

DEPARTMENT OF IQBAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB LAHORE



Compiled by PROF. MOHAMMAD MUNAWWAR



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Vol. I

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1982

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
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The tear-drops falling from the Muslim's eyes create the effect of April showers, and will produce pearls in the depths of the ocean of Abraham's creed — submission and Islam.

The book of the glorious nation and faith is being renewed and bound again; this branch of the tree of Banu Hashim is about to blossom into bud and leaf again.

More difficult than running the affairs of the world is to see what lies at the root of events: it is only after knowing great suffering and pain that the heart's eye opens to deeper insight.

En lines

CONTENTS

	•					Page
	Preface	."			. *	xi
1.	Prophetic Faith in Iqbal, Bu Sheila McDonough	uber and	d Tillich	ı 		. 1
2.	The Medieval Religiosity of the Modern Religion of Iqu		and			
	Alessandro Bausani	• • •	•••	•••	• • •	17
3.	Iqbal and Malek Bennabi					٠,
	Asma Rashid			• • •	• • •	33
4.	A Comparative Study of Iq A. Shakur Ahsan	bal & Sa	anai 		•••	67
5.	Iqbal and Bhartarihari S. Samad Husayn Rizvi		• • •		• • • .	81
6.	Iqbal a Modern Interpreter M. Saeed Sheikh	of Islan	1	• • •	• • •	95.
7.	Iqbal and The Third World W. S. Karunaratne	•••	• • • •	• • •	•••	107
8.	Iblis in Iqbal's Poetry Annemarie Schimmel	• • •	•	• • •	• • •	119
9.	Reflection on Iqbal's Mosq Barbara D. Metcalf	ue 		•••	•••	123
10.	The Poet's Mission The Mainspring of Iqbal's li M. Hadi Husayn	fework				131
11.	Iqbal Seeing Our Time & Sp Carl E. Svenning	peaking	Today	•••	•••	153

12.	Parveen Shaukat Ali				• • •	163
13.	Iqbal: His Art and Thoug Jagan Nath Azad	ht 				173
14.	Iqbal as Member of the Pu Abdul Hamid	ınjab Le	egislative 	Counc	il	179
15.	Iqbal's Linguistic Situation Jussi Aro	n 	• • •		• • •	187
16.	Indian Critics of Iqbal A. Qayyum		•••	•••		197
17.	Therapeutic Aspects of Iq Nazir Qaiser	bal's Th	ought			217
18.	Is Iqbal a Pantheist B.A. Dar.		•••		• • •	
19.	Iqbal and the Notion of M C.A. Qadir	leditatio	on 	• • •	• • •	241
20.	Iqbal's Preface to the Lect Q.M. Aslam	tures	• • •			255
21.	Iqbal on Observation of N Abdul Khaliq	ature ar	nd God-l	cnowle	dge	261
22.	The Importance of Scienti Iqbal's Philosophical Thou M. Raziuddin Siddiqi		wledge i	n 	·	269
23.	Metaphysical Implications Mohammad Maruf	of Iqba	ıl's Epista	amic V	iews 	281
24.	Iqbal and Tassawwaf Javaid Iqbal	•••	•••	•••	: 1 •••	293
25.	Iqbal and Reason Agha Iftikhar Hussain	• • •		• • •	• • •	305
	APPENDICES					325
	INDEX				4	343

PREFACE

Allama Muhammad Iqbal is one of the most distinguished alumni of the University of the Punjab. In fact, if one reviews the contribution made by the alumni of the University of the Punjab in the fields of literature, culture, religion and philosophy, one can say without fear of contradiction that Allama Muhammad Iqbal's contribution surpasses that of all the other alumni in these areas made during the last one hundred years. The University has always felt and acknowledged its indebtedness to Iqbal for re-shaping the contours of collective life of the Muslims in South Asia. Iqbal made, as we all know, great contribution to the Islamic resurgence in the twentieth century.

No homage can be too great for the alumnus who symbolizes the aspirations and the struggle of his people. As a tribute to the services which the poet-philosopher of Pakistan rendered to humanity in general, and to the world of Islam in particular, the University instituted Iqbal Memorial Lectures and also created 'Iqbal Chair' in the Department of Philosophy in 1965.

The International Congress on Allama Muhammad Iqbal, was organized by the Punjab University as part of the centenary celebrations to pay homage to one of the most illustrious sons of the soil. The Congress was held at Lahore from December 2 to 8, 1977, in which 192 Iqbal scholars participated, 63 from 29 foreign countries and the rest from Pakistan. Besides highlighting various aspects of the life and works of Iqbal, quite a large number of delegates contributed papers on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Aesthetics, Linguistics etc. from the viewpoint of Iqbal, bringing out their impact on the present-day world situation. The papers emphasized the relevance of Iqbal's thought to the modern situation and stressed its diagnostic and prescriptive value for the ills and problems of ailing humanity.

The Congress constituted a world forum for Igbal scholars to exchange views on various aspects of his poetry and philosophy. It further afforded an opportunity to the delegates to join the people of Pakistan in paying a befitting homage to the great sagephilosopher of Pakistan. Idbal has been a Socrates to his people in that he played, Socrates-like, a great role in awakening the collective conscience of his people by making them aware of their socio-political predicament and activating their potentialities to re-discover their identity and re-dedicate themselves to the creation of an era of hope, prosperity and freedom. Socrates accosted his compatriots with pricking questions at the marketplace to help them find a sound basis for morality. Iabal appears to me to be standing at the crossroads of cultural configurations holding out a multi-facet mirror to his people showing their glorious past, their present decadence and, through another facet of the mirror, the great future yawning at their feet, which they could realise, provided they shook off their attitude of indifference to their political environment and came out of their intellectual stupor.

Iqbal was also a 'warner' who made a clarion call to the down-trodden masses of the world to re-discover the infinite sources of their creative power and develop faith in themselves. He has thus a message, not simply for his countrymen, nor for Millat-e-Islamia alone, but for the whole of humanity. As time passes, the Universality of Iqbal's message will find deeper roots in the hearts of men and women all over the world.

The papers contributed constitute, I am sure, a valuable addition to Iqbal Studies, and will guide students and research workers for decades to come. The papers were contributed in English, Urdu, Persian and Arabic. The present volume is a selection of papers contributed in English. The selection was made by a committee consisting of Professor B.H. Siddiqui, Professor Dr. Waheed Qureshi and Professor Muhammad Munawwar. For a number of reasons, it has taken the University a long time to bring out the first volume of the papers—almost on the eve of the quinquennial Iqbal Congress—a Congress which will be held after every five years to provide a forum for Iqbal scholars to compare and exchange notes on the new meanings and perspectives in the works of the Poets of the East.

I would like to record here my appreciation of the great efforts put in by my colleagues who organized the Congress and

made it a success. In this regard, I am particularly in debt to Professor Dr. Rafiq Ahmad, then Pro-Vice-Chancellor of this University (now Vice-Chancellor of Islamia University Bahawalpur) and Professor Khwaja Ghulam Sadiq, Chairman, Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education, Lahore, for their untiring and willing support, without which the Congress could not have become a real success.

I am also thankful to Mr. Saleem Ismail of the al-Kitab Publishers Lahore, who took more than a professional's interest in publishing this volume.

(DR. KHAIRAT MUHAMMAD IBNE RASA)

xiv

 XX_{i}^{2}

PROPHETIC FAITH IN IQBAL, BUBER AND TILLICH

"How shall I call you now a flowerTell me, oh withered rose!

How can you be that beloved for whom
The nightingale's heart glows?

The winds' soft ripples cradled you
And rocked your bygone hours,

And your name once was Laughing Rose
In the country of flowers;

With the dawn breezes that received
Your favours you once played,

Like a perfumer's vase your breath
Sweetened the garden glade.

These eyes are full, and drops like dew Fall thick on you again;
This desolate heart finds dimly its Own image in your pain,
A record drawn in miniature
Of all its sorry gleaning:
My life was all a life of dreams,
And you — you are its meaning.
I tell my stories as the reed
Plucked from its native wild
Murmurs; oh Rose, listen! I tell
The grief of hearts exiled."

Muhammad Iqbal

"For despair... is the highest of God's messengers; it trains us into spirits that can create and decide...."

Martin Buber

"It belongs to life's ambiguity that both qualities, the holy and the profane, are always present in its structures....."³

Paul Tillich

This opening poem from *Bang-i-Dara* indicates the starting point of Iqbal's thought. The Muslims of his generation are alienated, as he sees it, from a proper understanding of their own potentialities. They are exiled even from a knowledge of what they might be and do in history.

There are many ways in which and levels at which this symbol of exile could be interpreted. There can be significance in all the interpretations, since a profound symbol of this kind derives its strength from its capacity to mean many different things. Here we will consider this symbol in the context of twentieth century religious thought. We will compare Iqbal's religious affirmations to those that one finds in two other major religious thinkers of our age — the Jewish philsopher Martin Buber, and the Protestant Christian theologian Paul Tillich.

These three men were roughly contemporaries, although Iqbal died in 1938 and the other two lived until after the second World War. All the three, however, started to write before 1914. Thus their sense of alienation is partly shaped by the fact that their original hopes and expectations of life were formed before the realities of the new potentialities for destructive violence became generally known in this century.

Of the three, Iqbal is the one who most obviously is both poet and philosopher. Yet Buber's prose, especially in some of his most powerful writing, as in *Daniel* and *I and Thou* is often very close to poetry. He is like Iqbal in his capacity to stimulate religious awareness through the use of significant images. Tillich was not able to write poetry. In relation to the creative arts, he was more interested in painting as a means of revealing unexplored depths of meaning. He wrote that Picasso's Guernica was the most significant statement made about twentieth century reality. The bombing of the defenseless village of Guernica during the Spanish civil war unveiled the awareness of the terrible possibilities of destructiveness implicit in the new weapons and the brutality of the men who used them. Tillich insisted that it was the artists who could best communicate awareness of awesome realities of this

nature.

Iqbal and Tillich had similar views of the necessity of reason and the powers of artistic creativity to function in an organically whole manner when truths, and especially significant religious truths were to be uttered. In Tillich's words:

"Spirit as a dimension of life includes more than reason—it includes eros, passion, imagination—but without logos—structure it could not express anything. Reason in the sense of technical reason or of reasoning is one of the potentialities of man's spirit in the cognitive sphere. It is the tool for the scientific and technical control of reality. Life drives toward the new. It cannot do this without centredness, but it does it by transcending every individual centre. Life by its very nature as life, is both in itself and above itself, and this situation is manifest in the function of self-transcendence. For the way in which this elevation of life beyond itself becomes apparent, I suggest using the phrase 'driving toward the sublime'. The words 'sublime', 'sublimation', 'sublimity' point to a 'going beyond the limits towards the great, the solemn, the 'high'. 4

Thus although Tillich was not himself a poet, his understanding of the necessity for religious persons to speak from the depths of their understanding, and to search for new ways of speaking was very like Iqbal's and Buber's views of the relationship between reason and the capacity for intuitive or creative insight. Iqbal wrote:

"To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation. In fact all creative activity is free activity. Creation is opposed to repetition which is a characterization of mechanical action".⁵

Tillich further argues that the creative mind necessarily expresses itself in symbols.

"The creative man, in all realms of life, is like a child who dares to inquire beyond the limits of conventional answers. He discovers the fragmentary character of all these answers, a character darkly and subconsciously felt by all men... The misery of man lies in the fragmentary character of his life and knowledge; the greatness of man lies in his ability to know that his being is fragementary and enigmatic."

On the same issue, Iqbal says:

"And if my true nature eludes your analysis, Your claim to omniscience need fear no paralysis; For me also my nature remains still unravelled, The sea of my thoughts is too deep and untravelled....

To Iqbal of Iqbal little knowledge is given; I say this not jesting — not jesting by Heaven."⁷

In this comment made in response to an orthodox Muslim's attempt to understand how Iqbal could be fitted into the traditional moulds of medieval Islam, Iqbal's insistence on the fragmentary and obscure nature of his insights reveals a cast of mind very like Tillich's. Buber also has insisted that his insights resist systemization and codification. He wrote:

"I myself have no doctrine. My function is to point out realities of this order. He who expects from me a teaching other than the pointing out of this character, will always be disillusioned. And it would seem to me, indeed, that in this hour of history the crucial thing is not to possess a fixed doctrine, but rather to recognize eternal reality and out of its depth to be able to face the reality of the present. One's purpose must be to help men of today to stand fast, with their soul in readiness, until the dawn breaks and a path becomes visible where none suspected it".8

The similarities in thought that I discern in these three thinkers is indicated here. None of them wishes to offer a final doctrine. Each of them begins with a recognition that twentieth century humans are alienated. Each says that the traditional ways of expression of his own religion are inadequate, because the real problems of the contemporary world demand new insights. Each claims that reason alone cannot offer the help that is required. Therefore each insists that those who would offer religious guidance must search the depths of their own selves, face honestly all that they know to be true, and seek to point, in Buber's phrase, to the elements of truth that seem meaningful.

Buber published this book in 1945. Hence the honour of history in his case was the fearsome anguish of the German Jews of his generation. As a religious thinker, he is trying to point the way to some kind of significant meaning for the Jews at the darkest moment of their history. Tillich as a German Protestant pastor had a different kind of historical dilemma to deal win. He

began his career as a pastor in the midst of German troops who were losing their faith in God's Divine Providence because the Germans were losing the war. Subsequently, he was amongst those in the twenties who tried to create a workable and just democracy in Germany. He was one of the first Professors to be driven out of Germany by the Nazis. For him and for Buber the grief of exile was poignantly real. In Tillich's thought, idolatry and false religion continued to be dominant themes. He saw the disastrous madness of his own people as linked with their idolatry, and their folly in worshipping the nation instead of the God of justice and final truth. This madness was linked with their inability to retain their faith in a good God after they had themselves endured defeat.

The three have in common an awareness of God's desertion of his people, a theme most eloquently expressed in Iqbal's *Shikwa*. In Iqbal's case, the anguish results from the degraded condition of the Muslims of his generation, subjected to foreign domination, and too fatalistic and other-worldly to take effective action. They complain to God that their pious prayers are not being answered in the way that they want.

In the quotation from Buber above, we noted that he said that believers must both face the reality of the present, and the eternal reality. In Iqbal's case, the two poems Shikwa and Jawab-i-Shikwa indicate a similar way of understanding life. These three men are trying to hold together two different poles of awareness. One pole is the real human situation; believers must see it with stark realism, and not delude themselves or ignore its truth. And the other pole is the divine reality. The human perspective and the divine perspective must not be confused. Thus the Jawab-i Shikwa always reveals a different perspective than that of the Shikwa.

The capacity to write both the human complaint and the divine answer in a credible and potent way demands an extraordinary type of religious consciousness. It requires a person able to free himself from all false hopes about his own situation, so that he can see its problems with stark realism. Yet he must also be able to free his awareness from his own personal involvement so that he can see the situation as it looks to God. It is not surprising that few are able to achieve these heights of awareness. But it is my argument that the great and decisive influence that these

three men have had on the religious thought of this century is linked to the ability that each of them had to see these poles clearly and to articulate what they saw with compelling passion and strength.

I would call the capacity to write both a *Shikwa* and a *Jawab-i-Shikwa* prophetic faith. This notion is held by all three, writers.

Iqbal says:

Round, round the shrine's lamp flutters. Credulity Spins webs to make men think their religiousness Pure, unmixed with heaten delusion:

Magic and myth are the tales alike to
Brahmin and Mullah! Grant to his country, oh
God, such a guide as hides under beggar's rags
Prophet's high thoughts!

Iqbal is not saying that another Prophet should come; but he is saying that believers, if they are to deal realistically and effectively with the real problems of life, must think in the way Prophets think—they must have prophetic faith.

Tillich's book *The Shaking of the Foundations* is the one in which he argues that believers in the present should have prophetic minds. He begins by quoting the Prophet *Isaiah*.

"The foundations of the earth do shake.

Earth breaks to pieces,

Earth is split in pieces,

Earth shakes to pieces,

Earth reels like a drunken man,

Earth rocks like a hammock;

Under the weight of its transgression earth falls down

To rise no more!

Lift up your eyes to heaven and look upon the earth beneath:

For the heavens shall vanish away like smoke.

And the earth shall grow old like a robe;

The world itself shall crumble.

But my righteousness shall be forever.

And my salvation knows no end".

Isaiah 24: 18-20

In commenting on these verses, Tillich writes:

"Earth is split in pieces', is not merely a poetic metaphor for us, but a hard reality. That is the religious meaning of the age into which we have entered.......

Man's claim to be like God has been rejected once more; not one foundation of the life of our civilization has remained unshaken. As we read some of the passages from the prophets, we might easily imagine that we are reading the reports of eye-witness from Warsaw or Hiroshima or Berlin. Isaiah says: 'Behold, the Lord maketh the earth empty and maketh it waste, and turneth it upside down and scattereth its inhabitants. . . . Towns fall to pieces; each man bolts his door; gladness has gone from the earth and pleasure is no more. The cities are left desolate; their gates are battered down; and few are left . . . For earth has been polluted by the dwellers on its face. . . breaking the Eternal Covenant.' "10

Thus having a prophetic mind means for Tillich the ability to write what I am calling a Jawab-i Shikwa. When the people cry that they have been good and pious people and that their God has wrongly deserted them, the answer from the Divine perspective is that God's righteousness endures, but the people have been idolaters. When God is clearly seen, Divine Judgement is also seen.

Buber's book *The Prophetic Faith* describes the developing awareness throughout the Hebrew Bible of new aspects of prophetic awareness. It is, he argues, always characteristic of prophetic faith that:

"To be a *nabi* means to set the audience, to whom the words are addressed, before the choice and decision, directly or indirectly. The future is not something already fixed in this present hour, it is dependent upon the real decision, that is to say the decision in which man takes part in this hour. When a *nabi* announces deliverance as something about to come, he presupposes... 'returning', that is to say a positive and complete decision of the community, whether in this generation or in one of the generations to come". 11

Buber insists that prophetic awareness necessarily carries with it recognition of the otherness of God. Like Tillich, Buber sees the vision of the Prophet Isaiah as a compelling image of the divine/human encounter. Isaiah's vision stresses the awesome

separation of God and man.

At the time of the vision Isaiah is apparently in the hall of the temple, looking in the depths of sanctuary right into the darkness of the Holy of Holies, where the ark, YHVH's throne, stands. At this moment the darkness becomes light, the confined space extends without limit, the roof is lifted, in place of the ark a throne is raised up to heaven, so great that the skirts of the clothing of Him that sits upon it fill the temple. Isaiah says: 'I saw the Lord'....

The moment when the door posts move at the cry of the seraphim and their burning breath mingles with the smoke rising from the altar of incense, Isaiah cries, 'Woe is me, for I am undone, for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips, for mine eyes have seen the King, YHVH of hosts'.¹²

Buber and Tillich both consider this vision of great importance as an indication of what a prophetic attitude to an historical situation should be. The people should never confuse their righteousness, with that of God. On the contrary, for anyone with a real sense of God's justice and mercy, the uncleanness of human institutions and behaviour will be self-evident. Yet, although Isaiah's vision is one of the strongest condemnations of human possibilities, in the sense of the emphasis on the uncleaness of the people, Buber thinks that the honesty of this attitude can itself be a first step towards the purifying of the people. He wirtes:

"It is true that Isaiah's words at this period, his first sayings... point much more to the judgement than to the possibility of escape. But their influence upon open hearts cannot possibly be 'fattening'; behind every prediction of disaster there stands a concealed alternative." ¹³

Thus the Jawab-i Shikwa according to each of our three prophetic minds begins with the insistence that the people must acknowledge their unclean lips and rid themselves of idolatry—they must not confuse their institutions with God's purposes.

In his reconstruction lectures, Iqbal has argued that the religious experience of Muhammad is intended to have created a living-world force. In Iqbal's words:

The desire to see his religious experience transformed into a

living world-force is supreme in the Prophet. Thus his return amounts to a kind of pragmatic test of the value of his religious experience. In its creative act the Prophet's will judges both itself and the world of concrete fact in which it endeavours to objectify itself. In penetrating the impervious material before him the Prophet discovers himself for himself, and unveils himself to the eye of history....

In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. . .

According to the Qur'an there are two other sources of knowledge—Nature and History; and it is in tapping these sources of knowledge that the spirit of Islam is seen at its best. . .And the Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs and not to pass by them 'as if he is deaf and blind' for he 'who does not see these signs in this life will remain blind to the realities of the life to come'. . .

It is one of the most essential teachings of the Qur'an that nations are collectively judged, and suffer for their misdeeds here and now. In order to establish this proposition the Qur'an constantly cites historical instances, and urges upon the reader to reflect on the past and present experience of mankind.

"Of old did We send Moses with Our signs; and said to him Bring forth thy people from the darkness into the light, and remind them of the days of God'. Verily, in this are signs for every patient, grateful person." (14:5)...

It is therefore a gross error to think that the Qur'an has no germs of a historical doctrine. The truth is that the whole spirit of the Prolegomena of Ibn-i-Khaldun appears to have been mainly due to the inspiration which the author must have received from the Qur'an. Thus a false reverence for past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no remedy for a people's decay. The only effective power, therefore, that counteracts the forces of decay in a people is the rearing of self-concentrated individuals. . .

Religion, which is essentially a mode of actual living, is the only serious way of handling Reality. . .Conduct, which involves a decision of the ultimate fate of the agent cannot be based on illusions. . .a wrong deed degrades the whole man, and may eventually demolish the structure of the human ego. 14

It is not our intention to ignore the very real differences that

exist in the understanding of prophetic experience in the Jewish. Christian and Muslim traditions. But for the purposes of our discussion here, we want to stress some of the common threads that underlie the efforts of our three thinkers in their attempts to view the dangers and the potentialities of the twentieth century from the perspective of prophetic faith. One of these threads as indicated in the above quotation from Iqbal is how to think about what is happening in history. Iqbal has not elaborated as fully as we might have wished his insistence that the Prolegomena of Ibn-Khaldun reflects a Qur'anic perspective. But we take him to mean that the frankness with which Ibn-i-Khaldun discussed roots of decay in all societies as well as in nominally Islamic ones is one reason for the attractiveness Iqbal finds in the writings of the great Muslim philosopher of history.

The prophetic mind is to look at signs in history, and to make real decisions. The future is open, but wrong deeds can lead to destructiveness. The emphasis in all the three writers is on the necessity of avoiding illusions, and rejecting false religions. Tillich has written at length on the various forms of illusion that are dangerous in our century. At the core of most of these illusions is a wrong exaltation of human institutions, such as the nation. In Tillich's words:

"The most irrevocable expression of the separation of life from life today is the attitude of social groups within nations towards each other, and the attitude of nations themselves towards other nations. The walls of distance in time and space have been removed by technical progress; but the walls of estrangement between heart and heart have been incredibly strengthened." ¹⁵

Tillich developed his point by insisting that self-contempt is one of the roots of destructiveness. Such self-contempt can result from the fragility of the self that is rooted in illusion rather than in a secure knowledge that the ultimate source of life and righteousness is other than man. Thus much of the chaos in history can be attributed to the false self-righteousness of those who, like the complainers of Iqbal's *Shikwa* think that everything should be done for them. Instead they should realize that they are required to mature religiously until they understand that God's righteousness is not to be equated with finite societies and institutions.

In one of his last great poems, Iqbal deals again with the Jawab-i-Shikwa from another angle. This time he writes about modern history from the point of view of the Devil and his counsellors. In a sense, it is a vision of the world seen as veiled from the presence of God because of the preponderance of demonic forces. This is very like Buber and Tillich's view of our age as a time dominated by idolatries. Iqbal characterized as follows many of the demonic forces at work in the early thirties when this poem was written.

Western capitalism is a satanic force.

"(Satan" it was

Who drew in Europe's brain the fantasy of empire".)

The eastern countries are enslaved by their condition of subservience to the western powers.

"Firm, beyond doubt, is the sovereignty of Hell, Through it the nations have grown rotten-ripe In slavishness".

Communism first looked as though it might have true prophetic fire. The communists at least resisted exploitation by the capitalist powers.

"That rebel Jew,
That spirit of Mazdak come again! Not long,
And every mantle will be rent to shreds
And tatters by his fury. The desert crow
Begins to plume itself among the hawks
And eagles: dizzily the face of the world
Goes altering! What we blindly thought a handful
Of blind dust has blown whistling over the vast
Of the skies, and we see trembling, so deep sticks
The terror of to-morrow's revolution."

The Italian Fascists are attempting a reival of spirit and activism.

"In the halls
Of mighty Rome behold the antidote.
We have revealed once more the dream of Caesar
To Caesar's offspring".

But Satan, as Iqbal conceives him, sees no danger that any of these movements will remove the veils between God and humanity. On the contrary all these movements are tools of Satan in as much as

they are false religions which obscure true religion. Truth is obscured when the full maturation of the self is not required. These movements do not demand that persons discover their finite condition in relation to the transcendent righteousness of God. Satan, as the poem has it, fears only prophetic faith.

"Yet none the less
The importunities of the hour conceal
One peril, that somewhere the Prophet's faded path
Be rediscovered. A hundred times beware,
Beware, that Prophet's ordinance. . . .
That forges men and tries them,
That bears a death-warrant to every shape of servitude." 16

'Every shape of servitude' can be read to mean 'every form of ideology'. There is implicit in Iqbal's thought a theology of culture similar to that which is implicit in Buber, and which has been made explicit in many of Tillich's writings. All three are anti-ideological thinkers, because they insist that a proper grasp of both poles of the *Shikwa* and the *Jawab-i Shikwa* requires believers to retain an awareness of the fragmentary nature of their attempts to create just and good human institutions. In this poem, Iqbal, though himself profoundly democratic in his ultimate values, argues that western forms of democracy in the thirties were demonic, as were fascism and communism. On the democracies, one of Satan's counsellors says:

"But my scrutiny of the world
Assures me of no danger in what is only
A fig-leaf hung to hide the lust of empire.
Was it not we, when men began to observe
And to reflect, who dressed autocracy
In democratic costume? The true power
And purpose of dominion lie elsewhere,
And do not stand or fall by the existence
Of Prince or Sultan. Whether parliaments
Of nations meet, or Majesty holds court,
Whoever casts his eye on another's field
Is tyrant born. Have you not seen in the West
Those Demos-governments with rosy faces
And all within blacker than Ghangiz' soul". 17

Ideology of any kind is demonic when the fig-leaf is used to hide the lust. In other words, human being create their cultures,

and they also tend to create many fig leaves to obscure the reality of the injustice and imperfection of the cultures they have created. The Jawab-i Shikwa, the answer from the perspective of God's righteousness, always as it were rips off the fig leaf and shows the lust and tyranny for what it is. The first necessity for prophetic faith is that the believers should learn to be honest and realistic about their own situation. They should refuse the mystification of ideological language that tries to blind them to the facts of injustice and exploitation.

We began with the comment from Tillich that it belongs to life's ambiguity that both qualities, the holy and the profane, are always present in its structures. Applied to a theology of culture from the perspective of prophetic faith, this means retaining awareness of the necessity continually to strive to create better and more just political social and economic institutions, while at the same time never confusing the actual creations of human beings with the Absolute Goodness and Justice of God. Tillich argues that prophetic freedom for essential self-criticism of God. Tillich argues that prophetic freedom for essential self-criticism is always necessary. Ideology is demonic when it is self-satisfied, or idolatrous, that is when the nation, or the economic order, or the democratic order has lost the awareness that, from the point of view of the absolute, these actual human creations are imperfect. More just and more humane orders are likely to be created only when humans have learned to be continuously ready to criticize what has so far been accomplished, and to try to make it better. But this is often painful. To remove the fig leaf and to see the lust can hit at the core of a community's satisfaction with itself. Prophetic minds are therefore usually unpopular.

Tillich argues that the relationship between Divine will and human history should not be conceived as the working out of an automatic Divine Plan. We are not puppets.

"Providence must not be understood in a deterministic way, in the sense of a divine design decreed before the creation of the world," which is now running its course and in which God sometimes interferes miraculously. Instead of such supranatural mechanism we applied the basic ontological polarity of freedom and destiny in the relation of God and the world and asserted that God's directing creativity works through

the spontaneity of creatures and human freedom."18

Like Iqbal, Tillich sees demonic forces on the rampage in actual history.

"The immensity of moral and physical evil and the overwhelming manifestation of the demonic and its tragic consequence in history have always been an existential as well as a theoretical argument against the acceptance of any belief in historical providence . . . A concept of providence which takes evil into account radically excludes. teleological optimism. and the progressivism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. First of all, no future justice and happiness can annihilate the injustice and suffering of the past. The assumed well-being of a 'last generation' does not justify the evil and tragedy of all previous generations. And second, the progressivistutopian assumption contradicts the elements of 'freedom for good and evil' with which every individual is born. Where the power for good increases, the power for evil increases also. Historical providence includes all this and is creative through it toward the new, both in history and above history. This concept of historical providence also includes the rejections of reactionary and cynical pessimism. It provides the certainty that the negative in history... can never prevail against the temporary and historical aims of the historical process. . . The demonic forces are not destroyed, but they cannot prevent the aim of history, which is reunion with the divine ground of being and meaning."19

One of the main common threads in the thinking of Iqbal and Tillich is this awareness of the need to balance honest recognition of the reality of demonic forces with an equally honest insistence on the potentialities of change for the better. Iqbal also saw fatalism, and the refusal to fight actively against evil as demonic.

Satan says:

"I who taught the homeless That all is ruled by Fate."

Satan's Counsellor adds:

"Firm, beyond doubt, is the sovereignty of Hell. Through it the nations have grown rotten-ripe In slavishness; wretches, whose destiny is From age to age to kneel, whose nature craves A prostrate worship, no prayer uttered erect; In whom no high desire can come to birth Or born must perish, or grow misshapenly."²⁰

Sometimes these verses of Iqbal have been understood to mean only that the Muslims in British-dominated India needed to wake up and get moving. Certainly, in the context of Iqbal's own lifetime, foreign domination, and the relative weakness and hopelessness of the Muslim community were the immediate problems pressing on the peot's mind. But here I would like to argue that Iqbal's meaning need not be confined to anat particular historical situation only. At bottom, he has a point of view that can be applied to any historical situation. It is, we have been attempting to demonstrate, a perspective that has much in common with the attitudes of Jewish and Christian religious thinkers who try to look at actual historical situations from a prophetic perspective. that is who take prophetic attitudes as exemplified in the great Prophets of their traditions as the best key to how humans can most realistically and constructively think about their immediate problems.

The fact that in Satan's Parliament and elsewhere Iqbal's mind roams freely through past and present history indicates that he is trying to speak in a way that will hold good for all situations. He was trying to say much more than that his own people needed to wake up. His ultimate vision is perhaps best articulated in another phrase from this peom. Satan after laughing at the communists for their tortured brains, says he fears only —

"That people in whose ashes
Still glow the embers of an infinite hope." 1

Our three thinkers would all agree that the communist brains are tortured because their ideology prevents them, as any absolutist ideology does, from grasping the fragmentary and imperfect nature of the culture they are attempting to create. The lack a transcendent standard from which honest criticism would be possible. Hence they tie themselves in mental knots, as do the ideologies of the capitalist and other ideological systems, in order to cover up plain injustice and tyranny. Fig leaves of justification as Iqbal would say.

The image of 'embers of an infinite hope' strikes me as a marvellous expression of the prophetic attitude. That the hope is infinite means it is other than any finite hope, and certainly more than any form of material success, or of victory over mundane forces of repression. It includes all such activities, but is never limited to them. It is a compressed statement of the Jawabi Shikwa, since it means that no matter how bad any actual situations may be, there is always the possibility of renewal and starting again. The basis of the hope is in the nature of God; and this no human nor demonic force can destroy.

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NOTES:

- 1. Poems from Iqbal, trans. V.G. Kiernan, John Murray, London, 1955, p. 1.
- 2. Martin Buber, Daniel, New York, Holt, Rinchart and Winston, 1964, pp. 133, 134.
- 3. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III CHICAGO, The University of Chicago Press, 1963, p. 89.
- 4. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III pp. 24-41.
- 5. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, Ashraf. 1968, p. 50.
- 6. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, New York, Scribner's 1948, p. 111, 112.
- 7. Poems from Iqbal, pp. 5, 6.
- 8. Martin Buber, For the Sake of Heaven, New York Harper's 1966, p. VIII.
- 9. Poems from Iqbal, pp. 90, 91.
- 10. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 2-7.
- 11. Martin Buber, The Prophetic Faith, New York, Harper's, pp. 2-3.
- 12. Ibid. pp. 127, 129.
- 13. Ibid. p. 134.
- 14. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 124, 128, 138, 151, 184, 185.
- 15. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 157.
- 16. Poems from Iqbal, pp. 79-85.
- 17. Poems from Iqbal, p. 80.
- 18. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III. p. 372.
- 19. Ibid. p. 373.
- 20. Poems from Iqbal, p. 79.
- 21. Ibid. p. 83.

THE MEDIEVAL RELIGIOSITY OF DANTE AND THE MODERN RELIGION OF IQBAL

- 1. It may seem strange to compare Dante, a representative of medieval Christianity, with Iqbal, born and grown in a modern Muslim environment. The fact that both were "poets-philosophers", both composed a poem on a heavenly voyage and were considered little less than "prophets" by their most enthusiastic countrymen, does not suffice to justify such a comparison, that would amount to nothing more than a belletristic exercise of a limited value. My aim is however not literary, but concerns important points of cultural history, that I hope to visualize through this comparison. These points are:
 - a) The culture of the Middle Ages is a unit, in which the Muslim Middle Ages cannot be sharply distinguished from the Christian Middle Ages. Only seen as a whole the historical importance of this great era in human modern culture can be fully comprehended.
 - b) Only seen in this prospect the Middle Ages recover their capital importance, the traditional slogan of the 'dark ages' vanishes and the historical line of the development of civilization becomes more or less as follows (the names are purely indicative): al-Biruni—Copernicus—Kepler—Newton—Modern World. Humanism and Renaissance lose their exaggerated importance, based only on a Eurocentric point of view and on a purely humanistic literary idea of cultural development.
 - c) The hypothesis according to which Muslim culture started its "decadence" already in the XIV-XV cc. or even before, a typical slogan of the traditional school of Western Orien talism, is incorrect, and is due chiefly to the fact that the Oriental scholars of the West had most-

ly focussed their attention upon the events and the culture of the central part of the Islamic world (the Fertile Crescent) on the one hand and on the purely humanisticliterary aspect of culture on the other? For instance, if we consider also Muslim science as a part of Muslim culture, periods considered generally of decadence, like the XIII-XV, cc. show remarkable progress, say, in astronomy. It would be enough to consider the astronomical schools of Maragha and Samarqand, with per-, sonalities like those of Nasir Ud-Din Tusi (d. 1274) and Ghiyath Ud-Din Jamshid al-Kashi (d.1429). Or, if we include the Indian Sub-Continent into the area of Muslim culture, we are led to admit that the XVIIIth c., traditionally considered by Western orientalists as one of the most barren in the history of Islam, becomes a great epoch, the epoch of flower of Urdu literature, the epoch of the great Sindhi poet Shah Abd al-Latif (d. 1752), one of the greatest Muslim mystics, the epoch of Shah Waliyallah of Delhi (d. 1762)! One of the merits of Iqbal comparatively less known perhaps than certain more macroscopic aspects of his personality is just that of having recognized, in his half-forgotten Munich thesis on the Development of Metaphysics in Persia, the importance of personalities like those of Mulla Sadra Shirazi (XVII c.) and Mulla Hadi Sabzawari (XVIII c.) only quite recently revalued by European scholars (chiefly Corbin and his school).

Summing up, our world, the modern technological world, is as much Islamic as Christian; our civilization is one, it is the civilization of Adam conquering Nature, of the *Taskhir-i fitrat* of Iqbal's *Payam-i Mashriq*. Seen historically as a whole our (European and Muslim) culture includes Dante as well as Iqbal, and its history, from our common Middle Ages up to modern times becomes a living and comprehensible development.

- 2. What were the chief characters of the medieval religiosity of Dante's Europe? They might be, rather superficially, summarized as follows:
 - a) To use the very clear and graphic description by Prof. S.H. Nasr (in Sufism and the Perennity of the Mystical Quest, in "Milla-wa-Milla no. 10 1970) the Cosmos"...

was finite in outward forms but, infinite in its symbolical content. The traditional Cosmos was bound in space: its limits were almost felt and certainly visible. When traditional man looked to the stars he saw in the heaven of the fixed stars the limits of the Universe. Beyond that Heaven was not space but only the Divine Presence. This finite cosmos however was far from being a prison without an opening. On the contrary by the very fact of its finite form, it served as an icon to be contemplated and transcended. Thanks to its symbolism-the concentric spheres acting as a most powerful and efficient symbol for the states of being which man must traverse to reach Being itself-the content of this Cosmos was infinite, and its finite forms....led man to an inner content which was limitless". For Prof. Nasr this is true "of all the traditional cosmologies. Islamic as well as Christian" and even those "of some of the Hindu and Buddhist schools". In this I do not agree completely with him (neither does Iqbal, if I am not mistaken. . .) because certain aspects of Islamic thought seem to show a sort of proto-modern character (for instance Ash'arism, according to Iqbal, see Lectures p. 4, 68 ff.; or even certain mystical thinkers like Ibn 'Arabi, as we shall see afterwards). But these words of Prof. Nasr perfectly describe the Christian European trend in the Middle Ages, and Dante's ideas too, Prof. Koyre the great historian of science rightly entitled one of his most famous works, "From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe"

b) A quantitative study of the phenomena of the physical world is shunned. This is the reason of another famous title by Koyre: "From the world of Approximation to the world of Precision". Only with Galileo—so sounds thr traditional opinion of Western scholars—the physical phenomena are expressed in a mathematical rather than in an Aristotelian/philosophical language. This too is true (and only in part) of European Middle Ages, but not completely of the Muslim Middle Ages (al-Biruni and al-Khazini as precise experimenters on specific weights, for instance, seem to contradict this), and

anyway not of the Middle Ages as a whole.

- c) The principle of authority opposed to the idea of a free research of truth. Certain limits must not be overstepped. Actually this is true of both forms of Middle Ages. But it is important to remark that in traditional Christianity authority exercised itself chiefly in the dogmatic. theological field, whereas in traditional Islam authority dominated especially the field of *Shariah*, of law, and the philosophico-theological speculation was comparatively freer.
- Middle Ages is the predominance of a mystico-dogmatic form of Christianity with its basic intellectual dogmas of Trinity, Divinity of Christ, Incarnation, Redemption of Mankind from Sin through the passion of the God-Incarnate on the Cross. The non-monotheistic origins of these theories are sufficiently clear (Greek mysticism, ancient pagan cults etc.) but it formed the core of the unquestionable authority of the Medieval Church. Only a few instances from Dante's Comedy (quotations are from D.L. Sayers' translation, 3 vols., Penguin Books, 1949, 1955, 1962):

Madness! that reason lodged in human heads should hope to traverse backward and unweave the infinite path Three-personed Substance treads.

Content you with the *quia*, sons of Eve: for had you power to see the whole truth plain no need had been for Mary to conceive...

(Purg. III. 34-39)

Therefore, Dante, even Plato and Aristotle are tormented by an eternal pain because they did not receive those transcendent truths

The best example of a proto-modern Man in Dante's Divine Comedy is Ulysses, the Greek hero, whose tragical end described in the Comedy derives from no classical source and appears to be Dante's own invention. But Ulysses is in Daute's Hell for having overstepped the medieval physical limits of the known world:

No tenderness for my son, nor piety

To my old father, nor the wedded love That should have comforted Penelope

Could conquer in me the restless itch to rove And rummage through the world exploring it, All human worth and wickedness to prove....

"Brothers—said I—that have come valiantly Through hundred thousand jeopardies undergone To reach the West, you will not now deny

To this last little vigil left to run
Of feeling life, the new experience
Of the uninhabited world behind the sun.

Think of your breed; for brutish ignorance Your mettle was not made; you were made men To follow after knowledge and excellence....

(Hell, XXVI, 94-99, 112-120)

The voyage of Ulysses ends in disaster, and God destroys this man who had dared too much

Iqbal, of course, would not have ageed with Dante nor with Dante's God. But it is interesting to remark that not only the *modern* Muslim Iqbal, but even a *medieval* Muslim, like Nizami of Ganja, treats a similar theme in a quite different way. The Alexander (Iskandar) of the legend narrated by Nizami in his *Iqbal-Nama* (the second part of *Skandar-Nama*), in his voyage towards mysterious and unknown lands in the Far East, speaks to his pilot in a way similar to the Ulysses of Dante:

باستادِکتی پُنی گفت شاه ککشتی در اسکن درین موجگاه درین آب شوریده نوابم نشست که دازِحن دا درین برده بست خطرناکی فعت د دانِست ام شدن دُور از و کم توانسته ام

(Iqbal-Nama, Babaev-Bertels ed. Baku, 1947, p. 163)

The King (Elaxander) ordered the boat-man To throw the boat into the ocean.

I will sit in this agitated ocean for there are Secrets of God hidden behind this curtain

Dangers of depth are known to me. I have Very rarely been able to be away from dangers.

But this time Man is not punished for this temerity: on the contrary he vanquishes the dangers by means of a sort of prototechnique (talismans), with the full permission of Nizami's God, that seems to have nothing against knowledge, even in its extremest forms

In Dante's *Comedy* the guide of the poet, the pagan Vergil, can accompany himonly till the Seventh Stair of Purgatory; in spite of Dante's admiration for him and his pre-Christian virtues, Vergil was not able to recognize the praeterintellectual truths of the Christian dogma and was therefore damned forever.

3. The road from the Muslim Middle Ages to Iqbal is in a certain sense smoother than the way from Dante's Christian Middle Ages to the Western modern world. This comparatively greater smoothness is chiefly due to the fact that the modern Muslim poet had not to fight against dogmas, i.e. against the core itself of religion, but simply against certain mystical neo-platonizing additions to genuine Islamic monotheism, as he puts it. On the contrary modern mind, in Europe, had to destroy the ancient dogmatic religion in order to become "modern". This is one of the cief weaknesses (but also forces. . .) of modern Western mind: its essential tragicity, and consequent radicality.

The modern religion of Iqbal can be defined or studied especially under the following headings:

a) Personalistic monotheism. Godism more than a "Being" (as in classical and orthodox Christian religion/philosophy). He is a "Person".

بر کرش گم نندن انجام مانیت اگراد را تو دگرسیدی نانیت خودی راعینِ خود و در کال ست خودی اند زخودی گنجد محال است

To get submerged in His ocean is not our goal. If you absorb Him (His qualities) you will become deathless.

It is hard to contain ego in an Ego. It's perfection lies in being and becoming itself.

(Gulshan-i Raz-i Jadid, vv. 167-168).

This is practically the essence of Iqbal's theological thought, with all the necessary consequences that can be drawn from it. The Avicennian theory of emanation and reabsorption the Neoplatonic idea that "from the One only One can come", ex uno non fit nisi unum, is alien to Iqbal's thought, whereas it penetrated deeply into Medieval Christian theology. It is not strange that Iqbal evaluates positively certain aspects of Islamic mystical thought which in spite of what we often read in certain popularizing books on Sufism, were much more "personalistic" than one could think. So Ibn 'Arabi is praised in Igbal's Lectures and Maulana Jalal Ud-Din Rumi as everybody knows is his Vergil in Javid-Nama I cannot resist the temptation of mentioning a little known passage in the Futuhat Makkiyya of Ibn 'Arabi in which the great Murcian mystic uses the simile of the centre and the circumference to show that the famous problem of the One and the Many that so much tormented the classical philosophy, is a false problem. The centre potentially can initiate infinite rays; it is One, but it can directly create the Many, it is a single point but at the same time it is the beginning of infinite lines. Thereforesays Ibn 'Arabi, batala qaul man qala innahu la yasdur 'ani 1-wahid illa wahid. And he adds that every point (every Khudi) we could say with Iqbal) in the circumference can on its turn originate other circumferences ad infinitum. (Futuhat Cairo ed., p. 260). In this way God is ahsanu l-khaliqin, the best of creators, and even Man can be a creator.

b) Ibn CArabi is quoted in Iqbal's Lectures as one who emphasized the importance of dahr as an attribute of God (Lectures, p. 73). Time is God, the presence of an element of a Bergsonian duree even in the personality of the Absolute is still another element of modernity in Iqbal's thought. God, being a person, is perpetually active, its creation is yet unfinished etc. All the problems related to evil and predestination are solved, as it were, automatically by means of this revolutionary idea of an ever active God that kulla yaumin huwa fi sha'n (Qur'an 55, 29 interpreted by Iqbal as "every

day He is in a new work"). The world as it is now is simply a first exercise of the creating God, as Iqbal seems to suggest in a beautiful ghazal in Payam-i Mashria (Lahore ed. p. 183):

صدجهان می رویداز کشت خیال ما چوگل یک جهان داآن بم ازخون تست سأخی طرح فومنگن که ماجِدت پسندا فیآده ایم این چه جیرت خانهٔ امروز ومنسهٔ ژاماختی

Innumerable worlds sprout like flowers out of our thought farm. You built one world only and that too with the blood of (our) ambitions.


Bring in a new fashion, we are fond of novelty. This wonder-house of todays and tomorrows is of no occasion.

Therefore the possibilities of new and better worlds are infinite:

ساروں ہے آگے جہاں اور بھی ہیں ابھی عثق کے آجب اں اور بھی ہیں

In this context the Islamic Satan, *Iblis*, that was already in the Muslim tradition, little more than a *servant* of God loses the morbid and quasi-hysterical character of sinfulness that he had in the strongly "manichaeanized". Christian tradition (see *Lectures*, p. 85), and becomes a sort of dialectic companion of Adam, stimulating him to an eternal research of knowledge and to a limitless activity.

c) Just at the beginning of his Lectures Iqbal declares that the spirit of the Qur'an is "essentially anticlassic" (p.4) and that the Qur'an differently from Greek classical philosophy, emphasizes" deed rather than idea". But, unlike modern anarchism for which "deed" means complete and unrestrained individual freedom. Iqbal believes in institutions in a universal Shari'ah. As he says in Rumuz-i Bekhudi (p. 139-140; Arberry's transl. p. 27):



"When a community foresakes its Law its parts are severed like the scattered dust. The being of the Muslims rests alone/on Law, which is in truth the inner core/of the Apostle's Faith. A rose is born/when its component petals are conjoined/by Law; and roses being likewise bound/by Law together fashion a bouquet./As sound controlled creates a melody,/ so when control is absent, dissonance/results....

The Universal Institution of Iqbal is, however, not, as in Dante, a diarchy of Pope and Emperor (rendered necessary once one admits the type of religiosity of Medieval Catholicism, i.e. a ritualistic and priestly religion) but the "theocratic democracy" of the *Ummah*

4. We can now dwell for a moment on the chief work in which Iqbal 'imitates' Dante, in the Javid-Nama, to find out the differences in the treatment of the ancient theme of the Celestial Voyage, a theme which finds, in its specific form, perhaps the oldest forerunners in Iranian myths, and, in Islam, apart from the elaborations on the idea of Mi'raj, was treated in various forms by personalities like the Persian Sani'i of Ghazna (d. 1130) in his Sairu I-ibad ila il-ma'ad or the Syrian Abu'l-'Ala' al Ma' arri (d. 1057) in his Risalat al-ghufran, only to mention two classical instances

The initial sadness of Iqbal's Javid Nama ("Man in this many-coloured world is at every instant full of laments like the lute...

آدمی اندرجی ای منت دنگ مرزمان گرمنمن اندیونیک


finds its parallel in Dante's "dark wood":

Midway this way of life we're bound upon
I woke to find myself in a dark wood
Where the right road was wholly lost and gone. (Hell. 1-3)

For Dante the "dark wood" is Sin, the original destiny of man according to Christian theology; for Iqbal it is the feeling, I should call it the range, of man conscious of his limitations when placed in front of the infinite cosmos (a cosmos no more limited as in Dante's times), of impotent man who will not be satisfied with anything less than omnipotence, of man shut in by high walls who aspires to conquer the universe. This is the reason for which Iqbal starts on his voyage to the skies—he goes to shatter them. "How to get to the presence of God—he asks his Vergil, Maulana Rumi—how to smash mountains of water and earth? He who commands and creates is beyond the worlds of creation, and we are nearly throttled by the iron fist of Destiny!"

I asked again, "But how to reach the Lord, And break the way through all material bounds, The Lord who doth create is far above, The world of men who groan with pains untold.

It is, again, interesting to notice that a similar idea, the desire to pierce the skies in order to enter into a freer space is already present in certain Medieval Muslim thinkers, for instance, again, Nizami of Ganja. Towards the end of his *Khusraw-u-Shirin* he says:



"Who is in this (roofed) world a strongly fortified, He who has no (visible) noose makes every head sit down, How can we bring about an opening in this (roofed) world? As non has opened it upon, how can we?

The aim of Dante's voyage is quite different. Dante starts on his voyage to purify himself from sin so as to be able to arrive at a contemplation of God. Also outwardly the difference is clear. There is no voyage through Hell in Javid Nama nor is there too much talk of sin. The itinerary, an itinerary of conquest, already

presumes victory over at least the minor forms of sin. When Heaven, at the beginning of the poem, reproaches Earth for its heavy and gross materialism and blindness, Earth can answer that it received from God the consoling promise that He will establish on her a khalifah, a Vicegerent, Man, the end of physical evolution and the beginning of a still more surprising spiritual evolution. "Still he entwists himself in Nature—the Angels sing of him—but he will be harmonic one day!" (Hanuz andar tabi^Cat mi-khalad, mauzun shavad ruzi!, Jav. p. 10). Dante's Prologue stands under the sign of redeeming femininity (the Grace of God) represented by Mary, Lucy and Beatrice; in Iqbal it stands under the hazy distant omen of the inimitable power of Man:

بنان وزون شودایس بیا فاده موسن کریزدان دادن از مانیرا و برخون شود موند

Soon fashioned forth in rythmic poise, This subject old, this common man, Will with his rapturous impact, The heart of even God attain.

The journey of Iqbal through the heavens is a "shattering" of the heavens, as he more than once expresses himself. The last part of Iqbal's poem is particularly interesting: the few words exchanged with the Eternal Beauty, which at the end reveals Himself to the Poet, ends with a hymn in which there is a breath of that "oriental" superiority over world and non-world, over ancient and modern, and that mystic detachment that Iqbal so often criticized in his co-religionists seems to return once more. But it is a detachment that leads to activity, not to a sterile escapism.

"Abandon the East and let not the magic of the West enchant you, as all the ancient and the modern is not worth a grain of barley. Oh! you who form part of the caravan, free yourself from all and go with everybody. You have come here shining more brightly than the sun which lightens the whole world; live in such a way as to throw light over every atom of dust!"

بگذرازخاور وافعونی فرنگ تو کمنیزدد بجسطی مهردیرینی ونو زندگی جسس آونگه که نوخوا لیک در فافلهٔ سیمیشو بامیرو

This message is rather of a prophetic than of a mystic type. The difference is graphically given by Iqbal himself in his Lectures

- (p. 124): "Muhammad of Arabia ascended to the highest Heaven and returned. I swear by God that, if I had reached that point, I should never have returned". These are the words of a great Muslim saint, 'Abdu'l-Quddus of Gangoh and are used by Iqbal to describe the difference between the Prophet and the Mystic. But every prophet is also a mystic; Iqbal, quite differently from certain modern prophets of anarchic activism, before acting has ascended heaven, and we must be careful in taking his revaluation of self too literally and giving it a meaning which is only too habitual for us Westerners to give
- 5. The real originality in Iqbal's message lies, for me, in its being at the same time a prophetic message, mystic message and a dynamic-historicist message. And this has been rendered possible for him just because he utilized the most positive features of Islamic tradition, in which mysticism, prophitism and science were not so divorced as in the christian orthodox tradition.

Coming back again to the beautiful characterization by S.H. Nasr of the dilemma: traditional cosmology vs. modern cosmology, Iqbal does not accept it as a dilemma. He accepts the essential values of modern technology and modern science. "The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history—he writes in his lectures, p. 7—is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam"

Iqbal accepts the modern limitless cosmos with joy, as a result of the shattering forces of an Adam freed (partly through Iblis.) from his bonds, but the limit remains towards a personal God. "And verily towards thy God is the limit" (Lectures, p. 131) the Iqbalian interpretation of the well known verse of the Qur an (53, 42) wa anna ila rabbika I-muntaha (an interpretation perhaps not wholly correct philologically, but certainly so philosophically) rendered possible to him to effect a sort of harmonic fusion between Modernity" and "religiousness". A fusion that, as always, finds expression in beautiful poetical form, like this quatrain of his Tulip of Sinai" (Lala-e Tur, at the beginning of Payam-i Mashriq, p. 48):

زائم آ به الحب صدحهان بود خدم جاکه پرزداسم ان بود سیکن چوس بخود نگرستم من کان سیکان در من نهال بو

"From star to star there are hundreds of worlds; everywhere Reason soars there is a sky; but when I regarded into my Self, I saw hidden inside me the limit of the Infinite!"

Iqbal is able to extend the voyage of Ulysses even to the skies (modern space flights have nothing sinful!) but this, just this, renders the infiniteness of our Khudi ever deeper and holier! If, after Dante's condemnation, all the Ulysses' of the West have developed themselves generally under the sign of atheism, this is chiefly due to the strong tie of our medieval religious tradition with the Greek premonotheistic, Aristotelian cosmology. That, and not pure monotheism, condemned Ulysses. Iqbal in his Lectures (p. 85), speaking of God, the Supreme Ego that permits the emergence of other finite egos who are free to choose and are, in a way, creators like him (remember the infinite centres and circumferences of Ibn 'Arabi..) says that this is a great risk; "that God has taken this risk shows his immense faith in Man; it is for Man now to justify this faith".

Of course such a position is extremely difficult. Both conservatives and progressives may oppose it as a heresy or even worse both could adopt it as their own. If you allow me this criticism, this is just what happened to Iqbal. He spoke of a reconstruction of the thought of Muslims, a fresh orientation of their faith (Lectures, pp. 7 ff.), but it must be confessed that in some cases the veneration for Iqbal has become—to use the words of a great friend of Iqbal and Islam, the late French orientalist L. Massignon-a pretext for a certain Muslim bourgeoisie to save all the most traditional and obsolete forms of Islamic culture and society. Actually the Islam of Iqbal—and this forms one of the reasons of his universality—appeals to every monotheist, even to a non-Muslim monotheist, inviting him to operate a similar reconstruction in his own form of monotheism. Ighal even went so far as to menace the substitution of the Muslim Ummah or Millat by a new one if a new spirit, a new energy were not infused into the old body of the Islamic community. The quatrain in Armughan-i Hijaz (no. 7, in Persian), Iqbal's last work, in which, calling the

Islamic *millat* a *bar-i dush* for the world, he invites to create a new Holy Nation, a new *Millat*, is well-known. And also in *Javid Nama* he puts into the mouth of Jamaluddin al-Afghani, words like these (*Jav* pp. 91-92):

"The mention of the Holy Name of God is free from Time and Space, it needs not Syrian nor Greek! If God takes away from us His name, He can propose it to another people. From Moslems I saw only blind imitation and false imaginations. I fear lest one day they will be deprived of His Holy Name and God will kindle His fire in other hearts!".

One of the "Prophetical" aspects of Iqbal's personality is, alas!, just this: as in the case of all prophets, it is very easy to *venerate* him, forgetting to do what he wanted us to do.

The enucleation of the idea of the 'personality of God' as the essential point of every true monotheism leads to the fascinating idea of man's struggle with God. Completely alien to the Aristotelian world of Dante, this idea was already present in the most ancient part of the Hebrew Bible, for instance in the majestic episode of Jacob's struggle with God (Gen. 32, 24-31); it emerges again in certain Muslim mystics (especially of the malamatiyya type, but also in 'Attar), and is fully and splendidly used by Iqbal in some of his best poetical creations. This is, for me, the real Iqbal, and not the Iqbal that admitted the purdah for women, or affirmed, in Rumuz-i Bekhudi, that in times of decadence obedience even to reactionary authorities is better than free speculation (Rumuz, p. 40 of A.J. Arberry's translation, London, 1953).

And when I say *real*, I mean simply the Iqbal that can nelp us modern men (and could help even future men because *ila rabbika 'L-muntaha* and the road towards God is infinite) to create new worlds. So he sang in this beautiful poem of his "Persian Psalms" (Zabur-i ^CAjam p. 192, no. 69), with which I close my rather haphazard considerations:

باذای عسالم دیریت بوان بائت برگر کامش صفت کوه گران می بائت کف خاکے کہ گاؤ ہسد ہیں ہیں لاکو خصر سیرش حب گرا تودہ فغان می بائت این مہ وہسٹ کر کہن داہ بجاسے نہ بزند آنجسٹ مازہ تیسسے بیان می بائت ہزگادے کہ مرابی شیس فطن میں آید خش کادے است و نے شراؤاں می بائت مخت نیدال کونیسی بائت وگر کہیں گا گفت آدم کوئیسی اسٹ جیاں می بائت

This ancient universe
New youth must now rehearse,
Its trembling blade of grass
Huge mountains should surpass.

The handful of poor clay That did a glance display All-viewing, in the brain Must shape a cry of pain.

Our aged moon and sun The course have never run; Fresh stars we must pursue To build the world anew

Each image of delight
That dawns upon my sight
Is fair; yet fairer still
The image that I will.

God said, "The world so lies And say not otherwise"; Said Adam, "So I see But thus it ought to be"



IQBAL AND MALEK BENNABI

In the closing chapter of his provoking and original work *Vocation de l'Islam'*, ² Malek Bennabi (1905-1973) probably the most profound Algerian thinker of our times, discerns two tendencies in the seeming chaos of the Muslim world: the one of historical order is imputable to internal forces manifesting themselves as actions and reactions of 'colonisibilite' and 'colonisation' that could be summed up under the designation of 'reformism' and 'modernism', while the other pertains to the grand phenomenon of the transfer of civilisations on a global scale — *it is the displacement of the centre of Islamic gravity from the Mediterranean to Asia*

Bennabi envisages as the most important political, cultural and psychological consequences of this transfer, the formation of the volonte collective' and the liberation of Islam from its internal impediments in its new social climate which is not hierarchical but broadly popular'. Islam would also be forced to adapt itself to the genius of an agrarian society with its innate sense of work, thus promising a new synthesis of 'man, soil and of time' that would form the basis of a new civilisation.

Further in its Mediterranean era, the contact of Islam with Christianity had taken place in a colonial context, gravely distorting Christian faith in Muslim eyes, and helping it to retain its superiority complex without any provocation to re-understand and rethink its faith. The contact of the Asiatic Muslim elite took place in entirely different conditions. In this land of Budhhism and Brahamanism, "Islam could not help feeling itself a stranger... At the same time 'conquerant and minoritarie' it lived in a land conquered by other religions, and the Muslim there daily witnesses the extraordinary religious life of these beings who are doubt-

less among the most religious of the world and who live in an atmosphere aflame with mysticism.

"It is before this spectacle and in this atmosphere that has ripened the consciousness of an Iqbal, that it has acquired in this great thinker and poet, the rich subjectivity of consciousness endowed, at the same time, with reason and affectivit with the faculty of understanding and that of vibrating. This dialogue between the heart and the mind that the post-Almohadin man²³ has lacked and which still does not seem to have ressucitat in his on the Mediterranean littoral, is not the least lesson which Islam could draw from its displacement towards the Asiatic sphere...²⁴

When he wrote the above lines, Bennabi in all probability knew Iqbal only through the pages of Gibb's Modern Trends in Islam which by no means convey a full or fair picture of the latter's thought. Yet the instinctive response of this writer from the West of Islam to that 'dialogue between heart and mind' that he discerns in the philosopher of the East, and his observations on the role of Islam in India that strongly recall Iqbal's own ideas on the subject²⁵ point to a mutual affinity of mind and soul. There is a sociological heredity like biological says Bennabi. so that one could ascertain the same characteristic wherever the social life has espoused through the centuries the same aesthetical, ethical and technical forms: ". . . Thus one would find that the Muslim problem is 'one – not in its variants of political or ethnical order but in the essential, that is, the social order. . . " A study of the thought of the two thinkers lends substance to this statement. Despite the great distance that divides them politically and geographically, and the difference in their approach-Iqbal adopts a philosophical approach in his momentous effort to rethink the entire content of Muslim religious thought in the light of recent developments in science and philosophy, so as to help towards the meaning of Islam as a message to Humanity, while Bennabi seeks to examine from a mainly sociological angle, the ruptures and tensions within the Muslim civlisation that led to its disintegration, the basic components of the chaos in the Muslim world and in the West, and the new paths lying before the Muslim world in the present global context – they come remarkably close to each other in their diagnosis and conclusions concerning the Muslim problem. Hailing as he does from a distant and distinct

ethnical and geographical climate that contributed to the flowering of the nascent Muslim civilisation in North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, whence had later surged the great militant movements for the re-generation of Islam before it was despoiled by a most degrading, "totalitarian' colonialism that effectively sealed it off from the rest of the Muslim world, and with a decade more of rich experience at his command, Bennabi is in a rare position to look into the malaise affecting the Muslim and Western civilization and to detect the direction of history. It would be most interesting to review Igbal's own analysis and predictions of the same in the light of fresh experience and the new angle of approach that the Algerian thinker brings to bear on the Muslims problem. Bennabi has deplored that the Muslim world still lacks academies that could establish contact and dialogue between its intellectuals: ". It is thus that the work of Taha Hussein has barely touched the educated milieu of North Africa and the work of Iqbal does not even find an echo therein..." This lack of communication explains also to certain lacunae in Bennabi's own work. such as those referring to the genesis of Pakistan, notwithstanding his insight in the role of Islam in the sub-continent. He attributes the grant of independence of India and the creation of Pakistan entirely to Churchill's strategy to deprive the Soviet Union of an effective propoganda weapon, to provide a security zone against communism to isolate the Muslims from the Hindu masses by creating a Pakistan-India 'antiomie', and preventing at the same time the formation of a powerful Indian union. He has also an exaggerated view of the religiosity of Hindu masses and their supposed penchant for mysticism. Had he been acquainted with Igbal's 1930 address, the Algerian writer would have had a better understanding of the forces that created Pakistan. In the same way we in Pakistan are in general culpably ignorant of the extraordinary ferment of ideas and movement and the tremendous sacrifices involved in the great Algerian Revolution. The following article is an attempt towrds this much needed exchange of ideas and experiences. It seeks to present the basic outlook of the two thinkers towards the fundamental issues facing the Muslim world, as expressed in the Vocation de 1 'Islam, 26 and The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.27 Such a comparative study should be all the more interesting since the thought of Iqbal and Bennabi strongly forecasts the future course of the destinies of their peoples as worked out in the Creation of Pakistan and the

Algerian Revolution, representing probably the most dynamic, progressive and promising forces of Muslim renaissance that have revived the original Islamic concept of an enlightened, universal, and popular social order, and restored the moribund concepts of jihad and ijtihad to their original role as indispensable factors of progress in Muslim society.

One is sturck at the outset by the profound insight of the two thinkers into the inner meaning and working of their own cultures coupled with a deep consciousness of the immense achievement of modern thought; their innate belief in the organic unity of human origin, the concept of life as a continuous, creative, rationally directed movement in time, and the spiritual regeneration of the individual as the basis and condition of all civilisation

Both Iqbal and Bennabi reject the Greco-Hellenic legacy of thought with its static concept of the universe. While Greek philosophy broadened the view of the Muslim thinkers says Iqbal, on the whole it obscured their vision of the Quran. It was some two hundred years later that it gradually dawned on them that the spirit of the Quran with its appeal to the concret and its dynamic concept of the origin of the universe, was essentially anti-classical, and the resulting intellectual revolt found its best expression in Ibn Khaldun Considering the direction in which the culture of Islam was unfolding itself, observes Iqbal, only a Muslim could have viewed history as a continuous collective movement, a real inevitable movement in time. The Quranic view of the alternation of day and night as a symbol of the ultimate Reality, the tendency in Muslim metaphysics to regard time as objective. Ibn Miskwaih's view of life as an evolutionary movement, and lastly, Al-Beruni's definite approach to the conception of nature as a process of 'becoming' - all this constituted the intellectual inheritance of Ibn Khaldun. His chief merit lay in his acute perception of, and systematic expression to, the spirit of Muslim culture of which he was a most brilliant product. Igbal found his conception of the process of change of infinite importance because of the implication that history as a continuous movement in time is a genuinely creative movement, and not a movement whose path is already determined. It marked the final victory of the anti-classical spirit of the Quran over Greek thought for which time was either

unreal or moved in a circle, resulting in eternal repetition rather than eternal creation.²⁸ In view of his conception of the nature of time, Iqbal regarded Ibn Khaldun as the fore-runner of theory of evolution and his notion of pure time regarded as an organic whole, but rejected the duality of will and thought implied in the vitalism of the French philosopher as well as his contention that the forward rush of the vital spirit is unilluminated by an immediate or remote purpose. While thought appears to break up reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesise the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents. In conscious experience life and thought permeate each other and form a unity. Thought, therefore, in its true nature is as much organic as, and identical with life.

Again Bergson regarded conscious experience as the past moving along with, and operating in, the present, ignoring that the unity of consciousness has a forward looking aspect also that could not be apprehended without reference to the future. Igbal too rejected. as totally alien to the Quranic spirit, the idea of the universe as the temporal working out of a pre-conceived plan, where destiny takes the place of rigid determinism, leaving no scope for human or even Divine freedom. However, he believed the nature of Reality to be teleological in the sense of a "progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands. We become by ceasing to be what we are. Life is a passage through a series of deaths. But there is a system in the continuity of this passage. Its various stages, in spite of the apparently abrupt changes in our evaluation of things, are organically related to one other. The life-history of the individual is, on the whole, a unity and not a mere series of mutually ill-adapted events. . ."29

With his perception of life as an organic unity, Iqbal naturally rejected Spengler's thesis that each culture constituted a specific organism with no point of contact with the preceding or following culture, leading the British thinker to the wrong conclusion that the European culture with its basically anti-classical spirit, was solely the result of the specific genius of Europe and owed no inspiration to the culture of Islam.

Iqbal reiterates his belief in an organic rationally directed life while discussing the concept of God. He reviewed Divine omnipotence as intimately related to Divine wisdom, and found the infinite power of God revealed not in the arbitrary and the

capricious, but in the recurrent, the regular and the orderly: "... Our intellectual constitution is such that we can take a piecemeal view of things. We cannot understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoic, and at the same time sustain and amplify life. The teaching of the Quran which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognises a growing universe and is animated by the hope of man's ultimate victory over evil..." ³⁰

The same organic concept of life as a continuous, creative process --- a gently ascending path across the millenium that humanity slowly scales in its onward march, underlines Bennabi's exposition of history and civilisation. In opposition to the mechanitic concept of the Greek philosophers, the Algerian thinker uses the cyclic phenomenon as the basic of a fascinating theory of the perpetuation of civilisation. According to him, this phenomenon is marked in history by two essential aspects; the metaphysical or cosmic, — that of a general design, of a finality; and the historical or sociological, — that of an enchainment of causes. Under the later aspect, civilisation presents itself as a numerical series, following its course in similar but non-identical terms, giving birth to the essential notion of of history — the cycle of civilisation. Each cycle is defined by the psycho-temporal conditions proper to a group, that is, it is a civilisation in the above conditions"... Then this civilisation migrates, shifts its abode and transfers its values in another air. It thus perpetuates itself in an indefinite exodus, across successive metamporphoses, each of them being a particular synthesis of the man, the soil and the time . . ." Sometimes, however, deceived by the apparent discontinuity that masks the real continuity of civilisation, one truncates this concept of history, as did Thucidyde, by his assertion that before his epoch 'no important event was produced in the universe'. Annulling thus the entire past of humanity, and creating the 'culture of the empire', with its myths of the dominant race and the civilising mission of colonialism. The Marxist thought, likewise, neglects the essential notion of cycle by the finalism implied in the passage from primitive animality to the era of abundance and liberty, which contradicts the very principle of dialectic.

Bennabi ascribes to his progenitor, Ibn Khaldun, the notion of cycle, as presented in his theory of the 'three generations', and like Iqbal, believes the latter to have been inspired by Islamic 'psychological factors'. It accentuates the transitory aspect of the civilisation which is viewed as a succession of organic phenomena, each of them necessarily possessing in a determined space a beginning and an end. The importance of this concept lies in that it allows one to discuss not only the conditions of progressive development but also the factors of regression and decadence. For the evolution in the social order does not follow, as in the biological, an inevitable course. Here the fatality of life and death is limited or rather conditioned, since its direction and term depends on certain psycho-temporal factors on which an organised society could act in some measure by regulating its life and pursuing certain ends in a coherent fashion...^{3 1}

As may have been noted, the evolutionary concept of history as presented by Iqbal and Bennabi has nothing in common with the scientific determinism governing Western historical method. According to Iqbal, time regarded as destiny forms the very assence of things. However, it is no unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; "it is the inward reach of a thing, its realisable possibilities which lie within the depth of its nature and serially actualise themselves without any feeling of compulsion..."

". . . Life is one and continuous. Man marches always onward to receive ever-fresh illuminations from an Infinite Reality which every moment appears in a new glory . And the recipient of Divine illumination is not merely a passive recipient..." ³

"It is the lot of man to share in the deeper aspirations of the universe around him, and to shape his destiny as well as that of the universe, now by adjusting himself to its forces, now by putting the whole of his energy to mould its forces to his own ends and purposes. And in this process of progressive change God becomes a co-worker, provided that man takes the initiative: 'Verily God will not change the conditions of men, till they change what is in themselves'. (13:12)" ^{3 4}

The life of man and the onward march of his spirit depend on the establishment of connections with the reality that confronts him. It is knowledge that establishes these connections and knowledge is sense-perception elaborated by understanding. But man's relation to nature in view of its possibilities as a means of controlling her forces must not be exploited in the interest of a desire for

domination but in the nobler interest of a free upward movement of spiritual life. In order to secure a complete vision of Reality. therefore, sense perception must be supplemented by the perception of heart —— which along with nature and history, forms one of the sources of knowledge mentioned by the Quran. It is a kind of inner intuition or insight that brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense perception. Nor are thought and intuition opposed to each other. They spring from the same root and complement one another. Only thought must necessarily simulate finitude because of its alliance with serial time. However, it is the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite that keeps alive within it the flame of aspiration and sustains it in its endless pursuit. The one grasps Reality piecemeal. the other grasps it in its wholeness; the one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. Both seek vision of the same Reality that reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life.35

This organic relation between thought and intuition is reflected in the unity of the ideal and real, temporal and spiritual in Islam. The problem of Islam, according to Igbal, was really suggested by the mutual conflict and attraction of the two forces of religion and civilisation. Early Christianity confronted the same problem by a search for an independent contant for spiritual life through revelation of a new world within the soul. Islam, on the other hand, sought the affirmation of the spirit not by renunciation of the external forces already permeated by the illumination of the spirit, but by a proper adjustment of man's relation to these forces in view of the light received from within. "... The life of the ideal consists, not in a total breach with the real which would tend to shatter the organic wholeness of life into painful oppositions but in the perpetual endeavour of the ideal to appropriate the real with a view eventually to absorb it, to convert it into itself and to illuminate its whole being..."36

As may be surmised from the above, in Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains. This ancient mistake, says Iqbal, arose out of the bifurcation of the unity of man into two different realities which somehow had a point of contact but were in essence opposed to each other. In truth, however, matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man is body if one looks at it as acting in regard to the external world;

it is mind or soul when one looks at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim or ideal of such acting. An act is temporal or profane if it is performed in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity. The stat according to Islam is only an effort to realise the spiritual in a human organisation"... There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the realisation of spirit... As the Prophet so beautifully put it: 'The whole of this earth is a mosque'...³⁷

The same thesis regarding the wholeness of human life and experience in a dialectical unity of the ideal and real, temporal and spiritual, that Iqbal philosophically presents as a cardinal point of Quranic teaching, finds as forceful an expression in the sociological context in Bennabi's analysis of the ruptures and contradictions that finally led to the disintegration of Muslim society.

The Muslim world, says Bennabi, knew its first rupture at the Battle of Siffin (37 H), since it already contained an internal contradiction: the *jahilian* spirit opposed to the Quranic spirit. It was the 'demi-convert' Mu'awiya who broke the synthesis in principle established for long, perhaps for always, on the equilibrium between the spiritual and temporal. From this first rupture onward, even if it remained fundamentally attached to a spiritual order contained in its believing soul, the Muslim one owes to this 'deviated' civilisation that flourhished at Damascus the first landmarks in scientific thought, yet from the biohistorical view this brilliant civilisation was but a "de-naturalisation of the original synthesis realised by the Quran, and founded on the equilibrium of spirit and reason on the double moral and material base, necessary for all durable edifice.

In fact, continues Bennabi, the Muslim world could only survive this first crisis in its history by reason of what remained in it of the Quranic living force and impulsion. It were men like 'Oqba, 'Omar Ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz and Imam Malek who maintained it not because of their distinguished positions, but because they incarnated under different titles the simple and great virtues of Islam, — contempt for the glory offered, refusal of the power that was undue, and defiance opposed to it when it became unjust —— that have maintained in the Muslim world the ferment deposed in it by the Quran.

One could well understand the importance that 'the great sociologist Mohammad' attached to moral values as the essential force of civilisations. But in periods of decadence, the scale of values is reversed; frivalities then, appear as great things, and the social edifice that could not stand solely on props of technique, science or reason must collapse. For it is the soul alone that allows humanity to soar, when it makes default, it is the fall and decadence

Bennabi regards the unity of spiritual and temporal in life as inextricably linked with his cyclical notion of civilisation, since moral paralysis is bound to result in intellectual paralysis, leading to the end of a cycle. When the breath that gave a society its first impulsion ceases to animate it, is the "exodus of the civilisation towards another air, where another cycle commences in a new biohistorical synthesis. But in the air thus left vacant, the work of science loses all significance. Where there ceases the radiation of spirit, there ceases also the rational effort. It would be seen that the man loses the thirst to understand and the will to act, the moment he loses the elan, 'the tension of the faith', It is thus that the work of Ibn Khaldun seems to have come too late or too soon: it could no longer impress itself on the Muslim genius that had already lost its plasticity, its aptitude to progress and renew itself. ."

No temporal expansion could, in the course of history replace this unique source of energy, that is faith. Neither the 14th century 'Timourid renaissance', nor the Ottomon empire could give the Muslim world a 'movement' that no longer had its source within itself. The internal contradictions were going to attain their culminating point in the dislocation of a world and the appearance of a new society endowed with new characteristics and new tendencies.³⁸

It is essential to point out that when Iqbal and Bennabi speak of faith, they do not have in mind the faith of the recluse that provides him a 'kind of cowardly escape from the facts of life' but faith as an active, living truth 'a source of energy that galvanises the wills'. The prophetic experience, according to Iqbal, was essentially social in nature and produtive of world-shaking psychological forces calculated to completely transform the human world. He was highly critical of the Sufi ethics that appeared to him as a symbol and source of passivity and resignation, and held the rise and growth of ascetic Sufism, that gradually developed under the

influences of a non-Islamic charcter a purely speculative side, largely responsible for the attitude of the 'ulemas in closing the door of Ijtihad. The emphasis it laid on the distinction between zahir and batin created an attitude of indifference to all that applied to appearance and not to reality, and resulted in a spirit of total other-wordliness thus obscuring man's vision of a very important aspect of Islam as a social polity. The technique of medieval mysticism had caused greater havoc in the Muslim East than in Europe: "Far from integrating the forces of the average man's inner life, and thus preparing him for participation in the march of history, it has taught him a false renunciation and made him perfectly contended with his ignorance and spiritual thraldom." ³ 9

Bennabi is as anxious to dissipate the same equivocation. "It may be noted", he says," that faith-considered in terms of an echatological estimate of spiritual values, never lost its empire in the Muslim world, even in its period of decadence but if one wishes to consider the problem from a sociological and historical point of view, one must not confound the salvation of individual soul with the evolution of societies. The social role of the individual here is nothing but that of a catalyser favouring the transformation of values which pass from a natural state to a psychotemporal state corresponding to a certain stage of civilisation. This transformation turns the biological man into a social entity, the time, from simple choronological duration evaluated in hours, into sociological time evaluated in working hours, and the soul, from a unilateral provider of food to the man according to a simple process of consumption, into a certain technically equipped and conditioned for catering to the multiple needs of social life according to the conditions of a process of production.

Religion is then, the catalyser of social values but in its nascent, dynamic state when it expresses a collective thought. The moment the faith becomes centripetal, without radiation, that is, individualistic, its historic mission on earth is finished where it is no more fit to promote a civilisation. It becomes the faith of the devotee who withdraws himself from life, fleeing his duties and responsibilities like all those who since Ibn Khaldun have taken refuge in maraboutism:⁴⁰

". . . History commences with the integral man, constantly adapting his effort to his ideals and needs, and accomplishing

in a society his double mission of actor and witness. But history ends with the disintegrated man, the corpuscule deprived of centre of gravitation, the individual living in a dissolved society that no longer furnishes his existence with either moral or material base. It is then the escape into maraboutism, or no matter what other Nirvana, that are but the subjective form of the social 'save-who-can'."⁴¹

Bennabi's pre-occupation with the above problem appears throughout his work. Dealing with the chaos in the modern Muslim world he again emphasises the necessity of differentiating between truth as a simple theoretical concept. enlightening abstract reasoning, and active truth that inspires concrete acts and warns that "truth could even provde disasterous as a sociological principles when it no longer inspires action but paralyses it, when it no more coincides with the modifications of change but with alibis of individual and social stagnation. It could thus become the source of a paralytic world that Renan and Father Lammense denounced saying that Islam is 'a religion of stagnation and regression'."⁴⁻²

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Their common spiritual and dynamic outlook towards life and religion is reflected in their assessment of the factors of progress and retrogression in Muslim society and the trends of thought that mark the Muslim re-awakening.

According to Iqbal the ultimate spiritual basis of all life is eternal and reveals itself in varity and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile in its life the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, but they must not be understood to exclude all possibilities of change which according to Quran is one of the greatest signs of God. The failure of Europe in political and social sciences illustrates the former principle, the immobility of Islam during the last five hundred years the latter.

Iqbal finds in *Ijtihad*, the 'principle of movement' in Islam, that means 'to exert with a view to form an independent judgement on a legal question'. With the political expansion of Islam systematic legal thought became an absolute necessity and early

doctors worked ceaselessly untill all the accumulated wealth of Muslim law found a final expression in the recognised schools of Muslim law. Henceforth though the theoretical possibility of ijtihad was still admitted, it was so hedged round with conditions that its exercise was practically made well-nigh impossible. Whatever the causes of this tendency to over-organisation by a false reverence of the past, it was the powerful reaction of Ibn Taimiyya one of the most indefatigable writers and preachers of Islam', Claiming freedom of ijtihad for himself, he rose in revolt against the finality of the schools and went back to the first principles in order to make a fresh start.

His spirit found a fuller expression in a movement of immense potentialities—Iqbal terms it the 'first throb of life in modern Islam'—which arose in the 18th century from the sands of Nejd. The great puritan reformer, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab succeeded in spreading the fie of his restless soul throughout the world of Islam. He was similar in spirit to Ghazali's disciple, Ibn Tumert—the Berber puritan who appeared amidst the decay of Muslim Spain and gave her a fresh inspiration. The essential thing to note, says Iqbal, is the spirit of freedom manifested in the movement, though inwardly it too was conservative in its own fashion. While it rose in revolt against the finality of the schools, its vision of the past remained wholly uncritical and in matters of law it mainly fell back on the Traditions.

Though one can detect in Shah Waliullah of Delhi the urge of a new spirit, Iqbal continues, it was Jamal-uddin Afghani who fully realised the enormity of the problem facing the Muslim world. His deep insight into the inner meaning of the history of Muslim thought and life combined with broad vision engendered by his wide experience of men and manners would have made him a living link between the past and future "...If his indefatigable but divided energy could have devoted itself entirely to Islam as a system of human belief and conduct, the world of Islam, intellectually speaking, would have been on much more solid ground today..."⁴³

Iqbal himself found no justification for closing the door of *ijtihad* either in Quran or the Tradition. In fact, the teaching of Quran that life is a process of progressive creation necessitated that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors should be permitted to solve its own problems.

No wonder that Iqual found the way in which the idea of ijtihad reinforced and broadened by modern philosophical thinking was working in the religious and political thought of the Turkish nation of great interest and promise for the future course of Muslim renaissance. He fully supported the contention of the Grand National Assembly that the Khilafat or Immamate could be vested in a body of persons or elected assembly and believed the republican form of Government to be not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but also a necessity in view of the new forces set free in the Muslim world. Indeed he saw in the replacement of the universal Immamate by a multiplicity of free independent units, with their racial rivalries adjusted and harmonised by the unifying bonds of a common spiritual aspiration, the slow realisation of that vision of an international Islam glimpsed by Ibn Khaldun centuries ago, when driven by the hard realities of his age he had declared that since the power of the Quresh was gone there was no alternative but to accept the most powerful man in the country where he happens to be most powerful.

Even though Iqbal was critical of the idea of the separation of Church and State envisaged in Turkish nationalist thinking and feared that the underlying race-idea might ultimately wipe off the broad human outlook which the Muslims had imbibed from their religion, on the whole he pinned great hopes on the Turkish experiment. "... The truth is that among the Muslim nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained to self-consciousness. She alone has passed from the ideal to the real -- a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral struggle. To her the growing complexities of a mobile broadening life are sure to bring new situations suffeating new points of view, and necessitating fresh interpretations of principles which are only of an academic interest to a people who have never experienced the joy of spiritual expansion. . . . Such is the lot of most Muslim countries today. They are mechanically repeating old values, whereas the Turk is on the way to certain new values. He has passed through great experience which have revealed his deeper self ot him. In him life has begun to move, change, and amplify, giving birth to new desires, bringing new difficulties and suggesting, new interpretations. The question which confronts him today, and which is likely to confront other Muslim countries in the near future is whether the Law of Islam is capable of evolution — a question which will require great intellectual effort, and is sure to be answered in the affirmative; provided the world of Islam approaches it in the spirit of Omar——the first critical and independent mind in Islam who, at the last moments of the Prophet, had the moral courage to utter these remarkable words: 'The Book of God is sufficient for us'.'44

Bennabi discusses at length the internal and external factors responsible for the ruptures and contradictions that led to the downfall of the Muslim society, and assesses in their light the trends of Muslim renaissance——the Reformist and the Modernist——that have given the Muslim world its present physiogonomy.

Like Igbal, the Algerian writer traces the Reformist current in Muslim consciousness to Ibn Taimiya who was 'neither an alim nor a mystic, but a militant of spiritual as well as social renovation of the Muslim world'. It was the same current that had surged with Ibn Tumert in the West, and with Ibn Abdul Wahab into the desert kingdom of Arabia. However, it was nearly a century after the disappearance of the first Wahabi empire in 1820, that this current found a consciousness that would reflect it to the modern Muslim world. Jamal-uddin-Afghani whose intellectual capacities Gibb' seemed to doubt⁴⁵ dared talk to the social function of the Prophets in the decayed post-Almohadian, society. Spurred by the bloody ending of the Sepoy mutiny. Afghani launched an offensive against antiquated institutions and mortal ideas. On the one hand, he sought to bring about a political recomposition of the Muslim world on the basis of Muslim fraternity, breached at Siffin and finally destroyed by the colonial regimes; on the other, he led the combat against the alleged materialism of Syed Ahmad Khan's naturism' imputing it to occult Western influences. Though Afghani's attitude appears reactionary. observes Bennabi, it supplied the necessary corrective to the future orientation of teaching at Aligarh just as Rashid Radha's opposition to the thesis of Taha Husayn exercised in the end, a salutary influence on the future orientation of Egyptian culture.

However, Afghani sought to cure his rotten milieu through a suppression of its institutional framework rather than through a transformation of the post-Almuhadian man. He might have achieved his objective if such a revolution were accomplished, since all

revolution is creative of new values, susceptible as a result of transforming the man. But the lever of this revolution could be efficacious only if the sentiment of Islamic fraternity could have been transformed as in early Muslim society, into an act of fraternisation. Yet, if Afghani was "neither the leader nor the doctrinarie of modern reformist movement, he was its initiator, gathering and transmitting all along his life of a pilgrim the inquietitude to which one owes the modest efforts of the present renaissance.⁴⁶

It was Sh. Abduh who realised that a reform of Muslim society could come about only through the reform of the individual, taking for reference the Quranic verse: God does not make any change in the condition of a people till the latter had not changed what there is in its soul. But how to transform the soul. The dog-matic spirit of Abduh led him to conclude that a re-formulation of Muslim theology was indispensable. But theology touches the problem of the soul only in the realm of creed, of dogma. However, as pointed before, it was not the creed that the post-Almohadien man lacked but its social radiation and efficiency. Had a synthesis been attempted between the dogmatic view of 'Abduh and the political and social views of Afghani, the Reformists would have found quite another path than that leading towards a mere reformulation of theological principles.

The Reformist deviation must also be explained with reference to what Gibb terms 'super-imposition' that manifested itself in traditional Muslim culture in resistence to Western ideas, transforming the theological work of Abduh into virtual apologetic. That was not all. To the tendency towards atomism, dogmatism and the apologetic were added blemishes of an institutional order ——the mujadala, literalism, hysterics and poetism. For building a new one needed a wholesale and systematic confrontation of Islam with taqlid——the magic word covering all sorts of superstition and mystification under the prestigious varnish of Islamism. But this immense task of detection could not be shouldered by a single man.

If it did not know how to transform the soul, the Reformist movement did at least, break the static equilibrium of the post-Almuhadian epoch by introducing in the Muslim consciousness the notion of its secular drama. Since Siffin the Muslim civilisation did in fact represent an accommodation of doctrinal Islam to the imposed temporal order. Now the reconstruction of Muslim cul-

ture demanded the re-establishment of the pure doctrine over 'le faith de prince'——that is, the extriction of the pure Quranic text from its triple gangues of theology, jurisprudence and philosophy.⁴⁷

Bennabi obviously does not share Iqbal's enthusiasm for the Modernist movement in Islam, and believes that it had belied the expectations of the latter. Compared with the Reformist he finds it less profound, more fortutious, and more particularly connected with the aspiration of a new social category, the social outcome of the Western school, as the Aligarh movement in India.

Bennabi contests Igbal's assertion that "the most remarkable phenomenon of modern history is the enermous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West". since neither did Europe bring its soul to the world of Islam nor did the latter go out to discover it on the spot. 48 Instead Europe came to the East not as the bearer of a civilisation, but as a coloniser; and the young bourgeoise who went to Europe for study or pleasure could only grasp a superificial knowledge of the West. His unconscious materialism made him insensitive to the most generous as well as the most odious aspects of Western civilisation. Being content to 'learn' rather than 'understand' (just as he no longer understood the Quran but learnt it) he also remained ignorant of the history and evolution of European civilisation and its incompatibility with the laws of human order since racism and colonialism and changed its culture from that of a civilisation to that of an empire. As he had not acquired even the sense of real efficiency at the Western school, he more readily borrowed the bourgeoise brand of European materialism, that is, materialist tastes, rather than its proletarian tendency, that is, a dialectical discipline Ignoring the ontological liason of European products with their natural cadre, he did not bother to see if these tastes had any rapport with Muslim life. This disposition to accumulate indiscriminate borrowings denounces the rudimentary aspect of the Modernist movement.

In the circumstances words were emptied of all their content and lost their social value, as may best be seen during political campaigns. Instead of leading to the necessary over-effort for tackling the problems of the present, they translate themselves in an under-effort barely sufficient for securing a seat in parliament or a job in govt. In the absence of the liason between the word as

an expression of thought, and the act as its concretisation, Bennabi observes the spirit loses the "perpetual dialectic that goes from new conquests to new words, and by these words to yet other conquests". 49

If the salafi did not realise it methodically, he did not lose sight-of the notion of renaissance and was conscious enough of his milieu to demand only the duties leaving rights to the Modernist. He was thus able, across his reformative effort however naive, to reach an understanding of his milieu. With the Modernist, on the other hand, the very notion of renaissance made a default. The primary question before him was not the regeneration of the Muslim world, but of pulling it out of its present political predicament. For him it was not a 'Muslim problem of man', but a 'European problem of institution', and he never really arrived at an understanding of his milieu.

Bennabi, nevertheless, finds in the crystallisation of a collective consciousness lacking since Siffin, a positive achievement of the modernist political effort. If it has not formulated the essential objective, it has at least presented certain practical ends, capable of drawing the masses from their indifference and stagnation; while, on the intellectual plane, its borrowings from the West have given birth to a current of ideas which though debatable, have the merit of bringing into question all the traditional criteria.

As mentioned earlier, Iqbal watched with mingled hope and anxiety the rapid spiritual drift of the Muslim world towards the West. Though he regarded European cluture on its intellectual side as merely a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam, he feared that the dazzling exterior of the European culture might arrest the Muslim movement and prevent it from reaching the true inwardness of that culture. Since the Middle Ages when schools of Muslim theology were completed, enormous advance had taken place in the domain of human thought and experience. New points of view had been suggested, old problems re-stated in the light of fresh experience, and new problems had risen. The appearance of liberal ideas constituted an inevitable element of the reawakening of Islam but it also confronted the Muslim world with the most critical moment in its history. For liberalism had a tendency to act as a force of disintegration, and already the ideas set free by European political thinking were materially counteracting the

humanising work of Islam, and racialising the outlook of Muslims. The young Muslim political and religious reformers were eager to see these new ideas as living forces in their own countreis without any critical appreciation of facts that had determined their evolution in Europe. The Muslim world was passing through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution. The net outcome of Luther's movement, which Iqbal regards as essentially political, was the gradual displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by a plurality of national, hence narrower, systems. While the best European thinkers were at last realising the initial mistake of the separation of spiritual and temporal, her statesmen were indirectly forcing the world to accept it as unquestioned dogma.

Iqbal was greatly concerned with the idea of territorial nationalism and its implications for Islam, particularly in India where the presence of a non-Muslim majority further complicated the issue. He opposed the idea not because its application in India was likely to bring less material gain to Muslims, but because he saw in it the germs of atheistic materialism which he considered as the greatest danger to humanity. A European with his concept of Christianity as a monastic order, could look upon religion as a private affair but the Prophet's experience was an individual experience cleative of a social order. The religious ideal of Islam was, therefore, organically related to the social order it had created, and the construction of a polity on national lines if it implied displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity was simply unthinkable for a Muslim. 50

In Muslim countries outside India, however, the idea of nationalism seemed to be working itself in conformity with the inner catholicity of Islam. As mentioned above Iqbal saw in the abolition of *Khilafat* and the constitution of independent Muslim states, the birth of an international order which though forming the very essence of Islam had been hitherto overshadowed, or rather displaced, by Arabian imperialism: "... It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nation which recognises artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricing the social horizon of its members" ⁵ ¹

Iqbal warned his compatriots that it would be fallacious to argue that since other Muslim countries were progressing on

national territorial lines, they could do the same: ".. the countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population. There are no social barriers between Muslims and the minorities who belong to the 'People of the Book'. Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realisation of a final combination of humanity was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran declares: 'O People of the Book. Come, let us join together on the 'word' (unity of God), that is common to all'. The wars of Islam and Christianity, and later, European aggression in its various forms, could not allow the infinite meaning of this verse to work itself out in the world of Islam. Today it is being gradually realized in the shape of what is called 'Muslim Nationalism'." 5 2

Herein lay the real destiny of Islam. It furnished a basis for the organisation of humanity on a universal basis long before the course of history inexorably forced it on the attention of the world"... Islam appeared as a new culture to replace the culture of the throne and systems of unification based on blood-relationship. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in origin. Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from earth..."^{5 3}

But the perception of life as an organic unity is a slow achievement and depends for its growth on a people's entry into the main current of world events. This opportunity was brought to Islam, Iqbal continues, by the rapid development of a vast empire. By drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races and transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing a self-consciousness of their own, Islam furnished a model for final combination of humanity. It is true that Christianity long before Islam brought the message of equality to mankind, but Christian Rome did not rise to the full practical apprehension of the idea of humanity as a single organism, and since then the idea does not seem to have gained much depth and rootage in Europe. Indeed, the growth of territorial nationalism with its emphasis on so-called national characteristics has tended rather to kill the broad human element in the art and literature of Europe. It was quite otherwise with Islam. Here the idea was neither a concept

of philosophy nor a dream of poetry. As a social movement the aim of Islam was to make the idea a living factor in the Muslims' daily life and thus silently and imperceptibly to carry it towards further fruition.^{5 4}

The Muslim renaissance had, therefore, a far more serious aspect than mere adjustment in modern conditions of life. The great European war, the awakening of Turkey, and the new economic experiment being tried in the neighbourhood of Muslim Asia all pointed to the inner meaning and destiny of Islam. What Humanity needed today was a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe had no doubt built idealistic systems on these lines, but experience showed that truth revealed through pure reason was incapable of imparting that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone could bring. That was why pure thought had so little influenced men while religion had always elevated individuals and transformed whole societies. The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, resulting in a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerable democracies whose sole function was to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich.55

The modern man, Iqbal continues, with his philosophies of criticism and scientific specialism found himself in a strange predicament. His naturalism had given him an unprecedented control over forces of nature, but robbed him of faith in his own future. It was strange how the same idea affected different cultures differently. While the formulation of the evolution theory in the world of Islam had brought into being Rumi's tremendous enthusiasm for the biological future of man, the same theory developed more precisely in Europe had led to the secret fear of the modern man that the present rich complexity of human endowments could not be materially exceeded. Even Neitzche's enthusiasm for the future of man ended in the doctrine of eternal recurrence based, according to Iqbal on the most hopeless idea of immortality ever formed by man. 56

Wholly overshadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, the modern man lives today in conflict with himself and with others. His ruthless egoism and infinite gold-hunger was gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him noth-

ing but life-weariness. Absorbed in the 'fact' that is the optically present source of sensation, he found himself entirely cut off from the unplumbed depths of his own being. Modern atheistic socialism possessing all the fervour of a new religion had a broader outlook, but having received its philosophical basis from left-wing Hegelians, it rejected the very source that could have given it strength and purpose. Igbal believed that both nationalism and athiestic socialism, at least upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion and resentment that tended to impoverish the soul of man and close up his hidden sources of spiritual energy. Neither the technique of medieval mysticism, nor nationalism, nor athiestic socialism could cure the ills of a despairing humanity. In its present cultural cirisis modern world stood in need of biological renewal. And religion, which in its higher manifestation was neither dogma, nor priesthood, nor ritual, could "alone ethically prepare the modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which the advance of modern science involves, and restore to him that attitude of faith which makes him capable of winning a personality here and retaining it hereafter. It is only by rising to a fresh vision of himself, his origin and future, his whence and wither, that man will eventually triumph over a society motivated by an inhuman competition, and a civilisation that has lost its spiritual unity by its inner conflict of religious and political values

While Europe constituted for the present the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical development, Iqbal firmly believed that Islam could yet act as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its material and geographical limitations. The Muslim was "in possession of these ultimate ideas which, speaking from the inmost depths of life, internalises its own apparent externality. With him the spiritual basis of life is a matter of conviction. . . and in view of the basic idea that there can be no further revelation binding on man the Muslims ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated people on earth". Early Muslims emerging out of the spiritual slavery of pre-Islamic Asia, Iqbal concludes, "were not in a position to realise the true significance of this basic idea. Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position reconstruct his social life in the light of the ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam",58

Bennabi's penetrating analysis of the chaos in the Muslim world leads him to the same conclusions regarding the malais of the modern civilisation, and the inner meaning and destined role of Islam as revealed in the inevitable march of history towards world unity.

The Algerian writer sums up under 'colonisibility' and 'colonisation' the factors responsible for the chaos in the Muslim world. A systematic study of these two concurrent yet distinct notions and their relation to the causes of inhibitions that have hitherto paralysed all enterprise. Modernist and Reformist, would lead to the logical conclusion that for liberating oneself from an effect —— colonialism, one must first get rid of its cause, that is, colonisibility. An analysis of the causes of inhibition would reveal that they are overwhelmingly the result of the latter, and their effects could best be seen in the political field. Instead of seeking to transform the fundamental rudimentary means at the disposal of the colonised, --- soil, time and his own genius, into more perfect means through a self-transformation, current politics, especially in N. Africa, addresses itself exclusvely to the coloniser demanding from the latter the means to change the condition of the colonisable --- the paradox of a captive who asks his jailor for the key of his cell. The easy access of certain Muslim countries to independence, due to conjecture of international strategy has confirmed the other Muslim peoples in their false hopes. But Bennabi warns them that they cannot attain a veritable freedom unless they themselves prepared its technical conditions: for ceasing to be colonised, one must cease to be colonisable.^{5 9}

While internal factors play a preponderent role in the chaos of the Muslim world, Bennabi does not minimise the eliminating role of colonialism. Its technique of disorientation directed against all dignity, nobility and modesty, adapts itself continuously to new situations, sabotaging all initiative. Since religion remained the sole and ultimate means of rebuilding the moral health of a people that in the crisis of its history he had lost all moral resort the Muslim renaissance excites its mot passionate interest, and its unbounded power and ambition had inspired it with the mad and tragic idea of halting the march of civilisation in the colonised country. To counter tajdid it has set up an artificial archiasm, complete with its puppets —— marabout, pasha or false alim, —— under the cover of Islamic taqlid, that

had become the password of colonial policy.60

Colonialism played as decisive a role in the chaos of the Western world. One could discern therein an aspect marking the ineluctible culmination of a historical process, as well as an accidental aspect due to the incidence of the colonial fact on the life, ideas and habits of more than a century, --- the two aspects confounding together in a phenomenon common to all civilisations: the retard of consciousness over science and the march of thought. Bennabi traces at length the resulting ruptures in the European society on the moral, political and social plane, that had finally culminated in a confrontation of the practical materialism of the European bourgeoise with the dialectical materialism of its proletariat. It was this period of European history marked by political, moral and social schism that coincided with the zenith of the colonial era and the first manifestations of Muslim renaissance, so that the Muslim world became conscious of European influences in its political and intellectual evolution, accumulating thus in a society burdened by its own dead and decaying ideas, the residue of another discomposition.

Drunk with the new forces that he had unleashed Europe became enticed by its own genius. It was the era of quantitatism and moral relativism when one lost all so see of the 'absolute'. The unchained eppetites of the moral relativist found full vent in the colonised territory, and never was the thirst for gold so violent as after the discovery of a colony. These two factors of 'scientism' and 'colonialism' joined together to become the fatality of Europe as theology had become that of the post-Almuhadian man. In the genesis of the phenomenon compounded by the above factors, the conflagration of the 1939 was only a return of the flame. Europe that should have used its torch of civilisation to guide the march of humanity, employed it to set aflame the colonial world. But it harvested, therefrom, the same chaos, the same disorientation and the same fatalism before the powers of mythology on its soil as it had sown in the rest of the world.

For Cartesian Europe has also its myths, inhabitive in a different fashion; while the paralysis of Post-Almuhadian society is silent and sympathetic, that of Europe is convulsive and hurling.⁶ And the ruptures and corruptions multiply and amplify each day in Europe, distorting justice, destroying conscience and awakening in the coloniser the most brutal instincts of greed, violence and

racial hatred.

To make politics, says Bennabi, coming back to the new paths that lie before the Muslim world, is in fact preparing man to make history. The post-Almuhadian man would become immune from colonial attacks when he would talk less of his rights and more of duties, less of Atlantic Charter and more of his own resources, and would have shed his inhibitive myths and rectified his manner of thinking and acting according to a pragmatic logic of action and Cartesian logic of thought. This condition sees on the way of being realised since the Palestine affair which Bennabi considers in a sense the most fortunate event in the history of the modern world. It has inaugurated a new stage in Muslim renaissance by laying bare all the false values and illusions that had hitherto distorted future perspectives and forcing a search in the profound causes of the chaos. The new spirit seems to pervade the entire Muslim consciousness, manifesting itself in the growing concern for a rise in the living standard of the common man as a precondition to his participation in the national effort, in the official pre-occupation with agrarian reform in Syria, Pakistan and Egypt, and gradual emergence of a popular consciousness that had made default in the Muslim world since Siffin —— as well as in the construction of a small path in a remote Algerian village by the unaided efforts of the villagers themselves.

While on the individual plane, the Muslim renaissance would lead to an integrated life in a non-colonisable society, on the collective plane the new stage would be marked by an original synthesis of its own Islamic genius and that of the Musim world modern world. But this calls for a deep understanding of the man and an attentive examination of the social values of Islam with the help of psychology and sociology. Only an exploration of the innermost recesses of the post-Almuhadian soul would reveal where the transformations are needed. In the past these have always been linked with personal experience of the sort wherein humanity discovered its own reality in the experience of certain men, and religion which is the historical and social expression of such experiments repeated in the course of the centuries naturally inscribed itself as the origin of all great human transformation. Man is implicated in the social life as a psycho-temporal factor. Since under the former he is essentially the 'homo religious', the religious factor directly intervenes here as the very basis of

the conscience in quest of itself. As a point of departure for all social reform, therefore, religious reform is necessary.

The Reformists posed the problem in theological terms thus missing an essential stage of the evolution, —— the spiritual, corresponding precisely to the transformation of individual and the primary transformation of social values. Instead of bringing the individual back to the era of early consciousness, it merely brought him back to that of the theological science, thus reducing itself to a 'reform of scholars' that hardly touched the masses. Bennabi finds himself in agreement with the views of Iqbal who posed the problem on quite other terms, demanding "not a science but a consciousness of God, not a theological concept but an immanence." Self-criticism within the Reformist milieu itself, and the set up of various association all over the Muslim world, show that Muslim consciousness is in search of a new path, conforming more to Iqbal's wishes. 62

Bennabi finds an evidence of the new trend in the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. The salafia made the Quran its doctrinical basis but failed to make the Quranic notion a living reality in the thought and compartment of the post-Almohadian man. However, truth if it never become the catalyser of a radical transformation of fundamental sociological factors into a social synthesis, thus establishing an organic rapport between a social doctrine and its object. It is by utilising the Quranic verse, not as a mere word, but as a notion revealed that Hasan El-Banna overwhelms the consciousness, turning it into a living verb, "a light... that illuminates and guides, a source of energy that galvanises the wills. It is not the theological and rational God that he manifests, but the acting, immanent God of whom the first Muslims felt physically the presence and breath at Badr and Honain..." ⁶³

The execution of El Banna and the subversion of the movement by his successors⁶ does not detract from the value of his religious experience, and Bennabi believes that just as Ibn Taimiya's ideas have surged in modern Islam in the form of *Islah*, those of El-Banna could not henceforth be separated from the evolution of the Muslim world, where they have renewed the 'moral tension' and opened perhaps the first positive tentative of a bio-historical synthesis aiming to bridge across history the rupture that began at Siffin.

Though the Muslim world cannot seek guidance from a Western world itself on the verge of apoplexy, Bennabi states while reviewing the evolution of the Muslim against the background of world evolution, it cannot achieve its evolution in isolation either. For integrating itself efficaciously in the world evolution, it must know the world, know itself, and make itself known and proceed to an evaluation of its own values as well as of all the values that constitute human patrimony — a task rendered difficult by the absence of the di for lack of a discipline of controlled thinking. However, since the Palestine affair a critical spirit and a concern for method is evident in the judgements and actions of the Muslim world, even if it has not yet resulted in overall concented action.

While scientific and economic factors have put the world in a state of pre-federation, the ideas on the contrary have maintained their old ferment of discord, marking at its most violents the imbalance between a retarded consciousness and progressive science. The latter has abolished space, leaving between peoples only the distance of their culture, that has but increased to think only of the illiterate beggar in Africa and the man detonating the atom in U. S. or U.S.S.R. The world has become a tiny, extremely inflammable ball where the fire that touches one end could immediately spread to the other. It marks the turning of a new page in history: Humanity must be one or cease to be. Yet world leaders seem intent on patching up the old edifice instead of making room for the new world that is bound to come with or without them. However, for the moment this contradiction between facts and ideas is tragic. What could the declarations of 'human rights' could signify to the 'native' brute in Asia or Africa. Underlying it all is a materialist culture that could promote an empire or an imperialism but not a civilisation.

Endowed with all the inertia of matter, this culture is incapable of following the evolution of its own products, immured in this contradiction by its own Cartesian method. One is pre-occupied not with 'finality' but only with 'causality'. One knows how to fashion the matter, but not how to render it useful to man. Europe has become technical but ceased to be moral — no longer able to discover the human perspectives beyond the limits of the world defined solely in material terms, numerical or quantitative. A civilisation finding its equilibrium between the spiritual

and the temporal, between causality and finality. A breakdown in this balance had plunged the Muslim civilisation into the metaphysical anarchy of the maraboutic chaos; one witnesses today another experiment ending in another imbalance: the Western civilisation, having lost its spiritual direction finds itself on the brink of disaster.

Thus for the Muslim world it is no more a question of separating values but of coupling together science and conscience, physics and metaphysics, ethics and technique, in order to realise a world according to the law of its causes and the imperative of its ends. Despite his colonisibility, the post-Almuhadian man has retained an essential sense of the moral value. At the same time Islam is on the way of renewing itself thanks to the Cartesian spirit. This synthesis is bound to gain momentum once problems are tackled with the scientific spirit that singularly shortens the stages and eliminates those unnecessary. The Palestine affair has underlined the necessity of such a course while opening new paths in the light of past lessons. 65

The disintegration of the colonial world has laid bare the profound sense of history, revealing at the same time the unity of problems and needs in the world and the necessity of re-adjusting rapports among peoples. Colonialism and nationalism are alike condemned as being incompatible with an international existence not based on force; one could not form part of a human order when one is colonised and coloniser. The world is on the way of realising institutionally the direction of history. 'Liberalism' cedes place to a rational order that tends towards general harmony, not in accordance with utopian plans, with the strict law of vital necessities. The Muslim world would have to take count of this decisive step of history in its evolution. Formulas such as pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism are henceforth absolete, just as pan-Europeanism that one seeks to resurrect at Strasbourg.

Though still grasped only on a spatial plane, the unity of the world has always been the essential phenomenon of history, while the divisions constituted were accidents, the epiphenomena. If it escapes the cartesian spirit, it is because its formative culture ascribes the commencement of history and thought to the foundation escape of Rome and the establishment of Athenian academies. The Muslim world, on the other hand, by its very atavism is already half-way towards the new world. Even if backward, the

post-Almuhadian man realises better than the 'civilised' man the psychological conditions of the new man —— the 'citizen of the world'. While he must still use all his faculties of adaptation to attain the technical level of the atomic age, his role remains, above all spiritual as moderator of materialist thought and notion of nationalist egoisms. Already while tracing the path of its spiritual renaissance, the Algerian thinker points out, Igbal had called for the Muslim world a turn of spirit capable of considering things and institutions 'not from the standpoint of social advantage or disadvantage to this or that country, but from the point of view of the larger prupose which is being gradually worked out in the life of mankind as a whole . . . 66 This metaphysics of Igbal, Bennabi comments, may doubtless shock spirits warped by a rationalism for which all that escapes the ponderable dimensions seems irrational, but is bound to command the attitude of the man in the new world.

For seizing the integral sense of history, one must adopt the cosmic point of view. Bennabi refers to the Swiss historian Gustave Jacqier, who after studying a four thousand years' slice of Egyptian history arrived at certain significant conclusions. He discerned, on one hand, a civilisation that follows a path rising in gentle ascent, a harmonious line traversing smoothly the millinairs. and on the other, the political upheavals, the human drama with all its contingencies of joy and sorrow. The distinction between two orders of facts. Bennabi comments, in no way breaks their unity. The link between the two is of a dialectical nature: Man is the fundamental condition of all civilisation and civilisation fixes the human condition. Seized in their total human perspective even the most ordinary facts acquire a significative complexity. Likewise certain historical events surpass the framework of simple rational interpretation founded on immediate human factor. For example a rational study of the life and character of Tamerlane fails to explain why he chose to destroy the Golden Horde as well as the army of Bayazid, thereby defeating their plans to conquer Europe. To understand what Toynbee terms 'blindness' of the great warrior that defied all considerations of dynastic rights, personal ambition and religious sentiment, one would have to envisage these events not in terms of their causality but of their finality in history, —— that is, to demand what would have happened if Toghtamish and Bayazid had been allowed to pursue their inten-

tions. In such a case, Europe would have passed under the trium phant sceptor of temporal Islam, and more significantly, the nascent renaissance of Europe would have melted into the Timourid renaissance. But though equally brilliant, the two did not possess the same significance. "The one was the commencement of a new order, the other, end of an order drawing to its term. Had Tamerlane followed but his personal impulse, nothing would have saved the entire world from the night that was slowly stealing over the Muslim lands. . . The saga of the Tatar emperor illuminates a finality of history since it had had a conclusion that conformed to the continuity of civilisations ——— so that its cycles may succeed each other, and the relay of genius continue on the path of progress. A cycle born in certain psycho-temporal conditions develops therefrom, and when human civilisation has passed them by, it is a cycle that stops. Another commences in new conditions that would, in their turn, be by-passed. It is this law that traces across the millenium this 'path mounting in gentle ascent' which humanity slowly scales. The finality of history confounds itself with that of the man."67

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NOTES:

- 22. Malek Bennabi, Vocation de 1 'Islam, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1954, pp. 167.
- 23. Bennabi regards the year 1369 as the point of deflaction in Muslim history and civilisation. Since it coincided with the Almuhadian empire in North Africa and Spain, Bennabi uses the term 'post-Almuhadian' to denote the era of Muslim decadency.
- 24. Malek Bennabi, Vocation de 1 'Islam, Paris, Edition du seuil 1954.
- 25. "... It cannot be detained that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity—by which expression I mean a social structure, regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical order—has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of Muslims of India. . . India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam as a people-building force has worked at its best. . . What I mean to say is that Muslim society with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity has grown to be, what it is under the pressure of laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. . . "Claiming that the formation of a Muslim state would be in the interest of both Islam and India, he observed that it would provide Islam, "an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arab Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, culture and to bring them in

- closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times. . . ." (Iqbal, 1930, Address) Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, (compiled by) Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement, Lahore Publishers United.
- 26. Bennabi op. cit., p. 78.
- 27. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, (Reprinted) 1944.
- 28. Iqbal, op. cit. pp. 141-142.
- 29. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944.
- 30. Ibid., p. 81-82.
- 31. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore. Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944, p. 23.
- 32. Iqbal, op. cit. p. 51.
- 33. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, p. 123.
- 34. Ibid., p. 13.
- 35. Ibid., pp. 2-7.
- 36. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, 1944, p. 9.
- 37. Ibid., pp. 154-155.
- 38. Bennabi, op. cit. pp. 23-26.
- 39. Iqbal, op. cit. p. 187.
- 40. The term 'marabout' originally meaning a pious man, is used in a derogative sense by Bennabi to denote religious quacks. It is equivalent to our own term 'pir', as employed (and denounced) by Iqbal in his work.
- 41. Bennabi, op. cit. pp. 26-27.
- 42. Ibid., p. 77.
- 43. Bennabi, op. cit. pp. 97.
- 44. Iqbal, op. cit. p. 162.
- 45. Bennabi is referring to Gibb's criticism of Iqbal' estimate of Afghani. See Gibb, op. cit. pp. 28-29.
- 46. Bennabi, op. cit. p. 47.
- 47. It may be noted that Iqbal too considered Siffin as a point of deviation that led 'Arab Imperialism' and stultified the growth of those germs of an economic and democratic organisation of society that he found scattered up and down the pages of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet that was not all'''.... The practical materialism of the opportunist Omayyid rulers of Damascus needed a peg on which to hang their misdeeds at Karbala and to secure the fruits of Amir Muawiya's revolt against the possibilities of a popular rebellion. Thus arose despite protest from Muslim divines a morally degrading Fatalism and the constitutional theory known as the 'fait accompli', in order to support

vested interest. . . Since Muslims have always sought the justification of their varying attitudes in the Quran, even though at the expense of its plain meaning, the fatalistic interpretation has had very farreaching effects on Muslim peoples. . . "Iqbal, op. cit. pp. 110-111.

- 48. Bennabi has taken the quotation from Gibb (op. cit. p. 78) who does not present it in full. See Iqbal, op. cit. p. 7.
- 49. Bennabi. op. cit. p.63. One is strongly reminded of Iqbal's emphasis on the dialectical link between intuition and thought, ideal and real, outlined above.
- 50. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit. pp. 121-124.
- 51. Iqbal, op. cit. p. 159.
- 52. Iqbal, 1930 Address, Jamil-ud-Din ahmad, op. cit. pp. 135-136.
- 53. Ibid., pp. 146-147.
- 54. Iqbal, op. cit. pp. 140-141 & 167.
- 55. Ibid., pp. 178-179.
- 56. Ibid., pp. 185-186.
- 57. Iqbal, op. cit. pp. 186-188.
- 58. Ibid. p. 179.
- 59. Like Bennabi Iqbal is emphatic that transformation of society could not come about externally through mere institutional or legal reform, but only through a self-transformation of the individual. Calling upon the Indian muslims to rely on themselves alone he said: "... the whole community needs a complete overhauling of its present mentality in order that it may again become capable of feeling the urge of fresh desires and ideals. The Indian muslim has long ceased to explore the depths of his own inner life. The result is that he has ceased to live in the full glow and colour of life, and is consequently in danger of an ummanly compromise with forces which he is made to think, he cannot vanquish in open conflict. . . . The lesson that past experience has brought to you must be taken to heart. Expect nothing from any side. Concentrate your whole ego on yourself alone and ripen your clay into real manhood if you wish to see your aspirations realised. . . . The flame of life cannot be borrowed from others; it must be kindled in the temple of one's own soul". (Address at the sesson of A.I.M.C. Lahore 1932), Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, op. cit. pp. 154-155.
- 60. One is strongly reminded of the *rind*, *faqih*, *mir* and *pir* of Iqbal's poetry.
- 61. One finds a remarkable illustration of Bennabi's observation in the marked contrast between the products of the paralysis of the two societies,—the *pir* or *marabout* of the Muslim society, and the hippy of the Western society.
- 62. It is remarkable how Bennabi grasps Iqbal's concept of religion so similar to his own from Gibb's scanty references to it. Discussing the final goal of religious experience Iqbal said ".... The final act is not an

- 63. Bennabi, op. cit. p. 143.
- 64. Just before the publication of his work in 1954, Bennabi following a visit to the Middle East, added a postcript, saying that while his views remained valid as far as the personal experience of El-Banna was concerned, they no longer applied to the movement itself which under its new direction seemed to have become a political instrument, despoiled of its civilising character and tending to utilise religion for certain immediate practical ends. Bennabi, op. cit., Below p. 144.
- 65. Ibid. pp. 149-153.
- 66. Iqbal, op. cit. p. 167.
- 67. Bennabi, op. cit. pp. 159-160. One is tempted to apply to Bennabi what Iqbal said to Ibn Khaldun—that only a Muslim with his inherited and inherent sense of the universal and his belief in the unity of human origin and dynamic nature of the universe, could soar so high above petty religious, racial or national considerations, to present such a staggering, sweeping vision of history.

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IQBAL AND SANAI

Sanai is the first great Sufi poet of Persian language who set the tradition of presenting mystical thought in mathnawi form. As such he is the forerunner of 'Attar and Rumi who developed their genres on Sani's famous mathnawi Hadiqatul-Haqiqat Rumi had even the humility to say:

And again:

Sanai has inspired other poets too. Khaqani claimed to be Sanai's successor in the following line:

Nizami Ganjvi also composed his Makhzanul-Asrar in emulation of *Hadigatul-Hagigat*

Apart from Rumi, whom Iqbal regards as his spiritual guide and preceptor, he has admired many Persian poets and accepted the influence of some of them in thought or expression. Amongst these, he has not only paid tribute to Sanai in open words, but has also revealed a marked identity of thought and emotion with the great mystic poet. There are direct references to Sanai in various works of Iqbal, namely, Musafir, Bal-i Jibril, Darb-i Kalim and Armaghan-i Hijaz

The closest contact with Sanai, however, is established in

Musafir, in which Iqbal has given an account of his visit to Afghanistan in 1933 at the invitation of King Nadir Shah. The poet travelled right upto Ghaznin to pay homage to the sage. In his account of this visit, Iqbal draws a close parallel between himself and Hakim Sanai in the following words:

The similarity is striking. Both exult in the joy of spiritual experience. While Sanai, says Iqbal, reveals the unhidden beauty of faith, his own thought lays bare the destiny of the faithful, Both derive their inspiration from the Quran. While Sanai talks about God, the ultimate Truth, Igbal concerns himself with men of God. With his characteristic humility, Iqbal beseeches the sage for a message to fight the tyranny of the age offensive nationalism and Western imperialism on the one hand, and disarray and schism in the ranks of the faithful on the other. This is rather significant, because Sanai himself was painfully conscious of the evils of his own times and believed that he had a vital message for his age. After imploring him for a message, Iqbal speaks out his own mind on subjects like 'Faqr', sovereignty, love, religion, materialism, spiritualism, and the rise of a new Adam; and ends his messages on the inevitable characteristic final note of hope and cheer. One of Iqbal's outstanding poems in Bal-i Jabril has been composed on the model of Sanai's famous Qasida "Dar Magam-i Ahl-i Tauhid" which opens with the following line:

Iqbal's poem, which is preluded with an acknowledgement of Sanai's inspiring poem begins with the following couplet:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IQBAL AND SANAI

And the poet ends his poem again with a tribute to Sanai's profound thought:

In Darb-i Kalim Iqbal has described an imaginary meeting in the heavens between Sanai and Rumi in which the former on a word from Mansur-i Hallaj pleasantly surprises Rumi with the tidings of a new iconoclast in the East who, at long last, has divulged the secret of the Self:

Iqbal's infatuation with Sanai lasted all his life. In his posthumous work *Armaghan-i Hijaz* the poet has prayed to God to grant him Sanai's virtues.

The striking similarity between some of the fundamental ideas of Iqbal and Sanai begins with their glorification of the gospel of love. For Sanai, spiritual experience is the guiding light which reveals the mystery of life. He was one of the earliest Sufi poets who decried discursive reason as an uncertain means of true knowledge of the Universe and believed in love as the only way to perceive Reality. He scorns pure reason as a poor guide, even blind in its voyage of discovery and only leads to astonishment and stupefaction:

Again:

However, the poet would concede a substantial role to reason in probing the mystery of the Universe provided it could blend itself with the emotion of life and respond to the callings of the heart:

He is aspiring for the same 'hikmat-i jan' when he warns against the dangers of knowledge equipped with the mundane passions of life:

Reason or intellect must, in any case, subordinate itself to the all-pervading influence of love to play its destined role in life:

Sanai's concept of love has assumed vast dimensions in Rumi and Iqbal's system of thought. But the essentials are the same. Love is the guiding force of life. Discursive reason, on the other hand, is doomed to perpetual scepticism and failure. According to Iqbal:

If Sanai believes:

Iqbal repeats the same idea:

And if Sanai assigns a special position to reason and knowledge and wishes it to be fortified with 'hikmat-i jan', Iqbal also holds that reason by its righteous conduct is able to create the desire to see beauty in all its original glory; only it lacks the desperate courage:

Therefore, like Sanai, he proposes that reason should subject its activity to the dictates of love:

He believes that when permeated by love, intellect becomes fully identified with spiritual experience. In his lectures Iqbal observes:

"In fact intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect."

Sanai and Iqbal both believe in man's vital mission of the conquest of the Universe. Sanai has ardently described man's ultimate goal as far beyond the low earth. He is a constant traveller on celestral paths unknown; the moon is only the next stage:

The poet visualises man's victory over the entire cosmic phenomenon and describes his mastery of the Universe with excited joy and pride:

Iqbal is fascinated by Sanai's sublime thought and picturesque imagery. The idea of soaring high in the heavens recurs in his works with ever greater stress and ardour. To give a few instances:

Man's superiority in the Universe is one of the fundamentals of Iqbal's thought. In one of his earliest works Rumuz-i Bikhudi he lays down the conquest of the Universe as an essential requisite for full expression of the collective personality of the 'Millat'. The words and the style employed here have a striking resemblence with Sanai's above-mentioned lines. Iqbal says:

Not only have stars and planets been declared as man's servile

agents, but also the same vocabulary and imagery as employed by Sanai have been reproduced. Iqbal's line:

appeares to be an inspired paraphrase of Sanai's:

Both Sanai and Iqbal have pointed out the hazards which lie between man and his ideal. Only rarely does a man of destiny achieve it. Sanai has expressed this concept in a string of metaphors and allusions which culminate in the following rare exceptions:

Iqbal supports Sanai's concept with still greater force and conviction:

This rare realization of the ideal dismays both the poets with a feeling of unfulfilment and inadequacy. Both suffer from an acute sense of loneliness and lack of the ideal man. In Sanai this sense of loss takes the following shape:

Iqbal has expressed equally wistful cravings for a companion who could share his lofty ideas and come up to his ideals. In his prayer in *Asrar-i Khudi* he thus opens his heart:

Both Sanai and Iqbal stress the eternity of the soul and have scant respect for death. They treat it as a mere pause in the dynamic process of life. Sanai is stirred by the approach of death with a sense of delight and fulfilment:

Iqbal strikes the same note when he welcomes death with a smile:

Both regard death as the gate to eternity and welcome it as the beginning of a higher and fuller life. Sanai says:

Iqbal expresses precisely the same reaction to death:

For Sanai death is the message of deliverance and freedom for a life spent in pursuit of noble ideals:

Iqbal conveys the same idea in a different way:

Sanai and Iqbal have a remarkably identical approach towards Tasawwuf. Iqbal firmly rejects all mystical theories like neo-Platonism which run counter to the Islamic concept of a dynamic and creative life. He is very clear on this point and in one of his letters he has defined mysticism as "discovering ultimate source of the law within the depth of one's own consciousness". And he has repeated this in his lectures in another context. Again he emphasises:

Iqbal is intolerant of a system which encourages a "lifedenying and fact-avoiding attitude of mind". Sanai anticipates Iqbal by his exclusive devotion to religious law and subordinating mystical experience to dictates of religion. His attitude towards mysticism is amply revealed in the following couplet:

And again:

This attitude is radically different from his successor Attar who as a profound protagonist of "Wahdatul-Wajud" would say:

Iqbal has succinctly communicated Sanai's point of view in a dialogue with the latter during his visit to the saint's tomb in Ghaznin in the following words:

Another common factor in their thought is their profound love for the Holy Prophet of Islam. Iqbal's poetry bears an eloquent testimony to this boundless devotion. Whenever he speaks of the Holy Prophet he does so with a rare sense of dedication and love expressed in lines of lasting loveliness and grandeur. Sanai has also composed a number of poems in love and glorification of the Holy Prophet. It is in view of this fact that Iqbal has made Hakim Sanai convey the following message to Muslims:

In the field of expression and technique Sanai has left some mark on Iqbal's poetry. A comparative study of the two poets reveals some interesting common features. At least two of Iqbal's lyrics can be quoted as an instance. They reveal not only Sanai's influence on form, but also on the poet's mood and emotion. One of Iqbal's 'ghazals' partly reads as follows:

Sanai's "ghazal" opens with the following couplets:

Iqbal has followed the same metre and the same delicate cadence. It is soft, slow and slumberous as in case of Sanai. Iqbal's line

تأكيتجن فل آزمائي

seems to be a paraphrase of Sanai's

تاکے بود از توسیے وفائی

Similarly the desire pulsating lqbal's heart

is not very different from Sanai's wistful yearning

Both the lyrics are characterized by the same wistful charm, deep listlessness and a poignant emotion. But whereas Iqbal has meticulously specified the Beloved, Sanai, one of the forerunners of symbolism in Persian poetry, has preferred to be ambiguous.

The other two lyrics are infused with an altogether different spirit. Their rapid music and rhythmic precision are in harmony with the force and passion of their themes. Here are a few verses from Sanai:

چورُخ براب آری اسے مر بشراب اندر اقب ل کیا دوبد در عین حباب اندر اگر توست کم اے جان شگفت کہ در قرت ورّاج عمت بی شد چوں شد بعقاب اندر ا اندر اند

And here is a selection from Iqbal's lyric:

While Sanai's 'ghazals' rings with exuberant emotion, Iqbal's lyric presents a blend of thought and emotion. On a close study the two poems reveal some exceedingly interesting features. Sanai sings of the beauty and glory of love and Iqbal of the power and immensity of the self. However, both agree on self-expression

in a big way. Sanai's phrase "Johar-i ruh" comes close to Iqbal's favourite term 'khudi' although he has himself defined it as 'johar-i ishq". The proximity however, is highly significant:

Apart from this striking inter-relationship drawn between love and ego both have used the rather exhilarating symbol of fragrance (bu) for these two fundamental concepts of their poetry.

Sanai has found a significant simile in 'uqab' or eagle, which is one of the most favourite symbols in Iqbal's poetry. Sanai is also fascinated by this bird although he uses it as a mere simile or metaphor and not as a powerful symbol.

Iqbal has borrowed a couple of epithets from Sanai's poem "Dar Maqam-i Ahl-i Tauhid" mentioned earlier. A couplet of this famous poem reads as:

In his poem composed in emulation of this 'Qasideh', Iqbal employs the epithet "Chadur-i Zahara" with still greater irony in an exceedingly tragic situation. He says:

Again Iqbal has drawn on Sanai's vocabulary. Sanai looks upon "khishtan dari" as an essential requisite of love. He says:

Iqbal defines love itself as "khishtan dari":

In the same poem Iqbal has inserted the second hemistich of Sanai's following verse:

Apart from this he has been inspired to reproduce almost the same idea in a separate couplet which reads as follows:

Iqbal has been so fascinated by Sanai's imagery that at times he repeats it with a gay abandon, albeit with an added gusto and passion. Sanai was amongst the earliest Persian poets who employed wholly sensuous imagery to portray the mystical experience. This has remained an uninterrupted tradition down to our times. Iqbal has actually enhanced the symbolic tradition by giving entirely new meanings and values to some old symbols. At times, however, he borrows Sanai's symbols and images. For Sanai tresses form a favourite symbol of ravishing beauty. One of his couplets which portrays the poet's yearnings for a glimpse of the beloved's tresses has prompted Iqbal to reproduce the same picturesque image both in Persian and Urdu. Sanai says:

Ighal repeats it with an added spell of melody:

And the same restless desire persists in Urdu in the following couplet:

Last but not least, the two great poets have hit upon the fascinating idea of conveying their message by a description of imaginary journies through the heavens. Sanai's mathnawi Sayrul-Ibad ilal-Ma'ad is, in this respect, a forerunner of Iqbal's 'Javid Namah''. Although the latter is a work of far greater import and

magnitude both in point of thought and imagination, yet it was preceded by Sanai's above-mentioned mathnawi by eight centuries. Incidentally Sanai's work, the first of its kind in Persian, preceded Ibnul Arabi's al-Futuhatul-Makkiyyeh by about one hundred and Dante's Divine Comedy by two hundred years.

Ibqal exulted in the thought that he shared the fiery passion which Sanai had first evoked in Rumi's heart:

عےروش زیاک مِن فرور تخیت نوشام دسے کہ در دامانم آونجیت نصیب از آستشے دارم کہ اول سسنائی از دل دومی برامجیت

Sanai, for Iqbal, was a paragon of truth and sincerity. That is why he prayed to God to bless him with the same virtues:

عطاكن صدق وانعلاص سنائي

IQBAL AND BHARTRIHARI

It is well known that 'Allama Iqbal had studied the works of various old scholars and poets in different languages and had gained much knowledge from these works. Amongst those who impressed him the most was the ancient Sanskrit poet Bhartrihari who flourished in the first century before Christ in the vicinity of Ujjain in India. Firstly he was a king at Ujjain and then he became an ascetic. During his princehood he had composed one hundred stanzas or shlokas regarding love affairs known as "Shringara-shataka"; during his reign he had composed one hundred shlokas regarding political and ethical affairs known as "Niti-shataka"; and during his ascetic life he had composed one hundred shlokas regarding ascetism known as "Vairagya-shataka". The word "shataka" literally means "a collection of one hundred stanzas".

Before I say something about the life and time of the eminent Sanskrit poet Bhartrihari and about his influence on Allama Iqbal, I want to draw the attention of the audience to the Urdu couplet of Allama Iqbal which is written on the title page of his Urdu book "Bale-e-Jibrel".

This Urdu couplet is a faithful and concise translation of the 6th shloka of Bhartrihari's Nitishataka, and Allama Iqbal has clearly written the name of Bhartrihari under this couplet which runs thus:

پھول کی بتی سے کٹ سکتہ ہے ہے کا جگر مرونا داں پر کلام نرم و نازک بے اثر

Translation: "Is it possible to cut the innermost portion of a diamond with a petal of flower? (No. Similarly)

"Soft and tender words are ineffective on an ignorant man".

Obviously the first line of this Urdu couplet is written in a negative interrogation, the answer of which is "No". Therefore a note of interrogation should be placed at the end of the first line. But there are such scholars also who maintain that this line is a simple statement and there should be no note of interrogation at the end of the line. So they read this couplet in this way: —

پمول کی پی سے کے سے کتاہے ہے کا جگر مرونا داں پر کلام نرم و نازک بے اثر

Translation: "(Even) The innermost portion of a diamond can be cut by a petal of flower, (but) soft and tender words are ineffective on an ignorant man".

Earlier in the year 1937 i.e. one year before the death of Allama Iqbal, this controversy arose at the Aligarh Muslim University between a student Nawabzada Rahat Said Khan of Chhatari and his teacher Professor Al-i-Ahmad Surur. This incident has been mentioned in the Urdu book "Ruzgar-e-Faqir" part one written by Faqir Waheed-ud-Din. In order to put to an end this controversy a letter was sent to Allama Iqbal at Lahore who sent its reply to Aligarh in the following words: —

Translation: "Both the meanings are good in their own right, but, what, I want to say, will be better understood in the time to come".

In this letter Allama Iqbal had purposely avoided a clear cut reply, because it required a detailed description and Allama Iqbal's health did not allow him to write lengthy letters. So he left it for the future time to settle this issue. The future time anticipated by Allama Iqbal forty years ago has now come and I quote below the original shloka of Bhartrihari.

व्यालं बालमृणालतन्तुभिरसौ रोद्धं समुज्जूम्भते छेत्तुं वत्रमणीञ्छिरीपकुसुमप्रान्तेन संनद्धते।

माधुय्यं मधुविन्दुना रचियतुं क्षाराम्बुधेरीहते, नेतुं वाञ्छतियःखलानपथिसतांसूक्तेःसुधास्यन्दिभिः।६

Translation:

"As it is not possible to tie up an elephant by means of a rope made of the tender threads of the stem of a young lotus, as it is not possible to pierce a diamond by means of delicate fibers of "shrisha" flower, and as it is not possible to sweeten the saltish water of an Ocean by means of a drop of honey, similarly it is also not possible to make wicked persons follow the path of noble persons by means of nectar-like sweet and soft words".

By examining the meanings of the original shloka of Bhartrihari we can clearly understand that the first line of the Urdu couplet of Allama Iqbal is in the form of a negative interrogation meaning thereby "No, it is not possible to cut the innermost portion of a diamond by means of a petal of flower". As Allama Iqbal has written the name of Bhartrihari under this couplet, there is no reason to presume that he might have changed the basic construction of the original shloka by saying "Yes" instead of "No", especially when the central idea of both the versions remains the same. It should also be appreciated that although Allama Iqbal has translated only half of the shloka, yet the main idea of Bhartrihari has been faithfully conveyed.

An important point about this translation is also to be noted. In the original shloka the word "Khala रवली" is used which means "wicked" and it should have been translated in Urdu as instead of "Inis variation is most probably due to the fact that Allama Iqbal had read the English translation of this shloka in the book of Prohit Gopi Nath M.A. which was first published in Bombay in the year 1896 A.D. and its second edition was published in the year 1914 A.D. In those days this book was more popular than other books on the subject. In this book the word "Khala" has been erroneously translated as "Blockhead" instead of "Wicked". This mistake could not have been noticed by Allama Iqbal, and so it is reflected in the Urdu couplet as well, because the translation of "Blockhead" has been correctly done as "Ich will be about the subject of this alteration of But. In spite of this alteration of

words, the Urdu couplet of Allama Iqbal has not lost its pristin force, because in many other shlokas of similar meanings and similar construction Bhartrihari has used the words which mean "Blockhead" instead of "Wicked". A photo copy of page 64 of the book refered to above is given on the next page which contains this shloka alongwith its Hindi and English translations and the relevant footnotes. It is clear from this photo copy that Prohit Gopi Nath has also erroneously translated the word "Madhu " as Nectar instead of Honey. The word Madhu has indeed both the meanings, but in this place the appropriate meaning is Honey and not Nectar. In the Hindi translation, however, he has correctly translated the word "Khala" as "Wicked person "."

As regards the greatness of Bhartarihari, Allama Iqbal had a very high opinion about him. Besides, he had also read many other Sanskrit works through English translations. He had also translated Gayatri Mantra and its underlying idea into Urdu poetry. In his Persian work "Javed Namah", his masterpiece. Allama Iqbal has praised Bhartrihari indirectly through the mouth of Maulana Rumi. Here he has placed him in the highest Heaven (i.e.the ninth Heaven) known as Jannatal-Firdaus while he has placed the great ancient Indian sage Rishi Vishwamittra (whom he calls Jahan Dust) in the first Heaven which belongs to Moon. Even the great poet Ghalib and the great poetess Qurratul Ain Tahira have not been given this high position whom he has placed in the sixth Heaven which belongs to Jupiter. He has, however, not assigned the fourth Heaven to anybody which belongs to Sun Either he thinks that this Heaven is not inhabitable on account of the burning heat of sun, or he has reserved it for himself. By the word "Heavens" (اللاك) he means the known distances of various heavenly bodies from earth in the ascending order.

In the paradise Allama Iqbal learns many things from Bhartrihari. As mentioned in Javed Namah, two of them being most important; firstly, the fire of poetry is kindled by the burning desires, and secondly, Heaven and Hell are the result of good and bad actions. These things were already known to Allama Iqbal through Islamic Teachings, but Bhartrihari had pressed these points in a unique style of his own Allama Iqbal has identified himself here with the "Zinda Rud" and the name of Bhartriव्यालं बालमृणालतन्तुभिरसौ रोढुं समुज्जुम्भते छेत्तुं वज्रमणीञ्छरीषकुसुमप्रान्तेन सनह्यते। माधुय्यं मधुबिन्दुना रचयितुं क्षाराम्बुधरीहते, नेतुं वाञ्छतियःखलान्पथिसतांसुक्तैःसुधास्यन्दिभिः।६

अपनी अमृतमय शिक्षाओंसे दुष्टपुरुषोंको सन्मार्गमें लानेकी अभिलापा करना ऐसाही अनुचित है जैमा कि कोमल कमल-नालसे मत्तगजराजको रोकना, शिरीपपुष्पके सुकुमार अग्रभगसे कठोर वज्रमणिको छेदन करना, अथवा अमृतके विदुसे अपार क्षारसमुद्रको मधुर करनेका साहस है ॥ ६ ॥

The endeavours of a man to bring a blockhead to the right path by the influence of his wise and mellifluous words are nowise better than the fruitless efforts of one who ventures to keep an elephant fast bound by means of the delicate threads of a lotus stem, or to pierce a diamond by the tender fibres of shirisa, or to sweeten the saline waters of the vast ocean by pouring a single drop of nectar into its midst.

Also found in the Vairagya Sataka (देशायशतक) of Padmananda (पदानंद कवि) at No. 54. Cf.—

गुणपरिचितामार्यो वाणी न बस्पति दुर्बनिश्वरमपि बळाध्माते लोहे कुतःकनकाङ्गतिः॥'' (Attributed to मर्नुहरि in the शार्ङ्गचरपद्धति । १७०)-

Facsimile of the page 64 of English Translation by Prohit Gopi Nath.

⁽a) "दुर्बनःसम्मनीकर्तुं परनेनाऽपि न शन्यते। संस्कारेणापि लग्नुनं कःसुगन्धीकरिष्यति"॥ (सुमापितावितः। १८७। B. S. S. No. XXXI,).

⁽b) "न विषममृतं कर्तुं शक्यं प्रयत्नशतैरापे स्वजवि कडुतां न स्वां निम्बः स्थितोऽपि प्योद्गदे।

hari has been persianized by him as "Bartarihari" or "Bartari". The lines in which Allama Iqbal speaks of Bhartarihari are as under:—

صحبت باشاعر بهندي برتري مبري

> ٠٠ زيره رود

اے گھنتی تحتر بلے لنواز مشرق انگفت رِقود اللے ان شعروا سوزاز تحب آیڈ تجوے ازخودی یا از حن لایڈ کجوے

برتری ہری

کن نداند در حبان شاعر کجاست پردهٔ او از م و زبر نواست

پیش بردان سنی گیرد قرار شعرداموزاز سمت ماردوست گرترا آید میشراین مست می توان بردن دن از حور مبشت آن دل گرسے که دارد دکیت او جان مارا لذت اندر بستجوت الے تواز ماک بخی سست میم ام باد و بیتے درجان سنگ و خشت

. . زنده زود

این فدایان نک ایزسنگ ندوزشت برتر سے سبت که دوراست زدیروزکشت سجده بے ذوق علی خشک و نجابے ترسد ندگانی سم سرکردار چرنیا و میلی نشت فاکش گریم توسی سے کرکندا ندیم سکو سی اثریزدان نمیت برخدا زنست میم آن برشت که بردوک ورثت بیش آئین کا فاست عمل سحب و گذار زائد خیزد زعمل دوزخ واعراف و بهشت بیش آئین کا فاست عمل سحب و گذار زائد خیزد زعمل دوزخ واعراف و بهشت

Translation

Meeting with the Indian poet Bartarihari

My mournings roused fire in the hearts of Houris. One of them drew her head out of her tent, and another one showed her face through the window and looked at me. I gave the sufferings of that land (i.e. Kashmir) to every heart in that eternal Paradise. The pious old man (i.e. Maulana Rumi who was acting as a guide of Zinda Rud) smiled and said, "Oh 'India-born' magician, behold that Indian poet, by virtue of whose eye-sight even a dew-drop is transformed into a pearl. The name of that poet is Bartari, and his nature is like a rainy cloud. He has always plucked fresh buds from the garden, and he has been attracted towards us because of your melody. Although he is a king and a poet.

yet his rank in asceticism also is very high. He composes beautiful verses with high imagination, and a world of meanings always remains hidden in his stanzas. He is conversant with the structure of life; he is like king Jamshid and his verses are like the bowl of Jamshid (through which the whole world could be seen)".

We (i.e. 'Allama Iqbal and Maulana Rumi) stood up as a mark of respect for his poetry, and thereafter we arranged a meeting with him.

Zinda Rud

Oh thou wise and affectionate poet, the whole East has learnt secrets from the poetry! Tell us, where-from comes the fire in poetry? Does it come from 'self" or from God?

Bartarihari

Nobody knows the whereabout of a poet in this world. He remains hidden behind the curtain of the high and low notes of his own melody. His burning heart remains restless in his breast even before God. We (poets) feel delight in quest, and the fire of poetry comes out of the burning desires. Oh you always drunk with the wine of poetry, if you attain this stage, it is possible for you in this world of stones and bricks to win even the hearts of Houris of Paradise.

Zinda Rud

I have observed that the Indians remain entangled in various thoughts. Here is the time for you to tell us openly the secrets of truth

Bartarihari

"These frail gods are made of stones and bricks. Those, who remain far from temple and church, are better. Worship without delight of action is dry and ill-placed. Life is wholly constituted by character, whether good or bad. I tell you a word openly which is not known to every-body, and he is lucky who keeps it in his heart. This world which you behold is not made as such by the Providence. It is like a "charkha" or wheel which is driven by yourself, and the thread, which is made on its spindle, is also due to your own efforts. So, bow your head before the Law of actions and their outcome, because it is only due to your actions that you earn either Hell or Heaven or none".

All the ideas expressed in these lines can be easily traced in the three shatakas of Bhartrihari either directly or indirectly. The last two couplets mentioned above, are but a faithful translation of the 94th shloka of Niti-shataka of Bhartrihari, which is reproduced below:—

नमस्यामो देवान्ननु हतविधेस्तेऽपि वशगा विधिर्वन्द्यः सोऽपि प्रतिनियतकर्मेंकफलदः। फलं कर्मायत्तं किममरगणैः किंच विधिना नमस्तत्कर्मभ्यो विधिरपि न येभ्यः प्रभवति९४

Translation:

"We bow our heads before the gods, but they are under the control of the Providence. Then the Providence is to be adored, but it also gives fruits according to the actions already committed. If all the fruits depend on actions, what is the significance of the gods and the Provindence? Then bow your heads before the actions themselves which are not influenced even by the Providence".

'Allama Iqbal, at times, adopts the same style of expression as that of Bhartrihari in order to make his poetry forceful. So far as the subject matter is concerned, all the great poets think alike; they convey the universal truths which are basically the same in all languages. For example in the 81st shloka of Vairagya-shataka Bhartrihari says:—

बद्गाण्डमण्डलीमार्च कि लोभाय मनस्विनः॥ शफरीस्फ्ररतेनाब्धेः श्वब्धता जातु जायते ॥८१॥

Translation:

"How can this universe create temptations for a man who possesses an unshaken faith? Are ever big waves caused in an Ocean by the frolicsome movements of a small fish?"

This idea has been taken by Bhartrihari from Bhagvat-Gita:

ज्यापूर्यमाणम चल मितष्ठं समुद्रमापः प्रविशान्ति यहत् तहत्कामायं प्रविशान्ति सर्वे स शान्तिमा प्रोतिच काम कामी

Translation:

"As the Ocean absorbs the agitated water of all the rivers without itself being perturbed; similarly he, who is not perturbed by all the worldly affairs, achieves peace of mind, and not he, who is full of sensuality".

Allama Iqbal also adopts the same style to express the same universal truth in the following couplet:

کافٹ رکی یہ پہان کہ آفاق میں گم ہے مومن کی یہ چپ ن کد گم اس میں برآ فاق

Translation:

"The identification of a disbeliever is that he absorbed in the worldly affairs and the identification of a believer is that the worldly affairs are absorbed in him"

Bhartrihari in the shloka of his Nitishataka says: -

लांगूलचालनमधश्चरणावपातं भूमौ निपत्य वदनोदरदर्शनं च । श्वा पिण्डदस्य कुरुते गजपुङ्गवस्तु धिरं विलोकयति चादुशतेश्च भुङ्क्ते ॥ ३१ ॥

Translation:

"a dog falls down at the feet of the person from whom he expects some food, wags his tail before him, and shows his mouth and belly to him by lying down on the ground, but the lordly elephant calmly looks on, and eats his food only when entreated with hundreds of flattering words".

Iqbal also describes the same theme in the following couplet, in his own style.

دل کی آزادی شنبنشای شکم سامان موت فیصله تیراترے باتھوں میں ہے دل کیشکم

Translation: "Freedom of heart is kingship, but belly leads to death. Your decision is in your own hands—either

heart or belly".

Bhartrihari in the 66th shloka of his Niti-shataka says: -

सम्पत्सु महतां चित्तं भवत्युत्पलकोमलम्। आपत्सु च महाशैलशिलसंघातककशम्॥६६॥

Translation: "In prosperity the heart of an ideal man becomes as tender as a lotus, but in adversity the same heart

becomes as hard as a mountain rock"

Iqbal has adopted this idea in many of his couplets with slight variations. For example : —

بوحس القد يا دان تو بريش كى طرح زم رزم حق و باطسسل بهو تو فرلاد المساح مومن

Translation: "Muo'min or an ideal man becomes as tender as

silk in a friendly atmosphere, but he becomes as hard as steel when there is a struggle between

right and wrong".

Bhartrihari in the 87th shloka of his Niti-shataka says: -

छिब्रोऽपि रोह्ति तरुः क्षीणोऽप्युपचीयते पुनश्चन्द्रः ॥ इति विमृशन्तः सन्तः सन्तप्य-न्ते न ते विपदा ॥ ८७ ॥

Translation: "A trimmed tree gets its branches again, and a crescent is converted into the full moon again. Remembering this fact the virtuous men do not

lose their hearts in their miseries".

Iqbal has also expressed the same idea in many of his couplets. For example : $_$

اے مسلم دلخستہ مصائب سے نہ گھرا خورسٹ میر کتا ہے سدا پردہ شب سے

Translation: "Oh heart rended Muslim, do not lose your heart in your miseries, because the sun always comes

out of the veil of night".

Bhartrihari in the 92nd shloka of Niti-shataka says: —

सृजित तावदशेषग्रणाकरं पुरुषरत्नमलङ्क-रणं भुवः॥ तदिप तत्क्षणभिङ्क करोति चेदहह कष्टमपण्डितता विधेः॥ ९२॥

Translation: "The Providence first creates a man who is full of virtues and is a gem among all creatures. Then the same Providence breaks him down in a moment.

Alas, how un-reasonable is the action of the Pro-

vidence"

Iqbal has also expressed the same idea in many of his couplets. For example: —

ای کوکب کی تا با بی ہے ہے تیراجال دوش زوال آدم سنگی زیاں تیراہے یامیراء

Translation: "(Oh God,) It is Man who has enlightened the

whole world like a star. Then, is the decay of this

clay-made Man a loss to me or a loss to Thee?"

It is clear from what has been said above that Allama Iqbal has learnt much from the three shatakas of Bhartrihari. That is why he has praised Bhartrihari so much in his Javed Namah. Bhartrihari's Niti-shataka and Vairagya-shataka were first translated into Dutch language in 1651 A.D. They were subsequently translated into French language in 1670 A.D., and into Greek language in 1863 A.D. Two more French translations were published — the one in 1852 A.D. and the others in 1875 A.D. Few Hindi translations were also made during this period. The first English translation of these two shatakas was made by Professor Tawney in 1877 A.D. at Calcutta, the second was made by Mr. Durga Prasad in 1889 A.D. at Lahore, the third was made by Prohit Gopi Nath in 1896 A.D. at Mount Abu, and the fourth was made by Mr. K.M. Joglekar in 1911 A.D. at Bombay. Afterwards many other translations were also made, but it appears

that the translation book which was mainly in use of Allama Iqbal was that of Prohit Gopi Nath. Translations of Shringarashataka were generally avoided due to its obscene content although it contains very charming shlokas.

Before closing, I shall say something about the life and time of Bhartrihari. Different authorities have given different accounts regarding his personal life. The main reason of these differences is that there were more than one personalities called by the name of Bhartrihari. It would not be appropriate here to give a detailed account of all those traditions and historical references which are found in various books about Bhartrihari and his family. So far as my own research goes, the most probable times of Bhartrihari is the first century before Christ. He was the elder brother of that Vikramaditya who started the famous Vikrami Samvat in B.C. 56/57. There was another Vikramaditya also who ruled Ujjain in the sixth century A.D., but he should not be confused with the younger brother of Bhartrihari.

Bhartrihari belonged to a royal dynasty whose capital was Ujjain. During his princehood he enjoyed a very luxurious life, and composed one hundred shlokas which are now known as Shringara Shataka. Shringara means "love affairs" and Shataka means "one hundred stanzas". When he took over as a king, he ruled with great pomp and show, and during this period he composed one hundred shlokas pertaining to ethical and political affairs, which are now known as Niti-shataka. After about fourteen years' reign when he discovered that his queen Padmakshi, whom he loved very dearly, was not faithful to him, he handed over his kingdom to his younger brother Vikramaditya and retired to the forests where Yogi Goraksh Nath taught him secrets of Yoga or mysticism. During this period he composed one hundred shlokas relating to mystical affairs, which are now known as Vairagya shataka.

The story of his discovering the infidelity of his wife is very interesting. One day a sage named Sumanta came to the king Bhartrihari and gave a fruit of immortality to him to eat. As this fruit was extremely pervious, the king, instead of eating himself, gave it to his beloved queen to eat. The queen, on her part, gave it to another man whom she loved secretly. That man, on his part, gave it to another woman whom he loved secretly. That woman, on her part brought it to the king Bhartrihari whom she loved

secretly. To his great surprise the king Bhartrihari recognized that fruit. Then he made thorough inquiries about the whole affair, and when he came to know that his queen had betrayed him, he became so disgusted that he left his kingdom and went to the forests in exile.

* * * * *

6

IQBAL AS MODERN INTERPRETER OF ISLAM

It is evident from the very title⁶⁸ of his major work in English that Iqbal's was an attempt essentially to reconstruct the religious thought in Islam in the light of the latest developments in modern science and philosophy. And in the twentieth century so far he indeed is the greatest Muslim thinker to hve made an attempt at a really modern philosophical interpretation of Islam. Many Muslim modernists, Iqbal's contemporaries or those belonging to the preceding genration, Namek Kamal and Ziya Goklap in Turkey: Abduh, Rashid Rida, and Abd al-Razig in Egypt: Kasim Assar, Allama Tabatabai, and Ali Husayn Rashid in Iran; Muhammad Kurd Ali in Syria Haji Agus Salim in Indonesia; and his own compatriots Sayvid Ahmad Khan, Shibli Nu'mani, Ameer' Ali and Abu'l-Kalam Azad, to mention just a few names, were great in other ways but not in the modern philosophical interpretation of Islam. None of them has had Iqbal's rigorous formal discipline in Western philosophy and other domains of modern knowledge, nor was anyone of them fortunate enough to be possessed with his almost numinous poetic visions bordering on the metaphysical disclosures of reality. There is no gain-saying the fact that it is verily a biological necessity for the Muslims of the modern world to have a reinterpretation of the teachings of Islam in the idiom and grammar of modern science and philosophy. for thus alone can they be communicative to others and have a meaningful international existence as well as an international message.

One may, however, very legitimately ask: How far is it possible to reinterpret and reformulate religious thought in Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy? Is this attempt at the modernization of Islam justified from the point of view of the

Qur'an and the Hadith? Are they through and through prophilosophical or pro-scientific? What is the philosophical justification of bringing about a kind of rapproachment between the humanly discovered truths of modern science and philosophy on the one hand and the divinely revealed teachings of Islam on the other? What really is at the back of Iqbal's mind in effecting such a rapproachment? What practical purpose does it serve? The present paper is an attempt to answer these and other subsidiary questions as briefly as possible.

In the Holy Our'an there is no dichotomy between faith and knowledge as there is none between the spiritual and the secular aspects of man's individual and social life. The very word Our an signifies 'the book which is (or should be) read' and it speaks of itself; among other titles, as al-Kitab, 69 i.e. 'the Writing' which is complete. Indeed 'reading' and 'writing' have been given such a paramount place in the Holy Qur'an that the very first revelation received by the Prophet was an injunction to read and there is also the mention in it of 'the pen' (al-galam)⁷⁰ of which the Qur'an elsewhere takes an oath.71 The Prophet, according to the Qur'an, is both a messenger and a teacher⁷² who himself like a great teacher is represented as praying: 'My Lord, increase me in knowledge.73 Knowledge raises man in dignity and it is through the exercise of his noetic faculties and the acquisition of knowledge that he comes to rule over the forces of nature. Man is superior to angels verily because of his capacity to name things⁷⁴ which is at the same time the capacity to form concepts through a process of inductive generalisation. This is just a passing mention of the importance given by the Holy Qur'an to knowledge in general. The sayings of the Prophet (ahadith) bearing on the subject are too many and too famous to be listed here. Suffice it to say that, according to the Prophet, 'seeking of knowledge is religiously obligatory on every Muslim man and Muslim woman' and no difficulty, howsoever great it may be even so much as to march on foot from Arabia to China, exonerates a Muslim from the performance of this duty.

It is of utmost importance to note that Islam is a dynamic religion in the sense that it makes full allowance for the reinterpretation or reconstruction of its teachings in the changed circumstances and novel conditions of life through the institution of *lithad* which is considered, besides the Qur'an and the Hadith,

the third source of the Islamic law. Ijtihad is a jurist's exerting the faculties of mind to the utmost for arriving at a legal opinion concerning a doubtful and difficult point. The importance and value of the exercise of one's judgment or, in other words, the use of one's reasoning faculty is expressly recognised by the Holy Our'an. It is full of repeated exhortations like the following: 'Do you not reflect?' 'Do you not understand?' 'Why do you not reason?' 'Have you no sense?' In case of a controversy with people of other religions it urges the believers to make use of an argument in the best possible manner. 75 Those who do not make use of their reasoning faculty have been called by the Qur'an the deaf and the dumb. They have been spoken of as cattle and even worse than them. 76 'The vilest of the animals in Allah's sight are the deaf and the dumb, who do not understand.'77 On the other hand, the learned doctors of Islam who, by the use of their deductive faculties, bring out (istinbat) the hidden meanings of the text of the Qur'an, have been given a position and status next only to the Prophet. 78 According to the Qur'an, though revelation as a source of knowledge is higher than reason and though it is through revelation alone that the fundamental principles of Islam are made known to the believers, there is also an ample provision, particularly through the institution of Ijtihad, for the exercise of one's rational faculties. It is thus alone that those learned in religious sciences of Islam are to explicate the inner meanings of its fundamental teachings and work out their practical ramifications in individual and social life. Islam thus admits of the principles both of 'permanence' and 'change' with regard to its teachings and makes full allowance for their perpetual readjustments with the changing conditions of time as novel situations crop up and new socio-economic problems arise. The institution of *litihad* is also expressly recognised and equally emphasised in the Hadith. What is important to note here is that the Companions of the Prophet were freely allowed to resort to the exercise of their Judgement even during the Prophet's own lifetime. On being appointed the Governor of the province of Yemen, Mu'adh was asked by the Prophet as to the law by which he would manage the affairs of the people. 'By the law of the Qur'an,' Mu'adh replied, 'But in case you do not find any (explicit) direction in the Our'an?' asked the Prophet. 'Then I will act according to the Sunnah (practice) of the Prophet', was the reply. 'But if you do not find any direction even

in the Sunnah?' the Prophet asked further. 'Then I shall exercise my own judgment and act according to it,' was Mu'adh's reply. He did not say that he would send an emissary to the Prophet to seek his advice in a difficult matter, nor did the Prophet make any such suggestion. He instead, on hearing Mu'adh's reply, raised his hands and said: "Praise be to Allah who guides the messenger of His Messenger as He pleases." ⁷⁹

The above is a short account of the importance accorded by the Qur'an and the Hadith to the seeking of knowledge and the use of reasoning faculty in general. Iqbal, however, avowedly makes an attempt to reconstruct the religious thought in Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy. What then is the attitude respectively of the Qur'an and the Hadith to the study specifically of philosophy and science?

The term 'philosophy' being derived from the Greek words philein and sophia, originally means 'love of wisdom.' The Arabic word for wisdom and so also for philosophy is hikmah and it has been used at least nine times in the Holy Qur'an and many more times in the sayings of the Holy Prophet. The term hikmah as used in the Qur'an and the Hadith has a unique and peculiar connotation of its own rarely to be found in the modern use of the term 'philosophy', Philosophy, for example, has been defined by William James as an 'attempt to think clearly and methodically about certain notions (concepts) which are always turning up in our thinking and which seem necessary to our thinking but which the special sciences do not tell us about.' Philosophy', according to another modern philosopher, G.T.W. Patrick, 'is an attempt to combine the common experiences of life on the one hand and the results of the special sciences on the other into a consistent and harmonious world theory.'80 Whereas the former may be said to be an analytical and the latter a synthetical or synoptic definition of philosophy in both cases it has been primarily understood to be a theoretical affair, an abstract or speculative study. With the advent of the movements of Logical Positivism and Philosophical Analysis, philosophy in our days in fact has been reduced to a clever but empty game - mere logic chopping and trifling with semantic husks, the salad of truth tables and the dust of sensedata. Hikmah is far from being any such thing. It may partly consists in the theoretical understanding of the universe and man's place in it but it is essentially a practical wisdom - a vision and

light - gained through the inner purification and cultivation of one's soul and the rigorous discipline of one's individual and social life. Philosophy according to hikmah is not mere noetic ownership or equipment which leads one to a certain 'world theory' or point of view but entitative assimilation of new visions of reality through a living encounter with it, which assimilation leads to a complete transformation of one's inner self and lifts it up to ever new horizons and dimensions of being. It is in this sense that the Qur'an speaks of hikmah or philosophy and says: 'Whoever is granted hikmah, he indeed is given a great good.'8 1 It is also in this sense that it very rightly speaks of itself as the 'Book of Widsom'82 or 'the Book the verses in which are characterised with wisdom.'83 In the Hadith hikmah is said to be 'the lost thing of a believer,' that is, a thing of which he is in a perpetual search or quest. The Prophet is also reported to have said kad al-hakimu an yakuna nabiyya, meaning that 'a philosopher is well-nigh a prophet', which saying is to be construed in the light of the Qur'anic meaning of the term hikmah. According to another tradition, the Prophet is said to have prayed, 'O Lord! show me the inner reality of things as they are,' which indeed is a truly philosophical prayer and it readily reminds us of the Kantian notion of the noumenon or the thing-in-itself. One is tempted to conclude that it is because of the above-mentioned pro-philosophical attitude of the Qur'an and the Hadith that Igbal as against Kant strongly maintains the thesis of the 'possibility of metaphysics'.

The teachings of the Qur'an certainly evince a through and through favourable attitude towards the study of various sciences so much so that Iqbal makes the rather challenging pronouncement that 'The birth of Islam... is the birth of inductive intellect.'84 It is singificant to note that the Qur'an uses the same word ayat (singular ayah) for the Qur'anic verses as well as for the observable phenomena of nature as if the open book of nature is another Qur'an which every Muslim is obliged to study with as much devotion and diligence as the Holy Scripture. In fact the Qur'an repeatedly enjoins upon the believers to make a close observation of the rich variety of the facts of nature and thus have the vivid sense of the presence of God to things. Of the very many verses of the Qur'an bearing on this theme only a few can be quoted here.

"In the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alter-

nation of the night and the day, there are surely signs (ayat) for men of understanding?"8 5

"And He it is Who sends down water from the clouds, then We bring forth with it buds of all (plants), then We bring forth from it green (foliage), from which We produce clustered grain; and of the date-palm, of the sheaths of it, come forth clusters (of dates) within reach; and gardens of grapes and the olive and the pomegranate, alike and unlike. Look at the fruit of it when it bears fruit and the ripening of it. Surely there are signs (ayat) in this for a people who believe".

"He it is Who made the sun a shining brightness, and the moon a light, and ordained for it stages that you might know the computation of years and the reckoning. Allah created not this but with truth. He makes the signs (ayat) manifest for a people who know. Surely in the variation of the night and the day, and that which Allah has created in the heavens and the earth, there are signs (ayat) for a people who keep their duty." ⁸

"And He it is Who spread the earth, and made in it firm mountains and rivers. And of all fruits He has made in it pairs, two (of every kind). He makes the night cover the day. Surely there are signs (ayat) in this for a people who reflect. And in the earth are tracts side by side, and gardens of vines, and corn, and palm-trees growing from one root and distinct roots — they are watered with one water; and We make some of them to excel others in fruit. Surely there are signs (ayat) in this for a people who understand." 8 8

"He it is Who sends down water from the clouds for you; it gives drink, and by it (grow) the trees on which you feed. He causes to grow for you thereby herbage, and the olives, and the date-palms, and the grapes, and all the fruits. Surely there is a sign (ayah) in this for a people who reflect. And He has made subservient for you the night and the day and the sun and the moon. And the stars are made subservient by His command. Surely there are signs (ayat) in this for a people who understand. And what He has created for you in the earth is of varied hues. Surely there is a sign (ayah) in this for a people who are mindful!"

"See they not the birds, subjected in the heaven's vault. None witholds them but Allah. Surely in this are signs (ayat) for a people who believe." 90

"See they not the camle, how they are created? And the

heaven, how it is raised high? And the mountains, how they are fixed? And the earth, how it is spread?" 91

It is evident from the above verses that the Qur'anic epistemology is as much pro-empirical as pro-rational. Knowledge through the sense-organs is not illusory or mere appearance but a veritable blessing of God. Says the Qur'an: 'He gave you hearing and sight and hearts that you may give thanks.'92 Sense-experience indeed is in a way our source of revelation to us of the signs (ayat) of God as manifested through the observable phenomena of nature – as much in the ripening of fruits and the flight of birds as in the alternation of the night and the day and the swing of the sun and the moon in the vault of heaven. There is in fact a God-like mystery about all the phenomena of nature and the more we know about them the greater our sense of wonder about them. With all the great strides that we have made in our scientific knowledge of things we have yet not been able to unravel all the myriad secrets that lie embedded in their heart. The simple act of opening our eyes and perceiving a thing that lies before us is as much mysterious as the jump of the electrons from one orbit to another in their frenzied dance around the protest in an atom. The philosophers of all times have puzzled over the former and the modern physicists have posted the embarrassing 'principle of indeterminancy to account for the latter. Nature seems to have the divine touch of the miraculous in all its varied phenomena and the deeper we go into their study the greater our feeling that we are enwrapped all round by impenetrable mysteries. Yet we also become very acutely aware of an ineluctable power and glory, a wonderful intelligence and a creative design pervading the entire scheme of things. Such are the revelatory signs (ayat) of God in all the pehenomena of nature. It is in this sense that nature is an open book of God, a veritable another Qur'an; the study of the pehnomena of nature under various sciences may be said to be an attempt to divide this divine book into various chapters (surahs). According to Iqbal, the so-called laws of nature are in fact the habits of God (sunnat Allah). He tells us in so many words that 'knowledge of Nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour,' and adds that this is only 'another form of worship'.93 There is no dichotomy in Islam between being a great Muslim and a great scientist. There indeed has never been a conflict between science and religion in the history of Islam as is to be found in the his-

tory of Christianity in Europe. Because of the clearly pro-scientific teachings of the Qur'an, the Muslims in the early era of Islam pursued the study of various sciences almost with a sense of religious devotion and soon became famous for their remarkable achievements in Astronomy and Mathematics. Physics and Chemistry, Botany and Zoology, Geography and Historiography, etc. But their greatest singular achievement was the discovery anew of the scientific method, hence the statement of Igbal: 'The birth of Islam. . . is the birth of inductive intellect.' There is no gainsaying the historical fact that the Muslim scientists keenly elaborated and promoted the various methods employed in scientific investigation and it is rightly claimed by Igbal that it was through the study of Arabic and not Greek works that the European scholars for the first time came to be initiated into the inductive methods of scientific inquiry. He corroborates this claim of his by quoting at length from R. Briffault's famous work the Making of Humanity and of this we reproduce below the last passage:

'The debt of our science to that of the Arabs does not consist in startling discoveries of revolutionary theories; science owes a great deal more to Arab culture, it owes its existence. The ancient world was, as we saw, pre-scientific. The Astronomy and Mathematics of the Greeks were a foreign importation never thoroughly acclimatized in Greek culture. The Greeks systematized, generalized, and theorized, but the patient ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive knowledge, the minute methods of science, detailed and prolonged observations and experimental inquiry were altogether alien to the Greek temperament... What we call science arose in Europe as a result of a new spirit of inquiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of experiment, observation, measurement, of the development of Methematics in a form unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced into the European world by the Arabs.'94

We have tried to establish so far that Iqbal's attempt to reconstruct religious thought in Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy is fully justified on the basis of the teachings of the Qur'an and the Hadith. But is this attempt also justified philosophically and if so in what sense? The essential basis of Iqbal's entire philosophical thinking is the fundamental Islamic,

doctrine of Divine Unity (tawhid) and so ontologically he is primarily a monist. He believes that reality is essentially one even though it has various levels or grades of its manifestation. It manifests itself variously at the levels of matter, life and mind, and it best manifests itself in the selves of human beings. But in every case it is the manifestation of the same one reality - more at this level and less at that - and not of many realities. As to the epistemological position of Iqbal it is necessary to draw the important distinction between an epistemological theory which is independent of ontological presuppositions and the one which is not so. Iqbal's epistemology is of the latter kind: it is through and through based on his ontological doctrines and particularly on the monistic doctrine of the unity of God. Hence his epistemology like that of the Qur'an is a global epistemology making full allowance for all kinds of noetic experiences: sense-perception, reason, intuition, prophetic revelation, etc. All these according to him are the various media for our apprehension of the same reality at the different levels of its manifestation. Scientific, philosophical, and religious approaches to the understanding of reality are man's endeavours directed to the same objective. True that science, philosophy, and religion lay varied emphasis on man's nostic sources, apparently speak different languages — each having its own peculiar terminological vocabulary and grammar and they certainly have palpable procedural and methodological differences, but all these are differences of degree or level only and not of kind or quality. In the final analysis there is nothing in them which should make them inherently anti-thetical to each other. In fact, Igbal insists, they need each other for mutal supplementation and rejuvenation. 95 It is not logically impossible to be a great Muslim as well as a great scientist and philosopher; a Muslim on the contrary comes to have much deeper and richer vision of the teachings of his religion because of his greater scientific and philosophical understanding of things. It is indeed biologically necessary for the very inner unity and integrity of our personality that we should bring about some kind of coherence in our scientific, philosophical, and religious worldviews. We as Muslims cannot possibly afford to keep them in watertight compartments.

In the Preface to the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbal tells us that in his attempt at a kind of rapprochement between Islamic religion and modern science and philosophy he

has only followed the past philosophical tradition of Islam. Though is true that the Muslim philosophers from al-Kindi (d.c. 260/873) onward in general have made sincere effort to reconcile their fatih with the scientific and philosophical knowledge of their day, there have also been, one may point out, some serious exceptions to this general practice. Imam Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun and Ibn Taymiyah, for example, were not at all happy over the philosophers' syncretic attempts at grandiose system-building and they even declared an open warfare against them. 96 But what is important to note here is that Idbal's gaze is fixed more on a present need and urgency than on the past tradition or practice. He is convinced that the Muslims in the twentieth century can illafford to keep their religious beliefs altogether insulated from the great strides made by the West in the various domains of human knowledge. Further, Igbal's interest in the reinterpretation of Islam in terms of modern science and philosophy is essentially and primarily of a practical nature and not merely theoretical or academic. Thus alone, he thought, he could bring about the revival of the Muslim community and pull it out of the woeful state of backwardness into which it had fallen.

The Muslims all over the world, Igbal felt keenly and painfully particularly after his return from Europe, lagged much behind in the march of nations not only politically and economically but almost in all spheres of life. Technologically they were pitiably underdeveloped, intellectually unproductive, and morally no better. Lethargy, sloth, inefficiency, and mismangement seemed to prevail upon their individual and social life in general. Religion, which they often considered the best compensation for the loss of their material well-being, was reduced by them more or less to ritualism, obscurantism, and fanaticism. Above all, they lost their cultural roots: they were so overwhelmed and demoralised by the dazzling progress of the West that they no longer had any faith in their own cultural values and norms and even awareness of them. They stopped thinking out things for themselves and began to cherish more and more foreign imported ideas and ideals, fashions and fads. It is at this juncture that Igbal made his clarion call to awaken the Muslims of the world from their state of self-oblivion and infused a new life into them.

IQBAL AS MODERN INTERPRETER OF ISLAM

NOTES

- 68. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Oxford University Press, London, 1934.
- 69. The Qur'an, ii.
- 70. Ibid., xcvi. 1-4.
- 71. Ibid., xviii. 1
- 72. Ibid., ii. 151.
- 73. Ibid., xx. 114; xxix. 9
- 74. Ibid., ii. 31.
- 75. Ibid., xvi. 125.
- 76. Ibid., vii. 179.
- 77. Ibid., viii. 22.
- 78. Ibid., iv. 83.
- 79. Abu Dawud, 23; 11.
- 80. See article 'Philosophy' in *Encyclopaedia of Religion*, edited by V. Ferm, The Philosophical Library, New York, 1943.
- 81. The Qur'an, ii. 269.
- 82. Ibid., x, 1.
- 83. Ibid., xi, 1.
- 84. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 120.
- 85. The Qur'an, iii. 189.
- 86. Ibid., vi. 100.
- 87. Ibid., x. 5, 6.
- 88. Ibid., xiii. 3, 4.
- 89. Ibid., xvi. 10–13.
- 90. Ibid., xvi. 79.
- 91. Ibid., 1xxxviii. 17-20.
- 92. Ibid., xvi. 78; xxxii. 9.
- 93. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 14.
- 94. Ibid., p. 124.
- 95. Ibid., p. 2.
- 96. See M. Saeed Sheikh 'Reorientation of Muslim Philosophy, *The Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 7 ff.



IQBAL AND THE THIRD WORLD

Iqbal's inspired poetry and elevating prose constitute a significant and epoch-making contribution to the humanist literature of our century. To the young and old alike his works provide an everlasting source of joy and inspiration. They serve to humanise and civilise and to ennoble and elevate all those who read them either in their inimitable originals or in their renderings into multifarious tongues the world over. Their simplicity and profoundity continue to exercise universal appeal. They provide an antidote to our dehumanising bustle; they enable us to rediscover our latent humanity; they assist us in relating ourselves to our common human inheritance; they help us to discern the ways in which philosophy, religion and science could be harmoniously integrated in our everyday wordly life. It is not an hour too soon for us to realise the energy, insight, practicality and humaneness that have gone into the life and thought of this creative genius who refused to cut himself off from the ceaseless drama of man in society.

It is exceedingly difficult to pin down Iqbal to any 'ism'. His values and ideals go beyond any sectarian determinations. His genius is many-splendoured. His works testify to his acknowledged roles as poet and philosopher, educator and student of culture, lawyer and politician, missionary and visionary, psychologist and sociologist, freedom fighter and inspirer of a new nation, scholar and man of action, and mystic, seer and statesman.

Iqbal's profound humanism throws into bold relief his status and role as a true citizen of the world. He has drunk deeply at the fountains of culture in the East and the West. He has been conditioned by the best traditions of both worlds but his honest and choiceless awareness of this conditioning has enabled him to go

beyond the fetters of both. The true prisoners of history are verily those who are least conscious of the extent to which the latter has conditioned them. The most important thing is unlearning, namely, disabusing one's mind of the lumber that is pumped into it by tradition or is imperceptibly gathered like carbon around it. Iqbal dins into our ears and instils into our minds the need to decarbonize our heads and hearts constantly and incessantly. He has made an eloquent plea for the promotion of cultural empathy by the elimination of the hydra-headed demon of ethnocentrism. Racism, casteism, tribalism, communalism, nationalism, regionalism, religious denominationalism and ideological chauvinism, are but species of the genus called ethnocentrism, namely, the mentality born of ignorance, bigotry, arrogance and intolerance. The antidote to all this is cultural empathy, namely, the ability born of wisdom and understanding wherewith one could appreciate other cultures, other values and other peoples.

Igbal is a sage for every age. He awakens in people qualities that lie buried within them. He not merely describes the ills of man in society but also prescribes remedial action. He extols the good points in the cultures of the East and the West and decries the dehumaning elements in both. He takes us back to the wellsprings of art and science and calls individuals and nations to vigorous and purposeful action. He awakens peoples from their spiritual slumber and seeks to lead them to the light of wisdom and love. He emphasises the truth that the causes of bondage and liberation lie within our own minds. This insight is born of intuition. He denounces the apathy of societies which seem determined to wallow in the quagmire of their own illusions. He reminds subject nations of the basically psychogenic nature of their predicament. He wields a vigorous pen to write about their frustration. dejection and confusion only in order to summon courage in their hearts and resolve in their minds to rise to the heights of their own potentialities. Man must care for himself and be deeply concerned about the welfare of his neighbour. This must necessarily lead to the invigoration of society and the regeneration of humanity.

Iqbal's seminal ideas continue to inform and inspire the peoples the world over. His voice articulates the values, ideals and aspirations that are near and dear to millions of voiceless peoples in Asia, Africa, Europe and the two Americas. In the words of

Iqbal the disinherited and uprooted peoples of this world listen to the voice of an essentially revolutionary mind speaking out with the authority of an inspired leader of humanity, a stranger nowhere, therefore welcome everywhere. He gaily transcends all barriers — ethnic, linguistic, territorial and ideological — and addresses himself to minds that genuinely care for the dignity of man in society in terms of the health of his body and mind and of his economic, social and spiritual wellbeing. He pleads for the unity and solidarity of the dispossessed of the world who are enfeebled by the loss of their courage, enslaved by colonialist values and atrophied by the lack of vigorous exercise of the faculties of their heads and hearts.

Igbal's humanist philosophy, particularly that embodied in his intuitive poetry, is a perennial source of inspiration to mankind including generations yet unborn. Its universal appeal cannot and ought not to be prescribed by the delimiting dimensions of time and clime. But the message of a poet and philosopher must be rediscovered by each succeeding generation for itself, consistent with its own needs and aspirations. Understandably the Third World likes to claim Iqbal for itself. He was born into it and completed his life's labour in it although it was not strictly so called during his time. Undoubtedly Iqbal's achievement is the common inheritance of mankind and his principles must form an essential part of the foundations of the worldwide humanist culture that remains yet to be realised and sustained. Viewed in terms of universal history, it is easy to recognise the ephemeral nature of the Third World as well as of other Worlds yet to come into being from time to time. If the philosophy of Iabal would be found to be viable and resilient enough for adoption and adaptation by other Worlds at other times it would only be further proof of its inherent universality as a humanist teaching.

In the context of the history of our own time, however, Iqbal's message has a refreshing relevance to the solution of the massive problems afflicting the peoples of the Third World which continues to remain the far-flung home of two-thirds of mankind. The Third World, more than any other, is characterised by immense diversities in culture, religion, language, race, climate and history. The people of the Third World who mostly inhabit Asia, Africa and Latin America are within their own countries divided by ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural factors. For

considerable periods of time during the modern period they had been subjugated by imperialist Western nations, namely, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the Spanish, the French, the British, the Germans, the Belgians and the Americans. At the time of the death of Iqbal (1938) the countries of the Third World continued largely to retain their colonial status. Inspite of wide diversity between and within their countries, the people of the Third World also share several common features. Laregly but not wholly as a result of their common colonialist heritage, these countries are characterised by economic poverty in terms of low per capita income and standard of living. They are largely agricultural, least industrialised, mostly dependent, lacking in capital resources. therefore under-developed or less developed or just developing. They are sociologically handicapped with most of their socieites inclined towards social insularity in terms of tribes, caste, sect and community. Their subsistence agriculture tends to promote rigid social stratification and inhibit social change and mobility. Against a background of general poverty there are deplorable contrasts between affluence and indigence. There is evidence of exploitation of man by man and of one region or community by another. While the vast majority of peoples in the Third World have won political freedom for themselves there are a few peoples scattered over the globe who are yet denied the right of self-determination for themselves. While some parts of the Third World are accomodating themselves to rapid social, economic and political transformation, others seem impervious to it or are grimly determined to impede or retard it. Some of the religious and cultural values and the customs and manners associated with them continue to exercise a debilitating influence on the peoples in many parts of the Third World arresting their march towards progress and betterment. Disincentives born of traditional attitudes and outlooks current in some societies of the Third World have continued to admit impediments in the path of development and modernisation. Inspite of impassioned political rhetoric by the ruling classes there is an appreciable lack of positive and meaningful action on their part to realise the community of interests of the countries that form the Third World. Where one should expect unity and solidarity there appears to be disunity and division. The yearning for regional hegemony and paramountcy, the obsession with fundamentalist religious fanaticism, the megalomania prompted by arrogance and bigotry, the intransigence born of ideological

chauvinism, the superciliousness impelled by vanity and ignorance and the totalitarian outlook dictated by the comtempt for democracy are among the causes that have contributed to this distressing situation. To a world suffering from such illnesses Iqbal is verily a kindly physician who can prescribe the medicine based on his own competent diagnosis.

During the period between the two World Wars Iqbal published a number of works such as the Asrar-i-Khudi (The Secrets of the Self), Rumuz-i-Bekhudi (Mysteries of Selflessness), Bang-i-Dara (The Call of the Bell), Payam-i-Mashriq (The Messsage of the East) and the Javid Nama (The Pilgrimage of Eternity) in which he set out a philosophy of meliorism extolling a life of action and struggle and a dynamic work ethic which is of compelling interest and appeal to the peoples of the Third World today. He found a spirit of general apathy and lethargy characterising the life of his people. He dedicated himself to an ennobling consecration worthy of his creative genius and to a stupendous mission that activated his adult and active life until its premature termination in 1938. This historic mission was to rouse the voiceless millions from their centuries-old slumber and to galvanise them into action in the course of their own liberation from the imperial yoke and freedom from the bondage of their own stupor. He surveyed the situation in all subject countries and found evidence of the degrading misery, both material and spiritual, of their peoples. He found his own fellow Muslims, who in bygone eras were the standard-bearers of a dynamic civilisation, to be more illiterate than most other peoples, decaying and decadent, submerged in obscurantism, torn asunder by anachronistic quarrels based on sectarian orthodoxy and held under by the deadweight of rigid social systems. He found the Hindus to be enslaved by their own caste system and social taboos and enervated by the negative effects of other-worldly renunciation. Alienated from the lifegiving sources of their own creative cultures, these peoples had taken to imitating their Western colonial masters as though the way to modernise was nothing more than to westernise, to europeanise, to anglisise or to americanise. Ighal realised that this was not the way out for the dispessessed and the down-trodden. They must rediscover their own genius; they must regain their own soul. The question was basically one of values and ideals, both spiritual and cultural. There was no question of going back to the past; nor was there any question of trading their own heritage for

another that was altogether alien to it. Western culture is exceedingly compartmentalised, distinguishing clearly between the sacred and the profane, and the religious and the secular. Iqbal who drew his basic inspiration from the teachings of Islam correctly recognised that this distinction ran counter to the Eastern religious tradition. Whether in the West or in the East life is indivisible. And religion comprehends the entirety of life, the personal no less than the social. Religion must inform and inspire all behaviour in thought, word and deed. It must need influence and determine the basic philosophy of economics and politics. Religion makes a total claim on the life of the individual and society. It is exemplified at its best in the history of early Islam.

Igbal discerned the historical process in terms of challenge and response. New challenges call for new responses. Conventional wisdom is nothing but the accumulation of old responses to bygone challenges. Where these are clearly recognised to be inadequate or inappropriate, creative answers must be found afresh. The basic need of the Third World is the creative spirit and the courage that goes with it. The impulse to action must be born of knowledge which is obtained through education. The illiteracy in the Third World is a disgrace to humanity. Igbal called upon his people to educate themselves and reminded them of the place accorded to knowledge and education in Islam. The Holy Prophet of Arabia is unique among the teachers of the world in emphasising the role of knowledge. To seek knowledge is the duty, as he said, of every Muslim and every Muslimah. We must seek knowledge even if it be in China. The ink of the scholar is holier than the blood of the martyr. An hour's contemplation, he reminds us, is better than an year of adoration. Whoever reveres the leanned, he reveres the Prophet. Allah has not created anything nobler or better than reason. To listen to the words of the learned and to teach science to others, we are told, is better than any number of religious exercises. We are admonished to acquire knowledge which lights up the path to heaven. Verily, it is knowledge that is our only friend in the desert, our company in solitude, our solace in adversity, our ornament among friends and our effective armour against the adversary. He walks in the path of Allah who leaves his own home in search of knowledge. Knowledge unexercised is like unto a poison. The man of knowledge who knows not how to apply it is like a donkey carrying books. The emergent nations have in Igbal one of the most powerful of their ideologues who

point the way to their liberation. The distance between the rulers and the ruled exists primarily because of their ignorance. The generality of the peoples of the Third World cannot acquire the consciousness of their own rights except through education on a mass scale. The polarity between the elitist bureaucracy and the untutored mass of the citizenry exists solely on account of the disparity between the expert knowledge of the former and the illiteracy and ignorance of the latter. The prime requisite for nation-building is therefore universal education up to the highest possible levels. In the context of the modern world, education is primarily viewed as an economic investment in terms of the systematic and scientific training of human resources for growth and development of society. Igbal has a wider and nobler role assigned to education. Education cannot be confined to the acquisition of mental, manual and mechanical skills alone. Education must primarily promote the moral and spiritual sides of human consciouness. Intellectual achievement must keep pace with moral development.

In the realm of economics and politics Iqbal's words assume an undoubted contemporary relevance to the non-alligned nations of the Third World. He has articulated clear and unambiguous words on the unacceptability of the extremes of capitalism and communism.

He extols the virtues of the golden mean. In the Javid Nama. Igbal recognises them as two millstones that pulverise the human kind. He claims that the author of the Das Kapital has truth concealed in falsehood and that he had the heart of the believer and the brain of the heathen. 'These westerners', he say, 'have lost the realm of the soul for which they search the stomachs, although the soul does not borrow from the flesh its tint or smell. With naught except the body socialism concerns itself.' 'The prophet of socialism', he says, 'based his faith on the equality of bellies, while fraternity lies in the heart of man, its roots not in clay or the water laid.' His criticism of imperialism, which is the advanced stage of capitalism, is equally unrelenting. 'Imperialism too fattens but the flesh; it owns a gleamless breast devoid of heart. It acts like bees that suck the flower's juice, but, otherwise leave all its petals gay.' 'Its charms', he concedes, 'remain undimmed and still evoke the bulbul's plaintive songs, but this scent and play of colour is appearance mere; regard it not, but see reality. Dis-

content gnaws through the heart of both Communism and Capitalism: the former for revolution thirsts, the latter for tribe. The one brings carnage with its art, its creed and craft; the other from the body tears away the soul, bread from the hand. In mere matter they sunken lie with unenlightened souls and bodies fair.'

Iqbal accuses the West of having sacrified the lamb of love at the altar of reason. Only by the integration of reason and love can a different world be created. He declares, 'Let love and reason be intermixed to chart a world all new. The embers of the West are cold; their eyes can see, their heart is dead; they're seared and scarred with their own swords; self-hunted victims all. Thou shalt not seek from western vines the eager flaming drink of ecstasy. The West is barren now, no new age can she spawn. It is the fire of soul that gives an ardency to life and forms its symphony.' As though addressing the peoples of the Third World, Iqbal says: 'To forge a world all new is thy appointed destiny.'

The brave new world that has to be forged cannot be a carbon copy of the Western original. He accuses Kemal Ata Turk of modern Turkey of having borrowed idols from the West. 'No fresh tune', he claims, 'trembles in the Turkish lute; her new is Europe's old'. Speaking of the need for a vital breath in the human breast, he says: 'The cosmos shapes unceasing wonders ever new; the stuff of life is not blind following. A heart which is alive creates an epoch new, and repetition makes its contact sag with its own inner soul.' The basic inspiration of a society must come from its own tradition. The ideal world that men must create is 'a world without distinctions, free from race and pigment, with an eve far brighter than the western morn; a world all unprofaned by kings and slaves; a world, a coastless sea that can be likened to the faithful's heart.'

The Third World with its two billion and more of peoples is today called upon to modernise itself. In meeting this challenge it cannot think of a more eloquent and surer guide and ideologue than Iqbal. In his Payam-i-Mashriq he declares: 'Destroy the old: on its foundations build afresh. For Time's sweet will we cannot wait'. Man is not God's passive creature, a mere inactive entity destined to vegetate in idle monotony. Iqbal says: 'God made the world: man makes it beautiful. Man is God's colleague and companion'. He admires the bird in its flight: 'O swift-winged bird, with your light weight, you the joy of flying incarnate. We are

held down to earth by wordly greed: you fly because your happy wings vibrate.' That is what Iqbal wishes man to do, namely, to soar to great heights of human achievement through his own vibration. He is against the spirit of resignation born of the false belief in fortuitous destiny. He says: 'Do not tell me about that silly moth who met an easy, suicidal death. It is the hardy moth that I admire, the one who bravely fights with his last breath'. Iqbal is a man to travel, not one to arrive, for that is the way of complacency. He says: 'I love wayfaring so much that to me a destination seems an obstacle'.

Iqbal makes an impassioned plea for a life of action and struggle. It is unnecessary to remind the people of the Third world of the sense of urgency attaching to the need for ceaseless struggle. The impulse to action must be born of courage and fearlessness. Iqbal says: 'Lions to dauntless hearts appear as sheep, while quaking hearts see tigers in mere deer. The sea is a plain, if you do not fear. But if you fear, each wave contains a shark'. The life of inaction, passivity, withdrawl and resignation is largely prompted by a misdirected sense of security which seeks to avoid the need to take risks. To such people Iqbal replies as follows: 'Live dangerously, my wise friend, if it is life you truly seek. Like a sword of fine mettle, hurl yourself upon the whetting stone; stay sharp thereby. For danger brings out what is best in you: It is the touchstone of all that is true'. Igbal wants man to get drunk with action, not with mere words. Mere philosophy is like unto the dregs at the bottom of life's cup. We must endeavour to make life take to action's path. Mobility must be preferred to rest. Convert knowledge into action in order to make it live. The motionless shore, being at rest, does not know its own identity but the restless wave rolls fast and says: 'For me to roll on is to be, to lie still not to be'. Ighal sings of the joy of adventure: 'How can you have the joy of straying from the path, if the path that you have to tread is fixed and clear?'. The resolve to act banishes doubt and vacillation. The way of knowledge is different from that of action'. If you seek knowledge, then be of two minds; Increase your doubt, decrease your certainty. If you seek action, doubt less, be more sure, be of one mind, one personality'.

Iqbal asserted the supremacy of man and the sanctity and dignity of the individual. He championed the cause of human and civil rights of man in society. The task of crowning this strug-

gle with success now devolves largely on the peoples of the Third World. All mankind belongs to but one species, homo sapiens. There can be no discrimination on the basis of caste, creed, race and colour. Iqbal says: "You are still tied to colour and to race, so you call me Afghan or Turkoman. But I am first of all a man, plain man, and then an Indian or Turanian'. He chastises his own religious compatriots: 'Learn to respect yourself, O childish one. Are you a Muslim? Then abandon pride of birth. If Arabs preen themselves on skin and blood, say goodbye to them there and then. Called whether Tartars, Turks or Afghans we belong to one great garden, one great tree, born of a springtide that was glorious. Distinction of colour is a sin for us'.

The dignity of the individual and the equality of mankind entail democratic and egalitarian forms of social, economic and political organisation. No man has the right to exploit or enslave another. Men who allow themselves to be enslaved in any form whatever are worse than dogs. Says Igbal: 'Man out of his shortsightedness consents to be a slave. He had something in him, but gave it all away to kings. Because of this servility he is worse than a dog. No dog will ever call adoringly another dog his lord'. The egalitarian philosophy entails social and distributive justice. In the name of Islamic socialism no man shall hoard or stockpile spec 1lating on the premise that one man's distress ought to be the opportunity of another. The rich shall be taxed so that the proceeds may be distributed among the poor. No man shall eat his meal while his neighbour suffers in hunger. The labourer shall be paid before the sweat on his brow dries up. Women shall not be considered as chattel or marketable commodity. Undoubtedly here is a philosophy of man and society with a tremendous revolutionary potential, a philosophy that is more relevant to the Third World than to any other.

Iqbal believed in the possibility of perfectibility of man in society not exclusively or wholly in terms of either inner change or outer change but in terms of a symbiotic integration of both where the one needs the other for its growth and sustenance. The method of governance most consistent with human dignity must necessarily be democratic. Democracy is not in Iqbal's view, the tyranny of an untutored majority over an enlightened minority. If it were that, it is a contradiction in terms. Apropos this kind of democracy he said that it were better to 'follow the lead of man of

ripe experience, because the brains of two hundred donkeys cannot produce the understanding of one human being'. Undoubtedly democracy calls for representative government allowing the right of discussion and enshrining minority rights. There must be limits to governmental power and those who govern must be held responsible to the people. The rule of law shall prevail for the majority and the minority alike and the sovereignty of the people shall guarantee to them the right to revolt against the inhumanity of rulers. Iqbal says: 'Law shall not cow us down with gallows or with jail, to buy us off our path King's glittering gold shall fail. We will not speak a word though Moses may entreat, e'en Abraham as guest we will decline to meet'. People have the right reserved to themselves to throw out rulers who seek to govern through undue exploitation. Igbal says: 'We'll fight them who claim tribute of what we grow, out from the garden's gate they shall untrophied go'.

One cannot fail to be impressed by the progressive outlook of the social and political thought of Iqbal. He has tremendous faith in science and its distinctive method. He sees no conflict between science and religion. Both have their parts to play in building a world-wide humanist culture. He sees nothing sacrosanct in past responses. What cannot be mended must be ended. A brave new world must be brought into being so that the dispossessed of the world shall inherit their rightful place in state and society. Nations of the Third World with a heritage of ancient history and culture tend to idealise and idolise their past. Such enhancement of what is past leads more often than not to the devaluation of the present and the future. Iqbal reminds us of the futility of such outlooks and summons us to action and struggle to create a world that is better and newer.

Today the peoples of the Third World like the peoples in other Worlds, have formed themselves into states on the basis of nationalism. Those who seek to adopt Iqbal as their ideologue for the Third World must remind themselves of the fact that nationalism itself is nowadays becoming increasingly obsolescent consequent to advances in the technology of communication and travel. What is good for the viability of our common earth must be good enough for every one of its nations. The Third World as a distinctive family of nations is perhaps unlikely to endure for more than a few decades. Iqbal decried nationalism long before the

space age shortened its longevity. In the name of Iqbal let us remind ourselves that the Third World is no more than a transitional stage in our history and that the need of our time is to hasten the process of its transformation and development so that the quality of life in it will not be at variance with that in any other.

In this historic and gigantic task the peoples of the Third World shall find in Iqbal an unfailing source of inspiration, strength and wisdom.

Note: Quotations from Iqbal's two Persian poems, Javid Nama and Payam-i-Mashriq are from their English translations by Shaikh Mahmud Ahmad (The Pilgrimage of Eternity, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1961) and M. Hadi Husayn (A Message from the East, Iqbal Academy, Karachi, (now at Lahore 1971) respectively.

IBLIS IN IQBAL'S POETRY

One of the most fascinating figures in Iqbal's work is Satan, Iblis, who boasts in a famous poem in Bal-i-Jibril that he is 'a thorn pricking God's heart'. Satan has always played a prominent role in the Islamic tradition. As the Our an attests he refused to bow down before Adam and therefore was cursed by God. On the other hand we find mystical speculations, probably originating with Hallaj, in which Iblis becomes the great lover who does not want to share his eternal love of God and his complete surrender to His will with anyone else. Echoes of this attitude can be found in the poetry of Sanai and in the sayings of Ahmad Ghazzali (d. 1126), and have reached the Subcontinent where mystical poets like Sarmad (executed 1661) and even Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai (d. 1752) speak of ashiq Azazil, 'Satan the lover' A thorough study of these developments is at present being made by one of my Ph. D. candidates at Harvard in order to elucidate the background of Iqbal's Satanology.

In Iqbal's work the various strands of the Christian and Islamic attitudes toward Satan are woven together into a highly interesting fabric. A. Bausani, who has devoted a fine Italian article to this problem, discerns five different aspects of Iqbal's Satan: the prometheian side, which Iqbal may have taken over from Milton; the Judoao-Islamic aspect according to which Satan is and remains a creature and instrument of God; the gnostic-Christian ideas, originating in Iran, that Satan is an independent power in the world; the idea common in some mystical trends in East and West that Satan is the manifestation of God's Jalal side, and eventually the aspect of Satan as the pragmatic politician. Iqbal's interest in Satan is visible already in his thesis, but the most important source is the Javid Nama. There, he shows Iblis as pure

monotheist who spoke his 'Yes' to God's unity in the veil of a 'No'. These ideas go clearly back to Hallaj and his Persian commentator, Ruzbihan-i Baqli (d. 1209), whose work was well known in the Subcontinent. Iblis appears here as the lover who does not want union, but rather prefers the burning of separation because only by longing the creature remains active. Iblis is the poor creature that was caught between God's order and His will. How should he know that God can order something which He. basically, does not will, or vice versa? But in such an approach, one danger of this Satanic position becomes also clear; Iblis is short-sighted, and ascribes his own misfortune to the working of predestination, tagdir. Thus, he can be regarded as the fore-runner of those who ascribe their own evil actions to the pre-eternal destiny and try to get rid of their spiritual responsibility. In the same line Iblis may appear as the model of envy—he, after serving God for thousands of years as the most perfect ascetic, nay as the preceptor of the angels, envied Adam who was given a higher rank by being invested as God's Khalifa. His vicegerent. And since he regarded himself as better than Adam maintaining that his element, fire, was superior to Adam's element, clay, he is also the representative of one-eyed qiyas, analogy, unable to see the divine spark in the form of clay and water.

Iqbal's Iblis appears sad when he emerges from his dark clouds (Javid Nama, Jupiter Sphere). This, again, is a trend well known to the Islamic mystical tradition; but it has also been mentioned by Nietzsche, who sees in Satan 'the spirit of heaviness through whom everything is bound to fail'. In the Javid Nama. Iblis complains that man too willingly lends his ear to his insinuations. It would rather be man's duty to struggle against him and to try to overcome him. Thus, Satan becomes an active and activating power, and is required for the development of the world in general and of man in particular. It is he who leads Adam out of the sweet gardens of pre-logic, of the primordial Paradise, into life. That is lucidly expressed in Iqbal's great poem Taskhir-i-Fitrat (نسخير نطرت) in the Payam-i-Mashriq. About this picture of Satan one may well say - as has been said about Milton's Lucifer, that he is a trespasser, hence a sinner, yet represents our aspirations toward higher levels of existence. As Goethe has put it. Satan is the manifestation of error, but of an error which is necessary for man's spiritual maturing. From this

angle, the image of Satan can develop into two different directions: either he becomes the power of radical evil, or the representative of that intelligence which helps man to overcome the powers of chaos, and thus assists him in his highest goal, that of individuation. Iblis's role as the representative of intelligence is again twofold: it may be the power that clears up the chaos of man's lower instincts step by step, thus leading him upward, or the power of loveless intellect which defends itself with its head and is therefore represented by the serpent.

But if Satan is, on the one hand, the dangerous yet necessary intelligence, he is, on the other hand, also a representative of the chaos, of the unbridled instincts which to overcome man is called. It is this aspect of Iblis which was most familiar to the Muslim mystics who relied upon the Prophet's word aslama shaitani, (اسلم شیطانی) 'My Satan has surrendered to me' or: 'has become a Muslim'. That means that he had tamed his lower instincts in such a way that they became useful instruments in the struggle of life: Satan, touched by the power of the Perfect Man and, even more, by the power of Love which is manifested through the Perfect Faithful, can become a helper for man (as already Maulana Rumi had said in the Mathnawi). That is why Iblis in the Javid Nama and in Taskhir-i-Fitrat asks man to overcome him; as in the works of Nietzsche and Valery, he wants to be a victim of the Perfect Man before whom he will eventually perform the prostration which he refused to perform in front of the immature young Adam. As the power that tries to seduce man Iblis becomes, for Iqbal, the advocate of lovely mystical dreams and opium-like poetry: the scene in the Javid Nama where he tries to hinder Zoroaster from going out and preaching is indicative of this aspect of his role. He is the advocate of Weltflucht, of seclusion, and thus the mouthpiece for Iqbal's criticisms of decadent Sufism and decadent Sufi literature. Again, he appears in the Sphere of Venus as the happy leader of the old deities who have been dug out of their tombs by the European archeologists, and who represent the worship of Baal in all its aspects, thus threatening the Muslims in their firm belief in one God.

The fact that Iqbal sees the European archeologists responsible for the revival of Satanic powers in the Middle East leads to the final aspect of his satanology: it is the political Satan. He manifests

himself in the various types of Europeans, be they men or women, and is perhaps depicted best in the figure of the would-be prophetess in the Sphere of Mars in the Javid Nama who embodies the loveless attitude of European women, and in Miss Ifrangin, who talks to Judas Ischarioth and is blamed by him for selling the spirit of Christ in every moment. Iqbal had called the politicians of our age 'Satan's prophets' while he was still a student at Cambridge, and these blows are taken up once more in his last poetical works, where we find the Parliament of Iblis and many other poems against those Satanic powers which try to seduce the Muslim people by various means in order to establish their own rule instead of the rule of the one God.

One cannot see Iblis in Igbal's poetry simply as Intellect, as materialist, as determinist, or as Adam's adversary. His figure is woven together from many strands, taken from the books of Islamic mystics and and European thinkers and poets (Jacob Boehme, Goethe, Milton, Nietzeche), and eventually Satan became the fitting symbol of Iqbal's criticism of the loveless Western world. But one should remember that Igbal, faithful to the Islamic and Judeao-Christian tradition, sees Iblis never as absolute evil, or as God's enemy; he is rather the enemy of man, the power with whom man has to struggle in order to grow. It does not make any difference whether we understand this power as the dark feminine element of chaos which has to be tamed in order to serve man. or as the lucid masculine element of luciferian intellect which is necessary for man's individuation although it can grow into a hypertrophy of intellect once it is separated from love and becomes an independent force, we may also understand this power as the seducer into useless dreaming, mystical introspection, unsocial attitude, or as the protector of a civilisation that is devoid of Divine love. In each of these aspects Iblis is a necessary companion of man who is called to overcome him and thus to develop into the Perfect Man, whose model is the Prophet of Islam.

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REFLECTIONS ON IQBAL'S MOSQUE⁹⁷

In 1931 Muhammad Iqbal went to London to participate in the Second Round Table Conference organized by the British Government to discuss further constitutional reforms in the Indian Empire. Iqbal's role was a minor one on that occasion, but on his way home he stopped in Spain. There he sought out the monuments that testified to the glorious past of Andalusia. He was moved by his tour and found, above all else, the Mosque of Cordoba to be a monument that rivetted his thoughts and emotions. He secured permission from the authorities of the building, now a church, to perform the canonical prayers, and he carried away from that moment a complex of emotions and perceptions from which he was to forge one of the best known and beloved poems of his entire Urdu corpus. In the British Brit

The poem, "The Mosque of Cordoba" exemplifies many of those qualities that have won Iqbal his popularity. The appeal of the poem is often attributed to its subject. That alone, however, does not explain the poem's magic, for the mosque alone could be read about in Baedeker or a history of Spain. The subject is important only because of the way it is treated and the way it is embedded in the poem. It is, therefore, important to examine the poem itself, its stanzaic form and patterns of rhyme and rhythm as well as its content. Most studies of Iqbal take for granted the fact that Iqbal is a poet and do not analyze his skill as craftsman and artist. Treatments of his poetry typically extract from the verse aspects of Iqbal's political or philosophic or religious thought without attention to the context that gives them form and meaning.


The poem's ordering of line, meter, and rhyme on the one hand, and its patterning of metaphor and diction on the other,

together are central to its effectiveness. Moreover, I would suggest, the meaning of the poem is inextricably linked to the fact that it is a structured and crafted expression. Iqbal in this poem not only celebrates a mosque, but literally builds in the verse a "mosque" of his own. I should like, first, to look at the form of the poem: then, at the metaphor and diction that shares its language and, finally, at the meaning the structure embodied.

I

Iqbal, for all his modernist thought, did not deviate from classical forms when it came to poetry. His poems were written within well-defined patterns of meter and rhyme which he was able to manipulate masterfully. "The Mosque of Cordoba" is a long poem. It consists of eight stanzas, each of sixteen lines of which the final two form an emphatic final couplet. The metric and rhyming pattern are basically that of the ghazal, a short lyric poem, here multiplied eight times. In this poem, however, each stanza has its own rhyme, and as typical in what is called tarkib band, each stanza concludes with a couplet whose importance is made clear by the fact that it does not include the common rhyme. Each line has a caesura, a break in the middle, and occasionally the common rhyme appears there as well. In the first verse, for example, the rhyme appears not only in the first two lines and in alternate lines thereafter, but in the middle of three lines as well. The rhyme is particularly important. It resounds in each verse and its choice has a subtle influence on the reader or listener. In the first verse for example, the end rhyme is at -a syllable which often indicates an Arabic plural; and I would suggest that its choice here strikes a tone of formality, of abstractness, of solemnity: hadisat, hayat o mamat, sifat, mumkinat, ka'inat, and so forth.

Within this structure, Iqbal chooses to create more patterns by using repetition and variations on recurrent phrases. He takes, again looking at the first stanza, a single phrase, silsila-i ruz o shab, "the chain or succession of day and night" and introduces five of the first eight lines with it. Moreover, in this stanza and throughout the poem he is particularly fond of parallel constructions. As many as four or five lines in a single stanza will have parallel forms in each of two phrases:



The examples are many. Repetition of a phrase in the preceding couplet often appears in the first lines of a new stanza, making the transition effective.

The result of these patterns is that the poem sings. Fast paced and flowing, it is hypnotic. Rhymes, repetitions, and parallels are muemonic devices also and the listener remembers, soon predicts what comes next. This is true of all successful Urdu poetry, for this is a poetry primarily designed for recitation. Tempted to abstract from the poetry lofty thought no socialism or sufism, we must not lose sight of the fact that Iqbal's skill in manipulating traditional poetic forms provided a foundation for his work. Poetry is not all craft, but craft certainly is an important part of poetry.

Ħ

A further dimension of Iqbal's craftsmanship and skill is evident in the metaphoric images and diction of the poem. I should like, briefly, to describe the poem, stanza by stanza, pointing to prominent themes and selected examples of the poet's use of language.

The poem begins with a meditation on Time, on the succession of day and night. This succession itself is the delineator of all events; is the "two colored silk" from which God creates "His robe of attributes". In this one vivid image, Iqbal introduces the profound and complex issue of the relation between God and His creation. For the moment, he stresses human transience and he introduces the metaphor of music as a cry of pain from the endless succession of Time. Time is personified as a shroff who weighs creation in the balance, finds it wanting and rewards it with death. Time, as noted above is repeatedly described in the Persian phrase, silsila-i ruz o shab. Against it, utilizing the rich

options of vocabulary available in Urdu, Iqbal plays the humble everyday time of man for which he uses the common Hindi words of din and rat. That time, like all else associated with creation, is fleeting. The final emphatic couplet of the stanza insists on this nothingness: manzil-akhir fana, a phrase which recalls the final stage pursued by the sufi. Here that phrase resonates not with a sense of fulfillment but of emptiness.

The second stanza, echoing phrases from the first, continues the theme of the flow of Time, identifying it with water, with flood. But now 'ishq or dynamic love—to use Professor Schimmel's definition—is proclaimed as itself a tide able to stem all else. 'Ishq is characteristic of the special man, the Believer or Man. of God. 'Ishaq is equated in a series of cascading phrases with Gabriel's breath, the Prophet's heart, the envoy of God, God's word, the scholar, the noble, the vagabond. It is—returning to the question of the identity of man and God—the common link between man and some special segment of His creation. Again Iqbal speaks of music but now no longer a cry of despair, it is the melody played on the strings of life plucked out by the plectrum of love. Throughout the stanza now plays an image of light, of radiance, of illumination, all owed to the presence of 'Ishq.

In the third stanza, Iobal develops the central meaning of the poem, the idea that the mosque, here introduced as the very embodiment of love, the product of the heart's blood, itself lives. The creative artifact, whether the stone of the mosque or the word of the poet, is thus transformed from death and mortality to life and immortality. Man's emotions transcend in value all else in creation, far surpassing the obedience of the angels which is given without cost. Of all men it is the poet-and this poet in particular—whose emotions are of such value. Igba! calls himself kafir-i hindi whose passion is the passion of faith, made the stronger by the pride of the recent convert. In the final couplet he describes himself as an embodiment of the name of God. God the Creator, the Artist, and the Artist's artifact all are linked by the qualities which are introduced at the opening of the fourth stanza, those of jalal and jamal which are the qualities par excellence of God but are here shared by the mosque and by its architect. Iqbal revels in the beauties of the mosque and links it with other expressions of 'ishq, exulting in the Muslim past and again celebrating the faith in the final couplet which incorporates the first phrase of the *shahada*. Finally, in the fifth stanza, Iqbal pushes even further the question of the relation between the Creator and the artist when he says "As is God's Hand, so [is his] hand." He delineates the character of the Believer who is the triumph of God's creation, the slave whose qualities are in fact those of the Master.

In the sixth and seventh stanzas, Iqbal develops further his historical perspective, recalling the great moments of the Muslim past which now exist only in the memory of Muslim hearts. Muslim rule was humble, unlike European rule which was merely regal. Muslim rulers instructed the rest of the world. Echoes of that past live on in the warmth and openness of the people the poet sees before him. Andalusia's breezes waft the fragrance of Yeman; its songs retain the coloring of the Hejaz. But the poet wakes from this reverie to face the reality that Muslim worldly greatness is gone. He thinks of the Protestant Reformation and the French Revolution and hints that now the caravan of 'ishq has found its new halting place in the soul of Islam. What, he asks, will come surging from the ocean to change the whole color of the cosmos?

In the final stanza Iqbal weaves together a synthesis of his images of the flow of time and water, of music, of color and light, and of the crafted work. His opening note in this stanza is muted and nostaligic, set against neither day nor night but twilight. Music is now concrete, not abstract—the simple and affecting song of a peasant girl. Water is now no cosmic flood but the flowing Gudalquivir by whose banks he stands. But the music is transformed as the poet continues, for he announces that behind his eyes burns a new dawn. Latent within him is a song whose fire Europe will not be able to bear. Light is no longer twilight but the glow of his words. A people—not Time—must weight its acts, he writes, and bring to life the fervor that passionate life requires. That fervor, the blood of the heart, alone makes a creative act like a poem perfect and whole.

Iqbal's poem at once describes and actualizes the power a poem can have. At one level, Iqbal writes to instruct the reader, to remind him of past glory and future potential greatness. At another level, far more profound, he writes to embody his own spirit, to make it eternal. To achieve this latter objective he

creates, as we have seen, an artifact—symmetric, highly structured, as classic as the mosque which is its analogue. Iqbal's stanzaic and imagistic pattern thus is important not only for creating a poem that sings, that resounds and allures the listener, but is intrinsic to creating the meaning of the poem as well.

III

"The Mosque of Cordoba" as a whole has salience, I would argue, because it touches two concerns that have been central to thoughtful Muslims in this centry: first, an interest in the glorious past of Muslim history; and second, a quest to understand the relation of man to God, an issue that has long roots in the intellectual history of Islamic, especially sufi thought, and that finds in Iqbal a particularly interesting formulation. Underlying both themes is an orientation characteristic of modern Urdu literature, namely its didactic character. From the "Musaddas" of Hali and the moral tales of Deputy Nazir Ahmad in the late nineteenth century through to the Progressive Movement of Iqbal's own day, Urdu literature has often taken as its mission that of the goal to instruct. Not all of Iqbal shares this concern, but this poem decidedly does.

Many of those intellectuals who wanted to change the attitudes and behavior of their fellow Muslims turned to the past and identified a period of earlier glory that both re-affirmed the pride of a now subject people and provided a model toward which they might aspire. Such an emphasis was one response to the fundamental dilemma that confronted all thoughtful Indians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under British rule: why are we so weak, so powerless; why is the disparity between us and our rulers so substantial! In general the response, for Hindus and Muslims both, was to blame oneself for a failure to adhere to proper belief and behavior and discipline, to find oneself wanting and to conclude that current subjection was deserved. Such a conclusion was profoundly troublesome. Yet it provided a program for change and the solace that it was only human error, not something intrinsic to one's culture, that was at fault. Either by adhering to the texts of religion or by reviving the practice of the historical past, Indians could again be great. Among Muslims, for example, the mujahidin of the 1930's and the early ahl-i Hadith, and, among Hindus, Ram Mohan Roy and the early

reformers in Bengal, all emphasized the revival of texts. They insisted that if one brushed away false accretions a shining truth could emerge that would put aright individual lives and the life of society as well. Later in the century other reformers emphasized glorious ages in the past when one's people were subject to no one and one's science advanced. The Arya Samajis with their focus on the age of Vedic glory represented this stance and, among Muslims, the work of Hali, Amir Ali and Shibli did so as well. For members of each community a pride in their past became only then a crucial strand in their identity.

In focussing on Cordoba, Iqbal found a symbol of past Muslim glory more evocating than any other. It represented the farthest reach of the great early empires, and, specifically, a time when Muslims ruled European soil and far surpassed Europeans in both morality and the arts and sciences of civilization. Iqbal claimed a tie to that past on the basis of religion. Indeed he explicity raised in the poem the lurking anxiety of South Asian Muslims that they could not make that claim, that they were inadequate in their faith because of their distance from the Islamic heartland and their presence in an infidel land. He insisted that the emotion of his heart was proof irrefutable of his tie. Rather than let others accuse him of a tainted faith, he called himself a kafir, but insisted that the depth of his emotions linked him unquestionably to the truest currents of the faith.

Iqbal used the context of reflections on Cordoba and the past to raise what I have indicated to be a second central theme of the poem, namely the relation of man to God. Iqbal looked at the mosque as an artifact, a creation, a tangible expression of man's power at its peak. He celebrated the architect of the mosque; the warrior who made his work possible, and, in a daring leap, the poet, Iqbal himself, who before our eyes creates an artifact that will transcend time. In this, as in other poems, Iqbal celebrates man's power. The poem is an exciting statement of man's extraordinary potential and in this rests without question a major reason for the popularity of the poem.

The subject of the poem, the mosque and the glories of the Islamic past, is one that has particular salience for South Asian Muslims. For Pakistanis, perpetually seeking to define a locus for their roots, its appeal is clear. But the treatment of the subject

goes far beyond such particular issues to universal ones. At that level Iqbal transforms the idiom of mystic thought—of such profound concepts as 'ishq and shauq—to an original view of creative man's potential, a view that places a theory of aesthetics within the context of tasawwuf. Thus even when some day the historic romanticism of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries will seem dated, the deeper currents of the poem will continue to have meaning. The poem—as Iqbal meant it to be—will be like the mosque itself: an artifact that has transcended time.

* * * * *

NOTES:

- 97. I should like to thank Professors A.H. Dani and C.M. Naim for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The latter will see some of his falicitous phrases incorporated intact.
- 98. For a useful survey of Iqbal's life see Hafiz Malik and Lynda P. Malik, The Life of the Poet—Philosopher, in Hafiz Malik, ed. Iqbal Poet philosopher of Pakistan, New York, 1971, p.p. 3-35.
- 99. The Poem is printed in Iqbal, Muhammad, Bal-i-Jibril (Amritsar, 1969). It has been translated into English in V.G. Kiernan. Poems from Iqbal, London, 1955. p.p.37-42.

THE POET'S MISSION

THE MAINSPRING OF IQBAL'S LIFE WORK

There have been very few great poets in the history of world literature who were not wholly dedicated to their art. This is as it should have been. The Muse is an imperious and jealous mistress, who demands unquestioning obedience and whole-hearted devotion. Divided minds are not fit for her service. The great ones whom she specially favoured were virtually her life-long slaves. Serving her was their sole vocation, and any other interests or pursuits they had were subordinate to it. However, not unlike a human mistress, the Muse is known to have dealt indulgently with a handful of her devotees who showed an independent spirit. Most of these were versatile geniuses with many gifts of a high order, including that of poetry, which enabled them to serve her well and truly along with engaging in other pursuits. They added not only to her glory but also to her riches, for they brought their other gifts to her service. Nevertheless, complex and manysided as were the personalities of these men, their relationship with the Muse was not always simple. On the contrary, it was full of tensions, contradictions and paradoxes. It is to this handpicked elite of the Muse's lordly followers that Iqbal belongs. Besides being a poet, and a great one at that, he was a teacher, a lawyer, a philosopher, a social critic, a religious writer, a politithinker and, to crown all, something of a practical politician. In some of these other capacities he rivalled and, according to some people, even outrivalled himself as a poet. Conflicts between these various capacities were only natural, and they were reflected largely in his relationship with poetry. Strange, indeed, was that relationship. It can best be described as an ambivalent relationship, one of love-hate, of mixed attraction and repulsion, of loyalty alternating with rebellion.

A born poet, Iqbal could not help writing poetry. So he wrote it from early childhood almost to the last day of his life; and yet he never fully acknowledged it as his vocation. As a matter of fact, in some of his irate moods he denied being a poet at all and strongly resented being called one. At the other extreme are verses in which he eulogizes poetry and the poet almost to the point of hyperbole and speaks proudly of his own poetic achievements. Between these extremes are occasional cries of anguish at being afflicted by nature with something like a compulsion to write poetry, a thankless task on the whole, as he often felt it to be. It is interesting to study the development of this bipolar approach from stage to stage in Iqbal's poetry.

Collections of Iqbal's poems appeared in the following chronological order: —

Asrar-i-Khudi, 1915; Rumuz-i-Bekhudi, 1918; Payam-i-Mushriq, 1922, Bang-i-Dara, 1924; Zabur-i-Ajam, 1927; Javid-Nama, 1932; Bal-i-Jibril, Darb-i-Kalim, Pas Che Bayad Kard, and Musafir, 1936; Armaghan-i-Hijaz, 1938.

While this sequence does not necessarily imply that the poems included in the various collections were composed strictly in accordance with it, it can, I think, safely be assumed to constitute a set of landmarks on Iqbal's poetic journey indicating the course of his development as a poet. I shall, therefore, follow this sequence, as far as practicable, in tracing the development of his conception of poetry, which, one may take it for granted, must have been closely linked with his practice of it.

Iqbal made his poetic debut at a time when Urdu poetry, in the wake of what is generally regarded as its golden age or in any case, its classical age, was going through a spell of decadence—a fin de siecle phenomenon which, strangely and unaccountably enough, it shared, across the seas, with contemporary English literature. Urdu poetry's counterpart of Oscar Wilde with his cult of art for art's sake was a somewhat different figure, namely, Dagh, a writer of amorous ghazals in a conversational style full of repartee, badinage and spicy phrases, but lacking truth of statement, sincerity of feeling and depth of thought. For all his levity, however, Dagh was a master craftsman, a survivor from a period during which the Urdu ghazal had attained to its formal perfection. So, in accordance with the traditional practice of novices

seeking initiation into the Muse's temple through one of the acknowledged masters, Iqbal, after he had attained a degree of skill in versification, attached himself to Dagh as a pupil and used to send his verses to him by post for correction. He naturally wrote ghazals in Dagh's style. Most of the ghazals he wrote thus he seems to have destroyed later on, but he included some in the Bagh-i-Dara: these latter are juvenilia of no intrinsic merit and at best half-hearted imitations of the master's style. The apprenticeship came to an end when Dagh communicated to Iqbal his opinion that he has acquired enough skill to need no further instruction.

Meanwhile, the vogue of Dagh had been gradually yielding place to a modernist movement heralded by Hali and Azad. Although they knew no English, Hali and Azad had indirectly learned enough about the broad features of English poetry to venture upon experiments in imitation of it. They wrote poems on social, moral and patriotic themes, which aimed at instruction, enlightenment and elevation rather than entertainment and which were couched in language free, on the one hand, from the persiflage and banality of the Dagh school and, on the other, from the artificialities, poeticisms, hyperboles and far-fetched conceits characteristic of Urdu poetry's traditional diction. Breaking away from ghazals in the style of Dagh, Iqbal turned to the writing of poems modelled on English poetry, to which, unlike Hali and Azad, he had direct access. The themes he chose were some of those uppermost in the minds of the new intelligentsia brought up on ideas of freedom, patriotism, religious tolerance and human progress then prevailing in the West. To mention five most outstanding of these poems, one ("Himala") was a tribute to the ancient grandeur of the Himalayas and the second ("Taswir-i-Dard") a long lament on the moral and material degeneration of the Indians, while the third ("Tarana-i-Hindi") and the fourth ("Hindustani Bachchon Ka Git") were national anthems proclaiming India's historical greatness, and the fifth ("Naya Shiwala") a plea for religious tolerance. In these poems there is no vestige of poetry for poetry's sake: they are all poems written with a purpose beyond the mere writing of poetry. There are, however, many poems written during this period which apparently have no purpose beyond themselves: they are spontaneous utterances evoked by intellectual and emotional experiences that demanded

expression and communication. In fact, there are two poems, namely, "Ek Arzu" and "Rukhsat Ai Bazm-i Jahan" (an adaptation from Emerson), expressing the wish for a quiet beauty spot in natural surroundings where one could lead a life of Arcadian peace and simplicity far from the hurly-burly of daily life in crowded human settlements. In keeping with this dual approach in his poetic practice during this early period, Iqbal describes the poet as a people's eyes: —

The poet singer of colourful songs, Is a people's eyes that see for it. When any organ of the body is In pain, the eyes weep.¹⁰⁰

It is a merely passive role that this description assigns to the poet in connection with human suffering. He is a sensitive organ that sympathetically feels the suffering, but he can do nothing about it beyond giving vent to his feelings in regard to it, which may or may not provide relief. In other words, he is just an observer and a recorder of human experience, not an active agent who in some way influences and shapes it. It may be that in describing other people's experiences as if they were his own the poet has in view the purpose of influencing the quality of those experiences, such as hightening the people's joys and hopes or alleviating their griefs and despairs. Nevertheless, this purpose exists in his mind only as a hope and not as an act of will, a goal consciously conceived and deliberately pursued.

It was probably a hangover of this passive and non-committal conception of poetry that led Iqbal to think of giving up writing it during his stay in England. Abdul Qadir in his introduction to the *Bang-i-Dara* relates how Iqbal told him of his intention to spend in doing something useful the time he was wasting in writing poetry. In answer to 'Abdul Qadir's appeal not to do so Iqbal wrote:

Let someone tell this from me to the Editor of *Makhzan* That nations which are doing something worthwhile have no taste for poetry.¹⁰¹

NOTE:

The translations of all the quotations from Iqbal are mine.

M. Hadi Husayn.

This dictum was probably evoked by Iqbal's observation of two opposite phenomena existing side by side at that time in English—on the one hand, the dazzling spectacle of her material progress and, on the other, the sorry state of English poetry after the passing away of the great Victorian poets, Tennyson, Browning and Arnold. But the dictum was biased and historically incorrect; for the Victorians, to take the nearest example that was available to Iqbal, had enjoyed great poetry and had at the same time done worthwhile things in other fields. However, Abdul Qadir and Iqbal's teacher, Sir Thomas Arnold, were successful in arguing him out of his mood of disillusionment with poetry. The mood yielded place to a Browningesque optimism about the potentialities of poetry as a guiding light. Thus, addressing 'Abdul Qadir, he calls upon him to arise and join him in dispelling the darkness engulfing the East:—

Arise, for darkness has appeared on the horizon of the East. Come, let us light up the assembly with our flaming songs. Ours is only to burn like rue.

But let us by thus burning turn the assembly upside down. 102

The realization is, of course, still there that the utmost the poet can do is to give forceful expression to his feelings; but there is now attached to it the hope that by so doing he may be able to move and activate his audience. So, buoyed up by this hope, Iqbal declares:

In the darkness of night I will lead out my caravan.

My sighs will shower sparks, my breath will send forth flames. 103

In the third part of the *Bang-i-Dara*, consisting of poems written between 1908 and 1924, the note of confidence in poetry's power to influence a people's conduct gathers further strength. For example, Iqbal ends his "Tarana-i-Milli" (Muslim Anthem), a counterpart to his Indian anthems, with this triumphant declaration:

Iqbal's anthem is as it were a bell of departure.

Thanks to it our caravan takes to the road again. 104

The title of the collection, namely Bang-i-Dara (Sound of

the Bell of Departure) is itself a token of Iqbal's emerging faith in himself as an awakener and leader of his people.

During the period I am now speaking about (i.e. 1908–1924) Iqbal must also have been writing the Asrar-i-Khudi, which appeared in 1915. A long poem in Persian, this is an essay on the philosophy of the Self and was written with a definite purpose in view, namely to develop among the Muslims-who had by then become Iqbal's special audience and his dearest concern-a dynamic self-awareness which would help them realize their potentialities and overcome their mental, moral and material backwardness. In the Prologue to the Asrar he made his first clear exposition of his idea of the poet's mission. The Prologue is a powerful composition, emphatic in statement and rich in imagery. Although it is best read as a whole, considerations of space do not permit its being quoted in full or even ad lib. I, therefore, content myself with a few key lines selected from different parts of it, hoping that they will together present an adequate summary of an elaborate piece of writing about the purpose of poetry, about its power to fulfil that purpose and about Iqbal's own poetic ambitions, achievements and poetntialities.

I am tomorrow's poet's voice,
Which in today' void sings.
My age does not appreciate
The meaning of life's mysteries.
My voice outsings
My instrument's capacity.
But I am not afraid to shape its strings
In drawing from it a fit melody.
I have been granted access to the springs
Of everlasting life, and I evoke
The living soul of things.
No one before me who has sung
Of truths that lie concealed.
Come, saki, fill my cup and flood
My intellect's night with the light

Of moon-bright wine that I might lead Back to the right path those who stray.

Re-echo as a vibrant cry In the world's ears, Uplift to a new height The worth of poesy

And, last of all, rehearse
The sealed-up book of secret love
With guidance from the Master of Rum's verse.

The Master of Rum (the poet Rumi), appearing to Iqbal in a dream, exhorts him thus: -

"Invent a new style for your song.
Enliven the assembly with your lusty strains.
Arise, and re-inspire all living ones;
Pronounce 'Arise' and make them all the more alive.
Come, savour the delight of self-expression. Sing.
O caravan bell, ring."

The Asrar is a result of this exhortation.

So I arose as music does from strings, And sang as one in frenzy sings. I unveiled the Self's mysteries. And showed its wonders to men's eyes.

But the Asrar is not mere poetry.

The purpose of this mathnawi, Is not composing poetry:
No images of beauty have I made, No love songs have I sung. 105

The note of disavowal on which the Prologue ends qualifies its effusive claims. Poetry, Iqbal seems to be saying, is great, but not all poetry; the *Asrar* is poetry but not poetry of the kind that he disapproves of, not poetry for poetry's sake. Poetry, he maintains, is not its "own justification, but derives justification from some purpose higher than itself which it serves, namely, the building up of the Self. Poetry is thus subservient to life. If it aids life by creating a zest for it, it is good; otherwise it is bad.

An interesting episode in Iqbal's dramatic affairs de coeur with poetry is a violent attack he makes in the Asrar on that denigrator of poets and poetry, Plato, for the latter's philosophy of idealism. He regards that philosophy is life-denying and thinks that it has had a baneful effect on Muslim art and literature. The attack was made in the teeth of the fact that Igbal and Plato are at one in subordinating poetry (and all art, for that matter) to morality in the interest of the good society. The difference between them lies in this that, while Plato thinks that poetry is intrinsically incapable of coming up to the moral standard prescribed by him and therefore exiles the poet from his model republic as dangerous to the fabric of society, Iqbal maintains that poetry, in the true sense of the word, is a force for the building up of society. The difference arises from a difference in their conceptions of reality and of the function of poetry in relation to it. Plato regards the natural world, the world of the senses, as an imperfect reflection of a supernal world of ideas and degrades all products of human art to mere imitations of this imperfect reflection. For Igbal, on the other hand, the natural world is a reality in its own right, and good art is not a mere imitation or reproduction of nature, but an addition to it and an improvement upon it. I quote below the concluding lines of Iqbal's indictment of Plato: -

He presents loss to us as gain and says
That what we think exists does not exist.
His spirit went to sleep and dreamed a dream;
His intellect created a mirage.
Living in a phantasmagoric world,
He had no gusto for activity.
Denying this world of phenomena,
He fabricated an ideal world—
A world which cannot be perceived or known.
This world of actualities, where things
Occur, is good enough for living men;
Let the dead have the whole ideal world 106

In the world of the living, for which Iqbal opts in preference to Plato's world of ideas, a world that has been irretrievably lost, the poet has a vital role to perform. He has to come to grips with it and to impose his active Self upon its passive non-self through his creative will. Instead of turning his back upon the sensuous world, he has to face it squarely and reshape it according to the urges of his spirit. Therein lies his moral task, by performing which well and truly he does his duty as a member of society. He is society's visionary, who accepts his environment as a reality, but also as a challenge in that it is his appointed task to transform it in accordance with his vision. Poetry that lives in a cloud-cuckooland away from the world of sensible reality is inimical to society's life, but so also is poetry that slavishly imitates that world, for it debilitates the creative force of life.

As a corollary to his invective against Plato, Iqbal went on to inveigh against poetry inspired by Platonism, choosing for his main target one of the greatest of Persian poets, Hafiz. He disapproved of Hafiz's quietism, his hedonism, his mystical eroticism and his indifference to the momentous events that were taking place around him. However, in a subsequent edition of the Asrar he deleted the verses he had written against Hafiz and contented himself with a general condemnation of the kind of poetry that Hafiz stands for. Here are a few lines from the verses to that effect:—

Woe to a people which subscribes to death. Its poet casts away all zest for life.

His opium makes your sinews weak. The price he takes from you is life itself.

He hurls you into contemplation's sea, And breeds in you indifference to activity.¹⁰⁷

The poetry which Iqbal commends is that which fosters desires, aspiration, ambition, the will to act, the spirit of adventure, the resolution to triumph over one's environment, the urge to adorn everything one touches. A few lines from Iqbal's description of such poetry are quoted below:

The poet's bosom is the stage where beauty manifests itself. The Sinai on which its theophanies take place. His glance lends further beauty to the beautiful, His magic adds to Nature's charms. The nightingale sings with his voice, The rouge that tints the rose's cheek is his. It is his ardour that burns in moths' hearts,

And it is he who lends romance to tales of love. He is a Khizar with the water of eternity in his domain; His teardrops are the universe's spring of life.

His bell makes caravans take to the road, And the sound of his footsteps is their guide. 108

The high purpose of poetry set forth broadly in the Asrar-i-Khudi is pinpointed in its sister-poem, the Rumuz-i-Bekhudi (1918), which carries a step further the philosophy of Selfhood expounded in the Asrar and extends the connotation of Selfhood beyond the personality of the individual, making it conterminous with the personality of the community. In the Prologue to the Rumuz Iqbal addresses the Muslim milla and makes it an offering of his poetic gift. Here, again, I content myself with quoting a few key lines:—

O you, whom God has made the signet of the nations, With whom He ended all beginnings that He made,

Lay the foundation of Love in your soul, Renew your covenant with the Elect.

My fellow-singers sing of others' loveliness, Of winsome faces and of comely hair.

But I am in love with the beauty of your face,

For you are the beloved of our friend,
Nestled in our breasts like the heart.
My love for you makes me bewail your state.
Its fire has made a mirror of my heart.
I rend open my bosom like a rose,
And then hold my heart's mirror up to you,
So that you cast a glance at your own face
And be enamoured of its loveliness.
I sing your ancient story once again,
And so revive old longings in your heart.¹⁰⁹

Then in an Epilogue addressed to the Prophet he prays for the fulfilment of his mission. A few basic lines from the Epilogue follow: —

You kindled the lamp of life in the world, And taught mere slaves the art of rulership.

Your breath blew up a fire from humble dust, And you transformed heaps of earth into men.

I have brought the corpse of my people to the healer; Yes, I have brought it to the Chosen One. I gave it a draught of the water of eternal life: I made some of the secrets of the Quran known to it.

Grant me the wages of my poetry In the shape of a prayer to God That He may couple my love with activity.

He has endowed me with the riches of a feeling heart And a share of the knowledge of the Faith.

May He make me more steadfast in activity.

I am a springtide rain-drop,

May He turn me into a pearl. 110

Here it is a metapoetic aspiration that is speaking. Iqbal is proud of being a poet, especially one with a grand vision and a high mission, but he is not content to be that alone: he wishes to be a man of action too so that he may realize his vision and fulfil his mission himself. It was this motivation which was the root cause of Iqbal's being in two minds about poetry ever since the time in England when he had thought of saying goodbye to poetry. He had devoted himself more and more to the writing of poetry, but had not been able to assuage the conflict in his mind between the rival claims of poetry and action. The conflict, indeed, became greater with the passage of time, as we shall see; but so did his devotion to poetry.

In the Payam-i-Mashriq, which purports to be an offering from the East to the West in response to Goethe's Westoestlicher Divan and which is an interpretation of the East's soul, Iqbal reached the high-water mark of his poetic achievement, at least from a purely poetic point of view. Unlike the Asrar-i-Khudi and the Rumz-i-Bekhudi and like the Bang-i-Dara, the Payam-i-Mashriq is a collection of poems on a wide variety of subjects rather than an essay on a specific theme. Although by the time he

wrote the poems it contains he had reached a stage in his poetic development where he consciously avoided writing poetry for its own sake, one senses in most of the poems an unstrained quality of emotion and a spontaneity of expression by virtue of which they seem closer to pure poetry than to poetry written in the service of a cause. However, in the Dedicatory Epistle to King Amanullah Khan, which forms the introduction to the *Payam-i-Mashriq*, Iqbal attributes to the collection some purpose higher than mere poetizing. Comparaing himself with Goethe, he says:—

We both have delved into the inmost heart Of being; both of us are messages Of life in the midst of death's ravages.

No one around me knows me properly.
They go away with empty vats from my.
Wine-fount. I offer them a royal state,
With Chosroe's throne for use as their footmat.
But they want fairy tales of love from me,
The gaudy trappings of mere poesy.

Is merely madness; if this madness be Complete, then wisdom Is its name. Alas!

Vouchsafed this gift, I am condemned to pass
My days in exile in this joyless land,
This India, where none can understand
The things I sing of like a nightingale
With not a tulip, not a rose, to hail
Its song—a nightingale singing alone

This outburst of personal emotion sounds like a discordant note in the serene lyricism of the *Payam-i-Mashriq* as a whole and was probably an afterthought that found expression in what was intended to be an introductory poem but became an apologia. The purpose underlying it presumably was to make the point that the *Payam-i-Mashriq* was not merely a collection of erotic or entertaining poems in the traditional style of popular Urdu poetry. However, the note found an echo, more relevant and accordant, in the grand symphony of the philosophical poem

In some deserted place, sad and forlorn¹¹¹

entitled "Gulshan-i-Raz Jadid" included in the Zabur-i-Ajam. There it appears in the form of Iqbal's most vehement disclaimer of being a poet along with claims of being a revealer of hidden truths:

It is truths of a new kind that I make you grasp:
I put the sun in the mote's clasp.
Do not think I am drunk without an honest draft of wine.
That mere poetic fantasy is all this talk of mine.
No good will ever come from any churlish boor
Who lays the charge of versifying at my door.
I do not know the alley where the poet's sweet-heart dwells;
I have no lovelorn heart which someone's coldness ails.
Mere humble dust, I yet do not lie on the street
To be a carpet under Beauty's feet.
Nor is there in my dust
A heart made clamorous by lust. 112

Iqual insists that he is a poet of a distinctive category, one of those whose mission it is to shape the future of peoples and to determine the course of history.

The destinies of worlds are shaped behind
The awnings of my mind,
And resurrections are brought up
In my heart's lap.
I spent a moment in my inner solitude,
And there emerged a world which knows no finitude.
"If this is what is poetry, I have no cause for shame,
For in so many centuries not one more 'Attar came."
113

In another long poem included in the Zabur-i-Ajam, namely "Bandagi-Nama", Iqbal makes a full exposition of what he regards as good and bad art, including poetry. Although he is speaking about the art of slaves in particular, what he is attacking is not so much slavery itself as its effects on artistic production, and he condemns all art—whether that of slaves or of free peoples—which has the characteristics he finds in the art of slaves. The gravamen of his charge against the art of slaves is that it lacks originality, vitality, ardour and the joy of life.

It mourns the death of multitude and makes You sad and weak and tired and sick of life.

Music should be forceful and impetuous And should rush forward like a flood so that It sweeps away all sorrow from the heart.

The credo of the slave is imitation.

And his job is to make false images.

In his religion novelty is sin.

New things fill him with doubt and misgivings;

With old things he is in his element.

His eye is on the past and future-behind. 114

This difference between good and bad, true and false, poetry is again described in the Javid Nama: —

O many poets through the magic of their art Are robbers of the heart and Satans for the eye. God help the poet of India. O may his spirit lose the joy of speech. He has taught Love mere minstrelsy, And has imparted Adhar's ways to Abrahams. His verses are mere chirps with little ardency.

The poet's nature is all quest:
He is a generator and sustainer of desire.
The poet is the heart within his people's breast.
A people with no poet is a heap of mud.
New worlds are made by ardency and ecstasy,
And poetry without these is a dirge.
If poetry's objective is the building up of man,
Then it is heir to prophethood. 115

The Bal-i-Jabril contains no sustained treatment of the subject of poetry, but there are scattered all over its pages dozens of verses dealing with one or other aspect of it, especially with Iqbal's own endeavours and achievements. In fact, one gets the impression that discussing his own poetry was his main preoccupation in this collection. I quote a few verses from what is virtually an embarras des richesses:—

Give to the youth my fervent morning sigh. Then give these eaglets wings with which to fly. To you, O God, this is my earnest prayer That of my vision everyone may have a share.¹¹⁶ There is a little wine left in my ghazals' jar. O saki, but the sheikh says it is contraband. 117

My fellow-singers take my poetry To be an outcome of the spring. O how would they know what a thing Is an impassioned song of Love?¹¹⁸

I would utter those words of mystery Which madness has made known to me, If God endowed me with The breath of Gabriel. 119

The sufi and the mulla know Little of my madness. Even the edges of their gowns Are not yet torn. 120

O do not take my stray songs For simple poetry, For I have inside knowledge of The tavern's mystery.¹²¹

Nature does not lack good taste. However, you should do What it has not been able to.¹²²

If you lack vision, do not join
My poetry circle,
For subtle points about the Self
Are like a sword of genuine steel. 123

It is a dark night, and you have Been separated from your caravan. The flame of my song is a torch for you.¹²⁴

Events as yet behind
The heavens' veils
Find their reflection in
The mirror of my intellect.
Your destiny lies neither in the stars
Nor in the revolution of the heavens,
But in my fervent songs.
It will not be surprising if
The embers in your ashes are
Revived by morning songs of mine.¹²⁵

There is no undiluted wine

Left in the *khanqah* or the *madrasa*. 126

Your breath has made the rose's flame burn brighter. O garden bird, this is your singing's best reward. 127

The wind is blowing hard, But still the *Darwesh* whom the Lord Has granted royal ways Is keeping his lamp's flame ablaze.¹²⁸

In the *Darb-i-Kalim* Iqbal devotes to art and poetry a whole section consisting of short poems. Here he seems to be setting forth something in the nature of an aesthetic theory. I quote from that section a few lines selected from here and there:

Music, religion, politics, knowledge, art
Have all in their possession matchless pearls.
They emanate from the mind of a creature made of dust,
But higher than the stars is their abode.
If they protect the Ego, they are life itself.
If they cannot, they are mere magic and false tales.
Peoples have come to grief under the sky
Whenever their religion and their literature
Have been divorced from Egohood. 129

O people with observing eyes. A taste for observation is a good thing, but What good is observation if it does not see The inwardness of things? The aim of art should be to generate A vital flame that never dies. What use is a mere momentary sparks? What good, O rain-drop, if you do not agitate The bosom of the sea. And are content to be A pearl lodged in a mother-of-pearl's womb? What good a breath of morning breeze, Whether as poet's verse or singer's air, If it can only make the garden wilt? O never without miracles do people rise. What good is art that does not have The impact of the rod of Moses?¹³⁰

I do not know the mysteries of poetry.

This point, however, is clear from the nation's history
That poetry which is a message of eternal life
Is Gabriel's song or Israfil's trumpet-call. 131

The euphoric sense of power and achievement that blows like a strong wind through the whole of Iqbal's poetry, expressing itself every now and again in crescendoes of assertion, exhortation and prophecy, is modulated by occasional notes in a low keynotes of self-questioning, misgiving, frustration and loneliness. These notes, far from diminishing the charismatic appeal and the messianic grandeur of his utterances, invest them with an amiable human quality. They save some of his most trenchant and sonorous passages from sounding like naive fanfares or pontifical sermons, especially to sophisticated readers or to those unfamiliar with the Persian and Urdu poets' conventional practice of making rhetorical claims about themselves and treating the reader to solemn homilies. Apart from this, they afford us a glimpse into Iqbal's own assessment of the actual and potential success of his poetic mission. Along with indications of the conflict in his mind between poetry and action, they are to be met with in almost all collections of his poems, but gain in poignancy towards the end of his poetic career. Some of the earlier ones are among the quotations already given. Here are a few of the most poignant from his later collections: -

O saki, in this winehouse there is none who is my confident. Perhaps I am the first man come here from another world. 132

What I thought was the caravan's departing bell Was nothing but a weary traveller's anguished cry. 133

Empty of wine are *khanqah* vats,
The *maktabs* tread the beaten path.
O I went sad from poets' gatherings:
Their melodies come out dead from their flutes.¹³⁴

They did not follow up the secrets I revealed, Nor did they eat of the fruit of my tree. O King of nations, I appeal to you for justice; My comrades took me only for a writer of ghazals. 135

There are moments when, dejected by doubts about the success of his mission, he feels his urge to write poetry to be an oppressive burden, a painful obsession. Here is a cry of distress in

that strain: -

These morning songs are my heart's blood outflowing. O God, what is the crime for which this is my punishments? 136

Sometimes the grief caused to him by the apparent non-fulfilment of his mission is intensified by the thought that he has not gained any remarkable success in worldly pursuits either. While many of his contemporaries with no greater talents or higher qualifications than his rose to positions of power and wealth, he remained an ordinary legal practitioner with an income nearer poverty than affluence. Verses like the following are products of such moods: —

My ill-luck is unchanged, And so is my indifference to fortune. Of little use has been to me My gift of poetry.¹³⁷

Roams the heavens my high-soaring thought. I stay on earth sad, wretched and distraught. In all my worldly tasks I lag behind; I stumble, flounder, blunder like one blind. In worldly tasks why am I such a ne'er-do-well, Wise on religion, foolish in things temporal? 138

As a counterpoint to this plaintive note there is a note of jubiliation betokening a feeling that his mission may be bearing fruit inasmuch as there are some individuals whose hearts seem to beat in unison with his:

Nature compels me constantly to sing. Perhaps there is someone still there Who understands my pain.¹³⁹

Gone are the days when I was a lone soul In the midst of assemblages, For there are others now Who are of the same mind with me. 140

He even hopes that the type of self-conscious individual it is his endeavour to bring into existence is emerging under the influence of his poetry: -

In the school of my poetry are being trained Beggars who know how to wear

Their caps tilted at a proud angle. 141

As regards his own future, he consoles himself with the reassuring thought that posterity will acknowledge his achievement:

When I am no more, men will read my verse and say, "A self-aware man revolutionized the world." ¹⁴²

One of the anxious questions that troubled Iqbal's mind during his last days was whether the torch of self-consciousness he had lit among his people would go out with him or whether it would be kept alive by someone else. In one of his quatrains addressed to the Prophet in the *Armaghan-i-Hijaz* he reflects on this wonderingly:

Will there again be those past ecstasies?
Will there blow in again Hijaz's breeze?
The days of this faqir are near their end.
Will there again be one who knows the mysteries?¹⁴³

In the next quatrain he prays that, if a spiritual successor to him comes, he may be endowed with the gift of writing moving poetry—like him, as he obviously implies:—

If one who knows the mysteries comes again, Then, O God, grant him a heart-moving strain. It is a Moses or a singer-sage Who makes his people's conscience clear and sane. 144

The age of the divinely ordained prophets having ended many centuries ago after having performed its role on the stage of history, there was obviously no likelihood of a new Moses coming. So the hope for mankind or, in any case, for the people with whom Iqbal was concerned lay, according to him in the advent of the other category of inspired visionary, the poet. What the poet of Iqbal's conception shares with the prophet is the fact that he has a message to deliver and the power to deliver it effectively: his mission it is to deliver his message in the best manner possible for him. We may, therefore, conclude that Iqbal could well have departed from the world with the serenely comforting thought that he had fulfilled his mission by delivering his message as best he could. He had fulfilled it not only as a poet, but also as a man of action, that is to say, in both the roles the conflict between which had worried him throughout his life, the more so during

the second half of it. His fino of action was poetry, and in that field his achievement has been equalled by only a few men in history. At the same time, it was his ambition to go beyond that field; for, in accordance with the philosophy of ceaseless journeying which he advanced, he treated every goal as a stage to be passed. He, therefore, set himself a metapoetic goal, that is, to achieve through his poetry something that men of action, worriors, statesmen, reformers, revolutionaries, achieve by other means; and he was successful in achieving it through his poetry.

It would perhaps not be a far-fetched poetic conceit to say that Pakistan is a creation of his poetry, a masterpiece in a human and geographical form, and at the same time a crowning achievement of his as a man of action. It was as a poet that he prepared the imagination of the Muslims of India for the vision of a sovereign state of their own, and it was as a political visionary—a combination of a poet and a man of action of another category to translate it into a concrete reality. The conflict in his mind between poetry and action, for all we know, was never resolved; but we may imagine that he would have died a happier man than he perhaps did if he had known that, so far as his lifework was concerned, the conflict was only apparent and only theoretical. History may well remember him both as a great poet and as a man of action, the two being synonymous in his case. He was a poet writing with the dynamic will of a man of action and a man of action-a statesman-acting with the creative imagination of a poet.

* * * * *

NOTES

100. Iqbal, Bang-i-Dara.

101. Ibid., p. 136.

102. Ibid., p. 132.

103. Ibid., p. 142.

104. Ibid., 159.

105. Iqbal, Asrar-o-Rumuz.

106. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

107. Ibid., p. 39.

108. Ibid., p. 37-38.

- 109. Ibid, pp. 93-95.
- 110. Ibid, pp. 193-196.
- 111. Iqbal, Payam-i-Mashriq, pp. 2-4.
- 112. Iqbal, Zabur-i-Ajam.
- 113. Ibid, p. 205.
- 114. Ibid, pp. 251-253.
- 115. Iqbal, Javid Nama.
- 116. Ibid, p. 11.
- 117. Ibid, p. 17.
- 118. Ibid, p. 23.
- 119. Ibid, p. 43.
- 120. Ibid, p. 52.
- 121. Ibid, p. 76.
- 122. Ibid, p. 87.
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- 123. Ibid, p. 92.
- 124. Ibid, p. 93.
- 125. Ibid, p. 94-95.
- 126. Ibid, p. 100.
- 127. Ibid, p. 105.
- 128. Ibid, p. 176.
- 129. Iqbal, Darb-i-Kalim, p. 98.
- 130. Ibid, p. 117.
- 131. Ibid, p. 133.
- 132. Iqbal, Zabur-i-Ajam, p. 58.
- 133. Iqbal, Bal-i-Jibril.
- 134. Iqbal, Armaghan-i-Hijaz.
- 135. Ibid, p. 57.
- 136. Iqbal, Bal-i-Jibril, p. 82.
- 137. Ibid, p. 27.
- 138. Ibid, p. 189.
- 139. Ibid,p. 85.
- 140. Ibid, p. 90.
- 141. Ibid, p. 68.
- 142. Iqbal, Zabur-i-Ajam, p. 143.
- 143. Iqbal, Armaghan-i-Hijaz, p. 14.
- 144. Ibid, p. 1.

IQBAL SEEING OUR TIME AND SPEAKING TODAY

When Dante was working on his *Divina Comedia* he started from an idea which had been generally accepted in the scientific world of his time. He began in Hell, advanced to Purgatorio and finally reached Paradise.

When Iqbal planned his wonderful masterpiece, the Javid-Nama, he used an idea that had already interested the theoretical planners in science and technology — the idea of men travelling into space.

Today with more advanced technological resources we are embarking on a new idea - an expansion of what we used to call memory. Memory in our traditional meaning was connected with the personality of a living man. Now we are told that there could be constructed a new kind of memory which has nothing to do with human personality and life. This is typical of our present world of data-manipulation. But even now we are starting to face another kind of memory. We start to suspect that memorizing could exist in a sense where personality is in a way surviving biological death.

When a dog is following the scent of someone who has recently passed by a place, he by this means seems to reach an expected goal; when sensitive persons are supposedly able to follow the trace left by people long ago — there seems to be a way by which the surrounding world is able to memorize what living persons have done and thought and how they have expressed their personality. Some technologists are even now prepared to foresee the day when we with the help of advanced machinery may be able to trace the contents of the memory stored since long ago in our material surroundings.

Just as Iqbal in his composition of the Javid-Nama showed his poetical and philosophical genius by forestalling the idea of space travel we might today in poetry try to forestal the idea of reading what personality, what thought and activity may rest stored in the material surrounding of holy places where prophets or poets or philosophers have lived and worked. The poetical insight may not be as convincing as the deliberate manipulations of scientisits and technologists. So let us accept to look forward to their checking up of the matter.

But please permit the poet to start even now in a way to foresee how sensitive persons may again make the personality of dead persons live and act again in the surroundings that were once there. Please permit the poet, in a series of metaphysical sonnets, to present the idea of *Iqbal seeing our time and speaking today*. And may I summarize the contents of these sonnets as follows:

A poor shepherd in the area of Tebriz, Iran, is taking his flock of sheep over to Turkey close to the mountain Ararat when in the night he suddenly meets persons who are sent by Rumi to find the disappeared dervish Shamsuddin Tebrizi. Instead of the dervish they now take the surprised shephered to Konva to see Rumi. Not having found Shamsuddin, Rumi is now with the help of the shepherd going to find Igbal. After some travel they join him in Munich. Rumi and Iqbal resolve to make their company three, and in Sweden another younger poet is supposed to start a journey to inspect the present world. In the Occidental world they are upset by their discovery of poisonous mental environment of men. They advance from person to person, from situation to situation with the kind of understanding that they have gathered and Iqbal is again seeking for the Orient and for his values and demanding a resurrection of the whole world, not in words but in deeds to save humanity which seems close on the road to suicide.

This series of sonnets which is called *Iqbal seeing our time* and speaking today, will, it is hoped, not contain anything controversial. It is still in the state of growing and is open to corrections and inspiration from the International Congress to which it will be presented in its present state as a small means of stimulating its work and inspiring future activities.

T

A Shepherd under Mount Ararat

The Shepherd, on the mountain slope at night, Assisted by his eager barking dog, Moves with his flock towards a distant light That flutters faintly through a dim bleak fog.

But suddenly the soil is turning bright And clouds are rising from a closeby bog And in the water deep a hoarse old frog Is speaking out enchantment and delight.

The Shepherd, walking on with steadfast pace To bring the barking dog, the bleating sheep Off to a place where they can rest and sleep, Is holding up his earnest human face

Towards the light which leads him in his walking And to the vaning night his voice is talking:

2

"This night was darker than I ever thought, And when I left Tebriz so long ago I did not know how far I had to go To reach the far off place where sheep are brought

But by that distant light my eyes were caught And though the movement of my flock is slow And though my midnight rest has come to naught I must get closer to this friendly glow.

I must get there in time for morning prayer. I cannot stay on this depressing slope. I am drawn on by glowing rays of hope. I have to run. I am no lazy strayer.

When I get there I shall be glad to rest, For by its peaceful beams I must be blessed". And so the shepherd with his sheep that bleat And with his dog that always wants to bark Advances slowly through the highland dark Along a steep and narrow desert street.

And suddenly the mist starts to retreat; Quite easily the shepherd's eye can now remark How from some firebrand the light doest spark; The sheep, the dog, the shepherd here meet

Some strange and solemn men who could not be At home on this wild road by Ararat.

With whirling movements and a dervish hat They might arrive to him straight from eternity.

But all their movements emphasize the task Of strongly stressing what they ask.

A shepherd under mount Ararat

4

"From where are you and how did you come here? This mountain that has learned to memorize Our lives and bring us back from Paradise Why should tonight it make us to appear

Again along this mountain road so near Where once we ran like restless spies In search of the supposed great seer Whose life in Konya we but could despise?

Are you related to the Shamsuddin That we were looking for so long? Who are you then? Where have you been In spite of all our Master's mighty song?

Like us our Master has again come down And we should bring you back to Konya town".

Π

Meeting Rumi

5

The shepherd answered with a slow and shy Unwilling bow that he had long been living In Tebriz. And he felt a strong missgiving Towards these earthbound members of the sky.

But they were anxious to explain just why They must demand his kindness and forgiving: Their master, the great Rumi, asked to pry Into a lost world he would be reliving.

And so his sheep and dog were taken over And with the swiftness of a running dream The shepherd moved away to Konya's border.

There in the Blue Mosque of the Masters order, Where he was standing in a golden stream Of peaceful rest, great Rumi's soul did hover.

III

What Rumi said

6.

"I am the poet singing in the night
I am the prophet speaking to your mind.
I am your inward peace at rest behind
All pressing fight to gain what you thought right.

Today I was this dim and distant light
This memory of someone almost blind,
This guiding sign, not green, not red, but white,
To thought and memories deep in your mind.

And you are happy who can rise and see So slim an outcome of eternal vision.

Far from the road to blindness and derision.

And I will slowly bring you close to me And I will open up your eyes and give You access to those men who truely live".

7

"Those truely great men that I saw by God, Deep rooted in an everlasting love Of him who rules all with his holy rod In peaceful hands, not with a wariors glove,

Those whom I saw in prophet sandals shod When I was scanning every path above In Paradise and heard a turtledove Coo loving at whatever step I trod,

There was no Shamsuddin in their sphere, He was no longer to be heard or seen As in my book of poems he had been.

IV

Meeting Iqbal

8.

And so the shepherd and the Poet-Master Went off by train from Konya to the West. They hurried on, they did not stay on rest. The shepherd found his world grow always vaster.

But while the engine started to move faster The Poet, on this train a ghostly guest, Regarded through the window ruined plaster In which this old and tired world was dressed.

And in a throng of children, wives and men Who went as guests to serve in Western lands They suddenly arrived at Munich station.

IQBAL SEEING OUR TIME AND SPEAKING TODAY

And on the platform with uplifted hands, As if he would bring forth this strange occasion, Stood Iqbal among crowds that cried and ran

v

What Iqbal Said

9.

"My dear Master, how I am impressed
To see you walking in your order's gown.
In search of my abode you have come down
From endless skies so well and saintly dressed.
A poet's foresight must have filled your breast
While you returned again to Konya town.
What was it then that stopped your dancing zest
That always gave you glory and renoun?

My Master, when I knew how very soon You would be coming down to see me here I thought how in a distant stellar sphere You joined me once for visits to the moon.

Are we again to tour that realm above To reach for truths of paradize and love?

VI

What Rumi Said

10

"Well, I remember now how we were bound To visit planets and to see those men Whom we might ask, we thought so then, If they had learned how real truth was found.

But now I walk on a disturbing ground That moves me more. These people try to span Their instrument to songs that lost their sound.

Through every tune, I neard, discordance ran.

My soul is aching now for harmony.
While I am staying on this sorry soil
I want to dance away those things that spoil
Their very lives. It is my task to be

That harmony, that recreating power By which existence turns a fragrant flower."

VII

Meeting a Poet In The West

11.

The shepherd will no longer travel on In these unending foreign parts. He looks for safety and oblivion. But their Northwards journey starts.

In whirling dance the way is gone And while they rest deep in their hearts Still as if following some mental chart Their distant voyage seems in no time done.

And so they reach a small white bungalow, Built on an island in a Swedish parish. Between the trees they find much peace to cherish. Their passage through the garden gate is slow.

But now at once they recognize a face That makes them feel at home in this new place.

II'V

What Iqbal Said

12.

"This is the Western poet whom I knew
To probe the anxious movements of my mind

IQBAL SEEING OUR TIME AND SPEAKING TODAY

He made me speak his tongue. He stood behind Some words I felt as fresh as falling dew.

Again we meet, the sky is high and blue. I recognize your face. Could I be blind Enough to miss your features with their true Deep insight which I found so rich and kind.

But yet, my Rumi, see his sorry eyes. His closed, pale lips have lost their happy laughter. I only hope that he will recognize His friends and know what work we should look after.

He must wake up. His self should now refrain From these depressions that invade his brain".

IX

What the Western Poet Said

13.

"I am so happy to have met you, brothers, And please, permit me now to use this name, A deep and painful premonition bothers My mind and fills my heart with shame.

Alone or in the company of others, Wherever I may be, it is the same I notice how the lives we live disfame Us before men unbornd by earthly mothers.

The air and the soil that God created Is now polluted and the atoms stink. From all the greedy thoughts we like to think And from our needs so wholly overrated.

It is a crime to crush what God has made And still we do it and are then afraid".

X

What Iqbal Said

"You know that God is present everywhere, Performing all his tasks from day to day. However ready men are to betray His aims and to deny him — he is there.

What you lament may only be a share Of misdeeds and deceits that men display. How wonderful if we could see a flare Of how he works and where he walks his way.

Come, let us trace at once in space and time From bygone seeds what crofts today may grow And see bad weeds that God will now undo And praise his wondrous work in rhythm and rhyme.

To find God's way we must today advance On poets wings and in extatic dance.

IQBAL AND PAN-ISLAMISM

Iqbal's intellectual and poetic maturity coincided with the time when the Pan-Islamic movement had taken a firm hold over the religious and political thinking of the Muslim world. His mind was nurtured on these ideas and after his initial enthusiasm for territorial nationalism, he became an ardent Muslim Universalist. Iqbal's concept of *Millat*, was basically Pan-Islamic and his whole-hearted advocacy of return to the Quran as a code of human conduct, with his emphasis on an energetic and determined prosecution of the mission of life, were found in abundance, in Jamal-ud-Din Afgahani's thinking. It can be said that with Iqbal's genius, the movement which had been started by Jamal-ud-Din Afghani reached its highest watermark.

Iqbal has expressed great admiration for Jamal-ud-Din Afghani in his prose and poetic writings. In a letter to Muhammad Ahsan dated 17th April, 1932, he wrote as under:


"In modern times, from my point of view if anybody is entitled to be called a *Mujaddid*, it is Jamal-ud-Din Afghani. The future historians of the Muslims of Egypt, Iran, Turkey and India will first of all mention the name of Abdul Wahab Najdi and after that of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani. In fact, the latter is the chief architect of the present day renaissance in the Muslim world. If the Muslim nation has not declared him a *Mujaddid*, or if he has not claimed that title for himself, that in no way reduces his status in the minds of those who have a proper insight into the matter" 145

In his reply to a question raised by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Iqbal further expressed his immense esteem for Jamal-ud-Din Afghani: —

Maulana Jamal-ud-Din Afghani was a man of a different

stamp. Strange are the ways of Providence. One of the most advanced Muslims of our time, both in religious thought and action, was born in Afghanistan. A perfect master of nearly all the Muslim languages of the world and endowed with the most winning eloquence, his restless soul migrated from one Muslim country to another, influencing some of the most prominent men in Iran, Egypt, and Turkey. Some of the greatest theologians of our time, such as Mufti Muhammad Abduh and some of the men of the younger generation who later became political leaders, such as Zaghlul Pasha of Egypt, were his disciples. He wrote little, spoke much and thereby transformed into miniature Jamal-ud-Din's all those who came into contact with him. He never claimed to be a prophet or a renewer; yet no other man in our time has stirred the soul of Islam more deeply than he. His spirit is still working in the world of Islam and nobody knows where it will end. 146

In poetry too, Iqbal pays homage to Jamal-ud-Din Afghani as the chief exponent of the cause of Islam in the modern world. In *Javid Nama*, Iqbal has devoted considerable thought and space to the exposition of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani's ideas. While on a heavenly sojourn with Rumi, as his guide, Iqbal is introduced to the spirits of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and Saeed Halim Pasha. Rumi introduces these luminaries by saying that the East has produced no greater personalities than these, that their insight has resolved many complex problems for us. The great Syed Jamal-ud-Din had such force and eloquence that even stones and pebbles could come to life by his speech.¹⁴⁷



Iqbal's image of the future of Islam is Muslim Universalism. He firmly believed that denial of the universal brotherhood of Islam means the rejection of the basic principles of Quranic ideology. This is the pervading spirit in all his thinking. He attributed the downfall of the Muslim community to the disappearance of the inherent unity, which led it from

triumph to triumph in the early history of Islam. He realized that if the Muslims failed to appreciate this point, their future would be bleak and desolate. All students of Iqbal agree that Muslim Universalism lay at the core of his message to the contemporary Muslim world. Sinha is of the view that "Islamic internationalism" or Pan-Islamism is the key-note of Iqbal's poetry, and permeates it through and through. Vehemently worded tirades against nationalism, and the exaltation of Pan-Islamism are the most striking features of Iqbal's poetry. ¹⁴⁸ Professor Arberry, in the introduction to his translation of Rumuz-i-Bekhudi (The Mysteries of Selflessness) writes: —

In the Rumuz, Iqbal states the case for international Islam. In this phase of his life he was still thinking most intently of the possibility of a revived caliphate bringing together in a single theocracy the 300,000,000 Muslims of the world.¹⁴⁹

Professor Browne in his review of Asrar-i-Khudi (Secrets of the Self) translated into English by Nicholson observes: —

.... it is by no means a Western philosophy, but rather a philosophical Pan-Islamism, designed to cure the ills of quietism, self-suppression and pantheism, which according to author's view, have emasculated the adherents of once virile doctrine of the Arabian Prophet.¹⁵⁰

Pan-Islamism was not merely one of the phases of Iqbal's thought. In fact after the first phase of a deep patriotic fervour, once he fully absorbed the spirit of Islam, he undeviatingly advocated Islamic internationalism. Like Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, he believed that unless this realization dawns upon the Muslims, they will remain backward, both socially and politically. A writer, while commenting upon Iqbal's indebtedness to Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, and the meaning of Pan-Islamism says: —

Of the modern Muslim thinkers, he is indebted most to Syed Jamal-ud-Din Al-Afghani who flourished in the second half of the nineteenth century and tried to drive home into the fallen Muslim world the message of scientific outlook and political resurgence.¹⁵¹

Iqbal himself tirelessly advocated the cause of Pan-Islamism and although his non-Muslim critics used the epithet "Pan-Islamist" for him in a derogatory sense, he himself was convinced that

the universality of Islam was vital to the faith itself. He firmly believed that if Muslim nations were to survive in the contemporary competitive world, they must find out some device which could again link them together as one compact entity. In a short address, which he delivered at the Muhammedan Educational Conference in 1911, Iqbal said: —

Some unkind critics, while commenting on my poems have labelled me as an advocate of the Pan-Islamic movement. I proclaim myself openly a Pan-Islamist, and it is my conviction that our nation has a glorious future. 152

In the lecture which was reproduced in the Report on the Census of India 1911, Vol. XIV, Iqbal has elaborated the same point in the following words:—

Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on a purely abstract idea objectified in a potentially expansive group of concrete personalities. It is not dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a particular people. In its essence it is non-temporal, non-spatial.¹⁵³

To many observers Iqbal's undiminished zest for a Pan-Islamic society is just an ideal. But according to Igbal himself. the ideal and the real are not two opposing forces which defy conciliation. Idealism does not mean a complete break with realism, in fact it is his perpetual endeavour to bring the ideal appropriately closer to the real. 154 In his opinion, Islam as a religion is the simplest of all religions because it does not expect from its believers more than a belief in the Unity of God, and the finality of the mission of the Prophet (May peace be upon him). A belief in these principles is sufficient to eliminate all distinctions of caste, colour, creed and race. This fact gives a supra-national hue to the socio-political system of Islam, and it was realization of this basic concept of equality and universality, which made early Muslims a great political power. As a levelling force against all distinctions and discriminations. Islam gave each individual a sense of personal security and power. 155 In a letter to Muhammad Akbar Munir, Igbal clearly pointed out that if the Muslim nations of the Middle East were to unite they would be saved, but if they were unable to resolve their differences and frictions, then there was no hope for their rejuvenation. 156 Sir Fazl-i-Hussain once made an observation in the Council of State that political PanIslamism never existed in Islamic history. On 19th September, 1933, Iqbal issued a statement explaining his views which reflect maturity of his thinking and deep reflection on this vital issue of Islamic politics. He said:

Sir Fazl-i-Hussain is perfectly correct when he says that political Pan-Islamism never existed. It has existed, if at all, only in the imgination of those who invented the phrase or possibly as a diplomatic weapon in the hands of Sultan Abdul Hamid Khan of Turkey. Even Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, whose name is closely associated with what is called the Pan-Islamic movement, never dreamed of a unification of Muslims into a political state.


It is significant that in no Islamic language—Arabic, Persian or Turkish—does there exist a phrase corresponding to Pan-Islamism. It is, however, true that Islam as a society or as a practical scheme for the combination not only of races and nations but also of all religions does not recognize the barriers of race and nationality or geographical frontiers. In the sense of this humantarian ideal Pan-Islamism—if one prefers to use this unnecessarily long phrase to the simple expression "Islam"—does and will always exist. 157

This portrays a clear picture of Iqbal's mind about Pan-Islamism. He is not indicating that the Muslims of the world can politically unite as one compact entity, but at the same time he is firmly convinced that the Muslims are tied by belief, history, outlook on life here and hereafter and common way of looking at what is good and what is bad in thought and conduct. This phenomenon brings the believers of the world into a common fold of eternal values. Another point which can be constructed from the above quotations is that in Iqbal's thought *Millat* and Pan-Islamism mean the same thing. He points out:—


Islamic outlook on nationalism is different from other nations. Our nationalism is not based on the unity of languages, oneness of territory, or economic affinities. We belong to one family which was founded by the Holy Prophet (May peace be upon him), and our membership of it rests on common belief about the manifestations of the universe and the historical traditions which we all share together. 158

Iqbal's poetry is also replete with ideas on Pan-Islamism. In

a poem entitled "Prayer" in Asrar-i-Khudi, Iqbal makes a fervent appeal to God that his community, by losing oneness has created innumberable difficulties for itself. The Muslims are helplessly scattered all over the world and he prays that God may unite them through ties of mutual love and trust. 159



Iqbal feared that parochial affinities had created so much friction and hostility among Muslims that they would never be able to join in a common cause against their common enemies. He was fully aware of the fact and had an eloquent testimony from the history of Islam, that joining all Muslim nations of the world into one supra-national state, was an impossibility under contemporary conditions. But these conditions could in no way hinder some form of unity which would help them in times of need to rise above their local bonds to serve the cause of Pan-Islamism. He was convinced that contemporary indifference to the cause of Muslim brotherhood could directly be attributed to rapid Westernization in Muslim lands. Under its influence the Muslims were becoming indifferent to religion, and they were being divided into rigid territorial units. Iqbal advocated that Muslims should try to forego these territorial labels. 160



- (1) If you can differentiate between good and evil, then do not fall in love with pebbles, stones and bricks.
- (2) What is Islam, it is to rise above the level of earth (matter) so that the unallyed self may know itself.

After establishing the fact that belief in the universal sovereignty of Allah is an integral part of the Muslim faith, Iqbal could not reconcile himself to the idea that the Muslim world should be divided into antagonistic territorial nation-states. In *Payam-i*-

Mashriq while narrating an incident pertaining to Tariq, the conquerer of Spain, Iqbal says that love of one's place of birth, to the extent that it becomes a barrier to the spread of the mission of Islam, is an alien concept. A Muslim is expected to cherish the belief that since the entire world belongs to God, by virtue of this a Muslim can never be an alien in any land and the whole world belongs to him.¹⁶¹

طآرق چربرکنارهٔ اندسس مفینیه وخت گفت ندکار تو به نگاهٔ خرد خطاست دوریم از سواد وطن بازچ س رسیم می ترک مبنب نسست نبویت کجاره است خند بهٔ دست خوش نیم شیر مرد وگفت هراک فک اِست که فک خدائط مت

- (1) When Tariq on Andalusian shore set fire to the boats, it was said his action for the wise eye was a wrong one.
- (2) They said, "we are far away from our homeland. How would we be able to return. To forsake the means is not advisable according to the shariah.
- (3) Tariq laughingly took hold of his sword and declared, "every territory is ours because every territory belongs to our Allah"

The basic principle of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani's Pan-Islamic movement was to rescue the Muslim lands from alien domination and to make them the masters of their own destiny. It was also meant to purify Islam from fictional mysticism and to remind Muslims about the real purpose and mission of their religion. In Armughan-i-Hijaz, Iqbal has arranged an imaginary meeting of the Advisory Council of Satan, in which a discussion is on between Satan and his advisers about the future of the Muslim community. Satan, whose sole purpose is to mislead the Muslims and to detract them from the Islamic way of living in this world, concludes the dialogue by saying that the best thing would be to see that the Muslims always remain under foreign subjection and leave the world for other nations. They should be kept busy with useless mystical pursuits so that they remain ignorant of the real purpose of life. Satan feared the reawakening of the Muslim community. 162

خیرای میں ہے قیامت کک دہیے مومن غلام جھوڈ کرا وروں کی خاطر پیجہان بیشب ت

ہے دہی شعرق تعوف اس کے تی میں خوب تر جو چھپا دساس کی اکھوں سے نما تنا سے جات ا نبوس در اہوں اس ہت کی بیاری سے میں جی تقیقت جس کے دیں کی احتساب کا کنات

- (1) It is good for us if the believers remain slaves till the dooms day in this way they hand over their temporal universe to others.
- (2) Only such verses and mystic ideas can suit them better and are capable of hiding from their eyes the vision of the realities of life.
- (3) I am every moment afraid of the reawakening of this Ummah, the spirit of whose religion (belief) demands the "stock taking of the universe".

The efforts of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and Iqbal were directed to believe the hopes of Satan, and to reclaim for the Muslims their rightful place in the world. Iqbal was convinced that his community could not play a decisive role as long as the Muslims were scattered.

From the above narrative it can be easily construed that Pan-Islamism was one of the aspects of the great reformative crusade, which engulfed every Muslim land during the later half of the nineteenth century. Alongwith their tirade against imperialism and advocacy of the unity of the Muslim world, Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and Mohammad Abduh were striving to preach reforms of various outmoded values of Muslim societies, which, in their opinion, were un-Islamic. With the passage of time, however, Pan-Islamism as a political ideal remained, but as a reformative movement it gradually subsided. 163

Iqbal continued as an advocate of both political and religious aspects of Pan-Islamism and his zest for it remained undiminished till the last moment of his life. As such we can sum up by saying that if Pan-Islamism meant unity of the Muslims, application of Quranic law to the affairs of men and removal of un-Islamic practices through reformative interpretations so that stagnation could be avoided, then Iqbal was a life-long champion of this cause. Like Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, he is convinced that challenges of Westernization and Western Imperialism could be met only be creating some form of unity among the Muslims of the world. Rosenthal, in comparing Pan-Islamism and modern Pan-Arabism

has argued that the former is rooted in the logic of religion and history and is articulated in theory, while the latter is a product of modern nationalism. ¹⁶⁴ This fact was referred to by Iqbal in his famous Presidential Address at Allahabad as follows:

One lesson I have learnt from the history of the Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not *vice versa*. If today you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever-vitalising ideas embodied in it; you will be only reassembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity and thereby saving yourself from total destruction.¹⁶⁵

But the Islam which he is advocating is the one which has the lustre of its original purity, and which through *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning), has been given sufficient strength and adaptability to meet contemporary exigencies. Unity among Muslims is a recurring theme in Iqbal's works. He believes that the *Ummah* is a compact universal entity and any attempt to divide it into sectional and parochial entities is against the mission of the Holy Prophet (May peace be upon him). In *Darbi-Kalim* he disapproves of the Arab princes of the day by saying that due to internecine feuds and unending conflicts, they have undermined the unity of Islam and have forgotten the message of the Prophet, who instructed the Muslims to live for ever in a bond of interminable unity. 166

- (1) I, an Indian unbeliever (according to the Arabian standards), can make hold to say something provided the Arab chieftains do not take it ill.
- (2) Who is the Ummah taught before any other that unity was of Mustafa and disunity of Abu-Lahab.
- (3) The Arab world does not exist on account of its areas and boundaries. The Arab world exists on account of Muhammad

of Arabia (May peace be on Him).

Universal Muslim polity and translation of the canons of Islam in the practical life of the Muslims, form the crux of Iqbal's thinking.

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NOTES

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IQBAL: HIS ART AND THOUGHT

Iqbal's poetry is as remarkable for its thought content as for its artistic value. His deep thoughts are culmination of his most exquisite emotions. What is actually new and thus more important in Iqbal's verse as compared with the Urdu and Indian Persian poetry of the past, is that it has not only been a reflection of his times, but also of a new attitude of the poet towards his surroundings. In Iqbal's compositions, for the first time in the history of the Urdu poetry, as also Persian poetry in the sub-continent the gap between the art and the people has disappeared to a great extent. While in the poetry of pre-Iqbal period realism frequently came into contradiction with the poet's world outlook, Iqbal acquired a world outlook which had enabled him freely and unfetteredly to reflect the truth of life.

According to some of Iqbal's critics Iqbal is a great poet but not a significant philosopher. Here I would like to emphasize that it is not correct to study Iqbal's thoughts as something different from his emotions. Iqbal the poet and Iqbal the thinker are not two different personalities and we can appreciate his poetry only in the light of his thoughts. According to Coleridge it is great thought content that lends greatness to art, and this aptly applies to Iqbal.

In the galaxy of Urdu poets Iqbal occupies a unique position not because of the formal or technical superiority of his poetry but because of its overpowering thought content and the cosmic sweep of its canvass. Without abandoning the artistic quality and beauty of diction of Urdu poetry, Iqbal endeavoured to relate it to the inner contradictions and external conflicts with which human mind and spirit were struggling in his period. He used poetry as an effective medium to express man's unending

resolve for self-assertion and his courage to explore secrets of the universe and to conquer new horizons. It is the compelling vigour, and the burning emotional drive which singles him out as the tallest poet among contemporaries.

ART FOR LIFE

Iqbal upheld the view that all fine arts—and his own poetry stood up to this test—should be inbued with a spirit that includes the cognition of life, and an active influence upon life, a feature that places the artist in the forefront of the people, in the vanguard of the eternal struggle for progress and freedom. And this principle has opened up to Urdu writers and poets vistas that were beyond their comprehension till the turn over of the last century. Describing his attitude towards art Iqbal writes in Darb-i-Kaleem —

الے اہلِ طف رفوق نظرخوب ہے میکن جوشے کی حقیقت کو مذد کیجے وہ طسد کیا مقصوق مہن مست رسوز حیات اجبی ہے یوایک نغس یا فوسس شل مشدر کیا یوایک نغس یا فوسس شل مشدر کیا بیم معجزہ دنسی میں امجرتی نہیں قریں جو ضرب کلیمی نہیں رکھتا وہ ہندر کیا

O discerning ones, thirst for knowledge is welcome. But what is in art that fails to grasp the reality of things? The object of all art is to attain warmth of life immortal;

The object of all art is to attain warmth of life immortal What good is existence for a breath or two like a spark?

Without a miracle nations cannot rise
What is art without the striking power of Moses' staff?

(Translation by S. A. Vahid)

This innovatory quality of Iqbal's verse in the development of art has shown itself first and foremost in the fact that it has developed and brought to the fore positive human characters. Iqbal perceives in the people a latent beauty, a strength and a heroism that excells anything known to the art of Urdu poet of the past. For Iqbal art is not only a part of mainstream of life but also an active agent of change.

The limited vocabulary of Urdu lyric, panegyric and elegies was too inadquate for this purpose but the master craftsman in Iqbal imparted new flexibility to the traditional symbols and fresh adaptability to the idiom, borrowing freely from the rich heritage of both Sanskrit and Persian on the one hand and European literatures on the other. In the process Urdu literature acquired new vitality and a universality of outlook, seldom noticed in poets of smaller calibre.

DAWN OF A NEW ERA

The poet feels that a new era is about to unfold itself and a new type of man is in the making. His verses on the subject of greatness of man are a promise, a prophecy, a demand presented to the immediate future. In one of his charming ghazals in "Zabur-i-Ajam" and later reproduced under the title of "Song of the Angels" in "Javed Nama" this demand grows even more insistent and incisive: —

فروغ فاکیاں از فردیاں افزوں شودروزے زیں از کوکہ تیعت پر ماگردن شودروزے خیال ماکہ اورا پر ورشس دا و ندطون نہا زگردا ب بہتر سیکی ہروں شودرونے کی درست کی آدم نگر! ادمن جبر می برس ہوز اندرطبعیت محت مدون شود این بیش با فادم ضمو سنے پیال موزوں شود این بیش با فادم ضمو سنے کہ یزداں دا ول از آئیس باو کر نوں شودرو ایسے

Brighter shall shine men's clay Than angels' light, one day; Earth through our destiny Turns to a starry sky.

The fancies in our head That upon storms were fed;

One day shall soar, and clear The whirlpool of the sphere. Why askest thou of me? Consider man, and see How mind, developed still, Sublime this subject will. Come fashioned forth, sublime. This common thought, in time. And with its beauty's rapture Even God's heart shall capture.

(Translation by Prof. A.J. Arberry)

This prediction even in its purely literary sense very soon came true, though the poet himself was not there to see it. Baby moons and satellites were launched in the space in quick succession followed by man's landing on moon.

An unparalleled ability to react swiftly to the spirit of the modern age displayed by Iqbal's poetry is something exceedingly remarkable. The stirring march of time in Europe, Asia and Africa provided Iqbal with fresh sources of inspiration and induced him indirectly to reflect in his works the profound changes that took place in the world. He did not only register the brisk tempo of life but also translated it into the language of art. He also reacted to events still in the making through the medium of poetry of an exceedingly high order. The very fact that Iqbal is able to show the pulse of time, its enthusiasm and its problems, is a patent proof of the existence of his close and organic ties with his surroundings.

Iqbal's poetry has a universal appeal mainly because there is political wisdom and a calm optimism in all his poems. His strength, like Goethe's, lies in the fact that he is not only a teacher or thinker but also, and chiefly, a prophet of humanity. One fact which we must bear in mind is that in Iqbal the two powerful impulses to artistic expression are his faith in the human capacity for limitless development and man's unique position in the universe. Both these impulses tend to make the appeal of his poetry universal.

A brief survery of topics, dealt with by Iqbal is sufficient to show the immensity of the living material tackled by him. It gives an idea of the complex and unprecedented literary problems facing Iqbal. His poems entitled "At Napoleon's Tomb", "Mussolini", "League of Nations" "Tolstoy", "Karl Marx", "Nietzsche", "Lenin and Kaiser William", "Socialism", "Voice of Karl Marx", "Europe and Jews", "Bolshavik Russia", "East", "Abyssinia" and "Syria and Palestine" are an expression of the keen searchings that Iqbal had embarked on and which were dictated by the desire to find new art forms worthy of the new content. These poems not only expanded the thematic borders of poetry but also increased the range of its means of expression.

And then notice the vast range of his poetry—his subjects include in addition to those mentioned above: A cat in a girl's arms, Himalayas, Morning, Graveyard, Shakespeare, Ghalib, a mother's dream, sun, candle, withered flower, love and death, cloud, historical buildings in Cordova and so on. Having sung of every conceivable subject on this planet, he, in *Javid Namah*, soars to other planets. This vast range needs versatility in poetic art, and Iqbal's is immense.

It is highly characteristic that problems of life, ethics and norms of behaviour, which in classical Urdu literature and much less in poetry, had not been treated, stemmed in Iqbal's poetry directly from its close association with surroundings.

Iqbal shows his readers the new values born of the post-World War I era. He describes not only the birth of the new world but the resistance of the old; he tells us the story not only of individual fates but tries to put his finger on the pulse of history and shows the links between the fate of the individual and that of the people.

At the very root of Iqbal's realism lies an aspiration to depict life in motion, and in its continuous development to show the march of life against the background of a broad historical perspective. This has provided favourable conditions for a realistic recreation of the past, all the more so since in this field too Iqbal has been able to base his work on the great traditions of classical realism. In this field Iqbal has based his work on the assumption that the process of historical development should be understood not as movement in a circle, but as an onward and upward movement. It is this approach to history that enables Iqbal not to

varnish or modernise the past, but to recreate it poetically. For him the poetry of the past lies not in a picturesque depiction of its details but in the forward movement that has determined the historical fate of mankind. Thus for instance his "Masjid-i-Qurtaba" (The Cordova Mosque) was inspired by stormy days of great historical changes that highlighted this important period in the history of Europe.

Taken in their sum the varied and various works of Iqbal present a poetical picture of people which can be seen nowhere else in Urdu or Indian Persian literature.

By its example Iqbal's poetry has reminded the writers of the sub-continent and particularly Urdu writers that great art is unthinkable without a faithfull portrayal of life. At the same time, it has shown in practice that genuine realism in art is inimical towards a petty and idealless copyist naturalism.

With Urdu poets of pre-Iqbal times, the artistic embodiment of the ideal in art often acquired a shade of abstractness, of the declarative, often bordering on the fantastic. The blending of the romantic and the realistic, the roots of which go back to the classics has reached fruition in Iqbal's poetry. Armed with a progressive world outlook, Iqbal, whose poetry has been a worthy reflection of great historical changes has shown the younger generation of Urdu poets how to weld into a single whole the beauty of ideals of art and the truth of actual life.

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IQBAL AS MEMBER OF THE PUNJAB LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

The Punjab Legislative Council, as it was called under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, was a small body of some 80 members. It was elected on a narrow franchise. The names of those who owned property of a certain annual rental value or above were placed on the voters' register: they constituted about three per cent of the total population. The majority of Muslim Councillors came from the countryside, the landed and rural interests being, on the whole, overrepresented. Their voting behaviour inside the council was generally believed to be dictated by the chief of district bureaucracy. The urban Hindu representatives formed a block of their own and dutifully followed the Hindu Mahasabha line. Their conscience was disciplined by commercial and moneylending classes in the province. The Hindu phalanx apart, the only organised group in the council was that of the Unionists. Organized in early 'Twenties' the Unionist party was professedly non-communal. That is to say, its doors were open to Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Actually, its membership was primarily confined to Muslim representatives of rural areas. The party functioned only within the Chamber. It was not much heard of outside the Council. It claimed to work for the good of the masses and was able to bring some opportunities and advantages within the grasp of the rural population in the fields of public health, education and state employment. The Panchayt system that it revived soon withered away for lack of conditions and traditions that had contributed to its success for countless generations in the past.

The Council was a disciplined body. Rigid time limits ruled out filibuster. Rowdyism was unknown. The scope of debate was regulated by statutes, formal rules, and readiness of members

to oblige the treasury benches. There was no provision for feminine representation. The Council was called into session three times a year including a brief summer session at Simla. Fazli-Husain, the founder, philosopher and organizer of the Unionist party was easily the most important and influential figure in the Chamber till he went over to the Viceroy's Executive Council early in 1930.

Iqbal and Fazl-i-Husain were old class-mates and friends. By upbringing, training and temperament, the two were poles apart. Fazli was a real politician adept in the art of political maneouvre. Iqbal had little interest in, or aptitude for, the seamy side of politics. Fazli was a persuasive debater who mastered every detail of the case he had to argue. In private and committee discussions he was formidable. Iqbal was factual and forthright. He delivered judgements and seldom cared to convince or appease others. There was the studied reserve of a cautious politician about Fazli. Iqbal had the natural detachment of a philosopher. In spite of all this, their politics was practically identical. It was only on the land question that they differed openly. They were to part company on the momentous issues of late 'Thirties' when Iqbal emerged as the most unforgiving critic of Fazli, his principles and politics.

Iqbal decided to contest a seat in the Punjab Legislative Council in the general elections held towards the end of 1926. His decision evoked mixed reactions, varying from enthusiasm to utter surprise, in the circles of his friends and admirers. only recently he had spoken of the Council as a "Millionaires' Club" and harshly denounced the whole Reform scheme (of which the Council was only a part) as a trap to ensnare helpless victims of colonial tyranny. He defended his candidature in election speeches pointing out that it was the predicament of the Muslim Community at the juncture that had brought him out of his wonted seclusion, possibly to help retrieve the situation from a vantage point in the proposed sphere of activity. In every recorded election speech he reiterated his resolve to safeguard the wider interests of the Muslim Community rather than seek redress for his constituents' grievances.

The decade that began with 1922 is viewed as the most critical period in the annals of Muslim India. The overall mood was one of despair and gloom and there appeared to be no way out.

Commanding and inspiring leadership was noticeably absent. The Muslim parties and leaders were at loggerheads with each other. The Hindu leaders fully exploited this situation (which was partly of their own creation) and addressed the Muslims in aggressive and abusive language. Generally triggered off by Hindu street roughs violent communal rioting was the order of the day. The British politicians, particularly those of the rising Labour party, were openly hostile to the Muslim plea for modest constitutional safeguards. The long-suffering community felt isolated and developed a sense of inferiority and insecurity. It was this crisis that drove Iqbal, the chronic shunner of politics, into the arena of debate.

Ighal sat in the legislature for a single term of three years. Then he quit the field for good. He attended the Council sittings regularly, but was not one of the vocal legislators. Nature had not intended him for the role of a parliamentarian. During the entire period of his membership, he spoke only on eight occasions. Four of his speeches were made during annual budget discussions; two dealt with Hindu-Muslim relations directly or indirectly. One came in support of the indigenous system of medicine as against Allopathy. In the eighth and his best-remembered utterance he expressed his views on the various aspects of the complex land problem in the province. He also gave notice of his intention to introduce a remedial bill on the subject, but the matter was not pursued. In the course of debates he freely gave his opinion on relevant social and economic issues. He had the mental make-up of an educator and his interest in education was old and abiding. Much of his comment would appear commonplace today. But it sounded differently to his contemporaries. He was, broadly speaking, an upholder of orthodox economy who advocated light taxes, balanced budgets, industrial development, mass education, prevention of crime, provincialization of income tax, total revenue exemption for owners of small and uneconomic agricultural holdings and a higher rate of tax on higher landed incomes.

Iqbal was outspokenly pessimistic about the future of Hindu-Muslim relations and offered no apology for this attitude. The Muslims being an economically weaker people, he stated that the population of the province was divided into lenders (Hindus) and borrowers (Muslims). He saw little hope for peace in a land

in which the strong were out to crush the weak out of existence. The Hindus, he said, "paid lip service to God with an eye stealing glances at the property of others; they seemed, in effect, to tell the Muslims: We are not prepared to let go what we have already got hold of". Thus, in Iqbal's view, it was the refusal of the Hindu Community to share the benefits of political and social life with the Muslims that lay at the root of the whole trouble.

The state of law and order, during this period, was precarious, practically all big cities witnessed savage street fighting between Hindus and Muslims. Igbal interpreted this alarming situation as indistinguishable from that of a state of civil war. "God forbid if violence spreads to rural areas", he added in a speech that he made in the Council on 18th July, 1927. He went on to explain that the malady of heartless and indiscriminate communal killings had been variously diagnosed by different pundits. Similarly, there was no dearth of suggestions about preventive measures emanating from various authoritative sources. The basic reason for ferocious intolerance was the absence of mutual trust between the two major communities. In the tense atmosphere, ad hoc peace committees and conciliation boards called into existence from time to time by wellmeaning notables from both sides did not yield encouraging results. Their members indulged in platitudes and dreaded effective action. Few were honestly concerned about establishment of peace. Igbal himself had seen that in the days of communal disturbances leading individuals of each community bitterly complained of the devious or high handed procedures adopted by investigating officers belonging to the other community". Both preferred European officers who could be relied upon to do this kind of duty at least with a show of impartiality. He even pleaded for a strengthening of the British element in public services. Needless to add that this provoked irritating rejoinders from the other side. By tearing the suggestion from its context, critics promptly denounced him as a lackey of imperialism.

The difference of temper and outlook between the two communities was again demonstrated on the next day i.e. 19th July, 1927 when a Sikh member of the Council, Ujjal Singh by name, 167 tabled a resolution recommending to the Government that all grades of public employees should be recruited on the results of competitive examinations. The resolution was much

less innocuous than it looked. Its ill-disguised object was to preserve, project and perpetuate Hindu monopolies in the sphere of public administration as Hindus were likely to fare better than Muslims in the prevalent type of written and literary tests for public employment. The Government did not favour an unqualified "merit system". Its spokesman stood for the principle of competition tampered by selection and nomination because of the patent undesirability of allowing any one of the communities to acquire unhindered a position of unshakable dominance in public services. Ighal concurred with this proposition. Answering the major argument of the supporters of the resolution, Ighal asserted that the success of the competitive system abroad need not tempt us to presume identical results by its adoption in the Indian environment, "our conditions are far different". He supported his contention by citing the instance of a reportedly nonpartisan body like the Punjab University whose distrust of examiners had led its authorities to adopt the system of fictitious roll numbers to ensure secrecy of the candidates' denominational identity: under conditions then prevailing the Hindu candidates feared that the merit of their performance would carry little weight with their Muslim examiners. Much the same way, the Muslim examinees entertained similar apprehensions about the integrity of Hindu examiners. The non-availability of impartial examiners alone would militate against the success of the competitive system.

The debate which was apparently meant to thrash out a comparatively minor administrative problem involved a weightier and a fundamental principle. Whether Hindu and Muslim interests were identical or even reconcilable; could they be promoted in the same way and by the same devices? The resolution assumed the absence of all discord between the two communities as both formed part of one and the same Indian nation. Iqbal entered emphatic protest against this theoretical proposition and stated his own views on the subject thus: "I am not enamoured of false and shallow nationalism...the talk of united nationalism is futile and will perhaps remain so for a long time to come. The word (i.e. nationalism) has existed on the lips of the people for the last fifty years and like a hen it has cackled a great deal without laying a single egg". Elsewhere he went so far as to doubt the desirability of Hindus and Muslims merging with one another to give birth to a single United Indian Nation.

Iqbal was no admirer of the Western system of medicine with its wonder drugs. Not many would share his opinion that Professors of medicine in the West had still a great deal to learn from medieval Muslim researches in the field. The publication of scattered manuscripts of Unani works in European libraries, he continued, would give a fresh insight to those who glibly boasted of the superiority of exotic methods and medicines. Probably, much more convincing was his argument that Western healing remedies were more expensive and less homely for a people living on the margin of subsistence and that indigenous herbs would yield better results in the treatment of tropical diseases. At the same time, he conceded that the traditional methods of preparing Unani medicines were defective and outdated and needed to be brought up to modern standards. Pointedly, he drew Government attention to this side of the problem of public health.

The land system in the Punjab with its periodic revenue assessments was another area of Igbal's interest. The early British administrators had built the land revenue system on the foundations laid by the Mughals. As land revenue receipts brought the largest single contribution to the public treasury, land settlement was viewed as one of the most important of governmental operations. The entire system rested on the assumption that all land belonged to the State. Iqbal's studies had led him to the conclusion that this was far from the case. Never in the chequered history of the sub-continent, he told the Council on 5th March, 1927, had the State claimed proprietory rights in land. It was barbarous theory, he said, and if it ever existed, it deserved to be discarded at the earliest moment: land belongs to the people and not to wielders of sovereign authority; "Crowns come and go; people alone are immortal". Equally indefensible, in Iqbal's view, was the land revenue structure, even though it was sanctioned by tradition and acquiesced in by the farming community. This prescription was the negation of justice. He recommended that earnings accruing from very small agricultural holdings should be declared revenue free just as small emoluments and receipts were exempt from income tax. Iqbal denied the ethical soundness of the Government argument admitting gravity of injustice to the small farmer but pleading inability to rationalize the inherited system in the face of "insuperable administrative" difficulties. Unwillingness or inability to undo a wrong cannot furnish any

justification for perpetuation of iniquity. 'We must seek remedies', he advised. Relief was also imperative for the reason that the produce of a small farm was insufficient even to maintain the owner's own family. Iqbal was unable to sympathize with the Government case that the demanded abolition would shrink the resources available for developmental purposes. This argument, he retorted, could be used to sanctify "any kind of evil practice which brings in money". However, the Government position on the issue was inflexible. And the matter rested there for the next fifty years.

Ighal had decided views on the subject of education. He expressed the opinion that foreign rulers were not interested in spreading light and learning among people. Mass education being "absolutely essential", he was disturbed at the apathy of the Department of Education which lacked both vision and vigour. The provision for compulsion was only a paper arrangement. and the so called compulsory primary schools were no different from voluntary primary schools: the inspectorate had dismally failed in their duty of implementing legislation on the subject. even though the areas involved were limited and selected. Much of the money spent under this head brought no return and benefited no one. He also referred to the chronic problem of dropouts: very few among those joining the primary schools went up to higher classes. "Make them reach the higher classes by compulsion", was his advice, in 1930 he pointed to a fall in the number of schools and students. This was probably due to the great depression that lasted well into World War II. Another grievance voiced by Iobal related to the step-motherly treatment meted out to schools maintained by Muslim voluntary associations. Between themselves these schools received only about one-fifth of the total Government grant-in-aid distributed among similar schools managed by other communities in the province: this was "unjust" and "disappointing". He would have the money spent carefully and distributed equitably over backward areas and communities.

This is a summary of Iqbal's record as a provincial legislator from 1927 to 1930. In spite of the high standard of his speeches, his performance as an active politician was indifferent. The Council membership was just an episode in his life and it did not add anything to his stature. Nor do the proceedings of the legis-

lature give a full picture of his politics. On issues of utmost importance to himself, like the question of co-operation with the Simon Commission or the grossly one-sided character of the Nehru report, he did not utter a word in this forum. A study of his press statements would furnish fuller information about his hopes and fears during this period than his Council speeches. A later generation imperfectly acquainted with the implications of the political duel of the day would dub him a "Conservative" in politics. Perhaps this was inevitable in a philosopher inbued. with a strong sense of history. Towards the end of his term he realized that the political life of the province was made up of "deficit budgets, communal bickerings, starving millions, debt or (and?) unemployment". Had he so desired he was assured of another term in the Council. But he was positively disinclined to offer himself for another electoral contest. And he was not missed much by any of his old colleagues in the new Council.

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167. Subsequently this dignitary made history by wrecking the last chance of a Hindu-Muslim political settlement at the Round Table Conference (January 1931) by his uncompromising insistence on a single additional seat for his community in the Punjab Legislature in the constitutional scheme then under consideration.

IQBAL'S LINGUISTIC SITUATION

A European who reads about Iqbal's poetical career will be most often surprised by the fact that Iqbal wrote poems both in Urdu and Persian and that he actually used Persian in what he himself considered to be his most important works. It is generally believed in the Western world that a fully artistic use of language can only be achieved in one's mother tongue. Although much poetry was written in Latin in the West during the Middle Ages and afterwards, very little of it has survived as a matter of serious concern for the history of literature, the most notable exception being perhaps the vagrant songs known as Carmina Burana.

On the other hand, some of the most elementary facts about the cultural history of Muslim India will at once explain Iqbal's linguistic situation in general and his preference for Persian in particular.

It is well known that the Persian Inaguage was the main vehicle for literary culture in Muslim India from the sixteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. As a matter of fact Persian was the universal language of the Eastern part of the Islamic World, from Constantinople to Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent. In addition to Persian other literary languages were developed on a more local level, as Ottoman Turkish in the West, Chagatay Turkish in Central Asia and Urdu in India. When considering these languages from the point of view of vocabulary and stylistics we find at once that Persian is a kind of common denominator to them. It had lent these languages their religious, scientific and poetical vocabulary and a large part of the stylistical and poetical conventions that were characteristic of them. Moreover, in the cultural world of Eastern Islam Persian was not really felt as the national language of Iran but rather

as a universal medium of a common religious and literary heritage. It was a symbol of a fixed, changeless world. As a language it was not subject to essential changes as it tried to preserve the vocabulary and grammar of the great Persian classics, and it was not thought that this universal language should follow the development that was inevitable in Iran where it is an indigenous language. It was learned by tradition from books, and older literary works continued to be used as stylistic models for its use. The archaic character of Persian used in the Subcontinent (and in Afghanistan) is also accentuated by the fact that it preserved a more archaic pronunciation of vowels (the so-called majhul vowels 'e' and 'o').

This reminds us of the position of Latin as a universal language in Medieval Europe and even afterwards. It seems, however, that the position of Persian as a language of culture in the Eastern part of the Muslim world was even more stable than the position of Latin in the West, it was learned more thoroughly than Latin and there is no such weakening of the linguistic standard that has been observed in the use of Latin in the Middle Ages. When the linguistic standard of Latin was elevated in the Renaissance period, people did no more feel themselves free to use it as a medium of expression and began to cultivate national languages instead (though there were other reasons for the use of national languages). There is no such development in the use of Persian as a universal language; on the contrary, its grammar and style were preserved more or less intact in non-Iranian countries, except for minor blemishes which can be detected in the works of Igbal, too. 168 The obvious reason for this stability is that those participating in the Persian literary culture of the Muslim East got a very thorough linguistic education which begun at an early age. so that they really could absorb this "foreign" language to a degree approximating the status of a mother tongue or a literary language used instead of the colloquial.

At present I don't have any exact details about Iqbal's early education at my disposal, but I should venture to suppose that he begun his Persian studies at such an early age that later on he didn't find any real difficulty in using that language as a literary medium. As a matter of fact we have to bear in mind that actually Urdu was not his mother tongue any more than Persian was. His first language was Punjabi, and I find in Syed Abdul

Wahid's "Iqbal" that he was once criticized for mixing his Urdu with Punjabi expressions. This is of course still today the fate of native Pakistanis whose first language is Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashtu etc. If such people want to have a nation-wide audience as writers, they must use a language that is not their mother tongue in the strict sense.

Various reasons can be adduced for Iqbal's use of Persian instead of Urdu. One reason may have been a kind of artistic ambition. It is known that Ghalib who wrote in both languages was inclined to consider his own Persian poems as having more artistic value than the Urdu ones. 169 This is a matter of taste that I am not able to judge myself. I should, however, think that only Ghalib's Urdu poetry is really living poetry in today's Pakistan and that his Persian ghazals are only read and appreciated by specialists. The same will probably be the fate of Iqbal. Another reason is that Iqbal probably wanted to have an audience wider than the Urdu-reading community. In this he really succeeded, and it is especially because of his Persian poetry that he gained the appreciation of orientalists like Nicholson, Browne and Arberry.

As stated above, it did not make much of a difference for Iqbal whether he was writing in Urdu or Persian. One could actually ask whether these two languages can be described as really different languages as far as traditional poetry is concerned. They are very different languages on the level of spoken everyday language and even common Arabic and Persian loan-words into Urdu often get a meaning different from the original. An obvious instance is.....the word gharib which means "strange; a stranger" in Arabic (and Persian) but is used in Urdu in the meaning "poor". On this level Urdu really is an independent language and cannot be defined as a calque of Persian on an Indian substratum language. The situation is different in regard to the very elevated language used by poets. As Persian poetry had served as a model for Urdu poetry, the specialized poetic vocabulary tended to be identical in the two languages. In most instances one will find that the Arabo-Persian stock of words and poetical expressions is used in exactly the same sense in Urdu poetry as it is used in Persian, the only difference consisting in the purely Urdu constructions, particles and some verbs. In a sense there is only one poetical language with two realisations or two grammars. I am,

however, not quite sure whether this statement is not somewhat oversimplified; there may be in the works of several Urdu poets instances of an independent and abnormal use of Arabo-Persian vocabulary, and the whole subject might be worthy of thorough and detailed study. As far as Iqbal is concerned, the difference between his two languages is, however, minimal. This is because his poetry is to a large extent of a didactical nature and he wishes to inculcate very precise religious and philosophical ideas in his audience. He uses several key-words of his own like 'ishq "love", khudi "self" etc., which in their context get a well defined Iqbalian meaning, and at least these and several other words in his Urdu and Persian poetry must be absolutely identical.

As is well known, most of the earlier Persian and Urdu poetry was coloured by the Sufi ideology and used a special set of key-words which included the metaphorical use of terminology associated with wine, love etc. In practice, however, even this fixed poetical vocabulary allowed for the expression of widely divergent moods and ideologies, cf. e.g. the well known difference between Hafiz and Jalaluddin Rumi. The common technique in using this vocabulary and set of ideas was calcidoscopic, especially in the ghazal genre, and it could only be fully appreciated by a reader who had a wide background of traditional poetry. One has to be acquainted with the concrete and metaphorical use of the words and the stories connected with them, e.g. the special relationship between the rose and the nightingale, the moth and the candle, the story of a drop falling into the ocean, the story of Joseph and Zulaikha etc. Every poet tried to create a new and exciting combination of these bits of glass in the caleidoscope, and given the great number of poetical items of vocabulary and ideas, there actually was an endless range of variations even if the conventions and the stylistic heritage also imposed certain limitations.

The contribution of Iqbal to this poetry is that he used its conventional forms to express a new and original world-view and philosophy. He was in direct opposition to some features of the current poetical philosophy, the quietism, the pessimism and the flight from the real world that is often characteristic of it. Because Iqbal had a definite message to convey, this had a necessary effect on his use of language, too. He had to make a careful selection of the bits that he wanted to use for his personal calei-

doscope. He uses most of the old words but in such contexts that do not allow ambiguity. He does not want to be understood in two ways as Hafiz undoubtedly did. He is not concerned with the passions of the individual; he wants to draw the picture of an ideal man. He does not use art for art's sake but is conveying a message almost like a prophet. This must obviously cause a difference in the use of language. The central concepts must be exactly defined by their context, and the traditional lyric vocabulary must be supplemented with religious and philosophical vocabulary.

It is generally agreed that Iqbal succeeded remarkably well in this ambitious attempt. He avoided the danger of becoming dry and prosaic and succeeded in giving his ideas a poetical form that proved to be attractive to his readers. The present writer is not really able to give an independent aesthetic judgment on Iqbal's poetry, but I think I can say that its linguistic dress is admirably clear and precise in both Urdu and Persian. Even a reader that is not a real specialist in these languages can grasp his meaning.

We shall now consider the nature and changing fates of such universal languages as Iqbal's Persian in a wider perspective of cultural history. There are numerous greater and smaller languages in the world and all of them differ from each other, not only in external details of grammar and vocabulary, but also in regard to an undefinable "spirit" that they may convey. Languages are nearly identical when they are used to express those details of everyday life which are more or less common to all civilisations on earth. In all languages we can ask "Where have you been?" and "What are you going to do?". There are big differences of vocabulary in the field of material culture according to differences of environment. Arabic is rich in regard to camel-rearing vocabulary and poor in regard to fishing and lacks all adequate vocabulary for describing life in Arctic regions. But the most important differences between languages appear in terminology referring to religion and world-view, especially in ancient cultures having a long history behind them. The ancient culture of India found its most perfect expression in Sanskrit, but Classical Chinese language gives an expression of a widely different way of thought, and it was a very hard task for Buddhists to translate their Holy Books into Chinese. The Islamic world is another instance of a religion and culture that prefers to express its world-view with

words that have to be identical in all languages within the compass of this religion and culture. It can also be said that Islam is the strictest of them in this respect. The Qur'an cannot be adequately translated. Consequently it has to be read in the original, and a translation can only serve as a tafsir, an explanation for the benefit of a reader who does not have a full command of Arabic. For this reason it is natural that Arabic influenced very deeply these languages of the Islamic world that it did not actually obliterate, as happened with Aramaic, Coptic, etc. During the first three centuries of the Islamic era. Arabic was the only written language in Iran; and when the so-called Neo-Persian finally emerged for literrary use, it was from the very beginning steeped with Arabic, especially when used to express Islamic subjects. Only writers like Firdausi who treated purely Old Iranian subjects were able to avoid this profusion of Arabic words in their language. Theoretically there would have been a possibility to preserve Persian as a "purely" Persian language. Sasanian Middle Persian was well equipped with religious and philosophical vocabulary, but the difficulty obviously was that its vocabulary was felt to convey purely Zoroastrian concepts that either were not fully identical with Islamic ones or were suspected of reminding too much of the old religion. In addition, Arabic was much spoken in Iran on the everyday level too, and this explains the intrusion into Persian of a good many "useless" Arabic borrowings. And whatever the reasons were, the result is known. The interesting thing is that later on a double borrowing of combined Arabo-Persian elements took place into Turkish, Urdu and several other languages. In regard to the religious terminology the reason is again apparent: the traditional Sanskrit terminoloy of Indian religious concepts is so widely different from Islamic ideas as to be nearly unusable. What is more remarkable is that the borrowing extended into all layers of vocabulary: items of everyday words and expressions, verbs and particles. The Persian conjunction ki "that" is borrowed both by Turkish and Urdu. This again makes us believe that Islam did not conquer its territories in Central and Southern Asia only as a religion and as a matter of belief. It was felt to represent an entirely new way of life that affected everything, and this thorough penetration is very clearly reflected by the nature of the languages of the Islamic world.

Something similar happened also in the earlier history of the European languages. Greek was the earliest language of European culture, and it had a powerful impact on Latin that later became the universal language of Western Europe. In the Middle Ages, popular Latin developed into the Romance languages in those countries where it was spoken (in Italy, Spain, France, etc.) It also affected English almost to the same degree as Arabic affected the languages of the Islamic world. This happened because English was long dominated by French-speaking Norman aristocracy whose language had a prestige greater than the Anglo-Saxon language of the peasantry. This led to the result that English borrowed a very large number of French words in the course of the Middle Ages, and because it was usual in French to borrow freely from Latin when so-called "learned" words were needed, the same was done in English. This is why English is a mixed language like most languages of the Islamic world.

The same thing did not happen in all European languages. German was preserved remarkably atact despite the fact that in the Middle Ages Latin was the language of the Church and the higher education in Germany as much as everywhere else. Later on, during the Reformation, Luther's translation of the Bible created a feeling for the purity of the German language and there remained a remarkable trend to avoid foreign loanwords and to coin purely German expressions instead. The German language also happens to have considerable possibilities of word-derivation and word-composition, and this in turn encouraged e.g. the German philosophers to coin a very sophisticated philosophical terminology, some expressions of which are hardly translatinto English. The ideals of the Bible-translators able of the period of Reformation spread into other countries of Northern and Eastern Europe. It was believed that everyone should be able to read the Bible in his own language, and several languages, among them Finnish, were elevated to the status of a literary language because of this belief. Later on the idea of a national language gained ground. It was believed that it is very important for every nation to have a national language which should be conciously cultivated and even "purified" if it happened to have been too much subjected to foreign influence. In the political sphere a parallel development followed. After the first World War a number of countries in Europe became independent. Usually there had been in each country a parallel development of national awakening which had preceded the political independence.

This European nationalism and the concomitant feeling for a national language spread into the Islamic world, too, in the beginning of this century, and they were most fully realized in the Turkish reforms of Kemal Ataturk. Turkey gave up its former role as an universal state for a great part of the Islamic world and instead chose to become a national state according to the European model. This change of ideology was most forcibly reflected in the change of the Turkish language. Until then, Turkish had been an Islamic universal language that made the fullest use of the inherited Arabic and Persian vocabulary, especially on the higher level of poetry and elevated style. In the Turkish language reform that had to some extent begun already in the beginning of the century and was really put in practice after 1928, the purpose was to dismiss as much of this inherited vocabulary as possible and to reinstate genuine Turkish words or to coin new ones to replace the Arabic or Persian words. Of course it was not possible for practical reasons to get rid of all of them. However, it is possible now to find a modern Turkish novel where there are at most two or three Arabic or Persian words on a page. A notable feature of this linguistic reform was also the adoption of the Latin alphabet. It was beneficial to general education because the Latin alphabet is more suitable to express Turkish sounds than the Arabic one, but it accentuated the break with the Islamic heritage and the former unity of the Islamic world.

There has not been a development quite comparable with this in any other Islamic country (except for Indonesia, where the Latin alphabet has likewise been adopted). However, there is some tendency in Iran also to reiranize the common vocabulary of Persian and to avoid excessive use of Arabic and this trend is most clearly visible in the newly coined technical and scientific vocabulary. As for Urdu, I am not really aware of any attempts to "re-urduize" the language. It has remained faithful to the ideals of an Islamic universal language except for a perhaps needless profusion of English words for modern concepts. There is also a very clear reason for this. In India, a sanscritized form of language has been created on a common basic language that was identical with Urdu, and I suppose that it must be in pure opposition with this trend that Urdu prefers faithfully to retain its Arabic and Persian elements.

However, it seems that the period of linguistic uniformity in

the Islamic world seems to be past and gone. The European idea of national states, each with a language of its own, has gained firm ground everywhere. The Arabic world with its literary language is the only one which has so far avoided this trend. Turkish has been developed to a strictly national language, as described above, and in the Eastern Turkic area belonging to the Soviet Union, there are now a dozen national languages instead of the former uniform Chagatay Turkic. Persian in the Soviet areas is called Tajik and is considered a language different from the national language of Iran, etc. It is a curious paradox that, as progressive a thinker as Iqbal was, he was one of the last great representatives of a linguistically universal age.

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NOTES

168. Syed 'Abdullah, Igbal II, 1-2.

169. Altaf Husayn Hali, Yadgar-i-Galib, Lahore 1963, p. 167.



SOME INDIAN CRITICS OF IQBAL

The presentation briefly reviews three critical English works on Iqbal by non-Muslim Indian writers with a view to get to their thought-content and to observe new trends in *Iqbaliat* in India. The works under review include the books appearing on the eve of and after the creation of Pakistan. They are: (1) *Iqbal: The Poet and His Message* (1947) by Sachchinanda Sinha, (2) *The Ardent Pilgrim* (1951) by Iqbal Singh and, (3) *Iqbal and his Poems* (1969) by K. N. Sud.

The selection of these works is based on their -

- less familiarity with readership in Pakistan,
- containing a number of striking similarities of thoughtcontent, and
- claim for providing a critical appraisal of Iqbal as distinguished from mere laudation "a fresh look at him", "a detached view of his (Iqbal) achievements and contribution to mankind", and "an objective assessment of his works".

Dr. Sinha's book — Iqbal: The Poet and His Message is by far the most comprehensive one. It covers almost all significant aspects of Iqbal's message and works. The book consists of 28 chapters besides introductions by Nawab Yar Jang Bahadur, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Prof. Amarnath Jha. Among the appendices and exhaustive list of "Annotated Bibliographical References" deserves special mention. It is a nice piece of research itself. The list effectively indicates the wealth of literature produced both by Muslim and non-Muslim writers on Iqbal during a short span of nine years between the time of his death and the creation of Pakistan. This in a way shows the wide appeal of

Iqbal's message. To indicate the comprehensiveness of the book it will not be unfair to list the main chapters. They are: (1) What is Critical Appraisal; (2) Iqbal's Career, Works and Personality; (3) Greatness of Iqbal; (4) A Poet of India; (5) Iqbal's Religious Background; (6) Iqbal's Philosophical Background; (7) Iqbal's Basic Sentiments; (8) Samples of Iqbal's Sentiment; (9) Iqbal's Political Background; (10) Literary Value of Iqbal's Persian Poetry; (11) Literary Value of Iqbal's Urdu Poetry; (12) Study of Iqbal's Philosophical Themes; (13) Iqbal Attitudes towards Mysticism; (14) Iqbal's Works and Non-Muslim and Iqbal; (17) Iqbal and Some Great Poets; (18) Difference due to Divergence in Interpretation; (19) Author's Interpretation of Islam; (20) Iqbal's Interpretation of Islam; (21) Some Critical Estimates of Igbal; (22) Igbal's Position as Poet-Philosopher; (23) Iqbal and the Cultural Unity of India; (24) Iqbal and (25) Igbal and Patriotism: the Indo-Muslim Renaissance: (26) Iqbal and Humanism; (27) Popularity of Iqbal, (28) Truth, Tolerance and Unity.

A closer look at this long list of topics and thier treatment reveals a fair amount of content-overlapping. This has led, at places, to not only unnecessary repitition of thought but also repeated reproduction of many a statements and observations. This has, occasionally, made the reading dull and boring.

Dr. Sinha sums up the raison de etre of his book as follows:

"By far the greater part of literature dealing with, or relating to Iqbal is laudatory and eulogistic and this wave has not ebbed out, therefore, there is need for analysis of uncritical admiration of Iqbal" (9:10). He also pleaded that "above all this book is a plea for toleration of views" (9:11).

General treatment in each one of the 28 chapters follows a uniform pattern. Dr. Sinha, introduces theme with a long list of endless quotations from greatmen-writers, thinkers, politicians; etc. particularly the English, Hindus and liberal Indian muslims. The quotations normally stretch over 2 to 6 pages. This is followed by gradual exposition of sub-themes with the help of mostly external support evidences. Surprizingly he rarely refers to primary sources and internal evidence. Mostly he will bring in

imported standards for his judgements on Iqbal. Chapters on "Iqbal's Religious Background", "Iqbal's Interpretation of Islam", and "Literary Value of Iqbal's Persian Poetry" may serve as typical examples in this regard. Since Dr. Sinha did attempt a wide range of subjects relating to Iqbal and his message, he naturally was not in a position to do full justice to the themes. In most cases, the exposition of the themes appears inadequate and wanting in many respects. The book at places does show strong reaction to uncritical laudation of one or another aspect of Iqbal's works and message. It is not possible even to touch upon all the 28 chapters of the book. However, attempt has been made to record some significant observations and comments. The three introductions present a balanced view-point and the first three chapters contain some significant observations.

Defending Iqbal, on the one hand, Sir Sapru opines that those who call Iqbal a mere Islamic poet do a great injustice to him while on the other hand, Dr. Sinha judges Iqbal's poetry with Tagore's yard-stick, quality of his philosophical thought in the light of Aurobindo Ghosh's doctrines and understands his concept of life through Gita. Dr. Sinha toes faithfully this line all through his book.

Chapter on "Iqbal's Religious Background" makes quite an interesting reading. Dr. Sinha builds up his thesis on the plea that religion is an individual matter and a service. After a fairly long discussion of Iqbal's concept of religion Dr. Sinha concludes as follows:

"But there can be no doubt that Iqbal was obssessed with it (extra-territorialism), and it is, therefore, essential to understand his attitude in regard to it" (9:63). At other place he remarks, "But Iqbal did neither understand nor care to understand Hindu intellectualism" (9:60). This view runs all through this chapter and the chapter on "Iqbal's Political Background". The chapter on "Iqbal's works and non-muslim Readers" has a deep religions bias—the ground on which author dubbs Iqbal as a communalist. Some brief quotes from the chapter are given below for the facility of the readers to judge the claim of the author that 'his book is an attempt at critical appraisal of Iqbal as distinguished from the laudatory.

"Where do the Hindus come, in Iqbal's sweep of poetic

vision, or range of philosophic thought?" (9:183). "But there are no two opinions that Iqbal, whether deliberately or otherwise, ignored the literary need of non-Muslims". (9:186).

"Whatever the reason Hindus are literally imbued with the ideals and aspirations of nationalism—therefore, who, whether openly or by implication, will preach against nationalism (as does Iqbal) must run the risk of being unpopular with Hindus". (9: 191).

The chapters on "Author's Interpretation of Islam" and "Iqbal's Interpretation of Islam" make the most interesting study. Dr. Sinha draws support from Mr. C.F. Andrews to conclude discussion on interpretation of Islam. He says.—

"This serious defect (sharp-cut line of demarcation between believers and non-believers) in the present day Indian Islam, in my opinion, due mainly to the influence of dogmatists, and to their illiberal interpretation of Quranic teachings". (9:298)

I shall confine myself to this awfully brief discussion on some selected chapters of Dr. Sinha's book. The readers may find a lot more in later discussions.

Dr. Sinha's book was almost immediately followed by The Ardent Pilgrim by Iqbal Singh. The book which consists of nine chapters, is a faint attempt of presenting Iqbal in correct perspective. Iqbal Singh is rarely taken away by communal feelings in his attempt to rediscover Iqbal but he misunderstands Iqbal as a great political thinker. His major asset is his dispassonate study of Iqbal's Persian poetry. There he is quite convincing as he tries to reach to the true message of Iqbal's persian works. His summing up of discussion on Asrar as given below may help judge his merits as a critic:

"Philosophically speaking, the most significant idea in Asrar was Iqbal's affirmation of 'desire' as the ultimate urgency and compulsion underlying the forward movement of life". (8:94)

At another place Mr. Singh briefly but aptly compares messages of Asrar and Ramuz. He says, "Asrar had dealt with the problem of individual personality in relation to the problem of its own internal integration and development". (8:98)

And his assessment of Ramuz is as follows:

"Ramuz concerns itself with the relationship of the individual personality to the collective will and purpose, to society itself. The essential idea is that the individual through identification with the group-consciousness fulfills himself". (8:99)

Iqbal Singh could add very little to the life story of the poet-philosopher in the opening chapter of his book. The second chapter presents a brief survey of the contemporary philosophical thoughts and their role in the evolution of Iqbal's thinking. The description contains hardly anything startling. The third chapter, in fact, is an extension of the previous one. It attempts to explain the contemporary philosophical influences on Iqbal with special reference to Hegel's idealism, Bergson's theories of time and space and Nietzche's philosophy of superman. The critic is of the opinion that Iqbal, during his stay in Europe, went through some sort of spiritual crisis the exact nature of which is not fully known. In the later part of the chapter Mr. Singh discusses many things including the originality of Iqbal's ideas, literary value of his Persian poetry, assessment of Ighal's doctoral thesis, the crucial change in his political and social ideas from nationalism to Islamic revivalism, and rejection by Ighal of a number of socio-political currents, namely, cosmopolitanism of the Western intellegentia, internationalism of socialistic movement, etc. Chapter four is 'in search of faith'. It explains the process of political alienation in India, and the role of Iqbal, his hatred for insincereties and compromises of the world of real-politic, and manifestations in his writing of the idea of "Commonwealth of Islam". Chapter five deals with the 'time of unveiling'. It describes Iqbal's quest of his own. Major portion of the chapter is devoted to appreciation of "Secrets of the Self".

The next chapter is an appreciation of Ramuz and Piyam-e-Mashriq. Chapter seven is a balance sheet of Iqbal's credits and debits. At places the presentation appeares totally out of context. Chapter eight deals with the validity of Iqbal's political thinking. Two points deserve special mention, namely, Iqbal's scheme for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India and the narrow sectarian outlook of the predominantly Hindu leadership of the Congress. The final chapter is concerned with the assessment of Iqbal's personality by critic and others.

Iqbal and his Poems (1969) by K.N. Sud is primarily an English translation of selected urdu poems by Iqbal. In all 71 poems and 17 quartains have been rendered into English and they represent a part of the early period of Iqbal's poetry when Iqbal was temporarily fascinated by political aspect of nationalism. Mr. Sud does not feel for justifying the selection of poems. The quality of translation may be judged from a sample presentation at the end of the paper.

The translation is preceded by a description of Iqbal as a patriot and pan-Islamist, and poet-philosopher. The last chapter records some lingering memories. The description lacks originality. Sud's criticism on Iqbal and his works is almost entirely based on extensive reference to Dr. Sinha's work on Iqbal. The first chapter makes the following points:

- Iqbal supplied philosophic background to the Muslim intelligentia and thus diverted its mind in a separatist direction.
- Iqbal was so obssessed with his new creed (pan-Islamism) that he turned extremely dogmatic and intolerant towards other religions.
- Iqbal failed to reconcile religion and progress.
- Iqbal trained his mind to see more of the differences of humanity in matters relating to religion, rather than their fundamental oneness and essential unity, and
- Iqbal could not remain influenced by the new trends towards socialism.

The elaboration of these points is followed by a suggestive compromise that one should deal with Iqbal as a whole and not as 'bard of Islam''. (10:28). The next chapter presents literary merits and dements of Iqbal's Urdu and Persian poetry with special reference to style, diction and thought-content. The critic laments that Iqbal wrote bulk of his verses in Persian and that better use of Urdu would not have created misunderstanding about him.

Sud's vague assessment of Iqbal is given below which may convince the reader of his failure to understand Iqbal as a whole.

"Iqbal was essentially a political poet, and was concerned with men as social beings. In early period he was under influence of romanticism and several European thinkers. He imbibed the doctrine of dynamic individual personality developed through practical activity. Surprizingly his own mentor was the great Persian Sufi poet Rumi'. (10:27)

He also compares Hali's *Musaddas* with Iqbal's Shikwa and Jawab-i-Shikwa and complains that Iqbal's poems are full of overt anti-hindu references. The chapter on 'lingering memories' is more or less a biographical sketch of Iqbal. It hardly improves upon the earlier sketches by Dr. Sinha and Iqbal Singh.

A closer look at the content-details of the three critical works on Iqbal may well reveal that the details, broadly speaking, have been drawn up against a typical nationalistic frame of reference. This is evident from a host of themes which are strikingly similar in the three works under reference but with slight variation in treatment. Some illustrative examples are:

- Iqbal as separatist, communalist and illeberal dogmatist,
- Iqbal's poor understanding of Hindu intellectualism.
- Iqbal's personality as a sum of contradictions.
- Literary value of Iqbal's Urdu and Persian poetry.
- Unsystematic philosophy of Iqbal.
- Iqbal's voyage from 'Indian Song' to 'Song of Millat'.

Attempts have been made in the following pages to take a detached view of the points brought against Iqbal and clarify the misunderstandings.

Politically Iqbal has been much misunderstood. He is dubbed as rank communalist (9:297), anti-nationalist (9:277), dogmatic and intolerant towards other religions (10:17) and the one who diverted the mind of Indian muslims to a separatist direction and viewed everything anthromorphically. (8:6). The tone set by Dr. Sinha has almost faithfully been followed by the other two critics. They quote and support Dr. Sinha extensively on subjects under reference.

While passing judgements on Iqbal and his work they care little to take into account the political atmosphere that prevailed in India from the beginning of the present century. They criticise Iqbal for his frequent references to intellectual traditions of Islam, his use of Islamic metaphors and the political lead provided by him at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930.

Against this compaign a liberal Hindu—Tej Bahadur Sapru comes to the defence of Iqbal.

"I have always maintained that it can be no reproach to Iqbal to say that his poetry is suffused with the spirit of Islam, and there should be constant references in his poetry to Islamic history or religion. It is perfectly natural for a poet to be influenced by the religion in which he was born, and by the culture of the society in which he moved". (9: xxxi).

In the heat of argumentation the untiring efforts of Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Maulana Muhammad Ali for attainment of internal harmony were altogether ignored. These muslims stalwarts for a long time during their political career, worked hand in hand with the leaders of the majority group for the liberation and unity of India. This partnership could not last for a long period as everyone was for himself, every community was fighting for survival, every dogma was being revived to cover the demand for jobs and privileges. The strife was so ripe that "The non-violent non-cooperation inovement of Gandhi" in the words of Dr. Mulk Raj Anand, "even could not live up to his ethical ideas". (7: XI).

Reviewing the general condition of India, its caste system, its religious units, its failure to sink its respective individualities in a larger whole, the zeal of each group for its collective existence, Iqbal could not help remark:

"The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation but in the mutal harmony and cooperation of the many. True statemanship cannot ignore facts, however, unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existance of things which does not exist, but to recognize facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery in India, it will bring peace and mutual goodwill to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her situation in hisoric space than because of inherent incapacity of her people". (12:9-11).

The truth contained in the reference has been established with the creation of Pakistan and the practicability of the ideas witnessed by the world. It is unfortunate at the same time that

Iqbal's association with the political life of his country has been unjustly interpreted. The universal appeal of his poetry has largely been ignored and his desire for a peaceful Asia misunderstood. The West valued and still values much the idea of nationalism and racial superiority and it was and is not possible for them to accept any solution of the world problem which fails to accept geographical unit as its basis. Iqbal's political philosophy is rooted deeply in the three fundamentals of Islam i.e. equality, brother-hood and tolerance. Iqbal's frequent choice of personalities from the muslim history and his constant references to the Quran also stood in the way of the West's and the Hindu's appreciation of the real significance of his message.

The misunderstanding about Iqbal's religio-political thinking started from an unwillingness to recognize that a period of Islamic revivalism and Hindu revivalism started soon after the collapse of the war of independence in 1857. Long before Iqbal put forward his scheme for the redistribution of India on the lines of racial, religious and cultural affinities. Tagore emphasized to see 'the real difference between the Muslims and the Hindus'. As back as October, 1911 when the issue of whether the Banaras University be named as Hindu University or not, Tagore in one of his papers spoke in detail of Hindu-Muslim relationship. He said:

"There is a very real difference between the Hindu and the Muslim which it is not at all possible to ignore. If in our preoccupation with our needs, we do not recognize that difference, neither will it recognize our needs". (11:145).

Tagore explained further:

"Some time ago this cleavage between Hindus and Muslims was hardly as pronounced as now. We were so mingled together that we did not perceive our difference. The absence of a feeling of separateness was, however, a negative, not a positive fact. In other words we were not conscious of our difference, not because there was none. The fact was that we were much in a torpor which had bred a lack of awareness. A day came when the Hindus started being conscious of the glory of Hinduhood. . . . The Muslimhood of Muslims started asserting itself for the same reason as the Hinduhood

of the Hindus. Now he wants to be strong, not by merging with the Hindu, but being a Muslim". (11:145-46).

When Iqbal emphasized the same fact and declared that the muslims of India were a nation in the modern sense of the term and demanded the creation of a separate homeland for them in the interest of "free development of their cultural traditions" he was dubbed as a communalist. It was nothing but a statement of facts. Even Nehru could not help expressing that:

Tagore rightly foresaw the operation of Pakistan and urged Hindu community to accept the reality. He said:

"The fact of the matter is that separateness is a reality, a blind attempt to wipe it out in order to secure the advantage of a larger unity is not in consonance with truth. A suppressed separateness is a terrible explosive force; some time or other it would create a mighty upset by blowing up suddenly under pressure. The best way to union is to honour the separateness of really what is separate". (11:142).

In a poetic mood Tagore continued that:

"Even a small entity, as soon as it gets to be aware of its true individuality, tries hard to preserve itself in tact—such is the law of life. In fact it would rather live in its smallness than die in largeness". (11: 142).

What a tragedy! The truth spoken by Tagore and Nehru was ignored and when the same was voiced out by Iqbal he was dubbed as cummunalist, anti-nationalist, etc.

Another issue on which all the three writers are in agreement is Iqbal's turning to Persian. Iqbal composed almost all his major works in persian. Mr. Singh tries to justify Iqbal's turning to Persian on the ground that it is rich in association, possesses a vast and varied vocabulary and simplifies Iqbal's problems as a poet. But at the same time he joins Dr. Sinha and Mr. Sud in raising questions like, "Was gain of Persian commensurate with the loss suffered by Urdu?", "Was his Persian poetry well-

received"? etc, and endorses a number of pharisiacal judgements made by Sinha and Sud on the literary value of Iqbal's Persian poetry. Iqbal Singh, however, at the end suggests to consider these judgements with a measure of reserve. Well before this suggestion Mr. Singh remarked "Had he (Iqbal) tried in Urdu his contribution would have been greater than Tagore even". (8:43)

The harsh criticism on the literary value of Iqbal's Persian poetry has come from Dr. Sinha. He draws support from a number of researchers establishing low literary value of persian poetry produced in India and applies this generalization to the Persian works of Iqbal. He further draws strength, in this regard, from the statement by the members of the Iranian Cultural Mission to India (1944). He quotes head of the Mission saying:

"Iqbal is not widely known in Iran. His name is confined to a few literary circles". On the contrary, "Iqbal was only a local poet, while Tagore was a great personage". (9: 124) The member of the Mission said:

He then refers to "Modern Persian Poetry" by Dr. Ishaq as follows:

"Iqbal was wholly out of tune with almost everything for which modern Iran stands and for which modern Iranians care—intense nationalism, keen interest in patriotic themes, simplicity in style, complete purge of Arabic influence in Iranian vocabulary, literature and culture". (9:128—129)

This discussion on Iqbal's turning to Persian is a queer mix of hypotheses, out of context references, and somewhat sweeping statements regarding what the modern Iran stands and care for. The critics should have looked to Iqbal himself for the reasons for turning to Persian. In a letter to Prof. Nicholson in January, 1921 Iqbal pointed out:

"The object of my persian poems is not to make a case for Islam; my aim is simply to discover a universal social reconstruction and in this endeavour I find it philosophically impossible to ignore a social system which exists with the express object of doing away with all distinctions of caste, rank or race, and which while keeping a watchful eye on the affairs of the world, fosters a spirit of unworldliness so absolutely essential to man in his relations with his neighbours". (6:4-6).

The need for change in medium is to be judged from the purpose set for the change and the quality of thought-content of his Persian works and not by hypothetical questions and biased referential support.

When, once, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's attention was drawn to this issue, he said:

"I shall not venture to express my opinion on the purity of Iqbal's style as writer of Persian. That judgement must be left to those who claim Persian as their mother-tongue". (9: xxx)

Even if such an opinion is made a criterion of literary value of Iqbal's Persian works unfavourable or otherwise judgements made on the quality of Iqbal's Persian works should have been taken into account before drawing a conclusion to the disadvantage of the poet.

Exactly the time when members of the Iranian Cultural Mission to India made the remarks referred to earlier, Bahar—the poet-laureate of Iran, recited a long poem entitled "Address to India" in the annual meeting of 'Indo-Iranian Cultural Association'. Two lines of the poem deserve special mention:

"This age belongs to Iqbal, he excels millions of his contemporaries. The poets were like a retreating army; but this warrior was too good to hundreds of horsemen". (2:1)

Six years later in 1950 speaking on Iqbal Day the poet-laureate said:

"To me Iqbal is the sum total of Iran's 900 years old literary history". (2:2)

Besides, the poet-laureate, Muheet Tabatabai brought out "Iqbal Number" of his magazine — "Mujallah-e-Muheet", in April, 1944. It was well-received all over Iran. Nafisi's appraisal of Iqbal's works in the form of articles and lectures deserves special mention in this regard. These contemporary evidences should have been taken into account before passing any judgement on the quality of Iqbal's Persian poetry.

Yet another issue on which the three non-muslim writers agree is Iqbal's poor understanding of Hindu intellectualism. While painting Iqbal's religious background Dr. Sinha makes a wild remark. He says, "Iqbal did neither understand nor care to

understand Hindu intellectualism". (9:60).

In an earlier chapter entitled "Iqbal's Career, Works and Personality" Sinha pays tribute to Iqbal in the following words:

"Iqbal was one of the greatest intellectual forces that modern India has produced. He possessed the highest culture—both of East and West, and was one of the nature's gentlemen". (9:20).

At another place Dr. Sinha says, "Iqbal stood for three decades as an impressive intellectual force, a tower of strength to many a great and a good cause". (9:22).

Yet at another place, while tracing the history of Iqbal's poetic evolution, Dr. Sinha finally declares him 'Poet of Humanity'.

What a contradiction! Can a person be termed ignorant of 'Hindu intellectualism' who was 'brought up in the temple of idols', who during his early political career, like many other liberal Muslim and Non-Muslim leaders, worked hard to forge unity between the two rival Indian communities, who kept a watchful eye on Indian and world affairs and who was forced to demand the creation of a separate homeland for Indian muslims in the interest of free self-development. Without full knowledge of Hindu intellectualism he would not have done so. Without indulging in further argumentation, I shall confine myself to two things in this regard. First, the tribute Ighal paid to the wisdom and teachings of great Non-Muslims spiritical leaders, to name a few, Rama, Swami Ram Tereth, Baba Nanak, etc. in his works and second, a beautiful exposition of Hindu intellectualism through his Urdu introduction to Asrar, and the greatest tribute he paid to the vision of Sri Krishna. These references may well demostrate the understanding by Iqbal of Hindu intellectualism and his religious broad-mindedness. I have rendered loosely into English the relevant paragraphs. In the opening passage Iqbal established that the nations of East, with philosophical bent of mind, had led to believe that Ego was nothing but illusion and the sooner one got rid of it the better. From this point onward Ighal explained in quite detail the nature of Hindu intellectualism. The explanation is as follows:

"Hindu intellectualism is a queer mix of theory and action. The classical Hindu philosophers have had puzzlingly minute

discussions on the nature of action and they finally reached the conclusion that continuous manifestation of Egoic life, the root-cause of sorrows and miseries, is determined by action. In other words the existing state/s and requirement/s of human ago are essentially the result of the past action/s and so long as this law of action remains in force it will lead to similar results. When Nietzsche makes Faust read word. 'action' in place of 'communion' in the first verse of Jonah's Bible, in fact, his insight is referring to the subtle point which the Hindu philosophers appreciated centuries ago. They, in this curious manner, tried to resolve the most puzzling issue of predestination and human freedom. Philosophically speaking, undoubtedly, they deserve all praise for this originality; specially when they courageously accept all the consequences resulting from this issue. In other words when ego is determined by action the only way to get out of its stranglehold is refrainment. Such a course was fraught, from individual and national point of view, with danger. The situation demanded the appearance of a revivalist who could explain, in full the exact meaning of refrainment. Sri Krishna will be remembered for all times to come in the intellectual history of mankind for it was this great grand man who convincingly criticized the philosophical traditions of his people. He disclosed that refrainment in no way meant total refrainment as action was exigency of nature and reinforcement of life. He further explained that refrainment meant non-infatuation to action and its consequences. Sri Ram Nauj followed the course set by Sri Krishna. It is deplorable that the reality which Sri Krishna and Sri Ram Nauj were desirous of unveiling was once again veiled under the spell of Sri Shankra's logic. Thus Hindus were deprived of the fruit of Sri Krishna's revivalistic move". (3:14-15).

The final point on which the three critics seem to agree is that Iqbal was guilty of contradictions. Mr. Singh, in the introduction to his book, refers to two brief statements by Iqbal himself indicating that his personality was 'a sum of contradictions'. He draws attention of his readers to contradictions in the political thought of Iqbal, particularly his condemnation and at the same time glorification of nationalism and democracy. Dr. Sinha on the other hand saw these contradictions in the

philosophical thought of Iqbal. He opines that:

"There was not one systematic philosophy which could be associated with the name of Iqbal, but different sets of thought, sometime contradictory, developed by him from time to time, under the stress of divergent influences". (9:72)

Admittedly, these contradictions, either political or philosophical, are not difficult to find in the thought process of Iqbal. Such contradictions one can find in Iqbal's contemporaries and all great men of all times. They cast little reflection on their greatness. In the case of Iqbal, unfortunately, little has been done to objectively look into the contradictions in his thought.

To a certain extent all great writers and thinkers are guilty of some contradiction. These contradictions are the natural result of the evolutionary process of mental conflict of great writers and thinkers. The currents of contemporary thought are sometimes so sudden and strong that a thinker is temporarily swept away by their sheer force. Thinking is thus partially coloured by the force of the contemporary thought before complete understanding is reached. This early reaction is sometimes different from the later assimilative thought. A general reader takes it for contradiction.

Sometimes this contradiction is the result of a lack of understanding of certain words commonly conveying certain connotations but used by the writer and thinker in a different meaning in a different context. This is generally the case with Iqbal. Occasionally Iqbal has made clear his meaning by explaining different aspects of the word used, but often he has left it to the imagination of his readers to grasp the pertinent meanings of the word used in its different context.

For instance on democracy Iqbal has maintained a dual approach i.e. that of praising one aspect of the thing and condemning the other. He admires and respects democracy and democratic way of life. In his lecture, "On Islam As Ethical and Political Ideal" (1908) he says:

"The best form of government for such a community would be democracy, the ideal of which is to let a man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much

freedom as practicable". (1:95).

Iqbal wanted to see such a democracy reigning over a united world, but he did not fail to remind the world in the strongest possible terms of the sad and unfortunate results of the often narrow concept of democracy when translated into practice. Iqbal had no patience for such democracies, and considered them as harmful to society as Fascism and Communism. In his New Year's Day message in 1938 he said:

"The modern age prides itself on its progress in knowledge and its matchless scientific developments. No doubt, the pride is justified—but inspite of all these developments, the tyranny of imperialism starts abroad, covering its face under the masks of Democracy, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism and heaven knows what else besides. Under these masks, in every corner of the earth, the spirit of freedom and dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way of which even the darkest period of human history presents no parallel". (12:200).

A careful study of the two statements will convince a reader that they are not contradictory. When read together they help clarify a number of doubts and misunderstandings about democracy.

Another example may be the use of the word 'nationalism' by Iqbal. Iqbal admires the natural aspect of nationalism and condemns, in strongest possible words, its political aspect. The following translation of few lines from Bang-e-Dara will further explain it.

"Fatherland means one thing in political discussion, another in bidding of the Prophet; it breeds rivalries and suppressions, if robs politics of truth, and it plunders the weaker nations. It divides God's world into nations and cuts through the root of Islam". (5: 174).

These two illustrative examples are enough to show that sometimes contradictions in the writing and thinking of Iqbal were due to a general misunderstanding. One may find some contradiction in Iqbal's mental voyage from existentialism to humanism and this is but natural and in no way casts reflection on him as poet-philosopher.

Before concluding my paper I would like to present very briefly some latest writings on Iqbal by Non-Muslim Indians. As you know that the books under reference represent a period when Iqbal was greatly misunderstood and harshly criticized. However, literature produced on Iqbal in recent years in India, comparatively speaking, shows appreciable accommodation. It appears that during this period Iqbal's message has become wide-spread and he is being interpreted by almost every notable Indian class. It is indeed, a good omen. But objective evidence to this positive change is lacking as we in Pakistan have little idea of the wealth, range and nature of recently produced literature on Iqbal. Add to it the problem of availability of this literature in Pakistan. However, I quote briefly from whatever is at hand to explain the nature of change.

Prof. Gopi Chand Narang has made an intelligent analysis of the sound structure of Iqbal's Urdu Poetry in an article published in the Pakistan Times on November 7, 1977. The analysis has led the author to conclude that Iqbal makes excessive use of spirants sounds like F, S, SH, Z, ZH, X and GH. He creates his characteristic spell by combinging these sounds with continuants, I and L. Refering to another interesting feature of Iqbal's Urdu poetry. Prof. Narang opines that though Iqbal used Persio-Arabic spirants excessively yet it neither violates nor disturbs the finesse of Urdu poetry. To illustrate he extensively quotes from Iqbal's poems, e.g. "Masjid-e-Qartabah", "Zauq-o Shauq" "Khizr-i-Rah", etc. He concludes that Iqbal had a peculiar musicality, unique resonant quality which stuns and at the same time fascinates.

In April, 1977 the Institute of Languages Jawahar Lal Nahru University in collaboration with Department of Urdu, Delhi University organized a symposium on Iqbal. Eminent writers, philosophers, intellectuals, and research scholars presented papers on Iqbal and his poetry. The symposium has briefly been reported in the latest issue of "Jamiaat-i-Hind" — a spokesman of University Urdu Teachers Association in India. English version of the reporting of papers presented by Non-Muslim scholars is given below for the purpose indicated earlier.

Dr. Mulk Raj Anand spoke on two occasions. In his first speech he said that Iqbal was the prophet of love and he made it the focal point of his philosophy. His concept of love was all-

vibrant which gave the oppressed and exploited nations of the East a burning desire for assertion. Dr. Mulk deplored that contemporaries of Iqbal failed to appreciate fully the purpose of his poetic ramblings'. Prof. Nagindar also spoke on Iqbal's concept of love — vigorous and virtuous.

On the second occasion Dr. Mulk explained in detail that 'Iqbal was the first Urdu poet who refused to follow the conventional themes of Urdu poetry and grappled with the practical problems of life. He critically studied eminent Euro-Asian thinkers and scholars and made valuable contributions to their thought and content. Iqbal showed individual the way to self-knowledge and thus played a very important role in the liberation of India and creation of Pakistan. Dr. Mulk declared Asrar the manifesto of Iqbal's concept of humanity in verse.

Jagan Nath Azad presented a paper on Iqbal's poetry and ranked him as the greatest of Urdu poets. He maintained that Iqbal was highly respected in Iran and that his Persian compositions carried and conveyed a new concept of love, desire, and self.

Dr. Sadha Karma made comparative study of Iqbal's concept of man and Indian and Western concept of man by referring frequently to Arabic, French, Persian, English, Sanskrit, Bengali and Marathi literature. He concluded that the man which Iqbal visualized was a happy blend of vigour and vision and that Iqbal in real sense of the word was prophet of muslim rennaisance.

Prof. Namwar Singh compared the bird symbols used by Iqbal and Tagore in their poems with those used by other poets. He emphasized that Iqbal's Shahin was a symbol of freedom, vigour and contentment. To Prof. Namwar the greatest contribution of Iqbal had been the element of realism which he introduced to romanticism. He concluded that Iqbal was the torch-bearer of progressive movement in Urdu literature.

Music Director Anil Biswas pointed out that Iqbal's ghazals required special treatment of tune and harmony to be sung properly.

Prof. Itar Singh said that the Punjabi poetry had its roots deep in mysticism and that Punjabi mysticism was inspiring rather than visionary. Iqbal being a Punjabi himself fully appreciated that characteristic of Punjabi mysticism and forcefully

projected the same.

When these briefs are read together at least one thing becomes abundantly clear that Iqbal is a universal poet and whoso-ever looks to him receives inspiration, guidance and food for thought.

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
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


THERAPEUTIC ASPECTS OF IQBAL'S THOUGHT

Psychotherapy is "the application of specialized techniques to the treatment of mental disorders or to the problems of every day adjustment" of the modern man who has been defined as "complexed, stressed, and frustrated". It has various schools like Behaviour thereapy, Gestalt therapy, Psychoanalysis, Logotherapy and so on and so forth. Despite their inherent limitations which cannot be discussed here, these schools have rendered great service to humanity.

To my mind, Iqbal also has served humanity immensely in his own way by offering remedies for different human maladies. While building up my own system of 'Ego-therapy, which is based upon an application of sufistic philosophy to the clinical practices, I have come across many therapeutic aspects in Iqbal's thought. And it is interesting to note that these are getting recognition, though unconsciously, by some of the eminent Western psychotherapists and psychologists of the present age — of course, much later than Iqbal. I take the opportunity to discuss some of these aspects in order to support my position.


Higher Nature of Man: To Iqbal, man is basically a spiritual agent and the crown of all creation. Iqbal regards him with great esteem. He says, "Hard his lot and frail his being, like a roseleaf, yet no form of reality is so powerful, so inspiring, and so beautiful as the spirit of man" To Iqbal man with all his failings is superior to nature. To him:



"Loftier than the heavens is the station of man, and the beginning

of education is respect of man".

Iqual believes in the purity of heart. He also speaks of his belief in the higher nature of man. He says:



"What a light there is within the heart of man! A light that is manifest in spite of its invisibility. What a life-illuminating and heart-kindling light! The sun is nothing in face of single ray of this light".

To him, "The heart is a kind of inner intuition or insight which... brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception.¹⁷⁴

The present-day psychology has begun to give man his due status. Several psychotherapists realise the limitations of the Freudian pathology and hold that "Psychology at the moment is concerned chiefly with the sub-normal; never with the higher ranges of human possibility". The time has come to complement the so-called depth psychology with what one might call height-psychology". His scheme of thought "does not confine itself to the instinctual unconscious but is also concerned with man's spiritual aspirations. To Some other psychotherapists believe that Behaviour Psychology cannot keep pace with the higher nature of man and the analogy of human behaviour with that of animal is erraneous. To Ellis a human being, unlike an animal "can be rewarded or punished by his own thinking, even where this thinking is largely divorced from outside reinforcements and penalties". The several sever

With this recognition, the above psychotherapists claim to be in better position to understand and cure man of his ills. Iqbal's place in this respect cannot be overlooked.


Uniqueness of man: Iqbal is a great champion of the uniqueness of man. The uniqueness of man emerges from his high

status. To Iqbal, "important characteristic of the unity of the ego is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of every ago! Thus, uniqueness is consequent upon its essential privacy which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another, and entitles him only to what is due to his personal effort. He refers to the Quran and says, "The personal pronoun used in the expression Rabbi ('My Lord') throws further light on the nature and behaviour of the ego. It is meant to suggest that the soul must be taken as something individual and specific, with all the variations in the range, balance, and effectiveness of its unity". 181

The uniqueness of man is a fact which is being acknowledged by different present-day psychotherapists also. Personalistic Psychotherapy, for example, "takes special cognizance of individual differences." Next, Frankl asserts, "Each man is unique and each man's life is singular; no one is replaceable nor is his life repeatable". Further, Latarus warns the would-be therapists "not to forget the obvious fact that every individual is unique, and to tailor his therapy accordingly." 184

Personal Growth: Iqbal believes in the progressive development of the ego, which can be hardened or dissolved. To him the self is not a datum; it is to be developed. He says about man, "If he does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter".185

Iqbal believes in man's capacity and power. "When attracted by the forces around him, man has the power to shape and direct them; when thwarted by them, he has the capacity to build a much vaster world in the depths of his own inner being wherein he discovers sources of infinite joy and inspiration". Again, Iqbal has a deep-rooted trust in every body's hidden potentialities. He beautifully says:



"When the grass found a means of growth in itself, Its aspiration clove the breast of the garden".

To Iqbal remedy or weakness lies in self-actualisation and


development of ego. He says:

العكدى خوابى ذدشمن جال بى از توبيست خطرة ما يوسسى

"O thou that wouldst deliver thy soul from enemies. I ask thee—Art thou a drop of water or a gem?"


To Maslow, as Wilson says, "Everybody is potentially a self actualiser, and the choice is largely a matter of free-will and courage, not of circumstances". 189 Again, to Maslow Neurosis is a failure of growth. He says that "general illness of the personality is seen falling short of growth, or of self-actualization. And the main source of illness (although not the only one) is seen as frustration of the basic needs, idiosyncratic potentials, of expression of the self, and of the tendency of the person to grow in his own style, especially in the early years of life. 190 Next, Wilson asserts, "Neurosis is the feeling of being cut off from your own powers". 191 Similarly, Rogers believes in actualization and says, "the most basic drive is that to actualize, to maintain and to enhance the self. He believes that given a chance the individual will develop in a forward-moving, adaptable manner". 192

Purpose, aim and meaning in life: To Iqbal, the ego "is a rationally directed creative will" To him personality cannot be integrated unless it has a definite end. He adds, "Life is only a series of acts of attention and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious. even our acts of perception are determined by our immediate interests and purposes. . . Thus ends and purposes, whether they exist as conscious or subconscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of conscious experience" Again, it is purpose which preserves life,



"Life is preserved by purpose: Because of the goal its caravan-bell tinkles"

To Iqbal, among other factors, Ishq is the remedy for fear and disappointment. The man who has madness to achieve his purpose will have no fear of any kind. He beautifully says:



"Once more that voice from Sinai's tree would cry Fear Not! If some new Moses led the attack".


In psychotherapy, as Reisman holds, it is generally argued that "it is an effective method of treatment when the therapist can convey to his clients confidence in the value of what they are doing." Maslow acknowledges that life of mental health depends upon a sense of purpose. The existential psychotherapists, who followed Maslow believe that a sense of meaning and purpose is necessary for man to truly become man and that in the absence of aim in life man becomes neurotic. To Frankl, purpose is the life-blood of healthy mental life. He says, "Meaning sets the pace of being. Existence falters unless it is lived in terms of transcendence towards something beyond itself". Lack of aim in life creates "existential vacuum". He clearly admits that lack of meaning leads to depression, suicide, frustration and boredom. On the suicide of the suicide, and boredom.

Action: To Iqbal, action is one of the most important factors to integrate personality. To him the closed-doors of destiny are opened through action:

"The destiny of this world of strife is mystery, indeed; zeal for action unfolds the secrets of the destiny unknown".

To Iqbal self-realization is not possible without action. He warns against passivity and inactivity. He relates the tale of certain lions who gave up exertion due to the sermons of the sheep, and eventually met their doom.²⁰³ It is why he does not recommend 'art for the sake of art''. To him, "The highest art is that which awakens our dorment will-force and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness. .is message of decay and death.²⁰⁴ He adds, "Whatever is got without action amounts to begging. Even inherited wealth which is acquired without effort is begging, because such wealth is taken without personal efforts".²⁰⁵

Thus tension is not condemnable to Iqbal as it is usually regarded by some thinkers. To him, "Personality is a state of tension and can continue only if that state is maintained. . .Since personality, or the state of tension is the most valuable achievement of man, he should see that he does not revert to a state of relaxation". Further, obstacles and difficulties, and risks which are involved in struggle, are touchstone of the will and help us give vent to our hidden potentialities. He says:



"He that hath a sound heart

Will prove his strength by great enterprises.

The potentialities of men of action

Are displayed in willing acceptance of what is difficult".

It is why Iqbal has soft corner even for enemy²⁰⁸ and the Satan²⁰⁹ because both inspire man to action and help him to express his hidden potentialities.

Years after Iqbal Moreno realized, "Victory without effort leads to a cheapening of the cultural conserve in the mind of the winner. Thus, not on moral grounds but upon psychological principles, getting something for nothing (no effort) is wrong". Harvey Cushing believes, "The only way to endure life is always to have a task to complete. It To Maslow, "Striving, the usual organizer of most activity, when lost, leaves the person unorganized and unintegrated" and to Frankl inactivity generates neurosis. He says, "Ever more frequently psycho-analysts report that they are confronted with a new type of neurosis that is characterized mainly by loss of interest and by lack of initiative". To him there are spiritual crisis in retirement and no holidays when one has nothing to do. He calls them "unemployment neurosis" and "Sunday neurosis". It

Further, Maslow, among others, realizes the importance of frustration, conflict and suffering. From Maslow, "We learn also about our own strength and limits by overcoming difficulties by straining ourselves to the utmost, by meeting challenge, even by failing. There can be great enjoyment in a great struggle and this can displace fear" Again, "Adjustment is, very definitely,


not necessarily synonymous with psychological health". 216

Probably it is in this context that Dr. Schimmel says, "The fact that he (Iqbal) likes to show Iblis as the active principle in life, and even more as the spirit which is required for man's individualities leads the reader close to the standpoint of modern psychologists"²¹⁷

Creativeness: To Iqbal, freedom is the source of creativeness. Being created in the image of God, man is to create in order to improve upon this world. By self-inflicted pains he had already improved the world through his inventions and creations. Addressing God, Iqbal says:

"Thou created the night, I the lamp;
Thou created the clay, I the vase;
Thou created the jungle, mountains and deserts,
I created gardens, orchards and flower-plots.
It is I who make glass out of stone,
It is I who extract alixir out of poison".

This implies that the prerequisite of creativity is freedom of the ego. No creativity or originality without freedom is possible. Freedom without creativity is not a comprehensive view of Freedom. The slave is not creative.



"The slave is by nature repetitive, His experiences are bereft of originality!

Creativeness is highly regarded by most of the modern psychotherapists. Rollo May believes that the healthy person

always "shows a new element in his behaviour. His actions are fresh, spontaneous, interesting, and in this sense he is just the opposite of the neurotic and his predictability.²²⁰ Maslow remarks, "Only the flexibly creative person can really manage future, only the one who can face novelty with confidence and without fear. I am convinced that much of what we now call psychology is the study of the tricks we use to avoid the anxiety of absolute novelty by making believe the future will be like the past".²²¹ Frankl says, "Life can be made meaningful. . by what we give to the world in terms of our creation; . . "²²² To him, neurotic personalities lack creative energy.²²³

The place of Society: Iqbal is against renuciation of the world. To him, man's development is possible only in society. Disconnected from environment, man's capacities remain underdeveloped. The ego cannot develop without the mutual invasion of the ego and the environment. To Iqbal, "It is our reflective contact with the temporal flux of things which trains us for an intellectual vision of the non-temporal. Reality lives in its own appearances; and such a being as man, who has to maintain his life in an obstructing environment, cannot afford to ignore the visible" that is why Iqbal does not appreciate the thoughts which teach lessons of renunciation from society. He depreciates Plato's philosophy²²⁵ dislikes pseudo-mysticism. He beautifully says:

کوسکتی ہے بے معسد کہ جینے کی ملائی
الے بیرِحسرم تیری مناجات سحر کیا
ممسکن نہیں تحت لیں خودی خانفتوں سے
ال محسل کو نم خوردہ سے ٹوٹے گا شرد کیا

"O' Pir can your morning prayers Compensate the life without advanture? The creation of the ego is not possible in Monasteries, What spark will issue from this damp flame?

Among other European writers, Fish condemns segregation from society and asserts that it generates Schizophrenia. He asserts, "It has been found that Schizophrenia is more common in urban areas where there are a large number of people living alone. It has, therefore, been claimed that social isolation is

a cause of schizophrenia"227

From the views of the psychotherapists discussed above, one can easily conclude that Iqbal's thought contains therapeutic aspects and the modern psychotherapists are very near to him. Especially those who completely break away with the conventional systems of psychotherapy, according to which, neurosis is the result of conditioned responses and maltreatment in childhood and wherein personal freedom, higher nature and uniquencess of man, the place of purpose, action and creativeness are ignored.

But still, to my mind, Iqbal's view is more comprehensive. His view of personality, with its integrating and disintegrating factors, is much more balanced than that of any Western psycologist, and philosopher including Nietzsche. With Iqbal, integrated personality is achieved through Action, 'Ishq', Intellect and 'Faqr' is disintegrated through fear, grief, disappointment, imitation, segregation and from community, and subservience or slavery, etc. The organic whole consisting of these factors has not been visualised by the Western psychotherapists. Some of these factors like 'Ishq' and 'Faqr' are simply alien to the Western thought.

It is not difficult to find the reasons for this comprehensive approach. Firstly, Iqbal's approach is largely philosophical. And this is an approach which is definitely to be recknoned with. It is important to note that modern psychotherapy has greatly been influenced by philosophy. Morris I. Stein openly admits that the philosophical orientations of our time have a great impact upon the contemporary development in psychotherapy.²²⁸ Further, Iqbal gives central place to spiritual experience which "brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense perception"229 Thus Iqbal's field undoubtedly, is much vaster than that of mere psychology upon which psychotherapy is generally based, in its strictest sense. Secondly, Iqbal propounds his theory of personality within definite frame of reference of Islamic history. It is from the lives actually lived, a study which Graumann wished and exclaimed, "shall our units of analysis in the study of personality be derived from general psychological concepts, or from lives as actually lived"230 and Allport admits, "We stop with our wobbly laws of personality and seldom confront them with the concrete persons" 231

In the light of the above, Iqbal has, naturally, much more to offer than the Western Psychotherapists. To review the therapeutic aspects discussed above, Iqbal gives a very high status to man. He regards man superior even to angels and in support of his view he quotes the verses from the Quran regarding the prostration of angels. 232 Again, he has a definite view regarding the uniqueness and personal growth of man. He says, "It is in contact with the Most Real that the ego discovers its uniqueness, its metaphysical status and the possibility of improvement in that status"233 To him the developed personality is that which remains undissolved even in the presence of God. Further, Igbal has definte aim in view. To him man has not only to shape his own destiny but also the destiny of the universe, through his deeds, creations and unbending will. As regards Action, immortality and freedom are earned through. "Personal immortality. . . . is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort" 234 and freedom is attained by removal of all obstruction on its way by action. 235 Next, regarding Society and Individual, as A.J. Arberry says, Igbal "was not interested merely in the individual and his selfrealization; he was equally concerned with the evolution of an ideal society, or community. . . . 236 society is developed like an individual. It dies like an individual, dies due to lack of aim and is developed or disintegrated due to the values or disvalues.²³⁷

I am sure these views will help psychotherapists in their scheme of work. They have still to know a lot about the spiritual aspirations of man, and in the words of Iqbal, "to analyse the contents of non-rational modes of consciousness" Unless they know the complete picture of a well-developed ego, they cannot invent a technique of psychotherapy on healthy and comprehensive lines. Probably Iqbal envisages this when, addressing the psychologist, he says:

جراًت ہے تو افکاد کی دنیا سے گذر جا بیک بیرخودی میں انجی پیٹ بیر جزیرے کھلتے نہیں کس قلزم فائوشس کے اسراد جب تک تو اسے ضرب کلیمی سے نیچیرے

"If you have courage, surpass the world of thought,

THERAPEUTIC ASPECTS OF IQBAL'S THOUGHT

There are hidden islands in the ocean of Self, Unless you do not cut it with the blow of Moses, The secrets of this silent 'Qulzam' (ocean) will not be open.

To sum up, I feel Iqbal's thought contains a potential therapeutic aspect. True that some adepts in psychology will disagree with me at this moment and criticise my thesis because it is new and strange and does not fit in their frame of reference. But I am confident about my view, and feel proud that I am the first person to touch this so far untouched aspect of Iqbal's thought. I simply draw their attention to Iqbal's prophetic vision, according to which:

جہان تازہ کی افکار تازہ سے ہے نمود کرنگ خشت سے موتے نہیں جہاں پید

"The new world comes into being only by fresh thoughts, Because the worlds are not created by stones and bricks.

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IS IQBAL A PANTHEIST?

I would first like to define Pantheism. It is the doctrine that, true to its etymology, identifies God with the universe or as is usually expressed, All is God. There is only One Being, Existent, that is manifested everywhere, in the material world, in the animal kingdom and in man. Besides the One Being, there is nothing in existence. This Existent is a cosmic force that pervades everywhere and is absolutely impersonal. We may call it Substance in the language of Spinoza, Nirguna Brahman in the language of Shankara or Wujud al-Mutlaq in the language of Ibn al-Arabi.

This Wujud-i Mutlaq is the source and cause of all beings. From it flows or emanates all plurality which is logically separate from the One but essentially they are identical. The One is the Ayn of Many. "Ontologically there is but One Reality; epistemically there are two aspects: a Reality (Haq) which transcends the Phenomenal world and a multiplicity of subjectivities (khalq) which find their ultimate explanation and ground in the essential unity of the Real. 241

The Absolute Reality is often styled by Ibn al-Arabi as Al-'Ama (Blindness) to emphasise the absolute indeterminate character of the Reality; it corresponds to Nirguna Brahman of Shankara, characterless and immutable. The pantheistic God is devoid of all attributes; he is not the Creator of the universe—the latter is only a spontaneous self-manifestation of the former.

Relation of One and Many is often described through metaphors of mirror and image, and sometimes by the metaphor of substance and its shadow (zill). The many is as if mirror-images or the shadow of an object. The implication of duality in the metaphor is refuted by asserting that the mirror, mirror-images and the on-looker are all one,²⁴² and so is the shadow (zill) iden-

tical with the substance. ²⁴³God of pantheism is thus neither the creater nor the cause of the universe but only its ground.

Although the two terms of the relationship, God and the universe, are correlates, yet in many pantheistic systems, either the phenomenal world is a mere illusion and God the only Real Being; or God is pushed back into the background and the phenomenal world becomes the only reality. Pantheism, as expressed in Muslim thinkers, has adopted the first alternative and is usually theocentric, and like Shankara's Vedanta looks upon the universe as a dream. ²⁴⁴ It is true that the notion of God in pantheism has nothing personal about it as in theism, yet whatever type of deity it may be Ibn al-Arabi expresses his deep emotional attachment to Him. Like Spinoza, he can equally justifiably be called a God-intoxicated philosopher.

The same is the case when we come to look at the status of man in his system. Here it seems to be thoroughly anthropocentric. In the very first chapter of his Fusus al-Hikam, the classic text of Muslim pantheists, entitled: Logos of Adam (Kalama-i Adamiya), he says that God wanted to reveal His glory to Himself and for this purpose He created (in Ibn al-Arabi's sense of creation) a mirror which was unpolished. When He breathed His Spirit into it, it became Man. He is the centre of all creation. The whole chapter is an eulogy of man in his relation to God and the universe. In one of his letters, Iqbal said, "Man's (possibilities) have no limits and this is the truth embodied in pantheism".

The Muslim pantheists designated the metaphyical category of Logos the Reality of Muhammad, which in fact did not stand for the personality of the Prophet but being associated with his name, it was elevated to the highest rank and made eternal principle of almost co-eternal with God.

All kinds of praises were showered on him and just as in the case of God we find in the writings of these thinkers emotional outbursts and loving outpourings before the Prophet. The two well-known pantheist sufi poets, 'Attar and Jami, are famous for their soul-stirring praises of the Prophet. ²⁴⁸ These were, most probably, the reasons why Pantheism became so popular among Muslim poets, intellectuals and masses.

As was to be expected, Iqbal took the theory of pantheism

as granted. In his letter to Sayyid Sulayman Phulwarvi, he relates that while he was quite young, Ibn al-Arabi's Fusus and Futuhat-i-Makkiya the classical texts of pantheism used to be recited as sacred texts every evening, just as the Quran and the Mathnavi of Rumi. This was a usual practice in his home, though at that stage he could hardly appreciate their significance. ²⁴⁹ When Taggart read Nicholson's English translation of his Asrari Khudi, he wrote "I am writing to tell you with how much pleasure I have been reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much? Surely, in the days when we used to talk philosophy together, you were much more of a Pantheist and mystic." ²⁵⁰

It is thus clear that Iqbal was an advocate of pantheism but later on he changed his position round about 1907. This change Iqbal expresses in several of his letters but while writing Urdu introduction to the first edition of Asrar-i Khudi, he gives vent to his antagonism against this theory. "The point of view adopted by Shankara in the interpretation of the Gita was the same as was adopted by Ibn al-Arabi in the interpretation of the Quran. The deep erudition and charming personality of the Shaikh Al-Akbar made the doctrine of pantheism an indispensible element of Muslim thought structure..... But while in India pantheism was a philosophical doctrine with its appeal to reason. In Iran it went beyond its limits and in the hands of poets it began to appeal to the heart..... Reaching every hook and corner of the Muslim world, it became the main cause of Muslim decay. 251

There is another reason for the popularity of pantheism among Muslim mystics. We may call it the psychological aspect in contradistinction from the ontological aspect which I have tried to explain above briefly.

The mystic, while he is in a trance, actually feels that the light of God pervades the whole universe and wherever and whatever he sees, there is nothing but Divine Light: he is nothing, only the One abides. I give below a few statements of some representative mystics.

Plotinus speaks about his experience:

"No doubt we should not speak of seeing but, instead of seen and seer, speak boldly of a simple unity. For in this seeing we neither distinguish not are there two. The man...is merged with

the Supreme, one with it. Only in separation is there duality. This is why vision baffles telling; for how can man bring back tidings of the supreme as detached when he has seen it as one with himself.....Beholder was one with beheld......he is become the unity, having no diversity either in relation to himself of anything else. 252

This passage from Plotinus can be supplemented by another passage of his which I quote from Vaughen:

"You ask how can we know the Infinite?/ I answer, not by reason. It is the office of reason to distinguish and define. The Infinite therefore cannot be ranked among its objects. You can only apprehend the Infinite....by entering into a state in which you are your finite self no longer. This is...... the liberation of your mind from finite consciousness. When you thus cease to be finite you become one with the Infinite.....You realise this union, this identity". 253

Bayazid of Bistam, the famous mystic of Intoxication (sukr) School, relates his experience of unitive state:

"Then I became a bird, whose body was of Oneness, and whose wings were Everlastingness, and I continued to fly in the air of the Absolute until I passed into the sphere of Purification, and gazed upon the field of Eternity, and beheld there the tree of Oneness." ²⁵⁴

Junaid of Baghdad, the renowned sober mystic, whom historians of mysticism call as 'the leader of the group', speaking about this experience says:

".....The saint is submerged in the ocean by unity, by passing away from himself... He leaves behind him his own feelings and actions as he passes into the life with God. 255

We find Ghazali expressing this state in a similar fashion. He says :

"When the mystic enters the absolute and pure unicity of the One and Alone, mortals reach the end of their ascent. For there is no ascent beyond it since ascent involves multiplicity implying.....an ascent from somewhere......to somewhere, and when multiplicity has been eliminated, Unity is established and relationship ceases." ²⁵⁶

Commenting on these different statements of the Muslim

sufis, Margaret Smith states that "in that vision the mystic passes away from the self into the One and attains to that state of union which is the end of the quest.²⁵⁷ This experience of unicity is not confined to Plotinus or to Muslim mystics; it is common experience of all mystics, Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, Jewish and Christian. We could very easily give quotations from their writings but it will serve no purpose. The fact is undeniable that in this state the experient feels unity, in which all multiplicity dissolves.

It was this psychological experience of the mystic which made him think that the metaphysical theory of wahdat alwujud must be correct. This confusion, between the psychological experience of all-pervading Unity and the Ontological statement that everything is God, did play a part in making this doctrine of pantheism popular among the Muslim poets and masses, though certain logical implications of this metaphysical theory were evidently against the spirit of religious consciousness. It was under the stress of such contradictions that we find several mystics indulging in clear anti-theistic utterances, camoflaged as *shatthyat*. It is one thing to express one's deep emotional response under the influence of unity experience; it is quite different to advocate, rationally and logically, identity of God and universe, to assert that there is nothing in existence except God.

It was this confusion which played great havoc in assessing the true position of Hallaj and Rumi. Unfortunately both of them have been labelled, quite wrongly, as pantheists while in fact they were pure theists. The expressions which often are found in their writings, expressing this psychological experience of identity, are misinterpreted as advocacy of metaphysical theory of wahdat al-wujud.

Massignon is quite emphatic about Hallaj. In his notes on Hallaj's Kitab al-Tawasin he says that Hallaj affirmed God's transcendence which, however, did not mean that God is inaccesible to man. Speaking of God man, Hallaj speaks of them as two spirits, bound together in ties of deep love. I give here English rendering of Hallaj's two different quatrains:

(1) I have (become) the One whom I love, and the One whom I love, has become I. We are two spirits come down in one unique body.....

(2) Thy spirit has mingled itself with my spirit like the wine which mixes with pure water. Whence, if a thing touches Thee, it touches me. Behold, 'Thou' art 'I' in every state. 258

In another place, Massignon states, "In spite of his adversaries classifying him among the adepts of existential unity (wahdat-al-wujud), al-Hallaj has been proved to be a vindicator of cognitive (i.e. psychological) unity". (wahdat al-shuhud)²⁵⁹ Nicholson, while commenting on Hallaj's Kitab al-Tawasin, says that his position "is entirely opposed to pantheism, for it makes the human nature an image of the divine." ²⁶⁰

Same is the case with Rumi, whom enthusiasts of Pantheism have misrepresented as one of them, ignoring the distinction that I have drawn between the psychological and metaphysical aspects of the problem. The emotional outbursts of the poet, in a state of unitive ecstacy, are wrongly regarded as proofs of Rumi's pantheism. In this psychological state of union, Rumi cries out:

I am the theft of rogues, I am the pain of the sick, I am both cloud and rain, I have rained in the meadows.

But the same Rumi sings of God's praises and feels pride in being His slave who falls prostrate before His majesty.

O Thou who art my soul's comfort in the season of sorrow,

O Thou who art my spirit's treasure in the bitterness of dearth, That which the imagination hath not conceived.

That which the understanding hath not seen,

Visited my soul from Thee; hence in worship I turn towards
Thee. 261

Talking of these misrepresentations, Nicholson speaks, "Neither the theologian (i.e. Ghazali) or the poet (i.e. Rumi) is a pantheist.....The mysticism of Hallaj, Ghazali, Ibn al-Farid and Jalaluddin Rumi, like that of all early sufis, is predominantly religious ("and not pantheistic).....The object of this religious feeling is not a Being without personal attributes but" a personality as wide as to include in itself all existence and all action, all matter and all force. 'It is at once universally immanent and absolutely transcendent, and it expresses itself most completely in Man, who is nothing except in so far as he realises his true nature to be the image of the Divine......It is the religious life of

the soul, its longing for union with God, and its contemplation of Him in moments of ecstacy, that Jalaluddin chiefly dwells on" ²⁶²

When we come to study Iqbal, we notice that he is very careful to steer clear of all these ambiguities. While writing for the Introduction to the English translation of Asrar-i Khudi, Igbal elucidates his position vis-a-vis pantheism. He states, "Obviously, this view of man and universe (as explained in the mathnavi) is opposed to all forms of pantheistic sufism which regard absorption in a universal life or soul as the final aim and salvation of man". He characterises God as Individual, unique and matchless, only to distinguish it from the impersonal deity of pantheism.²⁶³ Later on, in his Lecture on The Conception of God', he develops this individualistic concept of the deity by reference to the Quran. The word Allah, a proper name, was meant, according to Iqbal, to emphasise the sense of His uniqueness and exclusive individuality. 264 The other argument in favour of his stand. he develops on the basis of Bergson's definition of individuality. According to Bergson, a perfect individual would be one, no detached part of whom could exist separately. In sura Al-Ikhlas, the Ouran describes God as One Who begetteth not nor is He begotton of any one else. Thus according to definition God is a Perfect Individual.265

His third argument about this point is based on the text of the Quran where God is described as Light of the heavens and the earth (xxiv. 35) which tends to be interpreted pantheistically as a pervading cosmic force. Iqbal argues that the metaphor of light as developed in the verse is meant to emphasise individualistic concept of God. He concludes, "The metaphor of light as applied to God, therefore, must in view of modern knowledge, be taken to suggest the Absoluteness of God and not His omnipresence which easily lends itself to a pantheistic interpretation. ²⁶⁶ To avoid this mis-conception, Iqbal calls Him Ego which is another way of emphasising individuality of the Creator.

How does Iqbal view the relation of the Ultimate Ego to the universe? We perceive objects as lying external to us in space. Does the universe confront Him as His other with space intervening between Him and it? According to Iqbal this common sense view of relationship is not correct. It would be totally wrong to view the creative activity of God as if objects come out of his

hands at some particular moment of time as pots are made by the potter. From the divine point of view, universe is a continuous creative act which human thought, in the process of understanding, breaks up into a plurality of discrete things.²⁶⁷ Iqbal has illustrated this difference in human and divine view of things by referring to an interesting discussion on the subject of creation in the assembly of the great mystic, Bayazid of Bistam. A disciple, speaking from the human point of view, remarked: there was a moment of time when God existed and nothing else existed beside Him. The mystic, speaking from the divine point of view, asserted: It is just the same now as it was then.²⁶⁸ The universe, according to Iqbal, is thus not a confronting 'other' to Him but "only a fleeting moment in the life of God......Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the picturesque phrase of the Quran it is the habit of Allah." ²⁶⁹

What about the human self? Is it also a mere phase of God's consciousness? Iqbal is emphatic on this point. He believes that the finite human ego enjoys a profounder personality which has the potentiality of conquering even death. It is a self-contained centre of will and energy: it is too profound to be intellectualised. ²⁷⁰

Commenting on Bradley's scepticism with regard to this finite centre of experience, Iqbal states that "to my mind this inexplicable finite centre of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe". Intellectually we may not be able to understand the full significance of its reality, yet "our feeling of egohood is ultimate and powerful enough to extract from professor Bradley the reluctant admission of its reality." 272

But the basic question is: does the human age lie outside and apart from the Ultimate Ego? Are the Absolute Ego and the human ego so related to each other that they mutually exclude each other. It is indeed very difficult to answer this question either positively or negatively. The reality of the human ego is so basic that it would be hardly possible to give any defnite answer, Iqbal has tried to resolve this difficulty by referring to two different terms used by the Quran, Khalq and Amr. These two terms express two ways in which the creative activity of God reveals itself to us. Khalq is creation; Amr is direction. The former is used to denote the relation of God to the universe while the latter is used to express the unique relation which

egoes have with the Ultimate Ego. The essential nature of ego is directive, as it proceeds from the directive energy of God; though we do not know how divine amr functions as ego-unities.²⁷³

In one of his articles, where he raises the same question, he states; "All that we can say in answer to the extremely difficult question raised above is that the amr is not related to God in the same way as the khalq is. The amr is distinct but not isolated from God.²⁷⁴

Iqbal's repudiation of pantheism becomes all the more clear when he comes to deal with the problem of personal immortality. Relying on the text of the Quran, he holds that on the Day of Resurrection every human individual will retain his individuality in face of the Infinite. Says the Quran (xix. 95–6): each of them shall come to Him on the Day of Resurrection as a single individual. In another verse (xvii. 14), it is stated that on that day a book shall be proffered to each individual for reading an account of his deeds in the earthly life. "It is with the irreplaceable singleness of his individuality", says Iqbal, "that the finite ego will approach the Infinite Ego to see for himself the consequences of his past action......" 275

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NOTES:

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- 266. Ibid., p. 64.
- 267. Ibid., p. 66.
- 268. Ibid., p. 65.
- 269. Ibid., p. 56.
- 270. Ibid., p. 98.
- 271. Introduction to The Secrets of the Self, p. xii.
- 272. Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 98.
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- 275. Iqbal, Reconstruction, pp. 117-8.

IQBAL AND THE NOTION OF MEDITATION

In the Second Lecture of the RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN ISLAM, Allama Iqbal, while highlighting the distinctive features of the efficient and the appreciative aspects of the Self observes, "In our constant pursuit after external things we weave a kind of veil around the appreciative self which thus becomes completely alien to us. It is only in moments of profound meditation when the efficient self is in abeyance that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience "276 He also says in the same strain, "In its deeper movement, however, thought is capable of reaching an Immanent Infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments".277 Thought in this sense, he says, is "a greeting of the finite with the infinite." From these extracts it becomes obvious that the deeper movement of thought which Allama Iqbal speaks of and sinking into our deeper self as a result of meditation are allied processes as in one case the Immanent Infinite can be reached and in the other the veils that have covered the appreciative aspect can be ripped aside and the efficient self held in abeyance.

As a process-philosopher, Allama Iqbal believed in perpetual, ceaseless change. Consciousness like everything else is in constant mobility, a stream of processes which ever flows on without halting or resting place. But this change is not felt oridinarily as the self has two aspects—the efficient and the appreciative and it is the efficient aspect which dominates in the every-day working life of men and women. The efficient aspect is nothing but intellect functioning in its intercourse with the material world and its realities. It is this aspect which gives rise to science and philosophy, it produces grand systems of conceptual thinking and leads indivi-

duals, imperceptibly but surely, to their involvement in gross activities of life to the total neglect of the finer and the sublimer dimensions of life. The efficient self is not however without use. In order to live, it is imperative to evolve a system of thought which ensures success and effectiveness, and for this purpose. intellectual rendering of the physical reality is absolutely essential. But what is essential in a limited field comes to acquire authority far beyond its legitimate area. The efficient self whose duty it is to serve as an instrumentality for successful dealing with the physical environs assumes an over-all control over all aspect of life. thus driving the nobler side of life to a position of insignificance. This is unfortunate for in this manner as Allama Iqbal says "we weave a kind of veil around the appreciative self."279 The veil that Allama Iqbal talks of is the conceptual framework which, being static, renders a person unfit to see change. The intellect cuts up Reality into sections for purpose of analysis and enquiry, and so gives a distorted view of the nature of things. Allama Iqbal feels that "Natural science deals with matter, with life and with mind; but the moment you ask the question how matter, life and mind are mutually related, you begin to see the sectional character of the various sciences that deal with them and the inability of these sciences, taken singly, to furnish a complete answer to your question. In fact the various natural sciences are like so many vultures falling on the dead body of Nature, and each running away with a piece of flesh."280

Not only does Intellect in the form of sciences gives an artificial view of Reality, through its analytical and logico-mathematical procedures, it also obscures the vision of the Ultimate Reality. It creates words for things and gives the illusion that the words are the reality. The linguistic philosophy of the Anglo-American world has declared in unmistakable terms its sole intention to deal with language in the domain of philosophy and to have no truck with anything extra-linguistic. In ordinary life too, as the business of life is mainly carried on through language, it is believed that the sole reality with which life deals is nothing but language. Thus another veil is woven around the appreciative self. It is the veil of words as they take the place of actual experience. Allama Iqbal believes that both these veils, one of logical and the other of words, can be got rid of through meditation. T. D. Suzuki, a Zen Buddhist, says, "If we really want to get to the bottom of life,

we must abandon our cherished syllogism, we must acquire a new way of observation whereby we can escape the tryanny of Logic and the one-sidedness of our everyday phraseology."²⁸¹ The breaking up of the tyranny of name and logic is at the same time Spiritual emancipation. Therefore Suzuki says "Zen deals with facts, and not with their logical, verbal, prejudiced and lame representations".

Allama Iqbal is anti-intellectualist in his account of religion, as the above discussion shows. He feels like many other religionists of different denominations that if the traditional proofs for the existence of God, namely the entological, the teleological and the cosmological fail, 282 it does not matter in the least, for there is a more direct, immediate, and certain knowledge of the existence of God than anything that could be given by such speculative proofs. This view classically articulated by two German theologains, F. Schloiernacher, ON RELIGION: SPEECHES TO ITS CULTURAL DESPISERS (1799), and Rudolf Otto, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY (1917), tries to give a foundation for faith in religious experience, which would subvert the need for an appeal to proofs for the existence of God. Allama Iqbal, also, after discussing the first two stages of religion, namely the doctrinal and the metaphysical comes to the third stage, namely the experimental one in which metaphysics is replaced by experience. "It is here" Allama Iqbal says, "that religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power; and the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness."283

If the direct, immediate and intuitive knowledge of the Ultimate Reality is to replace the slow, tardy, indirect and doubtful knowledge of metaphysics, then it must be said that religious knowledge which is a direct perception of the Ultimate Reality is a self-authenticating and self-validating process. In other words it cannot submit itself to criteria which are external to it. Intuitive knowledge if not clear is a contradiction in terms. For only such knowledge can be termed intuitive as can stand on its own legs and requires no proof,²⁸⁴ for no proof is at all needed. If proof is offered for what is alleged to be intuitive, it immediately becomes inferential and as such antithetical to the very notion of intuitive knowledge. Allama Iqbal has however offered two criteria for the

validation of religious knowledge, one is intellectual and the other is pragmatic.285 The intellectual test consists in showing that what is claimed for religious experience is upheld by what modern researches in the domain of Physics, Biology and Psychology have established. Allama Iqbal believes that the Ultimate Reality is spiritual and this, he says, is the verdict of natural science as well. He also believes that the pragmatic test as applied to religious experience in Islam will show the nature and significance of the culture that Islam tended to produce. (According to Allama Iqbal, the culture that Islam created was dynamic, inductive and lifeyielding). It is not clear whether the so-called tests are simply intended to demarcate a spurious type of religious experience from a genuine one or whether their intention is to establish the validity of religious experience as such. If they are meant for the former purpose, they have a utility, but if their real purpose is to establish validity, then they offshoot the mark, for an intuitive experience being intuitive does not stand in need of intellectual proofs. The pragmatic test may be applied to religious consciousness which is charged with a mission as the prophetic consciousness is but it is not true of those species of mystic experience which are an end in themselves.

Allama Igbal holds intuition is higher kind of intellect. "Higher's may mean qualitatively better and therefore superior in worth or it may mean highly evolved and so belonging to the same type but standing at a higher stage of evolution. Many intuitionists take the first meaning of intuition and consider that intuition being qualitatively superior exhibits characteristics which are fundamentally different from those of intllect."286 Allama Igbal. however, maintains that "there is no reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring from the same root and complement each other."287 This statement simply means that intellect and intuition are not opposed to each other; rather they supplement each other's work; but it does not show that if one is superior or higher to the other, how is this term higher or superior to be interpreted. If however intuition belongs to the same species to which intellect belongs and there are no qualitative differences between the two, then the distinction between the efficient and the appreciative aspects of the self loses such of its significance and relevance.

Like Bergson, Allama Iqbal is anxious to reap the benefits of

intuition while not eschewing intellect altogether. He wishes to provide an intellectual justification to religion but he does not admit the superiority of philosophy to religion. He thinks that in this manner the Muslim youth who are enamoured of the Western mode of enquiry will be drawn towards religion and their aversion to religion will be changed into attraction. But whether philosophically speaking the attempt to intellectualise intuition or to intuitionalise intellect is justifiable is a doubtful matter.

Allama Iqbal maintains that "In the interests of securing a complete vision of Reality, therefore, sense-perception must be suplemented by the perception of what the Quran describes as 'Fuad' or 'Qalb' i.e. heart...... The heart is a kind of inner intuition or insight which. . . bring us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to mense-perception. . . . The vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience." About this experience Allama Iqbal says, that "its reports if properly interpreted are never false." 289 Allama Iqbal here distinguishes the perception vouchsafed by senses from the perception vouchsafed by Qalb, which, according to Allama Iqbal, is just another name for intuition and brings one in contact with that aspect of Reality which senses do not disclose. This would mean putting the senses into bracket in Hussrel's language and awakening the Qalb of offer from its innermost recesses that knowledge which is truer, completer and more revealing than that offered by the intellect. That this is by no means easy has been recognized by religionists, mystics, Idealistic philosophers all over the world. Therefore they have devised special technique to explore the Qalb and to bring out the treasure hidden therein. One such technique is that of Meditation. It is very difficult to say what Meditation is, for its nature and technique differs in different mystical orders. But as a preliminary and by no means final statement, one can say that Meditation consists in the endeavour to bring into waking consciousness, that is, into the mind in its normal state of activity, some realisation of the superconsciousness, to create by the power of aspiration a channel through which the influence of the divine principle may irradiate the lower personality. It is the reaching out of the mind and feelings towards an ideal, and the opening of the doors of the imprisoned lower consciousness to the influence of that ideal. In short Meditation is the inexpressibel longing of the inner man for

the Infinite. According to Allama Iqbal, it is an occasion for the Infinite to greet the Finite."²⁹⁰ It is in all cases the uplifting of the soul towards its divine source, the desire of the particularised self to become one with the Universal Self.

To understand the nature of Meditation, one has to understand the nature of time which according to Bergson has two aspects, namely the serial and the durational. The serial time is the time of everyday life-a time which is pulverised into seconds minutes and hours, that is to say, a time out of which past, present and future are constructed. In short it is the time of History, Geometry, Mathematics and of the business world. It is obvious that in the absence of the serial notion of time, the work of the mundane world would come to a stop. But though serial time has a high degree of utility for the average man, it is nevertheless not the true aspect of time. Change which is the fundamental characteristic of Reality as well as freedom which accompanies every act of creative evolution remain insoluble problems, at best mysteries, at the serial time level. Allama Iqbal has discussed Zeno's objections against motion and comes to the conclusion that they cannot be met so long as one remains at the serial level. At this level, the notion of infinite divisibility will pose a problem hard to be settled on scientific and mathematical grounds. Hence Bergson proposes and Allama Iqbal fully agrees with him, that the real nature of change and freedom can be understood if one realizes the other notion of time which is duration, that is to say, change without succession. When in deeper moments of thought or in profound meditation, one dives into the inner richness of one's being, one realizes that all distinctions of time into present, past and future vanish and one lives in eternal-now. This is duration. Meditation cuts across the serial time and leads a person straight to duration.

In Bergsonian philosophy space and time are treated separately and also regarded as separate, independent entities. In meditation one leaves the space behind and lives in time alone. Bergson believes that space binds one to the gross and the sordid of life, it is so to say the *prakirti* of Indian philosophy, while time liberates one from the shackles of material existence and grants true emancipation. Time can be compared to the *pursa* of Indian philosophy. And just as Bergson wants people to live the life of time, more precisely the life of duration, similarly the Hindu sages would recommend the life of pursa. In meditation one is lifted out of the

plane of material existence and made to live in an environment constituted of duration alone. Allama Iqbal would endorse this view, for in the act of meditation, all that is material is to be transcended and the meditator has to dwell, though for a short while, in a world at once ethereal and spiritual.

Allama Iqbal has observed that the appreciative self which is suppressed by the efficient self can reassert itself during meditation. Since efficient self is the creation of intellect or intelligence in its dealing with the external world, it is necessary that in meditation, in order that appreciative self should start functioning that intellect should be paralysed and its operations held in abevance. It is for this reason that *Kiekaard* calls faith a leap into the dark. and Suzuki, an act of illogicality, while some Existentialists would call it an absurdity, meaning thereby that faith belongs to the realm of no-reason. Zen Buddhists like the novice to go through exercises of illogicality before he or she is initiated to the regular order. These exercises are intended to liberate mind from the shackles of intellect and give to life a new orientation. For unless old habits are broken and the mind is conditioned to new ways of looking at things and the world around, it is impossible for a person to grasp non-sensuous realities. As old habits are not easy to be got rid of, a long continuous exercise in non-reason is needed. sometimes with the help of a Master or Pir. A psycho-analyst breaks the resistance of a patient in order to gain access to his Unconscious, likewise a Master breaks the resistance of Reason in order to awaken the spiritual or what Allama calls the appreciative self. And just as a rapport is established between the psychoanalyst and the patient which is another name for faith, similarly a bond of union or togetherness grows between the Master and the murid. This rapport or bond of union that comes into being between the Master and the murid, helps in deconditioning some of the old ways of thinking and feeling and facilitates the adoption of new ways, enabling the murid to immerse into the innermost recesses of his consciousness to come in direct contact with the Reality.

Allama Iqbal calls 'appreciative self' as our 'deeper self' and also 'the inner centre of experience'. He says, "In the life-process of this deeper ego the states of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individuals ancestors exists, not as a

plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. There is no numerical distinctness of states in the totality of the ego, the multiplicity of whose elements is unlike that of the efficient self. Wholly qualitative. There is change and movement, but this change and movement are indivisible, their elements inter-penetrate and are wholly non-serial in character."291 Thus. according to Allama Iqbal, the appreciative self lives in duration and not in serial time and also it is unity, not in the sense that there is no change or movement but in the sense that change and movement are indivisible. This kind of experience in which the law of divisibility ceases to operate and the time is not serial in character but durational can be achieved if intellect is completely shut off. This then is the realm of non-reason—a realm in which the categories of thought hold no away. As a philosopher looks at familiar thing in an unfamiliar way, so a mystic looks at things not in the customary manner. And simply because the path is unfamiliar and also needs a non-ordinary angle., it is essential that the initiate should have a long period of training to become capable of receiving the uncommon vision. His sensitivites have to be given a different turn so that radar-like they catch stimulii from the non-That this turn is possible and desirable is the faith of a great many thinkers who, tired of the soul-killing advancement of science and technology, are inclining towards their 'heart' in the language of the Quran, to find peace and tranquility.

Meditation is often divided into three stages: Concentration, Meditation and Contemplation. Concentration consists in focusing the mind on one idea and holding it there. To be able to concentrate, it is necessary to gain control of the mind and learn by gradual practice to narrow down the range of its activity until it becomes one-pointed. Some idea or object is selected on which to concentrate, and the initial step is to shut out all else from mind, to exclude therefrom the stream of thoughts alien to the subject. Meditation is the art of considering a subject or turning it over in the mind in its various bearings and relationships. As one meditates on goodness and beauty, the mind expands and gradually acquires something of that personal experience which spans the gulf between the man of knowledge and the man of wisdom, and attains to inner peace and exaltation of the soul. Contemplation opens up new vistas of experience and attunes the mind to new verities. It presents objects at a higher level of consciousness which modern Psychology has as yet not explored.

The consciousness at this level is unitary, it is an experience of wholeness, of duration and of blissor, in other words, of appreciative self reasserting itself in all its pristine glory.

The type of experience which liberates the appreciative self from the over-all domination of the efficient self and which is acquired through meditation, according to Allama Iqbal, can be obtained, so Aldous Huxley claims in THE DOORS OF PERCEP-TION, through mesoalin and other so-called psyche-delic drugs of various types. This claim, if true, would provide a physiological base to religious experience. There is evidence to show that some mystics have been taking bhang, hashish and other intoxiocants to facilitate the on-coming of esoteric experiences and in some cases not only to facilitate but to produce the desired frame of mind in which sensitivity to transcendental experiences is raised to the uppermost limit. But no attempt was made on the part of mystics to discover the rationale of this process. It was left to Huxley to subject the whole process to laboratory test under strict experimental conditions and to bring out results which can be tasted objectively. In order that chances of deception and mis-interpretation be reduced to the minimum, Huxley made himself the subject of experiment. He took a certain quantity of mesoalin, as according to him, mesoalin has an advantage over other intoxicants, for if it is administered in suitable doses, it changes the quality of consciousness more profoundly than they and yet is less toxic than any other substance in the pharmacologist's reportory. "He took the mesoalin pill which started its work within half an hour, and continued to work for about eight hours. During this period, Huxley experienced something very unusual. The three flowers in the glass vase looked to him under the influence of the drugs, something ethereal. He says, "I was seeing what Adam had seen on the morning of his creation—the miracle, moment by moment, of naked existence."292

From what Huxley says, it transpires that his sense of colour was immensely hightened and natural objects seemed to possess a reality and meaning they did not normally have. All this seems to correspond to Zen Buddhist experiences and also to mystical experiences in which time and space appear to be transcended and the experiencer seems to live in what Allama Iqbal calls the 'eternal-now'. Huxley says, "My actual experience had been, was still of an indefinite duration or alternatively of a perpetual pre-

sent made up of one continually changing apocalypse". Huxley calls the mesoalin experience as 'contemplation at its hight' or 'pure contemplation'. He claims that by virtue of these experiences, he was in a position to pronounce high quality judgements on works of art, seeing them from what he calls the standpoint of Mind at Large.

What is however significant from the religious point of view is that Huxley believes that the mesoalin are comparable to mystic experiences and can liberate the forces which meditation or any other mystic technique is intended to liberate. If as Allama Igbal supposes that Mediation releases the appreciative self from the iron grip of the efficient self, and if mesoalin experiences resemble the meditative experience in content and quality, then the age-old practices of sufis, yogis and other mystics like renouncing the world, chastening and tormenting one's self, fasting and vigilance can be replaced by drug taking, as it is a far easier, far quicker and far surer way of achieving the state which the sufis, yogis and mystics aspire. The ascetic practices taken long, are tedious in execution, and doubtful in their results, while drug-taking leads to the desired result quickly and surely. The old methods were based upon conjectures and hearsay, while drug-taking is a scientific technique, tested under laboratory conditions and so has all the advantages that a scientifically established formula has.

Huxley's findings have been corroborated by Huston Smith who quotes researches to show that there is no characteristic difference between mystic and drug experiences. One study referred by him is that of the California psychiatrist Oscar Janiger, whose 24 per cent of the 194 subjects reported that their experiences were of religious character: the other study is that of Ditman and Hayman, which states that 42 per cent of the subjects under the influence of L.S.D. were left with a greater awareness of God, or a higher power or ultimate reality. Another study mentioned by him is that of Walter Pahnke who worked out a typology of mystical experience based on the characterisation of such experiences by Walter Stace, as mentioned in his book MYSTICISM AND PHI— LOSOPHY. He administered psilocybin to ten theology students and professors in the setting of a Good Friday service. The drug was given 'double-blind'. Neither the experimentor nor the subjects knew who was being given placebos or psilocybin. The result was

that "those subjects who received psilocybin experienced phenomena which were indistinguishable from, if not identical with... the categories defined by our typology of mysticism." ^{2 9 3}

There are two dangers against which we have to guard ourselves. One is that drug induced experiences do not prove the religious experiences to be delusory. Their religious or spiritual character is not in any way affected. What the psychotomisetic drugs show is that an experience similar to the one produced by meditation and other acetic exercises can be produced by drugs as well. Drugtaking is simply a scientific technique, creating the sort of experience that mystic desires for his spiritual emancipation. Another danger is to invest the religious experience with a trans-empirical quality and so hold it unique and therefore not producible through drug-taking. This position has been taken by a good many theologians who maintain that religious experience is sui generis and therefore qualitatively different from all other experiences. As such, the drug induced experience can never be put at par with the religious experience. Though this position is taken by a good many theologians, yet it can be said that this does not accord with the scientific temper of the age and the prevailing mood of the youth. When the theologian holds that the religious experience is a class by itself, he is relying on faith, which may be self-certifying to the person having that experience but hardly a ground for those who are denied the privilege of having that experience. Thus if it is admitted that the drug does not militate against the sanctity of religious experience and also that the religious experience is not unique in character, it would not be difficult to concede that the drug experiences are similar to, if not identical with, the mystic experiences.

There is still another difficulty which need to be disposed of. It is held that drug-experiences do not conduce to that type of life which results inevitably from mystic experiences. Here it is well to distinguish between religious experience and religious life and to remark that those people who equate religion with religious experience are in the wrong. Religious life is more than religious experience and that accounts for the fact that religious life associated with religious experience is hard to be achieved through drug induced experiences despite the fact that their character is similar to that of religious experience.

Allama Iqbal does not discredit the view that discovers orga-

nic conditions underlying mystic experiences.²⁹⁴ All that he maintains is that if we are in a position to specify the physiological conditions occasioning a mystic experience, it will not belittle the importance or the significance of the mystic experience, for the origin of a phenomenon has nothing to do with its validity and its present status. And Allama Iqbal is quite right in saying so. Organic conditions are very essential in all mental experiences including the mystic ones. During Allama Igbal's time the James-Lange theory of emotions was quite well-known. This theory holds that emotions are accompanied by organic conditions which if removed, the so-called emotion loses its importance and even existence. Subsequent researches have confirmed James' hypothesis, so that the present-day physiologists are busy finding organic conditions not only behind normal experiences but also behind abnormal and paranormal experience. Mystic experiences, being mental experiences, cannot be excluded. The ascetic, vogic and other mystic practices like self-denial, self amutilation. starvation etc are intended to change the angle of the mystic by changing his physiology. It is very unlikely that these exercises which are carried on for years in some cases do not result in introducing fundamental changes in the organism itself. If this is correct, then there is nothing extra-ordinary in believing that the changes wrought by drugs in the organism of the drug-taker may conduce to the production of experience similar to the one produced through meditation and other mystic exercises, provided the physiological changes in either case are similar. No study has as yet been undertaken by psychologists on this aspect of the problems so far. At least none that I know of. But if researches corroborate what has been conjectured above that will lend another evidence to support the view that mystic and drug induced experiences are indistinguishable.

These findings if experimentally established will go to prove that mystic experiences can be aroused both by meditation and drug-taking. In other words the appreciative self which is ordinarily imprisoned in the hands of the efficient self can be set free by drug-taking also. But as said above this needs further enquiry and experimental investigation.

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NOTES:

- Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, 1965 pp. 47-48
- 277 Ibid, p. 6.
- 278 Ibid, p. 7.
- 279 Ibid, p. 47.
- 280 Ibid, pp. 42-43.
- 281 T. D. Suzuki, An introduction to Zen Buddhism, Grove Press 1964, p. 60.
- Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 1965, pp. 28-29.
- 283 Ibid, p. 181.
- 284 G. N. Moore, Principia Rthies, Cambridge 1960, pp. 148-150.
- Allama Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 1965, p. 27.
- 286 Ibid, p. 3.
- 287 Ibid, p. 2.
- 288 Ibid, pp. 15-16.
- 289 Ibid, p. 16.
- 290 Ibid, p. 7.
- 291 Ibid, p. 48.
- 292. Ibid, p. 11.
- The Journal of Philosophy, 61: 18 (October 1, 1964) Article by Huston Smith "Do Drags Have Religious Impert?".
- Allama Muhammad Iqbal. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought, in Islam, Lahore, 1965, p. 23.

IQBAL'S 'PREFACE' TO THE LECTURES

Iqbal's Preface to his *Lectures* on 'the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam' is a very compact statement, the point of which is not easy to grasp. However, after one has gone through the *Lectures*, much of its obscurity disappears.

Iqbal seems to be of the view that at the present time a rational approach to the problem of reconstruction of Islamic religious thought is the most suitable. Other approaches are possible and even exist. Iqbal's criticism of these is hinted at but not made explicit.

The argument of the Preface, therefore, is a defence of the largely rational approach employed in the Lectures. We need to follow with some ease. Let us restate it in numbered paragraphs:

- 1. It is true, Iqbal says, the Quran offers the way of experience in preference to that of logical argument.
- 2. It is also true that religious faith itself ultimately rests on a special type of inner experience.
- 3. But this special type of inner experience cannot be had by every one. There are men who remain strangers to it.
- 4. Modern man especially has become a stranger to it. This because of his habits of thinking viz. observing and experimenting and relying generally on sense-experience.
- 5. These habits of concrete thinking—Iqbal reminds— Islam itself fostered in the earlier phases of its cultural career.
- 6. Modern man shaped by modern science has become incapable—or at least less capable—of experience on which

religious faith rests, over which Islam will have no regrets because Islam itself has fostered habits of concrete thought.

- 7. Not only has modern man become less capable than ancient or medieval man of having the unique experience which makes for religious faith. The whole business of having such experience has become suspect in his eyes. And why? Because "of its liability to illness". Such experiences are often had by persons who only suffer from hallucinations.
- 8. The more genuine schools of Sufism have done good work in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience in Islam. This means that religious experience can be genuine and valid anything but illusory and that there are Sufistic schools which have taken pains to describe and record this experience and reduce it to some kind of order, so that Islamic religious experience could be said to have become a continuing and developing tradition, with its unique methods, terminology, criteria, etc.

What then is the difficulty? Why cannot modern man benefit from this tradition?

9. Igbal's reply is: The present-day representatives of these one-time genuine schools are ignorant of the modern mind. By 'modern mind' Igbal means something which may be said to be the product of the intellectual, political, and technological progress which has taken place in the West in the three modern centuries, viz, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth which have made the modern Western mind what it is. This ignorance of how the modern mind works, how it thinks, judges, and feels, has made the Sufis of today incapable of learning anything from modern thought or of imparting anything to it. They are happy and contented with methods which have become obsolete, methods "created for generations possessing a cultural outlook different in important respects from our own". The way Igbal contrasts modern with ancient or medieval mind to the distinct advantage of the modern is unmistakable. But it may be questioned.

- Are they so very different after all? Impressed by quite different methods of thinking and persuading and arriving at conclusions and convictions? But......
- 10. Iqbal is adamant and even cites Holy Quran in support of his view. He cites verse 29 of *Surah Luqman* which says, 'Your creation and your resurrection are like the creation and resurrection of a single soul'.

The verse points to an analogy between the individual mind, soul, or spirit and a whole people's mind, soul or spirit. Two points are stressed in the analogy, viz., creation and resurrection and these, we may assume, put a limit on what inferences may be drawn from the analogy. The point of this verse—for Iqbal's defence of the rational approach to the problem of Islamic reconstruction is not clear at once. But when we remember Iqbal's determination to reach the mind of modern man and modern Muslims and when we look at what Iqbal has to say in the course of the *Lectures*, we begin to grasp the relevance of the verse to Iqbal's approach. Let us present some excerpts from the *Lectures*, and let them speak for themselves:

In Lecture III (Meaning of prayer") Iqbal says:

"Religion is not satisfied with mere conception; it seeks a more intimate knowledge of and association with the object of its pursuit the agency through which this association is achieved is the act of worship prayer ending in spiritual illumination. The act of worship however affects different varities of consciousness differently. In the case of the prophetic consciousness it is in the main cognitive"295 Then in Lecture-V "Spirit of Muslim Culture" Iqbal says: "During the minority of mankind psychic energy develops what I can prophetic consciousness-a mode of economising individual thought and choice by providing ready-made judgements choices and ways of action. With the birth of reason and critical faculty however life in its own interest inhibits the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at an earlier stage of human evolution. . . . The idea however does not mean that mystic experience which qualitatively does not differ from the experience of the prophet has now ceased to exist as vital fact. . . . God reveals His signs

in inner as well as outer experience and it is the duty of man to judge the knowledge—yielding capacity of all aspects of experience. ²⁹⁶

Igbal warns however that the Lectures will not draw on mystical experience reported in the past Muslim traditions or by contemporary Muslim mystics or theologians. The time is over when appeals to mystical experience could succeed. Modern man no longer understands or appreciates such experience. Iqbal does not indicate whether he himself shares this disability. But it is obvious enough in the course of the Lectures that Iabal sympathises. though he does not see eye to eye with modern man in this respect Iqbal values mystical experience and cites Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi (Lecture VII) to show that such experiences are valid experiences and that they constitute a part of the continuing tradition of Islam. Mystical experiences of a higher order — which Idbal calls prophetic experiences — have ceased. Islam's role in the History of human progress is to lead mankind — the whole of mankind — away from authoritarian, and towards rational ways of thinking, away from the deductive, and towards the inductive approach to the moral and spiritual problems of man.

The Quranic test in support of the thesis is the verse from Surah Luqman. Human communities — and therefore human-kind as a whole recapitulate etc. — which constitute the career of the individual human soul. The human individual is a child to begin with, but becomes an adult. Methods which could be valid in childhood are no longer valid when the child has become adult. The human group — humankind that is to say — resembles the human individual. Therefore, a time must come when religious thinking must forsake revelational authority and fall back upon the ordinary method of observing, experimenting, and reasoning. This seems to be the point of the Quranic verse which Iqbal quotes.

11. Iqbal's conclusion, in short, seems to be that prophetic experience which could be authoritative having ceased, and mystical experience which has not ceased, is not authoritative, the only method left for religious discourse is the method of science. "The demand for a scientific form of religious knowledge is only natural". says Iqbal and in any case modern man including the modern Muslim — if he is to attain to a living reconstruction of faith

— must have at his disposal" a method physiologically less violent and psychologically more suitable". The reference here is to mystical exercises of holding the breath and making the body resound to the repetition of religious names or formulae. These exercises cannot be adopted by modern man. He will not try them out, and probably not think the experiment worth while. Occasionally Western writers turn up and say they have tried Yoga exercises and found them more or less true to their scientific appeal. If they are valid they are valid only for those who perform the exercises and have the alleged experiences. They are not valid for all the sundry. They are not experiences which all can have, which all can test, check and judge, like the experiences of science.

- 12. Iqbal's Lectures, therefore, try to meet "even though partially the urgent demand for a reconstruction of Muslims religious philosophy, in the light of the philosophical tradition of Islam", on the one hand, and "the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge". on the other. Reconstruction, in short, is the need. To be achieved by a rational criticism and construction of Islamic tradition and modern science.
- 13. The time at which Iqbal wrote the Lectures was most favourable for such a reconstruction. Why? Because classical physics had moved away from its traditional assumptions, from crude nineteenth century materialism, that is to say, According to which the universe including man was ultimately made up of irreducible last particles constrained by their nature, to follow only mechanical laws. Iqbal was optimistic about the outcome of modern physics. Religion and science, he said (in 1928) may discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies. The lectures show where these harmonies could be found.
- 14. In true scientific humility, Iqbal warns that there is no finality in philosophical thinking. Therefore, his is not and cannot be —— the last word on the subject. "As knowledge advances fresh avenues of thought will open

up and other and probably sounder views will become possible. Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it".

The comment may seem irresistible that Iqbal begins by saying that the preference of the Our'an is for 'deed, rather than 'idea'. But the burden of his Preface carries a preference for 'idea' rather than 'deed'. Is it a contradiction and a serious one, proof of emotional ambivalence and so on? No, is my answer. The Preface is an intellectual deference of an intellectual approach adopted by Igbal in the Lectures. Appropriately the Lectures provide an exposition of the New Physics which emerged with Einstein earlier in the present century, also of the constructions which philosophers following Einstein, had begun to put, and which some Muslim philosophers in their time had already put on ideas basic in philosophy, viz, space, time, matter, man, mind, God. The message that emerges out of the Lectures extols 'deed' rather than 'idea'. The argument for the existence of God is 'experience', it may be the experience of religious seers throughout the world and over the centuries, it may be the experience of Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi nearer home. The end — the ultimate end — of human life is more and more life, free, creative, spontaneous, constructive. Igbal — like all voluntaristis, like Bergson, like Nietzsche wishes to extol 'deed' but not without absorbing 'idea' into it.

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Iqbal, the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Sh. M. Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, p. 89.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 126.

IQBAL ON OBSERVATION OF NATURE AND GOD-KNOWLEDGE

Iqual rejects the celebrated cosmological and teleological arguments as a proof apparatus for the existence of God. The former, he holds, is self-contradictory. It reduces God to just an item in the long chain of causes which is arbitrarily elevated 'to the dignity of an uncaused first cause, 297 thus setting at naught the very principle of causation. The latter, on the other hand, "gives us a skilful external contriver working on a pre-existing. dead and intractable material, the elements of which are (ex-hypothesi), by their own nature, incapable of orderly structures and combinations. (It) gives us a contriver only and not a creator."298 Both these arguments agree in being cosmological in a broader sense of the term as they equally well start from the cosmos or the universe and lead up to God. And it is specifically due to this essential character that, in spite of being fallacious on logical grounds, they 'embody a real movement of thought in its quest after the Absolute'²⁹⁹ Nature is, after all, relevant to the existence of God. The Quran i.e. the word of God gives certain verbal characterizations of Him. Nature, on the other hand, is the work of God. So between them there should be complete accord. The thesis of the essential harmony between the work of God and the word of God was propounded most forcefully by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and later by 'Allama 'Inayat Ullah Khan Mashriqi. Igbal also had the conviction that the two are in mutual agreement and somehow support each other. That is very much the reason why in one of his lectures³⁰⁰ he sought the confirmation of the descriptions of the Ultimate Reality as contained in the Qur'an by a reference to the findings of natural, empirical sciences. In Islam the instrument of encounter with God has been technically known as prayer. And Igbal rightly observes that the scientific observer of nature too is involved in the act of prayer.³⁰¹ "knowledge of nature," he says, 'is the knowledge of God's behavi-

our. In our observation of nature we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the Absolute Ego"³⁰² It is instructive to point out here that the Qur'anic word [pl.) has been used for a verse in the scripture as well as for a phenomenon of nature. This shows the basic affinity between the divine and the natural order.

However, what is basically wrong with the nature-based cosmological arguments is, for one thing, that they abstract particular single aspects of the natural happenings — causality or movement or harmony and order and so forth - at the total exclusion of our experience as such. Talking of these arguments, H. J. Paton writes: "They appeal... not to a rich and full and diversified experience but to its bare bones. The inference, so to speak, is not from the living body of experience but only from its skeleton. Hence the cosmological argument is arid". Happily, the Quran while building up its metaphysics does not abstract in this way. It accepts the whole of nature that is revealed to sense perception as a system of signs of the Ultimate Reality, which signs we are almost duty-bound to observe. Those who are oblivious of facts of experience here and now, it says, will remain blind to the beauties of the Ideal in the hereafter. The Qur'an says:

Surely, in the creation of the heavens and of the earth and in the alternation of night and day; and in the ships which pass through the sea with what is useful to man; and in the rain which God sends down from heaven, giving life to the earth after its death and in scattering over it all kinds of cattle; and in the change of the winds and in the clouds that are made to do service between the heavens and the earth are signs (of God) for those who understand.³⁰⁵

Further,

And it is He Who sends down rain from heaven, and we bring forth by it the buds of all the plants and from them we bring forth the green foliage and in the close growing green and plam trees with sheaths of clustering dates and gardens of grapes and the olives and the pomegranates like and unlike. Look at the fruits when they ripen. Therein are signs for people who believe.³⁰⁶

And so on.

The Quran recoreds a number of instances where prophets them-

selves had a recourse to the observation of nature while seeking to know God. When Prophet Moses expressed his wish to see God, he was asked to look towards the mountain³⁰⁷ which is a natural object. Prophet Abraham, the unitarian par excellence, found his way to God through a strong realization, based on observation and experience, of the ephemral character of the stars, the moon and the sun.³⁰⁸ Even when he had acquired a belief in God in this way he had to refer back to the world of experience in order to confirm his belief and be at peace with that belief.³⁰⁹

However, all these Quranic references do not imply that even the diverse phenomena of nature mentioned do in any way provide sufficient proofs for the existence of God. There can, strictly speaking, be no argument worth the name for the existence of God in which nature is accepted as the major premise. Nature is finite and temporal; God is infinite and eternal. Neither a deductive nor an inductive reasoning is applicable here because in both of them the premises and the conclusion must have at least a continuity of reference and belong to the same universe of discourse. And this expressly is not the case here. We may extend finitude to whatever degree we desire; it would never be transformed into infinity. Nor can any number of moments joined together give us a glimpse of eternity. Eternity is simply timelessness and infinity is the negation of all finitudes and determinations. God is Wholly Other. There is nothing and no one like Him.

Now how to bridge up the gulf between nature and God so that we may have God-Knowledge, the natural way, as envisaged by the Quran. In other words, how is natural theology possible. Nature, we have already observed, is a system of signs or symbols pointing towards God. So, knowledge of God should be a matter of interpreting these signs and giving them a meaning rather than of arriving at a conclusion on the basis of certain premises. In order to perform this interpretative function it is necessary but not sufficient that we observe well and find out in the spirit of naturalism as to how things happen. What we are required to have in addition is a cosmic vision, a cosmological insight or, in the terminology of Iqbal, the vital way of looking at the universe. The Quran aims at recalling these religious intuitions, which are possessed by all of us, into conscious awareness of man and bringing them into active operation in him. That is why one of its names is Zikr^{3 1 0} (خگن) which literally means reminder. It

is to these intuitions primarily and not to a 'scientific' study, in the usual sense of the term, that the Qur'an appeals when, for instance, it says:

See they not the clouds how they are created And the heaven, how it is raised high And the mountains, how they are fixed And the earth, how it is spread out ^{3 1 1}.

Faith in, and a continued remembrance of, God and a higher consciousness of an I-Thou relationship with Him are the essential components of this insight according to the Qur'an. It says:

This Book (i.e. The Qur'an), there is no doubt in it, is a guide to those who keep their duty, who believe in the Unseen (i.e. God)³ 12

Further,

In the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day, there are surely signs for men of understanding —Those who remember God standing and sitting and (lying) on their sides.³¹³

It is truly at this level of his attitude towards God that a scientific observer of nature can be identified with the religious seeker after the Ultimate Reality. It is at this level alone that he realises that the epatio-temporal world is not simply a three-dimensional world: it has a fourth dimension as well. "Every thing we experience in the course of our lives', says Herbert Butterfield, 'is not only what it is, it can be psychologically a symbol of something more. It is this something more that is the fourth dimension". The Quran condemns the strictly matter-of-fact type of people. It is about them that it says that their hearts are locked or sealed:

- "Do they not reflect on the Quran or are there locks on their their hearts?" 3 1 5
- "Allah has sealed their hearts and their hearing and there is covering on their eyes". 316
- "They have hearts with which they understand not, and they have eyes with which they see not and they have ears with which they hear not; nay. They are like beasts. But they are more astray (than beasts)."³¹⁷

The phrase roughly corresponding to the locking up of the heart

is 'expanding of the breast':

Whomesoever Allah intends to guide, He expands his breast for Islam.³¹⁸

This 'expansion of the breast' help the individual to develop in himself an acute vision and understanding. He begins understanding the true, esoteric meaning of the world as well as the work of God and is thus transported from finite nature to God, the Infinite. This is what Iqbal means when he says that the observation of nature sharpens our inner perception so that we can have a deeper vision of it (i.e. nature). Once we have that vision, our normal perception, our reason and understanding are thoroughly metamporphosed against new perspectives. 'Positive views of ultimate things', Iqbal rightly observes, 'are the work rather of inspiration than metaphysics'. Elsewhere indicating the inadequacy of natural-cum-rational approach to God, he quotes with approval the saying of Ibn Arabi that God is a percept as differentiated from the world which is a concept. 321

Observation of nature as the basis for God-Knowledge has been emphasized by the Quran, as shown above, due to the simple fact that nature furnishes pointers to God and suggests the right direction in which a search for Him can be fruitfully undertaken. It is only an evocative technique and simply furnishes the occasion to have a knowledge of God who thus, in spite of its relevance to Him, retains His singularity and autonomy. This can be made clear with the help of an illustration.³²² Suppose I have to bring home the existence of a circle to person who has a peculiarly developed geometry which is completely without curves. I will ask the person to draw a regular polygon with a certain number of sides. Then I shall ask him to make more polygons each time adding one side more to the last figure already drawn. If the process goes on, there generally comes sooner or later a point of disclosure. The man realizes with a flash of insight that his activity of drawing polygons with more and more of sides is leading to an absolutely new kind of figure – the circle – which he will never reach. The circle is then the 'infinite polygon'. The word 'infinite' is significant here. It implies that we may add as many sides as we like to our polygon but still the difference between the circle and the polygon nearest to it will be as wide as between the infinite and the finite. Yet, circle is definitely

relevant to the growing polygons and presides over the whole series. On the same analogy, nature is relevant to the existence of God but still it cannot be equal to Him nor can it furnish a sufficient proof for His existence.

The entire above account speaks eloquently for a need to undergo a process of self-culture on which the muslim mystics in particular have invariably laid special emphasis. Ighal, also, speaks of ego's 'gradual growth in self-possession, in uniqueness and intensity of his activity as an ego'. "The climax of this development', he says, 'is reached when the ego is able to retain full self-possession even in the case of a direct contact with the allembracing Ego". 323 So, it is only a full-grown, well-integrated ego who can afford to have personal knowledge - knowledge by acquaintance - of the Divine Being. From the very beginning, the seeker of God must learn to discipline his attitudes and be most sincere in his efforts for the realization of the ideal. Daily canonical prayers are generally begun with the declaration: I have turned my face towards Him Who created the heavens and the earth and I am not one of the polytheists'. So also the observer of nature should always have in mind the attainment of the Ultimate Truth as the grand objective of his experimentations and should never divert his attention elsewhere however strong the temptation. There is no holiday in the spiritual life of man.

God-Knowledge, which is pursued with such absorption and single-mindedness and with the discovery of the true I-amness in the back-ground, is, of course, not knowledge in the discursive or the analytical sense of the term. It is not the sort of knowledge in whose case it would be possible to make a water-tight distinction between the knower and the known and also we could understandably talk about the known object in normal everyday language. It is rather of the nature of what the Sufis call (معرفت) or gnosis where the gnostic develops a kind of unicity with God and, not very infrequently, comes out with the spontaneous eruptions like 'I am the creative truth' or 'I am holy; how great is my majesty' and so on. The distinction between discursive knowledge and gnosis can be well brought out by referring to a corresponding distinction made by Bergson between a man's knowledge of a city which he gathers from the hundreds and thousands of photographs of that city taken from all possible angles and view-points and another man's knowledge who lives in that city and roams about its

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS

streets.

Anyway, the unicity of the human ego with the Divine Ego and the spontaneous ejaculations of certain mystics in that regard can very easily be interpreted in terms of pantheism. Iqbal scrupulously guards against this interpretation. The finite ego, he holds, must remain distinct though not isolated from the Supreme Ego.³²⁴ "... unitive experience is not the finite ego effacing its own identity by some sort of absorption into the Infinite Ego; it is rather the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite".³²⁵ Talking specifically of the well-known words of Hallaj (I am the creative truth), Iqbal says: "The true interpretation of his experience... is not the drop slipping into the sea, but the realization and bold affirmation in an undying phrase of the reality and permanence of the human ego in a profounder personality."³²⁶

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NOTES

- 297 Iqbal: Lectures, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Sh. M. Ashraf, Lahore, 1977.
- 298 Ibid p. 29.
- 299 Ibid p. 28.
- 300 Ibid Second Lecture.
- 301 Iqbal, cp, cited p. 91.
- 302 Ibid, p. 57.
- 303 H. J. Paton, The Modern Predicament, pp. 193-194.
- 304 The Quran 17:72.
- 305 Ibid 2:159.
- 306 The Quran 4:95.
- 307 Ibid, 7:143.
- 308 Ibid, 6:76-80.
- 309 Ibid, 2:260.
- 310 The Quran, 21:50 etc.
- 311 Ibid, 88:17-20.
- 312 Ibid, 2:2-3.
- 313 the Quran, 3:189-190.
- 314 Quoted by C. S. Spinks, Psychology and Religion, p. 187.
- 315 The Quran, 47:24.
- 316 Ibid, Ibid, 2:7.
- 317 Ibid
- 318 Ibid, 6:126.
- 319 Iqbal, op cited, p.91.

- 320 Iqbal, cp cited p. 114.
- 321 Ibid, p. 183.
 322 It has been taken from I. T. Ramsay: Religious Language, p. 69.
- 323 Iqbal, cp. cited. pp. 117-118.
- 324 Iqbal cp. cited pp. 118. 325 Ibid, p. 110.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS

Iqbal was not only a gifted poet but also a profound thinker and a great scholar. Whether we read his poetical works or his Lectures and other Essays, we are deeply impressed by the magnitude of his intellectual powers, by the vastness of his knowledge, the breadth of his outlook and the thoroughness of his grasp of the classical as well as modern principles of religion, philosophy and science. He had pondered deeply about the highest and most fundamental problems of 'Anfus' and 'Afaq', i.e. of the inner life of man, and of the cosmos, and expressed his thoughts and experiences in a forceful poetic language which finds a ready response in the heart of his reader.


Iqbal possessed yet another characteristic of a true scholar. He always kept an open mind, ready to change his ideas and judgements according to fresh advances in human knowledge. In the preface to *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, he sets it down as the basic principle of all enquiry that:

"There is no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking. As knowledge advances, and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other views and probably sounder views than those set forth in these lectures are possible. Our duty is to carefully watch the progress of human thought, and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it" 3 2 7

How refreshingly different from the dogmatic pronouncements we usually encounter all around us!

It is quite well known that Iqbal studied philosophy at Lahore and did advanced studies and research on the subject in England and Germany. Yet like other Philosophers, he did not

present his ideas as a logical system and philosophical treatise in a coherent and integrated account, the single exception being the Lectures on Reconstruction which he wrote at the last stage of his career. The reason for devoting his whole life to higher poetry was that he had set quite different objectives and ideals for his efforts. He wanted to save the human race from the disaster and catastrophe towards which it was heading as a consequence of its total pre-occupation with material things and mechanistic way of life. He found that for achieving his objectives, poetry was far more effective than cut and dried philosophy. He has himself remarked in an eloquent verse:



i.e. "if truth is expressed in a cold language, it is philosophy; if a spark from the heart is added to it, it becomes poetry".

A misconception has spread among some of Iqbal's readers who have not gone deeply into his poetical works or his Lectures, that he set no value to scientific knowledge, and belittled the importance of reason and intellect as compared to intuition and inner experience. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The misunderstanding has been created due to a superificial reading of some of his earlier poems divorced from their context. The fact is that Iqbal found the young men of the Muslim World coming under the influence of the materialist outlook generated by Classical Physics at the end of the 19th century, and becoming indifferent to their religion and culture. He wanted to present the other side of the picture, and to show the limitations of science and of pure reason, as Kant had done before him in Germany and Berkeley in England. To remove the erroneous notion that there is no rational basis for religion or belief in God, Igbal pointed out the limited validity of the scientific knowledge in its own sphere beyond which it could not and should not be applied. The following passage from the Lectures is quite emphatic on this point:

"There is no doubt that the theories of science constitute trustworthy knowledge, because they are verifiable and enable us to predict and control the events of Nature. But we must not forget that what is called science is not a single systematic view of Reality. It is a mass of sectional views of SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS

Reality. Natural science deals with matter, with life and with mind; but the moment you ask the question: how matter, life and mind are mutually related, you begin to see the sectional character of the various sciences that deal with them, and the inability of these sciences taken singly to furnish a complete answer to your question"^{3 2 8}

This is the kind of limitation of science to which Iqbal refers in some of his verses. There are other passages in the *Lectures* where he describes the difference between the methods of science and those of philosophical theology in dealing with Ultimate Reality. He says:

"It seems that the method of dealing with Reality by means of concepts is not at all a serious way of dealing with it. Science does not care whether its electron is a real entity or not. It may be a mere symbol, a mere convention. Science can afford to ignore metaphysics altogather, and may even believe it to be a justified form of poetry, as Lange defined it, or a legitimate play of grown-ups, as Nietzsche described it." 329

However, Iqbal is not alone in describing these limitations of science. Most of the great scientists of the present century from Einstein & Planck to Heisenberg and Dirac have expressed similar ideas. For instance, Dirac has remarked that it is not correct in Science to ask the question: "What is Electricity"? One can only ask "What does Electricity"?

From these observations of Iqbal on the limitations of science, it would not be correct to conclude that he was anti-rational or opposed to science. I shall try to explain in the following paragraphs how much importance he attached to the study of science and to the scientific method.

First of all there is abundant evidence in his poetical works, in his letters, essays and personal discussions, and above all in the Lectures on Reconstruction, that he studied carefully and kept touch with the latest developments in the physical, biological and sociological sciences, and made appropriate use of them in his philosophical writings. I have referred to a few of these scientific ideas in some of my essays published previously, such as:

- (1) Iqbal's Concept of Time and Space.
- (2) Iqbal and the Problem of Free Will.
- (3) Religion and Science in Iqbal's Thought.

Iqbal's Lectures are actually full of scientific ideas taken from the diverse branches of knowledge, and applied to the problems of philosophical Theology.

To illustrate this point, a couple of passages are reproduced below:—

"Since the Middle Ages, infinite advance has taken place in the domain of human thought and experience. The extension of Man's power over Nature has given him a new faith and a fresh sense of superiority over the forces that constitute his environment. New points of view have been suggested; old problems have been restated in the light of fresh experience; and new problems have arisen. It seems as if the intellect of man is outgrowing its own most fundamental categoriestime, space and casuality. With the advance of scientific thought even our concept of intelligibility is undergoing a change. The theory of Einstein has brought a new vision of the universe and suggest new ways of looking at the problems common to both religion and philosophy". 330

The following is another instance, this time from the Biological Sciences:

"Life is then a unique phenomenon and the concept of mechanism is inadequate for its analysis. Its 'factual wholeness'.... is a kind of unity which, looked at from another point of view, is also a plurality. In all the purposive processes of growth and adaptation to its environment... it possesses a career which is unthinkable in the case of a machine.... It would therefore seem that life is foundational, and anterior to the routine of physical and chemical processes, which must be regarded as kind of fixed behavior formed during a long course of evolution" 3 3 1


And finally an example from the realm of Psychology:

"There is, however, some relief in thinking that the new

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS

German Psychology, known as (Gestalt) 'Configration Psychology', may succeed in securing the independence of Psychology as a science, just as the theory of Emergent Evolution may eventually bring about the independence of Biology. This new German Psychology teaches us that a careful study of intelligent behaviour discloses the fact of insight over and above the mere succession of sensations." ^{3 3 2}

Iqbal was not only an intelligent reader of modern scientific developments but constantly urged upon his compatriots and coreligionists to acquire mastry over the various scientific disciplines:—



i.e., "God spoke of wisdom as abundant Good. Acquire it wherever you find it: The knowledge of things is a source of power like the miracle bestowed upon the prophet Moses. Knowledge has access to the highest heaven to take the light away from the sun. It can even create bubbles in the desert and mirages in the sea".


In some other verses Iqbal urges upon the believers to conquer the forces of Nature and pierce the heavens. The universe of light, sound and colour is there to be subjugated by man and to be moulded and modified according to his needs and requirements. That is the kind of power and sovereignty which is an essential accompaniment of faith and religion:—

خنگ دونه کرگیری این جهال مشکافی سینهٔ نه آسمال دا مکت بردن جهب ان چاد شودا مقام فرد و صوت دنگ و بو دا فزوشش کم کم او مبشیس کردن دگرگون برمرادِ خوکیشس کردن محکوی خسروی این است جین فک است کوتوام دیرایست

Iqbal says that it is only through scientific knowledge that the human mind can traverse the physical world and make it subservient to his will for the development of his potentialities. It is essential that man should unravel the mysteries of Nature and conquer the world within and the Universe without:—

علم انسامان خفوندگی است علم اناسباب قویم خودی است دست زنگی کن نخون کومها د جست آب گومهراند در ما برآر صد جهان دریک فضا پوشیداند مه و دختره او پشتیاند انتخام شده کن ادبیده دا و انسا اسار ناخمی دا تا برای داری و انسان و در شده اسار برای می اسال در اسال در برای می اسال در اسال در

He asserts that nations can live a life of honour and dignity only when they acquire mastery over the sciences while holding fast to the unflinching faith and firm belief in the one and only Omniscient and Omnipotent Allah who is the Creator and Sustainer of the Universe. It is only in this way that man can become the noblest of God's creatures and his vicegerent on earth:



Recounting and explaining the importance of science, Iqbal goes one step further and proclaims that modern science which rests on observation, experimentation and systematization by means of contemplation and theorization, was created by the followers of Islam according to the technique of the Qu'ran. He says in the Lectures:—

"The one noteworthy feature of the Qu'ran is the emphasis that it lays on the observable aspect of Reality... No doubt

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS

the immediate purpose of the Quran in this reflective observation of Nature is to awaken in man the consciousness of that of which nature is regarded a symbol. But the point to note is the general empirical attitude of the Quran which engendered in its followers a feeling of reverence for the actual and ultimately made them the founders of modern science. It was a great point to awaken the empirical spirit in an age which renounced the visible as of no value in men's search after God."^{3 3 3}

Ighal points out that the Qu'ran sees signs of the ultimate Reality in the 'Sun', the 'moon', the 'lengthening out of the shadows', the 'alternation of day and night', the 'variety of human colour and tongues'. . . . in fact in the whole of Nature as revealed to the sense perception of man. It has been enjoined that the Muslim's duty is to reflect on these signs and not to pass by them as if he is deaf and blind. According to Igbal this appeal to the concrete, combined with the Qu'ranic teaching that the Universe is dynamic in its origin as well as finite and capable of increase, is the fundamental point of departure of Islamic Thought from the classical Greek Philosophy. Starting from this fact and after a searching analysis spread over a number of pages, Igbal has shown that the experimental method of modern science was discovered by the Muslim scholars. He says that although Europe has been rather slow in recognizing the Islamic origin of the scientific method, however, the fact has at last been recognised fully, and he quotes a number of historians in support of his statement.

He makes this point still more clear in his imitable verses in one of his last poems, 'Musafir':—

المحت اشاف ركى ناذميت اصل الحب زنت المجاد نيت الك اكرب في معمان ادواست الكهراز دست ما افتاد واست يون عرب اندراً روباً بركث و علم و محمت دابت در يكونس د وانداآن محمل في نشينان كاشتند طالم من افزيكيان برواشتند اين برى از شيئة اسلاف ماست باز صيرش كى اواز قاف ميت

"Modern science, which is in reality based on discovery, is not of Western Origin, but has been created by the Muslims, who have cast away this pearl. When the Arabs infiltrated Europe, they laid fresh foundations for scientific knowledge. Thus those dwellers of the desert sowed the seed and the harvest was gathered by the westerners. This fairy (science) has thus come out of the bottle belonging to our forefathers, and it is but just and fair that we should re-capture her ourselves".

I have so far given some indication of the importance Iqbal attaches to science as an agent and a tool for the conquest of Nature. I shall now turn to a description of his views about the importance of science for man's inner world or 'Anfus'.

There is a most eloquent passage in the *Lectures* where, describing the revelations of religious experience, he observes:

"Thus the view we have taken gives a fresh spiritual meaning to physical science. The knowledge of Nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour. In our observation of Nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour. In our observation of Nature we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the absolute Ego; and this is only another form of Worship". 3 3 4

Going further, Iqbal affirms that for modern man it is essential that religious knowledge should be presented to him in a scientific form. Indeed, he attaches so much importance to this point that he considers it necessary to explain it in the Preface to the Lectures:

"Moreover, the modern man by developing habits of concrete thought — habits which Islam itself fostered . . . has rendered himself less capable of that experience (i.e. the inner experience on which religious faith ultimately rests). A living experience of the kind of biological unity embodies in the verse, 'Your creation and resurrection are like the creation and resurrection of a single soul', requires today a method physiologically less violent and psychologically more suitable to a concrete type of mind. In the absence of such a method, the demand for a scientific form of religious knowledge is only natural".³³⁵

Iqbal lays the utmost emphasis on the fact that although the essence of religion is faith, yet it cannot be denied that faith is more than mere feeling, and it has something like a cognitive content. Agreeing with Whitehead that religion on its doctrinal side is a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended, Iqbal says that since the transformation and guidance of man's inner and outer life is the essential aim of religion, it is obvious that the general truths which it embodied must not remain unsettled. He goes on to say:

"In view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a rational Metaphysics. Indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience, and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself. That is why Prof. Whitehead has actually remarked that "the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism." ³³⁶

Iqbal explains further that there is no reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. In his opinion, "they spring from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps Reality piecmeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality . . . Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life". Iqbal agrees whole-heartedly when Bergson affirms that "Intuition is only a higher kind of Intellect". 3 3 7

The climax of Iqbal's evaluation of science and the rational method is reached when he observes that "the search for rational foundations in Islam may be regarded to have begun with the Prophet himself. His constant prayer was "God! grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things". Explaining the spirit of Muslim Culture he remarks that the essence of that culture lies in the development of Inductive Reason. In the earlier stages of man's evolution Psychic energy developed what may be called prophetic consciousness — a mode of economizing individual thought and choice by providing ready made judgements, choices and ways of

action. With the birth of reason and critical faculty, however, life in its own interest inhibits the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at an earlier stage of human evolution. . Inductive reason, which alone makes man master of his environment, is an achievement, and when once born, it must be reinforced by inhibiting the growth of other modes of knowledge.


In an inspired paragraph, Iqbal links the birth of Inductive Reason to the finality of the institution of Prophethood, and shows how it was inevitable and logically imperative that there should be no more Prophets after the Prophet of Islam. He says:—

"Looking at the matter from this point of view, the Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In so far as the source of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the modern world. In him life discovers other sources of knowledge suitable o its new direction. The birth of Islam . . . is the birth of inductive intellect. In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in leading stings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness man must finally be thrown back on his resources. The abolition of priesthood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Quran, and the emphasis it lays on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality. . . . Indeed, the Qu'ran regards both 'Anfus' (self) and 'Afaq' (world) as sources of knowledge. . . . The intellectual value of the idea (of finality of Prophethood) is that it tends to create an independent critical attitude towards mystic experience by generating the belief that all personal authority, claiming a supernatural origin has come to an end in the history of man. This kind of belief is a psychological force which inhibits the growth of such authority. The function of the idea (of finality) is to open up fresh vistas of knowledge in the domain of man's inner experience"3 38

Even this brief analysis is sufficient to show that Iqbal attaches a very great importance to science and scientific method.

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN IQBAL'S PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS

Although he points out that Pure Reason has its own limitations and cannot lead to an integrated and unified knowledge of Ultimate Reality, he is convinced that it is also indispensable for a rational presentation of the principles of religious knowledge for the benefit of man in this modern age. Iqbal has, therefore, come to the conclusion that the ideal solution would be to have an integration or synthesis of Faith and Reason, Intution and Intellect, Inner Experience and scientific knowledge, so that the human race can find its salvation. He affirms most emphatically that:



i.e. When Intellect is blended with Faith, it discovers Truth, and when faith is accompanied by Intellect, it acquires secure foundations. The synthesis of faith and Intellect creates a new world. Let us, therefore, create this New World by blending faith and Intellect.

It is necessary to bear in mind here that by عشق (Ishq) or Love, Iqbal means ايمان (Iman) or faith, in the spirit of to the well known verse of the Quran:

i.e. "those who believe, have the utmost 'love' for Allah"!

Finally, Iqbal concludes his Message to the West by extolling the integration and synthesis of faith and Intellect of intuition with reason for generating the kind of wisdom which penetrates the mysteries of Nature and which is akin to the Divine Intelligence, inasmuch as it combines the vision of an angel with the throb of the human heart:

عقل خود میں دگر وعقل جهاں میں دگراست بال بلبل دگر و بازو سے تناہیں دگراست دگراست دگراست در شدیب سیر گرفت نیر گراست دگراست انسو سے نیر در مثنا دن نظر سے ایسو سے پر دہ کمان فطن تخین دگرمت دگراست انسو سے نیر دہ کمان فطن تخین دگرمت

كينوش آعقل كه بينائ وعالم بااوست نورا فرسشته وسوز دل آدم با اوست

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NOTES

- 327. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam, Sh. M. Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, preface, p. vi.
- 328. Ibid, pp. 41-42.
- 329. Ibid, p. 184.
- 330. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
- 331. Ibid, p. 44.
- 332. Ibid, pp. 107-108.
- 333. Ibid, pp. 13-14.
- 334. Ibid, p. 57.
- 335. Ibid. Prefact, V.
- 336. Ibid, p. 2.
- 337. Ibid, pp. 2-3.
- 338. Ibid, pp. 126-127.

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IQBAL'S EPISTEMIC VIEWS

Iqbal's philosophy of knowledge has a special significance for his whole philosophical system in so far as it provides for its foundation. Too much stress has usually been placed on other aspects of his thought, overlooking that all these have their footing in it. His famous theory of 'ego' is based on the feeling of 'I-amness' and his philosophy of religion is embedded in a type of consciousness. Again, his poetry, both Urdu and Persian, is replete with elucidation of 'intellect', 'ishq', 'illumination', 'qalb', and their synonymous terms; especially their relative cognitive import. Unfortunately, very little work has been done on this aspect. Except for a few articles, one by Dr. L. S. May in her book "Ighal: His Life and Time" (published by Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore). a lecture delivered by Dr. H. H. Bilgramy at the Oxford University and later published in "Glimpses of Iqbal's Mind & Thought" (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf), and perhaps here and there some stray articles, not much worth the name has been written. The first notable book has just come from the present author under the title "Igbal's Philosophy of Religion" 339 based on his doctoral thesis entitled "Iqbal's Philosophy of Knowledge", submitted to the University of the Punjab in 1968. It deals with genuineness and cognitive import of religious experience, as discussed by Dr. Muhammad Iqbal. It may be added here that Iqbal was not an epistemologist and he never claimed to propound a theory of knowledge, which has to be extracted from his writings. In his epistemological views he drew inspiration from the findings of the modern epistemologists, and also from the Quran which is a great book of knowledge. Igbal extended the application of epistemological principles, enunciated in perception, to the realm of religion, showing how well they apply there. He differed with the commonly held view that religious knowledge was something veird

and mysterious, and hence incapable of verification. He rather emphasised that religious knowledge was amenable to the selfsame kind of verification as other kinds of knowledge. His great contribution to religion lies in bringing it closer to ordinary forms of knowledge, shearing off its uncommon tinge. To me, what is really to his credit is his analysis of thought which is more thorough than any put forward before him, because he does not acquiesce in confining it to discursive thought alone as done by the epistemologists in general. There is no doubt that S. K. Langer in "Philosophy in a New Key" 1340 has come to emphasise presentational sense of thought, but it is much later and still falls short of Igbal's analysis. However, the above confinement was first imposed by Kant, who denied 'inellectual intuition'341 to man, and the whole line of epistemologists ensuing from his tradition followed him doggedly. Iqbal brings home other applications of thought³⁴² also, where thought is able to transcend the pale of phenomenon into the realm of 'noumenon' the infinite. From this extension some very important metaphysical implications ensue. which are going to from the main fabric of my article.

Ighal agrees with Kant in his basic presumptions, viz., (i) that knowledge is 'sense-perception elaborated by understanding^{3 4 3} and (ii) 'the character of man's knowledge is conceptual '3 4 4 These two presumptions necessarily involve that human knowledge has two elements: viz., (a) the data or 'given', and (b) thought or understanding which organises the data into knowledge proper. This is true, says Igbal, of all human knowledge, including religious knowledge. Knowledge has a 'rational' and a 'non-rational' element, which must coordinate to generate complete cognition. As modern epistemology tells us, the non-rational element rises from external sources, i.e., external objects in the case of senseperception; while the rational element, as Kant has most thoroughly inquired in his famous Critique. 345 is the internal or subjective working of the various faculties of the mind itself. Kant proceeded to distinguish between, what he called, 'sensible intuition' 346 and 'intellectual intuition', and on the basis of his agnostic leanings came to declare that the latter was not possessed by man. Consequently, man could only know phenomena. This conclusion of Kant is surely debatable and a petitio principii; and Iqbal, in company of the majority of mystics and drawing inspiration from the Quran, oversteps the boundaries set by modern epistemology.

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IQBAL'S EPISTEMIC VIEWS

He acquiesces in the Kantian position followed by his disciples in the field of religion also, that discursive thought plays no part in religious knowledge, for it is incapable of reaching the infinite. But he agrees only to that extent, for his analysis of thought is more thorough than any of the Kantian epistemologists. His analysis reveals three potencies of thought: viz., (i) thought in its discursive potency, (ii) thought in its practical potency, and (iii) thought in its deeper movement. The Kantians, as the students of Western philosophy are well aware, recognise only the first two potencies. Kant wrote two *Critiques*, one on each of the two potencies. With the denial of 'intellectual intuition', ipso facto, the third potency of thought found no place in his system.

In his theory of knowledge, again, Igbal disagrees with the basic positivist assumptions: viz., (i) sense-experience is the only genuine from of experience, 348 and (ii) the word 'fact' is applicable to natural phenomena only, to phenomena which C. B. Martin discribes as 'public and neutral', 349 The first assumption has already lost ground in view of the findings of the Freudian psychologists, who have brought home the importance of subconscious and unconscious processes of the mind. 350 It may be added that this illumination did not come with the Freudians, for such processes had already been recognised by Spinoza, 351 nay, centuries ago by that great Muslim thinker al-Farabi (258/870 - 339/950), 352 but it were the psycho-analysts who brought it to prominence in the present century. Ever since the modern epistemologists^{3 5 3} have come to acknowledge other forms of consciousness and other kinds of objects of knowledge amenable to human research and industry. Quite lately, the greatest amount of light on the mystical recesses of the mind has been shed by the International Society for Psychical Research. One of the most interesting subjects of study today is the dream experiences³⁵⁴ and the nature of their objects. Igbal, however, in his avowal of other forms of consciousness is more philosophical and empirical, because he appeals to the testimony of thousands of mystics of all ages and countries^{3 5 5} that there are 'potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness', 356 and that 'these types of consciousness open up possibilities of life-giving and knowledge-yielding experience. This is a great advance over the traditional view of knowledge.

This extensive and comprehensive view of knowledge was first advocated by the Holy Quran, which emphasised three sources of knowledge, viz., Nature, History and 'Qalb' or Intuition.358 The instrument of the former two is Intellect, while Qalb is the internal source of illumination. These sources of knowledge, to Iqbal, are not discrete and isolated; rather they are complementary to each other, 359 and none can afford complete knowledge without a unison of the others. There is no rift between 'head' and the 'heart' as the sources of knowledge. The two are organically-related — nay, as says Iqbal in the Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid, 360 they spring from the same root and are two facets of the same light. Thus, the two sources of knowledge spring from the same root, and do not go counter to each other unless interfered with. Even a complete trace of a mystic, says Iqbal' 'does not mean a complete break with serial time'. 361 Intellect is important because it affords a knowledge of the observable aspects of reality, which says Iqbal, lives in its own appearances.^{3 6 2} This knowledge of the observable is indispensable to a complete vision of the real; it is a necessary stage in the spiritual uplift of man. But for a collaboration of the internal and external sources of knowledge, no full and comprehensive illumination of reality is possible. It is keeping this fact is view that Dr. Jamila Khatoon remarks that 'In his theory of knowledge, sense-perception, reason and intuition, all are combined in an organic whole. He knew full well that light from one direction alone could not illuminethe whole of reality in all its manifestations.'363 Reliance on any one of these sources alone can afford an incomplete and one-sided vision, and engenders ills peculiar to it. The East and the West, says Iqbal, are clearly separated in respect of their reliance on any one of these sources. As Iqbal says in Javid Name, 'For Westerners intelligence is the stuff of life, for Easterners love is the mystery of all being". 364

Iqbal traces the ills of the West back to its over-rationalism and excessive intellectualism. They have given birth to materialism and atheism, and as a result'... the embers of the West are cold; their eyes can see, their heart is dead'. Commenting on the excesses of reason in the West Iqbal says, Reason is a chain fettering this present age: where is a restless soul such as I possess, It is because of the fact that the West has lost the restless soul that it is in the present explosive situation. He disagrees with

the idea advocated by Russell and other rationalists in Europe that intellect has brought man to the verge of an imminent catastrophe, and that only reason can save him from this situation. Iqbal contends that 'wholly over-shadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, the modern man has ceased to live soulfully. i.e., from within. In the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless egoism and his infinite gold-hungers which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and brining him nothing but life-weariness'. 367 This has been confirmed by Aldous Huxley who similarly remarks on the situation of the modern man thus, 'Most men and women lead lives at worst so painful, at the best so monotonous, poor and limited that the urge to escape......, is and has always been one of the principle appetites of the soul'.368 The renowned modern psychoanalyst Erick Fromm, in his book The Sane Society, 369 has depicted no other picture of the modern man and has agreed to impute this sitution to the present material development. His findings are very interesting and informative. Excessive rationalism can beget nothing but materialism and atheism, the two principal causes of the abnoxious conditions obtaining in the West, especially in the developed countries. It has produced a state of perpetual conflict and strife, and led to self-estrangement and forlornness. Over intellectualism has brought man face to face with an explosive situation, which Iqbal describes in Javid Name thus, 'Man's chronicle both in the East and West narrates a single tale; the tale of war and strife for land'.370

An exclusive reliance on Qalb or inner experience also does not retrieve the situation a whit for it is equally one-sided and generates its own ills. It begets traditional pantheism and in extreme cases leads to nihilism. It encourages escape from the world of hard facts into a realm of phantasy, and it led to the doctrine of 'wahdatul wajud' in the East, and to monasticism in the West. It renders man unfit for a manful life, and produces 'resignedness' and 'introversion', the two states of mind which Iqbal condemns. Iqbal stresses the need for grappling with life, for eternal life is in this sturggle, he says in *Payam-i-Mashriq*. ^{3 7 1} Not to speak of a reclusive life, he condemns even meditation in seclusion, and refers to the Islamic emphasis on congregational prayer. He says in

Javid Name, even search for truth in isolation is sinful, and one should seek in the company of seekers.³⁷² He further stresses, 'Solitude begets desire and search, congregation affords vision; solitude brings proximity to God, company bestows power and sovereignity'. 373 Iqbal advocates an intensely active and practical style of life. Even religion and knowledge have a great practical import, to him. He criticises Christianity, on the ground that the affirmation of spirit cannot come by 'the renunciation of external forces which are already permeated by the illumination of spirit, but by a proper adjustment of man's relation to these forces in view of the light received from the world within'.374 Iqbal condemns renunication of the world as cowardice and a means of escape. He expresses the same thing in his Lectures thus, 'the life is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion'. The environment is indispensable to ego-development, for which even enemy and Satan are very important, says Ighal. The society is a boon or blessing to the human ego. The development of ego is not possible in isolation, which kills the higher nature and potentialities of man. The importance of society to man he expresses in Ramuz-i-Bekhudi, where he calls it 'rehmat'3 76 for the individual, and in Darb-i-Kalim, where he denies that the ego can develop in monasteries.^{3 7 7} He condemns Plato's philosophy and Hafiz's poetry, and pseudo-mysticism because they teach the lesson of inaction and flight from the society. Ighal himself, after the publication of Asrar-i-Khudi in 1915, devoted more attention to society of 'millat' and to the principles which conduce to the emergence and growth of a true community. In one of his letters to (late) Dr. Hadi Hasan, he regretted his having published Asrar-i-Khudi, because he was afraid his doctrine of self would be largely misconceived.378 However, he did not over-stress this doctrine in his later works, rather he assigned to Individual and Community an equal treatment. As Prof. A. J. Arberry has very acutely remarked; Iqbal 'was not interested merely in the individual and his selfrealisation; he was equally concerned with the evolution of an ideal society, or community. To him, individual cannot retain himself apart from the community; his very existance owes to the presence of a community, like a wave which owes its very existence to the ocean to which it belongs. 380

Divining the ills of the East, Iqual particularly condemns, imitation and plagiarism. By blindly following into the footsteps of the West, it is falling into the same pitfalls. Imitation and dogged following have wrested the originality and research from the bosom of the oriental scholars, who are getting tailor-made knowledge from their counterparts in the West. And what is more to regret, the Eastern scholar plumes himself on his bondsmanship of the West. In Javid Nama Iqbal regrets that 'The Turks, Iranians, Arabs lie benumbed with Europe's noose around their throats'. 381 He adds that the west has wrecked the East with its Imperialism and has bedimmed its flame of faith with its Socialism'. 382 Consequently, two major ills have befallen the East: (i) disintegration and weakening of the ego, which are consequent upon asking and plagiarism; and (ii) the breaking up of the community or 'millat' into countries and terrotiries. As early as 1903 in Baang-i-Dara. Iqbal preferred suicide to imitation.³⁸³ In man imitation kills all aspiration and zest for research, and deadens his heart (i.e., inner illumination, which flows from original research and industry). He advises that 'khudi' is a very rare belonging of man, which should not be spoiled through plagiarism. It is inimical to 'fagr' also, one of the greatest Eastern — rather Islamic virtues. Dr.A. Schimmel, the famous orientalist from Germany, and a scholar on Iqbal, rightly observes that 'imitation 'taqlid' is considered by Igbal the negative complement of 'fagr', since it weakens and even destroys the ego'. 384 Iqbal urges himself in his Lectures. 'Conservatism is as bad in religion as in any other department of human activity. It destroys the ego's creative freedom and closes up the paths of fresh spiritual enterprise'. 385

Imitation is detrimental to the make-up of the society also. It disintegrates the society as well as the individual. Iqbal accuses the lords of the West for having taught the concept of 'country'³⁸⁶ to a people not previously conversant with it. The people of the East, especially the Muslims, with faith in their bosoms, were familiar with the higher ideal of humanity only; it was the Western impact which has dividided them into, Iqbal regrets, Syria, Palestine and Iraq. The West is trying for unity among its ranks, while it is dividing the people of 'tauhid' into races and countries.³⁸⁷ The East cannot expect anything from the West except its Imperialism, Socialism, and recialism, which have encouraged hatred between man and man, and a consequent strife and struggle for

supremacy. While discussing the Western impact on the East, Iqbal fears that it is seducing the East from itself, that is, from its essence and inheritance. He suggests in Javid Nama that what the East requires is an incisive criticism of the Western culture rather than its blind following. 388 The East is in possession of much better systems, and in this connection Iqual alludes to the Quranic teachings which, even Goethe in his Conversations with Eckermann, was force to appreciate in the following words, 'you see that nothing is wanting in this doctrine; that with all our systems we have got no further; and that, generally speaking, no one can get further'. 389 In this passage lies an unreserved apprecaition of the system propounded by the Quran. The real position is that, as realised by Goethe, the West is looking for something in the East, after getting disillusioned with their own systems and 'isms'. This fact was expressed by Bertrand Russell also in his Re-awakening of the East, and which is practically manifesting itself as indicated by their greater interest in Eastern thought and practices, e.g., the Indian 'yoga', sufi practices; and the growing interest they are showing in the works of Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, 390 the Persian sage, and Allama Idbal, the poet-philosopher of Pakistan and whose Centenary we have assembled here to celebrate. How funny it is that we are looking to the West for guidance, who are themselves groping for something in the East. It is like a half-blind man looking for guidance to a full blind man. You can well imagine the kind of guidance which the latter can render. Iqbal advises that we should cut out our own path, because treading the path of others is a sin; if we commit a sin with our own effort, it is better than a borrowed virtue. 391 He adds that it is by nature that we yearn originality and desire to create a new world out of the old one^{3 9 2} (meliorism). To him, vehemence and creativity are the very marks of true life.393

Iqbal concludes that life cannot be full and vision complete unless Intellect and Intuition combine; it is from their amalgamation that a true vision ensues, and a new world is 'spawned'. In Javid Nama he says, 'If reason be divorced from love, then knowledge is about Satan's progeny; . . .'³⁹⁴ and again that 'Love-led can reason claims the Lord and reason-lit love strikes firm roots. When integrated these two draw the pattern of a different world'. ³⁹⁵ The fusion of the two, he adds, bestows power, vision and sovereignty — in short, 'faqr'³⁹⁶ as inculcated by the

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IQBAL'S EPISTEMIC VIEWS

Ouran. In the Gulshan-i-Raz Jadid 397 Iabal stresses that it is sin to get illumination through only one source, for it would detract one from the true path which can be found through the two sources combined, pushing one into antinomies (as Kant said) and inconsistencies. As said before, the West is too much engrossed in the external world, ignoring completely the internal side of reality; the East, on the other hand, is more given to the internal world, ignoring outward manifestations of reality altogether. The West, so much engrossed in empiricism and materialism, was disillusioned with the boons of reason after the World War II. There was a very strong feeling that their prevalent plight was due to the misdeeds of the Nazis and the Communists, and that the remedy lay in a return to Christianity. This feeling was not unfounded altogether because faithlessness, as Iqbal also acknowledges, had certainly brought man to the verge of catastrophe. The rationalists like Bertrand Russell, however, combated this feeling on the ground that a return to traditional Christianity would bring in its wake all the ills of obscurantism and mutual mistrust, rather than remedying the prevalent ills. Igbal will agree with Russell in so far as a return to traditional and orthodox religion is concerned; but he will not agree with his Welsh contemporary that the cure lies in a more of reason. To him, it rather lies in accepting true religion which is, unlike Freud, not a dogma or a ritual; but a 'vital act'. 398 In its true sense, it is 'neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man', 399 Such a concrete notion of religion, presents a good fusion of thought and intuition and, in this sense, it can go a long way, he believes, to salvage the human situation.

Iqbal understands religion at three different levels. 400 (i) the level of 'faith' or discipline and obedience, which is the level of the common believer; (ii) the level of 'thought' or understanding, at which 'religious life seeks its foundation in a kind of metaphysics'; and (iii) the level of 'discovery', which is the level of original research and may be called 'mysticism', though with certain reservations. In the last sense, religion is 'essentially a mode of actual living' and 'can alone ethically prepare the modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves, ... '401 To Iqbal, 'The basic perception from which religious life moves forward is the present slender unity of the ego, his liability to dissolution, his amenability to re-formation and his capacity for an ampler freedom to

create new situations in known and unknown environments'. 402 With this perception as the starting-points, and with the goal in view which is the integration of personality, religion can prepare man to salvage his present explosive situation. The true religion is very practical, and brings out and develops the latent capacities of man. Through fortification of the ego, it prepares man even for the most crucial tests, of which the highest test is facing the 'ultimate reality' without flinching or withdrawing; and in the history of mankind, it was in the person of Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) that humanity reached that optimum development in which he could see God face to face with a smile on his lips (i.e., 'mi'raj').403 This level of development is not amenable either through intellect alone or through intuition alone; it is possible only through a right fusion of both thought and intuition. Such a fusion will beget a religion which arises in revelation, but finds its justification in thought; it is the rationally-based religion. By a rationally-based religion Iqbal does not mean a rationalistic religion like Calvanism or Quakerism which had no revealed basis. In fact, he is looking for a religion which has orginated in revelation, but has a rational basis; . . . He says, 'Humanity needs three things today — a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis'404 Only a true religion can provide for these three basic needs of humanity, says Iqbal.

To sum up, then, Iqbal believes that the ravages of reason can only be remedied through its fusion with intuition, which will afford a full vision of the real and enable man a better adjustment to his environment, ensuring him better survival in this world as well as in the world to come. To emphasise either thought or intuition-alone will lead to inimical consequences, as discussed above. Religion, in the highest sense, alone can ensure the requisite fusion, and in this sense it is no mere dogma or ritual, but a genuine experience capable of yielding vision and guidance man needs today. Of all the systems known to the world, only true religion (which is Islam in this case) can guarantee such a complete vision and guidance, because it reveals those three ultimte ideas which alone can produce the requisite understanding in man which will enable him to transcend all racialism, apartheid and petty nationalism, and teach him the noblest principles of equality, fraternity and justice.

METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS OF IQBAL'S EPISTEMIC VIEWS

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IQBAL AND TASSAWWUF

There are three modes of acquiring knowledge and these are: sense-perception, intellect or reason, and intuition. Knowledge acquired through sense-perception is demonstrable, through reason objective, and through intuition highly subjective and personal. Mysticism or Tassawwuf falls in the third category and the form of knowledge acquired through it is technically called gnosis. It is not possible to define Tassawwuf in rational terms except that it is longing of man's soul for a personal contact with God. However, according to Muslim philosophers and *Ulema* it is defined as knowledge gained through waidan or kashf (intuition) of life and universe as well as the Reality behind them which is technically called irfan or ma'rifat (gnosis). The seeker of such knowledge, the wayfarer, is called salik, the method of acquiring gnosis is called saluk and the specific way adopted for the realization of the objective is called maslak or tarigah. The one who possesses gnosis is called arif as distinguished from alim.

The mystics or sufis themselves have given different definitions of a *sufi*. According to Ma'ruf Karkhi, a *sufi* captures Reality, comprehends the events which flow therefrom and is unconcerned with what is in possession of the created beings. In the eyes of Dhun-Noon Misri a *sufi* is the one who likes only Allah in the whole of universe. Junaid has stated that a *sufi*'s

Islamic Sufism, as a movement of spiritual purification, is both sacred and transcendental. The author has used the terms "mysticism" and "gnosis" in this paper not in their Western connotation for mysticism may be sacred as well as profane and gnosis implies immanence of God, but in the Islamic connotation of Sufism.

heart detests the world and he only obeys the Ordinances of Allah. According to Abubakr Shibli a *sufi* is separated off from the created universe and is attached only to Truth (Haqq).

It is still a matter of speculation as to how the term sufi entered Islamic culture. Some derive it from the word safa (piety). The others trace its origin from the Ashab-i-Suffa. Still others are of the view that the term is derived from suf i.e. coarse woollen cloak usually worn by the dervaishes who kept themselves away from worldly affairs and were concerned only with God. The Western critics of Islam maintain that Jesus Christ always wore a coarse woollen cloak, and following him, numerous Christian hermits, who had renounced the world, were spread out in the territories of Islam and that it was through them that Tassawwuf entered the Islamic way of life as an alien element. However, according to sufis themselves the sources of Tassawwuf are the Quran, Traditions of the Prophet and Techings of Islam. In their view Tassawwuf means reflection of the qualities and assimilation of the ethics of the Prophet. In this connection withdrawal of the Prophet to the Cave of Hera for meditation and solitude has been frequently mentioned as the state of Tassawwuf or (mystic consciousness) which had preceded the state of Nabuwwat (prophetic consciousness).

Tassawwuf or mysticism is the purely spiritual aspect of every religion. In the early phase of Islam no sufi is found. But by the end of the Umayyad dynasty or the beginning of the Abbasid period, when too much emphasis was laid by the theologians on the formal or ritualistic aspect of Islam or hair-splitting debates were held by the jurists for elaborating Figh (Jurisprudence) in order to resolve the worldly matters and the philosophers became concerned exclusively with the development of rational sciences, Tassawwuf appeared in order to protect and preserve the spirit of Islam by leading the people from mere appearance (zahir) to the inner perception of Reality (batin). Thus, Tassawwuf emerged as a protest or reaction against formalism, rationalism and hypocricy so that the fire of ishig (love) was rekindled in the hearts of men. In this connection the story associated with the woman saint, Rabia Basri, is worth quoting. She was seen carrying a bowl of water in one hand and a burning piece of wood in the other. People asked her as to what she was doing. She replied that with the water she intended to

put out the fire of Hell and with the burning piece of wood she wanted to set fire to Heaven so that men could be released from the fear of punishment or the joy of reward and base their actions purely on the love of God for God's sake.

The other view is that Tassawwuf originally emerged as a result of political and social disillusionment which followed the replacement of the early Islamic Republic of the Rightly Guided Caliphs by the Umayvad dynasty. During that period emphasis was laid on withdrawal from the community by such ascetics as Hassan Basri and Wasil ibn Ata, although they were not called *sufis*. The presence of Christian hermits, particularly their mode of life and not their religious ideas, also influenced Tassawwuf in the early stages of its development. Eventually Tassawwuf stood for renunciation of the world and spiritual unification of the sufi with God. The other-worldliness in Tassawwuf obscured the vision of Muslims of Islam as a social polity, and as it offered the prospect of isolation as well as unrestrained meditation, in those times of political and social unrest, it attracted and gradually absorbed the best minds in the world of Islam.

In the early phase Tassawwuf was based on piety and asceticism and it stood for renunciation of the world. In the process of its further development it adopted fana (complete annihilation in God) and baga (survival in God), as its cardinal principles. Thereafter, it developed its own cosmology, metaphysics as well as ethics and presented itself as a complete system. Gradually numerous orders of tarigahs of sufis were founded and scattered in far off lands. These orders rendered considerable service in winning over converts for Islam through their spiritual teachings. In the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent alone by the times of Akbar there were in existence more than fourteen Tarigahs including the famous Nagshbandiyah, Suhrawardiyah, Qadiriyah and Chishtiyah. At a later stage Tassawwuf was also affected by such alien influences as Christian monasticism, Neo-Platonism, Hindu Vedantic philosophy which regarded life and universe as maya or deception of reason. Buddhism as well as Persian mysticism or Manichaeism.

The Tariqahs reflected different trends. Some of the sufis impressed the people through the karamat (spiritual feats) and preached the novices to purify their selves. Some of them strictly

followed the law of *Shariah*, whereas the others preferred *Tariqat* (meditation). Some laid stress on *fana* (annihilation) or *wisal* (unification) whereas the others emphasized *baqa* (survival). Some remained constantly in a state of lamentation and sorrow, whereas the others had smiling faces as if they were in a state of perpetual bliss. Some remained in a condition of *sukr* (intoxication), others in a state of *jazb* (absorbed in God), giving the impression as if they were mad men. Sufis belonging to the *Jalali Tariqahs* reflected the wrath of God whereas the *Qalandariyah* danced in circles.

The transformation of Tassawwuf from a purely spiritual or religious experience to a gnostic theosophic system took place in the hands of Ibn-i-Arabi, who is responsible for having introduced the concept of Wahdat-al-Wujud (Untity of Being or essential monism) in Tassawwuf. According to him there existed no distinction between the creator and the created, the essence and the attributes, the lover and the beloved or the worshipper and the worshipped. The multiplicity of forms or beings was merely an outward manifestation of the unique Divine substance. Thus all was Him, for, under the doctrine of hulul (fusion), He was present in Unity, Duality, Trinity as well as Plurality (kathrat). The instinctive quest of the created beings was to annihilate themselves totally in order to accomplish eternal union with Him, and since this had been pre-ordained, the created universe was determined. The teachings of Ibn-i-Arabi exerted tremendous influence on Tassawwuf for the sufis who followed him interpreted Tawhid (Dogma of the Unity of God) in wujudi terms. The teachings laid stress on renunciation of the world, quietism, annihilation of the self and led to the development of what has been termed Monastic Tassawwuf. Under the spell of Ibn-i-Arabi's doctrines most of the sufi orders abandoned the strict observance of the Shariah law and went to the extent of advocating that the created universe was merely a dream, the created universe as well as life would suddenly cease to be or would completely dissove itself into nothingness.

There was indeed a reaction against the teachings of Ibn-i-Arabi as is evident from the writings of Ibn-i-Taimiyyah and Sheikh Ahmad of Sirhind who regarded his doctrines as heretical and opposed to Islamic teachings. The main objection was that if there existed no distinction between the Creator and the

created, the lover and the beloved or the worshipper and the worshipped, then in the absence of I-Thou relationship, neither love was possible nor worship. Again, even the longing for ultimate union necessitated the existence of distinction or separation (firag). Further, if the created universe was determined, then in absence of free-will, the reality of Good and Evil Iman and Kufr or Reward and Punishment became meaningless. Love and worship required the existence of I-Thou or personal relationship between man and God and if such relationship was nonexistent, then love or worship lost its significance altogether. Sheikh Ahmad of Sirhind advanced the concept of Wahdat-as-Shuhud (testimonial monism) as opposed to Wahdat--al-Wujud and thus laid emphasis on the transcendental God, distinct from His attributes as well as the created universe. According to the Sheikh, all was not Him, but all was from Him. In the light of the teachings of the Sheikh, Naashbandiyah-Mijaddidiyah Tarigah interpreted Tawhid in shuhudi terms and emphasized that the God of Islam is personal as well as transcendental and that the created beings can never be absorbed in Him. They must, therefore have Faith in the Unseen and obey His commands for the only relationship which exists between man and God is that of abd and ma'bud (the worshipper and the worshipped). The order lays stress on strict observance of the Shariah law for the interpretation of which resort can be made to the *Ulema* and jurists.

Any-way, despite the fundamental difference between the aforementioned two main currents in *Tassawwuf*, Persian poetry or literature was deeply influenced by the concept of *Wahdat-al-Wujud* and as the Persian model had been followed in the subcontinent, Muslim poetry and literature, generally speaking, was *wujudi* oriented, and traditional *Tassawwuf* came to be regarded or identified as *Wujudi Tassawwuf*.

A brief outline of *Tassawwuf* was necessary for understanding Iqbal's attitude towards it. Some critics of Iqbal are of the view that he was anti *Tassawwuf*. But a correct assessment of Iqbal's ideas respecting *Tassawwuf* depends on the way how *Tassawwuf* is interpreted.

Iqbal descended from a family which was profoundly religious. His Brahmanic ancestor, Lol Hajj, who had embraced Islam in the fourteenth century was one of the eminent Sheikhs of the Tariqah-i-Rishian in Kashmir during the reign of Sultan

Zainul Abedin. Some of his ancestors were practicing sufis and one of them is even stated to have written a book on *Tassawwuf*. Iqbal's own father had a deep involvement with traditional *Tassawwuf*, and probably, under his influence, Iqbal was affiliated with the *Qadiriyah Tariqah* since his Childhood.

Before the publication of Asrar-i-Khudi in 1915, one notes that Iqbal remained tied up with Wujudi Tassawwuf and based his ideas on pantheism. Even during his stay in Europe as a student, he appears to have followed the traditional pantheistic interpretation of the thought of Jalaluddin Rumi and of Mansur Hallaj. However, after his return from Europe Igbal realized that pantheism was only one aspect of Rumi's thought and he started to reveal him, no longer as an exponent of all-embracing pantheism, but as an ardent advocate of passionate love between man and a personal God. His view on Hallaj had also undergone a change. Hallaj is stated to have uttered the cry anal-hagg (I am the creative Truth), and its accepted interpretation, in terms of pantheisticmonistic doctrine of Ibn-i-Arabi, was the alteration of the word al-haqq into haqq so as to mean: 'I am Truth. I am the mystery of God's Truth in the visible form'. In the eyes of Hallaj himself, however, union with the Divine did not result in the annihilation or destruction of personality of the sufi but the experience made him more perfect. Rumi describes this unio-mystica by using the traditional iron and fire symbol. When iron is thrown into fire, its colour takes the colour of fire and iron cries: 'I am fire. you can touch me and feel that I am really fire'. But that only means a union of attributes and not a real fusion, because iron remains materially and factually iron, although it has taken the heat and colour of fire. Ighal writes that the contemporaries of Hallaj and his successors interpreted his words pantheistically, but "the martyr saint could not have meant to deny the transcendence of God. The true interpretation of his experience, therefore is, not a drop slipping into the sea, but the realization and bold affirmation in an undying phrase of the reality and permanence of the human ego in a profounder personality" 405

The impression that Iqbal was against *Tassawwuf* gained currency after the publication of the first edition of *Asrar-i-Khudi* in 1915, which contained verses bitterly criticising the concept of life as advanced by Hafiz, the renowned Persian

poet. Iqbal had expressed the opinion that if literary standard was Beauty for Beauty's sake, be its result useful or pernicious, then Hafiz belonged to the best poets of the world. Dr. Annemarie Schimmel while commenting on Iqbal's opinion regarding Hafiz, writes: "In this sentence lies also the root of his criticism. The Asrar had been written as a protest of 'Arabic' Islam against the Platonizing and Persianizing philosophy of medieval and largely of modern Islam, as a challenge against the monism which permeates Persian Poetry." 406

Iqbal had also been critical of Ibn-i-Arabi and his concept of Wahdat-al-Wujud. In a letter written in 1919 he observed that if through Tassawwuf was intended the purification of soul by way of religious experience (as was accomplished in the early stages of its development), then no Muslim could have any objection to it. But when under the influence of alien ideas Tassawwuf aimed at becoming a philosophy or laid down theories of spontaneous discovery as to what was the Essence of God or as to how the universe was formed, then his spirit rebelled against it. 407

It is evident that Iqbal had rejected Wujudi Tassawwuf primarily because it laid stress on renunciation of the world or annihilation of the self and had reduced the personal God of Islam to an undescribable neutrum. Iqbal's main object was to accomplish a revival in Islam. He, therefore, went back to the highly personal or original Quranic God and rediscovered the I-Thou relationship between man and God. Early Tassawwuf was based on and had affirmed this personal relationship. But subsequently the utterances and writings of most of the eminent sufis had been interpreted in wujudi terms by the followers of Ibn-i-Arabi and thus the Muslim masses came to regard the wujudi concept of Tawhid as the anthetic interpretation of Islam.

Iqbal had perceived the psychological difference between the prophetic and mystic types of consciousness. He wrote: "The mystic does not wish to return from the repose of 'unitary experience'; and even when he does return, as he must, his return does not mean much for mankind at large. The Prophet's return is creative. He returns to insert himself into the sweep of time with a view to control the forces of history and thereby to create a fresh world of ideals". 408 To Iqbal,

therefore, the prophetic type of consciousness which transformed the world at large by creating a new cultural order had a greater significance for humanity than the mystic consciousness.

At this stage it may be useful to give a brief summary of the metaphysical ideas of Iqbal. He considers God as a personality, vigorously alive and constantly willing, and he prefers to call Him by His personal name Alla.i. God is the Ultimate Ego whose infinity is intensive and not extensive, and His existence is established by intution, not by reason. He is continuously creative, goes on adding to His creation and is capable of changing His mind. From God conceived as the Ultimate Ego only egoes proceed. Therefore, the universe from the mechanical movement of the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in human ego is a self-revelation of the 'Great I am'. Thus the universe is one continuous act of God and it is not a block universe or a finished product, immobile or incapable of change. There is no distinction between mind and matter except that of the degree of egohood. Man is distinguishable from the universe because, in the process of creation, he, as an act of God, has become self-conscious. He, as a finite ego and as a personality, is unique and distinct from God. He is free, his desires and aspirations are exclusively his, and even God cannot feel, judge or choose for him when more than one course of action are open to him. He is potentially a creative activity and if he takes the initiative, he has a capability of becoming co-worker and cocreator with God in the process of progressive change.

Life after death cannot be claimed by man as of right. He has to earn it through the fortification of his ego or personality. Hell is not a pit of everlasting torture, nor is Heaven a holiday. These are merely corrective experiences. There is no end to the activity of man as he always marches onward to receive ever fresh illumination from the Ultimate Ego. Each and every act of man creates a new situation and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding. Man and God are highly dynamic personalities, distinct from each other and yet together. The example of sub-mergence of the drops of water into the Ocean only applies to those who fail to fortify their selves and are unable to stand the shock of death. But the egoes which can fortify themselves move and have their being like

pearls in the perpetual flow of the Divine Sea. Their separate existence is never obliterated but they are held by the All-Embracing Ultimate Ego within Himself just as the flames of candles retain their separate and distinct existence in the over-powering light of the sun. Life, therefore, is a constant struggle for the drop to attain pearlhood and the destination of man is not emancipation from the limitation of individuality but a more precise definition of it.

The creative acticity of God appears outwardly as a process of change in serial time, but in reality the change is a continuous act in durational time. Thus the universe continues to be in a state of 'permanence-in-change'. The relativity or objectivity of atomic time has been deliberately created by God as a device to test or measure the creative activity of man. Human acts, if performed by a fortified personality, are creative and live as permanent forces unaffected by serial time. All other human efforts are ultimately bound to perish by the remorseless rolling on of time. Consequently, man is essentially a spiritual being realizing himself in space-time. He can be properly perceived only as a living force possessing rights and duties in a social organism. Unique individuals must constitute a unique society, a society which possesses a well-defined creed and has a capability to enlarge its limits by example and persuation. In the opinion of Iqbal, Islam succeeded in establishing such a society by laying stress on the importance of community along with the individuals who constituted the same. Hence his ideas on individual and collective ego were founded on the Ouranic conception of a perfect Muslim and the Islamic society.

The ethical values which can be derived from the metaphysics of Iqbal are such attributes as Love (ishq), Freedom (hurriyat), Courage (shuja'at) and Supreme Distinterestedness respecting the acquisition of material comforts or wealth (faqr). The cultivation of such attributes results in the fortification of man's personality. The acts of such a man are creative and everlasting for he is co-worker and co-creator with God.

According to Iqbal, Love is the basic inner quality which sustains faith and thus unifies and harmonises the thought and activity of man. It hightens the intensity of desire and is free in essence. Defining Love, Iqbal maintains: "The word is used in a very wide sense and means the desire to assimilate and to

absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realize them. Love individualizes the lover as well as the beloved. The effort to realize the most unique individuality individualizes the seeker and implies the individuality of the sought for nothing else would satisfy the nature of the seeker". Hence the traditional agony of separation (firaq) is transformed into the joy of distinctness in Iqbal's concept of Love. As is evident, for him Love is free, dynamic and creative.

The factors which destroy man's personality, according to Iqbal, arise from stagnation, the opposite of creative activity. Stagnation gives birth to passive virtues such as humility, submission and obedience as well as to fear, corruption, cowardice begging or asking not only for the means of livlihood but also for ideas from the others, imitating and finally servitude.

From this analysis of Iqbal's thought, it is clear that he approved of only that Tassawwuf which was founded on the Quranic-conception of Tawhid, believed in the personal God of Islam, maintained the basic distinction between man and God (Firag) at every station of spiritual progress, respected man's freedom of will, preached fortification of man's ego and its survival (baga), upheld Love as a dynamic and creative force, accepted the realities of life and endeavoured to reform the world. He, therefore, rejected the Tassawwuf which laid stress on withdrawal or isolation from the community and preached renunciation of the world, regarded life and universe as unreal, encouraged the development of an escapist attitude towards life, advanced a concept of Love based on introspection, intoxication of selflessness, believed in such life-destroying ideals as annihilation (fana) or unification (wasal), regarded life as preordained, was indifferent towards Good and Evil, gave secondary importance to the law (Shariah), and stood for inactivity or quietism.

In the light of the history of religious experience in Islam, Iqbal argues that higher *Tassawwuf* consisted in the creation of Divine attributes in man and the unitive experience never implied the effacement of the identity of the finite ego by some sort of absorption into the Infinite Ego. It was rather the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite. It was in this background, Iqbal maintains, that genuine orders of sufi-ism did considerable work in shaping and directing the evolution of

religious experience in Islam. But at present, owing to their ignorance of the modern mind, the traditional sufi had become incapable of receiving fresh inspiration from modern thought and experience.

According to Iqbal, since reason and intuition have sprung up from the same root, they complement each other and are not opposed to one another. One grasps Reality piecemeal and the other in its wholeness. Intuition is to him a higher form of reason. Sense-perception as well as reason require supplementation by what the Quran describes as *qalb* i.e. heart, and Iqbal explains that heart is not a special faculty, but a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation in the physiological sense of the word, does not pay any part. To describe it as psychic, mystical or supernatural does not detract from its value as experience. Iqbal was of the view that modern psychology is not yet equipped with a really effective scientific method to analyse the content of non-rational or mystic consciousness.

The main characteristics of mystic consciousness, according to him, are: Immediacy of the experience of knowing God as one has cognition of other objects. Unanalysable wholeness of the experience. The experience is a moment of intimate association with the unique other Self, transcending, encompassing and momentarily suppressing the individual personality of the subject of experience. The experience cannot be communicated as it is more like feeling than thought. Its content can be conveyed to others in the form of propositions but the content itself cannot be transmitted because it is a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect. The experience is in durational time and, therefore, gives the impression of unreality of serial time. But it does not mean a complete break with serial time as the state soon fades away, leaving a deep sense of authority after it had passed away. Just as one can encounter errors or inaccuracies in the knowledge gained through sense-perception or reason, the demon in his malice may counterfeit experiences which can creep into the circuit of the mystic state and mislead the subject of experience.411

Iqbal was profoundly influenced by the writings or ecstatic utterances of some of the great sufis whom he frequently quotes in support of his own ideas. Rumi was his spiritual guide for he, in Iqbal's eyes, is the leader of the caravan of Love. Iqbal was

in agreement with the shuhudi exposition of Tawhid as advanced by the Nagshbandiyah-Mujjaddidiyah Tariqah and one can, generally speaking, trace the influence of Shuhudi Tassawwuf in the development of his own ideas. But he was definitely opposed to Wujudi Tassawwuf in all its forms. A Dervaish, in his view, who is indifferent towards the fate of the community and whose insight is incapable of providing any solution for its problems. is of no value. If Truth (Haga) has left an imprint in a heart. its radiance must illuminate the outer environments so that a private vision of Truth of a man of God becomes a public vision for accomplishing the betterment of humanity as a whole. But evolution of a complicated structure of thought, renunciation of the world for ascending a multi stepped spiritual ledder or elaboration of a meticulous system of exercises, purification and meditation aiming at the ultimate extinction of the individual self, carried, according to him, a message of death and not of life.

Iqbal strives to resurrect man, as a unique personality, and to awaken in him the longing for direct communion with the highly personal God so that he could absorb into himself the Qualities or Attributes of God and thus become a co-worker and co-creator with Him in the construction of a better universe and a more perfect world order.

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NOTES:

- 405. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. p. 96.
- 406. Gabriel's Wing. pp. 339, 310.
- 407. Ibid. p. 364.
- 408. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. p. 124.
- 409. Ideology of Pakistan by J. Iqbal. p. 111.
- 410. Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. pp. 1 to 28.

IQBAL AND REASON

Igbal was a poet and a philosopher. These two accomplishments can be complementary but according to their source, method and appeal they are often divergent from each other. Poetry and other fine arts have their source in the contemplation of beauty, their method is spontaneous communication, and their appeal is mostly to emotion. On the other hand philosophy and other sciences have their source in mental and physical phenomena, their method is sustained inquiry and their appeal is mostly to Reason. This distinction should not be understood to mean that one excludes the other completely and that these two activities can be divided into water tight compartments. Poets and other Artists do take into account the concrete realities of nature and life and are often rational in their approach; while Philosophers and Scientists are not completely devoid of asthetic contemplation and emotional influences. The fact, however, remains that poetry appeals more to emotion than to a Reason, and Philosophy appeals more to Reason than to emotion. Ighal presents a synthesis of these two divergent activities of the human psyche. He excelled in poetry which appeals to a much wider audience but his basic training was that of a Philosopher, although he did not give the same attention to this discipline as he did to poetry. One of the interesting subjects on which Igbal has shown divergence of emphasis in his poetry as compared to his philosophy is the problem of Reason. In his poetry Urdu and Persian, except on rare occasions, Iqbal has mostly condemned Reason while exalting intution and Religious experience. But in his philosophical writings he has not only assigned a reasonable place to Reason but has also, at times, credited it with a status which even a staunch rationalist would hesitate to grant. In this paper an attempt will be made to offer a very brief exposition of the position of Iqbal with regard to Reason as re-

IQBAL CENTENARY PAPERS

presented in his philosophical writings in English prose especially in his 7 lectures delivered at Madras, Hyderabad, Aligarh, and London and published in the book entitled "The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam".

The Scholastic Tradition

It may be stated at the outset that it is not intended here to inflict an academic discourse about the problem of Reason on a worthy audience in which professional philosophers are in a minority. Iqbal himself did not get very deep into this problem as a Theory of Knowledge in the manner in which, for example, Kant did. Iqbal discusses Reason in the context and in relation to Religious Experience the highest level of knowledge, while intellect and Reason according to him are at a lower level. This is consistant with the traditions of most of the scholastic Muslim thinkers. As Dr. Zafarul Hassan of the Aligarh University pointed out in his Presidential remarks at the time when these lectures were delivered in 1930 at Aligarh. Iqbal "carried out the task which centuries ago our great scholastics like Nazzam and Ashari, set to themselves in face of Greek science and philosophy". Ighal not only carried out the task which the old Muslim thinkers had undertaken but also gave a new direction to this work in the context of modern philosophy and science. Thus while stating the objectives of these lectures Iqbal says the following in the preface:

"The more genuine schools of Sufism have, no doubt, done good work in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience in Islam, but their latter-day representatives, owing to their ignorance of the modern mind, have become absolutely incapable of receiving any fresh inspiration from modern thought and experience. They are perpetuating methods which were created for generations possessing a cultural outlook differing, in important aspects, from our own".

Why did Iqbal use the medium of prose for the exposition of his ideas after he had created excellent poetry in Urdu and Persian for about 30 years and had established himself as an eminent poet of the East? Iqbal gives the answer in the beginning of his first lecture on "Knowledge and Religious Experience". He says:

"But the kind of knowledge that poetic inspiration brings is essentially individual in its character; it is figurative, vague, and indefinite".

Hence, Iqbal found that his position with regard to Religious Experience and other philosophical problems cannot be correctly expressed or understood in poetry and the need for a logical presentation of ideas required a passage from poetry to prose.

Rational foundation of Religion

On the same page Iqbal raises the fundamental question "Is it then possible to apply the purely rational method of philosophy to religion?" The traditional answer to this question would be an emphatic No. Most of the thinkers, Religious as well as Secular, have said that the rational method which philosophy often follows is of free inquiry, suspecting all authority. On the other hand religion is based on faith in an Authority. Hence, in the history of the Muslim thought, like the thought in other religions, there have been unfortunate confrontations between philosophers and religious orthodoxy. But Iqbal does not agree with this traditional view of confrontation between the Rational Method of Philosophy and Science, and the intuitive method of Religious Experience. In this connection Iqbal makes a very radical observation regarding the need for a rational method for religion. Iqbal says:

"Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science. Science may ignore a rational metaphysics; indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself. That is why Professor Whitehead has actually remarked that 'the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism'.

This observation of Iqbal is a sincere attempt to restore Reason to its rightful place from which it had been dislodged by certain religious thinkers in the East and West. Iqbal, however, hastens to point out that this restoration of Reason does not mean that Philosophy is superior to Religion. Iqbal clarifies the position of Religion as follows:—

IOBAL CENTENARY PAPERS.

"Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms. While sitting in judgement on religion, philosophy cannot give religion an inferior place among its data. Religion is not a departmental affaire, it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man. Thus, in the evaluation of religion, philosophy must recognize the central position of religion and has no other alternative but to admit it as something focal in the process of reflective synthesis".

Thought and Intuition

The main cause for the confrontation between the philosophers and religious thinkers was that it was thought that since Religious Experience depended on intuition and philosophical and scientific thinking was based on Reason, the result was that philosophy was opposed to Religion. Iqbal has cahllenged the very basis of this confrontation which has existed for long in the Eastern and Western thought and continues to exist to some extent even in modern thought. Iqbal has made his position clear in the following words:

"Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation. Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. In fact, intution, as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect".

Greek Influence

According to Iqbal the search for rational foundation of Islam may be regarded to begin with the Prophet himself. Iqbal

has cited several verses from the Quran, most of which are wellknown, emphasising the importance of Reason and Observation. During the time of its early development the first external influence that Muslim Thought accepted was of Greek philosophy. Muslim thinkers, however, cannot be accused of paying due attention to Greek thought because at the time of the advent of Islam for several centuries later Greek thought had the most prestigeous fund of scientific knowledge available to Man and therefore it could not be ignored by the open and inquiring minds of the Muslim thinkers. Many writers, however, have considered Greek influence to be a disaster for Muslim thought. Often the main reason given is that Greek thought emphasised the need for rational methodology and therefore defiance of intellectual authority which had the effect of shaking the faith of the Muslims in Islam. This may be quite true. But here again Iqbal makes a radical observation different from the traditional view. He says that the Greek influence was harmful for the earlier Muslim thinkers, not that it was too rational but because it was not rational enough. Comparing the ideas of Socrates and Plato with the teachings of the Quran Iqbal says:

"Socrates concentrated his attention on the human world alone. To him the proper study of man was man and not the world of plants, insects, and stars. How unlike the spirit of Quran, which sees in the humble bee a recipient of Divine inspiration and constantly calls upon the reader to observe the perpetual change of the winds, the alternation of day and night, the clouds, the starry heavens, and the planets swimming through infinite space! As a true disciple of Socrates, Plato despised sense-perception which, in his view, yielded mere opinion and no real knowledge. How unlike the Quran, which regards 'hearing' and 'sight' as the most valuabe Divine gifts and declares them to be accountable to God for their activity in this world. This is what the earlier Muslim students of the Quran completely missed under the spell of classicial speculation".

Iqbal is, therefore, of the view that the spirit of the Quran was essentially anti-classical, and "the result of this perception was a kind of intellectual revolt, the full significance of which has not been realised even up to the present day".

IQBAL CENTENARY PAPERS

After referring to Greek influence, Iqbal speaks briefly of Muslim Thinkers, the *Mutazila*, *Ashaira*, and particularly of Imam Ghazali. But before we discuss Ghazali a brief survey of the Rationalism in Islamic History would be useful.

Rationalism in Islam

It is interesting to note that after receding from the Greek intellectual tradition, it took Christian Europe more than fourteen centuries to produce the spirit of Rationalism and scientific inquiry which blossomed in the form of Renaissance. But in Islam the first rationalist movement appeared within the first century of its birth. Igoal regarded the birth of Islam itself as the birth of inductive intellect, by virtue of the emphasis that Quran lays on Reason and scientific inquiry. However, Rationalism as an intellectual movement emerged during the reign of the Omayyads, as a reaction against Fatalism of the rulers. Quran had preached freedom of Will to make Man responsible for his salvation in the other world, and his well being in this world. Thus, according to Ouran "Varily God will not change the condition of men till they change what is in themselves" (13:12). But soon after the Prophet and four pious Caliphs, when the Omayyads established a hereditary monarchy they did not adhere to this important doctrine of Islam and preached that since God is all powerful, everything good or bad, happens with the order of God. This idea was propagated sometimes to achieve political ends. Iqbal tells the story as follows :-

"God was thus conceived as the last link in the chain of causation, and consequently the real author of all that happens in the universe. Now the practical materialism of the opportunist Omayyad rulers of Damascus needed a peg on which to hang their misdeeds at Kerbala, and to secure the fruits of Amir Muawiya's revolt against the possibilities of a popular rebellion. Mabad is reported to have said to Hasan of Basra that the Omayyads killed Muslims, and attributed their acts to the decrees of God. Thus arose, in spite of open protests by Muslim divines, a morally degrading Fatalism, and the constitutional theory known as the 'accomplished fact' in order to support vested interests. This is not at all surprising. In our own time philosophers have

furnished a kind of intellectual justification for the finality of the present capitalistic structure of society".

Allama Shibli Numani also holds the same view that the doctrine of Fatalism was preached by the Omayyads for reasons of political expediency ⁴¹¹ As a reaction to this tyranny a group of thinkers put forward the idea that God is all powerful, but God is also Just. A Just God cannot order tyranny. Hence it is necessary that the teachings of Islam should be viewed in the light of Reason. The leader of this group was *Mabad Juhni* who was executed under orders of the Omayyad Caliph Abdul Malik in 699 A.D.

These believers in free will and justice of God were known as Mutazila. In spite of persecution they flourished during the time of Omayyads, and gained considerable power during the reign of the early Abbasids. Initially the main object of the Mutazila was to defend the Muslim faith by rational argument. Hence they were scholastics or Mutakalimeen. But later on particularly under the patronage of the Abbaside Caliph Al-Mamoon, they made great contribution to learning and scientific inquiry. It was mainly under the direct or indirect influence of the Mutazila movement that suitable atmosphere was created in which the great Muslim philosophers and scientists flourished. Unfortunately however, some of the Mutazila involved themselves in purely academic discussions which had controversial religious overtones. A few Mutazila even became vindictive as a reaction against their early persecution during the Omayvad rule. Hence the Mutazila movement got involved too much in politics with the result that the Mutazila were again persecuted under the Abbaside Calip Al-Mutawakkil. This was understandable, but the philosophers and scientists as a class came to be hated and often persecuted. The Rationalist movement however continued under ground by a secret organisation called Ikhwan-us-Safa. After prolonged persecution in the Muslims in East, Rationalism migrated to the West in Spain and produced such eminant philosophers as Ibn-Baja, Ibn-Tufail and Ibn-Rushd. With them Rationalism died out among the muslims, but lent great support, post humus, to the emergence of the Renaissance movement in Europe.

Ghazali and Iqbal

Imam Ghazali (1058-1111) was a reaction to the extreme

IQBAL CENTENARY PAPERS

Rationalism of the Mutazila. He was a great protagonist of intuition, mystic experience and religious experience and, therefore, ordinarily one would expect that Iqbal would support Ghazali whole-heartedly. But contrary to the popular impression, Iqbal disagrees with Ghazali on a very vital point.

According to Iqbal's interpretation of Ghazali, he (Ghazali), "finding no hope in analytical thought, moved to mystic experience, and there found an independent content for religion". This could be understood, but Ghazali went further and thought that the total Infinite could be revealed in mystic experience and that intellect and thought were considered by him as entirely inconclusive. On the other hand intuition was conclusive. Iqbal, therefore, thought that Ghazli was responsible for drawing "a line of cleavage between thought and intution" Iqbal sharply disagrees with Ghazli and says:

"He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily stimulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time. The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge".

Iqbal is of the view that there is no basic conflict between intellect and intuition. In its superficial level of logical understanding, intellect is not capable of comprehending the Infinite but, "in its deeper movement. . . thought is capable of reaching on immanent infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments."

Some scholars do not agree with Iqbal's criticism of Ghazali's position on this point. For example, Professor Saeed Shaikh in his book Studies in Muslims Philsophy points out that in his Mishkat-al-Anwar, Ghazali "explicity refers to the Infinite possibilities immanent in Reason through the dynamic self-unfolding of which it has the capacity to transcend itself and capture the Absolute". This point, M. Shaikh says, was missed by Iqbal in his lectures. It is true that sometimes in his writings at different periods of his life Ghazali considered Reason as almost at par with intuituion in its capability for comprehending ultimate things. But the general tenor of Ghazali's writings is against Reason. Perhaps Ghazali who

had a sound training in philosophy did not want to condemn Reason outright, but unfortunately the general impression that was created about his writings was that Reason was not only incapable of knowing the ultimate reality but was also a misleading faculty in Man for persuit of knowledge. It would be unjust to indict Ghazali for having deliberately preached this doctrine. His "Tahafut-al-Falasifa" is directed mostly against the philosophers who sometimes in their misplaced enthusiasm and ingenuity had come forward with the so called 'Rational' interpretations of certain beliefs of Islam which were not acceptable to the majority of the Ulama. Ghazali might have felt rather unhappy over the results which the ideas of these philosophers were creating among the masses diverting them from the religious beliefs and in that mood he did say some very uncharitable things against Reason itslef. But it cannot be held beyond doubt that Ghazali was always against Reason and, therefore, against scientific inquiry. It is said sometimes that the politics of his age and after, made a substantial contribution towards emphasising that aspect of Ghazali which was against Reason and scientific inquiry and ignoring his love for Reason and scientific knowledge which is the very spirit of the preachings of Islam. This may be true only partially but history has many examples when the ideas of great men have been used for political expediency.

Empirical Attitude of the Quran

What is the character of man's knowledge? According to Iqbal the character of man's knowledge is conceptual. This is how Iqbal understands the verse of the Quran according to which God saidt, "O Adam, inform them of the names' 13 Thus, according to Iqbal Man is "endowed with the faculty of naming things, that is to say forming concepts of them... and it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of Reality". Iqbal draws attention to the emphasis laid by the Quran on the observable aspects of Reality, by quoting several verses. It This emphasis on the observable aspect of Reality is, according to Iqbal, "the basis for the genral empirical attitude of the Quran". Iqbal points out that Quran awakened the empirical spirit "in an age which had renounced the visible as of no value in man's search after God". This empricial attitude towards life has great ramifications in the rise and fall of civilizations.

IQBAL CENTENARY PAPERS

Iqbal says:

"Reality lives in its own appearances; and such a being as man, who has to maintain his life in an obstructing environment, cannot afford to ignore the visible. The Quran opens our eyes to the great fact or change, through the appreciation and control of which alone it is possible to build a durable civilization. The cultures of Asia and, in fact, of the whole ancient world failed, because they approached Reality exclusively from within and moved from within outwards".

Now what are the blessings which observation of Reality, as emphasised by the Quran, bestows on Man? According to Iqbal the entire progress and superiority of the Muslim culture is due to the results of observation. All scientific activity is based on observation leading to inductive Reason. Iqbal believes that "inductive Reason, which alone makes man master of his environment, is an achievement, and when once born it must be reinforced by inhibiting the growth of other modes of knowledge". Islam was the pioneer of the inductive method, and according to Iqbal "the birth of Islam. . . . is the birth of inductive intellect".

It is generally believed that the inductive method which led to scientific discoveries in Europe was introduced by Roger Bacon. Iqbal in his lecture on "The Spirit of Islamic Culture" quotes two passages from a European author Briffault's book entitled 'Making of Humanity'. According to this author, Roger Bacon was no more than one of apostles of Muslim science and method to Christian Europe who "never wearied of declaring that knowledge of Arabic and Arabic Science was, for his contemporaries, the only way to true knowledge". Iqbal goes on to give examples of several Muslim scientistis and philosophers who made valuable contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge and method and the great debt that the West owes to the East, which, it must be said, is whole-heartedly acknowledged by the modern scholars of Europe and the USA.

Thought and Being

Before proceeding further a few words may be said about what Iqbal means by "thought" which he often uses to indicate

intellectual or rational activity of the human mind. Iqbal differs from those who regard "thought" as an agency working on things from without. This view, Iqbal holds, is too mechanical and also implies acceptance of two independent entities viz. the "Ideal" and the "real". According to Iqbal it is possible to take thought not as a principle which organises and integrates its material from the outside, but as "a potency which is formative of the very being of its material. Iqbal thus tries to do away with the dualism of thought and being, and coming very close to Hegel, considers "thought" and "being" as ultimtely one.

Nature as Habit of Allah

Having brought out the emphasis that Quran lays on observation and on empirical attitude, and, therefore, on scientific inquiry (all fruits of Reason generally), Iqbal goes a step further in his lecture on "The Revelations of Religious Experience". He says that this view gives a fresh spiritual meaning to physical science. "The knowledge of Nature" says Iqbal "is knowledge of God's behaviour. In our observation of Nature we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the Absolute Ego and this is only another form of worship". This is logical because as stated earlier by Iqbal in the same lecture, "in the picturesque language of the Quran, (Nature) is the habit of Allah".

The next step is quite natural. If nature is the habit of Allah and its observation is a form of worship, then scientific activity has a sacred content. Thus in his lecture on "The Conception of God and the Meaning of Prayer" Iqbal asserts:

"The truth is that all search for knowledge is essentially a form of prayer. The scientific observer of Nature is a kind of mystic seeker in the act of prayer".

Prophetic Consciousness

While all men have been credited with the capacity for religious experience the religious experience of a Prophet is certainly of a very high level. Indeed he is credited with the highest form of religious experience, namely "Wahy" (inspiration). But here Iqbal points out that the way in which the word "Wahy" has been used

IQBAL CENTENARY PAPERS

in the Quran, shows that Quran regards it as a universal property of life, though its nature and character are different at different stages of the evolution of life. "Wahy", according to Iqbal, is active in plant life, the animal life, and in the human life in the form of inspiration (or the 'will to live'. If one wants to use modern terminology) varying in character according to the needs of the recipient. The Prophet, of course is credited with the highest and the sublime level of Wahy. He is credited with, what Iqbal calls "prophetic consciousness which is a unitary experience inclined to overflow its boundaries and seek opportunities of re-directing or re-fashioning the forces of collective life". Thus one way of judging the value of a Prophet's religious experience, according to Iqbal, would be to examine the type of manhood he has created and the cultural world that has sprung out of the spirit of his message.

Finality of prophethood and Reason

The contribution made by Islam to all forms of cultures in Religion, Science and Art is well known. History has, therefore, already examined the value of the Message and has given its verdict. But Iqbal discovers another important dimension of the nature of prophecy especially in the finality of prophethood. He says that during early stages of the development of Man, when he was not endowed with much of Reason and critical faculty (Iqbal calls it the "minority of mankind"), prophetic consciousness provided him with ready-made judgements, choices and ways of action. What happened when man became more rational and less subject to instinct? Iqbal's answer is as follows, in his lecture on "The Spirit of Islamic Culture":

"With the birth of reason and critical faculty, however, life, in its own interest, inhibits the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at an earlier stage of human evolution. Man is primarily governed by passion and instinct. Inductive reason, which alone makes man master of his environment, is an achievement; and when once born it must be reinforced by inhibiting the growth of other modes of knowledge".

And what is the role of the Prophet of Islam and the nature of the

finality of prophethood? Iqbal says as follows in the lecture:

"Looking at the matter from this point of view, then, the Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In so far as the source of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the modern world. In him, life discovers other sources of knowledge suitable to its new direction. The birth of Islam, as I hope to be able presently to prove to your satisfaction, is the birth of inductive intellect. In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in leading strings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness man must finally be thrown back on his own resources. The abolition of priest-hood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Quran, and the emphasis that it lays on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality".

In this bold assertion Iqbal has pointed out that the justification of Reason springs out from the finality of prophethood itself. Iqbal, however, hastens to point out that he does not mean to say that the mystic experience or the religious experience of the Prophet has now ceased to exist as a vital fact. Quran emphasizes both the inner as well as the outer experience. The intellectual value of this idea, according to Iqbal, lies in the fact that it creates "an independent critical attitude towards mystic experience by generating the belief that all personal authority claiming a supernatural origin has come to an end in the history of man".

No greater compliment could be paid to Reason by a man of religion.

Iqbal as Mutakallim

Many valuable works exist on various aspects of Iqbal's thought and his concepts of religious experience, God, Superman, Self, etc. have been examined from the points of view of Philosophy and Religion. But Iqbal's position with regard to Reason has not yet received due attention from scholars. Eminent scholars like Khalifa Abdul Hakim, M. M. Sharif, Dr. Ishrat Hasan and others

IQBAL CENTENARY PAPERS

have concentrated their discussions mainly on other aspects of Igbal. There is, however, one work entitled "Igbal Ka Ilm-i-Kalam by Syed Ali Abbas Jalalpuri in which the learned author, after presenting a short history of scholasticim (Ilm-i-Kalam) in Islam, has given a critical analysis of Iqbal's ideas regarding God, Pantheism, Reason, Intuition, etc., and has finally emphasised the need for the re-discovery of the tradition of Rationalism in Islam⁴¹⁵ Some scholars have disagreed with the learned author on his interpretation of Igbal, or his criticism of Igbal's philosophical position in which he (the author) has pointed out some inconsistencies and contradictions in Iqbal's thought particularly with regard to Reason and Faith. But no one will doubt the profound erudition of Syed Sahib as a philosopher and his keen and peneterating critical judgement which goes to make this work as one of the finest specimens of philosophical criticism. It is not possible to discuss in this short paper the various issues raised by Syed Sahib, but I shall mention just one point in defence of Igbal. In the first chapter of this book the learned author has assigned Iqbal the role of a mutakallim (Scholastic) and not a philosopher as such. A mutakallim defends faith with the help of Reason. Igbal himself would not have been too happy to be called a mutakallim but he would not quarrel with somebody who said that Iqbal used Reason where necessary to defend the religious beliefs of Islam. But, having considered Iqbal as a mutakallim, it would be hardly fair to expect that Iqbal would satisfy the demands of a pure philosophical criticism. The first loyalty of a mutakallim is towards his religion, and Igbal makes this frankly clear in his poetry as well as in his prose. Even when he emphasises the importance of Reason, examples of which have been given in this paper, he never forgets to point out that religious experience is above and superior to all other experiences. Besides, Igbal had embarked on a stupendous task in attempting a colossal synthesis. He was trying to introduce a compromise between the usually divergent concepts such as Religion and Science, Intuition and Reason, Transcendence and Immanence, Tradition and Modernity, Mysticism and Scientific Inquiry, Taglid and Ijtihad, Poetry and Philosophy etc. During these attempts at rapproachment it was natural that he sometimes emphasised one thing and sometimes another. One cannot, therefore, expect to find in Iqbal a cut and dry system as one finds, for example, in Descartes or Spinoza. It is

the overall effect that matters in Iqbal. He developed a world view mainly based on Religion and, while he emphasised the importance of the various capabilities in Man, he considered all of them subservient to Religious Experience.

Conclusion

The problem of Reason is not merely of academic interest. Emphasis on Reason means emphasis on scientific inquiry and material progress. It implies critical judgement with more objectivity and less emotion and sentiment. It is not contended here that an individual or a nation should get rid of all emotion and sentiment in order to be rational. This is neither possible nor desirable. But there should be a balance between emotion, sentiment, intuition, and spiritual advancement on the one hand and Reason, scientific inquiry and material progress on the other. History bears out that a nation, which lost this balance and neglected one side for the sake of the other, declined and fell sooner than was expected. Reason helped many nations to rise and its neglect ushered in long eras of decadence. Europe is one example. The European civilization emerged with the help of the Greek tradition of Rationalism. The Roman Empire flourished till the momentum of that tradition was still there. But then religious orthodoxy emerged and preached more about life after death than about life in this world. It took more interest in miracles than in natural phenomena. It considered Reason and scientific inquiry as heresy and confined its intellectual occupation mainly to reading what was written in the scriptures. Roman emperors and lords relegated the profession of teaching to their slaves. All respect and reverence of the people was claimed either by the war lords who could wield the scourage of tryanny in this world, or the priests who could terrorise people about the scourage of God in the next. The only way to salvation was to follow the priesthood blindly. The result was that people, who would have gone for trade and commerce and other means of progress, found their way to monastries. The Great Roman Empire cracked by its own weight and then fell into pieces. Edward Gibbon's sarcasm on the decline and fall of the Empire is well known. He said that the fall of the Roman Empire was the triumph of the barbarians and of religion.

There was, however, nothing wrong with the great revealed

IQBAL CENTENARY PAPERS

religion which was God's blessing to Man. The Prophet wanted to establish God's Kingdom on Earth. The priests twisted the Prophet's message and diverted the attention of the people to the other world while trying to establish their own Kingdom in this World. They put Europe to sleep for a thousand years, until it was awakened by the spirit of Renaissance (which was essentially rationalistic) to which Muslim thought made a substantial contribution.

Iqbal, with his deep sense of history, was aware of the dangers of neglect of Reason and the spirit of scientific inquiry. He was also aware of the polemics that have been indulged in and the intellectual battles that have been fought in various periods of history of nations on the issues of Faith and Reason; Religion and Science, and the disaster that they brought to the common man. Iqbal was a deeply religious thinker and was addressing a nation with a long religious tradition. He did not, therefore, take Religion to Science; instead he brought Science to Religion. He did not try to discover rational and scientific basis for miracles or for religious rituals, but asserted that rational and scientific activity was really religious activity and all search for knowledge was prayer.

While Ighal was aware of the results of neglect of Reason, he was also very much conscious of the dangers of excessive Rationalism. As a doctrine, extreme Rationalism was challenged by Kant who specified the limits and brought out the limitations of Reason. As a general mental attitude, excessive Rationalism makes life too mechanical and tends to deprive man of the blessings and the happiness which normal emotional activity in Fine Art, Literature, Music etc. offer him. Above all extreme Rationalism does create doubts in religious beliefs and thereby disturbs the sense of security and the hope for ultimate Justice which are among the great gifts of Religion for the common man. There was reaction against Rationalism during the later Abbasides in the Muslim history, and in the eighteenth century Europe. But the difference has been that, while the reaction against Rationalism continues almost unabated in Muslim history, (except on rare occasions) in the case of the West there has been a chain of action and reaction for and against Reason which continues even today. Iqbal was alive to the necessity of this action and reaction which gives life and vigour to the psyche of a nation and helps in maintaining a

balance between two extreme ideas. Iqbal himself set a beautiful example of a synthesis of action and reaction in his own creative activity. His poetry is a reaction against Reason, while his prose (the lectures) is a reaction against the "reaction" in his poetry.

In his lecture on "The Spirit of Muslim Culture" Iqbal said that "inner experience is only one source of human knowledge. According to the Quran there are two other. sources of knowledge — Nature and History; and it is in tapping these sources of knowledge that the spirit of Islam is seen at its highest". The importance of the inner source of experience viz. Intution, Wijdan, Ishq, etc. has been emphasised by great Muslim thinkers, poets, and mystics. Iqbal made his own valuable contribution in continuing the emphasis on that source of knowledge. But, unfortunately, the other two sources of knowledge viz. Nature and History, specified by Quran, have not received due attention from the Muslims for several centuries. These two sources of knowledge should also be tapped adquatedly in the modern world. Iqbal acted as a Reminder for this message of the Quran.

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APPENDICES GENERAL INDEX

AUTHORS

- Prof. Sheila McDonough, Department of Religion, Concordia University, Montreal—Canada.
- Prof. Alessandro Bausanii, Head, Department of islamic Studies, University of Rome – Italy.
- Miss Asma Rashid, Assistant Professor, Govt. College for Women, Multan-Pakistan.
- Dr. A. Shakoor Ahsan, Professor Emeritus, University of the Punjab, Lahore—Pakistan.
- 5. Syed Samad Hussain Rizvi
- Prof. M. Saeed Sheikh, Director, Institute of Islamic Culture.
- Prof. W. S. Karunaratne, Dean, Faculty of Arts, University of Sri Lanka, Colombo—Sri Lanka.
- 8. Dr. Annemarie Schimmel, University of Bonn-Germany.
- Dr. Barbara D. Metcalf, Assistant Professor, South Asia Regional Studies, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia—U.S.A.
- 10. M. Hadi Hussain,
 President,
 Urdu Development Board,
 Karachi—Pakistan.
- 11. Prof. Carl Elof Svenning,C/o Internationella Bokklubben,S. 181 62, Lidingo-Sweden.

- Dr. Parveen Shaukat Ali, Government College, Lahore—Pakistan.
- Prof. Jagen Nath Azad, Head, Urdu Department University of Jammu, Jammu.
- Dr. Abdul Hamid,
 Member, Board of Governors,
 Quaid-i-Azam Academy,
 Islamabad—Pakistan.
- Prof. Jussi Taneli Aro, Department of Asian & African Studies, University of Helsinky— Finland.
- Dr. A. Qayyum,
 Associate Professor,
 Allama Iqbal Open University,
 Islamabad—Pakistan.
- Dr. Nazir Qaiser, Principal, Sir Syed Cambridge School, Lahore—Pakistan.
- Mr. B. A. Dar, Managing Editor, Pak. Philosophical Journal, Lahore—Pakistan.
- 19. Dr. C. A. Qadir,
 President,
 Pak. Philosophical Congress,
 University of the Punjab,
 Lahore—Pakistan.
- 20. Prof. Qazi Mohammad Aslam 14-S, Gulberg-II, Lahore—Pakistan.
- 21. Mr. Abdul Khaliq,
 Assistant Professor,
 Deptt. of Philosophy.
 University of the Punjab,

Lahore-Pakistan.

- 22. Dr. M. Raziuddin Siddiqi. F 7/3, Islamabad—Pakistan.
- 23. Dr. Muhammad Maruf Dept. of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore—Pakistan.
- Dr. Justice Javid Iqbal, Judge, Lahore High Court, Lahore—Pakistan.
- Dr. Agha Iftikhar Hussain, Director,
 Public Administration Research Centre, Islamabad—Pakistan

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APPENDIX 'B'

LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE

 General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Chief Martial Law Administrator and Chief of the Army Staff.

(Chairman)

- 2. Mr. Justice Mushtaq Hussain.
- 3. Secretary, Ministry of Culture, Archaeology, Sports and Tourism.
- 4. Secretary, Ministry of Education.
- 5. Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 6. Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
- 7. Secretary, Ministry of Finance.
- 8. Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Lahore.
- 9. Chief Secretary, Government of Sind, Karachi.
- 10. Chief Secretary, Government of NWFP, Peshawar.
- 11. Chief Secretary, Government of Baluchistan, Quetta.
- 12. Chief Secretary, Government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Muzaffarabad.
- 13. Dr. Justice Javid Iqbal, 3-Allama Iqbal Road, Lahore.
- 14. Chairman, University Grants Commission.
- 15. Vice-Chancellor, University of the Punjab, Lahore.
- 16. Vice-Chancellor, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

- 17. Vice-Chancellor, University of Sind, Hyderabad.
- 18. Vice-Chancellor, University of Karachi.
- 19. Vice-Chancellor, University of Peshawar.
- 20. Vice-Chancellor, University of Baluchistan, Quetta.
- 21. Director, Iqbal Academy, Lahore.
- 22. Prof. Fiza ur Rehman Khan, Principal, Government College, Lahore.
- 23. Dr. Ebadat Brelvi, Principal, University Oriental College, Lahore.
- 24. Mr. Q. U. Shahab, 21-I, St. No. 10, F. 6/3, Islamabad.
- 25. Mr. Ahmad Nadeem Qasmi, Director, Majlis-e-Taragi-e-Adab, Lahore.
- 26. Dr. Syed Abdullah, Chairman, Board of Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam, University of Punjab, Lahore.
- 27. Director, Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad.
- 28. Sufi Ghulam Mustafa Tabassum, Vice-Chairman, Iqbal Academy, Lahore.
- 29. Prof. Mohammad Usman, Vice-Principal, Government Education College, Lahore.
- 30. Prof. Karrar Hussain, 97-Garden West, Karachi-3.
- 31. Mr. Bashir Ahmad Dar, 335-Shadbagh, Lahore.
- 32. Prof. C. A. Qadir, 62-Shah Jamal, Lahore.
- 33. Pir Hussamuddin Rashid, Ali Raza House, 60-Al Hamra Society, Karachi-8.
- 34. Syed Nazir A. Niazi, 7-A, Chamba House, Lahore.
- 35. Prof. Mirza Mohammad Munawar, Government College, Lahore.
- Prof. A. Waheed Quraishi,
 Dean, Faculty of Islamic & Oriental Learning,
 University Oriental College, Lahore.
- 37. Mr. Majid Nizami, Editor, The Daily Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore.

- 38. Mr. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, 27-G, Gulberg-II, Lahore.
- 39. Mr. S. A. Vahid, 26-D-HI, 6-P.E.C.H.S., Karachi-III.
- 40. Dr. A. W. Halepota C/o Sind University, Jamshoro, Hyderabad.
- 41. Dr. N. A. Baloch, OSD (Culture) & Secretary, National Committee.
- 42. Kh. Ghulam Sadiq,
 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy,
 University of the Punjab, & Secretary, Organizing Committee.
- 43. Mr. M. B. Khalid, Deputy Secretary & Secretary, Executive Committee.

APPENDIX 'C'

LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

- Mr. Iqbal Masud, Secretary, Ministry of Culture, Archaeology, Sports and Tourism, Islamabad.
- (Chairman)
- Dr. N. A. Baloch, OSD (Culture) & Secretary, National Committee, Islamabad.
- Mr. S. Shah Nawaz, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad.
- 4. Dr. M. A. Kazi, Secretary, Ministry of Education & Chairman, University Grants Commission, Islamabad.
- Mr. Masood Nabi Nur, Secretary, Ministry of Information, Islamabad.
- 6. Dr. Justice Javid Iqbal, 3-Allama Iqbal Road, Lahore.
- Mr. Q. U. Shahab, H. No. 21-1, St. No. 10, F. 6/3, Islamabad.
- 8. Prof. K. K. Aziz, Chairman, National Commission on Historical & Cultural Research,

- H. No. 6, St. No. 22, F. 6/2, Islamabad.
- Prof. Abdul Hashim Khan, Vice-Chancellor, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
- 10. Vice-Chancellor, University of the Punjab, Lahore.
- Vice-Chancellor, Peshawar University, Peshawar.
- 12. Vice-Chancellor, University of Baluchistan, Quetta.
- 13. Sufi Ghulam Mustafa Tabassum, Vice-President, Iqbal Academy, 90-B/2, Gulberg-III, Lahore.
- 14. Mr. Aish Bahadur Khan, Financial Adviser (Education), Islamabad.
- 15. Dr. Laeeq A. Babri, Director, Institute of Modern Languages, Sector H-9, P.O. Shaigan, Islamabad.
- Prof. Abu Lais Siddiqui, Professor of Urdu Literature, Karachi University, Karachi.
- 17. Dr. Shamsuddin Siddiqui, Associate Professor, Peshawar University, Peshawar.
- 18. Dr. M. Moizuddin, Director, Iqbal Academy, 90-B/2, Gulberg-III, Lahore.
- Mr. Ahmad Nadeem Qasmi,
 Director, Majlis-e-Taraqi-e-Adab, Club Road, 2 Narsing Das Garden,
 Lahore.
- Prof. M. Saeed Shaikh,
 Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Club Road, 2 Narsing Das Garden Lahore.
- Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad,
 Director, Central Board for Development of Urdu,
 I-A Gulberg, P.O. Box 3177, Lahore.
- 22. Kh. Ghulam Sadiq, Secretary, Organizing Committee, International Congress on Iqbal, 191-A, Upper Mall, Lahore.
- 23. Mr. M. B. Khalid, Deputy Secretary & Secretary, Executive Committee, Islamabad.

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APPENDIX 'E'

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- 2. Lt. General Mohammad Iqbal Khan, Martial Law Administrator Zone 'A'
- 3. Prof. Dr. Khairat M. Ibne Rasa Vice-Chancellor, University of the Punjab and Chairman, Organizing Committee.
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- 10. Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab.
- 11. Dr. Justice Javid Iqbal. Judge, Lahore High Court, Lahore.
- 12. Chairman, University Grants Commission, Islamabad.
- 13. Vice-Chancellor, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
- Vice-Chancellor, University of Sind, Hyderabad.
- 15. Vice-Chancellor, University of Karachi, Karachi.
- 16. Vice-Chancellor, University of Peshawar, Peshawar.
- Vice-Chancellor, University of Baluchistan, Quetta.
- 18. Director, Igbal Academy, Lahore.
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- Dr. Ebadet Brelvi,
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- 21. Mr. Q. U. Shahab, 21-I, St. No. 10, F. 6/3, Islambad.
- Mr. Ahmad Nadeem Qasmi,
 Director,
 Majlis-e-Taraqi-e-Adab, Club Road,
 Narsing Das Gardens, Lahore.
- Dr. S. M. Abdullah,
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 Department of Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam,
 University of the Punjab, Lahore.
- 24. Director,
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- Dr. Rafiq Ahmad, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, University of the Punjab, Lahore.
- 41. Prof. Sh. Imtiaz Ali,
 Dean, Faculty of Law and Principal,

University Law College, Lahore.

- 42. Prof. M. A. Khan,
 Dean, Faculty of Education,
 University of the Punjab,
 Lahore.
- 43. Prof. M. N. Romani,
 Dean, Faculty of Science and Engineering,
 University of the Punjab, Lahore.
- Dr. (Miss) Rifat Rashid,
 Dean, Faculty of Arts,
 University of the Punjab, Lahore.
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- 46. Prof. Muzaffer Ahmad,
 Chairman,
 Department of Zoology,
 University of the Punjab,
 New Campus, Lahore.
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- 54. Secretary of the Government of the Punjab

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 Sector H-9, P. O. Shaigan,
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 Karachi.
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 University of Peshawar, Peshawar.
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 Principal,
 Government College of Science, Lahore.
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 Director,
 Institute of Islamic Culture, Club Road,
 2-Narsing Das Gardens, Lahore.
- Mr. Ashfaq Ahmad,
 Director,
 Central Board for Development of Urdu,
 I-A Gulberg, P.O. Box 3177,
 Lahore.
- 67. Mr. M. Mukhtar Qureshi, Central Training College, Lahore.
- 68. Dr. Arbab Alam,

o Principal, Nishtar Medical College, Multan.

69. Mr. Abdul Hamid Chaudhry, Assistant Professor, Government College, Sargodha.

A

Abbaside 294, 311, 320,

Abbaside Caliph 311, Abd 297. Abduh, Sheikh Mohammad 48, 95, Abdul Hakim, Khalifa 317, Abdul Hamid Khan, Sultan 167, Abdul Khaliq 261, Abdul Malik, Caliph 311, Abdul Qadir 134-35, Abdul Quddus of Gangoh 28, Abraham 117, 144, 263, Absolute 23 Abu Lahab 171, Abyssinia 177, Activism 11. Adam 18, 24, 28, 68, 119-22, 249, 313, Adhar 144. Advisory Council of Satan 169. Afaq 269 Affifi, A.É. 239, Afghan 116, Afghani, Jamaluddin 30, 45, 47, 48, 63, 164, Afghanistan 68, 164, 188, Afghans 116, Africa 59, 108-9, 176, Agrarian Reform 57, Ahadith 96, Ahl-i-Hadith 128, Ahmad Khan, Sir Syed 47, 95, 261, Ahmad Mahmood 291-92, Ahmad Sarhindi, Sheikh 258, 260, 296, 297, Ahsanul Khaliqin 23, Akbar 295, Akbar Munir, Mohammad 166, Al-Akbar, Sheikh 233, Al-Ama 231. A1-Biruni 19, 36, Alexander 21 Algerian 35, 38, 47, 55, 57, 61, Algerian Revolution 35-36, Ali Abbas, Jalalpuri 318, 321, Aligarh 47, 49, 82, 308, Aligarh Muslim University 82, Al-Ikhlass 237, Alim 47, 55, 293, Al-Khazini 19, Al-Kindi 104, Al-Kitab 96 Allah 97, 100, 112, 169, 237, 274, 279, 293-94, 300, 315,

Allahabad 171, 203, All India Muslim League 203, Allopathy 181, Allport 225, 229, Al-Ma'arri, Abul Ala 25, Al-Mamoon 311, Almuhadian Empire 62, Al-Mutawakkil 311, Al-Qalam 96 Amanullah Khan 142, Amarnath Jha, Professor 197, Ameer Ali, Justice 95, 129, America 108, Americans 110, A Message from the East 118, Amr 238-39, Anal Haqq 298, Analysis 98. Ancient Pagan Cults 20, Andalusia 123, 127, Andalusian Shore 169, Andrews, C.F. 200, Anfus 269, 276, Angels 27, 226, Anglo-American 242, Anglo-Saxon 193, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism 253. Anwar-i-Iqbal 239, Arab 102, 171, Arab Chieftains 171, Arabia 47, 96, 112, Arabian Imperialism 51, 62-63, Arabian Prophet 165 Arabic 98, 102, 167, 189, 191-94, 207, 214, 314, Arabic Science 3:14, Arabo-Persian 189-90, 192. Arabs 102, 116, 276, 287, Arab World 171, 195, Aramaic 192. Ararat 154-56, Arberry, A.J. 24, 30, 165, 172, 189, 226, 229, 240, 286, 291-92, Arcadian 134, Arctic 191, Ardent Pilgrim 200, 215, Arif 293. Aristotle 20, Aristotelian 19, 30, Aristotelian Cosmology 29 Armughan-i-Hijaz 29, 67, 69, 132, 149, 151, 169, 172, Arnold 135, 227-28, Art 108, 316, Artists 305,

Arya Smajis 129 Ascetic Sufism 42 Ashab-i-Suffa 294, Ashari 306, 310, Ash'arism 19 Ashiq Azazil 119, Asia 54, 59, 108-9, 176, 205, 314, Aslam, Q. M. 255 Asrar 136-37, 139, 200, 214, Asrar-i-Khudi 74, 111, 132, 136, 140-41, 165, 168, 233, 237, 286, 298, Asrar-o-Rumuz 150, 172, 228-29, Assr, Kasim 95, Astronomy 18, 102, Ata Ullah, Sheikh, 172, Atheism 29 Athenian 60, Atlantic Charter 57, Atomism 48, Attar 30, 67, 75, 143, 232, Avicennian Theory 23. Ayah 99-101, Ayn 231, Azad, Abdul Kalam 95, Azad, Mohammad Hussain 133,

Biology 244, Bistam 234, 238 Biswas, Anil 214 Blue Mosque 157 Bolshavik Russia 177 Bombay 92, Book of God, 47, Botany 102; Bradley 238, (Bradley) Brahmin 6, Briffault, R. 102, 314, British 37, 110, British Administrators 184, British Dominated India 15, British Government 123, British Politicians 181, British Rule 128, Broad, C.D., 291, Brown, Professor E.G., 165, 172, 189, Browningesque Optimism 135, Buber, Martin, 1-5, 7-8, 11-12, 16, 283, Buddhism 295 Buddhist 19, 191, 235, 242, Butterfield, Herbert 264,

B

Baal 121, Bacon, Roger 314, Badr 58, Baedeker 123, Baghdad 234, Bahar 208 Bal-i-Jibril 67-68, 81, 119, 130, 132, 144, 151, 228-29 Banaras University 205, Bandagi Nama 143 Bang-i-Dara 2, 111, 132-35, 141, 150, 212, 287, 292, Baqa 295-96, 302, Batin 43, 294, Battle of Siffin 41, Bausani, A. 17, 119 Ba Yazid 61, 234, 238, Beatrice 27. Behaviour Theraphy and Beyond 227, Belgians 110, Bengal 129 Bengali 214, Bennabi 35-36, 38-39, 41-44, 47, 49-50, 55-59, 61, 63-65, Berber 45 Bergson 37, 71, 201, 237, 244, 246, 266, 277, 308, Bergsonian 23, Berkeley 270, Berlin 7. Bhagvat Gita 89 Bhartrihari 81-82, 84, 86-94, Bhitai, Shah Abdul Latif 119, Bible 193, Bilgramy, Dr. H.H., 281,

C

Caesar 11, California 250, Calvanism 290. Cambridge 122, Canons of Islam 172. Capitalism 113, 114, Capitalist 15, Carmina Burana 187, Cartesian Europe 56, Cartesian Logic 57 Cartesian Method 59, Cartesian Spirit 60, Case System 111, Caste 116, Casteism 108 Causality 59, 61 Central Asia 187, Chadur-i-Zahara 78 Chagatay Turkic 195 Chagatay Turkish 187, Champlin, J.P., 227-28, Chauvinism 111, Chemistry 102, Chhatari 82, China 96, 112 Chinese 191, 235, Chishtiyah 295, Chosroe 142 Christ 81, 93, 122, Christian 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 119, 235, Christian Europe 310, 314, Christian Hermits 295. Christianity 17, 20, 40, 51, 52, 102, 286, 289 Christian Theology 26, Church 48, 88, 193,

Churchill 35 Civilization 38, 43, 55, 56, 61, 62, Classical Chinese 151, Climate 109 Clinical Psychiatry for the Layman 229, Colonialism 35, 38, 55, 56, 60, Colonisibility 55, Colour 116, Comedy 20, Common Wealth of Islam 201, Communalism 118, Communism 11, 12, 113, 114, 212, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East 172 Communists 15, 289 Companions of the Prophet 97, Congregational Prayer 285, Constantinople 187 Contemporary Muslim World 165, Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann 228, 292, Copernicus 17, Coptic 192, Corbin 18, Cordova 128, 129, 177, Cordova Mosque 123, 124, 178, Cosmic 38, Cosmic Forces 38, Cosmologies 19, Cosmology 28, Cosmopolitanism 201, Cosmos 18, 19, 26, Council 181, Council of State 116, Creed 116, Critique of Pure Reason, 291. Cross 20, Culcutta 92 Culture 109 Culture of Islam 28, 37, 50, 62,

D

Dagh 132, 133 Dagh School 133, Dahr 23, Damascus 41, 63, Dani, A.H., 130, Daniel 2, Dante 17, 22, 25, 27, 30, 80, 153, Dar, B.A. 239, 292, Darb-i-Kalim 67, 69, 132, 146, 151, 171, 172, 174, 229, 286, 292, Dar Magam-i-Ahl-i-Tauhid 78. Darwesh 146, Das Kapital 113, Daulity 296, Dawud, Abu 105, Day of Resurrection, 239, Delhi 45, Democracy 210, 212, Descartes 318, Destiny 26, Development of Metaphysics in Persia

Devil 11,
Dialectic 38,
Dictionary of Psychology 227,
Dirac 271,
Ditman 250,
Divan 141,
Divina Comedia 153,
Divine Comedy 80,
Divine Plan 13, 19,
Divine Will 13,
Divinity of Christ 20,
Do Drags Have Religious Import 253,
Dogmatism 48,
Doors of Perception 249, 291,
Dutch 110.

E

East 27, 49, 69, 107, 108, 112, 119, 135, 141, 177, 209, 214, 285, 287-89, 306, 307, 311, 314, Eastern Countries 11, Eastern Europe 193. Egoism 53, Egypt 95, 164, Egyptian 47, Egyptian History 61 Einstein 260, 271, 272, Ek Arzu 134, Elan 42, El Banna, Hassan 58, 65, Ellis 218, 227, Emerson 134, Emperor 24, Encyclopaedia of Religion 105, England 134, 141, 269-70, English 133, 135, 193, 198, 214, English Literature 132 English Poetry 133, 135, Enneads 240, Escapism 27, Eternal 40, Ethnocentrism 108, Eurocentric 17, Eurocentric 17,
Europe 11, 18, 22, 37, 43, 44, 49, 5154, 56, 59, 61, 62, 102, 104, 108,
114, 127, 176-78, 201, 275, 276,
285, 287, 311, 319-20,
European 18, 20, 52, 121, 127, 129,
182, 193-95, European Civilization 49, 319 European Culture 37, 50, 192, 193, European Languages 192, European Libraries 184, European Literatures 175, European Materialism 49 European Nationalism 194, European Political Thinking 50, Europeans 122, European Scholars 102, European Society 56, European Thinkers 51, European World 102, Eve 20.

Existentialism 212, Existentialists 247, Existential Psychology 229,

F

Fana 295-96, 302 Fanaticism 104, 110, Faqih 64, Farabi 283 Far East 21 Faith 42, 96, 104, Fascists 11 Fatalism 14, 56, 63, 310-11, Fate 14. Father Lammense 44, Fatherland 212, Faust 210, Fazal Hussain, Sir 166-67, 180, Fertile Crescent 18, Finality, 59-61, Finality of Prophethood 278, 316-17, Fine Art 320, Finnish, 193, Figh 294 Firaq 297, 302, Firdausi 192 Fish, Fank 224, 229 Five Types of Ethical Theory 291. For the sake of Heaven 16, France 193 Frankl, V.E., 218-19, 221-22, 224, 227-29, French 37, 110, 214 French Revolution 127, Freud 289 Fromm, Erick 285, Fuad 245 Fusus al-Hikam 232-33, 339 Futuhat-i-Makkiyya 23, 80, 233

G

Gabriel, 126, 145, 147,
Gabriel's Wing 228, 292, 304,
Gairdner, W.H.T. 321,
Galileo, 19,
Gayatri Mantra 84,
Geography 162,
Geometry 246,
German 193, 273,
Germans 5, 110,
Germany 5, 269-70, 287,
Ghalib, Asad Ullah Khan 84, 177, 189,
Ghangiz 12,
Ghazal 124,
Ghazali, Imam Ahmad 45, 104, 119, 234, 236, 310-12,
Ghaznin 68, 75,
Ghosh, Aurobindo 199,
Gibb 47-48, 63-64,
Gibbon Edward 319,

Gita 233 Gita 233, God 5-9, 11-13, 16, 21-24, 26-27, 29, 37, 39, 44, 51, 58, 68-69, 80, 88, 99, 101, 114, 119-20, 122, 125-29, 140-41, 144-45, 148-49, 158, 161-162, 168-69, 176, 182, 212, 223, 231-37, 243, 250, 257, 260-66, 270, 273, 275, 290, 293, 295, 297-304, 309-11, 313, 317-18, 320, Godism 22 Goeth 120, 122, 141-142, 176, 288, Golden Horde 61, Good Friday 250, Gopi Chand Narang, Professor 213, Gopi Nath, Prohit 84, 92-93, Goraksh Nath, Yogi 93, Government 46, Grand National Assembly 46, Graumann 225 Greco Hellenic 36 Greek 24, 29, 30, 36, 98, 102, 192, 308-10, 319, Greek Culture 102 Greek Mysticism 20. Greek Philosophers 38, Greek Philosophy 275, 306, 309, Greeks 102, Greek Science 306, Greek Thought 36, 309, Gudalquivir 127, Guernica 2, Gulshan-i-Raz Jadid 143, 227, 289, Gustave Jacqier 61,

H

Hadi Hussain, 118, 134, 286, Hadiqatul Haqiqat 67, Hadi Sabzawari, Mulla 18, Hadith 96-97, 99, 102, Hafiz 139, 190-91, 286, 298-99, Hafiz Malik 130 Hali, Maulana 128-29, 133, 195, Haliaj, Mansur 69, 119, 120, 235, 236, 267, 298, Haq 231, 294, 304, Harvey Cushing 222, 228, Hashmi, S.Y. 215 Hassan Basri 295, 310, Hayman 250, Heaven 4, 19, 27, 28, 84, 88, 295, 300, Heaven and Hell 291, Heavens 217, 262, 266, 273, Hebrew Bible 7, 30, Hegel 205, 315, Hegelians 54 Heisenberg 271, Hejaz 127, 149, Hell 11, 14, 25, 84, 88, 153, 295, 1 300. Hera 294, Hereditary Kingship 278, 317, Hikmah 98-99 Hikmat-i-Jan 70-71, Himala 133,

Himalayas 133, 177, Hindu 19, 84, 126, 179, 181, 183, 199, 201, 203, 205, 235, Hindu Community 182, 206, Hinduhood 205, Hindu Intellectualism 208-9, Hindu Leaders 181, Hindu Mahasabha 179, Hindu Majority 206, Hindu Muslim Relations 181, 205, Hindu Philosophers 209-10, Hindu Revivalism 205 Hindu 111, 128, 181-83, 198, 200, 205-6. Hindu Sages 246, Hindustani Bachchon Ka Git 133, Hindu University 205, Hindu Vedantic Philosophy 295, Hiroshima 7 Historiography 102, History 109, 246, 321, History of Islam 168, History of Muslim Philosophy 240, History of Spain 123, Holy Book 65, Holy of Holies 8, Holy Prophet 76, 112, 167, 171, 290, Holy Scripture 99, Homeland 169, Honain 58, Houris 87-88. Hours with the Mystics 240. Humanism 17, 107, 198, 212, Humanistic 17, Humanity 59, Hurriyat 301, Hussain, Taha 35, 47, Hussain Rashid, Ali 95, Hussrel 245 Hexley, Aldous 249-50, 285, 291, Hyderabad 306,

I

I and Thou 2, Iberian Peninsula 35 Iblis 28, 119-22, 223, Iblis 28, 112-2-, Ibn al-Farid 236, The Arabi 19, 23, 29, 80, 231-33, Ibn Baja 311, Ibn Khaldun 9-10, 36-38, 42-43, 46. 65, 104, Ibn Rushd 311, Ibn Taimiyya 45, 47, 58, 104, 296, Ibn Tufail 311. Ibn Tumert 45, 47, Idea 40, Ideal 41, 46, 73, Idealism 53, Ideals 74, Idea of Personality 240, Idea of Personality 240, Idea of Personality in Sufism 239, Idea of the Holy 243, Ideological Chauvinism 108.

Ideology 12-13, 15, Ideology of Pakistan 304, Ifrangin 122, Iftikhar Hussain, Dr. Agha 305, Ijtihad 36, 43-46, 96, 171, 318, Ikhwan-us-Safa 311, Ilm-ul-Kalam and Al-Kalam 321, Iman 297, Immamate 46, Imperialism 113, 170, 287, Incarnation 20, India 35, 39-51, 62, 81, 133, 142, 144, 187, 191, 194, 197-98, 201, 203-5, 207-9, 213, 214, 233, Indian 87, 116, 171, 192, 197, 200, 213-14, Indian Anthems 135, Indian Communities 209, Indian Empire 123, Indian Muslims 64, 198, 209, Indian Nation 183, 204, Indian Persian Literature 178, Indian Persian Poetry 173, Indian Philosophy 246. Indians 128, 133, Indian Subcontinent 187, Indo-Muslim Renaissance 198, Indonesia 95, 194, Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent 295, Intellect 71 International Congress 154, International Islam 165, Internationalism 201, Interpreting Personality Theories 228. Intution 71, Intution 71, Iqbal, Sir Allama Mohammad Iqbal 1-6, 10-12, 14-19, 21-23, 25-31, 35-40, 42, 44-47, 49-51, 53-54, 58, 61, 63-65, 67-79, 81, 84, 86, 88-93, 95, 98-99, 101-5, 107-43, 146-51, 153-54, 159-60, 164-70, 172-78, 180-85, 187-91, 195, 197-215, 217-20, 222-29, 232-33, 238-53, 255-61, 265-67, 269-83, 285-93, 298-303, 305-21, Iqbal and his Poems 215, Iqbal and his Poems 215 Iabal and Post Kantian Voluntarism 239, Igbal Day 208. Iqbal: His Life and Time 281, Iqbalian 28, Iqbaliat 197, Iqbal Ka Ilm-i-Kalam 318, 321, Igbal Nama 172 Iqbal Number 208, Iqbal Poet Philosopher of Pakistan 130, Iqbal Shanasi 215, Iqbal Singh 197, 200-201, 203, 207, 210, 215, Iqual's Lectures 23, Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion 281, Iqual's Thinking 172, Igbal's Work 171. Iqbal: The Poet and his Message 215, Iran 95, 119, 164, 187, 192, 194-95, 207-8, 214, 233, Iranian 25, 192, Iranian Cultural Mission to India 207. Iranians 207, 287,

Iraq 287, Irfan 293. Irtani, Abdul Hamid 215, Isaiah 6-8, Ishq 126, 130, 220, 301, 321, Ishrat Hasan, Doctor 317, Iskandar 21, Islah 58, Islam 9, 25, 29, 35-36, 40, 41, 43-55, 60, 62, 76, 95-97, 99, 101-102, 127, 164-67, 169, 171, 192, 198-200, 203-205, 207, 244, 255-56, 258-59, 261, 265, 274, 276-77, 290, 294, 295, 299, 301-3, 306, 309-11, 313-14, 316, 318, 321 295, 299, 301 14, 316-318, 321, as an Ethical Islam as an Ethical and a Political Ideal 215, Islamic 10, 19, 36, 38, 129, 255, Islamic Community 29, Islamic Culture 29, 294, Islamic Era 192, Islamic Fraternity 48, Islamic Genius 57 Islamic Heartland 129 Islamic History 167, 225, 310, Islamic Internationalism 165, Islamic Law 97, Islamic Literature 172, Islamic Millat 30, Islamic Monotheism 22, Islamic Politics 167, Islamic Revivalism 201, 205, Islamic Socialism 116, Islamic Society 301, Islamic Teachings 84, 296, Islamic Thought 19, 275 Islamic Tradition 28, 259, Islamic Traditions 206, Islamic World 18, 187, 192-95 Islam in Modern National State 172, Islamism 48. Israfil 147, Italian 11, Italy 193, Itar Singh, Professor 214,

T

Jacob 30,
Jaffari, Ali Sardar 215,
Jagan Nath Azad 214,
Jahan Dust 84,
Jahilian 41,
Jala 119,
Jalali 296,
James, William 98,
Jami 232,
Jamiaa-i-Hind 213, 215,
Jamil ud-Din Ahmad 63-64,
Jamshid 88,
Jamshid 88,
Jamshid al-Kashi 18,
Janatal Firdaus 84,
Javid Iqbal, Doctor 293, 304,
Javid Nama 23, 25-26, 30, 79, 84, 92,
111, 113, 118-22, 132, 144, 151,
153-54, 164, 172, 175, 177, 227,
285-88, 291-92.

Jawab-i-Shikwa 5-8, 11-13, 16, Jazb 296, Jesus Christ 294, Jewish 10, 15, 235, Jews 4, 11, 177, Jihad 36. Jinnah, Mohammad Ali 204, 210, Joglekar, K.M. 92, Johar-i-Ishq 78, Johar-i-Ruh 78, Joseph 190, Junaid 234, 293, Jurisprudence 49,

K

Kafir 129, Kalama-i-Adamiya 232. Kant 99, 270, 282, 289, 291, 306, 320, Kantian 99, 283, Kantians 283, Karamat 295 Karl Marx 177, Kashf 293 Kashmir 87, 297, Kathrat 296. Kemal Ata Turk, 114, 194, Kepler 17, Kerbala 63, 310, Khalifa 27, 120, Khalq 231, 238-39, Khanqah 146-47, Khaqani 67 Khilafat 46, 51, Khizar 140, Khizr-i-Rah 213, Khudi 23, 29, 78, Khusraw-u-Shirin 26, Kiekaard 247 Kiernan, V.G. 16, 130, Kitab al-Tawasin 235, Knowledge 96, Koyre 19, Kufr 297, Kurd Ali, Mohammad 95,

L

Lahore 63, 82, 92, 269,

Lala-e-Tur 28,
Lange 271,
Langer, S.K. 282,
Language 109,
Laqueur, Walter Z., 172,
Latarux 219,
Latin 187-88, 193-94,
Latin America 109,
Law 25,
League of Nations 51, 177,
Lectures 24, 27-29,
Lenin 177,
Letters and Writings of Iqbal 292,

Liberalism 50, 60,
Life of the Poet-Philosopher, 130,
Literalism 48,
Literature 320,
Logic Positivism 98,
Lol Hajj 297,
London 123, 306,
Love 69-71, 78,
Lucy 27,
Luther 193,
Luther's Movement 51,

M

Mabad 310, Mabad Juhni 311, Ma'bud 297, Madhu 84, Madras 306. Madrasa 146, Makhzan 134, Makhzanul Asrar 67, Making of Humanity 314, Maktahs 147, Maktubat-i-Iqbal 239, Malamatiyya 30, Malik, Imam 41, Malik, Lynda P. 130, Manichaeism 295. Maqalat-i-Iqbal 172. Marabout 63-64, Maragha 18, Marathi 214 Margaret Smith 235, 240, Ma'rifat 293, Mars 122. Maruf, Doctor Mohammad 281, 291, Maruf Karkhi 293, Mashriqi, Allama Anayatullah Khan, 261 Maslak 293, Marxist Thought 38, Mary 20-21, Masjid-i-Qurtaba 178, 213, Maslow 220-22, 224, 228-29, Massignon, L. 29, 235-36, 240, Materialism 27, 47, 68, 310, Mathematics 102, 246. Mathnavi 121, 137 Mathnavi of Rumi 233, May, Doctor L.S., 281, Mazdak 11, Mctaggart's Philosophy 239, Medieval Catholicism 25, Medieval Christian Theology 23, Medieval Church 20, Medieval Europe 188, Medieval Islam 4, Medieval Muslim Thinkers 26. Medieval Mysticism 43, MeDonough, Sheila 1, Meliorism 38 Metaphysical 38, Middle Ages 17-20, 22, 50, 187-88; 193, 272,

Mullah 6, 145, Munich 18, 154, 158, Murcian 23 Musaddas 128, 203, Musafir 67-68, 132, Music 127, 320, Music 127, 320, Muslim 9, 10, 17, 22, 29, 36, 41, 44, 48, 51, 55, 59, 65, 95, 99, 103, 112, 116, 122, 126- 27, 169, 181, 183, 185, 197, 202, 206, 209, 232, 234, 245, 275, 299, 301, 321. Muslim Art 138, Muslim Asia 53 Muslim Brotherhood 168, Brotherhood of Egypt 58, Muslim Muslim Civilization 35, 48, 60, Muslim Community 15, 104, 164, 169, 180, Muslim Councillors 179, Muslim Countries 46,51,55 Muslim Culture 18, 36, 38, 277, 314. Muslim East 43, 188. Muslim History 62, 128, 320, Muslimhood 205, Muslim India 180, 187, Muslim Lands 62, 168, Muslim Law 45, Muslim Life 49, Mujallah-e-Muheet 208, Middle East 65, 121, 166, Millat 29-30, 72, 167, 287 Millat-i-Baiza Par Aik Imrani Nazar . 172, Milton 119, 122, Mir, 64 Miraf 25, 290, Mishkat-al-Anwar 312, 321, Misri, Dhun-Noon 293, Mission of Islam 169, Mujjaddidiyah 297, Modern Islam 299, Modernist 47, 50, 55, Modernist Movement 49, Modern World 17, 95, 164, 278, 317, Mohan Roy, Ram 128, Monasticism 285, 295, Monist 103, Monotheism 29-30, Monotheist 29 Montague-Chelmsford Reforms 179. Moreno 222, Moses 9, 117, 146, 149, 174, 221, 227, 263, 273, Mosque 126, 128, 129, Mount Abu 92, Mu'adh 97, Mu'awiya, Amir 41, 63, 310, Mughals 184, Muhammad 8, 28, 42, 171, 232, Muhammad Ahmad, Sheikh 118. Muhammad Ali, Maulana 204, Muhammedan Educational Conference 166, Mu'ini, S.A.V., 172, Mujadala 48, Mujahidin 128,

Musaddas 128, 203, Muslimhood 205. Muslim Milla 140. Muslim Modernists 95 Muslim Mystics 18, 30, 121, 233, 235, Muslim Nationalism 52, 206, Muslim Peoples 55, 64, Muslim Philosophers 104, 260, 293, 311, 314, Muslim Poets 232, 235, Muslim Renaissance 36, 46-47, 53, 55-57, 214, Muslims 2, 5, 15, 25, 29, 30, 46, 51, 64, 76, 102-4, 111, 121, 128, 129, 136, 164, 165, 168, 170-72, 179, 181-83, 204, 205, 276, 287, 295, 200, 11 309-11. Muslim Science 18, 314, Muslim Scientists 311, 314, Muslim Scholars 275, Muslim Societies 170, Muslim Society 36, 41, 44, Muslim Spain 45, Muslims of India 62, 150, 201, 206, Muslim State 62 Muslim States 51, Muslim Theology 48, Muslim Thinkers 36, 232, 306, 309-10, 321, Muslim Thought 45, 307, 309, 320, Muslim Traditions 258, Muslim Universalism 164-65, Muslim World 35, 41, 42, 44-47, 50, 51, 55-60, 168, 170, 188, 233, 270, Musolini 177, Mustafa 171 Mutakallim 18, Mutakallimeen 311, Mutazila 310-12, Mutazila Movement 311, Mysteries of Selflessness 165, 172, 229, 292, Mystic 28, 47, Mysticism 65, 75, 198, 293 Mysticism and Philosophy 250, Mystics 282, 293, 321, Mystics of Islam 240,

N

Nabi 7,
Nubuwwat 294,
Nadir Shah 68,
Nafisi 208,
Nagindar, Professor 214,
Naim, C.M., 130,
Namwar Singh, Professor 214,
Napolean 177,
Naqshbandiyah 295, 297,
Naqshbandiya'ı Mujjaddidiyah Tariqah 304,
Nasr, Professor 19, 28,

Nationalism 51, 54, 60, 68, 108, 117, 165, 167, 171, 183, 194, 200-202, 206-7, 210, 212, 290, Naturalism 53, 178, Nature 18, 27, 39, 321, Naturism 47 Naya Shiwala 133, Nazir Ahmad 128, Nazir Qaiser, Doctor 217, Nasiz 5, 289, Nazzam 306, Nehru 206, Neitzche 53, 120-22, 177, 201, 210, 225, 260, 271, Nejd 45, Neo-Persian 192 Neoplatonic Idea 23, New Pathways in Psychology Newton 17 New World 61. Nicholson 165, 189, 207, 228-29, 233, 236, 239-40, 292, Nirguna Brahman 231. Nirwana 43, Nizami 22 Nizami of Ganja 21, 26, 67, Non-Muslim 165, 197, 209, 213, Non-Muslim Indians 213, Non-Muslim Majority 51, Non-Muslims 179, 200, Norman 193, North Africa 35, 55, 62, Notes on Kitab al-Tawasin 240,

0

Obscurantism 104, Occidental 154, Omar Ibn Abdul Aziz 41, Omayyid 63, 310-11, On Islam As Ethical And Political Ideal 211. On Religion: Speeches to its Cultural Despisers 243 Optimism 14, 38, Oqba 41 Orient 154, Oriental Scholars 17, 287, Oscar Wilde 132 Otto, Rudolf 243 Ottoman Empire 42 Ottoman Turkish 187,

P

Padmakshi 93, Pakistan 35, 57, 150, 197, 204, 206, 213-14, 288, Pakistanis 129, 189, Palestine 57, 60, 177, 287, Pan-Arabian 60,

Pan Arabism 170, Panchayt System 179, Pan Europeanism 60, Pan-Islamic Movement 166, 169, Pan-Isiamic Society 166, Pan-Islamism 60, 165, 167-68, 170, Pan-Islamist 166. Pantheism 231-32, 236, 267, 298, Paradise 87-88, 153, 156, 158, Parliament 12 Parliament of Iblis 122 Pas Che Bayad Kard 132, Pashtu 189, Paton, H.J. 262, 267, Patrick, G.T.W. 98, Patriotism 198 Payam-i-Mashriq 18, 24, 28, 111, 114, 118, 132, 141, 142, 151, 168, 169, 172, 201, 228, 229, 285. Penelope 21, People of the Book 52, Persian 67, 79, 80, 125, 136, 147, 167, 175, 187-89, 191, 192, 194, 195, 202, 206-8, 214, 306, Persian Mysticism 295, Persian Poetry 77, 173, 198-203 208, 297, 299 Persian Poets 79, 139 Persian Sage 288, Persio-Arabic 213 Personality of God 30, Pessimism 14, 38, 190, Philosopher 99, 103, Philosophers 305, 308, 313, Philosophy 49, 95, 98-99, 102-3, 105, 107, 109, 269, 272, 305-8, 313, 317, Philosophy In A New Key 282, Physics 102, 244, Picasso 2, Pilgrimage of Eternity 118, 291, Pir 64, 247, Planck 271, Plato 20, 138-39, 244, 286, 309, Platonism 139 Plotinus 233-35, 240, Plurality 296, Poem 15 Poems From Ighal 16, 130, Poet and his Message 172, 215, Poetism 48, Poets 305 Political Pan-Islamism 166-167, Pope 25, Portuguese 110, Post-Almuhadian 56-58 Post-Almuhadian Man 60-61, Post World War 177 Praeterintellectual 22, Pragmatic Logic 57, Prakirti 246, Presence 19. Presidential Address 171, Priesthood 278, 317, Principia Rthies 253, Progressive Movement 214, Progressivism 14 Prolegomena 9-10, Prophet 6, 9, 12, 15, 41, 47, 51, 63, 65, 96-99, 112, 121, 126, 140, 149, 166,

171, 191, 212, 232, 257, 277, 294, 299, 308, 315-317, 320, Prophethood 278 Prophetic Faith 7, 12-13, 16, Prophet of Islam 122, 278, 316-17, Prophets 17, 47, 278, Protestant 127, Protestant Revolution 51 Psychology 57, 244, 272-73 Psychology And Religion 267 Psychotheraphy and Existentialism 227-Punjab 183 Punjabi 188-89, 214, Punjabi Mysticism 214, Punjabi Poetry 214, Punjab Legislative Council 179-80. Punjab University 183, Purdah 30. Purgatorio 153, Purgatory 22, Pursa 246.

Q

Qadir, Doctor C.A. 241, Qadiriyah 295, Qadiriyah Tariqah 298, Qalandariyah 296. Qalb 245, 285, 303, Oasideh 78 Qayyum, Doctor A. 197 Qiyas 120, Quakerism 290. Quakerism 290, Quietism 190, Quran 9, 23, 24, 28, 36, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 49, 52, 58, 63, 64, 68, 96-99, 101-3, 105, 119, 141, 192, 205, 219, 226, 233, 237-39, 245, 249, 255, 257, 260-65, 267, 274, 275, 278, 281, 282, 288, 289, 292, 294, 303, 309-310, 313-17, 321, Quranic 258, Quranic Ideology 164, Ouranic Law 170. Quranic Spirit 37, Quranic Teachings 41, 200, 288, Quranic Text 49, Quresh 46,

R

Rabia Basri 294,
Rabbi 219,
Race 109, 116,
Racism 108,
Rama 209,
Rashid Radha 47, 95,
Rationalism 61, 310-12, 318-20,
Readings From Mystics of Islam 240,
Real 40-41, 46,
Reality 37, 39-40, 44, 69,
Reason And Emotion In Psychology
227,
Re-awakening of the East 288,
Reconstruction of Religious Thought

In Islam 16, 35, 63, 103, 105, 227, 240-41, 253, 255, 260, 267, 269, 280, 304, 306, Redemotion 20 Reformation 127, 193 Reformist 47-49, 55, 58, Reformist Movement 48, Reform of Scholars 58, Regionalism 108, Rehmat 286 Reisman, J.M. 221, 228, Religion 43, 55, 57, 68, 103-4, 107, 119, 112, 117, 259, 269, 272-73, 277, 281, 289-90, 294, 307-8, 316-Religious 58, Religious Demoninationalism 108, Religious Experience 305-8, 312, 315-19, Religious Quacks 63 Religious Reformers 51, Religious Thinkers 308, Renaissance 17, 50, 62, 188, 311-20, Renan 44 Reorientation of Muslim Philosophy 105 Republican Form 46, Rind 64. Risalah fi Ara Ahl al-Madinat al-Fadilah Risalat al-ghufran 25, Ritualism 104, Roman Emperors 319, Roman Empire 319. Roman Empire 319, Romanticism 202, Rome 11, 52, 60, Rosenthal, E.I.J. 170, 172, Rukhsat Ali Bazm-i-Jahan 134 Rumi, Maulana Jalal Ud-Din 23, 26, 67, 157, 159, 161, 164, 190, 203, 235-37, 298, 303, Rumuz 200-201, Rumuz-i-Bekhudi 24, 72, 111, 132, 140-41, 165, 229, 286 Russell, Bertrand 285, 288, 289, Ruzbihan-i-Baqli 120,

S

Sadha Karma, Doctor 214,
Sadra Shirazi, Mulla 18,
Saeed Halim Pasha 164,
Saeed Sheikh, Professor 103, 312, 321,
Salafia 58,
Salik 293,
Salim, Haji Agus Salim 95,
Saluk 293,
Salum, Haji Agus Salim 95,
Sanar, Hakim 25, 67-69, 71-80, 119,
139, 221,
Sanskrit 81, 175, 191-92, 214,
Sapru, Sir Tej Bahadur 197, 199, 204,
208,
Sarmad 119,

Sasanian 192 Satan 11-12. 14-15, 119, 121-22, 170, 222, 286, 288, Satanology 119, Satans 144 Satan's Parliament 15, Satan's Prophets 122 Sawami Ram Tereth 209, Sayer, D.L. 20, Sayrul Ibad ilal-Ma'ad 79. Schimmel, Professor 126, 223, 228, 287, Schizophrenia 224, Schloiernacher, F. 242, Schools of Muslim Theology 50, 95, 102-3, 107-8, 117, 248, 259, 269, 271-73, 316, 318, 320. Scientist 103 Scientists 305 Second Round Table Conference 123, Second World War 2, 289 Secrets of the Self 165, 172, 201, 228-229, 240, Secular 96, Selected Letters of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi 239, Self-Criticism 58 Sepoy Mutiny 47, Shahin 214, Shakespeare 177, Shaking of the Foundations 6, 16, Shamloo 172 Shamsuddin Tebrizi 154-56, 158 Shariah 20, 24, 169, 296-97, 302, Sharif, M.M. 240, 317, Shattering 27, Shauq 130 Shibli, Abu Bakr 294 Shibli Namani 95, 129, 311, 321, Shikwa 10, Shikwa and Jawab-i-Shikwa 5-6, 12, 203 Shroff 125 Shuhudi 297, 304, Shuhudi Tassawwuf 304, Shuja'at 301, Siddiqi, Doctor M. Raziuddin 269, Siffin 47-48, 50, 57-58, 63, Sikh 182 Simla 180, Sin 20, 26, Sindhi 18, 189, Singha 202 Sinha, S. 165, 172, 197-98, 200, 203, 206-7, 209-10, 215, Skandar Nama 21, Smith, N.K. 291. Socialism 54, 113, 125, 177, 287, Socialistic Movement, 201, Social Reform 58, Social Values 58 Social Values of Islam 57, Sociology 57. Socio-Political System 166. Socrates 309 South Asian Muslims 129. Southern Asia 192, Sovereignity of Allah 168.

Soviet 185, Soviet Union 35, 195, Space 19, 29-30, Spain 62, 123, 169, 193, 311, Spainish 110, Spanish Civil War 2, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal 172, 215. Spengler 37, Spinks, C.S. 267, Spinoza 231-32, 283, 318, Spirit of Islam 46, Spirit of Muslim Culture 321, Spiritualism 68, Spiritual Life 40, Spiritual Renaissance 61, Spiritual Values 43, Sri Krishna 209-10, Sri Ram Nauj 210, Sri Shankra 210, 231-33, State 46, 117, 184, Strasbourg 60, Studies in Muslim Philosophy 312, 321, Sub-Continent 35, 184, 188, Sud K.N. 197, 202, 206-7, 215, Sufi 65, 67, 69, 145, 190, 293, Sufi Ethics 42 Sufi Literature 121, Sufis 293, 299 Sufism 23, 121, 125, 256, 293, 302, 306, Sufism, an Account of Mystics of Islam Sufistic School 256, Sufi Thought 128. Suhrawardiyah 295, Sukr 296, Sulaman Phulvari, Syed 233, Sumanta 93, Sunnah 97-98 Sunnat Allah 101, Supreme Ego 29, Surahs 101, Surur, Al-i-Ahmad 82, Swedish 160, Sweeden 154, Swiss 60-61, Syria 57, 95, 177, 287, Syrian 30, Systematic Theology 16, Suzuki, T.D. 242, 247, 253,

T

Tabatabai, Allama 95, Tafsir 192, Tagart 233, Tagore 199, 205-7, 214, Tahafut-al-Falasifa 313, Tahira, Qurratul Ain 84, Tajdid 55, Tajik 195, Tamerlane 61-62, Taqdir 120, Taqlid 48-318, Tarana-i-Hindi 133, Tarana-i-Milli 135,

Tariq 169. Tariqah 293, Tariqah-i-Rishian 297. Tarigahs 295, Tariqat 296 Tarqib Band 124, Tasawwuf 75, 130, 293, 295-96, 298-99 Taskhir-i-Fitrat 18, 120-21, Taswir-i-Dard 133, Tatar 62, 116, Tawhid 103, 287, 296-97, 299, 302, Tawney, Professor 92, Teachings of Islam 294, Tebriz 154-55, 157, Technology 248, Teleological 14, Temple 88 Temporal 40-42, 48, 60, Tennyson 135 Territorial Nationalism 51-52, Theological Science 58, Theology 49, Theory of Knowledge 291, Third World 109-18, Thoughts And Reflections of Iqbal 172, 239, Thucidyde 38, Tillich, Paul 2-4, 6-8, 10-14, 16, Time 125, 127, Timourid (Timourid) 42, 62, Toghtamish 61, Tolstoy 177 Towards The Integration of Psychotheraphy 228. Towards Universi Man 215, Toynbee 61, Traditional Islam 20, Traditions 45, 294, Tragicity 22 Tribalism 108 Trinity 20, 296. Turanian 116, Turk 46, Turkey 46, 53, 114, 164, 167, 194, Turkish 46, 167, 187, 192, 194-95, Turkish Language 194, Turkoman 116, Turks 116, 287 Tusi, Nasir ud Din 18,

I

Ujjain 81, 93, Ujjal Singh 182, Ulema 293, 297, 313, Ultimate Aim 41, Ultimate Reality 36, Ulysses 20, 21, 29, Ummah 25, 29, 170-71, Unani Medicines 184, Unionist Party 180, Unionists 179, United Indian Nation 183, United States 59, 314, Unity 296, Unity of God 52, 166, Unity of Islam 171, Universality of Islam 166 Universal Muslim Polity 172 Universe 19, 39, 65, 70-72, 237, 310, University 82 University of the Punjab 281, Uqab 78, Urdu 81-82, 84, 123, 126, 127, 147, 173-73, 178, 187, 189, 191-92, 194, 202, 206, 209, 214, 233, 281, Urdu Literature 18, 128, 175, 177, 214, Urdu Lyric 175 Urdu Poetry 125, 132, 142, 173, 198, 213, 214, Urdu Lyric 175 Urdu Poetry 125, 132, 142, 173, 198, 213, 214, Urdu Poets 173-74, 178, Urdu Writers 178, U.S.S.R. 59,

V

Vahid, S.A. 215, 239, Valery 121, Vaughen, R.A., 234, 240, Vedic Glory 129, Venus 121, Vergil 22-23, 26, Vicegerent 27, 120, Viceroy's Executive Council 180, Victorian Poets 135, Vikramaditya 93, Vikrami Samvat 93, Vocation de l'Islam 35, 62,

W

Wadud, K.A. 172,
Wahab, Mohammad Ibn Abdul Wahab
45, 47,
Wahabi Empire 47,
Wahdat al-Shuhud 236, 297,
Wahdatul Wajud 75, 235-36, 285,
296-97, 299,
Waheed Ud-Din, Faqir 82,
Wahid, Syed Abdul Wahid 188-89,
Wahy (Inspiration) 35-16,
Wajdaan 321,
Waliullah, Shah 18, 45,
War of Independence in 1857, 205,
Warsaw 7,
Wasil Ibn Ata 295,
West 12, 17, 21, 27, 28, 47, 49, 50,
104, 108, 112, 114, 119, 133, 141,
158, 160, 187, 209, 279, 285, 287,
288, 289, 307, 311, 314.

Western 39, 47, 158, 160-61, 214, Western Capitalism 11, Western Civilization 35, 49, 60, Western Culture 112, 288, Westerners 28, 276 Western Europe 193, Western Ideas 48. Western Imperialism 68, 170. Westernization 168, 170, Westernization 168, 170, Western Orientalists 18 Western Philosophy 165, 283, Western Powers 11, Wester Scholars 19, Western Society 64 Western System of Medicine 184, Western Thought 308. Western World 56, 59, 122, 187, Western Writers 259. Westoestlicher 141, Wilson 220, Whitehead, Prof: 307, Why I am Not A Christian 292, Wisal 296, 302, World of Islam 28, 47, 49, 52-53, World Wars III, Woozley, A.D., 291, Wujud al-Mutlaq 231, Wujudi 296, 299 Wujudi Tassawwuf 298-99, 304,

Y

Uadgar-i-Galib, 195, Yemen 197, 127, YHVH 8, Yoga 93, 259, 288,

Z

Zubur-i-Ajam 31, 132, 143, 151, 175, 227, 228, Zafarul Hassanm Dr. 306, Zaghlul Pasha 164, Zahir 43, 294, Zainul Abedin, Sultan 297-98, Zaud-o-Shauq 213, Zen Buddhist 242, 247, 249, Zeno 246, Zill 231, Zinda Rud 84, 87, 88, Zoroaster 121, Zoroastrian 192, Zoology, 102, Zulaikha 190,