THE COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

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Dedicated to Sophia (Wisdom)

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The present work consists of comparative studies of various thinkers both Muslims and he European modern philosophical movements, specially, existentialism.

The first section the book deals with the comparison of Mulla Sadrā, his contemporaries, the impact of the Greek philosophers, the modern European philosophers, specially, existentialism and Iqbal.

The second section tends to show the impact of Rumi's thought on Iqbal. There is a detailed discussion of main concepts of Rumi's theosophy and comparison of Rumi and Iqbal.

The third part seems slightly different from the afore-mentioned two parts, because, it is comparative analysis of two modern intellectual movements and schools of thoughts, i.e., psychoanalysis and Existentialism. In my view, however, this comparison is relevant to the first two sections, specially, in the case of Sadrā whose thought has been compared with existentialism and essentialism.

According to some academic circle it is an exercise in futility. Their argument is that it would be projection of modern ideas into philosophers and theories belonging to different periods of history, and different cultures and religious on different disciplines. For example, comparing Sadrā firstly with the classical thinkers and later on with the modern western philosophers. Similarly, contrasting Sadrā and Iqbal on one hand, Iqbal and Rumi on the other hand. In the same way, psychoanalysis and existentialism (though both

of them are modern European schools) belong to different disciplines. The former is a school of psychology and the latter is a school of philosophy.

In my humble opinion, the comparative studies are worthwhile, on account of the fact that there are resemblances between the human thoughts, even if they are separated in terms of time and place. No one can deny that the human mind has raised the similar questions about the nature of reality, and in some cases even the answers are similar. Therefore, such studies are fruitful from the following points of view:

a. From historical academic point of view it is interesting to note the affinities, anticipations and differences, as well.

b. Such comparative studies are also imperative, in order to establish universalism of human intellectual patterns, and continuity of human intellectual processes, despite the differences.

c. To bridge the gap between different ages and civilizations by indicating affinities and resemblances.

The purpose of the present work is to accomplish the above-mentioned goals. But I would not claim that this is the end of the journey. Much has to be done in this respect. It would be exciting, interesting and informative to draw further parallel not only between Sadrā, Rumi and Iqbal and other thinkers, both classical and the modern, movement such as Existentialism and Psychoanalysis.

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Part I
Mulla Sadrā

LIFE HISTORY OF MULLA SADRĀ

Sadrā was born in Shiraz to a notable family of court-officials in 1571 or 1572. He was the only son who was named Mohmmad but called Sadrā. He moved at first to Qazvin in 1592 A.D., later on to Isfahan in 1597A.D. He studies philosophy, theology, the traditions (حديث) and the Quranic hermeneutics.

His teachers were Mir Mohmmad Baqar Damad and Sheikh Baha al-Din 'Amile' who was the leading jurist in Shah Abbas I's reign. Mir Damad taught him philosophy, theology and illuminationist thought, with Sheikh Bahai he studies the Quran and Hadith. He was interested in Sufism, Sufi poetry and law.

In 1601-2 A.D., he returned to Shiraz to teach, but could not find an adequate patron. Then retreated to the village of Kahak near Qom to meditate where he developed his magnum opus i.e. *al Asfār al Arba'ah*. His retreat lasted five years. Later on he stared teaching in Qom, and his family estates in Shiraz.

During his retreat Qom, he married. He had five children, two daughters and three sons.

He completed *al-Asfār* in 1628 A.D at Shriaz. He also taught science and philosophy at a local institute. Sir Thomas Herbart in the same year (i.e. 1628) described it as a college in Shiraz where philosophy, astrology, physics, chemistry and mathematics were taught. He stayed and taught there until his death. After an illustrious career he died on his way to Basra

for his seventh Hajj. His date of death probably was 1604 A.D.

The total number of his works was forty five, including "*Al-Shawāhid al-Rububiyya*" (The Divine Witnesses), "*Al Masha'ir*", *Hikma al-'anshyya,* and of course, the famous "*Al Asfār al-Arba'ah.*"

Sadrā al-Din Shirazi (1571/72—1604A.D) more commonly known as Mullā Sadrā was a great original thinker of the Muslim Worl. According to the editor[1] of his book— "*Al Asfā*r Araba" (Vol. I, Tehran, 1958) the list of Sadrā's works included numerous treatises. He was a prolific writer. As an introduction to his *al-Asfār* he wrote 32 to 33 treatises.

His contribution to Muslim philosophy is immense. His influence in Persia, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and even in Indo-Pak subcontinent cannot be ignored.

No doubt Mullā Sadrā had been a household word, but he remained unknown to the west until the beginning of 20th century. During the early years of the century E.G. Browne and Max Horten directed attention of the orientalists to his thought.

The discovery and study of Mullā Sadrā is highly significant for the historian and the students of Muslim thought, because, there has been a misconception prevailing among the orientalists and also in the general public that the philosophical activity died in the Muslim world after al-Ghazali's deadly attack on philosophy.

The story of Mullā Sadrā's inner life or intellectual journey was narrated in the preface of '*al-Asfār al-Arba'ah*' . According to the preface's narrative Sadrā had a keen desire to study and understand the problems of theosophy or philosophical theology. He felt the above-mentioned keenness right from the beginning of his academic career. Therefore, he studies very seriously the thought of the past thinkers. He was not interested in mere rhetoric or sophistry

in order to become famous. He concentrated on real and deep understanding of the issues and the questions discussed by the masters. Thus he studies the peripatetics and the illuminationists. Then he decided to write a comprehensive work harmonizing wisdom of the past with his own original ideas. However, his earnest efforts to do so failed. According to the autobiographical preface of '*al-Asfār*' there was not only criticism but also threat of persecution by the traditionalists Ulema who were not ready to accept any new interpretation of the religious dogma. They considered it dangerous and sense unpardonable.

Sadrā was deeply hurt and shocked. He decided to leave Isfahan. He retired to Kahak— a small far away village near Qum off the road between Qum and Isfahan. According to Hussain Nasr:

> The town of Kahak itself, probably was not chosen by accident. It sits like a jewel in a valley surrounded by outwardly barren hills with higher mountain chains extending into horizon. It belongs to the natural locus where Qum itself was built— a city which remains to this day a holy centre of Persia, prophesied to remain uncorrupted to the end of time— the city where Mullā Sadrā's own teacher Mir Dāmād had received his supreme spiritual vision. [2]

Nasr continued:

> There are some mysterious aspects of Mullā's life which have not as yet unraveled. There stands a saint's tomb overlooking the two on one of the hills. Perhaps this saint— this spiritual master attracted Mulla Sādrā to this idyllic place. [3]

Whatever the reasons might be for choosing Kahak, it was true that Sādrā left Isfahan and that was the turning point in his life. Nasr believed that he would had been a celebrated figure even if he had chosen to stay in Isfahan. Then why he decided to leave Isfahan? According to the narrative of the preface of '*al-Asfār*' the cause of his retirement was severe criticism and condemnation of his views by the Shia Ulema. But was this the whole story? One fact was evident from the

preface of *'al-Asfsar'* that he was deeply shocked and even heart-broken when he left Isfahan. In his own words:

> The stifling of the intelligence, which follows from the hostility of our period, forced me to retire to a faraway place, holding myself in obscurity and distress, deprived of my hopes, and with a broken hear…[4]

He also experienced repentance on account of the feeling that he had been wrong to have the worldly ambitions of glory and for being over confident of his own intellectual abilities as well as relying on the logical reasoning. So he decided to submit himself entirely to God's will with humility and sincerity.

In the opinion of Hossein Nasr, "Sādrā's decision to retire from the cosmopolitan centre of Isfahan to Kahak must be the result of an inner urge to go into solitude, for in solitude are satisfied the needs of the contemplative soul for a direct encounter with the spiritual world; because, the inner and outer stillness is a prerequisite of all spiritual experience."[5]

However Nasr maintained that it would be false to conclude that Sādrā's retreat to Kahak was only for negative reasons. He was also urged inwardly to seek a treat from the turmoils of social life in order to achieve that inner purification which was the necessary basis for the attainment of the wisdom which was his main objective.

According to H. Nasr[6] his retirement was search for another dimension of his intellect and personality in order to achieve full development. So he left Isfahan for this specific purpose with his departure from Isfahan ended the first period of his life which was that of formal learning, and to begin the second period which was devoted to the spiritual training that Sādrā considered an absolutely essential condition for those who aspire to reach the Divine mysteries and gain a true knowledge of *Hikmat-Illhāi* or Theo-sophia in the literal sence.

Fazal-ur-Rehman, however, has a different elucidation of Sādrā's crisis. In his words:

> The training of Sādrā had been that of a philosopher. But this does not mean that he had not studied orthodox disciplines like Hadith, Tafseer and Kalām before he went into seclusion. He was unsure of the philosophical whose purely rational method he regarded as extrinsic. So he retired from the worldly life partly because of the persecution, but largely because he was in search of a method that would give him certainty and would transform merely rational oppositions into experienced truths.[7]

So in the opinion of Fazal-ur-Rehman the real reason of Sādrā's retirement, seclusion and realization of the superficiality of the logical reasoning and adopting the method of meditation, deep and sincere contemplation of the fundamental problems of God, being and the universe. Thus he gave himself up to an intuitive invasion from without.[8]

Fazal-ur-Rehman compared Sādrā's crisis with that of al-Ghazali. Ghazali also described his search for truth in his auto-biographical book *"al Munqidh-min-Dalal"*. According to Fazal-ur-Rehman both Ghazali and Sādrā wanted to transform rational prepositions into experienced truths. Thus the cognitive content of their philosophy and mystic experience was identical. Only the quality, i.e., the degree of certainty was different. Fazal-ur-rehman continued that another difference between them was that Ghazali wished to transform the Sunni Kalam's propositions. However, in the case of Sādrā the object was to transform the rational philosophica propositions and "lived through".

Ghazali in his book — '*Munqidh-min-Dalah*' gave an detailed account of his search for truth. He was an inquisitive person from the childhood. He studies various disciplines and a number of religions. He also noticed that each religion claimed to be the sole carrier and custodian of truth. Ghazali also analysed the various sources of knowledge. For instance, he examined sense-perception and rejected it as

untrustworthy because of the plenmena of illusions and hallucinations. He also examined reason which considered a reliable source of knowledge, but felt tremors of doubt. The cause of his scepticism was the phenomena of dreams in which everything of seemed real. However, on waking we find that the case was otherwise. Thus the phenomena of dreams pointed the possibility of another state in which the truths of reason would appear like phantoms of dreams, i.e., unreal. So Ghazali on account of the above-mentioned observation reached the stage of complete and all scepticism. The psychosomatics symptom of this mental state appeared in the form of the loss of speech. Consequently, he left the teaching job and went on pilgrimage to various holy places. He traveled for almost twelve years, slowly and gradually his paralysis of the tongue was cured. According to his statement in '*al Munqidh-min-Dalal*' his deliverance from total scepticism was made possible through the spiritual mystic experience.

How far Sādrā really resembled Ghazali? In my humble opinion despite some-resemblance between Sādrā and Ghazali, there were noticeable differences between them which were the followings:

(i) Sādrā renounced the world partly because of the intense opposition he met on account of his views. Ghazali, on the other hand, was not facing any such external pressures. But Sādrā in the preface of *al-Asfār* clearly stated that he had to face strong negative reactions. Therefore, Sādrā's retirement if not wholly, then at least partly was due to external factors. But in the case of Ghazali his inner philosophical crisis was the sole cause of the retirement.

(ii) Sādrā's doubt about the truth of the philosophical propositions was largely due to the severe criticism leveled against them. That unbearable criticism shook his self-confidence. Being shaken he lost trust in his own judgment and started doubting the truth of philosophical propositions formulated by him. Hence the very process of doubt was engineered by the external pressure.

In he case of Ghazali thee process of doubt was not the result of an external pressure. It was the outcome of an earnest epistemological search leading to an existential crisis. He did not wish to reach the truth of any specific propositions. His sole goal was to find truth. With this purpose in mind he surveyed all the sources of knowledge methodically and properly.

(iii) Sādrā might had doubted the philosophic formulations constricted by him, but 'doubt' did not become a philosophical methodology for him. However, for Ghazali it became a philosophical method of testing the truth of various sources of knowledge.

(iv) The preface of Sādrā's *al-Asfār* revealed that his scepticism did not transform itself into an existential crisis. Ghazali on the other hand, experienced an existential crisis which manifested itself in the psychosomatic symptom and that as paralysis of the tongue.

(v) Ghazali finally owed his deliverance from state of utter doubt not through reason but the mystic experience. In his own words, "…to the light which God caused to enter his heart."

Sādrā also maintained that truths have to be experienced. But when he used the term experience he did not mean what was generally known as Sufi in mystic experience. He meant by it an intuitive apprehension of truth or rational experience (*mushāda aqliya)*. That he opposed to superficial logical reasoning and disputation. In order to clarify that above-mentioned point we should study the following extract:

> …correct rational cannot contradict intuitive experience. [9]

The above-mentioned extract shows that Sādrā did not deny the validity of reason. For him intuition and reason were not contradictories. They were only contraries or perhaps just two different forms of the same source of knowledge. According to Sādrā intuition was a higher form of reason.

Thus they should be considered complementaries rather than contradictories.

(vi) Ghazali's scepticism led him to deny even the validity and reliability of reason as a source of human knowledge. However, Sādrā did no reject reason altogether. Even after attaining intuitive certainty he presented detailed and thorough logical proofs and arguments in favour of his formulations. As Fazal-ur-Rehman (Intro., p. 4) had pointed out that according to Sādrā the nature of existence was something to be experienced, yet the presented numerous extensive rational arguments to prove his point of view. That shows his inclination to consider the intuitive truth as essentially intellectual truth and the intuitive experience as cognitive experience.

(vii) Sādrā maintained that the experience or intuition was required not to produce new thought content but to transform a thought content into a personal quality. That was the essential difference between Sādrā and those Sufis who denied that their experience had any intellectual content which they declared to be ineffable. Such Sufis instead of dealing with philosophic propositions, devoted themselves to a purely experiential spiritual itinerary ending up in an ethico-ecstastic ideal. In Fazal-ur-Rehman's words:

> There is no trace of this in Sādrā's thought and there he differs mentally from Ghazali. [10]

One common strain of thought between Sādrā and Ghazali was their reluctance to accept purely intellectual philosophic propositions. Both of them were not satisfied by mere rational arguments. However, Ghazali altogether rejects reason and find peace in mystic experience. Sādrā too feels the need to supplement rational knowledge with experience, i.e., intuition.

The afore-mentioned trend was common among most of the Muslim thinkers belonging to Mediaeval period. Thus their majority manifested dissatisfaction with reason and a

desire to discover a supra-rational source of knowledge. For example Ibn Tufayal in his philosophical novel—Hayy Ibn Yaqzan narrated the story of a child born on a tropical island and was brought up by a deer. He, however, not only survived but also passed through different stages of intellectual development from science to philosophy, and from philosophy to mysticism. Finally experiencing the beatific vision of God.

Descartes and Sādrā

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) — the father of modern European philosophy was born at La Haye (Tavraine). He was the son of a noble family and was educated by the Jesuits of La Fléche, learning ancient languages, scholastic philosophy and mathematics. He found desired certainty and clarity in mathematics alone. The other disciplines did not satisfy him and he abandoned them upon leaving school in 1612A.D. He joined army (1617-19), but often retired to meditate. The problem that stirred him was how to reach that certainty in philosophy which characterized mathematics. He prayed for divine illumination, vowing a pilgrimage to the shrine of Loretto in case his prayer was answered.

Descartes endeavoured to establish a body of certain and self-evident truths. The scholastic philosophy failed to give that sort of knowledge. There were different opinions on one and the same subject. There was not a single subject in philosophy that was not disputed. So Descartes concluded that the edifice of knowledge should be built a new from its very foundations.

There is no doubt about on uncanny resemblance between Descartes "Discourse de mēthode" and Ghazali's "*al-Munqidh*". According to M. Saeed Sheikh: [11]

> There is remarkable similarity between al-Ghazali's method of doubt as given in '*al-Muniqh*' and the one expounded by Descartes in his 'Discours de la method, which appeared in 1047 A.H. (1637 A.D).

Similarly G.H. Lewes exclaimed:

Had any translation of it existed in the days of Descartes, everybody would have cried Plagiarism. [12]

So far we had been discussing the amazing similarity between Ghazali and Descartes, but what about Sadrā and Descartes?

Some sort of affinity seemed to exist between them. Descartes like Sadrā and unsure of philosophical truths and their purely rational or speculative method did not satisfy him. Both of them were searching for a method to reach certainty. Hence their goal was the same. However we must keep in mind the following differences:

(a) Descartes' method for certainty was mathematical. It was not Sadrā's model. He would have called it as extrinsic as rational proofs. After all mathematics was an abstract structure based on reason.

(b) Descartes doubted everything, but could not doubt about itself. That was the point of return for him. From doubt he drew the existence of the doubter and arrived at 'cogito ergo sum' i.e., 'I think. Therefore, I am', and it could be doubted.

Sadrā, on the other hand gave himself up to an intuitive invasion 'from without'. When he retired to Kahak instead of operating by artful reasoning, he contemplated sincerely the basic problems of God, being and the universe.

(c) Descartes doubted everything and regained his confidence by reason. His deliverance from scepticism was through reason. However, Sadrā liberated from doubts by intuition or what he called "experience."

(d) Descartes' scepticism was thoroughly intellectual. As stated earlier he was a man of the world and had worldly pursuits despite his meditations. Therefore, his doubt remained just on the level of intellect. But Sadra's uncertainty

was existential. It touched the inner core of his being. It became the turning point of his life and thought. Hence he renounced the world and spent almost fifteen years in solitude.

(e) Descartes' doubt was epistemological. He wanted to reconstruct the whole structure of human knowledge and to provide a secure basis for sciences. Sadrā's uncertainty was ontological. He wished to experience existence which he finally did.

The afore-mentioned comparison between the Western and the Muslim thought pointed to one important fundamental difference between them. Descartes— the father of modern European philosophy depicted the rational trend which was imbibed by the Western Civilization and consequently it led to the development of thorough going Rationalism and finally Empiricism. Sadrā on the other hand, represented the Muslim tendency to seek a supra-rational source of knowledge and to find final guidance through it. The tendency to so resulted in the evolution of spiritualism and Sufism among the Muslims.

THE CONCEPTS OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE AMONG THE MUSLIM THINKERS

Farabi (870-950) in his ontology mentioned the distinction between essence and existence. According to him 'essence' is the reason why a thing is what it is. 'Existence', on the other hand, is the actuality of essence. If essence and existence were one, we would not have been able to conceive one without the other. In his opinion in the case of created things essence does not necessarily implies the existence of an object, because, it is possible to think of essence without existence, i.e., without knowing whether it exists or not.

After Fārābi, Ibn Sinā sharply distinguishes between essence and existence. Then the question of primacy of one or the other comes to the forefront. Most of the Muslim thinkers hold the view that existence being the common attribute of all beings is a most general concept. Therefore, nothing in reality corresponds to it. The illuminationist philosopher —al-Suhrawardi holds the afore-mentioned view. According to him if we consider 'existence' as reality of essence' as Ibn Sina appears to do, then 'essence' in order to have this attribute, must exist prior to 'existence.' Fazal-ur-Rehman[13] points out that Ibn Sina has been largely misunderstood. Far from saying that "existence" is a mere attribute, he declared it to be the sole Reality of God, while in contingent beings he regards existence to be derived or borrowed from God. Hence additional to particular things that exist. Ibn Sina, draws then hard distinction between essence and existence in reality and consider existence to be

an accident of the essence, though it is not an accident of a thing. However, most subsequent Muslim thinkers thought essence to be the reality and existence a mere subjective abstraction.

Al-Suhrawardi's argument in this respect is that if existence is external realiy or its part, then existence will have to exist and this second existence will in turn have to exist, and then third – so on and so forth. Consequently we will have to imagine infinite series of existences. But the human mind is not capable of imaging any such infinite series. Therefore, al-Suhrawardi concludes that any general concept, e.g. existence, unity, necessity, contingency, etc., whose nature is such that if a corresponding factor or form is assumed to exist in external reality, it will lead to an infinite regress, must be a mental construct existing in mind and not in external reality.

The above-mentioned argument leads to the conclusion that 'existence' is not an extra factor attributed to the external reality. However, al-Suhrawardi draws a different conclusion— a conclusion favouring his thesis that only essences are real and that existence is only a general idea— a secondary intelligible to which nothing corresponds in reality. Sadrā points out that al-Suhrawardi himself contradicted the principle by describing God as pure and necessary Existence.[14]

Sadrā rejects the view that nothing in reality corresponds to existence. He asserts that nothing is real except existence. Since Suhrawardi is the chief exponent of the view that 'essence' is the sole reality and 'existence' only a mental abstraction; therefore, makes it a point to refute his arguments for the reality of 'essence'.

Suhrawardi's first argument is that if existence is a real attribute of essence, and if essence were to exist after existence is united to it; then existence would have existed perse and independently of essence. On the other hand, if

essence would exist together with existence, then essence would exist together, and not through it. Therefore, it will require the second existence.

Sadrā rejects the argument on the plea that essence per se is nothing positive. In external reality essence is not there. What is there, should be considered a mode of existence. Here Sadrā presents a fine analysis of the process of the formulation of concept. He holds that when a mode of existence is presented to the mind, it is the mind that abstracts an essence of a concept, and we must keep in mind that essence is a concept. However, existence escapes it unless it develops a proper intuition for it. It is the mind then which considers essence to be the reality and existence as an accident. He points out that in fact essence is an accident of existence. He goes to the extent of saying that in reality existence is the primary sole reality, while essence arises out of it or from it. Hence it is secondary. [15] In reality there are not two things, i.e., existence and essence, but only one thing, i.e., existence. Therefore, when the mind distinguishes between the two and claims essence to be real, it distorts reality.

Another argument is presented by Suhrawardi according to which existence cannot be related to a non-existent essence, nor to an essence which is neither existent nor non-existent. In the latter case both sides of contradiction will be eliminated. Sadrā's reply is that at certain levels of reality elimination of opposites is not impossible. 'Essence' per se is neutral to existence as well as non-existence. Since an essence per se is what it is — and to exist or not to exist is no part of it. However, if we consider essence not per se but in reality, then it is a matter of observation that essence has no separate reality from existence, since its being is the being of existence itself. Hence, existence cannot be considered as a quality of essence in reality, because, quality presupposes already something existent.

Suhrawardi argues that we can conceive an essence

without knowing that it exists — existence is additional to essence. But we can go on asking the same question about existence, i.e., even after conceiving its existence we still do not know whether it really exists. Sadrā points out that this argument is valid for those who regard existence as separate from essence, but not against his view according to which existence is the sole reality. This sole cannot be conceived. It can only be intuited directly.

Suhrawardi further claims that essence and existence are related. Their relation has an existence and this existence in turn, will be related to the relation, so on *ad infinitum*. Sadrā refutes the argument by pointing out that the distinction between essence and existence exists only in the mind. The relation and infinite regress generated by it also exist only in the mind.

To sum up, Sadrā concludes that al-Suhrawardi rejects the external reality of existence; because he thinks that existence is an abstract noun, and as such it is a mental abstraction. Consequently, he draws the conclusion that it has no reality. Existence is a unique unanalyzable fact. Existence as a concept i.e., a mental abstraction. It is related to existence or reality as 'humanity' is related to real men. [16]

Existence is not an object which has reality. It is the sole reality itself. The distinction between existence and essence– this dualism arises only in the mind.

According to Fazal-ur-Rehman[17] in the afore-mentioned controversy Sadrā pleads his case eloquently, but he is wrong in seeking support from Ibn Sina whom he quotes again and again. In Fazal-ur-Rehman's opinion he has misunderstood Ibn Sina's position. Indeed it is Ibn Sina who makes popular the distinction between essence and existence and introduces the dualism of essence and existence. Later on this theory is rejected by Ibn Rushd, but adopted in the West by Aquinas and among the Muslims by a number of thinkers. For Ibn Sina 'essences' are real and everything is combination of

essence and existence. Sadrās commentator – Al-Sabazwari also points out the same inconsistency in Sadrā's attitude.

SADRĀ'S THEORY OF EXISTENCE

According to Sadrā nothing is real except existence. But this sole reality cannot be grasped by the mind which can understand only the general ideas i.e., concepts or essences. There is a fundamental difference between essences and existence. Essences do not exist per se, but arise in the mind from the particular modes of existence. Therefore, they are mental phenomena. The mind is capable of capturing them. However, the general idea of existence cannot grasp the real existence, since existence is an objective reality and its transformation into an abstract idea distorts it. In other words, what exists is uniquely particular. Hence it cannot be understood by the conceptual mind. However essence is a concept and does not exist per se. Therefore, it can be grasped by the mind.

Sadrā further clarifies his view and admits that there is an abstract notion of existence arising from different existents. He also endorses the fact or observation that there is nothing that strictly corresponds to this abstraction; but the blunder is to imagine the existence is just this abstraction or concept.

Sadrā maintains if existence is to be considered as a concept, then it is some sort of essence or a genus. But existences are unique and no general idea can do justice to the uniqueness of real being. Moreover, essences are static. Hence, each instance of an essence is exactly the same. No instance of essence is unique or individual *Fard* (فرد). Existence on the other hand, means individuals (فرد) who are unique and not just cases (hisas حصاص) of existence. [18]

Existence is dynamic and constantly manifesting itself is new and dynamic form. Reality is the home of existence, while mind is the proper place for essences, concepts and static ideas.

The above-mentioned chain of reasoning leads to the conclusion that existence is a unique unanalysable factor in everything. Sometimes an objection is raised against it. According to it if existence is asserted of essence as something over and above essence, then essences will be invested with being prior to their existence. One answer to this objection is that existence is a special attribute which does not presuppose the existence of an essence. However, in reality existence is just the status of being real. It is not an attribute of something which is in its own right already something real.

For Sadrā existence is pure and absolute. It manifests itself in different forms. The resultant beings are modes of existence *(anwaul al-wujud)*. They differ from the absolute existence and exhibit certain essential characteristics to the mind. Hence it is in the mind and not in external reality that essences arise a sort of secondary nature of the primordial reality which is existence. [19] Here Sadrā draws an analogy between absolute existence and the sun which in a sense is identical with the rays of light it emanates; but the rays can give rise to different characteristics.

The more an existence is complete, the less of essences it exhibits. Hence, God has no essence. From this point of view essence constitutes negation of existence. Existence is positive, definite, determinate and real. Essences are vague, dark, indeterminate, negative and unreal. Essences are nothing in themselves unless they are conjoined with existence, but existences are real; because, they are manifestations of the absolute existence.

When it is said that essence and existence are "united", this description gives the impression as if there are two

realities, i.e., essence and existence, and they are united, but Sadrā has already declared that essences do not possess any reality. The question arises: 'In what sense these are said to be conjoined?'

In the light of afore-mentioned discussion the answer is that when absolute existence ceases to be absolute and becomes 'modes' of existence. These modes give rise to essence. From this point of view essence is the subjective element. God himself gives rise to essences when he "descends" from his absoluteness and generates attributes as contexts or ideas of His mind. [20] His attributes have no real existence. They are purely subjective to him. Therefore in its downward movement, when existence is further diversified into modes, these modal existences generate essences.

The fundamental difference between Sadrā and the Muslim Peripatetic is that according to the former existence itself creates essences, while the latter believe that a concrete existent is a combination of essence and existence and each of them having a separate reality in its own right. This point of view separates Sadrā from al-Suhrawardi who holds that essence is the reality and existence is only an abstraction.

THE PRINCIPLE OF *TASHKIK*

The classical Aristotlean logic has made the distinction between two types of universals which are the following:

(a)   The universals univocally applicable.

(b)   The universals equivocally on ambiguously applicable.

Later Muslim peripatetic believe that there is no difference within a single essence and differences exist only in particular existences of an essence. For example there is no differences in general 'redness', but instance of redness differ from each other. So when it intensifies, a new species of red arises and the previous red goes out of existence.

Al-Suhrawardi does not agree with the above-mentioned view and maintains that a single specific essence may have a range of intensity. So when a qualitative intensification takes place essence is not replaced by another essence. Therefore, when red colour intensifies not only "redness" but also "red" remain the same, though a qualitative increase has taken place. In other words, all essences are capable of increase and decrease. For Al-Suhrawardi, the category of 'more or less' is most basic category applicable to the range of reality.

Sadrā has taken this category of "more or less" and makes it as the basis of his theory of existence. However, this principle called "*tashkik*" (تشکیک), is not applicable, to existence. Sadrā argues that essences are univocal and existence is equivocal or ambiguous (*mutashakik*). When something is ambiguous, it acts both as a principle of identity

and difference. Only existence is such a principle and that is why it creates identity in difference. [21]

Moreover, existence is not only ambiguous, it is systematically ambiguous. Its reasons is that existence is not static but in perpetual movement. The movement is from the more general (*āmm*) and the more indeterminate (*mubham*) to the more concrete and determinate (*khāss*), integrated and simple forms of existence. Every prior form of existence behaves like genus or matter and it is absorbed into he concreteness of the posterior form which behaves like differentiae. This movement from the less perfect to the more perfect is uni-directional and irreversible. Therefore existence never moves backward.

The more a thing has essence, the less it has of existence. At the lowest in the scale of existence is primary matter which does not exist. It is only a concept, i.e., an essence. The highest in the scale of existence is God who is absolute existence. Hence He has no essence and is beyond the reach of the conceptual thought. For Sadrā existence is not something static. It is constantly moving from the lower to the higher. The driving force this movement is '*Ishq*' or cosmic love which compels everything towards a movement of concrete form. Sadrā believes that intellectually and spiritually perfected members of the human species will become a species in themselves hereafter. Since existence is good and absolute existence is absolute good. The absolute existence has no opposite; because, opposites are subsumable under a genus and existence has no genus.

What does Sadrā means by the systematic ambiguity of existence? In order to answer the question we should keep in mind the following points:

(i)   Existence is all things is basically the same.

(ii) Existence is basically the same, yet it creates fundamental differences which renders every

existence unique.

(iii) Due to substantive movement in existence all the lower forms of existence are contained in and transcended by higher forms.

Difference and Unity

There seems to be real tension between existential monism of Sadrā (according to which everything vanishes in the Absolute existence, i.e., God) and the doctrine of the systematic ambiguity of existence according to which every contingent being has a unique reality of its own which cannot be reduced to anything else. When we study Sadrā it becomes clear that for him God alone is real as Reality. The contingent beings are real only as appearance. If this is so how we can reconcile the principle of ambiguity of existence with this absolute and all encompassing monism?

Sadrā tries to answer the above mentioned questions by differentiating between necessary and contingent existents. He maintains that all existents are unique and irreducible. Therefore, all existents whether necessary or contingent are original & unique. However, there is a difference in the case of God who is pure existence and a necessary existent, while the contingent existents are mixture of existence and essence.

Sadrā on the basis of the principle of '*tashkik*' rejects existential monism. He criticized those Sufis who think that existence is a single individual reality, i.e. God, and it is a universal having multiple instances. In Sadrā's opinion it is not possible that God's being itself should form the existence of contingents— substances or accidents. The reason is that in the case of many existents whose essence is identical (for example in the case of men). Supposing that their existence is also identical (as in the case of God), then there will be no distinction among them. This shows that existence can never be identically the same in any two existents, whether they stand under the same genus or essence.

Sadrā also rejects monism on the basis of his famous principle:

"That which is of simple nature is everything (*basit al-haqiqa Kull al-ashya)*." [22]

On the basis of this, Sadrā argues that God is absolutely simple. Therefore, He is all existence. However, Sabazwari maintains that this does not lead to the conclusion that there is unity in multiplicity. It means multiplicity in unity, where as absoluteness of God means that nothing relative can be attributed to Him. God being absolutely simple cannot be identical with anything that is composite, because, composite is that to which affirmative or negative attributes can be ascribed.

Lastly, according to Sadrā, the contingent existence is not static or fixed. There is an intrinsic movement of being upward (*haraka fil jouhar).* He presents the principle of movement as a manifestation *tashkik* The physical nature in moving towards higher forms of existence gives rise and assumes the higher froms. This movement towards higher forms of being a matter of observation and experience. It can be attested and confirmed. The end product of this process is that perfect man (انسان کامل) in whose being the contingent and the eternal meet. However, it does not mean that the contingent becomes God.

SADRĀ AND MODERN EXISTENTIALISM

In order to determine the affinity between Sadrā's philosophy and modern philosophical movement of Existentialism, firstly, we have to study the latter in general; and secondly to decide how far it is justified to consider him on existentialist in the modern sense of the term. We are going to study the questions under two headings which are the following:

(a) Existentialism in General

(b) Sadrā and Modern Existentialism

(a) Existentialism in General

Existentialism was attributed by Frank Thilly to the discovery of Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855A.D) after a long period of relative obscurity. Just before the First World War the afore-mentioned discovery began to exert profound influence on the German philosophy. However, its influence rapidly increased between the two world wars and spread beyond the boundaries of Germany and evolved the philosophy of Existentialism in France, Latin America and the United States of America.

According to Paul Foulguie[23] the word or the philosophical term "Existentialism" is a neologism derived from the substantive 'existence' from which had been derived 'existential', to which had been added 'ism'. Existentialism as a philosophy affirms the primacy of existence. The question arises: Primacy in relation to what? The answer is in relation to essence. The next question would be: What it means to exist? It is difficult to answer, for existence is not an attribute,

but the reality of all attributes. One finds existence in that which exists, but not existence in itself. According to the classical definition that exists which is real, not merely possible. For the modern existentialists existence is not a state, but an act i.e., the actual transition from possibility into reality. In the words of Guido de Ruggiero:

> Existence is explained by all existentialists as an emergence—a coming of being out of being. [24]

In recent years the word existentialism has become popular mainly through he works of Jean Paul Sarte. Therefore, the people seems to think that existentialism means his particular brand of nihilism. However a notable fact is that the existentialism began as a religious and theistic mode of thinking. Hence, we can divide the existentialists in two groups and those are the following:-

(a) Theistic existentialists

(b) Atheistic existentialists

Although existentialism is a philosophy which is very difficult to define, yet we can describe certain general characteristics of this mode of thinking. These are the followings:-

First of all, it is a reaction against all forms of rationalism which assumes that reality can be grasped primarily or exclusively by intellect. In the words of David E. Roberts, "It is an emphatic denial of the assumption that construction of a logical system is the most adequate way to reach the truth." [25]

Secondly, existentialism makes a sharp distinction between the subjective and objective truth and gives priority to the former. It is possible to misunderstand the word—'subjective'. In everyday language the word means—''prejudiced', 'biased', and 'unreliable'. However, when existentialists speak of 'subjectivity', they have in mind something very different. They are not denying that through science, common sense, and logic men are capable of arriving

at objective truth. But they insist that in connection with ultimate matters, i.e., in search for ultimate truth the whole man and not only his intellect or reason is involved. His emotion and will must be aroused and engaged so that he can live the truth he sees. The fundamental difference is between knowing the truth is some theoretical detached way and being grasped by the truth in a decisive personal manner.

Gudis de Ruggiero maintains, "Existentialism is a lively appeal against abstract concepts of idealism. But this reaction is not new. The anti-thesis between conceptual possibility and act, essence and existence, was fully understood by the Greek thought. In every epoch there has been reaction against it in the name of existence and non-rationality." [26]

It is obvious that the afore-mentioned tendencies attributed to modern existentialism are as old as human thought and their initial forms can be traced back to the Greek thought. However, one cannot agree with Ruggerio's statement that the Greeks fully understood the distinction between essence and existence. These concepts in their earlier form grew like wild flowers. The consciousness of the sharp distinction between them was developed and cultivated later on by the Muslims. Indeed there had been long heated debates among the Muslim thinkers about the question whether essence was prior to existence or not.

Parmenides, to keep the track of the historical roots of the concepts of essence and existence. We should turn back to Parmenides.

—The first thinker who mentioned and presented the concept of 'Being'. Before him the Ionics tried to find the ultimate reality in different forms of matter. Later on the Pythagoreans considered 'Numbers' to be the ultimate reality. Then came Parmenides and maintained that 'Being' was the ultimate truth. According to him 'Being' was real and not-being was unreal. 'Being' for him was eternal and above all changes. Its knowledge was possible through reason. The

senses deceive us, because; they tell us that there is change and multiplicity. Heraclitus on the other hand teaches that being and not-being both are real. According to him the perception of permanence is illusion. There is not-being within being. Hence change and multiplicity are real and it is the truth that can be discovered through reason. The senses give us the wrong impression that there is stability in the world.

Plato is the chief exponent of Essentialism also believes that the world of senses is just a copy of the real world of Ideas or essences.

Aristotle, a pupil of Plato, maintains that every object in the universe is a combination of Form and matter. The afore-mentioned view is slightly different from the Platonic ontology. In reality it is just another brand of Essentialism, because; Aristotlean 'Forms' are nothing but another name for 'essences' or Platonic Ideas. Forms and matter are separable in thought, but not in reality. Hence matter cannot exist without 'Form'. It is a universal principle applicable to all the objects except God, heavenly bodies and creative Reason, because; only these have no material element. These are pure Forms. But matter is never without Form.

(b) How far it is justified to consider him an existentialist in the modern sense of the term.

We have already described existentialism in general and Sadrā's theory of existence. Therefore, we are in a position to find out whether he can be considered an existentialist in the modern sense of the term.

Existentialism affirms the priority of existence. The priority is affirmed in relation to essence. Essence is what a thing is. By saying so we state those qualities that it possesses in common with all the objects of the same kind. These qualities constitutes the essence which is general and universal. It is this general and universal essence that is indicated when we speak simply of an essence and it is

determined by definitions. However, this general idea does not imply that there must be actual instances in which it is realized. But it also does not mean pure non-existence. It is in the nature of essence to be within the range of possibility. This possibility become reality by virtue of existence, e.g., "I am man".

In his statement "I am" affirms existence, and "man" designates essence. [27]

The above-mentioned basic philosophical formulation of Sadrā, is also the major thesis of modern existentialism, i.e., primacy of existence against essence. At an early stage in his intellectual journey Sadrā belonged to that school according to which the reality of an existent comes from it essence. In other words "existence" as used for various existents is merely a mental construct (*I'tabari)* and the essence possesses reality. However later on he became a defender of the principality of existence (*asalat-e-wajudi).* But the change did not occur through reflection or reasoning. In his treatise— *Kitab al-mashair*, he describes his conversion in the following words:

> In earlier days I was a passionate defender of the thesis of the principality of quiddity, until God provided me with guidance and permitted me to witness His demonstration. All of a sudden my spiritual eyes were opened and I was able to see that the truth of the matter was contrary to what philosophers in general had held. Praise be to God who by means of the light of illumination guided me out of the darkness of the baseless idea of the principality of essence, and established the thesis of the primacy of existence…… a thesis which will never change." [28]

Sadrā has not kept the exact record and details of his conversion. But it seems that it was an experience like that of Pascal. He like Sadrā had been living in solitude. He had been felt the great scorn of the world and unbearable disgust for the people. Similarly, Sadrā in his preface to *Asfār* has expressed anger and disgust for the worldly life of fame and

glory, as well as for the majority of the people. Like Pascal he retired and in a way renounced the world. As Pascal retired to the French country side, so Sadrā went to live in Kahak.

Sadrā's conversion, though not religious, was at least some sort of existential experience or may be intuitive revelation. In this respect he reminds us of the modern existentialist thinkers who pass through a subjective experience which is not rational (in the sense that it is not the result of reasoning or logical thinking), but it reveals the reality of the existence with astounding clarity.

The modern existentialists are not interested or concerned with speculating on existence in general i.e., on the essence or concept of existence.

The afore-mentioned implies a contradiction with which Kierkegaard reproaches Descartes' famous dictum— "I think; therefore, I am." In short, modern existentialism is concerned, as Gabrial Marcel says, "with indissoluble unity of existence and the existent."

Sadrā maintains that existence cannot be defined. It is the most basic and evident of all realities and also concepts. It is the most primary of all the concepts with the aid of which all the other concepts are understood, and the reality of existence is the most immediate and primary experience of reality— on experience which is the foundation of our knowledge of the external world. Man's awareness of this reality is immediate and intuitive. No mental and intellectual analysis can hope to reach it. Existence in its purity can become neither an external object on the physical plane nor a finite concept in the mind to be logically defined. However, the immediate, intuitive understanding of existence can be later on conceptualized. In contrast to the concept of existence in mind (which in the terms of modern existentialism means essence of existence), the reality of existence is the most difficult of all things to know in depth, for it requires a spiritual preparation which only few would be

able to achieve. However, if any one contemplative, he becomes aware of this profound mystery of existence.

Existential is considered a reaction against the classical European philosophy which is basically Essentialistic from Plato to Hegel. Similarly, in the Muslim World long before modern existentialism Sadrā by advocating the principality of existence brings a revolution in the world of the Muslim thought. The problem of the relation between existence and essence for the Muslim peripatetics goes back to Farabi and Ibn Sina. During the mentioned period the metaphysics remained static from this point of view and essentialistic. According to Nasr, [29] it was Sadrā who with his doctrine of the principality of existence, "transformed the Aristotlean mould of the earlier Islamic Philosophy."

The philosophy of Existentialism uphold the view that we cannot understand anything that we cannot deduce or construct. An existent cannot be deduced. It is its own verification. It is unique, Hence, theoretical knowledge is inadequate. Similarly, Sadrā argues that existence (which is the sole reality) is never captured by the mind which can only grasp essences and general nations. There is a fundamental difference between essences and existences. The essences do not exist per se but only in the mind from particular forms or modes of existence. Hence they are mental phenomena. But the mind is not capable of capturing the objective reality of existence. It will try to form an abstract mental concept which will necessarily falsify the true nature of existence. In other words, Sadrā like the modern existentialists thinks that what exists is uniquely particular. Therefore, it cannot be known through concepts, deductions and mental constructs; because, these are general notions, but existence in unique. [30]

The question arises: What it means to exist? Both Sadrā and the modern existentialists agree that existence is not an attribute, but the reality of all attributes. According to the classical view that which is real and not merely possible, exists. It gives the impression that existence is a state of

being, but Sadrā and the modern existentialists maintain that it is not a state of being. It is an act of being—the actual transition from possibility to actuality. Hussain Nasr described it in the following words:

> Mulla Sadrā had elevated true metaphysics to the level of the study of the very act of being; that mysterious fiat lux which causes things to leave the ocean of non-existence and become endowed with the gift of existence. [31]

Nasr's understanding of Sadrās concept of existence as an act is also endorsed by F. Schuon who presents it in the following words: "For Sadrā metaphysics must be concerned not with things which exist, i.e., the existents, but the very act of existence which is a ray cast from Pure Being Itself in the direction of nothingness." [32]

Existentialism is sometimes characterized as a reaction against rationalism. For example, it is said that the experience of Kierkegaard is a vindication of the irrational and immediate such as existence, faith and personality against the universal values of reason which annul what is singular and individual; in other words, against Hegelian rationalism. Guido Ruggiero says:

> Existence in its irrationality, its surge towards the transcendent is a lively appeal against the abstract concepts of Idealism. In every epoch there has been reaction against it in the name of irrationality, individuality and existence. [33]

The above-mentioned view is further clarified by a brief study of the modern existentialists' attitude towards reason. For instance, Pascal contrasts between reason and the heart. Clearly, Pascal does not regard the two as utterly opposed, for he insists that both kids of truth are reached by conquering willful desire. It is obvious that rational demonstration must be free from emotional bias. But he also holds that the truths of the heart are at the opposite pole from believing whatever I happen to be or wish to believe. A man's whole nature must be transformed by God before such truths can be grasped.

Faith and reason belong to different orders, but they need not come into conflict with each other. Actually both are indispensable. Reason employs principles which are basically similar in all men. But only faith can reach what is unique in each man. Pascal expresses his view in "The Provincial Letters", p. 94) According to him, "The senses, reason and the faith each have their separate objects and their own degree of certainty." [34]

Kierkegaard is considered to be the father of modern existentialism goes a step further in manifesting existentialist reaction against rationalism. However, he does not deny the appropriateness of objective, scientific and logical thinking. In other words, he does not negate the practical utility of mathematics, natural science, history and metaphysical speculation. However, he protests against those who claim that this is the whole story i.e., objectivity is all-inclusive. The objective thinking or rationalism cannot reveal the whole truth. Rationalism is one-sided and ignores the subjective aspects of existence.

To sum up, in his own way every existentialist has expressed his dissatisfaction with reason and rationalism. Here the question arises: What is Sadrā's attitude towards reason?

Sadrā repeatedly tells us that the nature of existence and its uniqueness can only be experienced. As we have pointed out earlier his 'conversion' is based on 'experience' which gave him intuitive certainty. Sadrā thinks that when we try to conceptualize, it ceases to be existence and becomes an essence. The intellectual content of the experience has to be "lived through" to be fully realized. If it is only entertained by rational propositions, they lose their character as truths. Sadrā insists that when something is known repeatedly by direct perception or intuition, it cannot be refuted by purely logical reasoning.

The afore-mentioned view shows that Sadrā believes that

the human mind is structured to understand only concepts. The concepts are nothing but general ideas or essences, and the mental ability which formulates them is reason. So when Sadrā asserts that the mind can understand only essences and not existence which is external to the mind; what he is saying is that reason cannot grasp existence; because; reason only captures the notions, concepts and essences. But existence is not a notion, It is an objective reality. In other words, Sadrā like the modern existentialists is expressing dissatisfaction with rationalism and also indicating the limitations of reason. Indeed like them he is confirming that reason cannot understand the truth and the reality of existence which is unique and particular. The reason can capture only what is general and intellectual. Like the existentialists he emphasizes that rational propositions and logical proofs are not as conclusive as the experience—living the truth. In other words, the conclusions based on experience.

Despite the afore-mentioned similarities between Sadrā and the modern existentialists, there are a number of differences between them. In this respect we should keep in mind the following points:

(1) The modern existentialist philosophy is basically humanist. The fundamental question of the modern existentialism is that when man is in question which principle is prior— essence or existence? Their answer is that in the case of man existence precedes essence. What it means to exist? For them existence is not a thought. It is a transition from possibility to reality. However, it is not sufficient to pass from one state to another in order to exist. True existence presupposes freedom. It follows that for the modern existentialism existence is a prerogative of man. Existence is a perpetual transcendence, i.e., passing beyond hat which one is. It is our essence that we choose in making the choice of the person that we wish to be. Thus essence is subsequent to existence, since in order to choose we must exist. This with certain differences is the thesis of all the modern

existentialists. It is only in man that existence precedes essence. The reason is that he alone in the world of our experience is free. All other beings are predetermined. Only in the case of man after his choice we come to know what he has chosen. This demonstrates that the modern existentialism is fundamentally humanist, i.e., its starting point and the pivot is man who alone has the capability to choose, and from this point of view he alone is free in the world.

We have already pointed out that Sadrā, is an existentialist in the sense that he too, believes in the principality of existence. Here the question arises whether his philosophy is humanist too, like the modern existentialists? In my humble opinion, it is not.

No doubt Sadrā in his metaphysics is concerned essentially with 'Being', but his fully aware of the supra-ontological nature of the supreme principle and state above all limitations. His discussion of the Absolute in its completely undetermined and supra-ontological level even while making use of ontology. The metaphysics of Sadrā begins with the Absolute Principle which transcends all limitations then leads to Being which is its first determination the creative principle, and finally concerns itself with existence in both its universal and particular aspects. In other words, existence is basic to the exposition of the nature of Reality in its source and various levels of the manifestation.

It is quite evident that for Sadrā existence is a universal principle and its primacy is not true only in the case of man alone. All the objects of the universe come under its domain. The conclusion can be drawn that Sadrā's existentialism is not humanistic. It is much wider. On the on hand, it is all-inclusive as far as the objects of this world of universe are concerned. But the modern existentialism specially in its systematic expositions (e.g., Heidegger and Sartre) is basically a discussion of the ontological or ontology.

(2) Another fundamental concept of the modern

existentialism in "Nothingness". The question of Nothingness pervades the whole of Being. The classical metaphysics would say that from nothing comes nothing. An existentialist would say that from thing comes Being. The problem of Being and Nothingness are related. Perhaps they are even identical. Hegel and Heidgger are aware of the fact. According to them pure Being is Pure Nothing. Unless man has the courage to encounter Nothingness, he cannot enter into his own essential nature and ask a metaphysical question.

The question arises; how can this meeting can be arranged. Heidegger proceeds to analyse the ordinary language is order to get a clue. A layman would say, "Nothing is the opposite of everything that is." The implication of this answer is that only by first encountering everything that is and then having it succumb to negation, could we hope to encounter Nothingness. This takes us into the realm of proper metaphysics, which leads to the question; what is or what is being? Actually we cannot comprehend what is this on what is in totality total annihilation, i.e., Nothingness. But there are certain experiences which reveal it. For instance; boredom is such an experience. Boredom does not mean being bored with this or that with everything, i.e., means totality of what is. Everything seems colourness, tasteless and meaningless. Similarly, according to Heidegger anxiety is a fundamental way to attune to Nothingness.

Sadrā[35] clarifies the connotation of Nothingness (عدم). In his opinion it is a wide and simple term. There is no disagreement about its meaning. The only difference of opinion arises when it is attributed to different objects. This difference ever is due to these objects. The faculty of reason imagines different objects with different accidents. For example, cause, effect, condition, conditioned, etc., after thinking about them. The reason adds to them the concept of Nothingness (عدم) by negating their existence. This is true that nothingness of one contrary creates the possibility of the

existence of the other contrary. For instance, nothingness, of blackness gives room to the existence of whiteness. But this difference is only relative. Only in this sense one nothingness cannot be distinguished from the other. [36]

To sum up, Nothingness is only one and it cannot be divided into different kinds. In other words, it is undifferentiated. In reality there is only no such thing which can be called Nothingness. Therefore, if anyone asks you that what is Nothingness, you cannot point out, "This is Nothingness." [37] Consequently, Nothingness cannot be considered cause of something. Sadrā concludes that Nothingness does not exist.

Sadrā proceeds to analyze how the human reason is capable of having a notion of something which does not exist, and uses it as a subject. He explains that reason has the ability to imagine and construct all sorts of notions and construct. For instance, it can imagine its own nothingness and even nothingness of Nothingness which is an absolute non-existent. [38] To sum up, for Sadrā Nothingness is only a rational construct and not a reality.

(3) The afore-mentioned discussion demonstrate that when Sadrā mentions Nothing he means only the logical act of negation rather than 'annihilation'. The latter sense of Nothingness is used by the modern existentialists. For example as Heidegger would say that the former (i.e., logical negation) is only a superficial mode of the latter (i.e., annihilation). The conflict between people, the violence of loathing, the pain of refusal and the bitterness of renunciation are far more powerful forms of annihilating than the logical act of denial.

(4) The above-mentioned points lead us to another difference between the modern existentialists and Sadrā. Sadrā is trying to understand Nothingness (عدم) through reason, while the modern existentialists through a-rational (if

not irrational) experience like anxiety, boredom, etc. Indeed, the existentialist thinkers like Kierkegaard have preached the doctrine of the irrationality of existence, which cannot be grasped through reason.

Sadrā teaches that existence cannot be understood by the conceptual intellect. He emphasizes the fact that the truth has to be experienced, shows his resemblance with the modern existentialists. For example, in *al-Asfār*[39] he defines knowledge as an intuitive state which leaves no room for illusion or doubt. It is also true that he narrates the story of his experience or conversion by which primacy of existence is revealed to him. Yet he gives a number of rational arguments to provide his thesis. Indeed he is very rational in building a well-knitted system consistent with his fundamental thesis. However, most of the modern existentialists believe that reality of existence cannot be grasped by rational arguments or conventional philosophical discussion or discourses. Hence, they write drama, novels and short stories. However, Sadrā continues to prepare the philosophical expositions, though he also composes poetry too. On the other hand, it can be observed that even among the modern existentialists there are thinkers such as Sarte, Heidegger, Sartre and Jaspers who have presented systematic expositions of their existential thesis. But Sadrā's attitude towards these is definitely not as antagonistic as that of Kierkegaard.

The above-mentioned discussion demands further elucidation of Sadrā's concept of knowledge based on experience. In *al-Asfār* Sadrā (Part X, vol. II) writes:

> Sensations do not have the knowledge whether the object of their experience exists or not. It is the function of reason. [40]

In another passage he again asserts:

> Sensations or the sensitive mind is totally unaware of the fact whether the object of sensory experience exists in external world or not. Man attains knowledge through experience……

It is the function of the thinking mind or reason to get information about the existence of the object. [41]

Sadrā mentions the example of the insane who sees things which do not exist. They cannot discriminate between the reality and delusions, because; their reason is not working.

The above-mentioned passages show that Sadrā does not believe in the efficiency of sensations in reaching reality or in other words, existence or the reality, because for him existence is the reality. In both the quoted passages he clearly maintains that it is only reason which has the required capability. However, it is a little bit confusing or confusion may arise due to the word "experience" used by him. The word is ambiguous. Hence its connotation should be determined and clarified. In one sense affective experience is denoted by it, but Sadrā clearly denies it. It may mean sensory experience, but he openly rejects it. It can be used in the sense of cognitive experience or mystic experience. The former meaning is supported by Sadrā's[42] presentation, and the latter sense is not accepted by him. According to him truth must be experienced, but this experience is an intuitive apprehension.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MULLA SADRĀ AND THE WESTERN ESSENTIALISTS

According to Essentialism at first sight existence seems to impart being to things. But in actual fact existence is an existence of something. What a thing is matters even more than the fact of being.

Sadrā, as we have already stated in the earlier section of the treatise, does believe that essences are real in a sense. He affirms the mental character of essences and also the existence of Platonic Forms. He also asserts that the Forms are independent existents, and they are not the contents of the mind. They are not universals, but particular beings. These views make Sadrā an Essentialist but with a difference. In the present section of the treatise we would try to compare and contrast Sadrā's Essentialism with some of the prominent Western exponents of Essentialism.

We begin the comparative study with Plato who is considered the founder Essentialism by presenting the theory of Ideas. Socrates teaches that all knowledge is though concepts. Plato accepts this epistemology but turns it into a metaphysics by claiming that the Ultimate Reality is the Ideas. Then he proceeds to describe the fundamental characteristics of the Ideas and calls them substances, Forms and Essences. He goes further and maintains that they are existents in the world of Ideas. Here again we see departure from the Socratic point of view who believes that the concepts exist in the human mind not external to it, as they were subjective. However, the Platonic Ideas become objective realities.

The second important feature of Platos' system of thought is the claim that the world of material objects or the world of existents is a pale copy of the world of the Ideas. The ultimate Reality is the world of the Ideas or Forms. The world of existents is a degradation of the original perfect world of Ideas.

Sadrā not only affirms the existence of Platonic Forms in the Divine realm but also rejects the Neo-Platonic view that Forms exist either in the mind of God or of separate Intelligences. Like Plato he believes in their independent existence. We, however, bear in mind the following fundamental differences between Plato and Sadrā:

(i)   Plato is a pure essentialist. For him essence is prior to existence, but Sadrā thinks that existence is prior to essence.

(ii) According to Plato the ultimate reality is 'the Ideas'. For Sadrā the ultimate reality is existence.

The influence of Plato is evident if we study his doctrine of the unity of Being. He asserts that the various beings in the world of manifestations are all limitations of one reality or Being. These limitations are abstracted by the mind and become the forms of quiddities (*mahiyyat*) of things, and when transposed into the principal domain, they become the Platonic ideas or archetypes. Unlike the Being which is objectively real and in fact is the reality of the cosmos, the *mahiyyat* are accidents of Being abstracted by the mind without having a reality independent of Being. Even the archetypes possess a form of Being which in this case is God's knowledge of them.

The afore-mentioned discussion supports the view that Sadrā is an essentialist like Plato. Yet we should bear in mind the following fundamental differences between the two thinkers:

(i)   Plato is a pure essentialist. For him essence is prior

to existence, but Sadrā thinks that existence is prior to essence.

(ii) According to Plato the ultimate reality is "the Ideas". For Sadrā the ultimate reality is "Being."

(iii) In Plato's system of thought the existents are the shadows or pale copies of the Ideas. Thus for him existence is a degradation of the reality. But Sadrā maintains that existents are the manifestation of the ultimate Reality.

(iv) According to Plato the Forms or the Ideas are universals. Sadrā, on the other hand, believes that they are particular existents or beings. Sadrā maintains that it cannot be accepted that a thinker of Plato's caliber would not distinguish between an intellectually abstract entity and a concrete existential order of existence which contains all peculiarities. Here Sadrā is not presenting the Platonic view, but his own doctrine of the movement of the concrete.

(v) The afore-mentioned discussion leads us to the conclusion that though apparently Sadrā accepts the Platonic theory of Ideas, but transforms Plato's essentialism into his own form of existentialism by maintaining that the Platonic Forms are not abstract. They are concrete particulars and not abstract universals. They are transcendental beings. Each having an individual existence of its own. Their universality only means that to the mind they appear universal.

(vi) Although, in the Platonic system of thought the concept of God is not clear. [43] But it is evident that Plato's philosophy cannot be considered theistic. Sadrā on the other hand, is clearly theistic thinker and the concept of God is consistent with his philosophy of existence. Since 'Existence' is the

only reality. Therefore, God or the ultimate Reality is not to be searched beyond the sphere of existence. He is within the realm of the existence. God is simple and pure Existence.

(vii) According to Fazal-ur-Rehman (p. 49 II para) Sadrā mollifies the epistemological function of the Platonic Forms. It is consistent with his general doctrine that intellectual cognition cannot capture reality which is pure existence. Sadrā, however, wishes to retain the metaphysical function of the Platonic Forms. Here Fazal-ur-Rehman criticizes, because; in his opinion it is inconsistent with his doctrine of the flow of existence. Fazal-ur-Rehman points out that the whole notion of a pre-existent superior order of the world contradicts the idea of continuous emergent movement of existence.

Aristotle and Sadrā

Aristotle a pupil of independent mind tried to reconstruct the Platonic idealism in a more consistent and scientific manner. According to him Plato seemed to place the Forms beyond the stars. Moreover the gulf between Form and Matter had to be bridged somehow. Aristotle retains the changeless eternal Forms which are the idealistic principles of Plato, but rejects their transcendency. He brings them down from heaven to earth. He maintains that the Forms are not apart from things but inherent in them. Form and matter are not separate. They are eternally together. Their combination produces individual things. The human reason has the power of discerning the Forms in their particular exemplifications. From this pint of view 'Forms' constitute the essences of things or particular material object. At the same time they are principles of reason. Then they are both forms of thought as well as reality. In Aristotle's view they i.e., thought and being coincide. The universals are the last thing we reach in our thinking, but are first in nature. In other words, they are the first principles of reality.

Plato regards the objects of experience as imperfect copies of the universal ideas. For him forms are the substances. Its copies i.e., concrete material objects of the world are mere accidents. Aristotle, on the other hand, considered the particular objects or the individual beings as real substances. But the essence or true nature of the particular concrete being is constituted by its form— the essential qualities of the class to which it belongs. So after all, the form or idea is for him too, the most essential element.

The study of Sadrā evidently confirms that for him the ultimate reality is existence. Essence, on the other hand, is 'idea', but still it is real in the following two senses:

(a) An idea occurs in the mind. It has a sort of existence, but it is mental existence.

(b) There is something in the external reality which causes it to arise in the mind. Thus essence has a kind of secondary reality.

This leads to major difference between Sadrā and Aristotle. For Aristotle, essence still remains primary to existence; because; in his philosophy there is graded system of beings. At the upper end is pure Form, which is the final cause.

Moreover, as it has been pointed out earlier, Aristotle despite of all differences with Plato, still agrees with him that essence or Form is the most essential element in the constitution of a particular concrete being and it is universal. But for Sadrā it is 'existence' which is the major reality. 'Essence' has some kind of mental existential status. However, this status secondary in nature or in other words, it has semi-reality.

Besides the afore-mentioned point there are other differences between Sadra and Aristotle's views which should be kept in mind. Those differences are the followings:-

(i) Sadrā affirms the existence of the Platonic Form in

the Divine Realm.[44] Aristotle clearly rejects their existence in a transcendent world. For him they exist in this very world in the concrete objects.

(ii) According to Sadrā Forms are particular beings, but Aristotle thinks that they represent the universals. In other words, they are concepts consisting of essential qualities of all members of a class. According to Sadrā they appear universal to the mind. In reality, however, they are individual transcendent beings.

(iii) Sadrā distinguishes between two types or meanings of essence. Firstly, it may mean only a notion without any reference to any existent. Secondly, it may mean the notion or concept of an existent. In the former case, essence has only mental status, while in the latter case it has existential status. Fazal-ur-Rehman[45] points out that this distinction has an Aristotelian basis, but it seriously modifies Aristotle's view, since, according to him only existents possess an essence or a real definition, while in the case of fictional or imaginary objects, only the meaning of the term can be given, and is not mentioned a proper essence. In short in Sadrā's opinion essence only has a semi-reality while Aristotle maintains that an essence must exist in order to be a proper essence.

(iv) Aristotle has presented matter-form formula, in order to explain every concrete object. Ibn Sina converts it into genus-differentia formula. Differentia becomes more important, because; by declaring differentia simple and irreducible, it becomes allied to simple and unanalyzable fact of existence. For Ibn Sina, however, differentia is not identical with existence, Differentia as a part of specific essence (i.e., genus plus differentia) is subsumable under a genus, and is, therefore, part

of what Aristotle calls, "secondary substance."

Sadrā maintains that the differentia is neither a substance nor an accident, since it is identical with individual existence. Sadrā develops on argument which interprets the genus-differentia formula in accordance with his doctrine of emergent movement of existence or substantial change. Thus he synthesize it with the principle of essence-existence.

To sum up, Aristotle presents matter-form formula which is interpreted as genus-differentia formula by one of the greatest interpreter—Ibn Sina. Later on this interpretation was turned into essence-existence formula, which was a further deviation from the original Aristotle an position.

Sadrā and the Christian Scholastics

St. Augustine (Birth. 353) is the most prominent teacher of the early Christian Church. Plato's impact on his thought evident. The world of essences are identified with the divine intelligence. He believes that the Divine Mind is the abode of Forms or essences. These are expressed through the Word. Thus all that exists, exists only by participation in the ideas of the Word, It is the Word itself, Thus it is given to us in all the creatures. Man is on the horizon of the two worlds. His lower nature is in the existence, while the higher nature in the essences. However, the Augustinian doctrine is much less essentialist than that of Plato on account of two reasons. Firstly, essences do not constitute a world of their own. They are no more than the ideas in the mind of God. Secondly, the objects of the material world are real, but essences play major role in their nature.

Let us compare St. Augustine and Sadrā. Although, Sadrā teaches that the essences have some sort of reality, but at the same time emphasizes the fact that it is a semi-reality. In St. Augustine's thought, on the other hand, they are primary realities as the Divine ideas. He argues that all that exist, exists only by participation in the ideas of the Word. Its implication is that essence precedes existence. Sadrā,

however, believe in the principality of existence. He does confirms the existence of the Forms or essence, but he believes them to be secondary tope existence. Thus St. Augustine is a thorough essentialist, while Sadrā's essentialism is less essentialist as compared to him, because; in his philosophy existence plays the major role.

Thomas Aquinas and Sadrā

Thomas Aquinas (1225/27—1274A.D) is considered the culmination of Christian Scholasticism. In general his thought seems to be in conformity with the Augustinian metaphysics, but he adopts Aristotle's method and uses his concepts. According to him God has created the world. It follows as St. Augustine asserts that as a creator he has the idea of all existents. For St. Aquinas concrete beings are composed of Form and matter. By Form he means the Platonic Idea. The human intelligence does not grasp individual things in their individuality. It judges existents according to those essences in which hey participate. St. Thomas Aquinas has no interest in existence, except as a means of access to essences. Therefore, St. Aquinas too, is a thorough essentialist.

Sadrā seems to be richer in his philosophical insight though like St. Aquinas, he too, has theological interests. He is much more original than him. He accepts certain notions of Aristotle, but interprets them in such a way as to assimilate them into his general theory of existence.

Another difference between Sadrā and St. Aquinas lies in their attitude towards existence. The former believes in its principality, the latter considers it only a means of access to essences. Since St. Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian philosophy on the whole, he also adopts Aristotle's matter-form formula as it is. Sadrā, as we have mentioned earlier turns it into genus-differentia formula and identifies differentia with existence.

Moreover, under the influence of Aristotle St. Aquinas believes that forms are present in the concrete objects of the

material world, while Sadrā affirms the transcendental nature of the Forms. Therefore, he resembles in this respect to St. Augustine for whom the Forms are the Divine ideas. But Sadrā instead of considering them ideas in the Divine Mind, thinks that they are the Divine attributes. He, however, still seems to take a philosophical view closer to St. Augustine than St. Aquinas.

SADRĀ AND THE MODERN ESSENTIALISM

Essentialism is characteristically a classical philosophy which later reappears in the Medieval times among the Muslim thinkers based on the notions of essence and existence. In the preceding section of the book we have already compared the Greek essentialists such as Plato and Aristotle and Mulla Sadrā, as well as the Christian essentialists like St. Augustine and St. Acquinas. Still there remains the comparison of Sadrā and the modern essentialism, though it is a philosophy which is no longer supported by the majority of the modern philosophers. However, there are exceptions to the above-mentioned statement. One exception, worth mentioning in this respect is Louis Lavelle who is perhaps its chief exponent in the 20th cent. with his own brand of essentialism.

Louis Lavella (July 15, 1883—Sept. 1951) is one of the great metaphysicians of the 20th cent. He is French, taught philosophy at Sorbonne (1932-34). Later on he joined college de France (1941-51). During his times reaction against system building was prevalent; but he boldly elaborated an extensive system of thought. The historian M. Delfgaau[46] considers it a new brand of spiritualism, which is at the same time an extention of the tradition of essentialism. It is a sort of return to the concept of the Absolute. In 20th cent. the French tradition of spiritualism continues. Bergons, Gabriel Marcel and Louis Lavella embraces it.

Louis Lavella:

According to Louis Lavelle there is no metaphysics of the objective. Metaphysics should be the science of spiritual intimacy. He rejects all the modern doctrines of negativity, because of their emphasis on despair and anguish. In his opinion such attitudes are the result of subjection to the physical and total denial of the spirit. Consequently, those make the human beings slaves to the temporal leading to servitude and not freedom. He believes that philosophy of spirit restores the respect Love for the spirit.

Actually, Lavella revives the classical themes of essence. For him the absolute is an endless reservoir of forms and essences from which the individual being receive their own limited existence. The primary aim of our life—the human life is to discover our unique from and spiritual essence. The accomplishment of our essence at our death means the radical passage from finite to the transfinite Being.

Although Lavelle is characterized as an essentialist, because; he believed in the spiritual essence of man, and considers the Absolute as the infinite source of forms or essences, but at the same time he describes it as the pure Being and actuality, which is also dynamic and not mere formal immobility. Consequently, he believes in temporal progression and creativity, actuality and potentiality, perfect Being and continuous act of discovery.

Comparison of Lavelle and Sadrā

The resemblance between L. Lavelle and Sadrā is amazing, though we cannot assert that there is any direct influence of one on the other. Sadrā exists, speculates and presents his views long before Lavelle. It would be more appropriate to say that he anticipated Lavelle. Here the question arises, 'Whether Lavelle has studied Sadrā's thought by any chance? There is no substantive proof that he has or he has not. Still there is astonishing resemblance.

While comparing L. Lavelle and Mulla Sadrā we should keep in mind the following points describing their affinities and differences:-

1. Both have been thinkers and received regular formal education of philosophy and trained to philosophize.

2. We have already discussed epistemology of Sadrā in a previous chapter of the book. During his retirement to Kahak Sadrā mediates and comes to the conclusion that purely rational method is extrinsic and superficial. The realization leads him to search for a method that transforms merely rational propositions into experienced truth. Similarly, Lavelle maintains that spiritualism is based not on speculation, but induction. In other words, knowledge is merely speculative. It should be based on observation and experience. Thus both Sadrā and Lavelle present a comprehensive epistemological theory. According to it all forms of experience should be considered. Sadrā and Lavelle do not believe in divorcing any source of knowledge.

3. Sadrā and Lavelle revive the classical ontology of Plato and Aristotle, and their essentialism, related to the Platonic idea that anything without essence would not be what it is. Aristotle though sceptical about Platonic Idea that anything without essence would not be what it is. Nevertheless accepts the idea of 'telos' or purpose within and try to identify various essences or final causes.

Sadrā while affirming the mental character of essences, also confirms the existence of the Platonic Forms in the divine realm. Thus supporting Plato's thesis that Forms or Ideas or essences have an independent existence, because; he at the same time rejects the Neo-Platonic view that Forms

exist in the mind of God or emanated Intelligences.

Louis Lavelle also accepts the essentialists thesis that the value of man is not his particular being, but his essence. Lavelle in his spiritualistic Essentialism maintains that ever if existence is primary to essence, nonetheless, it is given to us so that we can acquire our essence. He does not reject the notion of an Ideal essence which links individual being to the Pure Being.

4. The concept of God in the philosophies of both the thinkers seem similar. For Sadrā God is pure Being and a source of various modes of existence which are His manifestations. Lavelle too asserts that God is the Absolute Being and as such pure actuality and infinite dynamism and endless forms.

5. Sadrā and Louis Lavelle's concept of being are not very different. For Sadrā existence is not a state of being. It is an act — the transition from possibility to actuality. (Hossein Nasr and F. Schuon) Similarly, For Lavelle being is an act— a real experience and a personal accomplishment. A thing becomes a being through an act of participation—an active participation in the process of self-discovery. (Deli'etre, Paris, 197, p. 35)

6. Both of them are theistic thinkers. Therefore, they try to integrate Platonism with their religious beliefs. Here they part with classical essentialist Ontology of Plato and Aristotle. The latter thinkers mentioned the word 'God', but their concept of God very different from that of Sadrā and Lavelle. Moreover, we should note that both of them synthesize their religious beliefs with the classical essentialism, but their religious belief system is different. In the case of Sadrā integration of the classical essentialism is in the context of Islam and in Lavelle's spiritualism it is a synthesis or at least an effort to connect it with Christianity.

7. Sadrā and Lavelle seems to present philosophies which can be categorized as pantheism. For example, Lavelle asserts

that the accomplishment of an essence at the time of death means the radical passage of our essence from finite into transfinite Being. Sadrā, however, counter the impression that his thought is pantheistic by the principle of *Tashkik* or ambiguity of existence. He solves the apparent tension between his existential monism (pantheism) and *Tashkik*, i.e., the principle of the ambiguity of existence according to which every contingent being has a unique reality of its own which cannot be reduced to anything else. He maintains that God alone is real as Reality. Then low this all-embracing monism can be reconciled with the above-mentioned view? By making a distinction between necessary Being and contingent beings. Everything is a mixture of essence and existence except God who is Necessary and absolutely simple. Therefore, he cannot be identical with anything that is composite, where as all contingent beings are mixture of essence and existence, therefore, composite. Hence, Sadrā rejects the existential monism (pantheism) of those Sufis who think that existence is a single individual reality, i.e., God, and it is universal having multiple instances.[47]

To sum up, Sadrā counters the assumptions of contradiction of two opposing conclusions which can be drawn from his philosophy of essentialism. The question arises: What about Lavelle? We are not sure, but he has been criticized by Gabriel Marcel.[48] If the immanent proceeds from the transcendent, then Lavelle circles back to he original dialectic.

8. After a brief comparison of Sadrā and Lavelle it becomes obvious that both of them are syncretic thinkers. They tried o integrate the different sources of human experience and the classical dialectic of essence and existence. Both of them are exponent of speculative rationalism. Both of them tried to accommodate both primacy of existence and a place for the concept of essence in their system of thought.

9. Both the philosophers introduced dynamism into the classical ontology of Plato and Aristotle. We have already

discussed Plato and Sadrā in a previous section of the treatise. Sadrā affirms the existence of the Forms in the divine realm. But at the same time he asserts that they are not abstract notios devoid of all particularity. He also denies them primary reality and attribute only secondary ontological status. At the same time he asserts the idea of constant creative flow of existence. The Platonic Ideas are perfect and permanent. Hence no change is possible. The Platonic world view confident change an illusion and a flaw. Hence their world view is static. Similarly, Aristotlean ontology in a modified way supports the notion of static ultimate reality, though there is an evolutionary movement upward, but they have been eternally determined by the Final cause.

Sadrā, however, develops an argument which interprets the genus-differnia formula in accordance with his doctrine of emergent existence, substantial change and thus assimilates dynamism to the classical static ontology.

Similarly, Lavelle's conception of the nature of the relation of beings to the Being is dynamic. The Absolute Being is pure actuality and an infinite source of existential Forms from which the individual receives his own finite existence. In short, his view of the nature of beings to the Absolute or Pure Being introduces dynamism to the traditional Aristotlean ontology. Moreover, his definition of being not as a state, but an act, automatically makes room for movement, evolution, change and dynamism.

10. Finally, the greatest affinity between Sadrā and Lavelle is that they did not mollify the concept of essence, and yet they believed in the primacy of existence. As such both can be considered Existential Essentialists with one point of difference that they belonged to totally different times and periods of history. In a way Sadrā anticipated L. Lavelle.

Conclusion

In the philosophy of Sadrā we fined a synthesis of the

various intellectual crosscurrents of the Muslim world of his times, such as Sufism, Shi'aism and the Greek schools of thought, i.e., Platonism and Aritotleanism. But if we intend to understand his thought in the light of modern perspective of the Western thought, then we will detect a curious blend of existentialism and essentialism in his views. Perhaps, he is not an existentialist in the modern Western sense according to some historians of philosophy, because, modern Western existentialism and its various brands are basically humanist and mostly atheistic. From another point of view he will be considered an existentialist, since he believes in the principality and primacy of existence. 'Existence' is the sole, reality and the very foundation of his philosophical system. There is no doubt that at the same time he affirms the semi-reality of essences. Thus he synthesizes existentliasm (i.e., primacy of existence) with a sort of essentialism by supporting the existence of Forms or essences. Therefore, he can be and he is considered an Essentialist Existentialist in his own right and in his own way.

THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE (MULLA SADRĀ AND THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS)

Philosophy's birthplace is Greece. Its date of birth is considered round about 475B.C. The first period of its history is called, "The Pre-socratic age." Its first school is considered "The School of Ionics." Therefore, we will bring our comparative study of the Greek thinkers and Sadrā on the question of change with a survey of the Ionics.

The phenomenon of change becomes a philosophical debate among the Greek thinkers right from the beginning. Thales—the first philosopher and first Ionic, when he declared, "All things are Water," he conceived the great thought of the unity of the world. He however, is silent about the question of becoming, i.e., how water the primary principle changes itself into different forms and objects. But Thales' statement implied that the fundamental reality or the substance of the universe is capable of change and assuming forms of different objects.

The second Ionic thinker-Anaximander's views that the primary substance is the indeterminate Matter. He also presents the vague idea of two processes responsible for the origin of the world and the phenomenon of change. Thus he, too, seems, conscious of the process of change and the question of the emergence of different multiple forms from the unity of the original source. Later on the third Ionic thinkers—Anaxemines maintains that the different things come into being through the processes of rarefaction and

condensation. So it is evident that even the first school of Greek philosophy is aware of the problem of change in the world and the question how it takes place or occurs in the primary unity of the original source leading to multiplicity.

The second school of Greek philosophy known as the Eleatics, however, rejects all change and consider it to be illusory. Their chief exponent believes that the ultimate reality is Being and it is above motion, time and space. He concludes that they are mirages produced by the senses. It is only reason that leads to truth and tells us that the ultimate reality is permanent, static and unchangeable. Being is and not-being cannot be. Motion and multiplicity are not-being. Consequently, Zeno-the follower uses all his logical skill to prove that motion and multiplicity do not exist.

Heraclitus (Dates not known) presents the opposite view of reality. He thinks that change is the ultimate reality. Permanance is an illusion produced by the senses. Reason, on the other hand, tells us that nothing is stable or enduring. Everything which exists, moves and changes. The objects come into being and again pass away into nothingness. Not only the absolute permanence does not exist, but even the relative permanence is not present. Being and not-being both are real. Becoming means simultaneous existence of being and not being.

Sadrā[49] has some resemblance with Parmenides so far as the latter preaches unity of being. But his philosophical position comes much closer to his opponent—Heraclitus. Like him he asserts that change is a universal phenomenon of the universe or the world of existents. He considers the world to be like stream of water flowing continually. In his opinion all change is a form of motion and he introduces the idea of substantial motion (الحركة الجوهرية). He attaches much importance to this concept and discusses it not only in his first chapter of "*Al Asfār*" but in many other chapters of the book, and in

nearly all of his other books. He, however, mentions the fact that he is not the first thinker to conceive this idea. He has great respect for the Pre-Socratics and indicated it, but either did not describe it explicitly or did not develop the concept. In order to judge the truth of Sadrā's statement we have to study carefully Heraclitus' concept of change. When we do that we certainly notice the resemblance between him and Sadrā.

According to Sadrā's point of view motion is the continuous regeneration and recreation of the world at every instance. He maintains that it is not only the accidents but the substance of the universe itself that partakes of motion and becoming, i.e., continuous recreation and rebirth. In order to prove his point of view, he presents the following arguments:-

(i) He asserts that it an accepted fact that accidents need a substance upon which they depend for their properties. Therefore, every change that takes place in the accidents of a body must be accompanied by a corresponding change in the substance. Otherwise the being of the former would not follow the being of the latter. In other words, since the effect must be the same as its cause, the substance, i.e., the cause of a changing accident must itself be changing.

(ii) It is known that all beings in the universe are seeking perfection. Therefore, they are in the process of becoming and change. In order to overcome their imperfections. Since divine manifestations never repeats itself. God creates new theophanies at every moment in order to bring new perfections. Thus the matter of each being is in the continuous process of earning new dress, i.e., being united to a new form. It is only the rapidity of this change that makes it imperceptible and guarantees the continuity and identification of a particular being through substantial change.

Heraclitus, though, does not use the same language, but

asserts that becoming has two forms which are the following:-

(a) The movement or transition from not-being to being.

(b) The movement change from being to being.

The above-mentioned change or movement is both in things (substance) as well as in their qualities or properties (accidents). [50] For instance, a man does not exist, and then with his birth he comes into existence. Therefore, it is a movement from not-being to being. Later on he passes away, i.e., movement from being to not being. But between birth and death a number of changes occur in his characteristics. He grows old. His hair turn grey. He becomes wiser or grows more foolish, etc., etc. Similarly, a tree not only comes into being and then disappears, but in between, its height and size changes. It bears fruit. The colour of its leaves turn from green to brown, and then again from brown to green.

Heraclitus compares life to constant conflict and war between being and not-being. For him conflict is a fundamental feature of the universe. It is all-prevading. Sadrā, however, being impressed by Sufism does not use the metaphor of war. He compares life to a stream continuously flowing. In a stream the waters are always i.e., continuously changing, but there is no conflict among the waves. An over all serenity and harmony prevails.

Another common freature of Sadrā and Heraclitus is that both of them accept the idea of unity of being. For Sadrā various beings in the world are all manifestations of ultimate Reality or the Divine Being. But both hem also believes that there is unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity. Parmendies is the first to preach the doctrine of unity of Being, but excludes motion and multiplicity from the circle of reality. Consequently, his thought leads to the irreconcible dualism between the world of illusion and reality. However both Sadrā and Heraclitus have to face no such problem.

Both thinkers makes room for multiplicity, and yet unity of Being is kept intact.

In the previous section we have discussed the resemblances between Heraclitus and Sadrā, but the differences should also be noted. For example, one major difference is that in Heraclitus' thought we do not find any theistic reference. But in Sadrā's theosophy existence of God is a prior. Moreover, since Sadrā comes long after Heraclitus and long before Plato and Aristotle, therefore their terminology and conceptions are different.

As it is mentioned earlier Sadrā has philosophical affinity not only to Heraclitus, but also with his chief opponent Parmenides—the founder of Eclecticism. He resembles Parmenides as far as the doctrine of unity of Being is concerned. According to Sadrā Being is the same in all the realms of existence, but with different graduations and degrees of intensity , just like rays of the sun, the light of a lamp or the light of a glowworm is the same. (I chap. *Al-Asfār*). But they mean the same subject, i.e., light. However, their predicates are different under different conditions of manifestations. The same holds true in the case of Being. For instance, the being of God, of a man and of a tree or of a heap of earth are all one Being or Reality, but in a various degrees of intensity of manifestations.

Parmenides' doctrine of Being should be discussed in order to determine how far it reassembles Sadrā's concept of Being. Of course, Parmenides' is the exponent of the doctrine of unity of Being. In order to prove his view he present the following arguments:-

(i) Suppose that Being (the ultimate reality) is not a unity, then it means that it can be divided into different parts. The question arises what is that which divides it into different parts? It can either Being or not-Being. If it is assumed that it is Being which is dividing Being, then they still remain parts of the same whole, i.e., Being. On the other hand if it is

asserted that it is not-Being which divides the Being, then it implication would be that not-Being is a being, i.e., a thing. But it is absurd, since not-Being is just an idea, not an existent. Hence it is wrong to suppose that Being is divisble. That which distinguishes one object from another is also Being. Thus such distinctions are illusions.

The afore-mentioned exposition of Parmenides' doctrine of unity of Being, makes it obvious that there is a similarity between his and Sadrā's doctrine of Being and it unity. But there is a major difference as well in their thought as far as multiplicity is concerned. Parmenides not only denies divisibility of Being, but also multiplicity of the objects of existents. He considers it illusory. Sadrā, however, does not agree with Parmenides' denial of the multiplicity. He believes and argues that there is multiplicity despite the unity of Being on account of gradation of Being. This gradation depends on different degrees and intensities of the manifestations.

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SADRĀ AND IQBAL

Iqbal in his first lecture of T*he Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* describes the relationship between knowledge and religious experience. He points out that religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogma of science. He continues, "But to rationalize faith is not to admit the superiority of philosophy over religion……Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition and essentially opposed to each other."[1]

According to Iqbal, they spring up from the same source and complement each other. One grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of Reality. Both seek vision of the same Reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. Iqbal confirms Bergson's view that intuition is only a higher form of intellect.

Iqbal's view is that in order to secure a complete vision of Reality, sense-perception must be supplemented by the perception of *Qalb* (قلب), i.e., the heart. The heart is a kind of intuition or insight which brings us into constant aspects of Reality other than open to sense-perception. However, it is not a mysterious faculty, it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense, does not play any part. Yet the experience is as concrete as any other experience. The total Reality which invades our consciousness as an empirical fact has other ways of entering our awareness. Religious experience is a fact like any other fact of human experience

Iqbal proceeds to describe the characteristics of mystic experience. It is immediate, unanalysable , highly objective and incommunicable like all feeling, untouched by discursive intellect. But like all feeling, it has a cognitive element. It is the nature of feeling to seek expression in thought. Feeling and idea are non-temporal and temporal aspects of the same experience. According to Iqbal, "Feeling is as much objective fact as is the idea". [2] At the same time he says, "Thought or idea not alien to the being." [3]

(The above-mentioned views of) Iqbal has striking resemblance with Sadrā concept of intuitive experience. Sadrā al-lin al Shirazi (979/80—1571-72A.D), more commonly known as Mulla Sadrā, was a great and original thinker. According to the list of Sadrā's works given by the editor of his book—*Al-Asfār Al-Arba* (vol. I, ehran, 1958) in his introduction to the work, Sadrā wrote 32 to 33 treatises.

His contribution to Muslim philosophy is immense, and his influence in Persia, Afghanistan and Indo-Pak subcontinent cannot be ignored. Iqbal has mentioned his name in his writings.

Sadrā like Iqbal was trained to be a philosopher. He retired to seclusion partly because he was not sure about the philosophical truths. He regarded purely rational method as superficial and extrinsic. He was, therefore, in search of a method that would transform merely rational propositions into experienced truths. In his "confession" [4] he expressed this desire to reach certainty.

Sadrā emphasizes the point that the nature of existence and its uniqueness can only be experienced, the moment you conceptualize it, it ceases to be existence and becomes an essence. Yet Sadrā has employed a number of sophisticated rational arguments to prove the above-mentioned view. This leads us to the conclusion that for him, mystic truth is essentially intellectual truth and mystic experience is a cognitive experience. But this intellectual truth has to be lived

through to be fully realized. If intellectual truth is only entertained as rational propositions, it will lose its essential character.

Sometimes the afore-mentioned point of view leads to the impression that in order to understand Sadrā's philosophy an understanding of Sufism is a must. However, Sadrā nowhere asserts that one should be a Sufi in order to be a philosopher. Sadrā unlike Ibn Arabi (who otherwise, is a model for him) adopts a thorough-going rational and philosophical method. In fact, he disapproves of philosophy without intuitive experience, but at the same time does not like pure Sufism without philosophical training.

The question arises: What does Sadrā means by experience? He is no talking about Sufi or mystic experience, which is only ecstatic or ethico-estatic, but about an intuitive apprehension of truth or rational experience (مشاهده عقلیه). This he opposes to pure rationalization, superficial logical reasoning and rational disputation. He insists that purely logical reasoning cannot dispute direct perception or intuitive experience.

Sadrā says, "Demonstration, indeed, the way of direct access and perception in those things which have a cause. This being the case, how can demonstration and direct perception can contradict each other? Those Sufis who have uttered (in defence of experiences of man like Ibn Arabi) words like 'If you disprove them by arguments, they have disproved you by their experience' are actually saying, 'if you disprove them by your so-called arguments……;, otherwise, correct rational proofs cannot contradict intuitive experience." [5]

This shows that intuition for Sadrā does not mean denial of reason. It is higher form of reason—a more positive and constructive form than formal reasoning.

To sum up, there seems to be a close resemblance

between Iqbal and Sadrā's point of view. In this respect we should keep in mind the following affinities:-

(1) For both of them intuitive experience is a cognitive experience Here they differ from the thinkers like Ghazali, for whom mystic and intuitive experience is ethico-ecastatic, i.e., without any intellectual content.

(2) Both Iqbal and Sadrā believe that the purely rational method is not sufficient to achieve the knowledge of truth and Reality.

(3) Both search for a method to attain certainty.

(4) Iqbal and Sadrā do not reject reason altogether. Sadrā, for example, gives a number of rational arguments, in order to support the content of his intuitive experience. Similarly, Iqbal maintains that religion stands in need of rational foundation of its ultimate principles. Iqbal also proposes the philosophical test, in order to prove the significance of the religious experience.

(5) Both Iqbal and Sadrā agree that intuition and reason are not opposed to each other. Iqbal compares them to great rivers which have the same source. Similarly, for Sadrā intuition is a higher form of intellect. But he asserts that reason without intuitive experience is empty and superficial. Thus Iqbal and Sadrā maintain that reason and intuition complement each other.

(6) Both have an ambivalent attitude toward Sufism. Some consider Sadrā a Sufi. But he was not a Sufi or a supporter of Sufism in the usual sense of the word. Iqbal also seems to have an inclination towards Sufism; because, mystics experience is intuitive, yet he does not approve of all forms of Sufism.

So far we have been discussing the affinity between Iqbal

and Sadrā in respect of their views about intuition and reason. But another significant analogy can be drown. Iqbal in his lecture— "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam", says, "The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change."[6] He also maintains that change is one of the greatest sign of God. Similarly, in "The conception of God" while discussing atomism he arrives at the conclusion that nothing has stable nature. In the very first lecture Iqbal points out that the Muslim rejected the Greek concept of the universe; because, it was fixed and determined. There were no creative possibilities in their conception. Iqbal believes that the Islamic concept of the universe is dynamic.

A similar dynamism is present in Sadrā's theory of existence. He asserts that movement not only occurs in the qualities of things but in the very substance. He calls it substantial movement (الحرکة الجوهریہ). This doctrine of Sadrā is an important contribution to the Muslim philosophy. It transforms the fixed grades of al-Suhrawardi into systematic ambiguity of existence. The reason is that grades of being are no longer static and fixed, but more continuous and achieve higher forms of existence in time.

The driving force of this movement is '*Ishq*' or cosmic love, which impels everything towards a more concrete form. Sadrā believes that each of the intellectually and spiritually perfected members of the human species will become a species unto himself in the hereafter.

Sadrā[7] thinks that in the Quran itself there are a number of verses establishing the thesis of change in substance. For instance, "When you see the mountains, you think they are stable, but they are fleeting just like clouds." (Quran, XXVII, 88). In order to illustrate the perpetual flux,[8] he quotes the following Quranic verses: He (God) is everyday in a new mode." (Quran, LV, 29).

The similarity between Iqbal and Sadrā's afore-

mentioned doctrines of concept of change, and '*Ishq*' as the driving force of evolution and perfect man's emergence is obvious. Iqbal as we know, believes in the dynamic nature of reality, leading to the evolution of a more spiritual selfhood of men and the great potential of '*Ishq*' in stimulatory the inner sources of spiritual energy which finally leads to creativity and evolution. Iqbal also quotes the above-mentioned second Quranic verse in "*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*" to establish change as the ultimate principle. His exact words are: "The Quranic view of the alternation of day and night as a symbol of the ultimate Reality which appears in a fresh glory every moment, shows the tendency in Islamic metaphysics to regard time objective." [9] However, Iqbal[10] more often presents another verse in support of the thesis of change, and that is related to the phenomenon of the succession of day and might.

To sum up, there is a thought-provoking resemblance between some of the views of Iqbal and Sadrā. The question arises: Is it shear coincidence or does it show the influence of Sadrā on Iqbal? The latter possibility does not seem plausible; because, in Iqbal's writings the references to Sadrā are rare.

No doubt he is acquainted with his name and with some of his views. In *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia,* he does not attach much importance to him. The study of this book shows that he has not studied Sadrā seriously and thoroughly; because, for Iqbal Sadrā's most important doctrine concept is "identity of subject and object." He does not appear to be aware of Sadrā's theory of existence, the principle of systematic ambiguity of existence and the idea of substantial change— Sadrā's most revolutionary notions. This leaves with the former possibility, i.e., the affinity between Iqbal and Sadrā may be due to the fact that sometimes two minds working independently reach the same conclusion or conclusions in their intellectual search. In the field of psychology James—Lange theory of emotions, is an example of the he phenomenon.

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SADRĀ AND IBN ARABI

Ibn Arabi (July 28, 1165–November 16, 1240) is considered one of the greatest theosophist and mystic whose full-fledged philosophical expression of the esoteric mystical dimension of Islamic thought is incomparable. His birthplace is *Tai*. His early education centre was Sevilla, which was considered centre of Islamic culture and learning. Ibn Arabi stated there for thirty year the studies with various mystic masters who found in him a young man of great spiritual inclination and extraordinary intelligence. During this period he traveled a lot to various cities of Spain and North Africa in search of great Sufis. One of those trips he had the dramatic encounter with the great Muslim Aristotlean philosopher— Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) at the city of Cordoba. Ibn Rushd asked for this meeting, for he had heard a lot about the brilliant young Ibn Arabi. It was arranged and according to the traditions, he was highly impressed by his intellect and mystical depth.

In 1198, he had a vision and was commanded to travel to the East. Thus he began his pilgrimage first to Mecca (1201) where he received the divine command to write his major work *"Al-Fatuhat"*, which was completed much later in Damascus. The full title of the book was— *"Al Fatuhat al-Makkiyyah"* (The Meccan Revelation). The book is not only an encyclopedia of esoteric Islamic sciences as he understood them but also revelation of his own inner life. His conclusions were based on his mystical experience. In Mecca he also compiled his *diwan* (collection of poems— *"Tarjuman al Ashwaq"*, with a mystical commentary.

After Mecca Arabi visited Egypt and Anatolia (*Qonya*) and from there he traveled to Baghdad and Aleppo (Syria). However, he settled down in Damascus, teaching and writing and stayed there will his death. In Damascus he started and completed his another well-known work— *Fusus-al-hikam* (The Bezels of wisdom) in 1129. The book consists of twenty-seven chapters.

Main Doctrines (A Comparative Review)

The fundamental thesis of his philosophy is the doctrine of unity of being (*wahdat-ul-wajud*). However, he makes distinctions between "*haqq*" (Truth) and self-manifestation (*Zuhur*) or creation (*khalq*) which is ever new (*jadeed*) and in perpetual movement. Thus it unites the whole creation in a process of constant renewal. At the core stand dark cloud (*amā*) or mist *(bukhār)* as the ultimate principle of things and forms, intelligences, heavenly bodies, elements and their mixtures that culminate in Perfect man. God flows through out the universe and manifests Truth. He also mentioned the primordial principle of potentiality which generates archetypes and then the actually existing things in the universe. He names this principle as *"unsur"* (matter).

It is said hat Ibn Arabia has more impact on subsequent Muslim philosophy than Suhrawardi. Therefore, in latter Muslim thought the effort is to sysnthesize Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi and Ibn Arabi's philosophy. This syncreticism spreads to Asia Minor and Indo-Pak subcontinent.

Mulla Sadrā superimposed Ibn Arabi's mystical thought on Aristotlean Illuminationist synthesis of Mir Damad who was the favourite teacher of Sadrā even when in later period of his life Sadrā had difference of opinion with him in philosophical views. Sadrā's emphasis was on the priority of being. Al-Arabi argument for the unity of being within which being differ only according to perfection and imperfection. All beings are graded manifestation of the Pure Being. All beings possess His attributes with varying degree of intensity.

For Sadrā like Arabi existence of Being is pure and absolute, and manifest itself in different beings. He considers it "systematic ambiguity"; because, existence is not static but in perpetual movement from the less perfect to the more perfect.[1]

Sadrā's doctrine of Nature asserts that everything except God has been generated temporally as well as eternally. According to some historians of Muslim thought the above-mentioned doctrine is an elaboration of what al-Arabi calls Nature or Prime matter. Both the thinkers seem to agree that the matter of the corporeal things has the power to regenerate and to assume new forms. For them Nature is permanent activity which links the eternal and the temporal. For Sadrā the flow of Nature is upward. Al Arabi in a slightly different way and terms maintains that the flow of Nature unites everything by its continuous movement. In short, Sadrā and Ibn Arabi introduce the dynamic dimensions to their system of thought.

As it has been mentioned in the previous section of this work that Sadrā's theory of existence presents the thesis that nothing is real except existence or being. To repeat his own words, "To sum up, the fact that in reality nothing exists except being." [2] This thesis can lead to the conclusion that; "everything which exists is the reality or the Ultimate reality which in theistic philosophical terms means that, "All things are Divine or parts of the Divine or the Ultimate Reality." In short, assertion of the philosophy of Pantheism. But we have already discussed while narrating his life story that he has to face such an uproar and devastating criticism from the Ulema, [3] that he decides to reflect and to reconstruct his thought, which can be categorized as—Existential Monism, instead of pantheism.

Ibn Arabi is also one of chief exponents of unity of being or *Wahdat-ul-Wajud*. According to him only God is pure and absolute Being. He created (*Khalq*) existents or beings from within. Therefore, the later are not separate from Him

in reality. They exist within Him. They are manifestations of His Being. Whatever we observe in the universe is God Himself. Ibn Arabi thinks that the world and the objects within it are the reflections of the light of God. These objects do not exist in themselves. These creations are Time (*Dehr* دہر) or the world or universe. The universe is the apparent form of the Absolute Being and it is the universe of possibilities and perpetual creation. Ultimately, for him God, world and man become just three aspects of the same concept.

The above-mentioned views of Ibn Arabi clearly indicate that he is an upholder of Monism, but his Monism is not Sadrā's Existential Monism. It is clearly Pantheistic Monism. Therefore, inspite of his great caliber as a theosophist, thinker and literary figure, he is considered the most controversial personality in the world of Muslim thought. [4]

The idea of the Perfect man has been discussed by most of the Muslim philosophers and mystic thinkers. Most[5] of them have firm belief that the Holy Prophet (Pbuh) Muhammad was the Perfect man. This idea is very old and followed continuously by the Muslim thinkers. Perhaps inspired by Ibn Miskawaih. Ibn Arabi and Al-Jili have also described the personality attributes of the Perfect Man. Jalal-ud-Din Rumi however, criticized Ibn Arabi's concept of the Perfect Man. According to Ibn Arabi the first emanation from the *Haqq* (Absolute Being) is reality or truth of Muhammad (Pbuh) or the light of Muhammad (Pbuh) and that is *Kalma Tauheed*.

In Ibn Arabi's scheme of emanations; though, reality of Muhammad (Pbuh) is considered the genus of all objects, connecting them with the Absolute Being. But as Dr. S. M Abdullah[6] has pointed out he makes the distinction between reality (*haqq*) of the Holy Prophet and self of the Prophet. Therefore Rumi's objection against his view seems justified that He becomes just a metaphysical reality.

It is further pointed out that the universe, man, and God

creates the impression that all three are separate entities, but actually those three are not separate for Arabi, because; the Absolute Being is the sole reality, the self is only emanation or manifestation of Ultimate Reality or the Absolute. The Perfect man, for Ibn Arabi, [7] is an idea which he has cut off from that of the Prophet and has done it at the beginning of his system. Hence the Perfect saint can also identify himself with the Perfect Man completely and becomes himself the Vicegerent Lord of the Universe.

Sadrā also presents the idea of Perfect Man who is the end product of the dynamic movement of the existence which is upward. In the Perfect Man the contingent and the Eternal meet. It does not mean, however, that the mixture of the contingent Eternal being become God or the Absolute Pure Being.

While discussing the epistemology of Sadrā, it has been pointed out that philosophical truths has to be experienced. Here the question arises: What is meant by experience according to Sadrā? Definitely it is not mystic experience, but an intuitive apprehension of truth. He insists that when something has been Known by intuitive experience it cannot be disputed by purely logical reasoning. It may not bestow new knowledge, but bestows intuitive certainty to the thought content.

On account of the afore-mentioned view Sadrā's attitude is very different from those Sufis who claim that their experience has no thought content. They do not deal with philosophic or intellectual propositions. Therefore, they end up in ethico-ecstastic ideal. This is not Sadrā's point of view. According to Fazal-ur-Rehman, [8] here he differs from Ghazali in theis respect. Sadrā's model is Ibn Arabi who has used Sufi terminology, but has thorough intellectual content.

In the world of Fazal-ur-Rehman[9], "Under the influence of Ibn Arabi, Kalam, philosophy and Illuminationism was synthesized in Sadrā."

Still Ibn Arabi's method is not strictly speaking—philosophical. He uses analogies, images, symbols and stories in order to describe his thoughts. Sadrā, on the other hand, uses philosophical and even rational method which is called by him, 'Rational Perception" (مشاهده عقلیه). He condemns philosophy without intuitive certainty and Sufism without philosophic training.

Concluding the comparison between Sadrā and Ibn Arabi it would be appropriate to observe that in certain respects both the thinkers' doctrines and concepts are convergent, but on certain issues divergence is obvious, and it is divergence which makes them genuine and original.

References

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Part II
Rumi and Iqbal

BIOGRAPHY OF RUMI

Mualana Rumi the great spiritual guide, seer, poet and thinker was born at Balkh on September 1207 A.D. His father— Bahauddin was much respected among the people of Balkh, but when he realize that the rulers no longer like him. He decided to migrate from his native land. The historians disagree about the exact date of his migration and the age of Mualana Rumi. According to some of them he was five years old, while the other historian age 12 years. But all of them agree that he was very young when his family left Balkh.

Once Rumi's family left their native land, they moved from place to place. They went to Nishapur, Baghdad, Mecca, Maltia and finally to Konya.

In eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.D., the Muslim world was passing through a bloody and turbulent period of history. The centre of the Muslim world—Baghdad was destroyed by the Mongols. Consequently, small states came in existence. The rulers of such small Muslim states used to patronize scholars and artists. In the Asia Minor the state of Konya (Rum) was ruled by the Seljuk Sultan— Allaudin. Rumi's father requested him for asylum and he granted it. The history witnessed that when the Seljuk State of Rum was destroyed, then from it reins—a great saint rose whose radiance enlightened at first the Muslim world and now even the West is enchanted by his poetry and wisdom.

The Sufism had emerged atleast three hundred years before Rumi's appearance. It reached its peak in twelfth and

thirteenth century. The afore-mentioned observation is strengthened by the fact the Imam Ghazali (1111A.D), Ibn Arabi (1240A.D) and Rumi (1207-1273)— the towering figures of Sufism emerged in 12th and 13th centuries. The great Sufi poets like Sanai (1150), Farid-ud-din Attar (1230A.D) and Rumi belonged to the same period. However, even among these giants Rumi's unique status and stature cannot be denied, because on one hand he was an established Sufi and on the other hand, he was an inspiring thinker and a poet of unsurpassed literary beauty.

Rumi was of the Turkish origin. His father was an Uzbek Turk and his mother was a Khwarizmi Turk. So his other-tongue was Turkish, but his poetry's language was Persian. This diversity of psycho-linguistics added richness to his poetry and thought instead of showing to be a negative factor.

Rumi's father passed away when he was probably twenty or twenty-four. At-first he was educated by his father and later on by his father's student—Burhan-ud-din Mohaqiq. He studied the Quran and other Islamic disciplines as well as the Greek philosophy. After the death of his teacher Mohaqiq he assumed the title of "*Sheekh*". After 1240 A.D he directed his attention on the individuals with spiritual potential. Among such individual first of all he was attracted by Shams Tabrazi (1242-44A.D), who appeared out of blue and disappeared one day without leaving any trace behind. But he changed Rumi for ever. His son had written about his spiritual revaluation in detail. It was said that Mavelvia Sufi order and the practice of Sama started in memory of Shams Tabrazi.

After few years of Shams Tabrazi's disappearance Rumi paid attention to Saleh-ud-din Zarkob. He remained centre of his affection for seven or eight years. Later on his favourite companion was Hussam-ud-din who stayed with him till his death. He continued as a scribe of *Mathanvi* and Rumi mentioned him in *Mathanvi* with love and affection again and again.

No doubt that he was a seeker of truth and reality, but as a person his qualities of sincerest affection, humility and compassion were outstanding traits of his personality. On account of such traits Rumi was loved and respects by everybody.

Four Stages of His Life

Rumi's life consisted of four phases:—

(a) His life as an ordinary cleric, doctor of Islamic law and teacher of Islamic disciplines.

(b) His encounter with Shams Tabrazi and the question put by Shams which he could not answer. The question was: Why Bayazid tasted one drop of Divine love and was Satisfied, but Mohammad (Peace be upon him) continued to feel thirsty." Rumi was wonder-struck and could not find the answer. According to another tradition Rumi's books were thrown by Shams into water and he was perturbed. He told Shams that he did know how precious those books were, because; he did know about their contents. Then Shams took them out of water and they were neither wet nor damaged in any way. Rumi asked Shams how he managed to do that. Shams replied, "How this is something your don't know." At that moment he realized that despite his claim of knowledge there were so many things about which he did not know. Although both the stories differed about the thought provoking questions put by Shams, but both of them indicate Rumi's inability to answer the question or questions and his realization that he was totally ignorant of many truths.

(c) The third period of his life can be titled as "*Sohbat*"—a period of friendship with Shams. During that phase he came to know the secrets of heart and love through the companionship of

Shams. He felt the Divine presence in the form of Shams. However, the period of '*sohbat*' lasted only for two years. Then Shams disappeared forever.

(d) The disappearance of Shams opened another chapter of life in Rumi's life. He experienced agony beyond words, but he found that true love was strengthened and intensified through separation and sorrow. All these emotions were expressed in is '*Diwan* dedicated to Shams and named as *Diwan-i-Shams* Tabrazi.

(e) The final stage of his spiritual journey was the discovery of all-inclusive divine love. No doubt, he suffered the depths of sorrow; but he came out of it and reached the idea of religion of love and practice of the path.

Rumi's works

Rumi's works included *Diwan-e-Shams Tabrazi, Mathanwi* and *Rubayiat*.

Mathanwi Manwi's first part was written and completed from 1258 to 1261 A.D. The second part was finished in 1263A.D. The rest of the four parts were complete by 1273A.D and that is the date of his death.

Diwan-e-Shams included almost 2500 lyrics. Mathanwi consisted 25000 verses. The number of *Rubayiat* was probably 1600. The Western historian and critics considered '*Diwan-e-Shams*' far superior to *Mathnawi* from the point of view of literary craft. However, the oriental historians and critic gave preference to *Mahanwi* and considered it like a vast and deep sea containing pear of wisdom for everyone. They maintained that *Mathanwi* was simplistic from one point of view and complex from another point of view. Perhaps it was both, because; the life is both simple and complicated at the same time.

In *Mathanwi Manwi* was a mixture of Sufis' and poetic

vision. Of course, there were many Sufi-poets of Persian language. For example, Senai and Farid-ud-din Attar's Sufi poetry were admired and appreciated. But Rumi's *Mathanwi* has a unique style and literary status. He in his *Mathanwi* expressed wisdom and gnoisticism in an incomparable way. Therefore, Rumi's *Mathanwi* was claimed to be the diamond of Persian literature. He used examples, metaphors and stories to simplify the philosophical concepts, ethical principles and Sufi teachings based on mystic experience. In the *Mathanwi* the main message 'love'— the love for God and humanity. He not only taught love for humanity, but also respect for all creatures and beings. In this respect a story was told. According to the story one day Rumi was going somewhere. On his way he led to pass through a very narrow lane. A dog was sleeping right in the middle of the lane. A companion of wanted to kick the dog to wake him up and to clear the passage to facilitate Maulana Rumi. However, he was not permitted by Rumi who did not want to disturb the sleeping dog. So he sat on the doorsteps of a house in the lane and waited for the dog to complete his sleep. Such stories depicted his respect for all beings. In short, the *Mathanwi* reflected the fundamental Islamic beliefs, the philosophical questions of Muslim philosophy and the teachings of Sufism.

Rumi's Concept of Love:

It had been already discussed that Rumi's spiritual journey finally led him to the religion of love. In this it would be pertinent to raise the question: "What was Rumi's concept of love?"— In order to find a comprehensive answer to the question the following points should be kept in mind:–

(a) Rumi did not used the word 'love' in the sense in which it was taken in he common usage. It was an all-inclusive concept for him. It was neither physical nor conventional. His concept of love was spiritual in nature and its object was God and all his creations.

(b) According to Rumi 'love' was not just an emotional experience but an existential experience. In other words, for him it involved totality of being. In psychological terms, it involved not only feelings i.e., affective aspect of human mind, but also cognition. So love was also a source of knowledge. Finally, in his opinion it motivated action and led to a way of life or as Rumi called it i.e., "practice".

(c) Rumi believed that 'love' was a revelation of truth and reality through separation and sorrows. The heart should become mellow through separation and pain to achieve the ability to love God and humanity.

(d) Rumi maintained that 'love' was unconditional, and boundless. Its objective was not to achieve anything for our self.

(e) According to Rumi love was a means i.e., open a direct channel between the Ultimate Reality and the human beings which enables them to 'see' and understand. In his poetic words, "The windows of my soul opens and the Book (the Quran) comes to me directly from the original source."

(f) Rumi held to opinion that the experience of love led to rebirth and purification of heart that meant shedding of false idols of vanity, identity and negativity. With purification and understanding love grows and the lover's experience is intense ecstasy.

Rules of Love/the Practice:

Rumi pointed out that certain rules or guidelines had to be followed in the practice or the religion of love. For instance, remembrance or *dhikr* (ذکر). Its object was to remind us of the pre-eternal covenant (عہد الست), when God addressed our souls and asked, "Am I not your Lord," and we all said, 'Yes'. *Dhikr* was essential because; in the business of the worldly affairs the people had forgotten the covenant.

The other guidelines in Rumi's religion of love or 'the

practice' were listening, silence and experiencing sorrow. There are calls or signs from the Divine Reality if we listen carefully. They were the messages or telegrams in codes for those who understand and love. If Divine love governs our heart then people would rise beyond beliefs, identities and doubts.

According to Rumi we must learn language of silience. He taught that words were enemy of our soul. He believed that in silence we listen well. He also believed in extension of the threshold of human perception possible only through listening in silence, and that making our understanding strong and lucid. In his opinion sorrow and silence both were preparations for love and unity of being, i.e., *tauheed* (توحید). For him *tauheed* of being meant reconciliation of the opposites in the self, and life. In his opinion music, dance, and poetry were support systems in human life. Life meant clash of the opposites and love meant achieving harmony and trust in the spiritual reality which helped in suffering and sorrow.

Sama:

Since Rumi considered music, dance and poetry as support system in spiritual life of man, it became essential to discuss his practice of *sama*. The term '*sama*' and its practice was common before Rumi's times. Basically, it was a form of *dhikr* (ذکر). In other words, remembrance of God—a spiritual concert consisting of prayer, song and music. It was practiced by Sufis of various orders. However, Melvie order credited it to Rumi. According to one story of its origin, one day he was passing through the *bazaar* and the gold beaters were beating the gold. It is said that he was stunned by the sound, because; he could clearly hear the *dhikr* within the beating of he gold. He clearly heard: لا الہ الا اللہ (Translation: The is no God but Allah). The *dhikr* was so rhythmic that Rumi was entranced and in happiness—overjoyed he started whirling. With that Melevi order and its peculiar form of *Sama* including the

dance of the whirling dervishes, were born.

The Melevi whirling dervishes were the best known practioners. They used to be young men who moved as a group in a circle, while also spinning individual symbolically, the dance of whirling dervishes represent man's spiritual ascent through love to perfection. That the dance depicted the follower's evolution and return as a mature man to love and serve the whole humanity and creations of God. Rumi himself relaed his form of *Sama* to *Hajj*. Both had the same goal to bring the practioners closer to God.

The *sama* of various Sufi orders consisted of singings and music; but all instruments were not used. For example, in Mevlevi *sama* only flutes were used so *sama* consisted of music, dance and poetry i.e., Sufi poetry. The listener's heart must be pure and without lust. His heart should be full of love of God. The verses of the Quran were never used in the practice of *sama*, because; they were sacred.

The objective of *sama* was to get closer to Allah by focusing on melodies and dancing. The purpose was to stimulate love of God. The practice of same was a way not to arouse emotions, but to feel the presence of God in one's heart. Consequently, the doubts would disappear and direct communicate with God would be possible. However, the immediate goal was to attain the state of *wajd* (وجد) and that meant a trance like state of ecstasy. Sometime it caused unexpected physical movements or agitations and a state of spiritual drukeness known as *wajd* (وجد). Sometimes *wajd* leads to fainting or even death. However, usually the participants were silent, still and controlled unless *wajid* occurs. Moreover, it was presumed that the state of *wajd* should be genuine and not fake. Otherwise, no genuine spiritual results would be achieved. Although majority of the Suni Ulema were against it; but Ghazali considered it an aid to the enrichment of religious life as long as the heart was pure. The view was

expressed in Ghazali's book—'*The Achemy of Happiness*' (کیمیائے سعادت).

Ontology and Psychology of Rumi:

Rumi was not only a practicing Sufi and poet but also a thinker. He had expressed his percepts and concepts in the well-known tradition of the Muslim philosophical dialectical terminology. He maintained that human beings had two aspects representing two principles. One aspect was physical and its representative was human body. The other aspect was spiritual and it was presented by the human soul. The human body was bound by space and time. But the soul was not limited by such barriers. It transcends them. It was non-dimensional dimension of time. Rumi held that the human soul possessed the Divine attributes of being timeless and spaceless.

The above-mentioned ontology of Rumi led to a theory of psychology. In the terms of modern psychology human soul means 'self' and that is open to development. The self has a number of possibilities. In Sufi terminology 'self' meant '*Nafs*' (نفس) and it was capable of evolution. The Sufis believed that the goal of spiritual journey was to achieve *Nafs-e-Mutmena* (نفس مطمئنہ) or what the modern psychology would call an integrated personality.

Rumi described the different components of human psyche as followings:–

(a) Instincts

(b) Reason

(c) Intuition

(d) Love

Besides Rumi the other Muslim thinkers described the chemistry of human psyche and considered instincts, intellect and intuition as essential parts of human psyche; but they did

not mention 'love' as a distinct part. However, for Rumi love, the capacity to love and its experience was what distinguished human psyche, because; it was not just a sentiment, but totality of existential experience. According to Rumi as instincts were inborn and reason i.e., to rationalize was a natural tendency of the human beings, so was the thirst, desire to love and o feel love was inherent in the human nature.

The Self-realization/Transformation:

Rumi laid emphsis on self-realization According to him '*nafs*' (نفس) had all possibilities and potentialities hidden within. It depended on human beings to discover and develop them. However, he did not consider it an easy task. In this respect it would be essential to study and keep in mind his concept of '*fana*' (فنا). Its literal meaning was considered to be 'extinction'. In traditional Sufi literature it stood for the doctrine that on the path or '*tariqqa*' an individual loses his individual self. Evidently it was a negative sense. But for Rumi it meant destruction of those experiences, tendencies and mental states which bar or hinder the revelation of the real self. For Rumi it also meant—liberation from the conventional self.

According to R.A. Nicholson's[1] commentary (p.20):

In other words, cleaning one's own consciousness of what Rumi calls 'fictions, false, idols, greed, envy, jealousy, grief and anger.' Consequently the heart would be mirror like to reflect the reality within, and achieving the state of *Baqa* (بقا) by attaining the divine attributes.

Rumi maintained that transformation of self meant rebirth again and again. In other words, the spiritual maturity was the fruit of being born again and again. He expressed great respect for the person who was born atleast twice. Thus he says:

چوں روم بار آدمی زادہ بزاد

پائے خود بر فرقِ علت ہائے نہاد

(Translation: When a son of man is born twice, he plants his foot upon the head of all causes). [2]

The conclusion of) Thus for Rumi the rebirth was '*baqa*' and destructing the previous conventional self was '*fana*'.

Freedom of Will and *Tawakkal*:

Rumi also believed that choices have to be made and responsibilities have to be fulfilled. He clearly advocated freedom of will as a pre-condition of the virtuous action. In the psychological terms it meant a person's ability to perform voluntary actions. According to Titus[3] (Ethics Today) it is the person expressing himself in action.

Rumi further explained that one could acquire freedom of will be developing his personality. So he says

امر و نہی و خشم و تشریف و عتیب

نیست جز مختار را اے پاک حبیب

(Translation: Command and prohibition, and anger and conferonent of honour and repuke conern him (only) who possess the power of choice, O pure – bosomed one.). [4]

The directed our attention to the Quran which commanded us to do certain actions and prohibited us not to do certain actions. How could Allah command us— the human beings and consider us accountable if we were not free. After all commands cannot be issued to a marble rock which cannot follow them. In Rumi's words:

جملہ قرآن امر و نہیست

امر کردن سنگِ مرمر را کہ دید[5]

(*Mathanwi,* I, 3026).

Although Rumi was firm believer in the freedom of will, yet he preached '*tawakkul*' (توکل):

گفت آرے گر توکل رہبرست

ایں سبب ہم سنتِ پیغمبرست[6]

His view of *tawakkul* was not conventional. Therefore it was not negative. Of course, it meant completes trust in God, but according to him it did not mean that we should not endeavour or just sit and wait. We should strive and try our best and then trusting God we should hope for that result which would prove best or better in the long run.

Rumi and Iqbal:

Iqbal supported Rumi's stand point about *tawakkul* and said:

مومن از عزم و توکل قاہر است

گر نہ دارد ایں دو جوہر کافر است[7]

[اقبال-پس چہ باید کرد(مثنوی)]

In the terms of philosophical debates between Determinism and Indeterminism, it can be concluded that Rumi and Iqbal supported the middle view. Both of them believed in self-determinism. As self-determinists they hold the view that man was capable of perpetual initiative and response. He possessed the ability to reshape himself and to redirect the processes of the out-world within limits. The human beings, according to them were not dead matter or vegetables or even animals, because of their quality of self-consciousness and the ability to choose. Rumi in his *Mathnawi* said:

گردش او را نہ اجر و نے عتاب

کہ اختیار آمد ہنر وقتِ حساب[8]

[مثنوی معنوی،III،۳۲۸]

Rumi's main argument against determinism (جبر) was that reward for good deeds and punishment for evil promised by God in the Quran would become meaningless if the human being were not free to choose between good and evil. He also rejected the notion of pre-destination and maintained that those who shirked their responsibilities and attributed their failures to God, were devil's advocate. In attributing their misfortunes and wrong doing to Allah, they followed the footsteps of the Satan who attributed his sin (disabodience) to Him.

Iqbal also believed in self-determinism. In *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* he said:

> To live is to reshape and change ends and purposes, and to achieve them. There is a progressive formation of ends and purposes as life grows and expands. [9] (*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 54)

Rumi presented the thesis that '*jabbar'* and freedom were synthesized in the love of God. He expressed it in his *Mathanwi.* For example the following verse reflected the afore-mentioned view:

<div dir="rtl">

لفظ جبرم عشق را بے صبر کرد

و آن کہ عاشق نیست جبر کرد[10]

</div>

[*Mathanwi,* I, 1463-1466ـ مثنوی معنوی]

a. Affinities:

Most of the orientalists as well as some of the Pakistani and Indian intellectual, emphasis the influence of the Western thinkers on Iqbal's thought. They seemed to ignore the impact of the Muslim intellectual tradition much closer and similar to Iqbal's thought. For instance, they totally overlooked the great influence of Rumi whom Iqbal himself declared his spiritual guide. Therefore it would be enlightening to describe the basic affinities between the two

thinkers and to trace the extent of Rumi's influence on Iqbal's thought. In the following section of the article we would like to point out the similarities between the teacher Rumi and the disciple-Iqbal.

Rumi and Iqbal described the value of *Ishq* (عشق) and its various dimensions in silimar way. For example both of them hold the opinion that *Ishq* was a great motivational force leading to self-realization. In this respect Rumi maintained:

عشق نانِ مرده رازی جاں کند

جاں کہ فانی بود جاویداں کند[11]

(*Mathanwi,* I, 2012)

Similarly, Iqbal says:

از محبت چوں خودی محکم شود

قوتش فرمان دہ عالم شود[12]

When Rumi celebrated love's healing power and asserted:

شادباش اے عشقِ خوش سودائے ما

اے طبیب جملہ علت ہائے ما[13]

(*Mathanwi*, ii, 330)

Iqbal endorsed it by saying:

مرض کہتے ہیں سب اس کو یہ ہے لیکن مرض ایسا

چھپا جس میں علاجِ گردشِ چرخ کہن بھی ہے[14]

[بانگِ درا،ص ۵۲]

Rumi held the view that transformation of the self was possible through *Ishq*.

$$از محبت مرده زنده می کنند$$

$$از محبت شاه بنده می کنند^{15}$$

(Translation: Through love dead rise o life and the king become a slave.) (*Mathanwi*, ii, 1531)

Iqbal followed the same trail by saying:

$$از محبت می شود پائنده تر$$

$$زنده تر، سو زنده تر، تابده تر^{16}$$

(Translation: By love it is made more lasting, more loving more glowing.)

For Rumi and Iqbal separation and sorrow strengthened our love and ourselves.

$$خام را جز آتشِ هجر و فراق^{17}$$

(*Mathanwi*, I, 3058)

In the same way Iqbal claimed:

$$تو نه شناسی هنوز، عشق بمیرد ز وصل$$

$$چیست حیاتِ دوام، سوختنِ ناتمام^{18}$$

(*Payam-e-Mashriq,* p. 87)

(Translation> You don't know that union kills love. What is immortal life but burning constantly.)

Iqbal repeated the same idea in *Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadeed:*

$$جدائی عشق را آئینہ دار است$$

$$جدائی عاشقاں را سازگار است^{19}$$

(*Gulshan-e-Raz-e-Jadeed*, p. 158)

(Translation: Separation is a token of love. It suits the nature of lovers.)

The dialectice love and intellect or reason had been present in the Sufism since the beginning. Rumi, thought

celebrated the religion of love, but he recognized the value of intellect for the development of the self. According to him though *Ishq* was supreme, yet intellect was very important for human beings and human life. In *Mathanwi*[20] (iv. 1965) he asserted that its fountains was in the midst of the soul and considered it a gift of God.

Rumi's above-mentioned point of view was base on the saying of the Holy Prophet according to that saying the Prophet (Pbuh) prayed, "O God! Grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things." No doubt the Quran attached great importance of reflection, i.e., *al-tafukkur* (التفكّر). Perhaps in English it meant 'mediatation'. However, R.A. Nicholson[21] maintained that Rumi did not make any distinction, between love and knowledge. In other words, Rumi considered them inseparable.

What was Iqbal's standpoint on the above-mentioned issue? Although the common perception about Iqbal's view was that he favoured *Ishq* than reason (*Aqal).* The basis of the perception was Iqbal's poetry which seemed to advocate supremacy of *Ishq* over reason; but the study of his lectures would lead to the conclusion that like Rumi, he mentioned different sources of knowledge including sense-perception, reason and intuition. Intuition for him was knowledge based neither or senses nor reason. Its source was feeling or in the Quranic word *Qalb* (قلب). However, in the end he pointed out that intuitive knowledge was the higher form of intellect. Their root was the same, but function difference…

Another concept shared by Rumi and Iqbal was that of *faqr* (فقر). In classical Sufism it was considered a prepatory stage of the 'Path' on *Tariqqa* (طريقت). In the beginning of Sufism it was understood in its literal sense i.e., 'having no thing'. Later on the term was spiritualized and *faqir* was understood to be a "a person who does not need anything,

but whom everything needs." Junaied Baghdadi attributed the above-mentioned connotation to the word *'faqiri'*. Thus making the world a positive term or value.

The classical literature of the Muslims specially the literature of Persian language depicted *'Gada'* (گدا) opposing *'Shah'*. Faqir became a symbol of protest against wealth, power and tyranny.

In Rumi's own words his *mathnawi* was a shop of *'faqr'*.

$$هر \ دكانِ \ راست \ سودائے \ دگر$$

$$مثنوی \ دكانِ \ فقرست \ اے \ پسر ^{22}$$

Hence for Rumi *'faqr'* was a way of living which was the result of a particular attitude towards economic and social aspects of life. In Rumi's opinion *'faqr'* was important to the development of self.

Iqbal endorsed Rumi's view and considered it vital for self-realization. Iqbal said that the trait of faqir made a person independent, self-sufficient and morally pure. He too took it as a way life. For him it was an attitude towards religious, social, economic and moral aspects of life. It was an attitude towards life and that was not dependent on a person's economic status.

b. Differences

In short Iqbal and Rumi had almost similar understanding of the experience of love and its different dimensions. However, there were differences as well between the two thinkers and those could not be ignored. Some of the differences were the followings:-

(a) For Rumi *'Ishq'* was basically 'Divine love' and urge for the evolution of the spiritual plane. But Iqbal means by love the passion for creation and the conquest of the natural forces.

(b) Rumi reflected the height of emotion and the experience of ecstasy in his love-poetry, specially in *Diwan-i-Shams*. Such Spiritual states were rarely expressed by Iqbal in his poetry.

(c) The theoretical presentation of the concept of *Ishq* was more lucid, comprehensive and logical in Iqbal's thought than in Rumi's writings.

(d) In the case of Iqbal the political dimension of the human beings was very prominent. It was not in Rumi's philosophy.

(e) Although both of them believed that life was essentially strife, but Rumi's point of view was that it was the conflict within the self because of the inherent contradictions of the human nature itself. According to Rumi both Moses and Pharaoh were present in the human self. Raza Arasteh[23] clarified the fore-mentioned paradox of human nature mentioned by Rumi. He directed our attention to the map of human psyche given by Rumi which contain animal instincts as well as rationality. Often those two were at cross purposes. Rumi told us to go beyond them and transcend to achieve *nafs-e-mutma'ina* (نفس مطمئنه). In other word for Rumi harmony within was a sign of a mature developed self.

Iqbal on the other hand expressed the opinion that the major challenges and struggle for the human beings were external forces by which meant Nature and Society. Consequently, he preached the conquest of Nature, social transformation and development.

(f) Iqbal like Rumi was aware of the importance of *'faqr'* for the development of the self. However, he broadened the concept by extending it to the intellectual self-sufficiency and originality. For example he said:

اغیار کے افکار و تخیل کی گدائی

کیا تجھ کو نہیں اپنی خودی تک بھی رسائی[24]

(ضربِ کلیم، ص ۱۲۲)

Conclusion:

To sum up, we would like to concluded this brief comparative study of Rumi and Iqbal by pointing out that though there were so many affinities between them, yet the generation gap was evident. Iqbal appeared long after Rumi in a different age and part of the world. Although both of them based their thought on the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah. Consequently they were led to a number of uniform conclusions. But the historical distance, cultural difference and individual bent of mind were responsible for their conceptual framework and somewhat different complexion of their thought.

Notes and References:

1   R.A. Nicholson's Commentary, op. cit, Book I & II, verse, 128, p.26, Luzan and Co., London, 1937.

2   Rumi, *The Mathnawi* (Persian), Luzac and Co., London, 1929, III, 3576, ed. R.A. Nicholson

3   Harlod H. Titus, *Ethics Today,* p. 167

4   Rumi, *The Mathnawi* (Persian), ed. R.A. Nicholson, V, 2973, Luzac and Co., London

5   Ibid, V, 3026.

6   Ibid, I, 912.

7   Iqbal, *Pas Cha Bayad Kard, Kulliyat-i-Iqbal,* pub. Sh. Ghulam Ali and sons, Lahore, 1984, p. 6.

8   Rumi, *The Mathnawi,* 3288, III, ed. R.A. Persian, pub. By Luzac and Co., London, 1929

9   Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* pub. Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1965, p. 54.

10   Rumi, *The Mathnawi,* I, 1463-66.

11   Ibid., V, 2012, I.

12   Iqbal, *Asrar-e-Khudi*, p. 25.

13   Rumi, *Mathnawii,* iii, 330.

14 Iqbal, *Bang-e-Dra*, p. 52
15 Rumi, *Mathanvi,* ii, 1531
16 Iqbal, *Asrare-Khudi*, p. 18
17 Rumi, *Mathanvi,* I, 3058
18 Iqbal, *Payam-e-Mashriq*, p. 87
19 Iqbal, *Gulshan-e-Raz-e-jadeed,* p. 1
20 Rumi, *Mathnawi*, iv. 1965
21 R.A. Nicholson, *Commentary,* op. cit., I & II, p. 294
22 Rumi, *Mathanvi,* vi. 1525
23 Reza Arasteh, *Rumi the Persian,* Pub. Sh. Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1965, p. 93
24 Iqbal, *Zarb-e-Kaleem,* p. 122

Part III
Existentalism and Psychoanalysis

EXISTENTIALISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Definitions:

The word psychoanalysis means three things according to Ernest Jones: (i) It means a special method of 'medical treatment devised by Freud for the cure of a certain class of nervous disorders. (ii) It also means a special technique for investigating the deeper layers of the mind. (iii) It is used to describe the province of knowledge which has been won through the exercise of this method and in this sense it is practically synonymous with the science of the unconscious.

All these are the psychological meanings, but apart from the psychological aspect, there is also its philosophical aspect. The knowledge won through is use leads to certain conclusions about a number of philosophical questions. In this article we will try to point out the similarity between existentialism and psychoanalysis in psychological, psychopathological and philosophical fields.

Existentialism is a philosophy of crisis. The crisis is created by the problem. and the fact of alienation. Alienation objectively means disassociation between human beings and their objects, i.e. either persons or natural world; artistic and scientific creations. Subjectively, it means the corresponding states of disturbance, disequilibrium, strangeness and anxiety. In fact it is a multidimensional phenomenon, psychological, psychopathological and sociological. The role it plays in psychopathology may be gathered from the fact that the French term "alienation" denotes profound mental disturbances. As psychological and psychopathological

problem it is discussed by psychoanalysis as well. Freud was far more seriously affected by the philosophical temper of his time than he cared to admit. Kant, Ficthe, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, all had been impressed by the isolation of the ego and its separation from God, The mechanical revolution had set men free only to shake their traditional beliefs, and thus to isolate them. In Freudian theories we see a clear reflection of this feeling of isolation and alienation which, as we have seen, was present among the philosophers since Kant. They have also been preoccupied in discussing the true nature of the individual due to this feeling. Freud in his own way tries to make this discovery under the pressure of the same feeling, namely, isolation of the human self. This shows that Freud's psychoanalysis and existentialism face the same problem.

Anxiety is one of the most important concepts in psychoanalytical theory as well as in existentialism. Here first of all we will see what its connotation is according to Freud and his school.

Anxiety has two aspects:

(a) Physiological: Excitations in the internal organs of the body, which is the result of internal or external stimulation, governed by autonomic nervous system;

(b) Emotional: A painful experience which differs from other painful states (e.g. tension, pain, melancholy) by some specific quality of consciousness. There is no unconscious anxiety. One can be unaware of the reason of anxiety, but not of the feeling of anxiety.

Anxiety is considered synonymous with the emotion of fear. Freud however preferred the term anxiety to that of fear. The reason is that the latter means "to be afraid of something in the external world." But the term anxiety is wider than fear, since it can be the fear of something internal also. The seat of anxiety is ego. According to Freud it is a danger signal. Its function is to warn the ego. When it appears in the

consciousness ego may do something to avert the danger. But when it is not then it piles up and ultimately overwhelms the person. Its final outcome is nervous break down. Freud points out three types of anxiety: (i) Reality anxiety, arising out of the fear of external object; (ii) neurotic anxiety, its source is the fear of Id (symbol of instinctive self); (iii) moral anxiety, which is the result of superego or conscience. However, these three different types can blend into one another.

Thus in all mental disorders, anxiety plays the vital role. There are two views regarding this role. One is that Anxiety is itself a neurotic symptom. The other is that it is not a neurotic symptom, but is intimately related to it. The symptom is in order to avoid Anxiety. But one thing is clear that it is the fundamental phenomenon and main problem of neurosis. This opinion is expressed by Freud in *Inhibitions, symptoms and Anxiety.*

Anxiety has its part in the functioning of normal personality as well. The only difference between normal and abnormal personality is that in the case of the latter, anxiety reaches a breaking point and the individual becomes incapable of leading normal life. Both Freud and Jung had expressed this idea by maintaining that neurotics fall ill of the same complexes against which healthy people struggle as well. Whether that struggle ends in health, neurosis or in a countervailing superiority of achievement depends on quantitative consideration, and on the relative strength of the conflicting forces.

So far we have discussed the role of Anxiety in psychoanalytical theory. Now we will discover its importance for Existentialism. As we have already mentioned, Existentialism is the philosophy of Alienation, which means psychologically the states of disturbance, strangeness and anxiety. This shows that as for psychoanalysis Anxiety is the main problem, so for Existentialism the point of departure is the fact of Anxiety which is the internal aspect of

estrangement. This view can be further strengthened by the study of various existential thinkers.

Kierkegaard:

Like all existentialists, his problem is also alienation. In Heinemann's words, "Kierkegaard becomes the psychologist or rather the psychopathologist of self-estrangement" (Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, P.36). Kierkegaard emphasizes the psychological and psychopathological aspect of alienation. For him self-estrangement is primarily a process going on 1in one's self. It is not an external, but an internal relation, based on one's attitude to one's own self. He identifies the state of alienation with anxiety or what is known in German and Danish as *Angst*. Kierkegaard defines anxiety as "a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathic sympathy" and as "a desire for what one dreads ... , an alien power which captivates with a sweet apprehension" (*The Concept of Dread*). We have already seen that though anxiety is synonymous with the emotion of fear, Freud preferred anxiety to fear, because it means being afraid of something in the external world, whereas anxiety can be the fear of something internal also. The existentialists including Kierkegaard go a step further and maintain that anxiety is opposed to fear. Fear always refers to something definite, but anxiety is indefinite.

In *The Sickness unto Death*, Kierkegaard says that he is in despair at not willing to be him-self or in despair at willing to be himself. This state of despair or anxiety can be interpreted in psychoanalytical terms. He is in anxiety, because he does not admit that such an unconscious desire can belong to him (despair at not willing to be him-self). He knows that there is no way to satisfy this desire on account of moral (horror), social or natural impediments. Kierkegaard is not only acutely conscious of the problem of alienation and anxiety, but also suggests a way to overcome it as does psychoanalysis. Kierkegaard coined the term "Repetition" for "becoming again oneself before God." He said: start with despair and not

with doubt and his problem was not, how to become oneself. This means: return to health and integration of disintegrated personality. In his book *Repetition*, he shows that his hero after his entanglement in the world regains himself. In other words the split in his personality is healed and he reunites all his forces. Kierkegaard also illustrates this process of recovering health through the story of Job who after having lost everything, becomes again him-self, blessed with the double of his former possessions.

Kierkegaard has however stressed the morbid aspect of human life, being himself a psychopathological case, regarded by some as schizophrenic, by others as of maniac depressive type. But apart from his morbid exaggerations, one point is clear that he was intensely conscious of man's alienation, his anxiety, and his self-contradictions, in short his disintegrated self. His diagnosis of spiritual illness was alienation from God. He had a message for our age as well, which is as much of a psychotherapeutic value as the couch of any psychoanalyst. The message is: "Do not pretend." Do not pretend to be a Christian, if you are not. Do not pretend to be religious and human, if you are not.

Jaspers:

He is called by Heinemann as the "great psychopathologist-philosopher." He is not only the philosopher of existence, but at the same time his description of abnormal personalities shows great psychological insight. His philosophy deals with the psychological problem of alienation like psychoanalysis and it is essentially therapeutic. Jaspers begins with the statement of the present problem. Being is split into subject and object. In other words, what psychoanalytical theory would call disintegration of personality --- split or double personality. The result is neurosis in psychological terms and in Jasper's language shattering of existence. Now comes the crucial moment of despair or authentic choice. In medical terms 'shattering of existence' can be interpreted as a morbid mental state leading

either to complete merital break down or recovery and return to health of the patient. For Jaspers, the sickness of modern man is due to provision for the masses in planned production with the help of technical devices. He wants to show the way from unauthentic existence of mass-man to the authentic existence. In this sense Hiene-rnann rightly calls his philosophy 'Therapeutic' in, his book Existentialism and the Modern Predicament. The internal disintegration leads to external isolation and alienation. The individual is cut off from others and sinks into neurotic himself. Only in communication with them, he can become himself. As members of mass-society, being in state and society, dominated by impulses and natural desires, we have unauthentic existence. In choosing I am my true self. We must make an unconditional decision based on personal or the Categorical Imperative or on Ten Commandments. We must choose with clear conscience. This authentic choice of Jasper can be identified with what Freud would call a patient's decision to cure himself and to help the psychoanalyst. If the patient is not willing to cooperate, nothing can cure him. Jasper used a term "the philosophical rebirth", which is full of meaning from psychoanalytical point of view. For him "the philosophical rebirth" means "fall from established position which becomes an ability to float." What seems an abyss turns into the space to freedom? This "philosophical rebirth" seems a patient's return to health. "The ability to float" is identical with getting rid of the fixations, rigid ideas or complexes.

Jaspers in *Phiosophic* himself maintains, "Philosophy of existence is a way of thinking which uses and transcends all material knowledge, in order that man may again become himself." In his opinion it is an attempt to overcome the alienation of the world by interpreting its phenomena as symbolic expressions of a transcendent reality. This once again brings to light that essentially the aim of his philosophy is therapeutic. His endeavor to overcome man's alienation by

relating his self and his world to a transcendent reality can be compared to the mystic cure of mental patients by Jung.

Sartre:

His distinction between authentic and unauthentic being reveals that his problem is also the fact of alienation. For Sarte man is free. But this sense of freedom leads to the double feelings of anguish and responsibility. Anguish and responsibility are two typical existential states. Sartre does not attached the same importance to anxiety or anguish, which is given to it by Kierkegaard and G. Marcel. For Sartre anxiety arises from the sense of the consequences of our choices. He has a good cause for anguish, since he has no norm and is responsible for the whole humanity and its doings. Anxiety, as we have seen, is considered a most important concept by psychoanalysis.

Now in Sartre we come across an other psychological state, acute feelings of responsibility, which is at length discussed by psychoanalytical theory as a morbid mental state. In technical terms it is "the guilt complex." Sartre's concept of responsibility is especially pathological. "Man being condemned to be free, carries the load of the whole world on his shoulders and is responsible for the world and for himself in his specific being:, says Sartre (*Being and Nothingness,* P. 639). But the word "responsibility" is strange and ambiguous. In ordinary and normal sense one (e.g. God) or to something (e.g. values)." But Sartre rejects both. God does not exist; moral values are not objective, and depend on the individual as their creator. Thus he leaves no' room for normal moral responsibility. If responsibility means "consciousness of being the author of . an event or object" then in this 'Sense he is naturally responsible, but not normally responsible. As we have seen, moral responsibility means being answerable to something or someone.

Moreover, how can we be responsible even for the actions and situations, which we do not bring about? He is

right on stressing responsibility for others even in our solitary decisions, but he is wrong in making men responsible for actions they did not do and for situations they did not bring about and with overloading them with total responsibility. This type of responsibility is morbid and it does lead to anxiety. Actually he represents the stage where self-estrangement seems to have reached its highest possible degree; in other words, the stage where pressure of the group has become so great that the individual is almost forced to live in self-estrangement as the natural state of affairs. We can almost say as if neurosis which is particular and individual for psychoanalysis becomes general for Sartre. It is also evident that Sartre's anguish is what Freud has called 'Moral anxiety'. It is neither Reality Anxiety arising out of danger of an external object, nor is it neurotic anxiety created by fear of Id; it is fear of the Superego or conscience, because it arises out of the sense of responsibility for the consequences of our choices which affect the whole humanity.

Closely connected with responsibility and anxiety is the experience of absurdity, which is another morbid mental state. Alienation leads to absurdity. This sentiment of absurdity is present in all French atheist existentialists. Sartre's hero requesting in *La Nausee* becomes aware of the fundamental absurdity of life, i.e. of inanimate, animate 'beings, including his own existence. This feelings of absurdity is universal and general for Sartre and Camus. It distorts man's experience. As Heinemann has said about Sartre. "Sartre's world is a world in which the affirmative is transformed into the negative, the normal into the abnormal. The abnormal now parades as the normal, and what is normal in our life appears as abnormal" (*Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, p. 125).

Sartre is an existentialist who is clearly and consciously affected by psychoanalysis and Freud. Under their influence, he tries to develop Existential Psychoanalysis, which we will discuss later on. "Sartre's world is a world, in which the

affirmative is transformed into the negative, the normal into abnormal. The abnormal now parades as the normal, and what is normal in our life appears as abnormal." (*Existentialism and the Modern Predicament*, p. 125)

Sartre's development runs parallel to that of psychotherapy from Freud to Jung. Freud's psychoanalysis was atheistic and anti-religious. Freud defined religion as "a childhood neurosis." Jung found that most of the patients over 35 years have complexes of religious nature; religious symbols arise unconsciously in their souls, and their interpretations are helpful in the treatment of neuroses. Sartre believes that God does not exist; in fact he mentions the subject very little. However, he does not develop reasons for his atheism. Although Sartre beings is an atheist, but against his will reaches implicit religious conclusion. Man who has lost his centre seems unable to find it except in the Transcendent. Sartre confirms it against his will since in Saint Genet and Lucifer and the Lord, he uses religious symbols and categories, e.g., sin, conversion and the holy.

Marcel:

Marcel's problem is that which has haunted all the existentialists, i.e. to overcome the alienation of man or the neurosis general. It is also the problem of psychoanalysis, as we have repeated a number of times. Marcel presents his own diagnosis of neurosis general. The world in which man lives, is a broken world. Man is a mere functionary in a society dominated by technology and the state which is increasing its powers. These two are the sources of alienation "Having" is more important than 'being'. The objects which we have in return possess us. The people concentrating on "having", are in danger of being imprisoned, cut off from the other persons and not responding to their presence. He is particularly against technology, which makes man "sub-man", destroys his .self-respect, and makes him a machine ordained to fulfill certain functions; this carries him to the abyss of despair.

To sum up, the problem is the same in the sphere of human existence for the existentialists, as in psychology, namely, that of self-realization. Psychoanalysis as well as existentialism points out the fact of disintegration of human personality. This we have seen through the study of existentialism in general, and with reference to some thinkers in particular.

Before proceeding to discuss the difference between psychoanalysis and existentialism in respect of effective solution of the problem of alienation, we should also point out other similarities between them.

Both bring out the presence of irrationality in this life. Psychoanalysis has demonstrated that man is more irrational than rational. Freud and the supporters of psychoanalysis point out that the sources of all human actions are instinctive and instincts an: not rational. Man is more a creature of wants and drives than he cares to admit. Not only most of human behaviour is irrational, but even the apparently rational actions are in reality irrational. Man does not provide reason for the rational but rationalizations for the irrational. All human logic is used in order to justify what we believe in on illogical grounds. Of course this process of justification of the irrational is unconscious. The main thesis of existentialism is also irrationality and absurdity of this world and man's life, which is brought into this world through man. Things are without reason and absurd. The facts which lead us to this revelation are anxiety and responsibility which are irrational states of mind. The result is alienation and realization of absurdity of the world. This sentiment of absurdity is most prominent in French atheist existentialism. Its acute and realistic description is present in Sartre's *La Nausee*. Camus's The Myth of Sisyphus begins with the sentence, "The following pages deal with the sentiment of absurdity which prevails in our world." Man's presence in this world is a fact but it cannot be attributed to anyone. It is without reason. .Man has liberty but even this is absurd, because man is free

to choose, but not free not to choose. The theist existentialist is equally conscious of irrationality. In a general way faith implies a certain abdication of reason. Goel and creation are mysteries. Many religious doctrines are unreasonable, e.g. the original sin and grace of God. For Kierkegaard nothing is based on reason, because existence escapes Jrom reason. All that we live, we live in contradiction. Thus for the existentialists all existence is irrational because we can give no reason for it.

Sartre in his Existential Psychoanalysis points out that existentialism and psychoanalysis both search for a fundamental attitude which cannot be expressed by simple logical definitions, because it is prior to all logic. Psychoanalysis seeks to determine "the complex" and existentialism "the original choice". "This original choice operating in the face of the world and being a choice of position in the world is total like the complex. It is prior to logic like it. It is this which decides the attitude of a person when confronted with logic. Therefore there can be no possibility of questioning; it is in conformance to logic" (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, P. 570). This is in agreement with psychoanalysis, according to which source of all human behaviour is illogical. Not only logic is used in the service of the illogical, but even one's acceptance or rejection of logic is also based on illogical or at least non-logical grounds. Thus psychoanalysis and existentialism see irrationality in every aspect of human life. In Freud's opinion our wishes constitute for us a psychical reality which is more important than material reality. The same idea is present in existentialism, according to which our projects create the world for us. In other words, our ego depends on the world in which we find ourselves. But what that world is for us, depends on ourselves and that for us is the real world. Hence we come across the paradoxical statement of some existentialists, that we ourselves create the world and in creating it, create ourselves.

Psychoanalysis and existentialism not only emphasise the same fact of estrangement but have affinity in their aim also. Both endeavour to revive "the total man", both want to free man. Different existentialists present different ways to overcome self-alienation, e.g. Heidegger suggests the transition from the individual to a being within the world; standing in communication with others, mentioned by Jaspers; I-Thou relation by Ferdinand Ebner and Martin Buber; a person inserted in the collective and in the Universe by Monnier; from lonely individual which formed the basis and starting point of modern philosophy to a person standing in vital relations to others.

This shows that the solutions suggested by the existentialists are entirely different from the one given by psychoanalysis. For example, Marcel makes the distinction ,between problem and mystery, in order to rebuild "the broken man." Problem is something in front of us. It stands in our path, and in this sense it is alien to us. We can analyse it and tackle it in a detached manner. Mystery, on the other hand, is something within us in which we ourselves are engaged. Consequently it cannot be set in front of us in its entirety. If we can make a transition from a problem to a mystery, we have overcome the alienation. Now if we compare it with psychoanalytical treatment, we would see that it is exactly opposite. According to psychoanalytical theory, when a patient is no longer engulfed in a complex, and can view the entire complex in a detached manner, he is cured. In other words, his journey to health means going from mystery to problem.

Jaspers:

Jaspers, the great psychopathologist philosopher, is also doubtful of therapeutic value of psychoanalysis. In his books, Reason and Anti-Reason in our Time, he openly expresses his disappointment. "Psychoanalysis now an active force throughout the world, makes extraordinary promises; it claims to provide absolute knowledge- of man and to bring

about perfect happiness." But in reality it does not fulfill its promises. He defines psychoanalysis as "the urge to be freed from freedom," "to forget the possibility of authentic existence" (pp. 36 and 37). Although both psychoanalysis and existentialism begin their journey in search of the revival of "the total man" and his freedom, yet, according to Jaspers, psychoanalysis just creates an illusion of liberation and does not lead to real freedom and authentic being.

The existentialist reluctance to be dazzled by the glamour of psychoanalysis is based partly on the factual evidence and partly on difference of theoretical principles. Facts show that psychoanalytical (solution) treatment is ineffective and in some cases seems to aggravate the process of estrangement On (in) principle, existentialism disagrees with psychoanalysis, because it gives a standard picture of man; divides men into normal and abnormal without considering the individual. This objection. is mentioned clearly by Sartre in Being and Nothingness. According to him, psychoanalysis gives us only a list of tendencies. But a person is not merely a collection of these tendencies; he is a totality, not a collection. Psychoanalysis tries to analyse him according to present concepts until the person, the individual, is buried under a collection of instincts and complexes, thus losing his personality, self and liberty. And this leads us to another basic difference between psychoanalytical and existentialist attitude about human freedom.

The belief in human liberty is a fundamental thesis of existentialism. True existence presupposes freedom. For Sartre, as for Jaspers and Heidegger, only the man who chooses freely to be himself, can truly be said to exist. It is only in man that existence precedes essence, because he alone in the world of our experience is free. All other beings are predetermined. But in the case of man only after his choice - we know what he has chosen and what his limited by our environment, our heredity, and our own not deny man's dependence on the external reality; and .in liberty, because for

him everything is simply raw material on which he is free to confer a meaning of his own choice. Facts cannot be altered, but we can modify our attitude towards them. The same is true of our personal past. The way in which we are able to choose is to take up one particular attitude rather than another. Our ego depends on the world in which we find ourselves. But what that world is for us depends on ourselves and that for us is the real world.

Freud:

Freud, on the other hand, believes in Psychic Determinism. The principle of causation is applicable in the field of psychic reality, as it is in the physical world. Hence the fundamental principle of psychoanalysis is "every effect has a cause." "Effect" in this case means every psychic event. Thus psychoanalysis has strict belief in the determination of mental life. Nothing is arbitrary and haphazard. In Freud's own words, this is one of the obstacles to recognizing psychoanalytical trains of thought. ,"In the first place, people are unaccustomed to reckoning 'with a strict and universal application of determinism to mental life" (*Two Short Accounts of Psychoanalysis*, by Freud, p. 84, trans. And edited by James Strachey.)

For Freud, causation is not only mechanical, but .... also unconscious, According to him most of human actions are not only determined, but they are also determined by unconscious mental processes. These are called by him 'the unfulfilled wishes' (which are pushed back into the unconscious), and "the complexes." So normal and abnormal, both type of behaviour, is controlled by them. This leads to the conclusion that man's behaviour is not free, because freedom depends upon consciousness.

Sartre; in his Being and Nothingness, while expounding Existential psychoanalysis, clearly states that it does not believe that environment acts mechanically on the subject. He emphatically denies the mechanical causation preached by

Freud and his followers. For Sartre, every thing in our psychological life is free. This freedom of play of consciousness is identical with existence. It follows that liberty is not the prerogative of my voluntary acts. My emotions and passions, which also depend on what I am, are equally free. This shows that psychoanalytical and existentialist views in this respect are diametrically opposed.

It would be enlightening to study in detail Sartre's exposition of existential psychoanalysis. Here we will come to know both the agreements and the disagreements between the two.

Affinities:

Sartre begins with the admission that the first outline of existential psychoanalysis is furnished by Freud and his followers. He agrees with them in the following respects:

(a) Objective visible manifestations, characters, symbols related to the total individual.

(b) No primary givens, e.g. dispositions, characters, etc. Existential psychoanalysis recognizes nothing before the original upsurge of human freedom. Similarly for psychoanalysis, originally individual's personality is virgin wax. The libido can be fixed on anything.

(c) Man is a perpetual searching historization. No static constants. So both take into view man's situation. Hence reconstruction of a man's history through letters, dreams, witnesses, etc.

(d) Search within an existing situation for a fundamental attitude which cannot be expressed by simple logical definitions, because it is prior to all logic.

(e) The subject has no privileged position to inquire his own psyche.

(f) Insistence on objective methods, i.e. introspection and testimony of others.

Differences:

But later on he explains his differences with Freud and his followers:

(a) Psychoanalysis has decided upon its own tirreducible, instead of allowing this to make itself known. It is for them libido or will to power. On the other hand, Sartre's irreducible is "the original choice." It is always unique and particular. The foundation of all behaviour is to power are neither general term like libido. Libido and will to power are neither general characteristics common to all mankind nor they are the real irreducibles.

(b) Psychoanalysis accepts the principle of mechanical causation which is rejected by Sartre.

(c) Freud and his followers believe in universal symbolism. Sartre, however, asberts that a symbol in a particular case has to be discovered. Symbols change their meaning. Method for one may be useless for another and even for the same person at a later period.

(d) Goal of the existential inquiry is to discover a free, consciously determined choice and not a datum buried in the unconscious. For Sartre the goal of analysis is comprehension of being. According to him existential psychoanalysis is a method to bring to light, in a strictly objective form, the subjective choice by which each person makes himself a person. It should reduce particular behaviour patterns of fundamental relations, not of sex and will to power, but of being. Thus ontology should be the basis of psychoanalysis.

Conclusion:

All the above mentioned objections of Sartre can be traced back to two basic existentialist views which we have

mentioned earlier as the basis of differences between psychoanalysis and existentialism. Those are the following:

First, Existentialism is against all generalizations and abstractions which destroy the individual and the unique. That is why Sartre rejects, as would .all the existentialists, explanation of "the complex" in terms of libido and will to power. Libido and will to power are general and abstract concepts. Similarly he refuses to believe in universal symbolism and a general method .of treatment and psychic inquiry. Symbols are as unique and individual as persons are.

Secondly, as we have already pointed out, existentialism unlike psychoanalysis believes in human freedom: On account of this belief, Sartre turns down both the concepts of mechanical causation and "the Unconscious," preached by Freud and his followers. It is quite evident that mechanical causation leave no room for human liberty, but so does "the Unconscious." If human actions are really determined by unconscious mental processes, then there is no scope and hope for free conscious determination. So existential psychoanalysis rejects "the Unconscious" and believes that the original act of psychic choice is conscious. It does not mean that it is known to the subject, because consciousness and knowledge are two different things. This distinction between consciousness and knowledge is further clarified by Sartre with reference to the process of psychoanalytical treatment. When the analysis reaches a stage, resistance of the subject vanishes and he recognizes his complex.

The question arises, how? If the complex is unconscious, it cannot become conscious. But enlightenment of the subject is a fact. Sartre draws the conclusion that Freudian psychoanalysis does not give him the consciousness, but the knowledge of his being. There is doubt that a deeper analysis of the so called psychoanalysis reveals a basic contradiction inherent in it. Freud maintains, "The mental and somatic power of a wishful impulse, when once its repression has failed, is far stronger if it is unconscious than if it is

conscious; so that to make it conscious can only be to weaken it. An unconscious wish cannot be influenced and it is independent of any contrary tendencies, whereas a conscious one is inhibited by whatever else is conscious and opposed to it" (Two Short Account of Psychoanalysis by Freud, p. 84, trans. and edited by James Strachey). Does it not mean that Freud recognizes human freedom? Perhaps, in a sense, "Yes", because he admits that these powerful instinctual wishes when become conscious, it is same book has the same implication. "In his present day maturity and strength, he will perhaps be able to master what is hostile to him with complete success (Ibid, p. 85). In a way it amounts to what existentialists believe in. Facts do not change, but we can alter our attitude towards them. '-The same is true of our personal past. Unconsciously psychoanalysis uses the same postulate. The incidents which lead to the complex are facts and cannot be changed. But after the treatment the patient take a new attitude towards them "in his present da maturity" (to use Freud's words) and by making them conscious the control of reason is made possible. Thus in spite of himself Freud has to admit (which he does not) that man has the freedom - freedom not to alter facts but to see them in a new perspective.

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