IQBAL'S
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
'A Study in the Cognitive Value of Religious Experience'

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...*To My Wife*, who has always been a great source of encouragement to me in my intellectual pursuits...

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PREFACE

Religion, like metaphysics, has lost its prestige in the eyes of the erudite, and has a genuine cause for bearing grudge against the scientific advancements of, what may rightly be called, the Scientific Era of Mankind. The present era has been marked by a significant shift in the direction of an excessive development of the analytic activity of man; a belief in the gradual evolution of the higher forms from the lower (physical as well as mental); a zest for discovering kindred facts from among the multiplicity and diversity; and classifying them to facilitate the process of forming general laws; which render them intelligible; and an attempt at reducing all phenomena to a limited set of mechanical laws and to explaining them retrospectively. This shift has done much harm to religion and philosophy, which are activities of quite a different order, *viz.* synthetic and evaluative activities.

Religion, however, has of late won some favour, though the reason for this change of fate is circumstantial only. This change it owes to the common belief gaining in the West, that the present peril, which humanity is facing, is due to the abandonment of faith and anti-Christian activities of the Nazis and the Communists, and that the only remedy for the ills caused by them lies in a return to religion. Consequently there is a general revival of religion in the West. Russell and many others, however, are convinced that a return to dogma won't do any good, for dogma cannot cure the ills of the excesses of reason and science. What is requisite under the circumstances is a more rational approach to the world problems: only reason can cure the ills of reason. But reason is too feeble to produce any change by itself; it requires some sentimental basis, which can best be provided by religion. Thus, the remedy seems to lie neither in

pure dogma nor in pure reason, but in a right amalgamation of the two. What humanity needs today is a rationally-founded religion, which can resuscitate the dead sense of values and bring man closer to man.

These are some important considerations, which are going to form subject-matter of the following pages. It is going to be an attempt to discuss some of the crucial questions, which are troubling the thinking mind today, particularly mind of the religious philosopher.

Dr. Mohammed Maruf

Lahore:
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INTRODUCTION

The present book entitled "Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion" deals with the views of Philosopher of the East on the status of religious experience as a source of knowledge. To Iqbal, religion is not merely a body of dogmas or rituals; it is rather a form of experience, which ensures a grasp of nothing short of a direct and immediate illumination of the very core of Reality. What is peculiar of Iqbal is that he treats of it as an experience among other experiences, rather than a mysterious illumination, and holds it as much cognitive as other forms of experience. Nature has bestowed on man the capacities for perceptual and conceptual knowledge, which enable him to engulf and understand external facets of Reality, the sources of our everyday knowledge, science and philosophy. She has also conferred on man the capacity or sensitivity for internal apprehension, which enables him to have a glimpse of the substantial nature of that very Reality whereof the aforesaid two sources yield only outward appearance or manifestation. Here Iqbal disagrees with Kant who denied that man possessed 'intellectual intuition', which could give him knowledge of the 'noumenon'. The three sources of knowledge supplement each other and, when combined, afford a complete vision of the Real. The external sources of knowledge being too common and practically useful, and the present world having concerned itself more or less exclusively with outer appearances, the 'Qalb' or internal apprehension has come in for a good deal of doubt and criticism. Iqbal has devoted a good deal of his energies to a defence thereof with a view to establishing that it is also a genuine source of knowledge. I have presented, though not uncritically, these very attempts of Iqbal in the present book.

Though primarily concerned with religious experience, Iqbal, as we shall see in chapter three of Part II, recognizes the importance of ordinary types of experience as a necessary stage on our journey towards the fullest possible insight into the ultimate nature of the real and towards spiritual development of man. Religious experience, Iqbal holds, is not discontinuous with other levels of experience. Knowledge in any form, to him, is not an intellectual luxury undertaken for its own sake. It is rather a means for establishing connexions with the reality that confronts us, for it is on the establishment of these connexions that both life and the onward march of the spirit of man depend.[1] In the case of ordinary knowledge Iqbal would agree with Western epistemologists like Kant, who affirm that "knowledge is sense perception elaborated by Understanding".[2] He would also have no reason for disavowing the prevalent view, which the Holy Qur'an also emphasizes, that human knowledge is in the main conceptual. He refers to the Quranic verses importing that "man is endowed with the faculty of naming things, that is to say, forming concepts of them, and forming concepts of them is capturing them".[3] He, however, acknowledges that "it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of Reality".[4] Here he is agreeing with Kant that the human mind, in its ordinary way of knowing, cannot go beyond 'Phenomena', i.e. appearance only; that 'noumena' fall beside its limits and reaches.[5] Commenting on this aspect of Kant's epistemology Iqbal says, "His *Critique of Pure Reason* revealed the limitations of human reason and reduced the whole work of the rationalists to a heap of ruins".[6]

Iqbal, however, does not accept Kant's basic assumption that "all experience other than the norm level of experience is impossible".[7] He, on the other hand, in agreement with al-Ghazali and other mystics, holds that there are potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness".[8] He agrees with mystics and sufis that inner experience, which may be called 'Fuad' or 'Qalb'[9] or 'Intuition', is capable of reaching the innermost aspects of Reality, which elude understanding of man. He refers to the evidence of religious experts in all ages and countries in order to bear out his contention. The fact of

other forms of consciousness has, at least vaguely, been recognized by some of the renowned modern epistemologists also. Professor A. D. Woozley in his treatise *Theory of Knowledge* writes, "because different forms of consciousness might well have different objects, we cannot afford to start by assuming that they do not. Ordinary language certainly assumes that what I am aware of when I look around me are things of a different sort from what I am aware of when I am imagining, or, again, when I am dreaming".[10] He goes on to add, "we must not at the outset suppose that an object of consciousness is a thing of a special sort; it may be found that things of more than one sort are objects of different forms of consciousness; ...[11] Our ordinary experience, as we have seen before, works only with observable aspects, and not with 'the innermost nature of Reality', which is accessible to another form of consciousness, i.e., religious consciousness. Iqbal, however, acknowledges the importance of sense–perception and reason also besides intuition, in the attainment of fullest knowledge of Reality: sense–perception and reason being subservient to the attainment of insight into the nature of the real, according to him. Commenting on this aspect of Iqbal's view of knowledge Dr. Jamila Khatoon writes: "In Iqbal's view of knowledge sense perception, reason and intuition, all are combined in an organic whole. He knew fully well that light from one direction alone could not illumine the whole of reality in all its manifestations".[12] "Iqbal cannot be classed", she rightly remarks, "under any of the three schools of philosophical thought: the empiricist, rationalist or intuitional–ist".[13]

There are, however, some grave misgivings, which have often been entertained about the genuineness and truth of mystical forms of consciousness. The scientific-minded people have often looked askance at any form of consciousness, which is not reducible to ordinary sensuous experience. Kant has been a standing testimony to it. And in our own times, we find the same mentality pushed to its logical extremes in the linguists and in thinkers like Moore and Russell. This skeptical turn is, perhaps, due to the following reasons: (i) the marvellous achievements of science have convinced them that scientific

knowledge is the only genuine kind of knowledge. This attitude they hold not only to religion, but also to metaphysics and ethics; (ii) the non–sensuous forms of consciousness are accessible to a small minority only, while a great majority have no relish of them; and (iii) mystics who have experienced these peculiar states of mind have seldom taken pains to communicate them; and if ever they have tried, the commoners fail to understand because of the lack of proper training and any similar experience in their own lives. It is, perhaps, because very few mystics were also religious philosophers. But a mystic understands another mystic all right, because he has got kindred experiences himself. Professor J. B. Pratt says, "To be sure all the mystics of every land and century may in one sense be said to speak the same language; they understand each other and no one else fully understands them"[14] It is because very few understand them that there have been raged so many attacks on religion from various quarters.

The present work I have divided into two parts. The first, which may be regarded as preparatory to the second, deals with some of the various polemics, which have been hurled on religion, while the second delineates the nature, characteristics and cognitive significance of religious experience. Chapters one to three of Part I shall at some length critically examine lines of attack from psychoanalysts like Freud and Jung, the medical materialists like Huxley and Sheldon; while the main attacks of the linguists shall be dealt with in chapter on "Verification of Religious Experience". The Appendix B at the end contains a brief treatment of Bertrand Russell's critique of religion. Most of these various lines of attack, as we shall see, converge on the same basic assumption, i.e. the present value and significance of an experience are determined by its origin and history. These chapters shall also contain a refutation of these attacks as offered by Iqbal, William James and others. Chapters four and five deal respectively with an examination of proofs for religion propounded from time to time and with a probe into the possibility of verification of religious experience. The question of verification is a very crucial question both to the votary and to the impugners of religion.

Part II, which is spread over four chapters, deals with the nature, characteristics and cognitive value of religious experience. Chapter three deals with the main subject of the book, i.e. cognitive value or knowledge-yielding capacities of religious experience. It also contains some of the original reflections of Iqbal, which may be summarily stated as follows:

(i) Iqbal lays stress on the distinction between prophetic and mystic consciousness–a distinction which most of the Western theologians and psychologists have failed to recognize;

(ii) following the Qur'an, the importance that Iqbal attaches to other levels of experience as subservient to the spiritual uplift of man;

(iii) agreeing with a majority of the sufis, his denial of the merger of individual self into the Infinite Self of God as a condition for the attainment of religious knowledge; and

(iv) the importance of thought in the attainment of religious knowledge–a fact which most of the theologians and writers on religion, both in the East and in the West, have overlooked conspicuously.

These are some of the distinctive features of Iqbal's philosophy of religion, and it is these in particular that I will busy myself in chapter three of Part II. The most important of all, and also the most original of Iqbal's contributions to philosophy of religion, is his treatment of thought as operative in the mystical knowledge of God. Most of the Western, and also some of the Eastern, theologians disavow that thought plays any part in religious knowledge; they, on the contrary, urge that in this knowledge thought is reduced to the minimum. They are, of course, right in their disclaimer so far as discursive thought is concerned. But for them all thought is discursive. Iqbal, however, disagreeing with them, urges that thought has a deeper movement also, and that "In its deeper movement, ... thought is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite and whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments".[15] Of the Western writers, particularly of Kant, Iqbal says that they "failed to see that thought and intuition are

organically related and that thought must necessarily simulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time".[16]

The concluding remarks are contained in chapter four of Part II. It is followed by a small appendix on "Iqbal's View of Divine Knowledge" in which the main discussion centres round the possibility or impossibility of God's fore-knowledge of particular events. Iqbal, championing the cause of freedom and creativity, denies any such knowledge to God. God knows potentialities or possibilities only. He knows "the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities, which lie within the depths of its nature and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion".[17] The main difficulty in Iqbal is, as we shall see in the appendix, that he treats of God's knowledge and creativity as a single activity and feels that if God were to possess fore-knowledge of future events, these events would have been predetermined thereby. In other words, there would not be any freedom and originality, and hence no creation in the world.

Appendix B, as said before, is exclusively devoted to a treatment of "Russell's Critique of Religion". It contains his "position of the main motives of religion which are, according to him, fear, hatred and conceit; his disclaimer of the possibility of a verification of religious assertions (in agreement with the linguists); and particularly his polemic on traditional Christianity. As we shall see in chapter on the "Verification of Religious Experience", Russell expresses grave doubts about the pragmatic view that consequences can determine truth-value of religious statements, though in his own turn he rejects Christianity by referring to its ill-consequences in the past. Russell's main contention is that what is requisite is a non-dogmatic and rationally-based religion. Here, as we shall see in the sequel, he is in agreement with Iqbal.

It is surprising that in his defence of religion Iqbal omits any reference to two of the live wires of his own times, viz., atheistic existentialism and logical positivism, especially the latter one which has thrown a graver challenge to religion. I do

not think that any defence of religion is complete without a refutation of this challenge. It is in view of its importance that I have included a refutation of the positivist critique of religion in chapter on Verification and again in chapter on "Cognitive Value of Religious Experience". One of the most critical problems that religious man faces today is to establish knowledge–yielding capacities of his peculiar experience, and in this respect the positivists are the most important force against religion for if religion loses its cognitive value, it reduces to mere emotionality and subjectivity. Atheistic existentialism[18] is also a challenge, which religious man is called upon to meet, but its main approach is a bit different and it does not question the veracity of claims of one who chooses to live by religion. It is a matter of choice with an individual to believe in God or to go without one; he is only called upon to bear the brunt that ensues upon his choice. Again, existentialist philosophy is not critical of religious assertions; it does not concern itself with truth-value of statements about God, immortality, and so on; it has nothing to do with proofs for religion or with the question of verification of religious statements. Such an approach does not concern us in the present book, which is mainly dealing with truth-value of religious assertions, and with knowledge–yielding capacities of religious experience,

Notes and References

[1] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 12
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] F. Thilly. *A History of Philosophy*, pp. 427-28.
[6] Iqbal, *ibid.*, p. 5.
[7] Iqbal, op., cit., p. 182.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 185.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[10] *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 13.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
[12] *The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal*, p. 3.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 338.
[15] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 6.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
[17] Iqbal, op. cit., p. 50.
[18] Iqbal gives only a passing reference of Bruno as the Italian Existentialist thinker in his introduction to *Payam-i-Mashriq*, p. 10

PART ONE

CRITICAL AND EVALUATIVE

CHAPTER ONE

NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF RELIGION

> ... the organic causation of our mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by which we judge them to be superior or inferior in point of value. (Iqbal)

In general, it may be said that there are three leading views on the origin and nature of religion. These are supernaturalism, naturalism, and the one mid–way between the two. In the following chapters, we are embarking on some of the various attempts at explaining the origin and nature of mystic revelations naturalistically. We will be treating of in this connection the positions of naturalists like the medical materialists, the Freudian psycho-analysts, and Jung's treatment of religion. Naturalism, in whatever form, has one thing in common, namely, it either denies altogether the existence of any supernatural realm, or, if it admits its possibility, insists on its complete separation from nature and that it must be kept strictly apart from it in our thought ; the supernatural never interferes with the natural. "Mysticism", J. B. Pratt holds, "is to be accounted for solely by the laws of a scientific psychology, and its source is to be sought in the individual mind and in society. Imitation, social education, and individual suggestion furnish a

quite sufficient explanation for all the phenomena of Mysticism."[1]

The naturalistic explanation, though diametrically opposed to the supernaturalistic, which refers everything unpredictable and inscrutable to the supernatural forces, has one assumption to share with the latter : viz. the value and meaning of a thing are derivable from, and dependent upon, its origin ; the valuable states must have a sublimer origin. Where the naturalist differs from his opponent is that while he denies, the latter affirms, a supernatural origin for the mystic revelations. For the naturalist, all phenomena, including the purely spiritual, have their beginning in natural antecedents, psychical or physical. For the supernaturalist, on the contrary, there is at least one type of phenomena–the mystical phenomena–which cannot be explained completely in terms of natural antecedents. They have their origin in some super-sensible, supernatural realm, which does not obey the ordinary laws of nature but has its own ways and means. In short, the supernaturalist affirms, where the naturalist denies, the possibility of miracles and miraculous happenings.

Medical Materialism and Religion

An important and habitual way of discrediting the value of an experience with modern naturalists is to trace it back to some low origin and show that the present state has gradually evolved from it. Among the modern psychologists, who have shown some interest in religious phenomena, and who have resorted to the above line of discrediting an experience which may claim to be religious, we have the Freudians and the physiological psychologists, whom Professor James calls the "medical materialists".[2] It is with the latter that we are concerned in the present chapter.

Medical materialism, as James calls it, received inspiration from modern psychology which, "finding definite psycho-physical connections to hold good, assumes as a convenient hypothesis that the dependence of mental states upon bodily conditions must be thorough-going and complete".[3] It is a

specific form of epiphenomenalism which is the doctrine that all experience whatever is the product of certain physiological and brain processes which, if known, can fully account for, not only the origin and nature of an experience, but also its value and significance.[4] The difference between the normal and the abnormal experience, according to medical materialist, is that the former has been the result of normal functioning of the organism, while the latter has been produced by the malfunctioning of one organ or the other. The religious phenomena they try to account for in the same way. Some of the materialists like Dr. Binet-Sangle, who show some interest in the study of religious phenomena, try to explain them physiologically.[5] Professor James rejects all such attempts on the ground that they explain away Saint Paul's vision on the road to Damascus as a 'discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic', dub Saint Teresa as 'an hysteric', Saint Francis as 'an hereditary degenerate'. They treat George Fox's discontents with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, as a symptom of a disordered colon. Carlyle's organ-tones of misery they impute to 'a gastroduodenal catarrh'. "All such mental overtensions", says James "are, when you come to the bottom of the matter, mere affairs of the diathesis (auto-intoxications most probably), due to the perverted action of various glands which physiology will yet discover".[6]

Whatever the value of medical materialism, it is based on one valid assumption - viz. all mental states and experiences, religious as well as non-religious, are the products of physical and physiological causes. M. Tain in the introduction to his *History of English Literature writes*, "Whether facts be moral or physical, it makes no matter. They always have their causes. There are causes for ambition, courage, veracity, just as there are for digestion, muscular movement, animal heat. Vice and virtue are products like vitriol and sugar".[7] Talking of the physical causes of thoughts Lord Russell remarks, "What we call our 'thoughts' seem to depend upon the organization of tracks in the brain in the same sort of way in which journeys depend upon roads and railways. The energy used in thinking seems to have a chemical origin;.... Mental phenomena seem to be bound up with material structure".[8] The same is the position of

the behaviourists[9] in general. But where the materialists err is that they think that organic conditions also determine the value and significance of mental states they cause.

The materialists like Aldous Huxley have gone to the extent of affirming that mystical experience is the result of certain excretions which carry into the blood stream, and that such experiences can well be produced or induced through the introduction of the same substances extraneously. Thus, in one experiment, Huxley took mescalin, a drug, and reported the following results:

1) The ability to remember and to "think straight" is little if at all reduced. (Listening to the recordings of my conversation under the influence of the drug, I cannot discover that I was then any stupider than I am at ordinary times.)

.(2) Visual impressions are greatly intensified and the eye recovers some of the perceptual innocence of childhood, when the sensum was not immediately and automatically subordinated to the concept. Interest in space is diminished and interest in time falls almost to zero.

(3) Though the intellect remains unimpaired and though perception is enormously improved, the will suffers a profound change for the worse. The mescalin-taker sees no reason for doing anything in particular and finds most of the causes for which, at ordinary times, he was prepared to act and suffer, profoundly uninteresting. He cannot be bothered with them for the good reason that he has better things to think about.

(4) These better things may be experienced (as I experienced them) "out there", or "in here", or in both worlds, the inner and the outer, simultaneously or successively. That they are better seems to be self-evident to all mescalin-takers who come to the drug with a sound liver and an untroubled mind".[10]

While remarking on the above experiment Zaehner urges that the author clearly makes the claim that what he experienced under the influence of mescalin was closely comparable to a genuine mystical experience. If he were right, then it could only

be said that the conclusions to be drawn from this were alarming. However, one thing seems certain that both the mescalin-taker, who does not have a sceptical turn of mind, and the mystic seem utterly convinced that their respective experiences are incomparably more real than their ordinary sense-experiences. Moral problems cease to have meaning once this 'higher' vision is obtained and personal relationships, too, cease to have any importance. The mundane world is transcended, and therefore what goes on there or what appears to be going on there, can have no possible interest.[11]

R. C. Zaehner, on the basis of his own personal experience and those of others with the drug, contends that it does not seem possible to make any generalization about the effects of mescalin on different subjects.[12] Talking of the effects of the drug on different subjects Mrs. Rosalind Heywood, in her account published in the *Manchester Guardian* on 29 May 1934, writes, "Of these, one man of high scientific competence had visions of geometrical shapes, but later on he fell into a state of unqualified, uncontrollable mental distress. A psychiatrist alternated between extreme distress and intense bliss. Another man had exterior hallucinations of tropical forests, parrots and all, outside his London window, and of Eastern beauties on his drawing-room chairs. A linguistic analyst had no interesting experiences. Nor did a lady who had spent two years in a Buddhist convent. A painter shared Mr. Huxley's vision of our normal outer world, pulsating and transfigured".[13] Concluding a lengthy account of his own experience with the drug Zaehner writes: "I would not presume to draw any conclusions from so trivial an experience. It was interesting and it certainly seemed hilariously funny. All along, however, I felt that the experience was in a sense 'anti-religious', I mean, not conformable with religious experience or in the same category. In Huxley's terminology 'self-transcendence' of a sort did take place, but transcendence into a world of farcical meaninglessness. I slowly returned to sanity, my normal religious consciousness, which was never completely swamped, returned in full vigour".[14] Again, he writes, "As far as I am concerned, mescalin was quite unable to reproduce the 'natural mystical experience' I have

described elsewhere. I half hoped it would. However, once the drug started working and I was plunged into a universe of farce, I realized that this was not to be. The two experiences were so totally different that I refused, during the experiment, to be tempted by Rimbaud".[15]

Against the above conclusions of Zaehner, G. Stephen Spinks in his book *Psychology and Religion* urges that Zaehner's criticism equally applies to the properly so-called experiences. "If drugs produce experiences which seem to be pseudo-transcendental in character then the experiences which follow the self-inflicted tortures of ascetics, Christian and non-Christian alike, are by the same token, open to the same objection. There is psychologically and chemically very little difference between taking a drug and submitting oneself to such masochistic mortifications as those endured over many years by the Blessed Suso, except that the former is pleasant and the latter horrifyingly painful. The nervous system is always being affected chemically. When the Lenten fast is observed with strictness for forty days, the chemistry of the body is strongly affected. Many of the most vivid visions of the medieval mystics seem to have occurred during periods of prolonged fasting. When ascetic practices include such mortifications as flagellation and effect of such bearing is 'the equivalent of fairly extensive surgery without anaesthetics'. As a result large quantities of histamine and adrenalin are released into the blood stream and when, as usually happens among ascetics, the self-inflicted wounds begin to fester, they release other toxins *which* further affect the action of the brain. On a purely chemical basis, it could be argued that mystical insights which appear to be associated with alterations of the chemistry of the body are not essentially different from the insights which, it is claimed, can be experienced by the administration of drugs. Are we then to conclude that all experiences associated with the use of *external aids* are to be dismissed as invalid or hallucinatory"?[16]

Spinks, however, adds that "all human experiences, whether religious or not, are accompanied by chemical changes ... ... But

the matter does not end there. The work of a great artist or a great scientist need not be dismissed because he is a chain-smoker. The chemistry of the physical processes does not necessarily invalidate the 'quality' of the result. It is the quality of the result that is to be judged and not the physical or physiological processes by which it is obtained. We may, therefore, adopt a suggestion made by Evelyn Underhill that *what* are often described as 'mystical automations' are 'the media by which the self receives spiritual stimulus' ; so it may be argued that drug-induced or ascetically-induced experience can be the means by which the human personality is laid open to the suggestion of the unconscious through whose primordial imagery the deeper activities of the soul emerge as conscious recognition of the transcendental".[17] One of the most important distinguishing features of a genuine religious experience, Spinks says, is "that an authentic mystical experience (whether involuntary or induced) involves a transformation of character... a sanctification... that is both communicable and contagious".[18] This has been accepted by A. Huxley also.[19]

The basic mistake of Huxley seems to have been his presupposition that "Religion means principally escape from the ego",[20] a form of escape from the dull, painful facts of life. He writes, "Most men and women lead lives at the worst so painful, at the best so monotonous, poor and limited that the urge to escape, the longing to transcend themselves if only for a few moments, is and has always been one of the principal appetites of the soul".[21] And he believes that religion is one of the most efficient ways of satiating this appetite. Zaehner remarks on this position of Huxley : "Huxley sees salvation as an escape from self, as the annihilation of the ego and merging into a greater entity which he calls Mind at large".[22] This end, Huxley thinks, can well be attained through administering an appropriate dose of mescalin. He rather goes to the extent of saying "that the taking of drug is, or should be part and parcel of all religion;...".[23] He appears to be in the most alarming manner "identifying the mescalin experience with the Beatific Vision...."[24] Thus he writes, while describing his experience with the drug, "The Beatific Vision, Sat Chit Ananda, Being-

Awareness/Bliss–for the first time I understood, not on the verbal level, not by inchoate hints or, at a distance, but precisely and completely what those prodigious syllables referred to".[25]

Zaehner objects that to most of the Christian and Muslim mystics the end of religion is not escape from self, but, on the other hand a natural growth of the whole individual personality to its full stature in which soul, mind, and body all develop, along their own lines, not encroaching on one another".[26] It is what William James calls the 'sick soul' which longs to escape from itself..."[27] Iqbal, too, has emphasized that "the ultimate aim of religious life, (is) .... the reconstruction of the finite ego.,...."[28] "The climax of religious life, ... is the discovery of the ego as an individual deeper than his conceptually describable habitual self-hood".[29] Again, "The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality ; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it".[30] Of the Beatific Vision Zaehner writes : "Possibly I am wrong, but I had always understood that the Beatific Vision means a direct appreciation of God, not through a glass, darkly, but face to face, with all the veils of sense stripped aside as the 'Muslim -mystics would say. Unless Huxley's descriptive powers have failed him altogether, I am afraid that I cannot discern any likeness between what he experienced and what is generally understood by the Beatific Vision"[31] Huxley himself acknowledges in the epilogue: "I am not so foolish as to equate what happens under the influence of mescalin or of any other drug, prepared or in the future preparable, with the realization of the end and ultimate purpose of human life : Enlightenment, the Beatific Vision".[32]

The Plausibility of the position of medical materialists on religious experience seems to have drawn on certain confusion. The question concerning the nature, origin and historical development of a thing is of quite a different order from the question regarding its importance, meaning, and value. As Professor James rightly says, "The answer to the one question is given in an 'existential judgement' or proposition. The answer to the other is a 'proposition of value'.... Neither judgement can be deduced immediately from the other. They proceed from

diverse intellectual preoccupations. In the matter of religions it is particularly easy to distinguish the two orders of question. Every religious phenomenon has its history and its derivation from natural antecedents ...Under just what biographic conditions did the sacred writers bring forth their various contributions to the holy volume ? And what had they exactly in their several individual minds, when they delivered their utterances ? These are manifestly questions of historical fact, and one does not see how the answer to them can decide offhand the still further question of what use should such a volume, with its manner of coming into existence so defined, be to us as a guide to life and a revelation"?[33] Again he says, "You see that the existential facts by themselves are insufficient for determining the value ; and the best adepts of the higher criticism accordingly never confound the existential with the spiritual problem".[34] But this is what the naturalists, including the medical materialists, appear to do. They inquire into the origin, nature and history of religious phenomena and think that they have succeeded in discrediting the value of those phenomena and in undermining the spiritual authority of the personages who have made pretensions to them. Lord Russell emphasizes the necessity for keeping the two orders of question apart in the following words: "The philosophy of nature", he says, "is one thing, the philosophy of value is quite another. Nothing but harm can come of confusing them".[35] This is what Hume referred to in the first instance[36] and what G. E. Moore dubs as the 'Naturalistic Fallacy'.[37]

Contending against the naturalists' position regarding the dependence of value of a state of mind on its nature and origin, Iqbal writes : "Psychologically speaking, all states, whether their content is religious or non-religious, are organically determined. The scientific form of mind is as much organically determined as the religious. Our judgement as to the creation of genius is not at all determined or even remotely affected by what our Psychologists may say regarding its organic conditions. A certain kind of temperament may be a necessary condition for a certain kind of receptivity ; but the antecedent conditions cannot be regarded as the whole truth about the character of what is

received. The truth is that the organic causation of our mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by which we judge them to be superior or inferior in point of value".[38] Again, the medical materialists appear to have ignored the fact of "emergence" in such important matters as mental states and experiences. "The fact that the higher emerges out of the lower", Iqbal says, "does not rob the higher of its worth and dignity. It is not the origin of a thing that matters, it is the capacity, the significance, and the final reach of the emergent that matters".[39] In contending that the antecedent conditions determine not only the later developments of an experience, but also its significance and value, the medical materialists are guilty of the fallacy of "mental chemistry".[40]

It has been urged by some that it is not necessary that, whosoever claims to have the experience under review must be sane in all respects. It is quite possible, they say, that nature chooses an otherwise abnormal type to reveal her secrets. Thus Dr. H. Maudsley writes : "What right have we to believe Nature under any obligation to do her work by means of complete minds only? She may find an incomplete mind a more suitable instrument for a particular purpose. It is the work that is done, and the quality in the worker by which it was done, that is alone of moment; and it may be no great matter from a cosmical standpoint, if in other qualities of character he was singularly defective– if indeed he were hypocrite, adulterer, eccentric, or lunatic..."[41] What Dr. Maudsley says may be true of a genius in some other line--in arts, science, philosophy, etc., –but it cannot be true of a religious genius, for what counts most in his case is his over-all character, including his veracity, honesty, wisdom, modesty, etc. Among the persons who make pretensions to religious experience, the community makes a distinction between those who are true and genuine and those who are insane, hypocrites or adulterers. A true religious reformer cannot be a hypocrite or an adulterer. A good character is the first mark of a true prophet or a mystic. When Abraham dreamt of sacrificing his son and proceeded to comply with the will of God,[42] nobody would condemn him for a madman. But if somebody today were to do the same on the pretext of a similar

experience, he would be condemned as a liar or sent to the mental asylum. It is a very important fact that even enemies testified to the truthfulness, honesty, and uprightness of the Prophet of Islam.[43] Thus, mere claims on the part of an alleged recipient do not suffice to establish the verity and truthfulness of his pretensions. His messages are no less open to verification than the assertions of a scientist, and they have to satisfy certain conditions, which we have elaborately discussed in our chapter on "Verification of Religious Experience", in order to pass for genuine.

Professor James does not stop here but goes to the extent of saying that the presence of an insane temperament is necessary to make one authoritative, and even effective as a leader. He says, "Borderland insanity, crankiness, insane temperament, loss of mental balance, psychopathic degeneration (to use a few of the many synonyms by which it has been called), has certain peculiarities and liabilities which, when combined with a superior quality of intellect in an individual, make it more probable that he will make his mark and affect his age, than if his temperament were less neurotic....the psychopathic temperament, whatever be the intellect with which it finds itself paired, often brings with it ardour and excitability of character. The cranky person has extraordinary emotional susceptibility. He is liable to fixed ideas and obsessions. His conceptions tend to pass immediately into belief and action; and when he gets a new idea, he has no rest till he proclaims it, or in some way works it off".[44] Professor James, however, seems to have missed one very important difference between a neurotic and a religious reformer. The latter may be having fixed and persistent ideas which tend to pass into belief and action, and in this respect he may be akin to a neurotic; but, unlike him, he does not live in his own phantasies and airy castles, quite unmindful of the surrounding reality. He, on the contrary, never loses touch with the objective world and his principal mission has always been to reshape and remould it according to the new standards revealed to him. As Iqbal very rightly says of the Holy Prophet, "Judging from the various types of activity that emanated from the movement initiated by the Prophet of Islam, his spiritual tension

and the kind of behaviour which issued from it, cannot be regarded as a response to a mere fantasy inside the brain. It is impossible to understand it except as a response to an objective situation generative of new enthusiasms, new organizations, new starting-points".[45]

Again, the two forms of consciousness--religious and neurotic--may be agreeing in that both have a zeal to pass their ideas into belief and action, but the beliefs and actions of a neurotic seldom suit the existing needs of the time and, if they have an impact on the time, it is hardly for the betterment of the community. His actions are usually stuck into impasses and thus fail to have any substantially tangible results. A grandiose, for example, while scrubbing the floor, may believe that she is the queen, and despite all facts to the contrary, may persist in her belief. And her beliefs either fail to issue in action or, if they do, the actions are usually so silly and funny that she cannot have any influence whatsoever on the evolution of the society. While scrubbing the floor, she believes herself to be in her court with all the subjects standing to her and bowing their heads before her[46]. But how can such a belief make any difference to the external reality ? Similarly, a patient of the persecutory delusion believes to be the victim of a dangerous intrigue, though there is no justification for his belief[47]. And again the actions that flow from his delusion cannot be useful either to himself or to the community at large. One indispensable mark of a true religious person is that his beliefs and actions always tend towards the increase of health and betterment of the community, nay, even of the humanity at large.

Again, as Professor James himself admits, a neurotic or a psychopathic temperament by itself is seldom a sufficient condition for the revelation of religious truth. It will be so when coupled with a superior intellect. But even then there is no warrant for it, for there have been men who never pretended to be recipients of religious truths, although in them the rare combination of a psychopathic temperament and superior intellect was found. As said before, we have to distinguish between genuine and sham recipients, and it is certainly not the

presence of an abnormal nervous system that can serve for the distinguishing mark. Even the presence of a superior intellect, coupled with an abnormal constitution, is not a sure and sufficient criterion. The fact seems to be that a psychopathic temperament with a superior intellect, though necessary, is not sufficient for the unique type of receptivity involved in religious experience. Something else is also necessary, and that "something else" is, perhaps, more important. What is that "something else" modern psychology has not yet been able to discover and understand. That is what Iqbal means when he asserts over and again that "modern psychology has not yet touched even the outer fringe of religious life".[48] A superior intellect and an emotional excitability are conditions of only a secondary importance. What are the conditions of primary importance are yet to be known.

Modern psychology fails to understand fully this unique experience for yet another reason. Psychology being a scientific enterprise, it has intellect for its instrument, and the intellect, as Professor James rightly says, deals with an object in some such way : "The first thing the intellect does with an object is to class it alongwith some thing else".[49] In this way intellect does away with the uniqueness, the *sui generis* character of a thing. Professor James's own approach is typically intellectual when he writes, "To pass now to religious phenomena, take the melancholy which constitutes an essential moment in every complete religious evolution. Take the happiness which achieved religious belief- confers. Take the trance-like states of insight into truth which all religious mystics report. These are each and all of them special cases of kinds of human experience of much wider scope. Religious melancholy, whatever peculiarities it may have 'qua' religious, is at any rate melancholy. Religious happiness is happiness. Religious trance is trance".[50]

Professor James seems to have argued that since happiness arising from benevolence is as much happiness as the one present in a maliciously revengeful state of mind, therefore, the two happinesses are alike; that the blissful state of mind in a

saint is at par with, and of the same kind as, the glee of a madman ; and so on. This is the typical hedonistic mistake which is well expressed in the following adage of Bentham : "The quantity of pleasure being equal pushpin is as good as poetry".[51] But ever since J. S. Mill, another of the renowned hedonists, it has been quite an acknowledged fact that there are kinds of pleasure that one pleasure can be superior to another irrespective of their amount of pleasantness.[52] Thus, one pleasure is not of the same kind as another even qua pleasure, except when we abstract from those elements in both in respect of which they differ. Pleasure differs with different states of mind of which it forms a part.[53] Now what is true of pleasure is also true of all the other elements of an experience. That is why it is true to say that, in one sense at least, every experience, nay, even each aspect of an experience, is unique.

Some of the recent naturalists, seeing weak side of their general position, have resorted to another line of attack. They try to explain the various types of religious experience on the basis of the discoveries of modern psychology regarding different types of temperament and their bearing upon various types of experience. In the sequel I am going to add Dr. Sheldon's views on the subject as stated by Spinks : Dr. W. H. Sheldon in *The Varieties of Temperament* (1942) has distinguished between three types of temperament and their religious affiliations. These three types are described as viscerotonic, somatotonic and cerebrotonic. Apparently no treatment can change these basic types ; many men are a mixture of all three, but some belong almost entirely to one or other of these types. Every religion has in it something that appeals to all three types, but some appeal more to one type than to another.

"(1) The Viscerotonic temperament is associated with a physique which exhibits breadth of body, weight and a tendency to adipose tissue (endomorphic). Such a physique is often found with a character that is amiable, tolerant, slow to anger, dislikes solitude, desires company and companionship when in trouble, enjoys good family relationships, loves comfort and has an inclination to luxury."

"(2) The Somatotonic temperament is found with a strong muscular body, an active and athletic physique often continuing from youth into active middle age (mesomorphic). Such physical development is generally associated with a character that is courageous, combative, loves danger, is indifferent to pain, dislikes being in enclosed places, can be ruthless when in personal trouble, shows a tendency to seek some active occupation as a means of dispelling 'gloom and despondency'."

(3) The Cerebrotonic temperament is generally found with those whose physique is of a highly nervous type both in build and in gesture (ectomorphic)....',

"Dr. Sheldon's cerebrotonic type ... tends to avoid company, is emotionally restrained, dislikes open spaces, is introverted and when in trouble needs solitude."

"Each of these three types has its own religious orientation. The viscerotonic type inclines to sacramentalism, with solemn and elaborate worship in magnificent architectural settings ... The somatotonic type shows a strong inclination to make converts, a readiness to suffer martyrdom as well as to persecute others for 'a good cause'. This type has a marked tendency to austerity, and a dogmatic insistence upon morality and good works rather than upon sacraments and rituals .... But our third type, the cerebrotonic, is associated with a very different religious attitude. Being introvert, the cerebrotonic type lives inside himself, rather than in the outside world. The revelations of religion, or for that matter, of psychoanalysis, have for him no specially disturbing message, because he has always lived within himself. Such a type rarely experiences that convulsive kind of emotional experience that is so characteristic of somatotonic temperaments. The positive contribution of the cerebrotonic type is often made in the contemplative life. Psychologically, the history of mysticism is mainly the record of the cerebrotonic temperament, not that this temperament in itself produces mystical experiences but such experiences are most readily apprehended by those who have this particular temperament. This type often renounces, or seeks to avoid, ritualistic forms of worship as impediments to the soul's free

encounter with the Divine ... the cerebrotonic type regards the life of voluntary poverty as the most natural form of life, while he worships in churches almost devoid of ornament... It is the cerebrotonics who design special systems of religious exercises both as aids to private devotion and also as means to mystical experience...

Attempts have been made, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, to classify the great religions of the world in terms of these temperamental types. The religions of Vedic India in their use of ritual and their mystical practices are said to be a combination of the viscerotonic and cerebrotonic types,... In China, Confucianism seems to be predominantly viscerotonic, a religion of forms and ceremonials with a strong bias in favour of the Family. Muhammadanism is a somatotonic religion, hard and militant with a strong zeal for making converts, inflicting persecution and a readiness for martyrdom. Christianity is a mixture of all three types. It has ritualistic and aesthetic aspects which correspond to the viscerotonic type ; contemplative and mystical aspects which correspond to the cerebrotonic, and, more recently, a devotion to the social aspects of the Gospel which corresponds to the somatotonic temperament".[54]

I personally feel that Dr. Sheldon's evaluation of Islam in temperamental terms is not fair. Islam is a mixture of all the three types, with social aspect dominating which, according to Sheldon, corresponds to the somatotonic type. There is no doubt that Islam has made many converts, but this is no less true of Christianity. Christianity is perhaps known from other religions by its greater readiness for persecution. Lord Russell writes : "Christianity has been distinguished from other religions by its greater readiness for persecution. Baddhism has never been a persecuting religion. The Empire of the Caliphs was much kinder to Jews and Christians than Christian states were to Jews and Muhammadans".[55] Islam has been known for its religious tolerance shown to the non-Muslims. Russell himself adds, "It left Jews and Christians unmolested, provided they paid tribute".[56] Islam condemns inhuman attitude to the non–believer captives, to the slaves, etc.

The upshot of the position of Dr. Sheldon seems to be that religious phenomena are the products of abnormal mental processes and their nature is determined by the temperament of a people who pretend to them, and that they are not related to any ultimate reality. Evelyn Underhill agrees that "many of the experiences ascribed to saints and mystics (as well as to lesser men) are difficult to accept on 'strictly rational grounds'. The fact that religious experiences so often seem to be associated with such psychical phenomena as visions, auditions, automatic scripts, levitation and so forth, is often a ground for adverse criticism. Pierre Janet, for instance, once objects that the kind of things said to occur in the lives of medieval saints and mystics suggest that these men and women would, if they were living today, be patients in mental hospitals".[57] But all these physiological psychologists, as Spinks has pointed out, forget that "whatever a man's temperament may be, no religion makes a full appeal to him unless it indicates some way by which he may experience what is believed to be an authentic commerce between man and the Ultimate. It is in their pursuit of the Ultimate that certain temperaments have played such a notable part in religion, especially in those practices and experiences which are labelled mystical".[58] These naturalists, in fact, miss the real nature of mysticism in particular, and of religion in general. As Professor J. B. Pratt suggests in his discussion of 'The Milder Form of Mystical Experience,' one of the best short definitions of mysticism that have been offered is "the consciousness of a Beyond",[59] and this clearly shows that a reference to 'the Beyond' or something outside is an essential mark of all mysticism and religion. This fact has been overlooked by the physiological psychologists who have busied themselves with discovering a relationship between religion and the various types of temperament, and are anxious to show that the so-called religious awareness is a subjective figment of the mind.

Thus we see that the materialist treatment of the religious facts, whether based on physiological studies of the working of various glands or on the relationship between religion and temperament, is inadequate for the reasons stated above. To

restate some of them in a summary form : In the first place, they make very common mistake of supposing that the value of a mental state is completely determined by the physical and physiological determinants of that state. In the second place, some of them at least mistakenly think that the so-called religious phenomena are the subjective figments of our own mind, and that they are closely determined by the temperament of the one who experiences them. And lastly, they ignore the very important fact of religion in general, and of mysticism in particular, that religious awareness necessarily involves 'the consciousness of a Beyond' and that this consciousness of a Beyond is the principal characteristic of a genuine religious experience. (More of this in our chapter on the "Characteristics of Religious Experience"). It also goes a long way to establish its objectivity.

Notes and References

[1] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 443.
[2] W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 14.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[4] A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 318-19.
[5] W. James, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 14- 15.
[7] James, *Ibid.*, p. 11
[8] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 39.
[9] R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, p. 68.
[10] A. Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*, pp. 11-12.
[11] *Mysticism-Sacred and Profane*, p. 12.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[13] Quoted by Zaehner *op. cit.*, Appendix A, p. 208.
[14] *Mind.*, p. 226.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 226.
[16] *Psychology and Religion*, pp. 171-72.
[17] *Ibid.* pp. 172-73.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 173.
[19] *Readings in Mysticism in Vedanta*, pp. 376-77.
[20] Zaehner, *Mysticism-Sacred and Profane*, p. 25.
[21] A. Huxley, *The Doors of Perception*, p. 49
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
[26] Zaehner, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[28] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 194.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 184.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 198.
[31] Zaehner, *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[32] A. Huxley, *Ibid.*, p. 58.
[33] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 5-6.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[35] *Why I Am not A Christian*, p. 43.
[36] *A Treatise of Human Understanding*, Book III, Part ii, Sec. (i).
[37] *The Principia Ethica*, Ch. 1.
[38] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 23.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[40] H. Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I, pp. 49-50.
[41] *Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings*, pp. 256-57.
[42] *The Quran*, xxxvii, 102-05: 'And when, (his son) was old enough to walk with him, (Abraham) said : 0 my dear son, I have seen in a dream that I must sacrifice thee. So look,- what thinkest thou ? He said : -0 my father I do that which thou are commanded.Allah willing, thou shalt find me of the steadfast.' According to the Quran it was Ishmael, while in the version of the Old Testament it was Isaac whose sacrifice was demanded of Abraham. See Old Testament : Creation, Ch. 22. Vs, 1-2.
[43] To him they called "Al-Amin" (the Reliable) his fellow citizens were ready to grant the highest and most coveted honours, with a post of preponderance in their city" - E. Dinet and Sliman bin Ibraham, *The Life of Mohammad, the Prophet of Allah*, p. 25.
[44] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 23-24.
[45] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 190.
[46] B. Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, p. 34.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[48] Iqbal. *op. cit.*, p. 192.
[49] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 10.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[51] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 78.
[52] *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*, pp. 7-11.
[53] J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, pp. 180-81."
[54] G. S. Spinks. *Psychology and Religion*, pp. 155-58.
[55] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 176.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 176.,
[57] Spanks, *op. cit.*, pp. 158.59.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[59] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 337.

CHAPTER TWO

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION

> ... religious experience has been too enduring and dominant in the history of mankind to be rejected as mere illusion (Iqbal).

Another line of attack on religion comes from the psychoanalytic school of the Freudians. They, intoxicated by the achievements of science, which has so much fascinated the contemporary mind by her cutting and penetrating analysis as against the achievements of the old philosophical method, try to approach religion in the same rational way as any other subject. Their main line of attack is similar to that of the medical materialists we have already discussed in the last chapter, i.e. argument from the origin. But the main reason for treating them separately and not alongwith the materialists is that, although they try to undermine the value or significance of religious states by tracing them back to some primitive origin, they differ from the latter in that their approach is in the main psychological. As we shall see, they trace religion back to the specific father-son relationship, which involves both ambivalence and helplessness. Again, they differ from the materialists not only in their specific approach, but also in their method of investigation. In other words, they have their own specific method and approach, which distinguish them from other types of naturalists.

In the sequel we are going to state the positions of Freud and his followers (some at least, if not all); and with certain reserves

and modifications, of Dr. C. G. Jung also. As said before, the main presupposition underlying the position of these eminent psychologists is that the present value of a state of mind depends upon, and is derivable from, the value of the original states from which it has taken its rise. We already have challenged this presumption in the last chapter and will take almost the same line in the present. It may be noted as a piece of warning that the account of the origin of religion and its subsequent development as given by the Freudians are to be treated as hypotheses, not as recorded facts.[1] They are, as we shall see, based on stories from the remote antiquity as told by some of the anthropologists for most of which there is no adequate warrant. It is quite obvious that we cannot put much reliance on mere stories in our treatment of such a subject as religion. Thus we should employ a good deal of care in treating of these stories and myths, and also in our examination of the hypotheses on which the psychoanalysts base their treatment. Again, the naturalists, including the analysts, ignore the important fact of "emergence" in the case of experiences and mental states. However, let us first see what these psychologists have to say on the origin and growth of this sublime subject. In this matter, Freud will be our main guide, for whatever he said has more or less been accepted by his disciples who have betrayed some interest in the scientific treatment of religion.

The one hypothesis Freud starts with is that 'totemism' is the oldest form of religion known to the human history[2] from which the higher forms of religion have arisen and developed.[3] The totem animal, supposed to be the ancestor of the clan, was also the deity, and the later forms of god (including the Christian and Islamic God) are nothing but improved substitutes for the totem animal.[4] This is obvious from the fact that the particular animal was as much the object of veneration[5] to our remote ancestors as gods or God is to the later generations. But totemism, though the most elementary form of religion known to us, is by no means the origin of religion which has to be found in something else,[6] according to Freud. Another important assumption of Freud is that the psychical development of humanity runs very much parallel to the mental growth observable in a child.[7] Thus we see that as Freud traces the development of personality in a child by

referring it to his relationship with his father, so he traces the growth of all culture and religion by referring it to the need of humanity for a protecting father in the face of demolishing natural forces, both within and without.[8] The father-son relationship represents two important aspects, viz., an ambivalent attitude, to father and a feeling of helplessness and need for protection.[9] Thus, ambivalence and oedipus complex play an important role in the origination and development of culture in a child as well as in humanity.[10] Another important Freudian assumption is that 'displacement', as it happens in the case of a child, also takes place in that of humanity.[11] These are some of the assumptions on which whole of the Freudian explanation of religion is based.

Now, coming to Freud's treatment of the subject. He treats of the origin and history of religion in his two famous books *Totem and Taboo* and *The Future of An Illusion* which may well be called complementaries. In both of them religion has been traced back to the father–son relationship. The two books, however, differ in the aspect of the relationship they emphasize. In the *Totem and Taboo*, it is the attitude of ambivalence that has been stressed upon as accounting for the emergence of religion.[12] This attitude, as the story goes, led to the murder of the primal father who had all the women to him; but the act of murder led to repentance and generated a sense of guilt in the sons.[13] Religion, in the first instance, Freud will say, developed from the need for atonement of the crime and removal of the sense of guilt.[14] It, beginning in the most elementary form of religion, i.e. totemism, has gradually developed into its higher forms as we find them in Judaism and Christianity. But whatever form it will take it is basically an attempt at the atonement of the primal sin.[15] Original sin is "a basic element of Christian belief ..."[16] The highest atonement, the Freudians hold, came from the sacrifice of the Christ,[17] and even the orthodox agree with them. J. C. Flugel remarks in this connection: "In the doctrine of the Atonement we have the supreme example of religious treatment of the scapegoat theme and of vicarious Punishment"[18] What he means to emphasize is that the Christ made atonement for the original sin by serving for scapegoat to humanity.

Not only memories of the original sin, but also the attitude of ambivalence itself is so painful that we require some means for alleviating it. By means of 'displacement' man has been projecting it on to various objects from time to time. In the earlier forms of religion —viz. totemism, —the projection had taken place on to the specific animals.[19] But by and by from some unknown source, as Freud says, the notion of an all-powerful God of higher religions emerged.[20] The notion of such a God proved much more efficacious than any other form of deity. As Flugel says, "As a final refuge we can turn to God, and here we are at least relatively safe; the ways of God being inscrutable, and his presence and manifestations being only indirectly perceptible to the senses, he is not subject to those imperfections which are sooner or later discernible in all human figures".[21] The same theme Freud discusses in *Leonardo da Vinci*[22] and *Civilization and its Discontents*[23] also. Commenting on this G. S. Spinks writes, "Freud's studies of religion are all variations upon this theme of God the 'magnified father,...'"[24]

Granting that religion originated in the way Freud states, and that ambivalence and original sin were among its chief problems demanding solution, the question which at once offers itself to the mind is 'how far does the projection of ambivalence on to an all-powerful God serve to solve the problem itself'. As seen before, Freud and his followers like Flugel, maintain that the unpleasantness of ambivalence towards father which resulted in his assassination, and generated a sense of guilt and a need for atonement, are the main problems of all religions, and that higher religions are nothing but attempts at solving the same problems by putting up the notion of God and projecting our ambivalence on to Him. But does it remove the unpleasant ambivalence itself? Quite to the contrary, what we find is that the same problem of ambivalence that we encounter in our attitude to our parents and to earthly rulers reappears in our attitude to God. 'For God, too, represents the same loving and protecting as well as the frustrating and punitive aspects of parents and rulers. One way out of this problem is the way it has so often been solved by the child in the case of his parents—viz. by the method of 'decomposition'[25] whereby the contrasting aspects are projected on to different figures. In the history of religion, this

decomposition appears in the form of two deities or divine principles, such as the Zoroastrian Ormuzd and Ahriman.[26] In still higher forms of religion represented by Christianity and Islam, the ambivalence is split up into God and the Satan, the former representing all goodness and justice, the latter evil and injustice. But even this solution is not free from its own ills and difficulties. One of the commonest theological problems is regarding the position of the Devil. Who created him ? If God created him, then ultimately He is responsible for creating evil in the world. If, on the contrary, He did not, then there are two gods which is ditheism. Thus God is facing a dilemma : on the first alternative He ceases to be all-Goodness, on the second He is no longer all Powerful and all-Creating.

I need not enter into this vexing problem which his been troubling the theologians for the last so many centuries. I will, however, remark that Islam has made an advance over the rival religions in its attempt to solve this difficulty. Good and evil are the creatures of God, Who created them with a view to offer humanity with free choice and responsibility.[27] This position explains the problem of reward and punishment also in a better way than many of the rival doctrines. But it has its own difficulties, for the creation of good and evil assigned to God is complicated with the notion of 'taqdir' to be discussed in our Appendix on "Iqbal's View of Divine Knowledge". Now, reverting to the Freudian hypothesis. It fails to explain such a high religion as Islam which did not originate from the notion of the 'original sin' on which the psychoanalytic hypothesis is based. Islam does not believe in the doctrines of original sin and redemption as ordinarily understood; on the contrary, it vigorously rejects them. The Holy Qur'an affirms the noble nature of man in verses like: "Surely We created man of the best stature".[28] "See ye not how Allah hath made serviceable unto you whatsoever is in the skies and whatsoever is in the earth and hath loaded you with His favours both without and within ? ..."[29] "Now of fine clay have We created man : ... ;"[30] and there are verses like, '... thy Lord said unto the angels : "Lo ! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth ..."[31] The import of these verses is that originally man was created from a noble stuff, it was only afterwards that he polluted himself through misdeeds and

thanklessness. Hence, the original sin on which the Freudian explanation of the origin of religion is based does not apply to Islam.

Freud's theory has been strongly criticized by some of the renowned anthropologists on the ground that no adequate evidence exists for his totemic argument. For a society has never been observed where there was a violent, jealous father who kept all the females to himself and drove away the growing sons. Freud, as said before, himself acknowledges that this primal state of society has nowhere been observed.[32] He bases his theory on the view of F. Atkinson who held that "at a very early period man lived in small communities consisting of an adult male and a number of females and immature individuals, the male being driven off by the head of the group as soon as they became old enough to evoke his jealousy".[33] He produced evidence "of an ever-recurring violent succession to the solitary paternal tyrant by sons, whose parricidal hands were so soon to be clinched in fratricidal strife".[34] To these contentions E. 0. James replies : "There is no anthropological evidence for a "dislocation in the family life of the primitive horde" as a result of the sexual urge, the sons slaying the father in order to secure the women for themselves, and then inventing a ritual device to expiate and commemorate their crime ... at least no traces have been left of its occurrence in any known culture..."[35]

Freud's theory that totemism is the most elementary form of religion has been subjected to searching criticism by Father Wilhelm Schmidt. He says :

"(1) Totemism as a practice does not belong to the earliest forms of human development. Peoples who are ethnologically the oldest have neither totemism nor totemistic sacrifice.

(2) Totemism is not a universal practice. Schmidt adduced substantial evidence to show that three of the leading races of mankind, the Indo-Europeans, the Hamito-Semites, and the Ural-Altaics had originally no totemistic practices.

(3) Freud's adoption of Robertson Smith's assumption that the ceremonial killing and eating of the totem animal is an essential feature of totemism is valueless. 'Of the many hundred

totemic races of the whole earth there are just four who know any rite even approximating to this one and they all belong, ethnologically speaking, to the most modern totemic peoples'.

(4) Pre-totemic peoples know nothing about cannibalism, so that the parricidal meal would be an impossibility. . These four objections, Schmidt summed up in a fifth objection :

(5) "The form of the pre-totemic family, and, therefore, of the earliest human family we can hope to know anything about... is neither general promiscuity nor group marriage, neither of which, according to the verdict of leading modern ethnologists, ever existed at all."[36]

Bronislaw Malinowski, objecting to Freud's thesis regarding the origin of religion, says : "Culture and Religion..., do not spring suddenly into being as the result of a supposed historical event but are the slow accumulation of experience. 'It is impossible to assume origin of culture as one creative act by which culture, fully armed, springs into being out of one crime, cataclysm or rebellion'."[37] Again he says, "If the real cause of the Oedipus Complex and of culture into the bargain is to be sought in that traumatic act of birth by parricide ; if the complex merely survived in the 'race memory of mankind'–then the complex ought obviously to wear out with time. On Freud's theory the Oedius Complex should have been a dreadful reality at first, a haunting memory later, but in the highest culture it should tend to disappear".[38] Malinowski also criticized "Freud's patrilineal explanation of the origins of religion by comparing such systems with the matrilineal forms of the Trobriand Islanders. In the West patrilineal forms are understandably associated with the Oedipus Complex, but matrilineal societies show no feelings of. hatred for the father while the infant's feelings for the mother are spontaneous and non-incestuous."[39]

Again, E. Fromm, one of the leading Freudians of our times, makes the assertion that in so far as there are various types of religion, which widely differ from one another, we should not treat of religion in general. We should see whether Freud's explanation applies to all the various forms. Instead of dealing with these various forms, we shall confine ourselves to two

broad divisions of religion which Fromm calls 'authoritarian' and 'humanistic'"[40] and which include well-nigh all the forms of religion. The former type includes all those religions which entail a "recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and worship".[41] "The essential element in authoritarian religious experience", says Fromm, "is the surrender to a power transcending man. The main virtue of this type of religion is obedience, its cardinal sin is disobedience".[42]

"Humanistic religion, on the contrary", says Fromm, "is centered around man and his strength. Man must develop his power of reason in order to understand himself, his relationship to his fellow men and his position in the universe. He must recognize the truth, both with regard to his limitations and his potentialities ... Man's aim in humanistic religion is to achieve the greatest strength, not the greatest powerlessness; virtue is self–realization, not obedience ... Inasmuch as humanistic religions are theistic, God is a symbol of 'man's own powers' which he tries to realize in his own life, and is not a symbol of force and domination having 'power over man'."[43]

Now keeping this important distinction between authoritarian and humanistic religion in mind, we find that the Freudian hypothesis of the origin and development of religion can account for, if at all it does, the authoritarian type of religion only. It does not even touch the humanistic type which scorns all authority and rejects obedience to some supposed higher power who controls the destiny of man. The notion of god as an exalted father can explain the authoritative side of religion only, for it draws mainly upon the authority of father. A Freudian might reply that since a humanistic religion believes in the power of man and his control over the forces of nature, it partakes of the same origin with the other type. This, however, will not do, for in his relationship to nature man is weak, and it is the overwhelming strength of nature and the submissive helplessness of man which necessitate the notion of an all-powerful and benevolent God capable of protecting man against the severities and vagaries of nature. One fact, however, goes in favour of the Freudian hypothesis. If we explain the humanistic type also on

this hypothesis, then, as the Freudians say, religion will be rendered superfluous with further advancements of science in its control over nature. Freud compares religion to a childhood neurosis, and is optimistic that mankind will overcome this neurotic phase, just as so many children grow out of their similar neuroses.[44]

When we come to higher forms of religion like Christianity and Islam, we find that both the authoritarian and the humanistic aspects exist within the same religion. In these religions, some teachings are authoritarian in their import, others humanistic. E. Fromm remarks, "The distinction between authoritarian and humanistic religion not only cuts across various religions, it can exist within the same religion. Our own religious tradition is one of the best illustrations of this point."[45] In the last part of the passage Fromm was referring to Christianity. But what is true of Christianity is also true of Islam, for the Holy Qur'an contains verses in which the supremacy of man and need for the development of his powers have been emphasized. In the Qur'an God says to the angels, "So, when I have made him and have breathed into him of My Spirit, do ye fall down, prostrating yourselves unto him".[46] Then there are verses where man has been spoken of as God's viceroy in earth. The Freudian hypothesis, which we have been discussing fails to account for the humanistic aspect of religions like Christianity and Islam. And this aspect of religion is far more significant, for it is in the emergence of this aspect that the development of religion lies. The transition of religion from authoritarian type to the humanistic is what marks the development of religion, jus as the development of morality consists in a transition from the customary to reflective morality.[47] The religious movement which made its headway in the West under the inspiration of George Fox[48] as well as the Religions of Reason after the French Revolution[49] were purely humanistic and in this respect they were superior to Christianity and Islam, although the latter are decidedly superior to them in many other important respects. Among the traditional religions Buddhism, in respect of its humanistic nature, is one of the highest forms of religion.[50]

The Freudian hypothesis fails to account even for the higher forms of authoritarian religion. The basic assumption of the Freudians that religion has grown out of 'totemism' has been challenged, as we have seen before, by Wilhelm Schmidt who denies that 'totemism' as a practice belongs to the earliest forms of human development. Again, the assumption of dislocation in the family life of the primitive horde has been challenged by E. 0. James on the ground that the whole story of sexual urge and jealousy leading to parricide, which the Freudians consider to be the beginning of religious rites, is unwarranted. No traces, says James, of this happening have been left in any known culture. The stories, then, on which Freud bases his explanation are pure myths, and such a sublime possession of mankind as religion cannot be explained away by means of mere myths.

The objection that the Freudian hypothesis fails to account for the humanistic aspect of religion, however, does not apply to all the psychoanalysts of that school. Erick Fromm, a disciple of Freud, explicitly states the distinction between the authoritarian and humanistic forms or aspects of religion. He tries to account for these different forms of religion by means of the social, economic and political conditions of the society in which, a religion takes its birth and develops. He writes, "Analysis of religion must not stop at uncovering these psychological processes within man which underlie his religious experience ; it must proceed to discover the conditions which make for the development of authoritarian and humanistic character-structures respectively from which different kinds of Religions experience stem .... What people think and feel is rested in their character and their character is moulded by the total configuration of their practice of life–more precisely, by the socio-economic and political structure of their society. In societies ruled by a powerful minority which holds the masses in subjection, the individual will be so imbued with fear, so incapable of feeling strong or independent that his religious experience will be authoritarian .... On the other hand, where the individual feels free and responsible for his own fate, or among minorities striving for freedom and independence, humanistic religious experience develops. The history of religion gives ample evidence of this correlation between social structure and

the kind of religious experience. Early Christianity was a religion of the poor and downtrodden;... Judaism, in which a strong anti-authoritarian tradition could grow up because secular authority never had much of a chance to govern and to build up a legend of its wisdom, therefore, developed the humanistic aspect of religion to a remarkable degree. Whenever, on the other hand religion allied itself with secular power, the religion had by necessity to become authoritarian".[51]

But does there really exist the type and degree of correlation of which Fromm talks, between the social structure and the kind of religion or religious experience ? Is it necessary that where the socio–economic and political conditions are oppressive, religion will be authoritarian, while it will be humanistic where these conditions are congenial and liberal ? How to account for religions like Christianity and Islam in which both the authoritarian and the humanistic aspects co-exist ? Are we to say that in the case of such religions the conditions were partly oppressive and partly liberal and congenial ? Moreover, when we take the case of Islam, we find that the socio-economic and political conditions of Arabia were not such as might, on Fromm's hypothesis, have led to a religion which has a dominant authoritarian aspect. The Arabian society, as we are told, was split up into various independent tribes, each enjoying a complete autonomy in its own sphere. Of course, they fought against one another, but there was no such thing as socio-economic and political oppression of any kind.[52] Nor was the society very humanistic, for virtues like respect for life and humanity were not known to the pre–Islamic nomads.[53] Islam did not emerge from any struggle for freedom and independence in any sense. Still Islam, as said before, has both the authoritarian and the humanistic aspects. Again, taking the case of the ancient Greek society. The teachings of Socrates were, as Fromm himself admits, very much humanistic; but can we say that the individual was very much free, socially and politically, in those times. What history tells us is that the Greece Islands were divided into city-states, each ruled by a despot.[54] Moreover, the circumstances under which the death of Socrates took place were totally unhumanistic.[55] All these historical and political facts should have, on the hypothesis of Fromm, led to religious

and philosophical systems which were predominantly authoritarian.

Granting that Fromm's hypothesis is true. Now, whatever is true of religion, is true of any political or philosophical system, for it is indubitable that the existing socio–economic and political conditions determine and mould any system of thought–religious or otherwise–that takes rise in those conditions. It is because thought and ideas do not take their birth in a vacuum, or in a water–tight compartment, immune to all influences from the circumstances and conditions at the time. How can religious ideas manage to remain uninfluenced by the conditions? This, however, does not mean that a thought–system is the product of those conditions only. The conditions can at best colour it and give it a certain tinge or character. Fromm is right in saying that the socio–economic and political conditions do not fail to help an experience, religious experience in the present case, put on a certain character; he is wrong in adding that these conditions definitely make the religious experience authoritarian or humanistic. He erroneously thinks that different kinds of religious experience stem from these conditions,[56] although the fact is that they only stem in them.

Freud takes religion in a very restricted sense. For him "religion consists of certain dogmas, assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality, which tell one something that one has not oneself discovered and which claim that one should give them credence."[57] Remarking on this view of religion Spinks writes, "It is significant that Freud's definition makes no reference whatever to experience, nor does it in any way refer to the fact that dogmas and statements of belief, are based upon the richness of religious experiences".[58] It has been ignored by Freud that religion is in the first instance an experience, an immediate experience of the apostle who claims to have been the recipient of that experience. If it does at all, it is only subsequently that this experience expresses itself in dogmas and dogmatic statements. To an ordinary believer, no doubt, religion consists of dogmas. But his religion is the second-hand religion, something which he gets ready-made. On the other hand, to the man on whom religion has been revealed, it is an

immediate experience of reality itself rather than dogmas and dogmatic assertions about facts and conditions of that reality.

Here the question may significantly be asked, can reality reveal itself to a believer through direct experience? Freud will certainly answer this question in the negative. For him religion is nothing more than a psychological expediency. As Iqbal aptly remarks, "Broadly speaking religious life may be divided into three periods. These may be described as the periods of 'Faith', 'Thought', and 'Discipline. In the first period religious life appears as a form of discipline which the individual or a whole people must accept as an unconditional command without any rational understanding of the ultimate meaning and purpose of that command.... Perfect submission to discipline is followed by a rational understanding of the discipline and the ultimate source of its authority. In this period religious life seeks its foundation, in a kind of metaphysics –a logically consistent view of the world with God as a part of that view. In the third period metaphysics is displaced by psychology and religious life develops the ambition to come into direct contact with the ultimate Reality. It is here that religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power;..."[59]

The above is the chronological order of development in the case of an ordinary believer who begins his religious life with faith, and then, undergoing necessary training and hardships, rises to the place of a mystic. A Prophet or a true believer, however, does not exhibit these stages in the same order; beginning with the stage of Discovery –because religion is his personal experience –he moves to the stage where a 'discipline' is imposed on the ordinary man, and lastly comes to the stage of 'thought' where whatever was previously imposed without any reason is made accountable for on rational grounds. But for the prophet himself or to a genuine believer, religion remains throughout a matter of 'discovery,' something which has to be experienced directly. Now, religion, in this higher sense, cannot be accounted for on Freud's restricted definition. Religion, as understood by Freud, is religion of the common man who accepts it and embraces it on blind faith. But it is by no means religion proper, which, as Jung has very rightly realized, is a

matter of personal experience rather than a dogma to be accepted on faith. He says, "I want to make clear that by the term "religion" I do not mean a creed. It is, however, true that on the one hand every confession is originally based upon the experience of the numinosum and on the other upon 'pistis', the loyalty, trust, and confidence toward a definitely experienced numinous effect and the subsequent alteration of consciousness;..."[60]

Religion, then, is a matter of experience; man knows God not as a "theological concept but as a percept. It is why 'Jung refers to God as the God-imago, or God-symbol', because a symbol is able to reveal 'reality' in a way no other medium can[61]. That is why religious language is symbolical. This does not, however, mean that God is only a psychical event within the consciousness; Jung has expressly remarked that "What exists in the psyche exists in reality".[62] Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), the German mystic, retained the objective and independent reality of God when he said, "God's being is of the soul, but his Godhead is of Himself".[63] This position of Eckhart is very similar to the metaphysical position of Kant who said that we cannot know Noumenon, only Phenomenon forms part of our experience.[64] Rather his position on God seems to have anticipated the metaphysical dichotomy of Kant. Commenting on the position of Eckhart, Spinks writes, "... this German mystic believed that God is 'a working function of the soul' and the soul itself is a working function of the Godhead. The God that is in the soul (God-imago) is that reality which we meet in religious experience, while the Godhead is that which is beyond our experience and beyond all human comprehension".[65]

In *The Future of An illusion* the main emphasis is on the helplessness of man against not-too-friendly forces of nature without and instinctual impulses within. Remarking on the helplessness of man and his need for protection, Freud writes, —Once before one has been in such a state of helplessness: as a little child in one's relationship to one's parents. For one had reason to fear them, especially the father, though at the same time one was sure of his protection against the dangers then known to one. And so it was natural to assimilate and combine

the two situations".[66] As man grows up and faces the oppressive and destructive forces of nature, he, despite all his advancement in his control over them, feels helpless particularly at the cold and merciless hands of death. He feels very weak and in need of protection. He regresses to the state of childhood when he used to look to his father for protection and provision in such cases. But now that he is grown up, he finds no father to provide him with them; he has only one way out. To use Freud's words, he makes "the forces of nature not simply in the image of men with whom he can associate as his equal that would not do justice to the overpowering impression they make on him–but he gives them the characteristics of the father, makes them into gods, thereby following not only an infantile, but also, as I have tried to show, a phylogenetic prototype."[67] And the, conclusion that Freud draws from this is that "religious ideas have sprung from the same need as all the other achievements of culture; from the necessity for defending itself against the crushing supremacy of nature".[68] In other words, the one basic motive of all religion is fear and helplessness of man in the teeth of inimical forces of nature.

Lord Russell, though not a disciple of Freud, acquiesces in this basic reflection of Freud in the following words: "Fear is the basis of religious dogma, as of so much else in human life. Fear of human beings, individually or collectively, dominates much of our social life, but it is fear of nature that gives rise to religion".[69] Freud says, "God, is the exalted father, and the longing for the father is the root of the need for religion".[70] As we have seen before, the same theme Freud discusses in *Leonardo da Vinci* and in *Civilization and its Discontents*. An important implication of 'this account of religion is that if man becomes strong enough to have command over nature, religion will lose its importance and utility, and will no longer be needed. Freud openly admits this possibility; rather he 'is looking forward to such a thing happening'.[71]

On the Freudian hypothesis, religion is 'related to the most insistent wish of mankind'-i.e., to man's desire to escape from the stern facts of reality and save himself from the crushing supremacy of nature and natural forces. It emerges from the wish

of mankind to have a father who will ensure protection and provision against the inimical forces of nature. Hence, Freud calls religious ideas illusory on the ground that they are only wish-fulfilments.[72] Religious ideas are not only illusions. "Some of them are so improbable", says Freud, "so very incompatible with everything we have laboriously discovered about the reality of the world, that we may compare them –taking adequately into account the psychological differences– to delusions".[73]

Not only this, but Freud proceeds to call religion the universal obsessional neurosis of mankind. This conclusion he bases on the supposed analogy –between the cultural development of the human child and that of 'mankind itself through' the ages. He says, "We know that the human child cannot well complete its development towards culture without passing through a more or less distinct phase of neurosis. In just the same way one might assume that in its development through the ages mankind as a Whole experiences conditions that are analogous to the neuroses, and this for the same reasons, because in the ages of its ignorance and intellectual weakness it achieved by purely affective the instinctual renunciations, indispensable for man's communal existence. And the residue of these repression-like processes, which took place in Antiquity, has long clung on to civilization. Thus religion would be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity. It, like the child's, originated in the Oedipus Complex, the relation to the father".[74]

Freud, however, acknowledges that the seeming resemblances and analogies should not be pushed too far.He says, "A warning must be uttered at this point. The similarity between taboo and obsessional sickness may be no more than a. matter of externals: it may apply only to the forms in which they are manifested and not extend to other essential character ... It would obviously be hasty and unprofitable to infer the existence of any internal relationship from such point of agreement as those, which merely derive from the operation of the same mechanical causes".[75]

Iqbal contends against this position of Freud that "religion is a deliberate enterprise to seize the, ultimate principle of value and thereby to reintegrate the forces of one's own personality, is

a fact which cannot be denied. The whole religious literature of the world..., is a standing testimony to it .... The evidence is that they possess a cognitive value for the recipient, and, what is much more important, a capacity to centralize the forces of the ego and thereby to endow him with a new personality. The view that such experiences are neurotic or mystical will not finally settle the question of their meaning or value".[76] Again he says that "religious experience has been too enduring and dominant in the history of mankind to be rejected as mere illusion".[77]

Again, man's helplessness against the overwhelmingly strong forces of nature, of which the Freudians talk so emphatically while explaining the origin of religion, may well be called a reason for believing in an omnipotent and almighty God; it cannot be a cause of such a belief. The diverse aspects of nature are said to be manifestations and signs of God. The Holy Qur'an abounds in such Verses in which nature has been referred to as the symbol of God. Thus the Qur'an says, "Lo! in the difference of day and night and all that Allah hath created in the heavens and the earth are portents, verily, for folk who Ward off (evil)".[78] Again, "Lo! in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the difference of night and day, and the ships which run upon the sea with that which is of use to men, and the water which Allah sendeth down from the sky, thereby reviving the earth after its death, and dispersing all kinds of beasts therein, and (in) the ordinance of the winds, and the clouds obedient between heaven and earth; are signs (of Allah's sovereignty) for people who have sense".[79] Freud seems to have taken 'natural forces and man's helplessness against them for the cause of our belief in God, but there is no warrant for it.

Again, by concentrating upon religion as a matter of paternally-induced activities, and by his singular omission of religion as an experience, Freud was able to indicate a number of resemblances between religious observances and the behaviour of patients suffering from, obsessive neuroses. Granting that a substantial part 'of religious observances is concerned with feelings, of guilt and helplessness of man, and with the desire to find some means of control over instinctual forces ; granting that much the same psychical impulses distinguish the behaviour of

neurotic personalities. "But to describe the observances by means of which the faithful give expression to their piety.... as a universal obsessional neurosis is to overlook the fact that an obsessional neurosis is, so far as that individual patient is concerned, an abnormal and strictly personal activity, whereas religion is a universal and normal activity of mankind. Freud see; ms A ever to have considered the possibility, that man might be by nature a 'religious animal'".[80] Dr. Ian Suttie remarked that "religion instead of being an obsessional neurosis of guilt was a form of psycho–social therapy that human life, instead of being dominated by hate was regenerated, and united by love".[81]

Thus religion, though it may be treated as an escapist device in the Freudian fashion, is neither merely a, provision against the helplessness of man nor merely a product 'of the instinctual needs of man, but a genuine inherent activity of mankind. It is quite possible ''that religion is a necessary part of human nature; man, as said before, may by nature be a religious animal,

A Note on the Original Sin

The concepts of Original Sin and Redemption go hand in hand to form one of the basic doctrines of the Christian faith. But for that, the very crucifiction of the Christ and his mission would become meaningless. Stating a part of the Declaration, the doctrine of original sin is "the doctrine of the church about man, who rebelled against God at the beginning of history (cf. *Vatican, 11, Constitution Gandium et Spes*, nos. 13 & 22). With the result that he lost for himself and for all his descendants the holiness and righteousness in which he was placed, and transmitted to all a real state of sin through the propagation of human race".[82] Original Sin presupposes that "Man is not neutral; he is guilty, and his sin separates him from God"[83] and again that, as Paul says, "The world is essentially not only something that is created (*Rom.* i, 20), but also something with sin in it; Sin descended on man through the disobedience of Adam and, in Paul's view, men are not isolated individuals, but are bound together in a common destiny of sin and death by Adam's sin".[84] According to Augustine, "Adam's sin and fall has so corrupted human nature that every individual is born in a state of sin and is bad".[85] Sin brought with it death upon man. As

Richard Jefferies contends, man's body was by nature immortal, and was made mortal by unsuspected flaws handed down to it through centuries (*The Story of My Heart*). Zaehner remarks: "This is almost exactly the Christian doctrine of Original Sin; for, according to the Christian legend, death came upon the human race as a result of Adam's sin. Man was created immortal in body and soul, and were it not for the hereditary 'defect' that has passed on to us from our first parent, our bodies would to this day be immortal. To Christians the guarantee that this 'original innocence' will one day be restored in its totality, is the Resurrection of Jesus Christ and his bodily Ascension into heaven".[86]

Thus, sin came from Adam and is hereditary. It has brought death upon man. The sin in question, according to John, is not all, or any sin (as has sometimes been supposed), but one specific act of sin. "All other sin is blindness, "unrighteousness... sin not unto death"; but this, which Christ brings to light, is "sin unto death".[87] According to John, " Sin is behaviour which runs counter to the divine ordinance, which corresponds to, what is right"[88] and again, "human sin is enslavement under demonic power, and so means absolute separation from God".[89] As Paul says, "Through the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners..."[90] "Adam's fall, human mortality, and the universal propensity to sin are inseparably bound together".[91] Thus, the sin in question is one particular act of disobedience by Adam through which the whole human race has been made sinner.

But for the fact of sin, the very appearance of the Christ, his whole mission, and atonement through crucifiction lose their significance. This is obvious from Christ's mission, which was "to proclaim the Rule of God.... The historic event brought to pass under this Rule is the conquest of sin".[92] It is also obvious from such proclamations: "I came not to call the righteous but sinners".[93] Paul's teaching on sin may be summarised thus: "(a) the fact of Christ is relevant to man in a particular situation, viz. to man as sinner; (b) the fact of Christ comes home to man as release and renewal".[94] Again John says, "Christ defeats the sin of the world as the expiator who makes atonement".[95] The two

aspects of Christ's mission, summarily stated, are "victory over sin through atonement and the universal significance of this..."[96]

Thus the very descent of Christ was to counter and expiate the fact of sin which came on man with Adam's disobedience. Take away this descent of sin on man and a need for its atonement, and you will take away the whole significance of the very appearance of Christ on earth, and of his crucifiction which, according to the Christian faith, is the highest form of atonement. Freud, while commenting on this, says, "There can be no doubt that in the Christian myth the original sin was one against God the father. If, however, Christ redeemed mankind from the burden of original sin by the sacrifice of his own life, we are driven to conclude that the sin was a murder....

"In the Christian doctrine, therefore, men were acknowledging in the most undisguised manner the guilty primaeval deed, since they found the fullest atonement for it in the sacrifice of this one son; ... The very deed in which the son offered the greatest possible atonement to the father brought him at the same time to the attainment of his wishes against the father. He himself became God, beside, or, more correctly, in place of, the father. A son-religion displaced the father-religion".[97] Freud seems to have dissented from the story of Adam's Fall and its Bequest to the human race as described in the Scripture. On the Freudian hypothesis, the original sin was a sin against father which later on generated the idea of God as the father-substitute. But according to the Scripture, it is the sin against God; it is, as John has said, "behaviour which runs counter to the divine ordinance".

Some writers like Paul Tillich have denied that the doctrine of original sin, taken literally, makes any sense. He writes: "It may well be that such a task demands the definite removal from the theological vocabulary of terms like "original sin" or "hereditary sin" and their replacement by a description of the interpenetration of the moral and the tragic elements in the human situation".[98] Tillich suggests a reinterpretation of the doctrine of original sin "by showing man's existential self-estrangement and by using the helpful existentialist analyses of the human predicament. In doing so, it must develop a

realistic doctrine of man, in which the ethical and tragic element in his self-estrangement are balanced".[99] For Tillich, transition from essence to existence is the 'original fact' which gives validity to every fact. The transition he expresses by two forms of myth-the myth of the transcendent fall and that of the immanent fall. "Both are necessary because the individual act of estrangement is not an isolated phenomenon but part of the universal tragedy of human existence".[100]

Catholic theologians are generally agreed, as regards the Message of Genesis 1-11, that "They are not historical narratives in the sense of history as written by the Greek and Roman historians. To some extent they have a symbolic meaning ... We find in these Chapters the basic elements of the relationship between man and God.

"... Several of these ancient narratives aim at responding certain aspects of our human situation or illustrate it with the help of primordial events. This is very specially true of the story of the fall of Adam and Eve".[101] This doctrine seldom appeals to the modern mind and there are two reasons for that : "First, its mythical expression was taken literally by its attackers and defenders and so was unacceptable to the modern mind with its emphasis on the critical function of historiography. Secondly, the doctrine seemed to imply a negative evaluation of man, which was in contradiction to the new feeling for life and the world, and the impulse of modern man to transform world and society".[102] As regards original sin of Adam, the questions arise: Was that a particular act of sin committed at a specific time in history ? and does Adam refer to a certain individual who brought sin into the world ?

"Sin is a theological term, which is primarily applied to an act which is morally evil (actual sin) and secondarily to the state of sin (habitual sin) which is a certain persistence of the malice of the sinful deed. By a sinful act, man turns deliberately away from God, whom he should love ... The state of sin consists of the fact that in consequence of a sinful act, the original deliberate alienation from God persists in the depths of the soul: "We have all become like one who is unclean".[103] As to how the sin of Adam is transmitted to his descendants, "The Council of Trent

makes it clear that the sin of Adam is transmitted to us by the propagation of human nature –by way of descent, we may say– and exists in each of us (Session 5, Canons 2 and 3)".[104] Again, regarding the question of the significance of the first sin, "St. Paul speaks more strongly and precisely of the significance of the first sin than the writer of Genesis. But it should be clearly noted that already in the Old Testament and then very specially in St. Paul, the great emphasis is on the multitude of the sins of men. The Old Testament is in a certain way the history of sin.

"Thus we gather from Scripture that humanity fully ratified the original revolt. And this perhaps enables us to suspect that without making Adam a strongly gigantic figure, without yielding to the temptation which led human fantasy in earlier times to the ancient Eastern myth of the "primordial man" or the Gnostic myth of the "heavenly man", we can undoubtedly attribute great significance to the first sin, in so far as it is intimately connected with the whole of mankind's sin".[105]

Regarding the question whether 'Adam' refers to one single person, "St. Paul thinks of Adam as the sinner of Genesis, and that he was one single person did not form a problem. This was also the case of the Fathers of the Council of Trent. We are no longer in the same situation. Without precisely affirming that the ascent of life gave rise in the beginning to a number of men, palaeontology, alongwith genetics, nonetheless poses the question of polygenism, i.e. of this multiplicity ... Is one bound to think that there is an original multitude of men concealed behind the figure of the biblical Adam?... In any case, the Second Vatican Council, linking up with Scripture and tradition, speaks several times of "Adam", of "men fallen in Adam". (cf. Gandium et Spes, no. 22; human Gentium, no. 2). Pope Paul VI spoke in similar terms (Profession of Faith, June 1968), which we are also to use".[106]

Thus, the word 'Adam', it is possible, refers to a number of men who originally arose, and the term 'sin' means the 'state of sin' in which all men find themselves. Thus understood, the original sin puts on a general import delineating the human situation.

Notes and References

[1] Freud himself acknowledges this fact when he says that the primal state of society in which there was only one, grown-up, male (father) keeping all the females to himself with young immature son and has never been observed see *Totem and Taboo*, p. 141.

[2] W. Robertson Smith believes that totemism was the starting point of all religions -See his 'Religion of the Semites' (1889): cf. *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 142 and 14 4.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 145–146.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 148-49.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[6] Op. it., pp. 143, 156: cf. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, p 76.

[7] *The Future of An Illusion*, pp. 75-76.

[8] Fromm, *Psycho-Analysis and Religion*, pp. 18-19.

[9] Flugel; *Man, Morals and Society*, p. 69-one of the 'mechanisms of defence', according to Anna Freud.

[10] *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 144-45; for Oedipus complex as the source of religion, morals, society and art, p. 156.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 146..

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 145, and 154 where Christianity and the original sin are discussed.

[16] C. H. Tavard, *Paul Tillich and the Christian Message*, p. 40. For original sin see pages 70-77 of this thesis.

[17] *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 153–54.

[18] *Man, Morals and Society*, p. 166.

[19] *Totem and Taboo*, p. 141.

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 147.

[21] *Man. Morals and Society*. p. 186

[22] *Leonardo da Vinci*, p. 103.

[23] *Civilization and its Discontents*, p. 23.

[24] *Psychology and Religion*, p. 75.

[25] J. C. Flugel, *op. cit.*, pp. 60,186-87.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[27] '.....and We try you with evil and with good, for ordeal: *The Qur'an*, 21 : 35.
[28] *Op. cit.*, 95 : 4.
[29] *Ibid.*, xxxi, p. 20
[30] *Ibid.*, xxii, p. 12.
[31] *Ibid.*, ii:p. 30.
[32] *Totem and Taboo*, p. 141.
[33] Quoted from *Primal Law* by Spinks, *Psychology and, Religion*, pp. 78-79.
[34] *Op. cit.*, p. 79.
[35] Quoted from '*Comparative Religion*', by Spinks, *ibid.*, p. 79.
[36] *The Origin and Growth of Religion*, English Trans. H. J. Rose, P. 103ff.
[37] Spinks, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–84.
[38] *Sex and Repression in Savage Society*, pp. 167-68. A. Spinks, *ibid.*, p. 84.
[39] Spinks, *ibid.*, p. 84.
[40] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, p. 34.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 34
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 37
[44] Gist of the argument of Freud in *The Future of An Illusion*', pp. 75-76.
[45] E. Fromm, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
[46] *The Glorious Qur'an*, tr. M. Pickthall, XV : 29.
[47] "It develops from customs, through law, to reflective principles"-J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 102.
[48] The founder of the Quaker religion-*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 7.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] Buddhism, according to Schopenhauer. is the highest religion- B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 7S7.
[51] E. Fromm, *Psycho-analysis and Religion*, pp. 51-53.
[52] D. L. O'Leary, *Arabia before Muhammad*, pp. 22-23.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21 where he depicts the Arab character. 'Fr. Lammens describes the Arab as the typical democrat, and we must recognize that in his character ara some of the salient characteristics of democracy in a somewhat exaggerated form, *ibid.*, p. 21
[54] J. Neither, *World History at a Glance*, pp. 47-50.
[55] Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, pp. 104-105.

[56] E. Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, pp. 51-52.
[57] *The Future of An Illusion*, p. 43.
[58] S. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 76,
[59] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 181.
[60] C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 63. Spinks, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
[61] Spinks, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
[62] *Op. cit.*, p. 97.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 97.
[64] Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*. pp. 420-21.
[65] Spinks, *ibid.*, p. 97.
[66] *The Future of An Illusion*, p. 29.
[67] *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
[69] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, P. 42.
[70] *The Future of An Illusion*, p. 39.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[72] *Op. cit., p. 52.*
[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 55.
[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
[75] *Totem and Taboo*, p. 26.
[76] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 189
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[78] *The Qur'an*, 19:7.
[79] *Ibid.*, 2: 164.
[80] *Psychology and Religion* : a suggestion by G. Spinks which seems to have been based on the instinctive nature of religious activity. Cf. page 78 where Spinks discusses Freud's position that religion is an obsessional neurosis.
[81] *Op. cit.*, p. 85.
[82] *This Supplement to New Catechism*, p. S.
[83] John, ix, p. 31.
[84] G, Quell, *Sin*, p. 81.
[85] H. H. Titus, *Ethics for Today*, p. 86.
[86] *Mysticism*, p. 49.
[87] I John, v. p. 16f.
[88] *Sin*, p. 72.
[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.
[90] I John, v. p. 19.
[91] *Sin*, p. 78.
[92] *Op. cit.*, p. 64.
[93] Math, xi, p. 19:cf. Luke vii, p. 34.
[94] *Sin*, p. 75.

[95] *Ibid*, pp. 71-72.
[96] *Ibid*., p. 72.
[97] *Totem and Taboo*, p 154.
[98] J. Heywood Thomas, *Paul Tillich: An Appraisal*. p. 124.
[99] *Ibid.*
[100] *Op. cit*., p.123.
[101] *The Supplement to New Catechism*, p. 6.
[102] J. H. Thomas, *ibid*., p. 123.
[103] *New Catechism*, I. S. 64:6, pp. 11-12.
[104] Ibid., Session 5, Canons 2 and 3, p. 11.
[105] *Ibid*., p. 10.
[106] *Op. cit*., pp. 7-8.

CHAPTER THREE

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND RELIGION-CONTINUED

> ... The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitatioios of individuality, it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it. (Iqbal)

Despite the fact that Freud holds to this day a supreme position among the psychoanalysts, and Jung followed him closely in some of his basic tenets and, therefore, could well be called his disciple, Jung's position has certain distinctive features–especially when we consider their respective positions on religion–which justify my treating him separately. Moreover, as we shall see in the sequel, Iqbal's position on some important points comes closer to that of Jung. This fortifies his claim to a separate consideration.

It may be remarked at the outset that it is by no means easy to state Jung's position as he very frequently changed his views on the fundamental questions of religion, and also as he never considered his whole work on the subject as a system. Jung himself writes, "I regard my concepts as suggestions and attempts at the formulation of a new scientific psychology based in the first place upon immediate experience with human beings".[1] In the beginning Jung, in his small work *The*

Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual, expressed views agreeing with those of Freud.[2] He acquiesced in the latter's position that God was an unconscious substitute for the father, and that religion had its roots in the repressed parental influence dating from the pre-historic (infantile) period, the repressed "infantile constellation",[3] as he called it. "In the place of the father", Jung says, "with his constellating virtues and faults, there appears on the one hand, an altogether sublime deity, on the other the devil..."[4] But Jung's views were soon to undergo a considerable change, for his attempts to deal with the phenomena of religion as objective psychical facts led him to the conclusion that all religions have their psychological roots in the collective unconscious of the race.[5] This led him to affirm 'quarternity' instead of the Christian 'Trinity', fourth term being the 'unconscious".[6] Jung, consequently, goes on to emphasize a definite relationship–nay, even an identification–between God and the unconscious. In his book *Psychological Types* he writes, "To our analytical psychology ... the image of God is the symbolic expression of a certain psychological state, or function, which has the character of absolute superiority to the conscious will of the subject....God is a function of the unconscious, namely, the manifestation of a split-off sum of libido which has activated the God–imago".[7] He expresses the same relationship in *Answer to Job* more clearly in the following words: " It is only through the psyche that we can establish that God acts upon us, but we are unable to distinguish whether these actions emanate from God or from the unconscious. We cannot tell whether God and the unconscious are two different entities".[8] Because of these and similar passages, Jung has sometimes been accused of identifying psychical facts with spiritual realities, and hence reducing the religious phenomena to mere mental productions and figments.

The above objection seems to be based on a certain misconception about Jung's real position. Although he identifies God with the unconscious, it is not the individual unconscious, but the collective unconscious in which all the religions have their psychological roots. Moreover, as we have seen before, Jung agrees with Meister Eckhart in making a distinction between the God-imago which a mystic experiences and the

Godhead, which is beyond all human experience and comprehension. Godhead is the thing-in-itself, while God-imago is the way God appears to the consciousness of a mystic. Jung also agrees with him that God is 'a working function of the soul' and the soul a 'function of the Godhead'. Thus we find that there is no justification for accusing Jung of subjectivism. He does not reduce God to a mere fabrication of the mind of a mystic, a fact which is quite obvious from the above discussion.

There is one great merit of Jung's identification discussed above. In identifying religious phenomena with the unconscious processes he has brought out the experiential nature of religion – a fact which Freud so conspicuously overlooked. As said before, this should not be taken to mean that God is only a psychic event within the mind, for, as Jung says, 'what exists in the psyche exists in reality'. In accentuating the experiential nature of religion, Jung differs from Freud for whom it was only dogma and assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality. Iqbal and a majority of the theologians agree with Jung that religion is basically an experience, with God being its object. Religion may be a creed or dogma for one who does not have a first–hand religious experience (the stage of Discipline, as Iqbal says), but to the mystic or the prophet it is an immediate experience rather than something accepted on others' testimony (the level of Discovery, according to Iqbal).

Jung's clinical experience with the patients soon convinced him of the fact that all men live for some end, whether they are conscious of it or not, "Life is a 'drama' in which plot, word, action and gesture are to be interpreted 'prospectively'. The end to which the drama moves is what Jung calls the Self.[9] But what is the Self which is the end of life ? Is it the individual self of man or some Universal Self to which all should aim at approximating? Jung seems to take the Self in a conceptual sense, for he applied to the Self the same adjectives as Otto applied to the 'numinosum–mysterium', in the sense of that which is wholly Other (das ganz Andere)... Such a Self appears to be a substitute for God...[10] Many mystics, especially the Christian mystics such as St. Paul, have talked of this Self as

"the Christ-who-lives-in-me."[11] Iqbal also identifies the Self with God in verses like :

در وجود او نہ کم بینی، نہ بیش
خویش را بینی ازو، او را ز خویش

"Thou seest the Lord through self and self through Him,
Nor more nor less thou seest of God than that".[12]

It has been urged against the above position that it at best provides a psychical notion of God *which* does not have an external independent existence of its own. But, as we have seen before, this allegation is not well-founded. Jung protests against this allegation in the following words : "I have never anywhere denied God. I proceed from a positive Christianity, which is as much Catholic as it is Protestant, and I endeavour to demonstrate, in a scientific and responsible manner, those facts which can be ascertained empirically and which not only lend plausibility to the Christian dogma, and especially the Catholic dogma, but are also likely to provide scientifically-minded people with some way towards understanding it..."[13]

The conceptual meaning of the Self which designates the end of life and religion according to Jung, becomes still more prominent in his system because of the fact that he lays so much emphasis on the 'collective unconscious of the race'. It shows that the end cannot be the Self or personality of an individual, but some over-all or transcendent individuality which may be identified with the Christ or God– in other words, some universal concept of the self. But, though Jung attaches so much importance to the collective unconscious in matters like religion, etc., the notion of individuation,[14] plays no lesser a part in his psychology, and he agrees with Levy-Bruhl, that the psychical evolution of man lies in his transition from psychological collectivism to individuality ; in other words, in the emergence of the individual from behind the background of the social or tribal self.[15] Jung bases his conclusion on the anthropological hypothesis that the primitive man was more or less identified with the collective psyche and it was much later that individuality developed from this psychological collectivity.[16] This transition from psychological collectivism to individuality

indicates, for Jung, the development of mankind for, as he says, "the self is born of the conflict between the world of collective consciousness and the world of individual awareness.[17] This conflict, he adds, is "the old play of hammer and anvil the suffering iron between them will in the end be shaped into an unbreakable whole–the individual".[18]

The end of life and religion, then, according to Jung, is the achievement of "nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being".[19] But on his way to the development of personality the individual finds himself thwarted by his own imperfections, limitations, by inconsistencies and oppositions within his own psyche, and by the counter-interests of the other persons who are aiming at the same end. There are also the natural factors to block his way and to cross his purposes and interests, and to raze to the ground his sublime edifices. This demands resolution on his part in order to become perfect and, if he really has a craving for perfection and completeness, it renders him uneasy and disconcerted. It is this craving for completeness, according to Jung, which generates his desire for union with the Other, and hence is the 'telos' of all religious activity.[20] "Religion enables a man to reconcile aspect of his inner and outer life and thus to achieve a complete and balanced personality".[21] In other words, religion for Jung provides assurance regarding the means for attainment of a full harmony between the internal forces of the individual and the external factors, which threaten his interests and purposes. It is obvious from this that for Jung individuation or development of the individual personality is the principal object of all religion.

Iqbal agrees with Jung that the end of all activity and life is the integration and development of personality, and that same is the ultimate end of religion which is one of the basic activities and experiences of mankind. He disagrees with the traditional mystic[22] standpoint that the end of religion is dissolution and submergence of individuality in the Infinite. Iqbal in his letter to Dr. Nicholson writes: "The moral and religious ideal of man is not self-negation but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique".[23] Iqbal says, the ultimate end before the human ego is a

greater integration and perfection of personality. Iqbal agrees with Jung that the human life is characterized by the pursuit of some end and that it has some destiny.[24] He also admits that the evolution of mankind takes the direction of a transition from collectivity to individuality, and that the "basic perception from which religious life moves forward is the present slender unity of the ego, his liability to dissolution, his amenability to reformation and his capability for an ampler freedom to create new situations in known and unknown environments".[25] Thus, according to Iqbal, the end of religion is not only an integration of personality, but also a provision of opportunity for the ego's freedom to create new situations in known and unknown environments.

Jung's approach to the problem of integration of personality, however, is purely psychological, he being a practitioner in clinical psychology. He makes it clear from the outset that his approach is going to be purely empirical and scientific in his treatment of such an important subject as religion.[26] So, for the integration of personality he would naturally suggest some psychological means. We should not overlook the fact that he was primarily a psychoanalyst who, as he says himself, derived his inferences from his experience with the patients.[27] There is no doubt that Jung acknowledged that man's craving for completeness generated his desire for 'union with the Other', but he propounded this as a hypothetical fact, and did not recommend it to be the means for integration. Iqbal, on the other hand, being a metaphysician and theologian, is quite interested in suggesting metaphysical means for the attainment of the requisite integration. He expressly says that "the ultimate aim of religious life,...(is) the reconstruction of the finite ego by bringing him into contact with an eternal life-process, and thus giving him a metaphysical status of which we can have only a partial understanding in the half-choking atmosphere of our present environment".[28]

Returning to Jung and Freud, the former did not share with the latter that psychology would eventually succeed in explaining the religion away. He, on the contrary, seems to have realized quite early that religion is an essential activity of man

and that psychology, instead of seeking to explain it away, must try to explain how man's nature reacts to situations normally described as religious.[29] The two also differ in their treatment of the libidinal activity. In his comparative study of the two genii, G. S. Spinks writes, "For Freud religion was an obsessional neurosis, and at no time did he modify that judgement. For Jung it was the absence of religion that was the chief cause of adult psychological disorders".[30] These two sentences indicate how great is the divergence between their respective standpoints on religion.

The two, Freud and Jung, also differ in their treatment of 'the unconscious', the pivotal concept of clinical psychology. For Freud, (to use Spinks' words) "The unconscious is, ... a repository for all psychic processes which are not in consciousness and for those which cannot emerge into consciousness without overcoming certain resistances."[31] So far Jung agrees with Freud; but he holds that in addition to the 'personal' unconscious there is an unconscious which is congenital and not due to repressive forces. Jung places greater emphasis on this hereditary aspect of the unconscious. This aspect Jung calls the 'racial' or 'collective' unconscious. The collective unconscious is constituted of the psychical tendencies and dispositions of the whole race. It is, to use Jung's language, the all-controlling deposit of ancestral experience from untold millions of years, the echo of prehistoric world events to which every century adds an infinitesimally small amount of variation and differentiation.... It seems in its totality a sort of timeless world-image with a certain aspect of eternity opposed to our momentary conscious image of the world".[32] We can acquire knowledge of the contents of the collective unconscious, Jung holds, "by comparing the mythological patterns of various religions with the complexes and dream symbolisms collected from many sources".[33] However, in fairness to Freud we may add that he also assumed "a psyche of the mass" without which social psychology could not exist at all.[34]

Although both Jung and Iqbal are unanimous on the point that the development of personality lies in a transition from the collective psyche to the individual soul, Iqbal, unlike his German

contemporary, is quite mindful of the importance of development in the social direction also; that is, the development does not take the direction of individuation only, but also moves towards a higher and further development of the society. The importance of socialization is obvious from the Islamic emphasis on congregational prayers.[35] Islam condemns isolation (monasticism) practised by non-Muslim hermits[36] and lays much stress on the social aspects of human nature and takes every care to inculcate social virtues among its believers. The Qur'an, apart from being a religious book, also claims to be a complete moral and social guide.[37] Iqbal emphasizes the importance of social contemplation in the following verses :

جلوۂ حق چشم من تنہا نخواست
حسن را بے انجمن دیدن خطاست
چیست خلوت؟ درد و سوز و آرزوست
انجمن دید است و خلوت جستجو است
عشق در خلوت کلیم اللہی است
چوں بجلوت می خرامد شاہی است!

"My eyes seek not an isolated Sight
Of God : I hold it sin to contemplate,
Without a congregation, beauty's view.
Alone we weave a fabric of desires,
We search a sight, but in community
The vision is fulfilled. Love, while alone,
Like Moses seeks the sight, when kindred souls
It kindles it doth claim a sovereignty".[38]

Modern Psychology fully appreciates the indispensability and importance of society to the development of the individual. Perhaps, it is this excessive emphasis on the social aspect which has engendered Socialism and Communism in the present world. But this excessive Socialism has jeopardized the individual significance of man. In Iqbal both the individual and the social aspects are equally necessary to the optimum development of man.[39]

Notes and References

[1] Jung's foreword to *The Psychology of C. G. Jung* (1942) by J. Jacobi, p. vii.
[2] Jung at first agreed with Freud that God was a substitute for the father, but later, as we shall see, he reversed his position. See pages 87-88.
[3] "The Significance of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual" *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 300-01.
[4] *Ibid.*. p. 301.
[5] See pages 88-89 for some details of this concept.
[6] G. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, 95.
[7] Jung, *Psychological Types*, (1938), *p. 300.*
[8] *Answer to Job*, p. 177.
[9] G. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 94.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] Mahmud Ahmad, *The Pilgrimage of Eternity*, lines 265-66.
[13] Footnote from a letter dated 22 Sept., 1944, quoted from *God and Unconscious,* p. 258.
[14] Spinks, *Psychology and* Religion, see "Individuation", pp. 60-61.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
[16] *Ibid*
[17] *Ibid*
[18] Jung, *The Integration of the Personality*, p. 27.
[19] The Development of Personality: *Collected Works*. Vol. 17, p. 171.
[20] G. Spinks, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Those who believed in 'Wahdatul Waujud' (all is God).
[23] Introduction to *The Secret of the Self*, p. 1xviii.
[24] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 52-53.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[26] Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, p, 2.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[28] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 194
[29] Spinks, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 53.
[32] *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 162.
[33] Spinks, *ibid.*, p. 54.
[34] *Totem and Taboo*, pp. 240-41
[35] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 197.
[36] '...; and We caused Jesus, son of Mary, to follow, and gave him the Gospel, and placed compassion and mercy in the hearts of those who followed him. But, monasticism they invented– We ordained it not for them– ...' (*The Qur'an* LVII : 27).
[37] *Ibid.*, xvi.: 89.
[38] *The Pilgrimage of Eternity*, vs. 854-61.
[39] Commenting on Iqbal, Prof. Arberry writes : 'It is obvious that the Iqbalian conception of self-hood, if developed in isolation from society, ends in unmitigated egoism and anarchy. But he was not interested merely in the individual and his self-realization ; he was equally concerned with the evolution of an ideal society, or community'–Eng. tr. of *The Mysteries of Selflessness,* Preface. p. xi.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROOFS FOR RELIGION

... Love-led
Can reason claim the Lord and reason-lit Love strikes firm roots, When integrated, These two draw the pattern of a different world.(Iqbal)

The proofs for the existence of God, the pivotal concept of a theistic religion, are as well proofs for the truth of religion itself, for mostly higher religions have God for their basic concept. Various attempts have been made at such proofs ever since the advent of the two great religions, Christianity and Islam. Among these proofs most commonly propounded are those known as the 'ontological', the 'teleological', and the 'cosmological' arguments.[1] To these Kant adds what he calls the 'moral' argument[2] which has also gained currency among the theologians. Of late, the most favourite argument with the theologians has been the 'argument from religious experience'.[3] The first three, which constitute the famous trio known since the Middle Ages, have so often been propounded and discussed that I need not waste any time on them. The cosmological argument, however, deserves some attention particularly because Professor Samuel M. Thompson has recently made an attempt at resuscitating it by presenting it in a modified form in his book *A Modern Philosophy of Religion*. The remaining two i.e., the moral argument and the argument from experience also deserve some space. In the interest of religion, it seems necessary to undertake a thorough examination of all the possible arguments which seem to hold out some prospects.

Beginning with the cosmological argument as restated by Professor Thompson. Whole of his argument is based upon the contingent nature of the world as well as of its parts, and a need for a cause of nature. He says, everything that exists is contingent, because, "As we look about us at the multitude of things which make up our world, we find that every one of them seems to depend on other things for its own existence".[4] Again he says, "It is because they all change, without interruption and without exception, that they are all contingent".[5] It is not only that the objects of the world are contingent, the world itself is contingent and as such depends for its existence upon some other being. "We have now found", he concludes, "that the real world of actually existing things and events is neither self-existent nor contains anything self–existent as a part of itself.[6] But "anything which neither exists of itself nor contains anything self-existent as a part of itself", he adds, "depends for its existence upon something which exists in and of itself and does not in turn depend on anything else".[7] Again he says that the cause of the world cannot be of the same kind as the contingent causes in nature. For, he says, "it is impossible for any contingent thing to be a cause of existence. Contingent causes are causes of change alone".[8] "The Cause of Nature", on the contrary, "is a cause of existence".[9] Again, Professor Thompson adds, "nothing can act except in accordance with its own nature", and from this "it follows that something which so acts as to bestow existence must itself be something whose very essence is the act of existence. So the essence of the Cause of Nature must be existence itself".[10] Only God can be such a Cause of Nature, He being a Necessary Being. "God's existence is His nature ; ... it is the very nature of God to exist. Existence is not a part of His nature, nor is it something which happens to His nature ; existence is His nature ; God is not self-caused, for He needs no Cause, not even Himself. That God does not flow from what He is. What He is, is that He is".[11]

The basic assumption of the argument is that since everything in the world is contingent, the whole of the world is, therefore, contingent. This involves the fallacy of Composition. Lord Russell, in his debate with father Copleston, brings out the

fallacy involved in all such reasonings as follows : "I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother –that's a different logical sphere".[12] Again he says, "The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things ; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever".[13] Professor Thompson is, of course, right in contending that contingent causes are causes of change alone. But this does not show that there is a cause of existence also, or that there is a cause of nature which is the cause of existence. It is quite conceivable that something has been existing from eternity, and that the changes produced by the contingent causes have brought the existence, originally so elementary, to the present state of complex and multiple existence that constitutes the total world.[14] Again, the idea of a Necessary Being, the one in whom existence and nature are identical, the 'that' and the 'what' are the same, has no warrant. It involves a petitio principii, for the assertion that a Necessary Being exists is what is at issue between both the theologians and the impugners of religion. It is quite genuine to raise the question, 'Is there such a being whose existence is his nature ? and it is binding on the proponents of the argument under discussion to establish the truth and existence of such a being before proceeding with their argument. But this is what they have seldom done.

The moral argument, which was propounded by Kant, and which in varying forms was extremely popular during the nineteenth century, is the next with which I am going to deal briefly. It has all sorts of forms, as I have said before, but in one of its most popular forms it may be stated thus : it has been argued that "there would be no right or wrong unless God existed".[15] This would be the case if all morality were theologically-based. But as is quite obvious today, it is better to have an ethics without a religious basis,[16] for religion is neither a very necessary, nor a very sure basis for ethics. Moreover, Russell argues against the moral argument as stated above that is difference between right and wrong due to God's fiat or is it

not? "If it is due to God's fiat then for God Himself there is no difference between right and wrong and it is no longer a significant statement to say that God is good." If right and wrong have some meaning independent of God's fiat, then "they are in their essence logically anterior to God. You could, ...say that there was a superior deity who gave orders to the God who made this world".[17] Moreover, this argument is the least intellectual of all, and perhaps also the least effective. This is quite obvious from the fact that the secular ethics is gaining its ground and flourishing rapidly in the West.

Now comes the argument which is very popular with the theologians at the present time-i.e. the argument from experience. Father Copleston resorts to this argument in his debate with Lord Russell. During the debate he argues that, taking religious experience for "a loving, but unclear, awareness of some object which irresistibly seems to the experiencer as something transcending the self,... should claim that it cannot be explained adequately and without residue, simply subjectively. The actual basic experience at any rate is most easily explained on the hypothesis that there is actually, some objective cause of that experience".[18] In his article "The Philosophical Relevance of Religious Experience", Copleston presents the argument in a slightly different but more significant form. He argues that if a person has come to the conclusion on some other ground that it is in some degree probable that there is a God who could conceivably be the object of human experience, then the fact of religious experience "might serve for him as an empirical verification of the hypothesis at which he has already arrived." It is "a general line of argument somewhat analogous to the process of hypothesis and verification in the sciences. In this case the conclusion would be more or less probable but it would be capable of indefinitely progressive verification".[19]

Criticizing the above line of argument Freud says, "...if the truth of religious doctrines is dependent on an inner experience which bears witness to that truth, what is one to make of the many people who do not have that rare experience .... Of what significance is it for other people that you have won from a state

of ecstasy, which has deeply moved you, an imperturbable conviction of the real truth of the doctrines of religion".[20] The same, however, can be said against all the higher forms of human experience –e.g. aesthetic or moral experience – which are accessible to a minority only. Again, it falls to the lot of a few to discover scientific truths, the majority taking them on faith only. Any higher or sublimer experience, religious or otherwise, which is accessible to man, is actually accessible to only a few, because it requires some special kind of sensitivity and aptitude which are, in part at least, congenital.

Again, it might be contended that religious experience tends to be private. Thus Russell says, "If there's a crowd in a room and there's a clock in a room, they can all see the clock. The fact that they can all see it tends to make them think that it's not an hallucination ; whereas these religious experiences do tend to be very private".[21] Again, he urges that "there are abundant recorded cases of people who believe that they have heard Satan speaking to them in their hearts in just the same way as the mystics assert God ... That seems to be an experience of the same sort as mystic's experience of God, and I don't see that from what mystics tell us you can get any argument for God which is not equally an argument for Satan".[22] Against the contention so often made by the theologians that religious experience has got good effects on the character of the recipient Russell urges, "I've had experiences myself that have altered my character profoundly. And I thought at the time at any rate that it was altered for the good. Those experiences were important, but they did not involve the existence of something outside me".[23] There is no doubt, of course, that from the facts of experience we cannot infer the existence of something outside us, but this is true of all experience without exception. From my experience of certain sense-data, say, the sensedata of a table, what warrant is there for my inferring the existence of a table 'out there'? As both Berkeley and Hume urged, it is quite possible that the table is nothing more than a "collection of ideas"[24] (Berkeley) or "a bundle or collection of different perceptions."[25] (David Hume).

Although none of the arguments, as we have seen, propounded to establish the existence of God is convincing, at least the cosmological argument which the Holy Quran uses so often, and the argument from religious experience, bear a substantial evidence to the possible existence of such an over-all reality as God. The Quran, as said before, persistently refers to the various phenomena of nature as affording a pretty conclusive or good evidence for the existence of God, the controller of all such phenomena. This is the cosmological argument, discussed above at some length put in a very simple but convincing way. All such phenomena which betray order, design, purpose, and regularity in nature symbolize some inherent controlling agent which cannot be but God.[26] There is no doubt that we cannot assimilate such a proof to a strictly logical proof, but it is none the less a proof more or less like an inductive proof, in which we talk of a good or a slender evidence for a conclusion. Just as in an inductive reasoning we say that the premises afford a conclusive or pretty conclusive evidence for the conclusion;[27] similarly we may say that the various aspects of nature, of which the *Quran* talks as 'signs to men of understanding', provide a good evidence for the existence of God. In other words, though we cannot be certain about the existence of God, it is quite probable that He exists.

So much for the cosmological argument. But when we turn to the argument from religious experience, we find that the recipient of that experience is never content with a probable existence of God. He feels a certainty about Him that is not possible about the earthly objects. He experiences His presence, as *the Quran* says, closer to his neck-vein[28] than anything else that can fall within his experience, and neck-vein is of a life and death importance to man. In other words, he feels at least as certain about God as about his own life, and he cannot be more certain about anything else in the world than about his own life.

Again, granting that the existence of God cannot be proved by any of the arguments discussed above, an inference to the impossibility of religion is far-fetched. For we can still legitimately ask the question, 'Is religion a fact ?' 'Are the

pretensions of thousands of mystics, of all ages and countries, to their reception of religious or mystical experiences genuine ?' These questions are legitimate, because the questions regarding the existence of God are not co-extensive with those regarding the fact of religion as an experience. For there is at least Buddhism, one of the great religions of the world, which does not cease to be religious because it does not believe in God.[29] Hence, questions regarding the truth of religion as an experience are to be treated on their own merits. Religion in general does not stand or fall with a belief in God, for God is the central concept of theistic religion only. Apart from Buddhism, there are extreme types of humanistic religion making headway in the West which are mostly non-theistic. Here the question of the Finality of Prophethood may be involved. Finality, however, does not mean cessation of religious experience altogether, and this is obvious from the long Sufi tradition in Islam. Again, the question whether there can be a godless religion depends upon the meaning that we assign to the word 'religion'. If we understand by this word a certain attitude towards a deity or divine being, to talk of a godless religion would be self-contradictory ; but there is no warrant for confining the word 'religion' to such a narrow sense.

Turning to the question of the need for religion, three proofs have usually been put forward which may be called the Scientific, the Practical, and the Historical Proofs respectively. Need for a full discussion of these proofs is rendered still more pressing by the fact that there have been some acute attacks aimed at religion, some of which we have discussed in the preceding three chapters. Now turning to the proofs.

1. *The Scientific Proof*

Science is covering distance towards its goal at a really marvellous speed. It is trying to make its headway into the undercurrents of reality with a view to understanding it and making it subservient to man. And no one can help feeling amazed at the tremendous success that it is making in its errand. Human intellect has been making a fast progress in the spheres of mathematics and physics, the former treating of the universe

as an elaborate differential equation,[30] the latter as a big and gigantic machine.[31] In biology again, a steady progress is being made towards reducing life, deemed to be a unique phenomenon, into chemico-physical processes,[32] and although it has not yet succeeded in explaining higher forms of life in this way, the biologists hope to earn some meritorious success in future. Psychology has been progressing, they say, because it is trying to deal with mind and behaviour of the living individual in a more or less mechanical way.[33] It is reducing conscious as well as non-conscious phenomena to certain regular and dependable laws, as biology is doing with life.In short, science is busy with reducing the external as well as internal worlds to some predictable and dependable regularities or laws. It is trying to bring all phenomena under the causal net-work[34] in which science is in the main interested. This has given man unthinkable mastery over the forces of nature, an old dream of humanity which is now heading towards its fulfilment.

But is the causality-bound aspect of nature the whole truth about it? Is not the ultimate Reality invading our consciousness from some other direction as well? Is the purely intellectual method of overcoming nature the only method ? In the modern history of thought, vitalists like Henri Bergson will not acquiesce in the view that the causality-bound aspect of nature is the whole truth. For Bergson, there are other and more important aspects of nature also which can be known through intuition only.[35] Even the renowned scientists like Professors Eddington and Haldane are convinced that the physical aspect of nature is not the whole truth. Professor Eddington says, "Feelings, purposes, values, make up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. We follow up the sense-impressions and find that they lead into an external world ..., we follow up the other elements of our being and find that they lead, not into a world of space and time, but surely somewhere".[36] And what is that where our feelings, purposes and values lead us to if not the realm of religion and morality ? It is surely the world of values, with God as a very important part of it, to which these elements of our consciousness lead, and which is as real as that to which our sense-impressions beckon. What right a physicist has to say that

the data on which our world of religion and morality is founded are sham and illusory, whereas those others he deals with are genuine ?

2. *The Practical Proof*

One very important consequence of the advancements of science and technology is the unprecedented control over the forces of nature. What were once mere dreams of man have become today the stark facts, and what are the dreams of man today, it is believed, will be the facts of tomorrow. So nothing seems to be a far-fetched idea, for with a further advancement of science, it is hoped, very many dreams will come true. Man today has mastery over the land, the waters, and the air, and there is every likelihood that he will have his control over the heavenly bodies also, including the moon. But all these unbelievable advancements have their dark aspect also. The advancement of science and technology means a reversal in the spheres of religion and morality, and perhaps in the sphere of all the various kinds of value. "Thus, wholly overshadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, Iqbal says very regretfully, "the modern man has ceased to live soulfully, i.e. from within".[37] The spiritual aspects of his nature are being ignored quite conspicuously. The result is that man has been torne from man ; he has been facing fellowmen as enemies, competing for the same objects as he. There is also a conflict and discord within his own nature. As a result of this estrangement, says Iqbal, "In the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself ; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless egoism and his infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness".[38]

Again, with advancement in the invention of means of mass destruction, with increase in the world-wide political tension as we find it in the world today, with rise of political groups each contending for supremacy in the world political scheme, and with the rise of so many 'isms' in the West, man has fallen a prey to isolation, estrangement and forlornness,[39] the facts which

the existentialists often emphasize. This state of affairs is due to the fact that the world is growing more and more materialistic, abolishing all traditional values, like love and sympathy. The Westerners impute this state to the misdeeds of Nazis and Communists, and to their dismissal of Christianity.[40] They hold these facts, in part at least, responsible for their present troubles and think that "if the world returned to Christianity, our international problems would be solved".[41] A more or less similar type of feeling prevails in the East also. The recent humiliation of the Arabs by the Israelites, we ascribe to the fact that they have gone astray from the real spirit and teachings of Islam. Against this view Russell contends, "I believe this to be a complete delusion born of terror. And I think it is a dangerous delusion because it misleads men whose thinking might otherwise be fruitful and thus stands in the way of a valid solution".[42] The present ills and troubles of the world are due to a less rational approach to the world problems, intolerance, and the lack of love and mutual understanding. He says: "Intelligence, it might be said, has caused our troubles ; but it is not unintelligence that will cure them. Only more and wiser intelligence can make a happier world".[43]

Again, while talking of the prevalent conviction in the West that the present crisis is due to the misdeeds of Hitler and the Communists, and that a return to Christianity is the only remedy for the present ills, Russell remarks that during the hey-days of Christianity the world was lacking in virtues like truthfulness and intellectual integrity,[44] and vices of obscurantism and intolerance[45] were very common among the Christians. Not much graver is the state of affairs produced by Nazis and Communists. "The Ogpu differs only quantitatively from the Inquisition. Its cruelties are of the same sort", says Russell, "and the damage that it does to the intellectual and moral life of Russians is of the same sort as that which was done by the Inquisitors wherever they prevailed".[46] Thus he says that a return to Christianity will simply mean going 'out of the frying-pan into the fire'. In short, what can save the world from the present ills is a more rational attitude to the world problems rather than a return to faith and religion which are non-rational.

3. The Historical Proof

It is a plain matter of fact that millions of men from all ages and countries have proclaimed to have had a direct and personal experience which may appositely be called religious. Centuries ago we had Buddha,[47] Krishna,[48] and Rama[49] in India who made pretensions to this experience. Among the Christians, the figure of the Jesus Christ stands out most prominently, but we also have mystics like St. John of the Cross,[50] St. Teresa,[51] St. Anselm,[52] including the most prominent personalities of Meister Eckhart[53] and Plotinus,[54] who have made similar claims. In the history of Islam also, we come across sufis like Shahab-uddin Suhrawardy,[55] Rabiya al-Basri,[56] Jalaluddin Rumi,[57] Ali Hujweri,[58] Maruf Karkhi,[59] and others, who had the relish of experience under review. Besides that, the world has seen thousands of those who professed to be the messengers from God. We also have the whole literature, mystical and prophetic, including the records of the specialists, though expressed in the thought-forms of an out-dated psychology, which bears ample testimony to the genuineness of that experience. Here, of course, a Freudian might say that the fact that a small minority of human beings have had a certain experience does not make it binding on all to acknowledge the truth of that experience. This point we have discussed before. I will simply say that the Freudian in question cannot afford to deny the historical fact that the claimants of this experience have not only made oral claims, but have also proved their reality by changing the world on the basis of their experiences. The prophets and the reformers, who have made such pretensions, have proved the worth of their claims by abolishing the extant values and norms, and dictating in their stead newer ideals and values which are certainly superior to the old ones. Commenting on the pragmatic significance of the teachings of the Prophet of Islam, Iqbal refers to the fact that he gave "a fresh direction to the course of human history",[60] and adds that "it is a point of the highest psychological interest to search his original experience which has turned slaves into leaders of men, and has inspired the conduct and shaped the career of whole races of mankind".[61] It is followed by a whole lineage of renowned Sufis who have been known for introducing

effective reforms into the existing social and moral orders of their ages. Again, we can refer to the famous Reformations[62] which, under the inspiration of men like Martin Luther,[63] brought about remarkable changes in the socio-political set-up of the West. And that was due to the light thrown by reflections and experiences of these men. As we shall see in the next chapter, these experiences not only caused revolutions in the socio-political order of the world, they also had the capacity for re-integrating and centralizing the very personality of the recipient himself.

Thus, we have seen that religious facts are historical facts which cannot be dismissed once for all. Religious reformers in the form of mystics and prophets have been making their appearance every now and then, controlling and reshaping the social and spiritual forces of the world. All the progress, no one can gainsay, which has been made by humanity, it owes, among other things, to the advent of such personages. Also, it is not possible to reject the world of values which runs parallel, perhaps opposite, to the physical world of science and perception. There is no doubt that the rift which human thought, since the times of Plato,[64] has created between the two realms --- namely, the realm of values and that of facts- is unwarranted, and there is a need for bringing the two Worlds closer than they at present are ; but however close we may succeed in bringing them to each other, values remain irreducible to facts,[65] they being an emotional reaction to facts. The fact of the world of values leads to the seat of values and, in one sense at least, God represents the seat of value.[66] Whether God, and all the super-structure built around Him, can save humanity from the imminent crisis is a question which we must take up now. Russell, as we have seen above, has denied any such efficacy to religion on the ground that, being a matter of faith and irrationality, it cannot remedy our troubles. What can cure these ills is a more rational and wiser approach to the world problems. Russell does not agree with those who claim that, since the troubles of humanity have been caused by excessive rationality and civilization, they can be cured by faith alone.

Russell seems to be quite right in his contention that only more and wiser intelligence can make a happier world. What he misses is that reason or intelligence by itself is not sufficient for meeting the requirements of the age. Reason by itself is too feeble to produce any change, whether for good or for ill.[67] And if it leads to any effects, those may be destructive and harmful.[68] It requires some affective basis to make it effective and efficacious, and this basis can well be provided by religion which is primarily a matter of feeling. Religion, no doubt, when left to itself may lead to those ills of which Russell speaks because without a rational basis it is apt to be misguided. What is required under the circumstances is a right amalgamation of reason and faith. In other words, what can save humanity from the imminent danger is neither reason alone, nor faith alone, but a rationally-founded faith. Iqbal tacitly recognizes this fact when he stresses the complementary nature of reason and intuition, of science and religion, in passages like, "Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement each other".[69] Again he says, "Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation".[70]

But it is in *Javid Nama* that Iqbal very expressly urges the need for a unison of reason and faith. He says,

زیرکی از عشق گردد حق شناس
کارِ عشق از زیرکی محکم اساس
عشق چوں با زیرکی همبر شود
نقشبندِ عالمِ دیگر شود

"..... "Love-led

Can reason claim the Lord and reason-lit
Love strikes firm roots. When integrated,
These two draw the pattern of a different world."[71]
And while talking of the human knowledge, he writes,

علم بے عشق است از طاغوتیاں
علم با عشق است از لاهوتیاں!

بے محبت علم و حکمت مردۂ
عقل تیرے بر ہدف ناخوردۂ

"... If it be divorced from love,
Then knowledge is but Satan's progeny
But if it blends with love, it joins the ranks
Of high celestial spirits. Love-bereft
All knowledge is but cold as death, the shaft
Of intellect its target fails to reach".[72]
And again, while talking of *faqr* as described by the Quran, he says

فقرِ قرآں اصلِ شاہنشاہی است
فقرِ قرآں اختلاطِ ذکر و فکر
فکر را کامل ندیدم جز بذکر

"The Qur'an inculcates a quality
Of '*faqr*', which is the very quintessence
Of sovereignty, a '*faqr*' which indicates
The fusion absolute of prayer and thought
No thought completes, its reach except by aid of prayer...".[73]

Ferre in *Reason in Religion* acknowledges this fusion of faith and reason thus: "In the realm of religion, faith and reason are inseparable.[74] No part "of faith is without reason. Without reason in its identifying and discriminating functions faith is empty. Without reason in its evaluative and ordering powers faith is blind. Every basic separation of faith and reason is a denial of both. Both are indispensable servants of life".[75] But there is a prejudice for reason which is treated as predominant over faith. To Iqbal, both reason and faith are equally indispensable, for whom love-bereft knowledge is cold and powerless.

While divining the causes of the prevalent ills of Europe, Iqbal accuses the excesses of Imperialism and Socialism, and imputes it to the fact of excessive intellectualization and civilization as a result of which the modern man has ceased to live 'soulfully' or from within. This state of affairs, though more marked in the West, is also spreading in the East. As a result of it, man is living in continuous conflict with himself as well as with others. Iqbal expresses this fact in his *Javid Nama* thus:

سرگذشتِ آدم اندر شرق و غرب
ہر خاکے فتنہ ہائے حرب و ضرب!

'Man's chronicle both in the East and West
Narrates a single tale, the tale of war.
And strife for land...'[76] (1323-25).

He finds himself a total stranger in the society–nay, rather one who has been estranged from himself as well as from his fellow–men, and his excessive selfishness has been killing all higher aspirations in him and bringing him nothing but life–weariness. He finds himself so absorbed in the 'fact' that "he is entirely cut off from the unplumbed depths of his own being."[77] The over-intellectualization of the present age Iqbal expresses in the following verse:

عصرِ حاضر را خرد زنجیرِ پاست

"The present age is shackled by the chains
Of intellect ... ;"[78]

And Iqbal adds, as a result of that

شعلۂ افرنگیاں نم خوردہ ایست
چشمِ شاں صاحب نظر، دل مردہ ایست!
زخمہا خوردند از شمشیرِ خویش

بخل افتادند چوں نخچیر خویش!

"...The embers of
The West are cold; their eyes can see, their heart
Is dead; they'r seared and scarred with their own swords
Self-hunted victims all ..."[79]

The West is now too barren to 'spawn' a new age.[80] Under the impact of the West, the Turks, Iranians and the Arabs are also lying quite dead.[81] The West with its Imperialism and Socialism his extinguished the flame of 'faith' in the East and has spiritually wrecked it.[82] The fault of the East lies in its blindly following into the foot-steps of the West. The East, dazzled by the exterior of the West, mistakenly thinks that the remedy for its ills lies in following closely the West.[83] The remedy, both for the ills of the West and for those of the East, Iqbal urges, lies in the birth of "an enkindled heart",[84] the soul which has and gives:

سوز و مستی را بجو از تاک شاں
عصر دیگر نیست در افلاک شاں!

'...an ardency to life
And forms its symphony ...."[85]

What can save the world from the imminent danger is a "restless soul"[86] or "a living heart",[87] the one in whom the heart is as keen and responsive as the head, who possesses a really keen vision or insight. Such a vision, Iqbal adds, can be possessed by one who has 'found himself', that is, who has discovered the psychological roots of his being.

جلوہ مستی؟ خویش را در یافتن!
در شباں چوں کوکبے بر تافتن!
خویش را نا یافتن نا بودن است
یافتن، خود را بخود بخشودن است!

"To be in vision drenched ? It doth connote
To find thyself, to shine like starts at night.

مشرق از سلطانی مغرب خراب
اشتراک از دین و ملت برده خراب!

To fail to find the self is naught to be,
To find it is but to bestow one's self
On self ..."[88]

Again, he writes,

----- اندر ضمیر خود نگر
روزہا روشن زغوغمائے حیات
نے ازاں نورے کہ بینی در جہات

"...For if thou lookst within thy soul
Thou'lt find tumultuous life to brighten up
Thy days and spurn the outer source of light".[89]

So much about the importance of religion in the present state of the human world. The world, we have seen, is facing a big catastrophe. Science has brought humanity to the threshold of a crisis. Under these circumstances, as we have seen during the present chapter, 'what can save mankind from the prevalent perils is neither Faith nor Reason alone, but a rationally-founded Faith'. This justifies a need for a return to religion–not, of course, the traditional religion of faith, but a well-thought-out religious life. But questions regarding the importance of, and need for, religion are not the same as those regarding the verification of religious experience. These are questions of two different orders, and it is quite legitimate for a person to recognize the importance of religion and still hold that religious assertions are not verifiable. Hence, we will concern ourselves with the question of verification in the following chapter.

Notes and References

[1] Iqbal discusses these arguments in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 28-31.
[2] Cf. pp. 73-74.
[3] For this argument see pp. 74-77.
[4] *A Modern Philosophy of Religion*, p. 306.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 307.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 322.
[7] *Ibid.* p. 323.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 327.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, p. *336.*
[11] *Ibid.*, p. *340.*
[12] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 152.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 152-53
[14] This seems to be the basic assumption of almost all the evolutionary and mechanistic theories of the universe.
[15] B. Russell, op. cit., p. 8.
[16] *Ibid.,* where Lord Russell says: 'I do not myself think that the dependence of morals upon religion is nearly as close as religious people believe it to be ... some very important virtues are more likely to be found among those who reject religious dogmas than among those who accept it ... the virtues of truthfulness or intellectul integrity'. p. 169 ; Again he says : ... in the present day such good as may be done by imputing a theological origin to morals is inextricably bound up with such grave evils that the good becomes insignificant in comparison. pp. 170-71; 'Again,any system of morals which has a theological basis becomes one of the tools by which the holders of power preserve their authority and impair the intellectual vigour of the young'. p. 171.
[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 8.
[18] *Ibid*, pp. 155-56.
[19] *Philosophy*, Vol. XXXI, No. 118, July 1956, p. 239.

[20] *The Future of An Illusion*, p. 49.
[21] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 136.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 157-58.
[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 158.
[24] W.K. Wright, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 179.
[25] *Ibid,*, p. 202.
[26] This is the famous argument from design discussed by Russell also. See *Why I Am Not A Christian*, pp. 6-7.
[27] R. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, pp. 237-38.
[28] *The Qur'an* '.... and We are nearer to him than his jugular vein' (I : 16).
[29] N. Smart, *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 38-39. "Thus, in our sense of the word, Buddhism in all its phases, is definitely a religious system. But unlike the Semitic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) it starts frofn an interior mystical quest, rather than from the prophetic experience of a dynamic personal God. It is mysticism without God" ... p. 39. cf. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, ch. xvii, *Attitude to God*, pp. 453-56.
[30] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 185.
[31] *Ibid.*, p, 41.
[32] *Op. cit.*, p. 41.
[33] R. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology*, see chapter on "Behaviourism".
[34] It is the ideal of science to bring all phenomena under a sys- tem of laws or principles.
[35] Reference is to the *Elan Vital* the true nature whereof is beyond the comprehension of Intellect. To Bergson, 'At least intellect can surround a prefabricated house of science whereas intuition has the noble privilege of entering the mansion of life and feeling and experience"-Morton White, *The Age of Analysis*, p. 67.
[36] Quoted in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. p. 186.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 187-88.
[39] "When we speak of forlornness, we mean only that God does not exist and that we have to face all the consequences of this-- B. Winn, *A Concise Dictionary of Existentialism*, p. 37.
[40] B. Russell, *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p.169
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*, p, 169.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 178.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 171-72.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 172.
[47] Gautama, the Buddha (Pali Gotama), the founder of the Buddhist faith, was born in or about 560 B. C.-*Ency. Bri*, Vol. 2,.pp. 881.
[48] In Rajput belief Krsna is the deified hero of the Yadava tribe, and he has his seat at Mathura (q. v.), where he sports with the *gopis*, or milkmaids. In another form, at Dawarka, he is god of the dark storm-cloud (J. Kennedy, *JRAS*, 1907, p. 951 ff.) ... *Mind*, Vol. 10, p. 566.
[49] Rama, regarded as one of the two last incarnations of Visnu. The cult of Rama as a chief god at present day prevails over an extensive area in India. But Rama was at first only an epic hero ; for in the original part (bks. ii-vi) of the Ramayana (q. v.), which celebrates his life and deeds, he is presented as an essentially human character. On the other hand, in bks. i and vii, which are admittedly later additions, his divine nature is fully accepted ... *ibid.*, Vol. 19, pp. 566-67.
[50] St. John, of the Cross (Spanish: San jaun De la Cruz) (1542–1591), the name in religion of Juan De Yepes Y Alvarez, the most profoundly lyrical of Spanish poets and one of the great mystics of all time ... *ibid.*, Vol. 13, p. 84.
[51] Teresa, St. (1515-1582) or Teresa de Cepeda, Spanish nun, was born at Avila, in Old Castile, on March 28, 1515 ... *ibid.*, Vol. 22, p. 74.
[52] St. Anselm (1033-1109), Archbishop of Canterbury, theologian and first of the scholastic philosophers, is one of the most important thinkers between Augustine and Thomas Aquinas ... *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 8.
[53] The greatest figure in the Germanic school of mysticism of the fourteenth century. Eckhart, Johannes or Heinrich, German Dominican theologian and mystic ... B. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, Index, p. 853.
[54] (A.D. 204-270), the founder of Neoplatonism, is the last of the great philosophers of antiquity ... *ibid.*, p. 284.
[55] (1153-1191 A.D.), a theologian and sufi known for Ishraqi wisdom.
[56] (717-801 A.D.), a famous woman mystic known for her doctrine of disinterested love for God.
[57] (d. 1207 A.D.) a renowned sufi poet who wrote *Masnavi*.
[58] (400-465 A.H.), another famous Sufi and reformer.
[59] (d. 815 A.D.), a renowned sufi.
[60] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 190.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] German Reformation was a revolt against scholasticism and ecclesiastical authority. It was a religious awakening.

[63] Luther, Martin, leader of the Reformation in Germany (d. 1483–1546) ... B. Russell, op. cit., index, p. SW
[64] *Republic*, Book VII, 514 Aff. Plato's famous simile of the Cave.
[65] A fact first brought out by Hume and later emphasized by G. E. Moore in the *Principia Ethics*.
[66] God has been conceived as the seat of values.
[67] "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them". *Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, Part 111, Sec. ILL D. Hume,.
[68] As we see it in the invention of media of mass destruction-i.e., atomic weapons chemical warfare, etc.
[69] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 2.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[71] *The Pilgrimage of Eternity*, 1135-40, p. 54.
[72] *Ibid.*, 1400.1405, p. 66.
[73] *Ibid.*, 1527-32. p. 72.
[74] *Reason in Religion*, p. 35.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[76] *Ibid.*, vs. 1323.25.
[77] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 188.
[78] *The Pilgrimage of Eternity*, 39-40, p. 2.
[79] *Ibid.*, 1140-43, p. 54.
[80] *Ibid.*, 1145-48: pp. 54-55.

ترک و ایران و عرب مست فرنگ
ہر کے رادر گلو شست فرنگ

[81] The Turks, Iranians, Arabs lie benumbed with Europe's noose ground their throats... *'ibid* , 1054.
[82] With its Imperialism has wrecked: the East. And Socialism bedimmed the flame of faith'--*ibid.*, 1055-57, p. 50,
[83] 'The East has lost its true self by imitating the West though instead it should have made critical appraisal of the West'-*Ibid.*, 1472-74, p. 70.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[85] *Ibid.*, 1145-48, p. 55.
[86] *Ibid.*, 40, P. 2.
[87] *Ibid.*, 1225. p. 58.
[88] *Ibid.*, 3160-64, p. 152 ,
[89] *Ibid.*, 136-38, p. 7.

CHAPTER FIVE

VERIFICATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

> A sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable.
> (Ayer).

.... the question remains to be asked, how to assess claims to the validity and genuineness of this experience. The fact that it is rare and unique, and not accessible to all or to a majority does not absolve the religious man from answering such questions as 'what is the guaranty for the truth of religious experience? 'Are we in possession of a test whereby to decide upon the claims of a recipient of the experience in question?, In short, the question of the verification of religious assertions. Theologians and philosophers have been quite alive to the importance of these questions. It is not only that the mystic should have means to satisfy himself regarding the validity of his experience, even a layman, who has never had such an experience himself, has a right to demand satisfaction regarding the truth of the experience. Thus, Iqbal rightly says that he is entitled to ask about any judgement which claims to be the interpretation of a certain region of human experience and which is not accessible to him, what is the guaranty of its truth? Are we in possession of a test which would reveal its validity? He adds, if personal experiences were the only ground for accepting judgement of

this kind, religion would have been the possession of a few individuals only.[1]

Thus, religion is an experience which, like any other experience, is open to public verification. This is obvious from the fact that not a single Prophet God has sent on the earth who was not required by his people to vindicate his pretensions to prophethood through the performance of miracles. Moreover, it has always been one of the most crucial problems of religion to look for some criterion or criteria "to discriminate between such messages and experiences as were really divine miracles, and such others as the demon in his malice was able to counterfeit...."[2], for the latter have been no less frequent than the divine ones. And because of this possibility even the Prophets had to be very careful in accepting any message as from God. When Abraham, for example, dreamt of sacrificing his son Ismail, he suspected it to be an evil suggestion from the Satan. It was after dreaming it on three consecutive nights that he summoned himself up to the execution of the deed. There are many other instances in the history of religion where a Prophet or a saint put himself similar questions before undertaking anything. Even the Prophet of Islam was bidden by the Qur'an to pray as follows And say: "My Lord, I seek refuge in Thee from the evil suggestions of the devil and I seek refuge in Thee, my Lord, lest they come to me".[3] The need for verification has been rendered still more pressing by the fact that the truth and value of religious assertions have been challenged by some of the latest philosophical traditions–especially the positivist tradition. It has been urged against the religious assertions that they are metaphysical utterances which cannot be either true or false;[4] they do not "express propositions which are empirically verifiable".[5] More of this line of attack will follow in the sequel. However, one thing is certain that the problem of verification in the case of religious statements is undoubtedly the most crucial of the problems of religion today.

It was not, however, a less crucial problem to the medieval theologians who were fully conscious of its significance. The ancient theologians used to put forward the following arguments for establishing the truth of religious dogmas. The religious

dogmas "deserve to be believed", they said, "firstly, because our primal ancestors already believed them; secondly, because we possess proofs, which have been handed down to us from this very period of antiquity; and thirdly, because it is forbidden to raise the question of their authenticity at all".[6] None of these, however, Freud says, is a valid argument to establish the validity and authenticity of the religious facts. The first argument is not valid. To say that we ought to believe because our forefathers believed is untenable for these ancestors were far more ignorant than we; they believed in many things which we cannot possibly accept today. It is quite probable that religious doctrines also fall in this category.[7] The second argument is equally untenable, for the proofs they have bequeathed to us are in writings which bear every trace of being untrustworthy. "They are full of contradictions", says Freud, "revisions, and interpolations. Where they speak of actual authentic proofs they are themselves of doubtful authenticity".[8] The third one is also not very convincing, because to prohibit raising any question regarding their authenticity can be due to the fact that society knows very well the uncertain basis of the claim it makes for its religious doctrines. "If it were otherwise, the relevant material would certainly be placed most readily at the disposal of anyone who wished to gain conviction for himself".[9] "It does not help much if divine revelation is asserted to be the origin of their text or only of their content", he adds, "for this assertion is itself already a part of those doctrines whose authenticity is to be examined,..."[10]

Freud and his followers, and of late logical empiricists, put a slur upon religious assertions on the ground of their non-verifiability. The positivistic position on this point is as follows; a sentence can only have actual meaning, i.e., meaning of a kind which admits of its being informative, if it is capable in principle of verification by sense-experience, and it seems plain that specifically religious sentences are not so capable. If so it follows at once that they have no factual meaning.[11] As Professor Ayer has put it, "a sentence had literal meaning if and only if proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable".[12] Professor Ayer, in order to include those statements also which are only indirectly verifiable, reformulates the

principle of verification "as requiring of a literally meaningful statement, which is not analytic, that it should be either directly or indirectly veriflable".[13] He urges that the religious statements cannot be a priori and analytic, for "we cannot deduce the existence of a god from an a priori proposition".[14] Nor are they "empirical hypotheses", for they are neither directly nor indirectly verifiable in the sense in which he explains the phrases "directly verifiable" and "indirectly verifiable". Again he says that "since the religious utterances of the theist are not genuine propositions at all, they cannot stand in any logical relation to the propositions of science".[15]

If they admit them to be factual statements at all, they are treated as statements concerning the working of one's own mind. Against this Professor A. C. Ewing, in one of his articles, urges that if this is the criterion, then "even the most respectable scientific propositions are not capable of direct verification by sense-experience, and the principle, if carried out strictly, would result in the denial of all natural laws and the reduction of the world to one's own sense-data, surely a reductio ad absurdum".[16]

Again, positivists have no right to proclaim that religious assertions are not 'empirically verifiable' on the ground that they are not verifiable by sense-experience. C. B. Martin in his article "A Religious Way of Knowing" writes: "His paper is an attempt to indicate how statements concerning a certain alleged religious way of knowing betray logic extraordinarily like that of statements concerning introspective and subjective ways of knowing".[17] He appears to have asserted that "the religious statement 'I have direct experience of God' is like a psychological statement ("I seem to see a star", "I feel or seem to feel pain", etc.) but it is not itself a psychological statement. ..., because it makes an existential claim which a straightforward psychological statement does not make".[18] But in what sense is it like a psychological statement? Martin seems to have replied that it is like a psychological statement in so far as it is "not admitting of tests and checking procedures",[19]–in short, verification–and it is because the objects of religious statements are not–"public and neutral".[20] Now, "being public and neutral", says Professor W. D. Glasgow in his article "Knowledge of

God" is one of the main conditions which we presuppose in calling anything a physical object or substance.

This condition is not fulfilled in religious experience",[21] but "we are not entitled to draw from this the conclusion that religious experience has no existential or objective import".[22] He concludes the whole discussion of experience and verification leads perhaps to the following classification:

"(A) Where tests are applicable, the experience may be

(a) proved ("objective")

(b) disproved ("subjective")

(c) neither proved nor disproved because of practical difficulties ("may be either");

(B) Where tests are "not" applicable, the experience may be

(a) subjective ("I feel sad")

(b) objective ("I am aware of God")[23]

Thus he tried to prove that religious experience, though not verifiable in the sense in which factual statements are, is-none the-less objective (viz. (B) (b) category above) A. C. Ewing urges against the position of the positivists that they limit the term 'fact' to empirical facts, i.e., facts which can be the object of observation and natural science, and in that sense God is not a fact. But this is not the usual meaning of the word outside the books and lectures of these philosophers. The position that nothing can exist except the type of subjects we know in science and ordinary sense-experience is certainly not true, and if other things do exist there will certainly be facts about them (in a well-recognized sense of "fact"). The metaphysician may rightly claim to be giving "factual information", though not about the empirical facts of ordinary life.[24]

In view of the fact that religious assertions are not reasoned out, it has usually been urged that they are dogmas. Against this Freud contends that dogmas in general "claim to be the condensed results of a long process of thought, which is founded on observation and also, certainly on reasoning; they show how, if one so intends, one can go through this process oneself,

instead of accepting the result of it;...".[25] But this is not true of the so-called religious dogmas, for it is not possible for any one, who so intends, to go through the whole process of observation and reasoning on which they are claimed to be founded. Hence, he concludes, religious dogmas are illusions and not even dogmas.[26] Now to be sure, there are many scientific dogmas which are no more verifiable, but still they pass for truth; e.g. the geographical dogma that the earth has an axis round which it rotates, etc. as it is physically impossible for a human being to go into the crust of the earth and see its axis. But these are scientific truths all the same. What is the criterion in their case?

Certainly such truths are treated as hypotheses and they are serviceable for supplying gaps in our experience and hence making it intelligible and coherent. What makes an hypothesis workable is the fact that a belief in its truth leads to 'better' consequences. Thus if we believe that the earth has an axis round which it rotates, we will be in a better position to account for the diurnal movement which causes the alternation of day and night. In the history of Western philosophy, Kant for one treated of the religious truths as 'postulates' amongst which he included the concept of God also.[27] Postulate for Kant was not knowledge, but a substitute for knowledge. Writing on Kant's postulates of Practical Reason Professor B. K. Milmed, in his article "Theories of Religious Knowledge from Kant to Jaspers", points out that Kant was careful to refer to these insights as 'postulates', not as 'knowledge', so as to preserve his rational standards of knowledge. But what was justification for accepting this distinction? Milmed replies, "If there is any justification for accepting postulates as true, they must to that extent be classified as knowledge. If there is no knowledge that can assert them, there is no justification for accepting them as true...".[28] However, Kant accepted them as postulates in contrast with knowledge which, according to him, was empirico-rational.[29] But hypotheses are not mere assumptions, requiring no justification for them at all. As Professor C. D. Broad has pointed out, a postulate is a proposition having the following characteristics:

(i) "It is neither intuitively nor demonstratively necessary and neither intuitively nor demonstratively impossible;

(ii) It can neither be proved, nor disproved by experience and problematic induction; and

(iii) to act as it were true will have better consequences than to act as if it were false or doubtful. These "better consequences" may be either (a) increase of knowledge and theoretical coherence, or (b) increase of happiness, virtue, practical efficiency, and so on. In the first case we talk of a 'theoretical', in the second, of a 'practical', postulate",[30] Professor Broad expressly says that a religious postulate-the postulate of God, for instance - "cannot be justified as a means of increasing our knowledge or introducing more coherence into our beliefs".[31] Perhaps the reason for this contention is that God is a mystery. Same is true of the other postulates of religion. The rest of his discussion indicates that these are not practical postulates either, for a belief, say, in God, does not lead to an increase of happiness, or virtue or practical efficiency.[32]

There is, however, no warrant for the latter position of Broad. Religious beliefs, I firmly uphold, are at least genuine practical postulates and they do possess hypothetical value of which he talks. They are true postulates; for to act as if God, the Immortality of Soul, and the Hereafter were true does lead to 'better consequences' inasmuch as a belief in them certainly leads to greater contentment, more virtue and heightened efficiency. This has amply been proved during the 1965 war with India, for it was primarily a war between the believers and the unbelievers, and who can deny that the Pakistanis, despite their small numbers, fought with their backs to the wall, sole motive force behind them being their unrelenting faith in the just and rewarding God, Immortality, and the Hereafter. Better still, it was the same faith which made Tariq[33] to ejaculate 'Every land is our land, for it is our God's land', and fight a desperate battle to victory in Spain, after burning his ships to ashes.[34] And above all, the same unfailing faith in God and His compliance with the believers enabled such a meagre number as 313 Muslims scantily-equipped, under the inspiring command of the Holy Prophet, to quash an overwhelming majority of the Kuraish at

Badr.[35] Instances can be multiplied indefinitely. Again, who can deny the contentment and equanimity that a true belief in religious dogmas engenders. I will only refer to an event from the life of the Holy Prophet who, when taken unarmed and unawares by a nomad, who came for his assassination, and asked ironically 'Now! who will save thee', could reply with an unparallelled and unshaken conviction, 'Only my Lord, Who is merciful and powerful'. The composure and peace betrayed by the Prophet put the nomad to trembling and made him lose his grip on the sword.[36] The history of religion in general, and that of Islam in particular–especially the life of the Holy Prophet–abounds in such instances in which faith has led to 'better practical consequences'. Even Lord Russell acknowledges that mystic emotion "reveals a possibility of human nature–a possibility of a nobler, happier, freer life than anything can be otherwise achieved".[37]

Religious truths, then, are 'practical postulates' at least and as we have seen before, this was the position of Kant in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. Contrasting faith with knowledge, Maud Bodkin in his article "Knowledge and Faith", refers to Jaspers who discusses the faith of such saints of philosophy as Socrates, Boethuis, Bruno who vindicated their faith "after the manner of martyrs". These men had faith in a truth with which they were so personally identified that they were ready to die for its sake. But Galileo, when threatened like Bruno by the Inquisition, would not die for his scientific truth. He retracted a truth objectively valid, verifiable in time by all men and needing no witness of a dedicated and surrendered life. "The truth for which these philosophic martyrs (and permit me to add, many more religious martyrs) died was not thus objective, verifiable, but for them, each in his historic situation, it was a truth commanding, absolute".[38]

Russell raises two objections against the position that God may be treated as an hypothesis. He points out that mystics disagree on many points, although they are "just as certain as when they agree".[39] This means that the mystics feel a sham certainty about their experience. Russell, however, concedes that mystics may meet this objection "by agreeing on the greater

importance of the matters about which they are at one..."[40] and on the main points he finds that "The chief argument in favour of the mystics is their agreement with each other".[41] Bergson accounts for even some of the most apparent differences among mystics by saying that "the path followed is the *same*, even admitting that the stopping-places by the way are at different intervals[42]... and concludes that "their deep-seated agreement, would find its simplest explanation in the actual existence of the Being with whom they believe themselves to hold intercourse".[43] Russell, however, urges that, although mystics to some extent corroborate *each* other's testimony, it is not possible for any 'normal' man to corroborate it. In science, we are told how to repeat the experiment the results of which we are asked to accept, "but many men might put themselves in the situation in which the mystic's vision occurred without obtaining the same revelation".[44] It is true, he admits, that "a man must use the appropriate sense",[45] but whereas in repeating a scientific experiment, a man must use only normal eyesight and must arrange only his laboratory instruments, mysticism requires "changes in the observer by fasting, by breathing exercises, and by careful abstention from observation".[46] Now it is, no doubt, true that the fault does not lie with the science of mysticism but with *the* subject in such an experiment, who happens to be a human being. Even modern psychology, which claims to be scientific and experimental, confronts the same difficulties and for precisely the same reason, that is why it cannot be placed among the perfect and complete scientific studies.[47] Again, Russell is mistaken when he says that a 'careful abstention from observation' is among the necessary conditions for the arousal of a mystic state. It is a psychological truth that when you wish to attend to your thoughts, you have to turn your 'eyes' inwards; and the more you succeed in distracting your attention from the external stimuli, the better you will be able to observe the internal happenings. This is the famous Law of Selectivity of Attention. Thus, in mysticism, when you wish to attend to the spiritual world, you are required, as one of the necessary conditions, to distract your attention from the physical world. Again, Bertrand Russell observes that, though the mystic may

himself be certain, without the scientific tests, of the truth of his "visions", others can believe him only after verification.[48]

Against the last point of Russell, Bergson argues that "we do sometimes believe scientific reports without varification-for example, Livingstone's reports on Africa, which were unverified for a long time. Of course, the explorations, although they had not yet been repeated, were always repeatable, and ultimately were repeated and verified; but more people were capable of repeating the mystic's explorations than were capable of exploring Africa. Some people, he admits, are impervious to music, and this does not discredit music".[49] Moreover, on what grounds is Russell justified in his contention that religious truths are unverifiable? Professor Ayer, as seen before, holds a position very kindred to that of Russell. He holds that only "empirical hypotheses" admit of verification, and that religious truths cannot be placed amongst them. Now, everybody will agree that a hypothesis is always to be verified by experience -this is what Ayer means by calling them 'empirical hypotheses', and when he denies that religious truths are empirical hypotheses he actually means that there is no experience whereby they can be checked and verified. This involves a disclaimer of the religious experience itself. But as we have seen before, religious experience, F. C. Copleston has pointed out, can ably serve for the empirical verification of the religious hypotheses. It is analogous to the process of hypothesis and verification in the sciences. The same thing Professor Ayer says about what he calls 'empirical hypotheses'. He says: "...all empirical propositions are hypotheses which are continually subject to the test of further experience; and from this it would follow not merely that the truth of any such proposition never was conclusively established but that it never could be;...".[50] A similar line of thought has been advocated by Henri Bergson in his book *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.*[51]

It might be replied to the above position that a scientist may form a hypothesis and then deduce that if certain requisite conditions were fulfilled and operations performed, certain events should occur if the hypotheses were true. And if the events do occur when the experiment is performed, it tends to

verify or confirm the hypothesis. But we are not in a position to make similar experiments with regard to mystical experiences. We cannot make experiments with other people.[52] This is the difficulty with all psychological experiments in which human subjects are involved. Moreover, as Fr. Copleston has pointed out, all scientific verification does not take the form of controlled experiment. He mentions the case of an astronomer who is not in a position to experiment with the heavenly bodies in the same way that a chemist can experiment with chemical substances. We may be able to deduce from an hypothesis that if the hypothesis were true certain phenomena should be observable. Similarly, it might be argued, "mystical experience can play a verificatory role analogous to that played by these observable astronomical phenomena".[53] Though, he adds, the analogy is not a strict one, but there is an analogy all the same. He argues that as in astronomy we can say "that certain phenomena must occur if the hypothesis is true",[54] so we can say in theology, "if there is a God Who could conceivably be the object of human experience, then it is tautologous to say that religious experience is possible. And if in fact it is found to occur, its occurrence serves as verification of the hypothesis".[55] Thus, religious truths are 'empirical hypotheses' in the sense in which our ordinary empirical propositions are and if the positivists are reluctant to accept that, it is because they presuppose that sensuous experience is the only type of experience. But in asserting this the positivists are begging the question, for this is what they are actually called upon to prove. As Iqbal has rightly urged, the position of the naturalists is acceptable "only if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible".[56] But he points out, "there are other levels of human experience capable of being systematized by other orders of space and time...".[57] Again he adds, The evidence of religious experts in all ages and countries is that there are potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness".[58]

It has so often been urged by the impugners of mystical experience that it is purely internal and private, and that the external observer depends upon the testimony of the mystics. There is no doubt that there "have been pseudo-mystical

charlatans and people who wished to draw attention to themselves".[59] But Father Copleston has pointed out that if we find Saint Teresa describing her experiences in writing and if we find that in ordinary life she was a woman of good sense and one free from pride and vanity, then it is more probable that "she intended to tell the truth as she saw it than that she intended to write what she knew or suspected to be false".[60] She goes on to say, "To avoid any possible misunderstanding, I must emphasize that I am not suggesting that the life of a mystic proves the truth of what he or she says. But it seems to me to be obvious that we can legitimately use available information about the life and character of a mystic to help us to decide whether he or she was in good faith and intended to tell the truth. This seems to me to be a matter of commonsense".[61] To this, however, it might well be replied that the life and character of a mystic are only a warrant against the possibility of his or her telling a lie intentionally; it is no guaranty against the possibility that the mystic has been duped by, say, an illusion or a hallucination. St. Teresa might have been reporting her experience honestly and faithfully, but this does not preclude the possibility that her "Visions" and "Locutions" were creations of her own imagination which had grown so strong as to make her sincerely believe in the external reality of them all. Here I would like to refer to thinkers like Ibnul Arabi who were of the opinion that the Gabriel, who would inspire the Holy Prophet (and this he would say of all the prophets) with Divine messages, was actually the creation of the Prophet's own imagination.[62]

This, however, should not delude us into thinking that religious experiences are mere subjective figments which admit of no objective and public verification. I have cited some instances of faith leading to a definite increase in courage, efficiency, and contentment. These were some of the instances in which faith effected some drastic changes in the attitude of the believers. The phenomenon of conversion[63] is very important in this respect, for conversion actually means a change in the mental set and attitude of man; this change may be gradual or it may be sudden. But the mere fact that a belief, when firmly established, produces a change in the inner history of a man, is by no means a sufficient and adequate proof for its passing for

true; for no belief, when firmly held, can fail to produce some 'inward' change.[64] It is the type of change that a belief produces which goes a long way to determine its religiosity or otherwiseness. Saint Teresa beautifully enunciates the difference between those inward changes which can rightly be called religious and those which are otherwise. She argues that like imperfect sleep which, "instead of giving more strength to the head, doth but leave it the more exhausted, the result of mere operations of imagination is but to weaken the soul, whereas a genuine heavenly vision yields to her a harvest of ineffable spiritual riches, and an admirable renewal of bodily strength."[65] About those who doubted her visions she said: "I showed them the jewels which the divine hand left with me;---they were my actual dispositions".[66] Bella K. Milmed in his article "Theories of Religious Knowledge, from Kant to Jaspers", refers to the same fact when, writing on the tests of religious experience, he says: "we are presented with two criteria. The first is the reality of the effects of such experience; ... The second criterion is the desirability of effects (making us "more sane and true)".[67]

In his debate on 'The Existence of God' with F. C. Copleston, Russell contends against the above type of position thus: "The fact that a belief has a good moral effect upon a man is no evidence whatever in favour of its truth".[68] He adds: "Obviously the character of a young man may be -and often is-immensely affected for good by reading about some great man in history, and it may happen that the great man is a myth and doesn't exist, but the boy is just as much affected for good as if he did".[69] The point is very convincing, and the discussion eventually led Fr. Copleston to the admission: "Yes, in one sense the man's loving a phantom -perfectly true. But in another sense he's loving what he perceives to be a value".[70] But, in the first place, Russell admits that these experiences were important, and, in the second, his contention that they did not involve the existence of something outside of him, applies equally well to all the other forms of human experience, including ordinary type of experience. For even our perceptual experience offers no warrant for the existence of something outside of us, and the fact that a belief in the existence of an objective, independent world has a healthy effect on the smooth running of the life of man on earth

and goes a long way to fashion his character is no more an evidence whatsoever in favour of its truth than a good moral effect upon man is an evidence in favour of the truth of religious experience. It is due to the fact that the world exists for man only in relation to his consciousness.[71]

In a saint like Teresa, the changes produced by a true religious experience are at best psychological and in the form of 'actual dispositions'. When we come to the highest form of religious experience as we find in a prophet, we see that the changes produced are not only "inward" and Psychological; in him, as Iqbal has put it, " 'unitary experience' tends to overflow its boundaries and seeks opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life".[72] Again he says: "The prophet's return is creative. The desire to see his religious experience transformed into a living world-force is supreme in the prophet".[73] Thus, at the highest level, religious experience is not to be tested by the 'psychological transformations' produced in the recipient himself, but by (to quote Iqbal) "the type of manhood that he has created, and the cultural world that has sprung out of the spirit of his message".[74] This is the 'pragmatic test' which means that the truth of some things, not directly verifiable, can be known indirectly through their fruits only. Jonathan Edwards in his *Treatise on Religious Affections* says, "The degree in which our experience is productive of practice shows the degree in which our experience is spiritual and divine".[75] In reply to the Western psychologists of a certain school,[76] who, in their zeal for a scientific explanation of religious phenomena, accuse the Prophet of Islam of being a psychopath, Iqbal rightly says that "if a psychopath has the power to give a fresh direction to the course of human history, it is a point of the highest psychological interest to search his original experience which has turned slaves into leaders of men, and inspired the conduct and shaped the career of whole races of mankind. Judging from the various types of activity that emanated from the movement initiated by the Prophet of Islam, his spiritual tension and the kind of behaviour which issued from it, cannot be regarded as a response to a mere fantasy inside his brain".[77]

The above is a very good application of the pragmatic test for the vindication of religious experience of the Holy Prophet. It might, however, be urged against the pragmatic test that it cannot establish the truth of a proposition. It is actually a procedure of arguing back from the consequences of something to its causes and motives. But "a result is generally", as Professor Mackenzie has rightly said, "a resultant of several causes, of which the will of any particular agent (whether that agent is a human being or a deity) is only one".[78] This means that the revealed will of God, which is the essence of all higher religion, and which reveals itself to a prophet or to a mystic in the form of his peculiar experience, is at best only one of the causes of transformations, taking place both within and without. It is not, therefore, possible to determine the genuineness of religious experience through an appeal to the usefulness of its consequences. Lord Russell very acutely says, "I can respect the men who argue that religion is true and therefore ought to be believed, but I can only feel profound moral reprobation for those who say that religion ought to be believed because it is useful..."[79] In other words, consequences can at best determine the utility of an experience, or of a proposition based on that experience; they cannot warrant its truth or genuineness which should be the real concern of the votaries of that experience. But the same can be said of all experience, for in their case, too, the use of the pragmatic test, which is one of the recognized tests, can at best ensure their utility and desirability. The pragmatic test, it should not be forgotten, is one of the recognized tests for establishing the truth of a big mass of propositions.

The second of the tests so often used for establishing the truth of a proposition is, what Iqbal calls, the intellectual test and which he applies to religious assertions also. "By the intellectual test", says Iqbal, "I mean critical interpretation, without any presuppositions of human experience, generally with a view to discover whether our interpretation leads us ultimately to a reality of the same character as is revealed by religious experience".[80] This is the famous Coherence Theory of Truth, advocated by F. H. Bradley (*The Principles of Logic*) in the first instance, and with necessary revisions and modifications by Rudolf Carnap (*The Logical Syntax of Language*). According to

this, "a proposition is false if inconsistent with some chosen corpus of propositions, true if it can be consistently included in that corpus".[81] It is this test which Iqbal applies to religious propositions in the Second Lecture. He proceeds to show that if we analyse human experience, which "presents three main levels --the level of matter, the level of life, and the level of mind and consciousness–"[82] in the light of extant scientific knowledge, we shall find that all the three levels of experience are basically spiritual–a fact which brings them closer together and shows them to be the three stages of manifestation of the same spiritual principle,[83] which is the Ultimate Reality according to Iqbal and which may be called God. Even a physicist today, no less than a leading biologist or a psychologist, has been convinced of this fact. A modern physicist, for example, following the lead of Professor Whitehead, will acknowledge, "Nature is not a static fact situated in an adynamic void, but a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow which thought cuts up into isolated immobilities out of whose mutual relations arise the concepts of space and time".[84] Henri Bergson was the other amongst the modern philosophers of renown who advocated a similar view of reality.[85]

As to life and consciousness, many great biologists like Driesch and Haldane, are unanimous that the purely mechanistic view of life and mind is seldom successful. There are, no doubt, some tendencies among the recent biologists to liken a living organism to a machine, but, as J. S. Haldane has pointed out, "the main difference between a living, organism and a machine is that the former is self- and self-producing ..."[86] "Life", Iqbal says, "is a unique phenomenon and the concept of mechanism is inadequate for its analysis".[87] Of consciousness Iqbal very rightly says that it "is a variety of the purely spiritual principle of life which is not a substance, but an organizing principle, a specific mode of behaviour essentially different to the behaviour of an externally worked machine".[88] Another very distinctive feature of both life and consciousness, according to Iqbal, is the fact of purpose–a fact which eludes any mechanistic mode of explanation. This fact also reveals the spiritual nature of Reality. It is because of the purposive processes involved that life is said

to have "a career which is unthinkable in the case of a machine".[89]

So far as consciousness is concerned, it was Bergson who "undertook to examine it thoroughly. He came to conceive of life and consciousness as a rush of vital impetus[90] which he, in his anxiety to save freedom and originality, described as a blind, undirected impulse.. He said: "It would be futile to try to assign to life an end, in the human sense of the word. To speak of an end is to think of a pre-existing model which has only to be realized".[91] Thought, according to Bergson, was the faculty which spatialized and pulverized the ceaseless flow of consciousness into a number of discrete mental states, and the external world, which was again a dynamic flow, into a series of immobile objects situated in a span of void.[92] Iqbal, however, pushing a step further Bergson's analysis of thought and consciousness, emphasizes that thought has a deeper movement also. While it appears to break up Reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesize the elements of experiences by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents. It is as much organic as Life".[93] Again, unlike Bergson, Iqbal lays much stress upon the purposive nature of life. For Bergson, "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances".[94] Iqbal criticizing him remarks, "He ignores 'that the unity of consciousness has a forward-looking aspect also. Life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious".[95] "Thus ends and purposes", he says, "whether they exist as conscious or subconscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of our conscious experience".[96] He goes on to say, "On the analogy of our conscious experience, therefore, Reality is not a blind vital impulse wholly unilluminated by idea. Its nature is through and through teleologically.[97] He conceives of the Ultimate Reality "as pure duration in which thought, life, and purpose inter-penetrate to form an organic unity. We cannot conceive this unity except as the unity of a self –".[98] But what is a self? and what is the nature of the self which Iqbal calls the ultimate source of all individual life and thought?

According to Iqbal, self is "the intuition of 'I-am-ness,"[99] and he agrees with most of the philosophers that there are degrees of this intuition.[100] Replying to the second question Iqbal says that it cannot be the finite self which is the basis of all individual life and thought, for a finite self is dependent upon, and requires, a not-self confronting it and limiting it. It is, on the contrary, the Ultimate Self to whom, as Iqbal says, "not-self does not present itself as a confronting other".[101] "What we call Nature or the not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God",[102] says Iqbal. And such a self-hood or " 'I-amness' is independent, elemental, absolutes".[103] He adds that a self is unthinkable without a character, i.e. a uniform mode of behaviour. And nature rather than being "a mass of pure materiality -occupying a void" is "a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the Ultimate Self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self".[104] Thus, it is the Absolute Ego or Self (i.e. God) which, according to the, above analysis, is the ultimate source of all individual life and thought.

Iqbal, thus, shows how a critical examination of our ordinary experience leads us to an ultimate spiritual Reality, which is 'independent, elemental, absolute', and which he chooses to call 'the Divine Self'. The Divine Self is the ultimate source of all individual life and thought. This Self is nothing else but God. Thus, a thorough and critical examination of experience "leads us ultimately to a reality of the same character as is revealed by religious experience".[105] Among the European contemporaries of Iqbal, William Temple through his 'dialectical realism',[106] as he calls his philosophy, arrived, at the same conclusion (to use Macquarrie's, words), "The spiritual interpretation of the universal process leads to theism, for the spirit which emerges within the process has a transcendental character which points to God as the unifying principle who controls and indeed creates the whole process".[107]

The above line of thought, however, proves at best that the ultimate reality is spiritual; it hardly proves that this spiritual reality is the Divine Self or Individual God of higher religions. Nicolai Hartmann[108] the German contemporary, though believing in the spiritual nature of reality, declined that any theistic

conclusions could be drawn from such a line of thought. He said, "This world-view is far removed from any materialistic naturalism, yet it turns out to be equally far from theism".[109] Macquarrie remarks in this connection, "In particular, the explanation of this unity in terms of a personal God seems to Hartmann a piece of anthropocentric megalomania".[110] Similarly Eddington, the physicist-philosopher, acknowledges that a religious view of the world cannot be based on scientific findings alone, though consenting that "the idea of universal Mind or Logos would be a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific theory".[111] Here J. Macquarrie remarks that "such a Mind would be only a pale replica of the God of religion".[112] The positive evidence for religion, Eddington adds, comes from mystical experience which deserves our respects for science is only one approach to reality, and thus there is left plenty of room for other approaches.[113] John Macquarrie, while writing on 'the mew scientific theories and religion', remarks: "But these pointers are mainly negative. They discredit the older naturalism, but they do not positively point to theism–perhaps they call only for a more refined nataralism".[114]

Again, the intellectual test, so much stressed upon by Iqbal as the determiner–of the truth of religious experience, seems to be arbitrary. According to this test, a proposition, to be true, should be consistent with some chosen corpus of propositions. But what is the 'chosen corpus of propositions' in which a proposition is to be consistently included, if it is, to be true? Is not that corpus chosen arbitrarily? Moreover, it is quite possible that the total system of propositions hitherto revealed by experience, which constitutes the corpus, is itself false; and that any new revelation, which fails to fit into that corpus yields us truth. In that case we are rejecting what is true as false simply because it is not consistent with our other opinions and propositions. This is quite obvious from the fact that whenever a reformer or a prophet brings a new message as revealing truth, his opinions seldom fit in with the chosen corpus of opinions of the common man–nay, they may not fit in even with his own past opinions and beliefs. Are we to infer from this, on the basis of the test under review, that his newly revealed opinions and beliefs are false? If that were so, no intellectual and moral progress of the race would be

possible. Thus, mere consistency with the already existing opinions and beliefs is no warrant for the truth of any new opinion or belief. The intellectual test can at best ensure consistency, but not truth of any proposition.

Thus, the pragmatic test can at best ensure utility, while the intellectual test can establish nothing but consistency; none of them can establish the truth of any given opinion or proposition. They cannot be the criteria of truth, as has been erroneously held by some of the renowned philosophers. These two tests cannot even warrant a probable truth. From this, however, it should not be inferred that religious propositions are unverifiable and hence (as the linguists say) non-cognitive statements. For same is the position of all propositions - including the scientific - because the above are among the known criteria for testing their truth also. Russell, as seen before, denies that there are any criteria to which men of religion can appeal in case of disagreement, the result being an open appeal to force. He is, however, mistaken, for as both James and Iqbal have emphasized, it is the same criteria which are used to indicate the truth of scientific propositions that can be used to establish the truth of religious assertions also. Thus, we see that in respect of verification, scientific propositions are at no particular advantage over the religious statements. It is, perhaps, a mere illusion of the scientist that he stands on a surer footing, for, as we have seen during the course of the above, it is the same types of test which are handy to both the religious man and the scientist, and there is little justification for supposing that they apply better in one sphere than in the other. None of these criteria can establish truth in any sphere of knowledge.

Notes and References

[1] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 27.
[2] W James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 21.
[3] *The Holy Qur'an*, tr. by Maulana Muhammad Ali; Ch. 23, Vs.. 97-98.
[4] A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 117.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 45.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[10] *Ibid.*, P - 47
[11] A. J. Ayer, Language, *Truth and Logic*, p. 5
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[14] *Ibid.*, p.114
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 117
[16] *Philosophy*. Vol. xxxii, No. 122, July 1957. p. 214.
[17] *Mind*, Vol. Ixi, No. 244, 1952. pp. 497-512.
[18] *Philosophy, ibid.*, p. 229.
[19] *Mind*, ibid., pp. 502 and 504.
[20] *Philosophy, ibid.*, p. 232.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 232.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 235.
[24] A. C. Ewing, "Religious Assertions", *ibid.*, p. 213.
[25] S. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, pp. 44-45.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[27] Wright, W. K., *A History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 286-68.
[28] *Philosophy*, Vol. xxix, No. 110, July 1954, p. 199.
[29] F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 416.
[30] *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 254.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[33] Ibn Ziad, the great Muslim General and the conqueror of Spain, who defeated the Goths led by Roderick at the Battle of Medina Sidomia in 711 A.C. - Syed Ameer Ali, *A Short History of the Saracens*. p. 109.

[34] *Urdu Encyclopaedia* (Ferozesons), p. 931.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 282 and *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. I. pp. 867-68.
[36] Allama Shibli and Suleman Nadvi. *Seerat-un-Nabi*,Vol. 1, Part II, p. 301.
[37] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 28.
[38] *Philosophy*, Vol. xxxi, No. 117, April 1956, pp. 132-33.
[39] *Religion and Science*, p. 180.
[40] Quoted from Russell, ibid., *Philosophy*, Vol. xxix. No. 110, July 1954, p. 205.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 178-79.
[42] *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,* p. 211.
[43] *Ibid., p.* 212.
[44] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 179.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[47] Woodworth. *Psychology: A Study of Mental Life*, pp. 11-12.
[48] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[49] Quoted from Bergson, op. cit., *Philosophy*, Vol.No 110, July 1954, p. 206.
[50] A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 9. .
[51] *Philosophy*, July 1956, p. 239.
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 239-40.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 240.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 182.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 185.
[59] *Philosophy*, ibid., p. 233
[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 233-34.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 234.
[62] M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 404. Cf. Arabi's ed., *Fusus al-Hikam*, p. 66.; Al-Farabi advocated the same view: see M. M. Sharif, *ibid.*, p. 464.
[63] Conversion means "the achievement of a new or unified personality, as the result of a reorientation of the psyche to some new ideal or purpose"- G. S. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 110
[64] "Will and Belief", according to James, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the self, are two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon"-*The Principles of Psychology*, p. 321.
[65] James, *The Varieties, of Religious Experience*, p. 22.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[67] *Philosophy*, Vol. xxix, No. 110, July 1934, p. 204.
[68] Russell, *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 158.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[70] *Ibid*
[71] "...the crude world only comes into existence through consciousness"; this is particularly Sartrian phenomenology --P. Foulquie, *Existentialism*, pp. 75-76. Again, theonly world that exists for us, then, is the work of my consciousness. As Heidegger says 'I am the being by which there is (es gibt) being'. 'It is the uprising of the for-itself (the pour-soi)'- that is, of consciousness 'that brings it about that there is a world' (*L'etre et le neant*, pp. 305 & 503) - *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[72] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 125.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 124.
[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.
[75] Quoted by James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 12.
[76] The Medical Materialists and those who believe in epi-phenomenalism.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 190.
[78] *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 101, The italics are my own.
[79] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 172.
[80] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 27.
[81] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Vol. 22, p. 523.
[82] Iqbal, *ibid*, p. 3.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 61.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[85] *Creative Evolution*, pp. 331-35.
[86] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
[87] *Ibid*, p. 44.
[88] *Ibid*, p. 41.
[89] *Ibid*, p. 44.
[90] Bergson, *ibid*, pp. 58 and 97-98.
[91] *Op. cit.*, p. 58.
[92] *Ibid.* pp. 5-7.
[93] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[94] Bergson, *ibid.*, p. 7.
[95] Iqbal, *Ibid.*, p, 52.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[98] *Op. cit.*, p. *55.*
[99] *Ibid.*
[100] *Ibid.*

[101] *Ibid.*
[102] *Ibid.*
[103] *Ibid.*
[104] *Ibid.*
[105] *Op. cit.*, p.27.
[106] John Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 270
[107] *Ibid.*
[108] (1882-1950) who represented the metaphysical development of realism in Germany, *ibid.*, p. 267.
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 268..
[110] *Ibid.*
[111] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 332.
[112] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[113] *Op. cit.*, p. 247.
[114] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

PART TWO

ANALYTICAL AND DESCRIPTIVE

CHAPTER ONE

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

> ... it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man. (Iqbal)

About the nature of religion very little of scientific value has been known, partly because psychology has only recently realized the importance of, and felt the need for, a proper study of this experience; and partly because it is one of those forms of human experience which are abnormal in the sense of being rare and hence inaccessible to the common man. But however little is known about its nature, it is certain that it is not, as it was erroneously thought by Freud, something merely consisting of dogma and dogmatic assertions about facts and conditions of reality. Nor is religion to be identified with, as was wrongly done by the Mu'tazila[1] in the world of Islam, "a body of doctrine",[2] although it is hardly to be doubted that there is a doctrinal side to all higher religion. Professor Whitehead was talking of religion on its doctrinal side when he defined it as "a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended".[3] Both Freud and the Mu'tazila have ignored the experiential nature of religion, and also that dogmas and statements of belief are based upon the richness of what is called religious experience. Religion, then, is basically an experience, however unique, and is based upon

experience. This fact is known to the mystic community which has been and is having pretensions to experience in which they have conversed with God as with anybody from among their own fellows. In our own times, psychologists have begun to recognize the experiential nature of religion. Thus Jung, one of the disciples of Freud, as we have seen before, stresses upon this aspect of religion when he calls it an experience of the 'numinosum' and an attitude of consciousness altered by that experience.

Religion is, then, a matter of experience; man knows God not as a theological concept, but as an experience from which concepts may subsequently be formulated. Jung, in order to bring out the experiential nature of God's knowledge, denies 'absoluteness' to God; "Jung's position is that God to be 'psychologically real' cannot be 'absolute' because the Absolute cannot be known experientially".[4] Iqbal emphasizes the experiential nature of religion in the following words; "it insisted on the necessity of concrete experience in religious life long before science learnt to do so. The conflict between the two is due not to the fact that the one is, and the other is not, based on concrete experience. Both seek concrete experience as a point of departure".[5] Again he more expressly states the same fact when he says, "higher religion, which is only a search for a larger life, is essentially experience and recognized the necessity of experience as its foundation long before science learnt to do so."[6]

An experience, whether religious or not, is an analysable complex whole. But before I take to analysing it, I feel it necessary to make a very important distinction which has so often been ignored by the European psychologists, i.e. the distinction between the prophetic and the mystic consciousness. It was obviously the result of ignoring this distinction that Professor Macdonald, while talking of the observation of the psychic Jew youth, Ibn-i-Sayyad, by the Holy Prophet, humorously remarked that "one prophet trying to investigate another after the method of the Society for Psychical Research".[7] As these remarks go, Professor Macdonald, says Iqbal, "seems to have no idea of the fundamental difference between the mystic and the prophetic consciousness,...."[8] The one very important

difference between the two types of religious consciousness is that the experiences of a mystic have significance for him only in so far as they transform him into a better individual, while the experiences of a prophet have a definite social import as they aim at changing and reshaping the whole society. This important difference has beautifully been emphasized by a great Muslim saint, Abdul Quddus of Gangoh,[9] in his following remarks: "Muhammad of Arabia ascended the highest Heaven and returned. I swear by God if I had reached that point, I should never have returned".[10] These remarks imply, as Iqbal has said, that "The mystic does not wish to return from the repose of 'unitary experience'; and even when be does return, as he must, his return does not mean much for mankind at large. The prophet's return is creative".[11] "Both the mystic and the prophet return to the normal levels of experience; but with this difference that the return of the prophet, may be fraught with infinite meaning for mankind".[12] In short, what is an end to the mystic is merely a means to the prophet, and this is by no means a trifling difference, psychologically and philosophically speaking.

But although the mystic experience differs from the experience of a prophet, it does not differ from it qualitatively. That is, the two forms of religious consciousness differ not in kind, but in degree only. Iqbal defines a prophet "as a type of mystic consciousness in which 'unitary experience' tends to overflow its boundaries and seeks opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life".[13] "The above definition clearly indicates the fact that a prophet is a type of mystic consciousness, the only difference being that this consciousness has an important impact on the whole of the world and on humanity at large, where the ordinary mystic consciousness has no such social impact. We may say that the prophetic consciousness is a higher form of mystic consciousness with a decided social significance. It might here be urged by some that there have been mystics like Ali Hajveri,[14] (400-456/1063 A.D.) who introduced reforms, thus introducing new directions of life. No one can gainsay this fact. But perhaps, they introduced those reforms in the capacity of reformers rather than that of mystics, and we should take care not to confound the

two separate and discrete functions performed in different capacities.

To these differences I may venture to add one more. The prophetic consciousness is exclusively by the grace of God, while the mystic consciousness can be cultivated through training and practice as is obvious from the emergence of so many schools of mysticism. In mystic experience, too, a distinction may be made between those experiences which occur spontaneously (that is, involuntarily) and those which are deliberately induced by means of personal disciplines. Although an analysis of those involuntary experiences sometimes reveals "the operation over many years of 'unconscious volition'–what Henri Poincare called 'incubation'".[15] The involuntary mystical experiences are very much akin to prophetic experiences in point of involuntariness, though they certainly differ in the important lack of any social import. Moreover, though seemingly involuntary, they are, as said above, the result of 'incubation' all the same; while the prophetic consciousness is exclusively by the grace of God and hence involuntary in the real sense. The prophet, unlike the mystic, does not have to make any efforts, conscious or unconscious, in order to have divine revelation, which flows to him, as they say, of its own accord as rays of the sun flow unto the earth of their own accord. Iqbal expresses this fact when he describes prophetic consciousness as "a mode of economizing individual thought and choice by providing ready-made judgements, choices, and ways of action".[16]

It might be urged by men like al-Farabi,[17] Ibnul Arabi[18] and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan[19] that a prophet has to make no less efforts to attain to his peculiar experience. These theologians have been known in the history of Islam by the name of "kasbis".[20] To these men, of course, it may be replied that whether prophethood is conceived of as a skill or a capacity[21] (as by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan) or as the highest form of imagination[22] (as by al-Farabi and Abnul Arabi),[23] the fact remains that such a high degree of skill or imagination is still a gift from God, and cannot be acquired through any amount of practice or effort.

On the other hand, there have been those known as "wahbis"[24] who have contended that the mystic experience is as much by the grace of God as the prophetic. Al-Kindi,[25] comparing religious 'science' with other branches of knowledge, writes; "This latter knowledge is like the knowledge of the prophets, a knowledge bestowed by God; unlike mathematics and logic, it is received without research, effort, study and industry, and requires no period of time".[26] Kindi, however, adds, "This knowledge is no prerogative of all men, but only of the prophets".[27] But whole of the history of mysticism is there to defy this position. Thus we have to choose between the position of 'wahbis' and that of 'kasbis'. I personally feel myself in sympathy with those who well-nigh follow the middle course - viz., that mystic consciousness should be distinguished from prophetic consciousness, and that the latter is purely by the grace of God and cannot be inculcated or perfected through practice or exercise. Thus, Iqbal says that the prophet is endowed by God with 'ready-made judgements, choices, and ways of action'. In other words, it is not the society in which a prophet has been born that provides him with norms and judgements, for it is the mission of a prophet to challenge and, where necessary, over-rule the accepted norms and ideals of the society; nor are they the result of his own meditation and reflection, for then he shall be reduced to the level of a mystic only. It is God Who reveals them to the chosen few, who are then called upon to disseminate them among the masses.[28]

After this digression into the distinction between two forms of religious consciousness, I revert to the real question of this chapter - viz., What is the nature of religious consciousness? What are the various elements that go to constitute it? What part is played by reason, and what other elements contribute towards the total consciousness called religious? As said before, not much is known about the nature of experience under review, because of the following reasons;

(i) those who have pretensions to it seldom feel a need for describing their experiences,

(ii) those who have tried to describe them are bound to be vague and inexact because of their outdated terminology, and

(iii) our language having been formed for the everyday sensuous experience, any description of such a non-sensuous experience as the one we are treating of, is liable to distortion.

However little is known about the mystic experience, it is certain that it is essentially, though not exclusively, a state of feeling. That is to say, primarily the religious experience is a kind of feeling, however unique; it is only subsequently that thought assigns meaning to it, making it intelligible. In this respect it is very much like our ordinary sensuous experience. Iqbal says; "Mystic states are more like feeling than thought. The interpretation which the mystic or the prophet puts on the content of his religious consciousness can be conveyed to others in the form of propositions, but the content itself cannot be so transmitted".[29] As a result of this essentially affective nature of this experience, it is incommunicable. "The incommunicability of mystic experience", says Iqbal, "is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling, untouched by discursive intellect".[30] It might here be interpolated that our ordinary experience is as much a state of feeling as the religious experience; why is it that the former is, while the latter is not, transmissible? To be sure, the ordinary experience in its original form is as much incommunicable as the religious: e.g. if I have toothache, I cannot convey my experience itself to any one else –not even to my dearest ones –and he who has never experienced toothache himself, or who has no experience how an ache feels, will never be in a position to understand me when I say, 'I am feeling toothache'. The anecdote of the born-blind to whom someone undertook to explain what red colour looks like, is patent in this place. Similarly, when a mystic explains his experiences to a layman, who has never had kindred experiences himself, he fails to understand him; but when he explains them to another mystic, he understands him fully. H. J. Paton rightly remarked; "To those who have never experienced any religious emotion it will be as if we were trying to explain colours to blind man on the analogy of sounds".[31] Hence the difference between the ordinary and religious experience is not that the former is, while the latter is not, effable; it, on the contrary, lies in that the religious experience is not as common as our ordinary experience.

Though religious experience is essentially a state of feeling, it is not the ordinary feeling of pleasure or pain which is organically based and is, to use the Kantian terminology, 'pathological",[32] it is rather a unique kind of feeling to which Professor Rudolf Otto applies the adjective 'numinous', derived from the Latin word 'numen'. "Omen' has given us 'ominous' and there", he says, "is no reason why from 'numen' we should not similarly form a word 'numinous'. I shall speak, then, of a unique 'numinous' state of mind, which is always found wherever the category is applied".[33] H. J. Paton remarking on this position of Otto says, "By calling it 'numinous' he wishes to insist that it is not dependent on theoretical or moral concepts, but is something original and even primitive".[34] Again, while talking of the nature of religious experience, Otto writes that it "was a unique original feeling-response".[35] Thus Otto brings out the non-rational and non-conceptual aspect of the religious experience. Commenting on this position of Otto, Paton writes, "We may agree with Otto that religious feeling is unique in the sense that, as he says, it is distinct from pleasure or joy or aesthetic rapture or moral exaltation".[36] Thus it is not only that the religious feeling is unique, he also emphasizes that in so far as it is unique, it requires a special faculty to receive it. There is, however, no warrant for this latter assertion, for such a position is doomed to the same fate as the notion of a 'moral sense'[37] or 'conscience'[38] in ethics. In fact, the mistake of assuming a faculty for each peculiar experience, religious or otherwise, dates back to the Faculty Psychology[39] which is now obsolete and extinct.

Here the question may be asked, 'What is the nature of this unique religious feeling which Otto calls 'a unique original feeling-response'? It may be well to warn at the outset that it is not any single feeling but a whole complex of feelings which is not easy to describe. Paton brings out this fact in the following passage; "The emotional side of religion runs the whole gamut from despair to ecstasy, but on the humbler levels it may be most fittingly described as consolations. It could be described as peace –an inner peace even in the midst of strife–".[40] The fact that religious experience is essentially feeling should not, however, delude one into thinking that religion is merely a subjective state

of the individual. It was to avoid any such implication that Schleiermacher said that "the predominant religious feeling is one of dependence",[41] the word 'dependence' carrying an external reference. Commenting on this position of Schleiermacher, Paton writes; "Whatever he may have meant by this, I take it to be an immediate feeling of dependence on the Other –not a self-contained feeling of helplessness from which we make a dubious inference to something else as its cause".[42] Otto, however, objecting to Schleiermacher's position says that the feeling or emotion which he has in mind is in its specific quality, "not a 'feeling of dependence' in the 'natural' sense of the word".[43] Other regions of experience also occasion the feeling as sense of personal insufficiency and impotence, a consciousness of being determined by circumstances and environment".[44] Although it has an undeniable analogy with these states of mind; yet the feeling is at the same time also qualitatively different from such analogous states of mind. Schleiermacher himself recognizes this by distinguishing "the feeling of pious or religious dependence from all other feelings of dependence." "He misses the point that in calling it the 'feeling of dependence' we are really employing what is no more than a very close analogy".[45] Otto himself chooses to describe this feeling in the following way; "I propose to call it 'creature-consciousness' or creature-feeling. It is the emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures".[46] Against this Paton remarks that "this 'creature-feeling' –apart from its revolting character as a word –again suggests an intellectual theory of the relation between the creature and the creator,... Perhaps the feeling in question could be described better as a feeling of trust or even of self-surrender".[47] However be the religious feeling described, and however different be the views about its nature, one thing is certain that it is not any one feeling but a very complex affective state, rather a sentiment[48] consisting of a number of feelings and emotions. Moreover, the feeling aspect is by no means stable, and abiding; it varies with other aspects of the religious experience of which we will be talking in a short while.

I may be permitted here to make a digression into a brief discussion of the words 'feeling' and 'emotion', for it will certainly pay the reader –especially when he is going to start his readings in the subject. Professor C. D. Broad divides mental events into "those which are and those which are not directed to objects." To the second class he confines the name "Feelings", while in the first class would certainly come Cognitions, Conations, and Emotions".[49] This passage implies that while emotions are, feelings are not, directed to an object. In fact, emotion is a more complex state of mind than a mere feeling, which forms only a part of the former. Professor Thouless brings out this concrete nature of an emotion through his analysis of the emotional state called 'anger' in the following way: "The mind of a man when he is angry, as at all other times, contains all three elements, 'cognition, feeling and conation, although it is the feeling element which particularly attracts our attention in the state of anger".[50] Thus emotion differs from feeling in being very complex and in being directed to some object. Feeling, on the other hand, is an abstract element which always exists as part of a complex whole, and never independently. Thus, talking of pleasure, which is a pure feeling, Professor Mackenzie writes; "It is an element in a total state of consciousness, and is entirely relative to the other elements in that state. It is the inner side of that of which the other elements may be said to form the outer side".[51]

Religious feeling, as no mystic or theologian will gainsay, is a very complex whole and is also directed to a definite object. As such, it is better to call the affective side of religion an emotion rather than a simple feeling –nay, as suggested above, rather a sentiment.[52] Professor Thouless rightly says: "On its mental side, religion is clearly a sentiment, it is a system of emotional dispositions organizing in its system a variety of different emotions. It is therefore correct to speak of 'the religious sentiment'".[53] Unfortunately, a good majority of writers on religion, including Iqbal, use the two terms, feeling and emotion synonymously and more frequently talk of religious feeling. The phrase 'religious sentiment', I think, explains the affective side of religion in a better way than either of the words 'feeling' or

'emotion'. As Professor Thouless remarks, "religion is ordinarily one amongst many sentiments".[54]

Now reverting to the real point, religious experience is essentially a state of emotion. But there is not a single emotion which does not involve a cognition of some object. As Professor Hocking has very aptly said,--no feeling is so blind as to have no idea of its own object.... A feeling without a direction is as impossi ble as an activity without a direction; and a direction implies some objective".[55] He goes to the extent that in a vague state of consciousness which seems to be without direction, the feeling is itself absent. Feeling, in fact, itself depends on idea. He rather concludes that "feeling is quite as much an objective consciousness as is idea..."[56] In these passages, Professor Hocking uses the word feeling in the sense in which I use the word 'emotion'. If Hocking's view that feeling, in the ordinary sense, is as much an objective consciousness as idea is true, then subconsciousness and unconsciousness become impossible for a subconscious or unconscious state of mind simply lets itself 'be felt' rather than cognized. There are many things which we 'feel' without cognizing. Professor Hocking backs his argument with a cunning example of the man dazed by a blow, but he forgets that his lack of feeling is not because of any lack of knowledge, but because of the fact that intensity of the blow has temporarily disrupted both afferent and efferent nerves with the result that the brain is not receiving any sensations whatsoever. Sometimes the disturbance is so permanent (when the nerves are cut out because of the severity of the blow) that the feeling never returns though the man knows what has happened; that is, even the presence of idea fails to rouse the apposite feeling. Will Professor Hocking say that the experience is still waiting in the vestibule of consciousness? The fact is that feeling is not necessarily an objective consciousness, while emotions are necessarily so. Thus amending the position of Hocking we may say that an emotion refers always to something beyond the present self and this is what has been advocated by C. D. Broad.

Now, religious emotion, like any emotion, cannot be without an intellectual element. Realizing this fact, Iqbal says; "Religious experience....., is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive

aspect the content of which cannot be communicated to others, except in the form of a judgement".[57] "Faith is more than mere feeling", he adds, "It has something like a cognitive content and the existence of rival parties - scholastics and mystics in the history of religion shows that idea is a vital element in religion."[58] Thus along with the emotional side of religion, there is an essential rational aspect too. Professor Whitehead has acutely remarked, "the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism".[59] Professor Otto, despite the fact that he over-emphasized the emotional nature of religion, was no less alive to the importance of its idea-aspect. He, in this treatment of religious experience, in his book *Das Heilige*, translated into English by Professor. Harvey under the title *The Idea of the Holy*, separates the emotional aspect from the residue and calls the former 'non-rational' and the latter 'rational'[60] aspects of religion, bringing out the importance of the latter thus; Rather we count this the very mark and criterion of a religion's high rank and superior value - that it should have no lack of 'conceptions' about God;[61] Otto, recognizing the mutual importance of both the rational and the non-rational elementsof religion, writes; "Now the relation of the rational to the non-rational element in the idea of the holy or sacred is just such a one of 'schematization', and the non-rational numinous fact, schematized by the rational concepts yields us the complex category of 'holy' itself',[62]... And again, he adds: "The intimate interpenetration of the non-rational with the rational elements of the religious consciousness, (is) like the interweaving of warp and woof in a fabric,...."[63] He is concerned with both these elements and with their interaction or interpenetration; but he pays mote attention to the non-rational element because, he says, it has been neglected in the past.[64]

Paton has rightly pointed out that religion is not (mere) emotion. "If it were simply one form of emotional indulgence, it could never have played the part it has played in the history of the world." Again, "if we look for the highest expression of emotion, we find this in art; and the religious man will never admit that his religion is merely a form of art.... the artistic and religious attitudes seem at times to be diametrically opposed".[65] There is, however, such a thing as, what Paton chooses to call,

"obsession with emotion"[66] or, what Professor Thouless calls "sentimentalism"[67] possible in religion; and it is one of the chief dangers in this sphere. For, as Paton rightly points out, "those who make it their primary aim are likely to lose interest in the religious life itself and so to lose or to distort the emotion that accompanies it".[68] Moreover, it will not be out of place to remark here that Islam, for one, does not approve of certain forms of art,[69] e.g. paintings from life, music, etc.

Conation or action is the third necessary element, and it is, as much important a part of the total religious life as knowledge and emotion; for all emotion must issue in action and knowledge is meant for the guidance of conduct. Religious emotion, like all other, when it does not issue in action, is barren and sterile; it is not religious in the real sense, for religion claims to offer a practical guidance. Islam, last of the great religions of the world, lays much emphasis on action or 'deed'.[70] Iqbal emphasizes the importance of action in the following words; ---"It is the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution, or disciplines him for a future career... Personal immortality, then, is not ours as of rights; it is to be achieved by personal effort".[71] Professor Paton refers to the danger of religious emotion failing to issue in action thus: "There is a special danger of this when religious emotions fail to issue in action. Religion then becomes a form of selfishness or self-absorption; and like selfishness in general it leads only to a sterile narcissism and an emptying of the individual's life".[72] Thomas A. Kempis insists that "the religious man must set himself to endure toil and hardship, and not to enjoy supernatural delights".[73] Continuing to embark on the danger of excessive emotionality in religious life Paton adds "Sometimes the obsession with emotion takes form of a sickly sent- imentality, which is glorified too often by the sacred name of "love". The love we are bidden to our neighbours, and even to our enemies, is interpreted, not as genuine consideration and active kindness, but as an emotional fervour which would be excessive if directed towards our nearest and dearest and is impossible as a permanent state of mind. Insistence on this so-called love can lead only to a natural and very proper revolt. A sane religious view may enable a man to think more warmly and kindly of his neighbours and to regard every individual soul

having-at least potentially-an absolute worth in the sight of God. But this is worlds away from directing toward others a spurious emotion and subjecting them to treatment, repugnant alike to common sense and self respect."[74] As said before, Islam disapproves of the use of certain forms of art which are employed with a view to sharpen and heighten emotionality. It takes good care to avoid music, in particular, in worship and prayer.

Not only orthodox Islam, but Sufism also aims at securing as much an objective experience as it can, and does not favour the use of music to facilitate onset of the state of ecstasy so highly prized by mysticism all over the world. Talking on this point Iqbal says,---"Indeed with a view to secure a wholly non-emotional experience the technique of Islamic Sufism at least takes good care to forbid the use of music in worship..."[75] In fact, both Islam and Sufism are fully conversant with the importance of the attainment of a really objective religious experience which cannot be finally rejected as a mere figment of the mind. The Europeans took long to realize this thing and to cognize the dangers of sentimentalism. Professor Thouless calls our attention to the dangers of emotionality when he condemns what he calls 'sentimentalism' in religion in the following words: -"The first danger, then, threatening a religion in which the affective element has attained an exaggerated importance is that of sentimentalism, with its resultant moral weakness. There is secondly a tendency to intellectual weakness".[76] Hence the importance of all the aspects of religion of which the intellectual and the conative aspects are no less necessary and indispensable than the emotional.

The discussion of the importance of thought and action to religious life may lead some to think that religious emotion is only an accompaniment. They say, "Every human activity tends to be accompanied by some sort of feeling which, as it were, takes its colour from the activity and is closely connected with our judgements of value. To this rule religion is no exception; it is always emotional, and sometimes strongly emotional".[77] There is no doubt that every activity is accompanied by some emotion, and religious activity is by no means an exception. "Nevertheless

religious feeling" as Paton has rightly said, "should be regarded as more than an accompaniment, however precious, of the religious life".[78] Religious emotion is an integral part of the total religious life, and without it, it will cease to be religious although there can be no denying that religious emotion, like all emotion, takes its colour from the activity and. is closely connected with our judgements of value. In full justice to religion, it is negessary, to point out that exaggeration of emotionality is not the only danger to which religion is susceptible, for there is also such a thing as 'rational type'[79] as Professor Thouless chooses to call it, and it is by no means a lesser danger, Thouless says; "This is the type of religion in which, either deliberately in response to a preconceived theory, or as a result of a habit of mind, the rational element receives a disproportionate amount of emphasis".[80] After referring to, various difficulties of the 'rational type' Professor Thouless aptly remarks: "Purely intellectual conviction of the existence of God means very little until it has become associated with feelings and with experience. The mere proof of the existence of a supreme being would lead us little further towards a religion than the proof of the existence of infinite numbers".[81] It may be added here that, although all the various aspects of religion are equally indispensable, the feeling aspect is nonetheless very important, and Professor Thouless brings out its importance to religious life in the following passage: "The practices of religion have also their accompaniment of emotional experience without which they would become extraordinarily empty of meaning. The comment of a member of the Church of England attending a ceremony in the Greek Church, or of a Greek who has found his way into an Indian temple, will probably be the same; "This is mere meaningless ceremonial". The reason for this judgement is that in each case the observer is witnessing the practices of religion without himself feeling the emotional accompaniment which gives them significance to the worshippers".[82] This passage emphasizes the importance of religious emotion so well.

Religion has not only an intellectual and conative aspect besides its emotional part, it must also have morality among its indispensable elements. As H. J. Paton puts it, "no man is religious unless he is seeking to lead a good life. He may assent

to all the articles of a creed; he may enjoy the most edifying of emotions; he may be scrupulous in the performance of ritual actions; but if he is deliberately selfish, and entirely unrepentant, then his religion is a sham".[83] Again he says; "morality is a necessary element in a developed religion. A religion which does not flower into moral goodness is apt to be an emotional indulgence".[84] Even in our everyday life, if we come across a man, who prays regularly, has paid pilgrimage to Mecca more than once, and fasts in the month of Ramadan, but in his daily business cheats the customers, charges differently from different persons, etc. - in short, who puts his religion and profession into two different water-tight compartments we doubt his being religious in the real sense. The old Greek masters, following Socrates, were right in their insistence on the necessity of being a good citizen in order to be a good man. Professor Thouless, however, refers to the life of Benvenuto Cellini, who was a religious person in whom the moral element seems to have been entirely undeveloped. He writes, "Cellini was an intensely devout person; he lived in an atmosphere of exalted religious emotion. Yet his life was one of profligacy and murder, lived without any consciousness of inconsistency".[85]

The above is a very rare case. Moreover, I do not quite agree with Professor Thouless that Cellini was a religious person, despite his misdeeds mentioned above. From the point of view of Islam, such a one cannot be called a religious person; he is, on the contrary, an opportunist, a hypocrite. And history of Islam is by no means free of such persons: we have at least some of the Omayyads who have always been looked down upon as the opportunists.[86] Hence we see that morality is as indispensable to religion as a unique type of emotion, a system of thought, and a certain type of conduct flowing from that emotion. There is, however, the danger of an excessive morality also in religion. As Professor Thouless pointed out; "A very large number of people at the present time consider that the task of dealing with the moral conflict is the sole legitimate one for religion, and all that there is actually in the higher religions apart from the moral element is an accretion which it is the task of an enlightened criticism of religion to purge away".[87] "Amongst American psychologists", Thouless says, "Coe more definitely attaches a

higher importance to the moral element in religion; and it seems clear from his preface that this is because this element did, as a fact, predominate in his own religion".[88] As Professor Thouless rightly remarks, the danger of an excessive morality in religion is no less grave than that or any of the other excesses or exaggerations we have referred to above. He says that "in this type of religion, God becomes the supreme lawgiver rather than the lover of souls, (and) it is not surprising that it has tended to produce a religion which is curiously hard and unlovely".[89] However, it is not advisable to restrict religion to morality only. He says, "it is necessary to insist that it leads to a totally wrong method in the treatment of our subject to assume that that is what religion 'is'; to try to read into historical religion the moral element alone and to ignore all that it owes to other elements as secondary accretions".[90]

We may sum up the discussion by saying with Iqbal, "Religion is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is an expression of the whole man".[91] The same fact has been emphasized by H. J. Paton in the following words: "It looks as if religion cannot be identified with any of the main conscious or even unconscious activities of the human spirit... religion is concerned, not with some special aspect or manifestation of life, but with the whole of life..."[92] Again, "Religion appears to aim at the whole in which our intellectual ideas, our moral aspirations, our emotional needs, and even our sense of beauty, may alike find their satisfaction".[93] This wholeness of religion gets an ample expression if we liken it to an attitude, for an attitude involves the whole of the personality of a person - his conscious as well as unconscious aspects. According to Iqbal, "it (religion) is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories".[94] Professor J. B. Pratt defines religion thus: "Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies".[95] And again he says, religion is "an attitude towards the Determiner of Destiny".[96] Pratt goes on to add that "the word "attitude" shall here be used to cover that 'responsive' side of

consciousness which is found in such things as attention, interest, expectancy, feeling tendencies to reaction, etc"...[97] "It is not to be confined to any one of the three traditional departments of the mind - "knowing, feeling, and willing" - but involves factors that belong to each of them."[98] And in so far as religion involves an objective element also, Pratt concludes, "Religion is the attitude of a self toward an object in which the self genuinely believes".[99] Iqbal goes a step further when he says that religion "can embody itself only in a world-making or a world-shaking act; and in this form alone the content of this timeless experience can diffuse itself in the time-movement, and make itself effectively visible to the eye of history".[100] In other words, this peculiar attitude tends to express itself in acts which aim at transforming the whole or the world. At the same time it aims at transforming and fortifying the ego of the recipient himself. "The final act is not an intellectual act", says Iqbal, "but a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and re-made by continuous action".[101] Thus we find that religion is an attitude toward the Determiner of Destiny, which expresses itself in acts that transform the ego as well as the world at large - in other words, its aim is to bring about the highest possible adjustment of man to his environment. According to modern psychology, this adjustment is brought about either by changing the environment according to one's needs and desires, or by moulding oneself according to the environment, and the object of either adjustment is survival. Religion prescribes both the adjustments simultaneously and the means recommended are the "deeds".

It seems necessary to say a few words about the richness of this experience. Along with other Sufis and writers on religion, Iqbal accentuates the fulness and richness of the mystic experience. He brings out this point by quoting an anecdote revolving around the pious figure of the seventeenth century great religious genius, Sheikh Ahmad of Sirhind[102] one Abdul Momin. The passage, which describes the various Stations through which a mystic must pass in order to reach the last stage or Station where the illuminations of the Divine Essence are

received, thoroughly brings out the fullness and richness of the mystic experience. Ibnul Arabi,[103] a prominent Muslim mystic and philosopher, has described the various stages of mystic experience, and his treatment of the subject, I believe, is patent. There are, according to him, various stages of 'fana', and 'fana', according to Sufis, is by no means the ultimate aim of the experience under consideration.[104] The various stages of 'fana' as described by Ibnul Arabi, and his analysis clearly bring out the complexity and richness of mystical experience. These stages are followed by 'baqa', which is again a very complex experience. The total religious experience consists of both the states of 'fana' and those of 'baqa', a fact which makes this experience very complex and rich. The end or final stage of a complete religious experience, according to a majority of the Sufis, is 'baqa', 'fana' being only an intermediary stage.

To sum up, we have seen that a genuine religious experience is a complex rich whole of which emotion, thought, and action are some of the various parts. It is really an expression of the whole man who experiences it, and in this sense it shall be better to call it an 'attitude' towards the Ultimate Determiner of the Destiny, the Ultimate Source of all existence and Reality. Religion, in its proper sense, has a peculiar emotional aspect, a whole system of thought which constitutes its doctrinal side, a whole system of action or conduct which is believed to have been prescribed by God, and a moral aspect which is consequent upon the ultimate religious goal, i.e., the communion with God. To bring home to reader the complexity of the experience under review, it will suffice to remark that in its turn each of the various aspects of a truly religious life is very complex. The emotional aspect, for example, does not consist of any one single emotion, but of the sum of what one feels on the subject. As said before, the emotional side of religion runs the whole gamut from despair to ecstasy.

Notes and References

[1] The earliest sect of rationalism in Islam which had its inception in the 2nd century A.H. - M. M. Sharif, ed. *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, p. 199.
[2] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 4.
[3] Quoted by Iqbal from *Religion in the Making*, ibid. p. 2.
[4] Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 97.
[5] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 182.
[7] Quoted by Iqbal, *op. cit.* p. 17.
[8] *Ibid*
[9] A Muslim Saint and reformer from India.
[10] Iqbal, *ibid.*, p. 124.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid*,. p. 23.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 125.
[14] A Persian mystic of the eleventh century A.D. and a renowned reformer.
[15] G. Spinks, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
[16] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[17] al-Farabi, Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Tarkhan (b. about 258/870–339/950); a renowned scholar, rationalist and sufi, popularly called "The Second Teacher", Aristotle being the First.
[18] Shaikh Muhyi al-Din ibn al-Arabi (560/1165-638/1240), one of the most prolific authors in Muslim history, author of 140 works which are extant including the voluminous work the *Futuhat*, described by Brockelmann as a writer of colossal fecundity'.
[19] Sayyid Ahmad (1817-1898). a distinguished scholar and reformer of India.
[20] Those who believe in 'kasb' (acquisitions)-M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. p. 269.
[21] *Ibid.* Vol. II, pp. 1602-03.
[22] *Ibid.*, see al-Farabi, p. 464 (Vol. I).
[23] According to Ibnul Arabi, revelation is not due to some external source, but is something which arises from the nature of man-*Ibid.*, p. 404. Cf. Arabi's *Fusus al-Hikam*, p. 66.
[24] Those who believe that prophetic experience is the gift of God.

[25] Abu Yusuf Yaqub ibn Ishaq (801-873 A.D.) first Muslim Philosopher and a great scholar of Arab descent called "the Philosopher of the Arabs"..
[26] M. M. Sharif, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 426.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] 'The duty of the messenger is only to convey (the message)....' -*The Quran*, V. 99.
[29] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 20.
[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
[31] *The Modern Predicament*, p. 133.
[32] Kant, *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysique of Morals*, p. 17, where he distinguishes between practical and pathological love.
[33] *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 7.
[34] Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
[35] Otto, *ibid.*, p. 6.
[36] Paton, *ibid.*, p. 136.
[37] Supposed to be a special faculty pronouncing moral judge - J. S. Mackenzie, *A Manual of Ethics*, pp. 143-47.
[38] Conscience as a moral faculty - *Ibid.*, pp. 147-51.
[39] The Scholastic psychology which thought of a soul possessing the faculties of will, memory, imagination, etc. just as the body possesses arms, legs and a head - Thouless, *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 93.
[40] Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] *Otto*, op. cit., p. 9.
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Op. cit.*, pp. 9- 10.
[47] Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
[48] By the word 'sentiment' is meant an emotional disposition which has reference to an object, person, or abstract idea...
[49] *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 228.
[50] *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 95.
[51] *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 180.
[52] By calling it a 'sentiment' I wish to emphasize the fact that it is not a simple feeling or emotion, but the sum of what one feels on the subject'. Paton rightly says that the emotional side of religion runs the whole gamut from despair to ecstasy, a fact which can be expressed by the word sentiment.
[53] Thouless, *ibid.*, p. 100.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[55] Quoted in Iqbal's *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 21.
[56] *Ibid*, p. 22.
[57] *Op. cit.*, p. 26-27.
[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
[59] *Ibid.*, quoted, p. 2.
[60] *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 46.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[62] *Op. cit.*, p. 45.
[63] *Ibid*, p. 46.
[64] *Ibid.*, Rudolf Otto's foreword to the first English edition.
[65] *The Modern Predicament*, pp. 58-59.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 74.
[67] *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 69.
[68] Paton, *ibid*, pp. 74-75.
[69] Sh. Mansur Ali Nasib, *Al-Taj al-Jami's Lil-Asuk*, Part III, p. 166 and Part V, p. 260.
[70] *The Quran*, xcvi. 5-6. 'Then he reduced him to the lowest of the low, Save those who believe and do good works, and theirs is a reward unfailing'.
[71] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 119.
[72] Paton *op. cit.*, p. 75.
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Op. cit.*, p. 75.
[75] *Ibid* p. 197.
[76] *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 71.
[77] H. J. Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
[78] *Ibid.*
[79] *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 89.
[80] *Mid*
[81] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[82] *Op. cit., p. 68.*
[83] Paton, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
[84] *Ibid*
[85] *Op. cit.*, p. 56.
[86] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 111.
[87] Thouless, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
[88] *Ibid*, p. 49
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] *Op. cit.*, pp. 49-50,
[91] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[92] *The Modern Predicament*, p. 60.
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 61.
[94] Iqbal, *ibid., p. 184.*
[95] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 2.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[97] *Op. cit.*, p. 2.
[98] *Ibid. p. 3.*
[99] *ibid.*
[100] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 184.
[101] *Ibid.* p. 198.
[102] Sheikh Ahmad (971/1563-1034/1624), popularly known as Mujaddid Alf Thani.
[103] See Iqbal, *ibid.*, p. 193.
[104] See A. E. Affifi's *The Mystical Philosophy of Mohyid Din Ibnul Arabi*, p. 143.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

> 'It is neither poverty of language nor lack of experience which leads the mystic to speak of uniqueness, of incommunicability, or of the ineffable, but rather the nature of that which is experienced' – (W. T. Stace)

While talking of the nature and constitution of the peculiar experience called religious, it will be unjust not to devote some space to a discussion of its characteristics. In the present thesis this discussion becomes quite unavoidable in so far as we feel that it will serve to throw some further light on the nature of this experience, and particularly on the type of knowledge it is capable of yielding. Moreover, the mystics and the theologians, and also the religious psychologists are more, agreed on the question of characteristics than on the difficult question of the nature and right analysis of religious experience. (It is always easier to describe the qualities of an object of thought than to fully analyse it into its constituents and explain its nature). Moreover, the characteristics of religious experience are, perhaps, more relevant to a philosophical undertaking like the one I have ventured upon than an analytical approach which is more the concern of a scientist. Hence I propose to devote the present chapter to a scrutiny of characteristics which are commonly enumerated and discussed by mystics, theologians, and religious psychologists. They, however, differ among

themselves as regards the number of necessary characteristics and also in their inclusion or exclusion of any particular character in or from their list of necessary characteristics. However, there are some on which, if not all, a majority of theologians seem to have agreed. Beginning with those on which there appears to be a pretty good unanimity I opt to discuss them as follows:

I

1. INEFFABILITY or INCOMMUNICABILITY is the characteristic which appears on almost all the lists. By this is meant that mystic experience is very much personal and private, like any of our immediate experiences, e.g. our experience of toothache or headache, and as such it cannot be made known to any one who has not himself had a similar experience. "You can no more explain the knowledge revealed by mystical experience to a person who has not gone through the experience, than you can explain what 'red' means, to a blind man", says Ibnul Arabi. "No one but a mystic can realise the full meaning of such knowledge, and the way to describe it is to explain it, as mystics have always done, by means of ambiguous and misleading metaphors".[1] "The vision is there"; says Plotinus, "for him who will see it".[2] Commenting on the Ineffability of religious experience William James writes; "In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like states of intellect".[3] And Iqbal expresses the some thing thus: "The incommunicability of mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling; untouched by discursive intellect".[4] This characteristic of mystic experience, according to Professor James, is "negative".[5]

This, however, should not be taken to mean that mystic states are thoroughly private and subjective, and that they cannot be conveyed to anyone else. On the contrary, like all immediate experience, they are communicable provided there is a community of experience between the reporter and the one to whom it is being reported. Thus Professor J. B. Pratt rightly says "To be sure all the mystics of every land and century may in one sense be said to speak the same language; they understand each other and no one else fully understands them".[6] Moreover, as

Iqbal says, "The interpretation which the mystic or the prophet puts on the content of his religious consciousness can be conveyed to others in the form of propositions, but the content itself cannot be so transmitted".[7] Thus, though religious experience cannot be transmitted in its original form, it can, nevertheless, be conveyed to others through language. But this is true of all experience: when, for example, I report my having perceived a red spot, what I convey is my interpretation of sensations I have received, and not those sensations themselves, which are as ineffable as the mystic states.

It might be pointed out here that the language of a mystic is vague and unintelligible to the common mail, while our everyday conversations which mainly consists in expressing our ordinary experiences, is quite lucid and understandable to every one. Professor Pratt has conjectured the following reasons for this: "One is that the mystic is not usually interested in exact description and never thinks of taking the psychological paint of view. Poor introspection on the part of many is another reason. Most fundamental of all is the fact that exact psychological description of an emotional experience must necessarily be in sensuous terms, while the mystic often feels that sensuous terms are unworthy to be applied to his purely "spiritual experience".[8] To these reasons I venture to add yet another which, I think, is no less important –namely, the "lack of community" between the experiences of a mystic and those of man in the street which renders experience of the former incomprehensible to the latter. But this is true of all experience. If I were to report, for example, my toothache to one who has never experienced it himself, my report will not be quite intelligible to him. In this connection, we may well refer to the story of the man who tried in vain to explain what red colour looked like to a born-blind. And lastly so far as our language is concerned, it is formulated on the basis of our everyday practical life, and as such is ill-adapted and ill-suited to explain an experience so far removed from ordinary life and experience as the religious experience.

Professor Glasgow, while discussing the ineffability of religious experience in one of his recent article "Knowledge of God", urges that the main difficulty lies in the non-availability of

a suitable language and maintains that if mystics were supplied with a greater number of words or a larger vocabulary, (they) could no longer think of the experience as ineffable and incommunicable, for it could be described and the language could be understood by those who have had a similar experience and who have troubled themselves to learn the language. But at this point one might ask why it is that the mystics have never developed a language of their own. W. T. Stace suggests that this cannot be done in the nature of the case. "It is neither poverty of language nor lack of experience which leads the mystic to speak of uniqueness, of incommunicability, or of the ineffable, but rather the nature of that which is experienced".[9] Here both Professor Glasgow and Professor Stace forget one very important fact which, as said before, Professor Pratt expressed when he said that the mystic was not usually interested in exact description and never thought of taking the psychological point of view. What he actually means to say is that a mystic is neither a linguist who is interested in developing a suitable and adequate vocabulary, nor a psychologist, whose main concern is to describe and analyse his own experiences as well as those similar experiences of others. There is, of course, a truth in Professor Stace's point that ineffability is because of the nature of that which is experienced. But it is at best only one of the reasons. Our ordinary language has been adapted to the everyday practical needs and it is not fully possible to mould it so as to suit what Huxley and Professor Zaehner call "praeter-natural"[10] experience. It is because of this that mystical expressions and statements are bound to be symbolical, indirect, and circuitous. It will not be out of' place here to add that a mystic is not the same as a religious philosopher, although it is' true' that the latter cogitates, as Underhill says, on the material or substance provided by the former on the basis of his. personal experience.[11] Although there have been some "true mystics, such as Eckhart, who have philosophized upon their own experiences, greatly to the advantage of the world .... ";[12] but this, I deny, they have done in the capacity of mystics.

Again, it might be pointed out by some that mysic experience has a higher degree of ineffability than any other experience. Pratt admits that the mystic is justified in his assertion that "his

deepest religious experiences are indescribable, ineffable".[13] - This is, of course, true to a considerable extent of every emotion. In fact, all emotion " must undergo a certain amount of distortion and transformation if it is to be put into such a form as to be communicable".[14] But different emotions involve different degree of such transformation and distortion, according to their relative complexity and to the varying amount and kind of ideation and organic feeling involved in them.And almost universal assertion of the mystics is that " religious experience is the one most difficult of all to be thus analysed and described. In fact the ineffability of the experience is one of its most prominent characteristics".[15] In other words, what Professor Pratt means to emphasize is that, though the character of ineffability is common to all experience, including the most mundane, it characterizes religious experience to a much higher degree and can, therefore, serve well as a distinctive mark of that experience. There is some justification for this position of Professor Pratt, for the religious emotion, more than any other, eludes all description and this enhances its ineffability very much. But this at best is a difference of degree, and not of kind.

2. IMMEDIACY, another characteristic so commonly talked of in connection with mystic experience, follows from the ineffability of this experience. By immediacy is meant that its quality must be directly experienced. In other words, mystic expefience is non-transferable because it is an immediate experience and vice versa. The two characteristics imply each other–nay, they rather mean the same thing. Thus what is true of ineffability is also true of immediacy. Iqbal, however, treats of them as if they were two distinct and independent features of mystic experience. While talking of its immediacy, he acknowledges, "All experience is immediate.... The immediacy of mystic experience simply means that we know God just as we know other objects".[16] I have, however, shown in the last section that ineffability is by no means a distinctive mark of mystic experience; it is, on the contrary, what serves, to bring it closer to other forms of experience. And whatever is true of ineffability is also true of immediacy.

Some writers on religion in general, and mysticism in particular, have much emphasized this feature of religious experience, and mystics are very fond of talking of it as one of its indispensable characters. Professor Pratt counts two characteristics which have often been noticed and pointed out not only in the mystic of the milder sort but in various kinds of non-religious mysticism: viz., mystic's demand for immediacy and his love of the romantic. To him the mediate, the merely reasoned, the conceptual and discursive is relatively valueless. He regards "conceptual knowledge as ever unsatisfying or meaningless, and immediate experieace as the only trustworthy guide and the only solid satisfaction".[17] In order to bring out the 'immediacy' aspect of their experience, Sufis like Ibnul Arabi, prefer to use terms like "shuhud",[18] "kashf",[19] "qalb",[20] etc. The Sufi literature abounds in such terms.

As I have tried to show before, immediacy is no more a distinctive feature of religious experience than incommunicability. The two terms are mutually related: i.e. an experience is incommunicable because it is immediate and vice versa. My perception of, say, a red object, is as immediate and direct as a mystic's vision of God, and this fact mystics themselves are never shy of acknowledging. This feature, then, religious experience shares with other types of experience. To communicate an experience, religious or unreligious, is to make it mediate by interpolating 'idea' between the actual experience and the person experiencing.

3. UNANALYSABILITY, though not among the characteristics which are so commonly found on the lists of mystics and theologians, has got a very prominent place in some lists. This characteristic arises from the fact that discursive thought is reduced to the minimum in mystical vision. Discursive thought, as we know, is concerned with analysis, classification, and synthesis of the given data and when it is absent, as in the case of the experience under consideration, the data goes unanalysed. Comparing with ordinary forms of human experience Iqbal writes: "When I experience the table before me innumerable data of experience merge into the single experience of the table. Out of this wealth of data I select those that fall into

a certain order of space and time and round them off in reference to the table. In the mystic state, however vivid and rich it may be, thought is reduced to a minimum and such an analysis is not possible".[21] Again, he adds, "The ordinary rational consciousness, in view of our practical need of adaptation to our environment, takes that Reality piecemeal .... The mystic state brings us into contact with the total passage of Reality..."[22]

Now, as we shall see in the sequel, thought, Iqbal admits, does not reduce to the minimum in a mystic state– nay, it simply cannot, for then no knowledge would be possible, for thought is the faculty that puts interpretation on the perceived data and gives it meaning. Moreover, no knowledge is possible unless the data has been analysed and broken up into its bits. The mere mass of the given, unanalysed by thought, will never yield us any knowledge. Thought must analyse it and, after selecting its relevant data, interpret it referring it to some object which is believed to be divine; only then a mystic state will be cognitive and instructive, and a knowledge of God possible. The one distinctive feature of Iqbal's philosophy of religion is that he acknowledges that in its deeper movement[23] or, which comes to the same, in its non-discursive application, thought is a necessary element in religious knowledge. It is discursive thought, he says, which is reduced to a minimum in a non-sensuous experience. This position of Iqbal serves at once to differentiate him from a number of writers on religion, for mostly they would not agree with him that thought had a deeper movement also.

The unanalysability, however, of which Iqbal talks is actually a mirror of our incomplete knowledge and ignorance. It is because we have not yet attained to that stage of knowledge where the human mind is capable of analysing a religious state. The ineffability of which we have talked above, is due to the lack of a proper analysis, to which when the human mind attains even the most intense forms of mystical states, shall be rendered describable and communicable. The unanalysability or ineffability, with which it is intimately bound up, perhaps occupies the same position in mysticism as the Heisenberg's 'uncertainty principle' does in Physics. Copleston argues in his debate with Russell, with reference to Professor Dingle, that "the

Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us something about the success (or the lack of it) of the present atomic theory in correlating observations but not about nature in itself,..."[24] In other words, the uncertainty principle is a temporary phase which, with an advancement of knowledge and the possibility of more accurate measurements, will have to be replaced with something more positive. Similarly, I think, the unanalysability imputed to mystical states should not be regarded as final, but rather as something to be conquered and removed through the acquisition of more knowledge and deeper insight into the constituents of such states. The religious philosopher is required to assume the same attitude towards the unanalysability of the experience of a mystic who provides him with the material upon which to cogitate, as the physicist does towards the principle of uncertainty. His aim should be a proper and accurate analysis of mystical states without which they will remain a mystery to a majority, who will fail to understand them.

4. TRANSIENCY, one of the characteristics so often enumerated, means that mystical states are seldom lasting. Usually they last for a few moments and, as Professor James says, "Except in rare instances, half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit, beyond which, they fade into the light of common day".[25] He is scrupulous to add, "Often, when faded their quality can but imperfectly be reproduced in memory; but when they recur it is recognized; and from one recurrence to another it is susceptible of continuous development in what is felt as inner richness and importance".[26] Iqbal expresses the same fact in the following words, "the mystic state soon fades away, though it leaves a deep sense of authority after it has passed away. Both the mystic and the prophet return to the normal levels of experience; ...".[27]

There is no doubt that mystic states are not abiding. But this is true of all mental states, whether mystical or mundane. Not a single perception, or sensation, or feeling, or volition is eternally present in the mind. Mind being a continuous flow, it is not possible for a mind to perpetuate any of its states; the states must go on changing and replacing each other, and this is a relentlessly and unintermittently continuous succession, a change

without ceasing, as Bergson would prefer to call it. Bergson has aptly remarked: "I work or I do nothing, I look at what is around me or I think of something else. Sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas - such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing".[28] It is not only that various mental states go on replacing one another like one scene replacing the other on the stage; the states themselves are seldom static. Thus Bergson says that "there is no feeling, no idea, no volition which is not undergoing change every moment; if a mental state ceased to vary, its duration would cease to flow".[29] This is true not only of some of the states, but of all, including, the most stable of internal states, namely, the visual perception of a motionless external object. "The object may remain the same, I may look at it from the same side, at the same angle, in the same light; nevertheless the vision I now have of it differs from that which I have just had,..."[30] "The truth is that we change without ceasing", he adds, "and that the state itself is nothing but change".[31] Thus, transiency, in so far as it characterizes all the mental states without exception, cannot serve as a distinctive mark of the mystical states. It simply reflects the infirmity and imperfection of human mind. It is true, however, that the mystics yearn to make their states perpetual and eternal as an artist would yearn that the most exquisite cloud-formation in the sky, should be everlasting. This is obvious from the following remarks of Abdul Quddus of Gangoh, a great Muslim saint: "Muhammad of Arabia ascended the highest Heaven and returned. I swear by God that if I had reached that point, I should never have returned".[32]

5. PASSIVITY, also a characteristic of the religious states means that while a mystic state lasts, the mystic remains absolutely passive and inert. There is no doubt and most of the mystics are unanimous on this, that certain preliminary voluntary operations, such as the fixing of attention, going through certain bodily performances, etc. are required to induce and facilitate the on-coming of the mystic state; nevertheless, the mystic state, once it has set in, is completely passive. The mystic feels himself to be completely in the grip of a superior being, "as if his own will were in abeyance", says Professor James, "and indeed some times as if he were grasped and held by a superior power".[33]

Iqbal describes the same thing thus, "... to the mystic the mystic state is a moment of intimate association with a unique other Self, transcending, encompassing, and momentarily suppressing the private personality of the subject of experience".[34]

On the questions regarding the possibility and legitimacy of the use of psychological appliances for the inducement of mystical states, the mystics and the theologians are much at variance. In the history of Christian mysticism, the Catholics emphasize, where the Protestants deny, the importance and necessity of the preliminary voluntary operations for inducing the peculiar state. The latter lay sole emphasis on the inherent temperament necessary for such a reception and talk of the grace of God as the sole cause of this. They are reluctant "to admit the propriety of applying psychology to the culture of the religious life, and would feel half-ashamed to admit that it made use of any psychological methods in the production of its desired ends".[35] The Catholic mystics, on the other hand, though acknowledging the necessity of the requisite temperament, believe that "given an individual of the proper temperament, the methods approved by the long mystic tradition for training the moods may, if patiently practised, result in the production of the desired mental state, and may even be one of the conditions sine *qua non* of its production".[36] The history of Islamic mysticism is not without a parallel; for we come across a cognate controversy between the Chishtiya[37] and the Deo Bandiya[38] schools of Sufism. "The mysticism of India and of the Sufis is naively open in its application of psychological methods for bringing about the desired mental conditions".[39] But all the mystics, whether Indian or Muslim or Christian, Catholic or Protestant, however, are agreed that in many cases the recipient is totally passive during the mystic state, and in extreme cases sometimes loses consciousness altogether like Moses on the Mount of Sinai.[40]

In point of passivity, religious experience is by no means unique. This characteristic it again shares with some other types of experience which can hardly be called religious. The condition of the mystic when in trance is, for example, very closely comparable to that of an aesthete who is completely engrossed in the appreciation of a beautiful landscape or a piece

of painting: more or less, the posture of the two is also alike, for each is overpowered by the beauty and awe of the object of contemplation, and the two also share a well-nigh similar emotional attitude towards the object. Similar is the condition, at least in body, of the spectator who is fully absorbed in watching, say, a game of cricket; for he no less than either the aesthete or the mystic becomes unmindful of his surrounding and of himself. According to modern psychology, even such a passivity is also a form of activity. So Professor R. S. Woodworth takes the word activity in a very broad sense, i.e. as including motor, cognitive and emotional activities. He says, "Any manifestation of life can be called an activity. No matter how passive an individual may seem to himself in watching a game or listening to music, he is really carrying on an activity. The only way to be completely inactive is to be dead".[41] Thus the assertion on the part of the mystic that he was totally passive during his experience appears to be based on an old and out-dated notion of activity according to which the word would stand for motor activities only and for those emotional activities which have a motor aspect, i.e. laughing and crying.

Moreover, as Evelyn Underhill has emphasized, "True mysticism is active and practical, not passive and theoretical. It is an organic life process, a something which the whole self does; not something as to which its intellect holds an opinion".[42] Again, while remarking on the apparent passivity of the mystic, she writes: "The great mystics tell us, not how they speculated, but how they acted. To them, the transition from the life of sense to the life of spirit is a formidable undertaking, which demands. effort and constancy. The paradoxical "quiet" of the contemplative is but the outward stillness essential to inward work. Their favourite symbols are those Of action: battle, search, and pilgrimage".[43] "It is the eager, outgoing activity whose driving power is generous love", she adds, "not the absorbent, in drawing activity which strives only for new knowledge".[44] In view of the practical nature of mystical experience she calls mysticism "the art of establishing his conscious relation with the Absolute".[45] Iqbal, as seen before, agrees with Underhill on its practical significance. Thus we see that religious experience is an activity and, as Underhill has put it, an "Art",rather than a mere

passive reflection of the Ultimate Reality; it is active and practical, not passive and theoretical.

6. A STATE OF UNION with the divine object is another characteristic which Iqbal emphasizes. Generally speaking, the divine object with which union has been sought by the mystic may be, what Professor Pratt calls, "the personal Jesus",[46] or perhaps it is the vague cosmical and pantheistic "Beyond".[47] This raises the question as to what is the nature of the divine object after which the mystic aspires. The mystics of different ages and countries differ considerably on this question. We need not, however, go into details of the various possible answers to this question. One thing, however, is certain that Iqbal, being a Muslim, believes in the existence of "a personal God",[48] who is not a concept, but a percept - not a mere percept, but a being with whom one can enter into interpersonal relationships. It is such an interpersonal relationship that is sought with God in the religious experience properly so-called, and Iqbal talks of such a relationship. In calling it the unique Other Self, Iqbal, on the one hand, brings out the possibility of formulating interpersonal relationships with it, and, on the other hand, brings home to us the fact that the divine object is unique and independent. Again, God is not a mere delusion, a mere creation of our imagination, but has a veritable existence of His own outside of our mind. To use the Jungian terminology, it is "Godhead" and not a mere "God-imago".[49] This fact tends objectivity to religious experience, which otherwise would have been a mere figment of the mind. The Holy Quran is abounding in verses where God has been talked of as a person responding to our fellow-men. Iqbal quotes the following verses: "And your Lord saith, call Me and I respond to your call"; "And when My servants ask thee concerning Me, then I am nigh unto them and answer the cry of him that crieth unto Me".[50]

Almost all the mystics, from all lands and ages, who believe in a personal God, agree that the ultimate object of religious experience is a union with God. The Greeks, of course, had a very vague idea of the deity;[51] but the followers of all great religions of the world - Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam - are unanimous on this point, however much they may be

differing in their description of the deity. Sufis and the Christian mystics are particularly close in this matter. Thus in that great fountain-head of mysticism, the 'Enneads', Plotinus writes "The soul has naturally a love of God and desires to be united with Him. That we must put all else away, and abide in the Beloved alone and become only it, stripping off all else that wraps us about;..... and that we must hasten to the end that we may embrace the Beloved with all our soul and have no part of us left with which we do not touch God".[52] Underhill similarly remarks that "the end which the mystic sets before him is conscious union with a living Absolute".[53] This union with the Absolute is what the mystics choose to call the state of 'Fana'.

Of all the characteristics so far discussed, this one appears to be important and necessary. Mystical experiences are of a motley variety: they include, as Pratt says, the experiences called 'telepathic', the intuitive sense which the lover has for his love, which the mother has for her child, the "possession" of the Shaman, the cosmic consciousness of the poet, and the ecstasy of the "mystic";[54] but all of them aim at an intimate union with their respective object. And Professor Pratt adds that religious mysticism differs from other forms in that it has a religious object. Thus, the state of an intimate union with God, or the religious object however conceived, is, if not the only, one of the most important characteristics of religious, experience. It is a distinctive mark which serves to differentiate it from any other form of experience; for however immediate, incommunicable, and unanalysable it may be, if it does not have a divine object, which is only the privilege of an experience properly to be called religious, it ceases to be religious. It is a characteristic of the religious experience only, as no one will gainsay, and it is by virtue of this that it becomes a unique experience. The object lends its uniqueness to the experience itself.

7. LOVE OF THE ROMANTIC, the first of the two characteristics emphasized by Professor Pratt, the other being immediacy which we have already discussed. Of the former Pratt writes: "the mystic is essentially a romanticist. By saying this I mean that he exhibits in a large degree that confidence in emotion and imagination which are at the bottom of romanticism

.... Their intensity and his confidence in them mutually reinforce each other, and the result is what psychologists call a "circular process"his emotional life and his faith in it increasing with the year".[55] It is because of its romantic nature that Underhill calls it "the most romantic of adventures",[56] and also "the art of arts, their source and also their end",[57] and then goes on to emphasize a close affinity between mystical experience and music in the following words: "Yet of all the arts music alone shares with great mystical literature the power of waking in us a response to the life movement of the universe..."[58] Some mystics have explicitly called mysticism the "music of the soul",[59] and Richard Rolle of Hampole, the father of English mysticism, is one of them.[60]

Now there can be no doubt that a mystic state is highly emotional and this is obvious from such mystical phrases as "an intense love for the Divine", etc., and some religions, of course, make a positive attempt to enhance the emotionality of such a state by making use of music and dance in their prayers and rituals. This is true of Hinduism, or Jainism, and also of the Christians who make use of music in their weekly prayers. Some of the Sufis, too, were fond of music in the form of 'Qawali' as an instrument for inducing the state of ecstasy. This practice is very common among the mystics of Pakistan and India even to this day. But Islam takes good care to eliminate music and dance from its essential activities in order to secure a wholy non-emotional objective experience, a fact accentuated by Iqbal also. Again, religious experience, though essentially emotional, should not be taken to be a pure subjectivity. As said before, in Islam at any rate religious experience is not necessarily an emotional experience. Emotionality, on the contrary, is something which has to be alleviated rather than heightened. In other words, romanticism is not a necessary mark of Sufism, although there can be no denying the fact that a Sufi has a stronger imagination and an intenser emotionality than an ordinary man. Moreover, as I pointed out in the last chapter, religion is not a mere emotional state. It, of course, necessarily has a very important emotional aspect which goes a long way to determine its nature; but this by no means shows that this is the whole truth about religion, which, as we have seen, is a very

complex whole including all the various aspects of a total mental state or consciousness.

8. Religious experience is MARGINAL. It has been urged by Pratt that the marginal aspects of consciousness play a very important role in determining the nature of this experience, and this marks an important distinction between this experience and other levels of experience. Thus Pratt writes: "One of the chief ways in which individual minds differ is in the relative importance of the fringe region. With the extreme rationalistic temple whose thought is always clear and for whom everything has its definite and neat place, the margin is very narrow and has but little influence, The opposite type of mind has less power of concentration and correspondingly broader field, running out into a wide background. The former of these types seldom produces mystics, and for it the business of life will, at least during the working days, crowd out the sense of the Divine".[61] Again, he very expressly says that if we were to divide mankind into classes, the mystical and the non-mystical, one of the chief distinctions would probably be based upon the relative importance of the margin and the center of consciousness. The non-mystical type seems to have a narrower marginal region. "In the mystic ecstasy to be sure, consciousness is narrowed to a small point,... The working of his mind is largely guided by feeling and by ideas rising out of the fringe, while his non-mystical brother lives a life, perhaps, of clearer thought -".[62] Not only this, but Professor Pratt goes on to add that the mystical or religious consciousness is usually characterized by "a painful lack of inner unity and a great longing for it. And in those individuals who are destined to become ecstatic this lack of unity is often very pronounced and is sometimes described as a state of distraction".[63] Not only this, but there is "a tendency in the more extreme ecstatics towards mental dissociation. It can hardly be doubted that many of the mystics have been at least incipiently hysterics".[64] Professor Pratt, however, acknowledges: "The extreme condition,...of a split off consciousness is by no means universal with the mystics; and it is, in my opinion, an absurd exaggeration to identify mysticism (even of the more intense

type) as Murisier and Duprat seem to do, with a disintegration of the personality".[65]

What seems to have duped Professor Pratt into holding that mystical experience is marginal is, perhaps, the fact that it is usually very vague and indistinct, and it has generally been expressed in symbolic and metaphorical terms. He forgets that this experience demands much concentration, as is obvious from the use of "dhikr"[66] in Islam, perhaps, even more than our ordinary experience. Mysticism is by no means merely a state of the subconscious or the unconscious, although the subconscious or the unconscious might be playing a very important role in determining the nature of this experience. This has been the position of some of the psychologists and writers on religion.[67] The negative aspects of religious experience–the exercises and discipline followed by the mystics to eliminate any distractions from the external phenomenal world–bear ample testimony to the fact that it requires a deeper concentration and focalization, a pinning down of our attention to a very narrow field. This is also evident from the institution of 'auto-suggestion'[68] usually resorted to by the mystics of all places and times. Professor Pratt himself explains the value of the positive method called 'auto-suggestion' thus: "They are the means which the mystic uses to get his attention under the control of the proper ideas and emotions, so that these may dominate his whole mind and his whole activity".[69] Nobody will deny that 'meditation' is a necessary part of the mystic experience. Professor Pratt acknowledges this fact in the following passage: "Probably the most important of these methods is the "practice of the presence of God",---the habit diligently cultivated, of keeping constantly either in the fringe or in the center of one's mind the thought that God is present or that He is even within one".[70] As I have stressed above, its being "focal" is very necessary, and the more focal it is, the more intense is the experience. Thus 'marginality' is at the most an index of the imperfection of an experience. Professor Pratt, as said before, has admitted that the mystic has a longing for the unity.

That religious experience aims at inner unity and focalization is obvious from the fact that it has very often been called "the

repose of 'unitary experience'".[71] Thus Lord Russell very rightly says: "The second characteristic of mysticism is its belief in unity, and its refusal to admit opposition or division anywhere. We found Heraclitus saying "good and ill are one"; ..."[72]

II

Below are some characteristics listed by Ibnul Arabi, the Muslim mystic and rationalist of the 12-13th century A.D., which he affirms to be essential to the mystical experience and which serve to distinguish it from other levels of human experience. In what follows, I am going to critically examine them one by one.

1. "Esoteric knowledge is INNATE that of the intellect is acquired. It belongs to the divine effulgence (*al fayd al ilahi*) which illuminates the very being of all creatures. It manifests itself in Man under certain mystical conditions, e.g. perfect 'passivity' of mind. It is not the outcome of any practice or discipline; it ties dormant in the deepest recesses of the human heart".[73] It is a special case of the more general reminiscence[74] and the Stoic 'koinai ennoiai'[75], according to which all certain knowledge is "innate" or inborn in the mind; and it faces the same questions: Is there such a thing as innate ideas? What is innate in knowledge?

John Locke, in the first book of his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, has convincingly shown that there are no innate ideas[76] and very few modern thinkers, if any, will disagree with him on this point. Even Descartes, one of the earlier modern rationalists and the father of modern philosophy, acknowledges that ideas are not innate in the sense that they are in the mind at birth, but "Are innate in the sense that we say that generosity is innate in certain families, while in others certain diseases like gout or gravel. Infants are not born with them, but with a facility of acquiring them".[77] Thus, according to Descartes, only a certain type of proclivity or tendency is inborn. As Professor Pratt has pointed out, the Catholics uphold a similar view. They say that there is always an incalculable element to be reckoned with, "a supernatural and direct gift of God, which may be interpreted to mean some obscure but important psychical

conditions which lie too deep to be induced by any methods as yet devised .... It is not every one that can become a mystic, nor can the genuine mystic always force his moods".[78] Again, he adds that "a somewhat uncommon disposition or temperament to start with is, for the more extreme forms of mysticism, quite essential. This disposition is in part the result of education but is chiefly congenital".[79] Now, whether some training or education is necessary or not, it seems certain that a basic disposition or temperament is indispensable to the attainment of such an experience. It is a fact that very few will gainsay, and in this sense, of course, mystical experience is innate and congenital. But so are those of our non-religious experiences which call upon some special sensitivity or nervous set-up.

2. "It is BEYOND REASON, and we should not invoke the authority of reason to test its validity. On the. contrary, if reason and intuition should conflict, the former should always be sacrificed for the latter....; reason is no judge of such truths. Reason may be right sometimes, but Ibnul Arabi holds that its rightness is accidental. Reason should not interfere with divine knowledge or attempt to interpret it".[80]

Iqbal does not agree with Ibnul Arabi on this point. He holds that reason has a right to judge religion, and to interpret religious data, provided it does not exceed its limits. Thus he says: "to rationalize faith is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over religion. Philosophy, no doubt, has jurisdiction to judge religion, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it will not submit to the jurisdiction of philosophy except on its own terms".[81] Again, as we shall see in the next chapter, Iqbal insists on the important role that reason plays in organizing and interpreting religious data, a distinctive feature of his philosophy of religion. It is in its discursive application that thought is reduced to the minimum. But thought, as Iqbal emphasizes, has a deeper movement also,[82] and in its deeper movement it plays an important part in religious knowledge without this, in fact, there will not be possible any religious knowledge.

3. "IT MANIFESTS itself in the form of LIGHT which floods every part of the 'heart' of the Sufi when he attains a certain degree of spiritual purification".[83] The Qur'an is

abounding in expressions where God is referred to as light: "God is the light of the heavens and of the earth. His light is like a niche in which is a lamp the lamp encased in a glass–the glass, as it were, a star".[84] In the history of pantheism, that form at least which conceives or the Ultimate Reality "as some vague, vast, and pervasive cosmic element",[85] is predisposed to conceive of it as light. This is, for example, the view of Farnell in his Gifford lectures on the attributes of God.[86] Among the Sufis, we have al-Ghazzali, the great theologian of the eleventh-century, who "dwells much on the thought of God as light and Beauty ... (he says) All other lights are but partial rays or reflections of His Light".[87] And again, Ghazzali says, ---"All things are a ray of the essential light of God...The one real light is God Himself".[88]

Whatever be the position of the pantheists mentioned above, it seems certain that the Quranic identification of God with light is, at any rate, metaphorical and not to be taken literally. As Iqbal very rightly says, "The metaphor of light as applied to God, therefore, must ill View Of modern knowledge, be taken to suggest the Absoluteness of God and not His Omnipresence which easily lends itself to a pantheistic interpretation".[89] As Professor Nicholson has pointed out, the Sufis adhered to the original Islamic recognition of the divine transcendence, and in the proper sense there is no such thing as pantheism among them. He writes, "So long as transcendence is recognized, the most emphatic assertion of immanence is not pantheism, but Panentheism".[90]

Again, it is not always necessary that God reveals Himself in the form of light to the mystic consciousness. It reveals itself differently to different mystics, and to the same mystic on different occasions. When Ibnul Arabi affirmed that it manifests itself in the form of light which floods every part of the 'heart' of the Sufi he was probably trying to emphasize the fact that like light which dispels all darkness, religious knowledge dissipates ignorance. Light for Ibnul Arabi is the basic principle of all knowledge; it is "everything through which apprehension takes place".[91] As Plotinus says, "If you apprehend sound, you call the apprehending Light 'hearing', and if you perceive by sight, you call it 'seeing', and so on to the end of the senses and

faculties".[92] "Following the Ishraqis, Ibnul Arabi maintains that "Pure Light" (which is also Pure Being) is the source of all knowledge. The senses and all other human faculties are media through which this Light manifests itself. Light is the only apprehending (*mudrik*) "principle" in all conscious beings, the only thing that is "visible" in itself and makes other things visible".[93] Ibnul Arabi identifies Light with pure Goodness and Being. He holds that "pure evil is the same as pure not-being and pure darkness (*ash-sharru'l mahd huwa'l adamu'l mahd wazzulmatu'l mahdah*), and pure good is pure being and pure light (*al wujudu'l mahd huwa'l khayru'l - mahd wan-nuru'l mahd*)".[94] Suhrawardi al-Maqtul[95] held almost the same position.[96] All this shows that the word 'light' is being used metaphorically or, at any rate, in an uncommon usage, and by no means, in the ordinary sense. It seems to imply that religious experience is capable of yielding knowledge, that it has a cognitive aspect (a point with which I will be dealing in some detail in the following chapter). However, it cannot be treated as among the characteristics of religious experience; it simply states the fact of its knowledge-yielding capacities in a metaphorical and symbolic way.

4. "Unlike speculative knowledge which, at most yields probability, INTUITION YIELDS 'CERTAIN' KNOWLEDGE. The former has for its object the shadow of the Real - The Phenomenal World - the latter Reality itself".[97] Iqbal expresses this fact elaborately in the following passage: "In the domain of science we try to understand its meanings in reference to the external 'behaviour' of reality; in the domain of religion we take it as representative of some kind of reality and try to discover its meanings in reference mainly to the inner 'nature' of that reality."[98] Shadow of reality which Ibnul Arabi and most of the other mystics speak of, is not only the external and exclusive view of Reality, but also a sectional and superficial view taken by science - a fact which Iqbal expresses in the following words: "what is called science is not a single systematic view of Reality. It is a mass of sectional views of Reality–fragments of a total experience which do not seem to fit together".[99] ... Iqbal compares sciences to vultures each running away with a piece of flesh from the dead body of nature. Again, scientific approach is

artificial. He adds that "religion, which demands the whole of Reality and for this reason must occupy a central place in any synthesis of all the data of human experience, has no reason to be afraid of any sectional views of Reality".[100]

Ibnul Arabi's position is based on the Platonic conception of 'the Real World' and the 'world of shadows',[101] the Noumenon and the Phenomenon as Kant would call it. This bifurcation has done a lot of mischief in the metaphysical and religious thought, for in reality there are no two separate planes of existence - a fact which was very early pointed out by Aristotle,[102] though it never came to be recognized by the philosophers till very recently. The chief merit of Existentialism, one of the latest movements in the history of philosophy, is that it very emphatically disavows the existence of a world of essences as separate from that of existence. Iqbal's position in this matter is clear and evades most of the difficulties; for instead of saying that science deals with unreal shadows, while religion claims to have a knowledge of the ultimately Real, he would say that the approach of the former is sectional and exclusive, where that of the latter is inclusive and allembracive. Nobody will gainsay that the scientific approach is analytic and fragmentary, while that of religion is, like Philosophy, synthetic and complete. Ibnul Arabi's assertion that speculative knowledge is probable, while esoteric knowledge is certain, may be interpreted in the light of the above thus: by calling speculative knowledge probable he refers to its sectional and fragmentary nature, while esoteric knowledge is certain in the sense that it is inclusive, complete and all-embracing. Thus conceived, of course, religious knowledge is certain, and it is one of the most important distinctive marks of this experience.

It is possible to understand 'certainty' in the sense of infallibility and when Ibnul Arabi asserts certainty of the esoteric knowledge, he is perhaps referring to its infallibility, or at least he includes that in its signification. It may also be suggested that 'certainty' means that our knowledge exactly corresponds with the object it represents.[103] Both, infallibility and 'correspondence' are out of question, for they cannot be ascertained by any means. Infallibility cannot be claimed of any

form of human knowledge, and the test of correspondence in its naive form no longer holds ground.

There is, however, a logical sense of the word 'certainty' also. In this sense, an inductive conclusion is certain when the evidence for it is 'overwhelming' or 'conclusive': 'ccertainty' is the highest degree of 'support' that logical evidence can possibly tend to its conclusion. The 'probable' means a lesser degree of support. Thus, the difference between the certain and the probable is one of the degree of support. As P. F. Strawson rightly says: "there can be, and is, better or worse evidence for inductive conclusions",[104] and it is the strongest evidence that can yield certainty'.[105] Now, when it is asserted that the religious experience yields 'certain' knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, what is meant, logically speaking, is perhaps that this experience yields, or is, an 'overwhelming' or 'conclusive' evidence for the existence of God. It is, however, very far-fetched to assert this and it involves question-begging, for this is the very thing at stake.

5. "That through IT the mystic gains PERFECT KNOWLEDGE of the nature of Reality. The unaided intellect asserts absolute transcendence of God. The mystic asserts both transcendence and immanence. He sees through the divine *tajalli* how the One permeates the Many, and in what sense the One is different from the Many".[106]

The above passage is extremely vague. It is not clear what Ibnul Arabi means by perfect knowledge of the nature of Reality, if he means by it something other than 'certainty' and 'infallibility' discussed in the last section. In saying that in calling this knowledge perfect he means that it informs the mystic both of the transcendence and of the immanence of God, he seems to have referred to its completeness and all-inclusiveness which we have dealt with before under the head of 'certainty'. In this sense it simply means that religion yields a complete and absolute Knowledge of God. This, however, is not so much a characteristic of this experience as a peculiarity in its content. Anyway, absoluteness and certainty have often been claimed to be the distinctive features of the experience under

review. This point we have discussed elaborately in the last section.

III

SUMMING UP, then, the above discussion, there are some characteristics which seem to be indispensable to any experience which can be called religious, and which serve to distinguish it from other forms of experience which are non-religious. I do not, however, claim that the following list is exhaustive, or that it is final. Any one may have his own whims in the matter and chalk out his own list. The following, however, is the list to which my scrutiny of the various characteristics, enumerated by different theologians and mystics, has led me.

1. The presence of a DIVINE OBJECT with which union is sought by the mystic. The consciousness of a Beyond, which one recognizes to be divine, and with which one seeks union, is an essential condition for an experience to be religious. The divine object has been called by different names by different philosophers and theologians. Some call it "the Whole",[107] others "the Other";[108] Professor Otto calls it by the name of "mysterium tremendum",[109] Iqbal gives it the name of "the Ultimate Ego",[110] "the Unique Other Self"[111] or "the Ultimate Reality".[112] Without the divine nature of its object no experience can be called religious, however otherwise it might be similar to it. This encounter with the divine object is what is common to all mysticism. Thus, Professor F. C. Copleston in his article "The Philosophical Relevance of Religious Experience", writes: "When people speak of encounter with God as a characteristic of the religious consciousness, they are talking, I think, of a common phenomenon of an experience, that is to say, which is commonly enjoyed by devout Christians, Jews and Moslems....".[113]

2. INNATENESS, as we have seen before, refers to a certain innate and basic temperament without which such an experience will be impossible. Spirituality is by no means a state that can be induced at any time by any one; it is, on the contrary; a gift of God in the sense that it requires a certain kind of temperament and sensitivity, as among its preconditions, which cannot be

produced at will. Every one is born with a certain temperament and only those are amenable to religious experience who are fortunate enough to have been born with a suitable temperament. No doubt, the onset of such an experience can be facilitated by the practices and exercises prescribed in the manuals on mysticism, but a basic temperament is a necessary pre-condition. Innateness involves spontaneity.

3. IT IS BEYOND REASON. This, however, does not mean, as has so often been thought erroneously, that reason plays no part in religious knowledge. It simply means that discursive reason is reduced to the minimum. As Iqbal has rightly urged, reason is capable of a non-discursive application also and in this application it plays an important part in the interpretation and organization of religious data. Thus, in saying that religious experience is beyond reason what is meant is that discursive reason does not play any part in our knowledge of God.

4. It yields CERTAIN knowledge of the Ultimate Reality. By this is meant that knowledge yielded by religious experience is complete, inclusive and all-embracing, as distinguished from scientific knowledge which is sectional, piece-meal and superficial. Religious knowledge, unlike scientific knowledge, is neither a knowledge of a partial aspect of the total Reality, nor is it a mere synthesis of a number of piece-meal aspects of the Real put together; it is the knowledge of the whole of Reality taken at a single glance. Certainty, when understood in the above sense, is a characteristic of the religious knowledge.

5. LOVE OF THE ROMANTIC, as discussed before, means confidence in emotion and imagination which is at the bottom of all romanticism and which the religious man shows in large measures. Now there is no doubt that mystic experience is essentially emotional and it also requires a very strong imagination–the two conditions necessary to romanticism. This, however, should not be taken to mean that all mystics love emotions and try to sharpen their emotionality. As we have seen before, this might be true of the Hindu, the Christian or the Jewish mysticism; but it is by no means true of Sufism and Islam, which take good care to eliminate music and dance from their essential activities in order to secure a wholly non-

emotional, objective experience. However, love of the romantic, though not a necessary goal of all mysticism, is, at any rate, one of the characteristics in the sense that the mystic, whether Muslim or not, betrays a higher degree of emotionality and imagination.

To these I venture to add some more. Among these there are two from Professor James, namely, the noetic quality and the non-sensuousness (a characteristic which no mystic from any land and creed shall decry). To these I add Symbolism (the one which has been emphasized by E. Underhill), Immediacy (which I have discussed before), and Activity.

6. The NOETIC QUALITY, to emphasize which is the main purpose of my thesis, is the one characteristic that Professor James has accentuated. He rightly feels that unless capable of yielding knowledge, mystic states can hardly be said to constitute genuine experience. He says, "They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance,..."[114] The significance of the noetic quality is obvious from the fact that the present thesis deals with the knowledge-yielding capacities of the experience under review.

It might be alleged by some that this quality religious experience shares with all the other levels of experience which are capable of yielding knowledge. All right; but it is this quality or capacity of the religious experience which has been of late so much under fire. Moreover, as Professor James has pointed out, it is an insight into the depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect, and it is important to distinguish it from the other levels of human experience. Hence, it may rightly be said that religious experience has unique type of noetic quality what makes it unique is, no doubt, the nature of the object it endeavours to know and understand. It is also different from other kinds of experience in that it has the least amount of sensuous element in it. What makes it unique is not only nature of the object, but also the type of the approach to that object and that approach is non-sensuous. This brings us to the next important characteristic.

7. NON-SENSUOUSNESS is among those characteristics on which well-nigh all the mystics from all creeds and lands are agreed. It means that the senses play no part in religious experience–rather they are wilfully held in abeyance in order to make possible and facilitate the onset of that experience. Talking of the religious experience Iqbal says, "it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part".[115] The various inhibitions e.g. fasting, sleeplessness, breath-control, etc. - are undergone in order to stop any interference from the external world which is inimical to the inducement of mystical states of mind.[116] This, however, should not be taken to mean that senses are worthless and incapable of yielding knowledge, as was erroneously thought by the Greeks.[117] As some of the leading Sufis have acknowledged, sense-experience is indispensable to divine knowledge, so far as nature is a symbol of the Ultimate Reality. Iqbal goes to the extent of saying that nature is the character of God. This fact has been emphasized by the Qur'an in verses like, Nature "is the habit of Allah".[118] Commenting on the Qur'an Iqbal says, "the immediate purpose of the Qur'an in this reflective observation of nature is to awaken in man the consciousness of which nature is regarded a symbol".[119] "The Qur'an, recognizing that the empirical attitude is an indispensable stage in the spiritual life of humanity", Iqbal adds, "attaches equal importance to all the regions of human experience as yielding knowledge of the Ultimate Reality which reveals its symbols both within and without".[120] Some leading Sufis have advocated a similar view. Thus, Ghazzali says: "All things are a ray of the essential light of God...The one real light is God Himself".[121] In the same way Ibnul Arabi writes: "We ourselves are the attributes by which we describe God; our existence is merely an objectivization of His existence. God is necessary to us in order that we may exist, while we are necessary to Him in order that He may be manifested to Himself".[122] And Jami,[123] the famous Persian poet and sufi, prays to God: "Make this phenomenal world the mirror to reflect the manifestations of Thy Beauty, and not a veil to separate and repel us from Thee".[124] And, similarly Farid-uddin Attar,[125] the twelfth-century Persian Sufi very expressly remarks: "The world

visible and the world invisible are only Himself".[126] Hence we find that according to the Sufis, the world is an outer manifestation of the Real, and that sensuous knowledge is necessary to the spiritual knowledge. It is, however, only a means to the attainment of the latter, and once that vision has been attained, the sense-experience ceases to play any part; it withdraws well-nigh altogether.

Some modern religious psychologists like Professor J. B. Pratt have denied that sensation is altogether absent from religious experience. Pratt says that though the great majority of the recipients of mystic experience only in its milder form give us vague and inexact descriptions, "there is occasionally one here or there who recognizes the fact that religious emotion like every other emotion has a large sensuous element, and who frankly refers to this in his expressions".[127] This sensuous element usually appears in the form of visions and locutions which mystics from all lands and places have sometimes reported to have had. Professor Pratt, however, himself acknowledges that the sensuous element is among the least important of the characteristics of religious experience. He writes: "Perhaps the most striking and yet least important characteristic of the mystic experience so far as it is positively noetic is the occasional phenomenon of visions and locution".[128] Again, E. Underhill writes, "Sometimes the symbol and the perception which it represents become fused in that consciousness; and the mystic's experience then presents itself to him as "visions" or "voices" which we must look upon as the garment he has himself provided to veil that Reality upon which no man may look and live".[129] "The greatest mystics, however, distinguish clearly", Underhill adds, "between the ineffable Reality which they perceive and the image under which they describe it. Therefore the attempt which has sometimes been made to identify mysticism with such forms and figures – with visions, voices, "super-natural favours" and other abnormal phenomena– is clearly wrong".[130]

8. SYMBOLISM[131] refers to the fact that the mystical expressions are seldom direct and literal; they are usually indirect and symbolical. It might be said that all language,

including the scientific, is more or less symbolic. In fact, the degree of symbolism marks the degree of development of a science –that is the most symbolic the language, the more developed the science in question. Even our common language is not free from a symbolic element and that is because of the following reasons: in the first place, all experience has an ineffable element in it which does not admit of direct expression; and in the second place, spatial imagery is inseparable from human thinking and expression. It is more so in the case of such a rare, unique, and extraordinary experience as the one we are dealing with. Remarking on the necessity of symbolism in religion Underhill write: "Thanks to the spatial imagery inseparable from human thinking and human expression, no direct description of spiritual experience is or can be possible to man. It must always be symbolic, allusive, oblique: always suggest, but never tell, the truth."[132] Again, talking of the importance and utility of symbolic language in religion she remarks: "The greater the suggestive quality of the symbol used, ... the more truth it will convey".[133] And again, remarking on the necessity of the use of symbols in religious expressions, she writes that "its actuality is inexpressible except in some side-long way, some hint or parallel which will stimulate the dormant intuition of the reader, and convey, as all poetic language does, something beyond its surface sense. Hence the large part which is played in all mystical writings by symbolism and imagery; ...".[134] The whole mystical tradition of any land, period and creed, abounds in such symbolic expressions as, "the Valley of the Question"[135] "the limitless Valley of Love",[136] "the Bride of Christ",[137] "the Spiritual Marriage",[138] "the Sun of Righteousness,"[139] "the Beloved",[140] "the steep stairway of love",[141] etc. it may suffice to quote here a part of the passage from St. Bernard which reads - "Let Him kiss me with the kisses of His mouth. Who is it speaks these words? It is the Bride. Who is the Bride? It is the Soul thirsting for God .... She who asks this is held by the bond of love to him from whom she asks it".[142]

The above excerpt is an able representation of the fact that religious or mystical utterances are symbolic and indirect. But what is a symbol ? Why does the religious language tend to be symbolic ? In reply to the first question Professor Thouless says,

"If an image has a fairly uniform meaning for different people it is called a symbol".[143] To the second of the questions it can be replied that religious language is symbolic because it involves deep unconscious processes and is essentially emotional. Talking of this Thouless writes, "Unconscious thinking tends to use symbols. This is one explanation of the large part symbolism plays in religion ... "however meaningless they may appear when intellectually analysed they have a strong affective appeal because their appeal reaches the unconscious processes of thought. This suggests a reason why it is not really practical wisdom to try to reduce the symbolism of a religion, however foolish parts of that symbolism may sometimes appear to our intelligence. A reduction of symbolism means a weakening of the hold religion has on the unconscious modes of thinking..."[144]

9. UNIQUENESS I add as another of the necessary characteristics of religious experience. Almost all the mystics and theologians acquiesce in emphasizing the uniqueness of the object of their experience as well as of the experience itself–in fact, it is the uniqueness of the object that bestows uniqueness on the experience. Thus Iqbal writes "that to the mystic the state is a moment of intimate association with a unique other Self",[145] and it is this 'uniqueness' of the object that tinges the experience with uniqueness. But what is meant by the word 'uniqueness' ? And what is meant by calling an object or an experience unique?

It is not easy to define the word 'unique'. Professor F. H. Bradley, however, offers the following analysis of the word. He says, "Uniqueness has two aspects, one negative and the other positive

(a) With regard to the negative aspect there is, perhaps, no doubt. When one calls a thing unique, he says, "one denies that this thing, as far as it is unique, is one of a kind sort, or description, so as to be or become an instance or example. The thing may be "such" in certain respects, but it cannot be such so far as it is unique, and hence it does not admit of another such".[146]

(b) But negation, here as elsewhere, implies and rests on a positive ground. And it is the affirmative aspect of uniqueness

which we must now seek to understand. This aspect is, says Bradley, "in my judgement, the same as individuality or self-containedness. It is the positive inseparable oneness of "what" and "that". These aspects are taken as being in the thing so that neither, as far as the thing is unique, can for any purpose leave the other".[147] On its positive side, then, uniqueness consists, we found in the indissoluble union of "what" and "that". A thing which is self-contained is unique", says Bradley.[148] Now when the mystic or the theologian talks of the uniqueness of the object of his experience - i.e. God - he is obviously referring to the indissoluble union of "what" and "that", of essence and existence. God is a necessary being for him, and, as Professor Samuel M. Thompson rightly remarked, "in God there is a unique involvement of existence and essence. For if God is necessary being then the essence of God is, precisely, His existence. It is the very nature of God to exist".[149] Thus God is unique in the positive sense; in him "what" and "that", essence and existence are indissolubly united. He is an individual, a perfect individual, and is completely self-contained. Thus Iqbal says, "This characteristic of the perfect ego is one of the most essential elements in the Quranic conception of God",[150] ... the reference being to the individuality of God. Over and again, Iqbal calls God by such names as "The Ultimate Ego",[151] "the Creative Self",[152] etc.

God is not only unique in the positive sense, as shown above, but also in the negative sense. For He is not only individual and self-contained, but also unique in the sense described by Bradley. Both these aspects of the uniqueness of God have acutely been brought out by the Holy Qur'an in the following verses: "Say: Allah is One: All things depend on Him; He begeteth not, and He is not begotten; And there is none like unto Him".[153] All those who embrace some monotheistic religion are agreed that God is unique in both the negative and the positive senses. Again, Professor Bradley proceeds to distinguish between

(a) relative and absolute uniqueness, and
(b) essential and factual uniqueness.

In the (a), uniqueness is relative when it is borrowed and conditional, absolute when it is original and categorical.[154] In the (b), "A thing is de facto unique so far as we merely find the absence of any other such thing, and where we cannot say that the thing by its own nature excludes this other".[155] Now, God of higher religions is both absolutely and essentially unique in these senses.

But does the fact that the object of an experience is unique, both absolutely and essentially, bestow its uniqueness on the experience itself? It has been customary with the European psychologists and philosophers to trace out some "external" affinity and likeness between the religious states and the phenomena which are certainly pathological–nay, even to treat of them as instances of the latter. In other words, they deny that religious experiences are unique in the negative sense stated above. Thus Professor James, while discussing the passivity of the mystic during his trance, writes: "This latter peculiarity connects mystical states with certain definite phenomena of secondary or alternative personality, such as prophetic speech, automatic writing, or the mediumistic trance".[156] Again, while discussing religious phenomena, Professor James remarks that "religious melancholy, whatever peculiarities it may have qua religious, is at any rate melancholy, religious happiness is happiness and religious trance is trance". Now, there is no doubt that the above-mentioned religious phenomena are not unique, for they are always 'one of a kind, sort, or description'. In other words, they are, each of them, instances of a type or kind. But this does not mean that religious experience cannot, therefore, be unique in certain other respects a fact which Professor Bradley himself acknowledges. And, as said before, religious experience is unique only in respect of its object which Iqbal calls the 'Unique Other Self.' Thus, though not unique in all respects, religious experience is unique in certain very important respects, and in those respects it is, as we have said, relatively but essentially unique.

The above are some of the characteristics which seem to me necessary to a religious experience proper and which serve to differentiate it from other levels of human experience. These

constitute, in part at least, the differentia of that experience. However, as said before, I do not have any pretensions to the finality and infallibility of my list. Any one who feels so may have his own list. What I claim is that these are some of the necessary and distinctive characteristics of the experience under review, and on this perhaps very few will disagree with me.

Symbolism and the Religious Object

It is generally agreed that religious expressions are symbolic. But sometimes the object of the vision is also symbolic like dream objects - e.g. the Saviour appeared to St. Teresa in glorious light, "the Trinity is presented symbolically but visibly under the form of a diamond",[157] some Sufis have also reported seeing God as an effulgence of light, and so on. Remarking on these visions, J. B. Pratt writes: "The visions are rarely true hallucinations but are what psychologists distinguish as pseudo-hallucination;.... In psychological structure and causation many of these visions are not essentially different from dreams".[158] He says, "If there be any truth in Freud's insistence upon the symbolic nature of normal dreams, it is the less surprising that the dream imagination of the Christian mystic should work up visions of a symbolic sort".[159] But Pratt goes on to remark: "personally I think there is a little truth in it, but a truth which he and his followers have enormously exaggerated. Some dreams are probably symbolic; the great majority I believe are not".[160] Moreover, visions and other hallucinatory phenomena have been regarded as the least important part of the ecstasy by mystics themselves. At best they are "unnecessary accessories"[161] and are not always present. But supposing that the object of religious experience is symbolic, what is symbolic is 'God-imago', to use Jungian terminology, and not the 'God-head' itself. Moreover, if we go into the logic of 'signs' and 'symbols', we find that symbols, verbal or otherwise, are "vehicles for the conception of objects", that "it is the conception, not the things, that symbols directly mean".[162] In other words, "the symbol is an instrument of thought".[163] It is not a direct object of experience but an object of 'conceiving'. The relation between a symbol and an object is an indirect one. As Susanne K. Langer says, "The relation between a symbol and an

object, usually expressed by "S denotes 0," is not a simple two-termed relation 'which S has to 0; it is a complex affair: S is coupled, for a certain subject, with a conception that fits 0, i.e. with a notion which 0 satisfies".[164] But mystics claim to have a direct experience of the Divine object in which discursive thought plays a least part. This object, being a direct object, of experience, cannot be a symbol. To mystics, God is a percept, not a concept, and religious experience is akin to perception, rather than to conception.

Signs, unlike symbols, have a direct relation to the objects they signify. They are proxies for their objects. Signs are used to indicate things, at best to represent[165] them when used by man. The Qur'an is very careful in talking of Nature and its varying facets as "signs for men of understanding". A sign always signifies a thing or an object, unlike symbols the referent of which is a concept. As Iqbal points out, "Indeed the Qur'an regards both 'Anfus' (self) and 'Afaq' (world) as source of knowledge. God reveals His signs in inner as well as outer experience,...".[166] Thus, not only 'Afaq', i.e. Nature, but also Self, that is the inner experience of man, reveals the signs of God, that is, God is the object to which the inner experience of a mystic 'indicates'. He is not a symbol, but a reality or 'percept' as the mystics choose to call. What is revealed in direct experience is an object, not a concept; and God is so revealed to a mystic or prophet. A symbol symbolizes 'something', that is, presents it through a concept; whereas a sign signifies an object, that is, 'indicates' to its existence or 'represents' it. A symbol has always a relation to thought and description, while a sign is an acquaintance with some thing present to some 'sense, Symbols can 'present' things in the past and expected in future (as in dream symbols), but signs are always of present things: e.g. sensations are signs[167] for the presence, here and now, of objects. Professor Woodworth defines symbols thus: "Symbols are stimuli which stand for an object, as a name stands for a person and a word stands for a concept".[168] "Signals, on the other hand, have a more realistic and inevitable connexion with their meanings, The signal of an object is typically some stimulus received from the object".[169] While distinguishing the two he adds, "Smoke is a signal of fire; the word 'fire' is a symbol

standing for fire".[170] It is obvious from this that a symbol is the result of conceptualization, and is used for describing something or some experience. Thus, while the mystical utterances are symbolic in this sense, just as all speech and description is, the object of mystic experience is not symbolic. It is a signal indicating the existence of an Ultimate being, rather than a symbol 'standing for' that Ultimate being.

Again, signs have a very important practical import which a symbol need not have: "The sign is something to act upon, or a means to command action; the symbol is an instrument of thought".[171] Religion, as we have seen, has an important practical significance, rather than a system of thought or theorizing.

Notes and References

1 A. E. Affifi, *op. cit.*, pp.108-109
2 *Ibid.*, quoted by Affifi, p. 109.
3 *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 371.
4 *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 21.
5 James, *ibid.*, p 371.
6 *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 338.
7 Iqbal, *ibid.*, p. 20.
8 Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 344.
9 *Philosophy*, July 1957, pp. 239-40.
10 Zaehner, *Mysticism*, pp. 26-27.
11 *ibid.*, p. 83.
12 *Ibid.*
13 *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 346.
14 *Ibid.*, p. 346.
15 *Ibid*
16 *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 18.
17 *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 336.

18 *ash- Shuhud*-Consciousness, the quality of witnessing; Burckhardt, *An Introduction to Sufi Doctrine*, p. 161.
19 *al-Kashf*-Intuition; The raising of a curtain or veil"*Ibid.*, p. 158.
20 *Qalb*, Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
21 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
22 *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
23 *Ibid.*, p. 6
24 B. Russell, *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 153.
25 *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 372.
26 *Ibid.*, p. 372.
27 *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 23.
28 *Creative Evolution*, p. 3.
29 *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.
30 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
31 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
32 Quoted by Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
33 *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 372.
34 Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
35 J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 373.
36 *Ibid.*, pp. 372-73.
37 One of the orders of later Sufism; M.M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. .122.
38 A sect of *fiqah* (Islamic law).
39 J. B. Pratt, *ibid.*, p. 373.
40 *The Glorious Koran*, VII, 143.
41 R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology-A Study of Mental Life*, p. 3.
42 *Mysticism*, p. 81.
43 *Ibid.*, p. 83.
44 *Ibid.*, p. 85.
45 *Ibid.*, p. 81.
46 *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 338.
47 *Ibid.*, p. 338.
48 *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp.62-63 and 19.
49 *The Holy Quran*. 40: 62.
50 *Ibid.*, 2:182.
51 The Greek mind was vacillating between polytheism (the state religion) and monotheism (as in Xenophanes), between anthropomorphic and pure idea of deity. Even Plato and Aristotle failed to arrive at the idea of a personal God who was also the ultimate creator of all that existed (that is, the God of higher religion).
52 Quoted by Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 363.
53 *Mysticism*, p. 73.

[54] Pratt, *Ibid.*, p. 338.
[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 366-67.
[56] *Mysticism*, p. 76.
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] *Ibid.* p. 67.
[59] *Ibid.* p. 77.
[60] *Ibid.*
[61] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 362.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 370.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 371.
[64] *Ibid.*.
[65] *Ibid.*. pp. 371-72.
[66] *Dhikr* means the repetition of the name 'Allah' which is employed by the Sufis for concentration on God and fixing Him in the mind. It is among the positive methods used for exciting a mystical state of mind with God as its pivot. For a detailed account of *dhikr* see -*Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*' by Macdonald, pp. 255-56, where he delineates the methods used by the school of al-Ghazzali; cf. *Aspects of Islam* by Macdonald, Lecture V, New York; Macmillan (1911). See also *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*, by R. A. Nicholson, pp. 10 and 54.
[67] C. G. Jung, etc.
[68] J. B. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 387.
[69] *Ibid.*
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 124.
[72] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 10.
[73] Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibnul Arabi*, p. 106.
[74] John Burnet, Pythagoras and Plato believed in the doctrine of Reminiscence: *Greek Philosophy, Thales to Plato*, p. 43 and pp. 157-59.
[75] W. K. Wright, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 143.
[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 143-45.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[78] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 372.
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 366.
[80] A. E. Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibnul Arabi*, p. 106.
[81] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 2.
[82] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[84] *The Quran*, 24: 35.

[85] Iqbal. *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] S. Spencer. Quoted in *Mysticism in World Religion*, p. 306.
[88] *Ibid.*, p. 309.
[89] Iqbal, *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.
[90] "Panentheism is-not the doctrine that all is God, but the doctrine that all is in God, who is also above all"---*The Idea of Personality in Sufism*, p. 37. Panentheism is the name which C. Krause gave to his system in which God is a unity enclosing the, but superior to it - *Ency. of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 9. p. 912. Plotinus recognized panentheism in some such way: ---The perfect Being consists of all beings, rather it embraces in itself all beings" *Enn.* VI, VI. 7).
[91] Affifi, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[92] Whittaker, *Neo-Platonists*, p. 47.
[93] *Futuhat* 111, p. 365, 1.23 and *Futuhat* 1, p. 57, 1.18.
[94] Quoted by Affifi, *ibid.*. p. 157.
[95] Shihab al-Din Yahya ibn Habash ibn Amirak, popularly known as Shaikh al-Ishraq due to the fact that he founded what is called *Hikmatu'l Ishraq*.
[96] *Iikmatu'l Ishraq*, pp. 291-330.
[97] Affifi, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
[98] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p, 196.
[99] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[100] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
[101] 'The earthly sensually perceptible things are mere shadowy images of the bright world of ideas, a view which finds clear and emphatic expression in the famous simile of the cave at the beginning of the seventh book of the *Republic*'- Zeller, *Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy*, pp. 130-31.
[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74
[103] This is the famous 'Correspondence Theory of Truth' in its naive form - See *The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy* by A. C. Ewing, p. 53.
[104] P. F. Strawson, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, p. 237.
[105] "p., p may make it certain that q; "*ibid.*, p. 237. It is ---*Ibid.*, p. 237. It is important to notice that where we may speak of conclusive or overwhelming evidence for q, of p,-p making it certain that q, there also we may speak of 'proving', 'establishing', or putting it beyond all doubt that q. Again, it is sometimes thought, though erroneously, that the conclusions of inductive arguments are, as such only probable; perhaps very, very probable but never certain;"--*ibid.*, pp. 237-38.

[106] A. E. Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-Ibnul Arabi*, p. 109.
[107] Used by Ibnul Arabi, *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[108] G. S. Spinks, *Psychology and Religion*, p. 61, where he used the phrase 'union with the Other'.
[109] *The Idea of the Holy*, Ch. IV.
[110] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 76-77.
[111] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[112] *Ibid.*, p. 78.
[113] *Philosophy*, Vol. xxxi, No. 118, July 1956, p. 231.
[114] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 371.
[115] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 16.
[116] Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 377.
[117] Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 76.
[118] *Ibid.*, p. 56.
[119] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[120] *Ibid.*, P. 15.
[121] Quoted from al-Ghazzali by S. Spencer. *Mysticism in World Religion*, p. 309.
[122] Quoted from *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* by S. Spencer, *ibid.*, p. 310.
[123] Abd al-Rahman Jami (817-898/1414- 1492), a famous Persian Sufi poet and a great scholar, a follower of Ibn Arabi-M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, p. 870.
[124] Quoted from *Wisdom of the East*, by Spencer, *ibid.*, p. 311.
[125] Faridu'd-Din Attar, author of *Tadhkiratul-Awliya*, ed. R. A. Nicholson, London: Luzac, 1905 - Persian mystic - (b. 627/1229), cf. M. M. Sharif, *op. cit.*, p. 1966.
[126] S. Spencer, *ibid.*, quoted from *The Conference of the Birds*, p. 311.
[127] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 344.
[128] *Ibid.*, p. 402.
[129] *Mysticism*, pp. 78-79.
[130] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[131] See "Note on Symbolism and the Religious Object at the end of this chapter.
[132] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[133] *Ibid.*
[134] Q. from *Cantica Canticorum*, Sermon vii. by Underhill, *ibid.*, p. 137.
[135] *Ibid.*, p 131.
[136] *Ibid.*
[137] *Ibid.*, p 138.

[138] *Ibid.*, pp. 80 and 90.
[139] *Ibid.*, p.139.
[140] *Ibid*
[141] *Ibid*
[142] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[143] *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 114.
[144] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.
[145] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 19.
[146] F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, p. 647.
[147] *Ibid.*
[148] *Ibid.*, p. 649.
[149] *A Modern Philosophy of Religion*, p. 282.
[150] Iqbal. *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[151] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
[152] *Ibid.*
[153] *The Quran*, 112: 1-4.
[154] Bradley, *op. cit.*, pp. 648-49.
[155] *Ibid.*, p. 649.
[156] *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 372.
[157] J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 402,
[158] *Ibid.*, p. 403.
[159] *Ibid.*
[160] *Ibid.*, p. 403 ff.
[161] *Ibid.*, p. 404.
[162] S. K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 61.
[163] *Ibid.*, p. 63.
[164] *Ibid.*, p. 64.
[165] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[166] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 127.
[167] *Psychology*, p. 404.
[168] *Ibid.*, p. 405
[169] *Ibid.*
[170] *Ibid.*
[171] *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 63.

CHAPTER THREE

THE COGNITIVE VALUE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

> For the purposes of knowledge, then, the region of mystic experience is as real as any other region of human experience.
> (Iqbal)

I have dealt at some length with the question of verification of religious experience in the Fifth Chapter of Part I, and while discussing the question of its cognitive value in the present chapter, I am afraid, I will be indulging in some repetition. But that, I feel, cannot be helped, for the two questions –the question of verification and that of cognition– are cognate and involve each other. Some writers on religion, particularly the linguists in our own times, look askance at the possibility of assigning any cognitive value to the peculiar experience we are discussing. Plotinus, as we have seen, expressed his doubts on the subject so early in the history of theological thought when he said that the mystical experience cannot become the ground of inference. For Plotinus, the criterion for the significance of a proposition was that it could serve for the ground of an inference, that it should be such that along with other propositions it would yield inference which those other propositions could not yield by themselves. Of late, the same criterion has been re-stated by Professor Ayer in the following words: "... there can be no way of proving that the existence of a God, such as the God of Christianity, is even probable. Yet this also is easily shown. For if the existence of such a god were probable, then the proposition

that he existed would be an empirical hypothesis. And in that case it would be possible to deduce from it, and other empirical hypotheses, certain experiential propositions which were not deducible from those other hypotheses alone. But in fact this is not possible".[1] This is the positivist principle of verification which throws a real challenge to the cognitivists. Prof. Ayer adds, "there cannot be any transcendent truths of religion. For the sentences which the theist uses to express such "truths" are not literally significant."[2]

By 'literally significant propositions' Professor Ayer means those propositions which can be verified by experience. He believes in two kinds of propositions only: (i) the tautologies which are analytic propositions, as Kant would prefer to call them; and (ii) the synthetic propositions which include only those propositions that can be empirically verified. And he proceeds to show that religious assertions are neither the one nor the other.[3] Professor Ayer is, however, committing the 'petitio principii', for he is taking for granted that there are only two kinds of propositions which can be called meaningful. As Kant had tried to show, there might be a third kind also which he called by the name of 'a priori synthetic propositions',[4] meaning thereby that there is a class of propositions which are neither tautologies nor empirically verifiable synthetic propositions, but which partake of both. If the Kantian hypothesis is true, then religious assertions are of this kind and as such are genuine propositions. Logical positivists are not justified in starting with the presupposition that there is no such class of propositions: this is the very thing they are called upon to prove.

Another mistake of the linguists is that they assume, with Kant, without proving, that sense-experience is the only type of experience.[5] On this point Kant shares with them.[6] But this is the very assumption which Iqbal has challenged in order to bring home to us that there are other types of experience also, as real as the ordinary type. Some other renowned writers also have agreed to this point. The biggest shock to such a position comes from the psycho-analytical school of psychology which has convincingly shown that our conscious experience is neither the only type, nor the most important one; for there are also

sub-conscious and unconscious experiences which are equally real, and perhaps, this is how the psycho-analysts look at it, more important than our ordinary experience.[7] An equally severe blow to the positivistic presupposition has been dealt by the findings of the Society for Psychical Research who have been convinced of the fact of what they call "extra-sensory per-ception" and of the 'psi' phenomena, e.g. telepathy, clairvoyance, etc.[8]

Again, as seen before, Professor Ayer's contention is that the man who, from his experience of a yellow sense content, infers the existence of a yellow object to which the sense-content belongs is telling the truth, whereas the man who infers the existence of a transcendent God from his experience of a peculiar kind of sense-content is telling a lie. But there is no warrant for maintaining this partial attitude, because, from the experience of a yellow, sense-content it is as difficult to infer the existence of a yellow object to which the sense-content belongs as it is to infer the existence of a transcendent being from the experience of a religious emotion. Kant was, perhaps, very right when, after drawing the distinction between Noumenon and Phenomenon, he denied the possibility of knowing the former;[9] and George Berkeley was no less right when he asserted his famous proposition "esse est percipi".[10] If we can justifiably infer the existence of a yellow object from our sense-experience why cannot we infer the existence of a transcendent god from our peculiar religious experience ? This procedure shall involve the well known argument from experience to the existence of God Moreover, religious experience is not based on a peculiar kind of sense-data as Professor Ayer has erroneously thought; sense-content of any kind, as we have seen before, plays no part in this experience. There is, of course, some data which, when interpreted, yields the knowledge of God; but it is distinct from sense data. As Iqbal has rightly said, "it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part".[11] Hence we find the positivists' denial of the cognitive significance of religious experience on the ground that it is not empirically verifiable, is not well-founded. Religious experience is, at any rate to its recipient, a knowledge-yielding experience. The intransmissibility of this experience, to which the impugners of

religion so frequently refer as indicating that it is not a genuine experience, but simply a myth of imagination, is as I have tried to show in the last chapter, due to the lack of proper analysis of this experience, and not due to anything, inherent in it. Once knowledge advances to the level that it renders such an analysis possible, it will become as communicable as any other form of human experience. Again, even our most ordinary experience, in its originality is non-transmissible. One cannot, for example, transmit his original experience of, say, toothache to another, he can simply speak of it as mystic can speak of God.

Again, as Professor A. C. Ewing has very rightly pointed out, the positivistic position is based upon, and draws its plausibility from, yet another erroneous presupposition. They tend to confine, as we have seen, the word 'fact' to the empirical facts only, facts which can be the objects of observation and science. But there is, says Ewing, no warrant for this. It is not true that only those objects, which are known in science and sense-experience, exist for other things also exist and there should be facts about them. Thus, to presume from the outset, like the positivists do, that empirical facts are the only facts, is to beg the question and the naturalists and positivists are the committers of this fallacy.

C.B. Martin, following a similar procedure as that of ,the early linguists, in his article "A Religious Way of Knowing",[12] holds that statements, which are disproved as well as those to which tests and checking procedures do not apply, must be assimilated to psychological statements, because such statements are generally psychological. We are not concerned with statements definitely disproved, for very few of religious statements are such; they are statements, according to Martin, to which tests and check-up procedures do not apply. Thus the statement, I have direct experience of God is, perhaps such a one; but, as said before, W. D. Glasgow denies that this statement is psychological simply because it cannot be proved or disproved by usual methods. It is an existential statement, which cannot be verified because of the nature of its object, whose existence cannot be established by tests applicable to physical objects. He adds that religious assertions are objective, though

tests are not applicable to them. The mere fact that they cannot be verified in the ordinary way does not make them subjective.

Though ably advocating the cause of objectivity in religion, Professor Glasgow has placed religious statements among those where tests are not applicable. He has ignored the fact, which has so well been brought out by Professor James, and equally well pleaded by Iqbal, that religious statements are veritable, and, it may be surprising to some at least that the tests proposed are the same as those used to test empirical statements. Thus religious assertions are not only not psychological and subjective, as has been contended by Glasgow, but also they are no less verifiable than empirical statements (a fact omitted by Glasgow).

Turning now to the main question of the present chapter. To bring out the knowledge-yielding capacities of the religious experience and to stress upon its cognitive significance are, as the very title indicates, my chief concern in writing the present thesis. As said before, there are two levels of religious experience-viz. the prophetic and the mystic. In order to avoid any possible confusion, it will be well to treat of them separately.

It is with mystic experience that I am chiefly concerned here. At the outset, there are two very important facts about this experience:

(i) it is 'internal' as against our normal experience which may be called 'external',[13] and

(ii) it deals with a non-physical object which cannot be experienced in the "normal"[14] way. It is a stark psychological fact that we cannot attend to more than one object at the same time. This is the Law of Selectivity of Attention,[15] which is operative in all the spheres of human attention and experience, and religious experience is no exception to it. The Law states two things:

(a) We have to make a choice between the internal and the external world in attending. It is undeniable that no one can attend at the same time both to external objects of Nature and to internal thoughts and reflections. In order to attend within we have to shut out our senses to the facts of external reality. If you

wish to attend, say, to some dull pain in the stomach, you will have to divert your attention inwards, leaving the chair you are sitting in, the table with books on it, the shelves, etc., quite unattended for the moment; else you won't succeed in attending to your internal musings and reflections and

(b) even in attending to the internal or the external world, the field, being so vast and complex, you have to pick and choose a limited portion for your attention, the residue, forming a part of the marginal portions of mind.

Both of these conditions of attention apply as well to religious experience as to our normal forms of experience. In the cage of the former which is an 'inner experience',[16] the inner kingdom of God,[17] as they call it, the Law requires that all outward sources of distraction be stopped. This explains why it has been unanimously proclaimed by mystics, theologians, and religious psychologists, that in this experience sensations from the external world are minimized, if not stopped altogether. The stimuli from external sources are to be stopped for no other reason than that they cause distraction and hinder in the way to attaining a knowledge of God. This explains the importance of asceticism or mortification or the practice of, what are called austerities' such as fasting, vows of silence, sleeplessness, breath control, etc. practised by the mystics and sufis. These are valuable as negative methods and their main psychological significance is 'inhibitive',[18] that is, they are practised in order to eschew any distractions from the outside world. As Professor Pratt has put it, "The great aim of mortification is freedom from the things of this world and the distractions of 'the body".[19] Thus, asceticism and other similar practices are resorted to with a view to "tame or even destroy certain normal human impulses, ... only for the sake of the moral and spiritual freedom which it prizes higher than the things it sacrifices".[20] Asceticism is necessitated by the fact that human nature consists of two parts - the flesh and the spirit - which are non-cooperative and mutually militant. "The flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh", they say, "and in this deadly conflict it will not do for him who aims at complete mastery to remain merely upon the defensive. The war must be carried into the enemy's

country. One must not only resist the encroachments of the old Adam; one must crucify the flesh with the affections and lusts. The mind must be freed from the interruptions and distractions of the body at any cost. Hence the common expedient of what is known as 'mortification' or, 'asceticism'."[21] Thus, no wonder that sensations should be as much minimized as possible.

Although sensations are minimized in religious experience, they cannot possibly be stopped altogether, nor is it desirable, for there is an important sensuous element present in that experience too. We have already seen that sensations are eschewed not because of anything profane and irreligious about them, but because of the distractions and interruptions they cause. But some types of sensuous, images are helpful in facilitating and inducing this experience itself, and hence they form a necessary part of the experience; for instance, the sensuous image of God on whom, the mystic should concentrate while he is in a trance. On this Professor Pratt, as seen before, stresses that there have been those who recognize the fact that religious emotion, like every other emotion, has a large sensuous element, and who frankly refer to this in their expressions. Again he says, "It seems probable that will and sensation are but seldom as completely inhibited in "ligature" as many of the mystics themselves have believed".[22] Professor Janet's study of an ecstatic shows that "she was really in much closer touch with the outer world and much better able to react upon it during her ecstatic state than she herself supposed".[23] The presence, and necessity of sensations are well reflected in the fact that mystics in their peculiar experience report occasional phenomena of visions and, locutions'. "Christ and various saints are seen the Trinity is presented symbolically but visibly under the form of a diamond, or truths are beard inwardly but quite clearly expressed".[24]

Sensations are not only present in this experience, they are also necessary to it–a fact which some leading sufis acknowledged and recognized. From the fact that sensations, in the physiological sense, are well-nigh absent from mystic experience, theologians, mystics and psychologists of religion are misled into drawing a rigid bifurcation between the external world of factual reality studied by science and the inner spiritual

world, which is the object of religious sentiment and which is called "the Inner Kingdom of God", "the inwardness of religion", etc. The two worlds they, following Plato, regard as mutually exclusive to such an extent that in order to attend to "the inner world of God" we have to attend away from the external world. They fail to realize that the two worlds are complementary, and that the outer sensuous world is necessary to our understanding of the inner world of God. This fact has well been emphasized by the Holy Qur'an in all those verses, in which reference has been made to "hearing" and "sight" as "the greatest gifts of God"[25] and in which man is called upon to see and reflect upon the various aspects of nature as signifying God. It is under the inspiration of such verses that theologians in Islam emphasize the importance of sense-perception to the spiritual uplift of man. Iqbal, commenting on the Quranic emphasis on the importance of reflective observation of nature, says: "No doubt, the immediate purpose of the Qur'an in this reflective observation of nature is to awaken in man the consciousness of that of which nature is regarded a symbol". He adds, "It is our reflective contact with the temporal flux of things which trains us for an intellectual vision of the non-temporal. Reality lives in its own appearances; and such a being as man, who has to maintain his life in an obstructing environment, cannot afford to ignore the visible".[26] As we have seen before, the Qur'an attaches equal importance to all the regions of human experience as yielding knowledge of the ultimate Reality which reveals its symbols both within and without. Thus the sensuous world is a manifestation of God and provides a definite clue to His existence and reality.

Iqbal fully recognizes the significance of other forms of knowledge also as complementary and instrumental to spiritual knowledge - i.e. the knowledge of God. In this connection we have seen Dr. Jamila Khatoon's remarks on Iqbal's position. As Iqbal himself very expressly writes, "..... inner experience is only one source of human knowledge. According to the Qur'an there are two other sources of knowledge– Nature and History; ...",[27] which are complementary to the inner source and without which the latter is not complete. It is because of his recognition

of all the sources of knowledge that Dr. Jamila desists from calling Iqbal an empiricist, a rationalist or an intuitionalist.

Other sufis too, inspired by the teachings of the Qur'an, regard the universe and all that is in it as manifestations of the Real, as the symbols of Gad, and accentuate a need for observation. Jami, the well-known Persian sufi, prays to God, "Make this phenomenal world the mirror to reflect the manifestations of Thy Beauty, and not a veil to separate and repel us from Thee".[28] Another of the well known sufis, Ibnul Arabi says: "And when the secret of an atom of the atoms is clear, the secret of all created things, both outward and inward, is clear, and thou dost not see in this world or the next aught besides God".[29] He again more expressly says, "The divine presence is hidden within the form of outer things, so that to the illuminated soul, every atom is His throne".[30] Al-Ghazzali[31] and the scholastic theologians maintain that knowledge of God can be obtained through knowledge of the world.[32] All this clearly brings out the importance of our knowledge of the external world to our spiritual uplift and development. It may be well to add that Islam, for one, does not approve of the recluse life, which means a segregation from some very significant aspects of nature.

The Greeks were mistaken in condemning senses as capable of yielding opinion only[33], admonishing us not to put any value of reliance on what the senses would reveal. They tried in vain, of course, to arrive at a knowledge of the Ultimate Reality by closing their eyes and, ears and all the other sources of perception, and by solely reclining against their rational faculties. They forgot that reason without sensation is barren and empty, just as senses without reason are unorganized and a chaos. Commenting on the Greek philosophy and culture, Iqbal writes: "There is no doubt that the ancient world produced some great systems of philosophy at a time when man was comparatively primitive and governed more or less by suggestions. But we must not forget that this system-building in the ancient world was the work of abstract thought which cannot go beyond the systematization of vague religious beliefs and traditions, and gives- us no hold on the concrete situations of life".[34] The mystics, theologians and psychologists make a

similar mistake when they assert that sensation is altogether absent from the peculiar experience called religious. Sensations, as said before, are to be avoided only in so far as they cause distraction. But although most of the writers on religion agree that sensations play no part in religious experience, none of them will gainsay that some type of data is always the starting-point of that experience. Thus Iqbal says, "As regions of normal experience are subject to interpretation of sense-data for our knowledge of the external world, so the region of mystic experience is subject to interpretation for our knowledge of God"..[35] He adds that religion "really aims at interpreting a totally different region of human experience religious experience the data of which cannot be reduced to the data of any other science".[36] Nels Ferre expresses the same thing thus: "If revelation gives new data to reason in terms of which to interpret its experience, what is thus revealed is now known, and therefore no longer a mystery".[37]

It is not only sensation which is absent from religious knowledge, thought is also said to play a least part in it. On this point there is prevalent among the mystics and theologians a still higher degree of unanimity. As Professor Pratt puts it, "At this stage reasoning and argumentation and discursive thought are no longer needed and give way to an emotional conviction". "In like manner the mystic's scorn of conceptual knowledge and discursive thought sometimes leads him (especially if he holds the negative view of God...) to insist that emptiness of mind is the only road toward union with the "Divine Gloom"[38]. Dionysius goes to the "extent of asserting complete cessation of all mental activity. He writes, "It is during the cessation of every mental energy that such a union of the deified minds toward the super divine light takes place".[39] Meister Eckhart and Murisier also agree to the total absence of thought and intellect. "The emptier your mind" says Meister Eckhart, "the more susceptible are you to the working of His influence".[40] And again he more elaborately says, "Memory, understanding, will all tend towards diversity and multiplicity of thought, therefore you must leave them all aside, as well as perception, ideation, and everything in which you find yourself or seek yourself. Only then can you experience this new birth, otherwise never'?[41] Murisier, agreeing

with Eckhart and Dionysus says: "When this exceptional state of consciousness is reached "the intellectual elements of belief are lost, the soul is nothing but ardour and love. God manifests Himself still, but without the intermediation of any concrete or abstract representative, in an incomprehensible manner, in complete darkness..."[42] On this point Iqbal, while remarking on the unanalysability of mystic experience, says: "In the mystic state, however vivid and rich it may be, thought is reduced to a minimum and such an analysis is not possible".[43] That is why religious experience is unanalysable and incommunicable.

The basic assumption under this position is that all thought is discursive, a position which, in our own times, has been explicitly taken by the logisticians and linguists, who deny that religious assertions have any cognitive import. These two basic assumptions are: "(1) That language is the only means of articulating thought, and (2) That everything which is not speakable thought, is feeling".[44] On this position, "human thought is but a tiny, grammar-bound island, in the midst of a sea of feeling...".[45] "So long as we regard only scientific and "material" (semi-scientific) thought as really cognitive of the world, this peculiar picture of mental life must stand. And so long as we admit only discursive symbolism as a bearer of ideas, "thought" in this restricted sense must be regarded as our only intellectual activity".[46]

Iqbal, however, emphasizes (and this is one of the most distinctive features of his philosophy of religion) that thought cannot be absent from religious experience, for without thought no knowledge of any object or fact is possible. What he admits to be minimized is discursive thought.[47] But thought in a non-discursive[48] sense is indispensable to religious knowledge, and those who think that thought in no form is present are mistaking the very nature and function of thought in knowledge. Knowledge, in whichever form, arises out of an interpretation of given data- whether the data is sensuous or non-sensuous -- and to interpret data is one of the primary functions of thought. Thought cannot have its own data; data comes from some other source, whether that source is some sensation or not. Thought is simply operative on the given data, collecting, organizing and

classifying them, and assigning meaning to them. This is how thought goes about interpreting data supplied to it. Now, religious knowledge is no exception to it. Here, as elsewhere, no knowledge is possible except when thought operates upon, and interprets, peculiar data supplied by some specific source. Without interpretation of some data no knowledge of any kind of object- religious or non-religious- is possible. Thus, while talking of religious as seen before, Iqbal says that "it really aims at interpreting a totally different region of human experience religious experience-" Thought, however, when it interprets some sense-data, is called, discursive; when it is operating, on the contrary, upon a non-sensuous data, it may be called, non-discursive.

Discursive and non-discursive, however, are not two kinds of thought, but two approaches of the same thought, which is a unity and works as a unity. It is in its non-discursive approach that, according to Iqbal, thought is capable of a deeper movement in which it shakes off its finitude and aims at grasping the Infinite itself. He says, "The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge ... In its deeper movement, however, thought is capable of reaching an immanent Infinite in whose self-unfolding movement the various finite concepts are merely moments".[49] Here thought and intuition become identical. Thus Iqbal stresses that "thought and intuition are organically related"[50] and that "intuition", as Bergson rightly says, "is only a higher kind of intellect".[51] This fact has been recognized by Férre thus: "In the realm of religion, faith and reason are inseparable".[52] The same dual capacity of thought or self Iqbal accentuates in his distinction between what he calls, the Efficient and the Appreciative sides of the self.[53]

According to Iqbal, then, thought in a higher form is indispensable to religious knowledge; it is discursive thought which is unanimously said to have been absent from this unique and peculiar kind of experience. This conclusion, however, should not lead one into thinking that there are various kinds of thought; as said before, it is the same unified thought which acts,

'discursively' when working with sense-impressions and non-discursively' when acting upon some other kind of data i.e. 'non-sensuous data as is the case with religious data. Thus all those who draw a line of cleavage between thought and intuition as done by Ghazzali, too are mistaken.[54] Iqbal will agree with Rudolf Otto that there is a complete interpenetration of the rational and the non-rational elements of religious consciousness. Férre expresses the same inter-relationship of thought and intuition as we have seen before. That is why it has been emphasized that religious experience, like any other experience, has a rational and a non-rational aspect, the former being contributed by thought, while the latter coming from, and consisting of, the peculiar data whereon thought puts its interpretation.

This, however, should not lead one to suppose that religious knowledge is but objective. No doubt the source of religious data lies within one's inner being, and therefore should be subjective. But it cannot be denied that all experience has an important subjective aspect which is the real inner core of that experience. The presence of such an aspect, however, does not undo the objectivity of an experience. As in perception, so in religious knowledge, thought not only interprets data, it also refers it to some external source. The religious object is cognized as existing independently of us, just as we cognize physical objects-say, this table before me-as existing outside and independently of us. In other words, as Pratt puts it, "an important part of perception is the implicit recognition of the presence of an object which is more than just our psychical content. It is this same sense of objectivity "which the mystic feels; the experience brings with it an implicit certainty that the object or Being which he experiences is more than the experience itself". [55] It is because of the external reference that mysticism has so often been defined as, the consciousness of a Beyond. The necessity of an objective, independent Being as the object of religious knowledge is obvious from the hundreds of expressions typical of the mystics, for the mystic always invokes the Divine object as something other than himself. And it is, for him, something other than himself. While commenting on the beliefs which necessarily characterize the mystical experience,

Lord Russell writes: "Closely connected with this belief is the conception of a Reality behind the world of appearance and utterly different from it".[56] Iqbal remarks that "in a state of religious passion we know a factual reality in some sense outside the narrow circuit of our personality".[57] There is no doubt that religious passion appears as the work of the subconscious because of the intensity with which it shakes up the depths of our being. But it is because in all knowledge "there is an element of passion, and the object of knowledge gains, or loses in objectivity with the rise and fall in the intensity of passion. That is most real to us which stirs up the entire fabric of our personality".[58]

Again, in science objectivity is attained through a process of purification of experience in its own sphere. In religion the same process is adopted to achieve objectivity. In fact, both science and religion aim at reaching the most real; religion, however, to quote Iqbal "is far more anxious to reach the ultimately real than science. And to both the way to pure objectivity lies through what may be called the purification of experience".[59] A careful study of the nature and purpose of these really complementary processes[60] shows that both of them are directed to the purification of experience in their respective spheres. It has usually been claimed in favour of science that it aims at objectivity as its first and foremost object, and that the more of objectivity it attains, the more 'scientific' it becomes. This objectivity, as we have just seen, it attains through purification. The foremost object of the practical student of religious psychology, too, is not any different from that of the scientist. "His sense of objectivity", says Iqbal, "is as keen as that of the scientist in his own sphere of objectivity. He passes from experience to experience, not as a mere spectator, but as a critical sifter of experience who by the rules of a peculiar technique, suited to his sphere of inquiry, endeavours to eliminate all subjective elements, psychological or physiological, in the content of his experience with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective. This final experience is the revelation of a new life-process original, essential, spontaneous"[61]. This is true of religion, but above all of Islam, where, in order to secure a wholly non-emotional and objective experience, a good deal of

care is taken to forbid the use of music in worship, and much emphasis is placed on "the necessity of daily congregational prayers in order to counteract the possible anti-social effects of solitary contemplation".[62] The numerous stages whereof the mystics speak, and which have to be passed through in order to attain to the real illumination, are really the stages of objectivity, which more or less correspond to the stages of objectivity passed through in scientific quest of knowledge. In fact, the two processes-religious and scientific-are complementary and run more or less parallel to each other, a fact which Iqbal has emphasized over and again, and most of the other writers on religion are not far behind to recognize.

Granting that religious knowledge is no less objective than the scientific, the question remains, What kind of knowledge does this peculiar experience yield? How are we to compare religious knowledge with our ordinary perceptual knowledge? Mystic experience, as almost all the recipients are unanimous entails, like any other experience, a sense of presence. Hence, an attempt to analyse and describe the mystic sense of presence, in the words of Pratt, should begin with a consideration of ordinary perception. "Perception, as contrasted with sensation, has two elements: (1) an immediate sensational or ideational and logical content, and (2) an outer reference... External objects as Professor Stout puts it, are "cognized as existing independently of us, just as we exist independently of them"... "an important part of perception is the implicit recognition of the presence of an object which is more than just our psychical content. It is this same sense of objectivity which the mystic feels; the experience brings with it an implicit certainty that the object or Being which he experiences is more than the experience itself".[63]

In order to explain the nature and content of this experience, Iqbal compares mystic's knowledge of God to our inferential knowledge of other minds. He writes, "The only ground of my knowledge of a conscious being before me is the physical movements similar to my own from which I infer the presence of another conscious being".[64] Or as Professor Royce has said, "our fellows are known to be real because they respond to our signals and thus constantly supply the necessary supplement to

our own fragmentary meanings". "It is clear that whether we apply the physical criterion, or the non-physical and more adequate criterion of Royce, in either case our knowledge of other minds remains something like inferential only".[65] This is the standpoint of all the natural theologians who prefer to argue to the presence of God from design and purpose in nature and from the various happenings of nature-that is, from the manifestations of God in the regular sequence of nature. This is the standpoint of the Qur'an also, as seen before, for it is full of verses where a reference has been made to the changing facets of nature as signs for men of sense and understanding. Such an inferential knowledge as we have of other minds is indirect and mediate. It is knowledge yielded by 'understanding'. As the Qur'an itself says, there are signs for those who understand'. Thus it is an intellectual type of knowledge- it is not mysticism but natural theology.

Moreover, Iqbal's analogy of our knowledge of other minds is incompatible with characteristics like immediacy, directness, etc., recognized by Iqbal himself. The knowledge of God claimed by mystics, as seen before, is immediate and direct, and is comparable to our perceptual knowledge. No doubt, such an inferential knowledge- that is, our knowledge of God from regular happenings in the external world- contributes towards our apprehension and understanding of God; but this is not the type of knowledge claimed by mystics and prophets, who claim to have a direct acquaintance with God. The mystics of all ages and countries have "felt" the presence of God or perceived Him. On this matter Professor Pratt's position is more instructive and enlightening. He says, "As to the content of the mystical sense of presence we may again get light by considering the normal experience of perceiving and "feeling" the presence of other people ... This experience seems to be much the same as that of the ordinary realization of a person's presence, minus the sensory causes which normally give rise to it".[66]

Again, like ordinary perception, it involves an objective reference also with the difference that here the object is regarded as 'divine'. As Pratt writes, "Both the characteristics of the ordinary realization of personal presence here described- the

objective reference and the group of sensory-motor activities- are to be found in the mystical sense of presence. But the fact that the being thus felt is regarded as the Divine adds to the mystical experience an emotional intensity seldom found in the non-religious cases".[67]

To Pratt, then, the mystical sense of presence is, more or less, analogous to that of the presence of a person we have not actually seen or heard speak. This might be true of what Pratt calls the "milder form of mystic experience",[68] but so far as the more extreme and intense forms are concerned, the mystics have made pretensions to having very clear and well-defined visions of the ultimate Reality, although sometimes in dreams as believed by Imam Ibn Taymiya.[69] They claim to have experienced the existence of God and conversed with Him as if with an earthly friend. One of the correspondents of Pratt writes: "God is very real as an earthly friend, though with a more purely spiritual reality. I have experienced His presence.,.."[70]

It will be well to mention here, while writing on epistemic aspect of the mystic experience, a very important distinction often neglected by writers on religion i.e. the distinction between 'knowledge of acquaintance' and, knowledge-about",[71] or what Lord Russell calls 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description'[72] respectively. Iqbal does not make this distinction clearly. Hence it is necessary to say something on it as applied to religious experience. While writing on Mystic experience Professor Pratt brings out distinction between 'knowledge of 'acquaintance' and, knowledge-about'.[73]

'Knowledge of acquaintance' is the immediate and direct experience itself, standing for itself and not taken as pointing to or representing something else.... 'Knowledge-about', on the other hand, is seen in ideas and abstract thought. It is conceptual, descriptive, representative, communicable.[74] Again, he writes that "the mystic experience, so far as it is noticed at all, is characterized by the 'immediate' kind of knowledge, and has relatively little to do with 'knowledge-about';... Conceptual, representative knowledge is always pointing you elsewhere, it is always saying, Reality is not in me".[75] Plotinus says the same

thing in the following words: "Our apprehension of the One does not partake of the nature of either understanding or abstract thought as does our knowledge of other intelligible objects, but has the character of presentation higher than understanding. For understanding proceeds by concepts, and the concept is a multiple affair, and the soul misses the One when she falls into number and plurality. She must then pass beyond understanding and nowhere emerge from her unity".[76]

It is, in fact, the same thing as to say that religious experience is "immediate", "direct", and "incommunicable"-a fact which almost all the mystics and writers on religion are unanimous in accepting and accentuating Iqbal, as seen before, also recognizes these features or characters of mystic experience. Iqbal's lectures abound in rich comparison between mystic knowledge and conceptual knowledge involving an implicit reference to the distinction which Professor Pratt has explicitly and summarily brought out in the passages quoted above. Iqbal, however, misled by the analogy from our knowledge of other minds, thinks that our knowledge of God is inferential. But, as seen before, the view that religious knowledge is inferential is incompatible with the characteristics like immediacy and 'directness', enumerated by Iqbal himself. It has almost unanimously been acknowledged that in religious knowledge what is claimed is a direst acquaintance with God. Thus, truly religious knowledge is 'knowledge of acquaintance' rather than 'knowledge-about' the sublime object, God. In this respect, it is comparable to our ordinary perceptual knowledge which is also direct and immediate.

It has not infrequently been asserted by the traditional mystics[77] and theologians that in religious experience definition between the subject and the object disappears, that the subject merges into the object and becomes one with Him a state which has usually been known as 'Fana' and is sometimes described as the abandonment of the consciousness of self. It is also known as the state of *hulul*,[78] meaning thereby fusion or incarnation. Such was the view of sufis like al-Hallaj[79] who is said to have disclaimed, "I am the Truth".[80] But such an extreme view has been disavowed by some other well-known Sufis. Thus Sarraj in

his *Luma* says, "It is not a question of passing away from human attributes or becoming one with God: this is infidelity. It is nothing but a full recognition of the absolute power and will of God".[81] He goes on to say, "God does not descend to the heart of Man -what descends to the heart of Man is faith in Him and belief in His unity (*tawhid*) and the love of remembering Him (*dhikr*). God's essence and attributes are different from those of human beings, so how can fusion or incarnation be possible?...You can no more pass away from your humanity than black can go forth from a black object. Human qualities may change but they are always replaced by other human qualities".[82]

Another mystic Qushayri[83] gives an excellent analysis of 'fana' and baqa' as psychological states, i.e. a mere replacement of some mental states by others. According to him, 'fana' and 'baqa' are two aspects of a most minute analysis of the soul; the concentration on the divine and spiritual, and the abandonment of the phenomenal. Such a concentration, he says, might result in total absorption in the object of contemplation, and even a total loss of consciousness of "self", but this is no annihilation of "self". It is like a lover being absorbed in his beloved.[84] The absorption, and the lack of consciousness of self of which Qushayri talks, are best assimilable to the absorption of an aesthete lost in his contemplation and appreciation of some exquisite piece of art, for in such a state he is apt to forget himself and lose consciousness of himself. But this by no means implies the annihilation or abandonment of "self" except, at best, in a metaphorical sense.

Ibnul Arabi also understands the words '*Fana*' and, '*Baqa*' in a metaphorical sense. According to him, *fana* means "the passing away of ignorance" and, *baqa* "the remaining of infallible knowledge (gained by intuition) of the "essential oneness of the whole". "The mystic does not pass away from his "self" but he realizes its essential non-existence as a form".[85] He argues against the patent pantheistic position of the traditional Mystics when he says, "How can it be possible even for a mystic... to die to self and be at the same time conscious of God as the all-embracing Reality? Consciousness itself means persistence of "self"."[86] "To say that I have become God or died

to self in any real sense", says Ibnul Arabi, "is ignorance, and see your "self" alone in a mystical experience is polytheism. The perfect mystic therefore is one who sees both God and "self" in the mystical experience, both by mystical knowledge and feeling (*ilman wa halan*) and sees his "self" by mystical knowledge alone (*ilman lahalan'*),..."[87] As seen before, Spencer denies that there is such a thing as pantheism among the Sufis, who always recognized 'the divine transcendence'. Professor Nicholson has admitted that even their most emphatic assertion of immanence is not pantheism, but panentheism.

Iqbal agrees with these mystics that in this peculiar experience the self does not quite merge into the Infinite Ego and lose its own existence: the end of religious life is not this annihilation of the self. On the contsary, as seen before, it is an integration and development of personality, a fact which has been emphasized by Iqbal. In fact, to him the best model of a perfect mystic is the Holy Prophet, who retained his individuality even during his sublimest religious experience of '*mi'raj*'. Thus Iqbal agrees with a majority of the Sufis that mystic experience does not involve a merger of finite ego into the Infinite and its annihilation. On the contrary, it is the very retention of individuality on the part of the mystic during his knowledge of God, that he advocates. In this respect Iqbal differs from most of the theologians and philosophers in his treatment of religious experience.

A Note on Intuition

Intuition as the faculty of religious knowledge deserves some attention at the end of the chapter mainly concerned with the question of cognitive value of religious experience. Literally the word 'intuition' means immediate apprehension by the mind without reasoning.[88] In religion it means the faculty by which a direct and immediate apprehension of the Divine subject (whether it be called God or by some other name) is sought. The Qur'an uses the word, *Fuad* or *Qalb*, i.e. heart for this faculty, and Rumi describes the 'heart' as "a kind of inner intuition or insight" which "feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception".[89] Underhill explains the word 'heart' as used in the

mystic literature thus: "By the word 'heart', of course, we here mean not merely "the seat of the affections", "the organ of tender emotion", and the like: but rather the inmost sanctuary of personal being, the deep root of its love and will, the very source of its energy and life".[90]

The word 'heart' has been used, then, in two different senses: (i) as a faculty or seat of the 'inner perception', the inmost 'sanctuary of personal being', and (ii) as 'inner perception' or insight which brings man into contact with the innermost aspects of Reality. The word 'intuition' is also used in the same two senses. In the former sense it owes to the obsolete Faculty psychology of the Scholastics, who would invent a new faculty in order to explain any unique type of experience. In this sense it is called 'sui generis'. Of the faculty of intuition, it was claimed that it was infallible in its pronouncements, that it was a spiritual faculty through which God spoke to man, imparting His own judgements on to him. This faculty had once found favour with both the theologians and the moralists. In morality, it has lost its eminence because of its inadequacy and lack of infallibility, although there is still an intuitionist attitude in vogue. In religion it still has a place. Otto, after asserting that religious feeling is unique and that some people have a special aptitude or susceptibility for religious feeling, concludes to the existence of a special faculty, Called the Faculty of Divination."[91] "But it is a very big jump from this to postulate, as he does", says H. Paton, "a special religious faculty, termed appropriately enough, the faculty of divination' ...".[92] He goes on, "What Otto wishes to add is that this faculty- or this emotion- gives rise to "an a priori category" by which it is possible to know God. "Nothing could be more shocking to a modern ear, which is trained to connect the phrase "a priori" only with analytic or tautologous propositions".[93] Again, Paton adds, "If the faculty of divination by its own spontaneous activity "shapes" representations and "generates" Ideas a priori, how can it possibly grasp reality, let alone a transcendent reality, by means of such apparently subjective representations and Ideas."[94]

In the sense of 'insight' or inner perception the term is in vogue to this day, even in morality. Kant differentiated between 'sensible intuition' and a 'non-sensible intuition', which latter is "a special mode of intuition, namely, the intellectual intuition, which is not that which we possess".[95] It is the latter which can present 'noumena' to us, but man does not possess this form of intuition. It "can belong only to the primordial being".[96] The human mode of intuition is always sensible, according to Kant, because it is "dependent upon the existence of the object, and it is therefore possible, only if the subject's faculty of representation is affected by that object".[97] The religious man, however, disagrees with Kant's basic assumption that all human intuition is sensible he believes, on the other hand, that man is capable of a non-sensible type of intuition akin to, what Kant calls intellectual intuition, which may be called religious or mystical. It is not a special faculty, as was thought by theologians of the Middle Ages, but rather a kind of insight or inner perception which brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception. As Iqbal rightly says, "We must not, however, regard it as a mysterious special faculty; it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part. Yet the vista of experience thus opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience".[98] But thus understood, intuition is the same thing as religious experience, an analytical study of which has been undertaken in a separate chapter.

J. A. Hadfield psychologically analyses what may be called 'intuitions' or flashes of mind thus: "Intuition is the unconscious notice we take of things. Intuitions spring for the most part from our dispositions, for these represent the accumulated experience of the years; they therefore serve as a reliable guide in action and thought. So we judge aright, of peoples' character even in the absence of logical reasons. When we like or dislike people by intuition, it is because we have unconsciously noticed things about them which are pleasant or unpleasant to us, according to our previous associations. Intuition is not a 'sixth sense', but the unconscious deduction we make from all our senses".[99] Thus, Hadfield's analysis of intuition leads him to deny that intuition is

imputable to a 'sixth sense' or to a supra-sensible perception; it is, on the contrary, a result of habitual grasping of certain things on the basis of association and past experience, which have sunk into the unconscious. Hence intuition is the unconscious notice we take of things– that is, what we previously grasped through mental effort, through habituation came to be known as an instantaneous flash. The whole process of reasoning required in the beginning to grasp something later on comes to be known, intuitively.

Notes and References

[1] *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 115
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 117.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 117-19.
[4] W. K. Wright, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 261-63.
[5] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 182.
[6] Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 41.
[7] The conscious life of the human being, including the conscious decisions and volitions, is merely a mouthpiece for the unconscious–, reprinted from, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*'. Vol. X, 1950 under the title "Free-will and Psychoanalysis" in *Readings in Ethical Theory*, ed. by W. Sellers & J. Hospers, p. 563.
[8] R. Heywood, *The Sixth Sense*, Chapters Two to Five.
[9] Kant, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-68.
[10] W. K. Wright, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 179.
[11] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 16.
[12] *Mind*, Vol. LXI No, 244, 1952, pp. 497-512.
[13] Our normal experience is external because its data comes from the external sources through senses, whereas religious experience I call internal because its data does not come through external senses but through some internal source.
[14] By normal is here meant the ordinary sensuous way of know-objects believe to be out there.
[15] R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 396.
[16] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 127.
[17] Zaehner, *Mysticism*, p. 59.

[18] J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 387.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 377.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 375.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 423.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 423.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 402-3.
[25] See pages 189-90 of the present thesis.
[26] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 14.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[28] Quoted from *Wisdom of the East,* by S. Spencer, see *Mysticism in World Religion,* p. 311.
[29] Quoted from al-Ghazzali, by Spencer, *op. cit.*, p. 311.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] Mohammad Ibn Mohammed Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali in mediaeval Europe known as Algazel (1058-1111), Islamic Theologian and philosopher, was born at Tus of Persian stock; *Ency. Bri.* Vol. 10, p. 330.
[32] A. E. Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhid Din Ibnul Arabi*, p. 109 ff.
[33] F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, pp. 76-78.
[34] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 126.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[37] *Reason in Religion*, p. 25.
[38] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 392.
[39] Quoted from *Divine Names* (Parker's Translation), J. B. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 414.
[40] Q. *Mystische Schriften* put into modern German by Laundaur (Berlin, Schanabel, 1903), p. 20.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Quoted from, *Les Maladies du Sentiment Religionun*,' J. B. Pratt, *ibid.*, p. 425.
[43] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
[44] S.K Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, p. 87.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 88.
[47] Thought is discursive when it uses "abstract concepts in order to run over a number of instances or to pass consciously from one member of a class to anothter"-*The Modern Predicament* by H. J. Paton, p. 159.

[48] The term non-discursive' is my own; it is used in contrast to 'discursive'.
[49] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 6.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
[51] *Ibid.*, p 3.
[52] *Ibid*, p. 35.
[53] Iqbal, *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[55] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 350.
[56] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 9.
[57] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 196.
[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 3 and 196.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 197.
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 350.
[64] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[66] Pratt, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-51.
[67] *Op. cit.*, p. 351.
[68] *Ibid.*, Ch. XV1.
[69] M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Vol. 11, p. 803.
[70] Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 352.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 400.
[72] *Mysticism and Logic*. Chap. X.
[73] Pratt, *Ibid.*, p. 400.
[74] *Ibid.*
[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 400-401.
[76] Quoted from *Enneads*, V1, *ibid.*, p. 401.
[77] By this phrase I mean that line of mystics who were primarily pantheists and held '*fana'* to be the ultimate object of religion.
[78] "Hallaj in describing the union of the 'lahut' with the 'nasut' or, as he generally says, of the Divine Spirit with the human spirit employs the term 'hulul' *The Idea of Personality in Sufism*, p. 41. It usually means the Christian doctrine of incarnation---*Ibid.*, p. 30.
[79] Abu al-Mughith al-Husain bin Mansur, commonly known as Al-Hallaj (d. 923 A.D).
[80] M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, p. 1400.
[81] Al. Sarraj, al-Tusi,. *Kitab Al-Luma fi al-Tasawwuf*, p. 433.
[82] *Ibid.*, pp. 426-27.

[83] A renowned Muslim of the traditional mysticism who was executed for his unorthodox utterances and views.
[84] Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri, *Al-Risalat al-Qushayriyyah*, pp. 32-33.
[85] Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Mohyid Din Ibnul Arabi*, pp. 140-41.
[86] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, p. 600.
[89] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 15-16.
[90] *Mysticism*, pp. 71-72.
[91] *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 144ff.
[92] *The Modern Predicament*, p. 135.
[93] *Ibid*, p. 136.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[95] *The Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 268.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[97] *Ibid.*
[98] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 16.
[99] *Psychology and Morals*, pp. 186-87.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Unavailing attempts have been made by the naturalists of various types at discrediting the meaning and value of religious phenomena by reference to their nature, origin, and history. As we have seen before, they ignore the important distinction between 'existential' questions and questions regarding their importance, meaning, and value which are two separate orders of questions. Among the various kinds of naturalists, who have reported to this line of attack, those of special note are the medical materialists and the Freudian psycho-analysts. Though differing considerably in details about the nature and origin of religious facts, in broader principles they follow the same mistake, i.e. they confound existential questions with questions of value.

It having been made clear that value and significance of religious experience do not depend upon existential facts, the question 'regarding its value remains to be asked; and it involves' the most crucial question of verification which becomes still more crucial in view of the positivistic polemic on cognitive value of the experience under review. The position of the positivists seems to have been based on the unwarranted assumption that physical facts are the only facts and that only assertions about them can be factual statements. This assumption is begging the question. As seen before, Professor A. C. Ewing has contended that the term "facts" cannot be confined to empirical facts only, and thus assertions about those other facts, which are not empirical, are equally statements of facts.

Moreover, even the most respectable scientific propositions are not capable of direct verification by sense-experience.

Some of the positivists treat of religious assertions as analogous to psychological statements on the ground that they do not admit of 'tests and checking procedures', the objects of religious statements not being 'public and neutral'. W. D. Glasgow meets this position by classifying propositions, on the basis of the application of tests and checking procedures, into those which are verifiable and those which are non-verifiable. Positivists treat of religious assertions as unverifiable subjective 'propositions', that is propositions about the workings of one's own mind. In this sense, religious phenomena are nothing but figments of the mind of recipient. They do not refer to any external objective reality. On the other hand, there is the evidence of religious experts in all ages and countries testifying to the fact that religious phenomena denote a truly genuine experience, as any other. W. D. Glasgow, on the basis of his classification given above, urges that religious assertions, though non-verifiable, are nonetheless objective: they refer to an external independent reality.

But are religious assertions non-verifiable? This question has yet to be answered. Some theologians and psychologists, both from antiquity and from our own times, have urged that religious assertions are equally verifiable like the statements of science. Not only this, they also hold that it is the same tests that apply to the scientific statements which are applicable in the sphere of religion. Usually the test which has been applied on such occasions is the famous 'pragmatic test' which is favourite with the empiricists of today. Lord Russell, as seen before, expresses his doubts regarding the truth-determining value of the pragmatic test. To pragmatic test Iqbal adds, what he calls, the 'intellectual test', maintaining that these two tests are sufficient for determining the truth of religious assertions as well as that of any other proposition. The intellectual test is the famous Coherence Theory of Truth.

But as we have seen in our chapter on verification, this test is in no way privileged in its capacity for determining the truth-value of a proposition. It seems to be purely arbitrary,

because, as we have seen, the fact that a proposition is consistent with "some chosen corpus of propositions" does not ensure its truth. For the chosen corpus of propositions is at best only arbitrarily chosen. Moreover, it is also quite possible that the total system of propositions constituting the so-called chosen corpus is itself false, and that any new revelation which fails to fit in with that corpus yields truth. Intellectual test, at best, can ensure consistency which is by no means a guaranty of truth. There is no doubt that "consistency" has been a favourite criterion of truth. Again, the rejection of both the intellectual and the pragmatic tests will lead us to intellectual scepticism. These are the only tests known for determining the truth of scientific statements as well as that of religious assertions, for these are the only tests known for determining the truth of any preposition whatsoever. Thus, the same scepticism which is prevalent about the truth of religion is ipso facto present about the truth of science. Keeping the present state of knowledge in view, both religion and science are facing the same danger of agnosticism, for the truth of neither can, under the circumstances, be ensured. Hence, the positivist position that, while scientific statements do, religious assertions do not admit of verification is unwarranted. Both the scientist and the religious man are sailing in the same boat of scepticism and doubt. This scepticism in neither case, however, can be held to be final, for there is every likelihood that with further advancement of knowledge we shall be in a position to frame some criterion, which will determine truth-value of a proposition, religious as well as non-religious.

Another mistake of the impugners of religion is their assumption that normal level of experience is the only possible experience. The question before us, therefore, is whether the normal level is the only level of cognitive experience. Kant and his followers in the West, on the basis of their epistemological principles, answer this question in the affirmative. The positivists push the same position still further. This, however, is not endorsed by the evidence of religious experts of different ages and countries. And as seen before, it has been acknowledged by men like Professor Eddington and many others also.

Modern psychology, especially clinical psychology under the leadership of Freud, perhaps earlier since the times of Spinoza, recognizes the existence and greater importance of the other levels of mental processes. John Hospers, in his article "Free-Will and Psychoanalysis", expressing the Freudian position on the relative importance of various levels of consciousness, remarks, "The conscious life of the human being, including the conscious decisions and volitions, is merely a mouthpiece for the unconscious.-...".[1] Also the analogy of iceberg with only one-third on the surface is patent with the psycho-analysts of this school. All this implies that the normal level of experience is only a partial aspect of the total mental life of man, and that it is by no means the most important aspect. Thus, mystics and theologians are right in asserting that there are other levels of human consciousness lying close to the normal level. Whether these other levels are capable of yielding knowledge of an objective reality is as much disputable as whether our ordinary type of consciousness, involving perception, is capable of yielding the knowledge of external objects existing independently of a mind. This point we have discussed at some length in our chapter on verification. George Berkeley and David Hume were responsible, as we all know, for casting doubt on the possibility of inferring the existence of an independent external world from the facts of sense-experience, and ever since philosophy has put on a different look. It has ceased to be dogmatic. This is what Kant meant by saying that it was Hume who aroused him from his dogmatic slumber.[2]

Now, admitting that religious experience is capable of yielding knowledge, the question arises 'what is the type of this knowledge'? Lord Russell distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The mystic's knowledge is of the first kind, for he claims to have a direct and immediate vision of God. Thus Professor Pratt remarks on this, "Only in an immediate experience which stands for itself alone, can one find true reality; and most certainly of all, there alone can one find the ultimate Reality which is God".[3] Iqbal, as seen before, explains mystical knowledge of God on the analogy of our knowledge of other minds. But our knowledge of other

minds is inferential, and if the mystic's knowledge of God is analogous to this, then it cannot be immediate and direct.

It has sometimes been asserted that in this experience the distinction between subject and object vanishes- a state which has usually been described as *Fana* or 'the abandonment of the consciousness of self'. This is the position of traditional pantheists and is perhaps based on the metaphysical view that "knowing implies some kind of identification between the person who knows and the known object".[4] This view of knowledge has a long history. "Aristotle thought that there existed a kinship between the objects of intellectual comprehension and the intellect".[5]. Spinoza held that if one understood nature completely one would thereby become identical with nature, that is identical with God.[6] The same position was more clearly expressed by F. H. Bradley in his *Ethical Studies*. Warnock writes on this, "If ever our knowledge of any thing were complete, the distinction between the knowing mind and the object known would disappear. It is towards this identification of subject with object that Bradley thinks we strive, in trying to understand anything".[7] It was perhaps under the impact of this view of complete knowledge that traditional mystics were led to stress upon the merger of a finite self into the Infinite in the attainment of knowledge of the latter. Most of the sufis, however, as we have seen, did not agree to any such merger in the knowledge of God. And, as said before, both Sidney Spencer and Prof. Nicholson quite agree on this. This is true of most of the leading sufis like Sarraj in his *Luma* and Qushayri in his *Risalah*. To these mtystics *fana* was always a means to *baqa*, a higher state entailing an integration of personality rather than its dissolution. There have been, of course, some patent panthcists also in the history of Islam, e.g. al-Hallaj. But there have been many others like Ibnul Arabi, who have interpreted the words *fana* and *baqa* in a metaphorical sense. The state of *baqa* as the real quest of both Islam and Sufism has been stressed upon by Iqbal also. In affirming the integration of personality as the chief aim of religious life Iqbal, on the one hand, agrees with the long tradition of sufis and, on the other hand, with such a famous modern psychologist as Jung. The aim of religion as the

integration and development of personality clearly implies that religion is a practical, rather than a theoretical, enterprise.

There are two very important features of Iqbal's philosophy of religion. In the first place, though conceding that religious experience is unique, and also that it has prerogative over all other forms of experience in its capacity for yielding knowledge of the ultimately real, Iqbal nonetheless admits that it has a very close relationship with other levels. He does not fail to acknowledge the importance of perceptual knowledge to religious insight and spiritual uplift of man. On this point, as seen before, he has drawn inspiration from the Holy Qur'an. According to Iqbal, sense-perception is indispensable as a means to inner experience, the two being really complementary towards the attainment of a complete vision of the ultimately real. No one can afford to miss the persistent references of the Qur'an to such facts as 'the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, 'the alternation of night and day' which have been spoken of as signs for those who understand. In such verses the Qur'an clearly brings out the importance of sense-experience and history towards an understanding of the ultimate Reality.

Secondly, theologians and psychologists are generally agreed that thought does not play any part in religious knowledge. Iqbal agrees with them so far as discursive thought is concerned. But he urges that thought has a non-discursive application also in which it is capable of reaching the Infinite. In this capacity thought is organically related to intuition, according to Iqbal. The theologians, however, separated thought and intuition as two independent faculties, rather opposed in their functions, because, for them, thought was quite incapable of reaching the infinite. Among the Muslim theologians Iqbal refers to Ghazzali whom the finitude and inconclusiveness of thought "drove....to draw a line of cleavage between thought and intuition".[8] Iqbal's own position is based upon the assumption that discursive thought does not exhaust whole of the faculty of thinking, for thought is capable of a non-discursive employment too. This has been vaguely recognized by some of the modern writers also. It is in this employment that thought is a necessary constituent of religious knowledge. In affirming this, again, Iqbal

draws some inspiration from the Holy Qur'an. While discussing the Finality of Prophethood he writes, "the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Qur'an, and the emphasis that it lays on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality".[9] It is also obvious from such phrases in the Qur'an as, 'these are signs for those who understand', in which a clear reference has been made to the faculty of understanding as playing an important role in our knowledge of God.

The fact that Iqbal believes in a non-discursive employment of thought should not delude us into thinking that he believes in a plurality of thought or reason. Reason is universal, and it is capable of more than one employments- a fact which most of theologians and philosophers have failed to recognize. The basic function of thought is to operate upon some given data, organizing and synthesizing it into knowledge proper. But for this, there would be no knowledge at all. Now, data on which thought is required to operate is of various types. It may be sensuous or it may be non-sensuous. When thought operates upon sense-data, its employment is discursive but when, on the other hand, it operates on some non-sensuous data-say, religious data-its employment may well be called non-discursive. Thought remains the same unified faculty, however differently and on however different a data it may be employed. Thought works after the fashion of a machine which simply operates upon raw material supplied from outside. It cannot produce its own raw-material, nor can there be any products without the operation of machine. Similarly, thought cannot produce its own data, nor can there be any knowledge without the operation of thought. This is true of all types of knowledge, including religious knowledge. The only difference between religious knowledge and sense-knowledge is that, while the data of the latter is, that of the former is not, given by any of the senses or by a combined function of all. The religious data, since it does not come from any of the senses or from a combination of senses, arises from some other source variously called 'Intuition', *Qalb*, *Fuad*, or inner perception. When thought works on data arising from any such source- i.e. non-sensuous data- its employment is non-discursive; and it is perhaps to this

employment of thought that Iqbal refers when he says that 'thought has a deeper movement also'.

Again, religious experience differs from various types of non-religious experience in that it involves an intimate union with some divine object, or at least a search for such a union. But for this, the experience would cease to be religious in the proper sense. As Underhill says, "the end which the mystic sets before him is conscious union with a living Absolute.... there is- must be -contact "in an intelligible where" between every individual self and this Supreme Self, this Ultimate. In the mystic this union is conscious, personal, and complete".[10] Professor Pratt, as we have seen, has more clearly emphasized this point.

To sum up, then, religious experience, which is a genuine cognitive experience, is a direct and immediate experience of a divine object. It involves the consciousness of a Beyond, which is recognized to be divine. Like ordinary experience, it consists of an a posteriori element arising from religious data, and an a priori element contributed by thought. Where it differs from ordinary experience is that its data is non-sensuous - nay, its data is religious-because it arises from a divine object, which is supra-sensible,

Notes and References

[1] W. Sellers & J. Hospers, *Readings in Ethical Theory*, p. 563.
[2] F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, p. 413.
[3] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 401.
[4] M. Warnock, *Ethics Since 1900*, p. 6.
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] C. D. Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, p. 18. Spinoza "identifies the sensum, which is the objective constituent of a sensation, with the bodily change which is the necessary and sufficient bodily condition of the sensation".
[7] *Op. cit.*, M. Warnock, p. 5.
[8] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 5.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[10] *Mysticism*, p. 73.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX-A

IQBAL'S DEFENCE OF RELIGION AND POSITIVIST TRADITIONS

Iqbal took up defence of religion as a form of experience as early as 1929 when he delivered his famous lectures[1] at Madras and Hyderabad (India) particularly in his first lecture "Knowledge and Religious Experience", and then in his paper "Is Religion Possible?" which he presented to the 5th session of the Aristotelian Society in London in 1932.[2] In this lecture in particular he tried to refute Kant's famous rejection of the possibility of metaphysics because, as he believes, "his argument applies with equal force to the realities in which religion is especially interested"[3]. What interests us in this paper is that Iqbal's defence anticipates the logical positivists position on metaphysics and religion assumed much later and has offered answers which later critics of the movement were to offer subsequently. It is commonly believed that logical positivism emerged in 1930 as a result of interaction between the Cambridge School of Analysis and the Vienna Circle: at least the term appeared for the first time in 1930[4] though with some qualifications; but its application to the fields of morals, metaphysics and religion came as later as 1936 when A.J. Ayer first published his classical work Language, *Truth and Logic* (London)[5] and *The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge* in 1940 (London)[6]. The real threat to religion came through these works of Ayer as they directly attacked the realities with which both

religion and metaphysics deal, and such attempts were not rife in the times of Iqbal, at least when he delivered his lectures.

As said before, Iqbal begins his defence of religion with an examination of Kant's famous position on the possibility of metaphysics. Dilating on the significance of metaphysics for religion Iqbal says that "Science may ignore a rational metaphysics", but religion cannot in so far as it aims at "the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself". Kant's position as well as of those who followed hin in this rejection of metaphysics, says Iqbal, is based on the following presuppositions:

1. All experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible;[8]
2. There is only one single space-order and time-order which Kant calls the "Forms of Sensibility" which organize data into knowledge of objects and "percepts";
3. The term "fact" has been limited to "empirical facts" only which Iqbal calls "the optically present source of sensation".[9]
4. Discursive thought is the only kind of thought amenable to man.

1. Kant bases his position on metaphysics on the bifurcation between Phenomenon (Thing-as-it-appears) and the Noumenon (the Thing-in-itself), and holds that the latter falls beyond the pale of the manifold of senses" and hence is unknowable". For him, "The thing-in-itself is only a limiting idea. Its function is merely regulative"[10]. Again, Kant made a distinction between what he called the "sensible intuition" and "intellectual intuition", and denied that man possessed the latter[11]. This also contributes to his contention of the impossibility of metaphysics. Here Iqbal urges that "Kant's verdict can be accepted if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible.[12] Iqbal refers to the

evidence of religious experts of all ages and countries to prove that "there are potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness. If these types of consciousness open up possibilities of life-giving and knowledge-yielding experience the question of the possibility of religion as a form of higher experience is a perfectly legitimate one..."[13] He goes on to add, "These experiences are perfectly natural, like our normal experiences. The evidence is that they possess a cognitive value for the recipient,....[14] Iqbal discusses the position of modern naturalists who allude to the determinants of these experiences and decry them as 'neurotic or mystical"; but he agrees with William James that the quesitons concerning the nature, origin, and historical development of a thing are of quite a different order from the questions regarding their importance, meaning and values[15]. He says, "Psychologically speaking, all states, whether their content is religious or non-religious, are organically determined. The scientific form of mind is as much organically determined as the religious[16]". He concludes, "The truth is that the organic causation of our mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by which we judge them to be superior or inferior in point of value".[17] However, the question how to distinguish between what is really divine and what is counterfeit has always arisen in the mind of the religious people themselves. In such a situation, Iqbal, agreeing with James, recommends the use of the pragmatic test. James quotes Saint Teresa as saying of those who doubted her vision: "I showed them the jewels which the divine hand left with me;.. they were my actual dispositions".[18]

About two centuries after Kant, the logical positivists made an attack on metaphysics and religion on the selfsame grounds, though they approached the problem from a different angle: they were not so much interested in the genuineness of an experience as in the "meaningfulness" (to use their own term) of statements in which an experience expresses itself; thus the main question with them being

whether a given 'statement" is varifiable or not. As Iqbal believed in the cognitive aspect of "religious experience", he would agree that they were expressible in the form of "statements" which were no less verifiable. He says, "Religious experience..., is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be communicated to others, except in the form of a judgement".[19] He adds that any judgement placed before anybody entitles him to ask the question, "Are we in possession of a test which would reveal its validity?" This question can legitimately and justifiably be asked about "statements" expressing religious contents also. To those critics who regard religion as a personal and subjective experience only Iqbal replies that "If personal experience had been the only ground for acceptance of a judgement of this kind, religion would have been the possession of a few individuals only".[20] He is of the view that religious "statements" are perfectly verifiable; that we are in possession of tests "which do not differ from those applicable to other forms of knowledge".[21] These he calls the Intellectual and Pragmatic tests. In his Second Lecture "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience"[22], Iqbal applies the Intellectual Test with a view to proving religious or spiritual realities of the universe.

2. Kant and his followers presume that the ordinary space-time order is the only order which he calls the "Forms of Sensibility"[23], and it organizes data into "percepts". This unilateral approach leads to a physical and meterial reality and has culminated in the famous Einsteinian General Theory of Space-Time Relativity in which Time, losing its identity and significance, is relegated to the fourth dimension of the space. It precludes any possibility of spiritual interpretation of the universe. This approach, according to Iqbal, is un-Islamic as Islam laid exclusive emphasis on the importance of Time: more than once he

quotes a well known saying (Hadith) of the Holy Prophet of Islam(PBUH), viz., "Do not vilify time, for time is God".[24] The Holy Quran includes suras named "Ad-dahr" (The Time)[25] and "Al-Asr" (Time through the Ages)[26] wherein Allah swears by the Time. This convincingly brings home the importance which Islam attaches to Time, thereby opening the way to the mental and spiritual aspects of the universe. Iqbal discusses the possibility of other levels or orders of Space and Time. He refers to Ainal-Qudat al-Hamdani Iraqi (1098-1131 A.D.)[27] who propounded the view of various orders of Space and Time relative to the various levels of being. In his book *Kitab Iama't,* Iraqi conceives infinite varieties of time, relative to the varying grades of being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality".[28] Right from gross bodies which have a time divisible into past, present and future, he moves on through to the "Divine time—time which is absolutely free from the quality of passage, ... It is above eternity; it has neither beginning nor end"[29]. Similarly he holds that there are various levels of space including a kind of space relative to God (the word proximity, contact, and mutual separation which apply to material bedies do not apply to God")[30]. "The existence of space", says Iqbal, "in relation to the life of God,..., cannot be denied; ..".[31] Iraqi holds that there are three kinds of space—the space of material bodies, the space of immaterial beings, and the space of God. He further divides the space of material bodies into three kinds, i.e. "the space of gross bodies', "the space of subtle bodies, e.g., air and sound", and "the space of light".[32] He, then moves on to discuss the space of various classes of immaterial beings, e.g., angels; and finally "the Divine space which is absolutely free from all dimensions and constitutes the meeting point of all infinities".[33] If we go with Iraqi and conceive these various kinds of space and time orders, our whole conception of the nature of the universe would undergo a drastic change; for the admission of other space-orders and time-orders would open the way to non-materialistic, and spiritualistic interpretations of the

universe, especially when primacy has been assigned to time in preference to space. How unlike the Einsteinian version where time has been reduced to one of the dimensions of space which leads to the aforesaid presuppositions: viz., (I) there is only one kind of genuine human experience, and (ii) there is only one single space-time order.

The above presuppositions led to the concept of a physical world-order wherein the law of causation reigns supreme. Iqbal puts the question, "whether the causality bound aspect of nature is the whole truth about it? Is not the ultimate Reality invading our consciousness from some other direction as well? Is the purely intellectual method of overcoming nature the only method? "Iqbal here quotes a full passage from A. Eddington's (1882-1944) book *The Nature of Physical World* [34] in support of his view that there are other directions as well from which the reality is invading the human consciousness. To quote a part of the passage, "... Feelings, purpose, values, make up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. We follow up the sense impressions and find that they lead into an external world discussed by science; we follow up the other elements of our being and find that they lead not into a world of space and time, but surely somewhere".[35] But what is the nature of that "somewhere" is no less important for the human study and research than the world of science and sense; it leads to the teleogical and spiritual world of metaphysics and religion. Again, Iqbal says that the modern man has exclusively concentrated on the natural aspect of reality and consequently, "His naturalism has given him an unprecedented control over the forces of Nature, but has robbed him of faith in his own future".[36] He regrets that "wholly overshadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, the modern man has ceased to live soulfully, i.e. from within".[37] And as a result in "the domain of thought he is living in open confliect with himself; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflit with others"[38]. He has failed to control "his ruthless egoism

and his infinite gold-hunger" which is "gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness".[39] Thus, Iqbal regrets that the one-sided approach of the modern man has brought about atrophy of the spiritual side, and has given rise to such movements in philosophy as logical positivism and existentialism. In a beautiful Persian verse in *Gulshane Raze Jadeed (The New Rose Garden of Mystery)*[40], he says:

> *If he should close one eye, it would be sin: It is by seeing with both eyes that he can gain the path.*.[41].

Modern empiricists and positivists have, thus, sinned by adopting only one-sided approach to reality – the external approach – which reveals to consciousness only the external or perceptual aspects of reality. This, according to Iqbal, is the chief malady of the modern Western approach. Logical positivists simply reduce the modern empiricist position to "statements" and use the "meaningful" and "meaningless"[42] denominators for them; hence labouring under the same one-sidedness which Iqbal has condemned.

3. This brings us to the third presupposition of modern science and philosophy, viz., the term "fact" is used in the sense of empirical fact only; fact which is, for Iqbal, "the optically present source of sensation". The denomination of the term "fact" again forms the pivot of empirical position. Iqbal, however, denies that empirical facts are the only facts. He says, "The total Reality, which enters our awareness and appears on interpretation as an empirical fact, has other ways of invading our consciousness and offers other opportunities for interpretation. The facts of religious experience are facts among other facts of human experience and, in the capacity of yielding knowledge by interpretation, one fact is as good as another".[43] This fact has been acknowledged decades later by A.C. Ewing in his article "Religious Assertions" thus: 'The position that nothing can exist except the type of subjects we know in science and ordinary sense-experience is certainly not true, and if other things do exist there will certainly be facts about them (in a

well-recognized sense of "fact")[44]. He rightly adds, "The metaphysician may rightly claim to be giving "factual information", though not about the empirical facts of ordinary life".[45]

However, Iqbal makes an important distinction between, what he calls, "intellectual facts" and "vital facts", adding that the facts with which religion deals are the latter kind.[46] By an intellectual fact" he appears to mean facts which are concerned with cognition and add to our knowledge when interpreted, whereas a "vital fact" is concerned with conation and becomes a part of our faith when understood; of course, not blind faith but faith well-grounded in knowledge.[47] This he calls the stage of "Discovery".[48] This point is obvious from the opening sentence of his preface to his lectures, "The Quran is a book which emphasizes "deed" rather than "idea".[49] While talking of "discovery" Iqbal says that "the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually manageable fact; it is a vital fact, ...[50] which "can embody itself only in a world-making or world-shaking act; and in this form alone the content of this timeless experience can make itself effectively visible to the eye of history"[51]. This shows why this experience is more amenable to the pragmatic, rather than to the intellectual, test. Moreover, religious statements are more like the statements of history which have a cognitive as well as an evaluative aspect, and I believe that the positivists will have no objection to admitting statements of history as "meaningful" in the sense in which they are willing to use the word. Again, as Iqbal has emphasized, "there is no such thing as isolated fact; for facts are systematic wholes the elements of which must be understood by mutual reference:...".[52] It means that religious facts are, like other facts, systematic wholes with affective, cognitive and conative aspects; but the posititists keep these elements apart, especially in the case of metaphysical and religious facts, in order to disparage them in the light of their Principle of Verifiability, thereby violating their "systematic wholeness".

This brings us to the important question of the "objectivity" of religious experience which has been questioned by its opponents over and again. They hold that the scientific knowledge is objective, while religious knowledge is "subjective' (the positivists condemn them as mere "emotive assertions")[53]. Iqbal refutes the above position and urges that both religion and science aim at "pure objectivity" in their own respective spheres. While talking of the religious man Iqbal says, "His sense of objectivity is as keen as that of the scientist in his own sphere of objectivity He passes from experience to experience,...., as a critical sifter of experience who....; endeavours to eliminate all subjective elements, psychological or physiological... with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective".[54] "This final experience, he adds, "is the revelation of a new life⇔process⇔original, essential, spontaneous"[55]. Iqbal quotes a passage from the renowned Indian Sufi Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind[56] as an example of this objectifying process in the field of religion. He also refers to the banning of music as a part of worship in Islam with a view to preclude any subjective element in religious experience. Iqbal goes to the extent of saying that "..it must be said in justice to religion that it insisted on the necessity of concrete experience[57] life long before science learnt to do so".[58] He concludes that "the experience reached is a perfectly natural experience.. It is the human ego rising higher than mere reflection, and mending its transiency by appropriating the eternal[59]. Iqbal furhter stresses the objectivity of this experience when he says, "The final act is.. a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and remade by continuous action".[60] This statement brings out two very important things: viz.,

i. religious experience is basically conative rather than cognitive and

ii. the religious facts are vital rather than intellectual facts. Thus, the main mistake of the positivists lies in their confounding them with cognitive facts and trying to judge them accordingly.

4. The last presupposition of the empiricists is that they take "thought" in a discursive sense only. Ever since Aristotle the Western thinkers have been believing in a duality of thought, viz., the Pure Thought (Reason) and the Practical Thought (Reason)[61]. Centuries later Kant named his famous volumes[62] *The Critique of Pure Reason & The Critique of Practical Reason*[63], the former dealing with metaphysical problems of an analysis of human thought, the latter with the practical moral questions. The Westerners take thought in a finite and restricted sense to this day and it is basically analytical, and as a result they assign no important function to it in religious knowledge. Even Antony Flew, who in his *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (ed. 1979)[64], has treated thought in three different senses, has failed to go beyond the superficial movement of thought and its discursive nature which involved dichotomy of the object and subject. Iqbal, however, recommends that we should go beyond this superficial nature of thought when he says in *Baal-I-Jibril* (The Gabriel's Wing)

> Go beyond the pale of reason as this light; Can show the way, not the goal[65].

And Again

> Having unravelled the knotty skein of Intellect; O Allah; bestow 'madness' on me[66].

In the above two verses Iqbal has recommended to transcend both the Pure and Practical kinds of thought in order to fully appreciate the nature of thought itself. He says that thought, though finite "is capable of reaching an immanent infinite…[67]. According to him, thought "is a greeting of the finite with the infinite".[68] He says, "The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge".[69] He regrets that even

such great thinkers as al-Ghazali and Kant "failed to see that thought, in the very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude…".[70] Again, acknowledging that thought is basically finite, Iqbal holds that the finitudes of nature are mutually and reciprocally exclusive but not "the finitudes of thought which is, in its essential nature, incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned in the narrow circuit of its own individuality".[71] This he calls "the deeper movement of thought"[72] as against its superficial movements discussed above, and in this movement thought comes very close to intuition. He regrets that modern philosophy, despite its so much emphasis on epistemology, has failed to see this fact and to realize "the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite…[73]. Even Imam Ghazali, despite his admitting the importance of thought (intellect) in religion[74], was forced by his own personal mystic experience "to draw a line of cleavage between thought and Intuition…".[75] It was al-Farabi[76] in the Muslim world who could see that "rational knowledge coincides with ecstasy and inspiration,"[77] and Iqbal appears to have taken inspiration from him in understanding a proper relationship between thought and intuition. He says, "They spring up from the same root and complement each other".[78] He further says, "Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation". Both seek the vision of the same Reality which reveals itself to them…[79]. In *Javid Namah* he says more emphatically that

> ……..Love-led
>
> Can reason claim the Lord and reason-lit
>
> Love strikes firm roots. When integrated,
>
> These two draw the pattern of a different world"[80]

The amalgamation of love and reason, says Iqbal, is necessitated by the fact that the Ultimate Reality "reveals its symbols both within and without"[81], and that the "internal" aspect of the real is not less important than its "external"

and "observable" aspects. "Reality lives in its own appearances;..."[82] says he.

Again, Iqbal agreeing with Kant, holds that thought cannot be completely divorced from concrete experience in the domain of knowledge, and this is true of both scientific and religious knowledge. He agrees with the Freudians that "there are religions, ..., which provide a kind of cowardly escape from the facts of life, ..."[83] but this is not true of all religion. Similar is the position of the logical positivists who relegate religious statements to mere "emotive assertions", having no grounding in concrete experience, and hence condemning them to be 'meaningless' statements. Against all such positions Iqbal urges, as said before, that religion insisted on the possiblity of concrete experience in religious life long before science learnt to do so. He adds that higher religion is essentially experience and that it is "as critical of its level of experience as Naturalism is of its own level".[84] This experiential nature of religion and its critical approach dispel the position held by the positivists that religious experience was purely subjective. Iqbal, while discussing the nature of intuition, sounds the warning that we must not regard it as a "mysterious special faculty'" and adds that "the vista of experience' opened to us by this faculty" is as real and concrete as any other experience. To describe it as psychic, mystical or supernatural does not detract from its value as experience ".[85] He aptly remarks that to "the primitive man all experience was supernatural"[86] "The total reality, which enters our awareness and appears on interpretation as an empirical fact, has other ways of invading our consciousness and offers further opportunities of interpretation".[87] Once this fact is acknowledged, much of what appears to be mysterious about human life will be converted into hard facts of life requiring study and interpretation, and will enlarge the scope of human knowledge beyond its present limitations.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Iqbal Dr. M., *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, (Lahore Sh. Ashraf, 1978).
[2] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series-Vol.XXXIII, (London: Harrison, 1933), pp.47-64.
[3] Op.cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 182
[4] F. Waismann first formulated the verifiability principle in 1930. Cf. J. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, (Penguin, 1980), pp. 368-69.
[5] Ayer A.J., *Language, Truth & Logic*, (London: victor Golloncz, 1946).
[6] *The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge*, (London: Macmillan, 1940) *Logical Positivism*, (Illinois: Free Press, 1959).
[7] Op. cit, *Reconstruction*, p.2.
[8] *Ibid*, p. 182.
[9] *Ibid*, p. 188.
[10] *Ibid*, p. 182.
[11] Kant I., *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Eng, tr. Norman K. Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 268.
[12] Op. cit, *Reconstruction*, p. 182.
[13] *Ibid*., p. 185
[14] *Ibid*., p. 189
[15] Maruf Dr. M., *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, (London: Islamic Book Service 1977), p. 10.
[16] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 23.
[17] *Ibid*.,
[18] James William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, (London: Longmans Green, 1952), p. 22.
[19] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, pp. 26-27.
[20] *Ibid*., p. 27.
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] *Ibid*., p. 28.
[23] Wright W.K. *A History of Modern Philosophy*, (N.Y, Macmillan, 1962) Ch. XII, "Kant", pp. 263 ff.
[24] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p.11.
[25] The Holy *Quran*, Sura LVI.
[26] *Ibid*, Sura CIII.

[27] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 75.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 135
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.
[34] *Ibid*, quoted From Eddington's *The Nature of Physical World*, (Cambridge University Press, 1929), p. 323.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 186.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.* pp. 187-88.
[40] Iqbal, mathnavi, *Gulshan-e-Raz Jadeed Maa Bandagi Nama/ Kulliyat-e-Iqbal* (Persian), (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1990)p.433.
[41] *The New Rose Garden of Mystery*, Eng. tr. Hadi Hussain, (Lahore: Sh. Ashraf, 1969), p.8.
[42] According to the positivists only those statements are "meaningful" which are verifiable by experience: others are called "meaningless" statements. They prefer these terms to "true" and "false" used in logic.
[43] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 16.
[44] *Philosophy*, Vol. XXXII, No. 122, July 1957, p. 213.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 213.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 184.
[47] This appears to my mind Iqbal's own implication.
[48] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 181. Where he recounts three periods of religious life, "Discovery" being the highest and deepest level.
[49] *Ibid.*, Preface, p. V.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 184.
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86
[53] Positivists like Maritz Schlick, C.L. Stevenson, A.J. Ayer and others relegate religious statements to mere "emotive assertions"—A.J. Ayer, *Logical Positivism*, (Illinois: Free Press, 1959), pp. 247 ff.
[54] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 197.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *Ibid*, p. 193.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 197.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 25.
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 197
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

[61] Aristotle's theory of Thought in which he distinguishes between Passive and Creative or Active Reason – F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, (Allahabad, Central Book, 1958) pp. 112-13.
[62] English tr. By Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1963).
[63] English tr. By T.K. Abbott, (London: Longmans Green, 1959), 6th Revised Edition.
[64] (London: Pan books Paperback, first pb. 1979) see "Reason", pp. 278-79.
[65] Iqbal Dr. M., *Baal-I-Jibril*, (Lahore: Ghulamali, 1976), p. 84. (Eng. tr. My own).
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[67] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 6.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 6, 7.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 4, 5.
[75] Sharif M.M. (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), Vol.I, "Al'Farabi", p. 462.
[76] Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, p. 2.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[80] Ahmad S. Mahmood, *The Pilgrimage of Eternity*, Eng. tr. of Iqbal's *Javed Namah*, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1961), vs. 1135-40, p. 54.
[81] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 25.
[82] *Ibid.*, p. 182.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 16
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 182.
[85] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid.*

IQBAL'S VIEW OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

Divine Knowledge, in contradistinction to religious knowledge of a prophet or a mystic, is not 'knowledge of God', but 'knowledge by God'; it is the knowledge in which God is not the 'object', but the 'subject'. In other words, where religious knowledge is 'knowledge of God by man', divine knowledge is 'knowledge of the universe by God'. But the question is, 'what is the nature of knowledge by God?' 'How does it differ from man's knowledge, religious as well as non-religious?' These are some of the questions which will concern us in this small appendix, and a satisfactory answer to them will be very helpful towards an understanding of religious knowledge; for we understand a thing better by carefully distinguishing it from everything else with which it can be confused and mixed up: we know the grain better by separating it from the chaff.

Human knowledge is, in the main, 'discursive'[1] that is, it necessarily involves three entities, viz, an object to be known, a knowing subject, and a certain relationship between them which Spinoza called the relationship of "sensing".[2] Even where the subject is knowing himself as in 'self-knowledge', it is necessary that he should split himself up into two entities during the process of knowing i.e. himself as the knower and himself as the object known.[3] Thus, two terms and a relationship constitute a necessary trinity in all human knowledge. This is true of our religious insight, as well its of sensory knowledge, for there, too, we have the knowing consciousness of the mystic or the prophet, God as the object to be known, and a certain relationship between the two, however the mystics and the prophets may choose to designate this relationship. Bertrand Russell emphasizes indispensability of the dualism of subject and object

to human knowledge in the following words: "Now I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and object in my terminology because this dualism seems to me a fundamental fact concerning cognition."[4] The only difference, however, between the religious and non-religious knowledge, as we have seen in the Third Chapter of Part 11, lies in that the object in the former is at least recognized to be 'holy' or 'divine'.

There also some consequential and circumstantial differences. In the two cases, religious and non-religious, the nature of 'relationship', is also different, and so are the consequence is of the relationship. Non-religious knowledge leaves one very much engrossed in worldly affairs and discontented, while religious illumination enables one 'to rise above' the world of objective facts and leaves one very much contented and satisfied. But however different in other respects, the two forms of human knowledge are alike in that they both involve the notion of, what Iqbal calls, "a veritable 'other', supposed to exist 'per se' and confronting the knowing ego".[5] In both, the knower and the known are two distinct and independent entities, and they have to be treated as such even when it is a case of self-knowledge. Such a knowledge is relative and, as Iqbal rightly says, "even if we extend it to the point of omni science, must always remain relative to its confronting 'other',..."[6] In the case of divine knowledge, then, it will be proper to say that distinction between subject and object does not exist.

It might he said that in a genuine religious knowledge also the above distinction vanishes and to uphold this position there is whole of the history of Mysticism, especially non-Muslim mysticism. This is the patent pantheistic position to which 'annihilation of self' is the aim of ecstasy. But this does not always apply to Sufism which, to use the words of Nicholson, is better to be called panentheism, rather than pantheism. Iqbal, as seen before, also does not believe in 'the pantheistic annihilation of self during an ecstatic state of mind. The dissolution of human ego in the presence of Divine is, according to Iqbal, the very mark of a weak, disintegrated personality. Thus we see that even in the intensest religious ecstasies, the perceiving ego, if it is

truly developed, retains itself, so that the distinction between subject and object remains. Moreover, if it be admitted that the said distinction vanishes, the relationship between them should also go, and with that goes the possibility of knowledge itself, for human knowledge of whatever kind involves a relationship between the two terms. In other words, religious knowledge is still discursive in the sense that it involves a trinity - i.e. a subject, an object and relationship. When we come to Divine Knowledge, the said distinction does not exist, because the universe does not face God as a veritable 'other', supposed to exist per se and confronting Him. It is not that God created the world and then withdrew from it in the fashion of a human creator. God and the universe are somehow so related that the universe is not separate from Him as an independent entity; the universe, it may be said with the patent pantheists, is the manifestation of God. This, however, should not mislead one into thinking that the universe is identical with God (the position of the extreme pantheists like Spinoza) for though God is organically related to the universe, He is still distinct from it. This fact has well been expressed by saying that God is both immanent in the universe and transcends it; there is, in fact, a dual relationship between the two. Traditional pantheism is one-sided because it lays an exclusive emphasis on the relation of "immanence",[7] the orthodox err on the other side.[8] But proper position seems to be the one which provides both immanence and transcendence. Here, the question may be asked, "how the same thing can be both immanent and transcendent? The nearest analogy that we can find to it in our human knowledge is self-knowledge in which, in so far as the person has been split up into the subject and the object, the two are the same and yet distinct. Again, the dual relationship can well be brought out by saying that the universe is a moment in the life of God,[9] for a moment does not exhaust the whole life of a being. It might be remarked that there could not be Divine Knowledge without transcendence, which means that during the process of knowing God and the universe may be treated as two distinct entities.

The theories of Divine knowledge which have been propounded from time to time, both in the Middle Ages by men like Jalal-ud-Din Dawani[10] and Iraqi,[11] and 'in our own times by

thinkers like Professor Royce,[12] usually treat of it as a 'passive omniscience'. According to these theories, divine knowledge is "a single indivisible act of perception which makes God immediately aware of the entire sweep of history, regarded as an order of specific events, in an eternal 'now'".[13] To such a view Iqbal objects that "'it' suggests a closed universe, a fixed futurity, a predetermined, unalterable order of specific events which, like a superior fate, has once for all determined the directions of God's creative activity".[14] This objection, however, does not seem to me very impressive because it is based upon confusion between fore-knowledge and predestination. Fore-knowledge, in its ordinary sense, is a result of 'calculation' based upon knowledge of prevalent conditions, and it in no way entails the determination of events foreseen. When, for example, a meteorologist makes a weather- forecast on the basis of existent atmospheric pressure, we cannot say that he, in the process of making his forecast, determines the weather changes themselves. Similarly, when God knows before-hand that certain specific events will take place in the life of an individual in future, it is wrong to suppose that the fact that He has foreseen the occurrence of these events shall cause their occurrence. He is not determining the occurrence of events simply by His fore-knowledge, any more than the meteorologist is determining weather changes by means of his weather forecasts. There is no denying the fact that God determines and causes the happening of these events also, but He does that in a different capacity- i.e., in the capacity of the creator. God causes them by virtue of His creativity under the guidance of His fore-knowledge. Iqbal admits that God has the knowledge of potentialities which means that He foresees future events before they are actualized. What he does not admit is that He is in a position to foresee which potentialities are going to actualise. This means that He knows no more than I can, given an adequate knowledge of the potentialities of a certain species, e.g. who does not know that under normal circumstances a human child, after attaining to a certain level of maturity, will be able to stand upright and walk, utter meaningful words and sentences, and will not be able to fly in the air, etc.

Iqbal denies fore-knowledge to God in his zest for preserving freedom and originality in creation. He, however, forgets that God's fore-knowledge does not divest future of its originality and freedom any more than the forecasts of a meteorologist rob future weather changes of their originality and spontaneity. The Holy Qur'an over and again emphasizes fore-knowledge of God in verses like: "And with Him are the keys of the invisible. None but He knoweth them. And He knoweth what is in the land and the sea. Not a leaf falleth but He knoweth it, not a grain amid the darkness of the earth, naught of wet or dry but (it is noted) in a clear record".[15] "Lo! Allah is Aware of what is in the breasts (of men)?" [16] Again, "He knoweth that which is in front of them and which is behind them";[17] and again, "Lo! Allah! With Him is knowledge of the hours. He sendeth down the rain, and knoweth that which is in the wombs. No soul knoweth what it will earn tomorrow, and no soul knoweth in what Land it will die. Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware".[18] Verses can be multiplied which clearly go counter to Iqbal's denial of God's fore-knowledge.

Again, while talking of God's omniscience, the Qur'an uses two words, 'aleemun'[19] (knowledge in general) and 'khabeerun'[20] (knowledge of the hidden and unknown), which also indicates a special emphasis on God's fore-knowledge. Iqbal in his zest for freedom and originality in creation seems to have overlooked such verses in the Qur'an. He seems to have been misled by the fact that God is not only all-knowing, but also all-creating; and treating of them as a single capacity of God, he urges that any imputation of fore-knowledge to Him would lead to a predetermined universe, devoid of all novelty and originality. This seems to have been based on a confusion of the two quite distinct, though allied, functions or capacities of God, viz. His knowledge and creativity. There can be no doubt that in God we have the unique combination of these two capacities. The Holy Qur'an has verses where His knowledge and power are talked of together, e.g., 'aleemun hakim',[21] but the use of two words indicates that knowledge and creativity are two disparate, though related, attributes of God. Iqbal overlooks one very important fact when he denies Him fore-knowledge that

God's creation is not blind or capricious. It is guided by His capacity to foresee and to realize a definite purpose (which again requires fore-knowledge for its precondition). God, says in the Qur'an, "We have not created the Heavens and the earth and whatever is between them in sport: We have not created them but for a serious end".[22] Thus, God did not create the universe capriciously and wantonly but with a serious end or purpose-that is, with the help of a definite fore-knowledge, for ends involve fore-knowledge.

Again, Iqbal contends that on the view of Divine knowledge as a kind of passive omniscience, we cannot reach the idea of a creator. He argues, "If history is regarded merely as a gradually revealed photo of a pre-determined order of events, then there is no room in it for novelty and initiation. Consequently, we can attach no meaning to the word creation, which has meaning for us only in view of our own capacity for original actions.[23] This argument, however, is no better than the previous one, for it is based upon the same confusion between the two qualities of knowledge and creativeness. The two qualities, as seen before, are independent with this much connection between them that the former guides the latter. Creativeness, as we have seen, needs some knowledge or illumination which comes from knowledge-in-advance. God has both the capacities to perfection, that is why in Him the two appear to be the same activity. However, the two are distinct and need to be treated as such. Fore-knowledge is indispensable to true creation, but not the other way round. Iqbal confuses them when he says, "Divine knowledge must be conceived as a living creative activity to which the objects that appear to exist in their own right are organically related".[24]

Iqbal's denial of fore-knowledge to God reflects in his position on 'taqdir' also. He does not understand this notion in the sense of 'predestination'. He says, "the future is given to it not as lying before, yet to be traversed; it is given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility....Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities".[25] "The destiny of a thing then", he adds, "is not an unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is

the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion".[26] In other words, Iqbal denies that full-fledged events are lying as it were, in the womb of Reality, and drop one by one like the grains of sand from the hour-glass".[27]

To conceive of 'taqdir' as the total future possibilities of a thing, which it has yet to actualize, is to miss the mark by a wide margin. In the first place if potentialities Iqbal refers to are the general possibilities pertaining to a species, to which the individual belongs, then God knows nothing, for every one can know them, (e.g. who does not know that under normal conditions a human child, when grown up to a certain age, will be able to speak, walk, laugh, etc.); if, on the other hand, he refers to the specific and individual potentialities, then God foresees particular future events before they are actualized, and this is admitting fore-knowledge to Him. Moreover, in Arabic the word 'taqdir' is from the root 'qadr' and means 'to measure', 'to estimate' to calculate'.[28] It, no doubt, has some connection with words 'qadir' and 'qudrat' also which have the meaning of 'power', but this makes no difference to the fact that the word 'taqdir' means knowledge about and prediction of a future event - a specific future event - on the basis of measurement and calculation of the prevalent events or conditions. It means 'the dependence of future events on the present ones as their antecedents - it is cosmical determinism.[29] The destiny of a particular individual, then, is dependent upon, and determined by, his heredity and complex environmental influences bearing upon his life. In this sense modern psychology fervently believes in 'taqdir', which means neither fatalism, as it was conceived by theologians and thinkers of the Middle Ages, nor a mere amalgamation of realizable possibilities, as it has been conceived by Iqbal; it simply means, as said before, the dependence of future on the past, the determinate relationship between antecedent conditions and consequent happening. In this sense, 'taqdir' states a very important law of psychology according to which heredity and environment constitute a sufficient ground for the occurrence of subsequent changes.[30] On this view, if any one were fully conversant with the hereditary and environmental

forces which are relentlessly impinging upon man, he would have been in a position to make, like God, the most accurate predictions about future acts and ways of behaviour of that man. Same is the case with happenings and events of the universe. God has a complete and full knowledge of the conditions which man cannot simply have, –a fact which the Qur'an stresses over and again. Even when man has the capacity to foresee something into future, his foresight is problematical.[31] God's foresight, on the other hand, is categorical and apodeictic.[32] God's capacity to possess an unerring foresight in the sense stated above is what is meant by His omniscience and His Divine knowledge.

There is one more point in connection with the interpretation I have put on the word 'taqdir'. Thus interpreted 'taqdir' and Divine Knowledge can well explain the immanence as well as the transcendence of God; for in order to know all the conditions, both hereditary and environmental, God must identify Himself with and 'dip deep into' the object whose future is to be known: this is 'immanence'. But He should also be distinct from and superior to the object, for only then He will be able to know all the particulars about it: this is 'transcendence'. It also meets the very important question, 'Does the universe face up to God as a veritable 'other', existing per se and independently of Him? On this view, as we have seen before, neither the universe confronts God as a veritable 'other', nor is it quite identical and coextensive with Him. The universe is the manifestation of God, for it all the time depends upon Him for its existence as well as continuance.[33] God has created the universe, but He has not created it once for all, withdrawing from it and leaving it to its own fate. Every moment He is creating it– a fact which has been expressed in the verses like, "God adds to His creation what He wills",[34] and again, "His throne includeth the Heavens and the earth, and He is never weary of preserving them",[35] and so on. Perhaps Descartes[36] and Spinoza, in their theory of Substance, better understood and expressed the relationship of God to the universe than any of the modern philosophers and theologians.

Notes and References

[1] "Discursive knowledge - a temporal process which moves round a veritable other', supposed to exist per se and confronting the knowing ego" - Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam*, p. 77.
[2] C.D. Board, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, pp. 17-18.
[3] A. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, p. 157.
[4] *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 2 10.
[5] Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 77.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 77
[7] "Pantheism only conceives of the relationship between the Divine Principle and things from the one point of view of substantial, or existential continuity, and this is an error, explicitly rejected by every traditional doctrine"---T. Burkhatdt, *An Introduction to Sufi Doctrine* p. 23..
[8] Deism, which emphasizes God's transcendence-H. Titus, *Living Issues in Philosophy*, p. 388.
[9] Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 56.
[10] Muhammad bin As'ad Jalal-al-Din (830/1427-907–11501- or 908/1502), taught at the Madrasat al-Aitam, was famous for his knowledge and learning and became the Qadi at the Courts of Hasan Beg Khan Bahadur and Sultan Yaqub. He revived philosophical disciplines during the Ottoman period, reorientated the study of Shahab al-Din Maqtul.
[11] Fakhar al-Din Iraqi, one of the Sufis who are especially important in introducing the gnostic doctrines of Ibn Arabi into the Shiah world.
[12] Josiah Royce (1855-1916) an advocate of Absolute Idealism and a celebrated contemporary of William James and John Dewey.
[13] Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p. 78.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *The Holy Qur'an.* 6:59.
[16] *Ibid.*, 31:32.
[17] *Ibid.*, 2:255.
[18] *Ibid.*, 31:34.
[19] *Ibid.*, 4:25, 6:139 etc.
[20] *Ibid.*, 31:34, 49:13 etc.

[21] *Ibid.*, e.g. 6: 83, 6:128,4: 25, etc.
[22] *Ibid.*, 44: 38.
[23] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 79.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Elias' Modern Dictionary*: Arabic-English, p. 527.
[29] This is what Ibn Arabi calls 'rigid determinism'---*A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. by M. M. Sharif, p. 417.
[30] R. S. Woodorth, *Psychology*, pp. 154-55.
[31] "Problematic judgements are those in which affirmation or negation is taken as merely possible (optional) " - Immanuel Kant', *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. N. K. Smith, pp. 109-10.
[32] "In assertoric judgements affirmation or negation is viewed as real (true), and in apodeictic judgements as necessary", *ibid.*, p. 110.
[33] This was the position of Spinoza also, See W. K. Wright, *A History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 98.
[34] *The Holy Qur'an*, 35:1
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 2: 255
[36] W. K. Wright, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

APPENDIX C

RUSSELL'S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION

No defence of religion is complete which does not include a refutation of Bertrand Russell's (the great English philosopher) critique of religion. His arguments against religion, which are particularly contained in his famous book *Why I Am Not A Christian*, are very forceful and hold out a real threat to religion. What makes them still more dangerous is the fact that they have been propounded in a very lucid and simple way, and contain all the literary merits which characterize Freud's *The Future of An Illusion*, which we have discussed at some length in our chapter on 'Psycho-analysis and Religion'; and which for many years, perhaps to this day, has been a real headache for the religious men. It may be interesting to note that Russell agrees with Freud on many important points while discussing the origin of religion. In the present account of his position, consequently, I propose to keep the views of psycho-analysts of the Vienna School always in mind and, where necessary, to bring out affinity or resemblance between the two great thinkers of the present century. Russell, like Freud, as we shall see, is mainly interested in questions about the origin, utility, and truth of religion - the three basic questions which any one, who enters into this territory to plead the case for or against religion, finds himself forced to answer.

Beginning with questions about origin. In the First Part, I have already discussed at some length answers to some of these questions propounded by persons belonging to different schools of philosophy and psychology. In this connection, I have discussed the views of medical materialists like Huxley and Sheldon, and of psychoanalysts from two important sects of

Freud and Jung. While discussing Russell's account of the origination of religion, we shall find that at certain important points he agrees with some of them, without claiming his sympathies with any of these schools. He agrees with Freud that religion is primarily based upon fear, partly at least upon "the terror of the unknown".[1] This unknown includes the occult and weird forces of nature without and the instinctual forces within, and, of course, something more besides. As we have seen in the relevant chapter, Freud advocated a similar position in *The Future of an Illusion* where he based religion on the fear of natural and instinctual forces. Russell, however, includes under the feat of the unknown the "fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of death.[2]

Russell adds to fear at least two more motives of religion, viz. conceit and hatred, and remarks, "The purpose of religion, one may say, is to give an air of respectability to these passions".[3] He condemns religion, on the ground that "because these passions make on the whole for human misery that religion is a force for evil, since it permits men to indulge these passions without restraint,..."[4] This is giving a dog a bad name and hanging him. Also Russell's inference to these three motives seems to be based on his observation of ills caused by Christianity during the Middle Ages. He explicitly refers to the ills in his chapter on 'Can Religion Cure Our Troubles?' and writes that religion is inimical to the important virtues of truthfulness and intellectual integrity, and encourages obscurantism. He emphatically talks of the cruelties and persecutions done by Christians in the name of religion. The gravest of the vices disseminated by Christianity, and perhaps by other religions too, according to Russell, is its indifference to the important virtues of kindness and intelligence. ''Intelligence'', he says, "is impeded by any creed, no matter what; and kindness is inhibited by belief in sin and punishment..."[5]

There is no doubt that what Russell states are historical facts, but we should not forget that religion is not what the religious men do or have been doing. Moreover, what is true of Christians is not necessarily true of, say, Muslims or Jews, etc. He acknowledges himself, "The Empire of the Caliphs was much

kinder to Jews and Christians than Christian States were to Jews and Muhammadans. It left Jews and Christians unmolested, provided they paid tribute".[6] Again, Russell commits the famous 'hysteron proteron' when he argues that Christians have been committing all those atrocities and cruelties because religion is based on the passion of fear, conceit and hatred. There is no warrant for drawing this inference, particularly in the case of other religions, from the fact of persecutions and other ills done by Christians during the Middle Ages.

The ills of religion mentioned above are, perhaps, due to the fact that religious assertions do not admit of any verification; they do not stand the test of reason (say the impugners of religion) that is why religious men have to encourage obscurantism. To back this criticism, Russell and others appeal to the wide-spread disagreements in religious matters, and to the fact that usually religious men have to take to force and coercion to bring round the opponent to their own standpoint. While comparing scientific statements with religious assertions Russell writes: "When two men of science disagree, they do not invoke the secular arm; they wait for further evidence to decide the issue, because, as men of science, they know that neither is infallible. But when two theologians differ, since there are no criteria to which either can appeal, there is nothing for it but mutual hatred, and an open or covert appeal to force".[7] This point, however, I need not discuss any more as I have spent some time and space on it in my chapter on the "Verification of Religious Experience". Suffice it to say that Russell's (and, of course, the logical positivists') denial of any religious criterion is a petitio principii. He takes for granted what he (and others) is called upon to prove, i.e. that there are no criteria to which a theologian may appeal in case there arises a disagreement.

Russell examines two basic notions of theistic religion -i.e. God and Immortality. He examines various arguments propounded from time to time by theologians, to prove the existence of God, the pivotal notion of theistic religion. He examines the 'first cause argument',[8] 'the natural Law argument',[9] 'the argument from design',[10] 'the moral argument for deity',[11] and 'the argument from the remedying of

injustices',[12] and shows all of them to be null and void. He discusses the question of existence of God more elaborately in his debate with Father F. C. Copleston which was broadcast in 1948 on the Third Programme of the B. B. C. and was later, published in his book *Why I Am Not A Christian*.[13] He pushes Copleston into admission that in one sense God is a phantom and in another a value or a system of values,[14] and this amounts to the abandonment of his original position that by God he means "a supreme personal being".[15] I need not enter into any detailed consideration of these arguments some of which I have tackled in my chapter on 'Proofs for Religion'.

Against the refutation of almost all the various proofs for the existence of God, the theologians have resorted of late to another line of defence. They argue that, though none of the arguments so far offered is convincing, it is, none the less, undeniable that a belief in the existence of God and the Hereafter has better consequences. Though it is not possible to establish the truthfulness of a religious belief, they say, yet it is quite possible that the presence of such a belief may lead to better practical results than its absence. I need not go into any details on this matter for I have already spent a good deal of space and time on it in my chapter on the "Verification of Religious Experience" (see the Pragmatic Test), but I feel inclined to devote some place to a consideration of Russell's position on this point. He appears to have upheld that truth and utility being two separate categories, no amount of utility accruing from a belief in God can go any way to establish the truthfulness of that belief. To say that it can, would be to commit the well-known 'definist fallacy'.[16] Russell admits that many people are virtuous, or abstain from committing a vice, simply because they fear God and wish to avoid hell-fire. But the category of truthfulness, he says, is more important than that of usefulness; a thing may be useful and, none the less, false.

There is no doubt that the categories of truth and utility are quite different and that no amount of utility can establish the truth of a belief. But does this mean that the category of usefulness is not relevant? Moreover, what Russell perhaps has in mind is that utility does not 'entail' truthfulness any more than

redness does roundness, the two being different categories. Nobody, I am sure, is going to gainsay this. But one thing is certain, that there is a relationship between truth and utility in the sense that whatsoever is true must also be useful in the long run. There is not a single thing which is true but not useful. In other words, the category of usefulness is dependent on the category of truthfulness, and though it cannot be said to establish the truthfulness of a belief, it may be an indication to that. The utility of a thing can serve as an 'indicator' or 'pointer' of its truth, just as redness of an apple can serve for the indicator of its ripeness. It may be pointed out that granting whatever is true is also useful, whatever is useful may not be true. On many occasions, falsehood flourishes and the truth fails. No doubt, it is very often the case. But in the long run truth must flourish and falsehood meet its fall; it is present in the very connotation of truth and falsehood. Then, utility becomes necessarily dependent on, and synchronous with, truth and an 'indicator' thereof. It is in this sense that utility becomes an important category in the case of religious experience.

The question of immortality of soul, the second important notion in religion, Russell discusses elaborately in the chapter on "Do We Survive Death?" He discusses possibility of posthumous, existence on the basis of continued existence of the same person over years, despite all the changes he suffers during his life-time. He argues that the notion of a persistent physical or mental substance underlying the changing facets of an object is no longer tenable. Nobody can gainsay that the matter of a body is continually changing by the processes of nutriment and wastage; and, in the same way, our mental life is made up of continually shifting acts of perception, will, and feeling, and there is no abiding substance like mind or soul beneath them, just as there is no permanent physical entity beneath the changing bodily facets. But why, then, should there appear to be something persistent behind all these bodily and mental changes? What makes us conceive of the notion of a 'persisting self'? Russell says, "The continuity of a human body is a matter of appearance and behaviour, not of substance".[17] "The mental continuity of a person is a continuity of habit and memory:..."[18] and inasmuch as our habits and memories are bound up (he goes

on to say) with the structure of brain, and both body and brain-structure are dissolved at death, with them habit and memory may also be expected to be dissolved.[19] In other words, at death both our body and at least a certain portion of our mental personality are dissolved and finished. But what about the part determined by heredity? Even this part does not appear to survive the disintegration of body, because our heredity is bound up in certain chemical substances which constitute genes and chromosomes. Thus, both hereditary and acquired aspects of personality are bound up with certain bodily structures, and will vanish with the dissolution of those structures, nothing remaining which can be said to survive death.

Why is it, then, that we are nclined to believe in an after-life? Russell contends that because we are afraid of death for, as he says himself, "If we genuinely and whole-heartedly believed in the future life, we should cease completely to fear death".[20] He also refers to the considerable military value of our belief in Paradise for the first time proved by Muslims.[21] A need for a belief in the hereafter also emerges from the fact of injustice prevalent in the world; for we generally find the virtuous miserable and the vicious prospering. Our sense of justice demands that the former should be made happy, the latter unhappy, if not in this life, in the life to come. This is the famous 'argument from the remedying of injustice' usually propounded for the proof of God.

The plausibility of Russell's arguments against survival follows from his two basic assumptions; (i) there is no 'soul' or self subsisting behind the fleeting mental events, and the so-called mental continuity of a person is the continuity of habit and memory; and (ii) mental events are so closely bound up with the events in the brain that there exists a one-one correlation between the brain and the mind so that the whole of mental personality of man-the acquired as well as hereditary-has been completely determined by the structure of his 'brain and nervous-system'. Now, if the above assumptions are true, the mental events must cease with the annihilation of brain-events. But the researches of some of the prominent scientists and philosophers during the last century and the present, conducted

under the auspices of Society for Psychical Research (SPR), have shown that there are certain aspects of the mental life of man which do not seem to have any dependence on the brain or nervous structure. These they have chosen to call 'Psi' and designate "the whole family of apparent phenomena and experiences, real or alleged, for which no physical cause has as yet been discovered".[22] "Psi" include a large variety of phenomena such as telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and retrocognition, and the phenomena of apparitions[23] so often demonstrated by the Spiritualists. Particularly relevant to our present purpose are the phenomena of apparitions of the dead which make their appearance either synchronously with the event of their death or sometimes afterwards. Such appearances for which there is a good deal of strong evidence available, if they cannot be rejected as mere mental fabrications, afford a good testimony for the possibility of posthumous existence, and there are some instances collected by the researchers which cannot so easily be rejected as mere mental constructs. In this connection we may refer to the case of some Mrs. V. cited by Frederic Myers.[24] It may be pointed out that the researchers not only studied the spontaneous cases, but also conducted strictly controlled experiments with card packs and drawings.[25]

The research, it may be pointed out, has been conducted by some renowned philosophers, mathematicians, chemists, biologists, physicists and classical scholars; and among the first of them were men like Henry Sidgwick, Lord Rayleigh, Crookes, Barrett, J. J. Thomson, A. J. Balfour, William James, Henri Bergson, and L. P. Jacks.[26] These researches have been conducted under Society for Psychical Research in England and America at such important universities as Cambridge and Oxford, and the Duke University. Researches have also been done in France and Germany. It may be mentioned that the renowned psychoanalysts, Freud[27] and Jung,[28] were also convinced of the phonomenon of telepathy. Some of the renowned scholars like Lord Rayleigh, F. Myers, Crookes, Mrs. Sidgwick, Gurney, Lodge, and William James all accepted survival on the basis of their research into the phenomena of apparitions and retrocognition. In England Professor H. H. Price[29] and C. D. Broad,[30] in France Henri Bergson[31] and

Pascal,[32] and in America Professor Gardner Murphy[33] also in some sense, believed in the possibility of survival. There is no doubt that a majority of the scientists and philosophers are as yet not willing to concede that such phenomena are genuine, but what is encouraging is that adverse majority is thinning out with every further advancement in research. However, in the face of these advancements in the study of psychical matters, which are getting more and more advocacy from among the well-known scientists and scholars, it may be said that there is some growing evidence for posthumous life and that Russell's contention that mind dies with the body is losing in tenability.

To end, it will be well to return to a point which I have already discussed at some length in a previous chapter. It is a very common opinion, rather faith, in the West (in a lesser degree in the East also) that the present peril in which mankind is today is due to the renunciation of the Christian faith, and to the execution of certain anti-Christian and anti-moral practices by the Nazis and the Communists, and that the only remedy lies in a return to faith, they say, the Christian faith. Consequently, there is a general revival of religion in the West. Easterners, as said above, share the same sentiments with the Westerners in the matter. Against this common opinion Russell refers to various ills begotten by religion, specially by Christianity, amongst which he enumerates indifference to truthfulness or intellectual integrity and encouragement of obscurantism. He contends that the present situation is due to a lack of a fully rational attitude to the world problems. What can cure the ills under the circumstances, he says, is not an abandonment of reason and a return to religion (as is generally held today), which is faith and unreason, but the adoption of a more reasonable attitude. It is reason which has brought humanity to the threshold of an imminent danger no doubt, but a return to religion will not retrieve the situation a whit; it may, on the other hand, aggravate it by bringing back in its wake all the ills of the Middle Ages Christianity and the world, after coming out of the frying pan, may go into the fire. Russell very expressly says, "What the world needs is not dogma, but an attitude of scientific inquiry, combined with a belief that the torture of millions is not desirable, whether inflicted by Stalin or by a Deity imagined in

the likeness of the believer".[34] He also urges, like Freud in *The Future of an Illusion*,[35] "As civilization progresses, the earthly sanctions become more secure and the divine sanctions less so".[36] It may be pointed out here that Russell and other champions of the cause of reason also over-shoot the mark in their turn. As I have contended in my chapter on "The Proofs for Religion", what is requisite under the circumstances is a right amalgamation of reason and faith, the former providing a proper understanding of the situation in which the world finds itself today, the latter a right type of zest or motive for the execution of more befitting behaviour in the case. Iqbal has advocated a kindred type of amalgam.

In fairness to Russell, it may be well to point out that in his early youth he was religious and "for a long time accepted the argument of the First Cause",[37] till he read Mill's 'autobiography' which suggested to him a difficulty in the First Cause argument. He gave up the argument and with that his faith in God also. Remarking on this Edger Brightman writes, "Russell gave up the First Cause for a trivial question about the cause of the First Cause, and seems thereafter not to have explored seriously the possibility of there being a God, except in his study of Leibnitz's theistic argument".[38] Brightman suggests that perhaps, ".... Russell was from the start but slightly attached to religion....."[39] Again he adds that in the investigation of any subject the investigator may take an internal or an external point of view, and that Russell seems to have " externally apprehended and roughly understood"[40] religion. He remarks, "...Russell also seems to have remained at a pretty remote distance from primary sources of religious insight. His method has been mainly external; he thus enjoys the advantages and the disadvantages of the man from Mars".[41] His treatment of the subject is unsympathetic; it seems to be "... to a great extent critical in the negative sense, rather than constructive".[42]

Brightman says that Russell's critical philosophy of religion is mainly a polemic against historical Christianity. "He has apparently devoted little study", says Brightman, "to non-Christian religions or to the essence of universal religion– the Idea which makes any religion religious".[43] It is quite

obvious to the reader of his *Why I Am Not A Christian*, though every now and then he takes up some general questions regarding the nature, fundamentals, and truth of religion in general. His chief concern in that book is a refutation of the Christian faith. And where he appears to be waging a general criticism of religion, again he seems to have Christianity in his mind as the model for all religion. Thus his critique is primarily a critique of Christianity, and only secondarily and indirectly a critique of religion generally.

In his book *The Problems of Philosophy* (1911) Russell admits that questions of the profoundest interest to the spiritual life cannot be solved with our present limited powers, that questions regarding the permanence of consciousness and the importance of good and evil to the universe cannot be answered in propositions which are demonstrably true. But he closes his book with a profoundly religious confession that mind is "capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good".[44] Brightman urges against Russell, "In religion, he has applied the most rigid standard–either complete demonstration or no truth..."[45], a rigidity which he relaxes while treating of other subjects. In his treatment of both ethics and religion, Russell seems to be relying too much on reason and intellectual understanding. In his *Religion and Science* (1935) he denies all objectivity to values when he says that "questions of value, which of course are germane to ethics as well as to religion, "cannot be intellectually decided at all". Values "lie outside the realm of truth and falsehood". "Science has nothing to say about 'values'" (223), and "what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know" (243). "Thus on epistemological grounds, Russell arrives at a complete ethical and religious skepticism".[46] But the question arises 'Does he adhere to skepticism in his practical life also'? Do not we find that his life has been guided by certain values which he knows and believes to be preferable to their opposites?

These questions bring us to the positive side of Russell's philosophy of religion. In *Why I Am Not A Christian*, though mainly concerned with a criticism of the traditional Christianity, he stresses upon the importance of two values, viz. kindness and

intelligence.[47] He admits them to be the guiding passions of his life. In *In Praise of Idleness and Other Essays*, he mentions with approval the Christian values of humanity, love of one's neighbour, and respect for the rights of the meek.[48] Again, says Brightman, "Russell's life has been notable for its devotion to human values, individual and social. Human happiness, justice, freedom, and co-operation have been objects of his loyalty, ever since he defied the universe in their behalf in the 'Free Man'".[49] No one can gainsay that truth stands out prominently in Russell's list of values. Search for truth has been the main errand of his life, and truth includes for him scientific advancements. Russell acknowledges that "we owe to Christianity a certain respect for the individual;..."[50] and, despite his polemic on Christianity, he remarks, "The educational machine, throughout Western civilization, is dominated by two ethical theories: that of Christianity and that of nationalism. These two, when, taken seriously, are incompatible, as is becoming evident in Germany. For my part, I hold that, where they differ, Christianity is preferable, but where they agree, both are mistaken"[51] Despite his denunciation of traditional and institutional Christianity, he acknowledges that some of the important virtues we owe to her. To that extent he approves of Christianity.

In his four famous works, *The Free Man's Worship* (1903), *The Principles of Social Reconstruction* (1916), *The Conquest of Happiness* (1930), and above all, his essay "The Essence of Religion", published in the *Hibbert Journal* in 1912, we find him delineating the four essentials of his religion. These are, "a sense of infinity, a sense of membership in the whole, resignation, and social justice".[52] By the sense of infinity he means "the selfless untrammelled life in the whole which frees man from the prison-house of eager wishes and little thoughts".[53] Infinity and membership in the whole are thus inseparable. These qualities for Russell are universal and impartial as contrasted with the finite, self–centred, and particular in man. Russell condemns patriotism on the ground of its lack of universality and infinity. Infinity and membership in the whole are the mystical qualities which he shares with the most confirmed of the mystics, which mark out mystical or religious aspect of his nature. From these mystical qualities flows resignation by which Russell means

"freedom from anger and indignation and preoccupied regret".[54] Christianity meant by this word 'submission to the will of God', while Russell means by it 'a submission to the service of others' or the promotion of social values as contrasted with the individual values. This resignation leads to the fourth and last of the essentials of Russell's religion, i.e. love of others or social justice, for a resignation of your own good to that of the social whole is possible only when you love your fellowmen. Russell tells us, "Any adequate religion" will lead us to temper inequality of affection by love of justice, and to universalize our aims by realizing the common needs of man".[55] These four fundamentals, it may be pointed out, are the basic requirements of any true religion; they constitute the essence of religion.

It appears from these mystical aspects of Russell's life that he is not to be regarded as an absolute religious skeptic, though he may be an atheist. His polemic on religion, as has been said before, is really a polemic on traditional and institutional Christianity which is dogmatic and assertive. Russell expresses in 'What I Believe' that he wants "a new religion, based upon liberty, justice and love, not authority and law and hell-fire".[56] In his essay on 'useless knowledge', Russell expressly says: "For those to whom dogmatic religion can no longer bring comfort, there is need of some substitute, if life is not to become lusty and harsh and filled with trivial self-assertion".[57] It is obvious from this passage that what Russell denounces in religion is its dogmatism, and that he is in search of a non-dogmatic religion to replace it. He also admits that a life without any sort of religion whatever is liable to become "lusty and harsh and filled with trivial self-assertion". If we read between the lines, it seems to be the case that he is annoyed with religion as he finds it in practice. His writings are filled with a contempt for the clergy and the church.[58] What he appears to be groping for is a rationally-based religion which will serve to cater for the betterment of the world, without leading to any of the ills disseminated by traditional Christianity. As we have said before, Iqbal has been emphasizing a kindred amalgamation of reason and faith as the only remedy for the crisis man is facing today.

Before concluding this brief discussion of Russell's philosophy of religion, it will be well to reiterate one very important feature of his treatment of the subject. He rejects theism because there is no rational way to prove the existence of God. In this connection, he is happy that there is at least one great religion which is without God. His reference is explicitly to Buddhism, which betrays all the essentials of religion except a belief in God. Russell thinks that such a belief is not essential to religion, though it may be indispensable to a theistic religion. In fact, he appears to be distinguishing between theistic and non-theistic religions and is sympathetic towards the latter. In this respect, he very widely differs from Iqbal, with whom the essence of true religion is a belief in God and the Holy Prophet.

Notes and References

[1] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 16
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*,., p. 179.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[7] *Ibid.*,., p. 173.
[8] *Ibid*,. pp. 3-4.
[9] Ibid., pp. 4-6.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
[11] *Ibid*,. pp. 7-8
[12] *Ibid.*, pp 8-9.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 144-168.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 159.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 144.
[16] See "The Naturalistic Fallacy" by W. K. Frankena in *Readings in Ethical Theory*, ed. Sellars and Hospers, p. 109.
[17] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 70.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*,., p. 71.
[20] *Ibid.*. p. 72.

[21] *Ibid.*
[22] R. Heywood, *The Sixth Sense*, p 14.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 57-61.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-52.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[27] *Psychoanalysis and Telepathy*, pub. 1941.
[28] *Naturerklärung und Psyche*, Rascher Verlag Zürich, 1952.
[29] *Survival and the Idea of Another World*, pub. Proceedings SPR, Vol. L, p. I et seq.
[30] *Personal Identity and Survival*. ASPR. Vol. xxxix, 1945.
[31] *Matiere et. Memoire* (Felix Alcan. 1908).
[32] *Pensées sur la religion*, Eng. tr. W. F. Trotter (1908).
[33] *Field Theory and Survival*, Journal ASPR, Vol. xxxix, 1945.
[34] *Why I Am Not A Christian*, p. 180.
[35] S. Freud, *The Future of An Illusion*, pp. 75-76.
[36] *Ibid.*,.,p. 171.
[37] P.A. Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, p. 540.
[38] *Ibid*
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 541.
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 541-42.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 542.
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 250.
[45] P. A. Schilpp, *Ibid.*, p. 546.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 546-47.
[47] *Why I Am Not A Christian*. p. 179.
[48] *In Praise of Idleness*, p. 119.
[49] *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, p. 550.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 192.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 235.
[52] *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, p. 552
[53] *Hibbert journal*, 1912. pp. 46-47.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 56.
[55] B. Russell, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, p. 58.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[58] See Russell's book *Religion and the Churches*.

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