, a far-off fixed destination to which the whole creation moves. To endow the world process with purpose in this sense in to rob it of its originality and its creative character. Its ends are terminations of a career; they are ends to come and not necessarily premeditated. A time process cannot be conceived as a line already drawn. It is a line in the drawing—an actualization of open possibility".16 It becomes clear form this quote that Iqbal contradicts himself, for he saves the creativity of reality on the one hand and makes the reality purposive or directive on the other. Anything which we have in our mind or view and which is not yet fulfilled is called purpose, desire or end. However, a thing about which we know nothing at all cannot be called a desire or purpose or an end. "A future event cannot", C.D. Broad says, "be called an event"; similarly how can we call something an end or a purpose which we have not yet felt the desire for. A thing out of the range of the conscious experience, cannot be a purpose or an and. A purpose or an end must be foreseen or far-off fixed, otherwise it will not be a purpose. How can I conceive something as a purpose of my life if I do not know it already. There is a serious purpose behind my writing this paper and therefore it is called purpose'. If I had not known the purpose behind it, I would have never taken the hardship to write it. And so something which is purposive in any sense, cannot be creative as Bergson held before. After this explanation of the nature of purpose or end we seem to understand that the ego is not creative because it has ends and purposes, which are according to Igbal the terminations of a career. Igbal means by purpose or end the same thing as we have explained above.

"Thus ends and purposes, whether they exist as conscious or sub-conscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of conscious experience. The element of purpose discloses a kind

of forward look into consciousness. Purposes colour not only our present states of consciousness but also reveal its future direction. In fact they constitute the forward push of our life, and thus in a way anticipate and influence the states that are yet to be... On the analogy of our conscious experience, therefore, Reality is not a blind vital impulse wholly unilluminated by idea. Its nature is through and through teleological". And again, he talks about purpose or end in much the same way as in his work "The Secrets of the Self": that the ego cannot be developed if it does not form ideals or purposes. To be devoid of purpose is to be without life. Therefore he urges us:

"Life is preserved by purpose: Because of the goal its carvan-bell tinkles. Life is latent in seeking. its origin is hidden in desires. Keep desire alive in thy heart, Lest the little dust become a tomb. Desire is the soul of this world of hue and scent, the nature of everything is a store-house of desire. Desire sets the heart dancing in the breast. And by its glow the breast is made bright as a mirror. It gives to earth the power of soaring. It is a Khizer to the Moses of Perception. From the flame of desire the heart takes life and when it takes life, all dies that is not true. When it refrains from forming desires. Its opinion breaks and it cannot soar. Desire keeps the self in perpetual uproar. It is a restless wave of he self's sea. Desire is a noose for hinting ideals. A binder of the book of deeds. Negation of desire is death to the living, Even as absence if he extinguishes the flame. What is the source of our wakeful eye? Our delight in seeing hath taken visible shape. The partridge's leg is derived from the elegance of its gait. The nightingale's beak from endeavour to sing

The Finite Ego

Away from the seed-bed, the reed became happy: The music was released from its prison. What is the essence of the mind that Strives after new discoveries and scales the heaven? Knowest thou what works this miracle? 'Tis desire that enriches Life. And the mind is a child of its womb. What are social organizations, customs and laws? What is the secret of the novelties of science? A desire which realised itself by its own strength And burst forth from the heart and took shape. Nose, hand, brain, eye, and ear, thought, imagination, feeling, memory, and understanding All these are weapons devised by life for selfpreservation in its ceaseless struggle. The object of science and art is not knowledge. The object of the garden is not the bud and the flower. Science is an instrument for the preservation of life Science is a means of invigorating the self Science and art are servants of life. Slaves born and bred in its house. Rise, O thou who art strange to life's mysiery, Rise, intoxicated with the wine of an ideal, An ideal shining as the dawn, blazing fire to all that is other than God. An Ideal higher than Heaven Winning, captivating, enchanting men's hearts; A destroyer of ancient falsehood, Fraught with turmoil, and embodiment of the Last Day. We live by forming ideals, We glow with the sunbeams of desire!". 18

The Qur'an also substantiates this meaning of the concept 'purpose'. It says: "We created not the heavens, the earth and all between them merely in (idle) sport. We created them not except for just ends: But most of them do not understand". 19

From the above explanation we understand that Bergson was totally wrong in inferring that reality will not be creative if it is deemed with a purpose and that Iqbal was right to regard

reality or ego creative and purposive but wrong to regard purpose as not premeditated. The ego is purposive and therefore creative; if there were no purposes the whole cosmos would have been stagnant and hence not creative. As Iqbal asserts: "To my mind nothing is more alien to the Qur'anic outlook than the idea that universe is the temporal working out of a preconceived plan".²⁰

From this point we go onwards to the question how the human ego has been created?" For this we will first consult the Our'an. "Man we did create from a quintessence (of clay); then We placed him as a drop of sperm in a pace of rest firmly fixed. Then We made a (foetus) lump. Then We made out of that lump bones and clothed the bones with flesh; then we developed out of it another creature. So blessed be Allah the best to create".21 And again, "We created man from ascending clay, from mud moulded into shape..."22 "Behold! thy Lord said to the angels: "I am about to create man, form a sounding clay, from mud moulded into shape; When I have fashioned him (in due proportion) and breathed into him of my spirit; fall ye down in obeisance unto him. So the angels prostrated themselves all of them together".23 "He has created man from a sperm drop, and behold this same (man) becomes an open dispute".24

The scientific explanation (biologically speaking) of the creation of man is analogous with that of the Qur'an. Iqbal mentions that the ego of man "develops on the basis of physical organism—that colony of sub-egos through which a profounder ego constantly acts on me and thus permits to build up a systematic unity of experience". Here Iqbal brings forward the problem of dualism of body and mind which we have already discussed in the previous chapter. He does not believe in the independent existence of the body from the mind. Descrates was one of the chief exponents of this theory. Nor does he believe in the interaction of body and mind. He has another view, according to which both mind and body belong to the same system. And he says that according to the Qur'an, they do belong to the same system. "To Him belong 'khalq' (creation) and 'amr' (direction)". To Him belong 'khalq' (creation) and 'amr' (direction)".

The system lobal talk about, is the system of experience. and acts or events. He says: "the body is not a thing situated in an absolute void; it is a system of events or acts. The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts". He further says that "this does not obliterate the distinction of soul and body".27 In a (certain) sense, Igbal mixes up all the different kinds of acts, namely, those of experiences and those of the body. He makes all the acts belong to the same system. Man is constituted by acts. We know from the verse of the Qur'an, given above, that man is created from clay i.e. the body is created from clay while the soul is the breath of God. Soul is the more dominant of the two. The body has only physicological purposes. They do belong to God, as every thing in this universe does. However their system is not God; it would be a sheer mistake on the part of any one to consider it thus. Igbal did not indicate the name of this system but I think he means it to be the ego of which body and mind are the two faces. Russell says in the analysis of mind, that "the stuff of which the world of our experience is composed is, in my belief neither mind nor matter, but something more primitive than either". 28 Basically he agrees with Iqbal that "both are the expressions of the same reality. They are constituted of the same stuff" 29

Iqbal further elaborates the relation between body and mind "on the analogy of the relation of God with the universe. It is not placed at some definite or particular point in the body. It is not identical with the body either. It is related to it, is in contact with every atom of it, permeates and infuses it through and through and at the same time is over and above it. It is neither inside nor outside the body, neither proximate nor separate from it, and yet it is in contact with its every atom". 30

Now we come to the conscious experience. Conscious experience is a unique reality. There are no grades in this experience. Many philosophers have divided it into simple consciousness, intellect and intuition or religious experience. Al-Ghazali, for example, drew a line of cleavage between thought and intuition. In fact these experiences are nothing but the same unique consciousness. Iqbal holds: "he (Ghazali)

failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily stimulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time. The idea that thought is essentially finite and for this reason unable to capture the infinite is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge. 31

The above paragraph leads us to believe in the oneness or the organic wholeness of consciousness. At the first stage this consciousness equals animal consciousness. But man and beast have the animal desire for food, sex etc... still the human consciousness can supersede the animal consciousness if he desires so. It depends upon man how he shapes his consciousness. It is, like rubber; when you pull it, it will lengthen because it has elasticity in it. Similarly if you stretch your conscious experience, it will reach the stage of intellect. This further substantiates the acts of the conscious experience. If you further stretch the conscious experience, now residing at the stage of intellect, it will reach a still higher stage—what Bergson calls intuition and what, for Iqbal, is religious experience or love. This act of ego, of pulling off from one stage to another, is described by Iqbal in the following words: "Both Kant and Ghazali failed to see that thought, in the very act of knowledge passes beyond its own finitude. The finitude of nature is reciprocally exclusive. Not so, the finitudes of thought which, in its essential nature, is incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned in the circuit of its own individuality. In the wide world beyond itself nothing is alien to it. It is in its progressive participation in the life of the apparently alien that thought demolishes the walls of its nitude and enjoys a potential infinitude. Its movement becomes possible only because of the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite, which keeps alive within it the flame of aspiration and sustains it in its endless pursuit. It is a mistake to regard though as inconclusive, for it too in its own way, is a greeting of the finite with the infinite". 32 These stages, i.e. concrete experience, intellect and intuition all constitute the same consciousness. They are the only stages through which an ego has to pass, they are not independent categories or things of

the consciousness. They are not opposed to each other, though many a thinker seemed to have thought so. Therefore, lobal rightly says: "nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring form the same root and complement each other".33 Igbal agrees with Bergson that "intuition is only a higher kind of intellect". 34 Probably Iqbal means not that it (intuition) is the higher kind but that it is the higher stage of the intellect. When consciousness is at the stage of intellect it is in time, which means that the ego is in time and fixes its gaze on the temporal aspect of Reality. When it goes to the higher intuition, it fixes its gaze on the eternal aspect of Reality. When the ego reaches this stage of intuition, then sensations and intellect are in abeyance and play no part in dealing with the Ultimate Reality. Igbal more fully explains this whole process of consciousness or ego, when he divides the ego into two selves i.e. the appreciative self and the efficient self, so that when the ego is concerned with this world in its first stage, it finds itself on the efficient side; but when the ego breaks the chains of this world, goes beyond the time-space construction, and enjoys its appreciative side or aspect. This can be proved from the following paragraph.

A deeper analysis of conscious experience reveals to us what I have called the appreciative side of the self. With our absorption in the external order of things necessitated by our present situation, it is extremely difficult to catch a glimpse of the appreciative self. In our constant pursuit after external things we weave a kind of veil round the appreciative self which thus becomes completely alien to us. It is only in the moments of profound meditation, when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience. In the life process of this deeper ego the states of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which every experience permeates the whole, there is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is, unlike that of the efficient self, wholly qualitive. 35

There is a complete change from one stage to another. But this change and movement as Iqbal rightly says is indivisible,

their elements interpenetrate and are wholly non-serial in character. So consciousness has the following shape:CONSCIOUSNESS—SIMPLE-CONSCIOUSNESS—INTELLECT—INTUITION.

The problem is how we undergo these changes in order to attain to the ultimate knowledge of things. In this case Russell has remarked that "the experiences which have led men to believe that they were seeing Satan were as vivid as those which have led man to believe that they were seeing God". 36

This problem, I suppose, is a genuine one, not because it is posed by Russell but because it throws much light on the mature of consciousness. The ego, when going ahead in its process, will meet at a certain time, the necessity to choose between the two kinds of knowledge: the knowledge of God and the knowledge of Satan. The ego is completely free in choice. We will talk about the problem of freedom of will in our next section. Here it is sufficient to say that the ego itself will have to choose a way and then prepare itself to give account of its actions. Because there are different ways which allow the ego to go ahead in its stages, the ego needs a special kind of education in order to reach the stage of religious experience While passing through the first stages i.e. simpleconsciousness and intellect, the ego must undergo a sort of trial. This trial, Ighal depicts in his poetry as obedience and selfcontrol; when he passes these ordeals he reaches the place which the Our'an regards as Divine vicegerency. We will reproduce the whole poem from his Secrets of the Self. Thefirst stage is 'Obedience' about which he says:

"Service and toil are traits of the camel,
Patience and perseverance are ways of the camel.
Noiselessly he steps along the sandy track,
He is the ship of those who voyage in the desert.
Every thicket knows the print of his foot: He eates seldom, sleeps little and is inured to toil.
He carries rider, baggage and litter:
He trots on and on to the journey's end,

The Finite Ego

Rejoicing in his speed, more patient in travel than his rider, thou, too, do not refuse the burden of duty:

So wilt thou enjoy the best dwelling place which is with God.

Endeavour to obey, O heedless one!

Liberty as the fruit of compulsion.

By obedience the man of no worth is made worthy;

By disobedience his fire is turned to ashes.

Who so would master the sun and stars, let him make himself a prisoner of law!

The air becomes fragrant when it is imprisoned in the flower bud:

The perfume become must when it is confined in the navel of the musk-deer.

The star moves towards its goal with head bowed in surrender to a law.

The grass springs up in obedience to the law of growth:

When it abandons that, it is trodden underfoot.

To burn unceasingly is the law of the tulip

And so the blood leaps in its veins.

Drops of water become a sea by the law of union,

And grains of sand become a sahara.

Since law makes everything strong within,

Why dost thou neglect this source of strength?

O thou that art emancipated from the old custom.

Adorn thy feet once more with the same fine silver chain!

Do not complain of the hardness of the law,

Do not transgress the statutes of Muhammad!

The second stage is 'Self Control'

Thy soul cares only for itself, like the camel:

It is self-conceited, self-governed, and self-willed.

Be a man, get its halter into thine hand,

That thou mayst become a pearl albeit thou art a potter's vessel.

He that does not command himself, becomes a receiver of commands from others.

When they moulded thee of clay, love and fear were mingled in thy making:

Fear of this world and of the world to come, fear of death, fear of all the pains of earth and heaven; Love of riches and power, love of country, love of self and kindred and wife.

Man, in whom clay is mixed with water, is fond of ease, devoted to wickedness and enamoured of evil.

So long as thou hol'st the staff of "There is no god but He, "Thou wilt break every spell of fear.

One to whom God is as the soul in his body,

His neck is not bowed before vanity.

Fear finds no way into his bosom, his heart is afraid of none but Allah. Who so dwells in the world of negations. Is freed from the bonds of wife and child. He withdraws his gaze from all except God. And lays the knife to the throat of his son. Though single, he is like host in onset:

Life is cheaper in his eyes than wind.

The profession of faith is the shell, and prayer is the pearl within it:

The Moslem's heart deems prayer a lesser pilgrimage.

In the Moslem's hand prayer is like a dagger.

Killing sin and forwardness and wrong.

Fasting makes an assault upon hunger and thirst.

And breaches the citadel of sensuality. The pilgrimage enlightens the soul of the faithful: It teaches separation from one's home and destroys attachment to one's native land; It is an act of devotion in which all feel themselves to be one, it binds together the leaves of this book of religion, Almsgiving causes love of riches to pass away. And makes equality familiar.

It fortifies the heart with righteousness,

It increases wealth and diminishes fondness for wealth

All this is a means of strengthening thee:

Thou art impregnable, if thy Islam be strong

Draw might from the litany "O Almighty One"

That thou mayst ride the camel of thy body.

Finally the ego reaches the state of Divine Vicegerency

It thou canst rule thy camel, thou wilt rule the world. And wear on thine head the crown of Solomon. Thou wilt be the glory of the world whilst the world lasts, and thou wilt reign in the kingdom incorruptible. 'This sweet to be God's vicegerent in the world and exercise sway over the elements. God's vicegerent is as the soul of the universe, His being is the shadow of the Greatest Name. He knows the mysteries of part and whole. He executes the command of Allah in the world. When he pitches his tent in the wide world.

He rolls up this ancient carpet. His genius abounds whit life and desires to manifest itself:

He will bring another world into existence.

A hundred worlds like this world of parts and wholes spring up like roses from the seed of his imagination. He makes every raw nature ripe,

He puts the idols out of the sanctuary.

Heart-strings give forth music at this touch.

He wakes and sleeps for God alone. He teaches age the melody of youth and endowed every thing with the radiance of youth. To the human race he brings both a glad message and a warning,

He comes both as a soldier and as a marshal and prince. He is the final cause of "God taught Adam the names of all things". He is the inmost sense of "Glory to Him that transported His servant by night".

His white hand is strengthened by the staff.

His knowledge is twinned with the power of a perfect man. When that bold cavalier seizes the reins, the steed of time gallops faster. His aweful mien makes the Red Sea dry, He leads Israel out of Egypt.

At his cry "Arise", the dead spirits, rise in their

Bodily tomb, like pinces in the field. His person is an atonement for all the world, by his grandeur the world is saved. His protecting shadow makes the mote familiar with the sun, his rich substance makes precious all that exists. He bestows life by him miraculous actions, he renovates old ways of life,

Splendid visions rise form the print of his foot.

Many a Moses is entranced by his Sinai.

He gives a new explanation of life, a new interpretation of this dream. His hidden being is life's mystery. The unheard music of life's harp.

Nature travels in blood for generations. To compose the

harmony of his personality.

Our handful of earth has reached the zenith, for that champion will come forth from this dust!

There sleeps amidst the ashes of our to-day the flame of a

world-consuming morrow.

Our bad enfolds bright with a garden of roses, Our eyes are bright with tomorrow's dawn.

Appear, O rider of destiny!

Appear, O light of the dark realm of change!

Illumine the scene of existence.

Dwell in the blackness of our eyes!

Silence the noise of the nations,

Imparadise our ears with thy music!

Arise and tune the harp of brotherhood,

Give us back the cup of the wine of love! Bring once more days of peace to the world, give a message of peace to them that seek battle! Mankind are the cornfield and thou the harvest, thou art the goal of life's carvan. The leaves are scattered by Autumn's fury:

Oh, do thou pass over our garden as the spring!

Receive form our downcast brows the homage of little children and of young men and old!

It is to thee that we owe our dignity and silently undergo the pains of life". 37

It is clear form the above poem that the ego has to pass through a certain ordeal in order to reach its complete development. This development further necessitates the freedom of will for the ego. Whether the ego is free or not, is a fundamental question in the world of religions especially in Islam. The word creativity brings ego to the status of "free will". The question which Iqbal raises, is "does the ego determine its own activity?" To this he replies that "the human act of deliberation is understood to be a conflict of motives which are conceived, not as the ego's own present or inherited

tendencies of action or inaction, but as so many external forces fighting one another, gladiator-like, on the arena of mind. Yet the final choice is regarded as a fact determined by the strongest force and not by the resultant of contending motives like a purely physical effect." ³⁸

The reality is that the go is a free causality. The concepts of "doubt", obedience, disobedience, good and bad, right and wrong are the standing testimony to the freedom of the will. If the ego had not been free by will, it would have adopted one way as imposed by some Super-Being. Even the legend of the fall of Adam on this earth is, in fact, another circumstantial evidence of the ego's free will. Iqbal describes this legend as "man's rise from a primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self, capable of doubt and disobedience. The fall does not mean any moral depravity, it is man's transition from simple consciousness to the flash of selfconsciousness, a kind of waking form the dream of nature with a throb of personal causality in one's own being. Nor does the Qur'an regard the earth as a torture-hall where an elementally wicked humanity is imprisoned for an original act of sin. Man's first act of disobedience was also his first act of free choice; and that is why, according to the Our anic narration, Adam's first transgression was forgiven. Now goodness is not a matter of compulsion; it is the self's free surrender to the moral ideal and arises out of a willing co-operation of free egos. A being whose movements are wholly determined like a machine cannot produce goodness. Freedom is thus a condition of goodness. But to permit the emergence of a finite ego who has the power to choose, after considering the relative values of several courses of actions open to him, is really to take a great risk; for the freedom to choose good involves also the freedom to choose what is opposite of good. That God has taken this risk shows His immense faith in man; it is for man now to justify this faith".39 Iqbal further says that the "configuration psychology in Germany has brought at least some hope to the tension which existed between freedom and determinism. This newer German psychology teaches us that a careful study of intelligent behaviour descloses the fact of 'insight' over and

above the mere succession of sensations. This insight is the ego's appreciation of temporal, spatial and causal relation of things—the choice that is to say of data in a complex whole in view of the goal or purpose which the ego has set before itself for the same being. It is this sense of striving in the experience of purposive action and the success which I actually achieve in reaching my end that convince me of my efficiency as a personal cause. The essential feature of a purposive act is its vision of a future situation which does not appear to admit any explanation in terms of physicology. The truth is that the causal chain wherein we try to find a place for the ego is itself an artificial construction of the ego for its own purposes. The ego is called upon to live in a complete environment and he cannot maintain his life in it without reducing it to a system which would give him some kind of assurance as to the behaviour of things around him. The view of the environment as a system of cause and effect is thus, an indispensable instrument of the ego and not a final expression of the nature of Reality. Indeed in interpreting Nature in this way the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom".40 Thus we see that the cause and effect really forms the very nature of freedom. The element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity is another proof that the ego is a free personal causality. "He shares in the life and freedom of the Ultimate Ego who, by permitting the emergence of a finite ego, capable of private initiative, has limited this freedom of His own free will". 41

Iqbal's main purpose is that of an existentialist who proclaims that to exist is to be free. Existence implies freedom. Sartre and Kierkegard believe in the proposition that freedom and existence are inseparable. The two notions are one and the same thing as he (Iqbal) says in one of his poems:

"Life's essence is eternal, though, Seen with the body's eye, It is a part of time. For it has been allotted the supreme control of the realm of existence so That it may manifest itself infinitely.

The Finite Ego

Its destiny is immanent In its own Nature and, though outwardly Dependent on pure accident, It is completely free. What more can I tell you about What it is like, what not? The Holy Prophet said that Faith Resides between necessity and freedom. You think all created things are subject to A fore-ordained necessity. But O the soul is God's own breath. Enshrined for all its self-display, In its inviolate retreat. From Nature's hurly-burly far away. There is no question of necessity ordaining it: For soul cannot be soul, unless completely free. Created by necessity, it hurled itself at this material world And, conquering it, gained A freedom unrestrained. When it shakes off The shackles of necessity, It drives the world as if It were its dromedary".42

Iqbal declares in very clear words that it is up to ego to make his destiny. He is opposed to fate as this word is very much misused in the world of Islam. The point can be conveyed in simple words:

"If thou transform thyself thy fate will change.

If thou are dust, thou'lt only disappear,

If thou art stone, use shall be made of thee to shatter glass.

Art thou a drop of dew?

Evanescence is then thy fate. Art thou a sea?

Then thou will last. O passing one,

Shall'st thou endure by fashioning idols old?

So long as thou art from thy essence for thy unrealised, thy thought will but confine these close,

to thee will fate appear a dungeon dark without a treasure,
But let thy perspective change,
it is a wealth which brings no grief.
If religions should mean to be a thrall to fate,
it darkens more the indigent's all doleful lot.
Let woe betide a creed that only acts on thee as a soporific,
a charm that snares!" 43

As we have already seen, fate, or destiny has not an actual place in the philosophy f Igbal. He regards destiny as time which is prior to the disclosures of its possibilities. It has nothing to do with serial time or causal sequence. "It is time freed from the net of causal sequence—the diagrammatic character which the logical understanding imposes on it. In one word, it is time as felt and not as thought and calculated. He further says that "time" regarded as destiny forms the very essence of things. As the Qur'an says: God created all things and assigned to each its destiny'. The destiny of a thing is not an unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is the inwared reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion".44 Iobal substantiates his arguments for the freedom of will by giving verses from the Our'an, he himself has quoted only two but there are many which we will add in this regard to see what exactly the Qur'an means by the concept of "Freedom of Will". They are the following:

And say "The Truth is from your Lord; let him, then who will believe; and let him who will, be unbeliever. (16:28)⁴⁵

If ye do well, to your own behoof will ye do well, And if ye do evil against yourselves well do not.⁴⁶

We (God) did indeed offer the trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains; but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it— he is indeed very unjust (to himself in not fulfilling his responsibility

The Finite Ego

in respect thereof) and very ignorant (in respect of the evil consequences of not fulfilling his responsibility) (with the respect) that Allah has to punish the hypocrites men and woman. For Allah is ever forgiving, merciful.⁴⁷

Do what ye will (i.e. act as you choose in accordance with your free will). Verily He (God) sees clearly all that ye do.⁴⁸

We have shown him (man) the way (of right and wrong) (now it rests on his will) whether to be grateful (by using the gift of free will in the service of good) or ungrateful (by serving evil through his free will).⁴⁹

That is the day of certainty. Whosoever therefore wills, let him betake unto his Lord's resort.⁵⁰

...a warning to humankind,—to any of you that chooses (through his will) to go forward (towards Good) or to lag behind.⁵¹

The whole description of Igbal's freedom of will shows that he really imparts to man a complete status of free will so that man would not lack the power to create. This idea, I think, meets with some serious objections. If a man is free by his will, he has the power to choose whatever he likes or whatever he thinks to be useful for him. A man is free to believe in a proposition of this sort: "God does not exist". Or a man considers bad as good for himself, for he is free by his will. If I like to drink alcohol, I am (in the very sense of the word freedom of will) free to do so. This is not the case. These kinds of will are not free. If, according to Iqbal, man is entirely free then why are the above propositions not allowed? Why are there rewards and punishments accordingly from some superior Being? Another thing is that Iqbal forgets the real meaning of the verses he has quoted. From the verses as stated above, it becomes unmistakably clear that man's will is in the hands of Allah. He has, no doubt, given the power of free will to man but man is warned to steer his will according to the will

of God otherwise the most grievous penalty is there for him to encounter. In this connection we will repeat the verses quoted by Iqbal and will examine them properly. The verses run as follows:

Say, the Truth is from your Lord; let him who will believe and let him who will, reject it. For the wrong doers We have prepared a fire whose (smoke and flame) like the wall and roof of a tent, will hem them in: if they implore relief they will be granted water like melted brass, that will scald their faces. How creadful the drink! How uncomfortable a couch to recline on.⁵²

If ye do well to your own behoof will ye do well: and if ye do evil against yourselves well ye do not. (we complete this verse by adding), So when the second of the warnings came to pass, (we permitted your enemies) to disfigure your faces and to enter your temple as they had entered it before, and visit with destruction all that fall into their power.⁵³ Nay, verily this (Qur'an) is an admonition. So let him who will (i.e., has the will to do so) heed it. But they shall not heed except as Allah wills (in his infinite wisdom and in accordance with his universal scheme). He is the Lord of righteousness and the Lord of forgiveness.⁵⁴

This is an admonition: then whosoever (shall exert his) will, may choose, a way unto his Lord. But ye will not exert as Allah wills (in His infinite wisdom and in accordance with His universal scheme). For Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom. He will admit to his mercy whom He will (in accordance with the requirements of His Gracious nature and of the demands of absolute and universal Divine justice); but the wrongdoers, for them He has prepared a grievous penalty (in accordance with the misuse of their free will).⁵⁵

From these verses it becomes clear that human beings are given a will which is entirely free but which will always be exerted in Allah's favour. It is as if the Government pays a professor his salary which, however, will have to be completely expended according to the will of the Government. If the professor in question expends it in accordance with the will of the Government, he will be favoured, but if he expends it against the Government's will, the professor will have to face a penalty.

Apart from this religious problem of the free will, there are some other factors which will grip man's will. There are indeed some circumstances in which one cannot exert his own will. These are, according to A.J. Ayer, "the circumstances in which the freedom may be thought to be determined, without being altogether removed. They are, for instance, that one may feel oneself bound by a moral or a legal obligation which would be infringed by some action that one would otherwise wish or think it right to perform; one may be subject to emotional pressures which it is thought excusable to give way to even if they are not thought to be irresistible; one may be acting under the influence of some false belief; one may be under the control of another person as when one has been hypnotized or brain-washed; one may be exposed to blackmail or to torture, or to other menaces. Even when one is threatened with death, one is considered free to defy the threat, but in most circumstances this would not be thought reasonable. In all these cases, the idea of what it is reasonable to expect a man to do plays a large part in our assessment of responsibility",56

Our above discussion brings us to the conclusion that man is not entirely free. His will is chained in the will of some Super Being. Iqbal's own view about free will is thus not entirely borne out by the Qur'an.

We have seen above that the ego of Iqbal is free and totally independent of his destiny. Iqbal further asserts the fact that this ego whose will is free is also enjoying immortality. Here begins the problem of immortality. Iqbal holds that this problem was discussed by Ibn-i-Rushd from a metaphysical point of view. Ibn-i-Rushd, Iqbal says, "drew a distinction between sense and intelligence probably because of the expression. 'Nafs' and 'Rub' used in the Our'an. These

expressions apparently suggesting a conflict between two opposing principles in man, have misled many a thinker in Islam. However if Ibn-i-Rushd's dualism was based on the Our'an, then I am afraid he was mistaken; for the word 'Nafs' does not seem to have been used in the Our'an in any technical sense of the kind imagined by Muslim theologians. Intelligence according to Ibn-i-Rushd, is not a form of the body, it belongs to a different order of being, and transcends individuality. It is, therefore, one, universal and eternal; this obviously means that since unitary intellect transcends individuality, its appearance as so many unities in the multiplicity of human persons, is a mere illusion. The eternal unity of intellect may mean, as Renan thinks, the everlastingness of humanity and civilization, it does not surely mean personal immortality. In fact Ibn-i-Rushd's view looks like William James's suggestion of a transcendental mechanism of consciousness which operates on a physical medium for a while and then gives it up in pure sport". 57

Later on we will examine lqbal's view on immortality; now it is necessary to give the most important theories of immortality from two well-known Muslim thinkers i.e. Shaikh Shahab ul-Din Suhrawardi Known as Shaikh Ishraqi Muqtul and Al-Jili.

The first one i.e. Ishraqi, begins his theory by saying that the relation between the abstract illumination or soul and body, is not of cause and effect. The bond of union between them is love. The body which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since its nature does not permit a direct communication between the soul of light and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received light to the dark solid body which, considering its attribute stands on the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other, they require a medium between them, something standing midway between light and darkness. This medium is the animal soul-a hot, fine, transparent vapour which has its principle in the left city of the heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because of the partial identity of the animal soul with light that in dark nights land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea animals leave their aquatic

abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the moon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher in the scale of being and to receive more and more illumination which gradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is this ideal to be realized? By knowledge and action.

- (A) Knowledge: Igbal further explains the Ishragi philosophy. When the abstract illumination associates itself with a higher organism, it works out its development by the operation of certain faculties. The power of light and the power of darkness. The former are the five external senses and the five internal senses—sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding and memory. The latter are the powers of growth, digestion etc. But such a division of faculties is only convenient. One faculty can be the source of all operation. There is only one power in the middle of the brain though it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind is unity, which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as multiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be distinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real essence of man. Inbal considers Ishragi's theory of vision as the most important one. In this theory the ray of light is supposed to come out of the eye. This must be either substance or quality. If it is quality it cannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance (visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves either consciously or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious movement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver in this case would be the ray, not the man. If the movement of the ray is an attribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be peculiar to one direction and not to all. The ray of light, therefore, cannot be regarded as coming out of the "eye".
- (B) The second source is "Action". Man as an active being has the following motive powers: (a) Reason or the angelic soul, the source of intelligence, discrimination and love of knowledge; (b) The beast soul, which is the source of anger, courage, dominance and ambition; (c) The animal soul, which is the source of lust, hunger and sexual passion. The first leads

to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by reason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. It is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees itself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the nature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of light; and then also our love of that world becomes more and more intense. The stages, however, are the following:

- (1) The stage of 'I'. In this stage the feeling of personality is most predominant and the spring of human action is generally selfishness.
- (2) The stage of Thou art not. Complete absorption in one's own deep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external.
- (3) The stage of 'I am not'. This stage is the necessary result of the second.
- (4) The stage of 'Thou art'. The absolute negation of I and the affirmation of Thou, which means complete resignation to the will of God.
- (5) The stage of 'I am not, and Thou art not'. The complete negation of both the terms of thought—the state of cosmic consciousness.

Each stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are accompanied by indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to the spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death, are not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in proportion to the illumination they receive during their companionship with physical organism. Iqbal further explains the philosophy of Ishraqi: "that no two souls can be completely similar to each other". When the material machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual illumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body, determined by the experiences of the previous life, and rises higher and higher in the different spheres of beings, adopting forms peculiar to those spheres, until it reaches its destination—the state of absolute

negation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make up their deficiencies.

All souls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which calls back the whole universe when this journey is over and starts another cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history of the preceding cycles.⁵⁸

This was the philosophy of Al-Ishraqi about the Supermen or the immortality of such men.

The other well-known pantheist sufi philosopher, whose theory of immortality and the perfection of man is very important in the world of Islam, is Al-fili. His philosophy of the perfect man shows that man has three stages of spiritual beings. The first is the meditation upon the name which the philosopher (Al-Jili) calls "the illumination of names". Al-Jili remarks that "when God illuminates a certain man by the light of His name, the man is destroyed under the dazzling splendour of that name, and when thou calleth God, the call is responded to by the man". The effect of this illumination would be the destruction of the individual will, yet it must not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes on living and moving like the spinning wheel. It is here that the individual cries out in pantheistic mood: "She was I and I was She and there was none to separate us". The second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls "the illumination of the absolute". This illumination makes the perfect man receive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the power of receptivity possessed by man-a fact which classified men according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the illumination. Some men receive illumination from the Divine attribute of life and thus participate in the soul of the universe.

The effect of this light is soaring, walking on water, changing the magnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this way the Perfect Man receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the sphere of the name and the attributes and steps into the domain of the Essence—Absolute Existence. The Absolute Being has three voyages to undergo,

each voyage being a process of particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which has its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. This is the end of the spiritual ethics of Al-Jili. Man becomes perfect when he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or has learnt what Hegel calls the Absolute philosophy. He becomes the paragon of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the universe. He is the point where manness and Godness become one, and result in the birth of the God-man. His eye becomes the eye of God, his word, the word of God and his life, the life of God. He participates in the general life of nature and "sees into the life of things.⁵⁹

After giving the philosophy of these two medieval pantheist philosophers, we turn now to the modern times, in which the name of Kant, is most important for Iqbal. Kant's arguments for personal immortality are ethical. "With Kant immortality is beyond the scope of speculative reason: it is a postulate of practical reason, an axiom of man's moral consciousness. Man demands and pursues the supreme good which comprises both virtue and happiness. But virtue and happiness, duty and inclination are, according to Kant, heterogeneous notions. This unity cannot be achieved within the narrow span of the pursuer's life in this sensible world. We, are, therefore, driven to postulate immortal life for the person's progressive completion of the unity of the mutually exclusive notions of virtue and happiness". "60

Iqbal rejects this theory by telling us that "it is not clear why the consummation of virtue and happiness should take infinite time and how God effectuates the confluence between mutually exclusive notions. This inconclusiveness of metaphysical arguments has led many thinkers to confine themselves to meeting the objection of modern materialism which rejects immortality, holding that consciousness is merely a function of the brain, and therefor ceases with cessation of the brain-process. William James thinks that this objection to immortality is valid only if the function in question is to be productive. The mere fact that certain mental changes vary

concomitantly with certain bodily changes does not warrant the inference that mental changes are produced by bodily changes. The function is not necessarily productive; it may be permissive or transmissive like the function of the trigger of a crossbow or that of a reflecting lens. This view, Iqbal adds, which suggests that our inner life is due to the operation in us of a kind of transcendental Mechanism of consciousness, somehow choosing a physical medium for a short period of sport, does not give any assurance of the continuance of the content of an actual experience. 61

lobal here describes his own theory of immortality. He explains the concept barzakh which literally means "barrier". It is a state of some kind of suspense between death and resurrection. He further explains: "this state as a state of consciousness is characterized by a change in the ego's attitude towards time and space. There is nothing improbable in it. It was Helmholt who first discovered that nervous excitation takes time to reach consciousness. If this is so, our present physiological structure is at the bottom of our present view of time, and if the ego survives the dissolution of this structure, a change in our attitude towards time and space seems perfectly natural. Nor is such a change wholly unknown to us. The enormous condensation of impressions which occurs in our dream-life, and the exaltation of memory which some times takes place at the moment of death disclose the ego's capacity for different standards of time. The state of barzakh, therefore, does not seem to be merely a passive state of expectation; it is a state in which the ego catches a glimpse of fresh aspects of Reality, and prepares himself for adjustment to these aspects. It must be a state of great psychic unhingement, especially in the case of full-grown egos who have naturally developed fixed modes of operation on a specific spatio-temporal order and may mean dissolution to less fortunate ones. However, the ego must continue to struggle until he is able to gather himself up, and win his resurrection. The resurrection, therefore, is not an external event. It is the consummation of a life process within the ego. Whether individual or universal, it is nothing more

than a kind of stock-taking of the ego's past achievements and his future possibilities".62

Iqbal's theory of immortality is based on the Qur'anic view of immortality. The Qur'an says:

Thinketh man that he shall be left as a thing of no use? Was he not a mere embryo?

Then he became thick blood of which God formed him and fashioned him; and made him twain, male and female. Is not God powerful enough to quicken the dead.⁶³

Iqbal claims that "it is highly improbable that a thing whose evolution has taken millions of years should be thrown away as a thing of no use. But it is only as an evergrowing ego that he can belong to the meaning of the universe".⁶⁴

From the above verses of the Qur'an, Iqbal infers that "life offers a scope for ego - activity and death is the first test of the synthetic activity of the ego. There are no pleasure giving and pain-giving acts; there are only ego-sustaining and ego dissolving acts. It is the deed that prepares ego for dissolution, or disciplines him for a future career. The principle of the ego-sustaining deed is respect for the ego in myself as well as in others. Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it".65 This explanation makes it clear that Iqbal regards personal immortality as well as resurrection as not ours of right but as something that can be achieved through personal effort and struggle. Iqbal forgets the actual import of the verses he has quoted. We will reproduce these verses here in order to make it clear that these verses were misunderstood by Iqbal:

Man saith, that? after I am dead, shall I in the end be broght forth alive? Doth no man bear in mind that We made Him at first when he was naught.⁶⁶

It is We Who have decreed that death should be among you. Yet are We not thereby hindered from replacing you with others your likes, or from producing you in a form

The Finite Ego

which ye know not. Ye have known the first creation, will you not reflect? 67

These verses show that resurrection and immortality are the fundamental right of an ego (human being); as he has the right to live so he has the right to be resurrected and be immortal. Logically speaking, if immortality is supposed to be a continuous life with a little pause, i.e. death, then every human being is entitled to have this continuous life and hence he is immortal; every one has to die and will be resurrected according to the above mentioned verses of the Qur'an. Iqbal only creates opportunities for those who have upgraded their egohood and he leaves those who are degraded and disintegrated in their egohood as untouched by resurrection immortality. If so, how will they reach the Day of Judgement, and how will they receive rewards and punishments for their actions done in this world? In lobal's own words: "It is highly improbable that a being whose evolution has taken millions of years should be thrown away as a thing of no use". Man will be given another life and will be considered as immortal, because he in general has taken millions of years to evolve not only the ones whose egohood has reached a certain degree of perfection.

Ibn-i-Maskwaih also approached the problem of immortality; I consider his theory to be more conclusive than Iqbal's. According to Ibn-i-Maskwaih, "the soul is essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its immortality, since mortality is the characteristic of the material" This also shows that soul is immortal and therefore every body's soul is immortal. Ibn-i-Maskwaih considers immortality as a fundamental right of each and every man.

There are some other verses of the Qur'an which will further vindicate our position that resurrection and immortality are not achieved by personal effort and struggle, or that one has to win it, but that it is our genuine right. The verses are the following:

They swear their strongest oaths by Allah that Allah will not raise up those who die.

Nay, but it is a promise, binding on Him in truth. But most among mankind realize it not.

(They must be raised up) in order to that He may manifest to them the truth of that wherein they differ and that the rejectors of truth may realize that they had indeed surrendered to falsehood.⁶⁹

They say, What! when we are reduced to bones and dust, should we really be raised up (to be) a new creation? (Nay) be ye stones are iron or created matter which, in you mind is hardest (to be raised up). Then will they say: 'Who will cause us to return?" Say: "He Who created you first! "Then will they wag their heads towards thee. and say: 'When will that be'? Say, 'May be it will be quite soon'.70

Man says; 'What! when I am dead, shall I then be raised up alive?" But does not man call to mind that We created him before out of nothing'. 'So by thy Lord, without doubts, We shall gather them together, (also) the evils ones (with them) then shall We bring them forth on their knees round about Hell.⁷¹

O mankind! if ye have a doubt about the resurrection (consider) that We created you out of dust, then out of sperm, then out of a leech-like clot, then out of a morsel of flesh, partly formed and partly unformed, in order that We may manifest (our power) to you; and We cause whom We will to rest in the womb, for an appointed term, then do We bring you out as babes then (foster you that) ye may reach your age of full strength; and some of you are called to die, and some are sent back the feeblest old age, so that they know nothing. After having known much and (further) Thou seest the earth barren and lifeless, but when We pour down rain on it, it is stirred (to life) it swells, and it puts forth every kind of beautiful growth (in pairs).⁷²

Say, see they not that God, who created the heavens and the earth, and never wearied with their creation, is able to

The Finite Ego

give life to the dead? Yes, verily He has power over all things. Surely (Allah) is able to bring him back (to life).⁷³

From all these verses it becomes clear that resurrection and immortality are indispensable phases of human life. They are not something to be won by efforts. But they are the consummation of a life process within the ego. Iqbal's spiritual leader, Rumi, is also of the opinion that immortality is a problem of the biological nature and not a problem to be decided by arguments of a purely metaphysical nature. Thus, Rumi says:

First man appeared in the class of inorganic things.

Next he passed therefrom into that of plants. For years he lived as one of the plants,

Remembering naught of his inorganic state so different; And when he passed from the vegetative to the animal state,

He had no remembrance of his state as a plant, Except the inclination he feels to the world of plants, Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers; Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers, Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast.

Again the great Creator, as you know,
Drew man out of the animal into the human state,
Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.
Of his first souls he has now no remembrance,
And he will be again changed from his present soul.⁷⁴

Iqbal next discusses the problem of the form man will assume after his resurrection. "Does the re-emergence of man involve the re-emergence of his former physical medium?" Most of the Muslim theologians are of the opinion that it does involve at least some kind of physical medium suitable to the ego's new environment. Iqbal holds: "It seems to me that this view is mainly due to the fact that the ego as an individual, is inconceivable without some kind of local reference or empirical

background". 75 He further quotes a verse form the Qur'an in this regard.

What when dead and turned to dust, shall we rise again? Remote is the return. Now know We what the earth consumeth of them and with us is a Book in which account is kept.

"To my mind", Iqbal adds, "this verse clearly suggests that the nature of the universe is such that it is open to it to maintain in some other way the kind of individuality necessary for the final working out of human action, even after the disintegration of what appears to specify his individuality in his present environment. What that other way is we do not know nor do we gain any further insight into the nature of he "second creation" by associating it with some kind of body, however subtle it may be. The analogies of the Qur'an only suggest it as a fact; they are not meant to reveal its nature and character. Philosophically speaking, therefore, we cannot go further than this that in view of the past history of man it is highly improbable that this career—should come to an end with the dissolution of his body"?⁶

The above paragraph clearly shows that Iqbal does conceive of some kind of form or shape for the ego after its resurrection, because the ego is inconceivable without some kind of local reference or empirical background. Suppose we agree that the ego will again be in some kind of physical medium for the final working out of their actions i.e. for rewards and punishments, then after the Great Judgement Day they will be sent to their final abodes which are called by the Qur'an Hell and Heaven. Consequently Hell and Heaven must also be the kind of localities which will provide the same empirical background to the egos as they had before in the sensible world. But Igbal says that Heaven and Hell are not localities; they are states. "The descriptions in the Qur'an", he says, "are visual representation of an inner fact; i.e. character. Hell, in the words of the Our'an, is God's kindled fire which mounts above the hearts—the painful realization of one's failure as a man; Heaven is the joy of triumph over the forces

of disintegration".⁷⁷ We get the impression that Iqbal does not believe in Hell and Heaven as localities but regards them as experiences in the development of the ego. So we can conclude that if Hell and Heaven are not localities and are only states then how are we supposed to attribute a kind of physical shape to the ego or man after his resurrection? This is a great problem which really needs scholars to reckon with.

Now we come to another problem which Idbal has made the very theme of his philosophy. I refer here to 'the Perfect Ego' or what he calls "Mard-i-momen". To lobal the ego, which is free by will and goes higher and higher in its development and becomes immortal, is the perfect ego. We have already seen that consciousness evolves through various stages of instinct. sense-perception, intellect and reaches intuition. "For every action of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood, until it reaches its perfection in man". 78 When the ego achieves immortality, it means he has not succumbed to the Universal Destruction, because of having reached a certain position in his consciousness. As Igbal says: "the unceasing reward" of man consists in his gradual growth in selfpossession, in uniqueness, and intensity of his activity as an ego. Even the scene of 'Universal Destruction' immediately preceding the Day of Judgement cannot effect the perfect calm of a full-grown ego".79 He further says that there will be ones "in whom the ego has reached the very highest point of intensity. And the climax of this development is reached when the ego is also to retain full self-possession even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego" 80

Here Iqbal must face some criticism on the notion of "Perfection of Ego". We see that Iqbal is a great Muslim, a believer in one God and a believer in the finality of prophethood in Islam. His philosophy is a dynamic philosophy. We will discuss two points concerning his 'Perfect Ego'.

- (1) Is Iqbal's 'Perfect Ego' equal to the ego of the prophet of Islam i.e. Muhammad? If so then what does he think about the finality of prophethood in Islam? And if not so, then what position or degree does he concede respectively to this Perfect Ego and the Prophet's Ego?
- (2) Whether an ordinary ego can become perfect without being especially graced by some superior power i.e. God.

In tackling the first point, we will try to find out what the concept Perfection means. For him if I go through the creative process of evolution from instinct, sense-perception to intellect and lastly to intuition, I can be said to have attained perfection, as he says in *Javid Nama*:

Three witnesses should testify thy state.

The first as withness is the consciousness of self, to see thy self by thy own light.

The second is another's consciousness that thou may'st kindle these to see thy self.

And thy third witness is God's effulgence if thou stand'st, thou art alive like Him. For life is but to reach that destined end, that is to see the Lord unveiled. One who believes shall never lose himself in attributes for *Mustafa* (Muhammad) insisted on the sight. The flight to heaven means a longing for a witness who may testify thy self. Unless it be confirmed by Him, our life is nothing but a play of tint and smell. No one can stand against His Beauty bright except the sone who has perfection reached.⁸¹

It is clear from the above verses that for Iqbal any ego can reach perfection. Here he appears to violate the concept of the 'finality of prophethood' because the ego who has reached that stage, as we see in the above poem of Iqbal, is Muhammad alone. Iqbal in fact is a strong believer in the finality of prophethood in Islam. He explains this idea: "In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be dept in leading strings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness man must finally be thrown back

on his own sources. The abolition of priesthood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Qur'an, and the emphasis that it lays on nature and history as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality". Be himself defines the concept of Prophet as "a type of mystic consciousness in which unitary experience tends to overflow its boundaries and seeks opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life. In his personality the finite centre of life sinks into his own infinite depths only to spring up again, with fresh vigour to destroy the old, and to disclose the new directions of life". B

The above shows that Iqbal commits fallacy as he creates a dualistic and a contradictory position for himself. The Qur'an is very clear about the finality of prophethood, it asserts:

Muhammad is not the father of any of you men, but (he is) the Apostle of Allah, and the Seal of the prophets.⁸⁴

There is another problem. If we do not take the ego in question to reach a certain final stage but keep on going higher and higher, as Iqbal says, "life is continuous. Man marches always onwards to receive ever fresh illuminations from an infinite Reality which every moment appears in a new glory. And the recipient of Divine illumination is not merely a passive recipient. Every act of a free ego creates a new situation, and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding"85 Then he himself contradicts his ideas of the perfection of ego because perfection means that the ego must be at a certain position which is the last one. He says: "Do not think that you are perfect, for you are still in the making, you complete one stage and go on to the next; imperfect all the time. To reach no end, to travel on without a stop is everlasting life".86 According to Igbal Ego is always on the move. If we agree with him that ego does not stop at a certain so-called highest stage but goes even beyond that, then he resembles in some way the German philosopher Mietzche, who was the pioneer of Eternal Recurrence, Igbal himself rejected him: "Mietzche holds that quantity of energy in the universe is constant and consequently

finite. Space is only a subjective form; There is meaning in saying that the world is in space in the sense that it is situated in an absolute empty void. In his view of time, however, Nietzche parts company with Kant and Schopenhauer. Time is not a subjective form; it is a real and infinite process which can only be conceived as "periodic". Thus it is clear that there can be no dissipation of energy in an infinite space. The centres of this energy are limited in number and their combination perfectly calculable. There is no beginning nor end of this ever active energy, no equilibrium, no first or last change. Since this is infinite, therefore, all possible combinations of energycentres have already been exhausted. There are no new happenings in the universe; whatever happens now has happened in infinite number of times in the future. On Nietzche's view the order of happenings in the universe must be fixed unalterable; for since an infinite time has passed, the energy must have by this time, formed certain definite modes of behaviour. The very word 'Recurrence' implies this fixity. Further, we must conclude that a combination of energy centres which has taken place must always return; otherwise there would be no guarantee for the return even of the Superman.

Iqbal comments on this theory of Nietzche and regards it as a more rigid kind of mechanism. He further says that "it is the expectation that a recurrence of the combination of energy centres which constitutes my personal existence is a necessary factor in the birth of that ideal combination which he calls Superman. But the Superman has been an infinite number of times before. His birth is inevitable; how can the prospect give me any aspiration? We can aspire only for what is absolutely new, and the absolutely new is unthinkable in Nietzche's view which is nothing more than a fatalism worse then the one summed up in the word qismat "87 Nietazhe's view is called Eternal Recurrence, because the perfect man has to come back, in fact we get a sort of cyclic movement.

1) Iqbal's view of the Perfect Man is not eternal recurrence; it is rather eternal flight or Ascension. Both the perfect men of Eternal Recurrence and of Eternal Flight are

eternal and everlasting, unceasing. A thing, which is eternal, has no end and no boundaries, is always the same thing and not new. If the same thing happens always as it is, then the position of Iqbal is just the same as Nietazche's but if the thing in question is always new and therefore changes—as Iqbal holds: "we have seen before that the ego receives new aspirations and illuminations and thus creates a new situation which further offers opportunities of creative unfolding, then the ego is not eternal and has not yet reached the place of eternity. And so man will always be changing from one position to another and always marching onwards and will never be eternal.

2) Secondly, we do not agree with Iqbal that an ordinary ego i.e. every man will become perfect by struggle and effort. He, time and again, asks "to transmute thy hand full of dust or earth into gold, kiss the threshold of a perfect man"s and then make thee object of the text "Lo! I will appoint a vicegerent of God on earth". This means that for Iqbal every man can become perfect and eternal. The verse Iqbal has quoted from the Qur'an that "man is the vicegerent of God on earth" does not mean that there are certain people who are religiously better than the others, and that they are the only vicegerents of God on earth but the whole verse means that every man who has consciousness is a vicegerent, as distinct from other things in this spacious universe. The verse from the Qur'an runs as follows:

Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: I will create a vicegerent on earth. They (Angels) said wilt thou place therein who will make mischiefs therein and shed blood? Whilest we do celebrate thy praise and glory thy Holy name. He (God) said, I know what ye know not. And He taught Adam the nature of all things; then placed them before the angels, and said 'Tell Me the nature of these if ye are right. They said'. Glory to Thee, of knowledge we have none save what thou hast taught us, in truth it is Thou Who art perfect in knowledge and wisdom. He said, O Adam! tell them their natures. When he told them, Did I not tell you that I know the secrets of Allah said.

heavens and earths and I know what ye reveal and what ye conceal? 90

It is clear from this verse that every man is endowed with knowledge and that every man can go higher and higher in developing his intellectual powers. The more rational a man is. the stronger will be his ego. The evolution will make him go higher and higher in his rational thinking; in a sense, he will be more rational than the other human beings and hence more creative as is the case with Newton, Einstein, Russell and so on. They too are the vicegerents of God on earth. Now, some one will raise the question: 'what position we give to the mystics or sufis. These people are religiously and morally better people than others. They are the ones who are especially blessed and graced by God. We will give certain verses which will show that there are degrees of these people who are directly under the blessing of God. It follows that every man can become mystic or sufi; still we should not forget that according to Igbal these people are not perfect as we have the standard Muhammad before us. This means that no body can become perfect, that everybody will be below the degree of perfect manhood. The following verses are unmistakably clear on the point that Muhammad (peace be on him) and others of his class were the superiormost; it is impossible for anyone to be at that level. These verses are the following:

Their Apostles said to them: True, we are humans like yourselves, but Allah doth grant His grace to such of His errants as He pleases. It is not for us to bring you an authority except as Allah permits... Indeed He has guided to the ways we (follow).⁹²

And before thee (O Muhammad) also the Apostles we sent were but men, to whom We granted inspiration.

And before thee, also the Apostles we sent were but men, to whom We granted inspiration, or did We give them bodies that are no food, nor they were exempt from death. 92

The Finite Ego

And the Apostles whom We sent before thee were all (men) who are food and walked through streets. We have made some of you as a trial for others.

The above verses clearly show that these men were perfect who had unitary experience and a direct contact with God. It is clear that they had not reached the place of perfection due to their own struggle and effort, but because they were the chosen ones of God. The rest of mankind or, in the words of Iqbal, 'egos', are not perfect but are higher or lower in their degrees. The Qur'an asserts:

To all are degrees or (ranks) according to their deeds. For thy Lord is not unmindful of anything that ye do. 93

It is He (God) who hath made you (His) Agents, inheritors of the earth: He hath raised you in ranks, some above others: That he may try you in the gifts He hath given you.⁹⁴

We raise whom We will degree after degree; for thy Lord is full of wisdom and knowledge. 95

These verses illustrate that common egos or men can reach the mystic or sufistic experience and are therefore different in their degrees, still they cannot be perfect as we have seen in the philosophy of Iqbal. For Iqbal only Muhammad (p.b.u.h) is a Perfect Ego. About this Perfect Ego he says that when the ego escapes the universal destruction, then it will be considered as having reached the highest point of intensity. And the climax of this development is reached when the ego retains full self-possession even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego. The Qur'an says about the Prophet's vision of the Ultimate Ego:

"His eye turned not aside, nor did it wander".

Iqbal further says that this is the ideal of perfect manhood in Islam. Iqbal agrees with his spiritual leader Rumi that "Moses fainted away by a mere surface illumination of Reality: Thou (O Muhammad) seest the very substance of Reality with a smile". 96 Now if we examine this verse of Rumi, it will show

that for Iqbal even Moses was not perfect because Moses could not stand the face of Ultimate Reality. It was only Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) who reached the highest Ascension (Mi'raj) and met the Ultimate Reality—another proof for Iqbal that no body can reach that highest point, the Perfect Egohood.

The Finite Ego

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. The Reconstruction, p. 99.
- 2. Ibid, pp. 40-41.
- 3. Ibid, p. 99.
- 4. The Reconstruction, pp. 99-100.
- 5. Ibid, p. 100.
- 6. Ibid, p. 101.
- 7. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic system of Iqbal by Dr. Jamila Khatoon, pp. 126-127.
 - 8. A Treatise of Human Nature, Introduction, p. 90.
 - 9. The Reconstruction, p. 102.
 - 10. Ibid, p. 102.
 - 11. The Secrets of the Self, p. 6.
 - 12. Ibid, pp. 16-21.
 - 13. The Reconstruction, p. 103.
 - 14. Ibid, p. 54.
 - 15. Ibid. p. 54.
 - 16. Ibid, p. 55.
 - 17. Ibid, p. 53.
 - 18. The Secrets of the Self, pp. 23-27.
 - 19. The Reconstruction, pp. 38-39.
 - 20. Ibid, p. 55.
 - 21. The Qur'an, XXIII: 12-14.
 - 22. Ibid, XV: 26

- 23. Ibid, XV: 29-30.
- 24. The Qur'an, XVI: 4.
- 25. The Reconstruction, p. 104.
- 26. Ibid, p. 105.
- 27. Ibid, pp. 105-106.
- 28. Russell by A.J. Ayer.
- 29. The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal, p. 134.
 - 30. Ibid, pp. 134-135.
 - 31. The Reconstruction, pp. 5-6.
 - 32. Ibid, pp. 6-7.
 - 33. Ibid, p. 2.
 - 34. Ibid, p. 3.
 - 35. Ibid, pp. 47-48.
 - 36. Russell by A.J. Ayer, p. 131.
 - 37. The Secrets of the Self, pp. 72-84.
 - 38. The Reconstruction, p. 107.
 - 39. Ibid, p. 55.
 - 40. Ibid, p. 108.
 - 41. Ibid, p. 108.
- 42. The New Rose Garden of Mystery and the Book of Slaves, translated M. Hadi Hussain, pp. 29-30.
 - 43. Javid Nama, pp. 97-98.
 - 44. The Reconstruction, pp. 49-50.
 - 45. Ibid, p. 108.
 - 46. Ibid, p. 109.
 - 47. Qur'an, XXXIII:72-73.

The Finite Ego

- 48. Ibid, XII, 40.
- 49. Ibid, XXVI:3.
- 50. Ibid, LXXVIII:39.
- 51. Ibid, LXXIV:36-37.
- 52. Ibid, XVII:29.
- 53. Ibid, XVII:7.
- 54. Ibid. LXXIV:54.
- 55, Ibid, LXXVI:29-31.
- 56. The Central Question of Philosophy, A.J. Ayer, p. 231.
- 57. The Reconstruction, p. 112.
- 58. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia by M. Iqbal, pp. 108-114.
 - 59. Ibid, pp. 119 and 128-129.
 - 60. The Reconstruction, pp. 112-113.
 - 61, Ibid, p. 113.
 - 62. Ibid, p. 120.
 - 63. Ibid, p. 119; Al Qur'an, (XXV: 36-40).
 - 64. Ibid, p. 119.
 - 65. Ibid, p. 119.
 - 66. The Reconstruction, pp. 67-68.
 - 67. Al Qur'an, LVI: 60-62.
 - 68. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia by M. Iqbal, p. 32.
 - 69. Al-Qur'an, XVI:38-39.
 - 70. Ibid, XVIII:49-51.
 - 71. Ibid, XIS: 66-68.
 - 72. Ibid, XXII: 5.

- 73. Ibid, LXXXVI: 8.
- 74. The Reconstruction, pp. 121-122.
- 75. Ibid, p. 122.
- 76. Ibid, pp. 122-123.
- 77. Ibid, p. 123.
- 78. Ibid, pp. 71-72.
- 79. Ibid, p. 117.
- 80. Ibid, p. 118.
- 81. Javid Nama, pp. 11-12.
- 82. The Reconstruction, p. 126.
- 83, Ibid, p. 125.
- 84. Qur'an, XXXIII:40.
- 85. The Reconstruction, p. 123.
- 86. The New Rose Garden, p. 33.
- 87. The Reconstruction, p. 115.
- 88. The Secrets of the Self, p. 29.
- 89. Ibid, p. 37.
- 90. Qur'an, II: 30-33,
- 91. Ibid, XVI: 43.
- 92. Ibid, XXI: 7-8.
- 93. Ibid, VI: 132.
- 94. Ibid, VI: 165.
- 95. Ibid, VI: 83.
- 96. The Reconstruction, p. 118.
- 97. The Introduction to the Secrets of Self, p. 31.

CONCLUSION

Iqbal is in full agreement with the epistemology of the Qur'an. The three sources, sense-perception, intellect and intuition, are the fundamental ones, on which Iqbal bases his theory of knowledge.

We have seen in our work that an ego cannot be complete or perfect unless it does not reach its higher state— a state called by Iqbal religious or mystic experience. The basis of these states (sense-perception, intellect and religious or mystic experience) is an ego.

We conclude two things from our work:

Firstly, the ego has a unique state; and

Secondly, this unique state of ego changes.

In the first case, it cannot be divided into various states. All the three sources of knowledge are seemingly three but in fact they are one state. We cannot distinguish between these states. When the ego, for example, is at a certain stage, it is not aware of the earlier one, because the state itself goes higher not leaving anything behind. For Iqbal, all these three states are not three but one.

In the case of the second, this unique state of ego changes from one to another state. The ego is always changing and receiving new or fresh illuminations. The ego has stages and it moves onwards from one stage to another or, to put it differently, it (ego) purifies its one state and creates another one; the more purified is the state the greater will be its



TRANSLATION OF SELECTED POEMS

- A. Rampuri, Shafiq, Khitab ba Aqwam-i-Sharq (Urdu verse translation of Iqbal's poems. Lahore, 1929.
- B. Taseer, M.D., Musawat-i-Islamia, Nayrang-i-Khayal Salnamah (Lahore), 1930, Urdu verse translation of Iqbal's Hikaya-i-Sultan Murad Wa Mian Mir.
- C. Faridi, Mughith-uddin, *Ma`arif-i-lqbal* (Lahore), Urdu verse translation of some of Iqbal's poems, Alamgir, Silver Jubilee Number, 1950.
- D. Ashraf, Muhammad, The Devil's Conference, Gujrat, 1951.
- E. Sorely, H.T., Musa Pervagons, Aberdeen, 1955.
- F. Meiremaker, L. A. V. M. and Voten, Bert De Roep Van The Karavan, *Muhammad Iqbal*, *Dichterr van* Pakistan, The Hague, 1956.
- G. Bousani, A., Poesie di Muhammad Ighal, Parma, 1956.
- H. Mustafa, Qari Ghulam, Kalam-i-Iqbal Karachi Iqbal Academy (not dated), a Bengali translation of some of Iqbal's poems.
- I. Nuruddim, Amira, Genius of Iqbal, Baghdad (not dated)
 - J. Rahman, Mizanur, Bengali Translation of Shikwa, poem from (Bang-i-Dara), Puthir (not dated).
 - K. Kiernan, V.G., Poems from Iqbal, Bombay, 1947, translated from Urdu, Introduction by M.D. Taseer, Johon Murry, 1955.
 - Arberry, A.J. "Complaint and Answer" translated from Urdu Shikwa-wa-Jawab Shikwa, Lahore, 1955.
 - M. Tariq, A.R., Longer Poems of Iqbal, translated from Urdu Poems of Bang-i-Dara, Lahore, 1978.

N. Tariq, A.R., Rubaiyat of Iqbal, translated from Payam-i-Mashriq, Armughan-i-Hejaz, and Bal-i-Gibreel, Lahore, 1973.

- Beg, Abdullah Anwar, *Iqbal The Poet-Philosopher*, Pakistan Review, II, 2, 1954.
- Beg, Abdullah Anwar, *Iqhal and the New World*, Times of Karachi Special Supplement, April 21, 1954.
- Bilgrami, H.H., Glimpses of Iqbal's Mind, Lahore, 1954.
- Bilgrami, H.H., Iqbal's Concept of Democracy Based on Islamic Principles, Islamic Litrature, April, 1954.
- Bilgrami, H.H., Iqbal: His Approach to the Spirit of Islamic Cultur, Art and Letters, India and Pakistan, XXIII, I, 1949.
- Bilgrami, H.H., Iqbal's Mind and Thought, Lahore, 1954.
- Bilgrami, H.H., Iqbal's Theory of Knowledge and its Significance in His poetry, Islamic Literature, 111,5, 1951.
- Biruni, A.H., Al-, (S.M. Ikram), Makers of Pakistan and Modern Muslim India, Lahore, 1950.
- Brailvi, Ibadat, Jadid Sha'iri, Lahore, 1962.
- Brohi, A.K. Iqbal as a Philosopher Poet, Iqbal Review, April 1962.
- Chagla, A.G., Some Aspects of Iqbal's Thought, Trivini (Bangalore), XVIII, 2 June 1946, pp. 93-102.
- Chakravaty, Amiya, *Iqbal: Inida's Muslim Poet*, New York, 1938, pp. 559-62. Also in the Statesman, Magazine Section, 1939.
- Chakravaty, Amiya, Sir Muhammad Iqba, Voice of Islam (Singapore), January and February, 1939, pp. 19-23;
- Cragg, K., The Call of Minaret, New York, 1956.
- Dar, B.A., Iqbal and Post-Kantian Voluntarism, Lahore (not date).
- Bar, B.A., A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy, Lahore, 1944.
- Dinsawi, M. Bashir-ul-Haq, Tabarrukat-i-Iqbal, Patana, (not dated).

- Dinsawi, M. Bashir-ul-Haq, Islahat-i-Iqhal, Patana, (not dated).
- Dinsawi, M. Bashir-ul-Haq, Dr. Muhammad Iqhal and Ahmadiyya Movement, Review of Religions, XXXV, 1936.
- Edid, Halide, Inside India, Lahore, 1937.
- Enver, Ishrat Hussain, Ethics of Iqbal, Islamic Literature, September, 1956.
- Enver, Ishrat Hussain, Metaphysics of Iqbal, Ph. D. dissertation, Aligarh, Muslim University, 1944.
- Faizee, Atiya Begum, Iqbal, Bombay, Academy of Islam, 1947.
- Faizee, Atiya Begum, *lqbal as I Know Him*, Pakistan Times Special Supplement, April 21, 1950.
- Farman, Professor Muhammad, Iqbal aur Tasawwuf, Lahore, 1964.
- Faruqi, Muhammad Tahir, Sirat-i-Igbal, Lahore, 1939.
- Figar, Abdur Rahman, *Iqbal's Philosophy of Revolution*, Pakitan Quareterly, Karachi, IX, 1959. 4.
- Ghafar, Abdul, The Divine Comedy of Modern India: An Evaluation of Iqbal, Contemporary India, 11, 1936, pp. 255-260.
- Gibb, H.A.R., *Iqbal, Sir Muhammad* (1876-1938), in the Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-1940, London, 1949, pp. 266-273.
- Gibb, H. A.R. Modern Trends in Islam, Chicago, 1947.
- Hafeez Malik, *Iqbal's Conception of Ego*, The Muslim World (Hartford APril LX, 1970.
- Hafeez Malik, The Impact of Ecology on Iqbal's Thought, Iqbal Review (Karachi), October, 1969.
- Hafeez Malik, An Appreciation of guru Nanak in Iqbal's Poetry. Studies in Islam (Delhi), July 1969.



- Latif, Syed Abdul, *Iqbal and World Order*, Osmania Magazine (Hyderabad Deccan) XI, 1938.
- Latif, Syed Abdul, Islamic Cultural Studies, Lahore, 1952.
- Mc Carthy, E. Iqbal as a Poet and Philosopher, Iqbal Review October, 1961.
- Maruf, Muhammad, Contributions to Iqbal's Thought, Lahore 1977.
- Maruf, Muhammad, *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, Lahore, 1977.
- Menon, K.P.S. Message of Iqbal, Indian Review, 20, 1925, pp. 506-509.
- Merad, A., Muhammad Iqbal, IBLA (Tunis), XVIII, 1956.
- Marek, Jan, Life and Work of Muhammad Iqbal, (Czech) Ph. D. dissertation, Caroline University, Prague, 1958.
- Marek, Jan, The Date of Muhammad Iqbal's Birth, Archiv Orientalani, Prague, 26, 1958.
- Marek, Jan, Islamic Studies in Czechoslovakia, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, X, 4, 1962.
- Minowi, M. Iqbal-i-Lahori Sha'ir Farsiguyi Pakistan, Tehran, 1327 sh. Supplement to the Journal Yaghma.
- Mohan Singh Diwana, Handbook of Urdu Literature, Lahore, 1943.
- Moin, Muhammad, Mi'raj-i Iqbal, Iqbalnana (Tehran), 1330 sh.
- Moosvi, Z.H., *Iqbal and the Arab World*, Illustrated Weekly Pakistan, 4 April, 20, 1952.
- Nadwi, Abdul Islam, *Iqbal-i Kamil*, Azamgarh, Matba-i-Ma'arif, 1964.
- Nadwi, Sayyid Sulaiman, Sayr-i Afghanistan, Hyderabad Deccan, 1945.
- Nadwi, Sayyid Wahid Qaisar, *Iqbal Awr Bengali Adab*, Mah-i Nau, Karachi, April, 1952.

- Namus, Shuja, A. Discussion on Iqbal's Philosophy of life, Lahore, 1948.
- Niazi, Maulana Kausar, *Iqbal and the Third World*, Lahore, April, 1977.
- Niazi, Sayyid Nazir, Iqbal Ka Mutala`a, Lahore, 1941.
- Noman, Muhammad, Our Struggle, 1857-1947: A Pictorial Record, Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1954.
- Nur-ud-din, Abu Sayeed, *Islami Tasawwuf aur Iqbal*, Karachi, Iqbal Academy, 1959.
- O' Malley, I.S.S. (ed.), Modern India and the West, A study of the interaction of their civilizations, London, 1941.
- Parvez, Ghulam Ahmad, Ighal Aur Qur'an, Karachi, 1955.
- Qadir, Sir Abdul, *Modern Urdu Literature*, Hindustan Review, 71, Deccan, December, 1938.
- Qadir, Sir Abdul, *The Seer and the Mystic*, Pakistan Times Special Supplement, April 21, 1950.
- Qadir, Sir Abdul, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, The Great Poet of Islam, In I.F Rushbrook Williams, (ed.), Great Men of India, Bombay, 1939.
- Radhakrishnan, S. (ed.), History of Philosophy Eastern and Western, 2 vols. London, 1952. Iqbal, Vol. 1, pp. 541-545.
- Rafiq, Saeed Ahmad, Iqbal Ka Nazriya-i-Akblaq, Lahore, 1960.
- Rafiuddin, Muhamamd, *Iqbal's Concept of Evolution*, Iqbal Review, April, 1960.
- Rafiuddin, Muhammad, Iqbal's Idea of the Self, Iqbal, Labore 1, 1953.
- Rafiuddin, Muhammad, *The Philosophy of Iqbal*, Iqbal Review, October, 1961.
- Rahman, Muhammad Khalilur, *Iqbal and Nationalism*, Pakistan Review, 11, 4, 1954, pp. 27-30.

and the second of the second o

.

- Siddiqi, Abdul Latif, *Iqhal Aur Bedil*, Intekhab-i-Mah-i Nau., Karachi, 1958.
- Siddiqi, H. Iqbal's Legal Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Islamic Law, Progressive Islam, Amsterdam, 1955, pp. 3-4.
- Siddiqi, M. Raziuddin, *Iqbal's Conception of Time and Space*, Hyderabad Deccan, Hyderabad Academy, Special Number, 6, 1944, Article 7.
- Siddiqi M. H., Iqbal A Critical Study Farhan, Lahore, September 1977.
- Siddiqi, Mazharuddin, The Image of the West in Ighal, Lahore, 1956.
- Singh, Iqbal, The Ardent Pilgrim, London, 1951.
- Sina, Sacchidanand, Iqbal, His Poetry and Message, Allahabad, 1947.
- Taj-ud-Din, Pir, *Iqbal's political Career*, Pakistan Times Supplement, April 21, 1951.
- Taseer, Muhammad Din, *Iqbal and Modern Problems*, Pakistan Times Supplement, April 21, 1952.
- Taseer, Muhammad Din, *Iqbal's Conception of Perfect Man*, Pakistan Calling, IV, 8 April 1951, pp. 7-8.
- Tascer, Muhammad Din, *Iqbal's Theory of Art and Literature*, Pakistan Quarterly, karachi, 1952.
- Taseer, Muhammad Din, Iqbal, The Universal Poet, Pakistan Quarterly, Karachi, V, 1955.
- Vahid, S.A., Introduction to Iqbal, 1954, Lahore.
- Vahid, S.A. *Iqbal His Art and Thought*, Hyderabad Deccan, 1944, London, 1959.
- Vahid, S.A., Ighal an Estimate of His Work, Islamic Review, XXXIX, 3-4, 1951, pp. 21-23.

- Vahid, S.A., Iqbal and His Poetry, Islamic Review, XLII, 4, 1954.
- Vahid, S.A., Thought and reflections of Iqbal, Lahore, 1964.
- Vahid, S.A., *Iqbal's Payam-i-Mashriq*, Dawn, Magazine Section, September 2, 1951, p. 12.
- Vahid, S.A., Studies in Iqbal, Ashraf, Lahore Second ed. June, 1976.
- Vahid, S.A., Glimpses of Iqbal, Karachi, 1974.
- Vaswari, K.N., *Iqbal An Appreciation*, Triveni, Bangalore, New Series XI, 11 May 1939, pp. 18-23.
- Vekata, Rao., P.K., *The Secrets of the Self*, A Study of Iqbal's Poem *Asrar-i-Khudi*, Triveni, Banagalore, XIV, 4, 1942, pp. 246-249.
- Waheed, K.A., Pakistan, The Realization of Iqual's Dream, Pakistan Calling, VI, 8, 1952, pp. 9-10.
- Wali, Mustazid al-Rahman, *Iqbal's Doctrine of Destiny*, Islamic Culture. Hyderabad Deccan, 1939.
- Whitemore, R., *Iqbal's Pantheism*, Review of Metaphysics, September, 1956.
- Williams, L.F.R., (ed.) Great Men of India, Bombay: Times of India, 1941.
- Yusuf Ali, Abdullah, Doctrine of Human Personality in Iqbal's Poetry, 1941.
- Zarif, Qazi Muhammad, Iqbal Qur'an Ki Roshni Mein, Lahore, (not dated).
- Zia-ud-Din, M., Iqbal the Poet Philosopher of Islam, Vishvabharati Quarterly, New Series IV, May-July, 1958, 1.
- Zor, Sayyid Muhyiddin, Shad-i Iqbal, Hyderabad Deccan, 1941.

GENERAL WORKS

- Abdullah Yusuf Ali, The Holy Quran, Text, translation and Commentary, Lahore, first published 1838.
- Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Maulana, Holy Qur'an with English Translation and Commentary, Taj Co. Ltd. March, 1971, Vols, 1, 11.
- Ameer Ali, Syed, The Spirit of Islam, Karachi, 1969.
- Ansari, Fazl al-Rahman, The Quranic Foundations and Structure of Muslim Society. Vols. 1, 11, Karachi, 1977.
- Ayer, A.J., The Central Questions of Philosophy, Penguin Books Ltd, England, 1973.
- Bergson, H., The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, translation, R. Ashley Andra and C. Burton, London, 1935.
- Bergson, H., Creative Evolution, translation Mitchell, New York, Modern Library.
- Bernstein Jermey, Einstein, Tontana/Collins, 1973-1980.
- Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, London, 1962.
- Copeleston, F., A History of Philosophy, vol. 5, Modern Philosophy, The British Philosophers Part 11, Berkley to Hume. Garden City, New York, 1964.
- Flew, Anthony (ed.), A Dictionary of Philosophy, Pan Books, 1979.
- Al-Ghazali, *Tahafatal-Falasifa*, translation, Kamali, S.A., Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963.
- Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, (ed.), Maccabb, D.G.C. Fontana/Collins, first Published, 1739.
- Macquarri, John, Existentalism, London, 1972.
- Russell, B., Mysticism and Logic, London, 1951.

- Russell, B., Religion and Science, London, 1935.
- Russell, B., Why I am not A Christian, London, 1957.
- Russell, B., A History of Western Philosophy, New York, 1964.
- Sharif, M.M., A History of Muslim Philosophy, Vols, 1 and II. Wiesbaden, Otto-Harrassowitz, 1963.
- Spencer, S., Mysticism in World Religions, Penguin Book, 1963.
- Temple, W., Nature, Man and God, Gifford Lectures, 134.
- Thilly, Frank, and Wood, Ledger, A History of Philosophy, Allahabad, 1958.
- Underhill, E., Mysticism, London, (not dated).
- Watt, B.W.M., *Muslim Intellectuals*, A study of al-Ghazali, 1963.
- Watt, B.W.M., Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali, Lahore, (not dated).
- Woozley A.D., Theory of Knowledge, London, 1963.



