

EDITED BY
ASLOOB AHMAD ANSARI

IQBAL
ESSAYS AND STUDIES



GHALIB ACADEMY

NEW DELHI

رَبِّهِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ



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1978

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

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جہانے را دگرگوں کرد یک مرد خود آگاہے



MAHOMETSGESANG



—Goethe

Seht den Felsenquell,
Freudehell,
Wie ein Sternenblick;
Ueber Wolken
Naehrten seine Jugend
Gute Geister
Zwischen Klippen im Gebuesch.

Juenglingfrisch
Tanzt er aus der Wolke
Auf die Marmorfelsen nieder,
Jauchzet wieder
Nach dem Himmel.

Durch die Gipfelgaenge
Jagt er bunten Kiesel nach,
Und mit fruehem Fuehrertritt
Reisst er seine Bruderquellen
Mit sich fort.



Drunten werden in dem Tal
Unter seinem Fusstritt Blumen,
Und die Wiese
Lebt von seinem Hauch.



جوئے آب



[Iqbal's free Persian rendering of Goethe's
'Mahometsgesang']

بذکر کہ جوئے آب چہ مستمانہ می رود
مانند کہکشان بگریبان مرغزار
در خواب ناز بود بہ گہوارہ ستحاب
وا کرد چشم شوق بہ آغوش کوهسار
از سنگریزہ نغمہ کشاید خرام او
سیمائے او چو آئینہ بے رنگ و بے شمار
زی بصر بیکرانہ چہ مستمانہ می رود
در خود یگانہ از ہمہ بیگانہ می رود





Doch ihn haelt kein Schattental,
Keine Blumen,
Die ihm seine Knie umschlingen,
Ihm mit Liebes-Augen schmeicheln:
Nach der Ebne dringt sein Lauf
Schlangengewandelnd.

Baeche schmiegen
Sich gesellig an. Nun tritt er
In die Ebne silberprangend,
Und die Ebne prangt mit ihm,
Und die Fluesse von der Ebne
Und die Baeche von den Bergen
Jauchzen ihm und rufen: Bruder!
Bruder, nimm die Brueder mit,
Mit zu deinem alten Vater,
Zu dem ewgen Ozean,
Der mit ausgespannten Armen
Unser wartet,
Die sich, ach! vergebens oeffnen
Seine Sehrenden zu fassen;



Denn uns frisst in oeder Wueste
Gierger Sand; die Sonne droben
Saugt an unserm Blut; ein Huegel
Hemmet uns zum Teiche! Bruder,
Nimm die Brueder von der Ebne,
Nimm die Brueder von den Bergen
Mit, zu deinem Vater mit!



در راه او بهار پیری خانه آفرید
 نرگس دمید و لاله دمید و سمن دمید
 گل عشوه داد و گفت یکے پیش ما بایست
 خندید غنچه و سردامان او کشید
 نا آشنائے جلوہ فروشان سبزه پوش
 صحرا پرید و سینہ کوه و کمر درید
 زی بصر بیکرانه چه مستانه می رود
 در خود یکانه از همه بیکانه می رود
 صد جوئے دشت و مرغ و کهستان و باغ و راغ
 گفتند اے بسط زماں با تو سازگار
 مہارا کہ از تفک آبی نہ بردہ ایم
 از دستبرد ریگ بیابان نکالدار
 وا کردہ سینہ را بہ ہوا ہائے شرق و غرب
 در بر گرفتہ ہمسفران زبون و زار
 زی بصر بیکرانه چه مستانه می رود
 با صد ہزار گوہر یک دانہ می رود



Kommt ihr alle!—
Und nun schwillt er
Herrlicher; ein ganz Geschlechte
Traegt den Fuersten hoch empor!
Und im rollenden Triumph
Gibt er Laendern Namen, Staedte
Werden unter seinem Fuss.

Unaufhaltsam rauscht er weiter,
Laesst der Tuerme Flammengipfel,
Marmorhaeuser, eine Schoepfung
Seiner Fuelle, hinter sich.


Zedernhaeuser traegt der Atlas
Auf den Riesenschultern; sausend
Wehen ueber seinem Haupte
Tausend Flaggen durch die Luefte,
Zeugen seiner Herrlichkeit.



Und so traegt er seine Brueder,
Seine Schaetze, seine Kinder
Dem erwartenden Erzeuger
Freudebrausend an das Herz.



دریائے پرخروش ز بند و شکن گزشت
از تذگنایے وادی و کوه و دمن گزشت
یکساں چو سهل کرده نشیب و فراز را
از کاخ شاه و باره و کشت و چمن گزشت
بیتاب و تند و تیز و جگر سوز و بیقرار
در هر زمان تازه رسید از کهن گزشت
زی بصر بیکرانه چه مستانه می رود
در خون یکانه از همه بیکانه می رود



PREFACE

The centenary of the birth of Mohammad Iqbal, celebrated in 1977, saw the appearance of a spate of books on the multiple aspects of this rich and complex genius. It would be presumptuous on the part of any one to claim that the final verdict has been passed on him and all the infinite possibilities of interpretation exhausted. One feels, on the contrary, that an adequate critical approach to the poet-philosopher is likely to emerge only in the course of time. What has been done so far leaves much to be desired, for what has been done is largely either the product of a naive and excessive reverence for him or rests upon wilful distortion and critical purblindness. Hence it is necessary, on the one hand, to take nothing on trust and explode the fanciful myth that has been allowed to grow round the poet over the years; it is no less essential, on the other, to expose the false and misleading premises that support a calculated misrepresentation of him.

When Iqbal came out with his early Urdu poems, later collected in *Bang-e-Dara*, he was pounced upon by the composers of the traditional ghazal—the sticklers for purism, generally speaking, those who cared more for the finesse and chastity of the verbal idiom and the observance of decorum and correctness rather than for any freshness and originality of vision. Iqbal's poetry was examined from the linguistic point of view exclusively—a point of view that was hedged in by serious limitations. In their insistence on the idiom rendered sacrosanct by the practice of the earlier

masters Iqbal critics tended to ignore the larger aspects of stylistics and the processes involved in the intricate patterning of the literary verbal structures. They showed little or no awareness of the functioning of image-clusters, of the system of symbology, of myth as the exteriorisation of the collective consciousness, and of style and value as cohering into a pattern and thus raising the question of meaning. They could at best perceive a particular poem sprinkled over with similes and metaphors but had no notion of contextualism or of the correspondence between the thematic and formal components of a work of art. Ghazal may, without any mental reservation, be regarded as the best distillation of our cultural ethos. Its framework bears a curious and striking resemblance to that of the French Symbolist poetry, for in both of them the discontinuities are an index of a highly sophisticated sensibility rather than its reverse as is pertinaciously believed by a well-known but an unduly eccentric Urdu critic. And the maturity, the comprehensiveness and the width of range that is conferred upon this *genre* by Iqbal has pointed up new directions in which it can move and readily absorb the ambivalent drives and impulses of our humanistic culture. Iqbal was, indeed, the pioneer in making the age-old symbols of the ghazal vibrate with new potencies of meaning in accordance with the ever-changing perspectives of our life as is amply evidenced by the ghazals in *Bal-e-Jibril* and *Zabur-e-Ajam*.

In the early decades of this century Iqbal was subjected to a full blast of scathing and ill-informed criticism by those who swore allegiance to the tenets of the Progressive Writers' School. They applauded him, sometimes patronizingly, for welcoming the October 1917 Russian Revolution and for his admiration for the prophetic role of Marx and Lenin in getting the victims of capitalistic bourgeois economy emancipated. They, nevertheless, spoke of him pejoratively, for Iqbal lacked, in the opinion of these critics, an awareness of the changing social reality because he did not

conform to the Marxist stance and did not believe in the materialistic interpretation of history as outlined by Marx. Iqbal had doubtless hailed the emergence of the Communist State with all the exuberance and eager expectancy of his spirit and also tentatively approved the ideological bulwark lying behind it. But he did not regard the economic forces as the sole determinants of the cultural superstructure nor did he exclude God from his cosmology; nor did he concede that the sovereignty of the state transcended the operation of the ethical imperatives. The Progressive Writers' Movement was, in all essentials, politically motivated, and upheld a theory of art that was basically unsound. It demanded a mechanical conformity to a ready-made formula and did not pay any heed to the strange alchemy of artistic creation, for it aimed primarily at the furtherance of extra-literary interests. It was partisan both in intention and achievement. The set of premises on which the adverse criticism of Iqbal was based may be formulated thus: art exists for life; to be true to life it should reflect an awareness of social reality; the only convincing analysis of social reality can be offered in terms of dialectical materialism; and; inferentially, any work of art that is lacking in this particular variety of analysis *ipso facto* ceases to be vital, progressive and life-affirming. Iqbal was also dubbed a fascist and totalitarian because of his fervent admiration for world figures like Napoleon, Mussolini and Nadir Shah, for employing 'eagle' (like William Blake) as the key symbol in his poetry and for believing, like Nietzsche and Shaw, in the cult of energy and in the emergence of the superman at the climactic point of the process of Evolution. All these arguments have utterly lost their cogency (if they ever had any), and no sensitive critical reader subscribes to them any longer.

Most of the Iqbal critics have been preoccupied with not only deducing some kind of 'philosophy' of life from his poetry—which may or may not be a legitimate exercise—but also of regarding his poetry as a mere substitute for it. It is

all very well to talk about Iqbal's philosophical system; even the attempt to reconstruct it by joining together hints and suggestions interspersed in his famous *Lectures* is not only plausible but it is also necessary to accord it the degree of salience it very well deserves. And yet literary criticism is something distinct from lucid and coherent exposition of concepts and rests upon entirely different assumptions. Poetry and Philosophy are two mutually exclusive modes of apprehension of Reality, and hence, logically enough, literary criticism and philosophical elucidation have their own peculiar terms of reference. Literary criticism is basically a matter of explication and involves the endeavour to discover and reveal the enactment of the creative artist's sense of significance, his encounter with events of reality, which is mediated through the inwoven fabric of the literary artifact. It, therefore, requires, on the part of the critic, the exercise of discrimination, aesthetic distancing and a sensitivity to verbal nuances and texture as much as to the relevant co-ordinates of meaning. In spite of his disclaimer Iqbal is a creative artist of the highest order of excellence. And like all great artists his creative impulse may have flagged on occasions but the moments of the full flowering of the creative potential are far too numerous to be ignored. In other words a distinction may be made between poems which are merely rhetorical or lend themselves to a jejune summary, that is, those in which the concepts retain their rigidity, refusing to melt into the fluidity of felt experience, and those which enjoy the status of satisfying linguistic constructs through which Iqbal's basic impusions and insights about life were externalized. These may be regarded as value-laden organic wholes, with their own autonomous, self-subsistent identity, and through which the assent to those insights is not only induced in the reader but is made to grow on him.

It may not be out of place to mention here that although Iqbal assimilated in his system many valuable elements of thought derived from such Western thinkers as Nietzsche,

Leibnitz, Bergson, James Ward and Whitehead, yet he owed no less to Rumi, 'Iraqi, Ibn-e-Khuldun, al-Jili and the Muslim Medieval thinkers in general. And one might add that the single, fundamental and perennial source of inspiration for Iqbal as poet and thinker is the Quran and the personality of the holy prophet, Mohammed, in whom he saw one who was passionately in search of the roots of Being and who aimed at giving a new and decisive turn to the flux of history and the continuum of Time. It was his profound, irresistible overwhelming attachment to the Prophet that helped Iqbal crystallize his concept of love or *Ishq* in all its tremendous richness and complexity, and he used this personality as a medium for his finest configurations of thought and emotion. The concept of *mard-e-momin* in Iqbal, which provides a typology for the perfect man, also derives all its resonance, its full tension-power, when all is said and done, from the same personality.

It is a sheer travesty of facts to hold that Iqbal's poetry is marked by a facile optimism and an uncritical acceptance of a set of inherited values. Making a slight deviation from orthodoxy Iqbal was able to put a new construction on the cherished legends about man, Satan and God. He conceives of man not as a static entity but as a dynamic self—a centre round which is organized the whole potential of psychic energies and desires. Under the impact of Fichte Iqbal evolved his concept of the Ego because he wanted to galvanise the Indian Muslims and the peoples of Asia in general, and make them aware of their latent potentialities. He wanted them to cast off the shackles of enslavement by the Imperialist powers, get rid of inertia and stagnation caused by a stupid belief in fatalism and engage themselves in the hard and unrelenting struggle for life. He also cast Satan or Iblees in a heroic mould because that helped him bring Satan's motivations into conformity with his own peculiar notion of the Ego. It is only by being pitted against the sovereignty of God that Satan is made to walk into the region

of his egoism. Iqbal finds it difficult to resist the spell of Satan's fascination, for Satan is for him a symbol of self-assertion, dynamism and daring speculation. Iqbal probably does not believe in pure and unqualified evil because for him good and evil are inextricably mixed together, and it is possible to convert evil into good by a long-continued process of inner discipline. Iqbal's entire thinking seems to be centred upon the concept of freedom, the exercise of individual volition and willed acceptance of the risks involved in it, and all these are highlighted in the figure of Satan. Similarly Iqbal's conception of God is the end-product of a prolonged search for God's identity in the midst of the chaos of phenomena. For him God is not a hypothetical, transcendent and unapproachable Deity but He is conceived in terms of a dynamic Creative Will. He is also termed as the Infinite Ego that is set up as a perfect exemplar for the Finite Ego to approximate to but as One whose perfection may be measured not in terms of extensity but of intensity. The notion of an anthropomorphic or personalised Absolute Ego is capable of not only being harmonized with but derives from the teachings of Islam.

Iqbal is a poet and a thinker for whom Islam serves significantly as the major factor in the ordering of his value-system. We may identify this value-system as rational, dynamic and religious. His quest for the principle of universalism was bound to be integrated into some kind of framework, and the immediate framework available to him, as is the case with any other poet, was the one provided by his own faith and his own cultural matrix. Iqbal's claims to greatness rest not only on this value-system being important in itself but also on the fact that he has been able to provide for this value-system intellectual coherence, emotional depth and poetic force. In other words the value-system is involved in the structure of his poetry and the poetry is sustained by the value-system. Great poetry is almost always the product of a great vision of life. Iqbal was an advocate for the

discipline of religion and there are many things common between the discipline of religious meditation and the discipline of poetry. He was sensitive to the demands of an expanding physical universe around us—sensitive to its scientific and rational implications in the true Quranic tradition; he was no less responsive to the emotive and spiritual impulses which it involved. We had better make a distinction—and the distinction is always a legitimate and fruitful one—between theological dogmas and rituals on the one hand and the psychic life at the deepest levels which is exploited by religion on the other. Iqbal was deeply and painfully aware of the fact that unless the tremendous reservoir of energy put at our disposal by our scientific potential were properly harnessed and controlled by a moral order of values humanity would be in peril. He exalted the human Ego—the seat of all energy-centres—so highly and with such gusto that man could go ahead with the task of subjugating the environmental forces. He at the same time laid stress on the fact that we should resist the pressure of mechanization over the finer impulses of the human spirit in order to protect it from coarsening. An escape from this pressure was sometimes sought in primitive modes of living, in the life of the unconscious and in the building up of an alluring but impure archetype. For others the solution of this dilemma lay in the discovery of the timeless myths of religion that seemed to embody a kind of wisdom transcending the premises of logical reasoning and cold and barren abstractionism. Iqbal certainly belongs to the second category of thinkers and creative artists. To seek to refute, therefore, the complex expressions of a complex genius like Iqbal by invoking the axioms of a theoretical Communism or Marxism is downright blasphemous and impertinent. His is not a passive, colourless and naive acquiescence but an open-eyed, alert and energetic acceptance of a faith that has stood the test of ages.

Iqbal at his best compares very favourably with poets like


Dante and Eliot with both of whom he shares a cosmic vision and a variety of moral and metaphysical concerns. In his speculative reach and in the matter of externalising the experience of poetry in terms of a controlling vision he is of their tribe, indeed. One may even go to the extent of affirming that some of Shakespeare's most mature insights seem ultimately to derive from a latent but nevertheless ardent absorption into the central Christian myth. And thus one may legitimately assert that Iqbal's firm commitment to a profoundly religious attitude does in no way circumscribe the universality of his appeal. Iqbal's is not an epigrammatic poetry, as Mr. Firaq Gorakhpuri, in tones of pathetic nervousness and with the flaunted purpose of denigration, would erroneously have us believe. The term 'epigrammatic poetry' in this context may be deemed to imply a grudging and indirect tribute to the verbal felicity and economy of the poetic art, but it also surreptitiously insinuates a certain narrowness of thematic range. Iqbal's poetry, however, spans far wider horizons than may be conceded by those who are incapable, like Mr Gorakhpuri, of taking off their blinkers when confronted with a genius of such amplitude as Iqbal. In the final evaluation his is the poetry of vision in which Reality is apprehended and intuited with the subtle responsiveness of the soul. Iqbal's basic intuitions about life and the cosmos are vitalistic and forward-looking and help him in the ordering of experience. This poetry eventually leads on to epiphanies that defy reduction to any merely logical or quasi-scientific terms. Like that of a Dante or a Langland or an Elliot Iqbal's best and most distinguished poetry also tends to break out of its doctrinal envelope and insists on being interpreted on the basis of a fundamental ontology.

An attempt has been made in the various articles included in this volume to evaluate the remarkable achievement of this twentieth-century poet and thinker from different points of view. For purposes of avoiding duplication and achieving some semblance of unity of theme and design some amount

of pruning was necessitated for which I crave the indulgence of the learned contributors. In the compilation of this volume I received invaluable help and selfless and most ungrudging cooperation from two of my worthy colleagues and friends in the Department of English here—Mr. Z. A. Usmani and Mr. Maqbool Hasan Khan. Both of them are responsible for most of the translations of Iqbal's Urdu and Persian couplets done into English; the latter also prepared the index and offered many valuable suggestions regarding book-mechanics. I am also thankful to Mr. Rizwanuddin Khan, the English Seminar Librarian, and Mr. K. C. Mital of the Printwell Printers, Aligarh, for the efficient and attractive printing of the book. And last, but not the least, I wish to record my deep sense of gratitude to Janab Hakim Abdul Hameed Sahib, Director, Ghalib Academy, New Delhi, for his boundless generosity in financing this project and for his graciousness in allowing me an absolutely free hand in shaping this book according to my own taste and judgment.

Aligarh Muslim University
Aligarh
26 March 1978

Asloob Ahmad Ansari



IQBAL

Sabih Ahmad Kamali

QURANIC ALLUSIONS IN RUMI AND IQBAL

The exposition of an author's references to the Scriptures forms an integral part of the methodology of traditional Islamic learning. Technically known as *Takhrij*, the task can be simple and brief in the case of the Quran which lends itself to quick recognition by Muslim writers and readers alike. At any rate, such was the state of their knowledge in classical times when widespread memorisation of the Quranic text and professional training in the 'sciences' (*'Ulum*) related to it gave them confidence in its use and familiarity with its presentation. On the whole, their expositions might be characterized as negative in their approach. Inaccurate references had not the slightest chance of going undetected in their presence. On the positive side, they contented themselves with such details as the identification of the chapter (*Surah*) from which a quotation was taken, or a *resume* of the context in which it occurred. Unlike this method, the exposition of Hadith references abounded in minutiae of information (which have been defined by authorities on the subject). A classical work like Ghazali's *Ihya' al-'Ulum al-Din* (Revivification of the Sciences of Faith) brings out this contrast.¹ The *takhrij* of its Hadith elements forms a monograph by itself to which Ghazali's inadequacy as a Muhaddith seems to have drawn its author. On the contrary, its Quranic allusions never attracted a systematic *takhrij*; for, in quoting from the Quran, a man like Ghazali could not be imagined to err. It is only in our own times that such a thing has in fact been imagined. There is a passage in his *Tahafut al-Falasifa*² where he refers to the following verse: 'No person

knows what delights of the eye are kept hidden (in reserve) for them—as a reward for their (good) deeds' (Quran 32, 17).³ This is followed by a reference to the Qudsi tradition in which the Prophet (Muhammad) reports God (extra-Quranically) to have said: 'I have prepared for my virtuous slaves what no eye ever saw, no ear ever heard, and which never occurred to the heart of man' (*Bukhari*, 'Tauhid', 35). These words bear striking resemblance to a passage in the New Testament (I Corinthians ii, 9): 'But as it is written, eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him'. The juxtaposition of the Quranic Verse and the Qudsi tradition (introduced by the remarks which are prefixed to the Word of God) in Ghazali's citation has led D. B. Macdonald⁴ to imagine that Ghazali has mistaken a Biblical passage for a part of the Quran! The charge is easily refuted by Ghazali's references to the Verse and the tradition in some other parts of the *Tahafut* and in his other writings in general. However, Macdonald's observations point to the need for different introductory remarks before the Word of God (a) as revealed in the Quran, and (b) as reported by the Prophet in a Qudsi tradition. While *قوله تعالى* can be prefixed in either case, the addition of the words *فى كتابه العزيز* would strictly confine it to the Quran. Again, Macdonald's insufficient attention to Ghazali's quotation (which is not from the New Testament as such, but from a Hadith that happened to resemble something in the New Testament) is explained by his personal (Christian) faith and conviction.

In modern times, the general significance and relative roles of Quran and Hadith studies have changed. For the former there are great possibilities (and serious problems) in the increasing popularity of translations of the Quran, on the one hand, and in the inevitable depreciation of its memorization (as an educational method), on the other. For the latter the primary source of information has finally shifted from the spoken word to the printed page. Modern *apparatus criticus*

(crowned in the case of Hadith with an enormous Concordance)⁵ has placed the 'sciences of Islamic faith' within the reach of Muslim laity and non-Muslim scholarship alike. Within the Muslim society, a newly facilitated awareness of the Quran is reflected in the theoretical presuppositions of all Islamic movements and forces in recent times. Unlike classical precedents, however, this phenomenon is marked by the polarization of interest in the Quran and Hadith. With all its originality and excellence, modern Muslim fundamentalism remains one-sided and unproductive of a synthesis of Tafsir (exegesis) and Sunna (tradition). In one sense, this is understandable. Great minds which have rededicated themselves to the Quranic studies have found a wealth of ideas in them. In expounding those ideas, they might have found it difficult to follow the laborious methodology, the linguistic discipline, and the historical orientations which characterized Hadith scholarship. Conversely, Hadith scholars (who specialize in Quranic studies as well) confine their attention to concrete issues and positive aspects which open no vista to *Tawil* (interpretation) or neologism in general. A significant illustration of the parting of their ways comes from the development of Islamic 'sciences' in India—particularly, from the time of Shah Waliy Allah Dihlawi (1702-62) onwards. With Waliy Allah, Synthesis (*Tatbiq*) was the method not only for co-ordinate studies on the Quran and Hadith, but for the whole range of his 'scholarly' and philosophical pursuits. His pervasive influence is discernible in all subsequent expressions of Islamic thought and traditional Islamic learning in the country. However, no one of his successors has been able to re-employ the various elements of his *Tatbiqs*.

II

Iqbal is an author whose works in prose and verse furnish evidence of a deep and persistent Quranic influence. In

general, writings on him in recent years represent a fair measure of the appreciation that is his due. Indeed, they have reached a stage where their own trends and priorities can be subjected to analysis and review. In so doing, attention can be directed to the varying degrees of their appreciation of such factors as Iqbal's understanding of the Islamic and Western civilizations, or his response to the classical expression or interpretation of the two. In relation to the latter, there is evidence of a disproportionate emphasis on the influence of Western thinkers, like Nietzsche or Bergson, on Iqbal. On the other hand, elements which he might have received from Indian sources or Eastern thought in general remain relatively unexplored. Obviously, attempts (yet to be made) to reclaim these unexplored areas of research will add new dimensions to the tradition of literary criticism on Iqbal.

At a higher level, this is equally true of his indebtedness to the Quran. Careful documentation and analysis of the Quranic elements in his writings will be conducive to a definitive judgment on his role as an interpreter of Islamic life and thought. His spontaneous and unprofessional approach to the Quranic teachings nevertheless allows it a prominent place in post-classical exegesis or Quranic studies in general. In spirit, his Quranism is modern as it enables him to think on problems of his own day in the light of Revelation. In form, however, it can be compared to Sufi appreciations of the Quran even in classical times. For instance, Rumi's *Mathnawi* can be considered a model for Iqbal's use of the Quranic elements. Iqbal, who has described himself as the Rumi of the modern age,⁶ follows in Rumi's footsteps in this respect as he does in many others.

The *Mathnawi*⁷ is perhaps the only work in Islamic literature that has been freely compared with the Quran.⁸ Apart from poetical affirmations of this analogy, there are references to it in more objective places where it is introduced as an uncontroversial postulate.⁹ Needless to say,

comparisons with the Word of God raise serious doctrinal issues in Islam. As a rule, therefore, their occurrence elsewhere is accompanied by the consciousness of a deviation for which justification may or may not be offered by the author. For instance in the following lines:

گفتم حدیث دوست بقدر آن برابر است

نمازم بکفر خود کہ با ایمان برابر است

I said the Friend's words are equal to the Quran;
I am proud of my unbelief since it is equal to Faith.

the poet (Ghalib) finds justification for his deviation (which he identifies in terms of *Kufr* or Infidelity, and which arises out of his profane attitude towards the Quran) in the element of Faith (i.e. faithfulness to his 'friend') that is contained in it. For, in his view, strong and enduring Faith by itself constitutes *Iman*:

وفاداری بشرط استواری اصل ایمان ہے

Loyalty with perseverance is the basis of Faith.

Certainly, in Rumi's case comparisons with the Quran are predicated on the uncommon depth and power of the Quranic influence on his mind.

Quranic allusions in the *Mathnawi* follow different methods of selection. The simplest of these involves a captional reference to a passage or a chapter (*Surah*) which may be treated as the source of what Rumi is going to say. For instance, he says:

گر خبر خواهی ازین دیگر خروج

سورة بخرخوان والسماذات البروج

If you desire information about this second outbreak, read the chapter of the Quran (beginning): 'By Heaven which hath the (Zodiacal) Signs . . .'
(*Mathnawi*, i, 741). (Supposed to allude to the massacre of the Christians of Najran by Dhu Nuwas, the Jewish king of Yemen, in A. D. 523.)

Here a reference is made to the following passage in the Quran (85, 1-8):

والسماذات البروج' والیوم الموعود' وشاهدومشهود قتل اصحاب

الآخدود النار ذات الوقود' انهم عليها قعود' وهم على ما يفعلون
 بالمدو من ذين شهود ومانقوا من ذين الان يوم من ذوا بالله العزيز التميميد
 By the Sky, (displaying) the Zodiacal Signs. By the promised Day (of
 Judgment). By one that witnesses and the subject of the witness.
 Woe to the makers of the pit (of fire), fire supplied (abundantly) with
 fuel. Behold! they sat over against (the fire), and they witnessed (all)
 that they were doing against the Believers. And they ill-treated them
 for no other reason than that they believed in God, exalted in Power,
 worthy of all Praise.

In the second place, we come across words or phrases from the Quran which have been fitted (or forced) *en passant* into the poet's scheme of versification. For instance, he says:

انت مولى القوم من لا يشتهى
 قدردى كلاً لئن لم يذته

Thou art the protector of the people. He that desireth (thee) not hath gone to perdition. Nay, if he do not refrain. . . .

See Quran (96, 15): كلاً لئن لم يذته لنسفعاً بالناصية

Verily, if he do not refrain, We will drag him by the forelock. (Nicholson).

Beyond these two categories we find those instances in which Rumi offers his own comments or interpretations. An illustration may be taken from what he has to say of the Divine revelation to Moses on Mount Sinai:

جسم خماک از عشق بر افلاک شد کوه در رقص آمد و چالاک شد
 عشق جان طور آمد عاشقا طور مست و خمر موسی صاعقا
 کوه طور از نور موسی شد برقص صوفی کامل شد درست اوز نقص
 چه عجب گر کوه صوفی شد عزیز جسم موسی از کلوخی بود نیز

Through Love the earthly body soared to the skies: the mountain began to dance and became nimble. Love inspired Mount Sinai, O Lover, (so that) Sinai (was made) drunken and Moses fell in a swoon. Mount Sinai, from (seeing) the radiance of Moses, began to dance, became a perfect Sufi, and was freed from blemish. What wonder if the mountain became a venerable Sufi? The body of Moses also was (formed) from a piece of clay (*Mathnawi*, i, 25-6, 867-8).

See Quran (7, 139):

فلما تجلى ربه للجبل جعله دكا و خمر موسی صعقا¹⁰

But when his Lord appeared in glory to the mountain, He shattered it to pieces. And Moses fell down in a swoon (Nicholson).

Rumi is telling us that the mountain began to dance, and became a Sufi! Such a view of the incident is hardly borne out by the emphatic word 'shattered' in the Quran. Elsewhere in the Quran there are frequent references to the behaviour of a mountain under the stress of Revelation. In all those instances the phenomenon is described in terms of a catastrophe in which feelings of Awe or 'fear of God' predominate:

(i) لو انزلنا هذا القرآن على جبل لراه خاشعاً متصدعاً من خشية الله
(59,21)

(ii) ولو ان قراننا سيرت به الجبال او قطعت به الارض او كلمت به الموتى
(13,31)

(1) Had We sent down this Quran on a mountain, Verily, thou wouldst have seen it humble itself and cleave asunder for fear of God. (ii) If there were a Quran with which mountains were moved, or the earth were cloven asunder, or the dead were made to speak, (this would be the one).

Shall we then think of Rumi's interpretation as a distortion of the Quranic version? From the standpoint of classical Tafsir (exegesis), the question must be answered in the affirmative. At the level of speculative theology, however, there is room for the harmonization of Love (in Rumi) and Fear of God (in the Quran). For, in either case, the agent is involved in an activity that purifies his ego—if it does not obliterate it altogether. Moreover, the Divine being is One in Whom antitheses are resolved, and all contradictions meet. Accordingly, Love and Fear in relation to Him can mean one and the same thing. This point can be substantiated from the writings of some other authorities on Sufi experience. In his commentary on Quran 35, 28 ('Those truly fear God, among His servants, who have knowledge') Ibn'Arabi says:¹¹

This Fear is not fear of Punishment. Rather, it is a disposition of the heart, in devotion and humility, that goes together with the idea of the (Divine) attribute of Greatness . . . One who has no such idea is also

unable to fear (Him). And innumerable are the degrees of (this) Fear even as the degrees of Knowledge . . . are innumerable.

This can be compared with a passage in Ghazali's *Ihya* (iv 326: 'Kitab al-Mahabbat'):

One of those who possess Gnosis has said: A worshipper of God who has Love (for Him) but no fear gets lost because of the exhilarating and seductive effects (of that feeling). And a worshipper who has Fear but no Love keeps himself away from Him in estrangement . . . So the (true) Lover cannot be without Fear; nor the one who has (true) Fear, without Love.

By calling Mount Sinai a Sufi, therefore, Rumi is describing the behaviour of a Lover of God who is not unmotivated by Fear. Again, these personal qualities are attributed to a mountain because Revelation had changed it into a 'house of God'; and, in Rumi's way of thinking, the 'houses of God' (which include places of Worship and the Worshipers' hearts alike) have a personality and a life of their own.

A short Quranic passage: *قُلْ أَرَأَيْتُمْ إِنْ أَصْبَحَ مَاءُكُمْ غُورًا فَمَنْ يَأْتِيكُمْ بِمَاءٍ مَرِينٍ* (67, 30)—(Say: 'See ye?—If your stream be some morning lost [in underground earth], who then can supply you with clear-flowing water?') forms the basis of an interesting story in the *Mathnawi*. A philosopher took a sceptical view of Providence. Ordinary tools, he thought, could solve a problem unnecessarily related in Theology to the workings of Divine mercy. Consequently, blindness with which he was stricken in a dream put him more urgently and personally in need of God's favour. This, Rumi points out, could be granted if Doubt had not barred his way to Repentance and Prayer:

مقدونی می خواند از دوی کتاب
 مہار کم غوراً ز چشمہ بندم آب
 فلسفی منطقی مستہان
 می گذشت از سوی مکتب آن زمان
 چونکہ بشدید آیت او از ناپسند
 گذشت آریم آب را ما با کلند

شب بخفت و دید ادیک شیر مرد
 زد طمانچہ ہر دو چشمیں کور کرد
 گفت زین دو چشمہ چشم ای شقی
 با تیر نوری برار ار صادق
 گر بدالیدے و مستغدر شدے
 نور رفتہ از کرم ظاہر شدے
 لیک استغدار ہم در دست نیست
 ذوق توبہ نقل ہر سرمت نیست
 ہر دلے را سجده ہم دستور نیست
 مزد رحمت قسم ہر مزدور نیست
 می بیاید تاب و آہ توبہ را
 شرط شد برق و سحابے توبہ را
 تا نباشد برق دل آب دو چشم
 کے نشیند آتش تہدید و خشم
 کے بروید سبزۂ ذوق وصال
 کے بجوشد چشمہا ز آب زلال
 کے نماید خاک اسرار ضمیر
 کے شود چوں آسمان بستیاں منیر
 آن لطافتہا نشان شاہد یست
 این نشانہا پامے مرد عابد یست

A teacher of Quran-recitation was reading from the page of the Book: '(If) your water (shall have) sunk into the ground—(that is, if) I stop the water from (reaching) the spring'. A contemptible philosopher and logician was passing beside the school at that time. When he heard the Verse (of the Quran), he said in disapproval: 'We bring the water (back) with a mattock'. At night he fell asleep and saw (in dream) a lion-hearted man (who) gave (him) a blow on the face and blinded both his eyes. And said: 'O wretch, if you are speaking the truth, bring up some light with an axe from these two springs of vision'. If he had moaned and asked pardon (of God), the departed light would have appeared (again) through (God's) kindness. But (the power of) asking pardon, also, is not in (our) hands: the savour of repentance is not the dessert of every inebriate. Nor is it granted to every heart to fall down in prayer: the wages of (Divine) mercy are not the (allotted) portion of every hireling. For (true) repentance there must needs be a glow (of inward feeling) and a flood (of tears): such lightning and

clouds are the condition indispensable to repentance. Until there is the lightning of the heart and the rain-clouds of the two eyes, how shall the fire of (Divine) menace and wrath be allayed? How shall the herbage grow, (the herbage) of the delight of union (with God)? How shall the fountains of clear water gush forth? How shall the earth show forth the secrets of its inmost mind? How shall the garden become radiant as the sky? The graces are the signs of a Witness (or a Saint who is the representative of God): they are the foot-prints of a man devoted to God's service (*Mathnawi*, ii, 1633, 36-7, 39-40, 42-3, 51, 53, 55-6, 63, 65).

On the face of it, the moral of the story is loosely connected with its plot. Apparently, therefore, the relevance of its Quranic allusion is also problematical. Such appearances bestride the *Mathnawi* as a whole. Rumi has inveterate ways of taking liberties with diction, thought and documentation alike. On a closer look, however, his readers can discern the solid core of his 'message' in (or behind) his solecisms and idiosyncrasies. Such is the case with the present story. It owes its deeper significance to two factors. First, the philosopher's affliction represents an interiorization of outlook and attitude—viz., a necessary prelude to religious experience (positive or negative). Secondly, the artistic structure of Rumi's discourse on Repentance and Prayer, etc., adumbrates a full and commensurate response by him to the whole chapter (*Surah*) from which his story draws its caption. These formal affinities add to the theological significance of his discourse—i.e. as an attempt to show how the Signs of Mercy which have been described in that *Surah* as a whole are translated into the lives of men.

There is an instance in the *Mathnawi* in which a Quranic statement is interwoven into the fabric of Sufi epistemology. Says Rumi:

تا الیه یصعد اطیاب الکلم
صاعداً منما الی حیث علم
تدر تقی انذاسنا بالاتقار
متحصفا منما الی دار البقاء

ثم ياتينا مكافات المقال
 ضعف زاك رحمه من ذى الجلال
 ثم يلمحينا الى امثها لها
 كي يذال العبد مما نالها
 هكذا تعرج و تنزل دائماً
 ذا فلا زالت عليه قائماً
 پارسی گوئیم یعنی این کشف
 زان طرف آمد که آمد این چشم
 چشم هر قومے بسوئی مرانده است
 کان طرف یک روز ذوقی رانده است
 ذوق جنس از جنس خون باشد یقین
 ذوق جزو از کل خود باشد بدین

The perfumes of our (good) words ascend even unto Him, ascending from us whither God knoweth. Our breaths soar up with the choice words, as a gift from us, to the abode of everlastingness. Then comes to us the recompense of our speech, a double (recompense) thereof, as a mercy from (God) the Glorious. Then He causes us to repair to (makes us utter) good words like those (already uttered), that His servant may obtain (something more) of what he has obtained. Thus do they (our good words) ascend while it (the Divine mercy) descends continually; mayst thou never cease to keep up that (ascent and descent). Let us speak Persian. The meaning is that attraction (by which God draws the soul towards Himself) comes from the same quarter whence came that savour (spiritual delight experienced in and after prayer). The eyes of every set of people remain (turned) in the direction where one day they satisfied a (longing for) delight. The delight of (every) kind is certainly in its own kind (congener): the delight of every part, observe, is in its whole (*Mathnawi*, i. 882-9).

The words of the Quran: من كان يريد العزة فلله العزة جميعاً اليه (Whosoever desireth glory—glory belongs to God entirely: to Him the good words ascend and works of righteousness uplift them) to which these lines call attention have raised some problems for all concerned with them in the present context. Metrical requirements have led Rumi to change *al-Kalim al-Taiyib* into *Atyab al-Kalim* which is (unnecessarily) translated by Nicholson as 'the perfumes of our (good)

words'. Grammatically, Rumi's variant has changed the form, but not the meaning, of the original. Again, Nicholson's rendering 'and works of righteousness uplift them' is based on a vocalization of the text that represents one of several possibilities recognized by the Commentators (e.g. Razi in his *Mafatih al-Ghayb*). An alternative rendering, more in keeping with the development of this theme by Rumi, would be that the 'uplifting' is done by God. For, in general, the Commentators explain this verse with reference to a controversy over Prayer to visible or transcendental beings. The Meccan Polytheists believed that Islamic Prayer (to the invisible Divine being) brought the worshipper nothing but estrangement and humiliation. The present Verse rejects their contention, describing how God can be approached—in direct 'ascent' or through aided 'upliftment'—by means of good words and righteous deeds. From this assurance Sufis (like Rumi) proceed to assert that God is not simply approachable, but that it is His initiative or 'attraction' which causes such an approach to be made at all. Strictly speaking, the Sufi expostulation is not quite relevant to the present Verse. But there are other instances in the Quran which would lend it full and emphatic support. In his commentary on: *وإذا سألك عبادي عنى فإنى قريب أجيب دعوة الداع إذا دعان فليستجيبوا لى* (When My servants ask thee concerning Me, I am indeed close [to them] ... Let them also, with a will, listen to My call), Ibn 'Arabi says: '(This they can do) by purifying their capability through Self-denial and Worship. For (says He): "I call them to Myself, teaching them the ways of approaching Me. And they are to observe Me (in action) at the time of their purification. For in the vistas of their hearts I shine in glory to them"' (Tafsir al-Shaykh al-Akbar).

Incidentally, it is to be noted that Rumi equates the 'ascent' of words (to God) with the Ascension of their speaker. Another interesting thing here to note is Rumi's bilingualism and the formal indication that precedes his reversion from Arabic to Persian.

III

In a study of the Quranic influence on Iqbal, his *Lectures*¹² may serve as a convenient point of departure. Short of writing a regular and full commentary (Tafsir), he has had occasion in them for the reaffirmation of much of what he had learned from the Quran as a result of his life-long devotion to it. Unlike his poetical writings (in Urdu and Persian), the *Lectures* present him as a methodical analyst of the Quranic dicta—quoting chapter and verse, and providing lucid translations (which seem to be his own). His attempt to deduce his own philosophical ideas from the Quran has drawn adverse criticism from some quarters. In general, traditional scholars ('*Ulema*) in his country (or countries) do not recognize him as an authority on the Quran. Since he never wrote a commentary, their criticism remains implicit or oblique. Some other (non-Muslim) authors¹³ have also suspected philological misinterpretations and extravagant *Tawil* (interpretation) in his deductions. For their criticism provocations came from exaggerated appreciation by his admirers. Between themselves, the critics as well as the admirers have now prepared the ground for detailed and objective studies on this subject. For these studies a comparison between Rumi and Iqbal will always provide a splendid setting.

Let us consider some of the Verses which have been cited in the *Lectures*. *A propos* of the famous *Taqwim* passage (Quran 95, 4-6): لقد خلقنا الانسان في احسن تقويم ثم رددناه اسفل سافلين الا الذين آمنوا وعملوا الصالحات فلهم اجر غير ممنون Iqbal says: 'Endowed with a most suitable adjustment of faculties, he (man) discovers himself down below in the scale of life, surrounded on all sides by the forces of obstruction. "That of goodliest fabric We created man, then brought him down to the lowest of the low". And how do we find him in this environment? A "restless" being engrossed in his ideals to the point of forgetting everything else . . .'

(*Lectures*, p. 14). In the Verse which has been cited here, 'the lowest of the low' has a (pejorative) moral significance wherefore the following Verse ('except such as believe and do righteous deeds: for they shall have a reward unfailing') forms a proper antithesis to it. Taken together, the two Verses bring out a sharp contrast between the 'lowest of the low' on the one hand, and Belief (*Iman*) and righteous deeds on the other. Iqbal's 'down below in the scale of life' neutralizes the moral issue, and renders the following antithesis superfluous. According to him, those who occupy this position are not opposed to the virtues of Belief and Righteous Deeds. It is for this reason that this interpretation is unacceptable. To his credit, however, it should be noted that his appreciation of 'the goodliest fabric' (*Ahsan Taqwim*) is sincere and profound.

The Verse of Light (Ayat-al-Nur): 'الله نور السماوات و الارض' مثل نوره كمشكاة فيها مصباح المصباح في زجاجة الزجاجاة (God is the light of the Heavens and the earth. *His light is like a niche* in which is a lamp—the lamp encased in a glass—the glass, as it were, a star—24, 35)¹⁴ appears in the *Lectures* under reference to a debate over Divine omnipresence. Before we discuss Iqbal's views on it, it would be instructive to consider some classical interpretations. The validity of Light as a Divine name has been examined in Islamic theology and Tafsir (exegesis) under various aspects:

(a) Sanctioned by Quranic usage this term is accepted by Muslims as one of 'the most beautiful names' (*al-Asma al-Husna*) of God. Some nice distinctions are, however, made between God *being* Light or *having* it. In general, the significance of Light in common parlance is the decisive factor in its choice.

(b) In his Commentary (*Mafatih al-Ghayb*) on the Verse of Light, Razi has denounced the hypostatic predication (God being Light) in terms which point to his disorientation to the (pre-Islamic) religious traditions of Iran. Philosophy and Physics have given him arguments to prove that the

divinization of a physical substance can be a vestige of Polytheism.

(c) In the same context Razi has had to face the problem raised for him by Ghazali's acceptance of Light (in his *Mishkat al-Anwar*) as a Divine name. He tries to reconcile the difference by pointing out that he and Ghazali interpret Light in terms of Guidance and Creativity (respectively), and that the literal significance of the term finds favour with neither.

(d) Outside Tafsir (exegesis) proper, Ghazali's *Kitab al-Madnun* ('a book to be withheld from unqualified persons') presents the most profound analysis not only of the metaphor of Light, but of the whole use in Theology of 'likenesses' in general. There is nothing *like (mithl)* God, he tells us. But in thinking of him, we are inevitably drawn to Analogy (*Mithal*) from our own experience as no other way of knowing is possible. In so doing, we have to confine our attention to the highest and the noblest analogies (*al-Mathal al-A'la*). On this principle, 'father', 'king' and 'the Sun' are named as the three archetypal subjects of *al-Mathal al-A'la*. What Ghazali says about the Sun would seem to be applicable to the Light which emanates from it.

Iqbal quotes Farnell¹⁵ as saying that the metaphor of Light detracts from Divine individuality. As against this contention, his own reaffirmation of both Light and Divine individuality represents orthodox Islamic teachings. But, then, his arguments from Physics (like those used by Razi)¹⁶ do not help him to prove that the two are compatible. Hence perhaps the shift in Ghazali's *Kitab al-Madnun* from the metaphor of Light to the analogy of the Sun—viz. an individual.

Now to turn to the Quranic elements in Iqbal's poetical works. In his earlier poems they are few and far between. For instance, in the *Bang-e-Dara* we find such short quotations as:

چشم اقوام یہ نظارہ ابد تک دیکھے
رفعت شان رفعت مالک ذکرک دیکھے

May the nations witness this spectacle till the end of time—
May witness the great glory of the Words: 'And exalted thy fame . . .'

But an exception should be made in the case of the poem *Khizr-e-Rah* in that collection. The eponymous Saint or Prophet here is a Quranic figure (introduced in 18, 65-82 not by name but as 'one of Our servants'). In speaking to him, Iqbal enumerates the actions which had given rise to Moses' wonder and criticism:

کشتی مسکین و جان پاک و دیوار یتیم

علم موسیٰ بھی ہے تیرے سامنے حیرت فروش

The poor man's Boat, the innocent Life, the orphan's Wall—

Even Moses with all his knowledge is lost in wonder in thy presence.

Elsewhere in the poem there is a reference to Abraham's experiments (with 'false gods') in search of Truth:

وہ سکوت شام صحرا میں غروب آفتاب

جس سے روشن تر ہوئی چشم جہاں بین خلیل

That sunset in the tranquillity of the desert evening

Which brought greater Light to Abraham's world-comprehending eye.

Here the stillness of the desert at the time of sunset symbolizes the whole 'power and laws of the heavens and the earth' which have been described in the Quran:

وڪذا لك نرى
ابراهيم ملكوت السموات والارض وليكون من الموقنين فلما جن
عليه الليل را كوكبا قال هذا ربى فلما افل قال لا احب الاولين
(6, 75-6)

So also did We show Abraham the power and the laws of the heavens and the earth, that he might (with understanding) have certitude. When the night covered him over, he saw a star. He said: 'This is my Lord'. But when it set, he said: 'I love not those that set . . .'

As the final illustration from *Khizr-e-Rah*, the following lines are notable:

(a) آبتماں تجھکو رمز آیت ان الملوک

سلطنت اقوام غالب کی ہے اک جادوگری

(b) خواب سے بیدار ہوتا ہے ذرا مستحکوم اگر

پھر سلا دیتی ہے اسکو حکمران کی ساحری

(c) چادوئے مستحموں کی تاثیر سے چشم ایاز

دیکھتی ہے حلقہ گردن میں ساز دلبری

(d) خون اسرائیل آجاتا ہے آخر جوش میں

توز دیتا ہے کوئی موسیٰ طلسم سامیری

Come, let me tell thee the hidden meaning of the holy Verse, 'Lo! the kings . . .'

The Empire is nothing but a spell cast by dominating nations.

The moment the ruled wakes up from slumber

The ruler's magic art puts him to sleep again.

Mahmud's enchantment makes the eye of Ayaz

See a heart-bewitching ornament in the chain of slavery round the neck.

The blood of Israel is stirred up once again—

And a Moses comes to destroy the magical craft of Samiri.

The Verse (Quran 27,34): *قالت ان العلوك اذا دخلوا قرية افسدواها*

(She said: 'Kings, when they enter

a country, despoil it, and make the noblest of its people its

meanest') to which a reference is made in (a) occurs in the

story of the Queen of Sheba whose negotiations with

Solomon led to her final declaration: *قالت رب انى ظلمت*

(27, 44) (She said

'O my Lord! I have indeed wronged my soul. I do (now)

submit (in Islam), with Soloman, to the Lord of the Worlds'.)

Such a conclusion presents a sharp contrast to the conse-

quences which have been worked out by Iqbal. His views on

the 'slumber', the beguilement and the final liberation of those

in servitude can more aptly be related to some other parts of

the Quran. Facts of Jewish history which have been cited

in (d) facilitate the selection of such evidence. Quranic

assurances of Divine support for the *Mustad'afin* (those

depressed and despised) bear out Iqbal's interpretation—with

the proviso that Moses and Pharoah (not Moses and Samiri)

be recognized as their Saviour and Persecutor:¹⁷

ان فرعون علا فى الارض وجعل اهلها شيعة يستضعف طائفة منهم يذبح

ابناءهم ويستتحي نساءهم انه كان من المفسدين ونريد ان نمن على

الذين استضعفوا فى الاض ونجعلهم ائمة ونجعلهم الوارثين ونمكن لهم

فی الارض ونری فرعون وها مان وجنون هما مذہم ما! کانوا یحذرون
(28, 4-6)

Truly, Pharaoh elated himself in the land and broke up its people into sections, depressing a small group among them; their sons he slew, but he kept alive their females. For he was indeed a maker of mischief. And We wished to be gracious to those who were being depressed in the land; to make them leaders (in faith) and make them Heirs; to establish a firm place for them in the land; and to show Pharaoh, Haman and their hosts, at their hands, the very things against which they were taking precautions.

The collection of Iqbal's poems known as *Bal-i-Jibril* opens new vistas to appreciation of the Quran. Two of its couplets are notable:

(a) محمد بھی تیرا جبریل بھی قرآن بھی تیرا
مگر یہ حرف شیریں ترجمان تیرا ہے یا میرا

Mohammad is Thine, and so are Gabriel and the Quran;
But this sweet Word—whose interpreter is it, Thine or mine!

(b) وہ حرف راز کہ مجھ پر سکھا گیا ہے جنوں
خدا مجھے نفس جبرئیل دے تو کہوں

The secret Word that Frenzy has taught me—
I would utter it sure if I had the breath of Gabriel.

In (a) Mine and Thine signify the human and the Divine, respectively. Speaking for mankind as a whole, the poet appropriates Revelation as his story. In essence, this is comparable to sufi interpretations of the Verse: *انما عرضنا الامانة على السموات والارض والجبال فابدين ان يتكلمن بها واشفقن منها وحملها الانسان* (33, 72) (We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains. But they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof. But Man undertook it.) In (b) the poet aspires to the influence of Gabriel's breath which helps him communicate his newly acquired sense of Mystery. This is a favourite theme in Persian and Urdu poetry. It represents the artistic notion of inspiration. For instance, even the title of Iqbal's collection occurs in one of the Odes of Ghalib:

تیرا انداز سخن شانہ زلف الہام

تیری رفتار قلم جذبش بال جبریل

The manner of thy speech—the comb for Inspiration's lock;

The movement of thy pen—the movement of Gabriel's wing.

Elsewhere Ghalib makes an interesting claim about Gabriel's appreciation of his poetry:

پاتا ہوں اس سے داد کچھ اپنے کلام کی

روح القدس اگرچہ مرا ہم زبان نہیں

He only can show some appreciation of my speech—

Though the Holy Ghost does not speak the same language as I.

In Iqbal's case, however, references to Jibril find their fulfilment as well as their catharsis in a religious experience which has been described in his poem on the Cordova Mosque. In Islamic literature in general, such an experience is associated with pilgrimage (to Mecca and Madina). Its effects are partly lyrical, partly didactic. Under its influence, the pilgrim is charged with a new sense of Mission, calling for the reform or outright rejection of some of his attitudes in the past. A good illustration of such 'conversion' will be found in Shah Waliy Allah's *Fuyud al-Haramayn*:¹⁸

As a result of my spiritual communion with the Prophet, I acquired from him three things each of which ran counter to my natural inclinations. The first was a feeling that I need not bother too much about the Causes (of comfort and success in life) . . . Secondly, I acquired a feeling that I must adhere to the four Schools (of Islamic Law) . . . Thirdly, I acquired the feeling that I must exalt Abu Bakr and 'Umar above 'Ali . . . Alas these contradictions which exist within me! But for my fierce passion for System I would not have been involved in them.

Iqbal was no such Pilgrim. Nor does he give evidence of 'conversion'. In his view, however, the former limitation is somehow obviated by the splendour of the Mosque:

کعبہ اور باب فن سطاوت دین صمدین

تجہ سے حرم مرتبت اندلسیوں کی زمین

Thou Ka'ba for the devotees of Art, thou awe-inspiring manifestation of the illuminating Faith—

Thou that hast given the sanctity of God's shrine to the land of the Andulusians.

With regard to the latter, he seems to have found an alternative mode of response. The great Mosque reveals to him the beauty, the power and the continuity of manifestation of the Islamic spirit—in its own structure, and in a life informed with Islamic ideals:

تیرا جلال و جمال مرد خدا کی دلیل

وہ بھی جلیل و جمیل تو بھی جلیل و جمیل

Thy glory and grace are manifestations of the Man of Faith;

He has glory and grace: thou, too, hast glory and grace.

Iqbal's new insight into the Mosque-Worshipper relationship is the nearest approach to a Pilgrim's experience in 'the sacred cities'. It came to him as he beheld the Mosque. Once it had come, the authority of the Quran could be invoked in support of it. To illustrate the point, one has to show what parts of the Quran are presupposed by certain aspects of Iqbal's description of the Believer:

ان ناشئة الیل ہی اشد وطأ و اقوم قبلا ان لك فی الذہار سبباً طویلاً
Quran (73, 6-7). (Truly the rising by night is most potent for governing [the soul] and most suitable for [framing] the Word [of prayer]. True, there is for thee by day prolonged occupation with ordinary duties.)

تجہ سے ہوا آشکار بندۂ مومن کا راز

اسکے دنوں کی تپش اسکی شبوں کا گداز

Thou hast made manifest the secret of the Man of Faith—

His days of strife, his nights of tenderness.

ان الذین یدہا یعونک انما یدہا یعون اللہ ید اللہ فوق ایدیہم
Quran (48, 10). (Verily those who plight their fealty to thee do no less than plight their fealty to God. The hand of God is over their hands.)

ہاتھ ہے اللہ کا بندۂ مومن کا ہاتھ غالب و کار آفرین کار کشا کار ساز

The hand of God is the hand of the Man of Faith—

Dominating, initiating, resolving and expediting.

واضرب لہم مثل الحیة الدنیاء کما انزلنا من السماء فاختلط بہ
نبات الارض فاصبح ہشیماً تزرورہ الريح و کان اللہ علی کل

شی معتدرا، المال والبدون زینة الحیة الدنیا والہبات
الصالحات خیر عند ربک ثواباً و خیر املاً (18, 45-6)

Set forth to them the similitude of the life of this world. It is like the rain which We send down from the skies. The earth's vegetation absorbs it, but soon it becomes dry stubble which the winds do scatter. It is (only) God Who prevails over all things. Wealth and sons are allurements of the life of this world. But the things that endure, Good Deeds, are best in the sight of thy Lord as rewards, and best as (the foundations for) hopes.

الذین ینفقون فی السرار والضرار والکاظمین الغیظ و العافین عن
الناس . . . والذین اذا فعلوا فاحشة او ظلموا انفسهم ذکرُوا اللہ
فاستغفروا لذنوبہم . . . ولم یصرروا علی ما فعلوا وهم یعلمون
(3, 134-35)

Those who spend (freely), whether in prosperity or in adversity; who restrain anger, and pardon (all) men. . . . And those who, having done something to be ashamed of, or wronged their own souls, earnestly bring God to mind, and ask for forgiveness for their sins . . . and are never obstinate in persisting knowingly in (the wrong) they have done.

و عباد الرحمن الذین یمشون علی الارض ہوناً و اذا خاطبہم
الناس قالوا سلاماً (25, 63) (And the servants of [God]
Most Gracious are those who walk on the earth in humility,
and when the ignorant address them, they say: 'Peace!')

اس کی امیدیں قلیل اس کے مقاصد جلیل
اس کی ادا دلفریب اس کی نگہ دلنواز
نرم دم گفتگو گرم دم جستجو

دزم ہو یا بزم ہو پاک دل و پاکباز

His hopes are few, his aims sublime,

Captivating his gestures, his eye heart-bewitching.

Soft in discourse, persevering in strife.

Pure of heart and action, be it the battlefield or the assembly of friends.

و کذا لک جعلناکم امة وسطاً لتکونوا شہداء علی الناس (2, 143)
(Thus have We made of you an *Ummat* [community] justly
balanced . . . that ye might be witnesses over nations.)

عقل کی منزل ہے وہ عشق کا حاصل ہے وہ
حلقہ آفاق میں گرمی محفل ہے وہ

He is the goal of Reason, and the end of Love;
He is the very life of the Assembly of the universe.

Thus the Word of God and His 'house' raise this description of the Believer to a level of authenticity unsurpassed by any other summary of Islamic virtues in Iqbal. As such, it can be contrasted with (a) those poems in which the Believer's character has been described in more ornate or abstruse terms, e. g.

ہر لحظہ ہے مومن کی زندگی آن زندگی شان
گفتار میں کردار میں اللہ کی برہان
قہاری و غفاری و قدوسی و جبروت
یہ چار عناصر ہوں تو بنتا ہے مسلمان
یہ راز کسی کو نہیں معلوم کہ مومن
قہاری نظر آتا ہے حقیقت میں ہے قرآن
فطرت کا سروں ازلی اس کے شب و روز
آہنگ میں بکتا صفت سورہ رحمان

Every moment the Man of Faith has a new glory:
His speech and actions are an affirmation of the Divine.

Power, mercy, holiness and might—

These four elements combine to make a Muslim.

No one knows the secret that the Man of Faith.

Though he recites it, he is the Quran himself.

His nights and days resound with Nature's eternal harmony;

Unique his cadence—like that of the surah 'Rahman'.

or

بتاؤں تجھ کو مسلمان کی زندگی کیا ہے
یہ ہے نہایت اندیشہ و کمال جنوں
حقیق ابدی پر اساس ہے اس کی
یہ زندگی ہے نہیں ہے طاسم افلاطون
نہ اس میں عصر رواں کی حیثاً سے بیزار
نہ اس میں عہد کہن کے فسانہ و افسوں
عناصر اسکے ہیں روح القدس کا ذوق جمال
ہتجہ کا حسن طبیعت عرب کا سوزدرون

Let me tell thee what the life of a Muslim is:
 It is the ultimate in Thought and the perfection of Frenzy.
 Its basis is the eternal Realities;
 It is Life—not a Platonic shadow-house.
 Neither has it the modern aversion to modesty
 Nor the ancient bias towards myths and legends.
 Its constituents are the Holy Ghost's love of Beauty,
 The aesthetic disposition of the Persian, the heart-felt ardour of the Arab,
 and (b) those poems which reverberate with Quranic wisdom
 and its arguments for Divine unity and power, e. g.

پالتا ہے بیج کو مٹی کی تاریکی میں کون
 کون دریاؤں کی موجوں سے اٹھاتا ہے سحاب
 کون لایا کھینچ کر پچھم سے باد سازگار
 خاک یہ کس کی ہے کس کا ہے یہ نور آفتاب
 کس نے بھری موتیوں سے خوشگندم کی جیب
 موسموں کو کس نے سکھلائی ہے خوئے انقلاب

Who is it that nourishes the seed in the darkness of the earth?
 Who is it that raises clouds from the waves of the seas?
 Who is it that has harnessed the helpful winds?
 Whose is the earth? Whose is the light of the sun?
 Who has filled with pearls the pouches of the ears of corn?
 Who has given to the seasons the disposition to change?

With regard to the Believer's character, it is to be noted that the Quranic distinction between *Iman* (faith) and *Islam* (surrender) has not been reaffirmed by Iqbal for whom *Momin* and *Muslim* (or *Musalman*) are almost interchangeable terms.

In some other parts of *Bal-i-Jibril* Iqbal has had occasion for the adaptation of certain themes partly based on the Quranic narrative. Thus the Fall of Adam, and Satan's role in relation to it, offer possibilities of interpretation in terms of the dynamic principles and dialectical trends of cosmic evolution. Undoubtedly the *ipsissima verba* of the Quran form the basic framework of reference for such exercises. But their intellectual presuppositions and moral evaluations

come from some other sources. Iqbal's continued interest in them led in his later writings to such unorthodox statements as:

تجھ سے بڑھ کر فطرت انساں کا وہ مستحکم نہیہیں
سادہ دل بندوں میں جو مشہور ہے پروں گار

A deeper understanding of the nature of man He does not possess—
He who is known as the Nourisher among simple-minded people.

However, his attempts in some of those writings to make Satan speak in less heroic terms, e.g.

اے خداوند صواب و ناصواب
من شدم از صحبت آدم خراب
هیچگه از حکم من سر برنیستافت
چشم از خون بست و خود را در نیستافت
خاکش از ذوق ابا بیگانه
از شرار کبریا بیگانه
صید خود صیاد را گوید بگیر
الامان از بندگی فرمان پذیر
از چلین صیدے مرا آزاد کن
طاعت دیروزگ من یاد کن
اے خدا یک زندہ مردے حق پرست
لذتے شاید کہ یابم در شکست

O Lord of Good and Evil

I have been degraded by commerce with Man.

Never could he defy my behest;

Forgetful of Self, he never found himself.

Never does his dust feel the thrill of disobedience,

Unlit as it is by the Divine spark.

The Victim himself asks the hunter to entrap him;

O save me from this pliant slave!

O relieve me from chasing such a victim—

Recall my fealty of but yesterday! . . .

O God! give me a single man of living Faith;

I may perchance gain bliss in my defeat!

has brought this subject closer to traditional ideas.

In later collections of his poems (particularly those in Persian) Iqbal appears as a more self-confident and studious 'reader' (*Qari*) of the Quran. His borrowings from the Holy Book multiply; and his vision of its place in the life of its followers acquires greater range and depth. It will not be possible here to review all his writings of this period by way of illustration of his borrowings from the Quran. Attention must, therefore, be confined to one that may be the most typical. Such is the case with the *Javid Namah* in which the setting as well as the contents of Iqbal's poetical vision, have been influenced by his understanding of the Quran. In the *Javid Namah* the Quranic influences are discernible in a variety of ways:

(a) Verbal citations exemplify them in the most direct fashion. These may be short or extensive, casual or intrinsically relevant. In the following lines Iqbal has introduced several of them in rapid succession:

آیہٗ تسخیر اندر شان کیست این سپہر نیکوگون حیران کیست
 دازدان عالم الاسما کہ بود مرست آن ساقی و آن صہبیا کہ بود
 برگزیدی از ہمہ عالم کرا کردی از داز درون مستحرم کرا
 اے ترا تیرے کہ مبارا سینہ سفت حرف ادعونی کہ گفت و باکہ گفت

In whose glory is the holy Verse about 'Conquest'?
 At whom does the sky look rapt in gaze?

Who was taught the name of things?
 Who did the Saqi make inebriate? For whom was the Wine?

Whom did you honour most in all Your creation?
 Whom did You impart all Your mysteries?

O Thou Whose shaft has pierced my heart—
 Who had said 'Call out to me'? and to whom had it been addressed?

(i) Quran (16, 12):

وستخر لكم الیل و النهار والشمس والقمر والنجوم مستخرات بامرہ
 (He has made subject to you the Night and the Day, the Sun and the Moon; and the Stars are in subjection by His command.)

(ii) Ibid. (2, 31):

وعلم آدم الاسماء كلها ثم عرضهم على الملائكة فقال انبؤنى باسماء
هؤلاء ان كنتم صادقين

(And He taught Adam the nature ['names'] of all things: then He placed them before the Angels, and said: 'Tell Me the nature of these if ye are right'.)

(iii) Ibid. (17, 70):

ولقد كرّمنا بنى آدم وفضلناهم فى البر والبحر ورزقناهم من
الطيبات وفضلناهم على كثير ممن خلقنا تفضيلا

(We have honoured the sons of Adam: provided them with transport on land and sea: given them for sustenance things good and pure; and conferred on them special favours, above a great part of Our Creation.)

(iv) Ibid., (40, 60):

وقال ربكم ادعونى استجب لكم ان الذين يستكبرون عن عبادتى
سيدخلون جهنم داخرين

(And your Lord says: 'Call on Me: I will answer your [prayer]. But those who are too arrogant to serve Me will surely find themselves in Hell—in humiliation.)

In some cases, Iqbal adds short footnotes just to show that a certain word or phrase has been taken from the Quran. Without the title of the *Surah* (Chapter) or the number of the Verse, his notes make a very inadequate *Takhrij* (exposition). Some of them are inaccurate. For instance, in *Pas Che Bayad Kard*, Iqbal says:

هرکه آیات خدا بیدرد دراست اصل این حکمت ز حکم انظر است

In a footnote to this couplet, he adds:

حکم انظر : تلمیح ہے آیت قرآنی کی طرف : فانظر الى الابل كيف
خلقت - يعنى نظام فطرت کا بغور مطالعہ کرو

Here both the text and the footnote involve a misquotation and mistranslation of Quran (88, 17-20):

افلا يظنرون الى الابل كيف خلقت، والى السماء كيف رفعت،
والى التجال كيف نصبت، والى الارض كيف سطحت -

(Do they not look at the Camels—How they are made? And at the Sky—How it is raised high? And at the Mountains—How they are fixed firm? And at the Earth—How it is spread out?)

(b) Secondly, in some parts of the poem an attempt has been made to find Quranic answers to questions faced by the contemporary Muslim society. It would not be too much of a digression to analyse the logical structure of such an attempt. (i) It proceeds from a distinct awareness of the demands and presuppositions of modern life. (ii) Actual Muslim response to those demands is consequently distinguished (not to say dismissed) as a mark of a subservient or passive spirit, or as a symptom of deviation from Quranic teachings. (iii) From this induction the next step leads to sweeping generalizations concerning the potential significance of the Quranic message as an instrument for the re-ordering of ethical conduct and social institutions in all times and places. Generalizations of this kind are not borne out by reference to particular Chapters and Verses of the Quran. In a systematic or complete form, however, they represent a theory of Revelation in general, or a rationale of the Quran in particular. Iqbal expounds such a theory in the following lines:

چون مسلمانان اگر داری نظر	در ضمیر خویش و در قرآن نگر
صد جهان تازه در آیات اوست	عصرها پیچیده در آفات اوست
بنده مومن ز آیات خداست	هر جهان اندر بر او چون قبلاست
چون کهن گردن جهان در برش	می دهد قرآن جهانی دیگرش
عالمی در سینه ما کم هنوز	عالمی در انتظار 'قم' هنوز
عالمی بے امتیاز خون و رنگ	شام او روشن تر از صبح فرنگ
عالمی پاک از سلاطین و عبید	چون دل مومن کز انش ناپدید
آنچه در آدم بگنجد عالم است	آنچه در عالم نگنجد آدم است
برتر از گردن مقام آدم است	اصل تهذیب احترام آدم است
مصطفی اندر حرا خلوت گزید	مدتی جز خویشستن کس را ندید
نقش سارا در دل او ریختند	مدتی از خلوتش انگیختند

می توانی مژگر یزدان شدن مژگر از شان ندی نتوان شدن
وحی حق بینندهٔ سون همه در نگاهش سون و پرپود همه
دل اگر بندد به حق پیغمبری ست و در حق بیگانه گردن کافری ست

If thou hast the true insight of the men of Faith,

Then look into thy own Self—and into the Holy Book.

A hundred worlds lie concealed in its Verses.

And whole aeons are involved in its moments. . . .

A believing servant himself is a sign of God,

Worlds and ages are to him like garments.

When one world grows old upon his bosom

The Quran gives him another world! . . .

There is an unrealised world hidden in our breast.

It is a world awaiting yet the commad, 'Arise!'

A world without distinction of race and colour —

Its evening is brighter than Europe's dawn.

A world cleansed of monarchs and of slaves,

A world unbounded like the believer's heart. . . .

That which is contained within man is the world,

That which is not contained within the world is man. . . .

Loftier than the heavens is the station of man,

The essence of civilisation is respect for man. . . .

Muhammad chose solitude in the Cave of Hira

And for a space saw no other beside himself.

Our image was then formed in his heart,

And out of his solitude a nation arose.

Though you may deny the existence of God,

Yet you cannot gainsay the Prophet's glory. . . .

God's revelation sees the benefit of all,

Its regard is for the welfare and profit of all. . . .

If it [knowledge] attaches its heart to God, it is prophecy,

But if it is a stranger to God, it is unbelief.

(c) In the third place, *Javid Namah* excels in the dramatic representation of anti-Islamic personalities and words. It is possible to argue that such representations conform to the Quranic usage. For the Quran is an equally authentic record of the teachings of the Prophet (Muhammad) and of the criticism that was made on them by some of his bitterest

opponents. For instance, the following Verses report sceptical views on the composition of the Quran and sarcastic comments on the Prophet:

وقال الذين كفروا ان هذا الا انك افتراه واعانته عليه قوم آخرون
 . . . وقالوا اساطير الاولين اکتتبهها فهي تملي عليه بكرة واصيلا
 . . . وقالوا مال هذا الرسول ياكل الطعام ويمشي في الا سواق
 لولا انزل اليه ملك فيكون معه نذيرا (25, 4-7)

But the Misbelievers say: 'Naught is this but a lie which he has forged, and others have helped him at it' . . . And they say: 'Tales of the ancients which he has caused to be written; and they are dictated before him morning and evening' . . . And they say: 'What sort of an apostle is this, who eats food, and walks through the streets? Why has not an angel been sent down to him to give admonition with him?'

Presumably under the influence of such objectivity, Iqbal has given poignant expression to the thoughts and feelings of some of the most influential figures in the history of Biblical religion and the Islamic faith. The best example of such representations is to be found in Abu Jahl's lamentations over the fate of Arab paganism (*Jahiliya*) under the impact of Islam:

سینه ما از مستحدم داغ داغ
 از دم او کعبه را گل شد چراغ
 از هلاک قیصر و کسب سرون
 نوجوانان را ز دست ما ربود
 تا بساط دین آبا در نور
 با خداوندان ما کرد آنچه کرد
 پاش پاش از ضربتش لات و منات
 انتقام از دے بگیرای کائنات
 دل بغائب بست و از حاضر کسست
 نقش حاضر را فسون او شکست
 پیش غائب سجده بدن کوری است
 دین نو کورا ست و کوری دوری است
 مذهب او قبا طع ملک و نسب
 از قریش و مذکر از فضل عرب

در نگاه او یکے بالا و پست
 با غلام خویش بریک خوان نشست
 این مساوات این مواخات اعجمی ست
 خوب می دانم که سلمان مرزن کی ست
 باز گو ای سنگ اسود باز گو
 آنچه دیدیم از محمد باز گو

My breast is riven and anguished by this Muhammad;
 His breath has put out the burning lamp of the Ka'ba.

He has sung of the destruction of Caesars and Chosroes,
 He has stolen away from us our younger men. . . .

He has rolled up the carpet of our father's faith,
 And he has done with our Lord Gods what he has done!

To pieces has he smashed Laat and Manaat;
 Revenge thyself on him, O Universal

He has bound the heart to the Unseen turning it from the Seen;
 His sorcery has broken the spell of the Perceptible Image. . . .

To prostrate before the Invisible is blindness,
 The new faith is blind and blindness is separation. . . .

His creed cuts across rulership and race
 He denies the supremacy of the Quraysh and the excellence of the Arabs.

In his eyes the low and the high are the same,
 He has sat down at the same table with his slave. . . .

This equality and fraternity are foreign things—
 I know very well that Salman is a Mazdakite. . . .

Tell again, you Black Stone now tell again,
 Tell again what we have suffered through Muhammad!

As an inarticulate and unself-conscious tradition, Arab paganism in pre-Islamic times had produced few records of its intellectual and moral problems or its spiritual yearnings. When it was brought to an end by the new religious movement that was led by the Prophet (Muhammad), Muslim scholarship and historiography emerged as the only source of information about it. This information presents it as a *Sunna* (custom), not as *Din* (religion). Such an attitude is to be contrasted with the Quranic picture of *Jahiliya* as a

religion—i.e. a religion marked by 'play', 'amusement' and self-deception:

وإذا رأيت الذين يخوضون في آياتنا فأعرض عنهم حتى يخوضوا في حديث غيره . . . وذر الذين اتخذوا دينهم لعباً ولهواً وغرتهم الحياة الدنيا (6, 68-70)

When thou seest men engaged in vain discourse about Our Signs, turn away from them unless they turn to a different theme . . . Leave alone those who take their religion to be mere play and amusement, and are deceived by the life of this world.

With all these shortcomings, even this playful and deceptive religion could give rise to the deepest sentiments of affection and the strongest feelings of loyalty in the hearts of its followers. In Iqbal's dramatic representation, Abu Jahl's lamentations do in fact bring those deep sentiments and strong feelings to a very articulate and significant expression.

(d) Fourthly, Iqbal has an apocalyptic vision to describe in the *Javid Namah*:

ناگہاں دیدم جہاں خویش را آن زمین و آسمان خویش را
غرق در نور شامق گون دیدمش سرخ مانند طبر خون دیدمش
زان تجلی ہاکہ در جازم شکست چون کلیم اللہ فتادم جاوہ مسست
نور او ہر پردگی را وا نمود تاب گفتار از زبان من ریود
از ضمیر عالم بے چند و چون یک نوائے سوز ناک آمد برون

Suddenly I beheld my world—

That earth and heaven of mine.

I saw it drowned in a light of dawn,

I saw it crimson as a jujube-tree.

Out of the epiphanies which broke in my soul

I fell, like Moses drunk with ecstasy.

That light revealed every secret veiled

And snatched the power of speech from my tongue.

Out of the deep heart of the inscrutable world

An ardent haunting melody broke forth.

The description of the event is quite unpretentious. As such, it is unlikely to draw adverse criticism (from an anti-Sufi point of view in orthodox circles). In the present context,

its significance is due to the Quranic motifs of the scenography which precedes it as its background. These preparatory scenes are comparable to the final Vision both in essence and in structure. Some of them are modelled on Quranic eschatology. In some cases, associations with a particular Chapter of the Quran give them transcendental dimensions, e. g.

رفتہ و دیدم دو مرد اندر قیام
 مقتدی تاتار و افغانی امام
 باچندین مردان دو رکعت طاعت است
 ورنہ آن کارے کہ مزدش جنت است
 قرات آن پیر مردے سخت کوش
 سورۃ والنجم و آن دشت خموش
 قراتے کز وہ خلیل آید بو جد
 روح پاک جبرئیل آید بو جد
 آشکارا ہر غیب از قراتہں
 بے حجاب ام الکتاب از قراتہں

I went on, and saw two men engaged in prayer,
 The acolyte a Turk, the leader an Afghan. . . .

To offer prayer with such men is true devotion;
 A Labour else whose hoped-for wage is Paradise.

The recitation of that vigorous elder—
 The Chapter: 'the Star', and that silent plain!

A recital that would move Abraham to ecstasy;
 That would enrapture the pure spirit of Gabriel. . . .

At his recital every mystery was revealed,
 The Great Word appeared unveiled.

IV

The revival of Hadith learning in India, mainly under the influence of Shah Waliy Allah Dihlawi, received generous tributes from international Muslim scholarship for the new lease of life which it gave to a great Islamic 'science' threatened with extinction in modern times.¹⁹ No such tributes

have been won by Qur'anic studies in the country. Indeed, controversial views propounded by commentators like (Sir) Saiyid Ahmad Khan, Abul-Kalam Azad and Abul-A'la Maududi have overshadowed the significance of their life-long devotion to Tafsir, and of the latter's own function and prospects. Iqbal's preoccupation with the Quran affords a convenient point of departure for studies which may lead to an extended survey of the whole field, and succeed in presenting it in a fuller and possibly more favourable light. As pointed out earlier, this exercise will have to ignore technical differences between authors of systematic commentaries and writers who respond to the Quran in less systematic but more spontaneous ways. In the Indian context, a vital link between the two is supplied by their rededication to Qur'anic studies with a view to the confirmation of personal interpretations of Islamic history, life and ideals. Between the times of Saiyid Ahmad Khan and Iqbal, this composite genre has been susceptible of wide-ranging ramifications. To its Qur'anic orientations it owes its prestigious place in the religious life of the Muslims. On the intellectual side, its interpretations of Islam provide suitable channels for the development of the philosopher's interest in knowledge and the religious man's search for Truth. The development of those factors has run its course on the two planes of the historical process and psychogenetic change. Historically modern Tafsir and its by-product in India provide evidence of continuity, and grounds for comparison, with the famous debate on *Wahdat al-Wujud* (Unity of Being)—a debate which heralded the awakening of self-consciousness in Islamic life in India. In psychogenetic terms, interpretations of Islam within the framework of that Tafsir form a coherent pattern which has drawn its elements from scientific rationalism (Saiyid Ahmad), eclectic humanism (Azad), theocentric jurisprudence (Maududi), and positive tradition and mysticism (Daryabadi).

Of all these interpreters, Iqbal probably is the best heard.

Factors which explain his distinction in this respect include the power of the poetical medium, the charm of the Persian tongue, and the prestige of the Western influence in thought and verbal expression (in English). On the other hand, he also works under some obvious limitations which would present few (if any) problems to his compeers. One of those limitations appears in his selection of Quranic elements—not as original and direct sources of his dicta, but as criteria of their authenticity and illustrations of their meaning. Another limitation arises out of his attitude towards classical Tafsir. To him this whole body of literature symbolizes speculative extrapolations of the non-Arab mind from the 'small' or simple things which are the proper subject-matter of Revelation:

ذرا سی بات تھی اندیشہٴ عجم نے جسے
بڑھا دیا ہے فقط زیب داستاں کے لئے

It was something very simple which the Persian imagination
Magnified in order to embellish the tale.

This criticism is based on anti-classical feelings which characterized many other interpretations of the Quran by Iqbal's contemporaries. For instance, Azad looks upon classical Tafsir as a superimposition that involves distortion of the 'true' significance of the Quran (as the Companions of the Prophet understood it). With him as with Iqbal, Razi is the principal target of the sarcasm that is directed against extrapolations or distortions. Admittedly knowledge of classical Tafsir may not be an indispensable requirement in the case of authors who draw a sharp line between the Word of God and human discourse about it. In so doing, however, their inattention to the latter must not degenerate into scornful rejection and wholesale denunciation. If classical Tafsir is not to be taken seriously, there would be little justification for any new attempts to interpret the Quran in this second millenium of its historical existence—i.e. a period spanned by the history of classical Tafsir.

If in speaking about a particular passage from the Quran a modern commentator or interpreter like Iqbal is incognizant of comments on it in classical Tafsir, there is no reason why interrelations between the two points of view should escape the attention of his critics. The lacuna which they can fill affords them a valuable opportunity as, on the other hand, it also places them under an obligation. The fulfilment of the obligation that devolves on them will provide the current (centennial) phase of renewed interest in Iqbal with a new sense of direction and perspective. For their researches can prepare the ground for a veritable history of ideas in Islam, an area in which the establishment of Iqbal's proper place will mean the realization of his deepest aspirations.

What in specific terms the critics can do is to select some important questions which have received Iqbal's attention—e.g., Divine personality, or the distinctive character of the Community founded by the Prophet (Muhammad), or the phenomena of political domination and liberation, or the emancipation of women, etc. A rapid glance over his writings will show that his views on some of these questions have been correlated with his readings from the Quran, while others (e. g., the emancipation of women) seem to have received no such correlation. Methods of research in our own day require that all his correlations should be subjected to close scrutiny in Takhrij. In an earlier part of this essay it has been pointed out that classical Takhrij was mainly directed to (or against) an author who borrowed from the Scriptures. Accordingly, a strong presumption in favour of his knowledge of the Quran could dispense with Takhrij. In modern times, on the contrary, Takhrij is recognized as a helpful and constructive device not so much in relation to an author, as in the interest of his readers. The latter need (and can in all fairness demand) a thorough exposition of his references in any case—i.e., regardless of whether these are regular or cryptic, indirect and informal: and whether he is entitled to a presumption in favour of his credibility or not.

Beyond the scrutiny in Takhrij, there will be a possibility of comparison between Iqbal's interpretation and the views of his predecessors in Tafsir. It is only from comparisons on these lines that one can arrive at a definitive view of Iqbal's understanding of a particular problem, and of the place of that problem in the Quranic universe of discourse. Just a few remarks can be offered in conclusion to illustrate the point.

The problem of political liberation has been related in the *Khizr-i-Rah* to a particular Verse that does not substantiate Iqbal's views. But we have been able to relate it to another Verse which contains assurances of Divine support for the *Mustad'afin* (oppressed or despised) in a particular case. The latter Verse might have been an imperceptible factor in Iqbal's enunciation of a revolutionary doctrine. Classical Tafsir does not identify itself with a revolutionary doctrine in an absolute sense. But its theological implications and its bearings on Islamic history did not go unnoticed by the Commentators. From the case history thus built up we can see the points of contact (or confrontation) which have been established by Iqbal's mind between the Islamic tradition and the external (mainly Western) sources from which most of his political concepts have been derived. If in this particular link up with modern political ideas the Islamic tradition is dwarfed into insignificance, it can gain an advantage elsewhere in repeated instances of the same process. In fact the problem of Divine personality (as represented in this essay by the metaphor of Light) has already shown traditional interpretations at a distinct advantage.

Finally, Iqbal's view of the Muslim Community offers singularly rich material for the proposed history of ideas as it has already passed into the theory behind some political developments of his day. It lent substance to a controversy which placed him in opposition to an eminent representative of traditional Islamic 'scholarship', Maulana Husayn Ahmad

Madani. Like classical Tafsir, this living body of opinion could have been an admirable testing ground for Iqbal's interpretation of the Quran. As it turned out, however, the controversy left him utterly dissatisfied with 'scholarly' documentation as such:

قلندر جز دو حرف لاله کچھ بھی نہیں رکھتا

فقیر شہر قاروں ہے لغت ہائے حجازی کا

The Qalander has nothing but the two words of 'la-ilah',

The City Theologian is the proud owner of a mine of words.

Apart from that controversy (which in fact contra-indicated a meeting of minds and the concomitant relevance of words to express them), Iqbal could always bring authentic elements into his image of the Community, e. g.

مصطفیٰ اندر خدا خلوت گزید مردتے جز خویشتن کس را ندید
نقش سارا در دل او ریختند ملتے از خلوتش انگینختند

Taken from a passage already cited in this essay (p. 23), these lines attempt an explanation of the genesis and constitution of the Community with reference to some aspects of its Founder's personal experience. In their originality and depth, they are comparable to some historic explanations which find the *raison d'être* of the Community in personal examples like those of the Prophets Moses and Jesus, or in events like preparations for the Battle of Badr, or in the role of the Seventh Century A.D. as a turning-point in the history of mankind. Quranic statements and exegetical researches can be cited in direct and emphatic support of all these explanations—without raising any one of them to the level of final and exclusive validity.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹ (Imam) Ghazali, *Ihya' al 'Ulum al-Din*, published together with Zain al-Din al-Iraqi's *takhrij* of its Hadith material (Cairo, 1939 onwards). Rumi's *Mathnawi* is another important work to have found a *takhrij*. See Note 7 below.

² See the English translation by S. A. Kamali, *Incoherence of the Philosopher* (Lahore, 1958), p. 235.

³ Unless otherwise indicated, the translation of all Quranic passages in this essay has been borrowed from *The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary* by A. Yusuf Ali (Beirut, 1968).

⁴ D. C. Macdonald, 'Life of al-Ghazali', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XX (1899), p. 76.

⁵ *Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musalmane المعجم المفهرس للفاظ الحديث النبوي* by A. J. Wensinck. Fuad Abd al-Baqi, et al (Leiden, 1936 onwards).

⁶ Says he:

چو رومی در حرم د'دم اذان من از و آموختم اسرار جهان من
به دور فتنة عصر کهن او به دور فتنة عصر دول من

Also see the title of the book:

رومی عصر شرح احوال و آثار علامه محمد اقبال از خواجه
عبدالصمد عرفانی (تهران ۱۳۳۲)

⁷ Edited, with notes, translation and commentary by R. A. Nicholson (Leiden, 1925-37). Also *Sharah Mathnawi Sharif* by Badi uzzaman Farozanfar (Tehran, 1346-48). See also the latter's *Takhrij Ahadith Mathnawi* (Tehran, 1344 ?).

⁸ *مشنوی مولوی معنوی هست قرآن در زبان پہلوی*

⁹ *مشنوی مانند دیگر کتب بابواب و فصول قسمت نشده و از حیث نظم و ترتیب اساوپے مانند قرآن کریم دارن کہ معارف و اصول عقاید و قواعد فقہ و احکام و نصائح پشتا پشت درآن مذکور و مطابق حکمت الہی بہم آمیختہ است*

فروز انفر "شرح مشنوی شریف" ص "ب"

¹⁰ Note Rumi's *صاعقا* for *صاعقا* in the Quran.

¹¹ *Tafsir al-Shaykh al-Akbar* (Cairo, 1317).

¹² Mohammad Iqbal *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1930).

¹³ e. g. by H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1947).

¹⁴ Iqbal's translation. A better translation of the underlined (by us) words: the parable of His light is as if there were a niche . . . (A. Yusuf Ali).

¹⁵ L. R. Farnell, *The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion* (London, 1912).

¹⁶ Iqbal takes an ungenerous view of Razi's arguments (from *Philosophy and Natural Science*, etc.) in his *Tafsir*:

چو سرمه را از دیده فروشستم

تقدیر ز من دیدم پندہاں بکتاب اندر

¹⁷ Metrical requirements have led to the introduction of 'the spell cast by Samiri' where Iqbal should have spoken of Pharoah's power. Undoubtedly, Moses undid the former as he had destroyed the latter. But the crucial fact is that Israelite blood had 'boiled' against Pharoah, not against Samiri.

¹⁸ Ahmadi Press, Delhi, undated, pp. 64-5.

¹⁹ e. g. by Saiyid Rashid Rida in his Foreword to Fuad Abd al-Baqi's *Miftah Kunuz al-Sunna* (Cairo, 1352), p. xix.

ولولا عداية اخواننا علماء الهند بعلوم الحديث في هذا العصر
تقصى عاينها بالزوال من امصار الشرق.

(If our brothers the Indian 'Ulema had not devoted attention to the 'science' of Hadith, it might have declined in the Eastern areas.)

M. Abdul Haq Ansari

IQBAL'S RECONSTRUCTION OF ISLAMIC IDEAS

Formulators of Islamic religious ideas before Iqbal take their stand on thought and speak the language of being, regardless of whatever views they might have about knowledge and reality. For they had to work with a philosophical terminology that was developed on the belief that the real was that which was accessible to thought or some higher form of cognition. And since being is the most general category available to thought, it naturally formed their starting point.

Iqbal leaves this tradition and discards the terminology of what he calls a 'worn-out' metaphysics. Reality to him is only partly accessible to thought, and the way to deal with the whole of Reality is experience. Consequently he takes his stand on experience and uses the language of the ego which is the most real thing given in experience.

That Iqbal should begin with experience instead of thought and take the ego as the fundamental concept instead of being may be viewed as inspired by the vitalistic philosophies of his age and the new understanding of religion initiated by Schleiermacher. Our purpose, however, is not to view Iqbal's construction of Islamic ideas in the context of contemporary philosophical thought, nor to show the impact on him of the new approach to religion, however interesting that may be. We rather propose to view his reconstruction in the background of the history of religious thought in Islam, particularly as developed by the mystics, with whom Iqbal has much in common both in his approach

as well as temperament. Iqbal was brought up under the loving care of a sufi father, and was deeply interested in sufi literature. He had a great admiration for sufism, inspite of his criticism of some of its forms and expressions, a criticism that had been inspired more by love than real hostility, and was initiated in the Qadiriya order. These biographical facts are no less important than Iqbal's studies in contemporary thought in determining his approach.

The justification for starting with experience is partly philosophical and partly religious. The philosophical justification lies in the primacy of experience over thought, in the vision of Reality as something non-cognitive in its deepest aspects, and in the reality of the ego which thought postulates but fails to establish and which can only be affirmed in experience. Truths, such as the existence of God, cannot be demonstrated by logical arguments and the only way to attain certainty in these fundamental matters is experience. The religious justification lies in the nature of religion itself. Religious life begins with faith and submission to a discipline accepted unconditionally and without regard to any understanding of its meaning and purpose. In the next phase, religious life makes an effort to rationally understand the discipline and to seek justification for faith in terms of a general theory of reality. This gives rise to theology and metaphysics. But the religious yearning is not yet satisfied, it develops an ambition to have a direct contact with Reality. The truths that one has so far believed as a matter of faith or held as probable ideas of thought, are discovered to be facts of one's own experience. Hence, experience should be regarded as a means of unravelling the mysteries of religion. This view of religious development from faith through thought to discovery may not be universally true, but it is a fair picture of the religious life in general.

Religion at the highest level is experience. But what is the nature of this experience? Iqbal seems to identify it

with mystical experience. In the first lecture of the *Reconstruction* where he takes up the question of religious experience as a source of knowledge, the identification of the two kinds of experience does not seem to create much difficulty. But in the last chapter which deals with the nature of religion he uses religious and mystical experience synonymously, and gives little indication of any possible distinction between the two. I think that in the context of the question as to what is the highest form of religious life, it is imperative to make a distinction between them. Mystical experience specifically refers to 'unitive experience', though it may also include experiences like visions, dreams and auditions. Religious experience, on the other hand, is a wider term, and includes besides mystical experience, a whole range of experiences in which one has a numinous feeling of Divine Presence and Activity, when, for instance, one has a feeling of a mighty response to prayer, a sense of miraculous help in distress, a sudden illumination of truth, an unusual sense of peace in a perilous situation, an extraordinary urge for self-transformation, an overwhelming sense of mission, a tremendous upsurge of energy. Religious experience is not, however, confined to the extraordinary and the miraculous. One can experience God in a variety of ways in ordinary life with varying degrees of intensity. Viewed in this wider sense religious experience is not a specific dimension of life, but a higher and a more intense way of living. It is *ihsan* which literally means an excellent way of doing, and in the Quran refers to a higher level of activity and a superior state of living, and whose quality is defined by the Prophet as intense awareness of God 'as though you see him'. Experience in this sense is, to be sure, the highest form of religion.

In its capacity as knowledge-yielding experience religious experience can be identified with mystical experience if prophetic experience is also accepted to be a form of the latter as Iqbal takes it to be. In his view the prophetic experience is essentially a mystical experience, possibly

different in degree but not in kind. There are difficulties in this view, which I shall discuss later. Here I would like to point out that Iqbal does not examine the view but holds it rather uncritically.

Mystical experience, as Iqbal mentions, has five characteristics. First of all, it is immediate; one directly comes in contact with Reality without the mediation of sense or reason. Secondly, mystical experience is an unanalysable whole. But the way Iqbal explains it, this characteristic seems to be a combination of two different characteristics. One is that the mystical experience has no parts and distinctions; it is an indeterminate experience which lacks even the subject-object distinction so essential to normal experience. The other is that in his experience the mystic comes in contact with the whole of Reality, in contrast to the ordinary rational experience wherein one only grasps a part of reality at a time.

The fourth characteristic of mystical experience is that it is incommunicable. This in fact follows as a corollary from the second characteristic that mystical experience is indeterminate; for what is indeterminate cannot be communicated. Iqbal says that 'the incommunicability of the mystic experience is due to the fact that it is a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive thought'.¹ This, however, does not contradict the above suggestion. For what he really wants to say is that 'mystic states are more like feeling than thought' (*Reconstruction*, p. 20). In its knowledge-yielding capacity, the mystic state is a form of cognition, higher than thought, an intuition in which the inner self of the mystic comes in contact with the Eternal. The fifth characteristic of mystical experience is that because of his contact with the Eternal, the mystic feels that time is unreal. This does not, however, mean a break from the normal experience for the mystic does return to normal consciousness after the experience has passed away. Iqbal repeatedly underlines the point that mystic experience is a development rather

than a break from ordinary experience, and that intuition is a higher form of intellect.

The last characteristic (the third as Iqbal mentions it) of the mystical experience is that 'it is a moment of intimate association with a unique other self, transcending, encompassing, and momentarily suppressing the private personality of the subject of experience' (*Reconstruction*, p. 19). There are two questions here. First, the question is whether the mystic really experiences a unique other Self, or is it something which he interprets as an independent Self. The second question is whether it is at all possible to experience God as an independent Self. Iqbal raises the second question and the substance of his answer is that all experiences are not mediated by sense. 'We have a direct experience of ourselves, although our senses have a lot to contribute to our self-knowledge. We know other selves through sense perception as well as through their responses to our initiatives. But we also have a kind of direct experience of other selves, for we do feel that our experience of other minds is immediate and never entertain any doubt as to the reality of our social experience' (*Reconstruction*, p. 20). Our experience of God is very much like our experience of other selves, and 'probably belongs to the same category' (*Reconstruction*, p. 20).

Iqbal does not raise the first question, though he should have raised it, not only because mystics differ on that issue, but also because in view of his own statement that the mystic state is 'a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist' (*Reconstruction*, p. 19) that is a natural question to ask. If the mystic state is devoid of subject-object distinction, how is it possible that the mystic experiences God in this state as an independent other self?

One way to resolve this contradiction is to say that what the mystic experiences is absolutely devoid of all distinctions, and that is what the Reality ultimately is, and the concept of God and other selves is a creation of thought in

order to meet the needs of the practical self. This is the line which Sankar takes. The second alternative is that there are various levels of the manifestation of Reality, and that at the highest level Reality is absolute unity, devoid of distinctions, but at the lower levels distinctions emerge and they are also real. In his experience the mystic reaches the stage just short of the stage of absolute unity, which is the unity of plurality, yet he is convinced that there is a more fundamental level also. This is the line which Ibn 'Arabi takes. The third alternative is that distinctions are inherent in the mystic experience, that the mystic does experience an other self and that the ultimate Reality is not pure Being but an Ego. This is the line of Ramanuja and Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi. Iqbal belongs to this group and his statement regarding the absence of distinctions in mystic experience should be understood in a qualified sense.

What is given in mystic experience Iqbal seeks to confirm by an examination of different levels of experience—matter, life and mind—in the light of modern knowledge. He then elaborates upon it through an analysis of conscious experience and in the light of the Quran. The outcome of this endeavour is a view of Reality the outlines of which are as follows:

Matter that appears as a 'solid stuff' is essentially energy; it is not a 'thing' but movement. The universe is not a system of discrete things, existing independently of each other in time and space. It is a structure of events possessing the character of continuous creative flow which thought cuts into isolated immobilities out of whose relations arise the concepts of space and time (*Reconstruction*, p. 34). Contrary to the common belief that regards matter as fundamental and life an out-growth or an epiphenomenon, 'life is foundational and anterior to the routine of physical and chemical processes which must be regarded as a kind of fixed behaviour formed during a long course of evolution' (*Reconstruction*, p. 44). In its essence life is a psychic

activity, and Reality is ultimately a rationally directed creative life, a self (*Reconstruction*, pp. 60-2).

Nature does not confront the Ultimate Self as a not-self. On the contrary, it is organically related to the Divine life and represents the regular and the constant form of its activity. 'Nature is to the Divine self as character is to the human self' (*Reconstruction*, p. 36). Time, as we ordinarily know it, belongs to this fixed mode of Divine life which in its inner essence is above time. The Divine Self lives in pure duration which is the real time.

The Divine Ego is both transcendent and immanent. Internally, it is above nature and above time and space, a free spontaneous creativity; externally, it is nature itself, a determinate structure of events or acts, subject to time and space. The Divine as Nature is the object of thought and comprehensible by its categories, but as he is in his inner Self the Divine is beyond thought, accessible to what Iqbal calls the appreciative self in a moment of deep contemplation.

The Divine is not a static being or an immovable thought; it is a dynamic will, a ceaseless activity. Change and activity is a mark of imperfection when it is for something not yet realized. But since the Divine Self is the whole of Reality, 'the not-yet of God means unfailing realisation of the infinite creative possibilities of his being which retains its wholeness throughout the entire process' (*Reconstruction*, p. 60).

The Ultimate Ego is a unity of thought and will. The question as to which of the two is primary is not valid. For it arises from a supposed disjunction between thought and will, which though real in the case of the human ego, is untrue for the Ultimate Ego. In us thought is non-creative and different from our will which is a sheer force. In the Divine Ego, on the other hand, thought is essentially creative and will a rational power. Iqbal's definition of the ultimate Reality as the rationally directed creative will underlines the fundamentality of will against the classical primacy of

thought, and avoids the opposite mistake of subjecting thought to will. His criticism of the non-teleological nature of the Bergsonian will and his affirmation of the infinity of thought against the Ashairah is a confirmation of this point. Thought and will are two aspects of the same Reality which Iqbal calls the Ego in order to underscore the point that the ultimate principle is neither will nor thought but the unity of the two. The Ego's unity is a unique kind of unity: it is different from the composite unity of material things in that it has no parts, and it is different from the abstract mathematical unities because it is a concrete unity. A glimpse of this unity we get in the unity of our own consciousness.

From the terminology of *wahdat 'l-wujud*, the term that would be most appropriate to characterise the unity of the Ego is *wahidiyat*, which is a unity of plurality (*ahadiyat 'l-kathrat*), as compared to *ahadiyat*, which is pure, undifferentiated, absolute unity. To Iqbal the Absolute One (*al-Ahad*) would be a pure abstraction and a sheer non-entity. He would argue that Ibn 'Arabi was led to postulate an absolutely indeterminate being more fundamental than *al-wahid* because he isolated thought from experience under the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy. The abstract unity of Absolute Being (*al-wujud 'l-mutlaq*) is a creation of thought and not a fact of religious experience. It would be interesting to know that for Ibn 'Arabi, too, the Absolute is beyond experience.²

By conceiving the Absolute Ego as a rationally directed creative will and refusing to posit anything more ultimate than the Ego, Iqbal takes the fundamental attributes of God—thought, will and freedom—as the very essence of God. This aligns him with the scholastic theologians like the Ashairah and the Maturidiyah, and the sufis like 'Ala al-Dawlah al-Simnani and Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi on the issue of divine attributes. But what precisely were Iqbal's views in this context it will be hazardous to suggest. He has not formulated his views on the subject. Perhaps Iqbal consi-

dered the whole issue hypothetical. The unity of the Ego is experiential and beyond the reach of discursive thought which breaks it into the opposite concepts of essence and attributes and is not able to restore it. The Ego is a concrete unity of attributes; we have to take it as such, and resist the temptation of going beyond that.

The Ultimate Ego is an individual. To emphasise his individuality the Quran uses the proper name of Allah, which is not, however, an invention of the Quran but a common name used by all the Semites throughout their long history, with minor phonetic variations, of course. Individuality is a matter of degree and the Absolute Ego is the most unique individual, which fact rules out the possibility of a similar ego by reproduction or otherwise. Allah is one, he does not beget, and none is like unto him.

The individuality of God is not opposed to his infinity, and there is no case for pantheism. Those who correlate individuality with finitude conceive infinity in spatial terms which obviously cannot be predicated of the Ultimate Self who is beyond time and space. Iqbal explains his concept of divine infinity as follows:

Modern Science regards Nature not as something static, situate in an infinite void, but a structure of interrelated events out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time. And this is only another way of saying that space and time are interpretations which thought puts upon the creative activity of the ultimate Ego. Space and time are possibilities of the Ego, only partially realized in the shape of our mathematical space and time. Beyond Him and apart from His creative activity, there is neither time nor space to close Him off in reference to other egos. The ultimate Ego is, therefore, neither infinite in the sense of spatial infinity nor finite in the sense of space-bound human ego whose body closes him off in reference to other egos. The infinity of the ultimate Ego consists in infinite possibilities of his creative activity of which the universe as known to us, is only a partial expression. In one word God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. It involves an infinite series, but is not that series (*Reconstruction*, p. 64).

Knowledge as applied to the finite ego is a temporal process and is of necessity discursive; the subject has to

reach an object that confronts it as an 'other'; it is, moreover, a representation of the object and as such contingent upon it. This kind of knowledge cannot be predicated of the Ultimate Ego. For the universe is not an 'other' existing *per se* in opposition to him, but a part of his all-inclusive being. He knows and at the same time forms the ground of the object known. The divine act of knowing is also the act of creating.

The alternative concept of divine knowledge as a single indivisible act of perception in an eternal now, expounded by Dawwani, 'Iraqi and, I would add, Sarhindi,³ may succeed in securing independence of divine knowledge. But it suggests, Iqbal complains, 'a closed universe, a fixed futurity, a pre-determined unalterable order of specific events which, like a superior fate, has once for all determined the directions of God's creative activity' (*Reconstruction*, p. 78). It secures God's fore-knowledge at the expense of his freedom. Iqbal thinks that the way to save God's freedom is to conceive his knowledge as organically related to his creative activity. The future pre-exists in the organic whole of the divine creative life as an open possibility and unfurls itself with the progress of creation in time, just as the hidden implications of a fruitful idea in human mind unfold themselves in course of time. Iqbal explains:

You are immediately aware of the idea as a complex whole; but the intellectual working out of its numerous bearings is a matter of time. Intuitively all the possibilities of the idea are present in your mind. If a specific possibility, as such, is not intellectually known to you at a certain moment of time, it is not because your knowledge is defective, but because there is yet no possibility to become known (*Reconstruction*, p. 79).

This is a novel idea and an extremely ingenious effort to reconcile fore-knowledge with spontaneity of creation. But I doubt whether it succeeds. If the future implications of a complex idea are not known to us due to the limitation of our knowledge, what else are they due to? Moreover, it is difficult to concede that the future is known to God in

essence and not in details. Iqbal's characterisation of divine fore-knowledge as a kind of 'superior fate' is not justified because to its expounders divine knowledge is a part of His essence and an expression of His freedom rather than something imposed upon Him.

In the system of Ibn 'Arabi divine knowledge works at two levels; at one, it is knowledge of things as ideal prototypes (*a'yan thabitah*); at the other, it is knowledge of things in existence. But at either level divine knowledge is not of things that exist *per se* in opposition to the Divine, but to things that are organically related to the Divine Being. For the *a'yan* and the external objects are both the determinations of the Absolute Being, in one case ideal, and in the other existential. To Iqbal the Divine knows and at the same time forms the ground of the object known (*Reconstruction*, p. 78), and to Ibn 'Arabi the Divine knower and the object known are essentially one. Iqbal disagrees with Ibn 'Arabi regarding the concept of *a'yan*. To Ibn 'Arabi the *a'yan* are the advanced copies of things in existence with all conceivable details of their lives, or films of the entire individual histories ready for projection on the screen of existence. This view of the knowledge of God would mean to Iqbal a denial of the very concept of creation.

To think of God as a rationally directed will is to put a limitation on his omnipotence. But Iqbal would point out that without limitation no activity is possible. The Ashairah who do not like to limit God's power end by making it arbitrary. There are, however, theologians even in the fold of *ahl'l-Sunnat*, like the great Hanafi jurist Ibn Hammam⁴, who would not shrink from putting a limit on divine omnipotence as required by the concept of His rationality and not as imposed by an external authority that is the bug-bear of the Ashairah. The Quran, Iqbal rightly points out, presents God as a concrete Ego, a unity of thought and will and has no liking for abstract absolutes.

The question of reconciling God's goodness with his

omnipotence in the presence of an immense volume of evil in creation has always agitated sensitive minds. Iqbal who is a believer in the reality of evil does not try to explain it away by suggesting its relativity or its ultimate transmutation. He admits that on the basis of our present knowledge of the universe we cannot predict triumph of good over evil. Life, as the Quran suggests through the myth of Adam, is an open trial, with a possibility for man of greater control over nature and an eventual victory of good over evil. This is, however, a matter of faith.

Iqbal does not discuss God's speech. There is a passing reference to revelation in connection with the incommunicability of mystic experience. He writes:

The organic relation of feeling and idea throws light on the old theological controversy about verbal revelation which once gave so much trouble to Muslim religious thinkers. Inarticulate feeling seeks to fulfil its destiny in idea which, in its turn, tends to develop out of itself its own visible garment. It is no mere metaphor to say that idea and word both simultaneously emerge out of the womb of feeling, though logical understanding cannot but take them in a temporal order and thus create its own difficulty by regarding them as mutually isolated. There is a sense in which the Word is also revealed (*Reconstruction*, p. 22).

Reading this passage along with the following:

A prophet may be defined as a type of mystic consciousness in which 'unitary experience' tends to overflow its boundaries and seeks opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life (*ibid.*, p. 125).

and the comment that the 'mystic experience, which qualitatively does not differ from the experience of the prophet' (*ibid.*, pp. 126-7), one gets the impression that the content of the prophetic revelation is rather an inarticulate idea, akin to the inarticulate experience of the mystic which the prophet later interprets in his words just as the mystic does. Revelation is essentially non-verbal and may be called verbal in the sense in which a mystic inspiration is verbal.

This, as I said in the beginning, is the result of an

uncritical acceptance of the view of prophecy prevalent in some sufi circles. It is true that the prophet has experiences very similar to those of the mystic and that he has forms of *inspiration* which he later on interprets as the mystic does (*hadith qudsi*, and in a sense many other *ahadith*). And it is also true that the mystic experience is not completely formless, and that no inspiration is absolutely inarticulate. But there is no reason to doubt that some forms of inspiration may be fully articulated and that the prophet, unlike the mystic, may be favoured with verbal revelation.

Creation presents difficulties when the universe is regarded as something existing *per se* in opposition to God. Various accounts that conceive the world as something fashioned out of a pre-existing matter by a Maker, or an independently existing cosmos set in motion by a Prime Mover, or a system of graded beings emanating from an Original Source, all are unsatisfactory because they regard the universe as an other. But if the universe is taken as an integral part of the all-inclusive Divine life we would no longer require these accounts. The Divine life is a ceaseless creative activity, and the universe is a system of divine acts which thought breaks up into a plurality of mutually exclusive things.

On Iqbal's showing the real question is about how the creative activity of God works. And the answer to this question is that it proceeds through the creation of egos of varying intensities and magnitudes because from the Ego only the egos proceed:

The creative energy of the Ultimate Ego, in whom deed and thought are identical, functions as ego-unities. The world in all its details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of matter to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am'. Every atom of Divine energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of ego-hood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood until it reaches its perfection in man. That is why the Quran declares the Ultimate Ego to be nearer to man than his own neck-vein. Like pearls do we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life (*Reconstruction*, pp. 71-2).

Thus Iqbal's account of creation is what he himself calls a spiritual pluralism (*ibid.*, p. 72), or a spiritual version of Ash'arite atomism.

It has been remarked,⁵ on the basis of the above passage, that Iqbal also believed in the doctrine of determinations (*ta-'ayyunat*). But that is a complete misunderstanding of Iqbal's view. The ego of Iqbal's conception is, like the monad of Leibniz, a self-centred unity, and an exclusive individuality. Privacy is an essential characteristic of the ego in which none including the all-inclusive Ego can enter: 'My pleasures, pains, and desires are exclusively mine, forming a part of my private ego alone. My feelings, hates and loves, judgments and resolutions are exclusively mine. God himself cannot feel, judge and choose for me when more than one courses of action are open to me' (*Reconstruction*, p. 100). This is in direct conflict with Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of *ta'ayyunat*, according to which every action, thought, feeling, desire, resolution, belief or judgment of a determinate being is equally predicable of the Absolute (*al Haqq*). In fact it is He who acts, thinks, feels, desires, resolves, believes and judges, of course not as Absolute but as determined. This is not an inference from Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of *wahdat'l-wujud*; he makes explicit pronouncements on the subject in *Fusus* and *Futuh*. This is one of the main reasons why Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi rejected the doctrine of *ta'ayyunat*.⁶ Almost the same considerations induced Iqbal to work out a spiritual pluralism through an examination of the Ash'arite doctrine of atomism. The term itself suggests the fundamental difference between his doctrine and Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the Oneness of Being. So far as I know Iqbal's doctrine is a really original contribution to Islamic thought.

Freedom is implied in the concept of the ego. The Infinite Ego is perfectly free, and the finite egos are free according to the degree of their ego-hood. The freedom of the human ego in the true sense lies in the creation of new

ideals and values and in their realization. Iqbal identifies freedom with creativity, and extols it to such a degree that he almost forgets that there is something like an essential nature of man. This reflects an extreme reaction against the classical concept of fixed essences, and introduces in his thought an element of unhealthy existentialism. No wonder then if he is unable to lay down a secure foundation for ethics and a theory of society. 'That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad.'⁷ The trouble about this statement is that the concept of personality is too vague. If even an attempt is made to define personality as a standard of value, it has to be done in terms of some basic ideals and norms, in other words, in terms of some concept of essence or basic nature. Like modern existenti-
alists, therefore, Iqbal also fails to provide a norm for ethics.

Like creation which is an open-ended activity and like divine knowledge which is the working out of inherent possibilities, the destiny of man is also open. Predestination is not like the destiny of a guided missile, it is a particular realization of possibilities with which an ego is invested. And this particular realization is the ego's own act and responsibility.

The end destined for the human ego is not dissolution into the Divine Ego. That would contradict the whole purpose of creation. The goal is a greater fortification of the ego, a further reinforcement of its individuality by securing a direct contact with the Ultimate Ego and assimilating some more elements of his powers.

Dissolution or fortification of the human ego is a matter of attainment. The egos whose individualities are not fully developed run the risk of dissolution, die and fade away with no possibility of resurrection. Only those whose individualities are sufficiently developed survive the shock of death and deserve a new life hereafter (*Reconstruction*, p. 119). They earn their immortality. This concept of selective and earned immortality is not something new. Farabi too has a concept

of selected immortals.⁸ This is one alternative to the doctrine of universal resurrection and condemnation of a huge crowd of humanity. And the other alternative is the transformation of the very concept of Hell by an ingenious interpretation the way Ibn 'Arabi does it. Perhaps the value of Iqbal's view of immortality lies more in provoking the future theologian than offering a solution. There is no finality, as Iqbal says, in such matters.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- ¹ Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1930), p. 21. Further references in the text are to the same edition of the *Reconstruction*.
- ² Ibn 'Arabi, *Fusus al-Hikam*, 'fuss 12: فلا يشهد القلب ولا العين ابدا Affifi's edition (Cairo, 1946), p. 121.
- ³ Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi, *Maktubat Imam Rabbani*, Vo. II, letter 296.
- ⁴ Ibn Hammam, *Al-Musayarah* with Ibn Abi Sharif's Commentary *Al-Musamarah* (Cairo), pp. 151-71.
- ⁵ Maykash Akbarabadi, *Naqd-e-Iqbal* (New Delhi, 1964), p. 131. In the elucidation of Iqbal's philosophy it is not unusual to use *wujudi* terminology of Ibn 'Arabi. Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan frequently resorts to it in his *Ruh-e-Iqbal*. But it is very risky and may be at times quite misleading unless the distinction between the two systems is fully brought out.
- ⁶ Shaykh Ahmad Sarhindi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, letter 133:
 نزدیک این فقیر هیچ تعینے نیست کدام تعین بود کہ لا تعین را
 متعین سازد و این الفاظ موافق مذاق حضرت شیخ متحی الدین
 و تابعان اوست قدس اللہ اسرارہم در عبارات این فقیر این قسم
 الفاظ اگر واقع شود از قبیل صفت مشکلمہ باید دانست۔
- ⁷ Mohammad Iqbal, 'Introduction', *Secrets of the Self*, translated by R. A. Nicholson (Lahore, 1944), p. xvi.
- ⁸ Farabi, *Ara' Ahl 'l-Madinat'l-Fadilah*, edited by A. Nasri Nadir (Beirut, 1956). For discussion, see Abdul Haq Ansari, *The Moral Philosophy of Al-Farabi* (Aligarh, 1965), pp. 53-4 and p. 134.

S. Alam Khundmiri

IQBAL AND VITALISTIC THOUGHT

Iqbal's significance as a poet-philosopher can be better appreciated if one tries to place him in the history of Islamic thought in general and the Indo-Islamic tradition in particular, and this particular perspective involves a reference to the historical time and the spiritual space to which Iqbal belongs. No one can dare dispute the fact that Iqbal's concerns were practical and were mainly determined by the historic needs of his culture as he perceived them and the direction in which he would have liked to see it transformed. He is one of those men of letters who are not moved solely by an urge for self-expression. This observation leads one to the truism that all expression stems from some practical needs of a culture though in some cases the motivation is unconscious and only an occasional line or a stray reaction reveals the unconscious guiding factor. If this were not the case, there would not be so much variety in poetry and other forms of artistic expression. The question of practical concern has hardly any relevance in the case of, for instance, the great Urdu poet Mir Taqui Mir, and I dare say that posterity will not raise this question also with regard to Tagore's *Gitanjali*. Contrary to what some aesthetes would have us believe, this observation does not in any way accord superiority to such poets over those who were guided by cultural concerns; in other words, it does not mean that cultural concerns or a metaphysical attitude is a corrupting influence on poetry or any other art. So far as Iqbal is concerned, he represents a rare combination of genuine metaphysical quest and down-to-earth needs of his community

his involvement with which occupies a central position in his entire poetic psyche. To what extent his involvement with his community determined his ultimate concerns is a question which needs to be seriously considered. He had identified himself entirely with the contemporary destiny of his community in particular and the larger humanity in general. In fact, he did not find any contradiction between the two. His own destiny was tied to the destiny of his community. He could envision in the contemporary situation infinite possibilities of growth and development on account of which his concern with the contemporary situation and events did not become a limiting factor of his consciousness. A poet of lesser genius would have become a sad prisoner of his own time as he would not have been able, on the one hand, to integrate the past with the present and, on the other, to perceive the future direction of the contemporary movement. One becomes a prisoner of only one phase of time, whether past or present, if one forgets that there is a tension in each phase of time. We are apt to fail in the understanding of Iqbal's poetic expression if we ignore this time-tension which is a remarkable element of his poetic consciousness. No other poet of the Indo-Islamic tradition, perhaps with the exception of Ghalib,¹ experienced this tension and it is because of this that such tragic moments are not so easily discernible in Iqbal's poetry to one who is used to seek such moments only in the context of personal sorrows that result in the complete 'failure of nerves'. Another example in literature where the source of tragedy is such a time-tension is found in Nietzsche, who suffered a complete collapse of nerves in the physical sense but escaped it in his literary expression and philosophic speculations. Iqbal too would have met an identical fate if he had not been able to link the contemporaneous with the transcendent, in other words, the temporal with the eternal.

Philosophic attitudes are not always governed by a rigorous working out of premises in a logical manner, but also

by emotional attitudes, cultural passions and the practical concerns of a particular historical situation. A closer scrutiny would reveal that this also applies to those philosophers who, like Bradley, McTaggart, or G.E. Moore, kept the wider (or narrower?) questions of culture out of their field of philosophic speculation. If we classify philosophers and poets by their characteristic visions of the universe, as suggested by Montague, we can very well classify Iqbal as one in whose vision time and change signify the most important aspect of reality, as it is only through time and change that nature and the world of man find their destiny. It was this primary vision which shaped Iqbal's poetic career and caused time-tension in his poetic psyche. The vitalistic impulse too owes its origin to this vision, and also his ultimate concerns find their source in it. He transcended this time-tension by positing an abiding principle 'Self' or 'Ego' in the human world and God as Absolute Ego as inclusive of the former in the context of reality. In other words, in this transcendence neither time nor change are left out. The principle of transcendence, on the contrary, includes them in a manner that time does not mean mere temporality and change mere succession. Eternity pervades the temporal process and the temporal process rises to meet eternity as its destiny, and since eternity pervades the temporal process there is time-tension in the entire realm of existence. Iqbal's modernity lies in this element of his thought and poetic philosophy and this dominant element connects him with that tradition of the Western thought and spiritual culture which starts with Leibniz and reaches its fruition in Nietzsche, passing through the German Romantic Movement. It also connects him with that part of the Islamic tradition which is represented by Husain bin Mansur al-Hallaj and Attar and finds its consummation in Rumi. This observation might appear quixotic, but as Paul Tillich once remarked,² it is a familiar event in the history of philosophy that a special philosophy opens one's eyes to a special

problem which was not unknown to former philosophers but which was not the centre of their attention. Further, he adds, the movement of human thought is driven by the intensity with which old problems are seen in a new light and brought out of a peripheral significance into a central one. In the case of Iqbal, this special philosophy which opened his eyes and impelled him to seek a new interpretation of his philosophic heritage was the philosophy of life and personality. A closer examination of the classical Islamic world-outlook discloses an interesting fact that though this outlook was largely determined by the Neoplatonic vision, it was never content with the immutable order of hierarchy which this vision implied. On the contrary, it struggled against it to find a place for Divine contingency which could alone save freedom in the universe. The great passion of love and abundance so much conspicuous in Islamic mysticism and not so central in other mystic philosophies, is indicative of this dissatisfaction. One has to remember the fact that the concept of love of an Islamic mystic is much more refined than the Greek concept of Eros and much more intense than the Christian concept of Agape, and more vital and active than the Indian cult of Bhagti. It seems that the Divine word 'Be' (كن), the originator of the world order, always haunted the Islamic mystics along with the concept of the *Mithaq* of the pre-eternity. The Divine word results in the temporalization of the eternal Will of God and this did not merely happen at the crucial moment of the cosmic history but is the recurrent source of time and change. This vision dominated the mystic consciousness of al-Ghazzali but was later entangled in the medieval fatalistic *weltanschauung* and thus a wonderful source of freedom was completely obscured. Only if man had been seen as possessing creativity and being capable of not only rising to the word of Command but also of a 'return' which leaves in him the marks of eternity, the picture would have been different.³ One of the remarkable achievements of Iqbal consists in

the fact that he disentangled this tradition from its medieval moorings and integrated it with the contemporary vision of the world-order as a process in which time is not a mere triviality but an important element of the Divine plan itself.⁴ The classical Islamic philosophers were dominated by the monistic urge so much that they could only see that 'only one emanates from the One' (ان الواحد لا يصدر منه الا الواحد) or by the ethical impulse that only good can issue from the Good, but did not see that only will emanates from the Will and personality from the Person. This does not endanger the monistic urge but facilitates the understanding of the world-order which also reveals the principle of diversification, multiplicity of existence and the emergence of 'personality'—the principle which is also capable of challenging even its ultimate source.⁵ Iqbal discovered this possibility and envisioned the world as the order of life at its varying stages of manifestation and also perceived that it is not a mere reflection of an eternal pattern of Will but a dynamic process in which the lower is not eternally destined to occupy the same position; it has an urge and corresponding to it a destiny to rise to higher stages. He accepts Ibn 'Arabi's dictum 'no repetition in the epiphany'⁶ with all its literal and logical implications but substitutes the idea of the Divine Forms (صور عالميه), not very much different from the Platonic Ideas in their significance, with the idea of Divine Possibilities. It is not a trivial shift, but represents a major change in the philosophic outlook. There is a change in the ultimate question which had hitherto been: 'What are the objects of Divine Knowledge?'; now the question is about the 'objects' of Divine Will. The objects of Divine Will can only be possibilities and not actualities since will loses its character if everything and every event is preordained. Religious consciousness cannot avoid reference to eternity completely but the question of the 'content' of eternity remains open. Islamic classical thought, like its medieval Christian counterpart, accepted as its world outlook the closed Platonic world

of ideas with all its fixed, hierarchical implications with the result that the social philosophy too became a rigid system of the lower and the higher strata which was not strictly compatible with the early egalitarian spirit of Islam. A further consequence of this world-outlook was that naive optimism which regards the universe along with the human world as a closed perfect system in which evil, a necessary element of the pre-established cosmic system, is regarded as a source of general good. Even the mystic illuminationists by dividing the universe into areas of light and of darkness accepted the 'area of darkness' to be as much divinely ordained as the area of brilliance. The consequences of the conflicting ideologies were somewhat blurred and an anti-ameliorative ideological consequence followed. A close look at the contemporary philosophic polemic reveals the fact that ameliorative and transformatory philosophies accept the vitalistic premise as the foundation whether this transformatory position is radical or conservative. The contemporary pragmatic revolt, which inspired social democrats as well as conservative fascistic thinkers alike, makes this point clear.

So far as Iqbal's ontological position is concerned, he had always been eager to close the gap between being and acting and this could be done only by making 'Life' a primary principle. He does not start with a biological position but, on the contrary, seeks support from the biologist with this important reservation that Self or Ego is not regarded as a mere emergent from something which is non-self. The primacy of Self is the fountain of Iqbal's thinking from which all the other springs flow. This is certainly the consistent position of Iqbal from his *Asrar-i-Khudi* to *Javid Namah* and *Bal-i-Jibril*. His doctrine of the Self is a meeting point between the classical gnostic philosophy and contemporary vitalism and to miss this element will be tantamount to missing the entire truth about Iqbal.⁷ While modernistic Iqbalian scholarship emphasises the

Western vitalistic tradition, orthodox scholarship goes by appearance and tries to adjust Iqbal's entire thought exclusively to the Book and the Sunna.⁸ Although they always remained a constant inspiration to him, what inspired Iqbal in the Book was his interpretation that Quran gives primacy to 'deed' rather than 'idea',⁹ and the inspiration which he drew from the life of the Prophet was his role as a revolutionary transformer of history.¹⁰

Vitalistic philosophy inspired him not because it is a better scientific-philosophic interpretation of reality but because it could accommodate his passion for world-transformation. Mechanistic interpretation, it is obvious, does not leave any room for the facts of freedom and will and yet is not necessarily repugnant to all religious minds. It does not rule out the possibility of God, as the case of the deistic theologians makes it clear. Iqbal's primary urge was activist and the only philosophy which could satisfy this urge was some sort of vitalism. His attraction towards vitalism should not be overemphasised since he does not believe, unlike most of the vitalists, that the primary stuff of the world is 'universal life'. Iqbal does not share this pantheistic idea. He differs even with Bergson on this point. He considers all life as individual and God himself is regarded as the most unique individual.¹¹ As against the emergent evolutionists who saw in the chronological priority of matter an ontological principle, Iqbal believes in the primacy of the Living Self. Each being is to him, in a sense, a living being and an ultimate fact. Evolution consists in the emergence of higher individualities and what is called matter is itself a lower type of individuality, not conscious of its value as an individual.¹² The lower individuality in relation to the higher in its life of action uses the lower as matter but in its deeper moments intuits the fact of life shared by all beings. To Iqbal the emergence of individuality is a mystery in the sense that there is no law of its emergence prior to itself except, probably, in the Divine Will from which Divine Time is not different. It is one of the

implications of his brilliant suggestion that 'destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities' (*Reconstruction*, p. 51). The idea of personality as the highest value seems to be definitely a contribution of the Western and particularly German philosophy. He was earlier introduced to this idea by his master in Cambridge, McTaggart, and it seems it became a forceful idea during his stay in Germany. He is in general agreement with the Leibnitian position that Ego is the highest form of life in which the individual becomes a self-contained exclusive centre (*ibid.*, p. 99) except that Iqbal does not believe these exclusive centres to be 'windowless' and acting according to a pre-established harmony, in a strictly deterministic fashion. It is relevant to make this observation that the idea of personality constitutes an important element in his vision of reality. As far back as 1910, he made a very significant observation regarding this principle of personality. He wrote:

Personal immortality is not a state; it is a process. I think the distinction of spirit and body has done a lot of harm. Several religious systems have been based on this erroneous distinction. *Man is essentially an energy, a force, or rather a combination of forces which admit of various arrangements. One definite arrangement of these forces is Personality*—whether it is a purely chance arrangement does not concern me here.¹³

The italicized statement reveals the Leibnitian current of his thought, and this leads to an interesting discussion regarding Iqbal's relationship to Leibniz which has not received sufficient attention from Iqbal scholars.¹⁴ This relationship also reveals deeper religious interests which Iqbal shares with Leibniz. Leibniz is commonly known for his deterministic interpretation of the universe. It is often forgotten that freedom and personality were also crucial problems which, he felt, could not be explained sufficiently by a rigid deterministic-mechanistic explanation. As suggested by Russell in a different context, Leibniz really had two philosophies. It can even be said that he had two faces. On the one hand, he believed that all things have flowed forth

in a strictly necessary manner from the Supreme Power of God and on the other he had also a vision that 'there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe' and that 'in every particle of the universe a world composed of an infinity of creatures is contained'.¹⁵ This shows very clearly that the world for him was not merely a great machine but a system consisting of living organisms or egos of varying degrees of development. Even the vitalistic Faustian ideal which found its consummation in Goethe was strongly advocated by Leibniz for whom 'the very law of enjoyment is that pleasure does not have an even tenor, for this begets loathing, and makes us dull, not happy' (p. 250). This Faustian ideal goes along with the idea of a 'growing universe'. In one of his letters, Leibniz observes that while nature is always equally perfect it is always an increasing perfection and that it was not possible to give it its full perfection all at once (p. 256). It is significant that at one stage he extends the law of development to the entire universe. The significance of time and change is that there may be thereby more species or forms of perfection, even though they may be equal in degree (p. 256).

The idea of the continual advance of nature, more eloquently advocated by Whitehead¹⁶ in the early decades of this century was already suggested by Leibniz. Again, in one of his letters, he remarks: 'Since there is nothing outside the universe which could prevent it from doing so, it must necessarily be the case that the universe develops and advances continually.'¹⁷ It seems that the idea that 'progress will never come to an end' was a fascinating idea for Leibniz and even when he contemplated the future progress of the human soul he felt that 'the eternity which is reserved in future for all souls, or rather for all animate beings, is a vast field, designed to give, though by stages, the greatest perfection to the universe'.¹⁸

Iqbal was always impressed by this idea of the continual advance of nature and he expressed it eloquently not only in

his Lectures but repeatedly in his poetry:

یہ کائنات ابھی ناتمام ہے شاید کہ آدھی ہے دسمادم صدائے کن فیکون

This universe is perchance incomplete as yet—

Since the Call 'Be and it was' can still be heard.

A better artistic expression of the same idea is found in the following lines:

کمان صبر کہ پھاپیاں رسید کارمغان ہزار بادۂ ناخوردہ در دم تاک است

Do not think that the work of the Winehouse-Keeper has ended;

A thousand undrunk wines are still running in the veins of the vine.

This idea of the continual advance of nature and the ever-growing perfection of man may very well be a 'myth', yet it is a myth which symbolises man's urge towards transcendence. Iqbal employs this idea not in a rigorous scientific-philosophic manner but in a poetic-mythic way, like his German predecessor, Nietzsche. Iqbal's vision of a 'future man' or, more precisely, the race of future men to whom the role of viceregency will be assigned follows his poetic logic. If nature is continually advancing and creation (کن) is a recurrent event, then man too has not yet attained his final stage. This idea has a very serious implication: the viceregent of God has not yet emerged on the stage of history and that it does not belong to a remote past, but, on the contrary, its meaning is eschatological. It also serves another important purpose: the ameliorative motive, so much dominant in Iqbal's poetic philosophy, finds expression in it, a fuller implication of it being that only a 'transformed human race' can transform the world and realize the ontological meaning of man. One cannot find a better example of a 'myth' having been turned into a 'utopia' and a 'historical ideal'. A vital urge alone could have done it, and it is important that Iqbal calls 'faith' a vital act. This idea, or the 'poetic myth', also serves a vital need to bridge the gap between 'being' and 'acting' by giving priority to act. It is by action that 'being' is not only realised, it is also understood and cognised. 'Thus my real personality is not a thing; it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to each other, and

held together by the unity of a directive purpose. My whole personality lies in my directive attitude' (*Reconstruction*, p. 103).

In his letter to Nicholson, Iqbal by comparing his idea of the future race with Samuel Alexander's concept of 'deity' revealed its eschatological dimension. His comparison is unconvincing as Alexander's concept of deity does not merely belong to a distant future since each emergent is, in a sense, a deity to the lower. Iqbal used Alexander's 'myth' to fulfil the vital urge of his poetic philosophy.

Iqbal did not repeat his idea of the future race any further. The idea had been the most concrete symbol of his vitalistic thinking, and it had also revealed his fundamental religious motive of human transformation. In his later poetry a more modest symbol of the 'man of faith' (مرد مومنین) was employed. That the earlier idea had a certain resemblance to the idea of Mehdi (the Promised Guide), in a sense an archetypal image of religious consciousness, becomes clear in some of his poems. Particularly his poem entitled 'The True Mehdi' (مہدی برحق) in *Zarb-i-Kalim* throws some light on the eschatological motive. Although not a very high specimen of poetic art, it deserves being quoted for its relevance to the present discussion:

سب اپنے بنائے ہوئے زنداں میں ہیں مستحبوس
 خاور کے ثوابت ہوں کہ افرنگ کے سیار !
 پیران کلیسا ہوں کہ شیخان حرم ہوں
 نے جدت گرفتار ہے نے جدت کردار !
 ہیں اہل سیاست کے وہی کہنہ خم و پیچ
 شاعر اسی افلاس تخیل میں گرفتار !
 دنیا کو ہے اس مہدئی برحق کی ضرورت
 ہو جس کی نگہ زلزلہ عالم افکار !

All are confined to self-made prisons:

Be they the Eastern stars or Western planets.

Be they church fathers or the holy men of Mecca—

They make innovations neither in speech nor in character.

The politicians still have the same age-old devious ways;

The poets are the victims of the same poverty of imagination.

The world needs that Guide on the path of Truth

Whose eye may shake to its foundations the world of thought.

He had earlier made a significant remark: 'Give up waiting for the Mehdi—the personification of power. Go and create him'.¹⁹ This leads one to reiterate that in Iqbal's poetic philosophy the vitalist urge had a great religious purpose and a gnostic dimension: attainment of 'power' and the transformation of human race, and it is this passion which turns this common theme of modern thought into a unique idea in Iqbal.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- ¹ Iqbal was acutely conscious of his spiritual kinship with Ghalib. In his *Stray Reflections* he remarks: 'As far as I can see Mirza Ghalib is probably the only permanent contribution that we—Indian Muslims—have made to the general Muslim literature. Indeed he is one of those poets whose imagination and intellect place him above the narrow limitations of creed and nationality. His recognition is yet to come'. *Stray Reflections*, edited by Javed Iqbal (Lahore, 1961), p. 51.
- ² See *Contemporary Problems in Religion*, edited by Harold A. Bassilus (Detroit, 1956), p. 38.
- ³ In the Quranic view of man there appears a tension between the creativity of man and his creatureliness. It was not a mere accident that in the medieval religious consciousness the aspect of creatureliness overpowered the former. Modernity emphasises creativity at the expense of creatureliness and does it at its own risk. The risk is, however, exciting.
- ⁴ The activist element was more effectively and forcefully emphasised by the anti-sufi theologian, Ibn Taimiyya. Iqbal's ambivalent attitude towards the sufi (not so much against Tasawwuf as such) also owes its origin to the activist element and is undoubtedly inspired by Ibn Taimiyya.
- ⁵ It is interesting to note here that a consequence of the growing trend of powerful humanism was an aggressive denial of God. It is not a mere co-incidence that while the physicists took a humbler view, the biological philosophers adopted an aggressive stance.
- ⁶ The idea of life and existence being non-repetitive recurs in Iqbal's poetry. Of course he cloaked it in a biological language, but it is important to remember, for methodological purposes, that what Neoplatonism was for antiquity the doctrine of evolution is for the

contemporary intellectual world. For instance, Jacques Maritain, a contemporary of Iqbal, who studied in Heidelberg almost at the same time when Iqbal was there, dissatisfied with the prevailing intellectual atmosphere—a curious mixture of rationalism, scientism and positivism—came into contact with Bergson, heard his lectures and found there 'the spiritual perspectives of life' and the 'intellectual certainty for which he was longing'. (*Four Existentialist Theologians*, edited by Will Hereberg, Anchor Books, 1958, p. 28). There are interesting parallels between the humanistic attitudes of Iqbal and Maritain which need serious study.

- ⁷ It is not surprising that an important biographical fact about the poet-philosopher is that his first serious acquaintance with Islamic theosophy was with al-Jili's treatise, *al-Insan al-Kamil*.
- ⁸ For instance, B. A. Dar's *Iqbal and the Post-Kantian Philosophy*, and, on the other extreme, Maulana Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi's interpretation of Iqbal.
- ⁹ Preface, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1958), p. v.
- ¹⁰ 'The Spirit of Muslim Culture', *Reconstruction*. It is here that he defines prophecy: 'A prophet may be defined as a type of mystic consciousness in which "unitary experience" tends to overflow its boundaries and seeks opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life. In his personality the finite centre of life sinks into his own infinite depth only to spring up again, with fresh vigour to destroy the old, and to disclose the new directions of life' (*Reconstruction*, p. 125).
- ¹¹ Introduction to the English translation of *Asrar-i-khudi*, Letter to Nicholson, p. xvii.
- ¹² See Lecture IV in the *Reconstruction*.
- ¹³ Italics mine. *Stray Reflections*, pp. 17-19.
- ¹⁴ Though we have no autohiographical records, it seems certain that Leibniz was a major influence on Iqbal and I presume that during his stay in Germany he learnt much from him.
- ¹⁵ Quoted by Lovejoy in *The Great Chain of Being* (1960), p. 249. Further references are to the same edition.
- ¹⁶ In *Science and the Modern World* and *Process and Reality*.
- ¹⁷ Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 67.
- ¹⁸ The idea is a constant theme in later European, particularly German, thought.
- ¹⁹ *Stray Reflections*, p. 67.

Waheed Akhtar

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF TIME

There are a number of questions connected with the problem of the nature of time. Is time independent? What is its relation to space and matter? How is time, if accepted as real, related to God, self, freedom, creativity and evolution? These and many other questions have provoked controversies regarding the very nature of reality. The concept of time cannot be discussed in isolation. It is inseparably connected with the fundamental issues of significance having ontological, cosmological, social, political and ethical implications. All the major philosophers of the past have been concerned with this problem. Plato regards time as unreal; Berkley, Hume and Mach consider it as dependent on the individual consciousness; Kant regards it, along with space, as an a priori form of sensibility. Hegel considers it as a category of the absolute spirit. On the other hand, materialists accept time as having a real objective existence. Newton, and following him, the eighteenth and nineteenth century scientists considered time as absolutely independent of space, matter and motion. In recent times, Einstein, Eddington, Bergson, S. Alexander, McTaggart, C. D. Broad, Heisenberg and many other scientists and philosophers have thrown new light on this obscure region of reality. Early Arab philosophers, following the Greek tradition dominated by Platonism and Aristotelianism, generally regarded time as unreal. They gradually arrived at the concept of different space-orders and time-orders (cf. Iraqi and Khawaja Mir Dard). The Muslim conception of time has, on the whole, tended to regard time as subjective, relative and consequently

unreal. While the classical concept of the relativity of time led to the denial of its reality or rather its objective existence, the modern scientific concept of relativity tends to accept it as real and objective and inseparably connected with space, matter and motion. The ancient and medieval philosophers failed to comprehend the nature of time mainly because they divorced it from the total reality, i.e. space, matter and motion. True, time has always been discussed along with space yet both of them were usually regarded as independent of each other. The Euclidean three-dimensional geometry and Newton's concept of independent and absolute time and space had been responsible for all the one-sided and therefore misleading concepts of time and space till the end of the nineteenth century. The emergence of the twentieth-century physics and the non-Euclidean geometries has brought about a radical change in our approach to the study of the nature of time.

The Problem

The present century has witnessed tremendous changes caused and accelerated by scientific discoveries and technological advancement. Scientific revolution has not remained confined to technical and industrial fields. Trade and war, in the words of Bertrand Russell, have been two contributory factors in the development of science. This revolution has not only changed the social structure in advanced countries but it has also exercised a great deal of influence on backward countries. Change seems to be the greatest reality of our time. Everything is in flux. Physical environment, political ideologies, economic systems, moral, religious and aesthetic values have all been undergoing continuous change. Almost all recent schools of philosophy—dialectical materialism, pragmatism, Bergsonianism, realism, existentialism and all forms of positivism and empiricism, etc.—regard change as real. Change indicates temporal sequence and serial order and hence it can take place in time only. Acceptance

of the reality of change logically implies acceptance of the reality of time. Iqbal as a creative artist was fully conscious of the all-embracing phenomenon of change. As a keen student of philosophy and scientific discoveries he could not have remained indifferent to the theoretical implications and practical consequences of the modern emphasis on the reality of change leading to a radically new approach to the problem of time. Iqbal's poetry provides ample evidence of his awareness of the problem. In one of his early poems in *Bang-e-Dara* he asserts:

سکوں متحمل ہے قدرت کے کارخانے میں

تبدلات ایک تغیر کو ہے زمانے میں

('ستارہ')

It is impossible to accept anything as static or permanent;
Nothing is permanent in nature but change.

It is because of this view that he seems to be impressed by the Buddha, the advocate of change, and for the same reason he severely criticises Plato, for whom the world of permanent ideas alone constitutes reality and change is a mere illusion. Iqbal's belief in dynamic reality and his involvement in the process of universal change on physical, social and political levels made him come to grips with the reality of time. Man, he was convinced, could not remain a silent spectator of the drama of change. He has to participate in this process effectively in order to direct its course for attaining his desired ends. Iqbal's solicitude for the East in general and the Muslims in particular was mainly responsible for the serious attention he gave to the problems of change and time. He was of the view that it was only through a radically new interpretation of Islam, based on a new concept of time, that the philosophies of the East could be vitalized. His critique of Platonism and the passive variety of Sufism is aimed at shattering the fatalism deriving from the life-denying theories about the human ego and the corporeal world.

Iqbal undoubtedly took the problem of change and the

reality of time more seriously than any other Muslim thinker. His philosophical writings on the concept of time though meagre, are, nevertheless, significant and his main concern was not philosophical but practical to a large extent. In *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*,¹ Iqbal refers only to those Western and Muslim thinkers whose concept of time has some relevance to his own. He refers to the Ash'arites' atomism, Ibn-e-Hazm's rejection of the atomistic view of time, Nazzam's notion of Tafra or jump and Iraqi's concept of the varieties of time along with referring to the views of Al-Ghazali, Rumi, Tusi, Shah Waliullah, Mir Dard, Jalaluddin Dawani, Mulla Baqir, Jahiz, Ibn-e-Maskawaih, Ibn-e-Rushd and many other Muslim thinkers. He has also briefly discussed the concept of time as advocated by Plato, Zeno, Kant, Newton, Russell, Bergson, McTaggart, Einstein, Eddington, Cantor, James Jeans, Ouspensky, Royce, Spengler, William James, and even Broad. His treatment of time is not meant to be thorough-going but he has made an attempt to draw the outline of an approach for revaluating Islamic ideas and re-interpreting them in the light of modern philosophy and science. It is also worth attention that whatever the specific theme of a particular lecture in the *Reconstruction*, Iqbal, every now and then returns to the problem of time, trying to evolve and expound a concept which in his view is in conformity with the teachings of Islam. He was obsessed with this problem because of its practical consequences and socio-political implications. His concept of time is, therefore, neither metaphysical nor epistemological, but essentially one that may provide a secure foundation for a plan of action.

Another problem which Iqbal had to face was to reconcile unresolved dichotomies of nature and God, self and not-self, reason and unreason, theory and practice, individual and society, and determinism and freedom. He was fully aware that the Muslim world had to meet the challenge of the invading forces of the West. The Western idealism

appeared to him as something abstract, divorced from practical needs and devoid of any ideal that could transform the material into the spiritual. Islam could provide a mechanism through which the dichotomies created by one-sided philosophical systems could be resolved. The main source of the unresolved dichotomies, in his view, was the purely rationalistic world-view evolved in the early period and undue dependence on analytical intellect in the later ages. The West, having rejected rationalism centuries ago, replaced it by empiricism and the inductive method. But the advancement of science had induced faith in the superiority of the intellect, and this was leading the West towards some extreme form of physicalism. The trend towards anti-intellectualism in Western thought was initiated by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Kierkegaard did immense service in overthrowing intellectualism. The West came to realize the significance of his work only by the end of the second World War when existentialism emerged as an important movement of thought. Iqbal was of course fully acquainted with Bergson's critique of intellectualism and his concepts of intuition, *elan vital* and creative evolution. Bergson's philosophy may be regarded as the culmination of anti-intellectualism in the West. He had his supporters in the pragmatic camp. Even dialectical materialists like Marx and Engels had anticipated the pragmatic principle in emphasizing the unity of theory and practice and the concept of the instrumentality of ideas and ideologies in moulding and changing physical and social reality according to human needs. The new philosophy of life and action paved the way for the development of ideas which were relevant to Iqbal's conception of time. He incorporated these ideas within his basic Islamic framework. Iqbal's eclectic philosophy does not lack originality. What he could not succeed in evolving on the theoretical level was achieved on the intuitive level by his poetic vision and creative insight. Apparently contradictory elements of his thought are so

artistically interwoven in the fabric of his life-view that it is impossible to deal with one of his concepts without referring to the others. Reacting against the Western idealistic ego-philosophy, he came to base his philosophy of the ego on his concepts of time, intuition and love. Each one of these concepts is inseparable from the others. The concepts of time, intuition, ego, love, freedom, immortality and God are integral parts of his philosophical system—more exquisitely reflected in his poetic works than in his prose-writings.

Change, History and Evolution

Quoting a number of Ayas of the Quran, Iqbal points out how the Holy Book opens our eyes to the great fact of change. The Quran's emphasis on the observable aspects of reality motivate human thought to contemplate phenomenal reality and adopt an empirical attitude to it. The Quran's invitation to keen observation and understanding of this reality helped develop the inductive method and the scientific approach among Muslim scholars. He is convinced of the fact that it is through the appreciation and control of the processes of change alone that it is possible to build a durable civilization. When the Muslims ignored this possibility they degenerated intellectually and politically. Despite great advancement in theoretical science, they failed to develop the applied sciences. Iqbal thinks that if they had developed the applied sciences it would have given them power to direct the course of change according to their needs (*Reconstruction*, pp. 14-15). The West could attain this power by uniting theory with practice, though they failed to realise the unity of being and thought. Faith in abstract thought gave rise to unresolved antinomies of reason.

The observable phenomena of change occur in space and time. Space is divisible in thought, but indivisible in action (*Reconstruction*, pp. 38-39). The same is true of time. Hegel holds that the absolute reason unfolds itself in space

as nature and in time as history. For Iqbal history is not the unfoldment of reason, absolute or finite, but the continuous creative activity of the ego, both the Absolute Ego and the finite egos. The Quran invites man to study both nature and history in order to conquer them. The Quranic references to the past history underline the importance of the study of history and give the Muslims a keen sense of time. Hence the first systematic philosophy of history was developed by an Arab, Ibn-e-Khaldun. Iqbal maintains that the Quran contains germs of a historical doctrine. The Holy Book introduces two principles of history :

- (i) the unity of human origin;
- (ii) a keen sense of the reality of time and the concept of life as a continuous movement in time.

These principles encouraged the Muslims to accept time and change as real and helped them develop the method of historical criticism (*Reconstruction*, p. 140). The concept of the unity of human origin combined with the concept of life as a creative movement inspired the Muslims to accept and develop the evolutionary concept of nature, life, man, and human institutions. This approach not only accepts time and change as real, but also regards nature as a dynamic reality. Iqbal, therefore, rejects the Aristotelian concept of static nature and fixed inert matter upon which the Ash'arite doctrine of atomism was based. For him the universe is a free creative activity. Here he comes close to Whitehead's concept of reality as a process (*Reconstruction* pp. 32, 52, 71). Iqbal naturally rejects the mechanistic theory of evolution based on the negative principle of natural selection (or, more justifiably called, natural elimination) which refuses to assign any role to the creative principle. Iqbal's concept of evolution has an affinity with the theories of creative and emergent evolution. But these theories too regard intellect as a product of the evolutionary process (*Reconstruction*, p. 46), while Iqbal holds that the creative power of evolution issues from the activity of the self (in which intellect and intuition are

combined). Bergson's failure, he points out, derives from the dualism of will and thought in his philosophy—two modes of the activity of the same reality. Bergson's denial of the teleological character of reality leads to determinism (*Reconstruction*, pp. 53-5). The future is in fact an open possibility (p. 59) which can be pre-determined neither by the laws of nature (causality) nor by those of history. Iqbal appreciates Marx's attempt to evolve the principles of historical philosophy, but he is critical of the Marxian doctrine mainly because of its concept of historical determinism. Here, without depending upon the new philosophical developments which culminated in Existentialist philosophy, Iqbal anticipates Existentialist notions of freedom, creativity and openness of human existence. Heidegger distinguishes *Dasein* from *Sein*, regarding the latter as ontic (without having sense of history) and the former as ontological (having consciousness of present being connected with past and future). According to him man alone has a history because he alone is endowed with the consciousness of the past and the anticipation of the future, transforming as he does, his consciousness into reality through his free creative activity. Temporality is the mode of human existence. 'Far from travelling a predestined route, human existence extends itself in such a fashion that from the very outset its being constitutes itself as something extended.² This extendedness is transcendence. Self-transcendence means actualization of the future possibilities of Being. Iqbal would have agreed with the Existentialists that man makes his own history. Historicity of human existence was never stressed in Muslim thought in this fashion. Iqbal merely suggested how a radical philosophy of history could be built up but he himself could not fulfil this task. The philosophy of history he wished to evolve needed as its basis a dynamic universe in which man is the source of all activity and creativity and in which he controls the direction of time and creates his own destiny. Time is not alien to man but is human history itself

with its origin in God though deriving its creativity from the human ego. History and evolution of the universe is inseparable from the history and evolution of man. If there is any determination for man it is self-determination which does not negate human freedom. Any historical fact is an accumulation of a thousand and one events engineered by man, and each time-event also originates in human experience. History has meaning with reference to human activity and its various forms. Time, as an expression of human existence, is always human time. Iqbal has, in 'Secrets of the Self', elaborated Imam Shafi'i's dictum : الوقت سيف : 'Time is a cutting sword' :

سنگ از یک ضربت اتر شود بطور از متحرومی نم بر شود

در کف مری همین شمشیر بود کار او بهالا تر از تدبیر بود

At one stroke thereof water gushes from the rock,

And the sea becomes land from dearth of moisture.

Moses held this sword in his hand,

Therefore he wrought more than man may contrive.³

In man's hands time is a weapon to assault nature, to conquer history and to control it. The Muslims, who had inherited this revolutionary concept of time, lost their grip over the process of history as they accepted the non-creative, linear concept of time.

عصر نو از جلوه ها آراسته از خیمه پائے ما برخواستہ

The new age with all its glories

Hath risen from the dust of our feet.

And the Muslims have to regain that control, turning their attention to the nature and meaning of time. Thus Iqbal is not intrigued by time as mere concept but as an instrument of change in the social order.

Concept of Time in Retrospect

Plato regarded time as unreal but the Buddha emphasized its reality. Iqbal rejects Plato and accepts the Buddha. He devotes a part of his Mathnawi, *Secrets of the Self*, to the criticism of Plato's ideas and their deadening influence on the Muslim mind. He warns that 'we must be on our guard

against his theories'. For Plato the concrete, physical world is an illusion and ideas alone partake of Reality. Iqbal holds, on the contrary, that:

زنده جان را عالم امکان خوش است
مردۀ دل را عالم اعیان خوش است

Sweet is the world of phenomena to the living spirit,
Dear is the world of Ideas to the dead spirit.

Plato 'made hand, eye and ear of no account' and 'slumbered and took no delight in deeds'. The Muslim mind was poisoned by his philosophy of the denial of the material universe. It goes without saying that under his influence most of the Muslim thinkers somehow upheld the notion of the unreality of time. Sufism was more deeply influenced by Plato who may be regarded as its presiding genius. Iqbal does not regard change as evil and does not agree with the Buddha that salvation lies in the liberation from the life-cycle by eliminating desire, the root-cause of the will to live. Life is suffering and suffering is rooted in desire. Iqbal, like the Buddha, does certainly regard life as an expression of desire, but, unlike him, he considers it a blessing:

زندگی مضمون تستخیر است و بس
آرزو افسون تستخیر است و بس
زندگی صید افکن و دام آرزو
حسن را از عشق پیغام آرزو

Life is occupied with conquest alone,
And the one charm for conquest is desire.
Life is the hunter and desire the snare.
Desire is Love's message to Beauty.

Iqbal thus partly rejects the Buddha's philosophy of life because he, in Iqbal's view, could not appreciate the life-force of time. Desire is the vitality to grapple with the temporal. The temporal is real because time is God's attribute or God himself.

While Western thinkers relegated time to the physical world, the Muslim thinkers isolated it from the physical world to make it spiritually significant. The result was that

both of them denied its reality. The Muslim philosophers, from Kindi (b. ninth century) to Averroes (1126-1198), conceived time merely as serial order of before and after and thus made it unreal.⁴ Iqbal criticizes this approach in these words:

در گل خود تخم ظلمت کاشتی وقت را مثل خطے پنداشتی
باز با پیمانہ لیل و نهار فکر تو پیمون طول روزگار
ساختی این رشته را ز ناردوش گشته مثل بتان باطل فروش

Thou hast sown the seed of darkness in thy clay.

Thou hast imagined time as a line.

With the measure of night and day

Thy thought measures length of time

Thou mak'st this line a girdle of thine infidel waist;

Thou art an advertiser of falsehood, like idols.

The Ash'arites' atomistic theory regards time as a succession of discontinuous 'points', and existence as an accident that ceases to exist forthwith.⁵ At the same time the atomistic theory implies the notion of a continuum, and Iqbal fully appreciated the significance of the arguments of the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites.⁶

Iqbal holds that Al Ash'ari did not believe in the infinite divisibility of space and time. Ibn-i-Hazm rejected this notion of infinitesimals (*Reconstruction*, p. 37). Ash'arite atomism explains the creative activity of God as atomic (*ibid.*, p. 68). The rise and growth of atomism in Islam is regarded by Iqbal as the first important indication of an intellectual revolt against the Aristotelian idea of a fixed universe. (*ibid.*, p. 68). McDonald, admitting that there is nothing like atomism of Islam in Greek thought, finds a resemblance between this theory and the views of a certain sect of Buddhism (*ibid.*, pp. 68-9). Zeno had proved the impossibility of movement on the basis of infinite divisibility of space. He thus denied an independent space. The Ash'arite view did not resolve the paradox of Zeno. Nazzam's notion of *Tafra* (jump) was an attempt to overcome this difficulty. The atomistic theory of discontinuous points and Nazzam's notion of *Tafra* combined

together anticipate Planck's theory of discontinuity. Iqbal argues that this theory leads to two propositions:

- (i) Nothing has a stable nature.
- (ii) There is a single order of atoms, i.e. soul is a finer kind of matter.

He agrees with the first proposition, but rejects the other as it ends in pure materialism. This theory spatializes the atom, which as a phenomenon of Divine energy, is essentially spiritual. Iqbal aims at transforming the Ash'arite scheme of atomism into a spiritual pluralism. His view is akin to Leibnizean theory of Monads (spiritual atoms). What is regarded by atomistic theory as accident is in Iqbal's view prior to atom. Iqbal maintains that Nafs (ego) is not an accident but is more fundamental than the atom and its motion. Every atom is an ego. Hence reality consists of 'egos' (*Reconstruction*, pp. 71-3).

The Ash'arite notion of a single order of atoms was rejected by later Muslim thinkers. Iraqi believes in varieties of space and time. He advances for the first time a doctrine of the plurality of space-orders and time-orders. Iqbal reconstructed the atomism of Ash'ari, Abu Bakr Baqilani, Imam al-Harmayn, Shahrastani, and al-Ghazzali on the basis of the doctrine of the plurality of space-time orders. The germs of the concept of the relativity of time can be traced in later Muslim thought in India. An eminent sufi-poet of the eighteenth century Khawaja Mir Dard reinterpreted the sufi doctrine of Tajaddud-i-Amthal (Revival of Archetypes) resolving the dichotomy of being and non-being through his theory of the continuous creativity of God. He explains this attribute of Being in terms of a dialectical process. Supporting Nazzam's view he asserts that this phenomenon is confined to bodies, which are constituted of accidents. Accidents are revived at every moment.⁷ According to him accidents in relation to each other produce Relative Time, (*Zaman-i-adaffiyah*) which is grounded in Real Time (*Zaman-i-haqiqi*). An occurrence relating to itself occurs in real time. He does not separate thing-in-itself from time. Time constitutes a thing.⁸ Dard's

concept of time is surprisingly modern and is summed up in one of his couplets:

لے کر ازل سے تباہ ابد ایک آن ہے
گردِ زمانِ حساب نہ ہو مہماہ و سال کا

From eternity to eternity there is but one moment
Only if time is not measured in months and years.

For Dard time is a continuous creative activity of the real being; it is spatial (or serial succession) in relation to accidents; it is real in relation to one's own self. On the basis of such doctrines, intuitively developed by Muslim thinkers, Iqbal justifies the claim that Bergson's concept of time is more in conformity to Muslim thought than to Western thought. His claim to developing his concept of time independently of Bergson's thought should not be treated as a mere pretension. Origins of his concept of time can be found in the development of Muslim thought, not in the tradition of Western philosophy. Heisenberg accepts that until the discovery of Planck's quantum the exact sciences were materialistically oriented. The only properties that fitted the atom were geometric.⁹ Muslim thought during the medieval time introduced the concept of atoms and ascribed their activity and continuity to life-force, i. e. the ego. Bergson's 'pure duration' is an attempt to transcend the spacebound time sense of Western culture.

Space-time Continuum and Motion

Iqbal's attack on idealism is aimed at rejecting the world-view projected by the Platonic tradition of Western thought. Plato called the world of phenomena a myth and declared that being is not-being.

کار او تھامیل اجزائے حیات قطع شاخ سرو و عننائے حیات

'Twas his work to dissolve the structure of Life
And cut the bough of Life's fair tree asunder.

The world is situated in space. Denial of the world means denial of space. The highest status that the idealistic philosophy could give to space was that of an apriori form of sensibility

(Kant). The Quran regards both space and time as real. In Muslim philosophy space and time were always considered intertwined. It was the Greek influence which made early Arab philosophers conceive independent space and independent time. The concept of independent space cannot help explain motion, either quantitative or qualitative.

Perceptual space is the sum-total of the relations of things existing in and moving through it. It is limited, sensibly continuous, and extends in three dimensions or six directions. It is based on the apprehension of the spatial properties and relations of the concrete objects of ordinary sense perception. Empirical theory of space-perception assumes that perceptual space emerges from the correlation of the spatial features of the different senses. Aristotle regarded it as the container of all objects. It is generally supposed to be a great void. Conceptual or mathematical space is a mental construction which through abstraction of perceived relations becomes unlimited, infinitely divisible and mathematically continuous. Until the advent of non-Euclidean geometries the Western science could conceive only a single space-order as absolute reality. Muslim mind could never agree with the absolutistic concept of space. 'The ideal of the Greeks was proportion not infinite. The physical presentness of the finite with its well-defined limits alone absorbed the mind of the Greeks' (*Reconstruction*, p. 132). Iqbal holds that the ideal of the Muslims was the infinite and this could not be harmonized with the absolutistic concept of space. All the forms of atomism posed the same difficulty. The Ash'arite atomism was an attempt to overcome this difficulty. Nasir Tusi (A. D. 1201-74), for the first time since Ptolemy (87-165) gave serious thought to the difficulties of demonstrating the certitude of Euclid's parallel postulate on the basis of perceptual space. He realized the necessity of abandoning perceptual space, furnishing a basis for 'the hyper-space movement of our time' (*ibid.*, pp. 132-4). Al-Beruni saw, from a purely scientific point of view, the insufficiency

of the scientific view of the universe (ibid., p. 134). Iraqi, as Iqbal claims, insisting on the plurality of space-orders and time-orders, speaks of a Divine time and Divine space.¹⁰

The conception of time ascribed to Iraqi by Iqbal is relevant to the modern concept of space and time. He holds that there are varieties of time as well as varying grades of being between pure spirituality and pure materiality: the time of gross bodies, divisible into past, present and future; the time of immaterial beings, serial in character but moving faster than the former time; Divine time, indivisible, absolutely free from passage, sequence and change which is above eternity (*Reconstruction*, p. 182). There are three kinds of space also—the space of material bodies, of immaterial beings, and the space of God. Iraqi's theory implies not only different orders of space and time but also their relativity to matter and motion. Thus, almost six centuries ago, Muslim thinkers had anticipated the modern developments in Western physics and mathematics. Saccheri, Gauss, Lobachevsky, Bolyai and Riemann contributed to the current theories of time and space. Butlerov, Fyodorov and their followers revealed the dependence of spatial properties on the physical nature of material bodies, and the dependence of the physico-chemical properties of matter on the spatial distribution of atoms.¹¹ On the basis of these researches the concept of the unity of space and time was first suggested by H. Minkowski and immediately afterwards incorporated by Einstein into his theory of relativity.¹² Newtonian theory had regarded time and space separable in an absolute way. According to Relativity this separation is impossible. Reality consists of four-dimensional continuum (space-time manifold) with three dimensions of space and one of time. Matter and motion are also inseparably included in it. Space includes all its events and objects while time includes changes and motions. The space-time manifold can be regarded as changeless and motionless only when taken in abstraction from time or rather

when space and time are regarded as separate.¹³ A. Alexander and C. L. Morgan interpreted space-time metaphysically as the matrix of the world out of which have emerged matter, life, mind and Deity. Another concept is that of multi-dimensional space with n -dimensions in which the position of a point in space is defined by n -numbers (while space can have a limited or an infinite number of dimensions). This concept is the outcome of a complicated process of abstraction and idealization which finds an important application in Physics.¹⁴

Iqbal was fully aware of the recent developments in science and mathematics. He refers to Cantor's theory of mathematical continuity which shows that space and time are continuous. To him the philosophical value of Einstein's theory is two-fold.

First, it destroys, not the objectivity of nature but the view of substance as simple location in space—a view which led to materialism in classical physics. 'Substance' for modern Physics is not a persistent thing with variable states but a system of inter-related events. . . . Secondly, the theory makes space dependent on matter. The universe, according to Einstein, is not a kind of island in an infinite space; it is finite but boundless; beyond it there is no empty space. In the absence of matter the universe would shrink to a point (*Reconstruction*, pp. 39-40).

Iqbal faces two difficulties in Einstein's theory:

- (i) Its dealing with the structure of things throws no light on the ultimate nature of things which possess that structure (*ibid.*, p. 39).
- (ii) Time as a free creative movement has no meaning for the theory. It consequently accepts determinism—the future as something already given, as indubitably fixed as the past (*ibid.*, p. 40).

Hence Relativity-physics fails to explain the real nature of time. Like Bergson's theory, it advocates determinism. It is neither serial time, nor Bergson's 'pure duration'. Iqbal infers that time as a fourth dimension of space really ceases to be time. (*ibid.*, p. 40).

Iqbal refers to Ouspensky's *Tertium Organum* in which time is conceived as the movement of a three-dimensional figure in a direction not contained in itself. His time too as direction in space is serial time (ibid., p. 40). Iqbal argues that time, as the fourth dimension of space-time continuum, is not real time. Movement, in theory, is always causal. Iqbal holds that the law of causality fails at the level of life and mind. At this level we need concepts of 'ends' and 'purposes'. Movement, not causal, but purposive and end-bound, originates from within; it is not external to the effect. Intellect, upon which scientific theories are based, cannot apprehend and appreciate this movement. The faculty which apprehends it is called by Bergson intuition—a self-conscious instinct. In Iqbal's terminology it is *Ishq* (عشق) (love—but not in its narrow sense). It includes both intuition as a source of knowledge and love as a creative force. Only *Ishq* is capable of knowing real time and participating in its creative activity. Ego, the seat of *Ishq*, is prior to time. It is not an accident but the source of all creativity. It is grounded in freedom, and hence time, as its activity, is not deterministic. The real movement, implied in real time, is life-force. Time as the creativity of the ego is at the back of evolution. Motion resulting in quantitative and qualitative changes creates new forms of matter and life. It is this creative force that makes evolution purposive. Real time is related on the one end to the Absolute ego, i.e. God, and on the other end to the finite ego, i.e. human self. Realization of this relation helps man overcome finitude and attain immortality. Zarwan, the spirit of time and space, who carries the pilgrim (of eternity) to the universe above, says:

گفت ز روانم جہاں را قہارم ہم نہانم از نگہ ہم ظاہرم
 بستہ ہر تدبیر با تقدیر من ناطق و صامت ہمہ نخبچیر من
 ہم عتابے ہم خطایے آورم تشنہ سازم تا شرابے آورم
 من حیاتم من مہاتم من نشور من حساب و وزخ و فردوس و حور
 آدم و افرشتہ در بند من است عالم شش روزہ فرزند من است

در طلبم من اسیر است این جہاں از دم ہر لحظہ پیر است این جہاں
 لی مع اللہ ہر کرا در دل نشست آن جوانمردے طلبم من شکست
 کرتو خواہی من نہاشم در میاں لی مع اللہ باز خواں از عین جان
 (جاوید نامہ)

'Zarwan I am, who holds the world
 In thrall, at once concealed and visible.
 All efforts are related to my fate,
 I've thus enslaved the eloquent, the mute. . . .

I rebuke

And I reward: I cause the pangs of thirst
 Until I bring the wine; I symbolise
 Both life and death and resurrection too;
 I am the judgment, and both heaven and hell;
 All men and angels are my captives mere.
 The six-day world is but a child of mine. . . .
 Imprisoned in my magic is the world,
 Which, with my breath, grows old and doth decay.
 That valiant soul alone can break my charm
 Whose heart proclaims, 'I have a time with God'.
 If thou dost wish that I may not remain
 Between, let thy heart too announce the word'.¹⁵

The best poetic treatment of the concept of relativity by Iqbal is found in *Javid Namah* :

ہر جہاں را ماہ و پرونیے دگر زندگی را رسم و آئینے دگر
 وقت ہر عالم روان مانند زو دیر یاز این جا و آنجا تندرو
 سال ما این جا مہے آن جا دمے ہمیش این عالم بآن عالم کمے
 عقل ما اندر جہانے نو فذوں در جہانے دیگرے خوار و زبون

Each world

Had its own moons and galaxies;

Each world

Did order life in its own way.

Time flowed

Quite like a stream; here slow, there swift; a year
 Became a month here and a moment there;
 The more of this world was the less of that.
 Our reason, proud and so resourceful here;
 In other worlds, was object reprobate.¹⁶

The different orders of time and space are inaccessible to reason. New worlds are open to intuition or Ishaq.

Space-time in Relation to God

Iqbal repeatedly quotes a Hadith-i-Qudsi (God's revelation in the words of the Prophet) : 'Do not abuse time, for time is God.' Some critics of Iqbal see in his emphasis on this Hadith, supposed to be inauthentic, a heretical tendency converting Islam's concept of God and Time into the Zarwanism of the Persians. He quotes, both in *Asrar-i-Khudi* and *Javid Namah*, the prophet's saying, 'I have a time with God of such sort that neither angel nor prophet is my peer'. He also endorses Iraqi's concept of Divine space and Divine time.

Here we are faced with some tricky questions: What is the nature of Divine space and Divine time? A being in space and time is susceptible to change. Can change be predicated of the Ultimate Ego? Did God create the universe in time? While engaged in continuous creative activity does God seek perfection? Some of these questions may lead to dangerous answers, but Iqbal's re-interpretation of the concept of God saved him from falling into pitfalls of heresy. He had to retain the perfection of God as well as His life. Ibn-i-Hazm sacrificed God's life for His perfection. Iqbal writes:

Change, in the sense of movement from an imperfect to a relatively perfect state, or *vice versa*, is obviously inapplicable to His life. But change in this sense is not the only possible form of life. A deeper insight into our conscious experience shows that beneath the appearance of serial duration there is true duration. The ultimate Ego exists in pure duration wherein change ceases to be a succession of varying attitudes, and reveals its true character as continuous creation (*Reconstruction*, p. 6).

To God change means self-revelation. 'The "not-yet" of God differs from man's "not-yet". It means unflinching realization of the infinite creative possibilities of His being which retains its wholeness throughout the entire process' (*ibid.*, p. 61). Iqbal maintains that 'space and time are interpretations which thought puts upon the creative activity of the ultimate Ego' (*ibid.*, p. 65). The universe is only a partial expression of

God's creative activity. God's infinity is intensive, not extensive. For God nothing is non-ego. All time and all creativity depend upon God. The universe is not His 'other'. Mind's search for permanence has created the fixed universe. In God change and permanence are combined. His perfect permanent Ego in the process of self-revelation continuously creates the universe. Change is a mode of His directive creativity. Iqbal holds that the Arabic words 'Khalq' (خلق) and 'Amr' (امر) express the two ways in which the creativity of God reveals itself to us. 'Khalq' is creation; 'Amr' is direction (ibid., p. 102). God's life of self-revelation is not the pursuit of an ideal. He Himself does not pursue any 'end' because He is 'End-in-Himself.' But his directive activity makes phenomenal change a purposive process. Iqbal's concept of creative-purposive evolution originates in God's creation and is guided and controlled by His directive activity. It is because of this creative process that mind and body become one in action (ibid., p. 105). Iqbal rejects occasionalism because this theory regards creation as an accident. Creation is actually a continuous process, immanent in all that happens. God's time—pure duration—is free from beginning and end. It is 'Eternal Now.' Both past and future are present in it, but future is not predestined; it is an open possibility inherent in time. Eternity does not imply negation of time but it posits 'ever-present' time—a continuous flow of Divine creativity.

Time and Ego

In Iqbal's view pure duration is predicable to self. The multiplicity of objects and events cannot be explained in terms of pure space or pure time. It needs some creative and active principle. Self or ego serves this purpose. It has two aspects, appreciative and efficient. 'The appreciative self lives in pure duration, i. e. change without succession. The life of the self consists in its movement from appreciation to efficiency, from intuition to intellect, and atomic time is born out of this movement' (*Reconstruction*, p. 77). The conscious

experience of self on an intuitive level resolves the opposition of change and permanence. For appreciative self time is an organic whole or eternity, for efficient self it is atomic time. The multiplicity of duration is seized on by the appreciative self in order to be transformed into an organic whole. The efficient self analyses the reality, while the appreciative self synthesizes all oppositions. To self nothing is its other. It absorbs into itself the external reality which to analytical thought appears as alien.

Fichte says that the self unfolds itself in definite thrusts, *Anstosse*. The first thrust or *anstoss* is sensation; the second is the differentiation of the self from its perception; the third transforms perception into a world of objects; the fourth and the fifth are logico-conceptual assimilation of the world. The last thrust reveals that the ego is the source of all the laws of knowledge. At this stage the non-ego disappears and dissolves in the ego. In Iqbal's terminology this is the stage of pure duration. Fichte concludes that with its last thrust the ego itself disappears but Iqbal holds that at this stage alone a self is able to say 'I am'. The intuition of 'I-amness' determines the place of a thing in the scale of being (*Reconstruction*, p. 57).

Man, according to Iqbal, is chosen by God for vicegerency. To reach this stage—the highest that the ego can attain—man has to pass through two other stages, viz. obedience to law and self-control.¹⁷ God addresses man in the Quran (2: 28): 'Lo, I will appoint a vicegerent (Khalifa) on the earth'. Iqbal interprets this Quranic verse in the third section of the ninth part of *Secrets of the Self*. Every man has the germ of Divine vicegerency, being potentially a microcosm, possessing all the Divine attributes. He can display these attributes by attaining the highest self-consciousness. 'Awareness of the self is awareness of God' *من عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربه*

At the stage of self-control human will becomes Divine will, *(ومن الناس من ليسه من نفسه ابتغى مرضات الله و الله رؤف بالعباد)* human time becomes Divine time and a man may claim 'to

have a time with God.' Now time—Divine directive activity—does not remain alien but becomes man's own creative activity. In this sense alone Hallaj can claim: 'I am the creative truth', and Bayazid can assert: 'Glory to me'. When Ali Ibne Abutalib declares: 'I am the speaking Quran (Quran-i-Natiq)', he claims to be the word of God—Divine will—in this sense alone. The Prophet's saying 'I am time' identified man with time, i. e. Divine activity. Iqbal reinterprets Hallaj's declaration *Ana'l Haq* (اناالحق) (I am the truth) in a radically new way. *Haq* means both God and truth; *Ana* means 'I' as well as 'I amness', i. e. the ego. He translates this statement as 'Ego is the truth' to justify his doctrine of the ego as the source of time and all that 'was', 'is' and 'to be'. Man thus does not remain a creature but attains the status of a creator.

The universe, dancing to the unceasing rhythm of 'Kun Fayakun' (come into being), is not a finished product, but rather a continuous process of creation. It needs a creative being for translating God's creativity into concrete reality. Man is the instrument of completing the Divine act of creation. The Quran states: 'Blessed is God, the best of those who create' (23: 14). Thus the Quran indicates the possibility of creators other than God as well. Man is a creator in his own right. Iqbal in some of his exquisite verses deals with this theme asserting that it is man who has carved order and beauty out of the chaos. Iqbal's man dares to assert his ego in the presence of God and partakes of the gift of creativity.

Iqbal's Bhartari Hari addresses the pilgrim of eternity thus:

این جهانے کہ تو بینی اثر یزدان نیست

چرخه از تست وهم آن دشته که بدوک تودشت

The World thou seest is not

The handicraft of the Lord,

From thee alone emerge

The spinning wheel, the cord.

The Houries of Paradise address the pilgrim, the man, the true believer:

شیوہ ہا داری مثال روزگار

Thy habits are those of time itself

A. E. Taylor, following F. H. Bradley, argues that perceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real, because they involve reference to the *here* and *now* of a finite experience; conceptual space and time cannot be ultimately real, because they contain no principle of internal distinction, and are thus not individual. He holds that the space-time order is an imperfect phenomenal manifestation of the logical relation between the inner purposive lives of finite individuals.¹⁸ Iqbal overcomes this difficulty by pointing out that the relation of time to the inner purposive life of the self is not logical but existential. Taylor raises a question: How are space and time transcended in the absolute experience? We find an answer to this question in Iqbal's system of thought. The absolute experience belongs to the Absolute Being only and he can transcend space-time. Individuals may also transcend space-time through their creative activity. Time is not the fourth dimension of space; rather space is the concretization of time events in the life of the ego. At a higher level of experience the ego is capable of transcending space and time. There exists only the Absolute Ego and a Kingdom of finite egos. Every ego is an end-in-itself, and therefore has its own time-order. The finite Ego conquers time through time.

Finitude, Freedom and Immortality

Iqbal infers two principles from the Quranic legend of Adam:

- (i) Life's irresistible desire for infinity as individual.
- (ii) Seeking collective immortality through self-multiplication (*Reconstruction*, p. 88-9).

To him man is the possessor of a free personality accepted at his peril and the Ego is free personal causality. Its destiny is self determined in its unitive experience. 'In the higher sufism of Islam unitive experience is not the finite ego effacing its own identity by some sort of absorption into

the Infinite Ego; it is rather the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite (*ibid.*, pp. 109-10). The ideal of Islam is self-affirmation, not self-negation. Iqbal attacks Sufism because it tends towards self-annihilation—negation of one's own freedom to exist as an individual creative agent of the Divine will. Fate is not pre-destined, it is actually the ego's free creativity. In Iqbal's poetry and philosophy freedom seems to be the value of all values—the *Summum Bonum*. He would agree with the existentialists that human existence is grounded in freedom. Sartre's dictum that 'Man is condemned to be free' would have been turned upside down by Iqbal saying 'Man is blessed to be free.' Freedom is not condemnation. For Sartre there is no choice for man but freedom. For Iqbal man chooses his freedom from within, it is not thrust upon him from without. Ibn-i-Arabi says: 'What the essence (of man) demanded was given to him.' He means to say that man chose his being freely, for no compulsion was involved in this process. Man is the architect of his own destiny. Iqbal holds that acts are either self-sustaining or self-dissolving according to their affirmation or negation of freedom.

The ego has a beginning in time and therefore it is finite. But finitude is not a misfortune (*Reconstruction*, p. 116). Iqbal writes: 'The Quran does not contemplate complete liberation from finitude as the highest state of bliss. The 'unceasing reward' of man consists in his gradual growth in self-possession, in uniqueness and intensity of his activity as an ego' (*ibid.*, p. 117). He further claims, quoting a Quranic verse (39:69), that even the day of complete destruction cannot affect a full-grown ego. True infinity is intensity, not extensity (*ibid.*, p. 118). Action provides the ground for the intensity of the ego. Life offers scope for ego-activity.

It is in action that the ego seeks immortality. In Iqbal's view Martyrdom of Husain bin Ali is the highest instance of the individual freely choosing his own destiny and thus attaining immortality.

Immortality can be attained through action, living and creating one's own self and the surrounding universe freely. The ego does not end with the death of the body. An ego perfected through a life of action overcomes finitude. Martyrdom is eternal life for in it the individual ego becomes one with the creative activity of God and conquers time.

Iqbal finds a positive view of immortality in Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. In his view of time Nietzsche deviates from Kant and Schopenhauer by regarding it as a real and infinite process. But his doctrine implies fixity of events happening again and again. It is a more rigid kind of mechanism and hence eventuates in determinism. Time, regarded as circular movement, makes immortality intolerable. The Superman of Nietzsche's conception amounts to a repetition of what man has been a number of times before (*Reconstruction*, pp. 113-15).

Iqbal holds that the creative activity of time does not repeat itself. It is free; it is not deterministic. Consequently, Nietzsche's doctrine fails to overcome finitude. For Kant immortality remains merely a postulate of morality. The Quranic view is partly ethical and partly biological. Iqbal defines Barzakh (برزخ) as a state of suspension of life between death and resurrection. Resurrection itself is conceived by him as a universal phenomenon of life (*Reconstruction*, pp. 115-16). Reward and punishment on the day of judgment are not willed by God, but willed by man himself. He receives what he chooses to deserve. Immortality is within the reach of the ego, but man has to win it; it is not given him as a gift. Iqbal asserts that immortality is not liberation from the shackles of time, but it means to be eternally present before God. Man, having a time with God can himself become eternal.

وقت ما کو اول و آخر ندید
 زنده از عرفان اصلش زنده تر
 از خیابان ضمیر ما دمید
 هستی او از سحر تا بنده تر
 زندگی از دهر و دهر از زندگی است
 لا تسبوا الدهر فرمان نبی است

Our time; which has neither beginning nor end,
 Blossoms from the flower-bed of our mind
 To know its root quickens the living with new life;
 Its being is more splendid than the dawn.
 Life is of Time, and Time is of Life:
 'Do not abuse Time!' was the command of the Prophet¹⁹

The fifth part of the *Secrets of the Self* shows that when the Self is strengthened by Love it gains domination over the outward and inward forces of the universe.²⁰ Love, in Iqbal's thought and poetry, is the moving force and creator of values and ideals; it symbolizes man's freedom. It is through love that the ego conquers finitude and attains immortality. It is not the negation but the affirmation of individuality and hence it individualises the lover as well as the beloved. Iqbal's concept of love is the culmination of the Sufi concept of love, but he has redefined it and broadened its meaning and scope so that it may embrace the ego, time, creativity, freedom and even God.

Iqbal's conception of time is unique in the history of philosophy. He regards time as an instrument of conquering finitude and attaining immortality. The origins of this conception can be traced in the social reality of contemporary historic situation which he desired to change. This conception has social and political implications. It is not an exercise in abstraction. It arose from his awareness of the concrete existing reality which he wanted to reshape according to Islamic ideals and values. Time implies directive creativity and purposive evolution. Iqbal regards *Ijtehad* (اجتهاد) as the principle of movement in the structure of religious thought in Islam. In his view moving with changing time, not passively but freely, means to employ this principle of movement. He provided, in his concept of time, a secure ground for this movement which demands reevaluation and reconstruction of Islamic philosophy and religion in the light of the spirit of time.

There are certain elements in the Iqbalean concept of time which can be labelled as unscientific or rather meta-scientific,

for instance time's relation to ego-activity, its mysterious power as an expression of Divine creativity, its dimension of eternity or its potentiality to transcend finitude. But how far has science succeeded in exploring the obscure regions of reality called time? What sciences deal with is phenomenal time or at most the fourth dimension of space-time manifold. If a physicist is justified in describing time with reference to spatial events, why is not a metaphysician justified in explaining spatial occurrences in terms of time-relations? It is just a matter of hypothetical preference. A thinker, a mystic or a poet would not be prevented from discussing meta-scientific aspects of a reality, so challenging as time, in terms of existential experience. Freedom and purpose, as accepted by Einstein, have not yet become scientific notions. Iqbal's concept of time includes both of them and involves a number of other notions like love, intuition and creativity, which are not comprehensible in strictly scientific terms. He therefore had to use terms which acquire meaning with reference to his intuitive experience, and are meaningful for people who share his world-view and value-system.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- ¹ Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Delhi, 1975). Further quotations from the *Reconstruction* are indicated in the text.
- ² Bochensky, *Contemporary European Philosophy* (1956) p. 170.
- ³ Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *Secrets of the Self*, translated by R.A. Nicholson (Lahore, 1944), pp. 134-5.
- ⁴ Alam Khundmiri, 'Iqbal's Conception of Time' in *Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan*, edited by Hafiz Malik (New York, 1970), p. 247.
- ⁵ Alam Khundmiri, *op. cit.*, pp. 247-8.
- ⁶ A.H. Kamali, 'The Heritage of Islamic Thought' in *Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan*, pp. 232-3.
- ⁷ Khwaja Mir Dard, *Ilm-ul-kitab* (Delhi, 1308 A.H.), pp. 133-8.

- ⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 301-305.
- ⁹ Werner Heisenberg, 'From Plato to Max Plank' in *The Range of Philosophy*, second edition (New Delhi, 1974), pp. 82-3.
- ¹⁰ Maulana Imtiaz Ali Khan Arshi, in an article recently published in Urdu, has advanced the view that Iqbal has wrongly ascribed the relativistic conception of time and space to Iraqi. In all the extant works of Iraqi, according to the Maulana, there does not appear to be any reference to such a conception.
- ¹¹ M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin, *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (Moscow, 1976), p. 454.
- ¹² P.D. Runes, *The Dictionary of Philosophy* (Bombay, 1957), p. 297.
- ¹³ *ibid.*, p. 297.
- ¹⁴ M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin, *op. cit.*, p. 426.
- ¹⁵ Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *The Pilgrimage of Eternity*, translated by Sh. Mahmud Ahmad (Lahore, 1961), pp. 18-19.
- ¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 138.
- ¹⁷ *Secrets of the Self*, pp. 72-84.
- ¹⁸ A.E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics* (London, 1946), pp. 241-64.
- ¹⁹ *Secrets of the Self*, pp. 137-8.
- ²⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 43-7.

Jamal Khwaja

IQBAL'S CONCEPTION OF GOD

Introduction

As a committed Muslim Iqbal believed that there is one God and Muhammad is His Prophet; as a poetic genius and inheritor of the glorious Indo-Persian cultural tradition he raised an enchanting poetic world on the foundations of the above belief; as a thinker well versed in both Western thought and Islamic learning he reinterpreted the same belief in order to integrate it with the conceptual framework of contemporary science and philosophy. Though the attempted reconstruction was not thorough or complete, it was brilliantly executed and was meant to stimulate others to carry on the task. However, Iqbal's admirers and followers did not or could not fulfil Iqbal's hope.

In this article I shall confine myself to Iqbal's conception of God as found in his *Asrar-e-khudi* and *Ramuz-i-bekhudi* and *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. His mature poetry in both Urdu and Persian is great literature overflowing with moral exhortation, metaphysical insight and an almost epigrammatic elucidation of concepts like God, the ego or self, time, freedom, power, will to live etc. But Iqbal's poetry cannot always be treated as a source of intellectual clarification of philosophical themes and concepts. Indeed, this is inevitable, for even though poetry may be philosophical in content, it cannot be philosophical in structure and function. Poetry must, above all, move or inspire, philosophy clarify or enlighten. Though these two functions may be performed together up to a limited degree,

confusing one with the other leads to bad poetry or bad philosophy.

Some Methodological Considerations

It is a fairly common view of pre-critical theists that theism is a set of simple metaphysical beliefs about the ultimate nature of the world, these beliefs having no quarrel with science which deals with the world as it appears to our senses and not with ultimate reality or with values. According to this view the substance of theism is: (a) there is one and only one supreme self-existent Being, everything else being derivative or dependent upon it; (b) the supreme Being is also supremely good; (c) the supreme Being participates in the life of His creatures revealing what is good and demanding obedience from His creatures who ought to obey their Creator; and (d) the supreme Being has a plan or purpose (inscrutable to the finite creation) which will certainly be fulfilled. It is further held that the above beliefs are so simple that they do not raise any problems of meaning or interpretation, though one may deny them out of perversity or lack of sheer empirical evidence.

The above pre-critical approach to theism, however, ignores the fact that *prima facie* simple beliefs are, in the final analysis, highly complex judgments which are capable of several meanings or interpretations. These in their turn involve a total conceptual framework whose existence is hardly suspected by the non-philosopher. Again every natural language has its own rules or logic for dissecting the organic unity of our immediate perceptual and inner experience into concepts, used for grasping, classifying and connecting our experience for theoretical as well as practical purposes. No scripture, or for that matter, no set of propositions can be understood or made the basis of action without linguistic and conceptual interpretation. Now this is what is sought to be done by theologians or philosophers who study a particular scripture. When they differ, as they

must due to a number of factors, it is alleged that they needlessly complicate the plain, simple and profoundly convincing language of the scriptures. To give an example, the Quranic expression 'Lord of the worlds' (*Rabbul Alamin*) could be interpreted as the loving Father of all creatures, the sustaining Principle or Ground of being, the transcendent First Cause of all existence, the unmoved Mover, etc. according to one's particular conceptual framework. Now it would be an over-simplification to deny the possibility of plural interpretations, just as it is an over simplification to hold that the true Muslim believer should repudiate all philosophy or the use of conceptual gloss in the act of understanding the Quran. In other words, theologians like Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taimiya, Abdul Wahab etc. who claim to accept the Quran in its pure non-interpretative literal meaning are deluding themselves. The literal meaning which they attribute to Quranic expressions is rooted in their pre-critical commonsense world view even as other meanings are rooted in other world views or more sophisticated conceptual frameworks. As already implied above, we are all condemned, as it were, to see the Quran through some conceptual lens or other, if we wish to understand and act upon the Scripture rather than merely recite or memorise it.

Another point of fundamental importance is the recognition of the organic unity of the different fields of human knowledge and culture. There is mutual inter-action between the basic assumptions (though not the detailed theories) of science and philosophy on the one hand and the concrete interpretations of Scripture on the other. It is true that all attempts to understand the nature of God will necessarily be made within the framework of human experience. This, no doubt, applies to all objects of human knowledge. We must, however, distinguish between the unavoidable relativity of our knowledge of God and the quite avoidable projection of human modes of being or behaving upon God. In other words, we must distinguish

between the noetic and ontological senses of anthropomorphism. The latter, though quite common at the level of pre-critical theism, is avoidable, while anthropomorphism in the noetic sense is an ingrained feature of all human knowledge.

The fear of committing the anthropomorphic fallacy has led to the maxim of mystical silence among many philosophers, theologians and mystics. This rule no doubt liberates man from the grip of conceptual idolatry, but it must not be abused or turned into a device for stifling all conceptual activity. Mystical silence is indeed the destination of man's search for God, but the shores of silence must be reached after and not before the rigours of a conceptual journey involving comprehensive factual investigation and an existential interpretation of the universe. An impatient leap into mystical silence rooted in conceptual evasion would deprive us not only of conceptual growth but also of a richer or higher spiritual development.

The proper approach is, therefore, neither complete silence, nor the negation of all Divine attributes, nor an unqualified transference of value from the human context to God, but systematic investigation and reflection in the twilight of a willing and ready transcendence in the sense in which Jasper's ideal philosopher glides while contemplating reality. It seems this approach is basically similar to the method of analogy and transcendence (*tashbih wa tanzih*) followed by Ash'arite theologians, including Ghazzali. Iqbal follows the same approach. However, Iqbal's concepts are drawn from the scientific and philosophical framework of the present—space-time, Relativity, field theory, organism, emergent evolution, stream of consciousness, duration, etc. while Ghazzali's concepts were drawn from the Neoplatonic framework—emanation, grades of light, non-being, potentiality, etc. and those of the earlier Ash'arites from Greek atomism and Aristotle's logic of substance and attributes. In all cases, however, reality partly remains beyond men's outstretched conceptual arms.

The difficulties involved in conceiving God's nature or attributes prompts some thinkers to follow yet another approach—to posit an impersonal Divine Force, Power, Energy, Will or Spirit which is immanent in the universe and which creates and sustains it, without, however, possessing the attributes implied by a personal God—love, mercy, forgiveness, etc. An immanent Spirit is, however, a rather pale shadow or empty husk in relation to the God of religion. Iqbal rejects this approach, not because it fails to give emotional satisfaction or succour, but because his metaphysic of Personalistic Voluntarism demands the existence of a supreme Ego, rather than merely an immanent spiritual Energy, or merely an impersonal First Cause, or Ground of being, or the primal Source of value, or pure Form of all forms, or a poetic personification of the cosmic quest for values. Iqbal, however, does not claim that philosophical considerations which go to establish the existence of an absolute or supreme Ego also establish the God of religion in the full or strong sense. Iqbal, following Kant, rejects the different traditional philosophical proofs of God as inconclusive. They may or may not prove the existence of a First Cause, or a necessary Being, or a Designer, but they certainly do not prove the existence of God in the full religious sense. He holds that belief in God is a matter of faith even though science and philosophy may support the faith without proving it.

Background of Iqbal's Conception of God

Iqbal was fully aware of the conflict between the scientific and religious pictures of the universe, a conflict that was at its sharpest in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. During this period the growing evidence in support of Darwin's theory of organic evolution had made deep inroads into the traditional theistic belief that the world had been instantly created by an omnipotent God, while the concepts and discoveries of the New Physics—Relativity, field

theory, etc. were not yet there to provide a sort of a cushioning effect to the shattering blow delivered by biology and geology to the pre-evolutionary version of theism. It is no wonder then that Iqbal in his early student days came under the spell of scepticism, but was saved from atheism by the study of Wordsworth's poetry. Iqbal was also deeply perturbed by the existence of pain and evil in a universe believed to have been created by a perfect all-powerful and all-loving God. Indeed he says that this problem is the crux of the intellectual difficulty in the way of theism. However, Iqbal makes no attempt to resolve this problem, though he shows in some detail how the progress of natural science and its methodology in the twentieth century have removed the conflict between science and religion. Let us now study this point in some detail.

According to science the primal self-existent reality is matter and the concrete differentiated universe is nothing but matter in different configurations which arise (without any purpose) because of the uniform behaviour of matter in accordance with inherent and ultimately inexplicable laws. According to religion the primal self-existent reality is a perfect Being who creates matter, motion and the laws or regularities of nature, in the exercise of His sovereign power, inscrutable will and purpose. In other words for science the primal reality is devoid of all purpose and values, while for religion purpose and values eternally inhere in the primal reality. Now Iqbal points out that while developments in the New Physics do not and cannot end the above controversy by inductively or deductively proving the truth or falsity of one of the two views, they, however, reduce the intensity or sharpness of the conflict between religion and the eighteenth century atomistic materialism. These crucial changes came in two broad stages.

In the first stage, towards the end of the last century physicists like Thompson, Rutherford, etc. revised the

earlier view that matter consists of inert, solid, indivisible particles called atoms which were pushed by external force through physical contact or gravitational attraction. They now came to the view that motion was inseparable from matter and that the primal stuff of the universe was not matter alone but matter-in-motion. It should be noted that this conception removes the need for positing an external Prime Mover of an inert world and thus cannot be said to favour the religious view of the universe. Perhaps this consideration partly helped in the genesis of the dialectical materialism of Marx. The concept of matter was, however, revised still further in the first three decades of the twentieth century, and in this second phase energy or motion *per se* has become the fundamental concept in science. Scientists view the electron or the proton not as a particle containing some charge of electricity, but rather the charge itself, or a packet of charges. We may say that matter has been conquered by energy in the battle for conceptual supremacy.

It is true that we cannot form a mental picture of energy or pure motion *per se* without thinking of its being the motion of some entity that has energy or that moves. In other words, we tend to regard motion as an attribute or quality of a fixed or stable substance or subject that possesses the said attribute. The grammar of all natural languages is such that even though the word 'motion' can be used as a noun or substantive the noun remains an incomplete expression, unless we specify the thing or entity to which we can refer the motion—perhaps the Aristotelian logic of substance and predicate is derived from the grammar of the Greek and other natural languages. However, neither our inability to picture pure motion nor the evidence of grammar invalidates the scientific concept of pure motion as the fundamental reality.

The above approach considerably narrows down the chasm between matter and spirit, since both have now become concepts of dynamism even though the nature of the dynamism may differ—matter being electro-magnetic energy

(according to Einstein's famous equation $E=mc^2$) while spirit being akin to human energy. In other words, while the concept of energism does not obliterate the distinction between theism or idealism on the one hand, and materialism on the other, energism enables us to say that it is energy, in some form or at some level, rather than inert and lifeless matter that is the primal reality.

Iqbal further points out that Einstein's theory of Relativity, Whitehead's theory of spatio-temporal concretion, Bergson's method of intuition and his theory of duration—all converge upon the view that scientific truth does not contradict religious faith. Let us now examine this claim in some detail.

As is well known, Newton believed that space and time were absolute and objective, and this view prevailed among scientists right till the time of Einstein even though Leibniz and Kant, each in his own way, had notions that were different from those of Newton. To say that spatial and temporal features are absolute and objective means that Space and Time are independent total frames which are the locus of all finite and determinate spaces and times. The implications of Newton's view are as follows. In the first place, objective Space and Time, as empty containers, could exist *per se* even if there were no things or events to occupy empty Space and empty Time. Secondly, space and time are ontologically separable, so that things could be extended in space or possess spatiality without necessarily being extended in time or possessing temporality. Thirdly, matter or material particles possessing the primary or objective qualities of shape, size, mass and impenetrability had an absolute location in space and moved in time with an absolute velocity due to the push given by adjacent bodies or gravitational force, in accordance with the famous laws of Newton. Lastly, all change was the result of the mechanical movement of matter in Space and Time, and theoretically, the complete history of the universe could be calculated if

the total mass of matter and its spatio-temporal coordinates were given to us.

It was Einstein who pointed out that when the full implications of Newton's concept of absolute space and time are worked out mathematically, i.e. with deductive certainty and then experimentally checked, the results are not what they should have been if Newton's assumptions had been true. The revised view held that (a) space and time were not separate and that spatiality (existing in space) and temporality (existing in time) were mutually correlative dimensions of reality. Space and Time, as separate frames of reference, were merely abstractions from the organic unity of space-time, and (b) both motion and time could never be absolute, motion being relative to a point of reference, while time to a particular person. Let us examine (b).

Motion implies some velocity or rate of change of position. We are inclined to think that velocity of a moving object is a fixed quantity at a definite point of time. This is what is implied by believing in absolute motion. But we cannot meaningfully fix the velocity without indicating some observer to act as the point of reference. Suppose a train moves at 30 mph in a particular direction. Now if an observer were also to move at 5 mph in the same direction, the velocity of the train, in relation to the moving observer, would become only 25 mph, though it would remain 30 mph in relation to the observer at rest. Likewise, the velocity of the train would increase to 35 mph, relative to the observer, if he moved at 5 mph in the opposite direction. Thus velocity is always relative and not absolute. Let us now take the parallel case of time. No flow of time, which is nothing but pure motion, can be said to be in the past, present or future in the absolute sense without reference to a particular person. Consequently, we cannot say that reality is nothing but such and such fixed masses of matter moving at such and such fixed velocities in the absolute sense without any observer being involved in determining the position and

changes in the position of matter. The upshot of the above analysis is twofold: (a) the inclusion of the time dimension in the ultimate nature of reality injects dynamism or change into matter as was done independently by the earlier developments in Nuclear Physics; (b) the admission that all measurements of motion and time are relative to the observer and that there is no such thing as objective location in space-time, independent of any observer, renders all scientific knowledge relative to the human observer. This makes room for plural perspectives or levels of reality. In other words, Relativity makes it easier to hold that while scientific concepts apply to reality at the macro or micro levels of sense perception, religious concepts and categories apply at a different level which has yet to be fully explored through methods suitable for that level. Iqbal thus points out that the new Physics supports, though it does not prove, the truth of religion. The ideas of Bergson and Whitehead do the same, and we now turn to them.

The crucial starting point or basis of Bergson's philosophising is the distinction between the immediate datum of experience and concepts with which man tries to grasp the general structure of his experience. These concepts are used for satisfying man's theoretical need for logical system and architectonic harmony, and his practical needs of different types. When, for instance, a person asks 'What is time?' he wishes to grasp the essence or general structure of time as far as possible, while the person who asks 'What is the time?', wishes to catch the 3.30 train. But neither is concerned with immediate experience of time as an inner, felt, reality, say like physical pain or the pangs of jealousy. All analysis of previous experience imposes a network of abstract concepts or categories that emerge gradually due to cultural conditioning and our own ceaseless interpretative acts. Both conceptual analysis and practical acts are condemned to miss the organic complexity, i. e. the unity in diversity, of immediate experience. Conceptual analysis

dissects the datum into separate parts and deals with them as if they were atomic units of experience while practical activities which require physical movement and manipulation also require or presuppose breaking up of the whole into easily manageable parts.

Coming back to time, Bergson points out that time, as conceptually interpreted, is a succession of separate time-points or atomic 'nows', as it were. However, time, as immediately experienced by a person, is an organic continuity or stream of inter-penetrating 'nows'. Though every individual 'now' is a unique experience, there is no gap or jump from one 'now' to the other. In other words, there is continuous change without succession of separate drop-like 'nows' with infinitesimally small gaps in between. Thus time, as actually experienced, may be said to be either a mathematical continuum rather than a series, or an organic rather than an aggregative whole. As modern mathematics points out, the continuum is neither the primitive concept of numerical unity, nor the derived concept of a class with the primitive numerical units as its members, but a more complex concept which integrates both the above concepts into an entirely unique kind of totality or unity. Likewise, the biological concept of organism synthesises bare numerical unity and plurality into a more complex unity of mutual interpenetration of the whole and the parts, as distinct from mere spatial aggregation.

Now Bergson claims that time, as immediately experienced, is an organic mathematical continuity, and to this continuity he gives the famous name 'duration'. Duration is pure movement or flux without any substance or entity which moves, and duration *per se* is the ultimate or primal reality. When, however, we try to conceptualize or grasp the nature of duration it is transformed into serial time. Now serial time cannot be grasped without the notion of extensive magnitude. When we try to think out the abstract nature of time we cannot help arriving at the notion of space.

Moreover, our practical activities of dividing, joining, handling, moving physical things also presuppose extensive, as distinct from intensive, magnitude. Thus the 'other' as the objective pole in the complex unity of our immediate perceptual experience, appears to us as an aggregative whole or discrete spaces and discrete moments, i. e. extended in objective space and serial time. Indeed all our concepts of matter, substance, thing, cause, effect, etc. are second order abstractions of the first order immediate experience. Duration is thus for Bergson the bedrock or fundamental intuition of reality, nay, reality itself. Duration is direct awareness of reality and also constitutive of ultimate reality. In other words, duration is the unity of both knowledge and being. Now this concept of duration conforms to and reinforces the conclusions of the New Physics which reduces matter to a field of charge.

In the same way Whitehead's conception that the universe is not a mechanical aggregate of static parts occupying fixed locations in absolute space, but a finite structured spatio-temporal concretization of infinite ideal possibilities, some of which are turned into actual occasions by God's ceaseless creative activity, implies a dynamic universe.

Thus Einstein, Bergson, Whitehead and, much earlier, Leibniz, all hold dynamism in one form or other as an inherent and eternal feature of primal reality. Iqbal's metaphysics falls in the same broad category but with features of its own which we shall shortly describe.

Conception of God

We now come to Iqbal's points of departure from the philosophical positions of the Western thinkers mentioned above. Though Bergson particularly had deeply influenced him Iqbal was too creative and also too deeply rooted in his own Islamic cultural tradition merely to echo the latter's concepts. Iqbal's conception of God is his unique

creative synthesis of Bergson's concept of duration, Nietzsche's concept of the will to power, Rumi's concept of love and the existentialist approach to religion, and, last but not the least, a non-literal, philosophical interpretation of the Quran. In the final analysis, Iqbal's conception of God does not spring from any one source but represents his individual quest for truth in an age dominated by science and technology. His earnest and wide-ranging search should remain a source of inspiration to all, even if his philosophical method or findings are found to suffer from some limitations.

Iqbal's principal point of departure is Bergson's method of intuition and his key concept of duration as non-serial time. According to Iqbal, the very method of intuition which makes a person aware of pure non-serial time also reveals something more about duration. And it is precisely here that Iqbal parts company with Bergson. Bergson holds that duration is pure change without succession, and that change consists of the past overflowing into and organically intermingling with the immediate present which rushes into the future as a creative process which is neither mechanically determined by the past, nor guided by a conscious idea or purpose. Duration (which at times Bergson seems to equate with life or vital force, but which he generally regards as a more primitive or fundamental concept) is pure creative transformation of the past into the present and the future without any mechanical or external push from the past or purposive pull from the future. Indeed, Bergson regards the pull of the future as nothing but inverted mechanical causality, which he rejects. Now the basic or key thesis of Iqbal is that duration as directly intuited by man, is not merely pure change, but also the immediate consciousness of change. While dynamism or change is the inherent feature of consciousness, the latter has other dimensions not reducible to mere change or flux. At this point, Iqbal's thinking appears to be influenced by the philosophical ideas of McTaggart, Ward and James.

Iqbal holds that (a) consciousness has three dimensions—knowing, feeling and willing, which are inseparable from consciousness as a state, and (b) that the organic unity of knowing, feeling, and willing is not a passing state but the act of a more or less stable self or ego. Iqbal thus equates duration with egohood, whereas Bergson has equated duration with pure change without succession. Now the moment the element or dimension of will is included in duration the concept of purpose or value is also necessarily infused into the organic complexity of duration, for the act of willing implies striving to reach some goal which is deemed valuable whether as an end in itself or as a means to some other end. Thus Bergson's method of intuition when properly applied reveals that the pre-analytical first level reality is not duration, but rather a self-in-duration. This self knows, feels, evaluates and wills creative acts or modes of its duration.

From the above position Iqbal further advances to the view that reality consists not merely of my ego (to which I have a privileged access through introspective intuition) but of a system of egos presided over by the supreme or ultimate Ego called God in the language of religion. Though Iqbal expressly declares that God, in the religious sense, means much more than the ultimate Ego, and that the God of religion cannot be proved to exist by any philosophical argument, he does not deal with the logic of this transition from his own ego to other egos including the absolute Ego. Had Iqbal antecedently accepted any putative philosophical proof of God's existence as valid, the logic of such transition would have been clear.¹ But this is not the case, for Iqbal rejects all the well-known arguments for God's existence—the cosmological, the ontological and the teleological. Iqbal's procedure may however, be justified in the sense that the ego-in-duration is immediately aware not merely of its atomic egohood but of its being in a situation or of its essential and inalienable confrontation with the 'Other'. This is the

state of being thrown in a situation as understood by Jaspers and Heidegger. Now if the 'Other' is involved and presupposed in the perceptual experience as well as in the intuition of duration the problem of solipsism (which arose for Descartes) would not arise at all. Thus, what Iqbal needs to prove is not the existence of the 'Other' but only the nature or attributes of the 'Other', and this is what Iqbal attempts to do in his metaphysic of Theistic Personalism and interpretation of scientific knowledge.

Science claims to be a systematic and verifiable description of reality, and Iqbal fully accepts it. However, most scientists have themselves gradually come to realize that scientific knowledge, far from being a direct acquaintance with reality, is merely a highly abstract conceptual network or system, which is useful for controlling and predicting the course of nature and, only in this sense, true. Since, however, scientific knowledge misses the concreteness and richness of reality and also deliberately excludes the domain of value and the dimension of intensive depth of ego-acts, the world revealed by natural science is condemned to be an abstraction out of a reality far more complex than the conceptual symbolism of empirical science. But where science fails intuition succeeds. This, however, does not mean that science is inferior to intuition. It merely implies that the two do not compete with each other, since their respective functions are different. If metaphysics does not help us to fly in space (as does physics), physics does not help us to understand the significance of man in the universe (as does metaphysics). The question whether man should regard himself as an accidental worm in a waste land, or as the vicegerent of God (as Iqbal would have us believe) cannot be answered by physics, nor even be raised by it. It is true that metaphysical speculation or intuition, in Iqbal's sense, cannot give the answer to the above question. However, the very effort to do so heightens our self-awareness, making us alive to the crucial issue of man's ultimate destiny.² Iqbal's view that

the universe is a colony of egos created by God, as the absolute ego, is a metaphysical insight, at which he arrives through reflective intuition rather than empirical investigation or logical deduction.

Let us now study Iqbal's conception of God in greater detail, and see what changes are wrought by him in the traditional conception. Though Iqbal does not claim to advance an independent philosophical conception of his own) as was done by Aristotle, Spinoza, Whitehead, etc.) and claims merely to elucidate the Quranic conception of God, he makes radical interpretations of God's attributes as mentioned in the Quran. He retains the Quranic attributes, but reconstructs their meaning in the light of his metaphysic of theistic Personalism. As indicated above, the reconstructive exercise is rooted in his metaphysical insight, for which Iqbal gives no reasons even though he does give reasons when he reconstructs Bergson's concept of duration. This does not imply that his reconstruction is internally inconsistent though it does imply that his conception of God cannot claim to be more than one out of several possible conceptual maps or rather existential interpretations of the universe.

Granting that God is the absolute/ultimate/supreme Ego/Self/Individual (to use the different terms which Iqbal uses interchangeably) what more can we say about God? As is well known, the Quran refers to about ninety Divine attributes or the beautiful names of God (*asma al husna*)—the Creator, the Knower, the Just, the Powerful, the Hearer, the Seeing, the Wise, the Judge, the Chastiser, the Planner, the Patient, the Forgiver, the Healer, the Merciful, the Eternal, the First, the Last, the Manifest, the Hidden, etc. But, according to Iqbal, the important elements in the Quranic conception of God, from the purely intellectual point of view, are: creativeness, knowledge, omnipotence and eternity. Iqbal specifically excludes from this list attributes like love, mercy, compassion, etc. The reason for this appears to be that while creativeness, omnipotence,

knowledge and eternity can be proved to be deducible from the concept of the absolute Ego, goodness or love etc. cannot be so deduced. However, in view of the supreme importance of compassion as a Divine attribute I shall include its analysis in what follows.

The traditional conception of God's creativeness is that God, as the omnipotent self-existent Being, instantly created the differentiated universe out of nothing. This notion has several implications, though not all are explicitly realized by the average theist. In the first place, there was a time when there was no creative activity by God and until the creation began in time God was the sole Reality. Secondly, God is not a mere contriver or architect who moulds given matter into forms but the absolute Creator of matter, and perhaps also of forms. Thirdly, after having been created the universe exists separately from God. Though it may be totally annihilated any time by God who created it in the first place, the universe, as a created object, has a temporary objective or independent existence, confronting the Creator, say, as a picture confronts the painter, or the web confronts the spider. Fourthly, the concrete nature of the universe and the laws of phenomena have been willed by God who could have willed them differently had He so wished. Lastly, the Creator has a purpose in creating the universe and willing the qualities and laws which the universe actually bears, even though the purpose may be inscrutable to us. Now with the exception of the second implication Iqbal disputes all the others in some sense or the other. Iqbal points out that it is not the case that God became active at a certain point of time—namely, the point at which He decided to create the universe—and that, prior to that point of time, God was not active or creative. God not only exists eternally but also creates eternally. In other words, creativeness is not separable from the being or essential nature of God, as, say, redness is separable from the essential nature of the rose. Absolute creativeness or dynamism is an integral part of

the being of ultimate Reality. The reason why theists are prompted to hold that creation started at a point of time is their notion or unconscious assumption that created objects must confront their Creator. Now, if they concede that God has been eternally creative, this would contradict the ontological primacy and unity of God by making the created objects co-eternal with the creator. This was the substance of the Mutazalite view with regard to the relationship between the nature and attributes of God. But this objection will be valid only when created objects are spatial or physical, or when the Creator and the created object both exist in absolute space and time in the Newtonian sense. If, however, spatiality be only an appearance of a non-spatial reality the notion of continuous or even eternal creativeness will not erode the concept of Divine unity. Iqbal says that modern Relativity Physics which rejects the concept of absolute location in space-time, nuclear Physics which equates matter with energy, and the principles of indeterminacy and complementarity, all go to support (without confirming) Iqbal's metaphysic of voluntarism. In its Iqbalian version the finite egos-in-duration which think, feel, evaluate and strive to attain valued ends have been created by the absolute Ego and are subject to disintegration—except those who earn the status of immortality, as distinct from eternity, which belongs to the Absolute Ego alone.

In the light of the above conception of continuous creation the Quranic reference to instant creation by God does not mean the instant birth of creatures ready-made out of nothing. It rather means the instant delimitation of the infinite possibilities or routes of God's creative activity so that the structured egos acquire a determinate concreteness on the basis of which they could be known or be used by other egos in the hierarchy of egohood, with God at the summit and man as His deputy. Iqbal thus holds that the Quranic story of the creation and expulsion of Adam is a metaphorical version of the grand story of cosmic evolution.

However, Iqbal does not make any detailed interpretation of the full Quranic version of the story.

The fourth and the fifth implications of the traditional conception of God's creativeness bring into focus the concepts of omnipotence and purpose. Iqbal holds or implies that the traditional notion of omnipotence does not antecedently register the distinction between logical possibility and physical possibility, both being lumped together in the confused notion of capricious power. If, however, we first distinguish what is logically impossible from what is logically possible, we can then demarcate the field of logical possibilities from logical impossibilities (or rather absurdities, like, say, a circle becoming a square without ceasing to be a circle), and claim that God's omnipotence covers the total field of logical possibilities. Thus God could have created entirely different laws of phenomena or given entirely different qualities to his created objects. Modern science itself admits that its laws are empirical generalizations, rather than logical certainties, and that there may be universes with entirely different sets of laws. Modern science also holds that the universe is not a closed and completed product of an evolutionary process that stopped long ago, but that the creative process is still continuing, with new galaxies being formed, new patterns or organisations of elementary particles, or new types of viruses, etc. emerging. All these considerations go to support the validity of God's omnipotence in the proper sense of the term.

As regards the concept of Divine purpose Iqbal points out that though God's continuous creativeness as the supreme Ego is purposive, the purpose of an absolute Ego should not and cannot be reduced to human purposiveness. Finite egos are limited by other egos and also by their own imperfections, so that they have to strive after rather than merely will a goal. Now the supreme Ego cannot be purposive in the above sense. His purpose is not to reach a goal for Himself, but to create egos which can reach their goals

through striving and effort. Divine purpose is thus the ontological ground of the purposive striving of finite egos.

Let us now deal with Iqbal's analysis of the Divine attributes of knowledge and eternity before passing over to the attribute of love or compassion.

Iqbal says that God's knowledge is perfect knowledge of the ultimate nature of things. Since spaciality and serial time are merely an appearance for egos which are non-extended in space and serial time, God's knowledge cannot be a discursive and serial awareness of external things. Divine knowledge is an immediate and complete awareness of the depths of the finite egos. Nothing, past, present, or future, remains outside the grasp of God's knowledge since all these divisions are conceptual dissections made by the finite human intellect which cannot grasp the absolute duration of the absolute Ego. Moreover, since the supreme Ego creates the finite egos God's knowledge is not knowledge by discovery but knowledge by creation. However, neither God's fore-knowledge nor the creative character of Divine knowledge (when properly understood) erodes man's freedom in the sense of self-determination. The belief in God's omniscience and the belief that God endows the created ego with fixed qualities (taqdeer) do not contradict the belief in man's freedom to choose and act accordingly, though the latter belief certainly limits the range of man's freedom.

As regards God's eternity Iqbal points out that God is eternal, not in the literal sense of being the first or initial point in the infinite chain of serial time, nor even in the relatively more sophisticated metaphysical sense of being beyond the reach of time like timeless truths of reason. God is eternal in the sense that He, as the absolute Ego, is the absolute Duration in relation to which all finite durations begin and end, or, in other words, all finite egos live, move and have their being. Egos come and go, but the Absolute Ego ever was and ever will remain, not in the Newtonian sense of existing permanently in or within an infinite

objective time-frame, but in the sense that God is absolute Duration, or that duration is the constitutive essence of God. Iqbal thus gives a privileged place to time or rather duration instead of insisting on the organic unity of space-time in the manner of most thinkers after Einstein.

As regards God's love or compassion, it is not a sharing of or melting into the joys and sorrows of His creatures and giving primacy to their growth or welfare rather than His own. God loves His creatures in the sense that He is the ontological fount of compassion which bestows the quest for value upon all His creation. This quest is a gift of Divine grace. Man's yearning for truth, goodness and beauty and his capacity for inner freedom are the meaning and proof of God's love for man. Indeed the quest for value is inseparable from egohood. All egos—from elementary particle to atom, from atom to amoeba, from amoeba to ape and from ape to man—wish to preserve, enlarge and deepen their egohood, and this is nothing but a manifestation of the quest for value, which is of varying grades and operates at different levels. The rose which blooms in the garden, the nightingale which sings, the tiger that roars in the jungle, the eagle that soars in the sky, no less than the saint, the scientist, the statesman or the artist all affirm their egos and create values of different grades and with different degrees of freedom and intelligence.

In a similar vein the Divine modes of other attributes may also be distinguished from their human modes. Thus, for instance, God's wrath is not rage at having been frustrated by the other; God's patience is not resignation in the face of trial; God's planning is not optimum utilization of scarce resources which cannot be increased at a given moment; God's purpose is not to reach a goal or objective for himself; God's revelation or command is not the issuing of orders to an external agent; God's unity is not the numerical oneness of being the single instance of a generic type; God's existence is not like the existence of any substance, organism, thing, event, idea, concept, class, tendency, cause, power,

person, etc. but entirely *sui generis*. Indeed, we can never reach a conception of God free from logical inconsistencies or aesthetic dissonances. No human formula, no conceptual model is adequate for Divine attributes, which refuse to fit into the conceptual moulds of human attributes. Every Divine attribute slips out of our grasp the very moment we think we have caught it in our conceptual net. Our concepts are shattered to pieces beyond the boundaries of human attributes. This shattering of concepts, however, does not mean that God is absolutely unknowable, but only that our knowledge of God is condemned to be partial and misleading. What then is the point in continuing to try to describe the Indescribable?

The classical Islamic answer is that the contemplation of the beautiful names of God helps us to absorb the Divine attributes, as far as humanly possible. Iqbal fully accepts this, but he also deepens this answer by holding that conceptual thought, if rigorously and comprehensively developed, is also a way of greeting and partially embracing the fulness and richness of ultimate reality. Iqbal is critical of Ghazzali on the ground that he does not realize the essential complementarity of thought and intuition and is inclined to ignore the role of the former in man's integrated growth as the vicegerent of God. Nevertheless the *leitmotif* or dominant purpose of the Muslim's dwelling on the names of God is not the quest for knowledge but the quest for being. This, however, is not the absorption of the finite ego into God, but rather the ceaseless growth of man's potentialities. Such growth brings about an ever-growing nearness of man to God without, however, obliterating the distinction between the two.

Iqbal's quest for spiritual being thus sharply diverges from the pantheistic Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi known as unity of existence (*wahdatul wajud*) and also Vedantic non-dualism. The latter hold finite individuality of personality as an ontic deficiency or metaphysical evil—the root cause of imperfection

and suffering. Complete salvation or deliverance lies in the willing release from the shackles of finite individuality which is essentially a separation of the drop from the ocean. The will to live or the will to power which is the ultimate reality, according to the voluntarist metaphysic of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, is rooted in the ego's ignorance of its essential relationship with the Primal Being as also in its ignorance of the rapturous bliss of union with the Source. Ignorant man who clings to the pleasures of this world is like the child clinging to his toys and refusing to grow up. The awakened soul develops a longing to end its apprenticeship as a child and to embrace its true destiny and ultimate destination in the bosom of the Infinite.

Iqbal rejects the above approach, which, according to him logically leads to nihilism. He believes not merely in self-affirmation, but also in the pursuit of power through action and struggle. The proper way to acquire power is the conquest of nature through empirical science, while the proper way to use power is to conduct oneself as God's responsible vicegerent who loyally submits to the revealed will of God as explained and practised by the Prophet. However, as long as the law remains an external command rather than an authentic demand of the ego itself, the finite ego does not attain to the maximum nearness to God as is possible for man.

Iqbal's emphasis on power may suggest that his thought lacks a mystical dimension. This impression is likely to be strengthened by Iqbal's poetic barbs against ascetics or mystics with a passion for personal salvation. But Iqbal's approach is mystical in the sense that he admits the possibility or validity of religious experience as an 'open' means for complementing empirical knowledge. What Iqbal denies is the 'open' character of prophecy, which he holds to be the highest form of religious experience, and which, according to Islam, came to an end after the Holy Prophet.³

NOTES

- ¹ According to Iqbal, the self or ego is not merely a methodological postulate in the sense in which Kant understands the transcendental unity of apperception, but a self-aware existent. Both Hume and Kant went wrong when they denied that the ego or spiritual substance could ever be the object of direct awareness. Descartes also went wrong when he inferred the 'I am' from 'I think'. The 'I am' is not inferred, is not a logical construction out of pure flux, but the immediate datum of experience, apart from being the methodological unity of apperception in the Kantian sense.
- ² It is a dangerous over-simplification to suppose that metaphysical or religious faith is a matter of mere individual taste without any social effects, while science, technology and a purely secular morality suffice for the good life.
- ³ In this paper I have ignored the question of any growth or change in Iqbal's conception of God. According to the late Professor M. M. Sharif, however, there were three stages in the growth of Iqbal's concept of God. Even if this be true, we find only one clearly expressed conception in his works. There seems to be no clear evidence for the view that in his early 'romantic' phase (when he wrote nature poetry under the influence of Wordsworth) Iqbal held a purely pantheistic conception of God. To hold that God is immanent does not exclude the view that He is also transcendent.

A. A. Ansari

AN EXISTENTIAL APPROACH TO IQBAL

Though primarily anchored to the accepted modes of poetic utterance, and largely resting upon an apparently traditional substratum of concepts, Iqbal's poetry lends itself, surprisingly enough, to explication against some of the modernist perspectives of thought. In the absence of any specific external evidence one feels diffident to assert that Iqbal's poetic psyche was in any way shaped and moulded by the existentialist postulates. And yet Iqbal's passionate attachment to Nietzsche (1844—1900)—in whom may be sought the earliest germs of existentialism—his avowed concern for his tragic predicament and the fact of his contemporaneity with Sartre and Marcel make one inclined to believe that he was not wholly unaware of the far-reaching implications of their fundamental axioms of belief. The similarity between Iqbal's approach to the problem of consciousness, human identity, its freedom of choice, death, anguish and dread, the inconsequential nature of pure thought as against the validity of experiential reality and that of the existentialists of both persuasions—the secular and the religious—is very marked, indeed. This similarity becomes all the more intriguing because here there is no question of any cultural analogy nor of any direct influence. It is still more exciting because the universe of Iqbal's poetry is a God-oriented universe. Yet man, in his unique particularity, occupies a pivotal position in it. In a way we might hold legitimately that God, Satan and man are the chief *dramatis personae* in Iqbal's fictional world. In fact man is placed between the two polar opposites. And he is more than a

vague and abstract entity, a static substance; he is the point that focalizes an infinite mass of energy and from which radiate complex and intricate charges of feeling and emotion. With that is also linked up the nature of desires—the concrete forms of consciousness—the exercise of a moral choice and the principle of dynamism that animates the basic structure of personality.

The central issue that has engaged Iqbal's attention all along in his poetry is that of human consciousness. It is not something solid, given and complete like a full-blown rose, but a process and a self-creation based on an act of improvisation and rejection of what has been. The self may be equated with an articulation of freedom into being. Sartre makes a subtle distinction between two modes of being—the non-positional and the positional consciousness. Both of them seem to be distinct but interrelated and interdependent principles. Consciousness may disclose itself as consciousness of the self which is conscious as well as consciousness that is directed outwards towards some transcendent object in space. In other words, the being of the perceiving consciousness and of the perceived entity are sharply distinguished and are discrete. The former may be termed as non-positional and the latter as positional consciousness, and the positional consciousness is in relation to what it posits outside itself. The non-positional consciousness may more or less be equated with 'pure subjectivity' though it has also a definite ontological status attached to it. What Sartre is interested in—and Iqbal would concur with him in this respect—is not so much the conceptual function of consciousness as the fact that it makes us acutely aware of the world of men and things around us. Iqbal's view seems to be that Sartre's *en soi*—being in plenitude—is given to *pour soi* in order to provide occasion for the exercise of the latter's potentialities. Kierkegaard visualizes three levels or 'spheres of existence' through which the self passes—the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. The 'aesthetic'

sphere embraces the life of the 'natural' man who lives mainly on his senses and emotions. This is the life of immediacy, governed by a vital impulse of spontaneity in which the accent falls on seeking pleasures and satisfactions of a transient nature. In the ethical sphere the self abandons its all-absorbing preoccupation with momentary pleasures and enters the domain of the 'universal human'. He now comes to regard the practical world as the theatre of his action and life as a serious task to be performed in the light of moral obligation and sense of duty—in conformity with the Kantian Categorical Imperative. In the last stage the personality develops an acute awareness of the spiritual values of life and man becomes conscious of standing alone before God. He also perceives the absolute validity of the religious requirements imposed upon and reflected by the relationship forged between himself and God. The two levels of existence—the 'ethical' and the 'religious' in Kierkegaard remind us of the three factors involved in the Ego's growth in Iqbal—obedience, self-control and the idea of vicegerency of God—as elaborated in *أسرار خودی* ('Secrets of the Self'). Further, corresponding to Sartre's two modes of being spoken of earlier, Iqbal in a crucial passage in *Javid-Namah* distinguishes the three modes of consciousness thus:

زندة یا مردة یا جان بہ لب از سہ شاہد کن شہادت را طلب
 شاہد اول شعور خویشتین خویش را دیدن بہ نور خویشتین
 شاہد ثانی شعور دیگرے خویش را دیدن بہ نور دیگرے
 شاہد ثالث شعور ذات حق خویش را دیدن بہ نور ذات حق

Whether you be alive, or dead, or dying,

Seek witness from three witnesses:

The first witness is the consciousness of your own Self—

To behold Self in its own light.

The second witness is the consciousness of the Other—

To behold Self in the Other's light.

The third witness is the consciousness of the Divine Essence—

To witness Self in the light of the Divine Essence.

The crux of the argument here seems to be that we are, in the first instance, conscious of our own selves—our inherent possibilities and the utmost resources upon which we may depend for coming into Being; we are also conscious of the totality of other Existents that are posited as the not-self; and the ultimate referent of our awareness is Infinitude. It may be added that the act of witnessing involved in these three modes is part of the Divine pattern.

Iqbal shares with the existentialist thinkers the realisation of the inconsequentiality of pure thought. To him it is the concrete reality of objects rather than any mere abstract speculation about them that should attract our attention. Things may best be apprehended or intuited as pure concretions rather than as hypothetical entities. Similar is the case with our cognition and handling of human beings as lived relations, evolving and changing every moment. It is interesting to observe that Hegel among the Western thinkers and Razi among the Muslim medievalists are the constant target of Iqbal's attack though Hegel, not unlike Iqbal, also regards Reality as spiritual in its fundamental constitution. Hegel was, nevertheless, obsessed with the idea that everything could be explained in terms of ratiocination and that thought was itself the object of the process of thinking. Razi, though he is engaged all along in combating the categories of the Paripatetic philosophy of Aristotle and hence draws largely upon Plato's *Timaeus*, yet he also accords a definite value—and a very high value at that—to the rational faculty. His contribution to Muslim theology lies in developing a new kind of scholasticism, integrating faith and revelation into a science. Towards the later part of his life he came to believe in gnosis, and yet he lends support to some variety of determinism which fact probably erects resistance against him in Iqbal's mind. Iqbal is of the view that the ultimate end of the process of cognition is to reveal the singularity of objects. Existentialism may be conceived as a reaction against the abstractionism of Hegel

as also against Plato's theory of Ideas. The intelligible order of things is no more than an airy hypothesis, an *apriori* datum, and Iqbal, in his poem ایک فلسفہ زدہ سیدزادے کے نام in *Zarb-e-Kaleem* speaks with barely concealed contempt about Hegel thus:

ہیگئل کا صدف گہر سے خالی ہے اس کا طلسم سب خیالی

Hegel's shell has no pearl in it;
His Shadow-world is all illusion.

Likewise he never misses any opportunity of sneering at Razi or at least depreciating him as against Rumi perhaps because the former was drawn irresistibly towards Plato for whose Exemplary Ideas Iqbal had little or no sympathy.

The preference for Rumi may be accounted for by the fact that the *motif* of love or passion is exploited both by Rumi and Iqbal. Love or *ishq* is equivalent to the intuitive process that reveals the nature of ultimate Reality whereas logical reasoning, in spite of its impressive and elaborate mechanism, hardly brings any illumination to us. Passion implies a constant striving for self-realization. In a fine lyric in *Zaboor-i-Ajam* Iqbal gives eloquent and ecstatic expression to this cardinal belief of his:

من بنده آزادم عشق است امام من
عشق است امام من عقل است غلام من

ہنگامہ این صحنہ از گردش جام من
این کوکب شام من این صبا تمام من
جان در عدم آسوده بے ذوق تمننا بود

مستمانہ نواہا زد در حلقہ دام من
اے عالم رنگ و بو این صحت ماتا چند

مرگ است دوام تو عشق است دوام من

A free man I am, Love is my guide;
Love is my guide and Reason my slave.

All the warmth of this Assembly is from the movement of my Cup:
This my Evening Star; this my full Moon!

The soul reposed in non-being, without a taste for longing,
Arrested in my Net—it uttered mad cries of ecstasy.

O world of colour and fragrance, how long can we keep company:
Death is thy ever-lasting destiny while an eternity of Love is mine.

He professes his full and entire allegiance to love and claims to hold reason, which is restrictive and life-denying, under his subjugation. Here the impulse to freedom, linked up with *ishq*, is indistinguishable from the process of liberation initiated by the intuitive and immediate grasp over things, and it is also ultimately opposed to death and negation that results from strict adherence to the processes of discursive reasoning. Iqbal does not quite deny the efficacy of reason and the guidance that its instrument, logic, offers in certain contexts; he is also not unmindful of the fact that the application of reason to human concerns may sometimes yield fruitful results. It may also sometimes prove a stabilizing factor in the ordering of things and bringing a much-needed objectivity to our perspectives of thought. In *Javid Namah*, therefore, Iqbal designates reason as *زیرکی* or *مشاقتی* and concedes that one's basic intuitions about life, supported by the scaffolding of reason, may not only lead to equilibrium but such an interdependence may also vouchsafe to us the perception of ultimate truth:

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کار عشق از زیرکی مستحکم اساس

Intellect apprehends the Divine through Love;
Love's foundations are strengthened by Intellect.

Sometimes Iqbal seems to concur with the Persian mystical poets in assuming that *Ishq* or intuition provides us with a surer and more comprehensive manipulation of things. He is also persuaded of the fact that intuition represents the maximum degree of refinement to which the deductions of reasoning are subjected, and hence it may be equated with the Wordsworthian 'higher reason' that brings an 'amplitude of mind'. It may also be added that the impulse of love or *ishq* evokes a greater degree of resonance and operates within a wider range than the myth of 'eros' in European

literature. In a well-known quatrain of *Bal-e-Jibreel* Iqbal brings out, with subtle verbal economy, the contrast between the impercipience of reason and the revelatory power of *ishq* thus:

خرد سے راہرو روشن بصر ہے
خرد کیا ہے چراغِ رہگزر ہے
درون خانہ ہلکامے ہیں کیا کیا
چراغِ رہگزر کو کیا خبر ہے

Reason gives sight to the wayfarer;
Reason?—it is the lamp that lights the path;
But that which is going on inside the house—
What does the Lamp outside know of it?

Moreover, it is again 'love' that helps us realize the limitations of reason—the fact that the knowledge acquired through mere sense-perceptions is not enough but it is to be supplemented with the illumination offered to us by the higher mode of apprehension. Love or *ishq* impels us to make a sudden leap in the dark and this ecstatic gesture discloses to us the secret depths of the unknowable. Love is the motivating force behind all human actions and it enables us to establish between our consciousness and the object of perception an intimate relationship. It is the means of genuine communication and also helps us in the development of an authentic selfhood. The defect of analytic reason is that it views events at a distance, provides us with only 'hints and guesses', acquaints us with 'the wiry boundary line' merely, but love or *ishq* helps us penetrate to the innermost recesses of the sanctuary. This reckless onrush into the unknown regions by *ishq* is juxtaposed to the calculated, prudential moves of reason thus:

بے خطرِ کون پڑا آتھں نمرود میں عشق
عقل ہے مستحو تماشاٹے لبِ بہام ابھی
عشق کی اک جست نے طے کر دیا قصہ تمام
اس زمین و آسماں کو بیکراں سمجھا تھا میں

برتر از اندیشہٴ سود و زیباں ہے زندگی
 ہے کبھی جاں اور کبھی تسلیم جاں ہے زندگی

Fearlessly did Love leap into Nimrod's fire;
 Reason—it is still a spectator from without:

In a single leap did Love reach the end;
 The earth and the sky—I had imagined them to be Infinite!

Love is above thought of gain and loss;
 Life is being, but sometimes it is also the surrender of being,

It may, however, be added that Iqbal, without abandoning his belief in *ishq* or intuition as a sure and dependable means of apprehending the enigma of life, does not treat passion and reason as polarities but as inseparable components of an experiential whole. He expresses this conviction with an uncanny insight thus:

اک جنوں ہے کہ با شعور بھی ہے
 اک جنوں ہے کہ با شعور نہرین

A Frenzy there is that doth perceive;
 A Frenzy there is that knoweth not.

The self or the Ego is conceived by Iqbal as an active principle, a centre round which a total world that is both energetic and vibrant is organized. In a remarkably significant poem in *Bang-e-dara* entitled 'انسان' he has made the point that whereas all other objects in the phenomenal world are hedged in by a degree of passivity, man alone enjoys the distinction of being alert, wakeful and moving:

تسلیم کی خوگر ہے جو چیز ہے دنیا میں
 انسان کی ہر قوت سرگرم تماشا ہے

Everything that is is reconciled to its fate;
 Man's energies alone are insistently demanding.

The self, constituted of vital particles of energy, is involved in movement that knows no cessation. Iqbal's *Saqi Namah* is a spirited, eloquent and forceful presentation, with a remarkable rhythmic flow, of this dynamic impulse that permeates the entire universe. The crucial image in the poem is that of the mountain stream or the 'immense wave' in

terms of which the whole cosmos is visualized as pulsating with energy. And so does the 'self' that is placed within this larger context. It, too, can be envisioned not as something fixed and immutable but living and evolving, and amenable to change and radical transformation. It is something to which changes occur as it moves from one state to another and goes on adding dimensions to itself, becoming resplendent and multi-layered. This view of a constant flux in which the universe is swamped and of the self as it is all the time moving beyond itself, changing both its present physiognomy and basic structure, is presented thus:

زمانے کے دریا میں بہتی ہوئی
 ستم اس کی موجوں کے سپہتی ہوئی
 تجسس کی راہیں بدلتی ہوئی
 دسام نکاہیں بدلتی ہوئی
 سبک اس کے ہاتھوں میں سنگ گراں
 پہاڑ اس کی ضربوں سے ریگ رواں
 سفر اس کا انجام و آغاز ہے
 یہی اس کی تقویم کا راز ہے

Ever-flowing in the river of time,

Enduring the tyranny of its waves;

Its curiosity moving in ever-new directions,

Shifting its glance from moment to moment;

Heavy stones are light in its hands,

Mountains crushed into moving sand by its blows;

Constant movement is its beginning and end—

This alone is the secret of its being.

The self of Iqbal's construction is finite but it is also boundless:

وہ بتھر ہے آدمی کہ جسکا ہر قطرہ ہے بتھر بیکراہ

Man is an Ocean of which

Every drop is in itself a boundless ocean.

We belong to this world and yet the self is ever in quest of the roots of Being to be discovered elsewhere. Existence lies beyond thought and beyond existence is some form of

transcendence that offers a field for personal venture. Sartre sets up a distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, and he also argues that value emerges as a result of the insertion of the former into the latter. In other words, value is an expression of the for-itself's striving towards identification with the unattainable in-itself. The former, in spite of its utmost exertion and strain, is perpetually haunted by some kind of 'lack' and the successful exploitation of resources for removing this lack gives birth to ideals and norms and makes them worth living and contending for. The for-itself's nihilating movement towards its possibilities is really the mode of overcoming separation or *مہجوری* that is a recurrent theme in Iqbal's most significant poetry. This is also perhaps man's exclusive privilege because the totality of other existents that compose the world are not prompted by this longing:

دریا ، کہسار ، چاند ، تارے کیا جانیں فراق و نوا صدوری
شایاں ہے مجھے غم جدائی یہ خاک ہے مکرم جدائی

Rivers, mountains, the moon and stars—

What do they know of separation and longing!

The pain of separation—it becomes me alone;

This dust—it alone has known separation.

In a highly evocative lyric in *Bal-e-Jibreel* occurs the following couplet which is impregnated with meaning:

تارے آوارہ و کم آمیز تقدیر وجود ہے جدائی

The stars—strayed and non-communicative;

Separation is the destiny of all existence.

Other Existents are not particularly sensitive to it because they are not haunted by this sense of inadequacy or insufficiency. They share, therefore, with man neither this awareness of having been 'rent from Being' nor do they have any firm and strong instinct for possibility—the act of coming into Being. Separation does not so much betray the gesture towards other-worldiness as the endeavour to rediscover the roots of Existenz:

خیال من بہ تماشائے آسمان بود است
 بدوش مہار و بہ آغوش کہکشان بود است
 کمان مہر کہ ہمیں خاکدان نشیمن مہاست
 کہ ہر ستارہ چہان است یا چہان بود است
 زندگی در صدف خویش کہر ساختن است
 در دل شعلہ فرو رفتن و نگداختن است
 عشق ازین گلدہ در بستہ پروں تاختن است
 شیشہ مہار ز طاق فلک انداختن است

My imagination has journeyed to the Heavenly Spectacle;
 On the Moon's shoulder and in the lap of the Milky Way.

Do not imagine that this house of dust is our abode;
 Every star is or has been a world.

What is life but to create pearls in one's own Shell—
 To enter the heart of the flame but not to melt.

What is Love but to rush out of this closed Dome;
 To throw away the glass of the moon from the heavenly arch.

Transcendence is an ontological rather than an epistemological phenomenon and hence terminates in the building up of the final relationship of all Existents to Being:

تو اے اسپر مکن لامکن سے دور نہیں
 وہ جلوہ گاہ ترے خاکدان سے دور نہیں
 یہ ہے خلاصہ علم قلندری کہ حیات
 خدنگ جستہ ہے لیکن کمان سے دور نہیں

حکیم و عارف و صوفی تمام مست ظہور
 کسے خبر کہ تجلی ہے عین مستوری

O Prisoner of finitude, thou art not far from the Infinite;
 That place of Manifestation is not remote from thy abode of dust.

This is the secret of the Qalandar's knowledge that Life
 Is an arrow released but not far from the bow.

The philosopher, the sage, the mystic—all are inebriate by Appearance;
 No one knows that Manifestation is nothing but concealment.

To rise above the limitations of time and space, to receive intimations of the 'unknown modes of being' and to discover points of contact with Existenz is what constitutes the

latent, ingrained impulse with human beings in the exceptional moments of their life. It may be added that man is led to transcendence through a sense of freedom.

Iqbal looks on death without anguish or fear because it represents for him a continuation of life rather than its annihilation. Life and death are not to be conceived as polarities but as well-defined figurae in a continuum that extends from nothing to nothing. Iqbal does believe firmly in some degree of permanence lying behind the world of shadows and appearances. Death may in the ultimate analysis be treated as an event that unites in itself the relativity of the *Dasein* and the absoluteness of *Existenz*. In other words, it is at one and the same time the lapse of our facticity out of the world and our integration into *Existenz*. If renewal of life is ensured at the vegetable and animal levels of creation, how can this privilege be denied to man who represents the crown and apex of creatureliness? Iqbal would seem to argue that it is not that death occurs to man but that man chooses to die, thereby bringing about a reconstitution of the broken fragments of the primal monad. Iqbal maintains unequivocally that though the body is perishable and is reduced to mere nothingness yet the inner core of one's being remains untouched by the icy hand of death:

فرشتہ موت کا چہوتا ہے گو بدن تیرا

تیرے وجود کے مرکز سے دور دھتا ہے

Though Death may lay its hands on thy body:

Access it has not to the centre of thy being.

And Karl Jaspers puts it beautifully thus: 'What death destroys is the phenomenal; it is not Being itself.' In a fairly early poem, entitled *والدہ مرحومہ کی یاد میں* in *Bang-e-Dara* Iqbal had, through the use of psuedo-logic and analogical counterpointing, tried to induce belief in the fact of immortality. Later, in the deeply moving, philosophical elegy on the death of Sir Ross Masood he seems to persuade the reader that life and death in the conventional sense do not

matter very much. What does matter, however, is the steadfastness and continuity or otherwise of the finite Ego and the factors that contribute to it. On his own showing life would, therefore, be tantamount to the achievement of the perfected self or Ego, and death, correspondingly, to failure in this regard:

خودی ہے زندہ تو ہے موت اک مقام حیات
 کہ عشق موت سے کرتا ہے امتحان ثبات
 خودی ہے زندہ تو دریا ہے بیکرانہ تیرا
 تیرے فراق میں مضطر ہے موج نیل و فدا
 خودی ہے مردہ تو مانند کا پیش نسیم
 خودی ہے زندہ تو سلطان جملہ موجودات

Death is a station in life if the Ego be alive,
 Since Love seeks affirmation through death.

Thy ocean is boundless if the Ego be alive—
 The waves in the Nile and Euphrates are longing for union with thee.
 The dead Ego is like grass before the wind;
 The living Ego is the master of all that exists.

Death leads on to the threshold of a greater plenitude of being provided the self has already been sufficiently steeled and hardened by love or *ishq*. The latter serves as the touchstone for determining the final authenticity or otherwise of the self. Having passed through this crucible the self realizes its infinite possibilities and becomes co-extensive with the whole of cosmos, becomes in fact the supreme lord of creation. In another context, Iqbal puts it with greater perspicacity and more categorically also:

ہو اگر خودنگر و خودگر و خودگیر خودی
 یہ بھی ممکن ہے کہ تو موت سے بھی مردہ نہ سکے

If thy Ego be self-regarding, self-creating and self-apprehending,
 It is possible that even death may not be able to put an end to thy life.

This seems to be identical with Marcel's view—a view that excludes from death the element of trembling and despair that clings to it in the ordinary signification of the term. It is still more intriguing to observe that the English mystical

poet, William Blake, has given expression to a similar idea in his troubled short lyric, *The Fly*:

If thought is life
 And Strength and Breath,
 And the want
 Of thought is death;
 Then am I
 A Happy fly.
 If I live
 Or if I die.

One may hasten to add that thought here is hardly to be equated with pure logical thinking or arid abstractionism. On the contrary, thought in this particular context amounts to an awareness of identity and the lack of it to failure in its attainment. And if the equation between an awareness of identity and absence of it on the one hand, and life and death as used in common parlance on the other, is validated then life and death on the literal, physical plane become indistinguishable. And just as this validation and the logical corollary attaching to it hold good in the case of Blake so do they in the case of Iqbal. Viewed from this stance death loses all its gruesomeness and becomes identified with a psychic state. 'Death', as Allen puts it, 'is not the axe that cuts down the tree, it is the fruit that grows on it.'¹

One of the basic assumptions with Iqbal that has an existentialist ring about it is the sense of freedom that the Ego enjoys in its particular concrete situation. For him as for the existentialists of all varieties of persuasion existence is prior to essence, and existence alone enjoys a modicum of reality. In an exquisite, though little noticed lyric in *Bal-e-Jibreel*, the uniqueness of individual existence with all its inner fecundity and self-sufficiency, is underlined thus:

تیری قلمدیل ہے ترا دل تو آپ ہے اپنی روشنائی
 اک تو ہے کہ حق ہے اس جہاں میں باقی ہے نمود سیمپائی

Thy heart is thy candle,
 Thou thyself is thy light.

Thou art the only truth in the world,
The rest is magic's shadow-world.

And the human self is free in the sense that it is not determined by anything outside it; it is its own architect and the laws governing its mode of operation in the world are of its own making. Man in his freedom is creative: he is also self-subsistent in a way that is denied to other creatures of the terrestrial world:

ناچیز جہاں مہ و پرویں ترے آگے وہ عالم مسجدور ہے تو عالم آزاد

The world of the Moon and the Pleiades has no worth before thee;
Theirs is the world of necessity, thine of freedom.

At the heart of a highly significant early poem, entitled *Khizr-e-Rah* (Khizr-e-Rah), uneven though it is in its architectonics, one finds embedded a highly concretized vision that illuminates the various impulsions that life may be identified with:

اپنی دنیا آپ پیدا کر اگر زندوں میں ہے
سر آدم ہے ضمیر کن فکاں ہے زندگی
زندگانی کی حقیقت کوھکن کے دل سے پوچھہ
جوئے شیر و تیشہ و سنگ گراں ہے زندگی
بندگی میں گھت کے رہ جاتی ہے اک جوئے کم آب
اور آزادی میں بھر بیکراں ہے زندگی
آشکارا ہے یہ اپنی قوت تسخیر سے
ورنہ اک مٹی کے پیکر میں نہاں ہے زندگی

Create thy own world if thou be amongst the living;
Life is the secret essence of Adam, the hidden truth of creation.
Life's reality is known only to Farhad, the mountain-digger—
It is the canal of milk, the adze and the heavy stone.
It is reduced to a rivulet with little water in bondage;
In freedom, Life is a boundless ocean.
It is manifested through its conquering might,
Hidden, though, it is in an image of clay.

Freedom cleaves to the very roots of being and man, who shares the potential of creativity with the Divine, has to

carve his own way out of the chaos of phenomena unaided, perhaps, by anything external to himself. Life may more or less be equated with a perpetual projection into something new and unanticipated by our pre-conceived notions. It is not merely the effort and the striving involved in the process but what it eventuates into—the uncovering of the various strata of Being—that really determines the measure of our worth. The primal creative energy—the *elan vital*—for which man is the finest vessel, realizes itself in reducing Reality to manageable proportions.

Not only is the human Ego free and not only does life evolve spontaneously but the Ego is also creative in the highest degree. The physical phenomena, with all their multitudinousness, do not enjoy any existential reality, but derive all their subtle charm from the inner resourcefulness of the Ego. Not only is the whole cosmos comprehended within the human vision, it is also little more than an externalization of the latter. With the vision also go the passion, the inner upsurge and the whole nucleus of emotions and feelings that have brought the universe into being. Even space and time, far from enjoying any objective status, are but categories of human perception. What is involved here may be viewed as a movement from the inner depths to the outward centres of energy. Putting it differently we may hold that the individual self is the 'existential' orbit—the focal point radiating outwards to other forms of phenomena to which it is related from the beginning. Our cognition of the beauty and grandeur of the physical world is the only truth, unlike a scientific hypothesis, that can be affirmed intuitively. This stance may be deemed a variety of subjective idealism but a subjective idealism that may be revalued in terms of the uniqueness, the singularity and the minute particularity of the individual and his distinctive vision. The whole of the created universe, constituting a harmonious patterning of sounds, colours and forms, is merely the reverberation of the passionate nature of man. The

world in which I live is the circle of my preoccupations, the prism through which my interests and concerns are refracted:

این جهان چیست صدم خانۀ پندار من است
 جلوۀ او گرو دیدۀ بیدار من است
 همه آفاق که گیرم به نگاه او را
 حلقۀ هست که از گردش پرکار من است
 هستی و نیستی از دیدن و نادیدن من
 چه زمان و چه مکان شوخی افکار من است
 از فسوں کاری دل سیر و سکون غیب و حضور
 این که غماز و کشا نندۀ اسرار من است

What is this world? the idol-house of my imagination;
 Its manifestation is indebted to my watchful eye.

The whole universe that I comprehend at a glance
 Is a circle made by the compass of my Self.

Existence or non-existence is all due to my observation,
 What are Time and Space but the play of my imagination!

It is my heart's spell that has caused movement and stillness, privacy
 and presence,

It is this that brings my secret to light.

This piece of attestation of the self helps us put the miracle
 of creation in its rightful place.

It has been suggested earlier that Iqbal's mind was exercised over the problem of the ethical choice and the prerogative of freedom relevant to it and without which the former becomes absolutely meaningless. We might hold with justice that for Iqbal as for Sartre 'to exist is to be free'. Iqbal's portrayal of the figure of Satan who asserts his egohood against the sovereignty of God is a very convincing demonstration of it. Satan is a rebel and a revolutionary who firmly believes in his own integrity and unassailable position, and Jibreel pales into insignificance when the latter is juxtaposed against him. The earliest glimpse of him we catch in *تسخیر فطرت* ('Subjugation of Nature') in *Payam-i-Mashriq*. The accent here falls on his resolve to renounce the colourless life in the Garden of

Eden and the stasis of Eternity. In the colloquy between Jibreel and Iblis in *Bal-e-Jibreel*, later, the same stance is reiterated thus:

آہ اے جبریل تو واقف نہیں اس راز سے
 کر گیا سرمست سحر سے کہ تو توت کر میرا سحر
 اب یہاں میری گذر ممکن نہیں ممکن نہیں
 کس قدر خاموش ہے یہ عالم بے کاخ و کو

O Gabriel, thou art unaware of this secret truth;
 It made me inebriate—the Cup that brokel

It is impossible now—my coming back to this place—
 How listless is this world without (human) habitation!

He vibrates with energy, interrogates all that he is confronted with and finds it impossible to cast off the potent spell of the variegated physical world all around him. He would any day prefer the life fraught with risks, tensions and conflicts to a mere jejune existence offering no challenge to and requiring no initiative of him. His own egohood is all along pitted against the sovereignty and omnipotence of God. He follows the lead of his own spontaneous impulses in exploring the inscrutable mysteries of the created universe rather than taking anything on trust and making the necessary adjustments with the objective situation in which he is involved. To incur the displeasure of God by not surrendering to his omnipotent will is symptomatic both of his courage to undertake hazards and his capacity to manipulate his resources. In the colloquy in *Bal-e-Jibreel*, referred to earlier, one witnesses a juxtaposition of two personality types: the static and the dynamic, the weakly obedient and the vigorously assertive, the gentle and the ferocious, the lamb and the tiger of William Blake's emblematic vision. Also in evidence is the play of corrosive irony in Iblees's utterances, and his sardonic humour is directed against both Jibreel and God. In *Javid Namah* Iblees indulges in a kind of sophistry by arguing that he dared to incur God's displeasure with the specific intention of protecting Adam from the full blast of Divine wrath.

من بے در پردہ لا گفته ام گفته من خوشتر از نا گفته ام
توانصیب از درد آدم داشتم قہر یبار از بہر او نگذاشتم
شعلہ ہا از کشت زار من دمید اوز مسجوری بہ مستجابی رسید

Under the veil of 'No' I had said 'Yes';
What I said was better than what I had not said.

To share in the pain and suffering of Adam—
For him I did not escape the Beloved's fury.

Flames arose from my sown field;
Man out of predestination achieved free-will.

Whatever the flimsiness, the dangerous subtlety and the speciousness lying behind this argument Iblees has been portrayed consistently as the symbolic representation of the exercise of a personal, ethical choice that contains the quintessence of freedom. Freedom implies the freedom to commit oneself to a point of view that is consistent with one's value-system. Sartre pronounces that 'man is condemned to be free' and Iqbal would have gone the whole hog in corroborating this view only by inverting the negative suggestion latent in 'condemned' and insisting that freedom is not imposed from without and one is not constrained to be free but freedom is the gift of free choosing. Iqbal was instinctively and by conviction opposed to the kind of existence that is hedged in by passivity, inertia and lack of full assertion of the Ego.

With this is also linked up the vexed problem of destiny. Contrary to the common assumption, destiny, according to Iqbal, does not connote a fixed, irrevocable and unalterable structure of events, but the working out of their latent possibilities. These possibilities are ultimately contained within God's instantaneous act of perception but need not on that account have any predetermining effect on human volition. The world of contingency provides scope for the process of self-actualization; like the human ego it is also boundless and infinite because it is capable of change and growth. The very gift of choice—and choice involves the possibility of opting for good as well as for evil—with which

man has been endowed runs counter to the notion of destiny as ordinarily conceived:

گر ز یک تقدیر خون گردن جگر
خواه از حق حکم تقدیر دگر
تو اگر تقدیر نو خواهی روا است
زانکہ تقدیرات حق لائتہما است . . .
رمز بہاریکش بہتصریفی مضمیر است
تو اگر دیگر شوی او دیگر است . . .
شبلمی افتداندگی تقدیر تست
قلزمی پائندگی تقدیر تست

If thou art unhappy on account of one destiny,
Ask God to grant thee another.

If thou desirest a new destiny, it is proper,
Since the destinies that God can grant are infinite . . .

This subtle truth is contained in a phrase:
If thou transform thyself, thy destiny will be different . . .

Art thou a dew-drop? Thy destiny is to perish;
An ocean? Thy destiny is to endure.

The very fact that one is not bound by any pre-fabricated, eternally fixed order of responses but can give a decisive turn to the sequence of events in pursuance of one's own orientation demolishes altogether the orthodox conception of destiny. Man rises and falls, makes and unmakes his life with reference to his preferences and value-judgments. He, and not any hypothetical, remote and transcendent deity, is the architect of his life; he is the sole sovereign and master of his destiny:

عبت ہے شکوۂ تقدیر یزدان
تو خود تقدیر یزدان کیوں نہ ہیں ہے

Futile is the complaint about the God-determined destiny—
Why art thou not thyself the God-determined destiny?

In Iqbal's universe, therefore, man is to be understood in terms of a personal choice and the world is to be equated with an open possibility.

Anguish (*Angst*) or dread is part of the complex web of *motifs* on which Iqbal plays variations every now and then. Dread is not only evoked by something that is sublime in its impact but has also deeper implications. It has little to do with Nothing, it supervenes the category of Being and may more or less be equated with Non-Being. The earliest adumbration of this idea one comes across is in the German medieval thinker Eckhart who argues that the notion of Being has creaturely associations, and hence Non-Being would better subsume the implications of what transcends Being. The existentialists, generally speaking, linked up the notion of dread with possibility or manifestation. The impulse towards manifestation or emergence from the undifferentiated mode is inherent in all created objects. Similarly ingrained is the instinct to wash off the familiar face of things, to be identified with Non-Being, and Non-Being neither implies total annihilation nor connotes contingent being but suggests the notion of necessary Being or Infinity. Iqbal's *Lala-e-Sehra* is symbolic of the self that suffers from the ache of homelessness in an alien world. It evokes the uncomfortable and agonizing feeling of separation that is constitutive of personal existence and also betrays the impulse to become manifest. It is also symbolic of 'an expression of man's inner yearning for a response in the awful silence of the universe'.² The lack of response it meets—

خالی ہے کلبیوں سے یہ کوا و کمر ورنہ

The mountains and rocks are without Moses; otherwise . . .

—or the primordial silence by which it is enwrapped makes this longing to achieve non-being all the more poignant and insistent. The poem, entitled *تذہائی* ('Solitude') in *Payam-i-Mashriq* is centred round the theme of loneliness against the setting of the phenomenal world; here in *لالہ صحرایا* the whole poetic symbology and the taut organisation of the poem is achieved in terms of the *motif* of primordial alienation. The opening lines of the poem, with their weird,

haunting cadence, add weight and strength to this impression:

یہ گنبد سہیلانی یہ عالم تڑپائی
سبچہ کو تو قرأتی ہے اس دشت کی پھلانی

This azure dome; this loneliness:
I dread the vast expanses of this desert!

Dread, it may be added, is different from fear because the latter is attached to a specific object and is localized whereas dread, on the contrary, reverberates to the immanent vibrations of Being. Consider the opening lines of *Masjid-e-Qartaba* :

سلسلہ روز و شب نقش گر حادثات
سلسلہ روز و شب اصل حیات و ممات
سلسلہ روز و شب تار حریر دو رنگ
جس سے بناتی ہے ذات اپنی قبائے صفات
سلسلہ روز و شب ساز ازل کی فغان
جس سے دکھاتی ہے ذات زیروہم ممکنات
اول و آخر فنا ، باطن و ظاہر فنا
نقش کہن ہو کہ نو منزل آخر فنا

The day-night succession is the designer of (the web of) accidents;
The day-night succession is the basis of life and death.

The day-night succession is the warp of the twicoloured fabric
With which Essence makes its garb of Attributes.

The day-night succession is the melody from the harp of Eternity
With which Essence reveals the vicissitudes of Possibility.

Nothingness is the beginning and the end, the hidden and the revealed;
Be it new or old, the final destination of all that is is Nothingness.

These lines also elicit the fundamental feeling—*Grundbefindlichkeit*—of dread or of existential as distinguished from vital dread according to Karl Jaspers's formulation. It is associated with the value of Being. The relations between time and dread are worth exploration. The triple division of time—the present, the past and the future—or the interfusion of separate and distinct moments, which are hardly separate

and distinct, in a continuum has a direct relevance to both the contemplated and the lived reality. Time as a totality provides the frame of reference in which the essence manifests itself in its outward modifications and thus the whole expanse of possibility is laid before us for valuation. Dread too reveals to us the world as a totality, and hence the relationship between the notion of dread and the notion of time. It has been acutely pointed out by Jean Wahl that there are 'three rather incongruous ways in which dread is related to time: it is oriented towards the future; it slows down the passage of time; and yet it is an instant, a decisive instant'.³ Time derives its ultimacy from non-Being that may as well be referred to as *فنا* or nothingness which is again connected with dread according to Heidegger. Similarly the following lines of Zarwan, the spirit of time-space in *Javid Namah*, are worth a glance:

گفت ز روانم جهان را قاهرم
 هم ز پنهانم از نگه هم ظاهرم . . .
 من حیثاتم من مماتم من نشور
 من حساب و دوزخ و فردوس و حور
 آدم و افرشته در بند من است
 عالم شش روزه فرزند من است . . .
 در طلسم من اسیر است این جهان
 از دم هر لحظه پیر است این جهان . . .
 که تو خواهی من نباشم در میان
 لی مع اله باز خوان از عین جان

He said, 'I am Zarvan, I am the World-subduer;
 I am hidden from the eye—but also manifest. . . .
 I am life, I am death, I am resurrection;
 I am the Judgment, Hell and Heaven and Hourī,
 Man and angel both are in my bondage;
 This six-day world is my child. . . .
 This world is a prisoner in my talisman;
 It ages every moment through my breath. . . .

If you wish to remove me from your midst,
Recite from the depths of your soul: 'I have a time with God.'¹

These, too, evoke the feeling of dread in the sense of a forward-looking, anticipatory phenomenon which moulds man by destroying all his finitudes. The time-space spirit is all-embracing and represents a kind of totality of being:

من حیاتم ' من مماتم ' من نشور

I am life, I am death, I am resurrection.

It may also be conceived as contingent and reflects a degree of ambivalence, for dread itself is an ambivalent experience: man is attracted and repelled by the possibility of freedom, he is swayed at one and the same time by a 'sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy'. Its function may as well be seen to lie in removing itself and the perspectives of familiar preoccupations between the human consciousness and Existenz in the sense of man's having a time with God (لی مع الہ وقت).

REFERENCES

- ¹ E. L. Allen, *Existentialism from Within* (London, 1953), p. 36.
- ² Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1954), p. 92.
- ³ Jean Wahl, *Philosophies of Existence* (London, 1959), p. 113.

Maqbool Hasan Khan

IQBAL'S POETICS

Though Iqbal's views on the nature and function of art have always evoked great interest, his poetry as such has seldom needed an approach to his poetics or aesthetics as a preliminary to its appreciation. That the numerous poetic formulations of his aesthetic creed are integrally related to the core of Iqbal's vision of life and creativity has generally been recognised: they are what they are not merely because Iqbal happened to have been influenced by this or that indigenous or Western literary creed, but because he, besides claiming for poetry part of the role of prophecy, perceived, through the various phases of his poetic development, a certain continuity or analogical relationship between the act of poetic creation and other forms of vital activity. This is true as much of the early as of the later phase of his poetry. The main contours are familiar and well-charted. The early, partly derivative, poetry envisages a Neoplatonic universe vibrant with a pervasive numinous reality behind the world of appearances and assigns to the poet's eye a function in relation to truth that is analogous to that of the man of science and of the mystic ('Saleema', *Baang-e-Dara*, part II). The world of art is thought of, *a la* Renaissance Neoplatonism, as transcendent in that in it inheres the eternity of love ('Akhtar-e-Subh', *Baang-e-Dara*, II). The radical change that Iqbal's poetry underwent as he moved towards what might be described as a dynamic vitalism and something like Quran-centred existentialism is also reflected in his use of the act of poetic creation as a metaphoric elaboration or analogy of the deeper movements of the spirit. As an

example of this later use it would suffice at this stage to refer to the last two couplets of 'Naghma-i-Malaik' in the 'Tamheed-i-Aasmani' section of *Javid Namah* where the act of poetic gestation climactically serves to illustrate the possibility of man's spiritual development:

یکے در معنی آدم نگر، از ساچہ می پرسی
 ہنوز اندر طبعیت می خلد موزوں شود روزے
 چنان موزوں شود این پیش پا افتادہ مضمونے
 کہ یزدان را دل از تائید او پرخوں شود روزے

Ask me not; look awhile into the (as-yet-unrealised) meaning of man—
 (A poem-in-embryo) still pricking Creation's heart, one day to be made
 perfect—

The day it is made perfect—this hackneyed theme—
 It shall, with its poignancy, cause the heart of God to bleed.

The aim here is not at all to try to establish at the outset any polarities of growth in Iqbal's views on art but to suggest that, notwithstanding the changes in the so-called philosophical perspective of his poetry and the deepening of his intellectual concerns, Iqbal's convictions as to the organic relationship between poetry and truth in its vital aspect remained unchanged. Iqbal's is a notable example of a great poet to have evinced such profound concern with his art. General comments on poetry, especially of a nature that would highlight the particular poet's peculiar excellence, have no doubt, always been common in Persian and Urdu *ghazal*, and indeed (at a deeper level) it would have been surprising that those who collectively evolved such a civilised form of poetry should have remained unaware of the complex aesthetic problems relating to their individual and unique perception of truth and its expression through a form that relies entirely on a system of traditional symbolism and stylisation. The poetry of *ghazal*, like many other art forms in our cultural tradition, has, however, survived without adequate aesthetic theorising merely on the strength of an

intuitive grasp of its formal possibilities, and it was mainly because Iqbal was, or he thought he was, moving away from the tradition of *ghazal* that he might have felt obliged to give salience to his own conception of the vocation of poetry implying thereby that the point of departure of his poetry from that of the traditional *ghazal* writers was his own profound engagement with truth at the deepest level.

All this, however, is also partly to highlight the importance, at least initially, of the impetus that he might have consciously or unconsciously received in his search for new poetic modes from the movement of reform in poetry that had come firmly to establish itself during the closing years of the previous century. The features of the new movement are well-known: primarily, it was aimed at the enlargement of the area of the poet's engagement with 'truth'. However naive some of the formulations of the new Urdu poetic might now appear to us the fact is undeniable that the only way out of the morass of degeneration in poetry at that time was through a re-affirmation, albeit naively, of poetry's everlasting bond with 'truth'—even at the cost of the total rejection of some of the most precious elements of the traditional poetic: the extremely sophisticated process of idealisation, for example, and the concrete, remarkably value-charged patterns of myth and archetype that the poetry of *ghazal* had evolved over a period of a thousand years. The need was great, no doubt, but the price was greater. This, however, is no occasion to give an assessment of the radical changes brought about by the reform movement initiated by Hali and Azad since the task would remain incomplete till a thorough exploration of the aesthetic foundation of the poetry of *ghazal* has been made. What needs our attention here is the link that is felt to exist between the movement of poetic reform and the early poetry of Iqbal, and, at the same time, the perception that the essence of Iqbal's unique achievement in poetry may be found to lie in his re-discovery of the elements of idealisation

and mythic condescension—a return, in short, of the poetic consciousness, albeit after long sojourns into strange realms of philosophic thought and religious experience, to what had always been available nearer home. The journey was, however, worth the trouble since the successive processes of negation and affirmation, taking apart in order to piece together, is as much true of literary tradition as of the spiritual life or of the movement of history. In the development of Urdu poetry viewed as an organic process, Iqbal seems to provide the necessary complement to the work of Hali and Azad, a complement, however, that was beyond the poetic and intellectual powers of his two predecessors, and a complement that, in absolute terms, constitutes one of the finest embodiments of poetic vision. In the mature poetry of Iqbal we are back to what has traditionally been the most precious in great poetry, and in the slow process of his growth we can discern his re-discovery of the principles that are latent in all significant poetic creativity.

Studies of Iqbal's poetics or aesthetics have generally consisted of sketchy or elaborate summarisations of his patent views as frequently formulated by him in prose or verse. At best, such studies undertake to focus attention on the literary or philosophical perspectives of these views. Criticism has generally satisfied itself with the assimilation of Iqbal's views into expressionist or similar theorising about art. Commentators with a Marxist orientation have had reasons to be pleased as well as greatly embarrassed by much in Iqbal. While the general characterisation of art in 'purposive' and didactic terms has reinforced their predilections, the actual constitutive purpose as embodied in Iqbal's vision has left them cold or unsympathetic, if not openly hostile. A discussion, however, of Iqbal's theory of art as such is not our present concern. The search, on the contrary, is for the latent principles, for the actual character of the art as it evolves from a mainly West-oriented poetic based largely on what might conveniently be described as

the principle of particularisation and elaboration into a poetic that, in the manner of the traditional *ghazal*, mediates its imaginative apprehensions through structured idealisations of reality and which, in the process of being abstracted, occasionally acquire mythic charge and vibrancy. The scheme as envisaged here seems abstract but in its tentative working out in what follows it may raise questions that we have always been half aware of in reading Iqbal, questions that have enhanced or marred our aesthetic delight in his poetry. Great and significant poetry requires preliminary enquiries as to the exact nature of its particular artistic mode, and examples are not lacking of mis-appraisals owing to misconceptions about the underlying principles of construction. Excessive concern with poetics in this sense has not been encouraged only by the study of 'modern' poetry such as that of Eliot though it was no doubt his poetry that forced, in the English-speaking world, radical re-thinking about poetry. As in the case of Shakespeare, it is quite possible that the difficulties readers occasionally experience in their enjoyment of Iqbal's poetry might be because they are looking for things in the wrong places, that they are ignoring the system of self-allusion and cross-references that the work of a great poet gradually builds up over the years, the organic unity that inheres in the canon as a whole. The poet of 'Himala' is not the same, no doubt, as gives us in flashes the contours of an occasional symbolic landscape in *Javid Namah*, but the latter is a development of the former. 'Masjid-e-Qartaba' and 'Zauq-o-Shauq' partake of a system of cross-references that includes 'Khizr-e-Rah' and even 'Shikwah'. It is again the faltering, tentative groping towards a value-charged vocabulary in the early poetry that finds fulfilment in the absolutely transparent, reverberating and incantatory diction of the wonderful *ghazals* of *Zabur-i-Ajam* and *Bal-e-Jibreel*. A study of the constituents of Iqbal's poetics—the processes of idealisation and concrecence, the evolution of new symbolic and mythic

patterns, the transformation of thought-feeling combinations into sensuous and transcendent unities of poetic vision, the gradual perfecting of a diction that is at once the vehicle of a unique vision and a carrier of traditional resonances—the study of such elements, it is hoped, may ideally lead towards an apprehension of the sources of the strange poetic transcendence of Iqbal. Ideally, no doubt, but the reality of any such attempt is bound to be, at least here, both sketchy and tentative.

II

There is no denying the fact that a critical preoccupation with either the 'art' of Iqbal's poetry or its underlying principles is subject to considerable embarrassment since even a superficial encounter with his poetry makes one aware of the deep distrust that Iqbal everywhere manifests of 'mere' art, of art for its own sake. There seems, therefore, something very uncharacteristic in the fact of the early tutelage of Iqbal under Dagh, and this can be explained only in terms of the contemporary prestige of the ideal of 'correctness' in poetry— notwithstanding the changes in literary taste. An indication of the distance away from Dagh that Iqbal seems to have traversed even in the earliest of his published poems may provide us with an approach to the larger issues involved in the present discussion. The *ghazals* in the first part of *Baang-e-Dara*, the place where one could legitimately hope to discover the influence of Dagh, have very little trace of it in them except perhaps in the rather forced gaiety of the second (نہ آتے ہمیں اس میں تکرار کیا تھی). One can, on the other hand, discover everywhere a marked shift of emphasis in Iqbal's use of the characteristic *ghazal* motifs—perceptible even in the traces of awkwardness with which he occasionally handles them. One can detect in them a faint sense of dissatisfaction with the poetic mode being used, or at

least of the poet's not being fully at home in the traditional *ghazal* ethos. Certain conventional ideas and sentiments are given preference over others, and the extent of such preferences, too, is a measure of the desire for change. The near total absence of the erotic is highlighted by a marked predilection for the vaguely 'philosophical', deriving in the main from conventional literary 'mysticism':

جدہیں میں تھونڈتا تھا آسمانوں میں ' زمینوں میں
وہ نکلے میرے ظلمت خانہ دل کے مکیوں میں

He Whom I searched in the skies, on the earth,

Was found among the inmates of the dark chambers of my heart.

It is occasionally in these earliest *ghazals* that freshness of insight, anticipating later developments, finds a matching poetic medium and confident voice:

میں انتہائے عشق ہوں ' تو انتہائے حسن
دیکھے مجھے کہ تجھکو تماشا کرے کوئی

I am the ultimate in love, Thou in beauty;

Who is more deserving of notice—Thou or me?

All this is, however, very different from the gaudy and superficial brilliance, from the assured, playful, almost non-referential (since much of its point derives from its manipulation of specifically literary conventions) *artificiality* of the poetry of Dagh. The essence of the entire later development of Iqbal lies in his conscious repudiation of artifice, and it is therefore, touching to see him in his elegy on Dagh investing the work of his early though unsympathetic mentor with his own kind of moral significance. Not that Dagh had not achieved distinction in his delineation of certain aspects of profane love, nor that the magnificent third section of Iqbal's elegy with its inevitable climactic movement does not contain in the final couplet a critically valid summing up of Dagh's chief distinction as poet:

ہو بہو کھینچے گا لیکن عشق کی تصویر کون
اتھ گیا ناوک فگن ماریگا دل پر تیر کون

Who is it now that will delineate Love faithfully?

The archer is gone; who will now pierce the heart with arrows?

A characteristic though subtle distortion, however, has already taken place earlier in the second movement of the poem which begins with a reference to Dagh's poetic style. From the second line of the opening couplet begins what appears to be an unconscious attempt to provide contexts of significance to the patently 'youthful' and relatively 'thoughtless' poetry of an old man. The purely erotic tradition of *ghazal*, especially in some of its less individualised manifestations, has seldom concerned itself with questions of the relevance of such poetry to the actuality of life's passions or to the poet's own situation. It is now, no doubt, too late in the day to censure such a poetic stance for its 'unreality'; the sheer empirical fact of genuine aesthetic pleasure of a certain kind that one can derive from its limited world of poetic fancy and its verbal virtuosity is proof enough of its life and validity. The poetics, however, that has given us much that is worthwhile in modern Urdu literature, including the poetry of Iqbal, could not in its early naive formulations have done any justice to such non-purposive, patently 'decadent', poetic tradition. Hence the subtle, unconscious schematisation in the poem under review. The second couplet seeks to universalize the passion of love that may be said to have provided the main experiential plank for Dagh's poetry though, in the process, Iqbal attributes to Dagh a kind of contemplative detachment that is not always in evidence in the latter. The next couplet has the characteristic meditative rhythm of Iqbal's poetry: it is obvious that he is assimilating Dagh into a strange and unfamiliar intellectual matrix:

اب صبا سے کون پوچھے گا سکوت گل کا داز
 کون سمجھے گا چمن میں نالہ بلبل کا داز

Who will question the breeze about the secrets of the silence of the rose?
 Who is there now to discover the cause of the nightingale's wailing?

The final couplet, with its main image borrowed from Wordsworth, may not be objectively valid or even relevant, but it

is certainly a tribute to the generalising power of Iqbal's mind, a power that could not only discover the inner significance of things, but also view them in broad intellectual perspectives:

تھی حقیقت سے نہ غفلت فکر کی پرواز میں
آنکھ طائر کی نشیمن پر رہی پرواز میں

Never did he lose touch with reality in the flight of imagination;
The bird's gaze was always fixed on its nest as it soared.

What has here been designated as the tendency to generalise accompanied with a slight though subtle distortion of perspective, indication no doubt of a powerful meditative intellect, is one of the most marked features of Iqbal's poetry right from the beginning and one that lends a certain unity of approach to experience that persists despite the changes of the actual constitutive elements of his thought. The feature is of some importance since it is the discursive and speculative system which Iqbal slowly built up during the early years—from the quietist Neoplatonic standpoint to the dynamic philosophy of self—that provided the important though not indispensable scaffolding for the actual poetic explorations of the years of maturity. It might, therefore, be helpful to note that the urge to ruminate and schematise is a dominant feature right from the beginning. The mind is not satisfied, it appears, by merely noting the unique existence of an object, in and for itself; it must get at its full denotative significance, so to say, to fit it into a pre-existing scheme of things. This, it may be suggested, is the necessary condition of all cognition. Be that as it may, the point here being made is the extraordinary predominance of this element in Iqbal. It is this that enables him, on the positive side, to posit the essential unity of the phenomenal universe as also, at the level of speculative thought, to assimilate the disparate elements of the intellectual heritage to which he had access into a unified pattern. To speak of system-building and schematisation as features of a poet's thought may have for some a certain pejorative connotation, but

there certainly is a kind of poetry that presupposes an intellectual framework, that takes as its starting point some prior attempt on the part of the poet to clarify, in terms more or less discursive, particular areas of experience, a clarification that would still be valid even without the vivification accorded by poetic imagination. Dagh certainly was a poet of love, if of anything, but the kind of philosophic dignity and contemplative detachment that is by implication attributed to him in Iqbal's elegy is the result of a firm though unconscious determination to seize upon the least manifestation of a quality that the poet has already perceived to be the most significant element of the reality.

It would, however, be a mistake to insist too much on the intellectual or speculative aspect of the unifying framework of Iqbal's poetry since what distinguishes all such frameworks from arid intellectualism of non-poetic thought is the pervasive undercurrent of what can only be described as contemplative or poetic feeling since it remains unfocalised except through an occasional, abruptly surfacing image or a momentarily energised rhythm. The generalised feeling is not easily amenable to critical analysis while the focalised image disturbs us into a shocked awareness of the parabolic metaphoric reality of the object of contemplation. *اب صبا سے* *کون پرچھینکا سکوت گل کا راز* has a certain pleasant meditative insistence, an isolating, individualising, concreteness—qualities that suggest the 'inscape' of an object and that strike the reader of the early poems in lines like *ہے درختوں پر* *تذکر کا سماں چہایا ہوا*. Among the ways, incidentally, of measuring the growing poetic maturity of Iqbal may be counted this one of investing an object with poetic transcendence through a focusing of thought and feeling. In the process of development, however, the object comes progressively to be denuded of its particularity and is more and more absorbed into dynamic, living patterns of abstracted and idealised reality. It is in this sense, as we shall later see, that a polarity of total opposition can be envisaged between

'Himala' and the late Persian poem 'Tanhai'. But this is to anticipate; what we set out to note at the beginning of this section was the fact that, juvenilia apart, what Iqbal started with had very little in common with the tradition of *ghazal* as it had been practised by the generality of poets for centuries apart from the stock of inherited poetic motifs, but which Iqbal seemed determined to use with a difference.

III

The poetry of *ghazal* involves an unusual degree of sophistication with regard to the problem of the transmutation of experience into art. The problem is much more complicated than is suggested in the usual accounts of the aesthetic foundations of this poetic form, based as such accounts are on an application of the common criteria of judgment. A certain amount of stylisation and conventionalisation is no doubt the necessary condition of all formalisations of experience. In any case, the kind of resolution of the issue envisaged in the more popular forms of Romantic theory—a vulgarisation of the organicist standpoint—can hardly be expected to do justice to an art that even in its lesser perfections does not allow its shaping of the patterns of experience to be mediated through poetry without obliging them to pass through, howsoever imperceptibly, complex, almost unanalysable processes of abstraction, concretion, and idealisation. In having to deal with the process, one is not encouraged to step beyond the field of literary criticism into the cognate, though specialised, area of neo-Kantian epistemology in order to reinforce the contention that even the simplest art forms imply the mediation of controlling and regulating wholes of feeling and perception. The poetry of *ghazal* involves this process at a developed level of artistic creation. There is nothing peculiar, it should be added, to the mere external form of *ghazal*, to its acceptance

of couplet division, arrangement of rhymes or even its collection of conventional symbolism. What makes the *ghazal* such a representative form of poetry is its basis in the movement towards idealisation. It is, in this sense, the culmination both of the narrative and the dramatic, and may be said to be truly symbolic in its character. Poetry does certainly begin in a loving contemplation of objects, in the affirmation of their unique existence, but the act of affirmation itself transforms the object into a metaphor or symbol, a kind of bridge between the empirical and the ideal. A dramatic or narrative structure, similarly, mediates ideal significances when the experience has been fully absorbed by the reader or the spectator. A common, absolutely essential feature of the contemplative as well as the narrative and dramatic modes is the pervasive feeling tone that inheres in the total experience and gives it a living, vibrant touch. The ideal residue of the aesthetic experience in the mind has, therefore, a combination both of intellectual and emotional elements, a combination, however, that has been fused into a total unity. The fact that such an ideal residue in the mind may in turn act as a spur to the creative imagination, may become the launching pad, the recurring referent for further creation is amply borne out by the history of many art forms. There is, of course, a commonly accepted version of the argument being advanced here: we speak of the 'influence' as such of one writer on another, of a particular work of art implying or alluding to another. We may also refer to the necessary relationship existing between the different works of an author, how they build up a system of mutual illumination. It is possible to go further and suggest that the highly allusive poetry of the Augustans or of writers like Milton and Eliot is essentially involved in a similar process; it derives much of its point from the use of a kind of poetic shorthand. The poet is, so to say, spared the effort of having himself to create artistic structures as a necessary prerequisite for further exploration; he would

rather exploit the memory in the reader's mind of experiential patterns already familiar. It is thus a step in the direction both of greater sophistication and further idealisation. The use, in the *ghazal*, of conventional symbols, types and situations, the working of the imagination within elements already made ideal, is, in essence, not only of a similar nature but a culmination of what has been only tentative and half-realised elsewhere.

There is, of course, much more to an adequate theory of the *ghazal* than tentative suggestions with regard to only one of its many facets, and even these suggestions are not intended here to focus on the form of *ghazal* as much as on an aspect of the nature of poetic transcendence which the *ghazal* no doubt exemplifies to an extraordinary degree. What the so-called 'modern' theories of poetry, as enunciated in the *Muqaddima* by Hali and the Lecture on poetry by Azad, set out to do was to bring about ideological changes in the content of poetry, introduce 'simplicity' and 'sincerity' in it, and make it relevant to the times. The new critical doctrines are a strange medley of half-understood ideas derived from neo-classical theory and popular Romantic practice. One need not, however, be too harsh on their version of eclecticism since much of the popular contemporary criticism in Victorian England itself had developed a stance that combined simplistic scientism and superficial rationalism with a vulgarised version of the great Romantic insights. The new theory in Urdu can be summarised in terms of an almost Cartesian mechanistic outlook, an Addisonian view of the poetic imagination, and a Scott-like descriptive and narrative literalism. Hali did his best to deprive poetic imagination of its myth-creating power: he thought that the account of Rustam's heroic greatness as given by Firdausi in his *Shah Namah* was bound to lose much of its appeal and credibility with the growth in our knowledge, and the time was near when Rustam would only be regarded as an ordinary man. Hali, of course, cannot

be accused of over-subtlety in epistemological matters, and his insistence on 'nothing-but-the-truth' is ultimately derived from the eighteenth century view of mind's essential passivity. From such a source, it is obvious, only a literalistic naturalism, incorporating in its purview the directly meditative and reflective poetic modes and deriving its strength from the immediacy and directness of emotional appeal, could have been derived, depriving in the bargain the poetic object and the poetic narrative of its symbolic and metaphoric force. The poets of *Majmua-e-Nazm-e-Hali* and *Nazm-e-Azad*, as of the earlier sections of *Baang-e-Dara* to some extent, take recourse to 'directness' and 'immediacy', seek to create their own independent, self-contained value-systems in the sense of being unrelated to any traditional system of poetic or moral conventions, have their referents in the common, everyday world of objects and ideas. The break with the tradition was total and was born of a certain despair, of the conviction that the poetic idealisation of the *ghazal* was unreal and could not be modified to suit the new ideological content—ignoring thus the fact that though the *ghazal* derived its corpus of imagery and symbolism from outmoded social mores it had not in the past precluded changes and new borrowings. Owing to the pressure of an insistent didacticism it also ignored the fact of the gradational character of man's spiritual existence, how the extensive base is gradually absorbed and finally transmuted into the intensive apex, so that it is possible to incorporate a whole range of 'lower' experiential patterns into the matrix of love, something that had all along been the main ideological plank of the poetry of *ghazal*.

IV

When the 'new' kind of poetry came to be written during the last quarter of the previous century it had very few

models in the language. Apart from what the new poets thought to be the Western practice in poetry, they could have received little encouragement in the form of analogues and examples from the main traditions of Persian and Urdu poetry. The form of *mathnavi* was, of course, there, and could be used for all kinds of narrative, allegorical and reflective purposes. It had a rich tradition of non-lyrical poetry though in Urdu it did not have the range of subject-matter and treatment it had possessed in Persian. The *Musaddas* form was also there used in the main for quasi-epic purposes by writers on the theme of Karbala. A variety of stanzaic patterns had been used by Nazir in his would-be Chaucerian attempts to make poetry out of the stuff of common life. What all these forms had in common was their suitability for incorporating conceptual thought, narrative sequence and objectivity as also their freedom from *ghazal's* conventional symbolism of character and situation. All these features they also shared with much of the English poetry that could have been available to Indian readers in the Victorian age. There is a feature of the non-*ghazal* tradition of Urdu poetry that makes it different from the common poetic tradition in the West: it has always moved between the two extremes of pure narrative and pure allegory without ever achieving the true symbolic 'consubstantiation'—to recall Coleridge—of the object or the narrative and the inhering idea. The symbolic cohesion of the *ghazal* is purely essential and ideal and totally denuded of particularity. The kind of metaphoric cohesion, on the other hand, which is the chief feature of so many dramatic and narrative works in English is achieved through a combination of opposites: the interpenetration of the actual and the universal in the work of art as a whole. And this is what the initiators of the Reform movement in Urdu had more or less consciously set before themselves as their objective. The motto was to go back to the actual and invest it with as much of poetic transcendence as possible. That the task was well-nigh

impossible for 'the butterfly imagination' of the poet nurtured on Persian and Urdu literary traditions and the temptation too strong to move into the world of imperishable essences freed from the soul-crushing bondage to clay was soon to be borne out by the poetic development of Iqbal from *Baang-e-Dara* to *Baal-e-Jibreel* and *Zabur-i-Ajam*.

The poetry of *Baang-e-Dara* is the poetry of *nazm*, the new kind of poem in Urdu dating from the third quarter of the nineteenth century. As such, it would ideally be supposed to consist of attempts to struggle out of the conventional patterning of experience into forms that derive from a poetic of lesser stylisation. In effect it would measure its success by the distance it would traverse from the synthesising mode of *ghazal* towards a position where the poet is confronted with an object or a situation in itself and in which the poem is allowed to become a mere vehicle for registering faithfully the poet's response—a kind of intellectual—emotional 'framing' of the subject. Ideally, such a poem would have a linear structure, moving slowly towards a climactic moment, gathering momentum towards the close and achieving a sense of finality, a release of tension, after its point of 'discovery'. One would naturally expect the element of its texture to cohere into a unity, weaving a kind of unitive pattern out of rhythm, imagery and symbolism, and without any one of these elements ever claiming local attention to itself. An important feature of this poetic would relate to the use of language. The rejection of the conventional experiential patterns was logically involved with the development of a neutral, association-free, linguistic medium since most of the phrasal compounds—the main constituents of *ghazal's* 'poetic diction'—were also the carriers of the traditional gestalts of experience. Hali had been obliged to take note of the situation, and of the need gradually to get rid of what he thought to be the hackneyed diction of *ghazal* though, in view of its immense hold on the public taste, he had pleaded for moderation in

developing a neutral diction. In its approximation to the changed norm the new *nazm* would, therefore, be a kind of unveiling of actuality through an absolutely 'transparent' linguistic medium comprising mainly of pure idiomatic Urdu. Approaching as he did the poetic stance outlined above with greater or less deliberation, Iqbal could have moved along lines generally reminiscent of Romantic poetry in England or Germany—revealing a going out of the mind to the particulars of the phenomenal universe surprising them in their unique ideality in a language devoid of traditional semantic charge, but made alive by its links with the hidden reservoirs of spiritual energy. That Iqbal does so in his early poems is a fact, but a fact of greater interest is our perception of a marked contrary trend embedded in these very poems. The first poem in Iqbal's earliest collection—'Himala'—is a faithful record of the conflict between attitudes that would logically lead towards contrary poetic norms. Alternatively, it could be said that, apart from a vague allegiance to the new poetic, the hidden imaginative movement as manifested in the main conception as well as in the structural design of the poem is indicative of a powerful urge to revert to the more traditional poetic practice. The suggestion, however, calls for some analysis.

It would not do to suggest that the movement towards generalisation inheres in the very conception of the poem, since the ostensible subject, the one in the foreground, does not happen to be a specific but only a generalised landscape, almost an abstraction. It would not do because one can think of poems in which the generalised notion of a class of things has been vivified by a poetic recall of the particulars of actual experience. It is obvious that Iqbal's poem is un-Wordsworthian in its inspiration in that he does not appear to visit or re-visit actual 'spots', 'spots' that could be regarded as dear in themselves and not for any 'illustrative' or 'exemplary' value. The Himalayas in the poem are a far

cry from the Simplon Pass as it appears in *The Prelude* (Book VI) though Iqbal's poem, too, is not without its occasional glimpses of transcendence. The starting-point, however, and the framework are different. The mountains that guard the country's frontiers (فصیل کشور ہندوستان) are already a 'symbol', illustrative of certain ideas, before the poem begins; they are the *donnes* in the poem to be stated only and not explored as the poem gradually moves forward towards a climax. This would be a defect if one approached the poem with critical preoccupations from the consideration of works like the Simplon Pass passage in *The Prelude*. To do so, however, would be a mistake, since the main source of Iqbal's inspiration is generally a thought, an idea that has been brooded over in moments of emotional expansiveness. That such indeed is the case always with Iqbal would appear to be borne out by his philosophical preoccupations. He was a philosopher-poet and not merely a philosophical poet. His intellectual forbears, the one whom he had critically studied in search of his antecedents, had possessed a predilection towards summary generalisation, a disregard for the *merely* empirical. The world of appearances, whether conceived in terms of the theory of وحدت الوجود or that of وحدت الشہود was one where variety and singularity were delusions, and even in Iqbal, who later came to affirm the world of time, the pulsation of vital energy is conceived only in terms of a pervasive unity.

Approached from the standpoint of the concept of a cohesive structural design focusing on an actual landscape—like Wordsworth—the poem leaves much to be desired. The imagery seems to be casual and disparate, invoking slightly heterogenous systems of value. There appear to be three main thematic concerns in the poem: one of them centres round patriotic motifs, another evokes the world of natural beauty, and the third—deriving in the main from the second—seeks the realm of the abiding through the emblematic

mediation of the phenomenal. The first two lines of the opening stanza have a rhetorical flourish about them that, however, modulates into powerful evocation of the transcendent in the next two lines while the closing couplet absorbs the mountain—uncelebrated and unhallowed in the Indo-Muslim tradition—into an established mythico-religious scheme and invests it with emblematic significance. The patriotic theme, however, is soon relegated into the background, re-emerging perhaps in the last stanza where the mountain is envisaged as providing a link between the present and the simple unsophisticated life of early historical times. In between come brief vignettes of natural landscape—clouds breeze, mountain stream and the sunset—all, incidentally, vibrant with a nameless, hidden energy. The tendency to coerce objects into yielding their last iota of intellectually formulable significance is present here also, but it is not allowed to dominate, and occasionally some resistless image flashes into unique isolation. The piece of cloud that moves along in an ecstasy of joy and the trees that are lost in deep meditation stand out with a force that is truly symbolic and, what is more important, are indications of a crucial attempt to discover in the natural world symbolic counters—dislocated from the context of actuality—that could be developed into permanent tools in the exploration of the world of experience. The cloud moving in ecstasy is the precursor of many significant things in the later poetry of Iqbal. It was to acquire philosophical depth and meaningfulness in the rather abstract resonances of the paean to life in *Khizr-e-Rah*, and was not only to re-appear as the powerful, gushing mountain torrent (جوئے کہستان) in the opening section of *Saqi Namah*, but also to give that wonderful poem its throbbing and rhythmic energy. It would appear to be slightly out of place here in the contemplative stasis of the Neoplatonic universe of Iqbal's early poetry, and may be regarded as having truly acquired its *raison d'être* when Iqbal ultimately discovered for his intuitive

apprehension of life's energies a philosophical scheme in contemporary Western voluntarism and vitalism. It is here that one can see how the so-called philosophy—the philosophy in the poetry, that is—has its genesis in elements that penetrate deeper in the consciousness than discursive thought or recognisable emotion; the 'philosophy' inheres, in the ultimate analysis, in the discovery of images, of forms and patterns of experience. The growth of Iqbal as a poet could be traced in terms of his successive discoveries of such crucial images—isolated, idealised and symbolic. To return, however, to 'Himala' in relation to the new poetic.

The poem is in the *musaddas* form—a rhyming quatrain followed by a couplet. It seems to have been the favourite form of Iqbal during the early years since quite a considerable number of poems in *Baang-e-Dara* are in this form: 'Gul-e-Rangeen', 'Ahd-e-Tifli', 'Mirza Ghalib', 'Abr-e-Kohsar', 'Aftab-e-Subh', 'Mauj-e-Darya', 'Nala-e-Faryad', 'Wataniat', 'Shikwah' and 'Jawab-e-Shikwah'. The first part of the collection has eight poems in the form; the small middle part has none while the much bigger last part of *Baang-e-Dara* has only three poems with the stanzaic pattern of the *musaddas*. The form is never again used in any of the later collections. Along with the *musaddas* Iqbal also seems, in the early years, to have been experimenting with a freer kind of *nazm* with rhyming stanzas of varying length. He developed it for many of his major long poems: 'Tasveer-e-Dard', 'Shama aur Shaer', 'Khizr-e-Rah', 'Masjid-e-Qartaba' and 'Zauq-o-Shauq.' Apart from *Saqi Namah* none of Iqbal's major achievements in poetry is in the rhyming couplets of the metrical length that is common in *mathnavi*. *Javid Namah*, undoubtedly an ambitious attempt, is good only in parts and an achievement of an entirely different order from that of its model, *The Divine Comedy*. The early poem 'والده' 'والده' does certainly enjoy the freedom of the rhyming couplet, but, apart from its longer brooding metre, its organisation into movements of varied length with

an epigrammatic coda at the end of each movement (heard only as part of the movement of thought) brings it close to the formal pattern of 'Khizr-e-Rah' and 'Masjid-e-Qartaba'. Besides the later ghazals and the quatrains in *Payam-i-Mashriq* and *Armughan-i-Hejaz*, the movement-wise arrangement of short rhyming units seems to have suited best the needs of Iqbal's imagination at its most creative and untrammelled. That the form approximates to the freer movement of the *ghazal* and its processes of idealisation is something that may be more readily acceptable later; what needs recognition here is the suggestion that the *musaddas* form of the early poems was possibly abandoned for reasons that may be germane to our present concerns here. For one thing, the form envisages a firm grasp of the content, a sharp clarity of outline and, as each of the stanza units reaches the final climactic couplet, an unambiguous sense of at least partial ending. The early examples of the use of the form are to be found in the *marthias* of Anis and Dabir. There could indeed be no doubt as to the sharpness of focus and the hard metallic ring of the concluding stanzaic couplet in Anis; it is his *forte*, the main source of much of the effect of his verse. Among the reasons for his success with the *musaddas* form could be counted the sharp clarity of the moral and emotional lineaments of his material; and it is this inherent quality of the events of Karbala that enables even poets of much inferior mettle to achieve considerable success.

In the early poetry of Iqbal the choice of the form seems rather inappropriate. In the 'nature' poems the stress is not on pure description. As in 'Himala', his attempt is to assimilate nature into a scheme that evokes the infinite, and hence by its very nature the subject-matter refuses to have any sharp clarity of outline. The form calls for definition while the movement of thought is towards the vaguely wistful and metaphysically suggestive. Within the limited scope, however, of 'Shikwah' and 'Jawab-e-Shikwah', Iqbal

seems to have found appropriate content for the form. There is hardly any attempt at exploration here, and certainly no discoveries. Nothing is tentative; everything is well-defined and the reader's sympathies taken for granted. To say that the poems touch upon tremendous issues, slightly awaken the reader's curiosity in a questioning way and then with an amazing disregard for the norms of responsible thinking move into dogmatic assertion is not a subtle attempt at the denigration of the *musaddas* form by the indirect suggestion that it is not suitable for the poetry of exploration. The form has a limited usefulness for purposes of narration or pure description. The most valuable elements in Iqbal's poetry, however, are of a different order.

The concern with the early poems is not without purpose. For one thing, they are not much written about, and so the origins of Iqbal's greatness as poet are seldom brought to light. At the same time, a false discontinuity between the early and the late is sought to be established, a supposition that may be valid if the attention is focused on the patently ideological content. The poetic attitudes, however, and the deeper imaginative operations do not undergo much change, and it is these that need to be highlighted if one wishes to perceive the real unity of a poem like 'Himala' and its links with the development of Iqbal's crucial 'nature' images. One can do so by grasping the fact that the poem seeks to explore the potentialities of a natural object as a symbol, a metaphoric link between the world of appearances and the Infinite. The patriotic is only an attempt to involve the reader in a close alliance with the object of contemplation as also the evocation of natural beauty. Both inhere in a context of significance, an indeterminateness of response that ultimately serves to focalise into suggestions of infinitude. It is here that the analogy with Moses and Sinai seems pertinent; the mountain is the playground for the manifestation of divine energy in the motions of natural objects. These motions acquire mythic force as the poet's

imagination seizes them in acts of loving purposefulness. Looked at from this point of view certain features of the poem's diction, too, become meaningful and are absorbed into an organic unity. One saw how the residue of the traditional Persianised diction tended to appear as mere cliché accompanied with a certain recalcitrance to fuse into a poem ostensibly of natural description. Regarded, on the other hand, as a poem of evocation rather than description, of abstraction rather than elaboration, the traditional religious cliché in the poem assumes significance in that it becomes part of an attempt not only to idealise the actual but of defining it in terms of the sacred.

The early poetry of Iqbal does indeed seem to be seized with the task of exploring and realizing the abstracted and idealised gestalts of experience as embodied in the traditional diction of Urdu poetry, *ghazal* and elsewhere. Many of the early poems, apart from their own intrinsic charm, seem exercises in working out, in a relatively elaborate manner and with a nominal acknowledgment of debt to the new poetic, the experiential implications of the traditional symbolism—flower, moth, flame, light, nightingale, wine, garden, fragrance, wave, etc. With regard to the world of nature the movement seems to be initiated from the opposite direction, though the end is the same in both the cases. On the one hand, we have patently idealised objects, the overt symbols and emblems of the traditional poetry in poems like 'Gul-e-Rangeen', 'Shama-o-Parvana', 'Shama' and most ambitious of all such poems, 'Shama aur Shaer'. There is, at the same time, a much larger group of poems in which something like an inductive procedure is followed very much in the manner of 'Himala' as we have already seen: objects, whether from the world of nature or that of human experience are approached in isolation from their space-time context, given spirituality and allegorised or apprehended in their mythical life and individuality. Reverting, however, to the earlier group of poems we notice that in them Iqbal seems

to be reaching out into the landscape of the interior with the help of traditional symbolic counters though fidelity to the already established does not seem to carry much weight with him: he freely modifies, elaborates, and evolves newer designs. It is surprising why so little attention should have been given to the almost deliberate attempt made by Iqbal in these early poems to work out for himself, under the changed circumstances, the implications of the *ghazal* motifs. The poems read like paraphrase and commentary, and the process was ultimately to end up in the reverse direction: in the compression and concentration of the *ghazals* and quatrains of the later collections as also in the not dissimilar idealisation in *nazms* like 'Masjid-e-Qartaba' and 'Zauq-o-Shauq'. That the rose in 'Gul-e-Rangeen' is a far cry from the host of golden daffodils in Wordsworth's poem implies only a difference of approach; in terms of the ultimate outcome the daffodils partake as much of the ideality of poetry as the symbolic rose in Iqbal's poem. Nevertheless, the difference in approach is there, and entails a difference of procedure and of poetic attitude. Iqbal's poem looks back to the tradition and forward to the most characteristic elements in his own later poetry. The four stanzas of the poem work out in detail the experiential pattern in the nightingale-rose=poet-beloved symbolism. This elaboration would be pointless but for two reasons. In the first place, it is part of the poet's own personal effort to re-vitalise the tradition; he cannot simply take the symbolism for granted in the manner of the more traditional writers. There might, at the same time, be a feeling that the unelaborated, tacit acceptance of the symbolism may be misunderstood, or may not perhaps be able to carry some of the supposedly new semantic charge. Intellectual development has a way of flaunting itself as a discovery, but the elements of imaginative transcendence in poetry have a deeper origin than the level of mere thought, and the way forward in intellectual matters may sometimes be found to be the way

back to the real centres of creativity. Here is one of the stanzas from 'Gul-e-Rangeen':

سو زبانوں پر بھی خاموشی تجھے منظور ہے
 راز وہ کیا ہے ترے سینے میں جو مستور ہے
 میری صورت تو بھی اک برگ ریاض طور ہے
 میں چمن سے دور ہوں تو بھی چمن سے دور ہے
 مطمئن ہے تو پریشاں مثل بو رہتا ہوں میں
 زخمی شمشیر ذوق جستجو رہتا ہوں میں

Thou wouldst prefer silence to a hundred tongues—
 What secret lies hidden in thy heart?

Like me thou, too, art a leaf from the Garden of Sinai—
 Both of us are exiles from there.

Thou art satisfied; I am eager like fragrance—
 Wounded as I am by the sword of the urge to search (the Garden).

In the preceding stanza, Iqbal had laboured to establish a relationship of love between himself and the rose; going slightly against the tradition, he had made the rose symbolise the created universe of nature while he himself—the contemplative human consciousness—partook of the nature of the same created universe with the difference that the human spirit, higher in the hierarchy of being, experienced fiercely the yearning for re-union with the Infinite. The affinity between the natural and the human orders is no doubt established but with great effort:

آہ یہ دست جفا جو اے گل رنگیں نہیں
 کس طرح تجھ کو یہ سمجھاؤں کہ میں گلچیں نہیں

O colourful rose, this is not a cruel hand;
 How can I tell thee that I am not one who would pluck thee!

Iqbal had to go back to the traditional suggestion of the symbolism of the rose in order to make himself understood: (I look at thee with the loving eyes of the nightingale). It could very well be the source of some confusion since in the traditional symbolism the rose is generally regarded as the object of volition, the

Infinite itself. The concluding stanza speculates about the possible effects on the experiencing self of the transcendental yearning—something, however, that would in verse of greater concentration be merely taken for granted or only obliquely hinted at. It is also remarkable how, as we saw in the case of 'Himala', the elaboration itself is in terms of the ideal deriving from the tradition : *دشک جام جم میرا آئینہ : حیرت نہ ہو* (The mirror of my wondering eyes may not turn out to be superior to the cup of Jamshed). In the longer poem 'Shama aur Shaer' the framing symbolism is substantiated with a good deal of incidental symbolism of the traditional variety, but the design of the poem, unlike that of 'Gul-e-Rangeen', is not woven out of abstract elements. The scope of elaboration is so wide, and the range of the central organising symbol so limited, that the poem comes to acquire an entirely different character altogether. Like Khizr in 'Khizr-e-Rah' (or like Tiresias in *The Waste Land*), the protagonist is nothing but the philosophic consciousness of the poet. The role of direct philosophical reflection and the social-political comment as help or hindrance in the essentially poetic process of idealisation may better be postponed for later consideration; what concerns us here is Iqbal's attempt to found poems on the exploration of traditional symbolism, and from this point of view 'Gul-e-Rangeen' appears so characteristic of the early phase. After a time, however, the poetics of elaboration could not but have appeared as a blind alley for a creative urge that was so intimately concerned with all that is ideal. The distractions from the pursuit of the essentially poetic were many, but the end when it came after long journeys into arid expanses of discursive thought was most quintessentially poetic. The following quatrain from the 'Lala-i-Toor' section of *Payam-i-Mashriq* recalls the early poem of the rose symbolism discussed above:

مشو اے غلچہ نورستہ دلگیر
 ازین بستیاں سرا دیگر چه خواهی

لنب جو 'بزم گل' سرخ چمن سیر
 صبا 'شبنم' نوائے صبح گاہی!

Do not be forlorn, O newly-blossomed bud:
 What else dost thou seek in this fair garden—
 (Thou hast) the river-bank, the company of flowers, the meadow-loving
 bird,
 The morning breeze, the dew, and the melodious sounds at dawn.

The fact of greater concentration here is remarkable; the four lines of the quatrain say as much as the four stanzas of the earlier poem. There is no labouring here to establish the point of the identity of the human and the natural orders. There was also a certain tone of condescension in the earlier poem: the rose has the same origin as the human soul, but it does not seem to feel the pang of desire so keenly as the poet:

اس چمن میں میں سراپا سوز و ساز آرزو
 اور تیری زندگانی ہے کداز آرزو

What am I in this Garden but the anguish and joy of desire incarnate?
 And thy life?—without the softness born of desire!

In the quatrain, however, the entire created universe is implicitly envisaged as experiencing the longing for a return to the ultimate source of being: مشواے غنچه نورستہ دلگیر
 The transcendental yearning becomes an insistent refrain, the cherished motif recurring verse after verse in the later poetry of Iqbal. Here the newly-blossomed bud is suggestively made to experience it. The situation, however, is not simple: a whole complex of experiences, some of them possibly destructive of the validity of the transcendental longing itself, has been allowed to shed its ironic light at the central situation. The bud is new to life and to the soul-killing burden of material existence, and hence its urge to return to true freedom and also a certain desperation at the prospect of captivity is looked at, from the poet's 'mature' point of view, with a subtle though sympathetic irony. The catalogue of 'pleasing' objects has a two-fold point: it is

an acknowledgement of the soul's attraction for the merely phenomenal, but, at the same time, it also undermines the purely materialistic argument by its successive inspection of the items of material environment as the ultimate object of desire. There is, moreover, in the longer poem an obtrusive assertion of the inferiority of the phenomenal which is in the later poem replaced by a subtle and indirect devaluation. The strategy of exposure and of implied comment gives to the quatrain a suggestiveness that is lacking in the earlier poem.

'Gul-e-Rangeen' is certainly a specimen of the poetic of 'actuality' not in the sense that its rose is not symbolic in the traditional sense, but because it affirms the principle of explication, of the elaboration of the 'actuality' of man's inner life. The quatrain from *Payam-i-Mashriq* is a measure of the distance that Iqbal had to traverse in order to return to what had earlier been abandoned as unpromising.

V

The movement of Iqbal's poetry towards ideality is along three routes: it comprises of processes that originate in an elaboration of traditional symbolic patterns, in the symbolisation of reality (mainly of the natural order), and in discursive thought. The last-mentioned proved the most intractable of all since the prophetic role which had early been carved out for Iqbal owing to his own predilections as also the contemporary social and political conditions made it difficult for him to confine himself to what appeared to be merely 'poetic'. Of the other two, one that was concerned with the transformation of reality into symbol and myth or, to put it differently, with the apprehension of reality in its symbolic and mythic aspects, seems overtly close to the essential processes of poetry. All the three of them, however, derive

from, and are implicit in, the critical stance that is generally associated with the reform movement in Urdu literature. Thus, a discussion of the elements of Iqbal's poetic transcendence and an account of how his poetry came to possess it is also—in the larger context of poetry in Urdu—a story of search, retrieval and redress.

The movement towards the symbolisation of reality is easily traced; some of the most remarkable poems in *Baang-e-Dara*—themselves of great intrinsic charm—are a preparation towards the perfect symbolic transparency and mythic concrescence of later poetry. 'Masjid-e-Qartaba' which represents so much that is so valuable in Iqbal is remarkable from this point of view also. Its symbolisation of art and history, and also of nature, is the culmination of something that starts quite early. In the later *ghazals* we have not only the acme of the process of the symbolisation of reality, but also a fusion of this process with the one already discussed, viz., the exploration, in traditional symbols, of reality already made ideal. It implies that while Iqbal re-vitalises traditional symbols, he also adds to them through the reverse process of an intense idealisation of reality.

There is, as has already been suggested, an element of mythic apprehension of the individuality of natural forces in the central stanzas of 'Himala'. This is all the more remarkable since it is not part of a deliberate attempt. Elsewhere, however, Iqbal seems to be engaged in the task of a fanciful allegorisation of natural phenomena. He weaves patterns out of abstracted reality in order to communicate insights through a semi-narrative mode. In a number of poems the creative urge remains at the level of pleasing fancy while in the best of such poems the imaginative pressure is so powerful as to give them a degree of narrative credibility and mythical force.

Iqbal's symbolisation of reality is to a large extent involved with the quality of his work as a poet of 'nature' in the conventional sense. It should be possible to extract

from his poems about 'nature' a scale of value with reference to the degree of symbolisation and metaphoric transmutation. At the lowest level, there are poems that make an illustrative, analogical, and didactic use of natural scenes or objects. There is, for instance, this concluding section from his early poem *کنڈار راوی*:

دوڑاں ہے سفینہٴ دریا پہ اک سفینہٴ تیز
 ہوا ہے موج سے ملاح جسکا گرم ستیز
 سہک روی میں ہے مثل نگاہ یہ کشتی
 نکل کے حلقہٴ حد نظر سے دور گئی
 جہاز زندگی آدمی دوڑاں ہے یونہیں
 ابد کے بکھر میں پیدا یونہیں نہاں ہے یونہیں
 شکست سے یہ کبھی آشنا نہیں ہوتا
 نظر سے چھپتا ہے لیکن فنا نہیں ہوتا

On the river's surface floats a swift-moving barge;
 Its helmsman is struggling against the waves.

In its smooth movement the barge is like the eye;
 Out of the circle of sight it has gone far away.

The ship of man's life, too, moves in a like manner;
 It appears and goes out of sight in the ocean of eternity.

Wrecked completely it never is;
 It goes out of sight, but is never totally destroyed.

A number of poems serve the purpose of providing the poet with an occasion to reflect on human life, and it is only in an occasional image that such poems ('Chand' in *Baang-e-Dara* part I, for instance) come to life. The slow-moving, reflective rhythm and the simplistic analogical relationship that they seek to establish makes them heavy reading. It is only when we come to shorter metrical units in poems like 'Haqiqat-e-Husn', 'Chand aur Tare', 'Do Sitare', and 'Sair-e-Falak', and also 'Akhtar-e-Subh' and 'Bazm-e-Anjum' that the level of allegory and that of symbolism is attained. These poems are remarkable for their sensuous embodiment of thought, or at least for their apprehension of philosophical

truths in the form of convincing allegories. It is best to consider such nature poems along with those that allegorise spiritual life though, as in 'Muhabbat' it is difficult to draw any precise line of demarcation between the two. The source of all such poems is the parables and fables interspersed everywhere in the *Mathnavi* of Rumi and similar works. Another source of inspiration might have been certain specimens of Romantic poetry in England and elsewhere. Some of the later examples of the genre in Iqbal, 'Taskhir-i-Fitrat', for example, have to be considered in the light of his views on the Fall of Adam and on the nature of Heaven and Hell as expressed in his *Lectures*. His insight into the nature of myth as representing states of human consciousness and his poetic attempt at the creation of such myths himself, specially myths centring on the role of Satan in many other poems besides 'Taskhir-i-Fitrat', encourages one to seek parallels in other literatures. Yeats and Eliot both were preoccupied with a search for myth as the organising principle of experience. Eliot had to go back to the anthropological roots of man's spiritual life in his search for true personality while Yeats touched the borders of fantasy and non-sense with a view to creating his own personal mythology. Iqbal's links with the tradition were never disrupted and so he had only to re-vitalise the past and set it in perspective. Looked at from this point of view, the early poems like 'Haqiqat-e-Husn' 'Akhtar-e-Subh' (both 'myths' of nature, though slight) and 'Insan' (قدرت کا عکس) (anticipating 'Tanhai' in *Payam-i-Mashriq*) acquire significance; they are attempts at the recovery of the designs of spiritual life from out of the world of appearances, and hence part of the process of idealisation of poetry.

The scale of the symbolisation of nature moves between the poles of pure description and mythic personalisation. In between come analogy, allegory, and symbol, and this could very well serve as the scale of imaginative transcendence in

poetry. It was with some such formulation in mind that the suggestion had earlier been made about the possibility of assimilating 'Himala' and 'Tanhai' into a characteristic opposition. 'Tanhai' is among the crowning achievements of Iqbal in poetry. Its images of nature are a far cry from the nature poetry of the earlier phase though they undoubtedly have their origin in the loving, brooding contemplation of the natural phenomena which is so characteristic of the early poetry. The objects are torn out of the context of actuality which, however, does not deprive them of life and individuality. They are transmuted into the elements of the landscape of the soul. The poem may be compared with the earlier poem 'Insan' in which, too, man was represented as lonely in a 'heartless' material universe. There was, however, an element of description, an attempt to linger on the merely decorative deriving from the poetic of elaboration:

خورشید وہ عابد سحر خیز لائے والا پیام بخیز
 مغرب کی پہاڑیوں میں چھپکر بیٹھا ہے مدئے شفق کے ساعز

The sun, that early-rising worshipper,

One who brings the message 'Arise',

Hidden behind the western hills

Drinks out of the red wine of evening.

This is a source of distraction, an indication of a search to discover symbols that would incorporate particular ideas. It is more profitable, therefore, to approach the nature images of 'Tanhai' from the standpoint of the later poetry, in the light of verses such as the following from a ghazal in *Baal-e-Jibreel*:

یہ مہشتِ خاکی 'یہ صرصر' یہ وسعتِ افلاک
 ستم ہے یا کہ کرم تیرے لذتِ ایجاد

This handful of dust, this hurricane, this expanse of the skies—

Is it a favour or a curse, this thy delight in thine own creativity?

The conception of nature implied here and the function of nature imagery derives from the dominant metaphysical concerns in Iqbal's later poetry, the concern with the uneasy

relationship between man's essence and the soul's inhospitable habitat in the universe of nature:

یہ عالم یہ بتخانہ چشم و گوش
 جہاں زندگی ہے فقط خورد و نوش
 خودی کی یہ ہے منزل اولیں
 مسافر یہ تیرا نشیمن نہیں

This world, this idol-house for the eye and ear,
 Where life is no more than eating and drinking,
 This is only the first stage on the way to Selfhood
 O traveller, this is not at all your destination.

This concern is differentiated from the earlier, wistful metaphysical yearning by its tone of impatient urgency, by its total refusal to make any compromises. There are, no doubt, moments when the mood of loving contemplation persuades the imagination to dwell on nature for its own sake (پھر چراغِ لاله سے روشن ہوئے کوہ و دامن), but such a mood is rare in later poetry. There are also poems in which the natural universe is posited as the agency that helps man on his way to perfection. The concept is of crucial importance in Iqbal's philosophical system, and finds poetic expression in a poem like روحِ ارضی آدم کا استقبال کرتی ہے. Notwithstanding, the recurrent, unifying idea in the later poetry is that of a ceaseless struggle between spiritual essence and material existence and nature, therefore, acquires a touch of weirdness as in the couplet quoted above. The point, however, that is being sought to be made here is not at all related to any specific metaphysical design in Iqbal's use of nature imagery. The concern is not constitutive but modal. And hence, whatever the metaphysical orientation nature remains essentially ideal. In روحِ ارضی آدم کا استقبال کرتی ہے for example, generalised nature images are made to reveal a loving pliancy to man's creative touch. The movement towards symbolic generality is also marked in this very different opening couplet of a *ghazal* in *Baal-e-Jibreel*:

ہر شے مسافر ہر چیز راہی کیا چاند تارے کیا مرغ و ماہی

Everything is moving, a traveller :
Be it the moon and stars, bird or fish.

A very different ideational context, but the same idealising mode is also present in the following from another beautiful though little-quoted *ghazal* in *Baal-e-Jibreel*:

تارے آوارہ و کم آمیز تقدیر و جود ہے جدائی

The stars—strayed and non-communicative :
Being separated is the destiny of all existence.

یہ پچھلے پہر کا زرد رو چاند ہے داز و نیاز آشنائی

This late-appearing pale-faced moon—
Ignorant of the intimacies of love.

That there is no consistency in Iqbal's evaluation of the metaphysical status of nature as it emerges from his use of nature images is itself an indication that these images are non-referential in the sense that they are not evocative of nature in and for itself. Such representation comes very close to the overtly symbolic and ideal *gestalts* of nature in traditional poetry.

The movement towards the denudation of particularity does not mean the erosion of the individuality of objects, and it is with this important realization in mind that one should approach 'Tanhai' in our present concern. The poem is a dramatisation of the soul's loneliness in the universe of solid material objects. The strange thing about the poem is that its effectiveness is derived from a contrariety of response to the world of nature. On the face of it, the poem registers disenchantment, but the way the poem successively dramatises the various objects—the wave, the mountain, and the moon—lends them not only a certain humanity, but also mythic life and personality. A sense of wonder suffuses the objects dramatised, and in this respect the poem recalls many early poems, especially 'Jugnu'. In that poem, however, an accumulation of conceits had over-

laid the object of contemplation, and, consequently, the process of personalisation had been held in check—very much as it happens in some of Shelly's lyrics. In 'Tanhai', on the contrary, there is an absolute concentration on the object, a focusing on its most 'traditional' features, and as one comes to the concluding line of each stanza, the impenetrable ontological mystery of the object's and nature's being. The aim here is not to analyse the poem for its theme or its relation with the general metaphysical stance of Iqbal's poetry, but only to see in it the perfection of a tendency that is present even in the earliest of Iqbal's poems. The world of time and of nature is no doubt affirmed by Iqbal, but the affirmation is very little concerned with the uniqueness of particular objects and, with Iqbal's growing preoccupation with intensive metaphysical urges, the world of nature is more and more reduced to a concept. 'Reduced' has, however, no pejorative connotation, nor has 'concept' any suggestion of implied censure—since both are in this case the necessary concomitants of the process of poetic idealisation.

VI

The world of art cannot pretend to total autonomy; even at its most essentially 'poetic' its referents have to be found in the world of general human experience. There are, however, limitations of mode that regulate the infusion of concepts and intellection in general into the aesthetically determined world of art. Concepts have to be explored, their experiential implications realized, before they can be turned into the living, organic constituents of poetry. The substance of Iqbal's poetry, as has already been seen, is made up of ideas; the urge to philosophise is present right from the beginning, and in this he is slightly different from his great predecessor Ghalib. Ghalib, too, possessed a

philosophical mind, but somehow, it appears, the grip of the merely empirical was too strong on him. It is difficult to schematise his poetry into a coherent system—which may or may not be a virtue. His is a poetry of attitudes rather than ideas. Moreover, he was firmly rooted in the tradition of the *ghazal* and was therefore precluded from having to turn intractable ideological material into the stuff of poetry. For Iqbal the necessity to do so was urgent, but in this, as in other respects, the way to poetic transcendence was long and the attempt not always rewarded by success.

It is possible to suggest that his poetry is in a sense a glorious counterpart of his work in philosophical thought. Iqbal's well-known lectures have generally been described as the most ambitious attempt in recent history to determine the foundations of the Islamic faith in the light of modern thought. The poetry, too, in its own way may be described as an attempt at the reconstruction and re-vitalisation of certain fundamental Islamic concepts. Islam may or may not have needed such a reconstruction, but it certainly is the main constituent of Iqbal's vision of life as mediated in his poetry. Having a particular religious faith as the source of ideas in poetry is one thing, and to be able to make those ideas a living part of the poetic vision is another, and here only comparison and analysis can provide the real key. Iqbal's poetry must be approached with poets like Eliot as constant analogues since Eliot's is another remarkable example of the poetic re-vitalisation of a faith.

Shakespeare is not generally thought of as a poet of 'ideas', but it is remarkable how certain traditional Christian ideas have entered into the dramatic fabric of his plays, specially in the last phase. The ideas inhere in the dramatic structure or come to centre round a figure that acquires symbolic overtones. In any case, the Christian content in the plays is always a matter of exploration rather than mere statement. In Eliot, too, the Christian ideological slant is more or less a matter of discerning certain patterns in experience. The

religious content of his poetry meets with a certain ready acceptability—proceeding as it does from a disarming tentativeness of presentation. In any case, the pattern is there with its incontrovertible roots in experience.

Iqbal arrived at his ideology via Hali's *Musaddas*: 'Shikwah', however, can hardly be described as a success. There is no doubt a faint attempt in it to discover patterns of growth in history, but the whole thing is vitiated by a total refusal to probe the nature of the divine. The poem's 'monotheism' is only an assertion, a rhetorical gesture rather than a living, comprehended and comprehensible, concept. The 'God' of the poem remains unexplored, and His relationship with the community of the faithful undefined except perhaps in terms of a tribal deity. In the poems that follow we have the indication of a deepening concern with the need to relate the concepts of God and of community to experience, and it is with this concern that the process of idealising, of seeing the universal in the particular starts. The interest here, however, is not at all with particular concepts and how they are made to inhere in poetic texture; the point that needs brief substantiation now is that in Iqbal's greatest poems the use of concepts, too, is indicative of a return to processes that approximate to the idealisation of the *ghazal*.

It would, nevertheless, be better to concentrate on a particular concept and trace it through a number of texts in order to mark the stages through which it passes on the way to becoming a universal experiential whole with an attendant complex of emotional responses, a whole that could be freely used in varying contexts by virtue of its nature as an abstracted and idealised piece of reality. The origins of similar abstractions in *ghazal* are shrouded in obscurity though, of course, it is difficult to imagine that they could be traced to any particular sources even if the evidence with regard to their use could be made available. In Iqbal, however, the entire process of the liberation of particular concepts from actuality takes place within our view, and we can see how

he could add to the traditional symbolism of the *ghazal* through his own imaginative effort.

The concept of the community of the faithful is of crucial importance in the poetry of Iqbal. This concept passes through a number of clearly marked stages. At first, it is the historically-determined community of people who owe allegiance to a particular faith by virtue of the accident of birth. Iqbal's early poetry takes his own commitment to this community for granted; he identifies himself totally, implicitly, and unquestioningly. It is this concept of the community that serves as the point of reference in 'Shikwah'. The community is certainly defined with reference to a few moral values, but the definition is vague and sentimental. In 'Shama aur Shaer' starts the process that would explore the idea of the community not only in terms of a common history but also in a context of ethical and spiritual values. The search for generalising symbols that could embody the main values of the community is clearly marked in the poem.

خیمہ زن ہو وادی سینا میں مانند کلیم
شعلہ تحقیق کو غارتگر کشاہ کد

Pitch thy tent, like Moses, in the valley of Sinai:
Let the flame of truth destroy (thy) abode.

Earlier, however, in a remarkable short poem, 'Irtiqa', Iqbal had already made great poetry out of his perception of a ceaseless struggle between life-affirming and life-denying forces. The use of the basic terms of opposition in that poem had implicated the community into a cosmic scheme of spiritual evolution. The poem is significant in that here we have clear evidence of the bearing of a wider perspective on the problem. A distinction is made between the cosmic force of affirmation—symbolised in چراغ مصطفوی—and its historically-determined manifestations in the life of different communities. The hazards are many that attend the growth of true spirituality—from the dark bowels of the earth in the

vineyard to the wine in the glass—but the determined struggle against these forces of negation is the secret of the vitality of nations.

'Khizr-e-Rah' does not seem to mark much of an advance except that the particular section in the poem—'Dunya-e-Islam'—that develops the idea of the community assimilates some of the vibrations from its wider setting in the poetic exploration of the earlier section—*زندگی* and *صحرانوردی*. Iqbal, however, was by now fully engaged in poetically working out his philosophy of selfhood and also his concept of God and of the Perfect Man. It is important to remember that Iqbal's remarkable venture into the realm of philosophic thought was chiefly motivated by his commitment to the community, and, consequently, the concept of the community receives clarity of definition from explorations in cognate areas. The interest here, it may again be pointed out, is not with these concepts as such but with the consequences of the development of these concepts in the form of new motifs and experiential patterns. Iqbal's poetry develops, from 'Tulu-e-Islam' onwards, a whole complex of poetic motifs that are remarkable for their freedom, ideality, suggestiveness and symbolic force. It would not be much to the point to give illustrations of the use of these motifs since they comprise the substance of Iqbal's greatest poetry. The general conceptual framework within which these motifs and patterns operate are well-known. The 'origins' of the community are linked with elaborate myths of creation, and the perspective of eternity is never absent. History is not repudiated, but there is a growing insistence on the search for the points of intersection between time and the timeless. Discrimination is the keynote in Iqbal's approach to the past and the tools of discrimination are the concepts of *عشق* (love) and *فقر* (chosen poverty)—and these tools of discrimination are also means of poetic idealisation. We can now see how the deep meditative process can lead to the concentration and ideal freedom of verses like the following:

تو ابھی رہگزر میں ہے قید مقام سے گذر
مصر و حجاز سے گذر ' پارس و شام سے گذر

Thou art a wayfarer yet; get free from the limitations of space:
Get free from (the bounds of) Egypt and Hejaz, Persia and Syria.

امین راز ہے مردانِ حُر کی درویشی
کہ جبریل سے ہے انکی نسبتِ خویشی

The chosen poverty of the men of true freedom bears a secret:
(It is because) they happen to be the intimates of Jibreel.

عقل عیار ہے سو بھیس بدل لیتی ہے
عشق بے چارہ نہ ملا ہے نہ زاهد نہ حکیم

Reason is clever, and can assume hundreds of guises;
Poor love is neither a priest nor an ascetic; nor is he a sage.

These verses, as almost all the *ghazals* in *Baal-e-Jibreel* and *Zabur-e-Ajam*, bear the stamp of Iqbal's peculiar ideological slant, but this is perhaps as it should be, since it indicates only an approximation to, or a retrieval of, the norms of the traditional poetics. Moreover, is it not a fact that most of the traditional symbolic patterns and gestalts, objects, characters and situations, in the poetry of *ghazal* and elsewhere, have their roots in a distinct intellectual ethos, bear the marks of a particular approach to life and experience? Familiarity, perhaps, has blunted the edge of peculiarity.

In Iqbal, there is constant growth, and not discontinuity. That the process of growth towards concentration, ideality and transmutation of experience into symbolic modes is part of the substance of the imaginative transcendence achieved in an older tradition of poetry also goes only to show that the developments in that tradition, as also in Iqbal, reflect the movement of all poetry towards the goal of imaginative freedom.

S. Wiqar Husain

KHIZR-E-RAH : AN ANALYSIS

All the components of the scene with which the poem begins (though apparently in it, the poet is outside the scene) seem to be in perfect harmony and emphasize a state of complete peace in the world of nature. From the third line on, images of tranquillity follow in quick succession: the night is enhancing the calm all around, the air is gentle (here Iqbal has used the adjective *آسودہ* which means 'satisfied'), the river is flowing softly. Indeed the movement of the river is so imperceptible that the poet wonders if it is a river or a mere picture of it. The restless wave *موج مضطرب* which causes movement in the waters, is asleep somewhere in the depths of the river like an infant sleeping in its cradle. The birds are confined to their nests, and the dimmed stars appear to be under the magic spell of the moon. The only discordant note in this symphony of nature is struck by man, a hint of which we get right in the first line of the poem. The poet (=man= consciousness), as he contemplates the scene on the riverbank, is hiding a world of agitation *اضطراب* *جہان* in a corner of his heart. He does not at once elaborate the cause of his restlessness though the same feeling is again expressed in the last four lines of the stanza. The globe-trotting Khizr, who makes a dramatic appearance on the scene, calls the poet *جو پائے اسرار ازل* or one who is after the fundamental secrets (of creation). The reference to the tumult of the day of Judgment and the striking phrase *شہید جستجو* (martyr of the search), as the poet uses it for himself in the concluding couplet, bring to a sort of climax the agitation raging through the poet's inner being, At this

stage, we do not know the exact nature of this agitation, but we certainly get a clue to its cause even in the first stanza as Khizr remarks that the destiny of the world stands unveiled to the eye of the heart or 'the inward eye' (in Wordsworth's phrase): چشم دل وا ہو تو ہے تقدیر عالم بے حجاب which indirectly suggests that the poet is agonized because he does not have the right point of view, or he is beguiled by appearances. That the root cause of the agitation plaguing the poet, is his ignorance is further confirmed in the ninth stanza when Khizr says: مضطرب ہے تو کہ تیرا دل نہیں دانائے راز (you are agitated because your heart is not aware of the secret).

Placed in this context, the scene on the riverbank appears in a new light. Despite its tranquillity the scene is uninformed, hence imperfect, even illusory. Though a moonlit one, it is a night. Here the words افسوں and طلسم in lines 7 and 8 respectively of the first stanza assume a special significance, for they evoke associations of mystification and magic. The mystique of the night (=ignorance) is broken with the advent of Khizr, and there is a clear indication of dispelling darkness in the simile which equates with dawn the ever-reviving element of youth in the old age of Khizr.

Even now we are confronted with the same question: what is the ultimate significance of the scene with which the poem begins? One is at times tempted to dismiss it as just a conventional romantic setting for the revelation that follows. This stance would have had some justification but for the subsequent references to the river in the context of life and time. As we shall see later the poem abounds in water images. So the river, which is flowing and yet not flowing: تھی نظر حیران کہ یہ دریا ہے یا تصویر آب (the eye was puzzled if it was a river or painted water) symbolically offers the poet a timeless moment within time or at least an illusion of it. This is important, for the theme of the poem is contemplation

of time in general and of the present time in particular, and perhaps a meaningful contemplation of time is possible only in moments when it seems to have a stop. The fact that time can find its meaning only with reference to eternity has been brought home by the introduction of Khizr into the scene. Khizr is an emissary of the world of eternity who moves through the world of time to guide those who have lost their way.

The choice of the Khizr-myth has its reasons. Besides being of Quranic origin, the myth has a popular folk-base, and is firmly entrenched in the minds of the readers of Urdu and Persian poetry. Khizr has been alluded to in the literature of these languages in a variety of ways. Some of the allusions are even ironical. Iqbal himself has referred to Khizr in a number of poems. A few of these references are merely casual, and one of them is certainly not complimentary (what the lover got in the bitter dregs of death, Khizr could not get in the wine of his long life: 'Shafakhana-e-Hajaz' in *Baang-e-Dara*). Yet there is a striking similarity between many of these Khizr-allusions and the one in *Khizr-e-Rah*. For a comparison here are a few revelations made to the poet by Khizr in the Urdu poems of Iqbal:

1. Struggle is the very life of things ('Koshish-e-Natamam', *Baang-e-Dara*).
2. This and the other world, time and eternity are essentially one (a quatrain in *Bal-e-Jibreel* beginning with the line: وہی اصل مکان و لامکان ہے)
3. While the non-believer is lost in the universe, the universe is lost in the believer ('Kafir-o-Momin': *Zarb-e-Kaleem*).
4. Conquest of the material world سیکندری and indifference to it قلمداری are all ways of magic, hence unreal ('Mullazada Zaigham Lolabi Kashmiri Ka Biyaz: 15', *Armughan-e-Hejaz*).

Another factor which in a way links the above poems with

Khizr-e-Rah is that in two of these the omniscient spirit speaks to the poet on the riverbank. This undoubtedly corresponds to the Quranic setting for Moses' meeting with 'Khizr' (the name Khizr has not been mentioned in the Quran). It may be interesting to argue if the mythical persona of Khizr is not simply a facade for the better informed self of the poet. Since the revelation in *Khizr-e-Rah* (as also in some other poems of Iqbal) is symbolic, the argument appears tenable. Yet the fact should not be ignored that Iqbal has set up the mythical figure of Khizr ('apocalyptic' in the terminology of Northrop Frye) in a known and shared context which has its origins in the Quran.³ This accounts for the three Quranic allusions in the second stanza.

Before coming to these allusions, note should also be taken of the river metaphor in the opening lines of stanza 2. The poet, as he addresses Khizr and draws attention to the latter's power of foreknowledge, metaphorically equates the river with time. This supports our earlier contention that the river in the first stanza is symbolic. The three Quranic allusions not only emphasize Khizr's power to see things before they actually materialize, but his ability to see into the heart of reality. They also stress the paradoxical nature of reality which Moses failed to see. In this light the poet in the poem is identified with Moses. Though Khizr is all the time on the move, his movement is not time-bound: *زندگی تیری ہے بے روز و شب و فردا و دوش* (in your life there is no day or night, tomorrow or yesterday). So Khizr represents foreknowledge, insight, endless movement and freedom from time within time. That is to say only they are alive who know and who can act according to their knowledge. This concept is in conformity with Iqbal's outlook on life which is essentially Islamic. The outlook (irrespective of one's agreement with it or otherwise) will have to be borne in mind if one is to appreciate the significance of the questions the poet puts to Khizr, as indeed of much else in

the poem. These questions may appear trivial and disjointed, even unworthy of the elaborate background prepared for them. To avert this sense of anticlimax, they should be viewed in their proper perspective. The poet's assortment of queries would have lacked point and mutual relevance but for the fact that Islam does not dismiss man's temporal life as insignificant or unreal. There are two more allusions in the stanza which deserve some attention. While the one to Sikandar is ironical and focuses on a valueless biological existence, the other to Abraham suggests an alternative mode of being radically different from the first. What is implied here is man's freedom to choose between the two. The archetypal 'test-situation'³ contained in the second allusion, in a way, anticipates Khizr's answers and sets off reverberations that haunt the reader throughout the poem.

'Jawab-e-Khizr' or Khizr's Answer, as it begins with the third stanza and continues till the end of the poem, comes along the expected lines. *Khizr-e-Rah* is not a dramatic poem, not even in the limited sense in which 'Jibreel aur Iblees' is one. If the poet's questions are studied, so are Khizr's answers which at best state certain cherished beliefs of the poet with the force of a prophecy. Hence the possibilities of any dramatic exploration of thought and feeling are greatly reduced. What really sustains our interest in the poem is the fact that it contains two lines as vastly different as:

ریت کے تھیلے پہ وہ آہو کا بے پروا خیرام

That carefree movement of the deer on a hillock of sand . . .

and

ایک ہوں مسلم حرم کی پاسبانی کیلئے

Let Muslims unite for the protection of the holy K'aba . . .

Obviously, lines like the first will receive greater critical attention, though not by the total exclusion of whatever is bracketed with the second. The two modes of expression, as sampled above, are interfused and it is not always possible

to separate them without causing damage to the unity of the poem.

Originally 'Khizr's Answer' had no divisions. Later Iqbal grouped it under five sub-titles: *صحرای نوردی* (Wandering through Desert), *زندگی* (Life), *سلطنت* (Empire), *سرمایہ اور محنت* (Capital and Labour), and *دنیاۓ اسلام* (The World of Islam). Khizr has answered the poet's questions in the same order in which they were put. However, for our critical purposes we may slightly alter the order and catalogue the answers in the following way: Stanzas 3, 4, and 5 give the image of an idealized life which ultimately transcends time; closely corresponding to this is the image of the promised future as it emerges from stanzas 8, 10 and 11, and in between the two is sandwiched the image of a degenerate and fallen world, i. e. the present time. Hence 'Khizr's Answer' concretizes three modes of existence or three world-orders namely: the ideal, the fallen, and the promised (here the word 'fallen' is of course, shorn of its strictly Christian connotations).

First the ideal order. The journey-metaphor (life is movement) in stanza 3 combined with the Kohkan allusion in stanza 4 forms the nucleus of Khizr's conception of life as it ought to be. The landscape in the third stanza is symbolic and reminds one of the scene on the riverbank. The comparison only heightens the ironic aspect of the former. The details of the landscape, at once, evoke associations of an Arabian desert and a journey through it obviously means living a life based on Islamic ideals. But it is not as simple as that. The elaborate metaphor, which begins with line 3 and continues in its different aspects till the end of the third stanza, has a central place in the structure of the poem, for it unifies a number of images into an organic whole and serves as a magnetic field for attracting many more. The metaphor juxtaposes, at its start, two antithetical modes of human life: one is static and stagnant (suggested by phrases like *رہین خانہ* or 'home-bound' and

زنجیری کشت و نخل (or 'earth-bound'—the phrase literally means chained to crop and trees); the other with its nomadic overtones is dynamic and self-reviving. The first suggestion of the spacious world that the choice of the latter mode offers comes to us through an auditory image as we hear the echoing sounds of a caravan's setting out fill the vastness of the desert. Then an extraordinarily evocative visual image projecting the carefree movement of a deer on a hillock of sand dramatically captures the spirit of the journey and pinpoints its nature. That the journey is ceaseless has been stressed by the introduction of the luminous images of the morning star and the setting sun representing the cyclical movement of the heavenly bodies. The exceptionally fresh simile that equates the morning star with the forehead of the angel Gabriel provides the first of the three suggestions of a divine order or higher reality. The other two follow in quick succession as reference is made to the Quranic paradox of Abraham's becoming enlightened by watching the sun set, and then to the gathering of the blessed at Salsabeel (a canal in Paradise). Within the space of two lines the here and the hereafter have been linked up with a dramatic swiftness as the simile shifts the scene from a desert-spring to a stream in heaven. The keynote of Khizr's vision of ideal life is its negation of dualities.

The paradox in the second line of stanza 4 seems to demolish at one stroke the duality of life and death. The assertion in the succeeding lines that life cannot be measured in terms of time acquires its meaning with reference to this paradox. The lines also re-echo the symbolically suggested view of life as movement in the previous stanza. Besides focusing on this view the stanza further develops the image of the ideal life by introducing the concepts that life is an ever-continuing struggle and a perpetual test for man who is the creator of his own destiny. Hence there is no end to the possibilities of life. Of course this is too bland and crude a paraphrase of what has been said with great artistic

skill involving subtle variations of tone, inflexion and rhythm which can hardly be discussed here. However, before going over to the metaphors and images of stanza 4, a word about the choice of the word زندگی (life) as its ردیف or rhyming constant. Besides reiterating the theme of the stanza, the word زندگی as it occurs at the end of each pair of lines except the last, has a resonance of its own. Unlike the others, this stanza begins with a rhyming couplet and reads like a 'continuous *ghazal*' (couplets of which have a unity of mood, atmosphere or thought). This probably accounts for the immense popularity of these lines. In fact the poem is chiefly remembered for this stanza.

As said earlier, the water images in the poem are quite pronounced. Hardly have we forgotten the picture of the weary travellers pitching camp by a spring when we notice the recurrence of the river/sea metaphor in its different forms. First we get a hint of it in جوئے شیر (literally, milk-canal) which is part of the actual as well as symbolic scene characterizing Farhad's life: جوئے شیر و تیشہ و سذگ کراں ہے زندگی (life is the milk-canal, the mattock and the heavy rock). It is interesting how Iqbal has idealized the irony inherent in Kohkan's situation. Ghalib was acutely conscious of this irony. So was Iqbal at times. However, Kohkan emerges here as a wholly positive figure and responds to the view of life presented in the first line of the stanza: برتر از اندیشہ سود و زیباں ہے زندگی (life is above the considerations of profit and loss). The river metaphor recurs in the contrast of brook (life of slavery) and boundless sea (life of freedom). Again the simile in lines 13-14 projects man as a bubble in the sea of existence.

Apart from these there are other metaphors too which deserve attention: the material world has been viewed as زیباں خانہ or house of decay; the ignorant or the uninitiated man is a heap of clay and the 'mature' one a sword against which no one can stand. It is to be noted how the elements

earth and water in this and fire in the next stanza, as elsewhere too, have contributed to shaping the figures of speech. While the water images tend to stress the continuity of life those of earth and fire are associated with the unrealized and realized selves respectively.

There is a concentration of light and fire images in the fifth stanza. Understandably so, for the theme is the realization of man's potential self. The concluding couplet is obviously a throw back on the allusion to Abraham's Fire Test with which the poet had ended his queries. The burning of the borrowed earth and sky and raising a new world out of the ashes, taken metaphorically, refer to the disgusting phenomenon of modern life, disparagingly hinted at in the earlier phrases *زنجیری کشت و نخل* and *دھین خانہ*. Another fire metaphor brings to the fore the possible symbolic conversion of mortal life into immortal one with its paradox of the spark producing the everlasting fire. The simile and the allusive metaphor in lines 7-8 about the regeneration of the East have both a suggestion of fiery brightness in the references to the sun and the rubies of Badakhshan. In contrast to the dazzling light of the sun and the rubies is the dim and soft light of the stars with its mystical overtones as Khizr touches upon the theme of cosmic sympathy through prayer and meditation.

From the sunlit universe of the first three stanzas of 'Khizr's Answer', we now descend into a wintry world⁴ of make believe and deception. The Quranic dictum in the first line of stanza 6 sets the foreboding tone of what follows. Although the image in this section of the poem is that of the contemporary world (pre- and post World War I, to be precise), it has been placed in the continuity of time by employing a rich allusive framework. If Abraham and Farhad embody the spirit of the ideal world of the previous stanzas, the patron figures of this world are Samri and Hasan Bin Sabah (*ساحر الموط*): one created a false god (the Golden Calf); the other a false paradise. Even love

(Mahmood and Ayaz) appears in an ironic light in the background of the loss of freedom. Words and phrases suggesting sleep, intoxication, magic and illusion recur in a number of metaphorical contexts. As compared to those of the earlier stanzas the metaphors are simple; the parliamentary democracy of the West is an old musical instrument throwing up only the imperial notes; the legislatures and political reforms resemble the sweet-tasting occidental medicine that drugs the patient; the Western civilization is a heady wine the heat of which melts the container. Two traditional symbols قفس (cage) and آشیان (nest) have also been used. The images emphasize the ugliness, trickery and disintegration of the fallen world as we watch the demon of oppression dancing in the guise of democracy, the capitalist outwitting the labourer on the chessboard, and the Western thought cutting through the unity of the Muslim world as a pair of scissors would reduce to shreds a piece of goldleaf. But this dark world is not entirely without hope. That the illusions created by emperors, politicians and capitalists are not going to last has been indicated through the figure of Moses exposing the reality of the Golden Calf as early as lines 5-6 of stanza 6. At the end of stanza 7, one clearly hears the rumblings of the Russian Revolution, and the quotation from Rumi, which concludes the ninth stanza, ensures the regeneration of the Muslim countries.

If signs of redemption and revival are dotted all over the picture of the world without grace, the ominous hints of the discarded order do not altogether disappear in stanzas 8, 10 and 11. That this order is on the way out is obvious from the exclamatory *و دینف* of the eighth stanza: *کب تک* or 'how long.' The fusion of the positive and negative images in this stanza is worth considering, for it serves as a bridge between the abstract world of ideals and the concrete world of reality. The fusion works through the antitheses of the river and the dew, the song of the

awakening of the proletariat and the sleep-inducing stories of the emperors of yore, the birth of the sun and the disappearance of the stars, and man's emancipation from destiny following the loss of Paradise. The central image of the promised revival is that of sunrise which in terms of the historical context that perhaps Iqbal had in mind, corresponds to the Russian Revolution. The fact of the possibility of the sun being surrounded by threatening clouds leads to the clusters of ironic metaphors in stanzas 8 and 10. The gardener trying to heal up the wound of the rose, the ignorant moth going round the candle, and the ant without feathers—all fall under this class of metaphors.

That religion and not any independent political or economic ideology is the base of the promised revival has been made amply clear in the last two stanzas of the poem. The metaphorical allusion to salamander in stanza 11, besides bringing forth another figure of revival like the earlier sunrise, seems to suggest a cyclical view of history, and also re-echoes the following lines of stanza 5:

پھونک ڈالے یہ زمین و آسمان مستعار
اور خاکستر سے آپ اپنا جہاں پیدا کرے

Burn up this borrowed earth and sky,
And raise a world of your own from the ashes.

The river metaphor prophesying the fall of Europe (the same metaphor has also been used in the earlier poem *Shama aur Shair* and the lines in the two poems are strikingly similar) contains the phrase *مضطرب موج* (restless wave) which at once reminds us of one of the opening lines of the poem: *موج* (the restless wave was asleep somewhere in the depths). Here the restless wave assumes sinister proportions and signifies the force of evil inherent in action without faith. This makes one recall Iqbal's prophecy of Europe's becoming a wasteland in a ghazal of 1907: *تمہاری تہذیب اپنے خنجر سے آپ* (your civilization will commit suicide with its own dagger), and also Ghalib's line:

میری تعمیر میں مضمحل ہے اک صورت خرابی کی

There is hidden a possibility of destruction in my mould.

Despite its sustained anti-deterministic stance the poem ends with an affirmation of destiny:

سامنے تقدیر کے رسوائی تدبیر دیکھو

Look how destiny puts to humiliation man's designs.

This appears to be a contradiction, and a contradiction of this type may or may not be reconcilable in life or philosophy, but such matters are not of primary importance in literary criticism.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- ¹ All quotations are from *Kulliyat-e-Iqbal (Urdu)* Centenary Edition, Indian Reprint, 1976.
- ² Iqbal's letter in *Iqbal Nama*.
- ³ The term 'test-situation' is borrowed from Alfred Adler.
- ⁴ Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton, 1957). The phrase 'wintry world' occurs in the section 'The Mythos of Winter: Irony and Satire'.

Z. A. Usmani

IQBAL'S SAQI NAMA

If any symbol of Persian-Urdu poetry comes near to the figure of Dante's Beatrice it is that of the Saqi—of course with the difference that Beatrice is a Florentine girl who acquires symbolic significance through the experiential dialectics of the *Commedia* whereas the Saqi is a potentially value-charged motif like many other such motifs that go into the composition of Persian-Urdu poetry. 'Beatrice' means: 'blessings-bearer', and this is what the Saqi is supposed to be. For the poet he is the source of inspiration and enlightenment. Iqbal discovers new dimensions of meanings and values in this conventional symbolic motif. His Saqi is divine, and his Wine symbolizes the revelation of ultimate truths.

The convention of the Saqi Nama must have originated in Persian poetry because of the ghazal-poet's need to make a personal, full-length statement of his views or philosophy of life. For this purpose the most appropriate personage he can address himself to is the Saqi. In fact the Saqi Nama is the poet's testament of faith.

In keeping with the *Saqi Nama* convention, Iqbal begins his *Saqi Nama* by talking of the arrival of Spring. The first couplet makes no attempt to rise above a conventional announcement of this arrival. But it sets the tone, which is one of an almost epic-seriousness—the *Saqi Nama* has the same metre as the epic poem *Shahnama* has. The second couplet comes with an undulating gesture of word-music as wave after wave of colour bursts upon our sensibility bringing the climactic realization of 'the eternal martyr, tulip, with its bloody shroud':

گل و نرگس و سوسن و نسترن شہید ازل لاله خونیں کفن

The rose, the narcissus, the lily, the eglantine:
The eternal martyr, tulip, with its bloody shroud.

The 'tulip' (لالہ) resonates with the themes of love, Selfhood (خودی) and death-rebirth which the poem is going to realize and develop. (The 'tulip' has a similar symbolic significance at other places in Iqbal's poetry—compare, for example, 'Lala-e-Sehra' in *Bal-e-Jibril* and 'Naqsh-i-Farang' in *Payam-i-Mashriq*). These themes first come to us—and this is important—as sensations 'felt in the blood and felt along the heart', which are actually intimations of that cosmic principle of Life which pulsates in everything in the universe. It pulsates even in the veins of the stone.

جہاں چھپ گیا پردۂ رنگ میں
لہو کی ہے گردش دم سنگ میں

The world is steeped in colour;
Blood is running about even in the veins of the stone'.

This reminds us of Ghalib's:

دم سنگ سے تپکتا وہ لہو کہ پھر نہ تھمتا
جسے غم سمجھ رہے ہو وہ اگر شرار ہوتا

From the vein of the stone would have gushed out such blood as could never stop:

If that which you take for love's woe had been a spark of fire.

Spring has quickened the sense of life in everything. As for the birds:

فضا نیلی نیلی ہوا میں سرور
تھرتے نہیں اشیاں میں طیور

The cerulean sky, the air charged with joy!
The birds cannot contain themselves in their nests!

The couplet makes a sensuous appeal, while at the same time it intimates to us a Wordsworthian sense of Relationship. Like Ghalib, Iqbal is quite capable of this kind of effect. For example, in *Khizr-e-Rah* he says—again birds come into it:

رات کے افسوں سے طائر آشیانوں میں اسیر
انجم کم ضو گرفتار طلسم ماہتاب

Charmed by the night, the birds are made captive in their nests;
The dim stars are caught in the spell of the moon!

Spring reveals to the poet the very image of Life in the form of the mountain-stream:

وہ جوئے کہستان اچکتی ہوئی
اڑکتی 'لچکتی' سرکتی ہوئی
اچھلتی 'پھسلتی' سلپھلتی ہوئی
بڑے پیچ کھا کر نکلتی ہوئی
رکے جب تو سل چیر دیتی ہے یہ
پہاڑوں کے دل چیر دیتی ہے یہ

The mountain-stream, leaping,
Overcoming obstructions, swaying, crawling,
Bounding, sliding, composing itself;
Rushing forth in spite of many a turn and twist.
If it is stopped it can split the rocks,
The very hearts of the mountains.

Here we have the key-image of the poem. The whole poem is a sensuous form of the values focalized by this image. It is an extension of the experiential patterns perceived in the mountain-stream and an elucidation of the values embodied in them. The philosophical argument of the poem serves only to make these value-embodying experiential patterns more visible. This is what happens in a great philosophical poem which the *Saqi Nama* can lay a fair claim to be.

The mountain-stream symbolizes the values of Life itself (زندگی جوی روان است و روان خوانند بود); it symbolizes the eternal, onrushing movement of Life in and beyond time towards self-realization and transcendence. 'It announces the message of Life', as the poet observes. This announcement inflames the poet with the desire to have the Saqi's Wine which could initiate him into the secrets of Eternity, and

inspire him with a tremendous courage, like the courage of the sparrow fighting an eagle. Thus the poet's Invocation ends with a forceful gesture which enacts a value-pattern of the rock-breaking stream:

اٹھا ساقیا پردہ اس راز سے لڑا دے معمولے کو شہباز سے

Lift the curtain, O Saqi, upon this Secret—

Make the sparrow fight the eagle!

After this the second stanza begins with a change of poetic rhythm (زمانے کے انداز بدلے گئے) by which term I do not mean mere sound pattern. The change is a Functional Digression (گڈریز), as convention would have it. It takes account of the changes taking place in the world of time to emphasize the need for the Fire of Love the Saqi's Wine can kindle. Time has broken the spell of Feudalism, Imperialism and Capitalism—it has been enacting the value-patterns of the rock-breaking stream with regard to political phenomena. The streams of the Himalyas, which symbolize the political resurgence of the East, are boiling (ہمالیہ کے چشمے ابلنے لگے). These are signs of hope for humanity. A new revelation may come. The Moses of our world is waiting for it (تجلی کا پہرہ). But the guardians of Faith are stuck up in Idolatory. Iqbal regards the case of the Muslims as a symptomatic one—and it is for this and not for any sectarian reason that he is concerned about them here. In their case spiritual truth is lost in traditions and dogmas. The Muslim preacher is devoid of لذت شوق (the zest of yearning) for which the other name is the Fire of Love. It is لذت شوق that leads to the realization of the essential reality of things and hence to the transcendence of the world of finitude. But the Muslim is clinging to the images of the world of finitude, which is Idolatory, the worship of بتان عجم. He who was a Seeker is lost in the Stations of the Way (یہ سالک مقامات). This stanza too ends with a forceful gesture:

بجھی عشق کی آگ اذدھیر ہے

مسلمان نہیں راکھ کا ڈھیر ہے

How woeful, the Fire of Life is dead!
It is not a Muslim, but a heap of ashes!

This state is a negation of the dynamism of Life symbolized by the mountain-stream.

With the beginning of the third stanza the poetic rhythm acquires a compulsive drive:

شراب کہن پھر پلا ساقیبا
وہی جام گردش میں لا ساقیبا

Make us drink, O Saqi, the Old Wine again!
Make the same Cup go round again!

This Wine would emancipate Intellect from its bondage. (Iqbal is always concerned about the wretchedness of the Intellect which is isolated from Love). This wine symbolizes holy Love—and this is the justification for the poet's use of the phrases *دل مرتضیٰ* (the heart of Ali, the Approvable) and *سوز صدیق* (the burning of Abu Bakr, the True). He wants this Wine for himself and his fellow-men. Through it he wants desire to be awakened in the hearts (*تمنا کو* *سینوں میں بیدار کر*). Blessed is the state of desire! This feeling finds its symbolic embodiment in the following couplet:

ترے آسمانوں کے تاروں کی خیر
زمینوں کے شب زندہ داروں کی خیر

Blessed are the stars of Thy skies!
Blessed are those who keep awake at night!

The poet wants the young to be blessed with his own love (*عشق*) and insight (*نظر*). He prays for getting out of the Whirlpool of temporal existence and for knowing the secrets of death and life. The poet defines his love and insight in terms of value-charged experiential patterns through phrases like *مرے دیدہ ترکے بے خوابیاں* (the sleeplessnesses of my wet eyes) and *مرے دل کی پوشیدہ بے تابیاں* (the hidden restlessnesses of my heart). It may be observed that these patterns

are the human analogues of the value-life patterns perceived in the mountain-stream. The poet's love and insight, which involve his thoughts and feelings and hopes and desires and Faith (overcoming an army of doubts) are his only wealth, one that keeps him rich in poverty (فقیری). He wants the Saqi to distribute it among his fellow-travellers:

مردے قابو میں لٹا دے اسے لٹا دے ' تھکانے لگا دے اسے

Distribute it among my fellow-travellers!

Distribute it! Dispose it off duly!

Thus, the third stanza ends on a note of ecstatic self-abandonment—another value-life pattern inherent in the rhythm of the mountain-stream!

The fourth stanza begins by modulating this rhythm into the rhythm of the incessant flow of the Stream of Life:

دردم روان ہے ہم زندگی
ہر اک شے سے پیدا دم زندگی

Incessantly flows the Stream of Life;

Everything testifies to its dynamic movement.

It reminds us of Bergson's 'Immense Wave'. But 'in Bergson's view the forward rush of the vital impulse in its creative freedom is unilluminated by the light of an immediate or remote purpose.'¹ According to Iqbal's Quranic view Life has a purpose, but it is not a pre-ordained goal. Otherwise Life would not be moving forward through 'free, responsible moral agents,' and thus it would not be leaving any scope for Individuality, Selfhood or *Khudi*. Life is a free individuating movement which is an actualization of open possibilities in an ever-growing universe. 'Life is eternal, ever-moving, ever-young' (جماوداں ' پیدہم روان ' ہر دم) as Iqbal observes in *Khizr-e-Rah*, implying the same 'stream' image. Life is a unity (وحدت), but it assumes multiplicity (کثرت) for the sake of Individuation or Self-realization. Life itself has carved out the Idol House of time and space which Iqbal calls بت خانہ شش چہات .

Every atom of Life is a unique energy-centre that defies Nietzsche's theory of Eternal Recurrence.

پسند اس کو تکرار کی خو نہیں
 کہ تو میں نہیں اور میں تو نہیں
 من و تو سے ہے انتہا آفریں
 مگر عین محتفل میں خلوت نشیں

Life does not like the habit of repetition—
 For thou art not me and I am not thee.

With 'I' and 'Thou' Life makes up the cosmic society;
 But keeps its own Solitude in the midst of Assembly.

Philosophical ideas become experiential patterns because of the emotional pressure they are subjected to. Iqbal can state them even with a colloquial simplicity:

چمک اس کی بجلی میں تارے میں ہے
 یہ چاندی میں سونے میں پارے میں ہے

Its shine is in the lightning, in the star;
 It is in silver, in gold, in mercury.

Life is the Active Principle in everything: even in the eagle with its bloody claws, and in the pigeon struggling in the snare, away from its nest.

کہیں جڑہ شاہین سیماب رنگ
 لہو سے چکوروں کے آلودہ چنگ
 کبوتر کہیں اشیانے سے دور
 پھرتا ہوا جمال میں ناصبور

Towards the end of the fourth stanza, these vivid images reveal a rhythm of violent assertiveness in the Life-stream.

After this the poem pitches itself in a low key, as the theme becomes more abstruse, and the tone becomes more didactic. The fifth stanza tells us about the dynamic and the regenerative qualities of Life. Fixity is an illusion; every atom of the universe is in perpetual motion. The 'Caravan of Being' or کاروان وجود never stays; its glory is new at every moment:

تہہ پرتما نہیں کاروان وجود
کہ ہر لحظہ ہے تازہ شان وجود

Life is only the zest for flight, for moving forward; its reality is a perpetual journeying. On the philosophic plane the poet is consistently reinforcing the value-patterns he has perceived in the mountain-stream. He observes that Life takes pleasure in dealing with obstructions and overcoming them, and that it feels at home in strife and struggle:

الجبہ کر سہل جہنمے میں لذت اسے
تہ پرتما پھرتے میں راحت اسے

It has found out a way of dealing with Death and conquering it. After descending into this world Life waited in ambush to seize upon Death. For this purpose it divided itself into multiplicity through procreation and thus acquired the capacity of constant renewal. This is the vision Iqbal sees:

مذاق دوئی سے بنی زوج زوج
انہی دشت و کہسار سے فوج فوج
کل اس شاخ سے توڑتے بھی دھے
اسی شاخ سے پھوٹتے بھی دھے

With a taste of differentiation Life divided itself into pairs;
It rose as an army from plains and hills.

From this Branch flowers kept on falling;
But from this same Branch new flowers kept on blooming!

Life is a continuous flow in Pure Duration. From the Timeless Beginning (ازل) to the Timeless End (ابد) Life is the movement of one breath; and Time itself being a continuous flow of events is nothing but a turning over of breaths. This stanza concludes by establishing the reality of both Life and Time as change without succession.

The sixth stanza works out the implications of this idea for the human ego. What is the wave-movement of breath? A Sword. What is Egohood, Selfhood or خودی? The edge of this Sword—by which Life conquers the world of seriality and extensity. The ego is finite yet potentially boundless—

سمندر ہے اک بوند پانی میں بند

The ocean is enclosed in a drop of water.

The ego manifests itself through 'I' and 'Thou' and yet it transcends them. A Timeless Beginning is behind it and in front of it is a Timeless End; there is no limit behind it and there is no limit in front of it. And yet it realizes itself in time floating, as it were, in the stream of time and bearing the onslaught of its waves. It involves a perpetual seeking, a perpetual striving and a perpetual formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value. It conquers all obstructions—like the rock-breaking mountain-stream.

سپک اس کے ہاتھوں میں سنگ گراں
پہاڑ اس کی ضربوں سے ریگِ رواں

In its hands the heavy stone is light;
By its blows the mountain turns into mobile sand.

This reminds us of:

رکے جب تو سل چیر دیتی ہے یہ
پہاڑوں کے دل چیر دیتی ہے یہ

The beginning and end of the ego is a perpetual journeying. The ego is moon-beam in the moon; it is the spark of fire in the stone—which reminds us of لہو کی ہے گردشِ رنگِ سنگ—it is the colourless essence of all colours:

کرن چاند میں ہے شررِ سنگ میں
یہ بے رنگ ہے قوبِ کرِ رنگ میں

It had been striving since the Timeless Beginning of the universe until it manifested itself in man:

ازل سے یہ ہے کشمکش میں اسیر
ھوئی خاکِ آدم میں صورتِ پذیر

Iqbal's Quranic concept of the ego and its immortality is one of biological-spiritual evolution. 'Every atom of Divine Energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. But there are degrees in the expression of egohood. Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of

egohood until it reaches its perfection in man' (*Lectures*, p. 99). For this concept Iqbal finds support from Rumi. He quotes the following lines of Rumi in his *Lectures* (p. 168):

First man appeared in the class of inorganic things,
 Next he passed therefrom into that of plants,
 For years he lived as one of the plants,
 Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different;
 And when he passed from the vegetative to the animal state,
 He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,
 Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants,
 Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;
 Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,
 Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast.
 Again the great Creator, as you know,
 Drew man out of the animal into the human state,
 Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,
 Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now,
 Of his first souls he has now no remembrance,
 And he will be again changed from his present soul.

The ego lives in the human heart just as the sky is reflected in the pupil of the eye:

خودی کا نشیمن ترے دل میں ہے
 فلک جس طرح آنکھ کے تل میں ہے

The finite ego is related in intensity to the Infinite Ego. The poem is dealing, as Iqbal's mature poetry often does, with the basic existential tension between finitude and infinitude and its resolution through self-realization. The Still Point at which finitude and infinitude intersect each other is 'hidden' in the heart of every finite thing, as an intensive, and not as an extensive, possibility. In T.S. Eliot even Coriolan can have glimpses of it:

O hidden under the dove's wing, hidden in the turtle's breast,
 Under the palmtree at noon, under the running water
 At the still point of the turning world. O hidden.

The last stanza of *Saqi Nama* begins in a still lower key:

خودی کے نگہبیاں کو ہے زہرِ ناب
وہ نانا جس سے جاتی رہے اسکی آب

For the guardian of Selfhood that bread is poison:
That bread which takes its brightness off!

This reminds us of what Iqbal says in a ghazal of *Bal-e-Jibril*:

اے طائرِ لاہوتی اس ذوق سے موت اچھی
جس ذوق سے آتی ہو پرواز میں کوتاہی

O Heaven-soaring Bird! to have death is better than the Bread
Which shortens thy flight!

Kasb-i-halal (lawful livelihood), *Faqr* (non-materialistic detachment), Courage and Love—which includes the other three—are necessary conditions for the development of Selfhood. The guardian of Selfhood attends to nothing except God. All else is an Idol-House of Eye and Ear (بتخانہ چشم و گوش). This world of colour and sound, eating and drinking is subject to the rule of Death—it is, as Eliot puts it: 'Eating and drinking. Dung and death'. Man must not get stuck up in this world which is only the first Halting Stage of the pilgrim-ego.

خودی کی یہ ہے منزلِ اولیں
مسافر یہ تیرا نشیمن نہیں
تیری آگ اس خاکدان سے نہیں
جہاں تنجہ سے ہے تو جہاں سے نہیں

This world is the first Halting Stage of Selfhood—
Traveller, this is not thy abode!

Thy fire is not from this house of dust—
The world is from thee; thou art not from the world!

This stanza which began in a low key warms up now into a lofty utterance; the poetic rhythm again acquires a compulsive drive:

بڑھے جایہ کوہِ گرداں توڑ کر
طلسمِ زمان و مکان توڑ کر

Move on and on, breaking this big mountain of a world,
Breaking the spell of time and space!

This makes an inciting gesture towards living the value-life of the rock-breaking stream.

Man's ever-growing Selfhood conquers the world of space and time, breaks its spell of finitude, and with its perpetual regenerative movement creates a new world out of it at every moment. It implies the realization of the infinite possibilities of the Self and the not-Self in an ever-growing universe which has an intensive organic relation to the Infinite Self. Owing to this relation the universe is always liable to increase and is potentially boundless: 'God adds to His creation what He wills' (Quran). Creation is not once and for all: it is a ceaseless process (کہ آرہی ہے) (دمادم صدائے کن فیکون) There is 'no final external limit' to the growth of the universe. 'Its only limit is internal, i.e. the immanent self which animates and sustains the whole. As the Quran says: "And verily unto thy Lord is the limit" (53: 14).'² Newer and newer worlds perpetually subsist in the 'Not-yet' of God:

جہاں اور بھی ہیں ابھی بے نمود
کہ خالی نہیں ہے ضمیر وجود

There are other worlds unmanifested:
The womb of existence is not yet void!

ضمیر وجود for which 'the womb of existence' is a poor translation is one of those Iqbalian coinages which have enriched our language. Like God man must be Creative (خالق), Passionately Yearning (مشتاق) and World-conquering (گدیزندۂ آفاق), as Iqbal puts it in the *Javid Nameh*.

ہر اک منتظر تیری یلغار کا
تیری شوخی فکر و کردار کا

Every one of these worlds is waiting for thy conquering onrush,
For the free play of thy thought and action.

The word یلغار (conquering onrush) sums up the 'Message'

announced by the rock-breaking stream. Man must continually conquer and transform the world of good and evil.

یہ ہے مقصد گردش روزگار
 کہ تیری خودی تجھ پہ ہو آشکار
 تو ہے فاتح عالم خوب وزشت
 تجھے کیا بتائیں تیری سرنوشت

The object of the passage of time is:

To reveal to thee the possibilities of thy Selfhood.

Thou art the conquerer of the world of good and evil—

What should I tell thee of thy Destiny?

For Iqbal Destiny is not something pre-ordained but what man, the finite ego, continually creates, as a co-worker with God, through his free will (عزم او خلاق تقدیر بحق است) to transcend the world of Causality and Fate, the world of finitude itself. It has been pointed out³ that like Wordsworth Iqbal reminds us that:

Our destiny, our nature, and our home
 Is with Infinitude, and only there.

Yes, only there is the destiny of the incessantly onrushing, finitude-breaking stream of our ego-life:

With hope it is, hope that can never die,
 Effort, and expectation, and desire,
 And something evermore about to be.

REFERENCES

¹ Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore, 1930), p. 71.

² *Lectures*, op. cit., p. 77.

³ Asloob Ahmad Ansari, *Iqbal Ki Terah Nazmen* (New Delhi, 1977), p. 143.

Asloob Ahmad Ansari

LALA-E-SEHRA : AN EXPLICATION

Iqbal's insistent concern with the theme of loneliness or 'estrangement' is brought out from the beginning and in varying contexts of his poetry. This betrays not only the sense of his own uniqueness as a poet and of the prophetic burden of his intuitions about life but also of the fact of impercipient of those to whom this poetry was primarily directed. This is peculiar not only to Iqbal but to all those who are given to brooding over their felt experience and are introspective by temperament. The theme of solitariness is also in many instances the necessary conditioning factor for the blossoming forth of the creative potential. The creative writer, initially engaged in the act of externalization of his insights, also wishes of necessity to have a responsive audience, the absence of whom brings him chagrin and frustration. It is also true that the pressure of the creative impulse finds a fruitful soil in the detachment that is forced upon him by the external circumstances. This kind of ambivalence of the poetic strategy is given an eloquent and poignant expression by Iqbal as early as 1915 when in the concluding section of *اسرارِ خودی (Secrets of the Self)* he speaks thus:

در جهان یارب ندیم من کتجاست
نخل سینمایم ' کلیم من کتجاست ...
موج در بحر است هم پہلوئے موج
ہست با ہمدم تپیدن خوئے موج
بر فلک کوکب ندیم کوکب است
ماہ تابان سر بزانوئے شب است ...

من مثال لاله صحرا ستم
 در میان صحنے تہا ستم
 خو اہم از لطف تو ہمارے ہمدے
 از رموز فطرت من صحرے ...
 تابجان او سپارم جوئے خویش
 باز بیڈم در دل او روئے خویش
 سازم از مشیت گل خود پیکرش
 ہم صدم او را شوم ہم آذرش

Where, O God is a companion for me in this world?
 I am the Tree on Mount Sinai, where is my Moses?
 In the sea, waves are in the company of other waves;
 To be in commotion together is the waves' nature.
 In the sky, stars have each other's companionship;
 The moon rests in the lap of the night.

I am like the tulip of the desert—
 Lonely in the midst of company.

I ask Thee for a companion—
 One who knows the secrets of my nature,
 So that I may surrender my stream into his life,
 So that I may look at my visage in his heart;

(So that) I may shape his form out of a handful of my clay;
 (So that) I may be for him the idol as well as the idol-maker.

These couplets reflect an intense longing on his part to share the privacy of his ideals and intuitions with a kindred soul and to establish the kind of communication that helps forge the bonds of love. The search for کلیم (Moses), the specification of his own self as لاله صحرا (tulip of the desert) and the impulse to create an alter ego—all these are inherent to the interior journey of the soul. The alter ego is both the product of his own artifice and the object of his ardent adoration. Iqbal's is the soul of a contemplative that is bruised by the strains and compulsions of the workaday world and is all the time hankering after a dialogue of his insulated self with some one who may relieve him of the

load of his subjective experiences. Later in *Payam-i-Mashriq* (1923) he reiterates this intense longing thus:

ہموز ہم نفسے در چمن نمی بینم
 بہار می رسد و من گل نخستینم
 بہ آبجو نگرم خویش را نظارہ کنم
 باین بہانہ مگر روئے دیگرے بینم

I have not as yet found a companion in the Garden;

The spring has come, and I am the first flower;

I am looking into the water of the stream to see my visage in it—

But this is only a pretext for discovering the Other's face.

Out of sheer desperation he is moved to creating a mirror-state for himself that might help him build up the delusion of an existent other than his own self. The image of the 'mirror' latent here one frequently comes across in different places in *Bang-e-Dara* (1924), and its potency derives from the fact that it enables the poet to focus on the duplication of his basic self and seek some sort of comfort from it. This is also in consonance with the romantic predilections of Iqbal, for it highlights the wish to dissolve the agony of the isolated self into wider and more comprehensive commitments. It may also be equated with the death of the primitive psyche as a prelude to entering the threshold of a reincarnated existence.

Another facet of this desire for communion is brought out in a remarkable little poem, entitled *تذہبائی* in *Payam-i-Mashriq*. This poem, a triumph of taut organization and superb artistic control, may at once be designated as the enactment of a ritual. Its theme is the acute sense of alienation that one experiences in the midst of the cosmos in which one happens to be placed. The various manifestations of the phenomenal world are raised here to the status of characters performing their different roles in a bizarre shadowplay in which lights have been turned off. The self is apparently in contact with the Protean shapes that constitute the *Dasein* and yet they are, as if by tacit agree-

ment and with a sinister design, pitilessly and disdainfully indifferent to what troubles man in his bounded existence. The ominous, weird silence that enwraps those actors turns the whole action into a cruel and sordid joke that is being indulged in at the expense of man. Some sort of apathy or metaphysical malevolence seems to be one over-powering impression of the poem as a whole. It is a big interrogation mark that confronts the reader while going through the poem from beginning to end. He is benumbed into utter silence that is at once painful and intriguing. It appears that gradually the sea, the mountain and the moon have ceased to be discrete entities humiliating man by just ignoring him; they have, in fact, become transparent media of the same alienation from which the speaker in the poem is suffering. The Deity, however, approached only towards the end, is no better than the Jehovah of William Blake's construction—the hidden, faceless Divine whose smile freezes the bones of the speaker within him and who gives the lie to the passionate, quivering, anxious being of man. And the protagonist is thrown back, as if with a recoil, to his own dark broodings and his own fragmented psyche. The symbolic action of the poem is an activity of negation, and the poem does not seem to open the way to any kind of resolution but plunges the reader into an emotional impasse.

By the time the poem لاله صحرای included in *Bal-e-Jibril* (1936), was composed, Iqbal had traversed further afield in his spiritual quest. He had obviously moved away from his concern with his own heterogeneity in regard to the whole of nature to primordial estrangement from Existenz itself. The very opening lines of the poem:

یہ گنبد مہینمائی ، یہ عالم تنہمائی
 مسجد کو تو دراتی ہے اس دشت کی پہمائی

This azure Dome, this loneliness!
 I dread the vast expanses of this desert!

excite the feeling of dread—the bedrock of all our feelings—

and of puzzlement, not unlike what Pascal had experienced in the face of the pure phenomena. The over-hanging canopy of the sky and the circumambient physical landscape become images of the entire space-time continuum. Dread is the phenomenon of a special status, and it grips the soul here as much as it does in Andrew Marvell's poem, *To his Coy Mistress*, where in the midst of an erotic poem of high tension Time and Eternity are suddenly juxtaposed thus:

But at my back I alwaeis hear
Times winged chariot hurrying near!
And yonder all before us ley
Desarts of vast Eternity

The two crucial phrases *اس دشت کی پہنائی* and 'Desarts of vast Eternity' in Iqbal's and Marvell's poems, respectively, take us out of the context of life and land us into Nothingness with which the motif of dread is closely linked up. The sense of dereliction, highlighted with such conspicuous suggestive power in the poem 'تذہائی' is somewhat identical with what Wordsworth (to whom Iqbal was so deeply indebted according to his own confession) also experienced when he was thrown into a state of visionary 'dreariness' in the midst of the elemental powers of the universe. 'Lala-e-Sehra' has the status both of a physical object and of a symbolic form in the poem: as an object qua object it offers the distillation of passion, and it is also symbolic of the finite self which is a strayed wayfarer groping his way within the confines of time and space back to its point of origination: 'that sweet sweet golden clime where the traveller's journey is done', according to Blake's visualization of the track of experience:

بہتکا ہوا راہی میں ' بہتکا ہوا راہی تو
منزل ہے کہاں تیری اے لالہ صحرائی

A strayed wayfarer am I; a strayed wayfarer art thou!
O where is thy destination—thou wild tulip of the desert?

The second half of the couplet is in the nature of an obsti-

nate query, both irritating and persistent, and contains its own answer within the context of the poem. Dread, it may be added, is oriented towards the future and discloses our concern with the world as a totality. The phrase *بہتکا ہوا راہی* evokes the sense of being separated from 'the wholly Other' in relation to whom we live in a state of ceaseless tension. It is the preoccupation with pure 'isness' and even more strongly with transcendence that is brought out in the poem in its cryptic, undulating, dialectical movement. The finite self, of which *لالہ* (the tulip) is a symbolic correlate, evokes the sensation of homelessness, that is, of living and breathing in a world environed by alien powers. This does not elicit any gesture of responsiveness, neither 'antipathetic sympathy nor sympathetic antipathy'—as Kierkegaard, the main exponent of the concept of dread, would put it.

خالی ہے کلیموں سے یہ کوہ و کمر ورنہ
تو شعاع سینائی ، میں شعاع سینائی

These mountains and rocks are without Moses, otherwise
The Sinai Flame art thou, the Sinai Flame am I.

This seems to reverberate, as an underground swell, the line quoted earlier:

نختل سینایم ، کلیم من کجاست

I am the Tree on Mount Sinai, where is my Moses?

The prospect of a loving embrace, a total absorption into Existenz is held out and conceived only as a possibility but there is hardly any chance for it to materialize. It would be truer to hold that it is the ambiguity of experience, symbolised by the concept of possibility, that is at the back of the poet's mind all along rather than absorption into Existenz as such. The word *کلیم* that literally signifies 'one who speaks' and is mythically associated with Moses, has been the function of one on whom falls the burden of responding to interrogation, and the 'flame of Sinai', directly related with

کلیم is emblematic of the soul that burns with the desire to forge its links with Nothingness. It may as well be added that Being or Existenz, considered in its quintessence, and independently of all forms of determination, is indistinguishable from Nothingness. Also the idea of finitude implies the sense of limitation and it is only dread which by dissolving these finitudes helps the individual to build up his own authentic identity and his relationship with Nothingness. The self is subject to ambivalent drives: the passion for standing out from the undifferentiated mode of existence on the one hand, and the strong, unappeasable instinct for, the irritable reaching after, transcendence on the other:

تو شاخ سے کیوں پہوتا ، میں شاخ سے کیوں ٹوٹتا
 اک جذبہ پیدائی ، اک لذت یکتمائی

Why did thou grow on the branch? Why did I break away from the
 branch?

An urge for manifestation, a zest for uniqueness!

Earlier in *Bang-e-Dara*, in a poem entitled انسان Iqbal had given vent to this craving for manifestation thus:

لذت گیر وجود ہر شے سرمست مئے نمود ہر شے

Every object experiencing the ecstasy of existence;
 Every object made inebriate by the wine of appearance.

And in a number of lyrics in *Bal-e-Jibril* and *Zaboor-i-Ajam* the *motif* for manifestation has been underscored in different contexts, for instance, in these lines:

تو اے اسیر مکان لامکان سے دور نہیں
 یہ جلوہ گاہ ترے خاکدان سے دور نہیں

O prisoner of finitude, thou art not far from Infinitude!
 That place of Manifestation is not remote from thy abode of dust.

In *Lala-e-Sehra* the passion for manifestation (جذبہ پیدائی) and the ecstasy of uniqueness (لذت یکتمائی) are co-present: the latter subsumes the flight of the soul from the 'blood-dimmed tide' of this universe as well as the urge for the attainment of Nothingness.

The basic relationship between the individual existent and Being as the sumtotal of things is that of love and attraction as well as of antipathy and resistance. The sense of alienation may be removed by developing the attitude of love, for it alone is instrumental in the achievement of a genuine identification. The mere object can be changed into a person when it is irradiated by the light of love or when the rigidities of the self are corroded and it comes to be conceived as a malleable organic substance with its inward rhythm. This provides an analogy for the movement of the existent towards all that Being or Existenz connotes:

غواص مصحبت کا الہ نگہبیاں ہو
ہر قطرۂ دریا میں دریا کی ہے گہرائی

May God protect the diver into the river of Lovel
Every drop in the river has the river's depth!

ہر قطرۂ دریا میں دریا کی ہے گہرائی evokes the feeling of giddiness, and in that state we demand the presence of God. The phrase *بہنور کی آنکھ* in the next couplet is more or less equivalent to the whirlpool of existence or the eternal matrix in which everything is enmeshed or engulfed. The hiatus between the human Ego—frequently conceived as *موج* (wave) by Iqbal—on the one hand and Existenz on the other, has to be bridged: the failure to bridge it is evocative of a sort of 'sacred melancholy'. From the vantage point of Existenz the inability to achieve transcendence evokes a disturbing sense of loss and discloses the heart of darkness:

اس موج کے ماتم میں روتی ہے بہنور کی آنکھ
دریا سے اٹھی لیکن ساحل سے نہ تکرانی

The whirlpool's eye sheds tears over the destiny of the wave—
The wave that rises in the river but dashes not against the shore.

The image of the 'sea', emblematic of infinitude or Nothingness, links up this couplet with the preceding one by an inner nexus. Also whereas the earlier couplet reflects a state of wish-fulfilment, the latter is reminiscent of what

Wordsworth distinguishes in the lines: 'Hence in a season of calm weather/Though inland far we be . . .' that is, a state of dryness of soul. In juxtaposition to this the plenitude of life 'derives from what flows into it' from the depths of the human psyche. All other objects, belonging to heaven and earth, including the sun and the stars, are mute, though curious, spectators of the drama of life:

ہے گرمی آدم سے ہذاکامہ عالم گرم
سورج بھی تماشاہائی، تارے بھی تماشاہائی

From man is the warmth and activity in the universe—
The sun is a spectator, and so are the stars.

The same idea is adumbrated in a later poem *روح ارضی* *Bal-e-Jibril* in which the mythical overtones are too apparent to be missed:

ہیں تیرے تصرف میں یہ بادل یہ کہتائیں
یہ گنبد افلاک، یہ خاموش فضاہیں
یہ کوہ یہ صحرا یہ سمندر یہ ہوائیں
تہیں پیش نظر کل تو فرشتوں کی ادائیں
آئینہ ایام میں آج اپنی ادا دیکھ

Under thy subjugation are these clouds,
This dome of the sky, these silent spaces,
These mountains, these deserts these seas, these winds.
Yesterday, thou wast a spectator of the (captivating) gestures of the
angels:
Watch now thy own grace in the mirror of days.

The primordial silence as well as the passion and ecstasy of the soul are likewise aspects of that dread that makes us partake both of the spiritual and the temporal aspects of our self. It also helps us overcome the sense of alienation from the roots of Being:

اے باد بیابانی سچھکو بھی عنایت ہو
خاموشی و دل سوزی سر مستی و رعنائی

O desert breeze, let me also have thy gifts:
Silence and pathos, ecstasy and grace.

With this we seem to return to the opening couplet which evokes the sense of deep anxiety consequent upon the slowing down of the passage of time. *Lala-e-Sehra* is thus symbolic of the passional nature of man and of the intensity of the apprehension of Nothingness. The poem evokes a kind of existential dread that rises in undulations little by little, and it also reflects an anticipatory phenomenon.

Z. A. Usmani

DANTE AND IQBAL AS POETS OF LOVE

Both Dante and Iqbal are poets of love, and not merely love poets, because for them love is 'the cause and end' of all Creation, including artistic creation, of course. They recognize all Creation as a continual free becoming of the Infinite in and through the finite, and, therefore, a continual non-deterministic but purposeful activity in which God chooses to join with man. Love is the principle that makes cosmic potentiality one with actuality: the principle that moves the sun and the stars, as Dante puts it. Hence in *Purgatorio* XVII, Dante makes Virgil declare:

Never, my son, was yet
Creator, no, nor creature, without love,
Natural or rational—and thou knowest it.

And Virgil goes on to explain

how love must be the seed.
In you, not only of each virtuous action,
But also of each punishable deed.

Love creates both Hell and Heaven, as the experience of the *Divina Commedia* makes us realize. The torment of Hell is caused by love constricted into an attitude of exclusiveness, of desiring partial good against the innate desire of the soul for the whole good. The beatitude of Heaven is caused by love emancipated and refined, by a free will, into inclusiveness, into the desire for the whole good. It is for the soul to choose to make for itself Hell or Heaven out of its love, to choose to be damned or saved 'by either fire or fire'. As regards the relation of love to artistic creation this is how Dante introduces himself:

I am one who when Love breathes within
Give ear, and as he prompts take mode and pitch
From him, and go and sing his mind to men.

(Purg. XXIV, 52-54)

Iqbal makes similar statements at so many places. For example:

عشق سے پیدا نوائے زندگی میں زیروہم

عشق سے مٹی کی تصویروں میں سوزن مہدم

It is to Love that the music of life owes its rhythm;

It is Love that quickens images of clay with an ever-burning passion.

از تجلی کارہای خوب و زشت

میشود آن دوزخ این گردن بہشت

Good and bad deeds are revelations of Love:

That one becomes Hell and this one Paradise.

عشق سے نور حیات، عشق سے نار حیات

The Light of life is by Love; so is the Fire of life.

As both Dante and Iqbal testify, Love is the responsible Movement of the Spirit—*moto spiritale*—for the creative purpose of Individuation; a movement of Free Will, in its own passionate yearning, such as both the *Divina Commedia* and the *Javid Nameh* ultimately apprehend, towards the continual creation and fulfilment of Destiny (تقدیر) and therefore, a continual redemption or conquest of the world of Causality and Fate (قسمت). *Creativity, Passionate Yearning* and *World-conquest* are the three inter-related aspects of love, which unite man and God in the continual act of Individuation, Self-realization or *Khudi*. Iqbal calls them *Khallaqi, Mushtaqi* and *Afaq-giri (Javid Nameh)*. For Dante, who is writing in the Christian tradition, they are the principles of Creation, Incarnation and Redemption, which terms, inasmuch as they involve the essential nature of the Reality and the relation of the Infinite and the finite, must be understood in the intensive sense—on which Iqbal insists in his *Lectures*¹—and not in any extensive or Pantheistic sense, such as would imply a negation of

Individuality. Without denying their dogma-oriented historicity, Dante too sees them in intensity, as the eternal individuating *principles* of Love, as mythical Archetypes of the aspects of Eternal Love, revealing themselves in historic time in consonance with the evolution of the religious consciousness of the human race. Dante shows that for the loving man who affirms them in art and life in working out the Destiny of his unique individuality they exist in 'the always now'. Love is a relational responsibility involving, not extensity, but intensity, not a negation of individuality, but its affirmation; and it is in intensity, as Iqbal observes (*Lectures*, p. 164), that the Infinite and the finite egos are united and yet remain distinct in their ever-growing individualities. For both Dante and Iqbal the Infinite Self is transcendent as well as immanent. The finite self realizes it in intensity and unites with it in loving action which is the affirmation of the human-Divine attributes of *Khallaqi*, *Mushtaqi* and *Afaq-qiri*. The hand of the loving man is the hand of God—

ہاتھ ہے اللہ کا بلدۂ مومن کا ہاتھ

Iqbal means it in the intensive sense. In the same sense he interprets the Quranic Verse: *ما رصیت*, the saying of Hallaj: 'I am the Creative Truth' and the meaning of Destiny (تقدیر) in his poetic and philosophic utterances. In the same sense Dante's ultimate vision is that of 'our image painted' in the inter-related orbs of the Holy Trinity, which correspond to Creation, Incarnation and Redemption; and in the same sense his ultimate apprehension is that of the human will continually moving onward in being one with Divine Will,

like a wheel

In even motion, by the love impelled,

That moves the sun in heaven and all the stars.

It is through love that man continually regenerates himself into a real individual. In both Dante and Iqbal the central theme is regeneration of consciousness through love, which Iqbal calls 'the building up of Individuality or Selfhood

تعمیر خودی —and Dante 'the leading of men into a state of blessedness' (*Epistle to Can Grande della Scala*).

Love is the One Value that informs the sensuous forms of Dante's and Iqbal's poetry. It may be clarified that the sensuous forms of art are not just 'images' in the Imagistic sense (poetry is possible even without such 'images'), but the very forms of sentience involving value-life, the dynamic, mythical patterns of our sense-experience that art discovers and creates, in their unique living and lived concreteness, to reveal living and lived values. Such a revelation, since it involves a symbolic grasp of the very essence of reality (and this is why art had its use in the socio-religious activities of magic and ritual), is potentially constitutive of culture, of a life of desirable values: and this, and not any ideological propaganda, is the purpose of art. Both Dante and Iqbal are very much aware of this purpose of art. They are aware that art, which is a product of love, must potentialize a regeneration of consciousness into a desirable value-life. It must lead 'men into a state of blessedness', as Dante believes, or it must 'build up *Khudi* (Selfhood)', as Iqbal believes.

گر ہنر میں نہیں تعمیر خودی کا جوہر
وائے صورتگری و شاعری و نائے و سروں
If art lacks the essence of the making of Selfhood,
Woe to iconography and poetry and music!

شعرا مقصود اگر آدم گری است
شاعری ہم وارث پیغمبری است
If the purpose of poetry is man-making,
Poetry itself inherits the mantle of Prophethood.

Parallels can be multiplied. But poetry is poetry because of the uniqueness of its sensuous forms. This uniqueness must not be ignored. A comparative study must lead us back to it with improved understanding. Such a study can contribute to critical enlightenment particularly in those cases where value-concerns are common, as they are in the

case of Dante's and Iqbal's poetry, both being concerned with love and regeneration. Hence it may be hoped that a consideration of Iqbal's poetry in the light of the essential value-concerns it shares with Dante's can be of help in a fuller understanding and appreciation of its uniqueness in as much as it would focalize certain patterns of universal significance, certain criteria of a *philosophia perennis*, so to say.

Now, love itself has a unique form in the unique situation of every individual—and this is why it is so difficult to define love—but in this case too a general pattern—a *philosophia perennis*—is discernible, and some idea of this general pattern can be of help in a fuller understanding and appreciation of the unique manifestations of love in life and art. There is a world of mystical, religious, literary and philosophical thinking related to the subject, but it would be more convenient to think of the general pattern by keeping the observations of some modern writers in mind—writers like Eric Gill, Martin D'Arcy and C. S. Lewis, not to speak of thinkers like Kierkegaard and Martin Buber.

It may be pointed out (in these days of cinema) that love is not just the enjoyment of some wonderful feeling but the relational responsibility of an individual for an individual. Feelings, as we understand them in the ordinary sense, belong to the subject-object (*I-it*) situation which love transcends and transforms. In its realm of disinterested interest, feelings are not the dark amorphous fragments they are in the subject-object situation; in this realm there is rather a transparent, dynamic pattern or whole of feeling, transparent to value-concerns. This holds true for art just as well, for art is a product of love. Love is not constituted of feelings because love does not cling to the other in such a way as to have it only for its object, a mere *It*. We are reminded of Martin Buber's enlightening distinction between *I-It*, the subject-object situation of orientation, of transitive extensity, and *I-Thou*, the relational situation of realization,

of intransitive intensity, in which both the self and the not-self appear as unique individuals, distinct and yet related to each other, to the world and to God. As Iqbal observes: 'Love individualizes the lover as well as the beloved. The effort to realize the most unique individuality individualizes the seeker and implies individuality of the sought, for nothing else would satisfy the nature of the seeker.'² I become / when I say *Thou*. This is the secret of the continual regeneration of the Self and its world. Primarily, love is 'the responsibility of an *I* for a *Thou*', whatever the *Thou* is, a human being, an object of nature, an object of aesthetic perception, a form of truth or the Absolute Truth itself. The Absolute Truth is ultimately implicated, for the particular *Thou* is the glimpse-through to the *Eternal Thou* or God. The *Thou* is not a mere object but an individual with a unique value-embodying form, in fact a value-incarnation which is a unique and immanently self-sufficient whole, capturing attention in sheer immediacy and becoming the single point on which all the energies of the ego are focused. I am continually affirming its dynamic individuality, continually discovering and creating it, as it were, by making it present. Objects belong to the world of the past; but I live with the *Thou* not in serial time, but in duration, in the real, filled present, in 'the always now'. Unlike a mere object it is not a mere projection of the self (like the Siren of the *Commedia*) but a 'true other' (like Beatrice) and yet it is 'the soul of my soul.' I enter into relation with it with the whole of my being to live its value-life, to discover and create 'the always now' of my Destiny (تقدیر) by responding to it through loving action with all the passion of a free will and to redeem my *I-it* world of space and time, Causality and Fate (قسمت)—or, in the words of Iqbal, to conquer this world and create a new world out of it, continually. Thus, the general pattern of love is given in the three inter-related aspects of Creation, Incarnation and Redemption, in the intensive sense. In Dante's *Commedia* these aspects affirm the Christian Trinity

of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost and operate, on the human level, as the Celestial Virtues of Faith, Charity and Hope. In Iqbal they are the human-Divine attributes of *Khallaqi* (Creativity), *Mushtaqi* (Passionate Yearning) and *Afaq-giri* (World-conquest) which correspond to the Quranic *Nafs* (Self or Mind), *Qalb* (Heart), and *Ruh* (Spirit). In the *Javid Nameh* God says:

زنده ای مشتاق شو، خلاق شو، همچو ما کیندۀ آفاق شو

Art thou living? Be Passionately Yearning: be Creative:
Like Us be World-conquering.

But a reference to T. S. Eliot—another poet of love—can give to the modern mind a clear idea of the three inter-related aspects of love. Let us recall the experience of Eliot's *Waste Land* which culminates in the realization of these aspects of love through the three Injunctions of the Thunder: *Datta*, *Dayadhavam*, *Damyata* or Give, Sympathize, Control. We realize that according to these aspects: love is a giving—and if we think of any taking, then the taking is in the giving—a giving of oneself to create the *I* and the *Thou* for the creation of a desirable value-life; secondly, it is a passionate living of value-life in communion with the value-incarnating *Thou*; and thirdly, it is a direct charismatic control of the *Eternal Thou* over the value-life of *I-Thou*, uniting human will with Divine Will and redeeming the *I-It* world. Perhaps the least unsatisfactory general terms we can find to designate the three inter-related aspects of love are the Greek terms: Eros, Agape and Charis. Agape is the point of intersection where all the aspects of love meet: it is the *Qalb* or Heart of love. For finite man who is living in a symbolic world of Appearances or Phenomena, the middle-term of this trinity implies the central phenomenon of the symbolic apprehension of the Reality, that of communion with a value-incarnating *Thou*-form. All this has important implications for the *philosophia perennis* of art just as well. The central question that art-criticism must raise is: Does the artist say

Thou to the value-incarnating sensuous forms of experience? How far does he affirm the principles of Creation, Incarnation and Redemption, or *Khallaqi*, *Mushtaqi* and *Afaq-giri* at the level of art? And therefore, how far does his art achieve Maturity, Universality and Comprehensiveness (to use Eliot's terms)?

Primarily, love is not experiencing and using but meeting. And meeting is not in space and time but space and time in the meeting. The *I* that meets the *Thou* is at 'the world's end' (Eliot) where the finite and the temporal unite with the Infinite and the Eternal in intensity: such is the State of His Servant or مقام عبده (Iqbal). In this State nothing is apprehended except the *Thou*. It does not mean that nothing exists except itself: but that all else lives in its light. The particular *Thou* is a glimpse-through to the *Eternal Thou* or God in whom the parallel lines of relation meet and who is 'the wholly other' in his transcendence and 'the wholly not-other' in his immanence—

چسبان درجهانی و از جان بیرونی

How art Thou in my being and yet out of it.

There is no gap between the love for an earthly *Thou* and the love for the *Eternal Thou*, between what is called عشق حقیقی and what is called عشق مجازی. Love does not dwell in sex—which, in the narrow sense of the term means *I-It*—though sex may dwell in love.

Love involves a wholeness of being which does not exclude the *I-It* life but includes it, hallows and transforms it in the glow of *I-Thou*. All loves are included in the one love, as the experience of the *Commedia* makes us realize. Only an exclusive life of *I-It* is evil and sub-human. The lesson of love is: 'Be in the world but not of the world'. For the loving man the world is the Temple of the Lord—'the whole of this earth is a mosque', says Iqbal quoting the Prophet of Islam (*Lectures*, p. 217). In love, as both Dante and Iqbal testify, there is no either-or and there is no once-

for-all; for love involves a continual becoming of the whole being. Dante and Iqbal are not for the rejection of the *I-It* world, the world of body, intellect, reason, science and self-interest, but for a hallowing and transformation of this world by the life of love. Everything in the universe is a 'shadowy preface' of the One Reality which is the Whole Good, as Dante would say in his Thomistic-Christian terminology, or the Sign (آیت) of God, as Iqbal would say in his Quranic terminology. But all the signs must be seen in the light of that Personal Sign which is the immediate glimpse-through to the Reality: that Personal Sign is the *Thou*. For Dante it is Beatrice. For Iqbal it is Prophet Mohammed and his life (which he does not always realize as a value-embodying sensuous form of experience at the level of art). If for Dante Beatrice is the type of Incarnation intensively uniting the human and the Divine (again with the difference that Dante realizes it through sensuous forms, in the Eucharistic Pageant of the *Purgatorio*, for example, but Iqbal does not), for Iqbal Prophet Mohammed is not عبد (the servant) but عبده (His Servant) which is the union of the human nature (آدم) and Divine Essence (جوهر), as Iqbal's Hallaj elucidates it in the *Javid Nameh*.

The *Commedia* bears out Dante's concern for the wholeness of being in his visions of Hell and Purgatory—which means an ordering of all the loves, with the help and guidance of Intuition-controlled Reason (Virgil), in relation to the one love, the love for the God-revealing *Thou* (Beatrice)—and his concern for the continual regeneration of the whole being, through the human-Divine power of the one love for which the other name is Free Will. Dante does not simply talk about these things; he makes us realize them as living and lived values through the experiential patterns of his poetry. In this way he takes us all the way through the experience, the very process, of regeneration, which Iqbal does not. As compared to Iqbal, the Dante of

the *Commedia* never takes any value for granted but consistently and systematically explores values through the dialectics of experience. From the Dark Wood to the Beatific Vision he explores such a comprehensive range of value-life as no other poet does, not even Shakespeare. Dante's Infernal vision of the exclusive life of *I-It*, which is torment-stricken in its eternal aspect because of the soul's innate desire for wholeness, leads to the Purgatorial vision of the recovery of wholeness for the *I-Thou* meeting in the Earthly Paradise, and then, through a relational focusing of the whole being on the God-revealing *Thou*, to the Paradisal vision of beatitude and ecstasy, at the end of which the visionary pilgrim returns to the *saeculum* with a sense of the continual regenerative movement of Free Will-Love. In its mythical concrescence Dante's descent-ascent pattern of the regenerative-realizational journey can symbolize all aspects of human experience and can answer to man's most intense aspirations. Owing to its tremendous comprehensiveness, intensity and universality the *Commedia* has not been surpassed by any poem in the world. Iqbal's *Javid Nameh*, which incorporates an ascent-*minus*-descent pattern of spiritual journey is a much inferior poem in comparison to Dante's *Commedia* simply because it lacks the dialectics of experience which this kind of long poem should not.

Iqbal's best poetry certainly reveals living and lived values in and through the sensuous forms of experience. One would think of *Masjid-e-Qartaba*, *Zauq-o-Shauq* and the poetry of *Payam-i-Mashriq*, *Zaboor-i-Ajam* and *Bal-e-Jibril*. But in the case of a considerable body of his poetry, which belongs mostly to the long poems or *mathnavis*, values are just taken for granted instead of being explored and lived. In the long didactic poems *Asrar-i-Khudi* and *Ramooz-i-Bekhudi*, for example, philosophy is not transmuted into living and lived values through its fusion with sensuous forms of experience; the result of this lack of experiential texture is that we have not so much poetry as versified philosophy. In Iqbal's poetry

the exploration of values is not as consistent as it is in Dante's poetry. His long poems make a parade of mere didacticism—Dante turned away from it and left his *Convivio* unfinished. But even in the case of Iqbal's best poetry the exploration of values is not as intensive and as comprehensive as it is in the case of Dante's *Commedia*. For these reasons Dante is a much greater poet than Iqbal—in fact no poet is greater than Dante. But Dante and Iqbal are great for yet another reason—though for this reason too Dante is much greater. It is that their respective works are united by a consistent and developing personality. As Eliot observes, such an underlying unity is one of the measures of a poet's greatness. Like all the poems of Dante, all the poems of Iqbal are one poem. What unites all the poems in the case of each poet is the persistent and developing concern with the ultimate value of love. Cassirer points out that the activity of the human spirit ranges between two poles of the Ineffable: the Indeterminate and the Infinite. In Dante these two poles are symbolized by the Beatrice of the *Vita Nuova* and by the Beatrice of the *Paradiso*; in Iqbal, one might say, by Salima (سالمی) and by Abdahu (عبداه). In beginning and ending with Beatrice Dante again shows himself as the much greater poet.

Iqbal does not have Dante's deep insights into the drama of the *moto spiritale* to explore the possibilities of disintegration and re-integration of the self, but he does believe in wholeness and continual regeneration. A few quotations will serve as reminders.

As regards wholeness:

تو را یک نکتہ سر بسختہ گویم
 اگر درس حیات از من بگیری
 ہمیری کر بہ تن جانی نداری
 اگر جانی بہ تن داری ہمیری

I tell thee a piece of secret wisdom,

If thou would'st learn from me the lesson of life:

Thou diest if thou hast not the soul in the body;
If thou hast the soul in the body thou diest not.

(Payam-i-Mashriq)

تن و جان را دو تا گفتن کلام است
تن و جان را دو تان دیدن حرام است

To regard the body and soul as two is a sophistry not to be believed in;
To see the body and soul as two is a sacrilegious abomination.

(Zaboor-i-Ajam)

The *I-It* life or زیرکی (cleverness), which is so much emphasized by the modern Western civilization, must not be rejected; it must be permeated by the relational life of *I-Thou* or عشق (love) to achieve the wholeness that implies the regeneration of man and his world.

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کار عشق از زیرکی مستحکم اساس
عشق چون با زیرکی همپا شود
نقشبند عالم دیگر شود
خیز و نقش عالم دیگر بده!
عشق را با زیرکی آمیز ده!

By love cleverness becomes Truth-recognizing;
By cleverness the work of love gets a firm base
When love accompanies cleverness,
It becomes the creator of a new world.
Arise and create the image of a new world;
Infuse cleverness with love!

(Javid Nameh)

For the sake of the life of wholeness Natural Reason (دانش برهمنی) must be controlled by Intuition or Revelation (دانش نورانی) as Virgil is by Beatrice. The proper role of the former is to guide, to light up the way to the Meeting (خرد کیا هے چراغ رهگذر هے) and to vanish when the Meeting blazes forth:

بر مقام جذب و شوق آرد ترا
باز چون جبریل بگذارد ترا

[Intellect] would bring thee to the place of rapture and longing,
Then leave thee as Gabriel would (in *M'iraj*).

For Iqbal (as for Ibnul 'Arabi before him) *m'iraj*, which is originally Prophet Mohammad's Journey of the spiritual world, implies a change of consciousness (چہیت سے معراج) (انقلاب اندر شعور) —a change of consciousness from factuality (خبیر) to vision (نظر), from what he calls 'efficiency' to what he calls 'appreciation', a change that has an important bearing on the world of 'efficiency' to which the visionary pilgrim returns. In the *Javid Nameh* Iqbal makes use of *m'iraj* as a background-myth. The *m'iraj* is a vision of the transcendence of the *I-It* world of subject-object knowledge.

علم کی حد سے پرے بے لذت مومن کے لئے
لذت شوق بھی ہے ' نعمت دیدار بھی ہے

Beyond the sphere of knowledge, there is for the Man of Faith:
The bliss of longing, the blessing of the Meeting.

In Dante the choice of persisting in the lust for mere *I-It* knowledge brings about a tormentous disintegration of the Self, which is Hell. The Repentance-born choice of not persisting in it but purging it for the sake of reintegration, through a wilful acceptance of the torment involved, is Purgatory. The loving response of a pure and re-integrated Self to the universe is Paradise. Hell is not punishment inflicted by any 'External Authority'; nor is Paradise a reward of holiday-enjoyment. For Iqbal, as for Dante, Heaven and Hell are metaphorical representations of spiritual 'states, not localities' of reward and punishment. Hell 'is not a pit of everlasting torture inflicted by a revengeful God' but 'a corrective experience' and is, therefore, in time, which is what the Quran means by the word 'eternity' used in relation to it (*Lectures*, p. 170). This would bring Iqbal's Hell close to Dante's Purgatory; but it would blur the distinction of the soul's own choice of persisting or not persisting in sinful desire. In this sense the concepts of both Hell and Purgatory are foreign to Iqbal. What about those who do not desire to be 'corrected' because they see nothing wrong with themselves, except, of course, in a technical sense? What about the wilful Purgation of not only actual but also

of potential evils to become perfectly 'pure and ready to leap up to the stars'? Iqbal lacks Dante's deep insights into human experience, into its very drama of *moto spiritale*. If he cannot realize the deepest realities of damnation and Purgation, he cannot also realize the deepest reality of Paradisal beatitude in all its range of ecstatic intensity.

However, in his own way, Iqbal gives glimpses of the sinful attitude of exclusiveness, of the perverse lust of mere *I-It* knowledge. He usually calls it بت پرستی (Idolatory), کافری (Infidelity) or شیشہ بازی (Glass-tricks). He tells us that knowledge which is isolated from the one love is evil.

علم بی عشق است از طاغوتیان
علم با عشق است از لاهوتیان

Knowledge without love is Daemonic;
Knowledge with love is Divine.

اگر ہو عشق تو ہے کفر بھی مسلمان
نہ ہو تو مرد مسلمان بھی کافر زندقہ

If there is love, then even Infidelity is Faith;
If there is no love, then even a believer is an infidel.

Iqbal gives us glimpses into the value-life of this 'loveless' attitude, particularly when he speaks of the perverse materialism of the West and of the perverse spiritualism of the East, for which the 'West' with its فرنگی (materialistic Westerner) and the 'East' with its *mulla, sheikh* and *brahman* are often used as symbolic motifs (Iqbal's best poetry is often composed of value-charged symbolic motifs). Both the Western 'materialism' and the Eastern 'spiritualism' are forms of *I-It* exclusiveness; both amount to a denial of all-inclusive love and the death of *Khudi*, Individuality or Selfhood.

خودی کی موت سے مغرب کا اندروں بے نور
خودی کی موت سے مشرق ہے مبتلائے جذام

With the death of Selfhood the inner life of the West is dark;
With the death of Selfhood the East is stricken with leprosy.

The 'West' is clinging to the bodily reality so as to have it only for its object; the 'East' is doing the same to the spiritual reality: both are involved with *I-It*. 'The mentality of the West is commercial; the mentality of the East is ascetic' (ضمیر مغرب ہے تاجرانہ، ضمیر مشرق ہے راہبانہ). Both are involved with Sorcery or Idolatory, in the general sense, in that they are involved with the exploitation of reality through its fragmentation, mutilation and confinement into appropriable categories of mere *I-It* knowledge, be they imagistic or non-imagistic. The religious upholders of Monotheism do not generally recognize that their religion too may become Idolatory in this way.

عقل و دل و نگاہ کا سرشد اولیں ہے عشق
عشق نہ ہو تو شرع و دین بتکدہ تصورات

Love is the Primal Guide of the Intellect and the Heart and the Eye;
If there is no Love, theology and religion become Idol Houses of
fancies.

In Dante's vision of Hell Sorcery or Idolatory is explored through the drama of *moto spiritale*, which proceeds by a continuous concretion and intensification through regions of Incontinence, Violence and Fraud. In a general sense all the sinners in these regions symbolize the various forms of Sorcery or Idolatory, of the exploitation of reality through an exclusively *I-It* attitude; they symbolize the deepening possibilities of selfishness in the soul. We are specifically reminded of the Lustful whirled about the Black Wind; of the tyrants steeped in the river of blood; of the heretics and epicureans in burning tombs; of the violent against God, nature and art—among which we find blasphemers, sodomists and usurers—beaten down by the rain of fire on the burning sand; of the schismatics tearing their own bodies; of the barrators steeped in boiling pitch; of the flatterers steeped in human excrement; of the soothsayers and astrologers with faces turned backwards; of the various tricksters and falsifiers deformed beyond recognition by horrible diseases; and of the traitors frozen in the lake of

ice. An interesting example of the practice of fraud out of a self-gratifying lust for knowledge is Ulysses who prevails upon his ship-mates to sail into the forbidden seas, is drowned and then damned to move about imprisoned in a twisting and turning flame. Iqbal has his own glimpses of Incontinence, Violence and Fraud related to the Sorcery or Idolatory of the materialistic way of life, of which one need not speak here.

He has no hesitation to point out that Intellect and Religion are of no avail unless they are illuminated by Love.

بی تجلی زندگی رنجوری است

عقل مہنجوری و دین مستجوری است

Without the illumination of Love life is an illness;
Intellect is a desolation and Religion a bondage.

This situation would correspond to that of Dante's First Circle of Hell. Here the Humanistic-classical 'good life', which is actually an accommodation of selfish interests, has come to nothing in the absence of the love that implies Faith, Charity and Hope, and is eternally tormented by a longing for the ecstatic bliss it can never have. Mere morality is not enough. It would not let man fall to the sub-human level; but at best it would keep him only at the human level of *عبد* (Servant) and not raise him to the human-Divine level of *عبدہ* (His (Servant) to make him transcend the *I-/It* world and realize *خودی* (Selfhood).

The Humanistic Intellectual would see a block universe, given in mere extensity, and his concept of Essence would be a mere Negation of Existence. But the loving man proceeds, as Dante shows, both by the Negation of Existence as a thing in itself and by its Affirmation as a Sign of the Essential Reality. For him Negation (لا) is one with Affirmation (لا); for him 'the way up is the way down,' as Eliot puts it (*Four Quartets*). Both Negation and Affirmation are mutually inclusive conditions for the realization of Selfhood (لا و لا از مقامات خودی است) and also of the Essential

Reality. Such a realization is love. For Iqbal it is لا اله الا الله which in non-theological language would mean: There is nothing to attend to (to devote oneself to) except God. Iqbal's Nietzsche is the symbol of the Humanistic Intellectualism which knows only Negation.

اوبه لا در مانند و تما الا نه رفت
از مقام عبده بيگانه رفت

He was stuck up in Negation and did not proceed to Affirmation;
He went unaware of the State of 'His Servant'.

But above the First Circle of Dante's Hell there is another condition of Hell in which all Hell is present: it is the attitude of Indifference to both good and evil, of a total Negation of existence, not only of the not-self but also of the self, and this attitude is hateful both to God and his enemy, the Devil. Dante sees its sensuous forms in the Vestibule of Hell and Eliot in 'the strained, time-ridden faces' of the London Tube (*Four Quartets*) and in the crowd flowing over London Bridge. Iqbal is not unaware of it when he says:

نه خدا رها ، نه صدم رهي ، نه رقيب ديرو حرم رهي
نه رهي كه پيچ اسدالاهي ، نه كه پيچ ابوالهبي رهي

Neither God remains now nor the Idol; the rivals of the Idol House and of the God's House are no more;
There is neither the bold acclamation of God, nor the bold declamation of God.

Unlike Dante, Iqbal does not realize and explore the Paradisal experience, in all its range of ecstatic beatitude. But he emphasizes the point that Paradise is not what the *mulla* makes of it, a holiday with Houris and Wine etc.

جنت ملامے و حور و غلام
جنت آزادگان سیردوام
جنت ملا خور و خواب و سرود
جنت عاشق تماشاہی وجود

The Paradise of the *mulla* is Wine and Houri and Comely slave;
 The Paradise of Free Men is a Perpetual Journey.
 The Paradise of the *mulla* is eating and sleeping and intoxicating music;
 The paradise of the loving man is the vision of Being.

(*Javid Nameh*)

Being is perpetual Becoming. Hence

Man marches always onward to receive everfresh illuminations from an Infinite Reality which 'every moment appears in a new glory.' And the recipient of divine illumination is not merely a passive recipient. Every act of a free ego creates a new situation, and thus offers further opportunities of creative unfolding.

(*Lectures*, p. 170)

For this reason Iqbal is opposed to the Unityistic drop-slipping-into-the-ocean concept of Union (وصل), which would imply the end of individuality, desire and free action—Beware if Union means the end of desire (وصل اگر پایان شوق است التذکر)

تو نشداسی هنوز شوق بیدرد ز وصل
 چیست حیات دوام سوختن ناتمام

As yet thou knowest not that desire dies with Union:
 What is eternal life? a never-ending burning.

And here is the Quran:

It needs not that I swear by the sunset redness and by the night and its gatherings and by the moon when at her full, that from state to state shall ye be surely carried onward. (84 : 17-20)

For Iqbal the loving man's ideal is a perpetual Seeking which he calls *Firaq*, as opposed to *Vasl* or Union. He explores the value of *Firaq* in a great poem, *Zauq-o-Shauq*. Iqbal's glimpse of Paradise would come through such a couplet as the following:

فرصت کشمکش مده این دل بیقرار در
 یکدو شکن زیاده کن گیسوی تابدار در

Do not give this restive heart the opportunity of slackening away:
 Add a curl or two more to Thy bright locks!

What has been said above also testifies to Iqbal's belief in continual regeneration. For him life is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and values. 'We become by ceasing to be what we are. Life is a passage through a series of deaths' (*Lectures*, p. 74)—and rebirths! This is what Eliot means when he talks of 'a life-time's death in love' and 'a lifetime's burning in every moment' (*Four Quartets*), and this is what Dante means when he talks of a perpetual movement of Free Will, impelled by Love. The man of Free Will transcends and conquers the world of Time.

وہی زمانے کی گردش پہ غالب آتا ہے
جوہرِ نفس سے کرے عمر جاوداں پیدا
Only he overcomes the revolution of Time,
Who creates an eternal life with every breath:

(Zarb-e-kalim)

احوال و مقامات پہ موقوف ہے سب کچھ
ہر لحظہ ہے سالک کا زمان اور مکان اور
Everything depends on spiritual states and levels of consciousness:
At every moment the Seeker's time and space are new.

In carrying out the responsibility of love through his Free Will the loving-man-seeker is continually creating and discovering Destiny (تقدیر), which has infinite possibilities in the 'not-yet' of God. His will is God's Will and his hand the hand of God.

مرد مومن با خدا داون نیاز
"باتو ما سازیم تو ما بساز"
عزم او خالق تقدیر حق است
روز ہیبتما تیر او تیر حق است
نقش حق داری جہاں تختچیر تست
ہم علمان تقدیر با تدبیر تست

The Man of Faith has an understanding and a communion with God—
'We make up to thee, thou make up unto us.'

His will is the creator of God's Destiny;

On the day of Battle his arrow is God's Arrow.

Hast thou the image of Truth? the world is thy prey:

Destiny goes with thy effort.

Iqbal does not work out the process of regeneration because he does not work out a progressive illumination of meanings and values through the dialectics of experience. In the *Javid Nameh* he gives only some broad hints, and that is about all. Thus he speaks of the Three Witnesses which mark the three inter-penetrating stages of regeneration corresponding to those aimed at by Dante's visions of Hell, Purgatory and Paradise.

شاهد اول ' شعور خویشتن خویش را دیدن بنور خویشتن
 شاهد ثانی ' شعور دیگری خویش را دیدن بنور دیگری
 شاهد ثالث ' شعور ذات حق خویش را دیدن بنور ذات حق
 پیش این نور را بهمانی استوار حی و قیوم چون خدا خود را شمار

The First Witness: the awareness of the Self—
 Seeing the Self in the light of the Self.

The Second Witness: the awareness of the Other—
 Seeing the Self in the light of the Other.

The Third Witness: the awareness of God—
 Seeing the Self in the light of God.

If thou standest unshaken in front of this light,
 Consider thyself as living and eternal as He!

For Iqbal, as for Dante, the ultimate aim of the spiritual quest of the loving man is the seeing of God. It means:

نقش حق اول بجهان انداختن
 باز او را درجهان انداختن
 نقش جان تبار جهان گردد تمام
 میشود دیدار حق دیدار عام

First, informing the Soul with the Image of Truth;

Then, informing the world with the Image of Truth.

When the image of the Soul is completed in the world,

The apprehension of Truth becomes the apprehension of an open Revelation.

The *seeing* of God is possible for man only through a *seeing* of the Signs of God. Everything in the universe is a Sign of God, if it is so seen—even Satan. That which excludes the Kingdom of Satan cannot be called the Kingdom of God.

Dante and Iqbal would not, therefore, reject Satan and Hell, but would transform them into a new significance. Dante works out the process of this transformation by inverting Satan and all Hell into the Purgatorial vision; Iqbal hints that Satan should not be rejected but converted into a Muslim.

کشتن ابلیس کار مشکل است
 ز آنکه او کم اندر اعماق دل است
 خوشتر آن باشد مسلمانش کنی
 کشته شمشیر قرآنش کنی

The killing of Satan is a difficult task,
 Inasmuch as he is lurking in the depths of the Soul.
 It would be better to convert him into a Muslim—
 To kill him with the Sword of the Quran.

(*Javid Nimeh*)

Later on Iqbal sees Satan in an ironic light, sees him as already converted in eternity for the enlightened soul and calls him *خواجۀ اهل فراق* (Lord of the Seekers).

Dante goes about it differently. He descends into the depths of the Soul and discovers Satan in the state of treachery, learns his lesson and then turns his descent into a Purgatorial ascent. He makes us realize that the state of treachery is a Cocytus-like freezing of all passions, even of hate, and a shrinking of the ego to a single point of cold determination. Such a determination is impotent even for its own purpose, and the only thing it does is that it brings about the ruin of the traitor himself. Iqbal does not descend to such depths of the Soul as to see absolute egotism in absolute isolation from the being. It can be said that Iqbal's Satan does not represent a purely evil impulse; for 'there is no evil impulse unless the impulse is separated from the being' (Buber). His Satan throbs in the very pulse of the universe (*می تپد از سوزمن خون رمی کائنات*). He is the principle of dynamism and initiative. He has brought about the Fortunate Fall of man through the knowledge of good and evil and has taught him the lesson of choosing and

willing, of perpetual yearning and striving and Seeking (فدّاق) —he is recognized on these counts as the Lord of the Seekers in the *Javid Nameh*. The loving-man must subdue him, Faust-like, and employ him in the service of the good. Satan is perhaps the only character in Iqbal that rises above the level of persona. It is because of him that his great poem *Taskhir-i-Fitrat* acquires a dramatic life.

Dante's Satan is passive—except for his longing—and Iqbal's Satan active. The reason for this difference can be traced to the difference between the Islamic and the Christian myths. The concept of Satan which was not there in the Hebraic religion has crept into Islam and Christianity by way of Persian influences and has taken a different form in each of these religions. In the Christian tradition Satan is the treacherous Archangel who betrayed God out of absolute egotism before the creation of man. In the Islamic tradition Satan is the fire-born daemon who disobeyed God after the creation of man by refusing to prostrate himself before one created out of dust. In this myth Iqbal discovers new meanings and values, as pointed out above.

Like all art poetry is a product of love, of *I-Thou* relation (Buber), which means that it is a saying of *Thou* to the value-embodiment sensuous forms of experience. Being most uniquely significant these forms may draw upon potentially value-charged symbolic motifs or upon particular referents raised to symbolic significance through the dialectics of a large experiential pattern. Both the modes may co-exist in a poem. But the former can work well with short lyrical pieces and the latter with well-organized long poems. The latter is the symbolic-dramatic mode of sensibility, for which Keats's term is Negative Capability. Dante's *Commedia* is essentially in the symbolic-dramatic mode. It can be interpreted allegorically, but it is not an allegorical poem in the orthodox sense because it is through the realization of the particularity of things that the poem proceeds to explore values. In spite of the allegorical tendency, which was a strong influence in

the Middle Ages, the symbolic-dramatic approach to experience has always persisted in the European sensibility. To it the European cultural tradition owes the distinction of having a galaxy of well-organized long poems, such as the great Greek plays, the great plays of Shakespeare, the *Iliad*, the *Aeniad*, the *Divina Commedia*, the *Paradise Lost* and the *Prelude*—not to speak of works of fiction which one would like to be covered by a broad sense of the word 'poem'.

Now, we should not expect a well-organized long poem from Iqbal simply because a different approach to experience has persisted in the Persian-Urdu cultural tradition and has cut into it its own grooves of cultural activity. It must be admitted that in literature this cultural tradition has not developed the possibilities of focusing language consistently on the particularity of things so as to elevate them to the level of symbolic significance through the dialectics of a large experiential pattern.

It is necessary to consider the cultural tradition for at least two reasons. First, the cultural tradition defines the nature of its art and the possibilities of its greatness. Secondly, since the sensuous forms of art draw their value-life from a specific cultural tradition, a work of art cannot be appreciated from a point outside it—and without such an appreciation it would not be fair to hold it up for comparison with works of other cultural traditions and to evaluate its greatness according to the universal criteria of a *philosophia perennis*. So, it is not pointless to make a passing reference to the distinguishing features of the respective cultural traditions of Dante's and Iqbal's poetry.

The Persian-Urdu cultural tradition has not developed the symbolic-dramatic approach to experience—and this is why it has not developed drama as a form either. A very significant body of Persian-Urdu poetry proceeds by a composition of small patterns of sensuous forms mostly out of potentially value-charged symbolic motifs which are transformed by these patterns into art-elements. This involves

what may be called the Ghazal-Mentality. This peculiar approach to experience which is the most persistent feature of the Persian-Urdu cultural tradition originates from what Iqbal calls 'the butterfly imagination of the Persian' which 'flies half-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be incapable of reviewing the garden as a whole'.³ In this tradition, therefore, we should expect glimpse-like discoveries of this or that aspect of reality in small poetic units but not a consistent and systematic exploration of the whole of reality in a well-organized long poem. The latter is rather an exception. In fact, most of the long poems, which are called *Mathnavis*, are loosely organized fables, allegories and narrative pieces. A great poet like Rumi would give them the life of sensuous forms, but owing to the lack of the symbolic-dramatic approach there is a lack of those significant concretions that build up the dialectical unity of a large structure.

The Ghazal itself, which is a highly stylized form, proceeds by a series of concentrated, more or less self-sufficient poetic units that give spurtive visions into mythical situations. The poetic pattern that creates and discovers these situations gives a universalized short-hand of reality. The symbolic motifs that go into its composition are mostly associated with the experience of love itself. Hence they have an infinite potential of mythical value which is released as they become art-elements in the poetic pattern—we often refer to these symbolic motifs when we speak of the *Gul-o-Bulbul* ('Rose-and-Nightingale') symbolism.

It may be observed that since the experience of love involves the realization of essential reality it partakes of the nature of mythical experience which is the matrix of all human experience. The above observations regarding love should strongly remind one of Cassirer's observations regarding mythical consciousness—particularly such observations as 'the transcendence of subject-object knowledge', 'a whole of feeling', 'sheer immediacy,' 'immanent self-

sufficiency of the realized reality' and 'a focusing of all the energies of the ego on a single point.' Iqbal recognizes similar features in his discussion of mystic experience in the *Lectures*. Similar features have been recognized by philosophers of art, too, in their discussions of aesthetic experience. In fact all these experiences involve a 'unitary consciousness', to use Iqbal's term, which is primarily concerned with intuitive realization, with a saying of *Thou* to the value-embodying form of the reality. The responsibility for this *Thou*-form is love in its widest sense. For the prophet and the artist this responsibility becomes the responsibility of symbolic creation and communication.

But to come back to the Ghazal: the value-life patterns associated with the experience of love give to the sensuous forms of the Ghazal a mythical concreteness owing to which they can symbolize all aspects of human experience. The Ghazal which can touch the heights of great poetry is the Persian-Urdu poet's forte. Iqbal's best poetry either takes the form of the Ghazal—witness the ghazals of *Payam-i-Mashriq*, *Zaboor-e-Ajam* and *Bal-e-Jibril*—or comes very close to the form of the Ghazal—witness the poems of *Bal-e-Jibril* and *Payam-i-Mashriq*, particularly, *Zauq-o-Shauq*, *Masjid-e-Qartaba* and *Taskhir-i-Fitrat*. In these 'ghazal-like' poems even the stanzaic units are ghazal-like pieces often linked up with couplets which function as *codas* in the unique word-music of each poem.

In these ghazals and 'ghazal-like' poems the peculiar lofty ring of Iqbal's word music is most resonating, for here the poet does not merely talk about values but makes his semantic-musical patterns enact certain vital *gestalten* of value-life. It seems that Iqbal's concern with love is his concern with Vitalistic Transcendentalism, which, on being translated by his genius into poetry, becomes an intense resonating gesture of Iqbalian word-music by which I do not mean mere sound pattern. Since the poetic form, like any other artistic form, is a symbolic form, and since it is not

iconic of anything existing outside, and independent of, itself, no justification can be sought for a semiotic analysis of the sound-pattern, nor can such an analysis ever add anything to what is already known. But a reference is intended to the fact that Iqbal's best poetry proceeds by a peculiar accentuation, which is operative, not in the mere sound pattern, but in the total associative matrix of poetic language.

As a product of love (*Ishq* or *Khun-i-jigar*), poetry is a saying of *Thou* to the value-embodying sensuous forms of experience. Its affirmation of the three inter-related principles of Creation, Incarnation and Redemption or of *Khallaqi*, *Mushtaqi* and *Afaq-giri*, is a measure of its greatness. This affirmation would give to a work the qualities of Maturity, Comprehensiveness and Universality, which are universal criteria of the greatness of art (cf. Eliot's Essay: 'What is a Classic?'). Iqbal's best poetry certainly lives up to these criteria through an affirmation of the three inter-related principles of love at the artistic level. For example, when Iqbal says:

دل و نظر کا سفینہ سنبھال کر لے جا
 مہ و ستارہ ہیں بحیر و جود میں گرداب

Carry across with care the Boat of the Heart-and-Eye,
 For the moon and the stars are Whirlpools in the Sea of Being.

he creates a unique sensuous form of experience by his unique pattern of word-music which speaks of 'the Boat of the Heart-and-Eye', the 'Whirlpools' of the moon and the stars and 'the Sea of Being.' This unique sensuous form is an incarnation of the mythical value-life associated with the experience of moving forward with care to some noble end through dangerous temptations that lie all along the way. Its semantic-musical pattern is an intense gesture that calls for communion with this value-life, makes us passionately live it, particularly through the strong semantic-musical accentuations of *سنبھال* and *گرداب* in this

context. And this form, this pattern, redeems our time-bound (*I-it*) consciousness by transmuting its dark fragments of images and concepts and emotions into the transparent symbolic form of a timeless vision. This is great poetry, indeed; but it draws upon potentially value-charged symbolic motifs like *گرداب* and *بدر* , *مستازة* , *سفینه* , *دل و نظر* and has its due place in the ghazals and 'ghazal-like' poems of Iqbal.

But the lack of the symbolic-dramatic approach in Iqbal's sensibility tells on his long poems like *Asrar-i-Khudi*, *Ramooz-i-Bekhudi*, *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* and *Javid Nameh*. (*Shama-o-Shair*, *Tulu-e-Islam* and *Khizr-e-Rah* do not fare badly because their themes can flow into some ghazal-like structure. Nor does *Armughan-i-Hijaz* which is composed of lyrical pieces or *Qat'as*). The short-comings of these long poems—their loose organization, their lack of experiential texture and their lack of the drama of exploration of values arise from the poet's failure to make the needful symbolic-dramatic approach. And this points to a weakness in Iqbal's poetic, owing to which it is not quite successful with the long poem. Here in his reactionary enthusiasm for the *I* Iqbal forgets that the *I* becomes *I* by saying *Thou*—and this is why he does not work out the process of regeneration. Elsewhere in his reactionary enthusiasm for *Khudi* (Selfhood) he even denounces dramatic performance ('Tiatr')—which is also an instance of the absurdity that a purely expressionistic theory of art can lead one to.

It can be contended that Iqbal's best poetry is dramatic, in its own way, for like all great poetry it is a play of tensions. Iqbal sometimes deliberately makes dramatic gestures, though it is doubtful if he ever rises above the level of persona and dialogue to the level of character and true dramatic objectivity. In such cases he is often projecting his own self. But whenever he sees this self objectively, in its unique existential situation in a baffling universe, particularly in its relation to the Infinite Self, this self becomes the symbol

of the Self and the occasion for the great poetry of ghazals, 'ghazal-like' poems and lyrical pieces. Here we do not have the full-length drama of significant particulars but glimpses into the naked drama of Existence in its relation to Essence.

Significant particulars are foreign to Iqbal's poetic and its cultural tradition. With his inability to realize them the poet of the Persian-Urdu tradition is likely to suffer from a dissociation of sensibility in the face of a long poem. This inability amounts to the inability of realizing the unity of body and soul. It means: 'to see the body and soul as two', as Iqbal himself puts it. This is more likely to happen in the case of the taboo-ridden Eastern sensibility than it is in the case of the Western sensibility. The former would often divide the one love into *عشق مجازی* (bodily love) and *عشق حقیقی* (spiritual love or love for God). Love poetry itself would often belong to the one or to the other. If a respectable poet spoke in terms of the body he would be supposed to be allegorizing spiritual truths. Iqbal's own observation in this regard is ironic enough:

پیر مامر! بحثاً روبه مجاز آورد است

ورنه باز هره و شان هیچ سروکارش نیست

Our saintly guide has appealed to the body by way of tactics,
Otherwise he has nothing to do with Venus-like beauties.

Though significant uniqueness must be equally perceived in symbolic motifs, a failure to perceive the significant uniqueness of particulars may also lead to a failure to realize the mythical values of beliefs and ideas in and through experiential patterns. It may happen that the poet's symbols may exhibit certain beliefs without eliciting our poetic assent. This happens in the case of Iqbal quite often. At many places his symbols associated with Islamic beliefs appeal only to those who hold such beliefs. What is regrettable is not that Iqbal airs the beliefs of a particular religion, but that on the artistic level he does

not realize the experiential forms or patterns of these beliefs to reveal their mythical value-life, which Dante and Eliot always do. The same thing happens in the case of ideas. Unlike Dante and Eliot Iqbal does not always transform philosophical ideas into poetic experience.

Asrar and *Ramooz*, though they have their importance with regard to the unity of the poet's whole work, can be dismissed as versified philosophy. The *Javid Nameh* is a much better poem. But this kind of long poem, which intends to tell a consistent story, requires the symbolic-dramatic approach, which it lacks. For this reason alone it would show itself at a great disadvantage if compared with Dante's *Commedia*.

The *Commedia* is an organic sensuous form of experience having an infinite meaning. It is an exploration of values through the realization of the significant uniqueness of things, which realization proceeds by a continuous concretion and intensification. All this cannot be said of the *Javid Nameh*. Of course, the theme of regeneration or realization of Selfhood is directed in the *Javid Nameh*, as it is in the *Commedia*, towards the *seeing* of God. But the *seeing* of God does not become an experience, as it does in the *Commedia*; it does not involve the mounting ecstasy of a most comprehensive exaltation. It is so owing to the fact that all along the way to the Vision of God the Signs of God are not realized on the experiential level in their significant uniqueness and with greater and greater intensity of illumination. There is no ordering of experience according to this intensity. What is lacking is a Personal God-revealing Sign, the central *Thou*-figure (which is Beatrice in the *Commedia*), and the necessary purification (Purgation) for its fuller and fuller realization. It should be recalled that Dante's experience of the Beatific Vision becomes possible because of his experience of the Beatrician Vision. Everything in the *Commedia* leads to the fuller and fuller realization of Beatrice; the Infernal and the Purgatorial visions are

directed to this realization and the Paradisal vision is an extension and a further intensification of this realization. It is not the thought of God but the thought of Beatrice that makes Dante leap into the Circle of Fire; it is she that appears in place of Christ in the Eucharistic Pageant; the Twyform nature of the Gryphon-Christ is seen in her eyes; and it is in the light of her beauty that Paradise is seen—though she herself leads Dante to understand that she is not the only Sign of God and that 'these eyes are not thy only Paradise.' Everything is seen in her light, even the Light of the Universe. Dante's poem about the *seeing* of Beatrice has an infinite meaning because the *seeing* of Beatrice means the *seeing* of the Infinite. Everything in the poem means this. In other words, everything means Infinite Love.

The *Javid Nameh* is lacking in the exploration of values because of its lack of the symbolic-dramatic approach. The poet-protagonist of the *Javid Nameh* already knows the values he sets out to elucidate (تمهید زمینی and تمهید آسمانی). In fact, the poem delineates only the further enlightenment of the already enlightened, and not the crucial, soul-saving enlightenment of one lost in the Dark Wood. And this is what the *m'iraj* myth by itself would imply. In Dante's case it is not enough to recognize, with Miguel Asin, the influence of the *m'iraj* legends; nor can the recognition of influences provide us with any key to the understanding of the *Commedia*, or any work of art for that matter. What must be recognized is that Dante has transmuted all influences into a unique work of art which has a more comprehensive mythical pattern than the *m'iraj* legends by themselves could signify. It is the pattern of death and rebirth, descent and ascent, which marks the full curve of the regenerative-realizational experience and is found in adventure, romance and religion, especially in Nature Cults and Mystery Cults. Dante affirms that the death of the egotistical self is necessary for a spiritual rebirth, that a Purgation of all actual and potential evils is necessary for a fuller and fuller realiza-

tion of the Reality. He affirms that the descent into the Hell within the soul is necessary for spiritual ascent. Otherwise man's heart and eyes and ears may be so hardened or, as the Quran puts it, so 'sealed,' as to allow no ingress to the Image of Truth (نقشِ حق). In this dark Wood of hard-heartedness spiritual progress is blocked by the soul's own propensities to sin (Dante's Three Beasts). Iqbal does not have any deep awareness of sin and its torment and consequently he does not have any deep awareness of beatitude. His *آن سوی افلاک* (Beyond the Heavens) in the *Javid Nameh* lacks the exaltation and the ecstasy of beatitude delineated in the *Paradiso* by intense gestures of light and colour and music and speech and dancing movement. It is Dante that makes us realize what it feels like being in Hell or Heaven. For one thing, Iqbal has no deep awareness of these states because his spiritual journey does not lie through Purgatory. It cannot, in so far as the religious system he is committed to has not developed the idea of Purgation, Purgation of both actual and potential evils by a removal of their causes related to the *moto spiritale* of unwholesome love. And without such a Purgation the full range of the exaltation and the ecstasy of beatitude cannot be realized. Iqbal who has no idea of descent fails to make his ascent an intense experience.

Iqbal does not have Dante's deep insights into experience so as to delineate the whole drama of *moto spiritale* in its mounting intensity, in relation to the Absolute Value. A comparison of the *Javid Nameh* with Dante's *Commedia* would only highlight what Iqbal is not capable of. The *Javid Nameh* resembles the *Paradiso* in having a supra-sensible texture. But in the *Paradiso* this texture is essentially experiential and dramatic and its apparently didactic speeches are part of it. Everything in the *Paradiso* becomes an experience because everything is realized in its significant uniqueness. Through the dialectics of this experiential realization the theme of the poem develops by a progressive

intensification. All this does not happen in the *Javid Nameh*. Here, character and environment are significant, not immediately for themselves, but for the ideas the poet hangs on to them. They are not fused into a dialectical pattern of significant events. The characters appear, talk and disappear, but in most cases nothing significant happens, nothing that may develop the theme and lead it to a climax. Their appearance and disappearance would just leave us unaffected—compare, for example, the appearance and disappearance of Rumi with the appearance and disappearance of Virgil. In the case of Virgil we are most deeply involved; Virgil is most 'real' to us (to use an out-dated term): but Rumi is nothing but a set of speeches. In most cases the speeches of the characters have no experiential justification in the story, and therefore they do not involve us deeply; they just lie as dross, layer upon layer on the consciousness. There are some interesting episodes and some purple passages, usually in the form of ghazals, but they are not part of a developing thematic pattern. There are occasional flashes of drama too, usually in the Shavian sense. For example in *فلک مشتدبی* (Heaven of Jupiter) the conversation with Hallaj, Tahira and Ghalib, whose personalities are already associated with certain cultural values, adds new intellectual dimensions to the themes of Selfhood, love, Destiny and Perpetual Seeking (فراق) and leads to the appearance of Satan as Lord of the Seekers (خواجہ اهل فراق), whose personality is thus subjected to a shockingly novel interpretation. But all this is not part of an organic, dialectical pattern of experience, and is not experientially related to anything before (فلک زحل) and after (فلک مریخ). For lack of such a pattern the theme of Iqbal's poem does not develop through greater and greater intensity to reach the climactic experience of the Beatific Vision which may involve us most deeply with the sense of a most ecstatic, most comprehensive exaltation. Instead of such an experience, the *Javid Nameh* concludes with one more lecture lacking in experien-

tial justification—this time by God.

In the light of the above observations it can be said that it is the non-Muslim poet who, in fact, rises 'from state to state'.

NOTES

- ¹ Sir Mohammad Iqbal, *Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahor, 1930). See Lectures III and IV. All references are to this edition.
- ² Introduction to the *Secrets of the Self*, by R. A. Nicholson. Third Edition, p. XVIII.
- ³ Mohammad Iqbal, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (Lahore, 1954), p. IX.

Shamsur Rehman Farooqi

THE IMAGE OF SATAN IN IQBAL AND MILTON

What in me is dark
Illumine, what is low raise and support;
That to the highth of this great Argument
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justifie the wayes of God to men.

(Paradise Lost, I, 22-6)

Thus Milton, almost in the very beginning of his great effort to prove that God is always right. As has often been pointed out Milton conformed to the accepted classical manner in stating the theme of his epic before proceeding to tell the story. But the simple claim to assert the eternal providence and justify the ways of God to men leads into a complicated poem. Milton finds himself in a situation where he has to show that the Divine attributes of justice and mercy are not contradicted by other aspects of our experience of the world. This exercise in logical theology, in order to succeed, needed two things. In the first place, it was obliged to tease rationality out of the Genesis account of the fall and secondly, to show that the misery of Adam and Eve was relieved by God in his goodness and that God's goodness extends to and purifies all men through the Messiah. Although the sin of Adam and Eve made the Satanic tragedy possible, yet things are not entirely hopeless: God's mercy, alike as his wrath, has good reasons, and mercy always prevails in the end.

That Milton failed in his first enterprise and that—since he had attempted to give logical foundation to his poem—he failed in the second enterprise, too, has been a commonplace of Milton criticism, particularly among those whom (for

the sake of simplification) I may call the Romantic critics. They would like to claim Blake as their ancestor who stated, though with a different purport, that 'The reason Milton wrote in fetters, when he wrote of angels and God and at liberty when of devils and hell is because he was a true poet and of the devil's party without knowing it' (*Marriage of Heaven and Hell*). Blake here seems to identify the Poet with the Romantic Rebel, that is, one who disregards logic and rationality, discards received knowledge, acts in what Weber called the value-rational manner and gives to independence of mind precedence over all other things. Blake must have sensed that Milton was trying to create a logically—and therefore mathematically—coherent myth. He had condemned mathematical form as 'the dead form' as against the 'Gothic, which he declared to be the 'living form'. It was therefore natural that Blake should have seen Milton 'in fetters' when he was writing traditionally about angels and God and 'at liberty' when writing dramatically of devils and hell because the 'true poet' is supposed to be a Rebel and an individualist, and so was Milton.

The main point is whether we are to read the poem in terms of what Milton set out to do or in terms of what he actually did. It can be said that what Milton actually did should be taken as what he set out to do, his own avowals to the contrary notwithstanding. Milton wrote within a certain theological and philosophical framework and our understanding of what he actually did is bound to be incomplete if we ignore that framework. There is no doubt that even unintended meanings are valid meanings if the poem supports them. But with a poet like Milton and in a poem like *Paradise Lost* we are more than usually inclined to find inner evidence for meanings which do not really exist and ignore those that are unmistakably present. We are for example, rather disinclined to read *Paradise Lost* as a Protestant epic or even as a Christian epic. Certain 'intellectual' readings of *Paradise Lost* have tended to produce a vague

impression that Milton really admired Satan. What, in fact, we require is a dispassionate view of Milton's theology. Milton's failure as a theological poet was not that he intended to write a poem about the Fall and eventual redemption of man but that he ended up by producing a glorification of Satan in which (as Coleridge¹ said) he gave Satan a singularity of daring, a grandeur of sufferance and a ruined splendour. . . . Coleridge admitted that Satan finds in 'self the sole motive of action' he has a 'lust of self', and yet Milton somehow invests him with 'the very height of poetic sublimity'. Coleridge thus seems to imply that though Milton failed as a theologian, he succeeded as poet. Shelley thought that, as a moral being, Milton's Satan was far superior to his God, and presumably for the same reason. In our own time Empson² has pithily said that 'the reason why the poem is so good is that it makes God so bad'. But such critics are really judging the theology, not the poetry; they are somehow disinclined to look at the framework of belief and rationality on which Milton constructs his theology.

Milton sincerely believed that he could make his poem a theoretical model of the universe in which everything would be rationally and reasonably explained. For him Christian belief and rationality were one, because the Christian God differed from the pagan gods who were only irrational and vindictive. Indeed, literalism was the standard Christian doctrine. Calvinists had made it even more restrictive. Thomas Aquinas had firmly believed that the historical truth of the biblical narrative should always be the foundation of whatever spiritual explanation was to be offered. Milton shared the widespread Protestant insistence on the 'historicity' of the account of the Creation as given in the Bible and would have permitted an allegorical interpretation only 'when the matter is before proved by other firm testimonies'.

Thus, according to Milton, all that happened was real history and, as Aristotle said, if an improbable event comes

to pass, the very fact of its occurrence is proof of its being probable and true. Milton, as is commonly known, was not writing even a general Catholic poem, but a Protestant one which required a more strict doctrine and which made greater demands on man's ability to believe unseen and indirectly-experienced things. Milton thought that since whatever he believed was true, it was also logical. All he had to do was to let the logic operate in the poem. He went so far as to claim that he would justify the ways of God to 'men', that is all individuals in their individual capacity since the dawn of creation. In its theological aspect only this enterprise may be compared to the attempt of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in his commentary on the Quran where he attempted to give rational explanations of all the myths and miracles mentioned in it. As a theologian Sir Syed failed. Islamic scholars were perceptive enough to see that he failed precisely because the myths and miracles of the Quran did not need any rational explanation. Milton failed to realize this fully and his Romantic admirers the more so. In fact, Milton did have a faint understanding of this position, but he limited it to the rather routine concept of the *inscrutability* of God's ways whose motivations man cannot fathom but whose handiwork he should admire. He writes in the Argument of Book VIII: 'Adam inquires concerning celestial Motions, is doubtfully answer'd, and exhorted to search rather things more worthy of knowledge. This wry bit of prose is followed by some incomparable poetry. Adam wants to know why this whole machinery of the universe had ground endlessly to produce day and night only for 'this Earth a spot, a graine / An Atom, with the Firmament compar'd'. Raphael somewhat coldly replies:

To ask or search I blame thee not, for Heav'n
Is as the Book of God before thee set,
Wherein to read his wondrous Works, and learne
His Seasons, Hours, or Days, or Months, or Yeares;
This to attain, whether Heav'n move or Earth,
Imports not, if thou reck'n right, the rest

From Man or Angel the Architect
Did wisely to conceal, and not divulge
His secrets to be scann'd by them who ought
Rather admire. . . .

(Paradise Lost, VIII, 66-75)

It is obvious that what is involved here is the physical, not metaphysical or moral aspect of things. Adam only wants to know what makes the Newtonian machine work and is gently rebuked. This is further borne out about a hundred lines later: '... be lowly wise:/Think onely what concernes thee and thy being' (VIII, 173-4). Adam does not ask: 'why does man suffer?' or 'why was he created?' These and similar questions will be resolved by the poem. God as an engineer may be inscrutable, God as a ruler is not.

So Milton's consciousness of the impossibility of understanding or attempting to understand and justify God's ways was not really acute enough to make him appreciate the futility of his exercise. His critics have failed almost to a man to face the conclusion that Milton's Satan is imaginatively more appealing than his God not because Milton was an admirer of Satan but because his theology let him down. Had he not been over-ridden by the notion that religious beliefs were historical truths and therefore could be made the basis of a logical model, he would have written a poem more positively full of belief and the joy of believing without reason. Pascal, with his cautious reasoning joining hands with his mysticism, had said that the proof for the truths of the miracles are at least as strong as those for their falsity. Milton was no mystic. He was not even a Dante who, though not a mystic himself, had yet imbibed so much of the mystic lore.

And this brings us to Iqbal. Since the time it became fashionable to assign to poets the rebel's role Milton has been identified with Satan. In this Milton himself was an abettor by his insistence on Reason. Ignorance of the Christian tradition within which Milton worked also made its contribution to the myth. This was not the case with Iqbal. The Islamic tradition, Iqbal's real source of inspiration, was

quite well-known but a rather misguided zeal led critics to discover an outsider in every poet, and hence they averred that Iqbal, occasional though his treatment of Satan may be, was really an admirer of Satan. Needless to say, both impressions are false. Iqbal had undoubtedly his moments of scepticism—perhaps more than Milton had—and this makes his poetry the more warmly human. But the framework of tradition within which Iqbal works does not allow an admiration of Satan or encourage the poet to rationalise divine motivations which in Milton's case resulted in creating a false impression of near diabolism. Had Iqbal tried to rationalise, he too might have ended up with a low key *Paradise Lost* in the two famous poems جبریل اور ابلیس (Gabriel and Satan) in *Baale-e-Jibreel* and تقدیر (Fate) in *Zarb-e-kaleem* that deal directly with the 'fall'. In fact the latter poem runs no such risk even at the hands of the most ardent Satanist because its central idea is borrowed from Ibn al-'Arabi.

'God outmeasures our conjectures and imaginings' is a famous Persian saying. It seems to be based on a tradition in which Prophet Muhammad advises 'Umar and some others not to speculate about esoteric and metaphysical questions relating to God's existence and man's freedom of choice. This theme has been stated again and again by Islamic theologians and sufis. It was most tellingly stated by Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya of Delhi when he said that if God is merciful to his subjects it is his grace (Fazl) and if He is wrathful, it is his justice (Adl). Put in such unequivocal terms, the doctrine destroys forever all attempts to explain, justify or defend God's actions. In spite of his insistence on the potentialities of the self Iqbal makes it clear that whatever the self becomes it becomes only by turning towards God and by His aid. Man takes only what God gives but God cannot be held answerable for what He has or has not given. In his پیرو و مرید (The Seer and the Disciple) which has a strangely Baudelairean effect, he quotes Rumi :

آدمی دیداست باقی پوست است

دید آن باشد که دید دوست است

Man is but seeing, the rest is flesh
Seeing the Friend is what true seeing is.

And as regards Destiny :

بال بازان را سوئے سلطان برد
بال زاغان را بگورستان برد

Wings take the falcon to the king;
Wings take the crow to the graveyard for carrion.

Proceeding on these premises Iqbal had, perhaps, no need to rationalize. It is clear that he is not worried about the mystery of the events of man's creation and fall since he would not have man puzzle about these events. The Christian thinkers were hard put to explain the 'why' of things. Why should have God permitted Satan to rebel and have let him seduce Eve into eating the fruit whose 'mortal tast' gave birth to death and 'all our woe'? Milton explained that out of evil comes good because Satan did nothing but

Heap on himself damnation, while he sought
Evil to others, and enrag'd might see
How all his malice serv'd but to bring forth
Infinite goodness, grace and mercy shewn
On Man . . .

(Paradise Lost, l. 215-19)

But Milton dexterously skirts the questions: 'why did Satan rise in rebellion?' and 'who gave him power to do so?' Milton's theogony would not be complete without resolving these issues, but he only conforms to the pseudo-philosophy of Christian apologists (Calvin not excluded) that God's permissiveness would in a way reduce His control over the created order. This is only begging the question. On the contrary, the Quran, from which all truly Islamic traditions derive their sanction, does not raise this issue but states plainly that all angels 'except Iblis' refused to pay obeisance to Adam. The paradox of free will and God's eternal providence is not mentioned, the implication being that it does not matter. Iqbal's poem 'Satan and God' in *Zarb-e-Kaleem*

touches both questions. But he makes no attempt to philosophize. Making explicit what could be claimed to be implicit in the Quran he merely states that Satan was free to choose. He does not ask if this freedom was innate to Satan or was vouchsafed by God. These considerations are unimportant because in Iqbal's scheme one accepts or rejects totally. One does not temporize or prevaricate. Not that Muslim logicians (mutakallimun) had not tackled these problems. They had, but Iqbal had nothing to do with them and worked on a 'take it or leave it' basis. The poem is worth quoting in full:

ابلیس

اے خدائے کن فکان مستجبہ کو نہ تھا آدم سے بیز
 آہ وہ زندانی نزدیک و دور و دیر و زود
 حرف استکبار تیرے سامنے ممکن نہ تھا
 ہاں مگر تیری مشیت میں نہ تھا میرا سجدوں

یزداں

کب کھلا تجھ پر یہ راز انکار سے پہلے کہ بعد

ابلیس

بعد اے تیری تجلی سے کمالات وجود

یزداں (فرشتوں کی طرف دیکھ کر)

پستی فطرت نے سکھلائی ہے یہ حجت اسے
 کہتا ہے "تیری مشیت میں نہ تھا میرا سجدوں"
 دے رہا ہے اپنی آزادی کو مستحوری کا نام
 ظالم اپنے شعلہ سوزاں کو خود کہتا ہے دود

Satan : O Lord of creating and all that was created,

I bore no grudge against Adam,

Oh, he was but a prisoner of far and near, late and soon.

Words of pride were possible not in thy presence

But yes, thou hadst not ordained my obeisance!

God : When was this mystery discovered to thee, before or after thy denial?

Satan : After, O thou from whose Manifestations are the (wonderful) Signs of Being!

God : [Looking towards the Angels] His baseness of nature has taught him this argument,

Says he: 'Thou hadst not ordained my obeisance'
He terms as helplessness his own freedom.
The cruel joker gives his own burning flame the name of
smoke!

In letting Satan argue on the premise of lack of free choice, and thus making God himself implicitly responsible for the 'fall' of man, Iqbal briefly touches upon the paradox of providence which had troubled both Christian and Muslim (not specifically Islamic) thinkers. Christian theologians affirmed that Satan was only God's slave. He did what he did because God willed so. They further explained it by saying that God did so for the good of man. God 'turns evil into good, and fetches good out of evil'. In *Paradise Regained* particularly, Milton seems to substantiate God's permissiveness by letting Satan claim that he has 'large liberty' even to the 'Heav'n of Heav'ns':

... but that oft
Leaving my dolorous Prison I enjoy
Large liberty to round this Globe of Earth,
Or range in the Air, nor from the Heav'n of Heav'ns
Hath he excluded my resort sometimes.

(*Paradise Regained*, I, 363-7)

It is noteworthy that Milton makes God the active agent in conniving at or at least not preventing Satan's 'resort' to the highest heaven. Thus God becomes the author of evil not only on the terrestrial level but also in the heavens. Small wonder then that Empson thought Milton's God as evil. But this conception of God is directly related to Christian theological thought and not to Milton's alleged predilection towards Satan. Iqbal smoothly dismisses all this by characterizing Satan's argument of lack of free will as an afterthought. His God coolly places the onus on Satan whose burning flame (of pride of knowledge or individualism) denied him the pliability so characteristic of other angels. The Miltonic Satan finds 'permission from above' and leaves us holding a riddle which no amount of ratiocination can unwind:

Thy coming hither, though I know thy scope,
 I bid not or forbid: do as thou find'st
 Permission from above: thou canst not more.

(*Paradise Regained*, l. 494-6)

Iqbal's refusal to admit consideration of Satan's choice is nowhere more apparent than in his famous Persian poem *تسخیر فطرت* (Conquest of Nature) in *Payam-i-Mashriq*. The poem has been quoted as an example of Iqbal's so-called celebration of Satanic individualism and rebellion against authority. Reference has been made to the third canto where Satan tempts Adam not with sin but with visions of liberty and dynamism against the confinement and stasis of Heaven. Thus Satan is alleged to be the agent who fires Adam's heart with a flash of self-consciousness; he plays a positive role in weaning Adam from his innocent but abject dependence on powers that exist outside. Apart from the fact that this reading of the poem disregards the Quranic version of the myth which was never far from Iqbal's mind, we must note that the Adam of the poem is not really the first human being of the Quranic legend, nor is the Iblis the creature who refuses to pay homage to Adam. In 'Conquest of Nature' Adam and Satan are mere allegorical ideas. Iqbal objectifies his ideas of the dignity and power of man and his capacity to outsoar his limitations, both physical and spiritual, by finding the conveniently allegorical characters of Adam and Satan. According to Iqbal, man should be engaged in an eternal quest. Thus 'Conquest of Nature' (as the very title suggests) is not a theological poem like *Paradise Lost* or like Iqbal's own two dialogues, one between Satan and God, referred to earlier, and the other between Satan and Gabriel which will be taken up presently. 'Conquest of Nature' gives expression to Iqbal's own peculiar ideas about the growth of self-consciousness in man. It is an existentialist poem, just as Iqbal's observations on the story of the fall are markedly existentialist in character, making reference as they do to

'man's transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness.'³ The life of سوز و ساز (inner joy and ecstatic experience) that Iqbal considers the highest mode of existence is also celebrated by Adam in the poem thus:

چہ خوش است زندگی را ہمہ سوز و ساز کردن
دل کوہ و دشت و صحرا بدمے گداز کردن

How pleasurable it is to make a *soz-o-saz* of all life;
To soften the heart of hill and forest and desert by just one breath!

'Conquest of Nature' ought to be placed alongside that superbly lyrical Urdu poem فرشتے آدم کو جنت سے رخصت کرتے ہیں (Angels bid farewell to Adam from Heaven). This poem does not share the rhapsodic joyousness at Adam's 'liberation' with the Persian poem. It is tinged with a sacred melancholy and here the angels try to awaken Adam to his potentialities. It sings not so much of a fall as of an entry into a period of trial for Adam. The angels address Adam thus:

عطا ہوئی ہے تجھے روز و شب کی بیدتابی
خبر نہیں کہ تو خاکی ہے یا کہ سیمابی
سنا ہے خاک سے تیری نمود ہے لیکن
تیری سبشت میں ہے کو کبی و مہتابی
جمال اپنا اگر خواب میں بھی تو دیکھے
ہزار ہوش سے خوشتر تری شکر خوابی

Thou hast been vouchsafed restlessness over day and night.
We know not if thou art of earth or quicksilver.
We hear thou hast grown out of dust but
Thy nature is of stars and moon.
If thou were to see thy beauty even in dream
Thy sweet sleeping would then be sweeter than a thousand wakings!

Thus Iqbal is able to disregard the entity of Satan in Adam's farewell. This he could do because Satan's theological person presented no problems to him. Unlike Milton he had no dilemmas to resolve. Otherwise Iqbal almost always refers to Satan as the evil principle, the symbol of ingratitude and misdirection. He quotes Rumi with approval in

Payam-i-Mashriq:

داند آن کو نیک بخت و مستحرم است
 زیرکی ز ابلیس و عشق از آدم است

Knows he who is blessed and a knower of secrets
 That cleverness is from Satan and love from Adam.

Here cleverness stands for Reason (*Aql* in Iqbal's non-sufistic sense) and love for that psychic state which leads to the knowledge of Truth (*Marifat*). The precedence of Love over Reason is a recurrent theme in Iqbal. In *Javid Nama* Iqbal advises his son to destroy Satan with the sword of the Quran.

In the long Persian poem *Pas che bayad kard . . .* he again identifies loveless Reason with Satan:

عقل اندر حکم دل یزدانی است
 چون ز دل آزاد شد شیطانی است

Reason under heart's dominion is God-ness.
 When unfettered from the heart, it is satan-ness.

In the same poem, he states that the mores of Western scientific culture are so corrupting that they could convert Gabriel into Satan and that the Western culture has denigrated knowledge (the act of knowing) through 'city and desert'. Thus Iqbal questions the validity of the claims of reason and rationalism in matters of faith. Indeed, he humbles his Satan before his God precisely because Satan tries to rationalize.

Milton, on the other hand, shared the dilemma of the Christian theologians who had been obliged, almost from the very beginning of their history and particularly since the Renaissance, to walk on a very tight rope. It is obvious that when this kind of rigidity of belief is sought to be injected into a poem with the claim that it can be made to hang together under all circumstances the structure is bound to crack sooner or later. Hence, critics as different as David Daiches and Northrop Frye have reached almost identical conclusions. Daiches states with candour that Milton overlooked the fact that there could be no logical answer to the

question of evil existing in a world ruled by an omniscient, omnipotent and yet benign Deity. Frye speaks of the gulf between the dramatic and conceptual aspects of the poem and points out that 'the doctrinal coherence' of the poem is seriously impaired because the theological situation is the opposite of the dramatic one. The fact is that Milton's God comes out as a rather heartless and certainly unconvincing tyrant :

. . . whose fault?
whose but his own? ingrate, he had of mee
All he could have; I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.

(*Paradise Lost*, III, 96-7)

The slight element of doubt in 'all he could have' is worth some attention. God does not say 'would have' purposely. Yet if Satan was just and right, he should have had all that he would. Also, we may note the rather weak pleading : it was sufficient for him to have persevered in God's faithfulness. He was not required to perform any specific duties. Before commenting further on the concept of 'freedom to fall', attention may be drawn to:

Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell;
Not free, what proof could they have givn sincere
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,
Where onely what they needs must do, appeared,
Not what they would?

(*Paradise Lost*, III, 102-6)

This is obviously an attempt to rationalize the concept of freedom by seeking support from the idea that all created beings also enjoy freedom to worship because if worship were to be exacted, it were no worship at all. Alistair Fowler,⁴ quotes appropriately from Milton's *De Doctrina Christiana* to the effect that if free will 'be not admitted, whatever worship or love we render to God is entirely vain and of no value; the acceptableness of duties done under a law of necessity . . . is annihilated altogether . . .' This raises further questions, but God is not mindful of them. The Quran explicitly declares

'We did not create the Jinns and humans but for that they worship' and sets aside all questions. If the jinns and humans do not fulfil the purpose for which they were created, so much the worse for them. This may be bad logic but is good theology. Milton's God continues in the same vein:

They therefore as to the right belongd
So were created, nor can justly accuse
Thir maker, or thir making, or thir Fate,
As if Predestination overruled
Thir will, disposd by absolute Decree
Or high foreknowledge; they themselves decreed
Thir own revolt, not I: if I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less provd certain unforeknown.

(Paradise Lost, III. 111-19)

The query that if God foreknew, was he not also responsible? is pithily answered by saying that since their fault would have nonetheless occurred even if it was not foreknown, God's foreknowledge had no influence on the occurrence. Fowler again refers to *De Doctrina Christiana* in support of his contention that Milton believed in a liberal version of the doctrine of predestination but he carefully defined predestination and foreknowledge in such a way as to exclude necessity or determinism. He quotes Milton⁵: 'Future events which God has foreseen will happen certainly . . . because the divine prescience cannot be deceived, but they will not happen necessarily, because prescience can have no influence on the object foreknown, inasmuch as it is only an intransitive action.' But this brings the enquirer to a number of recalcitrant issues. If the fault was 'no less proved certain' even if 'unforeknown', then was it not rather preordained? And how does one distinguish between God's knowledge and God's will? Are knowing and willing not the same so far as God is concerned? Particularly when we see that God, even though knowing that the 'fault' would occur, did nothing to prevent it? It is also difficult to reconcile God's utterances here with the suggestion in *Paradise Regained* (I, 494-6)

that Satan does as he 'find'st permission from above' and 'can'st not more'?

Thus we again find Rational Christianity falling over and over again into the pits created by itself. Milton's greatness of course lies in that he faces the issues squarely. Iqbal was saved the embarrassment by sticking to his beliefs and by sticking to a tradition which demanded full acceptance so that it could be 'understood'. (I believe, so that I may understand' had been the doctrine of Aquinas when faced with the intellectual revolution created by the rediscovery of Aristotle in the late Middle Ages.) Immediately after the lines quoted above Milton makes God say that there is hope for man though indeed his tone belies the image of mercy that he seems to be projecting:

... they themselves ordaind thir fall.
The first sort by thir own suggestion fell,
Self-tempted, self-depravd: Man falls deceivd
By the other first: Man therefore shall find grace
The other none: in Mercy and Justice both,
Through Heavn and Earth, so shall my glorie excel
But Mercy first and last shall brightest shine.

(Paradise Lost, III, 128-34)

Milton's God does not speak of Grace but only of mercy and justice. On the contrary the authoritative tone is audible even more ominously later:

Hear all ye Angels, Progenie of Light,
Thrones, Dominations, Princedoms, Vertues, Powers,
Hear my Decree, which unrevok't shall stand.
This day I have begot whom I declare
My onely Son, and on this holy Hill
Him have anointed, whom ye now behold
At my right hand; your Head I him appoint;

(Paradise Lost, V, 600-6)

Then, in the words of Christ:

Mightie Father, thou thy foes
Justly hast in derision . . .

(Paradise Lost, V, 735-6)

According to rational theology, God's purposes were in some sense akin to the purposes and feelings of man himself. This urge towards anthropomorphism only makes matters worse because it necessitated a further urge to examine and question God closely. Thus Milton made the attempt to give a rational basis to theological issues but did not much succeed in carrying it through. Iqbal, on the other hand, made no such attempt—as we have already seen in the case of *تسخیرِ فطرت* where he contents himself with creating an allegorical rhapsody. The dialogue between God and Satan (entitled *تقدیر*) is the only poem in which Satan and God are juxtaposed. In this poem Satan is not the degenerate creature that C.S. Lewis would have us believe the Miltonic Satan to be, but he is clearly shown as more cunning than intelligent, eager to score a point yet not unwilling to ingratiate himself with God who gives him short shrift. The much more famous and complex dialogue 'جبریل و ابلیس' in *Bal-e-Jibreel* apparently shows Gabriel—and by implication God—on the defensive and is generally quoted as an indication of Iqbal's approval of Satan's posture of self glorification. Doubtless Satan upheld the right to individual affirmation or denial, and this quality Iqbal always admired, since it symbolically represents for him the necessary concomitant of the continual growth of the ego.

Dr. Johnson was perhaps the first important critic to complain that there was a want of human interest in *Paradise Lost*. That this view was ill founded most of us would agree now. There have, however, been important critics in the present century who have failed to discover in the poem any very significant area of critical interest, human or otherwise. To my mind the chief interest of the poem is not that Milton pitifully exposes himself as a diabolist, as envisaged by critics like Tillyard and Empson. What the case of Milton highlights is the truth that theology should not be tested against reason. Fowler has successfully argued against Waldock and Empson that Milton wrote an unchristian poem

in spite of himself. The poem can also be seen to have a logical structure. Milton may not have created a personal God nor a personal Satan as Empson and others have claimed, but he certainly created a Satan and a God who were larger than life.

Iqbal, on the other hand, made no attempt to create an epical Satan or even Adam. It is therefore unfair to isolate a few poems or lines for comparison with Milton. Iqbal conceives Satan in plain black and white and does not give him a true poetic stature. Because of the lack of necessity to rationalize, Iqbal is not much preoccupied with the fall. Even his famous observation in the *Lectures* that the fall is 'man's transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the dream of nature with a throb of causality in one's own being' (p. 85) leaves Satan entirely out of the reckoning. His long Urdu poem in *Armughan-e-Hijaz* entitled *ابلیس کی مجلس شوریٰ* (The Parliament of Satan) contrasts rather poorly with the Parliament of devils in *Paradise Lost*, II, 1-505 mainly because Milton shows greater dramatic sense, and Iqbal for all his rhetoric, presents Satan only as a general given to bombast and delusions of grandeur. He alternately raves and plots like a demagogic terrorist and does not come up to Milton's 'grand infernal peers' and 'their mighty paramount' (*Paradise Lost*, II, 507-708). Iqbal's other poems show that he had some talent for drama. That he held it here in abeyance would perhaps indicate that to him the subject was not big enough. At any rate, but for the two dialogues, Iqbal's Satan remains almost a shadowy figure while Milton's Satan stands supreme as a creature of the imagination.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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Annemarie Schimmel

IQBAL AND GOETHE

Among poets Iqbal had unbounded admiration for Rumi and Goethe who had indeed become the guiding stars in his life. He has immortalized their contribution to human culture in a poem in the *Payam-i-Mashriq* where he sees them as representatives of love, of that dynamic love which was expressed by Goethe in his *Faust* and by Rumi in the *Mathnavi*, so that each of them 'has a book although he cannot be called a prophet' (as Jami wrote about Maulana Rumi).

Iqbal is like a prism filtering out, as it were, certain rays of a particular wave length from the poetry and thought of both Rumi and Goethe. It would be all too easy to compare these masters superficially, as has been done time and again. We have to remember the different cultural situations, the political and social settings into which Goethe and Iqbal were born. Furthermore, as much as Goethe's poetry was inspired all through his life by the various experiences of human love, of *eros* in the full sense of the word, as little do we know of any 'human' attraction which could have induced Iqbal to write his poetry—neither Faust's Gretchen, nor the Sulaykha of Goethe's *West-Oestlicher Divan* has a counterpart in Iqbal's work; nor do we know of a Shams-i-Tabriz in his life if we want to compare him to Rumi. In spite of these external differences, however, there exists a spiritual affinity which enabled Iqbal to understand some of the most vital aspects of Goethe's work.

Goethe stands at a critical point of German cultural history, especially the history of Germany's meeting with the

Near and Middle East. He came at the time when the Age of Enlightenment had already opened new horizons; the narrow, church bound attitude towards the Muslim East was slowly being overcome in the West. The literary treasures of the East were now discovered for the first time, and duly appreciated. The beginning, however, of what Iqbal calls the 'Oriental Current' in German literature is mainly due to Herder. This theologian and philosopher had inherited from his teacher Hamann the idea that poetry is the mother tongue of the human race, and he rightly held that from poetry we come to learn the human mind much better than by studying the crooked ways of political history. Herder was very fond of Sadi while the elegant verse of Hafiz, available only in rather insipid translations, seemed too butterfly-like to him. It was during his meeting with young Goethe in Strassburg that the latter's interest in Oriental subjects was kindled. In Goethe's paternal home in Frankfurt, the Bible was, of course, intensely studied, and the poet always remained indebted to the powerful diction of this book. In 1772, at the age of 23, Goethe, however, began to study the Quran in the German version by his Frankfurt compatriot Megerlein. Inspired by various and conflicting writings about Prophet Muhammad, he intended to compose a drama about him as a counterweight to Voltaire's rather satirical picture of the Prophet of Islam. But he finished only two pieces of this drama: one is a prayer of Abraham, forsaking the worship of stars and turning to the Creator instead; it is clearly inspired by the relevant passage in Sura 6. The Second piece was meant as a dialogue between Ali and Fatima, but later converted into a hymn called *Mahometsgesang*. Here, the Prophet is symbolized as a stream which, emerging from a small fountain, grows into a brook, and eventually into a mighty river, carrying with him all the smaller rivers, which he brings back to the Father, the fathomless ocean. Goethe has very well interpreted the mystical feeling, expressed by Maulana Rumi and others, that prophetic

activity indeed resembles a river nourished by the rain of grace; river-like, the Prophet will bring home all those who search for the same goal and cannot find the way by themselves. More than one century after Goethe, R. M. Rilke was to use the same symbol in his deeply felt appreciation of Islam in a letter written from Cordova to the Princess Thurn und Taxis (1912). The truly Islamic character of Goethe's poem is evident; that is why Iqbal has given a very free Persian version of it in the *Payam-i-Mashriq*; and we may assume that the *nom de plume* which he is given by Rumi in the *Javidnameh*, i.e. *Zindarud*, 'Living Stream', is an elegant allusion to the prophetic power.

Goethe took little interest in Oriental topics, at least in the form of serious studies of these themes, for more than forty years, although he read the translations that appeared year after year in Europe (among them that of Tahsinuddin's *Kamalata and Kamarupa*). It was in early 1813, at the time of the greatest political turmoil in Germany, that he felt attracted to the East once more. Not in vain did he call the first verse of the new collection of poems, which grew in the next five years, *Hegira*, for he wanted to flee from the confused political scene in the West to the world of patriarchal harmony and purity. The outward reason for this reverting to the East was not so much the output of the Romantic poets and scholars who attested that the Orient, and particularly India, was the homeland of everything beautiful; it was rather the appearance of the first complete German translation of the Divan of Hafiz, produced by Joseph von Hammer. This rather unpolished translation of Hafiz, which was published in two small volumes in 1812-13, awakened in Goethe the feeling of a close relationship with the Persian poet, whom he called his 'twin brother'. Hammer's translation has often been criticized, but it is still better, because it is more faithful, than most of the later adaptations of the poetry of Hafiz in German or English. Goethe was able to discover the greatness of Hafiz from these translations, and

he readily saw the oscillating character of Persian poetry, which should neither be understood as completely worldly (as Hammer thought) nor as purely mystical (as Silvestre de Sacy held). 'The word is a fan'—that is what Goethe discovered: a fan, both veiling and unveiling the beauty of the Friend's face. Goethe was also aware that 'in this poetry the language as language plays the most important role'. The love of a charming young woman—Marianne Jung-von Willemer—added to the feeling of proximity to the Persian poet's love-songs all the more as Marianne was able to answer him in elegant verse. Thus various reasons contributed to the growth of the *West Oestlicher Divan*, in which Goethe utters his confession that, if Islam means surrender into God's will, all of us live in Islam:

Wenn Islam Gott ergeben heisst,
In Islam leben und sterben wir alle.

In this book of poetry a perfect blending of Eastern and Western thought has been achieved for the first time. And besides the deep and colourful poetry there are also the *Noten und Abhandlungen*, a collection of stray thoughts about oriental topics, such as the character of Arabic and Persian poetry, the most famous poets, political systems and so on. Even today the Orientalist cannot but admire Goethe's deep insight into the essentials of Islamic culture and into the character of Persian poetry.

In the same year that the *Divan* appeared in print, in 1819, a young German orientalist-poet, Friedrich Ruckert, composed for the first time ghazals in German, introducing the thought of Maulana Rumi as well as the Persian form into German literature. He thus inaugurated the Oriental Current proper, a current of which he, a gifted poet and an excellent scholar of some fifty languages, was and remained the best and foremost representative.

The Germans had accepted Oriental topics from early times, and with Goethe the legacy of the Islamic world became part and parcel of Germany's cultural tradition. In

the East, however, the knowledge of Western traditions was very deficient. For political reasons the Indian Muslims remained mainly confined to the English tradition in literature. Iqbal is an exception. Although he praised Wordsworth and translated short poems of some English and American writers into Urdu in his early years, his love for Goethe is visible from the very beginning of his career. It is evident from his beautiful poem in honour of Ghalib, who, says Iqbal, rests in the dust of Delhi, while his spiritual brother Goethe slumbers in the rose-garden of Weimar. This corresponds well with his remark in *Stray Reflections* (1910): 'I confess I owe a great deal to Hegel, Goethe, Mirza Ghalib, Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil and Wordsworth'. In fact, the *Stray Reflections*, which are notes written after Iqbal's return from Europe at the time of a transformation in his *weltanschauung*, allow us a revealing insight into Iqbal's mind. Although it would have been natural for a poet educated in British Mission schools and universities to prefer English poetry, yet he gives the palm to Goethe. Syed Nazir Niyazi rightly observes:

Perhaps what life needs more than those who 'know the secrets of nature' are men who can understand its ultimate purpose. Goethe was such a man and so was Iqbal. And it was Iqbal who turned our attention to Goethe. It is a remarkable episode in our history that Iqbal alone should have resisted the force of a whole literature and culture which was dominating our life through political control. Whatever the reason . . . it is a fact that we accepted Goethe rather than Shakespeare. Shakespeare is no doubt admired but Goethe is the favourite. Shakespeare is a unique artist whom we all recognize, but Goethe is one of us who has secured a place in our hearts. If we bear this point in mind, a glimpse of the perfect man, or vicegerent of God, or Man, and his character and disposition as conceived by Iqbal, is seen to some extent in Faust, a creature of Goethe's thought, and not in the Superman of Nietzsche.

According to Iqbal, Goethe was capable of symbolizing humanity in the one figure of his Faust:

Both Shakespeare and Goethe re-think the Divine thought of creation. There is, however, one important difference between them. The realistic Englishman re-thinks the individual—the idealist German, the

universal. His Faust is a seeming individual only. In reality, he is humanity individualised. (*Stray Reflections*, p. 144).

Or, in different words: 'if you wish to study the anatomy of the human mind, you may go to Wundt, Ward, James or Stout. But a real insight into human nature you can get from Goethe alone (*ibid.*, p. 139). Iqbal does not hesitate to see in *Faust* the true representative of the German mind, much closer to the people's feeling than even the new Testament: 'it is Goethe's Faust—not the books supposed to have been written by the Galilean Fishermen—which reveals the spiritual ideals of the German nation. And the Germans are fully conscious of it' (*ibid.*, p. 66). And as he acknowledged his indebtedness to Maulana Rumi's genius by choosing him as his spiritual guide, he also confessed that he discovered his own limits after reading Goethe: 'our soul discovers itself when we come into contact with a great mind. It [was] not until I had realized the infinitude of Goethe's imagination that I discovered the narrow breadth of my own' (*ibid.*, p. 2). This statement is repeated in poetry in the Prologue of the *Payam-i-Mashriq*, which contains perhaps the finest praise of the German poet in Iqbal's work. Rather, the whole of the *Payam-i-Mashriq* is devoted to his praise, for it was Iqbal's intention to give an answer to Goethe's *West Oestlicher Diwan*. He eagerly looked for someone who might translate this book of his into German so that Goethe's compatriots might see the first answer to his work coming from the East.

We may ask ourselves what the common denominator between the two men was. Perhaps one answer can be found in Iqbal's remark about Plato (quite different from his later criticism!): 'nature was not quite decided what to make of Plato—poet or philosopher. The same indecision she appears to have felt in the case of Goethe' (*ibid.*, p. 128). Was he himself not also caught in the same dilemma, acting both as poet and philosopher, although in both cases with a strong undercurrent of 'prophetic' inspiration and activity?

Perhaps it was Goethe's creativity which made Iqbal admire the German poet:

Goethe picked up an ordinary legend and filled it with the whole experience of the nineteenth century—nay, the entire experience of the human race. This transformation of an ordinary legend into a systematic expression of man's ultimate ideal is nothing short of Divine workmanship. It is as good as the creation of a beautiful universe out of the chaos of formless matter (ibid., p. 71).

Here, Goethe appears as the creative *khalifa*, God's vicegerent, whose activities are expressed best in the 'Dialogue between God and Man' in the *Payam-i-Mashriq*. Iqbal was also attracted by Goethe's evaluation of history and his broad knowledge of humanities and science; the lines in the *Divan*:

Wer nicht von dreitausend Jahren
sich weiss Rechenschaft zu geben,
bleib im Dunkeln unerfahren,
mag von Tag zu Tage leben—

(He who cannot give account of three thousand years of history, should stay in the dark as an ignorant man and may live from one day to the next!) fit well into his own appreciation of history in which, as the Quran has stated, God's activity manifests itself. To know the history of three thousand years, as Goethe deems necessary, means to see the ways of God in the movements of history and to possess the accumulated treasures of the past experience of mankind. Iqbal's stay in Germany certainly enhanced his love for German culture, as Atiya Begum has clearly attested in her memoirs; it also enhanced his capacity for reading German literature in the original language, and he did enjoy not only Goethe's but also Heine's verse (see *Stray Reflections* p. 151). One of his most famous early poems in the *Bang-e-Dara*, written in Heidelberg on the bank of the Neckar on a summer night, is without doubt his answer to Goethe's tender poem *Wanderers Nachtlied* (Ueber allen Gipfeln ist Ruh . . .) which the poet, then 31 years old, as Iqbal was in 1908, composed on 6 September 1780 in Ilmenau (Thuringia). Still, it was

not so much Goethe the lyric poet that attracted Iqbal, nor the Goethe who had praised Hafiz in glowing terms; it was rather Goethe the poetical thinker. Erns Beutler rightly says that the poems of the *West Oestlicher Divan* 'exude strength'; Iqbal did certainly feel this spiritual strength, this joyful acceptance of life in all its varieties as it found expression in Goethe's work.

One aspect of Goethe's thought which was particularly close to Iqbal's own feeling was the importance he attached to a certain polarity of experience. He had expressed the idea of this polarity with the help of an oriental symbol in his poem: 'In Atemholen sind zweierlei Gnaden . . .' (Favor twofold we in breathing see, / The air we draw, then set it free, / One is constraint, the other bliss . . .) thus taking up the Sufi tradition of the constant change of *qabd* and *bast*, spiritual constriction and spiritual exaltation as manifest in the act of breathing. This permanent interplay of the two 'breaths' is manifested best in the *dhikr* formula of the *shahada*, where the negative *la ilah* leads to the positive *illa Allah*. Comparable to Ibn Arabi and his followers, who saw the world as part of the eternal process of Divine breathing, Goethe, too, recognized God's breath in the *systole* and *diastole*, the inherent polarities of creation—be they thought and action, or Lucifer and the angelic powers. In Iqbal's work, the interplay of *jamal* and *jalal* is highly important, and like Maulana Rumi who had described the mystical *hal* as a sudden *jilwa* and the *maqam* as the enduring state of *khalwa* (*Mathnawi*, I, 1435), Iqbal sees the secret of man's spiritual life in his constant movement from the prayer-life in the *khalwa* with God to *jilwa* where the results of the former experience are to be manifested. *Khalwa* and *jilwa* together form the fabric of life, just as Love and Intellect constitute the *warp* and *woof* of human existence. Again we may remember Goethe who said in 1829: a century which occupies itself exclusively with analysis and is almost afraid of synthesis, is not on the

right path; for only the two together, like inbreathing and outbreathing, constitute the life of science. Iqbal's poem 'Love and Science' in the *Payam-i-Mashriq* seems like a poetical version of this saying. Like the German poet, Iqbal too thought that the polarities which constitute real life will be reserved in the infinite Perfection (*kamal*) of God. He therefore does not hesitate to quote one of Goethe's poems in his *Lectures*:²

In the endless self-repeating
 For evermore flows the Same.
 Myriad arches springing, meeting
 Hold at rest the mighty frame.
 Streams from all things love of living.
 Grandest star and humblest cold,
 All the straining, all the striving
 Is eternal peace in God.

Iqbal recognized in Goethe the same dynamism which permeated his own philosophical and poetical work. Faust, the man who always strives to attain higher levels of individuation, seems like a prefiguration of his own ideals. He was also fascinated by the second figure in *Faust*, Satan or Mephistopheles. This spirit 'who always negates' and who 'always intends evil and creates good' fitted well into Iqbal's satanology. Did not Goethe put the following words about Satan's importance into the mouth of God:

Des Menschen Tätigkeit muss allzuleicht erschlaffen;
 Er liebt sich bald die unbedingte Ruh;
 Drum geb ich gern ihm den Gesellen zu,
 Der reizt und wirkt und muss als Teufel schaffen.
 For man's activity can easily abate,
 He soon prefers uninterrupted rest;
 To give him this companion hence seems best
 Who roils and must as Devil help create. (tr. W. Kaufmann)

Out of man's constant struggle with Iblis, who lured him out of the peace of Paradise, the colorful picture of the world emerges. 'His blood make the story of creation

colorful', as Iqbal sings in the *Javidnameh*. His clearest statement about Satan is certainly the one in *Taskhir-i-fitrat*, the five-part poem in the *Payam-i-Mashriq*, which ends with man's victory over his temptor who now performs the prostration before the Perfect Man he had not performed before the unexperienced Adam. The Perfect Man can say with the Prophet '*Aslama shaytani*,' (My Satan has surrendered to me, or, has become a Muslim). Goethe's Faust, in turn, is rescued from Satan's clutches by the angelic powers because of his incessant striving to move to higher levels. Man's duty is the *jihad akbar*, the fight against the satanic powers and his own lower potencies which may prevent the unfolding of his personality—Goethe says in the *West Oestliche Divan*, when the poet asks for admission to Paradise:

Lass mich immer nur hinein;
 Denn ich bin ein Mensch gewesen,
 und das heisst ein Kämpfer sein.
 . . . once for all now—let me in,
 Know that I have been a mortal,
 That's a fighter to have been. (tr. J. Weiss)

This constant struggle of man is the theme of both Goethe's and Iqbal's verse; it should not, however, be interpreted as an ascetic achievement—something that distinguished early sufism; it must rather be understood in the context of Love, which is the dynamic core of life. Every step in which Satan is overcome is a step towards God, and that means, for both poets, towards the realization of man's personality. Goethe admired 'the powerful personality' even though he recognized its demonic aspects: his verses on Tamerlane in the *Divan*, where the conqueror and the demons of winter are confronted, is his poetical expression of his feelings for Napoleon and his breakdown in the Russian winter of 1812. To be sure, Goethe's most famous verse about 'personality' has a slightly ironical bent:

Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder
sei nur die Persönlichkeit—

Highest bliss for human beings
be the 'personality' . . .

We may interpret his attitude in the sense in which Max Scheler was to define it a century later: 'Love in prophetic religion means to gain a true personality by the living contact with God'. That would be Iqbal's view, too; for man drawing closer and closer to God, realizes the possibilities of his small Ego the more he approaches the all-embracing Divine Ego. It implies a constant growth in love; and in this respect Iqbal is close to classical writers of Sufism, such as Qushayri, Najmuddin Kubra, Attar and Maulana, who knew after every step a new step will follow, that longing has no end (as Ghazzali said in his *Ihya al-'Ulum al-Din*), and that the 'way in God' follows the 'way toward God'. The poet unfolds his love in growing circles; he cannot stop anywhere, and even the houris in Paradise complain that he does not care for them: Iqbal's poem 'The Houri and the Poet' in the *Payam-i-Mashriq* reminds the reader immediately of Goethe's similar treatment of the subject, as do some lines in Iqbal's later Urdu poetry. At the end of the *Javidnameh*, when Zindarud experiences 'growing without diminishing' in the Divine Presence, we are not only close to classical Sufi theories but even more to Goethe, who describes Paradise at the end of his *Divan* in the words:

bis im Anschau ew'ger Liebe
wir verschweben, wir verschwinden . . .

. . . till in swoon of Love eternal
we melt up, and with it blend.

This constant growth is produced by 'dying to one's lower qualities', by constant sacrifice. By following the device *mutu qabla anta mutu*, 'die before ye die', man experiences the spiritual resurrection already here on earth, and the shock of corporeal death means not much to him. His Ego will continue growing in the other world, provided it is

strong enough: 'Personal immortality is not a state, it is a process'. This statement from the *Stray Reflections* (p. 17) is later elaborated in the *Lectures* 'Personal immortality . . . is not ours as of right; it is to be achieved by personal effort' (p. 119). Heaven is no holiday, as Iqbal states in the same lecture: for man is called to enter into deeper and deeper abysses of the infinite Godhead. Goethe felt the same way, as he mentioned on 4 February 1829 to Eckermann: 'The conviction of our continuation emerges, for me, from the concept of activity; for when I work here without rest then nature is obliged to arrange for me another form of existence, if the present one can no longer endure my spirit'. But how to realize this growth? Goethe's poem *Selige Sehnsucht* is the answer to this question. Here the German poet has taken over the symbol of moth and candle, used first in the Islamic tradition by Hallaj in his *Kitab al-Tawasin*, to show that eternal life can be found only by 'dying and becoming', by sacrificing oneself in order to attain duration. He has expressed this feeling of the necessity of metamorphosis, the development in animals and plants, in many a poem, for he knew that the wish to remain stable and immobile is equivalent to death:

Denn alles muss in Nichts zerfallen,
Wenn es im Sein beharren will.

Iqbal intends the same mystery of life in his numerous lines about the *soz-i-natamam*, the renewed longing for ever-new and higher manifestations of life.

But we should not limit the similarities between Goethe and Iqbal to the spiritual sphere alone. Iqbal has also adopted some outward features from the German master—the very form of the *Payam-i-Mashriq* shows that. The *Javidnameh* is also influenced by Goethean forms although the name of the German poet is not mentioned. But the story of the upward way of the poet-philosopher (as in *Faust* blended with motifs from Milton's *Paradise Lost* and Dante's *Divina Commedia*, begins with a 'Prologue in Heaven' and a 'Prologue on Earth', both modelled on prolo-

gues in Goethe's *Faust*. Once more Syed Nazir Niazi is an important source for our knowledge of Iqbal's relation to Goethe. He writes:

Faust was translated direct from German into Urdu at the instance of the Anjuman-e Taraqqi-e-Urdu by the writer's companion, Dr Syed Abid Husain, in the Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi. This translation was in prose and was confined to Part I of *Faust*. It is possible that I had mentioned this translation to Iqbal or it had reached him in some other way, but in a letter dated the 14th August 1931 he enquired if Dr Abid Husain had also translated the Prologue in Heaven. Perhaps he made this enquiry in connection with the *Javidnameh* which he was writing at that time. . . . When I met Iqbal some days later and *Faust* was mentioned in the course of conversation, he again enquired why Dr Abid Husain had not translated the second part. He also offered to help Dr Abid Husain in this task. He observed that the second part was a little difficult as it contained numerous terms connected with Astronomy and Chemistry and also references and allusions with which the people of the West were not familiar and which were properly understood only by Orientals.

The impression that Iqbal's admiration of Goethe was partly due to the German poet's deep historical knowledge is reinforced by a further quotation from Nazir Niazi's book referring to the latter's impression of *Faust*.

He [Iqbal] said: During my stay in Germany, I had many an occasion to offer clarifications and explanations of these terms and usages and this used to leave a deep impression on my German audience. The fact is that Goethe possessed an enormous vision. It was his belief that if one had not studied and examined the history of the past one thousand [sic] years, he could not claim to be cultured and refined. How was it possible, therefore, for every German to be familiar with all the usages and allusions that Goethe had culled from Oriental literature? To us these terms are words of daily use. I had no difficulty whatsoever in digesting these sections of *Faust*. The Germans really marvelled at the ease with which I explained these terms.

This is perhaps the best explanation for Iqbal's great fascination for Goethe.

There is, however, one point that has always been slightly embarrassing for the lovers of both Goethe and Maulana Rumi. Iqbal himself has pointed out the fact that the remarks

of his German spiritual guide about Rumi, as laid down in the *Noten und Abhandlungen*, were anything but flattering. It seems that from the few comments which were available in German literature (Hammer's *Fundgruben* and, in 1818, the same scholar's *Geschichte der schoenen Redekunste Persiens*) he gained the impression that Rumi was a representative of measureless and formless pantheism, a religion which he thoroughly disliked; for hazy mysticism contradicted his lucid views about God and the world; Rumi's tales seemed to him confused and confusing. Goethe was afraid of, and did loathe, everything shapeless, everything that did not develop in a living form. Just as he wrote some satirical lines about many-headed Indian deities so that A.W.Schlegel, the founder-father of German Indology, called him 'Allah's new zealot', he could not find anything attractive in the few tales of the *Mathnavi* which were available to him. Iqbal rightly states in his Urdu introduction of the *Payam-i-Mashriq* that even though Maulana Jalaluddin appeared to Goethe as a pantheist, it was amazing that he, who defended Giordano Bruno and showed a deep interest in Spinoza, was not willing to acknowledge Rumi's greatness. Iqbal recognized the similarity of at least some of Rumi's and Goethe's thought, and that is why he placed them side by side in one of the most revealing poems of the *Payam-i-Mashriq*: he gratefully confesses his indebtedness to both the German and the Islamic poet-thinkers by showing that both of them were aware of the deepest mysteries of man's way through the world and had experienced and taught that the secret of life is (in Rumi's words): 'From Satan intellect, from Adam love'.

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A. A. Siddiqi

IQBAL AND MARXISM

The object of this paper is not to trace Marx's influence on Iqbal but to show the resemblance in their approach to significant social phenomena. Iqbal was the greatest thinker that the Muslims in India produced during the twentieth century. His influence on all aspects of educated Muslim thought and opinion was pervasive and profound. He built up his own system of thought in his philosophy of the ego, the elements of which he borrowed from the Quran and the teachings of the prophet of Islam. His *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is his major work in prose in which he elucidated various aspects of his thought. But for his social philosophy—where major issues like production of wealth, distribution of income, the composition of the society and the state, the major political and economic systems are concerned—we get no light from the *Reconstruction*. These ideas, curiously enough, are expressed in his poetical works, whose outstanding examples are 'Khizr-i-Rah', 'Tulu-e-Islam,' 'Payam', 'Paigham-i-Afghani ba Millat-i-Rusiah', 'Iblis ki Majlis-e-Shura', etc.

Iqbal was most sensitive to ideas and situations. One marvels at the wealth and variety of his references to past and contemporary events and situations presented in the most exquisite poetry: the crisis of ideologies in the 'thirties, the establishment of a socialist state in Russia, the emergence of Fascism; the formation of Labour government in Britain under MacDonald, the rape of Abyssinia, the constitutional reforms of 1919 in India, etc. He was not unfamiliar with the basic ideas of Marx and Lenin though we find no traces of his

specific comments on Marx's economic interpretation of history or his laws of motion of capitalism. If we could identify the community of ideas in certain important respects between Iqbal and Marx, and this notwithstanding their diversity of approach, the purpose of this paper will be more than served.

II

Iqbal's was a remarkable personality. The generation that grew up in India during two world wars shows unmistakable traces of his influence on it. In Iqbal we find Islam at its best, purifying human conduct contaminated by avarice, exploitation, slavery and addiction to purely selfish ends. His mind registered every single important incident that occurred between the beginning of the present century and its middle thirties. The rival systems of thought and belief were considered on their merit and were rejected in favour of Islam. Marx, too, passed through a similar process of rejection and acceptance. He was the arch enemy of capitalism, considered capitalism at its best, extolled its virtues and rejected it in favour of socialism. There is, therefore, a great deal common between Iqbal and Marx, inspite of the differences in their approach to social reality.

To be fair to Iqbal, one must concede at the outset that his acquaintance with Marx was more than casual. He often advised young men to study economics and physical sciences i. e. concentrate on disciplines other than those that had been cultivated among Indians. He himself had studied economics and must have had ample opportunity to reflect on the sociological and economic basis of Marx's thought. He was not unaware of the popularity of Marxist ideas in literary circles in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century when he himself was in Europe. Later on, after the first World War, the establishment of a socialist state in Russia must have profoundly affected him. Above all Iqbal was a visionary and a poet. His upbringing and family herit-

age inclined him towards mysticism. The latter with its emphasis on toleration of other people's point of view, equality, fraternity and social justice and a passion for the down-trodden must have attracted him to a system, which derives its motive force in large measure from the notion of social justice. His interest in Marxism as a significant force in shaping the destiny of the human race is apparent in his first major poem in Urdu, 'Khizr-e-Rah' and some verses in 'Tulu-e-Islam', all contained in his major poetical work in Urdu, *Bang-e-Dara*; in five poems—'Payam', 'Suhbat-i-Raftagan dar Alam-i-Bala', 'Mahavra mabain Hakim Fransvi Auguste Comte wa Mard-i-Mazdoor', 'M. Lenin wa Qaiser William' and 'Navai Mazdoor'—all included in *Payam-i-Mashriq* first published in 1923; his comments on 'Ishtirakiyat wa Malukiat' and 'Paigham-i-Afghani ba Millat-i-Rusiah', which find their place in *Javid Nama* (1932) and 'Lenin Khuda ke Huzoor main' and 'Farman-i-Khuda Farishton ke Nam', to be found in his greatest poetical work in Urdu, *Bal-e-Jibril*. In *Zarb-e-Kalim*, we find the poet musing on many significant matters affecting humanity. We are struck in particular by three poems—'Ishtirakiyat', 'Karl Marx ki Awaz', and 'Bolshevik Roos'. His last work, published posthumously, *Armughan-i-Hijaz*, contains the significant poem called 'Iblis ki Majlis-e-Shura'. Here we find the poet pondering on the causes of the disintegration of human society, the ills that afflict it, the systems it has devised to survive—monarchy, democracy, fascism, Marxism. He reiterates his point of view that salvation lies in Islamic principles contained in the Quran. It is, therefore, clear that a poet holding a definite point of view, discussing Marxism in such a variety of manner, highlighting its significant aspects and contrasting it with alternative systems of thought, cannot be said to have considered Marxism only casually. His rejection of Marxism does not imply that he had failed to apply his mind to the problems brought into focus by the social philosophy of Marx.

III

A superb theorist, an effective propagandist and pamphleteer, an agitator of some notriety, Marx founded a school of thought which extended over several disciplines. His economics is unintelligible without an understanding of his sociology and the latter is based on his analysis of past and contemporary history. His theory of social classes is grounded in the view of human history as a succession of periods determined by the mode of production—the system whereby the needs of the society are met and the relationships in which different sorts of people stand with one another in the productive process are established. Thus technology and social relations of production characterise the mode of production. The basis of class is the ownership of the means of production or exclusion from ownership. There are, therefore, two classes, the owners of the means of production—the capitalists—and workers, who own nothing except their labour power. The intermediate group has a tendency to merge with either of the two classes. The division of the society into haves and have-nots engenders conflict, intensifies it and it becomes an instrument of change in the position of one class in relation to the other. The theory of social classes imparts definiteness to the mode of production, and through it determines the social structure. Ideas, personality and religious fervour, all occupy a secondary place, though they are recognised to play their limited role in the social order. The economic interpretation of history reveals fine nature and peculiarities of beliefs, system of values and the whole superstructure of civilisation including the fine arts. The theory is by no means accepted even by historians, who object to its sweeping generalisations and its neglect of statistical data. In Marxian system, the economic interpretation of history provides the definition of capitalism. The mechanics of capitalism is provided by the economic theory. Marx looked on economics as providing a key to the discovery of laws of motion of capitalism.

Capitalism is based on exploitation and it is his theory of exploitation to which we will turn first.

Marx believed that the capitalist hires labour at market rate. Labour becomes a commodity through historical transformation, and its value is determined, like the value of any other commodity, by its cost of production; here in the case of labourer, cost of reproduction. The capitalist makes labourer work either for longer hours or more intensively in a short period. He is able thereby to obtain more value from the product produced through hired labour than he has to pay to the labourer in the form of wages. This is surplus value, unpaid labour, obtained by the capitalist to be invested in acquiring more capital. The process of capital accumulation goes on merrily changing the ratio of capital to worker, called by Marx, 'organic composition of capital' thus diminishing the labourer's share in the total output on the one hand, and bringing into being what he calls the 'reserve army of labour', on the other. In fair weather, as a result of capital accumulation, demand for labour goes up leading to rise in wages and the absorption of the reserve army of labour. Soon afterwards the costs of production rise, demand for commodities slackens and depression sets in. The reserve army of labour is replenished. The industrial activity thus exhibits a wave like pattern called business cycle, now rising, now declining; thus creating intense periods of hectic activity followed by fall in production, growing unemployment, reduction of incomes and uncertainty all around. The crises then become endemic and lead to further reorganisation of forces by capitalism through concentration or the tendency of firms to grow in size. The theory of capital accumulation is now combined with the theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, to show that the rate of profit is a function of the ratio of surplus value to the organic composition of capital. In other words, Marx says that the rate of profit varies directly with the rate of surplus value and inversely with the organic composition of capital. As wages rise but little, profit per worker remains constant, while

organic composition of capital has a tendency to grow. With the falling tendency of profit established the driving force of capitalism is thwarted leading to stagnation and its eventual breakdown. What is significant is that capitalism as a system of production is more advanced than anything the world has ever seen since its development. It goes a long way in the conquest of nature, derives inspiration from science and constantly revolutionises its technique of production, and brings into being a value system which is free from dogma and superstition. But it also produces within itself strife and conflict—contradictions, to be precise—which divide the society, create poverty in the midst of plenty, induce industrially advanced nations to embark on the venture of conquest of the weak and unindustrialised nations. The latter is necessary to ensure regular supplies of industrial raw materials and the existence of a safe market for finished products. It is to be noted that Marx's theory provides explanation for the growth of contradictions within the system itself, which result in the replacement of one system by another.

This is Marx's theory, presented in its barest outline and in an extremely simplified form. Suffice it to say that no professional economist of today considers Marx's theory free from defects, not merely in matters of detail but in some of its essentials. The exploitative theory is based on the simplistic assumption that labour alone is productive, while the instrument of production, business talent, ability to take calculated risk have no role to play. Marx had predicted that the rate of profit has a tendency to fall and wages will remain relatively constant. The long term data in advanced nations has failed to verify Marx's prediction. That both wages and profits as a share in national product have grown over the period together has been convincingly demonstrated. Above all capitalism has failed to break under the weight of its internal contradictions. It has shown a remarkable tendency to continue, though in this process it has made many compromises and adjustments. It has accepted collective ownership within

specified sectors of the economy, and has even allowed a loose centrally planned economy to function. But Marxism has affected modern economies at many vital points and has thus saved Marx from a total failure both as a thinker and as a prophet.

IV

With this much of Marx in the background, we now approach Iqbal's relationship with Marx.

To begin with, let us make Iqbal's stand clear. In one of his letters Iqbal says: 'To me fascism, communism or any isms of today have no reality. According to my conviction, Islam is the only reality, which from every point of view, can become the source of salvation for mankind. It is necessary to be aware of the realities of Islam before critically examining my poetry'. This is a statement of his stand in clearest terms. Why did then Iqbal devote so much attention to Marx? It was perfectly open to him to ignore Marx altogether and thereby earn the gratitude of his admirers. But Iqbal chose the other course, namely, to make Marx the special object of his comments and to analyse the relevance of his message. He, therefore, regarded him, one is inclined to believe, as a founder of a system which in certain respects is nearer to, though differing in others from, his own.

In 'Iblis ki Majlis-e-Shura,' Marx is introduced as:

وہ کلیم ہے تجلی وہ مسیح ہے صلیب

نیست پیغمبر و لیکن دو بغل دارد کتاب

He is Kalim (Moses) without the Light, he is Christ without the Crucifix;
He is not a prophet though the Book he has in his hand.

In *Javid Namah* he and his system are described as:

صاحب سرمایہ از نسل خلیل

یعنی آن پیغمبر ہے چپوٹیل

زانکہ حق در باطل او مضمر است

قلب او مومن دماغش کافر است

غریبیاں گم کردہ ازد افلاک را

در شکم جویند جان پاک را

رنگ و بو از تن نگهبرد جان پاک
 جز به تن کارے نہ دارد اشتہر اک
 دین آن پیغمبر حق ناشناس
 بر مساوات شکم دارد اساس
 تا اخوت را مقام اندر دل است
 بیخ او در دل نہ در آب و گل است

The author of the *Capital* is of the seed of Abraham;

He is a prophet without Gabriel.

Since truth lies hidden in untruth (in his book),

His heart is that of a Believer and mind that of a non-believer.

The Westerners have lost the way unto Heaven;

They seek the spirit in the belly.

The colour and odour (of pure spirit) are not of the body;

Socialism believes only in the body.

The religion of the prophet who does not recognise God,

Has its basis only in an equality of bellies.

Since true fraternity springs from the heart,

Its roots lie in the heart rather than in water and earth.

His appreciation of Marx and differences with him are clearly brought out in the above verses. Iqbal would like to think of Marx as a person with a genuine appeal. Marx's system appears to Iqbal as rooted in materialism; it measures the society's welfare by its ability to fill the number of empty stomachs. His belief in equality is based on the distribution of material products. There is total disregard for the things of the spirit. Brotherhood is born in heart and it has nothing to do with worldly considerations. Marx is not convinced of the power exercised by an omnipresent being. But since he believes in the equality of man, his mind is 'kafir' and his heart 'momin'.

For the statement of the more positive principles of Iqbal's system of social philosophy, and the affinity of this system with that of Marx's, we have to go again to *Javid Namah*. In a section called 'Paigham-i-Afghani ba Millat-i-Rusiah', Iqbal has outlined the main ingredients of his system of thought. The new state of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics is advised to turn its back on all western systems of governance and administration, discard 'Rubahi', which is explained as cunning, deceit, opportunism and exploitation, and adopt the positive virtue of 'Sheri', i.e., boldness of design, fairmindedness and straightforwardness. The real basis of a just social order should be 'Faqr', on which Quran lays particular emphasis. 'Faqr' is the combination of 'Zikr' and 'Fikr'. 'Zikr' is the expression of the love of God and offering obedience to him through love. Love is the true basis of a man's training and anyone who makes his beloved other than God, misuses the sentiment of love. 'Zikr' is concerned with the behaviour and action of man and does not consist in merely talking of Him. 'Zikr' therefore gives 'zakir' the strength with which to shatter 'Batil'. 'Fikr' is thinking about the creation of God so that His greatness may be firmly established and man may derive the strength to conquer nature. The basic elements of 'Fikr', according to Iqbal, are:

1. Death to the class of masters, the powerful and the rich, and the welfare of the weak and poor.

2. The person who accumulates wealth cannot get any good out of it if he does not share his riches with the poor and those without means.

3. Interest is the principal method of accumulating wealth, but it makes a man hard-hearted.

4. One is entitled to earn one's livelihood through the exploitation of land and its natural resources, but such a person should consider himself a trustee and custodian rather than the owner of the means of production.

5. The class of masters destroys flourishing towns and cultivated areas whenever they approach them.

6. Everybody is entitled to get subsistence because all are the progeny of one father, Adam.

To sum up. Iqbal is against the class of the rich, the capitalist, because it dominates over the weak, the poor and the helpless; it extends its power over them through interest by accumulating wealth through ill-gotten means; ownership

of the means of production belongs to God and man can, at best, be considered its trustee since lordship or mastery is unjust as the lords destroy cities and fields alike:

درگذر از جلوہ ہائے رنگ رنگ
 خویہش را دریاب از ترک فرنگ
 گر ز مکر غربیان باشی خبیر
 رو بہی بگذار و شیری پیشہ گیر
 چہست رو باہی تلاش سازو برگ
 شیر مولا جوید آزادی و مرگ ...
 فقر قرآن ، اختلاط ذکر و فکر
 فکر را کامل نہ دیدم جز بہ ذکر
 ذکر ، ذوق و شوق را دادن ادب
 کار جان است این نہ کار کام و لب
 خیز از رے شعلہ ہائے سینہ سوز
 با مزاج تو نمی سازد هنوز
 اے شہید شاہد رعنائے فکر
 بہانو گویم از تجلی ہائے فکر
 چہست قرآن خواجہ را پیغام مرگ
 دستگیر بندہ بے سازو برگ
 ہیچ خیر از مردک زرکش مستجو
 لا تملو البہر حتی تلفقو
 از رہا آخرچہ می زاید ، فتن
 کس نداند لذت قرض حسن
 از رہا جان تیرہ دل چون خشت و سنگ
 آدمی درندہ بے دندان و چنگ
 دزق خود را از زمین بدن رواست
 این متاع بندہ و ملک خداست
 بندہ مومن امیں حق مالک است
 غیر حق ہر شے کہ بیہی مالک است
 رایت حق از ملوک آمد نگوں
 قریہ ہا از دخل شاں خوار و زبون

آب و نان مسامت از یک مایده
دوده آدم کلفس واحده

You should pass by the colourful splendour,
And seek yourself in giving up the West.
If you become conscious of the deceit of Westerners,
You should give up foxi-ness and adopt lion-ness.
What is foxi-ness? It is the search for goods of comfort,
God's lion seeks freedom or death. . . .
The Faqr of the Quran is the combination of Zikr and Fikr,
I have not seen Fikr complete without Zikr.
What is Zikr? It disciplines yearning.
It is the work of the spirit rather than that of the palate,
You should part with that heart-consuming flame,
Because it does not agree with your temperament.
O, you martyr to the beauty of thought,
I tell you about the glories of Fikr,
What does the Quran say? It serves death warrant to the rich,
It is the helper of the person without resources;
Do not expect any good from the man of wealth.
You cannot attain virtue (from wealth).
Where does usury lead? To trouble.
Who does not know the delight of a kind loan [without interest].
Usury makes the spirit dark and the heart like clay or stone,
And man becomes an animal without tooth and claws,
It is desirable to get one's sustenance from soil.
It [the earth] is in the custody of man, but its ownership belongs to
God.
The Momin is the custodian, God the overlord.
And all that is not from God is destructive.
Truth's banner goes down with the arrival of kings;
Towns lose prosperity with their entry,
Our food and drink belongs to the same table;
The family of Adam is a single soul.

It is therefore clear that the most objectionable aspect of Marxism is its materialism and denial of the values of love and obedience to God. Barring this, Iqbal finds many aspects of Marxism as worthy of respect. Private ownership of the means of production, exploitation of the worker by paying him less than his due, the development and perfection of the vast productive apparatus built up for the exploitation of the

worker, interest and profit that lead to the establishment of economic imperialism, the system of governance and administration devised to usurp control over all levers of power—so powerfully described by Marx as the distinguishing features of capitalism meet with Iqbal's approval. In many poems Iqbal has commented with great artistry on various exploitative aspects of capitalism.

Settling on materialism as the major difference between Iqbal and Marx, we next pass on to consider the vast area of agreement between them. The major point on which there is complete agreement between Iqbal and Marx is that capitalism is inherently wicked; it is based on exploitation and lends respectability to the domination of the strong over the weak. In a poem in *Bal-e-Jibril*, 'Lenin Khuda ke Huzoor main', Iqbal makes Lenin seek permission from God to ask him a question which has tortured his soul for a long time. The question is: does the man now inhabiting the world really serve the purpose for which he was created? The world, affirms Lenin, shows that a system exists where people living in the East worship the Westerners and the Westerners worship the shining metals by which they enhance their power of domination, where places of worship are deserted but banks hub with activity, where civilisation has bred unemployment, drunkenness, poverty and lack of modesty, where people look drained of blood and when faces are lit up, it is because of cosmetics or drink. The worker lives in dire poverty and Lenin prays for an early destruction of this society. Again in 'Tulu-e-Islam', we are struck by this categorical statement of Iqbal:

تدبیر کی فسوں کاری سے مستحکم ہو نہیں سکتا
 جہاں میں جس تمدن کی بنیاد سرمایہ داری ہے

The magic of statesmanship cannot make strong,
 The civilisation whose basis is capitalism.

Iqbal was conscious that philosophers have been unjust to the working and exploited class by asserting that exploitation and domination are parts of the same reality,

that differences of high and low, of rich and poor, lend colour and beauty to the system. In 'Suhbat-i-Raftagan dar 'Alam-i-Bala', in *Payam-i-Mashriq*, we find Tolstoy, Marx, Engels, Mazdak and Kohkan taking part in a discussion in the other world. The discussion is about the part played by imperialism, church and nationalism in enslaving humanity and in devising tricks to deprive the working class in claiming its just share. The selection of participants must be carefully noted. Tolstoy, the rich landlord of Russia, was above nationalism and had renounced his wealth and put his reputation at stake by the distribution of his property amongst the lowliest serfs. He is against the domination of the strong over the weak because the former exploit the latter for their personal aggrandisement. He chastises Hegel for teaching the worker to be content with his present position. Hegel is the philosopher noted for reconciling the irreconcilables, who finds antagonisms as parts of the same reality. They lend colour and beauty to the world and cannot be called antithetical. Mazdak, the fifth century Iranian philosopher—Iqbal's favourite who said that the real source of conflict is money, woman and land—claims that the working class revolt owes inspiration to his teachings. Kohkan—the mythical lover of Shirin—who has fully understood the trickery of capital says that though the capitalist appears to be simple, he is very cunning when it comes to serve his interest. The poem pervades with sentiment of deep sympathy with the working class.

Secondly, Iqbal is extremely unhappy with persons who preach that the exploiters and the exploited have to live as members of the same family; that slavery is inherent in the nature of man and he himself creates new masters when he gets tired of the old: that mastery of the working class is after all the slavery for the rest of the society. His views on these matters show clearly where his sympathy lies. The worker is recognised to be the ultimate source of all wealth; he has dug minerals out of the bowels of the earth; extended

cultivation, and provided the capitalist the resources with which to revel in luxury and think of the devices subtle enough to hoodwink the simple worker. In two poems in *Payam-i-Mashriq*, in 'Muhavara mabain Hakim Fransvi Auguste Comte wa Mard-i-Mazdoor' and 'M.Lenin wa Qaiser-i-William', these ideas have been developed by Iqbal with all the art and the subtlety at his command.

Reference may now be made to a poem unique in expressing Iqbal's point of view towards the worker and the capitalist. The poet brings the capitalist and the worker to a meeting between them, and makes the capitalist very generously divide the assets and riches of the world between them. This is to prevent for ever the occurrence of mutual conflict. The capitalist makes the following offer. He himself is to own all factories made of steel while the songs of the church are to belong to the worker; to the capitalist would go all orchards, cultivated area and trees while canals and gardens of the paradise as also the hoories would be the share of the worker; all the fine table birds would belong to the capitalist, but Huma and the feather of the Unqa (which brings good luck) would go to the worker; the wine causing headache would be the share of the capitalist, the wine of Paradise would be the share of the worker. The irony is, of course, unmistakable.

قسمت نامہ سرمایہ دار و مزدور
 غوغائے کارخانہ آہنگری زمین
 گلپانگ ارغنون کلبیسا ازلن تو
 نخلے کہ شہ خراج بردمی نہد زمین
 باغ بہشت و سدرہ و طوبی ازلن تو
 تلخا بہ کہ درد سر آرد ازلن من
 صہبائے پاک آدم و حوا ازلن تو
 مرغابی و تذرو و کبوتر ازان من
 ظل ہما و شہپر علقا ازلن تو
 این خاک و آنچه در شکم او ازلن من
 وز خاک تبابہ عرش معلے ازلن تو

The harsh tumult of the mill producing steel is mine;
 The sweet song of the organ of the church is yours.
 The plant that bears tribute to the king is mine;
 The garden of paradise, heavenly mansion of the angel Gabriel, and the
 Tree in Paradise is yours.
 The wine that causes headache is mine;
 But the pure wine of Adam and Eve is yours.
 The teal, the pheasant and the pigeon belong to me;
 The shadow of Huma and the wing of Unqa [mythical birds] belong
 to you.
 The earth and whatever is in its bowels is mine;
 That (which is) between the earth and the high heavens above belongs
 to you.

Thirdly, Iqbal welcomes the emergence of socialism as a world movement and specifically the socialist revolution in Russia. Earlier we have referred to his receptivity to new ideas and his readiness to give them a fair trial. But the welcome he accords to the Russian revolution is more than formal. Its emergence seems to have touched some deep chord in his soul. Look at these verses:

نعمت بیداری جمہور ہے سامان عیش
 قصہ خواب آور اسکندر و جم کب تلک
 آفتاب تازہ پیدا بطن گیتی سے ہوا
 آسمان تو بے ہوئے تاروں کا ماتم کب تلک
 تو ز دالین فطرت انسان نے زنجیریں تمام
 دوری جذبت سے روتی چشم آدم کب تلک

The song of the awakening of the people is a source of delight—
 How long will you harp on the sleep-inducing stories of Alexander and
 Jamshed.

A new sun has come out of the womb of the earth.
 How long, O sky! shalt thou mourn the death of stars?
 The nature of man has broken loose all chains,
 How long should Adam's eye have mourned the loss of Paradise!

پیرانی سیاست کبری خوار ہے زمین میرو سلطان سے بیزار ہے
 کیا دور سرمایہ داری کیا تماشا دکھا کر مداری کیا

The old politics is now held in contempt,
 The world has developed an aversion to the ruler and the king.

The age of capitalism has vanished,
The magician has left after showing his tricks.

Iqbal welcomes the Russian revolution because it marks the beginning of a new era in human history. It is a manifestation of impatience with the older forms of governance. It puts in the centre of activity a people who have been exploited from time immemorial and who feel sympathy for the suffering humanity more because suffering has gone into their blood, and who by being just can be expected to be human. His faith in the new system is such that Iqbal makes even God concerned about the persistence of the old order. He orders angels to go to earth and rouse the weak against the strong, to burn the crops if the cultivator is not able to get a fair share, and to make for Him a place of worship free from embellishments.

فرمان خدا فرشتوں کے نام
اُتھو مری دنیا کے غریبوں کو جگا دو
کاخ امرا کے در و دیوار ہلا دو
گرمائے غلاموں کا لہو سوز یقیں سے
کنجشک فرمایہ کو شاہین سے لڑا دو
سلطانی جمہور کا آتما ہے زمانہ
جو نقش کہن تم کو نظر آئے مٹا دو
جس کھیت سے دھتیاں کو میسر نہ ہو روزی
اُس کھیت کے ہر خوشہ گندم کو جلا دو
میں ناخوش و بیزار ہوں میری کی سلوں سے
میرے لئے مٹی کا حرم اور بندا دو
تہذیب نوی کارگہ شیشہ گراں ہے
آداب جنوں شاعر مشرق کو سکھا دو

God's Order to Angels

Rise, awaken the poor of my world,
Shake the walls and doors of the palaces of the lords.
Enflame the blood of the slaves with the passion of conviction,
Make the small sparrow fight with the (mighty) eagle.
The age of the supremacy of the people has dawned,

All the sign of the old should be destroyed.
 From whichever field the cultivator has not obtained his livelihood,
 You should burn every ear of wheat of that field.
 I am unhappy and fed up with slabs of marble,
 You should construct a new home of clay for me.
 The new civilisation is the handiwork of glass-makers;
 You should teach the ways of frenzy to the poet of the East.

Lastly, there is an aspect on which both Iqbal's and Marx's thinking converges. It is their attitude towards the system of state, called by Iqbal 'Saltanat' or 'Malukiat'. The state reflects the views of the ruling class; if that class happens to be, as it mostly is in modern times, capitalist, then the government is run in the interest of that class exclusively. Like Marx Iqbal has little faith in modern democracy since he regards it merely as a means of exploitation of the common people by the ruling class. It has to be abolished or overthrown forcefully before the weak can expect justice or fair treatment. Marx's comments in the Communist Manifesto are too well known to be repeated here while in Iqbal the idea found memorable expression in a part of 'Khizr-e-rah'.

There is one aspect of Iqbal which requires in-depth analysis. This is his prophetic aspect. Like all true seers (and that would include Marx, too) Iqbal tries to analyse the main trends affecting contemporary society. The first World War which has been characterised as the European civil war, unleashed certain forces which grew to maturity during the period between the two wars. The economic system prior to the first World War was one of great expansion of the main institutions centring on the exchange of capital, export of capital to areas of European colonisation, building up of vast export enterprises in African countries, where only the 'backwash' effects of international trade were manifest. It was a period of great prosperity for certain nations whose economic development at home was already of the high order and who exported their surplus capital on reasonable and assured rate of interest to European-owned enter-

prises flourishing in North America, Australia and in the conquered territories of Asia and Africa. It was a period of great optimism, of self assurance and of confidence for European civilisation built up on the idea of free enterprise. But the period also marks great rivalry amongst the European nations themselves. The end of the war brought into being a state established on socialist principles and deriving inspiration from Marxism. This struck a great blow to the status quo, as it roused the weak, the disorganised and the enslaved Asian and African nations. The period after the end of the first World War saw the sliding down of the great capitalist system from its base and leading to its eventual breakdown in the great crash of the 'thirties and the emergence of new states of Germany and Italy deriving inspiration from militant nationalism exemplified in facsism and nazism. The intellectual climate of the world during the inter-war period was one of great confusion where several new trends competed with the old for recognition. In Asia, particularly in China and India, the nationalist movements under Sun Yat Sen and the Indian National Congress were rousing the conscience of the people against Western domination based on exploitation of their rich and vast potential resources. In *Payam-i-Mashriq*, Iqbal surveys the international scene and as a savant pronounces judgment. In a poem called 'Payam', Iqbal makes the old system of European conquest and the new emerging forces of freedom the subject of his analysis.

We are not told about the precise date of the composition of 'Payam', but as the first edition of *Payam-i-Mashriq* appeared in 1923, the poem must have been written in the early 'twenties. It shows a shriking affinity to 'Khizr-e-Rah' and 'Tulu-e-Islam'. Using his familiar terms of 'Aql' and 'Ishq', the poet comments with great artistry on the material achievements of the Western society, which show their hollowness by denying the vast humanity prosperity and sense of fulfillment. In the first stanza, addressed to the Western nations, we are struck by the following couplet

which offers criticism of the West and all that it claims to stand for:

عجب آن نیست که اعجاز مسیحیاداری
عجب آنست که بیمار تو بیمارتر است

It is not surprising that you have the miracle of the Messiah;
What is surprising is that your love-sick patient is becoming still more sick.

We are told in the later stanzas that though the Western science has made deserts bloom, it has had little effect on values:

کیمیاسازی او دیگ روان را زر کرد
بر دل سوخته اکسیر صحبت کم زد
وائے برسادگی ما که فسونش خوردیم
دهزنی بود کمین کرد و ده آدم زد

Its Chemistry made the particles of dust gold,
But on the affected heart its potent (medicine) of love produced little effect,

Pity be on our simplicity that we were bewitched by its sorcery—
There was a robber; he was in ambush and waylaid humanity

We are then warned that the old system cannot be resurrected, and that a new system based on freedom and human equality is fast taking its place. One has therefore to attune oneself to new voices which though low, are soon to overtake us all. What is significant is that the exploited are demanding their rights and their voice cannot be stifled for long :

وقت آنست که آئین دگر تازه کنیم
لوح دل پاک بشوئیم و ز سر تازه کنیم

It is time that we establish a different system,
The heart's table we wash clean and make a new beginning.

So far the teacher was in the ascendant; now the prophet takes over. The last three stanzas of the poem are remarkable for outlining the main contours of the future system which is growing fast and which only the short-sighted, the narrow-minded and the self-centred can afford to ignore. This remarkable poem ends on an optimistic note:

مژده صبح دریں تیرہ شبانم دادند
شمع کشتند و ز خورشید نشانم دادند

The blessing of morn God gave me in this dark night;

He blew off the candle and gave me the sign of the (rising) sun.

The foregoing analysis has brought out the close affinity between Iqbal and Marx in the criticism of the capitalist system. The exploitative character of capitalism, its control over all organs of the state, its devices to keep workers tied permanently to its apron-strings have been admirably highlighted by Iqbal. He shares with Marx the hatred of this system which perpetuates tyranny. But as against Marx's economic interpretation of history, Iqbal's system is rooted in the Quranic concept of Faqr, with Zikr and Fikr as its essential elements. They involve inculcation of spiritual values of love and true brotherhood. Iqbal's system is universal and his 'Mard-i-Momin' is not necessarily a Muslim. He has to be a universal man and must have the attributes of a Tolstoy or a Mazdak, considering himself more a trustee of wealth than its owner.

There remains one important question to be answered. Can Iqbal's reaction to capitalism and his sympathy towards socialism be called genuine? India has not experienced the full blast of capitalism; by and large Indian economy till the beginning of the first World War was pre-capitalist. In the absence of 'contradictions of capitalism' in India, how should one interpret Iqbal's hatred of capitalism and his appreciation of socialism? The answer seems to me to lie partly in his disillusionment with the West and partly in his basic social philosophy which put justice, fairplay and equality above everything else. Iqbal was critical of the West because, in the first place, it had imperialistic designs on other people and their land: secondly, the Western society had created inequality amongst its own ranks: the manifestations of degradation of human personality in drunkenness, poverty, unemployment and lack of modesty were too obvious to be missed. Lastly, the first World War appeared to him to be the Europ-

ean civil war, in which the fight was for sharing the spoils of the conquest of Asian and African nations. This is a genuine and authentic reaction, since it has its basis in the protest against the exploitation of the weak and indefensible people of India. Iqbal reacted like Marx and even went beyond him because the European civilisation had failed to act on the principles of justice, equality and humane behaviour towards the majority of people both within it and outside it. Iqbal has given Marxism more attention than to any other contemporary or past system of thought. Why did he write a poem like 'Nava-i-Mazdoor' in which the worker proudly claims the establishment of a new order based on equality, and to have taken revenge of all past injustices perpetrated by the capitalist? Why is Marxism termed a great threat to the authority of the all-powerful Devil in 'Iblis ki Majlis-i-Shura'? These are not the words of one who would take Marxism lightly or dismiss it with a sleight of the hand. True, Islam is said to be the greater threat, but Marxism comes a close second.

اس سے بڑھ کر اور کیا ہوگا طبیعت کا فساد

توڑدی بندوں نے آقاؤں کے خیمے کی طناب

What greater depravity of nature can there be—

The slaves have severed the rope of the lords' tent!

Iqbal may legitimately be credited with a true understanding of the core of the sociological phenomenon that has over the years given sustenance to Marxist ideology, as a programme for social change. An important part of this ideology, its real spirit, could easily be reconciled with what Iqbal justly regarded as the essence of the Islamic view of life, and that indeed was the meeting-ground between Iqbal and Marx.

Iqbal Ahmad Ansari

IQBAL'S ATTITUDE TO THE WEST

In a poem, entitled 'March 1907' and composed during his stay in England, Iqbal warned the West against the impending collapse of its civilization. Later in January 1938, a little before his death, came the severe indictment of the West for trampling underfoot the spirit of freedom and dignity of man. In the intervening thirty years Iqbal was engaged all along, in almost all his poetical works, with a wholesale condemnation of the West. Small wonder then that a facile impression of a predominantly anti-Westernist Iqbal has been current coin among the rather uncritical readers of his poetry.

This paper aims at discussing some of Iqbal's significant social, political and economic ideas in the context of his anti-Westernism. Terms like *Firang*, *Maghrib*, *Daur-e-Hazir*, *Tahzib-e-Hazir*, and even *Kalisa* (the Church) all bear a pejorative connotation in his poetry. 'Intellect', 'Reason', 'Rationalism' and 'Secularism' likewise signify the modern West in an uncomplimentary sense. In 'March 1907' the West as the imperialist power which has converted the human world into a market-place comes in for scathing criticism. The '*Maghrib*' and *Firang* are also associated with the exploitation of the real producer of the wealth, industrialism raising the spectre of economic crisis, machine turned into a totem, capitalist democracy being like a juggler's show, secularisation of life and culture, atheistic materialism, overemphasis on Intellect or Reason, lack of spiritualism, the conquest of external nature but denigration of the human personality, scientism, and the vision of life deriving from it.

While denouncing the impact of Westernisation on the Islamic East Iqbal's criticism is mostly directed against nationalism as a divisive political creed, the slavish aping of the West by the modern educated young Muslims, and the feminist movement in the Middle Eastern countries. Mustafa Kamal's experiment with secularism also does not escape condemnation at his hands.

It would be interesting to notice that some of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's ideas on Muslim social and educational reconstruction find an echo in Iqbal's first systematic presentation of his ideas on these issues in an article 'Qaumi Zindagi' in *Makhzan* in 1904¹, and subsequently in the famous lecture on the same subject delivered at Aligarh in 1910. But whereas Iqbal laid emphasis on technical education, on industrialisation and on measures to ameliorate the lot of the Muslim masses, Sir Syed's class sympathies had led him to lay stress on liberal education.

Interestingly enough, in both the articles of 1904 and 1910 the ideological background for a programme of social reconstruction is provided in terms of what may be called social Darwinism, which Hafeez Malik calls 'ecological struggle'.² In the 1910 article Darwin is mentioned by name, whereas almost similar ideas have been presented in 1904 without attributing them to Darwin. But more significant is what Iqbal says with regard to the application of this biological principle to the study of society: 'When this principle came in for closer examination and when other philosophers whose thoughts supplemented Darwin's ideas, revealed other facts of the structure of life—they led to a revolutionary change in man's ideas about social, moral, economic, and political aspects of civilization'. It is quite likely that Iqbal had Herbert Spencer in mind when he wrote these words. Later, in a letter to Dr Nicholson, the translator of *أسرار خودی* (*Secrets of the Self*), Iqbal clarifies that his interest in conflict is mainly ethical. 'I believe', says he, 'in the power of the spirit, not brute force'.³ In view of this and other clarifications

made about his stance regarding Mussolini, Napoleon, Tamburlaine, and Mahmud of Ghazni it is evident that his ideas about conflict, struggle, power and selfhood were grounded in a spiritual ethos.

In the preface to the *Secrets of the Self* (1915), Iqbal speaks unequivocally to the effect:

The Western nations are distinguished in the community of nations by their capacity for action. To be able to understand the secrets of life, therefore, their thought and literature can serve as the best guide for the people of the East. . . .

Truly the nations of the world are indebted to the English empiricism as it has a more developed and sharper sense of reality than that of other nations of the world. That is why any sophisticated system of philosophy that cannot stand the test of reality has never been popular in England. The writings of the philosophers and scientists of England, therefore, enjoy a privileged position in world literature. The spirit and mind of the East need to benefit from it and to revise its old philosophical traditions in that light.

How is this call to the East to follow the West as well as the plea for industrialisation of India, and emphasis on technical education, compatible with Iqbal's indictment of the West? It needs to be kept in mind that it is not a case of gradual change in the poet's attitude. The warning of doom to the West had come in 1907, eight years before the publication of *Asrar-i-Khudi*. On closer scrutiny, however, one realizes that appreciation and denunciation of elements of the Western social order and its cultural premises continue to coexist in Iqbal's judgment.

To be able to identify the elements of the Western civilization that come in for criticism let us have a close look at Iqbal's ideas about man, Nature, the scientific method and the basis of modern Western culture to be found in his writings.

In a significant article, 'Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal', published in the *Hindustan Review* in 1909 Iqbal makes the following observations⁴ :

Man [is] a unit of force, an energy, a will, a germ of infinite power, the gradual unfoldment of which must be the object of all human activity. . . . Islam believes in the efficacy of well-directed action; hence the standpoint of Islam must be described as melioristic. . . . According to the tenets of Islam man is essentially good and peaceful—a view explained and defended, in our own times, by Rousseau.

In this regard Iqbal considers Rousseau and Luther as the emancipators of European people from despotic politics and religion. He adds: 'The possibility of elimination of sin and pain from the evolutionary process, and faith in the natural goodness of man are the basic propositions of Islam as of modern European civilization.' He then affirms that man is 'an individuality of infinite power'.

Obviously all these ideas about man and his potentialities, whatever Iqbal's source of inspiration, are identical with the Renaissance and Romantic views of man. Iqbal further rejects, in the same article, the Christian idea of the insufficiency of human personality. This idea of man's self-sufficiency is brought to its culmination in the Romantic cult of the self and Iqbal adds significantly: 'I have a certain amount of admiration for the devil'—for his high sense of his own individuality.

In his writings and speeches Iqbal all along stresses the notion that the Western Renaissance owes a good deal to Islam. In the lecture on 'The Spirit of Muslim Culture', for example, he says: 'The birth of Islam is . . . the birth of inductive intellect'.⁵ He then goes on to trace the origin of the inductive process, its concomitant scepticism and the idea of sense-perception as one of the sources of knowledge to the constant appeal in the Quran to reason and experience. Nature and History are two other such sources. He also indicates Bacon's and Descartes' indebtedness to various Muslim philosophers: 'It is a mistake to suppose that the experimental method is a European discovery. . . . Europe has been rather slow to recognise the Islamic origin of her scientific method' (p. 129). Iqbal also dwells on the Quranic concept

of the reality of time and the physical world, and highlights the interest of Muslim philosophers like 'Iraqi in the concepts of time and space, and discovers in Ibn-e-Khaldun the germs of the Bergsonian idea of flux. The conquest of Nature has been defined by Iqbal as a goal to be pursued by his ideal man, for this can be instrumental in establishing the vicegerency of God on earth. It is also by subduing matter, an obstacle in the flow of life, that the human ego achieves its growth and expansion.

The human self, possessed of infinite potentialities, seeks, however, its fulfilment, according to Iqbal, in society. He seems to hold an organicistic, even holistic, view of society where the whole is larger than the sum total of its parts. This idea receives repeated emphasis in all of Iqbal's writings. His emphasis on history, on the sense of continuity, on the presentness of not only the past but also of the future, his comparison of collective life with living organisms are all of one piece. For Iqbal the individual is the measure of all things though the life of the community is the essential framework in terms of which he operates. Such an idea should not, however, be confused with the totalitarian view of the state that some verses like

فرد قائم ربط ملت سے ہے تذبذب کچھ نہیں
موج ہے دریا میں اور بیرون دریا کچھ نہیں

The individual is nought except in relation to the collective being;
Like the current that ceases to exist outside the river.

might erroneously suggest. Iqbal's view of society is close to the democratic-socialist order, and he has little in common with either fascistic totalitarianism or anarchistic individualism. A continuous creative tension seems to exist between the individual and society and ultimately the individual, having passed through the stage of submission to the Divine Law, becomes God's vicegerent, and thus the individual and collective urges are harmonized into a unity.

Now that the Western imperialism, chiefly British, is almost dead or dying in its palpable political form, it is only

with some stretch of imagination that one would be able to see things as Iqbal did and to say with him that 'the tyranny of imperialism struts abroad, covering its face under the masks of Democracy, Nationalism, Communism, Fascism, and heaven knows what else besides'. What deserves to be noted is the fact that Iqbal related Imperialism with the capitalist banker, as also with the Machiavellian idea of making statecraft morally neutral, even immoral. That is what he implies by the baneful aspect of the separation of the spiritual and the secular orders of things. This cleavage Iqbal traces to the Primitive Christianity which began as a monastic system, having no germs of evolving into a civil society. It resolved its conflict with Rome by driving a wedge between the temporal and the spiritual. Islam, on the other hand, far from being a private affair, externalizes itself into a civil society and the state. The role of the Prophet, Iqbal says, is different from that of the mystic with a unitary experience, for the former can transform an existing social order and replace it by a more just one.

This view of Islam and its role in society and state, however, does not lead Iqbal to say that Islam visualises a theocratic state. Iqbal's earliest views on the political philosophy of Islam were published in the *Hindustan Review* in 1910-11⁶, where he says: 'The Caliph is not necessarily the high-priest of Islam, he is not the representative of God on earth. He is fallible like other men'. Emphasising the elective principle in the course of the same article Iqbal defines the relation between the elected and the elector in terms of '*Aqd*', i.e. contract. The same contractual nature of the State in Islam is emphasised in his famous Presidential Address delivered at the Allahabad Session of the Muslim League in 1930. Dispelling the doubts of his Hindu compatriots he says: 'The truth is that Islam is not a Church. It is a State conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal'.

The sane rejection of the dualism of spirit and matter, and of the sacred and the profane, is forcefully presented in the lecture, 'The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam (*Reconstruction*, pp. 146-80). But Iqbal seems to have ignored the problem of the nature and structure of the state in a multi-religious society, especially where the Muslims constitute a minority as in India.

Iqbal's abhorrence for Imperialism is so deep-seated that he does not spare even the Islamic Arab Imperialism. In a letter to Dr Nicholson Iqbal wrote: 'I consider it a great loss that the progress of Islam as a conquering faith stultified the growth of those germs of an economic and democratic organisation of society which I find scattered up and down the pages of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet'. Again putting forward justification, in the Address of 1930, for his demand for the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in India he says that it will provide an opportunity for Islam 'to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give . . .'. In *Javid Nama*, similarly, Afghani exhorts the Bolshevik Russians to learn a lesson from Islamic history and not to develop into an imperialism.

It is very understandable that Iqbal's mind sees nationalism, materialistic atheism and imperialism as inter-related. In the Presidential Address of 1932⁷ he says: 'I am opposed to nationalism as it is understood in Europe. . . because I see in it the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity'. The Urdu poem *Wataniyat* (Nationalism) is a powerful expression of the same conviction. But it seems that Iqbal's gaze was so fixed on the European scene that he failed to realize that nationalism could be a healthy development and a liberating force in countries under colonial rule like India. In the context of the Muslim countries of the Middle East, however, Iqbal concedes that nationalism could have some legitimacy. Approvingly quoting the Turkish poet Zia, Iqbal says: 'It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam

is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a league of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only.

What is not easily understandable is Iqbal's diatribes against democracy. But it is only the uncritical who is misled by such verses as: 'Democracy is a form of government where heads are counted, not weighed' to believe that Iqbal was opposed to democracy. Even in this couplet Iqbal has quoted, though approvingly, Stendhal whose criticism makes us aware of the limitations of democracy, which not even the greatest democrat would deny. It is a criticism but not a rejection of democracy. In the same vein is Iqbal's response to his interviewer in *The Bombay Chronicle* in 1931: 'I tolerate democracy because there is no other substitute.'

Iqbal's criticism of democracy as a form of Government is based partly on the Western practice, and partly on the apprehension shared by a large number of Muslims of India in his times that under the garb of democracy based on universal adult suffrage the Hindu majority wanted to deprive the Muslims of their due share in political and economic life of the country.

Iqbal's lukewarm attitude to the Western democratic set-up that served as a handmaid of imperialism has nothing in common with any brand of Fascism or aristocratic elitism or other anti-liberal creeds which had come into vogue among artists, poets and writers in the West in the early decades of this century. It is rather unfortunate that a few stray verses casting aspersions on democracy coupled with the facts of Iqbal's admiration for Mussolini and the influence of Nietzsche's thought on him, led people to imagine that Iqbal was a fascist who exhorted his readers to be hard like steel and to wage war.

As early as in 1909 Iqbal wrote, in the article 'Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal', referred to above, that 'the best form of Government for such a community (i.e. the Muslims) would be democracy, the idea of which is to let man develop all the

possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable'. Stressing the point that none is infallible and above the law, Iqbal observes: 'Democracy, then, is the most important aspect of Islam regarded as a political ideal'. In the course of the same article he also adds: 'Islam has a horror of personal authority', and 'there is no aristocracy in Islam'.

In his article, 'Political Thought in Islam', discussing how the involvement of the early Muslims in territorial conquest resulted in the concentration of political power in a few hands leading to despotism, Iqbal warns the West against a likely development. He says: 'Democracy does not seem to be quite willing to get on with Empire—a lesson which the modern English Imperialist might well take to heart'. We also find Iqbal ending his sixth lecture, on 'The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam', thus: 'Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve out of the hitherto partially revealed purposes of Islam that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam' (p. 180).

We may hold that Iqbal who sings of man and of the sovereignty of the people, and pours contempt on all *Sultans*, *Mirs* and *Khwajas* (i.e. monarchs, despots, and overlords) is no mean champion of democracy.

Iqbal once made the observation that the West's was 'a wholly political civilization which has looked upon man as a thing, to be exploited and not as a personality to be developed and enlarged by cultural forces'. One may be tempted to believe that in this judgment Iqbal is less than fair to the West. But one may have to revise one's opinion when one finds Iqbal envisaging the regenerated future world-order as a place ' . . . where poor tax the rich . . . where private ownership is a trust and where capital cannot be allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the real producer of wealth'. Not only in the colonies did the imperialist powers treat men as things, but also within their own capitalist-industrial social system the real producers of wealth were subjected to

patently inhuman treatment. Iqbal gives vent to this passion for social justice when he says in one of the lectures: 'The idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich' (p. 179). In much of the criticism levelled against Western democracy and capitalism Iqbal's is a socialist point of view which he considers to be fully in keeping with the teachings of Islam. Even though on occasions Iqbal is critical of communism he never expresses any hostility to it. He seems, on the contrary, to accept the socialist vision of human equality as well as the theory that labour is the real producer of wealth, and that private ownership should not be an excuse for accumulation of wealth and for consequent domination over and exploitation of the workers. Iqbal concedes a role for private ownership as well as for capital but wants it to be socially regulated in order to achieve economic equality. He is, however, firm on the point that land cannot be permanently held as private property.

Iqbal also very enthusiastically welcomes the socialist ideal of universal brotherhood of man, and its opposition to aggressive nationalism, imperialism and all forms of exploitation of the weak by the strong. He welcomes the socialist movement as it has given the weak and the downtrodden courage to stand up and fight the strong.

But the atheistic materialism of scientific socialism is an anathema to Iqbal. To him it amounts to stopping at the stage of negation of all false gods, and not going beyond it to affirm the existence of true God, and the spiritual basis of life. It is significant, however, that for Iqbal socialism can be disengaged from its atheistic materialism and reoriented towards belief in God. His desire to do so was expressed in various places: in Jamaluddin Afghani's message addressed to the Russian people in *Javid Namah*, in a letter to Sir Francis Younghusband, and in the poem on Lenin supplicating to God. Iqbal also predicts that as the Russians are essentially

religious in temperament, atheism as the basis of collective life would not last long for them, and soon they would seek some positive basis of life. The final place of Marx and socialism in Iqbal's scheme comes out in varying shades of appreciation and irony in the great poem 'Iblis ki Majlis-e-Shoora'. One may conclude that Iqbal takes a socialist stance in attacking the capitalist democracy and imperialism of the West but he indicts both for their atheistic materialism.

Iqbal's sympathies always lay with the have-nots. Not only does his poetry bear an eloquent testimony to this fact but Iqbal's speeches, and the resolutions and amendments moved by him in the Punjab legislative council also throw interesting light on this issue. He made, for example, an impassioned plea for adopting a graduated scheme for land revenue (as was the case with regard to income tax) exempting the small peasant proprietors holding, say, not more than 5 bighas of land, from revenue as they were unable to produce enough to support their own families. This proposal was in conflict with the interests of the big landlords of whose Unionist Party he was a member. In another speech he asked for the reduction of the high salaries which he said had made the administration wastefully expensive. He also made a plea for the introduction of death duty. Once he suggested that small-scale industries, like weaving and shoe-making, should be set up in the Punjab and be protected from unequal competition with big industries. Mention may also be made here of Iqbal's famous letter to Mr M.A. Jinnah (28 May 1937) asking him to give the Muslim League a mass orientation and seeking the masses' involvement in socio-economic programmes for the amelioration of the lot of the poor Muslims based on what he calls social democracy i.e. democratic socialism: 'The League will have to finally decide whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it . . .' Further, he observes: '. . . our political institutions have never thought of improving the

lot of Muslims generally. The problem of bread is becoming more and more acute. The atheistic socialism of Jawaharlal Nehru is not likely to receive much response from the Muslims. The question therefore is: how is it possible to solve the problem of Muslim poverty?'

Readers may well recall Iqbal's plea in 1904 and 1910 for the industrialisation of India, and his exhortation to the people for acquiring technical education and setting up industries. One would therefore not be justified, on the basis of individual couplets in *Bal-e-Jibreel* and *Zerb-e-Kaleem*, to infer that Iqbal was opposed to industrialisation as such. What, however, is significant to note in these couplets is the phrase 'the dominance of machine', i.e. the industrial system, in a larger social order where man is converted into a thing, a mere cog in the big wheel. Iqbal's approval of science and its melioristic role points to the fact that he cannot be opposed to machines as such. His target of attack is not the machine but the socio-politico-economic scheme that perverts people and employs machines for Satanic purposes. Nowhere in Iqbal does one come across the idea that the Renaissance represented the second Fall of Man as is presupposed by some religious and romantic traditions in the West. There was no first Fall of Man for Iqbal, and hence the question of a second Fall did not arise. Much of the Renaissance temper and the inductive method evolved in pursuance of it is attributed by Iqbal to the Arabs who are credited with having dispelled the darkness of the Middle Ages in Europe. All this may ultimately be traced to the Quran's affirmation of reason, experience, Nature and history as sources of knowledge. Naturally enough, Iqbal not only approves this Renaissance-scientific basis of the Western culture but also exhorts the East, especially the Islamic East, to follow the West and reclaim this ideational system. How, then, may one reconcile the ubiquitous attack on Firang with Iqbal's emphasis on Reason, Science and melioristic conquest of Nature?

The concepts of Reason and Intellect, Science and Scientism, Industrialism and Mechanism have been subjected to severe criticism in the West itself. Apart from the Idealistic philosophies, chiefly German, there has been a strong tradition of Romantic criticism in the West—both intellectual and social. The Romantic movement in English literature vividly records this protest against Reason—by Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley. It has not exhausted itself yet. Polarities like reason and energy, mechanism and organicism, intellect and love, mind and feeling are everywhere in evidence in Romantic literature. One comes across social criticism of industrial society among Victorians like Carlyle, Ruskin, Morris and Arnold and the moderns like Eliot and Lawrence. Whitehead, whom Iqbal seems to have read carefully, is the great exponent of the vitalist thought in our own day. Iqbal assigns *Ishq* or love the supreme position in his scheme of things, but he does not reject Reason as many lesser romantics would do. But Iqbal's is not a unique case of not seeing Reason and Love as contraries. Within the Western Romantic tradition a complex attitude to Reason has all along persisted. In the utopian vision of Iqbal both Reason and Love, Empiricism and Intuition, find their proper place. Where Iqbal, however, leaves the happy company of the English Romantics and the German Idealists is with regard to the wider implication of *Ishq* (love) which takes him to Rumi who alone is his spiritual mentor. This concept of *Ishq* has dimensions which are unknown both to the modern West and the Islamic East. In a note that Iqbal wrote for R. A. Nicholson's translation of *اسرار خودی* (Secrets of the Self) and reproduced by Nicholson in his Preface, Iqbal maintains that *Ishq* is opposed to *Sual*, i. e., begging, and further elaborates that any one who enjoys whatever has not been earned by his own labour has the status of a beggar. Hence, besides other connotations, *Ishq* has bearings on social, economic and political matters in as much as it is opposed to begging. *Ishq* is

also an assimilative principle and is a potent means of strengthening the Ego. It may, however, be added that even in the East it is only an ideal that may be fully realised in the unfolding of things in the future.

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